

Eighth

***Summer Workshop on Analysis
of Military Operations and Strategy***

(SWAMOS 2004)

Sponsored by Columbia University's Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies,
convened at Cornell University

July 11 - 30, 2004

Morning sessions include lectures and plenary discussions, with all participants attending. Afternoon sessions occasionally split into two seminar groups. There are informal discussion sessions with refreshments on several evenings, relevant movie showings, and an evening meeting with people from the international relations section of the Cornell University Government department and the Peace Studies Program. The weekend after the first week is free (after 3:00 p.m. Friday), for those participants with families who need to return home for a couple days. The second weekend will be taken up with the field trip to Fort Lewis, Washington.

In the first section below are background reading assignments for participants to complete before arriving at Cornell. They are listed roughly in order of relation to subjects and sessions during the three weeks. Additional readings to be done each night during the three weeks of the workshop are listed under the schedule following the list. An optional supplementary bibliography for future reference follows.

As many of you doubtless already know, Clausewitz is one work that cannot be read quickly. He is not quite as taxing as Hegel, but more than one reputable scholar has misread Clausewitz – and misrepresented him – as a result of attempting to digest the work as expeditiously as many are accustomed to doing with normal works of social science or history. To say that he must be read slowly and carefully is not meant to endow Clausewitz with mystique or to imply excessive reverence, but only to warn that understanding him is a more than normally demanding intellectual chore.

The curriculum gives more attention to cases and readings in U.S. defense policy than to other countries. This does not represent a supposition about what is worth studying, but reflects the aim that the workshop focus on some questions rather than attempt to survey everything, and is also due to the particular expertise of the faculty and guest lecturers.

Several evening movie showings supplement the curriculum. One (*The Battle of Algiers*) is as close to realism as movies get. The others, while superior to the majority of war movies, do not fully escape typical Hollywood vices of political caricature, melodrama, and romanticization of combat. They do, however, effectively illustrate some themes about: the sociology of command; influence of doctrine, organization, and training on combat; and difficulties in linking operations and strategy. A list of other available films appears at the end.

Advance Reading Assignments

1. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret eds. and trans. (Princeton University Press, 1976), Book I: chaps. 1, 2, 4, 7; Book II: chaps. 1-4; Book III: chaps. 1-5, 11, 14, 17; Book VI: chaps. 1-8, 26; Book VII: chaps. 1-5, 15, 16, 22; Book VIII: chaps. 1-8. (RECOMMENDED FOR PURCHASE) (Participants should not substitute other translations. *Under NO circumstances read the widely available Penguin edition of the Graham translation, abridged by Anatol Rapoport.*)
2. Allan Millett and Williamson Murray, eds., *Military Effectiveness* (Allen & Unwin, 1988), Vol I: chaps. 1, 9; Vol. III: chaps. 8, 10.
3. Michael Geyer, "German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare," in Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton University Press, 1986).
4. Samuel P. Huntington, "Patterns of Violence in World Politics," in Huntington, ed., *Changing Patterns of Military Politics* (Free Press, 1962).
5. T. E. Lawrence, "Science of Guerrilla Warfare," *Encyclopædia Britannica: Fourteenth Edition* (Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 1929), vol. 10: *Game to Gun-Metal*, pp. 950-953.
6. *Mao-Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare*, Samuel Griffith, trans. (Praeger, 1961), chaps. 2, 6.
7. Colin McInnes and G. D. Sheffield, eds., *Warfare in the Twentieth Century: Theory and Practice* (Unwin Hyman, 1988), chaps. 1-8.
8. John Keegan, *The Face of Battle* (Viking, 1976), chap. 4.
9. *Field Manual 71-1: Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1998); available at: <http://www.atsc-army.org/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/71-1/711frntf.htm>, pp. 3-1 to 3-34; 4-1 to 4-37; and Glossary.
10. Captain Jonathan M. House, *Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of Twentieth Century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute, 1984), pp. 1-6, 19-42, 79-104, 172-190.
11. *Air Force Manual 1-1: Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), Vol. 1; available at: <http://www.cdsar.af.mil/afm1-1/BACKGROU.HTML>, pp.5-15.
12. *Field Manual 100-5: Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1986 edition), pp. 91-107, 129-138.
13. Col. Wallace P. Franz, "Maneuver," *Military Review*, Vol. LXIII, No.5 (May 1983), pp. 3-12.
14. Francis P. Hoerber, *Military Applications of Modeling: Selected Case Studies* (Gordon and Breach, 1981), pp. 6-32.

