

# Were the Perpetrators of Genocide "Ordinary Men" or "Real Nazis"? Results from Fifteen Hundred Biographies

Michael Mann

University of California, Los Angeles

An analysis of the largest such sample yet assembled, this article surveys the biographies of 1,581 men and women involved in Nazi genocide. The quantitative study of these perpetrators suggests that they resemble "Real Nazis" more than they do "Ordinary Germans." Most of the Sudeten Germans, the women, and the foreign ethnic-Germans who were recruited only after the Wehrmacht "liberated" their countries did seem relatively "ordinary." But among the remaining ninety percent of the sample, two-thirds were long-term Nazis, a third had been prewar extremists, and "careers" in violence were common. Perpetrators came disproportionately from "core Nazi constituencies." The more committed Nazis were of higher rank and longer experience—bringing the pressures of hierarchy and comradeship to bear on newer recruits. Previous scholars have shown how the Nazi movement was "radicalized" into genocide; biographies of its participants illustrate the social processes, institutional cultures, and power relations involved.

## Theories of the Perpetrators

The Nazi regime was the most genocidal the world has ever seen. During its short twelve years (overwhelmingly its last four) it killed approximately twenty million unarmed persons. From 1941 the so-called "Final Solution of the Jewish Question" was the centerpiece, killing between five and six million Jews (Hilberg, 1985; Maksudov, 1993). Yet Jews comprised only a third of the victims and their mass murder occurred well into the sequence. First had come prewar German street and camp murders, initially focussed on leftists and then, after *Kristallnacht*, aimed more at Jews. This was for a time overshadowed after 1939 by the "Euthanasia" project, codenamed T4, killing mentally retarded or mentally disturbed Germans (few of them Jews) in order to "improve the German racial stock." Though formally discontinued after it had eliminated 70,000 people, T4 actually continued in wartime secrecy, killing perhaps 250,000 all told (Burleigh, 1994; Klee, 1983; de Mildt, 1996); racist biology also dictated the elimination of "asocials" (repeat criminals), homosexuals, and persons with

grievous birth defects as "biological impurities." Some small ethnic minorities were decimated: Kashubians and Sorbians in Germany, Krimchaks in the Crimea. More than 200,000 Gypsies were killed (Kenrick and Puxon, 1972; Crowe, 1996; Hancock, 1996). Yet Slavs, defined as *Untermenschen*, were the most numerous victims—3 million Poles, 7 million Soviet civilians and 3.3 million Soviet POWs (Gutman, 1990; Hunczak, 1990: 122–24; Kumanev, 1990: 140; Streit, 1978: 10). Some 57% of Soviet POWs died, compared to fewer than 4% of the British and American POWs, whom as a whole the Nazis did not view as racial inferiors. Jews, Slavs, and leftists were conjoined in the Nazis' view of their main "enemy," the "Judeo-Bolshevik." All were seen as "parasitic and degenerative alien organisms" in the body of the race-nation.

I draw two contrary conclusions from this. First, the victims were killed in the name of a ferocious ideology that pursued a project of what I call extreme "nation-statism"—exclusionary organic nationalism plus authoritarian statism; Mommsen (1991) and others have described how this movement "radicalized" between 1933 and 1941 into a project of mass murder to achieve "race purity." Many long-term extremists espoused this ideology, and so everyday language (including that of many survivors) labels them "real Nazis." Additionally, such an enormous project involved a veritable army of less ideological participants across many institutions—T4 plus "wild [spontaneous] euthanasia"; the *Einsatzgruppen* shooting squads and support battalions; Waffen-SS and Wehrmacht units; the five death camps plus thousands of other camps; ghetto clearances and slave-labor establishments plus all their ancillary offices and transports. The total number of perpetrators is quite unknown but, as Goldhagen (1996: 168) suggests, it must have been "staggering." This was mass behavior committed by people whose prior attachment to Nazism must have been slight.

Thus we have had two main common-sensical but contradictory views of the perpetrators. The first is that these were "peculiar people," though in either of two different senses:

(1a) They were "real Nazis," committed to extreme nation-statism radicalized into murderous ethnic/political cleansing. They were *ideological* killers.

(1b) They were "real Nazis" in the other common-sense meaning of being men and women whose hatreds, fed by disturbed personalities, resulted in sadistic behavior. Perhaps they were alienated misfits with marginal or unhappy social or personal backgrounds or career trajectories, killing because they were *disturbed* killers.

Alternatively, and increasingly in recent years, five popular views see the perpetrators as "ordinary people," more or less like you or me, only placed in different circumstances:

(2a) They reflected the prejudices of their place and time, prejudices that could be bent toward an ideology of murderous ethnic and political cleansing. "Ordinary Germans" were murderous anti-Semites, says Goldhagen (1996); they viewed Slavs as *Untermenschen* without much urging from Nazism. These were ordinary *bigoted* killers.

(2b and c) They were ordinary people trapped into coercive yet also comradely organizations. Non-compliance with orders would have involved costs: punishment by the hierarchy, withdrawal of comradeship by peers. The implication is that people of all nationalities present, past, or future are made cowardly conformists by social pressure. This is largely how Browning (1993) explained the mass murder committed by Police Battalion 101 (cf. Birn, 1998: 98–100) They were *fearful or compliant* killers.

(2d) They were “ordinary people” trapped inside the “bureaucracies of modernity,” in which obedience to orders is neither ideological nor socially pressured, but the product of institutionalized routines and careers, caught up in Arendt’s (1965) “banality of evil” (cf. Baumann, 1989; Katz, 1993). Bartov (1996) agrees, tracing its origins to the “mechanized, rational, and impersonal” killing inaugurated by World War I. They were *bureaucratic* killers.

(2e) They were ordinary people pursuing material goals. They might be cultivating careers or just a decently-paid secure job amid difficult wartime conditions; or they might be interested in taking the jobs or possessions of the victims. These were *materialist* killers, including a sub-group (probably more middle-class) of *careerists*.

And so we have a rich panoply of potential killers—ideological, disturbed, bigoted, fearful, conformist, bureaucratic, materialist, careerist. Even this richness oversimplifies, since it tends to “freeze” motives, so that we view the perpetrators as unchanging. In fact, I hope later to trace their “careers” toward and during killing. Nonetheless, these seven characterizations give us a helpful starting-point. Leaders and militants *were* committed Nazis, murdering supposed “enemies” for what they thought were “idealistic” reasons. Some perpetrators *were* considered by reliable witnesses to be sadists, seeming to enjoy their atrocities—some of their behavior seems to leave us no other conclusion. The institutions of genocide *were* coercive, comradely, well-paid, secure, career-friendly, and routinized. Murderous cleansing also yielded loot. Such an army of perpetrators *must* have included fairly ordinary people. Most perpetrators probably had mixed motives. The problem is to assess the relative strength of the seven explanations in the overall extermination experience to see how they might have changed through a process of Nazi radicalization.

### Previous Evidence on the Perpetrators

The existing literature includes many case studies of individual perpetrators and organizations. Many offer greater psychological depth than can a quantitative study like this. Yet evidence on motives is problematic. It has to rely heavily on the testimony of the perpetrators, and so is biased toward “ordinariness” and “banality.” In postwar trials the accused denied racist, anti-Semitic, or murderous intent, claiming “I was only following orders,” “I was only a small cog in a giant machine,” “I was in the motor pool/personnel records/the cookhouse all the time.” Few incriminated each other. Most denied having ever had conversations with their colleagues about the genocide: truly an ideology-free environment in which “ordinary people” committed evil “un-

thinkingly," trapped inside coercive, bureaucratic institutions! Yet few of us would accept uncritically such self-serving testimony.

And when motives are so confused it is doubtful we can fully test the "disturbed" hypothesis (1b above). True, court-appointed psychologists have expressed opinions on a few defendants, usually concluding they were sane. A Nuremberg court psychologist reported that the defendants' personalities "are not unique or insane . . . they could be duplicated in any country of the world today." Camp survivors usually report that only a handful of the guards were actual sadists. Yet for the mass of perpetrators we lack adequate psychological data.

Consider, for example, one of the seemingly more honest perpetrators, the commandant of Auschwitz. It is easy to feel we know Rudolf Höss, since he composed a frank *Memoir* in 1945 (Höss et al., 1978). Already sentenced to death, Höss did not conceal the enormity of the killing-machine he had supervised. The *Memoir* is a calm and measured account of the organization and personnel of the death camp, by an obviously sane senior manager. Some have stressed his ordinary qualities. Katz (1993: 61-79) calls him "a Nazi bureaucrat," "an administrative functionary" attached to order, cleanliness, tidiness, and obedience to authority—the epitome, he concludes, of "the ordinary modern bureaucrat."

Yet this seems an extravagant extension of the word "ordinariness." Consider Höss's career. He began as a teenage volunteer soldier in World War I. After the War, at age nineteen, he joined the *Freikorps*, killing Latvians, Poles, and German communists. His unit was dissolved after it killed one of its own members, a suspected traitor. The leading killer, Höss, was convicted of murder. Released in 1928, however, he went straight into the "Artamen League," a Nazi agrarian organization; he was a full-time party militant until 1934, when he became one of the first concentration camp guards, at Dachau. He served in the camps until 1945. Höss may have been an efficient manager, but he certainly was a highly ideological Nazi, his adult life caged entirely within proto-Nazi and Nazi organizations, steeped in violence. It is difficult to picture him as an ordinary manager, or as representing "modernity."

Such is the justification for my method herein, which seeks to shed light on the perpetrators by analyzing simple, objective features of their backgrounds and careers. What kinds of biography preceded their terrible actions? Which of the hypotheses elucidated above do they support?

Previous studies do not permit authoritative answers. No study treats the entire corps of perpetrators, only particular sub-groups. But most stress three rather "ordinary" features of perpetrators' lives. First, they maintained fairly normal private lives amid their ghastly work, living with their families or writing loving letters home, celebrating life's rituals, having affairs. Of West German war crimes trial defendants whose marital state was known, 72% remained married at the time of their trial (Opitz, 1976: 170). Second, they were ordinary in the sense of their unexceptional talents. Arad (1987: 198) speaks for many authors when he describes the *Aktion Rein-*

*hard* death camp staff as people without exceptional qualities or characteristics. Third, their prior occupations have often seemed quite typical of Germany. Hilberg says "the machinery of destruction was a remarkable cross-section of the German population. Every profession, every skill, and every social status was represented" (1978: 649). Lasik (1994: 279) says pre-Auschwitz occupations reveal a "camp staff very much like the society from which it was drawn" (cf. von Hentig, 1967; Browning, 1993; Goldhagen, 1996). Recent research on Nazis in general has tended to argue that they also were drawn from all social classes (see Fischer's survey, 1995). These three characteristics mean that, shorn of their uniforms, swagger, and cause, the aging sober-suited defendants in postwar trials looked remarkably like the German man and woman in the street outside. It might comfort us if the evil of mass murderers were visible in their bearing: then they might have less in common with us.

