Chapter Three Summary:
Chieftaincy as Rival Governance in Ghana

Note: This is a summary/outline of a dissertation chapter I am currently writing. The dissertation argues that state weakness in Sub-Saharan Africa is, to a large extent, caused by the survival of hierarchical – as opposed to non-hierarchical/stateless – traditional institutions. The hierarchy of a traditional institution is measured as the number of levels of jurisdictional hierarchy beyond the local community (ICJH). A chiefdom, for example, is a traditional institution with a hierarchy of at least 3 levels (ICJH =3). A stateless traditional institution has a hierarchy of only one level (the village or sub-clan). I term level two traditional institutions semi-hierarchical (ICJH =2).

In this summary, I present:
1. The introduction to the chapter, which briefly reiterates the logic of the hypothesis I am testing. Please note that the logic of the hypothesis is three-fold and I divide a test of this hypothesis into sections 2, 3 and 4 of the chapter, each section corresponding with one aspect of the three-fold logic.
2. A very brief description of section 1 of the chapter, which codes the ICJH of 4 ethnic and ethnolinguistic groups in Ghana with at least ten percent of the country's total population. In the chapter, this section is over thirty pages, describing and coding the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial hierarchy of these 4 ethnic/ethnolinguistic groups.
3. A brief outline of section 2 of the chapter. This section is an analytic narrative of colonial and post-colonial Ghanaian history, focusing on the dual-principalship of Ghana's hierarchical traditional leaders (agents of the state and their local communities). The section tests the first, and to some extent the second, aspect of the hypothesis' logic.
4. A brief outline of section 3 of the chapter. This section describes the public goods and services traditional leaders/institutions provide their communities. It is a test of the second aspect of the hypothesis' logic.
5. A presentation of section 4 of the chapter. This section examines individual preferences for governance by traditional institutions, and is a test of the third aspect of the hypothesis. While not yet complete, I present the stats that I have completed.
6. Some potential questions for discussion.

Any and all comments are welcome.

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The hypothesis I developed in chapter two predicts that as the number of hierarchical ethnic and ethnolinguistic groups within a state's territory increases, state weakness increases. The logic of this hypothesis is based on three reasons. First, because institutions within a hierarchical ethnic and ethnolinguistic group screen, select, monitor, and check their agents, their traditional leaders have greater incentives to respond to the preferences of their communities: traditional leaders are not solely agents of the state. Second, leaders of hierarchical institutions have greater capacity to respond to community preferences, and in doing so, leaders of hierarchical groups obtain authority that can be leveraged against the authority of the state. Third, if the territory of the state encompasses multiple hierarchical ethnic and ethnolinguistic groups, as opposed to a single hierarchical ethnic or ethnolinguistic group, it is disadvantaged with respect to the provision of public goods that satisfy preferences *across all groups*. In responding to the preferences *within a group*, leaders of hierarchical traditional institutions provide local-public goods that compete with the public goods of the state. Since the first and second reasons are inter-related, the theory I develop in chapter two can be reduced to a two-by-two table.

Table 1: The Theory

	Hierarchical Traditional Institutions	**Non-Hierarchical Traditional Institutions**
Divergent Preferences (proxied by the number of ethnic/ethnolinguistic groups over 10% of the population)	Greater State Weakness (Ghana)	Less State Weakness (Case not determined yet)
Non-Divergent Preferences (proxied by the number of ethnic/ethnolinguistic groups over 10% of the country's population)	Less State Weakness (Botswana)	Less State Weakness (case in this cell not examined in the dissertation)

With four hierarchical ethnic and ethnolinguistic groups with at least ten percent of the country's population, comprising roughly 64 percent of the total population, Ghana *should* be a case of state weakness. To test this hypothesis, I separate my analysis of the Ghanaian case into four sections. In the first section, I explain the independent variable of my analysis by describing

the distribution and institutional organization of Ghana's ethnic and ethnolinguistic groups during the pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial period. Four hierarchically organized[1] ethnic and ethnolinguistic groups with at least ten percent of Ghana's total population[2] are identified: the Akan, Ewe, and Mole-Dagbani ethnolinguistic groups; and the Asante (Ashanti) ethnic group. Furthermore, I show that the hierarchy of these groups has remained relatively constant from the pre-colonial to the contemporary period.

In section two, I employ an analytic narrative to examine the first two aspects of my hypothesis. Emphasis is placed on the delegation relationships between the state, traditional leaders, and their communities from the extension of colonial rule in the late 19th century to the present. As agents of the state and their local communities, I examine the incentives hierarchical traditional leaders have to respond to the preferences of their communities, against those of the state. Furthermore, I examine the authority traditional leaders can leverage to resist state attempts at control, including the formation of alliances across traditional leaders.

In section three, I examine the public goods hierarchical traditional leaders provide their communities. In other words, I examine how hierarchical traditional leaders obtain authority by providing tangible benefits to their communities. Emphasis is placed on the governance – the public services and public goods – traditional leaders actually provide.

In section four, I examine micro-level evidence to assess individual preferences for governance by chiefs. After presenting the results of a survey by Abotchie (1997), who finds that Ewes prefer policing by traditional institutions over state institutions, I utilize *Afrobarometer* survey data to examine preferences for governance by traditional institutions. I first examine preferences for governance by chiefs. Then I examine preferences and preference divergence across ethnic and ethnolinguistic groups for a specific public good provided by traditional leaders, the administration of property rights in land.

Ghana is an ideal – though not necessarily a most-likely – case to examine the effects of traditional institutions on state weakness for two reasons. First, our historical, anthropological, and political knowledge of traditional institutions in Ghana is unprecedented on the African continent. The advanced state of scholarship is also supplemented by the fact that chieftaincy is actively debated throughout Ghanaian society. Therefore, additional information, primarily in the form of newspaper articles, is readily available to test my model's predictions.

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[1] See chapter 3. The hierarchy of a traditional institution is measured through ICJH, which measures the number of levels of legal hierarchy beyond the local community (village or sub-clan). It is an ordinal variable ranging from 0 (no political authority) to 3 (three levels of legal hierarchy; for chiefdoms this would correspond to three administrative levels of chieftaincy, with a king or paramount chief at the apex).

[2] As I explain in chapter 3, I only code ethnic and ethnolinguistic groups with at least ten percent of a country's total population.

