

Markets against politics: migration, EU enlargement and the idea of Europe

Adrian Favell and Randall Hansen

Abstract *This article examines new migration to Europe in the context of EU enlargement and debates about fortress Europe, framing the general agenda for the papers that follow in this special issue. We argue that the (normatively informed) image of fortress Europe is an inadequate account of migration and migration policy in Europe in three respects: the movement of family members, asylum-seekers and labour migrants has been substantially positive; enlargement itself generates dynamics of inclusion as much as exclusion; and there exists a significant component of intra-European circulatory migration. Against the fortress account, the article offers a market-driven analysis of new migration to Europe. In developing this account, we stress how existing theoretical accounts of immigration policy – dominated by a state-centred institutionalist and political focus – offer at best only partial explanations of the new European migration scenario. Both neo-liberal and older Marxian theories of the international immigration labour market need to be re-introduced to explain the selective, expansive and reconfiguring effect of market forces on European immigration policies. Our aim is to underline how new tendencies in East–West migration in Europe challenge and transform the traditional migrant trajectory from migrant to citizen that lies at the heart of state-centred accounts.*

KEYWORDS: IMMIGRATION; LABOUR MIGRATION; ASYLUM; INTEGRATION; FORTRESS EUROPE; CITIZENSHIP; ENLARGEMENT; SCHENGEN

Without question, migration has become an issue central to the future of Europe; perhaps the central issue. Amidst ever-increasing public hostility to immigration and immigrants and the rise of far-right anti-immigrant parties, West European states are trying to steer towards new policies that recognise an objective economic and demographic demand for new immigration in future decades. The EU integration process has put the international mobility of persons – the free movement of workers – at the heart of its economic dynamic. The problem of growing asylum-seeking, and a decline in the receptiveness of member states to the obligations of post-war international refugee law, remain high on the political agenda. And the vexing question of potential large-scale East–West migration, together with the incorporation of new accession states into the existing free movement and immigration control *acquis* of the European treaties, has moved to the centre of enlargement negotiations.

Scholarly reflection on these issues, however, has not kept pace with developments on the ground. Driven by a normative attentiveness to the negative and exclusionary aspects of both current governmental policies and hostile public opinion, scholars have tended to share the same vision which, in different ways, is also promoted by pro-migrant activists and control-minded European govern-

ments: that is, the idea of Europe becoming 'fortress Europe'. During the 1990s, dozens of articles were published on or about fortress Europe; journalists placed the term in frequent public circulation; and pro-migrant groups lined up to advertise and condemn its construction. Governments, meanwhile, while evading the charge of xenophobia, have been happy to encourage the questionable assertion implied by the fortress metaphor that they do indeed have full control of their borders. For all sides, then, the state is the villain or the victor in the fight against unwanted immigration. This state-centred approach to explaining European migration phenomena is echoed throughout the burgeoning international literature on the politics of immigration, citizenship and sovereignty (see Joppke 1998a for the best state-of-the-art collection on this subject).

This article articulates an alternative view, one which brings the market back into our understanding of migration in Europe. This in turn reflects the various contributions to this theme issue of *JEMS*, which add up to a new way of looking at European migration in the light of the EU enlargement programme.¹ To be sure, our argument involves drawing a line – in a way that the public often does not – between primary economic immigration and asylum. But the metaphor of fortress Europe is an inappropriate frame for both types of migration, albeit for different reasons.

First, in the case of non-asylum seekers, the fortress has proven, at precisely the moment it was meant to be under intense construction, anything but beyond breach. As the 1990s drew to a close, European governments returned to immigration as a means of addressing economic and demographic problems. This move was led by Germany and then Britain, the two most notorious examples of self-proclaimed 'zero-immigration countries' in Europe. Second, the wider process of EU enlargement has itself generated unpredicted and often unnoticed patterns of migration – some temporary, some permanent, and much of it circular or return in nature – that have little to do with the mass, one-way East–West migration feared at the beginning of the 1990s. Third, and more tentatively, circulatory migration around Europe – a feature of an earlier, pre-nation-state era of intra-European mobility – may be reappearing as a feature of the new European migration tapestry. As we will argue, the key to understanding these emergent processes is the way in which a new international market for labour has responded to demand by actively recruiting available non-European, and intra-European migrants – at both the high- and low-skill ends of the market – despite state-centred forms of restriction centred on preserving citizenship and welfare rights for recognised members only; and, further, by transforming the channels by which these migrants can legitimately move into, around and through Europe. Moreover, within Europe, the emergence of an increasingly integrated internal labour market has also enabled migrants to be mobile in opposition to state attempts to institutionalise more fixed immigrant residency. Traditionally, this has been achieved through policies of 'integration': the granting of citizenship rights alongside national obligations, aimed at territorially fixing the population of the national welfare state.

As for asylum, the image and argument of fortress Europe are correct about aims but wrong about outcomes. Although governments throughout Western Europe have sought to limit the movement of asylum-seekers through a battery of restrictionist measures, they have failed. Asylum applications, though down from their mid-1990s peak, still number hundreds of thousands yearly; in some countries, such as Britain, they have increased sharply since the middle of the

decade. As institutionalists have argued, the incorporation of international treaties into domestic law and the inhibiting influence of both national and European courts, continue to provide a part of the explanation for the relative liberalness of asylum regimes (Freeman 1995; Hansen 1999; Joppke 1998b). States do not have the power to control migration. They may erect a vast battery of measures against asylum-seekers trying to reach European soil (Joly 1996; Loescher 1993); but once they reach that soil – usually through the help of traffickers – states find it all but impossible to remove them. As a result, asylum applications remain high, as does the gap between rejections and removals (Gibney and Hansen 2001). Moreover, it is all too clear that the growth of asylum-seeking is aided by an increasing demand for low-skilled, irregular labour across Europe, and by information flows that transmit ideas of these opportunities through migrant networks back to those considering a move to the West.