In any case, we know rather little about perpetrator biographies. We have no precise data on economic sectors, though the public sector must have been over-represented. We know little about regional origins. Researchers on Nazis in general have concluded that they were drawn from all areas of Germany, yet this has been usually based on rather formal categorizations of region (North v. South, East v. West, Prussia versus other states, etc.), uninformed by any theoretical hypothesis. Merkl's re-examination of the sample of 1930s Nazi militants that Abel originally studied is the exception (1975: 133-38). He found men from the "lost territories" and "threatened borders" over-represented—because these areas were likely to generate extreme nationalists. These were examples of what I shall call "core Nazi constituencies." Perhaps they also provided many perpetrators. Most scholars also see Austrians and "ethnic Germans" from abroad as over-represented. Koehl (1983) believes the SS was especially successful at recruiting Austrians and Sudeten Germans, though he produces no actual figures. Banach's (1998: 50) figures for security policemen do not suggest Austrian or Sudeten over-representation, nor much skewed representation among the German states—except that the more Catholic states (Baden and Bavaria) are somewhat under-represented. He also found Catholics under-represented among security policemen (1998: 142). Lasik (1994) intriguingly found the reverse among Auschwitz staff, which is at odds with our knowledge of Nazis in general, who were disproportionately from Protestant backgrounds. Yet Lasik could not distinguish between Germans and Austrians in his sample, and accepts that Catholic Austrians might be biasing his result.

Did perpetrators already have "careers" in Nazism and violence? We know most about T4 personnel. Since they killed non-Jewish Germans, they were the group most likely to be brought to postwar trial in Germany. Most scholars emphasize how varied they were, some being highly selected through party or personal networks for their known "reliability," others being ordinary party members, totally unaware of the tasks awaiting them (e.g., Horwitz, 1990: 64-68). Yet de Mildt (1996: 311) believes that careerism shines through this variety:

they were not killers by conviction but by circumstance and opportunity. Instead of matching the image of the paranoid ideological warriors . . . their background profile far more closely matches that of rather ordinary citizens with a well-developed calculating instinct for their private interests. . . . The key word which springs to mind . . . is not "idealism" but "opportunism."

Banach (1998), Browder (1996), and Gellately (1990) emphasize variety among the Gestapo and other security policemen. Yet though they tend to identify more "ordinary" men than "ideological" Nazis, their work helps us break down the dichotomy with which we started. For they stress a congruence between the ordinary values and practices of police work at this time and the general ethos of Nazism. Though only a minority had been Nazis before 1933, almost all appreciated the special powers the Nazis conferred on them to hunt and interrogate suspects. Browder argues that the institutional identity conferred by security policework had a kind of elective affinity with Nazism. Policemen were further seduced into more "radical" Nazism by the escalating routine violence of their profession during the 1930s. Rather "tough" conceptions of public order were thus compatible with the Nazi stress on statism—as two leading, but initially non-Nazi, policemen in my sample, Müller and Nebe, discovered on their way to becoming major perpetrators.

Proctor (1988) interprets medical practice under the Third Reich similarly. Since race was already a "natural" object of German medical science before the Nazis came to power, there was already a strong affinity between medical "science" and Nazi doctrine. Allen (1995) likewise notes that administrators and engineers working for the WVHA (the SS camps headquarters) found an affinity between their commitment to scientific management and the seeming Nazi commitment to an ordered, rational society. Thus professional institutions and subcultures might draw "innocent" people toward Nazism—and then perhaps murder. This sociological view sees ideology less as abstract, fixed doctrine than as the drawing of general conclusions from one's own cumulative experience—blurring the distinction between the "ordinary person" and the "real Nazi." I will build on these insights.

Among the mobile killing units, the two well-known studies of Auxiliary Police Battalion 101 agree that most of the policemen had no long-term background in Nazism. Browning says they were "ordinary men," trapped into committing genocide by the pressures of hierarchy and comradeship (hypothesis 2b above). Goldhagen says they were "ordinary Germans," murdering because (like all Germans) they were bursting with "eliminationist anti-Semitism" (hypothesis 2a; Goldhagen is silent on their motives when killing Russians). Both stress that the policemen were draftees and not individually selected; few were Nazis before the war, and their prior occupations were representative of Hamburg, whence most came.

These studies would suggest that perpetrators' biographies varied greatly. Sometimes the variations seem patterned in obvious ways: the higher the rank, the greater the Nazism, and there were more committed Nazis in core SS and Party

organizations than in auxiliary police forces (Sandkühler, 1996; Pohl, 1996: 81–96; Jansen and Weckbecker, 1992: 79–81; Lichtenstein, 1990; Browning, 1993: 45–48). The higher Einsatzgruppen officers were ideological Nazis (and highly-educated—Müller-Hill, 1994; cf. Headland, 1992: 208). Thus the higher ranks in core institutions were brimming with long-term Nazis. Birn finds imposing histories of Nazism, and usually of political violence, in the careers of the forty-five highest-ranked SS-Police officers. Himmler himself selected them, and he “compared himself to a plant breeder—selecting, weeding out, and nurturing” (1986, 1991: 351). Segev (1987) reveals long-term Nazi careers, if more hit-and-miss selection procedures, among thirty concentration camp commanders. So does Safrian (1993) in his work on Eichmann’s staff.

Scholars also have noted how genocidal institutions developed over time. With “tough” tasks in mind, their founders took to recruiting people up to such tasks—“Old Fighters,” or persons deemed “reliable,” “ice-cold,” “tough,” or “sound.” Some later institutions were initially staffed from earlier ones, already involved in the encouragement of violent practices. Austrians picked for “tough” tasks after the *Anschluss* were often those who had fled Austria after the unsuccessful Nazi rising of 1934, then trained in Germany as full-time revolutionaries of the “Austrian Legion.” The first actual death camps (Sobibor, Belzec, and Treblinka) were opened with 97 staff members drawn from T4. Auschwitz was started with personnel trained under the “tough” prewar camp regime pioneered by Eicke at Dachau. Applicants to the SS were screened up to the mid-1930s, but then came great expansion, escalating during wartime, when the camps had to compete against the needs of the Front: the luxury of selecting known individuals declined, and recruits were found any which way—including drafting older police reservists and wounded soldiers unable to serve in combat. And thus perpetrators got more “ordinary” as their numbers expanded. Obviously we must investigate the social relationships involved in this expansion—between officers and men, between experienced killers and increasingly raw recruits. Sofsky (1996) argues that these relations helped the death camps accomplish genocide. Was this so?

### Sampling Perpetrators

To cope with the variety revealed in previous studies, we ideally need a sample of the whole corps of perpetrators. Otherwise scholars might forever generalize on the basis of particular sub-groups, using a few biographies to support their own theory. Yet we cannot draw up a total population of perpetrators from which a representative sample might be selected. The obvious strategy is to rely on those tried and found guilty by the postwar courts, but some perpetrators died in the war, others disappeared, some were unaccountably never tried, some were tried but surprisingly acquitted—because they may have killed most of the potential witnesses, or because the court showed dubious leniency (as in acquitting T4 doctors who had perpetrated mass kill-

ing because "they did not realize this was wrong"). Some countries' courts were far more lenient than others. Some groups were also more likely to be brought to court—officers directing actual killing-sites, persons involved in routinized killing in settings where there were also survivors (especially camp doctors, whose prisoner assistants often survived), and those whose personal brutality made their faces memorable to survivors. Most rank-and-file perpetrators who kept their heads down remained anonymous and free. All samples are biased. Thus, for example, among the convicted we find far more officers than men, and far more men than women, since the latter were usually not officers.

Two imperfect sampling strategies remain. We can avoid selection biases by using the limited data available on all persons involved in a single murderous setting, as Lasik (1994) did for Auschwitz camp staff or Browning (1993) did for Police Battalion 101. Yet each sub-group may have its peculiarities; more important, only some of its members may have actually been perpetrators of murder. Second, we can attempt a broader sample. By centering on postwar trials—despite their biases—in order to reach large numbers, we can use the richer, though variable, detail provided to the courts. To this core, we might add biographical data on the most likely perpetrators among the disappeared, the dead, and the dead lucky.

I here adopt this second strategy, collecting biographical data on 1,581 presumed German war criminals, derived from published court accounts, newspaper clipping files, and scholarly studies of perpetrators.<sup>1</sup> *Justiz und NS-Verbrechen*, the twenty-two-volume digest of West German trials occurring between 1947 and 1965 (Bauer, ed., 1968–1981), provided over one-third of my sample. The rest came from the large number of sources (almost all published) that I have marked with an asterisk in my bibliography. This is an analysis based overwhelmingly on secondary research, a first attempt at quantitative analysis of perpetrators. It could and should be strengthened by further primary research in the archives.

I included persons found guilty of murder or directly organizing or assisting murder in postwar trials in various countries (993 persons), plus persons whose guilt of the same crimes seems probable but who either died in the war (101), committed suicide at its end (62), escaped conviction (339), or whose fate is unknown to me (86). In these last four categories much depends on my judgement of likely guilt. I could have avoided this by studying only those found guilty by the courts, but this would increase sample reliability at the cost of decreasing its validity.

Included are the top Nazis: those operating the central SS killing machine (the RSHA); the "Higher SS and Police Leaders" (HSSPF) in the occupied territories; about three-quarters of the Nazi Party *Gauleiter* (those whose complicity in murder seems clear); and senior officers of the Einsatzgruppen. As we descend through the ranks, representation of the total perpetrators becomes thinner. The most notorious mid-level officers are men like Adolf Eichmann and Klaus Barbie. Josef Mengele leads the infamous company of doctors. Many of the lower ranks tend to be remembered not by their real names but by terrible nicknames: a second "Angel of Death"



(i.e., besides Mengele); "the Beast of Belsen"; the "Bitch of Buchenwald"; etc. They come from all over the killing-fields, men and women who ordered or committed repeated killings of Jews, Slavs, Gypsies, mental patients, and others. Nor is this sample without bias. It has far more leaders than led, and more of those who left paper-trails (including Nazi Party or SS membership cards). Nonetheless, it remains the largest and most representative sample of mass murderers yet studied.

I collected data on place and date of birth, religion, normal or disturbed family backgrounds, prior occupations of self and father, prior history in the Nazi movement, prior involvement in violence, wartime activities, and postwar fate. The bane of such research is the variability of data—complete for some individuals, sparse for others. The sample could be enlarged and missing data could be found by archival work amid SS and NSDAP files in Berlin, prosecutors' files in Ludwigsburg and Vienna, and the postwar files of the former communist states. This sample is only a preliminary attempt at collective-biographical research that should have been completed long ago.

In this study I sought four main biographical clues: (1) Were the perpetrators drawn from what I call "core Nazi constituencies"? Pre-1933 Nazis had been disproportionately drawn from: military, police, or public-sector backgrounds; economic sectors lying outside the key class conflict zones between capital and labor (i.e., not large-scale manufacturing and mining); the middle classes and the highly educated; "lost" and "threatened" territories; and, amid all these environments, from Protestants rather than from Catholics. Such backgrounds had tended to favor extreme nationalism or extreme statism, and so to generate Nazis before 1933.<sup>2</sup> Of course, before 1933 little suggested that such views might lead to mass murder. But would such backgrounds be even more characteristic of the perpetrators, suggesting that their involvement in mass murder might have partially flowed from such broader ideological commitments? (2) Were they involved early and/or youthfully in Nazism? Had they been full-time and/or highly committed Nazis? (3) Were they involved early and/or youthfully in illegal, violent, or murderous activities, before the main phase of exterminations? This might indicate careers in, and inurement to, violence. (4) Did they experience social marginality, downward mobility, unemployment, or family trauma? What Staub (1992: Chap. 3) has termed "the psychology of hard times" might push people to aggression or scapegoating of others. Without real psychological data, this is as close as I can get to evidence for the "disturbed" hypothesis (1b).