Second, Ghana's political history is marked by two periods where the state actively sought to increase its hegemony by eliminating the authority of traditional leaders, as well as replacing traditional institutions with regional and local administrative units. From the 1950's to 1966, Kwame Nkrumah and the Convention People's Party (CPP) sought to reduce the authority of chiefs and expand the authority of a centralized, Ghanaian state. During this period, the issue of cheiftaincy constituted a fundamental cleavage in national politics. Jerry Rawling's Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC), which ruled from December 31, 1981 to the elections of 1992, was less explicitly hostile to chiefs. However, the regime actively sought to reform local-level governance. This constituted an attempt to administratively undermine the authority of traditional institutions. The variation in state preferences in the post-colonial period allows us to examine how chiefs reacted to hostile regimes and employed strategies of survival.

I.   The Pre-Colonial, Colonial and Contemporary Hierarchy of Ethnolinguistic Groups in Ghana

In this section I explain the coding of my independent variable, the number of hierarchical ethnic and ethnolinguistic groups with at least ten percent of a country's total population, in Ghana. The classification of an ethnic or ethnolinguistic group is exceedingly difficult and inevitably involves some arbitrary decisions (Alesina et al. 2003, Roeder 2001, Laitin 2000, Morrison et al. 1989 and 1972). My research is no exception and readers should take note of the fact that I utilize the category of ethnolinguistic group or ethnic group based on circumstances surrounding the ICJH[3] scores of the respective group's traditional institutions. The Ewe, for example, share similar ICJH scores across the individual ethnic groups, and I therefore code them as a hierarchical ethnolinguistic group. The Mole-Dagbani, on the other hand, do not share similar ICJH scores across the ethnic groups within the ethnolinguistic group, but as I explain below, a large share of the Mole-Dagbani peoples are members of the hierarchical chiefdoms of Dagomba, Mamprussi, Mossi, Wala, and Nanumba. I therefore code the Mole-Dagbani as a hierarchical ethnolinguistic group. Finally, I separate the Asante from the Akan ethnolinguistic group even though they have similar traditional institutions. The reason for this is the fact that the Asante was, and is, a polity distinct from other Akan polities, due to its history as an empire and confederation of chiefdoms. Table 4 presents the ethnic and ethnolinguistic

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[3] See chapter 2, section 2. The Institutional hierarchy of a traditional institution is measured through ICJH, which measures the number of levels of legal hierarchy beyond the local community (village or sub-clan). It is an ordinal variable ranging from 0 (no political authority) to 3 and 4 (three to four levels of legal hierarchy; for chiefdoms this would correspond to three administrative levels of chieftaincy, with a king or paramount chief at the apex).

composition of Ghana, along with pre-colonial and contemporary hierarchy scores. Ethnic and ethnolinguistic groups with less than ten percent of the total population are not presented. Subgroups of an ethnolinguistic group are listed only if population data for them are available.

Table Two: Ethnic and Ethnolinguistic Composition of Ghana

Ethnolinguistic Group/Ethnic Group	Percent of Total Population, 1960[a]	Percent of Total Population, 2000[b]	Pre-colonial ICJH[c]	Contemporary ICJH[d]
Akan Ethnolinguistic Group, Minus Asante	30.8	34.3	3, on average	3, on average
1. Fante	10.5	9.9	3	3
2. Agona	0.7	1.4	NA	NA
3. Ahafo	0.3	1.1	NA	NA
4. Ahanta	1.0	1.5	NA	NA
5. Akuapem	2.2	2.9	NA	NA
6. Akwamu	0.2	0.6	NA	NA
7. Akyem	3.1	3.4	3	3
8. Aowin	0.2	0.6	NA	NA
9. Assin (Assin)	0.6	0.8	3	3
10. Boron (Brong), including Banda	4.8	4.6	NA	NA
11. Chokosi	0.2	0.4	NA	NA
12. Denkyira	0.5	0.5	NA	NA
13. Evalue	0.0	0.1	NA	NA
14. Kwahu	2.0	1.9	NA	NA
15. Nzema	1.7	1.2	NA	NA
16. Sefwi	1.1	1.2	NA	NA
17. Wassa	1.4	1.4	NA	NA
18. Akan, Not Specified	0.4	0.8	NA	NA
Asante Ethnic Group	13.3	14.8	4[g]	4
Ewe-Fon Ethnolinguistic Group (Individual Ethnic Groups not Specified)	13	12.7	2 to 3, on average	3, on average
Mole-Dagbani Ethnolinguistic Group	15.9	16.5		
1. Dagbamba[f]/Dagomba[f]	3.2	4.3	4	At least 3
2. Mamprusi	0.9	1.1	3	3
3. Wala	0.7	1	3	3
4. Mossi	1.6	NA	4	At least 3
5. Nanumba	0.2	0.5	3	3
6. Dagarti	3.0	3.7	2	
7. Farefare[e]: includes the Talensi[f], Gurune, Nankani and Nabt (Frafra, Tallensi, Guerensi, Nankanni and Nabdam)	3.6	NA	1	
8. Kusasi[f]	1.8	2.2	1	
9. Builsa[f]/Bulisa[f]	0.9	0.7	1	

a. *1960 Population Census of Ghana, Special Report E, Tribes in Ghana*. Accra, Ghana: Census Office, 1964.
b. *2000 Population and Housing Census: Summary Report of Final Results*. Accra, Ghana: Ghana Statistical Service, 2002.
c. Unless otherwise noted, ICJH scores obtained from Patrick J. Grey. 1991. "A Corrected Ethnographic Atlas," *World Cultures*, Vol. 10, #1
d. See Table 6.
e. The ethnic group's name of their language. From www.ethnologue.com
f. The ethnic group's name of their group. From www.ethnologue.com
g. Grey (1991) lists the Ashanti as an ICJH of level 3. I recode this as 4 because as I explain below, the Asantehene assumes a fourth level of hierarchy over many paramount chiefs.

