Aftermaths of Empire and the unmixing of peoples: historical and comparative perspectives

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Abstract

This article provides a historical and comparative analysis of post-imperial migrations of ethnic unmixing. It examines the post-Soviet migration of ethnic Russians to Russia in the light of the migrations of other once-dominant 'new minorities' engendered by transitions from multinational empire to incipient nation-states: Balkan Muslims during and after the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, Hungarians after the collapse of the Habsburg Empire, and Germans after the collapse of the Habsburg Empire and the German Kaiserreich.

Key words

Empire; migration; refugees; nationalism; nation-state; ethnic cleansing.

Migration has always been central to the making, unmaking, and remaking of states. From the polychromatic political landscapes of the ancient world, with their luxuriant variety of forms of rule, to the more uniform terrain of the present, dominated by the bureaucratic territorial state, massive movements of people have regularly accompanied — as consequence and sometimes also as cause — the expansion, contraction, and reconfiguration of political space (Zolberg 1983a; Marrus 1985; Weiner 1989; Zolberg et al. 1989; Weiner 1993).

This centrality of migration to political expansion, contraction, and reconfiguration is amply illustrated in the history of the Russo-Soviet state. 'The history of Russia,' wrote Vasili Kluchevskii, dean of nineteenth-century Russian historians, 'is the history of a country which colonizes itself' (quoted in Pipes 1974, p. 14). That colonization began in the mid-sixteenth century, when conquest of the Kazan and Astrakhan khanates permitted Russian peasant settlement to expand into the fertile black-earth zone heretofore controlled by hostile Turkic nomads. It did not end until the postwar decades of the twentieth century, when industrial and agricultural development strategies drew
large numbers of Russians to peripheral regions, most dramatically, in terms of ethnodemographic consequences, to Kazakhstan, Estonia, and Latvia. Throughout these four centuries, the eastward, southward, and (more recently) westward dispersion of Russians from their initially small region of core settlement has been intimately linked to the expansion and consolidation of the Russian state and its Soviet successor. It has comprised one of the greatest episodes of colonization in human history (Raeff 1971; Pipes 1974, pp. 13-6; Bennigsen and Wimbush 1978; Starr 1978, p. 11; Connor 1984, pp. 304ff).

State-sponsored migrations linked to the expansion and consolidation of Romanov and Soviet rule embraced, of course, many others besides Russians. A few scattered examples will have to suffice here. Russian conquests were often effected, or facilitated, by inducing the non-Russian military or economic élites of the territories in question to move to new lands (Raeff 1971, p. 27). As the state, and peasant settlement, expanded southward towards the vast Kazakh steppes, Cossacks, recruited with extensive land grants, were settled along its northern perimeter as military frontier guards (Demko 1969, pp. 36-43). German colonists, attracted by the lands, subsidies, religious autonomy, fiscal privileges, and service exemptions promised by Catherine II, began to settle the lower Volga frontier region in the 1760s (Koch 1977, pp. 6ff). The Russian government encouraged the mass emigration of Crimean Tatars to the Ottoman Empire after the Crimean War (Fisher 1978, pp. 88-89; Karpat 1985, p. 66); and it induced, and partly compelled, the mass emigration of Caucasian Muslims, most of them Circassians, in the same period (Karpat 1985, pp. 66-70). Most notorious, of course, are the vast deportations ordered by Stalin during and after World War II, including the mass deportations of élites from the newly annexed Western territories, the allegedly preventative deportation of Germans and Koreans, and the punitive deportation of entire nationalities for the collaboration of some of their members: Karachai, Kalmyks, Chechen, Ingush, Balkars, and Crimean Tatars (Conquest 1970; Nekrich 1978; Simon 1991, pp. 173-218).

If politically governed migrations were central, for four centuries, to the construction and consolidation of the Russian and Soviet states, they are already proving central to the reconfiguration of political authority in post-Soviet Eurasia. Substantial migrations within and from Transcaucasia and Central Asia have already occurred in connection with the progressive erosion and eventual collapse of Soviet authority and the incipient reorganization of rule along national lines (Zaiontchikovskaya 1992; Vitkovskaia 1993). However, it is the potential for much vaster migrations, rather than the scale of existing flows, that has focused attention and concern on migration in the last few years.

That potential has been viewed with special alarm in north-western and central European capitals and in Moscow, the former envisioning a mass westward exodus of millions, perhaps tens of millions of ex-Soviet citizens, the latter fearing a vast, chaotic, and brutal, 'unmixing of peoples' entailing, in particular, an uncontrollable influx into Russia of the Russian and Russophone population from the non-Russian successor states. Articulated in crude and undifferentiated fashion, these fearful visions, jointly propagated by western, Soviet, and post-Soviet journalists and politicians, have done more to obscure than to enhance our understanding of the actual and prospective dynamics of post-Soviet migrations. The former vision, to be sure, seems recently to have lost its hold on European public opinion. The alarmist rhetoric, sensationalist headlines, and cataclysmic imagery of 1990 and 1991, warning of the imminent inundation of western Europe, have all but disappeared – no doubt because the expected onslaught failed to materialize. The vision of mass ethnic unmixing, however, remains powerful. Its plausibility is enhanced by the Yugoslav refugee crisis, which resulted directly from the dissolution of a multinational state and the incipient reconfiguration of political authority along national lines (Hayden 1992). It is thus understandable that the spectre of an analogous 'unmixing of peoples' in post-Soviet Eurasia – the spectre of 'ethnic cleansing' on a vaster canvas – haunts discussions of post-Soviet migration.

Without belittling the potential dangers of a chaotic and brutal unmixing of peoples in certain parts of the former Soviet Union, I seek in this article to provide a more nuanced and differentiated analysis of the relation between political reconfiguration and migrations of ethnic unmixing in post-Soviet Eurasia. Although such migrations are likely to be highly variegated, potentially involving scores of ethnonational groups and migration trajectories, I focus here on a single set of flows – on the actual and potential migration to Russia of ethnic Russians and other Russophone residents of the non-Russian successor states. I analyse this reflux of Russians from the ex-Soviet periphery in broad historical and comparative perspective, considering them alongside earlier post-imperial migrations that ensued when a ruling ethnic or national group in a multinational empire was abruptly transformed, by the shrinkage of political space and the reconfiguration of political authority along national lines, into a national minority in a set of new nation-states. Three such cases are examined: Balkan Muslims during and after the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, Hungarians after the collapse of the Habsburg Empire, and Germans after the collapse of the Habsburg Empire and the German Kaiserreich. From this excursus into comparative history I extract four general analytical points, and bring them to bear on the post-Soviet migration of Russians to Russia. I adopt this historical and comparative
approach not because I believe we can find in the past precise historical analogs of the present. There are no such analogs. Comparative history can provide not analogs but analysis — analysis, enriched by the consideration of a variety of cases, of the intertwined dynamics of migration and political reconfiguration in the aftermath of empire.

