Benefactors and Beneficiaries:
Benefactive Status and Stance in the
Management of Offers and Requests

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The relationship between specific language practices and key vernacular actions such as requests has long been a central issue in linguistic pragmatics and in the broader field of language and social interaction research. The issue was first problematized by Austin's (1962) distinction between locutionary acts and illocutionary force, and by his recognition that successfully implementing any given action rests upon a confluence of conventional procedures and contextual appropriateness. This approach was subsequently formalized by Searle (1969, 1975) in terms of four types of felicity conditions that differentiated and particularized speech acts of different kinds. Particularly suggestive were rules specifying the propositional content and preparatory conditions required for the felicitous performance of a range of basic speech acts (Searle 1979). The research of this period also documented that asking questions or making assertions about these felicity conditions could be an 'indirect' way of performing speech acts (Gordon and Lakoff 1971), and that assertions about their non-fulfillment could be a way of building rejecting or uncooperative responses (Labov and Fanshel 1977:86-8).

Towards the end of the 1970s, this program of research came to a halt, hindered by a paucity of empirical data, an element of conceptual rigidity, and an inadequate appreciation of the role of sequence and context in the process of interaction (Levinson 1979, 1981, 2013). During this period, conversation analysts, who had long championed the role of sequential context in the recognition of actions (Schegloff 1984; 2007), contributed relatively little to the analysis of the 'first' or 'sequence initiating' actions that the speech act theorists had labored to specify. Indeed, with a few notable exceptions (Drew 1978, 1984; Pomerantz, 1978, 1984, 1988; Schegloff 1980, 1984, 1988, 2007; Wootton 1981a,b), CA largely stood aside from the analysis of first actions in terms of syntax and presupposition (Levinson 2013), while adding observations about the significance of various paralinguistic and nonlinguistic accompaniments of utterances (Couper-Kuhlen and Selting 1996; Goodwin 1979, 1984, 1986, 2000, 2010; Goodwin and Goodwin 1987; Selting and Couper-Kuhlen 2001).

While the traditional speech act approach had focused on the sentences that delivered actions together with their associated conditions, research in the 1990s and beyond highlighted the social and sequential contexts of utterances, together with the role of prosody, gesture, and body position in the process of what has come to be termed action formation. In Schegloff's (2007:xiv) words, action formation is concerned with the following question:

how are the resources of the language, the body, the environment of the interaction, and position in the interaction fashioned into conformations designed to be, and to be recognized by recipients as, particular actions – actions like requesting, inviting, granting, complaining, agreeing, telling, noticing, rejecting, and so on – in a class of unknown size?
In this paper we will follow Levinson's (2013) terminology in referring to recipients' understandings of actions as "action ascription" in order to draw attention to the fact that the recognition of an action is a complex process in which successive actions interlock to function as ways of validating, adjusting or invalidating the actions to which they respond. Thus in a sequence such as the following, we will speak of line 1 as initially designed as an invitation:

(1) [SBL 1:1:7R]
1 A: Why don't you come and see me sometimes. 
2 B: [I would like to.]
3 A: I would like you to.

Correspondingly we will treat line 2 as ascribing the action of inviting to line 1 by means of 'accepting' it, and line 3 as validating that ascription and reconfirming the original action as intended. This standard conversation analytic treatment of actions-in-sequences (Heritage 1984; Schegloff 1992) treats the formation and intersubjective apprehension of actions as a temporally extended work-in-progress that is managed through the serial interlocking of actions in a process of successive confirmation and specification.

In this chapter, we consider processes of action formation in the performance of requests and offers. We begin from the framework developed by Couper-Kuhlen (2013), who argues that requests, offers and related actions such as proposals and suggestions all involve convergences on recurrent and sedimented action formats (Fox 2007), that are differentiated in terms of who is projected to be the agent of the future action, and who is understood to be its beneficiary. Couper-Kuhlen's analysis is summarized Table 1. As this table indicates, while many actions embody a presumption of a clear division of labor between the agents and the beneficiaries of future actions, in the case of proposals (and, arguably, invitations) there is no necessary presumption either or a singular agent, or a singular beneficiary, of the proposed activity.

Table 1: Offers, Requests and related actions (Couper-Kuhlen 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agent of future action</th>
<th>Beneficiary of future action</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proposal</td>
<td>Self and Other</td>
<td>Self and Other</td>
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<tr>
<td>Offer</td>
<td>Self</td>
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<tr>
<td>Request</td>
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<td>Self</td>
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<td>Suggestion</td>
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Couper-Kuhlen (2013) also documents the relevance of linguistic form in the formation and ascription of these actions. For example, she shows that requests, whether for objects, immediate actions or deferred actions, are most often implemented through one of three linguistic formats: imperatives, e.g., "Pass the wishbone," "Give him my best wishes"; assertions of needs wishes or desires, e.g., "I want you to phone the clinic tomorrow"; and questions about the ability or willingness of the recipient to perform some action, e.g., "Will you call him tonight for me?" Correspondingly offers, echoing Curl (2006), are most frequently implemented by questions concerning the recipient's needs and desires, e.g., "Do you want/need X"; second, a conditional format "if X, then [offer]", and an imperative form "I'll [do X].

The compelling significance of Couper-Kuhlen's argument arises from her observation that there is relatively little overlap between the forms that implement these actions. Thus grammatical formats of utterances are comparatively reliable as indicators of the actions that the recipient is intended to recognize, and can be construed as routine solutions to the action formation problem (see Thompson and Couper-Kuhlen 2005).

If this was the whole story of action formation and ascription with respect to offers and requests, the picture would be relatively straightforward and amenable to analytic control. However many complexities arise from the contextual features of utterances, including the identities and other social characteristics that participants attribute to one another. For example, in the case of offers, it may not always be the case that the offer recipient will treat the thing offered as a benefit, as in (2):

(2) [NB IV:10, 41:17-35]
1 Lot:  -- > Don't chu want me tih come down getchu dihmorr'en
2  take yih down dih the beauty parlor?
3 (0.3)
4 Emm: What for I jis did my hair it looks like pruh- a
5 perfessional.

Other contextual difficulties may also create confounding puzzles. Over thirty years ago, Susan Ervin-Tripp invited consideration of a situation in which you are cutting up carrots with a large kitchen knife and a small child says "Can I help?" She continues:

"If you consider yourself the beneficiary of the assistance of a well-trained Montessori-taught carrot slicer, you may hear this as an offer. If you doubt the skill or even safety of the help, you may consider it a plea for permission … The difference here is that in the case of permission requests the speaker, as principal beneficiary, wants the action more than the hearer…. (Ervin-Tripp 1981: 196-7)
Here what is putatively the same linguistic signal will be understood, and treated, as an offer or a request depending on how the capacities of the speaker are construed.

