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E.O. 11652, Sec. 11

NIS letter, 8/31/77

By JK NARS, Date 1/14/77

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September 15, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

We discussed the question of Chinese nuclear weapons today, first in a lunch at the State Department given by Secretary Rusk for McNamara, McCone, and myself, and later at a meeting with the President in which Rusk, McNamara and I were with him in the Cabinet Room (McCone having left at a time when we thought the President would not be able to join us).

At the luncheon we developed the following position:

(1) We are not in favor of unprovoked unilateral U. S. military action against Chinese nuclear installations at this time. We would prefer to have a Chinese test take place than to initiate such action now. If for other reasons we should find ourselves in military hostilities at any level with the Chinese Communists, we would expect to give very close attention to the possibility of an appropriate military action against Chinese nuclear facilities.

(2) We believe that there are many possibilities for joint action with the Soviet Government if that Government is interested. Such possibilities include a warning to the Chinese against tests, a possible undertaking to give up underground testing and to hold the Chinese accountable if they test in any way, and even a possible agreement to cooperate in preventive military action. We therefore agreed that it would be most desirable for the Secretary of State to explore this matter very privately with Ambassador Dobrynin, as soon as possible.

These preliminary decisions were reported to the President in the Cabinet Room, and he indicated his approval. The Secretary of State now intends to consult promptly with the Soviet Ambassador.

McG. B.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

FYI - M-Mo Chapin
WAA pers - trip to Moscow
July 1963
10/2/64

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October 2, 1964

S/S - Mr. ~~Read~~

A search of our records of the Test Ban Treaty negotiations in Moscow fails to reveal any Harriman proposal for a joint US-USSR effort to slow down Red China's nuclear weapons development. On the other hand the question of Chinese nuclear capacities came up in various Harriman/Khrushchev conversations. Harriman probed USSR knowledge of Chinese capacities and its attitude toward them. He expressed our concern regarding this matter and said he hoped that the problem would be solved by eventual Chinese adherence to the Treaty or by disarmament. Khrushchev was obviously unwilling to talk at much length on the question and he tried to give the impression of not being greatly concerned.

One of the reasons that the Chinese issue was raised with Khrushchev was Harriman's theory that Khrushchev's interest in a test ban treaty flowed from his desire to isolate Red China in the international communist movement. Aside from this Harriman was also under instructions to express the President's great concern over Chinese development of nuclear weapons.

J. de Martino
John J. de Martino
S/S-S
Ext. 6952

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Harriman pp 539 / Test Ban Treaty. Background ①

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(Ltr. from State Dept.
2-28-86)

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MLI

Date 4-9-86

November 2, 1964

De Gaulle and Atlantic Nuclear Matters

De Gaulle's attitude toward the multilateral force is a logical extension of his concept of the organization and the role of Europe. This concept carries with it certain clear implications as to what should, and should not, be the status and role of European countries, and as to the limits of an acceptable relationship of Europe to the United States. I would expect de Gaulle to reason along the following lines:

"The primary task of European statesmanship is to achieve European unity on the basis of a correct understanding of the 'vocation of Europe.' This requires a structure for a united Europe which reflects the realities of power and of leadership within Europe. These realities are that the preponderant role within Europe must fall to France and Germany because they are the two principal truly European powers, and the two most powerful European countries. Countries in Europe are not all European. Their understanding of and loyalty to Europe varies considerably between them. The United Kingdom is a

satellite

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satellite of the United States and has other extra-European loyalties to the Commonwealth. It is manifestly not inclined to contribute substantially to the security of Europe. Its economy is largely dependant on non-European resources and markets.

"The same criticism is valid in varying degree with regard to Scandinavia, the Netherlands (a satellite of the United Kingdom) and Belgium (a 'non-country'). The neutrals don't count. Spain's time will come later: for the moment she is trying to compensate for the political unacceptability of her regime by fawning on the United States. Portugal is only concerned with trying to hold on to her African possessions. Italy is too unstable politically and too vulnerable economically to pursue a truly European policy. She will continue to be dependent on, and thus responsive to, extra-European interests and pressures, i.e., the United States and Great Britain.

"Thus the achievement of the 'vocation of Europe' rests with Germany and France harnessed through a progressive drawing together of their peoples and their resources,

and

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and cooperating formally within the framework of the Franco-German Treaty of 1963. Germany's history as a state is short and troubled, and she has today potentially dangerous centrifugal aspirations. Hence the primary leadership of Europe falls inescapably to France.

