

PREMIUM / 4495

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3/21/67
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Note of a Discussion at Luncheon with Mr. Romanov of the
Soviet Embassy on March 21, 1963.

(a) Nuclear Tests. I asked if there was any possibility of making progress on this and stressed its importance. Mr. Romanov said that he agreed with the importance of the subject and added that if only the Americans would now accept three inspections annually all would be well; the others could easily be settled. When I suggested that the Russians too ought to make some further concessions he replied that the Russians were afraid that if they moved to meet the Americans, the Americans would retreat; the truth was that the Soviet Government did not believe in American good faith on this at the moment. At one point, after discussing the seismic effects of explosions and earthquakes (during which Mr. Romanov alleged that scientists now said that there were only 15 unidentified events annually in the Soviet Union) I suggested that as scientific knowledge seemed to advance so quickly, it might be that in a few years time there would be fewer unidentified events annually and it might therefore be necessary to have fewer inspections. Did Mr. Romanov think that there would be anything in an idea for allowing more inspections in the earlier years of any treaty's life? Mr. Romanov said that he could not answer this for certain but it was an interesting idea.

(b) Non-dissemination Treaty. I asked if this would be agreeable to the Soviet Union and Mr. Romanov said that it certainly would. He agreed that it could well be linked with or follow shortly after a nuclear test ban treaty. The

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third thing which could well be signed could be a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. On this last point I suggested that such a pact might involve some degree of recognition of East Germany by the West but Mr. Romanov said that he thought this was a very far-fetched theory as the degree of recognition would be very small; in any case he did not see why the East Germans should want recognition by the West - it would only lead them into greater responsibility at the United Nations and elsewhere.

Coming back to non-dissemination, I asked what the position would be about China and Mr. Romanov said that he did not know whether China would sign a non-dissemination agreement or not. He rather thought they would not. The right course was for the United States to change their policy towards China and allow them to be admitted to the United Nations where international pressure could be brought upon them. He did not appear to think that the possible refusal of France to sign a non-dissemination treaty would be a serious bar to its conclusion from the Soviet point of view.

(c) Germany and Berlin. I mentioned to Mr. Romanov that in conversation in Moscow Mr. Khrushchev had not seemed to put nuclear tests at the head of his list of important topics. Mr. Romanov agreed and said that he thought the reason was that Mr. Khrushchev felt that the key to everything was the establishment of a better relationship in Central Europe. Why could we not accept United Nations forces in Berlin? I asked whether he meant a United Nations presence or a United Nations command over the allied forces in Berlin.

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Mr. Romanov said that he meant United Nations command in Berlin because the object of the arrangement would be to end the present situation. There was no reason why this should cause any difficulty from the Western point of view and of course if the United Nations were in Berlin they would naturally have free access but would guarantee that hostile activities in the City did not continue. He again emphasised the Soviet view that the two Germanys ought to get together with a view to reaching agreement on reunifying the country.

At one point Mr. Romanov said very firmly that the Russians were most unhappy at the prospect of the Germans getting nuclear weapons; he was referring to the NATO multilateral force. I said that the Nassau Agreement had been a most imaginative one which ought to appeal to the Soviet Government as much as to anybody else. It was a method of forestalling the increase in national nuclear forces. Was it any better that the Germans should feel that their aspirations for equality were being met under an arrangement of this sort which did not give them independent control of nuclear weapons? Mr. Romanov said that the Soviet Government were rather tired of these arguments about avoiding future dangers in Germany. They had been told the same sort of things when the first proposals were made for a modest German Army armed only with rifles but now the Germans had the largest army in Europe with a full range of arms. They remained excluded from the nuclear field but now they were starting to get into that and if they paid for the nuclear weapons in the multilateral force they would of course in time demand greater control over them.

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(d) Anglo-Soviet Relations. Mr. Romanov asked what could be done to improve Anglo-Soviet relations. The Soviet Government felt that they had given the British Government every encouragement (for example, they kept on selling us gold which they could sell outside London), and yet we seemed to make no response. Was there nothing which could be done to make relations better? We were always making excuses; at one time it was the Common Market negotiations but what was it now? I said that I thought Anglo-Soviet relations, although not particularly cordial, were perfectly correct; we were living together without too much difficulty. It might be possible to develop some trade but it was difficult to see quite what else to do. I felt that if it was possible to reach agreement on nuclear tests and perhaps non-dissemination, this might facilitate a change of climate. Mr. Romanov agreed generally with this idea.

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WP 5/4

Foreign Office (Secret) and Whitehall (Secret) Distribution

EXTRACT FROM RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THE FRENCH MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT THE QUAI D'ORSAY AT 6.15 p.m. ON MONDAY, APRIL 8, 1963

Present:

The Right Hon. The Earl of Home
Sir Pierson Dixon

M. Couve de Murville
M. Charles Lucet

Nuclear Questions and NATO

Lord Home asked M. Couve for his views on the proposals for the multi-national force which were being discussed in the North Atlantic Council.

M. Couve said that he was rather puzzled about what was being proposed at the moment. He understood that the British were prepared to assign their V-bombers to a multi-national force, or as it was now beginning to be called an allied force. There was a question of whether the French Mirage IV when they came into being should be similarly assigned. This of course would not be possible for the French, though they would see no objection to arrangements for joint targetting for NATO purposes of the French force which would remain under French command. What puzzled him was the latest proposal which seemed to imply that certain tactical forces under the command of the French, Germans and some others, supplied with warheads of which the Americans would retain the control, should also form part of the so-called multi-national force. He failed to understand what the purpose of this was.

Lord Home said that the purpose was mainly political. It was designed to interest the Germans who by having a say in the targetting, programming, command arrangements, and perhaps even in the control of the force, might be less inclined to hanker after nuclear arms of their own.

M. Couve was emphatic that the Germans had an incipient nuclear appetite which was likely to grow under the influence of the German military authorities. He failed to see how this appetite could be satisfied by what would in fact only be a sham. Would the multi-national force in fact have any real say in targetting? Would it not already have been done in NATO and how could the Germans be expected to relish a Dutch commander? The French found this whole problem worrying. They were far from believing that the Germans should be given something in the atomic field. On the contrary the German appetite for nuclear weapons was something which must be carefully watched and to which we must not give way.

Lord Home asked whether the Germans might perhaps be tied in by a non-dissemination arrangement on the lines of Mr. Rusk's proposals.

M. Couve remarked that the Germans had merely said that they would agree to this if the Chinese did. That did not amount to much of a commitment. He himself thought that the only safe way out of the German nuclear problem was to be found in genuinely European arrangements in the European field. This was something which we could not expect to come about immediately. It might be possible in say 10 years. He was bound to say that on reading the speech published to-day which Mr. Harold Wilson had recorded for the Americans, he wondered (with all apologies for what might seem like an intrusion into our domestic affairs) how Britain would stand in nuclear matters if the Labour Party came into power. He admitted, however, that politicians often made remarks when in Opposition which did not represent the attitude they might take up when in power.

Lord Home stressed the importance of tackling the question of non-dissemination. The Israelis might well develop an independent nuclear capacity.

M. Couve agreed and said that the Egyptians, Chinese and Indians might do so as well.

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16 APR 1963

PRISEC

1AD114/S7/G

Cypher/OTP

No. 794

April 15, 1963

D. 8.25 p.m. April 15, 1963

EMERGENCYTOP SECRET

1A

Addressed to Moscow telegram No. 794 of April 15,
 Repeated for information to: Washington
 U.K. Dis. Geneva [Both Immediate]

My telegram No. 3631 to Washington.

Following is British text of the joint letter.

"Dear Mr. Chairman,

You will recall that in February and March 1962, we had some correspondence about the Geneva Disarmament Conference, and in particular about the possibility of reaching agreement on the text of a treaty to ban nuclear tests. Both President Kennedy and I pledged ourselves to take a personal interest in the progress of this conference on which so many of the hopes of mankind have been fixed. Last October we both indicated in messages to you our intention to devote renewed efforts to the problem of disarmament with particular reference to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the banning of nuclear tests.

Since then the Geneva meeting has continued but it has not reached the point of definite agreement. Nevertheless, some encouraging advance has been made. For example, your acceptance of the principle of on-the-spot verification of unidentified events has been of great value. Equally, the Western countries have been able to reduce the number of annual inspections for which they felt it essential to ask, from about twenty down to seven. The difference remaining is of course real and substantial, if only because it presents in practical form the effects of two different lines of reasoning. At the same time the actual difference between the three inspections which you have proposed and the seven for which we are asking, important though this is, should not be impossible to resolve. As regards the automatic seismic stations, the difference between us appears to be fairly narrow.

/We all have

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FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET) AND
WHITEHALL (SECRET) - DISTRIBUTION

Sir H. Trevelyan

(A)

No. 751
April 25, 1963.D: 3.40 p.m. April 25, 1963.
R: 3.46 p.m. April 25, 1963.IMMEDIATESECRETAddressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 751 ofApril 25

Repeated for information Priority to Washington

UKDis Geneva

UKDel N.A.T.O.

My immediately preceding telegram: Interview with
Khrushchev.

Second part of record follows.

Your letter was then read. Khrushchev did not at first understand what the idea of a floating quota meant. Gromyko explained. ^{Khrushchev said "we won't agree to that"} At the point in the letter that final agreement was unlikely to be possible unless most of the other matters had been first disposed of, Khrushchev said, "then there will be no agreement."

2. We then explained the point about the special envoys and the possibility that you and Mr. Rusk might come to Moscow. Khrushchev said he had stated more than once that the Soviet Government wanted an agreement very much. But on these conditions, there could be no agreement. The Soviet Government could not agree to such conditions. They did not want to have their representatives on our territory and did not want Western representatives on their territory. He was cursing himself because it had been his initiative to make the offer of three inspections "and that had ruined everything." They believed national means alone were enough. Then the Soviet scientists began to talk about two to three automatic stations. It was on this basis that he had approached the President. He had made a fool of himself. ~~The Soviet Government could not agree.~~ It had been a mistake to offer two or three inspections

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SECRETMoscow telegram No. 751 to Foreign Office

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inspections as symbols. The West had then built upon this in such a way that McCone could have his representatives on Soviet territory. The Soviets were masters of their country and would not let anyone crawl around in it. National means were sufficient. The West knew whenever the Soviet conducted tests whether they were in the atmosphere, above ground, or underground. Underground testing was very expensive and the Americans could do it if they wanted to. The Soviets had only done one, to show that the Americans could detect it. If their military and scientists proposed atmospheric tests, they would allow them to make them. Such tests were cheaper. But the Soviet Government were not now testing and would sign an agreement that they would not test. Why wouldn't the West believe them? They were honest people. But the Soviet Government would not agree under the conditions we had set. He was ready enough to meet the President and the Prime Minister. There might be some use in that, but there would be no agreement on nuclear-testing on these terms.