In what follows, we begin with a conceptual, historical review of the role of migration and mobility in Europe, and the emergence of the European nation-state system. We then bring this account up to date by offering a brief critique of the dominant way in which the present-day idea of Europe is discussed: the idea of Europe as a fortress. Dismantling this idea requires several distinct stages. First, we offer a brief argument about the changing place of asylum in European migration questions. We then lay out two national cases of new thinking on economic immigration – Germany and Britain – which serve as the foundation of our argument that the dynamics of EU integration have had an influence on immigration that has been moderately expansive and destructive of the fortress idea, despite some enhanced control powers for police and frontier security. The EU integration process has itself underscored and enabled shifts in national policy towards more open immigration that have been clearly endorsed by national governments. In our conclusion, we stress how existing theoretical accounts of immigration policy – dominated by a state-centred institutionalist and political focus – offer at best only partial explanations of the new European migration scenario. Both neo-liberal and older Marxian theories of the international immigration labour market need to be re-introduced to explain the selective, expansive and reconfiguring effect of market forces on European immigration policies. Our aim is to underline how new tendencies in East–West migration in Europe challenge and transform the traditional migrant trajectory from migrant to citizen that lies at the heart of state-centred accounts.

Migration, mobility and the idea of Europe

For centuries, a central feature of Europe's political space has been the shifting nature of its borders. The German nationhood question, for example, was the single most important geopolitical factor determining European international politics in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In recent decades, borders have changed marginally in Western Europe, dramatically and completely in Central and Eastern Europe. Mobile or immobile, individuals are the human face of these macro-shifts of power and cartography. They have been the principles over which politicians and armies fight, the populations they have expelled, the soldiers and civilians they massacred. To be sure, their mobility as such is not a peculiarly modern phenomenon. Europeans have always moved, but modernisation and industrialisation led them to move more, and to move more

frequently for basic economic reasons rather than inter-ethnic conflict and war (Page Moch 1992). In the latter part of the nineteenth century and early years of the twentieth century, the modern political order of European states and European populations crystallised out of the territorial fixing of previously mobile Europeans, either nationalising them as territorially defined citizens of a particular state or expelling minorities who fell within the state's constructed borders (Brubaker 1992, 1996). As the era of formally unfettered mobility ended, migration (or *immigration* as receiving states came to designate it) became bureaucratised, directed, limited and defined – through passports, visas, border control institutions and sharp distinctions between the rights of citizens and those of non-members (Fahrmeir *et al.* 2002; Torpey 2000). The distinction between legal and illegal 'migration' (i.e. state-designated forms of mobility) thus became institutionalised, as a way of marking out state governance over the phenomenon. On the other side of borders – for those fortunate enough to be recognised as legitimate immigrants and future nationals – lay membership expressed through citizenship rights and entitlements to the pastoral protection of the thus completed European welfare state.

Paradoxically, though, this process of state-construction and modernisation has always depended *economically* on large numbers of unfixed, temporary labour migrants from outside the territorial 'national' citizenry (Olsson 1996). This was dramatically the case in the extraordinarily free-moving years of empire preceding World War I, but the economic demand has not gone away. Hence, the anomalous presence of unstable cross-border populations has always been a feature of the more-or-less clear nation-state patchwork of contemporary Europe. Two disastrous European civil wars, the genocide of a (partially nomadic) religious population (the Jews), and massive forced internal migration (mainly of Germans), managed to resolve this question to the point that, by 1945, the political order of Europe was sufficiently re-drawn along strictly nationhood and welfare-state based lines to aspire to a new era of peace and prosperity (Mazower 1998). The new order was cemented by the divisions of the Cold War. But economically, the newly-fixed national population containers of post-war Europe – both West *and* East – were still no less dependent than before on cross-border economic integration, that would inevitably incur further population mobility down the road.

During the second half of the twentieth century, the most obvious, brutal and uncompromising form of migration control was the Iron Curtain. The journey from Vienna to Budapest or Bratislava, to say nothing of East to West Berlin, had once been as natural and as uninhibited as the journey from Maastricht to Aachen. For 40 years, however, it was all but unthinkable. One consequence of Europe's division was the isolation of the European Community's member states from possible East–West migration. The only meaningful form of 'immigrant' from the Soviet bloc was a 'refugee', and a refugee was synonymous in Western eyes with a 'defector' (Loescher 1993). Welcoming the odd Soviet ballet dancer or sportsman was both financially costless and politically rewarding, an ideal means of emphasising the West's moral superiority over communism. In terms of East–West migration, the rest of Europe's population, meanwhile, seemed remarkably fixed. The Eastern bloc enforced a dramatic immobility on its citizens, limiting their rights of movement from region to region even within nation-states. In the West, intra-regional migration fell to record lows in modern times (Decressin and Fatás 1995), although south to north European labour

migration (Italians, Spanish, Portuguese, Greeks) grew until the early 1970s, when it dramatically began to reverse (King *et al.* 1997). Western states, instead, filled their need for outside temporary workers by turning to controlled, state-sponsored guestworker and colonial immigration programmes, from peripheral states (Yugoslavia, Turkey, Morocco) and former colonies (Algeria, India, Pakistan, West Indies, Indonesia, South-East Asia). These migrations did not yet undo state governance, remaining numerically under control, although many of the migrants refused to return home as planned. With the broad migration stop of 1973–74 it was expected that European states would consolidate these migrations, by integrating those who stayed alongside strict new immigration controls towards any and all new migrations (Hollifield 1992).

The end of immigration, and the triumph of the integrating nation-state, however, did not occur; quite the contrary. A small part of the reason for this lies in the respect of international human rights standards that preserved channels of family reunification and asylum-seeking during those years (Joppke 1999). But the bigger, broader reasons are economic. Global economic forces were pushing regional economic integration, represented in Europe by European integration, and the legal-political construction of the European Union. European integration is built on the growing encouragement of cross-border mobility of all kinds – canonically the free movement of capital, goods, services and persons – and the giving up of state sovereignty over these processes in deference to the needs of an integrated market. At the broadest level of abstraction, then, European integration began to reverse the two historical processes that had led to the exclusive formation of European nation-state population containers, and the geopolitical isolation of East and West. Through the economic integration governed by the European integration process, the European nation-state's supreme early-twentieth-century control over migration and population dynamics was being voluntarily dislodged. It is now being dislodged across all of Europe, including Central and Eastern Europe. Economic integration dictates that states must give up the discretion they once claimed to designate who is and is not a legitimate resident of their territory, and rather allow market forces to dictate supply and demand of migrant labour across economically interdependent territories. This is encapsulated in the idea of free movement as a market correction for asymmetric shocks and imbalances to the system. And, in return, as differentials and inequalities are reduced through the equilibrium mechanism across the continent, the spur to movement falls, and migration becomes controlled, only now through a market-based rather than a state-enforced mechanism. The implication is that migrants will not stay where the market does not want them, if it is the case that their opportunities and benefits are in fact better back home.