15. Frederick William Lanchester, "Mathematics in Warfare," reprinted in James R. Newman, *The World of Mathematics* (Simon and Schuster, 1956), Vol. 4, pp. 2139-2157.
16. John A. Battilana and Judith Grange, *The Military Applications of Modeling* (Government Printing Office, 1984), pp. 63-111.
17. Frederick S. Hillier and Gerald J. Lieberman, *Introduction to Operations Research*, Third Edition (Holden-Day, 1980), chap. 1.
18. Stephen Biddle, *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle* (Princeton University Press, 2004), chap. 2.

SWAMOS 2004 Schedule

Week One

Sunday Evening, July 11: Welcoming Reception and Dinner.

Monday, July 12.

Lectures Richard K. Betts, Columbia University, and Eliot A. Cohen, Johns Hopkins University Nitze School of Advanced International Studies:
War and Policy: Grammar and Logic.

Seminar 1: Betts: **Discussion of Advance Readings on Policy, Strategy, and Operations**, focusing primarily on Clausewitz, secondarily on Millett and Murray, eds., Geyer, Huntington, and Lawrence.

Seminar 2: Cohen: **Modes of Military Analysis: Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and Net Assessment.** Read: Sun Tzu, *The Art of Warfare*, Roger T. Ames, trans. (Ballantine, 1993), chaps. 8-13 (chaps. 1-7 recommended); Stephen Peter Rosen, "Net Assessment as an Analytical Concept," in Andrew Marshall *et al.*, eds., *On Not Confusing Ourselves* (Westview Press, 1991); Philip Karber, Grant Whitley, Mark Herman, and Douglas Komer, *Assessing the Correlation of Forces: France, 1940* (BDM Corporation, 1979).

5:00-6:30: Inaugural IENBHH (Intellectual Exchange and Network Bonding Happy Hour).

Evening: FREE.

Tuesday, July 13.

Lectures: Cohen and Betts:
Elements of Military Operations.

Seminar 3: Cohen: **Irregular Warfare.** Read: John Shy and Thomas W. Collier, "Revolutionary War," in Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton University Press, 1986); Col. C. E. Callwell, *Small Wars*, Third Edition (London: HMSO, 1906), chaps. 1-4.

Seminar 4: Betts: **Estimating the Culminating Point of Victory: Korea, Kuwait, Iraq.** Read: Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents* (Free Press, 1990), pp. 103-127; Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, *The Generals' War* (Little, Brown, 1995), chaps. 18-20. Also, review Clausewitz, *On War*, Book VII, chap. 22. Those unfamiliar with the basic history of

the first six months of the Korean War should consult a brief chronological account such as Marvin Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," Parts IV-VI, in Harold Stein, ed., *American Civil-Military Decisions* (University of Alabama Press, 1963).

Evening Film Showing (Required): ***The Battle of Algiers***. 1966. Directed by Gillo Pontecorvo. Screenplay by Franco Solinas.

Wednesday, July 14.

Lecture: Cohen:

Understanding the Tribes: Military Organizational Cultures.

Read: Carl H. Builder, *The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), chaps. 1-3.

Seminar 5: Cohen: **Understanding Military Technology.** Read: "Superiority," in Arthur C. Clarke, *Expedition to Earth* (Harcourt, Brace & World, 1970); Thomas C. Hone, "Carrier Requirements Exercise" (Center for Strategic Education, Nitze SAIS, n.d.).

Seminar 6: Betts: **The Vietnam Strategy Debate.** Read: Harry Summers, *On Strategy* (Presidio Press, 1982), chaps. 7-10; Andrew Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), chaps. 6-7.

Evening: FREE.

Thursday, July 15.

Lecture: Robert A. Pape, University of Chicago:

Uses and Misuses of Air Power.

Read: Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win* (Cornell University Press, 1996), chaps. 2, 7.

Afternoon Discussion: Cohen and Pape: **An Exchange on the Air Power Debate(s): Issues, Evidence, Methods.** Read: Barry D. Watts, "Ignoring Reality: Problems of Theory and Evidence in Security Studies," *Security Studies* 7, no. 2 (Winter 1997/98): pp. 133-149. (N.B.: Only this excerpt is assigned, to keep the amount of required reading manageable. For anyone who has time, the entire Watts article is recommended, along with Pape's rebuttal, "The Air Force Strikes Back," in the same issue.)

Evening: FREE.

Friday, July 16.

Lecture: Tami Davis Biddle, U.S. Army War College:

Strategic Bombing.

Read: David MacIsaac, "Voices from the Central Blue," in Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton University Press, 1986); Tami Davis Biddle, *Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas About Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945* (Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 270-301.

Seminar 7: T.D. Biddle: **Ethics and Bombing.** Read: Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, Second Edition (Basic Books, 1992), chap. 16.

