

A THEORY OF OPPOSITION COORDINATION

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The literature on contemporary African multiparty politics conventionally attributes the lack of opposition coalitions to the enduring influence of incumbent patronage and ethnic mobilization. I present here two chapters in which I develop an alternative explanation that links opposition behavior to the availability of private resources. The first chapter introduces a model in which elite donations under financial liberalization enable opposition politicians to make coalition bargains more attractive to each other despite the threat of time-inconsistent behavior. The second chapter's quantitative analysis confirms that financial liberalization, as proxied by the availability of private credit, significantly affects the opposition's ability to coordinate in executive elections. The results show that variables reflecting the opposition's liquidity problem are more consistent predictors of opposition coordination than patronage, ethnicity, or violence.

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CHAPTER 3

A MODEL OF OPPOSITION COORDINATION

Electoral coordination in Africa is a resource problem for the opposition.

Opposition politicians can seek to resolve this problem through financing from economic elites, but incumbents can also leverage their control over market access to deter them from providing that financing. This relationship between incumbents and economic elites significantly affects the opposition's ability to access resources, without which alternative national alliances cannot be forged in impoverished democratizing states.

This bargaining dynamic better explains patterns in opposition coordination than conventional accounts based on ethnicity, institutions or patronage alone. My focus on the economics of opposition coordination does not deny the influence of these other variables. However, as I suggested in the introduction, these cannot satisfactorily account for the pre-electoral coalitions that formed in 32 of 85 contested executive elections held across Africa between 1990 and 2005.¹ There is no significant difference in the values of these variables between elections in which opposition politicians coordinated or fragmented. And there is no other convincing explanation in the extant literature for the coordination of politicians across districts (Cox 1999).

Under what conditions can opposition politicians access the resources needed to resolve their coordination problem? In this chapter, I begin by presenting an

¹ I code pre-electoral opposition coalitions using the following rules: (1) multiple parties endorse a single candidate; (2) a major party participates in the coalition; (3) parties make the agreement public before the election; and (4) the coalition represents more than one ethnicity or region.

analytical framework for understanding how opposition politicians use resources to bargain over the formation of pre-electoral coalitions. I argue that the availability of private resources critically shapes the strategic context in which opposition politicians obtain the financing needed to bring about coordination. My claim is that such coordination occurs where incumbents have been forced to liberalize the financial sector, freeing elites from government intervention in a range of financial transactions. African economies obviously underperformed over the past two decades, but there has been significant variation among them in terms of financial liberalization. Incumbents reformed financial sectors to varying degrees since the 1980s, creating liberalized financial markets in some cases, as in Kenya, while retaining statist controls in others, as in Cameroon.

This focus on opposition financing provides key insights into the nature of electoral competition in Africa's evolving multiparty systems. First, it offers a mechanism that shows how economic relationships shape the development of opposition as one essential aspect of democracy. The survival of democracy is strongly correlated with per capita income (Przeworski et al. 2000), but comparativists have yet to work out a mechanism that connects economic conditions to democracy's sustainability (Laitin 2002).² It remains to be shown how exactly economic conditions can bolster the likelihood of democratic consolidation. My depiction of the constraints

² While the survival of democracy is correlated with per capita income, regime transitions appear to be unrelated to economic factors (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Przeworski et al. 2000). To clarify, I am concerned with the former rather than the latter. I seek to explain how a coherent opposition emerges once the rules have been changed to allow for multiparty competition.

faced in opposition finance shows that coordination among opposition politicians in Africa is highly sensitive to economic trends.

Second, a focus on opposition financing helps to explain why African countries with ostensibly similar social structures appear to have different patterns of opposition behavior. While I claim that opposition coordination depends on financial liberalization, I also engage the real impact of ethnic cleavages in this context. When elites do provide financing to the opposition, ethnicity serves as a focal criterion by which contributions are allocated: if elites seek to maximize the likelihood of backing a winner, they should systematically favor opposition politicians from larger ethnic groups. This suggests that a country's ethnic structure affects the distribution of resources among opposition politicians, but it does not by itself discourage opposition politicians from forming pre-electoral coalitions.

In what follows, I provide an overview of the causal logic connecting financial liberalization to opposition coordination. It introduces the relevant actors—incumbent, economic elites, and opposition politicians—and summarizes their strategic interactions. I then develop a model that formalizes the logic and from which testable implications can be derived.

Opposition Financing

The theory proposed in this chapter seeks to map variation in economic relations onto patterns of opposition behavior. I build on and adapt Dahl's (1970 [1964]; 1971) intuition regarding the relationship between economic control and the

emergence of contestation. The argument advanced here differs in that it concentrates exclusively on the interactions among elite decision-makers rather than on the relations between elites and masses. It offers a model of how elite choices are constrained under different economic contexts, assuming that these choices are consequential for the emergence of a coherent opposition in a multiparty system. It does not purport to attribute democratic attitudes to changes in economic conditions, especially since the kinds of changes discussed here occur far too intermittently or quickly to have any kind of significant impact on norms. However, as Diamond (1999, 88) observes, economic performance “does not produce a democratic transformation of political values and preferences, but it does provide a context in which such a transformation can gradually occur.”

I begin from the premise that electoral coordination depends on resources. A politician competing for national office needs resources to achieve an array of objectives across constituencies, ranging from mundane tasks like hiring a staff and buying campaign paraphernalia to more critical issues such as purchasing the endorsements of local notables. But a politician’s most important objective is to leverage his resources in building alliances with those who might compete against him for votes. He can encourage his rivals to join his campaign by signaling his capacity to outspend them as well as by offering side payments that can help make promises about the future more credible.

All politicians are concerned with securing the resources needed to achieve these campaign-related objectives. The arrangements for doing so can take a variety of forms: rival politicians can agree to provide for equitable financing through the state,

as is done in several European countries, or they can openly compete with each other for financial backing from voters, as is done in the United States. In poor countries with inchoate democratic systems, incumbents resolve this problem by raiding the state treasury and selectively distributing patronage to their cronies. Opposition politicians in those same poor countries, however, face a serious resource challenge. And in the African context, it is access to financing that distinguishes successful from failed politicians. According to Chabal and Daloz (1999, 34), “Aspirants to political office require both credibility and the means to fulfill their ambition. They must be rich enough to become convincing.” While some opposition politicians are wealthy enough to finance local or regional parties without access to state resources, the funds needed to build a national pre-electoral coalition are generally beyond the means of individual politicians. These politicians cannot rely on subsidies from the state or contributions from voters, so they must turn to economic elites for their financing.

For their part, economic elites have an incentive to diversify their financial contributions. While market access in one-party systems is usually a politically negotiated privilege that depends on personal relationships, the threat of a potential change in government in a multiparty system brings those relationships into doubt. Economic elites can hedge their bets through opposition financing, increasing the likelihood that they can demand official favors from whichever side wins the election. They may even be able to extract greater concessions—in terms of lower tax obligations or other lucrative privileges—if multiparty competition bids up their value as political financiers. Economic elites thus become central to opposition coordination

not because they are innately democratic, but because they seek to protect their own interests (Moore 1966; Bates 1999b).

Incumbents can, of course, anticipate such a nexus and take steps to thwart its formation. No incumbent, whether in an autocratic or democratic system, would voluntarily allow his rivals to acquire the resources needed to challenge him.³ If private resources fuel the opposition's coordination, an incumbent can respond by attempting either to block their fount or to obstruct their distribution. An incumbent's ability to restrict opposition financing can be defined as a function of his control over access to financial markets and the nature of his tax bases. The incumbent conceptualized here is thus a version of the predatory ruler who maximizes revenue by offering rights in exchange for taxes (Tilly 1985; Levi 1988; North and Weingast 1989; Root 1994). Incumbents seek to retain control over market access because it enables them to buy political support through the allocation of privileges; they bargain away some of that control whenever they need to raise more revenue or shore up their political position.

In the African experience, however, incumbents have sought to retain their relative power by bargaining with donors rather than citizens, or by relying on immobile tax bases such as oil and minerals. How this dynamic plays out, beyond specifying the incumbent's revenue, affects the extent to which economic elites are allowed to finance the opposition. The conditions of opposition finance thus emerge as the byproduct of the larger bargaining game between incumbents and donors.

³ Attempts to impose constraints are also made in established democracies. In the United States, both parties have sought to limit the ability of the other to receive financing from certain economic actors, e.g., corporations and labor unions.

Take as an example a statist economy in which market access is politically allocated rather than universally guaranteed, as it would be in a liberalized economy. Economic elites in the statist case would have no incentive to subsidize the opposition—even if legally entitled to do so—because it would put their own economic interests in jeopardy. And the incumbent would have no need to use coercion to attain this result. He could simply leverage his discretionary authority over their access to financial markets in order to induce their compliance, permitting their continued use of economic privileges in exchange for a monopoly on their political contributions.⁴ Such an incumbent manages to stave off potential electoral challenges in an almost imperceptible manner, essentially starving the opposition of coordination resources. This instrument became available to most African leaders through the statist development policies that coincided with the first multiparty period of the 1960s. And it has remained an instrument of choice in the second multiparty period that began in the 1990s. For example, Guinean President Lansana Conté’s slightly veiled threat at a meeting with business leaders in Conakry needed no interpretation: “I know that among you there are people who are funding political parties. I know them all, but that does not interest me, because there is no opposition leader who will come and beat me here in Guinea.”⁵

This logic suggests that economic elites have their own coordination problem. They can offer financial support to the opposition only when the incumbent loses his capacity to discriminate against them through administrative and regulatory measures.

⁴ This incumbent does not necessarily need to receive the economic elites’ contributions. He only needs to insure that they are not giving them to his opponents.

⁵ “Excerpt from speech by Guinean President Lansana Conté in Conakry on 12 January,” BBC Monitoring Africa, 15 January 2004.

In this sense, economic liberalization may provide a “coordination device”—in Weingast’s terms (1997)—through which elites can reach consensus on the limits to be imposed on the incumbent. Consider once more the statist case described above. Suppose financial liberalization were adopted in a way that increased the wellbeing of economic elites by providing them with greater protection against expropriation and fewer distortions in the allocation of resources. Such a Pareto improvement could be sufficiently profitable to elites that they would want to cooperate in ensuring its continuity. Indeed, liberalization may be so profitable to elites that they would be willing to pay to protect their new gains. One way that elites can protect those gains is by financing the opposition. Creating a viable challenger to the incumbent might make it more difficult for the latter to return to the status quo ante. Once financial liberalization is brought about, elites can finance the opposition with two effects: in the near term, it provides a way to credibly threaten the incumbent’s hold on power should he transgress against their newfound economic rights; in the long term, it may enable them to gradually expand their set of rights by exchanging policy promises for campaign financing to either the incumbent or the opposition.⁶

Two general scenarios can be deduced from this logic. First, the likelihood of opposition coordination is negligible in repressed financial markets. The incumbent who governs with statist controls has the leverage needed to induce private sector elites into denying financing to the opposition. This is the most common equilibrium in Africa. Second, the likelihood of opposition coordination is greatest under financial

⁶ My intuition is that elites in Africa have been unable to coordinate on the proper limits to incumbent power, not because they may come from different ethnic groups, but because incumbents have been able to use statist policies since independence to discriminate among them.

liberalization, when elites are relatively free access capital markets, and therefore to fund the opposition without fear of reprisals from the incumbent. An incumbent who is compelled to liberalize some economic sectors also loses the power to prevent elites from diversifying their political contributions.⁷

A Model

This section presents a simple model of the logic outlined above. Opposition politicians can improve their chances of winning executive power by fronting a single candidate. However, as reviewed in the previous chapter, observers of African politics widely claim that opposition politicians fail to do so because the incumbent can easily buy off any opposition politician through patronage or because opposition politicians are unable to make agreements across ethnic lines. The logic in either case suggests that power-sharing promises among these politicians are insufficient to resolve their coordination dilemma—mainly because such promises are incredible.

Taking account of such concerns, I follow the intuition in Fearon (1995b; 1995a) in proposing a model that examines how coordination bargaining might be influenced when opposition politicians can bargain over more than promises about future power sharing. I suggest that financial liberalization has facilitated opposition coordination in certain African countries by enabling elites to provide politicians with

⁷ Incumbents may be unable to prevent the opposition from coordinating even at middling levels of economic liberalization. These incumbents may lack the capacity to stop opposition politicians from obtaining external financing. The diaspora represents an important source of opposition financing in such cases. This is how Ethiopia's opposition sought to resolve its coordination problem. I examine the role of diaspora funding, including its influence on political strategies, in a separate paper.

the resources needed to resolve their bargaining. Two modal scenarios of opposition bargaining can be analyzed through this model: one in which economic elites cannot finance opposition politicians and another in which economic elites are free to finance them. The intuition that emerges from these contrasting scenarios is that—when bargaining over an agreement subject to time-inconsistent behavior—upfront resource transfers from one opposition politician to another can help to make the agreement more attractive to the recipient of a transfer, all else equal. These transfers thus increase the likelihood that a mutually agreeable bargain can be arranged among opposition politicians. However, this kind of bargaining is only feasible in a liberalized financial market, where economic elites can finance the opposition without fear of reprisals from the incumbent.