Muslim/Turkish migration from the Balkans

Consider first the Ottoman case. The protracted disintegration of the Ottoman Empire spanned well over a century, from the late eighteenth century to the aftermath of World War I. Throughout this period, and even earlier, the shrinkage of Ottoman political space was accompanied by centripetal migration of Muslims from the lost territories to remaining Ottoman territories (Karpat 1973, p. 106). But it was the last half-century of Ottoman disintegration, and the formation of national states in its wake, that produced mass displacements. It was this unprecedented wholesale restructuring of populations, linked to the transformation of multinational empires into nation-states, that led Lord Curzon to speak of the 'unmixing of peoples' (Marrus 1985, p. 41).3

While the details of these migrations are far too complex — and too contested (Karpat 1985) — to analyse here, a few general points should be emphasized. The first concerns the magnitude of the unmixing. Several million people were uprooted from Bulgaria, Macedonia, Thrace, and western Anatolia alone in the last quarter of the nineteenth and first quarter of the twentieth centuries. The migrations radically simplified the ethnic demography of these regions, constructing relatively homogeneous populations where great heterogeneity had been the norm. In 1870, for example, Muslims (Turks, Bulgarian-speaking Pomaks, and Circassian and Crimean resettlers from Russia) were at least as numerous as Orthodox Christian Bulgarians in most of what would later become Bulgaria. By 1888, however, the Muslim share of the population of Bulgaria (including Eastern Rumelia) had fallen to roughly a quarter, and by 1920 Muslims comprised only 14 per cent of the population (Rothschild 1974, p. 327; Karpat 1985, pp. 50–51). Similarly, between 1912 and 1924 the intricately intermixed population of Macedonia and Thrace — comprised mainly of Turkish-speaking Muslims, Greeks, and Slavs identifying themselves mainly as Bulgarians, with none of these constituting a majority — was sifted, sorted and recomposed into relatively homogeneous blocks corresponding to state frontiers: northern Macedonia became solidly Slavic, southern and western Macedonia predominantly Greek, and eastern Thrace (along with western Anatolia) purely Turkish (Pallis 1925, p. 316).

The unmixing of peoples initially followed ethnoreligious rather than ethnolinguistic lines, with Muslims moving south and east and Christ-

ians moving north and west (Marrus 1985, p. 41). It was thus not only ethnic Turks who retreated towards core Ottoman domains, but also other Muslims, notably Bulgarian-speaking Pomaks and Serbo-Croat-speaking Bosnians as well as Circassians and Crimean Tatars who had earlier fled from Russia to the Ottoman Balkans (Karpat 1973, pp. 1–2; Karpat 1985, pp. 65ff). Language became more important over time as the Ottoman rump state increasingly assumed an ethnically Turkish identity and as the Orthodox Christian Balkan successor states came into increasing conflict with one another. As a result, there was secondary intra-Christian ethnic unmixing, primarily between Greeks and Bulgarians, superimposed on the primary Muslim-Christian unmixing. However, even as late as 1923, the Lausanne Convention providing for a massive and compulsory Graeco-Turkish population exchange defined the population to be exchanged in religious rather than ethnolinguistic terms (Ladas 1932, pp. 377ff).

War was central to the mass unmixing of Balkan peoples (Marrus 1985, pp. 42ff, 96ff). Beginning with the Russo-Turkish war of 1877, intensifying in the Balkan wars of 1912–13, and culminating in the aftermath of World War I, almost all of the large-scale migrations occurred in direct or indirect connection with military campaigns. This is true, most obviously and directly, of spontaneous flight before advancing armies, in the wake of retreating ones, or as a result of attacks on civilian populations — depressingly prevalent in all the military campaigns of this period, and often intended precisely to provoke mass migration (Karpat 1985, pp. 71ff; Marrus 1985, pp. 45, 98ff).

Other migrations were indirectly caused by war. This is true, for example, of the Muslim migration to Turkey under the terms of the Graeco-Turkish population exchange mandated by the Lausanne Convention. Its counterpart — the million-strong Orthodox Christian migration from Turkey to Greece in 1922, which had already been virtually completed by the time the Lausanne Convention was signed — was directly engendered by war: Greeks fled in panic amidst the violence and terror accompanying the Turkish counter-offensive of 1922, which drove the Greek armies in a rout from the regions of western Anatolia and eastern Thrace that they had occupied since the Greek invasion of 1919. Because Turkey did not wish to allow these refugees to return en masse to Turkey, fearing that this would only help perpetuate Greek irredentist ambitions, it agreed to accept in return the compulsory resettlement in Turkey of the (mostly ethnic Turkish) Muslim citizens of Greece (Marrus 1985, p. 102).3 Thus, although the latter were not directly uprooted by war, their migration was none the less an indirect product of the Greek invasion of Turkey and the Turkish counter-offensive; it would not have occurred in the absence of the Graeco-Turkish war.

To underscore the centrality of war to mass migrations of ethnic
unmixing in the Balkans between 1875 and 1924 is not to suggest that it was war as such that was responsible for these migrations. It was rather a particular kind of war. It was war at the high noon of mass ethnic nationalism, undertaken by states bent on shaping their territories in accordance with maximalist—and often fantastically exaggerated—claims of ethnic demography and committed to moulding their heterogeneous populations into relatively homogeneous national wholes. Not all wars entail the massive uprooting of civilian populations. Nevertheless, wars fought in the name of national self-determination, where the national ‘self’ in question is conceived in ethnic rather than civic terms, but where the population is intricately intermixed, are likely to engender ethnic unmixing through migration, murder or some combination of both. Migrations of ethnic unmixing were thus engendered not by war as such, but by war in conjunction with the formation of new nation-states and the ethnic ‘nationalization’ of existing states in a region of intermixed population and at a time of supercharged mass ethnic nationalism.

Despite their paroxysmal intensity and ‘finality’ at particular places and times, Balkan migrations of ethnic unmixing have been protracted. This holds particularly of the outmigration of Muslim Turks from the Balkan successor states. The major phase of unmixing lasted fifty years, from 1875 to 1924, coinciding with the progressive disintegration of the Ottoman state and its final demise in the Kemalist uprising in the aftermath of World War I. However, the outmigration of Turks (though no longer of large numbers of non-Turkish Muslims) continued thereafter, albeit more intermittently and on a smaller scale. Bulgaria, in particular—the Balkan state with the largest ethnically Turkish minority—has experienced, in fits and starts, a substantial ongoing ‘repatriation’ of ethnic Turks to Turkey. Nearly 100,000 left under administrative pressure from the Bulgarian side in 1934–39 (Schechtman 1946, pp. 493–94); another 155,000 were pressured to leave in 1950–51 (Popovic 1986, p. 100). The most recent, and most massive, exodus occurred in 1989, a few years after the extremely harsh assimilation campaign of 1984–85, in which public use of the Turkish language was banned and Turks were forced to adopt Bulgarian names; when in 1989 the borders were suddenly opened, 370,000 Bulgarian Turks fled to Turkey, more than 40 per cent of the total Bulgarian Turkish population (although 155,000 returned to Bulgaria within a year) (Vasileva 1992, p. 348).

Finally, the fluctuating but generally favourable policies of the Ottoman government towards the immigration of Balkan Muslims, and of the Turkish government towards the immigration of Balkan Turks, have significantly shaped the incidence, volume and timing of the migrations. The openness to immigration had economic-demographic roots: both the Ottoman state and the Turkish republic through the interwar period viewed their territories, and Anatolia in particular, as underpopulated, and sought to encourage immigration in order to promote demographic growth and economic development (Schechtman 1946, pp. 488ff; Karpat 1985, pp. 61ff). But there was also an ideological and cultural dimension to late Ottoman and Turkish immigration policy. In the mid-nineteenth century, the Ottoman government was still largely indifferent to the cultural characteristics of potential immigrants, welcoming, and even seeking specifically to induce, the immigration of non-Muslims (Karpat 1985, pp. 62ff). However, as the late Ottoman Empire came to view itself as a specifically Muslim state (and in its last few years as an incipient Turkish national state), and as the Turkish successor state, defining itself as a nation-state, sought to weld its population into a homogeneous nation, the general openness to immigration was succeeded by a selective openness to Muslims (especially, though not exclusively, those from former Ottoman domains) and, in the Turkish Republic, by a still more selective openness to ethnic Turks from Balkan successor states, who, as Interior Minister Sukru Kaya Bey put it in 1934, could scarcely be expected to ‘live as slave where the Turk previously was the master’ (quoted in Schechtman 1946, p. 490).

