THE CHINESE DIASPORA AND INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

Zhou Min

Abstract

International migration among Chinese people is centuries old. Long before European colonists set foot on the Asian continent, the Chinese moved across sea and land, seasonally or permanently, to other parts of Asia and the rest of the world to pursue opportunities and alternative means of livelihood. It is estimated that there are more than 33 million overseas Chinese (huaren) and people of Chinese ancestry (huayi) living outside mainland China (including Hong Kong and Macau) and Taiwan. Chinese-ancestry people spread in 151 countries across the globe with about 80% in Asia and 15% in the Americas. This article aims to examine how the century-old Chinese Diaspora and its emerging migrant networks interact with broader structural factors—colonization, or decolonization, nation-state building, and changes of political regimes—to affect Chinese immigration. I argue that distinct streams of emigration from China, and remigration from the Chinese Diaspora, are contingent upon history and that the economy, diasporic communities, and migration networks interact with the state at origin as well as destination to shape the direction and nature of international migration. So the challenge for China and other immigrant-receiving countries may be how to negotiate and manage migration, but the power of the state is severely constrained not only by the economy, but also by migration networks and ethnic institutions.

Introduction

International migration among Chinese people is centuries old. Long before European colonists set foot on the Asian continent, the Chinese moved across sea and land, seasonally or permanently, to other parts of Asia and the rest of the world to pursue opportunities and alternative means of livelihood. History has witnessed various streams and distinct patterns of emigration from China to the outside world.

* This research was partially funded by grants from the UCLA Academic Senate, Center for International Business Education and Research, and Asian American Studies Center. An earlier version of this article was presented at the Conference on Migration and Development, Princeton University May 4–6, 2000. The author thanks Sara Curran, Charles Hirschman, Roger Waldinger, Guotu Zhuang, and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions and comments. She also thanks Amy Chai, Chiaki Inutake, and Ly Phung Lam for their research assistance.

Social Transformations in Chinese Societies, Volume 1
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2005
and then from the Chinese diasporic communities to other countries (Ma and Cartier 2003; Zuang 1998). It is estimated that there are more than 33 million overseas Chinese (huajiao) and people of Chinese ancestry (huaji) living outside mainland China (including Hong Kong and Macau) and Taiwan. Chinese-ancestry people spread in more than 150 countries across the globe with nearly 80% in Asia (approximately 75% in Southeast Asia) and about 14% in the Americas (Dudley et al. 1994; Ma 2003; Qiu 2002). Countries with the highest number of Chinese-ancestry populations, as of the mid-1990s, were Indonesia (7.3 million), Thailand (6.4 million), Malaysia (5.5 million), Singapore (2.3 million), and the United States (2.7 million) (Ma 2003). Such an expansive Chinese Diaspora is captured in an old saying, “There are Chinese people wherever the ocean waves touch.”

This article aims to address a key issue from a sociological perspective based on a review of the existing literature: How do the century-old Chinese trade diaspora and its emerging migrant networks interact with broader structural factors—colonization, or decolonization, nation-state building, and changes of political regimes—alter the courses and patterns of Chinese immigration? I also discuss the implications of contemporary Chinese immigration for developments in countries of origin and destination. I argue that distinct streams of emigration from China, and remigration from the Chinese Diaspora, are contingent upon history and that the economy, diasporic communities, and migration networks interact with the state at origin as well as destination to shape the direction and nature of international migration.

THE CHINESE TRADE DIASPORA AND HUASHANG-DOMINATED INTRA-ASIAN MIGRATION

In China, emigration patterns have changed in time and space. The Chinese and the Chinese state have responded to, and influence, migration differently also in time and space. It is thus important to place migration in the historical context tracing the century-old Chinese trade Diaspora and the development of migration networks that have emerged from it. Large-scale international migration across the Asian continent and the globe did not occur until the mid-19th century. In the earlier times, however, Chinese people always moved from their places of birth to other places in search of means and opportunities for survival and betterment, but they did so only selectively and seasonally. In most cases, the movements destined to neighboring towns and cities. Between the 12th and the 16th century, few people ventured off shore and traveled long distance from home. The only significant group that went overseas in large numbers was the Chinese (Liao 2002). Huashang (traders, merchants, and artisans) dominant patterns of earlier Chinese emigration, particularly to Southeast Asia prior to the mid 1850s (Wang 1991). In this section, I focus on examining how Chinese maritime commerce shaped migration to and from China and how the resulting Chinese trade diaspora in Southeast Asia affected patterns of international migration in general and intra-Asian migration in particular.

Pre-19th-Century Maritime Commerce

International migration of the time prior to the 19th century largely centered on the Chinese Empire through tribute missions to China and trading tropical goods to and Chinese manufactured goods from China. As early as the Tang Dynasty (618–907), which was the largest, richest, most sophisticated state in the world at that time, maritime trade was already well developed and thrived, and Chinese who ventured overseas were referred to as Tangren, or Tang people (Zhuang 1989 & 2001). During the 1100s, the Chinese further strengthened and extended their trade routes on the waters of the South China Sea onto Southeast Asia, a region that the Chinese historically referred to as Nanyang (Southern Ocean). During that period, the Chinese Empire had formal trade with neighboring Korea, Burma, Siam, Vietnam, and Ryukyu (Okinawa) Kingdom, while local officials and private traders conducted informal trade with foreign merchants

---

1 Most recently, based on the author’s own calculation from The World Factbook, 2003 (published by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on line: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/), countries with the highest number of Chinese-ancestry populations are Thailand (9.2 million), Indonesia (8 million), Malaysia (5.8 million), Singapore (3.4 million), and the United States (2.9 million).

2 More precisely, Nanyang refers to the region immediately to the south of China, including the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, Malaya and Borneo, Siam, Burma, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos (Pan 1999: 16).
through key Southeast Asian port-states, such as Ayudhya, Malacca, and Brunei (Reid 1996). The Philippines and Borneo were then chieftains struggling to turn their territories into states (Pan 1999).

Overseas trade had its heyday in China's maritime age of the Southern Song Dynasty (1127–1279), during which porcelain, textiles and lacquer production flourished and printing and publishing technologies were well developed. Historical documents depicting Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean from the perspective of Chinese trading ports were recorded in books (Liao 2002; Pan 1999; Zeng 1998; Zhuang 2001). Trade continued to flourish and expand into Russia and Persia under the rule of the Mongols who conquered China and turned the dynasty into Yuan (1279–1368). The Mongols promoted trade with the Arabs and allowed Islam to take root in China, while sponsoring expeditions to Japan, Java, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Burma, but failed to press Japan and Java to recognize its suzerainty while succeeded in the others (Pan 1999). After the fall of the Yuen Dynasty, the succeeding Ming Empire (1368–1644) banned all private overseas trade in an attempt to exert tighter control on maritime commerce and curb foreign influences. Meanwhile, the Ming emperor aggressively sought to incorporate Southeast Asian states into its tribute system, which defined the hierarchical relations of imperial China with neighboring states and kingdoms.