I model this intuition by presenting a game with three periods. The game involves an entrepreneur and two opposition politicians. The entrepreneur corresponds to the median among economic elites. The two opposition politicians represent ethnic constituencies that can vary in size. The opposition politicians are assumed to be risk neutral. All actors know which financial regulatory context prevails, how much the entrepreneur has given out in political donations, and the content of the power-sharing proposal. What is not known is the probability that an opposition politician will honor the power-sharing agreement if he is elected to office. The game's timing occurs in the following sequence: the entrepreneur chooses how to distribute her political donations depending on the prevailing economic context imposed by the incumbent; the first opposition politician then decides on what kind of power-sharing arrangement to

propose to his counterpart; the second opposition politician decides whether to accept or reject the proposal.

In period 1, the entrepreneur decides whether prevailing financial regulations allow her to contribute to the opposition without being punished. She is assumed to diversify her political donations as a strategy for protecting her wealth in a multiparty setting. However, this entrepreneur can only diversify her donations to the extent that the incumbent has liberalized the financial sector.⁸ The incumbent's decision to liberalize the financial sector is treated as exogenous and enters as a parameter in the entrepreneur's decision function. Incumbents who look down the game tree surely recognize the potential threat from liberalization and will therefore seek to forestall it as long as possible. My claim is that financial liberalization in most African countries is exogenous to the elites themselves, but endogenous to the type of development policies pursued by incumbents as well as the tax bases available to them. I provide evidence for this claim in the next chapter.

For ease of exposition, I dichotomize the entrepreneur's decision: if the incumbent does not liberalize, the entrepreneur does not diversify her donations because she would risk punishment through regulatory or economic reprisals. Her

⁸ Indeed, the variance in structural adjustment among African countries remains unexplained in the literature, but it can be assumed that economic liberalization is a strategy of last resort for cash-strapped leaders. An incumbent can afford to maintain the status quo—the combination of statist policies enabling him to regulate which economic elites can accumulate resources—as long as it generates the revenue needed to keep him in power. Only incumbents threatened by falling revenue should be expected to relinquish the influence they can wield through statist policies. An incumbent might adopt some form of liberalization because it is the only means by which he can increase the levels of aid (due to conditionality) or taxes (by stimulating private-sector productivity). The incumbent who can rely on extractive rents derived from oil or mineral deposits has no need to liberalize, since he can pay for recurrent expenses without depending on aid or taxes. In any case, we should expect that the incumbent who liberalizes is making a calculated bet: he would rather face the risk of competing against a financed, coordinated opposition than going without the resources needed to cover the recurrent expenses that hold his own coalition together.

donation d to the opposition takes on a value of 0 in this scenario. If the incumbent liberalizes, the entrepreneur diversifies her political donations as a means of increasing the likelihood that she can demand favors or policies from whomever wins office. Her donation to the opposition is then $d>0$.

The entrepreneur's actions in period 1 would suggest that she favors liberalization. It need not be the case that the entrepreneur actually demanded financial reform from the incumbent in order to benefit from it. To be sure, some proportion of elites can profit from the incumbent's over-regulation of the financial sector and should therefore not want any kind of liberalization. The problem for economic elites is that the incumbent's statist policies not only enable him to create privileges that favor a chosen few, but they also permit him to extract a higher share of rents from all elites, regardless of their ability to profit under the status quo. The median ideal point for liberalization among economic elites should therefore be higher than the incumbent's. This explains why economic elites may want to diversify their political contributions: since the incumbent's adoption of liberalization is a convenience rather than a preference, economic elites can try to ensure its continuity by cultivating greater electoral competition.⁹

Suppose there are two opposition politicians who lobby for the entrepreneur's political donation. All opposition politicians seek the entrepreneur's donation because control of such resources help to signal their viability as challengers to the incumbent; that is, an opposition politician who wants to become a coalition

⁹ The entrepreneur's decision function could be made more realistic by including a parameter that captures the difference between the incumbent and economic elites over economic liberalization. The ability of opposition politicians to lobby for donations from the entrepreneur would then depend on the distance between the incumbent's ideal point and the median ideal point among economic elites.

candidate must demonstrate that he can finance a national campaign for himself and subsidize the individual campaigns of his local allies at the same time. For her part, the entrepreneur needs to distinguish viable from hopeless candidates among opposition politicians in order to maximize the potential return on her donation. Assume that she can give only to a single candidate, and she bases that decision by considering that the vote-production function is mainly ethnic. If the entrepreneur expects each opposition politician's vote share to be based on the relative size of his ethnic constituency, she will systematically favor opposition politicians from larger ethnic groups. In the model, this is always opposition politician 1 (O_1) with estimated vote share p_1 . Opposition politician 2 (O_2) with estimated vote share p_2 has a smaller vote share such that $p_1 > p_2 > 0$. By assumption, the entrepreneur gives nothing to O_2 .

In the scenario where $d=0$ because the incumbent has not liberalized the financial sector, the entrepreneur is indifferent as to whether the opposition wins or loses; her utility is unchanged regardless of the outcome. The entrepreneur effectively drops out of the game when $d=0$ because she holds no sway over any of the opposition politicians and she does not expect her own payoff to be affected by their coordination. However, in the scenario where $d>0$, the entrepreneur will demand a set of policies or favors θ from O_1 in exchange for her donation. Let θ be a number that lies between 0 and 1. The entrepreneur can only benefit from θ if O_1 actually wins office. Her payoff from O_1 's victory would be $(1 + \theta)w - d$, where w represents her wealth, $1 + \theta$ reflects the potential profitability to be realized through the O_1 's favors, and $\theta > d$. Her payoff from O_1 's loss would be $w - d$; she loses out on her political investment. Since $(1 + \theta)w - d > w - d$, the entrepreneur who gives a donation will


prefer an opposition victory. What is more, because the entrepreneur's expected utility depends on the opposition's ability to coordinate, she has a vested interest in seeing a coalition formed whenever $d>0$.

Now consider how periods 2 and 3 play out depending on whether $d>0$. In a scenario where O_1 runs independently and no donations from economic elites are possible, he receives a payoff of $v - c$ with probability p_1 , where v is the value attributed to winning the presidency, c is the positive cost of campaigning, and p_1 represents O_1 's estimated vote share. The parameters v and c are assumed to be equal for both opposition politicians. A failed independent run gives O_1 a payoff of $-c$ with probability $1 - p_1$, since he is responsible for the costs associated with campaigning for office regardless of the outcome. O_1 's expected utility of running alone would therefore be $p_1(v - c) + (1 - p_1)(-c)$, which is the value of a successful independent campaign weighted by the probability of winning plus the value of a failed independent campaign weighted by the probability of losing. Similarly, O_2 's expected utility of running independently would be $p_2(v - c) + (1 - p_2)(-c)$, where p_2 represents O_2 's estimated vote share.

Suppose that O_1 can seek to become an opposition coalition candidate in period 2 by proposing a power-sharing agreement to O_2 . In this proposal, O_1 offers O_2 a set of promises π in exchange for standing down and endorsing his candidacy. Let π be a number that lies between 0 and 1, which means that the larger π , the more O_1 is willing to concede to O_2 . More concretely, π can be thought of as the vice presidency, a number of cabinet seats, the control of specific government ministries, or a set of political reforms. In return for such concessions, O_1 expects O_2 to deliver the votes of

his co-ethnics as represented by his estimated vote share p_2 . Moreover, if the entrepreneur has given donation $d > 0$ because the incumbent has liberalized the economy, O_1 must choose how to employ the donation to maximize his likelihood of being elected. O_1 can use those resources to entice O_2 with a direct resource transfer δ that can be thought of as a wage for the duration of the campaign, a subsidy to offset campaign costs, or simply a one-time cash payment consumed by O_2 . Assume O_1 divides d such that $d = \delta + r$, where δ is the direct transfer made to O_2 and r is the remainder kept by O_1 for his own campaign war chest. O_1 could also choose to keep all of d for himself if he were to run independently.

As shown in Figure 1 below, if O_2 rejects the offer of π in period 3 in order to run independently, he receives a payoff of $p_2v - c$. O_1 receives a payoff of $p_1v + d | (d > 0) - c$, where O_1 keeps all of d for himself if $d > 0$. If O_2 were to accept O_1 's offer of π , his payoff from coordinating would become $\varphi(\beta\pi) + \delta | (d > 0) - c$, where $\varphi = p_1 + p_2$ reflects the coalition's increased likelihood of winning the election by combining the opposition politicians' estimated vote shares, β is the probability that π is fulfilled, and δ is the direct resource transfer if $d > 0$. O_1 now receives a coalition payoff of $\varphi(v - \beta\pi) + r | (d > 0) - c$, where r is the share of d kept by O_1 if $d > 0$. In assessing O_1 's coalition proposal, O_2 has to consider the tradeoffs involved in running independently versus forming a coalition. If O_2 accepts O_1 's offer of π , he has a greater likelihood of being in government, though with a smaller payoff since $v > \pi$. O_2 would also have to consider O_1 's incentive not to honor π . While all other parameters are common knowledge, β captures the incentives for time-inconsistent behavior in power-sharing promises.

Figure 1. The Opposition Bargaining Model with Upfront Payments

To determine when the two opposition politicians coordinate, we can first derive O_2 's critical value for accepting O_1 's proposal in period 3. O_2 accepts the coalition bargain as long as $\varphi(\beta\pi) + \delta \mid (d>0) - c > p_2v - c$, which reduces to

$$\pi \geq (\varphi\beta)^{-1}[p_2v - \delta \mid (d>0)]. \quad (1)$$

O_2 's critical value for accepting a coalition proposal in equation (1) indicates that, besides being conditioned on the estimated number of votes that he brings to the coalition, the lower the value of β , the more O_2 will demand in terms of π . This means that O_2 will ask for greater compensation if there is greater risk that O_1 will fail to fulfill their agreement.

O_1 is faced with two constraints in reaching a mutually agreeable coalition bargain with O_2 . Not only must he meet the minimum condition in equation (1), but he must also restrict his offer of π so that it does not exceed what is actually available to

him in the presidency, meaning that that $\pi \geq (\varphi\beta)^{-1}[p_2v - \delta \mid (d>0)] \leq v$. This can be rearranged to show that

$$\beta \geq (\varphi v)^{-1}[p_2v - \delta \mid (d>0)]. \quad (2)$$

In words, equation (2) indicates that O_1 can influence O_2 's demand for π through the upfront payment δ , which is only true as long as $d>0$. The upfront payment δ enables O_1 to increase the likelihood of opposition coordination by making lower values of β palatable to O_2 .

It can then be shown that O_1 will want to offer π in period 2 in order to coordinate with O_2 . He will do so if $\varphi(v - \beta\pi) + r \mid (d>0) - c > p_1v + d \mid (d>0) - c$, which reduces to

$$d - \delta \mid (d>0) \leq r \mid (d>0). \quad (3)$$

Because equation (3) is always true, O_1 will always want to coordinate by offering π to O_2 .

I have suggested above that the uncertainty opposition politicians hold concerning the fulfillment of power-sharing agreements is a key impediment to opposition coordination. There is no guarantee that the power-sharing promises represented by π will be honored if an opposition coalition wins an election. Once O_1 is installed as the new president, there is no way for O_2 to enforce their bargain. To be sure, a bargain is more likely to be self-enforcing whenever O_2 controls enough political, financial or martial resources that his exclusion from the coalition would place O_1 's hold on power in jeopardy. But since few politicians have that kind of influence, how can O_2 trust that the bargain will be honored? My claim here is that the availability of private resources when $d>0$ enables opposition politicians to address the

commitment problem inherent in pre-electoral bargaining. The resource transfers made possible when $d>0$ can help facilitate the bargaining between O_1 and O_2 by making offers of π more attractive, all else equal.

But since opposition politicians themselves usually lack the resources needed to make such transfers, they must rely on economic elites, who, in turn, can only offer such financing when they are free from potential administrative or regulatory reprisals. Indeed, the bargaining constraints faced by opposition politicians differ significantly under the contrasting scenarios of financial repression and liberalization. When opposition politicians are unable to secure financing from economic elites, as when $d=0$, O_1 cannot influence O_2 's demand for π . By contrast, in the scenario where $d>0$, the uncertainty associated with π 's ex post fulfillment can be mitigated, though not eliminated, by resource transfers made as part of the bargain among opposition politicians. In short, the entrepreneur's campaign donation affords opposition politicians the needed flexibility to locate a mutually satisfactory agreement.

