

Chapter 2

Integration Nations: The Nation-State and Research on Immigrants in Western Europe¹

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Despite its somewhat old-fashioned, functionalist air, ‘integration’ is still the most popular way of conceptualizing the developing relationship between old European nation-states and their growing non-European, ‘ethnic’ immigrant populations. It is also widely used to frame the advocacy of political means for dealing with the consequences of immigration in the post-World War II period. Many similar, difficult-to-define concepts can be used to describe the process of social change that occurs when immigrants are ‘integrated’ into their new host society. But none occurs with the frequency or all-encompassing scope of the idea of integration across such a broad range of West European countries. This fact continues to decisively structure policy research and policy debate on these subjects in Europe.

The wide and varied ordinary language usages of the term are linked to a deeper association of the concept with a longstanding intellectual *paradigm* at the root of modern western society’s conception of itself. This paradigm roots applied social policy thinking in the idea of the ‘nation-state’ as the principal organizing unit of society, with all the epistemological assumptions and political constraints that this term implies. By using the term, writers continue to conceive of ‘society’ as a bounded, functional whole, structured by a state which is able to create policies and institutions to achieve this goal. This ‘nation-state-society’ paradigm may now no longer be the appropriate one for charting the evolving relationship of new immigrants and their host contexts in Europe. In this paper, then, I seek to explore the strengths and weaknesses of ‘integration’ as the seemingly inevitable framework for discussing issues in policy-directed research on immigration and ethnic relations.² After discussing *why* integration is still such a prevalent term in European thinking – despite emerging theoretical challenges associated with globalization and transnationalism – I explore some of the distinct national and supra-national contributions to research in this field. Our comparative understanding is often distorted by the predominant focus in much research on big and established country cases such as Britain, Germany or France. I also make reference therefore to newer debates surfacing in less central European nations such

as Italy, the Netherlands and Denmark, as well as the insights afforded by unusual cases such as Austria and Belgium.

‘Integration’ in Ordinary Language Usages

What is typically spoken of when academics or policy makers use the term ‘integration’ to speak of a collective goal regarding the destiny of new immigrants or ethnic minorities? We can, of course, think of a long list of measures designed to deal with the longer term consequences of migration and settlement. These can be distinguished from immigration policies *per se*, such as policies on border control, rights of entry and abode, or of asylum. ‘Integration’ conceptualizes what happens after, conceiving practical steps in a longer process which invariably includes the projection of *both* deep social change for the country concerned, *and* of fundamental continuity between the past and some idealized social endpoint. Measures concerned with integration include (the list is by no means exhaustive, but indicative): basic legal and social protection; formal naturalization and citizenship (or residency-based) rights; anti-discrimination laws; equal opportunities positive action; the creation of corporatist and associational structures for immigrant or ethnic organizations; the redistribution of targeted socioeconomic funds for minorities in deprived areas; policy on public housing; policy on law and order; multicultural education policy; policies and laws on tolerating cultural practices; cultural funding for ethnic associations or religious organizations; language and cultural courses in the host society’s culture, and so on (for similar checklists of policies, see Kymlicka, 1995, pp. 37-8; Soysal, 1994, pp. 79-82; Vertovec, 1997, pp. 61-2).

What is interesting is when and why such measures are packaged together and interlinked within the broader concept of ‘integration’. The very difficult-to-define process of social change with historical continuity pictured here, is for sure spoken of using a plethora of other terms: assimilation, absorption, acculturation, accommodation, incorporation, inclusion, participation, cohesion-building, enfranchisement, toleration, anti-discrimination, and so on. Yet other terms on this list are either vaguer (absorption, accommodation, toleration); too technically precise, and hence absorbed within integration (such as incorporation, which specifies a legal process, or anti-discrimination, which only describes one type of practical measure); or are concepts which can be used descriptively without necessarily invoking the active intervention of some political agency (assimilation, or acculturation). In recent years, less loaded terms such as inclusion and participation have had some popularity, but neither can match the technical ‘social engineering’ quality of the term integration; nor do they invoke a broader vision of an ideal end-goal for society *as a whole*. Visionary academics and pragmatic policy makers all need a descriptive *and* normative umbrella term, that can give coherence and polish to a patchy list of policy measures aiming at something which, on paper, looks extremely difficult and improbable: the (counterfactual) construction of a suc-

cessful, well-functioning multicultural or multi-racial society. The identification of this conceptual space in progressive-minded practical thinking about the consequences of immigration has – however euphemistic – always been a key part of the term's success.

The other key thing about the list of measures seen to be part of 'integration policy', is that they are all things that a *state* can 'do'. Although for the time being it is rare to come across a specifically designated 'Ministry of Integration', the policy field has emerged as a differentiated area of government, often crossing the competences of different departments. Integration is thus not only an ideal goal for society; it is also something a government sets out to achieve. This assumption is crucial to the nation-state centred conceptualization of social processes that will be found at the core of practical ordinary language usages of the term. Such a use precludes the idea that a society might achieve an integrated state of affairs without the state's intervention.

Sociologically speaking, we can, of course, conceive of integration taking place without the structure-imposing involvement of the state. Immigrants can be 'integrated' into the local labour market as employees or service providers, or they can be 'integrated' into complex inter-community relations at, say, city or district level. Looked at from a bottom-up perspective – where the integration of society as a whole is not assumed as the end goal of interaction between ethnically diverse groups – multicultural relations can be seen to take all kinds of organized and semi-organized forms. These may not at all be encompassed by the top-down, organized structures typical of state thinking on the subject, such as policy frameworks, official channels of participation, or legally circumscribed rights, restrictions and entitlements. Multiculturalism as a descriptive state-of-affairs, in this sense, could be the product of something that never had anything to do with the 'multicultural' policies or institutions of the state. However – as historical theorists of the state would remind us with their vivid terminology – the state has always constituted itself in the way it imposes formal structures and institutionalizes social relations via a systematic 'embracing', 'caging' and/or 'penetrating' of society (Torpey, 2000). This logic of incorporation has invariably in recent history taken a dominant form of collective social power (to borrow the terms of Mann, 1993) that seeks to encompass, contain and bind together the state's domination of society, and all the varied market or community relations inside it. This form is the modern nation state. And, as soon as we begin to think of integration as a collective societal goal which can be achieved through the systematic intervention of collective political agency, we inevitably begin to invoke the nation-state in the production of a different, caged and bounded version of multicultural social relations.

It is very difficult, then, to make much sense of the term integration in practical, applied terms, without bringing back in the nation-state, at least in the European political context. This is not only because the term gets monopolized by nationally-rooted policy makers who, I will suggest, typically link their ideas about integration and their measures for achieving it – even when they are 'multicultural' in inspiration – to historical concerns with nation-building. As I will also go on to

explain, it is equally because of a range of epistemological constraints imposed by the practical operationalization of integration as a framework for applied research, whether targeted at questions of policy or at generating knowledge through survey-based studies of immigrants and ethnic minorities.

