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FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET) AND
WHITEHALL (SECRET) (CABINET) (R)
DISTRIBUTION

Sir D. Ormsby Gore

No. 29
January 3, 1962

D. 3.01 a.m. January 4, 1962
R. 4.45 a.m. January 4, 1962

IMMEDIATE

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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 29 of January 3.
Repeated for information to:- Bonn Moscow
and Saving to:- Paris
U.K. Del. N.A.T.O.
U.K. Mission New York

Berlin: Mr Thompson's conversation with Mr. Gromyko.

At the Ambassadorial Group meeting this afternoon Mr. Bohlen read out Mr. Thompson's telegram reporting his conversation. The following is the gist.

2. The conversation lasted 2½ hours, and began with Mr. Thompson making a literal presentation on the basis of his instructions except that he did not stop at paragraph 4 (i.e. the all-Berlin solution).

3. Mr. Gromyko said that Mr. Thompson's presentation required serious thought and consideration. However, he was prepared to give preliminary reactions. He noted that the United States Government thought that access was the main problem. He disagreed. The main problem was to achieve a peace treaty putting an end to World War II. Access was important, but was only part of a peace treaty. It was not possible to deal with access alone. Discussions on access without linking it with other problems would be tantamount to accepting the other side's position. He recalled that the President and Mr. Rusk had used a "complicated formulation" in describing the scope of their talks with him. The conversations covered many questions all related to drawing a line under World War II.

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4. Mr. Gromyko continued that the Soviet Government wanted an agreement on a peace treaty to be signed with both German States. If the West would not do this, Russia, together with other States, would be prepared to sign a separate peace treaty with all the ensuing consequences. If no agreement was possible, it would be the responsibility of the allies to make arrangements for access with the G.D.R. The Russians did not rule out Four-Power agreement prior to a peace treaty. Such an agreement would establish a status for West Berlin, Russia and other States would then conclude a peace treaty with the D.D.R. to which the West Berlin agreement could be appended. He agreed that this could include an agreement on allied access. Such an agreement would not be contradictory to the allied position as he believed he had understood it in the conversations with the President and Mr. Rusk.

5. Mr. Gromyko went on to say that if an understanding on West Berlin were reached it would be possible to resolve the access question in a way satisfactory to all three parties, viz the allies, the Soviet Union and the G.D.R. It would be necessary to respect the sovereign rights of the G.D.R. Prior agreement on the status of West Berlin would open the possibility of agreement on access. Mr. Gromyko considered that it was possible to reach agreement on this problem as well as on other questions which had been mentioned in his conversations with the President and Mr. Rusk. He emphasized that access could not be isolated from the resolution of other questions, including Berlin and Germany and the wider problem of European security.

6. Mr. Gromyko then took up Mr. Thompson's remark that the former had seemed to understand in New York that the Western Powers could not recognize the G.D.R. either de jure or de facto. He was apprehensive that the United States might have obtained the wrong impression. In fact, the West already recognized the G.D.R. de facto. He cited Mr. Khrushchev to the effect that the preferable course would be for both German States to be recognized and to become members of the United Nations. But this was a matter for each government to decide for itself. The existence of the G.D.R. was a fact which must be recognized. The Soviet Government had no representation in Portugal or Ireland, but this did not mean that they did not recognize these two countries as States. Mr. Gromyko hoped that the United States
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would take a position more in line with realities. He believed it was possible to reach an agreement on a basis satisfactory to both sides, but it was essential that the realities of the situation should be accepted.

7. Mr. Gromyko then turned to questions relating to Berlin and the wall. On these matters, he said, the Soviet and G.D.R. position was well known. Recent steps had been taken by the G.D.R., with Soviet approval, in response to threats from West Berlin and to the United States desire to use West Berlin as a centre of subversion. The checking of documents stemmed from G.D.R. sovereignty. When Russians crossed into West Berlin they presented documents. Both sides should follow the same procedures. Mr. Gromyko did not consider that the situation in Berlin should lead to complications. There were more important questions involved in the main task of avoiding a collision.

8. Mr. Gromyko said that the status of West Berlin must be changed. It was quite impossible to maintain it in view of the threat constituted by the present situation in Central Europe. The decision of the Soviet Government announced at the Party Congress not to insist on December 31 as a fatal date should not be misconstrued. This decision was taken to facilitate agreement with the Western Powers. Mr. Gromyko was surprised at Mr. Thompson's references to an all-Berlin solution. If an attempt were made to proceed on this basis, no discussions would be possible. This question could not be discussed. East Berlin was integrated into the G.D.R. The problem in Berlin arose from the fact that West Berlin had a different social system from the surrounding country. He concluded by saying that the Soviet position was designed to facilitate agreement with the West.

9. Mr. Thompson took up the question of controls on the sector boundary. The East German actions were an attempt to force us to accept East German sovereignty. The American position regarding a peace treaty was well known. They thought there should be one treaty with one Germany. He acknowledged that final agreement on access could not be reached without knowledge of other aspects of the whole problem. But access was vitally important whether or not agreement was reached on Berlin. He asked Mr. Gromyko what the latter meant by "respecting the sovereignty of the G.D.R.". What did it imply

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control of travel to and from West Berlin? He reiterated Mr. Rusk's remark about not buying the same horse again and again. If there was agreement on Berlin but access was not secure, this would not be satisfactory. One means of arranging access would be a corridor under the exclusive control of the three Western Powers. Another means might be an international access authority for Berlin. At this point Mr. Thompson quoted from BQD-37, including the points about the governing body and the control of operations in the air corridor and the Berlin Air Safety Centre. He stressed that arrangements on these lines would greatly reduce the possibility of friction. He hoped serious consideration would be given to them.

10. Mr. Thompson continued that an all-Berlin solution would be preferable. If it was rejected it would have a serious effect upon what the West might be willing to do in other directions. His Government would be prepared to discuss questions other than access but progress on these was dependent upon what could be done about access.

11. Mr. Grayke took up Mr. Thompson's question about respect for the sovereignty of the G.D.R. He said that by signing the peace treaty to which was appended a prior Four-Power agreement, the G.D.R. would give its consent to this agreement and become one of the parties. The G.D.R. consent would be not only to the form of the agreement but also to its substance. By accepting these obligations the G.D.R. would be protecting its sovereignty. Any agreement should contain clauses respecting G.D.R. sovereignty.

12. As for the idea of corridors, the Russian position on Mr. Thompson's first alternative was well known. This proposal was entirely incompatible with G.D.R. sovereignty. On the second proposal, he could not give a definitive answer but had the impression that it would create a State within a State. He would give detailed study to it and comment later. It was unacceptable to isolate access from the rest of the problem. The President and Mr. Rusk had not put such limitations on the discussions he had had with them. The major problem was to write finis to World War II. Did the American proposal for an international authority involve a specific highway?

13. Mr. Thompson replied that the United States Government had thought the existing Helmstedt-West Berlin highway could be used. They had also given consideration to the construction of

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a new road. He made it clear that the proposal would exclude unauthorized exit or entry to East Germany. He repeated the provisions relating to the air corridors and B.A.S.C.

14. Mr. Gromyko confirmed that the Russian position was that it was possible to reach agreement on freedom of access. This would be respected by the G.D.R. along with the establishment of a free city of West Berlin.

15. Mr. Thompson said he wished to be particularly clear about what "free access" meant. It should mean freedom of travel to and from Berlin. Agreement on this point would be very important in facilitating agreement on other points.

16. Mr. Gromyko replied that prior agreement on a West Berlin status could include access and the G.D.R. would respect this. He thought it would be possible to reach agreement on access provided there was agreement on other points. He refused to be pinned down.

17. Mr. Thompson said that if an all-Berlin solution was rejected this would restrict the possibilities for agreement on other points. It was important to agree on access even if on nothing else. He noted that Mr. Gromyko had referred to a free city of West Berlin. He would not go into this at the present meeting but the fact that he said nothing about it did not mean that the proposal was acceptable. Mr. Gromyko asked what the point of the talks would be if there was to be no change in the status of West Berlin. Mr. Thompson replied that the point was to avoid a very dangerous situation.

18. Mr. Gromyko concluded the interview by saying that the big powers had a very heavy responsibility. He was ready to continue the talks that day or at any time in the future. There was much to discuss.

19. Please see my immediately following telegram.

Foreign Office please pass to Bonn and Moscow and Saving to Paris and U.K. Del. N.A.T.O. as my telegrams Nos. 1, 3, 11 and 8.

[Repeated as requested].

ADVANCE COPIES

Private Secretary	Mr Duncan Wilson
Minister of State (Mr Godber)	Head of Central Department
Sir. H. Caccia	Head of W.O.P.D.
Sir. E. Shuckburgh	Head of Northern Department
	Head of News Department

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FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

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RECEIVED BY
6 JAN 1962
CG 1071/e (A)

Sir D. Ormsby-Gere

No. 59 D. 1.30 a.m. January 6, 1962
January 5, 1962 R. 2.40 a.m. January 6, 1962

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 59 of
January 5.

Repeated for information to:- Bonn
Moscow
And Saving to :- Paris U.K. Del. N.A.T.O.
U.K. Mission New York

Your telegram No. 129: Berlin. CG 1071/e

I talked to Mr. Rusk today and he said he would be quite happy that your discussions in Bonn should be pursued along the lines set out in paragraph 2 of your telegram. He did, however, suggest that on (111) (a) and (b) it might be wise to avoid precision. The one thing he felt we must guard against at the present moment was frightening the Germans about the concessions that might become necessary in a negotiation and so encourage them to line up once more with the French against the Anglo-Saxons.

2. For the same reason his first reaction was to doubt whether the time had come to get the Germans to accept a particular formula with regard to East German sovereignty as is suggested in your paragraph 3(1). Gromyko's reference to Russia's relationship with Portugal during his talks with Thompson might indicate that what the Russians minded about was how we acted towards the East German authorities rather than how we described our relationship with them. In addition he thought that our final attitude on this might well depend on how things developed over the international access authority and the part which the East Germans might be allowed to play in this body.

3. More particularly with regard to your paragraph 3 (11), he confirmed that the Americans had the same feelings as ourselves and

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Washington telegram No. 59 to Foreign Office

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thought that East German representation on the authority might prove to be the necessary bait in order to get the Russians to swallow the idea. But here again he thought it hardly necessary to press the Germans on this at the present moment.

4. On your paragraph 3(11), he hesitated to give any firm opinion and said he would study it further, but as at Bermuda he thought we should try and avoid the specific word "trusteeship" since this had acquired a precise connotation which could be embarrassing to us. He did not have the same objections to a general phrase such as "a trust on behalf of the German nation pending reunification". Mr. Rusk's preliminary reaction on the whole idea contained in your telegram No. 126 was that in spite of the opening statement in paragraph 5(a), a declaration such as this might unduly erode our rights in Berlin. He tried to suggest that there was nothing wrong with "occupation rights" and that the Russians might be prepared to accept no change in the status of West Berlin. I strongly contested this and said that all the evidence we had went to show that Khrushchev was adamant that there would be no agreement unless there at least appeared to have been some change of status, nor would we feel that we were on very strong ground in insisting on an "occupation regime" seventeen years after the end of the war. Surely our relationship with West Berlin could be brought to conform more nearly to peacetime practice with the West Berlin authorities more in the position of partners rather than conquered subjects? Mr. Rusk conceded this and said that they would think seriously about it, but I do not expect them to come up with any concrete ideas before your visit to Bonn.

5. Mr. Rusk said he would be meeting the President later in the evening to discuss what further instructions should be sent to Thompson in Moscow, but he was not sure whether these would be available for your comments before you left London.

+Foreign Office please pass to Bonn and Moscow and Saving to Paris and U.K. Del. N.A.T.O. as my telegrams Nos. 5, 7, 17 and 14.

[Repeated as requested]

- ADVANCE COPIES:
 Private Secretary
 Mr. Marett
 Head of Central Department
 Resident Clerk

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FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET) AND
WHITEHALL (SECRET) (CABINET)
DISTRIBUTION

Sir D. Ormsby Gore

No. 99

January 11, 1962

D. 6.38 p.m. January 11, 1962

R. 7.55 p.m. January 11, 1962

PRIORITY

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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 99 of January 11.

Repeated for information Saving to: U.K. Del. NATO

Bonn

Paris

Berlin Military Operations.

At a military sub-group meeting on January 10, Mr. Nitze suggested that there should be a discussion in the sub-group of military operations beyond the limited ones relating to ground and air access planned by Live Oak on which we had been concentrating. This discussion might also cover the phasing of military operations as they expanded in scope and gravity. Mr. Nitze thought that such a discussion would be of value even before the expanded NATO plans, (the contents of which were known to the Americans and had been taken into account), were available.

2. Mr. Nitze said that the Americans had found it convenient to consider military operations connected with the Berlin crisis in four phases:

(i) initial military action of a reconnaissance nature, e.g. Free Style and Jack Pine. The purpose of these was to establish whether the Russians were determined to block access by military action.

(ii) Assuming that operations in the first phase did not lead to escalation, we might wish to have a military pause, during which we would take other actions such as serious non-military counter-measures, action at the United Nations, possibly blockade measures of some kind, and steps to improve our military readiness.

(iii) Assuming that phases (i) and (ii) had not led to the reopening of access, we might then move to stronger conventional measures. Mr. Nitze included Trade Wind in this phase.

(iv) Assuming that the measures in phase (iii) failed

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3. There was general agreement that a discussion of these matters would be worth while. Mr. Nitze then went on to give some preliminary comments on the way the Americans saw the nuclear balance of strength and its relationship to Berlin. He explained that this exposition was on similar lines to that given by Mr. McNamara to Mr. Watkinson and to the North Atlantic Council last month.

4. A fuller account of Mr. Nitze's statement, (which he prefaced by saying that he had deliberately not sought to put his thoughts on paper at this stage), and of the discussion which followed is being sent to you by bag. It was agreed that the sub-group would return to the subject on January 17.

Foreign Office pass Saving to U.K. Del. NATO, Paris, and Bonn as my telegrams Nos. 21, 25 and 5.

[Repeated as requested]

*don't mind this being discussed as an
I don't mind this being discussed as an
academic exercise.
But it must be clear that
political approval is necessary
even for stage (i)*

Hm

12/11

DEFE 4/142 COS (62) 5th Meeting, 16 January 1962

1/16/62

b. BERLIN CONTINGENCY - PLANNING

TOP SECRET

ii. Phasing of Military Operations

THE COMMITTEE had before them a Minute by the Secretary on a request by the Foreign Office for their views on American proposals for expanded military operations and their phasing. A further Minute by the Secretary, a telegram from the Chairman, British Defence Staffs, Washington and three telegrams from the British Ambassador Washington were relevant.

LORD MOUNTBATTEN said that the American proposals raised a number of important issues which should be examined by the Joint Planning Staff and a report thereon circulated for their consideration at their meeting the following week. In the meantime it was necessary to inform Sir George Mills of the position and he circulated a draft telegram.

In discussion the following points were made:-

- (a) It was not clear whether the plans now under consideration were purely US plans or whether they were the NATO plans being prepared by General Norstad. Judging from the expositions given by Mr. Macnamara to the Minister of Defence it was likely that they were the NATO plans.
- (b) General Norstad's view on the US proposal, was that the expanded plans, having been prepared on the instructions of the North Atlantic Council should be processed through NATO channels and that the Ambassadorial Group was not the proper body to discuss them.
- (c) The NATO plans were expected to be approved by General Norstad very shortly. They would then be submitted to the Standing Group and copies would be sent to NATO countries. At their meeting on the previous day General Norstad had emphasized that they represented no more than a catalogue of alternatives and did not necessarily have his support. Since they had been prepared on the authority of the North Atlantic Council their preparation could not be challenged, but it might well be necessary to register reservations on some or all of them for political or other reasons.
- (d) The Foreign Office were despatching a telegram of guidance to the UK representative on the Ambassadorial Group containing guidance on the same lines as the draft telegram to Sir George Mills.

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& Washington to F.O. Ho.99, 19 Saving
and 20 Saving.

The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.

It is issued for the personal use of C. L.

~~TOP SECRET~~ Copy No. 25
DEFE 4/142 COS(62)7th Meeting, 23 January 1962, Minute 4, CA

CIRCULATED FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF

JP(62)6(Final)

19th January, 1962

SPECIALLY RESTRICTED
CIRCULATION

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

JOINT PLANNING STAFF

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING - PHASING OF
MILITARY OPERATIONS

Report by the Joint Planning Staff

In accordance with the instructions⁺ of the Chief of the Defence Staff, we have examined American suggestions[@] for the scope and phasing of military operations in relation to the Berlin situation, and have taken into account a telegram⁶ from the Chairman, British Defence Staffs, Washington.

2. We have consulted the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Joint Intelligence Staff. Our report is at Annex I and a draft telegram to the Chairman, British Defence Staffs, Washington is at Annex II.

Recommendation

3. We recommend that, if they approve our report, the Chiefs of Staff should:-

- (a) Invite the Ministry of Defence to forward it to the Foreign Office as an expression of their views.
- (b) Authorize the despatch of the telegram at Annex II to the Chairman, British Defence Staffs, Washington.

(Signed) D.L. POWELL-JONES
A.M. LEWIS
E.V.M. STRICKLAND
D.C. STAPLETON

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

+ COS.61/15/4/62
@ Washington to Foreign Office No.19
Saving and No.20 Saving
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DEFE 4/142

TOP SECRET

COS(62) 7th Meeting, 23 Jan. 1962 / JP(62) 6(F), 19 Jan. 1962
Minute 4

Annex I to JP(62)6(Final)

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING - PHASING OF
MILITARY OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

1. In the Ambassadorial Group in Washington the Americans have put forward certain new ideas⁶ regarding the scope and phasing of military operations in relation to the Berlin situation. Sir George Mills has drawn attention⁵ to the importance of these proposals under discussion, and has referred to his previously expressed view⁶ that the West needs to re-examine its ideas on the risks of escalation when considering the extent of military operations in relation to Berlin.
2. The Foreign Office have asked for comments on these latest American suggestions, and the Chairman, British Defence Staffs, Washington, requires guidance.

AIM

3. To examine and report on the military implications of these United States proposals.

THE UNITED STATES PROPOSALS

4. The Americans consider the possible development of military operations in four phases:-
 - (a) Phase 1. The initial phase in which operations would be of a reconnaissance nature to determine whether the Russians were really serious and intended to block air and/or ground access by military action.
 - (b) Phase 2. A pause, assuming we had the choice, in which we would take such political action as going to the United Nations, strong economic counter-measures and possibly blockade of some kind; and to prepare for further military operations by reinforcing tripartite forces and taking appropriate NATO alert measures.
 - (c) Phase 3. Stronger military measures, assuming that the first two phases had not led to the re-opening of access.
 - (d) Phase 4. Nuclear action.

They have pointed out that, although the first phase is covered by agreed quadripartite plans, there is no agreement on what further action should be taken if the Russians persisted in denying access. They suggest that the second phase might be short or indeed non-existent. They consider that the nature of military operations in the third phase is a matter for discussion, and accept that TRADE WIND is one possibility. Finally, they consider that nuclear action in all its variations should be considered as a separate phase.

Annex I (Continued)

5. In considering the nuclear balance of power and its relationship to Berlin the Americans maintain that:-

- (a) The West has nuclear superiority, and that the Russians share this view. Even if the Soviets were to launch a strategic nuclear attack first they could not avoid very serious destruction to themselves, and the outcome in strictly military terms would be unfavourable to the Soviet Union.
- (b) The danger of nuclear destruction was greater for Europe than for the United States, but was very serious for both. The Western objective therefore was to avoid nuclear war.
- (c) The Russians take this nuclear relationship very seriously, and would not go to nuclear war except as a matter of considered national policy.
- (d) The preservation of the freedom of West Berlin is more important to the West than is its denial to the Soviet Union. The Russians know this.

The Americans therefore argue that the West could take a forceful position with respect to Berlin and should be able to succeed in a contest of wills. The Russians were trying to capitalize on the exposed position of Berlin and on their ability to assemble stronger conventional forces, but this did not outweigh the restraints on the Soviet Union owing to their recognition of Western nuclear superiority.

OUR COMMENTS

General

6. We have now received[&], in outline, General Norstad's NATO plans for wider military operations. We have also now heard^z that the actions being canvassed by Mr. Nitze in Washington are directly related to these plans. Although these American ideas have been introduced into the Ambassadorial Group with a view to obtaining quadripartite agreement, we emphasize that final decision cannot be reached on them until they have been processed through NATO.

7. We do not think that the American arguments on the nuclear balance of power and its applicability to the Berlin situation justify the conclusion that Soviet reaction to Western military measures will necessarily be restrained. The United Kingdom view^p is that the Russians would not initiate all-out nuclear war for any reason as a matter of considered national policy. We believe the danger of war lies in a miscalculation by either side, with even a minor military clash carrying the inherent risk of escalation.

8. In our view the progression of events over the Berlin situation is likely to involve a combination of politico, military action designed to solve the Berlin situation with the least

& Annex to COS.1545/15/12/61 and
Confidential Annex to COS(62)4th Meeting
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Annex I (Continued)

disadvantage to the West. We see this progression in the following stages:-

- (a) Communist political demands requiring some alteration to the status of the Western Power guarantees over Berlin.
- (b) Initiation of Allied political and military preparations, including certain NATO alert measures, to maintain their rights.
- (c) Communist restrictions imposed on Allied access.
- (d) Allied action, including:-
 - (i) Appropriate NATO and national alerts.
 - (ii) Attempts to restore access without force.
 - (iii) The use of force, if necessary.
- (e) Communist reaction to the measures in (d) above.
- (f) Further Allied action, as necessary, including:-
 - (i) Reinforcement of operations already initiated.
 - (ii) Wider military action.
 - (iii) Nuclear operations.

We see the present position as already entering the stage at (b) above.

9. It would be useful if the above progression could be accepted as the background for future discussions, so that the actions and plans to deal with the Berlin situation can be seen in their entirety. So far individual measures have not been considered against the comprehensive background. In particular:-

- (a) Political and military plans must march in step.
- (b) Military plans for all stages should be ready by the end of the stage at 8(b) above.
- (c) Allied plans should in all stages both allow for a pause and demonstrate without doubt the risk of escalation inherent in each step.

10. We consider below the nature of the military measures which might be worthwhile in the four phases enumerated by the Americans. Until full details of the NATO plans for wider operations are received, our assessment is based on our general impression of their military feasibility and on the likely Russian reactions. So far only the outline operational concept is known in London.

Phase I - Initial Operations

11. We agree with the Americans that the first military task in this phase is to establish the Soviet intentions in regard

Annex I (Continued)

to denial of air and/or ground access. We also agree with General Norstad that swift and effective response may deter the Soviets/GDR from further obstructive measures. Before military operations began we would see NATO support being sought and appropriate NATO alert measures having been initiated. Military operations in this phase would then, we consider, extend to:-

- (a) Ground. FREE STYLE Course 'C', which provides for a stronger force than Courses 'A' and 'B', and more capable of surmounting obstacles and protecting itself if fired on; and BACK STROKE which is a similar company group operation launched from the Berlin end of the autobahn.
- (b) Air. JACK PINE operations up to but excluding attacks on AA/SAM sites. The latter we consider should not be undertaken until NATO has reached an adequate state of alert. Moreover as they are retaliatory measures we believe they would be more appropriate to Phase 3.

Phase 2 - the "Pause"

12. We are concerned at the implication in the current American ideas that the pause might only be short, or indeed non-existent. We consider that if there is to be the best chance of preventing general war, it is essential to ensure a pause long enough to permit strong political and economic pressures to be brought to bear in order to persuade the Russians to negotiate, action to be taken by the United Nations, further appropriate NATO alert measures to be taken, and reinforcements from France, the United Kingdom and the United States to move to ACE. We have not looked on a pause as constituting a specific phase in such operations, but only as an interval between successive military measures. Further, it is difficult to see any military advantage in the Western Powers "pausing" directly after the Russians have interfered with access to Berlin. Militarily a pause has value only after we have made some effective response. All measures must be designed to convince the Russians of Western determination to defend its rights by force if necessary. We emphasize our previous view² that no military operations after the initial probes would appear convincing to the Russians unless accompanied by Western mobilization and readiness for war.

Phase 3 - Wider Conventional Operations

8

13. Plans now exist, or are under preparation for:-

- (a) Tripartite Autobahn Operations. TRADE WIND (battalion group) and JUNE BALL (division-size force) to be launched from HELMSTEDT; LUCKY STRIKE (battalion group) to be launched from Berlin.
- (b) NATO Air Operations
 - (i) BERCON ALPHA 1 - A large-scale fighter escort operation in a Berlin corridor.
 - (ii) BERCON ALPHA 2 - A conventional battle for air superiority over East Berlin.

Annex I (Continued)

(c) NATO Ground Operations

- (i) BERCON CHARLIE 1 - Reinforced division attack along the axis HELMSTEDT - Berlin.
- (ii) BERCON CHARLIE 2 - Two-division attack in front of the Kassel area.
- (iii) BERCON CHARLIE 3 - Three-division attack from HELMSTEDT along the line of the Mittelland Canal to the Elbe river.
- (iv) BERCON CHARLIE 4 - Three-division attack from the Thuringer - Wald.

General Norstad has emphasized that these plans represent no more than a catalogue of possible measures and do not necessarily have his support.

14. The advantage of TRADE WIND, possibly backed up by JUNE BALE, is that by being initially confined to the autobahn, it would legally assert the Allied rights of access to Berlin. In a previous examination⁸, however, we concluded that this operation has severe military disadvantages in that the Communists could either force the West to fire first or bring it to an ignominious halt.

15. The BERCON land operations would take time to mount, and the preparations would become known to the Russians, who are in a position to reinforce rapidly their existing conventional forces in East Germany. These already have powerful tactical nuclear support. Adequate air defence and air support for land operations would be essential and this would necessitate extensive conventional air operations which would probably involve attacking enemy airfields and thus extending the battle area. The BERCON air plans also might lead to large-scale conventional air operations. The possibility of counter-action by the Russians against our airfields reinforces the need for the West to be at a suitable state of readiness before any significant conventional air action is initiated. Further, if our readiness to resort to air-delivered nuclear weapons is to remain unimpaired, reinforcement of the NATO conventional air potential might be necessary.

16. Probable Russian reaction⁴ to conventional offensive operations would be to oppose the Allied attacks with overwhelming conventional forces, possibly countering the Western initiative by similar operations of their own (General Norstad has expressed⁸ his concern at the vulnerability of Hamburg and Munich to a Russian riposte to an Allied limited offensive). Apart from the military irrelevance of BERCON CHARLIE 2 to 4 to the main purpose of re-opening access to Berlin, we do not consider that the Russians would accept the humiliation of losing East German territory to a conventional attack which their superior forces would eventually be able to deal with. Rather, we believe that to restore the situation they would accept the risk that the Allies might resort to nuclear weapons.

17. We therefore consider that the BERCON ALPHA 2 and BERCON CHARLIE conventional operations would not necessarily persuade

8 Annex to COS(61)228
/ JIC(61)69
& Confidential Annex to
COS(62)4th Meeting

Annex I (Continued)

the Russians to negotiate, are militarily suspect, and in the event of an Allied reverse would place the West in a worse bargaining position. BERCON ALPHA 1 might however prove acceptable when we have examined the detailed plan.

Phase 4 - Nuclear Operations

18. The BERCON air and ground operations (paragraph 13 above) are all being planned with a nuclear annex so that they can, if necessary, be conducted as nuclear operations. There is a further NATO plan for an air operation (BERCON BRAVO) using five low-yield, air-burst nuclear weapons against selected targets with the object of demonstrating the Western will to use nuclear weapons.

19. Three possible courses⁴ of military action would be open to the Soviet leaders in the event of any of these plans being implemented in their nuclear form:-

- (a) To permit access to Berlin to be re-opened, calculating that the probability of global war was so great that the risk could no longer be accepted, and that they could now employ the Allied use of nuclear weapons as a pretext for withdrawal and as a propaganda weapon which would compensate them for their defeat.
- (b) To retaliate with nuclear weapons in the battlefield area, calculating that even now the West would shrink from global war.
- (c) To launch a pre-emptive strategic nuclear attack calculating that global war was now inevitable and that they could not afford to allow the Allies the advantage of first strike.

20. We consider that to initiate offensive nuclear operations, particularly if not directly related to Berlin air and ground access as in the Kassel and Thuringer-Wald areas, might cause the Russians to believe they were in imminent danger of general attack and to launch a pre-emptive strategic nuclear attack. We do not therefore think there is any justification for BERCON CHARLIE 2, 3 and 4 nuclear operations, but we suggest a possible adaptation of BERCON CHARLIE 1 in paragraph 21 below. Until we have seen the detailed plans we are unable to express an opinion on the proposed use of nuclear support for ALPHA 1 and 2.

21. There remains BERCON BRAVO. This operation embodies the concept of discriminate use of nuclear weapons in order to obtain a political decision. However, if it is to be anything more than "a shot across the bows", it would have to appear directly to improve our military position. In any case, it could only be undertaken if the Allies had achieved sufficient readiness both to meet and undertake all-out nuclear attack. Accordingly

Handwritten notes:
All 3 possible
prolongation
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8

Annex I (Concluded)

We believe that a more effective form of BERCON BRAVO would be in support of a division-size operation to restore access on the autobahn, such as possibly JUNE BALL or BERCON CHARLIE 1.

CONCLUSIONS

22. We conclude that:-

- (a) While it will be difficult to avoid discussing, in the Ambassadorial Group, the American ideas on the scope and phasing of military operations, they should in any case be raised in the Standing Group after General Norstad's reactions have been obtained.
- (b) The American arguments on the nuclear balance of power and its applicability to Berlin, as so far disclosed to us, would not appear to justify the conclusion that Soviet reaction to Western military measures will be restrained by recognition of Western nuclear superiority.
- (c) Military measures comprising Phase 1 as proposed by the Americans should extend to FREE STYLE (Course 'C'), BACK STROKE, JACK PINE (excluding ground suppression operations), and initial NATO alert measures.
- (d) The pause allowed for as the American Phase 2 is essential for political and economic pressure to be brought to bear on the Russians, for reinforcements to move to ACE and for NATO to mobilize.
- (e) In the American's proposed Phase 3 the conventional operations BERCON ALPHA 2 and BERCON CHARLIE are militarily suspect. In the event of an Allied reverse we believe they would place the West in a worse bargaining position. BERCON ALPHA 1 might, however, prove acceptable when we have examined the detailed plan.
- (f) We are unable to express an opinion on the proposals, on the American Phase 4, for nuclear support to operations until we are in possession of more details. However, we believe that the concept of the limited use of nuclear weapons to persuade the Russians of Western determination (BERCON BRAVO) might better be applied in support of a division-size operation to restore access on the autobahn, such as possibly JUNE BALL or BERCON CHARLIE 1.

23. We finally conclude that the Berlin problem ought now to be approached on more comprehensive politico/military lines, such as are outlined in paragraph 8 above, rather than in the four military phases now proposed by the Americans.

Annex II to JP(62)6(Final)

DRAFT

FROM: MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, LONDON
TO: BDS, WASHINGTON

PRIORITY

COS(W)

For Chairman from CDS

January, 1962

Reference (A) Washington to Foreign Office No.19 and
20 Saving

(B) Your GM 245 and 246

(C) COS(61)228

1. While we appreciate that it will be difficult to avoid discussing, in the Ambassadorial Group, the American ideas on the scope and phasing of military operations, they will in any case have to be raised in the Standing Group after General Norstad's reactions have been obtained.
2. We think the American arguments on the nuclear balance of power and its applicability to Berlin, as so far disclosed to us, would not appear to justify the conclusion that Soviet reaction to Western military measures will be restrained by recognition of Western nuclear superiority. Our view is that the Russians would not initiate all-out nuclear war for any reason as a matter of considered national policy. The danger of war lies in a miscalculation by either side, with even a minor military clash carrying the inherent risk of escalation.
3. In our view the progression of events over the Berlin situation is likely to involve a combination of politico/military action designed to solve the Berlin situation with the least disadvantage to the West. We see this progression in the following stages:-

- (a) Communist political demands requiring some alteration to the status of the Western Power guarantees over Berlin.

Annex II (Continued)

- (b) Initiation of Allied political and military preparations, including certain NATO alert measures, to maintain their rights.
- (c) Communist restrictions imposed on Allied access.
- (d) Allied action, including:-
 - (i) Appropriate NATO and national alerts.
 - (ii) Attempts to restore access without force.
 - (iii) The use of force, if necessary.
- (e) Communist reaction to the measures in (d) above.
- (f) Further Allied action, as necessary, including:-
 - (i) Reinforcement of operations already initiated.
 - (ii) Wider military action.
 - (iii) Nuclear operations.

We see the present position as already entering the stage at (b) above.

4. It would be useful if the above progression could be accepted as the background for future discussions, so that the actions and plans to deal with the Berlin situation can be seen in their entirety.

5. We consider the extent of military measures in Phase 1 should be judged not only by the need to establish Soviet intentions in regard to denial of air and/or ground access, but also on the basis that swift and effective response may deter the Soviets/GDR from further obstructive measures. We consider military operations should extend to FREE STYLE Course 'C', BACK STROKE and JACK PINE (excluding ground suppression measures). Before these began we would see NATO support being sought and appropriate NATO alert measures having been initiated.

6. We are concerned at the implication in the current American ideas that the Phase 2 pause might be short or even non-existent, if there is to be the best chance of preventing general war, it

Annex II (Concluded)

is essential to ensure a pause long enough to permit strong political and economic pressure to be brought to bear, reinforcements to move to ACE, and appropriate NATO alert measures, extending to mobilization, to be taken.

7. You know from Reference (C) our views on TRADE WIND and JUNE BALL.

8. We cannot comment fully on the NATO plans which might be implemented in Phases 3 and 4 until we have had opportunity to study them in detail. Our preliminary views, based mainly on JIC assessment of Russian reactions (JIC(61)69), are:-

(a) BERCON ALPHA 2 and all BERCON CHARLIE conventional operations would not necessarily persuade the Russians to negotiate, are militarily suspect and, in the event of an Allied reverse, would place the West in a worse bargaining position. BERCON ALPHA 1 might prove acceptable.

(b) Without more details we cannot comment usefully on BERCON CHARLIE 2, 3 and 4 nuclear operations. At first sight, however, we fear they may entail an unacceptable risk of precipitating Russian pre-emptive strategic nuclear attack.

9. We believe that the concept of the limited use of nuclear weapons to persuade the Russians of Western determination (BERCON BRAVO) might better be applied in support of a division-size operation to restore access on the autobahn, such as possibly JUNE BALL or BERCON CHARLIE 1.

1/23/62

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CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX

TO

C.O.S. (62) 7TH MEETING HELD ON
TUESDAY, 23RD JANUARY 1962

4. BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

(Previous Reference: C.O.S. (62) 5th Meeting, Minute 5)

J.P. (62) 6 (Final)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a report by the Joint Planning Staff examining the military implications of certain United States proposals on the scope and phasing of military operations in relation to the Berlin situation. A Secretary's minute[®] covering a note by the Joint Intelligence Committee on these proposals and a telegram[®] from the Chairman, British Defence Staffs, Washington, and two telegrams[®] from Her Majesty's Ambassador in Washington were relevant to their discussion.

SIR THOMAS PIKE (acting Chief of the Defence Staff) said he had received a minute from the Minister of Defence expressing concern that although the present discussions in the military sub-group in Washington were being conducted without commitment they would tend to lead to a commitment if they were protracted. The Minister of Defence would discuss this matter with the Foreign Secretary the following day.

In discussion the following points were made:-

- (a) The Americans believed that their nuclear superiority allowed them to adopt a forceful position on Berlin and they might in the current discussions between Mr. Rusk and Mr. Gromyko in Moscow, have convinced the Russians of the importance to the West of the freedom

✓ Washington to F.O. No. 19 (Saving)

© COS. 90/19/1/62

£ GM. 247

* Washington to F.O. Nos. 170 and 171

of West Berlin and of their intentions to take all necessary military measures to that end. On the other hand, in the context of statements made by Mr. Khrushchev and political pressures inside the Soviet Union the Russians might also place high value on securing a solution favourable to the U.S.S.R. The contention in paragraph 5(d) of the report was open to question.

- (b) Air Chief Marshal Mills had criticised paragraph 7 of the paper on the grounds that it did not give the arguments against the American theory on the risk of escalation. In relation to the Berlin situation it could be argued that if the Russians went to the lengths of forcibly cutting the land and air communications to West Berlin, it would mean that they were prepared to face expanded military action. They could exploit their superiority in conventional forces to counter each Allied move and put the Allies in the position of having either to back down or to increase the scale of military operations. Thus the Allies themselves could be directly responsible for escalation. Paragraph 7 of the report should be re-drafted to make this point.
- (c) The repercussions on the morale of NATO if a conventional attack on East Germany appeared likely to result in local defeat would be severe, and it could be assumed that the Americans would not allow such a situation to develop, and if necessary would resort to the use of nuclear weapons.
- (d) Paragraph 8 of the report raised a large number of far reaching issues which had not yet been considered by Ministers. It was not possible therefore to give detailed guidance to Air Chief Marshal Mills at this stage and the telegram at Annex to the report should not be sent. However, Air Chief Marshal Mills should be informed that Ministers were considering the questions involved in the American proposals and his views would be taken into account in their report.
- (e) The purpose of the discussions in the military sub-group were to exchange ideas and to try and clarify some of the issues involved. At this stage they were not intended to reach conclusions and nothing had as yet been committed to paper. These quadripartite talks anticipated discussions on these plans in the Standing Group.
- (f) Paragraph 12 as at present worded was not clear. Whilst a pause or series of pauses between military actions would be highly desirable to allow time for political and economic steps to be taken, the Allies could not ensure such a pause. The American views were therefore realistic. The paragraph should be re-drafted.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (1) Approved the report by the Joint Planning Staff as amended at Annex.
- (2) Took note that the acting Chief of the Defence Staff would forward the report to the Minister of Defence under a covering minute.
- (3) Instructed the Secretary to take action as at (d) above.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

23rd January, 1962

* Subsequently despatched as COS(W)2

ANNEX TO MINUTE 4

AMENDMENTS TO ANNEX TO JP(62)6(FINAL)

- (1) Paragraph 7. Delete in toto and substitute:-

"7. We do not think that the American arguments on the nuclear balance of power and its applicability to the Berlin situation justify the conclusion that Soviet reaction to Western military measures will necessarily be restrained. The United Kingdom view^o is that the Russians would not initiate all-out nuclear war for any reason as a matter of considered national policy. We believe the danger of war lies in a miscalculation by either side, with even a minor military clash carrying the inherent risk of escalation. In relation to the Berlin situation we believe that if the Russians went to the lengths of forcibly cutting the land and/or air communications to West Berlin, it would mean that they were prepared to face expanded military action. They could exploit their superiority in conventional forces to counter each Allied move and put the Allies in the position of having either to back down or to increase the scale of military operations. Thus the Allies themselves could be directly responsible for escalation."

Ø JIC(61)77

- (2) Paragraph 12. Delete in toto and substitute:-

"12. While a pause or series of pauses between military actions would clearly be highly desirable, to allow time for political and economic steps to be taken, the West cannot ensure such a pause. We therefore consider the American views on Phase 2 are realistic. It is difficult to see any military advantage in the Western Powers "pausing" directly after the Russians have interfered with access to Berlin. Militarily a pause has value only after we have made some effective response. All measures must be designed to convince the Russians of Western determination to defend its rights by force, if necessary. We emphasize our previous view^o that no military operations after the initial probes would appear convincing to the Russians unless accompanied by Western mobilization and readiness for war."

% Annex to COS(61)223.

- (3) Paragraph 21(c), line 4:- Delete "initial" and substitute "appropriate".
- (4) Paragraph 22(d), line 2:- Delete "essential" and substitute "highly desirable".

~~TOP SECRET~~

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Jan 22
1126/62
PREM 11/3804
There are
problems
I have
heard of
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with
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now

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET) AND
WHITEHALL (SECRET)(CABINET)
DISTRIBUTION

Sir D. Ormsby Gore

No.244
January 25, 1962

D: 3.06 a.m. January 26, 1962
R: 4.00 a.m. January 26, 1962

IMMEDIATE
TOP SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.244 of January 25
Repeated for information Saving to : UKDel NATO
Bonn
Paris

My telegram No.171: Berlin : Military Operations.

Mr. Nitze opened the discussion in the military sub-group on January 24 by saying that he hoped to circulate a paper on January 26 which would attempt to formulate the American view, taking account of some of the new thoughts expressed in previous meetings. The first part, which was not yet ready, would describe the significant strategic considerations involved i.e. balance of forces etc, the second part would assess the resulting restraints on the Soviet Union and the West. Mr. Nitze then read out the draft of the second part. The following is a summary.

2. (a) General

(I) For reasons given in the first part of the paper the Americans concluded that both sides would want to avoid a nuclear war, but the West could afford to take the greater risks.

(II) While restraints bore more heavily on the Soviets in relation to Berlin, which was not a vital Soviet interest, the contrary was true with regard to eastern Europe. The Allies did not think that their interest in the freedom of eastern Europe merited the use of force, whereas for the Soviets the defence of eastern Europe was vital. The conclusion from this was that if an uprising began the Soviets would act more boldly

Washington telegram No. 244 to Foreign Office

-2-

so long as there was only a latent threat of an uprising the Russians might act with greater restraint in order to prevent such an uprising. This meant that the West should avoid the appearance of a direct challenge to Soviet control of any satellite, although the latent threat of such an attack worked in the Western favour.

(b) Restraints on the Soviet Union

(I) The alteration of Berlin's status and the possible achievement of a temporary non-nuclear defeat of Western forces would not to the Russians be worth the serious danger of escalating to general nuclear war, the consequences of which would be disastrous for the Soviet Union. This restraint also worked against certain lesser actions: the Russians would be restrained from initiating non-nuclear operations which would, in their estimation, be likely to elicit a nuclear reply from the Allies with the inherent possibility of escalation.

(II) The Soviet Union attached great importance to sustaining an image of inexorable Communist success. Failure in a power contest over Berlin would impair this image. The possibility of failure would thus act as restraint against initiating military action. On the other hand this distaste for failure would push the Russians towards carrying any military actions through once they had started. Any solution involving a Soviet retreat would therefore have to be blurred so as to minimize the Russian failure.

(c) Restraints on the Western Allies

(I) The hazards of nuclear war influenced the West as well as the Russians.

(II) There was the risk that our use of significant force would create a situation in which the Soviets thought that their vital interests were involved and to which they would respond, e.g. by an attack on another part

Washington telegram No.244 to Foreign Office

-3-

- (III) It would be necessary to adjust the Allied response in a way which would ensure the maintenance of Allied unity.
 - (IV) The Western countries would need to retain the support of their peoples. More extreme actions could only be acceptable once lesser measures had been tried and proved ineffective.
- (d) From these considerations four principles emerged for Allied conduct:
- (I) The Allies should exhaust the possibility of non-military action first.
 - (II) The Allies should exhaust the possibility of non-nuclear military action before proceeding to the use of nuclear weapons.
 - (III) The Allies should avoid manoeuvring the Russians into a position where the alternative to raising the scale of fighting would appear to be the loss of vital interests.
 - (IV) The Allies should avoid operations which were liable to misinterpretation as an attack on Soviet vital interests. In conclusion it was to be emphasized that the purpose of the Allied use of conventional forces would not be to over-power the Russians but to change Russian policy. For this purpose it was necessary to minimize the apparent engagement of Soviet vital interests and the appearance of Soviet failure in a power struggle.

3. Her Majesty's Minister made the following comments:-

- (a) Any Western move against Berlin on the ground involved penetrating East German territory, which on Mr. Nitze's showing was a tender spot for the Russians. It was thus necessary to assess carefully what the dangers were of precipitating trouble in East Germany. Was the control exercised by the Communist apparatus there, with the backing of Soviet divisions; such that an uprising was only likely if a very serious blow was struck?

(b) While it was true that the Russians wished to avoid nuclear war, so did we. Since they were conventionally strong the Russians would be liable to react in kind to what they would regard as an aggressive military action. Their need to maintain a pattern of success to which Mr. Nitze had referred supported this view. It would make the Russians the less inclined to allow the West to get away with operations involving what they would see as an infraction of the sovereignty of their satellites.

(c) At first sight the principles for allied conduct suggested in the American paper seemed to be well taken.

4. In the ensuing discussion, the German representative asked how the concept of the selective use of nuclear weapons fitted in to the picture, particularly the principles in paragraph 2(d) above. Would this happen if the Soviets resisted a conventional operation, or if they counter-attacked? Mr. Nitze thought that the Russians would have three options if we started a conventional operation, for example on the scale of Trade Wind backed up by June Ball:

(a) They could limit themselves to containing the allied effort;

(b) They could counter-attack and re-establish the status quo ante;

(c) They could counter-attack, re-establish the status quo and then exploit the position further.

Mr. Nitze thought that the Russians had the capability to do (a) and (b) and to try (c). But the estimate of the restraints on the Russians applied here. If the American view was right the risk of destruction would inhibit the Russians from (c) and perhaps from any sustained effort to throw back the Allies, since this would increase the danger of escalation. In answer to a question, Mr. Nitze said that as an alternative to increasing pressure by successively larger attacks in different places he envisaged the steady reinforcement of an allied operation if the Russians sought to contain it or push it back. In either case this would entail the commitment of greater Russian forces and the point would

we cannot risk

Russians would rather negotiate than face the consequences of continued pressure by us.

5. The Americans explained that when drafting their paper they had weighed the arguments for the early selective use of nuclear weapons. The arguments for doing so were:-

- (a) There was no clearer way of demonstrating allied determination to risk nuclear war in defence of our interests in Berlin.
- (b) Once large forces were committed the use of nuclear weapons would have greater significance and would be more liable to misinterpretation.
- (c) If the Allies had embarked on a major operation which was in danger of defeat, they might be obliged to use nuclear weapons in order to rescue their forces, and the psychological effect on the Russians would not be so great.

The arguments on the other side were that the whole purpose of the Allies was to give time and every opening to the Russians to change their policy and come to the negotiating table, and to exhaust all possible means of achieving this before having recourse to extreme measures. The early use of nuclear weapons would bring things to a boil too quickly and might present too direct a challenge to the Russians. Moreover, after the first use of nuclear weapons we should all be entering uncharted ground; the possibilities of controlling events thereafter were unpredictable, and no-one could tell what the consequences would be. On balance, the Americans had thus come to the conclusion set out in paragraph 2(d)(II) above.

6. In considering the point made by Her Majesty's Minister in paragraph 3(a) above, the German representative suggested that a major conventional operation in the Mecklemburg or Thuringia area would be more liable to interpretation by the Russians and the East German population as a direct attack on East Germany than an operation in the autobahn area, since the latter would be more clearly linked with the question of access. Mr. Nitze agreed that it was important to convey the message that it was access to Berlin

rather than the liberation of Eastern Europe that was our purpose. This could be done by a variety of means including statements. But since a central purpose of military operations was to get across the seriousness of our determination, we must not rule out all action elsewhere than on the access routes. The Germans pointed out that operations away from the access routes on East German territory raised serious problems. How would the Russians react to the welcome which the local inhabitants would give to the western troops? What would happen if people from other parts of East Germany in large numbers tried to escape through the western salients? Above all what would happen should it eventually be agreed that the western troops as part of a settlement would return to their starting points? Would the whole population of the occupied areas be moved out too? It was agreed that these questions needed more study.

7. Although the discussion tended to centre on the use of nuclear weapons and ground operations, Mr. Nitze stated at one point that the Americans agreed that prominence should be given to air operations. These, he recognised, might be able to achieve directly the allied object of maintaining access to Berlin, whereas ground and sea operations could only hope to do so indirectly.

8. It was agreed that we should meet again on Friday when the Americans would hope to table their full paper.

Foreign Office pass Saving to U.K. Del. N.A.T.O., Bonn and Paris as my telegrams Nos. 74, 24 and 76.

[Repeated as requested].

ADVANCE COPIES

Private Secretary

Sir H. Caccia

Sir E. Shuckburgh

Mr. A. Duncan Wilson

Head of Central Department

Head of W.O.P.D.

BK 5/2/62
? lcl

PREM 11/3804

Germany Policy
(Future of - Pt. 21)

1/30/62

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FROM BONN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET) AND
WHITEHALL (SECRET) (CABINET)
DISTRIBUTION

Sir C. Steel

No. 112

January 30, 1962

D. 12.46 p.m. January 30, 1962

R. 11.55 a.m. January 30, 1962

PRIORITY

TOP SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 112 of January 30.
Repeated for information to:

Paris

UKDEL NATO

Washington

Washington telegram No. 244: Berlin military operations.

I am impressed by Nitze's presentation which seems both sensible and restrained. I absolutely agree that we should avoid the appearance of challenging the Soviet control of any satellite (especially East Germany) because for the Russians that would be a matter of life and death. Clearly operations on East German territory (Trade Wind or June Ball) might give the impression of being aimed at Soviet control and there would inevitably be reaction among the East German population. I think we could to some extent avert the risk through the Allied public statements which would precede or accompany military operations.

2. The situation would be much more dangerous if there were an actual uprising in East Germany. Personally I do not believe that the necessary organisation exists in East Germany for producing a major and co-ordinated uprising promptly in support of Allied operations. There would of course be local spontaneous demonstrations and I have no doubt that if circumstances permitted, those who could would get away westwards into the Federal Republic. There is of course a risk that despite any announcement we make things would get out of control but this is only another of the grave objections to intervention on the Autobahn at all.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Bonn telegram No. 112 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

to them) is to get the Russians to draw back and that we must if possible contrive to give them a way out which would not involve intolerable humiliation or admission of failure. If as is quite likely it was East German actions which necessitated military counter-measures one possibility would be to make it clear that we were moving against unwarrantable East German interference and that our quarrel was not primarily with the Russians.

Foreign Office please pass to Paris 19, UKDEL NATO 20 and Washington 23.

[Repeated as requested.]

XXXXX

1130/62

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CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX

TO

C.O.S.(62)8TH MEETING HELD ON
TUESDAY, 30TH JANUARY, 1962

2. THE LIKELIHOOD OF WAR WITH THE SOVIET UNION UP TO 1966
(Previous Reference: C.O.S.(61)58th Meeting, Minute 2)
J.I.C.(61)77(Final)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a report by the Joint Intelligence Committee on the likelihood of war with the Soviet Union up to 1966. A Secretary's Minute[@] was relevant to their discussion.

LORD MOUNTBATTEN said that after his recent talk with the Prime Minister, Doctor Adenauer had written to Mr. Macmillan saying that he considered the West should agree on maritime countermeasures because their inferiority to the Soviet bloc in conventional weapons on land would force them to have immediate recourse to nuclear weapons, whereas maritime measures, in which he (Doctor Adenauer) considered the West superior, were suitable for bringing the East to reason without the devastating consequences of a nuclear war. Furthermore, the advantages of maritime countermeasures were that they could be increased or diminished, depending on the attitude of the East. In the light of Doctor Adenauer's letter, the Minister of Defence had now minuted that he knew the question had been looked at before, but that he wished to have further advice, which should take into account the possibility of employing measures short of blockade.

He (Lord Mountbatten) understood that the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence were already discussing the whole question of Berlin countermeasures, and would be preparing a joint paper on which the Committee would have an opportunity to comment. In the meantime he would draw the Minister's attention to their views as previously stated⁺, which included some measures short of blockade, and suggest that further action should await the completion of the new paper.

@ COS.125/26/1/62

+ COS(61)351

In considering the paper before them, he felt that the Committee would have misgivings about paragraph 12 of the Annex and paragraph 10 of the Appendix concerning hostilities at sea. The Chairman, British Defence Staffs, Washington, had already pointed out the inconsistency between the views expressed by the Joint Intelligence Committee in their paper and the firm position which the Chiefs of Staff had adopted towards naval countermeasures in the context of Berlin Contingency Planning.

During discussion the following points were made:-

- (a) The paper now before the Committee had been written in a very different context from the previous one on naval blockade. In one case the Russians were assumed to have taken the initiative and in the other it was the West who would be the first to use force. It had been assumed that if the Russians took the initiative they would consider it necessary to hold back a large part of their Submarine Fleet against possible retaliation by the Strike Fleet and Polaris Submarines of the West. If this assumption was correct this would reduce the threat, but the view was expressed that it would still be so serious that it would be doubtful whether the West 'would be relatively stronger' in conventional naval forces.
- (b) Although it had only been shown to them unofficially, representatives of the United States Central Intelligence Agency had already seen the paper and were likely to have reported its contents to America. This would necessitate a revision of the paper, particularly as the arguments in the paper might be used when maritime blockade measures were discussed.
- (c) An Appendix on escalation could well be misleading written in abstract, and it would be better for this to be related to specific situations. In view of the importance of the subject, there was a very good case for deleting the Appendix on escalation from the report and inviting the Joint Intelligence Committee to prepare a separate study on the subject. The Central Intelligence Agency could then be given this explanation if they commented that the final paper on Likelihood of War with the Soviet Union was different from the assessment which they had seen.
- (d) The paper could be approved to the end of the Annex, on the understanding that paragraph 12 of the Annex was liable to be misconstrued and should be amended, the amendment being cleared with the Committee.

- (e) The Chairman, British Defence Staffs, Washington, should be informed of the reasons for the apparent conflict between the views concerning limited war at sea expressed in the present paper and those used when operations at sea were discussed in the context of Berlin Contingency Planning.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (1) Approved the report by the Joint Intelligence Committee subject to amendment of paragraph 12 of the Annex in the light of (a) and (d) above and deletion of the Appendix on escalation.
- (2) Invited the Chairman, Joint Intelligence Committee to prepare a separate study on escalation in the light of (c) above.
- (3) Took note that the Chief of the Defence Staff would inform the Chairman, British Defence Staffs, Washington, in the sense of (e) above.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

30TH JANUARY, 1962.

2/8/62

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SECRET

C.O.S. (52) 52

COPY NO. 88

8TH FEBRUARY, 1962.

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

53

WESTERN ATTITUDE IN EVENT OF AN UPRISING IN EAST GERMANY OR EAST BERLIN

Copy of a letter (Reference: UKLO/30) dated 26th January, 1962, from Chief-of-Staff, LIVE OAK, to Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee

Reference Ambassadorial Group Washington document BQD-EG-2 dated 4th December, 1961.

1. Attached for your information is a copy of the interim^x instructions issued by the appropriate U.S. military authorities implementing the guidance set forth in BQD-EG-2 - "Western attitude in event of an uprising in East Germany or East Berlin".
2. These instructions were released to LIVE OAK on General Norstad's orders so that similar instructions, if agreed, might be issued by the British and French authorities.

(Signed) G.H. BAKER
Major-General,
Chief-of-Staff,
LIVE OAK.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S. 4. 1.
8TH FEBRUARY, 1962.

ANNEX TO C.O.S.(62)52

Copy of Draft Interim Instructions Issued by US Military Authorities Implementing Guidance set forth in BCD-EG-2 -- Western Attitude in Event of an Uprising in East Germany or East Berlin.

1. (S) Following implementing instructions to subordinate commands have been prepared in accordance with guidance contained in BCD-EG-2 (revised) dated 4th December. Paragraphing conforms to that of BCD-EG-2.

QUOTE

a. Paragraph 2a. Instructions:

(1) The United States and her Allies will maintain a sympathetic attitude toward escape of refugees from East Germany.

(2) Any refugee who gains West Berlin or Federal Republic of Germany soil will be afforded instant asylum and protection.

(3) Those refugees who initially come under US military control will be evacuated as soon as possible from the immediate vicinity of the sector or zonal border to the appropriate military intelligence agency for processing and subsequent release to appropriate civil authorities for disposition.

(4) In those cases where refugees initially come under control of civil authorities in West Berlin or West Germany, US military authorities will, in accordance with existing procedures, participate with appropriate civil authorities in administrative processing of refugees to include intelligence gathering actions.

(5) There will be no active intervention on East German territory.

b. Paragraph 2b. Instructions:

(1) Step up in the current pattern of patrol activity will be made in local areas as required to meet the prevailing situation and to insure appropriate coordination with local civil authorities.

c. Paragraph 2c. Instructions:

(1) If the Russians or East Germans shoot at refugees who have fled across the border and are already on West Berlin or West German soil, US military personnel will take appropriate measures to protect such refugees under the following conditions:

(a) Local civil authorities should be employed to the extent of their capability prior to commitment of US military forces.

(b) When, in the absence of adequate local civil authorities, US troops deployed along the sector of zonal border become involuntarily involved by virtue of their presence at the scene of the action, they may return fire.

(c) Prior to the use of fire the local US military commander will, whenever possible, make the presence of US forces known to the communists in the vicinity.

(d) If the action in (c) above fails to restore order or provide adequate protection, or if it is not practicable, the commander may, if necessary, open fire.

(e) Should fire be employed, a warning shot will first be fired over the heads of the East German or Soviet Forces concerned. If additional fire is required, shots will be aimed to wound rather than to kill. Every effort will be made to avoid injuring innocent personnel.

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(f) The use of fire will be discontinued when no longer necessary to accomplish the immediate purpose.

(g) As soon as the desired effect has been achieved the following action will be taken:

1. Firing will be stopped at once.
2. Immediate assistance will be given to the wounded.
3. Dead bodies will be collected and held.
4. Crowds will be dispersed through coordination with local civil authorities if present or by US troops if local authorities are not present.
5. German refugees taken into military custody will be turned over to local civil authorities. Should other persons be taken into military custody, they will be retained by US military authorities pending transfer to appropriate national authorities.
6. A record of events, decisions, and orders taken in accordance with procedures outlined above will be maintained and forwarded to appropriate military authorities as soon as possible.

d. Paragraph 2d. Instructions:

(1) If Soviet or East German troops cross the sector or zonal borders into West Berlin or West Germany in "HOT PURSUIT" of escaped refugees, such action will not be tolerated by the US and her Allies. Such incursions will be dealt with by firm military action if necessary.

(2) Under these circumstances the following will apply:

(a) Local civil authorities, if present at the scene, should be employed to the limit of their capability prior to commitment of US Military Forces.

(b) In the absence of civil authorities, or if those present are obviously incapable of coping with the situation, the local US military commander will take prompt action to capture or eject the communist troops.

(c) Such force as is necessary will be used to insure prompt capture and disarming of communist forces.

(d) The use of fire will be discontinued when communist elements have been captured and disarmed, or when they have returned to East Berlin or East German soil.

(e) Paragraph 1 c (1)(g) above applies.

c. Paragraph 2e. Instructions:

(1) If East German insurgents gain control of an area contiguous with the sector border of Berlin or the zonal border, an effort will be made to suppress the temptation of West Berlin or West German citizens to cross the border to assist the insurgents.

(2) In no case will US military personnel cross the sector or zonal border without prior orders to do so.

(3) Local civil authorities should to the extent of their capability maintain law and order on West Berlin or West German soil along the sector or zonal border and prevent crowds from gathering in the vicinity of the area held by the insurgents.

(4) US military forces will be employed in the area of the sector or zonal border only to the extent required to insure maintenance or restoration of law and order and to conduct reconnaissance and patrolling to prevent incursions on West Berlin or West German soil by communist military forces in the vicinity of the area held by insurgents.

(5) Assistance to the insurgents in the form of weapons, ammunition and supplies will not be given without prior orders from proper authorities.

(6) Refugees who flee to West Berlin or West German soil will be handled as outlined for paragraph 1a above.

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Time to come (esthonet)

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4. One cannot answer this question without deciding what are the essential Soviet interests in Eastern Europe. To begin with we can surely say that the elimination of Western influence from Berlin is not, in itself, one of them. It is the effect of West Berlin on East German prospects which really counts for the Russians. ~~Our policy has two sides. First of all, we have sought~~ (successfully, so far) to persuade the Russians that they cannot get us out of Berlin without unacceptable risk of war. But ~~secondly, we are~~ seeking to show them that West Berlin can continue as a Western city, protected by Western troops, without prejudice to the existence of East Germany.

The wall has made this second argument ^{easier} ~~more~~ ~~to sustain~~ ~~credible~~. But the weakness of the régime in East Germany must remain a serious preoccupation to the Russians, and it is clearly one of their primary interests to give it more stability, and thus to perpetuate the division of Germany as long as possible. They evidently do not think that the presence of their 22 Divisions in the territory is enough in itself; they feel an urgent need to obtain recognition and international standing for the régime and a more general acceptance of the "finality" of the division of Germany and of the frontiers of all Germany. How far are we prepared to aid and abet them in this objective? That is our dilemma.

5. We do not ourselves want to see Germany reunited, though we will never deny the right of self-determination. It must follow from this that we do not really want to see ~~the~~ East Germany ~~regime~~ become untenable as a part of the Soviet

suits us best that it should remain as it is, a very bad advertisement for Communism and a burden to the Soviet Union. If we had our own way, I suppose we should be ready to have the same relations with East Germany as we have with other satellite governments, ~~for example Hungary~~. Two things make this impossible: first, the fear of alienating our own Germans by underwriting the division of their country and secondly, the particularly abhorrent character of the Ulbricht régime, with its mined frontiers and its wall, both for the inhabitants and for free opinion outside. When I think of these two obstacles to any "normalisation" of the situation, it seems to me that both of them might be susceptible of being overcome if, ~~but only if~~ the Russians would help us to overcome them. To take the second one first, if the Russians want to keep the two Germanies apart, ^{the best thing they could do} ~~their real solution is~~ would be to create less intolerable conditions in East Germany itself and (as a part of this) to allow the worst features of the frontier and the Berlin wall to be mitigated by arrangements for controlled movement of persons. This probably means getting rid of Ulbricht for a start. It may be that they are thinking of it. He is after all a Stalinist and not particularly loved by the Russians, and I have no doubt that if they could find someone less unpopular and more effective to run the country they would abandon him. ^{nevertheless} I wonder whether the time is not coming when we should ^{indicate to} ~~tell~~ them that, if they could do ^{something of their sort} ~~that~~ it would enormously simplify our problem in ^{the} of the East German

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The danger for them would be that any change might set off disturbances, but

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hint that it would also enable us to treat East Germany as a more stable feature of European life and to have more normal dealings with its government.

6. This brings us to the other obstacle - the problem of self-determination and the future of Germany as a whole. The Russians have accepted that we cannot be expected to abandon this principle, and that we will not recognise a separate East German government de jure. If they could be induced themselves to make some gesture to the general concept of eventual - albeit far off - German reunification, it might be possible for us in that context to do something about recognising the Eastern frontiers of Germany as a whole. Two types of gesture are possible. First (and no doubt very difficult for them) would be a (provisional) "all-Berlin" arrangement, under which the whole city would be set aside as a neutral, demilitarised, internationally guaranteed 'free city', a member of the United Nations, pending the reunification of Germany. The second, less satisfactory for us, would be acceptance of our idea for an international access authority for West Berlin which, because it would introduce international control into a matter affecting the relations of the two Germanies and Berlin, could provide a starting point for future all-German arrangements in other fields.

7. These are very general ideas, but I suggest that they deserve thought as a possible basis for a fresh approach to the whole problem of Berlin. They are not the sort of thing we could discuss with the Germans at the present time, but I

should like you to try them out generally with the Americans.

5. In the meantime, we have to deal with the more immediate question of the 'probe' and its prospects, and to try to determine what new effort, if any, we should make to bring about a real negotiation. My main feeling about this is that we are not getting enough real support from the Germans to enable us to keep the talks going if the Russians begin to become impatient. The trouble here is that Adenauer, who is probably more able than any other German to induce realism and impose sacrifices on German opinion is not giving us the benefit of his real thoughts. He may prefer to be able to suggest that any sacrifices have been forced upon Germany by her Western allies than to have to take the full responsibility himself. It has often been said that the Germans would rather be violated than voluntarily surrender their ambitions for reunification. People like Mende and Kroll seem to take a different view but, according to Kit Steel, there is little evidence that their ideas for dealing direct with the Russians over Berlin carry much support. We agree with the President that there is a lot to be said for "getting German snouts into the Berlin trough" and I think the time is now coming when we ought to make a determined effort to engage German responsibility more fully.

6. This thought had already been in our minds, as you will see from the copy which you will have received of a letter from Evelyn Shuckburgh to Kit Steel of February 8. I should like you to

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FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cyber/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET) AND
WHITEHALL (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION

Sir D. Ormsby Gore

No. 462

February 14, 1962

D. 7.58 p.m. February 14, 1962

R. 9.25 p.m. February 14, 1962

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

15 FEB 1962
C.G. 10-71/63

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 462 of

February 14.

Repeated for information to:- Moscow

And Saving to:- Paris

Bonn

U.K. Del. N.A.T.O.

Soviet Intentions

A tripartite meeting was held on February 13 at the French Ambassador's instance. We discussed Soviet intentions for about an hour.

2. Mr. Rusk said it would be useful if we could compare views on where the Russians were going. There was no sign of progress in the Moscow talks, but neither did the Russians appear to wish to break them off. Nor was there any immediate threat of a separate peace treaty.

3. The French Ambassador made a considered statement. Some thought that the Russian objective was to maintain the status quo, and that they would be prepared to settle Berlin and other questions on this basis. The French Government did not believe this. They thought the Russians were aiming at much more than Berlin. They were trying to influence West Germany, and, therefore, Western Europe and the Western Alliance. They were following two apparently contradictory courses. On the one hand, Mr. Gromyko was being very stubborn in his talks with Mr. Thompson, and there were the air corridor incidents, while on the other the Russians were making various gestures to the United States e.g. the release of POWs. Alternative explanations were possible. While being stubborn to the United States, the Russians might be aiming at directing the Germans, remembering their success in the bilateral talks, and noting a certain tendency in this direction in the other possibility was that the Russians were aiming at...

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Washington telegram No. 462 to Foreign Office

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meeting between Mr. Khrushchev and President Kennedy. The French Ambassador did not comment on which of these courses was the more probable.

4. I said there was a distinction between Russian long-term objectives and their short-term tactics. I doubted whether they would think it possible to achieve in the near future their long-term aims of engulfing West Berlin and neutralizing West Germany. We had no clear indications which would enable us to make a firm judgment on Russian policy. But it was possible that the dispute with China had put Mr. Khrushchev in a difficult position on the vital question of peaceful co-existence. It would be difficult for him if this policy appeared to have no results. But he must be aware of the great dangers in over-boldness on Berlin. There was an inter-relationship between the strategic position and Berlin. The Russians knew that we had a true idea of the former. Now that the wall had been built they must wonder whether it was worth getting near to the brink of war over a matter which had lost much of its urgency. Consequently, the Russians might be very doubtful about how to proceed, and they might, therefore, wish to play across the board, keeping open the greatest possible number of options and waiting for something to turn up. This theory was compatible with the recent Russian gestures to the United States, West Germany, etc., while at the same time refusing to make any move favourable to the West on concrete points such as Berlin and disarmament. Drawing on Sir Frank Roberts' telegram No. 257 I noted that Mr. Gromyko had not made use of the opportunities which Mr. Thompson had given him to raise the wider issues in connexion with Berlin. This was curious if the Russians really wanted progress.

Mr CG 1071/58

5. Mr. Rusk speculated that the Russians might be unwilling to get deeply into the wider issues lest it create the presumption that they were ready to meet the three Western vital interests. If they had no intention of doing this, they would know that there could be no agreement, and they might, therefore, shy away from getting too deeply into talks whose break-down would lead to greater tension. The consolidation of their position in Central and Eastern Europe must be a major point with the Russians. The wall had not solved all their problems in East Germany, and they would continue to try to neutralize the impact of West Berlin on East Germany. But he agreed that it was doubtful if the Russians thought it possible to separate Germany from N.A.T.O. in the short run.

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Washington telegram No. 462 to Foreign Office

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6. Mr. Rusk continued that Moscow might be uncertain not only about their own policy but also about the real Western attitude. Whilst they were no doubt impressed by the firmness of the Western reactions, were they convinced that we really would fight a nuclear war over Berlin? They must find it difficult to read the Western attitude clearly. They would know from intelligence sources that Western military preparations were incomplete and were not such as to suggest that we expected to fight in the near future. And they must find many aspects of Western policy difficult to follow, and, indeed, unpredictable. At the same time, they had many internal problems, particularly in agriculture where Mr. Khrushchev's major initiatives had not yet paid off. Serious strains might have been stimulated by de-Stalinization. It was conceivable that the Sino-Soviet dispute had reached the point of no return. At any rate, it was affecting the work of Communist Parties in many countries. The Russians had run into grave and probably unexpected complications in dealing with the under-developed countries. Finally, although this was highly speculative, the Russians must know that the West knew that the Russians did not have the nuclear capabilities which they pretended. This must be very upsetting, and they might well feel a need to repair their military deficiencies before pressing their policies to a point of possible explosion.

7. Mr. Rusk continued that the United States Government had no firm view on whether the Russians were marking time on Berlin with the object of letting the problem go off the boil, or whether they were planning to sign a separate peace treaty in the near future. On balance he thought the latter was not likely, but he admitted that he might be proved wrong at any minute. If the Russians were undecided on how to play the Berlin hand, it might in part be because they remembered how their actions in Korea and elsewhere had proved counter-productive. By pressing on Berlin too hard they might force the Western Powers to allow Germany to acquire a national nuclear capability and thus cause a major change in Power relationships.

8. The French Ambassador agreed that the Russians were probably hesitating and trying to keep several options open. He asked what view the United States Government took of the possibility and desirability of bilateral Russian-German talks. His own Government thought that such talks were very dangerous unless they were restricted to the technical level. Adenauer had gone to Moscow in 1955 with the

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Washington telegram No. 462 to Foreign Office

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...ention of being firm. But left on his own, he had given way to Khrushchev. If there were bilateral talks the Germans would not be able to avoid subjects of vital interest to the Western Powers, e.g. their rights in Berlin and the future of Germany. The dangerous tendencies in Germany, e.g. Mende, were admittedly still in a minority, but the French were suspicious.

9. Mr. Rusk said that our three vital interests in Berlin were indeed vital, and the retention of Germany as an integral part of the Western Alliance was another vital interest of the most overwhelming sort. Provided these vital interests were not put into question, West German talks with the Russians might be useful and uncover directions in which we could profitably move. After all, the "wider issues" were important to us largely in terms of West German opinion. For example, it was only the Germans who really cared about the Oder-Neisse Line. But he added that Kroll might not be the best channel for bilateral talks. He himself wondered why the West Germans were timid about greater contact with the East Germans. They should capitalize on their much stronger position and their gravitational pull.

10. I underlined this point. The Russian position might be less strong than some thought, and Western exchanges with East Europe might lead to a net weakening of the Bloc. In this direction our diplomacy had room for manoeuvre.

11. Discussion on the significance of the Russian actions in relation to the air corridors seemed to show agreement that the Russians were probing and hoping that we would conclude that our access was not certain and that it would be wise to get whatever agreement we could. Mr. Rusk said that intelligence reports showed that the Russians were not concentrating forces for immediate military action.

12. Turning to Mr. Khrushchev's reply about the Geneva Conference Mr. Rusk thought that it showed no desire to get to grips with the problems in a serious way. Mr. Khrushchev must know that a meeting of the Heads of Government of eighteen countries was a poor way to conduct business. If he had really wanted to meet Mr. Kennedy at Geneva he could have passed the word privately. It looked as if he had decided that he would not make the concessions necessary to make the disarmament conference a success, and was therefore trying to make what propaganda capital he could. Such parallel indications as there

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were suggested that Mr. Khrushchev was not seriously trying to bring about a summit meeting.

13. I said that another interpretation was possible. It might well be that Mr. Khrushchev seriously believed that progress could only be made on vital points when the ultimate authorities were brought face to face. The tone of the rest of the letter was consistent with a hope of serious talks. The omission of all reference to Christmas Island and atmospheric tests suggested that this was not mainly a propaganda document.

14. The French Ambassador concluded by asking whether the United States Government would favour broadening the talks on Berlin if Mr. Thompson and Mr. Gromyko reached an impasse in a week or two. The French were against broadening the talks. Mr. Rusk doubted whether the Russians wanted this. If they did, surely Mr. Gromyko would have indicated that while he could not accept much of the Western position on Berlin and access, he did not exclude a deal and would like to put these questions aside while the wider issues were discussed. Mr. Gromyko had not exploited the several opportunities which Mr. Thompson had given him. It might be that the Russians would make a major drive in the next year or two to improve their military position, and that they would let Berlin go off the boil until they had done so.

Foreign Office please pass to Moscow and Saving to Paris, Bonn and U.K. Del. N.A.T.O. as my telegrams Nos. 77, 156, 44 and 149 respectively.

[Repeated as requested]

ADVANCE COPIES:

Private Secretary
Sir H. Caccia
Sir E. Shuckburgh
Mr. A. Duncan Wilson
Head of Central Department
Head of W.O.P.D.
Head of Northern Department
Head of News Department

EEEEEE

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215/62

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DEF 4/143 COS(62)12th Meeting, 20 Feb. 1962

CIRCULATED FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF

JP(61)163(Final)

15th February, 1962

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

JOINT PLANNING STAFF

NATO STRATEGY - FINAL REPORT OF THE
VON KARMAN COMMITTEE

Report by the Joint Planning Staff

In accordance with the instructions⁺ of the Chief of the Defence Staff, we have examined the Final Report of the Von Karman Committee in the light of a request by the Standing Group[@], taking into account a telegram[£] from the British Defence Staffs, Washington. We have also considered whether any of the issues raised in the Report affect "British Strategy in the Sixties"[¥].

2. We have taken into account a report[£] by the Defence Research Policy Committee, and have consulted the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence, the staff of the Chief Scientific Adviser to the Minister of Defence and the Defence Research Policy Staff. Our report is at Annex.

Recommendation

3. We recommend that, if they approve our report, the Chiefs of Staff should authorize its use as a brief for the United Kingdom member of the Standing Group.