Magyar migration from Hungarian successor states

Our second case is that of ethnic Hungarians after the collapse of the Habsburg Empire in World War I. That sudden collapse differed sharply from the protracted decay of the Ottoman Empire. Hungarian rule in the Hungarian half of the Empire, far from decaying, had become increasingly consolidated in the half-century preceding the outbreak of war. Unlike the decentralized Austrian half of the Empire, the Hungarian half, although ethnically heterogeneous (Magyars comprised only about half the population), was politically unitary, ruled by a centralized, fiercely nationalistic, and almost exclusively Magyar bureaucracy (Macartney 1937, pp. 20–26; Taylor 1948, pp. 185f). This internally autonomous quasi-nation-state was dismembered by the postwar settlement. The shrinkage of political space was dramatic. The 1920 Treaty of Trianon stripped Hungary of two-thirds of its land and three-fifths of its pre-war population (though in so doing it largely confirmed a de facto state of affairs, the territories in question having been occupied and controlled, with tacit Allied backing, by Romanian, Czech, and Serbian forces since the winter of 1918–1919) (Macartney 1937, p. 1; Mocsy 1973, ch. 2; Rothschild 1974, p. 155). Although about 70 per cent of the lost population was non-Magyar, over three million Magyars suddenly became national minorities in neighbouring nation-states, including, most importantly, 1.7 million Magyars in Transylvania, which was awarded to Romania; a million in Slovakia
and Ruthenia, which went to Czechoslovakia; and 450,000 in Voivodina, which became part of Yugoslavia (Rothschild 1974, p. 155).

These new minorities emigrated in substantial numbers in the years immediately following World War I. However, the post-Habsburg migration of Hungarians was quite different from the late- and post-Ottoman migrations of Turks. In the first place, a far smaller share of the Hungarian population migrated. In the six years immediately following World War I, when most of the migration occurred, about 424,000 Hungarians migrated to Hungary from territories ceded to Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, representing 13.4 per cent, 13.7 per cent, and 9.5 per cent respectively of the ethnic Hungarian population of the lost territories (Mocsy 1973, pp. 8-9). Thereafter, apart from a renewed surge in the aftermath of World War II — including an organized Hungarian-Slovak population exchange at the insistence of Czechoslovakia, bent on ridding the country of its troublesome minorities (Janics 1982; Stola 1992, p. 337; Szőke 1992, p. 306) — there was little Magyar migration to Hungary from neighbouring states until the late 1980s, when a migratory movement from Transylvania began to develop. Although we lack directly comparable figures, Balkan Turkish-Muslim migrations to remaining Ottoman domains and Turkey were undoubtedly much larger, both in absolute numbers and in proportion to the Balkan Turkish-Muslim population.

Ethnic Hungarian migration from the lost territories remained comparatively limited in scope chiefly because it was primarily an élite migration, confined for the most part to the upper and middle classes. The migration had three analytically distinct phases (Mocsy 1973). First to flee were those most closely identified with the repressive and exploitative aspects of Hungarian rule — and therefore those with the most to fear from a new regime. This group, many of whom fled before Romanian, Czechoslovak, and Serbian/Yugoslav rule were consolidated, included great landowners, military men, and state and country officials connected with the courts and the police. Second, de-Magyarization of public administration, state employment and education deprived many middle-class Hungarians of their positions as officials, teachers, railroad and postal employees, etc. and engendered a second group of refugees, who fled less in fear than out of economic displacement and loss of social status. Third, agrarian reform, by breaking up the great Hungarian-owned estates, displaced and pushed towards emigration not only the landowners themselves but the larger category of managers and employees whose livelihood depended on the estates. The peasant masses, however, who made up the large majority of the ethnically Hungarian population in the lost territories, did not migrate in significant numbers. Neither their interests nor their identities were immediately threatened by the change in sovereignty; indeed, Hungarian peasants in areas ceded to Romania and Czechoslovakia actually benefited modestly from land distributions attendant on agrarian reform (ibid, pp. 96ff).

About 85 per cent of the 1918–1924 migrants arrived in rump Hungary between late 1918 and the end of 1920 (ibid, p. 9). The steep tapering off of the influx thereafter no doubt reflected a declining demand for resettlement on the part of those remaining in the ceded territories. It reflected, too, efforts by the Hungarian government, beginning in 1921, to stem the influx by granting entry permits only in exceptional cases. This restrictive policy reflected the economic cost of supporting the refugees, a very large number of whom remained on the bloated state payroll. It also reflected ideological concerns: the government did not want its revisionist case to be weakened by the mass emigration of Magyars from the lost territories (ibid: ch. 10).

The Magyar exodus from the lost territories to rump Hungary, then, was numerically limited by the fact that it remained an essentially middle- and upper-class phenomenon. None the less, it amounted to a substantial influx into Hungary, increasing the size of the post-Trianon Hungarian population by about 5 per cent in a few years. Moreover, the refugees’ impact on interwar Hungarian politics — magnified by the predominance of déclassé gentry among them and by their concentration in cities, especially Budapest — was much greater than these numbers would suggest. Radicized by their traumatic territorial and social displacement, the refugees played a key role in the counter-revolutionary movements of 1919–20 and the White Terror of 1920. Throughout the interwar period, they buttressed right-wing forces, exercising an influence disproportionate to their numbers in parliament and public life. Above all, their zealous, uncompromising, and integral revisionism, demanding the full restoration of the lost territories, powerfully constrained interwar Hungary’s foreign policy, preventing any reconciliation with neighbouring states and making more likely the fateful alignment with Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany (Mocsy 1973).

Just as the great 1989 exodus of Bulgarian Turks to Turkey marked the continuation of an intermittent process of unmixing spanning more than a century, so too the centrifugal migration of ethnic Hungarians resumed, forty years after the last significant episode, in the late 1980s. The flow began well before the fall of the Ceauşescu regime; some 36,000 Romanian citizens, three-quarters of them ethnic Hungarians, who fled to Hungary during the 1980s were residing in Hungary by the end of 1989 (Szőke 1992, p. 308). Interestingly, in view of the considerable frictions between the two groups in ethnonationally mixed Transylvania, ethnic Romanians as well as ethnic Hungarians from post-Ceauşescu Romania have been drawn to Hungary by its relatively attractive labour market. Yet this is by no means a purely economic migration. For ethnic Hungarians from Romania, unlike their ethnic
Romanian neighbours and fellow citizens, are able to use their ethnic nationality as a form of social capital that generates superior migration opportunities. Their language skills and extended family ties give them access to richer networks of information about migration and employment opportunities; and their ethnic nationality assures them preferential treatment by officials both at the border (at which ethnic Romanians are more likely to be turned away for failing to satisfy currency requirements) and in applications for citizenship. Moreover, although the Hungarian government does not encourage ethnic Hungarian migration to Hungary, it cannot easily turn away at the border or expel co-ethnics who, even if motivated largely by economic considerations, come from countries where the Hungarian minority is universally seen as deprived of basic rights.

When war broke out in Yugoslavia, Hungarians from Romania were joined by refugees (again mostly ethnic Hungarians) from Serbian Voivodina and Croatia. To date there has been comparatively little migration from the Transcarpathian region of south-western Ukraine, where there are 170,000 compactly settled Hungarians, or from southern Slovakia, inhabited by some 600,000 Hungarians; but such flows may develop as well, mainly for economic reasons in the former case, where national tensions are not acute, and for economic and political reasons in the latter, where the creation of a Slovak nation-state has intensified previously latent ethnosectarian tensions.

