WAR, PEACE, AND STRATEGY

Class: Mondays and Wednesdays 11:00-12:15
Betts Office Hours: Wednesdays 2:30-5:00, or by appointment
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Questions animating this course include: Why is force used in international politics? What causes peace? How do wars, or competitions shaped by the possibility of war, affect international relations and national societies? How can governments best prepare to prevent wars or to win them if they occur? By what standards should resort to force, or strategic and tactical choices in combat, be judged legitimate or immoral? How are the prevention, outbreaks, processes, and outcomes of mass violence (or crises resolved short of combat) determined by politics, ideology, diplomacy, technology, economics, geography, military plans and tactics, intelligence, or arms control? What are similarities and differences among conflicts between states, within states, and between states and transnational groups (such as terrorists)? How important is terrorism? How do weapons of mass destruction coerce or deter? Is the world safer or more dangerous after the Cold War? Can war be made obsolete? The course emphasizes problems in the relation between political ends and military means. Students must grapple with the terms of reference in both dimensions. The course is organized thematically, not by cases, but illustrative examples are drawn from conflicts in Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. The course emphasizes issues in the 20th Century, and in U.S. national security policy.

Requirements: This is a graduate course open to advanced undergraduates. *Read the alert on p. 14.* Any who do not wish to read and ponder a heavy load of material, or to accept the following rules, should not take the course. Students must (1) complete assigned readings (pp. 3-14 below); (2) attend all lectures, seated on time (NLT 11:00); (3) view two films; (4) take the final examination on the scheduled date (*make-up exams will **not** be allowed except for **documented** medical excuse or family emergency);* (5) give full attention to lectures and discussions. Undergraduates must also (6) take the mid-term examination (optional for graduate students) and (7) attend discussion sections (optional but recommended for graduate students). *NB*: **Multi-tasking is not allowed** in class (see p. 15). **Laptops may be used *only* for taking notes. Use of Blackberries, iPhones, other electronic devices, or any connection to the Internet during class is prohibited.** Students found checking e-mail, surfing the Internet, text-messaging, or otherwise violating the prohibition will leave the class. At examinations, students must leave all electronic devices except battery-powered watches outside the examination room.

To allow maximum time for reading no paper is assigned. Required reading averages **210 pages per week**, but is concentrated disproportionately in sections 4 and 6-8   To help you plan reading time, and which books you want to buy, the number of pages in each item and for each section of the syllabus, are noted in brackets. The **required reading totals 2,935 pages**. Books ordered in the College Bookstore should be purchased so that you can mark them up. Most but not all of the other assigned readings are available in a coursepack. Students may choose instead to do all the reading in the library or on a computer screen, but will then have a harder time taking proper notes. Students who do the reading without marking or taking notes are fools, unless they have photographic memories and superhuman capabilities for mentally retaining a complex array of concepts, arguments, and historical examples.

Columbia graduate students come from a wide variety of countries and educational systems.   Whatever your background, understand that the purpose of this course is education (teaching you *how to think*), not training (teaching *what to do*). The aim is not to indoctrinate you with what the instructor believes to be the right answers, but to highlight important questions and ideas and expose you to the main currents of debate about them. Performance on examinations is judged by how well you understand concepts, issues, and debates, and how thoroughly you exploit relevant readings and lectures in constructing answers.

1. *Introduction: Nature and Functions of War* [123 pages total]

Three Visions of Conflict: Does War Have a Future?
Concepts of National Security and Philosophy of War
Political Ends and Military Means: Rationality
War is Hell: Insanity and Obscenity
The Perspective Between Pacifism and Militarism

Richard K. Betts, ed., *Conflict After the Cold War*, 3d Edition (Pearson-Longman, 2008): [44]
Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History"
John J. Mearsheimer, "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War"
Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?"

- What are the essential differences in these three visions?
- What are their assumptions about causes and effects in international politics?
- Should we draw lessons from the past to predict the future? If so, which competing lessons are the best? If not, on what basis can we forecast?
- What developments would validate or discredit any of these theories or their implicit predictions?
- Which of them is most and least convincing? Why (that is, for what reasons *other than* whether the argument appeals to you or disgusts you instinctively)?

Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans. (Princeton University Press, 1976): Book I, chaps. 1, 2 [24]
 (*NB:* Only an unabridged German language edition is an acceptable alternative to this translation. Do not read a different translation. *Especially do not read the widely available Penguin edition of the Graham translation abridged by Anatol Rapoport.*)

Consider the following questions rationally and empirically, apart from the more important question of whether and why war is ever morally justified:

- What is the nature of war?
- What is the purpose of war?
- What is the relationship between the ends and means of war?
- What does Clausewitz mean when he says that "Combat is the only effective force in war"?
- When does he believe that "the object must be renounced and peace must follow"? How often do statesmen actually heed this advice?

