IMMIGRATION AND URBAN CHANGE

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Abstract

The immigrants to the United States since 1965 are overwhelmingly an urban population; they have converged on a small number of large metropolitan areas. This article describes the characteristics of the new immigration and its geography. It then focuses on the key immigrant-receiving metropolitan areas and discusses the relationship between the restructuring of their economies and land markets and the employment and settlement patterns of the new immigrants.

INTRODUCTION

Though the study of cities was largely the study of immigrants during the formative years of American sociology, this is certainly no longer the case today. The interested reader would search in vain through back issues of the Urban Affairs Quarterly for studies of the new immigrants who have settled in America's cities; and the related journals supported by our sister disciplines are equally prone to give immigration research short shrift. Immigration specialists, on the other hand, are no more attentive to urban issues. In a sense, much of the sociological research on the new immigration to the United States is about people who just happen to live in cities; but how the particular characteristics of the immigrant-receiving areas impinge on the newcomers is a question immigration researchers rarely raise.

What accounts for this inattention to the urban aspects of immigration is not entirely clear. Whatever the causes, there can be no question that immigration
is a fundamentally urban phenomenon. New immigrants—those newcomers who have immigrated to the United States since 1965—are disproportionately concentrated in central cities, and they are overwhelmingly a metropolitan population. Moreover, the new immigrant stream has converged on America’s largest urban places: in 1980, four of every ten new immigrants lived either in the greater Los Angeles or in the New York area. Elsewhere, as of the 1980 census, only a scattering of large cities could count substantial foreign-born populations.

This essay is concerned with the relationship between the new immigration and the changing economic and ecological characteristics of the cities in which they have settled. Given the extraordinarily localized dimension of the new immigration, only a handful of urban areas receive attention. These areas—New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, San Francisco, and Miami—are selected for two reasons: they comprise the largest concentrations of the new immigrant population (containing, together, 46% of all 1965–1980 immigrants counted in the 1980 Census); and they occupy similar positions in the hierarchy of cities.¹

IMMIGRATION TRENDS

The new immigration to the United States began with the passage of the Hart-Cellar Act in 1965, which abolished the old country of origins quota, affirmed family connections as the principal basis for admission to permanent residence in the United States, and increased the total numbers of immigrants to be admitted to the United States (Reimers 1985). Despite a number of changes, this system has essentially remained in place to this day. The major, entirely unanticipated, consequence of the Hart-Cellar Act was the dramatic increase in immigration from Asia, which has become the largest regional source of legal immigrants. While arrivals from Europe have fallen off sharply over the past 20 years, immigration from the Caribbean and Latin America has been on the upswing. The size of the legal immigration flow has also increased. Between 1966 and 1970, an average of 374,000 newcomers entered the country each year; between 1982 and 1986, by contrast, annual inflows averaged 575,000.²

In addition to the legal immigrant flow have come substantial numbers of undocumented immigrants—people who either cross the borders illegally, or enter the United States legally but extend their residence beyond their legally permitted stay. Just how many undocumented immigrants have been living in the United States has been a matter of controversy for over two decades. For many years, wildly disparate, often politically inspired estimates and guesses have been current, with upper and lower bounds at 12 and 2 million, respectively. More recently, a consensus appears to have settled on a 2 to 4 million range (Bean & Tienda 1987). Warren & Passel (1987) estimated that approximately 2 million undocumented persons were counted by the census in 1980. Although the 2 million figure is probably a lower range, it does not appear likely that a large proportion of the undocumented was left uncounted in the census. The Warren & Passel estimate suggests that Mexicans comprised over half of the undocumented population present in 1980.

Post-1980 estimates have been developed using the 1979, 1983, and 1986 Current Population Surveys. These estimates (Passel & Woodrow 1987, Woodrow et al 1987) point to modest growth in the undocumented population, with annual net inflows of about 100,000 to 300,000 persons, yielding a 1986 undocumented population of a little over 3 million. The national origins of this population appear little changed from 1980, with Mexicans and other Latin Americans heavily predominant.

