An Anatomy of Power

Michael Mann is one of the most influential sociologists of recent decades. His work has had a major impact in sociology, history, political science, international relations and other social science disciplines. His main work, *The Sources of Social Power*, of which two of three volumes have been completed, will provide an all-encompassing account of the history of power from the beginnings of stratified societies to the present day. Recently he has published two major works, *Fascism and The Dark Side of Democracy*. Yet unlike that of other contemporary social thinkers, Mann's work has not, until now, been systematically and critically assessed. This volume assembles a group of distinguished scholars to take stock, both of Mann's overall method and of his account of particular periods and historical cases. It also contains Mann's reply where he answers his critics and forcefully restates his position. This is a unique and provocative study for scholars and students alike.


16 The sources of social power revisited: a response to criticism

Michael Mann

I feel honoured by this volume and indebted to the contributors for their praise and their criticism. Having long avoided reflecting on my methodology, I thank Joseph Bryant for revealing it to me and then defending it. Randall Collins gives an incisive account of the substance of my model of the four sources of social power (ideological, economic, military and political) and its location amid other sociological theories. As he says, my power sources are distinct in not being abstract but embodied in real networks of people. These have emergent properties giving them some causal autonomy, though they do not amount to ‘logics of development’, since they are also closely entwined. I do not focus on power resources held by individuals – unlike Bourdieu’s model of economic, cultural, political and social forms of power. I focus on differences between the four networks, unlike most forms of ‘network theory’ (e.g. mathematical modelling or Castells’ “network society”). The closest parallel, as Collins observes, is with the new economic sociology emphasizing networks of economic connection. As he says, the same job could be done on ideological, military and political power. I also retain my distinctions between ‘collective’ and ‘distribution’, ‘intensive’ and ‘extensive’, ‘diffuse’ and ‘authoritative’, and ‘infrastructural’ and ‘episodic’ power, and I use them below.

I reject sociology’s foundational notion of ‘society’ because the boundaries of the four power sources rarely coincide. Despite the increasing ‘vagary’ of people within modern nation-states (noted in Sources, Vol. II), these have never been powerful enough to constitute whole ‘societies’. Human activity comprises multiple, overlapping, intersecting networks of social interaction. This model has become widely accepted since I initially advanced it. It enables us to identify the root of social change, since plural power organizations can never be entirely institutionalized or insulated from influences coming ‘interstitially’ from cracks within and between them. Social change results from a dialectic between the institutionalization and the interstitial emergence of power networks.

I oppose all systems theory, all holism, all attempts to reify ‘societies’. These make the ‘totality’ of social interaction into an actor in its own right.
But there is no totality. So Robert Brenner is right to pick me up for my remarks in Volume I of Sources suggesting that Europe in the Middle Ages was a single society. All I actually demonstrated was that Christendom was then a real network of interaction (though I did underestimate its links with Islam and Asia). There is no singular ‘world system’, no singular process of globalization, no multi-state ‘system’ dominated by a singular ‘realist’ logic; no logic of linear time. History is not the history of class struggle, or of modes of production, or of ‘epistemes’ or ‘discursive formations’, cultural codes or underlying structures of thought governing the language, values, science and practices of an era, underpinned by a singular process of power enveloping all human society. These systems theories succeed in capturing theorists not social reality.

I also oppose mono-causal theories. Implicit ones are now rare, though explicit ones abound, the unintended consequence of academic specialization. Economists tend to elevate the economy (though today many also embrace ‘institutions’ which are obviously more diverse), political scientists politics (though today often embracing economic models). Many sociologists are also surprisingly economic. In analysing globalisation, many content themselves with analysing changes in the structure of the economy, assuming these will change social life as a whole. Conversely, since the cultural turn many confine themselves to ideological and cultural analysis. This is not better. Globalisation involves economies, cultures, and also nation-states (there are now over 190 of them) and organisations dedicated to mass destruction. Globalization involves all four types of network and is therefore a plural and ‘opaque’ process.

Ideally, any sociologist analysing macro-topics would always discuss all four sources of social power. If sociological theory is to be of any use at all, it must be both empirically based and cover the breadth of human experience. Of course, juggling four balls at once through world-history is ludicrous over-ambition, and I drop one of them from time to time (most of my critics say I am prone to futilise ideology).

I begin by discussing general criticisms of ideological, military and political power. Then I turn to more empirical issues, beginning with ethnic cleansing and then at greater length discussing Europe’s ‘miraculous’ economic development and brief global dominance, focusing on comparisons with Asia/China. Finally, I offer some theoretical and normative conclusions.

**Ideological power**

My view of ideological power is said to be too materialist, too instrumental and too rationalist. Though in principle my model is none of these things, my practice has sometimes faltered. I prefer the term ‘ideology’ to ‘culture’ or ‘discourse’ not because I view ideologies as false or a cover for ruling systems which ‘surpass’ experience. ‘Culture’ and beliefs, values and norms, even sometimes all ‘ideas’ about anything, are clearly, the ‘ideal’ and the ‘material’, leading to the traditional debate about nature as opposed to culture, or the economic basis versus the superstructure, or joint economic/military interests (as in ‘IR realism’), as opposed to ‘constructionists’, or even as ‘structure’ as opposed to ‘agency’, by materialist theories of everything, we now have cultural theories of everything. In my recent work I have noted how ‘nation’ and ‘ethnicity’ are ‘cultural’, whereas classes are said to be ‘material’, they are usually symbolized they have largely replaced ‘materialist’ theories of nations and classes; now it is seen a ‘political religion’. My books Ethnic and is not progress, but a shift among equally one-sided theories. Since I offer this a four-sided theory, I win 4-1.

I have occasionally given the impression of being a materialist by (1) using the word ‘material’ when I should have written ‘concrete’ or ‘real’ (critics quote some of these passages); (2) endorsing John Hall’s and Perry Anderson’s description of my theory as ‘organizational materialism’; (3) emphasizing the ‘logistics’ and ‘infrastructures’ of ideology; and (4) concluding (1986; 471–2; 1993: 35) that ideological power had declined during the long nineteenth century, and that the extentive power of religion had continued to decline since, in the face of rising secular ideologies like socialism and nationalism.

Having now researched twelfth- and twenty-first-century fascism, I think that ideological power had declined during the long nineteenth century, and that the extensive power of religion had continued to decline since, in the face of rising secular ideologies like socialism and nationalism. Having now researched twelfth- and twenty-first-century fascism, I think that ideological power had declined during the long nineteenth century, and that the extensive power of religion had continued to decline since, in the face of rising secular ideologies like socialism and nationalism.
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organized. This is why the label ‘organizational materialists’ still seems apposite, for ideas are not free-floating. Nor are economic acquisitiveness, I mean by the term organizational materialism.

Since ideologies surpass experience, they provide a bridge between reason, morality and emotion. Successful ones ‘make sense’ to their initiates but also be a truth content, since an ideology would not spread otherwise, but the scientifically. Science alone lacks this power, being ‘cold’ and subject to groups infused with ideological fervour are more powerful than those who lack it. I find his analysis accurate and impressive.

I distinguished two main types of ideology: ‘transcendent’ and ‘immanent’. These terms were taken from theology, where they indicate two types of divine presence or spark. I wanted in fact to suggest that an ideology can have a presence or spark capable of moving human beings to acts outside, and then defining instrumental ends-ends calculations.

Transcendent ideologies are the most powerful, capable of breaking through divisions between established power networks – and across classes, genders, regions and states – by appealing to intersubjectively emergent common identities, interests and emotions generated by local change. The world religions did this most of all. More recently, nationalism, fascism, nationalism and nationalism ‘fundamentalism’ have also claimed transcendent visions and have drawn in an emergent collective people from across the boundaries of different institutionalized power networks. Socialist movements helped create broader bridging existing class and regional divisions. This also helped give both types of collectivity a moral belief and emotional confidence in their own world-historical role.

Immanent ideologies strengthen the moral and emotional solidarity and force of existing power networks. This is not merely ideological reproduction’ as Althusser and the early Bourdieu used to say. For it may be the enhanced moral given by an ideology which enables an army to be victorious (as Gellner suggests was as of Cromwell’s New Model Army), or it may enable a movement claiming to speak for a class to effect a revolution.

Since these are ideal-types, ideologies may be more or less one or the other. Influential ones tend to contain elements of both. At election times most politicians attempt ‘the vision thing’ (in the inimitable words of President Bush the Elder), though (like him) their vision tends to be
minimal and pragmatic. But even the most visionary ideologies are not born immaculate or transcendent. They become so after complex social processes involving coalition-building and instrumental perceptions of what will work as well as more intuitive or principled elements.

I now add a third residual type, institutionalized ideologies, indicating only a minimal presence of ideological power. These are conservative and pragmatic, endorsing ideas, values, norms and rituals which serve to preserve present social order. They believe that emerging conflicts can be mediated successfully by compromises embedded in present institutions. At the borderline are ideologies like Thatcherism and social democracy, which (as John Hall says) are mildly transcendent. Though they work within present institutions, they have a vision of a better society. The essence of institutionalized ideologies is recognition that progress lies through compromise and pragmatism, so that ‘dirty’ back-door dealings must compromise their values. That is what most politicians in democracies know above all else (and what they cannot quite openly admit before their supporters and supporters). But in parallel fashion, the masses comply less because they believe the existing social order is morally right than because they live in it and habitually reproduce it through their actions. This is their habitus, as Bourdieu says: they have internalized cultural dispositions to act, think and feel in certain ways which lie below formal consciousness. Institutionalized ideologies are closer to the anthropologists’ conception of ‘culture’ as the ideas, values, etc., that pervade everyday social practices.

I embrace as a version Hobson’s accusation that my treatment of ideology is ‘sporadic’ – in the sense that the importance of ideological power fluctuates greatly according to time and place. Though Tonnies stresses the significance of religion in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century England, I doubt he denies my main point: religious ideologies were most intense being genuinely transcendent in the seventeenth century, then they declined through the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Institutionalized ideologies are ‘thin’, in Hobson’s sense, intermittent ones are moderately thick, giving actors powers they would otherwise not have possessed. Transcendent ones are the thickest, constituting collective actors and interests and achieving major structural changes. Their construction is not an everyday occurrence, of course, at least not at the macro-level.

Emerging interstitial networks generate an explicit search for meaning. This happens where crises threaten the everyday routines of institutionalized networks and ideologies. In response, institutionalized elites begin to divide. Liberals may urge compromises with emerging discontented groups, conservatives intensify traditional values mixed with pragmatic through struggles, more general meaning-systems surprising practicalized elites remain divided, radicals may achieve more intensive and people from different social networks are now forced into common Goldstone (1995) has said of revolutions, while initial opposition to the systematic interest, the creation of an alternative order requires a plausible way of overcoming the existing crisis.