3. Kohler said he hoped Khrushchev would give further consideration to the proposal. He would see that a serious method of proceeding was proposed here. We wanted to do this privately in order to reach agreement on this subject. He and I were not experts and we hoped that people with a high degree of knowledge in these matters could discuss it. I said that the letters represented a real, serious and honest attempt to find agreement. We must find a way out of the deadlock and I hoped that serious study would be given to this proposal.

4. Khrushchev said that he would carefully study the document and there would be a reply in due course, but he could not pretend that he had not understood the essence of it and he saw no possibility of giving the answer we expected. He had been negotiating with the West for nearly eleven years, ever since Stalin died. He had met with President Eisenhower, Dr. Adenauer, Prime Minister Macmillan, President Kennedy and President de Gaulle. Where had it all led? The West did not want serious talks. It did not want to talk seriously about Europe. Who was interested in maintaining the state of

/war

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S E C R E TMoscow telegram No. 751 to Foreign Office

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war with Germany? Only the Revanchists. We were being led by the nose by West Germany. The real crux was not nuclear tests but the German question. The German question was the knot which if it could be cut, would improve everything. What did the British, French or Americans want in West Berlin? They were there in the interests of West Germany, not of the German people, but of Adenauer who wanted to heighten tension. The Soviet Union would be patient, but he did not know what it would lead to. The West must understand the dangers.

5. Khrushchev said that nuclear tests was not the important issue. It had no significance in reducing tension or limiting armaments. It was simply a humane or moral question. The Soviet Union wanted an agreement on nuclear tests, but the West wanted him to permit them to send their spies into his country. "We won't let you". He had the impression that the West was not yet conscious of the need for agreement and did not really want one. There was some domestic reason for all this correspondence. We had exchanged opinions thousands of times without result. Did we want him to bring out the old documents, write them out again and send them as his answer? There was nothing new in the documents. The only new thing was the proposal for a meeting of senior representatives or Foreign Ministers. But this was not new either; they had met before. He could not agree to inspections. He would not buy agreement at the expense of his country's interests. No right of inspection for the Soviet Union in the West, and no right of inspection for the West in the Soviet Union.

Record continues in my immediately following telegram.

Foreign Office please pass Priority to Washington, UKDis Geneva and UKDel N.A.T.O. as my telegrams Nos. 137, 17 and 31 respectively.

[Repeated as requested]

ADVANCE COPIES

Private Secretary.
Sir H. Caccia.
Sir B. Burrows.
Mr. A.D. Wilson.
Head of Atomic Energy and Disarmament Department.
Head of Northern Department.
Head of News Department.

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S E C R E T

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FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET) AND
WHITEHALL (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION (B)

Sir H. Trevelyan

No. 752
April 25, 1963

D. 2.50 p.m. April 25, 1963

R. 3.14 p.m. April 25, 1963

IMMEDIATE
SECRETAddressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 752 of April 25.Repeated for information to: Washington
UKDis Geneva
UKDel NATO [All Priority]

My immediately preceding telegram: Interview with Khrushchev.

Third part of record follows.

Kehler said he wished to remind the Chairman that the President and Prime Minister had made this approach with serious intentions. It was true that the problem had been discussed for many hundreds of hours, but in that time, as the President had said, considerable progress had been made. The positions had moved closer and were now very close. The President believed that an agreement would have considerable effect as a first step towards increasing trust and reducing tension and also from a practical point of view. There were perhaps ten to twenty countries capable of developing in the near future their own deterrents and they would do so if they were not confronted with a nuclear test ban agreement. The United States also approached the question of Germany with full seriousness. Both sides had the same interests in peace and security in Europe; they differed in the methods of achieving it. The President's desire for agreement was genuine. He hoped Khrushchev would consider it seriously. The messages contained a number of new things, such as the question of procedure and the peeling of inspection quotas over a number of years. The President and Prime Minister would like to have the benefit of Khrushchev's views. Khrushchev interjected to say that the quota proposal (i.e. floating quotas) made it worse. It was going further away from a solution. "We reject it". Kohler said that the President

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SECRETMoscow telegram No. 752 to Foreign Office

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proceeded from the principle of full equality on both sides, as he had said at Vienna. He would not expect the Soviet Union to do anything which he was not prepared for the United States to do. I again emphasized that the West was making a serious attempt to reach an accord. Our proposals were made not because of domestic considerations, but in the hope of reaching agreement and of proceeding subsequently to other agreements.

2. Khrushchev said that he could only repeat that they would study the document and give a reply. The Soviet Union would like an agreement but not on these conditions. It could only agree on the basis of no inspections (the British record omits this sentence. The Americans do not regard it as substantially altering the sense of the argument). They would discuss in the Government whether to renounce or retain the offer of two to three inspections; but if they did keep their word on this, they would not go a mile further. He asked that this be conveyed to the President and Prime Minister, both of whom he held in high regard. He saw no possibility of further concessions, which would be concessions to Goldwater and the "madmen". Kohler interjected that he could assure Mr. Khrushchev that the President was in charge. Khrushchev replied that he did not doubt it. Khrushchev said that the most they could do would be to keep to the offer of two to three inspections. Personally he thought they should take it back as the Americans had done. An agreement would not restrain other countries from making tests - perhaps it might be a very small restraining factor. It would not restrict the Soviet Union in the arms race. Disarmament was needed to do that. They no longer needed tests to develop nuclear weapons. Soviet scientists and military men were not putting forward demands for tests. As for other countries, they would say; "you tell us we must not make tests, when you have already accumulated a supply of nuclear weapons", and we would have no answer. A disarmament agreement on the other hand would solve the whole problem. It was probably time to stop the disarmament talks which had been going on for two years. Tsarapkin scratched about (a play on Tsarapkin's name) and there were no results. He was not justifying his expenses.

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SECRETMoscow telegram No. 752 to Foreign Office

If there was no basis for agreement, there was nothing to be done. "We must submit to fate".

3. Kohler said that the Ambassadors appreciated the time the Chairman had given them. They would faithfully convey what Khrushchev had said to the President and the Prime Minister. He had hoped it would be more positive and forthcoming. He hoped that after further consideration of the proposals it still would be. Perhaps after a second look, a more encouraging answer could be made. I added I would still ask Khrushchev to approach the proposal in a positive way.

4. Khrushchev said he could not give any encouragement. The document was politely phrased but contained nothing positive. He said he would reply after careful study of the document, but unfortunately there was no basis for assuring the Ambassadors that anything could come out of it on these conditions. Perhaps representatives or Foreign Ministers would meet, but if they had instructions based on these conditions, there was no reason to believe they would reach agreement.

5. Kohler said the United States and the United Kingdom did not intend to publish the letters, nor even to say they had been delivered. Khrushchev said that the Soviet side would take the same line.

Record ends.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington 138,
UKDis Geneva 18, and UKDol NATO 32, (All Priority).

[Repeated as requested.]

ADVANCE COPIES:

Private Secretary

Sir H. Caccia

Sir B. Burrows

Mr. A. Duncan Wilson

Head of Atomic Energy and Disarmament
Department

Head of Northern Department

Head of News Department

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Americans ought to deal with the Chinese themselves.

Germany and Berlin

Mr. Khrushchev had not given the impression of being very interested in the test ban question but had moved from it to a discussion of Germany whose great importance he had emphasised. Mr. Khrushchev had claimed that it was important now to "normalise Europe". From the Soviet point of view more had been gained by building the wall in Berlin than would have been gained by a peace treaty. Berlin was no longer a source of any trouble; there was currently no problem about Berlin. What was important, however, was to legitimize the two Germanies. At one point Mr. Harriman had asked Mr. Khrushchev if he was worried about West Germany having nuclear weapons. Mr. Khrushchev had replied that he was concerned mainly with the political problem of the two Germanies.

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Germany
Fitness of
Pg 24

Conclusion

Mr. Harriman had felt that Mr. Khrushchev was very preoccupied not so much about his own personal position as with the situation in the Communist camp, particularly as regards China. It might be that the position would be a little clearer at the end of May when the Russians would see rather more clearly where they were with the Chinese. Otherwise Mr. Harriman did not see what recommendations for future action could be formulated until the Russian reply to the President and Prime Minister's letter and the Test Ban was received. Mr. Harriman felt that Mr. Khrushchev's offer on the status quo in Germany ought to be very carefully considered.

B. J. Harriman
M. A. Miller
4/29/63

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6/27/63
- 6/30

TOP SECRET—GUARD

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Document No. 1

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY
AND THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE IN THE
FOREIGN OFFICE ON JUNE 27 (1963)

Present:

- | | |
|---------------------------------|------------------------------|
| The Right Hon. The Earl of Home | The Hon. Dean Rusk |
| The Right Hon. Edward Heath | The United States Ambassador |
| Mr. J. B. Godber | Dr. F. Long |
| Sir Humphrey Trevelyan | Mr. R. F. Courtney |
| Mr. A. D. Wilson | |
| Dr. R. Press | |
| and others | |

Nuclear Tests

Mr. Rusk said that President Kennedy was treating the forthcoming visit to Moscow as a really determined effort to get a nuclear tests treaty. In the President's view this might well be the last chance. Unfortunately there had been no real encouragement from the Soviet Government. *Mr. Rusk* believed that Lord Hailsham and Mr. Harriman should start on the comprehensive treaty, keep the discussion going for as long as possible and not allow the Russians to deflect it in the direction of other solutions. This meant that we must try to bring the Russians to a serious discussion of the two really important points, *i.e.*, their claim that existing national means of detection are adequate and the accusation that Western inspection proposals would provide opportunities for espionage. There was some hope at least that in a discussion of this sort the Soviet scientists would be able to exert a favourable influence.

There were two directions in which the United States Government might be able to move if it seemed likely to help. The first would be the division of the inspection quota between seismic and aseismic areas. The other would be a quota spread over a period of years plus perhaps several "bisques". *Mr. Rusk* thought that it was the earlier attempt of Mr. Dean with Mr. Kuznetsov to distinguish between seismic and aseismic areas that had led to misunderstanding with the Russians and to the Soviet claim that they had been led to believe that two to three inspections annually would be adequate.

Lord Home agreed that this was probably the last chance for a nuclear tests treaty and that our tactics should be to stick hard to the comprehensive treaty. *Sir Humphrey Trevelyan* said that it was important not to start by discussing the quota of inspections, particularly with Mr. Khrushchev. *Mr. Rusk* said that the modalities of inspection were as important as the quota. *Sir Humphrey Trevelyan* agreed, adding that Mr. Khrushchev objected particularly to inspection of an area of 500 square kilometres. *Mr. Rusk* agreed that we should not try to engage the Russians on the quota at the start.

Lord Home asked whether Mr. Rusk had any doubts on the need for inspection. *Mr. Rusk* said that inspection was not necessary for the Russians because secrecy could not be maintained in the West. But for the Americans the important point was that there would be about 50 underground events annually in the Soviet Union which would not be identified. *Lord Home* suggested that this was a matter of creating confidence in the treaty and that, if underground tests were to be useful to the Russians, a series of at least three or four would be necessary. *Mr. Rusk* said there were some very low-yield underground tests that could lead to very great military advances. The yields were low enough to create the risk of their not even being detected. This was a risk the United States had accepted. They did not want to pile on additional risks through inadequate inspection. *Dr. Long* said that the yield of these explosions would be in the range of three kilotons and less. A large number of United States tests had been made in this low-yield range.

