RULING CLASS STRATEGIES AND CITIZENSHIP

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Abstract. Marshall's theory of citizenship is criticized for being Anglocentric and evolutionist. Comparative historical analysis of industrial societies reveals not one but at least five viable strategies for the institutionalization of class conflict, here called liberal, reformist, authoritarian monarchist, Fascist and authoritarian socialist. In explaining their origin and development emphasis should be placed upon the strategies and cohesion of ruling classes and ancien régimes rather than upon those of the rising bourgeois and proletarian classes (as has been the case in much previous theory). In explaining their durability emphasis should be placed upon geo-political events, especially the two world wars, rather than on their internal efficiency. If Marshall's third stage of citizenship is a reasonably accurate description of contemporary Europe, this is primarily due to the military victories of the 'Anglo-Saxon' powers.

Marshall's theory

Novel, important and true ideas are rare. Such ideas which are then developed into a coherent theory are even scarcer. T. H. Marshall is one of the very few to have had at least one such idea, and to develop it. That is why it is important to understand and to improve upon his theory of citizenship.

Marshall believed that citizenship has rendered class struggle innocuous; yet citizenship is also in continuous tension, even war, with the class inequalities that capitalism generates. He identified three stages of the struggle for, and attainment of, citizenship: civil, political and social. Civil citizenship emerged in the 18th century: 'rights necessary for individual freedom — liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice.' Political citizenship emerged in the 19th century: 'the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body.' The third stage, social citizenship, developed through the 20th century: 'the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share in the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society.' It is what we mean now by the Welfare State and social democracy.

Through these stages the major classes of modern capitalism, bourgeoisie and proletariat, institutionalized their struggles with the ancien régime and with each other. Citizenship and capitalism were still at war, Marshall declared, but it was institutionalized, rule-governed warfare. Such was the model developed in his famous 1949 lecture, Citizenship and Social Class (1963 edition). It has continued to seem true and important. Major sociologists like Reinhard Bendix, Kalf Dahrendorf, Ronald Dore, A. H. Halsey, S. M. Lipset, David Lockwood and Peter Townsend have acknowledged his influence (e.g. Halsey, 1984; Lipset, 1973; Lockwood, 1974). It remains strong today (see, for example, the recent admiring work by Turner, 1986). This is for a good reason: Marshall's view of citizenship is
essentially true — at least as a description of what has actually happened in Britain.

There is one rather remarkable feature of Citizenship and Social Class. It is entirely about Great Britain. There is not a single mention of any other country. Did Marshall regard Britain as typical of the capitalist West as a whole? He does not explicitly say so. Yet the most general level of the argument explores the tension between economic inequalities and demands for popular participation, both generated everywhere by the rise of capitalism. This certainly implies a general evolutionary approach, and indeed he does intermittently use the term 'evolution'. In his book Social Policy (1975 edition), evidence from other countries is only introduced to illustrate variations on a common, British theme. Finally, others have used his model in explicitly evolutionary theories of the development of modern class relations (e.g. Dahrendorf, 1959:61-4). Flora and Heidenheimer (1981:20-21) have observed that general theories of the modern welfare state have been dominated by British experience, chronicled especially by Marshall and Richard Titmuss.

Six counter-theses

I wish to deviate from this Anglophile and evolutionary model in six ways.

(1) The British strategy of citizenship described by Marshall has been only one among five pursued by advanced industrial countries. I call these the liberal, reformist, authoritarian monarchist, Fascist, and authoritarian socialist strategies.

(2) All five strategies proved themselves reasonably adept at handling modern class struggle. They all converted the head-on collision of massive, antagonistic social classes into conflicts that were less class-defined, more limited and complex, sometimes more orderly, sometimes more erratic. Thus evolutionary tales are wrong. There has been no single best way of institutionalizing class conflict in industrial society, but at least five potentially durable forms of institutionalized conflict and mixes of citizen rights.

(3) In explaining how such different strategies arise, I will stress the role of ruling classes. By ‘ruling class’ I mean a combination of the dominant economic class and the political and military rulers. I do not mean to imply that such groups were unchanging or even united — indeed the degree of their cohesion will figure importantly in my narrative. But I do imply the pair of general explanatory precepts expressed in (4) and (5) below.

(4) Influence on social structure varies according to power. As a ruling class possesses most power, its strategies matter most. In fact, many anciens régimes could survive the onslaught of emergent classes with a few concessions here and there. Neither the bourgeoisie nor the proletariat has been as powerful as has been argued by the dominant schools of sociology, liberal, reformist (like Marshall) and Marxist. Indeed, ruling class strategies tended to determine the nature of the social movements generated by bourgeoisie and proletariat, especially whether they were liberal, reformist or revolutionary. This argument has also been made by Lipset (1985: Chapter 6).

