

The sources of social power

VOLUME II

The rise of classes and nation-states,
1760–1914

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3 A theory of the modern state

Chapter 1 distinguishes clearly between military and political power. Yet modern states seem to merge the two, since they formally monopolize the means of military violence. This did not end the autonomy of military power organization, as Chapters 12 and 21 make clear, but it redirected it through organizations that were formally the state's. Hence this chapter treats military power within a broader discussion of political power.

I review five current theories of the state, plus the political concepts of Max Weber. I then proceed in three stages to my own theory. I begin with an "institutional" definition of the state and seek to specify the many institutional particularities of modern states. Then I seek to simplify this complexity by moving to a "functional" analysis, offering a polymorphous view of state functions. I assert that modern states "crystallized" (over the area covered in this volume) in several principal forms. Responding to the other three sources of social power, they crystallized as capitalist, as moral-ideological, and as militarist. Responding to their own political struggles, they crystallized at variable points on two continua, one "representative," running in this period from autocratic monarchy to party democracy; the other "national," from centralized nation-state to a loosely confederal regime. Most diffusely, they also crystallized as patriarchal, regulating gender and family relations. Finally, I discuss whether we can detect relations of hierarchy among these, so that one or more crystallizations may ultimately determine the overall character of the state.

Five theories of the state

It has become common to distinguish three theories of the state: class, pluralist, and elitist (sometimes called statism or managerialism) (Alford and Friedland, 1985). Because elitism is similar to realist international relations theory, I discuss the two together. But I divide elite theories into two, each with a distinct view of state autonomy. I call these two "true elitism" and "institutional statism." I also add a fifth theory, implied by many empirical studies, which I label cock-up or foul-up theory. I borrow from all five, especially from institutional statism.

Most class theories have been Marxist. Marx tended to reduce states to economic power relations. States are functional for modes of

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economic production and for classes. Modern states have been determined by two phases of politicized class struggle, between feudal lords and capitalist bourgeoisie and then between bourgeoisie and proletariat. Applied to modern Western states, class theory has one tremendous virtue: It recognizes that they are in some fundamental sense capitalist. All five of my principal states during the long nineteenth century were already or rapidly becoming capitalist. But the vice of class theory is to regard this as their *only* fundamental property. True, Marx sometimes wrote as if other powers might be lodged in the state. I discuss the rather limited autonomies he allowed to the "Bonapartist state" in Chapter 9. Marxists see modern states as having only relative autonomy: Ultimately states service capital accumulation and class regulation. Marxists add "historical contingencies" and "conjunctures," but these are rarely theorized – they are added on empirically (as in Wolfe's 1977 history of modern states). Although class-plus-contingency indicates more empirical sensitivity than class alone, it does not transform the theory.

Most Marxists deny allegation of economic reductionism, but when they define the state they give the game away. Poulantzas (1978: 18–22), Jessop (1982), and Offe and Ronge (1982: 1–2) claim that states can be defined only in relation to specific modes of production – the "capitalist state" and the "feudal state" are possible concepts, they all say, but not the "state" in general. Those who do define the "state" do so only in terms of class relations: "The 'state' is a concept for the concentrated and organized means of legitimate class domination," says Zeitlin (1980: 15). In recent years some Marxists have become more hesitant. Jessop (1990) now emphasizes "contingency" in politics, arguing that the Marxian notion of state "relative autonomy" still offers too rigid an economic determinism. The capitalist class essentially pursues the "value form" but may have alternative accumulation projects (as I also emphasize in this volume). Dominant classes have "hegemonic projects" for which they may organize cross-class alliances, even sometimes for noneconomic purposes such as enhancing military power or morality. But he still only theorizes, and then qualifies, classes. Despite relative autonomy, conjunctures, or contingencies, Marxists have offered theoretically reductionist views of the state. This volume attempts to do better.

Most Marxists have become pessimistic about the chances for a proletarian revolution and advance "instrumental" or "structural" views of the capitalist state. Either modern state personnel are the direct instrument of the capitalist class (Miliband 1969), or they function structurally to reproduce capitalist relations of production (Poulantzas 1973). It is extraordinary that sociologists ever regarded

the "Miliband-Poulantzas debate" as being a significant controversy in state theory, as their debate was over such a narrow area when viewed from the perspectives of all other theories. Either way the state helps accumulate capital and regulate class struggle, sometimes even repressing capitalists whose sectional interests frustrate the interests of capital in general (there are many disputations on such points; for reviews, see Jessop 1977, 1982). These functions "required" a vast expansion of what Althusser (1971: 123-73) termed "repressive and ideological state apparatuses" - police, welfare agencies, education, mass media, and the like. The state is not an actor, but a place where classes and class "fractions" or "segments" (Zeitlin 1980, 1984) organize. Actually, states are *both* place and actor.

Class theorists who retain more optimism emphasize that capitalism still contains contradictions and class struggle, which is politicized and displaced onto the state as the "fiscal crisis of the state" (O'Connor 1973), "legitimation crisis" (Habermas 1976), or "crisis management" (Offe 1972, 1974; Offe and Ronge 1982). Offe distinctively accepts that the state has also become an actor, leading to a contradiction between its own institutional interests in compromising class struggle through developing welfare programs and the dynamic of capitalist accumulation, which continually seeks to subvert this and reduce state expenditure. Class theory has also generated an empiricist radical school, associated especially with C. Wright Mills (1956) and Domhoff (1978, 1990), who see states as less unified, composed of diverse institutions and branches colonized by power elites and class fractions. Apart from these radicals, most class theorists treat the state as passive and unitary: It is largely the central politicized place of capitalist society. State-society relations form a single system: The state, at the center of a "social formation" defined by its modes of economic production, reproduces their cohesion and their systemic contradictions. The modern Western state, thus, has, in the last instance, been defined by a single crystallization, as capitalist.

Unlike class theory, which seeks to explain all states, pluralist theory claims to explain only modern democratic ones. Pluralism is liberal democracy's (especially American democracy's) view of itself. Modernization shifted political power "from kings to people" (as Bendix's 1978 title suggests). Dahl noted that this consisted of two processes: (1) the emergence of institutionalized "contestation" between parties and pressure groups representing a plurality of interest groups in society and (2) the widening scope of "participation" by the people in this contestation. Combined, contestation and participation generate genuine democracy (which Dahl calls "polyarchy"). Since, as Dahl observes, contestation appeared early in the West, while par-

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ticipation remained very limited, its history is more critical in my present period. I term Dahl's contestation "party democracy." For pluralists, a broadening party democracy is the ultimately defining crystallization of most modern Western states.

Through party democracy, states ultimately represent the interests of individual citizens. Classes may be seen as the most important interest groups behind parties (as for Lipset 1959) or as merely one among many types of countervailing interest groups whose composition varies among states (others being economic sectors, religious, linguistic, and ethnic communities, regions, gender, age cohorts, etc.). Few pluralists claim that all interest groups have equal powers or that party democracy confers perfect political equality on all. But most assert that Western liberal democracy generates enough competition and participation to produce government by competing and responsive elites, not government by a single elite or dominant class. Power inequalities are not cumulative but dispersed, says Dahl (1956: 333; 1961: 85-6; 1977).

Pluralism correctly recognizes the importance of party democracy in Western history (though perhaps it exaggerates how ultimately "democratic" modern states are). It also recognizes that there is more to society than classes. But it makes two mistakes. First, though it suggests a more complex state, like class theory it is ultimately reductionist and functionalist. It credits the state with no autonomous power - the state is still a place, not an actor; party and pressure group politics radiate inward to control the state. Second, it sees classes, sectors, religions, regions, and so forth, as analogous and systemic in their competition with one another. Again, like class theory, the state is unitary and systemic. Relations between government and plural interest groups form a democratic functional *system*. Plural interest groups have powers in proportion to the muscle of their constituency. These sum up to a single totality, "society." Democratic government reflects "society" and its "needs" as a whole.

For Easton (1965: 56), "the political system" is the "most inclusive system of behavior in a society for the authoritative allocation of values." Coherence is attributed to the "political system," the "polity," the "political community," or the "government." Pluralists eschew the word "state," probably because it conveys a more Germanic sense of "power." Nothing whatever flows from choosing one of these words rather than any other; I use the shortest one, state. Whatever word pluralists use they agree with the substance of Poulantzas's functionalist statement: The state is the "factor of cohesion" in society. Only the pluralist view of society differs from his. As we shall see, neither state nor society is usually that cohesive.

By contrast, writers in the third school, "elitists" or "statists," focus on autonomous powers possessed by the state. Yet they contain two quite different views of autonomy that need distinguishing. There would be no point in my distinguishing political power as the fourth source of social power unless one or both of these possessed considerable truth. Although both contain some truth, one contains much.

Elite theory first flourished at the beginning of the twentieth century. Oppenheimer (1975) emphasized the increasing powers through history of the "political class." Mosca (1939) located political power in centralized organization. A centralized, organized, and cohesive minority will always defeat and control the disorganized masses, he correctly argued. Yet Mosca and Pareto emphasized that the power of political elites originated elsewhere, in civil society, and is eventually vulnerable to new counterelites arising therefrom. Control over other resources (economic, ideological, or military) enabled rising elites to overthrow the fading political elite and organize their own power in state institutions. Thus classical elitists saw political power as a dynamic relation *between* the state and civil society – and this is indeed correct.

Yet, about 1980, sociological attention concentrated on centralized state powers. Theda Skocpol (1979: 27, 29–30; cf. 1985) defined the state as "a set of administrative, policing, and military organizations headed and more or less well co-ordinated by an executive authority . . . an autonomous structure – a structure with a logic and interests of its own." She wished to correct "society-centered" pluralist and Marxist theories with a "state-centered" approach. Although neither Skocpol nor her critics seem to have realized it, these remarks actually contain two quite different versions of state autonomy, which I term "true elitism" and "institutional statism."

True elitists emphasize the distributive power of state elites *over* society. Thus states are seen as actors. Krasner (1984: 224) states this flatly: "The state can be treated as an actor in its own right." Levi (1988: 2–9) also insists that "rulers rule." She sees states as rational actors, maximizing their own private interests, becoming "predators" despoiling civil society – a very American viewpoint. Kiser and Hechter (1991) have advanced a "rational choice" model of states that assumes states are single, unitary, rational actors. Poggi (1990: 97–9, 120–7), while recognizing that states are also "serviceable" (i.e., serving plural interests) and "partisan" (benefiting classes), argues that states are ultimately "invasive," preoccupied with "their own" interests. True elitists invert class and pluralist theory: Distributive power now primarily radiates outward from, not inward to, the state.

True elite theorists have one tremendous virtue. They emphasize

school, "elitists" or "statists," focus by the state. Yet they contain two things that need distinguishing. Treating political power as the fourth or both of these possessed considerable truth, one contains much.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the increasing powers through his- tory (1939) located political power centralized, organized, and cohesive control the disorganized masses, he (1939) emphasized that the power of the state, in civil society, and is eventually derived therefrom. Control over other (civil or military) enabled rising elites to centralize and organize their own power in the state. Elitists saw political power as a dynamic society – and this is indeed correct. Attention concentrated on centralized power (1939: 27, 29–30; cf. 1985) defined the state, and military organizations dominated by an executive authority . . . structure with a logic and interests of its society-centered" pluralist and Marxist approach. Although neither Skocpol (1985) nor (1985) made it, these remarks actually contain a great deal of truth, which I term "true statehood."

Distributive power of state elites over the state. Krasner (1984: 224) states this as an actor in its own right." Levi (1985) rule." She sees states as rational actors, becoming "predators" from the American viewpoint. Kiser and Hechter (1985) "choice" model of states that assumes rational actors. Poggi (1990: 97–9, 120–7), so "serviceable" (i.e., serving pluralist interests), argues that states are defined by "their own" interests. True statehood: Distributive power now primarily inward to the state. A tremendous virtue. They emphasize

one aspect of states on which almost all class and pluralist writers have been inexcusably silent: that states inhabit a world of states and that states "act" geopolitically (Shaw 1984, 1988 is an honorable exception to Marxian silence, as are the radicals Mills and Domhoff). The few class theorists who discuss international relations tend to reduce them to modes of production and classes extended into the globe – the most recent such analysis being world systems theory. By contrast, theorists influenced by true elitism have emphasized geopolitics, war, and war finances (Giddens 1985; Levi 1988; Tilly 1990).

Elitists are reinforced by "realist" international relations theorists. Though little interested in the internal structure of states, realists see states as unitary power actors enjoying "sovereignty" over their territories. "Statesmen" are empowered to represent internationally an overall "national" interest. But among sovereign states there is no higher rationality or normative solidarity, only the exercise of distributive power, normlessness, and anarchy (Poggi 1990: 23–5). Thus foreign policy is made by states and statesmen systematically, "realistically" pursuing "their own" geopolitical interests against those of other states. The primary interest is security – vigilant defense coupled with intermittent aggression. Morgenthau (1978: 42) declared: "All history shows that nations active in international politics are continuously preparing for, actively involved in, or recovering from organized violence in the form of war." Realism thus emphasizes cohesion of states within, zero-sum games, normlessness, and war without. Most international relations theorists, realists or not, stress the difficulties of establishing international norms. Where norms exist, they tend to attribute them to "hegemony" or coercion (e.g., Lipson 1985) or to "realistic" calculations of national interest such as develops in balance of power systems. Ideological solidarity among Powers can be only transient and interest-determined.

Realism has been criticized by a countertrend in international relations theory, emphasizing interdependence among states. Realists are blamed for neglecting transnational and transgovernmental power networks around the globe. These crosscut state sovereignty, reducing their cohesion and providing an alternative source of norms and hence of world order (Keohane and Nye 1977: 23–37). Because interdependence theorists focus on modern global capitalism, they rarely apply their arguments to previous centuries. They seem to agree with realists that balance of power or hegemonic powers usually ruled then. Rosecrance (1986) is an exception. He regards trading and imperial states as present in varying degrees throughout history, both embodying distinct normative systems. I develop similar arguments in Chapters 8

and 21. In multi-power-actor civilizations, like Europe or the modern West, geopolitical relations exist within a broader civilization embodying transnational and transgovernmental power networks and norms.

Realist and interdependence theorists also share a curious blind spot: They concentrate on how benign pacific international norms appear. Interdependence theorists see contemporary norms of cooperation as reflecting shared plural, material interests; realists see norms as generalized calculations of state interest. Yet many transnational or transgovernmental norms and ideologies might not be benign or reflect material interests expressed peacefully on markets. They might embody repressive class and other power-actor interests, they might encourage war in the name of higher ideals, they might even idealize war itself. Normative solidarities might lead to disorder. Disorder might not result from the absence of an international regime but from the presence of one. Realists prefer to avoid this problem. For example, in Morgenthau's realist historical narrative, periods of calm, rationalistic balance of power or hegemonic power are abruptly shattered by more violent interregna, as during 1772–1815 or 1914–45. But Morgenthau makes no attempt to explain these interregna. Since he has earlier described ideologies as mere legitimations or “disguises” of interests, he has no theoretical concepts with which to interpret periods in which diplomacy and war were themselves deeply infused with violent revolutionary and reactionary ideologies (1978: 92–103, 226–8). Indeed, I show that calculations of interest were always influenced by all of the entwined sources of social power, and always involved norms – sometimes peaceful, sometimes violent – emanating from complex attachments to the “imagined communities” of class and nation.

Realism and true elitism also tend to share with pluralism and Marxism an emphasis on a cohesive, systemic state – this time in the form of a singular elite actor. Krasner has argued that the autonomy of the state elite is greater in foreign than in domestic policy; it is relatively “insulated” from domestic class and interest group pressures. The state is a “set of roles and institutions having peculiar drives, compulsions and aims of their own that are separate and distinct from the interests of any particular group” (1978: 10–11). I use Krasner's “insulation” metaphor later in this volume, while qualifying his conclusion. Statesmen also embody social identities emanating from beyond the state itself; and statesmen are not cohesive.

On the first point, as Jessop (1990) has argued, central state resources are rarely adequate for ambitious statist projects. State elites need alliances with powerful groups “out there” in society. These are not usually alliances between two quite distinct groups. Laumann and

civilizations, like Europe or the modern state within a broader civilization embodying governmental power networks and norms. The theorists also share a curious blindness to benign pacific international norms. Realists see contemporary norms of cooperation as plural, material interests; realists see norms of state interest. Yet many transnationalisms and ideologies might not be benignly expressed peacefully on markets. They have other power-actor interests, they might even have higher ideals, they might even have solidarities might lead to disorder. Disregard of an international regime but realists prefer to avoid this problem. For a realist historical narrative, periods of power or hegemonic power are abruptly changed, as during 1772–1815 or 1914–45. I attempt to explain these interregna. Since they are as mere legitimations or “disguises” of ideological concepts with which to interpret the world war were themselves deeply infused with reactionary ideologies (1978: 92–103), calculations of interest were always in the sources of social power, and always peaceful, sometimes violent – emanating from “imagined communities” of class and

to tend to share with pluralism and a diverse, systemic state – this time in the Krasner has argued that the autonomy of foreign than in domestic policy; it is the systemic class and interest group pressures. Institutions having peculiar drives, even that are separate and distinct from the group” (1978: 10–11). I use Krasner’s analysis in this volume, while qualifying his conclusions that social identities emanating from beyond the state are not cohesive.

