

by

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## I. WHY LOOK AT UNPLANNED AND PLANNED DISCOURSE?


In studies of child language, there is an implicit assumption that the child produces an imperfect version of the adult code. The adult code represents the target towards which the child's language is developing. In this perspective, the child moves through a series of 'stages' (Brown 1973) until she/he achieves 'competence' (Chomsky 1965) in the language of the adult speech community. For example, recent literature on the 'single word stage' suggests that the child at first deletes certain highly predictable information, then at some later stage, the child expresses that information in the utterance itself (Greenfield & Smith 1976, Bates 1976). Another development noted during this period is the movement away from the sequential expression of a proposition towards the syntactic expression of a proposition (Atkinson 1974, Bloom 1973, Keenan & Klein 1976, Scollon 1976). The child points out some referent in one utterance and predicates something of that referent in a subsequent utterance. The child uses discourse to convey the proposition, producing what Scollon calls 'vertical constructions.' Over time, the child comes to encode argument and predicate in the space of a single utterance, utilizing syntactic rather than a discourse means. The literature on multi-word utterances suggests again that the child moves through a series of stages in which not only utterance length but syntactic complexity of the child's speech corpus is increased (Bloom 1970, Slobin 1973, Brown 1973, Cazden & Bellugi, 1969).

This paradigm may lead one to assume that stages are transitory phenomena. As the child moves from one stage to the next, she/he does not 'go back' to utilize strategies developed at an earlier developmental period.

Rather, strategies emerging at a later period are seen as replacing earlier strategies. The present paper examines this assumption. It suggests that language development be viewed alternatively as the development of certain linguistic potentialities. Becoming more competent in one's language involves increasing one's knowledge of the potential range of structures (e.g. morpho-syntactic, discourse) available for use and increasing one's ability to use them. In this view, communicative strategies characteristic of any one stage are not replaced. Rather, they are retained, to be relied upon under certain communicative conditions.

The retention of emerging communicative strategies goes on not only during language acquisition, it continues throughout adult life.

The difference in the two perspectives on language development is represented visually in Figure 1. The replacement model sees language development as step-wise in nature; each step takes the child closer to the adult norm. Hence, auxiliaries at some point are permuted in interrogatives, agreement is marked, plural suffixes emerge (Brown 1973), and so on. With the exception of severe physical damage or extreme environmental interference, these processes do not reverse themselves. The view of language development as a broadening of knowledge of the language's potential expressive power is better visualized as a series of textures, in which developmentally prior communicative patterns co-exist with more recently developed patterns (retention model). The extent to which earlier patterns continue to remain prominent (i.e. are used) depends upon the linguistic structures under consideration and the developmental period observed.



We present an alternative model for language development as a vehicle for understanding not only child language but adult language as well. It is not only in the course of becoming competent that developmentally earlier communicative strategies are retained. We rely on a number of these same strategies as adult communicators as well under certain contextual conditions.

A major condition affecting adult reliance on early communicative patterns is the extent to which the communication has been planned prior to its delivery. We find that adult speech behavior takes on many characteristics of child language where the communication is spontaneous and relatively unpredictable. For example, spontaneous dialog and multi-party conversations among adults evidence greater reliance on developmentally early communicative strategies. Similarly, stream-of-

consciousness writing, casual letter-writing and so on display this reliance. On the other hand, more planned communicative behavior makes greater use of more complex structures and strategies developed later in the child's life. Formal expository writing, for example, or presidential addresses to the nation display this kind of speech behavior.

This claim has interest for those oriented towards integrating psychological and sociological dimensions of language behavior. Traditionally, notions such as 'spontaneous', 'casual', and 'planned' have been the concern of sociologists of language. Here we suggest that they may have a psychological basis as well. That is, we suggest that when speakers have not planned the form of their discourse, they rely more heavily on morpho-syntactic and discourse skills acquired in the first three to four years of life.

The counterpart of this suggestion is that more planned language use draws on knowledge that is acquired or learned (cf. Krashen 1976, 1977) later in life. In the case of our own society, the suggestion is that more planned uses of language draw upon knowledge transmitted through formal education. This knowledge includes use of complex syntactic structures (e.g. complementation, cleft constructions, certain types of relative clauses, passives) and more formal discourse devices (e.g. use of textual cohesion and transitional terms such as 'for example,' 'that is,' 'furthermore,' 'on the other hand,' and use of topic sentences to open paragraphs in written discourse).

We make this claim on the basis of speech behavior characteristic of middle class American adults (Anglo). It may be the case that unplanned and planned discourse can be so characterized only for this population.

In this case, we would be offering a culture-specific description of American English varieties. We may find, on the other hand, that if we looked at unplanned discourse across a number of societies, it would be characterized by a greater reliance on structures acquired early in language development. To the extent that these early-acquired structures transcend particular languages, we may find certain features of unplanned discourse that are common to diverse speech communities.

## II. DATA BASE

In the present paper, we present our research to date concerning planned and unplanned discourse. Generalizations drawn in this paper are based on analyses of several types of communicative situations: child-child (Keenan 1974, Keenan & Klein 1975, Keenan & Schieffelin 1976), child-adult (Bloom 1973) and adult-adult (Jefferson ts., Schegloff ts., Shimanoff ts.). We have examined relatively informal conversations among adult speakers of English, both native speakers and second language learners (Brunak ts.). Additionally we have looked at personal narratives delivered under two conditions by the same speakers. In the first instance, the speaker related the narrative without preparation orally within a classroom setting. Second, the speaker wrote the narrative and turned it in as a class assignment (two days later). The first context displayed relatively unplanned discourse, the second relatively planned discourse. The narratives obtained in this manner were transcribed and analysed as a joint project by the 1976-1977 discourse seminar, Department of Linguistics, University of Southern California. Members of the seminar include T. Bennett, J. Brunak, P. Giunchi, B. Kroll, C. Lehman, S. Peck, S. Shimanoff, S. Staron, S. Tenenbaum and J. Walcutt (with E. O. Keenan as director).

Our data reflect a variety of speaker-hearer relationships, topics, genres and modalities (speaking/writing). We have not, however, covered all the relevant contexts for understanding planned and unplanned communication. In particular, we lack material to date on unplanned written discourse and planned spoken discourse. Our generalizations are, then, necessarily preliminary.

### III. DIMENSIONS OF PLANNED AND UNPLANNED

#### A. Definition

Before proceeding, let us establish a working definition of 'unplanned' and 'planned' and set out contexts relevant to these concepts.