Long before the arrival of the Europeans in the 1600s, the Chinese dominated trade in most of the Southeast Asian region, or Nanyang. In Nanyang, the Chinese trade Diaspora turned many Southeast Asian port-cities into entrepots, through which Chinese silk, porcelains, and other manufactured goods were exchanged. Unlike present-day trade, early trade often required that merchants physically travel from one place to another or migrate to settle temporarily (Zhuang 2001). The Chinese traders, or huashang, who took a voyage overseas would temporarily stay in one place and then move onto the next to conduct their economic activities due to backward communications and transportation technologies. Consequently, circular migration from China to Nanyang became regular. Merchants and traders took their workers abroad with them to work on the trade for a short period of time and then returned home preparing for the next journey. When the Dutch and English arrived in the region in 1600, they found large and distinct Chinese resident communities in key port cities in Nanyang, such as Brunei, Malacca, Western Java, Batavia, Manila, southern Siam, Phom Penh. Thus, pre-colonial Chinese emigration was intertwined with trade and was dominated by huashang (merchants and traders) and their seasonal workers who were mostly their own relatives or village folks (Wang 1991). Of those who settled in the foreign land, they acted as middlemen minorities, turning their areas of settlement into bustling market places and their economic activities into dominance of internal and international trade (Zhuang 2001). In the process, they planted the seeds for subsequent Chinese trade and emigration.

The Role of the Imperial Chinese State

The imperial Chinese state has long been ambivalent toward international migration. Sometimes it allows migrants to go overseas but discourages their return, other times it favors out-migration with a keen interest in migrant remittances, and still other times it closes its door and prohibits international migration altogether (Zhuang 1989 & 1999). Whether at times of prosperity or depression, the Chinese state has played and has continued to play a paramount role in shaping patterns of international migration and the development of the Chinese Diaspora. In early Ming Dynasty, private trade and any trade outside the tribute system (e.g., trade with Japan) was banned, making it difficult for merchants to move to and from China freely. Later on, the imperial state relaxed restrictive policies on private and localized maritime commerce, but banned overseas residence (Zeng 1998). The succeeding imperial Qing government (1644–1911) inherited the hostile attitude toward emigration and made overseas travel and residence a capital crime punishable by beheading (Liao 2002; Zeng 1998; Zhuang 1989 & 1999). Trade with foreigners was restricted only to the port of Guangzhou. So as early as the late 14th century when restrictive trade policies were implemented, merchants and traders developed innovative strategies and tactics to bypass government regulations, which were later institutionalized to facilitate migration and the formation of diasporic communities overseas. For example, the Ming emperor restricted overseas trade with Japan. The imperial government's effort to crush illegal trade between the two countries drove the Chinese seasonal traders, mostly Fujianese merchants, to seek permanent refuge in Japan's port cities, notably Nagasaki. This Chinese settlement, in turn, established new routes between Fujian, Taiwan, and Manila (Kyo 1999; Zeng 1998).
Most of the bans on private trade abroad were revoked in 1727. In 1754, the imperial Qing government declared for the first time that law-abiding emigrants could safely return home and have their properties protected (Reid 1997). Even with the ban, however, overseas and overland private trade in South and Southeast China boomed and showed little sign of slowing down. An ancient Chinese saying, "the mountain is high and the emperor is far away," accurately described the attitude of local officials and traders in Guangdong and Fujian provinces. By the early 15th century, Chinese commercial communities had already made a strong presence and flourished in Java and Sumatra. In 1567, the Ming government legalized informal trade, which gave rise to new Southeast Asian port-cities, such as Manila of the Philippines, Hoi An of the southern Vietnamese state, Phnom Penh of Cambodia, Patani of Malaya, the pepper port in West Java, the Dutch port of Batavia (Pan 1999; Purcell 1965; Reid 1996).

The relaxation of the emigration policy led to a booming overseas junk trade already rapidly developing and a tremendous outflow of traders, miners, planters, shipbuilders, mariners, and adventurers of all kinds (Reid 1997 & 1999). Meanwhile, the imperial government took aggression over its neighboring states at the peak of China's prosperity and peace. China incorporated Korea into the tribute system in the 1630s and invaded Burma in 1766 and Vietnam in 1788. It was recorded that, in the last decade of the 18th century, tribute missions from Korea and Southeast Asia visited the Chinese Emperor for two to four times a year (Reid 1997).

Intra-Asian trade and tribute missions to China reached their peak in 1790, despite Western colonialism, and continued to remain high until the decline of the Chinese Empire in the mid-1840s. Trade and tribute missions, in turn, stimulated emigration from, rather than immigration into, China. During the period of what the historian Anthony Reid called a "Chinese Century" (1740–1840), nearly one million Chinese settled in Southeast Asia, representing three percent of the region's population (Reid 1996; Trocki 1997). The Chinese population in Bangka was estimated at around 30,000 in the mid-1700s (Andaya 1997). In Batavia, it accounted for about 10% of the population in the early 1810s (Abeyasekere 1983, p. 296). Siam, Java, Borneo each had about 100,000 Chinese, representing between 46% to 65% of the total population in the early 1820s (Blythe 1969). Diasporic communities took root overseas as a result. Merchants and traders, who were both sojourners and settlers, dominated these communities (Reid 1996). For example, almost all of the 11,500 seamen who were engaged in Bangkok's maritime trade were of Chinese descent (Reid 1999). But not all early Chinese emigrants were merchants or traders. As settling merchants and traders started to invest in agriculture and mining and other land-based ventures, they brought in workers from their ancestral villages to work on these new ventures. During the period, most of the emigrants were Chaozhou (Teochiu) from southeast Guangdong Province and Fujianese from coastal regions of Fujian Province. These pioneer emigrants were primarily involved in cash-crop farming, developing such goods as sugar, pepper, gambier, and rubber, as well as in tin and gold mining. Much of the products were developed by the Chinese merchant class and produced mainly for the China and international markets (Trocki 1997; Wickberg 1999a). The diasporic communities served to strengthen both formal and informal trade connections and facilitate sequent emigration from China.

