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_Ethos_, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Sep., 1993), 319-356.

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Morals, Models, and Motives in a Different Light: A Rumination on Alan P. Fiske’s Structures of Social Life

HARRIET WHITEHEAD

At one point in the evolution his thinking, Durkheim reasoned that the moral force of social rules felt by the individual as an external force could not spring from so feeble, so inconsistent, and so interior a source as the individual conscience itself but must be, as it is felt to be, an external pressure, the only logical source for which is ‘society’. Durkheim’s ‘society’ was not the aggregate of individuals that compose it, but that greater entity emergent from their collective association. This was the source of the force, so to speak, that greater entity as apprehended by the individual via the system of collective representations into which he was born. In cultural anthropology, this version of Durkheim’s vision survives to the

present, its awkwardness intact though somewhat masked under sophisticated discussions of ‘emergence’ and complex theories of internalization. The individual is still not quite the right starting point for the generation of anything social, however important he may be—once socialized—for its perpetuation. But let us try a different take on this formulation for a moment. What if every individual possessed, as her feeble but inborn conscience, a structured, generic moral sense, one that infused, appropriated, invented, or cannibalized apt representations (structure interlocking with structure) and one that mated with other consciences all around her (person comprehending person and group, group) so that what is seen as a thing of tiny proportions when viewed on an individual scale appears on the collective scale as equivalent to the multiple drops of cement that together maintain a giant edifice? Would not Durkheim’s vision be fulfilled?

Recently, in a wide-ranging work of analysis and synthesis entitled *Structures of Social Life*, Alan Fiske has presented the social science world with something rather close to this new take on the old issue of how to conceptualize the social-moral dimension of human life. While many anthropologists are willing to accept the proposition that humans are inherently sociable, even in some sense inherently moral, few have attempted to articulate in what this inherence consists. Fiske undertakes to do precisely this, and to do so nonreductionistically. His task is that of rescuing the social-moral dimension from the anonymity into which it falls in most forms of cultural analysis, where transcultural aspects of human morality and sociality vanish behind the screen of cultural particularities; while at the same time permitting human sociality to enter into expressions and combinations sufficiently diverse that cultural anthropologists may integrate it into a still highly relativistic framework. My feeling is that he accomplishes at least the major portion of this task. Even if one finds his typology of fundamental relations, at points, too confining or simplifying, his construction of it roughs out a general vision of where sociality fits and what directions we may take in further accounting for it. He has, in other words, given “the social” a new specificity.

Fiske has done anthropological fieldwork among the Moose (“MOH-say”) of Burkina Faso, and understands the parameters of the culture concept as most anthropologists use it. In the latter half of *Structures*, he illustrates his concepts in terms of Moose
sociality, and these illustrations offer a helpful guide to the use of his typology of social relations. These anthropological credentials notwithstanding, many cultural anthropologists I know will find Fiske out of tune with their discursive style. His prose is innocently positivist and often downright chatty; he relies upon mathematical formalization to underscore his claims; his citations often mix little thinkers with great ones indiscriminately. This packaging, wrapped around a quite audacious argument that is innatist in significant ways, is usually grounds for easy dismissal in cultural interpretivist quarters. Yet I would argue that his formulations cannot be simply ignored by culturalists. They proceed not from the usual space of tendentious evolutionism, but from the sorts of vision that new cognitive psychologies have begun to open up for us.

In what follows, my aim is to present the highlights of Fiske’s argument and to examine what implications it has for future cultural analysis. I do this not because I embrace Fiske’s argument unqualifiedly, but because I think it indicates the lines along which the culture concept has always required, and still does require, qualification. In this regard I will be particularly examining the way in which a nonreductionistic innatist argument can reconfigure what I would call the puzzle of internalization: how do social norms and cultural values get ‘inside’ the social actor? This puzzle is one that cultural analysis, as it now stands, inevitably confronts; yet years of grinding away at it seem to have resulted in little progress toward solution. Perhaps it is time for an end run around it. Perhaps Fiske provides one.

If also, at points, a feminist interest appears in the review, this is in line with the fact that much of academic feminism maintains a heavy commitment to the ‘constructionist’ position. The constructionist position, particularly in some of its feminist theoretical forms, has become more fragile and implausible the more it has absorbed into the domain of culture the rigidities and inevitabilities previously associated with the domain of (biological) ‘nature’. It may be that in ultimate theoretical practice, a more flexible ‘nature’ will provide the precondition for a still flexible, but more realistic culture.
STRUCTURES OF SOCIAL LIFE

The introductory paragraph of *Structures* succinctly summarizes Fiske’s argument:

My thesis is that people must use some kind of models of and for social relations to guide their own social initiatives and to understand and respond appropriately to the social action of others. People presumably use these models to plan possible actions and anticipate others' future actions, and above all to coordinate action so that dyads and groups act in concert—undertaking complementary actions that mesh with each other in a whole that makes sense as an integrated social relationship. Further, people apparently use such models to evaluate their own and others' actions, to persuade, criticize and sanction others, and to negotiate with them. Taken together, the set of such models should be something like the generative grammar of a language that can yield any number of novel but comprehensible utterances. The models also resemble a grammar in that people use them without generally being able to articulate them as a set of explicit rules. It is my hypothesis that people actually generate most kinds of social relationships out of only four basic models: Communal Sharing, Authority Ranking, Equality Matching, and Market Pricing. These implicit models are the psychological foundations of social relations and society. [Fiske 1991:3]

In an illustration Fiske is fond of offering, when the Moose villagers go to their intervillage market to purchase kola nuts, they negotiate for the best price per requisite quality and quantity of nuts, an act that requires the understanding and use of ratios and proportions and the implicit agreement to proceed according to them; here they are operating a Market-Pricing (MP) model. When they return home to offer these nuts as a gift to a particular compound, they will bestow the greatest number on the compound head, the next greatest on his nearest subordinate, and so on down the line, thus performing a linear ordering that is the hallmark of the Authority-Ranking (AR) model. When each of these recipients redistributes her kola gift to peers, the nuts will be doled out evenly in an act of Equality Matching (EM). Finally, when it comes time to relax with a kola chew, anyone in the assembled party is entitled to a portion without any account being kept of who got how much; this is the ethos of Communal Sharing (CS). There is a fifth position in any interactional system, that of the Null or Asocial relation, an interactional option that consists of proceeding as if the other party were not present or were not a human agent. Fiske does not treat this as a model in itself, but incorporates it into the scheme as an important implicit point of reference.
A brief account will have to be sufficient to convey the variety of ways in which these models (or "representations, grammars, schemata, etc.") manifest themselves in social life (see also Fiske 1992a).

The CS orientation most often appears in connection with close primary groups, such as kin groups or ethnic, religious, or local communities, as these orient themselves in distinction to outsiders. "We/they" is the operative distinction in the CS idiom, and ideas of shared substance are common. Intimacy motives are foregrounded in this orientation, rituals of solidarity and continuity with the past are typical, and breaches of this sort of moral order are often seen in terms of the violations of body boundaries that Mary Douglas emphasizes in regard to pollution symbolism. It is important to note that because the CS orientation is the least structured of the modes, pure enduring real-life communal sharing groups are seldom encountered; what is most usual is for this orientation to be found in combination with other, more structured ones.

The AR orientation obviously characterizes hierarchically organized relationships; superior/inferior is the relevant distinction; metaphors of differential size or spatial location are common; and power and/or control motives are foregrounded. Violations may be coded in terms of rebellion against authority or offense to higher powers. Characteristic rituals are those that legitimize the current hierarchy and renew obeisance to it. It is important to note that the variety of different ways to instantiate an AR relationship in any given society need not be coordinated; authority in one culturally designated area does not necessarily grant the individual authority in any other. It is also important to note that the tone of AR relationships varies widely according to cultural implementation.

EM appears in many guises—strict reciprocity, turn-taking, or one-for-one allocations are the rule of the day wherever we find EM. Fiske favors examples like voting (one citizen, one vote) and rotating credit unions, but vendettas are governed by the EM orientation as well. It is common for this orientation to prevail between tribal groups, nations, corporate kin groups, or any assemblage of social peer units who must maintain a relation but something less than a trusting relation. The dominant motive is to maintain balance, and idioms of strict reciprocity are common. "Envy" may be one of the up-close appearances of the EM motive,
as well as social punctiliousness. Though Fiske does not mention a characteristic ritual pattern for EM, the competitive feasting of tribal societies is one obvious candidate.

The MP orientation is the orientation of markets, business institutions, rationalized bureaucracies of all sorts, and highly rationalized special relationships such as those between professional and client; its hallmark is reliance on utilitarian motives and rational assessments—the weighing of matters in terms of costs and benefits, rewarding in proportion to contribution, and so on. While in Western social science and popular culture, the MP orientation is associated with profit maximization, competitiveness, and naked self-interest, it is Fiske's contention that none of these are among its essential features. Fiske also points out that, cross-culturally, MP is the least used of the four orientations in the formation of socially important groups and processes.

