Russian politics in a time of economic turmoil

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To explain Russia’s politics in the last two decades, most scholars focus on the aims of the country’s leaders and the formal institutions they created. I argue here that such accounts miss the central element in Russia’s postcommunist political economy. Although the designs of those in the Kremlin obviously made a difference, what mattered more were economic forces that were largely beyond their control. Economic conditions shaped the contours of public opinion, which, in turn, determined how the formal institutions worked and whether the leaders would get a chance to implement their ideas. Checks—if not balances—arose spontaneously to constrain presidents who had become unpopular and then melted away when the public recovered confidence in the state’s chief executive.1

In advancing this argument, I make five claims and offer brief evidence for them. First, Russia’s dramatic economic contraction after 1990 and its vigorous recovery after 1998 were caused by factors over which the presidents in power at the time had little control. Boris Yeltsin inherited an economy that was imploding; his successor, Vladimir Putin, took over one that was poised to recover. Second, the economy’s fall and rise reshaped public opinion, first destroying Yeltsin’s popularity and then helping sustain the persistently high ratings of his successor. Third, the incumbent president’s ability to enact and implement policies increased and decreased in line with—and, to a considerable extent, because of—changes in that president’s popularity. Yeltsin’s plummeting ratings emboldened his opponents in the parliament, in regional governments, and elsewhere to block his initiatives and undermine his authority. Conversely, as

1 This chapter draws throughout on my earlier paper “Presidential popularity in a young democracy: Russia under Yeltsin and Putin,” (University of California, Los Angeles: manuscript, November 2009), and on my forthcoming book The Return: Russia’s Journey from Gorbachev to Medvedev (New York: The Free Press, 2010).
Putin’s popularity soared, such opposition evaporated. Fourth, changes in Russia’s formal political institutions during this period explain little about the varying ability of presidents to set an agenda and push it forward. Fifth, the different ideas and aims of Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin, and Vladimir Putin did help to determine Russia’s path—but primarily at moments when the incumbent leader was popular. The ideas of unpopular leaders were mostly ignored.

This view of Russian politics differs from conventional accounts in several ways. Ordinary Russian citizens are usually portrayed, by both scholars and journalists, as innocent bystanders—or innocent victims of—Kremlin politics. I suggest that leaders were actually sensitive to and often constrained by public opinion. Although the public could be fickle, its views were often influential. While missing the importance of public opinion, observers have overemphasized formal institutions. Great significance is attributed to the extensive formal powers of the Russian presidency since 1993. I argue that these meant little when the president was unpopular and were not necessary when his ratings were high. A preoccupation with formal institutions led democracy advocates to condemn details of Russia’s political institutions—the use of proportional representation in Duma elections, central appointment of regional executives, a six-year presidential term—that in fact do not distinguish Russia much from many long-established and effective European democracies. The problem was not undemocratic institutions so much as undemocratic practices, by which incumbents, shielded by broad and genuine public support, subverted the letter or spirit of relatively democratic laws.²

² See Treisman, *The Return*, Chapter 12. Many of the world’s democracies—including Austria, Denmark, Spain, and Switzerland—elect their parliaments using the same party-list proportional representation system that Russia introduced for the 2007 election. (Previously, the Duma was elected half on party lists, half in single member constituencies.) Russia’s six-year presidential term is on the long side for European democracies, yet until 2002
If the character and outcomes of Russian politics depend on public opinion, itself driven largely by economic conditions, the financial crisis of 2008-10 could bring political change. I briefly explore how the early months of the crisis played out and outline three scenarios for what might lie ahead.

1 Economic crisis and recovery

Opinions differ about the quality of Russia’s economic management in the 1990s and the wisdom of the reform strategy chosen. Whatever one thinks about this, two points are hard to deny. As Yeltsin took possession of Gorbachev’s Kremlin office in 1991, the country was already in a grave economic crisis. And as his successor, Vladimir Putin, took over in 2000, Russia had already begun a vigorous recovery.

Yeltsin’s policies in the 1990s may have affected the depth and duration of the economic downturn. But by the time he reached the Kremlin, a severe contraction was unavoidable. This is evident from the fact that all the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union suffered a significant fall of output after communism fell. Among the 15 former Soviet republics, the drop in officially reported GDP per capita ranged from 68 percent (in Tajikistan) to 22
percent (in Estonia). Russia’s decline, at 39 percent, was the tenth largest. The East European countries, some of which had started their transitional recessions earlier, also suffered major recessions.

