speaking countries of Europe, conversely, the term ethnology was initially adopted by Völkerkunde, while many university departments and programs previously called Volkskunde acquired new names—cultural studies, European ethnology, cultural anthropology, among others. Their name change signified a shift towards the problem-oriented study of contemporary German, Swiss, or Austrian society informed by new developments in social theory as well as in international anthropology (Greverus 1978). In France, the ‘ethnologie contemporaine de la France’ represents a new orientation of anthropological inquiry into French society with a strong ethnographic flavor (see Cuisenier and Segalen 1986). In the post-socialist and postcommunist countries of Eastern Europe, new orientations being established could build on the fact that prior to 1989, the discipline of ethnography had integrated scholars working within and outside of Europe. Abandoning the name ethnography that dates back to the 1929 rejection of purportedly ‘bourgeois’ ethnology by Moscow and Leningrad anthropologists, in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia, at Polish and at Hungarian universities, to cite a few examples, ethnology, cultural anthropology, or combinations of both have been chosen as new designations for anthropological inquiries at home and abroad. Also, in Southern Europe, regional anthropologies are developing that combine research interests in their home countries and regions with the most advanced theoretical developments in international anthropology (for a European survey see Giordano et al. 1990, Giordano and Greverus 1992). These new directions on the European continent have been entering into a dialog with a Europeanist speciality, the Sociedad de Antropología de América, at American social anthropology since the 1970s.

As early as 1955, a Europe-wide conference of ethnologists and folklorists in Arnhem, Netherlands, recommended to use the name ‘European ethnology’ internationally for all disciplines concerned with the anthropological study of European societies. This suggestion was taken up by the founders of a European association, the Société Internationale de Folklore et d’Ethnologie, in 1964 and a Europe-wide journal Ethnologia Europaea in 1967. Still, it is obvious that inconsistencies in disciplinary names will persist between and within European societies. However, at the turn of the new millennium in many continental European societies, ethnology not only continues to be widely used as a disciplinary designation, but has been adopted and even reinvented to suggest a new direction taken in the anthropological investigation of European cultures past and present (Kaschuba 1999). As social and cultural anthropology are redefining themselves as the analysis of cultural complexity in a global framework, European ethnology promises to bring this new anthropological approach to the study of European societies and their cultures of late modernity, and might ultimately prove capable of overcoming the old split between intra- and extra-European fields of research in continental anthropology.

See also: Anthropology; Boas, Franz (1858–1942); Case Study: Methods and Analysis; Ethnography; Fieldwork in Social and Cultural Anthropology

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G. Welz

Ethnomethodology: General

Ethnomethodology is a mode of inquiry devoted to the study of the practical methods of common sense reasoning used by members of society in the conduct of everyday life. The significance of this seemingly mundane subject matter resides in the fact that
practical reasoning is what enables societal members to make sense of the circumstances in which they find themselves, find ways of acting in relation to those circumstances, and thereby contribute to the production and maintenance of an intelligible social world. Ethnomethodology, as the study of such reasoning practices, is thus concerned with the very foundations of social order.

It should be clear from this brief definition that ethnomethodology is not primarily a theory of social life, nor is it a methodology for the study thereof. It is in the first instance a discipline of inquiry devoted to a distinctive order of phenomena, one that is sometimes understood to be orthogonal to the concerns of mainstream social science. However, these phenomena have important theoretical, methodological, and substantive ramifications, and in the course of elucidating them ethnomethodology has had a major impact across a range of social science disciplines. Although it originated within sociology, ethnomethodology's sphere of influence extends to anthropology, cognitive science, communication, linguistics, psychology, and the philosophy of the social sciences.

Although a few studies appeared in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the nascent approach crystallized and attracted widespread attention in 1967 with the publication of Harold Garfinkel's *Studies in Ethnomethodology*. This was a time of great intellectual ferment in the social sciences, and ethnomethodology contributed in no small way to the revolutions that challenged prevailing theoretical perspectives and methodological approaches. In the domain of sociological theory, ethnomethodology helped end the dominance of the structural functionalist paradigm associated with Talcott Parsons, and led to a major reconceptualization of the theory of action and its relationship to social structure. It was also an important impetus behind the broad-based social constructionist movement that revolutionized theorizing about subjects ranging from deviance to gender. In methodology, ethnomethodological studies challenged the scientific pretensions of positivistic research methods, and fostered greater sensitivity and self-reflection among methodologists of various stripes. Finally, ethnomethodology inspired numerous research initiatives that revitalized a wide range of social science subfields, including the study of language and social interaction, the inner workings of bureaucratic and people-processing institutions, and the construction of formal scientific knowledge.