It is sometimes difficult but nevertheless essential to hold in mind the level of abstraction at which Fiske is casting these social-moral schemata. As soon as one invokes examples, cultural and phenomenological flavors creep in that overly concretize the models, and the only way to correct the situation is to proliferate further examples. Thus, CS may be the relevant orientation governing relationships within an intensely communal sect where one expects to witness hyperidentification with the group, but it can also be the orientation governing rights to use the photocopy machine in a university department (at least some departments in some universities). EM governs turn-taking in a game of darts, but also gang warfare in the streets of Los Angeles. AR emerges when a person seeks instruction in something from a more skilled friend, or when one country 'annexes' another. We do not find selfishness, competitiveness, or maximization the special dimension of any one moral model; these attributes can crop up in regard to any of the four. Nor do we find the libido confined to any one of the models; sexual relationships can be organized according to any of the four. Innate but "empty," Fiske's relational models emerge, under scrutiny, as perhaps the most colorless, tasteless, and odor free of any posited human essences.

The move that distinguishes Structures from yet one more typology of elementary social orientations is Fiske's grounding of his models in human cognitive structure and his principled limitation of these models to a basic, universal four. Inasmuch as these
models are a function of cognitive structure, that mysterious Durkheimian 'chemistry' that forges assemblages of individuals into something "social" is greatly illuminated. And, inasmuch as the models are limited in number, the orientations that flow from them are not reducible without remainder to the culture in place, however heavily the implementation and coordination of the models may be shaped by that culture. As we shall see, the scope for cultural variation in Fiske's system is quite large; some may feel that when all is said and done, the scope for cultural variation is as large as it ever was. And yet if Fiske is correct, a card has been removed from the deck and we can no longer play quite the same analytic game as before. We will have "cultural relativism" without the usually implied moral and relational relativism that goes along with it. More precisely, moral/relational relativism will be positioned on a different, and more restricted, theoretical plane.

Both the grounding of the models in cognition and their limitation to four are rendered persuasive by the rather striking results that emerge from the mathematical formalization of these models. In Chapter 9, "Semiotic Marking and Relational Structures," a chapter which the hasty or technically averse reader will be inclined to skip, but which is critical to his thesis, Fiske, in collaboration with Scott Weinstein, probes which features of each model remain invariant under transformation. For CS, the only essential feature is the equivalence relation. Those united in a CS bond are for all intent and purpose treating each other as of one identity. CS is structurally the simplest of the moral models; to operate it, one need only know the distinction: self ("us") versus other ("them"). AR, the next most simple relation, requires that one grasp linear ordering because the essential feature of AR is that of a linear ordering of the parties united in the relationship. Inasmuch as the AR relationship is operative, one party either assumes or cedes precedence in relation to the other, and those to whom a party cedes precedence outrank those over whom that party assumes precedence. The EM orientation emerges, under formalization, as an ordered Abelian group. To participate in an EM relation requires not simply that one comprehend that intervals obtain between parties, as in the AR orientation where intervals are present but of unspecified size, but that one be able to calculate the size of the intervals. The operation required for this is addition/subtraction: Is the other party to the relation ahead or behind oneself by
one turn or two, three pigs or four, etcetera? Finally the MP model requires the operation of multiplication/division in addition to that of addition/subtraction, as Market Pricing relations are calculated according to ratios and proportions (e.g., the parties to an MP relationship will expect compensation in proportion to contribution to any collective project, costs, and benefits of participation may be weighed before social commitment decisions are made and so on. The Market Pricing orientation emerges, under formalization, as an Archimedean ordered field.

The fact that the four models together compose a Guttman scale in which “each successive model makes all the distinctions and includes all of the procedures of the models it encompasses, along with some others” suggests a probable sequence of emergence or mastery in childhood and Fiske adduces some evidence, including cross-cultural evidence, that just such a sequential emergence occurs (see below). He does not, however, follow the Piagetian argument that developmentally earlier stages are swallowed up by later ones. Each model, once available, continues to operate in its distinctive way. Further, there is no implied ‘moral superiority’ associated with the ontogenetically later and more structurally complex modes, as against the earlier and more primitive. As indicated below, any of the four models may manifest in both positive and negative ways.

Successive inclusion of an earlier model’s operations by the later models’ also must not be confounded with reducibility of all the models to a single set of core axioms. On the contrary, formalization underscores the irreducibility of any one of the four models to any other. Each is a distinct selection of the operations they collectively display. EM is not simply a version of AR in which all the parties happen to be equal, for example; nor is AR in any way dependent upon a calculation of ratios (i.e., it is not an MP system in disguise). In other words, the delineation of the essential features of each model suggests no internal grounds whereby we can, on the theoretical plane, subordinate one relational ethic to another. This ‘autonomy’ of relational orientations is preserved even in cultural combinations of one mode with another or others. Fiske might have done more in the way of underscoring this point, especially for anthropologists, because it is a place where confusion easily arises.
Anthropologists, more often than not, are looking at cultural ‘combinations’ when they undertake their investigations. Studies of kinship and kinship ideology provide good illustration. Typically full-blown, on-the-ground kinship systems ‘nest’ AR and EM structures and processes within their idioms of global communalism (CS). (As I note above, it is rare for CS, in particular, to stand alone in any enduring social relation.) Frequently occurring mode combinations such as these, however, while they raise interesting “why” questions, do not override Fiske’s argument for the cognitive-motivational autonomy of each mode. Combining two things is fundamentally different from deriving one from the other. The autonomy point still stands and has obvious implications for some of the more reductive styles of analysis that have been popular in anthropology. We will turn to some of these implications at a later point.

Fiske is not in a position to offer ‘hard’ proof of his hypothesis. Rather, Structures is a concatenation of different lines of suggestive evidence and different lines of argumentation, each line tending to reinforce the others. Formalization is one such line, and its revelations fit suggestively with certain psychological testing work done by other psychologists and social psychologists, including Fiske himself. The work in question suggests that children begin to ‘externalize’ the different models over the course of maturation in the order predicted by formalization (see Fiske 1991:405–406 for discussion of Damon 1975, 1977, 1980; Enright et al. 1984); that this sequence of externalization holds true even when the children tested come from different cultures that differentially emphasize one model over the others (Enright et al. 1984); that adults, across cultures (only relatively literate cultures were used here), when asked to sort their different social relations into ‘piles’ based on self-perceived similarities, typically created piles that matched what the four models would have generated; that adults make substitution mistakes in calling people by name along lines predicted by the models; and so on (Fiske 1992b–d; Fiske, Haslam, and Fiske 1991).

Another line of support is the ease with which Fiske, using the four models, is able to encompass the numerous and diverse prior attempts by social theorists to typologize and theorize elementary social-moral orientations, solidarities, ‘ethics’, and economic motives. I can only begin to sketch the wealth of theoretical conver-
gencies that Fiske perceives. Weber, Piaget, and Paul Ricoeur have devised tripartite schemas of moral orientation that roughly match CS, AR, and MP (pp. 26–30). EM, meanwhile, is the specialty of ‘gift’ and reciprocity theorists such as Mauss, Lévi-Strauss, Sahlins, and among economists, Polanyi. Polanyi devises four economic-distributitional modes that turn out to mesh with the four modes of Fiske (pp. 32–33). Typologizers more typically have fewer types than Fiske, often preferring dual or tripartite schemas, which, from Fiske’s point of view, are achieved by either ignoring one orientation (EM is frequently ignored) or merging two or more. Victor Turner, for instance, gives us the relatively unstructured ‘communidades’, which matches quite well the CS orientation, and contrasts this with any more structured mode, the structural nature of others modes being immaterial to his argument (pp. 85–86). Mary Douglas, comparably, gives us two sliding scales of orientation: “group” that would translate ‘degree of CS emphasis’ versus “grid” that would translate into all the others, her particular formulations suggesting that entrepreneurial individualism (MP) is a ‘low grid’ position, while strict rank and protocol systems (AR) are ‘high grid’ positions (pp. 37–38). Reinforcing the implicit cross-cultural or cross-historical insight that is embedded in the typologies of prior theorists are certain more recent and explicit cross-cultural surveys such as Stanley Udy’s survey of the organization of work and material production, which generated a five-type schema remarkably parallel to Fiske’s four plus the Null position (pp. 33–36).

Typologizers are, of course, interested in different things. For Weber and Piaget, it is rule orientation; for Ricoeur, it is doctrines of evil; for Polanyi or Sahlins, forms of distribution and transaction; for Udy the organization of work; for Etzioni (to bring in another), the motivations associated with different institutional complexes, and so on (p. 31). What all have in common that makes it possible to abstract from them the Fiske models is their social-relational thrust. Thus doctrines of evil, for instance, speak to how one orients oneself socially as surely as do forms of economic transaction. Fiske comes up with additional phenomena not previously schematized, such as ways of understanding misfortune. Within an EM idiom, for instance, it is rather characteristic to see one’s own loss as another’s gain; within the MP modality, a misfortune will be understood as “the price you pay” or “the risk you take” for some projected or experienced benefit; Authority Rankers usually per-
ceive disaster emanating from an offense to higher powers, Communal Sharers tie it to pollution. Behind this schematization of misfortune responses lies a larger point. The fact that people spontaneously treat misfortunes (particularly their own misfortunes) as social-moral signs (even doing so privately when their culture offers no correlative guideline) testifies to an innate moral sensibility, without which there could be no successful socialization process.

