Symbolism of the Middle Classes in Japan and Taiwan: A Comparison*

Seio Nakajima

 

Introduction

Despite the recent economic recessions, it is still the case that economic development of East Asian countries in the past few decades has attracted considerable attention, both positive and negative, within and outside academic discussions.

One often mentioned feature of the development of these countries is that inequality is low compared to other industrializing or industrialized countries. Also, it is often said that the emergence of the so-called middle classes (n. 1) in the process of industrialization has been the important guiding force of later political, economic, and socio-cultural development.

However, compared to the frequency with which the above general scenario concerning the relationship between industrialization and stratification structure of East Asian societies is asserted, comparative research acknowledging the differences as well as similarities of the characteristics of the middle classes in East Asia has yet to be carried out.

Interestingly enough, after certain levels of industrialization are achieved in each country, the lively discussions concerning the role or roles of the middle classes seem to follow. Naturally, when and how the discussions develop rest heavily on the distinctive and sometimes situational factors of each country. However, the "discovery of the middle classes" (n. 2) appears to be an important consequence of industrialization, and also an important factor influencing further political, economic, and socio-cultural trajectories.

In this paper, I would like to discuss the symbolism in the "discovery of the middle classes" in relation to the emergence of the middle classes in Japan and Taiwan.

1. Approaches to the Middle Classes

Broadly speaking, I suggest that there are two ways to approach the middle classes.

One way can be labeled an "objective" approach. One can define middle classes by indices such as income, type of occupation and its position in occupational hierarchy, and education, just to take a few examples. If one’s location of these factors is in the "middle" in terms of "objective" scales of continuum, the person can be considered belonging to the middle classes.

There is another important way of defining the middle classes, which can be labeled a "subjective" approach. Of course, subjective identity of being in the middle classes is affected very much by objective indices such as income, occupation, and education. Yet, subjective meanings people give to the middle classes, and thus, meanings of being middle classes are indispensable in discussing the definition of the middle classes.

The ideal way to go is to combine these above two approaches, and ways of combination depend on what an observer wants to clarify.

In this paper, as a step toward the ideal approach of studying the middle classes, I will focus on the subjective meanings associated with the middle classes. Therefore, my approach is primarily the "subjective" approach. However, I will introduce in detail, "objective" factors surrounding the topic of middle classes such as the issues of ethnicity, consumption, education, etc., where necessary, in order to elucidate subjective meanings people may attach to the middle classes. Yet all in all, since my focus in this paper is on symbolism, the components of which is heavily affected by subjective meanings people have toward middle classes, my overall concentration on the "subjective" approach here should be justified.

One more caveat is in order. In any study of subjective consciousness of certain population, there roughly can be two ways to attempt to grasp the nature of its consciousness. One is to focus on the sources presented by the people who have more or less explicit understanding of the issue which a researcher is attempting to study. Just for an example, if you want to study a religious ethic in a society in a specific time period, you can refer to the materials written by the leading religious figures of the time. But on the other hand, isolated study of the "elite" sources does not necessarily enable us to grasp what "ordinary" people of the time really thought about. In this sense, comprehensive study of consciousness has to rely on numerous different kinds of materials, from written to spoken, "elite" as well as "popular." Again, the ideal way to go is to combine different sources. But because of the limitation on my part, in this paper I will mainly focus on the sources explicitly dealing with the middle classes, and clearly articulating the position regarding the state of the middle classes, e.g., newspaper articles, academic writings, etc. Where possible, I will try to incorporate more "popular" aspects of the middle classes by introducing different sources including, for example, "common knowledge" of the people in Japan and Taiwan.

2. Why Compare Japan and Taiwan?

The reason why I compare the case of Japan with that of Taiwan is because both, being counted as cases of the "East Asian Model" of state-led development, experienced rapid economic growth after the World War II, which prepared the similar bases for the emergence of the middle classes in each society. At the same time, Japan and Taiwan have enough dissimilarities in the constitution of society such as political climates, industrial structures, and ethnic compositions, just to mention a few. I am hoping that the comparison of the two societies will make clear both distinctive features of each society and generic characters that can be generalized to certain group of societies, in this case East Asian societies. Given the rationale behind the comparison in this study, the case of Korea, which is also considered to be a case of the East Asian Model, could have been incorporated. However, at present, it is beyond the scope of this paper.

3. Symbolism of the Middle Classes as a Discursive Formation

According to Peter J.M. Nas (1993, p. 3), "a symbol can be considered something - an object, act or other form of expression - representing something else, generally an idea of rather abstract nature." In this sense, middle classes can be conceived of as a very important symbol which has existed in "modern" society, especially industrial societies after the post World War II period. Middle classes have been symbols of affluence, peace, urbanity, homogenization, and so on, just to take a few examples, without questioning the "objective realities" of these symbolism for the moment. In this paper I will explore the symbolism of the middle classes in three conceptually distinctive spheres of the broader social system, that is, the political, economic, and socio-cultural spheres.

Here it is probably useful to introduce the notion of discourse, as put forward by Michel Foucault, in order to clarify what I will be trying to do in this paper. A succinct definition of discourse is presented by Stuart Hall (1995, p. 201) (n. 3).

A discourse is a group of statements which provide a language for talking about – i.e. a way of representing – a particular kind of knowledge about a topic. When statements about a topic are made within a particular discourse, the discourse makes it possible to construct the topic in a certain way. It also limits the other ways in which the topic can be constructed.

A discourse does not consist of one statement, but of several statements working together to form what the French social theorist, Michel Foucault, calls a "discursive formation." The statement fit together because any one statement implies a relation to all the others.

(Hall 1995, p. 201)

My contention here is that "a way of representing" took the form of symbolism in the discourses of the middle classes in the two East Asian societies, namely Japan and Taiwan. My argument will be that each of the two societies had their own "discursive formations" in the sphere of the discourse on middle classes. I will contend that these two sets of discursive formations in each society possessed both the differences and similarities in relation to each other. In addition, I argue that the similarities between the two discursive formations can be seen as a common discursive formation in the sphere of the discourse on the middle classes that encompasses the two East Asian societies. To put it another way, there existed two distinctive discursive formations in Japan and Taiwan around the phenomena of middle classes, but at the same time there existed a common discursive formation that encompassed both Japanese and Taiwanese discourses on the middle classes. This common discursive formation, I would argue, took the form of the symbolism in the three distinctive spheres that will be introduced in the following.

Now, to clarify the above statement, let me turn to the brief descriptions of symbolism in each three conceptual spheres I proposed above. Needless to say, these symbolism do not necessarily reflect the direct "objective" correlation between the middle classes and something which is symbolized by it. Here, I am only trying to propose foci of symbolism, whether they are "objective" "truth" or "subjective" "myth," as conceived by the people acting out symbolism and, also by the observers, here mainly academics, of the symbolism.

Political Symbolism: Around Democracy

Not only in East Asian societies but also in many other societies around the world, middle classes have been a symbol, again without questioning "objective" foundations, of some kind of force against totalitarian or authoritarian political rule, and ultimately a symbol of democracy (n. 4).

Economic Symbolism: Around Development

In the economic sphere, middle classes have been a symbol of economic development, which is often reflected in such indices as GNP, or the amount of foreign reserves.

Socio-cultural Symbolism: Around Equality and Homogeneity

In the socio-cultural sphere, equality is often a keyword for the symbolism of the middle classes. "Middle" often represents the large mass, which in turn represents "equal" society.

Together with equality, comes homogeneity, especially in terms of lifestyles and consumption patterns. Homogeneity is another keyword for the symbolism of the middle classes in the socio-cultural sphere.

As described in the above, middle classes are important symbols in each of the three spheres I presented. Middle classes have been a symbol associated with democracy in the political sphere, a symbol associated with development in the economic sphere, and symbol associated with equality and homogeneity in the socio-cultural sphere. To relate the statement back to the Foucault’s notion of discourse, a discursive formation that was shared by both Japan and Taiwan on the issue of the middle classes appeared in the form of political, economic, and socio-cultural symbolism presented in the above. However, besides the level of this common discursive formation that limited and directed the discourses on the middle classes into these three spheres of symbolism, there exists an another level in which specific ways of discussions developed distinctively in each of the two societies of Japan and Taiwan. The differences in the symbolism of the middle classes in the two societies exist at this level of two distinct discursive formations. Thus, I would like to emphasize again here that the only thing I contend is that the symbolism of middle classes are acted out in important ways around the above three factors, that is, democracy, development, equality and homogeneity, whether affirmatively or negatively.