Note that the combination of 1 through 3 above might also indicate a process of career "caging" inside violent Nazism, led by socialization and initial ideological preference toward becoming "real Nazis" (hypothesis 1a). Conversely, if in all four respects the perpetrators were not unusual but broadly representative of "ordinary Germans," then a version of hypothesis (2) might be supported.

### Overall Sample Characteristics

Table 1 summarizes the sample's characteristics, divided into the main genocidal institutions.<sup>3</sup> The varying totals in the last column reveal often incomplete data. This

**Table 1**  
**Selected Characteristics of Sample by War Crimes Sector**

	T4	Doctors	Camp	Einsatzgruppen	Security Police	Nazi Party	Other	All	Total N
% women	22	5	9	0	1	0	4	5	1581
% NCOs or below	67	0	71	28	16	3	18	36	1562
% working class	63	0	64	35	29	14	22	37	1216
% university graduates	25	99	5	34	43	54	49	41	912
% state employees	24	6+ <sup>4</sup>	21	58	53	51	57	40	1152
% with absent parent(s)	20	11	19	20	19	2	13	16	650
% with disrupted careers	21	11	47	16	30	9	13	24	765
% full-time/violent Nazis	53	51	62	72	95	100	60	72	784
average age joined Nazis	27	29	28	27	28	29	33	28	1159
average age in 1939	34	35	32	33	35	41	41	35	1562
% birthplace rural	30	25	38	32	25	36	28	32	1471
% birthplace 80%+ Catholic	46	37	32	31	30	40	30	33	1556
% foreign ethnic Germans	33	23	31	28	28	31	16	28	1581
% sentenced to life/ death <sup>5</sup>	28	46	35	35	44	41	32	37	1580
Number in sample	141 <sup>6</sup>	109	458 <sup>7</sup>	291	305	121	200 <sup>8</sup>		1581

raises methodological problems: Can we assume, for example, that data on inter-generational mobility for under 600 persons (limited at that by lack of information on father's occupation) can be generalized to all 1,581 persons in the sample? Perhaps not—but it is certainly better than nothing.

Note that 95% of my sample were men. Women were more than five percent only in T4 (as nurses and secretaries) and in the camps (as warders of women prisoners). This reflects the real participation of women in Nazi genocide. Women formed about 10% of concentration camp staff, as they did among all camp staff (Schwarz, 1994: 35). Given women's subordinate roles at the time, and their exclusion from full SS membership, their participation outside these two spheres was usually limited to indirect administrative assistance.

The women in my sample were much less educated and middle-class than the men, and only the six women doctors had a rank equivalent to that of officer. Few had a Nazi track record. Only 16% are recorded as having joined an adult Nazi organization before 1939. None were known to have participated in prior violence, and few chose their positions. Most women warders said they were conscripted and spent two to four weeks training at one of the main camps (Schwarz, 1994). The postwar prosecutors usually failed to show that accused women were "real Nazis." Some had male family members who were active Nazis (our sample contains one married couple, the infamous Kochs of Buchenwald), and surviving prisoners said only a few of the women had strong Nazi sympathies. Unfortunately, I lack systematic data on either, since the courts recorded this only sporadically. The women raise most acutely a methodological difficulty of this kind of research. Does lack of information mean

actual absence? Not necessarily. Some must have had strong Nazi views, though few had previously acted upon them and few seem "caged" within Nazism or prewar violence.

The second row of this table reveals that most of my sample were officers.<sup>9</sup> Though they did not form a majority in my camp subsample, they were still over-represented there compared to Lasik's (1994a: 282) more complete data on Auschwitz staff. Since my coverage of the major camps is good, the bias was probably in the prosecution process, not my sample selection. This also explains my skewed distribution of occupational class (compared to Lasik's). Other than for the camps and T4 the working-class figures little in my sample, while elite occupations are almost ten times over-represented. Approximately 41% of the sample had a university education. Obviously, this is a sample composed substantively of fairly elite perpetrators.

### Life Traumas

Tables 1 and 2 contain the rather limited available data relevant to life traumas and to hypothesis 1(b). Only sixteen percent of the sample suffered the loss or incapacitation of a parent (through death, severe injury, divorce, or desertion) while under the age of 19, which seems low in a period when average life expectancy was around 50 and which included World War I. Only 30 persons (4.6%) among the 650 with adequate family histories had lost a parent or had seen a parent psychologically shattered in the war (22 fathers, 5 mothers, 3 both). The disturbed biography of the Gestapo torturer Klaus Barbie is well-known (Linklater et al., 1984). His father had returned home shattered by his experiences in World War I. He drank heavily and beat his family. Klaus was not a happy child and his schoolboy worship of Hitler may have been displaced father-worship. Yet such traumas seem few in my sample, which runs against the grain of Loewenberg's (1983: 259-80) theory that loss of a father figure led to authoritarianism and Führer-worship—if this was assumed to lead on to the commission of war crimes at Hitler's behest. In any case, the decisive point about Barbie's biography is that he was informing for the Gestapo while still at school, joined it full-time on graduation, and never subsequently left its embrace. It was his home, his cage.

Disrupted employment affected 24% (Table 1, row 7). Again this seems quite low. Unemployment in Germany went over 30% in 1933 alone, and Browder found that at least 32% of his SD officers had been unemployed. My measure actually includes a little more than unemployment. It also covers business failure and charges of embezzlement at work. But for a third of these, Nazi or SA or SS membership had come first; for them disruption could have been a consequence of spending too much time with the movement (some said this). For half, Nazism had come after career disruption, and could therefore have been a consequence of it; for the remaining one-sixth, Nazism and disruption appeared too closely together to separate cause and effect. Thus at most 16% of the sample might have suffered career disruptions that

**Table 2**  
**Inter-Generational Social Mobility Among Male Perpetrators. Percentage of All Male Perpetrators in Each Category**

Father's Occupational Class	Own Occupational Class			Total %
	Elite	Lower Middle	Workers	
Elite occupations	19.6	12.0	1.2	32.8
Lower middle class	5.7	20.7	12.0	38.4
Workers	2.4	6.0	20.3	28.7
Total%	27.7	38.7	33.6	100.0
% in German labor force	2.8	42.7	54.6	100.0
Ratio of representation	9.89	0.91	0.62	

Total N = 581 male perpetrators for whom both occupations are known.

The occupation coded was the principal occupation stated for (a) father and (b) self during pre-Nazi career.

Occupations and classes are categorized as in the 1933 German Census:

Elite occupations = substantial landowners, entrepreneurs, higher managers, higher civil servants, academically trained professionals.

Lower middle class = independent craftsmen, nonacademic professionals, white collar, lower civil servants, small merchants, and farmers.

Workers = unskilled, semi-skilled, and skilled workers.

conceivably could lead through "the psychology of hard times" to extremist reactions. These people were not usually failures. Unemployment preceding Nazism mostly occurred to workers in my sample. Some said they had joined the Nazis hoping to get work from them. Though this was a self-serving claim in a war crimes trial (i.e., "I wasn't a real Nazi, just an ordinary German joining to get work"), it was probably often true for the "Bandwagon Nazis" who joined for careerist reasons (hypothesis 2e).

Evidence of prewar criminal marginality was very rare. Before the war only ten had been convicted or formally accused of crimes other than political ones. The true figure was presumably somewhat higher, since this was not information to be revealed freely. But had I included Kapos (prisoner-foremen) in my sample, this would have been different. Many of their records reveal a lifetime of drifting, petty crime, family disruption, and unemployment. Most of them were in the camps because they were criminals. They had not been prewar Nazis, nor had my sample included common criminals. Table 2 provides a crude overall assessment of social mobility. Most perpetrators (60.6%) were neither upwardly nor downwardly mobile compared with their fathers. Somewhat more were mobile in a downward (25.2%) than an upward (14.1%) direction. However, at least half the difference among the best-documented persons seemed the result rather than the cause of their political commitment: militant Nazis rarely cultivated their careers. Unlike the prewar Nazi leadership (especially the *Gauleiter*; Rogowski, 1977), the perpetrators had not previously experienced much upward mobility. They resembled Jamin's (1984) prewar SA sample: mostly rather static, though with a little more downward mobility (which she tends to overplay).

Thus few perpetrators seem to have had very disrupted lives of the kind that might produce severe frustrations, aggression, or scapegoating for personal unhappiness. This bears on hypothesis 1(b), though hardly conclusively.


## Region

For many variables we mainly want to know if the sample differed from the German population as a whole. Thus I calculate a "ratio of representation," the percentage of perpetrators with a given characteristic divided by the percent contribution of people with this characteristic in the German population or labor force as a whole. A ratio of more than 1.0 thus means over-representation of perpetrators with this characteristic, a ratio of less than 1.0 under-representation.

Were perpetrators drawn from particular regions? I coded birthplaces into the provinces and sub-provinces distinguished in the Reich census of 1933 (as reported in *Statistisches Reichsamt*, 1935), plus areas abroad containing "ethnic Germans" potentially available for recruitment to genocidal institutions: 6.4 million Austrians (the German 94% of the population); 1.5 million Germans in the lands lost to Poland and Czechoslovakia after World War I; 600,000 more in the rest of Poland; 3.2 million Sudeten Germans; 2 million Germans in the rest of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, the Baltic States, and Italy combined; and 350,000 in the western "lost territories" of Schleswig-Holstein, Alsace-Lorraine, and the Malmédy area of Belgium. Though twenty perpetrators were born in Russia, to include the large population of Germans in Russia would not be reasonable, since most would not have been able to get to the German lines to join in the genocide even had they wanted to. In any case I had already included virtually the entire supposedly Germanic population of eastern Europe, though not all of these would have considered themselves as such. There can be no exact population of "available" ethnic Germans, but my estimate of 14 million cannot be far off. The map shows birthplaces, with each region given a ratio of representation. The Reich German provinces have two further ratios: the ratio of perpetrators among Reich Germans alone, and the Nazi voting ratio in the Reichstag election of July 1932.

I hypothesized that some regions might nurture extreme "nation-statists" who favored an aggressive state capable of attacking the enemies of the German nation. Possible candidates would be Germans living abroad amid supposedly oppressive non-Germans, Germans living in the "lost territories," and Germans in regions adjacent to "threatened borders." Germany had lost territories around most of its borders: in the Northwest (Northern Schleswig, population 166,000); the Northeast (Danzig, the Polish Corridor, and the East Prussian border with Lithuania, population 3 million); the East-Center (parts of Silesia, population almost a million); and the Southwest (Alsace-Lorraine and small areas handed over to Belgium, population 1.9 million). In the Center-West the Saar was controlled by the victorious powers and the Rhineland occupied from 1923; along the entire central-western and southwestern borders, the Allies claimed the right of military intervention along a 50-kilometer strip. The map shows these territories. Did the "exploitation" of Germany by foreign powers stimulate the emergence of more future Nazi perpetrators there? The most

Regional Ratios of Over- and Under-Representation of German War Criminals and Nazi Electoral Support



striking finding is that all ethnic German regions abroad, except for the Sudetenland, are highly over-represented. The most over-represented are (perhaps surprisingly) the "Westerners," almost all from Alsace-Lorraine and areas lost to Denmark and Belgium. They are followed by ethnic Germans from Poland and other Eastern European countries. Most of those from Poland and a handful of those from Eastern Europe also came from "lost territories." These groups are more over-represented than those born in any region of Germany itself. Austrians are also somewhat over-represented, though my sample probably understates things, for there were fewer Austrian postwar trials than German, and more Austrian perpetrators probably disappeared into anonymity.

