

**Beating Reform:  
The Resurgence of Parties in Presidential Nominations, 1980 to 2000**

by  
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**Abstract**

This paper argues that the Democratic and Republican parties have beaten back the reforms of the McGovern-Fraser commission and regained control of presidential nominations. Not only have parties effectively controlled outcomes from 1980 to the present; they also seem to have been capable of coordinated action in selecting nominees. The principal evidence for the study consists of data on the public endorsements of party leaders in the period of the so-called Invisible Primary, which is roughly the calendar year prior to the election.

Parties are, to be sure, organizationally different than they were in the pre-reform period. They now operate as loose networks of office holders, activists, and other committed partisans, and exert power through influence or control over various scarce electoral resources, including funds, credible cues, and expertise. Party resources convey to chosen candidates an edge that permits them to prevail in the primary and caucus phase of the process. Party support is not so great that the favored candidate is sure to win. But if candidates have been well chosen, they will not often fail — and none has done so in the last two decades. Thus, in contrast to the wild nominations of the 1970s, the system of presidential primaries has become manageable for leaders of the contemporary Democratic and Republican parties.

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The standard scholarly view of presidential nominations is that the McGovern-Fraser reforms gave voters and the mass media control of the process and dealt party leaders out. We argue that, although accurate for the nominations of the 1970s, this view mischaracterizes the process as it has played out since then. Presidential parties are back. Operating as loose but stable networks of elected officials, fund-raisers, and other activists, the two major parties control the resources candidates need to compete for delegates in state primaries and caucuses. The result is that the candidates favored by party insiders have won every nomination from 1980 to 2000.

Several scholars have noted the success of insider candidates in recent cycles (Busch, 1992; Mayer, 1996, 2001; Hess, 1999), but our claim is larger. We claim that *parties* are responsible for the success of insiders and that parties are again capable of coordinated and strategic action. Their leaders are hard to force onto bandwagons, resistant to ideologues who would divide the party, and willing to pass on their most preferred candidates for the sake of coordinating on someone more broadly acceptable. In short, presidential parties behave the way parties are classically supposed to behave.

An important related development is that media-driven momentum, as emphasized in both popular and scholarly literature, has subsided since the Mondale-Hart contest of 1984. Even when insurgent candidates have managed to pull off upsets in Iowa or New Hampshire, momentum has been nowhere in sight. We make this claim on the basis of a replication and extension of Larry Bartels' (1988) model of the dynamics of presidential primaries in the period 1976 to 1984, as reported in a related project.<sup>1</sup>

None of this is to say that primaries have once again become what Harry Truman called them in the 1950s, "eyewash." It is, moreover, quite true, as Polsby and Wildavsky maintain, that party nominations are "fought and won in the mass electorate" (2000, 125). But control of essential resources by party networks gives the chosen candidates a decisive edge. If the anointed candidates were to campaign ineptly, they could lose; but if they have been well chosen, they will not often fail — and none has done so in the last two decades. Thus, in contrast to the wild nominations of the 1970s, the system of presidential primaries has become manageable for leaders of the contemporary Democratic and Republican parties. Party leaders obviously cannot dictate nominees in the manner of party bosses in the last century, but their power is sufficient to the tasks they must accomplish.

The paper has three main parts. It begins with a descriptive overview of the nominating system as it has evolved from the "mixed" system of the pre-reform period, to the momentum-driven system of the 1970s, to what we consider the mature, party-dominated system of the period from 1980 to the present. Our account stresses continuities in the pre-reform and post-reform party systems.

Part II presents a theoretical account of how parties work, first generally and then in the context of presidential nominations. With this theorizing, we interpret current patterns of activist behavior as party behavior and derive a number of empirical propositions about how the nomination process ought to work if, as we claim, party leaders have regained control of it. The main points are the dependence of candidates on party activists for campaign

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<sup>1</sup> Presented under the same title as this paper at the Midwest Political Science Association's annual meeting in Chicago, Ill., April 2001. Copies of the replication are available upon request.

resources, the incentive for parties to form a united front for the sake of winning general elections, and the process by which party leaders coordinate on a candidate to support, as they generally do. This process is the sequential revelation of preferences through public endorsements in a sort of “endorsement derby.” The endorsement derby is a signaling game that enables leaders to find a widely acceptable candidate in much the same way that bargaining at old-fashioned party conventions once did.

Part III undertakes a variety of empirical tests bearing on the propositions developed in the previous chapter. We show that (1) hopeful nominees do, in fact, build campaign organizations from a limited pool of partisan players and donors, (2) party leaders, including factional and subgroup leaders, actively try to coordinate support on candidates who are broadly acceptable and are generally effective at doing so, and (3) the coordinated efforts of party leaders on behalf of their chosen candidates tend to be decisive in the primaries.

We conclude with some observations about the nature of modern political parties.

In making our argument, we rely on a mix of statistical and qualitative information. The last consists of many, sometimes-lengthy quotations from journalistic sources. We might, of course, have condensed these quotations for the sake of brevity. We believe, however, that the original language communicates information that could not be adequately summarized. The many details and particulars of the passages we present add up to significant patterns. Just as we try to provide enough quantitative data to let the reader to independently judge those results, so also have we tried to provide enough qualitative material for the reader to judge our inferences from that as well.

## I. A Descriptive Account of Party Power in Presidential Nominations

### A. The pre-reform system

In this section we examine the presidential nominating system that existed from the 19th century to the McGovern-Fraser reforms in the early 1970s. We highlight aspects of this system that are, as we later claim, similar to the way the nominating system now operates. These are the need for prospective nominees to build support with party leaders around the country, and the need for party leaders to find a candidate who is both able to appeal to voters in the general election and acceptable to all factions within the party.

Building support. Before the McGovern-Fraser reforms of the late 1960s, there was only one real road to a presidential nomination, and it was to gain the support of leaders of local party organizations. These leaders controlled the majority of delegates at the party nominating conventions and could often throw the support of their whole state delegations to a candidate by simply ordering it to be done. Party leaders were beginning to lose their grip in the 1950s and ‘60s: They were less able to control their delegations as a previous generation of bosses had and more constrained to pay attention to public opinion in choosing a nominee (Carleton 1957; Schattschneider 1960; Reiter 1985; Aldrich, 1993). The nomination system, in short, was becoming gradually more responsive and democratic. Even so, party leaders in the 1950s and 60s were still the 800-pound gorilla in the nomination process, and aspiring candidates had no choice but to court them.

So court them they did. Presidential hopefuls set out early to get key party leaders in their camp. T.H. White (1961) was impressed by how well John F. Kennedy's organization and the candidate himself understood this:

The root question of American politics is always: Who's the Man to See? To understand American politics is, simply, to know people, to know the relative weight of names — who are heroes, who are straw men, who controls, who does not. But to operate in American politics one must go a step further — one must build a bridge to such names, establish a warmth, a personal connection. ... All this the Kennedys had learned in their upbringing. (p.149)

Now for three hours, broken only occasionally by a bit of information he might request of the staff, [Kennedy] proceeded, occasionally sitting, sometimes standing, to survey the entire country without map or notes. .... "What I remember," says [Lawrence F.] O'Brien, director of organization and keeper of the political ledgers, "was his remarkable knowledge of every state, not just the Party leaders, not just the Senators in Washington, but he knew all the factions and key people in all the factions (p. 59).

The epitaph of the Johnson campaign was written, for this reporter, by a Kennedy organizer who said with a flat simplicity: "Why, do you know, Lyndon actually thought Carmine DeSapio and Tammany controlled New York!" (p.150)

An early start on wooing local delegates was essential. As John F. Kennedy vied with Estes Kefauver for the 1956 vice presidential nomination, Robert F. Kennedy told White, they tried to sway a Maryland delegate and his wife:

"They were entirely friendly. They liked us. But Kefauver had *visited* them in their home. He had sent them Christmas cards. We couldn't shake them. Believe me, we've sent out a lot of Christmas cards since." (pp. 149-150)

Kennedy spent the four years prior to the 1960 election travelling the states, meeting with local party people, supporting their local campaigns and speaking at their Jefferson-Jackson Day dinners (p. 150). By 1960, he had an organization that was better connected and better informed than any of the other potential contenders at the convention in Los Angeles.

Kennedy's route to the nomination was well-trodden. Franklin D. Roosevelt's campaign manager, Jim Farley, claims to have invented the modern technique.<sup>2</sup> He organized a telephone and letter-writing campaign in which he wrote "every county chairman," and had the candidate make personal calls to "men and women in key positions throughout the country" (Farley 1948, p.9). Farley then famously followed up this effort with a personal trip through 18 states in 1931:

In the next nineteen days, I was up to my ears in meetings, conferences, luncheons, dinners and "gab fests" with Democratic leaders. Along the route, I talked to all sorts of people to learn everything I could about the public political temper. I was a sort of combination political drummer and listening post (p.12).

Two contemporary analysts of the 1932 campaign gave great credit to Farley as Roosevelt's organizing genius. Roy Peel and Thomas C. Donnelly wrote:

Early in the pre-convention period [Farley] had collected the names and addresses of practically every precinct committeeman in the United States, a task of no small magnitude when it is considered that there

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<sup>2</sup> "Never in the history of politics, up to that time, was there anything like our letter writing and long distance telephone campaign" (p.9). Farley may have pioneered the active use of the phones and organized letter writing. But personal politicking for the presidential nomination is as old as the office. William Robinson (1930) credits candidate William McKinley's lieutenant Marcus Hanna with introducing the technique of traveling the country to build up support for a candidate before the convention (pp. 328-339).

are more than 140,000 of them. These names were put on plates so that letters could be sent to all of them on short notice (p. 68).

If this sounds like a modern, technology-driven campaign, consider this account of the role played by the candidate in a supposedly party-centered system:

For years, Governor Roosevelt had been keeping in close touch with district leaders throughout the country. He had sent them letters, talked to them on the telephone, and had even sent out phonograph records....

.... The phonograph records said, in part: "My dear friend \_\_\_\_\_. I am a progressive.... I shall welcome any suggestions you may have to make and I hope to see you in person very soon (Peel and Donnelly, 1935, p. 60).

Even "dark horse" and insurgent candidates needed a network of support in the local party elite. F. Clifton White, head of the Draft Goldwater movement, began to put together his organization as early as 1961, before Barry Goldwater became the standard-bearer of the effort to reshape the Republican Party (White 1965, p. 90). In 1962, Goldwater himself began touring the country, and by 1963 Goldwater was "the most heavily requested speaker on the Republican banquet circuit" (Busch, 192, p. 539). By the election year of 1964, the Goldwater volunteer movement had developed formal campaign organizations in no fewer than 32 states (p. 95). White notes: "In South Carolina the Goldwater volunteers had so buttoned down that state that the *official* State Republican Committee passed an *official* resolution that it was now reconstituted organically and simultaneously as the state's Draft Goldwater Committee."

Decisions in the pre-reform system were made at party conventions, but a candidate couldn't join the convention fight if he didn't enter the convention with a base of support. And the only way to get that support was by wooing local party officials ahead of time. Candidates who couldn't succeed in what is now called "the invisible primary" or the "exhibition season" often simply gave up. Thus, Nelson Rockefeller decided not to contest the 1960 Republican nomination when he put out feelers to the fund-raisers and party leaders the year before. As one of Rockefeller's supporters told White:

[H]ere was the club, not only against Nelson because he was a liberal, but also committed to Nixon. Richard Nixon is a shrewd man; he spotted where control of the nomination lay seven years before (p.80).

Picking a Winner. Gaining the support of party leaders wasn't only about Christmas cards and friendly visits. Party elites needed, most importantly, to be convinced of the candidate's ability to win. In an early version of their classic text, Polsby and Wildavsky mark this as the central goal of national convention delegates (1968, pp.72-73). Thus, even though most of the delegates needed to win a party nomination were controlled by entrenched party elites, presidential primaries mattered — not for winning over voters, who controlled few delegates, but for winning over leaders, who controlled many. The classic example of this is Kennedy's win in West Virginia. The state had few delegates, but victory there convinced the party that a Catholic could win in Protestant territory, and demonstration of such strength was extremely important to party leaders (White 1961):

The nomination had to be won by the primary route. Not until he showed primitive strength with the voters in strange states could he turn and deal with the bosses and the brokers in the Northeast who regard him fondly as a fellow Catholic but, as a Catholic, hopelessly doomed to defeat (p.60).

But entering primaries could be dangerous, too. If primaries principally were about proving oneself, then the only candidates who entered them would be those who had something to prove. “The image communicated to political professionals by a few primary victories, unless they are overwhelming, may be less that of the conquering hero than that of the drowning man clutching at the last straw” (Polsby and Wildavsky 1968, p. 85). Hence strong candidates held back from the primaries or, if they entered them, entered selectively so as to make a particular point, as in the case of Kennedy and West Virginia.

The pre-reform system was a “mixed system” in the sense that it combined elements of both leader control through local party organizations and voter input via primary elections. But the mix gave most power to party leaders, as close observers have long claimed and as Hagen and Mayer (2000) have recently shown.

Bridging Factional Divisions. Reflecting on the prospects for the Republican party in 1860 and the kind of candidate who should get its nomination, Horace Greeley, the crusading anti-slavery editor of the *New York Tribune*, wrote:

Now about the Presidency: I want to succeed this time, yet I KNOW the country is not Anti-Slavery. It will only swallow a little Anti-Slavery in a great deal of sweetening. An Anti-Slavery man per se cannot be elected; but a Tariff, River and Harbor, Pacific Railroad, Free Homestead man MAY succeed ALTHOUGH he is Anti-Slavery.<sup>3</sup>

It is striking that even in the Republican party of 1860 — a party formed in 1854 for the purpose of opposing slavery — radical anti-slavery was not a winning position for a presidential nominee. Two prominent men facing this difficulty, William Seward and Salmon P. Chase, came up short. Each had been governor and senator of a major state and an anti-slavery radical — and each proved unacceptable to the party in large part because of the slavery issue. Meanwhile, a little-known Midwestern lawyer, whose highest position had been one term in the House of Representatives, was quietly convincing fellow partisans that he could develop the necessary breadth of support. As he wrote in reply to a supporter from Ohio:

My name is new in the field; and I suppose I am not the FIRST choice of a very great many. Our policy, then is to give no offense to others — leaving them in a mood to come to us, if they shall be compelled to give up their first love. This, too, is dealing justly with all, and leaving us in a mood to support heartily whoever shall be nominated. ... Whatever you may do for me, consistently with these suggestions, will be appreciated, and gratefully remembered. Please write me again.

(signed) A. Lincoln

These two vignettes illustrate of a great principle of American party politics. In the multi-party systems of Europe, factional leaders can do well as party leaders because there is often a distinct party for each major division of society — a farmers party, a Green party, a workers party, a Catholic party, and so forth. But the United States, a bigger and more diverse nation than any in Europe, has only two parties. Hence, politicians who appear to be merely factional leaders — “an anti-Slavery man per se” — have trouble capturing as much support as they need to win a major party nomination. Although they may have intense admirers, they also tend to have enemies to whom they are unacceptable. Nominations have more often gone to someone who is no one’s “first love” but has managed to “give offense to no one,” thereby becoming acceptable to everyone.

The traditional work of major parties in the United States has been to find the candidate who, though no one's first choice in the way a factional leader almost always is, is at least acceptable to all major factions. This means creating a united front among factional players who have little in common and no small number of antagonisms.

In the final decades of the pre-reform system, both parties were riven by factional division that gave their leaders plenty of such bridge-building to do. Many Republicans were reluctant to accept the social welfare reforms of the New Deal, especially social security, yet also reluctant to come out against them. The moderate and conservative wings of the Republican Party engaged in a delicate balancing act in each election through 1964, when moderates lost control to the conservatives. Democrats were divided over civil rights, with a northern liberal wing pressing for demands that were unacceptable to most southerners, and with union leaders who sometimes disagreed with both other wings. These divisions made agreement on a nominee difficult. As Polsby and Wildavsky (1968) write of the 1952 convention:

The factions working for the Stevenson nomination did not cooperate with one another to a significant degree and in fact squabbled among themselves on occasion. Yet Stevenson was nominated; his success came about because he was the second choice of an overwhelming number of delegates who could not agree on any of their first choices and the first choice of a significant number of leaders in spite of his disinclination to pursue the nomination in an organized faction. (p. 92)

Often agreement could only be reached by means of back room negotiations. As Polsby and Wildavsky (1968) wrote of conventions in this period:

No mass meeting of thousands of delegates can hope to find out who is acceptable to most of them. It is up to the leaders to take over. In the absence of quick agreement at the convention, the demonstrations and adjournments give party leaders time to meet and see if a candidate can be found who can receive a majority of votes. Generally, the most important leaders are the Governors who exercise considerable influence over their state and may be able to control the votes of its delegates. National committeemen, state chairmen, elder statesmen, and Congressmen may be among those who attend. This is the 'smoke-filled room' of convention lore. Its participants try to work out an agreement which will meet their desires. But they are severely limited in their choice by their estimate of what the people will accept at the polls and what the other delegates will stand for. The leaders are men of independent influence and differing interests and there may be only a limited range of agreement among them. (p. 102)

But as difficult as it was for party leaders to reach consensus on a candidate, they were the ones who made the decision. The power of party leaders to control party nominations in the pre-reform system was most nakedly demonstrated in the 1968 Democratic contest. Anti-war insurgents Eugene McCarthy and Robert Kennedy entered nearly every primary, and between them won the bulk of available votes. Insider candidate Hubert Humphrey avoided the primaries and instead put his energy into private meetings with the state and local party officials who controlled most of the convention delegates. When the party convened at its Chicago convention, Humphrey won the nomination handily.

Power in the old system lay among a geographically dispersed elite. These elites were animated by diverse local concerns and so were always potentially divided and often openly so. The nomination process can be thought of as a loosely connected network of party elites trying to agree on one of their own to champion their cause. In this

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<sup>3</sup> Luthin, 1994, p. 615.

decentralized system, the candidates themselves took most of the initiative, contacting these leaders on their home turf and attempting to line up their support. When the leaders managed to agree on one of them, the party convention was a mere coronation. But as often as not, the leaders couldn't agree ahead of time, and that would mean a struggle for the nomination at the convention. Many of the first-ballot victories in this period, such as Eisenhower's and Stevenson's in 1952, were actually hard-fought and somewhat bitter contests among opposing party factions.

As the Johnson campaign's confusion in 1960 over the influence of Carmine DeSapio in New York suggested, where *exactly* power lay in the pre-reform system was never completely transparent. "The closer one gets to our two great national political parties, the more difficult it is to find them," said Stephen K. Bailey of the old system.<sup>4</sup> Or, as V. O. Key, Jr. put it, "More than a tinge of truth colors the observation that there are no national parties, only state and local parties."<sup>5</sup> And yet these loose networks of local party officials did hang together as a national party and did control nominations. It is, as we shall argue, much the same in the post-reform system.

## B. Nominations in the aftermath of reform

Humphrey's capture of the Democratic nomination in 1968 was the last hurrah for the old system. As a concession to his defeated foes and in the hope of unifying the party, Humphrey agreed to a reform commission to revamp the party's nominating system. This was the McGovern-Fraser Commission. We shall not tell the story of that commission's work here, since that has already been ably done (see especially Shafer 1983). We shall only observe that the upshot was to transfer the formal power to select convention delegates from mostly closed party caucuses dominated by party elites to primary elections and open caucuses in which the party rank-and-file held sway. And since voters and even many activists could learn about presidential contenders only through the media, the media were, in the judgment of leading scholars, greatly empowered by the new system (Polsby, 1983). Subsequently, dark horse candidates George McGovern and Jimmy Carter took advantage of the new rules and some very good media coverage to win the nomination *despite* their lack of connections to party leaders.

In much of the ensuing scholarship, Carter became the archetype of the new system. The Georgia governor used the primaries not to prove to party leaders that he had broad appeal. Rather, he used the primaries to win outright the delegates he needed to be nominated at the convention. Whether party leaders were impressed or liked him didn't make two hoots of difference. By winning the first contest, which was in Iowa, Carter got increased media attention and financial support that helped him win New Hampshire, which in turn propelled him to similar victories in later primaries. With each early contest, Carter picked up money and support that made him harder to stop. As his principal opponent, Mo Udall, complained:

It's like a football game, in which you say to the first team that makes a first down with ten yards, "Hereafter your team has a special rule. Your first downs are five yards. And if you make three of those you get a two-yard first down. And we're going to let your first touchdown count twenty-one points. Now the rest of you bastards play catch-up under the regular rules."<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Cited in Broder, 1971, p. 228.

<sup>5</sup> Cited in Bernstein, 2000, 171

<sup>6</sup> Cited in Bartels, 1988, p. 4.

The mass media played a key role in the momentum Carter derived from early wins. Coming off a 29 to 23 win over Udall in New Hampshire, the “Man from Plains” made the cover of both *Time* and *Newsweek*, got ten times the coverage of his rival on the network news and in the national news magazines, and thereby became an overnight celebrity (Patterson, 1980). By the time reporters began asking “Jimmy Who?” Carter was too far ahead of the pack to be caught.

In most analyses of this post-reform system, party leaders have not loomed large as key players. In a typical assessment, William Crotty wrote in 1985:

The new party system has witnessed a collapse in party control over its own nominating process ... The new power center is the media, especially television. (p. 129)

James Davis, a long-time scholar of presidential nominations, wrote in 1997 that

The old-fashioned, coalition-building strategy of constructing alliances with various state party leaders to win the nomination has been superseded by candidate-centered campaigns (p. 63)

In the tenth edition of their respected textbook on presidential elections, Nelson Polsby and Aaron Wildavsky write that

Once upon a time, presidential nominations were won by candidates who courted the support of party leaders from the several states. ... That system is history. Now, nominations are won by accumulating pledged delegates in a state-by-state march through primary elections and delegate-selection caucuses. ... (2000, p. 97)

The enhanced influence of the mass media in the new system is a key concern of many scholars. Thomas Patterson, a political scientist who specializes in the mass media, argues that “The McGovern-Fraser reforms were significant because they denied party leaders ... the power to recruit, evaluate, and select party nominees. The reforms meant an end to the party-centered state delegations” that were the basis of the old system. The news media, Patterson argues, have taken up much of the slack:

The news media do not entirely determine who will win the nomination, but no candidate can succeed without the press. The road to nomination now runs through the newsrooms. (p. 33).

Two close students of the contemporary nomination process, Michael Hagen and William Mayer, concur in this judgment in a recent essay:

In the new system, effective power came to reside in the party in the electorate and in such non-party entities as the news media. The party organization and the party in government were almost entirely stripped of any significant voice in the decision.” (Hagen and Mayer, 2000, p. 52).

In their revisionist argument that *The Party Goes On*, Xandra Kayden and Eddie Mahe, Jr. argue that reports of the death of political parties in the United States have been greatly exaggerated. But they make an exception for presidential parties:

The one area the party appears now to have least influence over is the presidential nomination. The main obstacle to party control over this obviously important office is the number of primaries that determine the vote of so many delegates to the conventions. (1985, p. 195)

In their recent review of the evolution of the party system, John Kenneth White and Daniel M. Shea (2000) write that:

... the new presidential nomination system engendered by the McGovern-Fraser Commission...[is] one that is dominated by primaries and where most voters learn about politics through television. Collectively, the media exercise a form of “peer review,” where reporters act as political analysts and talent scouts. Political reporters are often fascinated with two things: who has raised the most money and from what sources and how the candidates stand in the various public opinion polls (p. 132-133).

In a rigorous examination of the “death of parties” argument, Howard Reiter conducted empirical studies of numerous propositions that previous authors had assumed but not tested. He seriously challenged several elements of the new conventional wisdom. Yet his principal conclusion was not that presidential parties are alive and well, but that the McGovern-Fraser reforms were at most a contributing factor to long-term decline. “Even if the McGovern-Fraser Commission had never held a meeting, we would have ended up with roughly the system we now have” (1985, 142).

Aldrich’s (1993) review of presidential elections states that there is “a great deal of power” in arguments that the reforms undermined parties (p. 29). Yet he suggests that, due to new campaign technologies, the campaigns of John Kennedy and Barry Goldwater were already becoming candidate-centered and demonstrated that “it was no longer necessary to build coalitions of party elites through wheeling and dealing in smoke-filled rooms (p. 31).”

The truth is, perhaps, that nomination reforms postdated weakened parties and reflected the media-dominated, candidate-centered realities, but they also furthered the deterioration (p. 31).

Stephen J. Wayne, in the 2000 edition of his respected textbook on presidential elections, is more cautious than other scholars but expounds a view similar to that of Aldrich and Reiter:

...weakening the state party structures and their leadership ... seems to have been an initial consequence of the increasing number of primaries. By promoting internal democracy, the primaries helped devitalize party organizations already weakened by new modes of campaigning and party leadership already weakened by the loss of patronage...<sup>7</sup>

Reiter, Aldrich, and Wayne thus all agree that presidential parties are in a greatly weakened condition, but attribute this situation as much or perhaps more to long-term conditions than to the McGovern-Fraser reforms. For purposes of this paper, which maintains that presidential parties are actually quite strong, this difference is of relatively little importance.

A notable feature of scholarship on presidential nominations is that, with a small handful of exceptions (Polsby 1983; Reiter 1985; Hagen and Mayer 2000), scholars do not attempt to empirically demonstrate the decline of parties. Most simply assume decline and go on to a topic of presumably greater importance, usually primary elections. Reflecting this, Barbara Norrander (1995), in a field essay

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<sup>7</sup> Wayne goes on to note, however, that the role of state parties in general elections has been strengthened by their role in collecting and dispensing “soft money” donations to the party nominees (2000: p. 121-122).

in *Political Research Quarterly*, summarized the operation of the nominations process without even using the word “party”:

The post-reform system involves a series of complex interactions between elites (candidates, media, large contributors), semi-elites (smaller contributors, activists) and a small, but mostly representative, group of interested voters (p. 900).

Norrander goes on to describe what she sees as the most important gaps for future research to fill, but again does not mention parties. Her review indicates, albeit indirectly, that most scholars and Norrander herself regard parties as virtually without importance in the current process.

A few scholars have suggested — without so far providing anything like systematic evidence — that parties play a stronger role in presidential nominations than generally believed. William Crotty concludes from the nominations of Gore and Bush in 2000 that:

The 2000 primaries suggest that the candidates who win the pre-primary battle of endorsements, party support and financial backing have the flexibility and resources to absorb early setbacks and yet go on to win the nomination. This may now be the most significant, and most under-reported, stage of the electoral campaign. Such was certainly the case in the 2000 election in both parties (pp. 96-98)

This view is quite close to our own. However, Crotty is referring to the 2000 nominations of Bush and Gore. Our claim, to be developed below, is that party leaders have been able to control nomination outcomes by controlling resources in every contest since Jimmy Carter and will likely continue to do so.

Perhaps the strongest general statement in the literature that party elites matter in the presidential nominations comes from Gerald Pomper (1999), who observes:

Presidential nominations certainly have changed, but the trend is toward different, rather than less, party influence. ... The selection of presidential nominees still evidences influence by leaders of the organized parties or its factions, even if these choices have not been made primarily by the formal party leadership (such as Democratic “superdelegates” and similar Republican officials). These decisions are quite different from the selection of such insurgents as Goldwater in 1964 or McGovern in 1972, the typical illustrations of the asserted decline of party. While insurgents do now have access to the contest for the presidential nominations, the reality is that they fail in that contest, as shown by the examples of Democrats Edward Kennedy in 1980, Gary Hart in 1984 and Jesse Jackson in 1988 and the virtual absence of any Republican insurgents throughout the period until 1992.

Pomper’s claim that party power over nominations is “different” rather than “less” is also our view. But Pomper’s remarks and those of a few others<sup>8</sup> have not yet been supported by systematic evidence. The dominant view of the role of parties in the post-reform system remains that expressed by Paul Allen Beck in the eighth edition of *Party Politics in America*:

The parties have devised strategies to retain some influence in the [presidential nomination] process — Democrats by selecting super delegates, Republicans by continuing some of the old rules — but the truth is that their efforts have borne little fruit. It is now difficult for the party organizations to exert much influence over the presidential nominations. (1997, p. 243).

### C. The resurgence of party influence in 1980 and beyond

Learning the New Game. One of the most impressive aspects of Carter's victory in 1976 was that he and his principal strategist, Hamilton Jordan, were not simply lucky in the decisions they made. As Jules Witcover documents in his book on that campaign, *Marathon*, Carter and Jordan understood exactly what they were doing and called every shot just right. In early memos, Jordan foresaw that the media would give heavy coverage to Iowa, which had been neglected in the past; foresaw that a win in Iowa could build the publicity for a win in New Hampshire; and foresaw that a New Hampshire win could be parlayed into more media coverage, a surge in the polls and a boost in fund raising that would carry all the way to the nominating convention.<sup>9</sup> Correctly appreciating all this, Carter spent much more time than other candidates in Iowa – and was duly rewarded.

But the Carter team was the only campaign in 1976 that grasped the new dynamic of media-driven momentum. Henry Jackson, the strongest of the insider candidates, skipped Iowa and New Hampshire to concentrate on Massachusetts, which came third in the sequence of contests. According to a biographer, Jackson viewed Wallace as his main opponent and wanted to conserve strength for the struggle against the Alabama firebrand in the bigger states.<sup>10</sup> Jackson also felt that Massachusetts "was the kind of state that would provide the kind of acceleration ... that would more than offset not going into New Hampshire" (Witcover, 1977, 191). Meanwhile, Wallace, confined to a wheelchair, also kept a low profile in Iowa and New Hampshire. These strategic miscalculations left Carter free to score big wins in a field lacking his strongest potential rivals.<sup>11</sup> The heavy media coverage that attended these wins -- appearances on the morning TV news shows, breathless reportage on the network news, getting onto the covers of *Time* and *Newsweek* -- enabled "Jimmy Who?" to burst onto the national scene as the man to beat for the Democratic nomination.

If the Carter campaign team was the first to figure out how media-driven momentum would work in the new system, then the last was John Sears, head of Ronald Reagan's 1980 national primary campaign. Sears felt that Reagan "should present himself as a front-runner, above the pack, beyond the pack (White 1982, p. 250)." That strategy might have been right when primaries were only about proving one's worth, since Reagan had little to prove. But early primaries in the new system were no longer about proving one's worth; they were about impressing the media, the public, and the big fund-raisers that you could go all the way. So George Bush, who went all-out in Iowa, set Reagan on his heels by capturing "Big Mo." "Of all the mistakes he made, said Reagan later, Iowa was the first." Reagan quickly fired Sears,<sup>12</sup> changed his strategy and went on to contest and win New Hampshire.

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<sup>8</sup> e.g. McCubbins 1992, Frymer 1999, and Ceaser and Busch 2001.

<sup>9</sup> Schram (1977) reprints some of these memos in his appendix. Jordan also correctly appreciated that, for an outsider like Carter, that it would not be possible to (in the later phrase) "spin" the national media into giving good early coverage to his Carter; he would have to earn it through strong performances. At a time when other candidates were picking their primaries, Jordan also correctly appreciated the value of entering every contest.

<sup>10</sup> Kaufman, 2000, p. 318-319.

<sup>11</sup> Witcover reports considerable division on Jackson's staff as some thought that "New Hampshire as a psychological media state was overwhelming, that it was New Hampshire or bust" (p. 191), but Jackson thought otherwise and prevailed. On Wallace's campaign, it was the candidate who apparently wanted to go to New Hampshire and the campaign staff that did not, with the latter calling the shot.