Seminar 8: Betts: **Nuclear Strategy: Practice vs. Theory?** Read: Scott D. Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons," *International Security* 18, no. 4 (Spring 1994).

Evening Film Showing (Recommended but not Required): **Twelve O'Clock High.** 1949. Directed by Henry King. Screenplay by Sy Bartlett and Beirne Lay, Jr.

Saturday, July 17: *FREE*

Sunday, July 18: *FREE*

Week Two

Monday, July 19.

Lecture: Stephen Biddle, U.S. Army War College and University of North Carolina:
Tactics and Technology: Land Warfare.

Afternoon Lecture: Michael O'Hanlon, Brookings Institution:
Defense Budgeting.

Read: William W. Kaufmann, *Assessing the Base Force* (Brookings Institution, 1992).

Evening: *FREE*

Tuesday, July 20.

Lecture: O'Hanlon:
Defense Program Analysis.

Afternoon Discussion: S. Biddle: **Tactics and Technology Workshop.** Read: E. D. Swinton, *The Defense of Duffer's Drift* (Avery, 1986), pp. 3-72.

Evening Film Showing (Recommended but not Required): **Zulu.** 1964. Directed by Cy Endfield. Screenplay by John Prebble and Cy Endfield.

Wednesday, July 21.

Lecture: Betts:
The Politics of Intelligence Analysis.

Seminar 9: Betts: **Security Dilemma or Aggression? Issues in Threat Assessment.** Read: Eyre Crowe, “Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany, January 1, 1907,” and Thomas Sanderson, “Observations on Printed Memorandum on Relations with France and Germany, January 1907,” in G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds., *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914*, vol 3: *The Testing of the Entente, 1904-6* (London: HMSO, 1928); Documents 551, 553, and 650, in E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, eds., assisted by Margaret Lambert, *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, Third Series, vol. II: *1938* (London: HMSO, 1949); Richard K. Betts and Thomas J. Christensen, “China: Getting the Questions Right,” *National Interest* No. 62 (Winter 2000/01).

Seminar 10: S. Biddle: **The Revolution in Military Affairs?** Read: Andrew F. Krepinevich, “Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolution,” *National Interest* No. 37 (Fall 1994); Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Garstka, “Network-Centric Warfare,” *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* (January 1998); Richard Harknett and the JCISS Study Group, “The Risks of a Networked Military,” *Orbis* 44, no. 1 (Winter 2000); Stephen Biddle, *Military Power* (Princeton University Press, 2004), chap. 10 (skim pp. 191-196, 206-208, and read the rest carefully).

Evening: FREE.

Thursday, July 22.

Lecture: S. Biddle:
Operational Art and Theater Strategy.

Afternoon Plenary Discussion: Betts: **Policy, Strategy, Operations, and Tactics: Why Is There One Country Now Where There Were Two in 1863?** Read: Michael Shaara, *The Killer Angels* (McKay, 1974). (Also, review Clausewitz, *On War*, Book VI, chaps. 1, 3, 5.)

Evening: Reception and Briefing. Drinks and *hors d'oeuvres* with members of the Cornell Government Department and Peace Studies Program, followed by briefing by Major Ike Wilson (who spent last year in Mosul with the 101st Airborne) on Army “transformation” planning..

Friday, July 23. Travel to Fort Lewis, Washington.

Evening Lecture: S. Biddle: **The Recent Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.**

Saturday, July 24. Briefings, demonstrations, and observations at Fort Lewis, Washington.

Sunday, July 25: More briefings, demonstrations, and observations at Fort Lewis.

Week Three

Monday, July 26. Return Travel to Ithaca.

Tuesday, July 27.

Lecture: Col. Kevin J. Weddle, U.S. Army War College:
Campaign and Operational Planning.

Afternoon Workshop: Weddle: **Combatant Command Planning Exercise.**

Evening: FREE.

Wednesday, July 28.

Lecture: Audrey Kurth Cronin (Congressional Research Service):
Terrorism in Historical and Strategic Context.

Read: Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism," *International Security* 27, no. 3 (Winter 2002/2003).

Seminar 11: Cronin: **Terrorism and the Use of Military Force.** Read: Timothy D. Hoyt, "Military Force," in Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes, eds., *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy* (Georgetown University Press, 2004).

Seminar 12: S. Biddle: **Offense-Defense Theory.** Read: Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics," *Security Studies* 4, no. 4 (Summer 1995); Stephen Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," *International Security* 22, no. 4 (Spring 1998).

Evening: FREE

Thursday, July 29.

Lecture: S. Biddle:
Military Modeling.

