Explaining Murderous Ethnic Cleansing: Eight Theses

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74-year-old Batisha Hoxha was sitting in her kitchen with her 77-year-old husband, Izet, staying warm by the stove. They had heard explosions but did not realize that Serbian troops had already entered the town. The next thing she knew, five or six soldiers had burst through the front door and were demanding “Where are your children?”.

The soldiers began beating Izet, “so hard that he fell to the floor”, she said. While they were kicking him, the soldiers demanded money and information on the whereabouts of the couple’s sons. Then, while Izet was still on the floor looking up at them, they killed him. “They shot him three times in the chest”, recalled Batisha. With her husband dying before her, the soldiers pulled the wedding ring off her finger.

“I can still feel the pain”, she said. They fired shots ... and finally they kicked Batisha and a 10-year-old boy who was staying with them and told them to get out.

“Twas not even outside the gate when they burned it”... Her husband’s body was in the flames. In that moment she was paralyzed. She was standing on the street in the rain with no house, no husband, no possessions but the clothes she was wearing. Finally, strangers passed in a tractor and bundled her into their wagon. Batisha’s daughter later found her in a refugee camp in northern Albania.

Looking tenderly at her one photograph of herself and Izet, Batisha murmurs: “Nobody understands what we have seen and what we have suffered. Only God knows.”1

This is how murderous ethnic cleansing was wreaked on one household in the village of Belanica in Kosovo, formerly part of Yugoslavia, in the very last year of the 20th century. The perpetrators were Serbs, using murder and mayhem to terrify the local Albanians into fleeing the area. Then it could be occupied by Serbs, as was “their right”. For, said these Serbs, though the population of Kosovo is 90% Albanian, this was the Serb heartland, the home of their ancient battlefields and monasteries. Now the Kosovo boot is on the other foot. Since 1999 it has been Albanians who have been terrorizing and kicking out Serbs. Kosovo is now cleansed, not of Albanians, but of almost all its Serbs.

Change the names and the incident could have occurred almost anywhere in the world over the last few centuries – in Australia, Indonesia, India, Russia, Turkey, Germany, Ireland, the United States, Brazil. Ethnic cleansing is one of the main evils of modern times. As genocide, the Holocaust (of the Jews) is not unique. Genocides remain thankfully few, but they are flanked by numerous other cases of less severe but nonetheless murderous cleansing.

Two rather simple opposed theories predominate in most accounts of murderous cleansing: it is perpetrated by primitive peoples or by manipulative elites. Books purporting to explain the cases

1 We know too -- thanks to Los Angeles Times reporter John Daniszewski, whose extensive, graphic report on Belanica appeared in the paper on April 25, 1999.
discussed in this book in such terms continue to pour out. These two explanations offer us comfort, since we can apparently blame human beings who are utterly unlike ourselves for such atrocities. But they are false: the perpetrators are much too like us for comfort.

Types of Ethnic Cleansing

I define terms. Ethnic groups are usually believed to share a common culture and common descent. Yet culture is vague and descent fictitious. So ethnic groups and their conflicts are “socially constructed”, though through time some of these constructions rather “deep” and “structural”. An ethnicity (or ethnic group) is therefore a group which defines itself or is defined by others as sharing common descent and culture. Ethnic cleansing is the removal by members of a self-identifying ethnic group of those they consider an ethnic out-group from a territory they define as their own.

Most ethnic group interactions, even most ethnic “cleansings” do not involve murder. The few cases involving mass murder are imprinted upon our consciousness, but they are rare. In the continent of Africa the mass killings of Hutus and Tutsis made it into the world’s media. We may believe this to be typical of Africa, which figures mostly in the Western media only for really bad news. But this is one of only a handful of African cases of murderous ethnic cleansing -- in a continent in which all states are multi-ethnic. Fearon & Laitin (1996) estimate all the cases of serious ethnic violence as well under 1% of all Africa’s multi-ethnic environments. Table 1.1 identifies levels of violence and cleansing in ethnic relations, enabling us to distinguish murderous from non-murderous “cleansing”, as well as from violence and killing whose purpose is not to ethnically cleanse.

TABLE 1.1

This Table distinguishes the extent to which a group is eliminated (“cleansed”) from a community from the level of violence used. Since ethnic groups are culturally defined, they can be eliminated if their culture disappears, even if there is no physical removal of persons. People can change their cultural identity. But I shall not fly in the face of normal understandings of the term ethnic cleansing to include mere cultural elimination in the category, except by placing inverted commas around the word cleansing in such cases -- as I do in this Table.

The first Row of Table 1 begins with policies involving no significant violence. Row 1 Column 1 involves equal treatment and respect shown to all ethnic groups. Multi-Cultural states may ignore ethnicity, treating all persons as equal regardless of ethnicity. This is a common ideal in countries of ethnically plural immigration, like the US or Australia. Since such immigrant groups cannot plausibly claim their own state, they present no threat to the existing state, and the constitution can safely ignore their ethnicity. But where ethnic groups dominate distinct territories or can aspire to

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² Goldhagen (1996) gives the best-known version of “blaming a whole people” (the Germans); Dadrian (1996) tends to blame “the Turks” (as a whole) for the Armenian genocide. For recent, sophisticated (but wrong) elite-centred accounts, see for example, Snyder (2000) and Fearon and Laitin’s (2000) review essay.
create their own states or regional autonomies, it is difficult to remain ethnically-blind. The ideal is not to ignore ethnicity but to build it into constitutions through collective guarantees – through **Confederal** methods (ethnicities have some regional control, as in contemporary Nigeria) or **Consociational** methods (they are guaranteed power-sharing at the centre, as in Belgium).

The next two columns of Row 1 include cases where ethnic groups weaken or disappear without violence. They are “cleansed”-- as in the later phases of ethnic homogenization in Western Europe. By the mid-19th century in France or Britain, their states needed apply little coercion to eliminate minorities. These accepted that their own language – Breton or Welsh – was “backward”, depriving their children of success in modern society. Most immigrants to the US or Australia acquire English voluntarily, do not teach their own language to their children, and abandon most cultural practices. Their descendants may retain only a sentimental sense of being “Germans”, “Slovaks” or “Welsh”. **Voluntary Assimilation** produces a “cleansed” society by positive inducements.

Row 2 contains the first escalation of violence, **Institutional Coercion. Discrimination** is the most common ethnic policy. It limits out-group rights but permits its members to live amongst us and retain their ethnic identity. African Americans still suffer discrimination, one hundred and fifty years after the abolition of slavery, fifty years after the Civil Rights Movement. The criminal offence sardonically described in the US as “Driving While Black”, where the cop pulls over a black man because he is driving “too good” a car, is an example. All such discrimination is deplorable but it is better than what follows in this table. In **Segregation** the out-group is permitted to live in society, but in ghettoized, apartheid or enslaved conditions. This may be more oppressive than the milder forms of total “cleansing”. Many slaves would like to run away from their oppression (which would produce a more “cleansed” society) but are prevented by force from doing so.

