An Anatomy of Power

Michael Mann is one of the most influential sociologists of recent decades. His work has had a major impact in sociology, history, political science, international relations and other social science disciplines. His main work, *The Sources of Social Power*, of which two of three volumes have been completed, will provide an all-encompassing account of the history of power from the beginnings of stratified societies to the present day. Recently he has published two major works, *Fascists* and *The Dark Side of Democracy*. Yet unlike that of other contemporary social thinkers, Mann's work has not, until now, been systematically and critically assessed. This volume assembles a group of distinguished scholars to take stock, both of Mann's overall method and of his account of particular periods and historical cases. It also contains Mann's reply where he answers his critics and forcefully restates his position. This is a unique and provocative study for scholars and students alike.

JOHN A. HALL is Professor of Sociology at Dartmouth College. His books include *Powers and Liberties* (1985), *Liberalism* (1989), *Coercion and Consent* (1994) and (with Charles Lindholm) *Is America Breaking Apart?* (2001).

RALPH SCHROEDER is a Research Fellow at the Oxford Internet Institute at the University of Oxford. His books include *Max Weber and the Sociology of Culture* (1992) and, as editor, *Max Weber, Democracy and Modernization* (1998).

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The Social Theory of Michael Mann

Edited by

John A. Hall

Ralph Schroeder

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16 The sources of social power revisited: a response to criticism

Michael Mann

I feel honoured by this volume and indebted to the contributors for their praise and their criticism. Having long avoided reflecting on my methodology, I thank Joseph Bryant for revealing it to me and then defending it. Randall Collins gives an incisive account of the substance of my model of the four sources of social power (ideological, economic, military and political) and its location amid other sociological theories. As he says, my power sources are distinct in not being abstract but embodied in real networks of people. These have emergent properties giving them some causal autonomy, though they do not amount to 'logics of development', since they are also closely entwined. I do not focus on power resources held by individuals – unlike Bourdieu's model of economic, cultural, political and social forms of power. I focus on differences between the four networks, unlike most forms of 'network theory' (e.g. mathematical modelling or Castells' 'network society'). The closest parallel, as Collins observes, is with the new economic sociology emphasizing networks of economic connection. As he says, the same job could be done on ideological, military and political power. I also retain my distinctions between 'collective' and 'distributive', 'intensive' and 'extensive', 'diffuse' and 'authoritative', and 'infrastructural' and 'despotic' power, and I use them below.

I reject sociology's foundational notion of 'society' because the boundaries of the four power sources rarely coincide. Despite the increasing 'caging' of people within modern nation-states (noted in *Sources*, Vol. II), these have never been powerful enough to constitute whole 'societies'. Human activity comprises multiple, overlapping, intersecting networks of social interaction. This model has become widely accepted since I initially advanced it. It enables us to identify the root of social change, since plural power organizations can never be entirely institutionalized or insulated from influences coming 'interstitially' from cracks within and between them. Social change results from a dialectic between the institutionalization and the interstitial emergence of power networks.

I oppose all systems theory, all holism, all attempts to reify 'societies'. These make the 'totality' of social interaction into an actor in its own right.

But there is no totality. So Robert Brenner is right to pick me up for my remarks in Volume I of *Sources* suggesting that Europe in the Middle Ages was a single society. All I actually demonstrated was that Christendom was then a real network of interaction (though I did underestimate its links with Islam and Asia). There is no singular 'world system', no singular process of globalization; no multi-state 'system' dominated by a singular 'realist' logic; no logic of patriarchy. History is not the history of class struggle, or of modes of production, or of 'epistemes' or 'discursive formations', cultural codes or underlying structures of thought governing the language, values, science and practices of an era, underpinned by a singular process of power enveloping all human activity.[1] These systems theories succeed in capturing theorists not social reality.

I also oppose mono-causal theories. Explicit ones are now rare, though implicit ones abound, the unintended consequence of academic specialization. Economists tend to elevate the economy (though today many also embrace 'institutions' which are obviously more diverse), political scientists politics (though today often embracing economistic models). Many sociologists are also surprisingly economistic. In analysing globalization, many content themselves with analysing changes in the structure of capitalism, assuming these will change social life as a whole. Conversely, since 'the cultural turn' many confine themselves to ideological and cultural analysis. This is no better. Globalization involves economies, cultures, and also nation-states (there are now over 190 of them) and organizations dedicated to mass destruction. Globalization involves all four types of network and is therefore a plural and 'impure' process.

Ideally, any sociologist analysing macro-topics would always discuss all four sources of social power. If sociological theory is to be of any use at all, it must be both empirically based and cover the breadth of human experience. Of course, juggling four balls at once through world-history is ludicrous over-ambition, and I drop one of them from time to time (most of my critics say I am prone to fumble ideology).

I begin by discussing general criticisms of ideological, military and political power. Then I turn to more empirical issues, beginning with ethnic cleansing and then at greater length discussing Europe's 'miraculous' economic development and brief global dominance, focusing on comparisons with Asia/China. Finally, I offer some theoretical and normative conclusions.

Ideological power

My view of ideological power is said to be too materialist, too instrumental and too rationalist. Though in principle my model is none of these

things, my practice has sometimes faltered. I prefer the term 'ideology' to 'culture' or 'discourse' not because I view ideologies as false or a cover for interests, as materialists tend to say. By ideology I mean only a broad-ranging meaning system which 'surpasses experience'. 'Culture' and 'discourse' are too all-encompassing, covering the communication of all beliefs, values and norms, even sometimes all 'ideas' about anything. When used so generally, they presuppose a contrast between only two realms, the 'ideal' and the 'material', leading to the traditional debate between idealism and materialism. The material might be conceived of as nature as opposed to culture, or the economic base versus the superstructure, or joint economic/military interests (as in IR 'realism'), as opposed to 'constructivism', or even as 'structure' as opposed to 'agency'.

These dualist debates are perennial but sterile. After a period dominated by materialist theories of everything, we now have cultural theories of everything. In my recent work I have noted how 'nation' and 'ethnicity' have largely replaced 'class' as objects of research; they are said to be 'cultural', whereas classes are said to be 'material'; they are usually discussed without any reference to classes; and 'cultural' and 'ethno-symbolist' have largely replaced 'materialist' theories of nations and ethnicities. Thirty years ago fascism was explained in relation to capitalism and classes; now it is seen as a 'political religion'. My books *Fascists* and *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing* suggest that this is not progress, but a shift among equally one-sided theories. Since I offer a four-sided theory, I win 4–1.

I have occasionally given the impression of being a materialist by (1) using the word 'material' when I should have written 'concrete' or 'real' (critics quote some of these passages); (2) endorsing John Hall's and Perry Anderson's description of my theory as 'organizational materialism'; (3) emphasizing the 'logistics' and 'infrastructures' of ideology; and (4) declaring (1986: 471–2; 1993: 35) that ideological power had declined during the long nineteenth century, and that the extensive power of religion had continued to decline since, in the face of rising secular ideologies like socialism and nationalism.

Having now researched twentieth- and twenty-first-century fascism, ethno-nationalism and religious fundamentalism I disown the second part of (4) above, and accept that these centuries have so far been highly ideological. I accept Gorski's criticism that religion has not generally declined in the world. I was generalizing only on the basis of traditional Christian faiths in Europe, which still are declining. Edgar Kiser is also right to see me moving towards greater recognition of value- and emotion-driven behaviour. I have sometimes been too rationalistic about earlier periods. Joseph Bryant rightly says I give early Christianity too

rational a content, at the expense of its mysticism, its superstitions and its prejudices. A universal doctrine of rational salvation cannot alone explain why 3,500 Christians chose martyrdom under the Emperor Diocletian – nor the conduct of Islamist or nationalist suicide bombers today. And Frank Trentmann is right to say I neglected the religious content of eighteenth-century English politics.

Yet John Hobson is wrong to see me as a materialist in the realist sense, as opposed to the idealist 'constructivism' he advocates. I have no objection to 'constructivists' whether in International Relations or sociology repeating that inter-subjective ideas, norms and values are important influences on human action, that actors' identities and interests are socially constructed, and that structures and agents are mutually constructed (Reus-Smit 2002: 129–34; cf. Brubaker 1996: ch. 1). Yes – but some human constructs then become reified as institutions and social structure, socializing and constraining later actors. Sociologists from Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann to Anthony Giddens have called this the duality of action and structure. Idealist and materialist theories are equally simplistic by comparison.

My model abandons the distinction between ideas and materiality in favour of one between 'ideas-and-practices combined' (or 'action and structure combined') in each of four power networks. Yet one, the ideological, is clearly more idea-heavy than the others. It comprises networks of persons bearing ideologies which cannot be proved true or false, couched at a sufficient level of generality to be able to give 'meaning' to a range of human actions in the world – as religions, socialism and nationalism all do, for example. They also contain norms, rules of inter-personal conduct which are 'sacred', strengthening conceptions of collective interest and cooperation, reinforced, as Durkheim said, by rituals binding people together in repeated affirmations of their commonality. So those offering plausible ideologies can mobilize social movements, and wield a general power in human societies analogous to powers yielded by control over economic, military and political power resources.

Hobson and Reus-Smit say this is too instrumental, since it is concerned with power as means not ends and so neglects the content of ideologies. Trentmann says I emphasize control over meaning systems at the expense of the production of meaning. These accusations puzzle me. When I discuss Sumerian or Christian religion, or nationalism, fascism, 'Hutu Power' or American neoconservatism, I do discuss their content, since powerful ideologies are those whose content gives plausible meaning to people's lives. I do not claim to discuss *all* ideas, values, norms and rituals, only those mobilized in macro-power struggles. Ralph Schroeder gives my defence of this neglect: ideas can't *do* anything unless they are

organized. This is why the label 'organizational materialism' still seems apposite, for ideas are not free-floating. Nor are economic acquisition, violence or political regulation – they all need organizing. This is all I mean by the term organizational materialism.

Since ideologies surpass experience, they provide a bridge between reason, morality and emotion. Successful ones 'make sense' to their initiates but also require and evoke a leap of faith, an emotional commitment. There must be a truth content, since an ideology would not spread otherwise, but the perception that it makes sense tugs morally and emotionally as well as scientifically. Science alone lacks this power, being 'cold' and subject to cold refutation. Jack Snyder succinctly explains in this volume why groups infused with ideological fervour are more powerful than those who lack it. I find his analysis accurate and impressive.

I distinguished two main types of ideology, 'transcendent' and 'immanent'. These terms were taken from theology, where they indicate two types of divine presence or spark. I wanted in fact to suggest that an ideology can have a presence or spark capable of moving human beings to act outside, and then defining, instrumental means–ends calculations.

Transcendent ideologies are the most powerful, with a more universal appeal, capable of breaking through divisions between established power networks – and across classes, genders, regions and states – by appealing to interstitially emergent common identities, interests and emotions generated by social change. The world religions did this most of all. More recently socialism, fascism, nationalism and religious 'fundamentalism' have also claimed transcendent visions and have drawn into an emergent collective network people from across the boundaries of different institutionalized power networks. Socialist movements helped create broader class identities than had hitherto existed, nationalists helped create nations bridging existing class and regional divisions. This also helped give both types of collectivity a moral belief and emotional confidence in their own world-historical role.

Immanent ideologies strengthen the moral and emotional solidarity and force of existing power networks. This is not merely 'ideological reproduction' as Althusser and the early Bourdieu used to say. For it may be the enhanced morale given by an ideology which enables an army to be victorious (as Gorski suggests was so of Cromwell's New Model Army), or it may enable a movement claiming to speak for a class to effect a revolution.

Since these are ideal-types, ideologies may be more or less one or the other. Influential ones tend to contain elements of both. At election times most politicians attempt 'the vision thing' (in the inimitable words of President Bush the Elder), though (like him) their vision tends to be

minimal and pragmatic. But even the most visionary ideologies are not born immanent or transcendent. They become so after complex social processes involving coalition-building and instrumental perceptions of what will work as well as more intuitive or principled elements.

I now add a third residual type, *institutionalized ideologies*, indicating only a minimal presence of ideological power. These are conservative and pragmatic, endorsing ideas, values, norms and rituals which serve to preserve present social order. They believe that emerging conflicts can be mediated successfully by compromises embedded in present institutions. At the borderline are ideologies like Thatcherism and social democracy, which (as John Hall says) are mildly transcendental. Though they work through present institutions, they have a vision of a better society. The essence of institutionalized ideologies is recognition that progress lies through compromise and pragmatism, so that 'dirty' back-stairs dealing must compromise their values. That is what most politicians in democracies know above all else (and what they cannot quite openly admit before their supporters and electorates). But in parallel fashion, the masses comply less because they believe the existing social order is morally right than because they live in it and habitually reproduce it through their actions. This is their *habitus*, as Bourdieu says: they have internalized cultural dispositions to act, think and feel in certain ways which lie below formal consciousness. Institutionalized ideologies are closer to the anthropologists' conception of 'culture' as the ideas, values, etc. that pervade everyday social practices.

I embrace as a virtue Hobson's accusation that my treatment of ideology is 'sporadic' – in the sense that the importance of ideological power fluctuates greatly according to time and place. Though Trentmann stresses the significance of religion in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century England, I doubt he denies my main point: religious ideologies were most intense (being genuinely transcendent) in the seventeenth century, then they declined through the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Institutionalized ideologies are 'thin', in Hobson's sense, immanent ones are moderately thick, giving actors powers they would otherwise not have possessed. Transcendent ones are the thickest, constituting collective actors and interests and achieving major structural changes. Their construction is not an everyday occurrence, of course, at least not at the macro-level.

