

In addition, use of two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki – the second was not militarily necessary – showed that for Truman and Byrnes, the prospect of political gain in Europe and Asia precluded serious thought not to use the bombs. And this may have led the Russians to conclude that the bombs were directed against them, or their ability to achieve their strategic interests. But Stalin would not be pressured; he was determined to pursue a Russian atomic bomb.<sup>44</sup>

Shortly, Truman backed Byrnes's "bomb in his pocket" diplomacy at the London CFM, which deadlocked over Russian control in Eastern Europe and American control in Japan. Truman told Byrnes to "stick to his guns" and tell the Russians "to go to hell."<sup>45</sup> The president then agreed with "ultranationalist" advisers who opposed international atomic accord by drawing misleading analogies about interwar disarmament and "appeasement" and by insisting that America's technological-industrial genius assured permanent atomic supremacy. Truman held that America was the world's atomic "trustee"; that it had to preserve the bomb's "secret"; and that no nation would give up the "locks and bolts" necessary to protect its "house" from "outlaws." The atomic arms race was on, he said in the fall of 1945, and other nations had to "catch up on their own hook."<sup>46</sup>

In the spring of 1946, Truman undercut the Dean Acheson-David Lilienthal plan for international control and development of atomic resources by appointing as chief negotiator Bernard Baruch, whose emphasis on close inspections, sanctions, no veto, and indefinite American atomic monopoly virtually assured Russian refusal. Despite Acheson's protests, Truman analogized that "if Harry Stimson had been backed up in Manchuria [in 1931] there would have been no war." And as deadlock neared in July 1946, the president told Baruch to "stand pat."<sup>47</sup>

Ultimately the UN commission weighing the Baruch Plan approved it on 31 December 1946. But the prospect of a Soviet veto in the Security Council precluded its adoption. Admittedly, Stalin's belief that he could not deal with the United States on an equal basis until he had the bomb and Soviet insistence

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44. Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb*, 132–33.

45. Entry for 12 August–3 September and 4 and 5 September 1945, Stimson Papers, Stimson Diary; Truman to Byrnes, 22 and 25 September 1945, Truman Papers, PSF, box 119.

46. James C. Forrestal memorandum, 21 September 1945, Truman Papers, PSF, box 157; Clinton Anderson to Truman, 25 September 1945, and Fred Vinson and Kenneth McKellar to Truman, 27 September 1945, Truman Papers, PSF, box 112; Truman Radio Report, 9 August 1945, in *PPHST*, 1945 (Washington, 1961), 431–38; entry for 18 September 1945, Davies Papers, Davies Journal; entry for 18 September 1945, in Blum, ed., *Price of Vision*, 481; Truman news conference, 8 October 1945, in *PPHST*, 1945, 383; Truman on armaments race, in Gregg Herken, *The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945–1950* (New York, 1981), 39, and Lord Halifax to Foreign Office, 17 November 1945, FO. 371/44539.

47. Herken, *Winning Weapon*, 153–70, and Larry G. Gerber, "The Baruch Plan and the Origins of the Cold War," *Diplomatic History* 6 (Winter 1982): 69–95; Truman quote on Stimson in "BMB Memorandum of Meeting with the President and J. F. Byrnes, June 7, 1946," in Lloyd C. Gardner, *Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941–1949* (Chicago, 1970), 195; Truman to Baruch, 10 July 1946, Truman Papers, PSF, box 113.