Looking across Western Europe in the broadest possible way, it is clear that 'integration' has emerged as the most widely used general concept for describing the target of post-immigration policies. This is not to say that every political figure or intellectual in every country likes or uses the term. The synthetic, cross-national pronouncements of international and intergovernmental organizations might be taken as one good indicator of its pervasive acceptance by the end of the 1990s. It is noticeable how, for example, the conclusions of the presidency of the European Council of Ministers at Tampere in October 1999, gestured specifically towards integration as the key term for encompassing the post-immigration processes EU institutions would like to get involved with in this area of rising political significance. Although rarely defined, it is also noticeably foregrounded in the formulations of some of the broadest cross-national programmes instigated by organizations as varied as the Council of Europe, the ILO or the OSCE. The formulations of NGOs in Brussels likewise constantly use the term, as do influential transatlantic policy fora such as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace or Metropolis.³

This success echoes the past and recent history of policy debate in individual nation-states. The case of France here is typical. The emergence of '*intégration*' as the central term of the 'new republican synthesis' of the 1980s, followed a period in which older assimilationist ideas vied with the post-60s inheritance of ideas about cultural difference and the anti-racist struggle (Costa-Lascoux, 1989; Weil, 1991; Haut Conseil à l'Intégration, 1993). Integration became the sensible position for the centre trying to distinguish itself from xenophobic nationalism on the one hand, and radical anti-system discourses on the other. A similar centrist convergence occurred earlier in Britain in the late 1960s, notably in a well remembered quotation from then Home Office minister Roy Jenkins, one of the principal architects of race relations legislation (Rose et al., 1969, Rex, 1991). Although the anti-racist left has always rejected it, the concept has retained a high degree of practical significance for the liberal, cross-party centre. Indeed, with the emergence of new migration questions surrounding the reception of asylum seekers, integration has re-emerged as the most comprehensive term for conceiving resettlement policies, and has been central to recent Home Office consultations on immigration policy (Castles et al., 2002). France and Britain are the paradigmatic early 'integration nations' in Europe: turning post-war, post-colonial policies into a mildly nationalist reaffirmation of the tolerant, cosmopolitan, inclusive nature of their conceptions of nationhood (on this, see Favell, 1998).

Across other European countries, we can find numerous examples of countries converging similarly on integration as the widest frame for discussing post-immigration policies (see Mahnig, 1998). It is used frequently in research in Germany or Belgium, albeit with ambiguity about *what* the immigrant is integrating

into, given the federal, city-centred and multi-levelled nature of the process here (Esser, 1999; Blommaert and Verschueren, 1998). It has returned to the fore in the Netherlands and Sweden, after periods of flirtation with more cultural differentialist thinking, as they seek to reconnect the provision of welfare benefits and multicultural policy with conditions about the learning of the national language and culture (Fermin, 1999; Soininen, 1999). It has also been the most obvious frame for 'new' (or self-discovering) countries of immigration – such as Italy, Spain, Denmark or Austria – finally formulating a centrist, more progressive response to their current immigration 'crisis'.⁴ Perhaps even more importantly, immigrant and ethnic groups themselves speak of desiring integration, or phrase their criticisms of racism and exclusion as barriers to full or fair integration (see, for example, the frequent use of word in Alibhai-Brown, 2000, a well-known ethnic minority spokesperson in Britain).

Some of these ordinary language usages shadow the well-established American preference for 'assimilation' as the core sociological concept (Alba and Nee, 1997). In terms of recent immigrants, 'integration' is here often used interchangeably with assimilation in the US, when it is gesturing to the functional involvement of new migrant 'ethnic' groups in the society's housing, educational, welfare or employment systems (Edmonston and Passel, 1994). Here, indeed, the term has been moved away from its discredited links with desegregation issues over black/white public relations in the 1960s, to a more European-looking concern with the cultural and social absorption of diverse new populations that have grown dramatically in the US since the opening up of immigration laws in 1965.

Europeans, however, usually shy away from the term assimilation, which in a European context would smack of biological overtones and the nasty cultural intolerance of the past. But the European preference for 'integration' ahead of 'assimilation' is not really the choice of a less loaded or more politically sensitive term over one which implies greater conformist and exclusionary pressures, quite the contrary. It signals, rather, a deeper concern with the fact that the changes brought on by post-war immigration in Europe have raised anew questions over historical continuity – about the substance of nation-building – which echo once again the longer histories of nation-building: the more-or-less coercive absorption of minority populations and regions through centralizing processes of modernization (the classic formulation of this is Gellner, 1983). Integration, then, is about imagining the national institutional forms and structures that can unify a diverse population; hence imagining what the state can actively do to 'nationalize' newcomers and re-constitute the nation-state under conditions of growing cultural diversity. The nation building institutions of European nations are – unlike the US and other continents of immigration – not historically built on immigration and geographical distance from Europe, but on bounded notions of specific territory and the constant self-distinction of 'indigenous', culturally 'unique' populations constrained to live alongside very close, and troublesomely similar neighbours. The essential problematic worrying European policy makers is, then, the difficult and often only partial accommodation of culturally distinct outsiders and foreigners into

longstanding social and cultural institutions which were essentially defined historically *within* Europe, and for highly *local* reasons, in quite exclusive and belligerent terms. The fear which thus defines the problematic of immigrant integration is that full assimilation on these conditions is probably never likely to occur.

The everyday popularity of integration as a term may appear peculiar at a time when so-called globalization and, in particular, new forms of migration and mobility are said to have generated all kinds of nation-state-transcending 'transnational' actors and forms of organization (see Faist, 2000; Papastergiadis, 1999). Our unit of society is now routinely said to be something we must look for beyond the nation-state (Cohen and Kennedy, 2000). In the more speculative fancies of social theorists we are invited to think of the trajectory of (post-) modernity as going beyond society itself (for example, Giddens, 1990; Urry, 2000). Under these conditions, migrant groups might be thought of as not following the same westernizing, modernizing integration path into full citizenship, membership and belonging of their new host societies. Pan-national and regional cooperation, as well as the re-emergence of the city as the locus for integration, is also said to have reduced the significance of the nation-state as an exclusive, bounded 'population container' in Europe (Torpey, 2000).

Yet the endurance of 'integration' as the goal of most *practical* policy thought on this question in Europe – including amongst the leading independent academic authorities – gives us a clue to the vested interests and applied imperatives of the older, nation-state building paradigm. As soon as their minds turn to applied policy formulations, these people recognize no 'beyond-the-nation-state' to immigration policy. Europeans continue to speak of the integration of immigrants into bounded, nationally-distinct societal units – focusing attention on typical nation-building questions such as naturalization, access to citizenship, access to the welfare state, participation in political and social institutions, and so on – precisely because anything else threatens the basic political ordering of European cultural and social diversity into state-centred, state-organized social forms. To put it another way, the incentive structures of policy thinking and comparative research on the integration of immigrants in Europe, are still very much set by the imperatives of the singular nation-state-society, which recognizes this and only this as the fundamental problematic at stake here.