Domhoff (1990) has argued, central state resources are used in statist projects. State elites need to be “out there” in society. These are not quite distinct groups. Laumann and

Knoke (1987) show that in contemporary America networks constituted by multiple organizations typically penetrate the formal division between state and society. State actors normally are also “civilians,” with social identities. Domhoff (1990: 107–52) shows that most modern American “statesmen” are recruited from big business and corporate law firms. They form a “party” “representing” an international capitalist class fraction more than America.

All class theorists stress the dominant class identity and interests of statesmen. As a sociologist believing that social identities cannot be reduced to class, I broaden their line of argument in this volume. Though I support Krasner by demonstrating that nineteenth-century statesmen were indeed somewhat insulated from both popular and dominant classes, they could not be wholly insulated because they themselves possessed social identities. They were all white males, overwhelmingly drawn from the old regime and from dominant religious and linguistic communities. All these social identities mattered in their conduct of foreign policy, shaping the norms uniting them with, or dividing them from, other domestic and foreign power actors, sometimes reducing, sometimes increasing, international violence.

On the second point, few states turn out to be unitary actors. Keohane and Nye (1977: 34) pointedly ask of arguments asserting that “states act in their own interest”: “which self and which interest?” State elites are plural, not singular. Some moderately statist writers acknowledge this. Tilly (1990: 33–4) accepts that reification of the state is ultimately illegitimate, as also, he acknowledges, is his neglect of social classes. These are just pragmatic and heuristic simplifications, he says. Skocpol recognizes that elite powers and cohesion vary. Constitutions matter. Democratic constitutions prohibit elite autonomies allowed to authoritarian ones. Her analysis (1979) of early modern revolutions centered state autonomy, reasonably enough, on the powers of absolute monarchs. In the period discussed here, monarchical powers usually approximate most closely true elitist notions of state autonomy, although autonomy is never absolute. But Skocpol’s more recent collaborative work (Weir and Skocpol 1985), on twentieth-century welfare programs, locates elite autonomy among specialized bureaucrats, a more surreptitious, lesser form of autonomy. In Trimberger’s analysis (1978) of “revolutions from above” in developing countries, the state elite differs yet again: It is a revolutionary alliance of bureaucrats and military officers. Thus state elites are diverse and they may be incoherent – especially in the period under discussion, when monarchies, the military, bureaucrats, and political parties cohabit states.

But Skocpol has also moved, seemingly somewhat unconsciously, toward a more fundamental revision of state autonomy. Let me again

quote her statement that the state "is a structure with a logic and interests of its own." "Interests" are obviously properties of actors – an expression of true elitist theory – yet "logic" need imply no actor or elite. State autonomy might reside less in elite autonomy at all than in the autonomous logic of definite political institutions, arisen in the course of previous power struggles, then institutionalized and constraining present struggles. Skocpol and her collaborators (Weir et al. 1988: 1–121) emphasize how American federalism and the party patronage system, institutionalized in the nineteenth century, then held back the development of U.S. state powers, especially in the area of welfare policies. Though they still intermittently assert that state elites (bureaucrats, technocrats, and party leaders) possess some autonomy as actors, Skocpol and her associates focus more on the autonomous effects exerted by state institutions on all political actors. Federalism, parties, the presence or absence of cabinet government, and many other features of what we call the "constitutions" of states structure power relations in quite distinctive ways. Laumann and Knoke (1987) offer a more empiricist institutional approach. They look for formal patterning of the interactions between state departments and pressure groups, concluding that the contemporary American state consists of complex "organizational" networks.

This is "state power" though rarely "elite power," as it relates more to collective than to distributive power. It affects more the forms in which politicized actors collaborate than who has power over whom. This theory would predict less that state elites dominate civil society actors and more that all actors are constrained by existing political institutions. Because states are essentially ways in which dynamic social relations become authoritatively institutionalized, they readily lend themselves to a kind of "political lag" theory. States institutionalize present social conflicts, but institutionalized historic conflicts then exert considerable power over new conflicts – from state as passive place (as in Marxian or pluralist theory) to state not quite as actor (as in true elitism) but as active place. Chapter 20 endorses such a view of the Western state.

I call this approach to state power "institutional statism," and I embrace it as part of my overall "organizational materialism." Because this period saw the emergence of a truly massive set of political institutions – the nation-state – the theory will prove to have considerable explanatory power in our discussion. True elitism may be usefully applied to the most authoritarian and dictatorial states – for example, to the Nazi or Stalinist state (though even there its assumption of elite coherence must be relaxed). Even in some of the states of my present period true elitism has useful things to say about absolutist

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and authoritarian monarchs. But overall I shall rely far more on institu-
tional statism to identify the predominant forms of state autonomy.

Naturally enough, many writers do not fit neatly into any of these
schools of theory. Some draw from more than one. Rueschemeyer
and Evans (1985) argue that capitalism imposes limits on states, yet
elites possess some autonomy. Laumann and Knoke (1987) draw on all
four of the theories I have so far identified. Dahl has qualified his
earlier pluralism by acknowledging that the concentrated power of
corporate capitalism now jeopardizes democracy. And anyone with
empirical sensitivity – like Dahl, Domhoff, Offe, or Skocpol – sees that
all three schools have something valid to say about states: that states
are both actors and places, that these places have many mansions
and varying degrees of autonomy and cohesion, yet also respond to
pressures from capitalists, other major power actors, and more general
expressed social needs.

But much of the empirical work on state administrations does not
stress any of the actors privileged by these theories – a state elite,
the interests of capital, or the interests of society as a whole. Rather
states are portrayed as chaotic, irrational, with multiple departmen-
tal autonomies, pressured erratically and intermittently by capi-
talists but also by other interest groups. Under the microscope, states
"Balkanize," dissolving into competing departments and factions
(Alford and Friedland 1985: 202–22; Rueschemeyer and Evans 1985).
For example, Padgett's (1981) dissection of the budgets of the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development does not find that
singular cohesive actor, *the* state, but multiple, sprawling, fragmented
administrations. Adding foreign policy often worsens the confusion.
In Albertini's (1952–7) painstaking reconstruction of the diplomacy
leading to World War I, states are riven by multiple disputes, some
geopolitical, others domestic, entwining in unanticipated ways far from
the cohesion portrayed by realist-elite theory and as implied by class
and pluralist theory. Thus, said Abrams (1988: 79), the very idea
of *the* state mystifies: "The state is the unified symbol of an actual
disunity. . . . Political institutions . . . conspicuously fail to display a
unity of practice – just as they constantly discover their inability to
function as a more general factor of cohesion."

Therefore, we might advance a fifth theory, which I describe with a
traditional English expression: The state is not conspiracy but "cock-
up." As this metaphor conveys quite the wrong meaning in American
English, I translate it as: The state is not functional but "foul-up."

Most sociologists would regard cock-up or foul-up theory with dis-
dain. They believe social life is patterned and ordered. Obviously,
some states are more orderly than others, but is there not a certain

consistency to state blunders as well as state strategies? Surely, modern Western states are in some fundamental sense "capitalist" and "party democratic" (as Marxists and pluralists assert). They have contained monarchal and bureaucratic elites (as elitists observe). They are major or minor Powers, secular or religious, centralized or federal, patriarchal or gender-neutral. Such states are patterned. Granted the excesses of systemic theories, can we pattern states while not reifying them? Do we have to abandon substantive theory and construct our theory merely from the formal properties of maps of the dense organizational networks of modern political influence, as Laumann and Knoke (1987) do? Despite the considerable virtues of their organizational theory, and the parallels between their enterprise and my own, does it not sometimes miss the wood for the trees? The American state surely is at some "higher," macro level capitalist; it is also essentially federal and it possesses the most powerful militarism in the world. I would not have guessed this from their maps of complex organizational power networks. Indeed, by dismissing the notion that this might essentially be a capitalist state because organizational networks are rarely configured for the defense of capitalism (and so may sometimes react belatedly to a threat to their property rights), Laumann and Knoke (1987: 383-6) are in danger of repeating the old pluralist error of mistaking the terrain of open political debate and organization for the entire terrain of politics.

My more substantive version of organizational materialism comes in two stages. First, I identify the particular characteristics of political institutions. Marxism and pluralism, being reductionist, tend to neglect political particularities. True elitism-realism regards them as singular, exaggerating the power and cohesion of state actors; cock-up-foul-up theory overproliferates particularities. In beginning to identify general patterns of political particularities, we cannot do better than start with Max Weber. Weber has been sometimes identified as a true elitist, yet this characterization is wrong. Weber did not produce a coherent state theory, but he left us concepts with which to fashion one. An institutional approach tends to proliferate organizational complexity, as do Laumann and Knoke (using much more sophisticated data than I can aspire to for historical states). So in the second stage I look to simplify institutional proliferation, using my polymorphous theory of "higher-level state crystallizations."

Weber's political concepts: an institutional analysis

Above all, Weber was a theorist of the historical development of social institutions. He began his discussion of the state by distinguishing three

stages in its institutional development, characterized by the terms "political power," the "state," and the "modern state." In his first stage, political power existed though a state did not:

A "ruling organization" will be called "political" insofar as its existence and order is continuously safeguarded within a given *territorial* area by the threat and application of physical force on the part of the administrative staff. [This and the next two quotations are from Weber 1978: I, 54-6; his emphases.]

Thus political power is essentially territorial, and it is physically imposed by a specialized (implicitly centralized) staff. The "state" then emerged in the second stage:

A compulsory political organization with continuous operations will be called a "state" insofar as its administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the *monopoly* of the *legitimate* use of physical force in the enforcement of its order.

This institutional definition of the state has been widely endorsed (MacIver 1926: 22; Eisenstadt 1969: 5; Tilly 1975: 27; Rueschmeyer and Evans 1985: 47; Poggi 1990, Chapters 1 and 2). Along with Giddens (1985: 18), I differ on one point: Many historic states did not "monopolize" the means of physical force, and even in the modern state the means of physical force have been substantially autonomous from (the rest of) the state.

Thus I loosen the ties between military and political power to generate my own definition, much influenced by Weber:

1. The state is a differentiated set of institutions and personnel
2. embodying centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate to and from a center, to cover a
3. territorially demarcated area over which it exercises
4. some degree of authoritative, binding rule making, backed up by some organized physical force.

This is an institutional, not a functional, definition of the state. It does not mention what the state does. True, the state uses force, but only as means to back up its rules, which are given no particular content. Of the theories considered here, only Marxist class theory and some realists specify state functions: to reproduce the social relations required by dominant modes of production (Marxists), or to pursue territorial security needs (realism). Yet states have undertaken multiple functions. Though states have indeed class and security functions, they also adjudicate disputes, redistribute resources among regions, age groups, and other interest groups, sacralize some institutions and secularize others, and do many other things. As different states pursue different functions with differing degrees of commitment, it is not easy to define

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the historical development of social n of the state by distinguishing three

the state in terms of functions. Later I move to a functional analysis to identify different functional crystallizations of states.

From my definition of the state we can derive four particularities, shared by all states, of political institutions:

1. The state is territorially centralized. It does not wield an analogous resource to ideological, economic, and military power. Indeed, it must draw on these very resources, which are located outside itself. But the state nonetheless possesses another distinct power resource: It alone is inherently centralized over a delimited territory over which it has binding powers.

2. The state contains two dualities: It is place and persons and center and territory. Political power is simultaneously "statist," vested in elite persons and institutions at the center, *and* it is composed of "party" relations between persons and institutions in the center and across state territories. Thus it will crystallize in forms essentially generated by the outside society *and* in forms that are intrinsic to its own political processes.

3. State institutions are differentiated, undertaking different functions for different interest groups located within its territories. Whatever centrality, whatever private rationality, the state possesses, it is also impure, different parts of its body politic open to penetration by diverse power networks. Thus *the state need have no final unity or even consistency*. It might do so if societies possessed such final unity or consistency, but my model of societies as overlapping, intersecting power networks suggests that they do not.

4. The very definition of the state as a delimited territory suggests a further set of "political" relations between this state and other states – that is, *geopolitics*. Throughout his work, and especially when dealing with his own Imperial German state, Weber emphasizes that geopolitics help shape domestic politics. Collins (1986: 145) suggests that, for Weber, "politics works from the outside in," though Weber also sometimes emphasizes the reverse causation. Politics and geopolitics are entwined; the one should not be studied without the other.

I shall expand on these points after explaining Weber's third stage, the "modern state." It additionally

possesses an administrative and legal order subject to change by legislation, to which the organized activities of the administrative staff, which are also controlled by regulations, are oriented. This system of orders claims binding authority, not only over the members of the state, the citizens . . . but also to a very large extent over all action taking place in the area of its jurisdiction. It is thus a compulsory organization with a territorial basis.

Thus the modern state added routine, formalized, rationalized institutions of wider scope over citizens and territories. It *penetrates* its

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territories with both law and administration (embodying what Weber calls "rational-legal domination"), as earlier states did not. Tilly (1990: 103-16) aptly describes this as "direct" rule and contrasts it to the indirect rule embodied in earlier states. But this is not merely a matter of the state increasing rule over society. Conversely, "citizens" and "parties" also penetrate the modern state. The state has become a *nation-state*, also representing citizens' internal sense of community as well as emphasizing the distinctness of their external interests in relation to the citizens of other states. Whereas the "legitimacy" problem in most historic states is, for Weber, primarily a problem of the cohesion between a ruler and his staff, he argues that in the modern state it principally concerns relations among rulers, parties, and the nation.

Weber sometimes selects one institution of the modern state for extraordinary emphasis: "monocratic bureaucracy," that is, bureaucracy centralized under one head. He famously wrote:

The monocratic variety of bureaucracy is, from a purely technical point of view, capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is in this sense formally the most rational means of exercising authority over human beings. It is superior to any other form in precision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability. It thus makes possible a particularly high degree of calculability of results for the heads of the organization. . . . The development of modern forms of organization in all fields is nothing less than identical with the development of and continual spread of bureaucratic administration. . . . Its development is, to take the most striking case, at the root of the modern Western state. . . . [T]he needs of mass administration make it today completely indispensable. The choice is only that between bureaucracy and dilettantism in the field of administration. [1978: I, 223]

Weber saw bureaucratization dominating the entire West. Although he viewed the German state as a bureaucratic pioneer, he took pains to demonstrate that two states that might seem decidedly unbureaucratic - tsarist Russia and the confederal party-ridden United States - were also falling under its sway. Everywhere competing political authorities were subordinated to bureaucracy. A democratic regime, by centralizing responsibility, only furthered monocratic bureaucracy. He anguished over this "irresistible advance," asking rhetorically, "How can one possibly save any remnants of 'individualist' freedom in any sense?" and again, "What can we oppose to this machinery, in order to keep a portion of humanity free from this parcelling out of the soul, from this total domination of the bureaucratic ideal of life?" (1978: II, 1403; Beetham 1985: 81).

At one point Weber seems to have sensed that his argument was weak. He mused whether modernization increased the *power* of bureaucracy - without explaining what this sudden italicization means.

But then he concluded plainly that it did: "The power position of a fully-fledged bureaucracy is always great, under normal conditions overtowering. The political 'master' almost always finds himself vis-à-vis the trained official, in the position of a dilettante facing the expert" (1978: II, 969-1003, quoted from p. 991; for an excellent commentary, see Beetham 1985: 67-72).

Weber went badly wrong in suddenly endorsing a true elitist theory of bureaucracy. Bureaucrats have rarely dominated modern states, and state administrations have rarely been monocratic (see Chapter 13). There are both conceptual and empirical objections.

Curiously, empirical objections are found in Weber's dissections of his own Imperial German state. There he identified not just a powerful bureaucracy but three distinct political institutions: bureaucracy, a dual political executive (kaiser and chancellor), and parties (especially the Junker party). Weber did not confine the term "party" to formal political parties fighting elections. He meant any group collectively organized for the acquisition of power, including factions at court or in ministries or high commands. As Chapter 9 shows, at different times he stated that each of these three actors dominated the *Kaiserreich*. Note, however, that parties differ from the other two actors. The bureaucracy and the executive are compatible with true elitism, but party power derived from a two-way relation between center and territory: The Junkers were a class "out there" in civil society, yet were also entrenched in the military and other key state institutions. In his work Weber gave greatest weight to parties; they, not bureaucracies or executives, comprised the third actor in his tripartite model of social stratification, along with classes and status groups.

Although Weber did not have a final theory of the modern state, his ideas differed from the state theories identified earlier. He was not a reductionist: Unlike proponents of Marxism and pluralism, he saw that states had powers of their own. And unlike those of true elitism and realism, he did not lodge those powers merely in a central elite; nor were they necessarily cohesive. Like many other modern writers, Laumann and Knoke (1987: 380) identify Weber as a realist elitist and criticize his supposed neglect of the blurring of boundaries between the public and the private. But this was precisely his point when analyzing parties. Political power was simultaneously a centralized resource, a two-way relationship between center and territories, and a relationship among states. Weber did not mold these institutional elements into a coherent state theory. Yet, by remedying his key conceptual confusion, we are able to do so.

