Prof. Kenneth A. Schultz   Political Science 220
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Theories of International Relations

This course offers a graduate-level introduction to the field of international relations, with an emphasis on contending theoretical perspectives and some of the key empirical findings. The material includes classics in the field as well as more recent research that illustrates ongoing areas of inquiry. Its purpose is to introduce and evaluate the theories and methods used in the study of international relations, to identify interesting and important questions in the field, and to think about the ways in which research can be designed to get at those questions.

This course is part of a two-quarter sequence (together with PS221) that is designed for doctoral students specializing in international relations.

Requirements

The first and most important requirement is your regular attendance and participation in the seminar. Please come to class every week prepared to discuss all of the assigned readings.

In addition, there are two writing assignments:

1) Two short papers, 4-5 pages in length, which critically examine a given week's readings. Students will sign up for weeks to do these papers at the first meeting, and each week's papers will be due by 5:00pm on the Tuesday before class meets. Papers can be put in my box or emailed. The papers should address some aspect of the week's readings, such as by critically examining a set of arguments, appraising a controversy in the literature, and/or discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the research designs employed.

2) A 15-page paper, due by the end of the exam week, which does one of the following:

(a) A critical review of the theoretical and empirical literature on a discrete question in the study of international relations. The idea is to trace the development of work on the chosen problem over the last several decades with an eye to understanding what we have learned (if anything), what theoretical innovations and/or research strategies have been productive, and what puzzles remain unresolved. Some examples of discrete questions in the field will be provided.

(b) A research proposal that draws some hypotheses from the theoretical literature and lays out an empirical strategy for testing them. The idea is to pick an interesting question or puzzle from the course material and to propose a research design for answering it.

Grades will be a function of course participation (50 percent), the short papers (20 percent), and the long paper (30 percent).

Readings

The following books will be available at the bookstore:

Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979).

Peter Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).

Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

The rest of the readings will be made available either on the course web page or in the Political Science graduate student lounge.

Schedule of Topics and Readings

1. Theory and International Relations

Waltz, ch. 1.

"Symposium: Methodological Foundations of the Study of International Conflict," *International Studies Quarterly* 29 (1985), pp. 121-154.

Gabriel A. Almond and Stephen J. Genco, "Clouds, Clocks, and the Study of Politics," *World Politics* 29 (July 1977), pp. 489-522.

John Lewis Gaddis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War," *International Security* 17 (Winter 1992-93), pp. 5-58.

I. Major Theoretical Traditions

2. Realism: Anarchy, Power, and the State

Waltz, chs. 4-6, 8.

Hans Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, chs. 1-3.

John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2001), chs. 1-2.

Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" in *Realism: Restatements and Renewal*, edited by Benjamin Frankel (London: Frank Cass and Company, 1996), pp. 90-121.

Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," *World Politics* 51 (Oct. 1998), pp. 144-172.

Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravscik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" *International Security* 24 (Fall 1999), pp. 5-55.

3. Liberalism I: International Institutions

Keohane, chs. 1-6.

Robert Axelrod, "The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists," *American Political Science Review* 75 (Jun. 1981), pp. 306-318.

Paul Milgrom, Douglass North, and Barry Weingast, "The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade," *Economics and Politics* 2 (1990), pp. 1-23 (skim).

Grieco, Joseph M., "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," *International Organization* 42 (August 1988), pp.485-507.

Powell, Robert, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," *American Political Science Review* 85 (December 1991), pp.1303-20.

James Fearon, "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation," *International Organization* 52 (1998):269-306.

4. Liberalism II: Domestic Society and Institutions

Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review* 80 (Dec., 1986), pp. 1151-1169.

Bruce Russett and John Oneal, *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2001), ch. 1.

Jeffrey A. Frieden, "Actors and Preferences in International Relations," in David Lake and Robert Powell, eds., *Strategic Choice and International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 39-76.

Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Relations," *International Organization* 51 (Autumn 1997), pp. 513-53.

J. A. Hobson. "Imperialism: A Study," in Harrison Wright, ed., *The "New Imperialism": Analysis of Late Nineteenth Century Expansion*, 2nd ed. (Lexington, MA: Heath, 1976), pp. 5-44.

Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 1-65.

Benjamin Fordham, "Economic Interests, Party, and Ideology in Early Cold War Era U.S. Foreign Policy," *International Organization* 52 (Spring 1998), pp. 359-95.

Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, "Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations," *International Organization* 50 (Winter 1996), pp. 109-39.

5. Constructivism: Culture, Norms, and Identity

Katzenstein, chs. 1 (Katzenstein) , 2 (Jepperson, Wendt, Katzenstein), 5 (Finnemore), 7 (Johnston), 9 (Berger).

Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It," *International Organization* 46 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425.

Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organizatio*n 52 (Autumn 1998), pp. 887-918.

Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), chs. 1, 3.

II. Explaining Conflict

6. Power, War, and Peace

Gilpin, pp. 1-49, 85-105, 156-210.

Harrison Wagner, "Peace, War, and the Balance of Power," *American Political Science Review* 88 (September 1994), pp. 593-607.

James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations of War," *International Organization* 49 (1995), pp. 379-414.

William C. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," *International Security* 19:3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 91-129.

Katzenstein, ch. 8 (Hermann).

7. Crisis Bargaining, Credibility, and Reputation

Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), chs. 2-3.

Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), ch. 3.

James Fearon, "Signaling versus Balance of Power and Interests," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38 (1994), pp. 236-69.

Anne Sartori, "The Might of the Pen: A Reputational Theory of Communication in International Disputes," *International Organization* 56 (Winter 2002), pp. 121-150.

Jonathan Mercer, *Reputation and International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 1-73.

8. Domestic Politics and International Conflict

John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, "The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992," *World Politics* 52 (October 1999), pp. 1-37.

Katzenstein, ch. 10 (Risse-Kappen).

James D. Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," *American Political Science Review* 88 (Sept. 1994), pp. 577-592.

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson and Alastair Smith, "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace," *American Political Science Review* 93 (December 1999), pp. 791-808.

Kenneth Schultz, "Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace," *International Organization* 52 (Spring 1999), pp. 233-66.

Lars Erik Cederman, "Back to Kant: Reinterpreting the Democratic Peace as a Macrohistorical Learning Process," *American Political Science Review* 95 (March 2001), pp. 15-32.

Joanne Gowa, *Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), chs. 4-6.

III. Explaining Cooperation

9. International Institutions

Lisa L. Martin, "Credibility, Costs, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions," *World Politics* 45 (April 1993), pp. 406-432.

Erik Voeten, "Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action," *American Political Science Review* 95 (2001), pp. 845-58.

Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, "On Compliance," *International Organization* 47 (Spring 1993), pp. 175-205.

George Downs, Rocke, Peter Barsoom, "Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?" *International Organization* 50 (Summer 1996), pp. 379-406.

Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations," *International Organization* 53 (Autumn 1999), 699-732.

Alastair Ian Johnston, "The Social Effects of International Institutions on Domestic (Foreign Policy) Actors," in Daniel Drezner, ed., *Locating the Proper Authorities: The Interaction of Domestic and International Institutions* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2003), pp. 145-96.

Barbara Koremenos, "Loosening the Ties that Bind: A Learning Model of Agreement Flexibility," *International Organization* 55 (Spring 2001), pp. 289-326.

10. Domestic Politics and International Cooperation

Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics," *International Organization* 42 (Summer 1988), pp. 427-61).

Helen Milner, *Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), chs. 1, 3.

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith, "Trust and Cooperation through Agent-Specific Punishments," *International Organization* 54 (Autumn 2000): 809-24.

Helen Milner and Peter Rosendorff, "The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape," *International Organization* 55 (Autumn 2001), pp. 829-858.

William Bernhard and David Leblang, "Democratic Institutions and Exchange-rate Commitments," *International Organization* 53 (Winter 1999), pp. 71-97.

Andrew Moravcsik, "The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe," *International Organization* 54 (2), pp. 217-252.

Kenneth A Schultz, "Tying Hands and Washing Hands: The U.S. Congress and Multilateral Humanitarian Intervention," in Daniel Drezner, ed., *Locating the Proper Authorities: The Interaction of Domestic and International Institutions* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2003), pp. 105-42.