II.   Macro-Analytic Narrative

In section two, I utilize an analytic narrative to examine the delegation relationships between the state, traditional leaders/institutions and their local communities from the establishment of colonial rule in the late 19th century to the present. The analysis asserts that chiefs are agents of two principals, the state and their community. Furthermore, it asserts that the institutions within a hierarchical chiefdom screen, select, monitor, and check their agents. These institutional mechanisms generate incentives for traditional leaders to respond to community preferences. In responding to those preferences, leaders of hierarchical traditional institutions can leverage a great deal of authority against the state. This section is the most underdeveloped of the chapter. What I present here should be taken with a grain of salt, because I have not verified all the statements I make below. The analysis will include a discussion of:

1. Colonial rule. Britain minimized the costs of colonial rule by nesting traditional institutions into the colonial state. To control chiefs, it asserted the right to dismiss traditional leaders who did not comply with the colonial state. Monitoring was poor, though, and traditional leaders during this period did accommodate community preferences: institutions within these chiefdoms, such as Asafo companies, provided mechanisms to check and remove unpopular traditional leaders, which generates incentives to comply. When coca prices fell in the late 20s and 30s, for example, chiefs sided with community preferences and organized mass hold-ups of the crop. When younger, more educated individuals agitated against various aspects of colonial-chiefly rule, many chiefs, threatened with dismissal (destoolment or deskinment), accommodated at least some of their demands. Overall, traditional leaders had substantial authority over their respective areas, rather than Britain.

2. CPP and Nkrumah era (1950's to 1966). Because socialism heavily influenced Nkrumah and the CPP, they were hostile to chiefs, labeling them as feudal. CPP support came from "youngmen." The term refers to several things. According to modernization scholars, youngmen means younger, more

educated, less traditional, more individualistic people. In Ghana, however, the term has special significance, as it is a rough translation of Akan terms which refer to individuals who are not part of the royal clan (chiefs are selected from members of the royal clan). During this period, a fundamental cleavage in Ghanaian politics developed which pitted most chiefs (and traditionalists) against the CPP. The Asantehene (paramount chief of the Asante confederation of chiefdoms) and others organized a party, the National Liberation Movement (NLM), to oppose the CPP in elections. They were especially critical of CPP plans to indirectly tax the export of cocoa. The NLM formed alliances across other hierarchical traditional leaders in the country, such as other Akan chiefdoms and the Mole-Dagbani chiefdoms. When the NLM lost the elections, the Asantehene pressed Britain and the CPP for a federal constitution. Activism in the Ashanti region forced a compromise, in which Regional Houses of Chiefs were established. Once Ghana became independent, Nkrumah quickly moved to suppress the NLM and the authority of chiefs. He was, to a large extent, successful. The bargain established to set up Houses of Chiefs was revoked, and Nkrumah intimidated and dismissed non-compliant chiefs.

3. (1966 to 1982). My knowledge of chieftaincy during this period is somewhat spotty, but following the coup which removed Nkrumah, chiefs threw their support behind the National Liberation Council (NLC), headed by Kofi A. Busia. The Regional Houses of Chiefs were again implemented. The constitution to return Ghana to democratic rule guaranteed the institutions of chieftaincy. Government still asserted authority over the recognition of chiefs by requiring official gazetting of traditional leaders elected by their communities. Busia set up the Progress Party (PP), which was the successor to the NLM. He won the elections, largely with the support of chiefs - the party carried all the seats in the Ashanti region.

4. The Rawlings regime (1982-1992). Jerry Rawlings was, like Nkrumah, a leftist. He attempted to generate grassroots participation through the reform of local-level governance. Peoples Defense Committees (PDCs), Citizens Vetting Committees (DVCs), Regional Defense Committees (RDCs) and National Defense Committees (NDCs) were established to encourage participation. This threatened the authority of traditional leaders. Most of these committees were hostile to traditional leaders and their respective chiefdoms.

5. 1992 to Present. Traditional institutions are still powerful. The 1992 Constitution again guarantees chieftaincy, has provisions which allow chiefs to mobilize communal labor, continues the Regional Houses of Chiefs, and grants chiefs sole authority over "customary" issues. This means several things: government no longer has the right to interfere with the selection and recognition of a chief; chiefs control property rights to communal land; chiefs are law-makers with respect to customary law; chiefs can effectively block the actions of District Councils and District Assemblies, which are the local-level state institutions. The National and Regional Houses of Chiefs are powerful institutions which the state has little control over. In essence, as other scholars have pointed out, Ghana has divided sovereignty, and traditional institutions now parallel state institutions up to the national level (the National House of Chiefs). Table three presents the membership, and territorial extent of the Regional Houses.

Table 3: Regional Houses of Chiefs in Ghana

Region	Area (km^2)	Membership	Avg. Area Represented by a Member (km^2)
Ashanti	24,390	36 traditional councils, each headed by a paramount chief (omanhene)[ec] The Asantehene is the permanent president of the House	678 Asantehene: 24,390
Brong-Ahafo	39,557	43 members (not clear if these are Paramountcies)[a]	920
Central	9,826	32 traditional areas/paramountcies[a]	307
Eastern	19,223	11 traditional areas (not clear if these are paramountcies)[a]	1,748
Greater Accra	3,245	NA	
Northern	70,384 (34,000 is inundated)	5 paramount chiefs[g]. Four are the paramounts of the hierarchical chiefdoms: the Nayiri (Mamprusi), the Ya Na (Dagomba), the Bimbilla Na (Nanumba), and the Yagbumwura (Gonja). The Mo ethnic group obtained Paramount status just before the 1992 Constitution went into effect[f].	7,277 (non-inundated area)
Upper East	8,842	6 paramount chiefs	1,474
Upper West	18,476	NA	
Volta	20,334	15 traditional councils, represented by 15 paramount chiefs, with 17 rotating members from 17 rotating groups (a traditional council is composed of several traditional areas)[bc] 118 traditional areas[d]	Traditional Councils: 1,356 Traditional Areas: 172
Western	23,921	21 traditional councils, each headed by a paramount chief (omanhene)[a]	1,139