(5) Tradition matters. We generally exaggerate the transformative powers of the Industrial Revolution. That Revolution was preceded by centuries of structural change — the commercialization of agriculture, the globalization of trade, the
consolidation of the modern state, the mechanization of war, the secularization of ideology. *If anciens régimes* had learned to cope with these changes, they could master the problems of an industrial society with traditional strategies, up-dated. If not, they were usually already vulnerable and internally divided before the actual bourgeois or proletarian onslaught. Others have also stressed the survival of tradition through the Industrial Revolution — classically Moore (1969) and Rokkan (1970), more recently Mayer (1981) and Corrigan and Sayer (1983).

(6) The durability of régime strategies has been due less to their superior internal efficiency than to geo-politics — and specifically to victory in world wars. The geopolitical and military influences on society have been considerable but neglected in sociological theory. However, they have recently been receiving the attention they deserve (e.g. Giddens, 1985; Hall, 1985; Mann, 1980, 1986a and b; Shaw, 1987; Skocpol, 1979).

Let us approach the historical record with these six theses in mind. What were the traditional régime strategies used to cope with the initial rise of the bourgeoisie?

*Absolute and constitutional regimes*¹

We can divide the regimes of pre-industrial Europe into approximations to two ideal-types, absolute monarchies and constitutional regimes.

By 1800 the principal absolutists were Russia, Prussia and Austria. Their monarch's formal *despotique* powers were largely unlimited. Citizenship was unknown. The rule of law supposedly operated, but personal liberties, and freedom of the press and association could be suspended arbitrarily. Indeed, any conception of universal rights was restrained by the proliferation of particularistic statuses, possessed by corporate groups — estates of the realm, corporations of burghers, lawyers, merchants and artisan guilds. Yet the real, *infrastructural* powers of the monarchs were far from absolute. They required the co-operation of the regionally and locally powerful. Repression was cumbersome and costly, and far more effective if used together with 'divide-and-rule' negotiations with corporate groups. The monarch's crucial power was tactical freedom: the capacity to act arbitrarily both in conducting negotiation and in using force. It is important to realize that these three characteristics — arbitrary divide-and-rule, selective tactical repression, and corporate negotiations — survived intact into the 20th century.

Britain and the United States were the main constitutional régimes. There civil citizenship was well-developed. Individual life and property were legally guaranteed, and freedom of the press and of association were partially recognized — they were 'licensed' under discernible rules. Political citizenship also existed, though it was confined to the propertied classes who 'virtually represented' the rest. Social citizenship was as absent here as in absolutist régimes. All this was well understood by Marshall.

Not all régimes were either predominantly absolutist or constitutional. Some formerly absolutist régimes had experienced revolution or serious disorder, and were now bitterly contested between constitutionalists and reactionaries: France after 1789, Spain and several Italian states. In others absolutism and constitutionalism merged through less violent, more orderly conflict: principally the Scandinavian countries.
Capitalist industrialization changed much, but we can nonetheless see the initial imprint of these four types of regime: absolutist, constitutional, contested and merged. Let us follow this in more detail, concentrating in turn on the US, Britain and Germany.

From constitutionalism to liberalism – the US and Britain

In Britain and the US the rise of liberalism strengthened civil and political citizenship. The rule of law over life, property, freedom of speech, assembly and press was extended, as was the political franchise. But any social citizenship remained equivocal. The regime provided basic subsistence to the poor out of charity and a desire to avoid sedition. But provision came from local worthies and private insurance; and legislation encouraged rather than enforced. Subsistence was not a right of all, but the result of a mixture of market forces, the duty to work and save, and private and public charity. The state was not interventionist or ‘corporatist’: interest group conflict was predominantly left to the economic and political marketplaces, its limits defined by law. However, collectivities could legitimately exploit their market powers, and the regime devised rules of the ensuing game. Under liberalism individuals and interest groups, but not classes, could be accommodated within the regime. Repression, now fully institutionalized, was reserved only for those who went outside the rules of the game.

Such was one basic strategy of dealing with the rise of the bourgeoisie. But could it cope with the working class? The two main cases, the United States and Britain, coped differently.

In the US labour was eventually absorbed into the liberal regime. A broad coalition, from landowners and merchants down to small farmers and artisans, had made the Revolution. White, adult males could not be easily excluded from civil and political citizenship. By the early 1840s all of them, in all states, possessed the vote — 50 years earlier than anywhere else, 50 years before the emergence of a powerful labour movement. Thus the political demands of labour could be gradually expressed as an interest group within an existing federal political constitution and competitive party system. As Katznelson (1981) has shown, workers' political life became organized more by locality, ethnicity and patronage than by work, unions or class. In the sphere of work there was severe and violent conflict, between unions and employers aided by government and the law courts. But here too the ruling class eventually came to accept the legitimacy of unions in essentially liberal terms; while the Wagner Act allowed unions to negotiate freely, Taft-Hartley compelled them to act only as the ballot representatives of their individual members.