**Cultural Suppression**, involves total cleansing through institutional coercion. The group’s language may be banned from schools or offices, its religion banned, its distinctive family names changed by law. Though this is coercive, it usually “legal” and involves little physical force. Such suppression is not often viewed as “ethnic cleansing”, if it is successfully imposed. After the passage of time, it may not be generally remembered by either group as cleansing -- as, for example, with the assimilation of Welsh people into a British identity largely defined by the English.

Physical violence begins in Row 3, containing **Selective Policed Repression**, targeted at dissidents, usually protesters against Row 2 policies. “Policed” means repression remains rather orderly, enforcing laws through routinized “legitimate” means -- plus limited physical violence. An example would be the settlement of Protestant Scots onto Ulster farms from the 17th century onward, forcibly displacing thousands of Irish Catholic farmers. The third column moves us to **Policed Total Cultural Suppression**, **Population Exchanges**, and **Policed Deportations and Emigrations**, varied state-run cleansings, coercive but not usually very violent. The policies discussed so far normally involve a state believing it is enforcing the rule of law.

Row 4 introduces serious physical violence. **General Policed Repression** is aimed at groups harbouring protesters, rioters, rebels or terrorists, inflicting sanguinary official punishment, in order to cow the main part of the group to submit. If this is routine, states will employ specialized
paramilitaries whose names become notorious to out-groups -- like the Cossacks or the Black-and-Tans. The next two columns involve wilder violence. Escalation to violent partial cleansing involves settlement/displacement, as in most European colonizations, and “Pogroms” and communal riots, varied short-lived forms of violence, including rioting, looting, plus some murder and rape, with mixed motives -- state agencies seek to displace political tensions onto out-groups, locals enjoy the looting, violence and rape, ethnic cleansers try to induce terrorized flight. victims have been the Jewish, Armenian and Chinese diasporas. “Wild” Deportations and Emigrations involve enough brutality to persuade members of the out-group to flee -- as in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. “Racial” cleansing may involve Biological policies. Here the out-group is denied reproduction by restrictive marriage or sexual policies, escalating perhaps to forcible sterilization or to rape where the intent is to make the woman unlikely to bear children carrying the identity of the out-group. Biological cleansing centres on females, since maternity is certain, paternity only presumed. 

Row 5 escalates to mass deaths which were the unintended consequence of policies. The first column involves policy “Mistakes”, often through submitting ethnic groups to labour conditions to which they were ill-adapted, or by revolutionaries seeking to achieve major social transformations with foolish policies -- for example, the “Great Leap Forward” in China, which unintentionally killed millions. Most big “mistakes” border on Callous policies, not intended to kill the out-group but the dominant group does not much care that death ensues. In the Chinese Great Leap Forward, Mao’s slowness in reacting to disaster revealed little concern for the lives of the victims. Wars and civil wars loom large here, especially in the devastation inflicted on civilian populations through “laying waste to the country” or bombing cities. Stalin’s famine-inducing policies among peasants and Ukrainians or the “Highland Clearances” of Scotland are other examples. The limiting case is the early colonization of Caribbean islands by the Spanish. When the Spanish realized what their impact on the natives was, virtually all the natives were dead, which makes this strictly “ethnocide”.

Ethnocide refers to a wiping out of a group and its culture which is not wholly intended by the dominant group but which is reacted to callously or even with satisfaction. Ethnocide characterized the main thrust of encounters between colonial settlers and indigenous peoples, in which most deaths resulted from diseases carried from the dominant to the out-group, worsened by “reservations” and terrible labour conditions which were not intended to kill, but which did wear down the natives to near death.

Finally, Row 6 contains premeditated mass killing. I have excluded killings normally legitimated by the rules of war (ie of defined combatants only). Exemplary Repression is how I style most
of the more atrocious imperial conquests of history -- putting an entire city to the sword in order to
cow other cities into submission. 20th century military campaigns have contributed indiscriminate
bombing of civilians, as in Dresden, Tokyo and Hiroshima. Modern campaigns also have variants
of the Roman practice of decimation (killing every tenth person of a rebellious population). In the
Balkans in the 1940s the German army killed fifty local civilians for every German killed by
guerillas. Rebels and terrorists are usually capable of only smaller atrocities of this type, though
September 11 was a very large one. This was presumably the first atrocity in a series aimed at
American civilians to force American withdrawal from contested parts of the world. Today, all
exemplary repression could be theoretically prosecuted under international law as “war crimes” or
“crimes against humanity” -- though killers who win wars are not prosecuted. Civil wars also often
involve slaughter of the civilian population, with motives of anger, revenge, sadism etc. usually
falling short of systematic cleansing intent – as in the Biafran or Sudanese civil wars.

Then comes murder whose intent is partial cleansing. **Forced Conversion** involves a stark choice:
“convert or die”. Serbs were given this choice by Croat Ustasha forces during World War II. Some
of the out-group are killed, either because they resist or because perpetrators wish to show that the
choice is for real. But most will live, cleansed of their religion but not their entire culture.
**Politicide** is killing where the intended target is the entire leadership and potential leadership class
of a more generally victimized and feared group (as defined by Harff and Gurr, 1988: 360). This
may overlap with exemplary repression, though politicide has a more cleansing intent. Wiping out
leaders and intellectuals aims to undermine the out-group’s cultural identity, whereas cities cowed
into submission through exemplary repression may retain their identities. By killing all educated
Poles, the Nazis intended to wipe out Polish cultural identity, just as Burundian Tutsis intended to
wipe out Hutu cultural identity through killing educated Hutus. I add a term, **Classicide** -- the
intended killing of entire social classes by leftists. The Khmer Rouge were the worst perpetrators;
Stalinists and Maoists perpetrated short bursts. Classicide seems to be distinctive to leftists, since
only they are tempted to believe they can do without “exploiting” classes. Rightist regimes
recognize they need workers and peasants to do the work. The slaughter by the Indonesian army and
Islamic paramilitaries of at least 500,000 Indonesian communist sympathizers in 1965-66, though
it disproportionately killed poor peasants, was targeted at a political rather than a class enemy – at
communists, not peasants or workers. It was politicide, not classicide.

Finally comes **Genocide**, a term invented in 1944 by the Polish lawyer Raphael Lemkin. The United
Nations' definition slightly modifies Lemkin’s and is now the international legal definition. The UN
says that genocide is a criminal act intended to destroy an ethnic, national or religious group, which
is targeted for destruction as such. The U.N. definition can be criticized because it includes both too
much and too little. It sometimes may include too much because it adds a sub-clause, allowing either
total or “partial” destruction to count as genocide. I have difficulty with the concept of "partial
genocide", unless this has a particular geographic connotation. Settlers in California in 1851
attempting to wipe out all the Indians from the Owens Valley were embarked upon partial, in the
sense of a local, genocide.