a. Ghana High Commission in Ottawa, Canada. http://www.ghanahighcommission-canada.com/corp-e-land-people.html
b. Another Source lists 20 Traditional Councils and 20 Paramount Chiefs for the Volta Regional House of Chiefs. Because these claims were made by activists of the Konkomba ethnic group in the north, I am inclined to discount them in favor of http://www.ghanadistricts.com/. Pul, Hippolyt A. S. 2003. "Exclusion, Association and Violence: Trends and Triggers in Northern Ghana's Konkomba-Dagomba Wars," The African Antrhopologist, Vol. 10, #1, pp. 39-82.
c. http://www.ghanadistricts.com/
d. Ghana News Agency (GNA). 12/20/2003. "Minister Advises Chiefs on Issue of Elevation." http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/regional/artikel.php?ID=48614
e. Another Source lists 30 Paramountcies for the Ashanti Regional house of Chiefs. Because these claims were made by activists of the Konkomba ethnic group in the north, I am inclined to discount them in favor of http://www.ghanadistricts.com/. Pul, Hippolyt A. S. 2003. "Exclusion, Association and Violence: Trends and Triggers in Northern Ghana's Konkomba-Dagomba Wars," *The African Antrhopologist*, Vol. 10, #1, pp. 39-82.
f. Pul, Hippolyt A. S. 2003. "Exclusion, Association and Violence: Trends and Triggers in Northern Ghana's Konkomba-Dagomba Wars," The African Antrhopologist, Vol. 10, #1, pp. 39-82.
g. As of the 1994-5 Konkomba-Dagomba war, 13 (mainly acephalous) ethnic groups were not given paramount status and were thus excluded from the Northern Region House of Chiefs (Pul 2003). Following this war, the House agreed to expand membership (i.e., give paramount status) to some of these ethnic groups. As of 2004, this reconstitution of membership was still in process. Ghana News Agency (GNA). 8/4/2004. "Pass LI reconstituting NR House of Chiefs - Yagbon-wura." http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=63261. Ghana News Agency (GNA). 8/12/2003. "GTZ organizes alternative conflict resolution workshop for Northern Chiefs." http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/regional/artikel.php?ID=41038&nav=next.

III.   Public Goods Provision by Traditional Institutions In Ghana

In section three, I examine the range of local-public goods provided by traditional institutions. Some of these that I will address are:

1. Local policing. Punishment for minor offenses, especially those violating customary laws, is meted out, while serious crimes, such as murder, are handed over to the state police.

2. Fire protection. Chiefs organize protection from bush fires and fires within the village.

3. Village infrastructure and upkeep. Chiefs organize communal labor for the cleaning and repairing of village and town infrastructure. This is especially common before religious festivals, when purification of the village is called for.

4. Maintenance of local roads, wells and sanitation. Chiefs organize the maintenance of non-paved roads and footpaths, local wells and watering holes, and pit latrines. The Asantehene negotiated with the World Bank for a grant of 20 million dollars, and technical assistance, for water and sanitation under the Bank's traditional authorities program.

5. Education infrastructure. A large number of schools in Ghana are built using communal labor mobilized by the chief. Traditional councils collect contributions to provide scholarships for gifted individuals. For example, the Asantehene negotiated with the World Bank for a donation of five million dollars (30 billion cedis) to the Otumfuo Education Fund. Founded in 1999 by the Asantehene (Otumfuo Osei Tutu II), it has since 2001 spent about 184 million cedis ($62,372)[4] on scholarships for over 300 basic school pupils from the Ashanti region. The fund has also spent over 591 million cedis ($200,339) on scholarships for approximately 900 senior secondary school students and about 100 students in tertiary institutions. The Fund also provides money for school construction and supplies like desks: 2000 have been provided since 2001. All of this money is distributed only in the Ashanti region.

6. *De facto* but not *de jure* judicial adjudication. While chiefs are not formally part of Ghana's judicial system, a very large number of cases (probably the plurality, if not the majority) are adjudicated by chiefs. Traditional adjudication can competes with the state courts primarily due to cost, but also due to the legitimacy of traditional leaders and customary law. Most individuals cannot afford the fees,

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[4] The US Dollar – Ghanaian Cedi exchange rate was 2,360 on January 1, 1999 and 3,540 on December 31, 1999. I average these two figures, reaching a rate of 2,950 Cedis to the Dollar. All subsequent conversions are based on this rate. However, the Cedi has depreciated considerably from 1999 to the present – using an average of exchange rates for 2006, this sum is only $20,000. http://www.oanda.com/convert/fxhistory

fines and lawyers associated with state courts. Chiefs are also law-makes with respect to customary law.

7. Property rights in land. While the ownership and sale of land is increasingly commercialized, chiefs still own and allocate property rights in land. Land sales are typically approved by the traditional leader of the region, and a small fee is paid to him. For the Asantehene, as Berry notes (2001), this includes the town of Kumasi, the capital of the Ashanti region and the capital of the Asante confederation. Kumasi is an urban city with a population of roughly 2.5 million.

8. Traditional religious functions, including annual religious and harvest festivals, witchcraft adjudication, and rituals associated with ancestral rites. This is the core basis for the legitimacy of traditional institutions, and it is a sector that the state cannot compete with.

9. Activism against foreign mining. Many chiefs in the Akan regions mobilize community activism against mining operations because of the environmental damage, state appropriation of communal land, and potentially adverse health effects. I'm slowly going through the data on this, but it seems that many chiefs are successful. One report I read indicated that the chiefs and the community successfully prevented a company from occupying its concession several years ago, with no resolution at present.

In addition to these public goods and services, traditional institutions also perform other tasks that are associated with governance:

1. Taxation. Data on this is spotty, but chiefs obtain revenue through the collection of fees and fines for the services provided above, as well as voluntary contributions (Englebert 2002, Trager 2001). They also assess tribute, most often in the form of a share of a farmer's crop. According to Ray (2001), a region of the Gonja Chiefdom (not part of the 4 ethnic/ethnolinguistic groups I analyze in the chapter) in the 1980's collected from one twelfth to one sixteenth (8.3% to 6.25%) of farmer's crops. By contrast, the state's collection of direct taxes (income, profits, and capital gains) was an average of 2.03% of GDP from 1972 to 1993.

2. Coercion. While my theory emphasizes the benefits chiefs provide their members in exchange for authority, coercion is also levied. Villages in Gonja that did not comply with demands for tribute were razed to the ground by traditional leaders. While traditional leaders cannot threaten the coercive capacity of the state, they do threaten the state's monopoly over coercion in their respective areas.

IV. Micro-Evidence of Preferences for Governance by Traditional Institutions

In this section, I examine the third aspect of my hypothesis by examining individual preferences for governance by chiefs, *and* by examining preference divergence across Ghana's ethnic and ethnolinguistic groups. According to the logic of my hypothesis, individuals living under hierarchical traditional institutions should prefer governance by chiefs, and they should do so more than individuals living under non-hierarchical traditional institutions. Additionally, where traditional leaders are particularly vigorous in providing services to their communities, such as the subsistence farming sector, we should observe greater preferences for governance by chiefs. Finally, we should observe preference divergence across Ghana's ethnic and ethnolinguistic groups for specific public goods, after controlling for other socio-economic factors such as age, gender, education, etc., thereby indicating the difficulty a state has with respect to competing with an ethnic or ethnolinguistic group's provision of that specific good. I examine preferences for governance by chiefs using the survey results of Abotchie (1997), and by using the *1999 Ghana Afrobarometer Survey* data. I examine preference divergence of a specific public service – administration of property rights in land – across ethnic and ethnolinguistic groups in Ghana, again using the *1999 Ghana Afrobarometer Survey* data.