<sup>12</sup> The Iowa misstep was only the catalyst for Sears' ouster, according to White. Sears had been at odds with most of the rest of the Reagan team from the beginning (pp. 247-253).

All the rest of the Republican candidates were hustling for the early advantage that Carter got from Iowa. As David Broder wrote in January 1979: “The example [Carter] set four years ago by declaring his candidacy almost two years in advance of election day, and campaigning at breakneck speed for over a year in the states with early delegate contests, has convinced his GOP rivals that this is the way to go (Broder 1979).” James Baker, who was George Bush’s campaign manager in 1980, candidly admitted that his candidate had simply commandeered the Carter game plan:

The truth of the matter is we haven’t changed our strategy one whit. It was never an original strategy. It’s what you read in [Witcover’s] *Marathon* about Jimmy Carter. We read that book. Damn carefully.<sup>13</sup>

Thus, by 1980, candidates of all stripes knew what only Carter had clearly known in 1976. This raises two fairly obvious questions. First, when everyone understands that the object of the game is to pull off a surprise in Iowa, it creates at least the possibility that a simple version of the strategy will no longer work. How, after all, does one do “better than expected” in Iowa when numerous others, including the strongest candidates, are trying the same thing? Second, the Carter strategy was an outsider’s strategy, a way for someone to build momentum from a low base. Wouldn’t there be a compensating strategy for strong candidates to use and wouldn’t their strength then enable them to prevail?

The answer to the first question is that the game did indeed change when not only the whole field of candidates but the media became aware of what a win in Iowa might mean in the new system. For reasons of space, we omit discussion of this issue in the present paper; see, however, Cohen et al., 2001. The answer to the second question is also yes. Neither party establishment was happy with a system that made it easy to challenge their favorites. We turn now to the establishment’s response.

Reforming the reforms. The Democrats nominated hapless candidates in both 1972 and 1976, and the fact that one of them actually became president didn’t entirely ease the discomfort. Republicans had to endure Reagan’s powerful and damaging assault on Ford in 1976, a challenge that would have gone nowhere in the old system. As a result, each party tinkered with the rules in the 1980s to try to assure the sorts of outcomes it wanted. The most important of the re-reform efforts is the Hunt Commission of the Democratic Party in 1983. It took the first steps toward front-loading of the system, a device intended to disadvantage outsiders and that, over the long haul if not immediately in 1984, seems to have had exactly this effect. David Broder (1983) describes the Hunt Commission’s main work as follows:

The compression of the calendar was one of the big changes ordered by the latest national party rules commission, headed by North Carolina Gov. James B. Hunt Jr. Two of its major goals were to shorten the campaign season and to diminish the bandwagon effect of plurality victories by the “outsider” candidates in states like Iowa and New Hampshire.

The Hunt Commission also gave states a winner-take-more option, allowing them to give one delegate to the winner of each congressional district primary or caucus before apportioning the remainder of the delegates according to the popular vote. ...

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<sup>13</sup> “The Long Journey of George Bush,” Paul Hendrickson, *Washington Post*, January 13, 1980, P. F1.

“There is very little turnaround or recovery time for a candidate who stumbles,” [Mondale Campaign Manager Robert] Beckel observed.

. . . even if somebody scores a Carter-type upset early, it may be tough to go all the way, for the financial and organizational requirements of that mid-March period are awesome. Beckel, whose candidate is currently ahead in both money and organization, emphasizes but probably does not exaggerate the consequences of that “compression.”

“You have to have a large crew of good organizers because you won’t have time to shift a few people from place to place, as campaigns have done in the past,” he said. “That will enhance the value of endorsements from groups like NEA the National Education Association and the AFL-CIO, which have ongoing organizations of their own in so many states.

“It also enhances the value of endorsements from politicians with their own political organizations, especially in caucus states,” which dominate the first half of the delegate selection calendar. “All this, we think, works to our advantage,” Beckel said.

It is no accident that the rules have taken this form.

When the Hunt Commission was meeting, in the aftermath of Carter’s defeat, there was a “never again” feeling about such outsider candidates. Mondale and Kennedy supporters and AFL-CIO operatives were influential in the commission decisions, as were elected officials anxious to reclaim their place of influence in the convention hall.

Other journalistic accounts made the same point. Germond and Witcover (1985) wrote

The commission proposed -- and the Democratic National Committee finally approved in 1982 -- a system with several devices for protecting the power of the permanent establishment and nominating a Kennedy or, once he stepped aside, a Mondale. One provision established a class of "super delegates" -- party officials and office holders -- who theoretically would ... use their expertise to temper any excesses of the primary voters that might produce another "outsider" nominee...

The change that attracted the most public attention was the effort to compress the delegate-selection process by establishing a thirteen-week period, the "window," in which all caucuses and primaries would have to be held ... To no one's surprise, the new rules encouraged states to move their caucuses and primaries to earlier dates in the hope of having some influence on the result. And it was this "front-loading" more than anything else that both Mondale and Big Labor depended upon to produce an early decision [favorable to more establishment candidates].

Goldman and Fuller (1985) wrote that "the real decisions [of the Hunt Commission] were made in back rooms, and the triple entente [of party regulars, big labor, and representatives of the leading candidates], conferring on everything, achieved its counter-revolution in two conflict-free days...their principal interest has been precisely to rig the game against outsiders and for themselves -- for men like Mondale and Kennedy, with national names and connections....[Thus] the calendar for 1984 was "front-loaded" with early primaries and caucuses, tightly bunched in time and widely scattered across the map , so that a campaign as rich and broadly based as, say, Mondale's could run everywhere and spend everyone else out of business" (p. 55-56).

Much has been written in recent nomination cycles that stresses the efforts by states to get to the head of the process, front-loading the system still more. But the first move toward front-loading was part of a conscious strategy by Democratic Party leaders to regain control of the nomination process, and Republicans have gone along. Parties are, of course, capable of exercising a firm hand when they see an interest in doing so. If, some 20 years

later, the system remains front-loaded in a way that provides major advantage to party insiders, it is reasonable to assume that it is because most party officials still want it that way.<sup>14</sup>

This seems to us a major point. Scholars often write about front-loading of the primaries as if it were prima facie evidence of that the system is out of control. For example, Hagen and Mayer write that “the combination of early withdrawals and increased front-loading greatly accelerates the voters’ decision process and thus makes the whole system less deliberative, less rational, less flexible, and more chaotic” (p. 40). Yet what functioning party wants voters to engage in rational, deliberative decision-making in its primaries? That’s a job party elites want for themselves. The front-loading of the presidential primaries — the details of which are, to be sure, a bit chaotic — could as well be taken as evidence that parties have found a means of regaining control over their most essential business, the making of nominations.

Two other reforms that date to the 1984 cycle are sufficiently obvious in their intent and effect that they scarcely need comment: The creation of regional, sub-regional, and supra-regional primaries that would advantage the kinds of candidates likely to be most effective in fall elections, and the inclusion of party officials as super delegates to the Democratic convention. As it has turned out, the Superdelegates have never been decisive, except possibly in 1984,<sup>16</sup> but the regional primaries may have functioned to help centrist candidates at the expense of extremists, especially on the Democratic side. This is as intended (Norrander, 1992). Thus, the regional primaries represent another means by which parties have regained control over their nomination processes.

The Post-Reform System Echoes the Pre-Reform System. The preceding sections make the point that the nominating process of the 1970s is different than that has existed since then. One difference is that candidates and their managers now understand its dynamic properties, thereby making the sort of miscalculations that paved the way for Carter’s explosive success in 1976 much less likely. Another big difference is that the schedule of primaries has been front-loaded in a way that was intended to make it easier for insider candidates to prevail and probably does. Hence we are in full agreement with Mayer’s (2001) observation that

Thirty years after a series of reforms that were supposed to “open up the parties” and “level the playing field,” the American presidential nominating process has become, if anything, even more hostile to outsiders than the system, that preceded it. If the 1996 nomination contests went a considerable way towards establishing this proposition, the 2000 races should remove any lingering doubt (p. 12).

We would, indeed, make the proposition stronger. Insiders, we believe, have won *every* contest since 1976 and are likely — though not, of course, certain in every case — to continue to do so. The reason is, as we shall now begin to argue, that party elites have regained control of the nomination process and are making it work in a manner surprisingly similar to the way the pre-reform system worked.

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<sup>14</sup> Prior to the 2000 cycle, the Republican party seriously considered but largely backed away from measures designed to de-frontload the system. See Busch 2000.

<sup>15</sup> For example, Hagen and Mayer (2000) write: Hagen and Mayer write that “...the combination of early withdrawals and increased front-loading greatly accelerates the voters’ decision process and thus makes the whole system less deliberative, less rational, less flexible, and more chaotic (p. 40).”

<sup>16</sup> See discussion in Polsby and Wildavsky, 2000, p. 150.

In the remainder of this section, we continue our descriptive account of the new system, stressing similarities with the old system. In Part II we provide the theory that explains why, despite some appearances, the post-reform party system is a genuine *party* system. Then in Part III we shall provide systematic tests of our argument.

Let us begin with this central fact: The McGovern-Fraser rules adopted by the Democratic Party required every one of the 50 states to open the delegate selection process to public participation, and for various reasons the Republican Party soon followed suit. This meant that seeking a presidential nomination required an active campaign in every state in the nation, often at the level of counties or congressional districts. This is a vast, vast undertaking. No presidential candidate has the staff, financial resources or know-how to conduct what are, in effect, hundreds of campaigns all around the country. Hence, the new campaign process virtually required serious candidates to build alliances with fellow partisans around the country. Even iconoclast Jerry Brown conformed to this law of politics:

One of the first things Brown did [when he entered the 1976 contest] was to contact [Hubert] Humphrey. "He came to see me," Humphrey recalled. "He told me he wanted to run in Maryland first. He said, 'Who do you know?' Who are the people over there?' And I told him." (Witcover, 1977, p. 333)

Of course, most candidates make such inquiries well ahead of the point of entering a primary. Many also have more of a national network to start with. Thus, Ronald Reagan's 1980 campaign actually began almost immediately upon the conclusion of his 1976 campaign and involved revisiting friends he had made over some 20 years as a popular speaker on the Republican party's "rubber chicken" circuit. As part of this effort, Reagan spoke in support of many Republicans' election campaigns and even helped them raise money. The result, as David Broder wrote in early 1980, was that Reagan:

... has the advantage of the most extensive intraparty organizational network, built on the loyalty of his 1976 supporters and maintained for the past two years by his interim political organization, Citizens for the Republic, one of the biggest spending political action committees in the 1978 campaign.<sup>17</sup>

Broder further noted that former Texas Governor John Connally "has a demonstrated ability to raise funds, but it remains to be seen how much political backing the former Democrat can get in the party he joined only in 1973." Broder's observation was, in fact, quite prescient of the way the new system was to operate. Connally was the first of several candidates to demonstrate that an early start and a great deal of money made little difference unless it was accompanied by the support of party insiders.

Bill Clinton was another early starter. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Arkansas governor worked to build a network of party people through the Democratic Leadership Council, which he had chaired since 1990, as well as

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<sup>17</sup> Broder traces the schedules of key candidates in Washington during Carter's State of the Union:

Ronald Reagan, who leads the early polls as the Republican voters' choice to oppose Carter in 1980, will have an intimate dinner with a group of Republican senators in a Capitol dining room just before Carter's Tuesday evening address to the joint session of Congress. Wednesday at noon, John B. Connally goes before the National Press Club to make what is expected to be his formal announcement of candidacy. On Thursday afternoon, George Bush, Houston's other White House hopeful, will unburden himself of his views of the world in a speech at Georgetown University.

the National Governors' Association (Balz and Dionne 1992). The DLC, for its part, consciously sought to provide a network for use in the primaries, and Clinton was a natural beneficiary:

Clinton and [DLC president Al] From said the DLC would retain its focus on issues, rather than become a vehicle for anyone's campaign. But From added, "We hope to build a network of people who might not have been involved in Democratic [presidential] primaries, an alternative infrastructure for the candidate or candidates delivering the message we hope the Democrats will emphasize in 1992" (Broder 1990).

Clinton made use of that network in much the same way that Kennedy used Jefferson-Jackson Day dinners: As a medium for speaking to the party insiders across the country, convincing them that he was the man for the job. Sen. Phil Gramm, though unsuccessful in his bid for the 1996 Republican nomination, was particularly clever in tapping into existing party networks. In 1991 and 1993, he won an election among his Republican colleagues in the Senate to run the National Republican Senatorial Committee, a party organ which raises money for Senate contests. This position entailed funds for Gramm to travel the country in the four years prior to the 1996 campaign, meeting and, as he hoped, winning the support of the party's top fund-raisers.

Academic accounts of the primary process tend, as we have seen, to stress the paramount importance of appealing to voters via the mass media. Insofar as scholars study the "invisible primary" — the 18- to 24-month period prior to the actual primaries, in which candidates travel the country seeking support — they examine fund raising, media coverage, early political organization, and poll standing, but not political endorsements (Mayer, 1996; Adkins and Dowdle, 2000, 2001). Buell (1996, p. 34-35) does examine straw polls among party activists, but finds that they shed little light on nomination outcomes. As Mayer (2001, p. 24) has noted: "no one has ever been able to show that congressional or gubernatorial endorsements carry much weight in a presidential primary."

Yet candidates — especially winning candidates — have always taken the support of party leaders seriously. In every campaign of the post-reform period, even those of the 1970s, candidates have traveled the country in search of inside support in the much the same way candidates in the pre-reform period did. We know this because the national media routinely cover their perambulations, making it possible to reconstruct in some detail what the candidates did, how and when party leaders responded, and how, in general, the race was shaping up. We shall make extensive use of these reports later in the paper.

For now, we wish to emphasize that the process of lining up political support continued in a form quite similar to that of the old system, and that it was a tough and serious business. It was not enough simply to ask for support. Candidates who wished to be taken seriously needed to be ready for grilling on their positions, strategies, and fitness for the job. Here, for example, is an account of a Bill Clinton speech before a group of Democratic party officials. If, as T. H. White stressed, John Kennedy had to convince party leaders in 1960 that he could win as a Catholic, Clinton had to convince Democrats that he wouldn't draw the party too far to the right:

Late on the morning of Nov. 23, after Arkansas Gov. Bill Clinton finished an address to the Association of State Democratic Chairs in Chicago, Karen Marchioro rose to ask about criticism that Clinton was little more than a warmed-over Republican.

The seemingly hostile question caused no anxiety among Clinton's staff. They had done everything they could to prepare the Democratic presidential candidate. They had caucused with Clinton on the speech,

established their goals, salted the hotel ballroom with boisterous friends – and even encouraged hostile questions from the audience.

Marchioro, the Democratic chairman from Washington state, gave Clinton an opportunity to confront publicly his doubters among party liberals. She said she had spoken with her friend and Clinton adviser Stephanie Solien earlier that day.

“They wanted the question answered,” Marchioro said....

Clinton’s response, which evoked his grandfather’s near-religious devotion to Franklin D. Roosevelt, drew strong applause. Clinton had cleared a major hurdle in his path to the Democratic nomination...

Clinton is the attention-getter in January 1992 because he used 1991 more effectively than his rivals to maximize his strengths and neutralize potential weaknesses (Balz and Dionne 1992).

Balz and Dionne point out, moreover, Clinton’s success with a tough audience paid very tangible benefits:

Until Chicago, fund-raising had been slack. But when the reviews came in, the fax machines at Clinton headquarters worked overtime to distribute the clips to potential contributors. Between mid-November and the end of 1991, Clinton raised roughly \$ 2.5 million, according to the campaign. The effort was led by finance director Rahm Emanuel, who put together 27 events in 20 days, and Robert Farmer, who was Dukakis’s chief fund-raiser in 1988.

We have few accounts of candidates giving such speeches in which they hit sour notes and failed to close the sale. Reporters generally consider such occasions un-newsworthy. However Gary Hart in the 1988 nomination cycle provides an exception. Because he was leading in the polls at the time he was giving speeches like Clinton’s, reporters did note the poor reception he got among Democratic insiders. Ronald Brownstein (1987) wrote in *National Journal*:

In February, he attended the AFL-CIO meeting in Florida and said he would welcome labor’s endorsement in 1988 ... But so far, he doesn’t have much to show for his solicitousness.

... “He has spent a lot of time trying to make friends with labor, seeing people one-on-one; then he comes back and tells people who’ve lost half of their members that he isn’t going to do anything for them on trade,” said Vic Fingerhut, a labor pollster. “That’s not a hard sell; it’s an impossible sell. People walk out of the room with Hart just shaking their heads.”

Brownstein segues from Hart’s trouble with endorsements to his trouble raising money. “In the short term,” he wrote

money may be the more pressing problem. ... Since 1984, Hart has signed up several first-tier Democratic fund raisers. ... But there’s been no rush of the big money givers toward Hart, and few in his camp expect him to raise as much money as quickly as Mondale did [in 1984]. “We are being kept alive by direct mail,” [a Hart campaign official] said.

Although Brownstein does not explicitly link endorsements and fund raising, it is hard to believe that a Democratic candidate who left union leaders “just shaking their heads” wouldn’t have trouble with fund-raisers precisely for that reason. In any event, a common theme in journalistic accounts of nomination campaigns of the 1980s and 1990s is that fund-raising and political endorsements are, as in Clinton’s case, quite definitely linked. Note how in the following passage how positions on the issues, political endorsements, and fund-raising were linked in Bob Dole’s 1996 campaign:

As of today, Dole has received endorsements from 19 of the 31 Republican governors whose states account for 844 of the 965 delegates needed to win the GOP nomination. . . .

Dole reached out to governors immediately after the 1994 elections, promising to make relief from federal government mandates his first order of business in the Senate and encouraging them to become partners

with congressional Republicans in reforming welfare, Medicaid and other domestic programs. Even before he had announced his candidacy, Ohio Gov. George V. Voinovich had announced his support.

[Dole's] recruitment of governors mirrors the strategy George Bush used to win the 1988 nomination, and he has used their support not only to build a national political organization *but also as the backbone of a fund-raising machine that has outdistanced competitors* (our emphasis).

Dole's campaign has carefully choreographed the gubernatorial endorsements, then followed them up with a fund-raiser in the state a month later. Those fund-raising events raised \$3.4 million in New York, \$800,000 each in California and Ohio, \$700,000 in Pennsylvania, almost \$600,000 in Illinois.

"The governors are incredibly important in their own states, in getting the best people and raising the money and helping to win the states," said Robert Teeter, who managed Bush's campaign in 1992 and served as a senior strategist in 1988. (Balz, 1995)

If the governors were a big part of the story of Dole's nomination, they were virtually the whole story of George W. Bush's nomination. They were among his earliest supporters and major factors in his fund-raising efforts. Half of the GOP's governors were working for him by early 1999. As Sam Verhovek (1999) of the *New York Times* wrote in November 1999:

Even before Mr. Bush emerged, the nation's Republican governors, eager for a greater say in the affairs of the national party in 2000 and privately irritated with what they regarded as Congressional Republicans' bungling of public sentiment, had largely concluded that the time had come to nominate one of their own for president.

Now Mr. Bush has assembled a remarkably unified team from the ranks of the Republican governors — the chief executives of 31 states, and of 8 of the 9 most populous — with whom he frequently consults for both campaign advice and policy ideas. Many of them endorsed him long before he officially jumped into the race in June, and led fund-raising drives that helped him amass more campaign money than any other presidential candidate in history...

The concerted effort on Mr. Bush's part was led by several governors, including Mr. Engler, Paul Cellucci of Massachusetts and Marc Racicot of Montana, who, beginning early this year, called colleagues around the country urging them to endorse him, even as he was saying he would not make up his mind about running until after the Texas legislative session ended in May.

Gov. Bob Taft of Ohio remembers getting a call from Mr. Engler but replying that he would hold off since an Ohioan, Representative John R. Kasich, was in the race. "Then the day after John dropped out" in July, "Marc Racicot was on the phone," Mr. Taft recalled. "And it was, 'O.K., can you do it now?'"

An earlier Bush boomlet occurred in February at a meeting of the National Governors' Association, where several other governors announced for Mr. Bush. "It was the only spontaneous thing I've seen happen in R.G.A./N.G.A. politics in five years," Governor Rowland said with a laugh.

A *Washington Post* reporter, Susan Glasser (1999), saw the same link between fund raising and political endorsements at a time at which Bush had only 13 governors on board.

The 13 governors who have endorsed Bush are also key to the money chase. Michigan's Engler, for example, "has launched full bore into a major fund-raising effort on behalf of Bush," said his spokesman. "He is doing a significant number of phone calls."

In Massachusetts, Gov. Paul Cellucci has put his political team on the Bush assignment, and they rounded up 16 key Bay State fund-raising types to send to Texas 10 days ago, including former governor Bill Weld. The 1 1/2-hour lunch at Shoreline Grill in Austin featured a pep talk from Bush. "I expect 95 percent of the key Massachusetts Republican fund-raisers will be nailed down for Bush," said Cellucci adviser Rob Gray. "*Our organization is transferable* (our emphasis)."

Bush's allies have turned the airport in Austin into a hub for prospective fund-raisers. Almost every day, delegations like those from Massachusetts arrive.

That the financial resources of governors — as well, one must suspect, as the resources of former governors and other locally important politicians — may be “transferable” to presidential candidates is a point of utmost importance. It indicates that the money that leading candidates raise is, in some significant part, a party resource rather than a mere candidate resource.

Journalistic accounts make clear, however, that party officials are not the only source of funds. Private citizens, ranging from wealthy industrialists to persons described in newspapers as “professional fund-raisers,” are also important. Yet such people are not lone rangers; they are partisan, strategic and often hierarchically organized. In short, they are best understood as an arm of the contemporary political party. Consider the following excerpts from a description of George W. Bush’s money-raising operation:

The fund-raising structure Bush’s advisers are assembling is a pyramid — “the air gets thinner as you go up,” is how Sheldon Kamins, a Potomac developer who will help lead the Maryland fund-raising, put it.

At the top are a few fund-raisers with national networks of their own — Bush money veterans such as Washington business consultants Wayne L. Berman and Peter Terpeluk Jr. and Michigan businessman Heinz C. Prechter. Owner of a car-customizing company, Prechter raised more than \$ 1 million in 1988 for Bush senior, who named him chairman of the president’s Export Council and took him on a trade mission to Japan that landed Prechter’s firm a lucrative deal.

In the battle for what one Bush veteran called “the name brand people” in GOP fund-raising, the Texan hasn’t won every round. Several of the biggest Rolodexes in New York, for example, are holding back as Bush and his top advisers negotiate with Gov. George E. Pataki, who has been floating his own presidential hopes of late. One Bush ally described the talks as “a very delicate minuet,” putting major New York fund-raising on hold until the summer.

“It far transcends the Washington establishment,” said one former senior White House adviser to Bush. “It’s certainly one part Bush family, one part Republican diehards and it’s one big part Texas.”

The Bush mobilization has featured a procession of more than 400 fund-raisers — a who’s who of the Republican rich and powerful — flying to Austin to hear his pitch.

[Even Bush’s] opponents concede they can’t compete with Bush for the key fund-raisers. “He’s done a superb job in locking up the party establishment,” said Ari Fleischer, spokesman for Elizabeth Dole (Glasser 1999).<sup>18</sup>

The notion that there are “brand names” in a “Republican establishment” of big campaign donors is, once again, a point of significance. It indicates that some part — we suspect a rather large part — of what is often derogated as “fat cat” or “private” money is rather a form of organized *party* support.

To be sure, the journalistic accounts we have cited do not refer to party support. They describe the Bush campaign as “assembling” and “locking up” support of various individuals. But were the individuals thus “assembled” entirely passive in the matter? Were they “locked up” by some involuntary means? Were they incapable of saying no, as union officials said to Gary Hart? Were these Republican elites somehow unable to instead say yes to Dan Quayle, Elizabeth Dole, Orrin Hatch, Lamar Alexander, or any of several other prominent Republicans who tested the political waters in 2000 but did not actually enter the primaries? One assumes not. The party officials who turned the airport in Austin into “a hub for prospective [Bush] fund-raisers” had many choices.

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<sup>18</sup> In the original article, the final three paragraphs of this quote appeared ahead of the first three.

That they lined up behind Bush indicates that they were choosing to support him at least as much as he was choosing to “assemble” them.

This difference in emphasis is important because it is the difference between a candidate-centered and a party-centered view of presidential nominations. Journalists, who often personalize stories by focusing on the most high-profile and dynamic actors, tend to tell the former story. As political scientists trying to identify systematic regularities, we think the latter emphasis makes more sense.

We turn now to another issue. The party leaders and fund-raisers recruited by candidates appear, by journalistic accounts, to constitute a very finite group. There are, to begin with, at most 50 governors for the various candidates in both parties to divvy up. But the fund-raisers, professional staff, and media experts whom the candidates also need are also distinctly limited in number. Thus, the effect of Bush’s early fund-raising and endorsement blitzes was to lock up the available pool of resources and deny them to the other candidates:

“Primary voters are a relatively small universe,” said Eddie Mahe, a veteran consultant unaffiliated with any presidential candidate. “If they know their governor and their legislators are saying George Bush is our best chance, it reduces the probability they will get involved actively or make contributions to other candidates. The collective result is to make it much more difficult for those other candidates to get traction” (Broder 1999b see also Caesar and Busch 2001, pp. 62-63).

Not merely difficult but often impossible. As we have noted, three potentially strong Republican candidates — former Vice President Dan Quayle, Elizabeth Dole, and former Governor Lamar Alexander — launched campaigns, hired staff, and raised substantial amounts of money without being able to “get traction.” As a result, they were forced to drop out before the first vote was cast in Iowa. Quayle had similarly dropped out of the 1996 race, quitting after about a month of active campaigning. As Ronald Brownstein explained in the *Los Angeles Times*:

Some GOP sources said that Quayle had received discouraging responses as he sounded out potential political and financial backers around the country over the last several weeks. In a recent straw poll in Arizona, where Quayle has strong family ties, he attracted only minimal backing.<sup>19</sup>

The same was true of Senator Paul Laxalt in the 1988 campaign. A respected conservative and confidant of Ronald Reagan, he announced on April 28, 1987, that his decision to run was “as close to final as one can get,” with financing the only question. But on August 25 he dropped out, saying finances were a “black hole” and offered him no hope.<sup>20</sup>

Black holes have also appeared on the Democratic side. While Bush was “assembling” so many supporters in 2000 that he left few or none for his potential opponents to “assemble,” Al Gore filed his candidacy with the FEC rather early, on New Year’s Eve 1998, because “it would be foolish to allow potential candidates such as Sen. Paul D. Wellstone (D-Minn.) and former senator Bill Bradley (D-N.J.) to get a jump on the money-raising contest that is likely to dominate 1999” (Connolly 1999; see also Balz 1999; Berke 1999). Political scientists James W. Caesar and Andrew Busch write

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<sup>19</sup> “Quayle won’t seek GOP bid for presidency,” Ronald Brownstein, *Los Angeles Times*, Feb. 10, 1995, p. A1.

<sup>20</sup> “Laxalt rejects bid for the presidency,” Richard L. Berke, *New York Times*, August 26, 1987, A12. “Laxalt Rules Out ‘88 Presidential Race, Cites Finances,” Josh Getlin and David Lauter, *Los Angeles Times*, August 27, 1987, p. A10.

Numerous potential Democratic candidates considered a race against Gore [in 2000], only to back out. House Minority Leader Dick Gephardt, the favorite of organized labor, left the race after the 1998 elections. Senators Paul Wellstone of Minnesota, Bob Kerrey of Nebraska and John Kerry of Massachusetts all explored candidacy, as did perennial gadfly Jesse Jackson. For most, the financial hurdle was decisive — or at least it was the excuse they offered (2001, p. 62)

The problem faced by these candidates is not that there is too little money sloshing around the political system to enable candidates to compete in the primaries. It is that there is too little money for *everyone* who might like to run. Money in politics is, as in most domains of life, a scarce resource, and it is directed by the political system to candidates judged likely to make the best use of it. Thus, as in the old system, the total reservoir of political support is adequate, but also finite and zero-sum. We emphasize this aspect of the process in our theoretical analysis below.

One might more generally compare the accomplishments of someone like Bush or Gore with those of Kennedy. In 1960, Kennedy won the nomination by convincing a far-flung party elite that he was the best candidate. They repaid him with their support where it mattered — with blocks of votes at the nominating convention. In 2000, Bush and Gore won their nominations by convincing probably even more dispersed party elites that they were the best candidates. The elites repaid them with support where it mattered — resources for use in the primaries.

If, as these accounts indicate, the structure of the nominating process requires candidates to raise substantial amounts of early money to have a chance, and if the availability of early money depends heavily on support of finite party networks, one can only conclude that party networks are important in the process. By the same token, one must suspect that other actors, such as voters and journalists, who cannot exercise much power until votes are cast, have their power diminished.

But can the support of the assorted party officials and activists who have gotten into the endorsement and fund-raising game be plausibly counted as the support of a political party? How could one decide whether these individuals are just a bunch of well-heeled political investors or something more like a classic political party? We now turn to these questions.

## II. Theory

In Part II of the paper we lay the theoretical foundations for making sense of the descriptive account of party processes in Part I and for rigorously testing the extent of party power in the contemporary nominating system. The first section develops a general conception of party. The second adapts that conception to the structural features of the current presidential nomination system in the United States. The third proposes and justifies a series of empirical tests to determine the nature and extent of party influence in the current system. With this theoretical work accomplished, Part III conducts an empirical evaluation of the propositions.

### A. What is a party?

Different analysts have different conceptions of what a political party is. The two classic definitions are Burke's (1790) notion that a party is an association of persons united by some common principle, and Schattschneider's (1942) view that a party is "an organized attempt to get power" (p. 35). We shall use the latter conception.

For us, then, the Democratic and Republican parties are groups of individuals who work in organized fashion to gain control of government by winning elections. We put no other restrictions on the term. Parties may consist of the “bosses” of big city machines, of which Mayor Richard J. Daley is the archetype. Or they may consist of the members of county and state party committees. Or elected office holders working in concert to retain or expand their power. Or loosely connected networks of elected officials, activists, money-raisers, and consultants. Or any combination of the above. Any such group can be, in our conception, a party, so long as it meets the basic definition: That it organizes for the purpose of contesting elections and thereby capturing control of government.

A more restrictive definition tied to the *form* of party that exists in a particular time or place is, in our view, a mistake. The constraints and opportunities present in a given situation obviously affect the organizational form of the people who seek to get control of the government. This is particularly true in the United States, where the constraints frequently consist of reform laws whose purpose is to frustrate party activity. Reforms may sometimes actually succeed in suppressing most party organizing, but more often they simply force party activity into forms not anticipated by those responsible for the anti-party rules. In light of this, it must be an empirical matter to characterize the form of parties — the organized attempts to gain power — in any given context.

The essence of organization, according to Schattschneider, is the presentation of a united front in elections. By putting forward the right candidate(s) and coordinating effort behind that choice, parties do their most essential work.

The development of a united front requires compromise, consultation, and willingness to take account of everyone’s point of view. This means it is not a mass activity, but a strategic activity that must be carried out by the elite managers of the party. Hence, our analysis of party resurgence will focus on the elite managers of the two parties rather than their mass base of party identifiers. These party elites (or leaders) are, in our understanding, persons who work regularly for the party and who control more resources than simply their own votes. Party leaders may vary in rank from president of the United States to state party chair to local organizer.