1. Intellectual Origins

The origins of ethnomethodology can be traced back to seminal research conducted in the late 1940s by Harold Garfinkel in the course of his graduate work in sociology at Harvard University. Garfinkel was a student of Talcott Parsons and he took Parsons' voluntaristic theory of action as a basic frame of reference, but he was also deeply influenced by the phenomenological writings of Alfred Schütz and the teachings of Aaron Gurwitsch. (Sometime later, the ordinary language philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein would become another source of inspiration.) The phenomenological enterprise directed Garfinkel's attention to certain fundamental pretheoretical problems posed by Parsons' theory of action, problems which were not adequately addressed within the Parsonsian framework. What would later come to be known as 'ethnomethodology' is in large part the result of Garfinkel's sustained effort to confront these problems by empirical means (see Parsons, Talcott (1902–79); *Phenomenology in Human Science*).

Parsons had sought to develop a theory of social action that would solve the Hobbesian problem of order while retaining purposive human agency within its framework. At the same time, he wished to avoid the limitations and pitfalls of strictly utilitarian thinking, which cannot account for the ends toward which action is oriented, and which treats intrinsic rationality as the sole standard governing the selection of means. Parsons' solution centered around the role of moral values in social action—he proposed that, through socialization, such values become internalized and incorporated into the actor's personality, where they guide both the selection of ends of action and the normative means by which they are sought. Insofar as such values are also institutionalized within a society and are shared by societal members, patterned activity and social cohesion will be the natural result.

Parsons' theory places primary emphasis on the motivational wellsprings of action, and in so doing it has relatively little to say about how concrete actions are managed and coordinated in real time. Thus, as Heritage (1987, p. 228) has observed, it is less a theory of action *per se* than a theory of the dispositions that give rise to action. Correspondingly, Parsons' theory fails to give serious consideration to the knowledge and forms of reasoning that actors themselves bring to bear in the course of producing and recognizing actual conduct. This insensitivity to actors' *endogenous* perspectives is exacerbated by Parsons' decision to define rational action in terms of an *exogenous* standard based on consistency with the application of scientific/logico-empirical methods. Any deviation from this standard is regarded as the embodiment of ignorance and error, in which case actors' own explanations of their actions may be dismissed in favor of a 'scientific' explanation cast in the language of norms and values.

Garfinkel recognized that Parsons' motivational solution to the Hobbesian problem of order implicates an analytically prior *cognitive* problem of order, one that cannot be resolved without due consideration to the common sense knowledge and practical reasoning employed by actors themselves. How do actors analyze their circumstances, determine which features are
relevant for present purposes, and grasp what those features ‘mean?’ How do they know what forms of behavior will be recognized as normatively appropriate under those circumstances? How in other words is the fundamental intelligibility of action and circumstance accomplished? It is questions like these that Garfinkel sought to answer.

2. Garfinkel’s Classic Studies

Although Garfinkel’s central analytic questions were inspired by phenomenology, his way of addressing them was distinctively his own. He eschewed highly interpretive methods involving introspection or free-wheeling verstehen in favor of a rigorously empirical approach based on close observation of social behavior. Since the methods of reasoning of interest are those embodied in social activities, they are publicly available to both lay members of society and professional analysts and are, at least in principle, eminently observable.

Analyzing such methods of reasoning-in-action, however, is intrinsically difficult because they are so deeply taken for granted. As an omnipresent resource for the management of social life, practical reasoning is not ordinarily an object of conscious reflection in its own right. Its very familiarity renders it elusive and resistant to analysis.