Sun-Tzu, *The Art of Warfare*, Roger Ames, trans. (Ballantine, 1993), chaps. 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 11 [25]
(The Sawyer, Griffith, Mair, or Huang translations are also acceptable.)

- What are the main apparent differences between Sun Tzu (Sun Zi) and Clausewitz?
- Which of these two basic approaches to the functions of war makes more sense?
- What differences in their situations and concerns when they wrote might explain the differences in their arguments?
- Can the apparent differences between the two be reconciled?

Paul Fussell, *Wartime* (Oxford University Press, 1989), chap. 18 [30]

- How does Fussell refute the view of war as a rational enterprise?
- Is he convincing? If not, what argument does he have for why you cannot know what you are talking about?
- Is Fussell a pacifist?

2.   *Causes of War and Peace[1]*   [290 total]

Psychology and Anthropology: Instinct, Ritual, or Continuation of Sport by Other Means
Religion: Fighting for God
Main Paradigms: Realism and Liberalism
Autarky or Interdependence
Ideology and Fraternity
Feudalism, Capitalism, Marxism, Militarism

Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (Columbia University Press, 1959), chaps. 2-4, 6-8   [184]

- What are the strengths and weaknesses of each of the three images that Waltz presents?
- What are the real-world consequences --- probabilities of success or failure in different policy choices --- of diagnosing the problem of war in terms of each of the respective images?
- Why does Waltz favor the Third Image?
- Although he privileges the Third Image, what does he see as the valid or useful elements of the other two images?

Betts, ed., *Conflict After the Cold War*:   [106]
Thucydides, "The Melian Dialogue"
E. H. Carr, "Realism and Idealism"
Geoffrey Blainey, "Power, Culprits, and Arms"
Margaret Mead, "War is Only an Invention -- Not a Biological Necessity"
Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace"
John Mueller, "The Obsolescence of Major War"
Norman Angell, "The Great Illusion"
Geoffrey Blainey, "Paradise is a Bazaar"
V. I. Lenin, "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism"
Joseph Schumpeter, "Imperialism and Capitalism"
Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Causes and Economic Effects"
Richard Rosecrance, "Trade and Power"
Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics."

- Which of these authors are arguing with each other?
- Which arguments are more convincing?
- What conscious or unconscious assumptions about what causes war or peace do each of these selections reflect?
- What evidence, if any, do they offer as proofs of their arguments? Do they offer answers to criticisms of their arguments by other theorists?
- How do we know whether any of them are right or wrong? What evidence would validate or discredit any of these assumptions, arguments, or theories?
- What are the benefits, costs, or risks of taking any of these arguments as guides for policymakers in the real world?
- Is international politics derivative of economics, psychology, anthropology, sociology, religious faith, or political ideology, or does international politics have a life and logic of its own?

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[1] All Ph.D. students, and any others interested in international relations theory, should read the survey of literature in Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, *Causes of War* (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010).

3. *Securing Peace: Balance of Power and Institutions* [138 total]

What is Stability? Equilibrium or Peace
Meanings of Balance of Power
Effects of Unipolarity, Bipolarity, Multipolarity
International Organization, "Regimes," and Collective Security

Inis L. Claude, *Power and International Relations* (Random House, 1962), chaps. 2-3 [82]

- What are the various meanings of "balance of power"?
- Of what use is the concept of balance of power? What are the practical consequences of the different conceptions?

G. F. Hudson, "Collective Security and Military Alliances," in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, eds., *Diplomatic Investigations* (Harvard University Press, 1968) [5]

- What is the difference between collective security and balance of power?
- What is the difference between collective security and an alliance?
- Is collective security in the proper sense of the term feasible? Under what conditions, if any?

Betts, ed., *Conflict After the Cold War* [19]
  Robert Gilpin, "Hegemonic War and International Change"
  Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, "Power and Interdependence"

- In what ways does or does not the sweeping historical pattern that Gilpin discerns provide lessons for the 21st century?
- Why do Keohane and Nye point to a conclusion different from Gilpin's?
- Keohane and Nye originally wrote over thirty years ago. Has the perspective they presented been borne out?

Richard K. Betts, "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention" (Revised Version), in Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds., *Turbulent Peace* (U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2001) [10]

- Can "peacekeeping" or "peace enforcement" missions ever cause harm?
- Would cases other than the ones mentioned in this essay (which is not a systematic study) lead to different conclusions?
- If the argument in this article is convincing, should the "international community" intervene less in civil conflicts? or intervene frequently but take sides, rather than try to be impartial? or be impartial and bear much higher costs to impose a settlement on the locals? If your answer is the last of these, where should the necessary extra blood and treasure come from?

Virginia Page Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work?* (Princeton University Press, 2008), chap. 5 [22]

- Do the data in this chapter refute the arguments in "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention"? What is the difference in the focus of the two?
- Which specific cases among the ones considered are most relevant for judging peace operations?
- Are any cases not listed relevant?
- Are implications for policy on mounting peacekeeping missions consistent with implications for peace*making* or peace enforcement missions?