"The 'vocation of Europe' implies the acceptance of certain conditions, not only of cooperation but of exclusion. First of all, it requires for its fulfillment the recognition that Europe can be built only on the principle of nationalism: the structure of Europe presupposes the cooperation of states. Thus, any policy which dilutes the spirit of nationalism in Europe is hostile to its creation.

"The major political threat to the creation of Europe is the United States, whose policy it is to bring about a politically integrated Europe, in which the role of the nation state would vanish in a technocratic bureaucracy, in which national identity and national policies and interests would be irrevocably dissolved. It is no coincidence that this danger to the creation of a true Europe made itself felt most acutely in the period of the

1950's

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1950's, when the degree of dependence of European economy and defense on the United States were at their height. In these years, Europe had no will of her own, no alternative to recourse to the United States for her economic reconstruction and for her security. The movement for the political as well as the economic integration of Europe was a reflection of an abdication on the part of certain Europeans of the will to protect and uphold the indispensable attributes of national existence. These Europeans failed to distinguish between the legitimate role of intra-European functional and technical integration, and the limits beyond which such integration constituted an unacceptable threat to the survival of the nation.

"It is no accident that the United States strongly supported and actively encouraged by direct intervention this trend toward national political suicide. The kind of Europe that America wants is a united Europe, entirely dependent on the United States for its security and (thanks to the disappearance of the political will to survive of its constituent elements), a subservient Europe, a docile follower

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follower of policies, formulated in Washington in the name of the interests of the whole Western world, and which would first and foremost serve the national interests of the United States.

"The negotiations in Brussels in 1961 and '62 clearly revealed that the United Kingdom was interested essentially in obtaining economic and commercial advantages by joining the Common Market, while retaining economic and commercial ties with the Commonwealth. The United Kingdom was in fact a stalking horse for United States policy, which used these means to achieve its European objectives. De Gaulle had 'mis fin à cette comédie' in January 1963, only to find himself now once again faced with another attempt by the United States to create an organic link between itself and Europe by the device of the proposed multilateral nuclear force."

The nature of de Gaulle's anti-Americanism should be seen in the light of this concept of the nature, the role, and the destiny of Europe on the one hand, and of its incompatibility with the declared goals and underlying assumptions of United

States

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States policy toward Europe on the other. This explains his attitude toward NATO which is today, in his view, an instrumentality for the perpetuation of an unacceptable degree of American involvement in, and control of Europe in the field of security. Not that he believes that Europe's security can be protected independently of the United States. In proclaiming his loyalty to the "alliance" he recognizes and accepts the vulnerability of Europe to a Soviet military threat without the protection of United States military power. He believes us when we state that the security of Europe is vital to the security of the United States. But he does not believe that in all foreseeable contingencies the United States would necessarily have a view identical to that of Europe on the measures required for assuring Europe's security. Nor can the decision on what measures to take -- and not to take -- in order to protect Europe be delegated to an extra-European power.

Against the background of this attitude of mind, it is easy to imagine how bitter to de Gaulle must be the German government's decision to subordinate its relations with France to what it considers to be the imperatives of its security, as set forth in the five unilateral preambular points to the Franco-German Treaty.

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An Atlantic multilateral nuclear force, whether restricted to the mixed-manned surface fleet, or augmented along the lines of current British thinking, are anathema to de Gaulle for political as well as for military reasons: (1) it brings the United States into a supranational institutional relationship with Europe in the most sensitive field, which is most directly related to the issue of preserving, or of abandoning, national sovereignty; (2) it cuts across his policy of building a European nuclear organization, based on the French national nuclear force, in which France would play a dominant role; (3) it draws Germany away from France into a nuclear organization in which the United States participates while retaining its veto, thus thwarting the development of a European nuclear force; (4) it extends the principle of political as well as military integration (both equally obnoxious) to a new field, and would provide a new base from which the political control of Europe by the United States would be advanced.

In short, the MLF and the Atlantic Nuclear Force concept strikes at the heart of de Gaulle's European policy and at his concept of the role of France in Europe. If successful, this project would, in his view, achieve that "hegemony" of United

States

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States over Europe which it is de Gaulle's declared policy to prevent. France must now either abandon her European policy, or pursue a policy independent of the Atlantic (i.e., American) framework. It may be that the real objective of de Gaulle's Latin American trip was, while taking advantage of the American invitation to see European countries play a greater role in Latin America, to lay the basis for an extension of France's role as the leader of the "third world," as spokesman for all those countries which are attracted by the prospect of a middle course between the two major protagonists.

