

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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5 September 1945

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D)
CIA LTR. 5-21-73
By MLT/MG, NARS Date 6-24-73

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The formation of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity was closely linked with Poland's strategic dependence upon the USSR and the latter's determination to have a friendly regime in Warsaw. The Government generally meets Soviet requirements. In terms of numbers and distribution of posts it is similar in character to its predecessor, the Lublin regime. Even the five non-Lublin men are likely to strengthen rather than decrease Poland's left-ward and pro-Soviet orientation.

Though seats in the Cabinet have been equally divided among the principal parties, the Communists' control of key positions is out of proportion to their estimated voting strength. Moreover, even though the various parties retain their nominal identity, they have formed a coalition so iron-clad as to create a virtual one-party system. No less friendly to the USSR than its predecessor, the new Polish Provisional Government is considerably stronger and more capable of establishing firmly

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By , NARS Date 6/26/73

the foreign and domestic policies initiated by the Lublin regime.

William J. Donovan

William J. Donovan
Director

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