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LINGUISTIC RESOURCES
FOR SOCIALIZING HUMANITY[1]

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1 Language socialization

Using language and participating in society are closely related activities in that using language is integral to social life and participating in society is integral to the process of making sense of linguistic constructions. It is difficult to imagine, on the one hand, how one might assign meanings to lexical, grammatical, phonological, and discursive structures without an understanding of the social situations which those structures depict. On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine how one might engage in social interactions, social institutions, social relationships, and other societal phenomena without the use of language. For better or for worse, language is our human medium for constructing a social order and a philosophy of taste, causality, knowledge, and experience. For those reasons, language can be viewed as a system of symbolic resources designed for the production and interpretation of social and intellectual activities. From this perspective, the acquisition of language and the acquisition of social and cultural competence are not developmentally independent processes, nor is one process a developmental prerequisite of the other. Rather, the two processes are intertwined from the moment a human being enters society (at birth, in the womb, or at whatever point local philosophy defines as "entering society"). Each process facilitates the other, as children and other novices come to a perspective on social life in part through signs and come to understand signs in part through social experience. In this sense, students of language acquisition need to reckon with the system of social and cultural structures that inform speaking and understanding in communities just as students of socialization need to reckon with the system of lexical, grammatical, phonological, and discursive structures that give meaning to facilitate social conduct and intellectual expertise in communities (see Bernstein 1964, Heath 1983, Hymes 1972, Ochs & Schieffelin 1984, Sapir [1927] 1963, for further discussion of this point).

A number of scholars have begun to examine language acquisition and socialization as an integrated process called *language socialization.*

Language socialization is the process whereby children and other novices are socialized through language, part of such socialization being a socialization to use language meaningfully, appropriately, and effectively (Schieffelin & Ochs 1986a, b). An important premise of language socialization research is that language socializes not only through its symbolic content but also through its *use*, i.e., through *speaking* as a socially and culturally situated activity. The emphasis in language socialization studies is not on how languages as symbolic systems encode local world-views (e.g. as lexical paradigms) and, as such, how acquisition of language (e.g. acquisition of lexical paradigms) entails acquisition of a world-view, in the vein of many ethnosemantic studies of linguistic relativity (e.g. Boas 1911, Conklin 1955, Whorf 1941). Rather the emphasis is on language *praxis*, what Sapir called "fashions of speaking" (Sapir 1963). A prevailing perspective in language socialization research is that language practices are socially organized and that, as novices recurrently engage in these practices with more expert members of society, they develop an understanding of social actions, events, emotions, esthetics, knowledgeability, statuses, relationships, and other socio-cultural phenomena. For example, I am socialized to understand and recognize who I am and who you are and what you and I are doing at any one moment in time in part because our linguistic practices characterize us and our actions in certain ways (i.e., give us and our actions meaning). In this sense, language praxis is a hand-maiden to culture, a medium for the passing of cultural knowledge from one generation to the next. Language socialization research reports this version of linguistic relativity, one that emphasizes the socializing power of *parole* (utterances).

This focus on language practices as resources for socializing social and cultural competence links language socialization research to post-structural sociological paradigms that portray *social structures as outcomes of social practices* (see Practice Theory [Bourdieu 1977], Structuration Theory [Giddens 1979]) and to psychological paradigms that portray *cognitive structures as outcomes of speaking* (see Slobin, this volume, for a discussion of "thinking for speaking") *and of social interaction* (see Cicourel 1973, 1980, 1989; Cole 1990; Cole & Griffin 1987: Engeström 1987, 1990; Lave & Wenger 1991; Leont'ev 1981a, b; Rogoff 1990; Rogoff & Gardner 1984; Scribner & Cole 1981; Vygotsky 1978, among others).

A basic challenge of language socialization research has been to articulate the role of language praxis in the process of becoming a member of society. This challenge has been addressed largely by detailed studies of language socialization in particular communities and settings (see for example Bernstein 1964; Briggs 1984, 1986; Cook-Gumperz 1973,

1981, 1986; Crago 1988; Eisenberg 1986; Goodwin 1990; Heath 1983; Kulick 1990; Miller 1982; Miller & Sperry 1988; Ochs 1988; Ochs, Taylor, Rudolf, & Smith 1992; Platt 1986; Schieffelin 1990; Scollon 1982, among others). The present chapter draws upon these studies to address two critical dilemmas.

The first dilemma concerns *how language practices encode and socialize information about society and culture*.[2] Since, typically, information about social identities, actions, stances, and the like is not made explicit (e.g. "This woman is an honoured guest," "We are telling a story," "This is a scientific fact"), how is such information otherwise conveyed? To say simply that the meaning of utterances is indeterminate is not itself illuminating vis-à-vis understanding the relation of linguistic form to the socialization of culture. We need to delve into the notion of indeterminacy to see if there is an architecture therein, much like other researchers seek order within chaos (Prigogine & Stengers 1984, Briggs & Peat 1989). In the discussion to follow, the process of language socialization will be related to the capacity of language practices to *index* socio-cultural information.

A second dilemma is the relation of language socialization not just to local culture but to *human culture* as a species phenomenon. We have for so long pigeon-holed culture as antithetical to universals of human nature that we have scarcely attended to culture as a singularly human enterprise. "Cultural universal" is not an oxymoron. A universal of human behavior is not necessarily an outcome of innate mechanisms; it may be an outcome of pan-species commonalties in the human accommodation to, and structuring of, social life. Without diminishing the importance of differences, it is important to recognize these commonalties as facilitating social co-ordination across social groups. What does this imply about language socialization? One implication is that human beings across societies may be using language in similar ways to both structure their environment and socialize novices. One challenge of language socialization research is to present candidate universals in the relation of language to socialization and the structuring of culture.

To this end, in this chapter I draw on diverse studies in pragmatics, sociolinguistics, conversation analysis, and linguistic anthropology to formulate three principles (the principles of indexicality, universal culture, and local culture) concerning the indexing and socializing of culturally relevant information through language practices and the scope of these processes across human societies. For purposes of this discussion, culture is here conceptualized as a set of socially recognized and organized practices and theories for acting, feeling, and knowing, along with their material and institutional products, associated with membership in a social group.