The Chinese Diaspora and International Migration

The Fall of the Chinese Empire: Semi-Colonialism and Huagong Migration

European colonists landed on Southeast Asian continental and island states in the early 16th century. The Spanish occupied the central Philippine archipelago in 1521, captured Manila in 1571, and extended their control to Cebu and other islands in the Philippines (Brown 1999). The Dutch East Indies Company turned the scattered forts and trading posts in the archipelago into a colonial empire (Cribb 1999). But it was not until the 19th century that Western colonization and expansion peaked. The Dutch took over Indonesia in 1799. The British occupied and ruled territories on the Malaya Peninsula, including Singapore in 1819. In the early 1840s, the British defeated China in two opium wars, forcing China to open its ports and turn over Hong Kong to British control, and hence making China a semi-colonial state (Li, M. 2002; Zeng 1998). Afterward, the French annexed Cochinchina (three provinces in the southernmost part of

---

1 The Portuguese reached China by sea in 1514 and were believed to be the first Europeans to do so (Pan 1999: 365).
Vietnam) in 1864 and the whole of Vietnam in 1885, and formed the Union Indochinoise by 1883 that included Cambodia and later Laos (Smith, R. 1999). Japan, during the same period, rose from a long national seclusion and began to aggressively pursue industrialization and modernization. In 1894, Japan defeated China in the sino-Japanese War and ceded the island of Taiwan and the Liaodong Peninsula in South Manchuria (Storry 1999).

Colonial expansion of the West allowed Western private enterprises to exploit the newly occupied colonies to intensively develop plantation agriculture and mining, extract petroleum and other natural resources, and expand the market in the region. European colonists began to import huagong (Chinese contract labor), often referred to as coolies, from China and neighboring states to work on plantations, mines, and infrastructure building (Wang 1991). The changing region’s geopolitics significantly altered the nature and courses migration. Next, I describe the historical context and the two distinct streams of Chinese emigration—contract labor from China to European colonies in Southeast Asia and to the Americas—that emerged from it.

The Century of Defeat and Humiliation

What succeeded “the Chinese Century” of stability and prosperity (1740–1840) was a century of defeat and humiliation for the Chinese. The two Opium Wars (1840–42 with Britain and 1856–60 with Britain and France) and internal turmoil fatally shook the foundation of the Chinese Empire and contributed to its eventual collapse. The first Opium War was ignited in 1839 when the imperial government confiscated opium warehouses in Guangzhou (Canton). Britain responded by sending an expedition of warships to the city in February 1840 and won a quick victory over China. The war ended with the Treaty of Nanjing (Nanking) on August 29, 1842. The Treaty of Nanjing, along with a supplementary one signed the following year, forced China to pay a large indemnity, open five ports (Guangzhou to the South, Fuzhou and Xiamen to the Southeast, Ningbo and Shanghai to the East) to British trade and residence, and cede Hong Kong to Britain. The unequal treaties also gave British citizens in China the right to be tried in British courts and imposed on China that any rights granted to one foreign power must also be given to other foreign powers.

The second Opium War further undermined the power of the Chinese Empire. In October 1856, Guangzhou police boarded the British ship Arrow and charged its crew with smuggling. Eager to gain more trading rights in China, the British used the incident to launch another offensive, precipitating the Second Opium War. British forces, aided by the French, won another quick military battle in 1857 and forced China to sign the Treaty of Tianjin (Tientsin). The Treaty of Tianjin stipulated that China opened additional trading ports, allowed foreign emissaries to reside in the capital Beijing, admitted Christian missionaries into China, and opened travel to the Chinese interior. When China refused to ratify the treaty, force resumed. In 1860, British and French troops occupied Beijing and burned the imperial Summer Palace. The Chinese government was once again forced to ratify the treaty. Later negotiations also make China legalize the importation of opium (Pan 1999; The World Book 1990).

During the same period when China clashed with, and was defeated by, foreign powers, the Taiping Rebellion in the South and a series of peasant uprisings elsewhere in the country greatly weakened the power of the state and accelerated the Empire’s decline. The Taiping Rebellion (1851–64), led by the Kejia (Hakka) “God Worshipper” Hong Xiuquan (Hung Hsiu-ch’uuan), was a popular uprising in early modern Chinese history. The Rebellion aimed at overthrowing the imperial Qing (Manchu) regime and building an egalitarian society. Originating from Guangxi Province, Hong proclaimed himself the king of the Heavenly Kingdom, led his forces through Hunan and Hebei provinces and along the Yangtze River, and finally captured Nanjing in 1853. Hong declared Nanjing as the capital of the Heavenly Kingdom and instituted an authoritarian government with Christian beliefs and an ancient Chinese egalitarian ideal (dividing land equally among the people). In 1864, a new imperial army partially aided by foreign powers put down the rebellion.4 Hong committed suicide at the fall of Nanjing. The 11-year revolt, which cost the lives of approximately 20 million people, almost toppled the Qing Dynasty (Pan 1999).

4 The foreign powers wanted the Qing Dynasty to survive so that the terms of unequal treaties could remain in effect (see World Book 1990, Vol. 3, p. 503).
The Chinese Diaspora and International Migration

Just at the time of its rapid decline, the Chinese Empire was also aggressively retrenched and defeated by the rising Asian powers—Japan in the mid-1890s, when Japan launched a war with China, and in 1904–05, when Japan overwhelmed Russia and seized influence over Korea. The defeat of China by Japan reinforced the belief in Japan's military and political superiority and increased the sense of a need for reform and modernization.

The Chinese Empire was also weakened by the Boxer Rebellion, an anti-foreign uprising that lasted from 1900 to 1901. The rebellion, which involved the Boxers, a secret society that sought to expel foreigners from China, was suppressed by a force comprising Chinese and foreign troops. The defeat of the Boxers had significant consequences for China, leading to the closing of the Boxer Protocol, which had authorized the Boxers to carry firearms in China.

The Boxer Rebellion also had consequences for the Qing Dynasty. The Qing Dynasty was a dynasty that ruled China from 1644 to 1911. The Boxer Rebellion was a major blow to the Qing Dynasty, and it led to the fall of the dynasty in 1912.

The Boxer Rebellion was also a major blow to the Chinese Empire, leading to its eventual collapse and the establishment of a republic.

The Chinese Empire was also weakened by the Boxer Rebellion, an anti-foreign uprising that lasted from 1900 to 1901. The rebellion, which involved the Boxers, a secret society that sought to expel foreigners from China, was suppressed by a force comprising Chinese and foreign troops. The defeat of the Boxers had significant consequences for China, leading to the closing of the Boxer Protocol, which had authorized the Boxers to carry firearms in China.