Keeping this above basic frame of reference in mind, now I will turn to the specific case of the Japanese middle classes. From here until the final remarks at the very end, I will concentrate on the symbolism instead of the notions such as discourse and discursive formation in order to avoid confusion. Nonetheless, when discussing symbolism, I would like the readers to be aware that I see symbolism as "a way of representing" something in a certain way that is limited and directed by the existence of a certain discourse. Or, in other words, in this paper, I see the symbolism as a form of discursive formation, again to use Foucault’s terminology.

Part I. Japanese Middle Classes

I. The Middle Strata Debate (Chukanso Ronso) in Japan

The so-called Rapid Economic Growth (Kodo Keizai Seicho) started in the mid-1950s and lasted until early 1970s. It was not merely a coincidence that the intense discussions on the nature of the middle strata emerged in the 1970s, when the Rapid Economic Growth resulted in a certain level of affluence, at the same time it came to a slowdown.

Let me describe some background as to why the debate on the middle strata surfaced in the particular time, that is, in the latter half of the 1970s.

First, the reason is quite economic. The so-called Rapid Economic Growth began in the mid-1950s. The 1956 version of the Economic White Paper (Keizai Hakusho) declared, "The post-war is already over," (Mohaya sengo dewa nai.) having examined economic growth in the fiscal year 1955. The economic growth of Japan continued until early 1970s, when the so-called Nixon Shock in 1971 and first Oil Crisis in 1973 hit the economy, with average annual growth rate of 9.6% (1955-1973). Although Japan’s economic growth had not stopped then, and continued with relatively high growth rate, the late 1970s was the time when many Japanese, both academics and non-academics, reflected on the meaning of the Rapid Economic Growth.

Related to this economic fact, many consciousness surveys, both by academic and commercial institutions, started to report the result of how people feel toward their lives. Many of the surveys asked people to position themselves in hierarchical terms, and many results reported that most of the Japanese felt that they were in the "middle." This was also one background for the emergence of the debate on middle strata. This reason can be said socio-cultural.

The third reason is political.

In 1976, the so-called Lockheed Scandal was exposed. The scandal, in which an aircraft building company Lockheed was said to have attempted at bribery in many countries in order to sell its aircraft, also hit Japan, and the involvement of many of the Japanese higher government officials including the former prime minister Kakuei Tanaka sent shock and anger throughout the nation. Many Japanese felt that the scandal was not only one incident, but a symbolic manifestation of political corruption nurtured since the end of the World War II, especially during the all-consuming Rapid Economic Growth. Thus, late 1970s was a time when Japanese reflected on the meanings of the Growth in political terms. Reflecting people’s doubt about politics, in the 1976 election of the House of Representatives (Shugi’in), so-called the "middle-of-the-roaders" (Chudo) party gained ground. The progress of the political "middle" was a reflection of the doubt toward long-established conservative-liberal politics. Although the coincidence of the word "middle" in the "middle-of-the-roaders" and the "middle strata" should not be exaggerated, the former was in some way a mirror of the political consciousness of the emerging latter, the middle strata.

No single person participated in the debate treated "symbolism" as their focus of arguments. However, I contend that new light can be shed on the debate by concentrating on symbolism surrounding the emergence and discovery of the middle strata. In sum, the rise of the middle strata debate was a very symbolic reflection of the Japanese’ struggle for understanding the meaning of post-war development, in all of the political, economic, and socio-cultural spheres.

In the following, I would like to examine the discussions around the nature of Japanese middle classes. I will focus on the so-called Middle Strata Debate appeared in the Asahi Shimbun, one of Japan’s leading newspapers, in the summer of 1977.

In the Middle Strata Debate on the Asahi Shimbun, four scholars expressed their own opinions as to the nature of the middle strata in Japan. Since I think the debate itself contains very interesting symbolism of the middle classes in Japan, I will dwell on each of the contentions in the following.

1. "Actuality of the New Middle Strata" — by Yasusuke Murakami

The Middle Strata Debate started with an argument by Yasusuke Murakami, who is an economist by profession.

The keyword for his argument is "the formation of the new middle strata." (Shin Chukan Kaiso no Seiritsu)

"’Formation of the new middle strata’ points to the situation under which large homogeneous strata in terms of lifestyle and consciousness emerge not in upper or lower position but in the middle position, and moreover, the strata are enlarging incorporating other adjacent strata."

(Murakami 1977)

He argues that the formation of the new middle strata is made possible by the Rapid Economic Growth from the mid-1950s until the mid-1970s, which uplifted the economic affluence of the Japanese across the board. According to Murakami, the economic development is reflected in social surveys as subjective consciousness of belonging to the "middle." One such survey cited by Murakami (Office of the Prime Minister, "National Lives" Survey) (Sorifu "Kokumin Seikatsu" Chosa) reports that to the question, "What is your standard of living?," each year from 1967 to 1977, 90% answer "the middle." In 1977, within "the middle," 60% answer that they belong to the "middle-middle" up 10% from around 50% in 1967. 1% answered "the upper" and 5% answered "the lower." In 1957, when the Rapid Economic Growth is said to have taken off, 72% answered "the middle," in which 37% answered the "middle-middle," and 17% answered "the lower." In sum, Murakami argues that both in objective economic measure and subjective consciousness, the formation of the new middle strata is a reality.

As to the character of the new middle strata, he presents the duality of it. On one hand, the strata try to preserve the standard of living and vested interests under the status quo. In this sense, the strata are for the status quo. On the other hand, the strata are potentially critical of the status quo in that they feel anxiety because of their "groundlessness" inherent in the sheer large size of the middle strata. Although he points out this duality of the middle strata, he does not suggest that this duality will polarize into the dual class struggle within the middle strata. His emphasis is on the duality of "one" middle strata.

2. "Is the discussion of the New Middle Strata Possible?" — by Shigenobu Kishimoto

Shigenobu Kishimoto countered the above argument of Murakami by basically Marxist point of view.

He agrees with Murakami in that the homogenization of the middle strata in terms of its consumption patterns and lifestyles is under way. However, he disagrees with Murakami asserting that the more important factor to be focused is the underlying structure. He argues that polarity of economy divided into the capitalists and the workers are preserved notwithstanding the phenomenal homogenization of the middle strata. He admits that the polarity has been modified in that in some cases, the distinction between the capitalists and the workers has been blurred. For example, a worker can become a capitalist by possessing the stock of a company. However, in sum, Kishimoto underscores the preservation of the polarity in the fundamental structural level. He contends that the homogenization of the new middle strata is overstated.

Also, he points out the fragility of the foundation of the new middle strata from the aspects of global economy. The affluence of the new middle strata has been made possible by the inequality of the developed and the underdeveloped countries in the world economy. He argues that if the affluence of the new middle strata relies not on their own foundation but on others, the middle strata are "a tower built on sand."

3. "The Situation of the Structure of Social Stratification" — by Ken’ichi Tominaga

Ken’ichi Tominaga, a sociologist, is the third to participate in the debate.

He basically agrees with Murakami that the enlargement of the middle strata is a distinctive feature of the social stratification structure of Japan.

One important point of his concerns the terminology, "new middle strata." He asserts that the term "new middle strata," which, in Murakami’s definition includes all the components from blue-collar workers to white-collar workers, and also from self-employed to employees, is too inclusive a term. Also, he points out the inconsistency with the long-recognized usage of C. Wright Mills and Emil Lederer, in which a similar term "new middle class" points only to the white-collar employees.

In this conjunction, he argues that we should focus also on the heterogeneity of that very middle strata. The keyword here is status inconsistency. Status inconsistency means that among plural factors determining the stratification position, not all factors are consistently in the same category making absolutely upper position, middle position, or lower position. For example, if high income is combined with low occupational prestige, the situation can be called status inconsistency. Tominaga asserts that by the introduction of democratic or multi-faceted rules of distribution of social capital and social rewards, status inconsistency has emerged, resulting in large but various middle strata. He relies on the data from the Social Stratification and Social Mobility Survey (SSM) Project of Japan, which has been collecting data decennially since 1955, for his contention of the discussion on status inconsistency. In this sense, his approach is "uniquely" quite empirical among the four scholars.

4. "Whither the ‘New Middle Strata’?" -- by Michitoshi Takabatake

A political scientist, Michitoshi Takabatake, participates in the debate as the fourth scholar.

He agrees with Murakami and Tominaga that the homogenization of lifestyles and attitudes is under way. However, his emphasis is on his contention that the middle strata’s political ideology will not converge. Under the managerial or organizational society of Japan, social inequality in power will not decrease, and produces political confrontation.