To address these contingencies, we introduce a distinction between benefactive stance and benefactive status. By the term 'benefactive stance', we intend the speaker's action encoded in the linguistic signal as described by Couper-Kuhlen (2013), so as to convey a distribution of benefits and/or costs associated with a projected future action. By the term 'benefactive status' we refer to a complex of underlying conditions for the action, including such matters as whether a service will be rendered that is of actual benefit to its recipient, whether the performer of the service is able and willing to perform it, whether the cost to the performer is high or low, and whether the service is to be performed immediately (a 'proximal' service) or at some later time (a 'distal' service). We argue that these elements of benefactive status may be, and frequently are, indexed in the verbal construction of offers and requests so that benefactive stance and status are aligned with one another. However we also examine cases where they are out of alignment, and consider what speakers are doing when they select formulations embodying ostensibly "ill fitted" relations between benefactive stance and status, and how the resulting misalignment may get resolved or otherwise impacts the subsequent development of the interaction.

2.0 Benefactive Stance

When a sequence-initiating action nominating some proximal or distal future action is being formulated, a variety of language practices can portray the nominated action as having an asymmetrical distribution of benefits such that one party is cast as the benefactor and the other the beneficiary. Configurations with the speaker as benefactor and the recipient as beneficiary are commonly associated with "offers," whereas the opposite configurations are commonly associated with "requests." As we have noted, although enacted stance is a fairly reliable, if imperfect, indicator of intrinsic status as it is available to the participants (Couper-Kuhlen 2014 a,b) the import of these enacted stances – whether the action actually comes off as an offer, or a request, or a request dressed up as an offer, or a proposal being given an other-attentive or altruistic lamination, etc. – is ultimately contingent on the benefactive status of the action and can only be determined on a case by case basis. In this section, we focus on the stance side of the equation and the recurrent language practices through which it is indexed within the primary initiating action. Subsequently, in Section 4, we zero in on offers and requests and consider more elaborated
practices embodied in explicit accounts. The practices in question vary in their emphasis on the burden of costs for benefactors, the payoffs to beneficiaries, and the configuration of these vis a vis speakers and recipients.

2.1 Formulating Participants' Interests in the Nominated Action

One set of practices involves reference to the participants' needs or preferences for the nominated action. Formulating such interests is one straightforward method of constructing a distribution of benefits that the action will deliver. Typical instances focusing on the recipient's interests include:

(3) [NB I:1]
Guy: Would you like to get out?

(4) [Field Sep-Oct 88(1.1)]
Gordon: If you wanna come over’n use it or play it, or if you decide you want it you can pick it up any time.

These formulations tend to be embedded within interrogatives (as in 3) or if-clauses (as in 4), thus embodying epistemic downgrading in deference to the presumption that recipients know their own preferences and needs best. Correspondingly, they are other-attentive and in context may endow the action with an "offering" import. In some instances (as in 5 below), an if-framed assertion of recipient interest in the projected action, without any accompanying then-clause or indeed any explicit formulation of the projected action, can in context stand on behalf of the offer itself.

(5) [F:TC]
Shirley: So if you guys want a place to stay

By the same token, there are practices that reference the interests of the speaker, which again typically take the form of needs or preferences.

(6) [NB IV:11]
Emma: I’d love to have you join us

(7) [Holt S088:1:3]
Gordon: I’d like to see you again before I go

(8) [NB IV:07]
Emma: Will you help me with this honey I need you

These are often embedded within the turn constructional unit containing the focal action (as in examples 6 and 7), but they may also appear as a separate unit that explicitly accounts for the action (as in 8). In both cases, they tend
to be declaratively formatted in accordance with the presumption that speakers have authoritative knowledge of their own experiences. Correspondingly, they are self-attentive and in context can endow the action with a "requesting" import.

2.2 Formulating Agents and Recipients

Speakers also have the option of specifying who is to perform the nominated action, and who is to receive the service it delivers. Thus, suggesting a get-together for coffee, Ros references both herself as the coffee-provider and her interlocutor as the recipient, thereby packaging the current action as an "offer."

(9) \[SBL 1:1:10R\]

Ros: "...if you'd care to come over 'n visit a little while this morning I’ll give you a cup of coffee.

Conversely, when Emma asks her daughter to call her estranged husband, she references the daughter as the agent of the call (line 1), and after a minimal response she adds an increment (line 3, "and do me a favor") clarifying that such a call would constitute a service for which she would be the primary beneficiary.

(10) \[NB IV:07\]

1 Emma: [hnhn] Would ju:ll ca::ll Da::d tihni::ght, hh
2 Barb: Yee:h?
3 Emma: En do me a fa:vor,

It bears re-emphasis that explicit reference to the agent or recipient of a nominated action or service is often optional, contingent on the granularity with which the contemplated action is being formulated. The fully detailed action of providing coffee to a visitor ("I'll give you a cup of coffee") could in principle be rendered as a nominalized activity ("coffee") and indeed social activity invitations are frequently constructed from such nominalized glosses (e.g., "Why don't you come over for coffee/drinks/dinner"; see Drew 1992). When these are unpacked so as to explicitly reference agents and recipients, they claim a benefactive configuration that might otherwise have been implicit, off the record, or obscure.

2.3 Benefactive Rendering of the Nominated Action Itself

The preceding observation about varying levels of granularity in the specification of agents and recipients may be generalized to all aspects of future action formulation. Action formulations can be compacted, glossing over the details of what will transpire and thereby obscuring any service-related characteristics and the benefactive
configuration they would implicate; or they can be expanded, with benefactive details specified, elaborated, and thus foregrounded.

For a relatively expanded benefactive rendering, consider how Ilene asks Lisa, who runs a dog breeding and kennel service, about collecting her dog from Lisa’s place (line 1). Ilene’s formulation of the activity in question (“come over and get her”) is more elaborate than is strictly necessary for intelligibility.

(11) [Heritage 1:03]
1 Ile: =Well now llook d’you want me tih come over’n get her? or what.

Relative to more compact formulations (such as "collect her," "pick her up," or "come get her"), Ilene includes additional detail that underscores the burden of costs to Ilene and by implication constructs Lisa as the beneficiary of Ilene’s generosity.