The Boxer Rebellion also had consequences for the Qing Dynasty. The Qing Dynasty was a dynasty that ruled China from 1644 to 1911. The Boxer Rebellion was a major blow to the Qing Dynasty, and it led to the fall of the dynasty in 1912.

The Boxer Rebellion was also a major blow to the Chinese Empire, leading to its eventual collapse and the establishment of a republic.

The Chinese Empire was also weakened by the Boxer Rebellion, an anti-foreign uprising that lasted from 1900 to 1901. The rebellion, which involved the Boxers, a secret society that sought to expel foreigners from China, was suppressed by a force comprising Chinese and foreign troops. The defeat of the Boxers had significant consequences for China, leading to the closing of the Boxer Protocol, which had authorized the Boxers to carry firearms in China.

The Boxer Rebellion also had consequences for the Qing Dynasty. The Qing Dynasty was a dynasty that ruled China from 1644 to 1911. The Boxer Rebellion was a major blow to the Qing Dynasty, and it led to the fall of the dynasty in 1912.

The Boxer Rebellion was also a major blow to the Chinese Empire, leading to its eventual collapse and the establishment of a republic.
and from areas bordering Burma and Laos in Yunnan Province. Laborers to Korea and Japan during the 1920s and 1930s were mostly recruited by the Japanese colonial government from Shandong Province on the East Coast (Pan 1999).

**Huagong (Chinese Labor) to Southeast Asia**

In the century between the mid-1840s and World War II, there were two distinct streams of Chinese emigration: network-driven free migration, or huashang-dominated migration, which was more or less a continuation of the pre-colonial pattern, and contract labor, or huagong-dominated migration (Wang 1991). The latter, also referred to as the coolie trade, was more voluminous. Most Chinese contract laborers worked for Western colonists, but some worked for other overseas Chinese who owned plantations and mines in Western colonies (Zhuang 2001). Pre-colonial and colonial emigration shared some remarkable similarities in origins and destinations.

First, colonial emigration was dialect-group based and traced its origins to the same regions as the heyday maritime trade. Similar origins indicated an intrinsic linkage between emigration and earlier trade diasporas. As I have just mentioned, most of the early Chinese migrants were from Guangdong and Fujian. According to surveys conducted in the mid-1950s, there were approximately 20 million overseas Chinese around the world, 12 million living in Southeast Asia. Among the Southeast Asian Chinese, 68% (8.2 million) were of Guangdong origin, and 32% (3.7 million) of Fujian origin. These emigrants were not evenly distributed in destination states (Zhu 1994). In the Philippines, the Chinese population was almost entirely Fujianese in 1800, and a hundred years later, between 85% to 90% of the people of Chinese descent were Fujianese and the rest were Cantonese (See Wickberg 1999a & 1999b). In Cambodia, Cantonese dominated the Chinese community in earlier days but later were overwhelmed by the Chaozhou-Hakka (Wickberg 1999b). In Malaysia, Hakkas were the dominant dialect group among the Chinese. In contrast, almost all (99%) of the Chinese immigrants in North and South America and West Indies of the period were from Guangdong (Pan 1999). Within a particular province, emigrants tended to come from just a few places. For example, most of the emigrants who went to Southeast Asia were from eastern Guangdong—Chaozhou-Shantou (Swatow)—in particular, while most of the emigrants who went to the Philippines and the Americas were mostly from Southwest Guangdong—the Sze Yap region. In Thailand (Siam before 1939), 95% of the Chinese immigrants or Siamese-Thai could trace their origin to the Chaozhou-Shantou region (Bunsratanaphand 1995; Chan and Tong 2001). In the Philippines, almost all Cantonese settling there were from the Sze Yap region. In the United States, close to 73% of the Chinese immigrants in San Francisco in the Chinese Exclusion era were from Taishan (Toishan—a part of Sze Yap).

Secondly, colonial emigration disproportionately headed for South East Asia where diasporic communities were established. Relatively small but highly fluctuated numbers of contract labor went to Hawaii, the continental United States, West Indies, and the Americas. It was estimated that between 1801–1850, 63% of all emigrating Chinese went to Southeast Asia destinations, compared to 6% to Hawaii and the United States, 5% to West Indies, and 8% to Cuba and Peru.\(^3\) The next 25 years (1851–1875) saw record-high numbers of Chinese immigration to Hawaii, the United States, and Canada (17%), Cuba (11%), and Peru (9%) (Stewart 1951). But the volume pouring into Southeast Asia was still quite substantial: about 27% of the Chinese emigrants went to the Malay Peninsula, 20% to East Indies, 4% to the Philippines. Between 1876 and 1900, the period of Chinese exclusion in America, those heading for the Malay Peninsula rose to 48% and, for East Indies, to 43%, while those heading for Hawaii, the United States, and Canada dropped to less than 3% (Zhu 1994). A sizeable portion of the Southeast Asia-bound migrants worked for coethnic-owned plantations, mines and other businesses.

Thirdly, circular migration continued to be distinctive because of high rates of return migration. Emigrant Chinese, merchants, traders, and workers alike, were predominantly sojourning males. The patriarchal family system facilitated the formation of the bachelor society abroad since sons, regardless of birth order, could claim an equal share of patrimony upon return, but daughters were forbidden to leave home. The male sojourner typically left his family behind, or returned home to get married and then left his bride behind to take

\(^3\) The total number of emigrants leaving China between 1801 and 1850 was 320,000. Most went to Southeast Asian, less than 6% to the United States, and 9% to Cuba and Peru.
care of his parents and raise his children. He routinely sent remittances home and hoped to return in the not-so-distant future. Merchants and traders, who usually spent a considerable amount of time in an overseas location that served as a temporary home, traveled frequently between home and places of business. But workers, especially those worked on plantations and mines and lived in camps or near work sites, were more constrained; many could not afford to make frequent home visits. Nonetheless, the overall return rates were considerably high. In Thailand, for example, the return rate was 57% between 1882 and 1905, 78% between 1906 and 1917; and 68% between 1918 and 1945, and then dropped to 40% between 1946 and 1955 (Skinner 1957).

\textit{Huashang vs. Huagong Emigration}

\textit{Huagong} migration during the second half of the 19th century and the early part of the 20th century highlighted the significance of the historical relationship between the century-old Chinese trade diaspora and emigration. Chinese emigration in the colonial period, however, was also distinct from that during the pre-colonial era in several remarkable respects. First, even though emigrants originated roughly from the same regions (i.e., Guangdong and Fujian provinces), they were a more diverse group containing a substantially higher proportion of contract laborers working for Western colonists rather than for the Chinese. In pre-colonial era, a typical worker was a relatively or a village folk working for his coethnic merchant or trader who ran a shop, a farm, or a mine. In colonial era, a typical worker is a "cookie" (bitter strength or hard labor) or an indentured worker.