2 The Indexicality Principle

The fields of pragmatics, linguistic anthropology, sociolinguistics, conversation analysis, and ethnomethodology all articulate ways in which the meaning of cultural forms, including language, is a function of how members engage these forms in the course of their social conduct. By now it is generally appreciated that members use cultural forms, including linguistic forms within their code repertoires, variably according to their conceptualization of the social situation at hand. In the social sciences "situation" is usually broadly conceived and includes socio-cultural dimensions a member activates to be part of the situation at hand such as the *temporal and spatial locus* of the communicative situation, the *social identities* of participants, the *social acts* and *activities* taking place, and participants' *affective and epistemic stance*. For purposes of this discussion, situational dimensions other than space and time are preliminarily defined as follows:

social identity encompasses all dimensions of social personae, including roles (e.g. speaker, overhearer, master of ceremonies, doctor, teacher, coach), relationships (e.g. kinship, occupational, friendship, recreational relations), group identity (e.g. gender, generation, class, ethnic, religious, educational group membership), and rank (e.g. titled and untitled persons, employer and employee), among other properties;

social act refers to a socially recognized goal-directed behavior, e.g. a request, an offer, a compliment;

activity refers to a sequence of at least two social acts, e.g. disputing, storytelling, interviewing, giving advice;

affective stance refers to a mood, attitude, feeling, and disposition, as well as degrees of emotional intensity vis-à-vis some focus of concern (Ochs & Schieffelin 1984, Labov 1984, Levy 1984);

epistemic stance refers to knowledge or belief vis-à-vis some focus of concern, including degrees of certainty of knowledge, degrees of commitment to truth of propositions, and sources of knowledge, among other epistemic qualities (Chafe & Nichols 1986).

Every novice enters a fluid, sometimes volatile, social world that varies in certain conventional, non-random ways. Membership is accrued as novices begin to move easily in and out of linguistically configured situations. As they do so, novices build up associations between particular forms and particular identities, relationships, actions, stances, and the like. A basic tenet of language socialization research is that *socialization is in part a process of assigning situational, i.e., indexical, meanings* (e.g. temporal, spatial, social identity, social act, social activity, affective or epistemic meanings) to particular forms (e.g. interrogative

forms, diminutive affixes, raised pitch and the like). I will refer to this tenet as the Indexicality Principle. To index is to point to the presence of some entity in the immediate situation-at-hand. In language, an index is considered to be a linguistic form that performs this function (Lyons 1977, Peirce 1955). Peirce, for example, defines index as follows:

[An index is] a sign, or representation, which refers to its object not so much because of any similarity or analogy with it, nor because it is associated with general characters which that object happens to possess, as because it is in dynamical (including spatial) connection both with the individual object, on the one hand, and with sense or memory of the person for whom it serves as a sign, on the other hand.   (Peirce 1955: 107).

A linguistic index is usually a structure (e.g. sentential voice, emphatic stress, diminutive affix) that is used variably from one situation to another and becomes conventionally associated with particular situational dimensions such that when that structure is used, the form invokes those situational dimensions.[3]

An example of linguistic indexing of *affective stance* is provided in (1) below. Affect is richly indexed in all languages of the world (see Ochs & Schieffelin 1984). In addition to indexing particular kinds of affect (e.g. positive affect, negative affect), languages also index degrees of affective intensity. "Intensity operates on a scale centered about the zero, or unmarked expression, with both positive (aggravated or intensified) and negative (mitigated or minimized) poles" (Labov 1984: 44). In (1), a stance of heightened affect is indexed in the immediate situation through the use of the following structures in English: quantifiers ("all over," "a lot") as well as emphatic stress (e.g. "a lot," "that long"), phonological lengthening (e.g. "s::-so," "jus::t"), interjections ("Go:d"), laughter, and repetition (e.g. "I didn't eat one bit I didn't take one bite").[4]

(1) Mother approaches her two children (Jimmy and Janet), who are eating dinner. Jimmy has just commented that Janet has drowned her meat in A1 sauce and compares this with how he used to drown his pancakes in syrup:

→ Jimmy   when I had pancakes one- pancakes (that) one time?
→   I like syrup? I put syrup? - all over my pancakes
→   and a lot - an - I didn't eat one bit I didn't take one
→   bite - I took some bites but =
     Mother: = when was that?
     Jimmy: a long time ago? - bout ((tosses head)) ten? - ten years old?
              - a:nd - the: [(Ja)
→ Mother: [(that wasn't that long
→ Jimmy: (well who knows) - but um th- the pancake- it was
→   s::-so soft (you) could - like (break) it with your -

→   - ju::st (pull it off) - Go:d hh
                      ((pause))
      Jimmy: (I) tried to scrape some of it off but hchehe
                      ((pause)) ((TV going))
      Mother: just sinks in

A second example of indexicality focuses on the indexing of *social identity*. This example is taken from interaction between two siblings in a Western Samoan household. Western Samoan society is elaborately hierarchical, with ranking on the basis of title, generation, and age among the variables. Traditional expectations assume that higher-ranking parties to an interaction will be less physically active than lower-ranking parties. Hence directives using the deictic verbs *sau*, 'come,' and *alu*, 'go,' are appropriately addressed to those of lower rank (Platt 1986). Within the analytic framework of the present chapter, we consider these verbs to index not only spatial dimensions but social relational dimensions of the social situation as well. In particular, the verbs *sau* and *alu* index that the speaker is of a higher rank than the addressee. In example (2), Mauga addresses her younger sibling Matu'u (2 years 2 months), with each instance of the deictic verbs indicating the asymmetrical nature of their relationship:

   (2) Matu'u's older sister, Mauga, is sitting at the front edge of the
         house. Matu'u is at the back of the house:

→   Mauga: *Matu' u sau*
                     Matu'u, come here.'

→   *Matu'u sau*
                     Matu'u, come here.'
                     ((Matu'u goes to Mauga))

→   *alu mai sau 'ie*
                     'Go get a piece of clothes (for you).'

→   *Alu amai le mea solo ai lou isu*
                     'Go get it to wipe your nose.'

→   *kamo' e, alu e amai le solosolo 'ua e loa 'ua e loa*
                     'Hurry, go get the handkerchief, you know, you know.'

When we examine the situational meanings linguistic structures index, certain situational dimensions appear to be grammaticized more than other dimensions across language communities. Pragmatic studies attest to rich indexical systems referring to *time* and *space* (Fillmore 1982, Hanks 1990, Lyons 1982, Talmy 1983). Less recognized is the fact that, in many languages, *affective* and *epistemic stance* is encoded at many levels of linguistic structure. For example, degrees of certainty are indexed

through sentential adverbs, hedges, presuppositional structures (e.g. cleft constructions, determiners), and sentential mood (e.g. interrogative mood indexing uncertainty/unknowing state), among other structures. As example (1) attests, affective stance is also elaborately indexed through grammatical structures such as diminutives, augmentatives, quantifiers, verb voice, sentential adverbs, and intonation (see Labov 1984, Ochs & Schieffelin 1989). While *social identity* is indexed across the world's language communities through pronominal systems and honorific morphology among the structures, social identity does not appear to be grammaticized through a wide diversity of grammatical structures, in comparison to grammatical resources for indexing time, space, and affective/epistemic stance.

Furthermore, other situational dimensions such as *social acts* and *social activities* are even less widely grammaticized. Thus while *act* meanings may be indexed through sentential mode, e.g. interrogatives (which might, in certain circumstances, for example, index that one is performing the act of asking a question), imperatives (which might, in certain circumstances, for example, index that one is performing the acts of commanding or reprimanding), and declaratives (which might, in certain circumstances, index that one is performing the act of asserting); relatively few grammatical structures directly index act meanings. Indeed a case could be made that interrogative, imperative, and declarative modes are not indexing act meanings but instead epistemic stance meanings, e.g. interrogative foregrounding relative uncertainty. (The relation between stance and social act meanings will be discussed in section 2.2.)