At the heart of our notion of planning is the idea of forethought. Unplanned discourse is talk that has not been thought out prior to its expression. In this sense, it is spontaneous. Second, our notion of planning involves the idea of a design or organization. In unplanned discourse, the communicator has not organized how she/he is going to express an idea or set of ideas or perform some speech act (Searle 1969) or event (Hymes 1972) prior to the time of communication.

We arrive at two working definitions:

(i) Unplanned discourse is discourse that lacks forethought and organizational preparation.

(ii) Planned discourse is discourse that has been thought out and organized (designed) prior to its expression.

Clearly these definitions characterize extremes of the concept of planning. At the one extreme, we have unplanned discourse that evidences not a shred of preparation or attempt to structure in an effective and appropriate manner the verbal act. The result is a string of nonsensical, haphazard sounds. At the other extreme, we have planned verbal behavior

in which every idea and every lexical item and every structure in which the idea is to be expressed is considered and designed in advance.

Most of the discourse we encounter in the course of day-to-day communications falls at neither extreme. Rather, we usually find ourselves producing and listening to language that is relatively unplanned or relatively planned. We shall address ourselves primarily to these less extreme expressions of discourse planning in the discussion at hand, as they more accurately represent the data we have examined. We do not wish to give the impression, however, that the extremes are never observed. Anyone who has worked on a transcript of young children's speech can find numerous instances of speech in which predications are not thought out in advance, in which informational needs of the intended addressee are not taken into consideration at the time of utterance production and so on (c.f. Atkinson 1974, Keenan & Schieffelin 1976, Scollon 1976). On the other hand, we can find extreme examples of total discourse planning when we deliver or listen to a speech that has been written down in advance and read aloud.

#### B. Referential and Nonreferential Dimensions of Planning

Nearly every endeavor that addresses itself to pragmatic considerations of language recognizes that language serves a variety of ends (Hymes 1962, Hymes 1972, Austin 1962, Searle 1969, Silverstein 1976, Grice 1967, Jakobson 1960). Language is used not only to articulate propositions (arguments and predicates), it is used to display deference, control the interaction at hand, persuade, comfort, antagonize, intimidate, impress and so on. We adopt Silverstein's view that all of these uses are social in the sense that "they get some socially constituted 'work' done; they accomplish or 'perform' something" (1976:18).



Indeed, earlier work on the expression of propositions among young children and caretakers indicates that reference itself is subject to negotiation, checking, confirmation and the like (Atkinson 1974, Keenan & Klein 1975, Keenan & Schieffelin 1976, Keenan, Schieffelin & Platt 1977, forthcoming). Reference in these contexts is characteristically interactionally accomplished.

In our discussion of discourse planning, we need to address this multiplicity of social uses of language as well. To characterize a discourse simply as planned or unplanned underrates the social behavior carried out and the breadth of planning demanded in particular situations. For purposes of this analysis, we divide the social uses of language into two categories suggested by Silverstein (op. cit.). The first category includes the use of language to refer and predicate, i.e. to express propositions. Silverstein calls this use the 'referential function' of language. The second category includes all other uses of language; these uses are referred to collectively as 'non-referential functions' of language.

A discourse may be planned with respect to all the social functions carried out. On the other hand, it may be planned with respect to certain of these functions but unplanned with respect to others. For example, a speaker may have planned his discourse with respect to referring and predicating but did not plan his utterance with respect to the level of politeness appropriate to the communicative situation. Similarly, a speaker (communicator) may have designed his utterance to meet the politeness norms of the situation but may have failed to take into account that his addressee may not be able to identify a referent specified in the utterance expressed. In this case, the discourse was unplanned with respect

to its referential dimension but planned with respect to its non-referential dimension.

### C. Within and Across Social Acts

A second important context for assessing discourse planning is the verbal unit under consideration. We can discuss planning with respect to individual social acts and with respect to sequences of social acts. We consider a sequence of two or more social acts to constitute a discourse. Hence, a discourse may consist of two or more descriptions, or adjacent pairs (Sacks and Schegloff 1974), e.g. summons-response, invitation-acceptance/decline, greeting-greeting, and so on.

As in our discussion of social functions, we may find that a communication may be planned to varying extents. We can find individual social acts that are well-designed although the sequence of social acts, the discourse, in which they are couched is unplanned. For example, a speaker may produce a well-thought out, well-designed predication, but the predication may unintentionally contradict a previous or subsequent predication in the discourse. Similarly, a speaker may have thought out the first part of a riddle sequence but forgets the appropriate response to the riddle. Children are famous for this behavior.

We do not wish to suggest that planning ends at the level of individual social acts. Planning also takes place within individual acts, in the course of their production. Goodwin (1975) has demonstrated that in multi-party conversations, speakers alter the content of individual utterances according to shifting contextual factors. For example, the speaker may alter what he/she is saying according to who gives the speaker positive non-verbal feedback. The speaker may start out directing an

utterance to one recipient but fail to get satisfactory eye contact and move on to another potential recipient.

We can talk about planning, then, on a number of levels. Discourses may vary in the degree to which they are planned. Discourses in which the form of every social act is worked out in advance are the most planned. Discourses in which only certain acts are attended to in advance are somewhat less planned. And discourses in which acts are thought out in the course of their production are even less planned and so on.

Discourses vary not only in the extent to which they are planned, they vary in the extent to which they are plannable. For example, truly spontaneous conversation is, by definition, relatively unplannable well in advance. Unlike other forms of discourse, in spontaneous conversation it is difficult to predict the form in which entire sequences will be expressed. The content may be even less predictable. Rather, what will be said, the form in which it will be said and who will say it can be anticipated for limited sequences only (e.g. certain adjacency pairs for certain speaker-hearer relationships). In terms of conversational analysis (Sacks et al 1974), spontaneous conversation is "locally managed." It tends to be designed on a turn-by-turn basis. Other forms of discourse are more plannable. For example, ritualized speech events tend to have more predictable sequential ordering of social acts and more predictable message content. Communicators can anticipate more what will be said and what their verbal contribution should be. Further, written discourse may be more plannable than spontaneous spoken discourse. In writing, the communicator has more time to think out what he is going to say and how it will be said. Additionally, the writer can rewrite and reorganize the

discourse a number of times before it is eventually communicated.

In the discussion of unplanned and planned discourse below, we are considering planning in terms of whether or not the discourse has been planned and in terms of whether or not the discourse is plannable. For example, the spoken narratives in the data base are not planned in the sense that the speakers did not know in advance that they would perform this task. The spontaneous conversations in the data base constitute unplannable discourse in the sense described above.