Garfinkel’s ingenious solution to this problem entailed seeking out extraordinary situations in which the sense-making process is foregrounded, exaggerated, and hence rendered conspicuous. For the most part, these situations were engineered by Garfinkel and his associates through a series of experiments and quasi-experimental demonstrations. The situations often involved social actors encountering anomalous events—typically, particular social actions—that are incongruous with a pre-existing or default ‘definition of the situation.’ In one such experiment, subjects were engaged in a game of tic-tac-toe by experimenters who would erase and reposition the subjects’ mark before placing their own mark on the grid. In another experiment, subjects were told to ask yes/no questions of a counselor but, unbeknownst to them, the ‘answers’ were given according to a random schedule. Elsewhere the focus shifted to incongruities that arise due to the experiential reality and temporal persistence of any social situation—whether a game of tic-tac-toe, a course of counseling advice, or a person’s sexual status—rests upon a foundation of such reasoning practices.

3. Theoretical Implications

Garfinkel’s findings amount to a major reconceptualization of the fundamental locus of social order. Most social science theories view social life as organized by structural entities (e.g., social institutions, cultural symbol systems, structures of race, class, and gender, etc.) that stand outside of the flow of events in everyday life and exert a more or less determining influence on the course of those events. Such theories embody what might be thought of as a top-down conception of social order. Garfinkel, in contrast, offers a thoroughly bottom-up conception, and this theoretical inversion is a natural consequence of his decision to treat social order as a cognitive rather than a Hobbesian problem—not a problem of how conflict is avoided and solidarity maintained, but a problem of how the social world, whatever its character, becomes intelligible and accountable to its members. From this vantage point, every orderly feature of social life is an ongoing contingent accomplishment, the result of members’ concerted effort to make those features recognizable to one another and the basis for subsequent action.

This theoretical inversion has further implications for the theory of action, and in particular for the role of social norms (as well as rules, conventions, etc.) in...
the conduct of action (Heritage 1984, 1987, Wilson 1971). In the traditional Parsonian view, norms regulate action by specifying what courses of action are appropriate under given circumstances. This view presupposes that situations, norms, and actions are independent entities, with each situation standing outside of the actions contained within it, and predefined norms constraining those actions to unfold along situationally appropriate lines. However, Garfinkel’s findings about the nature of practical reasoning suggest that this viewpoint is fundamentally misguided. Far from being independent entities, situations, actions, and norms stand in a co-constitutive or reflexive relationship to one another. Correspondingly, actors are knowledgeable agents at the very center of this process, with the capacity to alter or transform the ‘definition of the situation’ through their actions, and to decide upon the capacity and applicability of the norms deemed relevant to that situation. Thus, the experiential reality of social norms, like every other organized feature of social life, rests upon a foundation of practical reasoning whereby action is produced and rendered intelligible in normative terms. This does not mean that norms are inconsequential for social organization, but their primary significance is constitutive rather than regulative—norms play a crucial role as a resource for imputing meaning and motivation to situated behavior (see Action, Theories of Social, Norms).

4. Contemporary Research Initiatives

Following Garfinkel’s classic studies, ethnomethodological research developed in a number of fruitful directions. While some researchers continued to emphasize the generic properties of practical reasoning (e.g., Pollner 1987), most shifted toward examining such reasoning as it is applied in various specialized domains of social life. At the same time, the predominant research methods employed by ethnomethodologists underwent a corresponding shift away from quasi-experimental designs and toward more naturalistic methods involving the direct observation of ordinary conduct. The resulting corpus of studies resists easy summary, but three prominent lines of work will be distinguished.

4.1 People-processing Institutions

Ethnomethodologists first explored various organizational environments involved in people processing: schools, public welfare offices, police departments, and so on (e.g., Cicourel 1968, Sudnow 1965, Wieder 1974). These studies repeatedly documented the inadequacy of codified rules, formal procedures, and informal norms as explanations of organizational conduct. Rules and allied phenomena fail to capture the elaborate judgmental work necessary to implement the rules in concrete circumstances, and more generally to perform competently the tasks intrinsic to each setting. These previously unexamined professional competencies and discretionary judgements became the focus of close scrutiny and sustained analysis, shedding new light on the complex inner workings of people-processing institutions.