Moreover, even though emigrants headed primarily for the same destinations as the pre-colonial era, they were more responsive to labor demand in destinations. In pre-colonial era, trade and local investment by the Chinese created demand for labor that was easily accessible from home and home villages. So workers followed the trade diaspora. In colonial era, large-scale development in the plantation economy, mining, and infrastructural construction demanded a large amount of labor in one destination and little in another. So even in destinations where Chinese diasporic communities were well established, contract labor was unevenly distributed. For example, the Philippines, East Indies, and Malay Peninsular attracted over 95% of all contract labor to Southeast Asia. At the peak years (1851–1875), 350,000 laborers arrived in British colonies in the Malay Peninsular, 250,000 in the Dutch East Indies, and 45,000 to the Spanish ruled Philippines (Zhu 1994). Vietnam also attracted a considerably large number; between 1923 and 1951, 1.2 millions Chinese arrived in Vietnam to work as contract labor (but 850,000 returned to China).\footnote{His number probably included the refugees who walked across the border to Vietnam after the Communist takeover in 1949.} In contrast, few contract laborers went to French-ruled Cambodia and Laos.

Thirdly, the means of labor export were distinct.\footnote{The credit ticket system and labor contracts were also the main means of labor migration to South Pacific, Hawaii, the United States, and the Americas.} In the past, merchants and traders themselves established home-village-based networks to sponsor migration. In colonial era, labor migration was facilitated by two other means—the credit ticket system and labor contracts. Merchants and traders acted as labor brokers and agents to recruit prospective workers not only from their villages but also from similar dialect groups in the region. Most of the coolies were poor and uneducated and could not afford the journey. They either got money advanced to them by their labor brokers (relatives or overseas Chinese) or signed labor contracts to have their journey fees repaid from their wages earned at destination. So only those with direct connections to century-old diasporic communities or to labor migrant networks were likely to leave.

Fourthly, colonial labor migration was highly organized and controlled and was shipped off in large numbers from selected ports at origin. For example, Chinese labor migrants to Malaysia were assembled in Macao and then shipped overseas. So in the Malay Peninsular, they were often referred to as Macaos by the locals even though they were Chaoeshanese, Fujianese, Hakka, Cantonese, and Hainanese (Blythe 1969). The British labor recruitment agencies also ran operations in Hong Kong, Guangzhou, and Shantou in consultation with Chinese authorities (Pan 1999). Those headed for Hawaii and the Americas during the same period were primarily assembled in Hong Kong and then got on ships across the Pacific.

Fifthly, even though coolies arrived in destinations where long-standing Chinese communities exist, many had to stay in plantations...
and work camps and were quite isolated from overseas Chinese communities. Some workers were so poor that they were not even able to send money home, much less to go home to find someone to marry for continuing the family name. Intermarriage with indigenous women thus became increasingly common in certain destinations. Many descendants of these intermarriages, mestizos in the Philippines, jiks in Thailand, peranakan in Indonesia, and babas or nyonya in Malay Peninsula, and sino-Viet in Vietnam, were assimilated in the local cultures while others remained Chinese and became accepted into the overseas Chinese communities (Pan 1999).

In sum, during the colonial period, China was the largest labor-export country in Asia. Nearly two-thirds of Chinese emigrants went to Asian destinations and most were contract laborers. Most contract labor to Southeast Asia returned home after their contracts ended but some stayed and integrated into the local Chinese communities. Countries in Southeast Asia that simultaneously received and sent migrants were those ruled by Western colonists. For example, the Dutch East Indies received over 300,000 Chinese labor migrants, while the colonial government sponsored 30,000 migrants from Java to the sparsely populated outer islands during the same period (Zhu 1994). The Philippines under Spanish rule received over 65,000 Chinese laborers between 1850 and 1900 and had continued to receive Chinese immigrants even after the country changed its colonial masters in 1898 and implemented restrictive and anti-Chinese immigration legislation. Meanwhile, thousands of Filipino labor were shipped to Hawaii and the U.S. West Coast to replace Chinese and Japanese labor—45,000 arrived on the West Coast in the 1920s (Melendy 1977). During World War II, emigration from China ebbed, and intra-Asian migration took a crucial turn since then.

Large-scale emigration from China to Southeast Asia testified to the weakness of the Chinese state as well as the resilience of the century-old trade diaspora. Even though China was not colonized by any single nation, it had only limited control over contract labor demanded by Western colonists in Southeast Asia and the Americas and had no power to set the terms of labor contracts for protecting its nationals from harsh exploitation and mistreatment. The apathy and incompetence of the Chinese government indirectly strengthened the cohesion and organization of diasporic Chinese communities overseas. These communities were initially established to provide aid to the sojourning workers, to protect them from competing or threatening forces from outside, such as anti-Chinese sentiment, violence, and legislation, and to enhance profit-making and economic opportunities for ethnic elite groups. It was the overseas Chinese elite in diasporic communities that played a more active role in labor migration than the state.

**Developments in the Post-World War II Era and Chinese Immigration**

*De-colonization, Nation-State Building, and Restrictive Immigration*

From the late Ming Dynasty to the end of World War II, it was estimated that more than 10 million Chinese emigrated from China to various parts of the world, with about two-thirds settling in Southeast Asia (Qiu 2002). World War II shattered colonial powers over Asia even though Western colonists attempted to regain colonial mastery. The Japanese lost the war along with their "Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" and all its colonies, the British gave up the Indian subcontinent but resumed their control over Malaya and Hong Kong, the French regained control over Indo-China, and the Dutch struggled to take back the East Indies with British support (Azuma 1999; Cribb 1999). However, inspired by Marxist ideologies, former colonies in Asia witnessed grassroots nationalist movements demanding independence. The United States also opposed European colonialism in the region. Within one decade after the war, nearly all the Western colonies in Southeast Asia—the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaya, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos—collapsed (Brown 1999; Cribb 1999). With colonists gone, indigenous nationalist and socialist factions in many newly independent nations competed for power and struggled to rebuild their countries while exercising stricter control over its borders, which had a profoundly negative effect on Chinese immigration.

