Nationalizing states in the old ‘New Europe’ – and the new

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Abstract

The literature on nationalism as a form of politics has focused on polity-seeking (or polity-upgrading) nationalist movements, paying much less attention to the nationalization of existing polities. This article reverses the emphasis. It develops a framework for the analysis of ‘nationalizing states’. These are states that are conceived by their dominant elites as nation-states, as the states of and for particular nations, yet as ‘incomplete’ or ‘unrealized’ nation-states, as insufficiently ‘national’ in a variety of senses. Almost all of the twenty-odd new states of post-communist Eurasia are nationalizing states in this sense. Without directly analysing developments in these incipient states – a difficult task when so much is still in flux – this article seeks to develop a way of thinking about the projects and processes of ‘nationalization’ that are already observable in the new states, and that are likely to continue to play a key role in the coming years. It does so by way of a sustained examination of one particular nationalizing state – the newly resurrected Polish state during the interwar period. The analysis of the Polish case is preceded by a more general analytical discussion of the politics and policies of ‘nationalization’ in interwar Europe; the essay concludes by discussing nationalization in today’s new nation-states, the incipient successor states to the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.

Keywords: Nationalism; nation-building; nationalization; Poland; interwar period; minorities.

Nationalism can be understood as a form of remedial political action. It addresses an allegedly deficient or ‘pathological’ condition and proposes to remedy it. The discourse that frames, and in part constitutes, nationalist political action – and the subdiscursive sentiments which nationalist political stances seek to mobilize and evoke – can be conceived as a set of variations on a single core lament: that the identity and interests of a putative nation are not properly expressed or realized in political institutions, practices or policies.

This allegedly deficient condition comes in two basic forms: a nation may be held to lack an adequate polity, or a polity may be held to lack an adequate national base. Two corresponding types of nationalism may be distinguished: polity-seeking or polity-upgrading nationalisms.

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that aim to establish or upgrade an autonomous national polity; and polity-based, nation-shaping (or nation-promoting) nationalisms that aim to nationalize an existing polity.

The literature on nationalism as a form of politics – leaving aside the broader literature on nationalism as an idea, or sentiment, or state of mind – has focused on polity-seeking nationalist movements, paying much less attention to the nationization of existing polities. This article reverses the emphasis. It develops a framework for the analysis of what I call ‘nationalizing states’. These are states that are conceived by their dominant elites as nation-states, as the states of and for particular nations, yet as ‘incomplete’ or ‘unrealized’ nation-states, as insufficiently ‘national’ in a variety of senses to be explored below.

Almost all of the twenty-odd new states of post-communist Eurasia are nationalizing states in this sense. Without directly analysing developments in these incipient states – a difficult task when so much is still in flux – this article seeks to develop a way of thinking about the projects and processes of ‘nation-alization’ that are already observable in the new states, and that are likely to continue to play a key role in the coming years. It does so by way of a sustained examination of one particular nationalizing state – the newly resurrected Polish state during the interwar period. The article begins, however, with a more general analytical discussion of nationalization.

**Nation-building and nationalization**

Although the literature on nationalist politics has focused on state-seeking nationalisms, one developed body of literature has addressed policies and processes of nationalization within the frame of existing states. This is the literature – much of it produced a generation ago – on ‘nation-building’ and ‘national integration’. The central idea of this literature is that the population of the state – the citizenry – is progressively welded into a ‘nation’ in the crucible of a bounded and relatively homogeneous transactional and communicative space, a space defined and delimited by the state and by state-wide social, political, economic and cultural institutions and processes. In place of a welter of more parochial loyalties and identities, the citizenry is progressively united, through the gradually assimilative workings of these state-wide institutions, processes and transactions, by a common ‘national’ loyalty and identity.

Although analytically sophisticated in at least some of its variants, notably those developed by Karl Deutsch and Stein Rokkan and some of their followers (e.g. Deutsch 1953, Rokkan 1975), much of this literature is flawed by a teleological model of development towards ‘full’ national integration. Moreover – and particularly relevant for the present analysis – ‘nation’ and ‘national’ are conceived in this literature in restricted fashion as definitionally coextensive with the citizenry and with the territorial and institutional frame of the state. The ‘nation’ is simply the citizenry, to the extent that it becomes a unit of identity and loyalty – to the extent, that is, that citizens recognize one another as ‘belonging together’ in a subjective, ‘internal’ sense rather than as simply belonging to the state in a formal, external sense. Similarly, ‘national’ is primarily a term of scale and scope: it often means no more than ‘state-wide’.

In this perspective, as a result, ‘nation-building’ and ‘national integration’ are axiomatically inclusive.

A further and related characteristic of this literature was its remarkable neglect of ethnicity. This neglect was twofold. On the one hand, ethnicity was not generally seen as a major impediment to nation-building or national integration. Articulated during the high noon of modernization theory, and deeply influenced by its assumptions, the nation-building literature saw ethnic identity, like other local and particularistic attachments, as progressively attenuated by the multiple solvents of modernity, in particular by such universalizing, homogenizing, and thereby nationalizing forces as markets, bureaucracies, armies, school systems, transportation and communication networks and so on. On the other hand, ethnicity was not seen as a major component of the process of nationalization or nation-building. Again in line with the regnant assumptions of modernization theory, nation-building was conceived as occurring in a universalistic mode. The nation to be built was conceived as trans-ethnic or supra-ethnic. Its content was to be ‘civic’ rather than ‘ethnic’, its contours defined by the territorial and institutional frame of the state, rather than by cultural or ethnic boundaries.

Underlying this dual neglect of ethnicity was (1) a strong normative preference for civic over ethnic identities, and for the development of state-wide and state-oriented identities and loyalties at the expense of more local and particularistic attachments, often characterized, in more or less stigmatizing fashion, as tribal, subnational, parochial, etc.; and (2) a robust empirical confidence in the development of civic identities and state-wide, state-oriented loyalties. That confidence was soon shaken as the optimistically modernizing mood of the early 1960s was dashed. The obstacles posed by politicized ethnicity to nation-building and national integration in the new states of Asia and Africa quickly became apparent to scholars. A sophisticated literature on ethnic conflict in post-colonial states developed, culminating in major synthetic works by Crawford Young (1976), Donald Horowitz (1985), and others. Yet while there is now a substantial and sophisticated literature on politicized ethnicity as an obstacle to nationalization in the new states of Asia and Africa, there is not a comparably developed literature on ethnicity as a component of nationalization in those states, or on nationalization in an ‘ethnic’ or ‘ethnocultural’ mode. For the
most part, the literature on post-colonial states continues to see the 'national' as coextensive with the state, and to conceive 'ethnicity' as definitionally sub-national.

