MINUTES OF A MEETING HELD IN ROOM 200, NEW YORK CITY HALL BUILDING
ON FRIDAY, 28 OCTOBER 1946, AT 1430

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. H. Freeman Matthews, Acting Chairman
Mr. Robert A. Lovett (Acting for Mr. John J. McCloy)
Mr. Artemus L. Gates

STATE

Mr. John Carter Vincent
Dr. George Flakeslee

WAR

Major General Frank R. McCoy
Major General John H. Hilldring
Colonel Charles W. McCarthy
Colonel James McCormack
Colonel G. Stanton Babcock
Lt. Colonel Davidson Sommers

NAVY

Captain R. L. Dennison
Mr. John D. Rockefeller, III
Mr. John C. Geilfuss
Mr. Francis X. Downey
Lt. Hugh D. Farley

SECRETARY
5. FAR EASTERN ADVISORY COMMISSION (SWNCC 65/12: Agenda Item #4)

MR. MATTHEWS requested comment on the subject paper. MR. LOVETT then stated that he thought that the paper left much to be desired — that he did not wish to discuss the paper based primarily on objections by the War Department, but rather from an overall point of view. He said that he considered the paper inadequate for the purpose of giving General McCoy effective guidance and background for his negotiations. The concessions in Part II are obviously attempts to avoid making any concessions in substance, and would undoubtedly be recognized as such by the other powers and be unacceptable to them. Some of the reasons stated in Part III to justify the U. S. position appear unrealistic and will not be persuasive to the other powers. In addition, some of them are impolitic for the U. S. to advance.

In general, MR. LOVETT believed that the paper would invite a deadlock in the Commission, since it would not afford General McCoy any elasticity to negotiate in the face of claims which we know the other nations will assert. GENERAL McCoy agreed with the views of Mr. Lovett.

MR. MATTHEWS agreed that the paper as it stood was inadequate, but indicated that he was in no position to take any action on SWNCC 65/12 at the present time. He said that the Secretary of State wishes to go into this whole matter personally and that Mr. Byrnes has not yet had time to give it adequate consideration. The Secretary is carefully examining the Russian position in relation to this matter. MR. GATES asked if there were any indications that the Russians would participate in the Commission. MR. MATTHEWS replied that the Russians were still officially maintaining their position that a Control Council be set up before the Advisory Commission is convened. There were indications, however, that the Russians might be currently reconsidering their stated position.
MR. MATTHEWS stated his belief that the Russians were not thinking of a Control Council based on the German model, but that they had the Balkan pattern in mind— for them it was largely a matter of prestige and he believed they expected that in all cases General MacArthur would have the final word.

MR. LOVETT stated that as matters stood now General MacArthur was in complete control, based on directives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He asked whether it was anticipated that General MacArthur or his successors should receive their orders from the Control Council. MR. MATTHEWS said that this was not to be the case if a Balkan type of Control Council were used. This Council has a Russian president and the other powers represented do not possess any veto power. MR. LOVETT stated if this were so there should be a statement in the paper to the effect that any Control Council be patterned on the Balkan model. MR. MATTHEWS stated that if the revised terms of reference of the Allied Control Commission for Hungary were used as a basis for a Control Council, General MacArthur would not be handicapped in his administration of Japan. GENERAL HURDRING stated he believed that the War Department was willing to go along if General MacArthur’s effective control were not endangered.

MR. GATES proposed that the paper be returned to the Subcommittee for the Far East with the suggestion that it be reexamined with a view to giving our Allies some further degree of control. MR. LOVETT stated that he believed that three things should be done:

1. That the major points on which disagreement was expected should be outlined in detail.
2. That an effort should be made to determine how far we must depart from the present terms of reference to secure an effective degree of concurrence.
3. That the positions on which we would stand and would not retreat should be outlined in full.
He further stated that we were very short of time and that action such as he had suggested should be initiated immediately.

GENERAL McCoy asked if General MacArthur's ideas on this subject had been received. He was informed that such was the case.