Similarly, while the use of specialized lexicons, e.g. legalese, may index particular social activities, e.g. a trial, it is difficult to locate grammatical structures that directly index activity meanings. Are there grammatical structures that directly index that one is having an argument, making a decision, giving directions, coaching, or attempting to solve a problem at hand? As will be discussed below, the indexing of social activities may be accomplished through the indexing of other situational dimensions, e.g. the indexing of narrative activity may be accomplished through the indexing of historical present time.

It is important to stress at this point that the assignment of situational meanings is a complex, interactionally accomplished process. Interlocutors have available to them a reserve of linguistic structures – some grammatical, others discursive – that are conventionally associated with particular situational dimensions. Interlocutors may use these structures to index a particular identity, affect, or other situational meaning; however, others co-present may not necessarily assign the same meaning. This circumstance is captured by Searle's distinction between illocutionary act

(act meaning intended by performer) and perlocutionary act (act meaning interpreted by others) where illocutionary and perlocutionary act meanings are not the same (Searle 1970). Cases of indexical breakdown have also been central to Gumperz's study of "crosstalk" wherein interlocutors project different contexts of situation from linguistic "contextualization cues" (Gumperz 1982). In some cases of crosstalk, the discrepancy in interpretation goes by unnoticed as interlocutors strive to interact as if they do understand one another. In other cases, mutual understanding may be sought and sometimes jointly achieved through conversational devices such as repair structures (Schegloff, Jefferson, & Sacks 1977) or other types of negotiation.

It is also important to note before going on that assignment of indexical meaning involves more than perception of a single linguistic form alone. Rather, the situational interpretation of any one linguistic form is an outcome of its relation to co-occurring linguistic forms in the prior and present discourse structure, to subjective understandings of the propositional content of the utterances thus far and of the activity those utterances are constituting as well as subjective understandings of gestures and other dimensions of the non-vocal setting (see Brown & Levinson 1979, Ochs 1988, 1990, 1992, Silverstein 1987).

Indexical knowledge is at the core of linguistic and cultural competence and is the locus where language acquisition and socialization interface (Ochs 1990). A novice's understanding of linguistic forms entails an understanding of their indexical potential (i.e. the situational constellations of by whom, for what, when, where and to what ends forms are conventionally employed) in co-ordination with co-occurring linguistic forms and other symbolic dimensions of the situation at hand. A novice's understanding of social order similarly crucially relies on an understanding of how that order is linguistically realized moment by moment over interactional time.

As early as the first year of life, infants begin to be attuned to the indexical meanings of particular structures. For example, infants confronting novel objects will monitor the voice quality and intonation of significant others (along with facial gestures) as indexes of their stances towards that object, an activity developmentalists call "social referencing" (Campos & Stenberg 1981: Klinnert, Campos, Sorce, Emde & Svejda 1983). This observation is supported by developmental phonologists, who note that children at the single-word stage can discern and respond appropriately to culturally relevant emotional stances indexed by diverse intonational contours (Cruttenden 1986, Halliday 1973, Peters 1977). Young children also grasp indexical meanings of morphological structures. For example, Platt's observations of children at the single-word and two-word stage in Western Samoa suggest that they have

considerable understanding of the social rank indexed by specific verbs (Platt 1986). In particular, Samoan children grasp that the deictic verbs *sau*, 'come,' and *alu*, 'go,' can be used in directives only to inferiors, but that *aumai*, 'give,' in the imperative (begging) can be directed to kin regardless of status. As a consequence, Samoan children produce the semantically more complex form 'give' earlier and more often than the less complex forms 'come' and 'go.' Children at this stage of life appropriately address 'come' to animals, the only appropriate lower-status creatures. At this same period of development, Samoan children are able to appropriately switch between two different phonological registers and use competently the affect-marked (sympathy stance) pronoun *ta' ita*, 'poor me,' to index stance (Ochs 1988). Similarly, Kaluli children in Papua New Guinea master the affect-marked (appeal stance) pronoun *nel*, 'to me (appeal),' by two years of age (Schieffelin 1990).

Researchers have also observed that two- to four-year-old English-speaking children understand so-called indirect act meanings (e.g. indirect requests) indexed by co-occurring grammatical structures (e.g. indirect word order, pronouns) (Shatz 1983), and children as young as four vary linguistic structures according to social status of addressee (Shatz & Gelman 1973). By the age of five, English-speaking children understand and use productively linguistic forms that index social relationships such as doctor–patient, teacher–student, parent–child, and native–foreigner (Andersen 1977).

2.1 Indexical property of constitutiveness

The Sapir–Whorf hypothesis promotes the notion that language does not merely mirror "reality," it also shapes it. While deterministic interpretations of this generalization have been refuted, there lingers among anthropologists and sociologists of language the notion that nonetheless language does structure the phenomenological world. This notion is foregrounded in Austin's notion of performatives as verbal predicates that bring about social actions through their utterance (Austin 1962), in conversation analyses of how turn organization structures future interactional moves (Goodwin & Goodwin 1987; Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson 1974; Schegloff 1987), and in studies of how situationally bound linguistic forms bring into being particular social situations (Brown & Levinson 1979, Goodwin & Duranti 1992, Hanks 1990, Ochs 1988, 1990, 1992, Silverstein 1993). In some cases the linguistic forms may bring about the same situational definition for all participants but, in other cases, participants may use the linguistic forms to construct divergent situations (Gumperz 1982).

This property of language means that, when interlocutors use indexical forms, they may *constitute* some social structure in the immediate situation at hand. For example, in (2), Mauga uses the deictic verbs not only to indicate that she is of higher rank than her younger sibling, Matu'u, but also to bring that ranking into the situation at the moment. In using the deictic verbs, Mauga is both attempting to define her relationship with Matu'u and socializing Matu'u into the social indexical scope of these grammatical forms. When Matu'u complies with Mauga's directives to 'come' and 'go,' she ratifies Matu'u's definition of the relationship for that moment. This is not to say that all socialization is characterized by compliance and ratification on the part of the children and other novices. In some cases, novices (including children) struggle to redefine, i.e., to reconstitute, their relationship to more knowing members of the community. The important point is that interlocutors, including experts and novices, build up definitions of situations turn-by-turn, moment-by-moment, in the course of their interaction.

In this perspective, members of societies are agents of culture rather than merely bearers of a culture that has been handed down to them and encoded in grammatical form. The constitutive perspective on indexicality incorporates the post-structural view that the relation between person and society is dynamic and mediated by language. In an intellectual era that has brought paradigms such as practice theory and cultural psychology into academic parlance, we have come to entertain the notion that, while person and society are distinguishable, they are integral. Person and society enter into a dialectical relation in that they act on each other, draw upon each other, and transform each other. In such paradigms, while society helps define a person, a person also helps to (re)define society.