The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia decided General Krstic had committed a
“partial genocide” in 1995 because his Bosnian Serb troops murdered 7-800 Muslim men in
Many criticize the U.N. definition for omitting non-ethnic victims, targeted for political, mental, physical or sexual characteristics (Andreopoulos, 1994: Part I). Genocide is intentional. The aim is to wipe out an entire group -- though this goal is almost never completely attained. Genocide usually involves not only killings but also the attempt to eradicate cultural memory of the group (destroying its churches, libraries, museums, street names etc.). If only cultural cleansing occurs, I would not call this genocide -- in my terms it is cultural suppression -- though UN sources sometimes do. Genocide is committed by majorities against minorities, whereas politicide is the reverse.

I focus here on the worst ethnic cleansing, the darkly shaded area of the table, collectively labeled “murderous ethnic cleansing”. My category excludes all the categories contained in Column 1, even though its lower cells might involve many deaths. I have also coloured three cells adjacent to this dark-shaded area in a lighter hue to acknowledge that these “borderline” zones may also contain some murderous cleansing. I prefer not to call many of these types “genocide” as some do (eg Roger Smith, 1997; Jonassohn, 1998). Genocides are very few.

All these categories are ideal-types. Real-world cases typically mix them up together. The 95% elimination of North American Indians involved lesser segregations and deportations, escalating to outbursts of exemplary repression, amounting overall to a mostly unintended ethnocide, yet containing repeated genocidal outbursts. The worst cleansings have earlier less serious phases, and they typically proceed in erratic bursts, most of which either die away or produce backlashes. Even genocidal intent by some leaders may get subverted by reluctance or resistance from below -- or vice versa. Most cases of local inter-communal violence do not escalate to mass murder -- as in India, Northern Ireland and most areas of Indonesia today.

Making these distinctions reveals two broad but paradoxical features of ethnic cleansing. On the one hand, most has been quite mild. Murderous cleansing is uncommon. Assimilation, backed up by milder institutional coercion, has dominated. On the other hand, most advanced countries today are ethnically “cleansed” since they are at least 70% mono-ethnic, and in the past they were far more multi-ethnic. So we have two main problems. Why did such “cleansing” occur? And why in only a few cases did it turn really nasty?

My answers rest on analysis of a number of the more serious cases: in ancient and European
colonial history; the genocide launched in 1915 against the Armenian population of the Ottoman Turkish Empire – seen against the backdrop of earlier murderous cleansing of Muslims in the Balkans and the Caucasus; the genocides attempted by Nazis and allies during World War II; the cleansings committed by communist regimes (targeting classes more than ethnic groups); cleansings in the 1990s in the republics of the former Yugoslavia; and the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. To avoid “sampling on the dependent variable”, ie focus only on cases where the very worst eventuality ensued, I also covered cases in modern India and Indonesia where murderous ethnic conflicts do not usually escalate onto murderous cleansing. Obviously, in a single paper I can refer only very briefly to any of these cases.5

Eight Ethnic Theses

(1) This concerns the broad historical era in which murderous cleansing became common. Murderous cleansing is modern, because it is the dark-side of democracy. This is a provocative thesis. We are accustomed to think of democracy as bringing only good to the world. The thesis has two parts, concerning modernity and democracy. Some disagree with the first part, declaring that murderous cleansing is equally ancient and modern. They support this with brief references to the notorious Assyrians and to incidents of mass murder, like the Carthaginian destruction of two Greek city-states and the Roman destruction of Numantia and Carthage (Jonasson, 1998: Chap 17; du Preez, 1994: 4-5; Freeman, 1995). Roger Smith (1997) generalizes from such cases to declare “Genocide has existed in all periods of history”.

No age has a monopoly of mass murder. Earlier ages may have been more cruel than our own, more at ease with murder and torture with bare hands -- in public before applauding crowds. We moderns are more practiced in callous killing at a distance. We bomb from a safe height, but we are appalled by butchery with axes and swords (Collins, 1974: 421). The enormous gulf between rulers and ruled in ancient empires meant that treatment of lower classes, including the common soldiers, was much crueler than today. Discipline was harsh and exemplary, floggings routine, executions common. so the enemy’s lower classes were also treated cruelly. Armys “lived off the countryside”. Besiegers might sack, loot and rape their way through a city they had taken. But in historic warfare, notes Roger Smith, people were killed for where, not who they were. Murder and rape are not distinctively modern -- murder and rape in order to cleanse is modern.

Conquerors wanted people to rule over, to subordinate and enslave. “Barbarians” didn’t want to cleanse civilized peoples, they wanted to be civilized. A few lower class Romans wanted the reverse. The Ostrogothic King Theodoric summed it up: “An effective Goth wants to be like a

5 For overall accounts of most of these cases, see Stannard, 1992 (North America); Rowley, 1972 (Australia); Dadrian, 1995 (Armenia); Hilberg, 1978 (The Jewish Holocaust); Courtois et al, 1999 (leftist cases); Woodward, 1995 (Yugoslavia); Des Forges, 1999, and Mamdani, 2001 (Rwanda); and Naimark, 2001 (several 20th century cases).
Roman; only a poor Roman would want to be a Goth.” (Brown, 1996: 57-62). Theodoric’s theory is of “class assimilation” ie assimilation confined within comparable social classes of the two peoples. The upper classes become Romans, a few of the lower classes became Goths. This came after a bout of Exemplary Repression. Cleansing might mean the conquerors would have to do the labour themselves! At the extreme, conquerors might kill or deport entire troublesome elites or defiant cities or local populations. Jews were expelled from Palestine in AD 133 after an unsuccessful revolt against the Romans. Entire city populations were put to the sword to “make an example” of them. But conquerors assimilated elites who did submit. Assyrian bas reliefs depict a triptych of policies -- killing those who resist, selectively enslaving and chaining others and accepting tribute from the rest. They took the land, but used the labour of the conquered. The Assyrians killed, razed, deported according to political, not ethnic criteria (Oded, 1979:86; cf Yamad, 2000).

Rome had struggled for a century against Carthage. By the time Rome was getting the upper hand, feelings of revenge were strong, coupled with the desire to make an example of the capital city of Carthage so that no other Punic city would defy Rome. The policy of Delenda est Carthago -- Carthage must be destroyed -- was accomplished. It was razed to the ground, and the ground was then supposedly salted, to prevent crops ever growing there (apocryphal, given the amount of salt required). Mass Carthaginian deaths resulted. However, this treatment was highly unusual at the time. Elsewhere, the Roman conquerors tolerated Punic culture. It survived in Spain for at least three centuries after submission to Rome. Submission allowed allied or client Punic states to enjoy considerable freedoms. After a short time the Punic upper classes would begin to assimilate, then the lower classes. In North Africa and Sardinia Punic culture actually survived for 500 years, until the later Roman Empire (López Castro, 1995: 157-9, 210-19).