Included in our conception of party leaders are the leaders of many industries, many large labor unions, ethnic groups, religious groups and other interest groups – if these groups and their leaders are in long-term alliance with a party and participate in its councils. The AFL-CIO union, Pro-Choice on abortion groups, and leaders of civil rights organizations are, for example, important players within the Democratic party. The National Rifle Association, Pro-Life on abortion groups, members of the religious right, and tobacco interests are important players within the Republican party. Leaders of such interest groups have loyalties both to their party and to their group, as we shall discuss below. But if they regularly involve themselves in party councils and in electoral politics on behalf of one of the parties, they are, for our purposes, part of that party’s leadership.

A party creates its all-important united front by the issues it stands for and the candidates it nominates. As regards the so-called “parties-in-government” – office holders, such as members of Congress or state legislators or even the President -- the selection of issues is more important, since the candidates for office are already in place. As regards the party leadership, much of which holds no government office, selection of candidates is the more

important activity. The candidates a party nominates embody both its positions on issues and, perhaps even more importantly, its commitment to a particular style of governance. Thus, as Schattschneider writes:

[T]he nomination [is] the most important activity of the party. In an election the united front of the party is expressed in terms of a nomination. For this reason nominations have become the distinguishing mark of modern political parties; if a party cannot make nominations, it ceases to be a party (p. 64).

What it means for a party to “make a nomination” varies according to the organizational form of the party system. In some party systems, the party puts forth a list of candidates in on the general election ballot that includes just about anybody who wants to run. But only the top candidates on the list ever take office – the exact number depends on the party’s share of the overall vote -- and party leaders determine who is at the top of the list. This means that the leaders effectively control nominations even though they may have no influence over who gets on the list of party candidates. Thus, one must always look at how a nominating system works in practice in deciding whether a party controls its nominations. As Schattschneider observes:

Whether or not a nomination is a real nomination is whether or not it is binding, whether it effectively commits the whole party to support it. If it is binding, if all other candidates with the party (for the office in question) are denied party support, and if the party is able to concentrate its strength behind the designated candidate, a nomination has been made regardless of the process by which it is made. The nomination may be made by a congressional caucus, a delegate convention, a mass meeting, a cabal, an individual, or a party election. The test is, does it bind? Not how was it done? (1942, p. 64)

As regards presidential nominations in the U.S. system, there is a trivial and a critical aspect to the question of whether a nomination binds. The trivial aspect is whether the person designated by party conventions is accepted as nominee. With the exceptions of the 1912 Republican nomination and the 1860 Democratic nomination, in which the parties produced two nominees at two different conventions, major party nominations in this country have always been binding in this elementary sense. This includes nominations in the post-reform period.

The more critical question is whether the party managers can effectively control which candidate gets the official nod as party nominee. If someone other than party leaders picks the party’s nominee, it is hard to consider the leaders to be the party, as we do. Yet, as we have seen, many scholars doubt that party leaders in the contemporary Democratic and Republican parties have the institutional capacity to make binding nominations in any meaningful sense. Their claim is that ordinary voters, under the influence of the mass media, dominate presidential nominations. Our claim, however, is that even though voters do formally control delegate selection to the party nominating conventions, party leaders maintain informal control by determining which candidates are likely to run well in the primaries. We shall present evidence for this claim below.

In addition to the question of whether a nomination binds, there is the critical matter of whether a party’s united front is really united or just a front. The bare-knuckle triumph of a narrowly factional candidate or the accidental victory in a free-for-all does not indicate a *united* front. The question is whether a party at least tries to select the candidate who can best unify the party and win in November. As Polsby and Wildavsky wrote in 1968:

Unless party leaders achieve a consensus among themselves, chances are diminished that they will be able to elect a President. Parties tend as a result to nominate candidates who at the least are not obnoxious to, and ideally are attractive to, as many interest groups and state party leaders as possible. (p. 71-72)

A candidate who is strongly supported by a majority of party leaders could be a poor nominee if the remaining members of the party so strongly oppose that candidate that they stay at home on Election Day — or, worse, defect to the other party. Occasionally a party will have a politician so universally popular that everyone enthusiastically consents to the nomination. More often, however, creating a united front means that some or perhaps most party leaders must be prepared to pass on their most preferred candidate for the sake of nominating someone who is acceptable to most or almost all other members of the party.

The candidate who can best unite the party is not always the candidate who can do best in the fall election. Party members want a winner, but they also want a nominee who is a team player — a politician who will work with other party members to achieve their goals and to strengthen the party generally. The opposite of a team player is a “grandstander” or “maverick” who goes his own way or takes actions that advance his or her popularity, but at the expense of the rest of the party. Grandstanders and mavericks are not necessarily narrow factional candidates, and may project a populist appeal. Estes Kefauver, a Democratic Tennessee Senator in the 1950s with a penchant for using TV to promote his causes, was such a candidate. Big city Democrats distrusted him because his investigations of corruption threatened to expose their Mafia ties, and southern politicians distrusted him because he was liberal on race. Hence, despite his national appeal, he never won the Democratic nomination for president. Journalist T. H. White credits an urban Democratic boss for this explanation of Kefauver’s limited success in the party:

Kefauver? Look, let me explain in terms of my own governor. When I decided to nominate him, I called him in and said, “Today, I’m the boss. But when I nominate you and you’re elected, you’ll be the boss because you’re governor. I’m putting a gun in your hand and you can shoot me with it.” Now, you see, with Kefauver, you could never be sure he wouldn’t take that gun, turn around and shoot you.<sup>21</sup>

John McCain is perhaps the best contemporary example of a charismatic national politician who is widely considered by members of his party to be a populist grandstander rather than a team player. His signature issue is campaign finance reform, which he pursues despite the strong possibility that it would, if enacted, deprive the Republican Party of its fund-raising advantage over the Democrats. His campaign finance measure would also harm interest groups, such as the National Rifle Association, that make big contributions to the party, and incumbent politicians (of both parties) who benefit from such contributions. Republicans might rationally prefer to lose the presidency for one term rather than elect someone who might permanently undermine the party’s competitive edge in campaign finance.<sup>22</sup> McCain also makes a point of forcing Senate roll-call votes on legislative provisions that he considers “pork” and on the privileges (“perks”) of the Senate as a whole, such as free parking at city airports. By forcing senators to vote publicly to maintain their privileges, he embarrasses them while making himself look good

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<sup>21</sup> Theodore H. White, “Kefauver Rides Again,” *Colliers* CXXXVII, May 11, 1956, p.28. Sean J. Savage has written of Harry Truman’s attitude toward Kefauver: “Truman was motivated to prevent Kefauver’s nomination because of his intense dislike and distrust of the Tennessee senator. Truman believed that Kefauver, or “cow fever,” was so deceitfully opportunistic that he was willing to “discredit his own President” and weaken the Democratic Party’s electoral strength for the 1950 and 1952 elections. For Truman the party regular, it was intolerable that a Democratic presidential candidate, whom he believed had ‘no sense of honor’, could receive his party’s nomination by exacerbating dissensus within his party by holding highly publicized hearings that dramatized and exaggerated the extent of collaboration between Democratic politicians and gangsters.” *Truman and the Democratic Party*, Lexington: University, Press of Kentucky 1997 pp. 169-170.

to voters. These actions play well in the media — one conservative columnist has referred to the Arizona Senator as “McCain (R-Media)” — but contribute to his reputation as a non-team player.

The post-reform nominating process has attracted a number of candidates who are considered by their partisan colleagues to be grandstanders, mavericks, or in some other way poor team players. They include Gary Hart, Jerry Brown, Pat Buchanan and Phil Gramm.

The traditional means by which parties forged a united front behind a candidate who was popular, acceptable in the party on the issues, and "not a maverick" was the old-style nominating convention in which relatively autonomous local party organizations met in face-to-face convocation. According to Polsby and Wildavsky's (1968) classic account, the balance of power at conventions tended to be held by professional politicians for whom compromise was virtually second nature. Although some convention delegates were factionalists or “purists” more interested in getting their factional favorite nominated than in advancing the party generally, they were generally outnumbered by the professionals. What happened at conventions, then, was that party members from diverse points of view noted their relative strength, exchanged information about preferences and then, amidst the “hurly-burly, crush and confusion of convention activity” (p. 91), chose the candidate who represented the best chance to unify the party and win in November.

Of course, conventions did not always go smoothly. In 1924, opposing factions of southern and northern delegates to the Democratic convention held more than 100 ballots in an attempt to forge agreement. After days of balloting, they gave up and chose a sacrificial lamb, John W. Davis, who was then duly slaughtered in the general election. This incident was no doubt in Will Rogers' mind when he made his famous remark that “I don't belong to any organized party — I'm a Democrat.” What made his remark funny was that organization to create a united front is part of the common understanding of what a party is.

We should add, however, that the amount of organization necessary to create a united front and control an election can be quite modest. Schattschneider offers the example of an election for president of a boy's club in which each boy voted for himself. In this situation, any two boys who formed a united front could control the election. In general, the more dispersed and random the vote, the easier it is for even primitive organization to prevail. Given this logic and the extreme disorganization of the presidential nominating system as it operated in the 1970s, the amount of formal organization necessary to achieve control might not be large or conspicuous.

The history of presidential politics provides, as it happens, striking examples in which modest organization had huge effects. In 1799, friends of Thomas Jefferson realized that New York state would be the pivot of the Electoral College in the 1800 election and that New York city would be the pivot of New York state. Thereupon they organized what is often called the first modern political campaign in the United States, complete with door-to-door canvassing and get-out-the-vote drives, to win the fall municipal elections in New York, which they succeeded in doing. By the time the friends of the other candidate, John Adams, realized what had happened, the presidential

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<sup>22</sup> See Wilson 1962 on why it is sometimes rational for parties to accept defeat rather than nominate a reformer whose victory might undermine the basis of party support in the long-term.

election of 1800 was beyond their grasp. These two groups of friends are known to history as the Democratic-Republican Party and the Federalist Party.

Two decades later the friends of Andrew Jackson — soon to be known as the Democratic Party — were distressed that their candidate had won a solid plurality of the Electoral College in the election of 1824 but lost the election in the House of Representatives. Thereupon they organized to make sure that General Jackson had no important competitors for the votes of his natural constituents. This they accomplished by corresponding with their activist colleagues — or friends, as the term then was — around the country so as to guarantee that General Jackson would be the only western candidate in the race. Although the election of 1828 was hard fought, it is arguable that this bit of organization was sufficient to assure the outcome (Caesar and Spitzer, 1988). Jacksonians were so pleased with the results of their method that they decided to institutionalize it in the form of a party nominating convention. The opposition then turned to the same device, nominating a string of candidates, such as Indian fighter William Henry Harrison, whose principal qualities were that they could unite the party and win elections.

The convention remained valuable for these purposes until the late 1960s when the McGovern-Fraser commission fatally undermined it. The commission did so by requiring that the bulk of convention delegates be chosen by procedures open to rank-and-file voters and firmly attached — often even legally bound — to particular candidates. With convention loyal to particular candidates rather than regular party leaders, deliberation or bargaining to unite the party became an unlikely occurrence. Whether some other sort of organizational procedure has emerged to do what party conventions once did is the question that lies before us.

In the following analysis, then, we shall be concerned to discover whether political parties have, in some form, re-emerged in the sense that 1) one can find relatively small and stable groups of party managers who 2) control the outcome of the presidential nomination process, and who 3) do so by means of a procedure that attempts to create a genuinely united front rather than the triumph of a merely factional or accidental candidate.

## B. Empirical propositions concerning party power

We maintained earlier that constraints and opportunities in the political environment affect the form of party organization. The presidential nominating system is a case in point. When party leaders personally controlled the appointment of many convention delegates and a “unit rule” constrained state delegations to vote as a block, party leaders could achieve a united front by bargaining among themselves and ordering delegates to execute their agreement. But now that convention delegates are selected by voters in primaries, party leaders can no longer control nominations in this way. Yet it does not follow that they are thereby rendered helpless sideline players. If anything follows, it is only that, if they wish to remain influential, they must develop other means of doing so.

The current system provides them an obvious opening. As we have seen, current rules compel candidates to win convention delegates by running in a sequence of 50 primaries and caucuses that occur within a very short time. Even if all of the real action is in 20 or 30 contests at the beginning of the process, the requirements of the task — in

terms of money, people power, and communication — are much too great for any individual candidate to meet. The fact that money must be raised by means of \$1,000 contributions (a limit that, despite inflation, has been left unchanged since 1974) increases in each cycle the difficulty of raising the vast sums required to make a serious run for the presidency. Given this, candidates need help from people who understand state election systems and who have access to campaign technology and to donors. That need is the opening through which parties have reentered the process.

To be sure, there is no law that says candidates must turn to party leaders for the help they need. They can try to build their own organizations from candidate enthusiasts loyal to them and having no important connection with parties. Many scholars appear to believe we have this sort of “candidate-centered” system.

The question of whether the current system is candidate-centered or party-centered is just another way of asking whether party leaders are the dominant influence in the process. Let us therefore think carefully about what it means to have a candidate-centered system. Good starter questions are: Where exactly does the raw material for candidate-centered organizations come from? To what extent does this “raw material” have opinions and preferences of its own? Is there any way to define a continuum from “party-centered” to “candidate-centered” for the sake of making finer distinctions about the nature of the system we currently have?

A metaphor may be helpful here. Suppose that assembling a campaign team under the competitive pressure of presidential nominations is like a group of fisher-persons in a contest to catch the most fish. If there are many competitors, if they are fishing in something as big as an ocean, and if the number of fish they catch depends on their skill in luring fish, the contest would properly be called fisher-centered. But suppose all of the competitors are fishing in the same small pond. And suppose the fish are organized into schools. And suppose the school leaders scrutinize the hooks of all the candidates before deciding which fisher they’d like to be caught by. And, finally, suppose they talk it over and make a joint decision. One would probably call this a fish-centered rather than a fisher-centered game, since the fish would be running the show and purposively determining the outcome.

The same sort of logic ought to apply to the political world. If candidates must assemble their campaign teams and raise money from a small pool in which all the candidates are compelled to troll for support, and if the potential staffers and media consultants and fund-raisers make a strategically coordinated decision about which candidate to join, the process shouldn’t really be called candidate-centered. Rather, it should be called party-centered, since the party functionaries are the ones driving the process and determining the outcome.

This analysis implies a continuum running from a strongly candidate-centered to a strongly party-centered system, with intermediate nodes as follows:

- 1) If the pool of party activists is unstable from one election to the next, such that each candidate builds his or her organization from mere candidate enthusiasts drawn from an indefinitely large pool, one would say that the system is strongly candidate-centered.

- 2) If the pool of activists is stable and partisan but extremely large, such that the gains of one candidate do not much diminish the potential for comparable gains by other candidates, one should say the system is weakly candidate-centered but that party has some importance.
- 3) If there is some fixed and small number of party players whose support is essential but who make their decisions independently, one should say that the system is weakly party-centered.
4. If, in addition to the previous condition, the ability of candidates to assemble their campaign teams depends on the coordinated decision of a fixed and small number of regular party players, the system should be considered strongly party-centered.

Note that the key to deciding whether candidates or parties dominate is not, as analysts often think, the level of activity or initiative of the candidates, which can be high in any type of system. It is, rather, the extent to which candidates must develop essential campaign resources from a pool of party workers that is fixed and small rather than indefinitely large, and who try to coordinate their support behind a broadly acceptable candidate who can win in November rather than a mere factional favorite.

Thus, the question of whether the system is candidate-centered or party-centered brings us back to the same three issues raised at the end of the last section. Since these questions will frame our empirical analysis, we shall recast each as a proposition and give it a name:

1. **Small world.** The Small World proposition is that the supply of competent political personnel and campaign funds is relatively limited, such that candidates for the presidency must tap into the same limited pool of party leaders and activists.

2. **United Front.** The United Front proposition is that party leaders have the motivation and the means to coordinate on candidates who can best unite the party and win in November. As with the second proposition, the claim here is not that party leaders always manage to behave in accord with expectations about how a party should behave. It is only that they always try and therefore always give evidence that they are trying.

3. **Decisive Influence.** The Decisive Influence proposition is that support from the small world of party leaders has been a decisive influence on nominations since 1980 and is likely to continue to be so. We do not mean by this that party leaders have direct control over primary outcomes. Obviously they do not. Or that, even indirectly, they can secure the nomination for anyone they want. Obviously, they are constrained to rally behind someone who can compete well in the primaries and in the general election. They must, that is, choose from the available pool of candidates, taking account of the other candidates their candidate must beat. And still, in our conception, the resources conveyed by party backing may not amount to much more than what is necessary to prevail in the given contest — a decisive edge and perhaps not much more. Our proposition is meant to recall Schattschneider's notion that, in a highly dispersed electoral context, a small amount of organization can be very important.

In this same vein, we should note that the phrasing of the third proposition is intended to convey the idea that there are many important non-party influences on primary outcomes, some perhaps more individually powerful than that of the party leaders. The most important are probably the talent of the candidate not favored by the party

insiders and the predilection of the mass media to support an insurgent, which is often but not always high.<sup>23</sup> Thus, although the candidates favored by party leaders have won every nomination contest from 1980 to the present and are likely to continue to do so in most cases, they are not guaranteed to win and may sometimes lose. Indeed, candidates favored by party leaders in 1984 (Walter Mondale) and in 1996 (Bob Dole) nearly did lose. Thus, when we say that the influence of party leaders is decisive, we mean only that, if properly calculated and deployed, it is likely to control the outcome most though not necessarily all of the time. Few forces are so strong in democracy that they are assured of winning all of the time, and we do not claim that the resurgent presidential parties are among the exceptional cases.

All three of these propositions must be empirically supported to credibly establish the thesis of party resurgence. Yet none is trivial or particularly easy to demonstrate. We begin our analysis by considering the nature of the data that we shall primarily use in testing them.

### C. A consideration of our data and its properties

The primary data for this study are publicly reported endorsements of presidential candidates in the period prior to the start of delegate selection in the Iowa caucuses. To obtain these endorsements, we have combed the Lexis-Nexis database and pertinent hardcopy publications in an excellent university research library. In all, we turned up some 2,700 names across the nine nomination contests from 1980 to 2000, about a fifth of which appear as endorsers in more than one election. Given the nature of our search, which is more fully described below, it is reasonable to suppose that our set of endorsements includes a high fraction of the most important public endorsers of presidential candidates, especially governors. The likelihood of recording endorsements from less important figures declines at some unknown rate as the importance of the endorser declines.

These data are unquestionably incomplete and to some degree biased, as we shall discuss in the next section when we begin to analyze them. In this more analytical section, we shall focus on theoretical possibilities and limitations: What might such data tell us? Even if the data were entirely complete and accurate, what might be the pitfalls in using them to gain understanding of presidential parties?

The central question here is what exactly endorsements mean. At a minimum, endorsements are an expression of support. As such, they enable us to keep tabs on who is supporting whom within a party. The action in nomination politics might be entirely backstage, where leaders encourage their own supporters, convey access to campaign networks (volunteer contacts) raise money, share information and so forth. The act of endorsement might then be epiphenomenal — unimportant in itself but useful to us as outsiders trying to follow the outcome of the intra-party struggle.

We believe, however, that endorsements are useful for more than score-keeping. For one thing, endorsements are often a commitment to work for a candidate. The support of a governor, a professional fund-raiser, a union, or a local organizer or club leader — and, *a fortiori*, the support of many such people — is therefore an indication of

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<sup>23</sup> E.g., George Wallace was probably the most talented politician in the field in 1972 and was certainly an insurgent, yet the media did not favor him.

how resources are likely to be deployed in the primaries. To be sure, some endorsements represent nothing more than permission to use the endorser's name and a promise to appear on the podium when the candidate comes to town. Some straw polls are little more than staged events.

But other endorsements, particularly by governors or party chairs, may signify a major commitment of resources. As Jake Thompson of the *Kansas City Star* wrote in 1995:

Endorsers usually activate their own political networks for a candidate; they lend stature to a campaign; they signal vigor to big money donors; and they offer an early read from GOP activists on a candidate's chances of winning.<sup>24</sup>

Endorsements may also entail commitments of activist networks, phone banks, fund-raising lists, and locally respected cues. Because different endorsements convey quite different kinds of resources, it is hard to see big overall effects, as others have noted (e.g. Broder 1999, Milbank 1999, Doherty and Martinez 1999). But there is little question endorsements entail commitments of valued resources. The only question is the empirical question of how exactly important they are.

Endorsement can also shed useful light on intra-party dynamics. They enable us, for example, to observe the time path of a candidate's support, what it responds to and what, if anything, it affects. Endorsers, like candidates, tend to possess an ideological, geographical, and group coloration. How these factors play out over time may also be roughly determined from the study of endorsement data. Influence might trickle up, such that more important elites learn from the pattern of support among less powerful elites who are closer to the candidate and perhaps also closer to ordinary voters. Or influence might trickle down, from the powerful to the less powerful. Endorsements might, in other words, function as instructions to the troops about expected behavior. All of these are important empirical questions.

Perhaps most interestingly from a theoretical point of view, endorsements may be signals to other elites. As such, they may not only reveal intra-party dynamics, but help to create them. By observing which party leaders have endorsed which candidates, other party members can determine who is broadly acceptable within the party and who is not. Early endorsements resemble first ballots in a jury room, in which members of a group test each other's feelings and send signals about who they are supporting. The sequential revelation of preferences in the year prior to the primaries can, as we discuss below, enable party members to reach a better collective decision than otherwise possible.

Candidates devote great energy to gathering lists of supporters and releasing them at staged moments. In this they are like politicians at old-fashioned conventions, who also kept lists of endorsements pocketed until the time was just right, as they hoped, for starting a bandwagon. Journalists, for their part, report endorsements in great detail, noting anything unusual about their incidents. To be sure, some of journalistic reports are thick in ridicule, as in the following article by Dana Milbank in the *New Republic* (10/18/99. P. 17):

... the Gore campaign [has begun] circulating names of every Tom, Dick, and Harry for Gore. On September 21, the campaign, after announcing some endorsements from congressmen, sent out a press release declaring that "more than 100 Long Island leaders" endorsed Gore. Who are these leaders? Well,

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<sup>24</sup> "Dole Racks Up Support," May 29, 1995, p. A1.

there's Steve Goldberg, Long Beach deputy zone leader, and Lynne Bizzarro, senior assistant attorney for some unspecified town. Bizzarro indeed. Does it really make a difference whether Irvin Toliver, director of human services for the town of Huntington, is a Gore man? Or how about Dolores Otter, listed on Gore's press release without a title? You can practically hear the buzz sweeping the nation: "Well, if Dolores Otter is on board, count me in."

Yet, always happy to play both sides of an issue, journalists may also publish criticism of candidates that have too few endorsements. Thus, Paul Taylor of the *Washington Post* wrote:

[Senator Gary Hart] is campaigning [in 1988] as a lonely front-runner. Aside from Jesse L. Jackson, no Democrat registered within 40 percentage points of him in a nationwide Washington Post/ABC News Poll completed last weekend. But Hart hasn't collected endorsements commensurate with his poll standing — nor, by his calculation, is he likely to.

Some of his opponents are spoiling to turn that disparity into an indictment of Hart's ability to govern. Building from questions raised about Hart in 1984, they will portray him as aloof, unable even in this ripe moment to line up backing because he remains uncomfortable with fellow politicians and political transactions.

"How can you lead the country if you can't lead your peers?" asked Christopher Mathews, a Democratic public policy analyst, who predicted that question will frame an "anybody but Hart" movement he expects to take shape within the party in the year ahead. (3/13/87, A4)

Our interpretation of these competing journalistic views is that both are valid. Some endorsements are authentic indications of support, so that failure to get any is a sign of weakness. Yet, precisely because endorsements do signal political strength, politicians sometimes go into over-achievement mode in collecting and publicizing endorsements that have little value. In terms of our earlier metaphor, candidates attempt to inflate their fish count by including trash fish from the ocean along with prize fish from the pond — to which journalists loudly object. We see this as an essentially measurement issue and shall be sensitive to it in our analysis.

Even if, however, our measurement of endorsements were perfect, there would still be issues in using them to make inferences about party power. These impediments may be conveniently reviewed in light of our three basic propositions.

**Small World Proposition.** If, contrary to fact, our endorsement data were complete or even nearly complete, it would be a cinch to evaluate this proposition. If, as we propose, candidates must fish each election for potential supporters from a small pond of party regulars, we would see the same names turn up election after election. Barring death or retirements, the list of the endorsers would be as nearly constant from one election to the next as is membership in the House of Representatives. If, on the other hand, candidates are, as it were, fishing for potential supporters in something like an ocean, such as the nation at large, we would see huge turnover from one election to the next, as each candidate pulled in a fresh wave of candidate enthusiasts. The degree of repetition in the list of endorsers would thus be an indication of the size of the pool from which candidates must be recruiting supporters.

What we can learn from an *incomplete* list of candidate supporters is more difficult to say. But if we could somehow estimate the degree of incompleteness, we might make progress. Consider, for example, the following hypothetical case: Over a period of three elections, there is a core group of 200 party members who make

endorsements in each contest. However, reporting of endorsements is sufficiently sketchy that observe only a random 50 percent of each endorsement that occurs. Therefore, from the pool of 200 actual endorsements, we would collect data on only 100 endorsements per election.

Suppose, now, that as analysts we know the data are only 50 percent complete and do not know anything about the rate at which endorsers are active from one contest to the next and so want to estimate that rate. Toward this end, we make the following baseline calculation. If an individual has made endorsements in all three elections and is observed to have endorsed in Election I, the chances of observing that individual as an endorser in both of the other elections is the same as getting two heads in a row on tosses of a fair coin — which is, of course, 25 percent. If, therefore, we observe in the data that close to 25 percent of endorsers in Election I have been observed making endorsements in Elections II and II, we would conclude that the real rate was close to 100 percent.

The data we shall be dealing with are more complicated in many ways. Still, the points outlined here need to be kept in mind in interpreting the data we have collected.

**United Front Proposition.** One of the most developed and serious criticisms of the new party system is that, by cutting party leaders out of the process, it nominates poor candidates who then make poor presidents. These candidates, it is claimed, are not in any way the products of a united front; rather, they are the products of factional, media-driven, or even just accidental politics.

A leading articulator of this view is Nelson Polsby, who has argued that the post-reform nominating process not only strips parties of the organizational machinery to create a united front behind a widely acceptable candidate, but, worse, it is systematically rigged to favor factional candidates. His argument is worth examining in detail.

Polsby's focus is on the sequence of state-level contests for delegate selection. What a candidate needs to do in this system, Polsby explains, is to finish as high as possible in the vote of an early contest. This is because winning early contests attracts the media attention and money necessary to continue competing and winning. But finishing high doesn't require anything like majority support — or, therefore, anything like broad appeal. Simply getting, say, 29 percent of the vote rather than 23 percent of the vote in Iowa or New Hampshire may make all the difference.

The candidate's best strategy is therefore to differentiate himself from the others in the race and persuade more of his supporters to come out and vote. A premium is placed on building a personal organization and ... hoping that the field becomes crowded with rivals who cluster at some other part of the ideological spectrum or who, for some other reason manage to divide up into too-small pieces the natural constituencies of the primary electorate (pp. 67-68)

In such a system, a candidate who is acceptable to all factions of the party but the first choice of none will fail, since voters will tend to pick the factional candidate closest to their own hearts. Whichever of the factional candidates happens to finish high in the early primaries will tend, with the aid of the media attention that goes to top finishers, go on to the nomination even though he or she is acceptable neither to the party as a whole nor to the general electorate.

Polsby's logic is similar to the logic of Proportional Representation (PR) party systems, which encourage small parties with narrow appeal rather than big parties with broad appeal. As such, the logic is hard to dispute. It is,

moreover, easy to imagine party elites yielding to it. Consider, for example, a politician whose base is some sort of factional grouping — a religious or racial group, unions, a political movement like the nuclear freeze of the early 1980s, or an ideological wing of a party. How would such a politician resolve the following dilemma: She can support the candidate favored or perhaps even revered by members of her political base — someone, for example, with the standing of the Rev. Jesse Jackson in the African-American community — or she can support a candidate more likely to unite the party. If she goes with her group's candidate, few members of her group are likely to complain, since she has supported their favorite. Even if the factional candidate flops in the primary contests, no one can blame her if she has been on the politically correct side. Thus, support in her political base remains solid. If, on the other hand, she supports the candidate more acceptable within the party, she may be accused of being a turncoat or disloyal to the group, an outcome that could endanger her standing with her political base. The next time she needs to call on the group for its enthusiastic support, it may not feel like making the effort.

If party members were, as the factional scenario suggests, primarily concerned with playing to their political bases when lining up behind presidential candidates, it would be hard to see how presidential parties — in our sense of the term party — could ever revive. Yet this is not the only scenario that might hold. Although the incentive to factionalism in the current system for party leaders, voters, and especially candidates is undeniable, there is another incentive that could turn out to be more important in practice. It is the incentive to get control of the presidency by winning the fall election. With that office comes policy benefits, access to decision-makers in the executive branch, opportunities to appear on the podium with the president when he visits locally, and perhaps patronage appointments for one's supporters — all of which can also be useful in keeping one's political base happy. Some fraction of endorsers may hope for judgeships, ambassador positions, or executive appointments. Many party leaders are, moreover, such personally committed partisans that they would emotionally prefer to nominate a candidate who can beat the other party. Nominating such a candidate could have greater personal utility than to nominating someone from one's own faction who might likely lose in the fall. Party leaders may not be so shortsighted, or so narrowly tethered to their political bases, that they fail to respond to these concerns. Precisely because party leaders, even many factional leaders, are aware of the futility of nominating a merely factional candidate, they might be expected to exert themselves to avoid such a pitfall.

We have, then, an empirical question about which incentive is stronger: The incentive to satisfy factional group demands or the incentive to make such compromises as necessary to unite the party and capture the presidency. The same competing incentives were, to be sure, present in the old nominating system and were much discussed by analysts of that system (cf, Polsby and Wildavsky, 1968). The difference is that the pre-reform party system provided institutional machinery — a party nominating convention — for forging the united front whereas the current system provides little.

Yet the current system has, willy-nilly, evolved some machinery for this purpose and, as we shall now argue, this machinery is sufficient for the creation of a genuinely united front if party members are motivated to use it for that purpose. The machinery is a process by which party members sequentially reveal their endorsements in the year prior to the start of the primary voting season. (The next derby is tentatively scheduled to commence in January 2003.) Those who do badly in the endorsement derby often simply drop out of the race, whereas winners become

the *de facto* front-runners for their party's nomination. When, moreover, the endorsement derby has produced a clear winner, as it has in eight of the nine contested nominations from 1980 to 2000,<sup>25</sup> that candidate has gone on to capture the party nomination. Although it is by no means obvious why this is so, it does mean that the endorsement derby is worth the effort to try to understand, starting with its formal structure.

Although a process of sequential public endorsements may seem to have little structure, it can be considered a kind of coordination game in which participants decide as they go along who is broadly acceptable within the party and an appealing candidate. Party leaders who participate in this game face several strategic choices. They may support a factional candidate close to their own hearts, hoping that the candidate may attract enough support to capture the nomination. But this risks backing a loser. They may therefore prefer to line up behind someone with broader appeal and hence a greater likelihood of the unifying the party and winning in November. But which candidates have broad appeal is not always easy to tell at the start of the process. A few party leaders may actually know the candidates well enough to make the call from their own first-hand knowledge, but most clearly do not.

Charisma presents another interesting dilemma. If a candidate exists who is broadly acceptable to everyone on policy grounds and who is also charismatic, endorsers face an easy decision. Otherwise, however, they have a problem. Can charisma compensate for policy positions that are not widely shared? For some candidates, like Ronald Reagan, it can, but for others, like Jesse Jackson, it does not seem to. The pattern of endorsements — the breadth of support gathered by a candidate who is both factional and charismatic — can help answer this question, but only after endorsements have begun to accumulate. Again, a few party leaders may have specialized knowledge about this, but most will not.

