

**Description:** This course examines international conflict and cooperation, and it is divided into two parts: forms of strategic interaction and causes of war. Because much of what is interesting in the study of international relations does not involve strategies of pure conflict (zero-sum games), the course begins with a focus on theories of interdependent decisionmaking (mixed-motive games), which model conflict as a bargaining situation. Various kinds of strategic interaction will be examined, including deterrence, compellence, appeasement, and engagement. The second half of the course investigates a wide range of theories on the causes of war and peace. Under this heading, we will explore hypotheses on alliance dynamics, domestic unrest, trade, power shifts, the offense-defense balance, and regime type as causes of war.

**Requirements:** Class participation and a 20 page critical analysis of the literature under one of the subheadings.

**Required Books:**

Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (Yale UP, 1967) paperback, \$19.00  
Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Harvard UP, 1960), \$18.50  
Sean Lynn-Jones, Michael Brown, and Steven Miller, eds, Debating the Democratic Peace (MIT Press, 1996), \$21.00  
Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (Free Press, 1973), \$14.95  
Kenneth Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton UP, 1986), \$15.60 Mohammed Reinner, 1995),  
Ayooob, The Third World Security Predicament (Boulder, CO: Lynne \$18.95

**Part I: Theories of Strategic Interaction**

**Game Theory: Conflict as a Bargaining Strategy (Topic One)**

Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, chaps. 1-4.

Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence, chaps. 1-3.

**Supplementary Readings:**

Stephen Maxwell, "Rationality in Deterrence," Adelphi Papers, No. 50. London: Institute of Strategic Studies, August 1968. (discussion of Schelling's "rationality of irrationality")

Robert Jervis, "Bargaining and Bargaining Tactics," in J. R. Pennock and John W. Chapman, Coercion (Chicago and New York: Aldine, 1972), pp. 272-288.

Andrew Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model," World Politics 49 (April 1997):371-400.

**Cooperation Theory (Topic Two)**

David Lake and Robert Powell, eds., Strategic Choice and International Relations, ch. 1.

Kenneth Oye, Cooperation Under Anarchy, chaps by Oye, Jervis, Axelrod and Keohane.

**Supplementary:** Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, chaps., 2, 7.

**Critiques of Game Theory/Cooperation Theory (Topic Three)**

Robert Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation," World Politics 40 (April 1988): 317-349.

Helen Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses," World Politics, Vol. 44, April 1992), pp. 466-496.

Joanne Gowa, "Anarchy, egoism, and third images: *The Evolution of Cooperation* in international relations," International Organization, 40, 1 (Winter 1986):167-186.

*Supplementary Reading:*

Donald Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory, chaps 1-3.

Alexander George, D. K. Hall, and W. E. Simon, Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), chaps. 1, 5.

Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International Organization 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 427-60.

**Deterrence (Topic Four)**

Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," World Politics, Vol. 31, No. 2 (January 1979), pp. 289-324.

Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, ch. 3, "Deterrence, the Spiral Model, and Perceptions of the Adversary."

Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970, pp. 5-33.

***The Deterrence Debate***

Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980," World Politics, Vol. 36, No. 4 (July 1984), pp. 496-526.

Christopher Achen and Duncan Snidal, "Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies," World Politics, Vol. 41, No. 2 (January 1989), pp. 143-169.

Alexander George and Richard Smoke, "Deterrence and Foreign Policy," World Politics, Vol. 41, No. 2 (January 1989), pp. 170-182.

Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter," World Politics, Vol. 41, No. 2 (January 1989), pp. 208-224.

*Supplementary Readings:*

Franklin B. Weinstein, "The Concept of Commitment in International Relations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 13, No. 1 (March 1969): 39-56.

Charles Glaser, "Why Do Strategists Disagree about the Requirements of Strategic Nuclear Deterrence," in Lynn Eden and Steven E. Miller, eds., Nuclear Arguments: Understanding the Strategic Nuclear Arms and Arms Control Debates (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989), ch. 2.

**Accommodation: Engagement and Appeasement (Topic Five)**

J. L. Richardson, "New Perspectives on Appeasement: Some Implications for International Relations Theory," World Politics 40 (April 1988):289-316.

David Baldwin, "The Power of Positive Sanctions," World Politics 24 (October 1971):19-38.

Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross, "Introduction," in Johnston and Ross, eds., Engaging China: Managing a Rising Power (Routledge, 1999), ch. 1

Robert Keohane, "Reciprocity in International Relations," International Organization 40 (1986):1-28.

*Supplementary Readings:*

Paul Kennedy, "The Tradition of Appeasement in British Foreign Policy, 1865-1939," in Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870-1945 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983).

John Herz, "The Relevancy and Irrelevancy of Appeasement," Social Research 31 (Autumn 1964):296-320.