But we must also distinguish ethnic Germans who had returned to Germany before or after their country was "liberated" by the German armies (1938 for Austria and the Sudetenland, later elsewhere). The earlier "refugees" had fled under pressure, often to refugee camps whose atmosphere fuelled aggressive revisionism. Most had come early, shortly after World War I, though Austrian "refugees" tended to be

Nazis fleeing their country after their coup of 1934 failed. Many of these Austrians attained high positions in the Nazi Party or SS. Excluding the Austrians, there were 100 "refugees" and most had shown some commitment to Nazism well before World War II. They were older than the sample average, more likely to have been early and/or young Nazis, to have engaged in prior violence, to have attained higher rank, and to have received longer postwar sentences. Of the Austrians, 45% received death or life sentences, of the "refugees" 42%, and of both the Sudetens and the "liberated" ethnic Germans only 31%. The Reich Germans lay in the middle, at 36%. (This also largely disposed of one potential sample bias I had feared, that the ethnic Germans might be more vulnerable to postwar prosecution and severe penalties, being less protected by social support networks in postwar Germany.)

The "refugees" proved the most over-represented group among the perpetrators. In the 1933 census those born abroad who spoke German as a mother tongue comprised under 1% of the population. Yet they formed over 6% of the perpetrators (and just under 6% of those arriving after 1933). This group contained almost all the ethnic Germans from Alsace-Lorraine, Schleswig-Holstein, most of those from the Baltic States, about half of those from Poland, and a few from elsewhere. It is obviously a highly self-selected group, highly and early committed to Nazism as a militant form of nationalist revisionism, prepared to go to extreme lengths in support of it. This also seems true, to a slightly lesser extent, of most Austrians in my sample. All seem "real" and somewhat "caged" Nazis.

This alters our picture of the remaining 108 ethnic Germans (excluding the Austrians and Sudetens) who had waited abroad for "liberation." Their ratio was much less, though still high, at 1.5. They were younger, had less Nazi or violent experience and were predominantly workers with low war-time rank. Seventy of them worked in concentration camps, almost all as ordinary guards (some reached sergeant by war's end). Their sentences were lower than the sample average. They also seem to have been recruited more "accidentally" into genocide. Few were eligible for the Wehrmacht, but they could serve in the SS, rendering them more likely to be drawn into mass murder. The SS attempted to screen them in terms of "racial purity" (often measured by fluency in German), by skills, and by "political reliability." Yet few were Nazis, since most of the "liberated" ethnic German communities had been locally oriented, relatively uninterested in which state they belonged to. The main choices they faced on "liberation" were conscription into the Reich labor force (not much better than *corvée* labor), selection as a colonist on a farmstead seized from Slavs (alluring but dangerous), or "volunteering" for the SS—dangerous if assigned to the Waffen-SS frontline, comfortable if to the camps. Health and strength usually determined which of the latter assignments occurred; being wounded at the Front might result in transfer to the camps. The selection process seems to have produced a fairly representative collection of the less healthy workers and peasants of these regions now available to assist in genocide (Lumans, 1993; Komjathy and Stockwell, 1980).

support



Other  
Eastern  
Ethnic  
Germans  
2.37

as % of total  
as % of total  
ation

as % of total  
% of Germans  
y

supporting  
1932  
ers supporting  
2 [37.2%]

); [0.66]

uly 1933

etenland,  
prisingly)  
mark and  
stern Eu-  
n Eastern  
presented  
what over-  
ere fewer  
ably disap-

Germany  
for Austria  
nder pres-  
nism. Most  
nded to be

Most were initially assigned to the lowest jobs, distant from the actual killings, though some did become "block commanders." From this group came many war criminals. In the smaller camps ethnic Germans performed various "dirty" tasks, including some murderous. Surviving prisoners recall tensions between the ethnic-German guards and their Reich-German NCOs, who despised the former for their crude German and rough peasant ways. In Polish war crimes trials witnesses described the ethnic Germans in varied terms: some were said to have been decent, turning a blind eye to prisoner practices, or abusing them only in the presence of superiors. A few even helped the Polish underground. Others behaved very cruelly, but their atrocities seem rooted less in prior Nazism than in the license granted them by the SS to reverse local class hierarchies and turn murderously against the Polish officials and Jewish traders and professionals who had previously bossed them about. All of this produced motivations distinctive to the Eastern-European Germans.

If we turn to the Reich Germans, we also see the importance of revisionist nationalism. Regions adjacent to the lost territories or which were occupied and/or demilitarized by the Allies after 1918 provided most perpetrators. This is so of Schleswig-Holstein, East Prussia, Upper Silesia, and (marginally) of Baden/Saar/Rhine-Palatinate. By removing the ethnic Germans from the calculation, we can compare them to the other Reich Germans. The second set of ratios in the map shows whether each region is over-represented among Reich Germans only. This pushes up the ratio of the Rhineland to over 1.0 and of Eastern Pomerania and Eastern Brandenburg to exactly 1.0. Note that for all border regions, the region lying farther inside Germany has a distinctly lower ratio. "Inner Germany" provided fewer perpetrators: only two inner German cities are over-represented, Bremen and Osnabrück. By way of contrast, the East Prussians and the Upper Silesians, virtually surrounded by foreign states, were greatly over-represented. Eastern Pomerania and Brandenburg are at parity, while Lower Silesians and Saxons are under-represented (confirming that the Sudetenland border seems not to have produced a sense of threat).

The most striking feature of this map is that virtually all "lost territories" and "threatened borders" seem to have generated perpetrators. In fact "Western" ethnic Germans were the most over-represented, and "refugees" were far more over-represented than "liberated" Germans. Was the main factor contributing toward murderous Nazism the degree of local outrage over the perceived treatment of Germans after World War I rather than the local intensity of anti-Semitism? The findings suggest that the origins of mass murder lay in part in a rather generalized embittered revisionism, whatever specific bite local anti-Semitic sentiments may have added.

But the other surprise was the exception, the Sudetenland. Was the explanation that interwar Czechoslovakia had treated its German minority quite well? Its constitution was democratic (unlike other Eastern European countries), and Germans were granted more local autonomies and collective rights than in Poland, the Baltic states, or Alsace-Lorraine. Though two-thirds of ethnic German voters supported the na-



**Table 3**  
**Religion of Family of Origin and Birthplace Census District**

	Religion of Family			Religion of Birthplace			
	Protestant	Catholic	N	Protestant	Mixed	Catholic	N
% in whole sample	54	46	338	39	30	31	1519
% among sample ethnic Germans	37	63	95	38	10	52	394
% among sample Reich Germans <sup>10</sup>	61	39	243	39	37	24	1125
% in entire population of German Reich	66	34		51	29	21	
Ratio of each religion among sample Reich Germans to entire population of German Reich <sup>11</sup>	0.95	1.21	243	0.78	1.29	1.15	1125

tionalist Sudeten German Party in 1935, this only sought more rights within the framework of the Czech and Slovak state. When Hitler marched in, fewer than 2% of Sudetens were in the Nazi Party (Komjathy and Stockwell, 1980). Czech guards at Theresienstadt have been singled out as the mildest of the camp staffs. The few Sudetens in my sample were mainly workers conscripted into the SS and serving as camp guards. Their sentences were lower than the sample average. Perhaps higher-level Sudetens and Sudeten Nazis were still getting used to ruling their region, and could not so easily be tempted into genocidal institutions.

### Religion

We have seen that Bavarians were over-represented, especially those from Upper Bavaria (including Munich). They were the neighbors of the unthreatening Swiss, Sudetens, and Austrians, and surely cannot have feared them. But these were predominantly Catholic regions. Did Catholicism generate perpetrators? The map shows the German sub-provinces that were over 80% Catholic. These provided more perpetrators than neighboring Protestant areas, though this tendency becomes somewhat confused with the effects exerted by threatened borders. Thus Upper Silesia seems more threatened than Lower Silesia, but it is also solidly Catholic, unlike Lower Silesia. South Baden and parts of the Rhineland may also confuse "threat" with Catholicism.

Table 3 first trichotomizes the district of birth into 80%+ Protestant, 80%+ Catholic, and religiously mixed. We see that Protestant districts were under-represented, Catholic and mixed areas over-represented. Yet the results may elide provincial and religious effects. Most predominantly Protestant provinces are under-represented, while Bavaria alone provided two-thirds of the predominantly Catholic districts. There are only four provinces providing many Catholic as well as mixed or Protestant districts. In three (Bavaria, Silesia, and the Rhineland, but not Westphalia) the Protestant districts provide proportionately rather fewer perpetrators, though the numbers are sometimes small.

In any case, such global data have problems. It could be that perpetrators from

**Table 4**  
**Urban-Rural Birthplace**

	City: 100,000+	Town: 2,000-100,000	Rural: less than 2,000	Total
% among whole sample	35	33	32	100
% among sample ethnic Germans	31	31	39	100
% among sample Reich Germans	37	34	29	100
% among entire population of German Reich	31	37	33	100
Ratio of sample Reich Germans to entire population of German Reich	1.20	0.93	0.88	
Sample N	517	490	465	1472

Catholic regions were actually drawn from the Protestant population, embittered by local Catholic dominance. So the second measure in Table 3 is more direct, the religion of the perpetrator's own family. Unfortunately, however, this information is available for only 22% of the sample. But among these, Catholics are indeed over-represented.<sup>12</sup> They also got more severe sentences: 56% got life imprisonment or death sentences, compared to 42% of Protestants (half this difference is contributed by the foreign ethnic Germans). These findings offer tentative support for Lasik's conclusions based on Auschwitz. Catholics—actually it is probably lapsed Catholics—seem more likely to become perpetrators, reversing the pattern found among the mainly Protestant pre-coup Nazis. Yet this conclusion would be on firmer ground if data had been available for more of the sample. Further primary research might overcome this problem.

In any case such findings could be the product of intervening variables. Therefore I consider urbanization, the presence of ethnic-religious minorities, and institutional accident. But Table 4 shows that Catholic, Bavarian, and "threatened" border regions of Germany did not provide more perpetrators because of urban/ rural differences. Though perpetrators came slightly more frequently from big cities than did Germans generally, the "threatened" and Catholic regions actually supplied the same proportion of big-city perpetrators and more rural perpetrators (32% to 25%) as did unthreatened regions. Nor did these areas have a larger Jewish population. In the 1933 Census Jews were only 0.8% of the German population, so it is unlikely that a high percentage of genocidal impulses derived from personal experience with Jews. A third of German Jews lived in Berlin, a city whose populace was under-represented among the perpetrators. Most of the rest were scattered in tiny numbers in all the bigger cities. Though many Jews lived in Silesia (7% of all German Jews), most were in Lower, not Upper Silesia—the reverse of the distribution of the perpetrators. Except for eastern ethnic Germans, many in my sample had never encountered Jews until they began killing them. Slavs were obviously present in the lives of eastern ethnic Germans and those of East Prussia. But in the rest of the Northeast of the

Reich perpetrators were under-represented. I do not know the distribution of Gypsies, but it is unlikely that such a small group affected the Nazi sympathies of many Germans.

Was the pattern finally a locational accident, the result of locating genocidal institutions in Catholic regions (and then hiring local labor), perhaps for purely bureaucratic reasons? This could have been a factor in the T4 hospitals, most of which were located in southern Catholic regions (for reasons that the existing literature does not make clear). But most killing institutions transported their staff much farther. The major extermination camps were mostly outside Germany, in northeastern Europe, far from Bavaria and the South-West. Some were partly staffed by local ethnic Germans. Yet Auschwitz was in Poland, where the local ethnic German population was mostly Protestant, while the staff were mainly Catholic.