One classic example comes from Marxian and Weberian interpretations of the rise of Protestant capitalism. Marx stressed the rise of the bourgeoisie, a new class emerging interstitially from diverse backgrounds. Some even peasant farmers, engaged in more capitalist farming, others were traders and artisans taking goods between producers and consumers. Though their behaviour was converging, they did not initially conceive of themselves as being the same sort of people at all. Weber focused on the religious meaning and virtue to these practices, though he recognized in principle Calvinism. Through this mixed transcendental immanent process a new collective actor emerged: a self-conscious Protestant bourgeoisie, pioneering civil wars. Often it had higher morale than its opponents, derived from religious commitment. In Sources added geopolitics, adding the princes of Northwest Europe as interstitial power actors. They had been hitherto marginal, dependent actors in European geopolitics, yet their economic and naval power resources were growing. Removing religious legitimacy from Rome the moment that Luther nailed his defiant theses to the door of the Thirty Years’ War became inevitable. Thus the Protestant/Catholic power resources were (originally unintentionally) mobilized by divine grows ideologically discontented within the Church – a brief example of my model in action.
Fascists seek to explain the emergence of the first mass fascist movements in response to the European crisis generated by World War I. This was less severe in countries where liberal representative government was already institutionalized before 1914. Their elites could absorb post-war crises, blending centre-left pragmatic reformism and centre-right ad hoc repression. They gradually adapted their institutionalized ideologies with elements of social and Christian democracy. Here institutionalized ideologies held the upper hand.

It was different in the semi-authoritarian monarchies disambiguated by the war and the brand new states created out of the ruins of collapsed Empires. These were all ‘dual regimes’ (half-institutional, half-authoritarian), lacking the routine institutions and mass compliance for coping. Both proved more vulnerable to emerging fascist movements. These were distinctively classless, their original core forming from soldiers of all ranks demobilized in 1918. They confronted the crises with plausible ideological solutions drawn essentially from their experience of military power during the war. They saw discipline, comradeship and national unity as the keys to modern social progress. This was the kernel of fascism, a transcendent nation-state ideology. In Germany, Italy and Austria fascists could mobilize more mass emotional commitments and violence than could conservatives, liberals or socialists. But where conservatives maintained firmer control of military and political power, they were able to suppress the fascists, though taking the precaution of stealing fascist ideological clothing. The authoritarian regimes of Autonome in Romania and Fraco (in Spain) purported to be ‘traditional’, but actually their fascist-derived corporatism was a new immanent ideology of the right. Here we see institutionalized, transcendent and immanent ideologies struggling against each other in one period and continent.

Too much optimism pervaded some of my earlier discussions of ideologies. I dwell on ‘progressive’ ideologies that improved the world, stressing their creation of collective more than distributive power, as Geertz and Byany observe. Early Christianity was levelling and universal; medieval Christianity brought normative pacification; nationalism transcended classes. Geertz (drawing on Foucault) instead emphasizes the distributive-disciplinary power of Calvinism. He suspects ‘discipline’ also loomed larger in the normative pacification provided by Christendom. He may be correct. With fascism, communism and ethno-nationalism in mind, I now see clearly that world-transforming ideologies contain both collective and distributive power, and do both good and harm. On the whole I prefer mildly transcendent ideologies, offering a vision of a better, though limited and not ideal future. I return to this later.

Sources of power reviewed

Political and military power

Gianfranco Poggi criticizes my separation of military from political arguments voiced in his book Forma of Power (2003). He notes that the real deviance is to discuss military power at all. Poggi says that since separate military power deploying exactly these resources I will lightly reject this, arguing that the two have diametrically opposed qualities.

In Source I defined military power as ‘the social organization of physical force in the form of concentrated coercion’. Reflecting on Poggi’s dictionary allows ‘coercion’ to mean ‘compel to an act or choice’ or with dismissal, or priests clover into silence by their opponents. I should violence. ‘Concentrated’ means mobilized and focused, ‘lethal’ means injure or abuse, or ‘intense, turbulent, or furious and often destructive. These are the senses I wish to convey; military power is focused, physical, furious, lethal violence. This is why it evokes confront the serious possibility of agonizing pain, dismemberment, or death. Poggi and I agree that this is a distinctive and important experience of power in human societies.

Poggi, however, relates it to politics, drawing on Popitz and Schmitt for support, though they were discussing the extremely violent politics of mass (working-class) parties would vote on Aix en Paris and politically ideas, and be unable to engage in constructive debate. With the example of the Bolshevist Revolution before mass society. Politics required an authoritarian center as protection of politics, since force must be met by force. So his definition of politics in descent into militarism.

Military power holders say, ‘If you resist, you die.’ Such a lethal threat from armed persons is terrifying. The very unpredictability of who will end up as a corpse adds its own terror. Though bombing or storming a city never kills everyone, the inhabitants all fear they might be one of the
victims. Military power is not confined to armies. Lesser organized, lethal violence comes from gangs of paramilitaries, criminals, or youths. I have written this chapter in two cities, Los Angeles and Belfast. In both of them lethal armed gangs remain active. Since 1980 about 25,000 people in the US have died in gang warfare, over twice as many as in the Afghan war of 2001-2002. 'Only' 3,700 have died in the conflicts in Northern Ireland over the last three decades, though many more have been beaten up or knee-capped.

Very few rules govern the deployment of military power. The 'rules of war' are precarious in all ages - as we have recently seen in Afghanistan, Iraq and Guantanamo Bay. The paucity of rules or norms in the economic or ideological power - and especially unlike political power, as we see in a moment. Military power also has distinctive internal organization. It combines the apparent opposites of hierarchy and comradeship, intense physical discipline and esprit de corps. This is so that soldiers will not respond with flight when they face the prospect of terror themselves. Only where social movements actually begin to physically fight do they develop such intense and peculiar solidarity. This is what makes fascism tougher than their socialist rivals. Alcohol and drugs are often also administered, to dampen down combatants' own terror. They are not administered to political officials. Power exercised within military organization tends to be somewhat despotic and arbitrary, though tempered by shared comradeship and morale. And military power wielded over outsiders is the most despotic and arbitrary power imaginable.

I continue to define political power as centralized, territorial regulation of social life. Only the state has this centralized-territorial spatial form. Here I deviate from Weber, who located political power (or 'parties') in any organization, not just states. Most sociologists have ignored him and used the term only for state-oriented activity, though recent use by political scientists of the term 'governance' revives Weber's viewpoint. Governance may be administered by all kinds of bodies, including feudal manors and guilds, and modern corporations, NGOs and social movements. I prefer to keep the term 'political' for the state - including, of course, local and regional as well as national-level government. In feudalism, it becomes difficult to identify where states end and class organization begins, which Brenner makes some play of. But states and not NGOs and others have the centralized-territorial form which makes its rules authoritative for anyone within its territories. I can resign membership of an NGO and so forfeit its 'rules'. I am absolutely required to obey the rules of the state in whose territory I reside, and charges of citizenship are uncommon and rule-governed. 'Governance' is increasing in the world, but I prefer to discuss its non-state aspects in the context of
the death penalty or a life sentence. A Republican or Loyalist activist in Belfast may feel terror when confronted in the street by the Irish Republican Army, the Ulster Volunteer Force, the paramilitary Royal Ulster Constabulary (now the PSNI), or the British Army, but after
being arrested, different emotions will be aroused by the police and
judicial authorities (unless torture is feared). This is the force of rules,
not torture or violence.

Strikes and political dissent sometimes involve rough stuff from paramilitary and police forces. But Los Angeles typically feel more
fear when stepping into unfamiliar 'ghettoes' with alien gangs supposedly lurking nearby, than when picketing factories or marching against
war; similarly for Belfast Republicans straying into Loyalist areas, or
vice versa. They feel they understand and so can play around the edges
of the rituals of police violence more easily than with those of gang or
paramilitary warfare. You can't play games with the IRA or the UVF,
but you can (much of the time) with the British or Irish governments.

States sometimes express more violently, but usually in graded escalations. In the first, the police employ non-lethal riot tactics, causing
injuries but rarely deaths. In the second stage, mixed police, paramilitary
and army units will escalate shows of force. They broadcast threats, shoot in the air, and make demonstrative advances armed with low lethality
weapons – riot armour and clubs, tear gas, rubber bullets, the blunt edge
of cavalry sabres, carbines rather than automatic weapons, etc. In the
third, military, stage the armed forces take over, executing exemplary
reprisals by killing as randomly as they consider necessary, in order to
terrorize the others. Here we see the escalation from political through
mixed to military power relations.

Many states are more violent and/or despotic. Nonetheless, most still
try to institutionalize their power. Royal prerogatives were exercised most
effectively when they were not arbitrary, but predictable, conforming to
established norms in consultation with the main regional power-holders.
Royal courts, baronial councils, city-state oligarchies, estate assemblies,
even had their rituals and norms. The prevalence of rules among those
who counted politically means that truly despotic power was usually
mitigated by more routinized infrastructures. Despotism was a term of
abuse, meaning power arbitrarily applied, i.e. according to the will of monarchs or kings was illegitimate because arbitrary. The main
institutional weakness of monarchy was well understood – a disputed
succession could be an erratic, incompetent monarch, either of which in
summers might lead to civil wars – a move from political to military power. Of
course, many historic states dealing with crime or dissident used violence
more routinely, but this was usually under the lower orders, not politically
recognized personages. Public beatings and limb amputations were

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part of this sliding scale, while police and state paramilitaries often
pontifed more or less publicly after legal forms or consultations were
families of substance.

Of course, the most violent and arbitrary states leap right over any
and Catholic Grand Inquisitions killed large numbers of people whose
only crime was being defined as possessing an 'enemy' identity (as Jew,
Terrible or a Timur raised terror to an art-form. Any Ivan the
and military power. But all the power sources sometimes blur into
Many African states override the borderline between the two; state
officials control most of the economy but operate under corrupt capitalist
principles, while control over the para-statal economy generates much
1994, for example (see Dark Side, ch. 15). But these cases do not negate
do very violent states negate the division between political and military
power.

The second objection is that states deploy armies, which are often
the most powerful armed forces. Nonetheless, civil and military admin-
istrations are normally separated, military castes and coups are distinct
from state and in the Indian Federation (now India) states.
state and most insurgent and guerrilla forces were substantially independent of
to political parties than the state, like the Hutt Interlanthome or the Nazi SA,
states, as are bandit and criminal and youth gangs. Such
violence across the world today, enjoying
great success in challenging the armies of states. Only rarely since
World War II have the latter defeated guerrillas. Power is trying to
between states. Since 1945 inter-state wars have declined, and extra-state
wars – civil wars – now form the majority of wars, causing the majority
very old form of human social organization. All the military groups I have
identified deploy arbitrary terror against outsiders, and within they cultivate
discipline, comradeship and esprit de corps. Moreover, as Schreuder says,
military power conquers new territories, whereas political power can only work within.

