

POLSCI 106D
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
Department of Political Science
Duke University

Spring 2009
Time: Tu/Th, 11.55AM-12.45PM
Room: Social Sciences 139
Office Hours: Wed., 3.30-5.00PM, or by appt.

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COURSE DESCRIPTION

This course serves as an introduction to enduring and contemporary questions in international security, a field that is fundamentally about the threat and use of force by states and non-state actors to achieve their political and military objectives. We will seek answers to questions such as: What are the causes of war and conditions of peace? Are the constraints imposed by the structure of the international system the most important factors influencing state behavior, or are variables at the unit level—such as regime type or the characteristics of individual leaders—more important? Does the spread of nuclear weapons to more states make the world a safer or more dangerous place than a world in which only a handful of countries possess them? Would the acquisition of nuclear weapons by “rogue” states threaten the security of the United States, and can this be prevented? Why are some states better at fighting wars than other states? How do states and non-state actors (such as terrorists) use force to persuade their enemies to take—or refrain from taking—a particular action? Is this kind of violent persuasion—known as coercion or deterrence—effective? Finally, what are the dynamics of asymmetric conflict such as the United States faces today in Iraq and Afghanistan?

In pursuing answers to these questions, we will attempt to integrate theory and history: we will sample from the existing theoretical literature on a particular topic and then examine historical cases in order to observe these theories in action and compare their relative explanatory power. We will also experience first-hand the difficulties and complexities of international politics through a simulated Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference (see below).

PREREQUISITES

There is no formal prerequisite for the course. POLSCI 106D is designed both as a follow-up to POLSCI 93D and a gateway to more advanced courses on security in the Political Science department. Students who have taken POLSCI 93D and/or possess a rudimentary knowledge of IR theory (realism, liberalism, etc.) will have a slight advantage, mainly in the first section of the course. Students unfamiliar with these theories should consult the articles by Snyder and Walt listed under Lecture #2 (which also contain suggestions for further reading). I assume some familiarity with 19th and 20th century European history, as well as World Wars I and II. Suggested historical readings may be found at the end of the syllabus for those needing additional background.

COURSE REQUIREMENTS

The course is organized into two 50-minute lectures per week, plus one 50-minute discussion section led by a Teaching Assistant. The readings and lectures are not substitutes: they are designed to complement each other. To do well in the class, you will need to do the reading assigned for each session, attend the lectures, and be able to discuss both in section. You should also stay abreast of current events that pertain to the subject matter of the course, such as the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the status of Iran’s nuclear program, by reading a major newspaper like the *New York Times* or the *Washington Post*, both of which are available for free online.

The centerpiece of the class is a simulation developed by Professor Scott Sagan of Stanford University. This event (Feb. 19-21) is designed to emulate a review conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), held every five years to assess the treaty’s effectiveness and discuss ways to improve it. Students will be formed into fifteen or sixteen country delegations. Each student will be assigned a role on one of these delegations: head of the delegation, or representative of a government ministry or office, such as the Foreign, Defense, or Energy ministries, or the armed forces or intelligence service. Each delegation will formulate an initial negotiating position and present it to

the opening plenary session of the conference. Delegates will then attempt to resolve differences in their various positions, draft a resolution, and vote on it. Delegations will have formal meetings with their respective Heads of State on Thursday, February 19, to present their proposed negotiating position and receive instructions. The NPT simulation officially begins at 9.00AM on Friday, February 20, and will continue until approximately 5.00PM Saturday, February 21. All students are expected to participate; I will provide letters of excuse for those of you with classes on Fridays. If you have an unavoidable conflict, you will be given another assignment (albeit a less exciting one!) to complete. If you have to miss an hour or two or part of a day, you can still participate. You must notify your TA of all conflicts by February 1.

Course grades will be based on the following criteria:

- Mid-Term Take-Home Examination I (20%), due February 10: essay question based on the first part of the course on IR theory and the causes of war, handed out in class on February 3. A HARD COPY must be turned in at the start of lecture on February 10 AND a digital copy submitted via Blackboard's Digital Drop-Box function by that time. E-mailed papers will not be accepted without instructor's permission.
- Mid-Term Take-Home Examination II (25%), due March 17: essay question analyzing some aspect of the NPT simulation, distributed in class on February 24. The same rules apply as above for turning in the paper. If you are unable to participate in the simulation, you will be required to write a 5-7 page review of a journal article, and complete a take-home exam on a different question.
- Final Examination (35%): Wednesday, April 29, 2009, 2-5PM. Cumulative, but with an emphasis on Parts III, IV, and V of the course. The date and time of the final exam is fixed by the university; students need written permission from their academic Dean to be excused or to take the exam at another time.
- Participation (20%): participation consists of attendance at lecture, as well as attendance and participation in section and the NPT simulation. Participation means you contribute to discussion regularly and intelligently. We will circulate questions before each week's sections that will serve as a basis for discussion, and may ask you to write brief (one or two paragraphs) reaction papers to facilitate discussion. If for some reason you have to miss your regular section, you should attend a section at different time (a list of section times/locations is on Blackboard). Notify your TA and the TA whose section you will attend instead by e-mail.