Abotchie (1997) surveyed 335 southern Ewe to examine individual assessment of the efficacy of traditional versus modern methods of crime control. Southern Ewe's are largely represented by the Anlo chiefdom (ICJH =3), as I explained in section one of this chapter. His results are presented below in Table four.

Based on the results of this survey, we can conclude that southern Ewe prefer traditional methods of crime control versus modern, state methods. Eighty-six percent of male adults aged 35 to 55 years and 88 percent of females aged 35 to 55 years favor traditional methods over modern methods. Among individuals aged 18 to 30, 65 percent of males and 73 percent of females favor traditional methods over modern methods. Age plays a role in favoring traditional over modern methods: while only six percent of individuals (males and females) aged 35 to 55 prefer modern methods, 19 percent of individuals aged 18 to 30 prefer modern methods. It is important to note that the entire sample is Christian, given the fact that traditional methods of crime control rest largely on traditional Ewe religious precepts. While this evidence does not directly test my theory, it does indicate that many individuals prefer traditional governance over state governance, at least with respect to crime control among the southern Ewe. In other words, Abotchie's survey indicates that the state faces difficulties in competing with traditional institutions for preferred

provision of public goods and services. To more directly test these indications, I now to turn to an analysis of *Afrobarometer* survey data.

Table 4: The Distribution of Respondents in their Comparative Assessment of the Efficacy of the Traditional and Modern Methods of Crime Control

| Attributes | Age Group of Respondents | | | | Total | Percentage |
| | Adult 35 to 55 | | Youth 18 to 30 | | | |
	Male	Female	Male	Female		
In Favor of Traditional Methods	88 (86%)	73 (88%)	57 (65%)	45 (73%)	263	80
In Favor of the Modern Methods	8 (8%)	4 (5%)	19 (22%)	10 (16%)	41	11.5
Traditional and Modern	6 (6%)	6 (7%)	12 (14%)	7 (11%)	31	9.5
Total	102	83	88	62	335	100

Note: All respondents are Christian (Catholic and Protestant)
          Due to rounding, percentages may not total to 100%
Source: Table Reprinted from Chris Abotchie, *Social Control in Traditional Southern Eweland of Ghana*. 1997. Accra: Ghana
          Universities Press. P. 122.

The *1999 Ghana Afrobarometer* survey includes a question concerning individual's preferences for governance by chiefs, with responses ranging from zero (worst kind of government) to ten (best kind of government)[5]. Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for this question. I utilize this question as my dependent variable (*LikeGovtByChiefs*). It is an excellent proxy for my theory, yet it is only a proxy, for two important reasons. First, the survey question does not ask individuals their preference for governance by chiefs *rather than* by the state. The survey, however, does include a question asking individuals if chiefs and the government are the same or different. A large majority of the sample (76%) responded that chiefs are different from the government.[6] I include this dichotomous variable, *ChiefsDifferent* (0 = same, 1 = different) as a control.

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[5] Question 27D of the survey asks: "We are now going to discuss how much you like different kinds of government. I would like you to give marks out of ten. Let us say that the best government gets 10 out of 10 and the worst kind of government gets a mark of only one. What grade would you give to: the traditional system of government by chiefs?" For the codebook to the 1999 Ghana Survey, see Butler and Nadeau, 1999.
[6] Question 18a of the survey specifically asks: "In Ghana, is there a difference between the following organizations or are they the same thing? The chiefs and the government."

Table 5: "What grade would you give to: the traditional system of government by chiefs?"

LikeGovtByChiefs	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
1 (worst kind of government)	322	16.23	16.23
2	185	9.32	25.55
3	156	7.86	33.42
4	238	12.00	45.41
5	385	19.41	64.82
6	201	10.13	74.95
7	114	5.75	80.70
8	126	6.35	87.05
9	60	3.02	90.07
10 (best kind of government)	197	9.93	100.00
Total	1,984	100.00	100.00

Second, the construct of the survey question does not distinguish between paramount chiefs (ICJH=3), divisional chiefs (ICJH=2) or village chiefs (ICJH=1). Non-hierarchical (stateless) traditional institutions do have chiefs at the village level (ICJH=1), and members of these traditional institutions may prefer governance by tem. To test my theory, we need to compare the magnitudes of the regression coefficients to assess if hierarchical ethnic and ethnolinguistic groups prefer governance by chiefs *more than* non-hierarchical groups.

I proxy the hierarchy of traditional institutions by using a combination of regional dummies and the language respondents use most often[7]. My reasons for doing so are based on an attempt to minimize, as much as possible, the ecological inference problem. While Ghana's ethnic and ethnolinguistic groups are highly concentrated in many of the country's ten regions[8], no ethnic or ethnolinguistic group forms the entire population of a region. Responses of individuals from a different ethnic or ethnolinguistic group sampled from the region may bias the aggregate effects of a regional dummy that proxies the hierarchy of the dominant ethnic or ethnolinguistic group's traditional institutions. Additionally, the hierarchical Mole-

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[7] Question 1 of the survey asks: "Which Ghanaian language do you speak most often?" The variable *Region* is coded by the interviewer.

[8] According to the 2000 census, 71% of the Western region's population is non-Asante Akan (7.3% of the region is Asante); 79.5 percent of the Central region is non-Asante Akan (2.5% is Asante); 61.5% of the Ashanti region is Asante (16.4% of the region is non-Asante Akan); and 68.5% of the Volta region is Ewe. See Ghana, 2002.

Dagbani and the stateless ethnic and ethnolinguistic groups of Ghana cannot be proxied by regional dummies, as they do not form large majorities of a specific region[9].

On the other hand, using the respondent's language is also problematic because the language spoken most often may not accurately identify the ethnic or ethnolinguistic group the respondent is a member of. Language is especially suspect with the government-sponsored[10], hegemonic, trade language of Akan, which constitutes 60% of the survey's sample. Many non-Akan, living in regions where the Akan language is predominant, may speak Akan most often. This is especially problematic considering the fact that Ghana's most important export crop, cocoa, is produced in regions where the Akan language often predominates. Cocoa draws a large amount of migrant and settlement labor from non-Akan areas, especially from the north. Thus respondents who indicate Akan as their language spoken most often may not actually be members of the Akan ethnolinguistic group. Additionally, we cannot separate the Ashanti ethnic group from other Akan ethnic groups based on language. Finally, a respondent's language does not guarantee that (s)he is living under the ethnic or ethnolinguistic group's traditional institutions: (s)he may be living outside the area of the traditional institution, such as the capital (Accra), or another region.