A number of causes contributed—the chronic inefficiency of Soviet-style planning, the worn-out and obsolete nature of much of the capital stock, the disruption of production chains, the shock of transition to world prices for trade, the macroeconomic imbalances created by some of the last communist governments, and—for those like Russia that were major commodity exporters—the fall in world commodity prices. The official statistics greatly exaggerate the decrease in the value of what was produced. Under communism, much of the output counted in the GDP figures was overvalued, consisting of goods of appalling quality that no one would buy freely or state orders for which there was no real demand. Afterwards, much output was produced underground and therefore not recorded in the official statistics. But even taking such mismeasurement into account, there was almost certainly a significant fall in output. No country found a way to avoid it.

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3 Figures for the fall in real GDP per capita (in constant local currency units) between 1991 and the year in which GDP per capita was lowest, calculated from the World Bank’s, *World Development Indicators*.


If the crash was universal, so was the recovery. From the late 1990s, rapid growth resumed in all the postcommunist countries. The rise in GDP per capita in 1998-2008 among the former Soviet republics ranged from 44 percent (in Kyrgyzstan) to 282 percent (in Azerbaijan). Russia had the eighth strongest rebound. In Eastern Europe as well, the 2000s saw high growth. The recovery was caused in part by the effects of the reforms of the early 1990s, and, in Russia’s case, by the resurgence of commodity prices. Again, the fact that recovery came everywhere makes it hard to credit it principally to Putin’s economic management.

In short, although the policy choices of postcommunist leaders probably influenced the severity and length of their countries’ economic contractions and the speed and vigor of their subsequent recoveries, the experience of contraction in the early 1990s and recovery in the 2000s was common and apparently inescapable. In Russia, Yeltsin inherited an economic catastrophe from his predecessor; Putin received an economy that was ready to rebound.

2 The consequences of economics for politics

The gyrations in Russia’s economy had profound effects upon public opinion. The evidence suggests they were a major influence on the popularity of the country’s successive presidents.

In 1988, the polling organization VCIOM was founded in Moscow by several of Russia’s most-respected, semi-dissident sociologists. It quickly acquired a reputation for professionalism and independence. This was widely thought to be the real reason why in 2003 the Putin administration repossessed the organization, forcing out its director, Yury Levada. Most of Levada’s colleagues left to form the so-called Levada Center, which continued the group’s polls. From 1989, VCIOM began asking its representative sample of voting age Russians—at first
occasionally, from late 1996 more regularly—whether they approved or disapproved of the country’s political leaders. Figure 1 shows the percent approving of the country’s first four presidents (including Gorbachev, the one and only Soviet president). We see, first, the collapse in Gorbachev’s support in 1989-91, and the parallel rise in Yeltsin’s, which peaked in December 1990 at almost 90 percent.\(^6\) Then came Yeltsin’s long slide to a rating of just six percent in late

\(^6\) At first glance, because of the scale of Figure 1, it might appear that Gorbachev’s and Yeltsin’s ratings are positively correlated, but in fact the correlation between the two is negative \((r = -0.29)\). It was negative both in 1989-
1999. Approval of Vladimir Putin, appointed prime minister in August 1999, rocketed to 84 percent in mid January 2000 as he took over as acting president, and then remained between 61 and 87 percent during the next eight years. In 2008, his replacement, Dmitry Medvedev, started out a little below Putin’s final level.

The patterns of presidential approval shown in Figure 1 turn out to be closely related to public perceptions of the state of the Russian economy. From 1993—and then more regularly from mid-1994—the pollsters of VCIOM asked Russians how they would evaluate the economic situation of Russia and the state of their family’s finances, as well as what they thought awaited Russia’s economy in coming months. The relationship between economic perceptions and presidential approval can be seen in Figure 2. The dashed line plots an index of positive economic sentiment constructed by adding the percentage of respondents that thought Russia’s economic situation was “very good,” “good,” or “intermediate” to the percentage that said they expected a “significant improvement” or “some improvement” in coming months. Superimposed on it is a line measuring the average rating given by respondents to the incumbent president when asked to rate him on a scale running from 1, the worst, to 10, the best.

