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ANNEX A TO D(61)2

NATO STRATEGY AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

DRAFT MEMORANDUM BY
THE UNITED KINGDOM MINISTER OF DEFENCE

PART I

NATO STRATEGY

1. At the Ministerial Session of the North Atlantic Council on 16th December, 1960, the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary said "..... the time has come when there should be a comprehensive study of the purposes, control and deployment of the nuclear armoury in support of NATO with the object of making the deterrent as effective as possible without waste of resources." This paper sets out the views of the United Kingdom on what are the questions that should be examined.

Present NATO Strategy

2. The present strategic concept of the probable nature of a war involving NATO, set out in MC.14/2, is either:-

- (a) general war, involving the immediate use of the West's strategic nuclear forces and of tactical nuclear weapons by NATO; or
- (b) local hostile actions, without necessarily having recourse to nuclear weapons.

This concept requires the shield forces to be able to wage war on land, sea and air, in order to defend the NATO area until the enemy's ability and will to continue the war have been destroyed. There is no "NATO concept of limited war with the Soviets".

3. The Military Committee's paper MC.48/2 sets out the measures needed to carry out the strategic concept outlined in MC.14/2. These measures include the integration of nuclear weapons into NATO shield forces; instant readiness to use nuclear weapons; and the ability to sustain operations until the strategic counter offensive has achieved its objective.

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If the Soviet Government acted successfully on this belief, such a success might well lead to others and the West could be faced with the choice between the collapse of its whole position and all-out nuclear war.

7. Suggestions have recently been made by high military authorities for developing the idea of imposing a "pause" on Soviet aggression in the hope that the Soviet leaders, realising that they had miscalculated NATO's determination to resist, would withdraw before hostilities developed into all-out war.

8. For the reasons mentioned in paragraph 6, NATO might find itself, under present strategy, confronted at a given moment with the choice between defeat by a conventional attack and all-out nuclear war. In order to maintain the credibility of the deterrent, it therefore seems desirable to examine whether the strategy can be adapted so as to provide for whatever degree of force, not excluding nuclear weapons, might be required to induce an aggressor to abandon his aggression, while, at the same time, minimising the risk of precipitating all-out nuclear war. Some of the problems arising in such an examination are set out in Part II of this paper.

The Role of NATO Shield Forces

9. Under present strategy, the shield forces are required to be able to wage general war by land, sea and air, and to deal with local hostile attacks. As a result of the examination mentioned in paragraph 8 above, they might be required also to be manifestly able to counter by the discriminate use of tactical nuclear weapons Soviet aggression at levels between local hostile actions and all-out nuclear war.

10. Because we are approaching the time when each side can destroy the other, when even greater emphasis must be placed on the over-riding aim of preventing war, and because

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NATO strategy already recognises that it is the strategic counter offensive which would determine the outcome of general war, the review of NATO strategy should include the question of the extent to which NATO shield forces should be specially equipped to be enabled to wage general war after the main nuclear exchange.

11. On the assumption that the nuclear strategic forces in support of NATO will continue to be capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on any potential aggressor, the following questions about the role of the shield forces in conditions of nuclear equipoise arise:

- (a) To what extent should NATO plan to counter Soviet aggression by conventional means alone?
- (b) Could the shield forces of NATO be equipped - and if so with what types of nuclear weapons and under what system of control - in order:-
 - (i) that they may be a deterrent to aggression by showing that they can be used in such a way as to resist aggression by whatever degree of force is necessary;
 - and, if aggression occurs,
 - (ii) that they may be capable of being used in such a way as to convince the Soviet Government that it had miscalculated NATO's determination to resist, and to give the Soviet forces time to withdraw before hostilities developed into general war?
- (c) To what extent should NATO make special provision for the shield forces for the role of

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conducting operations after the main
nuclear exchange?

In order to answer these questions and to formulate a practicable strategy for NATO, it is necessary to examine the role, deployment and control of nuclear weapons in support of NATO forces with the object of making the deterrent as effective as possible without waste of resources. Part II of this paper deals with these aspects of the problem.

PART II

POLICY FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN SUPPORT OF NATO

12. The primary purpose of all nuclear weapons is to deter a potential aggressor from using force or the threat of force in support of his aims. But the weapons will deter him only if he considers there is an unacceptable risk that they could and would be used against him to whatever extent was necessary to induce him to abandon his attack. This part of the paper is, therefore, concerned principally with the way in which nuclear weapons might be used.

The Purpose of Nuclear Weapons in Support of NATO

Strategic Purposes

13. No question arises about the need for forces that could devastate the U.S.S.R. The existing strategic nuclear forces will continue to be available for this purpose.

Tactical Purposes

14. There are three stages at which nuclear weapons might be used for tactical purposes:-

- A. In the period after it had been determined that aggression could not be countered by conventional means alone and before all-out nuclear war had begun (i.e. before the launching of strategic nuclear forces).
- B. In conjunction with the launching of the strategic nuclear forces.

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- C. For continuing any battle there might be after the strategic nuclear forces had been launched.

15. At any of these stages, the weapons might be used for either or both of two main military purposes:-

- (a) for countering enemy forces which are in a position to take part in the current battle;
- (b) for preventing enemy reinforcements from reaching positions from which they could take part in the battle.

Stage A

16. Should the broad objectives of this period be:

- (a) to convince the Soviet Government that NATO would not shrink from the use of nuclear weapons to whatever extent was necessary to defend its interests?
- (b) to provide a period of time before resort to all-out nuclear war in which the Soviet Government would realise that it had miscalculated the determination of NATO to resist and would decide, with the aid of whatever diplomatic and other pressures could be brought to bear, to withdraw rather than risk all-out nuclear war?

17. In considering whether and how these objectives might be achieved, some of the questions that arise are:-

- (a) At what stage and by what means would NATO decide that Soviet aggression could not be countered by conventional means alone?
- (b) Must it be assumed that any use of nuclear

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weapons in any circumstances and of any size - even sub-kiloton weapons - would inevitably lead to all-out nuclear war?

- (c) If not, what arrangements should be made for the control, deployment and use of nuclear weapons to give the best chance of inducing the Soviet Government to withdraw while minimising the risk of all-out nuclear war?
- (d) Should the first use of nuclear weapons by NATO take the form of "a nuclear shot across the bows"?
- (e) What scale and duration of nuclear conflict in Stage A should be assumed, for planning purposes, before it must be held to have failed in its purpose?
- (f) What are the specific military objectives to be sought in this period?
- (g) What kinds of nuclear weapons (range, yield, etc.) would be needed?

Stage B

18. The following questions arise at this stage:-
- (a) What would be the military purpose of weapons used at this stage?
 - (b) Is there any purpose that would require weapons different from those required for Stage A?

Stage C

19. The following questions arise at this stage:-
- (a) What form and extent of military conflict, involving the shield forces, should we contemplate in this period?
 - (b) Is there any case for providing for it

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any nuclear weapons other than those provided for Stages A and B?

Control

Military

20, From the purely military point of view, what form of control (i.e. detailed allocation of responsibility to military authorities for the use of nuclear weapons) is most likely:-

- (a) to provide for the military objectives referred to in paragraph 17?
- (b) to reassure the Soviet Government that neither they nor their satellites are likely to be subject to irresponsible or pre-emptive nuclear attack by NATO?

Political

21, The following questions arise on political control:-

- (a) What are the objectives to be sought in developing a system of political control over nuclear weapons?
- (b) Can arrangements be devised whereby political control is shared more widely amongst NATO Governments without defeating the basic deterrent purpose for which the weapons are to be provided?
- (c) What kind of "control" would be involved under (b)? Would it necessarily mean a collective say by all NATO Governments in the use of nuclear weapons? Or would it mean a greater knowledge of, and say in, the distribution of the nuclear stockpiles and the introduction of new weapons, and administrative control over the withdrawal of the warheads from the stockpile?

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- (d) What would be the international effect (e.g. on Soviet policy) of giving NATO Governments more control over nuclear weapons in the NATO area? Would this be misrepresented as a step towards wider dissemination of nuclear weapons?

Present Arrangements

22. How far is the present equipment, deployment, organisation and control (e.g. arrangements for intelligence and communications) of the nuclear weapons provided for NATO appropriate to the requirements? What improvements are required?

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present form can any longer match up to the military and political problems with which it is likely to be faced.

3. The Americans have, therefore, been considering ways of achieving the following political objectives:-

- (a) to give the European NATO countries the feeling that they have a share in the main deterrent, i.e. that they will have a call on nuclear weapons when European countries are being threatened;
- (b) to promote the solidarity of the Alliance and to reassure the European members that the United States intends to remain fully committed to the North Atlantic Treaty defence system;
- (c) to prevent the development of further national nuclear weapons programmes and, in particular, the West German programme, partly by the financial pressure of contributions required under the new United States scheme.

4. In order to achieve these aims and to honour President Eisenhower's offer in 1957 to give NATO a share in "second generation" M.R.B.M.s, the present United States Administration put forward its proposals at the NATO Ministerial Meeting.

American proposals

5. At the NATO Ministerial Meeting, Mr. Herter put forward the concept of a multilateral NATO M.R.B.M. force, provided a suitable formula could be worked out "to maximise the deterrent effect and establish its multilateral character". As a first step, the United States Government offered to assign to NATO before the end of 1963, as an interim M.R.B.M. force, 5 POLARIS

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submarines. In return for this, they would expect the other members of NATO to be willing to contribute about 100 missiles to SACEUR in 1964 under multilateral arrangements. NATO requirements for M.R.B.M.s after 1964 would be considered as part of NATO long-term planning. The United States Government now regard this concept as a "package deal".

6. Mr. Herter said that there should be no doubt about the firm intention of the United States Government to keep in the NATO area, under United States custody, nuclear weapons contributed to the stockpile for the execution of approved NATO plans. This did not preclude the examination of the concept of increasing the authority of the Alliance over the NATO atomic stockpile.

7. The Foreign Secretary welcomed Mr. Herter's generous offer to assign the latest American weapons system to NATO and the objectives underlying the offer, but it was not then clear that the Americans regarded their scheme as a "package deal". The Foreign Secretary said that the proposal to establish a NATO M.R.B.M. force should form part of a comprehensive study of the purposes, control and deployment of nuclear weapons in NATO. He welcomed the undertaking to retain United States nuclear warheads in Europe for NATO.

NATO M.R.B.M. FORCE

Background

8. When the Gates proposal for modernising SACEUR's tactical strike forces by providing him with M.R.B.M.s was made, we offered our support though we entered reservations about numbers and deployment of these weapons and we have succeeded in our opposition to the proposal that these weapons should be made in Europe. The Gates proposal has met with little enthusiasm among

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the member nations of NATO but has been kept alive largely by the efforts of SACEUR and M. Spaak. We now consider that the whole question of M.R.B.M.s for NATO needs to be thought out as part of the wider study we have proposed.

9. The latest American proposals represent a considerable modification of the original scheme outlined to us in October. The Americans have gone a long way to meet the objections we then had to their ideas. To some extent, the present United States Administration has had to modify its plans because of Congressional difficulties and because the new Administration refuses to be committed to its predecessors' policies. The present United States Government are disappointed at our cool response to what appeared to them to be an imaginative plan needed to strengthen NATO both militarily and politically.

10. It is clear from conversations with the Americans since Mr. Herter made the American suggestion for a NATO M.R.B.M. force to NATO Ministers that the present United States Government is by no means clear how best to achieve its political objectives. The State Department have indicated that they would like to discuss the problem with British officials before putting the plan to the new United States Administration.

Implications of American proposals

11. We accept that, on the basis of present NATO strategy, SACEUR has a case, on military grounds, for replacing with M.R.B.M.s some of his strike aircraft which are becoming increasingly vulnerable on base and over target, but we have doubts about the validity of this strategy in a state of nuclear equipoise and we have now stated our view that the first requirement is for a comprehensive study of the purposes, control and deployment of the nuclear armory in support of NATO, with the object of making the deterrent as effective as possible without

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waste of resources. A separate paper has been prepared for circulation to the North Atlantic Council setting out the field of NATO strategy which we think should be examined together with a list of questions that we think NATO should consider before arriving at a policy on nuclear weapons, including M.R.B.M.s, within the Alliance.

12. We are not convinced that after a review of NATO strategy there will continue to be a case for providing NATO with weapons of the field and range of Polaris for deterrent or operational purposes. The Americans themselves realise that M.R.B.M.s would provide NATO with a weapons system that is inherently different from the delivery systems they replace and that the line between strategic and tactical capabilities is becoming blurred. We assume that the main Western deterrent will remain the United States and British strategic strike forces. But it is possible that, for political reasons, i.e. to achieve the American objectives, there may be grounds for providing NATO with some M.R.B.M.s under some form of NATO control arrangements. Such a scheme might strengthen opposition in France to the "force de frappe", but it is unlikely to deflect General de Gaulle from his objective of making France an independent nuclear power.

13. We are averse from stationing M.R.B.M.s in Western Germany and from giving the Germans the appearance of having a real share in the control of these weapons, but we are not willing openly to discriminate against the Germans. As the Americans recognise, other serious problems arising from the examination of the American idea for establishing a permanent M.R.B.M. force in NATO are:-

- (1) ensuring adequate military and political control over the use of

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the M.R.B.M.s;

- (ii) the practicability of multinational manning (see letter of 22nd December, 1960, from the Hon. P.E. Ramsbotham to Lord Hood and the Admiralty examination on which it is based - Appendix);
- (iii) the heavy additional financial burden for the United Kingdom (and, of course, for the other members of NATO) of providing our share of the further 100 POLARIS missiles and their transport, presumably ships. Our aim would be to find our contribution from existing resources;
- (iv) the effect on the international situation (e.g. on Soviet policy) of a scheme that appears as, or can be represented as, the dissemination of nuclear weapons among non-nuclear powers.

NATO SHARING IN NUCLEAR WEAPONSThe proposal

14. General Norstad has, on various occasions, suggested that there should be a NATO stockpile of nuclear warheads. The United States Government have indicated their willingness to examine a scheme of this kind. It has been suggested that this stockpile might comprise a cross-section of up to a half of all nuclear warheads in SACEUR's armoury. It might be in the charge of a NATO Committee, consisting perhaps of the Secretary-General, the Permanent Representatives of the United States, United Kingdom and France, together with those of two other NATO countries in rotation. General Norstad has never been specific or consistent about the powers of this Committee. His proposals have varied from:

- (a) giving NATO a share in the control of

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the use of the warheads; to

- (b) providing N.A.T.O. only with information about the size, composition and distribution of the stockpile, and administrative control designed to ensure that the warheads could not be removed from the stockpile in such a way that they would cease to be available for N.A.T.O.

15. A N.A.T.O. stockpile in one or other of these forms might, in varying degrees, reassure European members of N.A.T.O. that nuclear warheads would be available in their defence. The shared control of use, which must be made public if it is to achieve its aim with our allies, would undoubtedly cast doubts on the effectiveness of the force and would thus tend to undermine its credibility as a deterrent. This difficulty might be overcome by the device of putting only a part of the present nuclear armoury in the stockpile as General Norstad has suggested.

16. The United States Government will have to modify present United States legislation if they are to surrender custody of the nuclear warheads to N.A.T.O.

17. Any scheme of this kind would be warmly supported by the Federal German Government and welcomed by other members of N.A.T.O., but it is unlikely to deflect General de Gaulle from his decision to build up a French "force de frappe". If a scheme on the lines of paragraph 14(a) could be worked out, it would probably satisfy the aspirations of other N.A.T.O. countries which had wished to become independent nuclear powers.

United Kingdom attitude

18. A scheme on the lines of paragraph 14(b) would not raise difficulties of control of use of nuclear weapons and looks promising.

19. If, however, a scheme on the lines of paragraph 14(a) - perhaps including weapons as well as warheads - could be

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worked out that would reassure NATO without detracting from the credibility of the Western deterrent and without imposing a heavy additional burden on our resources, we should not oppose it. It would have the merit of achieving the political aims of promoting the cohesion of NATO and perhaps of checking the emergence of additional independent nuclear powers without the objections inherent in the permanent NATO M.R.B.M. scheme, i.e. providing Allied Command Europe and especially the Germans, with what are, in effect, strategic weapons; and the demand for an additional United Kingdom contribution to NATO.

U.K. TACTICS IN NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

20. In general, we can continue to support the American objectives described in paragraph 3. We can certainly support the American offer to keep nuclear weapons available for NATO forces as long as NATO military planning requires them. We could have supported the offer to assign 5 nuclear submarines with POLARIS missiles to SACEUR but, as it is now firmly linked to the provision of 100 more POLARIS missiles by other NATO countries and the establishment of permanent M.R.B.M. in NATO, we consider that the whole proposal would change the present character of the NATO shield forces so fundamentally that NATO should examine the full implications of the scheme as part of the comprehensive study of NATO strategy that we have suggested is necessary.

21. In our view, a scheme on the lines of para.14(b) for the establishment of a NATO nuclear stockpile looks a more promising way of achieving the objectives set out in para.3. We consider that this possible solution should also be examined in the comprehensive study of NATO strategy.

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22. The difficulty is to suggest a procedure for these studies to be undertaken. If carried out immediately in a NATO forum, we are likely to be faced with the fixed positions of SACEUR and the International Staff. We would prefer to have time to concert an agreed policy with the new American Administration before trying to influence NATO thinking. With this in mind, we have prepared the paper described in paragraph 11 for circulation in NATO, in order not only to give us time to influence the approach of the new American Administration to these problems, but also to try to get NATO on the right lines for reviewing its basic strategy.