#### IV. FEATURES OF CHILDREN'S DISCOURSE

In turning to the features of discourse planning, I would like to bring our attention back to the original motivation for this concern. I began this discussion with the remark that relatively spontaneous discourse between adult native speakers of English shared certain properties with the discourse of children.<sup>5</sup> I posited the hypothesis that in these situations, speakers may rely on certain communicative strategies that emerge in early stages of language development. I would like now to state more specifically what these strategies and features are.

In pursuing this exercise, let us examine a continuous stretch of discourse produced by two children, aged 35 months, in the course of interacting with one another:

- (1) Toby, David, 2;11 in bedroom, early morning  
(An alarm clock rings in the next room)

<u>David</u>	<u>Toby</u>
bell/	bell/
bell/	
its mommys/	(?) it/
was mommys alarm clock/	'larm clock/
	yeah/
	goes dindong ding dong/

DavidToby

no/

no/

goes fip fip/ fip fip/

This passage exhibits a number of communicative features generally characteristic of young children's discourse:

1) On the ideational level, a proposition is conveyed over a series of utterances. Objects and entities noticed in one utterance are subsequently used as major arguments of one or more predications. Here 'bell/' is noticed in one utterance and subsequently 'bell' becomes the major argument for the predications 'its mommys/' and 'was mommys alarm clock/.' Similarly Toby uses the referent of 'alarm clock/' as the argument for his subsequent predication 'goes ding dong ding dong' and so on.

The sequential character of expressed propositions is by now a fairly widely observed phenomenon. For reports of this feature in adult-child discourse, see Bloom (1973); Keenan and Schieffelin (1976); Keenan, Schieffelin & Platt (1976a, 1976b); Scollon (1976) and Atkinson (1974).

2) A corollary of the sequential expression of propositions is that arguments and their predicates are often tied through their position in the discourse rather than tied through syntactic means. We relate the two parts of the proposition because they appear in sequentially adjacent positions. We use some pragmatic principle in making the connection. For example, we connect 'alarm clock' with 'goes ding dong ding dong' because they are in close proximity of one another and we expect utterances in close proximity to be relevant to one another (unless otherwise signaled) (c.f. Sacks & Schegloff 1974, Grice 1968) and because it makes sense to

relate the utterances to one another given our knowledge of the world.

At 35 months, it is obviously not the case that all propositions have this status. We get a mixture of syntactically bound propositions and sequentially bound propositions. At the single word stage, however, the sequential connection predominates. Bloom calls such constructions 'holistic' (1973) and Scollon calls them 'vertical' (1976). The development of language is seen as a gradual progression away from pragmatic devices toward greater reliance on syntax ('horizontal constructions'). A point we would like to stress here is that the sequential strategy does not eventually disappear altogether. Adult discourse as well evidences this feature under certain conditions.

3) Notice as well in this passage that there is a great deal of repetition. The repetition is of two sorts: self-repetition and other-repetition. In other-repetition, <sup>the</sup> speaker repeats what someone else previously uttered. Self- and other-repetition carry out a variety of communicative functions, only a few of which are displayed in this example. Self-repetition may be used to draw the hearer's attention to something the speaker has noticed, as in example (2) below:

- (2) Toby, David, 2;11, bedroom, early morning  
(D. holding a truck, picks up rabbit. T. whistles on pretend flute continuously while facing D.)

DavidToby

rabbit/rabbit/  
I find truck/rabbit/  
(?) like rabbit/  
truck/ rabbit/  
rabbit/rabbit/  
truck truck rabbit/  
truck/ rabbit/  
(showing truck & rabbit to T.)  
truck/rabbit/rabbit/  
rabbit/  
let me blow?/

truck/rabbit/



Self-repetition may also be used to emphasize a point. Example (2) displays both of these uses. Further, self-repetition may be used to clarify or correct a previous utterance, as in example (1), where David says 'its mommys/ was mommys alarm clock/.' In the second utterance, the tense is changed and utterance is expanded to include the noun phrase 'alarm clock.' It is a fuller and more accurate expression of what has happened.

The use of other-repetition has been analyzed in some detail in previous papers (Keenan 1974, Keenan & Klein 1975, Keenan 1975, Keenan, Schieffelin & Platt 1976a). Other-repetition is one of the most widely used devices among language-acquiring children. Among other uses, it serves to let the speaker know that the addressee is attending to some object under consideration. For example, in (1), Toby's utterance 'bell/' lets David know that he too has noticed/is attending to the bell. In example (2), Toby finally lets David know he has noticed the truck and rabbit David is holding up. He does this by eventually repeating 'truck/rabbit/.' Similarly, the repetition of propositions or parts of propositions may serve to acknowledge, agree with, disagree with, challenge or question, depending on the nature of the prior communicative act (a request for information, an announcement, an assessment, etc.) and the manner in which the repetition is produced (e.g. the intonation contour).

4) There is a tendency to use lexical items having similar phonological features across a series of adjacent utterances (Keenan 1974, 1975, Keenan & Klein 1975, Weir 1970). In the discourse of young children, we find recurrent use of certain sounds and clusters of sounds. For example, in (2), we see that 'truck' and 'rabbit'

contain the sounds /t/, /k/, /b/. These sounds all share the features of being stops, varying only in place of articulation. On many occasions, the sound patterns themselves become a major focus of attention rather than the literal meaning of the lexical item. This could account in part for why David repeats 'truck' 'rabbit' in an apparently tireless fashion. We of course have observed cases in which the focus of the child was exclusively on the sound patterns, where the resulting combinations have no referential meaning whatsoever. Example (3) illustrates such an orientation:

(3) Toby, David, 33 months, bedroom, early morning

<u>David</u>	<u>Toby</u>
apple kings/apple keys/ apple kings/	apples/apples/apples/apples...
gi:naug/ gin :g/ gin :/	gin :g/gin :g/gin :g/gin :g/
(laughs)	
ki:tan/ki:tan/ kakadu/kakadu/	no/ kakadu/
kakadu/	no kakadu/w ps ko:s ps ko:z/
z p ko:z ka/	

5) In addition to the above properties, it is, of course, the case that children use relatively simple morpho-syntactic structures. We find reliance on simple, active sentences, unmarked SVO word order for declaratives. We find reliance on deictic items (this, that, there, here, etc.) rather than definite articles and relative clauses. We find deletion of major terms of reference as well as deletion of functor words (articles, prepositions, etc.). In short we find the kind of morpho-syntactic form that characterizes early child language (c.f. Brown 1973, Bloom 1970, Slobin 1973 etc.). Much of the deleted information is, alternatively, conveyed through non-verbal means, such pointing, touching, reaching toward, gaze



direction and the like (Keenan & Schieffelin 1976).