It is hard, looking at Figure 2, not to see a connection between economic sentiment and the public’s rating of its president. I confirm the link between economic perceptions and presidential approval with more elaborate statistical tests in a more technical paper. Although it

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7 Treisman, “Presidential popularity in a young democracy: Russia under Yeltsin and Putin.”
8 Treisman, “Presidential popularity in a young democracy: Russia under Yeltsin and Putin.”
is difficult to be certain which of the different elements of economic sentiment—evaluations of national economic conditions, of family finances, or expectations about future economic performance—were most important since they are highly correlated, measures of economic perceptions do a good job of accounting for the trends in the ratings.

Of course, economic factors do not explain all the variation. Other factors also mattered at various times. Episodes of boorish behavior on Yeltsin’s part cost him popularity. When in
Berlin in August 1994 after too many glasses of champagne he grabbed the baton and energetically conducted a police band while television cameras rolled, his rating fell by about one quarter point on the 10-point scale. Putin’s resolute response to the invasion of Dagestan by Chechen guerrillas and the terrorist bombings of four apartment buildings in late 1999 may have helped propel his rating upwards, although the economic resurgence would likely have achieved the same result a few months later. On the other hand, both the first and second Chechen wars appear to have mostly depressed the popularity of the incumbent president. Although these and other political factors help to explain some of the peaks and valleys in the rating, economic perceptions had a more consistent influence. Had the economy under Yeltsin performed as well as it did under Putin, statistical simulations suggest Russia’s first president would have left office extremely popular.

It could be that the public’s perceptions of the economy were themselves manipulated by the regime, which under Putin was exerting increasing influence over the mass media. In this case, economics would not be driving politics; politics would be shaping economic perceptions. Analyzing the determinants of economic perceptions, I found that media effects could explain some of the change over time in Russians’ views of the economy—in particular, assessments improved more than was warranted during the 1996 and 2004 presidential election campaigns, only to sink afterwards. Evaluations of the economy were also slightly rosier when Russians had greater confidence in their president. However, on the whole, Russians’ assessments of economic conditions tracked the objective economic indicators—the average real wage, the average pension, real wage arrears, unemployment, job openings. By and large, Russians were not tricked into approving of their president by deceptive media reports about economic performance. Rather, they accurately perceived the contraction of the early and mid-1990s and the rapid
recovery after 1998. As the economy deteriorated, their disapproval of Yeltsin intensified; as it recovered, support for Putin reached unprecedented heights.

3 Presidential popularity and political constraints

As the president’s popularity waxed and waned, so too did his ability to get things done. Yeltsin’s slide in the ratings encouraged ambitious rivals to block his attempts to enact and implement policies, generating deadlock and a widespread sense of impunity. As Putin’s popularity soared, most of the obstacles that had impeded his predecessor evaporated. After his first few months in office, Yeltsin had to fight with skill and stamina for every minor reform. By contrast, Putin enjoyed enviable freedom of action to push his agenda to fruition.

A first potential barrier for the executive was, of course, the parliament. At no point did Yeltsin enjoy a solid base of support in the legislature. But as his popularity dwindled, it grew harder and harder to get loyalists elected, or even to hold onto them between elections. In late 1990, pro-government parties held about 24 percent of the seats in the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.9

Three years later, in the election of December 1993 pro-government parties won 19 percent of seats in the new Duma. In December 1995, they won only about 14 percent. By 1999, however, the tide was turning. That December, on the back of Putin’s sprint upwards in the ratings, the pro-government Unity bloc along with the loyalist Our Home is Russia won 18 percent of seats. By the election of 2003, pro-government parties were winning 58 percent of seats, and in December 2007, they won 78 percent of seats (see Figure 3).

The Kremlin’s changing ability to win friends in parliament was felt not just at election time. During most legislative terms, factions shrank or swelled as deputies defected from one to another and “independents” joined factions in the hope of getting a committee assignment. The Kremlin forces usually managed to coopt a few additional independents in the first month or two of a session with promises of patronage. But after that, when the president’s popularity was falling the pro-government bloc tended to hemorrhage deputies. Its total fell from 23.6 percent of seats in January 1994 to 22.5 in October 1995, and from 14.7 percent in February 1996 to 13.9 percent in October 1999.