Under the condition of the middle strata society, he contends that the thoughtful examination and reflection on the value system of the industrial society itself is urgently needed. He points out the negative aspects of the industrial society in which the middle strata have emerged. He presents the "economic invasion toward Southeast Asia," and the Minamata Disease (n. 5), both of which are the negative results of industrialization of Japan.

In effect, he is urging us to reconsider the balance of importance between industrialization and the quality of life. He sees hope in emergent social movements including consumer movement, cooperative movement, and anti-nuclear-power-plant movement. He also sees hope not so much in the middle-aged-male-centered middle strata debate, but in the other products of the emergence of the middle strata society, that is, housewives and youth.

II. Symbolism of the Japanese Middle Classes

Let me classify the details of the above debate into three conceptually distinctive spheres of symbolism, that is, political, economic, and socio-cultural. Each corresponds with the rubrics of democracy, development, equality and homogeneity.

1. Symbolism in the Political Sphere: The Middle Classes as Symbol of Democracy?

As introduced in the above, Murakami presents the duality of the middle classes. According to Murakami, the middle classes can be for the status quo in that they have already acquired affluence in the midst of existing society. In this sense, the middle class is not for the further advancement of reform even under the situation in which there are some "undemocratic" factors in the existing regime. But at the same time, "identity-lessness" or "groundlessness" inherent in indistinct large mass can lead to the critical attitude toward the existing regime, and further advancement of reform in the society toward democracy. If I extend his discussion, the middle strata in the case of post-war Japan is situational in its attitude toward democracy, but they at least can act as a "lubricant" for the advancement of democracy and/or "emergency brake" against the deterioration of democracy.

For Murakami’s argument on political role of the middle strata, Takabatake is the one to disagree. Takabatake contends that the homogenization of lifestyles and attitudes does not necessarily converge in single political ideology of the middle class even admitting the duality Murakami presents. In the political sphere he sees confusion instead of conversion of the middle classes. He sees hope in emergent social movements including consumer movement and cooperative movement, for the advancement of more democratic society. He hopes that the young and housewives will be incorporated as central actors of the middle classes, contrasted against the current middle-aged-male-centered middle strata. In sum, he denies "easy" association of democracy and middle classes, although he admits the potential of middle classes as a driving force of democracy with the medium of social movements supported by the young and housewives.

As I pointed out earlier, the middle classes have not necessarily directly associated with the advancement of democracy. However, the participants of the debate admit the potentiality of middle classes to become a driving force of democracy. In this connection, middle classes still were a symbol of democracy, although the symbolism was complicatedly acted out.

2. Symbolism in the Economic Sphere: The Middle Classes as Symbol of Development?

In a sense, it is difficult to deny that the emergence of the middle classes in Japan was made possible by the economic development brought about by the so-called Rapid Economic Growth. Let me present some objective indices of economic growth Japan has achieved in the course of development after World War II.

First, let me look at the GNP and its growth during the period concerned. Though devastated by the war, already in 1955, it is said that Japanese economy recovered to the level of pre-war period. The GNP has grown to 88.3 billion U.S. Dollars in 1965. Then it grew to 141.9 billion U.S. Dollars in 1968, when the figure ranked second next to that of the United States. At present (1992), the figure is 3507.841 billion U.S. Dollars.

Secondly, let me turn to GNP per capita. Although GNP per capita is only a function of total GNP of a nation and its population size, and what really matters in the study of social stratification or social class is the distribution of wealth, including wage, income, and so on, it is at least one of many necessary conditions of the emergence of middle classes in economic terms. I will discuss the issue of distribution or equality/inequality in the section on the socio-cultural sphere. Here I will only present the figures of GNP per capita.

According to various estimates, it is said that the GNP per capita surpassed that of the United States in late 1970s. At present (1994), the figure is 34630 U.S. Dollars, and ranks at the top.

For the emergence of the middle classes in general, the economic development shown above is one of the most important factors. Without the pie to distribute in the first place, the middle classes cannot emerge in any society. In this connection, Japan especially during and after the Rapid Economic Growth was in an ideal condition for the emergence of the middle classes.

However, except for this connection between relative economic growth and the emergence of the middle classes, observers who participated in the debate do not necessarily agree in the economic sphere of symbolism of the middle classes.

Murakami’s argument is in a sense clear-cut. He argues that the economic development distributed its wealth to Japanese nation across the board, and thus made vast middle strata in objective economic terms. According to him, this objective affluence was the flip side of the coin of subjective middle class consciousness. Thus, for him, middle class was a definite symbol of economic development of post-war Japan, which was buttressed both by objective indices and subjective consciousness.

For Kishimoto, the picture is quite different. For him, the structural polarity of economy divided into the capitalists and workers is preserved, super-structural homogenization of the middle classes notwithstanding. So, although he admits that many in the Japanese general public consider middle classes as a symbol of economic development, he himself is critical about the very view. He contends that the homogenization of the middle strata is overstated. One more important argument of his is that he is critical of the symbolism of the middle classes because the "affluence" of the middle classes is achieved only by the existence of developed-underdeveloped countries relations.

This affluence does not have the universality, which can be shared globally, and which can break the global dual structure. If the qualification of the "middle"-ness is whether or not having the foundation to assure the affluence, we should think critically that the "new middle strata" by no means can exist in Japan, which for the present is merely a "castle on sand."

(Kishimoto 1977)

In sum, for Kishimoto, the middle-class consciousness was vastly an illusion. (n. 6)

Tominaga basically agrees with Murakami in that the economic development made possible both the objective and subjective "middle-ness" of the Japanese middle strata. For him, as I understand, the middle classes were actually a symbol of development. However, he differs in finer understanding of the middle classes in terms of distribution within the middle classes as he has elaborated utilizing the concept of status inconsistency.

Takabatake, a political scientist, also agrees with other authors in that the economic development was one important factor of the emergence of the middle classes in Japan. So, as I understand, he admits, as a present situation for many Japanese, that the middle classes are symbol of economic development. However, on the other hand, he is quite critical about the consequences of development. He takes two specific examples of the consequences of development primarily implemented by "the new middle strata, who are bound by institutions." (Takabatake 1977) That is, "aggressive economic invasion into Southeast Asia" (Takabatake 1977) (n. 7) and "the tragedy of Minamata disease, which spread in the midst of economic development." (Takabatake 1977) So, for him, symbolism of the middle classes has reflected the negative side of economic development, positive side notwithstanding.

In sum, for all of the participants in the debate, the symbolism of the middle classes was acted out around the factor of economic development. However, at least for some of the observers, the symbolism was not always associated with the positive consequences of the development. For some, the middle classes were a symbol of global economic inequality and domestic pollution.

3. Symbolism in the Socio-cultural Sphere: The Middle Classes as Symbol of Equality and Homogeneity?

In the socio-cultural sphere, symbolism of the middle classes was acted out around two factors, that is, equality and homogeneity.

Here, I would like again to emphasize that I am not suggesting that Japanese middle classes have always been an optimistic symbol for equality and/or homogeneity for all of the Japanese people. I am only suggesting that the symbolism of the middle classes in the socio-cultural sphere has been located and debated around the rubrics of equality and homogeneity.

As is already pointed out in the above, one often mentioned feature of the development of East Asian countries including the object of this study Japan and Taiwan is that the inequality is confined to surprisingly low degree compared to other industrializing or industrialized countries. To take one measure, rate of the income of the highest 20% to that of the lowest 20% was 4.31 in Japan in 1979 (Liu 1992, p. 317). GINI coefficient was 0.270 in the same year (Liu 1992, p. 317), which is quite low for countries developed to the same level.

Equality in income distribution, then, was, at least in the relative sense, achieved in Japan when the emergence of the middle classes was intensely debated.

Let me turn now to the discussions on the middle classes as symbol of equality, here especially that in income.

Murakami presents the diminishing trend in the rate of income of the highest 20% to lowest 20%, and sees this trend as an important manifestation of the "formation of the middle strata."

Kishimoto also admits that, in the relative sense, distribution of wealth including income has been equalized since the Rapid Economic Growth. However, as elsewhere, he asserts the duality of structure, that is, capitalists and workers, although he admits that the borderline has been blurred. Again for him, equality in income as a phenomenon does not assure the equality in structure. So, for him, the middle classes as symbol of equality is again an illusion.

Tominaga’s argument is two-fold. He admits that in the relative sense especially compared to Japan before the war, distribution of income has been equalized. However, his main thesis lies in his contention that "basic fact that should be emphasized regarding today’s social stratification structure is not that ‘everyone is the same, everyone is in the middle,’ but that increase of ‘status inconsistency’ which was brought about by the democratization of the rules of social resources and social rewards." (Tominaga 1977) For Tominaga, equality is achieved in the overall rules in distribution rather than in one single index such as income.