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The Prime Minister's Visit to General de Gaulle

I understand that the Secretary of State will not be accompanying the Prime Minister to Rambouillet. He will, no doubt, however, be discussing with him the lines of his approach to General de Gaulle, and a number of briefs are being prepared on the most likely topics.

2. Sir P. Dixon's paper contains a useful analysis of the main subjects which may be raised, and of de Gaulle's approach to them. Unfortunately,

- (a) it also gives a wrong picture of H.M.G.'s - or at least the Foreign Office - attitude towards one of the main subjects i.e. NATO and Tripartitism (para. 3);

and (b) makes recommendations for policy which are not in accord with Foreign Office thinking, (though they may find an echo in No. 10 and in some part of the Cabinet Office) and cut right across the more thorough analysis of the "complex of problems" which Sir N. Brook's Group has been studying and which will be discussed at Chequers on January 23 on the basis of Sir N. Brook's report. (viz: paras. 13, 14 and 17).

3. As regards (a) above, it is not true that "we" share de Gaulle's dislike of NATO as it is, and want to see the practices of the Alliance altered so as to result in a greater degree of effective consultation between the United States, France and the U.K; Nor that we can go a very long way with de Gaulle towards a system of tripartism. Again, one hears that these thoughts are entertained at No. 10, but the Foreign Office has consistently pointed out the drawbacks of such a policy. (I attach a copy of the paper on Tripartism which we circulated to Sir N. Brook's Group, and would draw attention to paras. 3, 6 and 7.)

4. As regards (b) above, paras. 13, 14 and 17 have rather a familiar ring. We should "do a deal with de Gaulle" (over the bomb) whereby "we should almost certainly be admitted to the new European structure", and de Gaulle "would very likely be prepared to give the necessary orders for a technical solution to be found to the problem of reconciling our association with the Common Market with our Commonwealth and agricultural requirements" (para. 13). We should renounce our independent role in the nuclear field and limit ourselves "to what we can do jointly with the French". (para. 14). We should strike "a sort of grand bargain between the French and ourselves" whereby we would give them equal nuclear status with ourselves and they would let us into Europe on a position of equality with them (para. 17).

5. We have been arguing strongly against Mr. Bishop's advocacy of just these themes in Sir N. Brook's Group - and the latter, with Sir A. Lee, seemed disposed to agree with us. Moreover, it has long been the Foreign Office case that we cannot buy our way into Europe on our terms by helping de Gaulle with his nuclear aspirations (Curiously, Sir A. Rumbold used to be the foremost exponent of this Foreign Office view).

6. The Prime Minister, unfortunately, has never been convinced and Sir P. Dixon's memorandum would merely help to persuade him that the Foreign Office is wrong. The pros and cons of the arguments will be fairly set out in Sir N. Brook's report (Mr. Bishop will see to that), and I submit that, for this reason, it would only confuse the Ministerial discussion of that report if these controversial passages of Sir P. Dixon's paper were passed to the Prime Minister.

7. In the circumstances, there would seem to be two ways of dealing with this paper without causing embarrassment to the Foreign Office:-

(a) pass it to No. 10, deleting paras. 3, 13, 14 and 17;

or (b) not passing it to No. 10 but either

(i) incorporating the analysis of the different subjects (except para. 3) and paras. 18 and 19 in our briefs for the Prime Minister;

or (ii) annexing these paras. to the briefs as an expression of Sir P. Dixon's views.

8. The difficulty about (a) is that Sir P. Dixon would presumably have said something on NATO, Tripartism, and the nuclear problem. He would also be surprised to learn from the Prime Minister that he had not seen his paper. Unless, therefore, it is felt that the Ambassador's paper should be passed in toto to No. 10, I would be in favour of alternative (b)(ii); and at the same time I think we should write to Sir P. Dixon and explain why we have treated his paper in this way (i.e. second sentence of para. 6 above).

P. Ramsbotham
(P.E. Ramsbotham)

January 17, 1961.

Sir E. Shackleton

Copy: Mr. Tomlinson

I think it is necessary to write to Sir P. Dixon and explain frankly that while the analysis is being included in the briefs for the PM, the policy recommendations are not entirely in line with our thinking. I attach a draft, which Sec of State should see.

P.U.S.

Secretary of State

S. Shackleton
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Mr. Humphrey in action!

I.—THE PROBLEMS

A.—Europe

1. The impulses which brought the European Community (the Six) into being are strong and likely to endure. Its members have many political interests in common, and they have a common interest in strengthening their economies through unity. They also feel that, as a group, they can exercise a stronger European influence on the policy of the Western Alliance. Although their basic loyalties are now towards the Western Alliance, there is a danger that, left on their own, they might come to follow independent or neutralist policies. The existence of a community which excludes the United Kingdom and other European members of the Western Alliance must place some strain on that Alliance, because the development of the Six involves increasing economic and political discrimination, notably against the other European countries.

2. The report* of July 1960 said that "It is now apparent that there are strong reasons of foreign policy for our joining the Six. If the Six succeed, we should be greatly damaged politically if we were outside, and our influence in world affairs would be bound to wane; if we were inside, the influence we would wield in the world would be enhanced; while still retaining in some degree the right to speak on our own account we should also be speaking as part of a European *bloc*. If, on the other hand, the Six fail, there would be great damage to Western interests, and the weakening of Europe which would follow would be a serious matter for the United Kingdom".

3. As regards our economic interests the report said "In joining the Six, we should be participating in a vigorous and rapidly expanding market, and there would be good grounds for hoping that our commerce and industry would benefit. . . The inflow of investment into the United Kingdom would be greater, and the outflow of capital to the Six might be less".

4. When they considered this report the Cabinet agreed that the political and economic arguments for an association with the Six were strong. But they were impressed by the difficulty of reaching a settlement which took sufficient account of our political and economic relations with the Commonwealth (including free entry) and of our agricultural and horticultural interests. They also had in mind our commitment to our partners in the Seven, and the possible reactions of the United States and other third countries.

5. We could bring about an economic agreement between the Six and the Seven quite quickly if there were the political will—on our side as well as in the countries of the Six—to have such an agreement. Indeed, if there had been the political will on the part of France, we could have secured agreement on the Free Trade Area proposals in 1958. We could not hope for agreement on that basis now; but, if de Gaulle could be brought to take the same attitude as Adenauer, and if we could make some surrender of political individuality and tolerate some awkward economic adjustments, we could get an agreement which would be reasonably satisfactory. It would probably involve accepting the Common Tariff on manufactured goods (damaging to Canada); and also on raw materials, but in this case with the continuance of Commonwealth free entry and some arrangements for compensation taxes in appropriate cases. We could probably make reasonably satisfactory arrangements for tropical foodstuffs, which would give our own oversea territories some relief from the damage which the Treaty of Rome will otherwise do to them. We would certainly need general exemption of temperate foodstuffs, but would have to make particular concessions to meet individual countries. For instance, the Dutch would certainly expect us to extend the bacon and other tariff concessions made for Denmark in E.F.T.A., and we should no doubt be pressed on other particular items, mainly horticulture. We should have to pay the price of getting in (including some shock to the Commonwealth) and there would be difficulties; but no major damage need be done either to Commonwealth trade or to agriculture and (less certainly) to horticulture in this country.

* C. (60) 107.

PM(W) (61) 1

Norman Groot memo

"Some aspects of our relations with the Six"

6. So far a solution on these lines has not been negotiable with the Six. Will circumstances develop, and can we help them to do so, in such a way as to make it possible to negotiate a settlement broadly on these lines?

7. As the Six develop, will they become more or less willing to accept the United Kingdom (which would be at least as prominent a partner as France or Germany)? What are the dangers of delay?

8. On the *economic* side, the Six will in two years' time have become more closely welded together and they might then be more ready to contemplate wider trading arrangements. They would have got further with the intractable problem of their own agricultural policy. Their industries would be finding that the competition which they were facing from each other was less damaging than they had expected. France might well be stronger economically if the drain on her resources of the Algerian war and her efforts in the nuclear field had been reduced. But during this period those who want to see us left outside would have become more entrenched; vested interests—possibly cartels—would have grown up within the industries of the Six; and investment by industry would have taken place, both by industries of the Six in the E.F.T.A. countries and by our industries within the Six. All this would lead to increasing pressure against an accommodation. Moreover, at present the Six are undergoing rapid economic expansion, which is a favourable time for removing barriers to trade (because industry feels the increased competition less), but in two years' time there may be relative stagnation with increased reluctance to face additional competition.

9. On the *political* side:

(a) The tendency of the Six to develop "political" consultation over an increasingly wide field will grow as the Community develops. De Gaulle wants some sort of political High Command for the Six: the other members at present fear this, but the evolution of the Treaty of Rome itself, and the habits of the continental Ministers and bureaucrats, will inevitably produce greater political consultation and common formulation of policies within the Six.

(b) We must not be left outside this; but, the longer we delay a decision, the sooner we shall experience such isolation and its possible consequences, viz.:

(i) the United States may come to attach more weight to the views and interests of the Six and less to those of the United Kingdom;

(ii) a European "third force" may develop, which would endanger the stability of the Atlantic Alliance.

(c) No one can say what the future will bring in France and Germany. While de Gaulle is there, with the greater likelihood of a strong and confident France, we have a better chance of securing satisfactory arrangements with the Six. When de Gaulle and Adenauer have gone, both France and Germany may go through an unsettled period, when decisions about our association will not be easily taken. Both countries might pursue policies which were more nationalist and this could lead to a break-up of the Six, with a consequential serious weakening of Europe. This would be a situation we could not leave to develop. But it would be difficult for us to act from outside: inside we might be able to prevent it from happening. On the other hand France and Germany might move towards a tighter form of Federation. This would be equally unwelcome to us.

(d) The attitude of the new Administration in the United States will be important. Mr. Kennedy may lose patience with the division between the Six and the Seven and throw his weight into finding a solution in the interests of Western unity. There are two points here:

(i) There are signs that some of Mr. Kennedy's new advisers may see greater political advantages in a wider European association, including the United Kingdom, and be less inclined than the Eisenhower Administration to back the Six. But, if we made no move ourselves and relied on the United States to influence the Six in our favour, the latter might be less likely to respond.

- (ii) An accommodation between the Six and the Seven must lead to increased discrimination against exports from the United States, and this will be particularly unwelcome to the Americans at a time when they are concerned about their balance of payments. If we wish to win their support, we must persuade them to subordinate their economic to their political interests. From this point of view the lower the tariffs of the European group, the better.

10. This analysis suggests that it would be to our advantage to take some early initiative towards a settlement between the Six and the Seven. But this would have to be a political initiative. Our problem is to find some means by which the Six (and, in particular, the French) could be induced to accept a settlement on the lines indicated in paragraph 5 above.

B.—NATO

11. The European movement itself shows that NATO has not succeeded in giving sufficient content to the concept of an "Atlantic community". Moreover, strains are now developing within the Alliance.

- (i) While de Gaulle's attitude to European unity may be ambivalent, in his attitude to NATO his "individualism and nationalism" appear to be dominant. He is unwilling to accept the concept of integrated forces; he is critical of the Command Structure; and he attaches little value to the Council as a means of political consultation. He does not conceal his preference for a system in which the United States, the United Kingdom and France would handle all matters of common concern, both within and outside the Alliance, under a system of tripartite consultation. The other European members of the Alliance are strongly opposed to de Gaulle's ideas of "Tripartitism" and are critical of his attitude towards NATO.
- (ii) De Gaulle's determination that France shall become an independent nuclear Power will place a further strain on the Alliance.
- (iii) Some of the other European members have recurring anxieties about the solidarity of the United Kingdom's support of the Alliance.
- (iv) The European members have a lurking fear that the United States might "pull out" of Europe.
- (v) Some of the doubts we feel about the military strategy of the Alliance are beginning to be shared by other countries. The suspicion is gaining ground that weapons may be determining strategy and not *vice versa*.
- (vi) There is increasing concern about the accumulation of nuclear weapons in Europe of which detailed knowledge, as well as control, is largely confined to the Americans.

12. Efforts are now being made to allay some of these anxieties. We ourselves proposed, at the last meeting of the North Atlantic Council in December, that there should be a review of the military strategy of the Alliance—a comprehensive study of the purposes, control and deployment of the nuclear armoury in support of NATO with the object of making the deterrent as effective as possible without waste of resources. The Annex to this memorandum gives a summary of the suggestions for such a study which we are proposing to put forward in NATO.

13. Even more important and urgent, however, is the need to forestall the development of independent nuclear capacity within the Alliance. It was partly with this in view that the Eisenhower Administration elaborated their proposals for a NATO force of M.R.B.Ms. We fully supported the objectives of this move, but we doubted whether the plan itself was apt for its purpose. In our view SACEUR's military requirement for M.R.B.Ms. is of low priority; and to satisfy it in the way proposed would involve a heavy additional burden and an extravagant use of resources. Politically, we doubted whether the plan would succeed in satisfying de Gaulle's aspiration for a real share in the control of the Western

strategic nuclear deterrent or in diverting France from developing as a fourth nuclear Power. Moreover, the deployment of a M.R.B.M. force in Europe would create considerable political problems—both internally in this and other countries, and externally *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union. It would have awkward implications in respect of negotiations for arms control and European security.

14. Nevertheless, despite these doubts about the expediency of the M.R.B.M. plan itself, it is necessary for the health of the Alliance that some effective means should be found of giving greater confidence to its European members in respect of nuclear weapons and preventing the emergence of separate nuclear capabilities within the Alliance.

C.—The Emergence of Further Nuclear Powers

15. Apart from the three main nuclear Powers, the following countries are capable of developing by themselves an independent nuclear capacity—France, China, India, West Germany, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland and Israel.

France has already exploded nuclear devices. China might be able to do so by 1962; and she will probably wish to develop nuclear weapons in order to attain world power and status and to be independent of Russia.

India, Germany, Japan, Sweden and Switzerland have the capacity unaided, but at great sacrifice, to produce a first nuclear weapon by about 1966. Israel could do the same by 1969–70. But, of these Powers, India is probably the only one which might wish to manufacture nuclear weapons though officially, like Japan, she has disclaimed any intention of doing so.

16. At one time it seemed possible that this problem might be handled by (i) concluding, through the Geneva Conference, an agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union for the cessation of nuclear weapons tests; and (ii) proceeding to internationalise that agreement by getting all other Powers to adhere to it. Under this plan the United States and the United Kingdom would have brought pressure on France to accede to the agreement; and they might have expected the Soviet Union to bring similar pressure to bear on China. If this plan had succeeded in respect of France and China, it would have been reasonable to expect it to be effective in respect of all the other potential nuclear Powers—including, probably, India.

17. Meanwhile, however, France has successfully exploded nuclear devices and is proceeding with plans to develop an independent nuclear capacity. Therefore, even if an agreement can be concluded at Geneva, it is unlikely that the French could be persuaded to accede to it unless the Americans (or we ourselves with American approval) undertook to give them the information and “know-how” to enable them to develop their nuclear capacity. (We could not give the French this help without American approval; for (i) at the Bermuda Conference of March 1957 we made a written agreement with the United States which binds us both to “do very little by way of encouraging or assisting” French plans to develop a nuclear capacity, and (ii) most of our “know-how” contains American ingredients and could not be passed on without their consent.) Thus, even if an agreement were reached at Geneva, it now seems likely that France would either decline to adhere to it or would only do so in return for assistance in developing her nuclear capacity. In either event France would become an effective fourth nuclear Power.

18. This would have two important consequences. First, it would seriously weaken the Anglo-American position on the general question of preventing the emergence of further nuclear Powers. If France declined to adhere to the agreement, we and the Americans could no longer expect the Soviet Union to bring pressure on China to do so. If we and the Americans helped the French to develop a nuclear capacity, the Russians might be more likely to do the same for China. Secondly, if France continued to develop a *force de frappe* and nuclear bombs (they could have a limited capability with fission weapons by 1964 and with long-range thermo-nuclear weapons by 1968) it is inevitable that sooner or later Germany would follow suit in order to avoid conceding to France a dominating position in Europe.

19. These considerations make it inevitable that we should consider other means of containing or diverting the French aspirations towards an independent nuclear capacity. The most promising approach is to develop some form of collective control over nuclear weapons and to induce the French to put their nuclear power under such control.

It was partly with this in view that the Eisenhower Administration put forward their plan for providing NATO with M.R.B.M. weapons on a multi-national basis. They hoped that the creation of a nuclear force under NATO control would so strengthen internal French opposition to de Gaulle's project of a *force de frappe* that it would not in the end be developed. We do not ourselves favour this particular plan, for reasons which have been indicated in paragraph 14 above. Moreover, our advice from our Embassy in Paris is that, whatever proposals are made for a NATO nuclear force, de Gaulle will persist in developing a French *force de frappe* so long as the United Kingdom maintains an independent nuclear force and claims a special position *vis-à-vis* the United States on that account.