German migration from Habsburg and Hohenzollern successor states

Our final comparative case is that of ethnic Germans. After World War I, some four and a half to five million Germans were suddenly transformed from ruling nationality or Staatsvolk in the Austrian half of the Habsburg Empire and in some eastern, predominantly Polish districts of the German Kaiserreich into beleaguered national minorities in the new and highly nationalist nation-states of Czechoslovakia and Poland as well as in equally nationalist Italy. Another two million Germans from the Hungarian half of the Habsburg Empire, while not, in the last decades of the Empire, a ruling nationality in the same sense, had none the less enjoyed a secure status; apart from the 220,000 Germans of the western Hungarian Burgenland, ceded to Austria after the war (Bohman 1969, p. 36), they, too, suddenly became national minorities – albeit initially less embattled and beleaguered ones – in Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. Altogether, some six and a half million Germans became national minorities including well over three million Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia, over a million and a quarter Germans in the territories ceded by Germany and Austria-Hungary to Poland, half a million in territory ceded by Hungary to Yugoslavia, half a million in rump Hungary, and a quarter of a million in the new Italian South Tyrol (Kann 1950, II, pp. 301ff; Kuhn 1959; Nellner 1959, p. 67; Rothschild 1974).

In response to this great status transformation, there appears to have been negligible migration of Germans from the Hungarian half of the former Habsburg Empire, and relatively little migration from the non-German parts of the Austrian half of the Empire, yet very heavy migration to Germany from the territories ceded by Germany to Poland. The lack of migration of Germans from former Hungarian territories is understandable. Their status changed least in the aftermath of the Empire. Even since the Compromise of 1867 gave Hungarians a free hand in their half of the Empire, they, not Germans, had been the ruling nationality. It was Hungarians, not Germans, who were the large landowners, judges, prosecutors, bureaucrats, teachers, and postal and railway employees in the non-Magyar areas, and who fled in fear or emigrated after losing their livelihoods when these areas passed to the non-Hungarian successor states. Germans, by contrast, suffered no such dramatic status reversal with the dismemberment of Hungary, and had no special impetus to flee. In rump Hungary, relatively homogeneous ethnically and preoccupied with territorial revisionism and with the fate of fellow Magyars in the neighbouring states, German-Hungarian relations were not particularly tense. Nor were Germans (unlike Hungarians) centrally implicated, in the early interwar years, in the national conflicts of Romania or Yugoslavia. It is therefore not surprising that the Germans of the Hungarian part of the Habsburg Empire remained in place after its dissolution.

For Germans from Hohenzollern Germany and the Austrian half of the Habsburg Empire, the abrupt transformation from ruling nationality to beleaguered national minority was much more drastic, and these new minorities were immediately plunged into harsh national conflicts in the successor states. At first glance, one might have expected similar post-imperial migration patterns on the part of these ex-Hohenzollern and ex-Habsburg Germans. Yet there were sharp differences. Adequate Austrian statistics are lacking for the crucial first few years after the breakup of the Empire (Bohman 1975, p. 146). Yet, while there appears to have been considerable migration of former Imperial civil servants and military personnel from the successor states to Vienna (Marrus 1985, p. 74), there was certainly no mass influx. While Austrians were unhappy with the peace settlement – with the exclusion of the Sudeten and South Tyrolean Germans from the Austrian successor state, and even more with the prohibition of Anschluss on to Germany – the migrants that did arrive in Vienna, quite unlike their politically powerful and radically irredentist Hungarian counterparts in Budapest, do not seem to have been strongly committed to recovering lost territories or to have had any impact on interwar Austrian politics.
From the territories ceded to Poland by Germany, on the other hand, there was a mass exodus of ethnic Germans — some 600,000–800,000 in the immediate postwar years (Kulischer 1948, p. 175; Blanke 1993, pp. 32ff). The large majority of these came from Posen and Polish Pomerania and resettled in the immediate aftermath, and even in anticipation, of the transfer of sovereignty (Broszat 1972, p. 212). Another substantial group arrived somewhat later from the portion of Upper Silesia that was awarded, after the 1921 plebiscite, and accompanying violent struggles, to Poland. More than half the ethnic German population from the former German territories that were incorporated into interwar Poland had migrated to Germany within ten years (Schechtman 1946, pp. 259ff; somewhat higher estimates are given in Broszat 1972, p. 212). The exodus was even heavier from urban areas in the lost territories. Ethnic German ‘public officials, schoolteachers, members of the liberal professions, and [unskilled and semiskilled] workmen [but not artisans] disappeared almost entirely from the towns of the Western Polish provinces’ (Schechtman 1946, p. 261). By 1926 the German urban population of Posen and Polish Pomerania had declined by 85 per cent (Blanke 1993, p. 34).

Why was ethnic German outmigration in the aftermath of empire so much heavier from former German territories of Poland than from Habsburg successor states? Why, in particular, was there mass emigration from western Poland but no substantial emigration from interwar Czechoslovakia? The three million Sudeten Germans of Bohemia, Moravia, and Czech Silesia, after all, were among the most politically alienated of successor state Germans. Highly nationalistic, and looking down on Czechs, over whom they felt historically destined to rule, they were initially unwilling to live as minorities in a Czechoslovak state. Clearly desiring, and formally proclaiming, unification with Austria, and assuming that the Paris peacemakers would recognize their asserted right to self-determination, they were bitterly disappointed when it became clear that the historic frontiers of the Habsburg provinces would be maintained, and the Sudeten territories incorporated into Czechoslovakia (Bohmann 1975, pp. 39ff; Rothschild 1974, pp. 78–81; Smelser 1975, pp. 8–9). Yet no substantial emigration ensued; nor did large-scale migration occur later in response to what Sudeten Germans interpreted as a government policy systematically favouring Czechs in economic and cultural matters and aimed at weakening the ethno demographic position of Germans.

The mass ethnic German emigration from western Poland but not from the Sudeten lands shows that the sudden transformation from ruling nationality to beleaguered and politically alienated national minority does not in and of itself generate migrations of ethnic unmixing. Two other factors shaped these strikingly different patterns of post-imperial migration. First, migration to Germany was less of a displac-

ment for the ethnic Germans of the new Polish state than migration to Austria would have been for their Sudeten counterparts. Germany had been defeated in war, diminished in territory, and transformed into a republic; but it was still ‘the same’ state, one to which ethnic Germans who found themselves under unwelcome Polish jurisdiction could plausibly return. The state of the Sudeten Germans, however, had vanished; there was no state for them to return to. Rump Austria was not ‘their’ state; it was not a diminished and transformed Habsburg Empire but rather a completely different state.  