If, as seems probable, the concept of an Atlantic partnership is in de Gaulle's view essentially a means of assuring American hegemony over Europe, the prospects of that partnership must be destroyed: in the economic and commercial field by wrecking the Kennedy Round even at the cost of leaving, or at least not participating actively in, the suprainstitutions of the Common Market, the Coal and Steel Community and EURATOM, and by leaving, or not participating actively in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

On the basis of de Gaulle's character and performance

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hitherto, there is no reason to suppose that he would hesitate to follow such a course, for to do otherwise would be, for him, to betray a sacred trust.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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December 17, 1964

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 322

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Guidelines for Discussions on the Nuclear
Defense of the Atlantic Alliance

We now face very important discussions with our Allies on future plans for the nuclear defense of the Atlantic Alliance. I am sending you this memorandum to establish guidelines for this discussion.

1. Unless I give specific instructions to the contrary, I do not wish any American official in any forum to press for a binding agreement at this time. I wish to maintain the position established in our talks with Prime Minister Wilson -- namely, that the U.S. is not seeking to force its own views on any European nation, but wishes rather to find a way of responding effectively to the largest possible consensus among interested European allies.

2. At the same time I expect American negotiators to maintain the position that no agreement can be made with the U. K. that does not take account of the legitimate interests of Germany, and that similarly no agreement can be made with Germany that does not take account of the legitimate interests of other European states. The American negotiators should continue to encourage direct discussion among Europeans, and in particular they should urge the U. K. to seek agreement with Germany and vice versa.

3. I wish all American negotiators to avoid public or private quarrels with France, and to maintain in public and private the following position: We are interested in reducing our differences with France; we will never support any proposal for a nuclear force which is in fact directed against

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France; we will not sign any agreement which does not contain open doors for France; nor will we make any agreement until after French opinion and French desires have been carefully and responsibly explored.

4. Any agreement we support must be a reinforcement to our basic policy of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. We warmly support the inclusion in any agreement of strong undertakings to this end.

5. Our position on the American veto and on the European clause is as follows:

"The United States takes the position that any charter for an Atlantic Force must provide for United States' consent to the firing of the nuclear weapons. If, however, major nations of Europe some day achieve full political unity with a central political authority capable of making the decision to use nuclear weapons, the United States recognizes that this will create a new situation in which reconsideration of various provisions of the charter would be appropriate. In any event, revision of the charter would be possible only with the unanimous approval of the members."

*Suppose -
James*

6. Our present position on other issues is as stated on December 8 in the U. S. memorandum of comments (attached at A) on the U. K. proposal, omitting the names of specific countries in paragraph 9, and leaving that paragraph in abeyance for the time being.

7. In my judgment, the principal advantages of any agreement will be:

(1) that it will lead the U. K. out of the field of strategic deterrence and thus reduce by one the number of powers aiming at this kind of nuclear strength;


(2) that it will greatly reduce the danger of any separate nuclear adventure by the Germans; and

(3) that it will advance the principle and practice of collective strategic defense, as against the proliferation of separate nuclear deterrents.

These three advantages are of great importance to the American public and to all who care for world peace in other countries, and it is essential that they be established in any agreement.

8. The provisions of NSAM 318 (attached at B) will remain in effect (except for the action in paragraph 6 which has been completed).

9. Finally, I find nothing in the position of this government or in the posture of the alliance which makes it necessary, from the point of view of the U. S. alone, that there should be final agreement or even agreement in principle within the next three months. I may take a different view on this in the light of new evidence, but this is my clear present position, and I wish all actions by American officials to be in conformity with it. If other governments for their own reasons find it important to reach early agreement, they will make their own efforts to this end, and in that case I do not desire that we on our side should drag our feet. But I do not wish anyone at any level to give the impression that we are eager to act on a short timetable, or are attempting in any way to force our own views upon Europe.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'R. M. Johnson', written in a cursive style with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

This is an account of a back ground session with Sec. of Defense McNamara on April 22 in Washington. None of it is to be attributed to him but all can be ~~attributed~~ attributed to "high officials" or "high government sources". Not for publication before 6:30 p.m. Saturday, April 24.

Summary

Mr. McNamara's summary of the war situation now was as follows:

First, he insists strongly that that the guerrilla war is NOT merely an indigenous rebellion, that in fact the Viet Cong do depend on outside power for weapons, strategy, tactical doctrine, daily operational control. For instance: he says there are 45-50,000 regular VCs and (less precisely) about 1.0,000 irregular VCs. All need weapons. The South Vietnamese forces of all kinds have lost 39,000 weapons since count began nearly four years ago. They have captured from the VCs about 24,000 weapons, for a net loss of weapons to the VCs of about 15,000 weapons. Therefore, he insists more than 100,000 of the VCs must be armed by outside assistance.