#### V. FEATURES OF UNPLANNED AND PLANNED DISCOURSE

We present here a number of features that characterize and distinguish unplanned and planned discourse. The principles are by no means exhaustive. They are presented as initial generalizations, to be refined and extended over the course of future research. We will relate these features to the strategies of young children. However, our order of discussion will not necessarily follow the ordering of child language features presented above.

FEATURE 1: In unplanned discourse more than in planned discourse, speakers rely on the immediate context to express propositions.

This principle claims that in spontaneous communication, speakers (communicators) rely less heavily on syntax to articulate semantic relations obtaining between referents or between whole propositions. That is, along a continuum of use, reliance on context to communicate information falls towards the unplanned pole and reliance on syntax falls towards the planned pole.

Context is used to link referents (logical arguments) to their relevant predications, and it is used to link whole propositions to one another. Let us consider first, the reliance on context to link arguments and predicates.

##### 1.a. Argument - Predicate Relations:

###### 1.a.1. Referent Deletion

One of the observations of child language presented above is that children frequently do not articulate the semantic relation of an argument to its predicate through syntactic means. On the one hand, we find reliance on non-verbal means to supply the missing information, e.g. the use of pointing, reaching, holding up, eye gaze, etc. Secondly, we find reliance

on the verbal environment to supply the necessary information. In particular, we observed a pattern whereby the listener has to turn to the previous discourse to locate exactly what the child is referring to. It is the 'nextness' of the referent and the predication that creates the link between the two pieces of information. The link is not made through syntactic means.

We find a similar pattern in the spontaneous discourse of certain speakers. In particular, we find predications in which the major argument is deleted in the current utterance. To locate the relevant referent the listener must turn back to the discourse history or the situation at hand. With respect to the situation at hand, it is primarily reference to the speaker and hearer that is deletable, as in example (4) below:

- (4) Two Girls (Schegloff ts.) -  
 B: Uh how's school goin' -  
 A: Oh: same old shit.  
 B: Hhhh/(really?)  
 → A: 'have a lotta tough courses.

With respect to the discourse history, speakers will rely on the listener's acquaintance with any referent, regardless of person (3rd person referents are as likely to be deleted as 1st person referents) and number (singular, plural). Examples (5), (6) and (7) illustrate predications that rely on previously specified referents.

- (5) Two Girls  
 B: Y'have any cla- y'have a class with Billy this term/  
 A: Yeah he's in my Abnormal class  
 B: Oh yeah//how  
 A: Abnormal Psych.  
 B: Still not married  
 → A: ((loud)) Oh no definitely not// (no)
- (6) A Jewish Grandfather (Shimanoff ts.)  
 (G. has been talking about the fact that his grandson is difficult to please. He gives one example - oatmeal cereal)

G: And its uh got ta good taste, its good. And the cereal-grandma e don't like cereal but she finished to the last (dish) and I enjoy - I like it too. It's tasty! And I  
 → uh (1.2) He didn't want the cereal, doesn't eat. I said, "Todd it wouldn't kill ya, taste it!"....

- (7) Subways in London (Brunak ts) (unplanned version)  
 (G. has been telling story of how he had to grab hold of a woman to keep from falling off a subway platform. The woman started to fall back as well but was stopped by a nearby man.)

G: ...and it seemed like a long time when it happened but when I look back at it it happened just like that ((snaps his fingers)) this man-this guy there almost casually looked over at 'er and just grabbed 'er arm (.7) and pulled 'er back up and then I just kind 'a grabbed her ((laugh))  
 → and looked at me like I had the nerve to assault 'er. it was like how dare you ((high-pitched))

Notice in these examples that it does not seem to matter what grammatical status the previous NP holds. Prior objects of prepositions (5), subjects (6), direct objects (7), and so-on may in turn be employed as deleted subjects of subsequent predications. Deletions such as these do not appear in more planned, more formal discourse. For example, (7) above is part of the USC seminar project on unplanned and planned narrative form. In the planned version, the above episode was expressed as in (8) below:

- (8) Subways in London (planned).

The train sped nearer as we were both ready to fall off the edge. A friend with whom she had been talking, clutched her other arm and steadied her as I pulled on the purse's shoulder strap moving closer to her arm. My balance was finally steadied and it wasn't until after some exchanges of looks did I move on with a quick "Excuse me."

We can see here how in the more planned version, the narrator does not delete any of the referents.

#### 1.a.2. Referent + Proposition

Thus far we have looked at cases in which there is no syntactic relation between a referent and its predication because the referent is in fact missing. There are, however, other cases in which a referent

is specified initially and subsequently an entire proposition relevant to the referent is expressed. These contributions have been treated in two earlier papers (Keenan & Schieffelin 1976, Duranti & Keenan 1976). We refer to them as 'Referent + Proposition' (Ref + Prop) constructions. They differ from the previously illustrated sequences in that no referent is deleted. In certain of these Ref + Prop constructions, it is rather that the semantic relation between the referent and the subsequent predication is not expressed. In a certain sense, these initial referents serve as 'topics' (Li & Thompson 1976) for the subsequent propositions and imply an 'as for' or 'concerning' relation. This is illustrated in (9) below:

- (9) Two Girls (Schegloff ms.)

(Discussing classes at the local university)

→ B: Ohh I g'ta tell ya <sup>Ref</sup> one course  
 A: (incred-) <sup>Ref</sup>  
 → B: The mo- the modern art the twentieth century art, there's <sup>Prop</sup>  
 about eight books

Here there is a reference to B's twentieth century art course and the reference is followed immediately by an entire proposition, i.e. "there's about eight books." We might paraphrase the sequence 'As for one course, the modern art, the twentieth century art, there's about eight books.' However, as it stands, there is no explicit 'as for' or its equivalent, and the semantic relation obtaining between the initial three noun phrases and the subsequent sentence is only inferred from the positioning of these two structures. It is not syntactically expressed. We use the principle of 'nextness' to make the link and associate the referent and the proposition.

As with the argument-predicate constructions discussed earlier, these Ref + Prop constructions as well rarely appear in more formal, pre-arranged



Standard English discourse. Work carried out by Duranti & Keenan earlier this year (1976) evidences that this difference is characteristic of Italian discourse as well. Ref + Prop constructions appear in spontaneous conversation between intimates but rarely appear in newspaper articles and magazines, scholarly papers and so on (Ibid.).