20. In considering the value, as a means of containing the emergence of additional nuclear Powers, of any plan for collective control over nuclear weapons—including any plan for a pool or stockpile of warheads—it must be borne in mind that such a plan can be misrepresented as having precisely the opposite effect, *i.e.*, as involving a wider dissemination of the control over nuclear weapons. This is strongly opposed by the uncommitted countries and in the United Nations. The Russians have already reacted in this sense to the M.R.B.M. proposals: Mr. Gromyko dealt with it in very strong terms in his speech of 23rd December to the Supreme Soviet. Although he deliberately misrepresented the plan as handing over control of nuclear weapons to German generals, his speech reveals a genuine Soviet fear of Germany. The Russians may also fear that, if the Americans give up their exclusive control over NATO warheads, they themselves will be subject to Chinese, and perhaps even East German, pressure to share control of some Soviet warheads.

21. Even so, it remains of first importance that some effective means should be found of diverting France from developing her independent nuclear capacity. For, if France does so, with or without help from the United States and ourselves, there seems to be little prospect of preventing the emergence of further nuclear Powers—including, first, China and thereafter, in all probability, Germany.

D.—The Future of the Strategic Nuclear Deterrent

22. The Americans will continue to maintain, under their exclusive control, a sufficient nuclear strength to preserve the nuclear equipoise between the West and Russia. It is in the interests of all countries of the free world that they should do so.

This memorandum is concerned mainly with the future of Britain's independent contribution to the strategic nuclear deterrent of the West.

Military Considerations

23. The independent British contribution consists of the following:

- (a) In the West, the V-bomber force and the nuclear strike power of our aircraft carriers which could be used in a strategic role.
- (b) In the Middle East, though we make no contribution to the strategic deterrent, the four Canberra squadrons in Cyprus have a tactical (mainly interdiction) role in support of CENTO.
- (c) For the Far East, we periodically detach three Medium Bomber squadrons from this country. The carrier East of Suez could also have a nuclear strategic deterrent role.

24. Militarily, the British bomber force would be capable of inflicting crippling injury on the Soviet Union. By 1962 we shall have developed a nuclear force sufficient to inflict an "unacceptable" measure of damage on Russia, *i.e.*, 50 per cent. destruction of 44 major Russian cities. Judged by the total strike

power of a West which remains united our contribution is not of great military significance: our contribution provides only one-tenth of the total striking power of the West's deterrent force. But, so long as the nuclear deterrent depends on bomber forces, the military value of our contribution is, for reasons of geography, proportionately much greater than its numerical strength. In retaliation against a Russian attack, rapidity would be of the first importance and forces on this side of the Atlantic would be able to react several hours quicker than those from bases in America. According to present plans, the R.A.F. would provide the greater part of the aircraft in the initial wave of the Anglo-American counter-attack and would much increase its strength and effectiveness.

25. This special value of the British contribution will, however, diminish as the power of the nuclear deterrent comes to depend more and more on missiles. Even at present, with the size of the American Strategic Air Command, the military effectiveness of the Western deterrent could be ensured, if there was no British nuclear contribution, by redeployment of the United States nuclear forces.

26. There is however some value from a military point of view in some diversification, both in the way of a variety of tactics and weapons and in dispersal of points from which attacks are launched and against which the Russians would have to guard. The V-bomber force adds to this diversification at present. Future developments, *e.g.*, the T.S.R.-2, could continue it.

27. It is also arguable that our independent contribution makes the Western deterrent as a whole more effective. The Soviet Government might doubt the will of the United States Government to use nuclear weapons in defence of a purely European interest. They are less likely to do this so long as the United Kingdom, lying closer to Europe, has nuclear weapons under its own control.

28. Nevertheless, on purely military grounds, and assuming continued cohesion between the United States and the United Kingdom, there is no great need for an independent British contribution to the strategic nuclear deterrent of the West. And over the years ahead its military value to the West will decline. If therefore there are political reasons for adjusting our policy in respect of our independent contribution to the Western strategic nuclear deterrent, there is no over-riding military reason why we should not make the adjustment.

Political Considerations

29. In the past we have obtained the following advantages from the fact of being a nuclear Power with a significant potential both in warheads and delivery-systems:

- (a) intimate co-operation with the United States in scientific and military matters—buttressing our "special position";
- (b) influence on United States policy;
- (c) general political prestige in the world (including Russia);
- (d) a special standing in East-West negotiations, *i.e.*, Geneva tests and disarmament. (Would an H-bomb manufacturing capacity alone now give this?);
- (e) perhaps some special standing in NATO.

30. Over the years ahead we must expect that these political advantages will diminish, for the following reasons:

- (a) Our strategic forces will become increasingly dependent on United States devices and delivery-systems (Skybolt or Polaris).
- (b) The development of United States missiles (I.C.B.Ms. and Polaris) will reduce the advantages of our geographical proximity.

- (c) We are not ourselves in the long-range missile business; and our contribution in the late 1960s is not likely to be so significant as in the 1950s when strategic deterrent forces were mostly bombers.
- (d) We are no longer the unique "third Power". The French are now in the business and, unless stopped or diverted, will by the late 1960s have a nuclear strike force of some kind with their own bombs.
- (e) The United States are less concerned with supplementing their own strategic deterrent power, and now want to "institutionalise" the long-range nuclear weapons of their Allies (though not their own).
- (f) Indeed, the United States may be unwilling to assist us to prolong the life of our "independent contribution" and may refuse to let us have Polaris except in a NATO context.

31. Should we reinvest before this valuable asset has depreciated too far to be used effectively to gain political objectives? It would be unwise to continue too long with our present policy on the assumption that we shall get Skybolt or some suitable alternative for maintaining a strategic bomber force in the late 1960s and 1970s. It will become increasingly questionable whether we can afford to maintain our independent contribution. We might end up with no effective force of our own, having missed the chance to gain more immediate political objectives by using our present capacity in new ways. If there are prizes to win, we stand a better chance of winning them by taking an early initiative than by acquiescing later under pressure.

II.—THE COMPLEX

32. In Part I of this memorandum the main problems confronting us have been analysed separately. This analysis shows that recent developments in Europe, and the future trend which they seem to foreshadow, are running contrary to British interests. The movement for European unity is taking, in the Six, a direction which, if it continues, will damage our economic interests, weaken our political influence and undermine our special relationship with the United States. Similarly, within NATO, there are disruptive influences at work which threaten the concept of an Atlantic Community. In particular, there is a very real danger that France may insist on attaining the status of an independent nuclear Power—with all the damaging consequences which that would bring, not only within the Alliance but throughout the world.

33. Most of these developments have a common element. They all reflect an increasing disposition among the countries of the Six to concentrate on, and seek their strength from, co-operation among themselves, despite the effect on wider European unity and on NATO. This presents us with a difficult problem. For the United Kingdom, with its world-wide trading and political interests, could not afford to throw in its lot with an inward-looking European association, regardless of those wider interests and especially its close relations with the Commonwealth and the United States. Our special role is to act as a bridge between Europe and North America. We have a special interest in fostering and developing the concept of an Atlantic Community. This is the link between the problems of Europe and of NATO which have been analysed separately in Part I.

34. The other group of problems reviewed in Part I—the problems of the nuclear weapon—are also linked in this same complex. For the political value of our independent nuclear power is changing. We shall not be able to continue for long to claim a special political status in the world by reason of being a nuclear Power. This is a diminishing asset. But we may now have an opportunity to use it as a means of influencing developments in Europe—to increase the cohesion of the North Atlantic Alliance, to check the creation of a “third force” in Europe, and to prevent the emergence of further independent nuclear Powers.

35. We have now to consider how we can obtain the best advantage from this asset—to ourselves and to the Western world as a whole. The alternatives which appear to be open to us are outlined in Part III of this memorandum. In considering this choice we should keep in mind the broad objectives which we wish to serve.

36. *Generally*, we wish to stand together with the Americans and our other Allies in resisting the expansion of Sino-Soviet influence throughout the world. We wish to maintain the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance; to maintain some special relationship with the United States; and to preserve the influence which we enjoy through the Commonwealth association.

37. In *Europe*, our *political* aims are as follows:

- (i) Western Europe should be kept united; there must be no weakening of the present system of alliances and no damaging rivalries between its members.
- (ii) But this alliance should not grow too self-sufficient; there must be no “third force” movement which might adopt neutralist policies, or, at the other extreme, embark on adventures.
- (iii) Politically we need a strong France and must keep West Germany firmly tied to the Alliance.
- (iv) The Americans should remain engaged in the future of Europe; their forces must not be withdrawn, and there must be increasing interdependence between the two sides of the Atlantic.
- (v) The whole *bloc* thus formed should function smoothly and make the best use of its resources in the East-West struggle and for any negotiations and settlements with the Russians.

Our *economic* objective is to secure the best possible access for our exports to the markets of the Six—*i.e.*, to eliminate any discrimination in favour of each other and against us. In addition we want to continue and improve the close consultation and co-operation in the development of economic policy which was started in O.E.E.C.

38. In the *nuclear* field our objectives should now be:

- (i) To help the United States to maintain the most effective deterrent on behalf of the West. If our contribution is of only marginal military value, we should, at least, offer it in the most effective form, politically and militarily.
- (ii) To maintain our influence with the Americans and our status in the Alliance.
- (iii) To use our nuclear status—
 - (a) To help solve the "fourth country" problem, both inside and outside NATO.
 - (b) To ensure continued United States commitment to Europe.
 - (c) To bring about the developments in NATO strategy which we desire.
 - (d) To maintain our position in East-West negotiations (tests, disarmament, European security, &c.).

III.—THE CHOICE

39. Our immediate task is to draw closer to Europe in order to

- (i) avoid the economic and political division of Western Europe which will ensue if the Six are left to develop their organisation on too narrow a basis;
- (ii) secure for ourselves the economic and political advantages of a closer association with the countries of the Six and avoid the disadvantages of exclusion from it;
- (iii) bring a united Western Europe into closer association with North America and the other countries of the Western world;
- (iv) ensure that, if France is determined to develop a nuclear capacity, this is done in such a way as to involve the minimum risk of disrupting the Atlantic Alliance and leading to still further rivalry and fragmentation in Western Europe.

A.—The Multilateral Approach

40. We could pursue this aim by consciously and overtly re-orientating our policies in the direction of Europe. Thus—

- (i) We could make it clear that we are willing to join the political institutions of the Six, if it is made possible for us to do so. We could make it plain that we share their political objectives, that we are prepared to go as far as they are to achieve them, and that we are not afraid of common institutions.
- (ii) At the same time we could continue to be active in seeking a basis for an economic settlement between the Six and the Seven.
- (iii) We could take the lead in a renewed effort to revitalise the North Atlantic Alliance. There is much to be done here, and there will be early opportunities for a fresh initiative. A new Secretary-General has to be found: we might seek to influence the choice in such a way as to ensure that a new direction and purpose would be given to the work of the Council. A review of the military strategy of the Alliance is about to be started: we might make a special effort to see that its results are such as to bring greater confidence and sense of reality to the European members of the Alliance. We might also bring up for consideration other questions of reorganisation—e.g., the position of the Standing Group and the co-operation of the military and the political sides of the Organisation.

41. If such an approach were accompanied by a change in our policy towards our "independent contribution" to the Western nuclear deterrent, this would be a practical, and indeed dramatic, earnest of our wish to draw closer to Europe. The possession of an independent nuclear capacity has come to be regarded—largely, perhaps, by reason of our own claims—as a badge of international status. Our possession of it, and our claim to special status in respect of it, are a cause of rivalry by one European member of the Alliance already and possibly by others in the future. To the extent that we were willing to relinquish (or even perhaps to mute) our claim to "independent" world status in the nuclear field, we should be more readily accepted as "Europeans" within the Alliance.

42. Our prospects of securing our other aims in Europe might be enhanced if we were able to propose that our nuclear strategic force should by some means be placed under NATO control. There are various alternative ways in which this could be done. Thus—

- (i) We could declare our force to be "at the disposal of NATO", but make any further integration or extension of this commitment dependent on some reciprocal action or the satisfaction of some United Kingdom objective. This would involve the smallest degree of commitment—indeed, it would be little more than a gesture.

- (ii) We could " earmark " the force in peacetime for " assignment " to NATO command in war. (This is the present arrangement for United Kingdom naval forces in NATO.)
- (iii) We could " assign " the force to NATO in peacetime and put it under an integrated NATO command. (This need not necessarily be SACEUR: there might be a new commander for the strategic deterrent.)

43. If any of these alternative arrangements were adopted it would be reasonable to make it a condition that all strategic nuclear forces in Europe (including SAC in Spain, the United Kingdom forces in Germany and Thors and Jupiters in Italy and Turkey) were covered by the arrangement, and that other European countries in the Alliance would undertake to " contribute " their nuclear force in the same way if and when they have one (*e.g.*, the French *force de frappe*). Our objective would be to ensure that all bilateral agreements with the United States for the provision of nuclear weapons to NATO countries would be subsumed under this scheme. This would make it less attractive for, *e.g.*, Western Germany to seek assistance to become a nuclear Power. It would be necessary to ensure that those countries, such as Italy and Turkey, which permit the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory should participate in any system for supervision over these arrangements.

44. An offer of this kind need not, at the outset at any rate, involve abandoning ultimate national control over the force or national control over the warheads. Even under the third alternative, it could be said that we retained " ultimate " control, since *in the last resort* we could withhold the force, or use it alone, if we thought fit.

45. How far would such an offer help to further our immediate purposes?

- (i) It would encourage the cohesion of the North Atlantic Alliance. It would help to meet the " nuclear " anxieties of the European members. It would allay their suspicions of United Kingdom solidarity in the Alliance.
- (ii) It might, by encouraging the " European " forces in France, induce de Gaulle to agree to put his developing nuclear power into NATO. If he agreed to do so, this would still further help the cohesion of the Alliance.
- (iii) Depending on the extent to which it succeeded in " diverting " de Gaulle's aspirations for a national nuclear capacity, it would help to meet the problem of the " fourth " nuclear Power; but this would depend upon the degree of the commitment involved—the more fully our forces were put under NATO control, the greater the help in this respect.
- (iv) It would offer to the European members of the Alliance an alternative to the M.R.B.M. plan.
- (v) It would enable us to take an initiative which could be represented as a move towards, and on behalf of, Europe.
- (vi) Above all, it would show that the United Kingdom believed in the Atlantic Community concept, and it would help to weld Europe to the United States.

46. There would be dangers in making an offer of this kind. Thus:

- (i) To the extent that our prestige as a world Power has been enhanced by our possession of an independent nuclear capacity, it would be weakened. To some extent we should appear to be stepping down, in the nuclear business, from world status to European status. It is true (as indicated in Section D of Part I) that an independent British contribution to the Western nuclear deterrent will not continue to pay the political dividends which it has paid hitherto; and our practical losses may be less than the potential gains. But a move of this kind may be something of a shock to certain sections of public opinion in this country and to public sentiment here and possibly in other parts of the Commonwealth too.

- (ii) There are dangers, both political and military, in giving NATO a strategic nuclear capacity. This will blur the distinction between the strategic and the tactical use of nuclear weapons. (The confusion will be increased by the fact that weapons which for us and the Europeans, because of our geographical position, are strategic are regarded by the Americans as tactical.) It will put an end to the distinction between "the sword" (the Anglo-American strategic nuclear deterrent) and "the shield" (the forces under SACEUR). It will be represented by the Soviet Union as provocative.

On the other hand, these dangers arise even more acutely in relation to the M.R.B.M. proposal already tabled in NATO. It may already be too late to avert them altogether. And it is arguable that some risks of this kind must be taken if we are to avert the still greater danger of the emergence of other independent nuclear Powers.

- (iii) In making the choice between the alternative methods set out in paragraph 42 above, it should be borne in mind that the smaller the degree of commitment, the less valuable would the offer be in securing the objectives we wish to attain.

On the other hand, the greater the degree of commitment, the more likely the offer will be to raise problems of control which give rise to acute difficulties, both domestic and international, especially from the angle of maintaining the credibility of the deterrent. A detailed study of this problem, in both its military and its political aspects, is now being made; and a report will be submitted for consideration by Ministers.

- (iv) The less the degree of commitment, the less likely would be the hope of "diverting" French national nuclear aspirations, and thereby of helping to prevent the emergence of further national nuclear Powers.

47. Finally, there is the crucial question whether de Gaulle would be favourably impressed by a multilateral approach on the lines indicated in the preceding paragraphs, including an offer to place our strategic nuclear force in one form or another under NATO control. Even if it were effective in producing the desired impression on the other European members of the Alliance, how far would it go to meet the special aspirations of the present Government of France? de Gaulle, it is said, is jealous of our "superior" status as an independent nuclear Power. Would he be content if we renounced it and stepped down to his level? Or will he be content with nothing less than a levelling up? Does he want us to come closer into Europe, or does he want France to stand partly outside it, as we do now, in the status of a "world" Power? Will he continue to seek a position for France superior to that of other European countries? Will he on that account still demand "Tripartitism"? And will he be deflected from his aim of making France the fourth nuclear Power? Even if his personal preferences remained unchanged, would those sections of opinion in France which are opposed to his policies (and especially to his concept of a *force de frappe*) be so far strengthened by the approach outlined above that he would be obliged to modify his demands?

Finally, how far would such an approach assist us to find a settlement between the Six and the Seven? Would it induce the French to modify their attitude?

B.—An Alternative Approach

48. Is there an alternative approach which would be more likely to attract the co-operation of France and still not damage the strength and cohesion of the North Atlantic Alliance?

49. The two claims to which de Gaulle attaches special importance are:

- (a) that France should be recognised as having status equal to that of the United Kingdom in consultation with the United States, and decision, on all the political and military aspects of the Western struggle against Communism throughout the world (Tripartitism);
- (b) that France should develop her own independent nuclear capacity in order to support this status.