A state may wield different military and political capacities. Germany has much more political than military power, the United States has the reverse. The US is the greatest military power in the world. In 2003 it conquered the whole of Iraq within twenty-four days. Its generals used the typical strategy of armies enjoying superior offensive fire-power: concentrate on the enemy's command-and-control centres, seize and hold strategic communications routes and then take the capital. The US did this very effectively, even without significant allies on the ground. Give-or-take a siege or two, it is how the European states also conquered their colonies. But American political power is puny by comparison with theirs. The US lacked international political allies, but more critical was its failure to find political allies within Iraq. Apart from Kurdish forces in the north, it lacked allies who could mobilize patrocinum-clear networks on the ground. Ignoring the experience of past empires, it has relied for pacification and policing on its own soldiers, and so its apparatus of control remained highly lethal. Its 'police' are soldiers armed with M-16/M-4 semi-automatic weapons, calling in tanks, artillery and air-strikes. Such weapons produce mayhem, mangled and maimed bodies, and male, female, infant and elderly victims. This is the way to conquer armies and terrorize peoples, but not to police them or establish the rule of law (or to win them over ideologically). Here the distinction between military and political power is crucial to an understanding of the abject American failure in Iraq. I see my book Incoherent Empire as a policy-off from my model, for I predicted the disasters which would ensue if an occupation and restructuring of Iraq (or Afghanistan) were attempted by a United States deploying massive military offensive fire-power, stingy economic budgeting, and wholy inadequate political and ideological power resources.

John Hobson says that I have tended to equate international relations with geopolitics. Initially I did, but not since introducing two refinements. First, I distinguished between 'inter-national' and 'transnational' relations. Intenational relations (always with a hyphen) are relations between states or between groups organized within each state--like national football associations organized into FIFA, for example. Transnational relations transcend the boundaries of states, passing through them without reference to state power. I used the distinction mainly when discussing globalization, which blends both. I could have usefully deployed them when analysing earlier multi-power actor civilizations like Sumer or Greece. Their individual city-states shared in a common 'civilization' which was predominantly transnational, and they also conducted inter-national relations, including going to war with each other (though the word 'national would be strictly anachronistic before modern times).

Second, I distinguished 'hard' from 'soft' geopolitics. 'Hard geopolitics' are matters of war and the avoidance of war; 'soft geopolitics' are inter-state education, the environment, etc. If the essence of political power is authoritar-rule-light lethal violence, then hard and soft geopolitics must be separated agreements between states often setting up inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) which write the fine print, police conformity and punish to routinized regulation, whereas hard geopolitics militarize it.

True, inter-national space is rarely as rule-governed as national space (though it is not anarchic, as realists sometimes say). We use the term 'trade war' to indicate a rivalry, in which, for example, in 2002 the US arbitrarily slapped tariffs on foreign steel imports, and the EU responded--as it was entitled to do under WTO rules--with counter-tariffs on a range of US exports. But while the WTO legal machinery ground slowly, the US evaded the fines by abolishing the offending tariffs in 2004. Since the WTO is ultimately a voluntary body, the US could refuse to pay, and withdraw from it, but the advantages of membership are too great. Or Global Warming may be enraged on without punishment. It involved overall, IGOs are part of politics. In contrast, the 'hardest' of geopolitics involve wars or determing wars, which are expressions of military power relations. So too are threats of so are alliances to build up one bloc's military strategic against others. Characteristically insecure and changeable, they are less rule-governed. Once again, politics is about rules, routinization and military power is rule-light, arbitrary and essentially despotic. But concepts are only valid if they help explain the real world. Are there military, as opposed to political, phenomena? At the beginning transnational civil society', the world remains lethal. One in six states are ravaged by civil wars, and there are purportedly twenty million
Kalashnikovs in use around the world. The US has military bases in over one hundred countries and has invaded two countries in the last three years. Over eighty countries collaborate in its 'war against terrorism' – because international terrorists have killed the citizens of over eighty countries. The US has 1.4 million men and women in its armed forces, though this is smaller than the 1.6 million employed in the US private security industry – a disproportion found also in Britain. There are 'no-go' areas for the police in many supposedly advanced and pacified countries. Isn't it time more social scientists studied organized, farcical, lethal violence? We are human beings, mobilized into social groups, perennially prone to attack each other violently. Not everyone can sublimate violence into academic polemic.

Explaining murderous ethnic cleansing

Which brings me to David Laitin's polemic against my treatment of ethnic violence. His provocative title, The Dark Side of Democracy, seems to have enraged him, since it is the only possible source for his main claim that I say democracies commit murderous ethnic cleansing. On pages 2-4 of the book I explain my title in the form of one principal thesis and five sub-theses. The last two of these say that institutionalized democracies do not commit murderous cleansing, except for some settler states, and that by definition a democracy cannot murder a large number of its own citizens. So I never simply say that democracies commit murderous ethnic cleansing. Nor is it correct that 'on through the text, Mann associates the most grievous murderous violations of human rights with democracy'. Since I do not say such things, I never refer to a 'watered-down version' of them. I do think there are connections between the two, or I would not have chosen this title. So let me explain what they are.

The book lays out eight principal theses (as well as the five sub-theses) which proceed successively from the most general causes to the most concrete processes of cleansing. After presenting them, I acknowledge (on pages 9-10) that they are only empirical tendencies, with exceptions. Nor do I present a large sample of cases. This is thick analysis of a few cases, able to bring out the unique features and causal processes of each.

My first thesis says that murderous ethnic cleansing is modern because it is the dark side of democracy – it does not say that democracies commit murderous ethnic cleansing. I go on to explain what this means. First, cleansing is modern, rarely found in large-scale human groups in former times. It does seem to have occurred in some conflicts between the kinds of small and simple human groups studied by anthropologists, and there was a larger exception perpetrated by a certain type of conqueror-serbet, to which I will return. Laitin says my overarching claim is 'trivially true', seeing it as a peripheral feature of the human condition. I have some sympathy here. Anthony Smith and John Hutchinson have overturned the old LSE orthodoxy (which Laitin and I apparently share) that ethnic solidarity and conflicts are not exclusively modern, but 'perennial'. I quote them too. I expect some of these scholars will criticise my book. If they do, they will reject my argument not as trivial but important – and false.

The main reason I give for my modernist position is that ethnicity, though present in all times, was much less important to power relations in this outweighed any common ethnic identity they shared (most shared occurs where ethnicity dominates class, with class-like sentiments of commitment transmuted into ethnic-nationalism. Acrories were rare, that the Assyrians' went around amounting to 'exemplary repression' of Babylonians were killed in order to get the majority to comply with political goals, with no desire to 'cleanse' whole ethnic groups from their homelands. They killed and deported many people, for different purposes.

My historical argument continues through a pre-modern phase of mid-level religious cleansing generated by ideologies of 'democratization'. Europe brought the notion of (political) 'rule by the people'. This ideology not only do so in the liberal countries. There 'the people' initially meant adult male property-owners, and so the emerging nation was 'saturated' and diverse – again nation did not transcend class. This extended class by class and from men to women, so that the whole of an citizenship only after liberal democracy was already substantial. Major 'catharsis' was already substantial constitutions. For example, in the British and France), but generally through more peaceful, yet through the nineteenth century the ideal spread of rule by the 'whole people', which is really what we mean by democracy. But this
might confuse two different root words of the people, the Greek terms demoter and etnos. In multi-ethnic contexts, rule by the whole people might mean only rule by a dominant or majority ethnic group. This became especially problematic in the authoritarian Romanov, Habsburg and Ottoman empires, where insurrection might be in the name of rule by either all citizens or the locally dominant etnos. I then trace the latter notion into "organic" nationalism, which sees the people as one and indivisible and demands "Poland for the Poles", "Ukraine for the Ukrainians", etc. This I say was the root of the evil that followed.

So Latin is wrong to say that I am imprecise about how modernity causes ethnic cleansing. Most scholars have concluded that it involved the rise of nationalism. This is true, but insufficient. I add that first the root of nationalism was the demand for rule by the people, and second murderous ethnic cleansing resulted where organic nationalism appeared in the bi-ethnic contexts explained in my theses 3-5. It is in this sense that ethnic cleansing is the dark side of democracy. More precisely, it is the perversion of democracy — not usually of institutionalized democracies (I will say why later), but of democratic ideals and processes of democratization. Nor is it a mere abstraction, for in my case studies I show that almost all the eventual perpetrators of murderous ethnic cleansing started their political careers seeking "rule by the people", and then perverting their own initial ideals. These are quite close connections, operating through both broad historical processes and individual careers. Are the connections "logical", as Latin seems to require? I don't quite know what "logic" would look like in history. But Latin seems to have been dealing so long with static correlations between variables, dealing with process through lagged variables and cohort analysis (which he does brilliantly) that he cannot recognize processual historical arguments when he sees them.

In the case of the settler colonies I make the most direct connection. This is the only type of case where I say that still-functioning representative governments (for the colonists, not the natives) perpetrated murderous ethnic cleansing, and were more likely to do so than less representative governments. To support this, I do make brief comparisons between different colonial powers, and Latin criticizes this brevity. He does not mention that the bulk of my comparative analysis concerns not place but time and agents. I compare colonies and states in North America and Australia before and after settlers acquired de facto and formal self-government. Murder increased after these changes. I also compare settlers, the colonial government and churches, and find that settlers favoured murder more, churches least.

I locate the underlying cause of such cleansing as the arrival of settler-conquerors who want the natives' land but not their labour (and sad
controlled every government in Yugoslavia (there were three rival groups in Bosnia), and they mutually escalated into organic nationalism and war. Among them, only Milosevic had not spent most of his political career favouring democracy.

