Intellectuals and the Rise of Mass Politics

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§ 1 - Introduction:

This dissertation will contribute to explaining why Italy became a fascist dictatorship but France remained a parliamentary democracy in the period between the two world wars (1918-1939). In both France and Italy there were social groups espousing ideologies of the radical right, both were involved in World War I, both contained powerful anti-parliamentary social forces and both had histories of authoritarianism. However in France parliamentary government survived while in Italy the fascist movement seized (or was handed) power in 1922. Explaining why the regimes of inter-war Europe took different forms is a classic problem of political sociology. Scholars have explained these differences as a result of differences in the relative gradualness or suddenness of suffrage extension (Mann 1987: 192), as a result of the balance of class forces (Moore 1966: xvii; Poulantzas 1974), as a result of strategic political failures and successes on the part of the socialist party (Luebbert 1987: 461), and as a result of the strength or weakness of the state apparatus (Skocpol 1973: 22).

These theories are important to explaining variation in regime forms. However, none of them have convincing explanations of what was specific to fascist movements, as opposed to non-fascist types of anti-democratic reaction. This is because these theories tend to reduce the political form of fascist movements to their social bases, whether these are conceived as a class coalition or a some other coalition of social groups. The point of this dissertation is to investigate the argument that the fascist form of anti-democratic reaction was the result of an over-representation of reactionary humanistic intellectuals among its leadership. Thus to contribute to the scholarship on regime variation I will investigate the argument that fascism, unlike other forms of anti-democratic reaction, linked a cultural reaction to a class reaction. I will suggest that this cultural element
affected the early ideology and tactics of the fascist movement, and was a crucial part of the fascist regime's policies. Thus in the theory of fascism that I propose, the cultural reaction is the *differentia* of fascism that distinguishes it from other forms of anti-democratic reaction.

To understand the conditions under which such a cultural reaction would emerge and could become politically important, I draw on the sociology of intellectuals. I argue that in Italy the conditions existed for a reactionary alliance between petty political journalists and southern 'gentleman scholars' in the defense of general humanistic training that was perceived as under threat by the advance of an over specialized modern culture. In France this alliance was not possible because the elite humanistic intelligentsia was tied to the Republican state through university employment, and was overwhelmingly committed to a reformist, liberal and positivist ideology (Ringer 1992: 7). Further in France, I argue, there was a greater distinction between intellectuals and politics. Thus intellectuals in France were less likely than their Italian counterparts to be directly involved in political movements of any kind. Thus although in France a form of literary fascism did emerge, it remained politically weaker than its Italian counterpart. Because of this, French reactionary politics largely remained confined to traditional conservatism rather than fascism. Fascism emerged in roughly the same milieux in both France and Italy. But in Italy it could develop into a full fledged cultural reaction, while in France it remained relatively impotent.

The question that this dissertation asks, then, is under what conditions do intellectuals affect the form of reactionary politics? My tentative answer to the question is that Italian intellectuals who possessed threatened forms of knowledge, developed the ideological and political techniques of fascism, were important to the seizure of power, and affected the policies of the regime. Thus the interests of intellectuals were crucial in determining the form of radical right wing politics in Italy. In France I argue that because the university system was more highly developed, and therefore modern specialized
knowledge was more institutionalized, the basis for a cultural reaction in the Italian sense was weaker. As a further result of this institutionalization the direct political role of intellectuals was weaker. Although there did develop a cultural reaction among the marginalized humanistic intelligentsia this did not spread to the high intelligentsia, nor was it able to penetrate important political movements. Thus in France intellectuals played a marginal role in determining the form of reactionary politics.

§ 2 - Theories:

The appropriate theoretical context of this dissertation, then, is theories of the effect intellectuals have on the form of reactionary political movements. This section adumbrates three positions on this issue: intellectuals as the expression of class interests, intellectuals as possessors of cultural capital, and intellectuals as the possessors of cultural influence. As I specify below each of these theories leads to a different prediction about the kind of intellectuals who constitute the leadership of different political movements. All of these theories suggest that intellectuals are important to political movements. Where they differ is on the issue of the kinds of intellectuals they expect to be over or under represented in particular political movements.

The first position suggests that intellectuals do not have a significant impact on politics as intellectuals. Intellectuals according to this theory express class interests either because they are part of a particular social class (organic intellectuals), or because they have allied with a particular social class (traditional intellectuals). According to this theory the form of reactionary politics is identical to its class content. This theory thus suggests that intellectuals will be distributed across political movements according to how closely connected they are to the class interests that those movements represent. Some intellectuals may be less tied to class positions than others, but these 'traditional' intellectuals are likely to ally with the class that is currently most powerful in the class struggle.
The second position suggests that intellectuals are likely to affect the form of reactionary politics where they are institutionally separated from classes because there is a weak market for their cultural products. This theory relies on the idea that intellectuals possess an asset, knowledge or cultural capital, and that their political behavior can be understood as an interaction between their interest in garnering relatively higher returns to this asset and the economic context in which they pursue that interest. Where that economic context is favorable, intellectuals are unlikely to join movements of the radical left and right. For this reason, this theory predicts that intellectuals will be important in determining the form of reactionary politics either where capitalism is weak, and thus where the cultural market is restricted, or where there exists a larger body of intellectuals who hold a form of knowledge, generally called humanistic or teleological knowledge, for which there is weak demand.

The theory that I propose states that intellectuals are likely to affect the form of reactionary politics where there is a powerful intellectual group whose control of the means of persuasion is threatened by the emergence of a new culture born by intellectuals directly tied to capitalism. This theory differs from the cultural capital theory, because it suggests that the form of culture that intellectuals possess is more important than intellectuals' economic interests in explaining their political behavior. Intellectuals who are tied to pre-capitalist class structures, far from seeking to increase returns to cultural capital, are likely to resist the development of modern specialized knowledge that would undervalue their own forms of culture and undermine their ability to speak on a range of issues with equal authority. This group of intellectuals is likely to espouse anti-intellectual ideologies and to attack 'mindless specialization' and academic knowledge.

