Copyright 2002 The Economist Newspaper Ltd.
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The Economist
September 21, 2002 U.S. Edition
SECTION: LEADER

LENGTH: 591 words

HEADLINE: Putin's folly

BODY:
THOSE who write speeches for Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, no doubt imagine they are good students of American foreign policy. They seem determined to copy, or rather caricature, every new American idea. They no doubt had a hand, too, in drafting the stern letter that Mr Putin sent to the United Nations, laying out his case for intervention in neighbouring Georgia unless its government clears its territory of a group of Chechen terrorists who have holed up there.

Like America in Iraq, his officials claim, Russia is insisting on its right to take military action, alone if necessary, against a nation which it deems to be in breach of international law; like America in Afghanistan, Russia justifies itself by recalling that failed states can be a source of festering security threats. Like George Bush, Mr Putin is merely proposing to act pre-emptively, in extremis, against a state that poses a deadly and increasing danger. Indeed, regime change cannot be ruled out.

A mixture of all these arguments has been used by Mr Putin and his lieutenants to justify their recent and repeated threats of military action against Georgia--some air raids have already taken place, say the Georgians, and Russians have been hinting darkly that a land attack may follow. The Georgians stand accused of posing a threat to Russian security because they cannot or will not take effective action against the Chechen fighters, possibly allied with Islamist extremists from elsewhere, who have set up camp in the remote Pankisi gorge. If you cannot solve the problem--and guarantee that no attacks on Russian territory will be launched from Georgian territory--then we will, is the Kremlin's message. The Russian media, meanwhile, have mounted an escalating series of personal attacks on Georgia's president, Edward Shevardnadze. The clear implication is that nobody in Moscow would shed a tear if, in the turmoil caused by a Russian attack, the leadership of Georgia were to change hands.

If there is one grain of truth in Russia's arguments, it lies in the fact that Georgia, while not a failed state, is one that has had difficulty asserting its authority in its border areas. Indeed in two of its regions--Abkhazia and South Ossetia--the writ of the Tbilisi government does not run at all. Even in other places, it struggles to collect taxes and enforce the law. This is a dangerous state of affairs; where the rule of law is absent, smugglers in drugs, guns and even deadlier things fill the void. The mote in Russia's eye

But there is also a huge flaw in Russia's argument. If the Georgian state functions less than perfectly--in Pankisi and elsewhere--that is in large part because Russia itself has consistently undermined it. The restive mini-states within Georgia's legal boundaries (Abkhazia, South Ossetia and, to some extent, Ajaria in the south-west) defy the government with the help of powerful friends in Moscow.

By sending 150 or so military advisers to Georgia, America is attempting to bolster the country's security forces. But even that programme has been undermined by Georgian officers with connections in Russia. If Russians are concerned about the security of their southern frontier, they would do better to reinforce Georgia's statehood rather than chip away at it. Georgia is neither a rogue state, nor (as yet) a failed one. Nor do Georgians need outsiders to orchestrate regime change for them. Imitation is a form of flattery, but others should not be duped into seeing parallels where none exist.

GRAPHIC: Russia would do better to bolster Georgia's stability, not undermine it

LOAD-DATE: September 21, 2002