Socialization in this constitutive view is not a uni-directional transaction from member to novice but rather a *synthetic, interactional achievement* where novice is an active contributor. In this view as well, while language is a socio-historical product, language is also an instrument for forming and transforming social order. Interlocutors actively use language as a semiotic tool (Vygotsky 1978) to either reproduce social forms and meanings or produce novel ones. In reproducing historically accomplished structures, interlocutors may use conventional forms in conventional ways to constitute the local social situation. For example, they may use a conventional form in a conventional way to call into play a particular gender identity. In other cases, interlocutors may bring novel forms to this end or use existing forms in innovative ways. In both cases, interlocutors wield language to (re)constitute their interlocutory environment. Every social interaction in this sense has the potential for both cultural persistence and change, and past and future are manifest in the interactional present.

2.2 Indexical valences

Many pragmatic and anthropological linguistic studies of indexicality tend to focus on only *one* situational dimension associated with *one* set of linguistic forms. For example, several decades ago, Whorfian-inspired research tended to analyze a single ethno-semantic situational domain, such as time (Whorf 1956). Pragmatic studies within linguistics and philosophy also analyze lexical and grammatical systems that appear to index a single situational dimension, e.g. pragmatic studies of honorific systems that index social identity (Comrie 1976, Kuno 1973), evidential systems that index epistemic stance (Chafe & Nichols 1986), or performative predicates that index social acts (e.g. Austin 1962, Searle 1970). The situational dimension chosen for analysis is usually grammaticized or lexically expressed in complex and interesting ways. Further, that situational dimension seems to be the foreground semantic field – i.e., the conventional, recognized meaning – that is associated with those particular linguistic forms.

In all societies, however, members have knowledge of norms, preferences and expectations that relate particular indexical dimensions to one another. That is, in all societies, members have tacit under-standings of norms, preferences, and expectations concerning how situational dimensions such as time, space, affective stance, epistemic stance, social identity, social acts, and social activities cluster together. For example, the Rundi as described by Albert (1972: 82) expect high-ranking men in public settings to exhibit a detached stance:

Caste stereotypes represent those in the upper strata of society as never raising their voices or allowing anger or other emotions to show...That total, glacial silence of a perfectly immobile Mututsi who has chosen not to speak has to be experienced to be appreciated. To all appearances, the silence can be maintained indefinitely and in the face of every known technique of provocation, domestic or imported.

To consider another example, in middle-class American families, the role of mother is associated with the acts of eliciting and initiating family stories during family dinnertime (Ochs & Taylor 1992). Performing these acts is part of what is expected of a middle-class mother. Other acts associated with mothers of this social group include praising children and verbally guessing at their unintelligible utterances (Ochs 1988). One way of considering such cultural associations is to think of particular situational dimensions as linked to other situational dimensions through socially and culturally constructed *valences*. Somewhat like elements in a chemical compound, these valences show how a particular situational dimension is linked to other situational dimensions (e.g. among the Rundi, the situational display of detachment has valences that link it to

high status). Fundamental to membership in a community is knowledge of the valences that link one situational circumstance to another.[5]

Because particular situational dimensions (e.g. particular stances, acts, statuses etc.) are linked through socio-cultural valences, the realization of any one situational dimension (e.g. the linguistic indexing of a particular stance) may invoke or *entail* (for members of particular communities) other culturally relevant situational dimensions (Ochs 1990, Ochs 1992, Silverstein 1993). While a number of studies of language use dwell on the relation of linguistic forms to only one situational dimension and ignore situational dimensions socio-culturally linked to that dimension, other studies – predominantly linguistic anthropological studies – consider a range of situational dimensions socio-culturally entailed by a set of linguistic forms (see Brown & Levinson 1979, 1987, Duranti 1984, 1990 Gumperz 1982, Hanks 1990, Haviland 1989, Ochs 1988, 1992, Sehieffelin 1981, 1990, Silverstein 1993). From a current linguistic anthropological perspective, indexicality does not stop at one situational domain. For example, for members of Rundi society, the linguistic forms that index an affective stance of detachment also index (because of socio-cultural valences that link situational dimensions) a particular social status. In other communities, reported speech forms (e.g. "they say") index more than an epistemic stance (indirect knowledge). Depending on community and circumstance within the community, reported speech forms may also index a range of situational dimensions including the act of reporting and/or some degree of authoritative status of the speaker vis-à-vis the expressed proposition. Relations of entailment among situational dimensions may vary across social groups even within the same language community. For example, for certain patients in the United States, knowledge that some party is a medical doctor may entail the stances of being knowledgeable, objective, and caring, and a set of actions and activities (medical procedures). On the other hand, for the community of medical personnel, such entailments do not necessarily hold. Indeed medical personnel assume medical doctors will display a range of knowledgeability, acts, and activities, and, in certain contexts (e.g. in grand rounds), will scrutinize one another's stance and practices (Cicourel 1989).

It is important to distinguish the range of situational dimensions that a form (set of forms) *potentially* indexes from the range of situational dimensions that a form (set of forms) *actually* indexes in a particular instance of use (in the mind of any participating interlocutor – speaker, addressee, overhearer, etc). The indexical potential of a form derives from a history of usage and cultural expectations surrounding that form. When a form is put to use in dialog, the range of situational dimensions that particular form indirectly helps to constitute and index is configured in a particular way. Not all situational meanings are necessarily entailed.

Indexical valences and entailed indexicality are useful constructs in understanding linguistic relativity, for they are powerful linguistic vehicles for socializing novices into the cultural structuring of everyday life. Knowledge of entailed situated meanings of particular indexical forms offers a wedge into how members construe their local worlds. Language acquisition and language socialization can be seen as unfolding understanding of the indexical potential of particular linguistic forms and the skill to apply that understanding to construct situations with other interlocutors.

2.3 The centrality of stance

Section 2.2 stresses the point that situational dimensions are linked by socio-cultural valences (i.e. expectations, preferences, norms) such that the calling into consciousness of one particular dimension may culturally entail other relevant dimensions. A way of recouching relations of entailment that obtain among situational dimensions (for members of a social group) is to view situational dimensions entailed by some other situational dimension as components that help to constitute the meaning of that situational dimension. Thus, in the case of the Rundi, a component of the meaning of upper caste (social identity) is impassivity (affective stance) in public. Or the converse: a component of the meaning of impassivity (affective stance) is the social identity of upper caste (as well as any other social identity to which those stances are linked). Similarly, as noted earlier, in the minds of many patients in the United States part of the meaning of medical doctor (social identity) is the set of stances of being knowledgeable, objective, and caring, as well as the activity of diagnosis (Cicourel 1989). Or the converse: part of the meaning of the cluster of stances "knowledgeable, objective, and caring" is the social identity of medical doctor (as well as any other social identity to which those stances are linked). Likewise, particular temporal dimensions are socio-culturally linked to affective stances (Hanks 1990) and as such can help to constitute the meaning of particular affective stances. For example, for many speakers of English, the temporal dimension of the present moment, "now," may help to constitute a stance of affective intensity (as in the utterance "Now look at what you have done"). And as well, for many speakers of English, the stance of affectivity/intensity is part of the meaning of "now."