Though not unknown in previous history, murderous ethnic cleansing became more frequent and deadly in modern times. Indeed, during our own lifetimes things got a lot worse! The 20th century death-toll through ethnic conflict amounted to 70-100 million, dwarfing that of previous centuries. Conventional warfare increasingly targeted entire “peoples” as “the enemy”. Whereas civilians accounted for below 10% of deaths in World War I, they rocketed to over half in World War II, and to somewhere above 80% in wars fought in the 1990s. Ethnically-targeted wars boomed in mid-century and then again from the 1970s to the late 1990s. Ethnic/religious tensions continue to simmer – in Northern Ireland, the Basque Country, Cyprus, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Turkey, Israel, Iraq, Chechnya, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, India, Kashmir, Burma, Tibet, Chinese Central Asia, Fiji, the Southern Philippines, various islands of Indonesia, Guatemala, Mexico, the Sudan, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Nigeria, Congo, Rwanda and Burundi. Over half these cases involve substantial killing. As you read these words, one ethnic crisis will be exploding into violence on your television screens or newspapers, while several other explosions will not be deemed newsworthy. The 20th century was bad enough. Perhaps the 21st will be even worse.

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It is impossible to give exact figures, but see Chesterman (2001: 2); Gurr (1993 & 2000) and Markusen & Kopf (1995: 27-34) for some rough estimates.
The atrocities of September 11, 2001 and the ensuing “war against terrorism” have imprinted the horror of murderous ethnic and religious strife on the consciousness of the entire world. It has especially struck home in the prosperous countries of the North, mostly shielded from such strife over the past half-century. Americans must now contemplate matters they thought were long-gone from their world (since they exterminated almost all their own Indians in previous centuries). Neither the attack of September 11 nor the retaliatory attack on Afghanistan had as their intent ethnic cleansing. Yet these attacks can only be understood in the light of a linked series of serious cases of ethnic/religious cleansing in the world today. Especially relevant are those involving Jews and Muslims in Palestine, Iraqis and Kurds, Sunni and Shi’ite Muslims in Iraq, Russians and Chechens, Uzbeks seculars and Islamicists, Kasmiri Muslims and Hindus, and “tribal” ethnic cleansings in Afghanistan.

Thus murderous ethnic cleansing belongs not to “primitive” peoples, but to our own civilization. This is because it is the perversion of modern aspirations to democracy in the nation-state. Democracy means rule by the people. But “the people” means two things. The first is the Greek term demos, rule by the ordinary people, the mass of the population (the mob, said some Greeks). But “the people” conveys a second sense, the Greek term ethnos, an ethnic group – a people which shares a common culture and sense of heritage. Where fused, the two are seen as creating the ideal of “organic democracy”, where the state expresses an organic or integral national identity. If this “people” is to rule in “its own” nation-state, defined in ethnic terms, what is to happen to those of different ethnicity? If one ethnic group forms a majority, then it can rule “democratically” but also tyrannically over other peoples. Thus the imposition of “organic democracy”, fusing demos with ethnos, in multi-ethnic environments creates certain problems.

Of course, if we define democracy not merely in terms of electoral arrangements, but also in terms of the rule of law, freedom of expression, assembly etc., then a regime committing murderous cleansing against its own subjects could not possibly be considered democratic. Even if we restrict the definition to electoral arrangements, I am not arguing that democracies commit more murderous cleansing than authoritarian regimes. Laitin and Fearon (2001) say there is no overall relationship between regime type and civil or ethnic war in the world today. Yet some democracies do commit murderous ethnic cleansing: the better their politicians represent the dominant ethnic group, the more severe the cleansing. This is my conclusion regarding the European colonial cases. Authoritarian regimes ruling over ethnically-fractious groups also often damp down their conflicts – as in most communist regimes, and in the Indian and some African cases under martial law in recent years. In these cases subsequent democratization worsens ethnic conflict by intensifying ethno-nationalist radicalization, as detailed below. But authoritarian regimes committing murderous cleansing also do it “in the name of the people” after a democratic regime has been brought down by the fusing of the demos and the ethnos (this is the Nazi case, for example). These are all outcomes generated by the diffusion for aspirations for rule by the people, and so they are the dark-side of democracy.

This has three further consequences. First, this casts doubt upon the “civil society” normative theory of democracy. “Civil society theorists” see democracy as resting on dense and vibrant voluntary associations in civil society. These theorists only discuss rather nice nice associations and
movements. But in all my cases, ethno-nationalist radicals mobilized denser networks of voluntary associations than their nicer rivals. Nazis were more likely to belong to voluntary associations and be more active in them than were any of their rivals; so were Serb and Croat nationalists; so were Hutu Power extremists etc. etc. (for the Nazis, see Koshar, 1986). Their activism compensated for their lack of numbers, though it also helped them in mobilizing at election times. Second, I go beyond the routine equation of ethnic cleansing with “nationalism”, to give a reason why nationalism is so entwined with mass murder. It is because nationalists aspire to the nation-state – rule by the demos/ethnos. Third, we can now see that murderous cleansing is moving across the world as the world modernizes and democratizes. This is why its past lay mainly among Europeans, who invented the democratic nation-state. The countries inhabited by Europeans – in Europe and elsewhere – are now safely democratic, but most have also been ethnically cleansed. Now the epicentre of murderous cleansing has moved into the South of the world. Unless humanity takes evasive action, it will continue to spread until democracies – hopefully, not ethnically-cleansed ones – rule the world. Then it will ease. But if we wish to ease it quicker from the world, we have to face squarely up to the darkside of modern democracy.

(2) Ethnic hostility rises where ethnicity trumps class as the main form of social stratification, in the process “capturing” and “channelling” class-like sentiments toward ethno-nationalism. Cleansing was rare in the past because large-scale historic societies were “class-divided” (in Giddens’ term). Aristocracies and oligarchies dominated them and they rarely shared a common culture or ethnic identity with the common people. They despised the people, often considering them barely human. “The people” did not exist across class lines – class trumped ethnicity. Even in the Roman Republic, with its representative institutions, the state motto was SPQR, Senatus Populusque Romanus, “The Senate and the People of Rome”, two different entities.

Mass murder has been ubiquitous through most of human history. But murder in order to remove (“cleanse”) a people was rare in earlier centuries. Ancient Empires might extend the “exemplary repression” of a particularly troublesome people into murdering many men of fighting age or deporting in order to disperse a troublesome people (as the Assyrians did on a very large scale). But conquerors had no interest in wiping out ethnic identities, because they wanted to use the labour of conquered peoples and they themselves usually lacked much of an ethnic identity.