The US gives us the truest picture of what would have happened to class conflict without the politics of citizenship. If class struggle had only concerned the Marxist agenda, of relations of production, labour processes, and direct conflict between capitalists and workers, then liberal regimes would have dominated industrial society. As the (white) working class was civilly and politically inside the regime, it had little need for the great ideologies of the proletariat excluded from citizenship — socialism and anarchism. American trade unions became like other collective interest groups exploiting their market power. If workers did not possess effective market powers, they would be outside this liberal regime and tempted by socialism.
and anarchism. But they could be repressed — with the consent of labour organizations accepting the rules of the game. Consequently, neither class nor socialism has ever appeared as a fundamental organizing principle of power in the United States. Those groups who in other countries constituted the core of the labour and socialist movement — male artisans, heavy industrial, mining and transport workers — became predominantly interest groups inside the liberal regime, while the unskilled, those in other sectors, females and ethnic minorities were left outside.

Liberalism was thus the first viable regime strategy of an advanced industrial society. It still dominates the United States, and is also found in Switzerland. In these countries social citizenship is still marginal. Economic subsistence and participation is provided overwhelmingly out of the economic buoyancy of their national capitalism, from which the large majority can insure themselves against adversity. Below that, there are welfare provisions against actual starvation, though they vary between states and cantons, are often denied to immigrant workers, and are sometimes provided only if the poor show their ‘worth’. It is closer to the 18th century Poor Law than to what Marshall meant by social citizenship. Its social struggles remained defined by liberalism. If civil and political citizenship could be attained early, before the class struggles of industrialism, then social citizenship need not follow. The most powerful capitalist state has not followed Marshall’s road. It shows no signs of doing so.

But Britain strayed from liberalism towards reformism, as Marshall depicted. Britain’s initial struggle for liberal political citizenship was more of a class struggle, waged predominantly by the rising bourgeoisie and independent artisans. However, the British constitution has not excluded classes or status groups as systematically as have most constitutions of continental Europe. The franchise before 1832 was extraordinarily uneven; then, until 1867, it passed through the middle of the artisan group; between 1867 and 1884 it grew to include 65% of the adult male population. In 1918 all adult males and many females were included, and in 1929 all females. Hence at any particular point in time emerging dissidents — petty bourgeois radicals, artisan and skilled factory worker socialists, feminists — have been partially inside, partially outside the state. Thus liberal and socialism have both remained attractive ideologies. Indeed, perhaps only the splits in the Liberal Party consequent on the First World War may have ensured that a joint liberal/reformist ideology would be carried principally by an independent Labour Party, rather than through Lib-Lab politics. Britain has enshrined the rule of both interest groups and classes, jointly. The labour movement is part sectional interest group, part class movement, irremediably reformist, virtually unsullied by Marxist or anarchist revolutionary tendencies.

Britain is thus a mixed liberal/reformist case. The state remains liberal, unwilling to intervene actively in interest-group bargaining — it has incorporated the lower classes into the rules of the game, not into the institutions of ‘corporatism’. Yet social citizenship has advanced somewhat beyond the American level. The state guarantees subsistence through the welfare state, but this meshes into, rather than replaces, private market and insurance schemes. Thus its major social struggles are fought out in terms of an ideological debate, and a real political pendulum, between liberalism and social democracy. In reaction to the Thatcher government’s liberal strategy, the reformist strategy is now becoming more popular again.
Contested and merged regimes – France, Spain, Italy, Scandinavia

In France, Spain and Italy, reactionaries (usually monarchist and clerical) and secular liberals struggled over political citizenship for most of the 19th and 20th centuries, with many violent change of regime. Citizenship remained bitterly disputed, though there was undoubtedly some secular progress in the Marshallian direction. As radical bourgeoisie, peasantry and labour were erratically but persistently denied political citizenship, these developed competing excluded ideologies. Sometimes they rejected the state, as in anarchism and syndicalism; sometimes they embraced it, as in Marxist socialism. The fierce competition between anarcho-syndicalism, revolutionary socialism and reformist socialism was not solved until after World War II, for reasons I mention later.

In several other countries the absolutist/constitutional struggle proceeded to more peaceful victory for a broad alliance between bourgeoisie, labour and small farmers. Over the first four decades of this century they achieved civil and political citizenship, and proceeded furthest along the road to social citizenship. The absolutist inheritance, never violently repudiated (unlike in France), provided a more corporatist tinge to regime negotiations which still endures. The Scandinavian countries are the paradigm cases of this route, less affected by the dislocations of war than any other. This second road, a corporatist style of reformism, corresponds closely to Marshall’s vision (more so than the British case does). Its social struggles are avowedly class ones, but they are managed by joint negotiations, and constrained more by pragmatic that ideological limits. Continuing reform, it is agreed, will be limited primarily by the growth record of each national economy.