(Signed) E.B. ASHMORE
A.M. LEWIS
E.V.M. STRICKLAND
D.C. STAPLETON.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

+ COS(61)83rd Mtg., Min.27
@ MCM - 162 - 61
£ WASSEC 283
¥ COS(62)1
& DRP/F(62)12

Annex to JP(61)163(Final)

NATO STRATEGY - FINAL REPORT OF THE
VON KARMAN COMMITTEE

INTRODUCTION

1. The Von Karman Committee was directed^Ø by the Standing Group to predict "possible and probable scientific progress to be expected in the next decade, and enough beyond to put the ten-year period in proper perspective". The Standing Group emphasized[@] that the aim of this long-term scientific study was to produce data which can be used by them as a basis for the study of NATO strategy and for the development by Major NATO Commanders of the military plans which will be necessary in 1970.
2. The Standing Group has now asked[@] for national and Major Commanders' views on:-
 - (a) The impact, if any, that the findings of the Von Karman Committee will have on NATO strategy.
 - (b) Future NATO basic military requirements that might be established as a result of their Report.

The Standing Group will then prepare[§] a paper for consideration by the North Atlantic Council in September, 1962, on the "Appreciation of the Military Situation as it affects NATO in 1970", taking into account also the current NATO intelligence assessment of the long-term threat. This paper will indicate where the "Overall Strategic Concept"[∇] and "Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept"[∇] require amendment or revision.

3. The Report covers a wide area of possible military requirements without relating them to any particular strategy. Subjects on which research would be profitable have been suggested, but no attempt has been made to establish priorities, or to include an estimated cost of research, development and production. Attention is also drawn to areas, for example ECM, communications and environmental warfare, which were inadequately covered or omitted from the study.

4. The United Kingdom Defence Research Policy Committee have examined[&] the technical aspects of the Final Report and have concluded that it provides most useful background and gives guidance to NATO staffs for their military studies. They note that it is a summary of a much fuller set of Working Group Reports, and is, in places, a deliberately selective digest of the very much more non-committal and sometimes conflicting statements of the Working Groups.

AIM

5. To consider the possible implications on NATO Strategy of the findings of the Von Karman Committee, what future NATO basic military requirements might arise from the Report and any issues which might affect "British Strategy in the Sixties"[%].

Ø SGM 630 - 60
@ MCM - 162 - 61
§ MCM - 166 - 61
∇ MC 14/2
∇ MC 48/2
& DRP/P(62)12
% COS(62)1

Annex (Continued)

IMPLICATIONS OF THE REPORT ON NATO STRATEGY

General

6. Decisions regarding the type of weapons and equipment which NATO will require in the 1970s must be taken some ten years from the time when they will be needed, in order to allow adequate time for research, development and production. This means that such decisions should be based on NATO long-term strategy rather than on Major Commanders' force requirements, which are only projected five years ahead, or on the long-term threat assessment which is unreliable when cast ten years ahead. We therefore consider that the Von Karman Report, which indicates the weapons and equipment capable of entering service within the next 10 - 15 years, is of considerable importance in determining future strategy.

7. Whereas the Report indicates that novel methods of waging war will deserve study, it concentrates more on the indication that, in the period 1970-75, there will be a greater sophistication of current means. It therefore does not point to any fundamental change in the present Strategic Concept. It indicates the need to review the tasks of the armed forces because of weapon development and in order to avoid costly duplication of weapon systems. We take particular account below of the following views of the Von Karman Committee:-

- (a) No overall system of defence against ballistic missiles can be foreseen in the period under review.
- (b) It will become increasingly difficult for a commander to adopt a dual posture in which he can be ready to react with either nuclear or conventional weapons. A dual posture would almost certainly necessitate the provision of two separate sets of armament, one for conventional operations and one for nuclear.
- (c) Although significant improvements can be expected in the ability of major components of the armed forces to survive the effects of nuclear attack, an improvement in the ability to prolong fighting in a large-scale nuclear war is very much more doubtful, because it is most unlikely that any technological improvements can ensure the supply system against breaking down.
- (d) The high cost of new weapon systems will make it essential to avoid duplication.

8. These views of the Von Karman Committee summarized above reinforce those which we have previously expressed when considering the validity of the current Strategic Concept. We show this below in the context of the findings of the Committee.

MC 14/2
Annex 'A' to COS(61)230
and COS(61)268

Deterrence

9. The Von Karman Report stresses that by 1975 a strategic nuclear force suitably composed of a variety of land, air, submarine and perhaps space-launched delivery systems would be virtually invulnerable. This substantiates the United Kingdom view that NATO strategy must be directed towards maintaining an effective deterrent to war in all its forms, rather than to preparations for fighting a protracted war in Europe.

10. The Report states that no generally applicable defence against ballistic missiles is foreseen in the time-scale. However, in view of the effect on the balance of power which any appreciable success in this field would cause, the continuous search for such a defence system is an essential part of deterrence, even if directed only at ensuring the penetrative ability of our own missiles.

Land Force Tasks

11. SACEUR's view^Ø is that widespread use of nuclear weapons would prevent a defensive battle being based on movement, and the Von Karman Report indicates that this view is likely to continue to be correct. It goes further, and stresses that prolonged fighting on a large scale is likely to be impracticable. These views should, in our opinion, lead not only to weapon and equipment development for land forces being directed to cater more for those operations which might precede the strategic exchange, and which are not emphasized sufficiently in the present strategic concept; but also to organization and logistic measures being similarly re-orientated. We consider, therefore, that the revised Strategic Concept should exclude any idea of a sustained tactical nuclear land battle preceding the strategic exchange, and that a re-appraisal is necessary of the tasks of the land forces in general (global) war.

12. We note that the Von Karman Report indicates that there will be a steady development in the capacity to deliver accurate and more manageable tactical nuclear strikes. We see a danger that the improved capabilities foreseen in the tactical deployment of nuclear weapons may be wrongly exploited in terms of a nuclear land battle. The adoption of this course is not supported by the Report which emphasizes the increasing difficulties of target acquisition in these circumstances and, properly, ignores the political implications. In our view the improved accuracies and manageability of nuclear weapons in a tactical role should be taken advantage of, rather, to develop the policy of their discriminate use on suitable military targets for primarily political purposes which we have already recommended*, and which is consistent with maintaining the credibility of the strategic nuclear deterrent.

Air Force Tasks

13. To establish the future employment of NATO air forces, account will have to be taken of the views of the Von Karman Committee that V/STOL aircraft could provide both sides with strike forces largely immune from enemy attack while on the ground. In these circumstances the present concept of operations, mainly pre-planned attacks on the enemy nuclear strike forces, would have to be modified if the relative invulnerability of the enemy air forces were to improve in this way. It will

← Annex 'A' to COS(61)230
and COS(61)268
Ø COS(62)4th Mtg.
* COS(61)146

Annex (Continued)

therefore be necessary for NATO to examine the need to develop new reconnaissance and strike techniques to meet these circumstances. The Von Karman Report also points out the potential of missiles for use against interdiction targets, as well as close air defence particularly in the forward area.

14. In order to arrive at a sound conclusion on the balance between missiles and aircraft, and to avoid duplication of weapon systems, we consider that any revision of NATO strategy should:-

- (a) Define precisely the division of responsibility between NATO nuclear forces and external strategic forces.
- (b) Define the tasks of NATO air forces in operations short of global war, and in particular indicate the tasks for both air and ballistic missile forces in the period preceding the strategic exchange.

Naval Tasks

15. The current Strategic Concept does not envisage clear division between the phases of global war at sea, and considers that anti-submarine operations may continue for an indeterminate period. The Von Karman Report emphasizes the increased vulnerability of seaborne supplies, because of improved capability for the detection of surface ships by aircraft and satellites, the increased submarine threat and in global war the use of nuclear weapons. It considers that this vulnerability represents a most disturbing weakness in our capability to fight a global war at sea lasting more than a very few weeks.

16. However, taking into account our previously expressed views that the strategic nuclear exchange will be short, devastating and decisive, the ability to fight a prolonged war at sea becomes irrelevant. We therefore consider that the significance of war at sea after the strategic nuclear exchange requires reassessment, and that the Von Karman Report emphasizes this requirement.

17. In stressing the continuing relative invulnerability of nuclear submarines, particularly as a launching base for strategic offensive weapons, and in stressing the increasing accuracy of submarine missile systems, the Von Karman Report is entirely consistent with our previous views. We consider that:-

- (a) Strategic missile-carrying submarines should acquire at least all the pre-planned nuclear targets in the strategic exchange at present assigned to Attack Carriers.
- (b) The Striking Fleets would then be free to concentrate on naval and possibly land contingency targets.

← Annex 'A' to COS(61)230

Annex (Continued)

- (c) The highest possible priority should continue to be assigned to means of submarine detection and destruction.

18. The Von Karman Report also raises the problem of whether placing ships in convoys is necessarily the most effective tactic by 1975. It suggests a study to determine whether there is a suitable convoy pattern which can reduce the various threats or whether it is better to rely on individual routing combined with hunter-killer groups. We consider that such a study should certainly be carried out and is an essential pre-requisite to a possible re-appraisal of the disposition and roles of the NATO naval forces, particularly in the Atlantic for the periods prior to and during the nuclear exchange. It may prove necessary in the light of this study to reconsider the reliance which NATO now places on the freedom of use of the Atlantic supply lines.

Command and Control

19. The Von Karman Report forecasts an era of increasingly complex and powerful weapons and an immense potential for the acquisition of information. The problems of identification and of filtering and digesting relevant military intelligence, so that timely and appropriate decisions may be reached, are among those to which it sets out no prospective solution. In our opinion the likely technological and weapon developments foreseen will raise in acute form the question of the stages at which human control and judgement can and should be applied in the general conduct of operations. We consider, therefore, that a prime requirement for any new weapon system (in which we include the human element) is that it should be workable in practice and that this should be studied and built in from its inception. An organization, which might possibly be under SACEUR, should be charged with the responsibility for the overall integration of new weapon systems into the NATO command organization. We suggest that the SHAPE Air Defence Technical Centre might possibly be suitable for this task.

National Resources

20. The Von Karman Report is concerned principally with an increasingly sophisticated form of warfare primarily applicable to NATO. The Defence Research Policy Committee feel it would be wrong, without further evaluation, to apply any conclusions drawn in the Report to conditions of non-nuclear limited war.

21. The Von Karman Committee have stressed that, because of the cost of new weapons and equipment and the consequent need to avoid wasteful duplication in weapon systems development, the West "should not think in terms of individual pieces of equipment, individual military formations, or strategies confined to particular fronts, or even theatres". Although some account is taken of this in the current Strategic Concept, which accepts the world-wide nature of the Communist threat, we consider this aspect needs to be emphasized more strongly.

22. The Von Karman Report admits that its biggest gap is the lack of an interpretation in economic terms of possible developments, and notes that it has been unable to suggest any division of labour between nations. In our view, increasing difficulties

Annex (Continued)

will face the United Kingdom in particular if we attempt to develop alone two types of weapon systems, one for NATO and the other for world-wide use. We consider that the Report adds weight to the need for interdependence, certainly between NATO nations and for NATO purposes, and that this should be stressed.

FUTURE NATO BASIC MILITARY REQUIREMENTS

23. Whilst the Standing Group consider[†] that the Report will be useful as a basis for the development of NATO basic military requirements, a report of this nature cannot of itself provide a sufficient basis on which to formulate such requirements. We do not consider it opportune to make a comprehensive review of future NATO basic military requirements until more of the outstanding issues on NATO strategy have been resolved.

NATO ORGANIZATION FOR SCIENTIFIC STUDIES

24. The suggestion in the Report that there should be a new NATO organization to support scientific studies was not regarded with favour by the Defence Research Policy Committee. We agree in the sense that a scientific organization, separate from the present NATO structure is neither desirable nor necessary. We do, however, feel that, if scientific advice is to be adequately related to the many unique problems presented in and by NATO (we have noted those of the division of labour, command and control, and interdependence), the present NATO operational research and scientific advisory organization should be effective at all levels. This would not preclude the continuing use of the present ad hoc Working Groups which, after many early difficulties, are making useful progress.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE REPORT ON BRITISH STRATEGY IN THE SIXTIES

25. "British Strategy in the Sixties"[‡], although mainly concerned with this decade, also serves as a lead into the period 1970 - 1975. It therefore covers the same period as the Von Karman Report but this Report affects it only so far as it emphasizes the gap that is opening between the technical requirements for global war and those for circumstances short of it. It would seem, however, on the basis of the Report that the equipment costs of NATO forces cannot fail to rise. This underlines the need, as the end of the decade approaches, for effective interdependence to be developed.

CONCLUSIONS

26. We conclude that:-

- (a) The Von Karman Report in important respects lends support to the United Kingdom views on NATO strategy, and in particular indicates the need for revision of a number of aspects in the light of scientific progress (see paragraphs 9-22 above).

[†] Appendix 'A' to MCM-143-61
[‡] COS(62)1

Annex (Concluded)

- (b) Greater interdependence between NATO nations must be achieved if the weapon developments envisaged by the Report are to be made.
- (c) The Report provides an essential scientific background for "Appreciation of the Military Situation as it affects NATO in 1970", as a result of which future NATO basic military requirements appropriate to the period can be formulated.
- (d) While a new NATO organization to support scientific studies may not be necessary, it is important that appropriate scientific advice should be available at all levels in NATO.
- (e) There are no issues raised in the Report which immediately affect "British Strategy in the Sixties".

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FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cipher/OTF

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INDEXED
20 FEB 20 1962
ZC 107/149

Sir D. Ormsby-Gore

No. 543
February 19, 1962

D. 3.15 a.m. February 20, 1962
R. 4.32 a.m. February 20, 1962

IMMEDIATE
TOP SECRET

My telegram No. 532. - Z

Following Personal for Secretary of State from Ambassador.

Berlin.

My discussion with the President about our defence policy led naturally into a talk about the Berlin situation. The President was clearly very dissatisfied with the present state of affairs. He had assumed that the tough, burdensome and unpopular measures taken by the United States would buy for the West a breathing space in which they could work out a negotiating position that had some chance of being acceptable to the Soviet Union. In practice, none of America's European allies who were most closely affected by the Berlin situation had made a comparable military effort. On the contrary, they had used the breathing space provided to sit tight, do nothing and hope for the best. Least of all had they shown any determination to work out a sensible negotiating position. He did not regard this as a responsible policy and he was becoming less and less convinced that any of the European nations cared enough about West Berlin to take any of the unpopular steps which would be required in order to bring about some solution to the problem. Either we must decide that there were no changes or concessions of any consequence which were acceptable to us, in which case it would be necessary for us to build up our forces and make it clear by deeds as well as words that the Russians could interfere with our position in Berlin only at their extreme peril; or we decided that we believed that new arrangements over West Berlin might be negotiated with the Russians without any serious risk to our basic interests, in which case our present approaches in Moscow were really a waste of time as no-one thought for one moment that our present proposals would have any effect on the Russians.

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TOP SECRET

Washington telegram No. 543 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

2. The President went on to say that apparently the French and German game was to make the Americans carry the main responsibility for the whole problem. He himself was expected either to threaten nuclear war in order to preserve the present status quo in Berlin with the fairly clear indication that if Khrushchev called his bluff he would in fact be asked not to start the war he had been threatening. Alternatively, he was expected to make concessions in order to reach an agreement with the Russians which the French and the Germans could then blame him for if the result turned out to be unsatisfactory. The President was quite clear that he was not prepared to allow this situation to continue and he believes that in Adenauer lies the key to the whole situation. He told me that he had had a long meeting with Rusk and the European experts from the State Department and he has told them that he now intends to take a personal day to day responsibility for handling United States policy in this field. He has not yet made up his mind of the best way to approach Adenauer, but his first thoughts are to confront him with the blunt alternatives of deciding against serious negotiations and preparing in the last analysis to fight a war, or of deciding in favour of negotiations which have some hope of a successful outcome. Put like this, he would hope and expect that Adenauer would exert himself in favour of the second alternative.)

3. I told the President that we also had grave doubts about allowing the situation to drift on in the hope that Khrushchev would decide to do nothing too unpleasant. We could not really understand the extremely negative and defensive attitude of the French and Germans who always seemed to imagine that increased contacts with the Communists would be dangerous for the West and not for the East. I thought that this was the reverse of the truth and we should not forget that the 1955 Summit, although it achieved no concrete results, did create an atmosphere of détente which was quickly followed by the rise to power of Gomulka in Poland and an anti-Communist revolution in Hungary.

4. At this [? grp. omitted] I put to the President your thoughts about summitry (your telegram No. 1375). I told him that we felt that we ought to keep in mind the possibility of a Summit meeting some time early this summer. In the meantime we should

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Wash. gton telegram No. 543 to Foreign Office

- 3 -

avoid saying anything which would subsequently require us to eat our words should we decide that a meeting of Heads of Government could not be avoided. The President immediately said that he would be perfectly prepared to go to a Summit meeting, but if it was to be in the disarmament context some progress must first have been made in the Geneva negotiations. He did not seem to think that there had been any marked enthusiasm for the idea of an 18-Power Summit meeting. With the possible exceptions of Egypt and Burma the response from the eight neutral members of the committee had been very cautious and even Egypt and Burma had not fully committed themselves in favour of Khrushchev's proposal. He therefore saw no reason to suppose that we would be stampeded into a Summit meeting. However, he repeated that he would be perfectly happy to go if it seemed that such a meeting could do good. But he found it difficult to see how it could do any good, unless the Russians had first of all displayed some desire to talk seriously about disarmament.

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German views on conduct of Thompson/

Gromyko Talks.

The statement from Bonn which the German Ambassador left with Sir H. Caccia yesterday is totally negative. It opposes any discussion of broader questions in the Thompson/Gromyko talks and argues that Gromyko has been stressing the questions of the Oder/Neisse Line and recognition of the D.D.R. because he thinks that the Western position on these matters is weak. Since the Germans know that Mr. Thompson has, with German agreement, already told Gromyko that the Americans will be ready to discuss broader questions, this new paper is a piece of back-sliding on the German part. It is also a scarcely veiled criticism of Mr. Thompson's conduct of his talks. If Dr. Grewe has handed over a paper like this in Washington, I imagine that it will irritate the Americans considerably. In any case we know that he has taken more or less this line in the Ambassadorial Group.

2. To sum up, the Germans have to all intents and purposes lined up with the French again and retreated upon their old argument that even to discuss questions with the Russians is the same as making concessions to them.

W.B.J. Ledwidge

(W.B.J. Ledwidge)

February 23, 1962.

Sir E. Shackburgh

I agree with Mr Ledwidge. We shall have to see what President Kennedy is going to do about this new German intransigence.

The fact is that the Germans think that

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The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.

It is issued for the personal use of C.L.

44

~~TOP SECRET~~ Copy No.

DEFE 4/143 COS (42) 16th Meeting, 1 March 1962

CIRCULATED FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF

JP(62)22(Final)

23rd February, 1962

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

JOINT PLANNING STAFF

NATO STRATEGY AND THE ROLE OF NATO FORCES

Report by the Joint Planning Staff

In accordance with the instructions⁺ of the Chief of the Defence Staff, we have examined two papers issued by the NATO (Defence Policy) Committee, "NATO Strategy and Nuclear Weapons"[@] and the "Role of NATO Forces"[£]. We have also examined a report by the Ministry of Defence on a "NATO Seaborne MRBM Force"[§].

2. We have consulted the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Joint Intelligence Staff. Our report is at Annex.

Recommendations

3. We recommend that, if they approve our report, the Chiefs of Staff should:-

- (a) Use it as a basis for their discussion with Sir George Mills.
- (b) In the light of that discussion forward it to the Ministry of Defence as an expression of their views.

(Signed) F.B. ASHMORE
A.M. LEWIS
E.V.M. STRICKLAND
D.C. STAPLETON.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

- + COS.186/9/2/62 and COS.213/15/2/62
- @ Annex 'A' to COS.186/9/2/62
- £ Annex 'B' to COS.186/9/2/62
- § Annex to COS.213/15/2/62

NATO STRATEGY AND THE ROLE OF NATO FORCES

INTRODUCTION

1. The NATO (Defence Policy) Committee has asked for the views of the Chiefs of Staff on two papers which are intended for use as briefs for Sir Paul Mason and the Chairman, British Defence Staffs, Washington, in future discussions on NATO strategy in the North Atlantic Council and the Standing Group. These are:-

- (a) NATO Strategy and Nuclear Weapons[@].
- (b) The Role of NATO Forces[£].

The Ministry of Defence will seek Ministerial direction on whether the latter should be tabled in NATO, or whether it should serve as a brief only.

2. The Chiefs of Staff have also been asked for their views on a report[%] prepared by the Foreign Office on a NATO Seaborne MRBM Force. In examining this paper we have taken into account the preliminary views[&] of the Chairman, British Defence Staffs, Washington.

AIM

3. To examine and report on the NATO (Defence Policy) Committee papers on NATO Strategy and Nuclear Weapons and The Role of NATO Forces; and on a Foreign Office report on a NATO Seaborne MRBM Force.

NATO STRATEGY AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

4. This paper starts with an axiom that once nuclear weapons have been used by both sides a European conflict is bound to escalate to all-out nuclear war, and that this cannot fail to involve North America. Thus the outbreak of nuclear war in Europe would inevitably mean the end of Western civilization as we know it. It then develops the proposed United Kingdom position that:-

- (a) The primary purpose of Western defence policy must be to prevent aggression or, if it occurs, to prevent it from succeeding, without bringing about a nuclear war. All military planning must therefore be directed to this aim.
- (b) Deterrence relies on the effectiveness of the strategic strike forces based outside Continental Europe; but these alone are not sufficient to deter the whole spectrum of aggression.
- (c) The function of the shield forces is to complement and lend credibility to the strategic deterrent by being evidently prepared to counter aggressions up to the level of a major nuclear exchange.

@ Annex 'A' to
COS.186/9/2/62
£ Annex 'B' to
COS.186/9/2/62
% Annex to COS.213/15/2/62
& GM 250 and ZO 875

Annex (Continued)

- (d) The provision and maintenance of the shield forces must be within the reasonable manpower and economic capacity of the Alliance.

Our Comments (Paragraphs in brackets refer to the NDPC Paper)

5. The following aspects of the paper are generally in line with previous briefs^Ø:-

- (a) The principles listed in sub-paragraphs 4 (a) to (d) above as a basis for the United Kingdom approach to NATO strategy.

We would, however, prefer for the sake of clarity to see the last words of paragraph 4 (b) read: "but these may not be sufficient to deter limited aggression", and the word "lend" in paragraph 4 (c) read "add". We also consider that the principle at 4(d) is different in kind from the others and should be used with discretion since it is liable to lead to misinterpretation of our motives.

- (b) The tasks, as defined in the paper, of the shield forces for conventional operations and the initial limited use of nuclear weapons.

6. We do not consider, however, that a brief on the United Kingdom position can be complete without indicating the role of the armed forces in the event of the strategic exchange and until that exchange has brought all operations to a halt. We have indicated elsewhere^Ø the need to re-examine the role of naval forces in this respect. In regard to ACE land and air forces we suggest that, accepting that they would have the lowest priority in the provision of forces, the need as far as possible is to:-

- (a) Prevent the occupation of Western Europe by Soviet ground forces.
- (b) Mitigate the effects of Soviet nuclear attack on NATO Europe by provision of air defence and a counter-nuclear strike capability.

We consider that (a) is a shield force task for SACEUR, and we refer to this in more detail in paragraph 10 below. (b) is a task at present assigned to SACEUR, the nuclear strike aspects of which we consider in our examination of the proposal for a NATO Scaborné MRBM Force.

7. We consider that the statement (paragraph 5), that once nuclear weapons have been used by both sides a European conflict is bound to escalate to all-out nuclear war, is as yet not an axiom. We further consider that the JIC report on escalation^Ø does not go as far as this and holds out some hope that a cease fire might occur after nuclear weapons had been used, provided that operations were not protracted.

- Ø FNWN/P(61)21 and
COS(61)230
- Ø COS(62)78
- Ø JIC(62)14(Revised Draft)

8. The Von Karman Report. In our recent examination we considered that the Von Karman report reinforced United Kingdom views on changes required in NATO strategy. We therefore consider that the United Kingdom brief would be strengthened by incorporating in it points from our examination, particularly in regard to:-

- (a) The continuing importance of a strategy based on deterrence, rather than on preparations for fighting a protracted war.
- (b) The impracticability of a sustained tactical nuclear land battle.
- (c) The need to achieve economies by avoiding duplication of weapon systems, and by greater interdependence in weapon development.
- (d) The role of the maritime forces.

9. Role of the Shield Forces. We consider that the definition of the role of the shield forces (paragraph 9) could, as it stands, be interpreted as requiring a considerable increase in conventional forces. We suggest that the second half of the last sentence should be re-worded as follows:-

"the shield forces must be prepared to contain the aggression for a limited time, so that the enemy could be persuaded to withdraw from NATO territory, without precipitating all-out war".

10. Nuclear Weapons in ACE. In defining the purpose of nuclear weapons in ACE (paragraphs 15 - 19) we consider that it is militarily unacceptable to exclude the possibility of a Russian major offensive into NATO Europe if they thought they could achieve their objectives rapidly, doubting the West's will to use their strategic nuclear strike forces. The provision of nuclear weapons for the shield forces against this possibility is part of the Allied deterrent.

11. Discriminate Use of Nuclear Weapons. We do not agree with the statement in sub-paragraph 18(a) (which contradicts paragraph 10) that one of the objects of including nuclear weapons in the shield forces is "to convince the enemy that we believe there are circumstances in which we could use nuclear weapons to counter aggression without causing escalation". In order to maintain the validity of the strategic deterrent, we must continue to impress on the Russians that escalation to general war would follow any use of nuclear weapons. The political effect of the discriminate use of nuclear weapons would in fact be obtained by confronting the Soviet Government with the imminent choice of escalation or withdrawal.

12. Role of Conventional Forces. The need for conventional forces to be capable of preventing a 'fait accompli' through limited conventional attack (paragraph 20(b)) has not been

/ COS(62)78

Annex (Continued)

stated in previous briefs. But this is clearly an important part of their role and is therefore rightly included. The corollary, that NATO must adopt a forward deployment as soon as possible, is included in the paper on the Role of NATO forces and should be in this one as well. The financial implications of a forward strategy are a subject for consideration in assessing priorities.

13. Duration of Conventional Operations. The statement (paragraph 24) that "the current military estimate is that the existing conventional forces of NATO could contain the maximum threat the Russians could pose with forces immediately available for little longer than 48 hours, before vital interests were in grave risk of loss" needs qualification. In our initial consideration in broad terms of the Military Implications of the Mottershead Concept⁷ we considered that it would be necessary for conventional forces to be able to resist for at least 48 hours. We also said that a detailed assessment by SACEUR would be necessary to establish the forces he would need in order to be able to hold for a minimum of 48 hours without using nuclear weapons. We considered that in the case of ground forces this might not differ greatly from those now available, but both ground and air forces would require some degree of re-equipment. An estimate such as this is eminently a matter for the NATO Commanders responsible, and should be avoided at this stage in a paper of this nature.

14. Dual Capability. The statement (paragraph 26) that units and weapons should so far as possible be designed for a dual role is not borne out by the Von Karman Report, which indicates that, apart from artillery, this will not be technically or economically possible. The fact must, we consider, be faced that conventional and nuclear weapons in proper quantities must both be provided.

15. Maritime Forces. These are only briefly mentioned (paragraph 27) and their roles are suggested as being those (paragraph 20) which are set out in terms of land warfare. We consider that the importance of maritime forces, used in a "shield force" role as distinct from a strategic role, should be mentioned in the light of the views that:-

- (a) Escalation at sea would be slower than on land.
- (b) Maritime trade and the free use of the seas are vital to the West, whereas the Soviet Union could not be damaged to an unacceptable degree by war at sea.
- (c) Scattered and sporadic Soviet attacks on Western shipping could be maintained for a long period at little cost to the Russians, while the West could be involved in the costly business of providing world-wide protection for its shipping.

16. Polaris Submarines. The statement (paragraph 27) that SACLANT possesses Polaris submarines is incorrect. His contribution to the strategic deterrent is at present made through the assignment of the Strike Fleet in time of war.

↳ Annex to COS(61)146
§ JIC(62)14(Revised Draft)

ROLE OF NATO FORCES

17. This paper presents the case for a revision of NATO long-term force requirements on the grounds that present plans are based on out-of-date NATO strategy, and that Major Commanders' 1966 force requirements, which were derived from that strategy, are likely to be beyond the resources which members of NATO can afford for defence. The paper covers similar ground to the paper on NATO Strategy and Nuclear Weapons in regard to deterrence, the need to avoid duplication of the functions of the West's strategic nuclear forces, and the tasks to be carried out by the NATO shield forces. It also recommends general priorities for NATO, and more detailed ones for the shield forces, as a basis for meeting force requirements.

18. If Ministers decided to table this paper, the North Atlantic Council would be invited to approve the conclusions in it as a directive for further military planning in NATO and to instruct the NATO military authorities to revise the long-term NATO force requirements accordingly.

Our Comments

19. General. We consider that this paper should substantiate more fully the tasks of forces and priorities whether it is to serve as a brief on the role of NATO forces or as a basis for a directive to Major Commanders to review their force requirements. We have indicated in paragraphs 6, 10 and 15 above the areas in which the tasks of forces should be more clearly defined. As the paper now stands, if applied literally in a review of force requirements, it could lead to a reduction of the present nuclear armoury in ACE to a dangerously low level militarily. We discuss below the statement of priorities and the proposal for tabling this paper in the North Atlantic Council.

20. Priorities. The statement of priorities within the shield forces (paragraph 11) differs from our previous approach to this problem. We would prefer them to be listed in accordance with our previous views, which define more precisely the military requirement and would therefore be of more assistance to Major Commanders in a re-assessment of force requirements.

21. The Von Karman Report. Since our previous assessment of priorities, the Von Karman Committee has emphasized the need for economy and we have recommended that this should be achieved through a revised strategic concept which would define more clearly the tasks of the armed forces and through greater interdependence. We consider that these would be sounder grounds for achieving economies than solely from a statement of priorities, since they would have the support of the Von Karman examination of future scientific and technological development.

22. Approach in the North Atlantic Council. The Standing Group is at present engaged in a review of NATO strategy, based on the Von Karman Report and the long-term threat assessment. The review is to serve as the basis for development by the Major NATO Commanders of their force requirements for the period 1965-69, a process which is due to start in March 1963.

4 COS(61)268
4 COS(62)78
Ø Enclosure 1 to
MCM-143-61

Annex (Continued)

We do not consider, therefore, that this would be an opportune moment to table this paper in the North Atlantic Council, or to seek Council direction for a separate review of force requirements.

A NATO SEABORNE MRBM FORCE

General

23. The Foreign Office Report^o outlines the United States proposals for a NATO Seaborne MRBM Force, and discusses the problems of political and operational control, ownership and organization. It also discusses briefly the military value of the force.

24. The report states that the main purpose of the NATO seaborne MRBM force would be the political one of re-assuring the Continental countries that the United States would be forced to use her strategic forces in support of NATO because MRBMs could not be used without causing total nuclear war. However, we agree with Sir George Mills^o that it would be better expressed "to enable European countries to have more control over a prime weapon for their defence".

Potential Military Value of the Force

25. The paper implies that the MRBM force would be used in the retaliatory role, an interpretation substantiated by Sir George Mills^o. Its targets, however, could include some covered already by the US/UK strategic forces, which is militarily unnecessary, and some covered by SACEUR's tactical atomic strike plan. To the extent that the delivery systems associated with this plan are becoming obsolete, this force would have a definite military purpose.

26. SACEUR's present Atomic Strike Plan is concerned primarily with strikes against airfields and missile sites. On 1963 estimates^o some 300 of these targets lie within a belt of 300 - 1500 nm radius to the East of the Iron Curtain, though the majority are within 900 nm. There is already a NATO basic military requirement^o for a MRBM of 1500 nm range which visualizes the possibility of seaborne delivery vehicles. A demand for 300 of these missiles has already been endorsed by NATO military authorities. End-66 Force requirements^o seek authorization for a force of 655 MRBMs including 160 submarine-borne. For the majority of tactical targets however, SACEUR would, ideally, prefer^o a shorter-range weapon having greater accuracy and carrying a smaller warhead.

27. We have recently suggested^o that, as both sides acquire mobile missiles and V/STOL aircraft, it will be necessary to develop new reconnaissance and strike techniques. In this context we recommended a review of the relative merits of the missile and the aircraft in the strike role. Such a review might lead to a lesser MRBM force requirement.

- % Annex to COS.213/15/2/62
- & ZO 875
- Ø GM 250
- * COS.412/28/3/60
- Ø AG 6440/1 PANDP
- = MC 26/4
- ^ COS(62)78

Annex (Continued)

28. The defensive concept of NATO strategy dictates a retaliatory capability for a NATO MRBM force. A submarine system will in the foreseeable future be to such an extent relatively less vulnerable to a pre-emptive attack than surface vessels equipped with MRBMs, that its use is much to be preferred.

Relationship to External Strategic Forces

29. The question of duplication between a NATO MRBM force and external strategic forces need not arise. We have already recommended that, to avoid duplication of weapon systems, any revision of NATO strategy should define precisely the division of responsibility between NATO nuclear forces and external strategic forces. Targets could be suitably distributed throughout the various components of the deterrent forces (i.e. SAC, Bomber Command, and NATO), bearing in mind the requirements of SACEUR Atomic Strike Plan. Many of the targets, particularly in Western Russia and the Satellites, could be engaged by Polaris submarines.

Operational Control

30. We consider that the difficulty of maintaining communications with the seaborne MRBM force after the outbreak of hostilities (as stated in paragraph 10) may be over-stressed, and that the need to delegate the power of operational decision to a lower level than on land might not be necessary.

Mixed Manning

31. The report states that the Americans have completed a major study on all aspects of MRBMs for NATO and have concluded that a multilateral force is "definitely feasible" and "no insuperable difficulties are foreseen over mixed manning". We have not seen the American Study and are therefore unable to comment on it. However, we see no objection to the principle of a multilateral NATO Polaris nuclear submarine force, but we do foresee considerable difficulties in the mixed manning of highly sophisticated nuclear submarines. Despite these difficulties, mixed manning might be possible if the political demand for it were strong enough. The difficulties of mixed manning would decrease if MRBMs were carried in a surface ship, the manning of which would be more within the immediate capabilities of Continental NATO navies. We therefore feel it would be militarily more satisfactory to have submarines each manned as a unit by one nationality and the force to be mixed, whilst in each submarine only the control of the missiles would be the responsibility of a separate (United States) organization.

The MRBM Force Organization

32. The report states that the organization of the force could take two possible forms:-

- (a) The United States could assign Polaris submarines to Major NATO Commanders in peacetime, with other members adding to this force in due course.

✓ COS(62)78

- (b) The whole force could be acquired by NATO as a corporate body, which would assume ownership and allocate the force to the Major Commanders.

In either case American or mixed crews would be employed.

33. We believe that militarily the organization in sub-paragraph (a) above would be much the better since it would retain a greater degree of co-ordination over nuclear targeting in United States hands and would take full advantage of the established chain of command. It would also follow normal practice. However, we consider that the political requirement for European countries to have more control over the deterrent may be the overriding factor, and may dictate the organization at sub-paragraph (b) above, which might have some financial advantage.

CONCLUSIONS

34. We conclude that the NATO (Defence Policy) Committee paper on NATO Strategy and Nuclear Weapons would be strengthened if it incorporated points arising from our examination of the Von Karman Report. It should also be revised to take into account our comments in paragraphs 6 - 16 above.

35. We further conclude that the NATO (Defence Policy) Committee paper on the Role of NATO Forces requires revision in the light of our comments in paragraphs 19 - 21 above, and might be considered to conflict with the current Standing Group examination of NATO strategy.

36. Finally, we conclude in regard to the Foreign Office report on a NATO Seaborne MRBM Force that:-

- (a) A submarine MRBM force could contribute usefully to SACEUR's/SACLANT's atomic strike plans and would also provide European countries with some control over a prime weapon for their defence without duplicating the tasks of the external strategic forces.
- (b) The best practical solution would be for submarines to be manned by one nationality, except for United States control over missiles, the force being multi-national. Whilst mixed manning of nuclear submarines would be possible we foresee serious difficulties in achieving this. Surface ships would present less of a problem.
- (c) Militarily it would be preferable for submarines to be assigned to NATO Major Commanders by the United States with other members adding to the force in due course.

/ COS(62)78

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FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

Cypher/OTP

P R I S E C

CG 1071/69 K

No. 1692

February 24, 1962

D. 1.33 p.m. February 24, 1962

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

257/64 G

CG 1071/69 G

Your telegrams Nos. 532, 538 and 543: President Kennedy's views on Berlin.

I am grateful to you for this interesting exposition of the President's thoughts on Berlin.

2. As you know I am in favour of trying to place more responsibility on the Germans for the decisions which have to be faced. In the end the Germans must say what price they are ready to pay for retaining the Western position in West Berlin. I agree with the President that Dr. Adenauer's personal rôle is of decisive importance in this. He alone has the power to issue the necessary directions for a change of attitude. At the moment the signs are that the Federal Government are digging in their heels harder than ever. The German Ambassador has just handed us a paper from Bonn flatly opposing any discussion at all of broader questions in the Thompson/Gromyko talks. I suspect that the Germans have been encouraged by recent evidence of the wide margin of American superiority over the Russians in nuclear weapons to retreat upon the positions of the Dulles era and conclude that West Berlin is after all still safe behind the shield of the American nuclear deterrent. Dr. Adenauer's willingness of last Autumn to talk to the Russians may therefore have evaporated.

3. If this is so, the President may not find it easy to move the Chancellor very far, even if he decides to make the attempt. The Chancellor will no doubt pay lip service to the desirability of negotiations, as he did last November in Washington. But it is questionable how far the German attitude on matters of substance will change. It is also not clear from what the President said to you what changes in the Western negotiating position the Americans would wish to suggest. Do you think that they are prepared to go as far as we should consider acceptable in the direction of recognising the sovereignty of the D.D.R.; accepting its frontiers; restricting

/nuclear

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Foreign Office telegram No. 1692 to Washington

- 2 -

nuclear weapons for German forces; and so on. I do not know what evidence the President has that the Russians would contemplate a deal on terms which he would consider compatible with vital Western interests.

4. At this stage I think we must wait for the President to decide how to play his hand. He is fully aware of our views on broader questions and this is not a good moment for trying to press them as British suggestions. We do not want to participate prematurely in any Anglo/Saxon campaign of pressure upon the Germans such as might do damage to our European policies. I recognise also that the President is not much happier about the British military effort than he is about the Franco/German performance. I am not therefore asking you to try and force the pace in any way.

5. At the same time we shall of course be grateful for any indications which you obtain of the way in which the President's plans are developing. If he decides to beard Adenauer, I suppose that a personal confrontation will be necessary. It would look odd for Adenauer to go to Washington again so soon for a conversation à deux. Perhaps therefore the President will conclude that a visit to Europe would be more appropriate. He could then have a variety of meetings, that with Adenauer among them.

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WBL 12/3
Mr. Rusk
Mr. Aske
12-3
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BERLIN.

CG 10711/82

It appears from Washington telegram No. 749 that Mr. Thompson made a couple of points to Gromyko which were not included in the instructions cleared with us and the Germans. These were:-

- (i) that Mr. Rusk was prepared to discuss not only Berlin but also wider subjects with Gromyko in Geneva, on an informal and bilateral basis,
- (ii) that Mr. Thompson knew that President Kennedy personally was determined to leave no method of discussion untried in order to reach an accommodation (paragraph 10 of Washington telegram No. 749).

2. Presumably the Americans did not try to clear these remarks with their Allies in advance because they were determined not to be put off by the inevitable Franco/German objections. They knew of course that we should be in favour of what Mr. Thompson said.

3. We know that Mr. Thompson's instructions were submitted to President Kennedy and that they were in the White House for several days before clearance. These two purely American additions to them can therefore be taken as an indication of the way the President's thinking on Berlin has been developing since he spoke to Sir D. Ormsby Gore early in February. On this evidence it looks as if the President may be moving away from the idea of confronting Dr. Adenauer now with a choice between a major military build-up and more flexibility over negotiations. It looks as if the President has decided to find out first by means of uninhibited American/Russian discussions just what price the Russians will settle for. This is logically the prior step because ~~not~~ only the President really knows what terms the Russians will accept, he does not know what alternatives to place before the French and Germans.

4. One does not know how openly Mr. Rusk will speak in the Ambassadorial Group today. But whatever he says, it seems that the essential decision has been taken that he should throw off Franco/German shackles and talk freely to the Russians, although without commitment. His remark to Lord Hood that, if people want him to talk to the Russians, they must be prepared to trust him, is further evidence of this. (Hood's letter to you of March 5).

5. If we can take at its face value, Mr. Thompson's statement to Gromyko that the President is determined to leave no method of discussion untried, it also appears that, if Mr. Rusk fails to establish what the Russian price is, the President is willing to discuss Berlin personally with Mr. Khrushchev, whether or not he agrees to an eighteen-Nation Summit on disarmament.

6. Dr. Adenauer will not fail to see what is in the wind and I imagine that he will soon be pressing for a four-power Western meeting.

W.B.J. Ledwidge
(W.B.J. Ledwidge)
March 8, 1962.

Sir E. Shuckburgh

Copy to: Mr. Ashe.

/It is difficult

7/12/62

This document was considered at COS(62) 21st Meeting, 23 March 1962, Minute 1

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DEF 4/143 COS(62) 21st Meeting, 23 March 1962, Minute 1

CIRCULATED FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF

JP(62)36(Final)

UK EYES ONLY

12th March, 1962

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CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

JOINT PLANNING STAFF

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Report by the Joint Planning Staff

In accordance with the instructions⁺ of the Chief of the Defence Staff, we have examined a paper[@] prepared by the Foreign Office, in consultation with the Ministry of Defence, as the basis for a Cabinet paper on Berlin contingency planning.

2. We have consulted the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Joint Intelligence Staff. Our report is at Annex.

(Signed) E.B. ASHMORE
A.M. LEWIS
D.C. STAPLETON
D.H. DAVIES.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

+ COS(62)16th Mtg., Min. 2A
@ Annex to COS.275/1/3/62

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BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

INTRODUCTION

A draft paper[@] has been prepared by the Foreign Office, in consultation with the Ministry of Defence, as a basis for a Cabinet paper to enable Ministers to decide major matters of principle regarding United Kingdom policy on Berlin contingency planning. It is necessary to reach decisions as soon as possible in view of current discussions in the Ambassadorial Group and forthcoming consideration in the North Atlantic Council of NATO Major Commanders' plans for wider military operations. This paper is being examined⁺ by the NATO (Defence Policy) Committee on 14th March, 1962.

AIM

2. To examine and report on the paper on Berlin Contingency Planning[@].

THE PAPER

3. The paper takes into account our previous report[£] on the phasing of Berlin military operations. It repeats the United States views which we commented on in our report, reviews the present position in regard to contingency planning of military and economic counter-measures, and makes recommendations on the position which HM Government should adopt in regard to both. It also takes into account the Joint Intelligence Committee note^ø on American thinking in regard to the nuclear balance of power and Soviet/GDR reactions to allied military operations.

4. The paper proposes that HM Government should accept the American suggestion of four principles for the guidance of Allied conduct, which are that the Allies should:-

- (a) Exhaust the possibility of non-military action first.
- (b) Exhaust the possibility of non-nuclear military action before proceeding to the use of nuclear weapons.
- (c) Avoid manoeuvring the Russians into a position where the alternative to raising the scale of fighting would appear to be the loss of their satellite empire, one of their vital interests.
- (d) Avoid operations which were liable to be misinterpreted as an attack on the stability of the Soviet satellite empire. The purpose of the Allied use of conventional forces should not be to overpower the Russians but to convince them of

@ Annex to COS.275/1/3/62
+ COS(62)16th Mtg., Min. 2A
£ COS(62)39
ø Annex to COS.90/19/1/62

Annex (Continued)

the seriousness of the Western intentions while giving them time and room to change their policy. For this purpose it would be necessary to reduce to a minimum the appearance of Soviet failure in a power struggle.

5. The paper also recommends that HM Government should approve the following conclusions:-

- (a) The military contingency plans already approved quadripartitely, e.g. FREE STYLE, BACK STROKE, JACK PINE, Q&L, TRADE WIND, LUCKY STRIKE, and JUNE BALL, should be retained, though it must be recognized that the last three are of a very serious character and in the nature of Phase 3 operations.
- (b) Of the larger-scale operations now being planned by the NATO Major Commanders:-
 - (i) Those relating to land operations (BERCON CHARLIE 1, 2, 3 and 4) are particularly dubious from the military point of view and dangerous politically.
 - (ii) Preference should be given to the air measures (BERCON ALPHA 1 and 2).
 - (iii) Maritime measures against Soviet bloc shipping must be further studied before their effectiveness can be gauged and their right place in the order of preference determined.
 - (iv) All types of nuclear action should be placed at the very end and regarded as theoretical only.
- (c) Economic counter-measures should be implemented prior to the initiation of large-scale military measures (probably prior to TRADE WIND, LUCKY STRIKE, and JUNE BALL). These would amount to a total trade embargo before any of the operations in (b) above.
- (d) No attempt should be made to provoke uprisings in the satellite countries.
- (e) Final decisions to implement any of the measures will rest with Governments.

OUR COMMENTS

General (Paragraph numbers in brackets refer to paragraphs in the Foreign Office Paper)

6. We consider that the paper meets our previous recommendations and approaches the Berlin problem on more comprehensive politico/military lines. We welcome the emphasis on principles for the guidance of Allied conduct as they could be applied to

£ COS(62)39

UK EYES ONLY

Annex (Continued)

the progression of events in a developing politico/military situation and are to be preferred to an arbitrary division between clear-cut military phases. We agree that the criterion we must adopt is that our counter-measures should keep alive Soviet apprehensions of the consequences of a show-down over Berlin to the utmost extent, but without confronting them with situations from which they cannot withdraw. To this end, military measures for Stage 3 and 4 must be planned; and an order of preference established for their execution. It is essential that our military readiness should be adjusted at all times so that we are fully prepared for the succeeding stage to that on which we may have to embark.

Military Operations

7. The statement introducing the list of plans (paragraph 9) would be more accurate if worded as follows:-

"Tripartite military contingency plans now exist, or are in course of preparation for:-"

8. Airlift. The paper states that it is quadripartitely agreed that "if serious attempts were made to block access, whether in the air or on the ground, the allied response would be the mounting of an airlift" (paragraph 13). The initial reaction would be the mounting of military and civil air probes to test Soviet/GDR intentions. If these probes were unmolested, an airlift could then be instituted, but it would be imprudent to mount a full airlift immediately air access had been interfered with. Moreover, since forceable interruption of a full-scale airlift could result in a very short Phase 2 period (paragraph 13) and could require the execution of JACK PINE ground suppression operations, which we have already recommended should be considered as Phase 3 operations, we consider that a high degree of military readiness ought to be assumed at least concurrently with the initiation of QBAL. We consider that paragraph 24(b) should be amended to reflect this view.

9. Military Precautionary Measures (paragraph 18). We have not yet seen NATO Major Commanders' recommendations for alert measures in connection with Berlin contingency plans and are not therefore aware of the timing and extent of them. We consider it essential, however, to bring to the notice of Ministers the views we have repeatedly expressed on the importance of taking appropriate measures in the initial stages to safeguard ACE. Such steps, which would place NATO on a war footing, would include mobilization, which would we consider carry far more weight with the Russians than limited ground access operations like TRADE WIND, and might obviate the need to mount operations of this kind. We feel therefore that a separate paragraph in the paper should deal with military precautionary measures, instead of the passing reference to these in paragraph 18.

10. Measures at Sea. The paper (paragraph 19), whilst recognizing that naval counter-measures in general would involve limited war at sea, suggests that certain types of operation,

£ COS(62)39
Ø Annex to COS(61)228 and
paragraph 12 of COS(62)39

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UK EYES ONLY

Annex (Concluded)

such as denying certain international waterways to Soviet shipping, would serve to indicate Allied intentions without causing escalation. In our previous examination we concluded that all such measures would almost certainly lead to war at sea, which would involve some risk of escalation; and that all such measures would have little effect on the Soviet bloc whose retaliatory measures could have serious consequences for the United Kingdom. We agree that further study should be given to maritime control measures but suggest that in the meantime the fifth sentence of this paragraph should be deleted.

11. Nuclear Action. We accept that nuclear action should be placed "at the very end", but we do not agree that this should be regarded as "theoretical only". As the BERCON CHARLIE operations entail considerable risks we consider that Major Commanders should be authorized to plan for nuclear support, but the authority to use nuclear weapons would remain a political decision which should, ideally, be taken before the operation is authorized.

CONCLUSION

12. We conclude that the draft paper is militarily acceptable except as noted in paragraphs 6-11 above.

§ COS(61)351
§ COS(62)39

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DEF 4/143 COS(62)23rd Meeting, 29 March 1962, Minute 4

CIRCULATED FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF

JP(62)18(Final)

19th March, 1962

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

JOINT PLANNING STAFF

SACEUR'S REVISED EMERGENCY DEFENCE PLAN

Report by the Joint Planning Staff

In accordance with the instructions⁺ of the Chief of the Defence Staff, we have examined SACEUR's revised Emergency Defence Plan[@], and have taken into account a telegram[£] from the Standing Group.

2. We have consulted the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Joint Intelligence Staff. Our report is at Annex.

Recommendation

3. We recommend that, if they approve our report, the Chiefs of Staff should authorize its use as a brief for Sir George Mills for discussion in the Standing Group of the revised Emergency Defence Plan.

(Signed) E.B. ASHMORE
A.M. LEWIS
D.C. STAPLETON
D.H. DAVIES.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

+ COS(62)9th Mtg., Min. 16
@ SHAPE 144/61
£ DEF 909764 (STAND 4673)

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Annex to JP(62)18(Final)

SACEUR'S REVISED EMERGENCY DEFENCE PLAN

INTRODUCTION

1. The Standing Group has asked[§] for national comments on SACEUR's new Emergency Defence Plan[@]. This plan, although still based on the 1957 NATO Over-all Strategic Concept[^], has been revised in accordance with SACEUR's statement[&] of "basic strategic guidance" in 1960, which was mainly concerned with the provision of defence against aggressions on a scale less than General War.

AIM

2. To examine and report on SACEUR's revised Emergency Defence Plan.

THE REVISED PLAN

(References in brackets are to the revised EDP)

General

3. The layout of the new Emergency Defence Plan remains basically the same except for the addition of a new annex entitled "Concept of Operations" and a re-arrangement of the previous annexes. The substance has, however, improved considerably, owing mainly to changes resulting from SACEUR's 1960 statement of strategic guidance. The plan is based on currently assigned forces (Annex D). The main points of interest are:-

- (a) The concept of operations in General War (pages A3 to A7).
- (b) The concept of operations against aggressions less than General War (pages A7 to A13).
- (c) The intelligence assessment (Annex 'C').
- (d) SACEUR's plans for the control of the use of nuclear weapons, particularly in operations on a scale less than General War. (Annex 'E').
- (e) The provision for succession in command for SACEUR (page 67).

Planning Assumptions

4. The plan is based upon certain fundamental assumptions (pages 19-21) of which a copy is attached at Appendix.

§ DEF 909764 (STAND 4673)
@ SHLPE 144/61
^ MC 14/2
& COS 44/6/1/61

OUR COMMENTS

General

5. We consider that the revised Plan meets the requirement of the current NATO Strategic Concept and SACEUR's own strategic guidance. In general it conforms with our recently expressed views on NATO strategy and the role of the armed forces, although there are two points at variance with our views:-

- (a) The concept of protracted operations in General War which derives from the Overall Strategic Concept.
- (b) The initial use of nuclear weapons in operations short of General War which should in our view be primarily for political rather than military effect, although directed at military targets.

Since, however, SACEUR's Emergency Defence Plan is in line with the accepted NATO Strategic Concept on both these points, we consider that we should not seek to amend it at this stage.

Planning Assumptions

6. We have previously indicated⁸ that we do not accept the first of the assumptions listed at Appendix, in view of the decisive nature of the strategic exchange and the impracticability of sustained operations in General War. We agree with the other three assumptions, although we consider that assumption (d) tends to underrate the risks of escalation and we would prefer "will" to replace "may" in the last line.

Concept of Operations in General War

7. The concept of operations in General War remains broadly the same as before with primary emphasis on the ACE nuclear offensive aimed at destroying the enemy's nuclear capability (pages A5 and E13). There are, however, significant changes in that:-

- (a) An increased emphasis is now placed on the destruction of the enemy's land and naval forces in addition to his air forces (pages A5 and E13). This is particularly reflected in the concept of nuclear operations for ACE Regional Programmes, in which destruction of troop concentrations (page E15, sub-paragraph 3b) is given priority over the interdiction programme (page E17, sub-paragraph 3c (2)(b)).
- (b) Provision is now made in the concept of nuclear operations for Armed Strike Reconnaissance (page E17). This is not a regional programme in itself, but strikes for armed reconnaissance aircraft may be included in the Regional Priority Programme.

We consider that this is a realistic approach towards reasonable use of the regional nuclear delivery forces prior to and during the strategic nuclear exchange and takes account of the increased mobility of the Soviet forces.

- Ø COS(62)100
- 7 MC 14/2
- 7 COS(62)78 and COS(61)146
- 8 COS(62)78

Annex (Continued)

Concept of Operations against aggressions less than General War

8. The concept of operations against aggressions less than General War is derived almost entirely from SACEUR's statement of strategic guidance, and not from the NATO Overall Strategic Concept, which provides very little direction in this respect. It is generally in accordance with our previously expressed views on defence against aggressions less than General War. We agree in particular with (pages A9, A11):-

- (a) The need for prompt action to prevent the enemy from prolonging or expanding his aggression.
- (b) The need to minimize the risk of General War.
- (c) The need in any period of operations against aggressions less than General War to preserve the overall capability of ACE forces to carry out General War tasks.
- (d) The definition of the aim of forcing a pause in the continuity of military action as:-

"to require the enemy to make a conscious decision as to whether or not he intends to extend his aggression to the point that it constitutes an act which might lead to General War".

9. These principles form the concept of operations, which is thus framed only in general terms. The following points need clarification before the validity of this part of the plan can be gauged:-

- (a) The ACE capability to implement a forward strategy with currently assigned forces.
- (b) The roles of the conventional forces, including problems of identifying aggression.
- (c) The capability to hold the enemy conventionally for the minimum period necessary to ensure that nuclear weapons can be used as a result of considered political decision.
- (d) How nuclear strikes are to be carried out in order to force a pause in circumstances short of General War.

Certainly in so far as the Northern Army Group/2 ATAF Region is concerned, we should be able to determine these points, and as a first step a planning team is due to visit the British Commanders-in-Chief Germany.

The Intelligence Assessment

10. We are advised that the intelligence assessment (Annex 'C') is based on the last (1961) Standing Group assessment, which

Ø COS(62)100
} COS(62)16th Mtg., Min. 2, B(m)
{ SG 161/14

Annex (Continued)

is currently being revised in accordance with the Standing Group practice to review the assessment annually. Such a review might lead to a revision of Annex 'C' of the Defence Plan which could result in amendment being necessary to other sections of the Plan.

Control of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

11. General War. SACEUR's control system for applying his nuclear fire-power in General War under the concept of immediate nuclear retaliation remains in general the same as before. Greater emphasis is placed on the accomplishment of military tasks with the "absolute minimum of destruction of non-military personnel and facilities" (page E3), and attention is now drawn to the need to consider the contamination effects from radiological fall-out (page E5). He has also revised his rules for the employment of nuclear weapons in friendly and neutral territory after R-Hour (page E5). Whereas formerly the use of any nuclear weapons in this context required his specific approval, now this only applies to weapons with a yield of more than 10 KT; although air defence nuclear weapons of any yield may be used in accordance with approved rules of engagement (which have not yet been defined for ACE).

12. Lesser Aggression. SACEUR reserves to himself the sole military authority "to direct the use of nuclear weapons under conditions of aggression less than General War" (page E11). In pursuance of this he has introduced a new S-Hour procedure to provide for the selective use of nuclear weapons (page E25) by which he will authorize their use singly or in limited numbers for specific purposes and in specific areas. It is not clear from the plan, however, whether he will be in communication direct with the releasing authorities himself, and whether he would have an effective veto procedure. These are two of the requirements which we have previously indicated[#] would be necessary in order to translate close political control into timely and effective military action.

Succession of Command

13. In a new section (page 67) SACEUR nominates Deputy SACEUR as his successor, to be followed by his Air or Naval Deputies, in order of rank, if available. If they are not available, CINCENT or the Chief of Staff, SHAPE, whichever is senior, will assume command. If SHAPE is not operational HQ AFCENT will take over its functions. We consider that these arrangements are acceptable, and note^z that they would continue to apply if the proposed ACE Airborne Command Post were approved.

CONCLUSIONS

14. We conclude that:-

- (a) SACEUR's revised Emergency Defence Plan is generally acceptable despite certain aspects of strategy (discussed in paragraph 5 above). Since, however, the plan is in line with the accepted NATO strategic concept on these points, we conclude that we should not seek to amend it at this stage.

COS(61)191

z SH 33183 (SHAPTO 2464)

Annex (Concluded)

- (b) The implications of the concept of operations against aggressions less than General War need to be discussed in several respects, and a planning team should visit the British Commanders-in-Chief Germany to this end.
 - (c) Clarification of the extent to which SACEUR will himself control the selective use of nuclear weapons, particularly in regard to direct communication with the releasing authorities and veto procedure, is still needed.
-

SACEUR'S REVISED EMERGENCY DEFENCE PLAN

PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

This plan is based upon the following fundamental assumptions:

- (1) If the Soviets initiate deliberate General War using nuclear weapons, there may be little or no warning of attack and nuclear weapons will be used by both sides from the outset of war.
 - (a) In this event, the war will most probably consist of two phases:
 - 1 Phase I: A period of violent large-scale organized fighting, not likely to exceed 30 days, the first few days of which would be characterized by the greatest intensity of nuclear exchange.
 - 2 Phase II: A longer period, of indeterminate duration, of rehabilitation, re-organization and regrouping of residual resources to accomplish the remaining military tasks.
- (2) If the Soviets initiate General War using conventional weapons only, or if General War arises from military operations which were, initially, of a lesser scale, ACE would, with the forces available or likely to be available, be unable to conduct a sustained defense of NATO territory unless NATO employed nuclear weapons both strategically and tactically. Accordingly, NATO will take the initiative in the use of nuclear weapons under these circumstances.
- (3) If the Soviets conclude that the initiation of operations on a scale less than General War is the best way in which they could profitably further their aims, then such operations will be directed against NATO forces or territories, directly or indirectly, covertly or overtly supported by themselves or their Satellites, trusting that the Allies in their collective desire to prevent a general conflict would either limit their reactions or not react at all. In this event:
 - (a) In accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty, as modified by the protocol on the accession of Greece and Turkey, SACEUR will be authorized and directed to employ NATO forces to deal with such acts of aggression.
 - (b) If ACE forces are subjected to a non-nuclear attack with which they cannot cope, SACEUR will be authorized to employ nuclear weapons in accordance with approved ACE plans.
- (4) Operations on a scale less than General War might, at any moment, expand to General War; however, the selective use of limited nuclear fire-power will not necessarily result in total war, although it may heighten the degree of risk.

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C.O.S.(62)120

20TH MARCH, 1962.

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Note by the Secretary

At their meeting* on Thursday, 15th March, 1962, the Chiefs of Staff approved the report at Annex examining; first, a draft statement@ to the North Atlantic Council on the role of the British strategic nuclear forces; and, secondly, whether targetting should be included in the terms of reference of the proposed NATO Peacetime Nuclear Administrative Committee.

2. In approving the report the Chiefs of Staff:-

- (a) Instructed the Secretary to forward the report to the Ministry of Defence as an expression of their views.
- (b) Took note that the Acting Chief of the Defence Staff would inform the Minister of Defence of the problems including targetting in the terms of reference of a NATO Peacetime Administrative Committee.

(Signed) J.K. WATKINS

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

20TH MARCH, 1962.

* COS(62)20th Meeting, Minute 1
@ Annex to COS.302/9/3/62

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ANNEX TO C.O.S.(62)120

CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

INTRODUCTION

The North Atlantic Council has recently been discussing a paper by the Secretary-General on the availability, control, and employment of nuclear weapons. In it he suggested that in view of the Soviet medium range missile threat to NATO the Council "should seek a formal assurance from the United States and the United Kingdom Governments that the national plans of their strategic air and naval forces provide for the interdiction of all such missile launching bases as are beyond the capacity of the nuclear strike forces available to SACEUR and SACLANT". The Ministry of Defence has drafted a statement[@] for Sir Paul Mason to make to the Council on this subject, and have asked for comments.

Another aspect of the control of nuclear weapons currently being discussed in the Council is a United Kingdom paper[%] proposing a NATO Peacetime Nuclear Administrative Committee. This paper, while suggesting that the Committee should have access to a considerable amount of information about warheads and delivery systems in NATO, does not refer specifically to targetting. The Minister of Defence has, however, asked for views of the Chiefs of Staff on bringing targetting within the Committee's terms of reference.

AIM

To comment on the draft statement[@] to the North Atlantic Council, and to consider whether targetting should be included in the terms of reference of the proposed NATO Peacetime Nuclear Administrative Committee.

DRAFT STATEMENT TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

We are in general agreement with the draft statement but would prefer the second paragraph to be amended as below:-

"H.M.G. wish to be associated with this general assurance to NATO insofar as the United Kingdom strategic forces are concerned. These nuclear forces make a significant contribution to the strategic forces of the West. The V-bombers, based on this side of the Atlantic, form a large proportion of the initial attack by aircraft."

We consider that the statement is correct in not specifically meeting Dr. Stikker's request for assurance in regard to interdiction of medium range missile launching bases, since they may become increasingly impracticable as they are hardened and made mobile.

THE PEACETIME NUCLEAR ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE

The immediate British aim in proposing a NATO Peacetime Nuclear Administrative Committee is^o to allay the anxieties of European NATO members about American determination to use

S NDP(WG)/P(62)4
@ Annex to COS.302/9/3/62
% NDC(62)9
o Foreign Office to UKDEL NATO Telegram
No. 313 of 16 February, 1962

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nuclear warheads in the defence of Europe, and to give them a greater sense of participation in the whole range of NATO military planning. A further factor affecting the British decision to put forward the proposal has been that the Americans would be unlikely to relinquish their veto on the use of United States nuclear warheads, which would preclude NATO control of their use.

The United Kingdom paper suggests that the Committee would receive information on nuclear matters generally and act as a clearing house for such information. They would also be consulted and have certain advisory functions on aspects of nuclear deployment, policy, and peacetime administration in Europe. The Committee might consist of all Permanent Representatives to the North Atlantic Council, but for security reasons a sub-committee of the Standing Group countries and the Secretary-General (representing the others) should deal with the more highly classified information. The Committee's advisory functions would contain no power of veto since this would adversely affect the credibility of the deterrent.

NUCLEAR TARGET PLANNING

General

Although the United Kingdom paper does not refer specifically to targetting, some of the proposals in it have a bearing on this subject, in that it is suggested that the Committee would:-

- (a) Correlate information which would cover existing and future arrangements relating to:-
 - (i) At the discretion of SACEUR and SACLANT, plans for the use of nuclear weapons.
 - (ii) In general terms, the nuclear capabilities of the strategic forces.
- (b) Be the central point in NATO for information and studies of general nuclear matters affecting the Alliance e.g.
 - (i) Nuclear considerations underlying the defence of the free world as a whole.
 - (ii) Assessments of Soviet nuclear dispositions and planning, and effects on the Soviet Union of attack by Western strategic forces.

The above proposals will ensure that the Committee will become acquainted with the general features of nuclear target policy for NATO. We consider below whether they should be associated more closely with wider nuclear target policy and targetting.

Target Policy and Targetting

It should be appreciated that there is a significant difference between target policy and targetting. They are

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defined as follows:-

- (a) Target policy is the definition given to the choice of a group or system of targets to be attacked.
- (b) Target planning (i.e. targetting) includes operating techniques, operational capabilities and limitations, routes and selected targets.

NK Strategic Nuclear Target Planning

This joint target policy is decided by Ministers on our advice, but target planning (targetting) is co-ordinated by the United States Air Force and Royal Air Force and in a similar way by the United States Navy and the Royal Navy on a strictly need-to-know basis. The security aspect of targetting is vital. It is an essential part of the validity of the deterrent. We therefore consider that it would be unacceptable for the Committee or its sub-Committees, to have access to information bearing on strategic nuclear target policy and targetting.

NATO Nuclear Strike Plans

NATO Atomic Strike Plans have been prepared on the following basis:-

- (a) Scheduled Programme. Strikes, automatic on declaration of R-hour, against the enemy's known atomic delivery capability and key control centres.
- (b) Regional Programmes. These are prepared by Major Subordinate Commanders and approved by SACEUR. They consist of high priority targets which are automatically attacked on R-hour and targets of opportunity which are subject to pre-strike reconnaissance at the time.

Before the declaration of R-hour a large number of targets are planned on a contingency basis only, and the target list is therefore incomplete. However, if this information, even though incomplete, were compromised it would seriously prejudice the deterrent value of the Atomic Strike Plans, and their success if they are to be carried out. We therefore consider that details of NATO Atomic Strike Plans should not be disclosed to this Committee.

All NATO nations are already to some extent aware of NATO's nuclear capability and general target policy, so far as it is reflected in the Supreme Commander's Emergency Defence Plans. We consider, therefore, that the proposed Committee would expect to have a say in the formulation of NATO target policy and we should see no objection to this provided that the position of the Supreme Commanders as military advisers to the NATO Council is preserved and provided that the United States agree.

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CONCLUSIONS

55. We conclude that the proposed statement to the North Atlantic Council on the British strategic nuclear forces is militarily acceptable, subject to amendment in accordance with paragraph 4 above.

56. We further conclude that:-

- (a) The proposed Committee should not be given access to any information bearing on US/UK strategic target policy or target planning.
- (b) The proposed Committee should not be given access to any information bearing on N.A.T.O. target planning.
- (c) The proposed Committee would, however, expect to have some say in the formulation of N.A.T.O. target policy. We see no objection to this provided that the United States agree and that the position of the Supreme Commanders as military advisers to the N.A.T.O. Council is preserved.

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458/3.23(11)

United Kingdom Delegation to NATO,
Paris.

(24229G)

March 27, 1962.

When the Council, in its discussion on NATO defence policy on March 26, moved into a session limited to Permanent Representatives, Finletter took occasion to make a statement about the present essential thinking of the United States which, he said, might get him into real trouble if he was known to have made it and might seem impossibly oversimplified if it were not the simple truth. This was the gist of what he said.

2. When the present Administration came into power Finletter and those who thought like him (the implication was that he had played a major part) made up their minds that there should be no more "trip wire" policies, but that on the contrary it should be made clear, and everything possible done to ensure, that the United States was committed from the outset and up to the neck, in the event of any aggression against NATO.

3. At a later stage, looking at the great increase in the strength of NATO forces which had resulted from the urgent measures taken in connection with the threat to Berlin, the Americans had come to the conclusion that they could now stand right up to the Communists and not only successfully hold a major conventional attack but throw it right back. (This was admittedly thought of in terms of the Central Front, but Finletter was quick to say that there was no thought of making the flanks expendable to the profit of the centre.)

4. The Americans had therefore decided that the above not only could but should be their policy: and that it should be carried out in such a way as to leave the Communists in no doubt that the West themselves were in no doubt of their ability to throw their opponents back.

5. The conclusion was inescapable. It was to serve notice on the Communists that there was only one form of aggression open to them, namely, all out nuclear aggression. This, said Finletter, seemed to

/point

The Hon. P. E. Ramsbotham,
Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

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GUARD

point the finger of danger straight at the United States and the United Kingdom. But the strike and survival capacity of Strategic Air Command (and, Finletter was careful to add, of Bomber Command) was more than strong enough to take care of this threat.

6. The Secretary General said that these remarks gave abundant food for thought. No-one else said aught. I do not quite see how we can come back on it before we tackle basic NATO strategy: and there are beginning to be clear signs that we shall have to do this in the coming summer.

7. I am sending copies of this letter to Ormsby Gore and to Scott.

F.W. Mottershead to Minister of Defence, 9 April 1962
Visit of Mr. Nitze
A brief on topics which you may wish to discuss with Mr.
Nitze on 10th April is attached.

4/9/62

NATO DEFENCE POLICY

DEFE 13/254

Role of Conventional Forces

1. We share with the Americans the general aim of evolving a NATO strategy that will make it possible to avoid all-out war without risking defeat at conventional level.
2. We are in agreement with the Americans that NATO must demonstrate its willingness to use nuclear weapons to prevail, if this became necessary, and we also agree with them that NATO should not use nuclear weapons until it is clear that the enemy has embarked on a determined large-scale attack. We are not entirely in agreement with them about the length and scope of any conventional phase at the start of operations.
3. The United Kingdom view is that once it was clear that the enemy had embarked on a determined large-scale attack there would be no advantage in delaying resort to tactical nuclear weapons, though probably used in the first place in small numbers primarily to demonstrate Western determination not to shrink from nuclear warfare if necessary. To defer such action once it was clear that the enemy had embarked on major aggression might tend both to weaken our military position for countering the attack and reduce the chances of ending the conflict before it escalated to all-out war. The United Kingdom fully accepts the need for conventional forces sufficient to show that NATO is ready and determined to resist aggression at any level and sufficient to identify a determined large scale aggression as such, but we do not accept the concept of long large-scale non-nuclear warfare.
4. The American view, on the other hand, as exemplified by a recent speech of Mr. McNamara, is that NATO should be ready to engage in large-scale non-nuclear warfare in response to a Communist provocation. This in part lies behind the American pressure to increase NATO's conventional strength. The Americans seem to assume that NATO has the capacity to provide enough conventional forces to achieve a stalemate, thus leaving it to the Russians to decide to withdraw or to resort to nuclear weapons. Apart from our doubts about the realism or usefulness of large-scale conventional war, and about NATO's ability to provide the forces required for it, it seems questionable how far once a war had started it would be wise to leave the initiative in Russian hands. It can be argued, moreover, that a stalemate would confront NATO with a choice between accepting the fait accompli and resorting to nuclear weapons in unfavourable conditions.
5. We consider that the American concept of large-scale conventional warfare, and in particular the purpose of prolonging it, needs fuller explanation and examination than it has yet had. The United States authorities should also be brought to consider what size of conventional forces their ideas would demand (our own military authorities have suggested forces of the order of twice those required by MC.70) and whether it is realistic economically or politically to expect that such forces could be provided.

M.R.B.M.s

6. The Americans, under strong pressure from the Germans, have suggested NATO should set up an M.R.B.M. force. SACEUR has asked for M.R.B.M.s to replace his obsolescent strike aircraft.

7. We can see little military justification for M.R.B.M.s in NATO shield forces. There is no need for NATO, even if they could afford it, to duplicate the retaliatory functions of the U.S. and U.K. strategic nuclear forces, and these strategic forces already cover also the Soviet nuclear strike aircraft and missile sites threatening Europe. M.R.B.M.s could be used only in all-out war and they would not decide the outcome. In these circumstances, we would give M.R.B.M.s only low priority on military grounds.

8. We can see little political advantage and serious political disadvantages in establishing a NATO M.R.B.M. force. So long as America retains its veto over the use of nuclear weapons in NATO, European fears about these weapons being used in their defence will never be completely allayed - certainly not by the establishment of a new and costly force. We consider that the establishment of such a force might be misrepresented as the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear powers and, in particular, the suggestion that the Germans had acquired a share in the control of nuclear weapons could be harmful to the prospects of the present disarmament talks. We do not think that a NATO M.R.B.M. force would discourage other members of NATO from acquiring an independent nuclear deterrent as long as the Americans retain ultimate control over its use.

9. We do not think that NATO can afford to strengthen its conventional forces and contribute towards an M.R.B.M. force.

10. We hope, therefore, that the Americans will let the proposal drop.

NATO and Nuclear Weapons

11. In order to help release the Americans from the offer of a NATO M.R.B.M. force, we are hoping that at Athens NATO Ministers will concentrate on the problem of the political control of nuclear weapons in NATO.

12. They will have before them a package deal comprising:-

- (a) assurances by U.S. and U.K. Governments that their strategic forces will be used in support of NATO;
- (b) guidelines setting out the circumstances in which nuclear weapons would be used in NATO;
- (c) NATO nuclear committee for informing NATO about nuclear matters.

It is hoped that these measures may take the pressure off the NATO M.R.B.M. force.

BERLIN

1. We distinguish between NATO defence policy on the one hand and the offensive contingency planning for Berlin on the other. We do not recognise that the strengthening of NATO forces as a result of the Berlin crisis is necessarily appropriate for a defensive strategy.
2. In our view, the expanded military planning, including attacks not directly related to access to Berlin against East Germany, are highly dangerous both militarily and politically.
3. We are also averse from the maritime counter-measures recently advocated as retaliation against Soviet harassment in the air corridors. Fortunately, the Russians failed to provoke the Allies into rash retaliation and seem now to have admitted the failure of this particular form of harassment. In our view, the maritime counter-measures which would have no connection with access to Berlin were absurd in the circumstances and would be ineffective against more serious harassment.
4. H.M.G. have been very pleased with the way General Norstad handled the recent harassments in the Berlin air corridors and have every confidence in his judgment.

9th April, 1962

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PRIME MINISTER

Nuclear Weapons

At the time of your meeting with the President, the situation with regard to nuclear weapons will be developing in various ways. I would summarise what these developments might be as follows:

The French force de frappe

2. Now that the General's position with regard to Algeria seems secure, I don't think there is any doubt that nothing will deter him from creating a French nuclear strike force at the earliest possible moment. He has already aircraft that can carry nuclear weapons and we think that he will probably possess shortly a kiloton weapon. The French believe that within four to five years they can become a full-scale nuclear power. They may have an H bomb by then but not a second strike capacity. Although the cost of doing this is already increasing rapidly, the General's orders at the moment are that this effort should have top priority.