Read: Francis P. Hoerber, *Military Applications of Modeling: Selected Case Studies* (Gordon and Breach, 1981), pp. 132-153; skim Charles T. Kelley, et al., "A First Look at Defense Options for Poland," in Paul Davis, ed., *New Challenges for Defense Planning* (RAND Corporation, 1994), pp. 451-476.

Afternoon Workshop: **Laboratory Exercise in Modeling.**

Evening: Farewell Dinner.

Friday, July 30.

Concluding Plenary: **SWAMOS 04 After Action Review.**

Afternoon: Travel home.

Recommended Supplementary Readings

The following list is idiosyncratic more than systematic. It includes some items of marginal importance, and may exclude other more important ones that the instructors have overlooked.

John I. Alger, *Definitions and Doctrine of the Military Art* (Wayne, NJ: Avery Publishing, for the Department of History, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, 1985) (a useful reference work: comprehensive treatment of terminology, acronyms, military map symbols, and notation).

J.B.A. Bailey, *Field Artillery and Firepower* (Oxford: The Military Press, 1989).

Hanson W. Baldwin, *Great Mistakes of the War* (Harper & Brothers, 1950) (right-wing revisionist view of World War II strategy).

John A. Battilega and Judith K. Grange, eds., *The Military Applications of Modeling* (Government Printing Office, 1984).

Antony Beevor, *Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege, 1942-1943* (Viking 1998).

Christopher Bellamy, *The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare: Theory and Practice* (London: Routledge, 1990).

Yoav Ben-Horin and Barry Posen, *Israel's Strategic Doctrine*, R-2845-NA (RAND Corporation, September 1981).

Richard K. Betts, *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises*, Second Edition (Columbia University Press, 1991).

Richard K. Betts, *Military Readiness* (Brookings Institution, 1995).

Richard K. Betts, *Surprise Attack* (Brookings Institution, 1982).

Richard K. Betts, "Is Strategy an Illusion?" *International Security* 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000).

Richard K. Betts, "Should Strategic Studies Survive?" *World Politics* 50, no. 1 (October 1997).

Richard K. Betts, "Must War Find a Way?" *International Security* 24, no. 2 (Fall 1999).

Alan Beyerchen, "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War," *International Security* 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992/93).

Stephen Biddle, "The European Conventional Balance: A Reinterpretation of the Debate," *Survival* 30 no. 2, (March-April 1988), pp. 99-121.

Stephen Biddle, "Rebuilding the Foundations of Offense-Defense Theory," *Journal of Politics* 63, no. 3 (August 2001).

Stephen Biddle, "The Past as Prologue: Assessing Theories of Future Warfare," *Security Studies* 8, no. 1 (Autumn 1998).

Stephen Biddle, David Gray, Stuart Kaufman, Dennis DeRiggi, and D. Sean Barnett, *Defense at Low Force Levels: The Effect of Force to Space Ratios on Conventional Combat Dynamics* (Institute for Defense Analyses, 1991), IDA P-2380.

Stephen Biddle, *Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army Policy and Defense Policy* (U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, November 2002).

Stephen Biddle, "Iraq and the Future of Warfare," testimony in U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings: *Operation Iraqi Freedom: An Outside Perspective*, 108th Cong., 1st sess., 2003.

Tami Davis Biddle, "British and American Approaches to Strategic Bombing," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 18, no. 1 (March 1995), pp. 91-144.

Shelford Bidwell, *Modern Warfare: A Survey of Men, Weapons, and Theories* (London: Allen Lane, 1973).

Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, *Firepower: British Army Weapons and Theories of War, 1904-1945* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1985).

Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War*, Third Edition (Free Press, 1988).

[James Blaker and Andrew Hamilton,] *Assessing the NATO/Warsaw Pact Military Balance* (Congressional Budget Office, December 1977) (example of "static" analysis which figured prominently in the Cold War).

Bruce G. Blair, *Strategic Command and Control* (Brookings Institution, 1985).

Bruce G. Blair, *The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War* (Brookings Institution, 1993).

Douglas Blaufarb, *The Counterinsurgency Era* (Free Press, 1977).

Bernard Brodie, "Technological Change, Strategic Doctrine, and Political Outcomes," in Klaus Knorr, ed., *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems* (University Press of Kansas, 1976).

Ambassador Linton F. Brooks, *Peacetime Influence through Forward Naval Presence* (Alexandria VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1993).

U. Candan, L.S. Dewald, and L.R. Speight, *Present NATO Practice in Land Wargaming* (The Hague: SHAPE Technical Center, 1987), Professional Paper STC-PP-252.

Mark Clodfelter, *The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam* (Free Press, 1989).

Eliot A. Cohen, et al., *Gulf War Air Power Survey [GWAPS]*, 5 vols. plus Summary Report (Government Printing Office, 1993).