But to investigate properly the absolutist legacy suggests a methodology of examining the ‘purer’ and longer-lasting cases of absolutism, in Russia, Austria, Japan and especially in Prussia/Germany.

From absolutism to authoritarian monarchy – Germany, Austria, Russia, Japan

The absolutist regimes entered the 19th century with two conflicting predispositions. First, monarch, nobility and Church were unwilling to grant universal citizen rights to either bourgeoisie or proletariat, since that would threaten the particularistic, private and arbitrary nature of their power. Second, despite their despotic appearance, they were pessimistic about their infrastructural capacity to overcome determined resistance with systematic repression. When it became obvious that neither the bourgeoisie nor the proletariat would go away, the regimes not only cast around for other solutions to maintain their power — they also realized that to incorporate these rising groups would ‘modernize’ the regime and increase its Great Power status. The most successful regime in Europe was Wilhelmine Germany, on which I will therefore concentrate.*

German absolutists were willing to concede on civil citizenship. Often this did not seem like ‘concession’ at all. Ancien régime members were major property-holders, gradually using their property more capitalistically. They were not opposed to the spread of universal contract law and guarantees of property rights — including the liberal conception of freedom of labour. Recent Marxists have observed that
classical liberalism, combining capitalism with democracy, has not often appeared subsequently: much civil can exist with little political citizenship (e.g. Jessop, 1978). Blackbourne and Eley (1984) have demonstrated this case with respect to 19th century Germany: liberal legal rights (civil citizenship) were achieved through a consensus between the Prussian regime and the bourgeoisie over what was needed to modernize society.

Absolutist regimes also favoured a minimal social citizenship. Their ideology and particularistic practices were already paternalist. Particular groups like artisans or miners often had their basic wages, hours and working practices guaranteed by the state. When state infrastructural powers expanded, after about 1860, so could a minimal social citizenship. As is generally recognized today, Bismarck and Kaiser Wilhelm, and not liberals or reformists, were the founders of the Welfare State, though it is true that they did not take it very far (Flora & Albers, 1981).

The sticking-point was over political citizenship. Real parliaments could not be conceded; democrats could not be allowed absolute freedoms of the press, speech or assembly. Gradually, however, the more astute monarchists institutionalized a workable political strategy. The regime conceded a parliamentary shell but weighted the franchise, rigged ballots, and only allowed elected representatives limited powers alongside an executive branch responsible to the monarch alone. Thus the bourgeoisie, even the proletariat, could be brought within the state but could not control it. By this sham political citizenship they were ‘negatively incorporated’, to use Roth’s (1963) term.

The tactics were divide-and-rule: negotiate with the more moderate sections of excluded groups, then repress the rest; play off incorporated interest groups and classes against each other; and preserve a vital element of arbitrary regime discretion. In the hands of a Bismarck the discretion could be used quite cynically: Catholics, regionalists, National Liberals, classical liberals, even the working class, would be taken up, discarded, and repressed according to current tactical exigencies (see the brilliant biography of Bismarck by Taylor, 1961). Divide-and-rule was corporatist and arbitrary – both qualities inherited from absolutism. Groups and classes were integrated as organizations into the state, rather than into rule-governed marketplaces. The state could alter the rules by dissolving parliament, restricting civil liberties, and selecting new targets for repression. By these means authoritarian monarchicalism emasculated the German bourgeoisie, dividing it among Conservative, National Liberal, Catholic and regionalist factions, all vying for influence within the régime. By 1914 the German bourgeoisie was finished as an independent political force (as Max Weber so often lamented). Only a small radical rump was prepared to ally with the excluded socialists against the regime.

The proletariat was treated more severely. Though the regime became somewhat internally divided, and though different Länder also varied (with liberals arguing that concessions to labour unions would detach them from socialism), in the end the authoritarians proved to be the heart of the regime. Apart from a brief period (1890-94) under the Chancellorship of Caprivi, a liberal Prussian general, the politics of conciliation never carried the court – and the Kaiser dismissed Caprivi rather than make concessions to labour. The regime was essentially united and so could respond with a clear strategy. The German working class could elect representatives to the Reichstag, but these were excluded from office or influence on the régime. Unions were permitted, but – even after the anti-Socialist Laws were repealed in 1889 –
their legal rights were unclear. The state could exploit legal uncertainties or invoke martial law to repress strikes, meetings, marches, organizations and publications. It did so arbitrarily, according to its traditions.