The slow-down of Chinese immigration during the three decades following World War II was also attributed to developments in East Asia. In China, the surrender and departure of the Japanese in 1945 left China deeply divided between the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) Nationalist Party and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). After the United States failed to mediate and build the two-Party coalition, civil war broke out. The CCP forces fought well with firm discipline
and broad-base support from the peasants and the urban working class, while the KMT armies had no will to war. The crumbling economy with record-high inflation and rife corruption in the KMT government and army alienated any social class, even the capitalists of Shanghai, and exacerbated the KMT’s chance to win the war (Fitzgerald 1965 & 1999). In 1949, the Communists won over China, despite massive U.S. arms supplies to the KMT and the KMT’s full control of the air and vastly superior numbers. The KMT retreated to Taiwan with about two million soldiers, officers, and their families, hence starting a bitter standoff and controversy over “one China: two systems” (the People’s Republic of China v. Chinese Taiwan) versus “one Chinese ethnicity: two nation-states” (the People’s Republic of China v. the Republic of China). Soon after the founding of the People’s Republic of China (the PRC), China was forced into the Korea War and, subsequently, the lengthy cold war, which completely isolate China from the West and from the Chinese diasporic communities until the late 1970s. Migration to and from China was strictly prohibited by the state. Illegal border crossing became a crime and any overseas connections were condemned as espionage and treason subject to punishment in camp labor or jail.

While Hong Kong remained a British colony, Taiwan was returned to the KMT-ruled Republic of China (ROC) after the Japanese defeat in World War II. When the KMT was driven by the CCP to Taiwan, the ruling KMT consistently rejected demands for independence. With massive U.S. aid and military protection, the KMT government successfully implemented a series of critical programs, including the land reform, industrialization, and a nine-year state-sponsored educational system, and rapidly rebuilt Taiwan into a modern industrializing nation. But the fear of a Communist takeover loomed large. During the 1950s, a substantially large group of mainlanders re-migrated to the United States. Since the 1960, the children of mainlanders and islanders, growing up in Taiwan and benefited from the reformed second educational system, have begun to arrive in the United States to seek higher education, making Taiwanese students one of the largest groups of international students in the United States for almost three decades. Most students of the 1960s and 1970s stayed in the U.S. upon completion of their higher education. The ouster of the ROC from the United Nations in 1972 and the normalization of Sino-U.S. diplomatic relations in 1978 set off high volumes of brain drain and capital drain from the island to the United States, Canada, and Australia. In some sense, Taiwan has been a skilled labor-export region with the United State as its primary destination.

Economic Developments and Contemporary Trends of Intra-Asian and International Migration

Nation-state building in Southeast and East Asia since the end of World War II has significantly realigned the region’s political economy. On the one hand, nation states protect their sovereignty by erecting entry and exit barriers and instituting control over population flows internally and internationally (Hugo 1998). On the other hand, nation states consciously pursue parallel goals of agricultural reform and industrial development (Abella 1992). After two decades of wartime recuperation, many Asian nations have rapidly risen to integrate themselves not merely into the world economy centered in Western developed economies, but also into newly formed Asian core. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was founded in 1967, allying Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines into an integral system for economic development. Brunei joined in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, and Myanmar (Burma) until 1989) and Laos in 1997 (Turnbull 1999). Japan emerged as Asia’s industrial and financial superpower in the 1970s, and South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore won their reputation as the “Four Little Tigers in Asia” for their impressive economic growth and prosperity a decade later. Meanwhile, Malaysia and Thailand caught up in rapid pace and rose to NIC status. The new Asian alliance, led by Japan and composed of Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and ASEAN countries, significantly challenged the single-core world system and brought about unprecedented economic growth in the region.

The development of the regional interdependent alliance through trade and investment has set off massive state-sponsored intra-Asian labor migration since the late early 1980s. Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Brunei became typical labor-import nations-states, while the Philippines, Indonesia, and China became major
Taiwan, despite strict immigration legislation and control, received migrant workers from other Asian countries, mainly low-skilled workers from Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia.Filipino and Indonesian females typically worked as domestic maids while other male workers worked in construction (Tsai 1995). In the 1970s and early 1980s, Taiwan also experienced the exodus of the middle class and capital outflow to the United States, as well as Australia and Canada, due to political uncertainty resulting from the ousting of Taiwan from the United Nations and the normalization of China-U.S. diplomatic relations. But the trend of US-bound migration reversed during the mid-1980s and 1990s. Many migrants returned to the island and transnational migration became a new trend, easing the brain drain problem. Several demographic and economic trends occurred concurrently in Taiwan that affected migration patterns despite strict control on immigration: decreasing fertility, economic restructuring from labor-intensive manufacturing to capital-intensive high-tech and financial services, and public investment in highway construction (Tsai 1995). These trends prompted huge demand for domestic workers and construction workers. In the late 1980s and the 1990s, Taiwan imported workers mainly from Malaysia and the Philippines to work on manufacturing and construction, who accounted for more than 70% of the foreign labor force (Tsai 1995). In Taiwan, no permits were issued to services, except for nursing aid and private household maids (13,007 maids in Taiwan). Since China implemented the open-door reform policy in 1979, Taiwan also invested heavily in the mainland and trans-Straits commerce flourished. Offshore fishing employed a lot of Chinese workers but these workers were not allowed to come to shore (Lee 1998).

Singapore is a city-state. Its small land area (641 square kilometers) and population size necessitate a carefully managed development strategy and globalization (Chew and Chew 1995). As the city-state rapidly rose to the status of an NIC in the 1970s, it began to suffer from rising cost of labor, severe labor shortage, and near-zero population growth, like most other Asian NICs. Importation of foreign labor, both high and low skilled, thus became top government policy priority. The government allowed two categories of guest labor into the country: work permits and professional passes. Those holding work permits were barred from bringing in dependents or, for female migrants, giving birth in Singapore, and their contract
terms were strictly enforced. Those holding professional passes were more favorably received. Between 1985 and 1994, the number of foreign workers admitted into the country increased from 100,000 to 300,000. As a proportion of the total employed work force, foreign worker comprised 18% in 1994, up from 8% in 1985. Most of the foreign workers were recruited from Malaysia and Thailand, with a smaller number from the Philippines (Chew and Chew 1995). In the 1990s, the immigration of highly skilled workers from mainland China and Taiwan has become significant and increasingly visible (Liu 2000 & 2005).

Compared to the Philippines and Indonesia, the two major labor-export countries, China did not seem to have large-scale labor migration. Because of the lengthy Cold War that cut China off from the rest of the world, migration to and from China was insignificant relative to its vast size, but potential labor export was very large given the huge domestic labor force (Arnold and Shah 1986; Goldstone 1997). Beginning in the late 1970s and at the peak of the Asian boom in the 1980s, China launched nation-wide economic development programs, first agricultural reform, then market reform, and then industrial restructuring aiming at export manufacturing and the privatization of state enterprises. The Chinese drive for modernization and industrialization, coupled with its population potential and the century-old "bamboo network" (Weidenbaum and Hughes 1996), has tipped the balance in the regional politico-economic alignment. These developments and trends have heralded a new era of the “Pacific Century” (Forbes 1999), which has witnessed tremendous changes in the pace, extent, direction, and nature of human movements.