Membership in the EU, then, implies a radical shock to the nation-state's pretence to control and govern migration through its exclusive border controls and its inclusive citizenship and welfare rights. The institutionalising of the four freedoms (movement of capital, goods, services and persons) is nothing new: it lay already at the heart of the first European treaties. Other member states may not have wanted to extend freedom of movement to persons, but already, in the Treaty of Rome (1956), Italy insisted with success on the right of Italian workers to move freely within the new European common market (Romero 1993). By 1992 and Maastricht it was institutionalised as a full new political space of European integration, under the banner of European citizenship (Wiener 1997).

The EU has thus in effect sanctioned that certain forms of European mobility can no longer be restrained or contained by national conceptions of citizenship and welfare-state closure; it has given power to the market to decide over who moves across borders and how they do it, where they live and work, and whether they bear any responsibility to the nation-state they happen to be resident in. As long as there is a demand for workers, the market-based reasoning for integration allows that the European labour market can draw on labour from throughout the European Union and beyond, orienting its demands to geographically proximate countries found in the periphery of Europe and in the newly opened East. This new logic represents an important challenge to the nation-state-centred conceptions of immigration and citizenship on which the political control of migration had been premised during most of the twentieth century.

A European fortress?

Such an historical account flies in the face of the dominant approach taken by academics and policy-makers towards the impact of European economic integration on migration and mobility in contemporary Europe. They have overlooked the centrality of free movement to the European market-building process, and the new age of possible mobility heralded by East–West integration understood in these terms. Instead, they have repeatedly interpreted the interrelation of immigration and European integration in terms of the construction of a ‘fortress Europe’. The metaphor rests on the following argument. As the EU expands, and as competencies over internal cooperation are increasingly transferred to the supranational level, the EU will seal its external borders to immigrants, and especially to non-white immigrants.

There are three basic versions of the fortress Europe argument. The first, which is distinctly British, and expands on frequent arguments made about British policy on race and immigration in the 1970s and 1980s, holds that the sort of racism that led member states to close their doors to colonial migrants at that time has simply now been extended to the Union as a whole (Wrench and Solomos 1993). The European Union is just a more effective way of pursuing that project with the help of like-minded cooperative neighbours. This links with a second argument, in cultural studies mode, which holds that the explanatory dynamic is based on EU identity, which is being formed – just as national European identities have been formed for centuries – through a process in which Europeans distinguish themselves from an inferior, hostile ‘other’, in this case immigrants (Fulbrook 2000: 10–13). The EU integration process, thus, as one author put it,

has been constructing a new European identity while it has been constructing the barriers of Fortress Europe. This new identity is a racialised identity. Europe is being defined in terms of its imperialist past, with its civilising mission in opposition to the Third World and the countries of the periphery, and in terms of Christianity in opposition to Islam (Kushnick 1998: 184).

Enlargement, it is argued, will cement this new Eurocentric order by creating an implicit set of concentric circles around Europe that offers partial integration to Central and East European nations, and even less to peripheral, non-European dependents such as Morocco and Turkey. Beyond these will lie the excluded

other, policed out of Europe by increasingly tough immigration controls externalised to the expanded EU's new eastern and southern borders (Rogers 2000).

There is a third, more sophisticated version. This holds that national policy-makers, keen to escape the progressive, human rights bias of domestic constitutions and constitutional courts, turn to EU forums where, sealed off from activists, lawyers and national courts, they can pursue the 'remote control' restrictive policies demanded by anti-immigrant publics (Guiraudon 2000; Lahav 1998). Such things as police and border cooperation are thus seen as the fruits of a European *Realpolitik* that is designed to enhance the protective territorial powers of nation-states. In tandem with this argument, beyond the academy, 'fortress Europe' is denounced by Statewatch, Pro Asyl, ECRE (European Council on Refugees and Exiles) and other international NGOs, all of which are deeply suspicious of European cooperation institutionalised in the Schengen agreement, particularly the Schengen Information System and the expanded cross-national collaboration among police forces.²

The implication of all three variants is the same. EU and member-state migration policies converge in one direction: towards effective restrictions and the exclusion of further non-European migrants. Like the obverse image of Europe's golden age of 'free' immigration in the 1950s and 1960s, the argument was always flawed, and its inadequacies have only become clearer as the last decade progressed. In particular the 'fortress Europe' metaphor/argument cannot capture three basic features of the European migration experience in recent years. First, from 1985, even leaving aside the special case of Eastern Europe, net yearly arrivals of migrants in Europe have been substantially positive; this has been true of asylum-seekers, family reunification *and* labour migrants. The fortress was obviously not beyond breach. Second, and of greater concern to East–West relations, there has been a noticeable increase in temporary labour migration, particularly between 'first-round' candidate countries for EU accession and EU member states, and in cross-border movements of all kinds (see the papers by Williams and Baláz 2002 and by Menz 2002 in this volume). Finally, from the middle of the decade on, just as the fortress was meant to be nearing completion, member-state politicians and EU policy-makers alike have explicitly shifted towards a pro-immigration stance, after years of zero-immigration rhetoric. In short, accounts that speak of a new European fortress are wrong empirically, a point which we develop with evidence from Germany, Britain and Southern Europe. Equally, they are wrong in their characterisation of the impact of the EU on control capacities; in fact, its market-building drive has led on balance to a more liberal, expansive, open European immigration scenario, that does not necessarily end even at the borders of the EU's accession partners. We take each of these points in turn.

Europe's new immigration experience: forms of permanent and temporary migration

Asylum-seeking

It is worth recalling that, for all the talk of restriction, Europe received substantial net migration throughout the 1990s. The Netherlands, Britain and (1997 excepted) Germany have been the major destinations. During 1994–96 alone, Western Europe had a net gain in foreign population by migration of 1.26

million, including 526,000 in Germany, 145,600 in the Netherlands and 216,000 in Britain (Salt 1999: 12). The figure of 1.26 million for 1994–96 is striking in that it excludes asylum-seekers (though it *includes* ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union). Once the asylum figures are added, therefore, a clearer picture of the scale of migration to Europe emerges (see Lavenex 2002, this issue: Table 1).