U.S./U.S.S.R. negotiations over Berlin

3. As you know, these negotiations have, as a very important element within them, the question of "nuclear diffusion"; in other words, a possible agreement that further diffusion of nuclear weapons into the control of any national Government not now owning them should be stopped.

NATO control over Nuclear Weapons

4. At the Athens NATO Conference, Foreign Ministers and Defence Ministers will be examining a NATO package on this subject which includes guide lines as to the circumstances in which nuclear weapons would be used. It is proposed that these guide lines should apply to all forces of the alliance, including those of the Americans and ourselves. A NATO Nuclear Committee will ensure that NATO members who have nuclear weapons on their soil will receive much greater information about their number and type, and there may also be some agreement to discuss at least the broad outlines of the nuclear targeting system with the non-nuclear NATO allies. It is hoped that this package will diminish the German desire to have either nuclear weapons of their own or a more important part in controlling NATO's nuclear armoury.

5. As a background to this situation, there is now a good deal of talk in France as well as in Great Britain about some way of sharing strategic nuclear weapons. There also remains on the table of the NATO Council the American offer to provide some kind of sea-borne NATO nuclear force to be manned and paid for on a multilateral basis. I don't think the Americans are at all keen on

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at 11/11/51
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be accepted by NATO. It is also clearly in our interests, and I should have thought in the American interests, that we try to achieve a nuclear position which will allow us to stop the Germans demanding nuclear weapons of their own. As to the NATO nuclear force, we have always believed this to be nonsense and the furthest we have ever gone in public is to say that "if a NATO pool of nuclear weapons was formed, we would consider contributing to such a pool". By 'pool' we do not mean a new nuclear strike force but rather the allocation of existing nuclear weapons to NATO. Our view has also been that such an allocation should only build up a pool that was a fraction of the total nuclear force available to NATO, for clearly a force under the control of all NATO nations would have little or no deterrent effect. (a)

6. This, then, is the background to any discussions that you might decide to have with President Kennedy. Perhaps the most important element in all this is the position of the French. In fact, France is today a nuclear power. I do not believe that either the Americans or ourselves can deflect President de Gaulle from his determination to make France co-equal with America and Britain by acquisition of a capacity to build and deliver nuclear weapons. On the other hand, if we allow him to continue to go it alone then the Germans will become almost impossible to control and, indeed, the French themselves might decide to give the Germans nuclear know-how. (b) // of 6, the how a answer (c)

7. In this note I do not forget the necessity for us to continue to stand well with President de Gaulle because of his decisive position with regard to our entry into the Common Market. My view is that British and, I think, U.S. requirements would best be met by Britain offering to join with France in a nuclear trusteeship over strategic weapons for NATO Europe. This would imply Franco/British consultation before strategic weapons were used, in addition to whatever NATO rules applied. There would be nothing to stop the Americans joining this trusteeship if they wished, but this might well raise difficulties for them in Congress and perhaps with American public opinion. Now that it is clear that any use of nuclear weapons would bring a devastating Russian retaliation on American cities as well as on Europe, the European NATO nations might well feel happier if there was an element of the strategic deterrent under European control. (c) // also 17

8. The combined Anglo/French strategic deterrent would have to accept the same guide lines and overall control as the Americans accept within NATO for their strategic nuclear forces. The United States would have to agree that we should be allowed to help the French in building up their deterrent force on an air-borne, not a missile, basis. I believe we should seek not to put them into the business of manufacturing sophisticated nuclear weapons but rather to offer them a share in our existing capacity (it is far too big for us anyway). u

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the concept of an "independent" British or French deterrent by reserving the right of each Government to withdraw its forces and employ them on a purely national basis if it so desired. This is the principle on which we have allocated Fighter Command to NATO.

9. This would enable de Gaulle to claim the status symbol of being a world nuclear power at much smaller cost than by going it alone. Whether it would give him the special position in U.S./U.K./French relations which he imagines might be a more difficult subject, for I think the General has always grossly over-estimated the special position which we enjoy vis-a-vis the Americans because of our nuclear capacity. However, as I believe that the General is more concerned with outward form in these matters than with the practicalities of the situation, I should have thought we would have met his desires. By this means the United States, Britain and France could at last take a common front on all these difficult nuclear problems. This would be very helpful in further negotiations with the Russians. It would enable us to face any German demands for nuclear weapons with a united front. A European element in the strategic deterrent would be increasingly a re-assurance to Europe that they would not be abandoned by the Americans if the crunch really came.

10. If we were seen to be the authors of this plan I should have thought it should make the General feel well disposed towards us, and its Anglo/French nature would be very much in line with the political and economic relationships we are trying to create with Europe. From the American point of view, it would at least give them some hold over the general nuclear situation in NATO, and indeed in the rest of the world so far as the anti-Communist nations are concerned. It is also in my view the best hope of restraining the Germans from becoming a nuclear power in their own right.

now out of it

11. I am sending copies of this minute to the Foreign Secretary and Sir Norman Brook.

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3. As you know, these negotiations have, as a very important element within them, the question of "nuclear diffusion"; in other words, a possible agreement that further diffusion of nuclear weapons into the control of any national Government not now owning them should be stopped.

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5. As a background to this situation, there is now a good deal of talk in France as well as in Great Britain about some way of sharing strategic nuclear weapons. There also remains on the table of the NATO Council the American offer to provide some kind of sea-borne NATO nuclear force to be manned and paid for on a multilateral basis. I don't think the Americans are at all keen on this proposition now and they would certainly prefer to have surface ships rather than commit POLARIS submarines, but they could hardly withdraw the offer if it were to

ourselves can deflect President de Gaulle's determination to make France co-equal with America and Britain by acquisition of a capacity to build and deliver nuclear weapons. On the other hand, if we allow him to continue to go it alone then the Germans will become almost impossible to control and, indeed, the French themselves might decide to give the Germans nuclear know-how.

7. In this note I do not forget the necessity for us to continue to stand well with President de Gaulle because of his decisive position with regard to our entry into the Common Market. My view is that British and, I think, U.S. requirements would best be met by Britain offering to join with France in a nuclear trusteeship over strategic weapons for NATO Europe. This would imply Franco/British consultation before strategic weapons were used, in addition to whatever NATO rules applied. There would be nothing to stop the Americans joining this trusteeship if they wished, but this might well raise difficulties for them in Congress and perhaps with American public opinion. Now that it is clear that any use of nuclear weapons would bring a devastating Russian retaliation on American cities as well as on Europe, the European NATO nations might well feel happier if there was an element of the strategic deterrent under European control.

8. The combined Anglo/French strategic deterrent would have to accept the same guide lines and overall control as the Americans accept within NATO for their strategic nuclear forces. The United States would have to agree that we should be allowed to help the French in building up their deterrent force on an air-borne, not a missile, basis. I believe we should seek not to put them into the business of manufacturing sophisticated nuclear weapons but rather to offer them a share in our existing manufacturing capacity (it is far too big for us anyway). The force would be targeted together and fully integrated from an operational point of view. It would also be firmly committed to NATO. One could, however, maintain

in further negotiations with the Russians. It would enable us to face any German demands for nuclear weapons with a united front. A European element in the strategic deterrent would be increasingly a re-assurance to Europe that they would not be abandoned by the Americans if the crunch really came.

10. If we were seen to be the authors of this plan I should have thought it should make the General feel well disposed towards us, and its Anglo/French nature would be very much in line with the political and economic relationships we are trying to create with Europe. From the American point of view, it would at least give them some hold over the general nuclear situation in NATO, and indeed in the rest of the world so far as the anti-Communist nations are concerned. It is also in my view the best hope of restraining the Germans from becoming a nuclear power in their own right.

11. I am sending copies of this minute to the Foreign Secretary and Sir Norman Brook.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'H' or 'H.' with a flourish.

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12th April, 1962

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PRIME MINISTER

The Minister of Defence is evidently favourable to your ideas about nuclear weapons and the French but I do not think that his proposals in paragraphs 7 and 8 will by themselves either satisfy the French or pacify the Americans and the Germans.

There seem to me to be two elements in the situation:-

(a) The present situation

We could of course offer to give the French some veto on the use of the British deterrent; this is what the Minister seems to propose. At the moment the French would be quite pleased but as the Minister recognises they would still wish to build up their own force de frappe because we obviously could not give the French authority to send off our nuclear deterrent without our agreement. In other words, the French would share with us the negative but not the positive control of our British deterrent.

(b) The future

The British deterrent will only be effective under present plans during the 1960s; thereafter a bomber force will become increasingly ineffective against either of the major powers. The French are in an even worse position than us because not only will their means of delivery be out of date but they will have a long way to go in developing their own H-bomb and building up their stock of nuclear weapons generally.

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I suggest that any effective Anglo-French arrangement which would have a chance of achieving the satisfactory results envisaged by the Minister of Defence must involve:-

(a) helping the French now to obtain for themselves some H-bombs and a larger stock of nuclear weapons generally. This could be achieved either by providing them with information or by manufacturing the finished product on their behalf. The Minister of Defence seems, rightly I think, to prefer the latter alternative. And

(b) reaching agreement with the French on a joint Anglo-French study designed to lead to an effective delivery system for nuclear weapons in the 1970s. Such a venture might well be a European one based perhaps on a development of ELDO.

This programme may well have to be approached in two bites; for example, American agreement to (a) is more likely if they are not at this stage informed closely about (b), but French agreement to (a) which will still involve some limitations for them is only probable on the basis that we have agreed to work together on (b). Once the reality of this arrangement had been accepted we could no doubt find suitable ways of fitting it nominally into the NATO pattern. Nor do I think that it would be necessary to reserve the right of the British and French Governments to withdraw their forces and employ them on a national basis if necessary. We do not need a specific reservation to preserve the right ~~of~~ national action in

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The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.

It is issued for the personal use of..... C.C.....

DEFE 5/126

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C.O.S. (62) 172

FOR INFORMATION

16TH APRIL, 1962

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

LIVE OAK TERMS OF REFERENCE

Copy of a letter (Reference UKLO/1 dated
11th April, 1962) from the Chief of Staff,
LIVE OAK to the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff
Committee

I enclose for your information a paper giving the
LIVE OAK Terms of Reference.

2. This paper, which was prepared within LIVE OAK, incorporates
the changes approved by the Tripartite Governments since the
original Terms of Reference were laid down in the 4 April 1959 basic
document on Berlin Contingency Planning.

(SIGNED) R. J. CHAUNDLER.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

16TH APRIL, 1962

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ANNEX TO C.O.S.(62)172

[SHLO 600/127 7
9th April, 1962]

LIVE OAK TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. Purpose:

The purpose of this memorandum is to set forth the mission, responsibilities and command arrangements of LIVE OAK.

2. Authority:

With the approval of the Governments concerned, a tripartite organization designated as LIVE OAK has been established under my command, composed of military representatives of France, United Kingdom and the United States and, in addition, liaison personnel representing the Federal Republic of Germany.

3. Mission:

The mission of LIVE OAK is to prepare contingency plans designed to maintain Allied access to West Berlin, to perform related operational functions as directed by me, and to maintain liaison with designated national, tripartite and quadripartite political agencies and military commands.

4. Responsibilities:

a. Develop tripartite military contingency plans to cope with Soviet/GDR actions affecting Allied access to West Berlin.

b. Maintain contact with appropriate national and tripartite force commanders in connection with LIVE OAK plans and operations.

c. Maintain liaison with the Governments concerned to obtain governmental guidance and approval of LIVE OAK plans and proposals, as appropriate.

d. Consult with specified tripartite/quadripartite agencies, as appropriate.

e. Receive and portray pertinent military and political intelligence data collected and evaluated by other agencies, and assess its applicability to the Berlin situation.

f. Maintain a capability to perform on a 24-hour a day basis the functions of an operations center pertaining to developments affecting access to and the security of West Berlin, to include arranging for adequate communications to support LIVE OAK.

g. Coordinate and assist, when necessary, in handling special training, communications, and logistical problems which may arise in connection with the implementation of LIVE OAK plans by tripartite military forces.

h. Coordinate tripartite contingency planning and operations with SHAPE.

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5. Command Arrangements:

a. LIVE OAK will operate directly under my supervision. In the event of my absence or incapacity, General Wheeler, Deputy USCINCEUR, will act in my behalf.

b. The Chief of Staff of LIVE OAK will be a Major General appointed by the Government of the United Kingdom. There will be two Deputy Chiefs of Staff, one a Brigadier General appointed by the Government of France and the other a Brigadier General appointed by the Government of the United States.

c. LIVE OAK will deal with appropriate field commanders specified in applicable LIVE OAK contingency plans, or directly with the commander of affected national forces, as appropriate.

d. The Senior Officer assigned to LIVE OAK by each of the nations represented in the organization may serve as the National Representative for LIVE OAK activities, as instructed by the respective Governments.

6. Rescission:

This memorandum rescinds memorandum dated 14 April 1959, subject: "LIVE OAK Planning Staff" (LO(IN)-59-2016) and supersedes any instructions previously issued which are in conflict herewith.

(SIGNED) LAURIS NORSTAD

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UK EYES ONLY

ANNEX 1 TO COS(62)163

ITEM 1

CLARIFICATION OF TERMINOLOGY USED IN
LAST DISCUSSIONS ON NATO STRATEGY

General

1. The United Kingdom Military Attache in Paris has represented that in the second round of talks it would be advisable to make sure that we attach the same meaning to basic terms used when discussing NATO strategy. He has suggested those which might have been misunderstood at the last staff talks and we make below suggestions in regard to these to serve as a basis for discussion.

Strategic and Tactical

2. Clarification has been requested of the terms "strategic" and "tactical" as applied to nuclear targets and/or weapons. In discussion of a NATO Nuclear Force at the last meeting the strategic capability of the force was defined¹ by the French as "the ability to strike within Soviet territory with part of its force". This is not, however, an entirely satisfactory definition, since for example Soviet territory could be struck with very short range weapons from Turkey or the Black Sea in the course of essentially tactical operations. Conversely, some weapon systems normally regarded as tactical have a very long range and could be used strategically. There is therefore a risk of ambiguity in basing a definition of the terms strategic and tactical, as applied to weapon systems, on range capability alone. We consider an accurate definition should take into account the role for which the weapon is used rather than its capability.

3. In general, we regard tactical targets and weapons as those directly engaged in the land/air/sea battle. The majority of

@ Annex to COS.1243/10/10/61

UK EYES ONLY

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UK EYES ONLY

Annex I (Continued)

such targets would be located close to the battle area though some would be in satellite or Soviet territory. They would include submarines, surface ships, airfields/strips, missile sites, troop concentrations, and interdiction targets.

4. We regard as strategic targets not only those on Russian soil, but also those on satellite territory, which it will be necessary to strike in order to:-

- (a) Destroy the enemy's strategic nuclear capability.
- (b) Disrupt the enemy air and missile defence system.
- (c) Destroy the will and ability of Russia to wage war (e.g. cities).

IRBMs

5. An MRBM (mid-range ballistic missile) is a missile with a range which might vary between 300 and 1,500 miles. It may be based on land, or in ships or submarines. The term should be used to distinguish the MRBM (or IRBM - intermediate range ballistic missile) from the shorter range missiles of the PERSHING type and the ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) of some 3,000 n.m. range. Because there may be different MRBMs, shore-based or ship-board, megaton or kiloton, and because they may be used tactically or strategically over varying ranges, care should be taken when using the term.

Forcing a Pause

6. We accept the definition given in SACEUR's revised Emergency Defence Plan of the aim of forcing a pause in the continuity of military action as:-

"to require the enemy to make a conscious decision as to whether or not he intends to extend his aggression to the point that it constitutes an act which might lead to General War."

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UK EYES ONLY

Annex I (Concluded)

7. The pause might be forced by Allied conventional forces alone or combined with the selective use of nuclear weapons on a suitable military target.

Raising the Threshold:

8. At the last staff talks the French envisaged the very early use of tactical nuclear weapons and distinguished between two different thresholds: a tactical nuclear threshold and a strategic nuclear threshold. We regard the "threshold" as the moment when NATO is forced to resort to the use of nuclear weapons, and interpret "raising the threshold" as delaying this moment by improving the Allied capability for conventional operations.

Discriminate use of Nuclear Weapons

9. We consider the term 'discriminate use' is best replaced by 'selective use' which is used in SACVUR's revised Emergency Defence Plan. In the revised plan he has introduced a new 5-hour procedure to provide for the selective use of nuclear weapons by which he will authorize their use "singly or in limited numbers for specific purposes and in specific areas".

The Nuclear Barrage

10. We understood from the French at the last staff talks^① that their concept of a nuclear barrage is a system of nuclear fire to be laid down in a limited area on this side of the Iron Curtain to prevent the movement of Soviet mechanized forces into NATO Europe. The weapons used, which might include atomic demolition munitions, would be carefully limited in yield. A public announcement of the existence of the barrage would be made in order to achieve the dual purpose of deterrence and, should it be launched, the avoidance of the risk of escalation.

① Annex to COS.1243/10/10/61

- 5 -

UK EYES ONLY

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ANNEX II TO COS(62)143

ITEM 2

NATO STRATEGY

General

1. At the last talks we were committed to further discussion of certain aspects of NATO strategy, and these are the items on the agenda for the next talks, with the addition of a French proposal to discuss the delegation of authority to use nuclear weapons within pre-arranged limits of yield. Separate briefs are attached as under:-

Appendix 'A' - Military questions arising from the
Beauvallet Questionnaire

Appendix 'B' - The Initial Use of Nuclear Weapons in ACE

Appendix 'C' - The French Concept of a Nuclear Barrage

Appendix 'D' - Delegation of Authority for the Use of
Nuclear Weapons within pre-arranged
Limits of Yield

2. Since the last talks there has been a number of developments in regard to NATO strategy which we consider are important as background to the next talks, and which we review below.

Review of Recent Developments

3. Control of Nuclear Weapons. The Military Committee paper^{*} which sets out the military views on the control of nuclear weapons is before the North Atlantic Council. The main theme of the paper is that either there must be adequate machinery for political authorization of the use of nuclear weapons by NATO Major Commanders, or there must be advanced delegation of authority from the sovereign political level. The United Kingdom and the United States have both emphasized that the latter would be unacceptable. However, on purely military grounds, we have expressed⁺ the view that a control system

* MC 95

+ COS(61)191

Annex II (Continued)

cannot be foreseen that is so perfect that it would remove the need to establish predetermined guide lines to allow subordinate military commanders some discretion in the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

4. Increased NATO Responsibility for the Use of Nuclear Weapons.

There has been considerable discussion in the Council on ways of giving NATO more responsibility for the use of nuclear weapons.

These have included:-

- (a) Assurances. In response to a request by the Secretary-General the United Kingdom and the United States have given assurances² that the operational plans of their strategic nuclear strike forces are co-ordinated with those of SACEUR and SACLENT, and that Soviet missile sites threatening Europe are recorded the same top priority as those threatening the United Kingdom and North America.
- (b) Guide Lines. These would set out agreed circumstances in which nuclear weapons would be used in defence of NATO. Agreement has not yet been reached on the form which they would take.
- (c) Nuclear Committee. The United Kingdom has proposed³ the creation of a NATO Nuclear Committee which would receive information on nuclear matters generally, act as a clearing house for such information, share in the peacetime administration of nuclear weapons committed to NATO, and be consulted on aspects of nuclear deployment and policy in Europe. The Council is now discussing the terms of reference

3 Annex to COS 302/9/3/62 and
COS(12)120
NDC(62)9

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UK EYES ONLY

Annex II (Continued)

for such a Committee. We have agreed^Ø that it should have some say in the formulation of NATO target policy, but that it should not have access to US/UK strategic target policy or planning, or to NATO target planning.

5. SACEUR's Revised Emergency Defence Plan. This plan has been revised to include guidance to SACEUR's subordinate commanders on defence against aggression less than general war, and will enable them to work out for the first time methods of forcing a pause. We are generally in agreement that the plan meets the existing NATO strategic concept, but there is a number of points in regard to its implementation at lower levels which the Directors of Plans are to investigate in their forthcoming visit to BIOR and RLF Germany.

6. United States Pressure for Larger Conventional Forces. In a recent statement[§] to the North Atlantic Council of United States views on nuclear strategy Mr. Rusk said that the United States regarded a deterrent policy approaching nuclear automaticity as both irresponsible and likely in the long term to be ineffective. He called for an increase in conventional forces so as not to have to resort unnecessarily to nuclear weapons. Finally he stated the United States view that the non-nuclear force strengths called for in the end-66 force requirements[£] were the minimum needed to ensure continuing credibility for the nuclear deterrent. The Secretary-General has subsequently circulated a paper[†] prepared by his staff showing the estimated financial and manpower requirements which would fall on NATO European countries if they were to meet the end-66 force goals. It shows a financial gap on probable national resources, likely to be available for NATO, of

Ø COS(62)120
§ Annexure 'A' to UKDEL NATO Memorandum
No. 101 dated 22nd March, 1962
£ MC 26/4
† NDP/62/5

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Annex II (Concluded)

at least 30% in the case of most countries (United Kingdom 15.7%) and increased overall manpower requirements of 449,900 (United Kingdom 39,100). The UK position is still under consideration but the main point is that the Berlin situation is exceptional and measures to meet this have no application to NATO strategy as a whole.

UK EYES ONLY

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APPENDIX 'A' TO ANNEX II TO
COS(62)163

MILITARY QUESTIONS ARISING FROM THE BEAUVALLET
QUESTIONNAIRE

General

1. At the last talks we undertook, so far as political considerations permitted, to study the questions^① posed by General Beauvallet in connexion with the problem of MRBMs and a NATO nuclear force. Our latest views^② on the subject related to certain Foreign Office and NATO Defence Policy Committee papers which are still being processed and have not yet been approved by Ministers. The French have since asked specifically for the British views on:-

- (a) A concept of graduated deterrence.
- (b) The problems concerned with the creation of a force of MRBMs for NATO.

Graduated Deterrence

2. If the French mean by graduated deterrence announcing in advance NATO's reaction to Soviet aggression, we cannot agree. If, however, the French merely mean that NATO must be evidently prepared to meet Soviet aggression at any level, we can accept this. We consider the French concept of a nuclear barrage in Appendix 'C'.

MRBMs in ACE

3. The United Kingdom position on the whole subject of MRBMs in ACE is not yet decided. It would however be useful to exchange views on questions such as those raised in paragraphs 25-29 of the paper^③ containing our recently expressed views on a NATO Seaborne MRBM Force.

① Appendix 'A' to Annex
to COS.1243/10/10/61
② COS(62)100

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APPENDIX 'B' TO ANNEX II TO
GOS(62)163

THE INITIAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
IN ALLIED GO FORTH EUROPE

French Views

1. At the last meeting the French considered that for various reasons the increase of conventional forces will always be limited and conventional aggression on "the Soviet scale" could not be met without recourse at least to nuclear weapons used tactically. They differentiated between a tactical nuclear threshold and a strategic nuclear threshold, and envisaged an early and general tactical use of nuclear weapons which would give the conventional forces the opportunities of facing the enemy attack under better conditions and thus avoid a speedy and catastrophic deterioration of the situation which would quickly lead to recourse to the strategic use of nuclear weapons.

United Kingdom Views

2. The following points might be used in discussion of this item, as an indication of our preliminary view that nuclear weapons could not be used tactically without serious risks of escalation:-

- (a) In order to maintain the validity of the strategic deterrent, we must continue to impress on the Russians that escalation to global war would follow any use of nuclear weapons; the political effect of the discriminate use of nuclear weapons would in fact be obtained by confronting the Soviet Government with the imminent choice of escalation or withdrawal.
- (b) If the use of nuclear weapons were limited geographically to a confined area, e.g. the

UK EYES ONLY

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Appendix 'B' to Annex II
(Concluded)

battlefield, the risks of escalation would be considerably reduced. We do not consider it realistic, however, to assume that the air forces of both sides would not be involved, particularly as the Soviet army nuclear missiles considerably outrange our own.

(c) Although the Von Karman Report indicates that there will be a steady development in the capacity to deliver accurate and more manageable tactical nuclear strikes, it also emphasizes the increasing difficulties of target acquisition.

(d) Our intelligence analysis^x of the Soviet reactions to the NATO use of nuclear weapons in operations short of general war indicates that for a number of reasons nuclear operations on land are unlikely to remain limited for long.

3. We recommend that:-

(a) Our views on escalation^x should be explained to the French.

(b) The French views should be sought on:-

(i) The tasks of air forces during conventional operations and during the transition to the use of nuclear weapons selectively and thereafter.

(ii) The problems of target acquisition.

(iii) The risks of escalation.

✓ JIC(62)28(Final)
✓ COS(62)78
x JIC(62)14(2nd Revised Draft)
(at present in abeyance)

UK EYES ONLY

THE FRENCH CONCEPT OF A NUCLEAR BARRAGE

The French Concept

1. We have outlined the French concept of a nuclear barrage in paragraph 10 of Annex I. At the last talks they explained it in the context of defence against large-scale conventional aggression. This would require recourse to nuclear weapons without delay, at least to tactical nuclear weapons, and called for delegation of authority to the appropriate military command (most probably ARCENT) to launch the nuclear barrage. It raised difficult political and humane problems, which they were discussing with the German General Staff. The French suggested that it would be better to have a localized nuclear action under control, than to risk rapid deterioration of the situation requiring the use of nuclear weapons in depth, which would cause even greater suffering and casualties. In addition, publicity given to the systems must add to the credibility of the deterrent.

2. The French doubted whether the United Kingdom concept of the tactical use of nuclear weapons would prevent Russian ground forces from taking large geographical areas before being forced to pause and negotiate. On the other hand their concept of a nuclear barrage, composed of weapons of wide yield, and sited to prevent the move of mechanized forces, would result in no loss of territory and still serve the purpose of forcing a pause for negotiation.

Preliminary United Kingdom Thoughts

3. The French idea of a nuclear barrage suggests a means of deterring and if necessary halting Soviet conventional aggression without resorting to either the strategic exchange or a massive build-up of our own conventional forces. We consider that the concept requires development in a great deal more detail before

UK EYES ONLY

Appendix 'C' to Annex II
(Concluded)

A military opinion can be expressed. It may be that it is seen as a partial solution to some of the problems of control over nuclear weapons; it may conceal an attempt to delegate authority for their use within specified areas and circumstances; it may involve great expense and excessive use of nuclear weapons; and it has yet to be shown how it would achieve its object of halting a Russian advance. We suggest that these points are further explored in the discussion, bearing in mind the grave risks of escalation in the use of nuclear weapons on any scale.

4. Practicability. In particular, clarification might be sought from the French of the following points:-

- (a) The number and types of weapons required.
- (b) Positioning of weapons to safeguard them against surprise attack.
- (c) Custody and maintenance of warheads so as to ensure immediate readiness.
- (d) Meteorological factors.
- (e) Precautions against dummy Soviet attack.
- (f) How the barrier would give adequate defence against an airborne assault.
- (g) How early authority for its firing could be given.

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UK EYES ONLY

APPENDIX 'D' TO ANNEX II TO
COS(62)163

DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY FOR THE USE OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS WITHIN PRE-ARRANGED LIMITS OF YIELD

Political Decision

1. This is a French sponsored item and we may therefore expect the French to advance their views first. We agreed with the French at the last talks that on purely military grounds some delegation of authority to use nuclear weapons is required. The United Kingdom position is, however, that in no circumstances should the decision for the initial use of nuclear weapons be delegated to a military commander. The United States also holds this view. Discussion should therefore be directed to the delegation of authority to subordinate commanders for the use of nuclear weapons after the political decision on the initial use has been taken.

2. However, we place great importance on the need to develop the communications and devise the political machinery which will enable NATO Major Commanders to receive the political decision for the initial use with the minimum delay. So far as the machinery is concerned, this is primarily a political matter, although from the military point of view the fewer fingers there are on the trigger the better, and we therefore support the guide lines idea (paragraph 4(b) of Annex II).

Control of the Land Battle

3. In order to ensure close control by SACEUR of the land battle during the limited use of nuclear weapons, which would be necessary in order to translate close political control into timely and effective military action, we consider⁺ that SACEUR should have direct communications with the level of releasing authorities. This appears to be SACEUR's

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UK EYES ONLY

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UK EYES ONLY

Appendix 'D' to Annex II
(Concluded)

intention from his revised Emergency Defence Plan and S-Hour Release Procedures, but it is not yet certain whether he has the direct communications for this.

4. We accept that the commander fighting the corps battle must have as much freedom of action as possible to use the nuclear weapons released to him in accordance with the tactical situation.

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4/18/62

DEFE 4/144 COS(62)29th Meeting, 26 April 1962
This document was considered at COS(62)29th Meeting, Minute 4

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CIRCULATED FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF

JP(62)57(Final)

18th April, 1962

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CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

JOINT PLANNING STAFF

NATO STRATEGY: CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND MRBMs

Report by the Joint Planning Staff

In accordance with the instructions⁺ of the Chief of the Defence Staff, we have examined a Ministry of Defence paper^o "NATO Strategy: Conventional Forces and MRBMs".

2. We have consulted the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence. Our report is at Annex.

Recommendation

3. We recommend that, if they approve our report, the Chiefs of Staff should forward it to the Ministry of Defence and invite them to take account of their views in preparing the brief for the Minister of Defence.

(Signed) E.B. ASHMORE
A.M. LEWIS
D.C. STAPLETON
D.H. DAVIES.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

+ COS(62)27th Mtg., Min. 4
@ COS(62)185

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U* EYES ONLY

Annex to JP(62)57(Final)

NATO STRATEGY: CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND MRBMs

INTRODUCTION

1. The Minister of Defence is concerned⁺ at the divergence of thought between the Americans and ourselves on two fundamental aspects of NATO Strategy - the size of NATO's conventional forces and the provision of MRBMs for NATO. He has therefore arranged to have informal discussions with the United States Defense Secretary prior to the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting in Athens in May. The Ministry of Defence, in consultation with the Foreign Office, have accordingly prepared a paper[Ⓢ] on the level of conventional forces and the provision of MRBMs, and have focussed, in an Annex to that paper, on a comparison of UK and US views.
2. In our examination of this paper we have taken into account previous comments[Ⓔ] by Sir George Mills on the MRBM question.
3. Paragraph references are to the Ministry of Defence paper.

AIM

4. To examine the military aspects of the Ministry of Defence paper[Ⓢ].

CONVENTIONAL FORCES

The Ministry of Defence Paper

5. The paper states the real differences between ourselves and the Americans in regard to NATO conventional forces to be:-
 - (a) The size of conventional forces needed to deter Soviet adventures.
 - (b) How long NATO should be prepared to fight conventionally before resorting to the use of nuclear weapons.

The Americans maintain that strong conventional forces deployed forward provide a necessary deterrent to limited Soviet conventional adventures against NATO. The paper states that they also wish to strengthen NATO's conventional forces in order to avoid rapid recourse to any use of nuclear weapons in any conflict short of an all-out Soviet attack; in this connexion they appear to contemplate a conventional battle in Europe going on for weeks or even months.

6. The United Kingdom view is stated (paragraph 7) as being that NATO only requires conventional forces strong enough to:-
 - (a) Identify a determined large-scale Soviet conventional attack.

+ COS(52)27th Mtg., Item 4
Ⓢ COS(62)185
Ⓔ GMs 250 and 267

U* EYES ONLY

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Annex (Continued)

- (b) Deter an attempted fait accompli by surprise attack by the Soviet forces immediately available.
- (c) Contain a large-scale conventional attack long enough for the decision to resort to the use of nuclear weapons to be taken.

The United Kingdom view is furthermore (paragraph 8) that any weakness in the credibility of the deterrent is likely to arise, not from the size of NATO's conventional forces but from a possible Soviet miscalculation about NATO's will to use nuclear weapons in defence against a limited aggression or fait accompli.

Our Comments

7. General. We consider that the paper in general correctly reflects our views on the role of NATO conventional forces. Where, however, paragraphs 5 to 11 of the paper are expanded in the Annex in an attempt to compare UK and US views in more detail, we consider that the arguments go beyond the position that our present knowledge of the US view would allow us to take up, and as a result some of the UK arguments verge on the hypothetical. We consider such arguments should not be deployed at this stage. Our comments on specific points in the main paper are given below.

8. Prolonged Conventional Operations. We consider that it would be advisable to explain the statement (paragraph 7) that to prolong large-scale conventional warfare in Europe beyond the time needed for the decision to resort to the use of nuclear weapons to be taken would reduce the chances of avoiding all-out war. We suggest substitution of the following for the second sentence of this paragraph:-

"We see positive disadvantage in planning to prolong conventional warfare in Europe beyond the time needed for these purposes for two main reasons. The first is the risk of escalation from associated air operations. The second is that resort to the tactical use of nuclear weapons in increasingly large numbers will be required if the conventional battle has been allowed to spread and that this might well prove insufficient to restore the situation and would certainly entail very considerable risks of escalation."

more escalation risk with conv. emphasis
as proposed whether nuclear use?
True but it is that this would have a deterrent effect

We further suggest that the main point at issue is one of deterrence and that the last sentence of this paragraph should begin: "This is our judgement on the issue whether....."

9. Duration of Conventional Operations. We do not consider that the statement of the United Kingdom views on the role of NATO conventional forces (paragraph 7) can be an adequate yardstick for assessing their size, without giving some indication of the duration of conventional operations for which NATO should make provision. The paper considers (paragraph 10) that two weeks might be too costly or too risky, and suggests that 48 hours

OS(62)100

UK EYES ONLY

Annex (Continued)

might be too short. The latter period was only our initial assessment of the minimum period which might be necessary to identify the extent of the aggression and to obtain political agreement for the use of nuclear weapons. But the US assessment of the duration of conventional operations does not seem to take into account the considerable pressure that would be exerted by the use of air forces in support of ground operations to extend and escalate the scale of the conflict. If the Allies were forced into the position of initiating hostilities in the air, enemy air reaction to be successful, even though Allied air action was initially confined to the immediate objective, would be bound to extend the area of operations. Similarly, if Allied air reaction was in response to Soviet air supported aggression, attacks would have to be launched against the sources of enemy air support, and thus lead inevitably to the conditions which we have already pointed out could cause an inadvertent nuclear war. For this reason we consider a shorter rather than a longer period of conventional operations to be more realistic, bearing in mind that the minimum time for which conventional forces must be able to contain the enemy is that required to request, politically authorize, release, and use nuclear weapons tactically. The duration might be longer, but we suggest that the first step might be to discuss with the Americans:-

- (a) Agreement on the procedure for obtaining political authority for the use of nuclear weapons.
- (b) Clarification of the capability of current ACE forces to hold the enemy without resorting to nuclear weapons.
- (c) The feasibility of providing additional conventional forces should this prove desirable.

10. SACEUR's 1966 Force Requirements. We do not consider it correct to say (paragraph 9) that SACEUR's assessment of his force requirements for 1966 was "based on the entirely different needs of winning a general war in Europe", although they are certainly required by the strategic concept to do this. His force requirements were in fact based on his own statement of strategic guidance as well as on MC 14/2. We therefore suggest the substitution of "required to meet additionally" for "based on".

11. Level of Future Conventional Forces. We do not consider that we have adequate evidence as yet that future conventional force requirements would be less if the United Kingdom views on strategy were adopted by NATO. We would prefer the last half-sentence of paragraph 9 to read as follows:-

"and accordingly we think that a level of conventional forces lower than that which would be required to meet a general conventional aggression would be adequate for this aspect of deterrence."

& COS(61)146
§ COS.44/6/1/61
≠ COS(62)158

UK EYES ONLY

Annex (Concluded)

MRBMs FOR NATO

12. The paper rightly dismisses any strategic use for MRBMs under NATO control, which we have already stated^o to be militarily unjustified. There remains the question of the need for a NATO-controlled force of MRBMs at all and of the need to provide ACE with some MRBMs in order to modernize and maintain the effectiveness of the shield forces as part of the overall deterrent. The question of control, NATO or otherwise, is a solely political one. The military requirement is for a balanced force of MRBMs and aircraft in ACE. The MRBM component would be required for the suppression of enemy air defences to enable Allied aircraft to penetrate to their targets, for striking interdiction targets which are heavily guarded against attack by aircraft, and within their capability for attacking elements of Soviet short and medium range nuclear strike forces. None of these tasks would amount to strategic retaliation against Soviet Russia, which should remain the function of the external strike forces. For MRBMs to complement these forces in their deterrent function we consider that they must be sufficiently accurate to be suitable for discriminate tactical use. Provided that this requirement can be met, small numbers are justified at high priority. The provision of larger numbers would depend upon the resolution of the relative merits and roles of air and ballistic missiles in Allied Command Europe, which we have recommended^b should be studied as part of any revision of NATO strategy. So far as MRBMs are concerned, these should, in our view, be at a low priority since they would be part of the forces provided for fighting a general war.

13. In this connexion we note that SACEUR has asked for 650 MRBMs in his force requirements for 1966 to replace obsolescent nuclear strike aircraft which are becoming vulnerable on base and over target, and so to ensure that he is able to implement effectively his nuclear strike plan under the present NATO strategic concept.

CONCLUSIONS

14. We conclude that:-

- (a) The arguments set out in the Annex to the Ministry of Defence paper should not be deployed at this stage.
- (b) The Ministry of Defence paper correctly reflects our views on the role of NATO conventional forces, but requires amendment in accordance with paragraphs 8-11 above.
- (c) In respect of MRBMs the paper requires amendment in accordance with our views, and in particular paragraph 13 should be replaced by one on the lines of paragraph 12 above.

o COS(62)100
b COS(62)78

1. Category AC telegram. Paraphrase NOT required.
2. A telegram which contains a reference to any classified telegram or correspondence must itself be classified.
3. The Ministry of Defence Cypher Office must be consulted if it is desired to distribute or release this telegram, or any part of it, to a person or nation who would not normally be authorised to receive it.

FROM : B.D.S. WASHINGTON

TO : M.O.D. LONDON

PRIORITY

IZ 7862
TOO 190015Z
TOR 191119Z

GM 271

19th April, 1962.

D.C.D.S. from Chairman.

U.K./U.S. Views on N.A.T.O. Strategy.

You have asked the Embassy and me to discuss a paper called "American Views on N.A.T.O. Strategy" with our opposite numbers. Concurrently J.P.S. are examining NDC(62) 6 "N.A.T.O. Strategy: Conventional Forces and M.R.B.Ms" and I feel constrained to comment on that. But both seem to me inextricably mixed with NDC(62)12 dated 13th April, 1962, and entitled "N.A.T.O. Strategy - Comparison of U.K. and U.S. Views". Indeed in many respects this latter seems to be the most immediately important because it is being prepared for the Minister before meeting Mr. McNamara on 1st May.

2. So these preliminary comments embrace all three papers together. It would be impossible to take each one separately without complete confusion because of considerable contradictions between them. Again they are made even more confusing because they still record views put forward in informal conversations which NITZE himself has stated contribute to the evolution of official opinion rather than expressing it (para. 3 of Ramsbotham's note on his conversation with Nitze on April 9th, 1962. I also made this point 10 days or more earlier).

3. This had led to a wrong assessment of U.S. thinking which bedevils the arguments in all the papers. Moreover it leaves a very strong impression that there is a wider divergence between U.S. and U.K. views than there really is.

4. I have already had preliminary discussions on my side and Hood and I hope to have a joint go later on. Meanwhile to check this idea of widespread differences and to prevent people beating their brains out on unnecessary arguments I would like to reiterate the broad lines of U.S. thinking as given to me very recently. This is almost exactly as already reported to you. It is not

a process of thought it is the basis behind Durbrow's statement.

- (A) The U.S. are not repeat NOF planning to fight a large scale conventional battle. As they say this makes nonsense when their whole contribution in conventional forces is 5 Divisions plus a possible 2 more:
- (B) A large scale conventional attack would be met with nuclear weapons if necessary to stop it:
- (C) But they feel that to make the deterrent complete N.A.T.O. must be able to prevent by conventional means a determined but limited aggression as described in the footnote on Page 2 of NDC(32)6. They believe this can be done by a relatively small increase in existing forces (2 to 3 Divisions in Central Europe) coupled with modernisation full manning and a more realistic deployment:
- (D) They do not believe we need aim beyond being able to deal with Soviet forces immediately available:
- (E) They think we must be able to prevent such an attack because it has two particular dangers:
 - (1) There might be quite a temptation to accept a fait accompli: and if not it would almost certainly need much more effort to restore the situation and so increase the dangers of large scale nuclear action.
 - (11) If the enemy achieved a quick easy success he might well be tempted to chance his luck further and so create an even more dangerous situation. They feel we must be able to counter such action conventionally because that will make the enemy much less likely to gamble on our not using nuclear weapons: and there will be less danger of our precipitating nuclear war by mistaking the enemy's intentions.
- (F) If we have our forces properly deployed and at the strength noted above they reckon the enemy would be forced to concentrate if he wanted to achieve a quick result. So the attack could not be done on an opportunist basis: He would have declared his intentions of really serious aggression and would offer very suitable targets for battlefield nuclear weapons: and they would be used if he attacked and it became necessary to use them to hold him on or near the frontier.

(G) The duration of the conventional phase must depend on the enemy. If he persists and cannot be held nuclears will have to be used on the battlefield as as start anyway. If he has been stopped and done no real harm but still hangs on then there might be no need to use them.

5. I have not discussed M.R.B.Ms very recently but I have no doubt these are the American views on them:

- (A) They see no need for a separate force for strategic purposes and will oppose it:
- (B) They believe that SACEUR needs an M.R.B.M. type of weapon to defend Europe in all out war - the outside strategic forces cannot meet all his needs:
- (C) Because M.R.B.Ms are in their view necessary for the defence of Europe they believe it would be good for Europe to be mixed up in their use. But they realise that there are extremely serious objections to a straight swop between aeroplanes which many countries including Germany now have and M.R.B.Ms:
- (D) For this reason they are sympathetic towards a multilateral M.R.B.M. force but only for SACEUR's purposes and not repeat NOT as an independent deterrent.

6. Lastly, I think we do have somewhat different views on deterrents. To be effective they do not believe that a deterrent is credible if our forces have holes in them vis-a-vis the enemy because:

- (1) In peace the fact of a big imbalance in forces like M.R.B.Ms for instance could affect the attitude the N.A.T.O. countries might take in a crisis:
- (11) If it did come to war the enemy might well find a way to exploit this imbalance.

CIRCULATION

TOO 190015Z

C.D.S.
First Sea Lord
C.I.G.S.
C.A.S.
Mr. P.A. Wilkinson, Foreign Office
Mr. A.P. Hockaday, M.O.D.
Sir Robert Scott, M.O.D.
Mr. C.W. Wright, M.O.D.
Mr. L.J. Sabatini, M.O.D.
Secretary, C.O.S. COMMITTEE

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correspondence must itself be classified.

4/23/62

3. The Ministry of Defence Cypher Office must be consulted if it is desired to distribute or release this telegram, or any part of it, to a person or nation who would not normally be authorised to receive it.

FROM : BDS WASHINGTON

DEFE 13/254

TO : MOD LONDON

ROUTINE

IZ 8048
TOO 231740Z
TOR 231905Z

CM 272

23rd April, 1962.

C.D.S. from Chairman

1. I am sending you the German reactions to SACEUR's EDP by air bag on 24th April because I feel they may blow up into something. The key point is their opposition to the doctrine of the pause, explicitly stated at the end of para (c) (II) and implied in most of their comments.

2. It is for the Standing Group to approve SACEUR's EDP and, in theory, it does not have to go to the Military Committee. I am sure the Germans will not be content with this, and that it will be better for us to meet the issue squarely in the Military Committee. The U.S. agree, but, as there is a danger that the Germans may bring this up sooner (e.g. Mr. Strauss at Athens or in the MC/CS) I thought you ought to know how things are going.

3. Each point made by the Germans stems, to my mind, from their inherent fears which lead to misinterpretation of SACEUR's plan and misunderstanding of U.S. intentions. I believe the only valid point which the Germans make is that SACEUR's definition of "General War" is related to the "Immediate Military Conquest of Europe". This suggests the conquest of all Europe, whereas Mr. Stickers guideland (b) refers to "Any sector of NATO" which I think would be better.

4. But it is no good treating all these as debating points: The Germans will have to be reassured that they are not being sold down the river if they are not to object strenuously to our more realistic interpretation of NATO strategy.

5. I suggest that the U.S. should be left to make the running here. I am sure they will argue that the EDP is entirely consistent with MC 14/2 and that SACEUR's own strategic guidance to ACE on which the EDP is based is simply an up-to-date interpretation of the basic NATO documents.

6. Wherever the matter comes up I am sure that the best forum for clearing what I believe are misunderstandings rather than wide divergencies of view is the MC/PS here in Washington. We are in the habit of having hard arguments

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PAGE 2:

and can go along without Political Commitment, and above all we have the time and broad military background.

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BERLIN.

Mr. Rusk will have another talk with Mr. Dobrynin on April 27. This will be the third in ten days. A much swifter tempo than that of the Thompson/Gromyko talks in Moscow.

2. This is largely because the Ambassadorial Group is not being asked to clear instructions for Mr. Rusk as it did for Mr. Thompson. Indeed it seems that the Ambassadorial Group is in cold storage. The Americans are briefing their allies individually about their talks and have begun briefing the Germans through Mr. Dowling in Bonn instead of through Dr. Grewe in Washington. This change has already been the subject of much comment in the German Press (Bonn tel to Foreign Office No. 381). It certainly looks like an American vote of no confidence in Dr. Grewe.

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3. Current Russian tactics are very interesting. Mr. Krushchev in his recent interview with Mr. Cowles was cautiously optimistic about the prospects of a Berlin settlement. Mr. Gromyko sounded the same note in a speech to the Supreme Soviet on April 24 (Moscow tel No. 703). The Soviet Ambassadors in Eastern Europe have ~~already~~ been calling on Heads of Government and reporting to them on the American/Russian talks. The Polish Press Agency reports that Mr. Gomulka has received the Soviet Ambassador and "discussed the Soviet/American exchange of views on a peaceful solution of the German question and connected problems". (It is interesting that the Poles avoid speaking of a German Peace Treaty.) It looks as if the Russians are positively trying to create a favourable atmosphere and to give the impression that the chances of a Berlin settlement are increasing.

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/4.

brief for Rusk's Mtg w Kyske

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4. Mr. Gromyko tries to give the impression that this improvement is due to the Americans moving towards the Soviet viewpoint on the sovereignty of the D.D.R., non-supply of nuclear weapons to both Germanies and conclusion of a non-aggression pact. ~~because~~ He distorts American views as spokesmen in Washington have pointed out. None the less it is true that Mr. Rusk has given hints of increased flexibility on two important points during his talks with Mr. Dobrynin. These are the ~~topic~~ of the occupation regime in West Berlin and "respect for the sovereignty of the D.D.R.". On the first he has said that although the presence of Western troops in West Berlin was not negotiable "some agreement might be found on the questions of status" (Washington tel No. 1209 para 6). On the second point Mr. Rusk said at his first talk with Mr. Dobrynin that "he did not see any fundamental difficulty in working out access arrangements consistent with what the Soviets called the sovereignty of the G.D.R. and what the West call the position of the local authorities". (Washington tel No. 1166 para 4). Both these statements go rather further than anything in our record of what Mr. Rusk said to Mr. Gromyko in Geneva. Mr. Dobrynin has on instructions from Moscow produced a revised formula which may possibly contain an element of flexibility although he described it as a wellknown Soviet view. He said that "the Soviet Government cannot accept an agreement providing for the continuation of the occupation regime and the further stay of occupation forces in West Berlin". (Washington tel No. 1209 para 3). This does not exclude the possibility of the Russians accepting the new American substantive paper because this makes no mention of the occupation regime or occupation forces. It also raises the question whether the Russians would have the same objection to the presence

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of Western forces in West Berlin if they were no longer described as occupation forces. Mr. Rusk has begun probing this important point.

5. Mr. Rusk will know more about the attitude of the Germans and French to the current American position than we do and should have something to tell us about it. Sir C. Steel reports opinion in West Germany is divided but that there is more realism in the air than there was a year ago. As to the French attitude, if Mr. Rusk does not already know of it he may be interested to hear of what M. Couve de Murville is reported to have told his Common Market colleagues at their recent meeting. This was that: "If the time ever came when negotiation with the Soviet Government about Germany appeared possible on a basis which the German Government was itself willing to certify to be in the German national interest the attitude of the German Government would be decisive for France." (Paris tel to Foreign Office No. 149 Saving of April 18). This suggests that the French will agree to be more flexible over Berlin, provided the Germans absolve them in advance from the charge of having urged unpalatable concessions on them.

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SIR VARYL BEGG said that, at a previous meeting⁴, the Committee had authorised the Commander-in-Chief, Royal Air Force Germany, to negotiate, without commitment, with Headquarters, United States Air Forces in Europe, regarding the operation in the conventional role of U.S.A.F. fighter squadrons from R.A.F. bases in Germany, in an emergency. A joint plan had been agreed and the Air Ministry now wished the Committee to give their approval to it and to authorise the Commander-in-Chief to enter into a formal agreement with Headquarters, U.S.A.F.E.

In discussion the point was made that before the Commander-in-Chief could be authorised to enter into a firm commitment with the United States authorities it would be necessary to obtain Ministerial approval.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (1) Approved the Note by the Air Ministry.
- (2) Took note that the Chief of the Defence Staff would seek the approval of the Minister of Defence to the implementation of the plan.

4. COS(61)74th Meeting, Minute 7

4. NATO STRATEGY - CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND MRBMs

TOP SECRET
UK EYES ONLY

(Previous Reference: COS(62)16th Meeting, Minute 2)

JP(62)57(Final)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a report by the Joint Planning Staff examining a NATO Defence Policy Committee paper⁵ on NATO Strategy - Conventional Forces and MRBMs. Two telegrams⁶ from the Chairman, British Defence Staffs, Washington, and a minute⁷ by the Secretary covering a letter from the Embassy in Washington to the Foreign Office, were relevant to their discussion.

SIR VARYL BEGG said that the Committee were aware that, on Tuesday, 1st May, 1962, the Minister of Defence was due to discuss with Mr. McNamara the divergences of thought between the Americans and ourselves on two fundamental aspects of NATO Strategy - the size of NATO's conventional forces, and the provision of MRBMs. The NATO Defence Policy Committee had accordingly prepared a paper, which would serve as a brief for the Minister at this meeting. This paper reflected previously assessed American views on NATO Strategy, which had been expressed in varying forms by a number of authorities. To seek clarification, a questionnaire on the United States views had been sent to Washington by the Foreign Office. Preliminary replies to this questionnaire had only just been received following conversations between Lord Hood, Air Chief Marshal Mills and Mr. Nitze in Washington. Lord Hood had stressed that this was only a partial account and further conversations were to be held the following week when a more full and balanced idea of American thinking would become apparent.

* COS(62)185
% GM 271 and GM 273
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The Chairman, British Defence Staffs, Washington, had also sent an account[&] of these discussions.

It was now apparent that the latest American views were more in line with our own and only differed in degree. In the light of the recent developments, he (Sir Varyl Begg) suggested that the NATO Defence Policy Committee paper^{*} would require recasting. The report[^] before them examined the military aspects of the NATO Defence Policy Committee paper^{*}, and if the Committee approved the amendments proposed, these would also require incorporation in the revised brief for the Minister of Defence.

On the question of MRBMs, Air Chief Marshal Mills had suggested^x that the United Kingdom would prefer an MRBM force for SACEUR to be provided by the United States with purely United States national forces; and had requested guidance for informal discussions to be held with the Americans that day. In view of the time factor, a reply⁺ had been sent to Sir George Mills by the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff indicating that in his opinion the Chiefs of Staff would agree with his submission. He (Sir Varyl Begg) believed that the Committee would wish to endorse this reply.

THE COMMITTEE then discussed the Joint Planning Staff report seriatim, and in discussion the following points were made:-

(a) Paragraph 7

The last sentence of this paragraph should be amended to indicate that the arguments in the NATO Defence Policy Committee paper^{*} did not reflect present American views on NATO Strategy. A consequential amendment would also be required to paragraph 14(a).

(b) Paragraph 9

There was a need to make a practical assessment of likely Soviet limited aggression "from a standing start" with the Russians employing forces presently deployed in Eastern Europe. Paragraph 9(b) should be amended to make this point; to give it additional emphasis, it should be transposed with paragraph 9(a). Without such a study it would not be possible to assess the number of divisions that NATO would require in Europe. Until the United Kingdom was in a position to talk in terms of precise Force Requirements there would be little chance of influencing American views. The Minister of Defence should however be briefed for his discussions with Mr. McNamara of the danger of pressing, at this stage, for such an examination since the figures, which could only be assessed by the operational Commanders, might prove to be unacceptably large. The Directors of Plans were shortly to visit Germany and should raise the question of force requirements in this context; any assessments made would, of necessity, be limited to BAOR's front.

& GM 271
* COS(62)185
^ JP(62)57(Final)
x GM 273
+ DEF 307

It seemed from recent statements by General Norstad and from the conversations between Lord Hood and Mr. Nitze that the Americans considered that, by the end of this year, it was possible that the conventional build-up might be such as to permit a forward strategy. The recent United States reinforcement in Germany, and the creation of new German divisions and potential developments connected with Algeria might provide before very long about 32 divisions on the Continent available for use in a crisis.

(c) Paragraph 12

The nuclear tactical armoury available to SACEUR was of considerable proportions. Politically a NATO MRBM force might well be desirable particularly since as pointed out by Air Chief Marshal Mills any unbalance between aircraft and missiles could affect the attitude NATO countries might adopt in a crisis. It would only be possible to justify such a force militarily if it could be shown that the large number of nuclear weapons already in NATO were insufficiently accurate for use in a discriminate warning role; in this event, the requirement would only be for small numbers. Paragraph 12 should accordingly be recast on these lines, and should also show the numbers of MRBMs required for NATO in the end-1966 programme; the amended version should be circulated to the Committee for clearance by telephone as a matter of urgency.

In further discussion the following additional points were made:-

- (d) The Americans had concentrated upon increased land forces and believed that their provision would reduce the threat of escalation. However, there was a grave risk of escalation from air operations associated with the land battle since, for tactical air strikes to be effective, it would be necessary to penetrate into enemy-held territory. If Allied air action was in response to Soviet air aggression, attacks would moreover have to be launched against the source of enemy air support, and such action on the part of the West would lead to escalation.
- (e) Air Chief Marshal Mills had suggested[#] that SACEUR's MRBM force would probably have to be sea-borne. The Directors of Plans were examining this question and would prepare a Note for the consideration of the Committee at their meeting on Monday, 30th April, 1962.
- (f) Existing MRBMs did not have the requisite accuracy for discriminate use. The Americans might claim that Missile X had the required accuracy; this was however still open to doubt, more especially as it would operate from a mobile launching platform.

+ GM 271
\$ MC 26/4
& COS 538/26/4/62
GM 273

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (1) Agreed with the views of the Vice Chief of Naval Staff in his opening statement.
- (2) Approved the report by the Joint Planning Staff, as amended (Annex); subject to telephone clearance of paragraph 12.
- (3) Took note that the Ministry of Defence would recast the NATO Defence Policy Committee paper on NATO Strategy - Conventional Forces and MRMs.
- (4) Instructed the Directors of Plans to take note of the point at (b) above.
- (5) Instructed the Secretary to take action as at (c) above.

* COS(62)185

5. OPERATIONS WEST OF SUEZ

Recorded in the Secretary's Standard File

6. ACCOMMODATION IN BAHRAIN

CONFIDENTIAL

In accordance with the instructions of the Chief of the Defence Staff two telegrams^x from the Commander-in-Chief Middle East has been referred to the Ministry of Defence for information.

x MIDCOS 39, 40

7. COURIER BAG SERVICE BETWEEN LONDON AND ADEN

CONFIDENTIAL

In accordance with the instructions of the Chief of the Defence Staff a telegram[@] from the Commander-in-Chief Middle East has been referred to the War Office in consultation with the Air Ministry for preparation of a draft reply.

@ MIDSEC 29

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TOP SECRET

RECORD OF A MEETING HELD AT THE WHITE HOUSE ON
 SATURDAY, 28th APRIL, 1962, AT 10.45 a.m.

Present:

UNITED KINGDOM	UNITED STATES
The Right Hon. Harold Macmillan, M.P.	President Kennedy
The Right Hon. Sir David Ormsby Gore	Mr. Dean Rusk
The Right Hon. Sir Norman Brook	Mr. David Bruce
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh	Mr. George Ball
Mr. P. F. de Zulueta	Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Mr. S. H. Evans	Mr. William Tyler
Mr. M. A. Robb	Mr. W. C. Burdett, Jr.
Mr. J. A. Thomson	Mr. J. Sweeney
	Mr. Pierre Salinger

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1. Berlin

See
 January
 future of
 (Pt 22)

President Kennedy said he had already discussed with Mr. Macmillan the significance of the talks between Mr. Rusk and Mr. Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador. Neither had any explanation of the Russians' reasons for relaxing their pressure. But the fact that they had done so made it more appropriate to go ahead.

Mr. Rusk gave a brief account of his discussion with Mr. Dobrynin on 27th April. He had pointed out to Mr. Dobrynin that the United States had gone a considerable distance towards indicating the possibility of an agreement on points of interest to the Russians. But the United States had received no satisfaction on their own vital points. The United States could not proceed indefinitely without progress on the central issues. He had pointed out that on the Berlin question the Russians and the Americans were standing nose to nose. Mr. Dobrynin had accepted that as a fact without agitation. It was puzzling that, while there was no progress on the substance, the Russians were showing no signs of trying either to speed up the discussion or to take action over Berlin. Mr. Dobrynin had shown some interest in the American "principles" paper. Mr. Rusk believed that this would be discussed after his return from his forthcoming trip in further meetings with Mr. Dobrynin.

Mr. Rusk noted that he would be discussing Berlin with his three colleagues at Athens. He thought it was important that Washington and London should tell Bonn and Paris that a dispassionate analysis of the United States-Soviet talks showed that the West was standing firmly on its positions in Berlin and was not making concessions in the process of talking. There was no need to apologise for the talks, and the nervousness of the Allies was misplaced. Where we went from here was another question, which must partly depend on an assessment of Soviet intentions.

Mr. Rusk said that the Russian attitude might turn on whether they thought they could make progress on their proposals. If they thought this unlikely, they might be prepared to let them fade into the background rather than withdraw them. Apart from the question of a separate peace treaty, on which they were deeply committed, they might be inclined to put the Berlin question into cold

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Note by the Prime Minister of his conversation with President Kennedy on the morning of Saturday, April 28, 1962, at the White House

I had a talk with President Kennedy for about three-quarters of an hour before the formal meeting where advisers were present on both sides.

1. He was very critical both of the Germans and of the French. He thinks the Germans are determined to try to make the United States become responsible for "selling out" German interests in Berlin, etc. He proposed to speak very frankly to Herr von Brentano and accuse him of this tactic. He surprised me by the bitterness of his feeling and that of the Administration against the French. Clearly de Gaulle's rudeness to Rusk, and the whole series of incidents, have affected the Americans more deeply than one would suppose. This is because they are fundamentally very thin-skinned and do not take the same humorous view of this sort of treatment as we are willing to do.

2. This led on to a discussion of the French desire to be given nuclear information. According to the strict reading of the McMahon Act, it would be possible to put forward before Congress a request similar to that which was put forward in respect of the Anglo-American exchange of information. But it would not be popular in Congress and would need a major effort to get it through. The President asked me my views on this. I said it depended what we were going to get at the present time in exchange. I thought

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that the matter might be left for the moment just to see whether the British are able to negotiate reasonable terms for their entry into the Common Market, and consequently to see after this what would be the European attitude, including that of the French, towards the reorganisation of NATO. However, I thought that any immediate transfer of information by the Americans would not now produce results. I would be quite frank and say that the idea of an Anglo-French nuclear contribution to NATO might one day be a good thing, and I would not be precluded from dangling this carrot before de Gaulle's eyes; but it would be a mistake to come to an agreement now. He would merely take, and pay nothing for it. The President agreed strongly with this view. Although the Pentagon were pressing, he was against it and was prepared to hold out.

3. This led on to a general discussion on the NATO deterrent. The President was very anxious to prevent nuclear weapons from coming into the hands of the Germans. He expressed anxiety about the generation of Germans likely to follow the present regime and thought that the longer they could be prevented from having the nuclear the better.

4. This led to a general discussion of the nuclear. The President said that he felt that the friendly and neutral nations of the world other than ourselves did not really understand the full character of the nuclear power now developed on both sides (at a later stage in the talks he showed me some of the results of the latest photographic reconnaissance). The power on both sides is now so staggering that in one sense the adding of small nuclear powers makes very little difference. On the other hand, the dangers of setting

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it off by mistake would be increased if some irresponsible power could begin nuclear warfare without realising the power of mutual destruction which the Americans and Russians are able to inflict upon the world. This led to the President saying that this was the real reason for his desire to see the increase in conventional forces. He feared that the nuclear might in the long run lose its credibility, at least to deal with minor incursions or aggressions. I said that I thought that might be so, but it was very important to keep up the concept of a violent retort to any aggression however small. We would be practically asking the Russians to do something in the full expectation that nothing serious would follow.

5. The final question discussed was Tests. The President expressed deep regret at how things had worked out since Bermuda. I expressed appreciation of his willingness to listen to arguments, and for the interchange of messages. What were we to do now? The President although rather vague gave me the impression that he knew that after both sets of tests were over some effort would have to be made, perhaps this autumn. He still seemed to be playing with the idea of an atmospheric ban alone. I expressed strongly the view that this would not satisfy the Russians and we would not get agreement. It would be a propaganda ban but not likely to produce agreement. I expressed the view which the President seemed more or less to accept, that at least international minus must be the starting point, and went on to say that we ought seriously to consider the possibility of a joint declaration, not necessarily a treaty, so that neither we nor the Russians would continue testing. If we had reason to suppose they had broken this treaty we

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should feel free to resume. I believe that the scientists in six months' time would feel this was feasible. At any rate they ought to start work now and not wait. The President agreed (this is indeed the first practical result and we ought to press forward consistently aided by the scientists on both sides).

The other private discussions with the President, at odd times, did not add very much to what I have recorded. He expressed pretty strong views about certain people: for instance about Mr. Diefenbaker, whom he thought a very foolish man. It was generally clear that he has learned a good deal since last year and events have so turned out as to make him, unless I am wholly mistaken, place more reliance on British good sense and advice than on anyone else. If this is so, a great deal of the credit is due to the Ambassador whose relations with the White House are of course quite unique.

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17

NOTE OF A CONVERSATION AT LUNCHEON AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON 28th APRIL, 1962*

1. Nuclear Problems

Mr. Rusk asked whether we were expecting the French to ask for our co-operation in nuclear matters as their price for letting us into the Common Market. On being told that there had been no indication that the French were likely to make such a demand and that, even if they did, we should reject it, *Mr. Rusk* expressed great relief and said that any other answer would have posed grave problems for the United States Administration. Despite speculation to the contrary, the United States were determined not to help the French in the nuclear field, either directly or indirectly through the United Kingdom. Though the French had never asked formally for United States assistance, he thought it was conceivable that they might ask us in the context of the Common Market negotiations.

(*Mr. Bundy* subsequently told *Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh* that *Mr. Rusk* had been merely speculating; there were no indications at the disposal of the United States to the effect that the French might make this request.)

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Mr. Macmillan suggested that it was above all important for SACEUR to be steady and calm. Mr. McNamara agreed and said that General Norstad had certainly displayed these qualities in the Berlin crisis.

5. Future of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Forces

Defense
Orgn.
Atlantic
Pact (A-2)

Mr. Macmillan said that it was important to consider what was likely to happen to the NATO forces in the next period. Assuming that President de Gaulle continued successfully to put an end to his commitments in Algeria he would presumably move the French Army back to Europe. At that stage he would no doubt begin to try to put into effect some of the ideas about which he had often talked in a general way for what he called the "Remaniement de l'OTAN". He knew General de Gaulle very well and had a high regard for him. His ideas were often of a rather general nature based on certain large conceptions which were quite logical but not always immediately apparent. He had undertaken a very formidable task in persuading France to accept his solution for Algeria. With that behind him he was looking to the future. He saw that there were only two strong forces in France which would hold the country stable and in the last resort prevent it going Communist. One of these was the Church, the other was the army. President de Gaulle would probably try to reform the Constitution of France somewhat on the American pattern with an elected President who would provide an element of stable administration. He would probably not wish to have a very large army although the French Army would be likely always to be larger than the British Army, but President de Gaulle would probably try to turn it into a well-organised and well-equipped professional force—what he had called "l'Armee de Metier". He would not find the idea of NATO easy to fit into this conception; his idea was that NATO removed the national characteristics from the army and he saw dangers in this for the future of France. He had talked to President de Gaulle about this and had pointed out that one advantage of the NATO structure was precisely that it did to some extent denationalise the Germany Army. If Germany was not divided this argument would probably carry decisive weight with President de Gaulle but as it was he was rather contemptuous of the Bonn Government and did not regard Federal Germany as a potential threat. So President de Gaulle would probably pursue his ideas about NATO. He believed that these were very revolutionary but in fact he did not really fully understand the present NATO structure, and in practice it might be fairly easy to meet his difficulties by some reorganisation of the command structure. Mr. McNamara felt that it might indeed be possible without too much difficulty to deal with this aspect of President de Gaulle's programme but he was more worried about the French determination to have an independent nuclear capacity. Mr. Macmillan said that he had discussed this question with President Kennedy. His own view was that this question required some further consideration. Mr. McNamara agreed; before the French could be helped in their nuclear programme they would certainly have to give very comprehensive safeguards and guarantees that they would not pass on knowledge to the West Germans. Mr. Macmillan suggested that if the United Kingdom did join the European Economic Community there would be some political readjustments to make which would have defence aspects. This would throw up the nuclear problem. It might be that some European nuclear deterrent force ought to be formed in which the British contribution could merge. However, this was all in the future. Mr. McNamara said that he was much concerned about the drive for military power, including nuclear power, which the Germans were beginning to make. Mr. Macmillan questioned whether there was a strong German feeling in favour of obtaining nuclear power although of course they would be very strong in conventional forces. Mr. McNamara feared that there were indications of a German desire for nuclear weapons and that this feeling would increase, particularly after Dr. Adenauer was no longer Chancellor. Mr. Macmillan said that one difficulty was that the strong German Army would have nothing to do except to look at the Russians. It would really be much better if German forces could take their part in the defence of the free world outside Europe. Mr. McNamara said that he was afraid, nevertheless, that the Germans would feel themselves ill-armed in face of the Soviet power. For this reason he proposed to inform Herr Strauss of the enormous size of the American and Russian nuclear forces and point out that only a very large German force would make any difference to the existing balance. As Germany was already being defended by the massive American nuclear forces the effort to build up a significant German nuclear power would be fruitless. Mr. Macmillan said that in his opinion it was true that the French were

Extract from
Macmillan - McNamara
interview, 4/29/62

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more interested in the prestige of possessing a small nuclear force than they were in its military effect. On the other hand, if the Germans obtained a nuclear capacity, they would probably wish to have an effective deterrent force. This difference reflected the varying national characteristics of the two countries. *Mr. McNamara* agreed that this was likely.

6. The Future of the Deterrent

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Mr. Macmillan said that in view of the enormous nuclear capacity now available to the United States and soon to be available to the Soviet Union he wondered if the deterrent was ceasing to have any meaning. He would be glad to know what *Mr. McNamara* felt about this. *Mr. McNamara* said that as Soviet nuclear power built up he felt that the Western deterrent would certainly be effective over a narrower range of potential aggressions than it had been hitherto. This was really the basis from which the United States Administration had come to feel that larger Western conventional forces were necessary. If there could be 30 Western divisions on the central front the situation would be better, and in the American view this target could be achieved with the aid of the potential contributions of the French and the Germans. *Mr. Macmillan* said that he understood this argument. While the Berlin problem was still unsettled there was clearly a danger of Soviet military action. But if Berlin was ever settled he wondered if it would really be necessary to keep such large Western forces in Germany. It was perhaps doubtful if the Russians really wished to increase their territory in Europe by military aggression. *Mr. McNamara* agreed that this was perhaps unlikely but suggested that the Russians might be tempted to undertake aggressions with conventional forces in other areas, perhaps in the Middle East. As a diversion from such operations the Russians might make a diversionary move in Europe; for example, they might try to occupy Hamburg. The presence of 30 Western divisions on the central front would be an effective deterrent to such plans. A recent study of the possible casualties in a nuclear exchange showed that something like 75 million people might be killed in the United States, 115 million in Western Europe, and 100 million in the Soviet Union. These figures must be known to both sides and in the face of such staggering losses it was obvious that the political leaders would hesitate a long time before initiating a nuclear exchange. That was why the Russians might be tempted to small conventional aggressions.

Mr. Macmillan asked whether *Mr. McNamara* took the disarmament negotiations seriously, or whether he regarded them largely as a propaganda exercise. *Mr. McNamara* said that he felt it was impossible to make progress at the present moment when so many political problems remained unsolved. The talks at present going on might however lay the foundation for real disarmament at some future date. Of course, disarmament was in fact in the interest of both sides. The Soviet defence effort and particularly their nuclear effort was on a vast scale. Technically it was most impressive and had been accomplished both efficiently and fast.

Mr. Macmillan asked if there was any sign of an effective defence against a nuclear attack. *Mr. McNamara* said that in the near future, the estimate was that of conventional bombers only about 25 per cent. would reach their target. But with Hound Dog now and Skybolt later the American assessment was that about 50 per cent. of the bombs would reach their target. In addition inter-continental ballistic missiles and the Polaris missiles would penetrate successfully. The United States would be able to deliver something like 3,000 megatons on the Soviet Union. This would effectively destroy the country. The Russians would fairly soon be able to inflict comparable devastation on the United States. At the present time their 400 medium-range ballistic missiles could wipe out Western Europe and even if the West made a first strike attack on these bases and achieved 90 per cent. success, which was an unduly optimistic assumption, the Russians could still inflict most serious damage on Western Europe, involving perhaps some 30 million casualties. It was unlikely that the Russians would be tempted to make the first strike on the West because, however successful they were, the Polaris missiles would largely survive and so would a high proportion of the Minute Man missiles which had been placed in hardened sites. In addition, half the United States bomber force was at 15 minutes warning and a substantial proportion were always in the air. In order to increase this American nuclear reserve power, the Kennedy Administration were spending \$4 billion over two years in increasing the nuclear and especially the second strike capacity.

NATO STRATEGY: CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND M.R.B.M.s

1. The proposed brief for the use of the Minister of Defence at his meeting with Mr. McNamara on Tuesday, 1st May, 1962, was discussed. A number of amendments were agreed, and these are given in detail in the Annex to Minute 1 of the Chiefs of Staff meeting held on 30th April, 1962 (COS(62)30th Meeting).

2. The following list of specific questions for discussion was agreed. These points would also be discussed by the Chiefs of Staff with General Lemnitzer immediately prior to the meeting of the Minister of Defence with Mr. McNamara.

- (a) What kinds of conventional aggression does the West need to deter by having conventional forces in the field, to ensure that we are not over-run from a "standing start"? A study of possible Soviet aggression on different fronts, taking into account their objectives, scope and general character, may be needed.
- (b) What should be the size and deployment of such forces? Presumably, SACEUR will advise.
- (c) If conventional aggression should start, how long should we be prepared to fight conventionally before resort to discriminate use of nuclear weapons as a warning?
- (d) Would the size, deployment and tactical disposition of forces required for (c) be different from (b)?
- (e) If our forces are poised to fight a conventional war and we are suddenly faced with the need to use tactical nuclear weapons, will it be practicable to change to a posture to fight a nuclear war?

3. As regards M.R.B.M.s, SIR EVELYN SHUCKBURGH said that he understood that the United States was no longer so favourably disposed towards the creation of a NATO M.R.B.M. force. THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE thought that the line at Athens should be to concentrate on the "Stikker package" and to leave other complicated and controversial subjects for further discussion.

4. SIR GEORGE MILLS said that Mr. McNamara would be making a statement at the Athens meeting which would put the recent "thinking aloud" by the Americans in a proper perspective. From the point of view of M.R.B.M.s, Mr. McNamara was likely to give more details of Project X. This sophisticated new weapon was likely largely to overcome the custodial problem as it needed to be told the target and to arm itself, and could be instructed to disarm and to dump itself at sea.

5. Summing up, THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE said that he would endeavour to obtain the views of Mr. McNamara on M.R.B.M.s. The United Kingdom would, in any case, be unwilling to provide funds for a NATO M.R.B.M. force and we should therefore discourage pursuance of this matter.

~~TOP SECRET~~1. MEETING WITH GENERAL LEMNITZERTOP SECRET

LORD MOUNTBATTEN said the Committee would wish to extend to General Lemnitzer, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a very warm welcome; he was a colleague, friend, and war time associate and it was an honour to have him present at their discussion. The Committee would value his views on Western Military policy particularly in relation to the present deliberations on NATO strategy and the size of conventional forces required to meet possible Soviet aggressions. It was well known that the United States favoured a forward strategy in Europe. The Committee fully supported this concept; however its adoption would raise a number of difficulties. It would require more men; the Command system would need re-organisation; and the provision of new barracks and other logistical arrangements would present severe problems. The move forward would also mean the abandonment of a natural river obstacle and a greater reliance on nuclear weapons.

GENERAL LEMNITZER said that the idea of a forward strategy in NATO was strongly held by the President and the present Administration. They wished to build up conventional forces in Europe so that allied positions could not be easily overrun and, to achieve success, the Russians would need to concentrate and thus show a deliberate intent to attack.

Any study of Western strategy must take account of the prime Russian objective - world domination; and Soviet willingness to use military power to achieve their ends. In these circumstances the United States could never allow the U.S.S.R. to achieve nuclear superiority. During the 1950's, and particularly since the U.S.S.R. had developed thermo nuclear weapons, the highest priority had been accorded to the American build up of deterrent forces both as regards delivery systems and weapons. Superiority had been maintained in both these fields.