Second, Sudeten Germans were much more deeply rooted and compactly settled than the Germans of western Poland. Germans comprised — and had for hundreds of years — the overwhelming majority (over 95 per cent of the population) throughout most of the Sudeten lands on the northern, western, and southern perimeter of Bohemia and Moravia (Bohmann 1975, p. 117). Ethnic Germans were in the minority, however, in the territories ceded by Germany to Poland after World War I. More important, they had been an embattled, demographically eroding, and artificially sustained minority even before the war, when the territories still belonged to Germany. The Prussian and German governments had made strenuous efforts to assimilate the ethnic Poles and to induce ethnic Germans to settle and remain in these frontier districts, but to little avail. The harsh efforts to Germanize the Polish population were counter-productive, alienating the Poles and reinforcing their Polish-national identity (Broszat 1972; Wehler 1979; Blanke 1981). The region’s ethnic Germans, moreover, participated disproportionately in the heavy east-west internal migration from the agrarian East to the industrial West in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, thereby weakening the ethnically German element in the East in spite of massive state efforts to sustain it. Having thus had a precarious and embattled existence even before the war, under German sovereignty, the ethnic German population of these territories lacked the rootedness and firm attachment to the region of their counterparts in the Sudeten region. They also had every reason to expect the new Polish government to attempt just as vigorously and heavy-handedly to Polonize its western borderlands as the German government had sought to Germanize the same territories before the war. That expectation was not disappointed: the policy of the Polish government towards the ethnic German minority was considerably harsher than that of the Czechoslovak government (Blanke 1993; Brubaker forthcoming). They were therefore much more likely to emigrate once sovereignty passed to Poland, and even, in substantial numbers, in anticipation of the transfer of sovereignty.

The migration of ethnic Germans from the western provinces of the new Polish state was heavier, both in absolute numbers and in proportion to the size of the new minorities, than any migration from
ex-Habsburg lands, including the migration of ethnic Hungarians to rump Hungary. Yet, while the German migration to Germany involved at least half of the German population of the ceded territories, and the Hungarian migration to Hungary only about 13 per cent of the ethnically Hungarian population of the ceded territories, the German migration did not have the political impact of its Hungarian counterpart. Nationalist publicists, to be sure, did accuse Poland of deliberately driving out Germans from the border areas (Schechtman 1946, pp. 259–60); but the resettlers themselves, unlike the Hungarian resettlers, had no identifiable impact on interwar politics. This was partly because German losses – of territory and of ethnic brethren – were much less extensive than Hungary’s, and resettlers from lost territories comprised a much smaller fraction of the population of interwar Germany than of interwar Hungary. The German resettlers, moreover, more closely approximated a cross-section of the German population of the lost territories than did their Hungarian counterparts, whose predominantly élite composition amplified their voice in interwar politics.

For Germans, then, little ethnic unmixing occurred in the aftermath of the collapse of the Habsburg Empire. The overwhelming majority of the more than five million Germans who became national minorities in the successor states remained in those states throughout the interwar period. Yet mass ethnic unmixing in this region was only postponed, not forestalled. Today there are scarcely any Germans in Czechoslovakia or the former Yugoslavia, and there are only small residual communities of Germans in Hungary and Romania. Of ex-Habsburg Germans in successor states other than Austria, only those of the Italian South Tyrol survive today as a relatively intact community (despite a harsh Italianization campaign in the interwar period and a 1939 German-Italian agreement, at Mussolini’s request, to resettle them in Germany [Schechtman 1946, pp. 48–65]). Most of the ex-Habsburg Germans – including virtually all of the Sudeten Germans were expelled, with Allied acquiescence, in the final stages and immediate aftermath of World War II (along with an even larger group of Germans from the eastern provinces of interwar Germany, who fled the advancing Red Army or were driven out in the aftermath of the war). By 1950 there were in the Federal Republic and German Democratic Republic some twelve million ethnic German \textit{Vertreibe} or expellees. Of these about seven million were German citizens from the eastern territories of interwar Germany, now annexed by Poland and (in the case of the area around Königsberg/Kaliningrad) the Soviet Union. The remaining five million were citizens of other states – mainly Habsburg successor states (Nellner 1959, pp. 122ff). Between 1950 and 1987, another million and a half ethnic Germans from eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were resettled in the Federal Republic, over half of them from Poland (Pusskepeleit 1990, p. 165). Since then, with the liberalization of travel and emigration, over a million and a half \textit{Spätassiedler} have settled in the Federal Republic, lured by its fabled prosperity, and taking advantage of the automatic immigration and citizenship rights that continue to be offered to ethnic Germans from the so-called \textit{Vertreibungsgebiete}, that is, the territories from which Germans were driven out after the war (Brubaker 1992a, pp. 168ff).

As a result, the once-vast German diaspora of eastern Europe and Russia is today undergoing a rapid, and probably final, dissolution.

Ethnic unmixing in the aftermath of Empire: some general characteristics

From this excursus into comparative history four general analytical points emerge. The first concerns the great variation in the degree, timing, and modalities of ethnic unmixing in the aftermath of empire – variation between the three cases we have considered, but also, and equally important, variation within each case over time, across regions and among social classes. Consider just a few of the more striking dimensions of variation. In some regions (for example, the Sudeten German lands of Bohemia and Moravia) unmixing has been virtually complete; in others (notably the Hungarian successor states) only a relatively small minority of the former dominant group has migrated. In some cases (for example, that of Germans in provinces ceded after World War I to Poland) large-scale migration occurred in the immediate aftermath of political reconfiguration or (in much of the Balkans) in the course of wars that produced the reconfiguration; in other cases (the ex-Habsburg Germans) mass migration occurred only much later. In many cases migrants fled actual or immediately feared violence (for example, Muslims and others in the Russo-Turkish and Balkan wars, and millions of Germans in the final stages of World War II) or were compelled to move by the state (Turks from Greece in 1923–24, Germans in the aftermath of World War II); in other cases (German Spätassiedler and the recent Hungarian migrants to Hungary) migrations occurred in more deliberate fashion, as the aggregate result of innumerable individual calculations of well-being.

A corollary of the first point is that there was nothing foreordained about post-imperial migrations of ethnic unmixing. The reconfiguration of political space along national lines did not automatically entail a corresponding redistribution of population. Neither migration nor even the propensity to migrate was inexorably engendered by the status transformation from dominant, state-bearing nationality in a multinational state to national minority in a successor state. Much depended on the manner in which political reconfiguration occurred (notably, the extent to which it was effected through or accompanied by war or other types of organized or disorganized violence); on the ethn демо-
graphic characteristics, especially the rootedness, of the new minority; on the anticipated and actual policies of the successor states towards the minority; on the availability and quality of the resettlement opportunities in an external national 'homeland'; on the plausibility and attractiveness of mobilization as an alternative to migration, of 'voice' as an alternative to 'exit'; and so on.

Second, post-imperial ethnic unmixing has been a protracted, if intermittent, process (Zolberg 1983b, p. 37), spanning three-quarters of a century for Hungarians and Germans, and more than a century for Turks. It continues today; it is striking that all three ethnontational groups have experienced dramatic new waves of migratory unmixing in the last five years. One should think about ethnic unmixing in the aftermath of empire not as a short-term process that exhausts itself in the immediate aftermath of political reconfiguration, but rather as a long-term process in which, according to political and economic conjuncture in origin and destination states, migratory streams may dry up altogether for a time, persist in a steady trickle, or swell suddenly to a furious torrent.