My theory then states against the class theory that a cultural reaction among the intelligentsia was a necessary but not sufficient condition for the fascist form of anti-democratic reaction. It further states, against the theory of intellectuals as holders of cultural capital, that intellectual adherence to fascism cannot primarily be explained by the
economic interests of intellectuals, but rather this adherence is rooted in their interests in preserving their own form of culture as the dominant one

Gramsci's Class Theory of Intellectuals

Class theory generally suggests that intellectuals affect political outcomes when they articulate class interests. Thus to explain political outcomes one can abstract from the interests of intellectuals as intellectuals, and move directly to an analysis of the interests and conflicts of social groups defined by their relations to the means of production. There are two ways that intellectuals may be tied to social classes. First, organic intellectuals grow directly out of the economic activities of social classes (Gramsci 1971: 5). For example the capitalist enterprise creates technicians and political economists out of the attempt to deal intellectually with the economic problems of the firm. These kinds of intellectuals elaborate the 'spontaneous ideology' of the social class to which they belong. However besides organic intellectuals there exists another stratum of traditional intellectuals, defined by the fact that their position and their knowledge is not rooted in production. Traditional intellectuals cultivate knowledge for its own sake, or for the sake of divine authority. Although not rooted in capitalist production they must be reckoned with in the process of class formation. To the extent that the organic intellectuals of a given class are developed that class will also be able to attract traditional intellectuals to its side. Gramsci argued that the pre-fascist period in Italy was characterized by a split between the traditional intellectuals and the bourgeoisie. At the same time he suggested that the proletariat had not yet developed its own intellectuals (Gramsci 1979: 270). In this situation Gramsci argued it was necessary to assimilate and conquer this mass of 'traditional intellectuals' (Gramsci 1970: 10).

Thus class theory identifies two groups of intellectuals, those who carry class ideologies, and those who are intrinsically political 'blank slates', the traditional intellectuals. This latter group will adhere to one class or another depending upon the state of the class struggle.
Intellectuals as Possessors of Cultural Capital

The cultural capital theory of intellectuals implies that they are likely to affect the form of reactionary politics when a large enough body of them perceives that the asset that defines intellectuals as a social group, cultural capital or cross-contextual knowledge, is unremunerated (Gouldner 1976: 22). Under employed intellectuals are likely to be politicized in a left wing direction if capitalist classes are non-existent, and are likely to politicized in a right wing direction if capitalism is relatively advanced. The basic implication of this theory is that intellectuals act according to their economic interests as the possessors of knowledge. This section explicates the most historically specific exemplar of this type of theory.

Konrád and Szelényi's analysis in *Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* begins with the question what kind of knowledge "...in itself confers a title to social reward and authority and, in itself relieves its possessor of any necessity of directly, physically producing use-values or performing any physical, mental, or even supervisory services of a routine nature" (Konrád and Szelényi 1979: 30)? This, they argue, is intellectual knowledge. In their specification of intellectual knowledge Konrád and Szelényi use three oppositions: regulating and orienting knowledge, cross contextual and context specific knowledge, and general and monopolized knowledge. Regulating knowledge specifies the kind of knowledge that identifies the most efficient means to achieve a given end. Orienting knowledge refers to a kind of knowledge for deciding among ends. Cross contextual knowledge refers to knowledge that can be applied across contexts, rather than knowledge that is specific to a given activity, which is context specific knowledge. Monopolized knowledge is the monopoly of a specific group, while general knowledge is relatively diffused. All of these forms of knowledge are concerned with or at least oriented toward values, but only two of the possible eight forms of knowledge (context free monopolized regulating knowledge, and context free monopolized orienting knowledge)
given by these three conceptual oppositions are forms of intellectual knowledge (see figure 1).

This typology yields two kinds of intellectual knowledge, technical or regulating knowledge and orienting or teleological knowledge (see the shaded areas in figure 1). For Konrád and Szelenyi the system of legitimated surplus extraction determines both the relative importance of these two types of knowledge, and the internal structure of the intelligentsia (estate, stratum or class). Simply put, the argument is that intellectual knowledge allows rewards only by being routed through the dominant system of legitimation. Some systems of legitimation favor the teleological or orienting fraction of the intelligentsia, some favor the technical fraction and others privilege both fractions. Thus under feudalism, where social positions are legitimated with reference to religious authority and tradition, it is theological knowledge that provides the highest rewards, under capitalism where the market is the dominant system of legitimation it is technical knowledge that provides the highest rewards. Under state socialism where intellectuals form a class, the division between technical and teleological knowledge disappears, and cross-contextual knowledge as such allows not only access to, but control over the social surplus (Konrád and Szelenyi 1979: 21, 61, 63, 68, 148).

Given this scheme how are the interests of intellectuals to be understood? The conclusion that the authors draw is that the intelligentsia has a potential class interest in the unification of technical and teleological knowledge and the establishment of a direct relationship between the possession of such knowledge and control over the social surplus. Konrád and Szelenyi argue, however, that this class interest could only become a class project where intellectuals were weakly integrated into the capitalist economy, and they faced modernizing pressures from the west.

For these authors intellectuals had two political alternatives in central, Southern and Eastern Europe in the early twentieth century: either an alliance with landowners and finance which issued in fascism, or the bid for class power which would establish state
socialism. Fascism was a more likely political project for the intelligentsia in the more liberal west where the professional intelligentsia, and thus reformism, was stronger and prevented socialist radicalization. Radicalization in the west was thus likely to take a rightist form. Fascism, on this interpretation, is a halfway measure under which the intelligentsia makes a bid through the state bureaucracy to share power with landlords and capitalists (Szelényi 1979: 131). This however does not represent the class-rule of the intelligentsia. The fascist system is unable to incorporate the radicalized intelligentsia who may even become an important element in de-stabilizing the fascist regimes (Konrád and Szelényi 1979: 132).