POLICY ON LATE PAPERS

Papers turned in after the due date and time without prior authorization will have one letter grade deducted per 24 hour period. Papers over 72 hours late will not be accepted.

ACADEMIC INTEGRITY

Students are expected to comply with the Duke Community Standard in their work for this course (see http://judicial.studentaffairs.duke.edu/resources/community_standard/cs_more.html). All work you submit for this course must be your own. Do not collaborate with other students on the take-home exams. You may, however, form study groups to prepare for the final exam. Cheating, plagiarism, or any other form of academic dishonesty will not be tolerated. Suspected cases will be referred to the Office of Judicial Affairs. If you have questions about what constitutes proper use of published or unpublished sources, please consult the Duke Library's "Plagiarism: Its Nature and Consequences" (<http://www.library.duke.edu/research/citing/plagiarism.html>), or ask the instructor or the TAs.

TEACHING ASSISTANTS

- Amber Diaz (amber.diaz@duke.edu)
- Anoop Sadanandan (anoop.sadanandan@duke.edu)
- Eugene Walton (eugene.walton@duke.edu)

READINGS

The following books (in paperback) are available for purchase at the Duke Textbook Store.

Stephen Biddle, *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).

Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed*, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 2003).

Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, *Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats*, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005).

Many of the readings for the course are articles or book chapters. Most of these are available online via databases accessible through the Duke University Library. These are indicated by the word “online” in parentheses after the citations below. To retrieve these articles, go to the Duke Library’s web site, select “E-journals,” search on the journal name, and follow a link (sometimes there are several) that includes the date of the article you want. Many other selections, however, are on E-Reserve, indicated by the term “e-res” after the citation. These texts are easily obtained through the Blackboard site that has been established for the class. Click on “Blackboard” from the library’s main page, log in, go to the page for this class, and click on “E-Reserves” on the left side of the screen. Articles and chapters are posted by the author’s last name and the first few words of the title. You may also search Course Reserves on the library’s web site to retrieve E-Reserve material. Finally, a few readings will be posted on Blackboard on the Course Documents page in a folder entitled “Course Readings.”

COURSE OUTLINE

I. IR Theory and the Causes of War

1. Course Introduction January 8
 - No readings
2. IR Theory: An Overview (27 pages) January 13
 - Jack Snyder, “One World, Rival Theories,” *Foreign Policy*, no. 145 (November/December 2004): 52-62 (online).
 - Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” *Foreign Policy*, no. 110 (Spring 1998): 29-46 (online).
3. The International System: Anarchy, Polarity, and War (90 pages) January 15
 - Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18, no. 4 (Spring 1988): 615-628 (online).
 - John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2001), 29-54 (e-res).
 - Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, “Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability,” *World Politics* 16, no. 3 (April 1964): 390-406 (online).
 - William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” *International Security* 24, no. 1 (Summer 1999): 5-41 (online).

4. The International System: Moving Parts (97) January 20
- Jack S. Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War," *World Politics* 40, no. 1 (October 1987): 82-107 (online).
 - John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2001), 334-359 (e-res).
 - Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30, no. 2 (January 1978): 167-214 (online; [skim](#) 167-187, [read](#) 187-214 carefully).
5. The State (97) January 22
- Bruce Russett, "The Fact of Democratic Peace" and "Why Democratic Peace?" in *Debating the Democratic Peace*, ed. Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 58-105 (e-res).
 - Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and War," *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 3 (May/June 1995): 79-97 (online).
 - Amy Oakes, "Diversionary War and Argentina's Invasion of the Falkland Islands," *Security Studies* 15, no. 3 (July 2006): 431-463 (online).
6. The Individual (100) January 27
- Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, "Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In," *International Security* 25, no. 4 (Spring 2001): 107-146 (online).
 - Jack S. Levy, "Loss Aversion, Framing Effects, and International Conflict: Perspectives from Prospect Theory," in *Handbook of War Studies II*, ed. Manus I. Midlarsky (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 193-221 (e-res).
 - Dominic D. P. Johnson, *Overconfidence and War: The Havoc and Glory of Positive Illusions* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 1-34 (e-res).
7. Causes of World War I (114) January 29
- Jack Snyder, "Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984," *International Security* 9, no. 1 (Summer 1984): 108-146 (online).
 - Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," *International Security* 9, no. 1 (Summer 1984): 58-107 (online).
 - Scott D. Sagan, "1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability," *International Security* 11, no. 2 (Fall 1986): 151-175 (online).
8. Causes of the Iraq War (111) February 3
Take-home midterm question handed out in class
- Kenneth M. Pollack, *The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq* (New York: Random House, 2002), 243-280 (e-res).
 - Chaim Kaufmann, "Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq War," *International Security* 29, no. 1 (Summer 2004): 5-48 (online).
 - John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "An Unnecessary War," *Foreign Policy*, no. 134 (January/February 2003): 50-59 (online).
 - James Fallows, "Blind into Baghdad," *The Atlantic Monthly* (January/February 2004): 52-74 (online).

II. Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Proliferation

9. Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Deterrence (58) February 5
- Cirincione, Wolfsthal, and Rajkumar, *Deadly Arsenals*, 45-55.
 - Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 1-34 (e-res).
 - Kenneth N. Waltz, "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities," *American Political Science Review* 84, no. 3 (September 1990): 731-745 (online).
10. Nuclear Proliferation: Causes (58) February 10
Take-home midterm due at start of lecture
- Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb," *International Security* 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996/97): 54-86 (online).
 - Sonali Singh and Christopher R. Way, "The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Test," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48, no. 6 (December 2004): 859-885 (online).
11. Nuclear Proliferation: For Better or For Worse? (100+) February 12
- Sagan and Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons*, pp. 3-87.
 - Matthew Kroenig, "Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Distributional Effects of Nuclear Proliferation," unpublished paper, Georgetown University (Blackboard).
12. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (75) February 17
- Cirincione, Wolfsthal, and Rajkumar, *Deadly Arsenals*, 3-43 (skim pages on chemical and biological weapons), 421-426 (Non-Proliferation Treaty).
 - John Simpson and Jenny Nielsen, "The 2005 NPT Review Conference: Mission Impossible?" *Nonproliferation Review* 12, no. 2 (July 2005): 271-301 (online).
13. Dealing with a Nuclear Iran (90) February 19
- Cirincione, Wolfsthal, and Rajkumar, *Deadly Arsenals*, 294-313.
 - David Albright and Jacqueline Shire, "A Witches' Brew? Evaluating Iran's Uranium-Enrichment Progress," *Arms Control Today* 37, no. 9 (November 2007): 6-14 (online).
 - Scott D. Sagan, "How to Keep the Bomb from Iran," *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 5 (September/October 2006): 45-59 (online).
 - Barry R. Posen, "A Nuclear-Armed Iran: A Difficult but not Impossible Policy Problem," A Century Foundation Report (Blackboard).
 - Whitney Raas and Austin Long, "Osirak Redux? Assessing Israeli Capabilities to Destroy Iranian Nuclear Facilities," *International Security* 31, no. 4 (Spring 2007): 7-33 (online).
- NPT Simulation February 19-21
- 2/19, Times TBA: Meet with Head of State
 - 2/20, 9AM-5PM: Plenary Sessions, resolution drafting sessions, and ongoing negotiations
 - 2/21, 9AM-5PM: Plenary and drafting sessions, negotiations, ending with vote on resolution
 - *Take-home midterm question distributed by email*

14. Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia (123) February 24

- Cirincione, Wolfsthal, and Rajkumar, *Deadly Arsenals*, 220-258.
- Sagan and Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons*, 88-124.
- Sumit Ganguly, "Nuclear Stability in South Asia," *International Security* 33, no. 2 (Fall 2008): 45-70 (online).
- S. Paul Kapur, "Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia," *International Security* 33, no. 2 (Fall 2008): 71-94 (online).

15. Nuclear Terrorism (51) February 26

- Jasen J. Castillo, "Nuclear Terrorism: Why Deterrence Still Matters," *Current History* (December 2003): 426-431 (online).
- Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, "Terrorist Nuclear Weapon Construction: How Difficult?" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, no. 607 (September 2006): 133-149 (online).
- Charles D. Ferguson, *Preventing Catastrophic Nuclear Terrorism*, Council on Foreign Relations, CSR no. 11 (March 2006), <http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/NucTerrCSR.pdf>.

III. Military Effectiveness16. Military Effectiveness: Causes of Victory and Defeat (97) March 3

- Biddle, *Military Power*, 1-51.
- Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, *Democracies at War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 10-57 (e-res; [read](#) 10-38, [skim](#) 38-57).

17. Operation Michael, March 1918 (63) March 5

- Jonathan M. House, *Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001), 31-64 (e-res).
- Biddle, *Military Power*, 78-107.

*** MARCH 10 & MARCH 12 = SPRING BREAK ***

18. The Battle of France, May 1940 (88) March 17
Take-home midterm due at start of lecture

- John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 99-133 (e-res).
- Jasen J. Castillo, "The Will to Fight: National Cohesion and Military Staying Power," unpublished paper, Bush School, Texas A&M University (Blackboard).

