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Ethnic Mobilization and Contentious Politics in Romania

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Why did Romanians and Hungarians come to violent blows on the town square of Târgu Mures, Romania, in 1990, resulting in approximately seven dead and several hundred wounded?¹ Some political science literature would argue that political elites manipulate individuals to fear members of the other group, inciting conflicts.² Others would say that ethnic political parties or political institutions may cause divisiveness,³ and still others would blame ethnic mixing as causing violence.⁴ However, the high levels of tension and mobilization that sparked the Târgu Mures violence actually originated from a debate over whether Romanians or Hungarians should control a local high school. How can we explain the complex processes through which this minor debate led to eventual bloodshed? Which processes foster high levels of antagonistic ethnic mobilization, and which mechanisms promote ethnic coexistence?

Much literature on nationalism focuses on singular macro-causes of national identification, such as ethnic origin (Smith), state-sponsored education (Gellner), print media (Anderson), elites (Hobsbawm, Snyder and Ballentine), or political institutions such as federalism or ethnic parties (Dorff, Roeder, Bunce, Horowitz). It is the case that education and elites and political institutions matter greatly for ethnic mobilization within groups and contention between groups in multiethnic states of East Central Europe. The most valuable strides in research will now be made through attempts to reveal the mechanisms of mobilization or de-mobilization that take place under conditions in which these plural issues frame mobilization — and, at the same time, serve as objects of contention.

This paper will address two cases of ethnic mobilization that led to violence in Romania, in Târgu Mures in March and in Miercurea Ciuc, Romania, in June.⁵ A few million Hungarians have resided within the borders of Romania since the treaties that ended World War I, which transferred large territories from the Hungarian portion of the Austro-Hungarian empire to neighboring states.⁶

In examining the processes through which these events developed into violence and then were subdued, I will illustrate the mechanisms of resonance, bargaining, and brokerage that are crucial for the routinization of contention in multiethnic states. I outline five causal propositions from various combinations of these mechanisms. The presence of all three is crucial for the routinization of contention processes into repertoires. While debate and contention is endemic in
multiethnic states, compromises between groups may be reached through such processes; peaceful coexistence in multiethnic states is thus often linked to processes of contention.

I. Foundations for analysis

A. Concepts for the context of multiethnic states

Beth Roy notes that religion has served as a principle of state-making in South Asia; religion “defined the nature of state power” there. In post-1918 Europe, the primary Wilsonian principle for carving states out of the Austro-Hungarian empire was ethnicity. In the process of state formation, the ethnic principle is thus understood as the most legitimate foundation for political claims; i.e., the foundation that is most likely to be recognized by world powers and other states. This understanding persists in East Central Europe.

Ethnicity is an ascriptive trait which involves a “sense of common ancestry.” A nation, however, is more than ascriptive; it is a group of individuals which “share a psychological bond,” or maintain an intersubjective relation to other members. Following the framework of Benedict Anderson, this project maintains a distinction between a geographic locale and a community. Anderson understands “community” as ”a deep, horizontal comradeship.” Nations, as communities that are “imagined” by individuals, are subjectively understood entities. Both the Hungarians and the Romanians living in the borders of Romania qualify as nations. The multiethnic cities and towns described in these cases contain more than one national community within the same geographic space.

Nationalism is, as Gellner notes, a “political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent.” This definition would seem to limit nationalist action in multiethnic states to 1) secessionist movements to rejoin Hungary among the Hungarian minority or 2) efforts by nominal groups to induce Hungarian exit from their state, increasing the proportion of nominal citizens. In any study of ethnicity, nation, and nationalism, it is fundamental that identification with a nation not be confused with identification with a state, an administrative apparatus. The term “nation-state” will thus not be used in this project.

B. Theoretical orientation: a relational approach

In attempting to explain affairs in the social world, social scientists tend to simplify complex reality by approaching it from a particular perspective. Charles Tilly, in *Durable*
Inequality, outlines four such perspectives that are widely used in social research. The first, methodological individualism, emphasizes the interest-driven actions of independent individuals. Systems theories focus instead on the power of social structures, institutions, and organizations to affect social action. Phenomenological individualism prioritizes the thought processes of individuals.

The fourth perspective, which will be used in this project, prioritizes relations between entities as holding prime importance in social life, thus “assuming not essences but bonds.” A relational approach can yield quite different results from that of methodological individualism. Social network theory is a theoretical approach which prioritizes relations. Although this method was originally developed in sociology, it has gained increasing use among political scientists in recent years. Scholars of this approach understand relations between individuals as bridges through which information may pass. Ties between individuals thus are not merely trivial phenomena but have causal force in several situations, ranging from how individuals obtain jobs, how civil society adds to governmental effectiveness, how associations between individuals of different groups might reduce ethnic conflicts, and the role that social ties play in group mobilization. Network approaches thus take a very different view of group mobilization than do approaches in rational-choice theory, which prioritize individuals as the unit of analysis rather than the ties between them.

A network map delineates relationships between actors at a given point of time. An assessment of the relational and power positions of actors in a social structure is an important foundation for understanding political processes. However, as noted by Tilly, network analysis alone fails to specify the dynamic causal mechanisms inherent in social processes. In order to assess such mechanisms, we will add the dimension of dynamism to our static model in section IV.

II. Who are the actors?

Political actors need not always be individuals, but may be collectives that act as unitary social entities. Power is a purely relational concept, which emerges from “the actual or potential interaction between two or more social actors.” We can thus understand the placement of actors in a political system in terms of the power distributions between them. Figure 1 denotes the
placement of the various actors in Romanian ethnic politics.