50. The difficulty about the first of these claims is the extent to which de Gaulle attaches importance to the public recognition of France's status as one of the three directing Powers in the Western world. The informal tripartite consultations, first between officials and then between Foreign Secretaries, which have been held on two separate occasions during the past months, precisely in order to meet this French preoccupation, have not appeared to satisfy de Gaulle, or even greatly to interest him. This was no doubt because these consultations, held under the shadow of some larger Ministerial meeting, were carefully arranged with the minimum of publicity so as not to arouse fears in other Allied minds that a "tripartite directorate" is in process of creation. A special meeting of the three Heads of Government, such as de Gaulle proposed last autumn, could not be covered up in this way—and it would not meet de Gaulle's main point if it were. It has to be recognised, therefore, that if we accept tripartism in a public form we are bound to arouse the active opposition of such NATO members as Canada, West Germany, Italy and Turkey—especially if it appears to be dealing with matters of direct concern to the Alliance. There is every reason to suppose that the United States Government would not contemplate acceptance of tripartitism in this form. If it were pressed, it could easily break up the Alliance.

51. On the other hand, there is no reason why we should not develop and extend practical consultation on a tripartite basis in the same discreet form as previously and without institutionalising the procedures. Most of the Allies are prepared to wink at this, and indeed recognise its practical value so long as the principal of equality in the Alliance is maintained. Personal meetings between the three Heads of Government, if carefully arranged, need not be excluded.

52. The second claim, that France should develop independent nuclear capacity, has two aspects. First, de Gaulle resents the operation of the McMahon Act, which prevents France from receiving technical assistance from the United States in creating her *force de frappe*. Secondly, he resents British possession of an independent nuclear capability and the "special position" which he believes we derive from this.

53. There is little we can do to meet the first point—though we could, if we thought it desirable on other grounds, urge the United States Government to be as helpful as possible to the French within the limits of their legislation.

54. As regards the second aspect, a decision by the United Kingdom Government to assign their "independent contribution" to NATO on the terms outlined in paragraphs 42 and 43 above should go some way towards eliminating the element of French resentment at Britain's advantages in the nuclear field. As stated in paragraph 46 above much would depend on the extent to which we were prepared to go. But we should get a better response from the French, and they would be more disposed to follow our lead, if the scheme could be made to result in Anglo/French or United States/United Kingdom/French political control over the forces, instead of the more general NATO control envisaged in the plan outlined in paragraphs 42 and 43 above. Can this be done?

55. It has been suggested that in offering to assign our bomber forces to NATO on condition that other European countries do likewise, we might propose that for the time being political control over these forces should be exercised jointly by the countries contributing them, as trustees for NATO; the idea being to create an Anglo/French-controlled nuclear force. France cannot, however, become in any significant sense a "country contributing" to such a force for at least three years. For some time ahead we should simply be sharing with France the control of our Bomber Command. Would our Parliament and public opinion accept this—even if it could be presented as a means of "containing" an eventual French nuclear force?

56. To opinion in the United Kingdom the proposition might become more palatable if United States forces were included and the control were made tripartite. This would make it easier to accept the fact that for several years France would have a share in the control without contributing forces. But would this be palatable to the other European members of the Alliance—such as Germany and Italy, who are deeply involved in the nuclear problem by reason of the weapons stationed in their territory?

57. Apart from its effect on the cohesion of the Alliance, an arrangement of this kind would involve in some degree the acceptance of France as the fourth nuclear Power—a development which (see Section C of Part I of this memorandum) will greatly increase the problem of preventing the emergence of further nuclear Powers. But can this be avoided? De Gaulle wishes France to become an independent nuclear Power largely because he regards that as a badge of a superior international status. We believe that, while this has been a powerful consideration in the last decade, it will be of much less importance in the next. Could we bring de Gaulle to believe the same? Could we persuade him that, in this particular aspiration, he is out of date? For this purpose we should doubtless have to show that we were ready to forego all our own claims to an independent nuclear capacity—i.e., we should have to be ready to assign the whole of our strategic nuclear force to NATO. But, as noted in paragraph 46 (iii) above, the smaller the commitment we are ready to make, the smaller the advantage we can hope to gain in return. If we were ready to go the whole way, could we persuade de Gaulle to renounce his ambition for an independent capacity and to place the whole of France's nuclear force, as it develops, under some common control?

58. Finally, is it possible that—in return for a promise of our support for some form of Tripartitism and some agreement for joint or NATO control of the British and French strategic nuclear forces—de Gaulle would further our close political association with the Six and an economic settlement between the Six and the Seven? This raises the ultimate question whether de Gaulle is willing, at any price, that the United Kingdom should “come into” Europe. His demand that France should be recognised as a world Power equal with the United Kingdom must rest to some extent on the claim that France is the leading Power in Europe. How far could we accept that claim if we came into Europe and joined the political institutions of the Six?

Reference:-

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

PREM 11/3715

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Re: commentary, a/c 2/14/61



TOP SECRET

SACEUR'S NUCLEAR ARMOURY

THE MORE IMPORTANT POINTS BROUGHT OUT
IN SACEUR'S BRIEFING TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

General Norstad briefed the North Atlantic Council on 26th January on his nuclear weapons. His briefing covered the history of nuclear weapons in NATO, the number and types of weapons at present available to his command, the control over the use of the weapons, a broad outline of his plans for using them and his future requirements.

2. The more important issues brought out in this briefing are as follows:-

Weapons

3. SACEUR has available at present nuclear strike aircraft with ranges up to 1,600 miles and nuclear missiles from HONEST JOHN, with a minimum range of about 5 miles, to JUPITER, with a maximum range of about 1,500 miles. He has at his disposal warheads with varying yields which he has categorised as follows:-

L = up to 50 Kt. [this category would have included the bombs dropped on Japan].

M = 50-100 Kt.

H = Over 100 Kt.

General Norstad said that he would require some manned aircraft for a long time, particularly in the armed reconnaissance role and to carry conventional weapons.

Control

4. General Norstad said that he was personally responsible for the assignment of targets for the nuclear forces, including the M.R.B.M. force, for the co-ordination of these targets with SAC and Bomber Command, for approving the plans for nuclear strikes of major subordinate commanders, for the allocation of nuclear weapons to strike forces, and (subject to political authority) for ordering initial nuclear attacks, i.e. declaration of R-hour. His general directions to his major subordinate commanders about the numbers of weapons available to them and their use after release allowed them some element of discretion to delegate this authority further.

5. General Norstad drew an important distinction between the authority needed for the release of nuclear weapons from U.S. custody and that needed for their operational use. The authority for release derived from the President of the United States through himself as CINCEUR to the American custodians. The authority for operational use, however, was subject to the political authority of Governments through himself as SACEUR. He regarded this system, which included a number of safeguards and required two separate orders before nuclear weapons could be used, as foolproof.

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TOP SECRET

6. General Norstad, however, was concerned over the lack of precise arrangements for the exercise by the North Atlantic Council of political control over the use of nuclear weapons. He suggested that it might be possible to draft "rules of engagement" by which the Council would authorise him in advance to use nuclear weapons in specific ways in certain defined circumstances. He expressed complete confidence in his own ability to control the use of nuclear weapons under his Command.

Atomic Strike Plan

7. General Norstad said that his military planning was based on a programme of pre-planned strikes after R-hour. Thereafter, there seems to be some degree of discretion and flexibility allowed to his major subordinate commanders. Selected targets would include 700, over 300 miles from Allied Command Europe's bases and some of them would be over 700 miles away.

Build-Up

8. General Norstad reminded the Council that, in 1952, NATO Military Authorities had been planning on the use of 20 nuclear weapons and by July 1954 this had risen only to 125. The table of build-up of nuclear capacity, which was circulated at the meeting, shows an immense increase of fire power between that available to-day and that required in 1966, particularly in the warheads for weapons with longer ranges such as M.R.B.M.s., in which the build-up is from 1 squadron in 1961 to 33 squadrons in 1966. Attached is a table which General Norstad showed to the North Atlantic Council of the planned build-up of nuclear capacity available to him. The final column, showing weapons available for first strikes in 1966, requires careful interpretation. Moreover, it appears that there will be no equivalent reduction in the numbers of tactical strike aircraft corresponding to the build-up of M.R.B.M. squadrons. However, there is not enough information available to show what proportion of the air squadrons are longer-range (e.g. Canberras) or short-range (e.g. fighter/bombers).

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TABLE 10

BUILD-UP OF NUCLEAR CAPACITY AVAILABLE TO SACEUR

Weapon/Aircraft	Range	Yield	1961 (i.e. current forces)	1966 (i.e. new force requirements)	1966 (Weapons available* for first strikes)	
					Ground/Sea	Air
8" Howitzer (Bty)	2,700-14,000 metres	L	10	40	160	
HONEST JOHN (Bn)	6,000-26,000 metres	L	21	61	244	
LACROSSE (Bn)	8,000-30,000 metres	L	4	10	40	
CORPORAL/SERGEANT (Bn)	25-75 n.m.	L	9	24	96	
REDSTONE/PERSHING (Unit)	50-500 n.m.	H	2	16	64	
Strike Aircraft (Sqdns.)			34	85		1911
Recce. " "			-	48		[850]
Cruise Missile (Units)	550 n.m.	L-M-H	3	5	240	
MRBM/IRBM (Sqdns.)			1	33	495	
NIKE (Bn)	85 n.m.	L	6	34	[1,224]	
Naval Strike Aircraft (Sqdns.)			12	16		162
" Patrol " ("")			-	22		[132]
Submarines			-	10	160	
TOTALS					2,723 on launchers	3,055 on aircraft
					5,778	

* i.e. does not include reload capacity or stockpiles



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Extract from conversation between President de Gaulle and
 Mr. Rambouillet on 2-30 pm, 28.1.61.

NATO DRIFT (P60)

Copy in
 Foreign Ministry
 (Dec. 1960)
 (Rambouillet
 Jan. 1961)

forced them into this position. France should provide the second line of troops and the United States the reserves. The U.K. would guard the northern flank and the sea communications. Of course this did not mean that some American divisions could not be with the advance guard in Germany and others with the second line in France. The Prime Minister suggested that this was more like the arrangement at the end of the 1914 war when each national army had its own Commander who in the last resort could disobey the Supreme Commander's instructions. But could not the Germans escape from such a system. President de Gaulle said that it was not integration which prevented the Germans from acting on their own but their political will. If they wanted to leave the alliance integration would not stop them. In any case when Chancellor Adenauer was dead other Germans might prefer to have a military personality of their own. The Prime Minister asked what President de Gaulle's views were about nuclear arms in NATO. President de Gaulle said that the idea of a NATO nuclear force had no reality. The nuclear forces were American and the Americans would use them or not as they wished. The Prime Minister suggested that it was paradoxical that in England many people were frightened that the Americans would use their nuclear power rashly whereas in Europe people feared that they would not use it at all. His own view was that the United States was full of good intentions and that many people there realised their terrible responsibility for the nuclear deterrent. Perhaps it might be possible to make some arrangement by which the United States, the United Kingdom and France became trustees of nuclear weapons for the Free World. Possibly some part

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Defence Orgn.

NATO MRBTR (P63)



PRIME MINISTER

General Norstad briefed the North Atlantic Council on 26th January on his nuclear armoury and his plans for its use. I attach a summary of the more important points brought out in this briefing.

2. I am sure that General Norstad's briefing could not have been more useful or more timely in easing the way for my memorandum on NATO Strategy and Nuclear Weapons now before the North Atlantic Council. It has brought home to the Council the immense power now at SACEUR's disposal and the vast increases in that power that he says he needs by 1966, and also the full extent of his personal authority in these matters. I am sure that our continental allies at least will recognise that the solution of the problems raised in the memorandum is both urgent and important.

3. The table shows that, if SACEUR's plans are approved, he would have available in 1966 nearly 6,000 warheads for first strike alone. This figure, which represents weapons actually on launchers or aboard aircraft, includes over 1,200 nuclear warheads for SAGW but makes no allowances for unserviceability and includes certain air reconnaissance squadrons which, presumably, would not be used to drop nuclear bombs in the first place. Even if allowance is made for these facts, SACEUR would have at his disposal at least 2,000/3,000 warheads with yields ranging from a few kilotons to over a megaton. With only those weapons with an operating range in excess of 500 miles, SACEUR would be able to deliver in a few hours at least 300 M.T. and this is a very conservative estimate.

14th February, 1961

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strengthening the Six, and indeed Western Europe generally. He recognised the desire of the Six that the Community should not be jeopardised or diluted. As regards Herr von Brentano's references to the E.F.T.A., the United Kingdom took the view that the position of their E.F.T.A. partners must be safeguarded in any wider arrangement which might be made. He thought that the proposal for expanding political consultation in W.E.U. should be considered at the forthcoming meeting of the W.E.U. Council in Paris. From the United Kingdom point of view it was essential that any arrangements made should provide for genuine political consultation amongst the Seven members of W.E.U.; it would be difficult if consultation were to be initiated on every occasion amongst the Six, the United Kingdom being admitted only at a later stage.

Dr. Adenauer agreed that the question of political consultation should be discussed at the W.E.U. Council; he accepted Mr. Heath's view that any such consultation must be genuine.

RECORD OF MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND Dr. ADENAUER AT ADMIRALTY HOUSE AT 10.30 a.m. ON FEBRUARY 23

Present:

The Prime Minister	Dr. Adenauer
The Chancellor of the Exchequer	Herr von Brentano
The Lord Privy Seal	Herr von Herwarth
Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar	Herr von Scherpenberg
Sir Christopher Steel	Herr von Eckhardt
Sir Patrick Reilly	Herr Harkort
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh	Herr von Etzdorf
&c.	Dr. Thierfelder
	&c.

The Prime Minister began by speaking of the European space project. There was much enthusiasm in Europe for this project and he hoped that the Federal Republic would join in. It had great scientific and commercial possibilities; there was no question of competing with the United States but we could work together with them better if we had something of our own to contribute. The launcher itself was already very advanced; most of the new money would go on the second and third stages. *The Chancellor of the Exchequer* added that if the costs were shared they would not be very large.

see
Scientific
& Industrial
Research
(Blue Sheet
Pt. 2)

Herr von Brentano said that the Federal Republic was very interested, not only in the rocket itself but in the development of the second and third stages, which he understood might lead to great advances in telecommunications. It would be a happy solution for many Europeans to pool their efforts here—not in competition with the United States but not lagging behind. The Federal Republic was prepared to consider the possibilities very carefully. *Dr. Adenauer* added that he was behind the idea in principle with all his heart; Europe must play its part.

Foreign Policy
(European
Coal & Steel
Community—
Pt. 2)

The Lord Privy Seal elaborated our attitude to European institutions, mentioning that our effort last summer to participate in some way in the Coal and Steel Community and EURATOM had been misunderstood in some quarters; it had been suspected that we might be trying to prevent the merger of the three European communities which was then being planned. For this reason no progress had been made and, though we had asked certain questions which had not yet been answered, we had not pressed the matters because we understood that the Six were still considering the future form of these Communities. As for relations between the Six and the Seven, the sort of joint institutions appropriate must depend on the detailed solution reached; this could therefore only be determined later. But we would be prepared to join the resulting institutions. The Prime Minister had stated our attitude to political consultations at the previous meeting. We were very interested in the suggestion that consultations in W.E.U. should be widened.

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Herr von Brentano agreed that institutions could not be set up before the details had been worked out. He could not say how and when the merger of the three Communities would come about, but the Federal Government was inclined to go ahead and the Belgians and Dutch were strongly in favour.

The Prime Minister asked Dr. Adenauer to say how he thought East-West relations would develop in the coming months and to expand his views on the problems of NATO.

Dr. Adenauer said that the West must try to prevent the German question from leading to fresh complications between East and West. If there were a real *détente*, the German question could be solved; but if the latter was discussed unsuccessfully, tensions would heighten. He repeated that there was nothing really new in the recent Soviet memorandum. A *détente* was our main aim, and fundamentally it was Mr. Khrushchev's too, because he wanted to attempt better relations with the United States. President Kennedy had showed himself so unyielding on Berlin that the Chancellor could not believe that Mr. Khrushchev would choose this subject to talk about first; so he tried to keep it in the background, though the D.D.R. would doubtless continue to put pressure on him. We could not expect a *détente* until Mr. Kennedy was properly in the saddle, but whether Mr. Khrushchev was prepared to deal seriously on such problems as disarmament would depend very much on the West itself; he might think that he could wait for cracks to appear there.

Turning to NATO, the Chancellor said that not much had come of co-operation in the political, propaganda and economic fields; some members, e.g., France, were not even doing all they had been asked in the military field. The Council had not shown enough persuasive power over its members. He implied that the Federal Government was playing its part militarily, but suggested that the until recently neutralist position of the S.P.D. had prevented it from doing as much as it might in other fields. He insinuated that the S.P.D. though now protesting its support for the NATO Alliance had not really changed its spots. He repeated his belief that the United States were very largely responsible for the lack of dynamism in NATO; the result was that the Soviet Union was far ahead of us in the field of global propaganda. Another difficulty was the question of nuclear weapons, which had created a revolution in NATO since it was set up. Members could not accept that these weapons would only be used on the orders of the United States President, since in an emergency things might look very differently from Washington. Unless the situation was changed, one or another member would start to manufacture its own weapons, which were cheaper now. France was already doing so, and she would not be the last. General Norstad and M. Spaak had both been hopeful in the summer of pressing these views, which they shared, on President Eisenhower, but the problem remained unsolved. If it was not solved, NATO would decline. SACEUR must therefore have authority—not in his capacity as a United States General—to use the weapons.