The opposite occurred after 1999 as deputies raced to join the faction of the suddenly immensely popular Putin. Between December 1999 and March 2000, Unity swelled from 18.4 to 21.1 percent of the seats. By July 2003, it had persuaded three other factions—Fatherland-All Russia, Russian Regions, and People’s Deputy—to join it in a stable coalition comprising 53

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10 If one classified the Union of Right Forces (URF), the successor to Russia’s Choice, as a pro-government party, the pro-government bloc would swell to about 24 percent. The URF won 6.4 percent of the seats in 1999. However, the URF was not a reliable partner of the government by this point.
percent of the seats. (Fatherland-All Russia merged with United Russia in 2001.) Between December 2003 and October 2007—without any new parliamentary election—the rush to jump on Putin’s coattails increased the pro-executive factions from 58 to 75 percent of seats.

The nominal size of factions was not everything. Even though his allies held only about one quarter of the seats in 1991, at moments when his popularity was soaring Yeltsin could leverage this into large majorities. Bathed in the glow of his victory against the August coup plotters, his rating near an all-time high, Yeltsin managed to convince almost the entire Supreme
Soviet to endorse his plans for radical economic reform and to vote him the power to rule by decree and appoint regional governors. But later, as his popularity plunged, he had to fight for each scrap of legislation. Every year, passing the budget required creative deal-making and tactical finesse.

Even when the government got its way, it took longer and longer to push bills through the legislature. The time taken to pass important, non-budgetary bills increased from less than six months in 1994 to almost two years in 1999. It fell rapidly in 2000 with Putin’s election and soaring popularity, and stayed relatively low throughout his presidency, averaging about six months.\(^{11}\) The momentous bill introducing a flat-rate income tax was signed by the president just 65 days after it was introduced in the Duma.\(^{12}\) The Federation Council proved readier to veto bills introduced by the executive branch under Yeltsin than under Putin. During 1994-99, the Federation Council vetoed 12 percent of such bills, while during 2000-04, it vetoed only six percent of such bills.\(^{13}\) And as Yeltsin’s rating fell, he had to fight off repeated attempts to impeach him. The deputies tried in December 1992, March 1993, September 1993, July 1995, and June 1998-April 1999. All attempts failed to receive the required number of votes, although the 1999 effort came quite close. No attempt was made to impeach the more popular Putin.


\(^{12}\) Yegor Gaidar, speech on current Russian politics at UCLA, June 14, 2002.

\(^{13}\) Calculated using dataset on Russian bills from 1994-2004, collected by Moshe Haspel and Thomas F. Remington. I am grateful to Tom Remington for sharing this. Since the executive is unlikely to introduce bills it expects the Federation Council to veto, it is not surprising that the absolute number of vetoes is relatively low. The contrast, however, suggests that the Putin administration was less frequently subjected to unpleasant surprises.
A second set of obstacles lay in the regional capitals. Yeltsin’s plunging rating emboldened the governors to take control of their budgets, assert rights over federal property, even to coopt locally-based federal bureaucrats. They ignored government instructions and remitted less tax revenue to the center. Some even supported the Communist extreme opposition. In deciding how far to go in resisting Moscow, the evidence suggests the governors took local public opinion into account. In regions where support for Yeltsin had been falling relatively faster, the governors were more likely to oppose Yeltsin at critical moments.

One such moment came in September 1993, when Yeltsin declared a state of emergency and ordered the Supreme Soviet to dissolve. A group of deputies refused to leave the building, prompting a constitutional standoff. At this point, 15 of the country’s governors spoke out against Yeltsin’s action, rallying behind the parliament. Which governors did so was related to local trends in the president’s popularity. In regions where support for Yeltsin had fallen in the previous two years, 30 percent of the leaders publicly opposed him; where support for Yeltsin had risen, only 11 percent did. A similar calculus appears to have influenced how regional delegations to the national parliament voted. Deputies from regions where support for Yeltsin had fallen in 1991-3 were more likely to vote against the government’s proposals at the March 1993 Congress of People’s Deputies session.¹⁴

By contrast, after Putin’s approval rating rose above 80 percent and he won election in the first round in 2000, opposition from the previously obstreperous governors disappeared. They stood by docilely as he took away their seats in the parliament’s upper house, which had

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conferred legal immunity, imposed a structure of presidential prefects to watch over them, reduced their share of government revenues from 54 percent in 1999 to 35 percent in 2005, and abolished popular elections for their positions.\footnote{Goskomstat Rossii, \textit{Finansy Rossii} (2000, 2008).} Despite these adverse changes, no governors were overtly fighting the Kremlin, and some seemed positively enthusiastic.