Eliot A. Cohen, *Citizens and Soldiers* (Cornell University Press, 1985).

Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime* (Free Press, 2002).

Eliot Cohen, "Toward Better Net Assessment," *International Security* 13, no. 1 (Summer 1988).

Martin van Creveld, *Fighting Power* (Greenwood, 1982).

Martin van Creveld, *Supplying War* (Cambridge University Press, 1977).

Lt. Col. Paul T. DeVries, "Maneuver and the Operational Level of War," *Military Review*, Vol. LXIII, No 2 (February 1983), pp. 13-34.

J.A. Dewar, J.J. Gillogly, and M.L. Juncosa, "Non-Monotonicity, Chaos and Combat Models," *Military Operations Research* 2, no. 2 (1996).

Edward Mead Earle, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to Hitler* (Princeton University Press, 1941) (the predecessor of Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* [Princeton University Press, 1986]).

L.F. Ellis, *Victory in the West*, Vol. I: *The Battle of Normandy* (London: HMSO, 1962).

William R. Emerson, "Operation Point-Blank: A Tale of Bombers and Fighters," in Harry R. Borowski, *The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History, 1959-1987* (Office of Air Force History, 1988), pp. 441-72.

John A. English, *A Perspective on Infantry* (Praeger, 1981).

John A. English, *Marching Through Chaos: The Descent of Armies in Theory and Practice* (Praeger, 1996).

Joshua M. Epstein, *The Calculus of Conventional War: Dynamic Analysis Without Lanchester Theory* (Brookings Institution, 1985).

Carlo d'Este, *Decision in Normandy* (London: Collins, 1983).

Noble Frankland, *The Bombing Offensive Against Germany* (London: Faber and Faber, 1965).

Paul Fussell, *Wartime* (Oxford University Press, 1989) (anyone who has never taken pacifism seriously should read this).

David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Praeger, 1964).

Rex Goad, "The Modeling of Movement in Tactical Games" in Reiner K. Huber, ed., *Operational Research Games for Defense* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1979), pp. 190-214.

Kent Roberts Greenfield, *American Strategy in World War II* (Johns Hopkins Press, 1963).

Paddy Griffith, *Forward into Battle* (London: Anthony Bird, 1981).

Michael I. Handel, *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*, Third Edition (London: Cass, 2001) (comparison and exegesis of Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Jomini, Machiavelli, and Mao Zedong).

Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones, *How the North Won* (University of Illinois Press, 1991), Appendix A, "An Introduction to the Study of Military Operations" and Appendix B, "Mobilization and Combat Effectiveness."

Charles Hitch, Roland McKean, et al., *The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age* (Harvard University Press, 1960).

Lt. Col. L.D. Holder, "A New Day for Operational Art," *Army*, March 1985, pp. 22-32.

Dan Horowitz, "Flexible Responsiveness and Military Strategy," *Policy Sciences* 1, no. 2 (Summer 1970).

Michael Howard, *War in European History* (Oxford University Press, 1974).

Reiner K. Huber, et al., eds., *Military Strategy and Tactics: Computer Modeling of Land War Problems* (Plenum Press, 1975).

- Reiner K. Huber, ed., *Modeling and Analysis of Conventional Defense in Europe* (Plenum Press, 1986).
- Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., *Fleet Tactics* (Naval Institute Press, 1986).
- Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., ed., *Military Modeling* (Military Operations Research Society, 1984).
- N.K. Jaiswal, *Military Operations Research* (Kluwer, 1997).
- Antoine-Henri Jomini, *The Art of War*, G.H. Mendell and W.P. Craighill, trans. (Lippincott, 1862/Greenwood Press, n.d.).
- Archer Jones, *The Art of War in the Western World* (University of Illinois Press/Oxford University Press [paperback], 1987), (on the basics of operations, tactics, and logistics throughout history, and a taxonomy of types of warfare).
- R.V. Jones, *The Wizard War: British Scientific Intelligence, 1939-1945* (Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1978).
- Alan F. Karr, "Lanchester Attrition Processes and Theater-Level Combat Models," in Martin Shubik, ed., *The Mathematics of Conflict* (Elsevier, 1983), pp. 89-126.
- William W. Kaufmann, *Planning Conventional Forces, 1950-1980* (Brookings Institution, 1982).
- William Kaufmann, "The Arithmetic of Force Planning," in John Steinbruner and Leon Sigal, eds., *Alliance Security* (Brookings, 1983).
- Thomas Keaney and Eliot Cohen, *Revolution in Warfare? Airpower in the Persian Gulf* (Naval Institute Press, 1995) (revised version of introductory volume of GWAPS).
- Charles Kupchan, "Setting Conventional Force Requirements," *World Politics* 41, no. 4 (July 1989).
- Benjamin S. Lambeth, *The Transformation of American Air Power* (Cornell University Press, 2000).
- Benjamin S. Lambeth, *NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment* (RAND, 2001).
- Jean Larteguy, *The Centurions*, Xan Fielding, trans. (Dutton, 1962).
- Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, *Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943* (U.S. Army Office of the Chief of Military History, 1955) **and** Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, *Global Logistics and Strategy 1943-1945* (U.S. Army Office of the Chief of Military History, 1968).
- John W. R. Lepingwell, "The Laws of Combat? Lanchester Reexamined," *International Security* 12, No.1, (Summer 1987), pp. 89-134.
- Jack Levy, "The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology," *International Studies Quarterly* 28, no. 2 (June 1984).
- Thomas Lucas, "How One Randomizes Matters: A Study of Non-Monotonicity and Randomness in Combat Analysis," *Phalanx* 30, no. 1 (March 1997).
- Captain Timothy Lupfer, *The Dynamics of Doctrine: Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War*, Leavenworth Paper No. 4 (Army Combat Studies Institute, 1981).
- Maj. James A. Machos, "Tacair Support for Airland Battle," *Air University Review*, 35, no. 4 (May-June 1984), pp. 16-24.

Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong), *On Guerrilla Warfare*, Brig. Gen. Samule B. Griffith, trans. (Praeger, 1961).

Mao Tse-tung, *On the Protracted War* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1954).

S.L.A. Marshall, *Men Against Fire* (Morrow, 1947) **and** Frederic Smoler, "The Secret of the Soldiers Who Didn't Shoot," *American Heritage* 40, no. 2 (March 1989); Roger J. Spiller, "S.L.A. Marshall and the Ratio of Fire," *RUSI Journal* (Winter 1988); and Russell W. Glenn, "Men and Fire in Vietnam," *Army* 39, no. 4 (April 1989) (on the controversy over Marshall's research on combat behavior).

S.L.A. Marshall, *The Soldier's Load and the Mobility of a Nation* (Marine Corps Association, 1980).

B.J.C. McKercher and Michael A. Hennessy, *The Operational Art: Developments in the Theories of War* (Praeger, 1996).

John Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Cornell U.P., 1983).

John Mearsheimer, "Assessing the Conventional Balance," **and** Joshua Epstein, "The 3:1 Rule, the Adaptive Dynamic Model, and the Future of Security Studies," *International Security* 13, no. 4 (Spring 1989) (contrasting views on one important issue in methodology for assessing force balances; for those interested, Mearsheimer has a 20-page unpublished surrebuttal to Epstein which he will gladly supply upon request).

Samuel Eliot Morison, *Strategy and Compromise* (Atlantic/Little, Brown, 1958)

Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein, eds., *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War* (Cambridge University Press, 1994).

Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, *Command Decisions* (Harcourt, Brace, 1959).

Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Defense Policy Choices for the Bush Administration*, Second Edition (Brookings Institution Press, 2001).

Michael O'Hanlon, *Technological Change and the Future of Warfare* (Brookings Institution Press, 2000) (skepticism about the idea of an RMA, from a technocratic perspective).

Richard Overy, *The Air War, 1939-1945* (Stein and Day, 1980).

Richard Overy, *Why the Allies Won* (W.W. Norton, 1995).

Kenneth M. Pollack, *Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991* (University of Nebraska Press, 2002).

Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine* (Cornell University Press, 1984).

Barry R. Posen, *Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks* (Cornell University Press, 1991).

E.S. Quade and W.I. Boucher, eds., *Systems Analysis and Policy Planning Applications in Defense* (American Elsevier, 1968).

James G. Roche and Barry D. Watts, "Choosing Analytic Measures," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 14, no. 2 (June 1991).

Stephen Peter Rosen, *Winning the Next War* (Cornell University Press, 1991).

Stephen Peter Rosen, *Societies and Military Power* (Cornell University Press, 1996).

Scott D. Sagan, *The Limits of Safety* (Princeton University Press, 1993).

James Schlesinger, "Uses and Abuses of Analysis," in U.S. Senate Committee on Government Operations, *Planning Programming Budgeting* (Government Printing Office, 1970).

Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 12, no. 2 (Summer 1948) **and** Omer Bartov, *Hitler's Army* (Oxford University Press, 1991) (contrasting explanations of German combat motivation in World War II).