Any situational dimension (any temporal/spatial dimension, affective/epistemic stance, social act, social activity, social identity) can in theory help to constitute the meaning of any other situational meaning. In this section, I focus on affective and epistemic stance and propose that these stances are central meaning components of social acts and social

identities and that linguistic structures that index epistemic and affective stances are the basic linguistic resources for constructing/realizing social acts and social identities. Epistemic and affective stance has, then, an especially privileged role in the constitution of social life. This role may account in part for why stance is elaborately encoded in the grammars of many languages.

2.3.1 Stance as a component of social acts
2.3.1.1 Affective stance

In all communities, affective stances are socio-culturally linked to social acts, in the minds of speakers (illocutionary acts), of hearers (perlocutionary acts), or of both speakers and hearers. For example, sadness may be conventionally linked to condolences, negative affect to complaints, positive affect to praises, and so on. We can think of these relations constitutively in the sense that particular affects help to constitute the meaning of particular acts. Where these affects are indexed by a linguistic form, that form may also constitutively index associated social acts. Example (3) illustrates an interaction between a Samoan mother and child in which the selection of a particular variant of the Samoan first person pronoun *ta 'ita* conventionally indexes the affective stance of sympathy or love for the referent ('poor me'). This affective stance, however, helps to constitute the meaning of the act performed in (3), namely begging. In (3), the use of *ta 'ita* then not only indexes sympathy/love, it also constitutes and indexes the social act of begging:[6]

(3)   K (1 year 7 months) with mother, who holds food

K	Mother
((crying)) //*mai* /	//*(leai) leai*/
'give (it)'	'(no) no'
((calls name of mother))	
	'o le a
	'what is it?'
→ *(i)ta*/	
'for) dear me'	

In Samoan, there are two alternate forms (*a'u*, 'I' and *ta 'ita* 'dear me') for referring to the first person. Only *ta 'ita* indexes a sympathetic affective stance. *Ta 'ita* is conventionally used by Samoan speakers to both give and elicit sympathy. It is used to console and to appeal. In this segment of interaction, K first uses the verb *mai*, 'give,' with a crying tone of voice. These structures help to constitutively index a demand, which

the mother rejects. K then elicits his mother's attention again and utters the sympathy-marked pronoun *ita* (a form of *ta 'ita*). While foregrounding the affect of sympathy for self, this form in this context (i.e. following the expression of *mai*, 'give') transforms the demand into begging. If the child had used the more affect-neutral pronoun *a' u*, 'I', the act might not be necessarily interpreted as begging despite the child's use of crying. *Ita* alters the meaning of the utterance sequence to cumulatively mean something like 'Have pity and give it to this wretched soul.' A similar pronoun in Kaluli (Papua New Guinea), *nel* 'to me (appeal),' not only indexes sympathetic affect but is central to defining acts of appeal, and is frequently used by two-year-olds in appealing for the breast (Schieffelin 1990).

In much the same way as the affect markers *ta 'ita* in Samoan and *nel* in Kaluli are central to constituting the acts of begging/appeal, so the use of respect vocabulary in Samoan and many other languages may be a central affective component of requests. The potential range of act meanings entailed by respect vocabulary, as with other affective forms, is large. Depending upon other co-occurring structures and circumstances, interlocutors hearing a switch from everyday to respect vocabulary try to interpret the nature of the social act being constituted through this display of deferential affect. In the course of fieldwork, our research group was often visited by members of the Samoan community who knew us well and spoke to us informally. Occasionally these same folks approached using respect vocabulary. During these occasions, we came to understand that these expressions of deference (e.g. *maalie lou finangalo*, 'please your wish') were helping to constitute a request for an item of some magnitude such as a loan or a ride into town.

Linguistic structures that index affective **intensity** also help to define acts. In the examples below taken from American family interactions, intensity markers such as emphatic stress, loudness, syllable lengthening, intensifying adverbs ("freezing cold"), interjections ("BU::::RR"), as well as repetition, index not only affect but also the act of **complaining**:

(4)   Mother, Father, and Grandfather, and three children [Heddi, Sharon, and Kit] are eating dinner:

→ Heddi:	the PEAS are CO::::LD!
Mother:	what ((*to Heddi*))
Sharon:	((*while tapping plate with fork*)) [( )
Kit	[mu mu mu mu mum
→ Heddi:	[these peas are cold!
Mother:	(it won't hurt/okay) -
	((*to Father*)) were- were your peas [cold when you ate 'em?
Kit:	((*Kit continues to struggle and whimper*))

Father: I didn't eat 'em - I (haven't had/didn't have) any yet
          ((pause))
Mother   ((to Kit)) just a minute I'll get you some mo:re
→ Sharon: BU:::[:RR!
   ?:   (what's a matter Sharon)
→ Sharon   bur[r these peas are cold!
   Heddi: [they're f- ((as she looks into pan for more food))
   Mother: oh=
→ Heddi: =they're freezing co::ld!

Other examples, from this same family dinner, of affect intensifiers (e.g. emphatic stress) that help constitute complaints include:

(5) Heddi's complaint about the spare rib she is eating:

Heddi: this huge thing, I can't even chew it ((throws down bone on plate))

(6) Father's complaint about the way in which Heddi is choosing a slice of cantaloupe from the serving bowl:

Heddi: ((Heddi is searching bowl for a slice and looks several times to compare sizes with Sharon's slice))
→ Father: ((annoyed)) Pick one Heddi and stop (this) diggin' around.

2.3.1.2 Epistemic stance

As noted earlier, epistemic stance includes qualities of one's knowledge, such as degrees of certainty as to the truth of a proposition and sources of knowledge, including perceptual knowledge, hearsay knowledge, commonsense knowledge, and scientific knowledge, among other phenomena. These stances in turn may be constitutive of social acts. For example, in example (7) below, the use of the epistemic indexical term "maybe" as a postscript to the earlier utterance "finish chewing and then you may talk" constitutively indexes not only relative uncertainty but also an act meaning something on the order of an implied threat or perhaps a warning:

(7) Mother, Father, and two children (Susan and Artie) are eating dinner. Susan talks with food in her mouth:

Mother: ((deliberately, to Susan)) finish chewing. and then you may talk
Artie: ((takes a noisy gasp for air))
→ Mother: ((continuing in same tone of voice to Susan)) maybe

Samoan has a sentence-final particle e which functions in a similar way to this post-completion use of "maybe" in English, as illustrated in (8):[7]

(8) In a Samoan house, a mother is talking with one of her three children who is acting selfishly towards his siblings.

Mother: e   le   koe   fa'akau aa   mai
         TA NEG again buy   EMPH DEICT.PRT
         aa   sau   fagu   e:!
→   EMPH ANY.YOUR GUN EMPH

'she won't buy again any water pistol for you (unless you shape up)!'