4. *Choosing War or Peace: Conquest, Coercion, Crisis Management* [410 total]

The Spectrum of Choice: Concession, Compromise, Combat
Setting the Price of Peace: Political Stakes vs. Military Costs
Setting the Price of War: Blood, Treasure, and Risk
Deterrence, Reassurance, Crisis Management, and "Accidental" War
Cases: 1914, 1938, 1962, 1967
Theory and Practice of Coercive Force: Bombing and "Compellence"

Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (Yale University Press, 1966), chaps. 2-4 [154]
- What are Schelling's assumptions about what will motivate statesmen to concede to coercion? (He is an economist. Would a psychologist, anthropologist, or historian offer any different assumptions?)
- How does Schelling implicitly agree and disagree with Clausewitz about the nature and purpose of war? Reconsider this question when you come to section 6 in a couple weeks.

Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win* (Cornell University Press, 1996),[2] chaps. 2, 3, 6, 9 [128]
- Why is the question Pape addresses especially important?
- How does Pape's analysis reflect on Schelling?

Gen. Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War* (PublicAffairs, 2001), chaps. 8-12 [128]
- How do the internal politics and decision processes of countries or alliances affect the applicability of strategic logic such as Schelling's?
- Was the military campaign against Serbia strategically sensible? With benefit of hindsight what, if anything, should have been done differently? According to what criteria? If any of the NATO actions implemented were bad ideas, or desirable actions were not implemented, who or what was to blame for the mistakes?
- Was the war over Kosovo, which occurred after *Bombing to Win* was published, inconsistent with Pape's argument?

5. *Modern War: Constraints, Conditions, Conduct* [176 total]

Geography: Natural Security and Vulnerability
Economy: Resources, Power, and Strategy
Combined Arms: Armies, Navies, Air Forces
Campaigns and Logistics

Robert D. Kaplan, "The Revenge of Geography," *Foreign Policy* No. 172 (May/June 2009) [9]
- How does Kaplan believe geography will determine political conflict in the 21st century?
- Do the patterns he discerns override other causes of conflict or cooperation (economic, ideological, social, and so on)?

Betts, ed., *Conflict After the Cold War*: [14]
Niccolò Machiavelli, "Money is Not the Sinews of War, Although It Is Generally So Considered"
Alan S. Milward, "War as Policy."

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[2] Ph. D. students: For criticism see Barry D. Watts, "Ignoring Reality," and Pape's rebuttal, "The Air Force Strikes Back: A Reply to Barry Watts and John Warden," in *Security Studies* 7, no. 2 (Winter 1997/98).

- Is the aim of profit a motive for war or a constraint against it?
- How do Machiavelii's theory and the historical experience described by Milward relate to the theories about economics and war in Section 2 of the syllabus?
- Is Machiavelli logically wrong?
- Are the rationales for war described by Milward forever outmoded?

Michael Howard, *War in European History* **(Oxford University Press, 1974),** chaps. 4-6 [62]

- What are the main trends in the evolution of warfare described by Howard?
- Which developments have enduring implications?
- How has the rough balance of advantage between attack and defense evolved over the centuries covered by Howard?

John Keegan, *The Face of Battle* **(Viking, 1976),** chap. 4, pp. 210-237 (pp. 213-240 in Penguin paperback edition) and 242-279 (246-284 in Penguin) [64]

- The Battle of the Somme was a disaster. Were the British planners of the operation stupid?
- How did technology affect the planning?
- How did sociology and organization affect the planning?
- What made the outcome confound the plans?

Michael E. O'Hanlon, *The Science of War* **(Princeton University Press, 2009**), chap. 3 [27]

- Why is logistics at least as important as strategy and tactics?
- How do geography, technology, economics, and politics affect logistics?
- Why is logistics a higher priority for a global or maritime power than for a regional or continental power?

6. *Policy, Strategy, and Operations: Integrating Political Ends and Military Means* [425 total]

Three Levels of Analysis
Technology: Innovations and Interactions
Plans: Organization, Doctrine, Tactics, Obstacles
Military Effectiveness: What Produces Success in Combat?
Attack and Defense: Aggressive, Preventive, Preemptive, and Defensive War
How Ends Determine Means, How Means Determine Ends

Clausewitz, *On War*, Book I, chap. 7; Book II, chap. 3; Book III, chap. 1; Book VI, chaps. 1, 3, 5 [26]

- How should the concept of "friction" affect strategic planning and decisions for war?
- How does the concept of friction affect academic strategic theories such as Schelling's, or nuclear strategists considered in section 11 below?
- Reconsider what Clausewitz means when he says that all strategic success is at base tactical success, and that combat is the only effective force in war.
- How do Clausewitz's arguments about attack and defense at tactical and strategic levels of analysis relate to each other?