They had certainly been considered

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work in progress.

Lord Home said that the main purposes of further testing would be to increase the power to weight ratio and develop warheads for the anti-missile. But the latter would have to be tested eventually in the atmosphere. *Dr. Long* said that some of the developments to which the Russians would have been led by their recent tests could now be brought to the stage of warhead production without further testing in the atmosphere. *Mr. Rusk* added that very important studies of the behaviour of materials could be carried out by underground testing. The fact was that the United States Government really wanted a comprehensive test ban because it would be valuable to American security.

Mr. Rusk suggested that the Russians might be invited to join in nuclear tests to determine the feasibility of detection and identification. *Mr. Godber* recalled that this had been offered in 1960 and rejected.

The meeting then discussed modalities of inspection. *Mr. Godber* said that the Western Powers had stepped backwards in their proposals recently tabled at Geneva. The worst moves had been to extend the area of inspection to 500 square kilometres and the composition of inspection teams to 70 per cent "other side". He believed both had had an unfavourable affect on the Russians. We must look at them again. *Mr. Rusk* said we had to look at what the Russians offered. If they continued to offer only three unmanned seismic stations the area of inspection would have to be large. *Mr. Godber* thought that a possible solution might be to offer more unmanned stations and a smaller inspection area. He, nevertheless, thought that 70 per cent "other side" in the inspection teams had increased the suspicion that we were planning espionage. *Mr. Rusk* said that given 50 inspections we could afford to be relaxed. With only seven we had to be much more careful. *Mr. Godber* suggested 14 "other side" and 14 neutrals. *Mr. Rusk* said this would be no problem to the Americans. Replying to a question by *Lord Home* *Mr. Rusk* said that the actual numbers of inspectors required had been carefully worked out in relation to the functions they would have to perform. If the area concerned was conveniently flat a smaller team might be adequate. *Dr. Press* said that the Russians did not like aerial survey but we hoped it would prove to be a key factor in quickly reducing the suspect area on the ground which would then require more detailed examination. *Lord Home* asked whether there was scope for letting the Russians themselves do more, e.g., aerial photography. *Dr. Long* said that the estimate of 20 inspectors assumed provision by the Russians of transport and fittings for equipment brought in by the inspectors. This was already a modest attempt to keep down the numbers.

Mr. Rusk said that there seemed to be more to be discussed on modalities. It was agreed that discussion should be continued by *Dr. Long* and *Dr. Press*.

Partial Treaty

Lord Home said that if no progress could be made on a comprehensive ban, we should have to consider a partial treaty. *Mr. Rusk* said that in that case, the first move might be to offer a simple ban on tests in all environments except underground. Alternatively, we could say that negotiations ought to be continued on the whole problem but our negotiators would have as their first task to complete a partial treaty, allowing further negotiations on underground tests to go on. If that failed, he thought we should offer a ban on tests in three environments, coupled with an agreement to regulate underground testing for two to three years. Under this arrangement the United States would not do a crash programme, but would want to do a certain number of tests, partly for their own value and partly because it would be assumed that the Russians would do the same. There should be some agreement on the amount of testing to be allowed, and there was of course the problem of verification, but this was less important for an arrangement of this kind. *Lord Home* doubted whether the Russians would agree, and *Sir Humphrey Trevelyan* said that according to *Mr. Harold Wilson*, *Mr. Khrushchev*, after speaking of the possibility of a partial ban, had added a qualification which showed that he still coupled a moratorium on underground tests with a partial ban. *Mr. Wilson* pointed out that *Mr. Khrushchev* would be unlikely at this stage to give anything away in advance.

Mr. Rusk said that a new complication had arisen over peaceful underground explosions (the Plowshare programme). Until recently the Americans had worked on the idea that peaceful explosions would be carried out either with the unanimous consent of the nuclear powers, or under arrangements allowing the other side to

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inspect the devices to be exploded. The Atomic Energy Commission now said that they wanted to use relatively clean devices, of which they would not be able to reveal details. The result was that Plowshare considerations were more closely linked with underground testing than previously envisaged.

Lord Home asked whether, if this approach failed, the Americans would consider a short moratorium on underground tests. *Mr. Rusk* said that the word "moratorium" was now quite unacceptable in the United States but even if they were called something else, it would be very difficult to accept for any substantial period. Rather than bind ourselves in this way, he thought we should explore the possibility of making some statement of intention to the Russians. He thought himself that there was a rather high chance that the Russians would test again before too long. This would explain their present coldness.

Lord Home raised the question of France and China, and the possibility that the Russians would refuse to sign without French participation. *Mr. Rusk* thought we should take the line that we can only take one step at a time. The first must be to get a treaty between the original three nuclear powers. Then, if France and China do not adhere, we must look at the situation again. The Americans would probably not feel it necessary to withdraw from a treaty just because the Chinese carried out one or two tests, and the same should go for the Russians as regards French tests. He did not think that the Russians really believed that the French were testing devices for the United States and the United Kingdom. They should have enough technical information to know that this was not true.

Other Cognate Questions

Lord Home said that there would probably be discussion of other questions and we should consider where we stood as regards non-dissemination of nuclear weapons and the NATO/Warsaw Pact Non-Aggression Pact. *Mr. Rusk* said that we could not go far on non-dissemination without the French. We should try to get the Russians to agree to the Western formulation of a basis for negotiations, which would then include the French. He thought the French were interested and at least wanted to leave the way open. The Russians had rejected the Western formula, but he did not think they had said their last word. *Lord Home* said that they must, however, beat the drum against the multilateral force. *Mr. Rusk* thought that China was the more serious aspect for the Russians, and their ideas would be clearer after the July meeting. This would apply also to questions outside the disarmament field. We should be ready therefore to talk about non-dissemination, and it might be a good idea to prepare detailed and comprehensive papers which could be given by *Lord Hailsham* and *Mr. Harriman* to the Russians, setting out our position on both the nuclear test ban and non-dissemination.

Mr. Heath asked how long the Americans envisaged for the talks in Moscow. *Mr. Rusk* thought that if there was really any prospect of a useful result we should be prepared for two weeks' discussion. We certainly should not endanger the prospects by rushing at it or setting a short time limit.

Lord Home said if *Mr. Khrushchev* wanted a nuclear test ban, he would probably want to get something else with it and this might be the NATO/Warsaw Pact Non-Aggression Pact. He asked if there was any further news of United States talks with the French and Germans on this question. *Mr. Rusk* thought that, if we were in sight of agreements on both nuclear tests and non-dissemination, both the French and German attitudes might change. He thought there was more flexibility on the German side. *Mr. Heath* said that if *Mr. Khrushchev* did not want a nuclear test ban he could simply stick on numbers of inspections. If he wanted one, he would certainly try to get something else at the same time. *Mr. Rusk* thought that if he did not want a test ban his tactics might be to bring in the multilateral force and the non-aggression pact. He thought that *Mr. Khrushchev* had been much more ready to discuss numbers last December and he suspected that since then there had been a decision for a further build up of the Soviet nuclear forces, which might mean nuclear tests. Such a change in the Soviet position, together with the China problem, would account for the change in *Mr. Khrushchev's* attitude.

Lord Home asked how *Mr. Rusk* saw the problem of reconciling the NATO Mixed-Manned Force with the Irish Resolution. *Mr. Rusk* said that there would of course be corporate ownership and any country that withdrew from the force could

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not withdraw any part of its equipment. The main problem was whether one German could order another German to fire the missiles. The United States view was that there should be both legal safeguards against this and actual physical means of preventing its happening. He was not sure that the Germans knew exactly what was in their minds but he thought that the Russians knew it. Furthermore, if the Russians wanted to prevent further dissemination the Western formula was really very satisfactory for them. He thought that the Russians might be tending to treat the question as academic, because they had more specific knowledge of Chinese nuclear progress. The United States Government wanted a non-dissemination agreement not only for the sake of Germany and China, but to get a good many other Governments to sign on the line.

Lord Home asked whether a paper of agreed conclusions, to be given to President Kennedy and the Prime Minister, could now be produced. He thought that, subject to the further technical talks that had been agreed, our positions were fairly close. *Mr. Rusk* said that President Kennedy could not be asked to put across an unverified moratorium in the United States. *Dr. Press* said that there was an agreed United States/United Kingdom position on the detection and identification of underground events, down to seismic magnitude 4. Where it appeared that there might still be a difference was in the significance of the Russians being able to carry out either one test or a series of tests at this level, without being found out. The laboratories would always argue the case for more tests, but he questioned whether such tests would introduce any new factor in the overall strategic balance. The United Kingdom view was that the important area was the anti-missile, but that, for this, it would become necessary at some point to carry out tests in the atmosphere. *Dr. Long* said that the Department of Defense considered that three or four tests of the low yield mentioned would be important. *Mr. Rusk* said that the Americans could suggest some good lines of development through these tests, and if the Russians could test while the United States was unable to do so they would be left some way behind. If at the same time the Russians made a breakthrough in interception, they would be in a strong position even though they would still have to do atmospheric tests. In any case, he thought that without verification there would be cycles of recurring suspicion which would threaten the treaty. *Lord Home* agreed that if there were no confidence the treaty must break down.

Modalities of Inspection

Lord Home asked what might be said to satisfy the Russians that inspection did not mean espionage. *Dr. Long* said that we could never completely convince the Russians, but the inspectors would not be free to roam where they wanted and the seismic areas, in which most inspections would take place, were of less military importance to the Russians. *Mr. Wilson* said that inspection as proposed by the Western Powers was an absurdly inefficient means of conducting espionage. *Mr. Rusk* pointed out that only about one per cent of Soviet territory would be inspected in 10 years. *Dr. Press* expressed some concern about the new attitude to the Plowshare programme. *Mr. Rusk* said that this was not a question for current consideration. It might be that the United States would have to choose whether to go ahead with Plowshare.

Collateral Measures

Mr. Wilson said that, in discussion in Washington, *Mr. Harriman* had raised the question of collaterals to be included in the Moscow discussions, other than non-dissemination and the NATO/Warsaw Pact Non-Aggression Pact. There were three or four such measures that could be considered. *Mr. Rusk* said that the Americans could discuss the cut-off of production of fissile material for military purposes, the transfer of fissile material to civil uses, and the prohibition of the orbiting of nuclear weapons in outer space. But there were serious inspection problems and he doubted whether any progress could be made. *Mr. Wilson* said that the Russians had shown little interest in these items at Geneva and took a tough line on verification. *Mr. Rusk* said that the United States could not make concessions in these fields as an additional price for a nuclear tests ban. Nevertheless, *Mr. Harriman* might have a chance to explore these questions in Moscow.