Weber's remarks confuse two conceptions of state strength, expressed in his cited quote as "penetration" and "power." Weber is right in

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that it did: "The power position of a state is great, under normal conditions, and the ruler almost always finds himself vis-à-vis a dilettante facing the expert" (p. 991; for an excellent commentary,

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are found in Weber's dissections of power. Here he identified not just a powerful political institution: bureaucracy, a dual monarchy (canceller), and parties (especially the Socialists). He confined the term "party" to formal organizations. He meant any group collectively exercising power, including factions at court or in parliament. Chapter 9 shows, at different times, that the same actors dominated the *Kaiserreich*. The ruler was far from the other two actors. The ruler was compatible with true elitism, but the two-way relation between center and periphery was "out there" in civil society, yet not in the ruler and other key state institutions. In contrast to parties; they, not bureaucracies, were the actor in his tripartite model of social power and status groups.

In his final theory of the modern state, his theories identified earlier. He was not a follower of Marxism and pluralism, he saw that the state was unlike those of true elitism and that powers merely in a central elite; he was not. Like many other modern writers, he identified Weber as a realist elitist and he blurred the boundaries between the state and precisely his point when analyzing simultaneously a centralized resource, a center and territories, and a relationship that would blend these institutional elements into a new state, remedying his key conceptual con-

ceptions of state strength, expressed in "power" and "power." Weber is right in

saying that bureaucracy increased penetration but wrong in saying that it simply increased power. He was confusing collective infrastructural and distributive despotic power. The former is emphasized by institutional state theories; the latter, by true elitism.

Despotic power refers to the distributive power of state elites over civil society. It derives from the range of actions that state elites can undertake without routine negotiation with civil society groups. It derives from the fact that only the state is inherently territorially centralized, fulfilling useful social functions that require this form of organization and that ideological, economic, and military power actors, organized on different bases, cannot themselves fulfill. Actors located primarily within states have a certain space and privacy in which to operate – the degree varying according to the ability of civil society actors to organize themselves centrally through representative assemblies, formal political parties, court factions, and so forth. They can alternatively withhold powers from central politics (discussed later) or undercut state powers by strengthening transnational relations abroad. A state with despotic power becomes either an autonomous actor, as emphasized by true elitism, or multiple but perhaps confused autonomous actors, according to its internal homogeneity.

Infrastructural power is the institutional capacity of a central state, despotic or not, to penetrate its territories and logistically implement decisions. This is collective power, "power through" society, coordinating social life through state infrastructures. It identifies a state as a set of central and radial institutions penetrating its territories. Because the infrastructural powers of modern states have increased, Weber implied this also increased their despotic power over society. But this is not necessarily so. Infrastructural power is a two-way street: It also enables civil society parties to control the state, as Marxists and pluralists emphasize. Increasing infrastructural power does not necessarily increase or reduce distributive, despotic power.

Effective infrastructural powers, however, do increase collective state power. Because more of social life is now coordinated through state institutions, these will structure more of it, increasing what might be called the "territorial centralization" or the "naturalization" of social life. Infrastructurally more powerful states cage more social relations within their "national" boundaries and along the radial lines of control between center and territories. They increase national and geopolitical collective powers at the expense of local-regional and transnational ones while leaving open the distributional question of who controls them. Thus the explanatory power of institutional statism increases in the modern state as its collective, infrastructural powers massively expand.

Table 3.1. *Two dimensions of state power*

| | Infrastructural power | |
|----------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| | Low | High |
| Despotic power | | |
| Low | Feudal | Bureaucratic-democratic |
| High | Imperial/absolutist | Authoritarian |

Despotic and infrastructural powers combine into four ideal types, as shown in Table 3.1.

The feudal state combined feeble despotic and infrastructural powers. It had little capacity to intervene in social life. It had considerable autonomy in its own private sphere but little power over or through society. The medieval king possessed the state; it was his household, his wardrobe, his estates, generating his own revenues. He could do as he pleased within it, but he could not do much to society outside. His rule there was indirect, depending on the infrastructures of autonomous lords, the church, and other corporate bodies. His army depended on their levies and these might decline his orders. The imperial state of Rome or China and European absolutism approximate to the second ideal type, with pronounced despotic but little infrastructural power. They could roar "off with his head," and if the person was within range, off came his head – but few were within range. Their armies were formidable but tended to fragment as generals became rival imperial pretenders. The modern Western liberal-bureaucratic state approximates to the third type, with massive infrastructures largely controlled by either capitalists or the democratic process (I shall not yet judge which). The modern authoritarian state – the Soviet Union when at its height – had both despotic powers and substantial infrastructures (though their cohesion was less than we often assumed).

From the sixteenth century on, a monarchical surge toward greater despotism provoked a representative backlash and massive political conflict. But infrastructural power grew fairly consensually as states partook in the exponential growth of the general collective powers discussed in Chapter 1. As Table 3.1 indicates, the unusual strength of modern states is infrastructural. Agrarian states could not even know the worth of their subjects, let alone tax them accurately. They could not tax income at all, assessed only crude indicators of wealth (size of landholding or house, value of goods brought to market, etc.), and relied on autonomous local notables to extract it. Yet today the

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| | High |
| absolutist | Bureaucratic-democratic Authoritarian |

powers combine into four ideal types,

1 feeble despotic and infrastructural intervene in social life. It had considerable sphere but little power over or king possessed the state; it was his states, generating his own revenues. He t, but he could not do much to society irect, depending on the infrastructures rch, and other corporate bodies. His and these might decline his orders. China and European absolutism appe, with pronounced despotic but little ld roar "off with his head," and if the ame his head – but few were within able but tended to fragment as generals ders. The modern Western liberal- to the third type, with massive infra- / either capitalists or the democratic ich). The modern authoritarian state – eight – had both despotic powers and gh their cohesion was less than we

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American and British states can both tax my own income and wealth "at source" – they know my approximate worth – and extract their cut without my even laying hands on it. Whoever controls these states has infinitely more control over me than agrarian states had over my ancestors. As Huntington (1968: 1) observed, the British, U.S., and Soviet (before 1991) states were more similar to one another than either were to historic states or to many states in developing countries – "the government governs," actually implementing cabinet, presidential, or Politburo decisions, capable of far more power mobilization at home and abroad than were their historic predecessors.

But not only state infrastructures expanded. A revolution in collective power logistics increased the infrastructural penetration of all power organizations. Civil society's capacity to control the state also increased. Modern societies contain both authoritarian states, effectively dominating everyday life in their territories (as no historic states did), and democratic-party states, routinely controlled by civil society (as only small city-states had been previously). This spelled the end for states in the upper left portion of Table 3.1 – autonomous and fairly cohesive, yet feeble, enjoying privacy from civil society but little effective power over it. Modern states and civil societies interpenetrate too tightly for autonomy without power.

This muddies our analysis. Given such interpenetration, where does the state end and civil society begin? The state is no longer a small, private central place and elite with its own rationality. "It" contains multiple institutions and tentacles sprawling from the center through its territories, even sometimes through transnational space. Conversely, civil society also becomes far more politicized than in the past, sending out diverse raiding parties – pressure groups and political parties – into the various places of the state, as well as outflanking it transnationally. Modern political power as place and actor, infrastructure and despot, elite and parties is dual, concerning both a center, with its multiple power particularities, and center-territory relations, with their power particularities. "Its" cohesion is always problematic. Only in one respect is "the state" singular: As infrastructural interpenetration increased, "it" tended to "naturalize" social life. The "power" of the modern state principally concerns not "state elites" exercising power over society but a tightening state-society relation, caging social relations over the national rather than the local-regional or transnational terrain, thus politicizing and geopoliticizing far more of social life than had earlier states.

Starting from Weber, in this section I identified the institutional particularities shared by all states. I then added the particularities of modern nation-states. Beyond these broad similarities states will differ

considerably, according to time and place. In the next section more detail, to list the main political institutions of Western during the long nineteenth century, beginning with those in domestic policy.

Nineteenth-century political institutions

Domestic policy

Table 3.2 gives the major institutions of central government later with central-local government relations). The first column institutions, and the remaining columns analyze who control with the aid of a distinction between "insulated" and "embedded" power. For a state to be despotic (as in true elitism), its network be insulated from civil society (as Krasner argued occurred in policy). Column 2 lists forms of insulation that might free elite from civil society pressures and interests. But if state is are "embedded" in civil society, they will be controlled, as pluralist theories argue (columns 4 and 5).

But full despotism and complete insulation are unlikely. The state is both center and relations between center and autonomy would require its territorial reach as well as its ce insulated. Most fundamental of all, the state's resource base and manpower networks penetrating throughout civil society insulated from civil society control. Yet such insulation has historically. Raising revenue and troops normally required in local-regional notables. Insulation became even rarer in this political representation developed – aimed precisely at controlling fiscal and manpower exactions. Full state autonomy or ins specified in the second column of Table 3.2 and by the t realist theories, is unlikely. It presupposes insulation of all institutions. It is more likely that some are relatively insulated in dominant classes, and still others in plural works (cf. Dornhoff 1990: 26–8). Thus the state would be less than any of the first three theoretical schools suggests. Ins autonomy might be possessed by parts, rather than by all, of More plausible is a "medium" level of despotic power, s

the third column. State institutions may be embedded in ticularistic civil society power actors, as in Weber's acco Junker party. According to him, the German monarchy autonomy from capitalists and from the citizenry in genera had formed a particularistic alliance with the Junkers, a cla dominant in society, now greatly declined in economic po

Table 3.2. Power networks in nineteenth-century states

| Political institutions | Despotic state | Particularistic state—civil society alliance | Dominant classes | Multiple interest groups |
|------------------------|--|---|--|---|
| Supreme executive | Absolute monarch, dynasty | Embedded in court and old regime | Embedded in feudal-capitalistic society | Constitutionally embedded in estates, parliaments, corporate privileges |
| Judiciary-police | Insulated royal courts | Embedded in corporate legal profession and universities | Embedded in property law | Civil citizenship (individual and collective) |
| Civil administration | Insulated corps of royal or bureaucratic officials | Embedded in old regime, new professionals, and universities | Functional for capitalism | Meritocratic bureaucracy answerable to parliaments |
| Parties, assemblies | One-party regimes (none in this period) | Limited legislatures, divide and rule, party intrigues | 1. Property franchise 2. Capitalist limits to parliamentary sovereignty | Political citizenship |
| Diplomacy | Insulated "statesmen" | Embedded in old regime | Embedded in property classes | Answerable to parliaments |
| Military | Insulated caste | Embedded in old regime and other particularistic groups | Embedded in property classes, answerable to civilian executives | Answerable to parliaments |
| Despotic power | High | Medium | Low | Low |
| Theory of state | True elitist-realist | Institutional statism | Class | Pluralist |

More plausible is a "medium" level of despotic power, specified in the third column. State institutions may be embedded in more particularistic civil society power actors, as in Weber's account of the Junker party. According to him, the German monarchy had much autonomy from capitalists and from the citizenry in general because it had formed a particularistic alliance with the Junkers, a class formerly dominant in society, now greatly declined in economic power though

still controlling the military and most civilian ministries. Through particularistic, embedded alliance regimes may attain moderate insulation and autonomy from the broader social forces specified by class and pluralist theories. Regimes may divide and rule to secure particularistic segmental allies, political insiders, and to encourage "outs" to moderate their opposition in the hope of getting back in. Of course, the balance of power contained in this alliance may work in the opposite direction: The particularistic civil society group may effectively "colonize" part of the state, using it against other state elites or more general power actors – as, for example, in the historic control exercised by American southern politicians, embedded in the merchant-planter oligarchies in southern states, over the congressional committee structure (Domhoff 1990: 53, 104–5). Column 3 lists the main particularistic embedded or semiinsulated segmental alliances found in the long nineteenth century.

The first row in Table 3.2 deals with the supreme executive, the chief model for true elitist-realist theory. Here is where we might expect true elite autonomy to center. All state constitutions then (as now) conferred certain powers on their chief executive, especially (as Chapter 12 reveals) in foreign policy. Most Western executives were emerging from an absolutist phase of monarchy. Louis XIV's "*L'état, c'est moi*" contained three truths. Absolute rulers possessed more despotic power than constitutional monarchs or republican executives. Constitutions matter, as contemporaries believed, entrenching different degrees of state autonomy. Second, in absolute and later in authoritarian monarchies, more depended on the abilities and energies of the monarch or the chief ministers to whom monarchs delegated powers. As historians aver, the talents of a Maria Theresa or a Bismarck (considerable) or a Louis XVI or a Bethmann-Hollweg (negligible) made a difference – more so than did the abilities of a constitutional monarch or even of a parliamentary prime minister. Third, hereditary monarchs and their families were unique in not being a relationship between center and territory, for they actually were centralized actors, constituting a core, insulated state elite, with their own power particularities.

But to exercise power over society, monarchs had to control further state institutions. At the center they relied on the court. Courtiers were usually aristocrats, high clerics, and military commanders, embedded in the dominant class, as class theory asserts. Monarchs sought to counter this embedding by segmentally dividing and ruling, using kin and client networks to split the dominant class into loyal "in" and displaced "out" parties. As society and state became more universalistic, this strategy shifted to embedding monarch and court in the old regime, a court-centered party alliance between monarch and

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 re unique in not being a relation-
 , for they actually were centralized
 ed state elite, with their own power

ety, monarchs had to control further
 they relied on the court. Courtiers
 clerics, and military commanders,
 , as class theory asserts. Monarchs
 by segmentally dividing and ruling,
 split the dominant class into loyal
 As society and state became more
 to embedding monarch and court in
 party alliance between monarch and

the old landed, rentier class plus the hierarchy of established churches
 and the officer corps.

The old regime dominates most of column 3's semiinsulations. This "party-cum-elite" survived well into the twentieth century (as Mayer 1981 has forcefully argued). It remained more important in authoritarian monarchies. Yet even constitutional monarchies retained old regime tinges, and republics exhibited "old" elements – "Republican notables," "the 100 (or 200 or 400) families," "the Establishment," and the like. In all countries some political power was or is wielded by an "upper class" centered on "old money," usually landed or banking, coupled with traditional status – the term "Establishment" conveys its role in Britain, and in relation to foreign policy making in America. Old regimes retained considerable powers over diplomacy, as Chapter 12 explicates.

Class theorists argue that old regimes became incorporated as a fraction into the increasingly dominant capitalist class. Though pluralists have rarely applied their theory to nondemocratic regimes, plural power networks may also have pervaded even absolute monarchies. Absolutists were pressured by multiple interest groups and so granted political rights and privileges beyond landed aristocracy and capitalists, to churches and to lesser estates – municipalities, professional bodies, merchant corporations and guilds, even to peasant farmers. Like courtiers, their privileges were particularistic, and their politics tended to factional, segmental intrigue. Subsequent chapters in this volume evaluate these class and pluralist views of the old regime.

The second row of Table 3.2 concerns judicial-police institutions – law courts and law-enforcement agencies. In this period police forces emerged distinct from armies but were not major power players. (See Chapter 12.) Law courts mattered more. Law had a dual role: expressing the monarch's will, yet also embodying customary and divine law. The monarch might prevail in his or her highest court, but lower justice was dispensed by or in cooperation with local-regional notables, often church notables. Europe was a law-governed community; even absolute rulers did not like to be seen infringing law and custom (Beales 1987: 7). Its hybrid character made law a central site of ideological struggle and gave lawyers a corporate identity reducible to neither state nor civil society. Monarchs granted lawyers corporate privileges, seeking to reduce their social embeddedness. The French monarchy went the farthest, granting patents of nobility carrying material privileges (*noblesse de la robe*) and rights to corporate assemblies (*parlements*). The collapse of their particularistic alliance in the 1780s was a necessary precondition of the French Revolution. (See Chapter 6.) The success of this despotic semiinsulation strategy varied. In some

states, lawyers and courts allied with despotism (as in Austria and Prussia); in some, with its enemies (as during the American and French revolutions). If judicial institutions acquired a little autonomy, it might on occasion be their own, not the state's.

Rising eighteenth-century classes and interest groups aimed much of their energy at the law, to secure the first of T. H. Marshall's triumvirate of citizen rights: civil citizenship. They demanded judicial rights for individuals, not for collectivities. Old regimes proved co-operative because they were becoming capitalist themselves, readier for that equation of personal and property rights labeled by C. B. MacPherson as "possessive individualism." Monarchs were also seeking to develop more universal contractual relations with their subjects. Modern states began to embody Weber's "rational-legal domination" (Poggi 1990: 28–30). There was little head-on class collision over individual civil rights in this period (unlike earlier centuries). Old regimes became factionalized as rising classes pressured. Civil-law codes were sometimes promulgated by absolute monarchs themselves. But the language of law codes was universal even if designed to protect male property holders (and sometimes the dominant ethnic or religious community). Law had emergent power, useful for extending the rights of lower classes, religious communities, and women. For a time legal organizations – half inside, half outside the state – exerted radical pressures. After about 1850, however, they became conservative, wedded to whatever combination of old regimes and capitalist classes had been institutionalized. Individual civil citizenship proved a barrier to the development of further collective civil and political citizen rights.

