GOVERNMENT 2710, FIELD SEMINAR ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Professors Celeste A. Wallander (Coolidge Hall 212; 5-4007; office hours Tuesday 10-12; cwalland@fas.harvard.edu) and Lisa L. Martin (Coolidge Hall 416B; 5-1294; office hours Wednesday 11-1; lmartin@cfia.harvard.edu), Fall 1999.

This seminar will meet Tuesdays from 2 to 4 p.m. Discussion questions will be distributed a week before each session.

1. Each student must write six concise essays of no more than 750 words based on the weekly readings or some subset thereof. Two copies of this essay must be turned in by 5 pm Monday, one in Professor Wallander’s box and one in Professor Martin’s. Both boxes are on the 6th floor of the WCFIA. Alternatively, students can email their papers. All of the essays will be graded, and late papers will be marked down.

2. A longer paper, of up to 3000 words, will be due on November 30. This paper will ask you to consider the relationship between philosophical approaches to international politics and modern empirical work in international relations. We will provide more details on this paper as the due date approaches.

3. A research design paper, of up to 3000 words, will be due on January 7. (Completion of this assignment prior to the holidays is encouraged, although not required.) This paper must: (a) specify one or more testable hypotheses drawn from any of the theories represented on the syllabus; (b) specify the alternative or null hypothesis; (c) indicate what evidence could be gathered that would permit an investigator to make a judgment about the hypotheses’ validity.

Grading: Grades will be calculated using the following formula: 20% course participation; 30% weekly assignments; 25% for each longer paper.

Enrollment will be limited to 15, with preference given to Government Department graduate students. Books available at the Coop in sufficient quantity for all students are marked with an asterisk (*). Readings available via JSTOR are marked with two asterisks (**). To access these readings through Hollis plus, go to http://hplus.harvard.edu and find JSTOR under electronic journals. (Note: JSTOR works best with Netscape as your browser, rather than Internet Explorer.) Required articles and books are available on reserve in Littauer Library.

On the following reading list, some weeks include a set of background readings. These are required readings for preparation for the Government Department's general examinations. However, we do not intend to discuss the background readings in class, and will not assume that students have read these selections prior to class discussion.

*Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War (Modern Library College Edition), Book I 1-88; Book II 1-65; Book III 36-50; Book V 85-116; Book VI, 6-32.

Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace.

*Arnold Wolfers, "Statesmanship and Moral Choice," chapter 4 of Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration (1962).

*Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (Basic Books, 1977), chps. 4-6 (pp. 51-108).

Stanley Hoffmann, "Liberalism and International Affairs," in Hoffmann, Janus and Minerva (Westview Press, 1986), pp. 394-417.

*Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War (Columbia University Press, 1959), especially chs. 1, 6.

*Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and its Critics (Columbia University Press, 1986), chs. 1-8, 11, pp. 1-255; 322-346.

Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, chp. 8 (pp. 161-193).

Randall Schweller, "Neorealism's Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?," Security Studies 5, no. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 90-121.

Background readings: Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, ch. 1.

E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, chs. 3-5, 8 (pp. 22-87, 102-145).

Waltz, Man, the State and War, chps. 2 and 4.

Helen V. Milner, "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique," Review of International Studies 17, no. 1 (January 1991), pp. 67-86.

Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part I," Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 12, no. 3 (Summer, 1983), pp. 205-235.

**John Gerard Ruggie, "International regimes, transactions, and change: embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order," International Organization 36, no. 2 (Spring 1982), pp. 379-415.

Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe (Cornell University Press, 1998), chp. 2.

*Helen V. Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and Information (Princeton University Press, 1997), chps. 3 and 4.

Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998), chps. 1, 3.

J. Lawrence Broz, "The Domestic Politics of International Monetary Order: The Gold Standard," in Contested Social Orders and International Politics, David Skidmore, ed. (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1997).

Background readings: J. A. Hobson, "Imperialism: A Study," in Harrison M. Wright, The New Imperialism (C. C. Heath, 1976), pp. 5-43.