This leads us to another line of persuasiveness, at least in regard to the innate cognitive grounding of these models, which is the analogy with linguistic structuration. Though no particular language can be generated from the deep parameters theorized by transformational grammarians, any given language is organized within their constraints. Language learning in the absence of such constraints could not plausibly take place. As Chomsky was given to emphasizing, the language learner is somehow able to produce consistent rules from corrupt and degenerate examples. The same goes, Fiske argues, for the moral learner. Despite the immense amount of learned detail that must go into the completely correct implementation of any actual interactional system, the basic principles of all such systems appear in childhood and children of diverse backgrounds, when thrown together, are able to converge upon these basics in a relatively short time. Even the sociopath, who lacks the motivation associated with any of the moral models, can cognize and manipulate them accurately, even persuasively.

There is more behind Fiske’s use of the language learning analogy than meets the eye of the casual reader. In it there is a tacit appeal to current theories of cognitive modularity in human learning and enculturation. We are seeing in this work, and I would expect in many future works, a departure from the idea of an “all-purpose” cognition—one seen as using the same processes to absorb any generically “cultural” thing, in favor of the idea of a modularly organized cognitive apparatus that employs rather different specializations to process different areas of the outside world (see Fodor 1983; Jackendoff 1991). Inasmuch as culture is treated as external (i.e., part of the outside world), the implications of modularity would be that ‘culture’ itself can no longer be treated as uniform. Fiske’s allusion to modularity is a distant one, however, and it would not be fair to hold him to it too rigorously.
What is intriguing in the language analogy, if we put it in a larger intellectual context, is that language, one of the first cultural areas to submit to a (still controversial) tethering in innate cognitive structures has always served, in anthropology, as the implicit model of the culturally free and arbitrary. This suggests that innate components are not incompatible with high levels of cultural variability. Let us remember this point as we turn to cross-cultural variability in the manifestation of the social-relational models.

In Fiske’s reasoning, the cultural variability of social-moral systems appears at the level of “implementation rules,” and the coordination of the models with each other. No particular rank system, no particular reciprocal balancing system, etcetera, and certainly no particular configuration of several models, such as the ‘nesting’ of one model within another, springs full-fledged (in social actors) from the hypothesized structures; rather the models must be realized in particular cultural clothing. What it is that must be kept in balance and with whom in the EM framework, how deference is signaled and toward whom in the AR framework, what can be permissibly transacted on the market and with whom in the MP framework, who one’s “identity people” (such as ‘kinsmen’) are in a CS framework: these are all matters specific to the given culture. Specific as well to the given culture is the degree of emphasis placed upon one model over others—the Indian or Polynesian comfort with AR (versus the American aversion), the Japanese concern for CS even in the rationalized business environment, the Melanesian mania for EM, all come readily to mind. Coming readily to mind, as well, are the particular clashes and synergisms between models that each culture tends to focalize. For example, many traditional cultures find AR an essential support to CS, while liberal urban Americans consider it an insidious destroyer of CS relationships; on the other hand, such Americans will comfortably turn to therapeutic counseling services where their close CS relationships are submitted to a cost-benefit analysis (MP).

In elaborating the implications of the cognitive models theory, Fiske is careful to emphasize that not everything that occurs in social life flows from a social-moral relationship. A state of No Relationship obtains between most of the individuals thronging city streets, filling up airports or riding together on an elevator. ‘No Relationship’ may even describe the condition that some marital partners arrive at even while continuing to cohabit. Indeed, the
physical presence of social others, even interaction with them, is no guarantee of a social-moral relationship. Fiske writes, “a social (moral) relationship exists only if people structure their interaction with other people or putative beings with reference to conceptions and rules assumed to be shared (or that they believe should be shared) and . . . they consciously or implicitly use shared goals, ideals or standards in guiding their initiatives and responses” (p. 19). The Null or No Relationship position in Fiske’s system is, however, left to cover rather too much territory. Nonmutual relational attempts that fail (one party successfully ignores another’s relational bid), nonmutual relational attempts that succeed (one party effectively ‘uses’ the other, ignoring the other’s social requirements), and tacit mutual agreements to ignore each other (the people on elevators) are all lumped together. We will take up the issue of nonmutuality more fully below.

As the physical presence of others is no guarantee of a social relationship with them, so conversely their physical absence is no insurmountable deterrent to a relationship. Of particular significance in the passage above is the entry of “putative beings” into the social-moral order. Obviously, here is the essential link between the cosmological and the social. Religion and supernaturalist phenomena are seen, in the Fiskean scheme, as simply a continuation into an hypothesized realm of the operation of the cognitive models, a continuation not so different really from the orientations that we routinely maintain toward persons who are for the time physically absent and that survivors maintain toward the deceased. (“Death ends a life, but not a relationship,” the opening voice-over of the film, *I Never Sang for My Father*, resonates well with Fiske’s viewpoint). In an arresting passage, Fiske speaks of sacrifice as follows:

When Moose make sacrifices and offerings they hope to help assure rainfall, ward off lightning and damaging winds, avert epidemics and plagues, avoid strife, protect against witches and sorcerers, and resolve injuries and illnesses. But that does not mean we should interpret these religious acts as a science-less technology. A sacrifice is more like inviting someone out to a meal than it is like setting a snare. An offering resembles a request more than it resembles making a brick. They are performative acts based on social-relational forms analogous to helping, thanking, apologizing, complimenting, praising, saluting, inviting, giving, promising, and pleading. The implicit mechanisms of sacrifice and offering are therefore social, not causal: they aim to establish social relationships or to restore equilibrium in social relationships with nonhuman beings. [1991:283]
The existence in every human system of vigorous social relations with the nonpresent and with the “putative” is, arguably, the strongest evidence for a contention that Fiske is at pains to foreground—that people obtain positive gratification, not merely utility, from the exercise of social relationships of all four kinds. The four social-interactional types are associated with distinct motivational needs; at one point, he even calls these ‘cravings’. People seek out, try to establish, and enjoy engaging in interactions that are guided by one or other of the four models. They will even construct such relationships out of thin air, as it were: Gods, not existing, will inevitably be invented—as will witches. There is thus no requirement, in Fiske’s system, that these forms of relationship be generated in toto out of external forces. To take what will be undoubtedly the most contested case, people engaged in an AR interaction may be motivated fully to so engage, even from the inferior position, for reasons intrinsic to the relationship itself. It may be the case that this motivation is a paramount factor in the perpetuation of the relationship. (Louis Dumont, who is liberally quoted in spots, could not be more pleased with this conclusion.) So too, Communal Sharers, enjoying and desiring the trust, solidarity, and intimacy that goes with this form of relationship may rely upon this orientation with little regard to its objective utility—even to their detriment. The Moose people, the African group studied by Fiske, communally share land and water not just with all Moose but with all human beings, allowing free access to wells even in times of (moderate) water shortage, and allocating even to in-migrants any uncultivated cropland on a first-come, first-served basis with no expectation of compensation. Bordering, as it does, on the nonrational, in terms of Moose self-interest, the practice is sustained out of simple preference for CS forms of relatedness.

Fiske does not address the intriguing issue of individual differences in relational preferences; nor does he address the issue of whether liking for one side of a modal ‘complementarity’ (most notably the complementarities found in the AR mode) automatically entails a liking for the other side. Extending the issue of individual preferences to that of gender-linked preferences brings us to the heart of many a feminist argument; but unfortunately we will have to leave this matter unresolved.

At this point enough summarizing of Fiske’s argument has been accomplished to allow us to turn to its broader implications, taking
up further specifics of the argument as context demands. I want first to look more specifically at Fiske's argument against the form of reductionism that he styles 'monism', an argument that flows out of the proposed autonomy of his relational models; I will treat this under the heading of "The Implications of Model Autonomy." Second, it will be necessary to point out and deal with the form of reductionism that Fiske (as an 'innatist') will be charged with, along with the inevitable charge of essentialism. This will appear under the heading of "The Implications of Model Innateness." Finally, under "Innate Models and Cultural Models," I will turn more specifically to the view of socialization or 'internalization of cultural forms that a Fiskean theory, as opposed to reigning more purely constructionist theories, would tend to imply. Along the way, as occasion presents, I will fill in Fiske's treatment of the 'morality' of the models.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF MODEL AUTONOMY

That each model should have its own drive is consistent with the argument, noted above, for the autonomy of the four models, an argument that is consistent with their irreducibility under formalization. It is worth dwelling a bit longer on the autonomy point as Fiske elaborates it, because its implications for cultural and social analysis are potentially far reaching. Fiske is well aware that he has not specified why it is that some societies prize and foreground one relational mode over the others, why some societies find a certain pair of models highly compatible (CS and AR, for instance) while other groups find the same pair antithetical, and so on. Nor will he specify the "whys" of these particular arrangements. He will stress instead that the line of explanation, if one is ever forthcoming, cannot in his eyes plausibly consist in a reduction of certain of the models to others, the logical privileging of one of the four motivations over the rest.

