The Politics of Intervention Iraq 'regime change' is a revolutionary strategy Henry A. Kissinger, Los Angeles Times Syndicate International Friday, August 9, 2002 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- As the first anniversary of the attack on the World Trade Center draws near, the administration is facing the most consequential foreign policy decision of George W. Bush's presidency. The president and Secretary of State Colin Powell have repeatedly stated that the United States insists on a "regime change" in Iraq. In an address in June at West Point, Bush stressed that new weapons of mass destruction no longer permit America the luxury of waiting for an attack, that we must "be ready for pre-emptive action when necessary to defend our liberty." At the same time, the administration's formal position is that no decision to resort to the use of force has yet been taken. The time has come to define a comprehensive policy for America and for the rest of the world. The new approach is revolutionary. Regime change as a goal for military intervention challenges the international system established by the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, which established the principle of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of other states. Also, the notion of justified pre- emption runs counter to modern international law, which sanctions the use of force in self-defense only against actual -- not potential -- threats. To find our way under these new circumstances, the administration needs to establish a comprehensive strategy for itself and declare that policy to the rest of the world. A conflict of such importance cannot be sustained as an expression of presidential power alone. A way must be found to obtain adequate congressional and public support for the chosen course. The administration should be prepared to undertake a national debate, because the case for removing Iraq's capacity to carry out acts of mass destruction is extremely strong. The international regimen following the Treaty of Westphalia was based on the concept of an impermeable nation-state and a limited military technology. But the terrorist threat transcends the nation-state; it derives in large part from transnational groups that, if they acquire weapons of mass destruction, could inflict catastrophic damage. That threat is compounded when these weapons are being built in direct violation of U.N. resolutions by a ruthless autocrat who sought to annex one of his neighbors and attacked another, with a demonstrated record of hostility toward America and the existing international system. The case is all the stronger because Saddam Hussein expelled U.N. inspectors who were installed as part of the settlement of the Persian Gulf War. There is another, generally unstated, reason for bringing matters to a head with Iraq. The attack on the World Trade Center had roots in many parts of the Islamic, and especially the Arab, world. It would not have been possible but for the tacit cooperation of societies that, in the words of President Bush, "oppose terror but tolerate the hatred that produces terror." While long-range American strategy must try to overcome legitimate causes of those resentments, immediate policy must demonstrate that a terrorist challenge or a systemic attack on the international order also produces catastrophic consequences for the perpetrators, as well as their supporters. The overthrow of the Iraq regime and, at a minimum, the eradication of its weapons of mass destruction, would have potentially beneficent political consequences as well: The so-called Arab street may conclude that the negative consequences of jihad outweigh any potential benefits. It could encourage a new approach in Syria; strengthen moderate forces in Saudi Arabia; increase pressures for a democratic evolution in Iran; demonstrate to the Palestinian Authority that America is serious about overcoming corrupt tyrannies; and bring about a better balance in oil policy within OPEC. At the same time, intervention in Iraq must be conceived as part of a continuum whose ultimate success depends both on the strategy that precedes and follows it. America's special responsibility, as the most powerful nation in the world, is to work toward an international system that rests on more than military power -- indeed, that strives to translate power into cooperation. Even when, on issues of ultimate national security such as Iraq, America acts alone, it is in our national interest to couple it with a program of postwar reconstruction, conveying to the rest of the world that our first pre- emptive war has been imposed by necessity and that we seek the world's interests, not exclusively our own. Special attention must be paid to the political and psychological framework of the Arab world. An explanation is needed of why Iraqi weapons of mass destruction impede the solution of all matters of concern in the area -- not in Western categories of security but in terms relevant to upheavals in the region. This is why it is so important to couple military pressures with a program of economic and social reconstruction in which allies and moderate Arab regimes are invited to participate. We may find many more nations willing to cooperate in reconstruction than in warfare if only because no country wants to see an exclusive position for America in a region so central to energy supplies and international stability. The complexity of the international environment must affect the design of military operations. If war should prove unavoidable, it will not be a time for experiments. The longer military operations last, the greater the danger of upheavals in the region, dissociation by other nations and America's isolation. In all probability, Iraq is much weaker and America stronger than in the Persian Gulf War of 1991. But planning should be based on an overwhelming force capable of dealing with all contingencies, and not on the expectation of a quick Iraqi collapse. Principal reliance on airpower and local indigenous opposition forces is too dangerous, for it leaves no margin for error or miscalculation. And it may place these local forces in a predominant political position, foreclosing other political options. Military intervention should be attempted only if we are willing to sustain such an effort for however long it is needed. For, in the end, the task is to translate intervention in Iraq into terms of general applicability for an international system. The imminence of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the huge dangers it involves, the rejection of a viable inspection system and the demonstrated hostility of Hussein combine to produce an imperative for pre-emptive action. But it is not in America's national interest to establish pre-emption as a universal principle available to every nation. We are only at the beginning of the threat of global proliferation. Whatever the views regarding Iraq, the nations of the world must face the impossibility of letting such a process run unchecked. The United States would contribute much to a new international order if it invited the rest of the world, and especially the major nuclear powers, to cooperate in creating a system to deal with this challenge to humanity on a more institutional basis. Henry A. Kissinger is the former Secretary of State under Presidents Nixon and Ford. He is now chairman of Kissinger Associates, an international consulting firm.