This prevailing opposition, in studies of post-colonial states, between the definitionally state-oriented category of the 'nation' and the definitionally sub-national category of ethnicity reflects the striking and consistent territorialism of anti-colonial nationalisms and post-colonial states. Especially in African colonies, territorial boundaries - as established by the colonial powers, and accepted, for the most part, as legitimate by anti-colonial nationalists - were not even approximately congruent with cultural boundaries. For this reason it has been nearly impossible to equate, even approximately, an ethnocultural group with a potentially sovereign 'nation'. The 'nation' in the name of which sovereignty over those territories could be claimed by anti-colonial nationalists was therefore almost universally conceived in territorial terms.

In other settings, however, 'ethnicity' (more precisely ethnolinguistically or ethnoreligiously embedded culture) is understood and experienced as constitutive of nationhood, not as opposed to it. In these cases, the dynamics of nationalization are quite different. Yet they have not been adequately explored. There is, of course, a large literature on ethnic nationalism; but it chiefly concerns politity-seeking nationalisms, directed against the framework of existing states, rather than 'nationalizing' nationalisms within that framework. The literature on 'nationalizing nationalisms', on the other hand, has focused on nationalization in a territorial rather than an ethnocultural mode, concentrating on two classes of cases: post-colonial states, and the 'advanced' states and societies of northwestern Europe and North America, conceived (at least by the early wave of nation-building and national integration theorists) as models and exemplars for the post-colonial states.

This selective focus is understandable. It reflected the emergence of the nation-building literature in the early 1960s, at a moment of high political confidence in Western models of political development and their transferability to the developing world (Young 1976, pp.7ff), sustained by robust epistemological confidence in a generalizing style of social science capable of discovering universal patterns of social and political development and of validating policies aimed at promoting such development. As this forward-looking conjuncture, there was every reason to be interested in the territorial nation-building projects of the newly independant states of Asia and Africa, and to seek to analyse, and further, the 'development' of those states along Western lines then widely accepted as normative for political development generally. There was, on the other hand, no reason to be especially interested in the more ethnocultural modes of nationalization prevalent in the earlier wave of new states that had emerged in the rubble of the great multinational land empires: Habsburg, Ottoman and Romanov. To the extent that they were considered at all, these programmes and practices of ethnocultural nationalization, together with so much else of interwar Europe, could be dismissed as marginal, as vestiges of a past peculiarly ridden with ancient and intractable ethnonational conflicts, or as pathological symptoms of the failure to modernize.

Today, however, the experience of the new nation-states of interwar Europe - itself, at the moment of its creation, a much-heralded 'New Europe' - does not seem so marginal. As a point of comparative reference for the analysis of today's new nation-states - the twenty-odd states that have succeeded to the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia - the new states of interwar Europe seem far more relevant than the post-colonial states of midcentury or the old states of European Europe, on which the nation-building and national integration literatures have focused.

Far from being vestigial or unmodern, the dynamics of ethnocultural nationalization in the new nation-states of interwar Europe represented a distinctively modern form of politicized ethnicity, pivoting on claims made, in the name of a nation, to political control, economic well-being, and full cultural expression within 'its own' national state. Similar claims are being made today. This article therefore approaches today's newly nationalizing states by way of a reconsideration of one of the newly nationalizing states of the interwar period: the newly re-established Polish state.

The old 'New Europe': nationalizing states in the interwar period

The crumbling of multinational empires - the prolonged decay of the Ottoman Empire and the sudden collapse in the First World War of the Habsburg and Romanov Empires - left in its wake a broad north-south belt of new states in East Central Europe, stretching from the Baltic littoral to the Balkan peninsula. All of these states were created as nation-states, legitimated by their claim to be the states of and for particular nations. Moreover, all were not only nation-states but nationalizing states, characterized, to differing degrees and in differing ways, by a distinctive politics of nationalization. Without analysing individual cases in detail, I sketch here the main features of that politics.

The politics and processes of ethnocultural nationalization varied widely in form and intensity in the new states of interwar Europe. But they characteristically involved the following elements: (1) the existence (more precisely the conceived or understood or 'imagined' existence) of a 'core nation' or nationality, defined in ethnocultural terms, and sharply distinguished from the citizenry or permanent resident population of the state as a whole; (2) the idea that the core
nation legitimately ‘owns’ the polity, that the polity exists as the polity of and for the core nation; (3) the idea that the core nation is not flourishing, that its specific interests are not adequately ‘realized’ or ‘expressed’ despite its rightful ‘ownership’ of the state; (4) the idea that specific action is needed in a variety of settings and domains to promote the language, cultural flourishing, demographic predominance, economic welfare, and political hegemony of the core nation; (5) the conception and justification of such action as remedial or compensatory, as needed to counterbalance and correct for previous discrimination against the nation before it had ‘its own’ state to safeguard and promote its interests; (6) mobilization on the basis of these ideas in a variety of settings – legislatures, electoral campaigns, the press, associations, universities, the streets – in an effort to shape the policies or practices of the state, of particular organizations, agencies, or officials within the state, or of non-state organizations; and (7) the adoption – by the state, by particular state agencies and officials, and by non-state organizations – of policies and practices, formal and informal, that were informed by the ideas outlined above.

This sketch is deliberately drawn in broad and general terms. This is partly because it attempts to capture features common to a variety of nationalizing states. But it also reflects the fact that state-based, nation-promoting nationalisms – the post-independence nationalisms of nationalizing states – are inherently more diffuse than state-seeking nationalisms. Central to the latter are distinct movements with clear goals. Even where nationalisms are not unambiguously state-seeking but (as is often the case) split between movements for independence and movements for increased autonomy within an existing state, there are still distinct movements with definite, if contested, goals. By contrast, ‘nationalizing’ nationalisms within the frame of independent states, do not usually involve distinct movements with clear and specific goals. Consequently, it is hard to pinpoint what is specifically ‘nationalist’ about politics in such states. In such settings, nationalism becomes an ‘aspect’ of politics, embracing both formal policies and informal practices and existing both within and outside the state, rather than a discrete movement. It is that diffuse and pervasive yet none the less distinctive aspect of politics that I want to analyse here, by way of a discussion of the politics of nationalization in the region’s most populous state, the newly re-established Polish state.

Interwar Poland as a nationalizing state

The Polish state that was resurrected in the aftermath of World War I differed radically from the old Polish Commonwealth that had disappeared from the map of Europe in the late eighteenth century after being thrice partitioned between Prussia, Austria and Russia. The old Commonwealth had never been a nation-state or nationalizing state. It was a loosely integrated polity whose great ethnolinguistic heterogeneity was not seen as problematic. ‘The nation’ in the old Commonwealth was defined by social and political status (membership in the ruling szlachta or gentry), not by language or ethnicity; it was conceptually located above non-privileged status groups (above all the Polish-speaking and non-Polish speaking peasantry) in the same territory rather than alongside other coordinate nations.