The third row in Table 3.2 concerns civil administration. Apart from judicial and military activities, previous states had not administered much; then nineteenth-century states greatly increased their infrastructural scope. But all states need fiscal and manpower resources (as Levi 1988 emphasizes). Despotism requires that revenue and expenditure allocation be insulated from civil society. Royal domains and regalian rights (e.g., state ownership of mining rights and the right to sell economic monopolies) had conferred some revenue insulation, as did ancient, institutionalized forms of taxation. War making was a state prerogative, and successful war might increase revenue through booty and using the army to coerce at home (though unsuccessful war might diminish powers). Few eighteenth-century monarchs had to submit budgets to parliaments. Yet for the increased scale of modern warfare, traditional insulated revenues proved insufficient. New forms of taxation and borrowing embedded administrations among taxpayers and creditors, though particularistic alliances with tax farmers and

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runs civil administration. Apart from previous states had not administered states greatly increased their infrastructural fiscal and manpower resources (as required that revenue and expenditure in civil society. Royal domains and monopoly of mining rights and the right to confer some revenue insulation, as in the case of taxation. War making was a war might increase revenue through the state at home (though unsuccessful war in the nineteenth-century monarchs had to submit to the increased scale of modern expenses proved insufficient. New forms of administration among taxpayers and political alliances with tax farmers and

merchants could stave off dominant class control. Thus fiscal balance sheets were complex and varied. I examine them in Chapter 11.

State officials were formally responsible to the monarch, yet they actually needed to administer through local-regional notables. In 1760, administrations were embedded in local property relations through office-holding practices we today call corrupt. Administrations then became substantially "bureaucratized," as Chapter 13 shows. Bureaucratization involved conflicts among monarchs, dominant classes, and plural pressure groups. The monarch sought to insulate officials as a dependent corps, although even this involved partial embeddedness, in the legal profession and higher educational organizations, and through them in classes and other power networks. Dominant classes tried to ensure that bureaucracy was run by people like themselves and was answerable to parliaments they controlled. More popular political movements sought to embed bureaucracy in universal criteria of performance, answerable to democratic assemblies. There emerged moderate state autonomy through semiinsulated, particularistic alliances between the executive and highly educated sons of the old regime, then broadened by admitting highly educated sons of the professional middle class. Control over secondary and tertiary education became crucial to these semiinsulation strategies.

So developed a distinct "technocratic-bureaucratic" institution within the state, in principle accountable at the top but actually with some bureaucratic insulation. Even where states represented the interests of society or its ruling class, states are nonetheless centralized and civil societies and classes are not. Their ability to supervise is limited. Two technocratic monopolies identified by Weber (1978: II, 1417–18) – of technical know-how and administrative channels of communication – permit the surreptitious and limited form of insulation emphasized by Skocpol and her collaborators. Classes and other major power actors are not routinely organized to supervise all state functions. They may stir themselves to legislate a desired policy. Having achieved that, they disband or turn to another issue, leaving civil servants in peace. These may act with quiet autonomy. If power actors do not once again stir themselves, then departmental autonomies may emerge. These are probably greater in authoritarian than in parliamentary regimes. Without centralized cabinet government with ultimate responsibility to parliament, authoritarian monarchs proved to have less control over "their" technocratic-bureaucratic organizations than did constitutional supreme executives. Constitutional regimes proved more cohesive, if less autonomous, than authoritarian ones.

Thus elite autonomies may be *plural*, reducing state cohesion. Though the growth of bureaucracy may seem centralized, it actually

sprawled. Thousands, then millions, of civil servants implemented policy. Technocracy and bureaucracy is inherently specialized and multiple, increasing state complexity, as stressed by cock-up-foul-up theory. Nothing has more misled analysis of actual states than Weber's notion of monocratic bureaucracy. State administration almost never forms a single, bureaucratic whole.

The fourth row in Table 3.2 concerns legislative assemblies and parties. I extend the term here, as Weber did, to indicate not just political parties but any pressure groups. Absolutism did not formally acknowledge parties, and (unlike in the twentieth century) there were no attempts to rule despotically through single-party regimes. But executive attempts to build up particularistic embedded alliances proliferated segmental factions composed of court and parliamentary cliques, embodying intriguing, behind-stairs clientelism. More formal and often less segmental were the formal political parties emerging in the nineteenth century, enabling diffuse civil society actors to control state executives (and each other) through Marshall's "political citizenship." This established sovereign legislative assemblies, elected secretly by widening franchises, usually enshrined in constitutions. These ensure that modern Western states are democratic, pluralists assert.

Yet political citizenship did not advance as smoothly as Marshall implied. Authoritarian executives could divide and rule between factions and parties, allying particularistically and segmentally with party oligarchies of notables. Constitutions also had emergent properties that could prevent further citizen development. Property and gender restrictions on franchises remained to the end of the period, as did restrictions on the sovereignty of assemblies. If "entrenched" to protect the rights of the contracting parties, constitutions proved resistant to social change. The U.S. Constitution preserved a federal capitalist-liberal state across two centuries into very different social conditions, resisting movements demanding collective and social citizen rights. The (unwritten) British constitution entrenched parliamentary sovereignty, which preserved a relatively centralized, two-party state.

Marxists also argue that parties and assemblies are limited in a more fundamental sense by their dependence on capitalism. Most political power actors in this period believed property rights and commodity production were "natural." They rarely considered encroaching on them. But even had they tried, their powers might have been limited, as capitalist accumulation provided their own resources (as Offe and Ronge 1982 emphasize). This is a key Marxian argument against both true elitist and pluralist positions. Neither state elites nor anticapitalist parties can abrogate the "limits" set by the need for capitalist accumulation, they argue (short of mounting a revolution). I have already

illions, of civil servants implemented eaucracy is inherently specialized and plexity, as stressed by cock-up-foul-up ed analysis of actual states than Weber's racy. State administration almost never ole.

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suggested that states had only limited chances of generating their own independent fiscal resources. This supports the Marxian argument. The modern state did crystallize as capitalist, though not only as capitalist.

Foreign policy

The fifth and sixth rows in Table 3.2 concern diplomatic and military institutions. As I have previously polemicized (in essays reprinted in Mann 1988; cf. Giddens 1985), most state theory has neglected diplomacy and military power. Yet states inhabit a world of states, oscillating between war and peace. Agrarian states raised at least three-quarters of their revenues to make war; and their military personnel dwarfed their civilian officials. States looked like war-making machines. Yet the machines were started up and wound down by diplomacy, often oriented to conciliation and peace. This was the essential duality of foreign policy.

European diplomats inhabited a "multi-power-actor civilization," not an anarchic black hole (as envisaged by some realists) but a normative community of shared norms and perceptions, some very general, others shared by specific transnational classes or religions; some peaceful, others violent. Many power networks operating across international space did not go through states. Chapter 2 notes that this was especially true of ideological and economic power networks. States could not fully cage the exchange of messages, goods, and personnel, nor interfere much with private property rights or with trade networks. Statesmen had social identities, especially of class and religious community, whose norms helped define conceptions of interests and morality.

Thus diplomacy and geopolitics were rule-governed. Some rules defined what reasonable national interests were and were shared by statesmen across the civilization. Others added normative understandings among kin-related aristocrats, among Catholics, among "Europeans," "Westerners," even occasionally among "human beings." Even war was rule-governed, "limited" in relation to some, righteously savage in relation to others. The stability of the civilization over many centuries aided what some realists assume to be universal human abilities to calculate rationally "national interest." In particular, European diplomacy had a millennium of experience of two particular geopolitical situations: balances of power among two to six near-equal Great Powers and attempts at hegemony by one of them, countered by the others. These common understandings are sometimes labeled the "Westphalian system," after the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia ending the wars of religion (Rosecrance 1986: 72-85). But they embodied older European norms.

Diplomacy was *alliance* diplomacy. Almost all wars were between groups of allied Powers, unless one protagonist succeeded in diplomatically isolating its opponent. Diplomacy sought to make friends and isolate enemies; in war a Power sought to use its friends, ideally to force the enemy to fight on more than one front. These are very realist tactics, of course. But some alliances also rested on shared norms, hitherto on religious solidarity, in this period on the solidarity of reactionary monarchs or of the "Anglo-Saxon" community, and on the increasing reluctance of liberal regimes to go to war with one another (see Chapters 8 and 21).

But, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw an increase in the lure of war. Europe was expanding east into Asia, southeast into Ottoman lands, south into Africa, and by naval staging posts and colonies of settlers throughout the globe. By 1760, war costs (financial and mortal) were escalating, but so were the benefits. Colonial wars were not usually zero-sum for the European Powers. They could all gain: If Britain and France conflicted in North America, or Russia and Austria in the Balkans, the winner took the choicest prizes, the loser took lesser ones. Colonialism was unusually profitable, and Europeans also congratulated themselves that they were furthering Christian or Western or "white" civilization and "progress" over savages, natives, or decadent civilizations.

Aggression within Europe also rewarded the bigger states. There were about two hundred independent states in Europe in 1500, only about twenty by 1900 (Tilly 1990: 45–6). The winners also appropriated history. When Germans, in 1900, reflected on their national identity, few conceived of themselves as ex-citizens of the thirty-eight German states defeated since 1815 by the kingdom of Prussia. They were German winners, not Saxon or Hessian losers. In a history written by winners, warrior aggression looked better than it really was. War has been ubiquitous among states. It looked entirely normal to most Europeans during the long nineteenth century.

The ubiquity of war and aggressive diplomacy infused the very notions of material interest and capitalist profit with territorial conceptions of identity, community, and morality – though these coexisted with the more market-oriented conceptions of interest and profit fostered by the multi-power-actor civilization. Thus flourished all six international political economies distinguished in Chapter 2: laissez-faire, protectionism, mercantilism, and economic, social, and geopolitical imperialism. All were "normal" strategies-drifts.

Five major organized actors participated in diplomatic decisions:

1. *Classes*. I return to the three types of class organization distinguished in Chapter 2. Most early theorists expected that modern

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macy. Almost all wars were between one protagonist succeeded in diplomacy. Diplomacy sought to make friends and sought to use its friends, ideally to more than one front. These are very realist alliances also rested on shared norms, in this period on the solidarity of "Anglo-Saxon" community, and on the eagerness to go to war with one another

teenth centuries saw an increase in the spreading east into Asia, southeast into Africa, and by naval staging posts and the globe. By 1760, war costs (financial) were the benefits. Colonial wars between the European Powers. They could all be fought in North America, or Russia and elsewhere took the choicest prizes, the loser was unusually profitable, and Europeans felt that they were furthering Christian or "progress" over savages, natives,

to reward the bigger states. There were no dominant states in Europe in 1500, only France (45-6). The winners also appropriated the spoils, reflected on their national identity, and ex-citizens of the thirty-eight German principalities of the kingdom of Prussia. They were Prussian losers. In a history written by Prussians, it looked better than it really was. Wars. It looked entirely normal to most of the nineteenth century.

Aggressive diplomacy infused the very capitalist profit with territorial concepts and morality - though these coexisted with conceptions of interest and profit for civilization. Thus flourished all the theories distinguished in Chapter 2: mercantilism, and economic, social, and "normal" strategies-drifts.

Participated in diplomatic decisions: three types of class organization differently. Early theorists expected that modern

capitalist or industrial society would be dominated by transnational classes and other interest groups, defined without reference to national boundaries. Aggressive transnational classes do sometimes exist - for example, the European warrior nobility of the Middle Ages, or the French revolutionary bourgeoisie seeking to export revolution. But over most of this period transnational classes were mainly cosmopolitan, internationalist in their expertise and interests, conciliatory, even pacific, in their diplomacy. Liberals expected this of the capitalist class, socialists of the working class. Classical Marxists and interdependence theorists emphasize such pacific transnationalism.

Then, about 1900, when the world seemed more violent, theorists began to emphasize the opposite: "nationalist" classes defined in opposition to inhabitants of other states. These were also believed to have expertise and interest in diplomacy, but this was aggressive, expansionist, and even militarist. The central theory deriving from this perspective is economic imperialism.

Transnational and nationalist diplomacy is supervised by organized actors in civil society possessing diplomatic expertise and interests. For example, the end of a major war often produces an upsurge of interest by dominant classes among the victorious Powers. Chapter 8 narrates the attempt to restore the old regime by the victorious Powers of 1815. Domhoff (1990: 107-52) and Maier (1981) have argued that a new world order was implemented by American capitalist class fractions at the end of World War II. But diplomacy will be much less expert if national classes dominate. If classes and other interest groups are largely caged by their state boundaries, they may have little interest in diplomacy. National classes are obsessed with domestic politics. They may leave diplomacy to others, increasing the "insulation" of statesmen, or they may express foreign policies that merely displace their domestic problems and so are rather shallow, unrooted in geopolitical reality, and volatile.

This volume narrates the entwined development of all three forms of class organization. But amid this, national classes emerged especially powerfully, allowing four other organized actors with stronger foreign policies more powers. One was rooted predominantly in civil society, two in the state, and one embodied an active relationship between the two.

2. *Particularistic pressure groups.* Amid the national indifference of classes and other major power actors, more particularistic parties might form around foreign policy. Economic sectors, industries, even individual corporations may have specific interests, usually in particular regions or countries. The broadest are class fractions - as in Domhoff's identification of an international fraction among modern

capitalists, located in large corporations and banks with global interests. Eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century "gentlemanly capitalism" was a comparably broad class fraction influencing British foreign policy (see Chapter 8); while three alternative German foreign policies from the 1890s (*Weltpolitik*, *Mitteleuropa*, and liberalism) partly derived from class fractions (see Chapter 21). Similarly, Weber argued that economic imperialism – what he called "booty capitalism" – was supported by capitalists with material interests in state power: "military-industrial complexes" we call them today. Noneconomic pressure groups also abound; notably ethnic, religious, or linguistic groups linked to other countries.

Pressure groups may be more decisive than in domestic policy, usually more closely supervised by classes and other broad power actors. They may also be activated rather more erratically. In recent U.S. foreign policy, for example, mining corporations have influenced policy toward Chile; blacks, toward South Africa; Jews, toward the Middle East; and so forth. But the attention span of pressure groups is narrow: Jews and blacks are uninterested in U.S. policy toward Chile, and most mining corporations have little interest in Middle East policy. Foreign policy dominated by pressure groups may be a series of short, sharp jabbing crystallizations with little overall pattern. As Durkheim remarked: "There is nothing less constant than interest."

3. *Statesmen*. Realism focuses on state actors concerned professionally with diplomacy, speaking for, even (as their title suggests) personifying, the state. Statesmen cluster round the chief executive. Monarchs had long possessed the prerogative to make foreign policy, including war. The growth of nationally caged classes allowed the prerogative to survive even into the democratic era, even though insulation was reduced by other power actors. Social pressures often came through statesmen's own identities. Almost all were drawn from the old regime class. They expressed its values, norms and rationality, and some of its transnational solidarities. Again, as with domestic policy, the particularistic alliance, rather than the wholly controlled or wholly insulated state, emerges – and again it is between chief executive and old regime. They conducted routine diplomacy, made and broke alliances or threatened war, and even occasionally went to war, without overmuch consultation with other power actors. Because they were cosmopolitan and multilingual specialists, statesmen were "experts" wielding technocratic-bureaucratic powers, possessing the broadest attention span over the whole range of foreign policy. Different foreign policies resulted when their insulation was at its peak than when it was disrupted.

But even old regime statesmen were changed by the rise of the

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were changed by the rise of the

nation-state. As Weber observed, statesmen came to represent the *nation*, as well as the state. Their own political power came to depend on their success in Great Power relations as perceived by the other power actors distinguished here (cf. Rosecrance 1986: 86–8). Weber emphasized that statesmen had become more active as imperialists, identifying their own political power with the brute power of their nation-state, aware that military victory would be their greatest triumph but also that defeat might overthrow them (Collins 1986). This, Weber argued, was equally so for monarchs, for their appointed chief ministers, and for elected leaders. This is a rather pessimistic view of the nation: Some nations generated a more liberal and pacific view of their world mission, and their statesmen could strike poses, attain prestige, and win elections as exemplars of pacific national virtues. Weber was a German nationalist; his politics should not color our entire view of national political prestige.

4. *The military.* Here I move on to the sixth row in Table 3.2, to the state monopolization of organized military power – gone were feudal levies and private armies. The military became centralized under a high command under the formal control of the chief executive. Modern techniques of insulation through salaries, pensions, and state employment upon retirement were developed for military personnel. Most eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century officer corps were heavily recruited from old regimes. (See the data in Chapter 12.) They favored a strong military posture in foreign policy, but lacked interest in routine diplomacy and were often rather sober about the reality of war, cautious about starting it and desirous of "limiting" it with rules. Nineteenth-century high commands were close to statesmen, as both were recruited overwhelmingly from old regimes. They also developed closer links to industrial capitalists as they became major customers for the products of the Second Industrial Revolution. "Military-industrial complexes" were only named by U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower; they had existed long before him. Nonetheless, militaries also generated quasi-caste insulation within the state. They possessed a technocratic self-confidence, and their skills became removed from everyday social practices and controls. They developed segmental discipline over their mass soldieries; their lower cadres became recruited from marginal social backgrounds. As the kill ratios of weapons grew, so did their potential impact on society. Nineteenth-century strategic thinking began quietly to prefer attack over defense. In deteriorating diplomatic situations, high commands advised mobilizing and striking first, as happened in late July 1914. So, although militaries were close to the executive and to old regimes and capitalism, their professionalism encouraged caste autonomy within the state, normally inconspicuous,

occasionally devastating. Military power autonomy survived the state monopoly of organized violence.