Intellectuals as Possessors of Cultural Influence

My theory states that intellectuals affect political outcomes when their cultural influence is under threat, but that how they affect these outcomes depends on the specific kind of knowledge that they possess. I share Konrád and Szelényi's argument that intellectuals can affect political outcomes. However I differ from their analysis of when and how this occurs. My theory suggests that it is not primarily intellectuals' material interests in guaranteeing high rewards on their form of knowledge that determines their political behavior. What determines this behavior is their interest in increasing the cultural influence of their forms of knowledge.

I distinguish between three kinds of knowledge, and thus three fractions of the intelligentsia, according to the degree to which credentialing is developed. First there is general humanistic knowledge that by its very nature cannot be credentialled. It is deployed in order to legitimate taking political and cultural stances on a wide variety of unrelated issues. This kind of knowledge is characteristic of gentlemen scholars and literati. The second kind of knowledge is tied to specific academic courses of study and is embodied in credentials that constitute a claim to expertise in a delimited area. This kind of knowledge is characteristic of modern university based intellectuals, regardless of their area of expertise. The third kind of knowledge is potentially, but not currently, credentialled, or is
weakly institutionalized. This is the kind of knowledge that is embodied in new scientific disciplines, or new branches of old disciplines.

My theory claims that when the cultural influence of these three kinds of knowledge is threatened the possessors of them respond in three different ways. The first group, the old humanistic generalists, are likely to respond with a strategy of reaction to cultural differentiation. This I will argue is the basis of fascist ideology. The second group, the credentialed academics, are likely to respond to cultural threats by insisting upon the necessity for a distinction between politics and culture, and perhaps organizing to defend this distinction. This group then is likely to support a liberal vision of an autonomous cultural marketplace that must be protected from the incursions of politics. The third group, the possessors of a culture that is yet to be institutionalized, are likely to pursue a strategy of cultural revolution. They will thus be likely to espouse radical left ideologies.

The implication of this theory for the explanation of different political outcomes is that these outcomes are partially the result of an interaction between the distribution of types of intellectuals and the existence or non-existence of a cultural threat.

**Implications that may be Empirically Investigated:**

The three theories presented above agree on one point: political movements are likely to be staffed by intellectuals. Classes, and other interests, do not represent themselves directly in the political sphere. Where the theories differ is whether and how intellectuals affect the form of politics. I reduce this conceptual difference to three predictions about the distribution of kinds of intellectuals in political movements. For the purposes of empirical investigation intellectual will be defined as the holder of higher degree or someone who gains at least part of his or her income from the production of written material.
The class theory suggests an over-representation\(^1\) of intellectuals, in relation to what the distribution would be if all types of intellectuals were distributed randomly among political groups, tied to big landlords, big industry and the petty bourgeoisie in parties of the radical right, an over-representation of intellectuals from the petty-bourgeoisie and working classes in the parties of the radical left, and an over-representation of intellectuals from the medium bourgeoisie in the liberal parties. The traditional intellectuals, those with an indefinite class position, should be relatively evenly distributed across the political parties. If there is a concentration of traditional intellectuals in a particular party this should be explainable as the result of prior class struggles. This is because the class theory suggests that the distribution of intellectuals should reflect the distribution of social classes and their relative strength. If this class theory is correct this provides evidence that the political form of fascist movements can be reduced to their class content, and that a class analysis of fascism is basically adequate.

The cultural capital theory suggests an over-representation of under-employed intellectuals in movements of the radical right and left, and an over-representation of well-established intellectuals in center right and center left. This is because this theory explains intellectuals' political behavior as a result of their interests in guaranteeing high returns on cultural capital. If the existing social order underemunerates intellectuals too drastically then they are likely to espouse radical politics. If however intellectuals are economically secure they are likely to adopt reformist or conservative political strategies.

My theory suggests an over-representation of humanistic generalists on the radical right and fascist movements, where their knowledge was relatively de-institutionalized, as in Italy. However, were a large proportion of the humanists were attached to academic institutions and committed to specialized knowledge, my theory suggests no over-representation of these kinds of intellectuals in right wing movements. It suggests an over...

\(^1\)Overrepresentation here always means overrepresented in relation to what the distribution would be if all types of intellectuals were evenly distributed among political movements.
representation of specialized academic intellectuals in the liberal and reformist socialist parties, and an over-representation of new disciplines among the parties of the radical left, if these disciplines have not been well institutionalized.

§ 3 - Investigating the Theories:

My dissertation asks: under what conditions do intellectuals affect the form of reactionary politics? The answer I propose to this question is that intellectuals affect this kind of politics when cultural specialization threatens their forms of knowledge, and when the intelligentsia plays a political role because intellectuals and politicians have not developed as distinct social categories.

There are, then, two propositions that I want to investigate. The first is that intellectuals shape right wing political movements where the possession of specialized knowledge is both weakly established as a claim to income or other forms of social recognition, and is threatened or is perceived to be threatened. This proposition is what differentiates my theory from the classical theories of regime variation. The second proposition is that the direction of intellectual politicization will depend on the kind of knowledge intellectuals possess -- credentialed institutionalized knowledge (center), knowledge that cannot be institutionalized (right), new kinds of knowledge that can be institutionalized but are not currently (left). This proposition is what distinguishes my theory from existing theories of intellectuals.