The findings have important implications for our understanding of organizational decision-making and its products. The institutions under examination routinely generate official designations of persons (e.g., ‘criminal,’ ‘juvenile delinquent,’ ‘qualified welfare recipient,’ etc.) and their actions (e.g., ‘burglary,’ ‘assault,’ etc.). Such designations do not result from workers mechanically applying clearly defined criteria to each case, but involve various ad hoc considerations guided by common sense knowledge of what outcome would be normal and reasonable under the circumstances. Insofar as the resulting designations form the basis for calculations of official statistics (on rates of crime, mortality, poverty, etc.), these studies also cast doubt on the validity of official statistics and their value for social scientific research (see Bureaucracy, Sociology of).

4.2 Science and Technology

Ethnomethodologists have also ventured into the laboratory to explore the highly technical competencies that underlie the creation of scientific and mathematical knowledge, and the production and use of technological artifacts. This line of research is most closely associated with the later work of Garfinkel himself and his immediate associates (e.g., Livingston 1986, Lynch 1993). It is reminiscent of Edmund Husserl’s later writings on the European sciences in that a primary objective is to elucidate the unexplicated foundations of scientific knowledge. However, where Husserl’s enterprise was essentially philosophical in character and retained a phenomenological concern with transcendental consciousness, the ethnomethodological approach proceeds empirically by examining publicly available details of situated ‘work-bench’ practices.

Much research in this vein is concerned with the genesis and reproduction of technical discoveries ranging from physical objects to mathematical theorems. Such discoveries are arrived at, accountably validated, and made intersubjectively available through complex courses of practical reasoning and embodied activity that receive scant attention in scientific texts. This may seem surprising, given that scientists are supposed to document their own methods so as to permit replication, but scientists’ methodological descriptions—like all abstracted accounts
of situated action—are necessarily incomplete. Ethnomethodologists thus seek to recover the mundane praxiological foundations of discovering work, and in so doing they re-specify discovered objects as locally produced and naturally accountable achievements. Furthermore, the very concept of discovery is transformed by this research. If physical and mathematical objects are unavoidably intertwined with situated practices, then the discovery of any such object is at the same time the discovery of a substrate of practices through which that object may be accountably produced and reproduced within concrete situations.

Ethnomethodological studies of science and technology hold the promise of yielding findings that represent recognized contributions to the various technical disciplines being studied. Indeed, the practical value of ethnomethodology is increasingly recognized in computer science, software engineering, and human–computer interaction (Schegloff 1987, Button 1993) (see Technology, Anthropology of; Truth and Credibility: Science and the Social Study of Science).

4.3 Talk and Social Interaction

Perhaps the most widespread contemporary variant of ethnomethodology is what has come to be known as conversation analysis. This burgeoning field was developed by Harvey Sacks, originally Garfinkel’s student and colleague, in collaboration with Emanuel Schegloff and Gail Jefferson (e.g., Sacks 1992, Atkinson and Heritage 1984).

Conversation analysis (henceforth CA) involves the study of practical reasoning as it is put to use in the conduct of spoken interaction. The domain of interaction—what Erving Goffman referred to as the interaction order—is more general than any of the specialized institutional domains investigated by ethnomethodologists, for interaction lies at the heart of virtually all of these institutions and extends as well to informal encounters between persons. Moreover, in the history of the human species, interaction developed long before other societal institutions came into being, and is in this respect ‘the primordial site of sociality’ (Schegloff 1988).

CA differs from other lines of ethnomethodological research not only in substance but in methodology. Conversation analysts rely exclusively on audio- and video-recordings of interactional data, and transcripts that capture the details of interaction as it actually occurs. Such data have numerous advantages—they can be examined repeatedly, analyzed at an unprecedented level of detail, and reproduced in published works so that readers can independently assess the validity of analytic claims.

The resulting research enterprise has generated an impressive array of interlocking and cumulative findings on a wide range of subjects. These include the organization of turn taking, action sequences, lexical choice, the relationship between talk and nonvocal activities, and the collaborative management of various interactional activities (e.g., giving advice, delivering good and bad news, telling troubles, etc.). More recently, researchers have applied the analytic resources of CA to various phenomena that intersect with, and can be informed by, the study of talk-in-interaction. These include how talk is organized in various institutional settings, and how it serves as a medium for the accomplishment of occupational tasks such as medical examinations, classroom lessons, journalistic interviews, trial examinations, and so on (e.g., Boden and Zimmerman 1991, Drew and Heritage 1992). Researchers have also begun to explore how the study of talk-in-interaction can illuminate linguistic phenomena such as grammar (Ochs et al. 1996), as well as medical disorders such as aphasia that manifest themselves at the level of speech (Goodwin 1995, Heeschen and Schegloff 1999).