In contrast to monistic theories that try to fit all human behavior into a single mold and assume a unitary goal for all human action, the relational-models theory posits a set of four distinct, autonomous orientations. All four social relational motives are equally basic, equally "natural." Each orientation is independent, none is consistently subordinated to any of the others, and there appears to be no inclusive, hierarchically superior arbiter that mediates among them in a systematic way. . . . [T]he four orientations may be concatenated in many combinations, but they are not necessarily integrated into a single overarching schema.
They may simply coexist. Or they may interfere with each other. This implies that a society is not a functionally integrated system, since there is no unitary coordinating principle. [1991:370]

There are two potentially separable points here. The first asserts the equal naturalness of the four orientations, their irreducibility to one another, and the lack of a single metric in terms of which to rank them in theoretical practice. The second point argues for no necessary integration between the four in any given real social system. The first point does not necessitate the second, despite Fiske’s tendency to merge them, because integration, in the broad sense, is not limited to logical forms of subordination. In fact, most cultures manage, typically through nonlogical means, to integrate some, and some cultures most, of their social-relational business into a coherency with which people can live. Fiske’s point is that this integration cannot consist of an internal logical subordination of the models to a single model. There is yet a third point that Fiske incorporates into the above two, yet this also requires temporary isolation; in real social life people are not (either consciously, semiconsciously, or unconsciously) “trading off” the different social orientations against one another (e.g., giving “love” or “deference” in order to obtain some calculated utility). Because the exercise of each relational type is gratifying in its own right, there is no need for actors to subordinate one to another; and as all models, in their basic principles, are incommensurable, there is also no way to subordinate one to another. While I will take some exception to this last point, arguing that the complexities of real social life require that we allow for a fair amount of “trading off” in people’s dealings with each other, I would agree that people experience trade-offs as unsatisfying, even while resorting to them.

Taken together these three points amount to a telling assault on some of the most time-honored tendencies in social-cultural analysis. Consider the “monistic” forms of social/cultural analysis that Fiske is decrying. The most familiar of these is utilitarianism, within which we may include much of sociobiology. Utilitarian explanations characteristically privilege a hidden calculus (MP) behind every institutional and cultural form. Thus reciprocal gift-giving (EM) in the view of utilitarians is simply “taking out an insurance policy,” AR differences must always be somehow the reflex of a measurably unequal social contribution, and so on. When the hidden calculus cannot plausibly be attributed to human actors, it
is located in the gene or in evolutionary selectivity. The most
credulity-straining of the ‘reductionist’ approaches, utilitarianism
has also been the most criticized, usually under the rubric of vulgar
materialism, in the process often serving as a whipping boy for
other forms of ‘monism.’ In fact, looking through a Fiskean lens,
we see there are other forms—three others to be precise—that have
in their own way been equally reductionist. British social anthrop-
ology, Durkheimian in an often one-sided way, implicitly privi-
leged the CS orientation. “Society” seeks above all to cohere, and
whatever hierarchical, balancing, or calculating relationships there
are must be understood as “society’s” way of protecting this cohe-
rence. Solidarity, corporateness, “kinship amity,” and other such CS
phenomena were the favored conceptual objects. Marxists, many
of them at least, implicitly privilege power relations (AR); relations
of production are seen as invariably producing a class situation and
the ensuant struggle between the classes drives the system. Diffused
into general cultural analysis, the ‘power’ orientation sees in a wide
variety of cultural idioms, idioms that a Fiskean might attribute to
other moral orientations, simply mystiques that cover over or
naturalize unequal power. The monistic privileging of EM shows
up, not surprisingly, in the works of Mauss, Lévi-Strauss, and others
who have done the most in highlighting this particular form. In
their formulations, we often see power relations generated from
imbalances in reciprocity (inability to respond in kind turns into
debt servitude, the gift turns into tribute), making AR the conse-
quence of a somehow more fundamental EM orientation. Acts of
exchange, in particular the exchange of women, are posed as
foundational in theoretical efforts that are heir to this intellectual
legacy. (It should perhaps be noted that Lévi-Strauss himself fell
back upon a functionalist, that is ‘hidden calculus’, argument when
trying to ground the exchange response; this fall-back position has
not been carried forward among later thinkers (Lévi-Strauss

Always in the past, the escape from monistic explanations has
entailed a flight toward “culture,” a culture embraced under the
Saussurean sign of arbitrariness. Dedicated to the arbitrariness
concept, cultural anthropologists nonetheless repeatedly face the
potential embarrassment of ‘comparability’. Social hierarchy,
punctilious balancing, ‘identity politics’—why are these so com-
mon the world over? As both Geertz and Clifford point out, cultu-
realists tend to beg the question, typically falling back on one of the two classic positions of either portraying the natives as "just chaps" whose moral comparability to ourselves and other humans goes without saying ("sensible enough when you get to know them, but with their own way of doing things" Geertz 1988:70), or of dealing with their nagging familiarity through a repertory of 'defamiliarizing' strategies that foreground difference and exoticism (Clifford 1988:145–146). In a rather disingenuous twist, the latter approach may be combined with the argument that any apparent familiarity in the other culture is a reflex of our projection of our own system onto the Other. Alone, neither of these two positions is quite honest. The first implicitly forgives innate universalism if the dirty work of explaining it, which generally leads off in a 'monist' direction, can be left to others. The second would enjoin a paradoxical practice of compulsory 'Otherization' in the name of political correctness! The relational models approach would enable us to say, without vacuity, that the two positions are in fact mutually implicative and would further enable us to specify where the comparabilities and where the differences should reside. This is a great relief.

It would be a great relief as well to be able, in a theoretically principled way, to allow for nonintegration in the social-moral systems under investigation. Cultural anthropology has been proceeding in this direction for some time now, beginning with the useful Marxist concept of contradiction and continuing on to the more ambitious portrayals of culture as inveterately heteroglossic and contested. As a nonintegrationist argument, Fiske's version, like the Marxist version, is able to stipulate where the shear-lines and fractures in the system are apt to emerge, rather than leaving the analyst in the awkward position of appearing to use protests of 'nonintegration' as a cover for insufficient understanding. Inasmuch as Marx's own use of the notion of contradiction often involves an implicit generic human morality, or generic human sociality (why, for instance, would the workers, once congregated in unified workplaces, begin to make common cause?), one might argue that Marxist analysis requires a relational-models theory for its final specification. Conversely, Fiske's theory, which offers us generic shear-lines but with no means of predicting when the social earthquake will strike, requires an apparatus (Marxist or other) of historical-cultural analysis for any final specificity itself. The two fit
together hand-in-glove. Advancing into truly heteroglossic (as opposed to merely contradictory) territory (viz., into the modern, multicultural world of "garrulous overdetermined cross-cultural encounter shot through with power relations and personal cross-purposes" [to quote James Clifford]), the relational-models theory enables us to begin to break down into particular social-relational situations that blooming buzzing confusion that is presumed to underlie whatever fragile hegemony obtains. It is of interest, in this regard, that a good deal of what is viewed as the contemporary crisis of cross-cultural communication flows from what is in fact a rather clear, though regrettable, social-moral situation: the eruption of EM as the principle orientation between identity-based CS groups (ethnic, racial, gender, and religious) in the wake of the collapse of the equally regrettable forms of AR that dominated the colonial and immediately postcolonial era. (A parallel and related upheaval appears in the former Soviet and Soviet-dominated countries.)