Third, in the protracted course of post-imperial migratory unmixings, the phases of greatest intensity have for the most part been closely linked to actual or threatened violence, especially during or immediately after wars. I emphasized above the importance of war as a direct and indirect cause of the Balkan migrations. And the bulk of the ethnic German migration occurred in the final stages of World War II and in the mass expulsions immediately following the war. Yet the centrality of war and, more generally, violence does not mean that post-imperial ethnic unmixing can be neatly subsumed under the rubric of 'forced migration.' That rubric is, in fact, too narrow and misleading. Some such migrations were, of course, directly compelled or forced in the most literal sense, and others, while not quite so literally coerced, were none the less powerfully induced by credible threats or well-grounded fears of imminent force or violence. However, other cases do not satisfy even this expanded, looser definition of forced or coerced migration. This is the case for the great majority of Germans leaving the western provinces of Poland after World War I, although Nazi propaganda claimed otherwise, and for Germans leaving eastern Europe and the Soviet Union after 1950; it is also the case for most of the Hungarian migration in the aftermath of the Habsburg collapse and for almost all of the Hungarian migration from Romania in the last decade. Even the mass Turkish exodus from Bulgaria in 1989, while certainly provoked by the communist government of Bulgaria during its last months in power, is not adequately characterized as a forced migration (Vasileva 1992). More generally, even where fear is a central motive of the migrants, it is not always appropriate to speak of forced migrations. Many German migrants from territories ceded to Poland after World War I, and many Hungarian migrants from Habsburg successor states were no doubt moved in part by diffuse fears and anxieties about their future well-being in the new states; but they were not thereby forced migrants. Fear is a capacious concept: there is a great distance between migration arising from a sharply focused fear of imminent violence, and migration engendered by a diffuse fear, concern, or anxiety about one's opportunities or the opportunities of one's children in the future. The conception of forced migration is simply not very useful as an umbrella concept here; it is insufficiently differentiated, and it obscures the fact that there is almost always, even in the case of flight from immediately threatening violence, a more or less significant element of will or choice involved in the act of migration. To question the usefulness of an insufficiently differentiated, overextended concept of forced migration, needless to say, is not to deny the importance of intimidation and violence as a means deliberately employed to provoke migration.

Fourth, except where whole communities were indiscriminately targeted for removal (as in the Greco-Turkish transfers of 1922–1924 or in the expulsion of Sudeten Germans), there was a pronounced social selectivity to post-imperial migrations of ethnic unmixing (as there is to many other migrations). Most vulnerable to displacement were groups dependent, directly or indirectly, on the state. This included first and foremost military, police, and judicial personnel, bureaucrats, and teachers, but also postal and railway employees and workers in enterprises owned by the state or dependent on state subsidies or contracts. This selectivity of ethnic unmixing was apparent in all the migrations we considered but was demonstrated most dramatically in the post-World War I Hungarian migrations, where the peasant majority remained entirely in place, while the Magyar state-dependent stratum virtually disappeared from the successor states. The reasons for this differential susceptibility to emigration are obvious. The new nation-states were all nationalizing states, committed, in one way or another, to reversing historic patterns of discrimination by the former imperial rulers and to promoting the language, culture, demographic position, economic flourishing and political hegemony of the new state-bearing nation (Brubaker forthcoming). Short of enacting overtly discriminatory legislation, one of the main instruments available to the new states in pursuit of these goals was control over recruitment to state employment.

Russian migration from Soviet successor states in comparative and historical perspective

In the light of the foregoing, how best can we think about the actual and potential migration to Russia of the twenty-five million successor-
state Russians? To begin with (and following the same four points), we should not think of it as a unitary process, evincing the same patterns and following the same stages and rhythms throughout the former Soviet Union. Instead, we should think of it as a congeries of related but distinct migrations (or non-migrations, as the case may be from some successor states), exhibiting distinct patterns and rhythms. We should expect, that is, great variation in patterns of post-Soviet Russian migration—variation both among and within successor states.

It follows that we should not think of the reflux of Russians to the Russian Federation as an automatic process, inexorably accompanying the breakup of the Soviet Union. We must avoid conceiving the causes of migration in overgeneralized terms. It is not adequate, for instance, to conceive of Russians leaving the successor states simply because they have been transformed from dominant nationality throughout the Soviet Union to national minorities in the non-Russian successor states. The forces, processes and conditions engendering Russian migration need to be conceived in much more specific and differentiated terms. When this is done (and I attempt to do so below), it becomes apparent that what is, in general terms, a uniform process—the transformation of Russians from dominant state-bearing nationality into national minorities in successor states—is, in fact, highly variegated and uneven, and that the specific migration-engendering forces, processes and conditions are unevenly and contingently rather than uniformly and automatically associated with the reconfiguration of political authority along national lines in post-Soviet Eurasia.

Earlier post-imperial migrations of ethnic unmixing, we have seen, were protracted; indeed, they continue to this day. A broad time horizon seems advisable in thinking about post-Soviet migrations as well. This means looking back as well as forward. The present Russian reflux towards Russia is not new and unprecedented. Selective ethnic unmixing began long before the explosion of nationalist protest under Gorbachev. The centuries-old current of Russian migratory expansion into non-Russian areas slowed and, in some cases, reversed itself during the last three decades. There was a substantial net Russian outflow from Georgia and Azerbaijan during each of the last three Soviet intercensal periods (1959–70, 1970–79, and 1979–89), and from Armenia in 1979–89. During the last intercensal period there was also a net outflow of Russians, for the first time, from Moldova, Kazakhstan and each of the Central Asian republics. Even though net Russian immigration continued, during the last intercensal period, to the Baltics and the Slavic west (Ukraine and Belarus), the rates of such Russian in-migration declined over the last three intercensal periods in each of these republics except Lithuania (Anderson and Silver 1989, pp. 640–2). The current and future phases of the Russian reflux towards Russia should therefore be understood not as initiating but as continuing and reinforcing a reversal of historic Russian migration patterns—a reversal the origins of which long antedate the breakup of the Soviet Union (Zaionchekovskaia 1991). A broad time horizon also requires that we try to look beyond the immediately visible problems, crises and migration currents to think, in an admittedly speculative mode, about the longer-term dynamics of political reconfiguration and ethnic unmixing in post-Soviet Eurasia.

The historically crucial role of war and, more broadly, violence in engendering post-imperial migrations of ethnic unmixing, especially the most intense phases of such migrations, holds out the possibility that ethnic Russians might avoid being swept up by the kind of cataclysmic mass migrations that are almost invariably driven by war or at least by actual or threatened violence. Even in the absence of war or significant violence directed against Russians, to be sure, many Russians from Transcaucasia and Central Asia have been moving, and will no doubt continue to move, to Russia. However, these migrations have not been, and need not be, cataclysmic, even if—to take a hypothetical limiting case—the entire Russian population of Central Asia (excluding Kazakhstan) and Transcaucasia were to migrate to Russia over, say, a ten-year period. Nor can recent and current migrations of Russians from these and some other regions be conceived as forced (vyuzhdenyi) migrations, although they are often referred to as such in Russian discussions. The fact that such migrations have been induced by political reconfiguration and changes in the political, economic and cultural status of Russians does not mean that they have been forced. Even so, as I argue below, substantial Russian resettlement from these regions would significantly strain the Russian Federation. Yet it is important to distinguish between this mode of non-forced, non-cataclysmic unmixing and the vastly more disruptive and dangerous migrations that could ensue should ethnopolitical conflict in Kazakhstan or Ukraine become militarized or otherwise linked to large-scale violence.