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Mr. Rusk said that he now favoured asking *Mr. Harriman* and *Mr. Foster* to fly over to join the talks between President Kennedy and the Prime Minister, particularly for the technical aspects. There was, however, the point that if they

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came to London now, Mr. Khrushchev might get some wrong ideas and he would like to take advice before deciding. *Sir Harold Caccia* pointed out that their visit might help to underline how seriously we were taking the Moscow visit.

It was agreed that a paper listing the points agreed in discussion, and others that required further discussion, should be drafted for Lord Home and Mr. Rusk to submit to the Prime Minister and the President.

NUCLEAR TESTS

The following conclusions were reached in discussions between Mr. Dean Rusk and Lord Home on the 27th of June.

Mr. Harriman's and Lord Hailsham's visit to Moscow might well provide the last chance of agreement on a nuclear tests ban. Every effort should be made to take advantage of this.

2. The first object should be to secure a *comprehensive treaty*, with adequate verification of uncertain events underground. This involves some on-site inspections, but Mr. Harriman and Lord Hailsham should in the first stages avoid argument in justification of any particular number. Their opening line should be:

- (i) Our aim was to secure a treaty which would last. For this purpose each side must have confidence that the other was observing the rules.
- (ii) National detection systems were not adequate to identify all uncertain events underground. A proportion of on-site inspections would be necessary for this end.
- (iii) Such inspections could be carried out under strict safeguards against the possibility of espionage.

3. Our position on these points should be put to the Russians as thoroughly as possible, and we should try to elicit from them a detailed statement of their own point of view. We should explain to them our ideas about the modalities of inspection. Our own experts should embody these in a paper for presentation to the Russians, with particular reference to the area of inspection, the make-up of inspection teams, and the need for low-level photography (all likely to be difficult points for the Russians).

4. As regards numbers, we should be ready to discuss the possibilities of aggregating the inspections over a number of years (with a maximum for say one year); or of dividing the quota of inspections between seismic and aseismic areas. Our own experts should again work these ideas out in detail at this stage.

5. If the Russians refuse to budge on a comprehensive treaty, our next object should be a *partial treaty* covering tests in all environments except underground, with no restrictions on underground tests. This might be offered either as something separate, or as the first stage of a further continuous negotiation for a comprehensive treaty.

6. If they refuse to accept a partial treaty in these forms, we should explore the possibility of some intermediate position between a comprehensive and a partial ban. Thus we could offer to conclude an atmospheric ban combined with some *annual limit* (by number and/or size) on *underground tests* (our experts should develop some specific examples of such offers).

7. The Russians might press for a partial treaty with an indefinite moratorium on underground tests, and might hope to secure at least a *limited moratorium*. It would be politically impossible to sign an agreement with them binding ourselves explicitly to any kind of moratorium. It might, however, be possible, if the state of negotiations seemed to warrant this, to declare our intention not to test underground for a limited period.

8. If the Russians try to make a nuclear tests treaty conditional on *French signature*, our line should be that we would do our best to secure the adherence of all other Powers if a treaty were signed; and we would count on the Russians doing the same in respect of China. In any case, the "withdrawal clause" was designed to meet the contingency that tests by a non-signatory Power should

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9. The Russians are likely to sound us on *non-dissemination*. We should be prepared to discuss this, bearing in mind that it was important not to go too far without bringing in the French. We should try to get the Russians to accept our existing formula as a basis for further talks including the French. We should have ready papers on this subject to give to the Russians, and these should now be prepared.

10. Another subject which the Russians might well raise is a *non-aggression pact* between the NATO and Warsaw Pact Powers. Our attitude should be that it would be time to start discussing this further after the conclusion of treaties on nuclear tests and non-dissemination.

11. There had been discussion in Washington of other "collateral" items that might be introduced in Moscow; for example, the cut-off of production of fissile material for military purposes, the transfer of such material to peaceful uses, and the stationing of nuclear weapons in orbit. It would be worth taking position papers on a series of such items to Moscow; but the Russians have so far shown little interest in them, and the cut-off raised important problems of verification. Where verification was concerned the Western Powers could not be seen to be making concessions on a further price to be paid for a nuclear tests ban.

Document No. 2 (a)

RECORD OF MEETINGS BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE AT 1 CARLTON GARDENS ON JUNE 28

Present:

The Right Hon. The Earl of Home	The Hon. Dean Rusk
The Right Hon. Peter Thorneycroft	The Hon. David Bruce (after lunch)
The Right Hon. Edward Heath	The Hon. Lewis Jones
Sir Harold Caccia	Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The Right Hon. Sir David Ormsby Gore	Mr. Burdett
Mr. J. O. Wright	

(a) NATO Mixed-manned Force

Lord Home explained that at the moment Her Majesty's Government could obtain no Parliamentary support for the multilateral force. Both the Government Backbenchers and the Opposition were against it. The principal reason was that a new weapons system of this sort would create a new source of tension between East and West to which Russian was bound to react. Neither party in the British Parliament was easy about the prospect that Germany might get access to nuclear weapons. Finally, no one thought that the project as at present envisaged made any military sense, as there was already a nuclear overkill.

Mr. Thorneycroft agreed. He said that Admiral Ricketts' visit had been very useful, particularly on the subject of vulnerability. The question remained whether the multilateral force would really add to the defence of the West. In the House it would come under severe attack on the defence aspect; there would probably be neutrality as far as the political side of the case was concerned.

Mr. Rusk said that when the President came to Birch Grove he would be concerned not to have his hands tied before he went on to Italy. We had to face the fact, however, that the alternative to the multilateral force was not sitting where we were and doing nothing. The fact was that since 1958, when the Anglo-

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Mr. Rusk said that when the President came to Birch Grove he would be concerned not to have his hands tied before he went on to Italy. We had to face the fact, however, that the alternative to the multilateral force was not sitting where we were and doing nothing. The fact was that since 1958, when the Anglo-American special relationship in nuclear matters was resumed and subsequently when France decided to develop a nuclear capacity of her own, Germany was no longer ready indefinitely to accept an inferior status in the alliance. The same

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went to a lesser extent for Italy. The British Government might not have received the full impact of German feelings on this subject but the Americans certainly had. The multilateral force was, in the American view, the least of all the damaging alternatives now open.

Lord Home asked if the German desire for equal status in the alliance were accepted, the same objective might not be secured not by giving them a presence in a mixed-manned unit which was represented as part ownership, but by giving them a seat on the board of management for policy making, direction and control.

Mr. Rusk said no, unless we were prepared to revert to the original proposals for M.R.B.Ms. on German soil. Germany was not prepared indefinitely to provide cannon fodder for the alliance. Since the President's visit to Bonn, it had become clear that the Federal Republic was in no tremendous hurry about the multilateral force, but they would have to be assured that progress was being made.

Lord Home said that much of the criticism in Britain would disappear if we were able to revert to the question of submarines. *Mr. Bundy* said that there were two different sorts of problems here. The first was that the idea for submarines had originally been sunk by Admiral Mountbatten. Secondly there was a security problem about the control system of Polaris submarines.

Lord Home said that it would be easier for us if the whole matter had been put into a NATO review, and if as a result of that NATO review a requirement were found to exist for a mixed-manned force of this or some other sort. *Mr. Rusk* said that the Soviet Union were developing new weapons systems and that the multilateral force could prove a useful counterweight to them. The United States thought it was valuable that the burden of the increase should be shared with Europe. But it was no use pinning a lot of faith on the NATO strategic review because NATO would not come up with an independent strategic assessment, but would simply reflect the different strategic views of the various Governments.

Mr. Rusk asked what really was at the basis of the United Kingdom difficulty. When the United States had agreed at Nassau to provide Polaris missiles for the United Kingdom as part of the multilateral force it was not envisaged the United Kingdom would eventually pull out of the mixed-manned component. *Mr. Heath* said that this was fundamentally a political problem and the opposition in Britain was made up of a combination of political factors. There was, first, the underlying anti-German feeling in the country. Secondly, there was the fact that the multilateral force idea was originally American and had been the subject of much high-powered American salesmanship. Thirdly, all service opinion, not least retired service opinion like Field-Marshal Montgomery, was against it as being military nonsense. And finally, there was the question of finance. It might have been possible for the Government to deal with any two of these factors but taken together they presented an unmanageable problem.

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either front for
would participate

Mr. Thorneycroft said that he realised that United States prestige was now committed to the multilateral force. The same went for the Germans. The Italians were in a state of suspended animation while the French wanted to see it fail. We had to face the fact that there was no real defence of Europe without France and we should think hard what to do about that problem. Our latest information was that France was proceeding very well with developments in the nuclear field. It might be worth our while to develop better co-operation with France, perhaps working towards a European deterrent in 5-10 years time.

Lord Home said there would be nothing in this for the Germans. *Mr. Bruce* said that Germany was not interested in a European force. The crux of the matter for the Germans was United States intentions. What they wanted was to bind the United States irrevocably into the defence of Europe.

Mr. Rusk said that Europe would be making a great mistake if it thought that by providing 5 per cent of the nuclear capacity of the alliance it would have a decisive say in the use of the 95 per cent supplied by the United States. He had made quite clear at Ottawa that if Europe was to be independent the United States would be independent too.

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Mr. Heath pointed out that there were two opposed concepts at work here. There was de Gaulle's concept of Europe on the one hand: on the other there was

essential to keep Germany on the Atlantic side of the alliance. *Mr. Rusk* pointed out that the United Kingdom and France had perhaps not borne the full brunt of German resentment. It seemed to the Germans on occasions as if America, Britain and France settled things on the first day and Germans were only allowed into the conversation in an inferior capacity on the third day. *Sir Harold Caccia* pointed out that this situation paradoxically had been at French insistence.

Mr. Bundy said that it had become clear in Bonn that Germany was making the multilateral force a clear cut test case regarding the future role of Germany in the alliance. *Mr. Rusk* pointed out that SACEUR had said that there was a NATO need for 600 M.R.B.Ms. Germany had turned out to be the only country willing to accept them. *Mr. Bundy* interjected that in military terms the best location would have been France but this was not possible. *Mr. Rusk* said that if Europe wanted to organise its own defence separately from the United States that was all right for the United States but he was not satisfied that that was what Europe wanted. But Europe had to make up its mind whether it wanted to be interdependent or independent.

Mr. Thorneycroft said that France in four years' time would have an independent nuclear capacity. *Mr. Rusk* said that the question would then arise whether the United States could permit France to use it independently. The fact was that after Nassau there was need for a more specific examination of what was required in the nuclear field. Nassau had in fact embarrassed American relations both with the Germans and Italians and also with the French. If the United Kingdom appeared to torpedo the multilateral force they would present the United States with a very difficult problem.

Mr. Bundy said that the problem was how to sustain European confidence in overall nuclear defence. *Mr. Rusk* said that if there was to be a satisfactory relationship there could be no going back from Nassau. The French had refused to come in and whenever they were asked for their ideas on the reorganisation of NATO they had none. The United Kingdom seemed to be getting into the position that it was difficult for them to participate in the multilateral force and since it was difficult for them to participate they did not want it to come into being. *Lord Home* said that the United Kingdom had a practical political difficulty in Parliament. The trouble was that our military opinion said that there was no military merit in the proposal. He was not convinced that what the Germans wanted was men and ships: they could perhaps be satisfied with a position on the board of nuclear management.

