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Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BEALL in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE WAR IN INDOCHINA

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, the time has come for the American people to be told the blunt truth about Indochina.

I am reluctant to make any statement which may be misinterpreted as unappreciative of the gallant French struggle at Dien Bien Phu and elsewhere; or as partisan criticism of our Secretary of State just prior to his participation in the delicate deliberations in Geneva. Nor, as one who is not a member of those committees of the Congress which have been briefed—if not consulted—on this matter, do I wish to appear impetuous or an alarmist in my evaluation of the situation. But the speeches of President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles, and others have left too much unsaid, in my opinion—and what has been left unsaid is the heart of the problem that should concern every citizen. For if the American people are, for the fourth time in this century, to travel the long and tortuous road of war—particularly a war which we now realize would threaten the survival of civilization—then I believe we have a right—a right which we should have hitherto exercised—to inquire in detail into the nature of the struggle in which we may become engaged, and the alternative to such struggle. Without such clarification the general support and success of our policy is endangered.

Inasmuch as Secretary Dulles has rejected, with finality, any suggestion of bargaining on Indochina in exchange for recognition of Red China, those discussions in Geneva which concern that war may center around two basic alternatives:

The first is a negotiated peace, based either upon partition of the area between the forces of the Viet Minh and the French Union, possibly along the 16th parallel; or based upon a coalition government in which Ho Chi Minh is represented. Despite any wishful thinking to the contrary, it should be apparent that the popularity and prevalence of Ho Chi Minh and his following throughout Indochina would cause either partition or a coalition government to result in eventual domination by the Communists.

The second alternative is for the United States to persuade the French to continue their valiant and costly struggle; an alternative which, considering the current state of opinion in France, will be adopted only if the United States pledges increasing support. Secretary Dulles' statement that the "imposition in southeast Asia of the political system of Communist Russia and its Chinese Communist ally . . . should be met by united action" indicates that it is our policy to give such support; that we will, as observed by the New York Times last Wednesday, "fight if necessary to keep southeast Asia out of their hands"; and that we hope to win the support of the free countries of Asia for united action against communism in Indochina, in spite of the fact that such nations have

pursued since the war's inception a policy of cold neutrality.

I think it is important that the Senate and the American people demonstrate their endorsement of Mr. Dulles' objectives, despite our difficulty in ascertaining the full significance of its key phrases.

Certainly, I, for one, favor a policy of a "united action" by many nations whenever necessary to achieve a military and political victory for the free world in that area, realizing full well that it may eventually require some commitment of our manpower.

But to pour money, materiel, and men into the jungles of Indochina without at least a remote prospect of victory would be dangerously futile and self-destructive. Of course, all discussion of "united action" assumes the inevitability of such victory; but such assumptions are not unlike similar predictions of confidence which have lulled the American people for many years and which, if continued, would present an improper basis for determining the extent of American participation.

Permit me to review briefly some of the statements concerning the progress of the war in that area, and it will be understood why I say that either we have not frankly and fully faced the seriousness of the military situation, or our intelligence estimates and those of the French have been woefully defective.

In February of 1951, for example, the late Brig. Gen. Francis G. Brink, then head of the United States Military Advisory Group, in Indochina, told us of the favorable turn of events in that area as a result of new tactics designed by Gen. Jean de Lattre de Tassigny. In the fall of that same year, General De Lattre himself voiced optimism in his speech before the National Press Club here in Washington; and predicted victory, under certain conditions, in 18 months to 2 years, during his visit to France.

In June of 1952, American and French officials issued a joint communique in Washington expressing the two countries' joint determination to bring the battle to a successful end; and Secretary of State Acheson stated at his press conference that—

The military situation appears to be developing favorably. . . . Aggression has been checked and recent indications warrant the view that the tide is now moving in our favor. . . . We can anticipate continued favorable developments.

In March 1953, the French officials again came to Washington, again issued statements predicting victory in Indochina, and again joined with the United States in a communique planning military action and United States support which would achieve their new goal of decisive military victory in 2 years.

