

Political Science / IAS 475

Topics in International Politics: Bargaining, Diplomacy, and International Conflict

Spring 2007

Meeting Time: TTh 1600–1730, Eliot 300

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Course Description: This topics course in international politics focuses on recent contributions to the scientific study of interstate conflict. Crossing history, economics, political science, and international relations, we will pay particular attention to two major contemporary themes in the study of conflict among nations: (1) bargaining and (2) diplomacy. Primarily focused on two recent developments – war as a bargaining problem and the role of diplomacy – this course provides an integration of theoretical approaches grounded in positive political theory and their application to prominent historical controversies. The course focuses on three questions: (1) Why do nations go to war? (2) How do wars end and how is this related to initial decision to go to war? (3) What, if any, is the role of communication and diplomacy in the origins and resolution of international disputes?

The course will interchange theory and history in our examination of conflicts through the last two centuries. One of the books is primarily theoretical: Nobel laureate Thomas C. Schelling's *Arms and Influence*.¹ Two books intertwine theoretical argumentation and historical evidence: Sartori's *Deterrence by Diplomacy* and Schultz's *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy*. At times, we will focus almost exclusively on archival and historical information to understand particularly important periods in primarily Western history. Trachtenberg's *A Constructed Peace* contains an almost exclusive focus on the origins of the Cold War. Beyond these significant issues, we will pay close attention to the origins of the Second World War, the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, and the Korean War.

The course will rely on the following books:

Anne Sartori. *Deterrence by Diplomacy*. ISBN: 0691116997

Kenneth Schultz. *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy*. ISBN: 0521796695

Thomas C. Schelling. *Arms and Influence*. ISBN: 0300002211

Marc Trachtenberg. *A Constructed Peace*. ISBN: 0691002738

¹We will also read chapters from Schelling (1960).

Grade Determination: Final course grades will be determined on the basis of a midterm examination (25%), reading quizzes (10%), a final examination (25%) and a research project (40%).

- **Examinations:** TBA. Take home examinations to be distributed in the first half of March and prior to pre-arranged final examination times.
- **Research Project:** You have two alternatives.
 1. An application of course concepts in a research review on some historical conflict to be mutually agreed. Sources for international conflicts include Singer and Small (1994), *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels*, Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997), and others. In addition to the written text, students will summarize the relevant details in a presentation to the seminar. Arrangements and scheduling of presentations must be confirmed with the instructor no later than 15 February 07.²
 2. Write a conventional research paper on a topic agreed with the instructor no later than 22 March 07. The research paper should provide a definitive answer to a well defined research question with appropriate length determined by the significance of the question. Details can be arranged but failure to schedule a presentation and arrive at an appropriate project under (1) by 15 February 2007 equates to electing this option.
- **Reading Quizzes:** Unannounced quizzes to verify that the assigned readings have been completed. Though they only account 10% of the course grade, they should not be ignored.

Reminders:

1. I expect that everyone will maintain a classroom conducive to learning. Thus, everyone is expected to behave with basic politeness, civility, and respect for others. This includes respecting the beginning and ending times for the course.³
2. My goal is to take you through a complete logically structured course that combines the key issues into a cohesive and self-contained whole. This plan is a bit ambitious and I reserve the right to alter the course readings beyond the midterm if it becomes infeasible.
3. I promise not to accept late assignments. This is my solemn vow.
4. Washington University has a clear Student Academic Integrity policy that I will enforce to the fullest.⁴

²A few select opportunities may exist to coordinate with a colleague to present two competing books that manifest as explanations of some significant historical conflict. If this option is of interest to you, act upon this interest quickly. Candidates include the First and Second World Wars, the Crimean War, and the Cuban Missile Crisis are particularly interesting here. Coordinated spacing facilitates thinking about diplomacy as a dynamic role.

³While probably unnecessary, but as an honest expression of an infuriating feature of modern life, I demand that cellular phones be set to silent (if not turned off) during my class.

⁴The following statement is provided as a general Undergraduate Student Academic Integrity Policy by the University. Effective learning, teaching and research all depend upon the ability of members of the academic community to trust one another and to trust the integrity of work that is submitted in classes for academic credit or conducted in

Suggestions: Suggestions for improvement are welcome at any time. Any concern about the course or your performance in this course should be brought to my attention.