This diagram represents the various political actors in a multiethnic state in which the minority group is represented through ethnic political parties. This is the case for the Hungarians in Romania, where the distribution of votes for the Hungarian party, The Democratic Union of Hungarians of Romania (RMDSz/UDMR) correspond closely to census figures for ethnic Hungarians. The taller of the two cones in the center of the diagram represents the state’s titular group, for example Romanians, while the shorter cone represents the Hungarian group. The elites of each group are found at the cone peaks; A for the titulars and C for the Hungarians. Area B represents non-elite, or mass, titulars and area D represents non-elite, or mass, Hungarians. Area E represents those individuals who, whether children of intermarriage or for other reasons, do not identify exclusively with either group. Given the degree of ethnic political polarization in a state with minority ethnic parties, it is extremely rare to see members of E in national offices in Romania.

The three rectangles to the sides of the cones represent actors outside of the multiethnic state which maintain varying degrees of influence on the state’s domestic politics. The most immediate actor is F, the Hungarian state, which monitors the situation of “Hungarians abroad” through a government office, provides state funds for the support of Hungarian cultural activities in the neighboring states, and which sometimes becomes directly involved in controversial issues, as in the recent debate in Romania over whether to construct a separate university for study in Hungarian language. The influence of the “motherland” state is crucial enough for Rogers Brubaker to label it the third node of a “triadic relational nexus” in which the two ethnic groups of the state form the other nodes.26

Second is the Western international community, actor G. The European Union has greatly influenced debates between ethnic groups in Romania, as the country has been attempting to adjust legislation to EU standards in hopes of being admitted as a member.

The third actor, H, represents a conglomerate of Hungarian communities in other states. The Hungarian party in Romania, not only maintains close ties to Hungary but to Hungarian parties in Slovakia, Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Ukraine, and Hungarian cultural organizations in Austria and other countries. It is thus not surprising that proposals articulated by
a Hungarian party in one state are often picked up by a party in another state. Academic journals and print information are shared among these groups, and the state of different communities is regularly covered on Hungarian TV, which a large number of “Hungarians abroad” watch on a regular basis.

**Actors at the local level**

The configuration of actors at the local level differs somewhat from that at the state level, and is represented in Figure 2. In this diagram, the actors in the cones remain similar to those at the state level. This graph represents relations in a city where the titular group is the local majority and the Hungarians the local minority; in cities where the Hungarians are the local majority, the C-D cone would be larger than the A-B cone. In cities were both groups are relatively equal, the cones would be relatively the same size. This difference is due to the fact that local demography greatly affects the local power structure in democracies that feature ethnic parties.

The primary external actor influencing local government debates is the state. However, the state government and administration itself may be divided into a titular (F) and a Hungarian wing (G) in Romania. In this diagram, Hungary (actor H), the Western international community (actor I) and communities of Hungarians in other East European states (actor J) have a greatly reduced influence on local debates, but remain in the picture.

**III. Understanding contention between groups**

**A. Primordialism or paradigm debates?**

Several authors writing on multiethnic democracies have described them as having unstable features. Juan Linz notes that the democratic assumption that today’s majority might be tomorrow’s minority does not hold in states with ethnic minority populations, which will always be part of the minority; thus one of the primary stabilizing features of democracy do not apply in such states. According to Elster, Offe, and Preuss, institutional consolidation in transitional states is more difficult in multiethnic states, where ethnic minorities may not accept procedural rules and where disputes involving ethnic groups are “categorical,” and thus naturally confrontational. Donald Horowitz is particularly concerned with the “centrifugal” effects of ethnic parties, arguing that they can pull the system apart. He argues for electoral strategies that give incentives for multi-ethnic cooperation. Arend Lijphart, Linz, and George Schöpflin have
argued for institutional forms of democracy, which accommodate ethnic or national minorities by institutionalizing a degree of representation for them. Romania has an electoral system of proportional representation, which results in higher minority representation than in states with “first-past-the-post” systems.

In spite of these structures to maximize representation, the problem of fixed minorities in multiethnic states remains. This difference is not merely one of form, but of content — ethnic minorities in East Central European countries commonly hold very different normative views of how the state should operate than the titular groups with which they share their states. For example, ethnic Hungarians in Romania argue that a federal state structure is crucial for adequate representation, while Romanians generally support a more centralized structure. The groups also differ over which versions of geography and history should be taught in schools as well as the degree to which minorities may use their language in official circles. Claus Offe notes that in many of these countries undergoing post-communist transitions, at the most fundamental level, there is contestation over the “identity, citizenship, and the territorial as well as social and cultural boundaries of the nation-state,” i.e., who the “we,” the citizenry that fill the state’s boundaries, are. While these disputes dissolved into violence in the former Yugoslavia, in most other states they have taken the form of contentious politics with an ethnic and national bent.