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Selected Movies About War Available During SWAMOS 04

This is not a systematic selection of classic movies about war, but they are films of which SWAMOS happens to have videotape or DVD copies. A few of the films listed below are superb. The others reflect common Hollywood vices but rise at least a bit above the norm of superficial action fantasies or chauvinistic (in the original sense of the term) propaganda tracts that characterize most war movies. Showings can be arranged if several participants wish to see any on evenings when events are not scheduled, or during the first weekend of the workshop. Films are listed in rough chronological order of the events they portray.

Breaker Morant. 1979. Directed by Bruce Beresford. Adapted from the play by Kenneth G. Ross. 1 hour, 47 minutes. An Australian atrocity and prosecution in the Boer War. Is murder in a combat environment murder? Is military justice justice?

All Quiet on the Western Front. 1930. Directed by Lewis Milestone. Adapted by Maxwell Anderson, Screenplay by George Abbott, from the novel by Erich Maria Remarque. 2 hours, 12 minutes (including restored footage). *The* classic interwar anti-war novel and film. (Star Lew Ayres became a conscientious objector in World War II.)

Grand Illusion. 1938. Directed by Jean Renoir. 1 hour, 15 minutes. Caste, class, identity, loyalty, and mass society -- the confrontation of nationalism and total war with transnational aristocratic sensibilities in a World War I prison camp. (Pay attention to the scene where Pierre Fresnay asks Erich von Stroheim, "How did we get to this?" and von Stroheim intones, "*C'est la revolution francaise.*")

Paths of Glory. 1959. Directed by Stanley Kubrick. Screenplay by Stanley Kubrick, Calder Willingham, and Jim Thompson, from the novel by Humphrey Cobb. 1 hour, 27 minutes. The vast distance between high command and battlefield.

Tora! Tora! Tora! 1970. Directed by Richard Fleischer. Screenplays by Larry Forrester (American sequence) and Hideo Oguni and Ryuzo Kikushima (Japanese sequence). 2 hours, 25 minutes. Docu-drama of planning and execution of the Pearl Harbor attack, and the failure of U.S. intelligence to detect and warn in time.

They Were Expendable. 1945. Directed by John Ford. Screenplay by Frank Wead, based on the book by William L. White (which was the true story of the experiences portrayed). 2 hours, 15 minutes. The story of the PT boats sacrificed in the doomed defense of the Philippines in 1941-42.

Destination Tokyo. 1944. Directed by Delmer Daves. Screenplay by Daves and Albert Maltz, from a story by Steve Fisher. 2 hours, 16 minutes. A U.S. submarine on a secret mission to the Japanese coast. (Incorporates a true story about an emergency appendectomy performed deep underwater by a pharmacist's mate.)

Thirty Seconds Over Tokyo. 1944. Directed by Mervyn LeRoy. Screenplay by Dalton Trumbo, from the memoir by Captain Ted Lawson. 2 hours, 19 minutes. True story of the 1942 Doolittle Raid, and one crew's escape through China.

Wing and a Prayer. 1944. Directed by Henry Hathaway. Screenplay by Jerome Cady. 1 hour, 38 minutes. An American aircraft carrier up to and during the Battle of Midway. Substantial actual combat footage included.

Guadalcanal Diary. 1943. Directed by Lewis Seiler. Screenplay by Lamar Trotti, adaptation by Jerry Cady, from the book by Richard Tregaskis. 1 hour, 33 minutes. Journalist's account of the U.S. Marines in the first battle of the island hopping campaign.

Das Boot [The Boat]. 1982. Written and directed by Wolfgang Petersen, from the novel by Lothar-Gunther Buchheim. 3 hours, 29 minutes ("the director's cut," with restored footage). Life and death aboard a German submarine in World War II.

Objective Burma. 1945. Directed by Raoul Walsh. Screenplay by Randal MacDougall and Lester Cole, from a story by Alvah Bessie. 2 hours, 22 minutes. A grim modern version of Xenophon's *Anabasis*, with a U.S. airborne special operation unit stranded behind Japanese lines.

A Walk in the Sun. 1946. Directed by Lewis Milestone. Screenplay by Robert Rossen, based on the novel by Harry Brown. 1 hour, 52 minutes. Infantrymen of a platoon cut off from the rest of their Company, their officer and senior NCO killed in the Salerno landing, adapt to friction and figure out how to execute their assigned mission under pressure of combat.

13 Rue Madeleine. 1947. Directed by Henry Hathaway. Screenplay by John Monks, Jr. and Sy Bartlett. 1 hour, 35 minutes. An OSS mission into occupied France

Saving Private Ryan. 1998. Directed by Steven Spielberg. Screenplay by Robert Rodat. 2 hours, 49 minutes. Moral dilemmas in deciding how to spend lives. The first 25 minutes covering the landing on Omaha Beach is the cinematic representation of combat that has probably been least criticized by combat veterans for lack of realism -- Paul Fussell of all people approved of it.