Here the Samoan particle e marks a future world that might come true if certain behaviors continue that the speaker does not condone. As with the use of "maybe" in example (7), the particle helps to constitute the utterance as a conditional threat or a warning. In both examples (7) and (8), the speaker is threatening to possibly withdraw something the addressee desires: in (7), to talk, in (8), to have a water pistol.

The recent monograph by M. H. Goodwin (Goodwin 1990) about the discourse of pre-adolescent Black children vividly displays how these speakers lace their utterances with epistemic forms that lend definition to the act meanings in play. In (9) below, Ruby uses the epistemic verb "know" both to constitutively index her certain knowledge about the proposition "it's a free world" and to construct a **challenge** to Stacey's possible assumption that "it's a free world" is news to Ruby:

(9) Stacey: Fight yourself.
     Ruby: Well you **make** me fight myself.
     Stacey: I can't **make** you. Cuz it's a free world.
→   Ruby: I **know** it's a free world.   (Goodwin 1990: 154)

Similarly, the children used modal verbs such as "can" and "could" to constitutively index not only the epistemic stance of possible or uncertain worlds but also the act of **suggesting**, as displayed in the following utterances:

(10)a.
→   Bea: We could go around looking for more bottles.

b.
                  ((Discussing where to break bottle rims))
→   Martha: We **could** use a sewer.
                  ((Discussing keeping the activity secret from boys))
→   Kerry: We can limp back so nobody know where we
                  gettin' them from.   (Goodwin 1990: 111)

2.3.2 Stance as a component of social identity

As noted earlier, "social identity" encompasses participant roles, positions, relationships, reputations, and other dimensions of social personae. In all societies, these identities are conventionally linked to affective and epistemic stances. One way of considering affective and epistemic stances is to see them as perspectives independent of social identities, which members expect of those who hold those identities. For example, we might consider the stances of being knowledgeable, objective, and caring as perspectives independent of the social identity of medical doctor in the United States. Similarly, we might consider the stances of hesitancy and delicacy as independent of female gender identity in Japanese society (Cook 1988). On the other hand, another way of considering stances is to view them as not outside the category of social identity. They do not merely point to a social identity but rather *help to constitute* that identity. In the case of medical doctor, one may display the stances of knowledgeability, objectivity, and care to build a certain kind of medical professional identity. In radically different circumstances, a Japanese woman may display hesitancy and delicacy to create a female gender identity for the situation at hand.

In all societies, members may vary which stances they display and in so doing build different sorts of social identities. In Japanese society, females do not necessarily display hesitancy and delicacy in every situation but rather select when to display these stances. Women the world over may play up or play down their female gender identity. They build their social personae using stance displays variably within and across social interactions (Cook 1988, Ohta in press). In West & Zimmerman's language (1987), a woman may choose to "do gender" or "do being female" to varying degrees and in different ways. In like manner, one may opt for "doing being mother," "doing being son-in-law," "doing being grandparent," or even "doing being baby" (as when two-year-old "reverts" to a baby identity when an infant sibling arrives home from the hospital).

Fluidity in stance and social identity is characteristic of institutional interactions as well. For example, a medical doctor may vary his or her stances within the same interaction with a patient or with a medical peer to create different professional identities at the moment, e.g. shifting between stances of greater or lesser certainty to create more or less authoritarian professional identities (Cicourel 1989, Fisher 1991). Similarly, Jacoby & Gonzales (1991) document how the director of a physics laboratory in the United States and the graduate students within the laboratory fluctuate between the role of expert and that of novice by modulating their displays of epistemic stance from certainty to uncertainty even while on the same topic in the same laboratory meeting. Even in highly prescribed, formal

interactions, participants have some fluidity in the social identities they enact. In highly formal decision-making councils (*fono*) in Western Samoa, for example, all the participants have the title of orator or high chief and each of these titles is ranked with respect to another tradition. Yet in any one meeting or even at any one point in the meeting, the participants may constitutively index themselves in a different, usually lower, status through the stances they linguistically and non-linguistically display (Duranti 1981).

3　The Universal Culture Principle

Section 2 of this chapter addressed "The display dilemma" (i.e., how does language display and socialize cultural knowledge?) by articulating ways in which linguistic practices index, constitute, and entail socio-cultural dimensions of situations. But what about "The scope dilemma" (i.e., what are the cultural boundaries of language socialization?)? Do these principles preclude the possibility of non-absolutive universals in the linguistic structuring of human culture? I think not. Culture is not only tied to the local and unique, it is also a property of our humanity and as such expected to assume some culturally universal characteristics across communities, codes, and users. Principle 2, the Universal Culture Principle, proposes that there are certain commonalties across the world's language communities and communities of practice in the linguistic means used to constitute certain situational meanings. This principle suggests that human interlocutors use certain similar linguistic means to achieve certain similar social ends. In this sense, the Universal Culture Principle is a limited (linguistic) means–ends principle. The principle is limited in the sense that it applies to some but not all indexical practices, in the sense that the common indexical practices may characterize many but not all communities, and in the sense that the indexical practices may give rise to unpredictable consequences; that is, linguistic means/social ends relations are inherently non-linear. Given these limitations, what is the basis for the Universal Culture Principle?

First, in all societies, linguistic forms are exploited to constitutively index the *general situational dimensions* of time and space, epistemic and affective stance, acts, activities, and identities (e.g. roles, relationships).

Second, within the dimensions of stance and social act, there are certain comparable categories of *stance and act meaning* across communities of speakers. For example, within the dimension of stance, epistemic categories such as relative certainty/uncertainty and experiential vs. reported knowledge are distinguished in many communities. Similarly, affective categories such as intensity/mitigation, surprise, positive and negative affect are indexed universally. Within the dimension of social act meanings, acts such as greeting,

asserting, prompting, thanking, agreeing, disagreeing, accepting, rejecting, refusing, approving, disapproving, reporting, announcing, prompting, asking questions, and requesting goods and services appear across the world's communities. Furthermore, there are common valences linking stance and act meanings across communities. Certain stance meanings are common critical meaning components of social acts that characterize culture universally; for example, uncertainty is an epistemic stance component of questioning, negative affect is an affective stance component of rejecting; positive affect is an affective stance component of thanking.

As noted earlier, these commonalties do not necessarily imply that the full social meanings of particular acts or particular stances are shared across communities. Indeed in all likelihood the rich network of valences and entailments will not be shared (Gumperz 1982, this volume). The valences and entailments that link stances and acts to, for example, social identities and activities may or may not span local community boundaries, may characterize universal culture or may characterize local culture. Candidate universal entailments may include the following.