The scenarios modeled here thus help to explain why opposition bargaining is so difficult to achieve and why we see the emergence of two distinct equilibria across Africa: recurrent coordination failure among opposition politicians where economic elites fear reprisals from the incumbent and frequent coordination success among opposition politicians where economic elites have greater financial autonomy. In either case, the main challenge for opposition politicians is to arrive at a pre-electoral agreement that will make sharing power as a coalition more palatable than independently pursuing the riskier gamble of winning the executive. If executive power is fungible, as I claimed in the previous chapter, then opposition politicians can

arrange tradeoffs through upfront resource transfers that compensate some opposition politicians for supporting others. The fact that opposition politicians control vote shares that vary in size, coupled with the costly nature of campaigning, should lead to the formulation of bargains that are profitable to all sides.

One issue not directly addressed by the model is the incumbent's ability to coopt opposition politicians. The model could be made more realistic by adding another node after period 3 in which the incumbent makes a counteroffer to O_2 as a means of breaking up his coalition with O_1 . To some extent, this aspect of incumbent influence is already captured in d . If $d > 0$, it is mainly due to the fact that the incumbent's resources are declining. He liberalizes the financial sector in order to qualify for more aid or to stimulate more tax revenues. If such an incumbent lacks the resources needed to keep his own coalition together, he is unlikely to have the wherewithal to bring more politicians into that coalition. Moreover, under $d > 0$, the entrepreneur could also look down the game tree to see that the incumbent would want to coopt O_2 if a coalition is realized. Her best response would be to increase d , within her budget constraint, at least to the point where O_2 could be made indifferent between the competing offers.

Conclusion

This chapter has presented an analytic framework for explaining the variation in opposition coordination in Africa's multiparty elections. This framework underscores the resource constraints encountered by opposition politicians in building

electoral alliances in poor, democratizing states. I argue that the choices made by elites in deciding whether or not to support the opposition depend on the incumbent's control over financial markets. The logic developed here suggests that opposition politicians will receive coordination resources wherever an incumbent's hold on financial markets has loosened. Conversely, opposition politicians are least likely to coordinate where incumbents can use their control over access to financial markets to induce the compliance of economic elites. Without the support of economic elites, no opposition politician can afford to undertake the actions needed to become a viable alternative to the incumbent.

In shifting attention away from ethnicity and institutions, this bargaining framework suggests that opposition politicians often fail to present a serious challenge to African incumbents, not because they are intimidated through political violence or polarized by ethnic conflicts, but mainly because they are unable to secure coordination resources in economies that are either heavily controlled, highly unstable, or both. This logic suggests that an incumbent can effectively neutralize his rivals by pressuring economic elites into starving the opposition of its financing. It is incumbents who lack the capacity to induce the private sector's compliance that end up having to use more ham-handed tactics.¹⁰

¹⁰ I assume that an incumbent would prefer to prevent opposition coordination *ex ante* rather than having to contain it *ex post*. An incumbent wants to avoid using violent repression because having to do so publicly reveals that he does have some weaknesses. The outcome of that violence is also often uncertain even for an incumbent.

CHAPTER 7

CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS

The theoretical framework I have developed attributes bargaining outcomes among opposition politicians to the availability of private resources from economic elites. Previous chapters have provided both qualitative and quantitative evidence at each stage of the causal chain connecting financial liberalization to opposition coordination. If this logic holds, we should expect to find that opposition coordination is more likely emerge wherever private resources have become increasingly available due financial liberalization.

In this chapter, I analyze a cross-section of African executive elections to assess whether the variation in opposition coordination outcomes is consistent with this alternative theoretical framework. I identify 32 instances of pre-electoral opposition coalitions among the 85 contested executive elections held across the region between 1990 and 2005.¹¹ These pre-electoral opposition coalitions were identified through three straightforward coding rules. First, multiple parties must publicly endorse a single candidate prior to the election in a plurality system or the first round in a runoff system. This rule excludes instances of first-round promises for a second-round endorsement or instances of second-round endorsements which were

¹¹ A total of 99 executive elections were held between 1990 and 2005, but 14 of these were boycotted by the opposition. I exclude these boycotted elections from the sample. The sample of executive elections includes parliamentary races from Botswana, Ethiopia, Mauritius, and South Africa. I reason that these should be counted as executive elections, since each party's candidate for prime minister is usually known before the time of elections. Besides, the powers of the prime ministers in these states are as expansive as those of their counterparts in presidential systems.

not preceded by any first-round negotiations.¹² The point of such a rule is to distinguish bargaining that entails upfront and verifiable costs for parties in the form of candidate withdrawals from promises of second-round endorsements which do not require commitments to be honored in advance. Second, at least one major opposition party must participate in the coalition. For such judgments, I mainly rely on the qualitative assessments found in country case studies and the parliamentary representation of opposition parties.¹³ Third, the coalition must represent more than one ethnic group or region. Focusing on the coalition's leadership to determine its ethnic and regional makeup, I identify the ethnic membership of the coalition candidate and other party leaders supporting him. The opposition National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) that formed for the 2002 Kenyan elections is an obvious example. NARC presidential candidate Mwai Kibaki is an ethnic Kikuyu who was supported by Kijana Wamalwa, a Luhya, Charity Ngilu, a Kamba, and Raila Odinga, a Luo.


Using this unique dataset on pre-electoral opposition coalitions, I find that opposition politicians have consistently been forming pre-electoral coalitions since the beginning of the region's second multiparty era. Figure 1 shows the ratio of opposition pre-electoral coalitions to contested elections for each year between 1990 and 2005. What is immediately striking from Figure 1 is the lack of any time trend in the data. There is no secular increase or decrease in the incidence of electoral coordination over

¹² This eliminates a total of six cases which occurred in countries with runoff systems. There were four instances in which opposition parties agreed prior to the first round to endorse their best-placed finisher for the second round: Central African Republic 1999, Chad 2001, Guinea 1998, and Niger 1993. However, only the presidential election in Niger actually went to a second round. There were two other instances in which opposition parties endorsed a candidate in the second round without any first-round commitments being made: Niger 1999 and Sierra Leone 1996.

¹³ For example, the five-party Democratic Angola Coalition (DAC) that was formed during the 1992 presidential election is not counted as an instance of opposition coordination because the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) refused to join.

time. The ratio of opposition coalitions was 50 percent for the 26 elections held between 1990 and 1994. This ratio fell to 32 percent for the 24 elections held in 1995-1999, but then rose to 44 percent for the 35 elections held in 2000-2005. Only in three of the 16 years under review were no opposition coalitions formed: 1993, 1997, and 1998. Most importantly, these pre-electoral opposition coalitions account for over half of executive turnover—15 of the 27 cases—experienced between 1990 and 2005.

Figure 1. Pre-Electoral Opposition Coalitions as a Ratio of Contested Elections



I explore the variation in opposition coordination by estimating a logistic regression model. The dependent variable is dichotomous: 1 if a subset of opposition parties coordinated for an executive election; 0 if no such initiative was undertaken. In estimating the logistic model of opposition coordination, I employ a set of explanatory variables intended to test competing theories based on resources, patronage, and ethnicity. The description, measurement, and source of all variables are listed in

Appendix 1. A list of variables and their summary statistics is shown in Appendix 2, and a correlation matrix for the main variables of interest is provided in Appendix 3.

I show in this chapter that opposition coordination is to a large extent a resource story. The results from the quantitative analysis indicate that financial liberalization—as proxied by the availability of private credit—significantly affects the opposition’s ability to coordinate in executive elections. Other proxies for the availability of private resources, such as FDI and GDP change, further reflect the opposition’s liquidity constraints. The estimated coefficients on all of these variables suggest that the impact of private resources is comparable in magnitude to the effects of patronage and violence. Private resources are one of the few factors that enable the opposition to counterbalance the incumbent. And it is changes in private resource availability that can effectively account for the variation in coordination seen across countries and within countries across time. In fact, the empirical results show that resource variables are more consistent predictors than patronage, ethnicity, or violence. While only select measures of patronage and violence seem to have any direct influence on opposition bargaining, indicators of ethnic fractionalization and polarization provide no leverage in discriminating between coordination outcomes.

The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. I continue in the next section by discussing measures for the main hypotheses regarding private resources, patronage, ethnicity, institutions, and violence. I then proceed with the quantitative analysis, fitting a series of binary logistic regression models to the data and assessing the degree to which the explanatory variables conform to their theoretical predictions. I conclude

by discussing how these results affect our understanding of inter-ethnic bargaining in contemporary African politics.

Hypotheses and Measures

Below I discuss the main testable hypotheses aimed at explaining opposition coordination and attempt to state each in its boldest, most falsifiable terms.

Hypotheses are derived from the main arguments reviewed thus far: my own theory about private resources and the standard claims about patronage and ethnicity. I review two additional sets of hypotheses about institutions and violence, since these factors can directly affect the incentives faced by politicians in deciding whether to coordinate. For each hypothesis, I discuss the variables used in the empirical analysis, their measurement, and their distribution in the sample. It should be noted that while each of these hypotheses provides a distinct causal mechanism, none are mutually exclusive. All may be influencing the likelihood of coordination on some level. The empirical analysis that follows this section, however, will enable us to assess each mechanism's plausibility as well as to gauge its explanatory power when compared to the alternatives.

Private Resources

In Chapter 3, I argue that changes in the financial regulatory context are more likely to determine bargaining outcomes among opposition politicians than either political patronage or ethnic cleavages. I specifically claim that financial liberalization

should free up the private resources necessary to facilitate opposition coordination— even when an incumbent retains his capacity to give out patronage or voters are sure to mobilize along ethnic lines. Improved access to private resources increases the likelihood of coordination by enabling opposition politicians to compensate their supporters for accepting otherwise incredible power-sharing promises. Opposition bargaining suffers from an inherent time inconsistency problem because it requires trading a promise of future power-sharing for electoral support tangibly demonstrated today. Unless a coalition candidate can make a self-binding commitment to the power-sharing promise made at period 1, his supporters can reasonably expect that, were the coalition to win in $t > 1$, the coalition candidate might be able to maximize his welfare by deviating from the promise. Their pre-electoral bargain can be unilaterally renegotiated by the coalition leader once he is in office: he can choose to give less than what was promised or nothing at all. This leaves the opposition politician who invested his own electoral resources with no payoff.¹⁴ Lacking some enforceable means for honoring the pre-electoral bargain, an opposition politician may well choose to reject power-sharing promises.

Opposition politicians can alleviate the time-inconsistency problem through the distribution of private resources. The opposition politician with greater liquidity is better positioned than his poorer counterpart to form a coalition because he can give

¹⁴ Consider that this opposition politician, in choosing to support another, might open himself up to another form of risk. Politicians, even those from small ethnic groups, run for the presidency not because they believe they can win, but because it enhances their status among their constituents as a player in national politics who could potentially negotiate his way into the government. Not running for office – to stand down in favor of another candidate – exposes an opposition politician to the risk of losing his presumed ethnic leadership, since another co-ethnic might choose to vie for the presidency and thereby usurp his mantle. In the worst of all possible scenarios, this opposition politician backs a losing coalition candidate and loses his own ethnic constituency to a rival candidate.

other opposition politicians upfront payments that compensate them *ex ante* for the possibility that power-sharing promises will not be met *ex post*. These payments can range from subsidies for another opposition politician's electoral activities to direct cash payments made to a party leader. Whoever emerges as the candidate for an opposition coalition is most likely to be the politician who can access the resources needed to offer these kinds of payments. Indeed, this explains why opposition politicians like Abdoulaye Wade, the victorious coalition leader in Senegal's 2000 elections, make such concerted efforts to stress their personal wealth: "I was very rich... I owned the most important legal firm in Dakar, and I came back from Abidjan with a lot of money. Everybody knew it; my visible signs of wealth were known"

(Quoted in Mendy 2001, 36).¹⁵

The ability of opposition politicians to engage in such transactions on a national scale, I argue, critically depends on whether economic elites choose to finance them. This is problematic in much of Africa because statist policies enable incumbents to use the threat of administrative or economic reprisals to induce the cooperation of elites. Opposition coalitions are therefore most likely to emerge in liberalized financial systems in which the flow of private resources does not depend on government approval. This leads to the first hypothesis.

H1: Greater availability of private resources increases the likelihood of opposition coordination by increasing the liquidity of opposition politicians.

¹⁵ The translation from French is my own.

To test H1, I operationalize my argument through three variables: private credit as a percentage of GDP, foreign direct investment (FDI) as a percentage of GDP, and GDP change averaged over a five-year period. The first two variables, as indicators of financial liberalization, reflect changes in the availability of private resources for opposition politicians. Private credit serves as a proxy for financial liberalization, defined as credit issued to the private sector, as opposed to governments and public enterprises, by deposit money banks as a share of GDP. In Chapter 4, I showed that countries that undergo financial liberalization subsequently show statistically significant higher levels of private credit provision. According to Beck et al. (1999), from where I take these data, private credit as a share of GDP provides a measure of the extent to which financial intermediaries channel savings to investors. This variable's expected effect on opposition coordination is therefore expected to be positive. The mean for the sample is 15.4 percent, ranging from 1.66 to 75.97 percent.