5. *Nationalist parties*.¹ In the absence of classes with strong material diplomatic interests, a more politically rooted nationalism emerged, first in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, then in the later nineteenth century. As classes and other actors attained civil and political citizenship, the state became "their" nation-state, an "imagined community" to which they developed loyalties. Its power, honor, humiliations, and even material interests came to be sensed as their own, and such feelings were mobilizable by the statesmen, pressure groups, and militaries. Nationalist parties and pressure groups pressed these feelings on statesmen. Yet aggressive nationalism in this period was never as broadly popular as is often believed. It had particular core carriers, who I identify as "statist nationalists," directly implicated in state institutions – the increasing numbers in state employment and socialized in state educational institutions. Rather milder nationalism emerged among classes enjoying citizenship and also among centralizing interest groups – the middle class and dominant religious, linguistic, ethnic, and regional communities. In the twentieth century, as the working class, women, and minorities also attained citizenship, this mild nationalism broadened.

The growth of national identities and of core carriers of statist nationalism sometimes gave diplomacy a popular, passionate, national tinge. But this lacked the precise rationality of interests pursued by classes or particularistic pressure groups and the precise, normatively rooted understandings of insulated old regime statesmen. Class, pluralist, and realist theories all suggest that foreign policy was dictated by material collective interests. But political nationalism might dictate conceptions of material collective interests, rather than vice versa. If another Power seemed to impugn "national honor," aggression or firm defense could be backed by popular, shallow, volatile, yet nonetheless, passionate nationalism. The extreme, perhaps, is where the nation is invested with a very broad crusading stance toward the world – defending Christianity or the Aryan race, carrying liberty and fraternity to the world, or fighting communism. In this period only the French Revolution generated such extreme sentiments.

These five organized actors jointly determined foreign policy over the long nineteenth century, as they mostly do today. Their interrelations were complex. And because the extent of their interest and

¹ Again, the word "parties" is used here in Weber's sense of any politically organized group. Nationalists usually pressured through lobbying groups (navy leagues, empire leagues, etc.) than by sponsoring formal political parties.

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attention span varied, there was relatively little systemic consensus or head-on collision among them. Unless substantial class fractions or moral national crusades intervened, routine foreign policy might be left to the statesmen, with others more sporadically, erratically jabbing them into and out of alliances, crises, and wars. This does not seem conducive to a very systemic foreign policy, as suggested alike by elitism-realism, Marxism, and pluralism.

I have identified diverse organized actors in domestic and foreign policy. Domestic policy institutions often differed from those in foreign policy, nor were the same institutions always found in different states - and this could create difficulties in the ability of regimes to understand each other. Realist calculations of state interests require accurate perceptions of each other, especially in changeable diplomatic crises. This was often lacking, as we see especially in Chapter 21 in the slide toward the Great War. Clearly neither state nor civil society were autonomous or cohesive entities. Despotic powers derived less from a centralized elite than from particularistic semiinsulated alliances among organized actors in states, national civil societies, and transnational civilization. State personnel can exercise autonomous power by virtue of the centrality they alone possess. Monarchs, bureaucrats, high commands, and others emerged as distributive power actors, if rarely as a singular, cohesive state elite. But institutions of central power have little distributive power unless enhanced by constituencies in civil societies channeling them fiscal and manpower resources. The singular state elite, that critical personage of true elitism, will barely figure in this volume. Far from being singular and centralized, modern states are polymorphous power networks stretching between center and territories.

Functional analysis: a polymorphous crystallization model

In chemistry a polymorph is a substance that crystallizes in two or more different forms, usually belonging to different systems. The term conveys the way states crystallize as the center - but in each case as a different center - of a number of power networks. States have multiple institutions, charged with multiple tasks, mobilizing constituencies both through their territories and geopolitically. As Rosenau (1966) observes, and Laumann and Knoke (1987) formally prove, different "issue areas" or "policy domains" mobilize different constituencies. States are thus thoroughly polymorphous. Perhaps, as Abrams has suggested, in describing any particular state, we should cease talking about "the state." But by shifting away from an institutional toward a

functional approach, maybe we can simplify multiple institutions in terms of the underlying functions undertaken by particular states. These may pervade multiple institutions and constituencies, activating states in simpler overall crystallizations.

In this period states crystallized enduringly and importantly as "capitalist," "dynastic," "party democratic," "militarist," "confederal," "Lutheran," and so forth. When later identifying the most fundamental one or more crystallizations in a state, I use the term "higher-level crystallizations." Marxism, pluralism, and realism assert that modern states have ultimately crystallized as, respectively, capitalist, party-democratic, and security-pursuing states. That is, they see patterned, hierarchical relations existing among multiple institutions. Cock-up-foul-up theory explicitly denies this, while pluralism adds that party democracy is the way there is systematic compromise between many other crystallizations. Marxism, realism, and pluralism ultimately imply a singular cohesive state making "final" decisions between crystallizations. There are two methods of adjudicating whether some crystallizations or compromises between them are ultimately decisive – two tests of "hierarchy" and "ultimacy." One method is direct, the other indirect.

The direct test might confirm that the state ultimately crystallized as *x* rather than *y*, say, as capitalist rather than proletarian. Since *x* and *y* are diametrically opposed, they collide head-on. In general we know that *x* (capitalism) triumphed over *y*, not invariably but in some "last instance" sense, systematically preventing proletarian revolution and setting limits to what proletarian parties can do. Can such a direct test be applied more generally?

Steinmetz has tried to submit rival class and ("true") elitist theories of Imperial Germany's welfare state policies to such a test. He says that to support elite theory we would have to identify

policies that directly challenge dominant class interests. . . . [S]tate-centered theory ultimately rests upon showing cases of "*non-correspondence*," meaning instances when state officials and policy-makers directly contravene the interests of the class that is economically dominant. [1990: 244]

Steinmetz argues that elite theory fails this test in Imperial Germany because there was not "noncorrespondence." Welfare policies were actually agreeable to many capitalists and were permeated by principles of capitalist rationality. There was actually "correspondence" between capitalism and welfare. In Chapter 14, I mostly agree with Steinmetz's empirical conclusions. Yet I disagree with his methodology of resolving the "ultimate" nature of the state. The problem is whether we can apply his test of noncorrespondence, head-on challenge, and ensuing victory-defeat-dialectical synthesis to the entire state. This implies a

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social system placing holistic limits on its state. The Marxian class model does envisage this as it sees class struggle as a dialectical totality, systematically structuring the whole society and state. *Provided* theo- retical disputes remain within these dialectical terms, we can adjudicate them.

Head-on class conflict can be stated in dialectical terms. States can- not be feudal and capitalist or capitalist and socialist or monarchical and party democratic. They must be one or the other or some systemic compromise between them. In this period they became and remained predominantly capitalist, rather than feudal or socialist. We can also specify the conditions under which systemic conflict might breach the "limits" normally exercised by capitalism on such states. Rueschemeyer and Evans (1985: 64) list these as (in ascending order of the threat to capital) where the capitalist class is divided; where threat from below induces the capitalist class to hand over power to the political regime (and the regime acts autonomously to compromise class conflict); and where subordinate classes acquire the power in civil society to capture the state themselves. Capital-labor struggle has been systemic in modern countries. They can function efficiently only if they produce, and efficient production presupposes solving class struggle. States require the struggle between capital and labor to be resolved, one way or another. Capital and labor have persistently struggled for over a century over the whole terrain of the state. We can analyze their re- peated head-on (x versus y) collisions and "noncorrespondences," see who wins, and come to a systematic conclusion of one kind or another.

How far can this Marxian model of conflict be applied across the board to all politics? The problem is that, considered in itself, every crystallization of function is systemic and limiting, in the sense that it must be stably institutionalized. Just as states must be capitalist, socialist, or some relatively stable compromise between these, so they must be secular, Catholic, Protestant, Islamic, and so forth, or some institutionalized compromise. They must stably divide political authority between national center and localities-regions; they must institutionalize relations between men and women; they must achieve efficiency of justice, administration, military defense, and diplomatic security. Each of these crystallizations is intrinsically systemic and contains head- on challenges and noncorrespondences that contemporary Western countries have managed to institutionalize broadly.

But relations *between* functional crystallizations are not systemic. Class and religious crystallizations, for example, differ and sometimes they conflict. But their conflict is rarely systemic, their collisions rarely constitute a head-on dialectic. States do not usually make "ultimate" choices among them. Italy today, for example, remains party demo-

cratic, capitalist, *and* Catholic, just as it remains patriarchal along with various other crystallizations. Steinmetz may find capitalistic rationality embodied in welfare policies. This is highly likely because these were economic policies substantially aimed at reducing class conflict (though he does not consider whether they were also patriarchal, as they were).

Nor is it surprising that over that war-horse of modern state theory, disputes over American New Deal welfare or agricultural policies, most writers have emphasized class crystallizations. These policies are primarily economic, mostly framed with classes or economic sectors in mind. Nonetheless, U.S. welfare policies have been also (if rarely explicitly) patriarchal and often they have been racist. How do these three crystallizations over welfare policy relate to one another? Some of the best American sociology and political science have wrestled with these entwinings of class, gender, and race and have not emerged with a consensual ultimate conclusion. Steinmetz may also not find correspondences or noncorrespondences in Imperial Germany among policy areas – among, say, class interests, the Kulturkampf, and Bismarckian diplomacy. These were different, not in head-on collision, yet entwined. We might say the same of American class, federal, and diplomatic policy areas.

Even without head-on confrontation, though, states might still allocate priorities, ranking crystallizations in ultimate importance. Four state mechanisms allocate priorities:

1. *Legal codes and constitutions* specify rights and duties. The civil and criminal law are precise about what they proscribe and what broad civil and political rights they allow. But they do not indicate exactly how power will be allocated. Constitutions are supposed to locate where sovereignty lies, but they do not indicate how its priorities are to be set. And, as Anderson and Anderson (1967: 26–82) demonstrate, eighteenth- and nineteenth-century constitutions were actually vague because they embodied an unfinished struggle against executive powers.

2. *Budgets* allocate fiscal priorities. All state activities cost money, so budgets may reveal where ultimate power and limits lie. A choice between a regressive or progressive tax or between spending on “guns or butter” may evoke head-on conflict and reveal the systemic distribution of power. This is the working assumption of my analyses of state finances. But finances also have their own particularities. The cost of functions cannot be equated simply with their importance. Diplomacy needs little money but may be devastating in its consequences. In any case, through most of this period states did not have unified budgets, or if they did, some items were constitutionally entrenched, not available for reallocation.

3. *Party-democratic majorities* might indicate the hierarchical dis-

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tribution of power, as pluralists assert. The policies of majority parties may indicate ultimate priorities. But party intrigue normally avoids head-on confrontation and ultimate decision making. Governing parties slide by issues of principle by making ad hoc compromises and logrolling. Regimes rarely choose between guns and butter; they seek both, in combinations varying according to complex changing political crystallizations. Moreover, majorities were only an imperfect indicator over this period. No major state enfranchised women; several did not enfranchise whole categories of men. Did the excluded have no political power at all? In several countries access to the monarch was also as important as a parliamentary majority. The state had many mansions. Parliaments did not routinely control diplomacy or military practices; classes and other interest groups lobbied court, army, and administrations as well as parliament. Parliaments were not actually, sometimes not even constitutionally, sovereign.

4. *Monocratic bureaucracy* might rationally allocate priorities within state administration. Though Weber exaggerated the autonomy of bureaucrats, they are arranged rationally by hierarchy and function, with priorities set authoritatively by the chief executive. Throughout this period, substantial state bureaucratization occurred. But as Chapter 13 shows, it remained incomplete, especially near the top of state administrations. Authoritarian monarchies divided and ruled to prevent cohesive bureaucracy; parliamentary regimes were careful to staff the highest administrative levels with political loyalists. Administrations were not fully insulated; they embodied the principal crystallizations of the rest of the state.

Of course, some states were more coherent than others. Such states can be distinguished according to how clearly they locate ultimate decision making – their *sovereignty*. We shall see that eighteenth-century Britain and Prussia located sovereignty more clearly in determinant sets of relations (concerning monarchs and parliament or higher officials) than did France or Austria, and that by 1914, party democracies did this more clearly than authoritarian monarchies. In these comparisons the latter sets of cases embodied more cock-up-foul-up than did the former. Overall, however, although the modern state was attempting to increase its allocative coherence in all four mechanisms just discussed, this was actually in response to assuming more diverse functional crystallizations (as Chapter 14 argues). Thus it was (and still is) incomplete. I argue that overall state coherence was probably decreasing throughout the period, so priorities could not usually be allocated systematically.

No single universal measure of political power exists comparable to money for economic power or concentrated physical force for military

power. There is no final measure of ultimate state power. For diverse crystallizations to result in a singular systemic state would require not only extraordinary organizing abilities by state officials but also extraordinary political interest by civil society actors. Why should the capitalist class, or the working class, or the Catholic church care about routine diplomacy? Why should nationalist parties or the military care about factory safety legislation? States do not routinely allocate fundamental priorities among such functions as class regulation, government centralization, or diplomacy. Powerful political actors pursue most of the multiple functions of states pragmatically, according to particular traditions and present pressures, reacting pragmatically and hastily to crises concerning them all.

Thus political crystallizations rarely confront each other dialectically, head-on. We cannot routinely apply the direct test of "who wins." States rarely embody *x rather than y*. The states I focus on were capitalist, but they were also patriarchal; they were Great Powers, and all but Austria became nation-states (and they might be Catholic, federal, relatively militaristic, and so forth). The logic of capitalism requires no particular gender, Great Power, or national logic – and vice versa. These *xs* and *ys* did not clash head-on. They slid through and around each other, the solutions to crises over each having consequences, some unintended, for the other. Even crystallizations that in principle were in head-on opposition often were not in practice perceived as such, since they came entwined with other crystallizations. I find Rueschemeyer and Evans's three conditions (noted earlier) by which labor might triumph over capital to be too restrictive. I find that wherever two of Marx's opposed classes collided head-on, the dominant class – possessing all the major sources of social power (especially the state and the military) – triumphed. Where subordinate classes had more chance is where their threat came entwined with other threats, from other classes but more importantly from religious or military factions, political decentralizers, or foreign Powers. In such circumstances political regimes and dominant classes could lose their power of concentration on the potential class enemy and be overwhelmed by their interstitial emergence. This happened in the French Revolution (see Chapter 6) and did not happen in Chartism (see Chapter 15).

Of course, different crystallizations might dominate different state institutions. That might be ordered by a perfectly bureaucratic state with a rationalized division of labor. But this did not exist in the nineteenth century and does not exist now. As often, the left hand of the state has not known what the right hand is doing. American insulated diplomats (jabbed intermittently by pressure groups) took

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care of relations with Iraq, until suddenly, in August 1990, the consequences of their (plus foreigners') actions compelled the president's entire attention. In recent years, NATO nuclear submarine commanders have carried sealed orders to be opened if their communications with headquarters were broken. It is believed these orders read: "Launch your missiles at the enemy targets designated here." In this case, the small finger on the right (military) hand of states can act autonomously to terminate the state, capitalism, and perhaps the world. The state is unaware of what its members are doing.

The direct test failing, can we apply the second, indirect test? State crystallizations may not often collide dialectically head-on, but are the effects of one or more crystallizations so devastating for the rest that they limit and pattern the whole, perhaps through their powerful unanticipated consequences? Was there at least one "higher-level crystallization"?

Higher-level state crystallizations

This volume gives suitably nuanced answers to the questions just asked. Different states crystallized differently. Yet I guardedly reply yes: Over this period I identify six higher-level crystallizations of Western states. The first five were as capitalist, ideological-moral, militarist, and at variable positions on a representative continuum (from autocratic monarchy to party democracy) and on a "national" continuum from centralized nation-state to confederal regime. I identify varied ideological-moral crystallizations, some religious (e.g., Catholic, Lutheran), others more mixed religious-secular. But they somewhat declined in significance over this period, as religions and ideologies became more (though never entirely) reducible to representative and national issues. The ideological-moral crystallization emerged most strongly when entwined with the sixth higher-level crystallization, which, unfortunately, I touch on only lightly in this volume: the state as patriarchal, which we shall find significant in linking the mobilization of intensive to extensive power relations. At the extensive level I generally emphasize four higher-level crystallizations: capitalist, militarist, representative, and national.

Each of these four crystallizations produced its own head-on dialectical conflict, which in combination constituted the essential politics of the period. True, some states were also Catholic, others Protestant, others secular, naval or land Powers, monolingual or multilingual, with varying old regime or bureaucratic colorings – all generating distinctive crystallizations. But through this diversity I discern four broad tracks: toward the maturation of capitalist economic relations, toward greater

representation, toward intensifying national centralization, and toward professionalizing and bureaucratizing state militarism. Modern Western states might vary their religions, their languages, and so forth, but a common capitalist and (with more room for variance) a more representative national and militarist character seems to have been forced on them by the general development of the sources of social power. If they did not modernize all four, they did not survive.