In the realm of *social identities*, relatively low rank may be universally linked to stances and acts of accommodation. Interlocutors may universally display lower rank through displays of attention and willingness to take the point of view of a higher-ranking party or otherwise meet that party's wants or needs. By implication, these same stances and acts of accommodation universally mark the other party's higher rank. Higher rank as well may be universally linked to rights to direct others through such acts as ordering and summoning. In the realm of *activity* entailments, disputes probably universally entail at least one act of disagreement and a display of negative affect (not necessarily reflecting an interlocutor's psychological state); clarifications probably universally entail the stance of relative uncertainty and either a request to restate a proposition, an assertion of noncomprehension, or a request to confirm/disconfirm a guess; planning activities entail at least some act (e.g. a suggestion, a directive, an assertion) that presents a method for responding to a present or future problem; and story narratives entail at least one assertion about a past event that is understood as part of a temporally ordered sequence of events.

A third dimension of the linguistic structuring of universal culture is that certain *linguistic forms* are used across a wide spectrum of communities to constitutively index comparable stance and act meanings. For example, in the domain of *epistemic stance*, indirect knowledge is widely indexed through reported speech predicates and particles (e.g. "says," "reports"); uncertainty is widely indexed through modals (e.g. "can," "could," "may," "might"), rising intonation, and interrogative structures; and

certainty through factive predicates (e.g. "know," "realize"), determiners (e.g. "the"), cleft constructions and iteratives ("He's smoking again") (Levinson 1983). Candidate universals for the linguistic structuring of *affective stance* include the indexing of heightened affective intensity through the use of vowel lengthening ("It's co::ld"), modulating volume (as in shouting or whispering), modulating the pace of delivery (by speeding up or slowing down), switching to a marked form (e.g. using plural marking for a single referent, using demonstrative pronoun to refer to a person [in Italian, *quello*, 'that one,' instead of *lui*, 'him': Duranti 1984]), and code-switching between registers. Brown & Levinson's (1987) study of politeness indicates that numerous communities use similar linguistic forms to index affects of deference and sympathy. For example, sympathetic affect is widely indexed through diminutives (e.g. in Italian *orsettino*, 'cute little chubby bear,' versus *orso piccolo / piccolo orso*, 'little bear'), in-group address terms, and switching to a local variety.

Candidate universals in the linguistic structuring of *social acts* include the use of interrogative pronouns and syntax and rising intonation to constitutively index requests for information and requests for goods and services, the use of tag questions and particles to constitutively index requests for confirmations, and the use of imperatives and address terms to constitute summons (e.g. "Young man!") and orders. Further, probably all societies have affirmative and negative particles to constitutively index the acts of agreement and disagreement.

We will find candidate universals in the linguistic structuring of *social identities* and *activities* much less commonly than in the case of stances and acts. Universals in the linguistic indexing of social identities and activities are conditional in part on the extent to which identities and activities share similar stance and act components across communities and the extent to which these stances and acts are constitutively indexed through the same grammatical, lexical, and phonological forms across communities. A candidate universal may be the linguistic structuring of dispute activities to the extent that disputes entail a stance of negative affect and acts of disagreement and to the extent that negative affect and disagreement are constitutively indexed through such linguistic forms as negative particles and increased or decreased loudness. Another candidate universal may be the linguistic structuring of relatively low/ high rank to the extent that rank entails receiving or projecting a stance and acts of accommodation, particularly deferential stance and acts, and to the extent that deferential stances and acts are constitutively indexed through similar linguistic structures across societies, for example respect vocabularies, honorific marking, hedges, modals.

These suggested universals in the linguistic structuring of social life have implications for the scope of language socialization and for

communication across community lines. I am convinced that children and other novices around the world enjoy a common ground of socialization experiences. With respect to language as a socialization tool, I am convinced that experienced and novice members of most societies use language in certain similar ways to co-ordinate their interactions and to index and structure their social environments. That is, children and other novices may well be acquiring common linguistic strategies for structuring social life regardless of the society in which they seek membership.

These commonalties characterize our humanity, our human culture. They afford, i.e. allow for the possibility of (Gibson 1979), a singularly human conversation in which some ways of displaying stances, some ways of acting, and some ways of meaning are recognizable as we traverse local borders. As each of us treads on "foreign" territory, we discern some common indexical threads that link us to one another as members of one human cultural fabric. The challenge to all cultural travellers is to go beyond these commonalities to recognize distinctly local ways of indexing and constituting social situations and cultural meanings.

4 The Local Culture Principle

The Local Culture Principle proposes that local culture is constituted in part by the myriad of situationally specific valences that link time, space, stances, acts, activities, and identities. (I am not trying to reduce the texture of local culture to these variables.) Culturally distinct patterns in stance–act–activity–identity relations lie in cultural expectations regarding (a) the *scope* of stances and acts associated with particular activities and identities, (b) the *preferences* for particular stances and acts within particular activities and for particular social identities, and (c) the *extent* of particular stance and act displays within particular activities and for particular identities.

4.1 Local scope

Local cultures may differ in expectations concerning the kinds of stances and social acts to be displayed in a particular activity or by a person of a particular status and/or in a particular social relationship among interlocutors. Thus while certain stances and acts associated with relatively low and high rank may be universal (i.e. accommodating stances and acts), others may be quite particular to a local group. For example, while the social identity of high chief in traditional communities in Western Samoa entails certain of the same stances and social acts of high-ranking persons across societies (e.g. receiving deference, rights to

direct certain other parties to gain access to desired goods and services), other stances and acts are particular to Samoan chiefs. For example, in decision-making activities, chiefs have the right, and are expected, to express opinions to lower-ranking persons (in this case, orators), whereas lower-ranking persons are expected to make suggestions when invited to do so (Duranti 1981). For members of the Samoan community, the social identity of chief (and orator) has distinctly local act entailments. Another way of looking at this relation is to say that in this community, the act of giving an opinion in decision-making councils constitutively indexes the social identity of high chief. The act of giving an opinion in decision-making councils in other communities does not necessarily index and constitute such an identity or even high rank more generally. This particular constellation of act–identity valences/entailments is constitutive of local cultural knowledge that Samoan children eventually come to grasp and some may even come to challenge in light of their experiences in New-Zealand- and Australian-style school classrooms.

4.2 Local preference

In addition to differences in which stances and acts are linked to particular identities and activities, there are local differences in the stances and acts preferred by particular identities and for certain activities. For example, in the sequence of acts comprising the activity of clarification, language communities and communities of practice will differ in their preferences for one or another act strategy for achieving clarification of an unintelligible or partially intelligible message. These preferences may be across the board for all speakers and settings or may be tuned to specific situational conditions. In traditional communities of Western Samoa, speakers have available in their pragmatic repertoire all the clarification strategies listed earlier as possible universals. Certain of these strategies, however, are highly preferred and others highly dispreferred. In particular, in most circumstances, Samoan interlocutors overwhelmingly prefer either the act strategy of directing the party producing the unintelligible utterance to repeat or simply asserting non-comprehension and overwhelmingly disprefer the act strategy of verbally guessing the nature of the message (Ochs 1988). The dispreference for making an explicit guess is strongest in the condition where the party producing the unintelligible utterance is a young child. Of all the possible clarification strategies, explicit guessing requires the most cognitive accommodation in that the guesser presumably tries to assume the perspective of what the other may be thinking/intending, whereas simply stating that one does not understand or directing the other to repeat does not demand the same degree of accommodation. As noted earlier,

accommodation is a stance/act that constitutively indexes actors of lower rank. In the case where the child produces the troublesome utterance, others co-present are higher rank than the child, rendering inappropriate acts of explicit guessing.