FDI is a secondary proxy for economic liberalization in general. It is designed to serve as a canary in the mineshaft. If foreign investors are particularly sensitive to the risk of expropriation, it can be reasonably assumed that FDI will be higher in countries where economic agents have greater guarantees against government intervention. While FDI to Africa is commonly associated with natural resources, the empirical evidence suggests that its distribution within the region is also determined by the legal system, the investment framework, and macroeconomic stability (Asiedu 2006). The variable for FDI, as defined by the World Bank (2007), measures net inflows of investment to acquire an interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in the local economy. This variable's effect on opposition

coordination is expected to be positive. The mean for the sample is 1.76 percent, but ranges from -6.9 to 10.53 percent.

GDP change averaged over a five-year period is designed to capture the general availability of private resources. This captures the opposition's liquidity constraint. Economic elites may be less willing to finance the opposition in difficult times, and, conversely, more willing in periods of growth. An increase in GDP growth should increase the probability of opposition coordination by providing opposition politicians with greater private resources. Mean five-year GDP growth for the sample is 3.16 percent. Attributing opposition coordination to growth in this way may seem to contradict the established empirical findings linking incumbent reelection to growth (Kramer 1971; Powell and Whitten 1993; Nannestad and Paldam 1994). An alternative explanation for opposition coordination could be stated in terms of the classic economic vote function: voters are satisfied with the incumbent's management of a growing economy, so they are more likely to reelect him. Opposition party leaders, recognizing that the incumbent is now in a stronger electoral position, would respond by seeking to coordinate. However, the findings from the Afrobarometer survey indicate that opposition coordination is unlikely to be induced by the fear that economic growth will favor the incumbent at the polls.¹⁶ In none of the three survey rounds have more than one-third of respondents rated their economies positively. Moreover, respondents largely believe their personal living standards have been falling over time (Bratton and Cho 2006).

¹⁶ The Afrobarometer surveys were performed in 12 African countries in three rounds between 1999 and 2006. The surveys pose a standard set of questions in local languages with a randomly selected, nationally representative sample size of 1,200 respondents in each country.

I use GDP per capita at purchasing power parity as a control for the level of development. This variable may also be thought of as a proxy for state capacity (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Opposition leaders may be able to tap more resources in higher income countries, but the incumbent may also have more patronage to distribute in these same countries. All else equal, increases in this GDP per capita should increase the likelihood of opposition coordination. I use the natural logarithm of this variable for the analysis. The sample mean is 7.3 or about \$1480.

Political Patronage

The centralized and personalized control of patronage in the hands of the executive makes opposition coordination unlikely. Because the distribution of state resources occurs at the executive's discretion—all clientelist networks ultimately have their source at the state's apex—political actors necessarily depend on the incumbent's largesse for the means to maintain their own status (van de Walle 2001). The incumbent's singular control of patronage means that alternative coalitions to the one in power are unlikely to be formed as long as the incumbent possesses the means with which to selectively purchase the support or silence of his rivals. In Chapter 2, I detailed the patronage literature's depiction of opposition bargaining as a prisoner's dilemma: bargaining among opposition politicians breaks down because each politician seeks to maximize his own payoff by negotiating themselves into the incumbent's patronage network rather than bargaining with their opposition counterparts. To accomplish this, incumbents merely need to extend their clientelist network to bring “into their ranks the hungriest of their ‘opponents’ to help put a

modern veneer on the status quo” (Monga 1997, 169). The repeated entry of opposition leaders into the governments of their rivals – as in Cameroon, Gabon, Kenya, and Senegal – underscores their tenuous autonomy vis-à-vis the executive’s patronage.

While all African incumbents have expansive powers and share the same incentive to hold onto power, what distinguishes them is their access to patronage resources. It is not that some incumbents are simply more inclined than others to use patronage to coopt opposition leaders. All incumbents would deploy this instrument if it were equally available to them, but there is significant variation among incumbents in terms of their resource constraints. Those incumbents who can exploit rents from oil and mineral deposits or aid are financially better placed to demobilize the opposition through cooptation. In Sao Tome e Principe, for example, the discovery of significant offshore oil deposits altered the balance between government and opposition parties. Between 1994 and 2001, no party had managed to control both the executive and legislative branches. But in the months between the July 2001 presidential and March 2002 parliamentary elections, the country’s political parties signed “a Regime Pact that advocated the formation of an all-party government after the elections, in order to guarantee political stability for the coming era of oil wealth... [T]he Pact was embraced largely because, as one commentator asserted, nobody wanted to be outside the government when the first petrodollars arrived” (Deegan 2003, 5).

H2: Greater access to extractive rents enables incumbents to lower the likelihood of opposition coordination through selective cooptation.

The incumbent's capacity to deliver patronage is proxied through a dummy variable for countries in which fuel and mineral exports represent over one third of merchandise exports. Ross (1999) has shown empirically that natural resource dependence can impede the development of democracy in poorer states. Jensen and Wantchekon (2004) have corroborated this finding with data on Africa.¹⁷ There are 12 established oil-producing states in the region; two others – Mauritania and Sao Tome e Principe – are new producers; 17 others have either negotiated concessions or ongoing explorations (Perdrix 2005). Since incumbents who can tap into oil and mineral receipts have deeper pockets than their counterparts in non-oil or mineral states, they should be more likely to coopt opposition politicians and thereby reduce the likelihood of their coordination. About 32 percent of the observations are found among oil/mineral exporters. The incidence of opposition coordination in oil/mineral exporters is expected to be far lower than in countries that lack such resources.

Aid as a percentage of GDP is used to capture the possibility that incumbents who can tap external sources of capital have a greater capacity to coopt their opposition. Incumbents whose income is not tied to the productivity of the domestic economy may engage in greater predation (Bates 2001; Knack 2001), enabling them to present opposition politicians with more attractive offers. The data on aid as a percentage of GDP is measured as net disbursements of grants and loans made on concessional terms by donor agencies (World Bank 2007). The mean for the sample is

¹⁷ However, neither of these works explicitly link resource rents to the cooptation of elites. Their analyses focus instead on the relationship between the ruling regime and the general population, explaining how rents could be employed to win voter support or repress groups, though Jensen and Wantchekon (2004, 821) do note, in somewhat of an afterthought, that “incumbents may simply use the natural resource rents to buy off the opposition.”

14.05 percent. The expected effect of aid on opposition coordination is expected to be negative.

Government expenditure as a percentage of GDP is used as another indicator of incumbent patronage resources. The more a government involves itself in economic activities, the more opportunities it might have to engage in predation. It is measured here as the annual expenditure for purchases of goods and services by all levels of government, excluding government enterprises, as a share of GDP (World Bank 2007). The sample mean 28.68 percent. Its expected effect on opposition coordination, according to H2, is negative.

Ethnic Cleavages

Opposition fragmentation is often attributed to the social heterogeneity of African states. Because multiparty competition is considered a zero-sum game, the selection of one ethnic group's candidate is necessarily interpreted as making one group better off while making others worse off. A more nuanced version of this argument suggests that heterogeneity itself is not the problem. It is the very ethnic nature of political mobilization that discourages political compromise. Because parties in multiethnic societies can most easily mobilize mass support by advancing communal appeals, these parties end up competing for votes among their co-ethnics by seeking to outbid each other in championing the interests of their particular group (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Horowitz 2000). The demands articulated by ethnic parties are thus thought to become increasingly extreme, making political compromise more difficult as competing ethnic interests become perceived as irreconcilable. In

Kenya, for example, it has been often argued that “[t]he fragmentation of the opposition along ethnic lines is one of the main reasons why Moi... survived two multiparty elections” (Carey 2002, 59).

Some scholars suggest that achieving compromise is particularly difficult when the social structure is polarized. Control of the state becomes vital to each group’s future if all sides believe that the eventual political victor will have no incentive to share power or distribute resources. Lijphart (1977) finds democracy most at risk of breakdown when “there are two major segmental parties, two stable alliance parties, or a majority party confronting two or more smaller parties.” According to Horowitz (2000 [1985]), ethnic conflict arises when “a few groups are so large that their interactions are a constant theme of politics at the center” because “the claims of one group tend to be made at the expense of another.” Empirical studies suggest that the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and political compromise is non-linear. Collier (1998) finds that politics are most likely to turn violent in societies found at a middle range of ethnic diversity; highly diverse societies are found to be even less conflict-prone than relatively homogeneous societies. Similarly, Bates (1999a) finds that violence rises when one ethnic group approaches 50 percent or more of the total population, suggesting that the fear of permanent political exclusion may encourage other groups to turn to violence as a political strategy. Taken together, the insights from the ethnic politics literature suggest that that bargaining across cleavages makes compromise more difficult, though they yield two distinct hypotheses.

H3a: Increasing heterogeneity decreases the likelihood of opposition coordination by raising the costs of compromise among politicians with ethnic bases.

H3b: Ethnic polarization decreases the likelihood of opposition coordination by inducing the fear of permanent political exclusion.

I employ a battery of different measures for the ethnic structure of society. I use four ethnic fractionalization indices to capture the potential number of social cleavages which could be politically activated in a country (Scarritt and Mozaffar 1999; Reynal-Querol 2002; Fearon 2003; Posner 2004). Following the original ethno-linguistic fractionalization index (Atlas Narodov Mira 1964), each of the indices used here is calculated as a Herfindahl concentration index and offers a statistic for the likelihood that two people chosen at random will be from different ethnic groups. Nevertheless, the choice of index is problematic because each uses somewhat different criteria for selecting which identities constitute politically or socially relevant groups. In arriving at different estimates for the same country, they may also yield different or contradictory results in the empirical analysis. For the purposes of this analysis, I estimate the influence of each index in the statistical models, not to maximize statistical significance, but as a means of triangulating on the general effect of ethnic diversity on opposition coordination. Higher ethnic fractionalization scores are expected, according to H3, to be associated with a lower likelihood of opposition coordination. For the purposes of H4, ethnic fractionalization enters the model as a quadratic function.

A series of dummy variables is used to indicate the largest set of potential ethnic blocs within society. Since the literature suggests that ethnic polarization

increases the likelihood of conflict, opposition coordination is expected to be systematically lower in countries where the two largest groups are nearly equally sized versus those countries where the population is made up of multiple groups of various sizes. The dummy variables indicate whether a country has one group that makes up at least 50 percent; two groups each make up 25 percent; two groups each make up 20 percent; three groups each make up 15 percent; four groups each make up 10 percent; or three groups each make up 10 percent. I separately use Reynal-Querol's (2002) measure of ethnic polarization. This index attains a maximum value of 1 when society is divided into two equal-sized groups and a minimum value of 0 either when the society is completely homogenous every person belongs to a different group.

According to H4, increasing polarization is expected to decrease the likelihood of opposition coordination.

I also control for the incumbent's ethnicity in two different ways. A dummy variable indicates whether the incumbent is from the plurality ethnic group. A separate variable measures the incumbent's ethnic size dominance (ESD) (Londregan et al. 1995). The ESD is a modified Herfindahl index in which the numerator is the population share of the politician's ethnic group. Its values fall between 0 and 1 as the relative size of the incumbent's ethnic group increases. Since an incumbent is presumed to favor his co-ethnics in the distribution of resources, minority groups may have an incentive to coordinate their efforts to gain greater access to the state when the executive is controlled by the plurality. The likelihood of opposition coordination is expected to be higher when the incumbent is from the plurality ethnic group. The

incumbent is from the plurality group in 37 percent of the cases in the sample. The mean incumbent ESD is .53.

Institutions

The comparative institutions literature has consistently shown that the strategies of politicians' choices over strategies are greatly influenced by the institutional context in which they vie for power. We should expect to find that different sets of electoral rules and power-sharing arrangements will affect the likelihood of opposition coordination, particularly for executive elections. Cox (1997) hypothesizes that linkage—the ability of parties to coordinate nationally across electoral districts—depends on the strength of electoral rules: the incentives to coalesce decrease under a runoff system and increase under a plurality system. However, contrary to Cox, van de Walle (2006) claims that the two-round majority system promotes bargaining among opposition parties. Opposition politicians can use the first round to gauge their respective levels of support and then they bargain for support in the second round. He notes that 11 of 17 cases of opposition victory occurred in two-round systems.

More generally, empirical studies of African elections raise doubts about the extent to which institutional variables may affect opposition coordination. While the literature on electoral rules has established that the number of parties is correlated with the strength of electoral rules, Golder and Wantchekon (2004) find that the number of parties is not necessarily higher under more permissive electoral rules: "it seems that electoral institutions do not (yet) have the same impact on the number of parties in

Africa as they do in other regions of the world.” They reason that the lack of experience with electoral institutions in Africa, coupled with the ethno-geographic concentration of parties, may account for a larger number of parties, regardless of electoral rules. dominant party systems have emerged in countries using both first-past-the-post and proportional representation systems (Mozaffar 2002; Rakner and Svasand 2002; van Cranenburgh 2003). In any case, the received wisdom on electoral rules offers a clear hypothesis.