Integration as a Paradigm for Policy Research

Unlike in America, academic research on immigrants and integration in Europe is still dominantly structured by its explicit or implicit links to the knowledge demands of specific policy agendas and political discussions in different national contexts (on these, see Favell, 2001). In Europe, the overlap and interpenetration of research and policy making is pervasive at national and, increasingly, international level. Academics are co-opted into politicized roles either through the direct

shaping of the research agenda by public and institutional funding opportunities to do 'applied' work; by the invitation to take on the role of public intellectual in media or government work; or by their activist involvement as campaigners, in which their work is used to articulate political positions. This involvement clearly is linked to society's functional need for someone to express political agency, with academics contributing through their research to the construction of both social problems (as they are perceived) and their solution. Insofar as their work also often serves to 'think' for the state, it also helps underwrite dominant nation-building ideologies. Such a role has its costs. The involvement of researchers in activism or the policy process can also diminish the intellectual autonomy and viability of independent academic research outside of more instrumentalized uses.

European nations are obviously at different stages of development in their internal debates, but in most cases academic thinking is now moving beyond purely denunciatory work on the negative consequences of immigration (such as studies of racism) into the conceptualization of practical integration solutions and trajectories of multicultural social change. For example, in Britain, the popular sub-field of more critical anti-racist, Marxist and post-Marxist writers (such as the cultural studies writers inspired by Stuart Hall) – whose work tended to focus on condemning the racism of state institutions and celebrating the 'resistance' of immigrant cultures – have themselves found there is a limit to what can be done with such arguments. More recently, they have begun to more consciously contribute to debates about multicultural citizenship, in relation to mainstream policy formulations (i.e., Gilroy, 2000; Alibhai-Brown, 2000).⁵ The desire to make a respectable intervention into the public debate, or to get hired for research by the government or political think-tanks, can thus be a disciplining experience. Such contributions can, as the evolution of anti-racist and multicultural thinking in Britain shows, play a major role in legitimizing in the mainstream a national sense of ease with difference and diversity. In many other countries, a similar evolution can be observed, with discussion about 'integration' playing the central mainstream role as a focus for constructive, pragmatic, policy-related interventions.

National self-sufficiency in policy debates has, however, been the rule. The terms and categories that dominate discussion in different places – for example, 'multiculturalism' and 'race relations' in Britain, or republicanism and *citoyenneté* in France – are the product of often exclusively internal national political dynamics. Notably, they are discourses which reflect and reproduce longer standing narratives of nationhood and national destiny popular in these countries. When references to other countries appear, comparison usually enters as a further self-justificatory strategy for the national ideology. In France, for example, a key move among many public intellectuals involved in producing the 'new republican synthesis' and idea of *intégration* of the 1980s was the contrasting of the 'universalist' French tradition with the 'differentialism' of its European and North American rivals (most dramatically in Schnapper, 1991; Todd, 1994). Over time, however, the prejudices of comparison have softened, especially as policy actors and academics have themselves been increasingly exposed to debates and consultation with other

national counterparts. Under these conditions, their national reflection may begin to incorporate more explicit elements of structured comparative knowledge, recognizing the specificities of the other national starting points and the opportunities of cross-national policy learning. The emergence of pan-European structures (both EU and Council of Europe) has added to this imperative, tendering research which, in order to get funded, must be explicitly cross-national in scope and personnel, and policy oriented in its objectives.

The first result of academic cross-national policy comparison was the identification of ideal-type national 'models' of citizenship and integration (Hammar, 1985; Castles, 1995). This Weberian comparative impulse was strongly influenced by North American writers bringing a more autonomous set of interests to the study of immigration in Europe (especially Brubaker 1989, 1992). The models approach was popular because it proved to be such an effective heuristic strategy: reducing the problem of the vague and indefinable object of enquiry – a national 'society' in all its complexity – to a 'model' which captures the key explanatory variables of social change. These were invariably identified as 'path dependent' historical sources of national cultural difference. The most well-known argument linked to the models approach has been the classic distinction between the 'ethnic' and 'civic' nation in citizenship studies, distilled from a reductive (and largely inaccurate) stylization of French and German nationality law as ideal types of *ius soli* and *ius sanguinis* citizenship. It was surely questionable to 'explain' the differences between these two similar cases by reference to national ideologies, themselves produced in the past by nationalist intellectuals and state actors to distinguish one nation from the other (on this see Weil, 1996). Yet even if historically dubious, the power of the contrast here worked to generate effective normative arguments about a *de facto* national convergence across Europe – foreseeing mixed sources of nationality and a limited recognition of *ius soli* for second and third generations – thus helping German policy makers to move towards reforms (Hansen and Weil, 2000).

The deeper explanatory challenge here would be to produce a more reflexive understanding of the ideological modes by which similar European nation-states have justified and reproduced their own models, as culturally distinct projections of collective identity (see Favell, 1998; Alund and Schierup, 1991; Joppke, 1999). More even handed comparison has gone on to recognize that while national policy legacies matter, they cannot be reduced to positive and negative national examples. One response was the move to introduce typologies of incorporation, factoring in modes of state-society relations and multi-levelled constitutional structures, as a more sophisticated reflection of the different factors determining integration. Soysal's work in particular had the virtue of turning the ethnic/civic distinction on its head: highlighting in its arguments about the postnational status of migrant groups such as Turks in Germany, the normative dogma involved in always equating full national citizenship with full integration (Soysal, 1994). Structured case-by-case comparisons along these institutionalist lines have enabled a more

fruitful type of cross-national work, particularly those located at sub-national levels such as the city (i.e., Ireland, 1994; Bousetta, 2000).

However, away from these predominantly North American led comparative efforts, more explicitly policy-oriented studies with a comparative range have tended to follow the least sophisticated academic approaches. This has certainly been the case with work produced through the sponsorship of European institutions. For example, the big winner from an intense bidding struggle among academics in this field for money from the Targeted Social and Economic Research (TSER) programme on 'exclusion' was a national models-based study – led by well-known national figures Friedrich Heckmann and Dominique Schnapper – that explicitly structured its investigations around the idea that immigration and ethnic relations in each country are determined by classic policy 'models' rooted in political cultural differences between France, Germany, Britain and so on (Heckmann and Schnapper, 2003). A models-based approach of this kind will often itself reproduce the ideological fictions each nation has of its own and others' immigration politics. Schnapper and associates duly found that minorities and majorities do indeed *talk* about the issues in each country in ways that follow the distinct national ideologies. But little or no *self-reflexive* effort was made to ask how these nation-sustaining ideas about distinct national 'models' have themselves been created and sustained by politicians, the media and the policy academics themselves in each country, precisely in order to foreclose the possibility that external international or transnational influences might begin to affect domestic minority issues and policy considerations.

