

DEPARTMENT  
OF  
STATE

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

5-5

DIVISION OF  
CENTRAL SERVICES  
TELEGRAPH SECTION

~~SE~~  
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ACTION-SE

INFO:

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NEA

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A-D

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SPA

SA

MS-633 -K

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SECRET)

Bucharest via War

Dated August 9, 1945

Rec'd 5:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.


PRIORITY

539, August 9, 6 p.m.

All opposition leaders are awaiting as a vital and  
urgent factor for Rumania's independence an official  
Allied interpretation that the Groza Govt under the  
Potsdam Declaration is not considered a "recognized  
democratic govt". (NYTEL 533 of Aug 7) (Rptd to Moscow  
as 149) From available evidence the King would request  
the resignation of the NDF cabinet if he were certain  
this was the case, while the Socialists for the same  
cause are withholding their resignations from the  
Cabinet, which would precipitate normal constitutional  
crisis and permit the King to request the formation of  
a new govt. Meanwhile responsible Rumanian circles  
are aware that the Allied missions have no information

beyond the Potsdam Declaration itself.

see  
8/23/45  
5:16



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Confidential File

DCR - EUR DCR

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SECRET

See limited 200 a/05 = 550.  
8/21/45 5:56pm USA 200 a/05

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SECRET

-2-#539, August 9, 1946 p.m., from Bucharest via Warsaw.

Maniu in an interview requested by him last evening gave his views and indicated his proposed course of action. He said that the opposition and the MDF are negotiating for a governmental change, but that the latter steadfastly maintains that the Potsdam Declaration recognizes its regime and it need not resign to be replaced by a broader-based cabinet. He further stated that both sides actually realize the declaration phrase "recognized democratic governments" would be superfluous if the Rumanian, Hungarian and Bulgarian Govt were all considered satisfactory. Nevertheless, Maniu feared Groza and Tatarascu were seeking with Soviet aid to name a delegation for the London peace treaty conference that would immediately begin drafting peace terms with the Russians prior to the formal conference. Accordingly, he emphasized the all-important time factor in gaining an Allied clarifying statement as to the MDF regime.

Maniu stated it had been arranged for himself, Dinu Bratianu and Titel Petrescu separately to see the King in the evening of August 10. From available information

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~~3~~-#539, August 9, 6 p.m., from Bucharest via War.

information the three leaders will adopt the following course pending Allied information as to the status of the Groza cabinet: Dinu Bratianu indicated in an interview yesterday with Gen. Schuyler and myself that his recommendations could not be energetic. Following two conferences with Petrescu yesterday Maniu expressed his belief, which I also share, that the former also will play for time.

Maniu, himself, said he intended to recommend to the King that the latter request the resignation of the Groza cabinet and form another satisfactory to the three armistice signatories. He anticipated the King's refusal to take action in view of the present uncertainty and stated that another alternative might be the organization of country-wide demonstrations requesting a govt change. However, he felt that it might serve as a pretext for the govt and Red Army to impose strong repressive measures, call the demonstrators "Fascists" and assure the continuance in power of the NDF. It is my impression that Maniu, too, for the moment, will defer definitive party action.

MELBOURNE

JT