I do not mean to suggest that it was presidential popularity by itself that reshaped the political arena so dramatically. The surge in presidential popularity under Putin was part of a syndrome of positive developments that also included higher tax revenues, expanded government spending (in absolute terms), and revived public optimism, all of which were stimulated by the economic recovery and, in turn, helped underwrite the image of an active, effective president. Yet, the president’s rating was not just a concomitant of presidential power—it was a signal to potential opponents not to stick their necks out. High approval enabled the president to intimidate, coopt, and coordinate other political actors.

In characterizing political systems, it is customary to focus on the institutions. Yet in Russia in the 1990s and 2000s, such an approach can lead one astray. In fact, the system operated very differently at different times, even without any significant change in the rules and structures of government. Conversely, institutions changed in major ways without much affecting the way the system worked.

The greatest institutional reform in the postcommunist period was the adoption of the new constitution in December 1993. This constitution was viewed by some as virtually—or
actually—authoritarian in the powers it gave to the president. The previous constitution had assigned sovereign—indeed, dictatorial—authority to the Supreme Soviet. Did this mean that after December 1993 Yeltsin could enact and implement the reforms he favored? Not at all. He remained blocked at every step by the opposition majority in the new Duma, by the defiant ranks of the governors, and by the evasive measures and lobbying of the country’s major business interests. There was no noticeable increase in the effectiveness of the executive. Yeltsin struggled for years without success to institute the free sale of land and a liberal new tax code.

Another much-discussed institutional change concerned the selection of regional governors. In late 1991, Yeltsin won the right to appoint the governors; then during the mid-1990s, he gradually allowed the regions to elect their leaders; finally in 2004 Putin returned the system to one of presidential nomination. Did the strength of the center vis-à-vis the regional executives increase and decrease in line with these institutional changes? Elected governors were sometimes harder to manage than their appointed counterparts. But this was a relatively small effect. Context was far more important. The greatest regional defiance of central authority came in 1992-3, precisely the period in which almost all the governors were presidential appointees. Putin’s success in curbing the governors came not after he re-introduced presidential nomination, but in 2000-02, while they were still popularly elected.

Indeed, the major recentralization of authority and reassertion of presidential power occurred between 1998 and 2002 with almost no significant simultaneous change in political institutions. During his entire eight years in the Kremlin, Putin did not amend the constitution

once, although he could have done so quite easily. The changes he did make to the formal government system were relatively minor. And yet his ability to get his way was incomparably greater than Yeltsin’s, and the pattern of political outcomes was completely different.

A second common misapprehension is the belief that in Russian politics the opinions of ordinary citizens have been largely irrelevant. In fact, as I have argued, public opinion plays a central role, helping to define the president’s freedom of maneuver. A popular president can accomplish far more than an unpopular one. In this, Russia is like many other countries, including the US, where the effectiveness of presidents also depends upon their approval ratings. But the logic in Russia is even starker.

In practice, both Yeltsin and Putin were often solicitous of public opinion, and both adapted their policies in response to it. Even before his first competitive election in March 1989, Yeltsin confessed that he was attentively following “all the official and unofficial public opinion polls (including those of the Americans).” Putin’s Kremlin remained an avid consumer of such data, served up for it in recent years by the sociologists of Aleksandr Oslon’s Fond Obshchestvennogo Mneniya. Yeltsin’s decisions both to pursue radical economic reform in late 1991 and to moderate its pace from late 1992 were in line with public opinion at the time.


19 The creation of a market economy was favored by 74 percent of Russians, according to one poll in late 1991, although slightly more favored a “gradual” than a “rapid” transition (VCIOM, Omnibus 1991-15, December 1991-January 1992, 3,453 respondents, see http://sofist.socpol.ru.) Sixty-one percent endorsed the privatization of large enterprises; only 13 percent thought that private enterprises were not necessary at all (VCIOM, Fakt 1991-11, November 1991, 1960 respondents, http://sofist.socpol.ru). Between December 1991 and December 1992, the
Putin’s emphasis on restoring order, attacking the oligarchs, and increasing the state’s role in the economy were all extremely popular.\(^{20}\) His nods to nostalgia such as the reinstatement of the Soviet era music to the national anthem also aimed to buy him popularity—and succeeded.\(^{21}\) Both his cooperation with the US after 9/11 and his gradual slide into resentful ambivalence also mirrored the evolution of Russian public opinion. In October 2001, 61 percent of Russians felt “very good” or “mostly good” about the US, and 62 percent expressed willingness to give blood to help the American victims of the 9/11 terrorist attack. By January 2009, after the Iraq war, the US recognition of Kosovo, and Washington’s support for Georgia in the 2008 war with Russia, the percentage feeling good about the US had fallen to 38 percent, and 49 percent “felt bad” about the American superpower.\(^{22}\)