Battleground. 1949. Directed by William Wellman. Screenplay by Robert Pirosh. 1 hour, 58 minutes. The 101st Airborne in the Battle of Bastogne.

A Bridge Too Far. 1977. Directed by Richard Attenborough. Screenplay by William Goldman, from the book by Cornelius Ryan. 2 hours, 58 minutes. Operation MARKET GARDEN, the airborne assault on Arnhem designed to end the war in Europe by the end of 1944.

Attack. 1956. Directed by Robert Aldrich. Screenplay by James Poe from the play by Norman Brooks. 1 hour, 47 minutes. How National Guard politics, and cowardice and indecision, get men killed in the crossing of the Siegfried Line.

The Longest Day. 1964. Directed by Ken Annakin, Andrew Marton, and Bernhard Wicki (for British, American, and German scenes respectively). Screenplay by Cornelius Ryan, based on his book. 3 hours. The story of D-Day, from several perspectives.

Open City. 1945. Directed by Roberto Rossellini. Screenplay by Sergio Amidei, Federico Fellini, and Rossellini. Vignettes of the end of the war in Italy, focusing on trials of the civilian population. Filmed in Rome just after liberation, winner of the best picture award at Cannes in 1946.

Die Brücke [The Bridge]. 1954. Directed by Bernhard Wicki. Schoolboys conscripted into the *Volkesturm* to defend a bridge in the last hours of the war in Europe.

The Best Years of Our Lives. 1946. Directed by William Wyler. Screenplay by Robert E. Sherwood. 2 hours, 50 minutes. Academy Award winner, best picture, about trials of returning veterans.

Pork Chop Hill. 1959. Directed by Lewis Milestone. Screenplay by James R. Webb, from the book by S.L.A. Marshall. True story of near-hopeless U.S. infantry attack on a Chinese position, mandated by negotiating strategy at Panmunjon at the tail-end of the Korean War. The vast distance between strategy and tactics.

The Bridges at Toko-Ri. 1954. Directed by Mark Robson. Screenplay by Valentine Davis, from the novel by James A. Michener. How the burdens of war (the air war in Korea) are not fairly distributed among the population. Michener produced the novel after his non-fiction *Saturday Evening Post* story of his experience aboard a carrier, which was also turned into a true-story movie, *Men of the Fighting Lady*, around the same time as the fictionalized *Bridges at Toko-Ri*.

A Gathering of Eagles. 1963. Directed by Delbert Mann. Screenplay by Robert Pirosh. 1 hour, 56 minutes. Social and organizational issues in elite unit command, personnel management, and operational readiness, and an insight into the most important U.S. military organization of the Cold War -- SAC. (A Cold War echo of themes in *Twelve O'Clock High*.)

Dr. Strangelove, or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb. 1963. Directed by Stanley Kubrick. Screenplay by Stanley Kubrick, Peter George, and Terry Southern, based on the novel *Red Alert* by Peter George. 1 hour, 31 minutes. Black comedy of accidental apocalypse. Is Peter Sellers' Strangelove Kissinger or Kahn?

Fail Safe. 1964. Directed by Sidney Lumet. Screenplay by Walter Bernstein, based on the novel by Eugene Burdick and Harvey Wheeler. Non-comedy version of accidental nuclear war. Is the Walter Matthau character Kissinger, Kahn, Wohlstetter, or Schelling?

Crimson Tide. 1995. Directed by Tony Scott. Screenplay by Michael Schiffer. 1 hour, 56 minutes. A fictionalized presentation of dilemmas in nuclear strategy. Should a U.S. submarine commander follow orders to launch a nuclear attack on Russian missile silos when communications break down and it is impossible to know whether the order might have been revoked, but when failure to fire might allow the Russian missiles to be launched against the USA? Should the commander's subordinates mutiny if they believe he is about to start an avoidable nuclear war? (Watch for the scene early in the film when Denzel Washington paraphrases Clausewitz to cigar-chomping Gene Hackman: "The purpose of war is to serve policy, but the nature of war is to serve itself.")

Platoon. 1986. Written and directed by Oliver Stone. 1 hour, 59 minutes. Cinematic *Bildungsroman* of Vietnam combat, made before Stone went over the edge with his nutty *JFK*. The best line is the first-person narrator's voice-over at the beginning of the film: "I think I made a big mistake in coming here."

No Man's Land. 2002. Written and directed by Danis Tanovic. 1 hour, 37 minutes. Personal confrontation between Bosniac and Serb in a pocket of the battlefield, with allegory for Bosnia War -- and UN peacekeeping -- writ large.