Mr. Bundy said that the Bonn meeting had taken the time limit off. Nevertheless the Germans wanted to see some forward movement. It was not enough to put the whole problem into NATO. To have 15 countries mixed up in it would mean the death of the idea. What was wanted was a small group consisting of those who were prepared to take part in it.

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/ but JFK had already abandoned it at Nassau! this thing runs on auto-pilot! no discussion in US govt

but 12:50 AM he wants to talk to JFK

Document No. 2 (b)

Present:

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|--------------------------------------|------------------|
| The Right Hon. The Earl of Home | Mr. Dean Rusk |
| The Right Hon. Duncan Sandys | Mr. D. Bruce |
| The Right Hon. Sir David Ormsby Gore | Mr. W. Burdett |
| Sir Harold Caccia | Mr. L. Timmons |
| Sir Arthur Snelling | Mr. O. Armstrong |
| Mr. C. Pickard | Mr. D. Schneider |
| Mr. N. Huijsman | |

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Document No. 5 (a)

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE
UNITED STATES PRESIDENT AT BIRCH GROVE HOUSE AT
10.15 p.m. ON JUNE 29

Present:

The Right Hon Harold Macmillan	President Kennedy
The Right Hon. The Earl of Home	Mr. Rusk
The Right Hon. Viscount Hailsham	Mr. Bruce
Sir Harold Caccia	Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The Right Hon. Sir David Ormsby Gore	
Mr. P. F. de Zulueta	

(a) Nuclear Tests

Mr. Macmillan said that it was of course true that a nuclear test-ban treaty would of itself not change the position of the world. However, such an agreement would have an importance far greater than its intrinsic value because of what it might lead to. The question was how best to play for the treaty. In Mr. Harriman the President had selected not only perhaps the most skilful and experienced negotiator in the world, but also a man of high ideals. In Lord Hailsham the British Government had a representative of equal ideals and skill. Of course the real difficulty was that the negotiations would be about nothing. The underground tests might assist in increasing the power of nuclear weapons in a given weight. This might allow the manufacture of an effective 100-megaton bomb launched from a missile. Alternatively, a so-called "clean" weapon might be produced which would be of assistance in the anti-missile missile field. But in fact there were many ways of using nuclear power for destruction which did not involve these tests; for example, a very large bomb in a merchantman exploded off the coast would cause an immense tidal wave. And the real difficulty about the anti-missile missile system was not the warhead but the rest of the immensely complicated apparatus. However, the political situation made it necessary to argue as if the debate was a real one and this meant that the West had to consider what they could offer the Russians. Perhaps one point might be that an agreement now would prevent both sides having to advance into the anti-missile missile field. Such a system was theoretically possible although immensely difficult and costly. No-one could afford to take the risk that the other side might succeed and therefore if one side began the other would have to follow. The second point was that at the moment the nuclear weapon was controlled by fairly responsible people. Unless it was possible to call a halt now to proliferation there would soon be a great many other countries who had a nuclear capacity. The Russians, being very grand and conscious of their own importance, were against being bothered by smaller countries possessing nuclear weapons. If an agreement to ban tests could be reached then 50 or 60 Powers would certainly be got to accede. The Germans would accede; they could scarcely refuse since they were bound by treaty not to test. France might perhaps be managed. China was in a sense more the business of the Russians than that of the West. And if China did explode a nuclear device in spite of the test ban, the West would be no worse off. And if China stood out might it not be an occasion on which a Joint Note from the United States and Russia could be sent to China; this would indeed be a revolutionary change. If a test agreement could not now be signed, however, the outlook would be far more serious. So far the various chances which had occurred to reach agreement on this issue had always been missed. There was always a reason for not signing. The United States and Britain must now agree about the method of approach to the Russians. This was not a technical problem any more but a purely political one. The question was what Mr. Khrushchev could get away with and what could be carried through the United States Congress.

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It was perhaps not very prob. that agr. could be reached but everything

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would depend on whether Mr. Khrushchev could be brought to feel that agreement was worthwhile. Khrushchev was a practical and hard man and therefore the West would have to try to persuade him that an agreement would be to his advantage. If both we and the Russians agreed that a settlement was in our interests then we could force the rest, even the Chinese, to conform. An attempt should now be made to work out a directive for Mr. Harriman and Lord Hailsham with the object of leaving them a great deal of freedom to play the hand as they thought best. What was essential was to conduct political talks and not to rely upon technical advice which had a way of varying from month to month.

President Kennedy agreed that this was the moment to settle the problem. If this effort failed there might be another chance but he doubted it. The United States was therefore in favour of making the best possible effort now. He agreed with the Prime Minister about the experts' advice. For example, he was very doubtful whether anything worthwhile had come out of the series of tests in the Pacific which had been authorised after the Bermuda meeting. His difficulty was that at the moment he had no majority in the Senate in favour of a treaty and indeed a strong majority against. Both the Armed Services Committee and the Atomic Energy Committee were opposed to a nuclear test ban and far from having the favourable two-thirds majority which he needed for a treaty in the Senate he probably only had 15 Senators in favour. It was therefore necessary to consider what were the minimum terms which would enable a treaty to be got through the Senate or at least not to be defeated too heavily. He would therefore like to get certain technical evaluations to put against the views of people like the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff who were opposed to a treaty. He would like to know the answers to two questions in particular. First, could the Russians carry out an unlimited series of small underground tests without being detected? Second, how much would they find out from such a series and would their extra knowledge alter the balance of power? It was quite true that the psychological position was very important. It was not only the true balance of power that mattered but also the appearance. At the time of the Cuban crisis the suggestion that missiles should be placed in Cuba was important not because it really changed the balance of power but because it appeared to do so. That was why if it was impossible to prove that the Russians could not carry out any small clandestine tests it was very important to determine as closely as possible how much they would gain by such cheating. Then of course the question of China would be very important. If China were to make tests it would not have any effect on the balance of power but it would have a great effect on Asia, on the world Communist parties and in the United States. If the Soviet Union did nothing in such circumstances it would be very hard for the United States to continue with a test-ban treaty. *Mr. Macmillan* asked how a nuclear test-ban treaty would affect the position of China. In any case would the Chinese not need atmospheric tests to make an effective warhead? *President Kennedy* said that the United States had intelligence that China was developing missile systems. However the question was really psychological. If China started to test then the United States would almost certainly decide that she would have to move ahead again in this field. The question was whether the Russians had any influence and could exercise restraint on China. The Russians would no doubt say that the West ought to deal with the French and the West might indeed be able to settle that problem in one way or another. The United States Administration would be considering all this as a matter of urgency on the President's return to the United States and he would send the Prime Minister a message. *Mr. Bundy* said that there was a division inside the United States Government. Some thought that underground tests would not alter the balance of power. The military, however, did not agree. That was why it was important to know how large a series could be conducted clandestinely underground and for how long and of what number of kilotons. The sceptics alleged that underground tests could give a head start to someone who cheated. *Mr. Macmillan* said that he had already outlined the two main purposes for which underground tests might be useful. In addition, there was also the question of small tactical weapons but these could not alter the balance of power. The other two possible advances—a very large bomb and a clean

like to get certain technical evaluations to put against the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff who were opposed to a treaty. He would like to know the answers to two questions in particular. First, could the Russians carry out an unlimited series of small underground tests without being detected? Second, how much would they find out from such a series and would their extra knowledge alter the balance of power? It was quite true that the psychological position was very important. It was not only the true balance of power that mattered but also the appearance. At the time of the Cuban crisis the suggestion that missiles should be placed in Cuba was important not because it really changed the balance of power but because it appeared to do so. That was why if it was impossible to prove that the Russians could not carry out any small clandestine tests it was very important to determine as closely as possible how much they would gain by such cheating. Then of course the question of China would be very important. If China were to make tests it would not have any effect on the balance of power but it would have a great effect on Asia, on the world Communist parties and in the United States. If the Soviet Union did nothing in such circumstances it would be very hard for the United States to continue with a test-ban treaty. *Mr. Macmillan* asked how a nuclear test-ban treaty would affect the position of China. In any case would the Chinese not need atmospheric tests to make an effective warhead? *President Kennedy* said that the United States had intelligence that China was developing missile systems. However the question was really psychological. If China started to test then the United States would almost certainly decide that she would have to move ahead again in this field. The question was whether the Russians had any influence and could exercise restraint on China. The Russians would no doubt say that the West ought to deal with the French and the West might indeed be able to settle that problem in one way or another. The United States Administration would be considering all this as a matter of urgency on the President's return to the United States and he would send the Prime Minister a message. *Mr. Bundy* said that there was a division inside the United States Government. Some thought that underground tests would not alter the balance of power. The military, however, did not agree. That was why it was important to know how large a series could be conducted clandestinely underground and for how long and of what number of kilotons. The sceptics alleged that underground tests could give a head start to someone who cheated. *Mr. Macmillan* said that he had already outlined the two main purposes for which underground tests might be useful. In addition, there was also the question of small tactical weapons but these could not alter the balance of power. The other two possible advances—a very large bomb and a clean bomb—would both have to be tested in the atmosphere and were themselves only a tiny part of larger problems. He would therefore like to add a third question to the two which the President proposed, namely, what value the information

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which might be obtained from an undetected series of clandestine tests could have? *Mr. Bundy* suggested that it was also necessary to consider the political effects of advances in nuclear techniques; this had been the lesson of Cuba.

Mr. Macmillan disagreed. Cuba had shown that, in the world game of chess, pawns were important but could only be exchanged one against the other. Everyone was reluctant to engage the bigger pieces. Supposing the United States took Cuba by conventional means, which could be done very easily, the Russians could only retaliate by nuclear war or by making a conventional move elsewhere, perhaps in Berlin. Conversely, if the Russians took Berlin by conventional means, which they easily could, the West could only retaliate by nuclear means or by a conventional operation in some other area. By a curious paradox *Mr. Khrushchev's* adventure in Cuba had made it rather less likely than before that he would attack Berlin; *Khrushchev* now knew that if he did attack Berlin the Americans would at once seize Cuba. *President Kennedy* agreed with this view but said that the appearances were nevertheless vital. The opposition in the United States to a nuclear test-ban agreement was nearly as great as the opposition in the United Kingdom to a mixed-manned NATO force. *Mr. Macmillan* suggested that if a test-ban treaty could be signed there would be such a surge of enthusiasm throughout the world as would sweep the United States Senate along. *President Kennedy* repeated that he needed a two-thirds majority in the Senate. He did not say that this was impossible to obtain but it would be very difficult.