To investigate the first proposition I intend to compare the leadership of the French right with the Italian right in the years 1910, 1914, 1918 and 1922. Over time, I expect to find a decreasing number of intellectuals on the French far right as a result of the increasing institution of specialized knowledge. In Italy, on the other hand, I expect to find an increasing number of intellectuals on the far right as a result of the threat, but not triumph, of a modern specialized academic culture. Further I expect evidence that intellectuals affected the ideology and political strategy of the Italian far right, giving it a fascist complexion, while I expect the ideology of the French right to have remained
predominantly conservative. This would support my proposition that intellectuals affect political outcomes when their knowledge is not well institutionalized (Italy) and they do not affect political outcomes when their knowledge is institutionalized (France). It would further support my theory that fascism was a fusion of a cultural reaction with a class reaction, and that where this cultural reaction did not occur the political outcome was unlikely to be fascist.

To investigate the second proposition I will research the distribution of types of intellectuals in far right, far left and center political groups in Italy in the same four years. For each political leader that I identify as an intellectual I will collect three pieces of information: class position, disciplinary background and employment prospects. I expect that over time the association between generalists and the far right, specialists and the center, and the new disciplines and the far left became increasingly strong in Italy as the threat of modern specialized culture increased. Further I expect this relationship to be stronger than either class background or employment prospects. Thus, for instance, I expect unemployed engineers to have been more likely to be political liberals than the generalist intelligentsia that was employed, but had antipathy toward 'positivism'.

Justification of the France-Italy Comparison

The political history of France and Italy in the late nineteenth century is parallel in important respects. In both countries there was a relatively strong anti-parliamentarian right wing. In France this included the movement in 1879 to install general Boulanger as a new dictator, right wing leagues that grew up around the turn of the century during and before the Dreyfus Affair, and the Action Francaise and other anti-parliamentary right wing movements that developed during and after World War I (Weber 1965: 84, 93, 98). Italy had a similar anti-parliamentarian right wing nationalist movement centered around the review Il Regno led by Enrico Corradini (Nolte 1966: 183; Seton-Watson 1967: 351-2).
By the late nineteenth century there was a sharp difference between the French and Italian intelligentsias. The basic difference was that in France intellectuals had an institutionalized and autonomous social identity while in Italy they still lacked this. In France the number of secondary teachers increased from 1,400 in 1894 to 2,200 in 1909. In Italy there was an increase from 946 to 1,141 (Charle 1996: 155). Partially as a result of this extension there was in France a relative democratization of intellectual professions. The social origins of French professors were lower than their counterparts in Germany and England (unfortunately figures for Italy are not available) (Charle 1996: 215). Further the social origins of writers in France were lower than their Italian counterparts. In France 37.4 percent of writers came from the petty-bourgeoisie while in Italy only 13.7 percent did (Charle 1996: 188). In Italy there was probably a greater mixture of social roles because the literary market was relatively restricted (Charle 1996: 190).

During the Dreyfus Affair in France the French intelligentsia developed a new relationship to politics. Charle argues that the politicization of intellectuals during the Affair was different than it had been at the beginning of the century. For the first time intellectuals intervened politically as intellectuals forming leagues and signing petitions. This strategy emerged first among the Dreyfusards, but was also adopted by the anti-Dreyfusards (Charle 1996: 264). The development of a well institutionalized intelligentsia in Italy was less advanced. Thus intellectuals in Italy often assumed a variety of roles, and also were directly involved in politics. Carducci, for example, was a professor at the University of Bologna, was a member of the municipal and regional council, was nominated as senator in 1890 and was also a journalist (Charle 1996: 295).

If my theory is correct, then, one should expect that intellectuals in Italy played a greater political role than they did in France. This was important since fascism linked a cultural reaction to a class reaction. Thus in France one of the conditions for the emergence of fascism did not exist.

Part I: Intellectuals and the Far Right in Italy and France
The first proposition I will investigate is that in Italy the far right was increasingly more dominated by intellectuals, than in France, and that intellectuals had an increasingly greater impact on far right political ideology and political style, than they did in France. For the Italian case I will research the background of the central committee of the Italian nationalist association in 1911, 1914 and 1918, and then the background of the leadership of the PNF in 1922. For the French case I will research the leadership of *Action Française* in 1910 and 1914 and the *Action Française* and the *Croix de Feu* in 1918 and 1922. I expect that in the Italian case the far right increasingly attracted intellectuals to its leadership, whereas in the French case the movement remained relatively unable to attract new intellectuals, and intellectuals had less influences on the political ideology of the French far right than in Italy. Further I will investigate the impact of the ideologies of intellectuals on the tactics and strategy of the two movements. In Italy I expect this impact to have been greater than it was in France.

**Part II: Within Italy Comparison**

The second proposition that I will investigate is that the direction of intellectual politicization depends on the form of knowledge that intellectuals' possessed. I will investigate this proposition through a comparison of the personel of far left, far right and center political movements in Italy in 1910, 1914, 1918 and 1922. I expect the association between institutionalized knowledge and center-left politics, threatened knowledge and the far right, and the new disciplines and the far left, to become increasingly strong over this period.

*Comparison of Far Left, Far Right, and Center Left in 1910*

*Comparison of the Far Left, 'Heterodox Left', Far Right and Center Left in 1914*

Italian politics, in 1914, was reconfigured by the war, out of which would later emerge the new position of fascism. The proposition I will investigate for this period is that the threatened humanists that still remained within the socialist party began to split away from it under the pressure of increasing bureaucratization and specialization.
In response to the war a new position emerged within Italian politics -- left-interventionism. I propose that the leadership of the left interventionists was dominated by intellectuals who had relatively few years of formal education, had no formal professional qualifications but some 'humanistic' culture, published relatively more books and articles than their orthodox socialist counterparts. I expect this leadership to have had some experience in the socialist party, but to have had their political careers within the party cut short by a combination of their own heterodoxy and the limited number of posts.