Emerging interstitial networks generate an explicit search for meaning. This happens where crises threaten the everyday routine of institutionalized networks and ideologies. In response, institutionalized elites begin to divide. Liberals may urge compromises with emerging discontented groups, conservatives intensify traditional values mixed with pragmatic

repression. If crisis deepens, radical ideologists emerge, developing, through struggles, more general meaning-systems surpassing practical experience and claiming to be able to solve the present crisis. If institutionalized elites remain divided, radicals may achieve more intensive and extensive popular mobilization. This happens interstitially, since many people from different social networks are now forced into conscious reflection on the *impasse*, coming to similar conclusions. As Jack Goldstone (1999) has said of revolutions, while initial opposition to the institutionalized order may be largely explicable in terms of narrow instrumental interests, the creation of an alternative order requires general ideological visions going beyond direct self-interest and presenting a plausible way of overcoming the existing crisis.

One classic example comes from Marxian and Weberian interpretations of the rise of Protestant capitalism. Marx stressed the rise of the bourgeoisie, a new class emerging interstitially from diverse backgrounds. Some began as prominent merchant families, others as gentry, yeomen or even peasant farmers, engaging in more capitalistic farming, others were traders and artisans taking goods between producers and consumers. Though their behaviour was converging, they did not initially conceive of themselves as being the same sort of people at all. Weber focused on the common problems of meaning they faced, making moral sense of lending and borrowing, establishing rational accountancy practices, and socializing labour discipline. He noted how the ideology of Calvinism gave religious meaning and virtue to these practices, though he recognized in principle that this was a two-way process, with capitalistic practices also encouraging Calvinism. Through this mixed transcendent–immanent process a new collective actor emerged: a self-conscious Protestant bourgeoisie, pioneering capitalism, fighting for its political rights, even fighting revolutions and civil wars. Often it had higher morale than its opponents, derived from religious commitment.

In *Sources* I added geopolitics, adding the princes of Northwest Europe as interstitial power actors. They had been hitherto marginal, dependent actors in European geopolitics, yet their economic and naval power resources were growing. Removing religious legitimacy from Rome meant release from the power of France, Spain and Austria. This is why the moment that Luther nailed his defiant theses to the door of Wittenberg Church, the Elector of Saxony sprang to protect him – and the Thirty Years' War became inevitable. Thus the Protestant/Catholic divide across Europe resulted as interstitial economic, political and military power resources were (originally unintentionally) mobilized by divines grown ideologically discontented within the Church – a brief example of my model in action.

Fascists seeks to explain the emergence of the first mass fascist movements in response to the European crisis generated by World War I. This was less severe in countries where liberal representative government was already institutionalized before 1914. Their elites could absorb post-war crises, blending centre-left pragmatic reformism and centre-right ad hoc repression. They gradually adapted their institutionalized ideologies with elements of social and Christian democracy. Here institutionalized ideologies held the upper hand.

It was different in the semi-authoritarian monarchies destabilized by the war and the brand new states created out of the ruins of collapsed Empires. These were all 'dual regimes' (half-constitutional, half-authoritarian), lacking the routine institutions and mass compliance for coping. Both proved more vulnerable to emerging fascist movements. These were distinctively classless, their original core forming from soldiers of all ranks demobilized in 1918. They confronted the crises with plausible ideological solutions drawn essentially from their experience of military power during the war. They saw discipline, comradeship and national unity as the keys to modern social progress. This was the kernel of fascism, a transcendent nation-statist ideology. In Germany, Italy and Austria fascists could mobilize more mass emotional commitment and violence than could conservatives, liberals or socialists. But where conservatives maintained firmer control of military and political power, they were able to suppress the fascists, though taking the precaution of stealing fascist ideological clothing. The authoritarian regimes of Antonescu (in Romania) and Franco (in Spain) purported to be 'traditional', but actually their fascist-derived corporatism was a new immanent ideology of the right. Here we see institutionalized, transcendent and immanent ideologies struggling against each other in one period and continent.

Too much optimism pervaded some of my earlier discussions of ideologies. I dwelt on 'progressive' ideologies that improved the world, stressing their creation of collective more than distributive power, as Gorski and Bryant observe. Early Christianity was levelling and universal; medieval Christianity brought normative pacification; nationalism transcended classes. Gorski (drawing on Foucault) instead emphasizes the distributive disciplinary power of Calvinism. He suspects 'discipline' also loomed larger in the normative pacification provided by Christendom. He may be correct. With fascism, communism and ethno-nationalism in mind, I now see clearly that world-transforming ideologies contain both collective and distributional power, and do both good and harm. On the whole I prefer mildly transcendental ideologies, offering a vision of a better, though limited and not ideal future. I return to this later.

Political and military power

Gianfranco Poggi criticizes my separation of military from political power, cleverly forcing me into considering them together. He refines arguments voiced in his book *Forms of Power* (2001). He notes that the separation makes me a deviant among theorists, though perhaps my real deviance is to discuss military power at all. Poggi says that since 'force and fear' underlie political power, it is redundant to identify a separate military power deploying exactly these resources. I will flatly reject this, arguing that the two have diametrically opposed qualities.

In *Sources* I defined military power as 'the social organization of physical force in the form of concentrated coercion'. Reflecting on Poggi's criticism, I realize that 'coercion' was not strong enough. Webster's dictionary allows 'coerce' to mean 'compel to an act or choice', or 'bring about by force or threat'. This could refer to workers threatened with dismissal, or priests cowed into silence by their bishops. I should have defined military power as *the social organization of concentrated lethal violence*. 'Concentrated' means mobilized and focused, 'lethal' means deadly. Webster defines 'violence' as 'exertion of physical force so as to injure or abuse', or 'intense, turbulent, or furious and often destructive action or force'. These are the senses I wish to convey: military force is focused, physical, furious, lethal violence. This is why it evokes the psychological emotion and physiological symptoms of fear, as we confront the serious possibility of agonizing pain, dismemberment, or death. Poggi and I agree that this is a distinctive and important experience of power in human societies.

Poggi, however, relates it to politics, drawing on Popitz and Schmitt for support, though they were discussing the extremely violent politics of inter-war Germany. Schmitt became a Nazi, of course. He feared that mass (working-class) parties would vote *en bloc* in disciplined military fashion (his metaphor) and be unable to engage in constructive debate and compromise. With the example of the Bolshevik Revolution before him, he concluded that liberal democracy could not survive the onset of mass society. Politics required an authoritarian centre as protection against class warfare. Schmitt embraced steadily more militaristic models of politics, since force must be met by force. So his definition of politics as 'dividing friend from foe' reflected not the essence of politics, but its descent into militarism.

Military power holders say, 'If you resist, you die.' Such a lethal threat from armed persons is terrifying. The very unpredictability of who will end up as a corpse adds its own terrors. Though bombing or storming a city never kills everyone, the inhabitants all fear they might be one of the

victims. Military power is not confined to armies. Lesser organized, lethal violence comes from gangs of paramilitaries, criminals or youths. I have written this chapter in two cities, Los Angeles and Belfast. In both of them lethal armed gangs remain active. Since 1980 about 25,000 people in the US have died in gang warfare, over twice as many as in the Afghan war of 2001–2002. 'Only' 3,700 have died in the conflicts in Northern Ireland over the last three decades, though many more have been beaten up or knee-capped.

Very few rules govern the deployment of military power. The 'rules of war' are precarious in all ages – as we have recently seen in Afghanistan, Iraq and Guantanamo Bay. The paucity of rules or norms is unlike economic or ideological power – and especially unlike political power, as we see in a moment. Military power also has distinctive internal organization. It combines the apparent opposites of hierarchy and comradeship, intense physical discipline and *esprit de corps*. This is so that soldiers will not respond with flight when they face the prospect of terror themselves. Only where social movements actually begin to physically fight do they develop such intense and peculiar solidarity. This is what made fascists tougher than their socialist rivals. Alcohol and drugs are often also administered, to dampen down combatants' own terror. They are not administered to political officials. Power exercised within military organization tends to be somewhat despotic and arbitrary, though tempered by shared comradeship and morale. And military power wielded over outsiders is the most despotic and arbitrary power imaginable.

I continue to define political power as centralized, territorial regulation of social life. Only the state has this centralized-territorial spatial form. Here I deviate from Weber, who located political power (or 'parties') in any organization, not just states. Most sociologists have ignored him and used the term only for state-oriented activity, though recent use by political scientists of the term 'governance' revives Weber's viewpoint. Governance may be administered by all kinds of bodies, including feudal manors and guilds, and modern corporations, NGOs and social movements. I prefer to keep the term 'political' for the state – including, of course, local and regional as well as national-level government. In feudalism, it becomes difficult to identify where states end and class organization begins, which Brenner makes some play of. But states and not NGOs and others have the centralized-territorial form which makes its rules authoritative for anyone within its territories. I can resign membership of an NGO and so flaunt its 'rules'. I am absolutely required to obey the rules of the state in whose territory I reside, and changes of citizenship are uncommon and rule-governed. 'Governance' is increasing in the world, but I prefer to discuss its non-state aspects in the context of

ideological, economic and military organizations (with some geopolitical exceptions I mention later).

Weber said the modern state possessed a monopoly of legitimate violence, though I prefer a monopoly of institutionalized violence. Political rituals and routines, rather than normative legitimacy, makes actual violence minimal. They go together with institutionalized ideologies, occurring when violence, like ideology, is minimal. Regulation exercised from centre through territories, rather than either legitimacy (ideology) or violence (military), is the key function of the state. Its key apparatuses concern law and rule-governed political deliberations in centralized courts, councils, assemblies and ministries. But as Linda Weiss emphasizes, the state is not only laws and rules but also informal coordination between officials and representatives of domestically powerful groups. As she says, the most effective states generate the intense infrastructural and collective power she terms 'governed interdependence'. Infrastructural power is the essence of the routinized powers of states, while the exercise of despotic power is a sign of a weaker state. The part of social life which is intensely, routinely regulated and coordinated in a centralized and territorial fashion concerns networks of political power. In these senses political is the very opposite of military power.

I now confront two objections: behind law and coordination lies physical force; and states deploy armies, especially abroad in space which is not nearly so rule-governed. Both obviously contain some truth. Behind law does lie physical force, but in most states it lies well back and is not usually mobilized into lethal action. Political force is usually evoked first as a ritualized, machine-like, rule-governed and non-violent constraint. I reject Poggi's notion that when facing the state and its force we normally feel 'vulnerability to death and suffering'. I start with the easiest case for my argument, contemporary Western states. Here politics are overwhelmingly pragmatic, ritualized and non-violent. Regimes change with ceremony, not force.

True, crime and dissent may bring more forceful retribution in the form of ritualized coercion. But as Durkheim noted, our law is more restitutive than repressive, and it allocates punishment along agreed sliding scales. If found guilty of minor offences, we may receive only a probationary sentence or a financial penalty. For more serious offences punishment escalates, and we may be coercively deprived of our liberty. But unless we physically resist, incarceration remains ritualized and non-violent – we are handcuffed and placed in a locked cell. Our main fears are of public shame, of being trapped in an oppressive judicial machine, of losing wealth, or of being coercively confined. Terror is not the most appropriate word for our sentiments, unless perhaps we face

the death penalty or a life sentence. A Republican or Loyalist activist in Belfast may feel terror when confronted in the street by the Irish Republican Army, the Ulster Volunteer Force, the paramilitary Royal Ulster Constabulary (now the PNSI), or the British Army, but after being arrested, different emotions will be aroused by the police and judicial authorities (unless torture is feared). This is the force of rules, not furious violence.

Strikes and political dissent sometimes invoke rough stuff from paramilitary and police forces. But Los Angelenos typically feel more fear when straying into unfamiliar 'ghettos' with alien gangs supposedly lurking nearby, than when picketing factories or marching against war; similarly for Belfast Republicans straying into Loyalist areas, or vice versa. They feel they understand and so can play around the edges of the rituals of police violence more easily than with those of gang or paramilitary warfare. You can't play games with the IRA or the UVF, but you can (much of the time) with the British or Irish governments.

States sometimes repress more violently, but usually in graded escalations. In the first, the police employ non-lethal riot tactics, causing injuries but rarely deaths. In the second stage, mixed police, paramilitary and army units will escalate shows of force. They broadcast threats, shoot in the air, and make demonstrative advances armed with low lethality weapons – riot armour and clubs, tear gas, rubber bullets, the blunt edge of cavalry sabres, carbines rather than automatic weapons, etc. In the third, military, stage the armed forces take over, exacting exemplary repression by killing as ruthlessly as they consider necessary, in order to terrorize the others. Here we see the escalation from political through mixed to military power relations.

Many states are more violent and/or despotic. Nonetheless, most still try to institutionalize their power. Royal prerogatives were exercised most effectively when they were not arbitrary, but predictable, conforming to established norms in consultation with the main regional power-brokers. Royal courts, baronial councils, city-state oligarchies, estate assemblies, etc. had their rituals and norms. The prevalence of rules among those who counted politically means that truly despotic power was usually mitigated by more routinized infrastructures. Despotism was a term of abuse, meaning power was illegitimate because arbitrary. The main institutional weakness of monarchy was well understood – a disputed succession or an erratic, incompetent monarch, either of which *in extremis* might lead to civil war – a move from political to military power. Of course, many historic states dealing with crime or dissent used violence more routinely, but this was usually against the lower orders, not politically recognized personages. Public beatings and limb amputations were

part of this sliding scale, while police and state paramilitaries often tortured, sometimes in public. But for persons of substance, such punishments usually followed after legal forms or consultations were followed – either a trial or an inquisition with rules or a deal struck with families of substance.

Of course, the most violent and arbitrary states leap right over any divide between political and military power. Nazis, Stalinists, Maoists and Catholic Grand Inquisitors killed large numbers of people whose only crime was being defined as possessing an 'enemy' identity (as Jew, kulak, landlord, heretic, etc.). Any legal forms were phoney. An Ivan the Terrible or a Timur raised terror to an art-form. These cases blur political and military power. But all the power sources sometimes blur into each other. Economic and political power blurred in the Soviet Union. Many African states straddle the borderline between the two: state officials control most of the economy but operate under corrupt capitalist principles, while control over the para-statal economy generates much political struggle, being an important cause of the Rwandan genocide of 1994, for example (see *Dark Side*, ch. 15). But these cases do not negate the utility of distinguishing between political and economic power. Nor do very violent states negate the division between political and military power.