A more complex example with multiple renderings of the nominated action follows, some of which are implicated in an offer to take a friend and her mother to dinner. Here Emma launches what initially appears to be a proposal for a joint activity (“Why don’t we” in line 2), with the reference to shared agency implicating benefactive symmetry. However she aborts this formulation, and restarts in a format portraying herself as sole agent and prospective benefactor (“Why don’t I…” in line 3). The subsequent rendering of the action itself is expanded (“take you ‘n Mom up there to Coco’s someday for lunch”) in a way that implicates distance and effort in getting there (the restaurant is located on top of a hill), as well as picking up the tab with explicit reference to Margie and her mother as beneficiaries. At this point the type of benefactive relationship associated with an “offer” is relatively transparent.

(12) [NB VII]
1 Marg: = W’ll haftuh do th[a[t more] oft[ten.]
2 Emma: [.hhhhh] [Wul w]hy don’t we: uh-m:=
3 Emma: =Why don’t I take you’n Mo:m up there tuh: Coco’s.someday
4 fer lu:nch.Well go, buzz up there tu[h,
5 Marg: ] k God.
6 Emma: Hai:h?
7 Marg: That’s a good deal. .hh=.hh=
8 Emma: =Eh I’ll take you bo:th [up
9 Marg: [No:;::: wil all go Dutch.=
10 11 Emma: =B’t [let’s do that.]
    N o : we wo:n’]t.

However, Emma goes on to produce a second rendering of the activity ("We’ll go, buzz up there" in 4), one that is more compact, shifts back to joint agency, and includes an idiomatic expression ("buzz up there") that minimizes what will be involved. This version pushes against the prior, obscuring the benefactive asymmetry that was previously exposed. Correspondingly, Margie’s responses (lines 5, 7) do not clearly register that an offer is in the
works. This in turn prompts Emma to provide a third and more expanded version of the activity ("I'll take you both up" in 9), one that resurrects her unilateral agency and clarifies her intent to take them both out for lunch. At this point the benefactive asymmetry is foregrounded once again, prompting Marge to resist with a counterproposal to "all go Dutch" (line 9).

3.0 Benefactive Appreciations

How is the benefactive stance encoded in an initiating action, and the sense of service that it embodies, consequential for what subsequently transpires? Here we focus on cases where stance is essentially congruent with status, and on various practices through which beneficiaries register and display appreciation of the service that is being performed or projected. For the benefactive stance associated with offers (speaker/benefactor, recipient/beneficiary), displays of appreciation tend to follow the offer in second position, and they may be present in both acceptances and rejections. For the stance associated with requests (speaker/beneficiary, recipient/benefactor), they tend to appear only after the request is granted and hence in third position. While some forms of appreciation appear to be restricted to certain action environments, others are remarkably similar across environments. And in general, such responses often validate and sustain the benefactive relationship previously in play.

3.1 Explicit Appreciations

Explicit appreciations take the familiar form of conventionalized expressions such as thank you, I appreciate that, etc. This instance appears in response to an offer to share a newspaper.

(13) [NB IV:5]
1  Glad: =An' now I've got (. ) tuh wash my hair en get the ↑goop out
2   'v it'n evrything? .hh 'n ah have the ↑paper here I
3   thought chu might li:ke tih ↑have it↓.hhhh[h

The next example occurs in response to the granting of a request. When Emma's daughter Barbara agrees to call her mother's estranged husband (lines 2-3), Emma acknowledges this with a term of endearment (line 6).
(14) [NB IV:7]
1 Emma: [nYeah, .t.h W[illyuh HELP M]E OUtTA [THI:S;, ]
2 Barb: [O k a' y . ] -- [Yeah [ah]'ll call
3 im tih|ni:ght,hh
4 (0.2)
5 Barb: [En you cn] call] [me]
6 Emm: [A: 'RIGH' ] DEAR [.h][h.hh]
7 Barb: [|You] call me et n:ine tihmorrow
8 |mor[ning.
9 Emm: -> [.t A'rig'h'darling ah'PPRECIATE *IT.

Subsequently, after an arrangement-making intervention from Barbara, (lines 7-8), Emma reissues her acknowledgement with a new endearment together with an explicit appreciation (line 9).

3.2 Appreciative assessments

A second method of registering a prior service involves appreciative assessments, some of which are targeted specifically at the service being rendered. For instance, when Ros invites Bea over and offers coffee (lines 1-2), Bea provides an appreciative assessment of the gesture ("well that's awfully sweet of you").

(15) [SBL I:1:10]
1 Ros: _ And uh th*e: if you' d care tuh come ovuh, en vis^
2 Bea: little while this morn‘ing I' ll give you[cup a' |coff]*ee.  
3 Bea: [ khhh _
4 Bea: --> Uhhh-huh hh W'l thet's awf'illy sweet of yuh I |don't
5 thinnk I c' n make it this morning, hheeeuhh uh:m (0.3)
6 'tch I'm running and in the paper 'nd an:d uh hh I
7 haftih stay near the pho::ne,

And a similar assessment follows this offer of assistance to a husband whose wife has been immobilized by a back injury.

(16) [Heritage I-3]
1 Edg: Oh hh lord an' we were wondering if there s anything
2 we can do to help
3 Mic: [Well that's
4 Edg: [I mean can we do any shopping for her or something like that?
5 (0.7)
6 Mic: --> Well that's most kind Edgerton .hhh At the moment no:
7 because we've still got two boys at home.

Other more generally favorable assessments – e.g., That would be wonderful/lovely/etc. – are also recurrent in this sequential environment. For instance, when an offer to pick up the recipient is elaborated with a question about timing (lines 1-4), the recipient first answers the turn-final question ("yes") and then offers a brief favorable assessment ("lovely").
Such generically favorable assessments are less clearly targeted at the service per se, and hence are somewhat ambiguous as to whether they are meant to be understood as service appreciations specifically or as expressing a broadly favorable attitude toward the activity in general.

In the cases examined thus far, appreciative assessments of the unambiguous service-targeted sort exhibited in excerpts 17 and 18 are limited to the environment of offer rejections. None have yet been observed in offer acceptances, or in response to the granting of requests.

### 3.3 Reciprocations

The final appreciative response to be considered involves a gesture of reciprocation. Here the beneficiary of a service promises to perform a service for the benefactor, which may be understood in context as motivated by or compensation for the service previously rendered. Reciprocations validate the current benefactive relationship, while simultaneously projecting a reversal of that relationship in a subsequent transaction.

For instance, in a segment of conversation between Ilene (a dog owner) and Lisa (a dog breeding and kennel service), further discussed below, about the return of Ilene's dog from the kennel, the eventual outcome is an offer by Lisa to return the dog to Ilene at her home, which Ilene accepts. As they are finalizing arrangements for the delivery of the dog, Ilene reciprocates with an offer of hospitality (arrowed).