The timing of endorsements is another strategic question. Leaders could express themselves early on, when a small number of endorsements could distinguish one candidate from the rest and thereby launch a bandwagon. But leaders might prefer to announce their support later, after a front-runner has emerged but before he sews up the nomination. At this point, small increments of support may effectively block one candidate, put someone else over the top, or both. One might also expect that the more knowledgeable party members would express themselves early in the process, when their specialized information would lessen their chances of wasting an endorsement on a loser. Persons with very intense preferences might also endorse early on.

Position in the party might also affect strategy. Low-level officials may back almost anyone who has a fighting chance and takes the trouble to personally request their support, since the endorsement may then create a bond with a possible president. But high party officials, such as governors, must decide among multiple suitors. They typically have preferences of their own, but also want to back someone who can do well in their state. Finally, because governors share policy-making authority with the federal government, they have an especially strong incentive to back someone who can win the party nomination and go on to become their ally in Washington. But who that candidate is depends to a considerable extent on who is broadly acceptable within their party, as indicated by the endorsements of others.

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<sup>25</sup> The exception is 1988, when no clear leader emerged until after the early primaries, at which point Dukakis gained both more endorsements and more financial support. We deal with this case in detail below.

Game theorists have studied a variety of such situations as coordination games. In the most developed of these games, players must reveal their choices simultaneously in a single play. The form of the game varies greatly, depending on the structure of the players' preferences. And these games generally have multiple equilibria, where the outcome in a particular play of the game may be dependent on a "focal point" that is exogenous to the game. (See Schelling 1960). For instance, an experimenter offers to pay two randomly chosen New Yorkers a million dollars each if they can meet in two hours time at some location in New York and identify one another. With communication between the two people disallowed, a natural focal point would be Grand Central Station.

Yet coordination on a choice of presidential nominee is not quite like this example since, given the million dollar stakes, no one would care whether the focal point was Grand Central Station or the Empire State Building. In a presidential nomination, people would care where they meet. The following coordination game<sup>26</sup> is therefore more apt: Two people agree to meet for dinner but forget to choose the restaurant. Each has a favorite restaurant, but many restaurants might be acceptable; the important thing is they must somehow coordinate their choice in order for each to wind up at the same restaurant. If, in this situation, one person has a favorite restaurant that is always his choice of where to eat, and if the second person knows about that favorite, and if the first person knows that the second knows this, and if the second person knows that the first knows, and so on, then the first person's favorite is a natural focal point and both may go there. Or, if one does what a more interesting game might forbid and *calls* the other to leave a voice message announcing where he will be, the equilibrium is easily chosen. One player may be a little better off than the other by virtue of ending up at his favorite, but the main thing is that they have agreed and can eat together. If, as we have suggested, party members care most of all about coordinating on a candidate who is acceptable to all, this example of a coordination game may be rather similar to what parties face in the new system.

As in most coordination games, the exchange of information about preferences *and intentions* makes the game uninteresting. If players are motivated to coordinate and if communication is possible, then coordination is easy.

The key point, then, is that the party leaders whose collective political support is essential to make a credible run in state primaries can, in fact, communicate quite effectively through the sequential revelation of their preferences and intentions. They may not be able to communicate as effectively as they could if they were all at the same convention together, but they certainly can communicate.

There are, moreover, two features of the endorsement derby we have described that considerably enhance its value as a coordinating device: One is the fact that endorsers often have public personas as liberals or conservatives, friends of labor or minorities or business or religion, and so forth. The other is that the early endorsements may, if they come from persons having no personal ties to the candidate, indicate either intensity of preference or high quality information about the candidate.

To illustrate how these factors may play out, imagine another restaurant game. Hundreds of people are trying to coordinate on a place to eat and, if a large majority of them go to the same restaurant, they will get a price discount. At the same time, they want to be sure they go to restaurant where they will find something they will be happy to eat. Some diners are more finicky than others. All choices are made sequentially over time; everyone can observe

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<sup>26</sup> This is a variant of the Battle of the Sexes, although here there are more than two options, and in the case of endorsements, more than two player.

everyone else's choices as soon as they are made; and the group consists of people with many different culinary preferences, all of which are known to all members of the group. A few members of the group have a connoisseur's knowledge of restaurants, but the identity of these people is not generally known.

Suppose we now observe that the first set of diners to express themselves split their choices fairly evenly among a vegetarian restaurant, a steak house, a fish house, and Denny's. One's initial hunch would be that Denny's, although an unexciting choice, would do best, since it offers something to all manner of tastes. But if we then observe that the fish house has drawn a diverse crowd of vegetarians, families with children, fish lovers and Texans, we might infer that it has some special quality. The presence of vegetarians and Texans at a fish house would be especially illuminating: Since choices made by such different persons would be unlikely to reflect intense preferences for fish, we might infer that they instead reflect high quality information. The most likely reason they are there is that they know it is a good enough place to bring together diners of all stripes.

The people who choose in the first rounds are likely to have either intense preferences or a connoisseur's information about the restaurants — and all the other players will recognize this. Therefore, if, in the second round of selections, the fish house continues to draw a diverse crowd, persons having no particular food preferences will infer that the connoisseurs are favoring it, which will cause more of them to choose it. Thus, by the third round, even people with intense preferences for foods other than fish might begin to acknowledge that the fish restaurant is the most likely bet for coordinating on a discount meal.

The process of sequential endorsements that we are calling an endorsement derby has all of the properties of this example, including the incentive for individual endorsers to reconcile any intense preferences they may have with the special bonus they get for coordinating on a common choice. Also, like the restaurant game, it aggregates both information and preferences. Thus, the elements of a functional replacement for the old-style party convention, operating over a much larger and less disciplined number of players than in the old system, would seem to be at least potentially present in the new nominating system.

Explicitly modeling this process (see **Appendix 1**) yields evidence that, even faced with a large number of "diners" who are not interested in coordinating on the right candidate, the remaining party elites should have no trouble coordinating. For instance, if only half the group wishes to coordinate, many initially think each of 20 candidates is equally likely to be able to unite the group and win the general election, and a handful of early endorsers are only 60% sure it is a particular candidate, endorsements of this handful are sufficient to communicate their confidence to others. That, in turn, will lead them to coordinate on that candidate.

Nor is the sequential revelation of preferences the only means of communication by which information can be communicated. The arrival of easy jet travel makes it possible for even a geographically dispersed party leadership to meet regularly at conferences, fora and symposia. As described above, Bill Clinton apparently made a key breakthrough at a conference of Democratic Party officials in late 1991. Similarly, the move to nominate George W. Bush began at a Republican Governors conference. Beyond this, the volume of political chit-chat — via TV talk programs which used to appear on Sunday mornings but now appear every day of the week; the nationalization of the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*; and the internet, which is an excellent communication tool for political junkies — is quite dense. The non-stop buzz of modern political communication keeps everyone who cares

to know continuously abreast of the inside story. No one, we think, would say of party elites what T. H. White said of them in his book on the Kennedy-Nixon contest:

The country is so vast, and its political worlds so many, that these local leaders, groping as they leave their home base, crave contact with one another and are grateful to any man who can give them the sense of strength through multiplication (p. 149).

The combination of the endorsement derby and the high density of political communication in the United States today make it quite possible for party leaders to coordinate on a widely acceptable candidate in the year prior to the primaries — assuming, as we have emphasized, that they are motivated to do so.

A key task for our empirical analysis in the next section is, then, to examine the process of sequential endorsements to see if, as we suspect, it is functioning as a kind of signaling game to create a united front. If it were, we might expect to observe the following empirical tendencies:

- The process of sequential endorsements is a manifestly deliberate process — neither an early rush to judgment nor a last minute stampede. Rather, for maximal signaling efficiency, endorsements are made at a fairly even pace throughout year prior to the start of the state primaries.
- Within the constraint of a basically deliberative process, the overall rate at which party members make endorsements is somewhat faster when a broadly acceptable candidate has emerged and somewhat slower when there is no such candidate.
- Candidates having broad initial support pick up more support as the process develops than candidates having initially narrow support.
- Interest and factional groups often refrain from supporting the candidate with greatest appeal to their group, preferring to align with a more broadly acceptable candidate who can better unite the party.

**Decisive Influence Proposition.** There are simple and obvious methods for assessing our proposition that support from the small world of party leaders is a decisive cause of the outcome of primary elections. The simplest is to find out whether the candidate who wins the endorsement derby among party leaders wins the nomination. As we shall see, this has happened in every contest since 1980. Another is to correlate a tally of total endorsements with the number of delegates each candidate wins in the primaries. That test, as we shall see, also strongly supports our position. Another is to redo this analysis as a multiple regression that controls for such factors as fund-raising and poll standing. This regression, as we shall also report, shows a strong continuing effect of leader endorsements on primary delegate share, quite enough to create a decisive effect.

Unfortunately, however, these simple tests are so potentially biased that only a naïf would rely on them. The problem is that party members are trying to select a strong candidate, a candidate likely to do at least fairly well in the primaries even if he or she gets little party support. Whether party leaders are personally ambitious to climb on the bandwagon of a rising star or ambitious just for their party to win in November, they want to back the strongest candidate. Hence, to find that candidates who get many endorsements tend to do well in the primaries could be to

mistake cause and effect. Even if one controls for the poll standing of candidates, as we shall do, a strong performance by the endorsements variable in a multiple regression could indicate simply shrewd judgments by political leaders about who, regardless of the polls, is likely to win.

Yet to say that party endorsements are simply an accurate forecast of the likely outcome and nothing more is also naïve. For one thing, endorsements entail the commitment of significant resources, as we have noted, and it is hard to believe these resources, including money, have no independent impact. In some kinds of elections, campaign efforts by one candidate serve only to cancel those of the opposition, but resources in presidential primaries are often very unevenly distributed. Given this, and given the relationship we shall demonstrate between endorsements and resources, there is plenty of potential for party leaders to be decisive.

Also, although it is true that many endorsers are simply trying to ally with the strongest and most gifted candidate, there are many years in which one candidate seems about as strong as another. The Democratic field in 1988, for example, was often said to consist of Jesse Jackson and the seven dwarfs, of which one candidate, Michael Dukakis, eventually pulled ahead in the endorsement derby and won the most primary delegates. (Dukakis did not take the lead in endorsements until after Iowa; we examine this case in detail below.) Or, to take another example, it is hard to say that Al Gore in 2000 was a much better campaigner than Bill Bradley, yet he far outdistanced the latter in endorsements and — though spending in the primaries was fairly even — won the primaries by a large margin as well. Sometimes, moreover, the strongest candidate may be a candidate whom party leaders really do not want to win the nomination. The outstanding recent example of such a Kefauver-esque figure is John McCain. There seems little doubt that if Republican leaders had supported McCain in 2000 as strongly as they supported Bush, the former could have won the Republican nomination.

A very good baseball team is one that wins 65 percent of its games. The reason that even the sport's legendary champions have rarely done better is that most competition is an inherently chancy thing. So also with politics. Which candidate gets hit by a scandal on the eve of a big primary, which fails to quite meet expectations or instead manages to surpass them, whose big win occurs in a news vacuum and whose gets lost in an international crisis — such vagaries can deter and potentially derail even a natural champion. The Democratic contests of 1972 and 1976 show how oddly presidential nominations may come out and why the strongest candidate may lose some notable fraction of the time, as did Edmund Muskie and Scoop Jackson, who were probably the strongest Democratic candidates in those years. If the only thing that party endorsements accomplished was to increase the win rate for the strongest candidates from something like 60 or 70 percent to something closer to 90 or 100 percent, it would be a notable accomplishment in a competition that may result in loss of the White House for stretches of four years at a time.

A final point is that many party leaders represent groups, such as African-Americans or religious conservatives, who have a special favorite in the nomination contest. Yet, as we shall see, many of these leaders do not endorse the group favorite. Insofar as leaders go against the grain of their group's natural preference *and* produce a demonstrable effect on the votes of members of their group in the primaries, it constitutes evidence of the independent impact of group endorsements.

Several nomination contests have been very close, apparently capable of swinging either way. Possible turning points include Walter Mondale as he entered the Super Tuesday primaries in 1984, scandal-dogged Bill Clinton losing New Hampshire in 1992, and Bob Dole going into the South Carolina primary in 1996 after a weak performance until that point. In these and perhaps other cases, the endorsement derby was much more lopsided than the voting in the early primaries, so if endorsements and their associated resource commitments have any independent impact, they could easily have made the decisive difference in these cases.

#### D. Summary

Let us briefly review the main points of this section. The requirements for winning the nomination in the new system are too great for most candidates to go it alone with such existing staff and resource base as they may normally have. They need help, but where they will get this help is unclear. One possibility is that they have or quickly build personally loyal organizations from a large pool of potential supporters and donors; another is that they tap into existing party networks that are relatively small in size. If the latter is the case, there is a further question about how the party networks behave. Do they tend to support ideologically pure or factional candidates who may not enjoy broad party support? Or do they try to coordinate their support behind candidates who are broadly acceptable within the party? If the latter, how does this coordination occur?

In support of our argument that presidential parties are resurgent, we have advanced three propositions that are capable of empirical verification or falsification. These are that the pool of party supporters is small, that party leaders in this pool have evolved a process that enables them to form a united front behind a widely acceptable candidate, and their support makes a big difference in the outcome of primary contests. In the next section, we examine evidence concerning these propositions.

Together, these propositions amount to asking: to what extent do presidential nominations depend on the support of party members whose concern is to select a candidate who is broadly acceptable within the party and can win in November?

With these questions in mind, we turn to our collected names of persons who made a public endorsement of a presidential candidate prior to the Iowa caucuses, across the nine nomination contests from 1980 to 2000. The heart of the paper consists of an analysis of these endorsement data that aims to answer the questions outlined above. We shall now develop and test a series of specific propositions that follow from the theory just presented.

### III. Systematic evidence of party power

#### A. Description of Data

As sketched in the last section, our measure of the wishes and efforts of party elites is their recorded endorsements in various print media, up until the day of the Iowa caucuses. We searched a broad range of publications, including local and national newspapers, political magazines and newsletters (the *National Journal's Hotline* was especially helpful, when available), news wires and whatever other sources turned up in electronic searches. We found around 300 to 400 endorsements in each contest from 1976 to 2000, and sometimes more. For

each endorsement, we have the date it was announced or reported. This allows us to break the data into quarters (we count January and part of February of the election year as part of the fourth quarter) and then to examine the endorsement process as it unfolds. The bulk of our analysis considers only the results from 1980 to the present. Data from 1976 will sometimes also be mentioned. As indicated in Part I, we regard 1972 and 1976 as transitional nominations in which party leaders were still learning the properties of the post-reform system. By 1980, however, it was widely understood. All of the endorsements are publicly available.<sup>27</sup>

Several idiosyncrasies of the data are worth noting. For one, a handful of endorsers switch support from one candidate to another. This is almost always because the candidate first endorsed has dropped out of the race before Iowa. (Switching is, of course, far more common during the primaries, which winnow out candidates at a more ruthless pace, but we do not study that period.) For the most part, however, an endorsement is one promise politicians are good at keeping. In the cases of switching, we have credited both candidates with the endorsement, on the grounds that the endorsement contributes to both the first candidate's high-water mark and the second's power on the brink of the primaries.

Second, the dates for some endorsements are most certainly inaccurate. Many stories report the exact date the endorsement was announced. But in other cases, the reporter is simply clearing her notebook, listing endorsements that have occurred since her last story on the campaign or that for some reason had not yet appeared in her paper. In some of these cases, we have been able to find more accurate references elsewhere, but not for all. This hampers our efforts to assess the sequence of endorsements. However, the bias makes it harder for us to demonstrate the hypothesis that is of most interest to us, which is that early endorsements from diverse party elites are a cue for later endorsements, even controlling for early polls. If some of a candidate's true early strength is recorded later, it will lead to understated measurement of the independent variable and overstatement of the dependent variable. And if polls are at all endogenous to (true) early endorsements, polls would then perform better in a multiple regression.

Third, we do not suppose that we have (or ever will have) gathered all of the endorsements. And our sample is not random, because reporters do not randomly decide which names to report. We have a much greater probability of finding an endorsement from a prominent figure than from an unknown. Since we do believe that the more prominent are the most important, this is a minor but still real bias. Also, journalists, seeking to appear fair, will sometimes report nearly equal numbers of endorsements for candidates with widely varied true depth, even in stories whose point is that one candidate has many more endorsement than another. (Fortunately, different reporters often name different endorsers when they can and are redundant when they cannot). This understates the strength of the front-runner, and so biases the sample against our hypothesis.

Finally, the 1991-1992 Democratic race deserves comment. Most campaigns for the nomination produce their first action in January of the year before the convention, get seriously moving in March, and are well underway by July. But the 1992 Democratic race did not follow this pattern. Scared off by President George H.W. Bush's popularity after the Gulf War, most Democratic candidates stayed back. Further delay ensued as Mario Cuomo once again considered whether to enter the race. Paul Tsongas was the first to declare in March, but the rest of the field didn't show up until fall. Consequently, there was far less time in that year for politicians to play the

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<sup>27</sup> See <http://www.bol.ucla.edu/~hnoel/endorsements.html> or <http://www.bol.ucla.edu/~dkarol/>

endorsements game before Iowa, and fewer players got involved. And when we divide our data into quarters, nearly all of the 1991 data fall into the final quarter, since there are few endorsements before October. We believe these early fall endorsements are more comparable to February and March endorsements in other years, and so we have split the 1992 data into four equal parts and treat these as quarters.<sup>28</sup>

The raw count of endorsements is a powerful measure of elite support. But it misses many nuances we believe are important. For one, some elites are more elite than others. Sen. Al D’Amato can make things happen in New York. Lynne Bizzarro probably cannot.<sup>29</sup> We have taken two steps to take account of this. First, we have used expert judges to create a weighting scale for the various kinds of people who show up in our endorsements sample.<sup>30</sup> This scale runs from 1 (current president of the United States) to .1, local office-holder or non-political celebrity. In a number of cases, we have given extra weight to particular individuals known to be more important than their office would indicate. Our raters also indicated that being from Iowa or New Hampshire might be worth at best an extra .1 points on the scale. Finally, our coders indicated that a reference to a block of unnamed endorsers connotes less weight than naming each of the individuals. Thus, a report that a candidate has the endorsements of 12 state lawmakers is worth a little more than naming one state lawmaker, but not 12 times as much. The full endorsement scale is in **Table 1**.

This scale gives due credit to big fish while also giving some weight to the cumulative mass of large hauls of small fish. The weighted variable can differ a good deal from the unweighted. Mostly this is because it assigns a relatively small weight to blocks of unnamed individuals, while the raw count credits the whole number. That is, the raw measure counts 12 unnamed local officials as 12 endorsements, whereas the weighted measure counts them as a little more than one endorsement. As shown below, use of the weighting scheme does not dramatically affect our results: We usually but do not always obtain the most statistically reliable results with the weighted measure. However, we believe that the results of the weighted variable should generally be given the greatest credence on substantive grounds, whether statistically the strongest or not.

Second, much of our analysis focuses on the group of endorsers we call “the pond,” — those people who appear in our sample of pre-Iowa endorsements more than once. For example, Alphonse D’Amato of New York was, according to our files, a Dole supporter in 1988 and in 1996 and a Bush supporter in 2000. Another New Yorker, Representative Charles Rangel of Harlem, is a five-time entrant, having been recorded in support of Carter in 1980, Mondale in 1984, Jackson in 1988, Harkin in 1992, and Gore in 2000. The fact that Rangel endorsed more often than D’Amato raises an interesting point: Both endorsed every time they really could, but D’Amato was

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<sup>28</sup> As a result, the 1 Quarter ends Dec. 18, 1991; the 2 Quarter ends Jan. 11, 1992; the 3 Quarter ends Jan. 24, 1992; and 4 Quarter ends with the Iowa Caucus on Feb. 10, 1992.

<sup>29</sup> Actually, we attempted to interview her but were unable to get contact information via the standard sources.

<sup>30</sup> Our weighting protocol was devised with the help of eight political experts in or associated with the UCLA political science department. We asked our panel to rate a sample of our endorsements on two variables, partyness (how much the endorser is part of the party) and resources (how much the person would be capable of helping the candidate). Our experts were generally consistent in their coding, with average intercorrelations of .72. We averaged their codes, weighted by their average correlation with the other coders and their score on a short but difficult test of political knowledge. (This test is available upon request. Do not expect to ace it.) We then multiplied the resultant partyness and resources scales, on the grounds that we are interested in resources from party elites. These results,

winning his first Senate election in 1980 and had little call to exert himself in the re-nomination of Reagan in 1984 and Bush in 1992. Although D'Amato was out of office in 2000, newspaper accounts indicate he remained politically influential, so his endorsement of Bush probably had some significance. Thus, D'Amato and Rangel are two of our (bigger) pond fish, with Rangel appearing more active even though he probably is not. Meanwhile Lynne Bizzarro, a Democrat, made only one endorsement in the entire period (we searched on her name in every year), thereby failing to qualify as a pond fish.

We argue that what matters most to candidates is how many big fish they can pull in from the pond of repeat endorsers, since the party activists who are repeatedly active are likely to be the politicians who are most valuable to candidates. Since the "pond variable" is a dichotomous variable — a person either repeats or does not repeat — we can weight the pond members by the party X resources weight, described above, to capture additional nuance among them. For example, there are some low-level players, especially in Iowa and New Hampshire, who play repeatedly in the nominations game. Thus, the pond includes bigger and smaller fish. The "pond variable" will be further discussed more below.

Another point about the data is that, particularly in the 1980s before Lexis-Nexis and other electronic coverage became extensive, we rely more heavily on elite newspapers, especially the *Washington Post*, which is electronically searchable back to 1978. As a result, we consistently get a disproportionate number of endorsers from the area served by that paper. This is a problem that we can only acknowledge, since we have no solution.

## B. Size of the Pond

Our use of the pond variable is justified by fact that there exist many repeat endorsers, which is itself evidence for our argument. We claim that endorsements reflect the preferences of a core of party activists. But the act of endorsing does not make one a member of the party. In 2000, both Michael Jordan and his mother endorsed a candidate for the Democratic nomination (Bradley and Gore, respectively). They are not part of the party, even if Jordan's endorsement of underwear, shoes and sports drinks have all been incredibly valuable. In our conception, party is a stable pool of elites that exists independent of any candidate organization. These persons have generally been active in the party for some time before this contest, and presumably will remain active in other party business after it is over. If we are correct, there ought to be a stable pool of endorsers who enter nomination fights repeatedly. Other candidate enthusiasts may be brought into the process by a candidate and play important roles, but the repeat endorsers are the ones who are critical to our argument.

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with a small number of additional modifications described in the text below, gave us our final scale, which groups endorsers in a way that is intuitively satisfying.

In our sample of nearly 2,700 individual names over 20 years, 20.6% of the names appear more than once, sometimes several times. The fact that these names appear again and again means that, in any given year, they contribute more than 20.6 percent of endorsements. In fact, in any given year, some 37.4% of the endorsers are from the “pond” of repeat endorsers, as shown below.

(If these two sets of numbers don’t seem to add up, consider this example. We have a set of 4 elections with 100 endorsements each. Fifty of the endorsers make an endorsement in all four elections — thus qualifying as repeaters — while the remaining individuals endorse in one election only. Hence there are 50 non-repeaters per election and 200 non-repeaters over all four elections. Given these numbers, the repeaters would constitute 50 percent of endorsers in each election but only 20 percent of all individuals (50/250) who make an endorsement. In the real data, the repeaters do not usually repeat four times, but they repeat often enough that the 20.6 percent of names in the sample who are repeaters make up 37.4 percent of all endorsers in any given election.)

Year	% Repeater
1976	32.20%
1980	33.00%
1984	45.60%
1988	31.90%
1992	40.30%
1996	44.70%
2000	34.40%
Average	37.44%

Thirty-seven percent is not an impressively high number. As explained, however, some endorsers in each cycle are people like Michael Jordan or Rob Lowe who have no permanent connection to politics and a scant contribution to make to any candidate’s fortunes. Often, they are merely celebrity friends of the candidate. If we examine only endorsers who score above .4 on our power index — this is, someone active at or above the level of statewide politics or Congress (see Table 1) — the percent of candidates who are repeat endorsers in any given year is notably higher, 53.4 percent. This is getting to be an impressive number.

*If we had collected the universe of all endorsers*, these figures would reflect the share of the endorsement activity that comes from people who involve themselves in the nomination process in general, rather than come out on a one-time basis for a candidate who has happened to mobilize them. But we cannot pretend to have the universe of endorsements, and the cases we do have are biased in a number of ways.

An obviously important bias comes from our inability to locate all important endorsers. Thus, there is no question but that many of the people whom we classify as ocean fish because they only endorse once are actually repeat endorsers whom we have failed to find a second time. Our chance of missing these people is greater if they do not hold a high state or federal office, or if they happen to be politically active in a place other than New York or Washington. These errors bias our estimate of repeaters downward.

On the other hand, repeat endorsers are, all else equal, more likely to be found than non-repeaters, for two reasons: Repeat endorsers are more likely to be high government officials who are more interesting to journalists

and therefore more likely to be reported upon. Additionally, once we have turned up someone's name, we often searched on that name in our electronic sources, thus giving pond people more chances to be found than one-timers. This is a particularly important factor in recent contests when our electronic sources permit more expansive searching. These two problems lead us to over-count repeaters, thus biasing upward our estimate of repeaters in the data.

Another source of incomplete information derives from vagaries of the reporting process. On one hand, a good fraction of one-time endorsers consists of notables and celebrities, like Michael Jordan, whom reporters are unlikely to ignore. Indeed, the likelihood that reporters will pay attention is the reason candidates ask their celebrity friends to make an endorsement. On the other hand, political circles are full of dedicated, tireless party people who have no celebrity value whatever. Such people are likely to be picked up on a hit-or-miss basis, but mostly missed. This combination of errors, which we believe to be very important, will tend to bias our estimate of repeat endorsers downward.

A final source of error in our measurement is that the people who constitute the party pond are rarely concerned only with presidential politics. They may, in a given year, devote themselves to a tough U.S. Senate or state assembly race; they may, due to personal reasons, decide to make their presidential endorsement only after Iowa; or may, like Al D'Amato in the example above, lack many opportunities to make many presidential endorsements, even in a fairly long career. Any such occurrence could lead us to incorrectly classify them as ocean rather than pond fish when they do enter the game. Thus, the effect of these errors would be to bias our estimate of repeaters downward.

It is obviously impossible to make a fine calculation of how these competing biases would play out. Our sense is that, on the whole, our data provide a conservative test of whether endorsements come from a pond of committed party workers. **Table 2**, a random selection of 25 endorsers,<sup>31</sup> provides a fresh view of the endorsers that strengthens this sense. The proportion of repeaters is about the same in this random subsample as in the parent sample, 24 percent versus 20.6 percent. But a perusal of the background sketches of the endorsers makes it clear that most have a history of party activism. Three, for example, are current or former members of the U.S. House but not repeat endorsers. A former co-chair of the Republican National Committee and current co-chair of Pete Wilson's campaign, a former executive director of the New Hampshire state Republican party, and a former chair of the Texas Democratic party are all listed as ocean rather than pond fish, as is a current president of the Maine State Senate. Altogether, 72 percent of the sample have positions that indicate on-going party activity. Several other endorsers — the two unions, the Phoenix lobbyist, and the health care activist (who lived in New Hampshire but was interviewed in Iowa where he was working in a campaign) — might also have been part of a party network, though we did not count them as such. And only two seemed clearly likely to be political neophytes brought into the process as candidate enthusiasts; these were, of course, the basketball coach (a Bush supporter in 1980) and the publisher of *Playboy* (a supporter of Paul Simon, the politician).

We will demonstrate below that the support of repeat players, conservatively estimated as we believe it is, has a strong independent influence on who wins the nomination. Indeed, endorsements measured in nearly every way

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<sup>31</sup> Each of our 2,700 names was assigned a random number and the highest 25 numbers were taken.

have such an influence. But the pond players are more likely to ally with the winner. Collectively, those in the pond backed a winner 50.9% of the time since 1976, while those who appeared in our data only once had a 44.7% success rate ( $p < .01$ ). These data are an initial validation that the pond fish are indeed the big fish in the nomination game.

We turn now to the subject of money. Although, for reasons we shall explain later on, money seems a less decisive influence in presidential nominations than it is often assumed to be — and notably less decisive than political endorsements — money is obviously of great importance. It is therefore interesting to know whether, in our now hackneyed metaphor, raising money involves trolling in something like an ocean or something like a pond.

Happily, there is solid evidence on this question — more solid, in fact, than the evidence we have been able to develop on candidate endorsements. Working with data from people who donated to a Democratic presidential candidate in 1988 and 1992, Brown, Powell and Wilcox (1995) were able to determine the degree of overlap. What makes their evidence so strong is that all significant campaign donations must be reported to the Federal Elections Commission, and it was from FEC donation lists that Brown et al. worked. Thus their data have none of the problems of crosscutting bias described above. The conclusion that they derive from this data supports our general position in virtually the same language we favor:

Most donors of serious money to presidential nomination candidates come from an established pool of habitual givers, not from a body of mostly first-time contributors assembled on an ad hoc basis by different candidates each election cycle. (p. 30)

But the evidence in support of our “small pool proposition” is even stronger. There are some tens of thousands of citizens in this established pool, some of whom respond to mail solicitations. Most donors, however, require a personal request in order to make a donation, usually from someone with whom they are acquainted. Candidates cannot possibly make any significant fraction of these requests themselves, which makes them dependent on the fund-raisers. As Brown, Powell and Wilcox explain,

Given the mathematical constraints imposed by the \$1,000 ceiling, successful personal-acquaintance solicitation campaigns must rely on a very large number of people making the initial contacts with the potential contributors. It is therefore necessary to create an organized hierarchical structure, with central fundraisers identifying a large body of solicitors who recruit other solicitors as well as contributors. This pyramid can go down through several levels, although in most campaigns it is not more than three or four layers deep.

The “central fundraisers” who run these organizations are a pool unto themselves — and not a large one. As Brown, Powell and Wilcox find,

Campaign fundraisers whom we interviewed agree that the key to a successful personal-acquaintance pyramid operation is the *small cadre of professional solicitors at the top*. (p. 57, our emphasis).

This “small cadre” of professional fund-raisers does not support every candidate who seeks its help. Thus, when, in a typical case, Quayle dropped out of the 1996 contest, “there were reports from other GOP officials that Quayle had been turned down by some major fund-raisers and that he had balked about taking out a loan to finance the start-

up costs of his campaign.”<sup>32</sup> Similarly, another paper noted that “several of [Quayle’s] advisers said he was increasingly frustrated in trying to recruit leading fund-raisers and party loyalists for his campaign.”<sup>33</sup>

If top fund-raisers are free to pick and choose among potential candidates, it is no doubt because it is the resources they control rather than candidates who are in short supply. Consider, in this regard, the following account of the a Democratic fund-raiser at the height of a nomination campaign:

Some aspirants for the 1988 Democratic Presidential nomination have apparently concluded that it would help to have E. William Crotty on their side.

In recent days, Mr. Crotty has fielded phone calls from Representative Richard A. Gephardt of Missouri, who announced his candidacy this week, and former Gov. Bruce Babbitt of Arizona, who plans to announce next month.

Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr. of Delaware flew to Mr. Crotty’s Florida home for dinner Sunday night. And on Monday Mr. Crotty met in Washington with Senator Dale Bumpers of Arkansas, who is expected to announce formation of an exploratory committee shortly. That night he was invited to a retreat in Colorado sponsored by former Senator Gary Hart but could not make it.

On Wednesday Mr. Crotty had lunch with Senator Albert Gore Jr. of Tennessee, who might be a long shot for 1988 but an attractive candidate in the future.

Mr. Crotty is senior partner in a Daytona Beach law firm. More to the point, he is a top Democratic fund-raiser and therefore a potentially key player in the 1988 contest.

Now that the early field has been thinned by Governor Cuomo’s decision not to run and by Senator Sam Nunn’s announcement that he will put his bid on hold, Mr. Crotty and other Democratic fund-raisers are finding themselves besieged.

“I feel a little embarrassed about it, really,” Mr. Crotty said of the attention he is getting.

He said he expected to decide in the next few weeks but was not leaning toward anyone. “I’m sort of waiting,” he said.<sup>34</sup>

This account does not fit the story of candidate-centered politics. It seems, rather, a story in which a small number of big fish are very important. It is not, however, clear that the fund-raisers are the really the biggest fish in the pond. As has been suggested before and will be again, qualitative evidence indicates that the fund-raisers take cues from party leaders at least as often as the other way around.

We turn now to a final topic, the availability of top political staff. These are people who know how to plan a schedule, turn out crowds at the airport, set up and run phone banks, get FAXes to the national media, help voters to the polls on Election Day, write speeches, prepare position papers, and do scores of other things that campaigns need to have done. Like top political figures and top fund-raisers, political staff also seem to constitute a fixed and relatively small pool. In “The New Presidential Elite” Jonathan Bernstein analyzes the career patterns of a set of party activists identified by *Campaigns & Elections* in 1988 as “Rising Stars” — people like Mike McCurry, Ed Goeas, Rahm Emmanuel, and Linda DiVall. In so doing, he discovers evidence of what we might call national party professionals:

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<sup>32</sup> “Quayle Forgoes Presidential Race; Advisers Cite Lag in Funds and Organization,” Dan Balz and David Broder, *Washington Post*, Feb. 10, 1995, A1.

<sup>33</sup> “Facing Financial Squeeze, Quayle Pulls Out of 96 Race,” Richard L. Berke, *New York Times*, Feb. 9, 1995, A14.

<sup>34</sup> “Stalking The 1988 Money Hunters,” Richard L. Berke, *New York Times*, February 27, 1988, A24.

The Rising Stars followed career paths best described as loyal to their parties. Many worked for or otherwise supported formal party organizations. Most worked for or otherwise supported multiple candidates from their party. And few have committed partisan violations.

Bernstein goes on to suggest that the Rising Stars constitute a new type of party organization and to call for rethinking of the nature of modern parties.

... The Rising Stars are not only party elites; they are national party elites, part of a network of governing and electioneering Democrats or Republicans who concern themselves with national matters — gaining partisan control of Congress and the White House, and then governing or influencing national policymakers. Indeed, unlike the state and local party notables who gathered to bargain over nominations at the pre-reform conventions, people like James Carville and Frank Greer, Scott Reed and Linda DiVall are truly a presidential elite. It is impossible to imagine a serious presidential candidate running, winning, and then governing without the help of these Rising Stars and others like them. (169, 171-172)

Below the “rising stars” is another level of personnel who also constitute a small pool. Thomas B. Edsall describes how the backing of these players, even though nameless, gave critical help to George H.W. Bush in 1988:

While a number of campaign strategists question the importance of local endorsements and backing by party leaders, Bush officials contend that in the South such support can be critical. .... “There are only 10 or 15 guys in these southern states who know how to run a campaign, and another tier of about 80 [to] 90 good campaign workers. If you get them, there’s nothing left for the opposition,” a Bush organizer said. “That’s why Dole could never get organized here because there was nothing for him. He’d come in on all these trips and it would be like a Chinese dinner, an hour later you’re hungry again.”<sup>35</sup>

Few of these 10 or 15 guys “who know how to run a campaign” or 80 to 90 who are “good campaign workers” got into our endorsement sample.<sup>36</sup> But, to judge from Edsall’s account, they are a small, experienced, and essential part of modern party organization — people whose support matters in presidential campaigns.

Summary. The bulk of literature on presidential nominations describes the process — rather too casually, we think — as candidate-centered. This section has provided some initial evidence that candidates must build their campaigns from human materials that come from a relatively small pool of partisan activists and leaders. This is a finding that should give pause to those taking the conventional view, but it is not enough to defeat it. To do that, we shall need to show that those who sign on to work for one candidate rather than another are part of a coordinated process that aims to advance the party by means of a United Front rather than individual party members or candidates. We turn to this task in the next section.

### C. Evidence of Effort to Create a United Front

A limited and stable pond, as described above, suggests a system in which party is important. But to call this party central to the system, those party members must also make efforts to coordinate. The aim of party in an electoral setting is to create a united front. What makes a collection of party activists a genuine party is the effort to coordinate effort behind candidates who can effectively lead the whole party in the general election. What evidence is there to suggest that the leaders of today’s parties behave in this fashion?

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<sup>35</sup> “Bush Has Upper Hand in Redefining GOP,” Thomas B. Edsall, *Washington Post*, March 10, 1988, A29.

As regards motive, there is firm evidence that the motive of ideological purity, although perhaps prevalent in the 1960s and at least in 1972, has been kept well under control among samples of presidential activists interviewed since 1980 -- and perhaps even before that time as well. As Stone and Abramowitz (1983) wrote in the *American Political Science Review*, "We believe that the literature on party activists has substantially underestimated the importance of electability [as a motive among activists] because it has relied on general measures of purism vs. pragmatism which involve asking activists to consider, in the abstract, the trade-off between ideology and electability. We [show] that such questions do not predict the behavior of party activists in selecting a presidential candidate. Despite a strong tendency among our respondents to opt for ideological purity over electability in the abstract, our data from 1980 indicate that Democratic and Republican activists were actually more concerned with electability than with ideology in choose a party nominee (p. 946).

This conclusion, which has continued to be supported (Stone and Rapoport, 1994; also Lagenbach and Green, 1992), bears on our analysis in an indirect but important way. For, as indicated by the "restaurant game" and its formalization above, activists can, if they are so motivated, coordinate to choose a candidate widely acceptable within the party. The activist studies by Stone, Abramowitz, and Rapoport, even though concerned with low-level activists unlikely to show up in our sample of endorsers, help to establish this motive.

The next question is whether the endorsement derby, as captured in our sample of endorsers, has the properties that a process of "public deliberation," as we have called it, would be expected to have. In contrast to the sequence of voting in state primaries and caucuses, it should not be a fairly calm and even process in which preferences aggregate smoothly rather than fitfully or wildly. Especially if, as we have proposed, early endorsements constitute a meaningful signal to later endorsers, the sequential revelation of preferences must allow time for the signals to be absorbed and reflected upon before they are refracted back into the process. In cases in which several viable candidates seem evenly matched, we should see endorsers hanging back to see how other endorsers are making up their minds.

We can observe the pace of endorsements by looking at the cumulative percent of endorsements in each race as a function of time. **Figure 1** shows these plots with a 45-degree line as a point of reference. If the data curve follows the 45-degree line, it means that the rate of endorsements is the same as the rate of the passage of time — if 10 percent of time has gone by, 10 percent of endorsements have come in; if 60 percent of time has gone by, 60 percent of endorsements have come in, etc. (See *Republicans 1980* for this pattern.) If the curve is bowed below the 45-degree line, it indicates that most of the endorsements have been made late in the process. (See *Democrats 1992* for this pattern.) If, finally, the curve is bowed above the 45-degree line, it indicates that endorsements come in quickly at the beginning of the time process. These plots are like standard Gini plots of income distribution.

As can be seen in the data in Figure 1, the data never bows much above the 45-degree line. Never, that is, is there a rush to early endorsement. Even in the 2000 Republican contest — perhaps the most consensual of all nominations from the perspective of party insiders — the endorsements came in at a markedly even pace.

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<sup>36</sup> The quote suggests that these are party workers rather than office holders; if this is the case, we find only about four or five people in our set of 1988 Bush endorsers who might fall into the group described in this paragraph.

The most important departures from the 45-degree line, when they occur, are cases in which the endorsement curve bows below the 45-degree line. The cases are the Democratic contests of 1980, 1984, 1988, and 1992, and the Republican contest of 1988. In these cases, the downward bow suggests that party endorsers were having trouble reaching agreement and so hung back.

This interpretation, a standard interpretation of this sort of Gini pattern, fits some of the cases pretty well. The 1980, 1984, and 1988 contests, as fought in the state primaries, were actually relatively close and eventuated in friction at the convention. We discuss the 1988 case in some detail below. The interpretation — that the party had a difficult time reaching agreement and then fought afterwards — does not, however, fit the 1988 Republican case. Nor does it work for 1992 Democratic contest; though in the 1992 case it is clear why: The political fallout from the Gulf War, not a contentious nomination, greatly back-loaded the whole Democratic endorsement derby, as reflected in the Gini plot and elsewhere. The cases in which the endorsement curves more-or-less follow the 45-degree line are the Republican contests of 1980, 1996, and 2000, and the Democratic contest of 2000. Although the 1996 case was closely fought, the others were one-sided and none of the ensuing convention was contentious.

The important point here is that all nine of the endorsement derbies we have examined are steady, deliberate affairs. Even allowing for the fact that some endorsements were made earlier than publicly reported, we see no evidence of any sort of rush to judgment that would invalidate our proposal that the sequential revelation of preferences functions for party leaders as a signaling game and a form of public deliberation.

Yet to show that a process is steady rather than rushed is not to prove that it is deliberative. Downstream endorsers might pay no attention to early signals or, worse, they could misread them. They might, for example, infer that the candidate with the most early support is the candidate most likely to win and then jump on that candidate's bandwagon. If the process of sequential revelation of preference is to function as a form of public deliberation, downstream endorsers must somehow make use of the *character* as well as the incidence of early endorsements. Otherwise, the party could bandwagon for the first candidate to get attention, too easily assuming that "the candidate earliest with the most-est is the best-est."

Consider the case of Phil Gramm of Texas, an academic economist who is likely to understand the role of focal points in coordination games, as discussed earlier. In early 1995, Gramm attempted to create just such a bandwagon by making himself an early focal point. According to a profile in *Texas Monthly* (Burka, 1995) Gramm's staff noticed that the candidate who had been most successful in pre-Iowa fund raising had won all recent nominations. With this in mind, Gramm sought the chairmanship of the National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC) for the 1992 and 1994 elections. This enabled him to travel at party expense around the country, meeting and tapping into party fund-raising networks. With this advantage, he was able to raise nearly twice as much money as Bob Dole in the first quarter of 1995, \$8.72 million to Dole's \$4.44 million. He also made a concerted effort to gain early endorsements and did a reasonably good job. In the earliest round of reporting, Gramm outpaced Dole 18 to 4. By the end of March, he attracted 11 more. Upon inspection, however, it turns out that Gramm's support was not broad. Almost half was from Arizona or the South. Moreover, Gramm's highest profile endorsers were all conservatives, such as N.H. Sen. Robert C. Smith and Ariz. Sen. John McCain (then seen as very conservative). Also notable among the early endorsement are three straw polls, events that are notoriously easy to orchestrate. Thus, Gramm's

earliest endorsements gave little indication that he was a candidate who would be acceptable to a broad swath of the party.

Meanwhile, eventual winner Bob Dole gathered 53 endorsements by the end of March, more than Gramm but not notably more. But Dole did have one advantage that was notable: almost all of his support was from outside his home region, and it ranged from moderate New York Republicans to conservatives Sen. Strom Thurmond and Rep. Bill Paxon. If party leaders were paying attention, this breadth indicated that Dole was a far more likely candidate to unite the party than Gramm.

We would like to measure this sort of breadth across all candidates and test its effects. We employ two strategies for doing so. First, we look at how many of a candidate's endorsements come from outside his "own group." Outside one's group means outside one's own state and region, but also outside other natural constituencies. In 1988, for example, Jesse Jackson's group was not a geographic region but African Americans, among whom Jackson had many endorsers. In the same year, House Majority Leader Dick Gephardt's group was members of the House of Representatives, among whom he had an usually large number of early endorsers. In creating a variable to measure this phenomenon, we counted all endorsements from outside any obvious natural constituency or from outside the candidate's home state or region as a 1; endorsements from the candidate's home region but not home state as .5; and endorsements from inside a candidate's home state or natural constituency as 0. From these data we can calculate the percent of all a candidate's support that comes from "outside his natural constituency." This PERCENT-OUTSIDE variable is then broken into quarters to measure diversity at different points in the process.

Ideological breadth probably matters more consistently than geographic or group breadth, but it presents greater practical measurement problems. For endorsers who have served in Congress, we can use Poole and Rosenthal's NOMINATE scores as a measure of ideology. The standard deviation of such scores suggests the breadth of the endorser pool. However, many candidates have little or no congressional support, especially early on. The standard deviation of the 3 or 4 NOMINATE scores in some candidates' endorsements portfolios may be misleadingly large or small. That doesn't mean that party leaders cannot assess the ideological diversity of the endorsers — only that we have no common scale for doing so. We hope to build a more complete measure of ideological diversity by gathering snippets of information about the endorsers and asking our expert coders to rate as many of our first-quarter endorsers as possible. This project is under way.

In the meantime, we make the most of the data that we have. Consider again the Gramm-Dole race. **Figure 2** presents a histogram of the first-dimension NOMINATE scores for Members of Congress endorsing the two candidates in the first quarter of 1995. Dole not only has more MCs, but their ideology spans a greater range, overlapping significantly with the range of Gramm's supporters. This difference was publicly available from early on in the nomination derby — not, of course, in graph form, but in a form that we believe other potential endorsers could readily recognize. Our supposition is that this breadth is an important reason that Gramm's campaign subsequently stalled and Dole's rolled to victory.

A variable using the standard deviation in NOMINATE scores of endorsers can, as we note, be calculated only for a handful of candidates. We shall nonetheless do our best with it. Specifically, we have built a variable

measuring first quarter endorsement BREADTH, a variable built by averaging the standardized variables “PERCENT-OUTSIDE” and “standard deviation of available NOMINATE scores.”

**Table 3** uses this measure and its component parts to understand the dynamics of the endorsement process. Specifically, it examines the effects of early breadth on endorsements in the fourth quarter, controlling for polls and initial endorsements. We use both the theoretically incomplete PERCENT-OUTSIDE variable as well as the more complete but methodologically imperfect BREADTH variable. We also interact the BREADTH variable with early endorsements, because both diversity *and* depth should send signals to other endorsers. In these models, we use both the raw counts and the weighted-pond count of endorsements. These represent the two extremes in our way of counting endorsements. Intermediate measures give similar results.

The results are very noisy, as would be expected given the imperfections in the measures. Nevertheless, early diversity always produces an effect in the expected direction, and it is significant in some specifications. With the PERCENT-OUTSIDE variable predicting the raw count in the first two models, we see that getting outsiders early gives significant help to a candidate’s efforts later in the contest. And using the weighted-pond measure, which we believe is the most appropriate substantively, the interaction of breadth and early endorsements (last model) is significant and substantial. Breadth alone is not impressive, but the interaction of broad and deep support is rewarded. There is, then, some quantitative evidence that the process of sequential endorsements allows party elites to respond to early demonstrations of diverse support — that it is, in fact, a process of public deliberation aimed at the creation of a united front behind a broadly acceptable candidate.

Submerged in these quantitative data are numerous cases in which politicians made hard choices to support a candidate other than the one members of their group most preferred. Indeed, we have found qualitative evidence of such choices in nearly every nomination contest. This evidence, though only anecdotal, covers most of the important groups in contemporary party politics; hence it adds up to serious evidence.

In 1984, for example, Walter Mondale enjoyed the support of numerous prominent African-American leaders despite the fact that the Rev. Jesse Jackson was running hard in the race. Their reasons were invariably pragmatic: As Charles Rangel, New York state’s top-ranking black politician, explained his support for Mondale, “I’d like to see someone who can get the Democratic nomination.” Another African-American politician, looking ahead to November, said she understood Mr. Jackson’s role as a symbol but added: “I can’t symbolize this one out. It might mean another four years of Reagan.”<sup>37</sup> Probably the single most influential of the black politicians endorsing Mondale was Richard Arrington of Birmingham Alabama. As he explained to his constituents:

“I have not lost my racial pride, but I have to deal with the reality of Ronald Reagan bearing down on us. . .

So we come to the point of a tough decision,” he says. “No matter how strongly we feel about Jesse Jackson, the reality is that this is not a race between Jesse Jackson and Ronald Reagan. Reagan has put more people in soup lines, more people out of work and tried to do the unthinkable of turning back our hard-won gains. We have to avoid illusions, and we can’t afford an emotional binge because we aren’t going to feel very good if after a good emotional high we wind up with Reagan.”<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> “Rangel and 4 Other Blacks in State Back Mondale,” Frank Lynn, *New York Times*, November 30, 1983, P. B5.

<sup>38</sup> “Alabama Black Leaders Are Urging Pragmatism in Supporting Mondale,” Ronald Smothers, *New York Times*, March 12, 1984, P. B9.

We shall see later on that the endorsements of politicians like Arrington may well have saved the nomination for Mondale in 1984.

Four years later, when Jackson was again running for president, African-American politicians were again on the spot, pressured by white politicians and the logic of electoral competition to support someone other than Jackson. This time, a large majority went with their black constituents. As an aide to Rangel explained:

“For those who have a predominantly black base, they’re pressured by their constituencies to be with Jesse Jackson, they’re pressured by Jesse Jackson supporters, and they’re pressured by the fact that last time, Jesse Jackson won handily in their districts,” said [the Rangel aide]. “The political equation has to be, if I’m going to go with somebody else, what can justify it?”<sup>39</sup>

Nonetheless, some did justify support for someone other than Jackson. Michael Lomax, chairman of the Fulton County Commission in Georgia, said

“I want to give my support to a candidate who I think will be the nominee, and the nominee who can win in 1988. As much as I sympathize with his effort, I don’t think he falls into either of those categories.” (*ibid.*)

As one of the most liberal groups in the Democratic party, African-American politicians feel this sort of cross-pressure nearly every year, whether Jesse Jackson is in the race or not. Thus, four years later in 1992, another black politician found he was supporting the moderate rather than the liberal in the presidential race. As Thomas Edsall of the Washington Post wrote.

“I’m tired of betting on the damn loser,” [said South Carolina State Senator Kay Patterson].

Earlier this year, Harkin came to South Carolina and announced that Jesse L. Jackson’s “Rainbow Coalition is my agenda. Tell blacks not to read my lips, read my record of 17 years. The Rainbow Coalition, that’s my agenda.”

Patterson, now a Clinton backer, said he liked to hear Harkin “spouting all these liberal ideas. But hell, ain’t nobody going to vote for him. You can’t win appealing just to black people. There ain’t enough to win an election. You have to appeal to white folks.”

The same sort of dilemma presents itself to union groups in the Democratic party. The 1992 Democratic contest is particularly interesting in this regard. Iowa Senator Tom Harkin was the natural favorite of many union leaders and activists, but their endorsements went mainly to Bill Clinton. A story from the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* captures sentiment among many union leaders:

Head or heart? That question is splitting the labor movement as trade unionists ponder which of two Democrats to support in the presidential race. Many political observers expected organized labor to overwhelmingly back Sen. Tom Harkin of Iowa, given his long pro-union record and his stand with labor on the key issue of trade. But that’s not happening; instead, Arkansas Gov. Bill Clinton is holding his own. . . . In Illinois, for instance, AFL-CIO spokeswoman Sue Altman sees many of Illinois labor’s heavy hitters going with Clinton. “It surprised us all here that Clinton could get as much as he has, because for Harkin, that’s his appeal — to working people,” Altman said. “I think a lot of people believe that Clinton is the most winnable candidate, and we all feel that we have got to get (President George) Bush out of the White House or working people are done for in this country.” Yet, she notes, many unionists feel Harkin could be “another Franklin Delano Roosevelt, if there is a way to get him elected.” That dilemma - success vs. sentiment - plagues labor nationwide. Rick Scott, political director

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<sup>39</sup> “Jackson Busy Courting Blacks in Office, and Converting Some,” Robin Toner, *New York Times*, September 24, 1987, B6.

for the 1.3-million-member American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, said his members were "evaluating electability along with issues." "They'd rather have someone who says some things they may not agree with 100 percent but who will get into the White House," Scott said. Such talk infuriates Sam Dawson, political director of the 650,000-member United Steelworkers of America. "I'm from Texas, and as (ex-Texas football coach) Darrell Royal says, 'You dance with who bring you' - and that's what I think you need to do in politics.'" "Labor people are ready to put their egos away," said Duke McVey, president of the 500,000-member Missouri AFL-CIO. "Our people want a winner." (1/26/92, p. 1A)

Harkin was naturally frustrated by this development, but tried to put the best face on it. "I've never said that every union is going to support me," he said. But he also said he hoped the big unions would endorse him, and added, "I wish they'd hurry up."<sup>40</sup> But, of course, they never did.

Historian Taylor E. Dark (1999: 191) sees strong parallels between the way labor responded to John Kennedy in 1960 and the way it responded to Clinton in 1992.

In 1960 Hubert Humphrey played a role comparable to that of Tom Harkin in 1992: the traditional heart-throb of the liberals - an ardent defender of the old-time religion, but an unlikely victor in the general election. John F. Kennedy in contrast, was not as close to the labor movement and was deemed more unreliable in his politics, but union leaders still swung their support behind his candidacy after the early primaries showed that he was the most electable choice. In similar fashion, Clinton garnered more union support as he succeeded in the primaries, despite his mixed record on union issues in Arkansas. And in both elections the most distrusted of the candidates -- Lyndon Johnson in 1960 and Paul Tsongas in 1992 -- were forced out of the race as serious contenders well before the convention.

Also common to both periods was that the union leaders were more interested in supporting an electable Democrat than in securing the nominee who was the most "correct" on union issues. As one AFSCME leader put it "We believe that we need to be about winning in 1992.... If we went for Harkin we probably could get 90% of our agenda. If we went for Clinton we probably could get 85% of our agenda. But it's Clinton who, in my opinion, can get us to the White House. " This kind of pragmatic bargaining stance was familiar, having guided unions in 1960 and earlier years, and it now produced a similar result: the nomination of a mainstream Democrat willing to support labor on most of its key issues.

The Christian right faced the same sort of dilemma in 1996. The leader of the Christian Coalition, Ralph Reed, had worked to integrate Coalition members into the Republican Party organization and, although the Coalition made no endorsement in 1996, it was squarely in Dole's camp. But other leading Christian conservatives were for Buchanan — and faced with conflicting cues from their leaders, most Christian conservative voters favored Buchanan, powering him, according to exit polls, to a strong second place showing in Iowa and a narrow win in New Hampshire. With South Carolina looming as the showdown between Dole and Buchanan, Thomas Edsall (1996) gave this account of factional politics within that state:

Citing the support of many county chairmen of the South Carolina Christian Coalition, such Dole backers as Gov. David M. Beasley and former governor Carroll A. Campbell Jr. are banking on winning enough of the Christian right to combine with a plurality of other voters to win overall.

Roberta Combs, chairman of the South Carolina Christian Coalition, is publicly neutral, but Dole supporters openly boast of the help she is providing and note that her husband has endorsed the Kansas senator.

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<sup>40</sup> " Big Labor Seeks Ways to Regain Campaign Clout." Richard Berke, *New York Times*, January 13, 1992, A1.

“We’ve got a lot of support there. In our internal polling, we win the right-to-life vote, we win the Christian Coalition vote,” said Warren Tompkins, Dole’s southern strategist.

He said the only weakness is what he called the “Bob Jones strain of religious conservatives,” referring to the fundamentalist Bob Jones University in Greenville.

Interviews with voters at a Thursday night Christian Coalition “God and Country” rally showed overwhelming support for Buchanan, and very little for Dole. The support for Dole among South Carolina Christian Coalition leaders has provoked some resentment.

Robert Taylor, dean of the school of business administration at Bob Jones University, said some Christian Coalition leaders have adopted a relationship with GOP leaders of “I’ll scratch your back if you’ll scratch mine.” He warned that some of these leaders “might be in jeopardy, might find they are no longer leaders.”

A scholarly study of the preferences of evangelical ministers during the Robertson campaign detected a similar division of opinion, but bent more clearly toward pragmatism. As Lagenbach and Green (1992: 157-58) wrote:

Like other kinds of activists, evangelical ministers make decisions on the basis of factors directly relevant to campaigns, such as candidate quality, campaign viability, and available electoral options. Such instrumental rationality on the part of religious traditionalists should not be surprising. While such groups sometimes pursue unpopular causes, they are as capable of goal-oriented behavior as anyone else. Thus, the crucial element in mobilizing such ministers is the prospect of effective electoral outcomes, and not general preferences or group solidarity.

The general strategy of the religious right in recent elections has been to make stern demands on mainstream Republican candidates to respect its views on key issues, especially abortion, and, having been satisfied, to work within the fold rather than sponsor its own candidate. This strategy was enunciated as early as 1988 by Paige Patterson, president of Criswell College in Dallas and a leader of the fundamentalist wing that has been attempting to take over the 14.7 million-member Southern Baptist Convention:

“We can now mobilize on a less emotional level,” [Patterson] said. “The New Right isn’t lying down. It’s become the better part of strategy not to be so identified in this round with any candidates. After the primaries and the conventions and we get down to the election you will see a powerfully strong evangelical bloc vote.”<sup>41</sup>

Such accounts — in combination with our endorsement data showing that early breadth matters in primary nomination contests — are critical to our argument. They suggest that, although impulse to factionalism remains alive within the two parties, as it is likely to be in virtually any two-party system, party leaders in the new system have not capitulated to it. Rather, they continue, as in the old system, to struggle with their factions and the related problem of creating a united front. They do this by trying to build coalitions for candidates who are not simply everyone’s first choice, but candidates most likely to bridge differences within the party and compete well in the fall elections.

We turn now to the subject of fund raising. A big part of the creating a united front is getting big money behind the right candidate. And this depends on the willingness of each party’s network of fund-raisers, as discussed earlier, to go along with the party consensus.

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<sup>41</sup> “Evangelicals a Force Divided; Political Involvement, Sophistication Growing, Dan Morgan, *Washington Post*, March 8, 1988, p. A1.

There is qualitative evidence suggesting that such willingness exists. Big fund-raisers seem to play a surprisingly weak and perhaps even dependent role in the nomination process. As journalistic accounts cited earlier suggest, some fund-raisers are so closely tied to governors that they are described as a “transferable” resource.

An effort by Democratic fund-raisers to play an independent role in the 1988 election ended up showing how difficult it is for them to actually do so. They formed a group called Impac '88, shared lavish meals at posh hotels, and met with and interviewed leading political figures in an effort to form a united front of their own. But no agreement developed and the wannabe king-makers began going their separate ways. Finally, 17 of the original 40 coordinated on Al Gore and promised to raise \$250,000 each for their man, or \$4.25 million. But as the primaries approached, they delivered only \$320,000. This made Impac '88 the butt of Gore's jokes as he eventually managed only a distant third-place finish.<sup>42</sup>

The 1988 nomination process on the Democratic side was, as we shall see in a moment, unusually late to resolve as political leaders were unable to agree on a choice. This made it an ideal year for fund-raisers to be decisive. But in the absence of agreement among the politicians, the fund-raisers were unable to agree either. As late as March there were reports of the Impac '88 group hanging back and trying to decide whom to support.

"What moves such people to spend such long hours raising money, at \$ 1,000 a pop? Influence? Ideology? Service? Ambassadorships?" asked a journalist who had been, somewhat bizarrely, allowed to look in on the deliberations of Impac '88. His answer was,

Yes, some of that. But mostly, [the fund-raisers] say, it is ego, action, the thrill of the hunt.

"It's being able to pick up the phone and talk to the president of the United States," said Duane Garrett, a San Francisco lawyer and art and coin collector. "These men want to be the sort of people who show up at the New Year's party that Walter Annenberg throws every year for Reagan. The sort of people who can call the president on the phone and say, 'Look, Don Regan's killing you.' The difference is that we're Democrats. There are maybe 50 of us in the country who raise our kind of money. The Republicans have got a couple of hundred" (Taylor, 1987)

Robert Shogun of the *Los Angeles Times* wrote a comparable assessment of the Impac '88 group: "Some of the fund-raisers hope to influence public policy. Others may privately nurture hopes of nailing down an ambassadorship. But all seem to relish high-level involvement in presidential campaigning as a way to gratify their egos."<sup>43</sup>

But the satisfaction of ego-gratifying relations with the president of the United States depends on being on the winning side. Hence, the motive to back a winner comes up in virtually every discussion of the motives of professional fund-raisers. Although there have been notable cases, prior to the onset of campaign finance regulations in the mid-1970s, in which extremely rich individuals were virtually sole-source supporters for politicians whose views they shared, the post-reform fund-raisers, dealing in hundreds and hundreds of \$1,000 contributions, seem more pragmatic. As one Democratic fund-raiser put it late in February 1988, when no clear Democratic front-runner had emerged: "Right now, most of the people who are going to be candidates have declared themselves. Now it's a matter of sifting through and seeing which one has the best chance of winning."

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<sup>42</sup> "Big fund-raisers keep Gore waiting," Richard L. Berke, *New York Times*, November 16, 1987, A30.

<sup>43</sup> "Campaign Fund-Raiser's Role Is More Important than Ever," May 3, 1987, p. 22.

The same motive was behind the rush to Bush in 2000, except that the sifting yielded a clear, quick conclusion. As Glasser (1999) wrote, “Several ‘Pioneers’ interviewed said their enthusiasm for Bush was simple and not necessarily ideological: They want to win.” In a similar vein, Brown, Powell and Wilcox address the motivations of fund-raisers as follows.

There are several important reasons why these top solicitors sign on to a particular campaign: being approached first, the personal chemistry between the candidate and the solicitor, and strategic objectives related to a candidate’s chances of winning.... backing a winner is important to almost all top solicitors. (p. 59)

Insofar as the motive to back a winner does prevail, professional fund-raisers are likely to be among the more eager seekers after a united front. And, insofar as their only concern were to find someone to unite the party, fund-raisers would be motivated to go along with an emerging consensus in the endorsements derby. Nor would they be deterred from doing so by a factional base, since most fund-raisers have no base. Altogether, then, characteristics of many fund-raisers — their ties to top politicians, their motive simply to win, and their relative freedom from factional distractions — means that the heavy dependence of the nomination process on big money should make it more rather than less easy for parties to create a united front.

#### D. The Decisive Party Influence Proposition

A first look at endorsements and primary outcomes. Thus far we have attempted to demonstrate that a small and stable group of party activists and leaders exists, and that they attempt to coordinate on one candidate prior to the Iowa Caucuses — all before the voters have made a single move. Now analysis shifts to the real battlefield — the primaries and caucuses that select the bulk of delegates. We claim that party leaders have been able to give their chosen candidates a sufficient edge on this battlefield that their anointed favorites have won each party’s nomination in every year since the momentum-driven nomination of Jimmy Carter 1976.