Faced with a strategy largely of civil and political exclusion, labour responded predictably. It followed the Marxist Social Democrats, ostensibly revolutionary but geared up in practice to fight the elections. Most activist workers joined the socialist unions, committed to SPD rhetoric, but able to make reformist gains in some industries and localities. But to be a reformist brought frustration, because of regime intransigence. By 1914 Karl Legien, the crypto-reformist leader of the socialist unions, had carefully built up a measure of autonomy from the SPD. But he was forced to confess that reform was impossible without a fundamental change in the state. The working class was largely outside political citizenship. It responded with a flawed revolutionary Marxism — extreme rhetoric, practical caution, and a leadership, conscious of the isolation of the movement, concentrating on electoral politics.

How frightened was the regime of the socialist threat? In the 1912 election the SPD achieved its greatest success, capturing a third of the votes, and becoming the largest single party in the Reichstag. The regime was taken aback but quickly recovered. The Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, used the Red Scare against his major enemy at the time, which was the Right, not the Left. He exploited the fears of the propertied classes to finally push through an income tax, long desired by the regime, long resisted by the agrarian landlords. Authoritarian monarchy was still successfully dividing-and-ruling and modernizing at the onset of the First World War.

Each of the authoritarian monarchies provided its variation on this German theme. I discuss them briefly in order of their success, beginning with Japan, the most successful.

The Japanese monarchy itself had less freedom of action. Instead a tightly-knit Meiji elite, modernizing but drawn from the traditional dominant classes, used the monarchy as its legitimating principle. The Meiji Revolution represented an unusually self-conscious regime strategy of conservative modernization. After a careful search around Western constitutions, the German constitution was adopted and modified according to local need. It is worth adding that forms of organization from liberal-reformist countries were also borrowed where they could fit into an authoritarian mould — notably French army and British navy organization. Authoritarian monarchy became rather more corporate, less dependent on the personal qualities of the monarch, than in Europe — an apparent strengthening of the strategy.

Less successful was Russia, whose regime generally favoured more repression and exclusion, yet vacillated before modern liberal and authoritarian influences from the West. Two periods of regime conciliation (1906–7 and 1912–14) enabled the emergence of bourgeois parties of compromise and labour unions run by reformists. But each time the subsequent return to repression cut the ground from under liberals and reformists. They could promise their followers little. Many became embittered and moved leftward. Socialist revolutionaries took over the labour and peasant movements and even some of the bourgeois factions (see e.g. on the workers' movement, Bonnell, 1983, and Swain, 1983). Divisions and vacillation at court prevented successful emulation of the German model. The ancien regime still
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possessed the loyalty of the nobility and propertied classes in general, but its modernization programme began to disintegrate from within (as Haimson, 1964 and 1965, classically argued). The regime lacked a corporate core of either liberal or conservative modernizers. Stolypin, the architect of the agrarian reforms designed to recruit rich and middling peasant support, was the potential conservative saviour of the regime, yet his influence at court was always precarious. The divided regime became buffeted by the personal irresoluteness of Nicholas and the reactionary folly of Alexandra. When monarchy begins to depend on the personal qualities of its monarchs, it is an endangered species. Russia represented the opposite pole to Japan within the spectrum of authoritarian monarchy – no corporate regime strategy, much depending on the monarch himself. On the other hand, economic and military modernization was proving remarkably successful in pre-war Russia. Could the regime find a comparably coherent political strategy? In 1914 the answer was not yet clear. Though regime weaknesses had begun to create what later proved to be its revolutionary grave-diggers, their influence was still negligible in 1914. The least successful case was Austria (become the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary in 1867), uniquely beset by nationality conflicts as well as class struggle across its variegated lands.

The monarchy attempted divide-and-rule on both fronts at once, but was faced by defections among ancien régime groups (Hungarian and Czech nobilities) as well as the hostility of bourgeois liberal nationalism. As the monarchy faltered, some peculiar alliances developed. After 1867 the most loyal and dominant groups in the two halves of the Dual Monarchy were the German nobility and bourgeoisie and the Hungarian nobility. But the monarchy found their support unwelcome because it alienated all the other nationalities these two exploited. After 1899 the Marxist SPD rejected nationalism as a bourgeois creed, thereby becoming to its surprise the major de facto supporter of the transnational monarchy. The monarchy belatedly converted to parliamentary institutions similar to Germany’s (universal suffrage to parliaments whose rights were subordinate to the monarchy’s), and tried to reach out to exploited nationalities and even classes.

But noble and bourgeois nationalists, not the proletariat, made the parliaments unworkable, and they were dissolved. This authoritarian monarchy could not even retain the loyalty of the whole ancien régime, let alone incorporate the bourgeoisie. By 1914 the regime consisted of the monarchy, the army, and the largely tactical support of various national and class groupings. Its corporate solidarity was probably the weakest of the four cases.