When Lisa suggests "half past 3" as a timeframe for her arrival with the dog, Ilene accepts this ("that's fine") and offers a generically appreciative assessment ("That's lovely"), and then without delay she proceeds with an offer to serve Lisa "a cup a' tea and a piece a' cake" (arrowed). Ilene's offer is not explicitly framed as a compensatory gesture for Lisa's delivery of the dog, but it clearly can be heard as such. And in this connection it is noteworthy
that Lisa appreciates the tea-and-cake offer with an assessment term ("lovely") identical to the one used by Ilene to appreciate the timing of the dog delivery.

In this section, we have focused on the framing of future courses of action in terms of benefactive stance: formulations of the distribution of benefits from benefactors to beneficiaries. In the next, focusing primarily on requests, we examine the formulation of costs and benefits so as to influence the likelihood of acceptance.

4. In Pursuit of Acceptance: A 'Felicific Calculus'

In 1789, Jeremy Bentham introduced the concept of the 'felicific calculus' as a method of determining the moral qualities of actions. According to Bentham, felicific actions are those for which the personal benefits of an action exceed its personal costs. Where more than one individual is involved, felicific actions are those for which the aggregate benefits to the collectivity exceed their aggregate costs. While Bentham's ideas may have limitations as political philosophy, they resonate with practices that speakers deploy in the context of requests and offers. Speakers who wish to forward a request can manage its presentation to either maximize the benefits of the request to themselves, or minimize the cost of the request to others, or both. In the case of offers, speakers may minimize the costs to themselves, while maximizing the perceived benefits of the action to their recipients. In both cases, they can also adjust or manipulate the presentation of costs and benefits in pursuit of acceptance.

4.1 Maximizing Benefits

The description of benefits to the requester is a basic characteristic of the accounts that, as Curl and Drew (2008) have noted, accompany many if not most requests in non-institutional contexts. Whatever other functions these accounts may have, they fundamentally work to establish the intrinsic benefits to the requester, or the requester's needs, that compliance with the request would fulfill.

In the following case, Gordon calls his mother to request that she bring a letter with her when she visits him shortly. The format of his request "Could you X" (lines 7 and 8) does not display particular entitlement (Curl and Drew 2008) or benefits, though his formulation "when you come up," (line 10) clearly presupposes a pre-existing plan for a visit and thus indexes a lower burden to his mother than would have been the case if the visit were not anticipated. However his subsequent account - the letter is essential for his access to funds for the university term (lines 20-22) - underscores the substantial payoff he will reap from a relatively low-cost action from his mother.
A similar benefactive accounting is visible even in cases where the request is for the return of a loaned item, as in (20):

(20) Field SO88II:2:4:2
1 Les: .hh okay .hh if you could (. ) let me have that book
2 u-so[me:
3 Dan: [yeah
4 Les: -> (. ) back sometime because I promised it to- to:
5 Harold.
6 (0.5)
7 Dan: Oh yeah.
8 Les: -> [uh::: becuz he’s looking up colleges as well.

Here Lesley portrays herself as subject to another obligation regarding the book.

The relationship between accounts specifying benefits to the speaker and the production of requests is so strongly patterned that it easily allows initial benefit statements to be understood as prefatory to the request itself. In the following case, the caller (Don) describes a stalled car and an urgent need to open a bank in Brentwood (11-12/14).

(21) [MTE: Stalled]
1 Don: (Guess what.hh)
2 Mar: What.
3 Don: ‘hh My ca:r is sta::lled.
4 - (0.2)
5 Don: (‘n) I’m up here in the Glen?
6 Mar: Oh:::
7 {(0.4)}
8 Don: {’hhh }
9 Don: A:nd.hh
10 (0.2)
Although Don never explicitly asks for a ride to the bank, the expression of this need is sufficient for his recipient to understand him as requesting it (lines 15-16). And in (22), a description of need (lines 5-6) is again sufficient to allow its recipient to pre-empt a likely upcoming request with an offer (lines 7-8) that is presented as re-invoking an earlier promise:

(22) ST (Schegloff, 1980:112)
1 Fre: Oh by the way (sniff) I have a big favor to ask ya.
2 Lau: Sure, go'head.
3 Fre: 'Member the blouse you made a couple weeks ago?
4 Lau: Ya.
5 Fre: Well I want to wear it this weekend to Vegas but my 
6 Mom's buttonholer is broken.
7 Lau: Fred I told ya when I made the blouse I'd do the 
8 buttonholes.
9 Fre: ((sniff)) but I hate to impose.
10 Lau: No problem. We can do them on Monday after work.

Note that Fred's response "But I hate to impose." (line 9) clearly makes reference to the cost-benefit orientation that is presented as underlying this exchange.

4.2 Minimizing Costs

An alternative requester's practice is to work to minimize the apparent costs of the request (see Kendrick and Drew, this volume). For example, the request may be implemented using verbs (such as 'nip' or 'hop') that connote the minimal nature of the action being requested:

(23) [JH:FN]
Ann: Can you just nip down to Whole Foods for some orange juice.

(24) [Stew dinner: Mother to child, after dinner]
1 Mom: Okay, why don't you hop yourself in the shower and then 
2 we'll read
3 ((Child starts to respond))
4 Mom: Thank you.

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1 Similar minimizing practices are described in Drew and Walker (2010) in connection with calls for assistance to the police, and in requests for permission to depart from the topics set by questions in broadcast news interviews (Clayman and Heritage 2002: 260-261).
Verbs like 'nip,' 'hop,' and 'pop' convey the brevity of the action requested and thereby a minimization of the imposition associated with the request, regardless of the other activities their recipients may be otherwise engaged in and may have to abandon.

In yet other cases, a request may be framed as minimally burdensome by formulating the requested action as involving a minimal departure from routine. In the following case, Skip's use of the expression "coming past the door," (line 5) - which implements a request for a ride to work - conveys that Skip's house is fully on the way to their shared workplace:

(25)  
1 Skip:     Good morning Jim,
2 (0.5) 
3 Skip: Uh it's Skip.
4 Jim: ↑Hiyuh,
5 Skip: -> You coming past the door,
6 Jim: Certainly?
7 (0.8) 
8 Jim: What time would ju like the car Sah.=
9 Skip: =Uh ↓well ehh hhehh hhehh hhehh .hh Oh that's most unexpected of you hhh::: n(h)o it's y(h)ery nice 'v you to offer huhh uu→heh heh-u-hu-.e hh hhThanks very much.£

In this case, Skip's line 5 hovers between a request and a pre-request and may indeed index a pattern of routine ride-sharing between the two colleagues.