But, from our knowledge of more recent colonialism and some smatterings of historical information, we can deduce one great exception. Murderous cleansing occurred where settler-conquerors wanted the land but not the labour of the native people. This probably happened in the case of the Anglo-Saxons moving into Britain in the 4th to the 6th centuries AD. They moved in as entire family groups and we deduce from the absence of linguistic mixing that they simply forced the Celts and Romano-British peoples westward. This was not the case in the later Viking incursions, whose intermixing with the Saxons seems evidenced in the English language and in the place-names in the areas they settled. More murderous, perhaps, were cases where conquering pastoralists did not want a settled, agricultural way of life. Groups like the Huns and the Mongols (outside of China) may have cleansed very large numbers of native agriculturalists in taking their lands. I note that these were relatively classless peoples moving in to occupy and graze or work the land themselves, without need of native labour. Their cleansing may have resembled that inflicted by European settler-
These arguments concern societies with states. Some anthropologists nowadays argue that some stateless village and clan groupings wipe out their neighbours. Again, this is more likely where they want their land but not their labour.

In the Caucasus during the 1850s and 1860s the Russian Empire committed massive murderous cleansings, including the almost total cleansing of the Circassian people (half died, half were pushed into the Ottoman Empire). This seems to have resulted only partly from the spread of modern Slav nationalism (and this was not a very democratic movement). A more traditional policy of imperial exemplary repression probably contributed more (Shenfield, 1999).

The rise of mass salvation religions open to all the classes – like Judaism, Christianity or Islam – brought some class levelling, of the ideological soul though not of political power. The first serious European cleansing was religious – of heretics, Jews and Muslims, then of Protestants and Catholics. By modern standards this cleansing was fairly mild. Death-rates turn out to be much lower than is often popularly supposed in historical memories of such events as the Albigensian Crusade, the expulsion of the Jews and Moors from Spain (Kamen, 1983a), or Cromwell’s campaigns in Ireland (Clifton, 1999). When confronted with the most extreme choice of the period, convert or die, most chose conversion – and lived.

The religious wars settled, Europe then underwent a long process of rather mild cleansing of minority language cultures. This did not transcend class, since it proceeded class by class. First the Welsh gentry were part-persuaded, part-compelled to adopt English, then the Welsh middle class, then the Welsh peasantry and working class. This class-by-class process then interacted with the rise of rule by “we, the people”, that is with representative democracy of the liberal kind. But “the people” was also initially class- (and gender-) bound – it only meant “men of property”. Liberal democracy did not transcend class, it institutionalized class differences politically. As its conception of “the people” was plural, tolerating class differences, it also tolerated ethnic differences. The liberal regimes of northwestern Europe rarely practiced murderous ethnic cleansing.

But things became different in eastern and southeastern Europe. Their struggle for rule by “we, the people” came later, and by the late 19th century it really did mean “all the [male] people”, not just the propertied classes. Their struggle was directed against the three great multi-ethnic Empires, Romanov, Habsburg and Ottoman. The demos was also the ethnos, in opposition to their foreign imperial oppressors. In this struggle for democracy, where peoples could be defined ethnically, the threat of murderous cleansing arose. Democracy and the nation were seen as “organic”, possessing a singular identity and soul. Croatia, Serbia, Poland, Romania etc were viewed as the state of the Croats, Serbs, Poles and Romanians – and not of others. Now ethnicity was potentially trumping class and my remaining ethnic theses might come into play.
But ethno-nationalism is strongest where it can “capture” class, regional and gender sentiments. The most serious defect of recent writing on ethnic nationalism has been its almost complete neglect of class relations. This simply inverts the defect of a previous era in which class conflict was believed to dominate while ethnicity was ignored. Now the reverse is true. But the bigger point is that these two types of conflict infuse each other. Palestinians believe they are being materially exploited. To neglect either ethnicity or class is mistaken. We do not find murderous cleansing among rival ethnic groups who are “separate but equal”. Mere difference is not enough. For serious ethnic conflict to develop, one ethnic group must exploit or threaten to exploit the other – or at least, this notion must have substantial plausibility to the “exploited”. And in turn the imperial “oppressor” will react in righteous outrage against the “threat” of having its “civilization” overwhelmed by “primitivism” – just as upper classes do when threatened with revolution.

(3) The “danger zone” of murderous cleansing is reached when (a) large movements claiming to represent two fairly “old” ethnic groups have both persistently laid claim to “their own” state over all or part of the same territory; and (b) this claim seems to them to have substantial legitimacy and some plausible chance of being implemented. Dangerous cases involve the overlaying of rival claims to political sovereignty on top of quite “old” senses of ethnic difference. These may have been originally “constructed” and then modified anew by each generation. But by the time real trouble breaks out, ethnic identities are deep and constraining. These are not cases of newly-constructed, highly-contingent ethnic identities. The Serb account of the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 may be a myth (for the two armies that day were what we would now call “multi-ethnic”), but Serb schoolchildren had been taught that myth as fact for one hundred years prior to the 1990s.

Clear perceptions of ethnic identity and difference are then worsened to hatreds, presenting the “danger” of murderous cleansing, by persistent rival claims to political sovereignty. This was the case in the colonial contexts, in the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Ottoman Empire before World War I, in Yugoslavia, in Rwanda. In India it distinguishes between the most murderous conflicts – all lying around contested northern frontier zones (in 1947, in Kashmir, and around the small northeastern frontier states) from the more spasmodically murderous urban riots elsewhere. And in Indonesia it sorts out East Timor, Aceh and Irian Jaya (and perhaps West Kalimantan) from other cases. The Nazi-Jewish case does not fit here (but see later). Murderous ethnic conflict almost always comes to a head on primarily political power relations, though as it develops it also involves ideological, economic and finally military power aspects. Even so, however, the most common outcome is that one group controls the state, while the other, no matter how large, submits and accepts discrimination and the lesser forms of cleansing identified in Table 1.1. More than rival
political aspirations is needed to cause actual murderous cleansing.

(4) The “brink” of murderous cleansing is reached in one of two alternative scenarios.
(4a): the less powerful side is bolstered to fight rather than to submit (for submission reduces the deadliness of the conflict) by believing that aid will be forthcoming from outside – usually from a neighbouring state, perhaps its “ethnic homeland”, in Brubaker’s sense. In this scenario both sides lay political claim to the same territory, and both believe they have the resources to achieve it. This was so in the Caucasian, Yugoslav, Rwandan and Kashmiri cases, for example. This we might call the “ethnic war” scenario.

(4b) The stronger side believes it has such overwhelming military power and ideological legitimacy that it can achieve its own cleansed state violently at little physical or moral risk to itself. This we might call “the final solution” scenario. This approximates to the most serious colonial settler cases, in North America, Australia and South West Africa (in 1907).

The Armenian and Jewish cases mixed these two scenarios together, since the Turkish and German sides believed they had to strike first in order to prevent the weaker Armenian and Jewish sides from achieving their states in alliance with far more threatening outsiders – in both cases Russia. Right now a few Israeli extremists are being tempted toward a similar solution to the Palestinian issue. All these terrible eventualities were produced by interaction between the two sides. We cannot explain such escalation in terms merely of the actions or beliefs of the perpetrators. We need to examine the interactions between the “perpetrator” and “victim” groups -- and also the latter’s relations with other groups as well. However, even so, this set of relations is insufficient to cause murderous cleansing. There are other cases of such interactions in which rival sides draw back from the brink, reasoning that compromise or submission serves their interests better than aggression or resistance.