H4: Plurality rules increase the likelihood of opposition coordination by inducing weaker candidates to ally with the two most viable candidates.

I use a dummy variable to indicate whether a country’s executive elections are held under a runoff system for executive elections. According to H4, the likelihood of opposition coordination should be lower in runoff systems because opposition parties will want to put off negotiations until after the first round in order to engage in bargaining that is backed with information about their vote share. About 68 percent of the sample holds elections under a runoff system. Incidentally, given that so many African countries use the runoff system, it is not surprising that van de Walle would find that 11 of 18 opposition victories (61 percent) occurred under such rules.

Another control relevant for institutions is democratic experience. Corroborating Golder and Wantchekon’s intuition, Kuenzi and Lambright (2001) find a clear divergence in party system institutionalization—volatility in legislative elections, average age of parties obtaining at least 10 percent of lower-chamber seats, acceptance of electoral results—between those countries with established multipartism

and newer democracies. Van de Walle also suggests that “opposition cohesion and the possibility of an electoral victory over an incumbent are functions of the level of democracy in countries that convene multiparty elections” (van de Walle 2006, 82). All of the 18 cases of opposition victory in his dataset occurred in countries considered free or party free according to Freedom House. I therefore control for a country’s democratic experience with a simple count of its previous multiparty elections. The likelihood of opposition coordination is expected to be greater as politicians gain more experience with democratic processes. The sample’s mean number of previous multiparty elections is 1.71.

Three sources of data provide measures to control for the quality of democracy. The combined Polity score from the Polity IV Project (Marshall and Jaggers 2004) is a composite measure for the characteristics of a state’s institutions, namely, political participation, executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive. Higher Polity scores should correspond to a greater probability of opposition coordination. The mean Polity score for the sample is 0.47. I also use Polity’s autocracy score as a measure for the institutionalization of authoritarian tendencies within the political system. Its mean is 3.01. Similarly, I use various Freedom House measures—civil liberties, political rights, and their combined averages—to control for the depth of democracy in a country. Lower Freedom House scores should be associated with a higher likelihood of opposition coordination. The mean for both civil liberties and political rights is about 4, and some 53 percent of the sample is considered to be Partly Free. Finally, the Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) (2007) human rights dataset provides an empowerment index, which is a composite

measure of government respect for basic freedoms of association, participation, and speech. I also use dummy variables to control for government behavior with regards to each specific right. The empowerment index sample mean is 6.22.

Violence

Multiparty elections in Africa are often marred by violence. Approximately 60.8 percent of all African elections involve some level of violence, while another 15.9 are affected by systematic politically-motivated violence (Lindberg 2006). As occurred in cases such as Ethiopia and Kenya throughout the 1990s, post-transition governments commonly use the state's coercive forces or irregular party militants to repress the opposition through physical intimidation, property seizure, or leadership assassination (Schedler 2002). Of course, opposition politicians themselves can use violence in responding to the state (LeBas 2006). But the case study literature on African elections suggests, generally implicitly, that incumbents fearing the loss of power resort to violence as a strategy for raising the costs of opposition cohesion. Just as many opposition politicians have different thresholds for resisting cooptation, it is also likely that they will divide over their responses to the incumbent's coercive tactics. This fragmentation is the objective of state-sponsored violence.

H5: State-sponsored violence decreases the likelihood of opposition coordination by raising the costs for individual opposition leaders.

I use three different types of variables to assess the role of state-sponsored violence in diminishing the prospects of opposition coordination. From the CIRI

(2007) dataset, I use the physical integrity index as a measure for state use of torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance. The sample mean is 6.22 on a scale that runs from 0 to 8, with less violence occurring at higher levels of the index. I also separately dummy out each of these categories, since some forms of violence are much more common than others. For example, there is no incidence of disappearance in 84 percent of the sample, but torture is frequent in 51 percent. Higher levels of violence on these CIRI indicators are expected to lower the likelihood of opposition coordination.

A second set of variables controls for an incumbent's likelihood of actually using the state's coercive apparatus. I code for whether the incumbent entered power as a military officer. About 34 percent of the sample's incumbents fall in this category. Military spending as a percentage of GDP is used as another control. The sample mean is .6 percent. A third set of variables reflects political instability, since it may be easier for an incumbent to employ coercion if it is already in use. A dummy indicates whether a country has experienced a civil war in the five years leading up to an executive election. Approximately 31 percent of the sample has experienced a civil war in the five years leading to an executive election. Another dummy indicates whether a coup has been carried out in the previous five years. A coup occurred in some 14 percent of the sample. Both civil wars and coups are expected to decrease the probability of opposition coordination.

Empirical Analysis

I estimate a logistic regression model to test whether the likelihood of opposition coordination is principally driven by private resources, political patronage, ethnic cleavages, or some combination of these factors. The units of analysis are executive elections held between 1990 and 2005. Tables 1 and 2 below present the main results for select variables. Appendices 5 through 13 provide additional tables with different specifications of the model. Column 1 in Table 1 is limited to the base model with the variables for private resources: credit, FDI, and GDP change. GDP per capita serves as a control for level of development. Columns 2 and 3 add patronage and institutional variables to this base model. I then proceed to add ethnicity and violence to the model in Column 3. These results are presented in Table 2. The estimates discussed in this section are from column 5 in Table 2, which is essentially the base model plus a single variable for patronage, institutions, and violence.

According to the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), a scalar measure of fit, this is the preferred model among competing specifications. This model has a correct classification rate of 78.08 percent.

Table 1. Logit Analysis of Opposition Coordination

| | | 1 | 2 | 3 |
|---------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| Resources | Credit % GDP | 0.10*** (0.03) | 0.14*** (0.05) | 0.11*** (0.04) |
| | FDI % GDP | 0.30** (0.14) | 0.47*** (0.15) | 0.43*** (0.15) |
| | GDP % Δ 5 yr mean | 0.42*** (0.16) | 0.58*** (0.22) | 0.49*** (0.19) |
| | Log GDP per capita, ppp | -1.19** (0.55) | -2.29*** (0.93) | -1.51** (0.72) |
| Patronage | Oil/mineral exporter | | -2.15** (0.94) | -1.15* (0.70) |
| | Aid % GDP | | -0.06** (0.03) | |
| Institutions | Previous election boycotted | | -2.55** (1.10) | -2.73** (1.21) |
| | Polity autocracy | | 0.30 (0.19) | |
| | Previous multi elections | | 0.35 (0.25) | |
| | Runoff system | | 1.41 (1.18) | |
| Constant | | 4.62 (3.41) | 9.91 (5.78) | 6.68 (4.28) |
| | | N | 73 | 71 |
| | | Prob. > χ^2 | .0000 | .0051 |
| | | Log likelihood | -36.09 | -27.27 |
| | | Pseudo R ² | .2575 | .4218 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01

The trend across the models indicates that private resources are a primary determinant of opposition coordination. The estimated coefficients on credit, FDI, and GDP change have their expected positive sign and all are significantly different from zero in every model specification, regardless of which other controls are added. Their estimated coefficients are only magnified by the inclusion of other variables. Note that the statistical significance of each resource variable does not depend on the inclusion

of the others. As shown in Appendix 4, the coefficients on credit, FDI, and GDP change individually remain statistically significant when the others are dropped from the model. Taken together, these estimates suggest that the likelihood of opposition coordination increases along with the availability of private resources. Opposition politicians are far more likely to resolve the liquidity problem entailed in their coordination wherever the economy has been liberalized and private resources flow more readily.

Table 2. Logit Analysis of Opposition Coordination

| | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|---------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Resources | Credit % GDP | 0.14*** (0.04) | 0.14*** (0.04) | 0.13*** (0.04) | 0.13*** (0.04) | 0.14*** (0.04) |
| | FDI % GDP | 0.55*** (0.17) | 0.52*** (0.17) | 0.52*** (0.19) | 0.51*** (0.17) | 0.52*** (0.17) |
| | GDP % Δ 5 yr mean | 0.63*** (0.25) | 0.65*** (0.22) | 0.57*** (0.22) | 0.55*** (0.21) | 0.58*** (0.21) |
| | Log GDP per capita, ppp | -2.13*** (0.82) | -2.05*** (0.81) | -1.68** (0.79) | -1.59** (0.75) | -2.00*** (0.78) |
| Patronage | Oil/mineral exporter | -1.72** (0.85) | -1.35* (0.79) | -1.21 (0.79) | -0.95 (0.78) | -1.07 (0.74) |
| Institutions | Previous election boycotted | -3.85*** (1.23) | -3.85*** (1.32) | -2.86** (1.25) | -2.82** (1.23) | -3.37*** (1.25) |
| Ethnicity | Ethnic fract (Fearon) | 11.51 (9.79) | 13.78 (9.72) | | | |
| | Ethnic fract (Fearon) square | -10.17 (8.09) | -11.21 (8.01) | | | |
| | Ethnic polarization | | | -2.04 (1.58) | -2.23 (1.61) | |
| Violence | Civil war in previous 5 yrs | -1.02 (0.83) | | -0.96 (0.84) | | |
| | CIRI torture: frequent ¹ | -1.07 (0.68) | -1.23* (0.67) | -1.22* (0.70) | -1.36* (0.72) | -1.41** (0.80) |
| | Constant | 8.35 (5.47) | 6.45 (5.19) | 9.04** (4.67) | 8.33* (4.44) | 9.92** (4.63) |
| | | N | 73 | 73 | 72 | 72 |
| | | Prob. > χ^2 | .0006 | .0006 | .0062 | .0010 |
| | | Log likelihood | -28.70 | -29.58 | -28.71 | -29.57 |
| | | Pseudo R ² | .4095 | .3915 | .4032 | .3855 |
| | | | | | | .3777 |


Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01

Note: Omitted category is (1) CIRI torture: occasional and none.

Based on the estimates from column 5 in Table 2, a single percent increase in credit as a share of GDP produces a .03 increase in the predicted probability of opposition coordination, holding all other variables at their median values and dummy variables at zero. The estimated coefficient on credit is robust to the inclusion of any

other variable for patronage, institutional, ethnic or violence. Figure 1 below shows that the predicted probability of opposition coordination rises progressively at higher levels of private credit availability. For a more concrete sense of how countries might move along this range, consider that private credit as a share of GDP stood at 18.6 percent during Kenya's first multiparty elections in 1992, when the opposition fragmented. By 2002, when Kenya's opposition coordinated for the country's third multiparty election, private credit had risen to 27.9 percent, indicating that there was greater liquidity in the economy that opposition politicians might be able to access.


Figure 1. The Likelihood of Opposition Coordination Increases with Private Credit



A similar pattern holds for FDI as a share of GDP. Using the estimates from column 5 in Table 2, a single percent increase in FDI yields a .12 increase in the predicted probability of opposition coordination, holding all other variables at their median values and dummy variables at zero. The estimate on FDI is robust to the

inclusion of any other variable for patronage, institutional, ethnic or violence. Figure 2 plots the predicted probabilities for opposition coordination across the range of FDI, producing a relationship comparable to the one seen with private credit, though on a reduced scale. Senegal provides a clear example of how a country might move along this range. When its opposition fragmented during the 1993 election, FDI as a share of GDP stood at .35 percent. By the 2000 election, when the opposition coordinated, FDI had risen to 3.22 percent.


Figure 2. The Likelihood of Opposition Coordination Increases with FDI



GDP change alone, reflecting the general effect of resource growth, has a considerable positive impact on opposition coordination. Increasing the five-year average of GDP change by one percent produces a .14 increase in the predicted probability of opposition coordination, holding all other variables at their median

values and dummy variables at zero. As with the other resource variables, the inclusion of other variables increases the coefficient on GDP change, while its statistical significance remains stable. The estimated effects of economic growth on opposition coordination reinforce a pattern from the data. Only one of 32 opposition coalitions coincides with a five-year economic decline: Liberia in 2005. More generally, mean GDP growth in countries experiencing opposition coordination was a full percentage point higher than the sample mean. Figure 3 below illustrates this positive relationship between the likelihood of opposition coordination and GDP change.

Figure 3. The Likelihood of Opposition Coordination Increases with GDP Growth



The variables used to proxy for patronage are less consistent. When these variables are added to the base model, as shown in Appendix 5, the coefficients on

oil/mineral exporters, government expenditure, and aid all move in the expected direction. Only the dummy for oil/mineral exporters is significantly different from zero in most model specifications, as seen in Tables 1 and 2. It fails to attain conventional levels of significance in column 5 of Table 2, but it retains considerable substantive significance. Moving from 0 to 1 on this variable would lead to .21 decrease in the predicted probability of opposition coordination, holding all other variables at their median values and dummy variables at zero.

We can compare the potential impact of patronage versus private resources. Table 3 shows the predicted probabilities of opposition coordination by level of private credit provision and whether the country is an oil/mineral exporter. As noted above, there is a substantial fall in the predicted probability of opposition coordination for the country that becomes an oil or mineral exporter. This is as theory would predict. However, Table 3 suggests that private resources have a comparable effect: the predicted probability nearly doubles when moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile for private credit as a share of GDP.