There may be small or no personal comfort in this insight, and our lack of comfort raises a point. The social-moral orientations that Fiske is outlining all have their moral downside. Fiske details these. Wars of conquest are activations of an AR orientation, vendettas of an EM orientation. The CS orientation is, Fiske remarks, "capable of generating great bloodshed," because it drives internal scapegoating and "purging" in addition to forming the solidarities that underwrite wars of conquest and wars for balance. In furnishing the logic of markets, MP underwrites not simply the positive but also the destructive "market forces" (crashes, 'bubbles', and the tectonic shifts of capitalist competition) that periodically leave millions jobless and spread emiseration. If, in perusing these corollaries, we find ourselves beginning to put the "moral" of "social-moral orientations" in inverted commas (Fiske prefers the more neutral term "relational"), we sense simultaneously that perhaps our deepest moral struggles consist in an effort to keep the button of our various social-relational toggles always switched to "positive." The "negative" position, in its hyperengagement, is what furnishes the stuff of horror and retrospective remorse. We would, if we could, exchange gifts but not bombs; foster the efficient allocation of resources while avoiding class difference and competition's heartless fallout; enjoy the intimacy and trust of primary group relations without somehow excluding anyone; and render our obedience to only the most benign Caesars. Somehow
it does not happen that way. Yet we are hard put to deny, and perhaps should stop trying to deny, that the energy that drives the stuff of horror, whether it is a simple blood revenge or a mass guillotining, is typically a "righteous" energy, a perversely moral force, not the 'devilment' and opportunism that are the amoral 'noise' in any system. The latter we treat with contempt more than outrage. It is our moral nature, in the end, that comes back to haunt us.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF MODEL INNATENESS

If nature it is. The stumbling block to acceptance of Fiske for many cultural anthropologists, whether for personal moral or for the usual jurisdictional reasons, will be the question of innateness. In proffering his "relational models," Fiske is invoking the notion of a 'schema-motive', or a 'driven-but-objectless' structure—that is, at least in some sort of kernel form—inherent. Indeed, it is hard to think of any of the four relational models he proposes as simply structure-without-drive or drive-without-structure, inasmuch as their very description tends to unite model with motive. One then has the choice of dealing with this unity as an exogenous thing or as an endogenous thing. As we see below, some cognitive anthropologists choose to treat it as an exogenous unity, arrogating to culture the dynamics of the linkage, but the only position consistent with the models' universality is the "endogenous" argument and this is the position that Fiske takes.

The notion of schema-motive is gaining, or regaining, currency in psychology, under the influence of researchers such as C. R. Gallistel (see Fiske 1991:382–383). When schema-motives are posited as innate, then the concept harkens back to that of 'drive'. Fiske does not explore for his reader the psychological credentials of the notion, nor does he speculate as to how such structures develop. Doing so in any depth here would carry this article too far afield. I will thus confine myself to pointing out the implications of such an idea and to focusing on the general objections to innatism that can be anticipated from Fiske's critics.

"Reductionistic" and "essentializing" are the two charges typically leveled against innatist arguments. The first means that complex phenomena/processes have been explained in terms of simple ones (thus, in effect, not explained), the second that the
innatist is attempting to render some aspect of his own cultural system inevitable because linked to the innate; at the very least, he is guilty of providing the tools for such an enterprise. Fiske has little to say on the essentialist charge and while I believe it useful to distinguish the political difficulties of an innatist argument from the internal theoretical ones, however confused the two may in concrete instances become, the real answer to a political charge, is one that meets it on its own terms. In this vein, some might prefer, as I do, a theory/politics that holds out the hope that we are, at some gut level, capable of cross-cultural understanding rather than one that implies a world of cultural monads. Some might prefer, as I do, a theory/politics that at least takes seriously the potential downside of any relational form, rather than grasping at gimmick solutions. If, for a feminist, the (additional) penalty for embracing a theory of mutual moral comprehension, at least in its Fiskean form, would be conceding that we all know, at some gut level, how to relate to power (AR), I might point out that cultural monadists often simply assume this knowledge anyway, minus any explanation.

As to reductionism, Fiske has largely finessed this problem by leaving virtually untouched much of the complexity that anthropologists wish to preserve—the entire range of cultural implementations that concretize and give phenomenological form to the social relational schemas. Indeed, if pitched at the right level of abstraction, the relational models become virtually 'transparent' to the analysis. One finds oneself saying, for example: yes, of course all human beings understand strict reciprocity, the question is why this particular culture demands it in relation to wife-giving. Or, of course, rank ordering appears as a universal tendency, but why is it men are typically ranked above women?

Reading Fiske carefully, we see that every concrete cultural implementation of CS, AR, EM, and MP schemas requires the invocation of exogenous features for its full explanation. This being the case, we are able to maintain our various arguments for historical contingency in regard to the implementations that we are considering, whether such implementations be common, as is gender asymmetry, or historically restricted, as is the rotating credit association. The universality of the particular cognitive models is, in other words, independent of the universality of their particular implementations. The reverberations for contemporary feminism of tribally common
'woman exchange', fretted over by feminists since Gayle Rubin's famous 'The Traffic in Women', (Rubin 1975) may in fact be nonexistent. Rather than EM (as concretized in the form of woman-exchange) posing a threat to the feminist cause in modern industrial states, the force of EM logic, extended into the area of contemporary gender relations, has effected rather powerful leverage against sexist usages. Again on the feminist front, AR expressed in the notion of a meritocracy has exerted powerful leverage against AR expressed in the notion of traditional "family values." It is not uncommon in fact that we hoist offensive moral implementations with the petard of their own principles.

There are places here and there where I feel Fiske overly concretizes his theoretical apparatus, thereby reducing its capacity to handle complexity, but for here the essential point is that his system can be operated nonreductionistically and even used to counter some of the 'essentialisms' that other innatist arguments have subtended.

Going a step further, an innatist position, properly specified, can produce a gain in elegance rather than a reduction in sophistication. One such gain in this case involves the problem of conceptualizing the relationship of norms and motives. Norms, characteristically viewed as external rules, and motives, characteristically viewed as internal drives, are viewed in Fiske's framework as different sides of the same coin—the relational models. Fiske writes:

individual motivation and social structure have to be considered together, since they are actually complementary aspects of the same fundamental models . . . the structural principles of the social system do not have a distinct status or origin independent of the shared conceptions and standards that people apply to each other. [1991:358–359]

each [relational] model is simultaneously a goal that people actively seek to realize in their actions toward others, a standard by which they judge their own and their partners' behavior, and a recognized criterion for others' legitimate interventions. [1991:385]

The same reformulation can be applied to cultural "values" (at least those that enjoin and support social relationships), for these again are, at their higher levels, relational-model goals, always classifiable under one or a combination of several of the four headings (pp. 382–390). In effect, the relational models have their "externality and constraint" because they have their "internality and drive." They
imple us toward patterned engagement with social others and toward a personal sanctioning of the mutually arrived at pattern; thus we become ‘constrainers’ the moment we become ‘engagers’, as do, of course, our social others.

As we will take up more fully below under the question of ‘socialization’, we note here that the usual struggle to theorize a socialization process that begins with a totally presocial individual posed against external societal rules and at the same time to theorize how these external rules come to be anything more coherent than simply the random debris of history is clearly obviated if there is something in the individual that automatically relates her to others in mutually comprehensible patterned ways. In Fiske’s system, if I read him correctly, the presocial individual does not exist, and the childhood socialization process takes on the form of a movement toward ‘synchro-mesh’ between developing innate schemata and incoming social/cultural experience that will be, in important respects, prefitted to these schemata (or more precisely, will be ‘recognizable’ by these schemata only to the extent that it is prefitted).

The difficulty that appears at this point is that Fiske’s argument seems, at first glance, to work only for relationships that are, as they say, “mutual.” As such, the argument would not cover the familiar and usual range of social life. What about all the relatively enduring but one-sided or coerced relationships that happen to ‘mimic’ the real thing? Indeed, Fiske’s only mentions of the one-sided, the coerced, the “deserted” (his term) and other such ‘sham’ relationships tend to downplay the significance of these specimens by suggesting that they are not really relationships. The criterion of a real relationship is mutual agreement as to relational mode. By implication, agreement over relational mode entails automatic moral engagement. This way of handling the matter appears in the paragraph cited above (“a social relationship exists only if people structure their interaction with . . . reference to conceptions and rules assumed to be shared”) and in statements bearing on the same point, such as

when pairs or groups of people jointly construct social relations of . . . these types, the relationships generally are mutually rewarding. Such social relationships are jointly constituted out of shared motives, and they fulfill shared needs. Of course, everyone involved may not find a given relationship equally fulfilling, or un-
equivocally satisfying: there certainly are dysfunctional and exploitive interactions. But in general . . . [1991:391, emphasis added]

To be sure, in the simple laboratory model of mutual motive-mutual constraint that Fiske is offering, individual 'motives' and 'norms' (the understood constraints) turn out to be flip sides of the same thing. But what is usually meant by 'norm'—and it seems to me worthwhile to preserve some of this sense—is a situation in which a presumption of shared motivation may conceal a good deal of motivational diversity, some of it potentially in conflict with the 'norm'. Situations of this sort are what furnish the experiential material for our gut sense of the 'individual versus society' opposition. Let us generate a few types for illustration. There are the 'deserted' relationships that still persist—the devitalized marriages, for instance. There are the relationships nobody involved feels they asked for, but that nonetheless they are stuck with, such as the relationship of the two former superpowers (the cold war). There are what one might call 'hypocritical' relationships, where enforcers enforce on others, but do not themselves personally follow, a particular relational model. Not all of these necessarily involve duplicity. The celibate Catholic clergy participates in enforcing marital 'norms' upon the lay population, for instance. Finally there are relation-like constraints generated from the interlocking of unintended consequences of diverse, and sometimes obscure processes in a complex system, such as the 'domination' over individual life chances of giant market complexes (the military-industrial complex, the insurance-health industrial complex, and the welfare system could all be mentioned in this regard). Where in Fiske's scheme do we put these sorts of 'norms' and 'constraints'?