Takabatake also admits that relative equality of income has been achieved by the overall development of Japanese economy. However, what matters for him is not so much the economic equality but inequality in power in the growing "managerial society," to borrow his words.

In sum, the four authors basically agree that the equality in economic terms is achieved more or less. However, they disagree in other aspects related to this equality. Thus the middle classes as a symbol of equality is only partly recognized.

Now, let me turn to the other factor, that is, homogeneity.

Murakami was probably the strongest contender of this trend. He asserts that vast homogeneous strata in terms of lifestyle and consciousness is emerging. He points out the two important factors for homogenization, that is, development of mass communication and mass education. For him, middle classes appear as a symbol of the advancement of these two factors.

Tominaga and Takabatake agree with Murakami on the trend toward homogenization in terms of lifestyle and consciousness. However, as is already pointed out in the above, they disagree with the strength of impact of the trend on other factors of the middle classes.

Kishimoto again does not deny the trend in phenomenal terms. However, he sees the middle classes critically, and asserts that the existence of the classes is very fragile at the structural level.

As is described in the above, the middle classes have been symbols of many different factors in all of the three spheres, that is, political, economic, and socio-cultural realms. However, at the same time, the symbolism was largely acted out around the factors of democracy, development, equality and homogeneity in each of the three spheres.

Now that I have discussed the symbolism of the middle classes of Japan, let me turn to the Taiwanese case of the emergence and discovery of the middle classes. In the following, we will find some surprising similarities, but at the same time, surprising differences that were produced by the distinctive historical trajectory of Taiwanese society.

Part II. Taiwanese Middle Classes

I. Discovery of the Middle Classes in Taiwan

According to Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, the 1970s was a period when the middle classes began to emerge (Hsiao 1989, p. 155). However, "the rise of the middle classes in the 1970s did not catch much attention from both the public or the government." (Hsiao 1989, p. 161) This observation of his can be reconfirmed by looking at academic papers written on the middle classes. Browsing through Sociological Abstract (1963-1986) published in Taiwan (Hsu, Chiu, and Chang, eds. 1992), I only found one paper examining "The Media Behavior of Upper Middle Class in Taiwan R.O.C.," (Chen 1983) which was published in 1983. So, academics also had not been explicitly discussing the middle classes until the 1980s.

The term, middle class, became attractive in the early 1980s. Not only the media became interested in using such term to catch the public’s attention; the business sector began commercial campaigns directed to meet those middle class needs; and the politicians (both the established and the opposition) also adjusted their images in trying to appeal to those in the middle.

(Hsiao 1989, p. 161)

In a nutshell putting aside the actual rise or emergence of the middle classes in the 1970s, the discovery of the middle classes seems to have become heated only in the 1980s. Let me discuss why the discovery happened in the 1980s comparing the case with Japan.

First, as in the case of Japan, the reason was economic. A peak of the Taiwan’s economic development was during the 1960s. According to Liu (1986, p. 263), from 1964 until 1973, annual growth rate of export was 29.7%. That of secondary industry was 19.4%, and that of GNP was 11.1% (Liu 1986, p. 263).

Especially, prices were exceptionally stable, and it was a "Golden 1960s," during which, as it were, a rapid growth without inflation was achieved.

(Liu 1986, p. 263)

However, as in many of the rapidly developing countries of the post-war era including Japan, 1970s was a period when rapid growth was somewhat slowed down, due to the two Oil Crises among other factors. The growth rate of export was 20.3%, that of secondary industry was 9.8%, that of GNP was 7.3% (Liu 1986, pp. 263-264). However, on second thought, 1970s was still a period of rapid economic growth relative to world standard, even compared to Japan, where the beginning of the growth was earlier, thus the slowing down also came earlier than the case of Taiwan.

20 years of rapid economic growth finally slowed down in the 1980s, compared to the Japanese case of the slowing down in the 1970s. However, many important seeds sown during the period of rapid economic growth seem to bud and flourish in the 1980s. For example, GNP per capita was US$144. Then it gradually rises to US$222 in 1965, US$384 in 1970, and it was US$948 in 1975. The amount started to rise more rapidly in the later period especially during the 1980s. It was US$2293 in 1980, US$3125 in 1985, US$6053 in 1988, and reached US$10180 in 1992 (Council for Economic Planning and Development). These figures are in a sense natural consequences of the rapid growth until the beginning of the 1980s and continuing growth until present. High appreciation of National Taiwan Dollar (NT$) added to the trend.

Small domestic market led Taiwan to seek market for the final consumer products abroad, and the resulting expansion of exports reversed the trend of trade deficit to the trend of trade surplus in the latter half of the 1970s. With the opening of the 1980s, Taiwan’s export surplus expanded due to the declining price of oil after the Second Oil Crisis. Taiwan’s foreign reserve at the beginning of the 1990s amounts to 72 to 90 billion US$, and occupies the second position next to Japan. The foreign reserve per capita exceeds that of Japan and occupies the first position.

(Asamoto 1996, p. 146)

However, at the same time, "the growing inequality in society and particularly the soaring urban real estate prices, have frustrated those growing numbers of middle income families whose expectations of improving their quality of life have gradually risen. The term ‘the new poor’ was suddenly applied to them." (Hsiao 1993, p. 7)

It should be clear from above that rising level of the standard of living on one hand and some important concerns emerging simultaneously with the economic development on the other have raised consciousness of the middle classes not in the most rapidly developing period but in the period when economy and society more or less "matured." In this connection, it was quite similar to the rise of the middle strata debate in that it emerged not in the period of "skyrocketing" economy but in the period of more or less moderate ripening of the economy.

Another reason is political. As Hsiao (1993, p. 7) points out, "the political liberalization with the ruling KMT [Kuomintang, or the Nationalist Party] regime and the opposition forces competing for political support from the rising middle strata also brought about awareness in those called middle class individuals." Then it was no coincidence that the discussion on the middle classes began to flourish in the latter half of the 1980s, when many of the "democratizing measures" were carried out. For example articles by Wei (1985) concerning the middle classes appeared in China Times, one of Taiwan’s leading newspapers, in 1985. Also, an article by Chu (1985), which also dealt with the issue, appeared in the same newspaper later in 1985.

The last reason can be said socio-cultural.

The trade liberalization which brought a wide range of imported consumer goods into Taiwan’s domestic market also changed the consumption patterns of society. Further differentiated classes based on the ability to access this new kind of lifestyle became noticeable.

(Hsiao 1993, p. 7)

In sum, like the Japanese case of the middle strata debate, the discovery of the middle classes in the particular time, that is in the 1980s and especially the latter half of the 1980s in Taiwan’s post-war history had its reasons, coincidental factors notwithstanding. Especially important factor for the case of Taiwan seems to be in the political sphere. As is well-known, from 1986 to 1987 various important steps toward democratization were taken. In 1986, the opposition party, Democratic Progressive Party (Minchintang) (n. 8) was established and the government tolerated this action despite the existence of martial law at the time, which could have justified a crackdown on such a defiant action. In 1987, the long-lasted martial law was finally lifted. Also, starting in 1988, restrictions on publications, including restrictions on the new publication of newspapers and on number of pages in them, were loosened. Then, the discovery of the middle classes in the 1980s, especially in the late 1980s, had to be always politically conscious. In a sense, more so than in the case of Japan, the Taiwanese middle classes were given political meanings. In this connection, Taiwanese middle classes were a clear symbol of the democratization process of the Taiwan polity.

For example, Hsiao wrote about middle classes in 1988 in a Hong Kong newspaper. As is clearly indicated by the title of the article, "Middle Classes and the Future of Taiwan’s Democracy," his concentration in this article was primarily political. Let me summarize his points in the following. His purpose of writing this article was, "what kind of relationship exists between Taiwan’s future political democratization and emergent middle classes?" (Hsiao 1988)

Since the middle classes are the most "infantile" newly emerging component of social structure in Taiwan, their class "life-history" is rather short and sporadic. Also, absolute majority belongs to "middle classes of first generation." Due to these reasons, their social characters are still very immature, their predispositions are also still in the process of "completion" in terms of class formation, their internal component factors are naturally greatly changeable and to be differentiated, and historical condition has not produced "organizational" class structure. Moreover, it has not produced political, social, and cultural character that every member of the middle classes can share.

(Hsiao 1988)

Hsiao sums it up by the phrase, "inconsistent character." The inconsistency of the middle classes, on some occasions makes them the preserver of the existing regime, but on other occasions makes them the supporter of reforms.