Despite low recognition rates (around 10–20 per cent), the ineffectiveness of liberal states' return policies means that securing access to European asylum systems is a good predictor of securing access to European residence. In fact, incredibly only 10–20 per cent of rejected asylum-seekers are ever deported from EU member states (Gibney and Hansen 2001). Asylum thus represents an important net transfer of population to Europe. International human rights legislation, therefore, only plays a minor role in accounting for the states' ineffectiveness in enforcing exclusion; the incapacity of the state to enforce effective deportation is a much more significant factor, an incapacity that only exacerbates the patent incapacity of states to prevent entry.

All this is happening at a time when Western states are clearly revising their moral attitudes towards asylum-seeking as an unavoidable obligation of the international state system. Established in the post-war period, refugee law was fashioned to protect precisely individuals left high and dry ('stateless') as a result of becoming dissidents or defectors from oppressive political systems. It responded to both the guilt felt by states towards the Jews they failed to protect in the inter-war years, plus the new imperative to protect heroes of Western capitalist freedom in a world divided by the Cold War. It was never designed as a legal framework for dealing with mass forced migration, let alone the blurred mix of economic and political desperation that pushes so many of the present-day migration crises (Loescher 1993; Weiner 1995). The year 1989 was indeed the watershed for this change in perceptions. The image of the refugee as the lone, individual dissident heroically escaping to the West, gave way to the astonishing sight of a mass, unsanctioned westwards movement – the highly political act of East Germans taking the future in their own hands and heading West via Czechoslovakia across newly opened borders – thus triggering the Eastern bloc's final collapse. This welcome movement was soon followed by another highly unwelcome one: the mass movement of Bosnians and others fleeing war in Yugoslavia. Asylum-seeking was never likely to appear so politically costless after these dramatic events. For several years following *die Wende*, Western Europe has waited in unrealised fear of a massive movement of former Warsaw Pact countries' citizens westwards – because the brute economic differentials, the bumpy transition from communism, and the expressed intentions of East Europeans, seemed to suggest only this (Kupiszewski 2002 in this volume). Since the collapse of the Eastern bloc, then, asylum-seekers have superseded other migrant groups in numbers and political importance. The collapse of Yugoslavia meant that 432,000 individuals applied for asylum in one state, Germany, in 1992 alone. The movement encouraged recourse to the novel 'legal' category of 'temporary protection' in order to avoid permanent settlement (Koser and Black 1999; Van Selm-Thorburn 1998).

None of these East European examples are uniquely economic in nature, but the growing perception in the West – with some justification – is that asylum channels have come to be seen and used as the prime channel for unsolicited, unskilled labour migration. For sure, the continued flows, and their

remarkable global diversity, suggest that feedback information through migrant networks is clearly portraying West European economic opportunities to work as the ultimate goal of asylum-seekers, however desperate the push factors behind their actual movement. For this to work as a migration system, there must be more than a grain of truth in this tacit 'market demand': that many of the lowest-status economic opportunities in the Western labour market can and have been filled by asylum-seekers. This is clearly the case in countries with high levels of asylum-seekers – such as Denmark and Sweden – which have incorporated these persons quickly and in large numbers into service industries such as cleaning work. Other countries such as Britain have forced these would-be refugees into informal and illegal work by barring work permits (for the first six months), with no more success in preventing their *de facto* incorporation in the labour market – with the corresponding signal that gets sent back to others waiting in places like Algeria, Palestine or China that there are abundant job opportunities awaiting in London for them. It is at least arguable that 'asylum shopping' for the most welcoming migrant network and most accessible labour market is a fact of asylum migrant life in Europe, that the Dublin Convention has done little to stamp out.

Asylum-seeking has thus become a dirty word, replacing 'economic migration' as the least desirable form of migration experienced by European nations. The suspicion is that the basic reason for this – beyond nativist hostility to sudden new arrivals of visible minorities – is that the use of asylum channels for economic migration in fact distorts the ability of the market to select the best and most appropriate migrant workers for the low-level labour opportunities that exist. The move to recognise new forms of legitimate economic migration is thus likely to be used to give governments and private firms the opportunity to hire, more or less officially, and for the same poorly-paid service jobs, 'closer' migrants – say, from Eastern Europe, peripheral European nations or former colonies – as opposed to trying to integrate Tamils from Sri Lanka or Sudanese from East Africa. This can be in the form of visa quotas, or after-the-fact regularisation programmes. The more 'white' or more 'westernised' migrants from Eastern Europe might prove more palatable to a hostile public. In any case, the future of international refugee law seems doomed in the face of the pressures to reinstate economic migration as a more legitimate reason for migration than asylum-seeking. By thus re-inserting the market into migrant selection processes, formerly centred on non-economic criteria such as persecution, human rights violations or vulnerability to violence, the state may accede to the creation of new migration opportunities that basically signal a loss of its sovereignty over migration entry decisions and the granting of migration rights.

Labour migration

Leaving aside asylum-seekers, there are in any case large numbers of worker migrants from Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries in the EU. Examining figures of foreign population from selected CEE countries in the EU in the early 1990s, there were, for example, 421,010 Poles, 159,154 Romanians and 23,028 citizens from the Baltic states in the EU (Salt 1999: Table 14). The main destination countries were Germany (276,753 Poles, 109,256 Romanians, 11,933 Baltic citizens), France (47,127 Poles, 5,114 Romanians) and, for Baltic citizens, Finland (8,627). Admittedly, these figures include individuals who migrated

before 1989, but, in the context of the Iron Curtain, they can be taken as a rough proxy of migration since then.

Equally significant – and commanding still less attention – has been temporary *Pendeln* (back and forth), circulatory and commuter migration in the region (Wallace and Stola 2001). Austria and Germany saw a two-fold migration opportunity after 1989. Permitting controlled labour migration would allow both countries to channel the migration pressures emerging after the fall of the Iron Curtain, and – as with previous generations of migrants from Southern Europe – it would fulfill the strong demand for personnel in relatively low-wage jobs with harsh conditions and little prestige: construction in Germany and tourism and gastronomy in Austria (see Menz 2002 in this issue). As the post-unification German economy boomed, Germany negotiated bilateral contracts with Eastern European countries and Turkey, allowing employers again to bring in workers for particular posts and specific projects. In 1991, there were 123,000 official seasonal workers, the majority of whom were in agriculture (92 per cent) and food service industries (5 per cent), along with another 51,000 project-related workers. Arrivals peaked at 212,000 official seasonal workers and 94,000 project-related workers in 1992. Subsequently, in the context of anti-immigrant public opinion, a few high-profile attacks on foreigners and emerging union opposition, numbers of seasonal and project workers respectively were reduced to the still-steady levels of 164,000/76,000 in 1993; 141,000/41,000 in 1994; 177,000/57,000 in 1995; and 210,000/47,000 in 1996. By 2000, numbers of seasonal workers were up again, reaching 264,000 (Martin 2002). In addition, an unknown number – but probably hundreds of thousands – of illegal migrants were employed in Germany, especially in the construction sector. It is no exaggeration to say that Germany's new capital – supposed symbol of a newly confident 'Berlin Republic' – would not have been rebuilt without unskilled migrant labour, both legal and illegal. Estimates of the latter run from anywhere between 150,000 and 1.5 million (Martin 2002).