Practical institutional imperatives also dictate that the policy study packages and presents its findings in a narrowly targeted way, which naturally curtails many of the more interesting lines of enquiry. This has been well-understood by one of the more influential NGOs in this field in Brussels – the Migration Policy Group – who have been involved in two of the most wide ranging funded surveys on integration policies across European society (Vermeulen, 1997; MPG, 1996). In the latter, the 'societal integration project', they set up roundtables in around twenty countries, and listened to the expert opinions of policy makers and policy intellectuals, generating a mass of material about how policy makers talk about the same issues in different places. However, in the end the slim report of highlights and recommendations boiled all this down to a reaffirmation that convergence was the source of future norms on citizenship and integration across Europe. Being limited to the typical state-centric talk and self-justification of policy makers, it was unable to offer any genuine comparative evaluation. Moreover, the freedom of reflection of such a project is naturally cut down by the expectations of the sponsors who lay down the lines of research. By definition, such comparative policy studies produce findings which reinforce the state-centred, top-down formulations familiar at national level. The one difference here – as a product of a supra-national European initiative – is that the conclusions about the inevitability of convergence underline a familiar EU strategy to focus, not on national exceptionalism or uniqueness (as do national level studies) but rather on the narrowing of

national differences. In other words, as we might expect given the sponsors involved, these arguments work to narrow down the freedom of agency of individual states, hence their sovereignty. Convergent citizenship criteria become like convergent criteria for monetary union.

To really be able to answer the evaluatory question of which nation-states are doing better on integration than others, we would need some kind of 'integration index': a convertible scale which enabled us to read off across European societies degrees of social segregation in housing, success in schooling or employment, differences in resistance of cultural behaviour, persistence of racist attitudes, relative social mobility, or whatever is argued to be the best set of objective measures. These indicators would then have to be linked to the existence, or the success and failure, of specific national policies or institutions. The inevitable impulse to cross-national evaluation of state policy is not only exceedingly difficult to do, given the cross-national data constraints I will go on to discuss. It also imposes as an assumption an untenable automatic correlation between success on the index and the effectiveness of state policies having achieved their goals by shaping or influencing the behaviour of groups and individuals. This assumption itself is a state-reinforcing one, penalizing any society which is less structured by state intervention, regardless of how well 'integrated' groups or individuals may in fact be.

The one way this kind of approach works is as a comparative shaming strategy directed towards states with less extensive formal rights and entitlements for migrants than others. The most extensive survey of this kind was a six nation Austrian study which did just this, in order to shame the Austrian government into better migration policy and anti-discrimination measures (Çinar et al., 1995; Waldrauch and Hofinger, 1997; Waldrauch, 2001). The extensively documented study broke down all formal rights and entitlements of non-nationals across various European states, rating each one between 0 and 1 as an index to barriers to integration. By definition, the approach foresees a state-centred, state-organized solution to integration, and cannot capture any forms of multiculturalism which are the outcome of more *laissez-faire* style approaches. We end up with the very common conclusion that highly state-organized societies, such as Sweden or the Netherlands, do it best. Yet these are also highly unified national societies, who put high demands of linguistic and cultural assimilation on their inhabitants (something to which the index is blind). They are also societies racked with dilemmas of informal economy, and high degrees of social segregation among their immigrant population. Current discussions on immigration in Denmark provide a good example of the paradoxes here in some of Europe's most enlightened social democracies. Laws and policies ensure excellent access to rights and high rates of formal participation among the so-called 'new Danes'. Yet the many socio-economic problems linked to disadvantaged immigrants are routinely interpreted in political discussion as dysfunctional to the smooth running of the Danish national welfare state, and stigmatized as 'ikke dansk'; i.e., rule-breaking immigrants not behaving in a 'true' Danish manner (on Denmark, see Schierup, 1993).

Rights-based evaluations of integration contrast dramatically with those which focus on different formal indicators. Britain, with its weak constitutional structures and idiosyncratic race relations institutions, does rather badly in the Austrian study, yet this contrasts sharply with how comparative British evaluations of European experiences view the matter. Contrasting its longstanding and successful multicultural practices with the troubled politics and social situations of many continental European societies, the most extensive studies made by British researchers have always found Britain to be far better endowed with anti-discrimination legislation and multicultural policies (Forbes and Mead, 1992; Wrench, 1996). The British state in fact pursues a minimalist style of intervention into the many and diverse forms of multiculturalism that have developed in the country. Yet homegrown studies routinely link these successes to the agency of the British state and its policy legacy: what is perceived by them as the existence of a strong state-centred multicultural race relations framework. Multiculturalism is thus claimed as an achievement of the British state, rather than a consequence of the weak penetration of the state in everyday life in Britain. From this point of view – which is more plausible in a comparative perspective – it could be argued that it is *laissez faire* that has enabled London and a small handful of other cities to develop as multicultural cities, in sharp distinction from the white and intolerant provincial hinterlands.

As more positive visions of multicultural integration become prevalent across Europe, other less ‘advanced’ integration nations than France or Britain are likely to follow their lead and see their ruling national elites claim the multicultural success in the name of their own tradition of nationhood. For sure, France and Britain look like successful multicultural societies on this score. Yet, it is precisely a country like France which imposes the biggest cultural burdens on newcomers in terms of their adhesion to the particular ways of the nation; or a country like Britain, which buys enlightened race relations as a trade-off for some of the toughest border controls in Europe. These paradoxical results follow from the fact that both countries practice ‘multiculturalism-in-one-nation’: a multicultural nationalism, that sees no other source of multiculturalism than the miraculously tolerant cosmopolitanism of the home culture. Such countries may then be ‘universalist’, and yet apparently highly intolerant of specific cultural differences; or they might be highly multicultural and multi-racial, and yet be at the same time extraordinarily xenophobic. There are clear costs involved in the stubborn maintenance of the fiction of exclusive nation-state agency over the multicultural aspects of these locations.

The strong sense of national self-preservation displayed here perhaps explains why the European Union has only been able to gain the weakest influence over immigrant integration policies, jealously guarded at the national level. The EU can get involved to identify good practices, or the best convergent norms across societies; but it cannot begin to constitute itself as a political agency here without taking agency (i.e., sovereignty) away from nation-states, which have used issues of immigrant integration precisely to actually underline and reproduce their own

existence as coherent, bounded, nation-building societies. European integration is of course itself the search for political agency at a supra-national level; but the fact that it seems to fail to constitute itself as a state, suggests that this is largely because the actual boundaries of European society remain very much fixed at the national level.

Survey and Census Based Work on Integration

It is no surprise that policy-centred studies should inevitably reproduce the state-centred, nation-building optic in their framing and prescription of ways to achieve integration. As the preceding discussion has indicated, such studies by definition can say very little about the kind of less structured social processes that are characteristic of much multiculturalism to be found in Europe's cities and metropolitan regions. Rather, where they recognize multiculturalism, policy and institutional-based studies tend to bolster nationalizing ideologies which affirm the nation-state as the sole relevant locus of political agency able to shape a 'society'. They are also, needless to say, the contributions which best chime with the interests of agents of the state, concerned with maximizing their realm of political influence by emphasizing the growing importance of top-down immigration and integration policy.

But what of bottom-up studies: empirical work which focuses on the experiences, attitudes or social mobility of the immigrants or ethnic minority members themselves? Policy and institutional-based studies often have very little to say about actual migrant experiences of integration. Here, more ambitious uses of survey and census-based work, based on studying their values, discourses and behaviour, offer a more advanced integration index for measuring and evaluating what is going on. Clearly, this would be material close to the actual process of social change going on inside 'multicultural' nation-states; and, it might be thought, material more likely to reveal evidence of tendencies that are decomposing the conventional nation-state integration paradigm. For example, it might be expected to find strong evidence – in those European cities that are significant 'nodes' in the global economy – of the growing transnationalism characteristic of the social and cultural forms of migrant groups whose activities are embedded in global economic networks (see Faist, 2000; Rath, 2000).