Table 3. Predicted Probability of Opposition Coordination

| Credit % GDP | Oil/Mineral Exporter | |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------|---------|
| | Non-Rentier | Rentier |
| 25 th Percentile: 5.82% | .31 | .15 |
| 50 th Percentile: 10.69% | .46 | .25 |
| 75 th Percentile: 16.10% | .64 | .40 |

Institutional variables appear to have no direct relevance to opposition coordination. Appendices 7 and 8 show that the coefficients on the conventional

measures for the quality of democracy—CIRI, Freedom House, and Polity—fail to attain standard levels of statistical significance. It may be that these measures are too crude to show any effect on opposition coordination. However, this institutional non-result does corroborate previous work indicating that the patterns in Africa's multiparty politics are not yet consistent with theories of institutions. One way to read this non-result is that perhaps the formal institutions will not have their predicted effects until politicians enter into stable coordination equilibria in whatever form that may be.

It is contrary to expectation that the coefficient on the runoff system is statistically indistinguishable from zero. It remains so under every specification of the model. Examining the empirical record, one finds that opposition parties are somewhat more likely to coordinate when competing under plurality systems than in runoff systems, as theory would suggest, though this difference is not statistically significant. I find 11 instances of opposition coordination among the 26 elections held under plurality rules (42 percent). In runoff systems, opposition coalitions were formed before the first round in 21 of 59 elections (36 percent), which is surprisingly high given the electoral logic implied in the runoff system. Opposition candidates have an incentive to delay making coalition promises until after first-round elections results are announced. However, the tendency to create pre-electoral coalitions in these circumstances may be due to the fact that all politicians know that the incumbent wants to avoid a runoff at all cost precisely because it creates a focal candidate for the opposition. In fact, few elections in the region ever go to the second round: 20 of 59

executive elections, or slightly over one-third, held between 1990 and 2005 required a runoff.

The only control that attains statistical significance under the category of institutions is, strictly speaking, not an institutional variable. I added a dummy to the model to indicate whether the opposition boycotted the previous executive election. The coefficient on this variable is large and negative under all model specifications. Based on the estimates from column 5 in Table 2, the predicted probability of opposition coordination plummets by .40 if opposition politicians boycotted the previous election, holding all other variables at their median values and dummy variables at zero. In the empirical record, I find only two instances of opposition politicians forming coalitions after having boycotted a prior executive election: Mali in 2002 and Mauritania in 2003. Since coalition bargaining involves linking power-sharing promises to the votes each member is expected to contribute, as I suggest in Chapter 3, it may be the case that prior boycotts create an intractable informational problem for most opposition politicians. The absence of an electoral record means they have no baseline on which to build estimates.

Interpreting the impact of ethnic cleavages on opposition coordination is more difficult. The estimates for ethnicity variables are either statistically insignificant or inconsistent. Appendices 9 through 11 show how these various indicators perform when added to the base model. The Reynal-Querol measure of ethnic polarization is the only one that attains statistical significance at conventional levels and in the hypothesized direction. However, as shown in Table 2, ethnic polarization loses significance when other controls are included in the model. None of the ethnic bloc

measures are statistically different from zero. The same is true for the incumbent measures.

The ethnic fractionalization indicators attain statistical significance only when they enter the model as a quadratic and are accompanied by the Polity control for autocracy. They become statistically indistinguishable from zero when that Polity measure is removed or other controls are added. This is true for all four fractionalization indices. Appendices 10 and 11 show that these indices differ in the magnitude of their estimated effects as well as in the direction of the relationship between ethnic fractionalization and opposition coordination. Without a theory-based argument for choosing a particular ethnic fractionalization index, one cannot a priori prefer one to another. However, since opposition coordination for executive office is a national-level game among representatives of ethnic constituencies, the focus should be placed on those indices that explicitly capture the cleavages activated in national rather than local politics. But here, we are faced with contradictory results produced by the Scarritt-Mozaffar and Posner indices, both of which are limited to groups mobilized at the national level.¹⁸

In Table 2, neither polarization nor fractionalization are statistically significant when included with the base model along with other controls. In comparing columns 2 and 4 – in which the two ethnicity measures are substituted—the BIC indicates that the model using ethnic fractionalization is weakly preferred. The coefficients on ethnic fractionalization from column 2 suggest that the predicted probability of opposition

¹⁸ As noted in Appendices 10 and 11, Scarritt and Mozaffar (SM) provide two different measures of ethnic fractionalization. The scores in SM1 are supposed to reflect identities mobilized at national rather than lower levels. The scores in SM2 reflect more disaggregated cleavages.

coordination rises slowly as fractionalization increases and then plateaus. When compared with the effect of resources, as shown in Table 4 below, it seems clear that ethnic fractionalization has a far weaker influence on the likelihood of coordination than private credit. The predicted probabilities in Table 4 are from column 2. The impact of ethnicity is partially dampened by the fact that the distribution of fractionalization scores is highly skewed; most African countries are in the upper quartile. Nevertheless, Table 4 suggests that changes along the range of private credit have a much greater impact on the likelihood of coordination than comparable changes in ethnic diversity.

Table 4. Predicted Probability of Opposition Coordination

| Credit % GDP | Ethnic Fractionalization | | |
|-------------------------------------|--|--|--|
| | 25th Percentile: .70 | 50th Percentile: .78 | 75th Percentile: .86 |
| 25 th Percentile: 5.82% | .41 | .35 | .29 |
| 50 th Percentile: 10.69% | .56 | .51 | .43 |
| 75 th Percentile: 16.10% | .71 | .67 | .60 |

As with institutions and ethnicity, the effect of violence on opposition coordination is ambiguous. Neither the incumbent's military background nor the level of military spending have any impact. A country's recent coup history has no discernible effect, while the coefficient on the occurrence of civil war within the previous five years is inconsistent. These estimates are shown in Appendices 12 and 13. Among the various CIRI measures for state-sponsored coercion—torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance—only the coefficient on torture reaches statistical significance at conventional levels. Its effect is substantial

when included in the model specified in column 5 of Table 2. The predicted probability for opposition coordination plunges to .19 when torture is practiced frequently versus occasionally or not at all, holding all other variables at their median values and dummy variables at zero. As Table 5 below shows, the impact of state-sponsored torture on opposition coordination is of about the same magnitude as being an oil/mineral exporter. Both serve to diminish the likelihood of a coalition being formed.

Table 5. Predicted Probability of Opposition Coordination

| Credit % GDP | Torture | |
|-------------------------------------|--------------|----------|
| | Not Frequent | Frequent |
| 25 th Percentile: 5.82% | .31 | .11 |
| 50 th Percentile: 10.69% | .46 | .19 |
| 75 th Percentile: 16.10% | .64 | .32 |

Conclusion

This chapter has presented new evidence on the factors which affect opposition coordination in Africa's democratizing states. The findings here indicate that coordination outcomes are not merely conditioned by ethnic diversity or inexperience with electoral institutions. While opposition politicians certainly must overcome bargaining problems which originate in the complex nature of their societies, the results from the quantitative analysis indicate that a large part of their coordination problem is a resource story. It is the opposition's ability to secure private resources—

as proxied by private credit, FDI, and GDP change—that significantly determines their ability to coalesce around a single candidate. This result does not mean that poverty prevents multiparty coordination, but that it becomes more difficult to negotiate a bargain when the incumbent can prevent elites from financing the opposition.

The results further confirm the important role of patronage and violence as incumbent strategies in multiparty politics. Opposition coordination is unlikely to take place where an incumbent can draw on oil and mineral revenues in order to distribute patronage. While it is well established in the case-study literature that incumbents use of patronage to coopt individual rivals, this paper shows that the impact of this strategy is broader: it discourages rivals from coordinating among themselves to form an alternative majority. The results further show that incumbents can profitably use violence to raise the costs of coordination, though this finding requires further corroboration.

While scholarly and journalistic assessments of African elections often reinforce the intuition that ethnic cleavages hinder opposition coordination, the results from this analysis show that neither fractionalization nor polarization has a definitive effect on the bargaining between the political representatives of ethnic constituencies. Perhaps greater leverage may be gained by shifting the focus to the cohesion of cleavages rather than their simple number. If coalition bargaining is based on the votes each politician can deliver, then we should expect opposition politicians to take pains to credibly demonstrate that they can deliver a particular ethnic bloc. It may be the capacity to engage in such signaling which may vary across cases and thereby influence the likelihood of opposition coordination.

Appendix 1. Variables: Description, Measurement and Source

| Variable | Definition & Measurement | Source |
|-------------------------|---|--|
| Coordination | | |
| Opposition coordination | Dichotomous variable indicates if two or more opposition parties coordinated for the election | Constructed from a press review for each election; elections were identified using Nohlen et al. (1999) and Internet resources such as africanelections.tripod.com and psephos.adam-carr.net |
| Previous coalition | Dichotomous variable indicates if opposition parties coordinated in previous election | Constructed |
| Previous boycott | Dichotomous variable indicates if opposition parties boycotted previous election | Constructed |
| Resources | | |
| Assets (% GDP) | Claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by deposit money banks as a share of GDP | Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (1999) |
| Credit (% GDP) | Private credit by deposit money banks as a share of GDP | Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (1999) |
| FDI (% GDP) | Net foreign direct investment inflows; sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, long-term capital, and short-term capital as a share of GDP | World Development Indicators (2007) |
| GDP Δ (5 yr) | Annual real GDP change averaged over previous five years | World Development Indicators (2007) |
| GDP per capita Δ (5 yr) | Annual real GDP change averaged over previous five years | World Development Indicators (2007) |
| GDP per capita | Log of GDP per capita (constant 2000 US\$) | World Development Indicators (2007) |
| GDP per capita, ppp | Log of GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (constant 2000 US\$) | World Development Indicators (2007) |
| Time | Dummies mark time periods for 1990-94, 1995-99, and 2000-05 | Constructed |
| Patronage | | |
| Oil/mineral exporter | Dummy indicates fuel and mineral exports represent over one-third or more of merchandise exports | World Development Indicators (2007) |
| Aid (% GDP) | Net disbursements of grants and loans made on concessional terms by donor agencies | World Development Indicators (2007) |
| Govt expenditure | Annual expenditure for purchases of goods and services by all levels of government, excluding most government enterprises, as a share of GDP | World Development Indicators (2007) |

Appendix 1. Variables: Description, Measurement and Source (continued)

| Variable | Definition & Measurement | Source |
|----------------------|---|---|
| Institutions | | |
| CIRI empowerment | Additive index based on indicators for the freedom of movement, speech, political participation, religion, and workers' rights; ranges from 0 (no gov't respect) to 10 (full gov't respect) | Cingranelli and Richards (2007) |
| CIRI association | Dummies indicate citizens enjoy freedom of association: 0 restricted; 1 limited; 2 free | Cingranelli and Richards (2007) |
| CIRI participation | Dummies indicate citizens enjoy freedom of political choice and legal right to change laws: 0 restricted; 1 limited; 2 free | Cingranelli and Richards (2007) |
| CIRI speech | Dummies indicate citizen freedom of speech and press: 0 restricted; 1 limited; 2 free | Cingranelli and Richards (2007) |
| FH: civil rights | Index of civil liberties based on freedom of expression, association, rule of law, and individual rights; measured on one-to-seven scale; one represents highest degree of freedom | Freedom House [www.freedomhouse.org] |
| FH: political rights | Index of political rights based on electoral process, political participation, and functioning of government; measured on one-to-seven scale; one represents the highest degree of freedom | Freedom House [www.freedomhouse.org] |
| FH: freedom status | Dummies indicating combined averages for civil liberties and political rights; countries with ratings averaging 1.0-2.5 are Free, 3.0-5.0 are Partly Free, and 5.5-7.0 are Not Free. | Freedom House [www.freedomhouse.org] |
| Polity | Composite measure of institutionalized authority characteristics runs from 10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic) | Polity IV (2004) [http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/] |
| Polity: autocracy | Eleven-point additive index based on indicators for competitiveness of political participation, regulation of participation, competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the executive | Polity IV (2004) [http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/] |
| Runoff system | Dummy indicates two-round runoff system used in executive elections. | International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance [www.idea.int] |
| Multiparty elections | Number of previous multiparty executive elections | Constructed |
| Regime years | Years current regime has been in power | Geddes (1999) |