The middle classes are very much interested in political reforms, but because of their possession of advantage in the status quo, it is the last to express it in the concrete attitudes and action (Hsiao 1988).

He describes two possible situations which put Taiwan in difficulty, in relation to the emergence of the middle classes.

If the government party, that is, the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang), will not be able to further advance the democratization and liberalization of Taiwan politics, the reform-oriented character of the middle classes will be betrayed and the middle classes will not be able to be a positive force for Taiwan to become a better society (Hsiao 1988).

On the other hand, if the opposition party, that is, the Democratic Progressive Party (Minchintang) will not be able to make clear its political, social, economic, and cultural orientations, and entangled by the difficult issues such as "unification-independence" issue (unification with the Mainland China, or independence from it), the status-quo oriented character of the middle classes will be betrayed and the middle classes, again as in the other scenario in the above, will not be able to be a positive force for Taiwan’s betterment.

Lastly, he refers to the role of intellectuals in the process of political democratization. With the inconsistency of the middle classes in mind, he asserts that the intellectuals should be the mediators for the contending opinions concerning political reforms. The "system of mediation," according to Hsiao, will become more and more important (Hsiao 1988).

Hsiao’s characterization of the middle classes is surprisingly similar to that of some Japanese scholars participated in the middle strata debate. Especially if we recall the sub-title of Murakami’s article, that is, "Political Responsiveness is Urgently Needed: the Dual Character of Conservative-ness and Critical-ness of the New Middle Strata," the similarity of the contention is clear.

In sum, basic political symbolism in the two countries was similar. However, acuteness of political symbolism of the middle classes seems much severer in Taiwan than in Japan mainly because of the distinctive political history of Taiwan described above.

The discovery of the middle classes in Taiwan was different from that in Japan in that political role of the middle classes was the first thing to be discussed. However, a closer look at the issue reveals that aspects other than political were also important in Taiwan. So, in the following I will examine the symbolism in more detail, dividing it into three spheres as I did for the case of Japan.

II. Symbolism of the Taiwanese Middle Classes

1. Symbolism in the Political Sphere: The Middle Classes as Symbol of Democracy?

As is already pointed out in the above, political symbolism of the middle classes has been a very important aspect in the case of Taiwan.

Browsing through some of the published papers concerning the middle classes, it is not at all difficult to find them discussing on the relationship between the middle classes and democratization. Just to take some examples, Wu and Lin (1989) wrote an article entitled "Middle Class and Political Reform: Reality or Myth? -- Reconstructing the Relationship between the Middle Class and Democratization." In the same book, Chu (1989) contributes an article entitled "The Middle Class and Taiwan’s Political Democratization." In another book on the comparative study of the middle classes in East Asia, including South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore, Chang contributes an article entitled "Middle Class and Social and Political Movements in Taiwan: Questions and Some Preliminary Observations." In the same book, an English version of the above-mentioned article published in Chinese in 1989 by Wu and Lin appears with the English title, "Democratic Consensus and Social Cleavage: The Role of Middle Class in Political Liberalization in Taiwan." The middle classes in Taiwan were seen as a stronger symbol of democratization compared to the case of Japan. In Japan, where basic democratizing process had been instituted "from above" within several years after World War II, the middle classes as a symbol of political democracy was never a central concern. Duality of the middle classes was recognized in the Japanese case, but the duality was between conservative and liberal politics within existing regime, and in a sense more moderate than in the case of Taiwanese duality. Clearly, the duality of Taiwan’s middle classes was seen as pro-democracy or pro-authoritarian regime. So, in the case of Taiwan, the symbolism of the middle classes in political sphere naturally had priority at least in the earlier phase of the discovery of the middle classes.

Let me examine here the article by Wu and Lin (1993) as one example of articles dealing with the relationship between the middle classes and democratization, in order to clarify the political symbolism of the middle classes in Taiwan.

Wu and Lin (1993) deal with the very question of "the Role of the Middle Class in Political Liberalization in Taiwan." They deal with the data collected in the survey on the election in 1986, and draw the following conclusion.

In conclusion, we have followed the argument of some modernization theorists to examine the political ideology of the middle class people in Taiwan. We confirmed the modernization argument that the middle classes are more inclined towards liberal democracy. There is a high level of consensus on liberal democracy among them. However, we also found that political loyalties of this stratum do not converge as their ideologies do. As a matter of fact, they are polarized into rather opposing directions. One segment (nearly all native Taiwanese) supports the liberal-democratic force, while the other (mostly Mainlanders) remains loyal to the authoritarian regime. The pressure for political reform largely comes from the former group. The latter group serves as an inducement for the KMT regime to political reform, or at least functions to reduce the risk on the part of the ruling group to reform.

(Wu and Lin 1993, p. 216)

Their claim that within the middle classes there exists a cleavage in terms of political orientations between the Mainlanders and the Taiwanese is quite consistent with the often-cited political history of Taiwan, in which the two ethnic groups have been in conflict, if not always overtly. (n. 9) The political attitudes of the two constituents of the middle classes come from the effects of ethnicity, and not so much from the consciousness in different class or stratification positioning within the middle classes itself. Then, in Taiwan, it maybe that division by class or stratification at least until present has never overwhelmed the cleavage of ethnicity produced by the distinctive modern and contemporary history of Taiwan.

In sum, although the middle classes were a symbol of democracy, the duality of its political orientation was found as in the case of Japanese middle classes. Also for the case of Taiwan, the manifestation of the duality in substantial part comes from the existing ethnic cleavage distinctive in Taiwan’s history.

Now, let me turn to the other important aspects of democracy in its broader meaning. I will deal with the issues of social movements in relation to the middle classes in Taiwan.

As is dealt in detail by Chang (1993), middle classes and social movements are seen as something interrelated in important ways. In this sense, as in the case of Japan, middle classes are a symbol of social movements. However, as is clearly pointed out by Chang, the direct positive correlation between the middle classes and the rise of social movements is too simplistic a story. Chang’s discussion on the middle classes is very comprehensive and insightful for the discussions on the middle classes and political and social movements. However, I have to limit myself to introduce one important contention of his at the moment, that is the importance of factors other than class in the issues of social and political movements.

In Taiwan, after thirty years of fast economic growth, an increase in division of labor and the expansion of Taiwan’s manufacturing and service sectors has brought about a growing middle stratum of people between the large conglomerates and the working people. They are professional, managerial, and the technical workers on the one hand, and self-employed small business owners and family-based small entrepreneurs on the other. From a sociological point of view, the former group is sometimes referred to as the "new middle class" while the latter group is referred to as the "petit bourgeoisie." But in ordinary language the term "middle class" is loosely used to describe both of these middle sectors.

(Chang 1993, p. 122)

It has been suggested that the so-called "middle class" as a whole is inclined to support the KMT and the State more than other social categories. But when looking at the dual nature of Taiwan’s opposition movement, democratization and Taiwanization, we found that the interaction between class and provincial origin needs to be explored further in future studies. It is also argued that the petit-bourgeoisie support the "taming" of the autonomous state while the public sector middle class would much hesitate to do so because of their vested interest in the extant system.

(Chang 1993, p. 164)

These above two citations of Chang’s article bring forward the three factors important in discussing Taiwanese middle classes and their symbolism. That is, ethnicity, the relationship between the new middle class and the old middle class, and different sectors of employment. Let me dwell on these three issues in the following.

The Middle Classes: The Relationship between the New Middle Class and the Old Middle Class

The old middle class is typically defined as "self-employed peasants, small manufacturers, and small entrepreneurs, existing as small property owner or small management." (Morioka, Shiobara, and Honma 1993, p. 272)

As a number of researchers have pointed out (Greenhalgh 1988; Sun and Li 1983), underpinning force making possible the so-called "Taiwan Miracle" is composed of small and medium-sized enterprises, typically family businesses. The higher percentage of family businesses is still a characteristic of Taiwanese industrial structure. People in this sector of business are mostly considered the members of the old middle class.

If we follow the "general scenario" of the emergence and development of the new middle class, we can foresee the demise of the old middle class and the birth and development of the new middle class as a result of the decline in the percentage of small and medium-sized enterprises and of increase in the percentage of large enterprises and organizations. The Taiwanese experience seems not to fit this general scenario precisely, given the presence of the sizable number of family enterprises, and thus old middle classes, in the present. Although it is true that the new middle class has become a major social force we cannot ignore, the relative liveliness of the old middle class in Taiwan seems to have significant impact on the characteristics of the middle class as a whole.