Ambitious studies along these lines are now beginning to emerge. The possibility of doing such work has grown out of an increasing societal thirst for more systematic knowledge about immigration phenomena as the political salience of the subject has risen. Governments, policy think tanks, international institutions and the media, are all beginning to show interest in funding much more large-scale survey data driven studies of integration issues. The positivistic style of large-scale survey work offers an interesting counterpoint to the normative leanings of policy studies and institutional-based works, which have tended to frame their more journalistic-style methods with the value-laden rhetoric of citizenship and rights.

Survey-based researchers, meanwhile, preserve their credibility, not by shadowing the language and conceptualizations of policy actors, but by the distinct 'scientific' autonomy of their methodology and results. By definition, the kind of work they are doing cannot be mounted by the personnel of governments and newspapers, lacking in the specialist quantitative and qualitative techniques required; such work has to be commissioned, with freedom of research negotiated in advance. This fact creates distinctive material conditions for the kind of work produced. One advantage is that the process of deriving 'policy' directed normative conclusions is (or should be) left to post-hoc interpretation, and not in-built in the normative state-centred conceptualizations which typically measure integration: such as those which rate already institutionalized state policy structures linked to citizenship rights or legal and political channels.

Numerous examples of impressive large-scale survey work do now exist in various countries at the single-case national level (see the discussion in Phalet and Swyngedouw, 1999; examples are Modood et al., 1997; Tribalat et al., 1996; Swyngedouw, Phalet, and Deschouwer, 1999; Phalet et al., 2000; Diehl et al., 1999; Veenman, 1998; Lesthaege, 2000). The new frontier for survey-based research is the possibility of cross-national comparative survey work on the integration of immigrants. However, as was clear from exploratory discussions at a conference in September 1999 on the subject organized by Hartmut Esser – which brought together the European Consortium for Sociological Research, a grouping of the leading quantitative social scientists in Europe – very few of the epistemological problems of doing such work have yet been considered by researchers more familiar with doing cross-national studies on employment, educational mobility or inequality (e.g., Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992). Cross-national efforts have to be synthesized from the best of the national level data provided on a nation-by-nation basis by governments. The very best of current cross-national efforts in the area of immigration mounted by an international organization, which monitors migration stocks and flows around the developed world – the annual OECD-SOPEMI report – is notoriously hampered by the fact that the expert respondents each report figures for its own country based on different national means of data-gathering (SOPEMI, 1998). Moreover, there is nothing like the systematic quantitative effort on integration questions as there is in the report for basic issues of entry, legality, residence and so on. The report does have a growing section on integration, but it is by far the weakest part of it, reflecting perhaps a lack of sociological expertise among the geographers and economists who make up the immigration specialist panel. The report in fact falls back into a more policy-centred style of analysis: reproducing the same old frameworks about national models and comparative rights indices.

We can imagine perhaps a more concerted attempt to conceptualize the integration questions in a way which escapes this nominalist nation-state centred approach. But the real problem here is that all available data on immigrant or minority numbers basic to the SOPEMI effort, follow the significantly different conventions in each country about collecting population data. There is, in other

words, an in-built dependency on nationally-specific research technologies; usually the state apparatus that has been built up around census gathering. The specific methods used to identify populations of immigrant origin in the post-war period vary from country to country, as does the political sensitivity with which this information is released or extrapolated. The technical methods – and the politics surrounding such sensitive state knowledge production – inevitably reflect the national ideology each nation has fashioned for itself as a narrative of nation-building. No matter how insulated the methodology, the broader national policy definition of integration as a social process impacts upon the production of categories and numbers elicited from survey results.

Counting only non-nationals as the immigrant population is still the base-line norm across nearly all European countries except Britain, which has a famously idiosyncratic form of ethnic self-identification in its census. Most comparative tables offer figures for non-nationals by nationality, which works up to point in countries where original nationality remains a distinguishing factor (as, say, in Germany, Italy or Spain; although it runs into problems in Germany, for example, in counting the three million *Aussiedler* from Eastern Europe). This method is clearly a criterion of declining usefulness, however, as increasing numbers of second and third generation immigrant children in fact accede to full national citizenship; it can indeed be simply a crude measure of administrative exclusion. Naturalization rates over time are a second set of figures, which trace the absorption of immigrants over shorter, given periods of time. Other countries may also offer figures which count those people who identify older family members born outside of the country. From this, a great deal can be extrapolated into second and third generation, but a country such as France still maintains barriers for ideological reasons to researchers using this information, which means that some naturalized second or third generation are lost to studies once they leave the immigrant household.

A strong moral prohibition, meanwhile, exists on the classification of people by race or religion across Europe. There is little more distasteful to continental Europeans than anything with a whiff of former Nazi racial classifications, or indeed the common practice in multinational empires such as the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia to brand people permanently on their interior passports with an 'ethnic' nationality (see Brubaker, 1995). However, a more racially heterogeneous population such as the Portuguese avoids these racial classifications for rather different reasons, to do with the cosmopolitan colonial conception of the nation. In Belgium, you are classified by language according to political records after you vote, religion after you choose university. Here, however, the census is banned by law to answer such questions up front. In the Netherlands, meanwhile, there is no national census at all, after a libertarian public revolt in the 1970s. Ethnic statistics here have to be reconstructed from local city and police records or special ministry surveys, something that has contributed significantly to the sense of unease about the numbers of 'undocumented' residents in the country. Other countries, however, such as Denmark and Britain – which in other respects have very different census

methods – are prepared under certain circumstances to make available census data to track specified (anonymous) individuals over time between censuses, in order, for example, to analyze spatial mobility or rates of political participation (see Togeby, 1999; Fielding, 1995). Such a babel of census information is a difficult starting point. In talking about integration, *who* are we talking about: ‘legally resident foreigners’, ‘immigrants’, ‘illegal/undocumented residents’, ‘third-country nationals’, ‘ethnic groups’, ‘racial minorities’, new or naturalized ‘citizens’, or simply formally undistinguishable ‘nationals’ with a different *de facto* cultural history or skin colour?

The narrow definition of immigrants as resident non-nationals has the virtue of avoiding the integration issue entirely. It offers the normative panacea of equating citizenship with full integration, an idea which has long reassured French republicans on the virtues of a cosmopolitan type of nationhood. A normative dogma such as this makes no sociological sense, of course, once any one is willing to admit that host populations and migrants alike will continue to informally discriminate themselves and each other regardless of which passport they are holding. Once some outsiders become insiders, however, their formal categorization (or ‘recognition’, in more affirmative terms) itself becomes a part of the integration process. Whether or not they are separated off for official monitoring purposes, and how and where they can be placed on some path towards full integration, becomes a crucial part of the integrative process itself, not least because the separation from one’s original nationality may also be a coercive state-enforced act (see Simon, 1997). There is a profound moral truth in the French refusal to actually recognize any French citizen of non-national ‘ethnic’ origin as such in official statistics, because the recognition itself can indeed be a form of inequality or discrimination. The power of naming does indeed count for something. The French refusal is also a dramatic statement of the nation-state’s continued prerogative to nationalize a new citizen as indivisibly French. Yet, on the other hand, no policy can be devised for systematic integration of foreign-origin groups until the nation-state begins to collectively recognize and classify minorities of ethnic origin, with special claims – targeted policies, resources, legal allowances, etc – that follow from this (this is the central problematic of the influential work of Kymlicka, 1995).