In addition to contract workers, there has been an upswing in trans-border mobility for purposes other than residence or work: that is, mobility such as tourism and shopping which can easily cover for black market enterprises, and which in any case represent significant economic and geographical transactions (Wallace 2002 in this issue). Taking the Slovakian example, almost half of all Slovaks surveyed visit Austria, despite border delays, once a month, including 59 per cent of Bratislava residents and 38 per cent of other Slovakian residents; the prime motivation is a desire to shop (Williams and Baláž 2002, this issue). There is no reason to think that movement is not equally frequent between Poland and Germany, Hungary and Austria, and the Czech Republic and both these countries. Moreover, one of the less frequently noted effects of the accession process has been the net return of migrants to Poland (and elsewhere) as a result of improving economic conditions there; this was something that could have been predicted from the experience of previous accessions in Spain and Portugal (Kupiszewski 1996).

What lies behind these new forms of economic mobility? With the events of the 1990s, and evidence presented in the papers which follow in this special issue, it is clear that East–West migration, and some forms of intra-EU labour migration, have increased sharply in the 1990s. The German example is again instructive. Unification and the mistaken impression that East Germany would enjoy a *Wirtschaftswunder* led to a building boom, and a sharp increase in

demand for labour. Germany's Christian Democrat/Christian Socialist coalition government thus responded by negotiating the new bilateral accords with CEE countries and Turkey. This had quick, paradoxical effects. Germany's powerful unions, in order to ensure just treatment or – depending on the perspective – to limit competition from already-settled guestworkers from the 1950s and 1960s, successfully demanded parity of wages. Germany's companies responded by pushing East European workers into unemployment or illegal employment, and sought lower-wage workers elsewhere in the EU. This was made possible by a mechanism allowing countries to employ workers at offices located in low-wage countries, such as Ireland, Portugal or Spain, and then post them 'abroad', in Germany, with the minimal insurance coverage ensured by EU accords. The result was a contradictory set of inclusive and exclusive effects. Foreign workers were extended the full range of (German) economic and social entitlements, yet they were thereby excluded, through their involuntary high pricing, from the labour market. Non-German European workers, however, were excluded from wage and welfare entitlements enjoyed by German workers, yet they were incorporated into the labour market through active employment anchored officially in employment and benefits 'back home'. The important point in both cases is that European companies secured the migrant labour to fulfil demand *despite* the wishes of an anti-migrant German electorate and, in the Portuguese/Spanish cases, against the expressed intention of European legislators (see Menz's paper in this special issue for a fuller account).

The story of labour migration post-*Wende* thus far is a story of unskilled labour. But it does not end here. From the mid-1990s, German, British and other European governments have looked with a sympathetic eye towards new kinds of skilled migration. The shift has multiple causes, but the most important concerns the position of the European economy within the global market. From 1995, American economic growth accelerated. It appeared for a time that the US had managed to double its non-inflationary growth rate: from an average of 2–2.5 per cent common to most OECD countries post-OPEC to (albeit briefly) one of 4–5 per cent. The source of the new growth potential was said to be a productivity increase occasioned by new applications of information technology (IT).

The competition from the US had two effects on Europe. First, the major European economies faced labour shortages in the IT sector; during the 2000 IT boom, Germany reported 75,000 unfilled vacancies. Second, policy-makers saw in the labour shortage one clear source of European sluggishness *vis-à-vis* the US: the liberal US immigration policy on H1 visas for highly-skilled workers, through which Indians, Koreans, Chinese and (even) many brain-drained Europeans have, in recent years, poured into America. The American shadow stood behind Germany's first attempt to attract skilled immigration: its policy of issuing 20,000 visas for high-skilled, high-wage jobs, earning more than Euro 51,129 (DM 100,000) per year, that was dubbed misleadingly (because of its 5-year contractual limit) the 'Green Card' programme. Importantly, Germany announced this policy during a time of high unemployment and continued opposition to new immigration. The Social Democrat/Green coalition's current (January 2002) immigration proposal, put forward during a time of high and rising unemployment, is explicitly linked with Germany's need to attract skilled workers in sectors facing continuing skill and labour shortages.

It is also designed to address a demographic time-bomb. In virtu-

ally all European countries, birth-rates are below replacement levels: Italy and Germany's rates are especially low, at approximately 1.2 and 1.3 births per woman respectively. Certainly, migration alone will not address Europe's reproductive shortfall. If the number of births remains constant, then Germany would actually require a net total of 600,000–700,000 migrants per year to make up the difference (Münz *et al.* 1997). By any measure, this figure is beyond Germany's integration capacity. But immigration can have the effect of rendering the depopulation process less difficult, and can affect the age structure in a manner that might cushion – particularly in the context of later retirement ages – social programmes under pressure through an ageing population.

In short, immigration to Europe has been driven primarily by market concerns, in the face of political hostility and a decline in state control policy: the needs of industry for low-skilled workers, shortages in high-skilled sectors and, in the case of day-trips and short-term visits, the inferior ranges of consumer goods in certain CEE countries. The story of primary economic migration to Europe has been a story shaped first and foremost by the market, not by politics or any state intervention.

National European migration policies

Meanwhile, national policies as such have been trying to catch up with these powerful economic and demographic dynamics. Europe's shift towards a moderately pro-immigration stance began quietly in the 1990s, much of it centring on Germany. As the decade progressed, Germany's nationality law – long the *bête noir* of immigration scholars – was also revived. Journalists, intellectuals and activists appealed for a reformed citizenship law based on *ius soli* and eased naturalisation requirements, and Schröder's Social Democratic/Green coalition (1998–) presented a liberalised nationality law, which passed after compromise over dual citizenship (Green 2000). In May 2000, the coalition then announced the Green Card visa programme. Four months later, Federal Minister of the Interior Otto Schily appointed a commission led by Christian Democrat Rita Süßmuth. The Süßmuth commission reported in July 2001, and made four key recommendations:

- Approximately 50,000 economic migrants should be brought to Germany, on the basis of a quota system, per year.
- An immigration bureau should be instituted at the federal level.
- The right to asylum should not be touched.
- Possibilities (*Angebote*) for integration should be increased.