See also: Conversation Analysis: Sociological; Parsons, Talcott (1902–79); Science and Technology Studies: Ethnomethodology

Bibliography


Ethnomethodology: Cultural Concerns

Claims to national identity based on race, kinship, language, or common culture are described as 'ethnonationalist.' Such ethnonationalist claims have been widespread throughout the modern era. They sometimes extend beyond the construction of identity to the reproduction of enmity, demands that members place the nation ahead of other loyalties, and attempts to purge territories of those defined as foreign. As a result, ethnonationalism is often associated with ethnic violence and projects of ethnic cleansing or genocide. However, ethnic solidarity is also seen by many as basic to national identity as such, and thus to the notion of the nation-state. While this notion is as much contested as defended, it remains influential.

In such usage, ethnonationalism is commonly opposed to civic nationalism. The latter is understood as the loyalty of individual citizens to a state based purely on political identity. Habermas (1998) has theorized this as constitutional patriotism, stressing the extent to which political loyalty is to a set of institutional arrangements rather than a prepolitical culture or other extrapoltical solidarity. Ethnonationalism, in such usage, refers precisely to rooting political identity and obligation in the existence of a prepolitical collective unit—the nation—which achieves political subjectivity by virtue of the state. The legitimacy of the state, in turn, is judged by reference to the interests of the nation.

The contrast of ethnic to civic nationalism is heavily contested by that of Germany to France (Kohn 1967, Alter 1989). The contrast has been enduring, and has resulted in different understandings of citizenship. France has been much more willing, for example, to use legal mechanisms to grant immigrants French citizenship, while Germany—equally open to immigration in numerical terms—generally refuses its immigrants German citizenship unless they are already ethnic Germans (Brubaker 1992). Other countries vary on the same dimension, but it is important to recognize that the difference is one of proportion and ideological emphasis (Callhoun 1997, Sassen 1999). As Smith (1986, p. 149) has remarked, ‘all nations bear the impress of both territorial and ethnic principles and components, and represent an uneasy confluence of a more recent “civic” and a more ancient “genealogical” model of social cultural organization.’ Not all scholars accept the distinction or hold it to be sharp; those who do use it often attribute ethnonationalism to countries that are ‘late modernizers’ (Bendix 1964, Nairm 1998, Schwarzmantel 1991).

Two enduring debates have shaped social science scholarship on ethnonationalism. First, is ethnonationalism an ancient (or historically nonspecific) phenomenon, possibly rooted in ‘primordial’ social relations, or is it distinctively modern? Relatedly, is it vanishing, enduring, or recurrent? Second, is ethnicity basic to nationalism in general, perhaps even an explanation for nationalism, and is ethnonationalism thus its ‘normal’ form? Much nationalist ideology has claimed definitive ethnic roots; social scientists are more divided on the question. Beyond these broad questions of orientation, research focuses on a variety of issues from the cultural content of ethnonationalism to explanations of its occurrence, forms of public performance, dynamics of leadership and mobilization, and reasons for violence.

1. Modernity vs. Primordiality

A long-running debate in the literature on nationalism pits arguments that it is an extension of ancient ethnicity (Smith 1986, Armstrong 1982, Hutcheson 1994) against those who argue that it is essentially modern (Gellner 1983, Hobswarm 1990, Greenfeld 1992). Majority scholarly opinion tends toward the latter view, though explanations differ. ‘Modernists’ variously see nationalism rooted in industrialization (Gellner 1983), state-formation (Tilly 1990, Mann 1993), the rise of new communications media and genres of collective imagination (Deutsch 1966, Anderson 1991), and the development of new rhetorics for collective identity and capacities for collective action (Callhoun 1997). While many favor specific factors as primary explanations, most recognize that several causes are interconnected.

Many nationalists but few scholars see nationalism as ubiquitous in history and simply the ‘normal’ way of organizing large-scale collective identity. Most social scientists point rather to the variety of political and cultural forms common before the modern era—empires and great religions, for example—and the transformations wrought by the rise of a new kind of