Jim's responsive offer - done as a parody of a chauffeur's response (line 8) - is acknowledged by Skip in an equally tongue-in-cheek fashion with a fulsome appreciation of his 'kindness' (lines 9-11).

A more elaborate case is the following. Here Jane has called to ask permission to retrieve a book from Edgerton's house. The request is delicate because Jane knows from an earlier call that Edgerton's family does not want company:

(26)  [Heritage:0I:Call 14] (Jan called earlier to invite Edgerton and his wife over for Christmas drinks. Edgerton declined; they've only just returned from another drinks party and his wife (Ilene) is 'tired' and 'wiped')
1 Edg: Hello?
2 Jan: Hello→Edgerton.hh
3 Edg: Yes(.—).
4 Jan: ↑[It's ME ag(h)ain.h.hh]
5 Edg: ↑'Yes.'=
6 Jan: =Uhm .hh ↓look I ↓left a book.h (.). uh:m in the dra:wing room. .hh Uh:::hh Yihknow the (luh si:ne) book. —
7 -> D-ju think I could→js pop over'n come'n get it.
8 (1.0)
9  
10 Edg: Why not?
11 Jan: -> Yes you sure?h
12 Edg: "Mh?"
13 Jan: -> Eh z ed- (0.7) I mean I'll be in'n out. Okay?
14 Edg: Ye:ehkay,
Here it is noticeable that Jane frames her requested action (line 8) as "popping over," deploying a syntactic frame ("Do you think I could just") that indexes low entitlement (Curl and Drew 2008), and hedges her request with numerous assurances of its brevity (lines 13, 15-16).

Just as minimization practices in requesting are designed to increase the likelihood of acceptance, so offers may incorporate minimization to the same end. In (27) Gordon and Dana - sometime boyfriend and girlfriend - are arranging to meet for a drink, at Gordon's initiation. Gordon does not drive and, after deciding to meet on Sunday,

Dana offers to come to him:

(27) [Field SO88:1:3]
1 Gor:  [How ‘bout Sun’day.*
2               (0.3)
3 Dan:  -Yeh
4               (0.3)
5 Gor:  .h[hhhhh]hhh h- (0.2)[(Right/Great]
6 Dan:  [-Sure]    [(-
7               (0.2)
8 Gor:  Okay.
9 Dan:  ->  [Right so I’ll poh- eh w'l- (.) D’you wan’
10 Dan:  ->  [me t’ pop over.
11 Gor:  [.p.hhhhh
12 Gor:  Please.
13               (0.3)
14 Dan:  Okay, ‘bout what ti{me.

Here Dana twice uses the term "pop" to characterize her offered action, thus reducing the burden of the offer. In this case, the formulation may be influenced by other factors: as the 'jilted' party in the relationship, Dana may not wish to seem over-eager or too accommodating in making the arrangement, and her "I'll poh-" (the putative beginning of 'I'll pop over') in line 9 is revised to the more circumspect "D’you wan’ me t’ pop over." (lines 9-10).2

And a minimizing practice that is a direct reciprocal of (25) above is visible in the following case, in which the non-driving Gordon is asking for a ride to a nearby town. While Gordon minimizes the imposition on Ken by

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2 Similar formulations are readily observable in offers of assistance during 'out of hours' calls to a family doctor (Drew 2006). In cases where the doctor is offering to visit a sick person at night, formulations such as "okay I’ll pop in I’ll be with you in about twenty (0.2) minutes to half an hour," are highly frequent.
proposing that his father can "drop me over" (line 6), Ken rebuts this with the claim that he will be "going past the door:"

(28) [Field: Sept-Oct: Side 1: Call9]
1 Gor: .hh You're not ah- I don't s'pose going into Yeovil
2 hhhh hU:hm .pl.k.tch (0.3) this afternoon
3 (0.3)
4 Ken: As a, matter'v fact: I- (0.5) jus' said to *Mum, I think
5 I will go Into Yeovil this afternoon cz I've g]ot nothing=
6 Gor: [.h h h h h h h h h h h]
7 Ken: ="be[ter to do"
8 Gor: ["hh" ["hh"
9 (.)
10 Gor: Ah:. Uhm (0.2) c'd I, accomp'ny you by any chan[ce,
11 Ken: =¯be[t will go into Yeovil this afternoon cz I've go
12 Gor: [hhwh[h
13 (.)
14 Ken: =¯be[t will go into Yeovil this afternoon cz I've got nothing=
15 Gor: [hhwh[h
16 (.)
17 Ken: = I should think so yuh-uh "no d- oh eet wouldn't worry
18 Gor: [that be possible] I'll I'll get me-] Dad t'drop me over "if: uh"
19 Ken: U h : m ] : ] = o o ]
20 Gor: [W]
21 (.)
22 Ken: But uh
23 Gor: hh-.hh-hh
24 Gor: That's very generous °of you.

And a similar minimizing pattern is present in (29). Lesley has accepted a ride to a meeting with Carol and, in an apparent effort to minimize the imposition on Carol, offers to get her husband to drive her to Carol's house. In her response, Carol rebuts the offer as too costly to the offerer ("not worth the rigmarole" [lines 3/5]). In tandem, Carol minimizes her own costs with "W'l while I'm in the car it doesn't make'ny differe:nce," (line s 8-9), while maximizing her portrayal of the costs to Lesley's husband with "'T's not worth him turning out again." (line 13).

(29) [Field Xmas 1985: Call 5:12-28
1 Les: .hh Well- () I'm alright if my husband brings me as
2 [far as your house].↓
3 Car: Well I c'd pick you up it's not [worth the whole]=
4 [n ⇐N O : : : :]=
5 Car: =[riga[m a r o : l e,]
6 Les: =[: : :N o it's alright he'll ]bring me
7 (0.2)
8 Car: W'l while I'm in the car it doesn't make'ny
differe:nce,
9 Les: [Dzn'lit
10 Car: No: : ::
11 (.)
12 Car: 'T's not worth him turning out again.
13 (0.3)
14 Les: Oh alright then.