I have thus chosen to proxy the hierarchy of ethnic and ethnolinguistic groups utilizing a combination of regional and language data. First, I assume that speaking a language that is not of an individual's respective ethnic or ethnolinguistic group is most likely for the hegemonic language of Akan. In other words, the bias introduced from language identification is most likely one-way: an individual listing a language other than Akan is more likely to be a member of the language's ethnic and ethnolinguistic group. This is especially true with respect to respondents whose reported language constitutes a small percentage of the overall language population. It is unlikely that respondents whose ethnic or ethnolinguistic group differs from these languages would primarily speak them.

Second, to identify individuals who live under their respective traditional institutions, rather than other regions of Ghana, I create dummy variables for individuals who speak an ethnic or ethnolinguistic group's language *and* who were sampled in the region where that ethnic or ethnolinguistic group's traditional institutions are concentrated. For example, the dummy variable *EweVolta* (0 = no, 1 = yes) indicates Ewe speakers who were sampled from the Volta region, where the Ewe chiefdoms are located. For the

[9] Only 46% of the Northern region is hierarchical Mole-Dagbani (34.2% Dagomba, 7.6% Mamprusi, 2.6% Nanumba and 0.4% Wala). Likewise, only 17.8% of the Upper West region is non-hierarchical Stateless (57.5% Dagarti Semi-Hierarchical): (16% Sisala, 0.5% Kasena, 0.5% Nabdom, 0.3% Vagala, 0.2% Builsa, 0.2% Kusasi, and 0.1% Nankansi). 57.5% Dagarti and thus semi-hierarchical (ICJH =2). 78.6% of the Upper East is inhabited by non-hierarchical ethnic groups (30.5% Nabdom, 22.6% Kusasi, 9.2% Nankansi and Gurensi, 7.6% Builsa, 6.5% Kasena, 1.1% Vagala, 0.9% Dagarti, and 0.2% Sisala). See Ghana, 2002.
[10] Ghana has nine national, "government-sponsored," African languages: Akan, Daagare/Waale, Dangbe, Dagbane, Ewe, Ga, Gonja, Kasem and Nzema. See languages at www.Ghanaweb.com.

hierarchical Mole-Dagbani, the dummy variable *HierarchicalMole* (0 = no, 1 = yes) indicates Dagbane[11], Mampruli[12], and Wali[13] speakers who were sampled in the Brong-Ahafo, Northern, Upper East and Upper West regions, where the Dagomba, Mamprusi, Nanumba and Wala chiefdoms are located[14]. For the non-hierarchical Kusasi (ICJH = 1), the dummy variable *KusasiUEUW* (0 = no, 1 = yes) indicates Kusasi speakers who were sampled in the Upper East and Upper West regions, where the ethnic group resides[15]. For the non-hierarchical Frafra (ICJH =1), the dummy variable *FrafraUE* (0 = no, 1 = yes) indicates Frafra[16] speakers who were sampled in the Upper East regions, where the ethnic group resides[17]. For the nonhierarchical Konkomba (ICJH = 1), the dummy variable *KonkombaNBA* (0 = no, 1 = yes) indicates Konkomba speakers who were sampled in the Northern and Brong-Ahafo regions, where the ethnic group resides[18].

To separate the Akan chiefdoms from the Asante confederation, the dummy variable *AkanCentral* (0 = no, 1 = yes) indicates Akan speakers who were sampled in the Central region. I have chosen this region to represent the Akan chiefdoms, as opposed to the Western region, because it has the largest concentration of non-Asante Akan residing in it. The Central region is 79.5% non-Asante Akan and 2.5% Asante, while 71% of the Western region is non-Asante Akan and 7.3% Asante (Ghana, 2002). By coding for Akan-speaking respondents from the Central region, the likelihood of sampling Asante Akan is minimized as much as

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[11] The codebook for the Ghana 1999 Afrobarometer lists the language of the Dagomba and Nanumba ethnic groups as Dangbane. According to Ethnologue, and the list of languages posted on Ghanaweb, this language is more appropriately spelled Dagbane/Dagbani. www.ethnologue.com and www.ghanaweb.com.

[12] The codebook for the Ghana 1999 Afrobarometer lists the language of the Mamprusi ethnic group as Mamprulni. According to Ethnologue, and the list of languages posted on Ghanaweb, this language is more appropriately spelled Mampruli. www.ethnologue.com and www.ghanaweb.com.

[13] The codebook for the Ghana 1999 Afrobarometer lists the language of the Wala ethnic group as Waale. According to Ethnologue, and the list of languages posted on Ghanaweb, this language is more appropriately spelled Wali. www.ethnologue.com and www.ghanaweb.com.

[14] For the Dagomba, 79.6% reside in the Northern region, 3.7% in Brong-Ahafo, 0.9% in Upper East and 0.4% in Upper West. For the Mamprusi, 66.1% reside in the Northern Region, 7.7% in Brong-Ahafo, 7.5% in Upper East and 0.3% in Upper West. For the Nanumba, who also speak the Dagbane language, 57.6% reside in the Northern region, 7.4% in Upper East, 2.4% in Brong-Ahafo, and 1.8% in Upper West. For the Wala, 51.6% reside in the Upper West region, 17.2% in Brong-Ahafo, 4.5% in Northern, and 1.1% in Upper East. See Ghana, 2002.

[15] 50.8% of the Kusasi reside in the Upper East region and 22.6% in Upper West. See Ghana, 2002.

[16] Farefare

[17] The Frafra (Farefare) language is spoken by a number of ethnic groups (Talensi/Tallensi, Gurune/Guerensi, Nankani/Nankanni, and Nabt/Nabdom/Namnam). While the 1960 census lists the Frafra as a tribe, with 77.7% residing in the Northern region, the 2000 census breaks this category down into separate groups, yet only lists the Nabdom, and the Nankani and Gurense. Furthermore, the Northern region from the 1960 census now corresponds with the Northern, Upper West and Upper East regions. For the Nabdom (Namnam), 60.9% reside in the Upper East region, 4.9% in the Northern, and 0.6% in Upper West. For the Nankani and Gurense, 84% reside in the Upper East region, 1.9% in the Northern, and 0.6% in Upper West. I have thus decided to code this variable only for Frafra speakers in the Upper East region. Of 45 Frafra speakers sampled in the 1999 Ghana Afrobarometer survey, 34 were sampled from the Upper East, 0 from the Upper West and 1 from the Northern region. See Ghana, 1964 and 2002.