What accounts for these different stances between ethnic groups? Some have argued that ethnic groups have maintained distinctions between each other throughout history, and that such disputes are simply a modern form of antipathy between them. This view is called “primordialism” in nationalism literature. One variant of primordialism is the “ancient hatreds” explanation for violent conflict between groups; that groups kill each other due to long-standing rivalries that cannot be broken. In contrast to primordialism stands the view that such conflicts are constructed as leaders “manipulate” or “stir up” nationalist feelings among individuals of their group, for ideological or materialist reasons. This view takes two primary forms. Discourse approaches illustrate the importance of media or elites in such construction, while rational-choice approaches examine benefits, sanctions, and coercion in group mobilization. Recent work in this area, however, notes that neither of these approaches presents a convincing picture on its own. Rather, elements of both are present, as identity is “continually reformulated in an iterative
process in which memory and myth shape and limit the boundaries of social construction.” These processes will be illustrated later in this paper; for now, it is enough to note that the different histories, cultures, and languages of different ethnic groups imply different normative visions of how the state should operate and of group interests within the multiethnic state. For simplicity, these differences may be understood as paradigms. When Hungarians argue for the right for their children to study Hungarian history instead of the history endorsed by the titular group, they are asserting a normative vision that cannot be reduced to interest alone. Paradigm differences may include normative claims as well as interests.

Different paradigms were not allowed to be debated under the structures of communism. Those in positions of power in communist states articulated the party line, and any vocalizing of divisive concerns, whether on ethnic or other lines, could be punished as action detrimental to the state. When the communist structure disintegrated in 1989 in Romania, debate on such issues became feasible. It is not the case that “ancient hatreds” popped out with the demise of communism, but simply that debate began to be exercised along cleavage lines. The Hungarian party split off rather quickly from the broad National Salvation Front (FSN) in late December, 1989, once they realized that their normative concerns and viewpoints diverged significantly from those of other movement members. These early differences became most visible in the form of views on education and language use, which were strong forces in the cases examined in this paper.

A decade later, these groups continue to experiment with the possibilities and constraints of democracy as they test how far they can go in pushing their particular paradigms in politics. The processes of contentious politics in multiethnic states such as Romania demonstrate how such jockeying takes place under conditions in which groups have accepted institutional solutions to resolving their differences. They thus stand in stark contrast with the experience of the Former Yugoslavia, where such acceptance did not take hold in time — and as violence began, became increasingly unlikely. The routinization of contestation and mobilization processes over time decreases the possibility for tense mass mobilizations between groups with each successful iteration. This happens as contentious repitoires, or “limited ensembles of mutual claim-making routines available” emerge, as the actors “adopt scripts they have performed, or at least observed,
In reworking “known routines... they acquire the collective ability to coordinate, anticipate, represent, and interpret each other’s actions.” This process is crucial in new multiethnic democracies in which these routines began only a decade ago, as opposed to democracies in which the repitoires of contention have been long-established.

**B. Objects of contention**

What do ethnic groups debate in multiethnic states? I have divided these issues into three categories for this analysis: 1) debates over language, 2) the content of a multiethnic state’s history and culture, 3) the structure of state and local democratic institutions; and 4) ethnic demography at state and local levels. The two cases examined in this paper fall under the first category, the use of minority vs. majority languages, primarily in schools. Debates over a multiethnic state’s history and culture are one of most visible aspects of paradigm debates, as they cannot be reduced to interest alone. Transylvania has been held twice by Hungary and twice by Romania during this century alone. After each territorial transfer, states have attempted to erase competing histories, in favor of histories that would legitimate their claims to the territories in question. With regard to democratic institutions, under the conditions of transition found in post-communist states, the decisions made concerning the forms that state and local institutions should take will set precedents that will last in years to come. Hungarians tend to favor decentralization of government to increase power to the local levels, while Romanians tend to favor a more unitary state structure. Ethnic demographics is a particularly interesting category as it includes some of the most benign and some of the most explosive issues of debate. On the subtle side, each group may contest the content of state or local demographics by maintaining that official census figures contain errors. They may also promote policies that can foster assimilation of one group to another. On the explosive side, demographics can by forcibly altered through population transfers or by violence and “ethnic cleansing.”

One of the most important traits of these issues is that they not only serve as the objects of debate between groups, but also serve as the conditions that frame ethnic mobilization. The language that will be spoken at a local high school may not only serve as an object of contention between groups, but it also frames ethnic mobilization by educating children in either their minority “mother tongue” language or in the official state language. The processes of contentious
politics in multiethnic states are thus closely tied to the mechanisms of ethnic mobilization in a bidirectional fashion. In order to unpack these processes we must identify the mechanisms through which contestation and mobilization affect each other. It is for this reason that an interactive process approach, which will be discussed in the following section, is the one taken in this paper.

IV. An interactive analysis

A. Dynamic relations

The essence of politics, particularly contentious politics, consists of a pattern of action and reaction — a process of relational interaction. Nearly any story we tell about particular tense events between groups will involve the words “response” and “reaction.” Scholars of social movements have noted the important influences that interaction patterns with opponents have on social movement mobilization. Recent work in the area of international relations examines the continuous processes of interaction through which states are formulated; states can thus be understood as either successful or unsuccessful “projects,” a useful insight into processes of state disintegration or formation. The analysis of processes is a relatively new research program with significant potential in political science.

While historical accounts often describe events in terms of interactions, such processes have often been obscured in social science by the assumptions of individualist approaches. The assumption that calculations of individual utility are the driving force of all political behavior facilitates an understanding of interactions between individuals as strategic games. These games occur in a vacuum in which only these individual calculations matter, thus each game begins afresh, with little or no attention paid to learning processes that might occur through interaction or repertoires that might be developed between individuals over time as a result of shared understandings that emerge from interactions.