The Prime Minister said that the greatest difficulties over consultation arose on questions of less direct interest to NATO, where we all tended to divide the world up into sectors too much. We should be able to co-ordinate our efforts in these areas more, since the Russians were most likely to attack us where we were disunited. As for control of nuclear weapons, it was held at different times and by different people that the United States was too likely and too little likely to use them. The problem was complicated by the development of tactical nuclear weapons. This was why we had asked NATO to study the whole problem; we could not neglect the role of conventional weapons either. From the Minister of Defence's talks with Herr Strauss, our views on the relative roles of the different types seemed to correspond closely. The important thing about the deterrent was its credibility. Polaris being a second strike weapon was an important advance here. Another point was that its credibility would not be increased if the powers to use it were too elaborately defined: would the Soviet Union be as frightened of a Committee as of a man?

The Chancellor of the Exchequer added on the economic side that the establishment of O.E.C.D. was going ahead fast: it might be ratified in the United States in March. It was essential that it should get off to a good start; the French attitude was sometimes worrying but it would be a disaster if the new organisation were allowed to lapse into inactivity; it should be the economic planning agency of the free world. Mr. Dillon would certainly back it hard, but he would need

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Pt. 11

strong European support. Dr. Adenauer agreed with this, but reverting to NATO, said that he had heard that there were ideas in the United States that MC-70, which was due to run out in 1963, should be replaced by some new set of requirements, which he described as "MC-66". (This is evidently a reference to the NATO triennial review force requirements for 1963-66.) We must get to know what new military plans were being made in the United States. He implied that the general spirit in that country left much to be desired. Meanwhile, Mr. Khrushchev was following the Tzarist policy of extending Russian frontiers; if he were to obtain control of the countries of the E.E.C., he could push the United States out of the world market. If he knew how dissatisfied everybody was in NATO he would merely have to wait for all these fruits to fall into his lap.

The Lord Privy Seal asked Dr. Adenauer why he thought Mr. Khrushchev had sent the memorandum at this time. How did it affect the Chancellor's policy of playing the hand long? He also wondered what the Germans thought about the recent East German moves on restrictions in Berlin (this question was not answered).

Herr von Brentano said that one reason for the memorandum might be the pressure from the D.D.R. which disliked Soviet dilatoriness. The Russians might think it was time to put their position on record again, particularly in view of the recent cooling of Soviet-United States relations over the Congo. Again Mr. Khrushchev would want to create disunity in the West by causing fears that the Federal Republic might go behind their allies' backs; this of course they would not do, though they would always contribute to negotiations. The line taken on disarmament in the memorandum was a new one, and made progress towards a *détente* even harder. There were two interesting, but dangerous, points in the memorandum:

- (a) the reference to an interim solution—but only if a date for a peace treaty was set;
- (b) the suggestion that if the Federal Republic would take part in the peace treaty negotiations the Russians would go some way to meet them on Berlin among other things—the suggestion being that for the price of two peace treaties the Soviet Union would be reasonable over Berlin.

Both these offers were unacceptable because they would perpetuate the division of Germany.

Herr von Brentano added that NATO should attempt political co-operation on a global scale; for instance, even if one did not agree with Portuguese policy in Angola, it would be a serious matter for NATO members to vote against Portugal in the United Nations. We should not fear embarrassing discussions in NATO, for instance, on Algeria or Indonesia; an Indonesian attack on West Guinea would be of direct concern to NATO.

Dr. Adenauer backed Dr. Stikker's candidacy for NATO Secretary-General and Herr von Brentano said that the Italians would have to be told that Signor Brosio's candidature was not very fortunate: he did not know NATO and would have insufficient standing; moreover if he were appointed Signor Casardi, the Deputy Secretary-General, would also have to go.

The Prime Minister asked the Chancellor what he thought about President de Gaulle's rather personal views on NATO. Dr. Adenauer replied that they all stemmed from his lack of confidence in NATO and in the United States. If Mr. Eisenhower had decided to make NATO a nuclear Power, President de Gaulle might have given up his nuclear aspirations. The French were now spending heavily on conventional arms, with which their 1½ divisions in Germany were being better equipped, and their army of 1 million men was a great burden. The Chancellor had some hope that the French decision not to test further in the Sahara was not merely a gesture to the Africans but a hint to NATO that, given satisfaction, France would not pursue its independent deterrent further. At any rate President de Gaulle had assured the Chancellor that he considered NATO indispensable. Herr von Brentano interjected that President de Gaulle wanted a loose alliance rather than integration; but the area of Europe was too small for this.

Dr. Adenauer expressed his gratitude at the course of the discussions which had taken place on February 22 about training areas for German troops in the United Kingdom.

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16. The United States Government will have to modify present United States legislation if they are to surrender custody of the nuclear warheads to NATO.

17. Any scheme of this kind would be warmly supported by the Federal German Government and welcomed by other members of NATO, but it is unlikely to deflect General de Gaulle from his decision to build up a French "force de frappe". If a scheme on the lines of paragraph 14(a) could be worked out, it would probably satisfy the aspirations of other NATO countries which had wished to become independent nuclear powers.

United Kingdom attitude

18. A scheme on the lines of paragraph 14(b) would not raise difficulties of control of use of nuclear weapons and looks promising.

19. If, however, a scheme on the lines of paragraph 14(a) - perhaps including weapons as well as warheads - could be worked out that would reassure NATO without detracting from the credibility of the Western deterrent and without imposing a heavy additional burden on our resources, we should not oppose it. It would have the merit of achieving the political aims of promoting the cohesion of NATO and perhaps of checking the emergence of additional independent nuclear powers without the objections inherent in the permanent NATO M.R.B.M. scheme, i.e. providing Allied Command Europe and especially the Germans, with what are, in effect, strategic weapons; and the demand for an additional United Kingdom contribution to NATO.

U.K. TACTICS IN NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

20. In general, we can continue to support the American objectives described in paragraph 3. We can certainly support the American offer to keep nuclear weapons available for NATO forces as long as NATO military planning requires them. We could have supported the offer to assign 5 nuclear submarines with POLARIS missiles to SACEUR but, as it is now firmly linked to the provision of 100 more POLARIS missiles by other NATO countries and the establishment of permanent M.R.B.M. in NATO, we consider that the whole proposal would change the present character of the NATO shield forces so fundamentally that NATO should examine the full implications of the scheme as part of the comprehensive study of NATO strategy that we have suggested is necessary.

21. In our view, a scheme on the lines of para. 14(b) for the establishment of a NATO nuclear stockpile looks a more promising way of achieving the objectives set out in para. 3. We consider that this possible solution should also be examined in the comprehensive study of NATO strategy.

Extract. Brief by MOB on 'NATO Strategy & Nuclear Weapons'
PM(W)(G) 11

DEF 13/211
MM 20/61, Note by the Rt. Hon. Harold Watkinson, M.P.,
United Kingdom Minister of Defence, of his discussions with
the Hon. Robert McNamara, United States Secretary of Defense
and officials of the American Defense Department in
Washington on Tuesday, 21st March 1961

The meetings opened with a restricted meeting between
Mr. McNamara, Mr. Nitze, Sir Harold Caccia and the Minister
of Defence.

RESTRICTED MEETING

2. MR. MCNAMARA opened by saying that the new Administration
had naturally had to grapple first with its immediate problems.
Prominent amongst these was the Defence Budget, urgent day-to-day
problems and the President's defence message to Congress which
was due in about a week's time. On the broader issues they had
done some thinking but they had hardly yet had time to come to
final conclusions. They would welcome the British Minister of
Defence's views on the broad defence issues that faced both
countries. He wanted however to make one specific point, and
that is that he accepted the previous Administration's SKYBOLT
commitment and he thought that the additional funds which he
believed the President would authorise would honour this
commitment.

3. I said that we too had been giving a great deal of study to
the NATO problems and also to our world defence position. We had
reassessed our priorities and they appeared to us to be coming
out something like the following.

4. Firstly, we thought it important not to over-insure in NATO;
but of course we must not under-insure. But one of the things
that had worried me about the Gates/Herter offer was that if
fully implemented it might well have meant that NATO strategy
would have become unbalanced. The British Government was quite
clear that in their view NATO should not become a strategic
nuclear power. As for priorities within NATO, I said that we had
quite independently come to views which appeared to me to be
similar to those in the agreed conclusions of the meeting between
Dean Rusk, Mr. Nitze and Sir Harold Caccia. I had already
discussed these views with the Canadians and to some extent with
the Germans. The Canadians were in full agreement and the
Germans I thought at least in partial agreement. Our priorities
were, first the strategic deterrent must be strengthened and
modernised in all possible ways; it should remain the President's
right to launch it as this, in our view, was part of the
deterrent. At the other end of the scale, we had come to the
view that conventional forces on the MC 70 scale, armed with
nuclear weapons of a "fire-support" nature, was equal top
priority. By "fire-support", I meant nuclear weapons of
relatively short range and low yield. Where we were in much
greater doubt was in the "grey area" that lay between these two
ends of the scale. If in the end it was decided to go ahead with
the European MRBM programme, we would loyally try to play our
part, although I must make it plain that we should find it very
difficult to find the additional funds required. If we were
asked to choose what kind of MRBM scheme, we would prefer
Norstad's "plain van" approach to land-based POLARIS missiles.
But our thinking was that MRBMs should take a pretty low priority,
and that the whole question of Norstad's interdiction targets
should be re-examined. We agreed that no doubt NATO needed more
encouragement and a greater sense of purpose, but we felt just
as worried about the situation in South-East Asia and in Africa,
with possible troubles that could arise in the Middle East and
elsewhere. Defeat for the West by one means or another was more
likely in these areas than in NATO. We had tried to re-draw our
defence plans so that our forces could still fulfil British
obligations in these areas. But we felt that greater

interchange with the Americans on our joint responsibilities in the rest of the world might strengthen the deterrent to war and perhaps show areas where overlapping responsibilities could be somewhat reduced to advantage.

5. MR. NITZE said that he did not disagree with this general picture. They too were extremely worried at the possibility of defeat by infiltration and subversion in Africa and Asia but they felt that NATO must have a new sense of purpose if it was to fulfil its functions. Their thoughts as expressed in the discussion between Dean Rusk and Sir Harold Caccia (Washington Telegram No. 695) would, he believed, form the basis of their NATO policies. In addition he thought that they would take responsibility for that part of the Gates/Herter offer that said that the United States would place 5 POLARIS submarines in the Mediterranean on "6th Fleet terms". They would dispose of the rest of the offer by saying that they hoped that the other NATO members would respond to this offer by making suggestions of their own as to how NATO might be strengthened and as to how the MRBM problem could be handled. I said that I very much hoped that we could continue discussions which had been so far fruitful and come to an agreed position on all this. We too were agreed that the problem of MRBMs should take a much lower priority than either the strategic deterrent or the combination of conventional forces combined with nuclear fire power that were necessary to enforce a pause. How to handle this situation in NATO was not primarily my responsibility once the defence aspects had been settled. How to play the hand and how to deal with the political aspects was clearly a matter for the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister, but it seemed to me that it should be possible for us to agree a line together and to agree also what kind of answers we would give to our own questionnaire now in front of the NATO Council. We naturally wished to make these answers as helpful to the Americans as we could.

6. MR. McNAMARA then turned to the general issue of making better use of our joint resources and said that one of the purposes of the Ford Motor Company in assuming full control of all its overseas subsidiaries was in order that production could be rationalised in the most suitable way between one plant and another. He wondered whether the same thing could not be done with the U.K./U.S. defence research and production, bringing in the Canadians and perhaps at a later stage other NATO nations. I agreed and said that this indeed was our earnest wish, and added that unless we could make interdependence a "two-way" operation, the whole basis of the alliance would be destroyed. It was agreed that at my later meeting with Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. Rubel and Mr. Macauley these matters should be examined in more detail. (This meeting is recorded separately. It led to the agreements in Washington Telegrams Nos. 726, 727 and 728.)

7. I ended by saying that in the main I had had close and friendly relations with his predecessor and that I had always understood that the relationship between our Chiefs of Staff and Military and Scientific Advisers were also close and friendly. It was my wish however to improve on this situation if possible and to try to bring our two countries even more closely together in the defence sphere and thus to share the burden between us to our mutual advantage.

8. MR. McNAMARA said it was his wish also that this closer linking of our joint effort should take place and he would hope that we would both feel able to communicate with one another on any matters of mutual interest and to maintain and improve the close association between our Advisers.

9. He then had to leave for a meeting with the President and we went on to the larger meeting at which we discussed interdependence.

OTHER CONVERSATIONS

10. Following the main meeting with Mr. McNamara and Mr. Nitze, I had separate conversations with Mr. Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Mr. McNamara again at dinner on Tuesday night. After dinner I also had discussions with Mr. McNamara and Mr. Kohler. I would summarise these discussions as follows, and in this summary I have also taken account of discussions which Sir Solly Zuckerman has had with Mr. Wiesner, Scientific Adviser to the President.

11. The Americans attach great importance to the maintenance of the strategic nuclear deterrent. Whilst they accept that there may be an approaching balance in numbers of megatons, they believe that by modernising and diversifying means of delivery, the West could maintain a satisfactory deterrent and one that could increasingly achieve a second strike capability. They accept us as junior partners in this enterprise but they are obviously not willing to share it with anyone else.

12. They are not likely to propose some great step-up in conventional forces or their equipment but they seek to get well balanced forces which will clearly include tactical nuclear weapons; these forces to be capable of enforcing a pause even with something greater than a probing attack.

13. They do not really like the Herter/Gates offer at all, nor do they seem very enthusiastic about a large MRBM force. They are however in the political difficulty that I do not think they wish to completely overthrow the actions of their predecessors and they will therefore tend to say that they merely give all this very low priority and to extricate themselves from the actual offer on the lines that I have indicated above. We should obviously seek to encourage this thought, as both Sir Solly Zuckerman and I have done during our visit.

14. They do not like the idea of creating any kind of NATO nuclear force, tactical or strategic, but they are willing to consider perhaps reinterpreting Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty and perhaps associating the nuclear strategic deterrent more closely with it. They would also, I think, accept the proposition that the NATO Council or some sub-committee of it might be given greater knowledge of nuclear stock piles and capacity, and through the process of consultation might in fact have a veto on any American withdrawal of nuclear capacity from Europe. They would very much like our help on further defining their policies on this and on MRBMs. I think it might be advisable to send Mr. Mottershead over in due course to discuss all this with them and to decide how best to frame our answers to our own NATO questionnaire in such a way as to help the American position. It is clearly in our interest to do this as the outcome might well be the end of the various MRBM schemes which have presented us with so many problems, although this would be achieved, rather by downgrading their priorities than by rejecting them outright.

15. We had some cursory discussions of relations with the French. The Administration is clearly not willing, because it does not think it would serve any useful purpose, to offer the French nuclear assistance of any kind or to support policies in

NATO which would be solely aimed at trying to persuade the French to give up their "Force de frappe". Their view seems to be that no action of theirs, and much less action of ours, could at this stage affect the French determination to proceed. It would be wise perhaps to leave the French some escape route for a later stage, particularly if a nuclear test agreement were to be signed. But here again they do not appear to be willing to make any major concessions nor, I think, are they likely to press us to do so.

16. As to the Germans, they are as determined as we are to seek some financial relief but they regard this for the moment as being more a matter for the Secretary of the Treasury and his Advisers. They raised however no objection to my statement that we would have to press the Germans very hard and reconsider some of our European defence commitments if they are unwilling to help us.

17. Although perhaps their attitude was a little swayed by their immediate problems in Laos, it is clear that they do not wish to over-insure in NATO to a point which might inhibit their actions in other parts of the world. They recognise very clearly that we are essential partners to them in the rest of the world defence tasks and this is a relationship which I think we could cultivate to our advantage.

H.W.

Ministry of Defence, S.W.1.

23rd March, 1961.

Cal (33) / 244 4/5/61

themselves and thus prevent a dangerous spirit from growing which would destroy the fundamental purpose of N.A.T.O. There must, of course, be unity but at the same time we should recognise a reasonable diversity within the Atlantic Community.

3. EUROPE

MR. BALL said he was impressed by the similarity between Mr. Macmillan's views and those of the United States Government on the problem of the Six and the Seven. The United States Government attached more weight to the political than the economic aspects. Here their objectives were two-fold, to maintain close Franco-German understanding and to bind Germany closely to the West. While they recognised that the relationship of the United Kingdom and the Seven with the Six was primarily a problem for the countries concerned, the Americans had been worried at the early ideas of a European Free Trade Area which seemed calculated, from the American point of view, to increase the commercial disadvantages while weakening the political advantages of a united Europe. They had feared that the United Kingdom, acting as a pole of attraction, might weaken the forces for unity among the Six. But if the United Kingdom became a member of the Six and brought her political genius to bear within it, she would provide an element of stability in the period of uncertainty which was likely to follow the departure of the present French and German leaders. Such a decision on the part of the United Kingdom would also confirm even more closely the special relationship of confidence between the United States and United Kingdom Governments. In short, the interests of all parties, on both sides of the Atlantic, would be advanced if the United Kingdom could see her way to become a member of the Six. But if there were merely some economic accommodation between the Six and the Seven, this would not only weaken the political value and potential of the Six but make the commercial problems more difficult for North America. He hoped that the O.E.C.D. might serve as an umbrella for further developments, possibly lead to some binding ties between the two sides of the Atlantic. If it was a question of bringing the Seven together into relationship with the Six, this again might raise difficulties insofar as the neutral members, i.e. the Swedes, the Swiss and the Austrians, would be unable to play their full part in the political institutions of the Treaty of Rome. He hoped therefore that the United Kingdom would take the lead and then see to what extent the other members of the Seven could follow suit.