The socialist leadership, I propose, had relatively more years of formal education than their interventionist counterparts, were more likely to have specific professional qualifications, published relatively few books and articles of a more technical nature than the interventionists, came from northern areas and families of small shopkeepers and professionals, and had a relatively stable lifetime political trajectory. In terms of the theoretical categories I developed above, I expect the socialists leadership to be comprised of possessors of cultural capital, while the revolutionary interventionist leadership was comprised of charismatic intellectuals.

The first *fascio di combattimento* emerged out of the broad 'left interventionist' milieu. The key political institution of this tendency in the war years was the *Fascì di Azione Rivoluzionaria* (Lyttleton 1973: 25). This movement should not be confused with 'official' fascism, indeed many of the figures involved in this movement (Alceste de Ambris for example) latter became prominent anti-fascists. However this was the movement that laid the institutional and ideological foundations upon which the post-war 'true fascist' movement grew. By the end of 1914 Seton-Watson says that there were fifty of these groups in north and central Italy with 5,000 members (1967: 423). Who were these people?

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2Fascio in Italian means literally 'bundle'. In English it has a meaning similar league, alliance or union (see the discussion in Lyttleton 1973: 448).
The leadership of the *fasci di azione rivoluzionaria* should be relatively easy to trace. The quasi official publication of these groups was Angelo Oliviero Olivetti’s *Pagine libere* (DeFelice 1965: 249). The first part of my research will then be trace the careers of this leadership group, and to compare this information with information on the leadership of the socialists, and the other small political groups-- the radicals and the republicans³.

There are seven pieces of information that I would like to know about these leaders. First how many years of formal academic training did they possess? Second what, if any, was their area of intellectual expertise? Third how many articles and books did they publish? Fourth what was their occupational history? Fifth, what region did they come from? Sixth what was their social background? Seventh what was their lifetime political trajectory (did they move from the extreme to the extreme right, from the center left to the right, from the right to the left)?

But what of the base of this movement? In the absence of any reliable statistics on the membership of these ephemeral organizations I will study the basis of the movement by researching the geographical distribution of interventionist demonstrations. According

³The leadership of the left interventionists would include: Ugo Dalbi (opposes fascism after its right turn in 1920), Elio Laceria (opposes fascism after its right turn in 1920), Enzo Ferrari (opposes fascism after its right turn in 1920), Ulisse Lucchessi (opposes fascism after its right turn in 1920), Antonio Polledro, Afonsio De Pietri-Tonelli, Antonio Renda, Massimo Rocca, Manticaa, Mario Rheli, Luigi Razza, Cesare Rossi (becomes fascist (Sternhell 1994: 191), Ottavio Dinale (becomes fascist), Tullio Masotti (becomes fascist), Sergio Panunzio (Sternhell 1994: 32. Considered to be one of the most important fascist ideologues together with Gentile and Rocco), Angelo Oliviero Olivetti (publisher of pagine libere, later fascist ideologue (Sternhell 1994: 32; 191 also Jewish), Enrico Leone (founder of Il devinire sociale) (Sternhell 1994: 32), Paolo Mantica (founder of Il devinire sociale) (Sternhell 1994: 32), Arturo Labriola, Agonstino Lanzillo (joins Mussolini in 1914 and from that time onward writes continually for Il popolo d'Italia), Robert Michels (In 1925 Michels writes *Sozialismus und Fascismus in Italien*. Here he argues that fascism grows out of a national ideology form Pisacane to Garibaldi. In 1929 begins teaching in Perugia. A year earlier he joined the PNF (Sternhell 1994: 192), Paolo Orano, Alceste d'Ambris (This guy became a militant anti-fascist) (Sternhell 1994: 178), Amilcare d'Ambris, Filippo Corridoni, Michele Bianchi, Tomaso Monicelli, Ernesto Cesare Longobardi (Sternhell 1994: 131), Romeo Soldi (Sternhell 1994: 132), De Viti De Marco, Edomondo Rossini (National syndicalists latter becomes fascist (Sternhell 1994: 189)).

The leadership group of the socialist party would include Constantino Lazzari, Arturo Vella, Giovanni Bacci, Angelica Balabanoff, Francesco Barberis, Alceste Della Setta, Anselmo Marabini, Oddino Morgari, Benito Mussolini, Celestion Ratti, Edoardo Sangiorgi, Giacinto Serrati, Filiberto Smorti, and Adolfo Zerbini
to the class theory one would expect manifestations of interventionist discontent in Turin and Milan, where big industry controlled local political life, in the south where labor repressive landlords dominated, and in the most 'petty bourgeois' regions of Italy -- Umbria, Tuscany and the Marche (Mazzetti 1978: 23).

The theories of the intellectuals would suggest that the interventionist movement was a movement of socially and organizationally unattached intellectuals and would thus predict the most interventionist demonstrations in towns with large university populations and underdeveloped class organizations.

*The Effect of Interventionism and Early Fascism on the Rise of Fascism:*

To show that interventionism and early fascism were created by the traditional intelligentsia is not to show that these had an impact on the rise of fascism to power in the post-war period. This requires a different line of research. I propose that the defection of the traditional intelligentsia to left-interventionism, and often to fascism, weakened the socialist party, leaving it with a lack of leadership in the post-war crisis. Thus the political behavior of the traditional intellectuals, although it may seem to be only a matter of a few obscure splinter organizations, had an impact on the rise of fascism. I further propose, in line with the theory presented above, that this defection was rooted in the impact of the increasing bureaucratization of the socialist party on the position of the traditional intellectuals. The defection to interventionism was not a simple consequence of the war, but rather was rooted in the interaction of the interests of the traditional humanistic intelligentsia and the development of modern politics, under conditions of war.