Stephen Biddle, *Military Power* (Princeton University Press, 2004),[3] chaps. 2, 3 [37]

- Why does Biddle believe that judgments about a nation's power are likely to be wrong if they are derived from economic data about resources without an understanding of the nation's military operational practices?
- Why haven't all countries adopted the "modern system" of force employment?

Betts, ed., *Conflict After the Cold War*: [25]
     Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma"
     Jack S. Levy, "The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology."

- What are the advantages of offense-defense theory?
- Are the advantages greater for understanding nuclear strategy and deterrence than for understanding other strategic competitions (see section 11 below)?
- Does Levy effectively discredit offense-defense theory?

Michael Shaara, *The Killer Angels* (Modern Library, 2002) [337]

- How does this docu-novel illustrate issues and theoretical concepts considered elsewhere in the course, for example the relative advantages of attack and defense, the political effects of specific military engagements, and so on?
- The Armies: Shaara presents a contrast between the two armies' sociology, culture, and ideology. Did these differences affect combat, and thereby, political results of the war?
- The Men: What effect did "the Cause" have on leadership in the two armies? What effect did personality have on command decisions?
- The Decisions: Who was right about strategy: Lee or Longstreet? What is the best case for the opposite answer? What was Buford's dilemma? What could have justified him in making a different decision? What was Chamberlain's most important decision?
- The Battle: Was Gettysburg a "decisive battle"? What is the best case for the opposite answer? What counterfactual history must be assumed for either argument?

7. *Ends and Means in Total War and Limited War* [362 total]

Estimating Costs, Benefits, and Feasibility
Estimating the Culminating Point of Victory
Total War: World Wars I and II
Limited War: Korea and Kuwait
Total or Limited? Iraq II

Clausewitz, *On War*, Book VII, chap. 22; Book VIII, chaps. 1-3, 6 [32]
- What are the risks in overshooting or undershooting the "culminating point of victory"?
- If "absolute" war is not "real" war, what is the point of understanding the concept of absolute war?
- Why does Clausewitz hammer so hard and in such detail on the principle that war must serve policy? How does the concept of absolute war relate to this question?

Michael Geyer, "German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare, 1914-1945," in Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy* (Princeton University Press, 1986) [70]
- Why and how does the proper relation between policy objectives, strategy, and military operations become compromised or even reversed?
- What would Clausewitz have thought of the strategic performance of his country in the century after his death?

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[3] Ph. D. Students: See criticisms by five scholars and Biddle's response in "*Military Power*: A Roundtable Review," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 28, no. 3 (June 2005).

Samuel Eliot Morison, *Strategy and Compromise* (Atlantic/Little, Brown, 1958), Pt. I,chaps.1-4,6-7 [44]
- Were the allies' World War II strategic decisions rational? If so, why did American military leaders oppose some of them? If not, why did political leaders make such decisions?

Michael Gordon and Gen. Bernard Trainor, *The Generals' War* (Little, Brown, 1995), chaps. 18-20 [86]
- How does the ending of the 1991 war illustrate important political effects of friction in military operations?
- Did that war end satisfactorily? By what criteria?

Michael Gordon and Gen. Bernard Trainor, *Cobra II* (Pantheon, 2006), Epilogue [11]
- How does the initial phase of the second war against Iraq compare with the preceding war?
- What factors in leadership, planning, political judgment, or military capability best account for the differences?
- Does the unanticipated advent of prolonged insurgent resistance discredit the U.S. decision to start this war?

Bob Woodward, *Obama's Wars* (Simon & Schuster, 2010), chaps. 18-19, 21-28, 30 [119]
- How do domestic and bureaucratic politics affect decisions on strategy?
- When responsible officials disagree about what strategy makes sense, is compromise the right solution?
- Did Obama make the right decisions in 2009?

Wednesday, October 26: Mid-Term Examination
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8. *Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare* [380 total]

People's War, Counterinsurgency, and Incentives for "Asymmetric" Strategies
Linkages Between Conventional and Unconventional War
Stealth, Strength, and Advantages of Attack Over Defense
Motives for Resort to Terror Tactics
Secular and Sacred Motivations

Betts, ed., *Conflict After the Cold War*: [92]
   T. E. Lawrence, "Science of Guerrilla Warfare"
   Mao Tse-tung, "On Guerrilla Warfare"
   Samuel P. Huntington, "Patterns of Violence in World Politics"
   Martha Crenshaw, "The Strategic Logic of Terrorism"
   Mark Juergensmeyer, "Religious Radicalism and Political Violence."
   Marc Sageman, "Jihadi Networks of Terror"
   Osama bin Ladin, "Speech to the American People."