In early August 2001, Schily announced the government's plan, hoping to secure multi-party agreement before presenting legislation. It proposed allowing a set number of skilled applicants to migrate to Germany each year, according to a quota and Canadian-style points system, but avoided specifying any number. The skilled migrants would be offered permanent residence. The measure would institute integration requirements, most importantly the learning of German. While allowing family immigration, it would reduce the age limit from 16 to 12. The law passed the Bundestag and the Bundesrat in March 2002, but the complex nature of its adoption means that the law awaits both the President's signature and a possible constitutional court challenge.³ The CDU/CSU candidate for the 2002 national election in the autumn, Edmund Stoiber,

promised to make opposition to immigration an issue. In any case, the pressures and people in Germany supporting a more open immigration policy will not go away.

Although receiving less attention, a similar shift is underway in Britain. Once described as having Europe's only successful 'country of zero immigration' (Layton-Henry 1994), the British government has been encouraged to reconsider more open policies in the light of Germany's new openness to immigration. Perceiving sectoral labour shortages, notably in the IT sector, the Department for Education and Employment (DEEA) announced in May 2000 that British businesses would be given the power to bypass normal immigration rules and to quickly employ non-European workers in areas of severe labour shortage, notably information technology and health (especially nursing). On 25 July 2000, the British government also announced a pilot scheme, to run for two years, which would create a special 'innovator category' for entrepreneurs who intend to establish enterprises in science- and technology-based sectors, including e-commerce.⁴ Using a mechanism first developed in Canada – a classic country of immigration – and applied earlier to Hong Kong migrants, applicants will be judged according to a points system. They must score a minimum number of points in three areas: personal characteristics (education, work and business experience), business plan (viability), and economic benefits (number and type of jobs created, amount of R and D spending). Finally, on 11 September 2000, Home Office Minister Barbara Roche announced to the Institute of Public Policy Research that the Labour Government wanted a debate on expanded immigration categories. On 29 September 2000, the government announced new immigration rules easing the requirements for workers entering the country and allowing them to stay longer. The DEEA has drawn up a list of professions requiring labour, notably IT personnel, but also service staff such as Indian restaurant chefs. In January 2002, the Home Office introduced a programme allowing skilled foreign nationals to enter Britain. Modelled on the Canadian points system, it rewards education, work experience and earning (Parker 2002).

Nor is it the case that this shift is restricted to Northern Europe; indeed, developments in Southern Europe have been in some instances more striking. Altering a decades-old pattern in which large-scale illegal migration was followed by periodic legalisation programmes, Italy adopted its first avowedly pro-migration policy on 6 March 1998. It provides for the establishment of an annual quota administered by the Ministry of Labour for new immigrants, as well as an annual quota for temporary workers entering the country for 20 days to 6 months (Calavita 2002). Recent hostility to immigration, notably expressed by some members of the ruling coalition under Berlusconi, have still been tempered by the recognition of the crucial role that cheap immigrant labour plays in the continuing economic 'miracle' of northern Italian small and medium enterprises, as well as the wholesale adoption of immigrant domestic workers by households where both parents now go out to work. Likewise, Spain as early as 1993 adopted a quota system for channelling labour migrants into specific regions and economic sectors; since 1994, an average of 30,000 work permits have been issued (Cornelius 2002). This has been particularly generous to migrants from Latin America, most recently large numbers from Ecuador.

To be sure, developments in immigration policy across Europe have in no way received the endorsement of public opinion, which is increasingly hostile to

these market-led demands. The 2002 election results in Denmark, Italy, France and the Netherlands all reflect in some measure a hostility to new immigration, though this is still sharpest towards asylum seekers rather than skilled migrants. It is too early to make sweeping, definitive statements on the political results or policy consequences that might flow from the new salience of far-right anti-immigrant rhetoric. The 11 September 2001 terrorist attack on New York City clearly also threw a wild card into the steadily liberalising attitudes that have followed global economic demands, though predictions of a sharp shift in American and/or European immigration policy after 9/11 have not yet been realised.⁵ In the US, the only quantifiable effect on immigration policy has been a shelving of George Bush's proposal for an amnesty of Mexican migrants and a resolution of the free movement consequences of NAFTA (the North American free trade bloc) for the US-Mexican border; in Europe, some countries have expanded powers to enforce security, including more frequent use of detention. Ultimately, the free movement of terrorists and skilled workers alike was made easy by the unqualified acceptance of the good of global international mobility that was led by the US economic boom of the 1990s. For sure, the events have intensified opposition to immigration in some quarters – notably in Germany, where the Bavarian Premier has sought to politicise immigration in the wake of the terrorist attack – and immigration policy is likely to become more 'securitised' (Bigo 1998) in its public face in Europe, as it has in the US since the attack. Nonetheless, the fact that scholars of immigration throughout the 1990s remained oblivious to the pressures in favour of new primary immigration suggests that the fortress Europe metaphor was and still is both factually inaccurate and a block to more fruitful scholarly inquiry. What is more, the idea of fortress Europe tells us nothing about the migration implications of enlargement, except perhaps to suggest that the fortress will become larger but no more penetrable.

In summary, Europe in the last decade – in diametric opposition to the normative arguments of those whose views were shaped by the fortress analogy – has basically accepted large numbers of semi-permanent and temporary migrants; it has, through the abolition of visas on first-wave candidate countries, encouraged a sharp increase in trans-border movement; and its largest member states have even openly adopted more positive immigration policies.