The four cases reveal considerable variation in regime strategy and success. The crucial criteria of success were to maintain the corporate coherence of the ancien régime, and to modernize by incorporating sections of the bourgeoisie. It is outside the scope of this article to attempt to explain why some régimes did much better than others at these tasks. However, régimes seem not to have prospered or faltered because of the strength in general class and numerical terms of bourgeoisie and proletariat. In these terms the rising classes in Germany were initially the most threatening, those of Japan the least threatening, with Austria and Russia somewhere in between. This is not the same ordering as for regime success. The bulk of the explanation of success would seem to lie among the traditional regimes and classes, not among the rising classes.

At its most coherent, authoritarian monarchy provided a distinctive mixture of
citizen rights — a fair degree of civil citizenship, minimal social citizenship, limited political citizenship, the whole varying by class and tactically undercut by an arbitrary monarchy and court-centred elite. Its social struggles were part ideological class struggle, part incorporated interest-group jostling, erratically violent yet institutionalized nonetheless. Was this the third viable strategy for advanced industrial societies? Could it have survived the working class pressure indefinitely? But for the fortunes of war, would it still survive today in three of the four greatest industrial powers in the world, a united Germany, a Tsarist Russia, and an Imperial Japan? We cannot be sure because these regimes collapsed in war. But let us consider four supports for this counter-factual possibility.

First, in its own time Wilhelmine Germany was not idiosyncratic. Its emerging institutions were better-organized versions of the European mainstream. As Goldstein (1983) has shown, the combination of selective repression and sham parliaments was the late 19th century norm, not well-developed liberalism, still less reformism. For this reason German institutions were much copied, especially by Austria and Japan.

Second, by the time of their entry into the decisive war, 1914 (or 1941 in the case of Japan), the authoritarian monarchies were already becoming great industrial powers. Germany had overtaken Britain and France and was matched only by the United States. Japan and Russia were industrializing rapidly and successfully; and Russian economic resources, then as now, made up in quantity what they lacked in quality (quantitative indices of the economic strength of the Great Powers can be found in Bairoch, 1982). Authoritarian monarchy was surviving into advanced industrial societies in Germany and Japan, still had a reasonable chance in Russia, and was obviously failing only in Austria, where nations, not classes, provided the main threat.

Third, we must beware a too-homogeneous view of industrial society and its class struggles. The main reason the working class was not so threatening was its limited size. National censuses conducted between 1907 and 1911 show Britain to be exceptional. Only 9% of its working population was still in agriculture, compared to 32% in the US, 37% in Germany, and more than 55% in Russia. Among the major powers only in Britain were more working in manufacturing than in agriculture (Bairoch, 1968: Table A2 has assembled the census data). Outside Britain, labour needed the support of peasants and small farmers to achieve either reform of revolution. It achieved this partially in the ‘contested’ cases of France, Italy and Spain, and more sustainably in the ‘mixed’ cases of Scandinavia. But in Germany, Japan and Austria it failed dismally. Socialism was trapped in its urban-industrial enclaves, outvoted by the bourgeois-agrarian classes, and repressed by peasant soldiers and aristocratic officers. Authoritarian monarchy could continue to divide and rule and selectively repress provided it could manipulate divisions between agrarian and bourgeois classes, and motivate them both with fear of the proletariat. Few 20th century socialists have broken this strategy — Lenin being the obvious exception.

Fourth, the numerical weakness of labour has continued, though in changed form. The rise of the ‘new middle class’ and of the ‘service class’, the re-emergence of labour market dualism, and the increasing size and variety of service industries soon introduced new differentiations among the employed population, just as agriculture declined. Successful labour movements in the post-war period, like those
of Scandinavia, have managed to repeat their earlier populist strategy (Esping-Anderson, 1985). They have recruited white-collar workers and new economic sectors into the Social Democratic movement, just as they earlier recruited bourgeois radicals and small farmers. But could labour movements which had already failed to attract the bourgeoisie or farmers, as in Germany or Japan, now do better among newer groups? It is surely more plausible to conceive of divide-and-rule, selective repression strategies, wielded by arbitrary authoritarian monarchies, surviving successfully today in Germany and Japan, and possibly also in Russia and constituent parts of Austria-Hungary.

I conclude that the third strategy, authoritarian monarchy, could probably have survived into advanced, post-industrial society, providing a distinctive, corporately organized, arbitrary combination of partial civil, political and social citizenship. This was not envisaged by Marshall, or indeed by any modern sociologist.