Ethnicity

As I have discussed in the earlier section, ethnicity is an important factor that shapes formation of the middle classes in Taiwan. It is reported that "the predominant portion of the Mainlanders (Waishengjen) still occupies the new middle class." (Hsiao 1995, p. 69) This report immediately reminds us of the "unique" history Taiwan has experienced since the Second World War, as I have described in the earlier section.

It is often suggested that officials, servicemen, and people in the educational field, who can be considered the "latent white collars" or "latent new middle class," were predominantly Mainlanders, who came to Taiwan accompanied by the Nationalist Party after its defeat in the civil war with the Communist Party in China. The Mainlanders, in a sense, had to find occupation in the work place where they didn’t have to speak Taiwanese, which, though a dialect of Chinese, they could not fully understand. So, the employment of the Mainlanders in the public sector including government, military and police, and the educational field were underpinned by the presence of language barrier between Mandarin (the official language of both the Republic of China = Taiwan, and of the People’s Republic of China = Mainland China) and Taiwanese (Minnanese) (the language spoken by the native Taiwanese people in everyday conversation), which is a consequence of ethnic division in the society. In turn, the Taiwanese, who can be considered the "dominated," could find niches in small and medium-sized enterprises mainly working on the production of light industrial goods, and later in "information industry" including computer industry, as well as certain kinds of commerce including international trades. The Taiwanese language was an "official language" for the operation of this industrial sector of small and medium sized enterprise. Thus, in the case of Taiwan, ethnic division of society in this respect, contributed to the development of Taiwan economy with Taiwanese characteristics, naturally with both advantages and disadvantages.

Needless to say, this second point on ethnicity may well relate to the first point on the relationship between the old middle class and the new middle class, if we recall the report saying that the larger portion of Taiwanese (Penshengjen), are still in the old middle class in present-day Taiwan. (Hsiao 1995, pp. 68-69)

However, we must be aware that the correspondence between the new middle class and Mainlanders, and the correspondence between the old middle class and the Taiwanese are by no means complete, and empirical investigations are yet to be implemented before definite conclusion.

Public and Private Employment

Also, we must remember that public employment and private employment add to the effects of the two factors of ethnicity, and old and new middle classes. Old middle class should be by definition mainly private self-employed. But the new middle class could be employed in both public and private sectors. And according to Wu and Lin (1993), political orientation of pro reform and pro status quo respectively is also largely affected by this private-public employment factor. Although some authors have elaborated on all of the three points related to the character of the middle classes in Taiwan, the relationship between three factors and the middle classes has yet to be investigated in the future study.

In conclusion to the political symbolism of the middle classes in Taiwan, middle classes are basically seen as a symbol of democratization and advancement of social movements. However, the symbolism is very much complicated by the situational factors discussed in the above. Namely, ethnicity, the relationship between old and middle class, and public and private sector employment.

2. Symbolism in the Economic Sphere: Middle Classes as Symbol of Development?

To my knowledge, very similar to the case of the Middle Strata Debate in Japan in late 1970s, the public discussions on the middle classes began in 1985, when Wei Yung (1985) commented on the results of the survey implemented by the Taiwan government’s research body under the Executive Yuan (Hsingcheng Yuan) (Yen Kao Hui). The survey reported that more than 50% of the people in Taiwan answered that they belong to the "middle stratum," other choices being "upper" and "lower." According to the survey, the figure increased from 51.7% in 1978 to 56.9% in 1983. For the commentator Wei, the result of the survey, "fully explained the correctness of the Three People’s Principles’ (n. 10) simultaneous concern for production and distribution." (Wei 1985) "It also demonstrated that our state on Taiwan region basically already realized the social-policy goal of affluence and equality." (Wei 1985) Wei also points out that "the middle class presents strong support for the government and the government party," and thus "the government party definitely is a party of the middle class." (Wei 1985) For Wei, and also people affiliated with the government saw (or tried to see) the middle class as an unquestionable symbol of the success of Taiwan’s development, despite an infamous labeling by some observers as a "developmentalist dictatorship." For these people including Wei, the middle class was a definite symbol of "successful" economic development.

However, others including Chiu and Hsiao, cast critical eyes to the simple direct correlation between development and the emergence of the middle classes in Taiwan, as some of the participants of the Middle Strata Debate in Japan did in the late 1970s.

For example, Chiu (1985), utilizing objective criteria including education, occupation, and income, contended that at present the best estimate is the percentage of the middle classes of about 14 to 21%. More importantly, he asserted that whether using "subjective" criteria or "objective" criteria, the delineation of the middle classes is not a simple task, and the reality of the emergence of the middle classes itself has to be examined carefully. Thus, when dealing with the middle classes, we need to be "very careful and hypothetical" (Chiu 1985). Although Chiu did not introduce Marxist perspective as Kishimoto did, or the concept of status inconsistency as Tominaga did, he was very considerate as to the examination of the meaning of the emergence of the middle classes, and thus he was skeptical of the simple and clear-cut treatment of the middle classes as a symbol of development as some of the Japanese contenders also cautioned in the 1970s.

3. Symbolism in the Socio-Cultural Sphere: Middle Classes as Symbol of Equality and Homogeneity?

In this section, I would like to focus on the symbolism acted out around the two factors, that is, equality and homogeneity in the socio-cultural sphere.

As in the case of Japan, an often-mentioned feature of the development of Taiwan is that the inequality is confined to low degree. To take one measure, ratio of the income of the highest 20% to that of the lowest 20% was 4.18 in 1976 and 4.17 in 1980. The GINI coefficient, which is often used as indicator of the distribution of income, was 0.6206 in 1952, then decreased to 0.2955 in 1972, and down to 0.2806 in 1979 (Hsiao 1986, p. 72). Some of the authors went as far to suggest that the emergence of the middle classes "fully explained the correctness of the Three People’s Principles’ simultaneous concern for production and distribution." (Wei 1985) "It also demonstrated that our state on Taiwan region basically already realized the social-policy goal of affluence and equality." (Wei 1985) As already pointed out in the above, some other authors cast critical eyes on this "optimistic view" of the middle classes as a symbol of government’s success in uplifting overall level of people’s affluence, at the same time achieving equal distribution. I agree with some critical sociologists in that Wei’s view was too simplistic in hindsight and we should be careful in examining the meaning of the emergence of the middle classes in Taiwan. At the same time, it is difficult to deny that Taiwan has achieved high level of overall affluence as can be indicated by the growth in GNP, and also relatively equal distribution of this affluence as is already indicated by the measures in the above. At any rate, again, as in the case of Japan, the symbolism was acted out around the concept of equality, whether affirming it or denying it.

As to the homogenization in lifestyles and consumption patterns, we can find interesting differences in the treatment by observers between Japan and Taiwan.

In the Japanese Middle Strata Debate, the starting point of the debate can be said to be socio-cultural. The first contender of the debate, Murakami, argued that a large homogeneous stratum in terms of lifestyle and consciousness is emerging and that this homogenization in lifestyle and consciousness is the key factor of the Japanese emergence of the middle strata. Put it another way, the debate’s baseline was this socio-cultural phenomenon of the middle strata, and the contenders followed presented different views around this baseline from the perspectives of sociology, economics, and political science.

The case of Taiwan was rather contrasting to the case of Japan. As can be partially indicated by the smaller number of articles included in edited volumes on the Taiwanese middle classes, the middle classes as a symbol of homogenization was not a primary concern for many of the Taiwanese contenders. Rather, middle classes as symbols of political or economic, or political-economical factors seem to be central concerns for many of the Taiwanese contenders. I have already pointed out a few reasons for the relative weight attached to the political symbolism of the Taiwanese middle classes. Here, let me summarize again the relative attachment of importance to the political or economic meanings, and introduce the relative neglect of the socio-cultural meanings of the middle classes in Taiwan.

First, it is understandable for the debate on the middle classes, which flourished since the latter half of the 1980s to be examined together with the important, even "dramatic" trend in democratization since the latter half of the 1980s. In the case of Japan, as is already pointed out, basic democratization process had been achieved before the middle classes emerged in the scene.

Secondly, although the homogenization of lifestyle and consumption patterns in the middle classes may have been an important phenomenon, there has also been the counter force cross-cutting the consolidation of the middle-class culture as in the case of political sphere discussed above, that is, the issue of ethnicity. Both in the sphere of high culture and popular culture there always remained a cleavage between the Chinese culture and Taiwanese culture. Then, it is more difficult in Taiwan to "optimistically" talk of the homogenization of lifestyle and consciousness than in Japan, where ethnic division (n. 11) is relatively small and easier to identify with "one homogeneous Japanese culture."