The most important piece of immigration legislation since the Hart-Cellar Act was the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, which provided an amnesty for undocumented immigrants who had resided continuously in the United States since January 1, 1982, and imposed sanctions against the employers of illegal immigrants.³ The bill established a 12-month period, from May 4, 1987 to May 5, 1988, during which eligible undocumented immigrants could apply for legalization. As of December 1988, close to 1.8 million applications by pre-1982 undocumented immigrants had been filed (US INS 1988), indicating that a sizeable portion of the estimated 2.5 to 3.5 million undocumented immigrants counted in the 1980 Census did not avail themselves of the legalization opportunity. For reasons that are not clear, Mexicans are considerably overrepresented among the pre-1982 legalizes (a group that excludes immigrants eligible under a special provision for agricultural workers), more so than they are among the counted undocumented population (US INS 1988)

THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE NEW IMMIGRATION

As in the past, immigration has been disproportionately urban-bound. In 1980, 40% of the new immigrant population lived in the SCSA of either New York or Los Angeles (with about 20% in each area); thereafter, concentrations

¹Given space constraints, and the concern with both immigration and urban change, justice cannot be done to the diversity of the new immigrant population. In general, greater attention is paid to the various groups of Hispanic immigrants; this essay does not attempt to treat the experience of new Asian immigrants, for which a separate review article might well be appropriate.

²Calculated from US Department of Commerce, 1987, Table 1.

³There are, in fact, three additional subgroups for whom the legalization criteria and deadlines differ from the main, pre-1982 group. The most numerous of the subgroups are undocumented immigrants who can show that they worked in agriculture for at least 90 days during 1984, 1985, and 1986. See Meisner & Papademetriou 1988.
dropped sharply. 1980 Census data for all SMSAs and for the ten metropolitan areas with the largest new immigrant populations are displayed in Table 1. The table underscores several facets of the new geography of immigration: The recent arrivals are overwhelmingly to be found in metropolitan areas, where they live, to a disproportionate extent, in central cities; the newcomers are even more overrepresented in the ten principal receiving areas; only Los Angeles and New York contain sizeable proportions of the total immigrant population; and only in occasional instances do immigrants significantly alter the demography of an area. Indeed, El Paso, Honolulu, and Jersey City, were the only other areas among the 100 largest SMSAs to contain new immigrant populations exceeding 10%.4

These leading SMSAs vary in the diversity and composition of their new immigrant populations. Of the five main receiving areas, three are dominated each by a single origin group: Mexicans in Los Angeles and Chicago, and Cubans in Miami. These comprise 47%, 32%, and 59% respectively of 1965–1980 immigrants in those areas. By contrast, San Francisco is diverse, with the largest group, Filipinos, making up 19% of the new immigrant population. New York's new immigrants are even more heterogeneous, with no group accounting for more than 10% of the newcomers.5

The distribution of the undocumented population differs significantly from the geography of the new immigrant population. Passel & Woodrow (1984) estimated that almost half of the undocumented population counted in 1980 lived in California, with the next largest concentration, New York, containing only 11.4% of the total. Eight other states with the largest numbers of counted undocumented aliens accounted for roughly seven eighths of the total. SMSA estimates (Passel 1985) underline the distinctive spatial pattern of the undocumented, more than a quarter of whom live in Los Angeles where they make up half of the post-1960 immigrant population (see Table 1).

The geography of the population taking advantage of the legalization program is more skewed still, though consistent with the national characteristics of the legalizers, as noted above. As of December 1988, 55% of the pre-1982 applicants lived in California, with another 18% residing in Texas. By contrast, New York accounted for less than 7% of the applicants, well under its share of the presumably eligible population (US INS 1988). This pattern of geographic differences of over- and under-representation points to interesting and as yet unexplored disparities in the characteristics and modes of incorporation of the immigrant streams feeding into the major receiving areas (see Meisner & Papademetriou 1988.91–104).

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1Unfortunately, the Immigration and Naturalization Service has published only fragmentary data on the intended places of settlement of post-1980 immigrants; this information suggests that there has been little change in the importance of the largest immigrant-receiving areas.

2Based on calculations from the 1980 Census of Population, Public Use Microdata Sample.
THE URBAN POSTINDUSTRIAL ECONOMY

The paradox of the new immigration is that the recent wave of newcomers converged on cities just when the cities appeared to be undergoing their period of most severe decline. Although the old central cities of the nation’s heartland had been declining slowly since the end of World War II, urban fortunes took a radical turn for the worse after 1969. Central city decline, a number of observers noted, was paralleled by and partly attributable to a vast redistribution of people and resources from the northeast to the south. The basic argument was first struck by Sale (1975), who contended that the new growth poles of the economy—aigibusiness, defense industries, advanced technology, oil and natural gas production, real estate and construction, and tourism and leisure—had become concentrated in the states of the “southern rim,” bringing in tow a massive shift of people and power. Sale’s somewhat anecdotal account was accompanied by a number of more academic treatments (Sternlieb & Hughes 1975, Perry & Watkins 1977, Sawers & Tabb 1983) that substantiated the thesis of interregional economic shifts and documented the simultaneous ascent of sunbelt cities and decline of northern urban areas.