Here Bentham's 'felicific calculus' is fully displayed as part of the request-offer process.
Finally, requesters may attempt to balance the costs to recipients by offering reciprocal benefits, even when, as in the following case, the benefits are hypothetical. Here teenaged Virginia is attempting to recruit her brother Wesley in a bid to get her mother to raise her weekly allowance. In an exchange in which she effectively implores her brother for help, she twice invokes the possibility of reciprocal assistance, albeit in irrealis (hypothetical) mood:

(30) [Virginia: 886-900]
1  VIR:  --> *Pleas:e try tuh help me talk Mom (into't.) please? <I'd do
2       --> it for you,
3       (0.4)
4  WES:  EHHHH! [hih| heh huh| `uh!| `huh huh ] (.) `uh
5  PRU:  ______ [A h| h a h| hah h| uhhuh huh huh]
6  VIR:  Plea::se.
7       (0.9)
8  ???:  (((sniff)))
9  PRU:  `uh `hhh
10     (0.4)
11 WES:  eh-uh:: (.) I'll think about it.
12 VIR:  uhh!
13 WES:  `huh huh huh huh ` (hm)
14     (0.5)
15 VIR:  --> Go::llly I'd do it fer y::ou::.

At lines 1-2, Virginia latches her hypothetically reciprocal offer to her request that Wesley help her "talk Mom into it". Subsequently, after Wesley defers his response (line 11), she renews the offer, and by implication the request it is mobilized to advance, at line 15.

As we have described it here, the design of requests and offers manifests a general preference for the minimization of costs and the maximization of benefits. Specifically, to an extent consistent with the 'facts on the ground,' a beneficiary should strive to provide for the least burden of costs to the benefactor, while maximizing the projected benefits of the projected action. Correspondingly, a benefactor should strive to minimize the burden of costs that the projected activity imposes, and with it any burden of reciprocal obligation that the beneficiary may incur. A departure from this preference by benefactors, especially one that inflates the burden of cost that the benefactor faces, may contribute to a perception that the offer or request acceptance is reluctant or less than sincere.

Consider two cases involving benefactor-initiated departures from this preference and the felicific calculus it embodies. The first occurs in the course of a request acceptance (arrowed below), and involves an expanded characterization of the requested action. The exchange begins when the matriarch at a family dinner comments on the heat of the evening, and makes a generalized offer of more iced tea to the assembled family members (lines 1-2).
In place of a straightforward acceptance, her son Wesley (line 4) counters with a request for "some more ice"—something that was not initially offered. Perhaps in response to the rather entitled manner of this request, the mother acknowledges it with a verbal formulation that notably expands the course of action involved: [get up + go + get some]. That this expanded form is heard as a rebuke to Wesley is evidenced in his sister Virginia's response "Why'n'cha get it yourself" (line 7), seconded a moment later by Mom herself (lines 10/12). In general, within request acceptances, expanded action characterizations that maximize rather than minimize the portrayal of costs may come across as insincere or resistant, and extract greater recognition of the burden being undertaken.

The next case involves a similarly expanded action characterization mobilized in the context of an offer. Ilene's offer to collect her dog (line 5), which is apparently at variance with a previous arrangement, invites the recipient (Lisa) to acknowledge a benefit (with "Do you want..."), identifies herself as the agent of that benefit ("Do you want me..."), and describes the projected course of action. Notwithstanding Ilene's ostensibly altruistic benefactive stance, her offer is rebuffed as entirely self-interested with "Well please yerself dear" and this is followed by an invocation of the previously arranged plan (lines 7-8), and a final response component ("but you're very welcome") that apparently 'grants' Ilene the right to come over.

(31) [Virginia: 360-371]
1  Mom:  = 'hhh Whooh! It is so hot tuhnight. *Would somebody like some
2            more ice tea.  
3 (0.8)  
4  Wes:  Uh(h) - (0.4) I'll take some more ice.
5  (.)  
6  Mom:  -> 'hhh Well, (2.0) let me: get up an' *go get some.
7  Vir:  Why'n'cha get it yourself.
8  (.)  
9  Pru:  ehhh!
10  Mom:  That's a good idea.
11  P/V:  eh[hh- huh huh ]
12  Mom:  [Get it yourself], boy.

(32) [Heritage 1:03: 50-67]
1  Lis:  [Yeh ah I'll tell you I'll give you chapter'n verse,
2  Ile:  Right.
3  Lis:  -ehh heh heh[heh he-]hh=
4  Ile:  [U h : m]
5  Ile:  -> Well now look d'you want me ti[h come over’n get her? or what.t.
6  Lis:  [°( ]°
7  Lis:  -> Well please yerself dear we- we were g’na t-bring’er
8  Ile:  Back b’t you’re very wel[come
9  Ile:  [NO well when’r you when’r you going
10  Lis:  to bring her ↓back.=
11  Lis:  -.hhh Uh well you said wait til a:fter the New -Yeah:
12  (0.2)
13  Ile:  Yeh.well ah mean you-you:- you choose the day.
14  (0.2)
15  Lis:  Oh: ah *mean* t’morrow will do ez far ez I’m [concerned]=
16  Ile:  [

T’morrow ]=
A re-examination of Ilene's offer, however, indicates some features that are discrepant from the benefactive preference for offers. First, the offered action "come over'n get her" is, as previously noted, in an expanded rather than a compact form (such as "collect her") - thus conveying the burdensome nature of the offer rather than its minimization, and putatively undermining the apparent sincerity that may be attributed to its production. Second the turn is concluded with "or what:"

Or-final conclusions of turns are generally designed to reduce the preference for acceptance or agreement to the matter proposed in the previous clause (Lindström 1993; Drake 2013) and, in this case, may index a reluctance to follow through on the offer. Moreover turn-final "or what" in the context of interrogatives may also index underlying aggression or even the exasperation of the questioner (Clayman and Heritage 2002). This final element of turn construction, thus, may also indicate a less than full-hearted offer from a well-motivated benefactor. It is in this context that Lisa's "Well please yerself dear" response may be best understood. That is, at no point in this sequence does Lisa seriously entertain the notion that she has been the recipient of a bona fide offer. The inappropriate form of the offer, the expansion of the burden that the utterance depicts, the final tag, and the pre-existing arrangements between the two women all conduce to undermine the notion that this is to be understood as a sincere offer that a recipient could sincerely accept.

5. Benefactive status and stance: Congruence and Departures

With the possible exception of requests that forward a joint and on-going project (Rossi 2012), requests are burdensome in that they require the diversion of the request recipient's time, effort, or material resources to serve the interests of the requester. Bentham's 'felicitic calculus' is much in evidence in the ways requesters work to display the benefits of requested actions and their gratitude for these benefits, or alternatively to reduce the perceived impositions that their requests place on recipients (Brown and Levinson 1987; Curl and Drew 2008). Similarly offerers may work to downplay the burden of offered actions, thereby reducing the perceived debt that an acceptance of the offer may engender. As we have depicted them so far, however, all of these maneuverings are

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3 We recognize that communicating reluctance to perform a service and insincerity in its proposition are in various ways distinctive, and that the ascription of insincerity in an undertaking to perform a service can have many grounds. Nonetheless inflation of the burdensome nature of a service in the very course of offering it may be one of a family of practices through which 'insincere offers' are communicated and recognized.
conducted within a framework in which there is a broad congruency between benefactive stance and benefactive status. Requesters, no matter how much they attempt to reduce the magnitude of an imposition, are nonetheless understood to be requesting something that will actually benefit them and will involve at least some imposition on the recipient. Likewise offerers are undertaking at least some burden in the interest of providing something that they believe will benefit the recipient.