The 1962 Defence budget, of 51.6 Billion dollars was the largest in American history. Contrary to views expressed by certain authorities and in the Press this appropriation was intended to increase both the nuclear strength and the programme of conventional weapon production. The deterrent forces were being increased by a considerable stepping up of MINUTEMAN and POLARIS programmes; and six wings of B.47 medium bombers were being retained in service - a total of 270 aircraft. America could, to-day, with present dispersal arrangements and detection systems, survive surprise attack and devastate Russia. As the programme progressed they would continue to improve their second strike capability. This should show clearly that the improvements being made to conventional forces were not being effected at the expense of the nuclear deterrent.

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The conventional forces programme had been accelerated since July, 1961, when the Berlin situation deteriorated. The Strategic Army Corps in America had been increased by a further three divisions, making a total of six in all; these forces could be deployed at very short notice. Additionally, the Administration had called up two National Guard divisions, which would be replaced by two additional army divisions. Conventional weapon production had also been expanded and particular emphasis had been placed on the provision of close-support aircraft and conventional bombs.

Turning to possible Maritime counter-measures in connection with the Berlin situation, and in response to Soviet harassment, he believed that it was necessary to have such measures available for use if required in circumstances to be decided at the time.

It was extremely difficult to see any final solution to the maintenance of powerful deterrent and conventional forces. Disarmament was a possible but unlikely solution. An essential pre-requisite to disarmament was the acceptance by the Russians of "instantaneous" inspections if seismic recordings warranted such action. In his experience in Korea, the forewarning of an inspection gave the country concerned time to take necessary concealment measures, and the inspection was therefore both useless and dangerous since the findings did not reflect the true position.

LORD MOUNTBATTEN said that the United Kingdom agreed with the assessment of present United States superiority over the Russians in nuclear delivery systems and weapons. He thanked General Lemnitzer for attending their meeting and for his most informative and interesting review of present American policy.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Warmly endorsed the remarks of the Chief of the Defence Staff.

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RECORD OF QUADRIPARTITE MEETING HELD AT THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE IN ATHENS AT 8.30 p.m. ON THURSDAY, MAY 3, 1962.

Present:

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| <i>The Rt Hon The Earl of Home</i>
Secretary of State | Mr. Rusk |
| Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh | Mr. Labouisse |
| Mr. Samuel | Mr. Kohler |
| Mr. Ledwidge | Mr. Hillenbrand |
| Dr. Schroeder | M. Couve de Murville |
| Dr. Carstens | M. Lucet |
| Herr Fischer | M. Gillet |
| Herr von Hase | M. Froment Meurice |

Rusk/Dobrynin Talks.

Mr. Rusk opened by suggesting that it would be useful to exchange views on Soviet intentions. In his talks with Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Dobrynin no progress had been made on achieving the essential Western aims regarding Berlin. Broader questions had been touched on but not pursued. The Russians understood very well that West Berlin was the central issue. Their tactics were interesting. Gromyko had said in his speech to the Supreme Soviet that the removal of Western troops was essential. He, Mr. Rusk, had again emphasised to Mr. Dobrynin in a subsequent talk that Western troops must stay in Berlin. Mr. Dobrynin had in effect replied "Why talk about the question? Let it wait awhile". His impression was that the Soviets wanted neither a crisis nor an impasse over Berlin. They were interested in continuing talks. They seemed not to intend to withdraw their own proposals nor to make any move to meet essential Western

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requirements. Nevertheless they seemed to be detente-minded. They had lowered the temperature in Berlin. He would say that, were it not that they were committed to a peace treaty, the Soviets wanted to shelve the Berlin question for the present.

2. ^{Lord Howe}
~~The Secretary of State~~ said that when the Yugoslav Deputy Foreign Minister had recently visited London he had expressed much the same view. He had said that the Western powers should not press the Russians too hard on Berlin.

M. Couve de Murville said that the Yugoslav advice was good and should be taken. ^{Lord Howe}
~~The Secretary of State~~ replied that it was of course necessary to maintain contact with the Russians.

Mr. Rusk said that the Russians were also keen on maintaining contact. He wanted to assure his colleagues that he had received no proposals from the Russian side on broader questions. Little time had been spent on them compared with the access problem. The Russians knew that that was the key question. But they were inflexible on substance. He could say that there was no basis for negotiation at present. M. Couve de Murville said that there could be no basis for negotiation and no prospect of agreement as long as the Soviets would not accept that Western troops must stay in West Berlin.

3. ^{Lord Howe}
~~The Secretary of State~~ asked whether his colleagues thought that Mr. Krushchev could postpone or drop a German Peace Treaty. M. Couve de Murville and Dr. Schroeder both said that he could not drop it but he could postpone it. Dr. Carstens suggested that the threat of a separate treaty was more useful to the Russians than its conclusion.

4. Mr. Rusk said that Mr. Krushchev might calculate that if the present situation continued the position of West
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Berlin might deteriorate. Dr. Schroeder said that the West could do a lot to support West Berlin. He doubted if Mr. Krushchev had much hope that West Berlin would wither away in existing circumstances. He thought it possible that, rather than wait for this to happen, the Russians might want to arrive at a modus vivendi of some kind. They could not postpone a peace treaty indefinitely but they might accept for a period a modus vivendi which left basic questions open. Mr. Krushchev had spoken of a glimmer of hope over Berlin. This was very unusual and significant. The Russians had been working since 1958 for a peace treaty and a de-militarised free city of West Berlin. Perhaps the Western attitude had now convinced them that they could not obtain all their demands at present. They might be working to achieve as much as possible of the effect of a peace treaty through other means, such as agreement on non-diffusion of nuclear weapons, acceptance of D.D.R. authority and so on. Perhaps they also hoped to go part of the way towards a free city now. In the immediate future they might be content to go on talking to the West in the hope of extorting more concessions while offering none themselves. Then they would accept a modus vivendi incorporating the Western concessions.

5. Mr. Rusk said he was not sure the Russians expected much in the way of recognition of the D.D.R. Mr. Gromyko had said to Mr. Thompson that the Western powers already recognised the D.D.R. de facto. If existing Western practice was enough for the Russians, there was really no problem here. Mr. Gromyko had not pressed for recognition of the D.D.R., but he had said repeatedly that access arrangements must respect the sovereignty of the D.D.R. Mr. Gromyko in his speech to the Supreme Soviet had distorted the American position on recognition of the D.D.R.

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In Geneva however Gromyko had given him the impression that the Russians would not press for full East German control of access to Berlin.

6. Dr. Schroeder said that the idea of some kind of international access authority might appeal to the Russians because they might regard it as a step towards international control for a free city of West Berlin. They might also be content for the time being with an offer to make some reduction in the Western garrison in West Berlin. They could probably accept a modus vivendi which gave them part but not all their original demands. If they achieved that, they could calculate with confidence that the situation in West Berlin would deteriorate and that they would get more concessions as time went by. He thought the Russians might feel that they were now quite close to the point of getting a modus vivendi like this. It would be easy for their propaganda to satisfy Soviet public opinion with such an agreement. Dr. Schroeder went on to emphasise that he was not saying that he thought the Russians would achieve these aims. He had been trying to guess what the Soviet idea might be of what they could get out of current Western ideas about Berlin.

American Substantive Paper.

7. ^{Lord Home}~~The Secretary of State~~ said that perhaps they should have a word about the programme for further talks with the Russians. Did Mr. Rusk intend to present another paper? Mr. Rusk said he had the impression in his last talk that the Russians were growing more interested in a modus vivendi and were beginning to understand the three-tier philosophy of principles, facts and formulas for living with disagreements which lay behind the American proposals. Subject to the views of his colleagues

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he was inclined to put in a new paper in order to see what happened. He would then have more material on which to test Russian reactions on, for instance, an international access authority. At present American and Russian plans for such an authority had nothing in common but the name. Dr. Schroeder agreed that this was so.

8. ^{Lord Howe} ~~The Secretary of State~~ asked whether Mr. Rusk had in mind a redraft of the paper which he had given Mr. Gromyko in Geneva. Mr. Kohler said that the Americans were working on a redraft with the Germans but had not got very far yet. ~~The~~ ^{Lord Howe} ~~Secretary of State~~ asked if the draft made provision for the eventual reunification of Germany. Mr. Kohler said that it did. The relevant passage had been revised to make this clearer. The Russians had however objected to the entire passage on Germany in the paper handed over at Geneva. Mr. Rusk said that the American aim was an arrangement which would require the Soviets not to withdraw their demands but simply to do nothing about them. Then there could be talks on the pattern of those which had led to the Austrian peace treaty. He thought this might work, because the Soviets might have decided some time last year that they were considerably weaker than the West in nuclear strength and that the West knew this. Perhaps they had launched a crash programme of nuclear rearmament and were postponing a Berlin crisis pending improvement of their strategic position.

9. Dr. Schroeder said that a Four-Power Committee of deputies of Foreign Ministers was appropriate for discussing Berlin and Germany, but he was not sure it would do for discussing non-aggression or non-diffusion of nuclear weapons. His ideas were however tentative.

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Non-diffusion of Nuclear Weapons.

10. Mr. Rusk said he realized the danger of enmeshing the Berlin question with others. Non-diffusion might at some stage be taken up in the Disarmament Conference at Geneva. The Americans thought it useful tactically to link non-diffusion with the Berlin question at present but did not want to tie them together permanently. ~~The Secretary of State~~ ^{Lord Howe} said it would not be easy to keep non-diffusion out of the Disarmament Conference although there was much to be said for keeping it to the Four Powers directly concerned.

11. Mr. Rusk pointed out that Mr. Gromyko had made it clear that he wanted a provision on non-diffusion that applied specifically to Germany. The Americans would however only accept a general formula which would cover China as well. Gromyko also wanted an arrangement which would prevent German forces obtaining nuclear weapons even in NATO. He realized that it would be extremely difficult to reach an agreement with the Russians on non-diffusion. Mr. Couve de Murville said that the Russian demand for specific discrimination against Germany was not new.

12. Dr. Schroeder said that the Disarmament Conference might provide a more promising forum for the Soviets. They might try to get part of what they wanted through a modus vivendi and a bit more through the Disarmament Conference. The fact that the Soviets had not stressed non-diffusion in their talks with Mr. Rusk did not mean that they were not very interested in it.

Modus Vivendi.

13. ~~The Secretary of State~~ ^{Lord Howe} asked for views on the best way on living with East West disagreement over Berlin and connected problems. He thought that a modus vivendi of the

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kind that the Americans were working on presented the best prospects.

14. Mr. Rusk said the two sides might come to live with their disagreements simply by gradually tailing off the American/Russian talks. Alternatively they might agree to set up a committee of deputies. There might be other possibilities as well. He thought agreement with the Russians on some procedural step or procedural understanding was necessary, as a limitation on any action the Russians took over a peace treaty. Otherwise the peace treaty could produce a grave crisis. The Americans had warned the Russians of this repeatedly.

15. M. Couve de Murville suggested that the Soviets obtained some satisfaction from the mere fact of having bilateral talks with the Americans. Mr. Rusk said he thought this was so. The Russians were snobs and liked the idea that only two countries mattered. At the same time they were inclined to accuse the U.S. Government of being "Dr. Adenauer's running dog". In order to correct that impression he had made a point of stressing the vital U.S. interest in West Berlin. M. Couve de Murville said that he thought the Russians had grasped this point all right. Otherwise they would not have put up with the present situation ever since 1948.

16. Lord Howe
~~The Secretary of State~~ said that he hoped it would be possible to give a new paper to the Russians fairly soon. There was nothing to hurt the Western powers in the new American draft paper. Mr. Rusk said that the decision depended on the Four Ministers at the table. If they agreed that the Americans were not involved in anything hurtful to Western interests he would like to present a revised version of his paper to the Russians. If he did not, the Russians would press for discussion

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of their own papers. If he presented a new paper it would also test the pace at which the Russians wanted to proceed. It would be interesting to observe whether they reacted in two days or two weeks.

17. M. Couve de Murville said that the French official position was well known. He would like, however, to express the personal opinion that a new paper would not be useful because the Russians had not yet reacted to the paper Mr. Rusk had given them in Geneva. Mr. Rusk said he had had some talks with Gromyko on his paper. The Russians had objected to the entire section on Germany and had come close to telling him that they did not want reunification for Germany even if it went Communist.

18. Mr. Rusk asked if there was agreement on presenting a revised paper to the Russians. Dr. Schroeder said that the Germans had been considering this question. On the one hand they would have liked a more positive Soviet reaction to the first American paper before a revised version was presented. On the other hand it was true that a new paper would help to probe the Soviet attitude towards a modus vivendi. Perhaps the best plan was to continue work on revising the American draft without a decision yet on when to hand it over. If we agreed on a revised paper we could hold it available for use at the appropriate time. ^{Lord Howe}
~~The Secretary of State~~ said that this seemed a sensible procedure.

19. Mr. Rusk said that it was important that the Western Powers should get together on substance so as to know what to say to the Russians. Dr. Schroeder said that the revised paper must be as favourable for the West as the earlier paper, which had, incidentally, been presented without prior consultation with the Germans. The great question was how interested the Soviets were in hastening matters. If they were willing to go slowly, we should do the same. If they were in a hurry, we should put in another paper. Mr. Rusk said that he had told Dobrynin that

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the Americans had gone about as far as they could go in making proposals. Dobrynin knew that they would be stubborn, unless they could see that the Soviets had something to offer on questions of interest to the West.

20. ^{Lord Howe}
~~The Secretary of State~~ said that it would be difficult to keep non-diffusion of nuclear weapons out of the talks.

Dr. Carstens asked if the Russians felt they had a real interest in withdrawing nuclear weapons from China. Mr. Rusk said that the Americans had good intelligence which indicated that the Russians gave no help over nuclear weapons to China at present.

Dr. Schroeder suggested that the Russians would nevertheless not wish to be bound for the future.

21. Mr. Rusk said the United States Government would only sign a non-diffusion agreement on condition that all parties were released from their obligations if a new nuclear power emerged. Any agreement they signed would also have to be binding on all non-nuclear nations. M. Couve de Murville asked if the U.S. Government would sign without China. Mr. Rusk said that they would want to think very hard about that.

Non-Aggression Pact.

22. ^{Lord Howe}
~~The Secretary of State~~ asked if there were any objections to a non-aggression arrangement between NATO and the Warsaw powers. Mr. Rusk said that the West always emphasised that NATO was a non-aggressive organisation. American ideas on this point went no further than the publicly affirmed position of NATO. ^{Lord Howe}
~~The Secretary of State~~ said that parallel declarations by NATO and the Warsaw powers that they had no aggressive intent might be the best solution. Mr. Rusk agreed.

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23. Dr. Schroeder said a non-aggression arrangement was a Soviet idea. M. Couve de Murville said that the difficulty was to fathom the Soviet purpose. On the face of it non-aggression declarations seemed harmless. Mr. Rusk said that he believed from his conversations that the Russians genuinely feared a strong and revived Germany. Dr. Schroeder said that might be so. There was also a possibility that such declarations would help towards recognition of the D.D.R. Mr. Rusk said that for historical reasons the Russians were apprehensive of what the Germans might do. They felt the Germans were the strongest continental power in NATO and might in time come to run the whole concern. They wanted to provide against that event.

24. Dr. Schroeder said that for a long time past he had been inclined to accept a non-aggression arrangement. Mr. Rusk said that no one in the United States would consider that such an arrangement made any difference to the existing situation. An alternative to parallel declarations would be an exchange of letters between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This might prevent declarations by individual governments, including the D.D.R. He had been surprised that Dr. Stikker had said at his Press Conference that he did not like the idea of a non-aggression pact. The other Ministers agreed that the matter was not within the province of the Secretary General.

Frontiers.

Lord Home
25. ~~The Secretary of State~~ asked if there was any difficulty about declarations that neither side would change existing frontiers by force. Mr. Rusk said that the Federal German Government had already adopted this policy. A new declaration would merely formalise it. But the question did not have high priority in his talks with Dobrynin. The Americans would not discuss it unless they got satisfaction on Berlin. Dr. Schroeder said the Germans did not want too many provisions in a modus vivendi which looked

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like parts of a peace treaty.

26. ^{Lord Howe}
~~The Secretary of State~~ said that the Germans might think there was a distinction between stating that one would not use force to change frontiers and stating that those frontiers were fixed. M. Couve de Murville said that the Germans had stated in 1954 that they would not use force. Dr. Schroeder said a statement to allies was different from a statement to the Russians.

27. Mr. Rusk said he doubted if the Soviets and the Poles were really worried about the Oder-Neisse line. ^{Lord Howe}
~~The Secretary of State~~ said that, when the Polish Foreign Minister saw him in Geneva, he had stated that he was really worried and hoped that, if there were an exchange of non-aggression declarations, the Oder-Neisse line would be mentioned.

28. Mr. Rusk said he had made it clear to Gromyko in Geneva that the Oder-Neisse line was a different matter from demarcation lines inside Germany. Dr. Schroeder said the Potsdam Agreement of 1945 made the status of the Oder-Neisse line clear. The British Foreign Office had produced good maps which showed the situation. Mr. Rusk said it did not help when the Germans produced maps showing territory east of the Oder-Neisse line as part of Germany. He realised however that this was a difficult problem for the Federal Government. The Americans had difficulty in educating their own people on the facts of life about China. Dr. Schroeder said Germany was not like China. Mr. Rusk said that surely everyone realised that there was nothing to be done about the Oder-Neisse line. Dr. Schroeder said this was a psychological and political problem for the Germans.

East/West German Contacts.

29. ^{Lord Howe}
~~The Secretary of State~~ said that the last point

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of substance was contact between East and West Germans. What did Dr. Schroeder think? Dr. Schroeder said that the German attitude to joint Commissions of East and West Germans was often misunderstood. They had proposed three commissions: one to deal with economic matters; one to deal with freedom of movement; and one to discuss electoral arrangements. There was no problem about the first of these, but they wished the second Commission to be responsible not merely for freemovement between West Germany and West Berlin but for free movement between West and East Germany too. As to an electoral commission there was really not much to say for it. Reunification was not a technical matter. It was an illusion to think that a commission could help. He was not clear whether the commission proposed by the Americans had the same areas of competence as those proposed by his Government or not. Nevertheless he thought the Germans would find it possible to accept three commissions. They thought an all-Berlin commission might help to bring about easier movement between East and West Berlin, provided the Russians were inclined to ease movement anyway. The West Berliners wanted the Commission.

30. Mr. Rusk observed that the U.S. had less contact with East Germany than any other Western power. It was ironical that they should now be accused in certain quarters of wanting to recognise the D.D.R. Dr. Schroeder said that he would like to make two points about German Inter-zonal trade: firstly it was of psychological importance in helping to maintain a feeling of national identity; secondly, and more important, through inter-zonal trade agreements, it was linked with traffic and trade between West Berlin and West Germany. If the West stopped inter-zonal trade, the East Germans could argue that they were no longer under any obligation to allow free trade and traffic between West Berlin and West Germany.

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General.

31. In general discussion Ministers agreed that each would make a separate statement in the NATO Council on the views of their respective governments regarding Berlin. It was also agreed to set up an official working group to agree a draft paragraph on Berlin for the final NATO communiqué. This was to be handed to the Secretary-General before the NATO drafting committee held its first meeting.

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3. PLANS OTHER THAN JOINT SERVICE PLANS

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THE COMMITTEE then discussed the problems involved when plans other than joint Service plans had not been referred to the Committee.

SIR WALLACE KYLE said that such plans might clash with joint plans approved by the Committee, were they to be put into operation at the same time, and a further danger was that such plans might not be known to the other Services who had a direct interest. An example was the directives on Nuclear Strike Planning in Support of SEATO Plan 4, which had been from the Admiralty and the Air Ministry to their single Service Commanders in the Far East; the Committee had therefore instructed^a that the Commander-in-Chief, Far East Land Forces, should be kept informed. It was undesirable to be inflexible as to which plans other than joint Service plans should be approved by the Committee, but should they concern the other Services there was a need to process them through the Committee.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note.

* COS(62)19th Meeting, Minute 4A

4. QUADRIPARTITE BERLIN NAVAL COUNTERMEASURES

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(Previous Reference: COS(61)64th Meeting, Minute 3)

J.P.(62)46(Final)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a report by the Joint Planning Staff examining the revised Quadripartite draft report^a on Berlin Naval Countermeasures. A Secretary's Minute^b covering a letter from the Foreign Office to the Ministry of Defence was relevant to their discussion.

A. J.P.(62)46(Final)

SIR WALLACE KYLE said the Committee would recall that they had previously considered, in September, 1961, a report^c by the Interdepartmental Blockade Working Group on Naval countermeasures and had concluded^d that the concept of Naval blockade operations put forward in this report was based on an unfounded premise of Western Naval superiority, and had underestimated the likely Soviet reactions to the measures proposed. Subsequently the Americans had prepared a new paper, largely as a result of the Committee's views, and the quadripartite Military Sub-group had now produced a further report^e on which they had requested National views. The fact that there were now 3 Maritime Contingency Plans, if the BERCON DELTA plans were included, 2 of which had been prepared by NATO i.e. the MARCON and BERCON DELTA plans, and one by the Quadripartite Working Group, tended to lead to confusion.

^a Annex A to COS.392/23/3/62
^b COS.605/9/5/62
^c Annex B to COS(61)327
^d COS(61)351

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The reason was that the Quadripartite Working Group had prepared Naval countermeasures as part of the larger catalogue of plans for Berlin contingency planning; whilst the NATO plans had been formulated as a result of instructions from the North Atlantic Council in November, 1961, when major NATO Commanders had been asked to prepare plans to provide as great a choice as possible of military countermeasures in relation to the Berlin situation. However the Quadripartite Naval countermeasures covered a similar ascending range of actions, from surveillance to blockade, as the NATO maritime plans; and since many of the former would involve action by NATO authorities the Ambassadorial Group clearly envisaged possible Quadripartite action as a preliminary to NATO - wide action. He believed the Committee would agree that planning without commitments should proceed on the Naval countermeasures proposed by the Working Group.

In discussion the following point was made:-

- (a) The Quadripartite report made no assumptions nor attempted to appraise the balance of risks, such as SACLANT had made in his Maritime Contingency Plan². SACLANT had assumed the pre-authorized use of tactical nuclear weapons for self-defence. The United Kingdom's position was that in no circumstances could the decision to initiate the use of nuclear weapons be delegated to military commanders; and the Committee had therefore previously agreed that the use of tactical nuclear weapons at sea could not be authorised in advance even in self-defence. It was important to obtain clarification that SACLANT's assumption, with regard to the pre-authorized use of tactical nuclear weapons for self-defence, had not been tacitly assumed by the Americans to apply to the Quadripartite Naval countermeasures. This could best be resolved in the Ambassadorial Group.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (1) Approved the report by the Joint Planning Staff.
- (2) Invited the Foreign Office to take action as at (a) above.

B. COS.605/9/5/62

SIR WALLACE KYLE said that in a letter² from the Foreign Office to the Ministry of Defence the suggestion had been made that the United Kingdom should now agree to plan on the first 3 of the minor maritime countermeasures proposed³ by the

- ∅ COS(62)112
- * COS(62)184
- & Annex to COS.605/9/5/62
- @ Washington to Foreign Office No.879

Americans in March, 1962. If, however, the United Kingdom could not agree that these measures were suitable in response to Soviet interference, then we should consider putting forward other ideas. In this connection the Foreign Office had suggested the possible redeployment of aircraft already in Germany or the sending of additional units from home bases to Germany.

Previously the question of planning for these maritime countermeasures had been considered in the context of active Soviet air harassment in the Berlin corridors. This Soviet action had now ceased and he believed the Committee would agree that planning for these minor measures should go forward without political commitment and without them being related to any particular circumstances; but should be considered rather as additional "arrows in the quiver". Concerning the suggested redeployment of aircraft or sending of additional units to Germany, plans already existed to cover this in the context of LIVE OAK planning and such measures were not suitable in the context proposed.

In discussion the following additional point was made:-

- (b) Since the American maritime countermeasures⁽¹⁾ were similar to those proposed by the Quadripartite Sub-group in Washington, the views expressed in the paper⁺ which the Committee had just considered, applied to them also. The reply to the Foreign Office should accordingly be framed on the views expressed in this report⁺ and in their discussion.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (3) Agreed with the views of the Vice Chief of the Air Staff.
- (4) Invited the Ministry of Defence to reply to the Foreign Office on the lines of (b) above.

@ Washington to Foreign Office 879
+ JP(62)46(Final)

DEFE 4/145 COS (62) 35 (6) /JP (62) 62 (Final) , 11 May 1962

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Briefs for the United Kingdom Representative at the 28th Meeting of the Military Committee in "Chiefs of Staff Session"

UK EYES ONLY

Annex (Continued)

ITEM 10BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

At the 27th Meeting of the MC/CS SACEUR and SACLANT gave presentations on Berlin Contingency Planning as it affected their commands. SACEUR also explained the relationship between bipartite contingency planning (LIVEOAK) and NATO planning. Their plans for wider offensive operations, which they were directed to produce by the North Atlantic Council, have subsequently been submitted to the Standing Group. The Standing Group has requested national comments in order that it, in consultation with the Military Committee, may develop an appraisal for consideration by the North Atlantic Council. However, before making their appraisal, the Standing Group also considered it necessary to seek clarification and amplification from SACEUR on certain aspects of his Contingency Plans. These points included:-

- (a) The particular deficiencies required to be met to support the BERCON operations.
- (b) The necessary redeployment to implement a forward strategy and when it can be undertaken.
- (c) The effect of the various BERCON plans on SACEUR's capability to implement his EDP.
- (d) The feasibility of providing an additional plan between ALPHAS ONE AND TWO.

SACEUR has stated in reply that although ACE would, if necessary, implement the BERCON plans from present positions and with existing forces, the only sound foundation for doing so is a true forward strategy by forces up to the strength called for in the end-1966 force requirements (MC 26/4). The requirement was therefore the same as that needed to implement the new EDP.

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 % SHAFTO 2511

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UK EYES ONLY

Annex(Continued)

The necessary redeployment was being examined by CINCENT. The successful execution of Plans CHARLIE TWO and FOUR would improve our defensive position, whilst CHARLIE ONE and THREE might well prove liabilities. Possible intermediate plans between ALPHA ONE and TWO were rejected since they would result in a disproportionate attrition of ACE air forces, but BERCON CHARLIE plans did provide for air actions lying between the two.

The oral report to be given by the Chairman of the Standing Group will embrace the status of Berlin Contingency Planning and future activity on this subject.

The United Kingdom Position

4. General. We have examined^{&Ø} the Contingency plans of both SACEUR[/] (BERCON) and SACLANC[§] (MARCON) and concluded that for both plans the placing of NATO on a war footing is the most important aspect and is best calculated to impress the Russians with our determination to assert our rights over Berlin, and that thereafter action should be related more to war against the Soviet Union than to Berlin.

5. BERCON Plans. In the case of the BERCON plans, we also concluded that:-

- (a) Some military options directly related to access to Berlin may be required for political purposes and should be planned for.
- (b) BERCON ALPHA ONE, BERCON CHARLIE ONE, BERCON BRAVO and BERCON DELTA warrant detailed planning action and may be included in the catalogue of Berlin counter-measures.

& COS(62)176
Ø COS(62)184
/ Annex to COS(62)144
§ Annex to COS(62)112

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UK EYES ONLY

Annex(Continued)

- (c) The remaining BERCON plans involve such risks of escalation or of military fiasco as would be likely unacceptably to prejudice Allied ability to deter or defeat general aggression, and from a military point of view should not be included in the catalogue of Berlin counter-measures.

6. MARCON Plans. In the case of these plans, we accepted that, under the special considerations obtaining over Berlin, all the MARCON measures could take their place in the catalogue of Berlin counter-measures, although we considered that:-

- (a) MARCONS ONE to THREE are unlikely usefully to influence the Russians to restore Allied access to Berlin.
- (b) MARCONS FOUR to SIX, which would also be difficult to relate to Berlin, could only be interpreted as acts of war.

We were unable to agree that the use of tactical nuclear weapons at sea in self-defence should be authorized in advance. We also considered that the redeployment within the NATO area of United Kingdom Category 'B' ships serving outside the NATO area should be subject of unilateral decision at the time, since this would reduce British military strength outside the NATO area at a time of world-wide tension.

7. Our conclusions on the military merits of the BERCON and MARCON plans are in no way invalidated by SACEUR's subsequent views on the relative merits of the BERCON plans.

8. Future Activity. We can accept that the very abbreviated form of the present plans is sufficient to enable the Standing Group to prepare their appraisal for the North Atlantic Council.

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Annex(Continued)

However, in both the BERCON and MARCON plans, we considered^{&Ø} that they are outlined so briefly that they amount to little more than statements of intention, requiring detailed implementing plans. We can therefore accept that future activity should be directed to more detailed planning, preferably confined to the measures which we have found militarily acceptable. These detailed plans should then be examined by the Military Committee in order to permit a clearer assessment of their practicability and desirability. Whether or not it will be necessary to refer certain of them to the North Atlantic Council will depend on the outcome of this detailed examination.

& COS(62)176
Ø COS(62)184

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WASHINGTON.

PERSONAL

R18
May 17, 1962.

Dear Prime Minister,

When I saw McGeorge Bundy yesterday, he gave me a verbal message from the President which had to do with the matters you discussed with him during your private talk in his office.

As I understand it, you had suggested that in some circumstances it might be worth considering whether, in order to try and satisfy the French, we, the British, might pool our nuclear knowledge with them and that having constituted ourselves nuclear trustees, as it were, of the European half of the Atlantic Alliance, we would then jointly continue to receive American help in the nuclear field. From what the President has said to me since that talk,

/ and Bundy

The Right Honourable
Harold Macmillan, M.P.,

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and Bundy confirmed this, he does not take up an attitude of doctrinaire opposition to such an idea but he does feel, as I think you do, that it would only be worth considering if it would buy something really spectacular like full French co-operation in N.A.T.O. and elsewhere plus British entry into the European Economic Community. The President's message relayed through Bundy was that he wished you to know that under present circumstances and in view of de Gaulle's inflexible attitude, he could not give American support to any such move. The right moment might come when such a proposal would have value, although it would need extremely careful examination, but the President was quite convinced that this was not such a moment. Evidently he is concerned that you might hint at some such arrangement when you see de Gaulle early next month.

I told Bundy that I had no evidence that you intended to even mention the subject during the coming talks but at the most I had imagined that you might do no more than throw a fly over the General to see whether he displayed the slightest interest. There were, in fact, good reasons / for supposing

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for supposing that so long as de Gaulle was in power he was absolutely determined upon a nuclear capability under purely French control although he would no doubt be happy to have outside help in the actual building of his force de frappe. Bundy then revealed that the Americans had thrown a somewhat similar fly over the General earlier this year when Ambassador Gavin had tried to persuade him to permit greater French co-operation in N.A.T.O. The only result had been that he had attempted to snap up the fly while turning down flat any idea of closer co-operation. The President hoped you would bear all this in mind when you are preparing for your talks with de Gaulle.

I think you should know that I have to leave for Seattle on the 26th May in order to attend the British Week at the World's Fair, and I shall not get back to Washington until the 3rd June since Prince Philip will be visiting the Fair on the 1st and 2nd June. If, therefore, there was any aspect of your coming talks with de Gaulle that you wished me to discuss with the President personally, I would need your instructions before the end of next week.

Yours ever
David Amshy Gore

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PERSONAL

SZ/477/62

MINISTER

Anglo/French Co-operation

While in Paris at SHAFEX this week, I had a useful opportunity to discuss Anglo/French co-operation in R. and P. and, although nothing decisive resulted, you may be interested in what I learnt.

2. General Puget^{*} is now in charge of what is in effect the Defence Staff which reports directly to the Prime Minister and the President. Exactly where he stands as Chef d'Etat of his agency in relation to Messmer I do not know, but I understand that he represents the policy-making body on defence matters for the French Government. He has two deputies - one military and the other civil. The latter is Francois de Rose who was previously in the Quai d'Orsay where, among other things, he was responsible for nuclear affairs. I have known de Rose for some time, and have had some intimate talks with him in the past about France's nuclear policy. When I discovered him at SHAFEX, I told him that you and Messmer had spoken about the possibility of Anglo-French co-operation in the field of R. and P. and suggested that it might be useful if he, de Rose, and I had a word on the subject. As a result, I spent nearly two hours with him in his Department going over the ground.

3. de Rose expressed himself all for co-operation and recognised that there was an immense amount of duplication at the present moment. As an illustration of his attitude, he cited BLUE STREAK and told me that it was he who had persuaded General de Gaulle that France should join with us. It turned out, too, that de Rose has seen Mr. Thornycroft on more than one occasion.

4. Very early on in our discussion de Rose put to me the blunt question 'how about co-operation in the nuclear field?' I told him that, in principle, the same problem of duplication related to the nuclear field as it did to the non-nuclear, but that this issue was, of course, determined by another set of political considerations and, in particular, by our relationships with the Americans.

5. This led de Rose to express a series of thoughts, which he repeated several times, about the American attitude which he made quite plain was heartily disliked by the French. He, first of all, said that Mr. McChamara's statement in Athens had given no satisfaction to anybody in France. Merely telling

/the

* Chef d'Etat major de la Defense Nationale

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the French how many nuclear warheads were disposed in NATO Europe told them nothing whatever about the way nuclear warheads would, if occasion demanded, be used. They did not know the types; they did not know the yields; and they did not know the circumstances in which they could be used. In fact, none of the information given by McNamara satisfied the political need the French felt for being included in the nuclear camp. He wondered whether we in the U.K. felt the same way, to which I could only reply that I was unaware that McNamara's statement about tactical nuclear weapons had left us feeling that we were being denied any piece of information which we required. He then went on to say that the Americans were always changing their concepts about the potential European battle far too quickly. In the days of Dulles, the theory was massive retaliation. This policy was followed by the concept of graduated deterrence. Now we have reliance on conventional forces. Europe had had enough of conventional warfare and did not want to have it waged over its soil again. I immediately said surely France would not want to fight a nuclear war, the consequences of which would be the probable permanent destruction of European cities. The current conventional thesis of the Americans was, I suggested, the other end of a spectrum of graduated response, and the Americans would undoubtedly reply to any French criticism of their policies in this sense.

6. de Rose kept asking me whether the Americans were really asking us to abandon our strategic nuclear weapons, and also wanted to know whether I knew what the Prime Minister had in mind when he suggested earlier on to de Gaulle that the U.K. and France might eventually get together about nuclear weapons. Apparently, the Prime Minister made the same general observations to the previous French Ambassador in London, and the new one when he arrived a few weeks ago. de Rose wanted to know whether what the Prime Minister had in mind was merely an operational liaison between the two countries, or whether he also conceived of technological co-operation. To this, I could only reply that I was sure the Prime Minister wanted the closest possible relationship which would help the NATO and European position, but that undoubtedly his attitude would be conditioned by our links with the Americans.

7. 'What value were these links?', asked de Rose. Were we really getting vital information in the nuclear field? He had been told by an American that some British nuclear and Service authorities felt that our liaison in this field was of no practical value from the point of view of building up our nuclear strength. Were we proposing to resume atmospheric tests? Were the Americans going to tell us all that they had learnt in their present series of tests? These questions were not difficult to evade.

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8. de Rose then put a much more interesting question - did we in the U.K. consider that the time might come when we would abandon our strategic nuclear capability? Without waiting for an answer, he went on to say that this was a most serious question for France. It did not matter while de Gaulle was alive, as he would not turn back from the course on which he was now set. But it would matter when he was dead, because a powerful opinion might then be generated in France against the force de frappe. Again, he did not wait for an answer, and went on to mention two other points. First, he could hardly conceive of any French government abandoning France's independent nuclear policy (a policy which, from previous talks with him, I know de Rose believes in personally), for the simple reason that so much effort had already been put into the implementation of this policy. Second, if there was any danger of France finding herself unable, for economical and technological reasons, to complete her nuclear programme, there was always a possibility that, in the absence of de Gaulle, France might tie up with Germany in the development of her nuclear armory. He, himself, thought this highly dangerous policy, and he hoped it would never come to pass. He said he was mentioning this not as a statement representing potential blackmail, but as a fact. In answer to my direct question, he assured me that no co-operation yet existed, however secret, in this field. Obviously, however, the matter was being discussed.

9. de Rose told me that he and his colleagues realised that France would never become a major nuclear power in the sense that the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. were and that, at best, they might end up with 50 one-megaton weapons. de Gaulle thought it important that France should be in a position to deter aggressive Russian action by herself - a view with which he concurred. I pointed out that the problem was not a matter of nuclear warheads, but that of delivery systems. Did he realise how expensive it was to develop strategic missiles, or an invulnerable aircraft delivery system? He told me that the French military were calling for bombers, POLARIS submarines, hardened missile sites and even mobile missiles on trucks. Here, I could only warn him that they would soon discover that the development of any one of these systems was going to prove more expensive and more of a drain on French resources than the manufacture of nuclear warheads. Could we not get together then, replied de Rose, on work on strategic delivery systems?

10. This provided an opportunity to bring the discussion back to co-operation in the broader field of defence R. and D. I pointed out that he was talking about only a fraction of the work in this field, even though I recognised that lack of co-operation in the nuclear field constituted an obstacle to collaboration in other parts of defence R. and D. We had important links in the development of the Mirage III V, but we did not know about French work on anti-tank weapons etc. etc. Would it not be possible for us to compare our non-nuclear R. and D. programmes? de Rose felt that the situation might improve from this point of view once Britain

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was in the Common Market, although, here, he added that, since we had asked to be admitted, we were unlikely to be so on the terms which we would like. On the other hand, de Rose said did we really want to co-operate with France when we had our close relations with the Americans from whom, for example, we were going to obtain SKYBOLT? How much easier it would be for France if she, too, could get SKYBOLT! What did France have to give us?

11. In spite of these views, I have arranged to see de Rose again when in Paris the week after next (I have to be there for two days for another NATO meeting) and this time in company with a man called Malvar who is in charge of R. and D. under Messmer.

12. There is just one further point which I see I noted down on a scrap of paper when I left de Rose's office. He was explaining de Gaulle's attitude to NATO and said that, having built up a force de frappe, de Gaulle would not be against putting it in NATO, but of course only on the understanding that this did not commit France to using her nuclear forces only within the NATO context. Nuclear forces were a political instrument; for example, it was important to France that Khrushchev had now said that he was not going to conclude a test ban treaty unless France was also party to it.

W. JACKERMAN

25th May, 1962.

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6/13/62

Defence Organization

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(For brief - see under 24/5)

Extract from a Record of a Conversation at the Chateau de Champs at 12.30 p.m. on Sunday, June 3, 1962.

..... President de Gaulle

It was necessary to think about the possibilities in the field of defence. There were two situations which might occur, in the first of which there would be a conventional battle in Germany. Like France, Britain proposed to take part in this battle to some degree but no-one knew what would happen in such an engagement. France wished to see what would happen and to keep some forces in reserve. That was why all French forces could not be committed to NATO. Certainly France was not anti-American and was quite clear that the United States must take part in this battle. Then Britain and France seemed to have similar ideas about the atomic armament; President de Gaulle thought that Mr. Macmillan envisaged the employment of this arm in rather the same way as the French did. It would have to be used if France was menaced. If it was possible to make a reality of Europe then there would have to be an Anglo-French plan agreed with others. Such a plan would not exclude NATO although it would not be solely concerned with NATO. A small deterrent force would have to be kept separate for employment if threats were made. The French Fleet would not be in NATO. It seemed to him that Britain and France were in the same psychological position in this matter and that this was an area in which agreement would be possible. It might be useful if further talks between the two

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C.O.S. (62)246

6TH JUNE, 1962

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

NATO STRATEGY

Draft Brief for U.K. Representatives in NATO

This paper sets out the position reached on NATO Strategy and the Role of NATO Forces after the Minister of Defence's discussion with Mr. McNamara and the Athens meeting. It shows where American views may differ from our own.

Deterrence

2. The primary role of the NATO forces is to deter Russia by convincing her that any form of aggression, on any scale, would meet a reply of such a kind that would make the aggression not worth attempting; or if attempted, not worth persisting in.

How a war might start

3. The Russians will not try a full scale nuclear surprise attack nor an all out conventional attack. They might try a limited conventional aggression if they thought they could get away with it. War might also start through international friction, e.g. Berlin, or a revolt in East Germany suppressed by Soviet forces with the West Germans then intervening.

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Forward Strategy

4. To deter a Russian coup and to defend our allies along the Iron Curtain conventional forces should be stationed as near the E./W. border as possible. Detailed plans for this forward strategy and a time table for introducing them need to be worked out by SACEUR.

Conventional Forces - Role and Size

5. The size of NATO's conventional forces will be governed by their role (deterrent and operational); the Russian threat; and the assumed length of any conventional phase of hostilities:-

(a) Russian Threat

We believe that any Russian attack would be made with forces immediately available so that they would achieve surprise and make obvious the limited nature of their attack.

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(b) Deterrent role

We and the Americans agree that the first aim of NATO's conventional forces is to deter a Soviet conventional attack. The Americans express this concept by stating that Soviet aggression would be made less likely if the Western Nations were to provide enough conventional forces to compel the Russians to concentrate prior to any attack.

(c) Operational role

If the deterrent effect of NATO's conventional strength failed, we believe that the aim of the conventional forces would then be to contain the Russians long enough for political pressure to force them to withdraw or for the decision to use nuclear weapons to be taken. The Americans wish to increase the number of options, particularly for non nuclear military action, in response to aggression.

(d) Length

The length of any conventional phase cannot be defined. We are both agreed that there is no purpose in planning for a conventional war to the finish. We believe that once it was clear that the Russians were determined on serious aggression there would be no point in delaying the first use of nuclear weapons. The phase would therefore be counted in days. The Americans seem to envisage a rather longer holding operation to enable political pressures to take effect; they do not seem to envisage a conventional phase of more than three weeks.

6. For deterrence under their concept of the conventional phase the Americans believe a force of 30 divisions is necessary. We have not so far been able to calculate what force would be necessary under our concept, but are content not to object to the American statement of the requirement provided no more divisions are called for from us.

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7. The Triennial Review will show what size of conventional forces countries are in fact able and ready to provide. If these are well below the forces required, it may be necessary to establish priorities among the Commanders' requirements so that the most important are fully met.

Initial Use of Nuclear Weapons

8. There would be a military requirement to resort to nuclear weapons in the event of failure by our conventional forces to hold a Russian attack or of a stalemate through the failure of political pressure to make the Russians withdraw. The first use should be selective and the aim would be to act as a warning. Targets should be military in East Germany but not of such importance as to force the Russians to reply with strategic weapons. The first use should be in very small numbers, possibly in single figures and their yield should be small, 10kt. or below.

TOP SECRET

9. Although the Americans seem even more reluctant to envisage this stage than ourselves, they agree that plans should be prepared for the initial selective use of nuclear weapons. This should be done by SACEUR. Nothing in this planning should commit Governments to any particular response at any particular time. Doubt in the enemy's mind about the nature of any response is an essential part of the deterrent.

Tactical Nuclear Battle

10. If the warning selective use of nuclear weapons failed to secure a Russian withdrawal, it would probably be necessary to take the decision to use nuclear weapons on a larger scale. However, it would be unrealistic to expect that a battle with full scale tactical use of nuclear weapons could be controlled. Any such battle would lose all possibility of movement and control. Such an extensive use of nuclear weapons would bring on the strategic exchange. Nevertheless a reasonable number of those weapons is required for deterrence.

Strategic Exchange

11. The Americans have suggested that it might be possible to have a controlled general war by confining the strategic exchange to military targets; there might be, as it were, a tacit agreement with the Russians on this. This idea will need close study to see whether it would make the deterrent more credible when the Russians learnt we could and would proceed to controlled general nuclear war, or less credible if they thought we were shirking the ultimate decision.

M.R.B.M.s

12. A further side issue is the provision of MRBM's for N.A.T.O. For discriminate warning purposes, we believe that there may possibly be some justification at high priority for a small number of very accurate MRBMs for attacks on certain selective targets if such targets cannot more effectively be dealt with by other weapons (including aircraft). If more are required for suppressing enemy air defences or striking interdiction targets, these are general war tasks only and the requirement should be given low priority.

13. The American views on M.R.B.M.s are not altogether clear. Although they have questioned the military role of M.R.B.M.s in NATO, they have nevertheless earmarked Polaris submarines and are pressing on with the development of Missile X. Although the earmarking of the Polaris may be merely a political gesture, it is difficult to see the purpose of the development of Missile X, if they have in mind no long term plans for its use in NATO.

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Conclusion

14. The way in which these matters will now be considered in NATO will depend largely on the Secretary General. Our own line in discussion should be:-

- (a) Forward Strategy. Support approval of SACEUR's new EDP based on the Forward Strategy.
- (b) The Conventional Forces. Allow the Triennial Review to take its course and, in the light of the Council's conclusions in December on the forces countries are ready to provide, settle in the Council the priorities for action on strengthening the NATO's forces.
- (c) NATO M.R.B.M. Force. We should discourage proposals for the establishment of a NATO M.R.B.M. Force or the provision of M.R.B.M.s to A.C.E. Forces unless a clear requirement for them has been established.

ITEM 2

CLARIFICATION OF NATO TERMINOLOGY

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1. This item has been proposed by the United Kingdom because it was found to be a useful preliminary to discussion on NATO strategy at the last Anglo-French staff talks. In the agenda for those talks we specified clarification of the following:-

- (a) Strategic/tactical
- (b) MRBMs
- (c) Forcing a pause
- (d) Raising the threshold.

There were, however, no apparent differences in interpretation when NATO strategy was discussed at the first Anglo-German staff talks in May, 1961, and the Germans have not proposed any additions to the list.

Strategic and Tactical

2. It was agreed[@] at the last Anglo-French Staff Talks that the definition of these words depended not on the range of weapons nor on the geographical situation of a target but on the role of the weapon used at any particular time. Thus "tactical" should be used for weapons and targets immediately connected with the land/air or sea/air battle. Most of these would be close to the battlefield, but some might be deeper behind the enemy's lines. "Strategic" should be used to cover other weapons and targets affecting the enemy's population centres, strategic capability, and air or missile defence systems of the USSR.

MRBMs

3. The term should be used to distinguish the MRBM (or IRBM - intermediate range ballistic missile) from the shorter range missiles of the PERSHING type and the ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) of over 3,000 n.m. range. Because there may

@ Annex to COS.542/27/4/62

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Annex II (Continued)

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be different MRBMs, shore-based or ship-borne, megaton or kiloton, and because they may be used tactically or strategically over varying ranges, they should not be regarded as either strategic or tactical weapons, but simply as ballistic missiles with a range of between about 500 and 3,000 n.m.

Forcing a Pause

4. We accept the definition given in SACEUR's revised Emergency Defence Plan of the aim of forcing a pause in the continuity of military action as:-

"to require the enemy to make a conscious decision as to whether or not he intends to extend his aggression to the point that it constitutes an act which might lead to General War."

The pause might be forced by Allied conventional forces alone or combined with the selective use of a small number of nuclear weapons on suitable military targets.

5. The Germans have objected to the pause concept being adopted in SACEUR's new EDP. They feared that unless the pause was extremely short it would be exploited by the enemy to continue or expand his aggression. We on the other hand regard it as imposing a brake on events which might otherwise escalate to General War. We are advised, however, that the Germans have since been persuaded in the MC/PS to accept the EDP without major amendment.

Raising the Threshold

6. At the last Anglo-French Staff Talks it was explained that the United Kingdom had only one threshold - that at which the first nuclear weapon was used. The French employed the term to allow a tactical threshold when the first tactical nuclear weapon was used and a strategic threshold when the strategic nuclear forces became involved.

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Annex II (Concluded)

7. We do not know whether the Germans envisage more than one threshold. There was no indication of this when NATO strategy was discussed during the first Anglo-German Staff Talks⁸.

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⁸ Annex 'D' to COS.583/15/5/61

UK EYES ONLY

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Annex III to JP(62)72(Final)

ITEM 3

THE INITIAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

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General

1. When discussing NATO strategy during the first Anglo-German Staff talks the Germans envisaged[@] an increase in conventional forces, continued dependence on tactical nuclear weapons, and the possibility of a long limited war in Europe, even with the use of tactical nuclear weapons. That was a year ago and since then the use of tactical nuclear weapons has been under discussion in various forums throughout NATO. We should therefore like to hear whether the Germans still hold the same views. As, however, we have proposed this item, they may expect to hear our ideas first.

United Kingdom Views

2. We have accepted⁵ the assumptions in SACEUR's new EDP that:-
- (a) If the Soviets initiate General War using nuclear weapons, both sides will use nuclear weapons from the outset.
 - (b) NATO will take the initiative in the use of nuclear weapons if the Soviet initiate General War using conventional weapons only, or if General War arises from military operations which were initially of a lesser scale.
 - (c) In the event of Soviet non-nuclear attack which is less than General War, SACEUR will be authorized at the time to use nuclear weapons if his conventional forces proved inadequate to the task.

In considering the initial use of nuclear weapons we are concerned mainly with (c).

@ Annex 'B' to COS.583/15/5/61
2 COS(62)158

Annex III (Continued)

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3. There will be serious risks of escalation in the initial use of nuclear weapons. If they are used selectively, with the aim of acting as a warning, our preliminary views are that their targets should be military in enemy territory, but not of such a type as to force the Russians to reply with strategic weapons. For this purpose, nuclear weapons should be used in very small numbers, possibly in single figures, and their yield should be small, 10 KT or below.

4. In order, however, to maintain the validity of the strategic deterrent we must continue to impress on the Russians that escalation to global war would probably follow any use of nuclear weapons; thus the political effect would be obtained by confronting the Soviet Government with the urgent choice of escalation or withdrawal.

5. If the selective use of nuclear weapons as a warning failed to secure a Russian withdrawal it would probably be necessary to take the decision to use nuclear weapons on a larger scale. We do not consider a battle with full-scale tactical use of nuclear weapons would last for long because movement and control would become impossible. Moreover, an extensive use of tactical weapons would quickly escalate to General War. However against aggression less than General War much will depend on its circumstances and extent.

Discussion Points

6. Our assessments have shown that to achieve battlefield objectives nuclear weapons would have to be used in considerable numbers. These are assessments in theoretical military terms and do not allow for the psychological reaction to the use of nuclear weapons, which may be very great but is difficult to assess in advance.

7. If the use of nuclear weapons were limited geographically to a confined area, e.g. the battlefield, the risks of escalation would be considerably reduced. We assume, however, that the

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UK EYES ONLY

Annex III (Continued)

air forces of both sides would be involved and would inevitably spread the use of nuclear weapons.

8. Northern Army Group have advocated the use of atomic demolition munitions (ADMs) as a rapid means of creating obstacles, and maintain that they should not be regarded as weapons but as demolition devices. We accept the need for a quick means of demolition and the considerable saving in sapper effort by the use of ADMs. However a small .2 or .4KT ADM, which is what they want, would be recognizable as a nuclear device and would create a small amount of fall-out in a limited area. Therefore it might not be politically acceptable to use them during the conventional phase. There may also be other limiting factors in regard to the civil population, such as movement of refugees.

Recommendations

9. We recommend that:-

- (a) In outlining the United Kingdom views attention should be drawn to the points for discussion as an indication of aspects of the problem which we are continuing to study.
- (b) The German views should be sought on:-
 - (i) The psychological effects of the first use of nuclear weapons.
 - (ii) The tasks of air forces during conventional operations and during the transition to the use of nuclear weapons selectively and thereafter.
 - (iii) The problems of target acquisition.
 - (iv) The use of ADMs.
 - (v) The risk of escalation.

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Annex IV to JP(62)72 (Final)

ITEM 4

MILITARY ASPECTS OF MRBMs

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Introduction

1. We understand that the Germans are to give a presentation on this subject. We have no indication of the line they will adopt but they have previously taken a lively interest in the subject during meetings of the MC/CS. The preparation of a discussion draft[@] paper on the "Military Aspects of the Introduction of MRBMs into NATO" resulted largely from German initiative[£] at the MC/CS 27th Meeting and the paper received[%] their approval at the 28th Meeting provided that SACEUR's comments[&] were incorporated. We indicate below the main views expressed by the Germans at these meetings.

Previous German Views

2. The Germans consider[£] that SACEUR's requirement for 655 MRBMs is fully justified, and that from a military point of view an excessive delay in dealing with the MRBM problem might have disastrous consequences for NATO. They support[%] SACEUR's plea that the MRBM question should be considered on purely military grounds, and also his contention that without such weapons, he would be unable to carry out his task of defending Europe.

3. While recognizing the political aspects of the problem the Germans have suggested[£] that to save time in dealing with the problem as a whole the Military Authorities ought not to postpone their planning pending solution of the political problems because:-

- (a) Soviet MRBM capabilities are very considerable.

@ MC 99 (Discussion Draft)
£ Record MC/CS 27th Meeting
% Record MC/CS 28th Meeting
& MCH-72-62

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Annex IV(Continued)

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- (b) The replacement of manned aircraft by missiles is essential in order to counter improved enemy air defences.
 - (c) Missiles will be required to compensate for the loss in radius of action of the next generation of V/STOL aircraft.
4. The Germans favour[%] a mixed force of mobile land-based and seaborne missiles, on the grounds that this would "avoid any gap opening within the range of possibilities at the disposal of a modern deterrent power". They stress the seaborne element because of:-

- (a) The limited extent of NATO territory in Europe.
 - (b) The concentration of population and industrial potential in this limited area.
 - (c) The reluctance of some European nations to station MRBMs on their territory.
5. Of the various proposed[@] methods of organization and control the Germans favour a force which is multilaterally owned and controlled. Such a force would consist of national units assigned to NATO under the operational control of Major Commanders, but responsive directly to SACEUR by a separate chain of command and control.

United Kingdom Views

6. The Von Karman Report has drawn attention to the high cost of new weapon systems, which will make it essential to avoid duplication. We accept that NATO defence will require a balanced force of missiles and aircraft, but in order to arrive at a sound conclusion on the balance between missiles and aircraft, and to avoid duplication of weapon systems, we consider^δ that

[%] Record MC/CS 28th Meeting
[@] MC 99 (Discussion Draft)
^δ COS(62)78

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Annex IV(Continued)

any revision of NATO strategy should:-

- (a) Define precisely the division of responsibility between NATO nuclear forces and external strategic forces.
- (b) Define the tasks of NATO air forces in operations short of global war, and in particular indicate the tasks for both air and ballistic missile forces in the period preceding the strategic exchange.

We do not therefore consider it desirable to form definite conclusions on the requirement for MRBMs before the current long-term review of NATO strategy has been completed.

7. We did not consider⁴ that the Standing Group paper on MRBMs[@] dealt adequately with the subject of targets of opportunity. Although it may become technically possible for MRBMs to take these on, it is likely that they may still be attacked more effectively by aircraft; the choice will depend on the allocation of tasks referred to above, and will also have to take into account battlefield factors such as assessment of information, enemy defences, vulnerability of our own forces, control, and post-strike damage assessment.

8. Another point not fully covered in the Standing Group paper was the security of seaborne missiles in surface ships. These ships operating on the high seas can be tracked in peacetime and are vulnerable to nuclear submarine and air attack.

9. We consider that it would be premature to attempt to decide on command and control systems, or between land and shipborne missiles, until the present discussions on MRBMs in the NATO Council have been concluded. The operational requirements stated[§] by the Americans will not necessarily be met in the

⁴ COS(62)218, Item 9
[@] MC 99 (Discussion Draft)
[§] MCM-73-62 (Revised)

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Annex IV(Concluded)

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completed missile, and do not indicate any decisive advantage for either the land or seaborne version except in regard to accuracy (at 1,000 n.m. the CEP is 1,000 ft. for the land version, e.g. Missile 'X', and 3,760 ft. for the surface ship version of POLARIS A-2).

Recommendations

10. The political aspects of MRBMs for ACE and a NATO controlled MRBM force should be avoided as far as possible and discussion confined to the operational requirement.
11. The Germans should be invited to give their views on the following points if they do not emerge from their presentation:-
 - (a) The problems of target acquisition as the enemy acquires increased mobility and V/STOL aircraft.
 - (b) Types of targets likely to be suitable for attack by MRBMs or aircraft, and the relative merits of each type of attack.
 - (c) Security of a surface shipborne missile force.
 - (d) Custodial and security problems of mobile land-based missiles and deployment problems, particularly in relation to the attitude of the civil population.

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Annex V to JP(62)72(Final)

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

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Introduction

1. At the last Anglo/German Staff Talks[Ⓞ], General Schenz discussed Berlin Contingency planning with General Fitzpatrick in restricted session. The German views, which were stated to be official, were largely confined to LIVEOAK plans, but also touched on the expanded NATO contingency plans then in the course of preparation. These views were broadly in line with those of the United Kingdom except in regard to blockade at sea and the warning use of nuclear weapons.

2. Since the last staff talks the plans for expanded NATO operations^{£%} and the revised Quadripartite Naval Countermeasures[&] have been examined^{∅/3}. These have been discussed by the Quadripartite Ambassadorial Group in Washington, when the German views were expressed[≠] at length.

3. We are not aware of what aspects of Berlin Contingency Planning the Germans wish to discuss on this occasion, but have based our brief on the German position disclosed in the Quadripartite discussion.

General

4. The Germans consider[≠] that build-up and readiness measures, together with forward deployment, constitute in themselves a very important element of the Berlin Countermeasures. They agree with the objectives set out in the BERCON and MARCON plans although admitting that several operations would bring us very close to general war and involve risk of escalation. They have also agreed that planning should go forward.

Ⓞ COS.1186/25/9/61
£ COS(61)112
% COS(61)114
& Annex 'A' to COS.392/23/3/62
∅ COS(62)176
/ COS(62)184
∅ COS(62)215
≠ Washington to F.O. No. 363

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Annex V (Continued)

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5. The United Kingdom Views. The BERCON, MARCON and Quadripartite plans show clearly that no purely military solution is possible to a Russian attempt to cut off Western access to Berlin. The most convincing aspect of all the proposed plans is the fact that NATO or the Quadripartite powers will have made preparations amounting, in most cases, to mobilization prior to their implementation. We believe that mobilization itself is the measure which will do most to convince the Russians of our determination to assert our rights over Berlin. We therefore see the logical end of contingency planning for Berlin on the point of general mobilization.

Air Operations

6. BERCON ALPHA 1. (Fighter escort in the Berlin air corridor). Both the Germans and ourselves regard this as an acceptable plan subject to detailed examination. We have not, however, received any detailed German comments on it. We believe that, as the operation would take place in airspace controlled by the Communist Air Forces, it would only succeed through Soviet reluctance to commit sufficient forces. As the corridors are well covered both by SAM sites and adjacent airfields, our escorts if they met with firm opposition would be faced with the decision either to extend or call off operations.

7. BERCON ALPHA 2. (Air superiority over East Germany). We regard this plan as militarily unsound and almost certain to escalate to general war. The Germans, however, have only concluded that it should be regarded with caution because:-

- (a) It would commit a large percentage of the NATO Air Forces.

Ø COS(62)176
≠ Washington Telegram 363
Savings to Foreign Office

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Annex V (Continued)

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- (b) There was a serious risk of misinterpretation by the other side.
 - (c) There would be a substantial attrition of NATO air strength.
 - (d) By posing a major threat to Soviet air capability it might encourage a violent response.
 - (e) It might encourage an East German uprising.
8. We maintain that the probability of maintaining air superiority in the manner suggested in BERCON ALPHA 2 without escalation to general war would be negligible because:-

- (a) It would be necessary to destroy most of the Soviet Air Force on the ground by attacks on their airfields. This could only be achieved by surprise or sustained attacks over a wide area.
- (b) The Soviets would obtain tactical warning of the initial attack from their radar system.
- (c) Not knowing the nature of this attack, they may launch or at least order to be airborne, their nuclear strike forces.
- (d) The allied nuclear forces would have to be poised before the launching of conventional operations, in order to avoid reprisals. Conditions for rapid escalation would then exist.

9. Air Support for BERCON CHARLIE Land Operations. The Germans believe that, because the danger of misunderstanding in this case would be less, there is consequently less objection to these operations. We believe that adequate

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Annex V (Continued)

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air support would be essential, would necessitate extensive conventional operations which would probably involve attacking enemy airfields, thereby extending the battle area, and thus greatly heightening the risk of escalation. It would be interesting, therefore, to hear the German views on:-

- (a) The possibility of confining air operations to the close support of ground forces.
- (b) The need for an increase of conventional air forces in order to implement the air plans which they consider necessary to support these operations.
- (c) The measures required to safeguard the nuclear strike forces during conventional operations.

The Nuclear Demonstration

10. The Germans agreed^z that the BERCON BRAVO operation would be a very strong demonstration of Western determination but thought that further consideration should be given to whether attacks should be made in isolation or in connection with other operations. The Germans favoured the latter but their preference for potential targets was first at sea, secondly in the air, and finally on the ground. They also thought that the selective use of nuclear weapons might come higher on the list of priorities than the BERCON plans, as perhaps involving lesser risks. At the last Anglo/German Meeting General Schnez referred to the exploding of a nuclear weapon in the Arctic or Caspian Sea as a "shot across the bows".

11. The United Kingdom Views. We consider^ø that BERCON BRAVO accords with our concept of the discriminate use of nuclear weapons in order to obtain a political decision but that it would

^z Washington to F.O. No. 363 Saving
^ø COS(62)176

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Annex V (Continued)

serve the purpose better if it were executed in support of a division-size operation to restore access on the autobahn.

As a discussion point it might be useful to ascertain how the Germans envisage a nuclear demonstration at sea in connection with another operation.

Ground Operations

12. General. The Germans have strong reservations on the BERCON CHARLIE land operations, particularly on CHARLIE 2, 3, and 4, unless they were mounted from a forward posture in NATO and provided they were carried out by additional forces not previously committed to the overall defence of ACE, which is very much in line with our views.

13. BERCON CHARLIE 1 (Attack by one reinforced division along the Helmstedt-Berlin axis to hold a Salient). The Germans appear to have accepted this as a feasible operation, but have implied that more forces may be required. We have also accepted the plan as a possible military counter-measure, although we regard the aim of the operation as mainly political which should therefore be achieved with as little risk to the force as possible. We think that the operation as planned is too hazardous and consider that a more limited geographical objective would equally demonstrate the determination of NATO.

14. BERCON CHARLIE 2 and 4 (Two divisions to pinch off the Kassel salient; attack by four divisions to seize the Thuringer-Wald). The Germans have expressed strong political misgivings about these operations, neither of which would be directly related to re-opening access to Berlin. They consider it would be highly dangerous if allied operations

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UK EYES ONLY

Annex V (Continued)

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were interpreted as an initial step towards the liberation of East Germany. Soviet vital interests would be threatened and the danger of miscalculation would be very great. We agree with the German views, and on military grounds consider that the operations would have little chance of success without resort to nuclear weapons which would involve considerable risk of escalation. We do not therefore consider these plans should be included in the catalogue of Berlin counter-measures.

15. BERCON CHARLIE 3 (Four division attack astride the autobahn). The Germans consider planning should be advanced further for this operation. We have not accepted it as a possible counter-measure. Although this plan has the advantage of a high concentration of force directly related to Berlin access, we consider it has the major disadvantage of holding a salient in enemy territory which could ultimately result in the loss of a sizeable force to no advantage.

Maritime Operations

16. The Germans consider that, because the Berlin issue could not be isolated, naval measures offer possibilities for action prior to land and extensive air operations. Although they might not in themselves bring about a Soviet withdrawal, they could serve as a warning and deterrent in the same way as alert and mobilization measures. They would moreover involve less danger of immediate escalation than air and ground operations. The Germans have not objected to SACLANT's assumption that the use of nuclear weapons should be pre-authorized at sea for self-defence because it accorded with the NATO concept that they could be used to avoid defeat in major operations. They accept the implementation of naval counter-measures either prior to other military measures or outside the NATO area.

UK EYES ONLY

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Annex V (Continued)

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They therefore consider that the planning of naval counter-measures should be advanced without delay.

17. Although the point does not emerge from the German position as expressed at the Quadripartite meeting, it is natural that they should show enthusiasm for naval counter-measures in view of the greater safety of such measures for Germany herself.

At the last Anglo-German Meeting General Schnez stated[®] that while naval counter-measures would not necessarily do Russia much economic damage they would so affect her prestige as to force her either to negotiate or use force to break out of a blockade.

18. The United Kingdom Views. These have been derived^g from the contradictions arising from, on the one hand, the need to have some naval plans in the catalogue of Berlin counter-measures and, on the other, our continuing belief that the assumption of Western naval superiority in a limited war context is not valid. We believe that the picture painted of the likely results of either sporadic or all-out Soviet submarine attack remains unduly optimistic and while we appreciate the American belief in the superiority of Western naval strength in so far as it applies to overall striking power, we believe that the West could be placed at a fatal disadvantage if the ability to strike at source with nuclear weapons were denied. Furthermore, the institution of a blockade would, if resisted, place the onus of firing first on the West, and war at sea would almost certainly ensue. We also believe that in no circumstances should the power to initiate the use of nuclear weapons be delegated to Military Commanders and cannot agree to their pre-authorized use at sea,

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Annex V (Continued)

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even in self-defence. There appear therefore to be fundamental divergences on the likely consequences of employing naval counter-measures and the pre-authorized use of nuclear weapons, and we consider that an exchange of views could usefully be concentrated on these points.

Phasing of Operations

19. The Germans may also raise the subject of the timing of military operations in relation to the four phases of Berlin counter-measures. Our views[†] on military action in these phases are:-

- (a) Phase 1. The military requirements are to establish the Soviet intentions in regard to denial of air and/or ground access and by swift and effective response to deter the Soviets/GDR from further obstructive measures. Appropriate NATO alert measures would be initiated, and military operations might extend to:-
 - (i) FREE STYLE and BACK STROKE
 - (ii) JACK PINE operations up to but excluding attacks on AA/SAM sites.
- (b) Phase 2. Preparation for further military operations. No military operations after the initial probes would appear convincing to the Russians unless accompanied by Western mobilization and readiness for war.
- (c) Phase 3. Wider conventional operations.
- (d) Phase 4. Nuclear operations.

† CDS(62)39

UK EYES ONLY

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Annex V (Concluded)

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20. Minor naval counter-measures which would not require mobilization might be initiated in Phase 2, such as Quadripartite Category 'A' operations and/or NATO MARCONS 1, 2, and 3. It would be undesirable to initiate them in Phase 1 as we would not want to widen the area of operations before we had established Soviet intentions.

21. Discussions in the Ambassadorial Working Group have indicated that the Germans thought that minor Quadripartite naval counter-measures might come in Phase I.

Recommendations

22. We recommend that discussion of the German views on Berlin contingency plans should be directed at clarifying possible differences in military views in regard to:-

- (a) BERCON ALPHA 2.
- (b) Air support for land operations.
- (c) Timing and location of BERCON BRAVO.
- (d) BERCON CHARLIE 1 and 3.
- (e) Maritime operations.
- (f) Phasing of Operations.

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UK EYES ONLY

6/25/62

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Record of a meeting in the United States

Embassy at 3 p.m. on June 25.

Present

Mr. Kohler

Mr. Tomkins

Mr. Hillenbrand

Mr. Ledwidge

Berlin

Mr. Kohler said he had suggested this meeting in order to cover at the official level the talks about Berlin which Mr. Rusk had had in Paris and Bonn and the Ministerial discussion in London on the evening of June 24.

French Attitude

Mr. Kohler said that in Paris Mr. Rusk had told General de Gaulle that the General had been right in forecasting that the exploratory American talks with the Russians would not produce a basis for negotiations on Berlin. So far no basis had been established. General de Gaulle had replied that something had been gained by the effort made by Mr. Rusk. For his part he had found that his earlier fears that the Germans would react unfavourably to the exploratory talks had not been justified.

In following up this question with M. Couve de Murville Mr. Rusk had tried to discover whether there was any possibility of the French rejoining East/West talks on Berlin. The Americans had concluded that the French were not yet ready to do this but that there was an increasing chance that they might agree later on. The officials in the Quai d'Orsay seemed to be increasingly anxious to do so. General de Gaulle had asked Mr. Rusk whether he did not think there was a danger that the

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continuation of purely American/Russian talks might make America's allies feel that they were being left out of the picture. Mr. Rusk had replied that he thought the great majority of the NATO Powers favoured the American initiative. He had been very restrained on this point. Some French officials had told the Americans that they thought Mr. Rusk might well have rubbed into the General a little more the fact that the main cause of the bilateral American/Russian talks was his own refusal to let France take part.

U.S. Principles Paper

Mr. Kohler said that in Bonn good progress had been made in discussion of the revised American "principles paper". The Germans had been insistent that the section on non-diffusion of nuclear weapons should be omitted but they had agreed that the other elements in the paper could be used in talking to the Russians. The Americans had accepted this and had promised that there would be further consultation before there was any question of handing the paper over as a written proposal to the Russians.

The Germans had also dropped their effort to limit the responsibility of the proposed Committee of Foreign Ministers' Deputies to matters in which the Four Powers to whom Germany had surrendered had a special responsibility.

Mr. Ledwidge said that the British had proposed an amendment which would make it clear that the Committee of Deputies was being set up by all four Powers on an equal footing. What did the Americans think of this? Mr. Kohler said that the Americans preferred to keep to the formula in the draft which they had handed to the Russians in Geneva. This left open the possibility that a Committee could be

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formed on a two-power or three-power basis if necessary. The Americans wanted to retain this formula which was a hint to the French that they could not necessarily prevent discussion on Berlin by refusing to take part in it.

Mr. Kohler added that he did not think the problem was actual. If and when it was understood that all Four Powers would join the Committee the Americans would be willing to reconsider the formula used for setting up the Committee. They agreed that there should not be two classes of members.

"Western Police" for Berlin

Mr. Kohler said that the Americans had been struck by the fact that Lord Home had asked them at dinner on June 24 whether they did not think that the allied garrisons in West Berlin could be called police instead of troops and that the status of the city could be changed from occupation to a kind of trusteeship. Lord Home had suggested that there might be advantage in producing new ideas while there was a lull over Berlin. The Americans saw the force of this, but felt there was no need for the Western Powers to produce new formulae at present. The American/Russian talks had focussed on the central issue, which was the presence of American, British and French troops in West Berlin. The Americans felt it was best to keep pressing this point. They did not believe that it was possible to interest the Russians in formulae which would enable the Western Powers to keep a garrison under another name in West Berlin as strong and well-equipped as the present force. As to substituting trusteeship for occupation rights, the idea had been discussed at length in Washington and it was felt that the Russians would never accept it. They could not do so without by implication condemning themselves for neglecting their own trusteeship duties in East Berlin.

/Mr. Ledwidge

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Mr. Ledwidge asked whether the Americans felt that there was any chance that the Russians would now agree to a face-saving solution of the Berlin crisis if an opening were presented to them. Mr. Kohler said that the paper which the Americans had handed to the Russians in Geneva presented such an opening if the Russians were interested. Silence on controversial points might be the most acceptable procedure to the Russians if they ever came to want a face-saving solution. American intelligence reports indicated that the Russians already knew perfectly well what concessions they could extract from the United States Geneva paper if they wished to accept it.

Rusk/Dobrynin talks

Mr. Tomkins asked what subjects had been left open for discussion at the end of the last Rusk/Dobrynin talk. Both sides seemed to have stated their case pretty firmly. Mr. Kohler agreed that the two sides were more or less "nose to nose" and that it would not be easy to think of a line for the next talk. Nevertheless the Americans believed they could surmount this difficulty, and the talks would continue. They had no inhibitions about repeating their viewpoint as often as the Russians repeated theirs. They would just carry on talking and see how the Russians took it. The Germans showed no disposition to take over the running and open talks of their own with the Russians. Informal enquiries in Bonn had elicited a decidedly negative reaction from Dr. Schroeder on this point.

Soviet Intentions

Mr. Kohler said that on balance the Americans still believed that the Russians wanted neither a crisis nor an impasse over Berlin. But some recent statements from the Soviet side had caused a slight touch of uneasiness. The Bucharest communiqué and Ulbricht's recent press statement had both spoken of the possibility of a separate

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peace treaty. Krushchev's difficulties at home were genuine, but they cut both ways. If they were relatively slight they might impose caution on him, but if they became too serious he might be driven to take a major risk in the hope of finding a scapegoat. The Americans did not think this would happen but they had to bear it in mind.

Mr. Ledwidge asked whether there were any signs that the Russians might be inclined to try for a new meeting between President Kennedy and Mr. Krushchev before provoking a fresh Berlin crisis. The latest United States Watch Committee Report suggested that this might be Russian policy. Mr. Kohler said that Mr. Krushchev had spoken to Mr. Salinger about the possibility of such a meeting but had made it clear that he did not yet consider the time ripe. There was also an intelligence report to the effect that the Russians were thinking on these lines, but it was pretty low-grade.

Situation in East Germany

Mr. Tomkins asked whether the West Germans had shown concern over the situation in East Germany during Mr. Rusk's talks in Bonn. Mr. Kohler said that they had certainly been worried but thought that the Communists had the situation under control. This was also the impression of Herr Thomas, the knowledgeable head of the S.P.D. Ostbüro. Dr. Adenauer nourished a special antipathy for Ulbricht and had for some time been encouraging the Americans to hint to the Russians that prospects of a Berlin accommodation would improve if they got rid of Ulbricht. The Americans had dropped one or two cautious hints but had got no response at all. The West Germans were anxious to make life easier for the population.

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of East Germany and had asked the Americans during the NATO meeting in Athens if this subject could be introduced into the Rusk/Dobrynin talks.

Mr. Kohler said that there had been some discussion of the East German request for long term trade credits but it had been inconclusive. The West Germans felt that the people of East Germany would be alienated if the Ulbricht régime were bolstered up by Western help; and they were reluctant to enter into any agreement which seemed to suggest that they were reconciled to the D.D.R. continuing to exist for another 10 years. Neither of these obstacles was, however, insurmountable if the West Germans concluded that arrangements could be made which would continue East German dependence on trade with West Germany and give them chances of penetration in East Germany. It had been agreed that the West Germans would get in touch with the Americans again when they had given the problem more study.