Mr. Macmillan suggested that it would be well to restate what *Mr. Khrushchev* might hope to gain by a test ban. First, he would avoid a new commitment for anti-missile missile work. Second, he would prevent the growth of small nuclear Powers and this would satisfy his sense of his own importance. *President Kennedy* added that he might also hope to prevent the Germans obtaining nuclear weapons. *Lord Home* interjected that this depended on a non-dissemination agreement and *President Kennedy* agreed. He added that a fourth advantage for the Russians might be that from a talk on this subject might come better possibilities for East-West relations generally. The first thing was to decide the West's own position. He would like the scientists who were near Birch Grove to work out by Sunday morning the answers to three questions. First, what kind of test could the Russians carry out without being detected? Secondly, what military advantage could they obtain from such tests? Third, how far could such knowledge be of real value in affecting the balance of power without being exploited in atmospheric tests?

This part of the meeting ended at about 11.15 p.m.

Document No. 5 (b)

RECORD OF A MEETING AT BIRCH GROVE HOUSE AT 11.15 p.m.
ON SATURDAY, JUNE 29

Present:

- | | |
|---|--------------------|
| The Right Hon. Harold Macmillan | President Kennedy |
| The Right Hon. The Earl of Home | Mr. Rusk |
| The Right Hon. Viscount Hailsham | Mr. Bruce |
| Sir Harold Caccia | Mr. McGeorge Bundy |
| The Right Hon. Sir David Ormsby
Gore | Mr. W. Tyler |
| Mr. P. F. de Zulueta | |

(b) The NATO Mixed-manned Force

President Kennedy enquired how the question of the multilateral force was to be dealt with. If the British Government could not endorse the idea, how was it

added that he might also hope to prevent the Germans obtaining nuclear weapons. *Lord Home* interjected that this depended on a non-dissemination agreement and *President Kennedy* agreed. He added that a fourth advantage for the Russians might be that from a talk on this subject might come better possibilities for East-West relations generally. The first thing was to decide the West's own position. He would like the scientists who were near Birch Grove to work out by Sunday morning the answers to three questions. First, what kind of test could the Russians carry out without being detected? Secondly, what military advantage could they obtain from such tests? Third, how far could such knowledge be of real value in affecting the balance of power without being exploited in atmospheric tests?

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The Right Hon. The Earl of Home	Mr. Rusk
The Right Hon. Viscount Hailsham	Mr. Bruce
Sir Harold Caccia	Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The Right Hon. Sir David Ormsby Gore	Mr. W. Tyler
Mr. P. F. de Zulueta	

(b) The NATO Mixed-manned Force

President Kennedy enquired how the question of the multilateral force was to be dealt with. If the British Government could not endorse the idea, how was it to be dealt with? It was important from the American point of view not to give the Federal German Government the impression that the United States had been speaking to them in bad faith. If the United States appeared to agree with Britain

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during the weekend to bury the idea of the multilateral force, then the Germans would naturally assume that the United States had been speaking to them in bad faith. Of course, if the multilateral force did eventually prove impracticable, then there would be strong pressure from the Germans for a bilateral arrangement with the United States for medium-range ballistic missiles on their territory. He therefore hoped that the British Government would agree to join in studying the M.L.F. proposal and with a draft communiqué indicating that this had been agreed. *Mr. Macmillan* said that in the circumstances it might be better to write the communiqué first and have the discussion afterwards. He was certainly ready to see if it was possible to agree a form of words.

President Kennedy said that in the talks with Herr Schroeder, the United States had reached agreement to study with the Germans the problems of control and so forth. *Mr. Macmillan* said that it would be easier to present this if the study could be expanded to cover the whole problem of associating non-nuclear members of NATO with the control of the nuclear deterrent. The multilateral force was only one proposed solution.

Lord Home suggested that there were a number of political questions which needed further study. For example, there was the question of the Board of Management and whether there should be permanent members and rotating members. Then there was the question of NATO's military requirements. *President Kennedy* said that he did not know how a Board could reach the actual decision to fire. At the moment three NATO countries might be able to give the order to fire, but the Germans could not. It might be that in a few months the pressure for a multilateral force would be less strong, particularly when Dr. Adenauer was no longer in power and Erhard and Brandt were the leading figures in Germany, and were pursuing the conciliatory policy towards the other allies which they were likely to favour. That was why he felt that a study of the multilateral force plan would be appropriate. In six months it would be possible to look at the matter again. He hoped that Britain and the United States would not disagree about this now, but that Britain would be prepared to join in a study of the multilateral force and agree a general form of words. *Mr. Macmillan* agreed that it would be good to find a form of words if possible. It might however be necessary to set out the divergent views of the United States and British Governments. At the present meeting it was not possible to make a definite agreement and indeed he had no right to do so without Cabinet concurrence. There were various matters which might be looked at. For example, was the force militarily necessary? This involved considering whether a war could be fought for a few days of a few months. Then there was the question of the total number of nuclear weapons available to the alliance; was it really necessary to add to them? Then there was the political question of how the alliance should be organised in the future. *President Kennedy* suggested that there might perhaps be two studies. One would be a German/American one and the other could comprise a larger group. He did not want to kill the idea of the multilateral force at this particular moment. ~~He felt that to do so would be a bad mistake.~~ In six months the idea might not have such an appeal. He would therefore hope that some defensible language could be found and he did not believe that this task was impossible. Perhaps the Foreign Secretary and *Mr. Rusk* might work out a form of words for the communiqué, together with some explanatory phrases. He agreed that the prospects for the multilateral force were now not so good as they had seemed at one time. *Mr. Macmillan* said that a study of how to bring the Europeans in to the management of the deterrent was one possibility. There was the question of the French. The purpose of such a study would be to solve a political rather than a military problem. The question of missiles would, of course, be involved in such a study. *President Kennedy* was afraid that, if the multilateral force collapsed, there might be an irresistible demand for land-based missiles. The British seemed to think that this was better, but he was not so sure that he agreed. *Mr. Macmillan* said that land-based missiles would at least not involve the same difficulties for the British Navy. *Mr. Bruce* said that this was really a political question. There was not only the question of the non-nuclear Powers in general, but also the question of the prestige of the United States and of Germany. It was all very well to think of keeping Germany in a subservient position, but if Germany was to be the largest European subscriber to NATO this would not be possible for ever. It might be that the German feeling for this was less strong than the United States had thought, but it was still latent ~~to play a larger part.~~ It might

Mr. G... At 5:00 PM

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he here would want to play a large part. It might

be that this problem was difficult to face now because the West had not faced it soon enough. The military power of Germany was becoming very great and would demand some satisfaction. *Mr. Macmillan* said that it was not German military strength which had made her a danger before 1939, but the collapse of the Capitalist system. Hitler's power had been built upon the misery of Germany, consequent on the break-down of Capitalism in the 1930s. If the present arrangements in Europe broke up it would be because there was not enough credit to keep the Capitalist system going, not because of arguments about missiles. *Mr. Bruce* said that this might be so, but the most hopeful thing since 1945 had been the progress in Europe towards greater cohesion. A division between the United States and Britain at this moment would be very bad.

Mr. Macmillan suggested that a study should now be made of a possible formula. The study should embrace not merely the answer to the main question, but also the answers to the obvious supplementaries.

President Kennedy agreed and this meeting ended at approximately midnight.

Document No. 6

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE UNITED STATES PRESIDENT AT BIRCH GROVE HOUSE AT 10.30 a.m. ON JUNE 30

Present:

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------|
| The Right Hon. Harold Macmillan | President Kennedy |
| The Right Hon. The Earl of Home | Mr. Rusk |
| The Right Hon. Viscount Hailsham | Mr. Bruce |
| The Right Hon. Peter Thorneycroft | Mr. McGeorge Bundy |
| Sir Harold Caccia | Mr. W. Tyler |
| The Right Hon. Sir David Ormsby Gore | |
| Mr. P. F. de Zulueta | |

(a) The NATO Mixed-manned Force

Mr. Macmillan said that he thought that there was general agreement that the immediate problem was one of presentation. It might perhaps be useful if he outlined what he would say in his winding-up speech in the Foreign Affairs Debate on Wednesday, the 3rd of July. He would begin by attacking the extreme opponents of the mixed-manned force, such as Lord Montgomery, and pointing out that although there were political difficulties in working such a force, these could be overcome and the idea was therefore not militarily absurd. He would then go on to refer to the Nassau Agreement and to point out that at that stage he and President Kennedy had agreed to try to make a multilateral NATO force. The problem of non-nuclear Powers in the NATO Alliance had to be faced sooner or later. People frequently talked of "handing the nuclear deterrent over to NATO". This was easy to say but not easy to do. The political problem was more important than the technical one. A start had been made after Nassau with the existing forces such as the British V-bombers, and an idea had been suggested for the future when the main deterrent would be carried in submarines. We were now preparing for the discussions in Moscow and after that studies should continue. He quite saw the President's difficulty in that just after talking to the Germans he could not quite agree with this view, but it was certainly important also not to give the impression that the United States and Britain were at loggerheads. The difficulty was for Britain to agree to participate in a Conference purely about the multi-manned force. What was wanted was a form of words which would cover rather more

Present:

The Right Hon. Harold Macmillan
The Right Hon. The Earl of Home
The Right Hon. Viscount Hailsham
The Right Hon. Peter Thorneycroft
Sir Harold Caccia
The Right Hon. Sir David Ormsby
Gore
Mr. P. F. de Zulueta

President Kennedy
Mr. Rusk
Mr. Bruce
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Mr. W. Tyler

(a) The NATO Mixed-manned Force

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thought that even though the United Kingdom would not be able to express a definite decision about the mixed manned force, it would be possible to set out the general position in a helpful way.

President Kennedy said that he would not disagree with any of this. He thought it was important to explain the origins of the multilateral idea. The United States had not wanted to cancel Skybolt; indeed his own administration had spent \$350 million on it. At Nassau they had felt under a moral obligation to offer Britain an alternative, but as they had to offer a weapon suitable for the 1970s to replace one suitable for the 1960s they had felt it necessary also to make other proposals to cover other people. They had therefore offered Britain Polaris, made the same offer to the French and proposed the multilateral force. It was true that the French had in the event not accepted the offer, but the problem remained. In his view, a study of the position should be defensible while not to study the matter was indefensible. He did not however favour a formal conference about the multilateral force; after all the West might want to trade the idea off in Moscow. However, it was important to determine what exactly the relation of the United Kingdom would be to the German-American study. Would Britain be part of the group which analysed the situation? Of course other solutions were not excluded.

Mr. Macmillan said that he was glad that there was not to be a conference. Bilateral discussions were much easier. Of course the problem had long been recognised and was very important. It had political and military aspects. NATO had already done something about this at Ottawa. The multilateral force, about which Britain had considerable reservations, should continue to be studied.

President Kennedy read out the relevant passage from the communiqué issued after his visit to Bonn. The three basic points were that (1) the multilateral force was a good instrument; (2) America and Germany would use their best efforts to bring the force into being; and (3) they would together study how to do this.