But what first appeared to be a uniform pattern of interregional job and population shifts has, in retrospect, been recognized as a modification in the hierarchy of US cities. In this process, a small number of mainly older urban places have retained their commanding role in the nation’s economy, even while sunbelt cities have enjoyed considerable growth.

As Cohen noted early in the debate, the economic rise of the Sunbelt was not “accompanied by a decisive shift in the traditional locations of corporate control functions (1977:212).” These functions—foreign sales by multinational corporations, research and development expenditures, international banking, loans to large corporations, and business services—were instead dominated by firms based in the older metropolitan areas at the top of the urban hierarchy. The Corporate Headquarters Complex in New York City (1977) identified the linkages among corporate headquarters, corporate service firms (banks, law, accounting, and security firms, advertising agencies and other business services), and ancillary business services as the source of new and enduring forces of urban agglomeration.

Binding these activities together is the shift to services and the concomitant globalization of the economy (Cohen 1981). Because internationalization involves an increase in the complexity and uncertainty of a firm’s business, large corporations with heavy foreign involvements have become more, not less dependent, on their external providers of business services. Services have in turn increasingly become concentrated in a cluster of firms that are disproportionately based in the very largest diversified urban centers. Business services in the largest centers have also capitalized on their existing expertise and resources and have been the quickest to take advantage of emerging global markets. Furthermore, the decentralization of routinized manufacturing and information processing activities has paradoxically increased the need for centralization of key control activities, producing a handful of “global information hubs” (Moss 1987). Finally, the efficiency and effectiveness of information flows combines with other imperatives—the need for frequent, and interorganizational, face-to-face contacts at high levels, the importance of specialized talent—to produce a “spatial bias” that stimulates growth in global cities (Pelz 1977, Drennan 1987).

Noyelle & Stanback’s (1984) classification of metropolitan areas according to the industrial characteristics of employment and specialization of business services, corporate headquarters, transportation, distribution, and communications, highlights four major trends: (a) the successful, far-reaching post-industrial transformation of the “national nodal centers” of New York, Chicago, San Francisco, and Los Angeles and their continuing dominance in corporate services, especially in international fields; (b) the emergence of new regional and subregional nodal centers associated with the new bases of economic growth in the sunbelt; (c) the stabilization of the older diversified regional nodal centers in the northeast; (d) and the continuing decline of the specialized production centers, most of which are located in the north.

What is striking about the metropolitan patterns of the new immigration is how sharply these flows have converged on precisely those cities with economies that are both post-industrial and heavily oriented toward international business services. As Table 2 shows, command and control functions remain concentrated in the four large cities that Noyelle & Stanback designate as national nodal centers. Among the top four, New York is clearly dominant on every dimension, despite the declining corporate headquarters presence. Miami occupies a lower-level but specialized position, with its concentration of foreign banks and its foreign travel hub pointing to its role as “the capital of Latin America” (Levine 1985).

Urban Restructuring: Implications for Immigrants

That so many immigrants should have arrived in America’s post-industrial cities is an anomaly from the standpoint of established urban analysis. The consensus holds that the advent of the post-industrial economy has undermined the historic role that cities have played as staging grounds for the integration of unskilled, newcomer groups. This view contends that urban economies suffer a mismatch between the skills of their minority residents and the job requirements of employers in the white collar sector (Kasarda 1988).

The mismatch hypothesis first emerged as part of the structural unemployment controversy of the late 1950s and early 1960s when concern over a then-sluggish economy and fear of an impending technological revolution led
Table 2  Concentration of control and command functions in major immigrant-receiving cities

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<td>New York</td>
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<td>San Francisco</td>
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Source: 
Columns 9-10: Brennan, 1987: 33 
Columns 11: Feagin and Smith, 1987: 6-7 

*Large law firms are those with more than 100 members. 
N.L. = not listed.

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admixture to the central city population. However, the differences are for the most part glossed over: the mismatch hypothesis simply extends its story about blacks to encompass the more variegated minority population of today’s cities.

The problem, of course, is that labor market outcomes differ dramatically by ethnicity and, within ethnic groups, by nativity. In Chicago, for example, the Mexican-born population increased by 83,000 between 1970 and 1980, despite Chicago’s loss of 115,000 manufacturing jobs over the decade. In fact, the newcomers had very low skills—far less schooling, on average, than native blacks, whose economic position deteriorated sharply during this period (Kasarda 1988). In New York, with its more complicated ethnic mosaic, the contrast between high immigrant employment gains for foreign-born blacks and job losses for native-born blacks makes it difficult to argue that a demand-side explanation can explain much of the change (Waldinger 1986–1987). Finally, the mismatch hypothesis is at odds with the immigrant phenomenon itself: if indeed urban employers are hiring none but the highly educated, and this trend is pronounced in cities that have made the most far-reaching shift from goods to services, then why have these post-industrial centers emerged as the principal settlements of the new immigrant population?