(5) “Going over the brink” into perpetrating murderous cleansing occurs where the state exercising sovereignty over the contested territory has become factionalized and then radicalized amid an unstable geopolitical environment leading into a war in which the outgroup is seen as one of the enemies. A “crisis” destabilizes both sides’ calculations of advantage. Out of such political and geopolitical crises “radicals” emerge calling for “tougher” treatment of perceived ethnic enemies. Most ethnic conflict between “old” rival groups is usually somewhat ritualized, cyclical and manageable (as in modern India) Truly murderous cleansing, in contrast, emerges unexpectedly, originally unintended, out of crises first concerning other matters, to which the out-group is then plausibly connected. War is the most serious crisis, for here it is said the out-group is attacking us, or aiding those who are attacking us.

The converse of this thesis is that in cases where states and their geopolitics remain stable, even severe ethnic tensions and violence tend to be cyclical and manageable at moderate levels of violence below that of massive murderous cleansing. Present-day India has long remained in the “danger zone” by virtue of rival political claims expressed by Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and others. Yet since 1950 almost never has this toppled over into massively murderous cleansing, because India offers a basic level of political and geopolitical stability in which the routinized politics of class and caste help undercut ethnic solidarity, and in which politicians are making routinized
calculations about electoral and other political advantage. At some point, despite their biases toward one side, most politicians and police officials will seek to preserve order rather than lead further aggression. But where political institutions are unstable and affected by war, violence may lead over the precipice into mass murder.

The forms of political instability vary, however. Some states were fragmenting and factionalizing (like the Hutu state of Rwanda), others had been seized and being newly consolidated, determinedly radicalizing and repressing dissidents and factionalism (like the Nazi or Young Turk state). In some brand-new states, consolidation was occurring in contradictory ways in different parts of the state (as in the new Bosnian and Croatian states). But the essential point is that these were not stable and cohesive states, of either democratic or authoritarian types. It is in exploring the consequences of conditions of instability and uncertainty that rational choice theorists have proved most effective in this area of research. Here “security dilemmas”, “fear-driven pre-emptive violence”, “commitment problems” and “information failure” are likely to prevail as paradoxical solutions are reached in which outcomes are worse than either side’s most rational options would have generated (eg Fearon, 1995, Kalyvas, 1999, Posen, 1993). But the “failed” states that political science researchers have shown are most likely to generate civil wars do not generate the most murderous cases of cleansing. These tend to be directed by radicalized states, and this requires some state coherence and capacity.

(6) As a consequence of (5), **murderous cleansing is rarely the initial intent of perpetrators.** Here I focus on elites. The thesis may seem surprising, but evil geniuses almost never plot mass murder from the very beginning. Not even Hitler did so. Murderous cleansing typically emerges as a kind of “Plan C”, developed only after the first two responses to a perceived ethnic threat fail. Plan A typically envisages a carefully planned solution in terms of either compromise or straightforward repression. Plan B is a more radically repressive adaptation to the failure of Plan A, more hastily conceived amidst rising violence and some political destabilization. When these both fail, some of the planners radicalize further and their power becomes enhanced, for they do seem to offer a practicable solution while others have become discredited. To understand the outcome, we must analyze the unintended consequences of a series of interactions yielding escalation.

Yet these successive Plans may contain both “logical” and more contingent escalations. The perpetrators may be ideologically determined from quite early on to rid themselves of the ethnic out-group, and when milder methods are frustrated, they almost logically seem to escalate with resolute determination to overcome all obstacles by more and more radical means. This was true of Hitler and his Myrmidons: “The Final Solution of the Jewish Question” seems much less of an accident than the logical escalation of an ideology ruthlessly overcoming all obstacles in its path. For the Young Turks, however, the “final solution” to the Armenian problem seems much more contingent, flowing out of what they saw as their suddenly desperate situation in 1915. Their Eastern army was falling back in front of the Russians (assisted by some Armenian units), their southern flank was assailed by an Anglo-French invasion, and their capital was threatened by the British Landing at Gallipoli. They feared they would have to retreat into their Anatolian heartland. Those radicals who were arguing for a modern, organic, cleansed nation based on Anatolia became much more influential. This was the final solution of the Armenian Question. For Rwandan Hutus we find elements of both: an inner core of north-western Hutu Power radicals increasing their power ever
since the Tutsi invasion began in 1990, then given sudden opportunity by the unexpected shooting down of the presidential plane in April 1994 – it was believed by Tutsi radicals.

With the Milosevic trial underway in the Hague, my model might be put to an empirical test. My reading of Milosevic’s initial policy, his “Plan A”, was “strong federation” (ie a Serb-tilting Yugoslav Federation). It did not involve ethnic cleansing – perhaps not even in Kosovo, the perennially dangerous province of Yugoslavia. Plan A was frustrated by the opposition of the Slovenian and Croatian republican leaderships. He then escalated to “Plan B”, giving small-scale aid to the precani Serbs, across the borders of Serbia, to seize control of their neighbourhoods. This would form a “Greater Serbia”, by now desired by a majority in the Serb parliament. When it became clear that Croatia would fight, he escalated to “Plan C”, a swift and overwhelming army invasion to achieve the same goal. After all, he controlled the bulk of the Yugoslav army, the JNA. Thus it seems he expected little killing, though probably more pressured emigration by Croats and Bosniaks. But over 50% of Serb males did not respond to their call-up papers, and those that did would not risk their lives in infantry assaults. So he plunged into the truly murderous “Plan D”, combining JNA artillery bombardments with “wild” assaults using the main reliable units, nationalist paramilitaries and security police units. This produced murderous cleansing. In Bosnia, he moved more quickly to “Plan C”. Again, he anticipated swift success. Failure then made him escalate quickly to “Plan D”. Even in Kosovo he seems not to have initially intended to preside over mass murder, though he responded to each policy frustration by escalating toward that. This hypothesis could be disproved by evidence presented at the Hague Tribunal. We will see.

To downplay intentionality like this is morally uncomfortable. It usually involves me in arguing against many who speak in the name of the victims. My position is not “denialist”. Genocide of the Jews, the Armenians, the Tutsis, of some colonized native peoples and of others was deliberately attempted and mostly accomplished. The evidence is overwhelming. But many who speak for the Jews, Armenians, Tutsis etc like to emphasize the premeditation of their oppressors. This probably derives less from the understandable hatred they bear them, than from their need to find “meaning” in the sufferings of their people. What could be worse than to regard such suffering as contingent? But murderous ethnic cleansing is eventually perpetrated deliberately, but the route to deliberation is circuitous. It was a twisted road even to Auschwitz, says Schleunes (1990).