- What are the differences between "conventional" warfare and unconventional/guerrilla/insurgent/irregular/asymmetric warfare?
- Is guerrilla warfare a substitute for conventional military operations?
- How does terrorism relate to guerrilla/insurgent warfare?
- By what criteria can terrorism be judged strategically rational?
- Are there effective strategic alternatives to terrorism? to guerrilla war?

Jerrold M. Post, "Terrorist Psycho-Logic," in Walter Reich, ed., *Origins of Terrorism* (Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998) [15]

- How does Post's diagnosis compare with Crenshaw's or Sageman's?
- Are the differences fundamental disagreements, or related to the different times and groups on which the three authors focus?

Clausewitz, *On War*, Book VI, chap. 26 [5]

- What differences does Clausewitz see between "the people in arms" and the other forms of warfare that he discusses?

Harry G. Summers, *On Strategy* **(Presidio Press, 1982),** chaps. 1, 7-11, 15 [93]

- Summers frames the Vietnam War in terms of Clausewitz. Is any other interpretation of Clausewitz relevant, and might it lead to a different conclusion?
- What does Summers believe the center of gravity was for each side?
- What is Summers' strongest argument?
- What is his weakest argument?

Andrew F. Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam* **(Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986),** chaps. 1, 6-8, 10 [109]

- What does Krepinevich believe the center of gravity was?
- Who is more convincing: Summers or Krepinevich?
- What is the main difference in their descriptions of U.S. strategy in Vietnam?
- Can the two interpretations be reconciled?
- Could the Vietnam War have been won by the USA and Saigon government if either Summers's or Krepinevich's preferred strategies had been fully adopted?

Eliot Cohen, Conrad Crane, Jan Horvath, and John Nagl, "Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency," *Military Review* **(March-April 2006)** [5]

- This article summarizes many of the points in the U.S. Army and Marine Corps' new field manual of counterinsurgency warfare.
- What assumptions about politics, both in societies experiencing rebellions and outside countries intervening in them, make the strategy and tactics recommended practical, and what assumptions would invalidate them?

Gian P. Gentile, "A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the Army," *Parameters: Journal of the Army War College* **(Autumn 2009)** [13]

- Is Gentile's critique of the U.S. Army's new focus on counterinsurgency persuasive, or an example of the dysfunctional attitude criticized by Krepinevich?

David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla* **(Oxford University Press, 2009),** chap. 1 [38]

- How is Kilcullen's idea of guerrilla war different from those of previous authors?
- What mistakes does he believe the USA has made in its approach to counterinsurgency?

Seth G. Jones, *In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan* **(Norton, 2009),** pp. 315-325 [10]

- How do any of the insights from other readings in this section help to analyze issues in Afghanistan?
- Was the Taliban prisoner who said "You have the watches but we have the time" right or wrong?

Required Film: See before the end of section 8: *The Battle of Algiers* (1967), directed by Gilo Pontecorvo, screenplay by Franco Solinas. Remember that the French did not consider Algeria a colony, but part of metropolitan France (it had about a million European settlers). Although fiction, several characters are composites of real figures (one of the FLN leaders plays himself in the movie). The realism of this film is demonstrated by the fact that after early showings the producers had to insert a notice at the beginning that it was not a documentary. While obviously pro-FLN, the film is also unusual in the extent to which it does not demonize the French, but empathizes with them.

- Were the tactics used on either or both sides illegitimate? Does the legitimacy or illegitimacy of terror or torture depend on the nature of the tactics or the justice of the cause they serve?
- By what criteria were tactics employed effective or counterproductive?
- Could either side have won without using those tactics? How are the issues of legitimacy and efficacy related?
- How are terrorism and guerrilla warfare related?
- How are the issues posed by Al Qaeda or the Taliban today similar and different from those in this case?
- Is Colonel Mathieu's character evil, admirable, tragic, or something else?
- How do the French and FLN strategies reflect Huntington's points about the "tripartite" nature of revolutionary war or Mao's points about guerrillas and population being "fish" and "sea"?
- Did the Bush II administration learn the wrong lessons from this film?

9. *Society, Polity, Culture, and Capability* [223 total]

Nationalism, State Expansion, and Social Mobilization
Civil-Military Relations
Recruitment, Conscription, Organization
Culture and Combat Effectiveness
Combat Motivation: When Fighting Can Get One Killed, What Makes One Fight?

Betts, ed., *Conflict After the Cold War*: [38]
Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and War"
Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars"
Radha Kumar, "The Troubled History of Partition."

- Do Mansfield and Snyder discredit "democratic peace" theory?
- Who is more convincing – Kaufmann or Kumar? What counterfactual histories do you assume in making your judgment?

Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II,"
***Public Opinion Quarterly* 12, no. 2 (Summer 1948)** [35]

- Why did the *Wehrmacht* hold together and continue fighting like wild dogs even after defeat was practically certain?