The over-representation of Catholics and Bavarians probably has a less direct explanation. A "Vienna-Munich" axis had provided most of the early leaders and intellectuals of Nazism, furnishing a distinctly Austrian anti-Semitism. This retained the territorial ambition of the old Habsburg ideal of *grossdeutsch* nationalism (an eastward-tilting union of all Germans in a single "Reich"), while changing this from a cultural-political union to an ethnic-racial one. These Nazis attacked Habsburg multi-ethnicity and "Jewish" cosmopolitanism. During the later 1920s and early 1930s German and Austrian Nazism grew apart. German rightism, including Nazism, became dominated by Protestants, more *kleindeutsch* in territorial scope, being pre-occupied with Weimar Germany's internal "enemies," especially "communists." By 1936, however, the Rhineland was re-occupied, the Reich's internal enemies had been defeated, and a flood of refugee Austrian Nazis had entered Germany. Hitler now sought to exploit the Sudeten issue, linking it to *Lebensraum* in the East. The Nazi regime also feared the disruptive effects of SA "radicalism"—now without an obvious enemy on which to vent its violence. Thus Nazism made a second shift, back toward the southeast. This emphasized *grossdeutsch* but thoroughly racial aspirations. Expansion was justified in terms of German racial superiority, a justification in which anti-Semitism, anti-Slavism, and anti-Bolshevism played more vitriolic roles. I am therefore suggesting that Nazi genocide resonated amid the more *grossdeutsch* sentiments of former Catholics.

Thus refugee ethnic Germans and those from "threatened" border, Catholic, and Austro-Bavarian areas were more likely to become perpetrators. For them genocide was a part of a racial *grossdeutsch* nationalism. It was racist because it was eastern-oriented, anti-Slav, and anti-Semitic. Jews and Slavs were murdered for reasons of extreme nationalism, allegedly standing in the way of the unity and power of the German nation. This is to explain the perpetrators' regional biases in terms of the resonance in their regions of Nazi ideology as a whole, not merely of its anti-Semitic component.

**Table 5**  
**Ratios of Over- and Under-Representation of Occupational Sectors in Sample**

Occupational Sector	Ratio—whole sample	Ratio—men only	% in whole sample
Occupational Sector			
Agriculture, forestry	0.20	0.21	6.24
Heavy industry	0.49	0.51	7.46
Light industry	0.46	0.43	7.89
Construction	1.25	1.31	6.68
Transport, shops, hotels, cafes	1.66	1.54	6.16
Commerce	0.96	0.98	7.20
Education	5.52	5.51	6.24
Health	10.74	9.38	13.53
Civilian state	5.54	5.74	12.92
Military, police, prisons	5.57	5.80	22.29
Law	9.94	10.50	3.38
Total N or %	1153	1091	100.00

A ratio of more than 1.0 signifies over-representation of perpetrators in that occupational sector, less than 1.0 signifies under-representation. Data for sectoral distribution of whole labor force from German Census for 1925.

### **Economic Sector**

Table 5 contains data on economic sectors, though for men only. Most of the few women were in traditional areas of female employment: light industry (usually textiles), health services, and shops, hotels, or cafes. The ratios here are extremely skewed. Perpetrators previously working in agriculture or industry are strongly under-represented. That there are few manual workers in the sample cannot explain this, since workers constitute more than half of those serving construction, service trades (such as transport, shops, hotels, and restaurants), and military/police/prisons—in all of which perpetrators were over-represented. During the war, workers and managers in key industrial and agricultural sectors were exempted from conscription, but by then most of these perpetrators were embarked on their ghastly careers anyway. And despite the sample being disproportionately middle class, commerce (merchants, banks, insurance, etc.) is not over-represented. These results support my more general evidence (Mann, forthcoming) that the Nazi appeal lay partly in the claim to transcend class conflict by nation-statism: the Nazis received support from all those classes lying outside the main zone of struggle between capital and labor, who endorsed the notion that a strong state should “knock both their heads together” to restore the integral unity of the nation.

Professionals and the public sector were heavily over-represented. Those in education and the media were almost all teachers, those in the law were primarily lawyers, and those in health care included many doctors. These were professions with many Nazis (Jarausch, 1990; Proctor, 1988: 66–67), and they were closely entwined with the German state. Most of the lawyers had spent some time in prosecutors' offices, in close contact with the police. Conversely, 62% of Nazi security policemen who were university graduates had read law (Banach, 1998: 79). Most of the doctors had worked in public hospitals. These institutions were heavily Nazi and they were entrusted with

sample
whole sample
6.24
7.46
7.89
6.68
6.16
7.20
6.24
13.53
12.92
22.29
3.38
100.00

1.0 signifies under-

st of the few  
(usually tex-  
are extremely  
strongly under-  
t explain this,  
service trades  
risons—in all  
and managers  
ription, but by  
s anyway. And  
e (merchants,  
my more gen-  
n the claim to  
from all those  
labor, who en-  
ls together” to

d. Those in ed-  
primarily law-  
rofessions with  
osely entwined  
ecutors’ offices,  
emen who were  
ors had worked  
entrusted with

crucial roles in genocide. Both the civilian and military/police branches of the state are strongly over-represented among the perpetrators. Perhaps we might expect employees of the Nazi state to appear among the perpetrators. Yet there had been no major purges of the public sector. None was needed since the state had long been a breeding-ground for authoritarian ideas, including Nazism. Over a quarter of Abel’s sample of Nazi militants (Merkl, 1975: 50–61), over a third of Nazi security policemen (Banach, 1998: 42), and over half of high-ranking SS officers (Wegner, 1990: 240–41) came from military and civil-service backgrounds. Authoritarian-leaning civil servants easily (if at first covertly) embraced Nazism (Caplan, 1988; Mommsen 1991). Nazism seems to have proved quite a congenial extension of these people’s own statism (as Browning, 1978, shows in the case of the Foreign Office). The importance of the professions and the civil service also explains why the perpetrators were so well-educated.

All these ratios point in the same direction: the perpetrators were overwhelmingly drawn from core Nazi constituencies. Few came from agriculture and industry, the main homes of organized class conflict, and the orthodox parties of left and right. Far more workers were drawn from construction, the service sector, and the state; far more middle-class persons came from the professions of the state sector. Part of the explanation may be that some parts of these sectors were less liable for war-service. But they had all been core Nazi constituencies even before the conquest of power in 1933. These people in my sample came from sectors most likely to be attracted by the Nazi ideology of extreme nation-statism: advocacy of a strong state to enhance the organic unity of the nation by suppressing class, political, and ethnic conflict.

Of course, genocidal institutions drew from very particular occupations. Most of the SD perpetrators had been career policemen; so had many of the Einsatzgruppen and some camp personnel. By virtue of their training in capturing, interrogating, and intimidating criminals and extremists, policemen were relatively “toughened,” with skills useful to the project of genocide. If we exclude policemen from the “military-state” category, the ratio for the remainder (mostly military men) declines to 1.65. Doctors, too, were caught up in T4 and experiments and “selections” in the camps; and networks of prosecuting lawyers, policemen, and civil servants together supplied most Einsatzgruppen officers. Again, these are not artifacts, but real features of Nazi genocide. Perpetrators were embedded in institutional sub-cultures already favorable to tough physical, legal, and biological remedies for social ills years before genocide was initiated. The Nazis could more easily accomplish genocide wielding such a willing core.

**Careers in Violence and Nazism**

I have selected five measurements of prior Nazism or violence. Since women, Sude- tens, and ethnic Germans “liberated” by the German armies scored minimally on

these measures, I have excluded them, confining my analysis to Reich German, Austrian, and refugee ethnic-German men. I divided them into three age-cohorts. Those born before 1901 could have fought in World War I (measure 1) and in the Freikorps militias (measure 2). Measure 3 distinguishes Nazis according to the age and year they joined the Party, the SA, or the SS. All but sixteen of the Reich German, Austrian, and "refugee" men were members of at least one of these—indicating at least a basic commitment to Nazism. The second age-cohort, men born between 1901 and 1912, were almost all too young to fight in the War or the postwar Freikorps militias, but could join the Nazi movement before it seized power. Persons joining before January 1933 were styled Old Nazis. The third age-cohort was born after 1912. Among them, those joining after 1933 under the age of 25 were termed Young Nazis. Older persons joining between 1933 and 1938 (i.e., when the Nazis were already in power) I call Bandwagon Nazis. Wartime Nazis joined from 1939 onwards, perhaps from simple patriotic motives or from immaturity (e.g., joining the SS for the powerful, if sinister, aura the uniform conveyed; or joining the party because one's comrades were members). The few youngsters joining during the war are termed Raw Nazis. I assume that Old and Young Nazis were closer to being "real Nazis" than the others—though obviously all five types will have included Nazis of varying hues. Measure 4 distinguishes those who worked full-time in the movement for at least three prewar years—a measure of Nazi "caging." Measure 5 distinguishes those who had committed serious prewar physical violence, or who were described in prewar records as especially fanatic Nazis. I had information on this measure for only half the sample. Of these 784 persons, 101 had been involved in prewar violence, while 81 were singled out in the sources as being ideological fanatics. Violence means "distinguishing" oneself (i.e., within the movement) in street brawling or the prewar camps, being deployed in murderous violence like the Röhm purge or Kristallnacht, or being described as "tough" or some euphemism in prewar Nazi records—men like Hermann Florstedt (whose drunken street brawling brought him into continuous trouble with the police), or Heinz-Karl Fanslau (who killed at least one SA man during the Röhm purge). Fanatics were either described as such or are recorded as making very extreme declarations, like the doctor Kurt Heissmeyer, experimenting on camp children, declaring there was no difference "between Jews and guinea pigs," or Ernst Weinmann, described in the 1930s as an "uncompromising National Socialist."

These measures illustrate a sequence and an escalation of Nazism and violence. Yet they are not unproblematic. Though membership in organizations was almost always recorded, evidence concerning violence or fanaticism (or their absence) was available for only half the sample. And perhaps perpetrators were more likely to be prosecuted and end up in my sample if they were party or SS members. Nazi membership and activism were relevant evidence in postwar trials while the Allies considered the SS a "criminal organization." SS men were also more vulnerable to arrest in

**Table 6**  
**Careers in Nazism and Violence, by Cohort (Reich German, Austrian & Ethnic German Refugee Men Only)**

	WW I veteran?	Participated in Freikorps?	Type of Nazi	Full-time Nazi?	Prewar violence or extremism?	N
<b>Cohort born 1900 or before</b>	No 11% Yes 89%	No 70% Yes 30%	<i>Old Nazi?</i> No 43% Yes 52% All yes 57% Yes 68%	No 45% Yes 34% All yes 55% Yes 71%	Yes 43% All yes 40% Yes 37%	282
<b>Cohort born 1901- 1912</b>	No 98% Yes 2%	No 91% Yes 9%	<i>Either Old or Young Nazi?</i> No 29% Yes 69% All yes 71% Yes 81%	No 41% Yes 43% All yes 59% Yes 69%	Yes 39% All yes 37% Yes 35%	332
<b>Cohort born 1913 onward</b>	No 100% Yes 0%	No 100% Yes 0%	<i>Young Nazi?</i> No 36% Yes 64%	No 51% Yes 4% All yes 49% Yes 74%	Yes 25% All yes 29% Yes 31%	78
<b>Whole sample</b>			Yes 65%	Yes 55%	Yes 37%	692

An arrow indicates the movement of a group of perpetrators with one experience to a later experience. Thus, Yes 50%  $\Rightarrow$  Yes 20% indicates that 20% of those to whom the first measure applies also fall into the second category. "All yes" is therefore the total of those to whom a measure applies. "N" signifies the number of individuals in each cohort for whom information is available on all measures.