*Fascism and authoritarian socialism*

World War I resulted in two further strategies, fascism and authoritarian socialism. Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union are their exemplars. Both used more repression, using the infrastructural capacities of the 20th century state, and proclaiming violent legitimating ideologies. In practice, as in all regimes, repression had to be combined with negotiation. Both regimes delineated out-groups with whom they would not negotiate: for both, anyone providing principled opposition; for the Nazis labour leaders, socialists, Jews and other non-Aryan groups; for the Soviets, major property-owners. But other interest groups – never acknowledged as antagonistic classes – could join the regime, establish cliques within and clients without, and bargain and jostle in time-honoured absolutist style. Now social struggles were not openly acknowledged at all. But within the regime they would continue, flaring into intermittent life with purges, riots and even armed factional struggle.

Neither regime provided civil rights; neither provided real political citizenship (though they provided the institutions of sham corporatism and socialism). Yet they moved furthest toward social citizenship. Fascism's move was hesitant: full employment and public works programmes were not greatly in advance of others of the time (and were partially an outcome of a more important policy goal, rearmament). But had the regime survived the war, its encroachments on capitalism would surely have extended the state's role in guaranteeing subsistence. The Soviet regime has gone much further, proud of its programme of social citizenship. The state formally provides the subsistence of all (though the reality, with private peasant plots and black markets, is less clear-cut).

Of course, German Fascism was deeply unstable. But this was due to the restless militarism of its leaders in geo-politics, not to its class strategy. Indeed, this was remarkably successful in a short space of time. The proletariat was suppressed more completely than any of the regimes discussed so far would have believed possible. Its leaders were killed or exiled; its organizations disbanded or staffed by the regime's para-military forces; its masses silenced, seemingly with the approval of other social classes. The bourgeoisie was emasculated even more effectively than the Wilhelmine regime had managed. The liberals were killed or silenced, the rest kept quiet or
loudly voiced their support. Ruthlessness was no longer hidden by scruple. Thus Fascism might have offered a fourth, chilling resolution to class struggle in advanced societies. Its main test would have been the next one: could it take on capital too? It was already beginning to do this by subordinating economic profit to militarism. This proved its downfall — but not at the hands of domestic social classes, who fought loyally for the Nazi regime down to its last days.

The stability of the fifth solution, authoritarian socialism, cannot be in doubt. The Bolsheviks and their ruling successors soon cowed the bourgeoisie, and gradually domesticated the labour movement. The trade unions were converted into a-political welfare state organizations (sometimes headed by ex-KGB men). It took almost fifty years for the institutionalization to be complete. But once in place, it appears no less stable than other enduring types of regime.

The impact of war and geo-politics

I have described five viable regime strategies and mixtures of citizenship: liberalism, reformism, authoritarian monarchy, Fascism and authoritarian socialism. Yet industrial society today has lost some of this variety. Authoritarian monarchy and Fascism no longer exist. Why? Is it because of their inherent defects or instability? I have already suggested not.

There is an alternative explanation. To paraphrase a famous epitaph on the Roman Empire — these regimes did not die of natural causes, they were assassinated. Of course, Fascism and authoritarian socialism were also born out of assassination. But for the fortunes of World War I, authoritarian monarchy might be alive today, while Fascism and authoritarian socialism might never have been born. But for the fortunes of World War II Fascism might dominate the world today. True, it is difficult to see American liberalism being overthrow by the German, Austrian and Japanese alliances. But Europe and Russia might well have had viable futures under very different regimes.

Of course, proof of this argument would require disposing of the reverse causality: regime type might have determined the role of war. This could have happened in two stages. Certain regimes — obviously the more authoritarian ones — may have been more militaristic and provoked the world wars; yet they may have been less effective at fighting them. The first stage has validity. The Nazis and Japanese did aggress in World War II; and, in a more confused, stumbling way, the authoritarian monarchies did start World War I. But is the second stage of the argument valid? Were liberalism, reformism and authoritarian socialism better suited to mass mobilization warfare? The ideologies of the victors suggest the answer 'yes'. I have only time here to give fragmentary evidence, but my answer is 'no'.

In both wars the German army fought better than its enemies, who continuously needed numerical superiority to survive. German civilians also loyally supported their regimes to the end. Both points hold also for the Japanese in the second war. The Eastern Front in the first war offers further shocks to the liberal/reformist perspective. Authoritarian monarchy Russia outfought the by now semi-autoritarian monarchy of Austria-Hungary, whose troops in turn outfought the by now largely liberal regime of Italy. Indeed, when in 1917 the Austro-Hungarian armies against Russia collapsed, they were stiffened by Prussian officers and NCOs
and then began to get the upper hand (Stone, 1975). The Central and Axis powers were correct in their view that the fortunes of war turned less upon citizenship than on efficient military organization. Unfortunately for them, military efficiency became over-weighted by numbers. Numbers resulted principally from the alliance system — how may powerful states were on each side? Authoritarian monarchy and Fascism were defeated by superior geo-political alliances, not by their domestic socio-political structure.