As one can guess with the above-mentioned relative neglect of culture in the discussion on Taiwanese middle classes, it was difficult for me to find articles dealing primarily with the culture of the middle classes. However, fortunately, I found one article on the theme. Let me now examine the article by Ye (1993) in the following.

He asserts that "these four decades, Taiwan has been a society in which ‘class’ consciousness has been highly repressed. General public’s ‘class’ consciousness is rather weak and obscure. To speak like this never means that in the past there had never been the emergence of ‘class,’ nor that in the future there is no possibility of its emergence. What we have to point out is: In the situation which the Nationalist Party government had cooperated with capitalists and had monopolized various social capitals (educational and disciplinary system [chiaohua chichi] in its broader meanings, among others), fully utilizing various strategies, class consciousness had always been obscured, and conditions to fully develop and facilitate the emergence of the class consciousness had been lacking." (Ye 1989, p. 115)

These three decades, this development promoted the economic growth, and changed rapidly the industrial structure and the reasonable cooperation of related structures (for example, spread of education and uplifting its standard). The occupational structure of Taiwan society has changed significantly, the opportunity of social upward mobility expanded, and people’s income also increased substantially. These conditions gave more and more people opportunities in terms of subjective identity and objective identification to be in the "middle stratum."

(Ye 1989, p. 115)

According to Ye (1989), under the above situation in which class differentiation is undeveloped, the "cultural taste" did not have an opportunity to fully develop among the Taiwanese, but the possession of certain commodities or consumption of things or services came to have increasing importance. Let me elaborate on the issue of consumption in the following. After this task, I will elaborate on the importance of education, as is also alluded to by Ye, in Taiwanese society, in relation to the issue of middle classes.

Consumption

Thorstein Veblen’s work is always a good starting point of the discussion on the issue of consumption.

The theory of Veblen (1899=1994) can be condensed in the concept of "conspicuous consumption." Conspicuous consumption is a term coined by Veblen to explain the social action of consuming goods or services not for their utility but mainly for the demonstration of the exclusive social status the actor possesses. Veblen’s original intention was to explain the action of the "leisure class" belonging to the higher social stratum. In this original sense of Veblen’s, as David Riesman has argued (Riesman 1950=1969), conspicuous consumption is more a characteristic of "inner-directed" type of society in which the leisure class Veblen referred to lived. However, the concept has now been utilized by many analysts, in order to elucidate characteristics shared by entire range of middle strata under the conditions of the so-called mass consumption society. In this latter sense, the concept of conspicuous consumption is in fact effective to analyze the consumption patterns of people living in what Riesman has called "other-directed" type of society, in that the conspicuous consumption became more of the way of showing other people that a person is same as these other people, and not different (or "superior" in some sense) from other people.

Looking back into Taiwanese society, the concept of conspicuous consumption in the latter broader meaning of the word seems to be valid in explaining consumption patterns or wider aspects of middle class consciousness of Taiwanese people.

By the end of the 1980s, especially in urban areas of Taiwan, air conditioner, large TV sets with satellite broadcast receiving system, and small motorcycles were the "necessities" for middle class Taiwanese people. In 1990s, automobile is already not a luxury for middle class people. As Japanese talked about "Three Imperial Treasures" (Vogel 1963=1971=1991, p. 72) or a set of three durable consumer goods of, say, any combination from the list of TV sets, electric rice cookers, electric washing machine, and refrigerator in the 1950s, and 3Cs (Cooler, meaning air conditioner in Japanese language, Color TV, and Car) in the 1960s, possession or consumption of certain kinds of goods has become the symbols of being in the middle strata in Taiwan. In the word of Riesman, the "standard package of consumption" has become major styles of consumption in Taiwan society in the 1980s.

In this sense, the term "conspicuous consumption" is appropriately transformed into the term of, say, "assimilative consumption," (n. 12) in the sense that the purpose of the consumption is not so much a differentiation but an assimilation toward the subjective image of the "middle class," when dealing with a society in which middle class identification is as widespread as Taiwanese society.

Thus, to a certain "objective" extent, Taiwan has become a mass consumption society, which is an important condition for the emergence of the socio-cultural symbolism of the middle classes.

Education

According to Pierre Bourdieu, a French sociologist (Bourdieu and Passeron 1977), cultural capital is reproduced across generations through the process of cultural reproduction, which basically is a process of distinctive socialization in major institutions. Bourdieu especially emphasizes the effect of schools in the process of cultural reproduction. He argues that schooling is a process in which the cultural ideas that underlie and support the privileges of dominant ruling class are passed along generations. He is especially interested in the uneven and unequal distribution of cultural capital in stratified societies. The "ignorance and forcefulness" of what dominant ruling class defines as basic knowledge make it essentially impossible for marginal and lower class people to succeed in institutions such as schools, since this "basic knowledge" is in fact congenial only to the everyday lifestyles and thinking of the ruling class. Through these processes, cultural capital is reproduced in unfair way that leads to inequality in its distribution. Bourdieu calls this process cultural deprivation, following Marx’s well-known concept of economic exploitation.

Although his formulation of the process of cultural reproduction is very original and gives us insights into the process of stratification in contemporary society, concepts of his seem not completely adaptable to the study of social stratification in East Asian societies including Taiwan.

Schooling in Taiwan, at least until recently, seems to have worked not as an institution to produce inequality but as an institution to spread opportunities even to the people who had been deprived of the chances of mobility until the relative spread of education.

Let me summarize briefly some of the important aspects of schooling in Taiwanese society.

First, the educational system, from primary to higher education, has always been led by the government wishing to increase the literacy rate in order to build up the human capital needed to maximize economic development. And as a result, public (meaning run by some level of government) schools have always been the majority in its educational system. Many of the prestigious universities, including National Taiwan University, which is often regarded as the most competitive university in Taiwan, are national universities. This dominance of public educational institutions means that educational opportunities are not limited to the rich but open to virtually everyone, and anyone who has qualifications in the case of the level of high school and above which has entrance examinations. For instance, tuition for National Taiwan University in undergraduate level is far less than that of Japanese universities (Moriwaka 1995, p. 82). Tuition for graduate level had been virtually free in National Taiwan University until 1993, when the administration of the university decided to change its policy (Moriwaka 1995, p. 82). This characteristic of educational system in Taiwan, in which the state leads the educational institution, has given relatively equal opportunities to everyone who may be in the different socio-economic status, with the low educational costs made possible by the institutions’ affiliation with the state.

The second character of the education in Taiwan is that the state tries to standardize the contents of educational curriculum. This standardization process has been led by the Ministry of Education, whose higher officials had been predominantly Mainlanders until the beginning of the process of "Taiwanization" in the 1970s and 1980s. This process, if basing arguments on Bourdieu’s thesis, could have led to the reproduction of cultural capital with significant level of cultural deprivation. In fact, at the outset of the process of educational expansion in Taiwan, Bourdieu’s argument seems to strongly hold. All subjects were taught in Mandarin (Kuoyu), which is the native language of the Mainlanders but not of the Taiwanese (Minnanese) -speaking Native Taiwanese people. The presence of this situation, in the beginning of educational expansion, in fact put many Taiwanese people in serious disadvantage in doing well in the educational system. However, as many people learn to speak Mandarin, this particular "culture" of the "dominant" class, in this case, the Mainlanders, came to be shared by the "deprived" Taiwanese. Moreover, the educational expansion started to serve as the key force to dismantle the Mainlanders’ privilege in the sphere of education. Thus, "Mandarin-speaking educated Taiwanese" were born, and this very group of people represented the increasing social force of native Taiwanese faced with the Mainlanders. In this sense, Bourdieu’s argument alone fails to explain the particular process of educational expansion in Taiwan.

To summarize, in the socio-cultural sphere, relatively egalitarian distribution of socio-cultural resources, as represented by the term "assimilative consumption" and also by the process of educational expansion, has been achieved in Taiwan, which in turn prepared the emergence of the socio-cultural symbolism of the middle classes around equality and homogeneity.

However, at the same time, as I have pointed out elsewhere in the above, when these socio-cultural factors are intermingled with the political factor of the "Chinese-ness"-"Taiwanese-ness" division, (n. 13) the issue of ethnicity comes into play. Hence, the socio-cultural symbolism of equality and homogeneity is by no means thought to be a complete phenomenon, especially as compared to the case of Japan.