4 Politics in the financial crisis

Despite the hopes of some Russian leaders that their country could remain an “island of stability” in the international financial crisis of 2008-9, it too succumbed to the effects of the global

\[^{20}\] In August 2001, 62 percent of Russians thought the state had “too little” role in the economy, compared to three percent that said it had “too much”. In July 2003, 37 percent thought all privatized property should be returned to the state and another 31 percent thought this should be done in cases in which illegality in the privatization process was proven. See \url{http://www.russiavotes.org/national_issues/privatisation.php}.

\[^{21}\] Treisman, “Presidential popularity in a young democracy: Russia under Yeltsin and Putin.”

\[^{22}\] Levada Center polls, at \url{www.russiavotes.org/security/security_trends.php#443} (accessed on November 15, 2009).
Industrial production fell by almost three percent in the last quarter of 2008 and by 15 percent in the first quarter of 2009, before stabilizing. Compared to a year earlier, real disposable incomes were six percent lower in the last quarter of 2008, roughly flat in the first and second quarters of 2009, and lower again in the third quarter. In line with the deterioration, Russians’ perceptions of the economy also darkened. The percentage characterizing the state of the Russian economy as “very good,” “good,” or “intermediate” fell from 64 percent in June 2008 to 50 percent in March 2009. The share expecting some economic improvement in coming months fell from 40 percent in June 2008 to 26 percent that December.

Based on past experience, one might expect the crisis to pull down the ratings of Putin and Medvedev, perhaps even jeopardizing the successful model of governance of the previous eight years. Since Medvedev’s inauguration, the ratings of the two leaders have been extremely highly correlated ($r = .88$ in levels and $r = .92$ in first differences). Medvedev’s approval tracks Putin’s almost exactly, and the gap between them narrowed from about 10 points early in Medvedev’s term to about six points in late 2009. As economic sentiment deteriorated, their ratings slipped a little in parallel. The popularity of both surged—Medvedev’s jumped 10 points and Putin’s five points—as Russians rallied behind the Kremlin after the August 2008 war with Georgia. But despite this, between June 2008 and April 2009, Medvedev’s rating fell from 73 to 68 percent and Putin’s fell from 83 to 76 percent. However, the economy began to stabilize in

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the spring of 2009, and economic perceptions improved again.\textsuperscript{25} By October 2009, approval had risen to 72 percent for Medvedev and 78 percent for Putin.

If the stabilization of mid-2009 proves temporary and the economy enters a period of sustained, severe decline, one might expect the slide in the leaders’ popularity to resume. Of course, they start from an unusually high level, so it could take some time for even a major deterioration to pull the leaders’ ratings into dangerous territory. On the other hand, in a grave crisis Russians’ sensitivity to economic conditions might increase. During the economic turmoil under Yeltsin, perceptions of the economy had a stronger impact on presidential popularity than in the period of steady income growth under Putin, during which Russians apparently acclimated to the new, more positive environment.\textsuperscript{26}

Were the ratings of the ruling “tandem” to plunge, history suggests opposition would spontaneously emerge, timidly at first but then more assertively. Most likely, it would come from familiar quarters. Regional governors and legislatures might dare to resist unpopular central projects. Dissent might sound from within the parliament, where factional divisions might appear within United Russia. One might see more public protests, the breaking of previous taboos in the media, more legal challenges against officials, perhaps even some overt disagreements among cabinet members. Of course, history never repeats itself exactly and resistance could also come from new directions. Some unusually independent judge might risk ruling against the Kremlin on some important issue. Institutions created to coopt the elite such as the Public Chamber might start to play a more independent role. Whatever its source, the viability of any resistance would

\textsuperscript{25} To evaluate economic perceptions, since the Levada Center results were only available with a long lag, I used results of polls of VCIOM at \url{www.wciom.ru} (accessed on November 15, 2009).