In two engagements this month, on April 5-6, SVN troops captured hundreds of weapons. 90% of small-bore arms were of Bloc origin, mostly Chinese, some Czech. 100% of large-bore were of Bloc origin.

This outside assistance has substantially increased in men and equipment in past 18 months -- approximately the period of extreme SVN political instability following fall of Diem. McN insists NVN and VC have seized this opportunity to increase infiltration.

To oppose the 150,000-odd regular and irregular ~~VC~~ VCs, 525,000 SVN forces of all kinds are in hand. This is a ratio of 4-5 to 1, compared to the accepted ratio of 10-1 needed in Greece, Phillippi Malaysia, elsewhere, to overcome well-led guerrillas.

So our strategy must be to improve the ratio -- in effect, to counter the infiltration that created the unfavorable ratio. The ratio against SVN is made even worse due to govt. instability, which reflects itself in troop morale and efficiency. So military situation is very bad, but has been improved since (a) Quat took over, improving govt. stability and efficiency (b) Marines landed, bolstering American commitment (c) air power applied to NVN, improving SVN morale while lowering VC morale and somewhat impeding the infiltration. Now the next steps are:

- add to the mobility of the SVN with more helicopters, etc.
- add to their firepower with close air support
- add to SVR forces at rate of 8-10,000 men for next 12 months (the subject of the Taylor visit and the Honolulu conference)

McN said the SVN with our assistance had made substantial progress last 30 days in increasing their armed forces and he gives Quat credit. Thus, in general period of air bombings, marine landing Quat takeover, he considers war situation to have improved.

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Mudd

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The Bombing Policy

McN makes limited claims for its success, in three fields -- military morale, political.

Military: Targets have been associated with infiltration routes -- depots, dumps, bridges, etc. Infiltration has not been stopped or even substantially slowed but it has been made harder to carry it out. Much slow night traffic now has to be subbed for day travel. Bridge repair crews working only at night. Infiltration, in effect, costs them more time, trouble, men, probably money.

Political: McN believes there is "confusion in the bloc nations" over how to respond, both politically and militarily. Professes to see some indications they now thinking about talking, whether or not they ever do it. Says bombings have brought internal stresses and strains on Hanoi govt. -- differences on strategy, how high a price NVN can pay for victory, etc. Says relations among NVN, Moscow, Peking now worse, which seems to be a strongly held opinion but not backed up with the evidence.

Alternative

The alternative to fighting the war as outlined, McN says, is not to negotiate a neutral, non-Communist SVN because that is not possible. The alternative is a ~~Communist-dominated~~ Chinese-dominated Southeast Asia which he thinks means a "Red Asia". Concedes possibility of Titoist tendencies in NVN but thinks China would inevitably dominate once we pull out. He further believes most of our allies share this view, including dissidents like Ayub Khan, and that their public statements are dictated by internal politics; he expects Ayub specifically and "allies" generally to be with us when the chips are really down.

Bomb China?

McN says our "clear objective" is to maintain an independent, non-Communist SVN. Our policy is to reach this objective at lowest possible cost in casualties and risk. To attack Red China substantially increases the risks and costs, probably would bring Soviet Union to assistance of China. Such assistance not necessarily nuclear retaliation on us but perhaps Soviet pressures on Western Europe or to the South on Greece and Turkey. Doesn't believe China and Russia pushed together yet, division probably widened, but conceivable could be closed in near future and might well be by attack on China now.

Nuclear Weapons

We are NOT following a strategy that recognizes any sanctuary or any weapons restriction. But we would use nuclear weapons only after fully applying non-nuclear arsenal. In other words, if 100 planes couldn't take out a target, we wouldn't necessarily go to nuclear weapons; we would try 200 planes, and so on. But "inhibitions" on using nuclear are NOT "overwhelming." Conceded that would be a "gigantic step". Quote: "We'd use whatever weapons we felt needed to achieve our objective, recognizing that one must offset against

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against the price" -- and the price includes all psychological, propaganda factors, etc. Also fallout on innocent. "Inconceivable" under current circumstances that nuclear would provide a net gain against the terrific price that would be paid. NOT inconceivable that the price would be paid in some future circumstances McN refuses to predict.