Appendix 1. Variables: Description, Measurement and Source (continued)

| Variable | Definition & Measurement | Source |
|--------------------------|--|--|
| Ethnicity | | |
| Plurality group size | Largest ethnic group as a share of total population | Scarritt and Mozaffar (1999) |
| Ethnic blocs | Dummies mark number of largest ethnic blocs by population: 1 group is at least 50%; 2 each make up 25%; 2 each make up 20%; 3 each make up 15%; 4 each make up 10%; 3 each make up 10% | Constructed using Scarritt and Mozaffar (1999) |
| Incumbent: plurality | Dummy indicates incumbent is a member of the plurality ethnic group | Constructed |
| Incumbent: ESD | Index of ethnic size dominance measures incumbent's ethnic group as share of population, following Londregan et al. (1995); values range from 0 and 1 as the incumbent's ESD increases | Constructed using Scarritt and Mozaffar (1999) |
| Ethnic polarization | Index of polarization using distribution of groups | Reynal-Querol (2002) |
| Ethnic fractionalization | Various indices of ethnolinguistic fractionalization | Fearon (2003); Posner (2004); Reynal-Querol (2002); Scarritt and Mozaffar (1999) |
| Violence | | |
| CIRI physical integrity | Additive index for torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance; ranges from 0 (no gov't respect) to 8 (full gov't respect) | Cingranelli and Richards (2007) |
| CIRI disappearance | Dummies indicate politically motivated disappearances: 0 frequent (50 or more); 1 occasional (1-49); 2 none | Cingranelli and Richards (2007) |
| CIRI imprisonment | Dummies indicate political imprisonment due to political, religious, or other beliefs: 0 frequent (50 or more); 1 occasional (1-49); 2 none | Cingranelli and Richards (2007) |
| CIRI killing | Dummies indicate extrajudicial killings by government officials: 0 frequent (50 or more); 1 occasional (1-49); 2 none | Cingranelli and Richards (2007) |
| CIRI torture | Dummies indicate torture practiced by government officials: 0 frequent (50 or more); 1 occasional (1-49); 2 none | Cingranelli and Richards (2007) |
| Military leader | Dummy indicates leader entered as military leader | Constructed |
| Military spending | Military spending as a share of GDP | World Development Indicators (2007) |
| Civil war (5 yrs) | Dummy if civil war fought in previous five years | Fearon and Laitin (2003) |
| Coup (5 yrs) | Dummy if coup occurred in previous five years | McGowan (2003) |

Appendix 2. Descriptive Statistics for Logit Analysis

| | Variable | Mean | SD | Min | Max | Obs |
|---------------------|--|-------|-------|-------|--------|-----|
| Resources | Assets % GDP | 20.14 | 17.47 | 2.15 | 81.20 | 73 |
| | Credit % GDP | 15.44 | 15.18 | 1.66 | 75.97 | 73 |
| | FDI % GDP | 1.76 | 2.74 | -6.90 | 10.53 | 73 |
| | GDP % Δ 5 yr mean | 3.16 | 2.64 | -5.05 | 8.53 | 73 |
| | GDP per capita Δ 5 yr mean | 0.54 | 2.69 | -7.30 | 6.55 | 73 |
| | Log GDP per capita, ppp | 7.30 | 0.86 | 6.19 | 9.31 | 73 |
| | Log GDP per capita | 6.02 | 1.05 | 4.59 | 8.37 | 73 |
| | Time 1990-94 ¹ | 0.29 | | 0 | 1 | 73 |
| | Time 1995-99 ¹ | 0.29 | | 0 | 1 | 73 |
| Patronage | Oil/mineral exporter | 0.32 | | 0 | 1 | 73 |
| | Aid % GDP | 14.05 | 12.61 | 0.22 | 65.04 | 73 |
| | Aid per capita | 40.41 | 25.49 | -7.96 | 123.00 | 73 |
| | Govt expenditure % GDP | 28.68 | 15.24 | 7.65 | 64.18 | 72 |
| Institutions | CIRI empowerment index | 6.22 | 2.21 | 1 | 10 | 73 |
| | CIRI assoc: restricted ² | 0.19 | | 0 | 1 | 73 |
| | CIRI assoc: limited ² | 0.52 | | 0 | 1 | 73 |
| | CIRI particip: restricted ³ | 0.29 | | 0 | 1 | 73 |
| | CIRI particip: limited ³ | 0.27 | | 0 | 1 | 73 |
| | CIRI speech: restricted ⁴ | 0.12 | | 0 | 1 | 73 |
| | CIRI speech: limited ⁴ | 0.66 | | 0 | 1 | 73 |
| | FH civil liberties | 4.44 | 1.85 | 1 | 7 | 73 |
| | FH political rights | 4.16 | 1.25 | 1 | 6 | 73 |
| | FH free ⁵ | 0.19 | | 0 | 1 | 73 |
| | FH partly free ⁵ | 0.53 | | 0 | 1 | 73 |
| | Polity | 0.47 | 5.73 | -9 | 10 | 73 |
| | Polity: autocracy | 3.01 | 2.76 | 0 | 9 | 71 |
| | Runoff system | 0.68 | | 0 | 1 | 73 |
| | Previous multiparty elections | 1.71 | 2.14 | 0 | 9 | 73 |
| | Previous election boycotted | 0.10 | | 0 | 1 | 73 |

Note: Omitted categories are (1) Time 2000-05; (2) CIRI assoc: free; (3) CIRI particip: free; (4) CIRI speech free; (5) FH not free.

Appendix 2. Descriptive Statistics for Logit Analysis (continued)

| | Variable | Mean | SD | Min | Max | Obs |
|------------------|--|-------|-------|------|------|-----|
| Ethnicity | Plurality group size | 38.15 | 17.74 | 12 | 90 | 73 |
| | Ethnic bloc: 1 group 50% | 0.30 | | 0 | 1 | 73 |
| | Ethnic bloc: 2 groups 25% | 0.21 | | 0 | 1 | 73 |
| | Ethnic bloc: 2 groups 20% | 0.33 | | 0 | 1 | 73 |
| | Ethnic bloc: 3 groups 15% | 0.36 | | 0 | 1 | 73 |
| | Ethnic bloc: 4 groups 10% | 0.40 | | 0 | 1 | 73 |
| | Ethnic bloc: 3 groups 10% | 0.18 | | 0 | 1 | 73 |
| | Incumbent: plurality | 0.37 | | 0 | 1 | 73 |
| | Incumbent: ESD | 0.53 | 0.30 | 0.07 | 1 | 73 |
| | Ethnic polarization | 0.78 | 0.22 | 0.02 | 1 | 72 |
| | Ethnic fractionalization | | | | | |
| | Fearon | 0.75 | 0.16 | 0.18 | 0.95 | 73 |
| | Posner | 0.39 | 0.22 | 0 | 0.71 | 73 |
| | Scarritt & Mozaffar 1 | 0.50 | 0.24 | 0 | 0.83 | 73 |
| | Scarritt & Mozaffar 2 | 0.60 | 0.20 | 0 | 0.91 | 73 |
| | Reynal-Querol | 0.69 | 0.22 | 0.05 | 0.96 | 73 |
| Violence | CIRI physical integrity index | 6.22 | 2.21 | 1 | 10 | 73 |
| | CIRI disappearance: none ⁶ | 0.84 | | 0 | 1 | 73 |
| | CIRI imprison: frequent ⁷ | 0.23 | | 0 | 1 | 73 |
| | CIRI imprison: occasional ⁷ | 0.49 | | 0 | 1 | 73 |
| | CIRI killing: frequent ⁸ | 0.18 | | 0 | 1 | 73 |
| | CIRI killing: occasional ⁸ | 0.47 | | 0 | 1 | 73 |
| | CIRI torture: frequent ⁹ | 0.51 | | 0 | 1 | 73 |
| | Military leader | 0.34 | | 0 | 1 | 73 |
| | Military spending % GDP | 0.60 | 0.59 | 0 | 2.43 | 73 |
| | Civil war in previous 5 yrs | 0.29 | | 0 | 1 | 73 |
| | Coup in previous 5 yrs | 0.14 | | 0 | 1 | 73 |

Note: Omitted categories are (6) CIRI disappearance: frequent and occasional; (7) CIRI imprison: none; (8) CIRI killing: none; (9) CIRI torture: occasional and none.

Appendix 3. Correlation Matrix among Main Variables of Interest

| | Assets % | Credit % | FDI % | GDP Δ 5 yr | GDP ppp | Aid % | Eth: Fearon | CIRI phys | CIRI prison | CIRI torture | CIRI empwr | FH political | Polity autoc | Mult elects |
|---------------------|-----------------|-----------------|--------------|-------------------|----------------|--------------|--------------------|------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| Assets % | 1.00 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Credit % | 0.97* | 1.00 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| FDI % | -0.12 | -0.16 | 1.00 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| GDP Δ 5 yr | 0.03 | -0.01 | 0.16 | 1.00 | | | | | | | | | | |
| GDP ppp | 0.66* | 0.64* | -0.17 | 0.23* | 1.00 | | | | | | | | | |
| Aid % | -0.45* | -0.42* | 0.17 | -0.07 | -0.59* | 1.00 | | | | | | | | |
| Eth: Fearon | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.13 | -0.19 | -0.24* | 0.05 | 1.00 | | | | | | | |
| CIRI phys | -0.03 | -0.09 | 0.10 | 0.43* | 0.21 | -0.03 | -0.17 | 1.00 | | | | | | |
| CIRI prison | 0.11 | 0.07 | 0.01 | 0.30* | 0.32* | -0.10 | -0.13 | 0.68* | 1.00 | | | | | |
| CIRI torture | 0.04 | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.21 | 0.21 | -0.08 | -0.16 | 0.69* | 0.28* | 1.00 | | | | |
| CIRI empwr | 0.15 | 0.14 | -0.16 | 0.23 | 0.28* | 0.07 | -0.03 | 0.48* | 0.55* | 0.42* | 1.00 | | | |
| FH political | -0.37* | -0.34* | 0.03 | -0.43* | -0.52* | 0.26* | 0.16 | -0.52* | -0.60* | -0.38* | -0.64* | 1.00 | | |
| Polity autoc | -0.13 | -0.12 | -0.02 | -0.34* | -0.21 | 0.10 | 0.06 | -0.32* | -0.50* | -0.05 | -0.50* | 0.68* | 1.00 | |
| Mult elects | 0.36* | 0.29* | 0.06 | 0.31* | 0.57* | -0.32* | -0.38* | 0.35* | 0.32* | 0.21 | 0.33* | -0.62* | -0.48* | 1.00 |

Note: * indicates correlation significant at the .05 level.

Appendix 4. Logit Analysis of Opposition Coordination: Resources

| | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
|-----------------------|------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Resources | Credit % GDP | 0.08*** (0.03) | | 0.08*** (0.03) | 0.08*** (0.03) | 0.06*** (0.02) | 0.10*** (0.03) | 0.08*** (0.03) | 0.10*** (0.03) |
| | FDI % GDP | | | 0.19** (0.09) | | | 0.38*** (0.15) | 0.36** (0.15) | 0.30** (0.13) |
| | GDP % Δ 5 yr mean | 0.45*** (0.15) | 0.27*** (0.10) | 0.45*** (0.14) | | | 0.46*** (0.15) | 0.38*** (0.13) | 0.42*** (0.15) |
| | GDP per capita % Δ 5 yr mean | | | | 0.42*** (0.12) | | | | |
| | GDP % Δ | | | | | 0.08 (0.05) | | | |
| | Log GDP per capita, ppp | -1.17** (0.51) | 0.04 (0.34) | -1.16** (0.50) | -1.19** (0.50) | -0.59 (0.38) | -1.27** (0.53) | | -1.19** (0.56) |
| | Log GDP per capita | | | | | | | -0.64** (0.33) | |
| | Time 1990-94 | | | -0.05 (0.65) | 0.09 (0.68) | -0.22 (0.64) | 0.78 (0.76) | 0.70 (0.74) | |
| | Time 1995-00 | | | 0.11 (0.69) | 0.22 (0.68) | 0.04 (0.64) | 0.92 (0.86) | 0.85 (0.84) | |
| | Constant | 5.17 (3.19) | -2.02 (2.48) | 5.13 (3.17) | 6.54 (3.33) | 2.65 (2.61) | 4.29 (3.44) | -0.36 (1.87) | 4.62 (3.47) |
| N | | 73 | 73 | 73 | 73 | 73 | 73 | 73 | 73 |
| Prob. > χ^2 | | .0031 | .0036 | .0124 | .0034 | .0774 | .0016 | .0023 | .0005 |
| Log likelihood | | -38.94 | -42.63 | -38.91 | -39.11 | -43.87 | -35.28 | -37.02 | -36.09 |
| Pseudo R ² | | .1989 | .1228 | .1994 | .1954 | .0975 | .2741 | .2382 | .2575 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01