The second objection is that states deploy armies, which are often the most powerful armed forces. Nonetheless, civil and military administrations are normally separated, military castes and coups are distinctive phenomena, and many armed forces are not state-organized. Most tribal military federations were stateless; while most feudal levies, knightly orders, private merchant armies (like the British East India Company) and most insurgent and guerrilla forces were substantially independent of states. Some modern paramilitary formations have had closer links to political parties than the state, like the Hutu Interahamwe or the Nazi SA, while the Italian fascist party emerged out of a paramilitary. Most terrorists are stateless, as are bandits and criminal and youth gangs. Such military formations are widespread across the world today, enjoying great success in challenging the armies of states. Only rarely since World War II have the latter defeated guerrillas. Poggi is trying to merge political and military power precisely when most warfare is not between states. Since 1945 inter-state wars have declined, and intra-state wars – civil wars – now form the majority of wars, causing the majority of victims. Some call this 'the new warfare', but actually it is a revival of very old human social organization. All the military groups I have identified deploy arbitrary terror against outsiders, and within they cultivate discipline, comradeship and *esprit de corps*. Moreover, as Schroeder says,

military power conquers new territories, whereas political power can only rule within.

A state may wield different military and political capacities. Germany has much more political than military power, the United States has the reverse. The US is the greatest military power in the world. In 2003 it conquered the whole of Iraq within twenty-four days. Its generals used the typical strategy of armies enjoying superior offensive fire-power: concentrate it on the enemy's command-and-control centres, seize and hold strategic communications routes and then take the capital. The US did this very effectively, even without significant allies on the ground. Give-or-take a siege or two, it is how the European empires also conquered their colonies. But American political powers are puny by comparison with theirs. The US lacked international political allies, but more critical was its failure to find political allies within Iraq. Apart from Kurdish forces in the north, it lacked allies who could mobilize patron–client networks on the ground. Ignoring the experience of past empires, it has relied for pacification and policing on its own soldiers, and so its apparatus of control remained highly lethal. Its 'police' are soldiers armed with M-16/M-4 semi-automatic weapons, calling in tanks, artillery and air-strikes. Such weapons produce mayhem, mangled and maimed bodies, and male, female, infant and elderly victims. This is the way to conquer armies and terrorize peoples, but not to police them or establish the rule of law (or to win them over ideologically). Here the distinction between military and political power is critical to an understanding of the abject American failure in Iraq. I see my book *Incoherent Empire* as a policy pay-off from my model, for I predicted the disasters which would ensue if an occupation and restructuring of Iraq (or Afghanistan) were attempted by a United States deploying massive military offensive fire-power, stingy economic budgeting, and wholly inadequate political and ideological power resources.

John Hobson says that I have tended to equate international relations with geopolitics. Initially I did, but not since introducing two refinements. First, I distinguished between 'inter-national' and 'transnational' relations. Inter-national relations (always with a hyphen) are relations between states or between groups organized within each state – like national football associations organized into FIFA, for example. Transnational relations transcend the boundaries of states, passing through them without reference to state power. I used the distinction mainly when discussing globalization, which blends both. I could have usefully deployed them when analysing earlier multi-power actor civilizations like Sumer or Greece. Their individual city-states shared in a common 'civilization' which was predominantly transnational, and they

also conducted inter-national relations, including going to war with each other (though the word 'national' would be strictly anachronistic before modern times).

Second, I distinguished 'hard' from 'soft' geopolitics. 'Hard geopolitics' are matters of war and the avoidance of war; 'soft geopolitics' are inter-state agreements concerning non-lethal matters like law, the economy, health, education, the environment, etc. If the essence of political power is authoritative rule-making and enforcement, while that of military power is rule-light lethal violence, then hard and soft geopolitics must be separated into, respectively, military and political power. Soft geopolitics involve agreements between states often setting up inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) which write the fine print, police conformity and punish breaches. Soft geopolitics politicize inter-national space, i.e. to submit it to routinized regulation, whereas hard geopolitics militarize it.

True, inter-national space is rarely as rule-governed as national space (though it is not anarchic, as realists sometimes say). We use the term 'trade war' to indicate a rivalry, in which, for example, in 2002 the US arbitrarily slapped tariffs on foreign steel imports, and the EU responded – as it was entitled to do under WTO rules – with counter-tariffs on a range of US exports. But while the WTO legal machinery ground slowly, it did grind towards fining the US millions of dollars for its tariffs. In this case the US evaded the fine by abolishing the offending tariffs in 2004. Since the WTO is ultimately a voluntary body, the US could refuse to pay and withdraw from it, but the advantages of membership are too great. Of course, some agreements are not enforceable at all. The Kyoto Treaty on Global Warming may be reneged on without punishment. It involved norms rather than laws, a much weaker level of political power. But overall, IGOs are part of politics.

In contrast, the 'hardest' of geopolitics involve wars or deterring wars, which are expressions of military power relations. So too are threats of war, and sanctions and blockades which inflict death and suffering, and so are alliances to build up one bloc's military strength against others. Alliances to preserve peace may blur the difference, though since they are characteristically insecure and changeable, they are less rule-governed than soft geopolitics. Once again, politics is about rules, routinization and the relative dominance of infrastructural over despotic power, whereas military power is rule-light, arbitrary and essentially despotic.

But concepts are only valid if they help explain the real world. Are there military, as opposed to political, phenomena? At the beginning of the twenty-first century, despite IGOs and NGOs and a supposed 'transnational civil society', the world remains lethal. One in six states are riven by civil wars, and there are purportedly twenty million

Kalashnikovs in use around the world. The US has military bases in over one hundred countries and has invaded two countries in the last three years. Over eighty countries collaborate in its 'war against terrorism' – because international terrorists have killed the citizens of over eighty countries. The US has 1.4 million men and women in its armed forces, though this is smaller than the 1.6 million employed in the US private security industry – a disproportion found also in Britain. There are 'no-go' areas for the police in many supposedly advanced and pacified countries. Isn't it time more social scientists studied organized, furious, lethal violence? We are human beings, mobilized into social groups, perennially prone to attack each other violently. Not everyone can sublimate violence into academic polemic.

Explaining murderous ethnic cleansing

Which brings me to David Laitin's polemic against my treatment of ethnic violence. My provocative title, *The Dark Side of Democracy*, seems to have enraged him, since it is the only possible source for his main claim that I say democracies commit murderous ethnic cleansing. On pages 2–4 of the book I explain my title in the form of one principal thesis and five sub-theses. The last two of these say that institutionalized democracies do not commit murderous cleansing, except for some settler states, and that by definition a democracy cannot murder a large number of its own citizens. So I *never* simply say that democracies commit murderous ethnic cleansing. Nor is it correct that 'on through the text, Mann associates the most grievous murderous violations of human rights with democracy'. Since I do not say such things, I *never* retreat to a 'watered-down version' of them. I do think there are connections between the two, or I would not have chosen this title. So let me explain what they are.

The book lays out eight principal theses (as well as the five sub-theses) which proceed successively from the most general causes to the most concrete processes of cleansing. After presenting them, I acknowledge (on pages 9–10) that they are only empirical tendencies, with exceptions. Nor do I present a large sample of cases. This is thick analysis of a few cases, able to bring out the unique features and causal processes of each.

My first thesis says that murderous ethnic cleansing is modern because it is the dark side of democracy – it does not say that democracies commit murderous ethnic cleansing. I go on to explain what this means. First, cleansing is modern, rarely found in large-scale human groups in former times. It does seem to have occurred in some conflicts between the kinds of small and simple human groups studied by anthropologists, and there was a larger exception perpetrated by a certain type of conqueror-settler,

to which I will return. Laitin says my overarching claim is 'trivially true', showing he is not familiar with the literature. Most writers on genocide see it as a perennial feature of the human condition. I quote some of them. I also have some local news for him from LSE, where present scholars Anthony Smith and John Hutchinson have overturned the old LSE (Kedourie/Gellner) orthodoxy (which Laitin and I apparently share). They say that ethnic solidarities and conflicts are not exclusively modern, but 'perennial'. I quote them too. I expect some of these scholars will criticize my book. If they do, they will regard my argument not as trivial but important – and false.

The main reason I give for my modernist position is that ethnicity, though present in all eras, was much less important to power relations in former times than was class. Rulers and ruled were so divided by class that this outweighed any common ethnic identity they shared (most shared none). This invokes my second thesis: murderous ethnic cleansing only occurs where ethnicity dominates class, with class-like sentiments of exploitation channelled into ethno-nationalism. Atrocities were rarely committed by one ethnic group against another. I show, for example, that the Assyrians' worst atrocities amounted to 'exemplary repression' not 'genocide', as many have said. Thus, for example, some Jews or Babylonians were killed in order to get the majority to comply with Assyrian rule. Even Assyrian deportations had pragmatic economic and political goals, with no desire to 'cleanse' whole ethnic groups from their homelands. They killed and deported many people, but for different purposes.

My historical argument continues through a pre-modern phase of mid-level religious cleansing generated by ideologies of 'democratization of the soul but not the body'. Then came the crunch: modernity in Europe brought the notion of (political) 'rule by the people'. This ideology transcended class divisions once it referred to 'the whole people'. It did not initially do so in the liberal countries. There 'the people' initially meant only adult male property-owners, and so the emerging nation was 'stratified' and diverse – again nation did not transcend class. This happy accident meant that representative government was gradually extended class by class and from men to women, so that the whole of an ethnic group (or of multiple ethnic groups) was admitted to a common citizenship only after liberal democracy was already substantially institutionalized. Major 'cleansing' happened in some of these countries (I instance Britain and France), but generally through more peaceful, institutional means.

Yet through the nineteenth century the ideal spread of rule by the 'whole people', which is really what we mean by democracy. But this

might confuse two different root words of 'the people', the Greek terms *demos* and *ethnos*. In multi-ethnic contexts, rule by the whole people might mean only rule by a dominant or majority ethnic group. This became especially problematic in the authoritarian Romanov, Habsburg and Ottoman empires, where insurgence might be in the name of rule by either all citizens or the locally dominant *ethnos*. I then trace the latter notion into 'organic' nationalism, which sees the people as one and indivisible and demands 'Poland for the Poles', 'Ukraine for the Ukrainians', etc. This I say was the root of the evil that followed.

So Laitin is wrong to say that I am imprecise about how modernity causes ethnic cleansing. Most scholars have concluded that it involved the rise of nationalism. This is true, but insufficient. I add first that the root of nationalism was the demand for rule by the people; and second murderous ethnic cleansing resulted where organic nationalism appeared in the bi-ethnic contexts explained in my theses 3–5. It is in this sense that ethnic cleansing is the dark side of democracy. More precisely, it is the perversion of democracy – not usually of institutionalized democracies (I will say why later), but of democratic ideals and processes of democratization. Nor is this a mere abstraction, for in my case studies I show that almost all the eventual perpetrators of murderous ethnic cleansing started their political careers seeking 'rule by the people', and then perverting their own initial ideals. These are quite close connections, operating through both broad historical processes and individual careers. Are the connections 'logical', as Laitin seems to require? I don't quite know what 'logic' would look like in history. But Laitin seems to have been dealing so long with static correlations between variables, dealing with process through lagged variables and cohort analysis (which he does brilliantly) that he cannot recognize processual historical arguments when he sees them.

In the case of the settler colonies I make the most direct connection. This is the only type of case where I say that still-functioning representative governments (for the colonists, not the natives) perpetrated massive murderous ethnic cleansing, and were more likely to do so than less representative governments. To support this, I do make brief comparisons between different colonial powers, and Laitin criticizes this brevity. He does not mention that the bulk of my comparative analysis concerns not place but time and agents. I compare colonies and states in North America and Australia before and after settlers acquired *de facto* and formal self-government. Murder increased after these changes. I also compare settlers, the colonial government and churches, and find that settlers favoured murder most, churches least.

I locate the underlying cause of such cleansing as the arrival of settler-conquerors who want the natives' land but not their labour (and such

had probably formed most of the exceptions in earlier history). Laitin says my economic argument makes democracy causally redundant, but he is wrong. Where authoritarian colonial governments and churches had the power to restrain the settlers, cleansing was less serious. Both causes – settlement for land but not labour, and settler representative government – were required for murderous ethnic cleansing.[2]

There were two partial exceptions to my colonial argument, occurring between the 1860s and the 1900s: the atrocities perpetrated by Imperial Russia in the Caucasus and by Germany against the Herero in South West Africa in 1907. Only the Herero case is sufficiently documented to perceive the role of settlers.[3] Coding *de facto* reality on the ground as democratic or authoritarian is also more complicated than Laitin seems to think. This governor formally ruled the colony, and he was more moderate than most settlers, but they controlled the law-courts and most land acquisition, so provoking the Herero revolt which was suppressed with massive force culminating in genocide. But in both cases, settlers (and the civilian part of the state) played only minor roles in the culmination. The main perpetrator was the army high command, who in this period came with distinctively modern and technocratically ruthless war-plans. I suggest this might be a generic exception, providing a secondary contribution of modernity, at least in this period. I discuss what I call military 'tactical lures' towards murderous cleansing, instancing General Sheridan's tactic (during the same period) of attacking Native American villages in winter, which committed the braves into a war of position (in which his fire-power had the advantage) instead of a war of movement (to which the Native Americans were better suited). This was intended to force the braves to return to the villages to defend their women and children. It worked, and the result was general slaughter of Indian civilians as well as braves. I suspect similar lures existed in the Caucasus. Later I instance Milosevic's falling-back on the more ferocious paramilitaries when his army, the JNA, proved ineffective as a 'constrained lure'. But ultimately I did not sufficiently integrate military power into an argument that centred most on political power and then on ideological power.