There is a particular type of Referent + Proposition construction that is more commonly discussed in the linguistics literature. This is the construction linguists have called left-dislocation (Ross 1967, Gundel 1975). According to Ross, left-dislocation is a transformation that moves an NP out of and to the left of a clause, leaving in its place a co-referential pronoun. A series of these constructions are illustrated in examples (10), (11) and (12) below:

(10) GTS 4-1 (Jefferson ms.)

(K has been talking about the fact that his car radio was taken from his car)

K: They cleaned me out. And my father oh he's//he's fit to be tied.

(11) GTS 4:15

K: Uh Pat McGee. I don't know if you know him, he- he lives in//Palisades.

(12) GTS 5:35

(Discussing students falling asleep in class)

K: Uh:: this guy, you could yell "Hey John, Hey Joh-"  
'n you c'd go over an' tap him on the shoulder

R: So he's gotta//good imagination

K: That's the only way you c'd snap him out of it.

In these examples, the left-dislocated NPs are "my father," "Pat McGee," and "this guy" respectively.

The left-dislocations differ from both of the previously discussed constructions in that there is a reference to the relevant referent within the subsequent predication. This reference is through the co-referential pronoun in the predication. The constructions are of interest to us,

because they otherwise appear to share many of the properties of sequentially expressed propositions. The initial referent appears to be part of a separate utterance, a separate speech act if you will in much the same way as the other referents we have considered are. We cannot say that the principle of 'nextness' alone encourages the listener to link the initial referent to the subsequent proposition. The copy pronoun does this as well. These constructions, then, stand somewhere between single subject-predicate constructions and discourse. They share properties of both.

A second reason why left-dislocations are of interest to this discussion is that they too rarely appear in highly planned discourse. We rarely find left-dislocations in written prose, for example. On the other hand, we do find left-dislocations or rather constructions like left-dislocations abundantly in the speech of young children producing multi-word utterances. For example, in (1), David's two utterances 'bell/its mommys/' could be considered as a left-dislocation (see also Gruber 1967). These constructions may as well be transitional structures, anticipating more syntactically coherent sentences. They are not transitional in the sense that they disappear altogether. We have just witnessed that adult speakers produce these constructions when they are speaking under casual spontaneous circumstances. They may be transitional in the sense that the child may first use this type of construction exclusively to express certain semantic relations. At a later point, the child comes to utilize both the subject-predicate and the left-dislocation construction to express those relations.

#### 1.b. Proposition-Proposition Relations:

Context may link whole propositions as well as constituents within a single proposition to one another. We may link one proposition to another



because they appear next to one another and because we expect sequentially expressed propositions to be relevant to one another. In using context, the communicator does not make the semantic relation obtaining between the propositions explicit. For example, if the communicator produces the sequence "I don't like that house. It looks strange.", he does not specify explicitly the link between these assessments. As recipients of this communication, we use our knowledge of the world and our expectations concerning the sequencing of talk to relate the two propositions. We treat the second utterance not only as relevant but as relevant in a particular sense, e.g. as providing an explanation or basis for the initial assessment.

Our observations of discourse indicate that context is an alternative to syntax and that planned and unplanned discourse differ in their utilization of the two alternatives. Syntax makes the semantic link explicit, e.g. "I don't like that house, because it looks strange." It is relied upon more heavily in planned vs. relatively unplanned discourse. This association may be due to the possibility that it takes more planning to express a specific semantic relation (using a syntactic term) than to imply only that some semantic relation obtains. In the former case, the speaker's encoding task is greater and may demand greater planning.

The spontaneous conversations and unplanned versions of personal narratives in the data base were laced with contextually linked propositions. An analysis of subordinate and co-ordinate constructions by Kroll (this volume) indicated that in the unplanned narratives, only 7.1% of the clauses were subordinate constructions, whereas in the planned narratives, 20% were subordinate.

To see these two types of propositional links, compare example (13) with (14) below. Example (13) presents a portion of a spontaneous narrative. Example (14) presents the same event described in the planned version of the same narrative.

(13) Driving Home (Kroll ts.) (Unplanned Version)  
(M describes how his father nearly crashed into a truck)

M: so he decides that he's gonna pass these cars ( ? )  
and uh (.4) he pulls out in the other lane and starts  
passin' 'em (.5) and all of a sudden we see this big  
truck, you know

Class: (laughter)

M: This truck comin' for us and uh (.5) this guy was going  
pretty fast and (.5) and we had passed one car and there's  
no way we can get (in or out) and uhm this trucker's  
comin' and he's just sort of bearing down on us and  
honkin' his horn. He wasn't slowing down

Class: (laughter)

(14) Driving Home (Planned Version)

After some five minutes of tailing these cars, my father  
decided it was time to pass the cars.

He pulled into the other lane and accelerated. As we  
passed the first car we noticed a large Mack truck coming  
our way.

Examples of the immediate context alone linking propositions are  
provided in (15) and (16) below:

(15) Two Girls

A: I'm so::: tired I played basketball today ( ) the  
first time since I was a freshman in high school

B: Bask(hh) etb(hhall) heh heh/heh

(vs. I am so tired, because I played basketball for the  
first time since I was a freshman in high school)

(16) Jewish Grandfather

G: Alright, he moved out, he's- in fact, Ruthie: wrote  
to me e Joseph (hey Pa:) is not good for him to stay  
here. let him stay here jist one weekend to let him  
get uh ( ) dormitory and (for what)- he's earning  
the money. Let him spend it. He'll be too much for you.

(vs. It is not good for him to stay here, therefore....  
Let him stay here just one weekend....because....etc.)

FEATURE 2: In unplanned discourse more than in planned discourse,

speakers rely on morpho-syntactic structures acquired in the early stages of language development. Planned discourse makes greater use of morpho-syntactic structures that are relatively late to emerge in language.

As suggested in the section above, in relatively unplanned discourse, speakers tend to avoid using grammatical structures that are late to emerge in language development. For example, Limber (1973) indicates that the use of subordinate conjunctions appears later in the child's speech than the use of co-ordinate conjunctions. In fact, "The earliest suggestion of conjunction is the grouping of two sentences together without a distinguishable conjoining morpheme. Very often in listening to tapes made between 2;0 and 2;4, one is apt to perceive a so, and, or if, when in fact, upon replay there is not any direct basis for this percept (p. 182)."