Withdrawal

If the U.S. withdrew from SVN, there would be a complete shift in the world balance of power. Asia goes Red, our prestige and integrity damaged, allies everywhere shaken (even those who publicly ask us to quit bombing, etc.). At home, he foresees as a result of these calamities a bad effect on economy and a disastrous political fight that could further freeze American political debate and even affect political freedom.

On the Other Hand

If U.S. achieved in SVN the objectives stated by LBJ in Baltimore, there would be substantial political and economic and security gains. Way then open (McN sez) to combine birth control and economic expansion techniques in gigantic arc from SVN to Iran and the Middle East, bringing unimaginable developments to this ~~region~~, proving worth of moderate, democratic way of growth for societies.

Region

A Settlement

The U.S. must insist on a non-Communist, independent SVN. Does not fear ultimate Communization of such a govt. Believes even Buddhists no longer Red sympathizers as a result of cleanup in last 8 or 9 weeks. Catholics certainly not. Insists students and labor recoil from VC as VC move nearer to being in actual authority. Even general subduing rivalries, under Quat. Thus, now believes if NVN support and control of VC could be ended, SVN could control guerrillas without "long-continued" American aid. Ultimate settlement would have to be guaranteed, giving us legal opening to go back to assist if the independent SVN govt threatened from without. But must have international guarantees, not just a U.S. guardianship.

OFF RECORD (cannot be used at all)

We have had no success in numerous attempts at infiltrating NVN with guerrillas of our own. About 50 per cent of SVN guerrillas sent north by various means wiped out. Now considered fruitless, particularly since they needed most in hardest places to get to, industrial areas around Hanoi. McN attributes this failure to tight police station controls in NVN through which he says introduction of guerrillas can be effectively discovered and stopped.

CHINA

China will increase its military power substantially in coming decades. Not likely to be able to threaten US within a decade. Ties between Soviet Union and satellites have weakened, Soviet Union has

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matured and mellowed in period since 1913. Assumes same sort of evolution for China outlook and attitudes but will take much longer because they started from further back than Soviet Union in industrializing process. Soviet Union was contained by a military alliance in expansionist period. So possible to contain China in her expansionist phase by similar alliances.

Miscellaneous:

Situation in SVN would be improved if more Asian troops to assist SVN. Have some Koreans now and they're good. Possibilities: Philippines and Thailand. Does NOT want Chinese Nationalists, whose appearance would not be welcome to Indochinese and who might force Red Chinese to come in too.

Bombings in north to date have destroyed 16 bridges. Interdicted main north-south rail line in 3 major places. Interdicted major highways in 10 to 12 major places.

Our air losses in doing this about 2 per cent of military sorties. Much less if all sorties (helicopters, supply flights, etc.) counted. Doesn't count this heavy in relation to target effect so far.

Defense Dept. mail runs about 60-40 against bombing policy and SVN policy in general. Administration mail generally against, probably heavier at White House. Discounts some because "antis" always write more than "pros".

VC terror incidents rise from 151 to about 370 average weekly in recent months. Says as result they kill far more innocent civilians than we do with air power in north and south.

McN denies it possible for us to run out of military targets in NVN. But he won't rule out the possibility of switching to economic target if it is warranted.

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

THE UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA

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ATHENS, GEORGIA 30602

May 21, 1984

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Mr. William C. Slany
The Historian
Room 3100 SA-1
Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Mr. Slany:

I have decided that I should place into the records of the State Department a note on a conversation I had with Chairman Nikita Khrushchev which is, thus far, not in your official records. This letter probably ought to be classified until such time as related and surrounding materials are declassified. I leave it to you to decide whether this letter should have any circulation beyond your office -- such as to some of the analysts in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. I would not care to read this letter in the next few weeks in the Washington Post or the New York Times.

In August 1963 I went to Moscow as the head of a substantial U. S. delegation for the signing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Following the signing, Chairman Khrushchev invited Mrs. Rusk and me to spend a day at the Black Sea and have luncheon with him.

During luncheon Chairman Khrushchev drew me aside with only his interpreter and said the following:

in SECRET "Mr. Rusk, Konrad Adenauer has told me that he would not fight a nuclear war over Berlin. Charles DeGaulle has told me that he would not fight a nuclear war over Berlin. Harold Macmillan has told me that he would not fight a nuclear war over Berlin. How do you expect me to believe that you Americans would fight a nuclear war over Berlin?"