The EU's role

Thus far, the analysis has only presented the national-level impetus across Europe to more open immigration. What role has European integration as such played in all this? As we have suggested, work on this topic has also been dominated by an exaggerated portrayal of European integration as the mechanism through which member states have collectively constructed a more securitised European fortress. The work of Bigo and others has delineated ways in which concerns for security have led to tightened immigration restrictions, expanded police cooperation and so forth (Bigo 1998; Guiraudon 2000; Mitsilegas 2002 in this volume). These self-declared 'compensatory measures' of the EU's third pillar, though, are themselves better understood as the *secondary* consequence of the more fundamental liberalising effects of the EU's involvement in this field, that has simply extended the market-building logic of free

movement of persons to an ever-wider territorial range that now extends to accession countries and beyond. That is, as the Schengen agreement made the European Union a zone of open borders, and as pre-accession agreements expanded opportunities for migration within this greater Europe, EU member states sought – notably through the Schengen agreement itself – to compensate for this loss of control with a reinforced capacity for internal security measures. Such a linkage follows a widely-established pattern in immigration policy: states with relatively porous external borders (those in Central Europe) compensate with reinforced internal control; only states with impenetrable external borders (Canada, pre-1997 Britain) have the luxury of dispensing with internal control. It is no surprise that in Britain – once the model of external control – pressure for ID cards intensified as asylum applications rose ever higher.

In fact, the EU's potential liberalising effect has been one of the chief reasons that some member states have long sought to keep the EU out of the immigration policy area. British and Danish non-participation in Schengen has only been the most conspicuous example. Before the Amsterdam Treaty, immigration policy governing movement from outside the EU, as well as the movement of third-country nationals within the EU, was kept firmly beyond the EU's competence (Guild 1998). The exclusion of EU competence was even greater in citizenship and national immigrant integration policies. The substantial qualifications added to the Amsterdam Treaty's (partial) communitarisation of migration policy were a further reflection of member-state fear that the Commission's proposals will have a liberalising bent in these areas (see Hailbronner 1997). Yet, even the Council of Ministers' restrictionist impulses should not be overstated. The attribution of excessive restrictionist success to the EU overstates the EU's restrictive capacities, and it ignores the reluctance of Eurosceptic states (Britain, Denmark) to transfer further power to supranational institutions, as well as the support of pro-migrant NGOs for more Europeanisation in this area, because they see the European Court of Justice, the Commission and the European Parliament as correctives to member states' exclusionary intent (Geddes 2000).

EU enlargement

If both the market and European integration itself are creating liberalising migration pressures, they are being refracted by an institutional factor: enlargement and the rules governing it. Enlargement has had at least three knock-on effects on migration and immigration policy. First, effective policing of external EU borders requires that EU member states are able to return illegal migrants/rejected asylum-seekers to their country of origin. In the case of Eastern Europe, this has required readmission agreements, which Germany signed with Poland in 1993 and the Czech Republic in 1994 (see Lavenex 2002 in this special issue). Second, EU policy-makers have explicitly linked enlargement with immigration control. This has both liberal and restrictive effects.

On the liberal side, countries wishing to join the EU have had to adopt the Geneva Convention on refugees and the 1967 protocol (limiting the Convention's temporal and geographical limitations). Thus, Bulgaria somewhat reluctantly both ratified in 1992 and adopted in 1994 a refugee law purporting to bring Bulgarian asylum provisions up to EU standards (Lavenex 2002). This will

open Bulgaria to more asylum-seeking. True, as a reflection of the low priority accorded asylum, the new law did not take effect until 1999, but it took effect nonetheless. On the restrictive side, the EU has indeed made it a condition of accession that candidate countries bring their asylum provisions in line with the Schengen and Dublin agreements. This alignment has involved the adoption of 'safe third country' and 'safe country of origin' rules, as well as other rules on manifestly unfounded asylum claims. It has also involved sealing off borders to countries with which there had previously been relatively free movement: Poland and Hungary have tightened borders with Belarus and the Ukraine, which has led to a severe disruption of routine cross-border transactions in this region (Jileva 2002, this issue). Although, as Lavenex argues (2002, this issue), the dominant mechanism was one of uncoordinated, bilateral negotiation (Germany-Poland, for instance), the result was the extension of European asylum rules, standards and restrictions to Central Europe. In the case of visa policy, accession countries have had to extend visa requirements to countries with which they previously had simplified border procedures. Thus, in 2000, the candidate countries of Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia and Romania introduced, at the EU's behest, visa requirements for contiguous but non-candidate countries: Russia, Moldova and the Ukraine (Jileva 2002). It should be pointed out, however, that lines did not always run in the direction of restriction: the candidate countries themselves have been freed of visa requirements for EU member states and thus, as noted above, they have enjoyed privileged access to the EU labour market through new bilateral agreements and new cross-border opportunities.

Several implications follow from these observations. First, it hardly needs pointing out – except that it is so often forgotten – that the enlargement of the EU is intimately and inevitably tied up with a process of exclusion *and* inclusion. Since 'Europa's' first emergence from Roman myth, Europe's core has shifted north and west – from Athens to the Franco/German/Benelux core. Now, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Europe (when 'Central Europe' was, literally, rediscovered overnight), is again shifting eastwards. As Europe expands, the newly included countries – Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic – are granted first visa-free access and then the promise of free movement and the right of establishment. The price of this exclusion for those caught outside the European geographical space will, in the short run, be severe: the cost of visas, restrictions on individual movement, and limitations on trade. Cross-border traffic between Poland and the Ukraine dropped by 50 per cent between 1997 and 1999, and in south-east Poland unemployment increased by 10–14 per cent. Yet this movement has to be set against a sharp increase in movement, semi-permanent, short-term and trans-border, between CEE countries and the EU, and the ever-expanding range of cross-border market transactions that will inevitably follow between new members of the EU and the new neighbours of the EU. Moreover, some unlikely EU members – such as Turkey and Morocco – are already well integrated into certain economic structures, with special labour agreements and privileged trading status. Whatever one thinks of the process, these dynamics of inclusion and exclusion are inevitable in the enlargement process; they inhere in the construction of Europe. The emerging governance of economic and geographical factors over state-territorial ones suggests that the borders of the new Europe will continue to be fuzzy and porous rather than fortress-like.

Conclusions

Our central argument in this paper is that we are currently witnessing a transformation in migration processes in Europe: from an historical situation in which these were dominantly shaped and restrained by state-centred and territorially bound forms of governance, to one in which they are increasingly defined and governed by market forces and the inability of states to enforce their jurisdiction over labour mobility. Further, we argue that public and scholarly discussion about migration has not kept pace with these changes on the ground, instead falsely interpreting changes in European attitudes and policies on migration in terms of the construction of a European fortress. In other words, despite the nation-state's continued attempt to define migration as a political phenomenon – controlled by categories of 'legal' and 'illegal' migration, the granting (or not) of nationality and citizenship rights, and so forth – migration in Europe is in fact beginning to resemble more the scenario of labour market theorists, who point to self-regulating supply and demand factors as the ultimate determinants of why people move and where they end up.