During the century and a quarter of partition, however, Polish nationhood was redefined in ethnolinguistic terms (Brock 1969, p. 316). This redefinition had two aspects, of which one might designate as ‘social deepening’ and ‘ethnic narrowing’ respectively. On the one hand, the eclipse of the status-bound notion of the ‘gentry nation’ reflected the democratization or popularization of or ‘social deepening’ of the concept of nation throughout Europe that began in the late eighteenth and continued through the nineteenth century; everywhere ‘nation’ was reconceived in a ‘populist’ idiom that expressly included all social classes or strata. On the other hand, the increased salience of language as a nation-bounding diacritical marker reflected the experience of prolonged statelessness, which prevented the development of a state-oriented, state-framed, ‘civic’ or ‘territorial’ understanding of nationhood.

The new Polish state, therefore, was conceived as the state of and for this ethnolinguistically (and ethno-religiously) defined Polish nation. A clear distinction was universally made between this Polish nation and the total citizenry of the state. By official count, which clearly overstated the relative predominance of Poles, the citizenry included large numbers of Ukrainians (14 per cent of the population in 1921), Belorussians (4 per cent), Germans (4 per cent), and Jews (8 per cent) (Polonsky 1972, pp. 35ff; Rothschild 1974, pp. 34ff). Not that the boundaries of the Polish nation were thought to be fixed. Ukrainians and Belorussians were considered candidates for membership in the Polish nation; policies towards them were therefore assimilationist. The assimilation of Germans and Jews, however, was generally viewed as unlikely (in the case of Germans, at least those living in territories ceded by Germany after the war) or undesirable (in the case of Jews). Policies towards them were therefore more ‘dissimilationist’ or ‘differentialist,’ based on differential treatment by ethnolinguistic nationality among citizens of the Polish state. Thus, nationalizing policies and practices varied sharply. Broadly speaking, in eastern rural districts the aim was to nationalize the frontier East Slav population; in the cities and in the west, the aim was rather to nationalize the territory and economic life, by replacing Germans and Jews with Poles in key economic and political positions, and by encouraging their emigration.
Nationalizing the western borderlands

Ethnic Germans, particularly those in the long German-ruled western borderlands of the new state, were trebly vulnerable to nationalizing programmes and practices. To begin with, the borderland regions, especially those of eastern Prussia, had been subjected for the preceding four decades to harsh, although ineffective, nationalizing policies by their Prussian and German rulers. These policies had succeeded only in stimulating national solidarity and stiffening nationalist resistance among Poles. Nevertheless, the sustained (and openly acknowledged) German efforts to nationalize the German-Polish borderlands during the Kaiserreich provided a convenient rationale for the analogous Polish measures after World War I. It permitted such measures to be presented as remedial and compensatory, as needed to reverse the political, economic, cultural and ethnographic legacy of the decades-long policy of Germanization.

Furthermore, Germans in the restored Polish state had the misfortune to 'belong', by ethnocultural nationality, if not legal citizenship, to a powerful neighbouring state with unconcealed irredentist ambitions. Under the leadership of Gustav Stresemann, Foreign Minister from 1923 until his death in 1929, Weimar Germany achieved a rapprochement with Western powers, but it continued to make border revision in the East--albeit peaceful, negotiated border revision--a top foreign policy priority. The border with Poland, particularly the 'Polish corridor' that cut off East Prussia from the rest of Germany, was universally viewed as an insupportable 'national humiliation', unjustly imposed on a prostrate Germany (Peukert 1993, pp. 201ff). Poles just as universally, and no doubt correctly, perceived borderland Germans as favouring, even if not actively supporting, a restoration of German rule in the borderlands. Thus, Germans were perceived from the beginning as a dangerous 'fifth column', stimulating, by their very existence, revisionist claims in Germany and, unlikely, in any crucial test, to prove loyal to the Polish state.

Germans' third vulnerability lay in their pre-eminent economic position in the Western borderlands, especially since this could be attributed to privileges they had enjoyed under a nationalizing German regime. In Poznańia and Pomerania, at the end of the period of German rule, Germans monopolized the civil service, held a disproportionately share of large landed estates and medium-sized farms, and were also disproportionately represented among professionals, merchants and artisans. In Upper Silesia, Germans predominated among owners, managers and workers of industrial enterprises (Blanke 1993, pp. 51–53). This favourable economic position, like that alleged to be occupied by Jews, would be a focus of nationalist concern throughout the interwar period.8

These three features conditioned Germans' immediate vulnerability, in the new Polish nation-state, to a politics of nationalization. But what kind of nationalization? To characterize it, as is often done, as an effort at 'Polonization', is insufficient. For Polonization can refer to two different, even antithetical processes. On the one hand, it can designate an attempt to remake the human material of the state, to nationalize the citizenry by turning Germany and others into Poles. In this sense, nationalization is a form of assimilation, that is, of 'making similar': it involves making a target population similar to some reference population, whose putative characteristics are conceived as normative for the citizenry as a whole. On the other hand, nationalization can be directed at spheres of practice rather than groups of people. In this sense it involves dissimilation rather than assimilation. Far from seeking to make people similar, it prescribes differential treatment on the basis of their presumed fundamental difference. Instead of seeking to alter identities, it takes them as given. Assimilationist nationalization seeks to eradicate difference, while differentialist nationalization takes difference as axiomatic and foundational.

Vis-à-vis Germans, nationalization was dissimilationist rather than assimilationist. There was no attempt to transform Germans into Poles. Many Germans, to be sure, did acquire Polish citizenship, as most residents of the ceded territories were entitled to do by the Treaty of Versailles. But they did not understand themselves (nor were they understood by Poles) as having thereby acquired Polish nationality. Citizenship and nationality, legal membership of the state and ethnocultural membership of the nation, were seen as sharply distinct by Germans and Poles alike (and were indeed seen as sharply distinct throughout East Central and Eastern Europe). There was no attempt to transform Germans' nationality, to make Germans into Poles in an ethnocultural sense. This was viewed as unrealistic. Much cultural assimilation, in both directions, had indeed occurred over the centuries in the German-Slav borderlands. But by the late nineteenth century, a hardening national struggle in the eastern districts of Prussia, in the context of an overall increase in social mobilization, led to the intensification of national identifications on both sides, and to their extension to strata formerly indifferent to, or only tenuously aware of nationality (Eley 1984). In this new context of struggle between mobilized nationalities, assimilation was much less likely to occur. It continued to occur in some regions outside the focus of the national struggle, for example among Poles who had migrated from eastern Prussia to the Ruhr industrial districts. And certain zones of mixed, fluid and ambivalent national identification remained, notably Upper Silesia, where political orientation and language often did not coincide (Kuhn 1959, p. 143; Blanke 1993, p. 28). But on the whole the trend since the 1880s had been towards a sharper crystallization of boundaries between
ethnonational groups. In this context it was implausible to think that
the new Polish state might assimilate its German minority, highly mobil-
ized and strongly conscious of its distinct ethnicultural nationality.