Non-diffusion of Nuclear Weapons

Mr. Tomkins asked whether the Americans had formed any conclusion about the reasons why the Germans were so reluctant to have a clause about non-diffusion of nuclear weapons in a Berlin agreement. Mr. Kohler said that after their latest visit to Bonn the Americans were quite convinced that the Germans wanted to keep the door open to ownership of their own nuclear armament if no scheme could be worked out for a multilateral NATO nuclear force. The Americans did not think that the W.E.U. safeguards would prevent the Germans from doing this in the long run, if circumstances seemed to them to require it. The Germans had made it clear that they were not really happy about non-diffusion being discussed even at the Geneva Conference although they did not openly object. No

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doubt they took it pretty much for granted that there would be no agreement at Geneva. Dr. Adenauer had stressed that the German undertaking in 1954 not to manufacture A.B.C. weapons had been given "rebus sic stantibus". Mr. Dulles had confirmed that he understood it in this sense, said Dr. Adenauer.

Mr. Tomkins asked whether there was any possibility of the Germans terminating this undertaking if they thought that circumstances had changed enough to provide them with justification. Mr. Kohler said he thought the Germans would be very cautious about that. Their preoccupation at the moment was not to extend the area of their commitment and, as he had said, to keep the door open to the acquisition of their own nuclear armament if efforts to create a NATO nuclear force failed.

Berlin Contingency Planning

In conclusion Mr. Kohler said that there had been no discussion of Berlin Contingency Planning in either Paris or Bonn.

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RECORD OF A MEETING AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE AT
11 a.m. ON JUNE 25, 1962

Copy on
"USA (Gen.)"
June, 1962

Present:

The Right Hon. The Earl of Home	The Hon. Dean Rusk
Mr. J. B. Godber	The Hon. David Bruce
Sir Harold Caccia	Mr. F. Kohler
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh	Mr. C. Bohlen
Mr. A. C. I. Samuel	
Mr. P. E. Ramsbotham	

The Nuclear Organisation of NATO

Lord Home said he believed that Mr. Rusk, like the Prime Minister, thought that the NATO Council should examine the military requirements for medium-range ballistic missiles (M.R.B.Ms.) for NATO but postpone serious consideration of the political problems such as the organisation of any nuclear force on a multilateral basis. Decisions on these questions would turn on whether Britain was successful in negotiating entry into the European Community.

Mr. Rusk said it was important that the discussions in NATO should proceed with "all deliberate speed". The United States did not want to give the impression of opposing the idea of M.R.B.Ms. for NATO. They would have preferred to continue to remain silent until the Europeans had produced their own proposals. But these had not been forthcoming and continued silence on their part would have been misinterpreted as indifference. They were also concerned not to present a cut and dried American plan as this too would have aroused antipathies from various quarters. They had tried to present their ideas in the wider context outlined in the statements at Athens. They hoped that Mr. Finletter's statement on the 15th of June would serve to inject some realism into the discussion and enable the Council to face the facts without any illusions about the costs involved. Certainly, if there was to be a multilateral force, the Europeans must bear their share. In the American view there was no urgent military requirement for these weapons and it was up to the Europeans to say if they wanted them in the alliance and if they were ready to pay for them.

Lord Home explained the reasons why Her Majesty's Government were not impressed by the suggestion of a multilateral M.R.B.M. force. We had taken a good step forward with the "nuclear package" presented at Athens. The Germans seemed to be satisfied with the arrangements for the Nuclear Committee and with the other assurances in the package, and not to be pressing for their own national nuclear capability. He thought this was now the best line to follow and he hoped that full use would be made of the Nuclear Committee and that it would develop a consultative role.

Mr. Rusk agreed that German pressures had been relaxed somewhat as a result of the Athens meeting. Herr Strauss's subsequent visit to Washington had also helped in this direction. There was no doubt that he had been impressed by the vast and increasing size of the American strike force. But there was also evidence that the Germans would, sooner or later, seek to have a nuclear capacity of their own unless they were offered some alternative arrangement such as the multilateral force. In his recent discussions with Dr. Adenauer the latter had applied the doctrine of *rebus sic stantibus* to the conditions which had obtained in

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1954 when the Federal Government had voluntarily renounced the manufacture of nuclear weapons and this had been enshrined in the control arrangements of the Brussels Treaty. The same attitude was revealed in the extreme reluctance the Germans were showing to permit the question of the non-diffusion of nuclear weapons to be discussed with the Russians in a Berlin context. It appeared from this that the Germans wished to reserve their right to become a nuclear Power in the future. It was primarily for this reason that the United States Government wished to keep open the discussion of a multilateral M.R.B.M. force: it might be the only means of satisfying German nuclear aspirations. As regards the military and political implications Mr. Rusk pointed out that there was considerable difference between a submarine or ship with a Polaris-type missile under exclusive German control and manned exclusively by a German crew and a similar vessel forming part of a multilateral force with mixed manning and shared command and control arrangements. Soviet reactions, for example, would be much sharper in the first place.

Lord Home said that the NATO authorities might conclude that there was, in fact, no military requirement for these M.R.B.Ms. because all the targets which such weapons might be called upon to cover were already adequately covered by the United States and United Kingdom strategic forces. *Mr. Rusk* agreed but thought that General Norstad, as SACEUR, would continue to advocate the views he had been expressing since 1959, in favour of a large number of mixed land and sea-based M.R.B.Ms. The Pentagon did not agree with this view. There had been important technical and strategic developments over the last two years. They did not believe that M.R.B.Ms. could be a substitute for, or perform the tasks of, the bomber aircraft with a 500-mile range or so. The M.R.B.Ms. were, in effect, designed for strategic targets reaching into Russia and it was not right for SACEUR to deploy these in any large numbers. In answer to a question by *Mr. Godber*, *Mr. Rusk* said that, under the American plan, the multilateral force would be based on European ports, e.g., Portugal. Some of the Europeans took comfort from the idea of a visible presence of land-based M.R.B.Ms. in Europe. But they had not yet thought this through. The Americans did not intend to urge their point of view in the NATO discussions though they did have strong views in favour of sea-based M.R.B.Ms.; these were better for both political and strategic reasons.

Lord Home said that if all these difficult military questions had to be examined first the discussions in NATO would have to be continued for many months—perhaps into 1963. Consultations with the NATO military authorities always took a long time. *Mr. Rusk* agreed. The Americans had had their say and he hoped that *Mr. Stikker* would now take over the lead in the discussion. He was not asking us to agree with the American position but simply that we should not frustrate the exercise. He hoped we would let the discussions go forward, though he recognised that we might not wish to express our views on the wider problems until the question of Britain's entry into Europe was settled. Perhaps we could make most of our points interrogatively. *Lord Home* said we would certainly not try to prevent a full discussion. We wished to see the military aspects examined thoroughly and objectively. But we hoped that the more political problems could be kept on one side until the military studies were completed.

Mr. Kohler thought it would be difficult to keep the two completely separate. The Belgians and others would wish to talk about the political advantages of the multilateral force. But at least it should be possible to postpone any conclusions on the subject. *Mr. Rusk* stressed the importance the United States Government attached to presenting all these nuclear questions to NATO as world-wide problems affecting the alliance as a whole. The United States had gone very far at Athens in revealing the details of the United States nuclear potential and strategic policy. Overall consultation before the use of nuclear weapons "anywhere in the world" was also a major step. They would continue to try to impress on the other members of the alliance that the nuclear defence of the West was indivisible. In statements at Athens the United States had laid equal stress on the targets threatening the United States and Europe. He saw that there might be some differences of view on this in the long term and thought it might be necessary to study the relationship between the two fronts. The Polaris force which had been offered to NATO was not simply in NATO for the defence of Western Europe but also for the defence of the United States.

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The Structural Organisation of NATO

Mr. Rusk said that the present organisation both on the military side and in relations between the military and civilian authorities was not altogether satisfactory. But it had been agreed between us that the question of a fundamental review of the NATO structure should be postponed until the Brussels negotiations had been concluded.

Mr. McNamara's Speech

Lord Home said that this speech had aroused considerable interest here and that as a result some pointed questions about the British deterrent would be raised in Parliament. It was being suggested that the speech outlined the new strategy involving a change from city to military targets. Some people would like to argue that, if the Government were in agreement with this strategy, it meant that the British deterrent force was obliged to switch its own targets at American behest and could not therefore be regarded as independent. But if Her Majesty's Government did not agree with this targetting policy then how could it be said that the British deterrent force was fully integrated operationally with the Americans? *Mr. Rusk* said it was really a question of priorities. The first priority was to possess and demonstrate the ability to strike first at the hostile forces which could inflict the worst damage in the event of hostilities. At the same time the West would retain the capacity to hit back at Soviet cities if nevertheless the Russians struck at Western cities.

Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh asked whether this could be described as a new strategic policy or whether we could not say that there was no fundamental change in policy and that this question, with others, would be discussed in NATO. *Mr. Rusk* said that acceptance of this strategy depended on whether the Russians were prepared to play the same game. Some Europeans seemed to be concerned that it might reduce the credibility of the deterrent if the Russians calculated that they could afford to lose some 20 million people, in a first strategic exchange, rather than the 100 million or more who would perish if the initial clash was directed against city targets. But of course this worked both ways and the West would stand to gain too.

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between the Foreign Secretary & Assistant Secretary
RECORD OF CONVERSATION AT LUNCHEON on July 21, 1962
 at 10 rue Senebier, Geneva, July 21, 1962

Registry No.

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PRESENT

for Hon. Sir E. Home
 The Secretary of State Mr. Dean Rusk
 Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh Mr. Foy Kohler

Lord Home BERLIN

The Secretary of State began by describing the ideas which Herr Mende had put to him last week as to the ingredients which might form part of a settlement. He wondered whether Mr. Rusk thought that it would be desirable to put forward some ideas of this kind, in order to discourage the Russians from signing a peace treaty, or whether it would be better to do nothing at all. Mr. Rusk replied that he thought the Russians might very well be preparing to sign a separate peace treaty in the autumn. He agreed, however, that there was no evidence as yet that they were making any preparations for such a move, for example by preparing neutral countries for the summoning of a peace conference. Mr. Rusk thought that the Russian aim might be to bring about something rather similar to the Bolz/Zorin agreement of 1954, that is to say to sign a peace treaty but to reserve certain powers which would enable them to control subsequent events; and that they would then pursue salami tactics in undermining the Western position. Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh pointed out that all the Soviet public statements recently were emphasising the opposite view, viz. that if a treaty was signed it would really mean the effective end of Western occupation rights. Mr. Kohler said that the United States Government did not agree with the rather gloomy line which he understood ^{was} held by the British Embassy in Moscow. Mr. Rusk (~~somewhat in contradiction to what he had earlier said~~) added that U.S. intelligence was to the effect that the Soviet Union were conscious of their relative weakness vis-à-vis the U.S. and were not technically ready for a showdown.

2. Mr. Rusk went on to say that he was not /expecting

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expecting to get anything new out of Mr. Gromyko when he met him ^{later in Geneva} ~~at dinner on Sunday~~. Perhaps, however, there would be some reaction to the President's interview with Mr. Dobrynin. The President had had one single purpose in this interview, namely to impress upon the Soviet Government that a defeat over Berlin could not be contemplated by the United States; whereas it was in no sense vital for the Soviet Union to win a victory in Berlin. Consequently, it was not a question of saving the United States' face but of saving the Soviets' face. Thus, the sort of proposals which the Russians had been putting forward (e.g. the plan for Belgian, Dutch and satellite forces in Berlin) had no point. Mr. Rusk went on to say that he had had a message through Mr. Dobrynin to the effect that Mr. Gromyko was prepared to stay on in Geneva for several days if there were a prospect of serious business. He was proposing to see him again, probably on Monday or Tuesday, depending on what emerged ^{of their first meeting} ~~on Sunday afternoon~~, and of course after informing his allies of the ~~Sunday evening~~ ^{first} results.

3. ~~The Secretary of State~~ then asked whether it was Mr. Rusk's intention to table the Principles paper. Mr. Rusk replied that he did not think this was of great interest to the Russians; they had so far shown no interest in proposals for handling a divergence of views between the two sides. They had only been interested in proposals which amounted to a Soviet victory. ~~The Secretary of State~~ then asked about the access agreement and whether this was still on the cards. Mr. Rusk said that the French and the Germans were opposed to any dilution of the responsibility of the Four Powers for Germany and Berlin. He thought that the problem of the participation of the two Germanies would have to be solved by their being connected in some technical capacity with the discussions.

4. ~~The Secretary of State~~ then said that he was very concerned about the way the situation was developing. He thought our position was very weak on the ground and only tenable on the /assumption

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that they were contained in the paper handed to Mr. Rusk in Geneva last Spring. They were,

assumption, which he did not believe for a moment was realistic, that nuclear weapons would be used to defend our position.

5. Mr. Rusk said he did not agree either that our position was weak or that we should not use nuclear weapons if necessary to defend it.

~~The Secretary of State~~ replied that he still had the gravest doubts about this. There would be tremendous pressures from all parts, including the United Nations, the neutrals and public opinion not to risk war over Berlin. He asked once again whether we should not put forward proposals for saving the Russian face and avoiding this situation. Mr. Kohler replied that Mr. Khrushchev had already seen a whole series of face-saving opportunities and had shown no interest in them. When ^{Lord Howe} ~~the Secretary of State~~ asked what these were, he replied ^{the} first ~~of all~~, continuation of ^{the} discussion ^{through} between Deputies; secondly, the acceptance of the borders and, thirdly, the implication that we could accept a great many things so long as they did not interfere with the three well known vital requirements. ^{Lord Howe} ~~The Secretary of State~~ then asked whether it might not be Mr. Khrushchev's calculation that, if he began the process of signing a separate treaty and made a great crisis the matter would get into the United Nations and proposals detrimental to us would be adopted. Mr. Rusk said that he thought it would be greatly in our interest to get the matter into the U.N. at the first sign of trouble. We ought not to have difficulty in getting the whole subject thoroughly confused over a long period. Even the French had apparently agreed "on a stand-by basis" that this would not be a bad thing.

6. Mr. Rusk went on to say that the President greatly hoped that the Four Ministers at their dinner ^{last} night would agree to a review being undertaken of the whole political planning and sequence of events which would follow a new move by the Soviets this autumn. Such a review should cover pre-military action of all kinds, including economic boycott, so that if suddenly a treaty was signed we should know

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what we were going to do. Mr. Kohler added that a paper had been tabled at the Ambassadorial Group by the U.S. Government yesterday.

7. After leaving the table, the ^{Lord Home} ~~Secretary of State~~ said once again that he was apprehensive - perhaps more so than many others - about what might lie ahead. He thought Mr. Khrushchev was most likely to sign a treaty and ~~and~~ doubted whether he would attach conditions to the treaty which would make life easier for us. Was it not worth considering putting to Mr. Gromyko some more ideas of a face-saving character, perhaps along the lines suggested by Herr Mende. Mr. Rusk said he doubted whether this would make the situation any easier. He had thrown out so many ideas in his talks with Mr. Dobrynin, including the idea of police forces, the idea of regarding the Allied forces as being United Nations forces, etc. and there had been no response. Mr. Kohler suggested that the Soviets were only concerned in testing our determination. Mr. Rusk said that there was one point on which he had detected some uncertainty in the Soviet position, and on which he intended to probe Mr. Gromyko further. At a certain point in his talks with Mr. Dobrynin the latter had said something which implied that there might be a difference between the theory and the practice of Western military presence in West Berlin. There might possibly be some loophole for a theoretical change which would still leave the allies with sole responsibility in the city. However, he did not attach very many hopes to this line. Mr. Rusk then asked the ~~Secretary of State~~ ^{Lord Home} whether he had heard that the Germans had undertaken a review of the Hallstein doctrine. ~~The Secretary of State~~ ^{Lord Home} replied that he had not. He then asked whether all-Berlin solutions were possible. Must it be ruled out because the East Germans had their capital there? Mr. Rusk replied that he did not see why the East Germans could not keep their capital in East Berlin if the whole city were made a free city under U.N. auspices. It then became clear that he had in mind, under such an arrangement, that Western troops would remain in West Berlin and /Soviet

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Soviet troops in East Berlin. In reply to questions, he said that he did not think that, even under an all-Berlin solution, the population of West Berlin could retain its morale unless troops of the major Western powers were present. In other words, he did not think the proposal was a starter except possibly as a propaganda move which the Russians would be ~~known~~ ^{sure} to refuse. Continuing, Mr. Rusk said it might well be desirable to put up a series of unacceptable proposals starting with a proposal for free elections in both parts of Germany and, when this was rejected, with an all-Berlin proposal. Up till now, however, he had been doing his best to confine his suggestions to serious proposals which would help towards a modus vivendi and he would not want to give this up if he could help it. Mr. Kohler said that he ~~was agreed~~ had great difficulty in ^{inspiring} ~~seeing~~ the U.N. Assembly ^{would be willing to} take over responsibility for Berlin, whether it was a whole city or half a city. The trouble with the U.N. was that it was always impelled towards freezing the status quo whatever it happened to be at the moment. That was why it was in the Western interest to go to the U.N. early on in a crisis, with the object of obtaining a "cease and desist resolution". ^{and then} The Secretary of State asked what Mr. Rusk thought of setting up a standing conference on Germany and Berlin. Mr. Rusk said he saw great merit in this idea; they could talk ad nauseam. It might moreover be possible to offer the Russians something in the wider field, for example in trade. The United States could open up its trade with the East to some extent if this seemed likely to achieve stability. He had to observe, however, that the Russians already had \$5 billion worth of trade with Western Europe and this had not prevented them from creating crises over Berlin. It was certainly the U.S. Government's intention to encourage trade between the two Germanies, however, and they were in favour of a favourable response by the Federal Government to the recent East German requests for credit.

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8. Turning to the attitude of the French, Mr. Rusk said that he would be perfectly ready to go to Paris if it were possible to have further discussions with French participation. He had thought at one time that M. Couve de Murville would be willing to join in the dinner with Mr. Gromyko but it had evidently been vetoed by de Gaulle at the last moment. He recognised that it was unsatisfactory that European problems should appear to be being discussed between the Americans and the Russians alone, but this was the fault of the French. He said, incidentally, that Herr Schröder had tried very hard to get them to ~~agree~~ agree to drop the item on non-diffusion of nuclear weapons from the Principles paper. He had refused; he was not prepared to tie his hands on this point. ~~The Secretary of State~~ ^{the French} pointed out that this was in any case going to come up in the Disarmament Conference. Mr. Kohler said it was clear as daylight that the Germans were determined to keep the door open for an eventual ^{national} unilateral German ^{nuclear} force if no international arrangement could be achieved. They would not repeat their unilateral renunciation.

Approved by me
S/S. 23/7

7/24/62

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DEFE 4/146 COS(62) 48th Meeting, 24 July 1962

C.O.S. (62) 48th Meeting

1. NATO LAND/AIR STRATEGY

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(Previous Reference: C.O.S. (62) 30th Meeting, Minute 1)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a Secretary's Minute² covering two inter-related papers on NATO Strategy.

LORD MOUNTBATTEN said the Committee would recall that, in May, 1962 the NATO Defence Policy Committee had, following the discussions between the Minister of Defence and Mr. McNamara in May, 1962, and the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Athens, approved two documents¹ on NATO Land/Air Strategy; these gave the position reached, vis-a-vis the Americans and ourselves, on certain aspects of NATO strategy, and tabulated a number of matters which required further examination. Subsequently, these papers has been recast² to take account of amendments proposed by the Joint Planning Staff³, the Chairman, British Defence Staffs Washington⁴ and departments within the Ministry of Defence. However, further amendments had been put forward and the papers now before them were the re-drafted N.D.P.C. studies with the addition of the proposed amendments. It would now be for the Committee to recommend to the Ministry of Defence the final form that these documents should take. It was intended that, following their approval by the Minister of Defence, they should serve as briefs for the Chairman, British Defence Staffs, Washington and the United Kingdom Delegation to NATO. The Committee then discussed the papers seriatim.

In discussion the following points were made:-

A. Annex A to COS.1005/19/7/62.

(a) Paragraph 5(a)

The original draft of Russian Offensive Capability framed the case concisely and should stand. However, even from a standing start it was possible that the Russians might be able to concentrate their forces by using deceptive measures such as a training exercise. The words "possibly concentrated, e.g. ostensibly for training" should be added to the last sentence of this sub-paragraph.

(b) Paragraph 5(c)

The re-draft proposed by the Foreign Office indicated that the aim of the conventional forces of the West would be to contain the Russians so that they would have to choose between abandoning their objective or bringing up major reinforcements. The concept in the original paragraph was the more likely; but for the sake of clarity the first sentence should be re-worded to make it clear that once the Russians were determined on a serious aggression nuclear weapons would have to be used before major NATO interests were lost.

¹ COS.1005/19/7/62
² COS(62)246 and COS(62)247
³ COS.915/5/7/62
⁴ JP(62)74(Final)
& GM.283

COS(62)48th Meeting

(c) Paragraph 9.

The concept that a battle using tactical nuclear weapons could not be sustained for long and that such a conflict would soon lose all possibility of movement and control, had been often stated and was liable to be taken as dogma. This concept was a matter of opinion and in any event was still under active consideration. The paragraph should be amended to reflect these points.

(d) Paragraph 10.

The Americans had suggested that it might be possible to have a controlled global war by confining the strategic exchange to military targets. However, the plausibility of this concept would rest almost wholly on its acceptance by the Russians, who appear already to have rejected it. The paragraph should be amended to reflect this point.

(e) The amendments proposed to paragraphs 5(b), 5(d), paragraph 7 and paragraph 11(b) were agreed.

B. Annex B to COS. 1005/19/7/62

(f) Paragraph 3.

It would be of use if recipients of the brief were aware of the manner in which the various questions were to be dealt with. However, such information should not be given to the Americans. Also in view of the projected studies on British Strategy in the 1970's, it would seem that the current Joint Planning Staff study on a British View of Strategy for the Defence of Central Europe⁶ had now been overtaken by events and should not be progressed. The paragraph should be amended accordingly.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Agreed the NATO Defence Policy Committee's papers on NATO Land/Air Strategy as amended (Annex) and invited the Ministry of Defence to take account of their views.

£ JP(62)75(a)

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C.O.S. (62)320

26TH JULY, 1962

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

NATO LAND/AIR STRATEGY

Note by the Secretary

At their meeting[%] on Tuesday 24th July, 1962, the Chiefs of Staff agreed the NATO Defence Policy Committee's papers, at Annex, on NATO Land/Air Strategy.

2. In agreeing these documents the Chiefs of Staff instructed the Secretary to forward them to the Ministry of Defence as an expression of their views.

(Signed) J.K. WATKINS

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

26TH JULY, 1962.

% COS(62)43th Meeting, Minute 1

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ANNEX 'A' TO COS(62)320

NATO LAND/AIR STRATEGY

Draft Brief for United Kingdom Representatives in NATO

1. This paper summarises the position reached in regard to certain aspects of NATO land/air strategy after the ~~Minister of Defence's~~ discussion with Mr. McNamara and the Athens meeting. It shows where American views may differ from our own.

Deterrence

2. The primary role of the NATO forces is to deter Russia by convincing her that any form of aggression, on any scale, would meet a reply of such a kind that would make the aggression not worth attempting; or, if attempted, not worth persisting in.

For a War might Start

3. The Russians will not deliberately initiate either a full-scale nuclear surprise attack or an all-out conventional attack. War might, however, arise from a process of miscalculation or by accident, particularly during a period of acute international tension, e.g. over Berlin, or in the event of a revolt in East Germany suppressed by Soviet forces followed by intervention by the West Germans. It is important that NATO remains manifestly strong and determined, so as to avoid miscalculations which might lead to Russian limited conventional operation to achieve a "fait accompli".

Forward Strategy

4. To deter a Russian "fait accompli" and maintain the territorial integrity of NATO Europe, conventional forces should be stationed as near the East/West border as possible. Detailed plans for the forward strategy are being worked out by SACEUR, but full implementation of the strategy cannot be decided until the Annual Review has shown what forces will be available.

Conventional Forces - Role and Size

5. The size of NATO's conventional forces will be governed by their role (deterrent and operational); the Russian threat; and the essential minimum period of any conventional phase of hostilities:-

(a) Russian Offensive Capability

We would become aware of any substantial reinforcement of Russian forces in East Germany. In order to achieve surprise in a limited aggression, they would therefore have to limit the initial operations to forces immediately available possibly concentrated, e.g. ostensibly for training.

Annex 'A' to COS(62)320(Continued)

(b) Deterrent Role

We and the Americans agree that the first aim of NATO's conventional forces is to deter any form of Soviet conventional attack. The Americans express this concept by stating that Soviet aggression would be made less likely if the Western nations were to provide enough conventional forces to compel the Russians to concentrate prior to any attack and to make clear that any attacking force, even if it achieves surprise, will be engaged effectively the moment it crosses the line. Moreover, forcing the Russians to concentrate would also present us with good nuclear targets were they to persist in their attack.

(c) Operational Role

If the deterrent effect of NATO's conventional strength failed and it then became clear that the Russians were determined on a serious aggression, we believe that the aim of the conventional forces would then be to contain the Russians long enough for political pressure to force them to withdraw or for the decision to use nuclear weapons to be taken before major NATO interests were lost. The Americans wish to increase the number of options, particularly for non-nuclear military action, in response to aggression.

(d) Length

The length of any active conventional phase cannot be defined. We are both agreed that there is no purpose in planning for a conventional war to the finish. We believe that once it was clear that the Russians were determined on serious aggression and that they could not be held by NATO's conventional forces, there would be no point in delaying the first use of nuclear weapons. The active phase would therefore be counted in days. The Americans seem to envisage a rather longer holding operation to enable political pressures to take effect. This we interpret as meaning that a successful conventional holding battle by the shield forces could lead to a stalemate which might last for weeks. It is, however, unlikely that hard fighting could last more than a short time.

6. For deterrence under their concept of the conventional phase the Americans believe a force of 30 divisions in the central region is necessary. We have not so far been able to calculate what force would be necessary under our concept but are content not to object to the American statement of the requirement provided no increase over and above 55,000 is called for from us.

Initial Use of Nuclear Weapons

7. There would be a military requirement to resort to nuclear weapons in the event of failure by our conventional forces to hold a Russian attack, or of a possible impasse through the failure of political pressure to make the Russians withdraw. The first use

• The last sentence of Paragraph 6 (in square brackets) should not be disclosed to the Americans.

Annex 'A' to COS(62)320(Concluded)

should be selective, and the aim would be to act as a warning. Targets should be military in enemy territory but not of such importance as to force the Russians to reply with strategic weapons. The first use should be in very small numbers, possibly in single figures, and their yield should be small, 10kt. or below.

6. Although the Americans think it might be possible to put off this stage longer than we do, they agree that plans should be prepared for the initial selective use of nuclear weapons. This should be done by SACEUR. Nothing in this planning should commit Governments to any particular response at any particular time. Doubt in the enemy's mind about the nature of any response is an essential part of the deterrent.

Tactical Nuclear Battle

9. If the warning selective use of nuclear weapons failed to secure a Russian withdrawal, it would probably be necessary to take the decision to use nuclear weapons on a larger scale. There is an opinion that it would be unrealistic to expect that a battle with full-scale tactical use of nuclear weapons could be sustained for long. Any such battle would soon lose all possibility of movement and control. This matter is still under active consideration. Such an extensive use of nuclear weapons would be likely to bring on the strategic exchange. Nevertheless, a reasonable number of those weapons is required for deterrence.

Strategic Exchange

10. The Americans have suggested that it might be possible to have a controlled general war by confining the strategic exchange to military targets; there might be, as it were, a tacit agreement with the Russians on this. However, the plausibility of this concept will rest almost wholly on its acceptance by the Russians who appear already to have rejected it. The idea will in any case need close study to see whether it would make the deterrent more credible when the Russians learnt we could and would proceed to controlled general nuclear war, or less credible if they thought we were shirking the ultimate decision.

Conclusion

11. The way in which these matters will now be considered in NATO will depend largely on the Secretary-General. Our own lines in discussion should be:-

- (a) Forward Strategy. Support approval of a Forward Strategy in ACS.
- (b) The Conventional Forces. In the light of the Council's conclusions in December on the forces countries are ready to provide, review the extent to which SACEUR is able to implement the Forward Strategy.

ANNEX 'B' TO COS(62)320

NATO LAND/AIR STRATEGY - FURTHER ACTION

In the discussions between Mr. Watkinson and Mr. McNamara which resulted in broad agreement on the general principles of NATO strategy, it was agreed that a number of detailed questions as to how to give effect to these principles required further examination. We suggested other questions for further study and discussions with the Americans. These questions are listed under broad heads in the Appendix, with proposals for how they should be studied.

Mr. Watkinson and Mr. McNamara agreed that the answers to many of these questions should be left to SACEUR and the NATO military authorities. However, SACEUR would need guidance from the United States and United Kingdom authorities in his study of them, and it would therefore be necessary for British and American experts to keep in close touch with each other. It is too early to say at what stage, if at all, we need consult the Americans about our studies or seek information about theirs. This will vary according to the study. However, it would be desirable that neither side should have taken up formal and irrevocable positions on any of these studies before bilateral discussions take place.

We have no objections to the list of questions being sent to the Americans as an indication of the lines on which we are developing our studies of NATO Land/Air Strategy, but the action proposed should be excluded. Papers examining Mr. McNamara's statement at the Athens Ministerial Meeting and Mr. Finletter's declaration to the North Atlantic Council on the nuclear aspect of NATO Strategy are now in hand. These should outline the British view on the outstanding military questions.

* COS(62)200
% C-M(62)55 and COS.789/14/6/62

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conventional
intensified and, in addition, felt that one effect would be
not to reinforce the U.S. nuclear arsenal overseas. This
opinion seems to me to be in line with the present move to
modify the warheads of every nuclear weapon overseas (and I
am now told in the U.S. as well), so that an additional key
has to be turned before the weapons could become operational.
The particular device is of an electro-mechanical nature.
Its purpose is to see that nuclear weapons could never be
made ready unless a particular code was put into operation.
The Americans are worried both about the possibility of
saboteurs (whether allied powers or otherwise) and about
de-centralisation of control.

3. I am sending a copy of this minute to the Minister.

Good
D
27.7.62

S. ZUCKERMAN

26th July, 1962.

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DEFE 4/146. COS (62) 51st Meeting, 2 August 1962

Summing up, SIR WILLIAM PIKE said that the Committee would wish to approve the visits and to instruct the British Defence Co-ordination Committee (Far East) to work out details direct with Headquarters Joint Task Force 116 and the Embassies in Bangkok and Saigon.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (1) Agreed with the remarks of the Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff in his summing up.
- (2) Invited the Service Ministries to take action as in (c) above.
- (3) Instructed the Secretary to signal⁺ the British Defence Co-ordination Committee (Far East) authorising them to organise the visits direct with the British political and United States service authorities concerned.

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4. BERLIN NAVAL COUNTERMEASURES

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(Previous Reference: C.G.S. (62) 34th Meeting, Minute 4)

J.P. (62) 80 (Final)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a report by the Joint Planning Staff examining the machinery necessary to co-ordinate, plan and exercise operational control over Berlin naval countermeasures.

SIR VARYL BEGG said that the Military Sub-Group had recently considered the revised Quadripartite Berlin Naval Countermeasures*, and were now considering the question of the machinery that would be required for the co-ordination and operational control of these countermeasures. The Foreign Office had accordingly requested the views of the Committee in this matter. There were two main points at issue: first, the co-ordination and planning for operations, and secondly, the actual conduct of such operations. The report before them had recommended that tripartite/quadripartite naval cells should be established in the Headquarters of SACLANF, SAGEUR and CINCPAC, and that these cells should co-ordinate plans and agree the concept of operations including rules of conduct. Whilst such an organisation might function efficiently, it might be difficult to achieve proper co-ordination between the three Headquarters since their locations were very widely separated. Another method, which was favoured by the Chairman, British Defence Staffs, Washington, was that this task should be carried out by a tripartite/quadripartite naval group, under SACLANF. He (Sir Varyl Begg) believed that a compromise solution, in which the three cells should remain but that the one in SACLANF's Headquarters should have responsibility for co-ordination and planning, would provide the most efficient answer. The cell in SACLANF's Headquarters would provide naval military advice to the Ambassadorial Group.

* Annex A to COS. 392/25/5/62

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Turning to the question of the conduct of operations, SIR VARYL BEGG said that this could either be carried out by Task Groups composed of ships of the three or four nations concerned, or by Task Groups of one nation only. From the naval point of view, either method would be practicable.

MR. TOMKINS (Foreign Office) said that it was important that the institution of naval countermeasures should be taken in relation to the Berlin situation as a whole and any other countermeasures that might have been instituted on land or in the air, and each individual measure must be considered in relation to its impact on the Russians. On the question of passing from tripartite to NATO control, the Foreign Office considered that this should be the same moment for maritime countermeasures as for the other measures which had already been worked out. From the political point of view, the Germans should not participate in maritime countermeasures under tripartite control. It was desirable to achieve the maximum flexibility in operations at sea, and although politically there were advantages in tripartite Task Groups, operational efficiency might dictate the use of national forces and the Foreign Office would have no objection.

In discussion the point was made that it would be desirable to seek from the United Kingdom Representative to LIVE OAK the likely reactions of SACEUR to the British proposals. As time was short, this should be done by signal.

Summing up, SIR VARYL BEGG said that he believed the report by the Joint Planning Staff should be recast to reflect the views of the Committee in discussion.

TIL COMMITTEE:-

- (1) Agreed with the remarks of the Vice Chief of Naval Staff.
- (2) Took note of the statement by the Foreign Office representative.
- (3) Instructed the Joint Planning Staff to recast their report in the light of their discussion as a matter of urgency.
- (4) Instructed the Secretary to take action on the point made in discussion.



DEF 13/254

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8/7/62

Copied to: C.D.S.
SEC:
C.S.A.

C O P Y

MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY - 3RD AUG: 1962.


My dear Friend,

I am increasingly concerned about the immense diffusion of so-called tactical nuclear weapons in NATO Europe. According to my information there are now many thousands of these weapons, and their total capacity amounts to scores of megatons. If they were used in action, the scale of destruction would be comparable to that from a strategic strike. The idea that the Armies in Europe could fight a tactical battle with nuclear weapons of this destructive power seems to me to be wholly unrealistic. Conditions in the battle area would be such that anything like a war of movement would be virtually impracticable. Moreover, once these weapons were engaged on this scale, escalation would almost inevitably follow and the strategic strength on either side would begin to be deployed.

I believe that we must take a fresh look at this dangerous situation. It seems to me that there would be great advantage if we could work towards the concept of a tactical nuclear command directly under SACEUR having the tactical nuclear weapons under its own control, instead of leaving them dispersed through the various national contingents. The strategic concept underlying the establishment of such a command would be different from that currently favoured in NATO. It would mean that, instead of preparing to fight a tactical battle with nuclear weapons, we were aiming to make such discriminatory use of those weapons as might be necessary to impose a pause or to demonstrate our will to use our strategic nuclear strength if fighting continued. I am convinced that on this point the current NATO strategy is misconceived; and I believe that, in the months ahead, we shall have to try to get it modified along the general lines which I have indicated. It would be helpful to me if I could have your thoughts on this. I should be greatly relieved if I could feel that we could move forward together, as soon as circumstances allow, towards a rationalisation of NATO thinking on the proper use of tactical nuclear weapons. The aim which I hope we can both pursue is concentration rather than diffusion of control. I have given you this frank indication of my thinking on this problem - much as you did the other day in your message to me of July 27 on nuclear tests. The delicacy of this question, especially with the Germans and the French, makes it important that we should keep this matter between ourselves until we have jointly decided what course to pursue.

Meanwhile, however, my colleagues and I have had to decide whether we should proceed with the development of BLUE WATER which is, as you know, our surface-to-surface weapon corresponding to your SARGENT. We think it is a better weapon than yours in some respects, but it is due to enter service about a year later. This means that it will not be operational before 1966; and we think it very likely that by then it may be unnecessary for each of the national contingents in NATO to be equipped with a weapon of this kind. If, as we think likely, it is eventually decided that the tactical nuclear strength of NATO should be held under a single command for discriminatory use for the purposes which I have indicated above, this need could be amply met by a smaller number of weapons. And our contribution to such a NATO pool could be made in the form of the TSR 2 aircraft which we shall in any event be

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developing at a cost of over £400 million. These aircraft will be capable of delivering our share of whatever tactical nuclear strength may need to be deployed. In addition it will have a variety of other roles throughout the world. In these circumstances we have decided to cancel the further development of the BLUE WATER weapon. For domestic reasons we shall have to make an early announcement of this decision. I am sending you with this the text of the announcement which I would propose to make towards the end of next week. In view of this I should be grateful for your early comments.

With warm regard,

(Sgd) HAROLD MACMILLAN.

DEF 13/254

8/9/62

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Copies to:

C.D.S.)
Secretary) 1
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PRUS 001/08

8 AUG 1962/0131Z

FROM THE PRESIDENT, THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, D.C.

TO PRIME MINISTER MACMILLAN, LONDON.

CITE CAP 5354-62

Dear Prime Minister:

Thank you for your message of August 3. The thoughts you express therein in many ways parallel the conclusions I had reached regarding the use of nuclear weapons in the European theater. One of the first things I took a hard look at last year was precisely this question. It seemed clear to me that we must arrange for a more effective control over the nuclear weapons already in the theater and that we must achieve the capability of a balanced and flexible defense which would enable us to deal with any military aggression in such a way as to give us the possibility of engaging military forces to bring about a pause which might give a last clear chance to avert the danger of nuclear war and to resume negotiations. This seemed to me also to require a really substantial build-up of conventional forces since it was not credible to me, and I am sure would not be credible to Moscow, that we would go from relatively limited surface probes directly to nuclear warfare as contemplated under the prevailing NATO Strategic Doctrine. As you know, we have been moving, without directly challenging that doctrine (CM-56) toward bringing our allies toward a recognition of both aspects of this matter. This effort has stirred some criticism and encountered some opposition.

On the question of achieving better control of the nuclear weapons stockpile in Europe, we have moved ahead toward the installation of permissive links to enable us to exercise a centralized control over their use. I think this is an important first step. I agree that it is desirable to consider in due course other methods of strengthening controls, including your idea of a tactical nuclear command directly under SACEUR. But I think it would be premature to go very far with this at the present time, since very complex questions about the organization of Europe and of NATO would arise. Further, if it were even known that we were considering such an organizational step at this moment, it would immediately give rise to further suspicions and speculations, some of which would be attributed to the forthcoming change in the supreme command.

Another reason for waiting a while on this matter, from my standpoint, is that Secretary McNamara has begun a careful review of our whole policy on tactical nuclear weapons. It is a tangled subject, and one on which feelings run high, but we hope by the end of the year to have a much better grip on it than we have now, and so to be in a position to join in forward steps of the sort which are implied in your letter. But before this study is completed and the argument thrashed out among us, it would not be easy for us to take a clear position.

We have tried to see to it during the past year that NATO received a considerable education with respect to nuclear weapons. You will recall the speeches which have been made in the NATO Council by Secretaries Rusk and McNamara. For your convenience, I am

attaching a portion of Secretary McNamara's speech in Athens which bears directly on this problem. Efforts of this kind have been beneficial, I am sure, but the educational process is still continuing. At the moment the discussion to focus on the question of an M.R.B.M. Force and, as you know, we have agreed to soft-pedal this in order not to cause complications to your Common Market negotiations. Meanwhile, what we need, I believe, is more education and less controversy. For this reason I would suggest the omission, in the statement you propose to make about BLUE WATER, of the first phrase in the fourth sentence reading, "Whatever the estimate NATO decisions may be on the Concept of large-scale use of tactical nuclear weapons in support of land forces in a continuing battle." I fear that this particular phrase would stimulate public discussion of this complex and controversial issue at a time and in a way which would not be helpful to the continuing consideration of broader nuclear issues in the NATO Forum.

As to the decision you are making not to proceed with the development of BLUE WATER, I appreciate your reasons for this and feel they are right. I welcome the suggestion that the savings in this respect can be devoted to speeding the build-up of your conventional force.

In summary, then, let me say that I was very glad to get your letter and that I think we are much of one mind on these matters. For a number of tactical reasons - the current situation in NATO, the Common Market negotiations, and the timing of our own internal studies - I believe that major new departures should wait until 1963. But I remain very glad that you have opened this subject with me, and I hope that we can work closely together in pressing forward to a better posture at the right time.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY.

EXCERPT FROM SECRETARY MCNAMARA'S SPEECH FOLLOWS:

IV. Tactical Use of Nuclear Weapons

Our great nuclear superiority for general war does not solve all our problems of deterring and dealing with less than all-out direct assault. What, then, is the prospect that NATO can fall back on the local or tactical use of nuclear weapons? Battlefield nuclear weapons were introduced in NATO at a time when our shield forces were weak and the Soviet Atomic stockpile was small. In these circumstances it was reasonable to hope that NATO might very quickly halt a Soviet advance into Western Europe by unilateral application of nuclear weapons on or near the battlefield. Using nuclear weapons tactically might still accomplish a desired end in the early 1960's. Consequently, we continue to maintain substantial nuclear forces within the European theater (and we now have a very large number of nuclear weapons of various yields stockpiled in Europe.)

But how much dependence should NATO place on these capabilities? We should succeed in deterring the Soviets from initiating the use of nuclear weapons, and (the presence of these weapons in Europe helps to) prevent Soviet use locally. But NATO can no longer expect to avoid nuclear retaliation in the event that it initiates their use. Even a local nuclear exchange could have consequences for Europe that are most painful to contemplate. Further such an exchange would be unlikely to give us any marked military advantage. It could rapidly lead to general nuclear war.

To be sure, a very limited use of nuclear weapons, primarily for purposes of demonstrating our will and intent to employ such weapons, might bring Soviet aggression to a halt without substantial retaliation, and without escalation. This is a next-to-last option we cannot dismiss. But prospects for success are not high, and I hesitate to predict what the political consequences would be of taking such action. It is also conceivable that the limited tactical use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield would not broaden a conventional engagement or radically transform it. But we do not rate these prospects very highly.

Highly dispersed nuclear weapons in the hands of troops would be difficult to control centrally. Accidents and unauthorized acts could well occur on both sides. Furthermore, the pressures on the Soviets to respond in kind, the great flexibility of nuclear systems, the enormous firepower contained in a single weapon, the ease and accuracy with which that firepower can be called in from unattacked and hence undamaged distant bases, the crucial importance of air superiority in nuclear operations - all these considerations suggest to us that local nuclear war would be a transient but highly destructive phenomenon.

I realize there is a school of thought which believes that the United States and the Soviet Union might seek to use Europe as a nuclear battleground and thus avoid attacks on one another's homelands. Not only does my Government emphatically reject such a view; we also regard it as unrealistic. It ignores the basic facts of nuclear warfare I have described; it contemplates geographical limits unrelated to the actualities of target locations, and of the varied sources from which attack would come. Any substantial nuclear

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operation in Europe inevitably would involve both forces and targets in the US and USSR. It is possible, as I have mentioned, that a small, demonstrative use of nuclear weapons could be contained locally and possibly distant nuclear operations in less vital locations outside the NATO area, or at sea, may be limitable. But there is likely to be no effective operational boundary, or set of mutual restraints, which could restrict large-scale nuclear war to NATO, Europe and the Satellites. As we understand the dynamics of nuclear warfare, we believe that a local nuclear engagement would do grave damage to Europe, be militarily ineffective, and would probably expand very rapidly into general nuclear war.

~~TOP SECRET~~

8/15/62
15 August 1962

15 August 1962

Annex to JP(62)97(Final)

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

INTRODUCTION

1. In accordance with the directive^a from the North Atlantic Council, the Standing Group has now prepared an appraisal^b of the NATO Berlin Contingency Plans prepared by SACEUR^c and SACLANC^d. This has taken account of the comments received from all National Authorities, and is intended to form a basis for consultation in the Military Committee in Permanent Session prior to its early submission to the North Atlantic Council. In view of the continuing urgency of the Berlin problem, this will be done without awaiting the revision of plans and provision of additional information which the appraisal requests from SACEUR and SACLANC. The Chairman British Defence Staffs Washington has requested^e comments on the appraisal.

AIM

2. To examine the Standing Group appraisal of the Berlin Contingency Plans prepared by SACEUR and SACLANC.

THE STANDING GROUP APPRAISAL

Basic Considerations

3. The Standing Group begin their appraisal by listing basic considerations, the more important of which are:-

- (a) The Allied purpose should be achieved without having to overpower the Soviet Union or disintegrate the Satellite area.
- (b) The implementation of any plans must not prejudice the defence of NATO.
- (c) The success of any plan depends on the correct Soviet interpretation of and response to the message conveyed by the Allied action.
- (d) No NATO military operation would appear convincing unless preceded or accompanied by NATO action in implementing alert measures leading to full readiness for general war.
- (e) Allied military operations conducted on Soviet controlled territory would be likely to create uncontrollable refugee movements, local uprisings, and possibly general revolt, which could markedly change the situation.
- (f) No military measures, in themselves, are likely to succeed in reopening access to Berlin should the Russians oppose them with adequate force.

1/ C-M(61)104
2/ MCM-94-62
3/ Annex to COS(62)144
4/ Annex to COS(62)112
5/ WASCOS 1

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Annex (Continued)

Appraisal of Plans

4. The Standing Group considers that from the military viewpoint the BERCON and MARCON plans appear to be responsive to the instructions of the North Atlantic Council and to the needs which these instructions sought to fill. In general they consider that:-

- (a) Air Plans. The air operations envisaged have the advantage that they are directly related to Berlin access and do not involve seizure of Soviet bloc territory. They involve far less risk of unintentionally provoking an uprising. However, in the execution of large-scale air operations it would be difficult to convey their limited intent and to prevent the launching of the poised nuclear strike forces by miscalculation.
- (b) Ground Plans. Certain of the ground operations have the advantage of being directly related to Berlin access and some, if successful, could improve the overall defence posture in Central Europe. However, they could be easily countered by the Soviets and military defeat would significantly degrade the general war posture of the NATO forces in the sector involved. They might generate uncontrollable population problems in areas occupied by the Soviets, and might entail the risks of aggressive Soviet retaliation elsewhere.
- (c) Maritime Plans. The immediate military advantages of maritime operations are limited, but the enemy would be engaged in a field where there could be certain advantages to NATO and where possibilities exist to assert the determination of the Alliance in a flexible and progressive manner. Moreover, escalation towards general war through operations at sea would probably be slower than in some other forms of operations.
- (d) Nuclear Plans. The selective use of nuclear weapons as a demonstration would be primarily political and psychological in nature and not have significant military value. Under certain circumstances it might be advisable to adopt a very graduated sequence from no targets to limited military targets or possibly to execute a demonstration in support of a ground operation.

Further Action by Major Commanders

5. The Standing Group considers that some changes in the BERCON and MARCON plans are necessary and that some additional information is required. They propose to request:-

- (a) SACGUR to prepare additional plans for non-nuclear air operations of lesser intensity than ALPHA TWO, to revise his plans to avoid any implication of predelegated authorization to employ nuclear weapons, and to expand BERCON ARATO to include the selective use of nuclear weapons on "no targets".

Annex (Continued)

- (b) SACEUR to provide additional information on ALPHA ONE, CHARLIE ONE, air support for all CHARLIE operations, implementation of the nuclear annexes, details of the DELTA plans, and his views on the impact of the operations on the East German population.
- (c) SACLANT to revise his assumptions to avoid any implication of predelegated authorization to use nuclear weapons, to revise his Appraisal of Risks and Advantages and Requirement for Alert Measures so as to distinguish between the various MARCON measures, and to indicate in his plans that the selection of sea areas for maritime control measures will be subject to decision by governments.
- (d) SACLANT to provide additional information about the military factors bearing on his plans, especially BERCON SIX.

Recommendations

6. The Standing Group considers that some of the risks involved in implementing the BERCON plans would be materially reduced by improving the present force posture and adopting a true forward strategy. They strongly support the measures recommended by SACEUR to this effect.

OUR COMMENTS

7. We consider that the appraisal has taken significant account of United Kingdom views of the BERCON and MARCON plans and in general is acceptable. We note in particular that plan ALPHA TWO has only been included subject to reservations in line with our comments on its feasibility, and has been referred back to SACEUR for re-examination.

8. The appraisal does not, however, stress sufficiently our opinion that the progressive placing of NATO on a war footing is one of the most important aspects of these plans, and is best calculated to impress the Russians with our determination to assert our rights over Berlin and to deter them from further encroachment. We would therefore prefer that paragraph 6 of the appraisal should be expanded to stress this point.

9. We consider that the Standing Group proposal to expand BERCON BRAVO to include a "no target" plan suffers from the disadvantages to which we have already drawn attention of "a shot across the bows" and would prefer not to see its inclusion in the catalogue of plans, but would not wish to press this.

10. We have no comments on the draft instructions to Major Commanders (Enclosures 2 and 3).

✓ SHAPTO 2511
✓ COS(62)176
✓ COS(62)184
✓ PNEW/P(61)21, page 7 of
Appendix 'A' to Annex 'B' and
COS(61)151

Reference:-		PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE					
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9/11/62

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FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET) AND
WHITEHALL (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION

Sir D. Ormsby Gore

No. 2280

D. 10.20 p.m. September 11, 1962

September 11, 1962

R. 1.35 a.m. September 12, 1962

PRIORITY

SECRET

Your telegram No. 5506: Supply of nuclear submarine parts to France.

Member of my staff was called to the State Department today by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of European Affairs, who gave a considered oral exposition of United States views on this problem.

2. He started by setting out the basis of United States policy on nuclear matters, pointing out that the United States Government have a nuclear mutual defence agreement only with the United Kingdom and that their cooperation in these matters is limited to the United Kingdom. So far as the United States Government are concerned, the export of even unclassified defence information and equipment is subject to determination. This applies particularly to information and equipment relating to nuclear submarine propulsion. In this connexion it was pointed out that originally, because of the "crash" programme, much information was treated as unclassified which really ought to have been classified. The present system of determination of export of unclassified equipment and information provides a real safeguard. When the United States Government agreed to cooperate with the United Kingdom in nuclear submarine propulsion, it was on the understanding that United States technical information would not be passed to other countries. Therefore the United States Government consider that the United Kingdom is obligated to give the same degree of protection to information obtained from the United States as the Americans themselves would do. And in this particular case the Americans had decided that, if the French request had been put to them, their national interests would require them to refuse it. They would therefore expect us to act similarly.

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Washington telegram No. 2280 to Foreign Office

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3. The State Department went on to say that as a result of United Kingdom/United States cooperation on nuclear submarine propulsion, it was hardly possible to distinguish between United Kingdom and United States technical information embodied in given items of equipment. As regards the equipment being built to French specifications, the Americans thought that no matter how detailed such specifications might be, there would still be a requirement for technical "know-how" from the United Kingdom manufacturer. If this were not so, the French would surely make the equipment themselves.
4. We pointed out that there was a distinction between the supply of a heat exchanger, with associated parts, and the nuclear reactor itself. The State Department said that their advice from the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defence was that in some respects this auxiliary equipment was even more critical than the reactor itself.
5. The State Department made the following comments on the points set out in paragraph 3 of your telegram No. 4094 Saving:-
 - (a) Nuclear submarine propulsion and nuclear weapons are admittedly different from each other but they are all part of the nuclear defence complex and are subject to the same policy considerations.
 - (b) The Americans assume that any other United Kingdom company in a position to manufacture the parts in question would have a similar sort of contractual relationship with the Admiralty as Foster Wheeler and that therefore Admiralty agreement would be required. If such a company did not have this contractual relationship, the Americans assume it would not be in a position to meet the French requirements.
 - (c) The American view is that so long as the machinery or design information relate to nuclear submarine propulsion, the question of supply to other countries should be governed by the above considerations. If there were borderline cases for commercial development, the Americans would want to see full technical details of the specifications involved.

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(d) The Americans consider any particular advantage from United Kingdom supply to the French to be subordinate to the main policy issues.

6. The State Department went on to say that discussions are being held with the French on United States balance of payments problems. They think it possible that the French may raise in this context the question of nuclear submarine propulsion. If in these circumstances the Americans should agree to give some form of assistance to the French programme they would immediately advise the United Kingdom, since it would clearly put a different complexion on the present case. However the Americans could not give any definite indications that the question would arise, nor could they anticipate what attitude they would take. And in any event a decision would take some time.

7. The State Department confirmed that in formulating their views they had taken into account the wider political considerations of United Kingdom/French and United States/French relations. They hoped that United Kingdom policy would be similar to United States policy and that we should oppose the sale of the nuclear submarine parts to the French. In this event, the Americans were quite prepared that we should explain to the French the reasons for our doing so.

8. It is clear that the Americans have adopted this line after full and careful consideration by all the various United States agencies concerned. The predominant factor is that so long as it remains United States policy to refrain from assisting all other countries (except the United Kingdom) in nuclear defence matters they expect us, by reason of our exclusive arrangements with the United States, similarly to refrain. At this stage there is little if any prospect of the Americans accepting our present case. But if their own policy towards the French nuclear defence programme is modified it would, of course, materially affect cases such as this.

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Defence Org.

To tell

PRIME MINISTER

I do not much like this telegram, particularly paragraph 6. There is a marked contrast between the high principles which the Americans express when they are dealing with our interests and the brutal self-interest with which they deal with their own. It seems to me that in this telegram the Americans are putting us on notice that they ~~propose~~^{may} to sell nuclear knowledge to the French but do not intend to let us do so.

I suppose that if the Americans take the line that all nuclear knowledge is now inextricably mixed up together, we could tell them that we expect them not to supply nuclear knowledge to the French ^{unless we agree} but this would not be of much value.

I agree. This is a bad telegram such as to suggest I

P. de Z.

September 12, 1962

W.S.

Annex to JP(62)114(Final)

NATO DEFENCE POLICY - THE STIKKER PAPER

INTRODUCTION

1. The Secretary-General to the North Atlantic Council has circulated a new paper^① on NATO Defence Policy which raises a number of controversial issues. The paper was considered by the Council on 18th and 27th September without any conclusions being reached. Further consideration of the paper will take place in the middle of October, probably after General Norstad has addressed the Council on the subject of MRBMs on 17th October. The Foreign Office produced a holding brief^② for the first meeting, which was in line with our views and did not consider the broader issues of NATO strategy pending our paper on Strategy for the Defence of Central Europe^③. As the latter paper will not now be ready until late November, we consider it necessary as an interim measure to comment on the Stikker paper in the light of our previously expressed views on NATO strategy.

AIM

2. To examine and report on the Secretary-General's paper^① on NATO Defence Policy.

THE STIKKER PAPER

Reasons for Resuming Discussions on NATO Defence

3. In his paper Mr. Stikker calls for an early resumption of the Council's discussions on NATO defence and gives as his reasons:-

- (a) No more time should be lost in tackling the problem of how to replace the aircraft and other weapon systems in ACE which will become obsolete in the next few years. Furthermore the NATO Military Authorities must begin early in 1963 to draw up their force requirements for 1965-69 in preparation for the 1964 Triennial Review.
- (b) The United States has no wish to hold up discussion of the MRBM problem if the general view is that it should now be considered. Moreover this cannot wait until decisions have been taken on British entry into the European Common Market and a European Political Union, if the Council are to have their proposals ready for the Ministerial meeting in December or even the Spring of 1963.
- (c) There is danger that the public controversy which has arisen over the outstanding issues of NATO Defence may cast doubts on the cohesion of the Alliance, and weaken the credibility of NATO defence.

① NDP/62/10

② Foreign Office to UKDEL NATO Telegram No. 3772

& COS(62)56th Mtg., Min. 8

Saving

③ COS(62)54th Mtg., Min. 2

Annex (Continued)

MRBMs

4. He recommends that the Council should consider the military case for MRBMs, and as a start should receive a briefing from General Norstad. The Secretary-General appears to think that there is a military case for MRBMs for ACE because of their quicker reaction time, greater accuracy (which would permit smaller yields) compared with longer-range or seaborne missiles, easier command and control, and the need to have weapons of this kind directly under SACEUR's control after the strategic exchange has taken place. He develops his case on the basis of the land version of Missile 'X'.

5. The Secretary-General also proposes that the Council should consider the political case for Missile 'X' and a NATO MRBM force, and he seeks the views of member governments on:-

(a) Whether the inclusion of Missile 'X' in the NATO forces will increase the deterrent to the Soviets from starting a limited war in Europe.

(b) If so, whether the deterrent value would be affected by the place of deployment of the missiles (i.e. on European continental territory or coastal waters or on the high seas) and by the allocation of Missile 'X' units to particular NATO Commanders.

(c) What form of organisation of a NATO MRBM force would carry most conviction that a political decision for their use could and would be taken in proper time.

6. Mr. Stikker also suggests that the Council should consider setting up a small Expert Working Group to study the cost implications of Missile 'X' without prejudice to the military and political decisions which have yet to be taken on the weapon.

A NATO Nuclear Force

7. The Secretary-General sees as a separate and much larger issue the question of a NATO nuclear force. He considers that this need not depend on whether Missile 'X' is introduced into the defence system of Europe since in any case there will continue to exist within ACE a large number of other tactical and strategic nuclear weapons and delivery systems. A NATO nuclear force might be formed to bring some of these existing weapons under direct NATO control. He regards the main arguments for and against such a force as being:-

(a) Against a NATO Nuclear Force

(i) It would add nothing to the sum of the nuclear weapons available for NATO defence and therefore to the overall deterrent, since it could hardly be used except as part of a co-ordinated nuclear strike.

Appendix 'A' to Enclosure to MCM-73-62 (Revised)

Annex (Continued)

- (ii) It would pose problems of political control which would paralyse the decision-making process and make the force less credible in Soviet eyes than the present nuclear forces.

(b) In Favour of a NATO Nuclear Force

- (i) It would be a concrete manifestation of the political unity of NATO and indivisibility of NATO defence, with important psychological benefits vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc and public opinion in Europe.
- (ii) It would enhance the credibility of the deterrent in Soviet eyes on the grounds that it would give European members of NATO, who have most to fear from Soviet aggression short of a full-scale nuclear attack on the whole of the NATO area, a direct share in the Alliance's capacity for nuclear retaliation.

8. Mr. Stikker emphasises that he has no preconceived views on a NATO nuclear force, and that there should be no retreat from the agreement reached at Athens on the guide lines[§] governing the possible use of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, because the impression is gaining ground that the Americans would only contemplate using nuclear weapons in desperate circumstances, he is deeply concerned lest the Soviet leaders might make a fatal miscalculation in the belief that NATO had lost faith in its own deterrent. He therefore suggests that the creation of a NATO nuclear force, however superfluous militarily, and however cumbersome politically, would provide a demonstrable proof that NATO defence is indivisible and that all member countries would take part in the conduct of that defence from "the repulse of a stray Soviet patrol to the ultimate sanction represented by nuclear retaliation". He emphasises that the prior agreement of the three powers which are shouldering the burden of a nuclear weapons programme is of paramount importance, and that it may be that this could not be achieved on a satisfactory basis without some refinement of political control and change in the command structure.

Conventional Forces and Tactical Nuclear Weapons

9. The Secretary-General is concerned lest, because the inevitability of escalation of nuclear warfare is often assumed, the idea is being encouraged that no choice is open between conventional defence and all-out nuclear war. He regrets that the efforts being made to improve the strength of our conventional forces, which are justified on the grounds of the credibility of these forces themselves, have become confused in many people's minds with retreat from the doctrines stated in "The Measures to Implement the Overall Strategic Concept"[§], that in no circumstances would NATO contemplate limited conventional war with the Soviet Union. He considers that 30 fully modernised divisions represent the approximate upper limit of what the Allies can realistically be expected to maintain on a permanent basis in the Central Region during the next few years at least, and

§ Annex 'D' to Minister's brief on NATO Strategy and Nuclear Problems (Annex to COS 1247/4/9/62)
} MC 48/2

Annex (Continued)

asks whether, if these are inadequate, the solution is to be sought in strengthening the tactical nuclear capability of the Shield Forces.

10. Finally he asks whether a second "threshold" should be introduced into NATO strategy which would imply a conscious decision to pass from localised nuclear defence to the use of strategic nuclear weapons, and would also help to ensure that the deterrent is genuinely a deterrent to aggression at any level. He asks whether this might be achieved by a new system of command for the nuclear weapons whose use is manifestly confined to the battlefield area, and whether this would involve any re-appraisal of the size, organisation, and deployment of the conventional forces.

OUR VIEWSGENERAL

11. The Secretary-General's paper provides a review of some current NATO problems in regard to the defence of Europe, and the questions which he asks are pertinent. However, as Mr. Stikker points out, his report was compiled without expert military advice and we consider that this omission is reflected in lack of awareness of the full implications of future nuclear war and of all the considerations bearing on the relationship between ACE and external nuclear forces. The initial reaction% of the Council to the paper showed a similar lack of awareness on the part of a number of member nations. We hope that this may be remedied in due course through the exchange of information in the NATO Nuclear Committee.

12. The Standing Group Long-Term Planning Study⁷, which was to indicate changes required in the Overall Strategic Concept⁷⁷, has not yet been completed and is in danger of being overtaken by the present Council discussions. It is important even at this stage, however, that account should be taken of the long-term scientific study by the Von Karman Committee⁶ which has been part of it, in particular the following views which are relevant to the current discussions in the Council, viz:-

- (a) That the ability to prolong fighting in a large-scale nuclear war is doubtful because it is most unlikely that any technical improvements could ensure the supply system against breaking down.
- (b) That the high cost of new weapon systems will make it essential to avoid duplication.

13. We do not accept the necessity for making policy decisions on the composition and organisation of forces by early 1963 to enable Major Commanders to meet the time scale for the next

% UKDEL NATO to Foreign Office Telegram No. 144
 ≠ MCM-143-61
 77 MC 14/2 and MC 48/2
 6 The Von Karman Report and COS(62)78

Annex (Continued)

Triennial Review. It would be desirable to do so, but it is much more important to ensure that decisions are taken in the light of agreed future strategic requirements, which it is important should be based on the Standing Group Long-Term Planning Study⁴. If necessary, the Triennial Review could be postponed a year by having an Interim Annual Review in 1964 similar to that in 1961, although we are advised that the United Kingdom would not wish once more to take the initiative in suggesting this.

A NATO NUCLEAR FORCE

14. We have previously stated⁴ that we consider that the question of control by NATO of a nuclear force (as defined by Mr. Stikker) is primarily a political one. Nevertheless we would emphasise that from the military point of view the arguments quoted by the Secretary-General against a NATO Nuclear Force will remain valid until an effective system of political control has been devised.

15. We agree with Mr. Stikker that NATO must maintain a deterrent which will prevent Soviet miscalculation of Allied cohesion and determination. We have indicated previously⁴ that a general deterrent to such miscalculation should include effective conventional forces stationed as near the Iron Curtain as possible and a reasonable number of tactical nuclear weapons. The most effective way of controlling these weapons and forces should be decided after their tasks and composition have been agreed.

MILITARY ASPECTS OF MRBMs

General

16. A NATO basic military requirement for an MRBM was formulated in 1959, and authorisation for 655 weapons was sought in End-66 force requirements. However, because of the nature of these weapon systems and the numerous considerations which their introduction into the NATO arsenal evoke, the Military Committee have deferred decision⁵ on the requirement pending further guidance from the North Atlantic Council. It is therefore premature to assume, as the Germans and Belgians have done⁶, that the military requirement for MRBMs has been accepted.

17. At present SACEUR's target list consists of large numbers of targets ranging from the Iron Curtain to inside Russia, of which the most important are the enemy offensive nuclear forces, and the bulk of these are today concentrated on fixed sites. No doubt the Russians are concerned over the extreme vulnerability of these targets and we must therefore expect them to take energetic steps to reduce this vulnerability. As such measures are taken SACEUR's strike plans will have to be revised. A proportion of fixed-site targets will become mobile and will then have to be transferred to the category of opportunity targets to be attacked when located. This development will increase the need to acquire target information, if necessary after hostilities have begun, but, even with better target acquisition systems, it is unlikely that MRBMs would be the best strike weapon to use against opportunity targets. We do not agree

4 MCM-143-61
4 COS(62)200
4 COS(62)320
4 MC 26/4
4 UKDEL NATO to Foreign Office Telegram No. 144

Annex (Continued)

therefore with the Secretary General's assumption that the most efficient or only way to replace cruise missiles and obsolescent strike aircraft in ACE with MRBMs.

18. We comment below on the specific points raised by the Secretary-General and suggest further questions which might serve to emphasise the complexity of the problems to be resolved.

Reaction Time

19. It is true that at present a large proportion of the external forces, being bombers employing in the main free-fall weapons, would take between four and eight hours to reach their targets but we do not consider the Secretary-General's doubts would be justified in the future. For example:-

- (a) Mr. McNamara's statement of programmed forces^W for the United States indicated a preponderance of ICBMs, Polaris MRBMs, and stand-off bombs and missiles. Moreover, Bomber Command, equipped with SKYBOLT, would be capable of striking targets in Eastern Europe and Western Russia within minutes of take-off. In the light of these capabilities and the time-scale of their introduction, how many Missiles 'X' should be provided to compensate for the slowness of the external forces in reaching NATO targets?
- (b) Will an MRBM system offer any significant advantages in relation to the Russian first strike?
- (c) Can a situation be visualised in which Russia would not have adequate time to complete her dispersal and deployment plans?
- (d) Is the different reaction time of the ICBM and MRBM a significant factor in preventing second strikes?

Weapon Yield

20. For a given delivery system not having a terminal homing device the accuracy of the weapon will decrease with increasing range necessitating a higher yield for a given target. We agree with the desirability of limiting the yield as much as possible against targets. However;-

- (a) Does such a measure, in the light of our strategy of deterrence, justify the provision of special weapons which would duplicate those already existing or programmed?
- (b) Does the seaborne version of Missile 'X' provide the required accuracy?
- (c) Might not our geodetic knowledge be a major limiting factor in ballistic missile accuracy?
- (d) Pending the development of terminal guidance for ballistic missiles is not the manned aircraft the best means of terminal guidance available?

^W C-M(62)55
Appendix 'A' to Enclosure to
MCM-73-62(Revised)

- 7 -

Annex (Continued)

Command and Control

21. The Secretary-General asks if there may not be practical advantages in maintaining under the theatre commander concerned the means of executing his mission. We consider that the strategic exchange would be rapidly decisive and that co-ordinated large-scale operations would be impracticable thereafter. It would be necessary to establish that MRBMs in ACE were either a necessary part of the deterrent or could be used in circumstances preceding a strategic exchange in order to justify them as assisting SACEUR in the execution of his mission. We do not consider that either case has yet been made, nor do we agree that ACE should possess MRBMs to prevent the Soviet Forces from re-grouping after the strategic exchange. However, were MRBMs to be provided, the control of them would have to be centralised to the maximum extent possible and plans for their use fully co-ordinated with those for the strategic nuclear forces.

Targetting Plans and Policy

22. The Secretary-General suggests that it would be useful to have information about targets of interest to NATO Europe. We acknowledge that this information is relevant but emphasise that it must be related to the time-scale of Missile 'X', which is also the time-scale of major improvements in the capability of the external strike forces, whose own capability should be the major military factor in determining what targets must be covered by ACE. A considerable amount of the necessary information about present day targetting was provided by Mr. McNamara at Athens^W, and from consideration of this we believe that useful discussion could take place on the division of responsibility for present targets between ACE forces and the external strike forces, and the principles on which this division should be developed in the future, including the degree of insurance to be provided.

Political Considerations

23. We consider that to answer the questions posed by the Secretary-General (paragraph 5 above) as political aspects of the MRBM problem before the military requirement has been established would be prejudging the issue.

Financial Aspects

24. The Americans have indicated^Y that 250 Missiles 'X' might cost about \$2 thousand million (i.e. more than £700m) and that they would expect the Europeans to bear a large part of the cost. We doubt whether NATO would be able to support such a project without sacrificing some other major capability. We note the proposal (paragraph 6 above) that a Working Party should examine the financial implications of MRBMs and their impact on future NATO plans and, while believing that this would make evident the undesirability of such costly duplication of the external strike forces' role, would emphasise that examination of the financial aspects in no way implies acceptance of a military requirement for MRBMs.

^W C-M(62)55

^Y OES/USRO, PARIS CONTROL NO CTS-62-6 (Statement by Mr. Findletter to the Council on 15 June 62)

Annex (Continued)

Deduction

25. Bearing in mind the cost of MRBMs, their inflexibility, and their application to global war only, we are not at present convinced that there is an urgent requirement for them, and certainly not for the numbers requested by SACEUR. We consider that the military requirement for MRBMs for ACE should be re-examined in the light of future targetting requirements and the capability of the external strategic forces, bearing in mind other priority calls on NATO's resources.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

26. A number of the issues raised by the Secretary-General in regard to conventional forces and tactical nuclear weapons are under study. It would therefore be premature to comment in detail on Mr. Stikker's points. These studies are:-

- (a) An analysis of escalation which is to establish broad principles which can be used by planning and intelligence staffs as a basis for assessing the chances of escalation in particular situations²;
- (b) A war game by the Army Operational Research Establishment which is studying the corps defensive battle using tactical nuclear weapons and the implications of an initial phase restricted to the use of conventional weapons by both sides.
- (c) A proposed strategy for the defence of Central Europe³ which will draw on (a) and (b).

27. Some of the problems, to which we hope these studies will help us to find answers and which may therefore be of interest in discussion of Mr. Stikker's paper, include:-

- (a) To what extent and in what ways could both sides expect to control escalation in the future, in the light of developments in conventional and nuclear weapons systems, communications, and target acquisition capabilities? Will the fear that limited hostilities may escalate to global war remain a fundamental factor affecting the defence policy of both the Soviet Union and the West?
- (b) What must be done to maintain the credibility of our conventional forces in the general scheme of deterrence, including minimising the risk of war by miscalculation? To what extent would clearer direction to SACEUR and his subordinate commanders accordingly be necessitated, bearing in mind that there is no clearly defined concept of conventional operations in MC 14/2, MC 48/2, or SACEUR's revised EDP?

² JIC(62)70 (Terms of Reference)
³ COS(62)54th Mtg., Item 2

Annex (Concluded)

- (c) To what extent should the tactical use of nuclear weapons form part of the concept of operations in ACE prior to the strategic nuclear exchange?

CONCLUSIONS

28. We conclude that:-

- (a) The military requirement for MRBMs for ACE should be re-examined in the light of future targetting requirements and the capability of the external strategic forces, bearing in mind other priority calls on NATO's resources.
- (b) It is important that in discussion of the political and financial aspects of a MRBM force for ACE it should be borne in mind that the military requirement has not yet been accepted.
- (c) An effective system of political control must be devised before the military value of a NATO nuclear force (as defined by Mr. Stikker) can be assessed.

SECRET

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Following from Secretary of State,
Berlin.

The President talked briefly about Berlin. He said that he was not convinced that there would be any value in his having a discussion with Khrushchev in the second half of November unless by then we had had some indication that it might lead to fruitful results. Nor did he agree when Rusk and I suggested that there might be some advantage in trying to find a formula such as a Deputy Foreign Ministers' meeting which would provide Khrushchev with another excuse to postpone the signature of a peace treaty. His judgment would be that the military balance was more favourable to us now than it would be later on. The Soviet military position was likely to steadily improve. It might therefore be better to allow a confrontation to develop over Berlin now rather than later.

2. As for our existing contingency plans which did not seem to have impressed Khrushchev, Rusk had been talking to Mayor Brandt who is at present in New York. He had been impressed by Brandt's suggestion that it might be wise to make some appeal to the East Germans to embark upon a campaign of passive resistance in the second stage of our plan rather than waiting as at present agreed until the third stage. Brandt had also said that we should examine the possibility in the context of a major Berlin crisis of bringing about a confrontation between East German troops and West Germans as he felt certain that the East Germans would be extremely reluctant to take forceful action against their fellow countrymen. This might not necessarily be the case with foreign troops such as the Americans. Finally Brandt had told him that
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U.K.Mis. New York telegram No. 1474 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

there were signs that the East Germans would like to find some means of increasing contacts between the people of East and West Berlin. There had been an unofficial suggestion that an establishment might be created between East and West zones where relations and friends from either side could meet and talk together. Rusk said that this smacked of the procedure adopted for prison visitors, but it might be better than nothing and, if there were to be any adverse propaganda about it, it was more likely to be directed against the East than the West.

3. I said that we would certainly be prepared to examine these ideas.

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ARCHIVES
19 OCT 1962

CG 1071/373

Soviet Intentions over Berlin

It seems that President Kennedy is now inclining towards the idea that it would be better to allow a confrontation with the Russians over Berlin to develop now than to postpone it by providing Khrushchev with fresh excuses for holding up the signature of a separate treaty. (New York Mem. to F.O. 1474, Oct 2)

CG 1071/344

2. This raises the question of what the Russians will do if we do not provide them with face-saving excuses. In this connexion it is instructive to re-read now the Moscow telegrams reporting the threats which Khrushchev made to Western representatives at the height of his pressure campaign on Berlin in July and August, 1961. The most interesting of the series are:

CG 1071/47/G (61)

(i) Moscow telegram No. 1235 of July 3, 1961 reporting Khrushchev's talk with Sir F. Roberts at the Ballet;

CG 1071/114 (61)

(ii) Moscow telegram No. 1403 of July 28, 1961 about the Khrushchev-McCloy meeting;

CG 1071/128 (61)

(iii) Moscow telegram No. 1448 of August 3, 1961 about the Khrushchev-Fanfani conversation.