Amitai Etzioni, "The Kennedy Experiment," Western Political Quarterly (June 1967).

**Part II: Causes of War and Peace**

**Origins of War: General Theories (Topic Six)**

Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (New York: Free Press, 1973).  
Stephen Van Evera, "Why Cooperation Failed in 1914," in Oye, Cooperation Under Anarchy.  
Richard K. Betts, "Must War Find a Way?: A Review Essay," International Security 24 (Fall 1999):166-98.

*Supplementary Readings:*

James Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization, Vol. 49, No.3 (Summer 1995), pp. 379-414.

Erik Gartzke, "War Is in the Error Term," International Organization, 53, No. 3 (Summer 1999):567-87.

**The Offense-Defense Balance and War (Topic Seven)**

Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30 (January 1978):317-349.

Charles Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," World Politics 50 (October 1997):171-201.

Stephen Biddle, "Rebuilding the Foundations of Offense-Defense Theory," The Journal of Politics 63 (August 2001):741-77.

*Supplementary Reading:*

Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "What is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?" International Security 22 (Spring 1998).

**Alliance Dynamics and War (Topic Eight)**

Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), chaps. 2, 6.

Steven R. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," World Politics 43, No. 2 (January 1991), pp. 233-56.

Dan Reiter, "Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past," World Politics 46, no. 4 (July 1994), 490-526.

Paul W. Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," in Klaus Knorr, ed., Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1976), pp. 227-262.

*Supplementary Readings:*

Robert Jervis, System Effects (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1997), chaps. 5 and 6.

G. Murphy, "On Satellitship," Journal of Economic History 21, No. 4 (Dec. 1961):641-51.

James D. Morrow, "Arms versus allies: trade-offs in the search for security," International Organization 47, no 2 (Spring 1993): 207-34.

Randall Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest (Columbia UP, 1998), chap. 3.

Mancur Olson, Jr. and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," in Francis A. Beer, ed., Alliances: Latent War Communities in the Contemporary World (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), pp. 121-140.

**Domestic Unrest and War (Topic Nine)**

Stephen Walt, "Revolution and War," World Politics 44, no. 3 (April 1992).

Jack A. Goldstone, Kurt Dassel, and Stephen Walt, "Forum on Revolution and War" in Security Studies 6, no. 2 (Winter 1996/97):127-196.

Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1991), chaps. 1, 2.

Jack Levy, "The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique," in Manus Midlarsky, ed., The Handbook of War Studies (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989).

**Power Shifts and War (Topic Ten)**

Jack Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War," World Politics 40 (October 1987):82-107.

Randall Schweller, "Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory," in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross, eds., Engaging China: Managing a Rising Power (Routledge, 1999), ch. 1.

Robert Powell, "Uncertainty, Shifting Power, and Appeasement," APSR 90(4) 1996:749-64.

James Morrow, "The Logic of Overtaking," in Jacek Kugler and D. Lemke, eds., Parity and War (University of Michigan Press, 1996).

*Supplementary Readings:*

Randall Schweller, "Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?" World Politics 44, no. 2 (January 1992): 235-69.

Dan Reiter, "Expoding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen," International Security 20, no. 2 (Fall 1995): 5-35.

### **Regime Type and War (Topic Eleven)**

Michael Brown, Sean Lynn-Jones, Steven Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace (MIT Press, 1996).

Andrew Kydd, "Sheep In Sheep's Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other," Security Studies 7, No. 1 (Autumn 1997):114-54

*Supplementary Readings:*

William R. Thompson, "Democracy and peace: putting the cart before the horse?" International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Winter 1996), pp. 141-174.

David L. Rousseau et al "Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace, 1918-88," APSR, Vol. 90, No. 3 (September 1996), pp. 512-533.

Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," Foreign Affairs 76, No. 6 (Nov/Dec 1997), pp. 22-44.

Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, "Democracy and commitment," International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Winter 1996), pp. 109-139.

### **Trade and War (Topic Twelve)**

John Conybeare, "Trade Wars: A Comparative Study of Anglo-Hanse, Franco-Italian, and Hawley-Smoot Conflicts," in Kenneth Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 147-172.

Dale Copeland, "Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 5-41.

Peter Liberman, "Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative Economic Gains," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Summer 1996), pp. 147-175.

### **Regional Conflicts and War (Topic Thirteen)**

David Lake, "Regional Security Complexes: A Systems Approach," in David Lake and Patrick Morgan, eds., Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World (University Park: Penn. State UP, 1997).

Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 1995).

Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 1991), ch. 5.

Benjamin Miller and Korina Kagan, "The Great Powers and Regional Conflicts: Eastern Europe and the Balkans from the Post-Napoleonic Era to the Post-Cold War Era," International Studies Quarterly 41, no.1 (March 1997):51-85.