In my non-colonial cases the relation between democracy and murderous cleansing was not so direct. Yugoslavia contained the closest relations. Elections were held in all the republics only weeks or months before the ethnic wars started. Ethno-nationalists, including those who (apart from Milosevic) became the leading perpetrators, won them all. These were free elections except for Serbia, where Milosevic exerted some controls over the process. He won the largest number of votes, but more extreme nationalist opposition parties got the second-largest share – and then provided the main paramilitary perpetrators. Ethno-nationalists now

controlled every government in Yugoslavia (there were three rival groups in Bosnia), and they mutually escalated into organic nationalism and war. Among them, only Milosevic had not spent most of his political career favouring democracy.

Ottoman Turkey held free elections, with a limited franchise in 1908, seven years before the genocide. Independent centrists won the most seats, though the Young Turks did respectably, in alliance with the minority nationalist parties who later became their victims. At this time they favoured extending representative government, with democracy as their ultimate goal. Then a succession of military defeats interacted with coups and ethnic conflict pushed them towards 'organic nationalism', away from democracy. Formerly the leading advocates of reform, they were the perpetrators of the 1915 genocide, not the reactionary Sultan's party or the conservative centrists. In Rwanda, elections had followed independence during the 1960s. Hutu nationalists won them and their notion of 'majoritarian democracy' became less and less tolerant of the Tutsi minority. A military coup led to a Hutu-led dictatorship under President Habyarimana, which lasted twenty-one years until the eve of the genocide. Most commentators believe that the Habyarimana regime restrained ethnic violence. However, it was destabilized by a Tutsi invasion, economic difficulties and international pressure for the restoration of elections. It was in the run-up to these elections that Hutu Power factions radicalized and began to take over most of the new parties. Since most Hutu politicians expected them to win the elections, they were jumping on the bandwagon. The Hutu Power factions perpetrated the genocide.[4]

So almost all the leading perpetrators began their political careers demanding the creating or deepening of representative government. Then they perverted their own ideals. I take pains to describe their political trajectories. This means that Laitin can give as evidence of their anti-democratic stance my descriptions of the later stages of their careers, when they had abandoned their earlier ideals. He takes some statements from when they were actually murdering, when they were not remotely democratic. But I am describing a process, which begins with attempted democratization and then, when *demos* and *ethnos* increasingly entwine, goes into reverse.

The Nazi movement is the only one that started anti-democratic. Nazi leaders endorsed the leadership principle, attacked a Weimar democracy they claimed was corrupt and ineffective, and were violently brawling from early on. Nazism does not fit. But their major foreign collaborators whom I discuss do largely fit. Seven nationalist movements of eastern Europe began as democrats, then embraced organic nationalism,

involving some murderous cleansing (though full-scale participation in Nazi genocides required other causes too).

Finally, India and Indonesia contain less serious conflicts. In India (Kashmir and 1947 apart) most ethnic conflicts involve 'riot cycles', in which further escalation is eventually stopped by government repression of rioters. Laitin says this is because India is a democracy, so this is a counter-case. My own argument is more complex. I repeat others' research finding that murderous riots occur less frequently in periods of martial law, when democracy has been suspended. I also say that government repression of riots comes from India being a stable institutionalized state, so that political elites see their own interests as resting more on the preservation of order than pursuing ethno-nationalist goals. I say that Indian democracy exercises a particular restraint on ethno-nationalism, for caste politics act like class politics elsewhere to lower the transcendent appeal of ethno-nationalism. Congress and the parties of the left express lower-caste grievances, undercutting the power of Hindu nationalism. Even the nationalist BJP is forced to respond to these, since it is vulnerable to the charge that it expresses high-caste interests. Caste/class partially undercuts nation. Laitin also claims violence is worse in Indonesia than in India because it is less democratic, though I emphasize that its state is less stable. Chua's (2004) case studies suggest that democratization generally worsens ethnic violence in developing countries, including Indonesia.[5]

This raises the broader links between political and ideological power. My thesis 1(c) says that democratizing regimes are more dangerous than stable regimes, whether these are democratic or authoritarian. My fifth thesis adds that going 'over the brink' into actual murder occurs when a state has been factionalized and then radicalized amid unstable geopolitical conditions. Putting these together reveals the differences between the types of ideology which I sketched earlier.

On the one hand, stable, institutionalized regimes generate 'institutionalized ideologies', strengthening pragmatism (including pragmatic repression), and routines which reproduce existing institutions. Politicians and police chiefs in India, despite often having strong Hindu biases themselves, eventually intervene to impose order since their careers ultimately depend on it. This lowers the attractions to them of 'immanent' or 'transcendent' ethno-nationalist ideals – whether the state is democratic or authoritarian. Tito's regime operated similarly in Yugoslavia. On the other hand, democratization is more likely to generate some domestic instability and faction-fighting. If it is also linked to unstable geopolitics, radicals can mobilize popular support around immanent and transcendent ideologies. Laitin thinks I am resorting to a weaker argument if I invoke ideals rather than practices. Both have

their distinct power. If practices are stable, generating routine pragmatism among elites and a routine *habitus* among the masses, they are strong. But if practice is unstable, then ideals matter. Some ideals may have very unpleasant consequences. I hope this is all now clear. Next time I might choose a more boring title.

Laitin's second complaint concerns my typology of violence and cleansing contained in Table 1.1. Its main purposes were to distinguish the main types of violence and cleansing, to distinguish the focus of my research – the shaded areas in the table which are high on both criteria – and to indicate stages of escalation. That I say the intention to kill large numbers appears late in the process does not 'undermine' my categories, as Laitin says. Quite the reverse: it enables me to better identify the stages of escalation. Throughout the book I describe many countries and sequences with what I hope is a consistent terminology. I think this table generates the most useful typology available in the literature.

Yet I do concede some ground to Laitin. My typology is not a pair of Guttman scales, since types and degrees of violence and cleansing mingle. There are actually elements of three scales: proportion of a total population cleansed, proportion of a total population dying, and extent of intended killing. I attempt to distinguish between unintended deaths, intentional killing and the half-way category of 'callous' deaths (behaviour which unintentionally caused deaths, but was not quickly rectified because the perpetrator cared little for the victims' fate). That is why genocide is below ethnocide in the violence typology and why callous projects rank above merely mistaken projects in the cleansing typology. This third element is confusing, I admit. If it were possible to devise accurate statistics on all these dimensions, I might devise a better schema.[6] But murderous ethnic cleansing does not allow that kind of precision, and the table is adequate to its purposes. It is also true that I occasionally compound the problem by saying that *x* is 'a worse' case. This seems to indicate a moral stance, though I only intended to indicate a relative position in the table. I share Laitin's doubts about the status of 'genocide' as the 'worst evil', as opposed to other forms of inhumanity. I say this in the text, when dealing with General Krstic's trial. It only makes a legal difference whether he is convicted of conspiracy to genocide or crimes against humanity – equivalent to most of my shaded areas. He did command mass murder.

But I reject Laitin's further accusation that I show leftist bias in excusing class more than ethnic atrocities. I do say that class conflict usually generates fewer deaths than ethnic conflict. I give reasons for this – classes are more inter-dependent than ethnic groups and tend to form less total identities. But I say that post-revolutionary Marxist regimes differ.

The whole point of my long chapter on 'communist cleansings' is to precisely categorize them (as no one has previously done) and to analyse similarities and differences in violence and cleansing between conceptions of democracy that became perverted by ethnic or class organicism. Of leftists I note their distinctive evils, 'classicide' (killing classes) and 'fratricide' (killing comrades), which fascists tend not to commit, plus the infusion into class of 'ethnic' (hereditary) elements, supposedly with no place in Marxism.

My book focuses on process, and my thesis 6 says that intentions to murder only appear very late in cleansing sequences. Clear intent to commit mass murder does eventually appear in my cases, including communist ones, especially in Cambodia. Laitin says I excuse leftists because they intended to kill less often. This was not true of the Khmer Rouge, while classicide once begun was fairly systematic. However, famine deaths resulting from forced collectivization in China and the Soviet Union were not intended. They fit my category 'callous wars, civil wars and revolutionary projects'. They were callous since once the lethal effects of policy were known, the regimes were slow to change them. They did not care much for their victims. I also say that these callous acts resulted in the deaths of truly vast numbers of people – in fact much more than the intended deaths in either the Soviet Union or China. These are all precise and, I believe, correct statements. I excuse no one. Since I say similar things about the Franciscan missions in California and the British government during the Irish famine (lower absolute death numbers but these were higher proportions of the total populations), perhaps it is these comparisons which really bother Laitin.

We like to think of perpetrators being quite alien from us – 'primitive peoples' (like Hutus or perhaps Serbs), Nazis bringing a supposedly unique Holocaust, and communist dictatorships. More recently 'failed states' have entered the category of 'the Other'. I had not thought much about good and evil until writing this book, but that I know now that they are not things set quite apart from each other or from everyday life. They emerge together out of the problems confronting each generation in each place. Representative democracy is a major improvement for large-scale societies (more direct forms of democracy were always available for small ones), but it brought evil where *ethnos* and *demos* entwined. This is a problem of *our* civilization. That is what I mean by *The Dark Side of Democracy*.

Economic versus political power: the European miracle

Two chapters in this volume, by Stephan Epstein and Robert Brenner, discuss the remarkable rise of Europe to global leadership in the early

modern period. I will respond, beginning within Europe and then broadening out to comparisons between Europe, especially Britain, and Asia, especially China. The latter also gives me the opportunity to comment on a debate which has erupted since my first two volumes of *Sources*. I finished Volume I twenty years ago and would now change various arguments in the light of subsequent scholarship. I also know more about basic economics. So I recognize my mistake in persistently using the rising productivity of land (rather than labour) as a measure of development – and now I can at least understand Brenner's accusation that I am a 'Smithian', though I reject it.[7] I also object to Brenner's assertion that mine is a functionalist theory of stratification. I do not say that those who hold power perform 'indispensable functions' for subordinates. I do say that distributive power derives originally from collective power, i.e. that stratification derives from social cooperation. So did Marx and so have many others.

Yet Brenner has a point when he says that my depiction of the European dynamic sometimes appears too 'systemic'. My remark that the crises of the fourteenth to fifteenth centuries and of the seventeenth century were mere 'hiccups' in an overall upward trend needs toning down (millions died). Brenner's argument that feudal lords and peasants were locked into relations which tended to stifle development also has some force. There were numerous obstacles and many inefficiencies and contradictions. Those who narrate development find it difficult to avoid an onward-and-upward tone. I did distinguish different geographic rhythms and I would now also distinguish more clearly several phases of economic development. First came the somewhat hidden and localized intensive development of the acephalous, backward and overwhelmingly rural networks of the early Middle Ages, in which Christendom and (over a certain space and time) the Carolingian Empire provided a minimum of more extensive integration. Then came more extensive 'Smithian' development towards markets, towns and states, still largely subordinated to local, feudal relations of production; then further development of commodities, markets, towns and states into Smithian 'high equilibrium' agrarian economies; then the surges into capitalism and industrialism that I will describe below. In each phase, there was a tendency for the institutionalization of social relations which had helped early development to block further development. As I described in *Sources* – and as Epstein also argues – these were not so much overcome as outflanked, as regions marginal and interstitial to previous phases pioneered new development. The ultimate 'secret' of such extraordinary yet uneven development in Christendom-becoming-Europe was its combination of intensive and extensive power relations, localism plus connections to a wider world.

Brenner sees his most fundamental argument as concerning the relations between economic and political power in feudalism. His discussion raises a dilemma confronting all analysis, but especially mine. I wish to make analytic and institutional distinctions between the four sources of social power, while also recognizing that they are mutually entwined. Since Brenner ignores ideological power and integrates military and political, he deals only with what he calls the economic and the political. He says I separate them too much. He says that the reproduction of the feudal ruling classes depended upon the political, while the reproduction of the state depended upon the economic. He adds that the *raison d'être* of feudal government was to enable the dominant class to extract the surplus labour of the peasants. This *is* a functionalist statement, since he is saying that not merely did government help the dominant class extract, but also this was the reason the government existed in the first place. The needs of the system (the mode of production) determined more particular social relations. I favour much more political (and military and ideological) autonomy than this. Medieval states performed multiple functions, and so they performed none of them perfectly.

He says the peasants physically occupied the land and knew they could live perfectly well without the lords. So the lords need their manorial courts, their armed retainers and the ultimate force provided by the central state in order to extract their own means of subsistence. This is quite unlike capitalism, he says, in which surplus labour can be extracted through purely economic means, since the workers do not possess the means of production. In fact, he says the distinction is between capitalism and all prior historical modes of production, practising a similar reductionism on all of them. I am sceptical of this familiar Marxist distinction. What happens to workers today who occupy their factories and deny access to the owner is rather similar to what happened to peasants withdrawing their labour from the feudal manor. They get repressed by force. Peasants were also economically trapped by the lords' organizational control of the mill and the market, just as workers today are by comparable economic power organizations. The differences are of degree not of kind.

But Brenner gets into more difficulties when he uses the same explanation for violence between feudal lords, that is in explaining wars. Medieval wars, he says, derived from 'the material requirements, the rules for reproduction, of the dominant class of feudal lords'. Indeed, he says that the eventual emergence of a Europe divided into national states is the inescapable outcome of the feudal mode of production. The ultimate driving force of wars was that lords could not derive higher productivity from their present lands. So they 'had to' either extend the cultivable part of their lands or extract more from the peasants or other lords by force.

This is surely a statement of alternative possibilities not just for a feudal regime but for any agrarian regime which has reached the limits of available technology on its presently cultivated lands.