Much of the labor migration to other parts of Asia from China in the late 1970s and the 1980s was more or less clandestine, fueled by century-old diasporic networks, to a lesser extent, the governments student exchange programs. The Chinese government continued, and was under pressure from the West and neighboring countries, to exert tight control over emigration. Because of lack of state sponsorship, Chinese workers in Korea and Japan were largely irregulars, who entered as students or visitors and overstayed their visas. Relatively few Chinese workers were present in other Asian NICs. International migration from China to North America, however, has become massive as the United States and Canada relaxed their respective immigration policies. Because of accelerated Chinese immigration, the ethnic Chinese population in the United States increased exponentially from 237,292 in 1960 to 1,645,372 in 1990, and to nearly 2.9 million including some 430,000 mixed-race persons in 2000, making up more than one per cent of the total US population (Zhou et al., forthcoming). In Canada, the ethnic Chinese population surged from 58,197 in 1961 to 633,933 in 1991, and to more than one million in 2001, forming the largest non-European ethnic group in the country and comprising of three per cent of the total Canadian population (Li, P. 1998). In fact, Chinese has become the third most commonly used language in Canada, next only to English and French (Zhou et al., forthcoming). New patterns of intra-Asian migration and trans-Atlantic migration have in turn prompted a new challenge for Asian nations—managing migration (Martin et al. 1995).

Illegal or Clandestine Chinese Immigration

Much of intra-Asian migration is of recent vintage and is typically short-term and circular labor migration with few possibilities for long-term settlement integration (Battistella 1995). Both sending and receiving nation states play a paramount role in negotiating and managing labor flows. However, globalization and integration of the national economy into the world system can undermine the state's capacity to control emigrant and immigrant flows. In the process of regulating labor migration, however, both sending and receiving states create loopholes for illegal or clandestine migration. China is a case in point. Emigration from China was strictly controlled between 1950 and 1980 (Zhuang 2001). Since China opened its door to the outside world and implemented economic reform in the late 1970s, China experienced unprecedented economic growth. In its drive to build a market economy, China unintentionally encouraged internal migration and international migration (Chan 1994) but lacked a sophisticated system of state-sponsored and state-managed migration, as many Asian sending countries had developed. Starting in the late 1980s, accelerated in the 1990s, and continued onto the turn of the 21 century, Chinese immigrants have become highly visible in Asian NICs as well as in Australia, Canada, the United States, and many European countries, and a sizeable proportion of them, at as high as 10%, are undocumented immigrants either overstayed their visas or had been smuggled into the countries of destination (Chin 1999; Li, M. 2002; Myers 1997; Smith, P. 1997).
Total emigration from China was roughly 130,000 annually in the 1990s. Illegal immigration from China was estimated to grow by a factor of 6 in the early 1990s, and by a factor of 10 between 1995 and 2005, which would translate into a net of 200,000 to 300,000 annually (Goldstone 1997). If Asia absorbed a quarter of this outflow, that would put tremendous pressure on the Asian NICs. For the Chinese, the most preferred destinations are developed countries in the West. In Asia, South Korea and Japan are currently major destinations. But other countries may be affected by the multiple routes of human smuggling. For example, one tactic is “high seas transfer” (Smith, P. 1997: 8). Hong Kong and Macau have traditionally served as interlupits for Chinese immigration. Thailand and Cambodia have recently emerged both as destinations and staging posts to other countries, mainly Australia, the United States, and Europe (Smith, P. 1997). Latin America, particularly Mexico, has also served as staging post for illegal entry into the United States.

Several factors contribute to the rapidly rising and highly publicly undocumented Chinese immigration, which are linked to China’s large-scale economic reform and structural changes in the new political economy. First, the erosion of the welfare state along with the dissolution of food rationing and state-provided welfare benefits, such as housing, did away with the incentive to stay in one place. When this powerful link was broken, workers felt free to consider migration, both internally and internationally, as an alternative means of livelihood (Goldstone 1997). Secondly, economic development weakened the political and economic power of the central government, but strengthened the power of provincial and local officials. Corruption at the local level then made it easier for well-connected and resourceful individuals and smuggling syndicates to function effectively. Thirdly, the century-old diasporic communities all over the world, once reconnected to the ancestral homeland, could touch off a chain migration initiated by family- or friend-sponsored tourist, student, or business visas, and could help meet the survival needs of illegal immigrants. Fourthly, Chinese syndicates and organized crime gangs could exploit loose border to ship their human cargo to different destinations, either from China or from the Chinese diasporic communities, via other countries with loose border controls, such as Russia’s eastern region and other Eastern European countries (Smith, P. 1997).

Governments in countries of destination all have strict regulations to control the flow of migrant workers, but vary in their attitude and ways of dealing with illegal immigration. For example, some Asian countries believe that illegal immigration from China is China’s long-term plan for “non-violent absorption” of the region (Smith, P. 1997: 14). Taiwan considers illegal Chinese immigration a national security concern. Singapore fears that the continued pressure from human rights groups and democratization can cause a breakdown of order and control, driving millions of refugees overseas (Smith, P. 1997). But in reality, the capacity for repatriation and control hinges on the state’s capacity for enforcement, unemployment and access to migrant networks in sending countries, and state labor-export policies (Pillai 1998). Often it may not be in the best interest of the receiving countries since the demand of the labor of illegal migrants is high. Thus, while receiving countries are inherently constrained in providing effective means of curbing illegal immigration given the size of the economy, labor market segmentation, and informal migrant networks, sending countries are also constrained since repatriation worsens domestic unemployment and reduces remittances and foreign exchange incomes (Lee 1998).

**Conclusion**

The above analysis based on the existing literature suggests that intra-Asian and international migration from China has been deeply affected by the century-old Chinese Diaspora and a wide range of geopolitical, economic, and social factors, such as colonization, or decolonization, nation-state building, changes of political regimes, and economic development programs. During the pre-colonial era, the dominance of the Chinese Empire and the proliferation of Chinese trade to Southeast Asia determined much of the intra-Asian migration, primarily via tribute missions and maritime trade routes. Although people moved from one place or island to another beyond their kingdom/chiefdom boundaries in order to search for new land, fishing waters, and better living, they rarely ventured too far off shore in large numbers. It was the Chinese, merchants, traders, and their workers in particular, who developed trade entrepots in port cities all over Southeast Asia, leading to the establishment of overseas Chinese communities and institutions. Ironically, the power of the state in controlling trade and emigration gave rise to sophisticated migration networks and linkages between home villages and the
Chinese Diaspora, which resulted in a unique pattern of emigration from China and permanent settlement at various destinations in Southeast Asia.