Joseph Schumpeter, "The Problem," and "Imperialism and Capitalism," in Imperialism and Social Classes (Meridian edition, pp. 3-7, 64-98).

V. I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, chps. 7-10 (International Publishers Edition, pp. 68-128).

**James Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," American Political Science Review 88, no. 3 (Sept. 1994), pp. 577-592.

Kenneth A. Schultz, "Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises," American Political Science Review 92, no. 4 (December 1998), pp. 829-44.

Kenneth A. Schultz, "Do Domestic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War," International Organization 52, no. 2 (Spring 1999), pp. 233-66.

**David Lake, "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," American Political Science Review 86, no. 1 (March 1992), pp. 24-37.

William Bernhard and David Leblang, "Democratic Institutions and Exchange-Rate Commitments," International Organization 53, no. 1 (Winter 1999), pp. 71-97.

*Beth A. Simmons, Who Adjusts? Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy during the Interwar Years (Princeton, 1994), chps. 1-3.

Background readings: Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire (Cornell, 1991), chapters 1, 2, 3, 8.

Graham Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," American Political Science Review 63 (September 1969), pp. 689-718.

George F. Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," in Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (Mentor Books, 1951), pp. 89-105; reprinted in Foreign Affairs, Spring 1987, pp. 852-68.

Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty (University of Wisconsin Press, 1978).

Stanley Hoffmann, "Domestic politics and interdependence," in Janus and Minerva, pp. 268-289.

**Peter Alexis Gourevitch, "The second image reversed," International Organization, vol. 32, no. 4, (Autumn, 1978), pp. 881-912.

Peter J. Katzenstein, "The small European states in the international economy," in John G. Ruggie (ed.), The Antinomies of Interdependence: National Welfare and the International Division of Labor (Columbia U. Press, 1983), ch. 2, pp. 91-130.

**Ronald Rogowski, "Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade," American Political Science Review 81, no. 4 (December 1987), pp. 1121-38.

*Robert O. Keohane and Helen V. Milner, eds., Internationalization and Domestic Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), chps. 1-3, 5, 7.

Lisa Martin, Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and International Cooperation (Princeton University Press, 2000), chps. 2 and 7.

Background readings: Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics," International Organization, vol. 42, no. 3 (Summer, 1988), pp. 427-461.

Jeffry A. Frieden, "Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance," International Organization vol. 45, no. 4 (Autumn 1991), pp. 425-51.

Peter A. Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times (Cornell University Press, 1986).

Peter J. Katzenstein, Small States in Global Market (Cornell University Press, 1985).

*Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry (Princeton University Press, 1994).

*James D. Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists (Princeton University Press, 1994), chps. 3-6, chp. 8 pp. 219-27, chp. 9 pp. 260-79.

Jeffry Frieden, "Actors and Preferences in International Relations," in Strategic Choice and International Relations, David A. Lake and Robert Powell, eds. (Princeton 1999), pp. 39-76.

**Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the security dilemma," World Politics, vol. 30, no. 2 (January, 1978), pp. 167-214.

**Lisa L. Martin, "Interests, Power, and Multilateralism," International Organization 46, no. 4 (Autumn 1992), pp. 765-92.

James Morrow, "Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation," International Organization 48, no. 3 (Summer 1994), pp. 387-423.

**Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidal, "Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies," World Politics, January 1989, pp. 143-169.

James D. Fearon, "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation," International Organization 52, no. 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 269-306.

Robert Powell, "Uncertainty, Shifting Power, and Appeasement," American Political Science Review 90, no. 4 (December 1996), pp. 749-64.

Background readings: Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Oxford 1960), chs. 2-5, pp. 21-117.

Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (Basic Books, 1984), chs. 1-4.

Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton University Press, 1986).

Robert O. Keohane, "Reciprocity in International Relations," International Organization 40, no. 1 (Winter 1986).

*Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, 1981), pp. 1-49; 156-244.

James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization 49, no. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 379-414.

**Paul K. Huth, "Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War," American Political Science Review, vol. 82, no. 2 (June, 1988), pp. 423-444.

*Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Cornell, 1996), chps. 1, 2, 4 (pp. 14-73, 110-153).