Ottoman Turkey held free elections, with a limited franchise in 1908, seven years before the genocide. Independent centrist won the most seats, though the Young Turks did respectively, in alliance with the minority nationalist parties who later became their victims. At this time they favoured extending representative government, with democracy as their ultimate goal. Then a succession of military defeats intersected with coup and ethnic conflict pushed them towards 'organic nationalism', away from democracy. Formerly the leading advocates of reforms, they were the perpetrators of the 1915 genocide, not the reactionary Sultan's party or the conservative centrist. In Rwanda, elections had followed independence during the 1960s. Hutu nationalists won them and their notion of 'majoritarian democracy' became less and less tolerant of the Tutsi minority. A military coup led to a Hutu-led dictatorship under President Habyarimana, which lasted twenty-one years until the eve of the genocide. Most commentators believe that the Habyarimana regime restrained ethnic violence. However, it was destabilized by a Tutsi invasion, economic difficulties and international pressure for the restoration of elections. It was in the run-up to these elections that Hutu Power factions radicalized and began to take over most of the new parties. Since most Hutu politicians expected them to win the elections, they were jumping on the bandwagon. The Hutu Power factions perpetrated the genocide.

So almost all the leading perpetrators began their political careers demanding the creating or deepening of representative government. Then they perverted their own ideals. I take pains to describe their political trajectories. This means that Latin can give us evidence of their anti-democratic stance my descriptions of the later stages of their careers, when they had abandoned their earlier ideals. He takes some statements from when they were actually murdering, when they were not remotely democratic. But I am describing a process, which begins with attempted democratization and then, when democracy increasingly entrains, goes into reverse.

The Nazi movement is the only one that started anti-democratic. Nazi leaders endorsed the leadership principle, attacked a Weimar democracy they claimed was corrupt and ineffective, and were violently brawling from early on. Nazism does not fit. But their major foreign collaborators whom I discuss do largely fit. Seven nationalist movements of eastern Europe began as democrats, then embraced organic nationalism.
their distinct power. If practices are stable, generating routine pragmatism among elites and a routine hatred among the masses, they are strong. But if practice is unstable, then ideals matter. Some ideals may have very unpleasant consequences, I hope this is all now clear. Next time I might choose a more boring title.

Latin's second complaint concerns my typology of violence and cleansing contained in Table 1.1. Its main purposes were to distinguish the main types of violence and cleansing, to distinguish the focus of my research—the shaded areas in the table which are high on both criteria—and to indicate stages of escalation. That the intention to kill large numbers appears late in the process does not "undermine" my categories, as Latin says. Quite the reverse: it enables me to better identify the stages of escalation. Throughout the book I describe many countries and sequences with what I hope is a consistent terminology. I think this table generates the most useful typology available in the literature.

Yet I do concede some ground to Latin. My typology is not a pair of Gauntman scales, since types and degrees of violence and cleansing mingle. There are actually elements of three scales: proportion of a total population cleansed, proportion of a total population dying, and extent of intended killing. I attempt to distinguish between unintended deaths, intentional killing and the half-way category of "callous" deaths (behaviour which unintentionally caused deaths, but was not quickly rectified because the perpetrator cared little for the victims’ fate). That is why genocide is below ethnic cleansing in the violence typology and why callous projects rank above merely mistaken projects in the cleansing typology. This third element is confusing, I admit. If it were possible to devise accurate statistics on all these dimensions, I might devise a better schema. But murderous ethnic cleansing does not allow that kind of precision, and the table is adequate to its purposes. It is also true that I occasionally compound the problem by saying that a is a 'worse' case. This seems to indicate a moral stance, though I only intended to indicate a relative position in the table. I share Latin's doubts about the status of 'genocide' as the 'worst evil', as opposed to other forms of inhumanity. I say this in the text, when dealing with General Karstic's trial. It only makes a legal difference whether he is convicted of conspiracy to genocide or crimes against humanity—equivalent to most of my shaded areas. He did command mass murder.

But I reject Latin's further accusation that I show leftist bias in excusing class more than ethnic atrocities. I do say that class conflict usually generates fewer deaths than ethnic conflict. I give reasons for this—classes are more inter-dependent than ethnic groups and tend to form less total identities. But I say that post-revolutionary Marxist regimes differ.

The whole point of my long chapter on "communist cleansing" is to precisely cite and differentiate in violence and cleansing between concepts of I note their distinctive evils, 'classicide' (killing classes) and 'fratricide' into class of 'ethnic' (hereditary) elements, supposedly with no place in murder—only appose very late in cleansing sequences. Clear inciting communist ones, especially in 1939 and 1941. Latin says I excuse Khmer Rouge, while classicide once begun was fairly systematic, and the Soviet Union were not intended. They fit my category 'callous the lethal effect of policy were known, the regimes were slow to use these callous acts resulted in the deaths of truly vast numbers of people—China. These are all precise and, I believe, correct statements. I excuse no and the Finnish governmen during the Finnish famine (lower absolute death perhaps it is these comparisons which really bother Latin.

We like to think of perpetrators being quite alien from us—'primitive Holocaust, and communist dictatorships. More recently "failed states" good and evil until writing this book, but that I know how to say that they are not together out of the problems confronting each generation in each place. (more direct forms of democracy were always available for large-scale societies it brought era where ethnic and demos entwined. This is a problem of our civilization. That is what I mean by The Dark Side of Democracy.

Economic versus political power: the European miracle

Two chapters in this volume, by Stephan Epstein and Robert Bretherton, discuss the remarkable rise of Europe to global leadership in the early
modern period. I will respond, beginning within Europe and then broadening out to comparisons between Europe, especially Britain, and Asia, especially China. The latter also gives me the opportunity to comment on a debate which has erupted since my first two volumes of Sources. I finished Volume I twenty years ago and would now change various arguments in the light of subsequent scholarship. I also know more about basic economics. So I recognize my mistake in persistently using the rising productivity of land (rather than labour) as a measure of development - and now I can at least understand Brenner’s accusation that I am a ‘Smithian’, though I reject it. I also object to Brenner’s assertion that mine is a functionalist theory of stratification. I do not say that those who hold power perform ‘indispensable functions’ for subordinates. I do say that distributive power derives originally from collective power, i.e., that stratification derives from social cooperation. So did Marx and so have many others.

Yet Brenner has a point when he says that my depiction of the European dynamic sometimes appears too ‘systemic’. My remark that the crises of the fourteenth to fifteenth centuries and of the seventeenth century were mere ‘blocs’ in an overall upward trend needs toning down (millions died). Brenner’s argument that feudal lords and peasants were locked into relations which tended to stifle development also has some force. There were numerous obstacles and many inefficiencies and contradictions. Those who narrate development find it difficult to avoid an overtly and upward tone. I did distinguish different geographic rhythms and I would now also distinguish more clearly several phases of economic development. First came the somewhat hidden and localized intensive development of the acclimatised, backward and overwhelmingly rural networks of the early Middle Ages, in which Christendom and (over a certain space and time) the Carolingian Empire provided a minimum of more extensive integration. Then came more extensive ‘Smithian’ development towards markets, towns and states, still largely subordinated to local, feudal relations of production; then further development of commodities, markets, towns and states into Smithian ‘high equilibrium’ agrarian economies; then the surges into capitalism and industrialisation that I will describe below. In each phase, there was a tendency for the institutionalization of social relations which had helped early development to block further development. As I described in Sources – and as Epstein also argues – these were not too much overcome as outdated, as regionally marginal and interstitial to previous phases pioneered new development. The ultimate ‘secret’ of such extraordinary yet uneven development in Christendom-becoming-Europe was its combination of intensive and extensive power relations, localization plus connections to a wider world.
This surely is a statement of alternative possibilities not just for a feudal regime but for any agrarian regime which has reached the limits of available technology on its presently cultivated lands.

But the question is whether any regime could do these things. If it could not, or if the cost of doing so was too high, then it might not even attempt them. In Europe some regimes could do this, cheaply. That is the decisive point, and that is not given by any definition of the class relation between lords and their peasants. In fact Brenner shows us how they could do this. He takes us on two brief tours of territorial expansions, one by lordly states into the pagan east, into Muslim Iberia and into Celtic lands, the other of expansions of kingdoms like France at the expense of smaller local lordships. But these two types of expansion did not derive from 'the rules of reproduction of feudal lords'. They derived from the geopolitical opportunities presented within Europe by the combination of the collapse of the Roman Empire, the barbarian invasions, and an era of local defensive warfare by knights with castles and armed retainers. Europe then presented the spectacle of much virgin land, many small states and some areas which were populated but almost stateless. Brenner here rightly emphasizes that some peasant communities were capable of mustering determined military resistance against the neighbouring lords. But scattered among these relatively weak states and stateless communities lay some more powerful states, for whom the opportunities for conquest were therefore unusually great. Some took their chance and the rest is European history. They would have probably taken their chance whatever their relationships to the peasants, whether or not these were feudal.

The consequence was the military/feudal state modernization charted for Europe by Charles Tilly and myself. Epstein raises some pertinent questions about this, including that I give insufficient attention to the actual form of medieval and early modern states. What I have to say about this actually derives from the puzzle that this European route has not been followed in those other continents which developed multi-state systems. Miguel Centeno (2002) has shown this for post-colonial Latin America, and Jeffrey Herbst (2000) has shown this for post-colonial Africa. They produce suitably nuanced explanations for this, but these begin from the absence of serious inter-state warfare in those continents. Europe turns out to have been an unusually warlike multi-state system. However, another continent had experienced comparable levels of warfare, and with an initially similar trajectory of development. During the Spring-Autumn and Warring States periods in China (6c. 770-221), there was repeated warfare among many small states. The outcome was political consolidation, penultimately into four great states, and then, finally, into one state conquering the others. Since then, China has remained one imperial realm (except for periods of civil war). Until this state, recognizably modern, pre-capitalist, resembling in many ways European states, contains itself as 'feudal'. But to explain their propensity for warfare and the ties of vassalage, relations of loyalty and service between lord and vassal (so Brenner stresses), exploitation, but from the power vacuums and the power dynamics, the power vacuum meant this was not a zero-sum game for those who had more power. Since the word 'feudal' has to do with double-duty, referring to rather different class and military/political relations, it leads to much confusion. Europe and China, one that reduces them neither to the feudal nor the also coining their distinctive military and ideological power relations 'mini-imperial', since the big states were absorbed by conquest and either highly (expressively or 'indirectly'), buttressed with ideologies of their culturally assimilating the conquered and integrating them into common were rather small empires, and they were multiple. 'Mini-empires' will re-introduce the concept in my discussion of the Europe/China debate, for they figure large there.

Yet we have not grasped all of the power structures of medieval Europe, or even begin to account for the different eventual outcomes in the two continents. Brenner reduces Europe to the villages [regardless of feudalism]. I have added the lords, vassals and temples. But what about the autonomous towns and guilds and the 'brotherhoods' their importance, calling them 'corporations'? Brenner says nothing about them. In Sources I say that the medieval period mobilized intensive combination being necessary for the development of market-based economy. Epstein is uneasy with this, and wants to add a
Carolingian political legacy and a Church revival of Roman law which turned into a powerful corporate legal profession. He adds more political power (and more complexity) to my main ideological argument. He may be right. But he and I agree that such institutions held some autonomous power, outside states and lords. For their part, states attempted to play off lords against merchants, the Church and other corporations. It is difficult to find much that is comparable in China. I trace a substantia part of the deep-rooted dynamism of Europe to the diversity of local power actors. I said that in a sense there was 'private property' in the sense of 'hidden powers' long before that term came to have specifically capitalist connotations. Now I turn to the 'Miracle' itself.