There is another side of the classificatory separation, however. Integration cannot be conceived, identified, let alone measured as degrees of inequality and so on, until a control group representative of the national population has been specified. But this raises the question: we are talking about integration into *what*? Here, the logic of classification becomes even more slippery. Are they the indigenous population (‘de souche’ in French), but if so, what length of time constitutes ‘roots’; are they defined culturally, by their family origins, by their length of residence; are they, rather, simply to be identified as the majority ‘white’ or ‘European’ population; or, are we in fact speaking of some representative sample or statistical mean of the citizenry as a whole, including all those new and culturally exotic recent additions? Moreover, as Michael Banton points out (2001), it makes

little sense to measure the integration of an immigrant or ethnic minority population, until we have some precise measurement of how well the majority population is integrated as a nation. Whatever method is chosen – however the state chooses to classify, count and control its population or define those who are in and those who are out – will again amount to a pre-determined national ‘sampling frame’, that is very closely linked to the ideological concept of nationhood present. Behind this, of course, lies the normative commitment to integration as societal end-goal, the underlying assumption that holds the nation-state-society unit together. Researchers who thus set out to objectively measure integration, without taking into account how much the nation-state unit has already determined the very quantitative tools they use, will fail to see how much the bounds of what they can discover have already been pre-set for them. If so, they are working no less to underwrite the predominance of the nation-state optic, than policy studies researchers who accept without challenge nation-state centred definitions of ‘universal’ citizenship or ‘cosmopolitan’ multiculturalism.

On the whole, however, progressive minded commentators across Europe do not challenge this conceptual recuperation of their very tools of research by a nation-state centred vision of integration. The majority, rather, has been content to push a different, conciliatory line, that squares the circle between the reality of on-going nation-building efforts and the contrasting idealism of cosmopolitan multiculturalism. They argue that European nations have become, or are becoming, ‘countries of immigration’. Such arguments have been very much present in those countries whose right wing refuses to recognize the reality of continued immigration and settlement at all. Among those promoting this happier version of Europe’s immigrant future, the coercive weight of ever-present nation-building processes is thus lightened by the claim that the integration of immigrants in Europe can be equated with what happens to immigrants in Australia, Canada or the US. The normative inspiration is clear – constitutional universalism, cosmopolitan idealism, the melting pot, open immigration regimes, and so on – but the idea of the old nation-states of Europe metamorphosing into brand new ‘countries of immigration’ is a dubious rhetoric on any empirical level, not least from a historical point of view. In Europe, we are talking about tightly bounded and culturally specific nation-states dealing in the post-war period with an unexpected – but still not very large – influx of highly diverse immigrant settlers, at a time when, for other international reasons, their sense of nationhood is insecure or in decline. It is a problematic very different to those faced by the US or Australia, whose histories and sense of nationhood have always been built on immigration. Europe, rather, faces a problematic where the continuity of nation-building is perhaps a much more significant fact than the multicultural hybridity that is sometimes sought for in these other, newer ‘model’ nations. A great deal of revisionist effort has gone into reconstructing certain European nations as undiscovered immigration nations (e.g., Noiriel, 1991). Although widely accepted, it is an effort which in fact empties significance out of other empirical attempts to problematize integration as a limited process of cultural change, combining multicultural adaptation with national

reinvention. Instead, it rather lamely gestures European survey-based researchers back towards the most culturally-neutral model available: that of classic American assimilation research, which charts the progress of different immigrant ethnic groups towards some ideal-typical absorption into the suburban middle class – a process where the pervasively national orientation of American assimilation is never even put into question, and where the nation-building effect here stays invisible (see also Brubaker, 2001). The spectacular resurgence of American patriotism in its crudest forms post ‘9/11’ has at least clarified how deeply nationalistic ideas of American unity and America’s global role in fact are.

Operationalizing this particular normative frame for immigrant integration – which recasts European societies as immigration nations in the idealized, immigrant American mould – has been done in distinctive national ways. On the face of it, the French offer the purest instance of a self-styled universalist country of immigration, not least after the assiduous reconstruction of this idea by historians and sociologists in the 1980s. Establishing this as the normative frame for new progressive policies was relatively straightforward. But, in empirical terms, the formal prohibition in official survey data on introducing any sub-categorization of the population by ethnicity (i.e., in the data produced by the national statistics office, INSEE), left grandiose declarations about the continued success of the French republican model bereft of evidence for these claims. For how else could the sociological integration of different cultural groups in France in fact be measured? A study which reintroduced some sub-classification of the population by ethnicity was, in other words, needed to show that ethnicity in fact did not matter. The nation-sustaining argument about integration was in a sense generating its own contradictions, that would then need resolution by a new scientific approach. This, then, was the background to the ambitious study by INED, headed by Michèle Tribalat, that still represents the state-of-the-art in integration research in France (Tribalat, 1995; Tribalat et al., 1996). Sample ethnic groups of different national origin – tracked down by ethnographic investigation, using the census only indirectly – were compared to a control group of non-immigrant origin French on questions of cultural behaviour, language use, housing concentration, political participation, and so on. The strongly French socialization of most groups observed – the Turkish and Chinese being the two outliers – in fact offered strong evidence for continued ‘assimilation’ in France, as Tribalat preferred to call it. The mere introduction of ethnicity into the survey, however, brought desperately controversial public reactions from other commentators, such as Hervé Le Bras (1998); and this despite the fact that it led to such conventionally ‘French’ results.

Systematic cross-ethnic comparative work is much more highly developed in Germany, which has strong national surveys of data by national-origin available, such as the socioeconomic panel commissioned annually by the Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaft, which provides data on ethnicity, language, identity questions and participation (an example of such work being Diehl et al., 1999). Progressive researchers here are even more sensitive to the de-categorization of foreigners and the positive idea of Germany as a country of immigration. There have been

advantages to such research in the fact it has had to be diverted away from the ideologically dominated discussions on citizenship and naturalization, where progress has been more difficult. German research is thus more likely to concentrate on conceptualizing integration in technical socioeconomic terms: in terms of participation in the welfare state, and in differences between federal or city level contexts. One consequence is the possibility of internal comparisons of integration geographically within the nation, something of which there is no trace in France and Britain. German research, however, does not escape the pervasively nation-centred frame which dominates its political debates. Negative evidence of non-integration – such as ethnic concentration or the failure of second and third generations to speak German – tends to get constructed as evidence of segregation or marginalization, in contrast with more successful state-centred integration or assimilation. These closed typologies of immigrant trajectories – which reinforce the idea of full national integration as the ideal – can be found in research going on in all kinds of countries (Nauck and Schönplflug, 1997; see also the closed scheme of claims-making laid out as an introduction by Koopmans and Statham, 2000).