Fiske obviously should have dealt more with this issue, but it bears pointing out that staying within his terms, one is able to generate some of the motivational diversity of real social life. First, even if all relationships originated voluntarily, we would still have to take into account that multiple and differently moded relationships are available to any individual in any society. Thus as each individual develops his relational life, there will be some inevitable collisions. Two relationships may be competitors within the same culturally implemented modality (e.g., the adulterous relationship). Or they may be competing implementations in the same mode (e.g., a division of loyalties between nation and ethnic group). Or they may
be competing models in regard to the same institution, as in the question of whether to run the family business as a 'family' or as a 'business and so on. While what is involved, really, in these collisions is a conflict between the consequences of alternate instantiations of sets of shared motives, not a conflict between 'constraint' purely and 'motive' purely, individuals caught in such conflicts are apt to defect emotionally from one of the instantiations, thus experiencing it as social pressure only, and view the other as their truer desire (individual against 'society'!). Fiske's aside about 'deserted' relationships bear upon such cases.

Fiske also briefly elaborates on the idea that the mutual motive-mutual constraint principle manifests in relationships between groups, and even between groups of groups, not simply between individuals. Here is another obvious place for felt discrepancies between self and 'society' to arise. We cannot, for instance, speak of the cold war as a relationship that Americans craved or found personally gratifying; nevertheless, as a political population, they went for a balancing modality over the image of subordination to the Soviets—a hierarchical modality.

Lastly we must bear in mind Fiske's observations that relationships 'ramify'.

Participants' actions within any particular social relationship ramify to affect the participants' relationships with others. Seen from the other side, each relational model is a standard that third parties use in judging and reacting to what people do in a relationship. The models link social relationships into larger systems by making processes in each social relationship contingent on processes in the participants' relationships with other people. [1991:21]

Ramifications are guided by cultural specifications, but again we have a point of generation for relational collisions.

If we add into our account as well that people also engage, often intensely, in relationships with "putative beings" and that such relationships also ramify, the scope for social pressure/desire from one relational field coming into conflict with pressure/desire from another becomes even wider. (Looking again at the Catholic clergy's motivation to sanction lay marriage, this may be interpreted either as flowing from their commitment to their group, which accepts a certain doctrine on authority, as a commitment to divine authority directly, or as the ramification of their own comparable 'marriages' to the divinity; or as all of these.) Before we know it, we've moved within Fiske's terms from his simple labora-
tory 'mutual desire-mutual constraint' model of norms to the morass of real, conflictual social life. Fiske's problem is that he has not probed his terms for the implications they generate and adjusted accordingly. What we still need, it seems obvious now, are ways of specifying how 'collisions' get sorted out when history shows them all tending to be decided one way rather than another (e.g., in the 19th and early 20th century devitalized American marriages generally held together; in contemporary life, they generally fall apart). Fiske's theoretical highlighting of the mutuality dimension of norms is a worthwhile corrective to current tendencies to search for exploitive power imbalances behind every norm, but it cannot be used to replace a wider sociohistorical accounting of any given 'normative' pattern.

INNATE MODELS AND CULTURAL MODELS

The potentially troubled issue of nonmutuality is simply one aspect of the issue of motivational engagement more generally, and it leads us to the great 'internalization' debate alluded to at the beginning of this review. Fiske's formulation puts him at interesting odds with the more common cultural anthropological approach to the question of internalization. The more accustomed anthropological approach appears in its most highly refined state in one school of cognitive anthropology where the appointed project is that of solving the problem of how "cultural models" become "motives." Obviously the problem itself threatens to evaporate if, as Fiske is suggesting, 'models' come with their 'motives' and develop from an innate base. This is why I single out exponents of this trend specifically. I will take as representative of the trend in question the remarks of Claudia Strauss in the recent volume entitled Human Motives and Cultural Models. Here we find that, pace the title of the volume, the main theoretical inclination is to put as much as possible of both models and motives on the side of culture, culture presumably being that which is Saussureanly arbitrary. Strauss writes: "culture as a whole is like music: it includes both the public actions, objects and symbols that make shared learning possible and the private psychological states of knowledge and feeling without which these public things are meaningless" (Strauss 1992:6). In the same volume, Dorothy Holland argues that the romance and intimacy "motives" that are expected to go along with
college dating are themselves cultural expectations that are not met in every empirical case, rather it would seem that developing some expertise in manipulating the cultural model of dating facilitates the subjective arrival of romance and intimacy motives (Holland 1992). Numerous contributors to this volume cite Spiro’s by now famous observations about the varying intensity of the “directive force” of cultural symbols (Spiro 1982).

Perhaps the most explicitly contrasting formulation to Fiske’s is that of Roy D’Andrade, co-editor of the volume. Like Fiske, D’Andrade embraces the notion of a unified ‘schema-motive’, arguing that many cognitive schemas carry their own, intrinsic motivational force. But D’Andrade sticks to the idea that “an important subset” of our cognitive schemas, the subset he is interested in, are “cultural,” presumably meaning “exogenous.” In such a case, the inheritance of the connection between schema and motive can only be a reflex of the interpretive nature of the schema, and the ultimate interpretation that any given schema provides is, in turn, a function of the subject’s entire interpretive system (D’Andrade 1992). This move returns us to a more Geertzian (more specifically Kenneth Burkean) vision of symbolic efficacy, one which relies implicitly upon common-sense notions of how people respond to interpretations of the world. In other words, if a person buys a certain cultural interpretation of the world, he will be moved intrinsically toward the appropriate actions.

For both Fiske and the cognitivists, culture mediates the individual’s motivated action in the world; there is no quibble over this. The real issue concerns the locus of structure. For Fiske some quite specific structure is pre-given, and this pre-given structure reaches out to match fitting exogenous materials, setting in process, but also continuously guiding the development of the subject’s interpretive framework. Though the cognitivists in question do not, in their wider writings, deny some innate starting points, the structures they examine in the cited works are absorbed apparently without remainder into exogenous culture, which then must be catechted by the actor, or got inside the actor’s head through processes that remain to be determined. Once ‘internalized’, such structures marshall energy in directed ways.

We might speak of Fiske and Holland, Strauss or D’Andrade, as negotiating not quite polar positions between the Scylla of essentialism and the Charybdis of a tabula rasa cognition. For those
unaware of the problems of the latter, tabula rasa theorizing tends to encode a sort of Zeno's paradox. The exogenous structure (the 'cultural model' for instance) can only click into a meaningful slot in the actor's "interpretive framework" if earlier internalizations have carved out such a slot, and these earlier internalizations are present only if even earlier ones have laid the groundwork for them, and so on in an infinite regress that would have to lead back into neurological and biological strata where the earlier externalities become "selective pressure." Even the formulation of human nature as the outcome of self-organizing processes is not an escape from some form of innatism; indeed the pure tabula rasa position is implausible (see Fodor 1980). Looking at anthropologists more broadly in these terms, one finds that for the most part we operate in a zone that swings between a sort of question-begging cultural phenomenology (the Kwakiutl are, for whatever reason, caught up in 'one-upmanship' and our task is only to illustrate how this plays out), a position that goes along with declaring questions of innatism 'uninteresting,' or the more commonsensical forms of innatism (the Kwakiutl capitalize upon "competitive feelings," "envy," "egomaniacal pride").

But there is more than one way to be an explicit innatist. The positions we are most familiar with are either the assumption ridden derivations of human nature from putative biological or evolutionary mandates, derivations which typically supply too much structure to the innate forms and overly 'animalize' the human outcome; or they are the quite weakly theorized appeals to common-sense humanness just noted. The alternative to these approaches, and one that unites Fiske in certain respects to the 'modularity of mind' school, is the aggressive filling out of a very specific cognitive, or cognitive-motivational space, one that potentially submits to empirical testing. In this enterprise, there is no prior commitment to any particular evolutionary rationale for the hypothesized 'cognitive space'; it is simply arguably there and in need of investigation. It is even possible to entertain the proposition that in some of these cognitive spaces, the evolutionary raison d'etre, whatever it may have been, gets lost as the schemas of that domain come to be applied to the diverse projects of culture-bearing beings. Similarly, in this enterprise there is no prior commitment to the idea that processes from one sort of 'module', such as
that of visual processing, are identical with processes in some other module; each domain must be probed for its own specificity.

Now that the differences between a Fiskean framework and the more mainstream project of the cognitive anthropologists cited above are clearer, we see that each has its take (implicit in Fiske’s case) on what might now be called the problem of engagement. The cognitive anthropologists cited above want to know how a cultural model, which already carries its intrinsic directionality comes to take up residence in the actor’s subjectivity. The Fiskean would want to know two rather different things. The first is how the relational schemas acquire their cultural clothing, their implementation rules. The second concerns why the (already internal) model-motive engages with variable intensity from one culturally implemented instance to another—why, in effect, we actively choose/pursue/enjoy one relationship over another available comparable one, and in situations of conflict respond in favor of one relation rather than its conflicting alternate. This last is the Fiskean transformation of Spiro’s question of different “directive force.”