Interaction between entities is particularly important for understanding social phenomena, because interactive conditions mean that possible actions are constrained to a certain degree. Thus, as noted by Tilly, “…the consequences of all social interaction, erroneous from the actors’ viewpoint or otherwise, pass through powerful systemic constraints.” Relational analysis thus posits that “recurrent patterns of interaction among occupants of social sites… constitute the
subject matter of social science.” We can identify regularities in interactional patterns in the form of mechanisms. Several of these mechanisms (though not necessarily all of them) can be usefully generalized to other situations. The analysis of causal mechanisms within an interactionist framework is a significant stride in the identification of causal processes in social science, and stands in contrast to the identification of correlations between attributes of variables.

Not only do the constraints of interaction affect the actions of individuals, but repeated interactions also “modify established patterns instead of striking out alone in empty causal space.” These changes of patterns occur only incrementally with iteration, but are no less real than abrupt shifts. Thus we can understand the inherent endogeneity between mobilization and contestation as outlined in the section above: “in relational analysis, social causation operates within the realm of interaction: conversation transforms language, struggle transforms power structures, daily interchanges in the course of production transforms the character of work.” In the section below, I will outline the mechanisms and processes through which banal debates between ethnic groups might become tense events, or how tense events might be reduced to banal debates.

**B. Mechanisms: resonance, bargaining, and brokerage**

A mechanism changes the nature of relations among specific elements. It should be generalizable, meaning that these changes appear in similar ways across various situations. Processes are combinations of mechanisms that are also generalizable to different settings. Three primary interaction mechanisms appear to have causal force for the processes of mobilization and contestation. These mechanisms, resonance, bargaining, and brokerage, will be outlined here. Because these mechanisms inhere in the interactions between actors, I will discuss them in connection with the diagram of actors outlined in section II, noted in Figure 3. While this diagram denotes actors at the national level, similar mechanisms can be transposed to interactions between actors A, B, C, and D at the local level. Figure 3 shows a series of lines between actors which represent various mechanisms.

*Resonance* a mechanism that facilitates mobilization, and it occurs when a positive interaction (action and reaction) occurs between the elites of an ethnic group and “their” masses, establishing a connection between them. Resonance is thus represented by the thick solid line
drawn between the elites of a majority ethnic group, A and their masses, B, as well as the thick solid line between elites of a minority ethnic group, C, and their masses, D.

*Bargaining* is a mechanism in the process of contention, which occurs when elites of two ethnic groups in a multietnic state interact with each other in order to devise compromises on various political issues on which the two elites disagree. Bargaining is represented by the dotted line drawn between the elites of a majority ethnic group, A, and the elites of a minority ethnic group, C.

*Brokerage* is the mechanism through which elites for each ethnic group represent the interests of their masses to elites of the other group. As noted by Knoke, “a brokerage relation involves at least three actors, in which the intermediary smooths the transactions between other actors who lack access to or trust in one another.” Here the elite of an ethnic group serves as a representative broker, as he or she is not neutral with regard to the parties between which the broker mediates. This mechanism plays a role in both the processes of contention and mobilization. Resonance might exist without a brokerage mandate — this is because while certain issues achieve resonance between elites and masses, masses may not necessarily endorse contestation or bargaining on these issues with the other group. The dashed lines in the diagram represent these brokerage relations: one covers A and stretches to B and C, and the other covers C and stretches to D and A.

**C. Consequences of mechanisms: causal propositions**

In considering the implications of the interactions outlined above, we can deduce five causal propositions regarding the way in which debates between groups might develop into tense events between groups or might fade in importance. Under conditions of paradigm differences, we should expect the following as particular issues are debated between groups:

1. Resonance is nearly always present. However, it varies among elites and may be achieved between more than one elite in section A with the mass B. In order for the routinization of contention to occur, resonance must be strongest between the particular elite that bargains with the elites of the other group. For example, if an extremist maintains the strongest resonance among the masses, efforts by an elite to bargain with the other group will most probably be
irrelevant to the routinization of relations, as the bargaining outcome will probably be ignored by the mass.

2. If bargaining relations cease, mobilization of masses B and D may occur. Under conditions of paradigm differences, a group without a legitimate elite to pursue bargaining will likely try to agitate for their normative views or interests on their own, sometimes *en masse*. Such a scenario is particularly volatile, as compromise cannot be achieved between mass groups. If there is no bargaining, yet there is brokerage, elites may make appeals to actors outside the state, such as the Western international community or the Hungarian state.

3. Elites that bargain without a brokerage mandate may either simply be ignored, rendering bargain efforts moot, may lose resonance and thus their place as an elite.

4. Exogenous shocks, i.e. actions taken by the Hungarian state, the Western international community, or communities of other Hungarians abroad (actors F, G, and H in Figure 3), often influence the processes of contention and mobilization. If Hungarians in another state begin to request autonomy from the titular group, for example, ethnic Hungarian leaders in the state under study may consider introducing this proposal themselves — or, leaders of titular groups might assume such proposals might be made and might adjust their bargaining stances accordingly. Exogenous shocks from the international context can alter the understanding of what is possible in situations of contentious politics.