But the question is whether any regime *could* do these things. If it could not, or if the cost of doing so was too high, then it might not even attempt them. In Europe some regimes could do this, cheaply. That is the decisive point, and that is not given by any definition of the class relation between lords and their peasants. In fact Brenner shows us how they could do this. He takes us on two brief tours of territorial expansions, one by lordly states into the pagan east, into Muslim Iberia and into Celtic lands, the other of expansions of kingdoms like France at the expense of smaller local lordships. But these two types of expansion did not derive from 'the rules of reproduction of feudal lords'. They derived from the geopolitical opportunities presented within Europe by the combination of the collapse of the Roman Empire, the barbarian invasions, and an era of local defensive warfare by knights with castles and armed retainers. Europe then presented the spectacle of much virgin land, many small states and some areas which were populated but almost stateless. Brenner here rightly emphasizes that some peasant communities were capable of mustering determined military resistance against the neighbouring lords. But scattered among these relatively weak statelets and stateless communities lay some more powerful states, for whom the opportunities for conquest were therefore unusually great. Some took their chance and the rest is European history. They would have probably taken their chance whatever their relationships to the peasants, whether or not these were feudal.

The consequence was the military/fiscal route of state modernization charted for Europe by Charles Tilly and myself. Epstein raises some pertinent questions about this, including that I give insufficient attention to the actual form of medieval and early modern states. What I have to say about this actually derives from the puzzle that this European route has not been followed in those other continents which developed multi-state systems. Miguel Centeno (2002) has shown this for post-colonial Latin America, and Jeffrey Herbst (2000) has shown this for post-colonial Africa. They produce suitably nuanced explanations for this, but these begin from the absence of serious inter-state warfare in those continents. Europe turns out to have been an unusually warlike multi-state system. However, another continent had experienced comparable levels of warfare, and with an initially similar trajectory of development. During the Spring–Autumn and Warring States periods in China (BC 770–221), there was repeated warfare among many small states. The outcome was political consolidation, penultimately into four great states, and then, finally, into one state conquering the others. Since then, China has

remained one imperial realm (except for periods of civil war). Until this final stage, there developed fiscal-military, patrimonial/bureaucratic states, recognizably 'modern', resembling in many ways European states, though much earlier in time.

Scholars tend to describe the earlier phase of this process in both continents as 'feudal'. But to explain their propensity for warfare and then for consolidation, they focus on a different aspect of feudal relations: the ties of vassalage, relations of loyalty and service between lord and vassal. Combined, they exploited the peasantry (as Brenner stresses), but the incentives to war and consolidation did not come from that exploitation, but from the power vacuums and the power disparities that resulted from initially highly decentralized lord/vassal configurations. The power vacuum meant this was not a zero-sum game for those who could mobilize a significant number of vassals. They were likely to win wars.

Since the word 'feudal' has to do double-duty, referring to rather different class and military/political relations, it leads to much confusion. Perhaps it would be better to give a different term to the latter at least in Europe and China, one that reduces them neither to the feudal nor the capitalist mode of production, allows for some political autonomy, while also conveying their distinctive military and ideological power relations and a dynamic towards consolidation and 'modernization'. I suggest 'mini-imperial', since the big states were absorbed by conquest and intimidation of smaller states and stateless areas, beginning to rule them either highly repressively or 'indirectly', buttressed with ideologies of their own civilizational superiority, but with successful mini-empires then culturally assimilating the conquered and integrating them into common state institutions. These are all characteristics of empires, though many were rather small empires, and they were multiple. 'Mini-empires' will serve well. I will reintroduce the concept in my discussion of the Europe/China debate, for they figure large there.

Yet we have not grasped all of the power structures of medieval Europe, or even begun to account for the different eventual outcome in the two continents. Brenner reduces Europe to the villages and manors of feudalism. I have added the lords, vassals and levies of feudal mini-imperialism. But what about the autonomous towns and guilds and the 'brotherhoods' of medieval Europe, and what about the Church? Epstein also recognizes their importance, calling them 'corporations'. Brenner says nothing about them. In *Sources* I say that the medieval period mobilized intensive, local forms of power within extensive normative solidarities, the combination being necessary for the development of market-based economies. In earlier periods I stressed the extensive normative pacification provided by Christendom. Epstein is uneasy with this, and wants to add a

Carolingian political legacy and a Church revival of Roman law which then turned into a powerful corporate legal profession. He adds more political power (and more complexity) to my mainly ideological argument. He may be right. But he and I agree that such institutions held some autonomous power *vis-à-vis* states and lords. For their part, states attempted to play off lords against merchants, the Church and other corporations. It is difficult to find much that is comparable in China. I trace a substantial part of the deep-rooted dynamism of Europe to the diversity of local power actors. I said that in a sense there was 'private property' in the sense of 'hidden powers' long before that term came to have specifically capitalistic connotations. Now I turn to the 'Miracle' itself.

Economic power: the European Miracle versus Asian revisionism

Here I respond not only to critics in this volume, but also to a more general debate which erupted since I wrote the first two volumes of *Sources*. Writers who stress the 'European Miracle' of development tend to emphasize the deep historical roots of the rise of Europe and especially Britain, hitherto back-waters. *Sources* put me in this camp since my explanation went back centuries and largely stayed within Europe.[8] Brenner (with Isett 2002) argues that Britain overtook China by virtue of a deep-rooted transition from a feudal to a capitalist mode of production, though breakthrough came only in Britain, and fairly suddenly, in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (since feudalism was blocking development before then). All this has been contested by a group of 'Asian Revisionist' scholars, comprising the 'California School', which includes Jack Goldstone (2002, and his chapter here), and an 'anti-Orientalist' group, which includes John Hobson in a recent (2004) book. They and writers like Pomeranz (2000), Bin Wong (1997) and Gunder Frank (1998) make the following arguments about the power sources.

Economic power

This is where most focus. They deploy two main arguments.

(1) Only in the nineteenth century did the European economy – more specifically, the British economy – overtake the Asian economy – specifically that of China's most advanced region, the lower Yangzi. In the eighteenth century, they say, the two continents and regions were broadly level. Before then, Asia and China had been much more advanced, but then

Europe had experienced 'Smithian development'. In the eighteenth century both were similarly caught in the Smithian 'high equilibrium' trap of agrarian economies. 'Smithian development' could extend the division of labour and markets, but without major technological or institutional breakthroughs no further surge of development was possible. Only the technology and institutions of the industrial revolution, acquired first by England from 1800, enabled first Britain, and then Western Europe to surge forward into global dominance.

(2) Overtaking occurred only because of two 'happy accidents'. First, Europe/Britain (unlike China) happened to have coal nearby its industry, reducing the costs of industrialization and enabling technological virtuous cycles to develop between its industries. Second, Europe/Britain forcibly acquired New World colonies which happened to provide sugar, timber, cotton and silver, which boosted its domestic economy and living standards and enabled it to trade with Asia. Revisionists reject the view that Europe and Britain possessed a deep-rooted dynamic which more persistently led towards breakthrough. Of course, Euro/British advocates (including myself) also note accidents, especially of ecology (soils, minerals, indented coastlines allowing lower transport costs, etc.), but alongside a deep social dynamic.

Ideological power

Goldstone says that the decisive reason for the eventual overtaking was the autonomous role and dynamism of British science. This is also implicit in the writings of some other revisionists. It is unclear whether we should regard this as a third happy accident. But, conversely, Hobson stresses the dependence of European on Chinese science.

Political power

They deny that the Chinese state was a growth-choking, anti-capitalist bureaucracy or even a major restraint on private domestic markets. It probably left trade more alone than European states, while the multi-state system of Europe also had inefficiencies.

Military power

The overtaking also involved military violence, in which Europeans excelled. Their military power also enabled eventual domination.

To discuss these issues it is helpful to distinguish two phases of economic development, one to a Smithian high-equilibrium agrarian society, and

a second resulting from a breakthrough into an economy of more permanent growth. It is also helpful to distinguish the period of European/British economic *overtaking* from a later period of European power *domination* of Asia/China. On economic issues I focus on the comparison between Britain and the lower Yangzi.

I start with the demographic and economic measures of the 'moment' of economic overtaking (the Chinese data are mostly in Lee and Campbell, 1997, and Lee and Wang, 1999). The revisionists say that these measures indicate that China was at least level with England through the eighteenth century and into the beginning of the nineteenth century. They show that China had achieved over the previous few centuries a massive population growth with no apparent rise in mortality rates. China also practised population controls, and not only the notorious female infanticide. Since there was a surplus of males, many men were celibate while even the luckier ones tended to marry late. Couples also delayed the first child longer than couples in England did and they ended childbearing over six years earlier, so family size was smaller. There was also widespread adoption, which enabled parents to cope with the gender imbalances that often resulted from such practices. This is a picture of an agrarian society able to expand population when resources expanded, and restrict it when they didn't. Only in the nineteenth century, Lee and his collaborators argue, did the system break down, with famines resulting.

Nonetheless, for England we have the far more comprehensive dataset of Wrigley and Schofield (1989). Interestingly, these data derive from parish records, that is from the implantation within each village of an ideological power organization, a nationally organized church. There was no parallel, organizationally or in terms of records, in China. These data cast doubt on the revisionist argument. They show a steady English population rise from the 1690s, then a dip in the 1730s and then an astonishing rise, a doubling of the English population in only eighty years, from 1740 to 1820. There is not consensus on its causes. Razzell (1998) emphasizes mortality decline, Wrigley and Schofield stress fertility rises. Hart (1998) links the two by tracing a large decline in the stillbirth rate during the eighteenth century, and therefore an improvement in female nutrition (confirmed by Wrigley 1998), suggesting women were particularly better off in England than China. But the most important differences are that by 1750 infanticide was unknown in England and mortality crises attributable to famine had disappeared. By 1700 the relationship between food prices and mortality rates, already weak, had disappeared. In contrast, Lee and Wang (1999: 45, 110–13) admit both to famines in eighteenth-century China and to a continuing strong relationship

between grain prices and mortality rates. Though any eighteenth-century differences between the most advanced regions of the two continents cannot have been great, it does seem that Malthusian crises had been banished in England and not in China.

Indeed, Kent Deng (2003) believes that fluctuations in the Chinese population were still those normal to traditional agrarian societies. Growth was possible, he argues, only where new land or new crops could be worked, and neither produced growth which could be sustained. He sees the Chinese economy as stuck within normal 'Smithian' agrarian cycles. On demographic grounds he dates the 'great divergence' between Europe and China as occurring before 1700. The revisionists respond to this by saying that without subsequent industrialization England would have reached the high point of a Smithian agrarian cycle, and then slipped back again as over-cropping and environmental degradation put a brake on living standards, nutrition and fertility. They point to Holland, which had surged ahead in Europe in the seventeenth century, and then slumped well behind England in the eighteenth.

But Brenner and Isett (2002) answer this with data on British labour productivity. These show fluctuations in earlier centuries, but a massive increase above these levels of about 60 per cent starting from somewhere just before 1700 to 1750. This enabled overall population growth, but there was also a doubling of the urban population, without any apparent decline in national health. Both these trends were unparalleled anywhere else in the world, though Holland saw a less dramatic rise. Brenner sees this as the crucial shift out of Smithian cycles, the fruits of a capitalist revolution in agriculture, with farmers treating all factors of production, including labour, as commodities. China's only expansions at this time were into virgin lands or new crops, neither of which increased labour productivity. In fact, say Brenner and Isett, Chinese labour productivity was declining. Britain could expand agriculture yet also release labour. The Smithian limits were being breached, since a breakthrough in labour productivity had occurred.

But was there yet industry to absorb the released labour? The conversion of coal into steam power proved to be the energy core of the English industrial revolution. Revisionists (following Wrigley) say that coal was a happy accident, abundant near the emerging industries, whereas in China coal was abundant but far from the areas which might have potentially industrialized. The facts are contested. But even if this were so, Britain's good luck had come early. Even by 1700 England produced five times as much coal as the rest of the world put together, and fifty times as much as China. Moreover, while Chinese coal output was declining through the eighteenth century, in Britain it was growing steadily, boosting the release

of population to the towns and boosting the growth of metal-working. As we see later, this linkage between coal and metal-working also generated technological invention. So, if coal was a happy accident, it came early, in steadily greater quantities, and with 'virtuous' linkages elsewhere.

Nonetheless, economic historians now place less weight on particular 'leading' industries like coal mining, metal-working and cotton. They say that growth diffused fairly evenly across the whole English economy (Crafts 2000). Temin (1997) measured the efficiency of early nineteenth-century English industry in terms of its ability to lower prices of its exports in relation to imports. Substantial lowering occurred across most industries, not just coal and cotton, but also 'hardware, haberdashery, arms and apparel' indicating generally rising productivity. He says this reveals that a general entrepreneurial, innovative economic culture was already in place by 1800. Capitalist economic institutions also existed in China, but they now dominated England. An institutional breakthrough had also occurred. Brenner wants to attribute this all to changes in agrarian class relations, but that seems too narrow. Entrepreneurs emerged out of a variety of social backgrounds – landlords, yeoman and tenant farmers, peasants, merchants, artisans. Something much more diffuse was occurring.

It is true that trade relations were still more developed in Asia. The revisionists have demonstrated that Asia still dominated long-distance trade. Capitalist commerce had existed in coastal areas all over Asia well before 1700, with Chinese traders in the lead. At the beginning of the nineteenth century Europe still contributed a much smaller proportion of world trade. Frank observes that Europe had essentially nothing China wanted, except silver, whose export from the Americas to Asia was the only product enabling the Europeans to receive the many Chinese goods they desired. So Immanuel Wallerstein was much too Eurocentric when he claimed that there was a European 'world economy' existing by the seventeenth century.

If Europe's colonies were a 'happy accident', had they yet made much of an economic difference? This remains controversial, but they obviously made some difference. They brought silver to Europe, enabling Europe to trade with China, and they brought new crops, impacting somewhat on diets and calorific intake. O'Brien (forthcoming) says that inter-continental trade before the industrial revolution was limited. He estimates that trade with the New World boosted British resources by (at most) 1 per cent of GDP. Of course, cumulatively 1 per cent per annum might provide quite a boost, and this trade had been proceeding since the early sixteenth century. From about 1650 the price of goods traded internationally had been slowly though consistently falling, suggesting improvements in efficiency.