That was quite a question and there was no opportunity for me to refer back to Washington for some comment or instruction. I looked at him very directly and said, "Mr. Chairman, you will just have to take into account the possibility that we Americans are God damn fools." We stared at each other unblinking for a bit; he thereupon changed the subject and gave me three watches to take home to my children.

End SECRET

I will not add my own comments or reflections on this exchange, but I thought that the exchange itself ought to be in the archives of the Department of State.

With personal best wishes,

Sincerely,
Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR	
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This is the original text of an article which appeared in the International Herald Tribune on June 19, 1991 under the headline A NUCLEAR WAR TO KEEP BERLIN OPEN?

(Some editorial changes were made in Paris.)

by John C. Ausland

Oslo. The quarrel over whether Berlin should be the capital of a united Germany is not the only sign the Cold War is over. A lesser noted event is that the State Department has recently released to me a top secret briefing which I gave President Kennedy in 1962. Previous efforts to get this under the Freedom of Information Act had failed on the grounds it still represented

I found this incongruous, since it was well known that George Pacques, an agent working in NATO, had systematically passed our contingency plans to the KGB. Khrushchev once remarked to Averell Harriman that he had seen these and was not impressed.

Encouraged by the disappearance of the wall, I tried again recently to get the briefing and was rewarded with a copy, with a few excisions concerning covert operations and nuclear weapons.

Thirty years later, you may wonder why I wanted this briefing. It was not only because it represented an important event in my life. I was also curious to see what we were saying at that time about the defense of allied rights in Berlin. Unfortunately, the text does not reflect the most important thing that happened during the briefing. This was a statement made by Kennedy about nuclear weapons.

Given the apparent ease with which the wall came down, it is not easy to recreate today the tension which existed in 1962. For reasons which have never been clear to me, Khrushchev had suddenly reignited the struggle over Berlin. After Kennedy's ill-fated meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna in the spring of 1961, it was difficult for those of us working on Berlin to see how we could extricate ourselves from the crisis without a war.

The erection of the wall reinforced our anxiety and led to an intensification of contingency planning regarding Berlin. Planning documents multiplied until they filled two file drawers.

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No imagined contingency was left unexamined. Officials flew to Camp David to play Berlin games, the best device yet found to

The planning, however, also assumed another dimension. Under the guidance of Paul Nitze, who was then an advisor to both Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and President Kennedy, planning became the crucible for selling flexible response to the allies.

In the middle of 1962, General Maxwell Taylor, military advisor to President Kennedy, commented that it would be useful to brief the president on Berlin planning. Having recently given such a briefing to the Berlin Task Force in the State Department, I was nominated.

While little attention had been paid to my briefing earlier, it is remarkable how interesting something becomes when officials find it is going to the president. Having survived the resulting onslaught of suggestions, sometime in August, 1962 I presented the briefing to President Kennedy in the Cabinet Room. As usual,

a number of senior officials were also present, including Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara.

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The briefing used as its framework National Security Action Memorandum 109, commonly known as the Poodle Blanket, which President Kennedy had approved in October, 1961. This used a four phase scenario, which ran as follows:

Phase 1. Soviet or east German interference with access to Berlin. For this phase, the allies had prepared a number of military plans regarding access. On the ground, these provided for token allied military probes, under the rubric Free Style. Plans regarding air access called for putting military pilots on commercial aircraft if the civilian pilots refused to fly. Under some circumstances, fighter aircraft would provide protection under the rubric Jack Pine.

Phase 2. Significant blockage of access to Berlin. This phase would be characterized by intense diplomatic activity, a NATO military buildup, and an airlift as needed. There could also be naval countermeasures, economic countermeasures, and covert action designed to encourage passive resistance.

Phase 3. If measures taken in Phase 2 did not end the blockage, the allies would undertake offensive non-nuclear operations. The names assigned to these plans were Trade Wind

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and June Ball.

Phase 4. If the conventional military action were "unsuccessful in inducing the Soviets to restore Allied right in

Although this scenario may sound bold, the briefing conveyed considerable caution. At one point, I noted that this was a conceptual framework and not an attempt to predict how history will unroll. Furthermore, I added that "we have no idea of rushing from one phase to another."

This reflected President Kennedy's outlook. As Secretary Rusk commented to several of us once, "You must remember, in dealing with the Russians, he always has in the back of his mind nuclear weapons."

Later, when I became involved in nuclear planning, I understood better what he had in mind. Nevertheless, at the time it was difficult to reconcile the president's concern with a remark he made during the briefing. When I was discussing Phase 4 and the possible use of nuclear weapons, he interrupted to say, "I suppose if we get involved in a war in Europe we will have no choice but to use nuclear weapons."