Getting relational models together with their cultural implementations should, in Fiske’s reasoning, follow a theoretical script comparable to that of getting language structuration together with any particular language. While it would be interesting to know just how this takes place even in the case of language, we sense that the answer would not fully address the second, or Spiro, part of the problem, the question of why for instance one young college woman in Dorothy Holland’s case studies of ‘romance’ is actively applying the “romantic model” to her college dating experiences while for another dating is an empty exercise.

It is useful to compare Holland and Fiske more specifically for a moment, because it brings out the contrast between the two approaches rather clearly. Holland takes as the problematic “cultural model,” the idea of heterosexual romance that circulates among female undergrads on two southern campuses. While as a cognitive anthropologist, Holland does not distinguish between cultural models that guide social relations and those that guide technical activities, her case in point usefully involves a social-relational institution. Noting the quite variable responses that her subjects had toward the ‘romantic’ model, some buying into it, some not, others appropriating it with their particular twist, Hol-
land hypothesizes that those who ‘took to’ college dating with the greatest enthusiasm were those whose practice with the dating institution was sufficient to unleash in them the sort of generativity and involvement that tends to emerge among budding experts and virtuosos in any area. ‘Practice’ (as in practicing your piano lessons, not as in practice theory) thus becomes the key to model engagement. We note here that within a severely constructionist framework, where virtually all structure must be imported, as it were, practice (drilling?) almost inevitably rotates to the theoretical foreground. Holland’s point seems to be that practice has a sort of alchemy that we have not been taking into consideration. Pursuing the music lesson analogy, there comes a point of sufficient practice at which the music student ceases to sound simply proficient and begins to ‘make music’. This seems to be the sort of alchemical switch point that Holland has in mind in regard to the ‘romantic model’.

From a Fiskean perspective—and I am extrapolating beyond anything Fiske has written—what practice would logically effect is a proficiency with the ‘implementation rules’ of the particular culture. Undoubtedly as Holland is suggesting, “practice” with an implementation is essential for implementation acquisition and thus one precondition for the active application of the schema to a particular instance. But it would be first of all a mistake to assume that such practice is always visible in the way that one’s first date is (if the analogy is to language learning, much of it goes on in the head and even out of awareness) and secondly, that practice is a sufficient condition for engagement. The term “empty exercise” testifies to the conventional wisdom that practice is not a sufficient condition. All in all, it seems to me useful to separate the question of primary acquisition—the language learning dimension of how people acquire their culture’s implementation rules—from the question of individual engagement in an implemented instance (not every date proves ‘engaging’) and moreover, to separate the question of engaged instances from the question of the degree of acceptance of a style of implementation (dating as a cultural practice may go out of fashion).

When we turn to either of the latter, I would argue that we discover here multifactorial problems, problems that in some cases cannot be addressed by an acquisition (socialization) theory alone and in other cases by an acquisition theory at all. While Fiske
answers the question of how moral engagement takes place, generally, he does not address the question why a particular individual ‘morally engages’ in a certain situation while another does not or engages in one situation and not another. At the same time, he usefully separates this sort of question from the culture-acquisition question, and offers us a theoretical angle from which to argue that the engagement answer cannot be of a single general sort.

Let us pursue for a moment longer the situation posed by Holland’s study, that of young college women who differentially ‘take to’ (become fully engaged by) the “cultural model” of college dating. We would note first of all that this “cultural model” is schematically complex, in Fiske’s perspective. While Holland singled out the CS motivation (‘romance’ and intimacy) that is so often culturally associated with dating, dating can be engaged at other relational angles as well. Some individuals operate the AR component of it, going out to score sex or break hearts, others enjoy the ‘rating’ and calculation (MP) elements, while yet others date as part of an EM orientation in relation to their same-sex peers. (All of these are culturally recognized parts of the dating complex as well). Clashes of motivation (e.g., he wants a sexual conquest, she closeness, and sharing; he wants sincere interest, she just to have a date that weekend like her friends do) could easily account for a number of ungratifying dates and even for withdrawal from the scene by some parties. (This is in fact a culturally recognized common outcome.) On a different plane, larger social AR considerations such as those emanating from social class, might interfere with or conversely facilitate acceptance of the local dating scene, as well as any one particular date: for those of a certain class position, dating may be considered ‘corny’, for others de rigueur, and for any particular dating pair class as well as other status factors, typically judged in EM or MP terms, will weigh in one way or the other. (This particular can of worms is culturally recognized as well.) In addition, of course, there is sexual orientation, which should be screened for in such a study if there is a way to do so, for while sexual orientation may itself be organized as a ‘schema-motive’, analogously to Fiske’s social relational schemas, it has, I would suggest, its own specificity and process of development. The larger point is that all of the ‘dating disruptive’ factors just listed, including the sexual orientation factor, amount to conflicts of schematically organized motivation of the sort that are apt to emerge in the
face of a motivationally complex cultural institution such as college
dating. Any one such conflict could account for failure to fully
‘engage’ the dating model in its romantic version, while nonethe-
less containing examples of relational engagement. Any one such
conflict could account for a failure to engage, which is independent
of practice, though not in such a way as to discount the importance
of practice in culture acquisition. In looking at any of these con-
flicts, we find ourselves moving away from the mystery of psycho-
logical engagement processes and toward simply the sociology of
situated action.

If the question of how cultural models become motives has been
robbed of some of its psychological fullness, there is a way to at least
partially recuperate this. The question of culture’s (or more
broadly environment’s) impact on schema-motive emergence in
childhood still dangles. I have been guardedly referring to Fiske’s
endogenous models as ‘developing from an innate base’, leaving
unspecified, because Fiske leaves it unspecified, how ‘hardwired’
their developmental unfolding will be. Obviously there is room
within most developmental psychologies for externally caused de-
velopmental variation to occur after birth (even well into adoles-
cence). Here we have a point of entry—wider or narrower, as the
theorist is inclined to press—for both direct and indirect environ-
mental shaping. Minimally one can suggest that, however transcul-
tural the relational models may be, an individual grows up
instantiating them in particular cultural implementations and thus
always ‘speaks’ new implementations in the ‘accent’, as it were, of
her native culture. Not quite so minimally, one might seek to
explain sociopathy, the limit-condition cited by Fiske in which the
models are cognized accurately but apparently without their associ-
ated motivations, in terms of the developmental damage wrought
by features of the sociopath’s childhood environment. There are
even more ambitious ways to play the developmental card; one
could conceivably pursue it almost so far as to erase any meaningful
opposition between Fiske and the more culturalist approaches, but
the Fiskean would be expected to hold back from the point at which
all structure is once again ‘imported’ and where “development”
simply turns back into “socialization.” Meanwhile any analysis must
be sensitive to the fact that the more one turns what was previously
coded as “cultural variation” into “developmental variation,” the
more the theory tends to preclude hope for easy social and indi-
vidual change, with the result that cross-cultural, cross-class, or cross-gender comparisons take on an even stronger political charge.

FISKEAN CULTURAL ANALYSIS

If by now it is obvious that I have found Fiske’s hypothesis an excellent catalyst for focusing central issues in cultural anthropological theorizing, the next obvious question is whether I am recommending it as a tool for decoding specific cultural examples. Is it my contention that it help us to think ethnographically? Typologies, however interesting their theoretical foundations, unfortunately tend to turn their users into ‘typologizers’ who too easily produce ethnographic accounts that are flat and uninteresting aside from the validation of the typology. This is not the utilization of Fiske that I would encourage. Where I have found Fiske most useful ‘in the field’ is in sharpening my thinking about those reflex-like relational dynamics that are not dramatically culturally coded and that are not readily articulable by informants—in other words, that vast territory of the implicit and the doxic that Bourdieu, under the banner of “practice,” has staked out but, strangely, failed to occupy. This is perhaps not quite the way Fiske intended his ideas to be deployed. Certainly our first impulse is to concentrate on the relational ethic that is officially, culturally stamped upon each institutional complex in the culture we are studying: dating is supposedly about romantic bonding (CS), the military about command (AR), the New Guinea pork exchange about reciprocity (EM), and legal reasoning about equitability (MP). I do not mean to say that these stamps are without meaning—the official modality has its raison d’etre. However, as my brief analysis of college dating above suggests, most institutions are relationally complex, and we do not properly understand what the people involved in them have to live with until we begin to penetrate this complexity. Thus it was only after reading Fiske that I realized that many of the giving and sharing practices at the village level among the Papua New Guinea people with whom I lived, operate in either an EM or a CS mode, depending upon the engaged parties, and did not, as I had previously thought, bespeak a situation in which institutions of careful reciprocity had begun to deteriorate under the impact of modernity. (The CS mode often
looks like very sloppy reciprocity, but it is simply a loosely specified, not a deteriorated, bond.) It was only after reading Fiske that I began to catch, in my notes, the interesting instances in which village people were (without saying so and without, I think, realizing so) reorienting certain sorts of traditional transactions into a MP mode, or to realize conversely that though the fluorescence of bride-price marriage in the local area is historically recent and tied in with colonial arrival and the appearance of cash wages, bride-price transactions still do not fit a market orientation and must be understood in terms of other relational modes. In a word, that which looked colonially-impacted was not necessarily, at least not at heart, and that which looked traditional could conceal a Western twist. I am oversimplifying Westernization for the moment,\textsuperscript{10} but my point should be clear: the relational models theory offers a new angle of vision onto the forms of sociality that infuse any cultural institution. Furthermore it is an angle that supplies meaningfulness that is not necessarily evident from immediate historical context and not inevitably fully specified in cultural discourse. Yet contrary to the expectations of much of cultural theory, according to which “common denominators are meaningless since they by-pass the cultural codes that make personal experience articulate,” (Clifford 1988:263) the social relational underpinnings of human life, though a common denominator, cross-cut the distinction between the articulable and the unreflected, permeating both the spoken and the unspoken, the speakable and, at times too, the unseepable. If our cultural “thick descriptions” are, in the end, as Geertz suggests, oriented toward the understanding of social discourse (Geertz 1973:20), Fiske has handed us a tantalizing set of new instruments for the pursuit of exactly this task.