All this suggests trade and colonies did make a difference. But only from the mid-nineteenth century was there substantial convergence in commodity prices, suggesting the emergence of integrated global markets. They then centred in Europe and its colonies, though including parts of Asia by the end of the nineteenth century (O'Rourke and Williamson 1999; 2002). Colonies did eventually make a big difference, but not by 1800. There was as yet no single 'world economy'. There was not a European world economy, but nor was there an Asian or a Chinese world economy (as Frank claims). Only the market for silver can be said to have been genuinely tri-continental, linking Asia, Europe and the Americas. Regardless of whether British productivity had 'overtaken' that of the Lower Yangzi, they were not in competition, let alone involved in relations of dominance. They were still separate parts of the world. Of course, that was not so for the Americas. We should not lose sight of the obvious: that colonies are not primarily about 'overtaking' or 'economic efficiency'. They are about domination, extermination and economic expropriation by a force more naked than feudalism had ever seen.

So I have tended so far to uphold the traditional view of European/British overtaking, of Asia/China. It happened well before 1800 – though dominance was not yet achieved. There were no longer Malthusian cycles in Britain, there was a surge in both labour productivity and capitalist institutions. The other vital factor in economists' models is technological innovation. To discuss this will take us out of the purely economic realm, however. It will take us especially into ideology. Of course, I argue that the European Miracle has to be explained in terms of all four sources of social power.

Science also played a major role in European development, one that I mentioned but did not stress sufficiently in *Sources*. Goldstone and others have shown that the new technologies of the industrial revolution can be traced back to the English 'scientific revolution' of the seventeenth century. Though (as I noted) most of the major inventions did not come from scientists, but from the 'micro-technologies' of engineers and artisans, it has now been shown that they had absorbed the general principles of scientific theories, and they shared a common technical vocabulary and method. They had imbibed the ideology that natural phenomena were orderly and predictable, mastered by means of a scientific method of exact measurement and reproducible experiment. Not absolute truth, but instrumental, incremental knowledge was their goal (Mokyr 1992; 2000). After about 1650, everyone agrees that Europeans, not Chinese, were making the important scientific and technological breakthroughs.

However, science was not as autonomous as Goldstone implies. Nor was it accidental. It was embedded in broader networks of ideological

power, being a central thrust of the part-Protestant, part-rationalist reaction against the theology dominating science in Europe until the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries. Scientists believed that the laws they discovered were God's laws. Leibnitz, Boyle and Newton embedded their theories amid Protestant theology. In Catholic Europe science blossomed later, embedded in the anti-religious rationalism of the Enlightenment. Margaret Jacobs (1997; 2000) notes that many of the scientists, entrepreneurs and engineers of the English industrial revolution were Protestant Dissenters, committed to values of probity, order, and faith in both religion and science. Even in Charles Darwin's time in the mid-nineteenth century, most researchers defined their work not as 'science' but as 'natural theology'.

But science also responded to demand from political and military power holders. Representative governments in Holland and Britain, and 'enlightened absolutism' elsewhere, opposed what they viewed as the particularism of old regimes, which had developed science as a closed, somewhat esoteric caste, often in holy orders. They favoured a more public science. Leibnitz, Newton, Boyle and others were members of the English Royal Society, subsidized from public funds. King Charles II himself granted permission for Newton to uniquely remain a Fellow of Cambridge University without taking holy orders (Newton would not accept the dogmas of the Church of England). States in competition with each other appreciated the utility and ideological lustre of science. So did militaries. Naval and artillery competition spurred discoveries in metallurgy, chemistry and the precise measurement of time and space. Biology, botany and geology were boosted by colonial expansion. French and British warships carried scientists like Jean-Charles de Borda, Joseph Banks and Charles Darwin around the world, and ships were often stuffed with plants and animals on both legs of their voyages to the colonies, with a massive influence on the agriculture and diet of the people of Europe.

There were reverse influences too. Science was also 'democratized', not only by Protestant or Enlightenment influences, but probably more importantly by changing economic and political power relations. Old class and status divides were breached as entrepreneurs and scientists mixed together in clubs and reading-rooms. Members of Parliament and artisans shared some knowledge of contemporary scientific theories. Free communication of invention is crucial to economic development. Newcomen's first steam engine of 1713 was for pumping water out of flooded coal mines. Hundreds of people added piece-meal improvements over the next 150 years. Early eighteenth-century craftsmen were perfecting small instruments like clocks, telescopes, eye-glasses, guns and naval sextants and their metal-working improvements were adapted

into bigger industrial machinery. Economic historians emphasize that technology made a slow but cumulative impact on growth in England. England's crucial technological resource lay less in initial invention than its subsequent diffusion, boosted by demand for industrial products from a competitive market, including large military customers, but also dispersed middling consumers.

Goldstone also says science retained autonomy after the industrial revolution. Scientific institutions may be distinct, but do they also exercise power over the four power sources? In Britain most university scientists/natural theologians remained in holy orders until the 1870s. Others found employment in commercial colleges like the East India Company College or the School of Mines. A few were gentleman-scholars with private incomes (like Darwin). Not until the late nineteenth century did they collectively congregate in secular universities, a caste apart. But by the mid twentieth century they needed research funding which only government, especially the military, and big corporations could provide. The leading edge of science (by now American) was servicing the demand of the military-industrial complex. Modern scientists have never been as autonomous as were earlier alchemists and astrologers. The problem with Daniel Bell's (1976) famous assertion that a post-industrial society moved power from capital to knowledge was presented by his own data: 75 per cent of R&D funds came from the government, mostly for military purposes. Science's main role was to contribute to the rationalization of ideological power in the modern era – science as ideology.

Goldstone is right that I neglected the role of science in the industrial revolution. I have remedied this not by making science a fifth source of social power, as he suggests, but by putting more science into my four sources. This especially puts more ideological power into my explanation of the later stages of the European breakthrough, as Gorski urged. But science was also stimulated by inter-state competition culminating in military and naval revolutions entwined with the (long-maturing) rise of northwest Europe, where it was reinforced by Protestantism and representative states. All this culminated in an agrarian capitalism/commercial imperialism, first in Holland, then more persistently in Britain, whose mass markets and communication infrastructures encouraged competitive industries to slowly invent and develop. I am also reluctant to accept Goldstone's emphasis on autonomous science as the crucial difference between Britain and China, since most of these broader stimuli were also absent from China at this time.

John Hobson (2004) has presented an impressive list of early modern European scientific and technological inventions which were imported

from China or adapted from Chinese prototypes. Thus he seeks to expose the Eurocentrism of most accounts of the European breakthrough. I plead guilty to downplaying earlier Arab influences and trade (as Epstein notes). Hobson accepts that most of the crucial last steps inserting machines in factory or mass production were added by Europeans. But the main issue raised for my model of power organizations by the inter-continental flow of science is whether such ideas are more 'free-floating' across the world.

Knowledge is communicated through social networks which are always logistically constrained. But a single traveller in an alien land who notices a machine which might be useful back home can take home a drawing or model of it. Hobson shows that some merchants and missionaries were doing so over centuries of contact between China and Europe. Anyone with some knowledge of European work practices might be the carrier. A Jesuit might see the utility of a threshing device.

Yet such communication still had power preconditions. From perhaps 1600 parts of Western Europe were reaching up toward Chinese levels of economic development, while facing very different political and military problems. So Europeans were more interested in Chinese economic than political or military techniques. We must also explain why Europeans were, by about 1600, much more eager to copy and modify foreign machines than were the Chinese. In fact, by then Europeans were unusually outward-going and curious. Today the world faces comparable conditions, but with a very different result. Economists note that contemporary conditions should have enabled poorer countries to acquire and adapt Western technology, especially since their elites are often educated in the West. East Asia did so, but much of the world has not. The main explanation given by economists is that their economic and political institutions have not been supportive.

So there are several preconditions for what first seemed like 'free-floating ideas'. Provided human beings widely separated in space face similar problems, are somewhat outward-oriented, and possess favourable institutions, then the diffusion of technical knowledge may float across the world. The global diffusion of broader ideologies, like religion, seems at this time to have been much more variable. Neither the Chinese nor the Europeans were much interested in each other's religions, yet elsewhere natives converted readily to Islam or Christianity when they identified it as the key to acquiring all forms of power, recognizing that the foreigners were vastly more powerful than they were. Ideology is a source of power, but it is closely entwined with the other power sources, and it probably diffuses more when it combines reason with morality and emotion, which science does not do.

I move on to political institutions. The revisionists concede signs of political decline in the Chinese (and in the Mughal and Ottoman) empire from about 1600 onward. These formerly great states now seemed less able to provide order or dominate their region. China had reined in its long-distance trading fleets in the mid-fifteenth century. Thereafter, not even Chinese merchants and settlers in nearby Taiwan received serious aid from the imperial court. The Chinese state had turned inward, even though Chinese merchants continued to trade across Asia.

Economists find a strong correlation between economic growth and the rule of law in the world today (e.g. Barro 1997). They stress the political underpinnings of markets and private property. Economic historians note the excellence of the British political underpinnings during the early modern period (North and Weingast 1989). Revisionists say the same about the Chinese imperial state: China had enforceable property rights, they say, with even fewer restraints on property sales (and on labour mobility) than in Europe. However, Stephan Epstein's (2000) figures cast considerable doubt on this. Europeans could borrow more and at longer-term and lower rates than the Chinese. Whereas Chinese interest rates were typically 8 per cent–10 per cent, European rates were at this level by the fourteenth century, and down to 3 per cent–4 per cent by the mid-eighteenth century. This suggests that Europe had more clearly and securely, legally defined property rights. In this volume Epstein also generates a typology (which is also a rough historical sequence) of states' ability to solve coordination problems and lower transaction and borrowing costs – feudal 'states' did worst, then territorial states, then urban federations, then city-states, then Britain after 1688, then nineteenth-century constitutional states, which were the most efficient of all. This is formidable historical sociology, backed by data on long-term borrowing costs by states, down to under 3 per cent by the early eighteenth century.

The British state provided its paradoxical mixture of the rule of property law (which enabled violent dispossession of peasants from the land) and the rule of laws providing freedom from arbitrary power, due process, and freedom of association, including business association. Both sides of the paradox seem different from China. On the one hand, during the eighteenth century the Dutch and British parliaments represented major property-owners and limited the powers of their monarchs. These states *were* the major propertied classes, whereas in China the imperial state was to some degree *above* class structure. The English state exercised more *collective power* through the major property classes. It was already more of a capitalist state.

On the other hand came political struggles also unparalleled in China. In *Sources*, I said that the second half of the eighteenth century in England

saw a revival of older seventeenth-century struggles over legal rights, taxation and representation. Trentmann criticizes me for neglecting similar struggles during the first half of the century. I expect he is right (the period 1600–1760 tends to slip between the cracks between my two volumes). But during the eighteenth century, emergent, interstitial forces sought further reform through parliament, the law-courts and the streets. Under pressure, the old regime divided. As Trentmann says, both conservatives and reformers mobilized mass support – 'King and Country' and 'Protestant Defence' against 'Reform' mobs (I had neglected the former). I stressed that these struggles were fuelled by a great expansion of the discursive media of ideological communication – literacy, newspapers, pamphlets, coffee-houses, etc. They mobilized to successfully extend freedoms and representation, coupled with rational-bureaucratic state reform over the period from 1760 to 1832. I am surprised that Trentmann thinks I give a uniformly top-down account of British politics, since my emphasis shifts in different periods. I emphasize that most political power actors (not just insurgents) stumble their way to success, under pressure, rather than plan it in advance. But by 1832 the state comprised *all* property-owners. China saw neither comparable political struggles during the eighteenth century, nor a similar result. The British state was more helpful to capitalism from the early eighteenth century, and then it was riven by class conflicts specific to capitalism.

Finally, I come to military power. Europe contained many states in lethal rivalry with each other for centuries. These originated as the 'mini-imperial' states I identified earlier, swallowing up their non-Christian and statelet neighbours, a game that was not zero-sum for the stronger. The game lasted for centuries, transitioning smoothly into imperialism overseas. Iberia, parts of Eastern Europe, Wales and Ireland saw plantations of settlers. Granada, the last Muslim province, fell to Ferdinand and Isabella's forces on 2 January 1492. Eight months later, on 3 August they saw off Columbus on his voyage of 'discovery'. Britain moved smoothly through Ireland into North America and the Caribbean, with settler colonies modelled on Conway and Londonderry. In the twilight of European imperialism, Germany and Italy sought overseas colonies almost as soon as they had absorbed the last local statelets into their domains. Existing imperial ideologies of civilizational superiority only needed fine-tuning. From the early sixteenth century Europe was Christianizing the Americas and sub-Saharan Africa. Thereafter European colonialism retained its self-righteousness, able to regard its most terrible atrocities as the workings of 'divine providence', or the necessary triumph of civilization over barbarism – and later as the triumph of the white race over inferior races. Conviction in its own

moral superiority was deep-rooted, improved morale, and so contributed positively to imperial triumphs, for the reasons given in this book by Gorski and Snyder.

For centuries victorious armed states, merchant associations and settler militias expanded, while the defeated decayed or disappeared in Darwinian processes of the survival of the fittest. From the seventeenth century, Holland, France, and then Britain – and their merchants associations and settlers – became the main winners in this process. Fiscal pressures from their colonial/commercial wars led the states toward devising modern financial institutions like the Bank of England, bond markets, stock exchanges and financial derivatives. It also led countries which were naval powers towards more representative government, as I explained in *Sources*. Abroad, these states not only allowed their merchants autonomy (as also did the Chinese state), but they also gave them economic and military support where necessary. Tariffs and taxes could be kept low where mercantilism involved seizing market share by military power. Associations of merchants like the British East India Company and the Dutch VOC deployed their own private armies, and so did settlers. Such organizations were devised less to accumulate capital than to conquer, expropriate and so monopolize economic resources. The Dutch and British states were aggressively promoting commerce abroad, unlike the contemporary Chinese state, sometimes doing the fighting themselves, sometimes merely giving political privileges to armed bands of merchant capitalists and settlers.