There are four ways to research the effect of the hemorrhaging of the traditional intellectuals on the socialist party. First one can ask, to what degree did *Avanti!* begin to air heterodox and non-socialist views? Gramsci suggests that under Mussolini's leadership the Italian socialist party began to lose its ideological coherence as the pages of *Avanti!* were opened to the revolutionary syndicalists (Gramsci [1926] 1974: 145). Second one can ask what was the effect of prior defections of intellectuals from the party on the
leadership and rank and file of the party. As DeFelice points out Mussolini's defection sent tremors through the entire organization, and his defection itself was partially a result of the pressure Mussolini was under from intellectuals outside of the party (1965: 256-7). Even Gramsci was briefly disoriented in this period writing a piece that offered qualified support of Mussolini's position in *Il grido del popolo* (Gramsci [1914] 1994: 3-7). Third one can ask to what degree was the party able to replace its lost intellectuals with new ones? Finally one can ask what was the quality of the strategy after the defections?

*Squadrist* 1920-1921:

The second period during which the intelligentsia may have been a political actor was during the first squadrist movement from mid 1920 to mid 1921. This paramilitary movement laid the foundations for the fascist seizure of power. Without the systematic destruction of the socialist organizations in the Emilia Romagna the fascists could not have staged the March on Rome. The beginnings of what would latter become the fascist squads emerged in early 1920 among 'defenders of order' in Milan, Bologna and Rome. This movement began to win support among the industrialists primarily because they were shocked at Giolitti's unwillingness to meet the occupation of the factories in Turin, during 1920, with force.

The fascists were the main beneficiary of this mood. The *fasci di combattimento* were founded at a rally at the piazza of San Sepulcro in Milan on the twenty-third of March 1919. It embodied a bizarre combination of nationalist and radical socialist elements. The political direction of the *fasci* was unclear for at least a year after their emergence. The most striking characteristic of the fascist movement, it was explicitly not a political party, was its impotence. In the elections of November of 1919 fascist candidates had failed to win a single seat in parliament. At the end of the year only 30 fasci survived and the movement had a membership of less than 1,000 (Seton-Watson 1967: 570).

Mussolini, however, shrewdly understood the changed political atmosphere of 1920. His speeches now began to take on a more nationalist tone and he praised the
burning of the Slovene organizations of Trieste by that city's fascio in July of 1920. This, Seton-Watson argues, was the first act of squadrismo, the paramilitary technique that the fascist used to systematically destroy the socialist organizations in the Emilia in 1921 (1967: 571). By the middle of 1921 the squadrist expeditions had grown into systematic military operations in which the fascists destroyed labor cooperatives, burned the chambers of labor, beat leading socialists and dosed them with castor oil. The socialists were utterly defeated in these operations (Seton-Watson 1967: 572). Socialists were not however the only victims of fascist violence. The squads also attacked ethnic Germans in the Tyrol and Catholic organizations.

The record of Fascist violence was impressive. In the first six months of 1921 they destroyed "...17 newspapers and print works, 59 peoples houses, 119 chambers of labor, 107 cooperatives, 83 peasant leagues, 141 communist clubs and offices" (Seton-Watson 1967: 572). The attacks of the fascist completely overwhelmed the left. This was partially because, since the fascists had attracted many of the ex-combatants that the socialists had rejected on principle, they were more effective in street battles. Further the socialist party was caught in a feud from 1919 to 1921 over whether to accept Lenin's conditions for admission to the communist party. In 1921 the party split and this undermined its capacities for resistance precisely at the moment when unity was most vital (Seton-Watson 1967: 575).

The second major reason for the fascist success was the tolerance of the local and national authorities. In some areas the fascists were almost officially supported by the local prefect and military commanders. Orders from Rome to quell fascist violence were disobeyed. At the same time liberals in Rome completely failed to understand the significance of the fascist challenge. Giolitti regarded the fascist subversion of authority as identical to the socialist one, and thought that if the fascists were given a share in power they too could be 'transformed' and become a responsible part of the ruling elite (Seton-Watson 1967: 577).
During the 1921 elections Gioliti "...committed the greatest blunder of his long political career" (Seton-Watson 1967: 588). On March 20th Giolitti decided to dissolve parliament and hold elections. The purpose was to weaken the socialists further. To this end Giolitti formed a 'national-bloc' of all anti-socialist forces including the fascists. Despite wide-spread violence and intimidate the 1921 chamber was not terribly different from the 1919 chamber. The left had only eighteen fewer seats than it had two years previously. However Giolitti had now brought thirty-five fascist deputies into the chamber. This not only increased the fascists political respectability, it also undermined the possibility of a democratic alliance with the socialists. Even the reformist Turati "...felt it morally impossible to support a man who had made himself the accomplice of fascist brutality" (Seton-Watson 1967: 589).

The question that this dissertation proposes about this historical sequence is: what was the effect of the existence of the socially rootless intelligentsia on the strength and political aims of the squadrist movement?

The class coalition theory would suggest that the power of the fascist squads and their targets were determined by the interests of big commercial landowners in the Po valley and to a lesser extent big industrialists (Stephens 1989: 1043). To put it in Stephens words "...conscious instrumentation was in fact very important" (Stephens 1989: 1043). My theory, while not for minute denying the validity of the class coalition thesis, would suggest that in the absence of a socially rootless intelligentsia that had its own reasons for disliking mass democracy, squadristm would not have emerged. Rather I would expect a more traditional form of reaction to the self organization of the landless day-laborers in areas where no socially rootless intelligentsia existed with which to ally.

There are two predictions of the class-coalition theory that are incompatible with my own theory. First, the class coalition theory would predict the emergence squadismo in rural areas where labor-repressive agriculture was challenged by the organization of the landless proletariat. My theory would predict the emergence of squadismo in areas similar
to those where my theory would predict interventionism to be strong -- towns with a large university population and weakly developed class organizations. Second the class coalition theory would predict squadrismo to be oriented exclusively against the socialist parties. My theory would predict squadrismo to be oriented against all mass parties -- in the Italian context this would mean both the socialists and the Catholic Popolari.