Nor was there a serious attempt to cultivate the political loyalty of
Germans to the Polish state – to assimilate them politically while tolerating their ethnicultural Germanness. Such an attempt would have
presupposed (1) an understanding of Germans' political loyalty and
identity as open and contingent, and (2) an understanding of the Polish
state as the state of and for all its citizens, not merely the state of and
for Poles. But neither was forthcoming. Germans were widely perceived
as unremittingly hostile to the Polish state and as sympathetic to
German irredentism. And the Polish state was widely understood as
‘belonging’ specifically to the Polish nation and existing to further its
particular aims and interests. Given these prevailing understandings of
German hostility towards, and Polish ‘ownership’ of, the state, attempts
to cultivate the political loyalty of Germans were condemned in
advance as futile.

Policies and practices of nationalization were thus directed neither
at the ethnicultural assimilation of Germans nor at turning them into
loyal, if culturally unassimilated, citizens of the Polish state. They were
directed at the nationalization not of Germans, but of Polish territory
and of political, cultural and economic life within it. They were differ-
entialist, not assimilationist. By virtue of their distinct ethnic national-
ity, and in spite of their common citizenship, the ethnically German
citizens of the new state were to be treated differently than ethnically
Polish citizens. Nationalizing initiatives sought to build the Polish state
as a specifically Polish state, that is, as a state that would embody and
express the will and interests of the Polish nation. Such initiatives
sought to Polonize the borderlands, the civil service, the professions,
the industrial base of Upper Silesia, the school system and so on, not
by making Germans into Poles, but by displacing or excluding Germans
from certain key positions and, more generally, by weakening Ger-
mans as an organized group, thereby preventing them from exercising
undue influence over the political, cultural or economic life of the new
state.

The most visible form assumed by ethnic nationalization in the
early years of the restored Polish state – indeed in anticipation of the
restoration of Polish statehood – was a large-scale migration of ethnic
unmixing, as Germans fled to Germany from the Prussian borderlands
that were ceded to Poland. Some two-thirds of the roughly 1.1 million
ethnic Germans in these territories (not including Upper Silesia) had
left by the mid-1920s, including 85 per cent of the urban German
population and 55 per cent of rural Germans (Rauschnigg 1930,
pp. 338ff, esp. 348–49; Blanke 1993, p. 49). The main towns of Poznań
and Pomerania, almost all majority German before the war, now con-
tained only small German minorities. The exodus, to be sure, cannot
be attributed solely, or even primarily, to the nationalizing policies
of the new state. Some migration was to be expected, notably on the part
of those civil servants and military personnel who had no roots in the
borderland region and had been sustained there only by the Prussian
and German state, and on the part of those who, regardless of the
anticipated policies of the new Polish state, preferred to cast their lot
with the more economically and politically powerful and culturally
familiar German state. Furthermore, large-scale migration began before
the new state was even established. Yet even this early migration,
occurring in anticipation rather than as a result of the transfer of
sovereignty, reflected a dynamic of nationalization: departing Germans
anticipated (correctly) that the transfer of sovereignty would reverse
the dynamic of nationalization, substituting Polonization for German-
ization.

Moreover, the migration was certainly welcomed, indirectly fostered,
and on occasion explicitly demanded, by Polish officials.10 Migration
was also encouraged by popular anti-German demonstrations, including
some violence against Germans. The most thorough, and most
detached, recent study of the migration concludes that ‘Poland’s basic
policy, at least during the period of National Democratic influence to
1926, was simply to encourage as many Germans as possible to leave
the country’ (Blanke 1993, p. 64). This does not mean that the
migration was ‘forced’, as many Germans claimed.11 It does mean,
however, that the anticipated and actual nationalization of life in
restored Poland was a major cause of the mass migration (keeping
in mind, of course, that this nationalization followed, and mirrored,
two generations of rule by a nationalizing Prussian/German state)
(Blanke 1993, pp. 40–43, 63–65).

A less visible, but equally important, dimension of nationalization
involved efforts to displace Germans from key positions in the econ-
omy. Central to economic nationalization throughout East-Central
Europe in the interwar period, for example, was land reform. By
‘expropriat[ing] ethnically “alien” landlords’, while sheltering landlords
of the ‘correct’ ethnic nationality from the brunt of agrarian reform,
states sought to defuse an explosive social issue at minimal political
cost (Rothschild 1974, p. 15). Not only German but also Russian,
Polish, Hungarian, Bulgarian and other landlords whose estates lay
outside ‘their own’ nation-state found themselves expropriated in this
manner (Seraphim 1937–38, pp. 47–50). In Poland the most con-
veniently expropiable ‘alien’ landlords were Germans in the western
borderlands (though there were also some Russian as well as a few
Ukrainian and Lithuanian estate owners in the eastern borderlands).

Although policies formally applied to estates owned by Poles as well
as to those owned by members of national minorities, in practice
land reform was implemented most vigorously vis-à-vis Germans.\(^{12}\) Distribution of the expropriated land, too, was guided by ethnopolitical considerations – a point that especially aggrieved the desperately poor Ukrainian and Belorussian peasants in the east, who saw Poles resettled on lands expropriated from Russian estate owners. Apart from land reform, state officials used administrative discretion to pursue a nationalizing agenda through such techniques as the selective denial of licences required to practise certain professions, the exclusion of German firms from state contracts, the nationalization of the civil service and pressure on industrial firms (especially in the strategically crucial heavy industrial district of Upper Silesia) to Polonize their managerial staffs and their labour force (Blanke 1993, pp. 116–20).\(^{13}\)

A final dimension of nationalization can be broadly characterized as cultural, although in this sphere, too, specifically cultural concerns were intertwined with geopolitical and security concerns and with economic interests. Here questions of language were central. Polish was made the sole official language of the state. From 1924 on, Polish officials were instructed not to accept any communications in German, and postal authorities would not deliver mail using the German spelling of place names (ibid., p. 67). But the main arena of language politics, and of cultural nationalization in general, was the school system. The Minority Protection Treaty obliged Poland (like other East-Central European states) to provide elementary education in minority languages where minorities formed a ‘considerable proportion’ of the population (Macartney 1934, p. 505). The latitude allowed governments in interpreting these provisions, coupled with a cumbersome and ineffective enforcement procedure, made them easy to circumvent. The number of German-language schools dropped sharply, even after the end of mass German out-migration, declining in Poznania and Pomerania from 1,250 in 1921–22 to 254 in 1926–27 (by which time mass emigration had ended) to 60 in 1937–38 (Kuhn 1959, p. 147; Blanke 1993, p. 79). In the German schools that remained, the administration and teaching staff as well as the curriculum were increasingly Polonized. These measures seem to have aimed less at assimilating German schoolchildren than at preventing Germans from controlling – and from using towards ends inimical to the Polish nation-state – the powerful organizational and ideological resources of ‘their own’ school system. In this respect Polish school policy reinforced other measures aimed at inhibiting, hindering or controlling the associational and organizational life of Germans, and thereby at hindering the organizational articulation and expression of specifically German interests.