MR. MACMILLAN remarked that the three neutral members of the Seven would in any case have to be treated as special members of a wider relationship. He did not think this would present any great difficulty. SIR ROBERT HALL agreed and suggested that the O.E.C.D. might help over this.

MR. BALL then turned to the question of the Commonwealth and the problem of tropical foodstuffs. Any merger of the two preferential systems would be difficult for the Americans, particularly in respect of their responsibilities to non-member, under-developed States. He hoped that the United States and the United Kingdom could tackle this problem together.

Exhort - Board of US-UK Washington Daily, April 5-8, 1961
chart PM (N) 61 (st) Mtg Apr 5 1961 Han On p8 (not ver)
TOP SECRET Macmillan had suggested showing a P
from "PVO"

1. NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION

PRESIDENT KENNEDY said that it would be useful to continue the discussion on nuclear weapons which had been held that morning.

After saying that he was in no sense speaking for the President, MR. ACHESON said that it was an objective of his proposals to stimulate the Allies to think about nuclear weapons in a responsible way. Mr. Macmillan had said that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (N.A.T.O.) was not a nuclear Power. Legally this was so, but the armed forces of many of the European Allies - e.g., the Dutch, the Italians and the French - were in fact holding nuclear weapons, and in this sense N.A.T.O. was already a nuclear Power. The United States control of these weapons was in some cases theoretical; there was not always a duplicate key and sometimes the control amounted to nothing more than a United States sergeant who was supposed to see that the weapons were not released without authority. There was no way at present of guaranteeing that those Allies who held nuclear weapons would in fact get the President's agreement before using them. This being so, the problem of command was a very real one and seemed to fit in with Mr. Macmillan's views. The problem was one for the Allies, in particular for General de Gaulle. It was true that Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) was militarily in command of these weapons but the problem was not military. It was one of political control. The Allies must make up their minds whether they wanted to shoot the weapons off and, if so, in what circumstances. In his view the United States Government should take the lead in posing this problem and inducing the Allies to face it.

Mr. Acheson then turned to the desire of the French to develop an independent nuclear capacity. He expressed his personal view that it would be a mistake to help France to develop nuclear weapons. Such weapons were useless without the means to deliver them. It was very expensive to provide this. The French would realise in time that this was beyond their means. Indeed, he thought there was only one way in which they could develop a real nuclear capacity, and that was with German help. The dilemma was that, if we helped the French, the Germans would insist on equal treatment. If we did not and the French persisted, they could only succeed by calling in the Germans. This would lead to the Germans acquiring nuclear power. Such a development would be very dangerous. It was not desired by Dr. Adenauer. It would finally extinguish any hope of an agreement to end nuclear tests.

There were, however, other ways of dealing with the French problem. For example, the United Kingdom bomber force in the United Kingdom, the United States Air Force in the United Kingdom and perhaps the I.C.B.Ms. could be committed to N.A.T.O. If this were done, and if General de Gaulle were asked to work out suitable command arrangements, this would appear to him as a constructive move. It would give him control, at least to some degree, of a force far more powerful than anything he could hope to have on his own. Mr. Acheson thought that this would be the best policy. The rules drawn up by the European Allies

for controlling the use of nuclear weapons would demand in all probability supplementary action by United States nuclear forces stationed outside Europe.

MR. MACMILLAN said that Mr. Acheson's ideas were interesting and constructive. They should certainly be studied. But they applied only to the European theatre. One of the causes of the malaise among the European Allies was their feeling that they were confined solely to this theatre, while the Anglo-Saxons covered the rest of the world. The Europeans, especially General de Gaulle, were determined to get into the big club and to talk on equal terms.

MR. RUSK wondered if General de Gaulle would feel that the possession of a national nuclear capability would give him the right to be consulted about the use by the United States of nuclear weapons anywhere.

MR. MACMILLAN said that Mr. Acheson's scheme seemed to apply only to existing, and not to new nuclear weapons.

In reply to a question from Lord Home, MR. ACHESON said that SACEUR had only military authority. His point was that the Allies should be told that they had the last word in the use of the nuclear weapons, and not only tactical weapons but also Polaris missiles.

PRESIDENT KENNEDY asked whether General de Gaulle would or would not be satisfied if the nuclear capability over which he had some control was confined only to Western Europe.

MR. MACMILLAN said this was a difficult question. Perhaps General de Gaulle might be ready to contribute to a common pool if he had something purely French to put into it. It was a prestige issue. The General was not thinking of a European war. He believed that there was not going to be a world war.

PRESIDENT KENNEDY asked if it would make any difference if SACEUR was a Frenchman. MR. MACMILLAN replied that this might well be so but it might create difficulties with other members of the Alliance. The crux of the problem was that Europe had revived. It was worth working out Mr. Acheson's ideas in detail to see whether there might be something in them which the European Allies might accept.

PRESIDENT KENNEDY asked Mr. Acheson to confirm that it was his idea that mechanism must be provided to make it impossible for the Germans to develop an independent nuclear capacity. Was it his idea that the Germans would achieve this either if the French were given assistance or if the French called in the Germans to help them? Was it further his idea that his own scheme was the only way to prevent Germany from acquiring nuclear weapons?

MR. ACHESON confirmed all these points.

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LORD HOME suggested that the Soviet Government might also have been looking again at the consequences which a detente might bring in the shape of inroads into their closed society. They would be under great pressure not to allow this because it would sacrifice so great a military advantage. This might well be among the reasons for their reluctance to conclude an agreement on tests.

2. BERLIN

PRESIDENT KENNEDY wondered why the Russians had made no move on Berlin. Were they hesitating to move because they believed that the Western response would be stiff? If so, it would be a mistake to do anything which might cause them to change that view.

In the discussion which followed it was suggested, on the United States side, that Mr. Khrushchev had been surprised by the strength of the Western reaction to his Free City plan. Nevertheless, he had continued to affirm his intention to make a peace treaty with Eastern Germany, and he was now more or less committed to taking action this year. He probably did not think that Berlin was worth the risk of war; but he had to satisfy his satellites and to keep control of the world Communist movement at a time when the Chinese were challenging his leadership. In the Party Congress in October he might want to demonstrate that he could gain his ends by means short of war, and he could instance such cases as Laos or the Congo. It was possible that he needed a diplomatic success. It might be that the Russians were deterred from taking action on Berlin by the threat of a direct clash with the West. If so, and if we had no new bargaining position, we should consider how to put the prospect as bluntly as possible. (The West was not in a position to negotiate successfully over Berlin.) Perhaps the only thing which would affect the Soviet position would be a move by the Federal Government to recognise de facto the East German regime. This could lead to important changes in East-West relations in Europe. But the West Germans lacked imagination, and they were not prepared to take any risks over Berlin.

On the British side, it was pointed out that there had been a very long negotiation between Foreign Ministers, which broke down because of the impossibility of deciding what the position would be at the end of an interim period. It would be dangerous to go into discussions with no firm negotiating position. It would be worth considering the possibility of making a stand, not on the legalistic view of Western rights in Berlin, but on the general thesis that the West would defend the Berlin population. It might be possible to tolerate a Soviet Peace Treaty with East Germany and a joint guarantee of a Free City for all Berlin. Would it be a mistake to move to a treaty basis for our rights in Berlin, with all the dangers

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JP(61)37(Final)

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7th April, 1961

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

JOINT PLANNING STAFF

NATO STRATEGY - USE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES

Report by the Joint Planning Staff

In accordance with the instructions of the Chief of the Defence Staff we have examined, in broad terms, the extent to which existing NATO conventional forces would have to be increased to counter a major conventional Soviet attack and have outlined the implications of providing such forces.

2. We have consulted the Ministry of Defence and the Joint Intelligence Staff. Our report is at Annex.

3. We have confined our examination to the land and tactical combat air forces required to counter a major Soviet attack in Europe, and have deliberately excluded maritime considerations. It will be evident, however, that such forces as we have recommended would create an enormous supply problem. There would undoubtedly be sufficient ports and anchorages available to NATO shipping for efficient handling of the requisite men and their supplies; but protection on the high seas in the face of the threat posed by the large Russian submarine and maritime air forces would inevitably involve the West in a very great increase in the size of their navies and maritime air forces. Without such shipping the land and air forces would very soon cease to have the wherewithal with which to fight.

4. We have, moreover, taken no account of the need for conventional strategic bomber forces.

Recommendation

5. We recommend that, if they approve our report, the Chiefs of Staff should forward it to the Ministry of Defence.

(Signed) D.C. STAPLETON
W.D. O'BRIEN
B.H.L. DITMUS.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, G.W.I.

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Annex to JP(61)37(Final)

NATO STRATEGY - USE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES

INTRODUCTION

1. It has been a matter of general agreement in the past that it would be neither practicable nor desirable for NATO to be prepared to counter conventional Russian aggression in Europe by conventional means alone. However, as the risk of escalation inseparable from even the most limited use of nuclear weapons for tactical purposes has become generally recognized, this view has come into question.

AIM

2. To examine, in broad terms, the extent to which existing NATO conventional land and tactical air forces would have to be increased to contain a major conventional Soviet attack; and the implications of providing such forces.

SCOPE

3. To meet the requirements of our Terms of Reference, we have had to ignore such considerations as:-

- (a) The fact that Soviet land forces are currently backed by a nuclear capability.
- (b) Whether it is realistic to think that Russia would be prepared to lose a conventional war without resorting to the use of nuclear weapons.
- (c) The inability of either side to differentiate between aircraft carrying conventional and nuclear weapons.
- (d) The effect on the balance of power in a conventional conflict of such agencies as chemical warfare.

4. Within this limited scope we have assumed that:-

- (a) Strategic nuclear forces would be maintained by both sides.
- (b) Since NATO shield forces would not be equipped with nuclear weapons for tactical use, the resources thereby saved would be available towards the cost of increasing the conventional forces.
- (c) "To contain a major Soviet conventional attack" means having the ability at least to hold successfully any scale of conventional aggression which the Russians might reasonably be able to mount against ACE. Although the ability to bring about the complete destruction of the committed Soviet forces by conventional means is not necessarily implied, the West would have to be prepared to fight a long war of attrition, culminating in the eventual withdrawal or surrender of the Soviet forces. (This assumes that neither side would in the end resort to nuclear weapons rather than accept failure.)

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Annex (Continued)

THE SCALE OF RUSSIAN THREAT

5. Based on the current intelligence study* of the employment of Soviet armed forces on a large scale we assess, at Appendix 'A', the scale of the conventional Russian land and air threat. The probable total deployment of land and tactical air forces would be as follows:-

Attack without
prior build-up

Divs 39
Tactical
A/C 2800

Reinforcement

Divs 33 (combat ready)
Divs 40 (within 10 days of
mobilization)
Tactical
A/C as required

The 33 combat ready reinforcement divisions are available for commitment as soon as logistics permit.

SCALE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES WHICH WOULD BE
REQUIRED BY ACE

6. In assessing the scale of conventional forces required by ACE to meet the Russian threat, the size will be determined by what general assumptions are employed as being realistic and reasonable as background to the calculations. For example, a study based on the theoretical size of the forces needed only to contain the estimate of deployed and reserve Soviet forces leads to a requirement of parity; and even this leaves the Soviet forces, who would have the initiative, with relative advantages on several different accounts over defending forces. The factors are summarized at Appendix 'B'.

7. Secondly, based on the assumption that any build-up of Soviet forces beyond their present level would declare an intention of all-out war in Europe necessitating the employment of the strategic nuclear forces, it might be argued that the conventional forces of MC 70 were sufficient.

8. Thirdly, the reason why the provision of present conventional forces is well below MC 70 force goals is because their strength is dictated by what the nations can afford and not by military logic. Their level is acceptable only because they are backed by nuclear weapons.

9. We list below the present level of forces provided, the requirements under MC 70 and the conventional forces that would be required to achieve parity.

	<u>Present ACE Levels</u> (approximate)	<u>MC 70</u> <u>Goals</u>	<u>Parity</u>
(a) M-Day Divisions	37	55	39
(b) Immediate Reserve Divisions (within 10 days of mobilization)	-	-	40
(c) 1st Echelon Divisions (within 30 days)	151	22	-

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(Annex (Continued))

	<u>Present ACE Levels</u> (approximate)	<u>MC 70</u> <u>Goals</u>	<u>Parity</u>
(d) Tactical Combat Aircraft	3,700	4,382	3,000
(e) Tactical Combat Aircraft (within 10 days of mobilization)	-	-	3,000

* Subject to short movement delay.

10. The above MC 70 force goals - already unrealistic - fall some 35 divisions and 1,600 aircraft short of what would be required to achieve parity. Looked at another way, the requirement for parity is at least twice the present land force ACE level, and over one and a half times the present combat aircraft level.

IMPLICATIONS OF ATTEMPTING TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY ADDITIONAL FORCES

Manpower and Finance

11. The failure of NATO as a whole to meet the MC 70 force goals indicates how unrealistic it would be to call for great additional burdens. The claims of military expenditure must be considered in relation to the need to maintain the economic strength of the West. It is no argument to say that as Russia, with a population of some 200 million, supports 80-100 active divisions, the NATO countries with some 400 million should be able to match this. Straightforward comparison takes no account of the differences of ideology, economic systems and particularly living standards between East and West. A largely increased demand on NATO military manpower would have much more serious economic and political effects than would continuation of the nuclear pattern of defence to which Western economy has adapted itself. In this connexion we are advised that there would be no possibility that savings on nuclear weapons would more than marginally offset the great increase in the cost of providing conventional forces on the scale required.

12. As far as the United Kingdom is concerned, assuming her proportion of the total force level remained constant, she would, together with making up her short fall on MC 70 goals, have to provide at least an additional three combat ready 1st Echelon divisions (including the necessary logistics backing) and some 200 additional tactical combat aircraft. Furthermore, many of her existing or planned combat aircraft would be of the wrong type and would have to be replaced. Apart from the financial and economic implications a future conscription would be inevitable.

Deployment

13. In order to maintain adequate conventional readiness against surprise attack in the circumstances being considered a major NATO redeployment would be necessary, bringing forces from rear areas, e.g. Italy, closer to the Curtain. Presuming that the political difficulties could be overcome (e.g. the restrictions imposed by Norway and Denmark on the stationing of foreign troops on their soil in peacetime), vast new infrastructure

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Annex (Concluded)

requirements would have to be faced, giving rise to yet further financial, economic and political implications.

Logistics

14. The implications on the logistic system in Europe require separate examination. It appears, however, that the present system of national responsibility would be likely to break down in war, and therefore would require to be replaced by a NATO system in peacetime.

CONCLUSIONS

15. We conclude that:-

- (a) MC 70 force goals - already unrealistic - fall some 35 divisions and 1,600 tactical combat aircraft short of the forces that would be required by NATO to counter, on a basis of parity, a major Soviet conventional attack in Europe. In terms of land forces alone this is at least twice the present ACE level.
- (b) From the implications outlined in paragraphs 11-14 above the provision of such large increases over present forces would appear to be out of the question, both for both NATO as a whole and for the United Kingdom.

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Appendix 'A' to Annex to
JP (61)37(Final)THE SCALE OF RUSSIAN THREAT

1. The current intelligence study⁴ of the employment of Soviet armed forces on a large scale is written in the context of global war and simultaneous strategic and tactical nuclear attack against the West. It thus does not cover precisely the circumstances postulated for this study. However, the figures given for the size and pattern of existing Soviet regular forces are considered to be realistic and reasonably accurate. In the unlikely event of a decision by the Russians to dispense altogether with tactical nuclear weapons, it is conceivable that increases might be made in the size of their conventional forces, but such increases would be contrary to present estimates of Soviet defence and economic policy.

2. Having regard to announced reductions in the Soviet armed forces it has been appreciated that their ground troops may be reduced to about 1,800,000 by the end of 1961. Assuming that this manpower would be divided between active and cadre divisions it is considered most unlikely that they would embark on war with less than 80 line divisions immediately available and some prospect of up to a further 120 line divisions within 10 days of mobilization. A possible deployment might be:-

East Germany and Poland	22
North West USSR	5
Western USSR	25
South West USSR and Hungary	10
Southern USSR	10
Far East USSR	8
	60

This represents the worst case from the USSR's point of view, and in all probability the Soviet Army would be much larger at the outbreak of war. In addition 19 satellite divisions might be available for external operations.

3. These forces would be sufficient to initiate simultaneous large scale invasion operations into peripheral areas on several fronts, either separately or concurrently, though it is believed that priority would be given to the attack on Western Europe at the expense of other theatres. Based on a Soviet Army of 80 active divisions, and having regard to logistic factors and current aircraft strengths, it is estimated that the probable deployment would be as follows:-

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Appendix 'A' (Concluded)

Theatre	Attack without prior build-up		Reinforcements	
	Divs	Tactical A/C	Divs	Tactical A/C
(a) Western Continental Europe	22	1200	25	1400
(b) Scandinavian Peninsula	2	400	3	as required
(c) Southern Europe and Western Turkey	5	500	5	as required
(d) Eastern Turkey and Iran	10	700	-	as required
	39	2800	33*	

* Note

These divisions would be available for commitment as soon as logistics permit. In addition a further 40 divisions would be available within 10 days of mobilization.