The theory of the rebel petty bourgeoisie would predict the emergence of squadrismo in the same areas, Umbria, Tuscany and the Marche, that it would predict the emergence of interventionism. This theory would expect squadrismo to be oriented against the working class organizations, but not against the Catholic Popolari. Both these predictions run counter to my theory, that would predict the emergence of squadrism in towns with large university populations, and would predict this movement to be oriented the Catholic Popolari and the socialist party.

*The Gentile Reforms of 1923:*

Investigation of the social basis of interventionism and squadrism is intended to shed light on the effect of traditional intellectuals on the rise of the fascist movement. However my theory suggests that intellectuals not only increased the likelihood of a fascist political outcome, but also affected the structure of the fascist regime. After the March on Rome Giovanni Gentile was called to become the minister of public instruction. Gentile was not a 'fascist of the first hour' (that is he was not involved the early *fasci di combattimento*). He was an interventionist but joined the PNF only in 1923. However, I would argue, he represented a more elite wing of the same social formation that had founded the *fasci di combattimento* in the first place -- the traditional intellectuals.

My theory suggests the adhesion of the actual-idealists (Gentile and his followers) to fascism can be explained by the same factors that led the renegade socialists and revolutionary syndicalists to become fascist of the first hour. Both groups, my theory suggests, possessed a form of de-institutionalized charisma, and they adhered to fascism as the best way preserve the institutional conditions for the exercise of this charisma. Just as
the ex-socialists who made up the core of the interventionist fasci had rejected the specialized and routinized character of mass party organizations, so the Gentilean idealists rejected the specialization of modern intellectual training. Like the revolutionary syndicalists who existed on the margins of and outside the mass party organizations, the actual-idealists were virtually all outside the traditional academy, in small clubs or philosophical libraries (Garin 1966: 38).

During the early part of the twentieth century there was sharp 'conflict of the faculties' in Italy between two models of university education: the positivist one and the idealist one. The idealists broadly attacked the professionalization of philosophy and the specialization of knowledge. In his 1912 book *The Philosophy that is Taught* Gentile argued that university research and training was too specialized. He suggested that pedagogy should be eliminated since it was "...identical to the philosophy of the spirit" (Piccioni 1983: 79). Croce also polemicized against those who pursued philosophy as a vocation insisting that philosophy had to be pursued out of love (Piccioni 1983: 78).

The Gentile educational reforms, of 1923, instituted this reaction against specialized knowledge. By opening up examinations to all schools including catholic schools, by separating examinations from specific materials taught in courses, and by liberalizing the curriculum of the faculty of philosophy and letters the relationship between specific knowledge and educational credentials was loosened (Piccioni 1983: 81).

My hypothesis is that the Gentile reforms were supported and implemented by the traditional humanistic intelligentsia for the same reasons that they supported the early fascist movement. Just as the early *fasci* were a reaction to rationalization in the political sphere, so the Gentile reforms were a reaction to the development of specialized knowledge in the cultural sphere.

The first part of the research, sketched out above, will attempt to establish the importance of intellectuals both in the fascist movement and on the policies of the regime.
This section is thus supposed to show the importance of intellectuals against all the classical theories of regime variation. The second part of the research is to establish why intellectuals were attracted to fascism. This part differentiates between my theory and the economistic theories of the intelligentsia. The economistic theories of intellectuals tend to suggest that intellectual 'radicalization' is a response to poor employment prospects. These theories predict radicalization to occur in the humanistic, or 'teleological' wing of the intelligentsia that is less integrated into the labor market than the professionalized or technocratic wing. My theory suggests that a surplus of humanistic, or traditional intellectuals was a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the move toward fascism. Two further conditions had to exist. First there had to be a threat from developing mass party organizations. Second there had to exist an alliance possibility between the under employed humanistic intelligentsia and elite humanistic intellectuals.

There are then four explanatory factors for which I need empirical indicators. These are type of intellectual, employment situation, possibility for allying with the humanistic elite, and political structure.

The theory I have presented distinguishes between two types of intellectuals. The first are intellectuals directly connected to the process of production. The knowledge of these persons is valuable because it either contributes to productivity or because it allows firms to deal intellectually with their economic problems. This includes engineers, political economists and industrial technicians. The second type of intellectuals, traditional or humanistic intellectuals, includes all those who are disconnected from the process of production and whose knowledge is valuable not because it contributes to productivity, but rather because it provides criteria for deciding among ends. This second type includes philosophers, literary figures and ecclesiastics (Gramsci 1971: 7; Konrad and Szelenyi 1979: 29-32).

For the Italian case I have collected the names of persons who competed for the state examinations in political economy from 1914-1922. These names constitute a sample
of the high technical or organic, intelligentsia. I intend to construct a skeletal prosopography of all of these figures. I will want to know four pieces of information. First, what was the proportion of technical works to political works that these figures published? This question will distinguish within the high technical intelligentsia those intellectuals who were more technically oriented and those who were more 'humanistic'. Second, what was the occupational history of these economists (for how long were they without definite employment)? This question will determine whether their employment prospects were good or bad. Third, what was their lifetime political trajectory? This question will determine when major shifts in their political views occurred. I will ask two further questions to control for the effects of region and social background on the political trajectory. These questions are, what region did they come from, what was their father's occupation?

My theory suggests, first that compared to their humanistic counterparts, discussed below, a lower percentage of the economists actively supported either the fascist movement or the regime. Second, my theory suggests that those who were involved in the fascist movement or actively supported the regime were more likely than their fellow economists who opposed or were neutral toward fascism, to have had employment difficulties. Third, my theory suggests that those who supported fascism were more likely than their colleagues to have published a relatively large proportion of political works. Finally, my theory suggests that those intellectuals who supported fascism began to turn to the right in 1911 with the rise of universal suffrage.