In May of 1953, President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles told the Congress that our mutual-security program for France and Indochina would help "reduce this Communist pressure to manageable proportions." In June an American military mission headed by General O'Daniel was sent to discuss with General Navarre in Indochina the

manner in which United States aid "may best contribute to the advancement of the objective of defeating the Communist forces there"; and in the fall of last year General O'Daniel stated that he was "confident that the French-trained Vietnam Army when fully organized would prevail over the rebels."

In September of 1953, French and American officials again conferred, and, in announcing a new program of extensive American aid, again issued a joint communique restating the objective of "an early and victorious conclusion."

On December 2, 1953, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter S. Robertson told the Women's National Republican Club in New York—in words almost identical with those of Secretary of State Acheson 18 months earlier—that "In Indochina . . . we believe the tide now is turning." Later the same month Secretary of State Dulles stated that military setbacks in the area had been exaggerated; and that he did not "believe that anything that has happened upsets appreciably the timetable of General Navarre's plan," which anticipated decisive military results by about March 1955.

In February of this year, Defense Secretary Wilson said that a French victory was "both possible and probable" and that the war was going "fully as well as we expected it to at this stage. I see no reason to think Indochina would be another Korea." Also in February of this year, Under Secretary of State Smith stated that:

The military situation in Indochina is favorable. . . . Contrary to some reports, the recent advances made by the Viet Minh are largely "real estate" operations. . . . Tactically, the French position is solid and the officers in the field seem confident of their ability to deal with the situation.

Less than 2 weeks ago, Admiral Radford, Chairman of the Joints Chief of Staff, stated that "the French are going to win." And finally, in a press conference some days prior to his speech to the Overseas Press Club in New York, Secretary of State Dulles stated that he did not "expect that there is going to be a Communist victory in Indochina"; that "in terms of Communist domination of Indochina, I do not accept that as a probability"; that "we have seen no reason to abandon the so-called Navarre plan," which meant decisive results only 1 year hence; and that the United States would provide whatever additional equipment was needed for victory over the Viet Minh; with the upper hand probably to be gained "by the end of the next fighting season."

Despite this series of optimistic reports about eventual victory, every Member of the Senate knows that such victory today appears to be desperately remote, to say the least, despite tremendous amounts of economic and material aid from the United States, and despite a deplorable loss of French Union manpower. The call for either negotiations or additional participation by other nations underscores the remoteness of such a final victory today, regardless of the outcome at Dien Bien Phu. It is, of course, for these reasons that many French are reluctant to continue the

struggle without greater assistance; for to record the sapping effect which time and the enemy have had on their will and strength in that area is not to disparage their valor. If "united action" can achieve the necessary victory over the forces of communism, and thus preserve the security and freedom of all southeast Asia, then such united action is clearly called for. But if, on the other hand, the increase in our aid and the utilization of our troops would only result in further statements of confidence without ultimate victory over aggression, then now is the time when we must evaluate the conditions under which that pledge is made.

I am frankly of the belief that no amount of American military assistance in Indochina can conquer an enemy which is everywhere and at the same time nowhere, "an enemy of the people" which has the sympathy and covert support of the people. As succinctly stated by the report of the Judd Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in January of this year:

Until political independence has been achieved, an effective fighting force from the associated states cannot be expected. * * * The apathy of the local population to the menace of Viet Minh communism disguised as nationalism is the most discouraging aspect of the situation. That can only be overcome through the grant of complete independence to each of the associated states. Only for such a cause as their own freedom will people make the heroic effort necessary to win this kind of struggle.

This is an analysis which is shared, if in some instances grudgingly, by most American observers. Moreover, without political independence for the associated states, the other Asiatic nations have made it clear that they regard this as a war of colonialism; and the "united action" which is said to be so desperately needed for victory in that area is likely to end up as unilateral action by our own country. Such intervention, without participation by the armed forces of the other nations of Asia, without the support of the great masses of the peoples of the associated states, with increasing reluctance and discouragement on the part of the French—and, I might add, with hordes of Chinese Communist troops poised just across the border in anticipation of our unilateral entry into their kind of battleground—such intervention, Mr. President, would be virtually impossible in the type of military situation which prevails in Indochina.