Omer Bartov, *Hitler's Army* (Oxford University Press, 1991), chaps. 3-4 [119]

- Why does Bartov disagree with Shils and Janowitz?
- Can the two interpretations be reconciled?

Kenneth M. Pollack, *Arabs at War* (University of Nebraska Press, 2002),[4] "Conclusions and Lessons" [31]

- If Arab military personnel fight so bravely, why does Pollack believe that Arab military organizations are ineffective in combat?
- What explanations other than cultural ones might there be?

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[4] Ph.D. students: See Risa A. Brooks, "Making Military Might: Why Do States Fail and Succeed?" *International Security* 28, no. 2 (Fall 2003), for a critique of Pollack.

Required Film: See before lectures for section 10: *Saving Private Ryan* (1998), directed by Stephen Spielberg, screenplay by Robert Rodat. Look at the first 25-minutes (the assault on Omaha Beach) as one of the least unrealistic of Hollywood portrayals of combat. (Paul Fussell approved heartily of this sequence.) Look at the rest of the film as an evocation of dilemmas about risking, deliberately expending, or wrongfully taking lives in wartime.

- How should decisions to expend lives be made? By what criteria?
- Whose decisions to spend lives in this venture were right or wrong?
- Did the Americans who shot surrendering Germans while overrunning the bunkers on Omaha Beach commit a war crime for which they should have been prosecuted?
- Was Upham right or wrong about whether to kill the prisoner the first time the question arose? The second time?

10. *When Is War Murder? The Moral Calculus of Killing*   [118 total]

> *Absolute vs. Utilitarian Criteria*
> *Atrocities: Cold Blood and Passion*
> *Are Some Lives Worth More Than Others?*
> *Is Terrorism Ever Legitimate?*

Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, 4th Edition (Basic Books, 2000),pp. 58-63 & chaps. 5,9,16,19   [77]

- In what respects does Walzer deny that utilitarian or consequentialist criteria should govern standards for legitimate killing?
- In what respects does he accept such criteria?
- When does he believe that killing civilians is legitimate?
- Are his arguments consistent?

Benjamin A. Valentino, *Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century* (Cornell University Press, 2004), "Conclusion"   [19]

- What are the motives for mass killing of civilians?
- Are the conditions promoting strategies of mass killing rare or common?
- What are the best ways to prevent or stop mass killing?

Paul Fussell, "Thank God for the Atom Bomb," in Fussell, *Thank God for the Atom Bomb and Other Essays* (Summit Books, 1988)   [22]

- Who is more convincing – Walzer or Fussell?

11.   *The Nuclear Revolution: Theory and Practice*   [117 total]

> *Nuclear Weapon Effects*
> *Deterrence and Compellence*
> *Rationality, Uncertainty, and Credibility*
> *Limited War and Escalation*
> *Nuclear War Plans and Operational Doctrine*
> *Cold War Crises*

Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, 3d Edition (Palgrave, 2003), chaps. 6-9, 12, 14-16   [117]

- What are the basic concepts of deterrence theory?
- What were the main changes in ideas and policies about nuclear strategy in the second half of the 20th century?
- What are the arguments for and against counterforce targeting, and for and against resting nuclear strategy on capability for "assured destruction"?
- How did NATO strategy for the defense of Western Europe affect the development of nuclear strategy?
- How much did actual practice in nuclear strategy reflect the dominant concepts of theorists?
- Can nuclear strategy be rational? What would Clausewitz think about nuclear weapons?
- Which aspects of Cold War deterrence theory and nuclear strategy are transferable to the 21st century and which are not? What does your answer assume about future developments in international politics and military technology?

12.   *Threat Assessment and Strategic Planning*   [92 total]

Aggression or Security Dilemma?
Intentions and Capabilities
Deterrence and Provocation
Intelligence and Uncertainty
Strategic Assumptions and U.S. Force Planning

Eyre Crowe, "Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany," January 1, 1907, and Thomas Sanderson, "Observations on Printed Memorandum on Relations with France and Germany, January 1907," in G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds., *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914,* **vol. III:** *The Testing of the Entente, 1904-6* **(London: HMSO, 1928)** (*NB:* Read pp. 399-405, 414-419; skim the rest.)   [11]

- How do the respective rationales of Crowe, Sanderson, and Henderson in the Munich crisis documents below, reflect the dilemmas of deterrence and crisis management?
- Is there a strategic concept for resolving such dilemmas?
- If British, French, and Russian statesmen had acted more in line with Sanderson's and Henderson's thinking, might World War I have been avoided?

Documents 551, 553, and 650 on the Munich crisis in E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, eds., assisted by Margaret Lambert, *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939,* **3d Series, vol. II:** *1938* **(London: HMSO, 1949)**   [7]

- Is it a good idea to empathize with an adversary? Is it easy to have empathy without sympathy?
- When a threat is uncertain, which emphasis in policy – deterrence or reassurance -- is least risky?
- If British, French, and Soviet statesmen in 1938 had acted more in line with Crowe's logic, might they have resisted Hitler earlier?