A more satisfactory answer to this query suggests that immigration is part and parcel of a fundamental process of urban “economic restructurings,” in which the growth of services breeds a demand for both high- and low-skilled labor while increasingly excluding workers with middle-level qualifications. Phrased this way, the story about the restructurings of urban economies is linked to broader controversies about changes in inequality in the United States (see Harrison & Bluestone 1988). The argument for restructurings has three principal components relevant to the discussion here. While the mismatch view sees manufacturing as a concentration of entry-level jobs available for the unskilled, the restructurings conceptualize manufacturing as a locus of unionized, primary sector jobs attached to well-developed internal labor markets, which in turn are available to workers of low- or middle-level skills. Secondly, the replacements for manufacturing are mainly service industries with a bifurcated job structure, offering low wages and unstable employment for less-skilled workers displaced from manufacturing, and therefore yielding highest levels of earnings inequality in cities with the greatest levels of service employment (Stanback & Noyelle 1982, Nelson & Lorence 1985). Thirdly, job arrangements in the service sector lack well-

developed internal labor markets (Noyelle 1987), with the result that low-skilled workers, whether new entrants to the labor market or displaced from manufacturing industries, have few opportunities for upward mobility (Harrison 1982).

The implication of restructurings for minorities is generally a muted sub-theme in the overall debate. Levy (1987) notes that, in contrast to the case of white males, the incomes of black males are increasingly divergent, with the split particularly noticeable between the 25 to 34 year olds with at least some college and those who never finished high school. Whereas Levy’s finding draws attention to polarization within minority populations, most advocates of the polarization view contend that the shift away from manufacturing produces disproportionate displacement among minorities and thereby widens the disparity in minority and white employment rates (Wacquant & Wilson 1988).

But the emphasis on displacement obscures one of the crucial insights of the restructurings hypothesis, namely that because the shift to services actually generates jobs for people with low skills it may also have created the demand for workers willing to work at low-status, low-paying jobs. While such low-wage jobs are increasingly found in the advanced services, the simultaneous proliferation of very high paid service workers further adds to the labor demand for immigrants, who attend to the household needs and elaborate consumption wants of these high income gentrifiers (Sassen 1988).

The restructurings hypothesis further suggests that once put into place, the immigrant labor force can bolster the declining goods production sector and help revive sagging urban economies. Various analysts have argued that the absorption of immigrants into the manufacturing sectors of New York and Los Angeles has helped stabilize industrial employment for three reasons: (a) Immigrants have been a more pliant labor force, with the result that manufacturing wages, relative to the national average, have declined; (b) immigrants provide a more flexible labor force, thus allowing for more customized production and greater subcontracting; and (c) the growth of the immigrant population adds to the aggregate local demand for cheap consumer goods, which can best be served by local producers (Davis 1987, Sassen 1988, Soja 1989).

An alternative to either the mismatch or the restructurings hypothesis is an argument emphasizing shifts on the supply-side (Waldinger 1986–1987, Bailey & Waldinger 1988). This explanation begins with a point developed by Lieberson in his book, A Piece of the Pie (1980), namely, if nonwhites are low in the hiring queue, their access to good jobs is greater where the size of the preferred, white group is smaller. Reformulated to account for changes over time, this proposition suggests that compositional changes in which the proportion of whites declines set in motion a vacancy chain, allowing non-

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whites to move into, and up, the job hierarchy as replacements for whites. In a process identified by Piore (1979) the demand for replacement labor is further amplified by the self-limiting character of recruitment into the secondary sector, which has historically relied on migrants, white and black, to meet its labor needs. As the children of earlier migrants enter the labor market, they drop out of the effective labor supply feeding into the secondary sector; hence, an additional set of vacancies emerge, beyond those generated by compositional changes alone. These two sources of supply-side changes offset the impact of structural change. Though urban economies are indeed shifting toward a job mix requiring higher skills, replacement needs ensure ample demand for workers with low-levels of schooling.