One specific migration-engendering process central to earlier aftermaths of empire was that of 'ethnic succession' among officials and other state employees. It was this that accounted for the pronounced social selectivity of those earlier migrations of ethnic unmixing, with the state-dependent stratum of the former Staatsvolk heavily overrepresented among emigrants. Here the implications for post-Soviet migration are mixed. On the one hand, almost everyone is dependent, directly or indirectly, on the state, increasing the scope for ethnonational conflict. Although privatization may eventually reduce this dependence, it is itself a state-dependent process, affording ample occasion for ethnonational conflict over modes of appropriation of public assets and enterprises. While the scope for ethnic conflict over jobs and resources is greater in the post-Soviet than, say, the post-
Habsburg case, given the near-universal dependence on the state, the opportunities for ethnic succession in its classic sphere, namely public administration, are smaller. The Soviet Union was unlike earlier multinational empires in its deliberate cultivation and institutional empowerment, in the peripheral republics, of numerous non-Russian national intelligencias – coupled, of course, with harsh repression of deviant political behaviour. As a result, the administrative apparatus of the periphery – monopolized by members of the imperial Staatsvolk in the old multinational empires, and consequently a prime target for ethnic succession in their aftermath – was already staffed largely by members of the titular nationalities. Public administration therefore does not provide the successor states with comparable opportunities for the wholesale promotion of the new state-bearing nation at the expense of the former ruling nationality. Nevertheless, competition for jobs in all sectors of the economy is bound to intensify as economic restructuring generates higher levels of unemployment, especially in regions where the labour force of the titular nationality is growing extremely rapidly (Zaiontchkovskaya 1991). Given the persisting centrality of the state in economic life, as well as the institutionalized expectations of ownership of their own polities held by titular elites (Brubaker 1994), such competition is sure to be politicized along ethnonational lines, albeit to differing degrees in differing successor states. Intensifying labour-market competition in the Soviet southern tier already contributed to gradual Russian outmigration during the last decade (Zaiontchkovskaya 1991), and it will no doubt continue to do so, although specifically political factors will probably become increasingly important in generating outmigrating from those regions. The extent to which conflict over jobs and resources will generate out-migration of Russians from other regions, however, rather than ethnopolitical mobilization on their part, remains to be seen, and will depend on a variety of other factors, some of them sketched below.

The Russian reflux to Russia: thinking analytically about variation

Under the Soviet regime, Russians in the peripheral republics enjoyed distinct privileges and advantages. These included Russian-language schools, newspapers, and other cultural facilities and access to desirable jobs throughout the Soviet Union without having to learn the local language – institutionalized cultural support that was unavailable for members of other nationalities living outside their own republics. They also included less tangible advantages such as the security of belonging to the Soviet Union’s dominant, state-bearing nationality.

As the Soviet Union careened towards disintegration in 1989–1991, however, the legal, cultural, political and psychological position of the Russian diaspora began to change in fundamental ways. What was formerly an advantage – identification with the ruling centre and mastery of the statewide ‘language of interethnic communication’ – became a liability, as Russians were more openly identified with Soviet misrule and oppression, and as the incipient successor states began to promote their own languages. Plans were made to expand schooling in the language of the titular nationality at the expense of Russian-language schooling. Knowledge of the local language was proposed, in some instances, as a requirement for employment and citizenship. Russian-language street signs were removed, and local shopkeepers and officials might pretend not to understand when addressed in Russian. Relatively few Russians know the local languages: figures range from less than 5 per cent in Central Asia to a high of only 38 per cent in Lithuania. Citizenship legislation enacted in Estonia, and even harsher draft legislation discussed in Latvia, excluded recent immigrants, mainly Russians. Anti-Russian sentiments were more openly articulated by some nationalist groups. Russians came to face the prospect of losing their privileges, their jobs, their right to vote or to own property, their sense of security and in some instances even their right to reside in the territory.

This story is by now a familiar one. It is not, however, adequate, for our purposes. It is not wrong; but it is insufficiently differentiated. To understand the dynamics of current and future Russian reflux towards Russia, it is not enough to point to the transformation of Russians from confident Staatsvolk into beleaguered national minority. Nor can one appeal in sweeping terms, as do Russian nationalists, to the persecution of and discrimination against Russians in the successor states. The most salient fact about Russian migration from the successor states is its unevenness; and we need an analytical framework that can help explain this unevenness.

The response of the Russian diaspora to non-Russian nationalisms, and to the nationalization of life in the incipient successor states, has been strikingly varied. Emigration from non-Russian territories is only one of an array of possible responses. Other possible responses include individual assimilation, or at least acculturation, to the dominant local population, and collective mobilization for equal civil rights, for special cultural or linguistic rights, for territorial political autonomy, for secession or even for the restoration of central control.

The extent of Russian out-migration from non-Russian successor states will vary across successor states and over time. A first set of factors that will determine its magnitude includes ethnodemographic variables such as the size, concentration and rootedness of the Russian populations in the territories in question, as well as the trajectory of these variables over time. Where the Russian population is small, scattered or weakly rooted, and especially when it is also rapidly shrinking, the prevailing response to local nationalisms is likely to be
emigration, together with a certain amount of apolitical individual acculturation or assimilation. A large, concentrated, and deeply rooted Russian population, on the other hand, is more likely to remain in place and engage in collective political action. Rootedness may be the key variable here. It can be conceived as attachment to the territory in which one lives, as expressed in resistance to moving even in the face of inducements or pressures to move. Duration of residence obviously contributes to rootedness – not only how long a given individual or family has resided in the territory, but also how long the community has existed. Past and present ties to the land also contribute to rootedness: peasant communities, and to a lesser extent even the urban descendants of such peasant settlers, are ordinarily more deeply rooted than historically purely urban settlements. Among Russian diaspora communities, rootedness may be greatest in northern and eastern Kazakhstan and in the eastern and southern Ukraine; it is probably weakest in the historically purely urban settlements of Central Asia. In wider historical and comparative perspective, though, it should be noted that none of the successor state Russian communities is as deeply rooted as peasant communities have tended to be.

A second set of factors has to do with the terms of membership for Russians in the new nation-states. The crucial variables here are the extent to which the local nationalisms are or become anti-Russian and the extent to which the rewritten rules of the political game in the new nation-states – especially those bearing on the language of education, the language of public life, the criteria of citizenship (Brubaker 1992b) and the rights of permanent residents who are not granted, or do not seek, citizenship in the new states – impose cultural, economic, or political costs on the local Russian populations.

A third, and probably more important, factor is the texture of everyday life for Russians in the successor states. Actual or feared violence will stimulate outmigration from weakly rooted Russian communities, and it will stimulate demands for restoration of central control, or for territorial autonomy, in deeply rooted Russian communities. Informal hostility towards Russians, even without the threat of violence, may have the same effects. Anti-Russian attitudes and practices are likely to be particularly important in Central Asia, given the high degree of segregation between Russians and indigenous nationalities and the more classically colonial character of Russian domination there. The great question mark is northern and eastern Kazakhstan, where the same segregation and quasi-colonial situation has existed, yet where the Russian settler population is much more deeply rooted, dating from massive rural colonization in the late nineteenth century. Russians in Kazakhstan might be compared in this respect with French settler colonists in Algeria (Lustick 1985), while Russians in the cities of Central Asia might be more aptly compared with urban Europeans in colonies without deeply rooted European rural settlements.

A fourth set of factors likely to condition the Russian response to non-Russian nationalisms concerns the possible economic or political advantages, balanced against cultural and psychological costs, that might induce Russians to remain in a successor state despite anti-Russian sentiment and nationalistic language and citizenship legislation. This might be the case especially in the Baltic states, which may be seen as having brighter prospects for economic integration into Europe, and brighter prospects for maintaining public order and establishing liberal institutions.

A fifth set of factors concerns the orientation and policies of the Russian state towards the various communities of diaspora Russians. This includes policies towards immigrants and refugees from the successor states in matters of citizenship, immigration and relocation or integration assistance (housing, employment, etc.). These policies may differ for different groups of actual or potential resettlers; diaspora Russians, in other words, may have differential resettlement opportunities. Designated refugees from particular peripheral territories, for example, might be granted preferential access to scarce housing.