The most basic evidence of the importance of pre-Iowa party endorsements is the relationship between these endorsements and delegate share. To measure endorsements, we use the raw count, weighted and pond measures described earlier. To measure delegate share, we credit each candidate with the “best share” of delegates won at any point in the process. The notion of “best share” arises as follows: Some candidates begin to win delegates, reach a high-water mark, but then falter and drop out of the contest before the convention. When this happens, their delegates usually swing to another candidate. Ignoring the “high-water mark” of drop-outs would understate the strength of challengers and overstate the margin of victory of the eventual winner. It would also tend to bias the results in favor of our hypothesis of party influence, since candidates who drop out are often candidates who accumulate delegates despite their lack of endorsements. Hence we permit candidates who drop out of the race to keep the delegates they would have taken to the convention had they stuck it out. But the candidates who do get to the convention are credited with all the delegates they have earned, including those freed up by dropouts. This results in some double-counting of delegates, and therefore percentages do not add up to 100%.

Delegate share also includes Superdelegates — that is, party officials, such as Senators, who become convention delegates by virtue of the office they hold rather than selection in a primary. About 18 percent of Democratic convention delegates in recent contests have been Superdelegates; the Republican side does not have

Superdelegates. Superdelegates may, of course, make pre-Iowa endorsements.<sup>44</sup> Hence some of the endorsers on the Democratic side appear in both our endorsement measure and our delegate share measure. To the extent this happens, we end up using delegate support to predict delegate support. However, this arrangement is part of the real control that party leaders (on the Democratic side) exert in the nomination process.

**Figure 4** now presents one of the most basic sets of findings of the paper — the relationship between winning endorsements and winning delegates over the period from 1980 to 2000. The endorsement measure is based on expressions of support from the “pond,” or repeated endorsers, as weighted by “partyiness” and “resources.” We present this measure of endorsements because, although not always the most empirically potent, it seems the most theoretically valid. The data in this initial display are in relatively raw form; later we report a statistical analysis of them that includes controls.

The candidates are arrayed by level of support, from greatest to least support. When fewer than 10 candidates ran, we nonetheless display spaces for 10 candidates in order to preserve visual comparability across figures. We believe this comparability is important. The number of candidates who fancy themselves presidential timber and test the waters is always larger than the number of who make it over the hurdle of attracting support from party leaders, assembling a campaign team, and contesting for votes. In most years, there are probably at least 10 such politicians who would like the job. In the 2000 race, for example, *Washington Post* columnist Howard Kurtz gave this rundown of potential candidates as of December, 1998:

The political press has been atwitter over the possibility that — brace yourself — Howard Dean may run for president in 2000.

The Democratic governor of Vermont will have plenty of company, if the great gushing gobs of media speculation are to be believed. Others said by reporters to be “eyeing,” “weighing” or “contemplating” White House bids are Paul Wellstone, Fred Thompson, George W. Bush, Dick Gephardt, John Kerry and Bob Kerrey. Also, Jesse Jackson, Bob Smith, George Pataki, Pete Wilson, Newt Gingrich, Ed Rendell and Pat Buchanan. Oh, and Bill Bradley, John Kasich, John McCain, Rudy Giuliani, Lamar Alexander, Steve Forbes, Jack Kemp, Dan Quayle, Elizabeth Dole, Gary Bauer and John Ashcroft. (Kurtz, 1998)

Kurtz is obviously dubious that so many candidates could be serious, but, in fact, he forgot someone who made a long if not very successful run for the presidency, Alan Keyes. Yet his cynical stance reinforces our point: That there are generally more candidates interested in running for president than have any real chance.<sup>45</sup>

The pattern in **Figure 4** is clear. In all but one of the nomination races, the eventual nominee was clearly ahead in pre-Iowa endorsements, usually by a large margin. The exception is the Democratic race in 1988, in which Dukakis did not lead in the endorsement derby. In 1980, the endorsement race between Bush and Reagan was also somewhat close — about 45 percent for the Californian to 20 percent to the Texan — though Reagan won both this contest and the overall nomination process. These two cases are worth examining carefully.

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<sup>44</sup> In 1984, many made early endorsements in an attempt to steer the nomination to Mondale; in 1988, however, many held back, preferring to observe the outcome of the primaries. Thus, the Superdelegates are strategic players, as would be expected.

<sup>45</sup> For the 1996 race, *The New Republic* published a collection of articles on the impending field. Their *Guide to the Candidates* 1996 has 19 names. See Fowler and McClure (1989) for more on the ways in which the number of declared candidates in an election understates the number who were seriously considered by political elites.

In the 1980 race for the Republican nomination, there was clearly a factional struggle within the party. Bush, the former chair of the Republican National Committee and the owner of the “best resume in Washington,” had the support of the top party leadership. For example, a *U.S. News and World Report* survey of 475 members of the RNC and state central committees found Bush preferred over Reagan by 39 percent to 25 percent (1/28/80). However, an Associated Press survey of county chairs found that 44 percent favored Reagan and only 8 percent favored Bush (10/13/79). This split appears in our samples as well. Bush has a solid but not commanding lead over Reagan among former officials and Beltway endorsers. Reagan has a commanding lead outside the Beltway.

The difference is related to ideology. The mean NOMINATE scores of the 26 Republicans members of the House who endorsed Reagan was .36. Among the 15 who endorsed Bush, the mean was .14.

Factional contests for presidential nominations are an endemic feature of party politics and have not disappeared in the post-reform system. For the Republicans, the most bitter such contest had been in 1964, when the forces of the right prevailed in the mixed system. In 1980, these forces prevailed again, except this time in the primary system. But the success owed much to the earlier movement. The Goldwater insurgents of 1964 were the mid-level party regulars of 1980. As Busch observes, “Reagan’s success was, in essence, the logical fruit of the organizational dominance won by the conservatives in 1964” (1992, p. 539).

Similarities and differences with 1964 are illuminating. As in the earlier contest, the more conservative candidate got most of his support from “out in the country,” especially the west and south. Also as previously, the country faction prevailed over the beltway crowd and the eastern establishment. A difference, however, was the greater civility in 1980. When the moderate candidate came up short in the delegate hunt, he made peace with his foe and created a united front for the party, in sharp contrast to the incivility of 1964. No doubt this was due more to the personalities of the combatants than anything else, but if it is claimed that the new system promotes faction, the experience of 1980 does not support that claim. Indeed, as noted earlier (Broder, 3/15/80), Republican governors held back from the factional fight and eventually climbed agreeably on the bandwagon of the winner. Thus, one can say that the Republican Party settled its internal differences more effectively in the post-reform system — and in this sense acted more like a functioning party — than it had at the end of the pre-reform system.

Another interesting point is that, although there were several moderates (Anderson, Baker, and Bush, with Ford on the sidelines) and several conservatives (Reagan, Crane, Connally, Dole), the contest narrowed to just two serious candidates in the race for endorsements, and these were the two candidates who were most closely matched in the primaries as well. John Connally, who was second only to Reagan in fund-raising but won scarcely any endorsements, managed to earn only one convention delegate in the primaries. Thus, pre-Iowa endorsements not only presaged the winner of the 1980 Republican race but structured the primary competition as well.

The other notable case is the Democratic race in 1988, the year of a large field dubbed “the seven dwarves” (plus Jesse Jackson). Democratic leaders were unusually slow in converging on a choice in this year. (Note that the endorsement curve is bowed below the 45 degree line in Figure 1.) “Many of the party leaders are simply waiting for one of the remaining candidates to prove himself,” wrote Jonathan Wollman (1987) of the Associated Press in late November 1987. Among those waiting was Governor Bill Clinton:

Massachusetts Gov. Michael Dukakis will have the “burden of proof” to show he’s not too liberal when he takes his presidential campaign to the South, says Arkansas Gov. Bill Clinton (Welch, 1999).

Even after Iowa, the endorsements were slow in coming. As David Broder (1999) wrote in late February:

Ohio Gov. Richard F. Celeste, who backed Glenn and then Mondale in 1984 only to see Hart win the Ohio primary, said, “A lot of us moved ahead of our own supporters last time, so there’s an inclination to lay back this time.”

Celeste and a number of others regarded as potential Dukakis allies indicated that they are inclined to make a public choice after Super Tuesday, presuming Dukakis avoids a shellacking that day. “I told Mike [Dukakis] he’s got to show he can get votes in the South before most of us in the West will be ready to make a choice,” said Idaho Gov. Cecil Andrus.

[New York Governor] Cuomo took a similar stance yesterday. “Super Tuesday will tell us a lot,” he said, adding that he hopes to make an endorsement before his state’s April 19 primary.

These comments suggest that the primaries were functioning in somewhat the manner they did in the old mixed system, when demonstration of strength in the primaries was often critical to getting insider support. There may also have been an element of factional disagreement. Of the seven Democratic governors whose endorsements were recorded by the *Washington Post*, four were for Dukakis and the other three, all Southern, were for Gore. But leaders did make a choice once the primaries got rolling and before the outcome was clear. Dukakis lost Iowa and South Dakota, but he won New Hampshire, Florida, Maryland and Rhode Island, and this told in his favor with party leaders. In 1988, we counted endorsements after Iowa as well as before. Dukakis rapidly gained on Gephardt, who led in pre-Iowa endorsements on the strength of support from his home turf, the House of Representatives, but who gained no new endorsements after Iowa (see **Figure 5**). Dukakis got 22 new endorsements to Gore’s 9. Money, moreover, tracked endorsements: Dukakis raised \$6.9 million in the two months following Iowa and New Hampshire, but Gephardt only \$2.6 million (Brown et al., Table 2.2).

This is surely a breed of momentum, but it is not the same as momentum among voters generated by media attention. It is, as just suggested, more like the role primaries played in the pre-reform period — party leaders unsure about the vote-getting ability of various candidates and gleaning information about this vital subject from the primaries.<sup>46</sup> The party had a tough problem in 1988: None of the mainstream contenders was a killer on the hustings, but Jesse Jackson was, and he was in a virtual tie with Dukakis in the delegate hunt.<sup>47</sup> So when Dukakis outpolled Gephardt by about 28 percent to 14 percent in contests through Super Tuesday, Democratic leaders saw no point in prolonging the decision. They closed ranks around Dukakis, leaving Gephardt unable to raise money and soon thereafter unable to run campaigns either (Gleckman 1988; Germond and Witcover 1988; Taylor 1988).<sup>48</sup> If elites took a long time to settle on Dukakis in 1988, it may have been because, as contemporary accounts indicated and

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<sup>46</sup> This is also in some ways similar to the bandwagon effect common in contested conventions (e.g. Polsby and Wildavsky 1968, p. 97), in which undecided delegates hasten to support a likely winner once he shows signs of strength.

<sup>47</sup> In mid-March, Jackson had won 461 delegates, which was just behind Dukakis’ 465; Gore and Gephardt were at 171 and 145.

<sup>48</sup> The media- and voter-generated momentum, on the other hand, should have helped Gephardt. He won Iowa on the basis of a Carter-like early organization. He was campaigning in the state for more than a year before the caucus (Taylor 1988). After Iowa, he won only South Dakota and his home state of Missouri.

later events bore out, the most that could be said for Dukakis was that he was relatively strong in a weak field — the tallest of the seven dwarves.

Altogether, then, the data in Figure 4 indicate that party leaders have gotten the candidates they wanted in every year in which they could clearly make up their minds prior to Iowa. In the one case in which they could not make up their mind until after Iowa, they still got the candidate they wanted. And, perhaps more important in that year, they avoided letting the candidate they didn't want, Jesse Jackson, become strong enough to credibly insist on being nominated. Among the others with a chance in 1988, leaders were probably willing to accept any that the voters would accept.

On its face, this is by no means a weak record for party leaders who, according to conventional wisdom, have been largely frozen out of the nominations process by the reforms of the McGovern-Fraser Commission and its subsequent refinements.

Let us now use some basic statistics to look more carefully at the overall relationship between endorsements and success in winning delegates in the primaries. There are, as we shall see, a number of subtleties to be drawn out.

To begin with, the bivariate R-squared of an OLS model predicting delegate share with endorsement share hovers around 80%, depending on how we measure endorsements. (We discount the result obtained from the Raw Count measure of endorsements, which makes no distinction between the endorsement of a movie star and the endorsement of a governor or state party chair.) Both delegate share and endorsement share are measured in percents; hence the coefficients in this table, which are all in the vicinity of 1.0, indicate that endorsements and delegate share are linked on a roughly one-to-one basis.

Measure of endorsements

	Coefficient	Standard error	R-squared
RAW COUNT	1.084	0.073	74.3%
WEIGHTED COUNT	1.197	0.068	79.9%
POND COUNT	1.204	0.063	82.3%
WEIGHTED POND	1.143	0.062	81.5%

Taken literally, the r-squares in these regressions mean that party elites control 80% of the variance in vote share at the convention. It is unlikely that even in the old system, the party leaders did this well. However, we do not claim that endorsers are really dictating 80% of delegate activity. They are, as we have noted, constrained to back a candidate who is close enough to winning that their help either clinches a probable win or elevates a probable winner from a divided field. If the party elites had wanted to nominate a systems analyst from Albuquerque in 2000, or even a graduate student in political science from UCLA, it is doubtful that all their resources and coordinated effort would have enabled him prevail. Public opinion, media (in)attention and the candidate's (in)ability to raise money would have hopelessly doomed him. But the strength of these data do suggest that, for candidates who can generate a following, charm the media and raise money, the difference made by party support is enough to be decisive.

A better indication of the marginal value of endorsements is in **Table 4**, where we include control variables for these other aspects of the nomination contest.<sup>49</sup> All variables are, as before, scored as candidates' percent share of the indicated resource in the race. Therefore, each coefficient measures the increase in the candidates percent share of delegates won that is associated with a 1% increase in the resource or indicator. Notably, *all* our endorsements measures stand up to the other resources. For instance, having 1 percent more of the pond endorsements is worth nearly 9/10ths of a percent of the delegates. Hauling in fish from the pond is, percent for percent, nearly the same as hauling in delegates. This is true even though the model includes both an early poll (taken in January of the year before the election<sup>50</sup>) and a late poll (taken in January, about a month before the party rank-and-file begin to express themselves in the Iowa caucuses).

We also include measures of two other central variables in the process: money (the candidate's share of all campaign money reported raised from January of the year prior through January of the election year) and media coverage (share of all stories in the *Washington Post* in the fourth quarter<sup>51</sup>). Once we account for polls and endorsements however, money and media are completely insignificant.<sup>52</sup>

The two big determinants of primary success, then, are late polls and endorsements. It should not be surprising that polls are important. For one thing, polls have been a major determinant of nomination outcomes since the very first polls in the 1930s (Beniger 1976). Parties want to select a popular politician to head their ticket and, all else equal, good poll standing is, as it should be, an asset in the quest for a nomination. For another, asking the public its preferences a month before much of this same public begins to vote in the primaries is bound to be a good predictor of those primaries.

The strong role of endorsements is, on the other hand, both novel and surprising. It says that, controlling for what the public wants just before the primaries and how much the candidates have raised to spend in the primaries and how much the media is telling voters about the candidates, endorsements continue to play a major role in primary outcomes. This is not a "gimme" finding.

Nonetheless, there are complications that require evaluation. The variables in our analysis — polls, endorsements, media coverage, and money — are not distinct from one another. As can be seen in **Table 5**, all of the variables in our analysis are quite highly correlated.

Technically, this problem is called multicollinearity. It is not necessarily a problem at all, so long as there are enough cases with enough distinctness to get reasonably tight standard errors on the variables of interest. Indeed, we run multiple regressions for the very reason that they can help us disentangle the effects of correlated causal

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<sup>49</sup> In this and other multi-candidate models, we exclude those candidates who are in the dataset by virtue of raising some money, appearing in some poll, or receiving one or two endorsements, but who otherwise never seriously competed. On a theoretical level, these candidates are still an important part of our story, because their failure to garner many endorsements reflects the ability of the system to lock them out. However, many observations with all but one zero could dominate and distort our results. We therefore include only those candidates with nonzero observations on multiple variables.

<sup>50</sup> A Gallup poll taken in January of the year prior, with these exceptions: 1980: Harris poll in December 1978; 1984: Harris poll in January 1983; 1992: Gallup poll in September 1991; 1996: Wall Street Journal poll taken in Jan. 1995

<sup>51</sup> In 1992, the variable measures just December. Unlike other quarterly variables in our analysis, this variable stops at the end of December. Coverage closer to the Iowa caucus would be overly focused on the intricacies of that specific contest.

variables, For instance, one of the most arresting findings in Table 4 is that pre-Iowa campaign donations have so little apparent effect on primary outcomes. Indeed, the effect seems to be consistently negative. How could money possible fail to help win delegates in the primary and caucus process?

The explanation lies in the fact that a handful of candidates manages to collect large amounts of campaign money even though they get few endorsements. They get this money from non-party people who are candidate enthusiasts rather than members of party networks. Thus, Democrat-turned-Republican John Connally tapped into Texas oil money; Pat Robertson was able to raise money through his 700 Club religious program and other religious donors; Malcolm "Steve" Forbes secured financing by loaning himself money from personal wealth; and Bill Bradley was able to raise money from NBA superstars. Such non-party money, however, appears to be much less useful than party money.

We derive this conclusion from a comparison of Tables 4 and 5. The latter shows that campaign donations are somewhat strongly correlated with delegate share ( $r = .64$ ). Thus, raising money and doing well in the primaries tend to go together. Table 5 further that shows the raising money and endorsements go together. And yet, as Table 4 shows, the substantial relationship between money and delegate share disappears once endorsements are controlled for. The standard statistical interpretation of this pattern is that money net of endorsements has little or no impact. That is, the money a candidate raises over and above party endorsements has little value. This may be because the intangibles of party organization and informal infrastructure mean that party elites from the pond can get more for their money than can candidate enthusiasts from the ocean.

Or it could mean that, when several top candidates have a lot of money to spend, the candidates who also have endorsements are the one who consistently win.

Table 6 provides some additional information on the evolution of money, media, and polls in the course of the Invisible Primary. The most notable finding is that a strategic consideration, breadth of early endorsements, affects fund raising. This finding tends to support our claim that much fund raising is tied to party networks, which are also strategic.

In this case, collinearity reveals something about the variables that are correlated. But for some of our variables, the process behind their correlation is not as easily described as in the case of money.

The Evolution of Support. We noted a moment ago that multicollinearity in evidence in Table 5 can lead to imprecise estimates. But the presence of multicollinearity can indicate a much more serious problem. It may, in particular, signal that certain variables in our analysis — notably, poll support and endorsements — evolve together over the year prior to the primaries and most likely influence one another. That is, candidates who do well in the polls may find it easier to attract endorsements, and candidates who do well on endorsements may tend to rise in the polls. When variables may endogenously influence one another in this way, using them as independent variables in a simple OLS regression can produce biased or misleading results.

To see why, imagine three variables X, Y, and Z. Now suppose that that X causes Y and Y causes Z. That is:

$$X \rightarrow Y \rightarrow Z$$

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<sup>52</sup> Dropping various variables in and out of the model does not much affect the effect of endorsements.

If this is the true causal process at work, a simple multiple regression to find the effect of X and Y on Z will find that only Y has much or perhaps any effect on Z. This is because, even though X has caused Y, which has caused Z, X works indirectly through Y rather than directly on Z. Hence controlling for Y wipes out the influence of X on Z and makes it appear that only Y has any importance. Y “gets credit” for all of X’s effect on Z.

Now consider this concrete case:

Endorsements → Late Polls → Primary Outcomes

If this were a valid model, a simple regression like the one reported in Table 4 — showing the effect of Endorsements and Late Polls on Outcomes — would tend to *underestimate* the effect of Endorsements, because part of the effect of Endorsements is indirect through Polls rather than direct on Outcomes. And, as we shall see in a moment, endorsements do indeed influence polls.

But here is another quite realistic scenario:

Early Polls → Endorsements → Primary Outcomes

If *this* causal process is at work, then Endorsements will tend to “steal” the effect of Early Polls in a simple regression like that shown in Table 4, because Early Polls may work through Endorsements rather than directly on Outcomes. And, as shown in Table 3, Early Polls do indeed seem to influence Endorsements. Hence we have reason to worry that the results in Table 4 may *overestimate* the effect of Endorsements on outcomes.

Given all this, the regressions in Table 4 cannot be taken at face value. They could present either an overestimate or an underestimate of the true effect of endorsements. Depending on the balance and magnitude of causal processes at work, the bias could be substantial.

We can assess the nature and extent of this bias by breaking our endorsement data into quarterly time periods and matching these time slices with poll data. Yet there is a problem with the data themselves that we must consider before proceeding with the statistical analysis.

In 1988 and 2000, sitting vice presidents Bush and Gore were discussed as leading candidates for their party's nomination before their administrations even began their second terms. There is little mystery about why or how this happen, Sitting vice-presidents can and routinely do use their office to make friends, incur debts which they can later call due, and generally enlist support. Hence when the curtain goes up on the presidential race, they typically are well-ensconced in everyone's mind as strong contenders if not commanding favorites.

But in other cases, there is at least some mystery. When, for example, the curtain went up on the 1984 and 1996 races, Walter Mondale and Bob Dole seemed almost as firmly in the lead as any sitting vice-president. They had the biggest campaign staffs, the most media buzz, and the most poll support. Where exactly these leads came from is not clear, beyond the fact that each had somehow managed to establish himself as de facto party leader and to parlay that informal position into commanding support within the party.

How George W. Bush emerged as the commanding front-runner for the 2000 presidential nomination might present an even bigger mystery, since he had no prior basis for claiming the position of party leader. As Gloria Bolger wrote in *U.S. News and World Report*: “There's no hierarchy in the Republican Party for the first time in 50

years. It's nobody's turn to be president."<sup>53</sup> Yet, with the help of the electronic databases available in recent years, it is possible to unpack at least some of the mystery of George Bush's rise to prominence.

Just two weeks after the inauguration of Bill Clinton in early 1997, Ronald Brownstein wrote in the *Los Angeles Times* that ""The great mentioners scoping out potential GOP candidates for the year 2000 already have their eyes on at least half a dozen governors. Everyone's list starts with Bush..."<sup>54</sup> Bush's strengths, the article notes, are his popularity in Texas, his success in cutting taxes, and his emphasis on a popular issue, education.

Six weeks later, Brownstein reported that "the pre-presidential maneuvering in GOP circles has begun unusually early this time. Almost every day, some prominent Republican calls Karl Rove, Bush's chief political strategist, offering to enlist for 2000 as soon as the governor gives the word."<sup>55</sup>

Such proffers of support were not premature. Trolling had already begun for one of the bigger fish in the Republican pond, Ralph Reed, then-executive director of the Christian Coalition. This particular fish, as Richard Berke reported in the *New York Times* in May,

... has been besieged by prospective contenders since he announced last month that he plans to resign and become a political consultant. "There is already a remarkable level of jockeying," Mr. Reed said. "I've had conversations with a number of the prospective candidates who have expressed interest in my involvement. Some have asked how soon I could start. But I think it's premature right now."

Even as they feel out possible advisers in private, many candidates are publicly lying low. Gov. George W. Bush of Texas, for one, has not set foot in New Hampshire this year, and he insists that his focus is on winning re-election next year. That has not stopped him from holding private meetings with Mr. Reed and others to discuss 2000.<sup>56</sup>

At the end of the summer -- still just more than seven months into Bill Clinton's term and 30 months before the Iowa caucuses -- Berke filed the following report from a Republican leadership conference:

The top billing, and the coveted Saturday night speaking slot, at a three-day Republican gathering here... went to George W. Bush, the Governor from Texas who in his first term has rapidly burst into the political stratosphere as the hottest figure among major players in Republican circles. Despite the most open field in years, many political professionals are declaring, embarrassingly early, that Mr. Bush is the Republican to beat for the Presidential nomination in 2000. The buzz only intensified on Saturday when Mr. Bush, despite his protestations that his only concern is his re-election next year, made a rare foray into national politics, coming to this meeting, which showcased Presidential hopefuls.

Berke goes on to say that Bush's speech was stiffly delivered and that several potential rivals -- millionaire Malcolm "Steve" Forbes, Dan Quayle, and Senator Fred Thompson -- performed better. "Still, many in the audience said that one off night for Mr. Bush did not detract from his overall appeal."

At this point, Bush still had no official endorsements because he was still not officially a candidate. Yet he was ahead in the polls that had already begun to be taken. So when the endorsement derby began two winters later and Bush jumped out in the lead, it could appear that his support was poll-driven. But this would be a misreading of events. For one thing, the professional politicians who were lavishing him with attention were well aware that early

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<sup>53</sup> Cited in Kurtz, 1998.

<sup>54</sup> "Washington Outlook: Successes of Republican Governors Stand as Guidepost for National GOP," p. A5.

<sup>55</sup> "Washington Outlook: Setbacks Aside, Gov. Bush May Yet Try to Become Next President Bush," *Los Angeles Times*, March 24, 1997, p. A5.

<sup>56</sup> "With Eye on 2000, Campaign Begins," May 11, 1997, p. A19.

polling about candidates who have had virtually no national exposure has little meaning, as indicated by the following early report on Bush's prospects in the *Baltimore Sun*:

Republican analysts regard [Bush] as an attractive presidential prospect. At the same time, they question the validity of national surveys, such as a recent *Wall Street Journal* poll, that show him at the head of the Republican pack for 2000 (the polls may indicate only that voters are confusing him with his father).<sup>57</sup>

Polls probably did matter for Bush's prospects, but they were Texas polls that showed him extremely popular among his state's rank-and-file after three years in office. But, more importantly, the Bush boomlet was clearly based on assessments of his performance as governor of Texas, his positions on issues, and his personal qualities, including his family name. Early poll standing was probably about as important to Bush's success in the endorsement derby as his stiff speech at the Republican leadership conference.

Indeed, the "Invisible Primary" that we have been attempting to measure with endorsements begins far earlier than any systematically measurable activity. In the most recent election, the party lawyers had yet to leave Florida before insiders began discussing Gore's chances for the 2004 nomination and floating the names of likely rivals. As of this writing, the process for 2004 is well underway, as we shall discuss below.

The fact that a great deal can happen before the earliest poll and the earliest endorsements is one factor that makes it difficult to trace the relationship between the two. Another is that, in any well-functioning nominating system, party leaders *should* pay attention to polls. As we observed earlier, primaries functioned in the pre-reform system as important information to party bosses, and polls appear to have been important as well (Beniger 1976). The critical test of poll influence, then, should not be whether party leaders heed the polls, because as often as possible they should heed them. The test, rather, should be what happens when a politician leads in the polls but gets along badly with a substantial number of party leaders, either because of positions on issues or maverick behavior.

Since 1980, there have been three cases of this sort, all on the Democratic side. In all three cases, party leaders refused to line up behind the poll leader. In 1988, Gary Hart was the commanding leader in the polls, with 40 to 50 percent of Democrats saying they favored him for the nomination. Yet, as we saw earlier, Hart, who was unable to satisfy union leaders and who had a reputation as an unstable maverick, attracted notably few endorsements, given his leadership in the polls. "Politicians Refuse Rides On Hart's Bandwagon; Coloradan a Lonesome Front-Runner" was the way a *Washington Post* headline put the matter.<sup>58</sup> The *New York Times* and *Los Angeles Times* carried similar reports.

Hart was driven from the 1988 race by scandal that broke shortly after these stories ran, but then returned after several months when the primaries were about to begin. As a result, it hard to know how he would have fared had he been in the race throughout. Yet, insofar as evidence exists, it indicates that party leaders did not rush to join his campaign simply because he was the poll leader. We also note that, although Hart continued to lead the national

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<sup>57</sup> "Texas' new breed of Bush; Politics: Gov. George W. Bush wants to be seen as in touch with ordinary citizens, a contrast to perceptions of his father." Paul West, *Baltimore Sun*, May 9, 1997, p. 1A.

<sup>58</sup> March 1, 1987.

polls up to the start of the primaries, he did poorly in the state-by-state contests, which supports our claim that endorsements have a “decisive influence.”

The candidate who ran second strongest in polls of Democratic preferences for the nomination in 1988 was Jesse Jackson. He attracted a great deal of support from black politicians, but little from others. The fact that Jackson is an African-American, espoused non-centrist views, and had never held public office meant that he would probably make a weak candidate in the general election. Hence, we do not believe that this case tells us much about the inclination of party leaders to slavishly follow the polls.

The clearest case in which party leaders refused to be stampeded by polls that pushed them toward a candidate they disliked was in 1992. The earliest Gallup poll found former California Governor Brown in the lead with 21 percent and the rest of the field in single digits. Clinton, the eventual winner, was in low single digits. Brown, a maverick politician notorious for his inability to work with fellow Democrats, went nowhere in the battle for endorsements (see Figure 4). Clinton, meanwhile, won the endorsement derby in a landslide and went on to prevail in the primaries.

This is, admittedly, a rather short and somewhat odd list of candidates who led in the polls and yet failed to win political support. To it might be added Ted Kennedy, who led in the polls through most of the endorsement derby in 1980 but failed to shake incumbent President Jimmy Carter's hold on party cadres and hence failed to get a majority of endorsements.

Counting Kennedy, only three of nine contested nominations from 1980 to 2000 were cases in which the early poll winner failed to win. In the other six cases - Reagan in 1980, Mondale in 1984, Bush in 1988, Dole in 1996, Gore in 2000, and Bush in 2000 - the early poll leader did win. As we have suggested, however, the reason for this 6 to 3 imbalance is not simply that party leaders slavishly follow the polls. It is, rather, that support in the earliest polls is usually a reflection of prior campaigning, media buzz, and, most importantly, informal support from party insiders. This is especially the case for Mondale in 1984, Bush in 1988, and Gore in 2000, for whom widespread recognition as their party's heir apparent was much more the cause of their poll success than the effect of it. When, on the other hand, a maverick candidate has managed to get an early lead in the polls, party leaders have felt little urge to support him.

In light of all this, one must take great care in interpreting cases in which the early poll leader has gone on to win a nomination. It may appear in such cases that polls are driving the whole process, but the reality is often a good bit more complicated.

With our eyes wide open to this difficulty, we shall now attempt a series of statistical analyses that rely on the earliest polls and the earliest endorsements to help isolate the independent effect of endorsements on the nomination process.

Our first move is a modification of the basic regression in Table 4. As will be recalled, that regression explains delegate share won in the primaries as a function of endorsements, an early opinion poll, a late opinion poll, media coverage, and campaign donations. There is, however, concern that, if some endorsements are affected by earlier polls, then endorsements may be an intervening variable between earlier polls and delegate share. If this were the

case, the regression would over-estimate the effect of the intervening variable (endorsements) at the expense of more distant variables (earlier polls).

Our modification, then, is to add measures of polls from all four quarters to the basic regressions in Table 4. We had already included two poll variables -- for the first and fourth quarters -- and we shall now add variables from the second and third quarters. The idea is that, if endorsements are partly or even wholly a function of prior polls, controlling for all prior polls and the current poll should eviscerate its effects.<sup>59</sup>

But no such evisceration of the endorsement effect occurs. For the four models shown in Table 4, the effects of the endorsement variables fall by an average of 19 percent, but continue to easily pass two-tailed tests of statistical significance. This indicates that the results in Table 4 did overstate the influence of endorsements, but not by much. For example, the impact of the pond variable falls from .88 to .73. Thus, a one percent rise in endorsements is associated with a .73 percent rise in delegate share. This is still quite a hefty impact (full data not shown<sup>60</sup>).

The endogeneity concern, to repeat, is that endorsements may be a function of prior poll information and little or possibly even nothing else. To more directly test this idea, we divided our endorsement data into quarters and sought to explain endorsements in each quarter as a function of endorsements and polls in the previous quarter. We did this for the second, third, and fourth quarters — but not for the first quarter, since we had no lagged poll or endorsement values for the first quarter.