To the extent that either a demand or a supply-side approach has significant explanatory power, it should succeed in accounting for the changes occurring in principal immigrant metropolises of New York and Los Angeles. As Muller & Espenshade show in their book The Fourth Wave (1985), the immigrants of the 1970s had little connection to California’s booming service economy. Though two thirds of the new jobs added in Los Angeles county were white-collar, and manufacturing barely expanded, half of the decade’s Mexican immigrants worked in the factory sector, with the next largest contingent in low-level services. Not only did the new immigrants garner all of the manufacturing jobs created during the 1970s, they replaced another 55,000 workers who found jobs in other industries. Outside the manufacturing sector, “the most dramatic changes took place in personal services, where all immigrants combined took 24,400 jobs when the sector lost 7,000 jobs” (Muller & Espenshade 1985:59).

The arrival of the new immigrants, Muller & Espenshade argue, had two effects on the economy of Los Angeles county. The newcomers directly spurred economic growth, both as a source of low-wage labor, and as consumers of services mainly produced and provided locally. More importantly, they provided replacements for Angelenos who migrated out of the county at a pace that exceeded the out-migration rate for all of the country’s metropolitan areas, except New York, Jersey City, Buffalo, and Cleveland. The bulk of these out-movers were blue-collar workers; had these internal migrants and their white-collar counterparts not been replaced by immigrants, Los Angeles county would have lost, not added, half a million people. 7

In New York, the pattern of immigrant incorporation during the 1970s reads much the same, notwithstanding a period of severe economic contraction and erosion in the manufacturing sector (Sternlieb & Hughes 1987). At

7 A comparable treatment can be found in McCarthy & Bureica Valdez (1986), who concur with Muller & Espenshade on the impact of Mexican immigration on low-wage job growth but conclude that low incomes diluted the immigrants’ purchasing power and thereby their effect on consumer markets.

the beginning of the 1970s, immigrants seemed poised for disaster, over-concentrated in precisely those industries that were to decline the most severely. Yet the biggest losers of the seventies were whites, who lost almost twice as many jobs as the city overall. By contrast, employment among New York black, Hispanic, and Asian immigrants increased by 215%, 64%, and 249%, respectively8. Despite liabilities of language, skill, and newness, rates of labor force activity for new immigrants compared favorably with the pattern for the white native-born (Bogen 1987, Papademetriou & Muller 1987).

Had there been no immigration, New York would have suffered an even more severe decline. As in Los Angeles, the arrival of the new immigrants provided a direct stimulus to the local economy. With a growing immigrant labor force, wage pressure eased up, making local manufacturers more competitive (Waldinger 1986); relative wages in goods production also declined, though without adverse impacts on the availability of labor (Sassen 1988). Marshall further argues that “the abundant supply of immigrants . . . actually stimulated a demand for labor in immigrant industries” (1987:95); While much of her evidence bears on manufacturing (Marshall 1984), it also seems likely that immigrants had a positive impact on the local economy sector. But the principal function of immigrants was as replacements for native-born, mainly white, workers in the declining sectors. Manufacturing and retailing together contributed more than half of the decline in white employment. By contrast, immigrants made their most sizeable gains in precisely these sectors, where they had already been concentrated in 1970 (Waldinger 1986–1987).

This comparison suggests that a more interactive framework may be in order, with an emphasis on the mechanisms whereby migration becomes a self-feeding process. Thus, one might argue that the initial influx of immigrants is closely related to demands for replacement labor, arising as a result of ethnic succession in traditional immigrant industries; this phase is likely to be extended, giving rise to a sustained need for replacement workers. Once in place, however, the new immigrant labor force has an independent impact on the local economy. Wage pressure is reduced, thus easing competitive pressures on manufacturing and other low-wage sectors (such as personal services); the immigrant population increases the demand for products and services from the local economy sectors; and as immigrants carve out occupational or industrial niches, they develop channels of labor market information and support, as well as business enclaves that both reduce the cost of migration for newcomers and directly open up recruitment channels.

THE ECOLOGY OF THE NEW IMMIGRATION

The geography of the major immigrant receiving cities has been transformed by the expansion of the corporate headquarters complex. What were stagnant, or in Los Angeles’ case, vestigial, downtowns have been transformed by an office construction boom that has often exceeded the underlying demand (Feagin 1983, Light 1988, Soja 1989, Squires et al 1987, Sternlieb & Hughes 1987). To serve the booming office complex there has come a new population of managers and professionals who comprise the huddled masses of the late twentieth century, piled up in neighborhoods in and around the central business district (CBD) (Zukin 1987).