\textsuperscript{26} Treisman, “Presidential popularity in a young democracy: Russia under Yeltsin and Putin.”
depend on the continued worsening of economic conditions driving down the incumbents’ ratings. Other events—military hostilities, terrorist attacks—could intervene.

How the two leaders would react is impossible to predict. A crisis of confidence in their leadership might prompt either a loosening or a tightening of administrative controls, and could either reinforce or weaken the bond between them. While nothing is impossible, the chances of genuine conflict between the two appear slim given how closely their political interests are aligned. The almost identical paths of Medvedev’s and Putin’s ratings show that, nearly two years after the turnover, Russians still see the two as virtually joined at the hip, and assign shared responsibility to them for both economic performance and the prosecution of the Georgian war.

Already in early 2009, some rumblings could be heard from the more outspoken governors. Shaimiev (of Tatarstan) and Luzhkov (of Moscow) had already raised the idea of reintroducing gubernatorial elections, earning a quick rebuke from Medvedev. Then in June 2009, Murtaza Rakhimov, the long-serving president of Bashkortostan, lashed out in an interview at the incompetence of the United Russia leadership, saying the party was being run by people who had “never commanded so much as three chickens.” He called the rubber stamp politics of the Duma “embarrassing to watch” and warned that: “The population is laughing!” This was just before the recovery kicked in; he may have regretted his candor as the tandem’s ratings revived. But it gave a hint of what might be expected were the economic slide to restart.

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27 Treisman, The Return: Russia’s Journey from Gorbachev to Medved.  
28 Mikhail Vinogradov, “Will there be a ‘Medvedev Thaw’?” Pro et Contra Nos.5-6 (2008).  
The administration, in 2009, appeared intensely focused on the possibility of protest. Riot police were flown from Moscow to Vladivostok in December 2008 to arrest dozens of demonstrators incensed by Putin’s increase in tariffs on imported automobiles, which had decimated the trade in used Japanese cars. By spring 2009, a program had been installed on the computers of Medvedev and two of his top aides, Sergei Naryshkin and Vladislav Surkov, showing a map of the country with regions in crisis—as classified on the basis of 60 indicators that included Putin’s local rating—lit up. Then, when unpaid workers in the “one-industry town” of Pikalevo blocked the highway and occupied the local government building, Moscow tried a new tactic—a televised, and completely staged, dressing-down of a Kremlin-friendly oligarch, who was in fact given additional financial aid to quiet the local workers. The spectacle was supposed to encourage other businessmen to dip into their wallets to appease local pockets of protest.

5 Conclusion

The way in which economic conditions shape Russian public opinion, which, in turn, determines the effectiveness of the government, is hardly unique. Indeed, the striking thing is how closely the logic described here resembles political processes in other electoral democracies, both liberal


and illiberal. Russia, often portrayed as unique and mysterious, is in this respect both familiar and intelligible. In the US, research has traced links from better economic performance to higher presidential ratings, and from presidential popularity to more effective promotion of the president’s legislative agenda, at least on salient issues on which the public does not have entrenched views. Similar phenomena have been noted in Latin American states such as Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay.

On the one hand, this pattern suggests greater accountability than is implied by views of Kremlin politics as the domain of an insulated elite. The public turns out to have an important role in politics. On the other hand, the mode of accountability is somewhat perverse. First, in Russia, where economic conditions depend strongly on international factors like the price of oil, economic performance is a very noisy signal of the incumbent’s competence. Presidents end up revered or scorned largely on the basis of fortuitous factors. This is not necessarily irrational—given the ignorance of the public about what drives Russia’s economy, it may make sense to

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simply hold the incumbent responsible. Still, it leads to some major errors. Second, the long lags between policies and their results have meant that Russia’s leaders, when they were not being rated based on international conditions, were repeatedly rewarded or penalized for the actions of their predecessors. Gorbachev was a bit of an exception. His own mismanagement arguably played as big a role in the economic disaster on his watch as the problems he inherited. But history played tricks on his two successors. Yeltsin was punished for the catastrophe bequeathed to him by Gorbachev, while Putin was rewarded for a boom caused in part by the market reforms Yeltsin had introduced.