The calendar below gives a rough schedule for the course. These dates are tentative; I reserve the right to alter than calendar as necessary.

Date	Lecture Title
COURSE OVERVIEW:	
01.16.07	Syllabus, Structure, and Review Materials
RE/OVERVIEW	
01.18.07	Schelling (1960, ch. 1) – “The Retarded Science of International Strategy”
01.23.07	Rationalist Explanations for War – Fearon (1995)
Bargaining	
Suggested: Schelling (1960), Powell (2002), and Wagner (2000).	
01.25.07	Bargaining (“An Essay on Bargaining” and “Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War”)
01.30.07	Arms and Influence, Part I
02.01.07	Arms and Influence, Part II
02.06.07	Arms and Influence, Part III
02.08.07	UCSD – Classes cancelled.
02.13.07	Reiter (2003)
02.15.07	The Concert of Europe: Slantchev (2005).
Diplomacy	
02.20.07	Cheap Talk and Bargaining: Farrell and Rabin (1996)
02.22.07	SPPC – Classes cancelled.
02.27.07	Sartori (2005, TBA) and Smith and Guisinger (2002)
03.01.07	Sartori (2005, TBA) and Smith and Guisinger (2002)
03.06.07	Sartori (2005) and “Anonymous” on The Korean War...
03.08.07	On the Empirical Study of Diplomacy: Revealed Preference? Crawford (2003)
Spring Break	
03.20.07	Schultz (2001)
03.22.07	Schultz (2001)
03.27.07	Schultz (2001) and Ramsay (2004)
03.29.07	Trachtenberg (1999)
04.03.07	Trachtenberg (1999)
04.05.07	Trachtenberg (1999)
04.10.07	Trachtenberg (1999)
04.12.07	MPSA – Classes cancelled.
04.17.07	TBA
04.19.07	TBA
04.24.07	TBA
04.26.07	TBA

the wider arena of scholarly research. When such an atmosphere of mutual trust exists, the free exchange of ideas is fostered, and all members of the community are able to work to achieve their highest potential. In all academic work, it is important that the ideas and contributions of others be appropriately acknowledged, and that work that is presented as original is in fact original. Ensuring the honesty and fairness of the intellectual environment at Washington University is a responsibility that is shared by faculty, students, and administrative staff.

We may conclude the course with two of my favorite academic articles: Frey and Buhofer (1988) and Conybeare and Sandler (1993).

References

- Brecher, M. and J. Wilkenfeld. 1997. *A Study of Crisis*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Conybeare, J. A. C. and T. Sandler. 1993. "State-sponsored violence as a tragedy of the commons. England privateering wars with France and Spain, 1625-1630." *Public Choice* 77:879-97.
- Crawford, Vincent P. 2003. "Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions." *American Economic Review* 93:133-49.
- Farrell, J. and M. Rabin. 1996. "Cheap Talk." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 10(3):103-18.
- Fearon, James D. 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War." *International Organization* 49:379-414.
- Frey, Bruno S. and Heinz Buhofer. 1988. "Prisoners and Property Rights." *Journal of Law and Economics* 31(1):19-46.
- Powell, Robert. 2002. "Bargaining Theory and International Conflict." *Annual Reviews of Political Science* 5:1-30.
- Ramsay, Kristopher W. 2004. "Politics at the Water's Edge: Crisis Bargaining and Electoral Competition." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48(4):459-86.
- Reiter, Dan. 2003. "Exploring the Bargaining Model of War." *Perspectives on Politics* 1(1):27-43.
- Sartori, Anne E. 2005. *Deterrence by Diplomacy*. Princeton University Press.
- Schelling, Thomas C. 1960. *The Strategy of Conflict*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Schultz, Kenneth. 2001. *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Singer, J. David and M. Small. 1994. "Correlates of War Project: International and Civil War Data, 1876-1992, ICPSR Study Number 9905."
- Slantchev, Branislav L. 2005. "Territory and Commitment: The Concert of Europe as Self-Enforcing Equilibrium." *Security Studies* 14(4):565-606.
- Smith, Alastair M. and Alexandra Guisinger. 2002. "Honest Threats: The Interaction of Reputation and Political Institutions in International Crises." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(2):175-200.
- Trachtenberg, Marc. 1999. *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Wagner, R. Harrison. 2000. "Bargaining and War." *American Journal of Political Science* 44(3):469-84.