Mr. Macmillan said that he could only agree to a study if it covered the whole problem including the solution proposed by the United States Government and other proposed solutions. The alternative for the communiqué was simply to set out the different American and British positions. In the House of Commons he would recapitulate the story of Nassau and explain how the United States had very honourably agreed to provide a substitute for Skybolt. He had very readily agreed that a further effort should be made to solve the problem of the Alliance, to which he had drawn attention in many speeches and to make the arrangements more practical. The question was how to associate the non-nuclear Powers with the deterrent. Then there was also the technical problem of whether it was worth adding new missiles to the armoury of the West, whether it was worth spending more money on this aspect of defence and whether, if this force was accepted, it would solve the underlying problem of the management and control of the nuclear deterrent.

Mr. Thorneycroft said that it would be better to face the House of Commons with the big issue. He thought that this would be possible. *President Kennedy* said that he hoped this could be done. In a sense he felt that the position in which America had found herself in relation to Britain when Skybolt fell through, was not unlike the position in which the United States would find herself with the Germans if the mixed manned force did not come into being; in such a case it would be very difficult to refuse M.R.B.Ms. to the Germans. However, he agreed that at the moment the important thing was to find a suitable form of words, and he suggested that the experts should now attempt to do this. The difficulty about the communiqué was that a lot of the issues could not be explained properly in three or four sentences.

The meeting ended at approximately 11 a.m.

did no meeting
this? let's just
worry about
the birds

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Document No. 6 (b)

**RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE
UNITED STATES PRESIDENT AT BIRCH GROVE AT 12 NOON
ON JUNE 30**

Present:

The Right Hon. Harold Macmillan	President Kennedy
The Right Hon. The Earl of Home	Mr. Dean Rusk
The Right Hon. Viscount Hailsham, Q.C.	Hon. David Bruce
The Right Hon. Duncan Sandys	Hon. W. R. Tyler
Sir Solly Zuckerman	Dr. F. A. Long
Sir Harold Caccia	Mr. J. T. McNaughton
The Right Hon. Sir David Ormsby Gore	
Mr. A. D. Wilson	
Mr. de Zulueta	

(b) Nuclear Tests

Mr. McNaughton gave the answers, as agreed with *Dr. Long* and *Sir Solly Zuckerman*, to three questions posed by the Prime Minister and the President as the result of their conversation on the previous evening:

1. What is the maximum size of underground nuclear tests which the USSR could repeatedly carry out without significant fear of detection?

Mr. McNaughton said that by testing in carefully chosen soft media, the USSR could test up to perhaps 3 kilotons without decoupling and risk only a 10 per cent chance of detection of individual tests by seismic means. This risk would be larger if a series of tests were carried out and the risk of detection by other kinds of intelligence would also increase. Substantially larger tests, up to perhaps 25 kilotons, could be carried out with small risk of seismic detection by accomplishing them in spherical underground cavities of 400-500 feet in diameter. But the construction of such cavities might be detected by other means.

In answer to questions, *Mr. McNaughton* explained that for a test of 25 kilotons decoupling would be necessary and that it was important for the hole to be perfectly spherical: natural cavities would therefore be unsuitable. *Sir Solly Zuckerman* emphasised that the construction of such a hole would be an enormous undertaking. *Mr. Rusk* said that a 10 per cent chance of detection was less than had been sought in the past. The traditional United States position was that there should be a fair chance of detecting by seismic means two out of three individual tests covered by a treaty. If this degree of precaution was still required *Mr. McNaughton's* figures should be doubled, i.e., tests of 6 or 50 kilotons might be undetected. *Mr. McNaughton* added that his figures assumed no ground detection stations in the Soviet Union.

2. What can be learned technically from such small underground tests and what will be the military significance of the increased knowledge?

Mr. McNaughton said that increases of several fold in the yield-to-weight ratio could be accomplished for weapons in the low kiloton range (3-10 kilotons). The fraction of fissionable material in thermo-nuclear weapons could be reduced. Some weapons effects tests could be carried out, specifically on the effects of radiation on warhead components, and some studies of hardened structure response. The following weapons effects could not be studied underground: electro-magnetic pulse, blackout, megaton-range ground shock and full-scale interactions of re-entry vehicles.

The necessity of carrying out clandestinely those tests which were practicable would substantially increase both the time-scale and the cost of the programme.

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Studies of these sorts would permit development of a wide range of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons. Underground tests could also lead to improvements, by reducing the proportion of fissionable material, in the warheads of anti-ballistic missiles. However, the warhead was only one component in the necessarily complex A.B.M. system, and the offensive forces had such means of counter-improvement at their disposal that the possible improvements of A.B.M. warheads did not appear to be of great military importance. Underground testing could not be expected to lead to operationally meaningful improvements in strategic warheads.

3. Will atmospheric tests be required to prove out developments made by underground testing?

Mr. McNaughton said that atmospheric tests would not be required for the development of tactical nuclear weapons. Nor were they necessary for improving some components of strategic weapons. However, a significant amount of atmospheric testing would be required:

- (a) to try out significant new designs of strategic weapons which might be based on developments made by underground tests;
- (b) to test the operational effectiveness of anti-ballistic missile systems;
- (c) for a range of significant weapons effects tests.

President Kennedy then read from a document prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Senate Armed Services Committee. This paper raised objections to the latest United States draft nuclear test treaty (of the 24th of May). They wanted an arrangement under which each side would be allowed to conduct 7-10 underground tests a year below a certain threshold. This might be of some interest, they thought, to the Russians who would not then be liable to the type of on-site inspections for which provision is made in the draft treaty. Some inspections would, however, be necessary under the arrangement suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They considered it important that they should be free to demand inspection on the basis of normal intelligence (as opposed to the evidence of seismic detection stations).

The gravest defect of the present draft, in their view, was that it prohibited the United States authorities from testing, and left the Russians free to make advances which might be important. Significant gains could be made by testing in the atmosphere at altitudes of 10-80 kilometres (Mr. Kennedy thought that 10-25 kilometres would be a fairer estimate) in the weapons range up to 30 kilotons. In the Joint Chiefs' view, it would be difficult to detect either these or underground tests in the range between 2 and 5 kilotons.

It was explained that the United States Senate were worried about the vulnerability of Minutemen and indeed of missile warheads. Sir Solly Zuckerman pointed out that the offence would always have the advantage over the defence in the missile field. President Kennedy asked what advantages the United States had gained from their underground tests. Dr. Long said that the MARSHMALLOW test had been significant as regards weapons effects. President Kennedy said that he understood that this meant that warheads were cheaper to produce and used less fissile material. He supposed that this would be an advantage to the Russians if they could make similar advance. Sir Solly Zuckerman pointed out that this would only be an advantage if one envisaged an armoury consisting of thousands of tactical nuclear weapons. Mr. McNaughton pointed out that the calculations in the study made by the Joint Chiefs were based upon a series of pessimistic estimates which they had to make in order to be on the safe side. They were not, however, necessarily realistic.

President Kennedy then said that he would let the Prime Minister know the United States Government's position on the problems raised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Discussion then turned to the visit of Lord Hailsham and Mr. Harriman to Moscow. It was agreed that Mr. Harriman should arrive in London in time for two days of preliminary discussion with Lord Hailsham, and that there should also be full preliminary discussions in London between the junior members of

who be

Mr. Harriman
team 5

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President Kennedy said that the crucial questions in Moscow would be the number of on-site inspections and the size of the area to be inspected. *Lord Home* said that, in discussion with Mr. Rusk, it had been agreed first to explain to the Russians our estimate of the need for on-site inspections and of how they should be conducted, before broaching the question of numbers.

Mr. Macmillan said that the first thing was to see what inducements would lead the Russians to end testing. These might be political in nature.

In the ensuing discussion it was agreed that, so far as the present state of the art was concerned, each side had the advantage at certain points and might wish to freeze the present situation by a test ban. The USSR had the lead in the multi-megaton range of weapons, the United States were ahead in the medium range and downwards. There was an asymmetry of strategic concepts and of weapons which meant that a test ban now might suit both sides.

Mr. Macmillan said that Khrushchev would ultimately be guided on the question of a test ban, not by detailed calculations of advantages to be gained by further testing, but by the broadest political and economic considerations. He might decide that the Russians stood to make substantial economic gains by halting the weapons race, stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and reaching an agreement on non-dissemination, and ultimately on disarmament. Such gains might look all the more attractive to Khrushchev in the light of the Sino-Soviet dispute and of the internal difficulties in the USSR. The decisions involved would be large and would be taken by Khrushchev himself. *Lord Hailsham* said that it seemed best to aim in Moscow at a comprehensive treaty. This was better in itself and as likely to be achieved as a partial treaty. *President Kennedy* again mentioned the possibility of securing an arrangement which permitted 7-10 underground tests yearly. This might be easier for the Senate to confirm. *Mr. Macmillan* suggested that it would be preferable if the Russians themselves could be induced to put this scheme forward as a compromise.

President Kennedy said that once China had started to test it would be very difficult for the United States to keep a test-ban treaty. The question was how the Chinese problem could be introduced with the Russians. The United States had not much information on Chinese plans. The United States Senate was unlikely to approve a treaty without a specific reservation allowing denunciation if other countries started to test. It would probably be necessary to try to have some discussions about China with the Russians. The first object would of course be for everyone to join the treaty. *Mr. Macmillan* asked how near China would be to an effective nuclear capacity even if she did succeed in testing nuclear warheads. *Dr. Long* said that she would be a very long way from an effective nuclear capacity because China's industrial base was too small. *President Kennedy* said that it would be useful to have an appreciation of the progress which China was likely to make as regards both tests and the development of the missiles. He would be grateful if the British would make such an appreciation and he would set one in hand also in the United States. *Mr. Macmillan* said that nuclear weapons were now in comparatively responsible hands and the world knew this. If it was in the joint interest of the Soviet Union and the United States to stop further proliferation of nuclear capacity, then for the first time there would be a joint American-Russian interest in working for a common purpose. This would be very significant and might lead to the two countries co-operating in bringing pressure to bear on the Chinese.

The meeting ended at about 1.15 p.m.

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10 JUL 1963

RECORD NO. 5

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Record of a meeting between the Prime Minister and the President at Birch Grove at 12 noon on Sunday, June 30, 1963.

Present: The Rt. Hon. Harold Macmillan, M.P.
The Prime Minister
The Rt. Hon. The Earl of Home
The Foreign Secretary
The Rt. Hon. Viscount
Hallsham, W.C.
Minister for Science
The Rt. Hon. Duncan Sandys, M.P.
The Commonwealth Secretary
Sir Solly Zuckerman
Ministry of Defence
Sir Harold Caccia
Foreign Office
Sir David Ormsby-Gore
British Ambassador to
Washington
Mr. A.D. Wilson
Foreign Office
Mr. de Zulueta
Private Secretary

The President
Mr. Dean Rusk
Hon. David Bruce
Hon. W.R. Tyler
Dr. F.A. Long
Mr. J.T. McNaughton

Nuclear Tests

Mr. McNaughton gave the answers, as agreed with Dr. Long, and Sir S. Zuckerman, to three questions posed by the Prime Minister and the President as the result of their conversation on the previous evening:

1. what is the maximum size of underground nuclear tests which the U.S.S.R. could repeatedly carry out without significant fear of detection?