This is not a new point, of course. In November of 1951, I reported upon my return from the Far East as follows:

In Indochina we have allied ourselves to the desperate effort of a French regime to hang on to the remnants of empire. There is no broad, general support of the native Vietnam Government among the people of that area. To check the southern drive of communism makes sense but not only through reliance on the force of arms. The task is rather to build strong native non-Communist sentiment within these areas and rely on that as a spearhead of defense rather than upon the legions of General de Lattre. To do this apart from and in defiance of innately nationalistic aims spells foredoomed failure.

In June of last year, I sought an amendment to the Mutual Security Act which would have provided for the distribution of American aid, to the extent feasible, in such a way as to encourage the freedom and independence desired by the people of the Associated States. My amendment was soundly defeated on the grounds that we should not pressure France into taking action on this delicate situation; and that the new French Government could be expected to make "a decision which would obviate the necessity of this kind of amendment or resolution." The distinguished majority leader [Mr. KNOWLAND] assured us that "We will all work, in conjunction with our great ally, France, toward the freedom of the people of those states."

It is true that only 2 days later on July 3 the French Government issued a statement agreeing that—

There is every reason to complete the independence of sovereignty of the Associated States of Indochina by insuring * * * the transfer of the powers * * * retained in the interests of the States themselves, because of the perilous circumstances resulting from the state of war.

In order to implement this agreement, Bao Dai arrived in Paris on August 27 calling for "complete independence for Vietnam."

I do not wish to weary the Senate with a long recital of the proceedings of the negotiations, except to say that as of today they have brought no important change in the treaty relationships between Vietnam and the French Republic. Today the talks appear to be at an impasse; and the return from Paris to Saigon of the Premier of Vietnam, Prince Buu Loc, is not a happy augury for their success. Thus the degree of control which the French retain in the area is approximately the same as I outlined last year:

Politically, French control was and is extensive and paramount. There is no popular assembly in Vietnam which represents the will of the people that can ratify the treaty relationship between Vietnam and the French. Although the Associated States are said to be "independent within the French Union," the French always have a permanent control in the high council and in the Assembly of the Union and the Government of France guides its actions. Under article 62 of the French Constitution, the French Government "coordinates" all of the resources of the members of the Union placed in common to guarantee its defense, under policies directed and prepared by the French Government. French Union subjects are given special legal exemptions, including the privilege of extraterritoriality. The French High Commissioner continues to exercise powers with respect to the internal security of the Associated States, and will have a similar mission even after the restoration of peace. When Vietnamese taxes affect French Union subjects, there must be consultation with the representatives of the countries concerned before they are imposed. The foreign policy of Vietnam must be coordinated with that of France, and the French must give consent to the sending of diplomatic

missions to foreign countries. Inasmuch as the French did not develop experienced governmental administrators before World War II, they have guided to some degree actions within the local governments by requiring the Vietnamese Government to turn to them for foreign counselors and technicians.

Militarily, French control is nearly complete. The United States has in the past dealt primarily with the French military authority, and these in turn deal with the Associated States. Our equipment and aid is turned over to the French who will then arrange for its distribution according to their decision. The French are granted for a period of time without limit facilities for bases and garrisons.

Culturally, the French are directly in contact with the training of intellectual youths of Vietnam, inasmuch as France joined in the establishment of the university, installed a French rector, and provided that all instructions should be in French.

Economically, French control of the country's basic resources, transportation, trade, and economic life in general is extensive. In Vietnam, estimated French control is nearly 100 percent in the field of foreign commerce, international and coastal shipping, and rubber and other export products. The French control 66 percent of the rice export trade. Moreover, possession of property belonging to the French cannot be changed without permission of the French; and France shares the veto right under the PAU agreement on matters affecting France's export and import trade.

All of this flies in the face of repeated assurances to the American people by our own officials that complete independence has been or will be granted.

In February of 1951, for example, the American Minister to the Associated States, Donald Heath, told us that the French colonial regime had ended and that "all Indochinese Government services were turned over to the Indochinese States." This is untrue. In November of 1951, Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk again assured us that—

The peoples of the Associated States are free to assume the extensive responsibility for their own affairs that has been accorded them by treaties with France.