Besides these ‘domestic’ policies towards immigrants and refugees, we also have to consider Russian ‘foreign-policy’ initiatives vis-à-vis the successor states, seeking either to forestall repatriation to Russia or, if repatriation cannot be forestalled, to regulate it. Russia might seek to prevent a potentially destabilizing massive influx of Russians by negotiating favourable conditions for the diaspora communities, for example, in matters of citizenship and cultural facilities. In a harsher mode, it might engage in coercive diplomacy or even intervene with military force to reassert control over all or part of a refugee-producing successor state, say a hypothetically radically nationalist Kazakhstan.13

In general, differential policies of the Russian state towards the various diaspora communities may differentially affect the propensity of diaspora Russians to emigrate.14

On the basis of these considerations, we can expect sharply differing rates of migration to Russia on the part of different diaspora groups. Migration may well be the dominant Russian response to non-Russian nationalisms in Central Asia (excluding Kazakhstan) and Transcaucasia. The Russian population of Central Asia, although large, is exclusively urban and not deeply rooted; and it faces the greatest informal hostility from the indigenous nationalities. The Russian population of Transcaucasia is small and rapidly shrinking. Already during the 1980s, as we have noted above, there was substantial Russian emigration from Central Asia and Transcaucasia, and the rate of emigration has increased sharply in the last few years. Russian outmigration rates are likely to be much lower from areas with territorially concentrated and
historically rooted Russian populations such as eastern and southern Ukraine, northern and eastern Kazakhstan, Moldova east of the Dniester, and north-eastern Estonia. There, we are more likely to see — and in some cases, of course, are already seeing — collective political responses on the part of Russians to non-Russian nationalisms. Elsewhere in the Baltics, comparatively bright medium- and long-term economic prospects, together with possible concessions to the Russian population negotiated by the Russian state, may limit the scale of outmigration, at least for the more established part of the Russian communities.

This means that of the twenty-five million Russians in the non-Russian successor states, only a small fraction — even if a large group in absolute numbers — is at high risk of being induced or forced to flee to Russia in the near future. The Russians most likely to resettle in Russia are those in Central Asia (3.3 million in 1989) and Transcaucasia (785,000). Many of these, though we do not have a very precise idea how many, have already moved, with the heaviest proportional outflow probably from violence-torn Tajikistan. This pool of actual and potential migrants amounts to less than 3 per cent of the total population of Russia. In principle, the resettlement of even a substantial fraction of this migrant pool might benefit Russia. For decades, Soviet demographers and economic planners have been concerned about rural depopulation in central Russia and about labour deficits in areas of Russia that were targeted for development projects. In practice, however, it will be difficult for the state to steer resettlement in accordance with demographic and economic needs. Far from benefiting Russia, the migration to Russia in the next few years of a substantial fraction of Central Asian and Transcaucasian Russians would probably place a significant strain on the Russian state, which, in the throes of economic crisis, and having no experience with immigration or refugee flows, is largely unprepared to handle a substantial influx of resettlers or refugees.

Such migration would pose a greater strain on the Central Asian societies, given the Russian or European monopoly or quasi-monopoly of many technical occupations in these countries. The outflow of skilled specialists in the last few years has already disrupted enterprises. Fearing further, more serious, disruptions, ruling elites of the Central Asian successor states have urged, and sought to induce, Russians and other Europeans to remain. How successful they will be remains to be seen. Retaining Russians and other Slavs will certainly be easier than retaining those with more attractive resettlement opportunities (especially Germans and Jews, whose Central Asian settlements have been rapidly shrinking). Much will depend on successor state governments’ ability to maintain public order and on the overall social and political atmosphere in these states.

Much more serious than even a near-complete Russian exodus from Central Asia would be a massive Russian exodus from the core areas of Russian settlement in the non-Russian successor states, namely Ukraine and Kazakhstan, with some 11.4 and 6.2 million Russians, respectively, in 1989, accounting for 70 per cent of the total Russian diaspora. With large, territorially concentrated, and historically rooted communities in these states, I have suggested, Russians are unlikely to leave in large numbers unless (1) government policies and popular practices in Ukraine and Kazakhstan take on a much more sharply anti-Russian orientation than they have at present, and (2) intensifying ethnonational conflict is militarized or otherwise linked with actual or threatened violence. Although there is no immediate prospect of this occurring, it must be reckoned a real possibility over the longer term, especially in Kazakhstan, given the potent historical memories that can be mobilized around the tremendous suffering inflicted by the Soviet state, with whose projects Russian settlers, at least in the case of Kazakhstan, can be all too easily identified.

Besides the tremendous economic problems it would entail, large-scale resettlement of Russians from Ukraine or Kazakhstan to Russia might well be politically destabilizing. Especially if Russians were forced to flee these territories in response to sharply anti-Russian state policies or threats of violence, the refugees could form core constituencies for radical Russian nationalists committed to recovering control of what they claim are ‘historically Russian’ territories. In other instances, including, as we saw above, interwar Hungary, displaced and dispossessed refugees have provided constituencies for extreme nationalist parties and programmes.

**Conclusion**

Post-Soviet Eurasia has entered what is likely to be a protracted period of political reconfiguration, involving simultaneously the reconstitution of political authority, the redrawing of territorial boundaries and the restructuring of populations. These multiple reconfigurations are likely to entail considerable migration, possibly on a scale unseen since the aftermath of World War II. The most important of these migrations will be that of successor-state Russians to Russia. Surveying earlier instances of ethnic unmixing in the aftermath of empire, this article has sought to come to grips analytically with the patterns and dynamics that are likely to characterize that migration. Arguing against overgeneralized explanations or prognostications of ethnic unmixing, it points to the need for a more nuanced, differentiated approach that would take systematic account of the varied and multiform conditions facing successor-state Russians and their varied and multiform responses, including migration, to those conditions.
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Notes

1. In what follows, I use the term ‘Russians’ for convenience, on the understanding that it includes not only the twenty-five million residents of non-Russian republics who identified themselves as Russian in the 1989 Census but also certain other Russophone residents of the non-Russian successor states whose migration behaviour is likely to be similar – above all, the roughly 1.4 million Ukrainian and Belorussian residents of non-Slavic successor states who, in 1989, identified their native language as Russian (calculated from Gosudarstvennyi Komitet SSSR po Statistike [1991]).

2. I limit my attention here to the migrations that occurred in conjunction with the emergence and consolidation of national states in the Balkans; and I focus chiefly on the migration of Balkan Muslims rather than Balkan Christians. There was also, of course, a vast and murderous uprooting of Armenians from eastern Anatolia; but that lies outside the scope of the present discussion.

3. The question of who was responsible for the compulsory rather than voluntary character of the Greco-Turkish population exchange is much disputed. For a balanced account, see Ladas 1932, pp. 335ff, 725.

4. I do not include wartime Hungarian-Romanian population exchanges within Transylvania, for this territory reverted to Romanian control at the end of the war (on these exchanges see Schechman 1946, pp. 425ff).

5. Interwar Hungary, on the other hand, was essentially a (much) diminished and transformed version of pre-war Hungary; it was in an important sense ‘the same’ state. For this reason, among others, migration to rump Hungary on the part of ethnic Hungarians from the successor states was no doubt more plausible than migration to rump Austria on the part of ethnic Germans.

6. In German usage, Aussiedler (ethnic German settlers from eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union) were distinguished from Obersiedler (Germans who moved from East to West Germany). Spätaussiedler (‘late resettlers’) are those who have come recently from eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, decades after the postwar expulsion of Germans from these territories.

7. Migratory unmixing also involved other nationalities. For three decades, for example, there has been substantial net migration of Armenians from Georgia and Azerbaijan to Armenia, and a modest net migration of Azeris from Georgia and Armenia to Azerbaijan. For these nationalities, refugee flows of the last few years, following the outbreak of Armenian-Azeri ethnic violence in 1988, have only reinforced a long-term trend towards ethnic unmix-

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