Persistent military market competition among states, trading companies and settlers had perfected concentrated offensive fire-power. Europeans had very small armies and ships compared to those of China and other big Asian states. But the edge in European warfare since the sixteenth century had gone to fire-power, and European states invested heavily in this. Small high-tech armies and navies triumphed. There were no 'Smithian cycles' in military power, but steady progress. Europeans became better and better at killing people and overcoming their civilizations. European army and naval forces became more and more difficult to overcome in battle. Skilfully inserted into disputes between native princes, they could conquer land empires, as in America and India, where musketeers were proving their superiority over native levies from the early 1700s. But before the nineteenth century, European forces were mostly confined to sea-coasts which their naval guns could rake. By 1750 they dominated most sea-coasts, though China and Japan were still beyond their logistical reach.

European wars were costly, often draining the economy – a major cause of the decline of Holland, for example. Perhaps more of the European

than the Chinese surplus was frittered away on war, cancelling out the waste of Chinese female infanticide or Chinese neglect of foreign trade. All human groups operate well below utility maximization. I do not neglect the economic inefficiency of war, but I do note that economic efficiency is not its principal goal. The 'efficiency' of war is military: achieving victory rather than defeat.

But the point is that victory can then change the parameters of economic efficiency. This is what militarism has done from ancient times right up to the successive expansions of Europe, Japan and the United States. Militarism generated an international economy not of free trade but of trade and land monopolies won by lethal violence. This had been nurtured by competition in countless battlefields and shipping-lanes. Militarism helped bring global domination, and with it the power to restructure the international economy. Exterminating the natives in colonies in the temperate zones, and replacing them with white settlers, brought economic institutions which boosted per capita GDP there – so say modern economists. This is a very macabre calculation. 'Per capita' means by each surviving person's head – the heads measured did not include dead native ones.

So Pomeranz, Frank and Hobson are right to emphasize the importance of military power to European dominance, and – to an extent depending on the economic importance of colonies and imposed terms of trade – to European overtaking. There was also a military reason for the inward-turn of the Chinese state. It did not result from any 'innate' conservatism of the imperial state, but from perception that its greatest threat came from the barbarians on its northern land frontier. Therefore China concentrated its resources and its trade there, and not in the sea-lanes. Its military posture on its northern frontier was defensive, geared to containing mobile, dispersed enemy forces. It had less incentive than Europeans to intensify aggressive fire-power against concentrated forces, since it did not face them. But this meant that in the long run the Chinese empire would disintegrate in face of the fire-power of European ships and marines.

But if revisionists wish to argue that lethal violence and colonies contributed substantially to European overtaking and/or dominance, they must recognize that this was neither accidental nor late. It was very deeply rooted in European social structure, and it had been repeatedly exercised, first against other Europeans, then against the relatively weakly organized peoples of the Americas and Africa, then into South Asia – and finally subordinating the Chinese Empire itself. Its rhythms were those of the centuries – of feudal mini-imperialism transitioning into the mini-imperialism of expanding national states and then into overseas

colonial imperialism. By the eighteenth century the forms of European militarism were well-suited to an age of naval/commercial rivalry.

In 1750 China was still the world's greatest power, with the greatest share of its trade. Millions of Chinese still enjoyed the living standards to which only thousands of Britons could aspire. But Chinese powers were by now stagnant, even in the lower Yangzi, whereas England's were surging. I have identified in each of the four sources of social power distinctive surging rhythms, each entwined with the others, though each also somewhat autonomous. Somewhere between 1660 and 1760 these surges began to cumulatively take Britain beyond Smithian cycles of even a high-equilibrium agrarian society. It was not a sudden 'take-off' (as in the Rostow theory of the industrial revolution, now largely discredited), but a cumulative process of sustained slow growth of at first about 1 per cent per annum, eventually rising to nearly 3 per cent (and never higher) in the mid-nineteenth century (Crafts 1998). There could have been no single 'moment of overtaking', for the different sources of power had different rhythms. But it was a cumulative, entwined set of surges. Then in the nineteenth century it spread to much of Western Europe and to Britain's white settler colonies.

If we want a purely symbolic 'moment of overtaking' the year 1763 will do, since it involves important moments in the development of at least three power sources. After success in its war against France and Spain, Britain acquired dominion over a large part of three continents under the terms of the Treaty of Paris. It also meant that some settlers, especially in North America, no longer needed protection by British forces. Their independence and greater extermination of the natives was now on the cards. In the same year James Watt began to tinker with a Newcomen engine, leading to the first modern steam engine; and John Wilkes MP was charged by the English Crown with seditious libel, provoking massive riots leading into a great political reform movement. But no single moment would adequately capture such a long-drawn-out process.

Revisionists have underestimated the deep-rooted, entwined nature of European economic, ideological, political and military dynamism. This undermines their 'moment of overtaking' and 'happy accident' arguments. I have stressed here the different and sometimes conflicting temporal rhythms yet inter-penetration and long-run cumulation of ideological, economic, military and political power development. But I dissociate myself from some of the notions of European/British 'superiority' evinced by writers like David Landes (1998) and Eric Jones (2002). In this overtaking, efficiency was subordinated to power, and virtue played no part. Natives across much of the world would have been better off without the British Empire; while Manchester, my own birthplace,

became the hell-on-earth which Engels described so graphically in 1844 in his book *The Condition of the Working Classes in England*. Most of the British themselves barely benefited for another hundred years.

This moment of overtaking was not global dominance. Not for a century after 1763 did the Western Powers begin to dominate East Asia, as symbolized by the unequal treaties imposed on Japan and China, and the colonialism imposed elsewhere. China continued to stagnate, though Japan responded, for it shared many parallel power resources to England's. China needed communism to adequately respond, almost another hundred years later, and two hundred and fifty years after the English surge. Western leadership may last little more than two centuries from the moment of overtaking, and only one century from the moment of dominance. The recent resurgence of Japan and the Little Tigers of East Asia, and the present resurgence of China and India (a similarly uneven yet cumulative process), seems to be shifting the balance of global power away from an over-extended United States and a toothless Europe. But this hundred years was actually the only period in history in which any single region of the world has been globally dominant.

To explain all this, I still feel that we must go back in time and further eastward and southward across the European continent – and also, of course, further afield. This began as a Mediterranean surge in contact with the Muslim world and Asia. Then it took a northwesterly swerve, through the network of trading cities and into the larger Catholic states, then into the Protestant lands, and then into England (before departing elsewhere). The deep ploughing of heavy, rain-watered soils in northwest Europe was not in itself of world-historical significance (as Goldstone observes with some acerbity). Its immediate significance was local, contributing to significant 'Smithian' growth. But since this locality later acquired world-historical significance, this plough played a part in the European Miracle, in conjunction with many other forces and relations of power. Explaining the emergence of all these required starting early. No one has persuaded me I should have started any later, or that a proper explanation should ignore any of the four sources of social power.

Conclusion

I began my project by asking the 'Engels question' – whether one of my four power sources was of decisive, final causal power in the structuring of social relations (he said economic power was, and so does Brenner). My answer is probably the Weberian 'no', but because of what Bryant calls my 'emergent' rather than 'foundational' view of power. The economy,

the state, etc. do not possess given structures, exercising steady, permanent influence on social development. They instead prove to have emergent properties, as new assemblages of bits and pieces of them emerge as unexpectedly relevant for more general social development, and are appropriated as part of a new interstitial force. There seems to be no general, single patterning of these processes. All I have managed so far are period-specific generalizations, some of them arguable. More usually, I give multi-layered explanations like the one just presented – tentative, controversial and somewhat vulnerable to the empirical research of the next decade.

However, I make two general observations about causality. First, the causes of the development of one power source (other things being equal) mostly lie within its own antecedent condition, because its organization has some degree of autonomy. If we want to explain the industrial revolution, we look more at late agrarian economies than at religious or scientific discourse or at the practices of militaries or states; yet all are necessary for a full explanation. If we want to explain the rise of the modern state, we must look first at antecedent politics, which derived more from struggles over fiscal-military exploitation than, say, from exploitation deriving directly from the mode of production. It is obvious that new military organizations and strategies arise primarily to counter prior ones, and that Luther developed his theology primarily in response to disputes within the Catholic Church – though he became of world-historical significance only with the addition of economic and political power relations which led into wars of religion.

Second, when we refine our explanation by including the influence of other power sources, we rarely stress their core qualities. More often we bring in peripheral aspects which come to have particular (usually unexpected) significance for the power source we are trying to explain. To explain the rise of the modern state, we must introduce economic power relations, but most crucially those which were especially relevant to states, like taxes and expenditures bearing differently upon economic classes, i.e. the state's own economic infrastructure. Conversely, to explain why twentieth-century capitalism is divided into nations as well as classes, we focus less on the major political struggles of the nineteenth century – which concerned class, religious and regional movements – than on the unintended consequences of the pressure for them all to organize themselves at the level of the state in order to further their collective interests. Such analysis takes us further away from the prospect of any simple theory of 'ultimate primacy'.

Yet we can generalize about the sources' distinctive power capacities. Ideological power tends to be diffuse rather than authoritative, flowing

informally and interstitially through networks of communication, relatively unimpeded by authoritative power centres like states, armies or class boundaries. The logistics of communicating verbal, then written and then electronic messages are less daunting than they are for armies, goods or law-enforcement. I stressed this in earlier historical times when writing about the spread of salvation religions, iron ploughs, cavalry and coinage. I returned to it here when discussing inter-continental flows of scientific and technical knowledge. Transcendent ideology also plays a distinctively discontinuous historic role, erratic in its manifestations, relatively sudden in its major eruptions. Yet such eruptions require conjunctions with long-maturing tendencies in other power networks, reaching crisis point through more contingent events like wars, recessions or fiscal crises.

Economic power is the most deeply entrenched in everyday life. Its routines involve half our waking lives and energies; it yields subsistence without which we would not survive. It combines diffuse markets with authoritative production units. Its rhythms are characteristically slow. The metaphor of economic 'revolutions' misleads, as we saw in Britain's industrial revolution, which took over a century. The great post-1945 economic 'boom' in Western Europe was also more persistent than sudden (Eichengreen 1999). Depression and inflation can impact more suddenly, but they do not, unaided, generate major social change. Political revolutions may transform distributive power relations, though they seem to also require combinations of war defeat, political crises and emergent ideologies. Economic networks exercise the most massive impact on collective power in the cumulative long term. Industrial capitalism may have changed the whole population's lives more completely than any other power process in human history. Yet gradualness means that the other power sources have time to adapt, often without great discontinuities in power distributions, as I showed in the case of nineteenth-century England in *Sources*. Trentmann criticizes my stress on top-down rather than bottom-up pressures on nineteenth-century politics. He exaggerates this, though my central argument does concern divisions within the working class. Economic conflict generated three competing types of working-class movements: class, sectional and segmental. Only where political exclusion of all workers thrust all three willy-nilly together did ostensibly revolutionary politics result. In Britain, in contrast, the regime was admitting male workers into political citizenship strata by strata and this produced a divided and then a reformist 'lib–lab' outcome. I still think this holds up.

Military power is essentially authoritarian and tends to provide the most disjunctive impact on social structure. The European Union

remains a decentralized decision-maker, and so remains a military minnow. In the past, the enormous power of each European colonialism – exterminating native peoples, overturning native states, property rights and sometimes religions in the tropics – resulted most directly from superior military power. The two world wars of the twentieth century generated communism and fascism among defeated and dislocated countries and shifted patterns of technological development across the world. The effect of World War I was to disrupt processes of globalization, the effect of World War II was to boost them. Wars have great emergent powers, especially of destruction, but also sometimes of construction. The small guerrilla wars of today degrade their local environment but often also generate their own local modes of production, dependent on coercive control of goods which are high in value–weight ratio, like diamonds or cocaine.

Political power is predominantly authoritative and 'conservative', in the sense that it regulates, institutionalizes and stabilizes social structures over given territories. It also usually changes quite slowly and pragmatically. The law does this above all. However, economic cycles, shifts in class power, war and emergent ideologies may entwine in broad political crises within these territories, crystallizing diverse forces onto broader, more confrontational political struggles resulting in the extreme in coups, revolutions or ethnic, religious or other civil wars. But the question today is whether 'soft' geopolitics can help soften external relations, lessening wars and gradually filling those spaces which IR theorists used to call 'anarchic' with institutions.

The entwined effect of these power relations is complex and changeable, making sociological explanation very challenging. A central theme of my third volume is to assess long-term economic power *vis-à-vis* the short-term deflective power of wars, political crises, revolutions and ideologies. Did they actually re-direct the development of modern capitalism or merely temporarily, sometimes catastrophically, disrupt it?

Moving to John Hall's challenge, I conclude by being more explicit about the normative and supposed pessimistic implications of my model (emphasized also by Trentmann), and this also enables me to comment on Linda Weiss's view of globalization.

Distinguishing between four distinct power sources generates a model which is in some ways pluralist. Ideological, economic, military and political power, though entwined, are not normally merged. Capitalism, states, ideologies and militaries are not normally staffed by the same people, serving the same interests, mobilizing the same emotions. That is a good thing. I am sceptical of all those fused, systemic and often rather pessimistic views of the modern world as dominated by a 'rationalization

process' leading to an 'iron cage' (Max Weber), by a 'capitalist system' now looking rather 'eternal' (pessimistic Marxism), or by epistemic disciplined power (Foucault) – or all theories of globalization as a singular process, even though some of them use metaphors of diversity – 'liquidity', 'hybridity', 'de-territorialization'. These still see globalization imposing a singular quality on all social relations. All these visions are greatly exaggerated. Even when there are tendencies in these directions, we see reactions against them.