1945 since they bore the incriminating SS body tattoo. Yet I found no trials where memberships were decisive to the verdict, though they did sometimes affect the severity of the sentence. Thus this sample bias may not be severe.

Table 6 presents the results sequentially, indicating the percentages of men sharing an earlier experience who also shared a later one. The starting-point is World War I service. Of the men in my sample who were born in the German Empire in the period 1875-1900, 89% served in World War I, a higher percentage than the national average of 81% (Winter, 1988: 27, 30). In itself this may indicate only a somewhat heightened patriotism. Yet for some, military values became radicalized. Of the Germans born before 1901, 30% fought after the war in the Freikorps (so did 30% of the Austrians and 24% of those born from 1901 to 1904, too young to fight in the war). Only about 3.5% of all the surviving 11.1 million German veterans can have served in the Freikorps. Thus many of the older perpetrators had engaged in political killings long before they became Nazis.

### Continuities within Extremist Careers

Over two-thirds of the Freikorps veterans joined the Nazi movement before 1933. In the three age-cohorts 57%, 71%, and 64% (65% overall) were Old or Young Nazis. Of these, 71% (55% of the whole group) went on to become full-time Nazis. This reveals two things. First, most had shown considerable commitment to Nazism; second, a disproportionate contribution at each stage was made by persons already experienced in an earlier violent right-wing or Nazi activity. These are all signs of "radicalizing careers." This changes somewhat when we arrive at the measure of violence or fanaticism. Only 37% scored positively here, and in two of the three cohorts they were slightly less likely to have been full-time Nazis. T4 staff and all doctors tended to have had less of a track record as Nazis, but they usually started killing in ways for which contemporary racial bio-medical theories had prepared the path. Only later, accustomed to death, did they descend into routine killing with no serious pretence of "euthanasia." In these different ways, "caged careers" were fairly common. Overall, then, about two-thirds of the Reich, Austrian, and refugee-German men might loosely qualify as "real Nazis" before the war, with just over one-third adding a track record of violence or fanaticism. These men also received lengthier postwar sentences than the sample average.

Table 7 shows a clear, expected relationship with rank. The overwhelming majority of the highest ranks were Old Nazis, while over half the rankers and NCOs joined only during the war. Most of the NCOs were Old or Young Nazis, most of the rankers Wartime or Raw Nazis. Again we see the importance of hierarchy: those giv-

**Table 7**  
**Type of Nazi by Rank (Reich German, Austrian, and Ethnic German Refugee Men Only)**

Type of Nazi	Rank or Equivalent Office				All Ranks	N
	NCO and Below	Lieut., Captain	Major to Brig. Gen.	Major-Gen. Up		
Old Nazi: joined before 1933	21	43	54	70	44	584
Young Nazi: joined 1933-37, age 25 or less	15	17	10	<1	12	161
Bandwagon Nazi: joined 1933-37, age 26 or more	11	16	17	9	14	181
Raw Nazi: joined 1938-, age 25 or less	4	1	0	0	2	20
Wartime Nazi: joined 1938-, age 26 or more	49	23	19	21	29	387
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	
N	378	410	326	219	1333	1333

Type of Nazi measured by date and age joined first adult Nazi organization (Nazi Party, SA, SS, or Nazi Front Organization in other country)



ing the orders were more likely to be longer-term Nazis. Table 8 contains information on twice as many perpetrators as Table 6 and reveals 6–11% fewer Old or Young Nazis across the three age-cohorts. Perhaps those for whom I have the fullest data were the worst Nazis. If so, my estimate of those who loosely qualify as “real Nazis” might be reduced slightly, to between 55% and 60%, with a third adding prior violence or fanaticism. Table 8 also shows that Old Nazis alone formed 44% of the sample. Mature Wartime Nazis comprised 29%, and there were very few Raw Nazis (most “liberated” ethnic Germans or women).

**Table 8**  
**Type of Nazi by Age Cohort (Reich German, Austrian, and Ethnic German Refugee Men Only)**

	Born –1900	Born 1901–1912	Born 1913–	All Cohorts	N
Old Nazis	48	47	18	44	589
Young Nazis	0	14	40	12	164
Bandwagon Nazis	21	12	0	14	182
Raw Nazis	0	0	13	1	20
Wartime Nazis	31	27	30	29	386
Total %	100	100	100	100	
N	450	732	159	1341	134

### Raw versus Experienced Killers

In some institutions we know when systematic violence or genocide began and so can see how “raw” the initial recruits were. My discussion will group together all the men in the sample. I begin where violence began to escalate to murder (though not yet genocide), in the German concentration camps of the period 1934 to 1939. Of my male sample 115 served in them. At this stage they could not have had experience in other genocidal institutions. But 112 of them were prior Party, SS, or SA members. Only 3 were raw recruits with no apparent experience of Nazism. Systematic racially-motivated killing started in T4 in 1939. Of the 118 perpetrators who served at T4 only 8 had been raw recruits on arrival, while 110 were prior Nazi or SS members (9 were also policemen and 13 had also been in the camps or the Einsatzgruppen). I had such full details on T4 staff that I could run a further calculation on them alone: 41% had relatives or friends already working there, and a further 47% were believed by the recruiter to be “reliable” in some sense. These were people with track records, though rarely yet of actual murder.

Genocide escalated substantially in 1941 amid the Einsatzgruppen. Of the 311 members of my sample group who served there, only 14 had been raw recruits, only 21 had been policemen, and 6 had served only in the Waffen-SS; 76 had only been Nazi or SS members, 144 had been Nazis and policemen, and 48 were Nazis and had served in a camp or the T4 program. The wartime death camps then became the center of routinized genocide. Some 67 served in the *Aktion Reinhard* camps. Only 6 were raw recruits, 16 were only prior party or Waffen-SS members, 5 were party

plus police, 31 were prior Nazis who had also served at T4, and 11 had also served in other camps or the Einsatzgruppen. Of the 286 who served in the Auschwitz or Majdanek camp complexes, 39 were raw recruits (mainly "liberated" ethnic Germans recruited after 1942), 142 were only prior party or SS members, 11 were Nazis and policemen, and 93 were prior Nazis who had also served in other camps or the Einsatzgruppen. Of the 295 who served in one or more of the remaining wartime camps, only 14 were raw recruits (mainly "liberated" ethnic Germans), 62 were only prior Party or SS members, 66 had served only with the Waffen-SS; 132 had served with T4, the Einsatzgruppen, the prewar camps, or a death camp, and of these only 9 were not already Party or SS members.

All these figures include strikingly few raw recruits. The latter reached 10% of the staff only where there were many "liberated" ethnic Germans. Normally they remained well under 5%. Even these few probably included some men who had been initiated into savage violence in earlier Wehrmacht service. But the raw recruits are everywhere overshadowed by prior Nazi Party and SS members, and everywhere except in the prewar camps they are exceeded by those with prior experience in other murderous institutions. The median man in my sample served for four years in three different genocidal institutions (this measure adds serving in the SD or as a full-time Nazi official after 1941 in those institutions just listed). Though almost all had started their careers in these institutions by being unexpectedly asked to kill, by about 1942 they were providing Nazi institutions with considerable murderous experience.

### Conclusion

We have seen that few women or Sudeten Germans were perpetrators of genocide. Among those who were—as among the ethnic Germans "liberated" by the Wehrmacht—only a few had much of a track record as Nazis. Most of these three groups were lower-rank perpetrators obeying orders, responding to both hierarchical and comradely pressures. Whether they were also vehemently pro-Nazi, anti-Semitic, or anti-Slav, we cannot strictly tell. They have left no traces in the records available to us. They are the likeliest candidates to be "ordinary Germans," though only the women among them were actually from Germany.

Most of the remaining 90% of the sample had some Nazi record, rising to a large majority in the upper ranks. A third also had prior experience of serious prewar violence, and most were inducted through careers in ascending violence. The perpetrators were also drawn disproportionately from core "nation-statist" Nazi constituencies—from "threatened" or "lost" border regions; from sectors of the economy already favorable to the Nazis; and from particular occupations (medicine, education, law, the military, and the police) where Nazi ideology could resonate amid broader proto-Nazi predispositions. Unexpectedly (though anticipated by Lasik), the perpetrators had reversed the usual correlation of Nazism with religion: perpetrators were more Catholic than Protestant. I interpreted this as the result of a shift from *klein-*

*deutsch* to *grossdeutsch* racial nationalism in Nazism. Thus there are strong indications that the core of Nazi genocide, as represented by my sample, was accomplished by ideological, experienced Nazis. There are also suggestions that this ideology derived from broader currents of embittered nationalism and tough statism than mere anti-Semitism (or anti-Slavism) alone.

Yet my sample cannot be considered representative of all perpetrators. Its biases make it "hardcore" rather than "typical." These "real Nazis" operated amid a much broader range of perpetrators, many of whom were likely to be rather more "ordinary." Among the frontline Wehrmacht soldiers who murdered civilians and POWs, we might merely find the cruelty of arrogant conquerors or the ferocious over-reaction common among desperate, frightened troops embroiled in a savage war. Among the lower administrators in the transport and other agencies smoothing the flow of victims, we would doubtless find many Germans with virtually no prior history of Nazism or violence, exhibiting the whole range of prejudices, equivocations, and moral evasions that studies have suggested characterized the German population as a whole. Germans turned a blind eye, thought about matters of more personal concern, cared nothing for disliked Jews, and facilitated the trajectory of the victims, with practiced and entirely normal human moral weakness.

The direct commission of ghastly, repetitive murder, far away from any frontlines, might be thought to require something more. Yet both Browning and Goldhagen (in their different ways) also emphasize mundane human motivations in their studies of Auxiliary Police Battalion 101. This, they agree, was filled with police reservists drafted mainly from the Hamburg area (not a very Nazi city, indeed under-represented in my sample) and arriving amid the Polish ghettos seemingly by accident. Here were surely ordinary men or ordinary Germans suddenly ordered in July 1942 to shoot thousands of unarmed men, women, and children. A chilling 85 to 90% of them obeyed. It is worth examining them a little more closely, since they may have been more "typical" lower-level perpetrators than, say, the Auschwitz guards or the T4 orderlies prominent in my sample.