Final Remarks

Many of the earlier modernization theories talked about democracy, development, equality and homogenization (and rationalization to add to the factors I pointed out in relation to the middle classes). My argument that the symbolism of the middle classes was acted out around the factors of democracy, development, equality and homogeneity shows clearly that the discussions on the middle classes have long resided within the thinking of modernity. In a sense, I was trying to show that the symbolism of the middle classes in the two societies was acted out in the spheres very much characterize the "modern" society. In Foucaultian sense, the common discursive formation at this level, that is, the symbolism around the factors of democracy, development, equality and homogeneity, was an undeniable product of modernity. In other words, the way of framing the discourse, or the discursive formation at this level was similar between the cases of Japan and Taiwan. However, at the same time and probably more importantly, as I have tried to show in the preceding pages, the content of the symbolism was largely affected by the distinctive factors of each society, and the symbolism of the middle classes has never converged between the two societies at this level. Again in Foucaultian paraphrase, there also existed two discursive formations distinctive to each of the two societies of Japan and Taiwan.

This paper was written keeping in mind a possibility of extending the observations to my future study of social stratification in the People’s Republic of China. Conversations with Chinese people reveal that the middle classes have not been clearly "discovered" in today’s Chinese society. However, especially in the coastal cities, where the economy is growing in a rapid pace, some of the features of the middle classes in terms of consumption and lifestyles seem to be appearing. In this connection, the study of the middle classes in relation to the overall social stratification structure of China will be a promising topic of study in the future. Especially, given the history regarding social stratification that, both in traditional China before the Communist Revolution in 1949 (recognized categories being, from higher to lower, Shi—scholars or gentry, Nong—agriculturalists, Gong—artisans, and Shang—merchants) and in Maoist China until the late 1970 (official categories being, for example in certain rural areas, from higher to lower, former poor-peasants, former middle peasants, former rich peasants, former landlords), society had always considered to be hierarchical in nature, the emergence and discovery of the middle classes may well change substantially the ways people understand the nature of equality/inequality, social stratification, and society in general.

 

Notes

* This is the first draft of a paper (thus, incomplete and to be revised) to be presented at the First International Graduate Student Retreat for Comparative Research organized by the Society for Comparative Research / Center for Comparative Social Analysis, UCLA, taking place in Los Angeles, California, May 8-9, 1999. Comments are greatly appreciated. Please direct correspondence to Seio Nakajima (E-mail: nakajima@socrates.berkeley.edu).

I will incorporate the usage "middle classes" instead of "middle class" since, as will be shown in the following, I recognize substantial differentiation within the "middle class" in Japan and Taiwan. This usage has been adopted by many of the investigators on the topic. See, for example, Hsiao (1993, p. 9).

2 The phrase itself is borrowed from the Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao’s edited book entitled Discovery of the Middle Classes in East Asia (Hsiao, ed. 1993).

3 For a more comprehensive discussion of the notion of discourse, see Foucault (1969=1972).

4 Appropriate definition of democracy would easily take a book. Here, I adopt a quite broad definition from a dictionary, as "a democracy (from the Greek, meaning "rule of the people") is a social system in which everyone has an equal share of power." (Johnson 1995, p. 73) In this connection, I include various social movements as an attempt for democratization or toward democracy in broader sense of the word, as well as including strictly political participation in a narrower definition of the word.

5 Minamata Disease was "found" around the Minamata Bay area of Kumamoto Prefecture in May 1956. It is a symptom of poisoning caused by industrial waste containing mercury. It is included in the "Four Large Pollution Diseases" others being Yokkaichi Asthma, Itai-Itai Byo, Ni’igata Minamata Disease, all of which have carried tremendous symbolic meanings as to the negative side of industrialization, and thus forces of critical reevaluation of Japanese development as a whole.

6 Kishimoto later published a book entitled Illusion of the Middle Class (Kishimoto 1978) elaborating on this argument of his.

7 As an "empirical" fact, this idea of "aggressive economic invasion" has been criticized at least in the case of Taiwan. It is not clear whether Takabatake is including Taiwan in Southeast Asia. However, it is worth while to consider alternative explanation of the idea. See Barret and Whyte (1982). See also Gold (1986) for more comprehensive examination on the development of Taiwan.

8 I basically use Wade-Giles romanization system, because it is still widely used in Taiwan, which is a primary focus of this research.

9 Let me describe some of the historical facts necessary to understand social situations of Taiwan including those around the formation of the middle classes.

In present-day Taiwan, the discourse of the "Four Major Ethnic Groups," in Chinese "ssuta tsuchun" is widespread. Constituents of the "Four Major Ethnic Groups" are the "Mainlanders" ("waishengjen"), "Native Taiwanese" ("penshengjen"), "Hakka" ("kechia"), and "Aboriginal People" ("Yuanchumin"). The Native Taiwanese are the people, and their descendants, who migrated from Mainland China to the island of Taiwan before 1945, when Japanese colonial government retreated from the island by the defeat in the Second World War, and Chinese government of Kuomintang took over power. The Mainlanders are the people who migrated from the mainland to Taiwan after 1945, especially in a few years after 1949, when the Nationalist government retreated from the mainland with its defeat in the civil war with Communist Party and moved into the island. There have been conflict and confrontation between these two ethnic groups in virtually every sphere of life, including political, economic, and socio-cultural, although the degree of conflict has certainly diminished, especially since the beginning of the process of democratization. Adding to the distinction between the Native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders, there is a demarcation within the group of Native Taiwanese. The Native Taiwanese includes Minnanjen (or sometimes called Fulaojen), who mainly came from the southern part of Fuchien Province in Mainland China, and Kechiajen, who mainly came from Kuangtung Province. Both ethnic groups have their own distinctive culture including language (Minnanjen speak Minnan dialect, and Kechiajen speak Kechia dialect), and have preserved their own ethnic identities. Also, there are the Aboriginal Taiwanese People, who basically belong to the Malay-Polynesian race, and have come to live in the island way before the migration of Han Chinese.

One estimate suggests the following figure (Yamada 1996, p. 20).

Total Population—20.94, Native Taiwanese—18.00 (86%) (Minnanjen—15.50 [74%], Hakka—2.50 [12%]), Mainlanders—2.00 (10%), Aboriginal Taiwanese—0.36 (2%). (at the end of 1993; in millions).

10 It is a doctrine put forward in the early twentieth century by Sun Yat-sen, "the father of Chinese revolution" and a founder of the Nationalist Party while the party was still in the Mainland China. The Principles included the Principle of the Nation, the Principle of the People, and the Principle of the People’s Livelihood, roughly corresponding to the notion of national independence, development of the rights of the people (or political equality and democracy), and enhancement of the people’s welfare by way of realizing economic and social equality. It is adopted by the Nationalist Party in Taiwan as an official doctrine of the state.

11 There may be, or should be controversy, on this "ethnic homogeneity of Japanese." Just for an example, Ainu people in Hokkaido (northern island of Japan) or people in Okinawa can be said to belong to distinctive ethnic groups. Also, again just for one example, so-called "Koreans in Japan" (Zainichi Kankoku-Chosen Jin), constitute an important ethnic group in today’s Japan. However, compared to the case of Taiwan, where, as indicated in the footnote 9 above, in numerical terms ethnic division is substantial, Japanese ethnic issue did not surface at least in relation to the discussions on the "Japanese middle classes." The number of "Koreans in Japan" is said to be about 700 thousand, which constitute about 0.5% of the total population. Again, however, I recognize the growing issue of ethnicity in contemporary Japan.

12 Coined, tentatively, by the author of this paper.

13 As is well-known, since the Nationalist government had officially claimed the "recovery" of the Mainland, they tried hard to preserve, or even to recreate, "Chinese-ness" on the island of Taiwan. Thus, cultural products associated with "Taiwanese-ness" had long been harshly prohibited until the process of Taiwanization in the late 1970s, especially until the beginning of political democratization in the 1980s. Just to take one example, the Nativist Literature Movement (Hsiang-t’u Wen-hsueh Lun-chan) began in the mid-1970s. The Nativist Literature was a literature concentrating on the hitherto "neglected" aspects of the daily life of the Taiwanese people. The government criticized this orientation toward "Taiwanese-ness" and tried to oppress the movement. However, the power and actuality of the movement could not be stopped, and the movement remained an important factor in the domain of Taiwan literature. See Wakabayashi (1992) for the importance of the Nativist Literature in broader political process of Taiwan democratization.

Also, even in the domain of "more" "popular" culture, for example, popular music, there is a distinction between Taiwanese pops, which are sung in Minnan dialect, and Chinese pops, which are sung in Mandarin. Of course, in the sphere of popular music, the issue of ethnicity is not always inscribed consciously. However, there still remains some force coming from, and related to the ethnic consciousness.

 

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