5. If resonance, bargaining, and brokerage are present, we should see the routinization of contestation and mobilization into benign forms in which mass mobilizations of actors B and D do not take place. This is due to the fact that elites have the support of their populations and the mandates to represent them in bargaining. Again, bargaining on the elite level maintains the possibility of compromise, while mass mobilizations rarely achieve compromise. When all of these mechanisms are functioning, we should see routinization of contestation and mobilization processes over time, and the possibility for tense mass mobilizations should decrease.
V. Applying theory to cases
A. Overview of events

1. Târgu Mures, March, 1990

The interethnic harmony that brought down the Ceausescu regime in December, 1989, began to feature cracks as early as January, 1990 in Târgu Mures, a city with an approximate 50-50 proportion of Romanians and Hungarians. During late January Hungarian students and teachers attempted to act upon a government ruling that the prestigious Bolyai high school be granted to hold courses exclusively in Hungarian rather than in both Hungarian and Romanian, and that the Papiu high school should give courses in Romanian. The city’s Hungarian press noted the importance of education in a group’s mother tongue for the preservation of national identity and the decline of Hungarian education over the past several years. Opposition to such changes was widespread in the city’s Romanian-language press, which criticized attempts to separate students of different groups, and Romanian students demonstrated in this vein in early February. Dialogue on the issue broke down into protests on each side, and the changes were suspended. A silent candle demonstration organized by the RMDSz drew several thousand Hungarian participants on Feb. 10. The issue continued as a rallying point for the new RMDSz, which began to mention the notion of cultural autonomy for Hungarians. The Romanian press noted the growing presence of history and geography books brought in from Hungary with alarm, and criticized a strike by students from the Hungarian section of the local medical and pharmaceutical university.

Several events coincided in the days that followed. A Hungarian holiday on March 15 brought some visitors from Hungary to celebrate in Transylvania with their co-ethnics. Graffiti was found on the statues of Romanian heros around this time, and the local Romanian media referred to the celebrations as an insult to Romanians who remembered the holiday as the anniversary of a local WWII battle in which several Romanians were killed by Hungarians. On March 16, a large crowd gathered outside a pharmacy in a largely Romanian neighborhood calling for the pharmacy to change its sign, which had recently been inscribed in Hungarian as well as Romanian. As the crowd grew and became more agitated, the pharmacy closed. There were some
scuffles, and to add to the confusion, a car careened into the crowd, harming several individuals. Others promptly set the car on fire. On March 17, a protest by students in the Romanian section of the medical/pharmaceutical university against separation was joined by members of Vatra Româneasca, a strident Romanian cultural organization. The protest, complete with slogans and songs, moved to the town square, where there were some scuffles between Romanians and Hungarians, and the Protestant church office sustained some damage. On the 18th and 19th, a Romanian crowd began to demonstrate for the removal of an ethnic Hungarian, Kincses Elod, from his post as temporary vice-president of the county administrative structure. In the midst of these demonstrations, some buses arrived containing ethnic Romanians from towns surrounding Târgu Mures. Some Hungarian signs around the city were removed by the crowd, which moved from the main square to the offices of the RMDSz. They surrounded the building, damaging offices on the first floor and effectively trapping ten members of the local Hungarian elite on the second floor. Some members of the crowd shouted threats to those inside and attempted to gain entry to the second floor. After approximately four hours, a contingent of military and police arrived, calling to the Hungarians that they would be protected if they came down; a truck was waiting to take them out of the crowd. Upon their descent, the crowd overpowered the meager police force and injured several of the Hungarians, some severely. Vatra Româneasca later denied responsibility for the events and called for a decrease in group tensions, and President Illescu visited one of the wounded in a Bucharest hospital.

Events escalated on March 20. A morning multiethnic demonstration against the events of the previous day was held near the RMDSz office, then moved to the main square, joined by students from the Bolyai high school. Several factories went on strike. By noon, several thousand people occupied the lengthy town square. A group of Romanians chanting Vatra Româneasca slogans gathered in another part of the square. After a standoff of approximately four hours, empty bottles were thrown across the square, inciting a melee between the groups. Once again, buses arrived from the surrounding villages, bearing Romanians who joined in the fighting. In the midst of the chaos, a truck moving at full speed careened toward an Orthodox church on the square, coming to a halt on its steps opposite the entrance. Several vehicles were set on fire. By the end of the day seven or eight individuals had died and over 300 were wounded. The hospitals
were filled.  

Local church leaders of all groups issued a joint declaration condemning the violence. By March 22, the local Hungarian press and the RMDSz began to criticize the version of the events presented in a declaration by the Romanian government, national television, and the local Romanian media. In spite of the fact that the local media of each group generally condemned the actions of the other, they also emphasized the need for dialogue and the avoidance of rumors. The RMDSz and Vatra Româneasca issued a joint declaration condemning extremism and false information. On March 23 new individuals were elected to the county council, and those who had participated in the events were barred from running for office. In addition, the new members were nominated in a “cross” fashion, with the Romanians nominating the Hungarians candidates and the Hungarians nominating the Romanian candidates. The new executive city council candidates were nominated in the same way. This process was not easy — it involved heated debates, and the county council meeting lasted eight hours.