[18] 64.4% of the Konkomba ethnic group resides in the Northern region, and 11% in Brong-Ahafo. See Ghana, 2002.

possible. For the Asante ethnic group, the dummy variable *AsanteAkan* (0 = no, 1 = yes) indicates Akan speakers who were sampled in the Ashanti region, where the Asante confederation of chiefdoms is located. This variable potentially introduces the most bias with respect to ecological inference, as the survey provides no way to separate the Asante ethnic group from Akan speakers. While 61.5% of the Ashanti region is inhabited by the Asante ethnic group, an additional 16.4% of the region is inhabited by non-Asante Akan (Ghana, 2002). The Asante confederation of chiefdoms, though, does encompass the entire region, with the Asantehene as the permanent president of the Ashanti Regional House of Chiefs (see Table 6).

As I explain in sections two and three of this chapter, traditional institutions provide a large range of goods and services to predominantly poor, rural individuals, especially farmers. They are also active in the mining sector because foreign mining raises community concerns surrounding land ownership, environmental degradation, and health. We therefore should observe greater preferences for governance by chiefs amongst farmers and miners. I utilize six variables to measure these two sectors: *urbanrural* is a dummy variable (0 = urban, 1 = rural), completed by the survey supervisor[19], indicating whether the respondent is from an urban or rural locale; *farmer* (0 = no, 1 = yes) indicates whether the respondent is a farmer; and *miner* (0 = no, 1 = yes) indicates whether the respondent is a miner[20]. To target poor farmers, I coded[21] three dummy variables: *farmer0* (0 = no, 1=yes) indicates farmers (and their spouses) whose monthly earnings are reported as none[22]; *farmer1* (0 = no, 1 = yes) indicates farmers (and their spouses) whose monthly earnings are reported as less than 50,000 cedis ($17)[23]; *farmer2* (0 = no, 1 = yes) indicates farmers (and their spouses) whose monthly earnings are from 51,000-100,000 cedis ($17 - $34)[24].

Additional variables are utilized to control for socioeconomic factors: *gender* is a dummy variable (0 = male, 1 = female), indicating the respondent's sex; *age* is a continuous variable, ranging from 18 to 98; *yearseducation*[25] is a continuous variable, ranging from zero to 28; and *EarningsPerMonth*[26] is an ordinal variable, indicating the earnings of the respondent and his/her spouse: 0 = none; 1 = less than 50,000 cedis

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[19] The *urbanrural* corresponds with the variable *urbrur2* in the dataset. I have chosen this variable over the variable *urbrur1*, which codes for urban/rural locales based on GSS data. See Butler and Nadeau, 1999.

[20] Both variables were coded from Question 70 in the dataset, which asks respondents their occupation. Only three Miners are in the sample, one from the Brong-Ahafo region, one from the Ashanti region, and one from the Eastern region. All three are Akan-speakers. 1 Miner makes 51,000-100,000 cedis per month; 1 makes 101,000-300,000 cedis per month; and 1 earns nothing per month. 656 respondents list farming as their occupation. See Butler and Nadeau, 1999.

[21] Codings based on Question Number 70 and 89 of the dataset.

[22] 83 out of 654 farmers (13%) reported their monthly earnings as none. 2 farmers did not report their monthly earnings.

[23] 260 out of 654 farmers (40%) reported their monthly earnings as less than $17. The US Dollar – Ghanaian Cedi exchange rate was 2,360 on January 1, 1999 and 3,540 on December 31, 1999. I average these two figures, reaching a rate of 2,950 Cedis to the Dollar. All subsequent conversions are based on this rate. http://www.oanda.com/convert/fxhistory

[24] 168 out of 654 (26%) farmers reported their monthly earnings as between $17 and $34.

[25] Question Number 3 of the dataset. See Butler and Nadeau, 1999

[26] Question Number 89 of the dataset. See Butler and Nadeau, 1999.

(<$17); 2 = 51,000-100,000 cedis ($17-$34); 3 = 101,000-300,000 cedis ($34 - $102); 4 = 301,000-500,000 cedis ($102 - $170); 5 = 501,000-700,000 cedis ($170 - $237); 6 = 701,000-1,000,000 cedis ($237-$339); and 7 = 1-5 million cedis ($339 - $1,695)[27]. I recode this variable into a series of dummy variables, using 2 (51,000-100,000 cedis) as the reference category in my model (*EarningsPerMonth2*).

Table 6 presents the regression results of three models, using robust standard errors and a pweight for gender. Across all three models, the constant is significant ($p < .001$), and is located approximately at the median of the dependent variable. The coefficients for *AkanCentral* are slightly positive yet insignificant across all three models. The coefficients for *EweVolta* are positive and significant ($p < .05$). On average, members of the hierarchical Ewe chiefdoms prefer governance by chiefs by an additional .5, or an additional 5% of the dependent variable's range. Coefficients for *AsanteAkan* are also positive across all three models, yet only marginally significant at the 95% level ($p = .055$) in the third model. On average, members of the Asante confederation appear to prefer chiefly governance by an additional third of a point, or 3%. Coefficients for *HierarchicalMole* are positive and significant ($p < .001$) across all three models. On average, members of the Mole-Dagbani chiefdoms prefer chiefly governance by an additional point, or 10%.

For the non-hierarchical proxies – *KonkombaBAN*, *KusasiUEUW*, and *FraFraUE* – all coefficients are positive, yet significant only for *KusasiUEUW* ($p < .05$). The magnitude for *KusasiUEUW* is approximately 1.5 points, or 15% of the dependent variable's range. These results, however, are suspect due to the fact that that only two Kusasi from the Upper East and Upper West regions were sampled. These two observations exhibit high leverage and high influence.

Overall, my theory's predictions with respect to the effect of hierarchy on preferences for chiefly governance are confirmed, yet not strongly. Two of the four hierarchical ethnic and ethnolinguistic groups – the Ewe and Mole-Dagbani – significantly prefer governance by chiefs greater than the average. Members of the third hierarchical ethnic group, Asante, prefer governance by chiefs greater than the average, yet with marginal significance. The third hierarchical group, the Akan, do not.