3. The salient point which emerges, I think, is that Khrushchev has never been nearly as fierce about Berlin this year as he was last year. He has not repeated in terms any of his more hair-raising threats of 1961, notably that the Soviet Government had "decided definitely that peace treaties or a peace treaty must be signed this year (1961)" (Moscow telegram No. 1235, paragraph 5); that thereafter the Russians would shoot first against a Western airlift; and that they would immediately resort to nuclear warfare if the West infringed the sovereignty of the D.D.R. (Moscow telegram No. 1448, paragraph 2).

4. In the event Khrushchev did not carry out any of his 1961 threats, despite the forebodings of Western Ambassadors in Moscow. All that he did was to build the Berlin Wall, which can surely not have been his original intention. All that he has done this year in the wake of his milder threats is to dissolve the Soviet Military Headquarters in East Berlin, while making provision for continued contact between the Russians and the West over access to Berlin. Now he has proclaimed a debtente over Berlin just as he did last autumn.

5. It seems to me that the conclusion suggested by these facts is that Khrushchev is even more aware today than he was 12 months ago of the difficulties of getting his own way over Berlin. He does not intend to stand still but he does mean to move with the utmost caution. It is a great help to him that he has far more room for manoeuvre than any Western

/Statesman.

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Statesman. The record shows that he can if necessary retreat from any threat that he has made over Berlin, however public or positive, without apparent prejudice to his position at home. There is no real evidence to support the view sometimes urged by Ambassadors in Moscow that Khrushchev is in a quandary from which we must rescue him. He can move in any direction he likes, and he withdraws or stands still when the Americans look as if they are about to use force. If Khrushchev shares President Kennedy's belief that the Soviet military position is likely to improve steadily - and he says that he does believe this - he is most unlikely to allow a confrontation over Berlin to develop now or in the near future. Even if he decides to sign a separate treaty he will, I suggest, do whatever is necessary to avoid a physical collision with the West. It will not be difficult for him to remain flexible. Even if a peace treaty is signed, it seems to me that Khrushchev may well be content to allow the salami slicing process to go on for years yet, unless his military position improves so much that he can face a confrontation with confidence.

W.B.J. Ledwidge.

(W.B.J. Ledwidge)

October 4, 1962.

Mr. Tomkins

Copy to:

Mr. R.H. Mason,
Northern Department.

) agree

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SECRET

Mr. Rusk and the State Department have been pressing on us for several weeks. We ourselves are not particularly in favour of it and we would not mind if the President came out against it. But taken together with his unwillingness to meet Khrushchev and the references to confrontation, it suggests that he is thinking of breaking off the dialogue with the Russians altogether. I am sure that this would be a mistake. The Russians have used the conversations with the Americans as a pretext for refraining from action and they would undoubtedly be provoked to do something dangerous if the dialogue were suspended.

5. My third point is that we must not delude ourselves into thinking that the signature of a separate peace treaty will not make any difference and that things could go on afterwards more or less as they were before. Even if it does not lead to immediate interference with Allied access, a peace treaty is bound to mean East Germans on the checkpoints on the autobahn, no guarantees for the safety of air communications, passports and visas for civilian travellers, the exclusion of the Western Powers from East Berlin and its integration in East Germany. The situation will inevitably be much more dangerous than it is now and from a diplomatic point of view it will be much more difficult. For one thing we shall not be able to resist being drawn into dealings with the East Germans, for another, once the peace treaty has been signed the neutrals will gradually begin to grant the D.D.R. formal recognition. All this is likely to lead to serious troubles with the West Germans whose morale is likely to suffer some shattering blows. But the real point is that a peace treaty concluded in these circumstances will not mean the end of the Berlin crisis. It will simply mean the telescoping of a lot of measures which Khrushchev could take separately and individually without signing a peace treaty and the opening of a new and different crisis designed to achieve the ultimate objective which is the evacuation of Allied Forces. This seems to me to be the greatest weakness of a policy of "allowing a confrontation to develop".

E.E. Tomkins
(E.E. Tomkins)
October 5, 1962.

Sir E. Shackburgh

ES 910

PREM II / 3715

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TOP SECRET

Depuce On
(NATO M.R.B.M.'s)

FROM UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION TO N.A.T.O. PARIS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET) AND WHITEHALL (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION

Sir P. Mason

No. 155

October 17, 1962

D. 9.04 p.m. October 17, 1962

R. 9.20 p.m. October 17, 1962

IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 155 of October 17

Repeated for information to: Bonn Washington B.D.S. Washington
and Saving to: Paris

N.A.T.O. M.R.B.M.'s.

General Norstad today gave the Council his promised presentation on the military requirement for M.R.B.M.'s in A.C.E., which had been postponed from July. His argument was that these weapons were required to enable him to attack effectively targets which posed a direct threat to Western Europe, and thus to enable him to carry out the task entrusted to him by the Military Committee and the Council. He accepted that other complementary weapon systems would be required, and that the balance between them must be kept under continuous review, and he also accepted that N.A.T.O.'s resources were required for other essential military measures. But he believed that the M.R.B.M. was an essential military requirement not only for general war, but also in conflicts preceding a major nuclear exchange.

To illustrate his case General Norstad described the 603 priority targets which form the fixed nuclear threat to A.C.E., consisting mainly of Soviet I.R.B.M. sites, light and medium-bomber bases (with associated special storage), and the conventional bomber bases which could be used as dispersal airfields for these aircraft. He also described the 1,300 selected contingency targets (airfields, bridges, communication centres, storage sites and fixed troop targets etc.) against which attacks might need to be mounted when hostilities broke out.

Emphasising that the essential need was for means of neutralising these targets within the shortest possible time, he voiced doubts about the contribution which the external strategic forces could make to the immediate and direct defence of N.A.T.O. Europe, vital though these forces were for the maintenance of the deterrent.

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/ For example

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TOP SECRETU.K. Del NATO Paris telegram No. 155 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

For example, half of the targets on the threat list which were assigned to the external forces were covered by Thors which he regarded as a diminishing asset. As for the forces under his own command, he regarded the reaction time of the Jupiter missiles as satisfactory, but thought that those of his aircraft strike forces and his short range missiles ought to be considerably improved upon.

4. He then showed figures to illustrate the theoretical comparison between the "expectancy" of destroying a target by an M.R.B.M. and by strike aircraft of the F104 type. He believed that the use of I.C.B.M's against technical targets in close proximity to centres of population was inconsistent with SHAPE's constraints policy, because of the high yield and comparatively low accuracy of these weapons. Finally he pointed out that the nuclear strike forces under his command, at present operating from a limited number of bases, were placed at a severe disadvantage compared with the Soviets operating from a far greater number. The mobility and dispersal of an M.R.B.M. force could redress this balance in favour of A.C.E. He declined to give any judgment between a land-based and a sea-based force, and said that for his part he saw great advantage in a mixed force.

5. As befitted his final appearance before the Council, General Norstad's presentation was on the whole given in a studiously objective tone, and he took care to disclaim any personal involvement in the problem. In his peroration, however, he left the Council in no doubt that he had in no way changed the views he had expressed to them in June, 1960. In fact he claimed that the military authorities of the West were unanimous in agreeing that the military requirement for M.R.B.M's in Europe existed, and that the only problem to be decided was the best way of providing them. It was in his view a question of M.R.B.M's or no defence at all, and if they were not acquired this would mean the end of N.A.T.O. within a relatively few years.

6. After a short discussion the Council adjourned without taking any decision about how the problem was to be further pursued. A full record of General Norstad's presentation and the subsequent question period follows by bag.

Foreign Office please pass Bonn 49, Washington 77 and send to B.D.S. Washington 7.

[Repeated as requested]

ADVANCE COPIES TO

Private Secretary. Sir H. Caccia.

Sir E. Shuckburgh, Head of W.O.P.D.

Head of Central Department

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10/19/62
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FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

C. Her/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET) AND
WHITEHALL (SECRET) (CABINET) DISTRIBUTION

Sir D. Ormsby Gore

No. 2621

D: 1.44 a.m. October 20, 1962

October 19, 1962

R: 4.30 a.m. October 20, 1962

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2621 of October 19
Repeated for information to Moscow
and Saving to Paris Bonn
U.K. Del N.A.T.O. U.K. Mis New York

My telegram No. 2617.

Mr. Thompson, speaking personally, gave his impression of the two conversations with Mr. Gromyko at both of which he had been present. He noted that Mr. Gromyko had given a concise re-statement of the full Soviet position, and had insisted that the Berlin problem had to be settled although it was true that he had mentioned no deadline. Mr. Thompson's personal impression was that Mr. Gromyko was saying that the next round of conversations would be the last, and that if they did not work out the Soviet Government would go ahead. It was because Mr. Rusk shared this impression that he had spoken in such strong terms to Mr. Gromyko at the meeting over dinner.

2. Mr. Thompson continued that the various conversations had left the question of a visit by Mr. Khrushchev to New York still a little up in the air. He himself thought that the chances were fifty-fifty or a little more that Mr. Khrushchev would come. On the other hand, (and this was very confidential) he had received the impression from two separate private conversations with Mr. Dobrynin that the latter thought it would be unwise for Mr. Khrushchev to come to the United States at present. Mr. Dobrynin had not spelt out his reasons, but the impression he had given was definite. On the whole question of a visit by Mr. Khrushchev, Mr. Thompson said that the White House was keeping very quiet, and he trusted that we would all do likewise.

3. When the French Ambassador asked if Mr. Gromyko had said anything new, Mr. Thompson replied there had, of course, been his willingness to discuss an air access arbitral authority. Mr. Rusk had replied that this would not be very useful, since it begged the main question.

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SECRETWashington telegram No. 2621 to Foreign Office

-2-

4. Mr. Thompson said he had been intrigued by the statement on peaceful coexistence (paragraph 10 of my telegram No. 2619), and he had asked Mr. Dobrynin about it. The latter had said that importance should not be attached to the fact that it was a separate statement. It should be viewed in the context of the whole interview. When pressed, Mr. Dobrynin had repeated his remarks. Mr. Thompson wondered whether the statement was intended as a reference to Cuba.

5. Mr. Thompson concluded by speculating about Mr. Khrushchev's intentions and plans. If he decided to come to New York, his purpose would look like being to try to negotiate a settlement. If he wanted useful talks with President Kennedy, what sort of speech would he feel able to make at the General Assembly? Mr. Thompson believed that some of Mr. Khrushchev's statement, e.g. on the presence of Western troops, constituted a negotiating position on which he would not ultimately insist. The United States Government had made their position so plain on this point that Mr. Khrushchev must know that he could not obtain it by negotiation. Therefore, Mr. Thompson doubted if he would press it during a visit to America, since he must know that it would mean the failure of the talks. It was on balance unlikely that Mr. Khrushchev would embark on negotiations with the President if he expected them to fail. Looking further ahead, Mr. Thompson thought that Mr. Khrushchev always had a let out. For example, it was easy for him to arrange that the East German Government should request the Soviet Government to continue to handle access matters even after a peace treaty. Mr. Thompson believed that Mr. Khrushchev would probably not press the Berlin question to the ultimate point, but personally he thought that in the absence of an agreement Mr. Khrushchev would sign a peace treaty within the next six months.

Foreign Office please pass to Moscow and Saving to Paris, Bonn and U.K. Del N.A.T.O. as my telegrams Nos. 313, 792, 263 and 738 respectively.

[Repeated as requested]

ADVANCE COPIES

Private Secretary
Mr. Duncan Wilson
Head of Central Department

JMG.

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FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

C
10/19/62 (B)

Cypher/OTP

Sir D. Ormsby Gore

No. 2619

October 19, 1962

FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET) AND
WHITEHALL (SECRET) (CABINET)
DISTRIBUTION

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

D. 1.17 a.m. October 20, 1962

R. 4.22 a.m. October 20, 1962

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2619 of October 19

Repeated for information to: Moscow
and Saving to:
Paris U.K. Del NATO
Bonn U.K. Mis New York

My telegram No. 2617

President Kennedy/Gromyko Conversation.

Mr. Gromyko read from a number of prepared statements from which he only rarely deviated.

2. On Berlin, Mr. Gromyko re-stated the Soviet position on a peace treaty and the normalisation of the situation in Berlin on that basis. The Soviet Union desired an agreed solution. Mr. Gromyko was firm that if there was no mutual understanding, the Soviet Government and some other governments would be compelled to sign a peace treaty without agreement with the West. This would entail indissolubly all the steps of which the West had been notified. There was no indication in his remarks of a deadline. He said, however, that the Soviets would not act before the United States elections, unless compelled to do so by actions on the part of the United States Government. After the elections there should be an active dialogue in November to bring about results on the basis of a peace treaty and the normalisation of the situation in Berlin. He alleged that the United States had made threats in connexion with a peace treaty. This had no effect on the Soviets. Mr. Gromyko referred to West Berlin as a NATO military base and described the occupation regime as a rotten tooth which should be pulled out. The Soviet Union would guarantee the freedom of the population and a NATO base was not needed for that purpose.

3. As regards access, Mr. Gromyko continued, the Soviet Government had taken account of the United States and United Kingdom's views and

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/was prepared

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Washington telegram No. 2619 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

was prepared to consider two alternative international authorities:-

(a) one alternative might deal with all types of access on the lines discussed previously with Mr. Rusk (presumably the reference is to the conversation on October 6 - see paragraph 9 of my telegram No. 2528).

(b) the other, which would involve a precisely similar type of authority, would deal only with air access. This was a new proposal. Mr. Gromyko said that the Soviet Government assumed that under either alternative all other subjects relating to Berlin and a German peace settlement would be resolved at the same time.

4. Mr. Gromyko said that the Soviet Government favoured contacts between East and West Germany, but this in itself would not mean a solution of the main problem. The Russians had taken account of the United States view on re-unification and considered that it would be possible to mention this in connexion with a settlement or in a peace treaty. It could be contained in a joint statement by the Powers concerned, or alternatively in a peace treaty with the G.D.R.

5. Mr. Gromyko concluded that if the problem of West Berlin was solved there were no other outstanding problems between the two countries except disarmament, and this question would be greatly facilitated by a solution of the Berlin problem.

6. President Kennedy referred to the conversations between Mr. Rusk and Mr. Gromyko and said that the Soviets were thoroughly familiar with the United States position. The United States Government had made several proposals on access. Their great concern was with the presence of Western forces in West Berlin. These forces had no offensive capability and West Berlin was not a NATO base. He expressed his unwillingness to withdraw Western forces because to do so would endanger West Berlin. He was prepared to continue the dialogue but pointed out that this also involved his allies. He said it was difficult to understand why access by air and ground could not be worked out without linking it to the presence of Western forces. President Kennedy repeated that the presence of Western forces was vital to the survival of Berlin and that the United States Government could not abandon their commitments.

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/ 7. Mr. Gromyko

SECRETWashington telegram No. 2619 to Foreign Office

- 3 -

7. Mr. Gromyko replied that the President's suspicions about the survival of Berlin were unjustified. The Soviet Government was prepared to guarantee its freedom together with the Western Powers and the United Nations. Why should such a guarantee be underestimated? They were prepared also to guarantee free and unrestricted access of persons and goods to a free and demilitarized city of West Berlin. Mr. Gromyko made the usual remarks about the Russian proposals not affecting the social order in West Berlin. The President retorted that if West Berliners were really free to make their own choice he did not see why the Soviets should be insisting on the withdrawal of Western forces. The United States Government had said and meant it, that the presence of these forces was vital to them. It was difficult to understand why access arrangements could not be worked out and the forces maintained in West Berlin.

8. Mr. Gromyko said that the Western forces were a dangerous element and though small in number they represented a threat of war. He hoped for a solution by mutual agreement. If the Berlin problem was resolved there were no other problems between the Governments except disarmament.

9. Mr. Gromyko said that Mr. Khrushchev believed that it might be useful if the two Heads of Government met to discuss the questions dividing them. They should discuss a peace treaty for Germany. If he was able to, Mr. Khrushchev thought of coming to attend the General Assembly in the latter part of November. President Kennedy replied that if Mr. Khrushchev came he would be glad to meet him, but without any specific agenda (eg. he would not commit himself to discussion of a peace treaty for Germany).

10. Mr. Gromyko then read a brief statement to the effect that the United States had a capitalistic system and the Soviet Union a socialist system leading to Communism. In the Soviet view this did not prevent peaceful co-existence. The determination of who should win should take place by peaceful and not by forceful means. It should be proved which was the better system.

Foreign Office please pass Moscow and Saving to Paris, Bonn, and U.K. Del NATO as my telegrams Nos. 311, 790, 261 and 736 respectively.

[Repeated as requested]

ADVANCE COPIES TO

Private Secretary. Mr. A Duncan Wilson
 Head of Central Department.
 Head of Northern Department. Resident Clerk

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FO 311/163502

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FROM MOSCOW TO FOREIGN OFFICE

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FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET) AND
WHITEHALL (SECRET) (CABINET)
DISTRIBUTION

Sir F. Roberts

No. 2015 C4 1071/377 D.8.40 p.m. October 22, 1962
October 22, 1962 R.9.16 p.m. October 22, 1962

PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL

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x RvB

24-10

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2015 of October 22.
Repeated for information to: Washington Bonn
and Saving to: Paris UKDEL N.A.T.O.
UKMIS New York.
C4 1071/377

Washington telegram No. 2621: Meetings with Gromyko.

Although I have had no opportunity for anything but the most general (and incidentally very calm and amicable) discussion of Berlin with Soviet officials, my own assessment is in most points very similar to Mr. Thompson's. The implications in Gromyko's statements that the skein of discussion is running out, that the Russians calculate that the post-election round of negotiation must be the last and that unless an agreement is reached during it they must proceed unilaterally to the signature of the German peace treaty, represent I believe their genuine present intention. But the lengths to which they will go to reach an agreement will depend on their assessment of the Western attitude.

2. I note that, talking with the President, Gromyko referred to American "threats" in connexion with a peace treaty. This I think supports the view that recent firm language from Washington and from you has had some effect and that the Soviet Government is becoming progressively less hopeful that Western declarations of determination not to be moved are just bluff.

3. On the other hand if as Mr. Thompson said the White House is "keeping very quiet" the United States Press, including those sections which are often held to reflect White House guidance, certainly is not; and the recent spate of articles about disagreement among the Allies and the supposed United States decision to "go it alone" can only encourage Khrushchev to believe that the Western position might crack wide open if he keeps up the pressure. There have also been some London messages (inter alia from Drew Middleton and Tom Lambert) which must have intrigued him.

4. In these

Roberts to FO (Robert) CONFIDENTIAL

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10/24/62

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PRIME MINISTER

Visit to Paris 16th to 19th October

My visit to Paris last week was encouraging in that M. Messmer was considerably more frank and forthright than I had expected in talking about the French attitude to NATO and to questions of nuclear weapons in Europe.

2. On NATO he left me in no doubt of the French dislike of the Organisation on account of the domination which the United States exercised. He thought that changes would have to be made to correspond to the part which Europe ought to play in the Alliance, but he did not elaborate on this or suggest that changes should be made so precipitately as to disrupt the Alliance.

3. I asked him about the role which he foresaw for the force de frappe. He told me that the French Government - and particularly General de Gaulle - were quite clear that the force de frappe must remain fully independent for all time and that what he regarded as a "qualified independence" such as we enjoy would not be acceptable. While he did not exclude the possibility of some liaison with the Americans and ourselves on targeting and the like, he would not agree that the force de frappe should be so tied in with the nuclear forces of other countries that its independence was impaired. He drew an analogy with the threads by which Gulliver was bound which, while individually very small, had the effect of making him a prisoner.

Copy in
Foreign Policy
(March, 1961)

4. M. Messmer also expressed strong dislike for any plan for an international M.R.B.M. force in Europe. He shared our scepticism of the military need for such a force and, while he could see that the Americans might wish to support such a plan for political reasons and from a desire to earn foreign exchange, he made it clear that the French would never devote any resources to it.

5. I had a private talk with him about the newspaper reports that the United States had offered to sell a nuclear submarine to France. He confirmed that this was so and told me that the French would shortly be sending a team to the United States to examine the implications of the proposal. I agree with your view (as expressed in your Private Secretary's letter of 22nd October) that we should now let Foster Wheeler go ahead on their deal with the French about the supply of a heat exchanger.

6. We also discussed the possibility of increasing co-operation between our two countries in the research and development of weapons and equipment. We agreed that there was little point in trying to make arrangements for

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projects already in a fairly advanced stage such as the P.1154 and Mirage III V VTOL fighter aircraft. We identified, however, a number of studies in development, applied research and fundamental research which we thought could be progressed in collaboration. These range from submarine detection through the development of a fair weather ground-to-air missile defence against low-flying aircraft to fundamental research into the military applications of space. On some questions, such as the development of an aircraft with variable geometry and of the next generation of tanks, we agreed that there should be further discussions at Staff level before technical collaboration could proceed.

7. I am sending a copy of this minute to the Foreign Secretary.

P.T.

R. 24th October, 1962.

Minister of Defence

Many thanks.

Not my emergency.

H.M.

26/10

Duplicate returned

+ form sent.

pc 26/10

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TOP SECRET

Prime Minister's
 Personal Minute
 No. M 298/12

FOREIGN SECRETARY

Secretary 7 Hale
Pr. 62/1052
you will see the... Cuba... Berlin
Admiralty House
 CG 1071/392 (D) *Whitehall, S.W. 1*

this has caused your
concern to the Ambassador
is not inconsistent with
it. We are 2. agree

WBL 1/11
1/11
AK 10/1/62
A-1/11

I have seen Sir David Ormsby Gore's telegram, No. 2710 of October 28.

At first sight I am doubtful about the Ambassador's suggestion of making an explicit link between the continued inviolability of Cuba and the inviolability of West Berlin. I do not think that these two places are of equal value to us and I fear that to make an explicit link between them might even encourage Mr. Khrushchev to feel that he might take Berlin at the risk not of nuclear war but only of the loss of Cuba. It seems to me that the protection of West Berlin must continue to be assured by the full weight of Western and above all of United States power rather than just by the Cuban hostage. Apart from other considerations it is surely possible that Senor Castro may one day be overthrown by a spontaneous revolution, and we should not get ourselves into a position in which such a development might seem to justify the Russians in seizing Berlin.

I quite recognise that there might be advantages to us if both Berlin and Cuba could be neutralised and demilitarised as part of a long term settlement leading to some degree of detente, and thus removing the Berlin situation from the arena of acute controversy. But even

reference-

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TOP SECRET

- 1 - 2 PM
- 3. CPS
- 4. S. Spicknagel
- 5. M. Chastain
- 6. M. Wilson
- 7. M. Tomkins
- 8. M. Barnes
- 9. Registrar
- 10. Mr. P. Light
- 11. Mr. R. H. Mason

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

Sir D. Ormsby Gore

No. 2733

October 30, 1962

D. 9.40 p.m. October 30, 1962

R. 11.06 p.m. October 30, 1962

IMMEDIATE

DEDIP

TOP SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2733 of October 30.
Repeated for information Personal for Ambassadors at:

- Bonn
- Moscow
- Paris and UKMIS New York

Your telegram No. 7636.

Personal for Secretary of State.

I think that your arguments against aiming for any explicit link between Cuba and Berlin are overwhelming particularly as, in view of last week's events, the Soviets will in any case presume that any forceful action by them over West Berlin would inevitably lead to the early demise of the Castro régime at the hands of the Americans.

2. However, I still have the gravest doubts whether it will be possible for us to lie low over Berlin hoping for the continuance of the recent tacit moratorium. Quite apart from German support for an early referendum in West Berlin, which would presumably stir up the whole question, one thing that Khrushchev has made abundantly clear again and again is that there can be no progress on disarmament or nuclear tests while the Berlin problem remains unresolved. I, therefore, doubt whether it will prove possible to get very far in wide-ranging East-West talks designed to reduce areas of tension if we attempt to ignore the Berlin issue.

3. The other argument I have against sitting tight relates to the conversation we had when you lunched with the President in Washington. You will remember that he questioned whether it was to the West's advantage to postpone a showdown over Berlin. At the moment the balance of nuclear power still favoured the United States but this might not be so for very much longer. You may

/also

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Washington telegram No. 2733 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

also have seen a recent J.I.C. paper which forecast that the number of I.C.B.M.'s available to the Soviet Union might double between the end of this year and mid-summer 1963. A related factor is that it would seem likely that Khrushchev had hoped to take a short cut to nuclear parity with the United States by putting medium range missiles in Cuba. This deployment was clearly designed to be completed in time for him to confront the President with a last chance to settle the Berlin problem by agreement in the latter half of November. He has now lost this card and this leads me to believe that it might well be advantageous to press the problem of West Berlin to an issue now rather than allow matters to drift and face the crunch at a time of Khrushchev's choosing. In addition, there would seem to be a better chance of getting all concerned to face up to the realities of the situation before they forget what it is like to be on the verge of nuclear war.

4. This morning Mr. Blumenfeld of the West German Bundestag called on me. You will remember that he visited the United Kingdom this summer with von Brentano and he seems to be on close terms with Schroeder. After a long conversation I asked him whether in his view it would be wise to leave Berlin alone for the time being or whether it would be better, in the light of last week's events to try and arrive at an early modus vivendi. He replied that he was most emphatically in favour of the second course and would be reporting to Schroeder in this sense having in mind that Schroeder would be preparing for his visit to Washington with Adenauer next week.

2/ Foreign Office please pass Immediate to Bonn, Moscow and Paris (personal for Ambassadors) as my telegrams Nos. 341, 332, 347 respectively.

[Repeated as requested.]

TOP SECRET

Steel to FO
rechartTOP SECRETBonn telegram No. 898 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

2. It seems to me that in this situation there is a wide range of measures which the United States could, in emergency, take, corresponding closely to the sort of thing which the Soviets might try on with Berlin's communications. In particular, Berlin's civilian trade requirements might, in the event of Soviet interference, be equated with those of the Castro régime, etc., etc. Suggestions that Kennedy's guarantee precludes this would have to be met by references to Soviet undertakings on Berlin, but I doubt if that would be so dangerous as suggested in paragraph 5 of your telegram No. 7636 to Washington. By the time we reached that stage we should probably be contemplating all sorts of economic sanctions in other parts of the world which would be far more unpleasant for Her Majesty's Government. The point is surely that the situations are parallel. In other words, the idea of equating Berlin with Cuba should be insinuated quietly and for its deterrent effect, before any Soviet interference with the former had taken place. I would be surprised if the implications were not already in some Russian minds.

3. I am nevertheless in agreement that it would be a mistake for us to open the Berlin issue now and in any case not with the idea of a definite understanding with regard to Cuba. I would much prefer to keep things quiet while we see if there really is a new climate in which some progress can be made on disarmament, etc. I consider, as you know, that there is fundamentally only one direction in which a long-term modus vivendi over Berlin can be obtained. That is the exchange of some degree of recognition for the East German régime against new hard and fast arrangements for access, our troops of course remaining. Such a solution conflicts of course directly with the edifice of illusions and shibboleths which the German politicians have erected around their hopes of reunification. Nevertheless, I suppose it is what the President has in mind when he talks of "realities". The fact is, as one is sometimes able to say very privately, that Germany is not divided by any legal or constitutional arrangements but by twenty-two Soviet divisions. There are very many Germans, and I believe their number is increasing, who fully realize this, but it will need some decisive shock to overcome the artificial inertia. Perhaps Adenauer's disappearance could begin it. Meanwhile, the United

/ Kingdom

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BRITISH EMBASSY

BONN.

October 31, 1962.

etc
2. 2. 6. 6. 6. 6.
cc 1071/392 G
(L)

Dear Evelyn,

- cc 1071/392 G.

With reference to various top secret personal telegrams to the Secretary of State on the subject of tactics in the post-Cuba era, I thought it well to sound out Carstens today on German views. I went for a general tour d'horizon and found him of very much the same mind as ourselves with regard to the origins of the crisis and how the Americans had met it. He was, however, markedly cautious in assessing future Soviet policy and immediately took the point when I suggested that the Russians could still obtain nuclear parity within a relatively short time.

When I asked him directly whether he thought the moment was opportune for an initiative on Berlin he said that the Chancellor and Schröder would be discussing just this when they go to Washington on November 7. In his personal view this would in fact be a good moment for the Americans to take the initiative although he confessed that he had no ideas in what the initiative should consist. He was sure of one thing only and that was that Berlin should not be treated in isolation, but the whole German question should be raised at the same time. He did say, however, that he thought the Americans were still playing with the idea of an Access Authority.

I did not pursue the question further as I did not want to be drawn into any speculation on my own account. In particular I did not want to be asked any questions about surprise attack and de-nuclearized zones. I trust you have well in mind the fatal character of both these ideas. I understand the Americans certainly do.

I am not sure that I do.

CS.

*Your man
kit*

Christopher Steel

Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh, K.C.M.G., C.B.,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

PREMIUM 3716

XC 8209

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11/29/62
11/19/62

E.R.

E.P. 2-11-62
note 4/19/62Skybolt

2

On 8th November, 1962 (Washington telegram No. 2832) Mr. McNamara the United States Secretary for Defense told our Ambassador of the reasons which might persuade the American Government to stop the development of SKYBOLT for their own forces. If this weapon were ever to be made to work it seemed likely that the cost of development would amount to over 500 million dollars, more than two and a half times as much as at first supposed, and the cost of the missiles themselves would be more than two thousand million dollars. The expected date when the missiles might come into operation was likely to go back by several months. SKYBOLT was in any case "a comparatively small proportion" of the total American ~~second~~^{nuclear} strike potential planned for 1967 and thereafter. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were examining the question and were likely to take a fortnight in reaching a conclusion: allowing for subsequent political discussions between the Secretary for Defense, the Secretary of State and the President, the American Government might be expected to reach a decision shortly before Christmas.

Mr. McNamara fully appreciated the political consequences of such a decision for the British Government and said that the United States would be ready to adopt one of the following courses of action in order to help us:-

- (a) offer to allow us to develop SKYBOLT ourselves from the point so far reached in America (this would certainly be financially impossible for this country);
- (b) offer to supply the R.A.F. with HOUND DOG or some other comparable missile instead of SKYBOLT (this would not amount to making Bomber Command a credible deterrent force in the years to come);
- (c) offer to supply the United Kingdom with missiles such as MINUTEMAN or POLARIS, without political strings (this last point was made clear in a telephone conversation with the Minister of Defence on 9th November, 1962).

PREM II / 3716

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E.R

Mr. McNamara would be willing to come to London for discussions before any final decision was reached.

On 18th November, 1962 (Washington telegram No. 2891) our Ambassador reported that in his judgement, with which General West agreed, there was no need for any formal approach to the American Government at this stage, because the President and Mr. McNamara fully appreciated the political implications of an unfavourable decision about the development of SKYBOLT.

Last week, officials of the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Aviation, the Admiralty and the Air Ministry were instructed to examine the following possible lines of action in this country supposing SKYBOLT were cancelled:-

- (a) further technical development of BLUE STEEL to give it a longer life against ~~foreign~~ enemy defences;
- (b) extend the period during which Bomber Command would be a credible deterrent force, in the light of technical improvements to BLUE STEEL and the introduction of the TSR 2;
- (c) accelerate the timing of the programme of production of nuclear submarines with the dual role of hunter-killers and missile launchers;
- (d) accelerate the design of a British warhead for the POLARIS missile.

[19.11.62]

11/14/62
11/11

E.R.

Handwritten notes:
2-11-62
11/11/62

Skybolt

2

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- (d) accelerate the design of a British warhead for the POLARIS missile.

[19.11.62]

FO 371/163584 = 163584

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11/20/62

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FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET)
AND WHITEHALL (SECRET)(CABINET)

CG 1071/443

DISTRIBUTION

Sir D. Ormsby Gore
No. 2906
November 20, 1962.

(#)
D. 7.24 p.m. November 20, 1962.
R. 8.20 p.m. November 20, 1962.

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2906 of November 20

Repeated for information to:-
Moscow Bonn
Berlin Paris
U.K. Del. N.A.T.O.
U.K. Mis. New York

CG 1071/405

Your telegram No. 8217: Berlin.

When I saw Mr. Rusk last night we had a short talk about Berlin. He was involved at the time in urgent discussions regarding both Cuba and India and I was not able to carry the matter very far.

2. I said that from what Khrushchev had told Sir Frank Roberts it seemed that the former might soon surface with his new proposals regarding Berlin. If so, we would be faced with the problem of how to play the hand. Should we be able to say that the proposals might form the basis for further discussions with a view to a settlement or should we pursue our own line and say that the topic of Berlin must be merged into wider negotiations looking towards a general East-West détente in Europe?

3. Rusk replied that with important aspects of the Cuban crisis still unresolved and a new and serious crisis developing between China and India, he did not personally think that Khrushchev would be in any great hurry to make a move over Berlin. If and when he did so much would depend upon the details of his proposal. What he had said to Sir Frank Roberts had in many respects been extremely vague. He thought that the proposals might well contain acceptable features and we might therefore be able to welcome these and call for a further examination of these related topics which would need to form part of any temporary settlement. He had guarantees of access particularly in mind. One thing we would have to guard against was allowing the United Nations to obtain overriding authority in Berlin. He thought that if we were to say

/that Khrushchev's

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Washington telegram No. 2906 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

that Khrushchev's proposals formed the basis for full-scale negotiations the French would certainly disagree. I should say here that Rusk has recently become increasingly scathing about what he terms "France's hitch-hiking diplomacy". By this he means that they remain totally immobile and take no responsibilities in the United Nations, in NATO, on disarmament or anything else. They simply sit back and allow the Americans to shoulder the burden and expect to share in any advantages the Americans are able to obtain but seem equally happy if they can blame them for any failures.

4. Rusk said that he felt that Soviet-Chinese relations were becoming an increasingly important element in the present international complex. With this in mind he had instructed McCloy to say during the course of his long interview with Kuznetsov on Sunday that he supposed that before long it might be necessary for the Americans to discuss with the Soviet Union the problems posed to them both by China. When McCloy had made this remark Kuznetsov, while not picking up the point, had made no attempt to brush it off as something which was unthinkable.

Foreign Office please pass to Moscow, Bonn, Berlin, Paris and U.K. Del. N.A.T.O. as my telegrams Nos. 352, 377, 179, 389, and 256 respectively.

[Repeated as requested]

ADVANCE COPIES:-

Private Secretary

Sir H. Caccia

Sir E. Shuckburgh

Head of Central Department

Head of W.O.P.D.

Head of News Department

SECRET

RECEIVED

Annex to JP(62)140(Final)

11/29/62

NATO NUCLEAR WEAPONS

INTRODUCTION

1. The Minister of Defence has set out^① a number of questions relating to NATO nuclear weapons on which he has asked our advice. This subject may be raised at the NATO Ministerial meeting in December 1962 although the Minister has sent a message to Mr. McNamara suggesting that it is kept off the Agenda.

AIM

2. To answer the Minister's questions and comment on General Norstad's presentation^② to the North Atlantic Council.

THE MINISTER'S QUESTIONS

3. The Minister has asked for our views on the military requirements for medium range nuclear weapons in NATO, our comments on General Norstad's recent presentation^③ to the NATO Council on this subject, and our views on the following possible arrangements:-

- (a) Is there any militarily viable method whereby tactical nuclear delivery systems in Europe could be treated as a European nuclear force?
- (b) Would or could the United Kingdom contribution in air delivery systems, i.e. TSR 2 and VTOL strike/fighter, be integrated into such a system?
- (c) Is there any way in which the "independent" United Kingdom strategic deterrent force could be contributed or subscribed to a European Strategic Force - i.e. could Bomber Command, an emerging French "force de frappe", and perhaps some European elements of SAC operate together as a strategic force for the defence of NATO in the same way as Bomber Command and SAC do at the present time?
- (d) Could such arrangements be made without interfering with the existing arrangements between Bomber Command and SAC? If not why not?

Assumptions

4. In answering (a) - (d) above, we have been asked to take into consideration the following assumptions:-

- (a) That the United Kingdom will continue to have a nuclear capacity.
- (b) That France will proceed with the development of her "force de frappe".

① Annex to COS.1625/13/11/62
② COS.1656/19/11/62

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Annex(Continued)

- (c) That "tactical" nuclear missiles of the Corporal/Honest John types will be present in Europe and that Sergeant will be sold to some European nations but not to the United Kingdom or France.
- (d) That the TSR 2 will be available and also some form of VTOL/STOL strike fighter.
- (e) That Bomber Command armed with V-bomber/Skybolt/Blue Steel will operate from the United Kingdom.
- (f) That, for political if no other reason, pressure for some form of "European" nuclear force is growing to a point at which something must be done to meet it.

Political Aspects

5. The Minister has stated that the political aspects are being considered separately and that his enquiry relates only to the military implications.

THE MILITARY REQUIREMENT FOR MRBMS IN NATO

6. We interpret the Minister's request for our views on the military requirement for medium range nuclear weapons in NATO as applying specifically to Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs). We begin by examining General Norstad's recent presentation⁵ to the North Atlantic Council on the subject.

General Norstad's Presentation

7. In his statement to the North Atlantic Council on the requirement for MRBMs General Norstad stated that they were needed to attack effectively targets which posed a direct threat to Western Europe, thus enabling him to carry out the directives which he had received from the Military Committee and from the Council. There were a number of targets, he claimed, which in present circumstances could not be attacked or destroyed effectively by any other weapon except an MRBM. He then described CO3 priority targets (missile sites, light and medium bomber bases, etc.) as the "fixed nuclear threat to ACE" and also referred to about 1500 contingency targets (airfields, bridges, road and rail centres, etc.) against which strikes might have to be mounted at the outbreak of hostilities.

8. General Norstad stated that an MRBM system should represent the primary nuclear capability of his Command, claiming, amongst others, the following advantages for MRBMs:-

- (a) They would be of value before, during, and after the main nuclear exchange.
- (b) They would provide the capability of attacking a large number of opportunity targets.
- (c) They would have the shortest possible reaction time.

Annex(Continued)

- (d) They would be less vulnerable than aircraft, both before launch and in flight.

9. General Norstad accepted the vital part which the external forces had to play in the maintenance of the deterrent, but asked whether their weapons would be launched until NATO had already reached a condition of general war; he confessed to doubts about the contribution which the external forces could make in the immediate and direct defence of NATO Europe. In his opinion there must be MRBMs or no defence for NATO Europe, and consequently no NATO within a relatively few years.

Areas of Agreement

10. There are many aspects of the Norstad presentation with which, in any strategic context, we can agree:-

- (a) The threat assessment; but, by 1967 this threat will include increased numbers of IRBMs/MRBMs which may be hardened, thus complicating targetting problems still further. Moreover, it is wrong to assume that the threat will remain "fixed".
- (b) The need to diversify and disperse the forces composing the Western deterrent in order to complicate Soviet targetting and defence problems.
- (c) The advantages which MRBMs have over longer range delivery systems, in terms of flight time, accuracy, yield, and economy.
- (d) The relative effectiveness of MRBMs, compared with aircraft, against static, well defended targets.

Areas of Disagreement

11. The validity of the directives⁵ on which General Norstad must base his concept is, in our opinion, open to doubt. For the following reasons we do not consider that they are applicable to present and future conditions:-

- (a) A protracted campaign in global war for the defence of NATO Europe has become an unrealistic concept since the strategic exchange would now be rapidly decisive.
- (b) The growth in the Soviet missile capability, which by 1967 will be formidable, requires a new strategic approach, rather than a parallel MRBM capability on our side, which could do little or nothing to mitigate its effect except in the deterrent role. *but that's the key*

12. Also we disagree with SACBUR in the following respects:-

- § The Political Directive (C-4(56)138) and overall Strategic Concept (MC 14/2 and MC 45/2)

- (a) That it is essential to provide MRBMs for use before or after the main nuclear exchange. We do not know if it would be politically acceptable to use them before, and it would be militarily unnecessary to use them after the exchange.
- (b) That they could be used effectively against opportunity targets.
- (c) That the costs of the new weapon system are justifiable.

13. We consider that MRBMs must be viewed in the context of deterrence and not as a means of fighting war. We consider that adequate provision has been made for strategic deterrence in the planned external forces which would include an MRBM capability in the shape of Skybolt and Polaris. The spectrum of deterrence is filled in by the assigned air delivery systems, many of which are obsolescent. Before it can be decided whether MRBMs have an essential role in the replacement of these forces, studies are required to determine:-

- (a) The correct allocation of responsibilities for nuclear strikes as between ACE and the external forces.
- (b) The correct balance between future aircraft (particularly VTOL) and missiles for the ACE tasks.

However, should deterrence fail, such forces could meet targetting requirements for the defence of Central Europe and could significantly reduce the weight of re-strikes by Soviet missile forces. We are yet to be convinced, though, in view of the heavy calls on NATO defence budgets for other purposes, that even if some role can be found for the MRBM it will justify the development and production of so expensive a new weapon at the present time.

THE MINISTER'S QUESTIONS

General

14. In examining the Minister's questions, while we have endeavoured to confine our examination strictly to the military implications, we have found it impossible to ignore completely some political considerations.

A European Tactical Nuclear Force

15. Military Implications. The present position in ACE is that, while all nuclear warheads are owned by the United States, both the delivery systems of surface-to-surface missiles and strike aircraft are nationally owned. Delivery systems extend from what is virtually a strategic capability down to Davy Crocket. We consider that the essential military safeguard against the unauthorised or accidental use of tactical nuclear weapons is American control through their custodial system which is responsive to an American commander. Any other control system involving divided command (for example one that embraced several national commanders or divided responsibilities in a NATO chain of command), or involving multinational manning, would be so much less reliable as to be unacceptably reduced in effectiveness compared with the present system. The safeguards which we require militarily, therefore, mean that a European system, if this is to be taken as excluding the Americans although still deployed in Europe, cannot be accepted.

Annex(Continued)

16. Political Control. Any form of NATO nuclear committee that was politically acceptable would be militarily acceptable provided that it was organized so as to be capable of reaching a timely decision to use nuclear weapons.

17. Integration of United Kingdom Elements. Provided that the safeguards for the control and custody of nuclear weapons were observed, we see no military reason why the United Kingdom contribution in air delivery systems, the TSR 2 and V/STOL strike fighter, could not be integrated into a European Tactical Nuclear Force in the same way as RAF Germany forms part of 2 ATAF at present.

A European Strategic Nuclear Force

18. General. If it was considered to be politically necessary, it would be militarily practicable to form a European Strategic Force by integrating Bomber Command, an emerging "force de frappe", and elements of SAC based in Europe. However, the force as a whole would have to fulfil certain conditions which we discuss below.

19. Capability. To continue to pose a credible deterrent, air-launched delivery systems are having to adopt an increased degree of dispersion. In times of acute tension they would have to resort to airborne alert. It would be possible with the introduction of Skybolt to maintain such an alert state with the 'V' force. The French "force de frappe" however might have more difficulty in maintaining an effective airborne alert, due to lack of stand-off weapons and their inadequate flight re-fuelling capabilities.

20. Integration. However inconceivable it might be for any of the nations concerned to operate their force independently, they would consider it as essential that they should retain the capability of doing so in the last resort. There would be no difficulty, in effect, for each element of the force to have and meet a national target plan as well as the integrated one for the force as a whole. We similarly foresee no difficulty in targetting all components in accordance with a single integrated strike plan, and of co-ordinating this with the over-all strategic plan.

21. Command and Control. The present UK/US arrangements for political control would have to be extended to include the French, and, if adequate communications are provided, this should be militarily acceptable. The forces should be commanded by their national commanders in the same way as Bomber Command and SAC.

22. United Kingdom National Commitments. To meet United Kingdom commitments outside NATO it would be essential to reserve part of Bomber Command. If we did not do so, while we could inform NATO whenever we re-deployed part of the V-force for that purpose, this would have an unacceptable effect on the target plans of the integrated force.

23. Relationship between Bomber Command and SAC. It is of cardinal military importance that the existing relationship between Bomber Command and SAC should not suffer. We could not be sure, without consultation with the Americans, that this would not occur if the major part of Bomber Command were to be integrated into a European force which included the French. However, so long as the United Kingdom confined its exchange of information to details of the overall strategic target plan and did not

Annex(Concluded)

extend it to include information on nuclear weapons, we should hope that the existing relationship between Bomber Command and SAC would be maintained.

CONCLUSIONS

24. We conclude that:-

- (a) There may be a place for some MRBMs in the deterrent role in Europe but further study is required of:-
 - (i) The correct allocation of responsibilities for nuclear strikes as between ACE and the external forces.
 - (ii) The correct balance between future aircraft (particularly VTOL) and missiles for the ACE tasks.

The cost must also be studied subsequently before we could commit ourselves to any of these weapons.

- (b) General Norstad's recent presentation stems from directives and a strategic concept the validity of which is now open to doubt.
- (c) It is militarily acceptable for tactical nuclear delivery systems as at present constituted in Europe to be treated as a European nuclear force, responsive to a NATO Nuclear Committee and retaining present control and custody arrangements.
- (d) Provided that the safeguards for the control and custody of nuclear weapons were observed, there is no military reason why the United Kingdom contribution in air delivery systems, the TSR 2 and V/STOL strike fighter, could not be integrated into a European Tactical Nuclear Force.
- (e) Bomber Command could, subject to (f) below, operate together with French and American forces to form a European Strategic Nuclear Force.
- (f) Although we can not be certain in advance of discussion with the Americans, membership of a European Strategic Nuclear Force should not prejudice the existing arrangements between Bomber Command and SAC, provided that we did not exchange with the French information on nuclear weapons obtained from the Americans.

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30 November 1962

Annex (Continued)

11/30/62

ITEM 13

DISCUSSION ON MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE INTRODUCTION OF MRBMs INTO NATO

SACEUR's Presentation

1. General. Discussion will be preceded by a presentation by General Norstad on the "Basis of ACE MRBM Requirements". This is likely to take a similar form to the presentation[@] on the same subject which he gave to the North Atlantic Council last October. In this presentation he stated that MRBMs were needed in order to enable him to attack effectively targets which posed a direct threat to Western Europe, and thus to carry out the directives which he had received from the Military Committee and from the Council.

2. Our Views. In so far as these directives require him to maintain a deterrent posture, to defend ACE against nuclear attack and to fight a protracted campaign in global war, we consider that SACEUR has no alternative but to attempt to evolve an effective counter to the Soviet missile threat. However, we doubt the validity of these directives and we indicate below the areas of agreement and disagreement with SACEUR.

Areas of Agreement

3. There are many aspects of the Norstad presentation with which, in any strategic context, we can agree:-

- (a) The threat assessment; but, by 1967 this threat will include increased numbers of IRBMs/MRBMs which may be hardened, thus complicating targetting problems still further. Moreover, it is wrong to assume that the threat will remain "fixed".

@ Annex to COS.1656/19/11/62

Annex (Continued)

- (b) The need to diversify and disperse the forces composing the Western deterrent in order to complicate Soviet targetting and defence problems.
- (c) The advantages which MRBMs have over longer range delivery systems, in terms of flight time, accuracy, yield, and economy.
- (d) The relative effectiveness of MRBMs, compared with aircraft, against static, well defended targets.

General Horstad is not reported as having asked for MRBMs in order to permit a less vulnerable deployment but in our view this would be one of the main advantages.

Areas of Disagreement

4. The validity of the directives[£] on which General Horstad must base his concept is, in our opinion, open to doubt. For the following reasons we do not consider that they are applicable to present and future conditions:-

- (a) A protracted campaign in global war for the defence of NATO Europe has become an unrealistic concept since the strategic exchange would now be rapidly decisive.
- (b) The growth in the Soviet missile capability, which by 1967 will be formidable, requires a new strategic approach, rather than a parallel MRBM capability on our side, which could do little or nothing to mitigate its effect except in the deterrent role.

£ The Political Directive (C-M(56)138) and Overall Strategic Concept (MC 14/2 and MC 48/2)

UK EYES ONLY

Annex (Continued)

5. Also we disagree with SACXUR in the following respects:-

- (a) That it is essential to provide MRBMs for use before or after the main nuclear exchange. We do not know if it would be politically acceptable to use them before, and it would be militarily unnecessary to use them after the exchange.
- (b) That they could be used effectively against opportunity targets.
- (c) That the costs of the new weapon system are justifiable.

6. General Norstad has stated² that there must either be MRBMs or no defence for NATO Europe, and consequently no NATO within a relatively few years. We consider that MRBMs must be viewed in the context of deterrence and not as a means of fighting war. We consider that adequate provision has been made for strategic deterrence in the planned external forces which would include an MRBM capability in the shape of Skybolt and Polaris. The spectrum of deterrence is filled in by the assigned air delivery systems, many of which are obsolescent. Before it can be decided whether MRBMs have an essential role in the replacement of these forces, studies are required to determine:-

- (a) The correct allocation of responsibilities for nuclear strikes as between ACE and the external forces.
- (b) The correct balance between future aircraft (particularly VTOL) and missiles for the ACE tasks.

However, should deterrence fail, such forces could meet targetting requirements for the defence of Central Europe and could significantly reduce the weight of re-strikes by

© Annex to COS.1656/19/11/62

UK EYES ONLY

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Annex (Continued)

Soviet missile forces. We are yet to be convinced, though, in view of the heavy calls on NATO defence budgets for other purposes, that, even if some role can be found for the MRBM, it will justify the development and production of so expensive a new weapon at the present time.

The Finletter Statement

7. Since the MC/PS have directed the Standing Group to report on the differences between General Norstad's assessment of the need for MRBMs and that of Mr. Finletter[%], the latter may also be discussed in the MC/CS. Mr. Finletter's main points were:-

- (a) MRBMs would only be used in major nuclear war, and consequently the requirement must be evaluated in the light of all other strategic nuclear forces.
- (b) Presently programmed external nuclear forces are adequate to handle opposing nuclear forces and therefore there is no urgent need for MRBMs.
- (c) The reaction time of external forces will improve and will be adequate to meet SACTUR's needs.
- (d) Present and programmed nuclear forces will deter the Soviets from any initial use of these weapons.
- (e) No possible addition to our programmed nuclear forces would enable us to destroy all of the Soviet nuclear strength.

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(f) A substantial number of short-range Soviet mobile missiles would be available for second strike and would inflict great damage to Western Europe even if MRBMs were provided for ACE.

(g) In Global War it is unlikely that a large-scale organised land battle for Western Europe would follow the strategic exchange. Any advance of Soviet Ground forces would be brought to a halt.

8. The Finletter statement shows a marked affinity with our views on the subject.

A NATO Seaborne MRBM Force

9. The United States has stated its willingness to assist NATO in establishing a seaborne MRBM force, if other nations want such a force and are prepared to bear a large share of the cost. We have recently received a detailed United States study[&] on the feasibility of this project. Their proposal is for a multinationally owned, financed, controlled and manned seaborne force. On the grounds of cost, they favour merchant vessel type hulls and propose 25 such ships equipped with Missile 'X'. They have indicated that the force might cost \$1000m (more than £350m) a year over a five-year period.

10. This study has not yet received a detailed examination in Whitehall and it would therefore be unwise at present to form a judgement on the viability of the force proposed.

11. In March 1962 we considered^Ø a Foreign Office report on this subject, but were not at that time aware that the United States detailed study was for a force of surface vessels only.

We therefore covered submarines as well, and our views were that:-

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- (a) The best practical solution for such a force would be for the submarines each to be manned by one nationality except for United States control over the missiles, the force being multinational.
- (b) Whilst mixed manning of nuclear submarines would be possible, we foresaw serious difficulties in achieving it and considered that this problem would be less in surface ships.
- (c) A submarine system would in the foreseeable future be to such an extent relatively less vulnerable to a pre-emptive attack than surface vessels equipped with MRBMs that its use was much to be preferred.

12. While the need for a seaborne MRBM force must be viewed in the light of the considerations we have outlined above for an ACE MRBM force of any sort, the current United States proposition specifically involves the setting-up of a multinational control system. We have yet to be convinced that the military disadvantages which in our view[^] would rule out such a system on land in ACE would not also apply to a seaborne force.

G.O.S.(62)76th Meeting

F. MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE INTRODUCTION OF MRBMs INTO NATO

In discussion the following points were made:-

- (h) It was for consideration whether the United Kingdom should still take a minority stand against the introduction of MRBMs into NATO. It might be tactically sounder for the United Kingdom to sit on the fence and either rely on the proposal being discarded on grounds of prohibitive cost, or, if the proposal were accepted, decline to contribute towards it. In all probability, however, if the proposal for MRBMs were accepted, it would be decided that it should be multi-laterally financed and in this event the United Kingdom would feel compelled to agree and contribute to the cost.
- (j) It was by no means certain what degree of support there was for MRBMs among the European members of NATO. On the one hand Sir Paul Mason had expressed the view that the proposal to introduce them would be likely to be abandoned on political grounds when it was discussed in the NATO Council; and, following the NATO Parliamentarians Conference, Senator Cooper was expected to report to Mr. Rusk and Mr. Ichimura that there was only limited support for the proposal. On the other hand there were genuine aspirations by some of the NATO nations in Europe to share in the control of nuclear weapons and a growing realisation that, so long as the need for SACER's nuclear strike plan was accepted, it would be necessary in due course to replace aircraft by a more modern delivery system.
- (k) It might be possible to defer a decision on MRBMs on the ground that the long term threat assessment was still under discussion, and that a new strategy for NATO had not yet been formulated; it was impossible to divorce the MRBM problem from this context. The brief for the Chief of the Defence Staff at the HC/CS meeting should be amended to include this point.
- (l) It had long been United Kingdom Government policy to resist the introduction of MRBMs into NATO. United Kingdom views were well expressed in paragraph 24(b) of the report on NATO Nuclear Weapons. If it proved necessary for the UK representative to make a statement, it should be based on this paragraph.
- (m) Paragraphs 1-6 of item 13 of the brief should be recast by the staff of the Chief of the Defence Staff in the light of their discussion and circulated for telephone clearance.

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DEFE 5/132, COS (62) 467, NATO Nuclear Weapons, Note by the Secretary

5 December 1962

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ANNEX TO COS(62)467

NATO NUCLEAR WEAPONS

INTRODUCTION

1. The Minister of Defence has set out¹ a number of questions relating to NATO nuclear weapons on which he has asked our advice. This subject may be raised at the NATO Ministerial meeting in December 1962 although the Minister has sent a message to Mr. McNamara suggesting that it is kept off the Agenda.

AIM

2. To answer the Minister's questions and comment on General Norstad's presentation² to the North Atlantic Council.

THE MINISTER'S QUESTIONS

3. The Minister has asked for our views on the military requirements for medium range nuclear weapons in NATO, our comments on General Norstad's recent presentation² to the NATO Council on this subject, and our views on the following possible arrangements:-

- (a) Is there any militarily viable method whereby tactical nuclear delivery systems in Europe could be treated as a European nuclear force?
- (b) Would or could the United Kingdom contribution in air delivery systems, i.e. TSR 2 and VTOL strike/fighter, be integrated into such a system?
- (c) Is there any way in which the "independent" United Kingdom strategic deterrent force could be contributed or subscribed to a European Strategic Force - i.e. could Bomber Command, an emerging French "force de frappe", and perhaps some European elements of SAC operate together as a strategic force for the defence of NATO in the same way as Bomber Command and SAC do at the present time?
- (d) Could such arrangements be made without interfering with the existing arrangements between Bomber Command and SAC? If not why not?

Assumptions

4. In answering (a) - (d) above, we have been asked to take into consideration the following assumptions:-

- (a) That the United Kingdom will continue to have a nuclear capacity.
- (b) That France will proceed with the development of her "force de frappe".

¹ Annex to COS.1628/15/11/62
² COS.1636/19/11/62

Annex to COS(62)467 (Continued)

- (c) That "tactical" nuclear missiles of the Corporal/Honest John types will be present in Europe and that Sergeant will be sold to some European nations but not to the United Kingdom or France.
- (d) That the TSR 2 will be available and also some form of VTOL/STOL strike fighter.
- (e) That Bomber Command armed with V-bomber/Skybolt/Blue Steel will operate from the United Kingdom.
- (f) That, for political if no other reason, pressure for some form of "European" nuclear force is growing to a point at which something must be done to meet it.

Political Aspects

5. The Minister has stated that the political aspects are being considered separately and that his enquiry relates only to the military implications.

THE MILITARY REQUIREMENT FOR MRBMS IN NATO

6. We interpret the Minister's request for our views on the military requirement for medium range nuclear weapons in NATO as applying specifically to Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs). We begin by examining General Norstad's recent presentation² to the North Atlantic Council on the subject.

General Norstad's Presentation

7. In his statement to the North Atlantic Council on the requirement for MRBMs General Norstad stated that they were needed to attack effectively targets which posed a direct threat to Western Europe, thus enabling him to carry out the directives which he had received from the Military Committee and from the Council. There were a number of targets, he claimed, which in present circumstances could not be attacked or destroyed effectively by any other weapon except an MRBM. He then described 605 priority targets (missile sites, light and medium bomber bases, etc.) as the "fixed nuclear threat to ACE" and also referred to about 1300 contingency targets (airfields, bridges, road and rail centres, etc.) against which strikes might have to be mounted at the outbreak of hostilities.

8. General Norstad stated that an MRBM system should represent the primary nuclear capability of his Command, claiming, amongst others, the following advantages for MRBMs:-

- (a) They would be of value before, during, and after the main nuclear exchange.
- (b) They would provide the capability of attacking a large number of opportunity targets.
- (c) They would have the shortest possible reaction time.

Annex to COS(62)467(Continued)

- (d) They would be less vulnerable than aircraft, both before launch and in flight.

9. General Norstad accepted the vital part which the external forces had to play in the maintenance of the deterrent, but asked whether their weapons would be launched until NATO had already reached a condition of general war; he confessed to doubts about the contribution which the external forces could make in the immediate and direct defence of NATO Europe. In his opinion there must be MRBMs or no defence for NATO Europe, and consequently no NATO within a relatively few years.

Areas of Agreement

10. There are many aspects of the Norstad presentation with which, in any strategic context, we can agree:-

- (a) The threat assessment; but, by 1967 this threat will include increased numbers of IRBMs/MRBMs which may be hardened, thus complicating targetting problems still further. Moreover, it is wrong to assume that the threat will remain "fixed".
- (b) The need to diversify and disperse the forces composing the Western deterrent in order to complicate Soviet targetting and defence problems.
- (c) The advantages which MRBMs have over longer range delivery systems, in terms of flight time, accuracy, yield, and economy.
- (d) The relative effectiveness of MRBMs, compared with aircraft, against static, well defended targets.

Areas of Disagreement

11. The validity of the directives³ on which General Norstad must base his concept is, in our opinion, open to doubt. For the following reasons we do not consider that they are applicable to present and future conditions:-

- (a) A protracted campaign in global war for the defence of NATO Europe has become an unrealistic concept since the strategic exchange would now be rapidly decisive.
- (b) The growth in the Soviet missile capability, which by 1967 will be formidable, requires a new strategic approach, rather than a parallel MRBM capability on our side, which could do little or nothing to mitigate its first strike effect except in the deterrent role.

12. Also we disagree with SACEUR in the following respects:-

- 3 The Political Directive (C-M(56)138) and overall Strategic Concept (MC 14/2 and MC 18/2)

Annex to COS(62)467(Continued)

- (a) That it is essential to provide MRBMs for use before or after the main nuclear exchange. We do not know if it would be politically acceptable to use them before, and it would be militarily unnecessary to use them after the exchange.
- (b) That they could be used effectively against opportunity targets.
- (c) That the costs of the new weapon system are justifiable.

13. We consider that MRBMs must be viewed in the context of deterrence and not as a means of fighting war. We consider that adequate provision has been made for strategic deterrence in the planned external forces which would include an MRBM capability in the shape of Skybolt and Polaris. The spectrum of deterrence is filled in by the assigned air delivery systems, many of which are obsolescent. Before it can be decided whether MRBMs have an essential role in the replacement of these forces, studies are required to determine:-

- (a) The correct allocation of responsibilities for nuclear strikes as between ACE and the external forces.
- (b) The correct balance between future aircraft (particularly VTOL) and missiles for the ACE tasks.

However, should deterrence fail, such forces could meet targetting requirements for the defence of Central Europe and could significantly reduce the weight of re-strikes by Soviet missile forces. We are yet to be convinced, though, in view of the heavy calls on NATO defence budgets for other purposes, that even if some role can be found for the MRBM it will justify the development and production of so expensive a new weapon at the present time.

THE MINISTER'S QUESTIONS

General

14. In examining the Minister's questions, while we have endeavoured to confine our examination strictly to the military implications, we have found it impossible to ignore completely some political considerations.

A European Tactical Nuclear Force

15. Military Implications. The present position in ACE is that, while all nuclear warheads are owned by the United States, both the delivery systems of surface-to-surface missiles and strike aircraft are nationally owned. Delivery systems extend from what is virtually a strategic capability down to Davy Crocket. We consider that the essential military safeguard against the unauthorised or accidental use of tactical nuclear weapons is American control through their custodial system which is responsive to an American commander. Any other control system involving divided command (for example one that embraced several national commanders or divided responsibilities in a NATO chain of command), or involving multinational manning, would be so much less reliable as to be unacceptably reduced in effectiveness compared with the present system. The safeguards which we require militarily, therefore, mean that a European system, if this is to be taken as excluding the Americans although still deployed in Europe, cannot be accepted.

Annex to COS(62)467 (Continued)

16. Political Control. Any form of NATO nuclear committee that was politically acceptable would be militarily acceptable provided that it was organized so as to be capable of reaching a timely decision to use nuclear weapons.

17. Integration of United Kingdom Elements. Provided that the safeguards for the control and custody of nuclear weapons were observed, we see no military reason why the United Kingdom contribution in air delivery systems, the TSR 2 and V/STOL strike fighter, could not be integrated into a European Tactical Nuclear Force in the same way as RAF Germany forms part of 2 ATAF at present.

A European Strategic Nuclear Force

18. General. If it was considered to be politically necessary, it would be militarily practicable to form a European Strategic Force by integrating Bomber Command, an emerging "force de frappe", and elements of SAC based in Europe. However, the force as a whole would have to fulfil certain conditions which we discuss below.

19. Capability. To continue to pose a credible deterrent, air-launched delivery systems are having to adopt an increased degree of dispersion. In times of acute tension they would have to resort to airborne alert. It would be possible with the introduction of Skybolt to maintain such an alert state with the 'V' force. The French "force de frappe" however might have more difficulty in maintaining an effective airborne alert, due to lack of stand-off weapons and their inadequate flight re-fuelling capabilities.

20. Integration. However inconceivable it might be for any of the nations concerned to operate their force independently, they would consider it as essential that they should retain the capability of doing so in the last resort. There would be no difficulty, in effect, for each element of the force to have and meet a national target plan as well as the integrated one for the force as a whole. We similarly foresee no difficulty in targetting all components in accordance with a single integrated strike plan, and of co-ordinating this with the over-all strategic plan.

21. Command and Control. The present UK/US arrangements for political control would have to be extended to include the French, and, if adequate communications are provided, this should be militarily acceptable. The forces should be commanded by their national commanders in the same way as Bomber Command and SAC.

22. United Kingdom National Commitments. To meet United Kingdom commitments outside NATO it would be essential to reserve part of Bomber Command. If we did not do so, while we could inform NATO whenever we re-deployed part of the V-force for that purpose, this would have an unacceptable effect on the target plans of the integrated force.

23. Relationship between Bomber Command and SAC. It is of cardinal military importance that the existing relationship between Bomber Command and SAC should not suffer. We could not be sure, without consultation with the Americans, that this would not occur if the major part of Bomber Command were to be integrated into a European force which included the French. However, so long as the United Kingdom confined its exchange of information to details of the overall strategic target plan and did not

Annex to COS(62)467
(Concluded)

extend it to include information on nuclear weapons, we should hope that the existing relationship between Bomber Command and SAC would be maintained.

CONCLUSIONS

24. We conclude that:-

- (a) General Norstad's recent presentation stems from directives and a strategic concept the validity of which is now open to doubt.
- (b) There may be a place for some MRBMs in the deterrent role in Europe but further study is required of:-
 - (i) The correct allocation of responsibilities for nuclear strikes as between ACE and the external forces.
 - (ii) The correct balance between future aircraft (particularly VTOL) and missiles for the ACE tasks.

The cost must also be studied subsequently before we could commit ourselves to any of these weapons.

- (c) It is militarily acceptable for tactical nuclear delivery systems as at present constituted in Europe to be treated as a European nuclear force; but although this force could be responsive to a NATO nuclear committee (capable of reaching timely decisions on the use of weapons), no control system involving divided command or custodial arrangements is militarily acceptable.
- (d) Provided that the safeguards for the control and custody of nuclear weapons were observed, there is no military reason why the United Kingdom contribution in air delivery systems, the TSR 2 and V/STOL strike fighter, could not be integrated into a European Tactical Nuclear Force.
- (e) Bomber Command could, subject to (f) below, operate together with French and American forces to form a European Strategic Nuclear Force.
- (f) We cannot give a judgment on whether or not an association on our part with a "European Strategic Force" would interfere with the existing relationship between Bomber Command and S.A.C. until we have had consultations with the Americans. Provided that we did not exchange with the French, information on nuclear weapons obtained from the Americans, it is possible that some mutually acceptable arrangement could be worked out. But it is of cardinal military importance that our existing relationship with the Americans should not be prejudiced.

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DEFE 5/132 COS (62) 473, Europe and Nuclear Defence, 6 December 1962

ANNEX TO COS(62)473

SUMMARY

EUROPE AND NUCLEAR DEFENCE

At present NATO relies primarily on the U.S. for nuclear defence.

Factors making for Change

2. There is some European anxiety about this. Moreover, the Community will want a bigger nuclear role as it develops politically.
3. France is developing an independent nuclear capability.
4. Germany wants a stronger voice in the use of Western nuclear power, and will not indefinitely accept a position overtly inferior to Britain and France.
5. The U.S. are alive to these points. But they are also strongly against any proliferation of national nuclear forces, and especially any possibility of a German force. They are therefore willing to help create a multilateral nuclear force in Europe.
6. To this end they have offered to sell the missiles for a NATO multilateral sea-borne MRBM force if so desired by the Alliance.
7. If Britain joins the Community political pressures to give up her independent deterrent will be strong, and after Skybolt (or in the absence of Skybolt or a suitable alternative) the cost of continuing it would be heavy.

British Aims

8. Assuming that any change will take place against the background of British membership of Europe, our aims in order of priority must be:-
 - (a) to ensure an effective deterrent against war;
 - (b) to retain U.S. military support for Europe and to prevent the defence of Europe being separated from the defence of the continental U.S., i.e. to maintain the unity of the defence of the Atlantic area;
 - (c) to prevent the spread of national nuclear forces (in particular the emergence of a German national force);
 - (d) to maintain British influence in the Alliance;
 - (e) to satisfy the European desire for less dependence on the U.S. and for an expression of European unity;
 - (f) to avoid duplication and waste of resources.

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Annex to COS(62)473(Continued)Possible Choices

9. For the reasons given above, we can probably rule out leaving the nuclear defence of NATO altogether to the U.S., and also, assuming Britain joins the Community, maintaining an independent British deterrent indefinitely.

10. We are therefore left with two possibilities:-

I. A jointly owned and operated nuclear force in Europe

If this were created in defiance of the U.S. there would be grave danger of encouraging both "third force" ideas and U.S. isolationism.

These risks would be avoided by a European deterrent which was integrated into NATO and built with U.S. agreement and help. It would be still better if it contained a substantial element of U.S. strategic force.

This could be a cure for the unequal relationship between the U.S. and her allies and, provided that the U.S. gave up her veto, for excessive European dependence on an American deterrent of which the credibility might be open to doubt. The U.S. Administration have indicated they would be ready to seek Congressional approval for a relaxation of the U.S. veto over such a force if this were necessary to prevent proliferation. The main trouble about such a force is that it would involve Germany having a share in operational as well as political control. For this and other reasons we are against the U.S. idea of creating a multilateral NATO MRBM force at present. But such a German role would probably have to be accepted if and when it really seemed that the alternative was pressure in Germany leading to her ultimate acquisition of independent nuclear power.

II. An arrangement designed to preserve the substance of the existing situation while accepting the form of greater multilateralism

Until Europe is more closely organised and while the European elements of the British and French nuclear forces continue to be available, these two forces (or the British force alone while General de Gaulle remains in power) could be put more explicitly at the service of Europe without compromising their essential national independence. Together with U.S. nuclear forces in Europe, they could be placed under a NATO Commander. This would be in line with a suggestion made by President Kennedy to the Prime Minister last year. The Commander would be answerable to the Alliance as a whole. But in practice the decision to use the force would be likely to devolve on the nuclear powers. So Britain (and France if she joined) would have to retain control over their crews and nuclear warheads.

11. But the Americans would argue that this would not satisfy the Germans indefinitely. If therefore seems that we will have to accept a European multilateral arrangement as the ultimate position.

Annex to COS(62)473(Continued)

Outline of a jointly owned and operated nuclear force in Europe

12. Such an arrangement might be on the following lines:-

(a) Essential Features

- (i) U.S. participation or help. But no absolute U.S. veto.
- (ii) No possibility of the Germans (or any other member country) obtaining independent control over any part of the force; but no overt discrimination against Germany.
- (iii) Under NATO command.
- (iv) A system of control which is credible while leaving the ultimate decision in political not military hands.

(b) Organisation

- (i) The force should include strategic weapons.
- (ii) Supply. Part of the force should be supplied and owned by the U.S., part (e.g. some warheads) should be made in England and France. Part (e.g. some delivery vehicles) should be bought from the U.S. by the European countries in the force or manufactured by them under licence. Perhaps European countries might also manufacture some delivery vehicles independently.
- (iii) Political control would be vested in a Permanent Commission which would include the U.S. European countries would at first be individually represented. This could become collective representation as political unity developed.
- (iv) Veto. The U.S. could only veto the use of the weapons which it owned, i.e. the parts of the force which were manufactured in Europe or bought from the U.S. would not be subject to the U.S. veto.
- (v) Military command in peacetime. The force would come under a NATO Supreme Commander who would receive political direction from the Permanent Commission.

Tactics

13. We should seek U.S. agreement to such an arrangement as an ultimate position on the understanding that we should have to make progress towards it by way of the interim solution for as long as this was possible.

14. In discussing these courses with the Americans we should need to make it clear that our proposals are made on the assumption that Britain joins the Community. If this assumption were not fulfilled we should have to think further on the problem.

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NOTE FOR THE RECORD

Skybolt

At a meeting which the Prime Minister had, primarily for other purposes, with the Minister of Defence, the Chief of the Defence Staff, Sir Robert Scott and Sir Burke Trend, at which I was present, there was some discussion about Skybolt in the light of the Minister of Defence's minute to the Prime Minister of December 7.

The Minister of Defence said that Mr. Macnamara would be seeing him on Tuesday, December 11. The latest news was that there had been a successful test of this weapon and that all those concerned in the United States Chiefs of Staff had already advised Mr. Macnamara to continue the programme. On the other hand the Department of Defence advisers had all advised Mr. Macnamara to discontinue the weapon.

His feeling was that the right course for him was to say to Mr. Macnamara that if the U.S. Administration decided to discontinue development of Skybolt they were under an obligation to discuss alternatives with us. We would like the U.S. to offer to lend to us two or three Polaris submarines in order to cover the gap between the end of the effectiveness of Blue Steel and the time when we could bring into service our own Polaris submarines. Mr. Thornycroft thought that this would be a very satisfactory arrangement if we could bring it off.

The Prime Minister thought the right course would be to take a very cagey line. His own feeling was, and he

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did not express this at the meeting, that our best plan would be to try and play Skybolt along for another year to eighteen months in order to avoid political difficulties at home. It was clearly in our interests to get on to a Polaris deterrent at some stage but we had made a number of statements about Skybolt and it would be a little easier if that continued for the time being.⁷ It was of course for the United States Administration to decide in the first instance what to do about a weapon development programme.

J.B.

December 9, 1962

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J.B.

December 9, 1962

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COPY NO. 27....

10 December, 1962

TALKS WITH PRESIDENT KENNEDY

December 1962.

Relations with the U.S.S.R. in the Aftermath
of Cuba: Berlin.

Background Note by the Foreign Office

President Kennedy told Sir David Ormsby-Gore recently that he did not think the time had yet come for a Western initiative on Berlin. But he is well aware that time may be on the Russians' side in Berlin and that we ought to get a new settlement if we can. If he thinks such a settlement is in sight he has told Sir David Ormsby-Gore that he is willing to press the French and Germans very hard to go along.

This seems reasonable and there would be no advantage in pressing President Kennedy to make a move now. The fact is that a settlement is not in sight because the Russians' asking price is too high. Our own contacts with the Russians during November prove this. It is up to the Russians to make the first move. They want to change the status quo in Berlin more than we do. The important thing at present is to keep in touch with them and take soundings. The Americans are doing this and will doubtless continue the process.

The Prime Minister has already seen and approved the attached review by Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh which sets out the present position in more detail.

Foreign Office

10 December, 1962.

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December 11, 1962

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Repeated for information to:

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Moscow	Berlin
U.K. Del NATO	Berlin

Washington telegram No. 3034: Berlin.

I am rather surprised at the general opinion in the Ambassadorial Group that nothing has basically changed in the Berlin situation since Cuba. I have just come back from a few days there and that is certainly not my impression. Ulbricht's Cottbus speech, reported in Berlin telegrams Nos. 156 and 157 Saving, now confirms that there has indeed been a change. As you know, I do not believe that the time is yet ripe for any forward move on Berlin by the West and certainly not by ourselves. But it is still important to have a right assessment of the situation on the spot; and it is simply not true to say, as Alphan and, to a lesser extent, Thompson, do, that there is no sign of a fundamental change in the Berlin problem.

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2. The Cottbus speech does, in fact, mark a clear change in the policy of the DDR and so, presumably, of the Soviet Union. So far, Ulbricht has always been ahead of the Soviets, straining at the leash and trying to drag his masters forward to a peace treaty faster than they wanted to go. Now he, as near as makes no difference, accepts the status quo and looks forward to a period of peaceful co-existence and trade with the Federal Republic while at the same time postponing the achievement of a full socialist economy in East Germany right up to 1970. Such a face-about can only reflect painfully changed guidance from Moscow.