That states became capitalist is too obvious to belabor. Throughout this period, Western states consistently privileged private property rights and capital accumulation. European states had not traditionally possessed many powers over the property of their subjects. By the time capitalist property and market forms were thoroughly institutionalized (by 1760 in Britain, by 1860 almost everywhere in the West) almost all political actors had internalized their logic. Countries became more similar on this crystallization, as they all commercialized and industrialized. I shall introduce adjectival qualifications of capitalism – liberal capitalism, industrial capitalism, and so forth. National (and regional) economies also differed. Britain was the only truly industrial society of the period; Germany and Austria were distinctively late developers. Such variations among capitalist crystallizations will matter, although we shall see that they usually mattered less than the many economic theories of modern social science have argued. Marx and Engels wrote in the *Communist Manifesto*: “The executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie” (1968: 37). Except for the “but” this is correct. Western states were and are capitalist, a crystallization relatively unthreatened by head-on oppositional challenges. In this period, we shall find little head-on conflict from feudal movements. In fact, feudalism tended to transform itself into capitalism with far less conflict than Marx seems to have believed. We find more socialist opposition to capitalism, though before 1914 this was not life-threatening for capitalism. The capitalist crystallization draws our attention toward class conflict, but also toward capitalist hegemony in this period.

Western states were and are not *only* capitalist, though. Pluralists seek to add many crystallizations. To classes they add segmental power actors, some economic, some non-economic: urban versus rural, inter-regional conflicts, Catholic versus Protestant versus secular, linguistic and ethnic conflicts, politicized gender conflicts – all forming parties, sometimes reinforcing, sometimes cross-cutting classes. There were also more particularistic pressure groups. An industry, corporation, occupation, sect, even an intellectual salon may dominate a party holding the political balance, or enjoy good communication channels to decision making – especially in foreign policy. Each state, even each

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regional and local government, may be unique. But are these pluralist
additions adding mere detail, or do they change the parameters of
political power? Religious communities, regional parties, even salons
may make a difference, but were these essentially capitalist states?

Precise answers will differ according to time and place. In this period
in the West, power networks also crystallized around other higher-
level issues. Two concerned citizenship: *Who* should enjoy it, and
where should it be located, I term these the "representative" issue and
the "national" issue.

Representation turned on Dahl's two democratic preconditions, con-
testation and participation. Contestation began as a struggle against
monarchical despotism, generating "in" and "out," "court" and
"country" parties. Contestation emerged fully when alternative parties
could form a sovereign government upon winning a free and fair
election – first guaranteed in the U.S. Constitution and effectively
established in Britain over the following decades. Participation con-
cerned which classes and which ethnic, religious, and linguistic com-
munities should be enfranchised and entitled to public office and (later)
to state educational credentials. At the very end of the period, it also
came to concern the issue of woman suffrage.

Some regimes yielded more on contestation, others on participation.
Over the long nineteenth century contestation was a far more sig-
nificant concession. A regime in which an opposition party could
become the sovereign government involved a degree of openness
denied to a universal male suffrage regime whose parties could not
claim sovereignty. This was recognized by authoritarian monarchs
themselves, far more willing to concede universal male suffrage than
parliamentary sovereignty since it still allowed them significant despotic
powers (this has been even more true of twentieth-century dictatorial
regimes). Thus, though Britain had a more restricted franchise than
Prussia-Germany in the second half of the period, I shall term Britain
as a party democracy but not Prussia-Germany. Parliament was sov-
ereign, the Reichstag was not. We shall see a fundamental difference
between their politics: British politics concerned parties, German
politics concerned parties *and* monarchy.

Representation can thus be arranged in this period along a continuum
running from despotic monarchy to full party democracy, along which
my countries unevenly moved.² First Britain, then the United States

² Over this period it is a single dimension because all these countries emerged
from one toward the other. Things get more complex in the twentieth century,
when most despotic regimes have been not monarchies but party dictatorships
or military regimes, each with distinctive "nondemocratic" properties differing
from those of monarchies.

led the way, while France zigzagged behind. By 1880, all three "liberal" countries (except for the American South) had improved the freeness and fairness of their elections and had attained sovereign legislatures (although they differed as to who should enjoy suffrage). Because they clustered on the representative continuum, I often contrast them to the two enduring monarchies, Austria and Prussia-Germany, which had not conceded parliamentary sovereignty and where the monarchs formed their own ministries. However, we can distinguish degrees of despotism within the period: The Russian "autocracy" possessed more power and more autonomy than Austrian "dynasticism," which possessed more autonomy (not more "power over") than German "semiauthoritarian" monarchy. Yet in all countries conflicts between advocates and opponents of more party democracy dominated much of the politics of the period.

But much domestic controversy also turned on *where* to participate. How centralized, uniform, and "national" should the state be? Centralization versus confederalism produced civil war in the United States and wars across Germany, Italy, and Habsburg lands. It persistently structured mundane politics. Confederalism remained important in the United States throughout. German party politics seemed complex: Some parties were class-based, others were explicitly religious (most notably the Catholic Center); others were implicitly religious (Protestant parties like the Conservatives, the National Liberals, and the ostensibly secular Socialists); others were ethnic (Danes, Poles, Alsations); and still others, regional (the Bavarian Peasant People's party, Hanoverian Guelphs). Yet much of this swirled around the "national" issue. Catholics, South Germans, and ethnic parties were decentralizers, opposed to North German Protestant centralizers.

The nineteenth-century House of Commons spent more time discussing religion than political economy or class. Though religion did matter, it also expressed the issue of how uniform, centralized, and national Britain should be. Should the Anglican church be "established" also in Wales, Scotland, and Ireland? Should education and social welfare be uniform, state-guided, and religious or secular? Across all states most active Catholics opposed state centralization. The church retained transnational while strengthening local-regional organization.

All states were riven by struggles over centralized versus local-regional powers. This was because there had been two historic ways to fight despotism: by centralizing democratic representation or by reducing all central state powers and boosting plural local-regional party democracy. The massive nineteenth-century growth of state infrastructural powers made this especially troublesome. Where to locate them? Religious, ethnic, linguistic, and regional minorities, for example,

Table 3.3. *The national question: central versus local infrastructural power*

| | Central government | | |
|------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------------------|--|
| | Infrastructural power | Low | High |
| Local government | Low High | (Premodern state) Confederal state | Federal nation-state Centralized nation-state |

consistently favored "antinational" decentralization. Yet these vital issues concerning the relations between central and local government have been ignored by almost all theories of the state (though not by Rokkan 1970: 72-144). Class and pluralist theorists use the same model for analyzing local as central government; elite theorists and Weber barely mention local government. Yet politics in the modern state fundamentally concerned the distribution of power between levels of government. Table 3.3 lists the principal options.

All eighteenth- and nineteenth-century states expanded their infrastructures and so the upper left box is empty. Most expansion might be of local-regional government, developing a confederal state, as in the nineteenth-century United States when most political functions were undertaken by state and local governments rather than in Washington. Or expansion might be predominantly of the centralized nation-state, as in France since the Revolution. Or it might occur fairly evenly at both levels, to produce a federal nation-state, as in Imperial Germany or in the United States in the later twentieth century. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the enemy of representative movements in Austria-Hungary (and at first in the United States) was believed to be centralization; yet in France democracy *was* centralization. In these debates class and nation became entwined, each having unintended consequences for the other, influencing the way in which each crystallized. Classes and nations were not "pure," but formed by their mutual entwinings.

In foreign policy the national issue focused on how nationalist, how territorial, how much dominated by aggressive *Geopolitik* diplomacy should be. It raised the six forms of international political economy identified in Chapter 2 and connected to the fourth higher-level state crystallization, *militarism*. At the beginning of the period, states spent at least three-quarters of their revenues on their military; by the end,

this had declined, but only to about 40 percent. Thus militarism still pervaded states, fiscal politics, and the dual representative-national crystallizations over citizenship.

Militarism also related to domestic representative and national crystallizations, as repression was an obvious way to deal with them. Different countries had different mixes of foreign and domestic repression and so it is not possible to rank them on a single militarist continuum (as I did with representation). The United States was least involved and least threatened by military geopolitics, yet was committing domestic genocide throughout the period against native Americans, while slavery required considerable local repression and there was a pervasive violence across American life. Thus American geopolitical militarism was low, while its domestic militarism was probably the highest – certainly the most violent – of my five countries. Other paradoxes are that the greatest Power of the age, Great Britain, was the most pacific domestically, and that for Austria domestic and geopolitical militarism merged as the regime became threatened by cross-border nationalism. Militarist crystallizations were dual and then complex.

Militarism mobilized not only the military. In the first half of the period military old regimes (allied particularistically to monarchy) helped give a relatively territorial definition to capitalists' conceptions of interest and to the foreign policy of emerging nation-states. At the beginning of the twentieth century these were reinforced by nationalist parties advocating geopolitical militarism and some capitalist classes advocating domestic militarism. All militarists were challenged by more pacific liberals and socialists, rarely straightforwardly pacifist, more often seeking limits to repression, military budgets, conscription, and wars. It was difficult to ban militaries in the West, because they had brought so much profit to the Powers, but they could perhaps be relegated to last-resort instruments of policy. That was the hope of most liberals and diplomats alike, though 1914 proved them wrong.

It would be nice to develop a general theory of the "ultimate" relations among these four higher-level state crystallizations. There are, however, four obstacles. First is the problem of the number of cases. I have identified four major crystallizations. Even if each were only a dichotomy, they would yield sixteen possible combinations. Capitalism, it is true, varied relatively little, but militarism contained two separable dimensions (geopolitical and domestic), while representation and the national issue crystallized in multiple forms. The possible combinations of variables are numerous. Thus, once again, macro-sociology pushes beyond the limits of the comparative method. There

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a general theory of the "ultimate" level state crystallizations. There is the problem of the number of crystallizations. Even if each were field sixteen possible combinations. Even a little, but militarism contained tactical and domestic), while represented in multiple forms. The possible numerous. Thus, once again, macroscopic of the comparative method. There

are just not enough states to test the impact of each crystallization while holding the others constant.

Second, these states were not fully autonomous, analogous cases. All four sources of power – a transnational economy, a Western civilization, a military community, and diplomacy – spread rapidly among them. A single shattering event, like the French Revolution, or the rise of a single state, like the Prussian-German state, might have massive consequences for all states. Theorizing the particular has obvious limits.

Third, all four crystallizations entwined to produce emergent, unanticipated consequences that then affected each others' development – "interaction effects" producing yet more "variables." Nation-states developed and changed as they internalized partial and contested capitalist, representative, and militarist rationalities. Capitalist classes changed as they internalized partial and contested representative, national, and aggressive territorial conceptions of interest. Militaries changed as they defended property, enfranchised classes, and the nation. The capitalist state, party democracy, the nation-state, and the military caste do not appear in this volume in "pure" form. Nineteenth-century states were constituted nondialectically by entwined contests over all four.

Fourth, the impurity of classes, representation, nation-states, and military-civilian relations increased as they participated in both domestic and foreign policy. Foreign policy remained more insulated and particularistic – more dominated by old regime statesmen, military castes, volatile nationalist parties, and pressure groups; domestic policy was dominated more by capitalism, representation, and national centralization. Domestic and foreign policy struggles rarely met head-on but in overlapping, entwining crystallizations in which all affected one another's development in unintended ways. My culminating example of this will be the causes of World War I, in which outcomes escaped the control of any single actor – of "elites" like absolute monarchs or bureaucracies, of classes, of parliaments, of high commands, of plural interest groups. The modern state has emerged in forms intended by no one and has in turn transformed all their identities and interests.

These four obstacles push me toward an intensive rather than an extensive methodology, based on relatively detailed knowledge of five countries rather than on the more superficial knowledge involved in covering many countries and variables. Even on only five cases (sometimes supplemented by hasty coverage of a few others) I can refute single-factor theories and make broad suggestions about general patterns. But this is also a history of a particular time and place, and one with a singular culmination: World War I.

Conclusion

I have borrowed from all the principal state theories to generate my own partly institutional, partly functional polymorphous theory. I accept class theory's insistence that modern states are capitalist and that politics are often dominated by class struggles. One higher-level crystallization of the modern state is indeed capitalist. But I reject any notion that the capitalist, or other class, crystallization, is in some sense "ultimately determining." I accept pluralism's identification of multiple power actors, multiple state functions, and a (partial) development toward democracy. This led toward a second higher-level crystallization as representative, in which monarchy fought a rearguard action against party democracy (entwined with the class struggles of the first crystallization). Pluralism is also comfortable with the third crystallization over the national issue. Yet I reject pluralism's conception of democracy as ultimately decisive; more forms of power than voting and shared norms help decide outcomes. With true elitists I accept that central state personnel may constitute autonomous power actors. However, I identified two rather different state actors in this period. Monarchies hung on in some countries, resisting party democracy and generating distinct representative crystallizations. Also, geopolitics and domestic repression, though usually in particularistic alliances with civil society actors, generated the fourth higher-level crystallization, as militarist. Yet the first power is, on its own, usually puny, whereas the latter is more erratic. It is the combinations of all these higher-level crystallizations (plus inputs from moral-ideological and patriarchal crystallizations) that provide such "ultimate" patterning of modern states as we can find.

Like cock-up-foul-up theorists, however, I believe that states are messier and less systemic and unitary than each single theory suggests. I thus borrowed from another type of statist theory and from Max Weber to develop what I labeled "institutional statism." To understand states and appreciate their causal impact on societies, we must specify their institutional particularities. Because the modern state has massively enlarged its institutional infrastructures, it has come to play a much greater structuring role in society, enhancing the power of all crystallizations. My history of Western society will focus increasingly on the entwined, nonsystemic development of capitalist, representative, national, and militarist state crystallizations.

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principal state theories to generate my functional polymorphous theory. I think that modern states are capitalist and shaped by class struggles. One higher-level theory is indeed capitalist. But I reject any other class, crystallization, is in some way. I accept pluralism's identification of state functions, and a (partial) development toward a second higher-level theory in which monarchy fought a rearguard action entwined with the class struggles of the modern era. I am also comfortable with the third issue. Yet I reject pluralism's conception of power; more forms of power than pluralism can decide outcomes. With true elitists I think that elites may constitute autonomous power. I think that rather different state actors in this world exist in these countries, resisting party democracy and representative crystallizations. Also, I think that, though usually in particularistic ways, pluralism generated the fourth higher-level theory. I think that the first power is, on its own, usually erratic. It is the combinations of all these theories plus inputs from moral-ideological theories that provide such "ultimate" patterned outcomes. However, I believe that states are shaped more by each single theory suggests. I think that the theory of statist theory and from Max Weber is "institutional statism." To understand the causal impact on societies, we must understand the ties. Because the modern state has shaped the infrastructures, it has come to play a central role in society, enhancing the power of all actors. I think that modern society will focus increasingly on the development of capitalist, representative crystallizations.

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20 Theoretical conclusions: Classes, states, nations, and the sources of social power

This volume has two concluding chapters. This, the first one, begins where Chapter 7 left off, generalizing about the rise of the two major actors of modern times - classes and nation-states - then about the four sources of social power during the period. Because the five countries covered (Austria, Britain, France, Prussia-Germany, and the United States) all differed, I must strike a balance between generalization and acknowledgment of uniqueness. But because history passed its own conclusion on the long nineteenth century, in the form of World War I, the final chapter will analyze the causes of that war, exemplifying and justifying the theory underlying this volume.

As we have seen, states were entwined with both classes and nations. I shall not once again summarize my research on states; rather, I refer the reader to the conclusion of Chapter 14. Here I repeat only the essential point: As the state became more socially significant through late eighteenth-century military and late nineteenth-century industrial capitalist expansion, it partially "naturalized" the West and its classes.

Classes and states

By the time of World War I, the entire West was becoming industrial. Britain and Belgium already were so, most countries were evenly balanced between industry and agriculture, and agriculture was also thoroughly commercialized. Capitalism had enormously accelerated human collective powers, predominantly diffusely, right across this multi-power-actor civilization. Its second industrial spurt, from the 1880s on, enhanced the material conditions of all classes and both sexes, enabling the conquest of bare subsistence and the near doubling of the human life span. Though unequally distributed, the benefits were spread so broadly that most power actors agreed that authoritative power institutions should support capitalist expansion. The scope of state civilian infrastructures now broadened. Capitalism and state bureaucratization developed similarly across the West.

Capitalism also transformed all countries' distributive power relations, generating extensive and political classes on a scale unparalleled in history. There emerged first a bourgeoisie and a petite bourgeoisie,

then a middle class, a working class, and a peasant class – all non-dominant classes with enlarged authoritative powers of collective organization. All these classes believed (despite the benefits) that they were exploited by dominant classes and political regimes, and all mounted collective protest seeking alternatives. This was evident to Marx and to most subsequent observers. More important, it was also evident to dominant classes and ruling regimes. Yet the outcomes of distributive conflict were not what Marx expected, for four reasons:

1. Because capitalism was predominantly a diffused power organization, its authoritative class organization emerged as essentially ambivalent. Bourgeoisies, petite bourgeoisies, and middle classes were economically heterogeneous. Without intervention from the other sources of social power, their conflicts with dominant classes and regimes turned out partial, mild, and particularistic. Over the first half of the period many compromised and even merged without much drama. Agrarian classes, especially the peasantry, developed as heterogeneous, generating three competing collective organizations: as "production classes," as "credit classes," and as an economic sector (in a segmental alliance with large estate farmers, their usual opponents on the other two dimensions). The proletariat also generated three collective organizational tendencies: class, sectionalism, and segmentalism. Thus the economic development of capitalism produced multiple collective organizations, among which classes, though inherently developing the dialectical conflict Marx expected, by no means dominated.