In addition to the above structures, we find the following morpho-syntactic preferences in relatively unplanned discourse:

### 2.1 Modes of Reference

We find a greater reliance on earlier emergent forms of reference in the spontaneous discourse. For example, we find frequent use of deictic modifiers where definite articles are used in planned discourse. Compare, for example, the unplanned version of a narrative, (17), with the planned version, (18):

#### (17) Subways in London (Unplanned)

G: I'd done this many times before so I didn't think twice about it ( I was walk-) I tried to walk between the edge  
→ of this platform (.7) A:nd this group of people

#### (18) Subways in London (Planned)

Squeezing through narrow spaces and finding my way between  
→ people I continued in my pursuit of an emptier spot on the

train platform and a woman whose back was turned toward me as she wildly conversed with some friends.

Similarly, in reference, there is a reliance on simpler, determiner (demonstrative, definite article etc.) plus noun constructions, where in planned discourse, the communicator would use a relative clause construction. Compare, for example, the unplanned and planned versions of the narrative "Subways in London." In the unplanned version illustrated in example (7), a character is referred to as "this man-this guy." The same individual is referred to as "a friend with whom she had been talking" in the planned version, illustrated in example (8). Similarly, in the same narrative, the major female character is referred to as "this woman lady" in the unplanned version. This is illustrated in (19) below:

#### (19) Subways in London (Brunak ms.) (Unplanned)

G: So I was walkin' along the edge and uh as I said there  
→ were these people talkin' and this woman lady was describin somethin'...

In the planned version, the same woman is referred to as "a woman whose back was turned." This is illustrated in (18) above.

Other alternatives to relative clause constructions found in relatively unplanned discourse include referent + proposition constructions (See Feature 1) and noun + prepositional phrase constructions. An example of noun + prepositional phrase is provided in (20) below:

#### (20) Jewish Grandfather (Shimanoff ms.)

G: So I didn't want so he did did it that way and uh  
and then with uh with uh the- the girl you know the  
→ girl with the prom, I I told him that its absolutely  
not right. This kind of money. You shouldn't spend it,...

Schachter (1974) has discussed the avoidance of relative clauses as a strategy of certain speakers learning English as a second language. Here we can see that native speakers as well often rely on syntactically simpler alternative forms of reference. Indeed in many cases, we can see the avoid-



ance explicitly in unplanned discourse. The speaker starts to use the relative clause construction but cuts the construction off before its completion and reformulates the reference in an alternative fashion. In the example below, the speaker reformulates the relative clause as an independent construction:

(21) Two Girls

B: That is s- y'know this 'the Indian class an' they  
 → stuck us in this crazy building- that they j-  
 they're not even finished with it.

2.2 Verb Voice

Another area in which planned and unplanned discourse differ concerns the use of active and passive voice. Developmentally, the passive voice is acquired much later than the active voice among English-speaking children (Bever 1970). We find that the passive voice is rare in both planned and unplanned discourse. However, relative to unplanned discourse, it appears with much greater frequency in planned discourse. Bennett (this volume) examined verb voice in the unplanned and planned personal narratives. In the unplanned narratives, the passive accounted for .9% of the total verbs. In the planned versions, the passive accounted for 7.05% of the total verbs. The contrastive use of these two voices is illustrated in examples (7) and (8) above.

2.3 Verb Tense

An additional point of contrast between planned and unplanned communication concerns the use of verb tense. Developmentally, the use of the present tense anticipates past and future tenses (Antinucci & Miller, 1976, Brown 1973). That is, even when the past or future is referred to, children will initially use the present tense. The narratives in our data base all concern past events in the experience of the narrator. In

referring to these events, the speaker did not always use the past tense in the unplanned versions. In contrast to the planned versions, the speaker frequently used the present tense in relating past events. Examples (13) and (14) above illustrate the different use of tense to relate the same events. Typically the past is used in the initial part of the narrative, to orient the addressee to the temporal and spatial context of the event related. Once the context is specified, the speaker moves towards greater use of the present tense (Walcott, this volume). Notice here that this way of marking temporal ordering is similar to that described for certain pidgin-creole languages (c.f. Bickerton 1974, Sankoff & Kay 1974, for example).

FEATURE 3: In relatively unplanned discourse more than in relatively planned discourse, speakers tend to repeat and replace lexical items in the expression of a proposition (Shimanoff & Brunak, this volume).

In most cases, repetition and word replacement within a speech act reflect trouble spots in the communication. Repetition of a lexical item may be part of the speaker's search for a particular word (Schegloff et al 1976) or predication. The search may be motivated by the speaker's desire to select a term or construction that is appropriate to the addressee or clear to the addressee. Or the speaker may repeat a term (set of terms), because the speaker feels that the initial term has not been decoded by the addressee. For example, in (13), the speaker repeats "this truck" following the occurrence of laughter simultaneous with the first mention of "this truck." Schegloff et al treat these repetitions as "repairs" on the occurrence of overlap in conversation. Repetition may also be simply part of the speaker's attempt to think out an idea. This use is illustrated in (20) above. Repetition is a highly versatile device, and



it is among the earliest behaviors emergent in the speech of the language-acquiring child (Keenan 1975, Scollon 1976).

Word replacement is another example of what Schegloff et al (1976) call 'repair' or error-correction. As with the use of repetition, the motivations for the replacement are diverse. The speaker may replace one term with another because the initial term is inappropriate:

(22) Two Girls

- B: This fella I have uh "fella" This man, he had uh f-  
who I have for linguistics is  
A: Hm hm  
B: really too much

Or the term (set of terms) initially used may not accurately express what the speaker wishes to convey:

(23) Skiing over a Cliff (Shimanoff ts.) (Unplanned)

- M: So: I sor:ta rushed myself. And I uh went down (1.1)  
this this uh (cliff) not really a cliff but it was a  
very sharp incline of the mountain.

Word replacement is part of a more general phenomenon characteristic of relatively unplanned discourse - afterthought (Hyman 1975). The communicator remembers after the relevant point in the discourse that certain information is missing. In many cases, the personal narratives in our corpus contained whole propositions as afterthoughts. The narrator would remember that relevant background information had not been provided. Example (24) below illustrates the appearance of 'afterthoughts' in the unplanned version of a narrative. Example (25) illustrates the omission of such afterthoughts in the planned version of the same narrative.

(24) People Scare Me (Staron ts.) (Unplanned)

- F: Well (.2) we ( ) came um we stayed across the street from our house. I used ta live in Florida an' we stayed across the street cuz my mom was in the hospital an' we were really small.

(25) People Scare Me (Planned)

When I was ten years old my sister, brother and I stayed with the neighbors across the street while my mother was in the hospital.