Economic power: the European Miracle versus Asian revisionism

Here I respond not only to critics in this volume, but also to a more general debate which erupted since I wrote the first two volumes of Sources. Writers who stress the 'European Miracle' of development tend to emphasise the deep historical roots of the rise of Europe and especially Britain, hitherto backwaters. Sources put me in this camp since my explanation went back centuries and largely stayed within Europe.18 Brenner (with Isett 2002) argues that Britain overtook China by virtue of a deep-rooted transition from a feudal to a capitalist mode of production, though breakthrough came only in Britain, and fairly suddenly, in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (since feudalism was blocking development before that). All this has been contested by a group of 'Asian Revisionist' scholars, comprising the 'California School', which includes Jack Goldstone (2002, and his chapter here), and an 'anti-Orientalist' group, which includes John Hobson in a recent (2004) book. They and writers like Pomeranz (2000), Bin Wong (1997) and Gunder Frank (1998) make the following arguments about the power sources.

Economic power

This is where focus. They deploy two main arguments. (1) Only in the nineteenth century did the European economy – more specifically, the British economy – overtake the Asian economy – specifically that of China's most advanced region, the lower Yangtze. In the eighteenth century, they say, the two continents and regions were broadly level. Before then, Asia and China had been much more advanced, but then

Europe had experienced 'Smithian development': in the eighteenth century both were similarly caught in the Smithian 'high equilibrium' division of labour and markets, but without major technological or institutional breakthroughs and no further surge of development was possible. Acquired first by England from 1800, enabled first Britain, and then

Overcoming occurred only because of two 'happy accidents'. First, reducing the costs of industrialisation and enabling technological virtuous cycles to develop between its industries. Second, Europe/Britain forcibly acquired New World colonies which happened to provide sugar, standards and enabled it to trade with Asia. Revisionists reject the view that Europe and Britain possessed a deep-rooted dynamic which more persistently led towards breakthrough. Of course, Euro/British advocates also note accidents, especially of ecology (soil, minerals), deep social dynamic.

Ideological power

Goldstone says that the decisive reason for the eventual overtake was the autonomous role and dynamism of British science. This is also implicit in the writings of some other revisionists. It is unclear whether we should regard this as a third happy accident. But, conversely, Hobson stresses the dependence of European on Chinese science.

Political power

They deny that the Chinese state was a growth-hindering, anti-capitalist bureaucracy or even a major restraint on private domestic markets. It probably left trade more alone than European states, while the multi-state system of Europe also had inefficiencies.

Military power

The overtake also involved military violence, in which Europeans excelled. Their military power also enabled eventual domination.

To discuss these issues it is helpful to distinguish two phases of economic development, one to a Smithian high-equilibrium agrarian society, and
a second, resulting from a breakthrough into an economy of more permanent growth. It is also helpful to distinguish the period of European/British economic overtaking from a later period of European power domination of Asia/China. On economic issues I focus on the comparison between Britain and the lower Yangzi.

I start with the demographic and economic measures of the 'moment' of economic overtaking (the Chinese data are mostly in Lee and Campbell, 1997, and Lee and Wang, 1999). The revisionists say that these measures indicate that China was at least level with England through the eighteenth century and into the beginning of the nineteenth century. They show that China had achieved over the previous few centuries a massive population growth with no apparent rise in mortality rates. China also practiced population controls, and not only the notorious female infanticide. Since there was a surplus of males, many men were celibate while even the luckier ones tended to marry late. Couples also delayed the first child longer than couples in England did and they ended childbearing over six years earlier, so family size was smaller. There was also widespread adoption, which enabled parents to cope with the gender imbalances that often resulted from such practices. This is a picture of an agrarian society able to expand population when resources expanded, and restrict it when they didn't. Only in the nineteenth century, Lee and his collaborators argue, did the system break down, with famines resulting.

Nonetheless, for England we have the far more comprehensive dataset of Wrigley and Schofield (1988). Interestingly, these data derive from parish records, that is from the implantation within each village of an ideological power organization, a nationally organized church. There was no parallel, organizationally or in terms of records, in China. These data cast doubt on the revisionist argument. They show a steady English population rise from the 1600s, then a dip in the 1730s and then an astonishing rise, a doubling of the English population in only eighty years, from 1740 to 1820. There is not consensus on its causes. Ruzell (1998) emphasizes mortality decline, Wrigley and Schofield stress fertility rises. Hart (1998) links the two by tracing a large decline in the stillbirth rate during the eighteenth century, and therefore an improvement in female nutrition (confirmed by Wrigley 1998), suggesting women were particularly better off in England than China. But the most important difference is that by 1750 infanticide was unknown in England and mortality crises attributable to famine had disappeared. By 1760 the relationship between food prices and mortality rates, already weak, had disappeared. In contrast, Lee and Wang (1999: 45, 110–13) admit both to famines in eighteenth-century China and to a continuing strong relationship between grain prices and mortality rates. Though any eighteenth-century famine has not been great, it does seem that Malthusian crises had been

Indeed, Kant Deng (2003) believes that fluctuations in the Chinese population were still those normal to traditional agrarian societies, he argues, only where new land or new crops could be worked, and neither produced growth which could be sustained. On demographic grounds he dates the 'great divergence' between China and England as occurring before 1700. The revisionists respond to have reached the high point of a Smithian agrarian cycle, and then slipped on living standards, nutrition and fertility. They point to Holland, which had surged ahead in Europe in the seventeenth century, and then slumped well behind England in the eighteenth.

Brenner and Jett (2002) answer this with data on British labour productivity. These show fluctuations in earlier centuries, but a massive increase above these levels of about 60 per cent starting from somewhere just before 1700 to 1750. This enabled overall population growth, but there was also a doubling of the urban population, without any apparent decline in national health. Both these trends were unparalleled anywhere else in the world, though Holland saw a less dramatic rise. Brenner sees this as the crucial shift out of Smithian cycles, the fruits of a capitalist revolution in agriculture, with farmers treating all factors of production, including labour, as commodities. China's only expansions at this time were in virgin lands or new crops, neither of which increased labour productivity. In fact, say Brenner and Jett, Chinese labour productivity was declining. Britain could expand agriculture yet also release labour. The Smithian limits were being breached, since a breakthrough in labour productivity had occurred.

But was there yet industry to absorb the released labour? The conversion of coal into steam power proved to be the energy core of the English industrial revolution. Revisionists (following Wrigley) say that coal was a happy accident, abundant near the emerging industries, whereas in China coal was abundant but far from the areas which might have potentially industrialized. The facts are contested. But even if this were so, Britain's good luck had come early. Even by 1700 England produced five times as much coal as China. Moreover, while Chinese coal output was declining through the eighteenth century, in Britain it was growing steadily, boosting the release
of population to the towns and boosting the growth of metal-working. As we see later, this linkage between coal and metal-working also generated technological invention. So, if coal was a happy accident, it came early, in stoically greater quantities, and with ‘virtuous’ linkages elsewhere.

Nonetheless, economic historians now place less weight on particular ‘leading’ industries like coal mining, metal-working and cotton. They say that growth diffused fairly evenly across the whole English economy (Crafts 2000). Temin (1997) measured the efficiency of early nineteenth-century English industry in terms of its ability to lower prices of its exports in relation to imports. Substantial lowering occurred across most industries, not just coal and cotton, but also ‘hardware, haberdashery, arms and apparel’ indicating generally rising productivity. He says this reveals that a general entrepreneurial, innovative economic culture was already in place by 1800. Capitalist economic institutions also existed in China, but they now dominated England. An institutional breakthrough had also occurred. Brenner wants to attribute this all to changes in agrarian class relations, but that seems too narrow. Entrepreneurs emerged out of a variety of social backgrounds – landlords, yeoman and tenant farmers, peasants, merchants, artisans. Something much more diffuse was occurring.

It is true that trade relations were still more developed in Asia. The revisionists have demonstrated that Asia still dominated long-distance trade. Capitalist commerce had existed in coastal areas all over Asia well before 1700, with Chinese traders in the lead. At the beginning of the nineteenth century Europe still contributed a much smaller proportion of world trade. Frank observes that Europe had essentially nothing China wanted, except silver, whose export from the Americas to Asia was the only product enabling the Europeans to receive the many Chinese goods they desired. So Immanuel Wallenstein was much too Eurocentric when he claimed that there was a ‘European world economy’ existing by the seventh century.

If Europe’s colonies were a ‘happy accident’, had they yet made much of an economic difference? This remains controversial, but they obviously made some difference. They brought silver to Europe, enabling Europe to trade with China, and they brought new crops, impacting somewhat on diets and caloric intake. O’Brien (forthcoming) says that intercontinental trade before the industrial revolution was limited. He estimates that trade with the New World boosted British resources by (at most) 1 per cent of GDP. Of course, cumulatively 1 per cent per annum might provide quite a boost, and this trade had been proceeding since the early sixteenth century. From about 1650 the price of goods traded internationally had been slowly though consistently falling, suggesting improvements in efficiency.

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All this suggests trade and colonies did make a difference. But only in commodity prices, suggesting the emergence of integrated global markets. They then centered in Europe and its colonies, though including Williamson 1998, 2002. Colonies did eventually make a big difference, not a European world economy, but not there an Asian or a Chinese to have been genuinely re-constituted, linking Asia, Europe and the rest of the world, that is not the case. There was no colony economically ‘overslaved’ in relations of dominance. They were still separate parts of the world. It is obvious: that colonies are not primarily about ‘overslavery’ or ‘economic expropriation by a force more rapacious than feudalism had ever seen. The British takeover, of Asia/China. It happened in the traditional view of European/colonial dominance was not yet achieved. There were no longer Malhussian cycle institutions. The alternative factor in economies’ models is technological innovation. To discuss this will take us out of the purely economic realm. European Miracle has to be explained in terms of all four sources of social power.