Partial results of this exercise are shown in an easy to digest form in the upper half of **Figure 6**, and complete results are in Appendix **Table A1**. The bottom line is that endorsements in a given quarter are a function of both lagged polls and lagged endorsement values. Over all measures and all time periods, the average effect of lagged polls on current endorsements (.61) is somewhat greater than the average effect of lagged endorsements on current endorsements (.45). But the main point is that endorsements are, in every quarter, more than simply a reflection of prior polls. They reflect some sort of exogenous force, presumably the independent judgements of the endorsers.<sup>61</sup>

In standard time series analysis, one would use more than just a single lag. However, given the structure of our data -- that is, only four time periods -- there is not much opportunity to test multiple lags. However, **Table 7** goes as far as we can go by showing effects for three previous lags. The results show, again, that endorsements reflect more than simply poll information. The results in Table 7 are for the pond measure; results for the other measures are quite similar.

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<sup>59</sup> More specifically, if endorsements contain no more information than contained in previous polls, including the polls along with endorsements should result in a multicollinear mess in which none of the variables has any impact.

<sup>60</sup> For the raw, simple weighted, and weighted pond endorsement variables, the impacts are .35, .64, and .62, respectively. The t-ratios are 2.11, 3.10, and 3.17.

<sup>61</sup> There are indications in Table A1 and Figure 6 that first quarter endorsements may have less effect relative to polls than later endorsements. If so, our results could be interpreted to mean that early polls directly and indirectly drive most of the endorsement process. However, there are several reasons to be dubious that first quarter endorsement effects are really weaker than those of later quarters. First, the numerical base for first quarter endorsements is somewhat smaller than that for other quarters, making them less reliable. Second, as discussed earlier in the text, some endorsements are reported later than they actually occur, and the effect of this would be to downwardly bias the estimated impact of early measures. This artifact could alone account for the apparently weaker showing of first quarter endorsements. Third, as discussed below in the text, first quarter polls are likely to capture the effects of party activity prior to the first poll and to build it into the analysis in a way that makes it misleadingly appear to be a poll effect rather than a party endorsement effect.

To round out this analysis, we examined the effect of endorsements on polls. Results of this analysis may be found in the lower half of **Figure 6** and in Appendix **Table A2**. The bottom line is that current polls are affected by both lagged polls and lagged endorsements. However, the effect of lagged polls on current polls is much larger -- an average of .71 versus an average effect for lagged endorsements on current polls of .21.

As best we can figure, these exercises have wrung out of the analysis the most important endogenous effects that could lead to an overestimate of the effect of endorsements at the expense of polls. There remain, however, two ways in which the effects of polls may still be overestimated at the expense of endorsements. First, polls are based on a standard measurement technology that is notably more reliable than the methods we used to measure endorsements. This would tend to give polls an artifactual advantage over endorsements throughout our analysis. Second, although we found that endorsements had little effect on polls, our statistical analysis omits the substantial effects of party endorsements in hoisting up front-runners at the very start of the nomination process. As discussed earlier, sitting vice-presidents (Bush *per se*, Gore), recognized party leaders (Mondale, Dole), and George W. Bush all emerged as front-runners as a result of party position or activity before any national polls were taken. These developments, moreover, almost certainly influenced the earliest polls and then carried through the analysis as an influence of (well-measured) polls. In this way, the poll variable probably absorbed some of what is, in reality, a party elite endorsement effect.

These analyses leave the endorsement variable looking strong. Yet as strong as the statistical evidence is, it is still not definitive: Our analysis has taken account the possibility that polls could influence endorsements; it has not, however, taken into account the possibility that political information other than polls -- notably peer observation and experience with the candidate -- could influence endorsements. Yet party leaders surely do use such impressionistic information. If they were very good at going beyond polls to intuitively figure out who is most likely to win the nomination in any case, and if they simply jumped on the bandwagon in order to reap the benefits of backing the person that they correctly foresaw would win, it could seem in our regressions that they were influential when they were merely good prognosticators. This is to some degree a merely technical objection to our findings, but it is a cogent one and therefore one that needs to be seriously assessed.

The first point to make is that, if endorsements and the support they entail really make no difference, it is more than a little mysterious that, as we have seen, candidates, party leaders, and the mass media make so much of them. A second point is that those making the endorsements do not feel their work is done when they make their announcement of support. The endorsement is the beginning. Endorsers are expected to follow through with the work necessary to make their expression of support meaningful. Even governors who are obviously loath to endorse anyone who can't carry their state are nonetheless regularly observed working hard to make sure that the candidate they have endorsed actually does win.

Another important point, sketched earlier but worth recalling, is that politics is sufficiently unpredictable that the strongest candidates do not always win. Making sure that outcomes that would probably occur anyway actually do occur in the real world of serendipitous politics is a major and quite real function of endorsements. Even more important is converting events that might possibly occur into events that do in fact occur.

The nominations of Walter Mondale and Bob Dole are two illustrations of the latter point. Each was an experienced politician who began the nomination process with a great deal of popular good will and all the money he needed to compete. Each might therefore have been expected to win regardless of the efforts of party leaders. But each was unexpectedly beaten in New Hampshire, suffered a dramatic loss of momentum, and by all accounts came close to losing. The practical on-the-ground support each received from his endorsers is most likely what saved their skins.

Take Mondale first. With Jesse Jackson, a politician tremendously popular among blacks, contending for the nomination, one might expect African-American voters to overwhelmingly support the reverend. Yet, as we saw earlier, many black leaders endorsed Mondale. This was not a case of leaders picking someone who would do well, but picking someone despite the expectation that he would do badly with their followers. The question was how badly? Could Mondale, with the help of leader support, carry enough blacks to eke out a win? Hart, meanwhile, received essentially no black endorsements.

In the Super Tuesday primaries that followed his loss in New Hampshire, Mondale needed wins in Georgia and Alabama to meet media expectations about continued viability. In Georgia, blacks make up roughly 20 percent of the electorate and Mondale rolled up a 30-1 advantage over Hart among them. This translated into approximately 40,000 votes. Since Mondale's winning margin in the state was only 20,000 votes, black support made the difference.<sup>62</sup>

In Alabama, Mondale's margins among blacks were as impressive. Mondale received 47 percent of the black vote to Hart's 1 percent. With African-Americans comprising 35 percent of the Democratic vote in Alabama, Mondale's ability to siphon off black votes from Jackson was key in his 14-point victory in that state. Mondale gained roughly 75,000 votes from the black community. His margin of victory over Hart was 65,000. As Dotty Lynch, Hart's polltaker, said afterward, Mondale was "saved by his ability to capture enough of the black vote" (*ibid.*)

Many informed observers attribute Mondale's "ability to capture enough of the black vote" to the efforts of several prominent black leaders. Among the most important was Richard Arrington, whom we discussed earlier. "Blacks here are experiencing a situation of having their first black mayor, and they want me to succeed and are willing to go the extra mile with me to help me. The question is, will they feel that way when I am pitted against the man who is the foremost black leader in the country today." When the votes were counted, it appeared that Arrington and his fellow black politicians had carried the state for Mondale. Whereas Mondale was strong among blacks across the state, his performance in Birmingham was stellar. He defeated Jackson among blacks by 2-1 in Birmingham, an outcome that cannot be explained in the absence of Arrington's energetic efforts to mobilize his constituents and get them to the polls. In Georgia, Mondale appeared to gain from the active support of John Lewis and Julian Bond, both of whom are prominent African-American leaders.

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<sup>62</sup> "How Mondale's Flailing Campaign Was Revived," Hedrick Smith, *New York Times*, March 15, 1985, B15.

Dole's Richard Arrington appears to have been South Carolina's Governor David Beasley. As we noted earlier, Patrick Buchanan seemed the better choice for Christian conservatives, but Beasley was a member of the conservative community and vouched for Dole among his followers. He also succeeded in lining up nearly the entire Christian Coalition leadership behind Dole.

When Dole carried South Carolina by a margin of 45-29 over Buchanan, analysts pointed to Dole's solid performance among religious conservatives. He did not beat Buchanan among this group, but he held his own. The AP exit poll reported a 44-38 edge for Buchanan while the Voter News Service had it 43-40 for Buchanan. Other surveys concluded from exit polling that it was a statistical dead heat. In South Carolina, self-proclaimed members of the Religious Right make up roughly 35 percent of the electorate. This amounted to approximately 100,000 voters in the 1996 Republican primary. The 40,000-odd votes that Dole received from these individuals provided the bulk of the Senator's margin of victory. R. W. Apple (1996) wrote in the *New York Times*:

Charles Dunn, a Clemson University political science professor who specializes in the religious right, said that [born-again Governor David] Beasley diluted Mr. Buchanan's strength among rank-and-file Christian conservatives by persuading a significant proportion of their leaders to support Senator Dole, quietly if not overtly. It was a vindication for Mr. Beasley; many local politicians had questioned during the campaign whether he could counter Mr. Buchanan's visceral appeal.

A reporter from the Guardian offered a similar view:

"Mr. Dole was helped in South Carolina... by local factors which may not be repeatable in other states. He had the support of Governor David Beasley - beloved by the Christian Coalition - and the highly popular previous governor, Carroll Campbell. They delivered their mighty machine in a way that might not be as smooth again."<sup>63</sup>

Dole had foreseen how helpful Campbell's endorsement would be. Earlier in the campaign, when Phil Gramm had just won the endorsement of an Iowa straw poll, Dole remarked, "You can buy a straw poll.... Give me an endorsement over a straw poll any time."<sup>64</sup>

We do not claim that events on Super Tuesday in 1984 or in South Carolina in 1996 were typical of the way endorsers follow up their statements of support or the difference their efforts make. Indeed, there is no such thing as a typical way to deliver the vote in a country as diverse as this one, and this is one reason the task of demonstrating the effects of support is difficult. It is also one reason why, in a supposedly candidate-centered system, every candidate needs the help of experienced fellow partisans across the country. Consider the following account of how the endorsements of prominent leaders in New York helped Dole in 1996:

All of New York's Republican state senators, county chairmen, members of Congress and the governor endorsed Sen. Bob Dole's presidential quest.

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<sup>63</sup> Freedland, Jonathan. "Dole Finds Southern Comfort in Primary Win" in *The Guardian*, March 4, 1996, Page 2. See also, Berke, Richard L. "Dole Easily Beats Buchanan to Win in South Carolina" in *New York Times*. March 3, 1996, Section 1, Page 1, Column 6. Edsall, Thomas B. "Christian Right's Political Dilemma: Principle or Pragmatism" in *Washington Post*. February 9, 1996, Section A, Page A0. Rosin, Hanna. "Christian Right's Fervor Has Fizzled; S.C. Reflects a Movement 'Gone Cold'" *Washington Post*. February 16, 2000, Page A01. Morin, Richard and Mario A. Brossard. "Dole Rallies Support of Key Groups; Buchanan Loses Hold on the Religious Right" in *Washington Post*. March, 1996, Page A09.

<sup>64</sup> "Dole discounts Iowa straw poll; Says showing won't affect his strategy, Judy Keen, *USA TODAY*, August 23, 1995, 4A.

The clean sweep prompted Guy Molinari, a former congressman and GOP power broker, to call Dole.

"Well, you got 102 delegates [to the Republican convention]," Molinari told him, referring to New York delegates up for grabs in the 1996 GOP presidential nomination race.

"How do I know that? " Dole responded, chuckling.

"I just told you," Molinari said.<sup>65</sup>

Although its effects are difficult to assess, an important means by which party leaders influence outcome is through direct voter contact and mobilization. In some states, governors or other important politicians control organizations that networks of workers (some paid and some volunteers) who will contact voters by phone, mail, or face-to-face conversation. Many unions, some churches, and some business also operate programs that may contact thousands of voters a day for several weeks or more. Such operations work from voter registration lists and may contact a large fraction of all registered voters in a caucus or primary. They may also provide assistance getting to the polls for as much as one percent of all voters.

The reason it is hard to assess the effects of voter canvassing is that many candidates engage in it, presumably with effects that are often cross-cutting. Moreover, voter canvassing is only one of many influences on an election; a candidate's ideology and general viability are almost certainly more important determinants of outcomes than voter mobilization. TV advertising is another competing influence. Yet indications are that the effect can be substantial. In the 1988 New Hampshire primary, a CBS-Times poll found that 47 percent of Bush's backers said they had been asked to vote for him by someone in his organization, while 26 percent of Dole's supporters reported such contact by the Dole campaign. "I think the thing that won it for Bush was his organization," said Warren Mitofsky, polling chief at CBS News.<sup>66</sup>

Mitofsky's conclusion does not strictly follow from his data, since it is possible that all of Bush's and Dole's supporters would have voted for their man even if no one had contacted them. Yet rigorous experimental data indicate that contacting voters can have important effects. Alan Gerber and Don Green of Yale University (Gerber and Green, 2000) found that, with randomly selected treatment and controls in the 1998 midterm election, personal contacts could raise turnout probabilities by about 12.8 percentage points. In a study of youth turnout in the 2000 election, personal appeals raised turnout probabilities by 8.5 percentage points (Green, Gerber et al., 2001). When the same non-partisan appeal was delivered over the telephone rather than in person, Gerber and Green found that the effect was approximately zero percent in the first study and 5 percentage points in the second. In the second study the authors found evidence of an additional increase in turnout of about 2 percentage points among roommates of those contacted by phone. In the only other large, recent experiment, Adams and Smith (1980) found that partisan appeals made over the telephone increased turnout 9 percentage points in a mayoral election. Three smaller

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<sup>65</sup> "Dole Racks Up Support," Jake Thompson, *Kansas City Star*, May 29, 1995, p. A1

<sup>66</sup> "In New Hampshire, a Change of GOP Minds," Gary Langer, Associated Press wire, February 17, 1988, PM cycle.

experimental studies of face-to-face canvassing, as summarized by Gerber and Green (2000: 654), had an average effect of about 27 percentage points.<sup>67</sup>

To be sure, all of these studies involve voter decisions about whether to vote at all rather than whom to vote for. Yet, since turnout is generally low in primary elections, much campaign effort is aimed at selectively raising turnout among voters who have been identified as favoring a given candidate. Thus it is quite plausible that a thorough, personal canvass of the sort that is fairly common in presidential primaries -- and most especially so by candidates that enjoy party support -- can raise turnout on behalf of that candidate by 5 to 10 percentage points or more. It is likely that appeals by trusted leaders to members of churches, unions, and other groups can produce group effects that are as large or perhaps larger, as appears to have been the case in the Democratic Super Tuesday primaries in 1984 and the Republican South Carolina primaries in 1996 and 2000.

These canvassing effects cannot be reliably estimated on a state-by-state basis because the necessary experimental data do not exist. But there can be little doubt of their existence and importance. The effects are, as we have emphasized, uncontaminated by the problem of reverse-causation. They are also typically over-and-above the effects of reported campaign spending.<sup>68</sup> And they are one of the most important ways by which party leaders regularly convey a decisive edge to the candidates whom they have endorsed.

Much of campaigning in the primaries consists of staging media events that generate favorable images and excitement for one's candidate. This is accomplished more easily with the support of local activists -- or, as an organizer for Bill Bradley in Iowa found in 2000, only with great difficulty if the local party is backing the other candidate. The organizer, Jeff Smith, kept a journal of his tough-luck experiences fighting the Iowa Democratic establishment. In one skirmish, he organized a union event to defeat the criticism that Bradley was an "egghead" who lacked worker appeal:

The nat'l media was following BB and so we were excited to have a good event -- approx 100 rank-and-file were expected to attend. Unfortunately the state chapter got wind of the event and the UAW was one of the most vehemently pro-Gore blocs of the AFL-CIO in Iowa ... State chapter sent hundreds of brawny union guys in black leather jackets from all over South East Iowa to stand outside the UAW hall holding Gore placards and chanting moronic Gore slogan "Stay and Fight," which was an implicit cut at BB for "quitting" the Senate when Republicans took over. This forced BB to "run a gauntlet" of approx 400 Gore guys in order to get into the union hall, and with nat'l media there the visual was looking grim: BB tries to show labor support but there's 4 times more Gore support than BB support at BB's own event.

Post-script: Advance guy called me in the van to tell me what situation was, and advised me to tell the van driver to go around back and have BB enter thru back entrance, or possibly even reschedule the event for later that day. I conferred w/ national staff, state director, and BB about what to do. BB replied, "Are you kidding? We'll drive right up front like we planned to do and I'll deal with it." Everyone advised against that but BB was adamant. So we went and BB got out of the van and all the people were chanting "1-2-3-4 We want Al Gore!" BB walks up to the first guy in line who is about 6'5" and looks

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<sup>67</sup> Although the Gerber and Green studies appear to be highly sophisticated, some of the other studies may have methodological problems. We shall therefore assume that, although there is undoubtedly some true variability in the size of effects from one context to another, the Gerber and Green results are the most reliable.

<sup>68</sup> In some cases, party or party-affiliated organizations, such as unions, churches, or candidate organizations, bear the entire cost of canvassing. In other cases, the candidates must pay for phone banks and handouts, but volunteers do most of the real work. In other cases, candidates simply hire professional phone banks, in which case canvassing effects are not over-and-above other campaign spending.

him in the eye. He puts his hand out and says, "Hi, I'm Bill Bradley. How you doin?" the guy stops yelling puts down his sign, and says, "Mr Bradley, honor to meet you. Always been a fan, ever since the Knick days. Good luck." Slowly the chants faded, most of the Gore signs went down, and BB walked up and shook all their hands.<sup>69</sup>

Thus, the candidate managed to hold his ground and battle the Gore forces to no worse than a draw. Not so, however, at the traditional Jefferson-Jackson banquet at which both candidates were to speak. From Smith's vantage as a Bradley man, this is how it came out:

There were approx 1600 seats so the party gives approx 300 seats to Gore to distribute, 500 seats to the AFL-CIO, 300 to us and 500 to the Democratic Party. Well of course that means 1300 for them and 300 for us. Moreover all the Gore, union, and Dem Party tables were seated up front where C-SPAN would catch them and where they would make most visible noise for their preferred candidate. Our campaign was so pissed, and had so many supporters who couldn't get seats, that we had an alternative event across the street, which merited little coverage compared to the J-J Dinner...

This varied evidence points to the fact, well known to students of American politics, that political leaders and their partisan activist-followers continue to exert considerable influence in their bailiwicks. Sometimes they do so in a manner reminiscent of old-fashioned machines, sometimes through credible endorsements, sometimes through the hard work of door-to-door personal contacts, and sometimes simply by knowing how to navigate treacherous local politics. The quantitative results presented in Table 4 should be interpreted in this light. Admittedly, political leaders endorse candidates they feel have a good chance of winning anyway. But then they go out and work hard for them, aiming to make their judgments stick, and there is every reason to believe their efforts have important effects. Thus, while admitting that today's party leaders do not truly account for 80 percent of the outcomes in primary elections, we also contend that there is little doubt that they make an important difference. Or, to summarize our whole argument, today's networks of party leaders constitute a relatively stable and elite group of party managers, well capable of forming a united front behind widely acceptable candidates and prevailing over sometimes serious opposition in the ensuing state caucuses and primary elections.

It is clear from their behavior that, if no one else believes our argument, presidential candidates certainly believe it -- else why would virtually all of them go through the trial described by Jules Witcover at the time of Walter Mondale's withdrawal, more than a year before any primary, from the 1976 race:

Mondale's decision to bow out even before the race had begun, and after having spent \$100,000 [in 1974 dollars] in the preliminaries, was a real shocker in the political community, and to no one more than myself. I had last encountered Mondale in early February 1974, waiting for the dawn and the first flight out of Johnston, Pennsylvania, airport to Pittsburgh. Then I had never seen a prospective candidate -- with the exception of his fellow Minnesotan and mentor, Hubert Humphrey -- who seemed to have more zest for running and determination to see it through. He had made a speech the night before in behalf of a Democratic congressional candidate in the first special election of the post-Watergate period, had talked politics with Pennsylvania labor leaders, caught a few hours' sleep, and was up and ready for another big day of prospecting. He had in tow an old Humphrey henchman who knew the labor crowd, Stan Bregman, to run interference for him, and Bregman's presence underlined his seriousness at that time. Mondale was not going to run simply as a liberal darling; he would be reaching out to the party's middle, riding on Humphrey's credentials and contacts as well as he own, with Humphrey's blessing. We climbed aboard a small commuter plane and Mondale spoke nonstop to Pittsburgh about the task ahead...

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<sup>69</sup> Personal communication.

Yet nine months later, Fritz was out of it. The "hard edge" he was certain he possessed had in that time melted away in the heat of the ordeal. He couldn't face, he said subsequently, spending another whole year "sleeping in Holiday Inns." And that, of course, was only shorthand for all the other burdens that would-be candidates without broad national recognition had to accept: meals on the run, except for long boring political dinners with pedestrian food at best; small talk at endless receptions with gladhanders, groupies, phonies, con men; not to mention separation from families, and loneliness, even when surrounded by people. Politicians are supposed to be inured to all these, of course, and especially the latter considerations. In fact, many are not. (Witcover, 1977, p. 126-127)

The reason, to answer our question, that candidates continue to put themselves through this workout is that the party endorsements lined up in the months and years of travel prior to the primaries are, quite simply, still the key to success in the primaries themselves. The lone candidate who has managed to win a nomination in the post-reform system without going through this ordeal, who happens also to be our current president, is not any less the beneficiary of success in the endorsement derby.

### Conclusion: Real Parties

Political scientists and commentators have been writing the obituary for American political parties for about 30 years now (Broder 1972; Nie 1976; Wattenberg 1984; Wattenberg 1991; Patterson 1993). Indeed, the death of parties argument goes back to the turn of the century when primary elections were first introduced in the American party system. Writing about the alleged effect of changes in nomination procedures 1909, H. J. Ford skeptically observed:

One continually hears the declaration that the direct primary will take power from the politicians and give it to the people. This is pure nonsense. Politics has been, is, and always will be carried on by politicians, just as art is carried on by artists, engineering by engineers, business by businessmen. All that the direct primary, or any other political reform, can do is affect the character of the politicians by altering the conditions that govern political activity, thus determining its extent and quality. The direct primary may take advantage and opportunity from one set of politicians and confer them upon another set, but politicians there will always be so long as there is politics.

It is no doubt true that presidential primaries, like the congressional and senatorial primaries that Ford described, have forced party leaders to be more solicitous of rank-and-file opinion than they had been previously. The notion that party leaders must promote a candidate who is capable of besting all other candidates who may also be vying for the nomination has also been part of our story. Yet, in pondering the candidates who have and have not been nominated since 1980, it is hard to see that party leaders have had to pay any more attention to mass opinion than the existence of the November election already forced them to do. Charismatically challenged insiders like Walter Mondale and Bob Dole have won party support and then (barely) enough voter support to be nominated; more exciting outsiders like Gary Hart and John McCain and Pat Buchanan have failed to do either.

Yet we are far from predicting that party insiders will prevail in every future nomination. If, in particular, factions within the parties should become greatly stronger - as they were, for example, 50 years ago when the northern liberal and southern conservative wings of the Democratic party were vying for control - we would expect the nominating system to have trouble producing a consensus candidate who could win in the primaries. But we

would also expect that occasional defeats would not discourage party insiders from trying to control their nominations in every cycle and succeeding in most.

The reason, we believe, that reports of the death of parties are so frequently exaggerated by scholars and others is that analysts are too easily confused by organizational form. If parties do not exist in the form they recently did, analysts pronounce them dead. Yet organizational form is not, as we have emphasized, what makes a party. It is, rather, the will and the ability of party members to bridge their differences in a united front for the sake of contesting elections. Organizational form can make that more or less easy to accomplish, but it is not the essence of the matter. Thus, the current Democratic and Republican presidential parties, though taking the form of loosely structured networks rather than traditional hierarchies, are nonetheless real parties in the sense that matters most: They have learned how to band together in a united front behind a suitable candidate and get that candidate nominated.

If our analysis of the post-reform presidential nomination system is valid, it suggests a number of questions that, in the current paper, we can only raise but not resolve:

- The 2004 Democratic nomination is shaping up as an interesting test of our argument. Early polls indicate that former vice-president Gore is the runaway favorite of the Democratic rank-and-file. As a candidate who, in the eyes of many Democratic elites, was robbed of victory by a partisan Supreme Court, Gore may also make a moral claim to re-nomination. But many Democratic insiders are nonetheless wary. A Labor Day 2001 article in the *New York Times* begins:

As part of his carefully choreographed return to the political arena, Al Gore has begun to reach out to the Democratic Party's most prolific fund- raisers and wealthiest donors, but some have greeted him with a cold shoulder.<sup>70</sup>

The story indicates that Gore has important support within the party, but also important opposition. CNN's newswire carried a similar message. The former vice-president, it says, simply smiles when asked whether he plans to run for the nomination in 2004, but

Democratic power brokers aren't smiling at the thought of a Gore comeback. While most say publicly that it's too early to discuss the idea, in private many of them are dead set against a Gore-Bush rematch.

"Al Gore is a wonderful human being, but he should not run again," says the state chairman of a crucial Democratic donor state. "Donors tell me they dread the call from his people, and I tell them to be candid. This is a message he's going to hear from a number of people."<sup>71</sup>

The *Times* story also refers to President Clinton, noting that another potential presidential candidate, Senator John Edwards of North Carolina, "has met with and spoken many times with former President Bill Clinton, who many party insiders believe has tremendous influence over whom fund-raisers will embrace." The story further notes that Edwards and other candidates are contacting Gore's 2000 supporters and trying to pry them away. David Shribman adds in the *Boston Globe*, "Though many of [Gore's] younger aides hope he will try again, and vow to

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<sup>70</sup> "Gore Gets a Tepid Nod From Donors." Don Van Atta, Jr. and Katharine Q. Seelye, p. A1.

<sup>71</sup> "Heeee's Back!" Tamala M. Edwards. <http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/time/2001/08/27/back.html>

support him if he does, some of his more senior advisers pray they won't have to face that choice; they hope he will stand aside and stand down."<sup>72</sup>

Polls, though cited in all of these articles, seem to have little to do with the political calculations since, as Shribman notes, polls have "scientific precision but [are] of dubious value this far from a presidential campaign." Much more important are intuitive estimates of how Gore performed in 2000 and how he might do in a replay.

It appears, in short, that the usual combination of party officials, top-fundraisers, and professional staff is beginning to ponder the 2004 nomination. How this will come out is obviously unclear at this point. But with the White House occupied by a strong incumbent of the other party, the incentive for Democrats to reach early agreement so as to effect a swift primary victory for their favored candidate is strong.

This creates the conditions for a potentially strong test of our argument. Having put together a successful nomination campaign in the past, Gore has the knowledge and connections to do so again. If, despite this inside advantage, Gore decides to sit out the race after testing the waters, and if another candidate emerges, wins the endorsement derby, and goes on to win the nomination, it would indicate that even a very strong candidate cannot win a nomination unless the party supports him. Such a development would be strong support for our theory of party dominance. If Gore stays in the race but is beaten in the primaries by a candidate who has won more insider support, it would also strongly support our theory of party dominance. If, finally, the party were to coalesce around Gore and he were to cruise through the primaries, it would represent support for theory, though not particularly dramatic support.

If, on the other hand, President Bush were to look as if he could be beaten in 2004 -- if, that is, he is low in the polls, saddled with a bad economy, or otherwise vulnerable -- our theory would expect the Democrats to work hard to create a united front to capitalize on the situation. If they were to fail to do so, it would be an embarrassment to our theory. Also bad would be if Democratic party elites did form a united front behind Gore but he subsequently lost in the primaries to another candidate. Worst of all for our position would be if a factional candidate, such as Al Sharpton or Paul Wellstone, were to win the nomination.

Listing the outcomes that could damage one's theory certainly does concentrate the mind. So let us reiterate a point we have made throughout: We have specified a set of actors with the incentives and capacity to make a decisive difference in primary outcomes. We expect to see clear evidence of their efforts in every cycle, as we think we already do in the 2004 cycle, but we do not expect to see insiders win in every case.

- The vast majority of analyses of the current nominating system are negative, often scathingly so. They complain about lack of opportunity for voters to learn, the demands on candidates created by the need to raise vast amounts of early money, the effect of front-loading in disenfranchising voters who come late in the process, among many alleged shortcomings. Many of the same authors complain about the effect of the McGovern-Fraser reforms in weakening or eliminating the role of parties in the nomination process.

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<sup>72</sup> "Pondering 2 Queries on Gore's Future," August 21, 2001, p. A3.

But, in our analysis, some of the features of the process most loudly lamented by its critics are among those that have given parties their opportunity to regain control of nominations. This should now raise the question: Do we want relatively strong parties or don't we? Parties have rarely been defended on grounds that their internal methods were democratic. Rather, they have been defended on the grounds that, in picking good candidates, they improved the competitiveness of general elections and, by that means, democracy (Schattschneider 1942, Schumpeter 1942; Wilson 1962). In freezing out mavericks and factional candidates, and in picking skilled politicians, as seems generally to have occurred from 1980 to the present, parties in the mature post-reform system appear to have kept their part of the bargain.

It is very unlikely that all Americans will now begin to sing the praises of the current system. Certainly, the factionalists, such as Paul Wellstone and Pat Buchanan, will not, since they are among those frozen out. They will instead cry out against elite domination. Factionalists cannot win in any functioning two-party system, so it is natural that such persons should oppose any strengthening of parties in America. But it seems that political scientists, who have long been occupationally enamored of parties, should now seriously consider whether they shouldn't try to find more good things to say about the nomination system than they have in the recent past.

- Much has also been written about the tendency of the nomination process to produce politically disconnected candidates incapable of effective governance (Polsby, 1983; Lowi, 1985; Kernell, 1997). But if our argument is correct, these claims need to be reconsidered. The current president makes the need for reconsideration especially clear. As numerous journalistic accounts and our data indicate, George W. Bush was, like his father, the choice of his party's leaders, especially its governors. Once in office, he staffed his administration with party stalwarts, cooperated with members of his party in Congress, and consulted carefully with the group leaders of the base of his support in the party, most noticeably on the controversial issue of stem cell research. Thus, President Bush is seemingly governing like the creature of his party that, in our analysis, he clearly is.

- Today, many political scientists believe, ambitious candidates and office holders seek power and influence without answering to any party authority. Parties are said to be "in service" to candidates (Aldrich 1995), who are at the center (Wattenberg 1991) of modern politics. The image is one of a succession of independent personalities who dominate electoral politics. The party, as distinct from the candidate, is unimportant.

The Bush vs. McCain story, as several analysts have noted, casts much doubt on this view. The governors who organized for Bush were not in his service. They were, rather, a faction of a party who settled on their candidate early and then sold him to the rest of the party. If the candidate-centered view were accepted, we would have to say that Bush chose the governors. But McCain also chose the governors. And every year candidates try to choose governors, professional fund-raisers, and so on. What matters is which of their suitors the party elites chose to back. McCain, in the end, had only a candidate organization, and it was not a match for party organization.

Much of the difficulty may come from a romanticized view of parties in the past. The notion that parties of the past were monolithic is inaccurate. Party elites then as now had to settle on candidates to win elections. They coordinated on William Henry Harrison because they needed a candidate. They coordinated, somewhat reluctantly, on Michael Dukakis because they needed a candidate. Presidential candidates usually seek the nomination, so they

attract our attention. And since they need the party, the party appears to serve their needs. But when the party doesn't need them, it won't serve them. And they lose. This means to us that we again have a system of party-centered presidential politics.