3. I came across two pointers in the same direction when I was in Berlin.

/First, I

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Berlin telegram No. 1030 to Foreign Office

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First, I had a long talk with von Eckardt, who seems to have made himself largely responsible for the conduct of the trade negotiations between Leopold and Behrendt. I was impressed by his confidence that by doling out credits in gobbets it should be possible to negotiate step-by-step with the East Germans arrangements which, by reuniting families, assimilating West Berliners to West Germans and establishing more crossing points, would have the effect of taking much of the sting out of the wall as far as Berlin is concerned.

Secondly, Klein the Senate Protocol Officer, told me of a conversation he recently had with Kibov, an official of the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin. Kibov said that a completely new situation had arisen as far as Berlin was concerned and that the Berlin problem could, for the time being, be regarded as only of tertiary importance. He went on to say that if it suited the Western Powers to have an access authority, this could be discussed and suggested that it might be possible to improve the atmosphere as far as the presence of Allied troops in Berlin was concerned if the occupation became a symbolic one with some minor reduction in the strength of the garrison. He also spoke of the possibility of Soviet and neutral guarantees for Berlin under the United Nations Commissioner for West Berlin. A full account of the conversation has already been sent to the Department. It may not be of great intrinsic importance, but it is certainly significant of the changed atmosphere in Berlin and of the extent to which the Soviets have disseminated their modified views.

Foreign Office please pass Washington 201, Moscow 86, U.K. Del NATO 109, and U.K. Mis New York 9.

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MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT
KENNEDY IN THE BAHAMAS ON DECEMBER 19, 1962

Germany Policy

future of Berlin

(Pt 24)

(March 1952)

At the Prime Minister's dinner party on December 19 the conversation turned to Berlin.

President Kennedy thought that United States tactics over the past year in the Ambassadorial Group had been foolish. They had involved themselves in rows with the French and the Germans over possible initiatives which had then been rejected by the Russians. Thus no progress had been made but a lot of ill-feeling inside the alliance had been engendered. At present there seemed no prospect of the Russians accepting reasonable terms. For a moment it had looked as if Mr. Khrushchev had taken a promising step forward in his conversation with Sir Frank Roberts but he had quickly withdrawn it. As things stood the President saw no point in the West taking the initiative.

Lord Home recognised that this might be so but was nevertheless worried that the West should be consigned to a position of complete immobility. If the West made no attempt to settle the Berlin question now the Russians might build up their strength over the next months and years and would precipitate another Berlin crisis, and the West would then again be inhibited from negotiating "under threats".

Mr. Thompson considered that the bilateral talks between the Americans and the Russians over the past year had brought out clearly the elements of a deal if the Russians wanted one. The basic elements were a Russian guarantee of access and a greater measure of Western recognition of East Germany.

Lord Home asked whether there was any hope of an all-Berlin solution.

Mr. Bruce thought that this was quite out of the question. The essential Russian interest was to stabilise and consolidate East Germany. They had put a considerable effort into this and the economic situation in East Germany was favourable by Eastern European standards, despite the drain of refugees, particularly in the managerial class and wage-earning age groups. The Wall had of course greatly reduced the outflow recently. He was convinced that the Russians would never surrender their control of East Germany which was the key to their European Satellite empire and provided, moreover, a platform from which they hoped to achieve their long-term aim of bringing Western Germany with its vast industrial potential within the Communist orbit.

Mr. Bruce continued that Allied policy in the immediate post-war period had been profoundly mistaken, and for this he recognised the United States was largely to blame. We had surrendered Eastern Germany to the Soviets in return for four-Power arrangements in Berlin which looked forward to Berlin becoming again the capital of a unified Germany. The essence of these four-Power arrangements had been destroyed by the Russians who would not accept reunification. The withdrawal of the Soviet Commandant from the Allied Commandatura in 1948 had in fact sounded the death knell of Allied policy and though this had not been properly appreciated at the time it had been the first step in the process, since deliberately pursued step by step by the Russians, of perpetuating the division of Germany. Given the Russian attitude, there was no real future for West Berlin although it had been built up by Western effort into the largest industrial city in Western Germany. The only hope of preventing a Communist absorption of West Berlin and providing its inhabitants with some hope for the future was to turn it into an international city and make it the seat of the United Nations Headquarters. Berlin was the one issue which could precipitate a world war; he did not deny that the West must fight for Berlin, but he urged that the West should try to arrive at some peaceful solution.

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have a moral effect. At the moment the British bomber force in conjunction with the United States Strategic Air Command provided a high proportion of the first wave attack on strategic targets. It was possible that in time bombers generally would pass more into a tactical rather than a strategic role or might be used as a second wave after a missile attack. So the United Kingdom would be ready, if it would help, to make available to SACEUR for planning and tactics say one squadron of V-bombers. He believed that the United States had done something similar and the French could be asked to do the same. This would enable the philosophy that nuclear forces were not entirely independent to be developed in a controlled fashion. First moves on these lines might be helpful and a gesture could be made straight away. Countries without a nuclear capacity could be informed of SACEUR's planning and made to feel that they were brought in to the general pattern.

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He would like to make one point about the alleged difference between POLARIS and SKYBOLT. It seemed to him that these weapons were not fundamentally different but merely varying ways of delivering ballistic rockets. Whether these were fired from the air or from the sea was just a difference in method.

Lastly, the difficulties which had been mentioned about the allies would be as nothing to the difficulties which would follow if the United States seemed to be using the SKYBOLT decision as a means of forcing Britain out of an independent nuclear capacity. This would be resented not only by those who were in favour of the British independent deterrent but even by those who opposed it and yet felt that abandonment of this United Kingdom force should come about because of a decision made by Britain and not by others.

President Kennedy agreed on the last point. The United States could not, however, take a decision in this purely on the basis of technical considerations. It was true that it was generally known that the United States did not favour national deterrents. But they were compelled to take account of the fact that POLARIS and MINUTEMAN existed. Recognising the British feeling on the question of nuclear capacity they did not wish to appear to have decided for political reasons to abandon SKYBOLT. That was why he was ready to propose that the United States Government should pay half the further development costs to completion of SKYBOLT which were estimated at \$200 million with Britain paying the other half and having the right to buy missiles. The United States Government could not at this time undertake themselves to buy any SKYBOLT missiles but if they could develop an aircraft which would stay aloft for several days, they might eventually wish to place an order for SKYBOLT. With this arrangement SKYBOLT would be completed as arranged and the United Kingdom would be able to buy what she had wanted to buy. For \$100 million plus \$1 1/2 million per missile the United Kingdom could obtain the full advantage of all the United States development work. This should certainly be an adequate deterrent for Mr. Khrushchev who would probably not know of SKYBOLT's disadvantages. After all 20 missiles in Cuba had been a deterrent to the United States. How much more would a missile system based on SKYBOLT deter the Russians even if they thought that the weapon might have the accuracy to fall only in the suburbs and not on the centre of Moscow. He therefore thought it possible to maintain the British deterrent on the basis of the SKYBOLT offer he had just made. This would be a good answer to those in Britain who thought that the United States was taking a decision on SKYBOLT because they were against a British independent deterrent.

He was, of course, aware in a general way of the history of Anglo-American co-operation in the nuclear field. He knew that the two countries had co-operated very intimately. The United States however had not supported the French in the nuclear field and the result of this policy had been to sour American relations with France. Rightly or wrongly they had taken this attitude because of Germany. The United States had paid more attention to Germany than had the United Kingdom and had spent a lot of money and effort there. The United States were concerned at what would happen in Germany after Dr. Adenauer left the scene. This was one reason why the United States had supported Britain's entry into Europe even though this must pose an economic and political threat to the United States at a time when they could ill afford this. They regarded Germany as potentially the most powerful country in Europe and one whose future was in some doubt. They had not helped President de Gaulle in his nuclear ambitions because they did not believe that the French would really abandon their hostile attitude to NATO

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extent therefore the room for manoeuvre on the nuclear was circumscribed. He was quite clear that no one in England would accept the position of there being only two nuclear Powers—the United States and Russia—with no other effective nuclear force.

President Kennedy accepted that there were arguments that could be used against a multilateral force and there were considerable difficulties both about political and military authorities. At the end of the day one man was in charge. It was one of the problems which the joint working party would have to study.

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Lord Home thought that many people in Europe would be quite happy to accept some form of agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom and France to act in the guise of trustees for Europe on nuclear matters over the next two decades. But there were few people in Europe who would be prepared to agree to any form of German participation in a nuclear force. For example, President de Gaulle had rejected the idea of Germany becoming in any way at all a nuclear Power because of the difficulties that it would cause with Russia and with the countries in Eastern Europe. Soviet distrust of Germany would be so intensified as to lead to a serious deterioration in East-West relations and prevent a *détente*. President Kennedy accepted the significance of this argument of President de Gaulle.

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Mr. Macmillan pointed out that President de Gaulle had now stated his objections to Germany having any form of nuclear weapons or participating in a multilateral nuclear arrangement. President Kennedy commented that, during his recent visit to Washington, Dr. Adenauer had asked the United States Government not to help France in any way at all on nuclear matters because it would raise the pressures in Germany to an unacceptable degree and would make life harder for him and his successors. Mr. Macmillan quoted a passage from the record of his talks at Rambouillet in which President de Gaulle had said that Dr. Adenauer was not opposed to French nuclear weapons.

MLP show

Mr. Ball felt able to share the general apprehension of Germany becoming an independent nuclear Power and agreed that this concept—which he was not suggesting—would constitute a real problem in East-West relations. But the same arguments did not apply to Germany participating in some NATO arrangement and this would have the effect, which was very important, of preventing the Germans from feeling as if they were permanent second-class citizens. This was a problem which had to be faced and it would be convenient to deal with it now rather than to go on putting it off. It was essential, he thought, to find some way of enabling Germany to participate in a multilateral force.

by
US

Mr. Thorneycroft felt there was something to be said for not pressing the multilateral concept too heavily at the outset. It would be quite possible for those countries which already had some form of nuclear capacity to be prepared to allocate part of what they had got. This gradual approach would be more realistic. Mr. Ball said that this did not help the German problem and would not be sufficient.

by
US

Lord Home said that there were none of the European allies who would in the foreseeable future be ready to let Germany have a "finger on the trigger". It was therefore not possible to avoid keeping the Germans in an inferior position. What was necessary now was to consider some method of approach that would go as far as possible to meet their aspirations without giving them the substance of what they might want.

President Kennedy said that it was extremely expensive to create nuclear capacity and to develop methods of delivery. The question of cost should not be forgotten. It should be allowed to operate to prevent the multiplication of national systems and was something on which the United States had relied to secure this. If the United States were now to make available methods of delivery to countries which had, in any degree at all, achieved some form of nuclear capacity, they would be removing a way of achieving a policy which they believed to be right. Nor was it possible in this field to foresee developments with any certainty. For example, Italy might be the next country to acquire some form of nuclear capacity. At present the United States appeared to have a monopoly position on delivery systems. Were they to make these available to anyone who asked? He felt that twin obstacles of time and money should be allowed to operate in

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MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT
 KENNEDY IN THE BAHAMAS ON DECEMBER 19, 1962

Germany Policy
 Future of Berlin
 (PC 24)
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Lord Home recognised that this might be so but was nevertheless worried that the West should be consigned to a position of complete immobility. If the West made no attempt to settle the Berlin question now the Russians might build up their strength over the next months and years and would precipitate another Berlin crisis, and the West would then again be inhibited from negotiating "under threats".

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because of such help. And if the United States did help France then pressure in Germany for similar help would rise. That was why the United States had moved towards the idea of a multilateral nuclear force; it was precisely for the reason that they wished to avoid dangerous national pressures.

In President Kennedy's view, SKYBOLT and HOUND DOG and the other aerial missiles were in a different category from POLARIS which was a new weapons system giving a new type of power. He recognised Mr. Macmillan's argument but in fact POLARIS not only was but manifestly appeared to be different. Appearances could be important as had been shown in Cuba where what the Russians were trying to do would not perhaps have altered the nuclear balance at all significantly but would have appeared to do so. President Kennedy feared that any co-operation between the United Kingdom and the United States over POLARIS would add further force to all President de Gaulle's arguments, which he used to some effect round Europe, about the United States intentions to dominate Europe. (And it would certainly have a further effect on the Germans. It might be possible to overcome these pressures and it might be necessary to face them.) But in the United States view it was not true to say that the supplying of POLARIS would make no difference at all. It would represent a change in the British position and would be exploited as such by the French. What the United States suggested therefore was that, in order to prevent the British people feeling that they were being driven out of the nuclear race by the United States, there should be an arrangement by which the United States would contribute a further \$100 million or half the further estimated development costs of SKYBOLT and that Britain should pay the rest and have the missiles which she had ordered. POLARIS should be dealt with if at all in a much more European atmosphere, so as not to increase the difficulties in Europe and so as to make a move away from national deterrents. In the circumstances of to-day President Kennedy considered that he was making a very fair offer on SKYBOLT which would put Britain about where she had been a month ago.

Mr. Macmillan said that while the proposed marriage with SKYBOLT was not exactly a shot-gun wedding, the virginity of the lady must now be regarded as doubtful. There had been too many remarks made about the unreliability of SKYBOLT for anyone to believe in its effectiveness in the future.

A multilateral European deterrent had been mentioned; he would like to know more precisely what this would be. He was not clear whether it would be manufactured by Europeans or would consist of missiles which they had been lent or sold. He would be glad to know how the United States saw this. He himself felt that the best solution might be to have a joint force with United States, British and perhaps French contributions. He would hope that in such circumstances no other countries would bother to build a nuclear force. The force commander could be similar to SACEUR and perhaps indeed could be SACEUR.

President Kennedy said that if the United States gave POLARIS to Britain it would be difficult in logic not to say that if in future any country developed a nuclear bomb the United States would give them a missile system. POLARIS was not just another version of SKYBOLT. SKYBOLT would not have been effective after 1970, whereas POLARIS would last from 1968 or 1969 until the Russians had an effective anti-missile missile—say in 1980. To give POLARIS to Britain would be a new step and so regarded in Europe. Mr. Macmillan said that he was all in favour of a multilateral force. It would appear, however, that the President envisaged that the United States would only contribute a part of their nuclear forces to such an arrangement whereas other countries would, as it were, put in all of theirs. President Kennedy assented. Mr. Macmillan said that this would cause great difficulty to the United Kingdom.

President Kennedy then said that the United States might be prepared to provide POLARIS under certain conditions. But he did not see how this could be decided straight away; it would need considerable discussion. Meanwhile he would like the meeting to accept that the disadvantages of SKYBOLT were relative; for example if the United States did not have POLARIS or MINUTEMAN they would have to take SKYBOLT. In their case, however, they had been

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thinking of buying 1,000 missiles and the cost would have been \$2½ billion. SKYBOLT would have a considerable value to Britain in prolonging the life of the V-bombers. He also felt that HOUND DOG might be of value particularly if it was used in conjunction with other systems. He felt that these two offers would maintain Britain's national deterrent and keep the spirit of the Camp David agreement. If the possibility of supplying POLARIS was to be discussed, then a divergence of view must be accepted; the United States at least thought that to supply POLARIS would cause difficulties in Europe. This was the view of all their experts and he would only cite Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Finletter and the Ambassador in Germany. At any rate he suggested that a small committee should be set up to discuss the limitations to any arrangements which could be made over POLARIS. The intention should be to reach a judgment on this during the winter of 1963.

Mr. Ball said that he should make clear the kind of arrangements which he would foresee for a multilateral concept. Not all countries might contribute physically, some might pay in money, while other contributed men. His idea was that the force should be manned on a basis of mixed nationality; this was because the right of withdrawal was not envisaged. Lord Home did not share the President's anxieties. To give POLARIS to Britain would have absolutely no effect on the French who would go ahead anyhow with their own plans. It might give them a new talking point and there might be some protest but it would not really have any serious effect. In any case even if there were a disagreement with the French, this would be far less serious for NATO than a rift between the United States and the United Kingdom. He understood that the United States were already giving some help to the French in the nuclear field. President Kennedy said that what the United States were doing for the French was miniscule; the co-operation was in the very outer circle of the nuclear world and the United States had no plans to move further in. Now, however, President de Gaulle was beginning to realise the difficulties of making an effective delivery system. What should the United States reply if the French asked for POLARIS? Lord Home said that whatever the answer it was clear that the idea of a multi-lateral force would be voted down in NATO. The French would say it was not credible because there would be too many fingers on the safety catch and all the other countries would vote against it because none of them wanted a German finger on the trigger. In his view the only sensible European arrangement to be envisaged in the immediate future was for the United States, the United Kingdom and France to put some of their nuclear capacity into some NATO framework and to develop the work of the NATO Nuclear Committee so that the smaller countries felt that they had some participation. Mr. Ball said that the United States were very conscious of the dangers of a reviving German militarism. Judging from past experience they believed it to be unrealistic to suppose that the Germans could indefinitely be deprived of some types of weapons and in a post-Adenauer Germany pressures for nuclear weapons would increase. That was why the United States favoured a multilateral force. The nuclear capacity was a status symbol and the lack of it was a stigma. The Germans would not be prepared to be condemned as second-class citizens for ever. The United States felt that this difficulty should be frankly faced and a mechanism found to allow Germany to participate in a controlled way in the nuclear deterrent. Such an arrangement would cause the least difficulty. Mr. Macmillan said that if one imagined a tough Germany determined to have a nuclear deterrent it was doubtful if they would be satisfied to have one of 16 in a submarine crew. He felt that a group such as the United Kingdom had suggested was the alternative. He had already taken his country a long way on the European road and if France accepted Britain would join the Common Market. It had been said that he was going against a thousand years of history by doing this. He would be going against it far more if he were to abandon Britain's independent power. Of course if the whole of Europe were to regard itself as like the kingdoms of Pontus and Bithynia impotent between the two Emperors then they might ask why they should take any part in their defence. And how would the military and political authorities of a multilateral force, such as had been suggested by Mr. Ball, be constituted? He would be prepared to agree to a joint study of these problems but it would not be easy to satisfy public opinion in England that a sharing in such a force would be an adequate substitute for the existing independent national deterrent. There were considerable sections of opinion in Britain who felt that the negotiations with the Six on Common Market problems had already threatened national sovereignty to a dangerous degree. To some

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Lord Home thought that many people in Europe would be quite happy to accept some form of agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom and France to act in the guise of trustees for Europe on nuclear matters over the next two decades. But there were few people in Europe who would be prepared to agree to any form of German participation in a nuclear force. For example, President de Gaulle had rejected the idea of Germany becoming in any way at all a nuclear Power because of the difficulties that it would cause with Russia and with the countries in Eastern Europe. Soviet distrust of Germany would be so intensified as to lead to a serious deterioration in East-West relations and prevent a détente. President Kennedy accepted the significance of this argument of President de Gaulle.

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Mr. Macmillan pointed out that President de Gaulle had now stated his objections to Germany having any form of nuclear weapons or participating in a multilateral nuclear arrangement. President Kennedy commented that, during his recent visit to Washington, Dr. Adenauer had asked the United States Government not to help France in any way at all on nuclear matters because it would raise the pressures in Germany to an unacceptable degree and would make life harder for him and his successors. Mr. Macmillan quoted a passage from the record of his talks at Rambouillet in which President de Gaulle had said that Dr. Adenauer was not opposed to French nuclear weapons.

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Mr. Ball felt able to share the general apprehension of Germany becoming an independent nuclear Power and agreed that this concept—which he was not suggesting—would constitute a real problem in East-West relations. But the same arguments did not apply to Germany participating in some NATO arrangement and this would have the effect, which was very important, of preventing the Germans from feeling as if they were permanent second-class citizens. This was a problem which had to be faced and it would be convenient to deal with it now rather than to go on putting it off. It was essential, he thought, to find some way of enabling Germany to participate in a multilateral force.

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Mr. Thorneycroft felt there was something to be said for not pressing the multilateral concept too heavily at the outset. It would be quite possible for those countries which already had some form of nuclear capacity to be prepared to allocate part of what they had got. This gradual approach would be more realistic. Mr. Ball said that this did not help the German problem and would not be sufficient.

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Lord Home said that there were none of the European allies who would in the foreseeable future be ready to let Germany have a "finger on the trigger". It was therefore not possible to avoid keeping the Germans in an inferior position. What was necessary now was to consider some method of approach that would go as far as possible to meet their aspirations without giving them the substance of what they might want.

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President Kennedy said that it was extremely expensive to create nuclear capacity and to develop methods of delivery. The question of cost should not be forgotten. It should be allowed to operate to prevent the multiplication of national systems and was something on which the United States had relied to secure this. If the United States were now to make available methods of delivery to countries which had, in any degree at all, achieved some form of nuclear capacity, they would be removing a way of achieving a policy which they believed to be right. Nor was it possible in this field to foresee developments with any certainty. For example, Italy might be the next country to acquire some form of nuclear capacity. At present the United States appeared to have a monopoly position on delivery systems. Were they to make these available to anyone who asked? He felt that twin obstacles of time and money should be allowed to operate in

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preventing countries from attaining these nationalist positions. Moreover, if the United States were to help France (who had considerable financial resources) and save them time and money, other European countries, especially Germany, should be offered the same advantages. The real problem confronting Europe now was the build-up of conventional forces. It was to that task that they should devote their resources. If they felt that by getting some form of rudimentary atom bomb they would then have access to sophisticated delivery systems, they might all wish to devote military resources to nuclear rather than conventional objectives.

Mr. Macmillan was not aware that the French had asked for any help from the United States on delivery systems. He did not think that the offer of POLARIS to the United Kingdom would be regarded by them as a reason for doing so. They would recognise the historical 50-50 partnership between the United States and the United Kingdom on atomic matters and they would readily accept that the substitution of POLARIS for SKYBOLT was not a new step in principle, since the weapons were basically the same, that is ballistic missiles. One was fired from an aeroplane, the other from a ship. There was no difference in principle. The French would not make an issue out of this.

President Kennedy said that the free falling bomb which the French might soon have was not really an effective deterrent. There would be strong pressures in France to get missile delivery systems. If the United States were to give the United Kingdom preferential treatment this would increase these pressures.

Mr. Macmillan said the French would regard the supplying of POLARIS to the United Kingdom as a substitute for SKYBOLT in order to honour a contract which the United States could not fulfil because SKYBOLT would not work. President Kennedy said that it was not so easy as that. The Camp David agreement had been reached in 1960 when France was not a nuclear Power but they were a nuclear Power now and they had never liked the 1958 decision which restricted American aid in this regard to countries that had their own nuclear capacity. But France could now be assisted under the McMahon Act.

Lord Home asked whether the United States would be prepared to offer POLARIS to France. President Kennedy said this was one of the problems that needed examination. Indeed, it might be necessary to abandon the multilateral concept and for the United States and the United Kingdom to make an approach to President de Gaulle to see if France would be prepared to join with their two Governments as joint defenders of Europe.

President Kennedy added that he had in mind that at the end of the present talks a statement would be issued which would make three points:

- (a) The United States would be prepared to offer to the United Kingdom on the usual terms the missile HOUND DOG;
- (b) The United States would be prepared to offer to complete the development of the SKYBOLT missile for the United Kingdom on a 50-50 cost sharing basis—the estimated total cost of completion being \$200 million.

Both of these offers would demonstrate to the world that the United States decision on POLARIS had been taken on technical and financial grounds and not as a political decision to deprive Britain of her independent deterrent.

- (c) With regard to the POLARIS missile, a new situation was created which needed to be examined with great care in view of the many complexities involved. Broadly speaking the United States felt this missile should be considered, so far as other countries were concerned, in a multilateral context. There would need to be talks to determine the constitution of the political authority and military controlling mechanism. The study would have to consider the effect of this idea throughout Europe and it was likely that any offer which they made to Britain would also have to be repeated to France.

President Kennedy felt that a statement on these lines should dispel any charges of bad faith that might be levied against the United States. Nobody could say that the United Kingdom were being left without an alternative source of deterrent power nor would it enable the French to say that the United States and United Kingdom were still united in preserving a nuclear monopoly.

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Lord Home thought that any statement on these lines would need to be considered very carefully. It might well stir up feelings in Germany about nuclear capacity which were at present quiescent. The Press would be extremely interested in the progress of any talks on a multilateral force and their content could not really be kept undisclosed for long.

Mr. Macmillan asked when the SKYBOLT weapon would have completed the development stage had the United States gone ahead with it as originally planned. *Mr. McNamara* thought the SKYBOLT could have operated from the bombers by 1966 and in reply to a question from the Prime Minister thought it would be reasonably safe to carry in the bombers and to fire from them. It was true that the weapon would not be entirely reliable on guidance but it would still act as a deterrent on Russia. If it were not for the existence of MINUTEMAN and POLARIS the United States Government would be completing the development of SKYBOLT for their own purposes, although only 20 or 30 per cent reliability was achieved. He thought that the percentage of failures in the tests in SKYBOLT were higher than usual for a missile. Of course the real problem was the extreme mobility of the platform from which SKYBOLT would be fired. This meant that inaccuracies in determining the exact location of firing were magnified at the other end, i.e., quite a small error at firing might mean that the weapon hit the suburbs and not the centre of Moscow.

Mr. Macmillan felt a considerable degree of responsibility for the decision which had been taken in 1960 for the United Kingdom to go for the SKYBOLT system rather than the POLARIS weapon. He was not, of course, claiming that President Eisenhower had then offered POLARIS but as the V-bomber force was coming off the production line and was in existence it had seemed preferable for the United Kingdom to opt for SKYBOLT. It appeared that this decision had been wrong.

President Kennedy thought that the United States Administration would themselves be under considerable attack in Congress for their failure to complete the development of SKYBOLT or to purchase it on their own account. They had, after all, devoted much money both to its development and that of the B-70 bomber, which was also to be cancelled. *Mr. McNamara* added that the Democratic Administration had increased the allocation to the SKYBOLT project some 60 days after assuming office, so that their political difficulties, if the project were now discontinued, would be considerable.

In a reply to a question from the President *Mr. Thorneycroft* said it was incontrovertible that SKYBOLT would be late, expensive and unreliable. This had been publicly stated by *Mr. McNamara*. It would be difficult for him to recommend to Parliament that Britain should now, as it were, buy shares in the company. He did not think it a defensible position for the United Kingdom to continue the SKYBOLT development.

President Kennedy thought it would be a good defence for the United Kingdom Government to quote the figures of United States expenditure on the project as given by *Mr. McNamara* as evidence that the project had been cancelled as a technical decision rather than as a political act aimed at depriving the British of a national deterrent. *Mr. Thorneycroft* said that no matter what was said or what was not said the British Press would feel and would say quite openly that as SKYBOLT was not being completed the United States had a responsibility to offer an alternative. The HOUND DOG missile would not be satisfactory in this respect. To fit it to the V-bomber force would necessitate long and expensive modifications and its operational advantages were not so far advanced over the present British weapon as to justify this expenditure. Moreover, it would, even when recessed into the wings of the Vulcan bomber, only leave 18 inches of clearance above the ground and this would make taking off and landing a hazardous procedure.

Mr. Macmillan recognised that there was a serious problem here, but what was really at stake was the future of the British independent deterrent and this was not an issue which could be blurred. There were in effect only two possible courses open to the United Kingdom Government. They could either retreat from the field of the nuclear deterrent altogether or they could go on no matter what the cost or the effort required. There were many who would point to the advantages of discontinuing the British nuclear deterrent altogether. It would reduce the burden

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: December 19, 1962

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SUBJECT: Skybolt

PARTICIPANTS:

U. S.

The President
Secretary McNamara
Mr. Ball
Ambassador Bruce
Mr. Bundy
Ambassador Thompson

U. K.

The Prime Minister
Lord Home
Mr. Thorneycroft
Ambassador Ormsby Gore
Mr. de Zuleta
Mr. Bligh

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Copies to: (See page 13)

The Prime Minister began the conversation with an expression of appreciation for the handling of the Cuban affair by the United States. In reply, the President expressed his appreciation for the attitude of the Prime Minister and the British Government which was in striking contrast with that of the British press.

The Prime Minister said that he regretted that the wide range of the talks in which he had expected to engage at this meeting had been overshadowed by the Skybolt problem. He thought he was probably the oldest of those present and knew the story from its beginning which he would like to recount. He fully appreciated the U. S. feeling of the danger of doing something which might be considered obnoxious or unfriendly by the other European powers. He did not want to cause trouble with the Germans, the French, the Italians and others or to impede developments which were wanted both by the United States and the United Kingdom.

In the first place, he wanted to mention that the atomic bomb had been developed almost entirely in the beginning by British scientists. The British Isles had been found too small to carry out tests. Churchill and Roosevelt had agreed that the development of the bomb should be carried out in the

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United States. The whole world knew about the partnership in this matter which was governed by agreement. He was not referring to a legal document but rather to the nature of the agreement. Then there had come the incidents of spies in Great Britain and the McMahon Act. There were many, including some in the United States, who felt that Britain had been treated harshly. Amendments to the McMahon Act had been made which made greater cooperation possible. At this time, the emphasis was on the bomb. Later the emphasis shifted to the means of delivery. Britain had spent about sixty million pounds on the Blue Streak missile. Then there arose the decision as to whether the development of this missile should be continued. Britain was a small and heavily populated island, and the missile would have to be situated near towns where it would be subject to observation and would be exposed to agitators. The Prime Minister had talked to President Eisenhower about the problem and had indicated the British were going to chuck it if they could get anything else.

Then Skybolt came along as well as Polaris. The British made an agreement to buy Skybolt. He was not basing himself on the terms of the agreement but rather on the gentlemen's understanding. Eisenhower had said he wanted something in return, namely the submarine base at Holy Loch. The British had favored another location but had agreed on Holy Loch which was more remote and harder for Lord Russell and his friends to reach. The Prime Minister said that from time-to-time doubts had been cast on the Skybolt development, and he had assumed that in the United States as in England there were always these rumors circulated by rival firms or services. He went on to say it did now seem that Skybolt was in trouble.

The Prime Minister said he understood the U. S. anxiety for the effect any US-UK agreement might have on other allies. He thought the main allies understood the US-UK relationship as a kind of founder company as well as the special arrangement brought about by the amendment of the McMahon Act. He said the other problem was the possibility of bringing into being a larger grouping of powers as well as the possible effect of any such agreement on the Common Market negotiations. The Prime Minister said flatly that he thought the effect of a new agreement on the Common Market agreement would be "frankly, absolute, none." These negotiations now depended on whether the French could maintain the good deal they have in agricultural products vis-a-vis the Germans. If it failed, it would be on that basis. The French and the British have a different concept about the Common Market, the French favoring an autarchical system. There was the question as to what effect an agreement would have on European multilateral arrangements. It was

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difficult to know what was meant by a multilateral deterrent. The Prime Minister saw no conflict between independent and interdependent forces. Until a supernational authority developed, it did not matter whether it was army troops or air force. Any contribution would be under the control of the Government contributing it. He remarked that the problem of control of allied forces had been with us "since Marlborough" and really was not difficult. He was aware that the French would go on and spend a lot of money. They were grateful for the aid the United States had given, and he had tried to explain this to de Gaulle. He gave the example (which he had not cited to General de Gaulle for reasons of tact) of British forces in the last war which were put under the command of the French General Gamelin, but at a certain time, Churchill had to issue orders to Lord Gort to save the British forces and any French who wanted to come along by going to the channel ports. This enabled the air force to save Britain. Until there was a single state developed, there must be a combination of independent and joint forces. The question was whether the switch of horses from Skybolt to Polaris would upset the principal allies. He thought not.

At present, Britain had a powerful bomber force which was important strategically, particularly because of its location in England. If there were to be a role for the bomber in the future, it would probably pass from a strategic one to a tactical one. Why should they not hand over one squadron to Saceur? They could ask the French to do the same. This would show the purpose of developing the philosophy of building a joint force. They could inform the others what the targets of such a force were to be. He thought that at present others were feeling left out and could well be brought in and given more information about these matters. He did not see the difference in principle whether one fired a ballistic missile from the sea or the air. He pointed out that the Skybolt was a ballistic missile. Many in Britain thought that Great Britain should not be in this game, but Britain could not have such a decision forced on them.

The President said he agreed that there was a danger that some would think that cutting off the Skybolt was an effort to cut off the British national deterrent. He pointed out that the United States had alternative means. In considering this matter, we were conscious of the importance of the British to our relationship to Europe. He had told the Prime Minister last night that the United States would divide the cost of Skybolt, which would amount to some \$200 million. It was possible that we could use it in the future if we could develop an airplane capable of staying in

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the sky for several days, but we have no great need for Skybolt. We were prepared to join equally in finishing it. He pointed out that this was a new position beyond that which had been given to Mr. Thorneycroft. All of the U. S. judgments in regard to Skybolt were made in consideration of the existence of our other systems. He pointed out that for \$100 million the British could get \$450 million worth of work which we had put in it. Skybolt should be capable of deterring Mr. Khrushchev. He pointed out that twenty missiles in Cuba had had a deterrent effect on us. For an amount of money that was not large, the British could maintain a deterrent that would take them through to a later period. For \$100 million, they would get a \$500 million system.

The second point the President wished to make was that he was aware of the history of the atomic weapon and wished to point out that we were still cooperating

We had supported Britain's entry into the Common Market although this was bound to have adverse effects upon us. The reason was that we felt that British influence was important in the balance and that Britain would contribute to the stability of Europe. We had refused help to the French because of our concern of what might happen in Germany. If we should assist the French, this would not change de Gaulle at all, but pressure in Germany would rise. If we helped the French it meant that any other country which became an atomic power would expect help from us. We hoped that we could use the time available to develop a multinational force.

The President went on to point out that there was a great difference between Polaris and Skybolt. Moreover, the problem was what these things looked like and not what they were. This point had been illustrated by the introduction of Soviet missiles in Cuba. These missiles had been less a military threat than a major political act. (If we join with the British in Polaris and refuse de Gaulle atomic or missile cooperation, we would feed the concept he already has of America and raise new problems.) The President said he did not believe that if we went ahead together on Polaris that it would not shake our European allies. All of our people who had recently been in Europe, and this included Secretary Rusk, Mr. Ball and Ambassador Bohlen, were convinced that such action would cause great difficulties. He did not want the British people to think that because of our view in opposition to the proliferation of atomic weapons

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that we had opposed a British deterrent. If we could work out a solution in regard to Polaris which would move Europe away from national deterrents, we would be prepared to consider such a move but it should be in that context. The President pointed out that all the implications would have to be considered and that this was a new problem on which study was needed. The United States had made a fair offer on Skybolt so that the British people should not think that we want to cut them down.

3. The Prime Minister said we ought to think about what a multilateral deterrent is. It need not be one in which the weapons are manufactured by the others.

The President said the question was one of how these weapons should be put in and how they could be taken out. As the Prime Minister had described the matter last night, it seemed rather synthetic. Of course, in extremes they could be taken out. He pointed out that there was a question as to whether we could get the French in and what the effect on the Germans would be of United States, British, and French participation.

The Prime Minister said we would create a force to which the United States, the French, and British would contribute. The President pointed out that if others developed atomic weapons they would expect us to give the delivery system. The Polaris was not just an extension of Skybolt which was not much good after 1970 when bombers would fade out.

The Prime Minister pointed out that Skybolt would be good into the early seventies. The Prime Minister asked if there were a multinational force was it the case that the United States would contribute part of their force while the others would contribute all of theirs?

The President replied in the affirmative, stating this was the greatest hope for a Polaris arrangement which would not upset other members of the alliance. He thought we should discuss two possibilities. The first was Skybolt. If the United States did not have Polaris, we would take Skybolt, but we had two other systems. The British did not. We were continuing our bomber force with the Hound Dog missile. He pointed out that we would have to discuss this whole problem with Congress, and he suggested that we and the British should set up a group to discuss these two problems and reach a judgment during the winter.

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Mr. Ball said that this should be done in a multilateral context. We had a different concept of a multinational force from the British. We had in mind mixed manning and that the right of withdrawal would not be envisaged, but a commission should consider this problem.

The President said that if after study the British judgment of the effect on Europe was correct we could consider the British concept or that described by Mr. Ball.

Lord Home said he did not share the anxiety the President had expressed. France was going ahead anyway. Even if there were a row with France, it would be far less damaging to NATO than a rift between the United States and Great Britain.

The President asked if we should make a similar offer to the French. Our cooperation with them now was minimal. De Gaulle was beginning to realize that the problem was not the atomic warhead, but the missile. If he asked for the missile, what do we do? (Zaw)

Lord Home pointed out that if the proposal was a multinational force as described by Mr. Ball, it would be voted down because it was impossible to have fifteen fingers on the trigger,

He thought that the U. S. and the U. K. and later the French should have a joint force with NATO targets.

Mr. Ball pointed out that we had different assessments of the German problem. We thought that after Adenauer, pressure would mount for some kind of participation.

Lord Home thought that the pressure would be for participation in political decisions.

Mr. Ball replied he thought we should face the situation and enable Germany to have participation in a manner that is controllable.

The Prime Minister asked what we meant by participating. He doubted if Germany would be satisfied with having one of fifteen sailors.

The President asked what was the alternative to national deterrents.

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The Prime Minister said that he had taken his country a long way in participating in Europe in the economic field. This was not all very agreeable for Britain, but he had done it. But if the whole of Europe was to be dependent upon the United States, why should they do anything? It was not satisfactory to have one out of fifteen sailors.

The President pointed out that Europe could use the same argument against Great Britain, though he agreed there was more logic in the present arrangements than in a multilateral force.

Lord Home thought that the Europeans would be satisfied to see the United States, Britain and France cooperate in a nuclear force if the Europeans knew about the deployment, targeting, etc.

De Gaulle had made clear his view that if Germany were to get atomic arms this would unite Eastern Europe. The Europeans did not want Germany to have atomic weapons and were opposed to a multilateral force.

The Prime Minister said that de Gaulle wanted to keep alive his distant hope that the Eastern European satellites, whom Germany had treated badly, could achieve freedom.

The President said Adenauer had expressed the hope that we would not give atomic weapons to France because of the pressure this would arouse in Germany.

The Prime Minister remarked that de Gaulle had quoted Adenauer as saying exactly the opposite.

Mr. Ball said

History had demonstrated that we could not keep Germany in an inferior position forever, and any attempt to do so would stir up latent forces in Germany. For this reason we supported a NATO approach.

Mr. Thorneycroft said we should not force the creation of a multinational force which was not wanted, but rather have the Europeans come in at the shallow end of the pool, informing them regarding targeting, etc.

Mr. Ball remarked that this would not work.

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Lord Home said we did not have a single ally in Europe that would allow Germany to have its finger on the trigger.

The President referred to the diminishing cost of atomic weapons and said they might become attractive to the Italians and others. If we gave the French Polaris submarines, we would save them a good deal of money and some time. He said that Secretary McNamara did not think the time saved would be very great, but the saving in money would be considerable. Secretary McNamara confirmed this statement. He thought the great protection with respect to delivery systems was their cost. He thought that it was important to keep the attention of the Germans in particular on conventional weapons because of Berlin, although if it were not for Berlin Europe could be defended with four divisions and a nuclear strategy.

The President asked what the argument was against giving such assistance to the French.

The Prime Minister said the British had made a contract which had not worked out.

The President observed that France had objected to our 1958 decision and to the Norstad proposals.

Now it was suggested that we come up with a new position which would represent a change of policy, and it would be wise not to hasten this decision.

The Prime Minister said it was simply a question of one horse being lame while the other was able to run. The President rejoined that these were two different races. The Prime Minister said he did not accept this.

Lord Home suggested that if we got a multinational force we could give the French Polaris at a later date.

The President suggested we should consider the whole situation and perhaps have a statement that should state:

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1. We had offered to make the Hound Dog missile available and he referred, in this connection, to the treatment of our position by the British and American press, which had made it look as though we were being unfair.
2. We had offered to continue the Skybolt program and to put \$100 million more into its development, which would enable Britain to continue its national deterrent.
3. We discussed the problem of Polaris, which was a new field and which should be looked at with care.

The President went on to say that we should look at what we meant by multinational force. How should control be exercised? Whether a similar offer should be made to France? And, finally, we should make judgment on what the effect of our action would be in Europe. The statement he had outlined would answer the charges of United States bad faith, and the charge that Britain was without any alternative. He did not think, however, that we could decide these matters here.

Mr. Ball said this should be on the basis of a private discussion.

The Prime Minister asked that if the present position had not arisen when the Skybolt would have been operational.

Secretary McNamara replied that it would have been operational in 1966.

The Prime Minister asked if the Skybolt was likely to be reasonably effective and if it would be safe to carry.

Secretary McNamara replied that it would be safe to carry and would be an effective deterrent, but would have low reliability -- something on the order of twenty to thirty percent operational reliability.

The President pointed out that if we did not have other systems available we would go ahead on Skybolt. Secretary McNamara said that in such circumstances we would certainly consider going ahead, but he did not feel that we could do so in view of the availability of alternate systems and the low reliability of Skybolt.

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The Prime Minister inquired if the record of failure was worse than normal.

Mr. McNamara replied in the affirmative, stating that this was the most complex system we had yet attempted. He pointed out that an error of one foot per second meant an error of one thousand feet at target.

Mr. McNamara pointed out that he was in a difficult situation in explaining to Congress why we had spent \$200 million since 1961. He had asked Congress for \$100 million for 1962 and for \$130 million for 1963.

The President suggested that these figures might be useful to Mr. Thorneycroft in explaining the situation to Parliament.

Mr. Thorneycroft said that his difficulty in Parliament was that the Skybolt would be late, expensive and unreliable, and these facts had been made public.

The President said the British press had been carrying stories to the effect that our action had not been taken on technical grounds but on political ones.

Mr. Thorneycroft said the British press was looking at the alternative.

The Prime Minister said he agreed that the press must be dealt with and not utilized. He pointed out that the Hound Dog was difficult to use on British planes.

Mr. McNamara pointed out that the Hound Dog could be adapted to British planes, although some changes in the missile would have to be made.

Mr. Thorneycroft pointed out that this would take a long time, and even when accomplished would leave only eighteen inches of clearance at take-off. In any event, this could not be accomplished until about the time when bombers would no longer be used.

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The Prime Minister said the problem was for him as it had been for Britain in 1940 -- whether to chuck it or go on.

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He would not engage in anything petty. We could stay at Holy Loch. He pointed out that he had taken big risks in his policies. People had said that Britain was in the front line where they were all targets, but had none of the power. He would be prepared to put in all of his part of a Polaris force provided the Queen had the ultimate power and right to draw back in the case of a dire emergency similar to that in 1940. He thought the United States would do the same if we did not have a superfluity of weapons. Britain could make submarines -- not nuclear ones -- to carry missiles. This could be accomplished in six years, but the cost would have to be compensated elsewhere. He hoped not in the Far East, where the British contribution was in some ways more important than in Europe. They would have to tax their people more as well. There was no use prolonging the life of the bomber, which was bound to die in any event. Submarines were much more suitable for an island like Britain, which also had a great naval tradition. Such a course, however, would lead to a deep rift with the United States. He said he would not accuse America, and reminded the President that he was one-half American himself.

The President said that in the first place we were prepared to do what we said we would do. He pointed out that we had spent a great deal of money in carrying out the commitment which Eisenhower had made, and that there could be no suggestion of bad faith. We placed great

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value on our relationship with Great Britain. He pointed out that the British had their own scientists at the Douglas Plant, and asked what they had been saving during the last six months.

British scientists at the Douglas Plant were apparently saying that the trouble was not technical but political.

Mr. Thorneycroft suggested that such reports might have come from U. S. personnel, particularly those interested in continuing the project. In reply to a question from the President as to his own opinion on Skybolt, Mr. Thorneycroft said he had to rely on Mr. McNamara's judgment, as he had gone thoroughly into the matter and had publicly said that Skybolt would be late, expensive, and unreliable.

The President pointed out that McNamara's judgment was based on the fact that he had alternative systems. He pointed out that for \$250 million investment the British could get a good buy which would deter Khrushchev.

Mr. Thorneycroft pointed out that his own experience was that systems of this kind could be successfully developed only if you went flat out in your effort and there was the prospect of a good order at the end of the line.

The President thought our only difficulty was the different judgment we had on the effect a bilateral arrangement would have in Europe, and he repeated that all of our experts thought this would be very serious.

The Prime Minister said this appeared to be based on the assumption that this was a different weapon.

The President said we could not settle this matter today, and then read excerpts from a U. S. draft paper which listed: (1) our offer of Hound Dog; (2) our offer to share equally in cost of completion of Skybolt; (3) a plan for the two governments to cooperate in a NATO missile force.

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The President said that after consultation with NATO the two governments might agree (a) that the forces developed under our agreement would be assigned to the NATO deterrent forces and assigned targets under agreements approved by NATO; (b) the U. S. would undertake to make similar assignment of parallel and equivalent forces; (c) the U. S. and U. K. would support the creation of a NATO multilateral force; (d) the U. S. and U. K. forces would be included in such a NATO multilateral force.

The Prime Minister inquired what would happen about SEATO. The British would be contributing all of their force to NATO and he inquired what would happen if the Chinese attacked Hong Kong. He threw out the suggestion that the British contribution might be made proportionate to that of the United States. He said that the British force might be of the most value in the Far East.

The President said the same assistance might be made available to France, which probably would not want it.

The Prime Minister thought the French might be tempted by the time that would be gained.

At this point the meeting broke up for lunch.

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MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT
KENNEDY IN THE BAHAMAS ON DECEMBER 19, 1962*Germany Policy**future of Berlin**(p 24)**(March 1952)*

At the Prime Minister's dinner party on December 19 the conversation turned to Berlin.

President Kennedy thought that United States tactics over the past year in the Ambassadorial Group had been foolish. They had involved themselves in rows with the French and the Germans over possible initiatives which had then been rejected by the Russians. Thus no progress had been made but a lot of ill-feeling inside the alliance had been engendered. At present there seemed no prospect of the Russians accepting reasonable terms. For a moment it had looked as if Mr. Khrushchev had taken a promising step forward in his conversation with Sir Frank Roberts but he had quickly withdrawn it. As things stood the President saw no point in the West taking the initiative.

Lord Home recognised that this might be so but was nevertheless worried that the West should be consigned to a position of complete immobility. If the West made no attempt to settle the Berlin question now the Russians might build up their strength over the next months and years and would precipitate another Berlin crisis, and the West would then again be inhibited from negotiating "under threats".

Mr. Thompson considered that the bilateral talks between the Americans and the Russians over the past year had brought out clearly the elements of a deal if the Russians wanted one. The basic elements were a Russian guarantee of access and a greater measure of Western recognition of East Germany.

Lord Home asked whether there was any hope of an all-Berlin solution.

Mr. Bruce thought that this was quite out of the question. The essential Russian interest was to stabilise and consolidate East Germany. They had put a considerable effort into this and the economic situation in East Germany was favourable by Eastern European standards, despite the drain of refugees, particularly in the managerial class and wage-earning age groups. The Wall had of course greatly reduced the outflow recently. He was convinced that the Russians would never surrender their control of East Germany which was the key to their European Satellite empire and provided, moreover, a platform from which they hoped to achieve their long-term aim of bringing Western Germany with its vast industrial potential within the Communist orbit.

Mr. Bruce continued that Allied policy in the immediate post-war period had been profoundly mistaken, and for this he recognised the United States was largely to blame. We had surrendered Eastern Germany to the Soviets in return for four-Power arrangements in Berlin which looked forward to Berlin becoming again the capital of a unified Germany. The essence of these four-Power arrangements had been destroyed by the Russians who would not accept reunification. The withdrawal of the Soviet Commandant from the Allied Commandatura in 1948 had in fact sounded the death knell of Allied policy and though this had not been properly appreciated at the time it had been the first step in the process, since deliberately pursued step by step by the Russians, of perpetuating the division of Germany. Given the Russian attitude, there was no real future for West Berlin although it had been built up by Western effort into the largest industrial city in Western Germany. The only hope of preventing a Communist absorption of West Berlin and providing its inhabitants with some hope for the future was to turn it into an international city and make it the seat of the United Nations Headquarters. Berlin was the one issue which could precipitate a world war; he did not deny that the West must fight for Berlin, but he urged that the West should try to arrive at some peaceful solution.

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have a moral effect. At the moment the British bomber force in conjunction with the United States Strategic Air Command provided a high proportion of the first wave attack on strategic targets. It was possible that in time bombers generally would pass more into a tactical rather than a strategic role or might be used as a second wave after a missile attack. So the United Kingdom would be ready, if it would help, to make available to SACEUR for planning and tactics say one squadron of V-bombers. He believed that the United States had done something similar and the French could be asked to do the same. This would enable the philosophy that nuclear forces were not entirely independent to be developed in a controlled fashion. First moves on these lines might be helpful and a gesture could be made straight away. Countries without a nuclear capacity could be informed of SACEUR's planning and made to feel that they were brought in to the general pattern.

He would like to make one point about the alleged difference between POLARIS and SKYBOLT. It seemed to him that these weapons were not fundamentally different but merely varying ways of delivering ballistic rockets. Whether these were fired from the air or from the sea was just a difference in method.

Lastly, the difficulties which had been mentioned about the allies would be as nothing to the difficulties which would follow if the United States seemed to be using the SKYBOLT decision as a means of forcing Britain out of an independent nuclear capacity. This would be resented not only by those who were in favour of the British independent deterrent but even by those who opposed it and yet felt that abandonment of this United Kingdom force should come about because of a decision made by Britain and not by others.

President Kennedy agreed on the last point. The United States could not, however, take a decision in this purely on the basis of technical considerations. It was true that it was generally known that the United States did not favour national deterrents. But they were compelled to take account of the fact that POLARIS and MINUTEMAN existed. Recognising the British feeling on the question of nuclear capacity they did not wish to appear to have decided for political reasons to abandon SKYBOLT. That was why he was ready to propose that the United States Government should pay half the further development costs to completion of SKYBOLT which were estimated at \$200 million with Britain paying the other half and having the right to buy missiles. The United States Government could not at this time undertake themselves to buy any SKYBOLT missiles but if they could develop an aircraft which would stay aloft for several days, they might eventually wish to place an order for SKYBOLT. With this arrangement SKYBOLT would be completed as arranged and the United Kingdom would be able to buy what she had wanted to buy. For \$100 million plus \$1 1/2 million per missile the United Kingdom could obtain the full advantage of all the United States development work. This should certainly be an adequate deterrent for Mr. Khrushchev who would probably not know of SKYBOLT's disadvantages. After all 20 missiles in Cuba had been a deterrent to the United States. How much more would a missile system based on SKYBOLT deter the Russians even if they thought that the weapon might have the accuracy to fall only in the suburbs and not on the centre of Moscow. He therefore thought it possible to maintain the British deterrent on the basis of the SKYBOLT offer he had just made. This would be a good answer to those in Britain who thought that the United States was taking a decision on SKYBOLT because they were against a British independent deterrent.

He was, of course, aware in a general way of the history of Anglo-American co-operation in the nuclear field. He knew that the two countries had co-operated very intimately. (The United States however had not supported the French in the nuclear field and the result of this policy had been to sour American relations with France. Rightly or wrongly they had taken this attitude because of Germany. The United States had paid more attention to Germany than had the United Kingdom and had spent a lot of money and effort there. The United States were concerned at what would happen in Germany after Dr. Adenauer left the scene. This was one reason why the United States had supported Britain's entry into Europe even though this must pose an economic and political threat to the United States at a time when they could ill afford this. They regarded Germany as potentially the most powerful country in Europe and one whose future was in some doubt. They had not helped President de Gaulle in his nuclear ambitions because they did not believe that the French would really abandon their hostile attitude to NATO

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because of such help. And if the United States did help France then pressure in Germany for similar help would rise. That was why the United States had moved towards the idea of a multilateral nuclear force; it was precisely for the reason that they wished to avoid dangerous national pressures.

In President Kennedy's view, SKYBOLT and HOUND DOG and the other aerial missiles were in a different category from POLARIS which was a new weapons system giving a new type of power. He recognised Mr. Macmillan's argument but in fact POLARIS not only was but manifestly appeared to be different. Appearances could be important as had been shown in Cuba where what the Russians were trying to do would not perhaps have altered the nuclear balance at all significantly but would have appeared to do so. President Kennedy feared that any co-operation between the United Kingdom and the United States over POLARIS would add further force to all President de Gaulle's arguments, which he used to some effect round Europe, about the United States intentions to dominate Europe. And it would certainly have a further effect on the Germans. It might be possible to overcome these pressures and it might be necessary to face them. But in the United States view it was not true to say that the supplying of POLARIS would make no difference at all. It would represent a change in the British position and would be exploited as such by the French. What the United States suggested therefore was that, in order to prevent the British people feeling that they were being driven out of the nuclear race by the United States, there should be an arrangement by which the United States would contribute a further \$100 million or half the further estimated development costs of SKYBOLT and that Britain should pay the rest and have the missiles which she had ordered. POLARIS should be dealt with if at all in a much more European atmosphere, so as not to increase the difficulties in Europe and so as to make a move away from national deterrents. In the circumstances of to-day President Kennedy considered that he was making a very fair offer on SKYBOLT which would put Britain about where she had been a month ago.

Mr. Macmillan said that while the proposed marriage with SKYBOLT was not exactly a shot-gun wedding, the virginity of the lady must now be regarded as doubtful. There had been too many remarks made about the unreliability of SKYBOLT for anyone to believe in its effectiveness in the future.

A multilateral European deterrent had been mentioned; he would like to know more precisely what this would be. He was not clear whether it would be manufactured by Europeans or would consist of missiles which they had been lent or sold. He would be glad to know how the United States saw this. He himself felt that the best solution might be to have a joint force with United States, British and perhaps French contributions. He would hope that in such circumstances no other countries would bother to build a nuclear force. The force commander could be similar to SACEUR and perhaps indeed could be SACEUR.

President Kennedy said that if the United States gave POLARIS to Britain it would be difficult in logic not to say that if in future any country developed a nuclear bomb the United States would give them a missile system. POLARIS was not just another version of SKYBOLT. SKYBOLT would not have been effective after 1970, whereas POLARIS would last from 1968 or 1969 until the Russians had an effective anti-missile missile—say in 1980. To give POLARIS to Britain would be a new step and so regarded in Europe. Mr. Macmillan said that he was all in favour of a multilateral force. It would appear, however, that the President envisaged that the United States would only contribute a part of their nuclear forces to such an arrangement whereas other countries would, as it were, put in all of theirs. President Kennedy assented. Mr. Macmillan said that this would cause great difficulty to the United Kingdom.

President Kennedy then said that the United States might be prepared to provide POLARIS under certain conditions. But he did not see how this could be decided straight away; it would need considerable discussion. Meanwhile he would like the meeting to accept that the disadvantages of SKYBOLT were relative; for example if the United States did not have POLARIS or MINUTEMAN they would have to take SKYBOLT. In their case, however, they had been

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thinking of buying 1,000 missiles and the cost would have been \$24 billion. SKYBOLT would have a considerable value to Britain in prolonging the life of the V-bombers. He also felt that HOUND DOG might be of value particularly if it was used in conjunction with other systems. He felt that these two offers would maintain Britain's national deterrent and keep the spirit of the Camp David agreement. If the possibility of supplying POLARIS was to be discussed, then a divergence of view must be accepted; the United States at least thought that to supply POLARIS would cause difficulties in Europe. This was the view of all their experts and he would only cite Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Finletter and the Ambassador in Germany. At any rate he suggested that a small committee should be set up to discuss the limitations to any arrangements which could be made over POLARIS. The intention should be to reach a judgment on this during the winter of 1963.

Mr. Ball said that he should make clear the kind of arrangements which he would foresee for a multilateral concept. Not all countries might contribute physically, some might pay in money, while other contributed men. His idea was that the force should be manned on a basis of mixed nationality; this was because the right of withdrawal was not envisaged. Lord Home did not share the President's anxieties. To give POLARIS to Britain would have absolutely no effect on the French who would go ahead anyhow with their own plans. It might give them a new talking point and there might be some protest but it would not really have any serious effect. In any case even if there were a disagreement with the French, this would be far less serious for NATO than a rift between the United States and the United Kingdom. He understood that the United States were already giving some help to the French in the nuclear field. President Kennedy said that what the United States were doing for the French was miniscule; the co-operation was in the very outer circle of the nuclear world and the United States had no plans to move further in. Now, however, President de Gaulle was beginning to realise the difficulties of making an effective delivery system. What should the United States reply if the French asked for POLARIS? Lord Home said that whatever the answer it was clear that the idea of a multi-lateral force would be voted down in NATO. The French would say it was not credible because there would be too many fingers on the safety catch and all the other countries would vote against it because none of them wanted a German finger on the trigger. In his view the only sensible European arrangement to be envisaged in the immediate future was for the United States, the United Kingdom and France to put some of their nuclear capacity into some NATO framework and to develop the work of the NATO Nuclear Committee so that the smaller countries felt that they had some participation. Mr. Ball said that the United States were very conscious of the dangers of a reviving German militarism. Judging from past experience they believed it to be unrealistic to suppose that the Germans could indefinitely be deprived of some types of weapons and in a post-Adenauer Germany pressures for nuclear weapons would increase. That was why the United States favoured a multilateral force. The nuclear capacity was a status symbol and the lack of it was a stigma. The Germans would not be prepared to be condemned as second-class citizens for ever. The United States felt that this difficulty should be frankly faced and a mechanism found to allow Germany to participate in a controlled way in the nuclear deterrent. Such an arrangement would cause the least difficulty. Mr. Macmillan said that if one imagined a tough Germany determined to have a nuclear deterrent it was doubtful if they would be satisfied to have one of 16 in a submarine crew. He felt that a group such as the United Kingdom had suggested was the alternative. He had already taken his country a long way on the European road and if France accepted Britain would join the Common Market. It had been said that he was going against a thousand years of history by doing this. He would be going against it far more if he were to abandon Britain's independent power. Of course if the whole of Europe were to regard itself as like the kingdoms of Pontus and Bithynia impotent between the two Emperors then they might ask why they should take any part in their defence. And how would the military and political authorities of a multilateral force, such as had been suggested by Mr. Ball, be constituted? He would be prepared to agree to a joint study of these problems but it would not be easy to satisfy public opinion in England that a sharing in such a force would be an adequate substitute for the existing independent national deterrent. There were considerable sections of opinion in Britain who felt that the negotiations with the Six on Common Market problems had already threatened national sovereignty to a dangerous degree. To some

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extent therefore the room for manoeuvre on the nuclear was circumscribed. He was quite clear that no one in England would accept the position of there being only two nuclear Powers—the United States and Russia—with no other effective nuclear force.

President Kennedy accepted that there were arguments that could be used against a multilateral force and there were considerable difficulties both about political and military authorities. At the end of the day one man was in charge. It was one of the problems which the joint working party would have to study.

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Lord Home thought that many people in Europe would be quite happy to accept some form of agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom and France to act in the guise of trustees for Europe on nuclear matters over the next two decades. [But there were few people in Europe who would be prepared to agree to any form of German participation in a nuclear force.] For example, President de Gaulle had rejected the idea of Germany becoming in any way at all a nuclear Power because of the difficulties that it would cause with Russia and with the countries in Eastern Europe. Soviet distrust of Germany would be so intensified as to lead to a serious deterioration in East-West relations and prevent a détente. President Kennedy accepted the significance of this argument of President de Gaulle.

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Mr. Macmillan pointed out that President de Gaulle had now stated his objections to Germany having any form of nuclear weapons or participating in a multilateral nuclear arrangement. President Kennedy commented that, during his recent visit to Washington, Dr. Adenauer had asked the United States Government not to help France in any way at all on nuclear matters because it would raise the pressures in Germany to an unacceptable degree and would make life harder for him and his successors. Mr. Macmillan quoted a passage from the record of his talks at Rambouillet in which President de Gaulle had said that Dr. Adenauer was not opposed to French nuclear weapons.

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Mr. Ball felt able to share the general apprehension of Germany becoming an independent nuclear Power and agreed that this concept—which he was not suggesting—would constitute a real problem in East-West relations. But the same arguments did not apply to Germany participating in some NATO arrangement and this would have the effect, which was very important, of preventing the Germans from feeling as if they were permanent second-class citizens. This was a problem which had to be faced and it would be convenient to deal with it now rather than to go on putting it off. It was essential, he thought, to find some way of enabling Germany to participate in a multilateral force.

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Mr. Thorneycroft felt there was something to be said for not pressing the multilateral concept too heavily at the outset. It would be quite possible for those countries which already had some form of nuclear capacity to be prepared to allocate part of what they had got. This gradual approach would be more realistic. Mr. Ball said that this did not help the German problem and would not be sufficient.

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Lord Home said that there were none of the European allies who would in the foreseeable future be ready to let Germany have a "finger on the trigger". It was therefore not possible to avoid keeping the Germans in an inferior position. What was necessary now was to consider some method of approach that would go as far as possible to meet their aspirations without giving them the substance of what they might want.

President Kennedy said that it was extremely expensive to create nuclear capacity and to develop methods of delivery. The question of cost should not be forgotten. It should be allowed to operate to prevent the multiplication of national systems and was something on which the United States had relied to secure this. If the United States were now to make available methods of delivery to countries which had, in any degree at all, achieved some form of nuclear capacity, they would be removing a way of achieving a policy which they believed to be right. Nor was it possible in this field to foresee developments with any certainty. For example, Italy might be the next country to acquire some form of nuclear capacity. At present the United States appeared to have a monopoly position on delivery systems. Were they to make these available to anyone who asked? He felt that twin obstacles of time and money should be allowed to operate in

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preventing countries from attaining these nationalist positions. Moreover, if the United States were to help France (who had considerable financial resources) and save them time and money, other European countries, especially Germany, should be offered the same advantages. The real problem confronting Europe now was the build-up of conventional forces. It was to that task that they should devote their resources. If they felt that by getting some form of rudimentary atom bomb they would then have access to sophisticated delivery systems, they might all wish to devote military resources to nuclear rather than conventional objectives.

Mr. Macmillan was not aware that the French had asked for any help from the United States on delivery systems. He did not think that the offer of POLARIS to the United Kingdom would be regarded by them as a reason for doing so. They would recognise the historical 50-50 partnership between the United States and the United Kingdom on atomic matters and they would readily accept that the substitution of POLARIS for SKYBOLT was not a new step in principle, since the weapons were basically the same, that is ballistic missiles. One was fired from an aeroplane, the other from a ship. There was no difference in principle. The French would not make an issue out of this.

President Kennedy said that the free falling bomb which the French might soon have was not really an effective deterrent. There would be strong pressures in France to get missile delivery systems. If the United States were to give the United Kingdom preferential treatment this would increase these pressures.

Mr. Macmillan said the French would regard the supplying of POLARIS to the United Kingdom as a substitute for SKYBOLT in order to honour a contract which the United States could not fulfil because SKYBOLT would not work. *President Kennedy* said that it was not so easy as that. The Camp David agreement had been reached in 1960 when France was not a nuclear Power but they were a nuclear Power now and they had never liked the 1958 decision which restricted American aid in this regard to countries that had their own nuclear capacity. But France could now be assisted under the McMahon Act.

Lord Home asked whether the United States would be prepared to offer POLARIS to France. *President Kennedy* said this was one of the problems that needed examination. Indeed, it might be necessary to abandon the multilateral concept and for the United States and the United Kingdom to make an approach to *President de Gaulle* to see if France would be prepared to join with their two Governments as joint defenders of Europe.

President Kennedy added that he had in mind that at the end of the present talks a statement would be issued which would make three points:

- (a) The United States would be prepared to offer to the United Kingdom on the usual terms the missile HOUND DOG;
- (b) The United States would be prepared to offer to complete the development of the SKYBOLT missile for the United Kingdom on a 50-50 cost sharing basis—the estimated total cost of completion being \$200 million.

Both of these offers would demonstrate to the world that the United States decision on POLARIS had been taken on technical and financial grounds and not as a political decision to deprive Britain of her independent deterrent.

- (c) With regard to the POLARIS missile, a new situation was created which needed to be examined with great care in view of the many complexities involved. Broadly speaking the United States felt this missile should be considered, so far as other countries were concerned, in a multilateral context. There would need to be talks to determine the constitution of the political authority and military controlling mechanism. The study would have to consider the effect of this idea throughout Europe and it was likely that any offer which they made to Britain would also have to be repeated to France.

President Kennedy felt that a statement on these lines should dispel any charges of bad faith that might be levied against the United States. Nobody could say that the United Kingdom were being left without an alternative source of deterrent power nor would it enable the French to say that the United States and United Kingdom were still united in preserving a nuclear monopoly.

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Lord Home thought that any statement on these lines would need to be considered very carefully. It might well stir up feelings in Germany about nuclear capacity which were at present quiescent. The Press would be extremely interested in the progress of any talks on a multilateral force and their content could not really be kept undisclosed for long.

Mr. Macmillan asked when the SKYBOLT weapon would have completed the development stage had the United States gone ahead with it as originally planned. *Mr. McNamara* thought the SKYBOLT could have operated from the bombers by 1966 and in reply to a question from the Prime Minister thought it would be reasonably safe to carry in the bombers and to fire from them. It was true that the weapon would not be entirely reliable on guidance but it would still act as a deterrent on Russia. If it were not for the existence of MINUTEMAN and POLARIS the United States Government would be completing the development of SKYBOLT for their own purposes, although only 20 or 30 per cent reliability was achieved. He thought that the percentage of failures in the tests in SKYBOLT were higher than usual for a missile. Of course the real problem was the extreme mobility of the platform from which SKYBOLT would be fired. This meant that inaccuracies in determining the exact location of firing were magnified at the other end, i.e., quite a small error at firing might mean that the weapon hit the suburbs and not the centre of Moscow.

Mr. Macmillan felt a considerable degree of responsibility for the decision which had been taken in 1960 for the United Kingdom to go for the SKYBOLT system rather than the POLARIS weapon. He was not, of course, claiming that President Eisenhower had then offered POLARIS but as the V-bomber force was coming off the production line and was in existence it had seemed preferable for the United Kingdom to opt for SKYBOLT. It appeared that this decision had been wrong.

President Kennedy thought that the United States Administration would themselves be under considerable attack in Congress for their failure to complete the development of SKYBOLT or to purchase it on their own account. They had, after all, devoted much money both to its development and that of the B-70 bomber, which was also to be cancelled. *Mr. McNamara* added that the Democratic Administration had increased the allocation to the SKYBOLT project some 60 days after assuming office, so that their political difficulties, if the project were now discontinued, would be considerable.

In a reply to a question from the President *Mr. Thorneycroft* said it was incontrovertible that SKYBOLT would be late, expensive and unreliable. This had been publicly stated by *Mr. McNamara*. It would be difficult for him to recommend to Parliament that Britain should now, as it were, buy shares in the company. He did not think it a defensible position for the United Kingdom to continue the SKYBOLT development.

President Kennedy thought it would be a good defence for the United Kingdom Government to quote the figures of United States expenditure on the project as given by *Mr. McNamara* as evidence that the project had been cancelled as a technical decision rather than as a political act aimed at depriving the British of a national deterrent. *Mr. Thorneycroft* said that no matter what was said or what was not said the British Press would feel and would say quite openly that as SKYBOLT was not being completed the United States had a responsibility to offer an alternative. The HOUND DOG missile would not be satisfactory in this respect. To fit it to the V-bomber force would necessitate long and expensive modifications and its operational advantages were not so far advanced over the present British weapon as to justify this expenditure. Moreover it would, even when recessed into the wings of the Vulcan bomber, only leave 18 inches of clearance above the ground and this would make taking off and landing a hazardous procedure.

Mr. Macmillan recognised that there was a serious problem here, but what was really at stake was the future of the British independent deterrent and this was not an issue which could be blurred. There were in effect only two possible courses open to the United Kingdom Government. They could either retreat from the field of the nuclear deterrent altogether or they could go on no matter what the cost or the effort required. There were many who would point to the advantages of discontinuing the British nuclear deterrent altogether. It would reduce the burden

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MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT
KENNEDY IN THE BAHAMAS ON DECEMBER 19, 1962

Germany Policy

future of Berlin

(Pt 24)

(March 1952)

At the Prime Minister's dinner party on December 19 the conversation turned to Berlin.

President Kennedy thought that United States tactics over the past year in the Ambassadorial Group had been foolish. They had involved themselves in rows with the French and the Germans over possible initiatives which had then been rejected by the Russians. Thus no progress had been made but a lot of ill-feeling inside the alliance had been engendered. At present there seemed no prospect of the Russians accepting reasonable terms. For a moment it had looked as if Mr. Khrushchev had taken a promising step forward in his conversation with Sir Frank Roberts but he had quickly withdrawn it. As things stood the President saw no point in the West taking the initiative.

Lord Home recognised that this might be so but was nevertheless worried that the West should be consigned to a position of complete immobility. If the West made no attempt to settle the Berlin question now the Russians might build up their strength over the next months and years and would precipitate another Berlin crisis, and the West would then again be inhibited from negotiating "under threats".

Mr. Thompson considered that the bilateral talks between the Americans and the Russians over the past year had brought out clearly the elements of a deal if the Russians wanted one. The basic elements were a Russian guarantee of access and a greater measure of Western recognition of East Germany.

Lord Home asked whether there was any hope of an all-Berlin solution.

Mr. Bruce thought that this was quite out of the question. The essential Russian interest was to stabilise and consolidate East Germany. They had put a considerable effort into this and the economic situation in East Germany was favourable by Eastern European standards, despite the drain of refugees, particularly in the managerial class and wage-earning age groups. The Wall had of course greatly reduced the outflow recently. He was convinced that the Russians would never surrender their control of East Germany which was the key to their European Satellite empire and provided, moreover, a platform from which they hoped to achieve their long-term aim of bringing Western Germany with its vast industrial potential within the Communist orbit.

Mr. Bruce continued that Allied policy in the immediate post-war period had been profoundly mistaken, and for this he recognised the United States was largely to blame. We had surrendered Eastern Germany to the Soviets in return for four-Power arrangements in Berlin which looked forward to Berlin becoming again the capital of a unified Germany. The essence of these four-Power arrangements had been destroyed by the Russians who would not accept reunification. The withdrawal of the Soviet Commandant from the Allied Commandatura in 1948 had in fact sounded the death knell of Allied policy and though this had not been properly appreciated at the time it had been the first step in the process, since deliberately pursued step by step by the Russians, of perpetuating the division of Germany. Given the Russian attitude, there was no real future for West Berlin although it had been built up by Western effort into the largest industrial city in Western Germany. The only hope of preventing a Communist absorption of West Berlin and providing its inhabitants with some hope for the future was to turn it into an international city and make it the seat of the United Nations Headquarters. Berlin was the one issue which could precipitate a world war; he did not deny that the West must fight for Berlin, but he urged that the West should try to arrive at some peaceful solution.

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have a moral effect. At the moment the British bomber force in conjunction with the United States Strategic Air Command provided a high proportion of the first wave attack on strategic targets. It was possible that in time bombers generally would pass more into a tactical rather than a strategic role or might be used as a second wave after a missile attack. So the United Kingdom would be ready, if it would help, to make available to SACEUR for planning and tactics say one squadron of V-bombers. He believed that the United States had done something similar and the French could be asked to do the same. This would enable the philosophy that nuclear forces were not entirely independent to be developed in a controlled fashion. First moves on these lines might be helpful and a gesture could be made straight away. Countries without a nuclear capacity could be informed of SACEUR's planning and made to feel that they were brought in to the general pattern.

He would like to make one point about the alleged difference between POLARIS and SKYBOLT. It seemed to him that these weapons were not fundamentally different but merely varying ways of delivering ballistic rockets. Whether these were fired from the air or from the sea was just a difference in method.

Lastly, the difficulties which had been mentioned about the allies would be as nothing to the difficulties which would follow if the United States seemed to be using the SKYBOLT decision as a means of forcing Britain out of an independent nuclear capacity. This would be resented not only by those who were in favour of the British independent deterrent but even by those who opposed it and yet felt that abandonment of this United Kingdom force should come about because of a decision made by Britain and not by others.

President Kennedy agreed on the last point. The United States could not, however, take a decision in this purely on the basis of technical considerations. It was true that it was generally known that the United States did not favour national deterrents. But they were compelled to take account of the fact that POLARIS and MINUTEMAN existed. Recognising the British feeling on the question of nuclear capacity they did not wish to appear to have decided for political reasons to abandon SKYBOLT. That was why he was ready to propose that the United States Government should pay half the further development costs to completion of SKYBOLT which were estimated at \$200 million with Britain paying the other half and having the right to buy missiles. The United States Government could not at this time undertake themselves to buy any SKYBOLT missiles but if they could develop an aircraft which would stay aloft for several days, they might eventually wish to place an order for SKYBOLT. With this arrangement SKYBOLT would be completed as arranged and the United Kingdom would be able to buy what she had wanted to buy. For \$100 million plus \$14 million per missile the United Kingdom could obtain the full advantage of all the United States development work. This should certainly be an adequate deterrent for Mr. Khrushchev who would probably not know of SKYBOLT's disadvantages. After all 20 missiles in Cuba had been a deterrent to the United States. How much more would a missile system based on SKYBOLT deter the Russians even if they thought that the weapon might have the accuracy to fall only in the suburbs and not on the centre of Moscow. He therefore thought it possible to maintain the British deterrent on the basis of the SKYBOLT offer he had just made. This would be a good answer to those in Britain who thought that the United States was taking a decision on SKYBOLT because they were against a British independent deterrent.

He was, of course, aware in a general way of the history of Anglo-American co-operation in the nuclear field. He knew that the two countries had co-operated very intimately. The United States however had not supported the French in the nuclear field and the result of this policy had been to sour American relations with France. Rightly or wrongly they had taken this attitude because of Germany. The United States had paid more attention to Germany than had the United Kingdom and had spent a lot of money and effort there. The United States were concerned at what would happen in Germany after Dr. Adenauer left the scene. This was one reason why the United States had supported Britain's entry into Europe even though this must pose an economic and political threat to the United States at a time when they could ill afford this. They regarded Germany as potentially the most powerful country in Europe and one whose future was in some doubt. They had not helped President de Gaulle in his nuclear ambitions because they did not believe that the French would really abandon their hostile attitude to NATO

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because of such help. And if the United States did help France then pressure in Germany for similar help would rise. That was why the United States had moved towards the idea of a multilateral nuclear force; it was precisely for the reason that they wished to avoid dangerous national pressures.