After 1945 this result was deliberately rammed home by the victors, careful not to repeat the mistakes of the peace treaties of 1918 (see Maier, 1981). Eastern Europe was made safe for authoritarian socialism by the Red Army. Western Europe and Japan were more subtly made safe for liberal/reformist regimes (though Japan’s regime does not fit happily into this categorization, because of the survival of many authoritarian traditions). In Western Europe the authoritarian Right was eliminated by force, the revolutionary Left had the ground cut from under it by reforms and economic growth offered to governments and industrial relations systems of the Centre and Centre-Left. By 1950 the contest was over. A cross between Marshallian citizenship and American liberalism dominated the West, less through its internal evolution than through the fortunes of war. It still dominates today.

Marshall’s general argument was that industrial society institutionalized class struggle through mass citizenship. This seems true. All regimes have guaranteed some citizen rights. But they have done so in very different degrees and combinations. It is a more complex and less optimistic overall picture than he envisaged. But for the logic of geo-politics and war — including the sacrifices of his own generation — it might have been a very different and infinitely more depressing picture in Europe.

Sociologists are prone to forget that ‘evolution’ is usually geo-politically assisted. Dominant powers may impose their strategies on lesser powers; or the lesser may freely choose the dominator’s strategy because it is an obviously successful modernization strategy. This means that what ‘evolves’ depends on changing geo-political configurations.

Let me quote Ito Hirobumi, the principal author of the Meiji constitution of 1889:

“We were just then in an age of transition. The opinions prevailing in the country were extremely heterogeneous, and often diametrically opposed to each other...there was a large and powerful body of the younger generation educated at the time when the Manchester theory was in vogue, and who in consequence were ultra-radical in their ideas of freedom. Members of the bureaucracy were prone to lend willing ears to the German doctrinaires of the reactionary period, while, on the other hand, the educated politicians among the people having not yet tasted the bitter significance of administrative responsibility, were liable to be more influenced by the dazzling words and lucid theories of Montesquieu, Rousseau and similar French writers.”

I have taken this quotation from Bendix (1978:485) who uses it in support of a general evolutionist model of how Western ideals of popular representation supplanted monarchy everywhere. He rightly notes the importance of ‘reference societies’, more advanced societies to which modernizers could point with approval. But the quotation reveals that at the end of the 19th century there were at least three – Britain, France and Germany — and this reflected a real balance of power among several great powers. No single power could impose its will on others (outside its
colonial or regional sphere of influence). Modernizers could choose from among several regime strategies. That is far less the case today. The Soviet and Anglo-American strategies were imposed — in the East by force, in the West by assisting certain political factions and subverting others. The two strategies have worked in their different ways for 40 years, and are now backed by the economic, ideological, military and political resources of two hegemonic superpowers. Eastern Europe is still held down by force. In the Western European periphery, deviant regimes in Portugal, Spain and Greece have succumbed to the Anglo-American vision of modernization desired increasingly by their domestic elites. In the Third World there is more variety of choice, because most countries are more insulated from both Western and Eastern blocs, but the choices tend to be around the two models provided by the superpowers.

Geo-politics has also provided a second recent change: the emergence of nuclear weapons. Warfare at the highest level would now destroy society. Therefore, the war-assisted pattern of change dominant in the first half of the century cannot be repeated. The emergence of the superpowers and of nuclear weapons both indicate that the future of citizenship will be different from its past. Our assessment of its prospects must combine domestic with geo-political analysis.

Notes

1. An earlier version of this article was given as the 1986 T.H. Marshall Memorial Lecture at the University of Southampton. My thanks go to the University's Department of Sociology for its invitation and hospitality and to John Hall and David Lockwood for their helpful criticisms of that version.

2. I write 'Great Britain' rather than 'The United Kingdom' because there is also no reference to Northern Ireland, which, of course, would not fit well into his theory.

3. The historical generalizations contained in the rest of this essay are given more empirical and bibliographic support in Mann, 1989. For the distinction between despotic and infrastructural power, see Mann 1984.

4. The literature on Wilhelmine Germany is enormous and often controversial. Apart from works cited later, good concise general accounts are provided by Calleo, 1978:57 – 84, and by various essays in Sheehan, 1976.

5. Kaiser, 1983: 458 – 62, makes this argument, against the more traditional view of writers like Berghahn, 1972, that the regime feared the Left and militarized society to counter its threat.


7. I am grateful to Professor Michio Morishima for this observation.

8. Historical sociologists have tended to ignore Austria, except in relation to nationalism. For a narrative that enables us to piece together most of the complex relations between regime, classes and nations, see Kann 1964.

References


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