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Appendix 'B' to Annex to
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FACTORS INFLUENCING THE CONVENTIONAL FORCE REQUIREMENT

1. In considering the requirements for a conventional defence of NATO Europe, there are a number of important factors which, though impossible to assess quantitatively, nevertheless must have significant bearing on the relative effectiveness of Soviet and ACE forces.
2. First, as opposed to the Soviet Union's monolithic organization, NATO is an agglomeration of sovereign states, whose armed forces are still far from being integrated.
3. Secondly, there is the advantage which accrues to any aggressor. Although defence confers an advantage classically assessed at about 3 to 1, this is only true in the context of the actual battle area. In strategic terms it is the aggressor who has the advantage, in that he can concentrate for attack at a time and place of his own choosing. This is particularly true for the opening attack of a war, for which the defence can never be completely ready and, which in the context of a Russian attack on the West, might be delivered in several different places on a very long and vulnerable frontier.
4. Thirdly, even in the battle area, the achievement of initial surprise and sustained momentum in follow-up (a type of attack in which Soviet forces are believed to be well trained and equipped and in which Russia is favoured by her high security standards) might well so disorganize and split-up a slow-reacting defence as to paralyse resistance, thereby annulling any pre-existing balance of numbers.
5. Lastly, though perhaps most important of all - and certainly the most difficult to assess in the unreal circumstances being considered - is the influence of the air situation on the course of conventional ground operations. It is axiomatic that, for a conventional land campaign to be successful, a favourable air situation is essential and in the case of ACE this could only be effectively achieved by offensive measures to destroy the enemy's air capability at source. However, the accomplishment of such counter-air tasks without the destructive power of nuclear weapons, together with the conventional need for direct support of the land forces, would undoubtedly call for air forces many times greater than NATO at present has, or is likely to have, at her disposal; and not only greater but of a different type. As the tendency in the West has been towards greater sophistication in aircraft and increasing reliance on nuclear weapons, including missiles, the provision of large conventional air forces would therefore also involve an anachronism - putting the clock back technically in several respects. By contrast, the Soviet Air Force has retained a strong tactical air potential specifically for the support of ground operations.
6. All the above considerations have the effect of conferring relative advantage on the Soviet forces attacking a Western force of similar strength in the circumstances of this study.

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Record of a Meeting between the
Rt. Hon. Harold Watkinson, M.P.,
United Kingdom Minister of
Defence, and M. Messmer, French
Minister of the Armed Forces,
in Paris on Thursday, 13th April,
1961.

PRESENTU.K. Representatives

The Rt. Hon. Harold Watkinson, MP.,
Minister of Defence.

Sir Anthony Rumbold,
H.M. Minister,
British Embassy,
Paris.

Mr. G. Wheeler,
Under-Secretary,
Ministry of Defence.

Mr. C. Benwell,
Principal Private Secretary
to Minister of Defence.

French Representatives

M. Messmer,
Minister of the
Armed Forces

General Lavaud,
Minister for
Armament.

Lt. General Martin,
Chief of Staff of
Inter Army Staff.

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1. After the main meetings (MM. 27/61 and MM. 28/61) M. MESSMER invited Mr. Watkinson, in restricted session, to enlarge on the possibility which he had touched on at an earlier restricted meeting (MM. 26/61) of some form of nuclear trusteeship.
2. MR. WATKINSON said that he had mentioned it tentatively without consulting his Cabinet colleagues, and therefore without backing or commitment. His train of thought had been that if at some stage the United States and the United Kingdom decided that they must accept that France was a nuclear power in her own right, what then would be the best system for the West? The British Government were opposed to making NATO a strategic nuclear power, though the deterrent must be linked to NATO in some way. But there were many difficult problems associated with the acquisition of a strategic nuclear capability which made it important to find common ground. For instance, in what circumstances would nuclear weapons be used? How would the decision to use them be taken? Was it possible to have a limited nuclear war, or to fire an atomic "shot across the bows"? What about targeting? And technical military control? He was now talking about the main strategic deterrent, not about tactical nuclear weapons, and he would like to know whether the French would regard it as practicable and worth while to work out some form of joint management by the holders of strategic nuclear weapons on behalf of the West as a whole.
3. M. MESSMER said that his reply could at this stage only be a personal one. As he understood it, Mr. Watkinson's suggestion had two aspects. First, there was a military and technical aspect. Countries with a nuclear capability would discuss targets, orders for attack, and so on. This would certainly be useful, but so far the Americans had repeatedly refused to discuss these questions. He took it that Mr. Watkinson's suggestion assumed that, in the circumstances envisaged, the British might be able to persuade the Americans to modify their position. Secondly, there was the political aspect. France was opposed to making NATO a strategic nuclear power and was equally opposed to giving General Norstad a mixed bag of strategic and tactical weapons. He assumed, therefore, that the suggestion was that countries with a nuclear capability would get a mandate to use the deterrent not only in their own name but also on behalf of the other NATO countries. He wondered whether the other NATO Allies were ready for this. The Germans, for example, strongly supported making NATO itself a nuclear power; and the smaller countries could be expected to oppose this aspect of trusteeship because they were so attached to the principle of equality. He thought it would need agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany to override this opposition.
4. MR. WATKINSON said that some reinterpretation of Article V of the Treaty might satisfy the other countries as a link with a nuclear trusteeship. He recognised the difficulties. He had not discussed it with the Americans, and of course his first step would be to raise it with the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary. But was the idea, in M. Messmer's view, altogether impossible?
5. M. MESSMER said that the first part - military and technical

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co-operation - struck him as feasible. He was doubtful about the political part of the scheme.

6. MR. WATKINSON then asked M. Messmer what position France would take up when she became an independent nuclear power? Did she envisage going it alone?

7. M. MESSMER replied that the question had been approached but not yet studied. In principle, France would be prepared to open talks with the United States and the United Kingdom.

8. MR. WATKINSON asked whether the French would accept one-source targeting, for example from Omaha.

9. M. MESSMER said that he realised this would soon be a problem. Probably they would wish to accept co-ordinated targeting.

10. SIR ANTHONY RUMBOLD said that there seemed to be two conflicting fears in Europe: one that the Americans would not use their deterrent in defence of Europe; and the other that they would use it too hastily.

11. M. MESSMER said that a sort of trusteeship was for the smaller countries of the Alliance the only possible solution, because they would never develop nuclear capabilities of their own; and it was in fact the system at present in force. But more and more the European countries, and particularly the Germans, were beginning to fear that the Americans would be unwilling to use the deterrent in their defence.

12. MR. WATKINSON said that some of these questions could certainly be covered in bilateral talks between the French and the British, but that did not settle the problem of how to manage a tripartite deterrent.

13. In conclusion, MR. WATKINSON and M. MESSMER agreed to give the matter further thought, and to consult their senior colleagues.

Ministry of Defence, S.W.1.
18th April, 1961

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MM.26/61.

RESTRICTED CIRCULATION

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RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN
THE RT. HON. HAROLD WATKINSON, M.P.,
UNITED KINGDOM MINISTER OF DEFENCE,
AND M. MESSMER,
FRENCH MINISTER OF THE ARMED FORCES,
IN PARIS ON THURSDAY, 13TH APRIL, 1961.

PRESENT

U.K. Representatives

The Rt. Hon.
Harold Watkinson, M.P.,
Minister of Defence.

Mr. G. Wheeler,
Under Secretary,
Ministry of Defence.

Mr. C. Benwell,
Principal Private
Secretary to
Minister of Defence.

French Representatives

M. Messmer,
Minister of the Armed
Forces.

Lt. General Puget,
Assistant to Chief of
Defence Staff.

Lt. General Martin,
Chief of Staff of inter
Army Staff.

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1. At a preliminary restricted meeting MR. WATKINSON began by giving M. Messmer a resumé of his discussion with M. Debré the previous evening (May 25/61) and said that M. Debré had appeared to welcome the possibility of closer informal links between the two countries on defence matters. If M. Messmer was agreeable, he would raise the question with the Chief of the Defence Staff on his return.

2. M. MESSMER said that he was entirely in favour and that he thought the recent defence reorganisation in his country, with greater centralisation, would facilitate such contacts. He was sure that the close links already established in NATO could with advantage be complemented by bilateral discussions, particularly as the North Atlantic Treaty did not cover Africa and Asia.

3. MR. WATKINSON then repeated the brief account of U.K. defence priorities which he had given M. Debré, and in response to questions, outlined our plans for our independent contribution to the West's strategic deterrent over the next decade - first with the V-bombers and BLUE STEEL and later with SKYBOLT. We were also, he said, developing the TSR.2 for low-level attack and were studying the possibility of low-level missiles. We had no present intention of going for POLARIS submarines, which presented great difficulties of communication and control and were also very expensive. It was not our policy to make NATO a fourth strategic nuclear power and we did not like the HERTER/GATES offer in its original form. But we would not necessarily be opposed to some form of nuclear trusteeship, under which those NATO countries which had nuclear weapons agreed to use them on behalf of the Alliance in accordance with ground rules worked out by NATO. Article V of the Treaty could perhaps be reinterpreted for this purpose.

4. M. MESSMER said that he wished to clear up straight away a misconception which appeared to be common in the United States and was perhaps also held by some in the United Kingdom. French plans for an independent nuclear striking force were in no sense negotiable. Those who imagined that they were a sort of blackmail and would be abandoned in return for concessions by France's Allies were completely mistaken. It had been decided, after difficult debates and careful consideration, that these weapons were essential for the defence of France and there would be no going back on that decision. France was utterly opposed to making NATO a fourth or fifth nuclear power. The reasons which impelled her to create her own "force de frappe" were, he imagined, very similar to Britain's - finance, manpower, and the conviction that the Russians and the smaller NATO countries would attach greater credibility to an independent deterrent in Europe than to one on the other side of the Atlantic. A small deterrent in Europe could be as effective as a very much larger deterrent in America, because the Russians knew that France could not tolerate Russian troops on the Rhine but might suppose that the Americans would accept this, if faced with a "fait accompli", rather than risk the devastation of the United States. He was aware of the danger that a future German administration might well wish to be a member of the nuclear club when the French had their own deterrent; but he was certain that at present the Germans were making no preparations, even covert, to become a nuclear power and was confident that with the help of a nuclear test

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agreement the Germans could be kept out. Certainly France would not help the Germans in.

5. M. MESSMER went on to say that France's acquisition of a kiloton nuclear capacity was imminent; and with the functioning of their isotope separation plant it was also certain that they could eventually develop a megaton capacity, perhaps in three or four years. They planned to have a force of 50 MIRAGE IV aircraft for high altitude nuclear strike; the first aircraft would enter service in 1963 and the force would be complete in 1966. If they were offered nuclear weapons without strings by their Allies, they would in principle be prepared to accept them; but they had no intention of asking for help.

6. Discussion then turned briefly to Mr. Watkinson's recent talks with Mr. McNamara and the new attempt, as recorded in Mr. Watkinson's letter to M. Messmer of 6th April, to reduce duplication between the U.K. and the U.S. in defence research, development and production. It was decided to leave discussion of Anglo-French progress in the same field to the main meetings which were to follow (LHM.27/61 and LHM.28/61).

Ministry of Defence, S.W.1.
18th April, 1961.

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4. In the discussions I specifically mentioned the position of the Germans, and said my fear was that if we accepted France, would we not then encourage Germany to follow very quickly? Messmer's position on this is that he fears such a consequence as much as we do. He believes, as I do, that the Germans at this moment have made no preparations even in secret to acquire a nuclear capacity. He equally, I think, sees the attractions of a test agreement in stopping the Germans once the French have got into the club. I think he is under no illusions that the Americans are likely to welcome his country as a nuclear power, although I think he might hope that we might be willing to help with the Americans over this. There are thus many unresolved issues here, but I thought you might like to have this report.

5. Messmer said that he would be talking over these problems with De Gaulle and Debré in the next few weeks. He said that he would like to have any further thoughts that I might have on our reactions to the military aspects of the French acquisition of nuclear capacity. It will be easy for me to drop these informal discussions, which have committed neither of us, at this point. I have a feeling, however, that if we have to accept the unpleasant fact that the French have got there, and I think we do, this sort of discussion might be the way of finding out the least price we can pay to live with them. Whether it will make the General more amenable in other directions is of course another question which I am not qualified to answer.

6. I asked Messmer whether our abandonment of the nuclear deterrent or "giving it to NATO" would make it possible for the French to give up their own programme. He said that he had faced these problems during their own debates on the Force de Frappe. What we did was our own concern, but as to giving V-Bombers to NATO, this would not make the slightest difference to the French determination to proceed. They were in any case strongly opposed to giving NATO a strategic nuclear capacity.

7. I am sending a copy of this minute to the Foreign Secretary.

14th April, 1961.

Watkinson (M20) → Maxmillan
(exhaust)

4/21/61

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1. THE SITUATION IN LAOS

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2. MR. ACHESON'S CONCEPT OF CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS - UNITED KINGDOM MILITARY IMPLICATIONS

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(Previous Reference: C.O.S. (61) 26th Meeting, Minute 5)

J.P. (61) 46 (Final)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a report by the Joint Planning Staff examining the military implications for the United Kingdom of Mr. Acheson's concept of operations.

SIR THOMAS PIKE (Acting Chief of the Defence Staff) said that the report before them was intended to provide comment on the military implications of Mr. Acheson's proposals for inclusion in a paper to be prepared by the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence for the consideration of the Defence Committee in the first week in May. Although the Foreign Ministers at their meeting in Oslo were not expected to discuss the substance of Mr. Acheson's proposals, nor even the United Kingdom memorandum, but rather to confine themselves to consideration of procedure for handling these papers, it would nevertheless be necessary to provide the Foreign Secretary with a brief in case Mr. Dean Rusk should wish to discuss these proposals with him.

In discussion the following points were made:-

- (a) It was not at all clear what motive lay behind Mr. Acheson's proposals, nor why he had stated the need for the ability to hold a conventional attack specifically of 20 divisions, nor why this attack should be held for two to three weeks. The first aim should therefore be to seek further explanation on these points. In this connection, although the paper suggested that the object of the proposals might be to revitalise NATO and share the defence burden more equitably, it should be remembered that Mr. Acheson had held these views three years ago and that they rested on a military case, whose theme was that in some way or other the onus of initiating nuclear warfare should be placed on Russian shoulders.
- (b) The statement in paragraph 6 of the report that the Russians could bring to bear some 40 divisions in Central Europe without mobilisation or at short notice was inaccurate. The Russians could deploy 40 divisions along the NATO periphery and only 20 in Central Europe. Moreover the use of a force of this size by the Russians would indicate an aim much more serious than limited aggression. This paragraph should be amended accordingly.

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Cark 133/244

4/6/61

LORD HOME suggested that the Soviet Government might also have been looking again at the consequences which a detente might bring in the shape of inroads into their closed society. They would be under great pressure not to allow this because it would sacrifice so great a military advantage. This might well be among the reasons for their reluctance to conclude an agreement on tests.

2. BERLIN

PRESIDENT KENNEDY wondered why the Russians had made no move on Berlin. Were they hesitating to move because they believed that the Western response would be stiff? If so, it would be a mistake to do anything which might cause them to change that view.

In the discussion which followed it was suggested, on the United States side, that Mr. Khrushchev had been surprised by the strength of the Western reaction to his Free City plan. Nevertheless, he had continued to affirm his intention to make a peace treaty with Eastern Germany, and he was now more or less committed to taking action this year. He probably did not think that Berlin was worth the risk of war; but he had to satisfy his satellites and to keep control of the world Communist movement at a time when the Chinese were challenging his leadership. In the Party Congress in October he might want to demonstrate that he could gain his ends by means short of war, and he could instance such cases as Laos or the Congo. It was possible that he needed a diplomatic success. It might be that the Russians were deterred from taking action on Berlin by the threat of a direct clash with the West. If so, and if we had no new bargaining position, we should consider how to put the prospect as bluntly as possible. (The West was not in a position to negotiate successfully over Berlin.) Perhaps the only thing which would affect the Soviet position would be a move by the Federal Government to recognise de facto the East German regime. This could lead to important changes in East-West relations in Europe. But the West Germans lacked imagination, and they were not prepared to take any risks over Berlin.

On the British side, it was pointed out that there had been a very long negotiation between Foreign Ministers, which broke down because of the impossibility of deciding what the position would be at the end of an interim period. It would be dangerous to go into discussions with no firm negotiating position. It would be worth considering the possibility of making a stand, not on the legalistic view of Western rights in Berlin, but on the general thesis that the West would defend the Berlin population. It might be possible to tolerate a Soviet Peace Treaty with East Germany and a joint guarantee of a Free City for all Berlin. Would it be a mistake to move to a treaty basis for our rights in Berlin, with all the dangers

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CIRCULATED FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF

JP(61)37(Final)

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7th April, 1961

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

JOINT PLANNING STAFF

NATO STRATEGY - USE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES

Report by the Joint Planning Staff

In accordance with the instructions of the Chief of the Defence Staff we have examined, in broad terms, the extent to which existing NATO conventional forces would have to be increased to counter a major conventional Soviet attack and have outlined the implications of providing such forces.