In sectors where traditional institutions are most active in the provision of public goods and services, the evidence suggests that individuals in those sectors significantly prefer governance by chiefs. Once we control for other socioeconomic factors, poor farmers significantly prefer governance by chiefs, while overall, farmers do not. In the third model, farmers who reported earning nothing a month significantly ($p < .05$) prefer chiefly governance by an additional .5 (1.075 for *Farmer0* - .501 for *Farmer*), or an additional

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[27] The question has an eighth category (over 5 million cedis), but it is not present in the dataset. I Assume that no respondent in the survey listed earnings over 5 million cedis.

5% of the dependent variable's range. These results seem especially strong given that non-farmers who reported earning of nothing per month significantly ($p < .05$) dislike governance by chiefs by approximately .6 of a point, or 6% of the dependant variable's range. Farmers earning less than 50,000 cedis ($17) a month significantly ($p < .05$) prefer chiefly governance by approximately an additional 2%. Farmers earning from 51,000-100,000 cedis ($17 - $34) a month prefer chiefly governance by approximately an additional an additional 1.5%, and this result is significant at the 90% confidence level.

Likewise, miners significantly ($p < .05$ in model 3) prefer governance by chiefs, with a magnitude of approximately 3.6 points, or 36% of the range of the dependent variable. The results, however, are suspect, as only three miners were sampled in the survey. These observations have high leverage and high influence.

Overall, my theory's predictions with respect to the effect of public goods and services provision on preferences for chiefly governance are confirmed. While the Miner variable is highly suspect, the variables for poor farmers are not. In areas where chiefs are most involved in providing public goods and services, namely the subsistence agricultural sector, individuals prefer governance by chiefs.

Table 6: Preferences for Governance by Chiefs in Ghana

	Dependent Variable: LikeGovtByChiefs (0 = "Worst Kind of Government, 10 = "Best Kind"		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	LikeGovtByChiefs	LikeGovtByChiefs	LikeGovtByChiefs
ChiefsDifferent	-0.544	-0.508	-0.446
	(0.000)***	(0.001)***	(0.004)***
AkanCentral	0.099	0.060	0.058
	(0.610)	(0.759)	(0.768)
EweVolta	0.512	0.515	0.521
	(0.040)**	(0.041)**	(0.041)**
AsanteAkan	0.343	0.344	0.381
	(0.082)*	(0.085)*	(0.055)*
HierarchicalMole	1.027	1.026	1.017
	(0.006)***	(0.006)***	(0.007)***
KonkombaBAN	0.386	0.248	0.283
	(0.445)	(0.637)	(0.589)
KusasiUEUW	1.479	1.594	1.523
	(0.038)**	(0.027)**	(0.028)**
FraFraUE	0.792	0.721	0.698
	(0.082)*	(0.120)	(0.133)
urbanrural		0.049	0.040
		(0.730)	(0.782)
Farmer0		0.415	1.075
		(0.305)	(0.020)**
Farmer1		0.682	0.730
		(0.019)**	(0.042)**
Farmer2		0.563	0.653
		(0.073)*	(0.080)*
Farmer		-0.173	-0.501
		(0.491)	(0.066)*
Miner		3.627	3.647
		(0.009)***	(0.017)**
gender			-0.134
			(0.311)
age			0.011
			(0.025)**
yearseducation			-0.021
			(0.102)
EarningsPerMonth0			-0.627
			(0.013)**
EarningsPerMonth1			0.016
			(0.945)
EarningsPerMonth3			0.131
			(0.540)
EarningsPerMonth4			0.003
			(0.991)
EarningsPerMonth5			-0.052
			(0.927)
EarningsPerMonth6			-1.037
			(0.194)
EarningsPerMonth7			-0.765
			(0.078)*
Constant	5.065	4.914	4.853
	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***
Observations	1935	1935	1935
R-squared	0.016	0.024	0.036

Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Robust p values in parentheses

Model includes pweight for gender

Note: I have not been able to complete the final stats for this section. The survey asks individuals if land should be owned by the community and allocated by chiefs[28]. This ordinal variable (1 = strongly agree, 2 = somewhat agree, 3 = somewhat disagree, 4 = strongly disagree) will be used to test for preference divergence across Ghana's 4 hierarchical ethnic and ethnolinguistic groups, and across the non-hierarchical Komkomba and Frafra. I tested whether the proportional odds assumption of ordinal logistic regression is met, and it is not. I'm currently learning how to compute and interpret a generalized ordinal logistic regression model (gologit2). The descriptive stats for the question are:

Table Seven: Should Chief's Own Land?

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Agree	919	45.88	45.88
Somewhat Agree	297	14.83	60.71
Somewhat Disagree	235	11.73	72.44
Strongly Disagree	552	27.56	100.00
Total	2,003	100.00	100.00

Potential Questions for Discussion

1. The dependent variable of this case study is not precisely defined. While the large-n chapter of the dissertation will define state weakness as being an inability to directly tax, the case study implicitly has a broader definition of state weakness. As far as I know, I cannot obtain regional information on taxes in Ghana. I'd like input on whether or not you think this is a problem.
2. I've been trying to revise the theory into a parsimonious, coherent whole that can be summarized in a few sentences. The problem is that the theory relies on three different things: a principal-agent argument (hierarchies have incentives to respond to community preferences); a capacity argument (hierarchies can respond to community preferences, which gives them greater authority); and a preference-divergence argument (when preferences diverge across groups, the state has trouble providing preferred public goods/services). The intro to this chapter represents the latest revision to the theory. I have merged the first 2 arguments, and revised the theory into a two-way-table. Yet the chapter is organized according to the three-fold logic. I'd like some comments about any/all problems you see with this.
3. The stats I present assume that the dependent variable (LikeGovtByChiefs) is continuous, and it is not. I tested whether the proportional odds assumption of ordinal logistic regression is met, and it is not. I'm currently learning how to compute and interpret a generalized ordinal logistic regression model (gologit2). I know that the best model is generalized ordinal logistic regression, yet the interpretation of the results is less intuitive for the reader. In your opinion, can I present these stats as they are, or should I rerun the model using gologit2?

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[28] Question 43A of the survey asks: "I am now going to give you several pairs of statements. Please tell me which one you agree with most. Choose Statement A or Statement B. A. In rural areas, land should be owned by the community and allocated by the chiefs. B. People should be able to own their own land, including buying and selling it, even in rural areas." Then, the enumerator probed, "Do you agree strongly or just somewhat?"