**Robert Powell, "Guns, Butter, and Anarchy," American Political Science Review 87, no. 1 (March 1993), pp. 115-32.

Paul K. Huth, Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), chps. 3 and 6.

Christopher Gelpi, "Crime and Punishment: The Role of Norms in Crisis Bargaining," American Political Science Review 91, no. 2 (June 1997), pp. 339-60.

Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Cornell, 1999), chp. 6.

Background readings: Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (Yale University Press, 1981), chps. 1-5.

Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," in Steven E. Miller, ed., Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War, Princeton University Press, 1984, pp. 58-107.

Marc Trachtenberg, "The Coming of the First World War: A Reassessment," International Security 15, no. 3 (Winter 1990-91).

*Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Second Edition, Little-Brown, 1989), chs. 1-3, 6 (pp. 3-60, 129-162).

*Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton University Press, 1984), chs. 1, 4-7, pp. 1-17, 49-132.

Robert O. Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches," International Studies Quarterly, vol. 32, no. 4 (December, 1988), 379-396.

*Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), chps. 1, 2, 4, 5.

*Celeste A. Wallander, Mortal Friends, Best Enemies (Cornell University Press, 1999), chps. 1, 2, and 5.

Background readings: Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Cornell University Press, 1983).

Stephen D. Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," World Politics.

Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (Columbia University Press, 1977) , chs. 1-3, pp. 3-76.

* First paper due *

*Peter Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); chapters 1 (Katzenstein), 2 (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein), 7 (Johnston), and 10 (Risse-Kappen).

Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework," in Goldstein and Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 3-30.

Matthew Evangelista, "The Paradox of State Strength: Transnational Relations, Domestic Structures, and Security Policy in Russia and the Soviet Union," International Organization 49, no. 1 (Winter 1995), pp. 1-38.

**Alex Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of State Politics," International Organization 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425.

Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," International Organization 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 887-917.

Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton 1995), chp. 2 (pp. 32-60).

Background readings: Peter M. Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," International Organization 46, no. 1 (Winter 1992), pp. 1-36.

Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Relations, Part I, pp. 3-113.

**Helen V. Milner, "Trading Places: Industries for Free Trade," World Politics, vol. 40, no. 3 (April, 1988), pp. 350-376.

**Stephen D. Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade," World Politics vol. 28, no. 3 (April 1976), pp. 317-347.

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn O'Halloran, "Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy: Theory and Evidence," International Organization 48, no. 4 (Autumn 1994), pp. 595-632.

Michael Bailey, Judith Goldstein, and Barry Weingast, "The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy," World Politics (1997), pp. 309-38.

**Joanne Gowa, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and Free Trade," American Political Science Review vol. 83, no. 4 (December 1989). pp. 1245-1256.

James Alt and Michael Gilligan, "The Political Economy of Trading States: Factor Specificity, Collective Action Problems and Domestic Political Institutions," Journal of Political Philosophy 2, no. 2 (1994).

Background reading: Judith Goldstein, "Ideas, Institutions, and American Trade Policy," International Organization vol. 42, no. 1 (Winter 1988), pp. 179-217.

Stephan Haggard, "The Institutional Foundations of Hegemony: Explaining the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934," International Organization vol. 42, no. 1 (Winter 1988), pp. 121-150.

Hans J. Morgenthau, "Alliances in Theory and Practice," in Arnold Wolfers, ed., Alliance Policy in the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1959), pp. 184-212.

Arnold Wolfers, "Collective Defense versus Collective Security," and "Stresses and Strains in Going it with Others," in Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Johns Hopkins, 1962), pp. 181-216.

**Glenn Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics 36, no. 4 (July 1984), pp. 461-95.

*Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Cornell University Press, 1987), chs. 1-2, 8 (pp. 1-49, 262-285).

**Dani Reiter, "Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past," World Politics 46, no. 4 (1994), pp. 490-526.

Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste A. Wallander, eds., Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), chapter by Gelpi.

Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), chps. 2 and 4.

WEEK 13 ( December 21). Optional review meeting, discussion of final papers.