2. Miercurea Ciuc, June, 1990

This city, located in a Hungarian-majority enclave in central Romania, features an 83 percent ethnic Hungarian population and a 16 percent ethnic Romanian population. The removal of local elites during the December, 1989 revolution (most of which were Romanian) was later criticized by the central government as having an ethnic character, a position strongly opposed by Hungarians. As in Târgu Mures, debates over separate schooling for Hungarian minorities began in late January, causing tension on both sides. Large demonstrations took place in Miercurea Ciuc in response to the March events in Târgu Mures; the first, on March 20, drew several thousand. The second, on March 21 and organized by the local RMDSz, also involved several thousand and included a general strike to protest the Romanian government’s approach to the events. The divergence in local media coverage closely resembled that of the Târgu Mures media, with the Romanian press emphasizing the celebration of the March 15 holiday and proposed separation of schools as provocations and the Hungarian press presenting the events as an anti-Hungarian campaign. These differences resulted in a largely Hungarian protest at the newspaper headquarters on March 22. Although the Romanian paper defended its position, it noted that an ensuing dialogue held between a delegation of 30 individuals of different views was of a peaceful
nature and contributed to true inter-ethnic cooperation and understanding.\textsuperscript{75}

The first post-communist elections were held on May 20, with Hungarians voting for the RMDSz in large numbers and Romanians voting for the National Salvation Front (FSN), which resulted in a significant win for the RMDSz in the region. Campaigns in each newspaper had presented the RMDSz as the only voting option for Hungarians and the FSN as the only option for Romanians.\textsuperscript{76} Polarization between the two groups became truly visible at this time.

On June 13, the local police removed bilingual signs designating the police bureau, replacing them with signs that read “Police” only in Romanian. A group of young men, some under the influence of alcohol, gathered around the police station demanding that the old signs be replaced. By evening the crowd had grown to over a thousand and had begun shouting pro-Hungarian and anti-Romanian slogans. They began throwing rocks and other items at the building. A Catholic priest was unable to calm down the crowd, which then broke into the police headquarters by damaging the main doors. Several rooms were set on fire, documents and equipment were damaged, and some soldiers attempting to block the crowd were injured and taken to the hospital. The police attempted to hold some of the most strident demonstrators, but they slipped away in the press of the crowd. By 2 a.m., the crowd had dispersed.\textsuperscript{77}

An extraordinary meeting of the county council was held soon after these events, where it was decided that the bilingual signs should once again be installed. Two explanations were discussed: 1) that the signs themselves provoked the events and 2) that something larger was behind the events that had nothing to do with minority conflicts, a notion embraced by the Romanian press.\textsuperscript{78} The view that larger forces were behind the demonstration was explicitly mentioned by the Romanian press in Târgu Mures, which connected the incident to arson at the police office in Bucharest and other events in the capital on the same day.\textsuperscript{79}

**B. Understanding the cases**

The March 1990 events in Târgu Mures have become famous in studies of East European ethnic conflict, as a case of ethnic conflict that did not spread. Nor did the Miercurea Ciuc events extend beyond one day of violence. The causal processes outlined above serve as a useful tool to understand the processes of development and moderation of these conflicts. What is more, these two conflicts, the most significant in post-1989 Romania, both took place in 1990 as institutions
of democracy were only beginning to take root. As the processes of inter-ethnic contention became more routinized over time, such escalation into violence became less likely. Although several provocative incidents and demonstrations over ethnic debates have taken place since 1990, they have not turned into violence between groups.  

According to proposition 1, some elites achieve more resonance than others, and the routinization of contention requires that those elites participating in bargaining should have the highest degree of resonance among the masses. While resonance is nearly impossible to “measure,” it can be easily spotted in the degree of mobilization achieved on particular issues. In the Târgu Mures events, those Hungarian elites that called for an increase in Hungarian schooling clearly enjoyed a high degree of resonance, as evidenced by the multitudes who mobilized in the form of demonstrations for schools. Hungarian elites that did not support increased Hungarian schooling (if there were any) did not resonate with their public, and any attempts by such elites to bargain with the Romanians would have been ignored by the Hungarian masses. The fact of resonance runs counter to notions that elites can “manipulate” masses according to their will — masses must agree with the position of elites for the relation of resonance to occur. Romanian resentment over the proposed separation of schools was also genuine. While it may be the case that elites vocalize concerns that masses might not, as in the case of the Romanian press’ alarm over history and geography textbooks arriving from Hungary, interviews reveal that these concerns in fact did resonate with many ethnic Romanians, as did surprise over the celebration of a Hungarian holiday with visitors from Hungary and the appearance of Hungarian national symbols, a novel incident after Ceausescu’s policy of isolation and forced homogenization.

The presence or absence of bilingual signs, on the pharmacy in Târgu Mures or on the police station in Miercurea Ciuc, was also enough to draw large crowds; in the tense atmosphere of the above issues, tense lines between the two groups had been drawn and the signs were a concrete representation of sincere grievances against the other group. The presence of buses to transport Romanians from the countryside into Târgu Mures and the strange coincidence of the Miercurea Ciuc events with the Bucharest events may indicate the involvement of outside “manipulators” to some degree. However, a large number participated in the Târgu Mures protests to remove Hungarian members of the local government, and thousands participated in the
melee that ensued. Efforts to orchestrate tensions, when clearly present as in Târgu Mures, still only remain part of the story. Over a thousand participated in the Miercurea Ciuc crowd that damaged the police station, in addition to the thousands that had previously demonstrated in solidarity with the Hungarians in response to the Târgu Mures events — including a demonstration of genuine resentment against differing views in the Romanian press.

Proposition 2 states that the cessation of bargaining relations may lead to mass mobilizations as groups perceive no other way to achieve their goals. This situation is particularly volatile, as compromise can almost never be achieved between mass groups. Such was clearly the case in Târgu Mures, where Hungarians protested a delay in their demands for increased Hungarian schooling. As a result of the stark polarization between groups over the school issue, communications reached an all-time low between elites each group with the March 19 demands by Romanians that some of the highest-ranking Hungarian elites be removed from office. It is noteworthy, however, that communication between moderates at the non-elite level was maintained, as evidenced by the multiethnic demonstration that took place on the morning of March 20. The potential for elite compromise did not resume until public revulsion over the violence forced radical changes in elite policy on both sides, with the RMDSz and Vatra Româneasca producing a joint declaration and the county and city councils resorting to the “cross” strategy of choosing the new leadership, with each group nominating the candidates of the other.