Western colonization overturned the dominance of Chinese trade and capsized the geopolitical centrality of the Chinese Empire in the region. With intricate networks of the century-old trade diaspora already in place, Chinese merchants and traders turned agents of labor recruitment, who managed to bypass the state to facilitate mass labor emigration from China to Western colonies in and beyond Asia. Post-World War II nation-state building and economic development realigned the geopolitical order in East and Southeast Asia and the Cold War severed China’s ties to most parts of the world. During this time, newly founded nation-states aggressively pursued modernization strategies while also setting entry and exit barriers, erecting tight border control, and enacting strict emigration/immigration policies. As international migration became institutionalized bilaterally at the government level, diasporic communities, informal networks, and migrant syndicates also emerged or revived in origin and destination states. These informal networks and institutions sometimes worked in tandem with the state to facilitate migration in responding to economic changes, but sometimes functioned quite independently to facilitate migration without much state sponsorship or intervention. Also, when preexisting coethic communities were well established at countries of destination, individual movers could easily reactivate long-standing ethnic or kinship connections to evade sending and receiving state regulations and migrate on their own. Once migration is set in motion, migrants, networks, and diasporic communities undercut the power of the state to structure and manage international migration (Massey et al. 1994).

When China opened its door to the outside world and implemented economic reforms, tremendous pressures for international migration built up rapidly. As the patterns of contemporary intra-Asian and international migration from China have shown, one of the direct, but unintended, consequences of China’s economic reform is network-driven migration along with clandestine migration. And illegal migration has a tendency to grow out of state control and adjustment mechanisms of the free market. In the next 10 or 20 years ahead, contemporary patterns of intra-Asian and international migration will likely to persist with one exception: China, with its largest population and the most expansive (and best developed) diasporic communities in the world, is potentially a huge labor-export country. As it has become increasingly integrated into the world system, as its marketization has continued to undermine the power of the state, and as the Chinese people have reconnected with their overseas diasporas, Chinese emigration, both legal and illegal may define a new “Chinese Century,” which can be many times the scale of what the historian Anthony Reid once termed the “Chinese Century” of 1740–1840 (Reid 1996). More precisely, the potential for emigration from China is already a tsunami on the horizon (Goldstone 1997; Qiu 2002). This is a mixed blessing for China, Asia, and the world. So the challenge for China and other immigrant-receiving countries may be how to negotiate and manage migration, but the power of the state is severely constrained not only by the economy, but also by migration networks and ethnic institutions.

References


Ng, Sek-hong and Grace O. M. Lee. (1998). “Hong Kong Labor Market in the


Zeng, Shaocong. (1998). *Dongyang Hanguo Yuan: Ming Qing Haiyang Yuan Taiwan xu Fenbi huan di Riji ao Yanjiu* (Maritime Migration to Taiwan and the Philippines in the Qing Dynasty). Nanjing: Jiangsu Gaocao Chuabanshe.


Social Transformations in Chinese Societies

The Official Annual of the Hong Kong Sociological Association

Editors
Bian Yan-jie, Chan Kwok-bun and Cheung Tak-sing

VOLUME 1
2005

Editorial Board
Alatas, Syed Farid, National University of Singapore; Cai, He, Zhongshan University; Chan, H.N., Annie, Lingnan University; Chiu, Chiu-hing, Catherine, City University of Hong Kong; Chiu, Hei-yuan, Academia Sinica; Chiu, Wing-kai, Stephen, The Chinese University of Hong Kong; Chu, Yin-wah, Cindy, University of Hong Kong; Davis, Deborah, Yale University; Hamilton, Gary, University of Washington; Hook, Brian, Middlesex University; Hsiao, H.H., Michael, Academia Sinica; Kao, Cheng-shu, Tsinghua University; King, Yao-chi, Ambrose, The Chinese University of Hong Kong; Lau, Siu-kai, The Chinese University of Hong Kong; Lee, James, University of Michigan; Lee, Ming-kwan, Hong Kong Polytechnic University; Lee, Pui-leung, Rance, The Chinese University of Hong Kong; Leung, Hon-chu, Hong Kong Baptist University; Leung, Sai-wing, Hong Kong Polytechnic University; Li, Lulu, People's University; Li, Pelin, Academy of Social Science, Beijing; Li, S., Peter, University of Saskatchewan; Li, Qiang, Tsinghua University; Li, Youmei, Shanghai University; Lin, Nan, Duke University; Madsen, Richard, University of California at San Diego; Mok, Ka-ho, University of Bristol; Pan, Ngai, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology; Postiglione, Gerard A., University of Hong Kong; Qiu, Haixiong, Zhongshan University; Salaff, Janet, University of Toronto; So, Y.W., Alvin, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology; Song, Linfei, Jiangsu Academy of Social Science; Thirone, Isabelle, National Center for Scientific Research, Paris; Vogel, Ezra F., Harvard University; Walden, Andrew G., Stanford University; Wong, M.H., O'dalia, Hong Kong Baptist University; Wong, W. P., Thomas, University of Hong Kong; Wright, Tim, University of Sheffield; Zhou, Min, University of California at Los Angeles; Zhou, Xiaohong, Nanjing University.
CONTENTS

From the Editors ................................................................. vii
Authors’ Biographies ........................................................... viii

Public Trust in a Transitional Democracy:
Modeling the Changes in Taiwan, 1990–2003 ............... 1
TONY TAM and CHANG LY-YUN

Material Rewards to Multiple Capitals Under
Market-Socialism in China .................................................. 31
DEBORAH DAVIS, BIAN YAN-JIE and WANG SHAOQUANG

Body Disabled? Rethinking Disability and Social
Integration in Hong Kong .................................................... 59
AGNES KU S. M. and JENIFER TAM P. Y.

Observations on the Design and Implementation of
Sample Surveys in China ...................................................... 81
DONALD J. TREIMAN, WILLIAM M. MASON, LU YAO,
FAN YI, QI YAQIANG and SONG SHIGE

Family Customs and Farmland Reallocations in
Contemporary Chinese Villages ........................................... 113
JONATHAN UNGER

Chinese NGOs Strive to Survive .......................................... 131
CHAN KIN-MAN, QIU HAIXIONG and ZHU JIANGANG

The Chinese Diaspora and International Migration .......... 161
ZHOU MIN

The Stranger’s Plight, and Delight .................................... 191
CHAN KWOK-BUN