Last year, the Department of State assured me that—

France had granted such a full measure of control to the 3 states over their own affairs that * * * these 3 countries became sovereign states.

In February of this year, Under Secretary of State Smith stated that the representatives of the Governments of Vietnam and of France would "meet in Paris to draw up the treaty which will complete Vietnamese independence." As I have said, those conversations began in July, and broke off 10 days ago. And again Secretary Dulles stated last week that—

Their independence is not yet complete, but the French Government last July declared its intention to complete that independence, and negotiations to consummate that pledge are underway.

They are underway 9 months after the pledge was originally given.

I do not believe that the importance of the current breakdown of these negotiations has been made clear to the Senate or the people of the United States. Every year we are given three sets of assurances: First, that the independence of the Associated States is now complete; second, that the independence of the Associated States will soon be completed under steps "now" being undertaken; and, third, that military victory for the French Union forces in Indochina is assured, or is just around the corner, or lies 2 years off. But the stringent limitations upon the status of the Associated States as sovereign states remain; and the fact that military victory has not yet been achieved is largely the result of these limitations. Repeated failure of these prophecies has, however, in no way diminished the frequency of their reiteration, and they have caused this Nation to delay definitive action until now the opportunity for any desirable solution may well be past.

It is time, therefore, for us to face the stark reality of the difficult situation before us without the false hopes which predictions of military victory and assurances of complete independence have given us in the past. The hard truth of the matter is, first, that without the wholehearted support of the peoples of the Associated States, without a reliable and crusading native army with a dependable officer corps, a military victory, even with American support, in that area is difficult if not impossible, of achievement; and, second, that the support of the people of that area cannot be obtained without a change in the contractual relationships which presently exist between the Associated States and the French Union.

Instead of approaching a solution to this problem, as Secretary Dulles indicated, French and Vietnamese officials appear to be receding from it. The Vietnamese, whose own representatives lack full popular support, because of a lack of popular assembly in that country, recognizing that French opinion favoring a military withdrawal would become overwhelming if all ties were entirely broken, have sought 2 treaties: one giving the Vietnamese complete and genuine independence, and the other maintaining a tie with the French Union on the basis of equality, as in the British Commonwealth. But 9 months of negotiations have failed thus far to provide a formula for both independence and union which is acceptable to the parties currently in the government of each nation. The French Assembly on March 9—and I believe this action did not receive the attention it deserved—substantially lessened the chances of such a solution, through the adoption of a tremendously far-reaching rider which declared that France would consider her obligations toward Indochinese states ended if they should revoke the clauses in the French Constitution that bind them to the French Union. In other words, Mr. President, the French Parliament indicated that France would no longer have any obligations toward the Associated States if the present ties

which bind them to the French Union—ties which assure, because of the constitutional arrangement of the French Union, that the French Republic and its Government are always the dominant power in the union—were broken.

I realize that Secretary Dulles cannot force the French to adopt any course of action to which they are opposed; nor am I unaware of the likelihood of a French military withdrawal from Indochina, once its political and economic stake in that area is gone. But we must realize that the difficulties in the military situation which would result from a French withdrawal would not be greatly different from the difficulties which would prevail after the intervention of American troops without the support of the Indochinese or the other nations of Asia. The situation might be compared to what the situation would have been in Korea, if the Japanese had maintained possession of Korea, if a Communist group of Koreans were carrying on a war there with Japan—which had dominated that area for more than a century—and if we then went to the assistance of the Japanese, and put down the revolution of the native Koreans, even though they were Communists, and even though in taking that action we could not have the support of the non-Communist elements of the country.

That is the type of situation, whether we like it or not, which is presented today in connection with our support of the French in Indochina, without the support of the native peoples of Indochina.