International economic integration – expressed in this regional context by the dynamics towards European integration and EU enlargement – lies behind the 'marketisation' of migration in Europe. As market demand takes over the state's discretion to award or deny access to mobile individuals, selectivity enters into a process that was previously governed by a mix of impartial human rights norms, nationally specific conceptions of citizenship, and a heavy dose of xenophobia. This has had mixed results. It has undermined asylum law and the generosity of Western states in welcoming needy and desperate long-distance migrants. But it has also broken down all kinds of barriers that existed to block the mobility of qualified, internationally available labour from fulfilling needs in the Western market place. The state has withdrawn from designating various categories of mobility – such as cross-border business transactions, temporary labour migration, tourism and shopping – as unwanted migration, and it has scrambled to 'regularise' large numbers of clandestine or undocumented labourers who have poured into various low-end niches in the Western economy. These are all migrants who have been 'selected' by labour market demand. Moreover, such migration has occurred well beyond the levels of tolerance that would politically reflect the temper of an increasingly hostile indigenous European public. Most of the academic work of the last decade has sought to explain migration and immigration policy in Europe through state-centred discussions about citizenship and sovereignty, or the centrality of the political and legal process. However, it seems clear that migration scholars need to think again about the more fundamental labour market dynamics that underpin these changes, whether from a neo-liberal (Borjas 1989, 1999), or a neo-Marxist perspective (Castles and Kosack 1973; Piore 1979; Samers 2000).

From the point of view of aspiring and hopeful new members of the European club, European economic integration offers access and engagement with Western markets without presupposing that all migration westwards is going to be an irrevocable commitment to leaving one's homeland ties and becoming a new 'integrated' citizen of a Western state. This logic offers preference for the geographically proximate and the economically interdependent, extending indefinitely southwards and eastwards, through concentric circles that are not yet watertight in their exclusion. This will include the Mediterranean,

some of the former Soviet sphere and perhaps even Turkey; it will exclude others further from Europe's radius. No enlargement can solve the dramatic imbalances of North–South inequality, but an enlargement driven by economic dynamics fashions less of a fortress than a politically constructed one. Economic free movement works to reduce differentials and bring migration imbalances under a more self-equilibrating supply and demand relation. But enlargement is only about changing the nature of the boundary for *some*, putting it more in the hands of bottom-up individual economic actors rather than the top-down nationalism of state actors concerned with preserving the nation. For many other, more distant and desperate migrants seeking access to Europe, enlargement will bring nothing. Europe will still be their 'Amerika', an impossible new beginning, achieved only after scaling exclusionary 'fortress' walls.

Another serious consequence of market-led migration is the further downgrading of citizenship and welfare rights for residents, in favour of market flexibility and a precarious workforce unprotected by benefits. The emptiness of 'EU citizenship' – which is little more than a fancy PR packaging of minimal cross-national economic rights for workers in the EU – signals this concern. Transnational migrants may seek their own protection in networks and transnational ties, no longer counting on the welfare benefits and migrant rights of citizenship and integration as in the past. Market-led openness will also undoubtedly have impacts on the privileged status of nationals and older migrants, who enjoyed the full benefits of closed European welfare states in the decades before more wide-scale economic integration.

It is perhaps this that lies behind states' and commentators' reluctance to recognise how extensively the market already governs migration processes in Europe. The market offers the promise of a far more rational immigration policy, in which supply and demand, not security and barbed wire fences, deal with the inevitable push-pull dynamics engendered by global economic integration. Nevertheless, European states for the most part retain a huge discretion over national immigration policies, which have yet to fully embrace the inevitability in the future of more economic and demographically sanguine thinking on migration. Yet the internal market in Europe is one of the most remarkable instances of modern nation-states 'letting go' of their need to control governance over the flow of capital, goods, services and persons, instead exposing all member states to the costs and benefits of an integrated market. Enlargement poses the challenge of 'letting go' over a much wider geographical territory, with further knock-on effects on the porousness of European borders to their peripheries. A market-based migration theory thus poses in stark terms the issue of whether EU states will have the courage and wisdom to defy popular nationalist hostility and residual fortress-building impulses; and hence whether they will allow East–West migration to become genuinely demand-driven across and beyond the new accession countries.

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Notes

- 1 The papers in this special issue represent the fruits of a long-standing collaborative effort to generate new research on East–West migration in the context of EU enlargement. As the various articles make clear, this pressing political issue also presents a challenge to existing migration theories, concepts and modes of prediction. One-way 're-settlement' migration has, in the new East-Central European context, given way to all kinds of new circulatory, temporary and return forms of mobility that confound predictions of a large-scale move West. At the same time, candidate accession countries are having to adapt to an exhaustive new range of policy directives as a steep condition for entry into the EU. The articles we have assembled in this issue cover the demographic, geographical and political dimensions of these questions. It is an exciting, largely uncharted frontier in migration research. We feel that this collection of papers offers a major contribution to shaping a fresh research agenda on migration in East and Central Europe, for readers in both migration studies and European studies.
- 2 See for instance the website of 'No Border Network': <http://www.noborder.org/news_index.php>, especially <<http://www.noborder.org/without/europe.html>>, consulted 25 April 2002.
- 3 The Bundesrat was evenly divided, with Brandenburg casting the deciding vote. Brandenburg's SPD/CDU coalition came under intense pressure from the government and opposition, and it cast a split vote (the Premier for, Interior Minister against). Bundesrat President Woweriet took the vote as positive, prompting cries of 'constitutional violation'.
- 4 In contrast with past immigration categories for business, which required from immigrants a minimum of either £200,000 (business people) or £750,000 (investors) of their own money, there is no minimum investment. Applications will be judged according to the economic benefit to Britain. Several conditions must be met: the proposed business must lead to the creation of at least two full-time jobs; the applicant must maintain a minimum of 5 per cent shareholding of the business's equity capital; and applicants must be able to accommodate and support themselves and their dependents without recourse to public funds.
- 5 See the recent reflections on international migration after 9/11 in *International Migration Review*, 36(1), 2002: 5–40.

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Author details

Adrian Favell is Associate Professor of Sociology, University of California, Los Angeles.

Randall Hansen is Tutor and Fellow in Politics at Merton College, University of Oxford.

They may be contacted at:

E-mail: afavell@soc.ucla.edu; randall.hansen@merton.ox.ac.uk