One of the most interesting features of the Miercurea Ciuc police station crowd is the blaring absence of elites to bargain and achieve compromise over the sign. There was thus no mechanism through which compromise could be achieved; the police were not simply going to remove their new sign due to a noisy crowd, though they might have done so had the mayor made such a request. There is an element of status in the mechanism of bargaining that cannot be overlooked; giving in to someone of high status is a means to save face, whereas one often refuses to give in to individuals considered beneath one’s own status. It is also notable that while the delegation of 30 at the Romanian paper to discuss their coverage did not achieve a change in the paper’s stance, the bargaining process itself was perceived as a significant means to promote cooperation and understanding through communication.
Proposition 3 notes that elites without a brokerage mandate may simply be ignored. There were some parents and teachers of each group that attempted to work out compromises to the Târgu Mures school conflict. However, in spite of the fact that such efforts resonated with some individuals, such compromises were largely ignored in the days before March 16-20. This is simply due to the fact that it was more tempting for the masses of each group to pursue their interests as far as possible in order to gain as much as possible. These elites were only granted a brokerage mandate after the masses realized that the extreme pursuit of their interests could run up against a brick wall — the undesirable alternative of violence. In the case of the Miercurea Ciuc police station, while the Catholic priest maintained a degree of authority and resonance in general, his attempt to calm the crowd was perceived as inappropriate for this particular situation. “Go make peace in the church!,” they shouted at him.82

According to proposition 4, exogenous shocks, or actions taken by actors outside of the immediate community, may influence the processes of events. In the case of Târgu Mures, these influences came in the form of Romanians bused in from surrounding cities to “help” their co-ethnics. In the case of Miercurea Ciuc, the presence of such exogenous factors remains murky, though several believe that there was a connection between the Bucharest protests and the police station crowd.

Proposition 5 states that a routinization of contestation and mobilization into benign forms requires the presence of resonance, bargaining, and brokerage mechanisms. The repetition of these processes over time results in the development of anticipatable repitoires among groups. Such repitoires are crucial in the context of paradigm differences. Different opinions on issues such as language use are a persistent fact of social life in multiethnic states. However, as old debates become routine, contention takes the form of repitoires in which each group has tested the limits of the other through repeated bargaining and compromise, often within an institutional framework. Under such conditions, the emergence of mass mobilizations leading to violence are extremely unlikely.

The evolution of repitoires over time is clearly visible in both Târgu Mures and Miercurea Ciuc. As of 1997, ethnic Hungarians in Târgu Mures were still requesting that the Bolyai high school be transformed into an exclusively Hungarian institution. This position no longer surprised
anyone, and the 1997 request was made through highly routinized channels. Soon after this action, nationalist politicians Gheorghe Funar, Valeriu Tabara, and Adrian Paunescu organized a meeting that drew six thousand in Târgu Mures, but the largely passive crowd simply dispersed after the rally ended. In Miercurea Ciuc, attempts by a small group of Romanian parliamentarians to stir controversy over the rights of Romanians in Hungarian enclave regions provoked much newsprint but few actions by Romanians living there, and legislation in parliament for specific protections for Romanians in such enclaves was soundly defeated. After seven years of contestation, arguments on ethnic lines have become routine, thus they have begun to be viewed more critically than they were in the early months of 1990, when knee-jerk reactions in favor of one’s own group were commonplace.

Conclusions

In this paper, I have made the case for an interactive analysis to specify the role that mechanisms of resonance, bargaining, and brokerage play in the political processes of contention and mobilization processes in multiethnic states. I have outlined five causal propositions from various combinations of these mechanisms and have used these propositions in order to illuminate the processes behind ethnic tensions and violent events in Târgu Mures in March, 1990 and in Miercurea Ciuc in June, 1990. As evidenced in these cases, the presence of all three mechanisms is crucial for the routinization of contention processes into repertoires. Such routinization of ethnic debates is possible even under conditions of stark paradigm differences between groups. We can see that, while debate and contention is ubiquitous in multiethnic states, compromises between groups may be reached through routinized and institutional processes. Coexistence in multiethnic states is thus not an anomaly, but rather a scenario we can expect under such conditions.
1. These numbers remain highly disputed.


5. This study is part of my dissertation, “Contention and Coexistence: Hungarian minorities and Interethnic Relations in Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine,” which compares contentious politics in nine multiethnic cities (three in each country). Hungary. I researched this project during 1997-98 in nine multiethnic cities in Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine, with support from the National Security Education Program (NSEP).

6. During World War II, Hungary reclaimed the territories on which the cities for this study reside, then was forced to relinquish them after the war.


9. The ethnic principle continues to be endorsed by Western powers in forms such as the 1995 Dayton Accords for Bosnia.


11. Connor, 93. He notes that Weber also draws a distinction between ethnic groups and nations; as ethnic solidarity does not necessarily equate the subjective identification that a nation does, 102-3.