Science also played a major role in European development, one that others have shown that the new technologies of the industrial revolution can be traced back to the English scientific revolution. Though (as I noted) most of the major inventions did not come from scientists, but from the ‘micro-technologies’ of engineers and artisans, it has now been shown that they had absorbed the general principles of scientific theories, and they shared a common technical vocabulary. They had imbued the ideology that natural phenomena were orderly and predictable, mastered by means of a scientific method but instrumental, incremental knowledge was their goal (Mohr 1992). After about 1650, everyone agrees that Europeans, not Chinese, were making the important scientific and technological breakthroughs. However, science was not as autonomous as Goldstone implies. Nor was it accidental. It was embedded in broader networks of ideological
power, being a central thrust of the pre-Protestant, pre-rationalist reaction against the theology dominating science in Europe until the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries. Scientists believed that the laws they discovered were God's laws. Leibnitz, Boyle and Newton embedded their theories amid Protestant theology. In Catholic Europe science blossomed later, embedded in the anti-religious rationalism of the Enlightenment. Margaret Jacobs (1997; 2000) notes that many of the scientists, entrepreneurs and engineers of the English industrial revolution were Protestant Dissenters, committed to values of probity, order, and faith in both religion and science. Even in Charles Darwin's time in the mid-nineteenth century, most researchers defined their work not as 'science' but as 'natural theology'.

But science also responded to demand from political and military power holders. Representative governments in Holland and Britain, and 'enlightened absolutism' elsewhere, opposed what they viewed as the particularism of old regimes, which had developed science as a closed, somewhat esoteric can, often in holy orders. They favoured a more public science. Leibnitz, Newton, Boyle and others were members of the English Royal Society, subsidized from public funds. King Charles II himself granted permission for Newton to uniquely remain a Fellow of Cambridge University without taking holy orders (Newton would not accept the dogmas of the Church of England). States in competition with each other appreciated the utility and ideological lustre of science. So did militaries. Naval and artillery competition spurred discoveries in metallurgy, chemistry and the precise measurement of time and space. Biology, botany and geology were boosted by colonial expansion. French and British worshiped scientists like Jean-Charles de Borda, Joseph Banks and Charles Darwin around the world, and ships were often staffed with plants and animals on both legs of their voyages to the tropics, with a massive influence on the agriculture and diet of the people of Europe.

There were reverse influences too. Science was also 'democratized', not only by Protestant or Enlightenment influences, but probably more importantly by changing economic and political power relations. Old class and status divides were breached as entrepreneurs and scientists mixed together in clubs and racing rooms. Members of Parliament and artisans shared some knowledge of contemporary scientific theories. Free communication of invention is crucial to economic development. Newcomen's first steam engine of 1719 was for pumping water out of flooded coal mines. Hundreds of people added piece-meal improvements over the next 150 years. Early eighteenth-century craftsmen were perfecting small instruments like clocks, telescopes, eye-glasses, guns and naval sextants and their metal-working improvements were adapted

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into bigger industrial machinery. Economic historians emphasize that England's crucial technological resource lay less in initial invention from a competitive market, including large military customers, but also dispersed middling consumers.

Goldstone also says science retained autonomy after the industrial revolution. Scientific institutions may be distinct, but do they also exercise power over the four power sources? In Britain most universities others found employment in commercial colleges like the East India Scholars with private incomes (like Darwin). Not until the late nineteenth century did they collectively congregate in secular universities, a caste which only government, especially the military, and big corporations might have never been as autonomous as were earlier alchemists and astronomers. The problem with Daniel Bell's (1976) famous assertion that science was autonomous is that he presented his own data: 75 per cent of R&D funds came from government, mostly for military purposes. Science's main role was to contribute to the rationalization of ideological power in the modern era - science as ideology.

Goldstone is right that I neglected the role of science in the industrial revolution. I have remedied this not by making science a fifth source of social power, as he suggests, but by putting more science into my full exposition of the first stages of the European breakthrough, as Gersdorff argued. But science was also stimulated by inter-state competition culminating in military and naval revolutions entwined with the (long-maturing) rise of northeast Europe, where it was reinforced by Protestantism and representative states. This culminated in an agrarian capitalism/commercial imperialism, first in Holland, then more persistently in Britain, whose scientific industries to slowly invent and develop. I am also reluctant to accept between Britain and China, since most of these broader stimuli were also

John Holbrow (2004) has presented an impressive list of early modern European scientific and technological inventions which were imported
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I move on to institutional factors. The revisionists concede signs of political decline in the Chinese (and in the Mughal and Ottoman) empire able to provide order or dominate their region. China had a novel concept of power more distant and less long-distance trading fleets in the mid-sixteenth century. Therefore, even Chinese merchants and settlers in nearby Taiwan received serious aid from the imperial court. The Chinese state had turned inward, even though Chinese merchants continued to trade across Asia.

Economists find a strong correlation between economic growth and the underpinnings of markets and private property. Economic historians note that modern period (North and Weingast 1989). Revisionists say the same, but even fewer restrictions on property sales (and on labour costs) are important in modern Europe. However, Stephan Epstein's (2000) figures for Europe's mid-eighteenth century are less rates than the Chinese, whereas Chinese interest rates were typically 8 per cent. In 1600, European rates were at this time the mid-eighteenth century. This suggests that Europe had more clearly generated a typology (which is also a rough historical sequence of states' institutional costs -- feudal states' did worse, in Europe), then city-states, then states after about 1688, then twentieth-century constitutional states, which were states, down to under 3 per cent by the early eighteenth century. Britain provided this paradoxical mixture of the rule of law and the freedom of association, including business association. Both sides of eighteenth-century businessmen represented major the major property classes, whereas in China the imperial state was oriented power through the major property classes. It was already more of a capitalist state.

On the other hand, the same political strategies also were unsurpassed in China.

In Source, I said that the second half of the eighteenth century in England
saw a revival of older seventeenth-century struggles over legal rights, taxation and representation. Tremlett criticizes me for neglecting similar struggles during the first half of the century. I expect he is right (the period 1600-1700 tends to slip between the cracks between my two volumes). But during the eighteenth century, emergent, international forces sought further reform through parliament, the law-courts and the streets. Under pressure, the old regime divided. As Tremlett says, both conservatives and reformers mobilized mass support - 'King and Country' and 'Protestant Defence' against 'Reform' mobs (I had neglected the former). I stressed that these struggles were fuelled by a great expansion of the discursive media of ideological communication - newspapers, pamphlets, coffee-houses, etc. They mobilized to successfully extend freedoms and representation, coupled with rational-bureaucratic state reform over the period from 1760 to 1832. I am surprised that Tremlett thinks I give a uniformly top-down account of British politics, since my emphasis shifts in different periods. I emphasize that most political power actors (not just insurgents) stumble their way to success, under pressure, rather than plan in advance. But by 1832 the state comprised all property-owners. China saw neither comparable political struggles during the eighteenth century, nor a similar result. The British state was more helpful to capitalism from the early eighteenth century, and then it was driven by conflicts specific to capitalism.

Finally, I come to military power. Europe contained many states in lethal rivalry with each other for centuries. These originated as the 'mini-imperial' states I identified earlier, swallowing up their non-Christian and weaker neighbours, a game that was not zero-sum for the stronger. The game lasted for centuries, transitioning smoothly into imperialism overseas. Iberia, parts of Eastern Europe, Wales and Ireland saw plantations of settlers. Granada, the last Muslim province, fell to Ferdinand and Isabella's forces on 2 January 1492. Eight months later, on 3 August they saw off Columbus on his voyage of 'discovery'. Britain moved smoothly through Ireland into North America and the Caribbean, with settler colonies modelled on Conway and Londonderry. In the twilight of European imperialism, Germany and Italy sought overseas colonies almost as soon as they had absorbed the last local states into their domains. Existing imperial ideologies of civilizational superiority only needed fine-tuning. From the early eighteenth century Europe was Christianizing the Americas and sub-Saharan Africa. Thereafter European colonialism retained its self-confidence, able to regard its most terrible atrocities as the workings of 'divine providence', or the necessary triumph of civilization over barbarism - and later as the triumph of the white race over inferior races. Conviction in its own moral superiority was deep-rooted, improved morale, and so contributed to imperial power.

Positively to imperial triumphs, for the reasons given in this book by Golski and Snyder.

For centuries victorious armed states, merchant associations and settler militias expanded, while the defeated decayed or disappeared in century, Holland, France, and then Britain - and their merchant Fiscal pressures from their colonial/commercial wars led the states toward markets, stock exchanges and financial derivatives. It also led countries I explained in Sources. Abroad, these states not only allowed, but they also gave could be kept low where mercantilist involved selving market share. Company and the Dutch VOC deployed their own private armies, and so did settlers. Such organizations were designed less to accumulate capital than to conquer, expropriate and so monopolize economic resources. The Dutch and British states were aggressively promoting commerce fighting themselves, sometimes merely giving political privileges to armed bands of merchant captians and settlers.

Persistent military market competition among states, trading companies and settlers had perfected concentrated offensive fire-power. Europeans had very small armies and ships compared to those of China and other big had gone to fire-power, and European states invested heavily in this. Small high-tech armies and navies triumphed. There were no 'barbarian cycles' in military power, but steady progress. Europeans became better army and naval forces because more and more difficult to overcome in battle. Skilfully inserted into disputes between native princes, they could conquer land empires, as in America and India, where muskets were proving their superiority over native weapons from the early 1700s. Before the eighteenth century, European forces were mostly confined to sea-coasts which their naval guns could rule. By 1750 they dominated most sea-coasts, though China and Japan were still beyond their logistical reach.

European wars were costly, often draining the economy - a major cause of the decline of Holland, for example. Perhaps more of the European
than the Chinese surplus was frittered away on war, cancelling out the
waste of Chinese female infanticide or Chinese neglect of foreign trade.
All human groups operate well below utility maximization. I do not
neglect the economic inefficiency of war, but I do note that economic
efficiency is not its principal goal. The ‘efficiency’ of war is military:
achieving victory rather than defeat.

But the point is that victory can then change the parameters of
economic efficiency. This is what militarism has done from ancient
times right up to the successive expansions of Europe, Japan and the
United States. Militarism generated an international economy not of free
trade but of trade and land monopolies won by lethal violence. This had
been nurtured by competition in countless battlefields and shipping-
lanes. Militarism helped bring global domination, and with it the power
to restructure the international economy. Exterminating the natives in
colonies in the temperate zones, and replacing them with white settlers,
brought economic institutions which boosted per capita GDP there — so
say modern economists. This is a very loosey-goosey calculation. ‘Per capita’
means by each surviving person’s head — the heads measured did not
include dead native ones.