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**Nationalizing the urban economy**

Towards Jews, as towards Germans, the nationalizing policies and practices of interwar Poland were assimilationist rather than assimilationist. Yet while the assimilationist stance towards Germans reflected the general belief that Germans could not be assimilated, the assimilationist stance towards Jews reflected the prevailing view that Jews should not be assimilated. Rather than seeking to assimilate Jews, or to cultivate the loyalty of acculturated though unassimilated Jews, policies and practices of nationalization sought on the whole to displace Jews from their all-too-visible positions in the urban economy and, especially after the Nazi seizure of power in Germany, to encourage their emigration.

The identities of Jews – their religious, cultural and political self-understandings – were exceedingly varied and intensely contested among Jews themselves in interwar Poland. There were deeply rooted political, cultural, economic and demographic differences between Jews of Galicia, Congress Poland, and the eastern borderlands. And throughout Poland, Jews were torn between the Yiddish, Polish and Hebrew languages, between religious and secular identities, between socialist and anti-socialist ideologies, between Zionists and their opponents (both secular and religious). Consequently, generalizations about Polish Jews as a whole are exceedingly hazardous. Still, it seems safe to suggest that unlike Germans, and precisely because of the great flux in Polish Jewish self-understandings, a substantial minority of Jews were potentially ‘available’ as members of the Polish nation during the interwar period, and more would have been or become available if the new Poland had not been the ‘most anti-Semitic state in Europe’ at the beginning of the interwar period.\(^{14}\)

Most Jews, to be sure, were linguistically and culturally unassimilated when the Polish state was re-established. But this was a period of great mobilization, rapid acculturation and linguistic assimilation, especially for the younger generation. Even at the beginning of the period, about a quarter of those who identified their religion as Jewish in the 1921 Census identified their nationality as Polish rather than Jewish (Mendelsohn 1983, pp. 23, 29).\(^{15}\) Yet apart from the Polish Left, which favoured the assimilation of Jews, Poles generally did not encourage assimilation. While the Left remained a strong oppositional force throughout the interwar years (distinguishing Poland from most other East European countries), the predominant nationalizing policies and practices in interwar Poland were emphatically not those of the Left. So while a substantial fraction of Poland’s Jewish population either already identified with Polish nationality or might have come to identify with it, Jews were excluded from that nationality by prevailing Polish understandings of nationhood and practices of nationalization (and, of course, also tended to exclude themselves from that nationality in
response to those understandings of nationhood and practices of nationalization).

Germans in the West and Ukrainians and Belorussians in the East were borderland minorities. All were concentrated in areas adjacent to neighbouring states that contained large populations of their ethno-national kin, that claimed (across the boundaries of state and citizenship) to protect and represent their interests, and that harboured unconcealed irredentist designs on the borderland territories they inhabited. Polish nationalizing stances towards these borderland minorities were determined by the felt need to Polonize (though in different ways, assimilationist in the West, irredentist in the East) the ethnic borderlands and thereby secure them against the irredentist designs of Germany and the Soviet Union.16

This, of course, was not the case of Jews, whose external national homeland, for those who considered it such, was still in the making, a homeland distant not only in space but also (given British limits on Jewish immigration to Palestine) in time. The absence of a proximate, putatively irredentist homeland did not prevent Polish nationalists from questioning the loyalty of Jews. Indeed, suspicions of Jewish disloyalty were behind the outbreaks of anti-Semitic violence, including several major pogroms, that accompanied struggles against Ukrainian nationalists, the incipient Lithuanian state, and the Red Army over contested borderland regions of the new state in 1918–1920 (Mendelsohn 1983, pp. 40–41). But the territorial dimension of nationalizing policies and practices, so pronounced in the case of borderland minorities, was missing in the case of the Jews. Vis-à-vis territorially concentrated, rooted, homeland-linked Germans and Eastern Slavs, Poles sought to nationalize the ethnic borderlands; vis-à-vis Jews, they sought instead to nationalize the urban commercial and professional economy.17

Jews were indeed prominent in Polish cities, and predominant in commerce and certain professions. In terms of demography and socio-economic structure, the contrast with the population as a whole was stark. Jews constituted nearly a third of the urban population of Poland in 1921, and half of the urban population in the backward eastern borderlands, while comprising just over 10 per cent of the population as a whole. While 60 per cent of the total population depended on agriculture for their livelihood in 1931, this was true of only 4 per cent of Jews. In 1921 Jews comprised over 60 per cent of those employed in commerce; in 1931, they accounted for more than half of the doctors, a third of the lawyers and substantial shares of other professions. In fact, the large majority of Polish Jews were very poor, and the single most striking economic fact about Polish Jews in the interwar period was their progressive pauperization. Nearly four-fifths of Jews active in commerce were self-employed, and did not employ other workers: ‘the typical Jewish “merchant” was a small shopkeeper, or owner of a stall in the local market, working alone or with the help of his family’. Yet the visible ethnic division of labour and statistics such as those given above ‘were interpreted by Polish anti-Semites as proof that Polish cities were dominated by “foreigners”, against whom a holy war must be waged by the native middle class’ (Polonsky 1972, pp. 42–44; Marcus 1983, pp. 29–31; Mendelsohn 1983, pp. 23–29 [quotations from pp. 28 and 23]).