However, it is in regard to the very interesting relational polyvalency of cultural forms that Fiske helps us to unravel that we are brought up against another area of ambiguity in Fiske’s working through of his ideas. This concerns the way in which, in any culture, the relational models come woven together in a particular warp and woof. Fiske wishes to leave this “up to the culture,” but can it be so left while still maintaining his point that the models are autonomous and not reducible one to another? We might embrace his autonomy argument and refrain from being “monists” in our analysis, but often it appears that the peoples of the cultures we investigate are “monists” themselves, tending to portray everything
as, at bottom, a reflex of their favorite relational mode, even (apparently) other relational modes. Don’t we, as cultural actors, do the very same thing ourselves (hence, the infiltration of this sort of reductionism into academic theory)? And if “monistic” judgments often appeal to us, even striking us at times as hugely ingenious, doesn’t this suggest that no violence has been done to our gut social reflexes when we perpetrate such judgments? I think that even if we accept Fiske’s models and the stipulation of their autonomy, we must hold open the possibility that some cultures and some individuals persist in striving for that elusive one-note moral cornerstone of all social action.

CONCLUSIONS

As indicated there are important rough spots in Fiske’s argument concerning both degrees of motivational concordance in real social life and the nature of model autonomy in real cultural systems. Both of these areas require more work if the relational models theory is to have the leverage it potentially could claim against “monist” forms of reductionism, against the assumption of automatic cultural-social integration, and against the still reigning constructionist (i.e., tabula rasa) paradigm of social motivation. Yet all three of these tendencies—monism, integrationism, constructionism—are points of fragility in contemporary cultural theory. This is evidenced by the frequency with which they are, in some form, asserted as axioms at the beginning of any given cultural analysis, then tautologically declared vindicated at the end of it. Thus the fielding of a countertheory that has the potential to bypass such dogmatisms while preserving cultural variability and foregrounding and explaining those dimensions of our interpretation that we have been smuggling past the reader as “common sense” deserves our serious attention.

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NOTES

Acknowledgments. I am grateful to Anna Clark, Alan P. Fiske, Susan Gelman, Jeannette Mageo, Bruce Mannheim, Naomi Quinn, Claudia Strauss, and Fabienne Worth for helpful discussion on earlier drafts of this article.
1. Fiske is an interdisciplinary social scientist, holding a B.A. from Social Relations at Harvard and a Ph.D. from Human Development at the University of Chicago.

2. Fiske admits to having some trouble classifying the cross-culturally common “joking relationship.” There are clear elements of tit-for-tat “capping” (EM) present but the culture typically specifies the joking partners as sharing common identity and having CS types of obligations to one another.

The reader may by this point be wondering what has happened to “complementary” relationships, which are certainly universal, and tend to arise spontaneously. In fact, in Fiske’s reasoning, complementarity is a general property of all model-guided social relationships. Thus the complement of assuming authority is deferring to it; the complement of disrupting balance is restoring it, and so on. In other words, all social relationships are complementary in some way, but the way depends upon the guiding model. What is often meant by “complementarity” is a division of labor that fits together hand-in-glove, but this can provide the scaffolding for more than one relational mode. EM may be a difficult mode to wrap around such a scaffolding, but one should not dismiss even this possibility prematurely. Perhaps it is because of the moral polyvalency of divisions of labor that so much dispute arises in feminist anthropology over whether they signal social inequality.

3. It is of interest that Fiske’s hypotheses provide a logic to David Schneider’s arguments about kinship that has been felt lacking in Schneider’s own articulations. Schneider argued strongly that what has been called ‘kinship’ is simply one manifestation of culturally common ‘shared substance idioms’, and not a reflex of actual biogenetic relatedness (see Schneider 1984). In Fiske’s system, “shared substance idioms” are an indicator that the CS relational mode is being invoked.

4. Describing the scarce water situation in the Moose area where he lived, Fiske writes:

From December until May or June [one well] was the only local source of water for 600 people and their livestock. People had to haul water up out of this well by hand in rubber buckets and then carry it on their heads hundreds of meters to their homes. When the lower wall of the well collapsed, the well went dry and required laborious repairs. . . . Even after these repairs it still went dry by the end of the dry season each year, so people had to haul all their water (including water for most livestock) two to three miles on their heads, on bicycles, or in a couple of donkey carts (when fodder could be found for the donkeys). [And yet] This [repetitive] shortage usually does not lead to overt competition between individuals over water, or to any system of rationing. For the most part, there is no prioritizing of users or uses. For the most part, access to the village well is free to all comers, including outsiders, strangers and even Fulani, whom Moose disdainfully regard as embodying the antithesis of the Moose ethos and cultural identity. Anyone who comes by the well may ask for a drink, and anyone who is drawing water will give the passerby a drink from her bucket. [1991:269]

5. Roy D’Andrade gives us a more sophisticated version of the idea of schema, pointing out that, examined microscopically, schemas always turn out to be organized ‘processes’ and that the schematicity of anything is always a matter of degree (D’Andrade 1992). For the purposes of this article, the coarser concept is sufficient.

6. In an essay not otherwise illuminative of the issues here, Thomas de Zengotita states this new approach succinctly: “Post-Chomskyan human sciences must follow the example of generative grammar; they must be logically explicit theories of naturally definable domains of cognition, perception and behaviour which are uniquely characteristic of our species, and they must entail empirical consequences for testing in that domain” (de Zengotita 1987:237).

7. It must be understood that we are painting in bold strokes here. The actual microprocesses of any particular field of culture acquisition, even fields as close as learning to speak a natural language and learning to read and write one, may differ significantly. The analogy
we seek between language acquisition and the acquisition of cultural implementations of relational modes is at highly general level.

8. In an earlier study of high school dating, Gary Schwartz and Don Merten have detailed the development of a Chicago high school girl from her earliest dating experiences to marriage with her main high school 'steady'. The bulk of her emotional work of 'learning to love' in a communal intimate mode took place not in any of her real dating relationships but through the medium of her years-long crush on Beatle, George Harrison. The "George fantasy," shared with girlfriends who in turn shared their own crush-fantasies, seemed to gratify her need for intimacy, while allowing for mental experimentation with different styles of implementation. Only after her off-again-on-again relationship with her steady evolved to a position of mutual trust, was she willing to relinquish the crush on George. What she had been practicing in her real dating life up till then was, besides the occasional power play, the nuanced manipulation of proportional valuations (MP) of the sort high school students tend to impose upon the dating game (Schwartz and Merten 1980).

9. In a genetic structuralist developmental framework, such at that of Piaget, the beginning points (nodes, kernels) of schema development may be innate, but it requires the interaction of mind with certain regularities in the environment to bring about their full typical developed expression. An environment deficient in the usual regularities will produce individuals with atypical outcomes. This perspective might help to solve the potential contradiction in Fiske's argument, which centers around the example of the sociopath. As he points out, the sociopath is fully capable of cognizing the relational models but lacks the associated motivation. How can this be? Fiske's system, as it stands, tends to make an innatist explanation necessary—the sociopath must be born with a kink (p. 135). (Perhaps the really worrisome thing about innatist arguments is that they tend to spread.) But the literature on sociopathy still, as far as I know, argues for a strong link between this condition and a brutalized or emotionally deprived childhood, thus offering what the genetic structuralist would expect: deficiencies in the environment.

10. As Fiske points out, the MP orientation is the modality least in evidence in tribal cultures, while for industrialized nations it is arguably the dominant orientation. This does not mean, however, that Westernizing influences have only this stamp. It is perfectly possible for Western forms of CS, AR, etcetera, to 'infect' non-Western cultures as well. Conversely, traditional cultures may have pockets of indigenous market mentality.

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