So Pomeranz, Frank and Hobson are right to emphasize the import-
ance of military power to European dominance, and to an extent
depending on the economic importance of colonies and imposed terms of
trade — to European over-tarking. There was also a military reason for the
inward-turn of the Chinese state. It did not result from any ‘insular’
conservatism of the imperial state, but from perception that its greatest
threat came from the barbarians on its northern land frontier. Therefore
China concentrated its resources and its trade there, and not in the seas,
its military posture on its northern frontier was defensive, geared to
containing mobile, dispersed enemy forces. It had less incentive than
Europeans to intensify aggressive fire-power against concentrated forces,
since it did not face them. But this meant that in the long run the Chinese
city would disintegrate in face of the fire-power of European ships and
mats.

But if revisionists wish to argue that lethal violence and colonies
contributed substantially to European over-tarking and/or dominance,
they must recognise that this was neither accidental nor late. It was very
deply rooted in European social structure, and it had been repeatedly
exercised, first against other Europeans, then against the relatively
weakly organized peoples of the Americas and Africa, then into South
Asia — and finally subordinating the Chinese Empire itself. Its rhythms
were those of the centuries — of feudal mini-imperialism transmuting into
the mini-imperialism of expanding national states and then into overseas
colonial imperialism. By the eighteenth century the forms of European
militarism were well-suited to an age of naval/commercial rivalry.

In 1760 China was still the world’s greatest power, with the greatest
which only thousands of Britons could aspire. But Chinese powers were
surging. I have identified in each of the four sources of social power
also somewhat autonomous. Somewhere between 1660 and 1760 these
three powers began respectively in Britain beyond Smithian cycles of even
the Rostow theory of the industrial revolution, now largely discredited,
cent per annum, eventually rising to nearly 3 per cent (and never higher)
single ‘moment of over-tarking’, for the different sources of power had
then in the nineteenth century it spread to much of Western Europe
and to Britain’s white settler colonies.

If we want a purely symbolic ‘moment of over-tarking’ the year 1763 will
do, since it involves important moments in the development of at least
three power sources. After success in its war against France and Spain,
terms of the Treaty of Paris. It also meant that some sepoys, especially in
independence and greater externalisation of the natives was now on the
engine, leading to the first modern steam engine; and John Wilkes MP
charged by the English Crown with sedition libel, provoking massive
riots leading into a great political reform movement. But no single
moment would adequately capture such a long-drawn-out process.
Revisionists have underestimated the deep-rooted, enmeshed nature of
undermines their ‘moment of over-tarking’ and ‘happy accident’ arguments,
rhythms yet inter-penetration and long-run cumulation of ideological,
military and political power development. But I dissociate
myself from some of the notions of Japanese/British ‘superiority’
this over-tarking, efficiency was subordinated to power, and virtue played
in no part. Natives across much of the world would have been better off
without the British Empire; while Manchester, my own birthplace,
became the bell-on-earth which Engels described so graphically in 1844 in his book The Condition of the Working Classes in England. Most of the British themselves barely benefited for another hundred years.

This moment of overtaking was not global dominance. Not for a century after 1763 did the Western Powers begin to dominate East Asia, as symbolized by the unequal treaties imposed on Japan and China, and the colonization imposed elsewhere. China continued to stagnate, though Japan responded, for it shared many parallel power resources to England’s. China needed communism to adequately respond, almost another hundred years later, and two hundred and fifty years after the English surge. Western leadership may last little more than two centuries from the moment of overtaking, and only one century from the moment of dominance. The recent resurgence of Japan and the Little Tigers of East Asia, and the present resurgence of China and India (a similarly uneven yet cumulative process), seems to be shifting the balance of global power away from an over-extended United States and a toothless Europe. But this hundred years was actually the only period in history in which any single region of the world has been globally dominant.

To explain all this, I still feel that we must go back in time and further eastward and southward across the European continent — and also, of course, further afield. This began as a Mediterranean surge in contact with the Muslim world and Asia. Then it took a northwesternly course through the network of trading cities and into the larger Catholic states, then into the Protestant lands, and then into England (before departing elsewhere). The deep ploughing of heavy, rain-watered soils in northwest Europe was not in itself of world-historical significance (as Goldstone observes with some acerbity). Its immediate significance was local, contributing to significant “southern” growth. But since this locality later acquired world-historical significance, this plough played a part in the European Miracle, in conjunction with many other forces and relations of power. Explaining the emergence of all these required starting early.

No one has persuaded me I should have started any later, or that a proper explanation should ignore any of the four sources of social power.

**Conclusion**

I began my project by asking the ‘Engels question’ — whether one of my four power sources was decisive, final causal power in the structuring of social relations (he said economic power was, and so does Brener). My answer is probably the Weberian ‘no’, but because of what Bryan calls my ‘emergent’ rather than ‘foundational’ view of power. The economy. 

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informally and interstitially through networks of communication, relatively unimpeded by authoritative power centres like states, armies or class boundaries. The logistics of communicating verbal, then written and then electronic messages are less daunting than they are for armies, goods or law-enforcement. I stressed this in earlier historical times when writing about the spread of salvation religions, iron ploughs, cavalry and coinage. I returned to it here when discussing inter-continental flows of scientific and technical knowledge. Transcendent ideology also plays a distinctively discontinuous historic role, erratic in its manifestations, relatively sudden in its major eruptions. Yet such eruptions require conjunctions with long-maturing tendencies in other power networks, reaching crisis points through more contingent events like wars, recessions or fiscal crises.

Economic power is the most deeply entrenched in everyday life. Its routines involve half our waking lives and energies; it yields subsistence without which we would not survive. It combines diffuse markets with authoritative production units. Its rhythms are characteristically slow.

The metaphor of economic ‘revolutions’ misleads, as we saw in Britain’s industrial revolution, which took over a century. The great post-1945 economic ‘boom’ in Western Europe was also more persistent than sudden (Hitchens 1969). Depression and inflation can impact more suddenly, but they do not, unaided, generate major social change. Political revolutions may transform distributive power relations, though they seem to also require conjunctions of war defeat, political crises and emergent ideologies. Economic networks exercise the most massive impact on collective power in the cumulative long term. Industrial capitalism may have changed the whole population’s lives more completely than any other power process in human history. Yet gradualism means that the other power sources have time to adapt, often without great discontinuities in power distributions, as I showed in the case of nineteenth-century England in Sources. Trennman criticises my stress on top-down rather than bottom-up pressures on nineteenth-century politics. He exaggerates this, though my central argument does concern divisions within the working class. Economic conflict generated three competing types of working-class movements: class, sectional and segmental. Only where political exclusion of all workers thrust all three willily together did ostensibly revolutionary politics result. In Britain, in contrast, the regime was admitting male workers into political citizenship strata by strata and this produced a divided and then a reformist ‘lab-lab’ outcome. I still think this holds up.

Military power is essentially authoritarian and tends to provide the most disjunctive impact on social structure. The European Union remains a decentralized decision-maker, and so remains a military externalising native peoples, overturning native states, property rights of superior military power. The two world wars of the twentieth century centuries and shifted patterns of technological development across the world. The effect of World War II was to disrupt processes of globalization, powers, especially of destruction, but also sometimes of construction. The small guerrilla wars of today degrade their local environment but coercive control of goods which are high in value-weight ratio, like diamonds or cocaine.

Political power is predominantly authoritative and ‘conservative’, in the sense that it regulates, institutionalizes and stabilizes social structures. The law does this above all. However, economic cycles, shifts in crises within those territories, crystallizing diverse forces onto broader, revolutionary or ethnic, religious or other civil wars. But the nature today wars and gradually filling those spaces which IR theorists used to call ’anarchic’ with institutions.

The enormous effect of these power relations is complex and making sociological explanation very challenging. A central theme of short-term direct or indirect power of the ideologues. Did they actually rededicate the development of modern people.

Moving to John Hall’s challenge, I conclude by being more explicit (emphasized also by Trennman), and this also enables me to comment on Linda Weiss’s view of globalization.

Distinguishing between four distinct power sources generates a model which is in some ways pluralist. Ideological, economic, military and political power, though enmeshed, are not normally merged. Capitalism, states, ideologies and militaries are not normally staffed by the same people, serving the same interests, mobilizing the same emotions. That pessimistic views of the modern world as dominated by a ‘rationalization
process leading to an 'iron cage' (Max Weber), by a 'capitalist system' now looking rather 'eternal' (Positivist Marxism), or by epistemic disciplined power (Foucault) - or all theories of globalization as a singular process, even though some of them use metaphors of diversity - 'liquidity', 'hybridity', 'de-territorialisation'. These still see globalization imposing a singular quality on all social relations. All these visions are greatly exaggerated. Even when there are tendencies in these directions, we see reactions against them.

Normatively, I oppose attempts to fuse together economic, military and political power in the service of some grand transcendental ideology promising attractive but chimeric ideals of perfection. If implemented, these fusions increase despotic power and then bring disaster or ossification. We recognize the despots and despars that ensued from the attempt to impose state-centred fusions in the name of fascism and socialism. Nazism, Stalinism, the Great Leap Forward and the Khmer Rouge brought some of the worst disasters in human history; though Mussolini, Franco and subsequent Soviet and Chinese regimes managed milder, less destructive despots. Currently, China and Vietnam may be working their way towards decent futures. More recent attempts at theocratic fusion have brought despotism to some Muslim countries - and mildly threaten it in Hindu India. The Taliban and Sudanese Islamists brought disaster, the Iranian Ayatollahs brought a more conservative despotism.

A neoliberal, capitalist-centred fusion, modelling all social life on the power of economic markets, now presents another potential despotism - by capital, since the ownership of capital is the greatest power within markets. This refers to the bundle of Thatcherite, neoliberal, 'rational-choice', 'cost-accounting', 'let-markets-rule' ideologies recently prominent in the West (including its academic), and especially in the US. They conceal trends towards monopoly and rule by big capital. In the US, for example, if current tendencies in disenchaining the poor, campaign financing, and media concentration continue, democratic politics and ideologies might be overwhelmed by capitalist power (maybe they already are). Where neoliberal 'structural adjustment programmes' are let rip across the world's poorer countries, they rarely have much impact on growth, but inequality widens and foreigners grab more of their economies (Invincible Empire, ch. 2). We should remember one former laissez-faire despot, the Irish famine, where interventions to feed the Irish was opposed on the grounds that it interfered with the natural workings of essentially beneficent markets. Unchecked market powers might be later followed by stagnation, since more resources must go into maintaining that power against resistance from below. As John Hall notes, my sources of power reviewed

empirical analyses reveal that despotism generates revolution. The way to rip. However, the world need not go through such suffering. For better to fire-walls between different sources of social power, protecting their Freedom and democracy rest on this separation of powers.