Economic nationalization vis-à-vis Jews was both governmental and extra-governmental. Jews were systematically excluded from state-controlled sectors of the economy. They were not hired in the civil service, municipal administration, state hospitals, schools or universities (where, even without an official numerus clausus, the proportion of Jewish students declined by two-thirds). Credit and work licences were distributed differentially. Sunday work was forbidden, putting religious Jews who could not open their shops on Saturdays at a competitive disadvantage. Governmental anti-Semitism was checked in the late 1920s under Piłsudska, but pressure on Jews intensified again with the onset of the Great Depression. After Piłsudska’s death in 1935, the government, declaring it only ‘natural that Polish society should seek economic self-sufficiency’, and openly endorsing ‘economic struggle [against the Jews]’, renewed its campaign of economic nationalization. Governmental nationalization from above was complemented by extra-governmental nationalization from below. Right-wing students harassed, humiliated and physically attacked Jews in universities. Centrist as well as right-wing parties campaigned against the economic position of Jews. The centrist Peasant Party, for example, even while rejecting violence and professing to endorse equal rights for Jews, blamed Jews – an unassimilable, ‘consciously alien nation within Poland’, for the alleged fact that ‘the Poles have no middle class of their own’, and concluded that it was vital that ‘these middle-class functions shall more and more pass into the hands of the Poles’. In the second half of the 1930s, a large-scale boycott of Jewish businesses was organized; and direct violence, unchecked by the state, was increasingly employed against Jewish shopkeepers and craftsmen (Polonsky 1977, pp. 465ff; Rothschild 1974, pp. 40–41; Mendelsohn 1983, pp. 42–43 and 69–74 [quotations from pp. 71 and 72]).

If nationalizing policies and practices vis-à-vis Jews sought in the short term to exclude them from the professional and commercial economy, the long-term aim was to promote Jewish emigration. Here the Polish government and right-wing nationalists made common cause with Zionist organizations. ‘If Zionism meant Jewish emigration to [Palestine], no one was more Zionist than Poland’s leaders in the late 1930s’. As both economic crisis and anti-Semitism intensified, many Jews were willing to emigrate. Precisely in the late 1930s, however, the British government sharply curtailed Jewish immigration to Palestine,
the number of Poles immigrating dropping from a peak of 30,000 in 1935 to about 4,000 per year in the late 1930s. It was thus, ironically, against the wishes of Poland’s virulently anti-Semitic government that the vast majority of Polish Jews remained in Poland to face the unimaginable catastrophe that would soon follow (Polonsky 1972, pp. 467–68; Mendelsohn 1983, pp. 71, 79–80, quotation from p. 71).

Nationalizing the eastern borderlands

The eastern borderlands presented yet another picture. To the east, the territory of the Polish state extended far beyond that of the Polish language, including a nearly two-hundred-mile-wide strip in which the language of the countryside was Belorussian (in the northeast) and Ukrainian (in the southeast) (Magocsi 1993, p. 131). Outside the cities, Belorussians and Ukrainians comprised large local majorities in these borderlands, and they formed over 20 per cent of the population of the state as a whole (Rothschild 1974, p. 36).^18

The economic and social condition of Belorussians and Ukrainians contrasted sharply with that of Germans and Jews. While Jews were 80 per cent urban, the East Slavs were almost 95 per cent rural (Germans were initially mixed but became heavily rural as a result of disproportionately heavy urban emigration) (Ammende 1931, p. 57). Belorussians and Ukrainians occupied no desirable economic or political positions from which there was any interest in excluding them. They were recognized – while Germans and Jews were not – as autochthonous; no one sought to encourage them to emigrate.

As territorially concentrated borderland minorities, linked to large populations of co-ethnics in neighbouring states, the East Slavs did, of course, share certain features with the Germans. But the national question in Poland’s eastern borderlands was more complex than it was in the west. In the west, Germans and Poles faced one another as mobilized and opposed nationalities. There were indeed zones of mixed settlement and others of uncertain national identity. But the contending identities were clearly profiled and deeply rooted even well before the re-establishment of Polish statehood.

In the eastern borderlands, the contours of national identity were more indeterminate. Between the Poles and Russians lay a vast zone extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea where national movements had developed only in the last few pre-war decades, and where incipient national identities, articulated and propagated by a small urban intelligentsia, had yet to acquire a substantial social base among the still overwhelmingly peasant populations.

The major exception to this eastern pattern was in eastern Galicia. Unlike the rest of this zone, which had belonged to the Russian Empire, Galicia had been a Habsburg province, with Poles predominating in its western, Ukrainians in its eastern half. There, for half a century before World War I, conditions for cultural and even political nationalist mobilization were much more favourable than they were in the more authoritarian Romanov territories. Consequently, a strong Ukrainian nationalist movement developed, led, as everywhere, by an urban intelligentsia, but mobilizing the peasantry as well, and generating, by the outbreak of World War I, a more deeply rooted sense of national identity.

The collapse of the Romanov, Habsburg and Hohenzollern Empires in World War I, as well as the postwar turmoil associated with the Russian Revolution and subsequent civil war, left the political fate of these regions radically uncertain. These turbulent years witnessed a welter of competing political projects for the region, sponsored by Germans, Poles, Bolsheviks and various native intelligentsias, supported or undermined by a succession of armies, and ranging from creation of new sovereign states through various federalist and confederalist schemes to proposals for outright incorporation by larger powers (Eley 1990, pp. 205–46).

Between late 1918, when Polish statehood was restored, and 1923, when its eastern borders were definitively fixed, there were two contesting Polish visions of the eastern borderlands. One, associated with Pilsudski and the Left, favoured an expansive federal Poland that would incorporate the extensive eastern territories of the historic Commonwealth, grant their incipient nationalities wide autonomy, and encourage them to develop their national individuality – all as a buffer against Russia, presently prostrate, but likely, on this view, to revive and constitute the main future threat to Poland. The second vision, associated with Dmowski and the rightist National Democrats, favoured a more compact state (though still one extending well beyond ethnographically Polish territory) whose East Slav-inhabited territories (albeit less extensive than those envisioned by Pilsudski) would be incorporated into a unitary Polish state, and whose East Slav inhabitants would be expected to assimilate.\[^{19}\]

By the mid-1920s, the latter, nationalizing approach to the eastern borderlands had decisively triumphed. Pilsudski’s grand federalist schemes came to naught, as Lithuania insisted on, and was able to sustain, full independence and as the Belorussian-Ukrainian borderlands, following the Polish-Soviet War of 1920, were partitioned, their western parts incorporated integrally into the Polish state. East Galicia, too, which Polish troops had occupied in 1918–19, crushing the ‘West Ukrainian People’s Republic’ that had been proclaimed in November 1918 and driving out its army, was incorporated in unitary fashion into Poland, despite the autonomy that had been promised by the Polish legislature in order to win Allied approval for Polish claims to sovereignty in East Galicia (Roos 1959, pp. 22–30).
While it was widely believed that Germans could not and Jews should not be assimilated, the assimilation of Belorussians and Ukrainians was seen as both possible and desirable, even as necessary. As leading National Democrat Stanislaw Grabski put it, referring to the eastern borderlands, ‘the transformation of the state territory of the Republic into a Polish national territory is a necessary condition of maintaining our frontiers’ (quoted in Tomaszewski 1993, p. 259). Outside East Galicia, where Ukrainian national consciousness was strong, the prospects for assimilation in the eastern borderlands were indeed relatively favourable. These areas were extremely underdeveloped economically and culturally. Under tsarist rule, they had lacked nearly completely the educational and cultural facilities that could support a public sphere through which national consciousness could develop and diffuse (Eley 1990, pp. 211, 226–27). The nationalist intelligentsia was tiny and lacked any substantial constituency. The Belorussian and Ukrainian inhabitants were overwhelmingly rural, their concerns were overwhelmingly economic, not national. Their identities were seldom, and then only weakly, articulated in national terms. Some identified themselves simply as tuteshi (‘from here’). Others, notably Catholic Belorussian speakers in the area around Wilna, already identified themselves as Poles.