The use of repetition and word replacement for the purpose of improving or correcting some dimension of the communication indicates that planning is going on in the course of the speech act itself. When we speak of these features as characteristic of relatively unplanned discourse, we mean that either the communicator has not planned his communication prior to the individual speech act or the communication was unplannable prior to the individual speech act (e.g. shifting addressees, speaker-hearer roles etc.).

The use of repetition and other hesitation phenomena, word replacement and other forms of afterthought and repair lead to lengthy formulations of particular social acts. We find that in relatively unplanned discourse, the expression of social acts tends to take up more discourse 'space' (c.f. Keenan and Schieffelin 1976) than in planned discourse. That is, the same social act verbalized in planned discourse will be more compact than the unplanned version. For example, compare the unplanned and planned versions of "People Scare Me" illustrated in (24) and (25) above. Other features mentioned in previous sections also contribute to this characteristic of unplanned discourse. The use of referent + proposition constructions rather than subject-predicate constructions and the use of co-ordinate constructions in place of subordinate constructions lead as well to more 'spacious' renditions of descriptions, requests, announcements and the like. Differences in discourse space created by these alternative constructions are demonstrated in (13) and (14) above.

FEATURE 4: In relatively unplanned discourse, the form and content of sequentially arranged social acts tend to be more similar than in relatively planned discourse.

In our discussion of feature 3, we mentioned that unplanned discourse contained repetition within social acts. Here we treat another form of repetition in which parts of previously expressed social acts are incorporated in subsequent acts. The features incorporated may be morphological, syntactic or phonological. For example, a lexical item appearing in one utterance in an unplanned discourse may be repeated in one or more subsequent utterances:

(26) Two Girls (Schegloff ms.)

- A: (You sounded so// far)  
 → B: Right/  
 A: Yeah  
 → B: See/ I- I'm doin something right t'day finally  
 A: Mm  
 → B: I finally said something right. You are home hh.

In many cases, the lexical item repeated serves the same grammatical function in the series of utterances in which it appears. We sometimes find the repetition of two or more lexical items, both occupying the same grammatical roles in the sequence in which they appear. Example (27) illustrates such a case.

(27) Jewish Grandfather (Shimanoff ms.)

- G: .... So sometimes you know you can lose the letter  
 you can-something can happen in Beverly Hills.

This example as well as example (6) illustrates how a speaker may become locked into a subject or subject-verb frame. Shifts in perspective are sometimes accomplished only by cutting off an existing frame and recyclying (Schegloff 1974) the speech act using a novel frame, e.g. the 'you can' frame is replaced by 'something can' in (27).

The repetition of prior utterances or parts of prior utterances is a basic characteristic of early child discourse. Scollon (1976) for single-word and Keenan (1974, 1975) and Weir (1970) for multi-word

utterances show that cross-utterance repetition dominates the earliest discourses of children. Earlier studies of the author (Keenan 1974, Keenan 1975, Keenan & Klein 1975) showed that over time reliance of repetition gives way to substitution (Mommys silly/Daddys silly/, not sketis/ makaronis, not shoes/ slippers) and formally novel means of maintaining continuity across utterances. In the initial period, form and content are maintained across utterances. In the subsequent period, form is maintained but content changes; and in the final period, both form and content change. (That is, in each subsequent period, an alternative means of maintaining coherence is available; options are increased over time.) It may be the case that it requires more forethought and planning to alter both the form and the content of a message than to alter the content alone. Language development may be linked to an increased capacity of the child to attend to both form and content of the propositions they express.

Similarly, in the adult corpus, it may be the case that when speakers have not previously organized their discourse, they may retain the same morpho-syntactic format to express novel content. Hence, stream of consciousness writing and on-the-spot working out of a difficult concept may exhibit repeated use of a formal frame.

The similarity in form across utterances in relatively unplanned discourse is not limited to morphological and syntactic form. We find as well similarities in the phonological shape of sequentially placed speech acts. For example, in (28):

(28) Two Girls

- A: Ripped about four nails, and oh::ch  
 B: Fantastic  
 A: But it was fun. Y'sound very far away

we have repetition of the phone /f/. Further, we have repetition of the



phone sequence /f/ + /r/ (four, far) and the phone sequence /f/ + /n/ (fantastic, fun).

As noted in section IV, phonological repetition is a very early feature of children's discourse (Jakobson 1968, Weir 1970, Keenan 1974). Children at times seem to select lexical items on the basis of their phonological similarity rather than on their appropriateness to the message conveyed. Previous reports of this phenomenon describe the behavior as language play or sound play. It has been associated with the speech behavior of very young children exclusively. In terms of the 'replacement' model, this behavior apparently disappears in the course of language development. We see here that this kind of behavior does not in fact disappear. Adults as well appear to select their words at least in part on phonological grounds (i.e. phonological similarity).

Schegloff (personal communication) refers to this phenomenon as 'sound touch-offs' in adult speech. That is, the sound of one item in the discourse may 'touch-off' the articulation of other items sharing those sound patterns. These sound touch-offs represent one type of touched-off behavior. For example, Schegloff has discussed the phenomenon of lexical touch-offs as well. In certain cases, one lexical item may touch-off another lexical item having a complementary or opposite meaning. We have found in our spontaneous data discourse of this character. The speaker mentions a particular lexical item in one utterance and in subsequent utterances its opposite appears. Example (29) illustrates this behavior:

(29) Skiing over a Cliff (Unplanned)

M: ...And we were caught up in a snow: storm (1.5) An:d we were skiing down the mountain. An:d he was in front of me with some other friend an:d I had stopped at a

corner, cuz one of my bindings were broken, and was trying to git my ski boot back up to the skii:es. (1.0)  
So I wasn uh: very sharp, and I'd say about six people i:n front of me...

Here we find 'up' followed by 'down' in the subsequent clause and then 'up' reappearing four clauses later. Similarly, 'front' is followed by 'back' three clauses later with 'front' reappearing two clauses after that.

From our point of view, we cannot tell if it is always the case that sounds or meanings of lexical items 'touch-off' subsequent items. It may not be the case that the initial item triggered the production of subsequent items. Rather, it could be the case that the speaker (writer) is thinking ahead, projecting what he is going to say next in the course of the current utterance or just before the current utterance. This projection may lead him to produce the initial lexical item in the first place (See Fromkin 1973).

(30) Jewish Grandfather

G: ...So we had a couple of skirmishes. Not only this with the food, but the you know he's he's hon- you know his he doesn't trust people.