(p6 of 6)

Silence fell upon the room for a moment, and then I resumed the briefing. Robert McNamara has recently revealed that he subsequently cautioned Kennedy against every authorizing the use

The irony was that shortly after this briefing Khrushchev threw Kennedy a curve ball by deploying nuclear missiles to Cuba. This was a terrible mistake on his part, for it moved the action from Khrushchev's front yard to Kennedy's. As a result, it was - happily - never necessary to determine if the US and their allies were as bold as their planning.

Although we continued to have difficulty regarding ground

access to Berlin after the Cuban missile crisis, we ceased to
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CHRONOLOGY

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E.O. 12355, Sec. 3.4

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By *[signature]* NARA Dec 6-15-93

July 22, 1957.

Secretary Dulles in a TV and radio address to the American people said, referring to the nuclear danger:

"And, as matters are going the time will come when the pettiest and most irresponsible dictator could get hold of weapons with which to threaten immense harm...."

"We believe it is possible to prevent a promiscuous spread of nuclear weapons throughout the world.

"....We hope the Soviet rulers view with concern the prospect of nuclear weapons production spreading throughout the world."

March 30, 1960

At a press conference, President Eisenhower was asked what the driving force was behind his determination to seek a test ban treaty. He said that:

"The driving force behind me is the belief that we should try to stop the spreading of this, what you might say, the size of the club. There are already four nations into it, and it's an expensive business. And it could be finally more dangerous than ever, merely because of the spreading of this knowledge and this know-how...."

September 25, 1961

President Kennedy submitted to the United Nations a draft disarmament plan containing the following: proposal for agreement:

"States owning nuclear weapons shall not relinquish control of such weapons to any nation not owning them and shall not transmit to any such nation information or material necessary for their manufacture. States not owning nuclear weapons shall

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not manufacture such weapons, attempt to obtain control of such weapons belonging to other states, or seek or receive information or materials necessary for their manufacture."

December 4, 1961.

Irish Resolution is adopted unanimously by the General Assembly (A/RES/1665(XVI)):

"Calls upon all States, and in particular upon the States at present possessing nuclear weapons, to use their best endeavors to secure the conclusion of an international agreement containing provisions under which the nuclear States would undertake to refrain from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons and from transmitting the information necessary for their manufacture to States not possessing such weapons, and provisions under which States not possessing nuclear weapons would undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such weapons;...."

March 15, 1962

In his opening statement to the Geneva Disarmament Conference, Secretary Rusk urged "that steps be taken to prevent states owning nuclear weapons from relinquishing control over such weapons to any nations not owning them."

April 18, 1962

The United States submitted to the Geneva Disarmament Conference a disarmament plan which proposed that nuclear powers would:

"Not transfer control over any nuclear weapons to a state which had not manufactured a nuclear weapon before an agreed date;

"Not assist any such state in manufacturing any nuclear weapons."

Non nuclear powers would:

"Not acquire, or attempt to acquire, control over any nuclear weapons;

"Not manufacture, or attempt to manufacture, any nuclear weapons."

August 23, 1962

Secretary and Gromyko. Sovs appeared more willing to consider non proliferation agreement separate from German problem than in past. Also, although Gromyko-suggested language ambiguous, appeared not to preclude MLP.

September 19, 1962

Secretary testified to Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee. Senator Goldwater was present. Among other things, Secretary said:

"A test ban treaty combined with an agreement by the nuclear powers not to transfer nuclear weapons into the national control of nonnuclear powers would constitute a significant inhibition upon the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries.

"This would be linked to an agreement by non-nuclear powers to refrain from manufacturing, testing or seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. If such agreements become possible, their combined effect would be to substantially enhance the national security interest of the United States," (Hearings before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 82.)

Later in response to questions by Senator Stennis concerning Red China participation, the Secretary said:

"If we had an agreement on the non proliferation of nuclear weapons, against the transfer of nuclear

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weapons, and we asked all those countries who did not have nuclear weapons to sign up not to produce or accept, I should think it would be very important for China to sign up because if it did not sign up we would want to think a long time before we went another step ourselves in this matter." (Id. at p. 114)

November 28, 1962

President Kennedy approved memo dated November 27, 1962 from Secretary. The memorandum had attached to it, among other things, the draft non-transfer declaration. The Secretary's memo of November 27 indicated that the Secretary had already conferred with the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany on the subject. The memo advised President Kennedy that the Joint Chiefs opposed the measure but that the Department of Defense did not.