In Indochina, as in Korea, the battle against communism should be a battle, not for economic or political gain, but for the security of the free world, and for the values and institutions which are held dear in France and throughout the non-Communist world, as well as in the United States. It seems to me, therefore, that the dilemma which confronts us is not a hopeless one; that a victorious fight can be maintained by the French, with the support of this Nation and many other nations—and most important of all, the support of the Vietnamese and other peoples of the Associated States—once it is recognized that the defense of southeast Asia and the repelling of Communist aggression are the objectives of such a struggle, and not the maintenance of political relationships founded upon ancient colonialism. In such a struggle, the United States and other nations may properly be called upon to play their fullest part.

If, however, this is not to be the nature of the war; if the French persist in their refusal to grant the legitimate independence and freedom desired by the peoples of the Associated States; and if those peoples and the other peoples of Asia remain aloof from the conflict, as they have in the past, then it is my hope that Secretary Dulles, before pledging our assistance at Geneva, will recognize the futility of channeling American men and machines into that hopeless internecine struggle.

The facts and alternatives before us are unpleasant, Mr. President. But in a nation such as ours, it is only through the fullest and frankest appreciation of

such facts and alternatives that any foreign policy can be effectively maintained. In an era of supersonic attack and atomic retaliation, extended public debate and education are of no avail, once such a policy must be implemented. The time to study, to doubt, to review, and revise is now, for upon our decisions now may well rest the peace and security of the world, and, indeed, the very continued existence of mankind. And if we cannot entrust this decision to the people, then, as Thomas Jefferson once said:

If we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them but to inform their discretion by education.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I have no desire to take the Senator from Massachusetts off the floor, but I wish to make a comment on the speech he has just made.

First of all, I must say there is much, and probably the predominance, of what the Senator from Massachusetts has said with which I would fully agree.

I think it important that the Congress and the Nation understand fully the problems that exist in Asia, particularly in the immediate area of southeast Asia with which the speech today of the Senator from Massachusetts was concerned.

Of course no one is wise enough at the present moment to know what the ultimate aim and objective of the Chinese Communists may be—whether they will enter the war in Indochina in force, as they did in Korea, or whether they will continue to supply arms and equipment, as they are doing now. It seems to me that if they enter the war in force there will be a challenge to the free nations of the world and free men everywhere which they cannot ignore or sidestep. I believe the time is rapidly approaching—if, indeed, it is not already here—when the free nations of the world, if they really believe in a system of collective security, must stand up and be counted. Certainly, this Nation of ours, large though it is in population, with 160 million people, and rich though it is in resources, is not in a position time and time again to assume the overwhelming share of the burden, as we did in Korea.

As the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts knows, only 17 of the 60 members of the United Nations contributed a single soldier, sailor, or airman to the resistance against aggression in Korea. All of them together contributed about 10 percent of what the United States alone contributed. This Nation supplied some 450,000 men at one time, although perhaps a million and a quarter of our men passed through Korea in the process of rotation. The little Republic of Korea supplied 600,000, but all the remaining members of the United Nations together supplied only about 45,000.

I have said on the floor of the Senate and elsewhere that I do not believe the Korean experience should be allowed to stand as a precedent. I happen to believe, as I think the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts believes, in a real system of collective security. I emphasize the word "collective." To me

that means that each nation should contribute in general conformity with its population, in general conformity with its resources, and in general conformity with its responsibilities, so that each would share the burden on a fair basis.

I think the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts has put his finger on the most vulnerable spot, so far as obtaining the complete support of the native populations of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia is concerned. Even though on July 3 the Government of the Republic of France went a long way toward granting what may be called a great degree of local autonomy, it did not go the whole way and give those people the right to determine whether they wished to remain in or out of the French Union. Personally I am of the opinion that there may be great advantages to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, after gaining their own freedom, in associating themselves, of their own volition, with the French Union. However, I think the choice should be theirs. I believe if they had such a choice they would rally to the support of the non-Communist forces in that area of the world, and the native forces, who are desperately anxious to remain outside the Iron Curtain, could be built up to such a point that, as in Korea, they would be able to carry a large share of the burden.

I do not wish to delay the Senate much longer, but from this side of the aisle I wish to commend the Senator from Massachusetts for a very well-thought-out and provocative speech, which I think both the Senate and the country should read with interest.