2. The outcomes of competition among these competing economic organizations were determined predominantly by the strategies or drifts of more authoritatively organized dominant classes and ruling regimes, which, after all, controlled existing authoritative states and armed forces. Providing they were concentrating hard on the emerging class confrontation (and that was not always so, as we shall see), most worked out an effective counterstrategy. This was not unusual. I have argued throughout that where class conflict is relatively transparent – that is, where it has the capacity to generate head-on class confrontation of the type Marx expected to result in revolution – then that is where ruling classes and regimes can most effectively use their greater institutionalized power to repress and to divide their opponent. Revolutions, I argued, occur where ruling classes and regimes become confused by the emergence of multiple, nondialectical but entwined conflicts. In this case the most effective regime strategy against transparent capital-labor conflict was to make concessions to some workers and peasants through sectionalism and segmentalism while repressing the rest. By this means they could undercut the class unity required for revolution or aggressive reform. The very emergence, simultaneously,

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ass, and a peasant class – all non-authoritative powers of collective force (despite the benefits) that they posed to dominant classes and political regimes, and all viable alternatives. This was evident to all observers. More important, it was also true of all ruling regimes. Yet the outcomes of the struggles Marx expected, for four reasons: (1) a diffused power organization emerged as essentially anti-segmental, and middle classes were without intervention from the other classes; (2) conflicts with dominant classes and regimes were particularistic. Over the first half of the nineteenth century, even merged without much drama; (3) the working class, developed as heterogeneous, and (4) collective organizations: as “production organizations” in an economic sector (in a segmental way) and their usual opponents on the other side of the divide also generated three collective organizations: sectionalism, and segmentalism. Thus the working class produced multiple collective organizations, though inherently developing the tendency to be no means dominated.

Among these competing economic organizations, dominated by the strategies or drifts of dominant classes and ruling regimes, and by authoritative states and armed forces, struggling hard on the emerging class divide (and always so, as we shall see), most striking was the working class strategy. This was not unusual. I have argued that conflict is relatively transparent – it does not generate head-on class confrontation – then that the working class can most effectively use their power to press and to divide their opponent. In the nineteenth century, ruling classes and regimes become multiple, nondialectical but entwined organizations, and a regime strategy against transnationalism, make concessions to some workers and segmentalism while repressing others. This undercut the class unity required for the very emergence, simultaneously,

of three forms of worker organization undercut class because it required hegemony over workers, whereas the other two did not.

3. In turn, the strategies or drifts of dominant classes and regimes, and so therefore of workers themselves, were predominantly determined by the other three sources of social power. I refer the reader to Chapter 7 for my summary of the outcomes of economic struggles up to the 1830s or 1840s. There I stress diffuse ideological but especially authoritative military and then political power sources. Chapters 17–19 give a more political explanation of later worker and peasant movements. Thus, about 1900, outcomes of capital-labor conflict throughout the West were determined by (1) an essentially similar global diffusion of capitalism generating a common ambiguity of collective organizations and interests, interacting with (2) various crystallizations of authoritative states – ideological, patriarchal, military, but especially their two citizen crystallizations, on “representative” and “national” issues.

4. These interactions were not like billiard-ball collisions of separate objects. Classes, segments, and sections all “entwined nondialectically” with authoritative political crystallizations, thus helping to shape one another. Actors’ very identities and interests were changed behind their backs by the unintended consequences of action. In such an uncertain environment, actors were prone to make “systemic mistakes.” Chapter 6 shows how the French regime of 1789 made disastrous mistakes because it did not appreciate the emerging, developing nature of its opponent. Chapter 15 illustrates the inverse. Rather unusually, dominant classes controlling a state were faced “dialectically” by a single, fairly homogeneous class opponent, Chartism. Confronting the enemy squarely, they made no mistakes, firmly repressing its militants and forcing workers with greater market powers toward sectionalism. The last chapters have revealed more persistent world-historical mistakes made by excessively productivist and statist labor movements, under the influence of Marxism or Lutheranism, peculiarly unable to appreciate the distinctive complexities of agrarian struggles and thus converting potential peasant allies into enemies.

These four determinants were not merely external to one another. They were entwined, shaping one another’s form. The relevance of regime strategies-drifts, of representative and national citizen struggles, of unintended consequences, and of mistakes derived from the way they strengthened class, sectional, or segmental identities according to context. Class, sectionalism, and segmentalism continued to battle over the souls of workers and peasants. In terms of their relations to the means of production, battle was joined in both industry and agriculture on deeply ambivalent terms, without decisive outcomes in

this period. Of course, persistent sectionalism and segmentalism did undercut and undermine the broad unity required by class action. In a capitalist world without states this may have permanently weakened labor in relation to capital, and almost certainly it would have prevented revolutionary, even aggressively reformist, outcomes. Yet capitalism inhabited a world of states. In this period, ambivalent tendencies toward class, sectional, and segmental organization were mostly boosted or reversed, often unintentionally, by authoritative representative and national political crystallizations, especially as they impacted on labor-peasant alliances. Classes were not purely economic; nor were states purely political.

Capitalism and industrialism have both been overrated. Their diffused powers exceeded their authoritative powers, for which they relied more on, and were shaped by, military and political power organizations. Though both capitalism and industrialism vastly increased collective powers, distributive powers – social stratification – were less altered. Modern class relations were galvanized by the first and second industrial revolutions and by the global commercialization of agriculture, but they were propelled forward along inherently ambivalent tracks in which varying outcomes were determined by authoritative political crystallizations that had been mostly institutionalized rather earlier.

Why were states already so diverse? Charles Tilly reminds us that European states had originated in the medieval period in many forms – territorial monarchies, loose networks of prince-lord-vassal personal relations, conquest states, city-states, ecclesiastical city-states, leagues of cities, communes, and so forth. Although Tilly charts a decline in state types throughout the early modern period, as territorial states stabilized and came to dominate, much variety remained. The fragmenting of Christendom added religious variety. States varied especially in relations between the capital and the regions. In 1760, Anglican Britain was moderately homogeneous and centralized, absorbing Scottish, Welsh, and Nonconformist regionalism, but with an adjacent imperial colony, Catholic Ireland. Catholic France had a highly centralized monarchy, but with highly particularistic relations with its regions (which also fell into two distinct constitutional types). Lutheran Prussia was a fairly compact state closely integrating monarchy and the nobility of the dominant region. Catholic Austria was a confederal monarchy containing regional religious minorities and languages. America was a series of separate, expanding colonies. All states differed, grossly. States are territorial and territories are laid out in very particular fashion.

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inished by industrial ones. Today, in advanced (or post-) industrial
 society, the economic activities in Britain, France, and Germany are
 remarkably similar because modern economies transform most of the
 products of nature many times. But agrarian economies depend on
 ecology – on the soil, vegetation, climate, and water – and these vary
 by locality. The ecology of agrarian Europe was unusually varied, in
 economists' jargon offering a "dispersed portfolio of resources." But
 as capitalism developed, "national" economies became more similar
 (as Chapter 14 notes).

Capitalism is an unusually diffused form of power organization,
 whereas states are essentially authoritative. Especially in its industrial
 stage, increasingly liberated from the particularities of territory, capi-
 talism spread right through the West in rather similar forms. Its dif-
 fused power also allows fairly "free" choice of alternative strategies,
 more unfinished competition, for collective as well as individual actors.
 Workers and employers, peasants and large estate farmers may make
 varied local arrangements that permit class, sectional, and segmental
 strategies to continue and compete. Yet states, by their very nature
 as a distinct source of social power, authoritatively allocate and in-
 stitutionalize. Although parties and state elites may argue and reduce
 state coherence, laws regarding civil rights, suffrage, state centrali-
 zation, conscription, tariffs, unions, and so forth, must be laid down
 authoritatively.

The modern state had first institutionalized the many territorial
 particularities of Europe. Then states greatly expanded as they faced
 two waves of common regulatory problems, emanating from the in-
 creased militarism of the eighteenth century and the capitalist devel-
 opment lasting through 1914. In this period, states became large,
 socially relevant, and distinctively "modern." The ways this happened
 now had an immense impact on social development. Yet, in their
 expanded roles, they first coped with the particular institutions devel-
 oped amid the more "territorial" era. In the first phase of expansion,
 militarism interacted with these to result in distinctive "modernized"
 institutions in each state: America institutionalized its unique con-
 stitution; France institutionalized conflict over its constitution; Britain
 institutionalized old regime liberalism; Prussia, semiauthoritarianism;
 and Austria (less successfully) attempted to give its dynasticism
 more infrastructurally penetrative powers. Modern states – induced by
 eighteenth-century militarism and nineteenth-century industrial
 capitalism – now enormously increased their social significance. Thus
 the structuring power of their existing authoritative institutions, forged
 in interaction between an earlier age and the militarist phase, also
 grew. After about the 1830s, most countries' political institutions had a

solidity absorbing almost all that industrial society could throw at them.

A second dialectic beside Marx's class dialectic was occurring, between what I label "interstitial emergence" and "institutionalization." Because societies are constituted by multiple, overlapping networks of interaction, they perennially produce emergent collective actors whose relations with older actors are not yet institutionalized but then become so. Classes and nations were emergent actors par excellence. They took dominant classes and regimes by surprise, and no existing institutions were directly designed to cope with them. Instead, dominant classes and regimes made do with the institutions designed for older, more territorially particular purposes. States did not grow primarily to cope with emerging classes and nations (but to fight costlier wars and then to assist industrialization), but their enlarged institutions bore much of the brunt of social control. Thus they increasingly determined class and national outcomes.

I give an example of this from Chapters 17 and 18: the diverging development of the American, British, and German labor movements. I focus here only on two forms of authoritative power, state representative and military crystallizations (for a fuller, more adequate explanation, consult those chapters). Eighteenth-century Britain had developed an embryonic form of party democracy primarily to institutionalize "court" and "country," dynastic and religious conflicts. Britain also lacked an effective home army (except in Ireland). Hence coping with emerging middling classes depended mostly on Parliament, and Parliament did cope. By 1820, Prussia had institutionalized noble-professional conflicts primarily within its royal administration and its army. These also helped the regime institutionalize middling classes, especially when the army gained legitimacy by turning Prussia into Germany. The German regime then also made innovative use of limited party democracy, which also bent the middle class Rightward. American party democracy originated primarily to institutionalize relations between large and small farmers. American military and paramilitary organizations developed largely to kill Indians.

When the proletariat emerged, dominant classes and regimes in the three countries handled it very differently. This was not because the British had a "genius for compromise" (until after midcentury they repressed more than they compromised) or because Germans were authoritarian or Americans schizophrenic. Most capitalists and politicians in all three countries wanted the same thing: to preserve order yet keep their privileges. But they had different authoritative state institutions already to hand for accomplishing these tasks. The British had competitive parties and a franchise whose relationship to class

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boundaries had varied and could vary again – but not much of a home army. The Germans had institutionalized a divide-and-rule party strategy excluding radical parties – and they had a large army whose shows of force had considerable domestic legitimacy. The Americans had competitive parties – but they also had military and paramilitary forces experienced in crude domestic repression. Thus similar emerging labor movements were deflected by different available state institutions along different tracks. Britain developed mild mutualism; Germany, a rather ritualized encounter between a reactionary state and capitalism and an ostensibly revolutionary Marxism, and America, greater violence and sectionalism and little socialism.

In all these encounters state institutions also changed, but more slowly than capitalism developed and classes emerged. The theoretical model appropriate for this phase of world history – with common diffusing capitalism entwined with more particular authoritative state institutions – is a kind of "political lag" theory, such as I teased out from the institutional theory of the state identified in Chapter 3. Variations between state institutions fostered various "collective laborers" in this period. This casts doubt on all theories asserting that capitalist development necessarily brings *any* determinant set of power relations between capital and labor – whether the theory is Marxist, reformist, or liberal. The collective laborer has been more malleable than these theories would suggest, compliant with (or unable to change) a number of regimes, and capable of crystallizing in many forms.

Indeed, this period seems to have institutionalized more diverse class relations than has more recent advanced capitalism, dominated by party democracies. Throughout most of the twentieth century, authoritarian regimes fared badly. Autocracy and semiauthoritarian monarchy disappeared as dominant strategies from the West, although comparable nonmonarchical regimes exist in many developing countries. Most Western theories have argued that this decline in variety and in authoritarianism was inevitable, the working out of the "logic of industrialism," of the "age of democracy" or of the "institutionalization of class conflict" – variant forms of modernization theory. Evolutionary theories have been boosted by the sudden collapse of twentieth-century authoritarian socialism in the Soviet bloc. But has there been such a "logic"? Why were tsarism, Imperial Germany – indeed, more than half the modernizing regimes – doomed? Were they stumbling and scheming to a viable alternative set of modern power relations to party democracy? These questions await Volume III. But one issue can be addressed here: Because authoritarian regimes bring militarism more directly into class regulation, this may make them

vulnerable to war-induced demise. The causes of the Great War become critical to the first stage in assessing their viability.

Complexity in state crystallizations also turns us toward the war. Contemporary power actors found it as difficult to control outcomes as we find it to explain them. The consequences of their actions were often unintended. Class struggles – agrarian, industrial, or both – did not proceed according to their own pure logics. From beginning to end they were entwined with ideological, military, and political power relations that helped shape classes themselves. These now became even more complex as state militarism intensified. Chapter 21 traces the beginnings of this cataclysmic intervention.

Nations and states

Chapter 7 presents the first three phases of a four-phase theory of the nation. The religious and the commercial capitalist-statist phases occurred before the time period of this volume began, contributing only what I call “protonations.” Then the militarist phase, detailed in Chapter 7, developed nations as real, partly cross-class, and occasionally aggressive actors. But nations came in three different types: state reinforcing (for example, England), state creating (Germany), and state subverting (across most Austrian lands). I now summarize the fourth, *industrial capitalist*, phase of these varied nations.

During the second half of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth, the industrial phase of capitalism, its class struggles, and its impact on the state reinforced emerging nations. States for the first time undertook major civilian functions, sponsoring communications systems; canals, roads, post offices, railways, telegraph systems, and, most significantly, schools. States were largely responding to the needs of industrialism, as articulated primarily by capitalists, but also by other classes, by militaries, and by state elites. Because almost all valued the increasing collective powers of an industrial society, they urged the state on toward greater social coordination. In turn, state infrastructures enhanced the density of social interaction, but bounded by the state’s territorial reach. We saw that social behavior – even intimate social behavior such as sexual mores – became “naturalized,” more nationally homogeneous. Quite unconsciously, most state activities furthered the nation as an experienced community, linking the intensive and emotional organizations of family and neighborhood with more extensive and instrumental power organizations.

The nation was not a total community. Localism survived, as did regional, religious, linguistic, and class barriers within the nation. The Western ideological community and global capitalism also maintained

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The causes of the Great War become their viability. The war also turns us toward the war. It is difficult to control outcomes as consequences of their actions were – agrarian, industrial, or both – did not follow pure logics. From beginning to end economic, military, and political power asserted themselves. These now became militarism intensified. Chapter 21 traces intervention.

The phases of a four-phase theory of the commercial capitalist-statist phases of this volume began, contributing to the militarist phase, detailed as real, partly cross-class, and occasional. They came in three different types: England, state creating (Germany), and Austrian lands. I now summarize these varied nations.

In the nineteenth century and the early industrial capitalism, its class struggles, and its merging nations. States for the first time, sponsoring communications systems, railways, telegraph systems, and, were largely responding to the needs primarily by capitalists, but also by state elites. Because almost all powers of an industrial society, they required social coordination. In turn, state intervention of social interaction, but bounded. We saw that social behavior – even sexual mores – became “naturalized,” quite unconsciously, most state action experienced community, linking the actions of family and neighborhood with power organizations.

Community. Localism survived, as did class barriers within the nation. The new global capitalism also maintained

transnational organization. Because capitalism, the modern state, militarism, mass discursive literacy, and industrialism increased overall social density, there was room for more national and transnational organization.

Nor was the nation an uncontested community. The popular, cross-class nation necessarily involved conceptions of citizenship (though of varying types). But these raised the two dominant political crystallizations of the nineteenth century, turning on the “representative” issue – who should be full citizens – and the “national” issue – where citizenship should be located, that is, how centralized the state and nation should be. I have stressed throughout that the national issue was important and as contentious as was representation. Few states started the period as nationally homogeneous: Most contained regions with distinct religious and linguistic communities, and many regions had their own political institutions, or memories of them.

The military and industrial capitalist phases of state expansion intensified both representative and national issues. The late eighteenth-century fiscal and conscription consequences of increased militarism resulted in greater representative pressures but very different crystallizations on the national issue, ranging from the centralization attempted by Jacobin revolutionaries to the confederalism of most Austrian dissidents. Yet the later industrial capitalist phase intensified pressures toward both more representative and more national societies. “Naturalization” was especially effective because it was unconscious, unintended, interstitial, and so unopposed. It involved the emotions as well as instrumental reason, subtly changing conceptions of communities of attachment.