In Britain, meanwhile, the ‘ethnic’ self-identification question in its census is clearly out of sync with its European neighbours. It indicates a conceptual history that has always looked for its normative inspiration to American race relations of the 1960s, and has always defined Britain more narrowly as a country of post-colonial immigration only. For all the masses of data provided about the select group of post-colonial racial and national groups recognized in the census, the framework has come to have serious limitations over time. The categories themselves have become highly politicized, putting into practice a variable geometry that has sought to respond to the emerging demands of new and increasingly diverse migrant groups who recognize that the census categories are a fundamental source of recognition, as well as legal coverage and public funding. Basic black and white distinctions, for example, have now fallen away into a broader recognition of Asian groups. Other new migrants in Britain, however, find themselves lost between the generic ‘white’ and ‘other’ boxes. Indeed, with Jewish and Irish anti-discrimination campaigners forcing open the Pandora’s box of whiteness (the all important control group) in the census of 2001, it is quite likely that the sharp ‘minority’ ethnic groupings that have been the core and inspiration of British race research may in future begin to crumble.

Obviously, the sources of minority data, and the qualitative evidence it also provides about nuances in ethnic self-identification, have created a boon for identities type work in Britain, much of it now pursued under the banner of ‘new ethnicities’. There are numerous studies in which individuals are ethnographically studied playing with or resisting (unsurprisingly) their given ‘ethnic minority’ category (Back, 1995; Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1993; Modood et al., 1994). Such work can often be an ideal vehicle for articulating ethnic ‘voices’ themselves. But structural work about the social mobility of such groups is hampered by the crude comparison forced by the data between racially designated ethnic groups and the generic ‘white’ block of the host population; this, inevitably it seems, leads

research to claim ethnic success as rooted in minority group solidarity, but ethnic failure as rooted in majority group racial discrimination. In this frame, too, there is no way of assessing the continued impact of nation-building assimilation – via evidence on cultural behaviour, etc – on ethnic groups, despite the self-evident Britishness of many of these well-established minority groups. Nor is it easy in this frame to cross-check for class, gender or regional factors, particularly if these might lead to the declining salience of race-based explanations. In some of the best recent work on social mobility and ethnic identities, transnational behaviour and sources of social success are still surprisingly downplayed against the interpretation that ethnic minority success is further proof of vibrant British multiculturalism (Modood et al., 1997). Britain celebrates with some pride its longstanding role in Europe as the leading country of post-war immigration; yet has until very recently refused officially to see itself as a country of *new* immigration. Within this paradoxical picture, well-integrated and recognized ethnic minorities have a status and advantage denied to the many other new migrant groups now found in the country.

In the nation-state centred version of integration research in the larger European countries, there is something odd about the fact that the status and success of immigrants gets measured entirely in terms of a social mobility relative to norms of integration into the nation-society, or average national social mobility paths; yet it is increasingly normal to think of elites in the same country becoming increasingly transnational in their roles, networks and trajectories. The exclusive destiny of full integration into host nation states may however not be the norm for immigrants in the future. Already, in other smaller European nations, a rather different picture is emerging. New migration countries such as Italy, Spain, and Portugal are actually going through the process of formulating their own uncertain national conceptions of integration at a very different historical moment compared to larger nations who continue to offer their models. As well as being countries that are more geographically exposed to migration, they are, moreover, countries with weaker state penetration of society or the market. In these less structured situations, the normative imperative of full national integration begins to lessen, if new non-nation-centred structures of social integration begin to emerge. A similar consequence follows from research on integration into a non-unified or multi-levelled state such as Belgium. In seeking to avoid the inevitability of nation-state centred visions of integration apparently forced on research by the kind of data available and the kind of concepts we work with, studying these smaller or newer integration scenarios may indeed offer a way forward out of the current paradigm.

Beyond the Integration Paradigm?

The clear message from the critical survey of current integration research in Europe offered here is that better research would be research that sets out to be more autonomous academically, and more thoroughly comparative in its intent.

Academics need to escape their role of underwriting nation-building efforts directed towards small immigrant populations that have provoked a renewed symbolic effort to imagine (inclusive) western nation-state cultures. A much higher degree of self-consciousness is needed about the way contextual factors determine the intellectual content of research itself.

How might this be done? I will conclude with a discussion of some of the newer insights provided by the way scholars of transnationalism have approached the problem (e.g., Portes, 1996; Basch et al., 1994; Smith and Guarnizo, 1998). Scholars of transnationalism have sought – for exactly the kinds of reasons I spell out in this paper – to expunge ‘integration’ from their terms of research. By definition, they do not wish to be underwriting the nation-state in a world which they see as increasingly transnational or global. Methodologically, too, their bottom up, ethnographic drive suits a style of work which draws large conclusions from the study of cases likely to be seen as exceptional, or indeed deviant from the conventional integration-focused perspective. For sure, it is this too which may account for the often excessively celebratory tone of transnational studies. Seeking a new kind of liberation, some studies fall into the longstanding problem that has distorted much radical ethnic and racial studies: the transfer of sympathy for the experiences, difficulties, and sometimes plight of migrants and ethnic minorities, into visions of these groups as some sort of heroic new ‘proletariat’. Although the ‘search for a new world’ – and the slogan ‘globalization from below’ – is the rather romantic packaging chosen in the work of Portes, Castells et al., this should not deflect us from the key insights of their work. Its major advance has been the empirical uncovering of trans-state, trans-nation economic and cultural networks of transactions (and protean forms of social organization) among new and developing migrant groups. These networks are clearly generating sources of collective social power outside of territorial state structures familiar from our conventional understanding of the world of nations. Whereas Portes principally recognizes the source of transnational power as the global market, others might point to Islam or Hispanic culture, or indeed informal (‘illegal’) sources of these same powers (see Cohen, 1997; Phizacklea, 1998).

The other crucial aspect of Portes’ work, however, is its insistence on linking emergent transnational forms with classic integration questions. The exploration of the notion of ‘segmented assimilation’ in the US, has pointed towards the new structural relationship between the transnational ‘survival’ strategies resorted to by migrant groups and the unappealing ‘downward assimilation’ offered to them by the host societies’ state and societal structures (Portes, 1995). European examples of this have been the similar emergence of community resilience against the negative socioeconomic conditions they found themselves in, or the strongly assimilatory host reception. The results have been the paradoxical innovations of the informal economy or inner city Islam in many European cities. The integration path may indeed prove to be, in Kloosterman and Rath’s terms, ‘a long and winding road’ (Kloosterman et al., 1998). As the Dutch state, for example, seems ever tighter in its heavily legislated attempt to discover, encompass, regularize and

normalize the spontaneous economic activities of new migrants, so there has seemed to be an ever-growing over-flow of undisciplined, self-organized informal activities in the country (Engbersen, 1996). The very best continental European work has focused on precisely this issue of informality or non-institutionalized forms of social organization; often focusing, unsurprisingly, on those groups identified in conventional integration research as the ethnic cases which fit worst into the kinds of automatically integrating schemes set up, for example, by French and British research (Fennema and Tillie, 1999; Bousetta, 1997; Phalet et al., 2000). It is not surprising that this work has invariably focused on either Turkish or Moroccan groups in various countries: two newer, non-colonial migrant groups that have displayed some of the most pronounced 'transnational', non-integrating social trajectories in Europe.

