Two hold a garment, Babylonian Talmud, Baba Mezi’a 2a

 

Negotiation, Fairness and Conflict Resolution

 

Two strategic issues in apologizing. In Simon Levin, ed., Games, Groups and the Global Good. Templeton Foundation, 2009.

 

A Talmudic Problem Involving Circles of Claims. Draft 2009.

 

Normative and Strategic Aspects of Transitional Justice (with Marek Kaminski and Monika Nalepa).  Journal of Conflict Resolution, June 2006.

  — introduction to a special issue on transitional justice edited by Marek and Monika and me.

 

What Good is a Disinterested, Powerless Mediator?  Draft

 

Partitioning a Population into Subgroups with Special Political Rights. International Studies Association, New Orleans, March 2002

 

Bargaining with an agenda. (with Dov Samet, Zvi Winer and Eyal Winter). Games and Economic Behavior. 2002. (Earlier version from the Center for Rationality reports.)

 

A question of procedure at the Vienna Arms talks. In Michael Intriligator and Urs Luterbacher, eds. Cooperative Game Models in International Relations. Boston: Kluwer. 1994.

 

Conflictual moves in bargaining: delays, threats, escalations and ultimata. In Peyton Young, ed., Negotiation Analysis. University of Michigan. 1991.

 

Structures for non-hierarchical organizations. Behavioral Science. 29, 61-77, 1984.

 

A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud. Mathematical Social Sciences. 2, 345-371, 1982.

  — Marek Kaminski's ingenious interpretation of some solutions as hydraulic systems.

  — William Thomson’s review of the subsequent literature up to 2003.

 

The number of outcomes in the Pareto-optimal set of discrete bargaining games. Mathematics of Operations Research. 6, 571-578, 1981. (Proves the Jimmy Durante theorem, as Roger Myerson calls it.)

 

Comparison of Bargaining Solutions, Utilitarianism and the Minimax Rule by Their Effectiveness. Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences Working Paper, Northwestern University, 1982.

 

 

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