- We cannot help suspecting that a case can be made for the resurgence of party-centered politics in other electoral contexts as well. Can it? Do partisan activists throughout the country function as loosely but effectively coordinated networks in the manner of the presidential activists we have studied? The following snippet from the *New York Times*, describing Elizabeth Dole's announcement of candidacy for the North Carolina Senate seat vacated by Jesse Helms, seems to us like it could be the tip of a very large iceberg:

The remaining suspense rests on Representative Richard M. Burr, a 45-year-old congressman from Winston-Salem, who is expected to announce by the end of the week whether he will compete.

Mr. Burr ... must examine whether his long-term prospects within the party will be damaged by bucking the national Republican leaders who believe that Mrs. Dole provides the strongest chance of holding the Helms seat.<sup>73</sup>

If, as this passage hints, parties do make efforts to create a united front behind the strongest candidates in congressional politics as well as presidential politics, it would mean that they are important not simply for serving candidates and office holders, but for choosing them.

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<sup>73</sup> "Elizabeth Dole to Declare Candidacy for Helms Seat," Kevin Sack, September 11, 2001, A16.

## APPENDIX 1: Bayesian Updating from Observed Endorsements

The party elites in our account of the nominations process face a simple problem. Their coordination on a common candidate can be decisive in securing that candidate's nomination, and coordination is also important in bringing the resources of the party in support of that candidate in the general election. But they must agree on one candidate among many to be the beneficiary of their coordinated effort. If they fail to agree, or agree on a poor choice, they are likely to lose the fall election.

Thus their decision to support a candidate involves two broad components: the coordination problem itself, and the matter of deciding on whom to coordinate. We model the coordination problem itself as a multidimensional Battle of the Sexes game. (See the illustration below.) The game differs from the traditional Battle of the Sexes in four ways. First, there is an indefinite number of options, rather than two. Second, there are many players, again indefinitely many. Third, these players move sequentially, rather than simultaneously. And fourth, there may be some players whose payoffs are not dependent on the coordination of others. The first two differences complicate the problem. The third simplifies it almost to the point of making it trivial. Almost.

Suppose Player 2 and 3 make the same move. The payoffs are then dependent on Player 1, and whether or not that player also coordinates.

		Players 2 and 3		
		Clinton	Harkin	Kerry
Player 1	Clinton	A	0	0
	Harkin	0	C	0
	Kerry	0	0	E

A,B,C,D,E,F>0

Any outcome in which all three players make the same move gives the coordination payoff, and all three are better off than if they failed to coordinate. Thus these outcomes are Nash Equilibria. Of course, this is not quite the problem that party members face in the endorsement derby. One of them might prefer to throw the election to the Republicans rather than coordinate on, say, Harkin. However, the game is not much changed if we allow some sort of coordination payoff to be awarded even when only some fraction of the players coordinate. In this case, those who do coordinate will still find it worthwhile to cooperate. And if all those who "fail" to coordinate do so because they prefer not to coordinate, the result remains a Nash Equilibrium. This means that the coordination game can be played in the presence of some who have no interest coordination, so long as their failure to coordinate does not prevent others from reaping a gain if they manage to coordinate.

As with most coordination games, the difficulty is not that there is no equilibrium, but that there are too many. Even if there are many different outcomes that would be acceptable *after* they have committed, they still need some means of choosing which equilibrium *before* they commit. If the game is sequential, choosing an equilibrium is elementary. Whoever moves first establishes the focal point. Again, the presence of some people who do not wish

to coordinate does not much complicate matters. If one of these players moves first, that might determine which equilibrium is focal, even though that player doesn't need coordination. This may especially be true if the other players are do not know whether the first player really wants to coordinate or would be happy not coordinating.

Sequence, then, *can* determine which equilibrium will be focal. But it may not be the optimal equilibrium. In addition to coordinating, the party would like to make as many of the players as happy as possible. This is not because they have some Benthamite ideal of collective utility, but because success in the general election requires a candidate who can mobilize the entire party.<sup>74</sup> If, from the whole field, party members can find the one candidate who can best unify the party and run most strongly in November, they will obviously be better off than if they had coordinated on anyone else. Collectively, then, the party still has a problem. Sequence can ensure that they coordinate. But it could lead them to a suboptimal equilibrium. And given the high stakes of the presidency, that suboptimality is a serious problem. Those in the party interested in coordinating also strongly want to coordinate on a candidate who gives them their best chance in November. (There may be several such "optimal" or nearly optimal candidates.)

What's to be done? Can sequential revelation, in addition to driving the endorsers to *an* equilibrium, drive them to the optimal one? Under the right circumstances, it can. An endorser later in the process, who wants to coordinate on the best candidate, can infer from the nature of earlier endorsements which candidate is the best. This signaling is sufficiently effective that even in the presence of some party members who do not wish to coordinate, those who do can coordinate.

We model the problem as a Bayesian updating from new information about the nature of the candidate. Suppose that each candidate either is or is not capable of uniting the party and winning in November. Many may be capable, or just one, but some are definitely less capable. Before the endorsement derby, each endorser has some beliefs about whether a candidate is "the right candidate for the party" or not. For most endorsers, the prior probability is small. Any of them could be the right candidate, so the probability that any one is is small. Some, however, have private information that enhances their ability to make an accurate assessment. Because of this information, their prior probability for one of the candidates is large enough that they are comfortable endorsing early. And, as endorsements accumulate for all in the endorsement process to observe and tally, other players use those endorsements as input to their decision process about which candidate is the right candidate. Bayes' Rule tells us that the updated probability, given an observed stream of endorsements, is:

$\Pr(\text{uniter} \mid \text{endorsements}) =$

$$\frac{\Pr(\text{endorsements} \mid \text{uniter}) \cdot \Pr(\text{uniter})}{\Pr(\text{endorsements} \mid \text{uniter}) \cdot \Pr(\text{uniter}) + \Pr(\text{endorsements} \mid \text{not uniter}) \cdot \Pr(\text{not uniter})}$$

The only matter now is what is the probability, under the given circumstances, that a specific stream of endorsements will be observed. This depends on two variables, the likelihood that an earlier endorser is playing the

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<sup>74</sup> This optimal outcome is not *the* "Pareto optimal" outcome. It is almost certain that some other outcome, in which many or most of the party are unhappy, makes some fraction of the party much better off, meaning that it too is Pareto optimal.

coordination game (that she wants to endorse the candidate who is right for the party rather than her own personal favorite), and the likelihood that an earlier endorser is correct in her judgment about who is right for the party. If she is correct and wants to coordinate, she will endorse the right candidate. If she is incorrect and wants to coordinate, she will choose someone who is wrong -- that is, unlikely to unite the party and win in the fall election. If she does not wish to coordinate, she will endorse a candidate that she prefers on purely personal grounds, such as personal ideology. Of course, this ideologically preferred candidate has some chance of being "the right candidate for the party," so later endorsers will not know whether this signal means he is "the right candidate" or that he is preferred on merely factional grounds.

A key variable, which can be observed by later endorsers, is whether the endorser has a preference for the candidate independent of that candidate's potential to be the right candidate for the party. If so, there is one set of possibilities. If not, another. **Figure A1** maps these possibilities onto two trees. In each tree, nature moves first, determining whether or not a candidate is right for the party. An endorser's priors for this probability are  $p$ . Nature then moves and determines whether or not an earlier endorser is correct in *her* assessment of the first move by nature. She is correct with probability  $w$ . We can interpret  $w$  as the earlier endorser's beliefs about  $p$ , either before the game began or after a few earlier rounds of endorsements. Nature's last move determines whether the earlier endorser wants to coordinate or not. The endorser is a team player with probability  $q$ , which can be taken as an estimate of the percentage of the party that cares more about winning in this election than about their narrow ideological or group faction. As discussed above, some party elites will care and some won't. In the last round, the endorser endorses, for the party's candidate if she is of the team-player type, and for her own candidate if she is not.

Bayes' Rule requires that we know the probability that an endorser would endorse, given that the candidate is or is not right for the party. In the bottom level of the tree, the endorser is choosing to endorse or not. The probability that she endorses is the product of the probabilities of the past two stages, which tell us how likely we are to have reached that point in the game. The probability, then, of observing an endorsement is the sum of the probabilities on that side of the tree in which the endorser endorses. On the left side of the tree, for instance, this is  $wq$  if the endorser is not ideologically aligned (see the bottom part of Figure A1), and  $1-q+wq$  if she is (see the top). This is the probability, given which side of the tree we are on, that the potential endorser endorsed (marked in bold red in the figure). If each endorsement is an independent event (see below), then the probability of many such endorsements is their product. Using this logic, we can see that, after a stream of endorsements, Bayes' Rule gives us:

$$\pi(p, q, w, m, n) = \frac{(wq)^n (1 - q + wq)^m p}{(wq)^n (1 - q + wq)^m p + (q - wq)^n (1 - wq)^m (1 - p)} \quad \text{[Equation 1]}$$

Where

$\pi$  = posterior (updated) probability that the candidate is capable of uniting the party, taking into account the endorsements game so far.

$p$  = anterior (initial) probability that the candidate is capable of uniting the party. (That he is “the guy.”) Bounded by the interval  $[0,1]$ .

$q$  = probability that the endorser cares more about uniting the party than supporting someone in her own group  
Bounded by the interval  $[0,1]$ .

$w$  = probability that the endorser has correctly determined whether or not the candidate is capable of uniting the party. Bounded by the interval  $[0,1]$ .

$m$  = number of endorsements from within the candidates’ own core constituency (from those who we would expect to endorse him regardless of  $q$ ).  $m > 0$ .

$n$  = number of endorsements from outside the candidates’ own core constituency.  $n > 0$ .

If a later endorser is constantly updating as new endorsements are reported,  $\pi$  gives her updated probability after  $m$  close allies and  $n$  others have endorsed a candidate, for any  $m$  and  $n$  in the process. When  $p$  becomes greater than some threshold, the potential endorser is sure enough to actually endorse. If this threshold is the same for all endorsers (see below), then the threshold is  $w$ , and an endorser endorses when  $\pi > w$ .

Under plausible conditions, the first derivative of equation 1 with respect to all the variables appears to be positive, as we would expect. We say this on the basis of computer simulation rather than formal analysis (but expect to have formal solutions for later iterations of the paper.) Increasing any of these makes coordination faster and therefore easier. The most notable exception is that if  $w < .5$  (if the party members are more likely to be wrong than right), then endorsements send a negative signal. This also is to be expected. Party members might be more wrong than right if they were acting under a wrong political theory; interestingly, however, having the wrong model would not prevent them from coordinating. It would only prevent them from coordinating on the right candidate.

This model makes a few assumptions about the nature of the probabilities and the independence of events that are worth noting.

1. **The probability that a given endorser is interested in finding a united front is  $q$  for all endorsers.** If  $q$  percent of the party is interested in finding a united front, then the probability of any given endorser wanting that is  $q$ . A later endorser may have knowledge about how much of a team player a given endorser is. However, that knowledge would only make coordination easier, by effectively driving  $q$  up through discounting (or ignoring) those known to have low  $q$  or  $q=0$ .
2. **The accuracy of a given endorser is  $w$  for all endorsers.** If  $w$  percent of the party is correct in its assessment of whether the candidate can unite the party, then the probability of any given endorser being correct is  $w$ . Again, a later endorser may have some knowledge of the how well a given endorser is at understanding the underlying politics. But again, relaxing this assumption only makes coordination easier, by effectively driving up  $w$ . Moreover, if we treat  $w$  as the threshold that all endorsers must overcome before they endorse, then again,  $w$  is a lower-bound estimate, and if it is known to be higher, this only makes coordination easier.
3. **The probability of one person endorsing is independent of another person endorsing.** We know this assumption to be false in two ways. First, some endorsers are no doubt following the cues of their proximate

leaders (recall how Guy Molinari delivered the endorsements of many New York Republicans.) This is not so much of a problem for the model. If a later endorser knows that some endorsements are of this type, she can imagine that the endorsement of the top guy is a genuine endorsement. If it comes from outside the group, it is among the  $n$ . However, once the leader has endorsed, then the followers are inside the group. This candidate is the one they have to endorse for non-united-front reasons. They are therefore among the  $m$ . Or the later endorser may choose to ignore them altogether. Since we get rather high posterior probabilities with even low  $n$  or  $m$ , the game can work even if the endorser ignores a large fraction of the endorsements. Second, some earlier endorsers are no doubt taking advantage of earlier stages of the game. They are therefore not technically independent. However, if each endorser endorses when  $\pi > w$  (when their new probability reaches some threshold), then we can say that their reliance on the others is included in the model. And each endorser has a different initial  $p$ . However, to the extent that later endorsements are still not independent, treating them as such drives up the posterior probability faster than we should.

4. **This model assumes that endorsing X is independent of endorsing Y.** The choice for each endorser is whether or not to endorse this candidate, with the assumption that if they do not, they either do not endorse at all, or they endorse someone else. Supposing there were two candidates who were capable of uniting the party. This model would say that each endorser would endorse them both. (Although we do not make any inference from the failure to endorse, so the model doesn't *require* multiple endorsements.) If there is only one candidate who is so capable, however, then this choice is not a problem. You either endorsed the right guy or you didn't. But the model doesn't directly address the problem of someone who thinks Bush or Alexander might be the guy, and is trying to use information about who endorsed *Bush* to tell him whether *Alexander* is capable. In this model, all information comes only from knowing who endorsed a person, not in who endorsed someone else. (Except to say that Alexander and Bush might be racing to see who can get the most people over the threshold  $w$ .)

These assumptions are not trivial, but in most cases the effects of relaxing them would be to make coordination even easier. And we do not think that the exception (independence of each endorsement) overly damages the model's usefulness. This is in part because, even with very low values of the various variables, endorsers are able reach a conclusion with high certainty that a candidate is a uniter.

Suppose that each party's member's accuracy ( $w$ ) is only 0.51. They are just *slightly* more likely to be right than wrong. Suppose that an endorser's initial assessment about a candidate is that he has a 1/20 shot of being a uniter ( $p=0.05$ ). If only half the party cares about winning in November ( $q=0.5$ ), then the process does take a while: after 56 endorsements from within the candidate's group and 56 from without, the posterior probability crosses 0.51. This is probably the worst-case plausible scenario. And slight changes make big improvements in efficiency: Changing the initial  $p$  to 0.1 brings the needed endorsements to 41 from each group. Improving the party elites' accuracy ( $w$ ) just a little bit, to 0.6 brings it down to just 7 endorsements of each kind. The efficiency of the learning is, in fact, most sensitive to the elites' accuracy. Even slight gains in their accuracy greatly reduce the number of endorsements needed to send a clear signal about the right candidate. Given the scores of endorsements each

candidate receives, and assuming that many have high initial probabilities, it seems quite plausible that, even without ever talking to one another (which they also surely do), they will be able to coordinate on the best candidate.

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**TABLE 1: ENDORSEMENTS WEIGHTING SCALE**

<b>Endorser</b>	
Current president	1.0
AFL-CIO	0.9
Governor, very well-known and influential politician (Hillary Clinton, Ted Kennedy)	0.8
Former president, major national organization associated with the party (Christian Coalition, NOW)	0.7
U.S. Senator, leadership in national party committee	0.6
Charleton Heston	0.5
former candidate for president, leadership in state legislature, Lt. Governor, U.S. representative, mayor from large city, straw poll at a party convention, well-known fundraiser, well-known celebrity with long ties to politics (Barbara Streisand)	0.4
former governor, former U.S. senator, member (not leadership) of national party committee,	0.3
Mayor from medium sized city, state legislator, state treasurer, consultant, local party official, former cabinet member, former aide to a major politician, former U.S. representative, president of a national organization	0.2
Municipal official (County supervisor, city councilman or alderman), mayor of small city, local branch of national organization, former candidate for governor, celebrity with little history with politics (Frank Sinatra, Shaquille O’Neal), newspaper,	0.1
think-tank policy wonk	0.0

These guidelines can be subject to adjustment as the case may be. Our coders rated the NRA as a point more influential than other national organizations associated with the party, they rated Charleton Heston as more influential than similar celebrities with long ties to the party, and they rated the Manchester Union-Leader as more influential than other newspapers.

Our coders also suggested that we adjust an endorser by at most .1 for being from Iowa, New Hampshire, a large state, or a major media market.

Finally, our coders suggested that a reference to a group of endorsements without naming them (say X-number of state legislators) is worth slightly more than one named person in that group, but not as much as if each of these people were named. How much more depends on the size of the group.

**TABLE 2. A RANDOM SAMPLE OF PRESIDENTIAL ENDORSERS, 1980 TO 2000**

		Repeater?	Positional Party Member
Bruce Caputo	Former U.S. Rep., NY	-	Yes
David Dreier	U.S. Rep., Ca., influential conservative	Yes	Yes
Richard "Digger" Phelps	Notre Dame basketball coach	-	-
William Scherle	Former U.S. Rep., IA., active 20 yrs. after loss in re-election	-	Yes
Grover Norquist	Americans for Tax Reform, 169 hits in Washington Post	-	Yes
Christy Hefner	Playboy publisher and daughter of Hugh	-	-
Dorothy S. McDiarmid	Va. State legislature	-	Yes
Larry Smith	U.S. Rep., Florida	-	Yes
Jeanie Austin	Former co-chair of RNC and Wilson campaign co-chairman,	-	Yes
Daniel Patrick Moynihan	U.S. Senator, NY	Yes	Yes
John Doerr	Venture capitalist, runs campaign fund, fund-raiser for Gore 2000	Yes	Yes
Gertrude Stein Demo. Club	Leading Gay group in D.C.	Yes	Yes
Calvin Guest	Former Texas State Dem. Party Chair	-	Yes
Marine Engineers Union		-	-
Haley Barbour	Former Republican National Committee chairman	Yes	Yes
Jack B. Johnson	Prince George's State's Attorney	-	Yes
Solomon Ortiz	U.S. Rep., Texas	Yes	Yes
Steve Gorin	Health care activist	-	-
Alfredo Guitierrez	Phoenix lobbyist	-	-
Bob Anderson	Iowa Lt. Governor	-	Yes
IBEW Local 2320	Manchester NH	-	-
Christine Jones	Md. state legislature, African. Am.pol. supports Mondale in '84	-	Yes
Paul Young	Former Executive. Director, NH state GOP	-	Yes
Julian Robertson Jr.	Tiger Management, investment adviser	-	-
Joseph Sewall	Maine State Senate President	-	Yes
		Percent Repeat	Percent Positional party
		24%	72%

**TABLE 3: EARLY BREADTH INFLUENCES LATE ENDORSEMENTS**

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	<i>Endorsements count (4Q)</i>		<i>Endorsements count (4Q)</i>		<i>Endorsements weighted-pond (4Q)</i>		<i>Endorsements weighted-pond (4Q)</i>		
CONSTANT	0.533 (2.796)		0.605 (2.895)		CONSTANT	0.722 (2.887)		1.863 (3.011)	
EARLY POLL	0.741 (0.135)	***	0.740 (0.136)	***	EARLY POLL	0.532 (0.162)	***	0.458 (0.171)	**
ENDORSEMENTS COUNT (1Q)	0.126 (0.082)		0.095 (0.294)		ENDORSEMENTS WEIGHTED- POND (1Q)	0.415 (0.095)	***	0.138 (0.238)	
PERCENT- OUTSIDE (1Q)	8.770 (4.444)	*	8.649 (4.615)	*	PERCENT- OUTSIDE (1Q)	3.893 (4.447)		2.190 (4.625)	
INTERACTION: ENDORSEMENTS X %-OUTSIDE (1Q)			0.038 (0.343)		INTERACTION: WT. POND X %-OUTSIDE (1Q)			0.402 (0.318)	
ADJUSTED R <sup>2</sup> N	51.1% 63		50.3% 63			59.8% 63		60.2% 63	

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	<i>Endorsements count (4Q)</i>		<i>Endorsements count (4Q)</i>		<i>Endorsements weighted-pond (4Q)</i>		<i>Endorsements weighted-pond (4Q)</i>		
CONSTANT	4.344 (2.241)	*	4.473 (2.237)	***	CONSTANT	2.444 (2.237)		2.494 (2.137)	
EARLY POLL	0.734 (0.137)	***	0.733 (0.137)	***	EARLY POLL	0.536 (0.162)	***	0.504 (0.155)	***
ENDORSEMENTS (1Q)	0.128 (0.086)		0.023 (0.125)		ENDORSEMENTS WEIGHTED- POND (1Q)	0.406 (0.100)	***	0.209 (0.122)	*
BREADTH (1Q)	3.870 (2.594)		2.874 (2.729)		BREADTH (1Q)	1.942 (2.614)		-0.979 (2.740)	
INTERACTION: ENDORSEMENTS X BREADTH (1Q)			0.121 (0.106)		INTERACTION: WT. POND X BREADTH (1Q)			0.281 (0.109)	**
ADJUSTED R <sup>2</sup> N	49.8% 63		50.1% 63			59.7% 63		63.2% 63	

OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.

- \* p<0.10
- \*\* p<0.05
- \*\*\* p<0.01

**TABLE 4: THE INFLUENCE OF ENDORSEMENTS ON DELEGATE SHARE**

		COUNT	WEIGHT	POND	WT. POND
<i>Dependent variable:</i>	<i>DELEGATES</i>	<i>DELEGATES</i>	<i>DELEGATES</i>	<i>DELEGATES</i>	<i>DELEGATES</i>
CONSTANT	0.171 (2.471)	0.855 (2.310)	0.324 (2.260)	0.453 (2.184)	0.473 (2.248)
MONEY	-0.203 (0.232)	-0.367 (0.222)	-0.401 * (0.219)	-0.295 (0.206)	-0.273 (0.212)
MEDIA	-0.314 (0.300)	-0.301 (0.279)	-0.206 (0.276)	-0.334 (0.265)	-0.245 (0.274)
LATE POLL	1.970 *** (0.259)	1.481 *** (0.287)	1.091 *** (0.344)	0.914 *** (0.342)	1.002 *** (0.355)
EARLY POLL	-0.199 (0.219)	-0.169 (0.204)	-0.091 (0.203)	-0.040 (0.198)	-0.065 (0.203)
<u>Endorsements Variables</u>					
COUNT		0.498 *** (0.158)			
WEIGHT			0.759 *** (0.216)		
POND				0.886 *** (0.213)	
WEIGHTED POND					0.721 *** (0.198)
ADJUSTED R <sup>2</sup>	78.5%	81.4%	82.0%	83.2%	82.2%
N	63	63	63	63	63

OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.

\* p<0.10

\*\* p<0.05

\*\*\* p<0.01

All variables measure the candidates' percent share of the resource in question, from 0% to 100%. A coefficient of 1 therefore indicates that a 1% gain in the resource in question is associated with a 1% gain in delegate share. ■ Delegates are the *best percent* of all delegates available that the candidate won. When a candidate drops out of the race and those delegates switch to a new candidate, both the original and new candidate are credited with them. Percents therefore do not add to 100. ■ Early Poll is a Gallup Poll taken in January of the year prior, with these exceptions: 1980: Harris poll in December 1978; 1984: Harris poll in January 1983; 1992: Gallup poll in September 1991; 1996: Wall Street Journal poll taken in Jan. 1995 ■ Late Poll is a Gallup Poll taken in January of the election year. ■ Media is the candidate's percent share of coverage in the fourth quarter of the year prior. ■ Money is the candidate's percent share of all money raised and reported in the campaign through January.

**TABLE 5: CORRELATION MATRIX FOR PRE-PRIMARIES VARIABLES**

	DELEGATE SHARE	MONEY	MEDIA	LATE POLL	EARLY POLL	<u>Endorsements</u>			WEIGHT POND
						COUNT	WEIGHT	POND	
DELEGATE SHARE	1.000								
MONEY	0.684	1.000							
MEDIA	0.732	0.818	1.000						
LATE POLL	0.884	0.820	0.888	1.000					
EARLY POLL	0.696	0.607	0.822	0.832	1.000				
<u>Endorsements</u>									
COUNT	0.855	0.800	0.800	0.888	0.708	1.000			
WEIGHTED	0.890	0.822	0.813	0.931	0.720	0.925	1.000		
POND	0.904	0.805	0.833	0.940	0.737	0.931	0.983	1.000	
WEIGHTED POND	0.899	0.791	0.810	0.934	0.726	0.910	0.988	0.991	1.000

**TABLE 6: EARLY ENDORSEMENTS INFLUENCE OTHER RESOURCES**

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	<i>Media</i>		<i>Money</i>		<i>Late Poll</i>	
CONSTANT	5.940 (1.147)	***	8.261 (1.578)	***	1.968 (1.059)	*
EARLY POLL	0.582 (0.083)	***	0.334 (0.114)	***	0.678 (0.084)	***
ENDORSEMENTS WEIGHTED-POND (1Q)	0.146 (0.051)	***	0.141 (0.070)	**	0.185 (0.052)	***
BREADTH (1Q)	-0.101 (1.341)		3.708 (1.844)	**	1.553 (1.291)	
ADJUSTED R <sup>2</sup>	70.6%		45.8%		75.7%	
N	63		63		63	

OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.

\* p<0.10

\*\* p<0.05

\*\*\* p<0.01

All variables measure the candidates' percent share of the resource in question, from 0% to 100%. Endorsements and breadth are measured in the first quarter. Early poll is taken in A coefficient of 1 therefore indicates that a 1% gain in the resource in question is associated with a 1% gain in delegate share.

Breadth is a scale built from the percent of a candidate's endorsements outside his or her natural constituency (see text) and the standard deviation of the NOMINATE scores of endorsers in the first quarter. Each of these variables was standardized and the variable is the average.

**TABLE 7:  
4TH QUARTER ENDORSEMENTS PREDICTED BY LAGGED  
ENDORSEMENTS AND POLLS**

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	<i>4Q pond endorsements</i>	
	Coefficient	t-ratio
CONSTANT	-0.843 (1.091)	-0.772
1Q POND ENDORSEMENTS	0.078 (0.058)	1.35
2Q POND ENDORSEMENTS	0.323 *** (0.073)	4.41
3Q POND ENDORSEMENTS	0.492 *** (0.071)	6.92
1Q POLL	-0.110 (0.105)	-1.05
2Q POLL	-0.287 (0.272)	-1.06
3Q POLL	0.560 ** (0.276)	2.03
ADJUSTED R2	90.0%	
N	63	

OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.

- \* p<0.1
- \*\* p<0.05
- \*\*\* p<0.01

**TABLE A1: QUARTERLY ENDORSEMENTS  
PREDICTED BY LAGGED ENDORSEMENTS AND POLLS**

	<b>ALL ENDORSEMENTS</b>	<b>WEIGHTED ENDORSEMENTS</b>	<b>POND ENDORSEMENTS</b>	<b>WEIGHTED POND ENDORSEMENTS</b>
<i>Dependent variable: 2Q ENDORSEMENTS</i>				
CONSTANT	0.382 (2.903)	1.911 (1.835)	3.496 (2.211)	3.636 (2.229)
1Q ENDORSEMENTS	0.344 *** (0.102)	0.466 *** (0.083)	0.288 *** (0.094)	0.266 *** (0.092)
1Q POLL	0.880 *** (0.178)	0.560 *** (0.129)	0.635 *** (0.160)	0.667 *** (0.162)
ADJ. R2	51.1%	68.6%	53.0%	52.9%
N	63	63	63	63
<i>Dependent variable: 3Q ENDORSEMENTS</i>				
CONSTANT	0.267 (2.380)	1.881 (2.006)	1.495 (2.011)	1.289 (2.183)
2Q ENDORSEMENTS	0.328 *** (0.108)	0.662 *** (0.120)	0.397 *** (0.109)	0.519 *** (0.119)
2Q POLL	0.851 (0.193)	0.271 (0.170)	0.675 *** (0.153)	0.520 *** (0.169)
ADJ. R2	62.5%	64.3%	63.7%	60.8%
N	63	63	63	63
<i>Dependent variable: 4Q ENDORSEMENTS</i>				
CONSTANT	2.190 (1.493)	0.706 (1.256)	-0.556 (1.276)	-1.174 (1.430)
3Q ENDORSEMENTS	0.356 *** (0.080)	0.559 *** (0.070)	0.612 *** (0.080)	0.584 *** (0.080)
3Q POLL	0.626 *** (0.126)	0.493 *** (0.095)	0.516 *** (0.107)	0.604 *** (0.112)
ADJ. R2	77.3%	84.2%	85.8%	84.1%
N	63	63	63	63

OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.

- \* p<0.1
- \*\* p<0.05
- \*\*\* p<0.01




**TABLE A2: QUARTERLY POLLS  
PREDICTED BY LAGGED ENDORSEMENTS AND POLLS**

	<b>ALL ENDORSEMENTS</b>	<b>WEIGHTED ENDORSEMENTS</b>	<b>POND ENDORSEMENTS</b>	<b>WEIGHTED POND ENDORSEMENTS</b>
<i>Dependent variable: 2Q POLLS</i>				
CONSTANT	1.559 (1.256)	1.345 (1.131)	1.547 (1.048)	1.720 (1.058)
1Q ENDORSEMENTS	0.133 *** (0.044)	0.252 *** (0.051)	0.270 *** (0.045)	0.256 *** (0.044)
1Q POLL	0.699 *** (0.077)	0.560 *** (0.079)	0.507 *** (0.076)	0.515 *** (0.077)
ADJ. R2	70.7%	76.0%	79.1%	78.6%
N	63	63	63	63
<i>Dependent variable: 3Q POLLS</i>				
CONSTANT	0.380 (0.570)	0.092 (0.539)	-0.051 (0.518)	-0.064 (0.504)
2Q ENDORSEMENTS	0.049 * (0.026)	0.116 *** (0.032)	0.125 *** (0.028)	0.135 *** (0.027)
2Q POLL	0.968 *** (0.046)	0.906 *** (0.046)	0.908 *** (0.039)	0.895 *** (0.039)
ADJ. R2	94.6%	95.3%	95.7%	95.9%
N	63	63	63	63
<i>Dependent variable: 4Q POLLS</i>				
CONSTANT	1.520 (0.995)	0.623 (0.945)	0.729 (0.954)	0.859 (0.970)
3Q ENDORSEMENTS	0.238 *** (0.053)	0.294 *** (0.053)	0.322 *** (0.060)	0.276 *** (0.055)
3Q POLLS	0.643 *** (0.084)	0.649 *** (0.071)	0.601 *** (0.080)	0.650 *** (0.076)
ADJ. R2	85.1%	86.9%	86.6%	86.0%
N	63	63	63	63



OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.

- \* p<0.1
- \*\* p<0.05
- \*\*\* p<0.01





**FIGURE 1: CUMULATIVE ENDORSEMENTS OVER ELECTION CYCLE**




Cumulative endorsements as a function of time. The red 45% line represents a perfectly steady progression of endorsements: X% are made after X% of time has passed. Plots below the line indicate endorsers are hanging back. Plots above would indicate endorsers moving quickly early on.



**FIGURE 1 CONTINUED**



**FIGURE 2: DISTRIBUTION OF ENDORSERS' NOMINATE SCORES**




Distribution of NOMINATE scores for current and former Members of Congress who endorsed Gramm or Dole (for the 1996 Republican nomination) in the first quarter of 1995.

Dole's endorser in solid blue




Gramm's endorser in red outline

FIGURE 2: PLOT MATRIX FOR PRE-PRIMARIES VARIABLES





Eventual winners in red

**FIGURE 4: DISTRIBUTION OF WEIGHTED POND ENDORSEMENTS**



Bars represent each candidate's share of all weighted endorsements in the "pond" of repeat endorsers. Eventual winner in black.

All endorsements variables are publicly available. See <http://www.bol.ucla.edu/~hnoel/endorsements.html>



**FIGURE 4 CONTINUED**