G. John Ikenberry, "The Rise of China and the Future of the West," *Foreign Affairs* **87, no. 1 (January/ February 2008)**   [14]

- Where does Ikenberry's argument fit among the theories surveyed in sections 2 and 3?
- What is the most important word that does not appear anywhere in this article?

Betts, ed., *Conflict After the Cold War***:**   [12]
   Richard K. Betts and Thomas J. Christensen, "China: Can the Next Superpower Rise Without War?"

- Is the possibility of deliberate aggression by China what the West should worry about most?
- What historical analogies are least misleading in estimating the odds of conflict between China and the West?

Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," *International Security* **21, no. 3 (Winter 1996/97)**   [48]

- How do the strategic alternatives discussed relate to theories surveyed in sections 2 and 3?
- Which of the four general strategies outlined make the most and least sense?
- Where do the strategies of the Bush II and Obama administrations fit in the Posen-Ross framework?
- Is there a fifth model truly different from the four outlined that should be added to the list?

13.   *Arms Control and Disarmament*   [21 total]

Political, Economic, and Military Rationales for Arms Regulation
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): Cold War Negotiations
Conventional Forces: "Defense Dominance"?
Costs and Benefits of Regulation
Regional Conflicts and Incentives for Proliferation
WMD After the Cold War: Biological, Chemical, Nuclear

Betts, ed., *Conflict After the Cold War:*   [21]
Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr. and Abram N. Shulsky, "Arms Control: The Historical Experience"
Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better."[5]

- What are the best, most successful examples of arms control?
- How can arms control have perverse effects?
- What prospective arms control projects would avoid unanticipated consequences and be a good idea?
- What are the best counterarguments to Waltz's benign view of nuclear proliferation?

14.   *Conclusion: Evolving Bases of Conflict and Cooperation*   [60 total]

Power Without Force?
Information Warfare
Non-Lethal Weaponry
Theories, Experience, and Prediction
A "Revolution in Military Affairs"?
Environmental Sources of Conflict
Religion, Culture, and Conflict

Eliot A. Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare," *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 2 (March/April 1996)   [17]
- Why did the concept of the RMA have such appeal?
- How does the RMA and its alleged promise relate to unconventional warfare?

Biddle, *Military Power*, chap. 10   [18]
- How does Biddle challenge the idea of the RMA?
- Who is more convincing – Cohen or Biddle?

Betts, ed., *Conflict After the Cold War*:   [25]
Thomas Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict"[6]
Samuel P. Huntington, "Peace Among Civilizations?"
- What should standards be for categorizing environmental dangers or resource competition as security threats?
- Are attempts to spread western values good or bad for peace?

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[5] For elaboration and rebuttal see Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed* (W.W. Norton, 2003).
[6] If you find Homer-Dixon's article compelling and are interested in the problem, be sure to read Indra de Soysa, "Ecoviolence: Shrinking Pie, or Honey Pot?" *Global Environmental* Politics 2, no. 4 (November 2002), which presents a different argument.

Are You Sure You Want to Take This Course ?

I'm delighted to have you take this course as long as you want the kind of experience it will be. Consider this in advance because evaluations at the end of the course in the past have sometimes been mixed. Most rate it positively; several times an evaluation has said that it is the best course the student ever took. But a fair number complain about some aspect. Some say the class should be different in ways x, y, or z. Maybe so, but the course is what it is for a number of reasons that make sense to me, so know what you're getting into and be sure that you want to accept the conditions.

First, this is a lecture class. Size shakes down after the first two weeks, but always stays at over 100. There will be interaction, and discussion now and then, but obviously it can be nothing like a seminar. For some graduate students, especially those who went to small colleges, this can be new and disappointing. If you do not want to listen and take notes most of the time, this class is not for you. There are opportunities for extended discussion---especially of the readings---in the weekly sections with the TAs; you should take full advantage of these.

Second, I read substantial portions of my lectures. Some students don't like this, preferring more informal lecture styles. I do this because I am not talented enough to memorize everything I should say, and using only rough notes takes more time, reducing the amount communicated. I apologize in advance, but if you do not like listening to formal lectures, the course is not for you. Also, I confess to being a man of the 20th century, not the 21st; I do not use hi-tech or even medium-tech instructional aids such as Power Point. Schematics or illustrative material I consider important will be given to you in paper copies to keep, or written on the blackboard for you to jot down. You will have to ponder a couple of movies too. Otherwise, you really just need to listen, read, and take notes.

Third, some think the course should focus more on subjects other than those emphasized on the syllabus, although there is never agreement on what the differences should be. Some want a current events course and less historical orientation, or a course that reflects American perspectives less (or more) than this one does, or one that is less theoretical (or more), and so on. So be sure you have considered the syllabus and want to spend your time learning about what it covers.