4.3 Local extent

Communities are particular not only in their preferences for one act or stance strategy over another vis-à-vis particular identities and particular activities but also in the *extensiveness* of those stance and act displays by those identities and in those activities. For example, members of communities the world over engage in prompting activities constituted by discrete acts of prompting. These same communities, however, may differ quite dramatically in the extensiveness of the prompting activities, i.e., how long and complex the prompting is in general and in particular situational conditions (Ochs 1990, Schieffelin & Ochs 1988). It is certainly one of the more frustrating experiences for language socialization researchers to report on the cultural import of prompting activities among the Kaluli or Kwara'ae or White working-class Baltimore families only to hear from a member of the audience that prompting goes on among mainstream American families as well. Yes it does. Indeed it goes on in all communities as far as we can see. What gives prompting a cultural importance among Kaluli (Schieffelin 1990) or Kwara'ae (Watson-Gegeo & Gegeo 1986) or White working-class Baltimore (Miller 1982) families, among other things, is its complexity and duration. In these communities, prompting talk covers pages of transcript and is used in triadic (A prompts B to tell C) as well as dyadic (A prompts B to tell A) interactions across a wide range of interlocutory relationships to elicit a vast range of stance, act, and activity displays. The use of prompts in mainstream American families pales in comparison: prompting activities tend to boil down to a two-turn prompt sequence between an adult and a child to display politeness ("Say 'thank you'") or in routines such as labeling objects ("say 'bird'"), or occasional prompts in dyadic or triadic interactions to facilitate a child's storytelling.

Scope, preference, and duration are three dimensions that characterize how "locals" choreograph language distinctly to index and constitute what people are feeling, knowing, and acting and how they are defining themselves as social identities. The steps of this choreography are particularly important for children and other novices to acquire and they do so by participating centrally and peripherally (Lave & Wenger 1991) in locally choreographed interactional "performances" from birth on. Through these interactions, children come to understand the locally

entailed indexical meanings surrounding linguistic forms. It is this area of knowledge that seems so elusive to the culture-travellers, those who find themselves by accident, by choice, or by necessity living a multi-cultured life, perhaps without even moving outside their homes or neighborhoods. Cross-cultural communication tends to break down not because interlocutors do not understand one another at all, but rather because, from the perspective of one or another interlocutor, the stance or act display was not expected (a breakdown in the domain of "scope") or was unusual (a breakdown in the domain of "preference") or went on too long or not long enough for the particular social identity or activity underway (a breakdown in the domain of "extent"). Some understanding is shared but not all, and that difference between some and all makes a difference, generating the bases for culture shock and negative stereotyping.

5 Socializing humanity

The three principles of indexicality, universal culture, and local culture together suggest that indexicality is at the heart of language socialization. Even more strongly, the principles suggest that a theory of indexicality is a theory of socialization and that a theory of socialization is only as strong as the theory of indexicality that underlies it.

Additionally, the three principles indicate that language socialization is a more potent and more pervasive process than the reader might have imagined at the start of this essay. Language socialization is potent in the sense that, once novices understand that language has a constitutive potential, they have a semiotic tool not only for constructing a world that abides by historically achieved conventions but also for transcending that world to create alternative worlds for other interlocutors to ratify or challenge. We have only to look at the language of working women in management positions to see how their language practices constitute alternative conceptions of leadership in the workplace (e.g. decision-making as consensual versus authoritarian); or take a look at minority and female lawyers whose insistence on the use of personal narrative in legal argumentation challenges status quo expectations. Language socialization is potent in that it is our human medium for cultural continuity and change.

Language socialization is also pervasive. It is everywhere. All communities rely on language socialization to persist. All persons experience language socialization. What is more, language socialization is a lifelong enterprise. I have come to think of language socialization as a perspective on social interaction, rather than as a kind of social interaction. By this I mean that any social interaction can be examined

for what transpires between a less and a more knowing party in terms of constituting knowledge and/or skills. In all of our interactions, we sometimes act as the knowing party (expert) and sometimes as the unknowing party. Or, as my research colleague phrased it, like yin and yang, there is an expert and a novice in all of us (Taylor 1991). Depending on topic and circumstance, we linguistically index/constitute ourselves as either one or the other. I might add, as a final note, that the socialization of a humane world depends on a continual human willingness to assume the status of novice as parents, as teachers, and as culture-travelers.

Notes

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2 In posing the dilemma in this fashion, I do not wish to suggest that language socialization is exclusively a unidirectional process in which the language practices of competent members inculcate knowledge among novices. In the broader view of socialization held in this chapter, socialization is bidirectional in that the language practices of novices may socialize so-called "experts" as well as the reverse (see Ochs 1988, 1990, Jacoby & Gonzales 1991). Indeed it is the interaction of expert and novice language practices that generates knowledge and perspective among members of a social group at any one point in developmental or historical time.

3 A number of social scientists have examined different dimensions of indexicality and have created distinct terms in their analyses. The reader is referred to the essays of Bühler on "shifters" and "pointing words" (1934), Goffman on "keys," "frames" (1974), and "footing" (1981), Gumperz on "contextualization cues" (1981, 1982, this volume), Hanks on "deictic fields" and "deictic zones" (1990), Rommetveit on "co-ordinates" of the act of speech (1974), and Silverstein on presuppositional and creative indexicality (1987, 1992).

4 The transcription notation uses the following symbols. Square brackets denote the onset of simultaneous and/or overlapping utterances, for example:

Jimmy: a long time ago? - bout ((*tosses head*)) ten? - ten
         years old? - a:nd - the: [(Ja)
Mother:
                                  [(that) wasn't <u>that</u> long

Equals signs indicate contiguous utterances, in which the second is latched onto the first; or an utterance that continues beyond an overlapping utterance:

       Mother: oh=
→   Heddi: =they're freezing co::ld!

One or more colons represent an extension of the sound syllable it follows ("co::ld"); underlining indicates emphasis ("freezing"); capital letters indicate loudness ("BU::::RR"); audible aspirations (hhh) and inhalations (.hhh) are inserted where they occur ("Go:d hh"); pauses and details of the conversational scene or various characterizations of the talk are inserted in double parentheses (((*pause*)) ((*TV going*))); items enclosed within single parentheses indicate transcriptionist doubt ("jus::t (pull it off)").

5 In cognitive science paradigms, these valences might be seen as structuring situational schemata (cf. Johnson 1987).

6 In Samoan child language transcripts using parallel columns to represent speakers' turns, the notation '/' marks the end of an utterance and '//' marks a point of overlap across turns.

7 TA marks tense/aspect; DEICT.PRT marks deixis: EMPH. marks emphasis: NEG marks negation.

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