Yet far from furthering the assimilation or even securing the loyalty of borderland East Slavs, Poland’s inept nationalizing policies and practices in the interwar period had just the opposite effect, producing by the end of the period what had not existed at the beginning: a consolidated, strongly anti-Polish Belorussian and Ukrainian national consciousness. This happened through heavy-handed efforts to nationalize the land, the schools and the churches of the region, and through the harsh repression of Belorussian and Ukrainian nationalist and social-revolutionary movements.

Although it had assimilationist aims, the new state’s land policy in the eastern borderlands employed differentialist, discriminatory means. Just as the nationalizing German Kaiserreich had sought to Germanize the lands of its predominantly Polish eastern borderlands by fostering ethnically German at the expense of ethnically Polish landowners – through state sponsorship of what was forthrightly called ‘colonization’ and state control over land sales – so the nationalizing Polish state sought to pursue similar policies _vis-à-vis_ Belorussians and Ukrainians, settling soldiers and other Poles from western territories on estates in the eastern borderlands; indeed, Poles were well aware of the parallels between the national struggles in the German-Polish and those of the Polish-East Slav borderlands (Brock 1969, p. 344). Yet just as the German colonization programme provoked sustained Polish opposition (and was in any event ineffective), so too the Polish colonization efforts, while only marginally affecting ethnic demography and land ownership, powerfully antagonized the local, land-starved Belorussian and Ukrainian peasants (Ammende 1931, pp. 62–63, 134–35; Polonsky 1972, p. 140; Rothschild 1974, pp. 42–43). This antagonism was compounded by the failure of the Polish state to carry out a radical land reform – but such a reform was unthinkable, for it would have meant expropriating Polish landlords (who held the great majority of large estates in the eastern borderlands) for the benefit of non-Polish peasants – precisely the reverse of the situation that made radical land reform politically profitable (and a perfect instrument of nationalization) elsewhere in East-Central Europe, where ethnically alien landlords could be expropriated for the benefit of ‘national’ peasants (Rothschild 1974, pp. 12–13, 67). The embittered agrarian situation allowed Belorussian and Ukrainian agitators to interpret economic grievances in national terms, and thereby contributed to the ‘nationalization’ of the East Slav populations, but in a sense opposite to that intended by the Poles.

In the sphere of education, culture and religion, policies towards the two East Slav nationalities initially differed. Before the war, the Belorussian national movement had been directed against Russia and Russification, while the most vigorous part of the Ukrainian national movement (in Austrian East Galicia) had been directed against Poles (who were dominant in Galicia as a whole). At first (before the definitive triumph of the unitarist, assimilationist National Democrats), the new state sought to take advantage of this anti-Russian orientation of Belorussian nationalism. It therefore not only tolerated but actively supported Belorussian school and cultural institutions, seeking to further the sense of Belorussian distinctiveness from Russia and thereby to secure the loyalty of the Belorussian population. Within a few years, however, this support was withdrawn and assimilationist policies were adopted throughout the eastern borderlands. Belorussian and Ukrainian schools were replaced with nominally bilingual but in fact predominantly Polish ones, and the activities of Belorussian and Ukrainian cultural organizations were restricted in a variety of ways. The Ukrainian University that had been envisioned when Poland was seeking allied approval of its claims to Galicia was not established, and the existing Ukrainian-language chairs at Lwów (Lviv) University were abolished. In the 1930s attempts were made, sometimes with force, to convert Orthodox Ukrainians (i.e. those living outside Galicia, where Ukrainians were Uniate Catholics) to Roman or Uniate Catholicism, and numerous Belorussian and Ukrainian Orthodox churches were closed down, or pressed to use Polish liturgical texts (Vakar 1956, pp. 121ff, 128–32; _Encyclopedia of Ukraine_ 1984–1993, vol. IV, pp. 81, 108, 248–50, vol. V, p. 633).

In terms of their own objectives, the exclusionary, assimilationist nationalizing policies and practices of interwar Poland towards Ger-
mans and Jews can be said to have 'succeeded,' at least in part. By contrast, the assimilationist nationalizing stance towards Belorussians and Ukrainians failed conspicuously on its own terms. Far from being absorbed into the Polish nation, Belorussian and Ukrainian speakers in the Polish borderlands developed much stronger Belorussian and Ukrainian national identities during the interwar period. Worse still, from the Polish point of view, whatever feelings of loyalty they might have had, or developed, towards the Polish state were replaced by hostility. When Poland was partitioned in 1939 between Germany and the Soviet Union, few Belorussians or Ukrainians regretted the end of Polish rule, though worse, by far, was in store for them under Soviet rule, and though the attractiveness of the Belorussian and Ukrainian national 'republics' within the Soviet Union – considerable in the 1920s, when Belorusification and Ukrainization were vigorously promoted – had long since been spoiled by word of the purges, collectivization and famine of the 1930s.

This draining of loyalty from the borderland population cannot be blamed solely on Poland's nationalizing policies and practices. More important, probably, was the government's harshly repressive response to the strong social revolutionary and radical nationalist movements that developed in the borderlands; for the repression touched not only the extremists, who openly espoused and practised terror against Polish officials, but fell heavily on moderate nationalists and apolitical villagers as well (Vakar 1956, pp. 125ff; Roos 1959, pp. 42, 51). But the state's nationalizing policies and practices were crucial in generating and aggravating the grievances that provided a fertile seed-bed for borderland militancy.

Afterword: nationalizing states in the new 'New Europe'

Can the model of a nationalizing state sketched above, and illustrated with reference to interwar Poland, help us think about today's new nation-states, the incipient successor states to the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia? A sustained discussion of this question would require, minimally, an article of its own.39 But a few general observations can be offered.

A caveat is required at the outset. I do not try here to draw lessons from the Polish case. As has been shown in detail, Polish nationalizing policies and practices were shaped by the specific (and internally varied) political, geopolitical, economic and cultural contexts that framed the relations between Poles and minorities. To say anything specific about nationalizing policies and practices in the new states, and about how they might resemble or differ from those of interwar Poland, would require sustained attention to their formative contexts – contexts that differ sharply from those that shaped nationalizing

stances in interwar Poland (and that vary considerably from one new state to the next). To address these varied contexts is impossible here. My remarks therefore are necessarily on a much more general level, and take as their point of departure not the detailed discussion of Poland but the general model of the nationalizing state presented towards the beginning of the article.