I cannot match the richness with which Goldhagen and especially Browning describe these policemen's predicament, motives, and actions. Once again I rely on biographical data to reveal something quite simple—four signs within Police Battalion 101 that things might actually have been a little out of the ordinary. First, 38% of the policemen were Nazi Party members, which was double the membership level among all German men at this time. Of course, policemen were under more pressure than most Germans to become Nazis. But "becoming a Nazi" itself carried caging consequences. Second, the higher the rank, the higher the proportion of Nazis. Though the commanding officer, Major Trapp, was a career policeman who was not a Nazi (and who showed some aversion to his murderous task), his two captains were zealous party members and SS men. Five of the seven lieutenants about whom we have data were party members, though none belonged to the SS. Of the 32 NCOs,

22 were party members and seven were also in the SS. Third, this was a battalion whose main officers, NCOs, and the more experienced lower-ranking enlisted men were career policemen: 20% had several years experience of policing, and since their average age was 39, most would have only had experience policing in a Nazi state—obviously not a training in genocide, but police work without effective limitation or regulation by the law. Fourth, the worse the complicity in genocide, the more these tendencies appeared. Ten of the thirteen battalion members who were convicted of war crimes were Nazi Party members (two Old, four Young, and three Bandwagon Nazis). Seven of the thirteen were career policemen (only one had served before the Nazi seizure of power), two had been conscripted into the police in 1939, and only four had been conscripted in 1941. Only six were actually from the Hamburg region: three were from Saxony, one was an Austrian, and three came from threatened borders. The Austrian had participated in the Nazi rising of 1934, and at least four of these policemen had served in the Polish campaign of 1939, when the German police had already killed many civilians. Even here—near the apparent margins of genocide—the hierarchy and the experienced core were mostly Nazis or initiates in violence, ordering and guiding the rawer recruits into genocide.

Indeed, says Birn (1998: 117–20), Battalion 101 was probably less Nazi, less steeped in violence than other police battalions formed from career policemen and volunteers and serving in Poland in 1939. This was true of Battalion 309, for example. Of its 14 members charged in postwar trials, 13 were career police officers and eight were Nazi Party members. With the invasion of the U.S.S.R. in 1941 the SS suddenly needed so many more killers that it could no longer select them individually. The SS hierarchy must have thought that reserve police battalions would provide relatively pliable instruments: the German police forces were already bent to the will of the Nazi state, had often killed civilians in Poland already, and were likely to contain a disproportionate number of Nazis. This was not quite so ordinary a bunch of Germans. I would tend to assume that research into a Wehrmacht unit committing atrocities would reveal rather more ordinary men, since so many soldiers were draftees. If so, my account would have to be modified and more allowance would have to be made among the total corps of perpetrators for persons other than “real Nazis.” Unfortunately, Wehrmacht atrocities were rarely prosecuted and are under-represented in my sample. Perhaps research simply cannot penetrate deeply enough across the full range of Nazi genocide to permit a decisive resolution of this point.

In the present study the perpetrators clustered toward the “real Nazi” end of the spectrum. Yet genocide was not perpetrated by a set of individuals with set characteristics. My results suggest we should move beyond the types of perpetrator identified at the beginning of this paper. For persons whom we might be inclined to label in the 1930s as “real Nazis,” ordinary Nazis, ordinary policemen, ordinary Germans, etc., were all implicated together in a radicalizing collective project. This involved

social processes—of interaction, of subcultures embedding ideology in institutional practices, of hierarchy, and of the cumulative experience of all of these. Hierarchy is the easiest to understand. Those farther up the hierarchy were almost always more fervent Nazis than those lower down. They ordered their subordinates to murder, and orders are not easy to disobey. Obeyed once, they become routine. But compliance was also assisted by cumulative experience. The more experienced personnel of all ranks were already half-initiated. Some knew, for example, that police forces must combat partisans and other “enemies” by “tough” means and they explained their practical knowledge to the novices (who knew less of “normal” police work). My data show that almost any German institution embroiled in genocide would have subcultures in which some personnel at all ranks would be quite fervent Nazis, who would confirm in more ideological terms what the hierarchy and the veterans were saying. Furthermore, the dominant ethos of some institutions—of medicine, the law, and the police in particular—offered a conducive sub-culture in which Nazi ideology could resonate.

In terms of the arguments that have raged among students of Nazi genocide, my evidence would seem to offer more support to those who stress the role of “real Nazis” over that of “ordinary Germans.” But we have seen that their own “exterminationist ideology” emerged progressively, institutionally, and through sub-cultural reinforcement. Only with such a sociological and historical perspective can we explain how “radicalized” Nazism was implemented—through the careful initial selection of appropriate institutions and personnel to begin the violence and murder, to the wider use of hierarchical, comradely, and subcultural experience to accomplish actual genocide. Thus did people like the “real,” “caged,” and “violent” Nazis who figure so largely in my sample socialize more “ordinary” Germans (and others) into the perpetration of genocide.

### Bibliography

*Sources marked with an asterisk contain biographical data on individual perpetrators.*

\*Adler, H. et al. *Auschwitz: Zeugnisse und Berichte*. Frankfurt: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1979.

\*Allach: *“Kommando” de Dachau*. Paris: Amicale des Anciens de Dachau, 1982.

Allen, M. “Engineers and Modern Managers in the SS: The Business Administration Main Office.” Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1995.

\*Aly, G. et al. *Aussonderung und Tod: Die klinische Hinrichtung der Unbrauchbaren*. Berlin: Rotbuch, 1985.

———, et al. *Biedermann und Schreibtischtäter: Materialien zur deutschen Täter-Biographie*. Berlin: Rotbuch, 1989.

\*Anderl, G. "Die Lagerkommandanten des jüdischen Ghettos Theresienstadt" in Y. Arad, *Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka: The Operation Reinhard Deathcamps*. Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1987.

Arendt, H. *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*. New York: Viking Press, 1965.

\*Ashman, C. and R. Wagman. *The Nazi Hunters*. New York: Pharos Books, 1998.

Banach, J. *Heydrichs Elite: Das Führerkorps der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, 1936–1945*. Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 1998.

\*Bartoszewski, W. *Warsaw Death Ring 1939–1944*. Warsaw: Interpress, 1968.

Bartov, O. *Murder in Our Midst: The Holocaust, Industrial Killing, and Representation*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.

\*Bauer, F., ed. *Justiz und NS-Verbrechen: Sammlung deutscher Strafurteile wegen nationalsozialistischer Tötungsverbrechen 1945–1966*. Amsterdam: University Press, 1968–81. 22 vols.

Baumann, Z. *Modernity and the Holocaust*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989.

\*Benz, W. and H. Graml. *Biographisches Lexikon zur Weimarer Republik*. Munich: Beck, 1988.

\*Biemacki, S. "Order-Enforcement Police in the General Government: Selection of Documents" in *Biuletyn Główniej Komisji Badania Zbrodni Hitlerowskich w Polsce*, 1982. Vol 31.

\*Birn, R. B. *Die Höheren SS- und Polizeiführer*. Düsseldorf: Droste, 1986.

———. "Austrian Higher SS and Police Leaders and their Participation in the Holocaust in the Balkans," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 6:4 (1991), pp. 351–72.

———. "Revising the Holocaust" in N. Finkelstein and R. Birn, *A Nation on Trial: The Goldhagen Thesis and Historical Truth*. New York: Henry Holt, 1998.

\*Black, P. *Ernst Kaltenbrunner: Ideological Soldier of the Third Reich*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Browder, G. *Hitler's Enforcers: The Gestapo and the SS Security Service in the Nazi Revolution*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Browning, C. *The Final Solution and the German Foreign Office*. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1978.

———. *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland*. New York: HarperCollins, 1993.

\*Burleigh, M. *Death and Deliverance: 'Euthanasia' in Germany, 1900–1945*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Caplan, J. *Government Without Administration: State and Civil Service in Weimar and Nazi Germany*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988.

Crowe, D. *A History of the Gypsies of Eastern Europe and Russia*. New York: St. Martin's, 1996.

\*Cyprian, T. and J. Sawicki. *Siedem wyrokow Najwyzszego Trybunalu Narodowego*. Poznan: Instytut Zachodni, 1962.

\*Czech, D. *Auschwitz Chronicle: 1939-1945*. New York: Henry Holt, 1990.

\*Degener, H. *Wer ist's?* Berlin: Degener, 1935.

\*Dicks, H. *Licensed Mass Murder: A Socio-Psychological Study of Some SS Killers*. New York: Basic Books, 1972.

\*Domanska, R. "Security Police of the Warsaw District and Its 'Inquiry' Prison Pawiak," *Biuletyn Glówniej Komisji Badania Zbrodni Hitlerowskich w Polsce* 28 (1978).

\*Durand, P. *La chienne de Buchenwald*. Paris: Temps Actuel, 1982.

\*Ebbinghaus, A. *Opfer und Täterinnen: Frauenbiographien des Nationalsozialismus*. Nördlingen: F. Greno, 1987.

\*Epelbaum, D. *Alois Brunner: La haine irréductible*. Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1990.

\*Executive Council of the National Front of Democratic Germany. *Brown Book: Nazi and War Criminals in the Federal Republic and in West Berlin*. East Berlin: Zeit im Bild, 1968.

Fischer, C. *The Rise of the Nazis*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995.

Fleiss, J. *Statistical Methods for Rates and Proportions*. New York: John Wiley, 1973.

\**Forfaits Hitlériens: Documents officiels*. Geneva: Trois Collines, 1945.

\*Freiwald, A. and M. Mendelsohn. *The Last Nazi: Josef Schwammberger and the Nazi Past*. New York: Norton, 1994.

\*Friedlander, H. and S. Milton. *Archives of the Holocaust*. New York: Garland, 1992-93. Vols. 11, 12, 16, 19, 22.

\*Friedmann, T. *Schupo-Kriegsverbrecher vor dem Wiener Volksgericht: Schutzpolizei Dienst-abteilung in Boryslaw: Dokumentensammlung*. Haifa: Institute of Documentation in Israel, 1995. 3 vols (Boryslaw, Kolomea, Stryj).

———. *Vor 50 Jahren 1944-1994: Das Sonderkommando Eichmann in Budapest und die Vernichtung der Juden Ungarns-Rumäniens: Dokumentarische Sammlung*. Haifa: Institute of Documentation in Israel, 1995.

\*Friedrich, J. *Die Kalte Amnestie: NS- Täter in der Bundesrepublik*. Munich: Piper, 1994.

\*Gehler, M. "Murder on Command: The Anti-Jewish Pogrom in Innsbruck 9th.-10th. November 1938," *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book* 38 (1993), pp. 119-53.

Gellately, R. *The Gestapo and German Society*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.

Goldhagen, D. *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust*. Boston; London: Little, Brown, 1996.

Gutman, I. "The Victimization of the Poles" in M. Berenbaum, ed., *A Mosaic of Victims: Non-Jews Persecuted and Murdered by the Nazis*. New York: New York University Press, 1990.

Hancock, I. "Responses to the Porrajmos: The Romani Holocaust" in A. Rosenbaum, ed., *Is the Holocaust Unique?* Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996.