When I returned from the Far East on my fourth trip there last October, an interview was published in the U. S. News & World Report of October 30. I shall not read the entire article, but I should like to take the time of the Senate to read the portion dealing with Indochina, because I think the Senator will see that we have much in common in the observations which we made.

The interview appears on page 42 of the U. S. News & World Report for October 30, 1953. The first question which was asked me by the editor of the magazine was:

Question. What impression did our truce in Korea make on the Indochina situation? Did they think this was an appeasement, or did they think of it as a possible solution?

Answer. I think they recognize that, with the limitations that were placed upon our force in Korea, that at least, while it was no victory for the free world, they do not look upon it as a defeat. They recognize it, I think, for what it was—a stalemated condition. But they would, I think, be very much concerned if there was any retreating in the face of further Communist threats or aggression, and they are watching very carefully every move that is made, not only in Washington but in the United Nations and in Europe, to see whether or not there is any major move toward appeasement in the defense of the free peoples of Asia.

Question. Is there any indication that Indochina is going to be a hotter spot than it's been before?

Answer. Yes, I think that it definitely will be within the next 6 months. The French have a new commander there, General Navarre, who has a very fine reputation, and I think that the French have decided that

they have to get away from the old Maginot Line type of defense where they would put their French military units in a fortified post on a hilltop in the "Beau Geste" type of warfare, and then the Communists would pretty well control the countryside, at least by night, and appear to be peaceful farmers in the daytime. Now they are taking a position that will permit them to bring in some of those outposts and to get a striking mobile force—the type that has been going out and raiding the Communist supply depots.

Question. Are there any signs that with the armistice in Korea the Red Chinese are able to supply more men and munitions to the Indochina war?

Answer. There are indications that the Ho Chi Minh forces are having their people trained in Communist China and are undoubtedly getting some equipment there. But so far, at least, they do not appear to have sent any substantial number of so-called "volunteers" into the fighting as they have done in Korea. Whether they will do that or not is one of the great unanswered questions at the present time.

I think, however, that since the French declaration in July the French have done a great deal to win the support of the non-Communist civil population in Vietnam, and they are now raising a substantial force in the Vietnam Army itself that will be of material help in cleaning up the Communist situation there.

Question. What indication is there as to the attitude of those countries toward us? Is Indochina thinking in terms solely of France, or do they look to us?

Answer. No, I think that the people want, and I think they are going to insist upon, their complete political freedom from France. My own view is that the age of colonialism in Asia is dead and that countries which expect to win the support of the non-Communist peoples of Asia are going to have to face up to that problem. I certainly don't think that we can have an effective foreign policy in the Far East if the impression is given, either rightfully or wrongfully, that we have tied our policy to that of any colonial power.

Question. What is the attitude toward us in countries like Burma and Thailand?

Answer. I think the United States stands very high in Thailand and in a good many of these countries. I believe that they look to America as a great free country. They recognize that we won our own freedom from colonialism. I think they have been impressed with the fact that we have been helpful to many of these nations having their growing pains, going through some of the same problems that we went through in the early days of the Republic. I think we stand very well. Of course, in a country like Burma they are following the same type of policy as Nehru in hoping that, regardless of how far communism advances up to their borders it will leave them alone.

But very few other people in Asia believe that, if the Communists should overcome Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand, it is realistic to think that they would stop short of invading Burma.

I conclude by saying again that I think the world may be approaching more rapidly than some of us think a decision on the question whether we are to have a real collective security system and are to maintain a system of international law and order which can preserve the peace of the world for ourselves and our children.

The United States has expended billions of dollars in resources in order to rehabilitate the war-torn nations of Europe. It has expended billions of dollars in order to build up situations of strength so that more of the free world

will not fall into the hands of the godless men in the Kremlin and the international conspiracy of communism.

But there cannot be an effective system of collective security if some of the nations that have received our help and billions of dollars of our resources, now when the chips may be down, stand on the sidelines and let the United States assume the preponderance of the burden, as we did in Korea.