Systematizing these deviant tendencies in research without simply reproducing the nation-state-society as the container unit has proven a lot more difficult. One might point to the Polanyi-inspired way forward in recent work by Faist (2000) or Kesteloot (2000). In this they offer schemes of transnational or local integration in economic and community structures which cross-cut with national, citizenship-centred forms. Empirical anthropologists, too, have provided some of the best recent work about immigrant and ethnic self-organization in urban contexts (Werbner, 1999; Baumann, 1996). Whether it is the bustling migrant markets of old Antwerp or East Amsterdam, or the mosque-centred inner city Islam of Turks and Moroccans in Brussels, there is clearly a need to recognize these city-embedded activities as emergent forms of social organization – and hence social power – largely unstructured or not incorporated (in formal or informal terms) by the state. The somewhat anarchical multiculturalism of some European cities now points towards a new type of multi-ethnic culture in Europe, rather different to the multicultural citizenship shaped by integrating nation-states. It is not egalitarian, it is not anchored in rights, and it is certainly not conflict free; but it is, for better or for worse, much less disciplined by the nation-building pressures hidden in top-down policies of 'integration'.

Interestingly, however, even this kind of multicultural challenge to dominant European nation-state-centred cultures tends to still be anchored in deterritorialized 'nationalities': the persistence of important political and social links with the 'homeland', as both a concrete and symbolic reference. This fact – which is certainly the case with Turks and Moroccans in Europe – indicates a limit to these forms of transnationalism outside of their European context. Viewed from here they are not really transnational at all, but rather examples of deterritorialized nation-state building, familiar perhaps from the older diasporic histories of countries like Ireland, Italy or Greece. What there is precious little evidence of across Europe is the kind of radical diasporic multicultural forms, beloved of British cultural studies writers: the 'black' Atlantic diaspora or 'black' Asian pan-ethnic groups (see Gilroy, 1987; Brah, 1993; Hall, 1988). Such diasporas would indeed constitute a more radical challenge to the present day international system, still fixed upon relations between nation-states in the western and developing world to the south

and east. But their absence betrays just how British these writers in fact are; reflecting – in their archetypal radical responses to frustrations encountered in the ethnic categories of the liberal multicultural race relations framework – the everyday activist struggles of British race politics.

As these overwhelmingly national sources for transnational ideas suggest, we should be wary of seeing transnationalism as an end to the integration paradigm. Rather, transnationalism in Europe has to be seen as a growing empirical exception to the familiar nation-centred pattern of integration across the continent. This remains the dominant focus for policy actors and migrant activists alike. Transnationalism points towards the new sources of power accessed by migrant groups when they begin to organize themselves and their activities in ways not already organized for them by an integrating nation state. By setting these forms against the continuity of nation-state centred patterns of integration, we may be able to understand how and why new spaces in the empire of the state are beginning to develop. What transnationalists should not do is leap beyond this into claims of an emerging international or global structure, in which all these nation-state challenging phenomena add up to a new global framework of governance, at which level a new kind of incorporation will be achieved (Soysal's supra-national human rights regime, for example). To do so is to project the same old normative nation-state-building impulses onto an emerging international situation characterized rather by its market and culture led undermining of traditional nation-state powers. It means, in other words, to reinvent the state by the back door at global level. There are, of course, political actors who dream of a postnational state at European, even global level; but the factual capture of this ideal by the far more powerful *realpolitik* of everyday international relations, simply turns these efforts back into a paradoxical 'rescue of the nation-state', to borrow Alan Milward's (1992) famous phrase.

In many ways, the continued focus on integration as the central idea in post-immigration policy debates across Europe, is itself a choice of rhetoric designed explicitly to rescue the nation-state. European policy makers and commentators have begun to formulate more constructive visions of a multicultural future that will be able to contain and structure within the nation-state the many new forms of immigration and multiculturalism beginning to spring up across the continent. As I have argued, these visions – and the academic research which has provided the knowledge to substantiate their claims – have continued to work within a nation-state centred paradigm, even when they claim to be transcending it. An awareness of transnational phenomena, as well as a better consciousness of the pervasive way work has been structured by a nation-state centred epistemology, may enable migration and ethnic studies researchers to escape in their analyses the normative constraints of the integration paradigm. But it is vital in looking for new concepts and tools to describe the changing relations of state and society across the continent, that we also continue to recognize the extraordinary continuity and resilience of the nation-state-society as the dominant principle of social organization in Europe.

Notes

- 1 Published in 'The multicultural challenge', *Comparative Social Research*, 22, 2003, pp. 13-42, reprinted with permission from Elsevier Ltd.
- 2 A more extended discussion and survey can be found in Favell (2001). Responding to this piece, Banton (2001) dismisses the use of 'integration' – 'a treacherous mathematical metaphor' – in any sociological studies on the subject. His vision is to purify sociological research on ethnic and race relations of these pervasive ordinary language concepts. Though a valid scientific response to the dilemma of using such terms, it forecloses the possibility in our research of reflexively accounting for *why* such terms are so predominant in policy discussions and academic research alike. See also related discussions in Bommers (1998) and Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002).
- 3 The number of quasi-academic policy studies on integration funded by such organizations in recent years has been remarkable. The Council of Europe's Committee on Migration has produced a number of reports on gender and religious issues, labour markets, and social and political participation, as well as an outstanding conceptual framework for research by Bauböck (1994). The ILO has pursued work on integration in labour markets (Doomernik 1998), and the OSCE has been linking minority rights and integration. Among NGOs in Brussels, there is the highly active Migration Policy Group, who have produced major cross-national studies of policies and policy thinking on integration (MPG 1996; Vermeulen 1997). Finally, charitable transatlantic organizations, have also joined the trend. The Carnegie Endowment's massively ambitious 'Comparative Citizenship Project' identified political and social integration as two key areas of concern (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer, 2002), and the Canadian-led Metropolis project focused on migrants in cities has sponsored several major studies (i.e., Cross and Waldinger, 1997; Vertovec, 1997). These various studies are some of the most ambitious comparative international projects to be found. Here, I mention but a sample.
- 4 For example, there was the creation by the left wing government of Italy in 1999 of a 'Commissione per l'integrazione' under the leadership of political sociologist Giovanna Zincone. This was explicitly intended to counter the increasingly salient use of negative anti-immigration rhetoric by Berlusconi's right wing coalition. In Denmark, again under pressure from the right, the government passed an 'Act on the Integration of Aliens in Denmark' in July 1998, followed by much public discussion and further reports on continuing integration problems. In Austria, the turn to integration (see Waldrauch and Hofinger, 1997) has been formulated by the opposition as a response to specifically exclusionary government attitudes.
- 5 In the report of the Commission on Multi-Ethnic Britain (2000), which involved some of these more radical commentators alongside more mainstream figures, 'integration' was the organizing concept that dared not speak its name. However, the Commission's chair, Bhikhu Parekh, has frequently written about the concept in his own work (Parekh, 2000).

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