But it is not clear just how immigrant residential patterns are affected by the reinvigoration of downtown, and the related housing market impacts. Research on immigrant settlement patterns remains heavily influenced by ecological theory, which argues that structural forces, as well as the characteristics of the migration streams themselves, will continue to generate distinctive ethnic neighborhoods (Micklin & Holdin 1984). Newcomers can be expected to settle in old, inner-city neighborhoods, close to their CBD jobs. The pace of neighborhood succession from native to immigrant will be influenced by the overall state of an area’s economy: rapid where economies are expanding, slow where economies are stagnant. And dispersion will take place with a rise in socioeconomic status, denoting a trend toward assimilation (Massey 1985).

The settlement patterns in the major immigrant-receiving areas are highly diverse, and the differences are not clearly consistent with the expectations of ecological theory. On the one hand, the emergence and burgeoning of Koreatowns, Little Havanas and Haitis, and Odessas by the Sea seem to replicate the concentrated, centralized pattern established by turn-of-the-century immigrants. Perhaps the best example is the rebirth of America’s once ageing Chinatowns, of which San Francisco’s is a typical example. Though the community seemed to be facing imminent physical disintegration in the mid-1960s (Nee & Nee 1973), the decline has since been turned around. By 1980, population gains produced high Chinese density in the core areas, led to overflows beyond the traditional boundaries, and attracted a massive influx of Asian capital, which in turn spurred further growth (Godfrey 1988). The pattern of Mexican settlement in Chicago is analogous, with the heavy inflows of the 1970s yielding a shift from a more decentralized pattern of the 1960s (Ropka 1973) to one of concentration in old industrial districts close to the city’s center (Belenchia 1977). These areas, which had long served as white immigrant and ethnic enclaves, saw rapid white-Mexican transitions during the 1970s (Chicago Fact Book Consortium 1984).

Though notable, the patterns of Chinese or Mexican clusters in established, inner city ethnic enclaves are anomalous in two respects. First, the centralizing imperative of the manufacturing industries of the Central Business District exercises less force than before. Though clustering next to the CBD persists, immigrant neighborhood formation in the older cities also takes a form that Ivan Light (1983) has identified as “leapfrog migration.” Ironically, the decentralized pattern is most in evidence in New York City, where only Dominicans and Chinese have established sizeable concentrations in Manhattan; the bulk of the immigrants have settled in the “outer boroughs” (Bogen 1987, Waldinger 1987). Even in these locations, the tendency has been for newcomers not to settle in the traditional, immigrant neighborhoods, but rather in areas that until recently supported a white, middle-class population.

The ecological model also bears a limited relationship to the actual process by which the immigrant-receiving cities of the sunbelt developed. In Los Angeles, for example, where the build-up of downtown LA pushed out the old Mexican barrio from the CBD before the 1920s, Mexicans jumped over other close-in areas to settle in emerging streetcar suburbs close to the city borders (Romo 1983). Over the years, as population grew and the rapid deconcentration of Los Angeles industry (Soja et al 1983) encouraged residential dispersion, the Mexican community spilled over the city boundaries. The end result was a vast, 15-mile wide community, which though known as East Los Angeles, lies mainly in unincorporated territory within Los Angeles county (Nelson 1983). By 1980, Hispanic majorities had emerged in numerous suburban municipalities that now found themselves part of the burgeoning East LA barrio (Garcia 1985). However, the attraction of low-cost housing being vacated by whites and the importance of proximity to industrial jobs have constrained the dispersion of Mexican settlements (Baer 1986, Davis 1987). Dagodag (1985) presents evidence suggesting that new immigrants were particularly likely to settle within a ten mile belt, south of the CBD, that lies mainly within city boundaries. Growing convergence on more central locations has also led to incursions into the black ghetto; the Mexican population living in Watts more than doubled between 1970 and 1980 (Oliver & Johnson 1984).

Settlement patterns in Miami reveal still another variant to the standard ecological model. According to Boswell & Curtis (1984), a core of Cuban settlers preceded the large wave of refugees who arrived following the Cuban revolution; the refugees then converged on that initial area of settlement. In the 1950s, this area was economically depressed and had been losing population; hence both cheap housing and low-rent storefront retail spaces were available. Proximity to jobs in the larger economy does not seem to have been an important attraction, since manufacturing had already shifted out of the core (Mohl 1983). Thus, a pattern of over-concentration in the Miami central city rapidly developed, with the clustering of Cubans of all classes in Little
Havana (Cooney & Contreras 1978) providing the basis for the enclave economy that developed during the 1970s (Portes & Bach 1985, Portes 1987).