Yet one area of state expansion in industrial capitalism remained contentious. Though most state infrastructures were expanded fairly consensually, mass education generated conflict with minority churches and regional linguistic communities. If minority churches were regionally entrenched, this could intensify state-subverting nationalism (as in Ireland or some Austrian lands). Educational expansion could also convey a subtler antistatism. Under growing representative pressures from emerging classes, no central regime now could simply impose its language on provinces with their own native vernaculars. The expansion of education in the province of Bohemia, for example, diffused a Czech more than an Austrian sense of nation. Conversely, throughout “greater Germany” and throughout Italy education encouraged a sense of nationhood extending across existing state boundaries. Thus, according to context, the industrial capitalist phase of the nation encouraged three different types of nations: state reinforcing, state creating, and state subverting.

Capitalism's class conflicts also fueled all three types of nations, according to local circumstance. The middle class, peasants, and workers became literate in native vernaculars, which, according to context, either further naturalized the existing state or fragmented the state into more popular regional nations (state fragmenting) or cross-state nations (state creating). Middle class, peasants, and workers demanded political representation, again with the same alternative consequences. By the late nineteenth century, popular nations – in all three guises – were mobilizing the middle class and many peasants and workers in all European countries.

In this phase, nations also became more passionate and aggressive. Passion derived principally from the tighter links between the state and the intensive, emotional sphere of family and neighborhood interaction in which state education and physical and moral health infrastructures loomed large. Ideologies saw the nation as mother or father, hearth and home writ large. Aggression resulted because all states continued to crystallize as militarist; all were geopolitically militarist, and some remained domestically so.

State-subverting nationalism became increasingly violent where repressive imperial regimes would not grant regional-national autonomies and representation. Especially if reinforced by religion, regional dissidents developed intense, emotional protest. Their family and local community lives reinforced their sense of difference from the exploiting imperial nation. The latter returned the sentiments to justify using domestic militarism against them. Each fueled the passion and the violence of the other.

Thus state-subverting nationalism has been most passionate and "fanatical" when nonrepresentative imperial regimes begin to lose their repressive grip. Western states that institutionalized class, but especially regional-national, representation have not experienced fanatic violence even when beset by deeply rooted interethnic disputes. Belgium and Canada may break up, but this would probably occur without fatalities. In contrast, hundreds have been killed in Northern Ireland because the province never institutionalized representation of the minority community while segregating the intimate lives of both communities. Thousands are being killed in Yugoslavia, and may be in the future in more than one formerly Soviet country, precisely because they have not institutionalized representative government amid distinct linguistic, sometimes religious, regional communities, many with their own historical political institutions. State-subverting ethnic violence is a product of authoritarian regimes, not of party democracies. This was so in the long nineteenth century. It appears still true today.

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on interstate wars. In 1900, about 40 percent of state budgets still went toward preparation for war. The use and threat of war was still central to their diplomacy. Military virtues were still a valued part of masculine culture; women were valued as the bearers and nurturers of future warriors. But now these states were becoming more representative and more national. It is often asserted that the middle class, peasants, and even sometimes workers began to identify their interests and their sense of honor with those of their state against other nation-states, endorsing aggressive nationalism. A rival class theory looks to see exactly who was represented in these states. It concludes that full political citizens, primarily the middle class, were the bearers of aggressive nationalism in alliance with old regimes. Indeed, I have emphasized that conceptions of capitalistic profit were also becoming embedded in this period with a supposed "national interest."

Overall, however, I look rather skeptically at these rival theories. There is a considerable difference between conceiving of oneself as a member of a national community, even if socialized into a mythology of common ethnicity, even common "race," and supporting any particular national policy, abroad or at home. Most conceptions of what the nation stood for were strongly contested. In France this was obvious, as Republicans, Monarchists, and Bonapartists strongly, emotionally adhered to rival conceptions of the meaning of "France." But also in mainland Britain the old radical "Protestant" conception of the popular nation, now more secular, fought against more conservative imperialist conceptions, and some liberals advocated a softer imperialism. Everywhere classes and minorities who experienced the sharp end of domestic militarism opposed militarism in general and aggressive nationalism in particular. In all countries, as class theorists argue, full citizens were more likely to endorse the state and its militarism as *theirs*. But I also demonstrated that state diplomacy and militarism remained strongly private, largely hidden from the scrutiny of popular groups, enfranchised or not. Thus aggressive nationalism (or, indeed, any strong foreign policy commitment) did not in fact spread deeply among most middle-class groups – and especially not among the much-maligned petite bourgeoisie.

Yet aggressive nationalism had broadened its appeal. As industrialism expanded states, two sets of tentacles extended an embrace over national society: the civilian and military administrations. Hundreds of thousands of administrators now depended for their livelihood on the state; millions of young men were disciplined by a military cadre into the peculiar morale, coercive yet emotionally attached, that is the hallmark of the modern mass army. These two bodies of men, and their families – not broader classes or communities – provided most of

the core of extreme nationalism. They were what I call "superloyalists," with an exaggerated loyalty to what they conceived to be the ideals of their state. Not all were militarists or aggressive nationalists, as state ideals varied. British civilian officials might be attached to liberal ideals; French, to Republican ones; and German and Austrian, to more authoritarian ideals. But because all states were militarist, their servants were generally mobilizable at least to an ostensibly "defensive" militarism.

So in the fourth, industrial capitalist, phase of its relatively short life, the nation had advanced in three essential ways. First, much of the population, largely unconsciously, had become naturalized, making the nation an extensive community of interaction and emotional attachment. Thus what I call "national" organization increased at the large expense of the local and the regional (unless that now turned into a nation itself) and at the lesser expense of transnational organization. This is where the nation rested for most of the population. Second, many citizens – at this point drawn from middling and upper classes and from dominant religious and linguistic communities – were drawn further toward nationalist organization, regarding national interests and honor as essentially conflicting with those of other nations. Third, the actually nationalist core was disproportionately drawn from state expansion itself, in civilian and military cadre employment. Its ideals then resonated rather shallowly among the families of the citizens. Combined, they could aspire to mobilize the merely national remainder. As we shall see in Chapter 21, the problem was that national populations were now more confined within cages whose relations with other national cages were defined not by the people as a whole but first by private state and military elites, second by the nationalists. Aggressive nationalism would out, but largely behind the backs of most men who composed the nation.

In the industrial capitalist phase the state-reinforcing nation can be simply represented as three concentric circular bands: the outer one circumscribed by and attached to the total national state, the middle more linked to the inner circle, the statist core. More graphically and more relevant to what was to follow, the nation can be represented as that cartoonist's delight, the late nineteenth-century anarchist's bomb, a black, pudding-shaped ball with a protruding fuse. The fuse is composed of the statist nationalists; the combustible material is composed of the full citizens, whose shallow aggressive pressure endures long enough to cause the explosion, which is the enormous power of the military state hurling outward the jagged fragments, coercively disciplined workers and peasants. The fuse needed igniting, however.

While Europe failed to curb the traditional militarism of its states,

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ignition could occur. Its violence could be peculiarly nasty when entwining nationalist with class, and sometimes with religious, ideologies. Extreme nationalists could entwine with citizen classes and religions to identify those outside national citizenship but wanting in – the working class and regional, linguistic, and religious minorities – as enemies of the nation-state, *Reichsfeinde* in Germany. The most violent of these statist nationalists directed emotional hatred simultaneously against foreigners and *Reichsfeinde* within. But my model views not even the most extreme as, as it were, "irrational demons." To anticipate Volume III: The Nazis were recognizably just more extreme versions of the European statist nationalists whose emergence I have here charted – more violent, more authoritarian, more racist. They represented the most extreme way in which three Western state crystallizations – militarist, authoritarian, and capitalist – entwined. They received disproportionate core support from "betrayed," "superloyal" ex-frontline troops and state employees, and their ideology resonated most in Lutheran bourgeois and agrarian Germany.

Have I not so far narrated a conventional evolutionary tale of the rise of the nation-state, ever strengthening its sovereignty, its infrastructural powers, and its powers of national mobilization? Obviously state sovereignty has both widened and deepened. Yet, I doubt if these later enlarged states were actually as coherent in many ways as had been the late eighteenth-century British and Prussian states. For as more of social life became politicized, so did its conflicts and its confusions. As the scope of state functions widened, parties and states became more polymorphous. By 1900, politics concerned diplomacy, militarism, nationalism, political economy, centralization, secularization, mass education, welfare programs, temperance, votes for women, plus many more particular issues. Thus politics mobilized state elites against mass parties, class against class, sector against sector, church against church and secular state, peripheral regions against center, feminists against patriarchs – and many others. By comparison, eighteenth-century politics had been relatively simple.

Were states merely in a transitional phase, acquiring modern crystallizations, without having shed all traditional ones? This was truer of the surviving semiauthoritarian monarchies – Germany and Austria, where parliaments competed with courts and factions swirled through ministries to culminate around the monarch. But everywhere foreign policy generated distinctive crystallizations. Diplomacy was conducted largely by a few old regime families, somewhat insulated from nationally caged classes and mass parties, though now buffeted erratically by nationalist parties. Officer corps retained autonomy by combining bureaucratic profession with old regime class composition and ethos.

Officers and noncommissioned officers became a military caste somewhat insulated from civil society and civilian state. More generally, though democracy, bureaucracy, and rational budgeting all sought to set coherent political priorities, all remained highly imperfect by 1914. Even today democratic control over diplomacy and the military remains feeble. It is difficult to regard the whole state as a single cohesive entity; rather, plural elites and parties entwine with one another in confused, varying ways.

Throughout the twentieth century, as state functions continued to broaden, political crystallizations further diversified. Today, the American state might crystallize as conservative-patriarchal-Christian one week when restricting abortion rights, as capitalist the next when regulating the savings and loans banking scandal, as a superpower the next when sending troops abroad for other than national economic interests. These varied crystallizations are rarely in harmony or in dialectical opposition to one another; usually they just differ. They mobilize differing, if overlapping and intersecting, power networks, and their solutions have consequences, some unintended for each other. It is a basic tenet of my work that societies are not systems. There is no ultimately determining structure to our entire social experience – at least, none that we, situated in its midst, can discern. The elites of many historic states were controlled by particular social groups – princes, priests, or warrior bands. They enjoyed considerable autonomy, yet caged little of social life. Their states embodied systemic qualities arising from their own particularities. But when states became the center and radii through which much of social life is regulated, they lost that systemic coherence.

Polymorphism has proved an enduring feature of modern states. When states became important regulators of material subsistence and profit, of ideologies, of intimate family life, as well as of diplomacy, war, and repression, many more parties became activated in politics. In dealing with individual states, I listed their principal crystallizations and showed how they entwined in nonsystemic, nondialectical ways. These structured the very identity of classes and nations, often in ways hidden from the actors themselves. I pursue this, as it was pursued in reality, “over the top,” in Chapter 21.

The sources of social power

This volume has sustained the general propositions stated at the beginning of Chapter 1. It is possible to steer between Marx and Weber, to make significant yet non-materialist generalizations concerning the “ultimate” structuring of human societies – at least within the confined

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time and space discussed here. After all qualifications and disclaimers are made, we can discern two major phases in both of which the overall structuring of Western society from 1760 to 1914 appeared as predominantly dual.

During the first phase, lasting roughly through the eighteenth century to 1815, diffused economic and authoritative military power relations dominated Western societies. Commercial capitalism and the enduring consequences of the military revolution enabled Europeans and their colonists to dominate the globe; commercial capitalism and military states completed the expansion of mass discursive literacy begun earlier by churches, adding to social density, extensively, intensively, and across class boundaries. Capitalism increased collective human ability to exploit nature, it expanded population, and it propelled the emergence of extensive classes and industrialization. Militarism politicized civil societies, their classes and their religious and linguistic communities, around contentious representative and national issues. Militarism strengthened large states and wiped out small ones.

Thereafter, the national state (the main product of these dual determinations) shed its puny historical frame and emerged interstitially – without anyone intending it – as a major authoritative power organization in its own right. At the end of the eighteenth century, citizenship struggles were already being structured by the degree to which states had institutionalized conflicts over increased taxes and conscription. Nineteenth-century capitalism continued to revolutionize collective productive powers, as geopolitics became more pacific and militarism more variable among states (especially domestically), more “private” and castelike within the state. Thus a second phase of dual determination emerged after midcentury. A predominantly (though not entirely) diffused industrial capitalism and the authoritative nation-state became the principal restructurers of Western society, the former providing essentially similar thrusts because so diffuse (and because so desired by all), the latter – principally through diverse representative and national crystallizations – providing most of the authoritative, varied solutions.

Because in both phases the two principal transformers were not colliding billiard balls but entwined, and because they generated emergent, interpenetrating collective actors – classes, nations, and modern states, plus their rivals – it is not possible to weight *their* interrelations. Neither can be accorded a Marxian-style accolade as the wielder of a singular “ultimate primacy” in society, although of course, the economic power of capitalism uniquely remained a part of both phases of dualism.

This civilization during the period came as near to a single general

developmental process as any ever has. In no other time or place has human collective power, over nature and over other civilizations, expanded so greatly or so rapidly. In no other time or place have all power actors except obscurantists and unconscious innovators at the leading edge had such a clear vision of how to increase powers. Desirable models of the future, wanted by almost everyone, were available in the latest, most "modern" form of capitalism, of the state, of military professionalism, and of scientific ideologies. Thus in no other time or place developed so many theories of progress and evolution.

Yet development was not unitary or systemic, "internal" to a single social organism. Even now this was not evolution. We can in principle abstract a single ideal-typical "logic" of capitalism. We may call it the "law of marginal utility" or the "law of value," according to preference. We can also abstract a "logic" of militarism: to concentrate superior coercion on the forces of the enemy. But as soon as we let *both* loose together in phase 1, and as soon as we add messier, polymorphous states in phase 2, then ideal-typical logics become decidedly impure and murky to their supposed carriers. I emphasize that the relative "efficiency" of market (i.e., pure capitalist) versus territorial (more military or political) conceptions of interest and profit remained unclear from beginning to end of the period. Competing political economies remained plausible means of enhancing collective and personal economic powers. Throughout the period, certain secular tendencies can be discerned: toward more capitalist industrialization, toward military professionalism, toward greater political representation, toward more state bureaucratization, toward the more centralized nation-state. Each of these "competed" with alternative structural arrangements and "won" – not in any final sense but as a definite tendency over the period. They won either because they were more desirable to a broad array of power actors or because they were genuinely more powerful. But none of these tendencies emerged from a single "logic." The nation-state was encouraged by all of them; so was capitalist industrialization.

Although I have simplified "ultimacy" into two phases of (roughly) dual determinism, I must also add caveats. The other sources of social power also added their weights, more particularistically and erratically. Ideological power relations, very significant at the beginning of the period, remained a force especially where religious and linguistic communities (the latter given more collective power over the period by the other power sources) did not coincide with existing state boundaries. Ideological power also made decisive contributions to classes and nations in the "world-historical moment" of the French Revolution. Militarism remained important in the West's dealings with the rest of

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s. In no other time or place has and over other civilizations, ex- no other time or place have and unconscious innovators at ion of how to increase powers. ted by almost everyone, were form of capitalism, of the state, tific ideologies. Thus in no other ies of progress and evolution. systemic, "internal" to a single t evolution. We can in principle f capitalism. We may call it the of value," according to prefer- of militarism: to concentrate enemy. But as soon as we let soon as we add messier, poly- typical logics become decidedly carriers. I emphasize that the are capitalist) versus territorial of interest and profit remained e period. Competing political of enhancing collective and it the period, certain secular ore capitalist industrialization, greater political representation, toward the more centralized d" with alternative structural final sense but as a definite ther because they were more actors or because they were hese tendencies emerged from encouraged by all of them; so

' into two phases of (roughly) ts. The other sources of social ticularistically and erratically. cant at the beginning of the here religious and linguistic tive power over the period by with existing state boundaries. contributions to classes and " of the French Revolution. est's dealings with the rest of

the world and in the domestic politics of monarchies retaining despotic powers and of the United States. The military caste was also secretly flexing its muscles for its own world-historical moment, July-August 1914. For all these reasons, my overall generalizations remain limited and crude.

For these reasons, too, Western distributive power relations remained unclear to contemporary actors. Their identities and conceptions of interest and honor were subtly transformed by entwinings of more than one power source and by the unintended consequences of actions. For these reasons, too, distributive power relations also remained objectively ambiguous, difficult for anyone to fathom. Economic actors emerged simultaneously as classes, sections, and segments, rendering uncertain the future of the domestic stratification. Its states were now dual civilian-military ones, each *Reichshalf* facing in different directions, controlled by different balances of power between elites and parties.

More broadly, the West comprised simultaneously both a segmental series of nation-state "societies" and a broader transnational civilization. Its ideologies of peace and war; of conservatism, liberalism, and socialism; of religion; of racism – all oscillated uneasily between the national and the transnational. There was no systematic resolution of ambivalences. Yet there was a more particular one. Most ambiguities were resolved in reality, and all these ambivalent actors and ideologies contributed to the resolution. Reality interposed the Great War. So, finally, we go over the top.