Mr. McNaughton said that by testing in carefully chosen soft media, the U.S.S.R. could test up to perhaps 5 KT without decoupling and risk only a 10% chance of detection of

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individual tests by seismic means. This risk would be larger if a series of tests were carried out, and the risk of detection by other kinds of intelligence would also increase. Substantially larger tests, up to perhaps 25 KT, could be carried out with small risk of seismic detection by accomplishing them in spherical underground cavities of 400-500 feet in diameter. But the construction of such cavities might be detected by other means.

In answer to questions, Mr. McNaughton explained that for a test of 25 KT, decoupling would be necessary, and that it was important for the hole to be perfectly spherical: natural cavities would therefore be unsuitable. Sir S. Zuckerman emphasised that the construction of such a hole would be an enormous undertaking. Mr. Rusk said that a 10% chance of detection was less than had been sought in the past. The traditional U.S. position was that there should be a fair chance of detecting by seismic means two out of three individual tests covered by a treaty. If this degree of precaution was still required Mr. McNaughton's figures should be doubled: i.e. tests of 6 or 50 KTs might be undetected. Mr. McNaughton added that his figures assumed no ground detection stations in the Soviet Union.

3. What can be learned technically from such small underground tests and what will be the military significance of the increased knowledge?

Mr. McNaughton said that increases of several fold in the yield-to-weight ratio could be accomplished for weapons in the low kiloton range (3-10 KT). The fraction of fissionable material in thermonuclear weapons could be reduced.

Weapons
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weapons effects tests could be carried out, specifically on the effects of radiation on warhead components, and some studies of hardened structure response. The following weapons effects could not be studied underground: electromagnetic pulse, blackout, megaton-range ground shock, and full-scale interactions of re-entry vehicles.

The necessity of carrying out clandestinely those tests which were practicable would substantially increase both the time-scale and the cost of the programme.

Studies of these sorts would permit development of a wide range of low yield tactical nuclear weapons. Underground tests could also lead to improvements, by reducing the proportion of fissionable material, in the warheads of anti-ballistic missiles. However, the warhead was only one component in the necessarily complex ABM system, and the offensive forces had such means of counter-improvement at their disposal that the possible improvements of ABM warheads did not appear to be of great military importance. Underground testing could not be expected to lead to operationally meaningful improvements in strategic warheads.

3. Will atmospheric tests be required to prove out developments made by underground testing?

Mr. McNaughton said that atmospheric tests would not be required for the development of tactical nuclear weapons. Nor were they necessary for improving some components of strategic weapons. However, a significant amount of atmospheric testing would be required:

- (a) to try out significant new designs of strategic weapons which might be based on developments made by underground tests;

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- (b) to test the operational effectiveness of anti-ballistic missile systems;
- (c) for a range of significant weapons effects tests.

President Kennedy then read from a document prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Senate Armed Services Committee. This paper raised objections to the latest U.S. Draft Nuclear Test Treaty (of May 24). They wanted an arrangement under which each side would be allowed to conduct 7-10 underground tests a year below a certain threshold. This might be of some interest, they thought, to the Russians who would not then be liable to the type of on-site inspections for which provision is made in the draft treaty. Some inspections would however be necessary under the arrangement suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They considered it important that they should be free to demand inspection on the basis of normal intelligence (as opposed to the evidence of seismic detection stations).

The gravest defect of the present draft, in their view, was that it prohibited the U.S. authorities from testing, and left the Russians free to make advances which might be important. Significant gains could be made by testing in the atmosphere at altitudes of 10-80 KM., (the President thought that 10-25KM would be a fairer estimate) in the weapons range up to 30 KT. In the Joint Chiefs' view, it would be difficult to detect either these or underground tests in the range between 2 and 5 KT.

It was explained that the U.S. Senate were worried about the vulnerability of Minutemen and indeed of missile warheads. Sir Solly Zuckerman pointed out that the offence would always

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have the advantage over the defence in the missile field. President Kennedy asked what advantages the U.S. had gained from their underground tests. Dr. Long said that the MARSHMALLOW test had been significant as regards weapons effects.

President Kennedy said that he understood that this meant that warheads were cheaper to produce and used less fissile material. He supposed that this would be an advantage to the Russians if they could make similar advance.

Sir Solly Zuckerman pointed out that this would only be an advantage if one envisaged an armoury consisting of thousands of tactical nuclear weapons. Mr. McNaughton pointed out that the calculations in the study made by the Joint Chiefs were based upon a series of pessimistic estimates which they had to make in order to be on the safe side. They were not, however, necessarily realistic.

President Kennedy then said that he would let the Prime Minister know the U.S. Government position on the problems raised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Discussion then turned to the visit of Lord Hallsham and Mr. Harriman to Moscow. It was agreed that Mr. Harriman should arrive in London in time for two days of preliminary discussion with Lord Hallsham, and that there should also be full preliminary discussions in London between the junior members of the visiting teams.

President Kennedy said that the crucial questions in Moscow would be the number of on-site inspections and the size of the area to be inspected. Lord Home said that, in discussion with Mr. Rusk, it had been agreed first to

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explain to the Russians our estimate of the need for on-site inspections and of how they should be conducted, before broaching the question of numbers.

The Prime Minister said that the first thing was to see what inducements would lead the Russians to end testing. Those might be political in nature.

In the ensuing discussion it was agreed that, so far as the present state of the art was concerned, each side had the advantage at certain points and might wish to freeze the present situation by a test ban. The U.S.S.R. had the lead in the multi-megaton range of weapons, the U. A. were ahead in the medium range and downwards. There was an asymmetry of strategic concepts and of weapons which meant that a test ban now might suit both sides.

The Prime Minister said that Khrushchev would ultimately be guided on the question of a test ban, not by detailed calculations of advantages to be gained by further testing, but by the broadest political and economic considerations. He might decide that the Russians stood to make substantial economic gains by halting the weapons race, stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and reaching an agreement on non-dissemination, and ultimately on disarmament. Such gains might look all the more attractive to Khrushchev in the light of the Sino-Soviet dispute and of the internal difficulties in the U.S.S.R. The decisions involved would be large and would be taken by Khrushchev himself. Lord Hallsham said that it seemed best to aim in Moscow at a comprehensive treaty. This was better in itself and as likely to be achieved as a partial treaty. President Kennedy again mentioned the

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possibility of securing an arrangement which permitted 7-10 underground tests yearly. This might be easier for the Senate to confirm. The Prime Minister suggested that it would be preferable if the Russians themselves could be induced to put this scheme forward as a compromise.

The President said that once China had started to test it would be very difficult for the United States to keep a test ban treaty. The question was how the Chinese problem could be introduced with the Russians. The United States had not much information on Chinese plans. The U.S. Senate was unlikely to approve a treaty without a specific reservation allowing denunciation if other countries started to test. It would probably be necessary to try to have some discussions about China with the Russians. The first object would of course be for everyone to join the treaty. The Prime Minister asked how near China would be to an effective nuclear capacity even if she did succeed in testing nuclear warheads. Dr. Long said that she would be a very long way from an effective nuclear capacity because China's industrial base was too small. The President said that it would be useful to have an appreciation of the progress which China was likely to make as regards both tests and the development of the missiles. He would be grateful if the British would make such an appreciation and he would set one in hand also in the United States. The Prime Minister said that nuclear weapons were now in comparatively responsible hands and the world knew this. If it was in the joint interest of the Soviet Union and the United States to stop further proliferation of nuclear capacity, then for the first

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time there would be a joint American-Russian interest in working for a common purpose. This would be very significant and might lead to the two countries co-operating in bringing pressure to bear on the Chinese.

The meeting ended at about 1.15 p.m.

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APPENDIX A

FRANCE AND A TEST BAN TREATY

The French Government is planning to continue nuclear tests. Further underground tests are likely in the Sahara, and plans are being made for atmospheric tests in the Pacific. These are likely to begin about 1965 and continue at intervals for several years. The Russians may use the fact of continued French tests as a pretext for not reaching agreement on a test ban treaty. In any case, French non-adherence to an agreed treaty might constitute an awkward precedent for other Governments.

2. The Chinese Government is also likely to test before long, and is also unlikely to be deflected from its intentions by any Anglo/United States/Soviet agreement.

3. Agreed Anglo/American policy has been that we should urge the Russians not to make a fuss over France in return for our doing the same over China. If this fails, a possible course would be to try to buy French adherence to a test ban treaty by giving them the secrets that they could only otherwise acquire by testing.

4. This possibility has not hitherto been seriously examined. But we have now learnt

that President Kennedy has sent a message to General de Gaulle to the effect that if a test ban agreement were concluded the United States Government "would have to take account of French interests". This has been interpreted by the French as meaning that the Americans would be prepared to give France nuclear secrets, although Her Majesty's Ambassador in Washington considers it unlikely that the United States Administration have thought out closely how much they would be prepared to do.

5. We are not supposed to know of this approach and it is important that the confidence of our informants should be respected. However, in a message to the Prime Minister on July 4, President Kennedy said he was troubled that General de Gaulle might see nothing to his advantage in any agreement of the sort that might now be possible (probably meaning an agreement involving both nuclear tests and some kind of non-

/ aggression

... and ... but - July 9, 1963
 Brief for Harriman / Hackham files; "Nuclear Test Ban"
 Methods of Security Assurance by Other Govts

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aggression part), and "we are thinking hard here about possible ways of leading him to a less negative attitude". He asked if the Prime Minister had any thoughts.

6. If an offer of nuclear secrets were made, it would place General de Gaulle in a difficult position. It would save the French a great deal of time and money and might be very hard to refuse outright. But General de Gaulle would probably much dislike it. Generally he would feel that he was being dragged along behind an American chariot. He would be facilitating a Russo-American agreement, to which on general grounds he is opposed. He would feel that he was compromising the independence of his nuclear force since he would have to rely on the "Anglo-Saxons" for technical secrets, if not for actual warheads, and might have to allow Americans or British into his nuclear establishments.

7. If he felt it impossible to refuse such an offer directly, General de Gaulle might therefore try to drag out negotiations indefinitely in the hope that something might happen to get him off the hook; or he might make agreement impossible by making a condition that China and perhaps all other countries should also join in a test ban.

8. A new element has been introduced into this problem by Mr. Zorin's telling the French Ambassador in Moscow that Russia would agree to France conducting a certain number of tests if she joined the test ban talks (and presumably a test ban treaty). This may suggest a new way of overcoming difficulties over French participation, though it is hard to see how a test ban treaty permitting atmospheric tests could be signed. Perhaps France might undertake to adhere by some fixed but later date. In any case it suggests that the Russians are comparatively relaxed about the French position.

9. Whatever action is taken by the United States Government along the lines of paragraphs 5 and 6 above, it is most unlikely to be paralleled by the Russians and might indeed put them in an embarrassing position, vis-à-vis the Chinese.

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