I believe that the Congress of the United States, the Government of the United States, and the people of the United States are entitled to have a clear-cut and frank expression from all the so-called law-abiding, free nations of the world as to what they are prepared to do in the event of any future type of massive Soviet aggression.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I believe that before we attempt to call on the people of Asia to say whether they would support any action to prevent the Communists from seizing control of Indochina, there must first be given to the people of Indochina a sufficient degree of independence, so that they will be attracted to the struggle, and so that the other peoples of Asia will feel that the war is being waged in their cause and for their benefit.

The Senator from California made reference to the French declaration of last July 3, and suggested that it gave some degree of independence to those people. The point is that the declaration of July 3 gave no further degree of independence to the people of that area than they had previously enjoyed, and those people are still being regulated by the PAU agreement of 1950. The declaration of July 3 was to the effect that it was time that conversations began. Bao Dai arrived in Paris in August, and the conversations continued from that date. They were broken off when the prime minister returned to Saigon 2 weeks ago. No progress has been made since then. Under all the circumstances, to expect that the people of Asia will support any action to prevent that area being taken over by the Communists, is, I fear, hopeless.

When the United States was paying 40 percent of the cost of the struggle and was not considering sending armed men into the area, it was perhaps captious of the United States to insist that the French take a step which they did not desire to take. But now, when the United States is perhaps getting ready to take affirmative action, which may even be unilateral action, it seems to me that we have every right to insist that the causes of the struggle be clarified and that its nature be made certain to our people and the people of the Associated States. Otherwise, we will go in on the "short end of the stick;" the Communists will continue to pour across the border, the people of the Associated States will be hostile to our efforts, and we will find ourselves in a far worse military situation than we ever experienced in Korea.

Therefore, before the United States goes any further, we should ask the French to make clear exactly what the political status will be of the Associated States, and, if necessary, change the

arrangement of the French Union. So long as the French Union's present constitutional status is maintained the people of Indochina will not have genuine independence within the Union. Therefore, if we are considering stepping in—and it must be remembered that we are now paying 80 percent of the cost of the struggle—and if we are to get the support of the American people for such a policy—and I believe the policy should be supported—we should insist that the French Union arrangement be changed, if necessary, even if it requires the repeal of the rider of March 8.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I had a conversation with an official of the Vietnam Government. I shall not identify him by name. He said to me, "Senator, we recognize that if the French were to pull out we would not have the military power or the training or the force to prevent our country from being overrun by the Communist forces, backed up, as they are, by Communist China." He said further: "It would not even be necessary for the Republic of France to say that we would have our complete independence tomorrow. If they would only say, as you did in the case of the Philippines, that by a given date, which date may be 3 years or 5 years from today, 'We give you our absolute pledge that at that time you will have a free choice of either remaining in the French Union or getting out of it,' the whole atmosphere would change."

As I pointed out, there might be some advantage to the people of that area in voluntarily associating themselves for defense purposes with the French Union. However, they would have to have some specific guaranty of that kind. Perhaps it would have to be underwritten by the United Nations or by the United States. In that way, when the day came that France had pledged that the people of the Associated States would have complete independence, they would be able to make the choice.

Finally I wish to say—and I do not believe the free world should lose sight of it, and I do not think people who are determined to maintain their freedom should lose sight of it—that in all the history of Russia, under the Czars and under the commissars, there has been nothing equivalent to the action of the United States of America in setting up a free and independent Philippine Republic, and there has been nothing equivalent to Great Britain setting up a free and independent India, Pakistan, and Burma, or of the Netherlands setting up a free and independent Indonesian Republic.

To the contrary, during the period when the nations of the west were giving freedom to the people of Asia, international communism, as represented by the men in the Kremlin, were destroying the freedom of the people of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, and were fastening satellite governments upon the people of Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, of North Korea, and were fastening Communist tyranny upon the people of China.

I believe that perhaps our story has not been sufficiently told in that area of the world. I believe we have made a

mistake. I say it in no partisan sense, because the same thing could perhaps be said of one administration as of another. We have many fine friends in Asia—in the Republic of Korea, in the Republic of China, now on Formosa, in the Republic of the Philippines, in Thailand, in Pakistan, and in other areas of that part of the world—and I believe those people could be encouraged to tell the story of what the free world has done to bring freedom to them, in contrast with the Communist tyranny which has been established by the Soviet Union, and in that way we might still win the battle for men's minds.