But while Miami’s Cuban community is over-centralized, blacks are mainly dispersed in outlying areas, with the largest concentration residing in the unincorporated area called Liberty City. The origins of this ghetto go back to the inability of blacks to find housing in Miami’s segregated housing market long before the Cuban influx, and to local government and business leaders’ desire to remove blacks from proximity to the CBD (Mohi 1983). Thus, the poorest, most alienated population resides not in the “inner city” but in an outlying area. And this presence is in turn felt in the evolving geographic patterns of the Cuban population, which has skirted black concentrations as it has suburbanized (Boswell & Curtis 1984).

A major focus of research has been on patterns of residential segregation. The influx of new Hispanic immigrants during the 1970s appears to have had two distinct effects in the five major areas with which we are concerned. First, the pattern of residential transitions shifted. In the 1960s, few Hispanic enclaves arose, with neighborhoods containing Hispanics also gaining Anglo residents (Massey & Mullan 1984). In the 1970s, by contrast, those same neighborhoods lost their Anglo residents, and Hispanics converged on increasingly homogenous clusters (Bean et al 1987). Second, the segregation of Hispanics (foreign and native-born) increased on all of the dimensions along which it is measured. Though the levels reached in 1980 remained well below the highly segregated pattern characteristic of blacks (Massey & Denton 1987), Hispanic segregation rose more sharply in the five top SMSAs than in other areas with sizeable Hispanic concentrations (Bean et al 1987). The increase was lowest in New York, which already had the most segregated pattern, and where there was little net increase in the Hispanic population — the principal factor behind the growing separation and isolation of Hispanics in the other principal SMSAs (Massey & Denton 1987).

Changes in the Urban Core: Toward a Reconceptualization

Research on residential segregation has become increasingly sophisticated over the past ten years, with the development of new (and refinement of old) indexes (Massey & Denton 1988), techniques for distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary segregation (Lieberson & Carter 1982), and the use of structural equation models to predict residential succession patterns (Massey & Mullan 1984). Nonetheless, the underlying theory is both incomplete and abstracted from the cultural, institutional, political, and market factors that affect the allocation and use of space among groups. The methodology suffers from similar deficiencies, yielding findings that are highly aggregated and not easily related to patterns on the ground.

These shortcomings reveal a broader lacuna in American sociology, name-

ly the failure to develop a sociology of the housing and real estate markets
(see Gilderbloom & Applebaum 1988). Thus, rather than a holistic approach to the study of urban spatial processes, there is a curious division of labor, with analysts focussing on their “own” piece of the urban land market, more or less insensitive to developments falling outside their immediate domain. Comparison of research on the settlement patterns of immigrants with work on urban revitalization underlines these points. One would not know, from reading either of these literatures, that urban revitalization and immigration are ongoing and simultaneous phenomena in these five principal settlements of the new immigrant population. The only book that treats immigrant and gentrification neighborhood transitions as related, and within a common analytic framework, is a 1988 publication by a geographer (Godfrey 1988)!

The methodologies of the two fields stand in equally sharp contrast. Research on urban revitalization tends to focus on a single city or cluster of cities; studies of institutional actors (banks, political entrepreneurs, community organizations) are common approaches, as are surveys of the residential preferences and life-styles of individual gentrifiers; and considerable attention is paid to the impact of urban revitalization on housing and job opportunities for other city dwellers. 10

No complement to these approaches seems to exist in the study of immigrant settlement patterns and neighborhood transitions. Yet the processes by which space is allocated and used by immigrants are undoubtedly affected by sociocultural characteristics that cannot simply be inferred from aggregate data. For example, differences in the distribution of social and political resources among ethnic groups affect both the spatial distribution of population and their access to housing. Thus, the very high levels of black-Hispanic segregation in Chicago undoubtedly bear some relationship to the fact that Hispanics are virtually excluded from the public housing sector, which is predominantly black (Orfield & Todaro 1983). Similarly, the organizing capacity of particular ethnic groups has frequently been invoked to explain high rates of self-employment (Light 1972), and such disparities, though not readily measurable by standard socioeconomic indices, may also affect ecological outcomes. New York’s Caribbean blacks have made their principal

*I am using this deliberately neutral term to encompass both gentrification and accelerated CBD commercial development; another term might be the “Manhattanization” of downtown (Feagin 1983). It does appear that gentrification and CBD development are closely related in the cities with which we are concerned, though the ecological and architectural conditions of gentrification are absent in Miami and relatively weak in Los Angeles.