12. Anderson, 6-7. A nation maintains a community in spite of the fact that they will "never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communication" through the printed media that they share.
13. Following the suggestion of Peter Juviler, I am using "locale" or often "city or town" to designate a geographic location, in place of the word "community," to avoid confusion with the Andersonian use of the term.


15. Agitation for territorial autonomy can be understood as an explicitly nationalist action, while cultural autonomy can take non-political forms. Agitation for political autonomy is a grey area. This paper will not address autonomy issues, though they are part of the larger project.


22. The use of networks in mobilizing individuals in a revolutionary situation has been examined by several authors, including Charles Tilly, "Models and Realities of Popular Collective Action," *Social Research* 52, no. 4, Winter 1985; and "International Communities, Secure or Otherwise,"
manuscript, Columbia University, October, 1996; as well as by Roger Petersen, "A Community-Based Theory of Rebellion," *Archives Europeennes Sociologiques* 34, 1993.


27. This description is particularly apt for Romania after the 1996 elections, when the Hungarian party (RMDSz) joined the government coalition, gaining increased power at the national level but maintaining views with regard to minority rights in opposition to those of the other coalition parties. Before that time Hungarian members of parliament maintained a degree of “permanent opposition” to certain Romanian policies, which also merits this schematic divide.

28. Juan Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis Breakdown, and Reequilibration*, edited by Linz and Alfred Stepan (Baltimore: John’s Hopkins University Press, 1978), pp. 61-65. Linz continued to argue this view in 1993, noting that “democracy has been very successful in handling class conflict because class interests are ultimately divisible: you can get higher wages, more profits, or you can split the difference somehow. Languages and flags, however, are not divisible.” Discussion Minutes from the Columbia University Seminar on Post-Communist States, Societies and Economies, topic of “Democratic Transition, Consolidation and the Risk of Breakdown,” Gabriel Topor, Rapporteur, April 16, 1993.


32. Claus Offe, “Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europe,” *Social Research* 58, no. 4, Winter, 1991, p. 869. At the second level, he argues, are debates over the forms that the new democratic institutions should take, while debates over “who gets what, when, and how,” what is often “mistaken for the essence of politics.”
33. The “ancient hatreds” view is actually somewhat of a straw man — it is not as widespread as one would believe from the number of articles vilifying it.


37. McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, *Dynamics*, manuscript Chap. 6, p. 9.

38. It is important to note that such stances are not only taken at the national level against minority groups, but sometimes at the local level against titular groups, if they form the minority in that area.

39. Such dubious “solutions” have been offered by security scholars such as Chaim Kaufmann, as well as nationalist elites such as Vladimír Meciar, former Slovak prime minister, and Gheorghe Funar, mayor of Cluj.


43. For a discussion of repertoires, see Tilly, Introduction to *Roads from Past to Future*.


47. Ibid., p. 45.

48. bid., p. 7.

49. This definition is adapted from Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, *The Dynamics of Contention*, manuscript, Stanford University, 1998, Chap. 5, p. 6: “a mechanism is a delimited class of events that change relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations.”

50. Ibid., p. 5: “processes are combinations and sequences of mechanisms that likewise reappear with considerable similarity from setting to setting.”


52. Other brokerage relations may preserve neutrality. Knoke, pp. 145-46.

53. These propositions are of course complicated by the fact that resonance may be present in one group and not the other, and so on. For simplicity, these possibilities will not be discussed here.

54. An increase in calls for Hungarian autonomy in Vojvodina, in rump Yugoslavia, seems to be having this effect to some degree.


57. CL: “Comunicat de la Ministerul Învatamântului,” 2/10/90. NU: “Lehetetlen a párbeszéd?” 1/26/90, and front page articles from 2/9/90 and 2/13/90. The newspaper puts the number of demonstrators at one hundred thousand, which is likely a bit high.


59. Government reports of the March incidents emphasize the presence of these visitors in inciting the inter-ethnic incidents; however, such mention is minimal among the local press. NU: “Március 15 megünneplése,” 3/16/90 and government declaration in Szabadság (Sz), 3/22/90.


62. NU, “Tüntetések Marosvásárhelyen... a Testvériség utcában,” 3/20/90. According to the Romanian account, the pharmacy employees were Hungarians who gave preference to clients who spoke Hungarian: CL, “‘Scînteia’ de la Farmacia 28,” 4/24/90.


64. These individuals, primarily from the ethnically-homogenous villages of Hodac and Ibanesti had been told by their local elites that the Romanians in Târgu Mures needed their help. Whether their transportation to the city was arranged by the Vatra organization, by the central government, or by someone else remains a murky and disputed issue.


71. Data from the 1992 national census.

72. Given the general chaos in the country at that time, this claim is difficult to substantiate one way or the other. A government report issued on the matter only served to polarize the two populations. These differences were well-covered in the local Hungarian and Romanian newspapers. A summary of different viewpoints appears in Adevarul Harghitei: “‘Starea a devenit patologica....’” May 8, 1991.

74. HN gave the number of demonstrators on both days at around ten thousand: “Tegnap megyénk helységeiben tízezrek tiltakoztak...,” 3/21/90, “Újabb határozott kiállás...,,” 3/22/90; AH: “Miting si greva generala la Miercurea-Ciuc,” 3/21/90.


80. Excluding the occasional barroom brawl.

81. Years later, these issues continue to resonate in a similar fashion, as in the 1997-98 government debate over the teaching of history and geography in schools.

82. AH, “Nefasta zi de 13....”


Figure 1
Sherrill Stroschein - Bibliography

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