Appendix 5. Logit Analysis of Opposition Coordination: Resources + Patronage

| | | 1 | 2 |
|-----------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Resources | Credit % GDP | 0.09** (0.04) | 0.09** (0.04) |
| | FDI % GDP | 0.37*** (0.14) | 0.36*** (0.13) |
| | GDP % Δ 5 yr mean | 0.34** (0.16) | 0.36** (0.16) |
| | Log GDP per capita, ppp | -1.30* (0.77) | -1.05 (0.74) |
| Patronage | Oil/mineral exporter | -1.46* (0.83) | -1.27 (0.82) |
| | Government expenditure | -0.04 (0.07) | -0.04 (0.07) |
| | Aid % GDP | -0.04 (0.03) | |
| | Aid per capita | | -0.01 (0.01) |
| Constant | | 7.22 (4.94) | 4.89 (4.56) |
| | | <hr/> | <hr/> |
| N | | 72 | 73 |
| Prob. > χ^2 | | .0005 | .0012 |
| Log likelihood | | -33.35 | -34.10 |
| Pseudo R ² | | .3069 | .2913 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01

Appendix 6. Logit Analysis of Opposition Coordination: Resources + Institutions

| | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|---------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| Resources | Credit % GDP | 0.14*** (0.04) | 0.12*** (0.04) | 0.13*** (0.04) | 0.12*** (0.03) | 0.12*** (0.03) |
| | FDI % GDP | 0.31** (0.15) | 0.36*** (0.14) | 0.38*** (0.13) | 0.35** (0.15) | 0.39*** (0.15) |
| | GDP % Δ 5 yr mean | 0.59*** (0.14) | 0.54*** (0.19) | 0.56*** (0.21) | 0.57*** (0.20) | 0.60*** (0.20) |
| | Log GDP per capita, ppp | -1.99** (0.87) | -1.82** (0.79) | -1.96** (0.82) | -1.57** (0.69) | -1.41** (0.63) |
| Institutions | Previous election boycotted | -2.87*** (1.03) | -2.89*** (1.11) | -3.30*** (1.30) | -2.85*** (1.11) | -2.70** (1.11) |
| | Runoff system | 0.99 (0.80) | | | | |
| | Previous multiparty elections | 0.17 (0.20) | | | | |
| | FH political rights | | | -0.20 (0.29) | | |
| | FH free ¹ | | | | 1.38 (1.07) | |
| | FH partly free ¹ | | | | 1.00 (0.83) | |
| | Polity | | | | | -0.02 (0.06) |
| | Polity autocracy | | | | | 0.14 (0.12) |
| | Constant | 8.45 (5.44) | 9.36* (5.68) | 8.51* (4.70) | 6.63 (4.23) | 4.84 (4.11) |
| <hr/> | | | | | | |
| | N | 73 | 73 | 73 | 73 | 73 |
| | Prob. > χ^2 | .0016 | .0085 | .0211 | .0019 | .0007 |
| | Log likelihood | -32.39 | -33.06 | -32.17 | -33.23 | -31.50 |
| | Pseudo R ² | .3337 | .3198 | .3380 | .3163 | .3320 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01

Note: Omitted category is (1) FH not free.

Appendix 7. Logit Analysis of Opposition Coordination: Resources + Institutions

| | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
|-----------------------|--|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Resources | Credit % GDP | 0.13*** (0.04) | 0.12*** (0.04) | 0.12*** (0.04) | 0.13*** (0.04) |
| | FDI % GDP | 0.40*** (0.15) | 0.35** (0.15) | 0.35*** (0.14) | 0.40** (0.17) |
| | GDP % Δ 5 yr mean | 0.57*** (0.18) | 0.56*** (0.20) | 0.55*** (0.21) | 0.62*** (0.19) |
| | Log GDP per capita, ppp | -1.87** (0.66) | -1.60*** (0.65) | -1.72** (0.66) | -1.99*** (0.78) |
| Institutions | Previous election boycotted | -3.00*** (1.03) | -2.84*** (1.16) | -3.01*** (1.21) | -3.41*** (1.16) |
| | CIRI empowerment index | 0.16 (0.15) | | | |
| | CIRI assoc: restricted ¹ | | 0.34 (0.84) | | |
| | CIRI assoc: limited ¹ | | 0.24 (0.70) | | |
| | CIRI particip: restricted ² | | | 0.87 (0.75) | |
| | CIRI particip: limited ² | | | 0.39 (0.78) | |
| | CIRI speech: restricted ³ | | | | -1.92 (1.79) |
| | CIRI speech: limited ³ | | | | -1.08 (0.77) |
| | Constant | 7.58** (3.91) | 6.69* (4.05) | 8.22** (3.96) | 10.23** (4.87) |
| | | 73 | 73 | 73 | 73 |
| N | | | | | |
| Prob. > χ^2 | | .0024 | .0049 | .0140 | .0052 |
| Log likelihood | | -32.66 | -33.22 | -32.75 | -31.87 |
| Pseudo R ² | | .3281 | .3164 | .3260 | .3442 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01

Note: Omitted categories are (1) CIRI assoc: free; (2) CIRI particip: free; (3) CIRI speech free.

Appendix 8. Logit Analysis of Opposition Coordination: Resources + Ethnicity

| | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|---|---------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Resources | Credit % GDP | 0.09*** (0.03) | 0.09*** (0.03) | 0.10*** (0.03) | 0.09*** (0.03) | 0.09*** (0.03) |
| | FDI % GDP | 0.31** (0.13) | 0.32*** (0.12) | 0.30** (0.13) | 0.31** (0.13) | 0.28** (0.12) |
| | GDP % Δ 5 yr mean | 0.42*** (0.15) | 0.43*** (0.15) | 0.46*** (0.15) | 0.43*** (0.15) | 0.45*** (0.15) |
| | Log GDP per capita, ppp | -0.77 (0.52) | -1.10** (0.54) | -1.04* (0.55) | -1.08** (0.54) | -1.09** (0.53) |
| Ethnicity | Ethnic polarization | -3.46** (1.73) | | | | |
| | Incumbent ESD | | 0.84 (1.08) | | | |
| | Incumbent plurality | | | 0.27 (0.63) | 0.19 (0.63) | 0.09 (0.64) |
| | Ethnic bloc: 1 group 50% | | | | -0.56 (0.77) | |
| | Ethnic bloc: 2 groups 25% | | | | | 0.28 (0.78) |
| | Ethnic bloc: 3 groups 15% | | | | | 0.38 (0.62) |
| | Constant | 3.52 (3.15) | 3.43 (3.36) | 3.34 (3.49) | 3.65 (3.40) | 3.68 (3.32) |
| | | N | 72 | 70 | 70 | 70 |
| | | Prob. > χ^2 | .0009 | .0008 | .0022 | .0016 |
| | | Log likelihood | -33.59 | -33.57 | -33.56 | -33.80 |
| | | Pseudo R ² | .3018 | .2730 | .2733 | .2681 |
| Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01 | | | | | | |

Appendix 9. Logit Analysis of Opposition Coordination: Resources + Ethnicity

| | | Fearon | Posner | SM1 ¹ | SM2 ¹ | RQ ¹ |
|------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Resources | Credit % GDP | 0.09*** (0.03) | 0.09*** (0.03) | 0.10*** (0.03) | 0.09*** (0.03) | 0.10*** (0.03) |
| | FDI % GDP | 0.29** (0.13) | 0.29** (0.13) | 0.30** (0.13) | 0.27** (0.12) | 0.30** (0.13) |
| | GDP % Δ 5 yr mean | 0.43*** (0.15) | 0.42*** (0.14) | 0.43*** (0.15) | 0.43*** (0.15) | 0.44*** (0.16) |
| | Log GDP per capita, ppp | -1.14** (0.55) | -1.08* (0.59) | -1.20** (0.57) | -0.96* (0.53) | -1.28** (0.58) |
| Ethnicity | Ethnic fractionalization | 0.70 (2.11) | 0.18 (1.47) | 0.24 (1.22) | 2.34 (1.51) | -0.83 (1.48) |
| | Constant | 3.76 (3.95) | 3.91 (3.89) | 4.53 (3.44) | 1.61 (3.38) | 5.88 (3.97) |
| | | N | 73 | 71 | 73 | 73 |
| | | Prob. > χ^2 | .0012 | .0013 | .0011 | .0005 |
| | | Log likelihood | -36.03 | -35.60 | -36.07 | -34.97 |
| | | Pseudo R ² | .2587 | .2367 | .2579 | .2804 |
| | | | | | | .2651 |

Appendix 10. Logit Analysis of Opposition Coordination: Resources + Ethnicity

| | | Fearon | Posner | SM1 ¹ | SM2 ¹ | RQ ² |
|------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Resources | Credit % GDP | 0.09*** (0.03) | 0.09*** (0.03) | 0.10*** (0.03) | 0.09*** (0.03) | 0.09*** (0.03) |
| | FDI % GDP | 0.27** (0.13) | 0.27** (0.12) | 0.30** (0.13) | 0.26** (0.12) | 0.30** (0.13) |
| | GDP % Δ 5 yr mean | 0.46*** (0.16) | 0.43*** (0.14) | 0.43*** (0.15) | 0.44*** (0.15) | 0.41*** (0.15) |
| | Log GDP per capita, ppp | -1.15** (0.58) | -1.07* (0.58) | -1.20** (0.57) | -0.98* (0.54) | -0.74 (0.55) |
| Ethnicity | Ethnic fractionalization | 7.81 (9.45) | -2.71 (5.26) | 0.46 (4.90) | 3.25 (5.77) | -11.74* (6.33) |
| | Ethnic fractionalization (sq) | -5.62 (7.55) | 4.23 (7.07) | -0.25 (5.47) | -0.83 (5.29) | -10.66* (6.34) |
| | Constant | 1.77 (4.40) | 4.12 (3.99) | 4.56 (3.38) | 1.49 (3.49) | 3.94 (3.42) |
| | | N | 73 | 71 | 73 | 73 |
| | | Prob. > χ^2 | .0025 | .0021 | .0026 | .0009 |
| | | Log likelihood | -35.79 | -35.44 | -36.07 | -34.97 |
| | | Pseudo R ² | .2637 | .2401 | .2579 | .2806 |
| | | | | | | .2990 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01

Note: (1) SM1 and SM2 refer to the Scarritt and Mozaffar indices. SM1 includes the lower and SM2 the higher estimates: Benin (.42 or .57), Guinea-Bissau (.1 or .53), Mauritania (.26 or .62), Nigeria (.5 or .81), Tanzania (.06 or .86), and Uganda (.09 or .91). (2) RQ refers to the Reynal-Querol index.

Appendix 11. Logit Analysis of Opposition Coordination: Resources + Violence

| | | 1 | 2 | 3 |
|------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Resources | Credit % GDP | 0.10*** (0.03) | 0.10*** (0.03) | 0.09*** (0.04) |
| | FDI % GDP | 0.29** (0.12) | 0.30** (0.13) | 0.30*** (0.12) |
| | GDP % Δ 5 yr mean | 0.44*** (0.15) | 0.42*** (0.15) | 0.43*** (0.14) |
| | Log GDP per capita, ppp | -0.27** (0.56) | -1.18** (0.56) | -1.12* (0.63) |
| Violence | Civil war in previous 5 yrs | -0.84 (0.77) | | |
| | Military leader | | 0.15 (0.64) | |
| | Military spending % GDP | | | -0.87 (0.62) |
| | Constant | 3.52 (3.15) | 4.51 (3.57) | 4.65 (3.88) |
| | | N | 73 | 73 |
| | | Prob. > χ^2 | .0014 | .0011 |
| | | Log likelihood | -35.30 | -36.06 |
| | | Pseudo R ² | .2736 | .2580 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01

Appendix 12. Logit Analysis of Opposition Coordination: Resources + Violence

| | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
|-----------------------|--|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Resources | Credit % GDP | 0.11*** (0.03) | 0.10*** (0.04) | 0.10*** (0.03) | 0.13*** (0.04) |
| | FDI % GDP | 0.31** (0.13) | 0.30** (0.13) | 0.32** (0.14) | 0.42*** (0.16) |
| | GDP % Δ 5 yr mean | 0.41*** (0.15) | 0.41*** (0.15) | 0.45*** (0.15) | 0.53*** (0.18) |
| | Log GDP per capita, ppp | -1.36** (0.59) | -1.35** (0.61) | -1.40** (0.59) | -1.71*** (0.64) |
| Violence | CIRI physical integrity | 0.17 (0.17) | | | |
| | CIRI imprison: frequent ¹ | | -0.65 (0.85) | | |
| | CIRI imprison: occasional ¹ | | -0.57 (0.78) | | |
| | CIRI killing: frequent ² | | | -0.44 (0.99) | |
| | CIRI killing: occasional ² | | | -0.95 (0.65) | |
| | CIRI torture: frequent ³ | | | | -1.53** (0.68) |
| Constant | | 4.96 (3.48) | 6.16 (3.99) | 6.45* (3.69) | 8.05** (3.91) |
| N | | 73 | 73 | 73 | 73 |
| Prob. > χ^2 | | .0025 | .0031 | .0026 | .0008 |
| Log likelihood | | -35.60 | -35.74 | -35.08 | -33.54 |
| Pseudo R ² | | .2676 | .2646 | .2782 | .3097 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01

Note: Omitted categories are (1) CIRI imprison: none; (2) CIRI killing: none; (3) CIRI torture: occasional and none.

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