Fourth, many consider the reading load unreasonable. I am a throwback whose standards of literacy predate the Internet age, and on education I am an elitist. You are all here because you are smarter and more motivated than average university students. This is not Morningside Heights Community College. It's Columbia University, the big leagues. I intend for my course to provide as much as the best students, working to maximum capacity, can absorb. And the best students at Columbia *do* manage to do all the assigned reading, ponder it, and integrate it thematically with the lectures in their minds. They are the ones who get straight A's---usually 10-15 percent of the class. Others who do not quite get everything, but come close, get A Minuses. More get A Minuses than straight A's, and since this is a graduate class a third or more of all grades are in the A range. The median grade has been B Plus, which conforms to the SIPA guideline. Students who cut many corners, or are not intellectually prepared for a graduate social science course, get lower grades.

Assigned reading totals about one regular academic book or five to ten articles per week. This was standard in Ivy League social science courses not long ago. Despite the profusion of electronic distractions and Internet blather in recent times I am confident that the current generation is as smart as earlier ones and fully capable of working to such a standard if the right priorities are accepted. You cannot do all the work if you do not spend at least 20 percent of your time on this course (the commitment implied if you are a full-time student), but you can if you do. Many graduate students come from places where they could be in the top tier with less effort than necessary to be in the top tier at Columbia. Some may need to adjust priorities if they want to excel in the course rather than just perform satisfactorily.

My simple goal is for you to feel by the end of the course that you have run a marathon, to feel exhausted but intellectually invigorated, and to feel that you have learned as much as possible in the time available. If you like that idea, welcome aboard.

If You Want to Have Responsibly Informed Opinions: Any who care enough about international affairs to take a course like this, or who believe anyone else should take their views on foreign policy seriously, should have a high level of knowledge about current events. That cannot be maintained with less than careful daily reading of the "A" section of *The New York Times* or *Washington Post,* or at the very least, *The Wall Street Journal* or *International Tribune* news sections. *The Economist* or *Time* once a week are not enough, though less thoroughly irresponsible for an aspiring professional in the national security business than anything less, such as reliance on television news.

A Note on One Rule

Some students ask why I insist on disconnecting from the Internet while in class – what I realize is an utterly Unnatural Act for the current generation. One reason is the conceit that I deserve your full attention; if not, you are being cheated of your tuition. At any moment you are looking something up on the Internet, you cannot be absorbing what I am saying. There is scientific evidence that discredits the practices of juggling intellectual engagement with related activities or attempting to perform two intellectual functions at once; studies have discovered measurable degradation of perception and performance when multitasking. See:

- Eyal Ophir, Clifford Nass, and Anthony D. Wagner, "Cognitive Control in Multitaskers," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,* vol. 106, no. 3 (April 1, 2009).

- Ruth Pennebaker, "The Mediocre Multitasker," *New York Times Week in Review*, August 30, 2009 (a journalist's more readable and humorous summary of the above academic study).

- Joshua S. Rubinstein, David E. Meyer, and Jeffrey Evans, "Executive Control of Cognitive Processes in Task Switching," *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance*, vol. 27, no. 4 (2001).

- Christine Rosen, "The Myth of Multitasking," *The New Atlantis* (Spring 2008).

The information technology revolution is wonderful; properly exploited, it helps us learn more than was possible in earlier times, and studies indicate that use of the Internet can improve cognitive performance in some ways. But overall the advance is a matter of two steps forward, one step back. Consider the downside of contemporary learning practices that have become second nature for many in the current generation, found in research studies reported in Nicholas Carr, *The Shallows: What the Internet Is Doing to Our Brains* (W.W. Norton, 2010): "When we go online, we enter an environment that promotes cursory reading, hurried and distracted thinking, and superficial learning." Or as John Horgan puts it ("So Many Links, So Little Time," *Wall Street Journal*, June 4, 2010):

> We skim web pages and skip quickly from one to another. We read in what is called an "F" pattern: After taking in the first two lines of a text, we zip right down the rest of the page. We lose the ability to transfer knowledge from short-term "working" memory to long-term memory…. **Students who net-surf during class, even if their searches are related to the professor's lecture, remember less than unconnected students…. Verbal SAT scores – which measure reading and writing aptitude – have dropped over the past decade as Internet usage has skyrocketed**. What we gain from the Internet in breadth of knowledge – or rather, access to knowledge – we lose in depth.

All that is the dark side of progress. In a course for which you (or your parents or scholarship donors) pay thousands of dollars I see no reason to waste time with readings that provoke so little thought that they can be sufficiently appreciated by skimming, or lectures that you can fully grasp while scanning something else. To ingest and assimilate the material in this course sufficiently you must concentrate, and concentrate on one thing at a time.