A nationalizing state, I have suggested, is one understood to be the state of and for a particular ethnocultural 'core nation' whose language, culture, demographic position, economic welfare and political hegemony must be protected and promoted by the state. The key elements here are (1) the sense of 'ownership' of the state by a particular ethnocultural nation that is conceived as distinct from the citizenry or permanent resident population as a whole, and (2) the 'remedial' or 'compensatory' project of using state power to promote the core nation's specific (and heretofore inadequately served) interests.

In the new states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, these key elements are clearly present. The new states (with the partial and ambiguous exceptions of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Russian Federation) are closely identified with particular ethnocultural nations. This is the legacy of their prior incarnation as the major ethno-territorial units of nominally federal multinational states, in which they were already defined as the (nominally sovereign) states of and for the particular ethnocultural nations whose names they bore. The Soviet, Yugoslav and Czechoslovak regimes deliberately constructed their constituent republics as national polities 'belonging' to their respective eponymous nations, while at the same time severely limiting their powers of rule. They institutionalized a sense of 'ownership' of the republics by ethnocultural nations, but limited its political consequences. Ethnocultural nations were given 'their own' political territories, but not the powers to rule them. With the breakup of these multinational states, the sense of ethnointernal entitlement and ownership of national territory persists, but is now joined to substantial powers of rule. Successor state elites can use these new powers to 'nationalize' their states, to make them more fully the polities of and for their core nations.

In almost all of the new states, the ethnoculturally defined, state-'owning' core nation is sharply distinct from the citizenry as a whole. Only in the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Armenia, where the overwhelming majority of the population belongs to the core nation, is that distinction blurred. In Estonia and Latvia the citizenry is relatively homogeneous, but the total population of the state is not; this discrepancy is the product of a politics of nationalization that, in the name of protecting the interests of the core nation, has so far excluded the
nation-states, notably in the Czech Republic and Slovenia. The best chance for the binational or multinational model would occur if two or more successor states were to merge into a wider federal or confederal state, defining the new unit as binational or multinational, but preserving their own ‘national’ character internally.

The prospects of the minority rights model might seem better. It has even greater international legitimacy than the civic model, and international organizations such as the Council of Europe, the European Union and the Organization (formerly Conference) on Security and Cooperation in Europe have pressed the new states to adopt and implement minority rights legislation. As a result, all new states are formally committed to non-discrimination and to protecting minority rights. But this was true of the new states of interwar Europe as well, all of whom were subject to League of Nations Minority Treaties that expressly required equal treatment, protected the use of minority languages, and obliged the state to provide minority-language primary education in regions with substantial minority populations. These treaties did little to hinder the dynamic of nationalization; formal guarantees of minority rights failed to impede substantive nationalization. It remains to be seen whether internationally-sponsored minority rights regimes will be more successful today.

Almost all the new states, in my view, will be nationalizing states to some degree and in some form. Already, various nationalizing policies, practices and stances have been adopted in domains such as language policy, education, mass media programming, constitutional symbolism, national iconography, migration policy, housing privatization, public sector employment and citizenship legislation; significant elements of nationalization can be found even in states that have presented themselves as models of interethnic harmony, notably Ukraine and Kazakhstan (Arel 1994; Bremmer 1994). But this does not mean that the new states will be as consistently, or counterproductively, nationalizing as was interwar Poland. There is and will continue to be great variation between states, and within states (over time, among parties, between sectors of the government, and so on), in the extent to which and the manner in which nationalizing agendas are articulated and implemented. Moreover, in all states nationalizing agendas must compete with other social, political and economic agendas for attention, support and commitment – not so much with agendas that repudiate nationalization as with those that by-pass or ignore it and thereby make it seem less urgent, compelling or relevant to the problems of the day. The interesting question – and a crucial question with respect to the problematic of self-determination addressed in this issue – is therefore not whether the new states will be nationalizing, but how they will be nationalizing – and how nationalizing they will be.
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Notes

1. This and the previous paragraph are based on Brubaker (1993, p. 354). Since writing that article, I have discovered a similar distinction, between the ‘politicization of ethnicity’ and the ‘ethnization of the polity’, in anthropologist Ralph Grillo’s Introduction to Grillo (1980, p. 7).

2. Although it is not part of the ‘nation-building’ literature, and indeed developed in part in reaction against that literature, the work of Charles Tilly (1975; 1992) has been characterized by the same restricted use of ‘national’ to mean ‘state-wide’.

3. For an influential critique of the modernizationist neglect of ethnicity, see Connor (1972).

4. For an succinct account of ‘territorialism’ as one of the chief distinctive features of national consciousness in Africa, see Smith (1983, pp. 50f).

5. As John Breuilly put it, ‘once a nationalist…opposition takes control of the state the specifically nationalist character of politics tends to diminish. Competing groups all proclaim their paramount concern with the “national interest”. In such a situation nationalism as a specific form of politics becomes meaningless. Again, where all foreign policy is justified in nationalist language it is difficult to identify a specific form of foreign policy which could be called nationalist’ (1985, p. 221).

6. The western borderlands had been ruled by Prussia since the late eighteenth- century partitions of Poland (in the case of East Upper Silesia since the mid-eighteenth century), and had belonged to the unified German state for half a century. Besides the perhaps 1.4 million ethnic Germans of these previously German-ruled western borderlands (Blanke 1993, p. 31), there were some half million Germans living in the formerly Russian part of Poland and another hundred thousand in the formerly Austrian part (Kuhn 1959, pp. 140-42). Blanke (1993, pp. 3-4) argues persuasively that these are fundamentally different cases. The latter did not suffer so dramatic a reversal in status; they were not regarded as so dangerous by Poles; and they did not, consequently, bear the brunt of programmes and practices of nationalization. I neglect them in this account.

7. On ‘privilege’ as a motif in Polish historiography, explaining German economic pre-eminence and justifying remedial Polish nationalizing efforts, see Blanke (1993, pp. 6-7).

8. On the economic dimensions of nationalizing state, Seraphin (1977-38) is an analytically sophisticated statement.

9. The entitlement to formal citizenship, granted to those who had been born in those territories or had resided there since 1908, was undisputed, for Poland construed the residence requirement as strictly as possible – in a manner ultimately invalid-
disparity of size between the groups, since Catholic Belorussians were classified as Polish by nationality.

19. On the historical background of these competing visions of the eastern lands of historic Poland, see Brock (1969).

20. I have begun to explore the national question in the new nation-states in Brubaker (1994, 1995a).

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