For example, in (30), it does not appear that the initial item 'honest' touches off 'doesn't trust.' Rather, it appears as if the speaker was thinking about 'doesn't trust' but unconsciously articulated a term having its opposite meaning. That is, it is the future concept that touches off the initial lexical item.

VI. CONSTRAINTS ON DISCOURSE PLANNING

In this section we ask the question "What conditions create relatively unplanned discourse?" In previous sections, we have mentioned that planning must be discussed for both referential and non-referential functions of



language. We suggest here that if one or the other of these functions places heavy demands on the communicator that relatively unplanned discourse will be produced. That is, in many cases, it is because the communicator is attending to ideational or situational demands that he is unable to attend to all dimensions of the message form. Let us consider each of these demands in turn:

#### A. Situational Demands

In some cases, a communicator cannot plan the form of his communication, because the situation in which he is participating requires more or less continuous monitoring. For example, in spontaneous conversation, who will assume the floor, when the floor will be assumed and what will be communicated is negotiated on a turn-by-turn basis. The participant in such a situation must attend closely to each turn to deal with each of the above questions. If he wishes to take hold of the floor, he must listen for the first possible moment in which he can appropriately do so (i.e. the first possible 'transition relevance space' (Sacks et al 1974). In previous studies (Keenan & Schieffelin 1976), Duranti & Keenan 1976), we found that 'referent + proposition' constructions (or left-dislocations) appear in the context of such behavior. In an effort to take hold of the floor, the speaker makes reference to some entity ('referent') initially and only subsequently formulates the predication relevant to the referent. The initial NP acts as a placeholder, allowing the speaker to maintain the floor. Where turn-taking is locally managed in this sense, it may take priority over the expression of well-formed propositions for the communicator. The more predictable the sequential ordering of talk, the freer the communicator is to attend to the propositions he wishes to express and the form in which they are

to be expressed.

#### B. Conceptual Demands

Just as situational demands may interfere with the planning of propositions, so the demands of expressing a proposition may interfere with the organization of other social acts. Conceptual demands may be of various sorts. For example, a concept may demand the speaker's (writer's) concentration, because it is cognitively complex for that individual. The communicator may need to focus primarily on working out the idea and articulating it. With this priority at hand, the communicator may fail to plan his discourse on other social levels. For example, he may fail to attend to social norms constraining how long a turn at talk should be, how much information should be conveyed and the appropriate form of expression for that addressee.

This kind of conceptual demand is the basis of egocentric speech in young children. Braunwald (forthcoming) observes that young children stop attending to the needs of their conversational partners when they talk about some topic that slightly exceeds their cognitive capacity. So, for example, when children start talking about the remote past, they may not attend to the needs of the intended recipient of the talk. On the other hand, when children talk about topics with which they are familiar, within their cognitive capacity, they are much more socio-centric. This study is consistent with the observations of the author of children's discourse. The most highly social behavior of the children observed involved songs, rhymes, sound play and topical talk linked to the here-and-now (Keenan 1974).

As with other dimensions of language development, we do not see egocentric speech as ultimately replaced by social speech. Rather,

egocentric speech persists throughout adult life, appearing under much the same conditions as in child language. When an adult is thinking through a difficult idea, he may 'tune out' the behavior of others present. Often, for example, the speaker will avoid eye contact. Here the speaker appears unwilling to establish intersubjectivity and register additional social demands.<sup>1</sup>

In our discussion of sources of unplanned discourse, we do not wish to suggest that situational demands take their toll only on the planning of propositions and that conceptual demands take their toll only on non-referential planning. The demands may affect every dimension of discourse planning. Thus, for example, conceptual demands may lead a communicator to not take into consideration critical informational needs of his listeners (readers) prior to its expression. Similarly, situational demands on the level of turn-taking may lead a speaker to ignore displays of politeness appropriate to that situation.

#### VII. PLANNED UNPLANNED DISCOURSE

This paper would not be complete without some discussion of the self-conscious expression of unplanned discourse features. There are cases in which a speaker or writer will intentionally produce discourse that appears unplanned. For example, a novelist trying to recreate a casual situational context will use many of the features (e.g. left-dislocation, deletion, hesitations) of unplanned discourse in his story. In fact, we regard a novelist highly if she or he is able to successfully reproduce such verbal spontaneity.

Secondly, we can find planned unplanned discourse in many speeches and lectures of skilled rhetoricians. Journalists, politicians, even academics at times have planned their discourse to appear as if it were being planned in the course of its delivery when in fact it has been worked out well in advance.

Third, in the anthropological literature there are accounts of cultures in which lower status individuals are expected to speak as if they had not or could not organize what they have to say. Albert's study of the Burundi makes this point effectively:

It would be an unforgivable blunder for a peasant-farmer, no matter how wealthy or able, to produce a truly elegant, eloquent, rapid-fire defense before a herder or other superior. However, the same peasant who stammers or shouts or forces a smile from a superior by making a rhetorical fool out of himself when his adversary is a prince or herder may (elsewhere) ... show himself an able speaker, a dignified man who speaks as slowly and as intelligently as ever a highborn herder could (1972:83).

We do not have to venture to distant cultures to witness this behavior. Accounts of lower socio-economic status groups within our own society describe the same expectations (c.f. Abrahams 1964).

In all of these situations, features of unplanned discourse are exploited for specific ends, e.g. to get something. We offer here a framework for describing the distinguishing characteristics of this communicative behavior, one that is potentially productive for cross-cultural studies of communicative strategies. Future research is needed to assess not only the extent to which features of unplanned discourse are common across languages and cultures, but the extent to which these features match more self-conscious attempts to produce unplanned discourse. Do the screenplay writer, novelist, politician and Burundi peasant in fact utilize the actual features of unplanned discourse? To what extent



have certain features become conventionalized? Are there features of unplanned discourse that have become stereotyped or stigmatized across a number of speech communities?

It is important to distinguish this use of unplanned discourse features from truly unplanned discourse. Simply displaying certain features is not sufficient for a discourse to be unplanned. The discourse must lack forethought and prior organization on the part of the communicator. (See Section III.A. for this definition of unplanned discourse.) We can draw an analogy here between this behavior and that of the sober man pretending to be drunk. He may stagger from pillar to post, roll back his eyes and slur his speech, but we would not want to say "This man is drunk." Similarly, when a communicator self-consciously adopts features of unplanned discourse, we do not want to say "This discourse is unplanned."

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup>We have mentioned only one source of egocentric speech, but there exist other sources as well. For example, the speaker may be concentrating on what he is doing or thinking because it is interesting or of some importance to him.

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