CAPTAIN DENNISON asked if the suggested revision is to be based on the assumption that United States policy will govern. MR. LOVETT asked the scope of "United States Policy". He suggested that the paper be referred back to the Subcommittee for the Far East, which, with the assistance of officers from the office of the Secretary of War and Civil Affairs Division, should redraft the paper with an eye to giving it greater elasticity.

MR. VINCENT stated there was another principle here which was important. In the case of the Balkan Control Council Russia did pretty much what she liked irrespective of the concurrence of the other powers represented. MR. MATTHEWS stated that in the revised terms for the Allied Control Council for Hungary, the Russian president is bound to consult his colleagues prior to action, but that the latter have no effective veto. MR. LOVETT said that if this were so the Russians were acting in Hungary in apparently two capacities: (1) as representatives of their government, and (2) as members of the Allied Control Commission.

MR. MATTHEWS stated that he believed it was very significant that the Russians had agreed that an American should be president of the proposed Japanese Control Council, which in itself was an indication that they did not expect to follow the German quadripartite model.

GENERAL McCoy stated that he felt uneasy about the contemplated procedure for the Commission. Provisions were made for the members to report to their governments and he wished to know what action would follow. He asked how agreements reached in the Advisory Commission would be implemented. He said further that the Supreme Commander receives
his policies and directives from the United States alone, and he felt that this fact would be extremely unpalatable to the other governments represented. He felt the whole procedure contemplated was a very loose one; the repercussions of any dealings we had in Japan would undoubtedly be felt in Europe by Generals Eisenhower and Clark, and that this aspect should receive careful consideration.

MR. VINCENT asked for information concerning the operation of the European Advisory Commission. MR. LOVETT stated that if the Far Eastern Advisory Commission were to parallel the European Advisory Commission that subsequent organizations must be contemplated. As it stood there were no provisions for such organizations. MR. MATTHEWS said that the European Advisory Commission was set up while hostilities were still in progress. He stated that the European Advisory Commission set up a series of programs and that the recommendations of the Commission were referred to the respective governments, that the Commission was formed primarily to:

1. Draft the surrender terms for Germany
2. Design control machinery
3. Set up the respective zones of occupation.

GENERAL HILLING stated that in the case of the European Advisory Commission three powers only were involved. Recommendations were made by the representatives to their respective governments, which in turn were transmitted to the various commanders in the field. It was comparatively easy to be effective when only three powers were involved, but in this case one had to consider thirteen different governments, which would make administration very difficult.

COLONEL MCCORMACK asked if the considered revision should be limited by the British suggestions. MR. LOVETT stated his belief that no such limits should be imposed, but that it was a question of seeing how far we could go along with our
Allies and yet maintain a firm stand on those points which we considered essential. MR. MATTHEWS stated that he believed we should examine the paper with an eye to establishing:

1. Essential minima of U. S. control
2. Non-essentials where we could make concessions.

THE COMMITTEE AGREED to request the Far Eastern Subcommittee to draw up a new paper, paying particular attention to the following points:

a. An outline of expected points of difficulty
b. Essential United States minimum demands
c. Possible concessions by this Government.

6. RELEASE OF PAPERS TO THE UNITED STATES AND ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FAR EASTERN ADVISORY COMMISSION

The Acting Secretary requested Committee approval for the release of Appendix "C" of SWNCC 21/6 (Directive to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers) to all members of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission. GENERAL NcCOY indicated that he would be under considerable pressure from his colleagues for information concerning what directives had been sent to General MacArthur and how he was carrying them out. GENERAL HILLDRING indicated that it was satisfactory if the paper under reference was released to all members of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission on a "top secret" basis, with the understanding that it would not be published.

Discussion followed and it was indicated that the Far East Subcommittee was editing SWNCC 58/9 (Disarmament, Demobilization and Disposition of Enemy Arms, Ammunition and Implements of War) and Appendix "D" of SWNCC 57/3 (Apprehension and Punishment of War Criminals) for release to the Far Eastern Advisory Commission.

THE COMMITTEE AGREED:

a. To release Appendix "C" of SWNCC 21/6 to all