One way to read the message of this chapter would be to conclude that everything in Russian politics is just a function of the price of oil. That would be too reductionist. Of course, oil price changes were a major determinant of Russia’s economic history from the 1980s to the present. But their importance varied over time, and other factors mattered as well. In the 1980s, the sharp drop in oil prices did not make the collapse of the Soviet economy inevitable. Rather, it prompted Gorbachev to borrow like crazy, triple the money supply, and initiate reforms that were disastrously misconceived. At this point, a different economic strategy might have had quite different results. During the recovery phase, the link between oil prices and growth was far clearer in 2005-9 than in 1999-2001 (when growth owed more to the devaluation) and 2001-04 (when higher output of oil and minerals mattered at least as much as prices). Economists estimate that higher oil prices can explain between one third and one half of the total growth


since 1999. I find clear statistical relationships running from real wages, pensions, and unemployment to economic perceptions, and from these to presidential approval. But I find only weaker relationships between changes in the oil price and economic perceptions.

Even though the oil price is not everything, it has become increasingly important in recent years. With most operational fields approaching exhaustion, increasing output will require major investments to develop new fields—investments that have been discouraged by high taxation of oil profits and insecure property rights. Within the Kremlin as well as outside, a belief has been spreading that the reasons for rapid growth in 1999-2007 no longer apply. The response has been to talk feverishly about innovation policy, diversification strategies, nanotechnology, and so on. Yet, so far, Medvedev’s focus on modernization has been undercut by continued evidence of judicial corruption, abusive corporate raiding by state insiders, and security service intimidation at the margins of academia. It is also unclear what niche in the world economy is free for Russia to fill if it diversifies away from minerals, in which it has an obvious comparative advantage.

Of course, economic performance and public opinion are not the only elements in Russia’s political economy. I do not mean to suggest that economic fluctuations can explain

Paavo Suni, “Oil Prices and the Russian Economy: Some Simulation Studies with NiGEM,” (Helsinki: Research Institute of the Finnish Economy, 2007) estimates that higher oil prices explain about 2.5 points (38 percent) of the 6.5 percent average growth rate in 2001-06. Roland Beck, Annette Kamps and Elitza Mileva, “Long-term Growth Prospects for the Russian Economy,” (Frankfurt: European Central Bank, 2007), reviewing previous studies, note estimated long-run elasticities of GDP to permanent increases in the oil price of .15 to .20. Using the monthly prices of European Brent oil, these elasticities imply that the change in oil prices in 1999-2007 can explain 25 to 33 points of the 72 percent increase in GDP (measured in constant rubles) between those years—or, in other words, 35 to 46 percent of the total growth.
every uptick and slide in the president’s rating or every success and failure in enacting policy. I show elsewhere that the wars in Chechnya also mattered for presidential approval, as did various other temporary factors. Despite Yeltsin’s low popularity and formidable constraints, his ministers did manage to push through important reforms in the 1990s, using strategies that coopted some opponents while marginalizing others. The Putin administration, despite more auspicious conditions, did not achieve all of its goals. 

In the next few years, Russia seems likely to develop according to one of three scenarios. If oil and gas prices surge again and remain very high, the sense of urgency about reforms will dissipate. “So long as oil prices were growing many, almost all of us, to be honest, fell for the illusion that structural reforms could wait,” Medvedev confessed in November 2009. Complacence could return. A resumption of boom times would keep the Kremlin incumbents popular and opposition to their rule muted. If oil prices remain around their current level of $70-80 a barrel, the Kremlin’s most likely strategy is one of muddling through. This would probably result in somewhat slower growth, with gradually increasing public discontent and louder grumbling within the elite. But, barring some unexpected trauma, a gradual slide would probably not be enough to prompt a major departure from the established model.

If, however, oil and gas prices plunge and stay low for long enough to push the economy into deep recession, driving up unemployment and exhausting the government’s fiscal resources, more serious opposition could emerge, leading ultimately to challenges to the regime. How the


men on the tandem would react is unpredictable. A joint approach seems far more likely than
genuine conflict between the two, although for public relations purposes Medvedev might be cast
as the advocate of a softer hand. Regimes that have been in power for a long time tend to make
mistakes at critical moments, and the current leadership has no experience of governing in bad
times. If economic turmoil returns, the centralized structures of the Putin era—the “super-
presidency,” the “vertical of power” between Moscow and the governors, and the hierarchical
United Russia party—may turn out to be less effective at enforcing the leaders’ will than in the
past. Once again, the context is likely to prove more important than the institutions.