In President Kennedy's view, SKYBOLT and HOUND DOG and the other aerial missiles were in a different category from POLARIS which was a new weapons system giving a new type of power. He recognised Mr. Macmillan's argument but in fact POLARIS not only was but manifestly appeared to be different. Appearances could be important as had been shown in Cuba where what the Russians were trying to do would not perhaps have altered the nuclear balance at all significantly but would have appeared to do so. President Kennedy feared that any co-operation between the United Kingdom and the United States over POLARIS would add further force to all President de Gaulle's arguments, which he used to some effect round Europe, about the United States intentions to dominate Europe. And it would certainly have a further effect on the Germans. It might be possible to overcome these pressures and it might be necessary to face them. But in the United States view it was not true to say that the supplying of POLARIS would make no difference at all. It would represent a change in the British position and would be exploited as such by the French. What the United States suggested therefore was that, in order to prevent the British people feeling that they were being driven out of the nuclear race by the United States, there should be an arrangement by which the United States would contribute a further \$100 million or half the further estimated development costs of SKYBOLT and that Britain should pay the rest and have the missiles which she had ordered. POLARIS should be dealt with if at all in a much more European atmosphere, so as not to increase the difficulties in Europe and so as to make a move away from national deterrents. In the circumstances of to-day President Kennedy considered that he was making a very fair offer on SKYBOLT which would put Britain about where she had been a month ago.

Mr. Macmillan said that while the proposed marriage with SKYBOLT was not exactly a shot-gun wedding, the virginity of the lady must now be regarded as doubtful. There had been too many remarks made about the unreliability of SKYBOLT for anyone to believe in its effectiveness in the future.

A multilateral European deterrent had been mentioned; he would like to know more precisely what this would be. He was not clear whether it would be manufactured by Europeans or would consist of missiles which they had been lent or sold. He would be glad to know how the United States saw this. He himself felt that the best solution might be to have a joint force with United States, British and perhaps French contributions. He would hope that in such circumstances no other countries would bother to build a nuclear force. The force commander could be similar to SACEUR and perhaps indeed could be SACEUR.

President Kennedy said that if the United States gave POLARIS to Britain it would be difficult in logic not to say that if in future any country developed a nuclear bomb the United States would give them a missile system. POLARIS was not just another version of SKYBOLT. SKYBOLT would not have been effective after 1970, whereas POLARIS would last from 1968 or 1969 until the Russians had an effective anti-missile missile—say in 1980. To give POLARIS to Britain would be a new step and so regarded in Europe. Mr. Macmillan said that he was all in favour of a multilateral force. It would appear, however, that the President envisaged that the United States would only contribute a part of their nuclear forces to such an arrangement whereas other countries would, as it were, put in all of theirs. President Kennedy assented. Mr. Macmillan said that this would cause great difficulty to the United Kingdom.

President Kennedy then said that the United States might be prepared to provide POLARIS under certain conditions. But he did not see how this could be decided straight away; it would need considerable discussion. Meanwhile he would like the meeting to accept that the disadvantages of SKYBOLT were relative; for example if the United States did not have POLARIS or MINUTEMAN they would have to take SKYBOLT. In their case, however, they had been

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thinking of buying 1,000 missiles and the cost would have been \$2½ billion. SKYBOLT would have a considerable value to Britain in prolonging the life of the V-bombers. He also felt that HOUND DOG might be of value particularly if it was used in conjunction with other systems. He felt that these two offers would maintain Britain's national deterrent and keep the spirit of the Camp David agreement. If the possibility of supplying POLARIS was to be discussed, then a divergence of view must be accepted; the United States at least thought that to supply POLARIS would cause difficulties in Europe. This was the view of all their experts and he would only cite Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Finletter and the Ambassador in Germany. At any rate he suggested that a small committee should be set up to discuss the limitations to any arrangements which could be made over POLARIS. The intention should be to reach a judgment on this during the winter of 1963.

Mr. Ball said that he should make clear the kind of arrangements which he would foresee for a multilateral concept. Not all countries might contribute physically, some might pay in money, while other contributed men. His idea was that the force should be manned on a basis of mixed nationality; this was because the right of withdrawal was not envisaged. Lord Home did not share the President's anxieties. To give POLARIS to Britain would have absolutely no effect on the French who would go ahead anyhow with their own plans. It might give them a new talking point and there might be some protest but it would not really have any serious effect. In any case even if there were a disagreement with the French, this would be far less serious for NATO than a rift between the United States and the United Kingdom. He understood that the United States were already giving some help to the French in the nuclear field. President Kennedy said that what the United States were doing for the French was miniscule; the co-operation was in the very outer circle of the nuclear world and the United States had no plans to move further in. Now, however, President de Gaulle was beginning to realise the difficulties of making an effective delivery system. What should the United States reply if the French asked for POLARIS? Lord Home said that whatever the answer it was clear that the idea of a multi-lateral force would be voted down in NATO. The French would say it was not credible because there would be too many fingers on the safety catch and all the other countries would vote against it because none of them wanted a German finger on the trigger. In his view the only sensible European arrangement to be envisaged in the immediate future was for the United States, the United Kingdom and France to put some of their nuclear capacity into some NATO framework and to develop the work of the NATO Nuclear Committee so that the smaller countries felt that they had some participation. Mr. Ball said that the United States were very conscious of the dangers of a reviving German militarism. Judging from past experience they believed it to be unrealistic to suppose that the Germans could indefinitely be deprived of some types of weapons and in a post-Adenauer Germany pressures for nuclear weapons would increase. That was why the United States favoured a multilateral force. The nuclear capacity was a status symbol and the lack of it was a stigma. The Germans would not be prepared to be condemned as second-class citizens for ever. The United States felt that this difficulty should be frankly faced and a mechanism found to allow Germany to participate in a controlled way in the nuclear deterrent. Such an arrangement would cause the least difficulty. Mr. Macmillan said that if one imagined a tough Germany determined to have a nuclear deterrent it was doubtful if they would be satisfied to have one of 16 in a submarine crew. He felt that a group such as the United Kingdom had suggested was the alternative. He had already taken his country a long way on the European road and if France accepted Britain would join the Common Market. It had been said that he was going against a thousand years of history by doing this. He would be going against it far more if he were to abandon Britain's independent power. Of course if the whole of Europe were to regard itself as like the kingdoms of Pontus and Bithynia impotent between the two Emperors then they might ask why they should take any part in their defence. And how would the military and political authorities of a multilateral force, such as had been suggested by Mr. Ball, be constituted? He would be prepared to agree to a joint study of these problems but it would not be easy to satisfy public opinion in England that a sharing in such a force would be an adequate substitute for the existing independent national deterrent. There were considerable sections of opinion in Britain who felt that the negotiations with the Six on Common Market problems had already threatened national sovereignty to a dangerous degree. To some

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extent therefore the room for manoeuvre on the nuclear was circumscribed. He was quite clear that no one in England would accept the position of there being only two nuclear Powers—the United States and Russia—with no other effective nuclear force.

President Kennedy accepted that there were arguments that could be used against a multilateral force and there were considerable difficulties both about political and military authorities. At the end of the day one man was in charge. It was one of the problems which the joint working party would have to study.

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Lord Home thought that many people in Europe would be quite happy to accept some form of agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom and France to act in the guise of trustees for Europe on nuclear matters over the next two decades. [But there were few people in Europe who would be prepared to agree to any form of German participation in a nuclear force.] For example, *President de Gaulle* had rejected the idea of Germany becoming in any way at all a nuclear Power because of the difficulties that it would cause with Russia and with the countries in Eastern Europe. Soviet distrust of Germany would be so intensified as to lead to a serious deterioration in East-West relations and prevent a *détente*. *President Kennedy* accepted the significance of this argument of *President de Gaulle*.

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Mr. Macmillan pointed out that *President de Gaulle* had now stated his objections to Germany having any form of nuclear weapons or participating in a multilateral nuclear arrangement. *President Kennedy* commented that, during his recent visit to Washington, Dr. Adenauer had asked the United States Government not to help France in any way at all on nuclear matters because it would raise the pressures in Germany to an unacceptable degree and would make life harder for him and his successors. *Mr. Macmillan* quoted a passage from the record of his talks at Rambouillet in which *President de Gaulle* had said that Dr. Adenauer was not opposed to French nuclear weapons.

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Mr. Ball felt able to share the general apprehension of Germany becoming an independent nuclear Power and agreed that this concept—which he was not suggesting—would constitute a real problem in East-West relations. But the same arguments did not apply to Germany participating in some NATO arrangement and this would have the effect, which was very important, of preventing the Germans from feeling as if they were permanent second-class citizens. This was a problem which had to be faced and it would be convenient to deal with it now rather than to go on putting it off. It was essential, he thought, to find some way of enabling Germany to participate in a multilateral force.

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Mr. Thorneycroft felt there was something to be said for not pressing the multilateral concept too heavily at the outset. It would be quite possible for those countries which already had some form of nuclear capacity to be prepared to allocate part of what they had got. This gradual approach would be more realistic. *Mr. Ball* said that this did not help the German problem and would not be sufficient.

Lord Home said that there were none of the European allies who would in the foreseeable future be ready to let Germany have a "finger on the trigger". It was therefore not possible to avoid keeping the Germans in an inferior position. What was necessary now was to consider some method of approach that would go as far as possible to meet their aspirations without giving them the substance of what they might want.

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President Kennedy said that it was extremely expensive to create nuclear capacity and to develop methods of delivery. The question of cost should not be forgotten. It should be allowed to operate to prevent the multiplication of national systems and was something on which the United States had relied to secure this. If the United States were now to make available methods of delivery to countries which had, in any degree at all, achieved some form of nuclear capacity, they would be removing a way of achieving a policy which they believed to be right. Nor was it possible in this field to foresee developments with any certainty. For example, Italy might be the next country to acquire some form of nuclear capacity. At present the United States appeared to have a monopoly position on delivery systems. Were they to make these available to anyone who asked? He felt that twin obstacles of time and money should be allowed to operate in

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preventing countries from attaining these nationalist positions. Moreover, if the United States were to help France (who had considerable financial resources) and save them time and money, other European countries, especially Germany, should be offered the same advantages. The real problem confronting Europe now was the build-up of conventional forces. It was to that task that they should devote their resources. If they felt that by getting some form of rudimentary atom bomb they would then have access to sophisticated delivery systems, they might all wish to devote military resources to nuclear rather than conventional objectives.

Mr. Macmillan was not aware that the French had asked for any help from the United States on delivery systems. He did not think that the offer of POLARIS to the United Kingdom would be regarded by them as a reason for doing so. They would recognise the historical 50-50 partnership between the United States and the United Kingdom on atomic matters and they would readily accept that the substitution of POLARIS for SKYBOLT was not a new step in principle, since the weapons were basically the same, that is ballistic missiles. One was fired from an aeroplane, the other from a ship. There was no difference in principle. The French would not make an issue out of this.

President Kennedy said that the free falling bomb which the French might soon have was not really an effective deterrent. There would be strong pressures in France to get missile delivery systems. If the United States were to give the United Kingdom preferential treatment this would increase these pressures.

Mr. Macmillan said the French would regard the supplying of POLARIS to the United Kingdom as a substitute for SKYBOLT in order to honour a contract which the United States could not fulfil because SKYBOLT would not work. *President Kennedy* said that it was not so easy as that. The Camp David agreement had been reached in 1960 when France was not a nuclear Power but they were a nuclear Power now and they had never liked the 1958 decision which restricted American aid in this regard to countries that had their own nuclear capacity. But France could now be assisted under the McMahon Act.

Lord Home asked whether the United States would be prepared to offer POLARIS to France. *President Kennedy* said this was one of the problems that needed examination. Indeed, it might be necessary to abandon the multilateral concept and for the United States and the United Kingdom to make an approach to *President de Gaulle* to see if France would be prepared to join with their two Governments as joint defenders of Europe.)

President Kennedy added that he had in mind that at the end of the present talks a statement would be issued which would make three points:

- (a) The United States would be prepared to offer to the United Kingdom on the usual terms the missile HOUND DOG;
- (b) The United States would be prepared to offer to complete the development of the SKYBOLT missile for the United Kingdom on a 50-50 cost sharing basis—the estimated total cost of completion being \$200 million.

Both of these offers would demonstrate to the world that the United States decision on POLARIS had been taken on technical and financial grounds and not as a political decision to deprive Britain of her independent deterrent.

- (c) With regard to the POLARIS missile, a new situation was created which needed to be examined with great care in view of the many complexities involved. Broadly speaking the United States felt this missile should be considered, so far as other countries were concerned, in a multilateral context. There would need to be talks to determine the constitution of the political authority and military controlling mechanism. The study would have to consider the effect of this idea throughout Europe and it was likely that any offer which they made to Britain would also have to be repeated to France.

President Kennedy felt that a statement on these lines should dispel any charges of bad faith that might be levied against the United States. Nobody could say that the United Kingdom were being left without an alternative source of deterrent power nor would it enable the French to say that the United States and United Kingdom were still united in preserving a nuclear monopoly.

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Lord Home thought that any statement on these lines would need to be considered very carefully. It might well stir up feelings in Germany about nuclear capacity which were at present quiescent. The Press would be extremely interested in the progress of any talks on a multilateral force and their content could not really be kept undisclosed for long.

Mr. Macmillan asked when the SKYBOLT weapon would have completed the development stage had the United States gone ahead with it as originally planned. *Mr. McNamara* thought the SKYBOLT could have operated from the bombers by 1966 and in reply to a question from the Prime Minister thought it would be reasonably safe to carry in the bombers and to fire from them. It was true that the weapon would not be entirely reliable on guidance but it would still act as a deterrent on Russia. If it were not for the existence of MINUTEMAN and POLARIS the United States Government would be completing the development of SKYBOLT for their own purposes, although only 20 or 30 per cent reliability was achieved. He thought that the percentage of failures in the tests in SKYBOLT were higher than usual for a missile. Of course the real problem was the extreme mobility of the platform from which SKYBOLT would be fired. This meant that inaccuracies in determining the exact location of firing were magnified at the other end, i.e., quite a small error at firing might mean that the weapon hit the suburbs and not the centre of Moscow.

Mr. Macmillan felt a considerable degree of responsibility for the decision which had been taken in 1960 for the United Kingdom to go for the SKYBOLT system rather than the POLARIS weapon. He was not, of course, claiming that President Eisenhower had then offered POLARIS but as the V-bomber force was coming off the production line and was in existence it had seemed preferable for the United Kingdom to opt for SKYBOLT. It appeared that this decision had been wrong.

President Kennedy thought that the United States Administration would themselves be under considerable attack in Congress for their failure to complete the development of SKYBOLT or to purchase it on their own account. They had, after all, devoted much money both to its development and that of the B-70 bomber, which was also to be cancelled. *Mr. McNamara* added that the Democratic Administration had increased the allocation to the SKYBOLT project some 60 days after assuming office, so that their political difficulties, if the project were now discontinued, would be considerable.

In a reply to a question from the President *Mr. Thorneycroft* said it was incontrovertible that SKYBOLT would be late, expensive and unreliable. This had been publicly stated by *Mr. McNamara*. It would be difficult for him to recommend to Parliament that Britain should now, as it were, buy shares in the company. He did not think it a defensible position for the United Kingdom to continue the SKYBOLT development.

President Kennedy thought it would be a good defence for the United Kingdom Government to quote the figures of United States expenditure on the project as given by *Mr. McNamara* as evidence that the project had been cancelled as a technical decision rather than as a political act aimed at depriving the British of a national deterrent. *Mr. Thorneycroft* said that no matter what was said or what was not said the British Press would feel and would say quite openly that as SKYBOLT was not being completed the United States had a responsibility to offer an alternative. The HOUND DOG missile would not be satisfactory in this respect. To fit it to the V-bomber force would necessitate long and expensive modifications and its operational advantages were not so far advanced over the present British weapon as to justify this expenditure. Moreover it would, even when recessed into the wings of the Vulcan bomber, only leave 18 inches of clearance above the ground and this would make taking off and landing a hazardous procedure.

Mr. Macmillan recognised that there was a serious problem here, but what was really at stake was the future of the British independent deterrent and this was not an issue which could be blurred. There were in effect only two possible courses open to the United Kingdom Government. They could either retreat from the field of the nuclear deterrent altogether or they could go on no matter what the cost or the effort required. There were many who would point to the advantages of discontinuing the British nuclear deterrent altogether. It would reduce the burden

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**MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT
KENNEDY IN THE BAHAMAS ON DECEMBER 19, 1962**

Berlin

At the Prime Minister's dinner party on December 19 the conversation turned to Berlin.

President Kennedy thought that United States tactics over the past year in the Ambassadorial Group had been foolish. They had involved themselves in rows with the French and the Germans over possible initiatives which had then been rejected by the Russians. Thus no progress had been made but a lot of ill-feeling inside the alliance had been engendered. At present there seemed no prospect of the Russians accepting reasonable terms. For a moment it had looked as if Mr. Khrushchev had taken a promising step forward in his conversation with Sir Frank Roberts but he had quickly withdrawn it. As things stood the President saw no point in the West taking the initiative.

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Lord Home recognised that this might be so but nevertheless it worried him that the West should be consigned to a position of complete immobility. If we made no attempt to settle the Berlin question now the Russians might build up their strength over the next months and years and would precipitate another Berlin crisis, and the West would then again be inhibited from negotiating "under threats".

Mr. Thompson considered that the bilateral talks between the Americans and the Russians over the past year had brought out clearly the elements of a deal if the Russians wanted one. The basic elements were a Russian guarantee of access and a greater measure of Western recognition of East Germany.

Lord Home asked whether there was any hope of an all-Berlin solution.

Mr. Bruce thought that this was quite out of the question. The essential Russian interest was to stabilise and consolidate East Germany. They had put a considerable effort into this and the economic situation in East Germany was favourable by Eastern European standards, despite the drain of refugees, particularly in the managerial class and wage-earning age groups. The Wall had of course greatly reduced the outflow recently. He was convinced that the Russians would never surrender their control of East Germany which was the key to their European Satellite empire and provided, moreover, a platform from which they hoped to achieve their long-term aim of bringing Western Germany with its vast industrial potential within the Communist orbit.

Mr. Bruce continued that Allied policy in the immediate post-war period had been profoundly mistaken, and for this he recognised the United States was largely to blame. We had surrendered Eastern Germany to the Soviets in return for four-Power arrangements in Berlin which looked forward to Berlin becoming again the capital of a unified Germany. The essence of these four-Power arrangements had been destroyed by the Russians who would not accept reunification. The withdrawal of the Soviet Commandant from the Allied Commandatura in 1948 had in fact sounded the death knell of Allied policy and though this had not been properly appreciated at the time it had been the first step in the process, since deliberately pursued step by step by the Russians, of perpetuating the division of Germany. Given the Russian attitude, there was no real future for West Berlin although it had been built up by Western effort into the largest industrial city in Western Germany. The only hope of preventing a Communist absorption of West Berlin and providing its inhabitants with some hope for the future was to turn it into an international city and make it the seat of

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the United Nations Headquarters. Berlin was the one issue which could precipitate a world war; he did not deny that the West must fight for Berlin, but he urged that the West should try to arrive at some peaceful solution.

Mr. Tyler agreed with *Mr. Bruce's* analysis but pointed out that Western initiatives were severely inhibited by the reactions of the West Berliners. If we could not carry the West Berliners with us there was grave danger that we would lose the West Germans as well. *Mr. Bruce* accepted this but pointed out that if there was real danger of war over Berlin the West Germans would be the first to run away from it.

Summing up, *Mr. Thompson* suggested that for the present our policy should be:

- (a) to keep the channels open and talks going with the Russians; even the French now accepted this;
- (b) to wait for the Russians to make the first move for a deal;
- (c) to continue bilateral United States-United Kingdom discussions about the forms which any settlement might take.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

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DATE: December 19, 1962

at: CIA am
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SUBJECT: Skybolt

PARTICIPANTS:

U. S.

The President
Secretary McNamara
Mr. Ball
Ambassador Bruce
Mr. Bundy
Ambassador Thompson

U. K.

The Prime Minister
Lord Home
Mr. Thorneycroft
Ambassador Ormsby Gore
Mr. de Zuleta
Mr. Bligh

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The Prime Minister began the conversation with an expression of appreciation for the handling of the Cuban affair by the United States. In reply, the President expressed his appreciation for the attitude of the Prime Minister and the British Government which was in striking contrast with that of the British press.

The Prime Minister said that he regretted that the wide range of the talks in which he had expected to engage at this meeting had been overshadowed by the Skybolt problem. He thought he was probably the oldest of those present and knew the story from its beginning which he would like to recount. He fully appreciated the U. S. feeling of the danger of doing something which might be considered obnoxious or unfriendly by the other European powers. He did not want to cause trouble with the Germans, the French, the Italians and others or to impede developments which were wanted both by the United States and the United Kingdom.

In the first place, he wanted to mention that the atomic bomb had been developed almost entirely in the beginning by British scientists. The British Isles had been found too small to carry out tests. Churchill and Roosevelt had agreed that the development of the bomb should be carried out in the

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United States. The whole world knew about the partnership in this matter which was governed by agreement. He was not referring to a legal document but rather to the nature of the agreement. There were had come the incidents of spies in Great Britain and the McMahon Act. There were many, including some in the United States, who felt that Britain had been treated harshly. Amendments to the McMahon Act had been made which made greater cooperation possible. At this time, the emphasis was on the bomb. Later the emphasis shifted to the means of delivery. Britain had spent about sixty million pounds on the Blue Streak missile. Then there arose the decision as to whether the development of this missile should be continued. Britain was a small and heavily populated island, and the missile would have to be situated near towns where it would be subject to observation and would be exposed to agitators. The Prime Minister had talked to President Eisenhower about the problem and had indicated the British were going to chuck it if they could get anything else.

Then Skybolt came along as well as Polaris. The British made an agreement to buy Skybolt. He was not basing himself on the terms of the agreement but rather on the gentlemen's understanding. Eisenhower had said he wanted something in return, namely the submarine base at Holy Loch. The British had favored another location but had agreed on Holy Loch which was more remote and harder for Lord Russell and his friends to reach. The Prime Minister said that from time-to-time doubts had been cast on the Skybolt development, and he had assumed that in the United States as in England there were always these rumors circulated by rival firms or services. He went on to say it did now seem that Skybolt was in trouble.

The Prime Minister said he understood the U. S. anxiety for the effect any US-UK agreement might have on other allies. He thought the main allies understood the US-UK relationship as a kind of founder company as well as the special arrangement brought about by the amendment of the McMahon Act. He said the other problem was the possibility of bringing into being a larger grouping of powers as well as the possible effect of any such agreement on the Common Market negotiations. The Prime Minister said flatly that he thought the effect of a new agreement on the Common Market agreement would be "frankly, absolute, none." These negotiations now depended on whether the French could maintain the good deal they have in agricultural products vis-a-vis the Germans. If it failed, it would be on that basis. The French and the British have a different concept about the Common Market, the French favoring an autarchical system. There was the question as to what effect an agreement would have on European multilateral arrangements. It was

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difficult to know what was meant by a multilateral deterrent. The Prime Minister saw no conflict between independent and interdependent forces. Until a supernational authority developed, it did not matter whether it was army troops or air force. Any contribution would be under the control of the Government contributing it. He remarked that the problem of control of allied forces had been with us "since Marlborough" and really was not difficult. He was aware that the French would go on and spend a lot of money. They were grateful for the aid the United States had given, and he had tried to explain this to de Gaulle. He gave the example (which he had not cited to General de Gaulle for reasons of tact) of British forces in the last war which were put under the command of the French General Gamelin, but at a certain time, Churchill had to issue orders to Lord Gort to save the British forces and any French who wanted to come along by going to the channel ports. This enabled the air force to save Britain. Until there was a single state developed, there must be a combination of independent and joint forces. The question was whether the switch of horses from Skybolt to Polaris would upset the principal allies. He thought not.

At present, Britain had a powerful bomber force which was important strategically, particularly because of its location in England. If there were to be a role for the bomber in the future, it would probably pass from a strategic one to a tactical one. Why should they not hand over one squadron to Saceur? They could ask the French to do the same. This would show the purpose of developing the philosophy of building a joint force. They could inform the others what the targets of such a force were to be. He thought that at present others were feeling left out and could well be brought in and given more information about these matters. He did not see the difference in principle whether one fired a ballistic missile from the sea or the air. He pointed out that the Skybolt was a ballistic missile. Many in Britain thought that Great Britain should not be in this game, but Britain could not have such a decision forced on them.

The President said he agreed that there was a danger that some would think that cutting off the Skybolt was an effort to cut off the British national deterrent. He pointed out that the United States had alternative means. In considering this matter, we were conscious of the importance of the British to our relationship to Europe. He had told the Prime Minister last night that the United States would divide the cost of Skybolt, which would amount to some \$200 million. It was possible that we could use it in the future if we could develop an airplane capable of staying in

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the sky for several days, but we have no great need for Skybolt. We were prepared to join equally in finishing it. He pointed out that this was a new position beyond that which had been given to Mr. Thorneycroft. All of the U. S. judgments in regard to Skybolt were made in consideration of the existence of our other systems. He pointed out that for \$100 million the British could get \$450 million worth of work which we had put in it. Skybolt should be capable of deterring Mr. Khrushchev. He pointed out that twenty missiles in Cuba had had a deterrent effect on us. For an amount of money that was not large, the British could maintain a deterrent that would take them through to a later period. For \$100 million, they would get a \$500 million system.

The second point the President wished to make was that he was aware of the history of the atomic weapon and wished to point out that we were still cooperating.

We had supported Britain's entry into the Common Market although this was bound to have adverse effects upon us. The reason was that we felt that British influence was important in the balance and that Britain would contribute to the stability of Europe. We had refused help to the French because of our concern of what might happen in Germany. If we should assist the French, this would not change de Gaulle at all, but pressure in Germany would rise. If we helped the French it meant that any other country which became an atomic power would expect help from us. We hoped that we could use the time available to develop a multinational force.

The President went on to point out that there was a great difference between Polaris and Skybolt. Moreover, the problem was what these things looked like and not what they were. This point had been illustrated by the introduction of Soviet missiles in Cuba. These missiles had been less a military threat than a major political act. [If we join with the British in Polaris and refuse de Gaulle atomic or missile cooperation, we would feed the concept he already has of America and raise new problems.] The President said he did not believe that if we went ahead together on Polaris that it would not shake our European allies. All of our people who had recently been in Europe, and this included Secretary Rusk, Mr. Ball and Ambassador Bohlen, were convinced that such action would cause great difficulties. He did not want the British people to think that because of our view in opposition to the proliferation of atomic weapons

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② security work

3. The Prime Minister said we ought to think about what a multilateral deterrent is. It need not be one in which the weapons are manufactured by the others.

The President said the question was one of how these weapons should be put in and how they could be taken out. As the Prime Minister had described the matter last night, it seemed rather synthetic. Of course, in extremes they could be taken out. He pointed out that there was a question as to whether we could get the French in and what the effect on the Germans would be of United States, British, and French participation.

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The Prime Minister said we would create a force to which the United States, the French, and British would contribute. The President pointed out that if others developed atomic weapons they would expect us to give the delivery system. The Polaris was not just an extension of Skybolt which was not much good after 1970 when bombers would fade out.

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The Prime Minister pointed out that Skybolt would be good into the early seventies. The Prime Minister asked if there were a multinational force was it the case that the United States would contribute part of their force while the others would contribute all of theirs?

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Mr. Ball said that this should be done in a multilateral context. We had a different concept of a multinational force from the British. We had in mind mixed manning and that the right of withdrawal would not be envisaged, but a commission should consider this problem.

The President said that if after study the British judgment of the effect on Europe was correct we could consider the British concept or that described by Mr. Ball.

Lord Home said he did not share the anxiety the President had expressed. France was going ahead anyway. Even if there were a row with France, it would be far less damaging to NATO than a rift between the United States and Great Britain.

The President asked if we should make a similar offer to the French. Our cooperation with them now was minimal. De Gaulle was beginning to realize that the problem was not the atomic warhead, but the missile. If he asked for the missile, what do we do? (1) summary

Lord Home pointed out that if the proposal was a multinational force as described by Mr. Ball, it would be voted down because it was impossible to have fifteen fingers on the trigger, (3)

He thought that the U.S. and the U.K. and later the French should have a joint force with NATO targets.

Mr. Ball pointed out that we had different assessments of the German problem. We thought that after Adenauer, pressure would mount for some kind of participation. (4)

Lord Home thought that the pressure would be for participation in political decisions.

Mr. Ball replied he thought we should face the situation and enable Germany to have participation in a manner that is controllable.

The Prime Minister asked what we meant by participating. He doubted if Germany would be satisfied with having one of fifteen sailors.

The President asked what was the alternative to national deterrents.

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The Prime Minister said that he had taken his country a long way in participating in Europe in the economic field. This was not all very agreeable for Britain, but he had done it. But if the whole of Europe was to be dependent upon the United States, why should they do anything? It was not satisfactory to have one out of fifteen sailors.

The President pointed out that Europe could use the same argument against Great Britain, though he agreed there was more logic in the present arrangements than in a multilateral force.

Lord Home thought that the Europeans would be satisfied to see the United States, Britain and France cooperate in a nuclear force if the Europeans knew about the deployment, targeting, etc. (5)

De Gaulle had made clear his view that if Germany were to get atomic arms this would unite Eastern Europe. The Europeans did not want Germany to have atomic weapons and were opposed to a multilateral force.

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The President said Adenauer had expressed the hope that we would not give atomic weapons to France because of the pressure this would arouse in Germany.

The Prime Minister remarked that de Gaulle had quoted Adenauer as saying exactly the opposite.

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History had demonstrated that we could not keep Germany in an inferior position forever, and any attempt to do so would stir up latent forces in Germany. For this reason we supported a NATO approach.

Mr. Thorneycroft said we should not force the creation of a multinational force which was not wanted, but rather have the Europeans come in at the shallow end of the pool, informing them regarding targeting, etc.

Mr. Ball remarked that this would not work.

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Lord Home said we did not have a single ally in Europe that would allow Germany to have its finger on the trigger.

The President referred to the diminishing cost of atomic weapons and said they might become attractive to the Italians and others. If we gave the French Polaris submarines, we would save them a good deal of money and some time. He said that Secretary McNamara did not think the time saved would be very great, but the saving in money would be considerable. Secretary McNamara confirmed this statement. He thought the great protection with respect to delivery systems was their cost. He thought that it was important to keep the attention of the Germans in particular on conventional weapons because of Berlin, although if it were not for Berlin Europe could be defended with four divisions and a nuclear strategy.

The President asked what the argument was against giving such assistance to the French.

The Prime Minister said the British had made a contract which had not worked out.

The President observed that France had objected to our 1958 decision and to the Norstad proposals.

Now it was suggested that we come up with a new position which would represent a change of policy, and it would be wise not to hasten this decision.

The Prime Minister said it was simply a question of one horse being lame while the other was able to run. The President rejoined that these were two different races. The Prime Minister said he did not accept this.

Lord Home suggested that if we got a multinational force we could give the French Polaris at a later date.

The President suggested we should consider the whole situation and perhaps have a statement that should state:

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1. We had offered to make the Hound Dog missile available and he referred, in this connection, to the treatment of our position by the British and American press, which had made it look as though we were being unfair.
2. We had offered to continue the Skybolt program and to put \$100 million more into its development, which would enable Britain to continue its national deterrent.
3. We discussed the problem of Polaris, which was a new field and which should be looked at with care.

The President went on to say that we should look at what we meant by multinational force. How should control be exercised? Whether a similar offer should be made to France? And, finally, we should make judgment on what the effect of our action would be in Europe. The statement he had outlined would answer the charges of United States bad faith, and the charge that Britain was without any alternative. He did not think, however, that we could decide these matters here.

Mr. Ball said this should be on the basis of a private discussion.

The Prime Minister asked that if the present position had not arisen when the Skybolt would have been operational.

Secretary McNamara replied that it would have been operational in 1966.

The Prime Minister asked if the Skybolt was likely to be reasonably effective and if it would be safe to carry.

Secretary McNamara replied that it would be safe to carry and would be an effective deterrent, but would have low reliability -- something on the order of twenty to thirty percent operational reliability.

The President pointed out that if we did not have other systems available we would go ahead on Skybolt. Secretary McNamara said that in such circumstances we would certainly consider going ahead, but he did not feel that we could do so in view of the availability of alternate systems and the low reliability of Skybolt.

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The Prime Minister inquired if the record of failure was worse than normal.

Mr. McNamara replied in the affirmative, stating that this was the most complex system we had yet attempted. He pointed out that an error of one foot per second meant an error of one thousand feet at target.

Mr. McNamara pointed out that he was in a difficult situation in explaining to Congress why we had spent \$200 million since 1961. He had asked Congress for \$100 million for 1962 and for \$130 million for 1963.

The President suggested that these figures might be useful to Mr. Thorneycroft in explaining the situation to Parliament.

Mr. Thorneycroft said that his difficulty in Parliament was that the Skybolt would be late, expensive and unreliable, and these facts had been made public.

The President said the British press had been carrying stories to the effect that our action had not been taken on technical grounds but on political ones.

Mr. Thorneycroft said the British press was looking at the alternative.

The Prime Minister said he agreed that the press must be dealt with and not utilized. He pointed out that the Hound Dog was difficult to use on British planes.

Mr. McNamara pointed out that the Hound Dog could be adapted to British planes, although some changes in the missile would have to be made.

Mr. Thorneycroft pointed out that this would take a long time, and even when accomplished would leave only eighteen inches of clearance at take-off. In any event, this could not be accomplished until about the time when bombers would no longer be used.

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The Prime Minister said the problem was for him as it had been for Britain in 1940 -- whether to chuck it or go on.

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... me would not engage in anything petty. We could stay at Holy Loch. He pointed out that he had taken big risks in his policies. People had said that Britain was in the front line where they were all targets, but had none of the power. He would be prepared to put in all of his part of a Polaris force provided the Queen had the ultimate power and right to draw back in the case of a dire emergency similar to that in 1940. He thought the United States would do the same if we did not have a superfluity of weapons. Britain could make submarines -- not nuclear ones -- to carry missiles. This could be accomplished in six years, but the cost would have to be compensated elsewhere. He hoped not in the Far East, where the British contribution was in some ways more important than in Europe. They would have to tax their people more as well. There was no use prolonging the life of the bomber, which was bound to die in any event. Submarines were much more suitable for an island like Britain, which also had a great naval tradition. Such a course, however, would lead to a deep rift with the United States. He said he would not accuse America, and reminded the President that he was one-half American himself.

The President said that in the first place we were prepared to do what we said we would do. He pointed out that we had spent a great deal of money in carrying out the commitment which Eisenhower had made, and that there could be no suggestion of bad faith. We placed great

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value on our relationship with Great Britain. He pointed out that the British had their own scientists at the Douglas Plant, and asked what they had been saving during the last six months.

British scientists at the Douglas Plant were apparently saying that the trouble was not technical but political.

Mr. Thorneycroft suggested that such reports might have come from U. S. personnel, particularly those interested in continuing the project. In reply to a question from the President as to his own opinion on Skybolt, Mr. Thorneycroft said he had to rely on Mr. McNamara's judgment, as he had gone thoroughly into the matter and had publicly said that Skybolt would be late, expensive, and unreliable.

The President pointed out that McNamara's judgment was based on the fact that he had alternative systems. He pointed out that for \$250 million investment the British could get a good buy which would deter Khrushchev.

Mr. Thorneycroft pointed out that his own experience was that systems of this kind could be successfully developed only if you went flat out in your effort and there was the prospect of a good order at the end of the line.

The President thought our only difficulty was the different judgment we had on the effect a bilateral arrangement would have in Europe, and he repeated that all of our experts thought this would be very serious.

The Prime Minister said this appeared to be based on the assumption that this was a different weapon.

The President said we could not settle this matter today, and then read excerpts from a U. S. draft paper which listed: (1) our offer of Hound Dog; (2) our offer to share equally in cost of completion of Skybolt; (3) a plan for the two governments to cooperate in a NATO missile force.

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The President said that after consultation with NATO the two governments might agree (a) that the forces developed under our agreement would be assigned to the NATO deterrent forces and assigned targets under agreements approved by NATO; (b) the U. S. would undertake to make similar assignment of parallel and equivalent forces; (c) the U. S. and U. K. would support the creation of a NATO multilateral force; (d) the U. S. and U. K. forces would be included in such a NATO multilateral force.

The Prime Minister inquired what would happen about SEATO. The British would be contributing all of their force to NATO and he inquired what would happen if the Chinese attacked Hong Kong. He threw out the suggestion that the British contribution might be made proportionate to that of the United States. He said that the British force might be of the most value in the Far East.

The President said the same assistance might be made available to France, which probably would not want it.

The Prime Minister thought the French might be tempted by the time that would be gained.

At this point the meeting broke up for lunch.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: December 19, 1962

at W. am
(RAV) (091) 8

SUBJECT: Skybolt

PARTICIPANTS:

U. S.

The President
Secretary McNamara
Mr. Ball
Ambassador Bruce
Mr. Bundy
Ambassador Thompson

U. K.

The Prime Minister
Lord Home
Mr. Thorneycroft
Ambassador Ormsby Gore
Mr. de Zuleta
Mr. Bligh

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Copies to: (See page 13)

The Prime Minister began the conversation with an expression of appreciation for the handling of the Cuban affair by the United States. In reply, the President expressed his appreciation for the attitude of the Prime Minister and the British Government which was in striking contrast with that of the British press.

The Prime Minister said that he regretted that the wide range of the talks in which he had expected to engage at this meeting had been overshadowed by the Skybolt problem. He thought he was probably the oldest of those present and knew the story from its beginning which he would like to recount. He fully appreciated the U. S. feeling of the danger of doing something which might be considered obnoxious or unfriendly by the other European powers. He did not want to cause trouble with the Germans, the French, the Italians and others or to impede developments which were wanted both by the United States and the United Kingdom.

In the first place, he wanted to mention that the atomic bomb had been developed almost entirely in the beginning by British scientists. The British Isles had been found too small to carry out tests. Churchill and Roosevelt had agreed that the development of the bomb should be carried out in the

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United States. The whole world knew about the partnership in this matter which was governed by agreement. He was not referring to a legal document but rather to the nature of the agreement. Then there had come the incidents of spies in Great Britain and the McMahon Act. There were many, including some in the United States, who felt that Britain had been treated harshly. Amendments to the McMahon Act had been made which made greater cooperation possible. At this time, the emphasis was on the bomb. Later the emphasis shifted to the means of delivery. Britain had spent about sixty million pounds on the Blue Streak missile. Then there arose the decision as to whether the development of this missile should be continued. Britain was a small and heavily populated island, and the missile would have to be situated near towns where it would be subject to observation and would be exposed to agitators. The Prime Minister had talked to President Eisenhower about the problem and had indicated the British were going to chuck it if they could get anything else.

Then Skybolt came along as well as Polaris. The British made an agreement to buy Skybolt. He was not basing himself on the terms of the agreement but rather on the gentlemen's understanding. Eisenhower had said he wanted something in return, namely the submarine base at Holy Loch. The British had favored another location but had agreed on Holy Loch which was more remote and harder for Lord Russell and his friends to reach. The Prime Minister said that from time-to-time doubts had been cast on the Skybolt development, and he had assumed that in the United States as in England there were always these rumors circulated by rival firms or services. He went on to say it did now seem that Skybolt was in trouble.

The Prime Minister said he understood the U. S. anxiety for the effect any US-UK agreement might have on other allies. He thought the main allies understood the US-UK relationship as a kind of founder company as well as the special arrangement brought about by the amendment of the McMahon Act. He said the other problem was the possibility of bringing into being a larger grouping of powers as well as the possible effect of any such agreement on the Common Market negotiations. The Prime Minister said flatly that he thought the effect of a new agreement on the Common Market agreement would be "frankly, absolutely none." These negotiations now depended on whether the French could maintain the good deal they have in agricultural products vis-a-vis the Germans. If it failed, it would be on that basis. The French and the British have a different concept about the Common Market, the French favoring an autarchical system. There was the question as to what effect an agreement would have on European-multilateral arrangements. It was

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difficult to know what was meant by a multilateral deterrent. The Prime Minister saw no conflict between independent and interdependent forces. Until a supernational authority developed, it did not matter whether it was army troops or air force. Any contribution would be under the control of the Government contributing it. He remarked that the problem of control of allied forces had been with us "since Marlborough" and really was not difficult. He was aware that the French would go on and spend a lot of money. They were grateful for the aid the United States had given, and he had tried to explain this to de Gaulle. He gave the example (which he had not cited to General de Gaulle for reasons of tact) of British forces in the last war which were put under the command of the French General Gamelin, but at a certain time, Churchill had to issue orders to Lord Gort to save the British forces and any French who wanted to come along by going to the channel ports. This enabled the air force to save Britain. Until there was a single state developed, there must be a combination of independent and joint forces. The question was whether the switch of horses from Skybolt to Polaris would upset the principal allies. He thought not.

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Mr. Ball remarked that this would not work.

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Lord Home said we did not have a single ally in Europe that would allow Germany to have its finger on the trigger.

The President referred to the diminishing cost of atomic weapons and said they might become attractive to the Italians and others. If we gave the French Polaris submarines, we would save them a good deal of money and some time. He said that Secretary McNamara did not think the time saved would be very great, but the saving in money would be considerable. Secretary McNamara confirmed this statement. He thought the great protection with respect to delivery systems was their cost. He thought that it was important to keep the attention of the Germans in particular on conventional weapons because of Berlin, although if it were not for Berlin Europe could be defended with four divisions and a nuclear strategy.

The President asked what the argument was against giving such assistance to the French.

The Prime Minister said the British had made a contract which had not worked out.

The President observed that France had objected to our 1958 decision and to the Norstad proposals.

Now it was suggested that we come up with a new position which would represent a change of policy, and it would be wise not to hasten this decision.

The Prime Minister said it was simply a question of one horse being lame while the other was able to run. The President rejoined that these were two different races. The Prime Minister said he did not accept this.

Lord Home suggested that if we got a multinational force we could give the French Polaris at a later date.

The President suggested we should consider the whole situation and perhaps have a statement that should state:

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1. We had offered to make the Hound Dog missile available and he referred, in this connection, to the treatment of our position by the British and American press, which had made it look as though we were being unfair.
2. We had offered to continue the Skybolt program and to put \$100 million more into its development, which would enable Britain to continue its national deterrent.
3. We discussed the problem of Polaris, which was a new field and which should be looked at with care.

The President went on to say that we should look at what we meant by multinational force. How should control be exercised? Whether a similar offer should be made to France? And, finally, we should make judgment on what the effect of our action would be in Europe. The statement he had outlined would answer the charges of United States bad faith, and the charge that Britain was without any alternative. He did not think, however, that we could decide these matters here.

Mr. Ball said this should be on the basis of a private discussion.

The Prime Minister asked that if the present position had not arisen when the Skybolt would have been operational.

Secretary McNamara replied that it would have been operational in 1966.

The Prime Minister asked if the Skybolt was likely to be reasonably effective and if it would be safe to carry.

Secretary McNamara replied that it would be safe to carry and would be an effective deterrent, but would have low reliability -- something on the order of twenty to thirty percent operational reliability.

The President pointed out that if we did not have other systems available we would go ahead on Skybolt. Secretary McNamara said that in such circumstances we would certainly consider going ahead, but he did not feel that we could do so in view of the availability of alternate systems and the low reliability of Skybolt.

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The Prime Minister inquired if the record of failure was worse than normal.

Mr. McNamara replied in the affirmative, stating that this was the most complex system we had yet attempted. He pointed out that an error of one foot per second meant an error of one thousand feet at target.

Mr. McNamara pointed out that he was in a difficult situation in explaining to Congress why we had spent \$200 million since 1961. He had asked Congress for \$100 million for 1962 and for \$130 million for 1963.

The President suggested that these figures might be useful to Mr. Thorneycroft in explaining the situation to Parliament.

Mr. Thorneycroft said that his difficulty in Parliament was that the Skybolt would be late, expensive and unreliable, and these facts had been made public.

The President said the British press had been carrying stories to the effect that our action had not been taken on technical grounds but on political ones.

Mr. Thorneycroft said the British press was looking at the alternative.

The Prime Minister said he agreed that the press must be dealt with and not utilized. He pointed out that the Hound Dog was difficult to use on British planes.

Mr. McNamara pointed out that the Hound Dog could be adapted to British planes, although some changes in the missile would have to be made.

Mr. Thorneycroft pointed out that this would take a long time, and even when accomplished would leave only eighteen inches of clearance at take-off. In any event, this could not be accomplished until about the time when bombers would no longer be used.

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The Prime Minister said the problem was for him as it had been for Britain in 1940 -- whether to chuck it or go on.

momentary report 6/9/40

He would not engage in anything petty. We could stay at Holy Loch. He pointed out that he had taken big risks in his policies. People had said that Britain was in the front line where they were all targets, but had none of the power. He would be prepared to put in all of his part of a Polaris force provided the Queen had the ultimate power and right to draw back in the case of a dire emergency similar to that in 1940. He thought the United States would do the same if we did not have a superfluity of weapons. Britain could make submarines -- not nuclear ones -- to carry missiles. This could be accomplished in six years, but the cost would have to be compensated elsewhere. He hoped not in the Far East, where the British contribution was in some ways more important than in Europe. They would have to tax their people more as well. There was no use prolonging the life of the bomber, which was bound to die in any event. Submarines were much more suitable for an island like Britain, which also had a great naval tradition. Such a course, however, would lead to a deep rift with the United States. He said he would not accuse America, and reminded the President that he was one-half American himself.

The President said that in the first place we were prepared to do what we said we would do. He pointed out that we had spent a great deal of money in carrying out the commitment which Eisenhower had made, and that there could be no suggestion of bad faith. We placed great

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value on our relationship with Great Britain. He pointed out that the British had their own scientists at the Douglas Plant, and asked what they had been saving during the last six months.

British scientists at the Douglas Plant were apparently saying that the trouble was not technical but political.

Mr. Thorneycroft suggested that such reports might have come from U. S. personnel, particularly those interested in continuing the project. In reply to a question from the President as to his own opinion on Skybolt, Mr. Thorneycroft said he had to rely on Mr. McNamara's judgment, as he had gone thoroughly into the matter and had publicly said that Skybolt would be late, expensive, and unreliable.

The President pointed out that McNamara's judgment was based on the fact that he had alternative systems. He pointed out that for \$250 million investment the British could get a good buy which would deter Khrushchev.

Mr. Thorneycroft pointed out that his own experience was that systems of this kind could be successfully developed only if you went flat out in your effort and there was the prospect of a good order at the end of the line.

The President thought our only difficulty was the different judgment we had on the effect a bilateral arrangement would have in Europe, and he repeated that all of our experts thought this would be very serious.

The Prime Minister said this appeared to be based on the assumption that this was a different weapon.

The President said we could not settle this matter today, and then read excerpts from a U. S. draft paper which listed: (1) our offer of Hound Dog; (2) our offer to share equally in cost of completion of Skybolt; (3) a plan for the two governments to cooperate in a NATO missile force.

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The President said that after consultation with NATO the two governments might agree (a) that the forces developed under our agreement would be assigned to the NATO deterrent forces and assigned targets under agreements approved by NATO; (b) the U. S. would undertake to make similar assignment of parallel and equivalent forces; (c) the U. S. and U. K. would support the creation of a NATO multilateral force; (d) the U. S. and U. K. forces would be included in such a NATO multilateral force.

The Prime Minister inquired what would happen about SEATO. The British would be contributing all of their force to NATO and he inquired what would happen if the Chinese attacked Hong Kong. He threw out the suggestion that the British contribution might be made proportionate to that of the United States. He said that the British force might be of the most value in the Far East.

The President said the same assistance might be made available to France, which probably would not want it.

The Prime Minister thought the French might be tempted by the time that would be gained.

At this point the meeting broke up for lunch.

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	INR	Amembassy Paris (Embassy and USRO)

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20661

December 19, 1962

4:30 p.m.

Prime Minister's House

SKYBOLT

Great Britain: The Prime Minister
Lord Home
Mr. Thorneycroft
Ambassador Omasby Gore
Mr. Ian Samuel

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United States: The President
Secretary McNamara
Under Secretary Ball
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Ambassador Bruce
Mr. William R. Tyler

The President read to the Prime Minister the text of the three documents which had been prepared by the U.S. Delegation on a possible substitute for Skybolt. The President emphasized that it was our intantion that the details of a multilateral force should be kept private. We should study its possible development and then come to a decision. This much could be said publicly, and meanwhile we would see what the reactions were in Europe. The President pointed out the advantages of the proposal under discussion from the UK view point.

The Prime Minister asked what was really meant by the words "assigned to NATO". He pointed out that SACEUR and SACLANT had forces under their command under double capacity: they are both NATO and national forces. At the time of Cuba, the US itself had withdrawn a number of ships that were assigned to NATO for the special action which the situation required. The fact that these ships were assigned to NATO had not stood in the way of the US. If "assigned" means something like their being part of NATO for ordinary times, for training purposes, manuevers, and of course joint military operations if the situation should come to that, then this makes things easier. The estion was whether units assigned to NATO could be taken out for purposes to which others are not parties.

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The President said he understood that it was in the UK interest to define "assigned" as loosely as possible so as to satisfy British opinion with regard to an independent role, whereas from the point of view of the European countries there was advantage in making the word "assigned" mean a firm commitment which would not be ignored except in a moment of extreme national peril.

There followed some discussion with the Secretary of Defense about the distinction between forces which have been "assigned" and those which have been "earmarked for commitment to". The Secretary of Defense said that "earmarked" was usually applied to sea forces, whereas the word "committed" was used for land forces. In any case there was no doubt that national forces which have been assigned to NATO can be withdrawn, with appropriate notice.

The Prime Minister then pulled a paper out of his pocket, which he read out and which set forth the British position and reasoning on the question of a substitute for Skybolt. He went on to say that the situation now was that the US had agreed to sell Polaris missiles to the UK, which would construct the actual submarines and the warheads. He said that the primary task of these units would be to contribute to the defense of the NATO area. So the job to be done was to build them, make them available to NATO in all ordinary conditions, and meanwhile see if we could work out some kind of multi-lateral force. If the UK Government was going to assume these heavy new expenditures, it would have to be in a position to justify the decision to do so. The UK Government would have to explain that the UK was in a period of history between two worlds: the world of independence and the world of interdependence. If the UK was going to undertake this program it would have to have the feeling that it had gained, in the last resort, an instrument which it could use, in certain circumstances, to preserve peace, and in other circumstances perhaps as an instrument of national policy. He said that the UK needed just that degree of sovereignty which would justify making the added effort. If this element were not present, then the question would arise whether the effort was justified, since there were other ways of spending money for the UK Armed Forces, such as making them more mobile, better equipped, and giving them greater support.

The Prime Minister recalled that there had been cases in recent years when it had been necessary to move rapidly to preserve peace:

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- (1) the UK forces had moved into Jordan while US forces had been sent to Lebanon;
- (2) the UK had had to move fast for the defense of the Gulf of Persia;
- (3) troops had recently been sent to put down the trouble in Malaysia.

What the UK Government needed was little, but this was "what is needed in order to remain something in the world". This sentiment was shared by the French. The Prime Minister did not think that Germany today entertained these sentiments. He thought the Germans were very different people now from what they were under Hitler. He thought that a phrase something like "the primary purpose of these forces would be to contribute to the defense of NATO" would be acceptable. He thought it might be healthy to have this kind of weapon available for special needs in other parts of the world, e.g., the Far East. Then there was the question of the morale of the crews. US submarine crews, for instance, on units assigned to NATO feel strong national loyalties. We would have to see whether and if so how a multilateral force could be created.

The President said that the US has had some rather serious disagreements with the French with respect to their nuclear role, in which the UK has not been involved. Our object is to make the force envisaged as multilateral as possible. We take the view, he said, that this proposal represents a substantial step. He said we do not discount possible difficulties with regard to France and German reaction. These missiles and submarines, said the President, should be available to the UK for national use only in case of dire emergencies. The proposal has the advantage of saving the UK something like \$300 million. We recognize that British national forces assigned to NATO could be taken back by the UK in extreme circumstances. The President thought that "ordinary conditions" should cover all situations that could be envisaged short of those which constituted "mortal danger" to the survival of the country.

-Lord Home

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Lord Home asked whether, if Nehru was in very great trouble, and the UK wanted to put three submarines in the Bay of Bengal, they would be entitled to do so. Mr. Ball said he had been impressed by the Prime Minister's reference earlier in the morning to the situation in which the UK found itself in 1940. That was the kind of desperate situation which in our view would justify the withdrawal of the committed forces. Lord Home said there were other potential crisis which should be considered. For example, Kuwait and the UK oil interests there.

The Prime Minister said it seemed to him that what we were saying was that it would be all right for the UK to withdraw its forces if it was a question of absolute survival, but that no situation short of this would justify their doing so. However, there were conceivable situations in which the UK would want to make policy by having Polaris at their disposal for national purposes. Otherwise, the British people might want to do something else with their money. The UK would be committing its entire force, whereas the US would retain a good deal of its Polaris forces outside of NATO. The Prime Minister referred to complications of giving submarines, which was far greater than in the case of aircraft and armies. Submerines would be spoken to but apparently must never answer back. He felt that a British Admiral of the fleet must be in the position of issuing commands to this particular fleet, otherwise the units would "have no life of their own". He added that there was no reason why the British Commander would not be part of a higher command, whether SACEUR or SACLANT.

The Secretary of Defense commented on the very heavy cost involved in the Polaris systems. He said the US and the UK would try not to duplicate overhead costs, and that the UK could share in use of the systems.

The President said that our language was intended to satisfy other members of NATO. After all, we are talking about 1970 for the force to come into being, whereas we are faced with the political requirements of the situation the next two or three years. He said that it was the US and not the UK which carried the responsibility for the situations with regard to France and a nuclear role.

The Prime Minister said he wanted to sum up where we now stood: the UK does not want to go on with Skybolt for the reasons given. Round Dog would have been absolutely splendid, "were it not for the fact that it would mean practically re-designing the bombers". The

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Prime Minister said he could see the difficulties facing the US, but if the UK were to acquire the Polaris submarines, it would put them entirely under NATO. The problem was what the word "assignment" really means. The value of the proposal to the UK would be if the British Government in power at the time were able to make use of the British element in the force, should the UK be faced by some national emergency which required its use. The Prime Minister drew a comparison with the US Sixth Fleet, or sending a cruiser or gunboat off to deal with some emergency situation. He said that the UK must reserve the ultimate right to withdraw from the force. The crews must feel that they are the "Queen's sailors" until a supra-national organization comes into being. The Prime Minister added that if General deGaulle were prepared to consider joining a multi-lateral force, he would undoubtedly say the same thing.

(At this point the meeting adjourned, after a brief discussion during which the President and the Prime Minister agreed to keep the Conference going until sometime Friday, December 21.)

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December 20, 1962

10:00 a.m.

Prime Minister's House

SKYBOLT

Great Britain: The Prime Minister
Lord Home
Ambassador David Ormsby Gore
Sir Robert Scott
Mr. Thorneycroft
Mr. Bligh

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United States: The President
Secretary McNamara
Under Secretary Ball
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Ambassador Bruce
Mr. William R. Tyler

The Prime Minister recapitulated the UK intentions:

- (1) The US Government has very generously made an offer on both Skybolt and Hound Dog.
- (2) The UK Government has raised the question of Polaris. The Prime Minister agreed that this was not merely a substitute for Skybolt. It represented something new which marks the opening of a fresh phase in US-UK relationships.
- (3) The world has moved on. France is now strong. Germany has a weak government with ambitions.
- (4) We are considering organizing a contributory NATO structure, whereby several countries put something into the pool.

"Actually", said the Prime Minister, "the whole thing is ridiculous." What do seven or eight UK units add to the existing strength, which is enough to blow up the world? So why does it matter? It is partly a question of "keeping up with the Joneses", which is human. We have not yet reached the point of a

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melting pot of nations. So countries which have played a great role in history must retain their dignity. This area is not merely a question of difference of degree, but of order. The UK does not want to be just a clown, or a satellite. The UK wants a nuclear force not only for defense, but in the event of menace to its existence, which the UK might have to meet; for example: when Khrushchev waved his rockets about at the time of Suez, or when that fellow Qassim got excited and Kuwait was threatened. The UK, the Prime Minister went on to say, wants to do three things: to contribute to NATO, to contribute to the strength and unity of Europe, and to retain an element of strength in its foreign policy in order to maintain the valuation given by other countries to the UK's advice. It was difficult to define what was meant by "withdrawal". You could talk about "dire emergency", but what was meant by "dire" and how much of an emergency would it have to be? It was right, he said, that we should not alarm the Germans or the French - particularly the Germans. We should promote the European concept. It was also necessary that the UK should not have the status of a satellite. The UK should increase or at least maintain the strength of its foreign policy, so that it should not be threatened with impunity. He felt that it was necessary to find language which would take the foregoing into account. The matter under discussion was very serious for the UK, and would be much debated. It would set the tone for the next 15 years. For these reasons, said the Prime Minister, he had asked the Deputy Prime Minister in London to call a Cabinet meeting for Friday, December 21, at 10:30 a.m. Thus there would be a Cabinet decision. He thought it would be useful to hold a drafting session to work out language.

The President agreed that the solution being discussed was, and would be regarded as being a very different question from Skybolt. The US did not want to have similar requests addressed to it, which it would have to refuse. Careful drafting would be necessary. With reference to Kuwait, doubtless the UK Government in power in 1970 would have to decide whether it was still a live issue. He assumed that the UK did not have the intention of using nuclear weapons against Qassim.

Turning to the question of what answer the Prime Minister should give to questions in the House of Commons, this matter would have to be carefully considered. The President said we would have to put something into the agreement on the need to increase conventional forces. So long as Berlin existed as a problem, there was danger

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of war. He felt that the extra costs involved in building nuclear submarines should not be at the expense of pressing forward toward conventional goals. (At this point, both Lord Home and Mr. Thorneycroft referred to the language in the recent NATO communique on conventional forces and suggested that this be used.) The President said that the language reached should be such that both countries could defend it. It should include the thought that, having talked together about a multilateral force, both the US and the UK wanted to make such a force a reality. We must not make the multilateral project a mere cover for national deterrents. There was the question of what the Prime Minister should answer to questions in Parliament.

The Prime Minister said he did not like the idea of defining a precise text. He would prefer just to say that the UK force was assigned to NATO. The Prime Minister went on to say that they were talking about a very long time ahead. He suggested making a start by pooling some of the bombers and other aircraft of the US, the UK and France. Thus the multilateral force "would grow naturally, as though from a seed". "Let us do it now", he said, "and build up on it."

The President said that pooling bombers might be a good idea, but asked what would the Prime Minister say in answer to questions.

The Prime Minister said this was a hypothetical question. The bombers, then the submarines, would be put into the multilateral force. "Of course", he said, "in the last resort you may be forced to pick up your stick and fight." Moreover, officers of Her Majesty's Navy would expect to take orders from a minister of the UK Government. The President asked the Prime Minister what he would say if people asked whether the UK was retaining an independent deterrent. The Prime Minister said he would say that the UK was making an independent British contribution to the nuclear defense of the West. The President noted that the emphasis was on the words "British contribution", rather than on "independent deterrent". (At this point the Prime Minister distributed a paper with some language.)

The President said that if deGaulle were to ask whether the US was prepared to make the same offer to him as to the UK we should say "yes". Of course, he might object to a proposal of this kind. (There followed some discussion of the language proposed by the Prime Minister, and it was decided to recess for one-half-hour in order that each Delegation should be able to discuss separately the situation which had been reached.)

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The meeting reconvened at 12:00 noon. The Prime Minister objected that the US language went too far in reasserting the very points that had caused him so much anxiety. It did not give him what he needed, which was: "a British force". He insisted that he would have to use the words "supreme national interest". At that point, the President read part of an article in that morning's Washington Post to illustrate the difficulties he faced with regard to American domestic opinion. The Prime Minister raised again the three desiderata from the UK point of view: (1) to make a contribution to NATO for joint defense; (2) to give the UK Government authority in international councils; (3) to retain the means of wielding influence in international diplomatic life.

Obviously, said the Prime Minister, he could not say that the British force envisaged would be as British as the Brigade of Guards, but if all this effort and expense were to be born, it must mean to the British people that they were thereby keeping up with the Joneses. He was sorry, but he could not accept the US paper as it stood. If the US insisted on keeping this language, he would prefer not to agree. It would look as though the US only wanted "to keep the little boys quiet". DeGaulle would say that the UK had sold out. The Prime Minister said he intended to stress both independence and interdependence together. The UK was prepared to put the whole force into the pool. The language he had in mind was such as to give the UK Government "a life, and existence" so that it is not merely a client". "I do not believe", he said, "that the Atlantic partnership will ever succeed or be built up except on pooling of equal pride and honor."

The Prime Minister then engaged in a long soliloquy of reminiscences of World Wars I and II. The British troops which had died had done so for their Sovereign, not for just some vague reason which meant nothing to them. He agreed that the force contemplated could be a joint navy for practical purposes, but the British contribution must be the Queen's. In the recent Cuban crisis, he said, the population of the US knew why it was prepared to face war if necessary. These thoughts must be taken into consideration in the agreement which we were trying to reach. If we were to disagree, "we would have to undertake an agonizing reappraisal of our military and political policies".

The President said it was clear that we had somewhat different interests with regard to what should be said after our meeting in Nassau. US policy has constantly been directed toward discrediting

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national nuclear deterrents, and it was not possible for the US to start saying the opposite.

The meeting broke up at about 1:00 p.m. for further consideration of the language proposed by each Delegation.

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TOP SECRET

forces to NATO; indeed he would be prepared to do this even if Britain could manufacture the whole missile system themselves. At the same time in the last resort Her Majesty's Ministers must be free to decide. There was no dichotomy here; they were looking at two sides of the same coin. The Government of the day would have to have authority to act. But the world was no longer in the days of bows and arrows and had moved into a much more sophisticated state. Most nations could not get up to this high level but between those who could he did not believe that partnership on the basis of equal pride and honour, although not of equal strength, was excluded. When in the 1914 war his battalion had been nearly wiped out, the officers and men had fought not because of the "entente cordiale" but because of their loyalty to their King and country. At the time of Cuba when the President had rightly been so pleased by the steadfastness of his people they had not stood firm because of NATO but because of America. Perhaps in time this feeling would change, but people were not ready yet. He did not wish to have an independent force in the sense used by the *Washington Post* in their edition that day; nor would the British Government want to take the force in and out of NATO every few weeks. At the same time the preservation of the principles for which he was arguing was of capital importance and this moment was a turning point. Much as he would regret it if agreement was impossible, the British Government would then have to make a reappraisal of their defence policies throughout the world.

President Kennedy said that in the long run the interests of the two Governments were exactly the same. The difficulty was that in the next few weeks they might be saying different things. The United States had for some years been declaring their opposition to national deterrents and it was difficult to abandon this position. However, he was quite prepared to look again at the drafts.

It was agreed that the paper would be redrafted by the two Ministers of Defence and advisers, and the meeting ended at about 12.35 p.m.

ANNEX I

DRAFT STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR DEFENSE SYSTEMS

United States Draft, December 20, 1962, 11 a.m.

1. The President and the Prime Minister received the development program for the SKYBOLT missile. The President explained that it was no longer expected that this very complex weapons system would be completed within the cost estimate or the time scale which were projected when the program was begun.
2. The President informed the Prime Minister that, for this reason and because of the availability to the United States of alternative weapons systems, he had decided to cancel plans for the production of SKYBOLT for use by the United States. Nevertheless, recognising the importance of the SKYBOLT program for the United Kingdom and recalling that the purpose of the offer of SKYBOLT to the United Kingdom in 1960 had been to assist in improving and extending the effective life of the British V-bombers, the President expressed his readiness to continue the development of the missile as a joint enterprise between the United States and the United Kingdom, with each country bearing equal shares of the future cost of completing development, after which the United Kingdom would be able to place a production order to meet its requirements.
3. While recognising the generosity of this offer the Prime Minister decided, after full consideration, not to avail himself of it because of doubts that had been expressed about the prospects of success for this weapons system and because of uncertainty regarding date of completion and final cost of the program.
4. As a possible alternative the President suggested that the Royal Air Force might use the HOUND DOG missile. The Prime Minister responded that, in the light of difficulties in adapting this missile for the British V-bombers, he was unable to accept this suggestion.

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RECORD OF A MEETING HELD AT BALI-HAI, THE BAHAMAS, AT
10.30 a.m. ON THURSDAY, DECEMBER 20, 1962

Present:

UNITED KINGDOM

The Right Hon. Harold Macmillan
The Right Hon. The Earl of Home
The Right Hon. Peter Thorneycroft,
M.P.
Sir David Ormsby Gore
Mr. Bligh
Mr. Samuel
Mr. de Zulueta

UNITED STATES

President Kennedy
Mr. McNamara
Mr. Ball
Ambassador Bruce
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Mr. Tyler

Defence Org.
ERB's (15)
July 1966

SKYBOLT

Mr. Macmillan said he would like to state the position that had now been reached. What he said should be at least historically correct. To begin with, he would record his thanks for the very generous offer that the President had made in respect of SKYBOLT and HOUND DOG. His reply to these offers was that for technical reasons these missiles would not do for the United Kingdom. He, the Prime Minister, had then proposed that POLARIS missiles would meet British needs. He had at first said that the POLARIS missile would be no more than a substitute for SKYBOLT. Perhaps he had been wrong in this because POLARIS had implications both in character and in time which meant that it marked the beginning of a new phase. Nevertheless he still asked for it. In doing so he fully understood the President's anxieties. The world had moved on and France and Germany had grown in strength and stature; France had nuclear ambitions and some Germans might have them now and others develop them later. But in spite of these French and German difficulties he felt, and he thought that the President agreed with him, that if we could organise a contributory NATO scheme which would not exclude the concept of multilateralism, we should be contributing to the peace of the world and not merely perpetuating national deterrents. (President Kennedy nodded assent to this.)

Mr. Macmillan said that there was of course another side to all this. There were already enough nuclear weapons to blow up the world and adding seven POLARIS submarines was not really adding anything significant to this potential. He sympathised with Americans who did not know what the Europeans were worrying about: the Americans were perfectly willing to defend Europe and had ample means of doing so. So why should the British want these new weapons? He would admit that part of the reason was to keep up with the Joneses. This was a universal and perfectly respectable feeling in the world. But there was another reason. The world was not yet organised politically or economically in a way that took cognisance of the disappearance of national independence. In this age of transition there were great nations like Britain, France and perhaps Germany, that felt they must have a means of defence which gave them the dignity and the authority of being participants in this strange new game. Previously in history there had been differences of degree between the defences of one country and the defences of another but now the difference was one of quality. Nuclear Powers lived in a different world and great nations felt that they ought to be represented in it. Even if their representation was only as part of a multilateral force they would regard themselves as being represented if only symbolically. Of course in war these weapons would have military value but their main value was that they satisfied the instinct of great nations that they should not become clients—not to use the word satellites. This instinct would, he thought, be satisfied in a NATO or multilateral force.

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There was yet another reason why the United Kingdom wished to acquire these weapons. The United Kingdom still had wide commitments overseas and must be able to use these weapons to defend herself. This defence could not of course be complete but would enable the United Kingdom, if threatened with nuclear attack, to make a significant counter threat. He was thinking of the threats made by Mr. Khrushchev at the time of Suez. The same thing might happen in Kuwait. There might be an Administration in the United States or powerful commercial interests there or elsewhere who would not mind seeing the British thrown out of Kuwait and the oil wells lost to the West. The United Kingdom would then be on her own and they must be able to act if, as a result of their threatening Kassem, Khrushchev threatened to bombard London. The United Kingdom must not get into a position where it was impossible to send an expeditionary force to any threatened part of the world because Khrushchev could reply with impunity that if the troops were used he would bombard London. In this way the possession of these weapons would avoid a weakening of British foreign policy and would enhance the value of the advice that the United Kingdom could give.

Mr. Macmillan then turned to the difficulty of defining the conditions in which these weapons could be used independently. He did not like phrases like "in a dire emergency". He would immediately be asked to define "dire" or "grave" or whatever other adjective was used. He could see that President Kennedy must avoid alarming the French or the Germans but he thought this could be avoided by promoting the European idea that he believed both he and the President agreed on. It was not good morally for the whole of Europe to lean on one country, however great. He thought that the various drafts could be revised in such a way that these and other American points could be covered and yet he himself would be left free to say that these weapons would constitute an independent contribution to the Western deterrent.

Mr. Macmillan then said that this was a most serious decision for the United Kingdom. A great deal of money was involved and the decision would set the pattern of their defence for the next 15 years. He had to consider not merely the interests of his own party but the national interest as well. If therefore the President thought that what he had said would be generally acceptable he would like to put a revised draft to the Cabinet meeting in London on the morning of Friday, December 21. He did not feel able to make a final decision without the Cabinet's advice.

President Kennedy agreed that POLARIS was and would be regarded as quite different from SKYBOLT. He did not want to be asked by the French or anyone else whether they could acquire these weapons. It would be very embarrassing for him to have to refuse. The reasons that the Prime Minister had given to show why the United Kingdom should have these weapons applied to other Powers as well. There was also a feeling in the United States that they should not be given to other countries. They would therefore have to be very careful in drafting any statement. The Prime Minister had mentioned the defence of Kuwait. He assumed that the United Kingdom was not proposing to use nuclear weapons against Iraq, but if in the course of defending Kuwait the United Kingdom was threatened with bombardment by Mr. Khrushchev, then of course the United Kingdom Government would say that this was a "dire" emergency and would take control of its submarines; but these weapons should certainly not be used for a Suez type operation to intimidate President Nasser.

President Kennedy then said that any joint statement must also contain something about conventional forces. So long as the Berlin problem remained unsolved there was always the danger of war. It must not appear that he had agreed to a scale of expenditure by the United Kingdom which would impair the United Kingdom's ability to reach its agreed NATO force goals. He did not wish in three years' time to have the United Kingdom saying that they could not meet their conventional commitments and that the United States had accepted when they had agreed to the expenditure of British money on POLARIS. People must not think that the United States had changed its view that adequate conventional forces were necessary.

Lord Home said that a NATO formula had been agreed in NATO only a few days ago. President Kennedy interrupted to say that he was sure that something could be worked out to cover this, but it was important that it should be.

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President Kennedy said that he was not now worried about the rights the United Kingdom would have over its POLARIS submarines 10 years hence in the event of an emergency. He thought the two sides were agreed on that. He also thought that a decision to provide POLARIS submarines to the United Kingdom could be defended as a first step towards the creation of a multilateral force, as a step which was at last being taken after years of talk in order to make a multilateral deterrent a reality. On that basis he thought an agreement could be presented as helpful to the United States, to the United Kingdom and to Europe. But what did worry him and what was still not agreed was what Mr. Macmillan would say if he was asked the direct question in Parliament or by the Press "Is this an independent national deterrent?" This was the key to the whole problem. People must not be able to say that the multilateral aspect of the agreement was no more than a fig leaf. He realised that the Prime Minister needed to show that the United Kingdom was getting value for money, but the United States would have to emphasise the multilateral aspect.

Mr. Macmillan said that he was most anxious to avoid having to enter into fine definitions. He would like to confine himself to the phrase "assign to NATO" and refuse to go beyond that. He had had an idea which might help. It would be a long time before the submarines were available, so why not make a start at once by putting part or all of the V-bomber force together with some American bombers into a NATO Pool. The French might be induced to put some of their bombers in as well. In this way a multilateral force would grow naturally. If he was asked what would be the status of the British POLARIS submarines he would reply that they would be like the V-bombers—that is, not as the V-bombers were at the moment but as they would be when they were contributed to a multilateral force. President Kennedy replied that he liked this idea but he still felt that the Prime Minister must have an answer to the direct question about the degree of the independence of the British deterrent.

Mr. Macmillan replied that he would say that the question was hypothetical. The present agreement envisaged the assignment first of bombers and then of submarines. Then the questioner might ask what would happen if the United States pulled out. He would reply that all sorts of suppositions were possible but in the last resort the crews of any of Her Majesty's ships would obey national orders. This was true in every force. There were no constitutional means of obliging the officers and men to do otherwise. But all this would be only in the last resort. Lord Home said that by "the last resort" he thought we would mean something that threatened the life of the country. President Kennedy agreed with this definition of "the last resort". He then asked what the Prime Minister would say if he was asked if this agreement meant that the United Kingdom was continuing to maintain an independent nuclear deterrent. Mr. Macmillan replied that he would say that we were maintaining an independent contribution to the Western deterrent. President Kennedy said that these were the very words that he had to be so careful about. He would like to see an actual draft. He was worried lest General de Gaulle or someone else might ask whether the same offer was open to France. He thought he might have to be ready to say that it was.

Mr. Macmillan said that he still hoped to avoid spelling out these things in detail. He showed President Kennedy a redraft (Annex I) of part of the paper that the President had given him the night before (Annexes II and III).

President Kennedy said that he was worried about the wording of paragraph 8 and wondered whether he would be able to say that he would do as much for General de Gaulle.

Mr. Macmillan asked the President whether, if the safety of the United States was threatened, he would withdraw United States nuclear forces from the multilateral force and President Kennedy replied that he would. President Kennedy went on to say that he did not think there was any disagreement between the two sides on that point, though the United States would expect to be consulted before the United Kingdom took such action. The problem did not lie there but in knowing what should be said in answer to a direct question about the degree of independence of Britain's nuclear deterrent. This was an immediate problem. There were words in paragraph 8 of the Prime Minister's draft which could be construed as meaning that the British deterrent was purely national.

Mr. Macmillan then proposed and President Kennedy agreed that the talks should be adjourned while the drafts were revised.

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