**Fungible Status, Optional Stances**

An exception to this pattern is to be found in a different category of action: proposals. Earlier we noted, following Couper-Kuhlen (frth a) that the anticipation of future actions does not entail a necessary presumption either of a singular agent, or a singular beneficiary, of the anticipated action. For the case of proposals, a defining characteristic is that both parties will participate in a future course of action and that both parties will share costs and benefits from the activity. As first noted by Couper-Kuhlen (frth a), proposals can readily be formulated in first person plural terms ('we' and 'us') that reflect this relationship. "Shall we X" and "Let's X" are perhaps prototypical forms. This is the form in which Hyla, who is going to a play with her friend Nancy, proposes an additional component of the evening's entertainment:

(33) [HGII:957-965]
1 Hyl: -> =.hh Maybe we c'n go out fer a drink t'night.
2 (.)
3 Nan: Ye::ah. That soun- Yeh I owe y'a dri:nk.
4 (.)
5 Nan: Ah wanna buy y'a dri:n[k.
6 Hyl: [Aow. A'ri[:ght,]
7 Nan: [Oka :]y'l So we will fer sure.=
8 Hyl: =A'ri[ght.
9 Nan: [A f]ter, (.) the play,

As Couper-Kuhlen also notes in connection with this example, Hyla's proposal is swiftly countered by her friend with an undertaking to bear the costs of the outing, an undertaking that takes the form of an offer to which Hyla acquiesces.

This "we" form for proposals is preserved even when a third party is framed as the motivating force for an activity, as in (34):
Here, though it is Vera who "wants us" to go for coffee (line 1), the action sustained across the sequence remains one of proposal and acceptance.

The fact that the underlying benefactive status of proposals involves a sharing of agency, costs, and benefits creates a distinctive affordance for would-be proposers: the proposal can be designed either to thematize the benefit accruing to the proposer or to the recipient of the proposal, or both.

The following two proposals contrast in just this respect. The first of these focuses on the payoff to the proposal recipient. Here Ida has called Jenny to propose a joint outing to Middlesborough, and the framing of her proposal (lines 6-7) references her recipient's interest in the trip ("Would you like to...").

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By way of contrast, the following proposal (arrowed) is designed with some of the benefactive elements of a "request." Here Gordon, who will be leaving town, proposes a get-together with Dana, his ex-girlfriend, and his proposal is framed exclusively by reference to his own interest in the encounter ("I thought I'd like to see you...").
Correspondingly, after receiving an initial token of acceptance from her (line 3), he moves the proposal forward while still avoiding any reference to her possible interest in seeing him, referring instead to possible contingencies that might affect her participation.

The alternate benefactive stances evident in these two excerpts are not mandated by the intrinsic benefactive nature of the activity being put forward, which in both cases is a sociable event to which both parties will contribute and from which both will ostensibly reap at least some benefits. It is this benefactive abundance, a defining attribute of activity proposals, that enables the adoption of varying and even diametrically opposing benefactive stances in the formation of such proposals. As we shall see, the degree of pragmatic choice is more constrained for actions that are accountable as services with a determinate benefactor-beneficiary asymmetry.

*Infungible Status, Manipulative Stances*

Returning now to request and offers, we consider cases in which the congruency between benefactive stance and status is strained or fractured. A precondition for this possibility is that benefactive status here lacks the kind of fungibility that is characteristic of proposals. Given this lack of fungibility in offers and requests, any manifest discrepancy between benefactive status and the stance expressed in the overt design of turns at talk becomes questionable or disingenuous, and may trigger special inferences.

Consider, first, cases in which an offer of actual benefit to the recipient is outwardly framed as a "request." In the following case, Ron has called Marcia's house in search of Marcia's daughter Gina, but ends up talking with Marcia instead. Marcia recollects explicitly that Ron is a television scriptwriter, and when asked about herself she discloses that she's "doing drug counseling down in Venice." (lines 5-6) and volunteers that she is producing a play with the people she's working with. At this point, Ron requests permission to attend the play. He uses a canonical request format ("Can I") indexing moderate entitlement (Curl and Drew 2008) and, with the possible exception of the use of the word "go," is clearly centered on Ron's perspective:
However such a theatrical production is to be regarded, a Hollywood scriptwriter's attendance - *de haut en bas*, as it were - may be more readily construed as an offer of primary benefit to Marcia, than a request in which Ron would be a main beneficiary. And this is entirely how Marcia seems to view the situation (Drew 1984:141-3), responding enthusiastically and treating it as of great value ("Oh: that'd be great.") with the tacit understanding that she will reap the benefits of Ron's attendance. Here then the underlying benefactive status of Ron's action at line 12 trumps the benefactive stance expressed in its design, and this underlying reality rises to the surface through Marcia's registering of it at line 13.

The next case involves a similarly incongruous framing. Here Jenny and Ida are near neighbors, and Ida calls to tell Jenny that some long-awaited dining room furniture has been delivered (lines 7-8). After an initial response that simply treats this announcement as 'news' (line 9), Jenny asks to "come round" (line 11), using a canonical request frame ('Can I') similar to the previous example.
Ida's initial response at line 12 ("Yes please") is, by contrast, a virtually canonical form for the acceptance of an offer. Her continuation ("that's what I want(che)") apparently reconfirms that her initial announcement was intended as an invitation (or a pre-invitation) for Jenny to visit. In its final form (line 14) the utterance proclaims her desire to have Jenny visit ("I wantche tih come round"), and its high degree of explicitness seems designed to counter the benefactive relationship implicit in Jenny's framing. In this sequence, then, an announcement triggers a formatted request to visit that is in turn treated as an offer. Who is the benefactor here, and who is the beneficiary? Each of the two friends has finessed the benefactor-beneficiary relationship, producing a sequence in which a mutual coincidence of wants emerges from a flurry of other-attentive actions.

Another set of cases involves the reverse form of incongruity: a request of actual benefit to the speaker is outwardly framed as an "offer." In both instances that we shall examine, the "offer" is resisted and unmasked as disingenuous. The following straightforward instance occurs during a dinner table conversation and involves the father's offer-framed request to "pass down the string beans" (line 1).