November 30, 1962

The Secretary told Mikoyan that we were hopeful that the Chinese would cooperate on a non-proliferation declaration. He assumed the Soviets felt the same way about FRG.

December 10, 1962

The Secretary read Dobrynin the first paragraph of the draft declaration.

December 12-15, 1962

NATO ministerial meeting. Secretary gave text of draft declaration to British, French, and Germans. Further consultation followed in succeeding months. The text was circulated in NAC in February of 1963.

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April 12, 1963

Secretary handed Dobrynin text of draft declaration.

July 26, 1963

In a statement to the American people concerning the test ban treaty which had been initialed in Moscow, President Kennedy said:

"...this treaty can be a step toward preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to nations not now possessing them. During the next several years, in addition to the four current nuclear powers, a small but significant number of nations will have the intellectual, physical and financial resources to produce both nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them. In time, it is estimated, many other nations will have either this capacity or other ways of obtaining nuclear warheads, even as missiles can be commercially purchased today.

"I ask you to stop and think for a moment what it would mean to have nuclear weapons in so many hands, in the hands of countries large and small, stable and unstable, responsible and irresponsible, scattered throughout the world. There would be no rest for anyone then, no stability, no real security, and no chance of effective disarmament. There would only be the increased chance of accidental war and increased necessity for the great powers to involve themselves in what otherwise would be local conflicts.

"...We have a great obligation--all four nuclear powers have a great obligation--to use whatever time remains to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to persuade other countries not to test, transfer, acquire, possess, or produce such weapons."

August 15, 1963

Shortly after the signing of the test ban treaty, the Chinese communist regime issued a statement which includes

the following:

"The object of U.S. imperialism in advocating the prevention of nuclear proliferation is not at all to manacle itself but to manacle socialist countries other than the Soviet Union. The United States is trying to achieve this object by consolidating the nuclear monopoly position of the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union. The Soviet leaders are fully supporting this plot and playing an active part in carrying it out.

"...As long as the imperialists refuse to ban nuclear weapons, the greater the number of socialist countries possessing them, the better the guarantee of world peace."

January 21, 1964.

In a message to the Geneva Disarmament Conference, President Johnson said:

"Fifth, and finally, to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to nations not now controlling them, let us agree: (a) that nuclear weapons not be transferred into the national control of states which do not now control them,...."

February 6, 1964

In a statement at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, Mr. Foster, after describing United States policy on non proliferation, said:

"....The United States has long sought an agreement which would implement the terms of the Irish Resolution."

* * * * *

"The United States will, in private discussions, seek agreement with the Soviet Union on the terms of a declaration based on the terms of the Irish Resolution."

April 3, 1964

In a press conference in response to a question concerning public confirmation of a series of U.S.-Soviet talks on nondissemination of nuclear weapons, Secretary Rusk said:

"It is true that we have from time to time discussed this matter with the Soviets. I was a little surprised to have it appear that this was something new. I would suppose that everyone had assumed that we have been talking about this with the Soviets. I have had some talks with Mr. Gromyko about it, there have been talks with the Ambassador, there have been talks in Geneva.

"Now, it is not going to be easy to bring this question of nondissemination of nuclear weapons to a formal agreement. On their side the Soviets have raised objections about our proposals for a multilateral force. Now we know ourselves that the multilateral force will not involve the dissemination of nuclear weapons to other national nuclear capability or to other national armed forces, and from that point of view it is some protection against the further spread of nuclear weapons on a national basis.

* * * * *

"Now, on our side we have a very substantial interest in the nondissemination idea as it applies to Peiping, but there is no evidence whatever that Peiping would engage in the kind of agreement that we have been talking with other governments about, and so at least some of our sense of urgency diminishes if it is clear that Peiping will not take part."

July 2, 1964

At the Geneva Disarmament Conference, Mr. Foster described the text of the draft declaration which the U.S. was discussing with the Soviet Union. He said:

".../T/he United States has been seeking, and will

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continue to seek, an international agreement under which the nuclear Powers would commit themselves not to transfer nuclear weapons into national control of States not now possessing them, as well as not to assist such States in manufacturing nuclear weapons. Such an agreement would facilitate a parallel undertaking by non-nuclear Powers not to manufacture such weapons and to refrain from acquiring control over such weapons and from seeking or receiving assistance in manufacturing them...."

September 16, 1964.

President Johnson, in a message to the Geneva Disarmament Conference, called attention to the fact that United States proposals included "urgently needed steps to curb the spread of nuclear weapons."

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