Normatively, I oppose attempts to fuse together economic, military and political power in the service of some grand transcendent ideology promising attractive but chimeric ideals of perfection. If implemented, these fusions increase despotic power and then bring disaster or ossification. We recognize the despotism and disasters that ensued from the attempt to impose state-centred fusions in the name of fascism and socialism. Nazism, Stalinism, the Great Leap Forward and the Khmer Rouge brought some of the worst disasters in human history; though Mussolini, Franco and subsequent Soviet and Chinese regimes managed milder, less destructive despotisms. Currently, China and Vietnam may be working their way towards decent futures. More recent attempts at theocratic fusion have brought despotism to some Muslim countries – and mildly threaten it in Hindu India. The Taliban and Sudanese Islamists brought disaster, the Iranian Ayatollahs brought a more conservative despotism.

A neoliberal, capitalist-centred fusion, modelling all social life on the power of economic markets, now presents another potential despotism – by capital, since the ownership of capital is the greatest power within markets. This refers to the bundle of Thatcherite, neoliberal, 'rational-choice', 'cost-accounting', 'let markets rule' ideologies recently prominent in the West (including its academe), and especially in the US. They conceal trends towards monopoly and rule by big capital. In the US, for example, if current tendencies in disenfranchising the poor, campaign financing, and media concentration continue, democratic politics and ideologies might be overwhelmed by capitalist power (maybe they already are). Where neoliberal 'structural adjustment programmes' are let rip across the world's poorer countries, they rarely have much impact on growth, but inequality widens and foreigners grab more of their economies (*Incoherent Empire*, ch. 2). We should remember one former *laissez-faire* disaster, the Irish famine, where intervention to feed the Irish was opposed on the grounds that it interfered with the natural workings of essentially beneficent markets. Unchecked market powers might be later followed by stagnation, since more resources must go into maintaining that power against resistance from below. As John Hall notes, my

empirical analyses reveal that despotism generates revolution. The way to revitalize leftist ideology across the world would be to let neoliberalism rip. However, the world need not go through such suffering. Far better to deconcentrate power. Freedom and social dynamism require erecting fire-walls between different sources of social power, protecting their relative autonomy. Different groups should control the power resources. Freedom and democracy rest on this separation of powers.

Reforms are desirable within the individual sources of social power. Though both collective and distributive power are necessary to social life, better to maximize collective at the expense of distributive power, so diffusing power more equally between social actors. That leads to three further preferences, for democracy, decentralization and competition, historically a liberal preference, though too often confined within the realm of political power. Political democracy is desirable. Even my consciousness of the dangers of confusing the *demos* with the *ethnos* means that the checks and balances normal to liberal models may demand confederal and consociational methods of power-sharing between ethnic groups (though this is a complex matter).

But the struggle for ideological and economic democracy may be equally important as political, and liberals have been less prominent here. Ideological democracy has been best explored by Habermas (1990: 116–18). He sees it mainly as a 'communicative structure' embodying a rational discourse whereby all contributions are equally heard and the better argument alone determines the 'yes' or 'no' responses of the participants. This 'ideal speech situation' would indeed be a truly egalitarian, democratic and collective ideological power. At present, he says, it is subverted by capitalism, the state and other power organizations which embody a rival strategic/instrumental rationality favouring their interests (what he calls 'the logic of the system'), which triumphs over the human 'lifeworld'. This might seem utopian, for it would involve radical curtailments of present distributive ideological powers. But that so much of our media, even its content, is controlled by authoritarian corporations, even individual persons, is inimical to genuine democracy. And therein lies a necessary struggle.

Marxists criticize a liberal democracy confined to the political sphere, seeing it as overwhelmed by the economic power of capitalism. They advocate workers' control to democratize and decentralize economic power. Of course, Marxists subverted this ideal when they reached power, fusing state ownership and control of economic power resources. In fact they left all the power sources more concentrated than under capitalism. The abject failure of state socialism forced most leftists to endorse weaker 'social democratic' forms of economic democracy,

involving freedoms of speech and association for workers, rights of bargaining and consultation, and a de-commodification of basic living-standards through the welfare state. This has been substantially achieved in numerous countries, though maintaining it requires struggle, and changing conditions require changing ideological solutions. Social democracy was until recently a mildly transcendental ideology. Then some of its adherents retreated to a more institutionalized ideology, from which they merely defend existing achievements. So arises another necessary struggle.

In contrast, liberals uphold the freedom and social creativity involved in competition between many economic units, each enjoying only limited powers. Liberals endorse capitalism as long as it is decentred, fearing only centralization and concentration. In his later work Robert Dahl saw capitalist concentration as subverting democracy. There are further economic problems with liberalism – neoliberalism in the South, and in the North evidence that the 'liberal' or 'Anglo-Saxon' regimes of political economy are widening inequality, unlike the social democratic, Christian democratic or Asian 'developmental' regimes which dominate most of the advanced world (Mann and Riley, 2004). Liberalism now seems to be more of the problem than the solution to the concentration of economic power in the hands of a few.

I welcome Linda Weiss's addition of 'governed inter-dependence' (GI) to my 'infrastructural power' (IP). GI captures what the most effective states do – like eighteenth-century Britain or Prussia, or the Chinese imperial gentry-scholar state ruling an agrarian society, or the contemporary regimes she instances. She does not mention these earlier states and they did differ. Organizations representing the masses were not a part of GI in them, but they are in contemporary instances, in the shape of organized labour, populist parties and religious pressure groups, generating welfare states, redistribution of incomes and intervention in labour markets. Weiss focuses on business/state relations, yet even South Korean GI in the 1960s (with powerful *chaebols* and a semi-authoritarian state) sponsored low inequality and housing and education subsidies. This leads to a distinction between class-divided (earlier cases) and populist GIs (her own examples), which helps qualify her statement that GI characterizes modern states. States attracted by neoliberalism, like Britain and the US, may coordinate with business groups (though presumably less than elsewhere), but are returning to more arm's-length legal controls over labour unions and the welfare state – a regression towards class-divided GI.

But this difference is dwarfed by the fact that many Southern states, like those of most sub-Saharan Africa, have never enjoyed much

infrastructural power, let alone governed inter-dependence. On independence, they inherited power networks which radiated less from territory to centre than from the colonial mother-country to their port-capital, which had little contact with most of the colony's hinterlands. Today the main power networks still radiate abroad from the port-capital, but now they reach to Northern-dominated capitalism. It is too simple to say that these countries are 'excluded' from global capitalism, as Weiss and I have both written. Their political and economic elites are not excluded. They are the 'gate-keepers' between the world and the country, but with the masses excluded. Weak infrastructural powers force elites to fall back on violent, less effective despotic powers to rule their countries (Herbst 2000; Cooper 2002). They may first attempt to rule through corrupt patrimonialism (half-despotically), but if this generates faction-fighting, they rely on repression which typically fails because of low infrastructural powers, generating revolt from regional warlords excluded from power, and the civil wars ably dissected by Laitin and colleagues. Latin American countries seem in a half-way position, with more effective and quasi-democratic states, though with infrastructures weakened by enormous social inequalities, *comprador* bourgeoisies and enclave economies – examples of faltering class-divided GI. But most of the South sees rather little GI.

High infrastructural powers coupled with low despotic powers give us populist GI. High infrastructural powers with more despotism moves towards class-divided GI, and this may then further reduce despotic powers. Low infrastructural powers push more towards despotism and the absence of any GI. This suggests that level of infrastructural power may be more causally decisive than level of despotic power. Support for this comes from the higher correlation of contemporary economic growth with measures of state capacity, like the rule of law and efficient Weberian bureaucracy, than with levels of democracy (Barro 1997: chs. 1 and 2; Evans and Rauch 1999).

Weiss is optimistic about the impact of economic globalization on Northern countries. She is correct that I have previously been rather defensive about the continuing powers of nation-states *vis-à-vis* globalization, and that this derived from social democratic Keynesian bias. I also agree that contemporary pressures may enable as well as constrain. But globalization itself neither constrains nor enables, since it is not an agent. Globalization is plural (economic, ideological, military and political), and so contains multiple agents. Some of these may constrain, as for example our economic pollution of the planet. In the future this may be viewed as the high-equilibrium trap of industrial societies, constraining further development, leading to economic cycles comparable to the Smithian

cycles of agrarian societies. But I see few constraints on the North coming from globalizing capitalists. They live here, after all. Indeed recent writing on economic globalization (including those of Weiss and Hobson) has downplayed such constraints, while my own research with Dylan Riley reveals the variety of macro-regional responses to recent pressures. I am pessimistic about the Anglo-Saxon macro-region, especially Britain and the United States. In that limited sense I am flattered to be described by Trentmann as a John Bright gone sour (and not only because we both lived in Rochdale).

Substantial pressures are felt on all Northern states. Lesser ones are capitalist though not global in origin. European populist GIs rested on compromise between capital and labour, and organized labour has weakened. Since it is now disproportionately based in the public sector, unions have lost some of their GI capacity to coordinate state with private sector workers. High unemployment and marginal employment among less skilled workers also seems structural in contemporary capitalism. But according to recent welfare state literature, the main pressures come not from globalization or capitalism, but from demography and life-styles. Over the last decades Europeans have been spending more years in education, retiring earlier, and living longer while requiring more health care. The burden of welfare is growing, the working population financing it is shrinking. The burden is higher the more generous the welfare state, the more populist the GI. Most states will have to slash welfare, unless they choose to exploit non-citizen immigrant labour. So far their cuts have maintained existing levels of class and gender equality. Though pressures on classes and genders vary, the biggest difference may be between the private and public sectors, the latter enjoying better retirement and pension schemes. This would also have the consequence that organized labour would be less crucial to reducing inequality. This reinforces Weiss's criticism of traditional Keynesian social democracy but indicates that populist GIs must find new solutions to new problems of economic power.

Military power differs. Its main defect is not distributive power within, but lethality towards those outside. Thus the question of internal military democracy does not so greatly trouble me. Though in earlier history I sometimes saw order, and even economic development flowing from the exercise of military power in large-scale societies, that is not true today, except in the direst, the most Hobbesian of local circumstances. Organized violence is now much too lethal to bring much good to anyone. There are alternative sources of order available today to the militarism wielded by local warlords, rival states or the enraged Superpower. We can potentially strengthen a dense web of soft geopolitical arrangements

which can ritualistically mediate and institutionalize conflicts, relegating lethal violence to marginal and infrequent roles in social interaction. That may also be utopian, but it generates another necessary struggle.

John Hall suggests I have become more pessimistic as tension has grown between my empirical work and my values. I remain attached to a mildly transcendental leftist ideology, which now must make revisions to twentieth-century social democratic Keynesianism. Progress has many facets – living-standards, more intensive and extensive power networks, wealth, democracy, security, etc. Any achievements in them bring new problems and many bring their own dark sides. The European Miracle brought dynamism and growth, alongside much increase in suffering. Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English people developed more constitutional government, especially in the settler colonies. Yet these most murderously cleansed the natives. Many highly educated young men and women in advanced European countries converted to fascism for what they saw as principled, moral reasons. Then many of them committed terrible atrocities. The liberal democracies fire-bombed the people of Dresden and Tokyo. In *Incoherent Empire* I depict Al Qaeda militants as being genuine anti-imperialists who kill innocent civilians. Freedom-loving Americans aerially assault Afghan and Iraqi settlements, killing civilians and terrorists alike. Good and evil in human affairs are usually closely entwined.

I suppose this is a mixture of pessimism and optimism. We must face up realistically to our social propensity to do both good and evil. The struggle for social betterment never ends. Democracy and freedom are not achieved states but processes, and each generation is set new challenges in reconfiguring the sources of social power.

Notes

1 Though Foucault does intermittently distinguish between three power agencies – class (or caste), command economics, and the state.
2 I qualify these arguments with careful discussion of the callous use of native labour causing high death-rates and of unintended ethnocide, especially through disease.
3 In the version Laitin saw, I instanced a third possible case, by China in Yunan in the same period. I relied on a single article which revealed little about the actual processes, so I dropped it.
4 I omit the three major communist cases from this discussion, since they did not pervert democracy in the way I have discussed. For what it is worth, all three parties had in principle favoured both political and economic democracy, but they soon betrayed these ideals.

5 I do not accept all Chua's arguments. She is less knowledgeable outside South-East Asia and she emphasizes the economic causes of conflicts which I think work better in explaining ethnic rioting than more sustained murderous cleansing.

6 Laitin's examples of 'elementary arithmetic' are too elementary. The figure of 3–4 million dead in the Holy Roman Empire as a result of the Thirty Years' War is not those 'killed' (by other humans), but mostly deaths through malnutrition and disease. After the storming of Beziers in the Albigensian 'Crusade', I said not that '8,000 or so' but 'most of its 8,000' inhabitants were slaughtered, according to one chronicler. I say not that he 'may have been exaggerating' but that 'most scholars believe the chronicler ... exaggerated'. I do not know of one who believes this is an underestimate.

7 I am no more Smithian than Marxian. In *Sources* (1986: 409), when my analysis of the 'Miracle' is mostly complete, I say that the difficult part of the explanation is now over, since *both* neoclassical and Marxian orthodoxies can kick in, with both markets and class actors in place. Brenner says I 'paraphrase' Smith's famous remark about markets being natural, but I was actually quoting Ernest Jones, and my next sentence is 'But this approach misses several important preconditions' (1986: 406–7). Nor do I say that the requirements for capitalism were in place by the end of the first millennium. In that passage I say (1986: 510) that 1477 was the symbolic date when various power networks 'were beginning to develop into ... a capitalist multi-state civilization' (1477 saw the collapse of that most feudal of states, the Duchy of Burgundy). Only half-a-millennium out!

8 Because I focus on Europe I figure as one of the eight characters in the title of Blaut's *Eight Ethnocentric Historians* (2000). Two other contributors here, Robert Brenner and John Hall, are also among the eight, and so is Max Weber. Karl Marx should obviously be the ninth. This is good company.

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