(39) [Dinner Table (Mandelbaum, this volume)]
1 Dad: You wanna pass down the string beans
2 ((Tim looks over))
3 (.)
4 Tim: No.
5 ((Mom looks at string beans))
6 (0.3)
7 Dad: Well do it anyway please,
8 ((Mom unfolds arms, reaches for string beans))
9 Tim: No:.
10 ((Mom picks up string beans and passes to Dad.))
11 Dad: *Thank you.* very much.*

The surface altruism conveyed in the conventionalized declarative and contracted design of Dad's initial request ("You wanna...") runs directly contrary the fundamentally self-interested nature of the action it delivers. The transparent falseness of the action frame, and the entitled stance that it conveys, may prompt Tim's resistant response, which specifically targets and exploits the frame as a resource for resistance. Dad's subsequent re-doing of his request as an imperative may further accentuate his communicated entitlement, with similar results.

While the discrepancy between self-interested status and altruistic stance was transparent from the outset in (37), in the next case it emerges gradually. Lottie first offers to pick up her sister Emma for a trip to the beauty parlor (Emma does not drive). The initial offer is overly granular (as in 34 above), highlighting a burden to the offerer (and perhaps implicating a reciprocal burden of gratitude to the recipient). It is also framed as a negative
interrogative, pressing for a positive response (Heritage 2002) which, in the context of requests is an entitled format (Heinemann 2006). It is robustly rejected (lines 4-5).

(40) [NB IV:10, 41:17-35]
1 Lot:  -> ↑Don't chu want me tih come dow:n getchu dihmorr'en take yih dow:n diH the beauty parlor?
2 (0.3)
4 Emm: What for I ↑jis did my hair it looks like pruh- a perfessional.
6 (0.3)
7 Lot:  -> ↑I mean uh: you wanna go 'd the store er anything over et the Market[Basket]er an]ything?]
9 Emm: [.hmhhh ].thhh].hhh .h]h=
10 =W'l ↑HO[NEY]AH]
11 Lot:  -> [or ]Richard's?
13 (0.2)
15 Emm: I've bou↑ght Evrythai:ng?
14 (0.9)
15 Emm:  => If you want ↑ME TIH go 't the beauty parlor ah wi:ll,
16 Lot:  ['Oh:.']
17 (.)
18 Lot:  ↑W'l I jus thought mayb we g'd g'over duh Richard's fer lunch then after uh get muh hair↓ fixed.
20 Emm: Awright.
21 Lot:  Okay,

Subsequently however Lottie renews her offer through two more rounds proposing other possible destinations in succession, and in the last round competing in overlap (lines 10-11) to forestall rejection (Davidson 1984). By line 14, when the two sisters have reached an impasse, it has emerged that Lottie has more interest in having Emma accompany her on this trip, than Emma has in going along. Emma finally breaks the silence with an offer to accompany Lottie to the beauty parlor. Her utterance "If you want ↑ME TIH go 't the beauty pahlor ah wi:ll," is highly explicit in the inverted benefactive relationship it conveys, presenting herself as devoid of any interest in visiting the beauty parlor except to comply with her sister's desire. Thus the initial benefactor-beneficiary relationship put forward at lines 1-2 has been both unmasked and reversed. Although Emma's offer is presented as an act of pure altruism, that it is so presented is perhaps less than altruistic, though Lottie fineses the situation at lines 18-19 with a lunch proposal to which Emma quite readily agrees.

Incongruities between benefactive status and stance are not particularly commonplace in ordinary conversation. Nevertheless, the cases examined here are at least suggestive of the import and consequences that such incongruities can entail. When an action with the status of an offer is packaged as a request, that framing downplays the burden of debt and the pressure for gratitude or reciprocation that an acceptance would otherwise engender. Correspondingly, in both of the cases we have examined, the maneuver yields unproblematic acceptance
as the outcome together with other displays of interpersonal harmony and affiliation. By contrast, when an action with the status of a request is packaged as an offer, it provides an altruistic veneer for an essentially self-interested action. And in both cases we have examined, this maneuver yields rejection as the outcome together with other displays of interpersonal discord.

Notwithstanding these various differences, a common thread may be discerned across both sets of cases: These diverse outcomes and consequences are all premised on an appreciation by the recipient (whether instantaneous or emergent) that benefactive status and stance are indeed out of sync and that the action's essential nature is at variance with its linguistic framing. Consequently, as we have proposed, it is benefactive status that trumps stance in action ascriptions involving offers and requests, although stance can impart further laminations of social meaning and import.

Conclusion

The argument of this paper has been that when turns at talk projecting an expenditure or redistribution of time, effort, or material resources are in play, benefactive stance and status are made relevant with varying degrees of self-consciousness and explicitness. Other underlying dimensions of the action are also activated: in particular, deontic stance and status (Stevanovic 2012; Stevanovic and Peräkylä 2012) are also mobilized and become more explicit as the arrangements for the fulfillment of the request or offer are finalized (Couper-Kuhlen frth b, and this volume).

Benefactive stance is to some degree malleable. This is an important resource for interactants who, facing actual or anticipated resistance to a nominated action, can formulate the action in ways that emphasize the benefits and minimize the costs in pursuit of an accepting response. At the same time, the malleability of stance occurs within limits, particularly when benefactive status is oriented to by the participants as determinate, asymmetrical, and mutually known.

Our proposal is that requests (and offers) are ordinarily characterized by a basic congruence between benefactive stance and benefactive status, and that this congruence is ordinarily sustained over the course of request and offer sequences though its exact contours may be subject to adjustment and manipulation. This makes turn design a broadly reliable indicator of benefactive status, albeit one that is not infallible. Persons may appear to offer and request goods and services that cannot be delivered, or that may not be beneficial to the putative beneficiary.
Thus it is necessary for participants to keep score of underlying benefits together with the potential for their delivery as an element in the ascription of the actions of requesting and offering, together with other actions that are differentiated by reference to future activities involving costs and benefits.

In considering the scope of different aspects of persons, resources, and actions that speakers must keep track of in the process of action formation and ascription, it is possible to hypothesize a hierarchy. Perhaps most pervasive is the epistemic 'ticker' argued by Heritage (2012) to be universally applicable when speakers produce or understand declarative or interrogative utterances. The deontic 'ticker' by contrast may be relevant when the talk represents future (and perhaps some past) courses of action. The benefactive 'ticker' applies still more narrowly only to that subset of the latter in which costs and benefits are relevantly apportioned, though the details of its linguistic and sequential management remain to be explored.
References