To understand leading perpetrators, we must also refine our conceptions of “evil”. We will find very few people who are in some original sense evil. Instead they are “radicalized” in crises into evil by varying combinations of ideology and unanticipated power interactions. These differences show up in the spirit in which they finally commit evil. Where driven mainly by contingencies, they become panicky and desperate. The culminating violence offers “success” in ridding them of the perceived threat, giving a sense of release, freedom and elated triumph which emotionally shields the perpetrator from recognition of evil. This seems to have been true of many Young Turks in 1915. Where driven more by ideology, perpetrators are different, exhibiting a more ruthless rigour, grim acceptance that evil must be endured for the sake of a greater goal and “good”. This is how most of the leading Nazis thought. As ghastly as are their deeds, we must try to understand their psychology. But understanding does not mean excusing.
But there are three distinct levels of perpetrator: (a) radical elites commanding “party-states”; (b) bands of militants forming violent “paramilitaries”; and (c) “core constituencies” of ethno-nationalism providing mass though not usually majority popular support. Elites, militants and “core constituencies” are all normally necessary for the perpetration of murderous cleansing. We cannot simply blame malevolent leaders or ethnic groups en masse. That would be to credit leaders with truly magical powers of manipulation, or whole peoples with truly remarkable single-mindedness. Both assumptions are at odds with everything sociologists know about the nature of human societies. In all my cases elites, militants and core constituencies are linked together in quite complex ways, forming social movements which (like other social movements) embody rather mundane power relations. Power is exercised “top-down” by elites, “bottom-up” by popular pressures, and “coercively sideways” by paramilitaries. These pressures interact and so generate mundane processes of hierarchy, comradeship and career. This has a big impact on perpetrator motives, as we see in a moment.

The notion of “core constituencies” makes explicit what should be obvious. Murderous cleansing resonates more in some social environments than others. It resonates more within constituencies favouring some combination of extreme ethno-nationalism, statism (a powerful organic state expressing the soul of the ethnos) and violence (as a means of solving social problems). So its main core constituencies are:

(a) ethnic refugees and people from border districts supposedly “threatened” by foreign out-groups;
(b) those more dependent on the state for their subsistence and values;
(c) those living and working outside of those sectors of the economy most likely to generate class conflict (these are more likely to favour class over ethno-nationalist models of conflict);
(d) those socialized into acceptance of physical violence as a way of solving social problems or achieving personal advancement – like soldiers, policemen, criminals, hooligans and athletes;
(e) those attracted to machismo ideology – young males striving to assert themselves in the world, often led by older males who were socialized as youths in an earlier phase of violence.

Yet I cannot claim that I have found much quantitative evidence on these core constituencies, apart from the Nazi case. In my analysis of the backgrounds of 1581 Nazi war criminals (Mann, 2000), I can demonstrate the existence of core constituencies (a) to (c) and a part of (d) – ie army veterans, policemen and Nazis trained in lower levels of violence before the mass killings began. Elsewhere, contemporaries in all cases also asserted that refugees were over-represented, and usually also people from “threatened” border regions. Men are always grossly over-represented among the perpetrators, but they are also over-represented among the victims. Both may simply reflect the fact that men dominate all forms of violence in almost all societies. Young men and “macho gangs” seem more evident in the less well-disciplined cleansings – Yugoslavia, Rwanda, but not among the

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10 Rape is ubiquitous but problematic in ethnic cleansing. Thanks to feminist pressure groups, the Yugoslav case has produced more documentation of rape than in any other case, but it does not follow that rape was more common here than in other ethnic conflicts, or indeed in more conventional inter-state wars.
Nazis (after the decline of the SA in the mid-1930s). Criminals have been shown to be over-represented among the Turkish perpetrators and under-represented among the Nazis. Journalistic stereotypes of criminals and macho youth gangs abound, especially in Yugoslavia. There is little hard evidence here, though Horowitz (2002) feels the evidence is sufficient to conclude that they were dominant in most cases of murderous riot across the modern world.

So the main axes of stratification involved in cleansing movements are probably region, economic sector, gender and age. Class is less directly involved, for it has been trumped and rechanneled onto ethnicity. Thus radical ethno-nationalist movements—unlike nationalism in general—tend to contain a “normal” class structure: leaders come from the upper and middle classes, the rank-and-file from lower down—with the real dirty work often performed by the lumpen proletariat (Horowitz also notes this of riots). Core constituencies give to core perpetrators distinctive value-driven ideological motives. They believe in the rightness of cleansing.

(8) However, when we consider the total body of perpetrators, “ordinary people” are brought by “normal” social structures into committing murderous ethnic cleansing. Thus we find them driven by much more varied motives, indeed by the range of motives to which we “ordinary people” are subject when we participate in social life. I distinguish nine

(a) **Ideological** killers believed in the righteousness of cleansing. They were commoner in the higher ranks of perpetrators. Though we may view them as extraordinary fanatics, their ideology might seem more plausible and “ordinary” when viewed within the context of a war with ethnic connotations or from the perspective of “core constituencies”-- for example, refugees who have already suffered at the hands of members of the out-group. Ideology also resonates in the practices and sub-cultures of certain professions. Doctors and biologists in the early 20th century found biomedical models of ethnicity and race particularly attractive. some believed in purifying the nation’s genetic stock. They were over-represented among Young Turk and Nazi perpetrators. And the commonest ideological motive is also rather mundane: the self-righteous justification of killing as “self-defence”. The killer protests he/she is really the victim.

(b) **Bigoted** killers are motivated by more casual, less ideologically-developed stereotypes of the victim group. Especially rank-and-file perpetrators share the casual prejudices of their place and time. Jews, Muslims etc. are denigrated and evoke not pity but disgust from the perpetrators. "Ordinary Germans" became murderous anti-semites without much urging from the Nazis, says Goldhagen (1996), since they saw Jews literally as “vermin”. "Ordinary Ukrainians" viewed them similarly, suggests Sabrin (1991: 242). Ordinary European colonists regarded natives as sub-human; ordinary Croats and Serbs might fear each other and despise Bosniaks and Albanians.

(c) **Violent** killers are drawn to killing. A few are sadists with enduring personality traits experiencing violence as pleasurable. They are often viewed as disturbed people, alienated misfits, probably with marginal social or personal backgrounds or career trajectories. But this is not true of the Nazis and most violent killers are not sadists. More people feel themselves “driven” toward violence, which they experience as release or freedom from emotional anxiety.