To assess the effect of academic culture on the political orientations of intellectuals, and to further assess the impact of mass politics I intend to compare this group of intellectuals with a group of French economists. I propose that a higher

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4 So far I have collected information on the following names. Luigi Einaudi, Alberto de Stefani, Carlo Cassola, Federico Chessa, Giovanni De Francis, Gustavo del Vecchio, Antonio Falchi, Benvenuto Grizziotti, Umberto Ricci, Iacopo Tivaroni, and Felice Vinci.
proportion of the Italian economists were attracted to the nationalist right even before the emergence of the fascist movement than their French counterparts (despite the fact that fascist like movements arose in France before they emerged in Italy). The reason, I suggest, is that in Italy economics occupied a weak position within academic culture (this is exemplified by the fact that most economists had degrees in jurisprudence), and economists thus often adopted the nationalist ideologies espoused by their humanistic colleagues. In France, the technical intelligentsia was institutionally stronger and was able to develop its own 'spontaneous ideology'.

In addition to this prosopography, I intend to do more detailed biographies of four exemplary figures Luigi Einaudi, Maffeo Pantaleoni, Luigi Albertini, and Alberto De Stefani. This figures were all very similar intellectually, but Albertini and Einaudi after a brief flirtation with Mussolini, became famous anti-fascists while Pantaleoni and De Stefani were complicit with the regime. I will use this more in-depth biographical study to determine whether the mechanisms that I have identified in the skeletal prosopography operated to explain differences between these individual thinkers.

The second group of intellectuals I intend to 'sample' is the high humanistic or traditional intelligentsia. Following Gramsci I will focus on the southern Italian neo-idealist revival. The southern philosophical revival of the early part of the twentieth century led by Gentile and Croce against what they labeled 'positivism' was rooted in the philosophical library of Palermo, a kind of autonomous academy, and Croce's review La critica (Piccioni1983: 11-12). The leading intellectuals of this group were not academicians but rather landed proprietors who practiced philosophy as an avocation (Charle 1996: 297). My sample of this 'school', the neo-idealists, will be culled from intellectual histories such as Eugenio Garin's Intellettuali italiani del xx secolo. I will want to know five pieces of information. First what was the occupational history of the figure? Second, what the figure's lifetime political trajectory? Third what was his father's occupation? Fourth what region did he come from? My theory suggests that these figures
were more likely than the northern economists to be involved in fascism, and that the reason for their involvement was likely to be their resistance to the development of a specialized academic culture. Further my theory suggests that those figures who did not become involved in fascism were likely to come from poorer backgrounds thus have a greater stake in institutionalized cultural capital than propertied counterparts.

I will compare this group of intellectuals to a group of French elite humanistic intellectuals. I expect the French group to have been less likely to be attracted to French fascist ideologies than their Italian counterparts were to Italian fascism. The reason I expect, was that they were more tied to the university, and thus the basis for an alliance with the lower humanistic intelligentsia, a common interest in resisting cultural specialization and the institutionalization of knowledge, did not exist.

The third group of intellectuals I intend to investigate is the under employed market dependent humanistic intelligentsia. For the Italian case my sample of these figures will be drawn from the petty political journalists who made up the revolutionary syndicalist movement, the nationalist movement and were sometimes involved in the socialist party. For the French case my sample will be drawn from the corresponding milieu, the petty-journalists of the nationalists and syndicalist movements. I expect that in the Italian case these groups fused around a fascist political project under the political pressure of the developing socialist party, whereas in France the petty-humanistic intelligentsia remained dispersed into a number of ideological currents, all opposed to official academic culture, but unable to organize politically.

The fourth group of intellectuals I intend to investigate is the petty technical intelligentsia. These figures will be the most difficult to research since they were less likely than their humanistic colleagues to leave a documentary record. Italian engineers however did have a journal *Giornale del Sindacto Ingeneri Italiani* in which they articulated their collective interests (Barbagli 1982: 125-6). I expect this group to have resisted fascism, because of its ideology of cultural de-differentiation, and to have struggled instead to
secure credentials. If these intellectuals did become fascist, I expect them to have come to the movement late, and to have had little part in formulating its ideology.

§ 5 - Conclusion

This dissertation proposal identifies a pocket of theoretical neglect in both the sociology of intellectuals and the political sociology of the rise of mass politics. It suggests that fascism was both a cultural and political reaction. The cultural reaction, I argue, was rooted in a charismatic alliance of under employed and elite humanistic intellectuals, both pursuing an interest in the de-differentiation and de-specialization of knowledge. Fascism was likely to emerge where an under employed humanistic intelligentsia existed, was threatened by the development of a mass socialist party that began to monopolize the means of persuasion (above all the party newspaper), and could form an alliance with an elite humanistic intelligentsia that its own reasons for pursuing a project of cultural de-differentiation.

I have sketched a two part research design to investigate this argument. In the first part of the research I will investigate the role of the marginal humanistic intelligentsia in the birth of early fascism, the impact of this group on the growth of fascism in 1920 and 1921 and its role in the Gentile reforms of 1923. In the second part of the research I will investigate why this intelligentsia supported fascism. I argue that in Italy the under-employed humanistic intelligentsia developed fascist ideology as an ideology of cultural de-differentiation in response to the threat that the socialist party posed to its control of the means of persuasion. It was able to spread this ideology by forming an alliance with the elite humanistic intelligentsia that was resisting the development of a specialized academic culture. In France although fascism did emerge as an ideology among the petty humanistic intelligentsia it was never dominant among this group because the political threat posed by the socialists was not as strong, and because there was no possibility of an alliance of elite intellectuals most of whom were tied to the system of university education and thus committed to the development of specialized academic knowledge.
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