- Headland, R. *Messages of Murder: A Study of the Reports of the Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police and the Security Service, 1941-1943*. London: Fairleigh University Press, 1992.
- \*von Hentig, H. "Beiträge zu einer Sozialgeschichte des Dritten Reichs," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, [West Germany] 16: 48-59.
- Hilberg, R. *The Destruction of the European Jews*. New York: Octagon Books, 1985.
- \*Hirschfeld, G. *Nazi Rule and Dutch Collaboration*. Oxford: Berg, 1988.
- \*Höffkes, K. *Hitlers Politische Generale*. Tübingen: Grabert, 1986.
- \*Höss, R., Broad, P. and Kremer, J. *KL Auschwitz Seen by the SS*. Cracow: Panstwowe Muzeum, 1978.
- \*Hohmann, J. and G. Wieland. *MfS-Operativvorgang "Teufel": "Euthanasie" Arzt Otto Hebold vor Gericht*. Berlin: Metropol, 1996.
- \*Horwitz, G. *In the Shadow of Death*. New York: The Free Press, 1990.
- Hunczak, T. "The Ukrainian Losses during World War II" in Berenbaum, ed., *A Mosaic of Victims: Non-Jews Persecuted and Murdered by the Nazis*. New York: New York University Press, 1990.
- \*Iwaszko, T. "Das Nebenlager 'Fürstengrube,'" *Hefte von Auschwitz* 16 (1978), pp. 5-92.
- Jamin, M. *Zwischen den Klassen: Zur Sozialstruktur der SA-Führerschaft*. Wuppertal: Hammer, 1984.
- Jansen, C. and A. Weckbecker. *Das "Volksdeutsch Selbstschutz" in Poland, 1939/40*. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1992.
- Jarausch, K. *The Unfree Professions: German Lawyers, Teachers and Engineers, 1900-1950*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.
- Kater, M. *The Nazi Party: A Social Profile of Members and Leaders, 1919-1945*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983.
- Katz, F. *Ordinary People and Extraordinary Evil*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993.
- \*Kempner, R. *SS im Kreuzverhör*. Munich: Rütten+Loening, 1964.
- Kenrick, D. and G. Puxon. *The Destiny of Europe's Gypsies*. London: Heinemann, 1972.
- \*Klarsfeld, S. and M. Steinberg. *Mémorial de la déportation des juifs de Belgique*. Brussels: Union des Déportés Juifs en Belgique, 1982.
- \*Klee E. "Euthanasie" im NS-Staat. Frankfurt/Main: Fischer, 1983.
- \*———, et al., eds. "Gott mit Uns": *Der deutsche Vernichtungskrieg im Osten 1939-1945*. Frankfurt/Main: Fischer, 1989.
- \*———. "Those Were the Days": *The Holocaust as Seen by Perpetrators and Bystanders*. London: Hamilton, 1991.
- Koehl, R. L. *Black Corps: The Structure and Power Struggles of the Nazi SS*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983.



Konjathy, A. T. and R. Stockwell. *German Minorities and the Third Reich: Ethnic Germans of East Central Europe between the Wars*. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1980.

\*Krätschmer, E.-G. *Die Ritterkreuzträger der Waffen-SS*. Preussisch Oldendorf: K. W. Schütz, 1982.

\*Kubica, H. "The Crimes of Josef Mengele" in Y. Gutman and M. Berenbaum, eds., *Anatomy of the Auschwitz Death Camp*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 1994.

Kumanev, G. "The German Occupation Regime on Occupied Territory in the USSR (1941–1944)" in Berenbaum, ed., *A Mosaic of Victims: Non-Jews Persecuted and Murdered by the Nazis*. New York: New York University Press, 1990.

Lasik, A. "Historical-sociological Profile of the Auschwitz SS" in Y. Gutman and M. Berenbaum, eds., *Anatomy of the Auschwitz Death Camp*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 1994.

———. "Rudolf Hoess: Manager of Crime" in Gutman and Berenbaum.

\*Lichtenstein, H. *Majdanek: Reportage eines Prozesses*. Frankfurt: Europäischer Verlag, 1979.

———. *Himmlers grüne Helfer*. Cologne: Bund-Verlag, 1990.

\*Lifton, R. *The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide*. New York: BasicBooks, 1986.

\*Linklater, M., et al. *The Fourth Reich: Klaus Barbie and the Neo-Fascist Connection*. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1984.

\*List of SS Officers compiled by Headquarters Command, Office of Military Government for Germany (US), 6889th. [sic] Berlin Documents Center, APO 742, 15 May 1946.

\*Littman, S. *War Criminal on Trial: The Rauca Case*. Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1983.

Loewenberg, P. *Decoding the Past: Historical Approaches*. New York: Knopf, 1983.

Lumans, V. *Himmler's Auxiliaries: The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle and the German National Minorities of Europe, 1933–1945*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993.

\*Maczarski, K. *Conversations with an Executioner*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1981.

Maksudov, S. "The Jewish Population Losses of the USSR from the Holocaust" in L. Dobroszycki and J. Gurock, eds., *The Holocaust in the Soviet Union: Studies and Sources on the Destruction of the Jews in the Nazi-Occupied Territories of the USSR, 1941–1945*. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993.

\*Mallman, K.-M. and G. Paul. *Herrschaft und Alltag: Ein Industrieviertel im Dritten Reich*. Bonn: Dietz, 1991.

Mann, M. *Fascists*, forthcoming.

\*Marsalek, H. *Die Geschichte des Konzentrationslagers Mauthausen*. Vienna: Österreichische Lagergemeinschaft, 1980.

Merkel, P. *Political Violence Under the Swastika*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975.

- \*de Mildt, D. *In the Name of the People: Perpetrators of Genocide in the Reflection of Their Post-War Prosecution in West Germany: The 'Euthanasia' and 'Aktion Reinhard' Trial Cases*. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1996.
- Mommsen, H. *From Weimar to Auschwitz*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991.
- Müller-Hill, B. *Murderous Science*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.
- \*Naumann, B. *Auschwitz: Bericht über die Strafsache gegen Mulka und andere vor dem Schwurgericht Frankfurt*. Frankfurt: Athenäum, 1965.
- Oppitz, U.-D. *Strafverfahren und Strafvollstreckung bei NS Gewaltverbrechen*. Ulm: Brau-land, 1976.
- \*Peschel-Gutzeit, L. *Das Nürnberger Juristen-Urteil von 1947*. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996.
- \*Piper, F. "Das Nebenlager Trzebinia," *Hefte von Auschwitz* 16 (1978), pp. 93–135.
- \*Pohl, D. *Von der "Judenpolitik" zum Judenmord*. Frankfurt: Lang, 1993.
- . *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien, 1941–1944*. Munich: Olden-bourg, 1996.
- \*Posner, G. and J. Ware. *Mengele: The Complete Story*. New York: McGraw Hill, 1986.
- \*von Preradovich, N. *Die Generale der Waffen-SS*. Berg am See: Vowinckel, 1985.
- Proctor, R. *Racial Hygiene: Medicine Under the Nazis*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988.
- \*Rogowski, R. "The Gauleiter and the Social Origins of Fascism," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 19:4 (1977), pp. 399–430.<sup>13</sup>
- \*Safrian, H. *Die Eichmann-Männer*. Vienna: Europaverlag, 1993.
- \*Sandkühler, T. *"Endlösung" in Galizien*. Bonn: Dietz, 1996.
- \*Sayer, I. and G. Botting. *Hitler's Last General*. London: Bantam Books, 1989.
- \*Scheider, H. "Der SS-Totenkopfsturmbann Stutthof," *Dachauer Hefte* 10 (1994), pp. 115–141.
- \*Schelvis, J. *Vernietigingskamp Sobibor*. Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1993.
- Schwarz, G. "SS-Aufseherinnen in nationalsozialistischen Konzentrationslagern (1933–1945)," *Dachauer Hefte* 10 (1994), pp. 32–49.
- \*Segev, T. *Soldiers of Evil*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1987.
- \*Sehn, J. *Konzentrationslager Oswiecim-Brzezinka (Auschwitz-Birkenau)*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Prawnicze, 1957.
- \*Shelach, M. "Sajmište—An Extermination Camp in Serbia," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 2:2 (1987), pp. 243–60.
- \*Smelser, R., et al. *Die Braune Elite II*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1993.
- Sofsky, W. *The Order of Terror: The Concentration Camp*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996.

*Statistik des Deutschen Reichs*, 1925, vol. 402. Berlin, 1927.

Statistisches Reichsamt. *Volkszählung der Bevölkerung*, 1933. Berlin, 1935.

Staub, E. *The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

\*Steiniger, P. and K. Leszczynski. *Fall 3: Das Urteil im Juristenprozess*. Berlin: VEB Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1969.

Streit, C. *Keine Kamaraden: Die Wehrmacht und die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen 1941–1945*. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1978.

\*Strzelecka, I. "Arbeitslager Gleiwitz I," *Hefte von Auschwitz* 14 (1973), pp. 75–106.

\*Sydnor, C. *Soldiers of Destruction: The SS Death's Head Division, 1933–1945*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977.

\*Ternon, Y. and S. Helman. *Le massacre des aliénés: Des théoriciens nazis aux praticiens SS*. Paris: Casterman, 1971.

\*Tillon, G. *Ravensbrück*. Paris: Seuil, 1988.

\**Trials of the War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, 1946–49*. Buffalo, NY: William S. Hein & Co., 1997. 15 vols.

\*United Nations War Crimes Commission. *Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals*. New York: Fertig, 1983–1992. 6 vols.

\*Vaupel, D. "The Hessisch Lichtenau Sub-Camp of the Buchenwald Concentration Camp, 1944–45" in R. Braham, ed., *Studies on the Holocaust in Hungary*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990.

Wegner, B. *The Waffen-SS*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1990.

Winter, J. "Some Paradoxes of the First World War" in R. Wall and J. Winter, *The Upheaval of War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

\*Wistrich, R. *Who's Who in Nazi Germany*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1982.

### Acknowledgment

\*I wish to thank Martin Tahany for help with German war crimes trial reports, Agnieszka Tibbo for help with Polish materials, and Christopher Paul for help in quantitative analysis.

### Notes

1. I would like to thank the library staff at UCLA; the Wiener Library, London; and the Simon Wiesenthal Center, Los Angeles, for placing their collections at my disposal.

2. I have compiled and analyzed all this evidence in my forthcoming book, *Fascists*.

3. Note that the category "Other" groups together a motley collection of civil servants, businessmen, propagandists, and Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS personnel.

4. This figure is much too low. Whether doctors had previously worked in the public or private sector was rarely made clear in the sources. Where unclear, I coded as private.
5. This figure includes estimates of likely sentence of persons dead or evading arrest.
6. Excludes doctors and dentists, who appear in a separate column.
7. Excludes doctors and dentists, who appear in a separate column.
8. Composed of 72 civil servants, 58 military (most Waffen-SS), and 70 diverse civilians (journalists, businessmen etc.)
9. Or persons in civilian life to whom I assigned an equivalent rank. I used Browder's (1996: 247-48) table of rank equivalences of the Wehrmacht, SS, and police, added SA ranks from Jamin (1984), and Nazi Party ranks from Kater (1983); and then attempted myself to estimate equivalent status ranks for persons such as civil servants, businessmen, and journalists. There is obvious room for error in these latter judgements.
10. This and urban-rural birthplace calculated from the 1933 Reich census (Statistisches Reichsamt, 1935). Faiths other than Protestantism and Catholicism among the German population excluded from the calculation.
11. I.e., ratio of percentage of this religion among the perpetrators compared to percentage of this religion among all Reich Germans (1933 census). Ratios higher than 1.0 signify overrepresentation of this religion among the perpetrators.
12. Tests of significance have been run on Tables 3 and 4. Chi-squared is the most appropriate test, yet is strongly affected by the size of the total N. Since one of the two Ns in each case is the enormous (61 million) German population, all raw chi-squares would emerge as very highly significant. To produce a more critical test, I reduced the size of the German population to the size of each of my sample Ns (such a procedure is recommended for chi-squared testing by Fleiss (1973: Chap 6). We then get the following results: religion of family of origin is not statistically significant (because of the small sample N of 243), while religion of birthplace district and urban-rural birthplace (in Table 4) are both highly significant—at the  $p > .00001$  level.
13. In this case it is not the published article that contains data on individual perpetrators, but rather Professor Rogowski's individual file-cards on the Gauleiter (on which he based his article), which he copied for my benefit. I thank him for his kindness.