We will not win the struggle by arms alone, Mr. President, as the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts has pointed out, although arms are important when we are facing a ruthless enemy. However, if we could acquaint them with that story and rekindle some of the spirit of freedom from colonial domination which animated our own country when we were a colony, if we could make known to them the truth about the difference between the free world and the godless Communist tyranny, we could still win the battle and help to maintain, both in Asia and in Europe, a free world of free men.

Mr. KENNEDY. I am sure we can do so, once we clarify the cause of the free world. Up to this date it has not been done because of the control which the French have exercised over the Associated States.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I wish to commend the distinguished junior Senator from Massachusetts for his brilliant analysis of the problem we face in Indochina. As I understand his remarks, the genius of our policy in Indochina must be to give full expression to the basic desires and wishes of the people of that area. I believe that their deep-rooted desire is for freedom. We must give full expression to that desire.

Mr. President, as we look at conditions in Indochina, the administration, it seems to me that conscientious as it is in trying to take some constructive action, is hesitant about giving to the people of the United States an explanation of the real problem which we face. I do not believe for one moment it follows that because the Chinese may not enter the conflict we can save Indochina. I think the people should be told in no uncertain terms that we cannot allow Indochina to fall into Communist hands. To do so would mean that we will lose southeast Asia.

I believe the administration hopes and prays that it will not have to come to Congress with this explosive situation. I think it has been a hope and a prayer up to this time. In my opinion, the Congress of the United States, Democrats and Republicans, have a responsibility to support the administration in trying to save southeast Asia. I think the administration should come to Congress with a resolution stating in no uncertain terms our wishes and aspirations for the people of Indochina and for all Asia and to outline the policy to be pursued. We should give to the President and his administration the support they need to carry out a policy of effective

collective security. What is needed more at this point than anything else is firm support from the Congress of the United States on a full bipartisan basis, so that the hands of the administration can be strengthened in dealing with other nations. The other nations must of necessity participate wholeheartedly and we must receive assurances that they will do their part. I do not believe we can wait much longer lest we lose southeast Asia to the Communist forces which are about to take over.

Mr. KENNEDY. I will say to the Senator from Washington that I do not think Indochina can be saved unless the other Asiatic nations which are now maintaining a policy of cold neutrality are willing to take their fair part in the struggle. After all, they are the ones who should do so. For the United States to intervene unilaterally and to send troops into the most difficult terrain in the world, with the Chinese able to pour in unlimited manpower, would mean that we would face a situation which would be far more difficult than even that we encountered in Korea. It seems to me it would be a hopeless situation. Therefore, I do not think we should adopt a policy which requires United States intervention unless minimum guaranties for real independence have been made. By such guaranties it may be possible to rally Asiatic support.

Mr. JACKSON. I wish to state that obviously the very foundation of any move on our part in asking for support from the people of our country and from other nations must be predicated upon the policies which the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts has so effectively outlined today.

I wish to commend the distinguished majority leader for all he has said in reference to the problem. We must make it clear to the people of Indochina and Asia that in whatever moves we make we have but one objective, and that is to support their basic desire for freedom.

Mr. KENNEDY. As the Senator knows, the French have replied that they will not continue the struggle if the present political arrangements are changed. Frankly, I see no real difference between French withdrawal today from Indochina, and having the United States intervene unilaterally in support of the French on the current political basis. Both policies would end in disaster.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator from Massachusetts yield?

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I wish to commend most highly the scholarly and statesmanlike address of the junior Senator from Massachusetts. I am glad to he is facing realities as they are and is inviting the attention of the administration to the need for greater knowledge with reference to conditions in that particular area of the world, not only on the part of the Senate and the House, but on the part of the American people as well. I was very much impressed by what the Senator said, and I paraphrase his statement, that the time to talk about a review is not after the fact has been accomplished.