10As Cornelius et al note, “Most studies of Mexican immigration have ignored housing patterns; and general studies of housing in the (southern California) region have not focused on the independent impact of immigration” (1982:52). The same point holds for the other areas with which we are concerned.
settlements in areas of small, multi-family dwellings, where they have achieved high rates of homeownership (Foner 1987), a characteristic that not only distinguishes them from native blacks, but also provides a structural basis for an emergent and distinctive Caribbean ethnicity (Kasinitz 1987). As Godfrey (1988: 104) noted in his study of San Francisco, distinctive group predispositions also exercise a significant effect on the types of areas that attract immigrant populations.

Whatever the methodological shortcomings of research on the ecology of these large immigrant-receiving cities, the fact that we know little about how urban revitalization and immigration are related to one another casts doubt on our understanding of both phenomena. For example, Berry has argued that gentrification is a phenomenon of older cities, in which tightness on the supply-side (caused by "contagious abandonment" of the older stock, far in excess of normal withdrawals), creates the necessary but not sufficient conditions for gentrification. Rather, "the process has to be activated by demand-side shifts rooted in professional job growth anchored in downtown offices . . ." (Berry 1985:92). But it seems difficult to believe that Sohos were the only areas where the "urban revitalizers" could find a place to live when housing markets in gentrifying cities were sufficiently loose to allow for the influx of hundreds of thousands of immigrants—many of whom settled in areas of fairly high housing quality.

A more useful analytical framework is the one developed by Taub et al (1984) who contend, on the contrary, that in the 1970s slackness on the supply-side created the preconditions for gentrification. Because the pent-up demand for housing among blacks eased off, "congestion and undermaintenance . . . became less profitable to those involved in urban real estate" and "the decline of pressure on the housing market . . . also took some of the profit out of encouraging racial change" (p. 7). The same set of circumstances yielded a permissive environment for gentrification: There was an ample stock of low-priced, attractive housing, and the availability of housing alternatives for blacks eased the pressures for black "invasion". While Taub et al are not concerned with settlement patterns of immigrants, their argument can be extrapolated to account for why housing vacancies emerged for gentrifiers and immigrants simultaneously.

Of course, circumstances in the urban housing market of the 1980s are altogether different. Rather than slackness, the problem is one of inadequate supply; the most extreme manifestation of these new conditions is the growth in the number of homeless. How the current housing crisis affects the settlement pattern of the most recent immigrants is as yet unexplored. One possibility may be a shift away from those locations with lowest vacancy rates and highest home or rental prices: That immigration to New York City should have risen during the 1980s suggests this has not happened. Research on gentrification has been particularly concerned with the potential for dis-placement; the conversion of single room occupancy hotels to luxury condominiums appears to offer a clear example of the relationship between "urban revitalization" and homelessness. Yet it is equally appropriate to inquire into the impact of immigrants. As Zukin (1987) has argued, "gentrification represents a filtering up of housing" (p. 141). The same might be said for immigrants, who not only add quantitatively to the demand for housing, but who are likely to be able to draw on greater resources in the search for housing than many native, minority residents.

CONCLUSION

The convergence of the post-1965 immigrants on America's largest urban areas was as unexpected as the composition of the new immigrants and their growing numbers. Just why cities provide a supportive environment for the newcomers at a time when urban economies have undergone great transformations remains an unanswered question. In this essay, we have tried to develop a framework that emphasizes the interaction between supply-side developments that create vacancies for immigrants and those demand-side consequences of their arrival that make immigration a self-feeding process. More puzzling still is the linkage between the changing internal geography of the immigrant-receiving areas and the settlement patterns of the newcomers, a question that researchers have generally not addressed. As with labor market developments, compositional changes are likely to have had an important effect. A supply-side account might do best in explaining why housing vacancies opened for immigrants and gentrifiers simultaneously during the slack housing markets of the 1970s.

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THE SOCIOLOGY OF ADOLESCENCE

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INTRODUCTION

The study of adolescence has long been dominated by psychologists, beginning with G. Stanley Hall (1904). In the 1980s a great increase in research activity has occurred, culminating in the founding of the Society for Research in Adolescence. Along with that increase in volume has come a major shift in the focus of adolescent research. Whereas most earlier research was limited to the study of individual adolescents carrying out their developmental tasks (Erikson 1968), an increasing proportion of research now places the biological, cognitive, and emotional development of adolescents in a broader social context.

The changing orientation of adolescent research is in part a function of the breakdown of traditional barriers between fields. Outstanding developmental psychologists now perceive adolescence as occurring in historical, social, organizational, cultural, and institutional contexts (Bronfenbrenner 1979, Lerner & Foch 1987). Biological determinism has been discredited, and the study of pubertal development is now concerned with the evaluation of physical development by social actors (Brooks-Gunn 1984, Dornbusch et al 1987a).