Reforms are desirable within the individual sources of social power. Though both collective and distributive power are necessary to social life, diffusing power more equally between social actors, that leads to three historically a liberal preference, though too often confined within consciousness of the dangers of confusing the demos with the ethos means that the checks and balances normal to liberal models may demand confederal and consociational methods of power-sharing between ethnic groups (though this is a complex matter).

But the struggle for ideological and economic democracy may be equally important as political, and liberals have been less prominent (1990: 116-18). It sees it mainly as a 'communitarian structure' embodying a rational discourse whereby all contributions are equally heard and the better argument alone determines the 'yes' or 'no' to be a truly egalitarian, democratic and collective ideological power. At organizations which embody a rival structural/instrumental rationality triumphs over the human life-world'. This might seem utopian, for it would involve radical curtailments of present distributive ideological power. But that so much of our media, even its content, is controlled by authoritarian corporations, even individuals, is inimical to genuine democracy. And therein lies a necessary struggle.

Marxists criticize a liberal democracy confined to the political sphere, seeing it as overwhelmed by the economic power of capitalism. They power. Of course Marxists subverted this ideal when they they reached. In fact they left all the power sources more concentrated than under capitalism. The object failure of state socialism forced most leftists to endorse weaker 'social democratic' forms of economic democracy,
involving freedoms of speech and association for workers, rights of bargaining and consultation, and a de-commodification of basic living standards through the welfare state. This has been substantially achieved in numerous countries, though maintaining it requires struggle, and social democracy requires changing ideological solutions. Social democracy was until recently a mildly transcendent ideology. Then some of its adherents retreated to a more institutionalized ideology, from which they merely defend existing achievements. So arises another necessary struggle.

In contrast, liberals uphold the freedom and social creativity involved in competition between many economic units, each enjoying only limited powers. Liberals endorse capitalism as long as it is decentred, fearing only centralization and concentration. In his later work Robert Dahl saw capitalist concentration as subverting democracy. There are further economic problems with liberalism – neoliberalism in the South, and in the North evidence that the liberal or Anglo-Saxon regimes of political economy are widening inequality, unlike the social democratic, Christian democratic or Asian 'developmental' regimes which dominate most of the advanced world (Mann and Riley, 2004). Liberalism now seems to be more of the problem than the solution to the concentration of economic power in the hands of a few.

I welcome Linda Weiss's addition of 'governed inter-dependence' (GI) to the 'infrastructural power' (IP). GI captures what the most effective states do – like eighteenth-century Britain or Prussia, or the Chinese imperial gentry-scholar state ruling an agrarian society, or the contemporary regimes she instances. She does not mention these earlier states and they did differ. Organizations representing the masses were not a part of GI in them, but they are in contemporary instances, in the shape of organised labour, populist parties and religious pressure groups, generating welfare states, redistribution of incomes and intervention in labour markets. Weiss focuses on business-state relations, yet even South Korean GI in the 1960s (with powerful chaebol and a semi-authoritarian state) sponsored lower inequality and housing and education subsidies. This leads to a distinction between class-divided (earlier cases) and populist GIs (her own examples), which helps qualify her statement that GI characterises modern states. States attracted by neoliberalism, like Britain and the US, may coordinate with business groups (though presumably less than elsewhere), but are returning to more arm's-length legal controls over labour unions and the welfare state – a regression towards class-divided GI.

But this difference is dwarfed by the fact that many Southern states, like those of most sub-Saharan Africa, have never enjoyed much

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infrastructural power, let alone governed inter-dependence. It is not sufficient: the post-crisis era from the colonial mother-country to their post-colonial main power networks still radiate abroad from the post-colonial state. Today they reach to Northern-dominated capitalisms. It is too simple to say that these countries are 'excluded' from global capitalism, as Weiss and I have argued. Their political and economic elites are not excluded. They are the 'gatekeepers' between the world and the country, but with the masses excluded. Weak infrastructural powers force elites to fall back on the traditional, less effective despotic powers to rule their countries (Herbst 2001, Cooper 2002). They may at first attempt to rule through corrupt patronisation (half-despotically), but if this generates faction-fighting, they rely on repression which typically fails because of low infrastructural dependence, and the civil war inability dissected by Latin and colleagues. Latin American democratic states, though with infrastructural weaknesses weakly by enormous examples of fluctuating class-divided GI. But most of the South sees rather little GI.

High infrastructural powers coupled with low despotic powers give us populist GI. High infrastructural powers with more despotic moves towards class-dividedGI, and this may then further reduce despotic powers. Low infrastructural powers push more towards despotism and the absence of any GI. This suggests that level of infrastructural power may be more causally decisive than level of despotic power. Support for this comes from the higher correlation of contemporary economic growth with measures of state capacity, like the rule of law and efficient Weberian bureaucracies, than with levels of democracy (Barro 1997; 2002a and 2002b). Weiss is optimistic about the impact of economic globalisation on Northern countries. She is correct that I have previously been rather defensive about the continuing powers of nation-states vis-à-vis globalisation, and that this derived from social democratic Keynesian bias. I also globalisation itself is not constraining nor enabled, since it is not an agent, but constrains multiple agents. Some of them may constrain, as for example in the high-equilibrium trap of industrial societies, constraining further development, leading to economic cycles comparable to the Smithian
cycles of agrarian societies. But I see few constraints on the North coming
growing from globalizing capitalism. They live here, after all. Indeed recent writing
on economic globalization (including those of Weis and Hobson) has
deployed such constraints, while my own research with Dylan Riley
reveals the variety of macro-regional responses to recent pressures. I am
pejorative about the Anglo-Saxon macro-region, especially Britain and the
United States. In that limited sense I am flattered to be described by
Trenثمان as a John Bright gone sour (and not only because we both
lived in Rochdale).

Substantial pressures are felt on all Northern states. Lesser ones are
capitalist though not global in origin. European populist and rest on
capitalist respect for capital and labour, and organized labour has
weakened. Since it is now disproporionately based in the public sector,
unions have lost some of their GL capacity to coordinate state with private
sector workers. High unemployment and marginal employment among
less skilled workers also seems structural in contemporary capitalism. But
according to recent welfare state literatures, the main pressures come not
from globalization or capitalism, but from demography and life-styles.
Over the last decades Europeans have been spending more years in
education, retiring earlier, and living longer while requiring more health
care. The burden of welfare is growing, the working population financing
it is shrinking. The burden is higher the more generous the welfare state,
the more populist the GL. Most states will have to slash welfare, unless
they choose to exploit non-citizen immigrant labour. So for their cuts
have maintained existing levels of class and gender equality. Though
pressures on classes and genders vary, the biggest difference may
come between the more he social and public sectors, the latter enjoying better
retirement and pension schemes. This would also have the consequence
that organized labour would be less crucial to reducing inequality. This
reinforces Weis's criticism of traditional Keynesian social democracy but
indicates that populist GLs must find new solutions to new problems of
economic power.

Military power differs. Its main defect is not distributive power within,
but lethality towards those outside. Thus the question of internal military
democracy does not so greatly trouble me. Though in earlier history
I sometimes saw order, and even economic development flowing from
the exercise of military power in large-scale societies, that is not true
to-day, except in the desert, the most Hobbesian of local circumstances.
Organized violence is now too lethal to be much good to anyone.
There are alternative sources of order available today to the militarism
wielded by local warlords, rival states or the enraged Superpower. We can
potentially strengthen a dense web of soft geopolitical arrangements
which can militarily moderate and institutionalize conflicts, reduce
the lethality of violence to marginal and infrequent roles in social inter-
struggle. That may also be utopian, but it generates another necessary

John Hall suggests I have become more pessimistic than he. I think that
grown between my empirical work and my values. I remain attached to
a mildly transcendental leftist ideology, which now must make its revisions
facets - living-standards, more intensive and extensive power networks,
problems and many bring their own dark sides. The European Miracle
brought dynamism and growth, alongside much increase in suffering.
Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English people developed more
most murderously cleanse the natives. Many highly educated young
for the way they saw as principle, moral reasons. Many of them of
the people of Dresden and Tokyo. In Inchoate Empires I depict Al Qaeda
militants as being genuine anti-imperialists who kill innocent civilians,
liberating civilians and terrorists alike. Good and evil in human affairs are
I suppose this is a mixture of pessimism and optimism. We must face
up realistically to our social propensity to do both good and evil. The
struggle for social betterment never ends. Democracy and freedom are
not achieved states but processes, and each generation is set new
challenges in reconfiguring the sources of social power.

Notes
1. Though Foucault does intermittently distinguish between these three power agencies - class (or caste), colonialism, and the state.
2. I qualify these arguments with careful discussion of the collusion of native labour causing high death-rates and of unintended ethnocide, especially
during disease.
3. In the version I listed, I decreased a third possible case, by Chias in Yaman in
produces, so I dropped it.
4. I omit the three major communist cases from this discussion, since they did not
prevent democracy in the way I have discussed. For what it is worth, all three
they soon betrayed these ideals.
5 I do not accept all Chia’s arguments. She is less knowledgeable outside South-East Asia and she emphasizes the economic causes of conflicts which I think work better in explaining ethnic rioting than more sustained murderous cleansing.

6 Latin’s examples of ‘elementary arithmetic’ are too elementary. The figure of 3–4 million dead in the Holy Roman Empire as a result of the Thirty Years’ War is not three ‘thousand’ (by other humans), but mostly deaths through malnutrition and disease. After the storming of Brestas in the Albigensian Crusade, I said not that ‘8,000 or so’ but ‘most of its 5,000 inhabitants were slaughtered’, according to one chronicler. I say not that he ‘may have exaggerated’ but that ‘more scholars believe the character . . . exaggerated’. I do not know of one who believes this is an underestimate.

7 I am no more Smithian than Malthusian. In Sueness (1986: 409), when my analysis of the ‘Miracle’ is mostly complete, I say that the difficulty for the explanation is now over, since both neoclassical and Malthusian orthodoxies can kick in, but both modes of thought Ackley in place. Brenner says I ‘paraphrase’ Smith’s famous remark about markets being normal, but I was actually quoting Ernest Jones, and my next sentence is ‘But this approach misses several important preconditions’ (1986: 406–7). Nor do I say that the requirements for capitalism were in place by the end of the first millennium. In that passage I say (1986: 510) that 1477 was the symbolic date when various power networks ‘were beginning to develop into . . . a capitalist multi-state civilization’ (1477 saw the collapse of that most feudal of states, the Duchy of Burgundy). Only half-a-millennium out!

8 Because I focus on Europe I figure as one of the eight characters in the title of Hatt’s Right Economics Historians (2000). Two other contributors here, Robert Brenner and John Hall, are also among the eight, and so is Max Weber. Karl Marx should obviously be the ninth. This is good company.

References


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**Bibliography of Michael Mann’s Writings**