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Katz (1988) has written persuasively of the “seductions” of violent crime in the contemporary US. He says that murder is usually highly emotional, involving a sequence of emotions: a sense of threat leads to an all-enveloping sense of personal humiliation, followed by a self-righteous rage to expunge it. “Rage”, he says, “is livid with the awareness of humiliation”. Ethnic hatreds may transpose this threat-humiliation-rage triad to a more collective level: Hutus feel threatened and humiliated by Tutsi power, and they strike out, enraged. But more triumphal forms of emotion may be also involved. Wielding superior violence enables us to exercise raw power. We may enjoy, even exult, in it. Collins (2002) argues that most violence in most contexts results as one party weakens, and the other strikes, exulting in its sudden superiority. Since weapons can easily overcome class differences, they especially enable lower-class people to humiliate a more prosperous out-group (Jews, Armenians or Tutsis). Eye-witnesses to the behaviour of militia commanders and troopers – from the colonial frontiers, to the Turkish village, to the SS, to the Khmer Rouge, to Serb or Croat paramilitaries, to the Rwandan Interahamwe, to the militias of East Timor – note the joys of power over life-and-death, especially when exercised over people of higher status. These are some of the worst features of ordinary human beings.

(d) **Fearful** killers felt themselves credibly threatened, with harm to life or limb, if they did not kill. These were physically coerced, reluctant killers perhaps, but killers nonetheless. We know this occurred in all cases. All began with killings of dissidents within the perpetrating community, before the out-group was attacked. We have the most graphic descriptions of coercion in Rwanda, where the paramilitaries would assemble Hutu villagers and tell them “kill your neighbours or else”.

(e) **Careerist** killers were employed in organizations involved in murderous cleansing. Their compliance with killing orders was perceived by them as leading to greater career prospects – or to worse prospects if they did not assist killing. This was more common in the more bureaucratized cases, like the Nazis and in the higher levels of Turkish and Rwandan officials.

(f) **Materialist** killers were lured by the prospect of direct economic gain by looting or taking the victims’ jobs, businesses or property. These materialist motives were very evident among Turks and Kurds in the Armenian genocide and in Rwanda, where Tutsi possessions were often redistributed in an organized way among Hutu villagers. In Yugoslavia material motives were often more “defensive” – that is, dispossessed refugees seized the houses and property of others of the out-group. Enrichment occurred among the Nazis, though it was officially discouraged. But in Indian murderous riots – as in most of those studied by Horowitz (2001) – looting was very subordinate to the destruction of the out-group’s property.

(g) **Disciplined** killers are caged within legitimate organizational authority, where non-compliance with orders is considered deviant. Less fear than the necessity of routine compliance to directives is at the forefront of their minds. People of all nationalities present, past or future can be made conformists by pressure from above. They will even murder under such pressures.

(h) **Comradely** killers are caged inside conformity by peer-group pressure, especially by fear of the peer-group withdrawing its emotional support. This is partly how Browning (1993) explained the mass murder committed by “ordinary” German policemen. And it mainly for this reason that Birn
(1998: 98-100) says the German perpetrators were "perfectly normal men who knew the difference between right and wrong" -- "ordinary men and women" with "personalities found in any country" who could "commit history's greatest crimes". This, she says, "is the really sensational truth about the perpetrators of the final solution".

(i) **Bureaucratic** killers are caged inside the "bureaucracies of modernity". Their obedience is neither ideological nor much socially pressured but habitual, produced by institutionalized routines and authority, trapping them into what Arendt (1983) famously termed "the banality of evil" institutionalized in modern societies. This is where Milgram’s (1974) experiments fit best. Ordinary **modern** people, trapped inside bureaucracies, factories and science, can murder, say Baumann (1989). I am rather sceptical of this view, since it seems to me that killers tend to use the most modern techniques available to them. In the case of Nazi Germany this did involve Baumann’s modernistic organizations; in the Armenian case, one railway and the telegraph were used, but most victims were not even shot, since the Turks had a shortage of guns; in the Rwandan case, machetes were used for most of the killing. I believe that the most general “modern” aspect of murderous cleansing has lain elsewhere, in modern ideologies of “organic democracy”. But note that killers of type (e), (g), (h) and (i) are more common in more institutionalized, bureaucratized cleansings, like the Nazi case and among upper level perpetrators.

So the killers were varied -- ideological, bigoted, violent, fearful, careerist, materialist, disciplined, comradely and bureaucratic. All types were present in all cases. Lower rank perpetrators were especially varied. Since these are ideal-types, almost all perpetrators had very mixed motives. My list of types also tends to “freeze” motives at the point of killing. Since few perpetrators initially intended to go out and kill people (thesis 5), their prior motives must have differed. Indeed, we must trace perpetrator **careers**, modifying motives and socializing them toward killing. To understand murderous cleansing, we need a sociology of power more than a psychology of perpetrators. The psychologist Charny (1986: 144) observes “the mass killers of humankind are largely everyday human beings -- what we have called normal people according to currently accepted definitions by the mental health profession.”

Charny is correct. If I have learned one thing from my research, it is that, placed in comparable situations and similar social constituencies, you or I might also commit murderous ethnic cleansing. No people is invulnerable. Many Americans and Australians used to commit murderous cleansing; some Jews and Armenians – the most victimized peoples of the 20th century – have perpetrated recent atrocities against Palestinians and Azeris (and in turn these “victims” are also perpetrators). There are no virtuous peoples. There is a powerful religious view which stresses the presence in all humans of “original sin”, the human capacity for evil. Indeed, placed in the” right” circumstances and core constituencies, we are almost all capable of such evil -- perhaps even of “enjoying” it. But “original sin” would be an insufficient explanation for this, since our capacity for evil only becomes realized in certain social circumstances. In the case of cleansing, these circumstances are less primitive or ancient than modern.

A final proviso. My theses may seem contentious and overly schematic. Given the messiness and uniqueness of societies, they cannot be scientific laws. Since mass murderous cleansing is
fortunately rare, we cannot easily generalize. The causes of murderous cleansing might be unique to each case. Nazis and their hatred for Jews were unique, imposed on top of the unique 1,000 year-old hatred of Christians for Jews. Tutsis and Hutus in Rwanda uniquely live right amongst each other across the whole country, unable to withdraw to any core territories. All cases have peculiarities. They do not even fit perfectly all my case-studies. The Nazi genocide of the Jews does not fit neatly into thesis (3) above, since Jews were not claiming sovereignty over any part of Germany. I would offer a modified, “indirect” version of thesis (3) in which Jews seemed to German radical nationalists to be implicated as conspirators in other groups’ claims to political sovereignty (especially as so-called “Judeo-Bolsheviks”). In the case of the US genocide of the Indians, thesis (5) does not fit very well, since the US government was cohesive and stably democratic (for whites) – though things were more fluid on the frontier where the mayhem was actually committed. Each case has to be explained in terms of its own particular features. My theses provide a broad explanatory framework, not a covering law.
Table 1.1: Types of Violence and Cleansing in Inter-Group Relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Violence</th>
<th>Types of Cleansing</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Partial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Unpremeditated Mass Deaths</td>
<td>“Mistaken” war, civil war &amp; revolutionary projects, fratricide</td>
<td>“Callous” war, civil war &amp; class war &amp; revolutionary projects</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NB: Darker shading indicates the core of the zone of murderous cleansing discussed in this essay; lighter shading indicates a borderline zone in which it may occasionally occur.
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