19. The Persian Gulf War (77) March 19

- Biddle, *Military Power*, 132-149.
- Daryl G. Press, "The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare," *International Security* 26, no. 2 (Fall 2001): 5-44 (online).

IV. Coercion20. Military Coercion (86) March 24

- Pape, *Bombing to Win*, 1-86.

21. Coercion in Practice: World War II (108) March 26
- Pape, *Bombing to Win*, 87-136, 254-313.
22. Coercion in Practice: Recent Conflicts (89) March 31
- Pape, *Bombing to Win*, 211-253.
 - Andrew L. Stigler, "A Clear Victory for Air Power: NATO's Empty Threat to Invade Kosovo," *International Security* 27, no. 3 (Winter 2002/03): 124-157 (online).
 - Robert A. Pape, "The True Worth of Air Power," *Foreign Affairs* 83, no. 2 (March/April 2004): 116-130 (online).
23. Coercion: Other Tools (77) April 2
- Robert J. Art, "Coercive Diplomacy: What Do We Know?" in *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*, ed. Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin (USIP, 2003), 359-420 (e-res; 2 parts).
 - Daniel W. Drezner, "The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion," *International Organization* 57, no. 3 (Summer 2003): 643-659 (online).

V. Contemporary Conflict: Insurgency and Terrorism

24. Asymmetric Conflict (87) April 7
- John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 15-33 (e-res).
 - Andrew J. R. Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," *World Politics* 27, no. 2 (January 1975): 175-200 (online).
 - Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson, III, "Rage against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars," *International Organization* (forthcoming; Blackboard).
25. Terrorism (76) April 9
- Robert A. Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 3 (August 2003): 343-361 (online).
 - Max Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," *International Security* 31, no. 2 (Fall 2006): 42-78 (online).
 - Assaf Moghadam, "Suicide Terrorism, Occupation, and the Globalization of Martyrdom: A Critique of Dying to Win," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29, no. 8 (December 2006): 707-729 (online).
26. Iraq (95) April 14
- David Edelstein, "Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail," *International Security* 29, no. 1 (Summer 2004): 49-91 (online).
 - Larry Diamond, "What Went Wrong in Iraq," *Foreign Affairs* 83, no. 5 (September/October 2004): 34-56 (online).
 - Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., "How to Win in Iraq," *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 5 (September/October 2005): 87-104 (online).
 - Peter D. Feaver, "Anatomy of the Surge," *Commentary* (April 2008): 24-28 (online).
 - Steven Simon, "The Price of the Surge: How U.S. Strategy is Hastening Iraq's Demise," *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 3 (May/June 2008): 57-76.

27. Afghanistan/Pakistan (70)

April 16

- Seth G. Jones, "The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad," *International Security* 32, no. 4 (Spring 2008): 7-40 (online).
- Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, "No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier," *International Security* 32, no. 4 (Spring 2008): 41-77 (online).

28. U.S. Grand Strategy after Iraq and Soft Balancing (74)

April 21

- Robert A. Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," *International Security* 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 7-45 (online).
- Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing," *International Security* 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 72-108 (online).

29. Final Examination

April 29, 2-5PM

SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS FOR HISTORICAL BACKGROUNDEuropean HistoryMichael Howard, *War in European History* (Oxford UP, 1976).Michael S. Neiberg, *Warfare and Society in Europe, 1898 to the Present* (Routledge, 2004).Bernadotte E. Schmitt, *Triple Alliance and Triple Entente* (Henry Holt, 1934/1962).Paul W. Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848* (Clarendon, 1994).Hew Strachan, *European Armies and the Conduct of War* (Routledge, 1983).A. J. P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918* (Oxford UP, 1954).Geoffrey Wawro, *Warfare and Society in Europe 1792-1914* (Routledge, 2000).World War IMartin Gilbert, *The First World War: A Complete History* (Henry Holt, 1994).James Joll, *The Origins of the First World War*, 3rd ed. (Longman, 2007).Steven E. Miller, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Stephen Van Evera, eds., *Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War* (Princeton, 1991).David G. Herrmann, *The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War* (Princeton, 1996).L.C.F. Turner, *Origins of the First World War* (Norton, 1970).World War IIP. M. H. Bell, *The Origins of the Second World War in Europe*, 3rd ed. (Longman, 2007).David M. Glantz and Jonathan House, *When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler* (Kansas UP, 1995).Akira Iriye, *The Origins of the Second World War in Asia* (Longman, 1987).Richard Overy, *Why the Allies Won* (Norton, 1995).Gerhard L. Weinberg, *A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II* (Cambridge, 1994).The Cold WarJohn Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*, rev. and expanded ed. (Oxford, 2005).Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Brookings, 1994).Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, 1992).Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963* (Princeton, 1999).