2. We have consulted the Ministry of Defence and the Joint Intelligence Staff. Our report is at Annex.

3. We have confined our examination to the land and tactical combat air forces required to counter a major Soviet attack in Europe, and have deliberately excluded maritime considerations. It will be evident, however, that such forces as we have recommended would create an enormous supply problem. There would undoubtedly be sufficient ports and anchorages available to NATO shipping for efficient handling of the requisite men and their supplies; but protection on the high seas in the face of the threat posed by the large Russian submarine and maritime air forces would inevitably involve the West in a very great increase in the size of their navies and maritime air forces. Without such shipping the land and air forces would very soon cease to have the wherewithal with which to fight.

4. We have, moreover, taken no account of the need for conventional strategic bomber forces.

Recommendation

5. We recommend that, if they approve our report, the Chiefs of Staff should forward it to the Ministry of Defence.

(Signed) D.C. STAPLETON
W.D. O'BRIEN
B.H.L. DITMUS.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, G.W.I.

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Annex to JP(61)37(Final)

NATO STRATEGY - USE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES

INTRODUCTION

1. It has been a matter of general agreement in the past that it would be neither practicable nor desirable for NATO to be prepared to counter conventional Russian aggression in Europe by conventional means alone. However, as the risk of escalation inseparable from even the most limited use of nuclear weapons for tactical purposes has become generally recognized, this view has come into question.

AIM

2. To examine, in broad terms, the extent to which existing NATO conventional land and tactical air forces would have to be increased to contain a major conventional Soviet attack; and the implications of providing such forces.

SCOPE

3. To meet the requirements of our Terms of Reference, we have had to ignore such considerations as:-

- (a) The fact that Soviet land forces are currently backed by a nuclear capability.
- (b) Whether it is realistic to think that Russia would be prepared to lose a conventional war without resorting to the use of nuclear weapons.
- (c) The inability of either side to differentiate between aircraft carrying conventional and nuclear weapons.
- (d) The effect on the balance of power in a conventional conflict of such agencies as chemical warfare.

4. Within this limited scope we have assumed that:-

- (a) Strategic nuclear forces would be maintained by both sides.
- (b) Since NATO shield forces would not be equipped with nuclear weapons for tactical use, the resources thereby saved would be available towards the cost of increasing the conventional forces.
- (c) "To contain a major Soviet conventional attack" means having the ability at least to hold successfully any scale of conventional aggression which the Russians might reasonably be able to mount against ACE. Although the ability to bring about the complete destruction of the committed Soviet forces by conventional means is not necessarily implied, the West would have to be prepared to fight a long war of attrition, culminating in the eventual withdrawal or surrender of the Soviet forces. (This assumes that neither side would in the end resort to nuclear weapons rather than accept failure.)

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Annex (Continued)

THE SCALE OF RUSSIAN THREAT

5. Based on the current intelligence study* of the employment of Soviet armed forces on a large scale we assess, at Appendix 'A', the scale of the conventional Russian land and air threat. The probable total deployment of land and tactical air forces would be as follows:-

Attack without
prior build-up

Divs 39
Tactical
A/C 2800

Reinforcement

Divs 33 (combat ready)
Divs 40 (within 10 days of
mobilization)
Tactical
A/C as required

The 33 combat ready reinforcement divisions are available for commitment as soon as logistics permit.

SCALE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES WHICH WOULD BE
REQUIRED BY ACE

6. In assessing the scale of conventional forces required by ACE to meet the Russian threat, the size will be determined by what general assumptions are employed as being realistic and reasonable as background to the calculations. For example, a study based on the theoretical size of the forces needed only to contain the estimate of deployed and reserve Soviet forces leads to a requirement of parity; and even this leaves the Soviet forces, who would have the initiative, with relative advantages on several different accounts over defending forces. The factors are summarized at Appendix 'B'.

7. Secondly, based on the assumption that any build-up of Soviet forces beyond their present level would declare an intention of all-out war in Europe necessitating the employment of the strategic nuclear forces, it might be argued that the conventional forces of MC 70 were sufficient.

8. Thirdly, the reason why the provision of present conventional forces is well below MC 70 force goals is because their strength is dictated by what the nations can afford and not by military logic. Their level is acceptable only because they are backed by nuclear weapons.

9. We list below the present level of forces provided, the requirements under MC 70 and the conventional forces that would be required to achieve parity.

	<u>Present ACE Levels</u> (approximate)	<u>MC 70</u> <u>Goals</u>	<u>Parity</u>
(a) M-Day Divisions	37	55	39
(b) Immediate Reserve Divisions (within 10 days of mobilization)	-	-	40
(c) 1st Echelon Divisions (within 30 days)	151	22	-

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	<u>Present ACE Levels</u> (approximate)	<u>MC 70</u> <u>Goals</u>	<u>Parity</u>
(d) Tactical Combat Aircraft	3,700	4,382	3,000
(e) Tactical Combat Aircraft (within 10 days of mobilization)	-	-	3,000

* Subject to short movement delay.

10. The above MC 70 force goals - already unrealistic - fall some 35 divisions and 1,600 aircraft short of what would be required to achieve parity. Looked at another way, the requirement for parity is at least twice the present land force ACE level, and over one and a half times the present combat aircraft level.

IMPLICATIONS OF ATTEMPTING TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY ADDITIONAL FORCES

Manpower and Finance

11. The failure of NATO as a whole to meet the MC 70 force goals indicates how unrealistic it would be to call for great additional burdens. The claims of military expenditure must be considered in relation to the need to maintain the economic strength of the West. It is no argument to say that as Russia, with a population of some 200 million, supports 80-100 active divisions, the NATO countries with some 400 million should be able to match this. Straightforward comparison takes no account of the differences of ideology, economic systems and particularly living standards between East and West. A largely increased demand on NATO military manpower would have much more serious economic and political effects than would continuation of the nuclear pattern of defence to which Western economy has adapted itself. In this connexion we are advised that there would be no possibility that savings on nuclear weapons would more than marginally offset the great increase in the cost of providing conventional forces on the scale required.

12. As far as the United Kingdom is concerned, assuming her proportion of the total force level remained constant, she would, together with making up her short fall on MC 70 goals, have to provide at least an additional three combat ready 1st Echelon divisions (including the necessary logistics backing) and some 200 additional tactical combat aircraft. Furthermore, many of her existing or planned combat aircraft would be of the wrong type and would have to be replaced. Apart from the financial and economic implications a future conscription would be inevitable.

Deployment

13. In order to maintain adequate conventional readiness against surprise attack in the circumstances being considered a major NATO redeployment would be necessary, bringing forces from rear areas, e.g. Italy, closer to the Curtain. Presuming that the political difficulties could be overcome (e.g. the restrictions imposed by Norway and Denmark on the stationing of foreign troops on their soil in peacetime), vast new infrastructure

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Annex (Concluded)

requirements would have to be faced, giving rise to yet further financial, economic and political implications.

Logistics

14. The implications on the logistic system in Europe require separate examination. It appears, however, that the present system of national responsibility would be likely to break down in war, and therefore would require to be replaced by a NATO system in peacetime.

CONCLUSIONS

15. We conclude that:-

- (a) MC 70 force goals - already unrealistic - fall some 35 divisions and 1,600 tactical combat aircraft short of the forces that would be required by NATO to counter, on a basis of parity, a major Soviet conventional attack in Europe. In terms of land forces alone this is at least twice the present ACE level.
- (b) From the implications outlined in paragraphs 11-14 above the provision of such large increases over present forces would appear to be out of the question, both for both NATO as a whole and for the United Kingdom.

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Appendix 'A' to Annex to
JP (61)37(Final)THE SCALE OF RUSSIAN THREAT

1. The current intelligence study⁴ of the employment of Soviet armed forces on a large scale is written in the context of global war and simultaneous strategic and tactical nuclear attack against the West. It thus does not cover precisely the circumstances postulated for this study. However, the figures given for the size and pattern of existing Soviet regular forces are considered to be realistic and reasonably accurate. In the unlikely event of a decision by the Russians to dispense altogether with tactical nuclear weapons, it is conceivable that increases might be made in the size of their conventional forces, but such increases would be contrary to present estimates of Soviet defence and economic policy.

2. Having regard to announced reductions in the Soviet armed forces it has been appreciated that their ground troops may be reduced to about 1,800,000 by the end of 1961. Assuming that this manpower would be divided between active and cadre divisions it is considered most unlikely that they would embark on war with less than 80 line divisions immediately available and some prospect of up to a further 120 line divisions within 10 days of mobilization. A possible deployment might be:-

East Germany and Poland	22
North West USSR	5
Western USSR	25
South West USSR and Hungary	10
Southern USSR	10
Far East USSR	8
	60

This represents the worst case from the USSR's point of view, and in all probability the Soviet Army would be much larger at the outbreak of war. In addition 19 satellite divisions might be available for external operations.

3. These forces would be sufficient to initiate simultaneous large scale invasion operations into peripheral areas on several fronts, either separately or concurrently, though it is believed that priority would be given to the attack on Western Europe at the expense of other theatres. Based on a Soviet Army of 80 active divisions, and having regard to logistic factors and current aircraft strengths, it is estimated that the probable deployment would be as follows:-

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Appendix 'A' (Concluded)

Theatre	Attack without prior build-up		Reinforcements	
	Divs	Tactical A/C	Divs	Tactical A/C
(a) Western Continental Europe	22	1200	25	1400
(b) Scandinavian Peninsula	2	400	3	as required
(c) Southern Europe and Western Turkey	5	500	5	as required
(d) Eastern Turkey and Iran	10	700	-	as required
	39	2800	33*	

* Note

These divisions would be available for commitment as soon as logistics permit. In addition a further 40 divisions would be available within 10 days of mobilization.

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Appendix 'B' to Annex to
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FACTORS INFLUENCING THE CONVENTIONAL FORCE REQUIREMENT

1. In considering the requirements for a conventional defence of NATO Europe, there are a number of important factors which, though impossible to assess quantitatively, nevertheless must have significant bearing on the relative effectiveness of Soviet and ACE forces.
2. First, as opposed to the Soviet Union's monolithic organization, NATO is an agglomeration of sovereign states, whose armed forces are still far from being integrated.
3. Secondly, there is the advantage which accrues to any aggressor. Although defence confers an advantage classically assessed at about 3 to 1, this is only true in the context of the actual battle area. In strategic terms it is the aggressor who has the advantage, in that he can concentrate for attack at a time and place of his own choosing. This is particularly true for the opening attack of a war, for which the defence can never be completely ready and, which in the context of a Russian attack on the West, might be delivered in several different places on a very long and vulnerable frontier.
4. Thirdly, even in the battle area, the achievement of initial surprise and sustained momentum in follow-up (a type of attack in which Soviet forces are believed to be well trained and equipped and in which Russia is favoured by her high security standards) might well so disorganize and split-up a slow-reacting defence as to paralyse resistance, thereby annulling any pre-existing balance of numbers.
5. Lastly, though perhaps most important of all - and certainly the most difficult to assess in the unreal circumstances being considered - is the influence of the air situation on the course of conventional ground operations. It is axiomatic that, for a conventional land campaign to be successful, a favourable air situation is essential and in the case of ACE this could only be effectively achieved by offensive measures to destroy the enemy's air capability at source. However, the accomplishment of such counter-air tasks without the destructive power of nuclear weapons, together with the conventional need for direct support of the land forces, would undoubtedly call for air forces many times greater than NATO at present has, or is likely to have, at her disposal; and not only greater but of a different type. As the tendency in the West has been towards greater sophistication in aircraft and increasing reliance on nuclear weapons, including missiles, the provision of large conventional air forces would therefore also involve an anachronism - putting the clock back technically in several respects. By contrast, the Soviet Air Force has retained a strong tactical air potential specifically for the support of ground operations.
6. All the above considerations have the effect of conferring relative advantage on the Soviet forces attacking a Western force of similar strength in the circumstances of this study.

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

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RESTRICTED CIRCULATION

MM: 29/61

COPY No. 19

Record of a Meeting between the
Rt. Hon. Harold Watkinson, M.P.,
United Kingdom Minister of
Defence, and M. Messmer, French
Minister of the Armed Forces,
in Paris on Thursday, 13th April,
1961.

PRESENT

U.K. Representatives

The Rt. Hon. Harold Watkinson, MP.,
Minister of Defence.

Sir Anthony Rumbold,
H.M. Minister,
British Embassy,
Paris.

Mr. G. Wheeler,
Under-Secretary,
Ministry of Defence.

Mr. C. Benwell,
Principal Private Secretary
to Minister of Defence.

French Representatives

M. Messmer,
Minister of the
Armed Forces

General Lavaud,
Minister for
Armament.

Lt. General Martin,
Chief of Staff of
Inter Army Staff.

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1. After the main meetings (MM. 27/61 and MM. 28/61) M. MESSMER invited Mr. Watkinson, in restricted session, to enlarge on the possibility which he had touched on at an earlier restricted meeting (MM. 26/61) of some form of nuclear trusteeship.
2. MR. WATKINSON said that he had mentioned it tentatively without consulting his Cabinet colleagues, and therefore without backing or commitment. His train of thought had been that if at some stage the United States and the United Kingdom decided that they must accept that France was a nuclear power in her own right, what then would be the best system for the West? The British Government were opposed to making NATO a strategic nuclear power, though the deterrent must be linked to NATO in some way. But there were many difficult problems associated with the acquisition of a strategic nuclear capability which made it important to find common ground. For instance, in what circumstances would nuclear weapons be used? How would the decision to use them be taken? Was it possible to have a limited nuclear war, or to fire an atomic "shot across the bows"? What about targeting? And technical military control? He was now talking about the main strategic deterrent, not about tactical nuclear weapons, and he would like to know whether the French would regard it as practicable and worth while to work out some form of joint management by the holders of strategic nuclear weapons on behalf of the West as a whole.
3. M. MESSMER said that his reply could at this stage only be a personal one. As he understood it, Mr. Watkinson's suggestion had two aspects. First, there was a military and technical aspect. Countries with a nuclear capability would discuss targets, orders for attack, and so on. This would certainly be useful, but so far the Americans had repeatedly refused to discuss these questions. He took it that Mr. Watkinson's suggestion assumed that, in the circumstances envisaged, the British might be able to persuade the Americans to modify their position. Secondly, there was the political aspect. France was opposed to making NATO a strategic nuclear power and was equally opposed to giving General Norstad a mixed bag of strategic and tactical weapons. He assumed, therefore, that the suggestion was that countries with a nuclear capability would get a mandate to use the deterrent not only in their own name but also on behalf of the other NATO countries. He wondered whether the other NATO Allies were ready for this. The Germans, for example, strongly supported making NATO itself a nuclear power; and the smaller countries could be expected to oppose this aspect of trusteeship because they were so attached to the principle of equality. He thought it would need agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany to override this opposition.
4. MR. WATKINSON said that some reinterpretation of Article V of the Treaty might satisfy the other countries as a link with a nuclear trusteeship. He recognised the difficulties. He had not discussed it with the Americans, and of course his first step would be to raise it with the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary. But was the idea, in M. Messmer's view, altogether impossible?
5. M. MESSMER said that the first part - military and technical

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co-operation - struck him as feasible. He was doubtful about the political part of the scheme.

6. MR. WATKINSON then asked M. Messmer what position France would take up when she became an independent nuclear power? Did she envisage going it alone?

7. M. MESSMER replied that the question had been approached but not yet studied. In principle, France would be prepared to open talks with the United States and the United Kingdom.

8. MR. WATKINSON asked whether the French would accept one-source targeting, for example from Omaha.

9. M. MESSMER said that he realised this would soon be a problem. Probably they would wish to accept co-ordinated targeting.

10. SIR ANTHONY RUMBOLD said that there seemed to be two conflicting fears in Europe: one that the Americans would not use their deterrent in defence of Europe; and the other that they would use it too hastily.

11. M. MESSMER said that a sort of trusteeship was for the smaller countries of the Alliance the only possible solution, because they would never develop nuclear capabilities of their own; and it was in fact the system at present in force. But more and more the European countries, and particularly the Germans, were beginning to fear that the Americans would be unwilling to use the deterrent in their defence.

12. MR. WATKINSON said that some of these questions could certainly be covered in bilateral talks between the French and the British, but that did not settle the problem of how to manage a tripartite deterrent.

13. In conclusion, MR. WATKINSON and M. MESSMER agreed to give the matter further thought, and to consult their senior colleagues.

Ministry of Defence, S.W.1.
18th April, 1961

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

STOREY'S GATE, LONDON, SW1

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MM.26/61.

RESTRICTED CIRCULATION

Copy No. 18

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN
THE RT. HON. HAROLD WATKINSON, M.P.,
UNITED KINGDOM MINISTER OF DEFENCE,
AND M. MESSMER,
FRENCH MINISTER OF THE ARMED FORCES,
IN PARIS ON THURSDAY, 13TH APRIL, 1961.

PRESENT

U.K. Representatives

The Rt. Hon.
Harold Watkinson, M.P.,
Minister of Defence.

Mr. G. Wheeler,
Under Secretary,
Ministry of Defence.

Mr. C. Benwell,
Principal Private
Secretary to
Minister of Defence.

French Representatives

M. Messmer,
Minister of the Armed
Forces.

Lt. General Puget,
Assistant to Chief of
Defence Staff.

Lt. General Martin,
Chief of Staff of inter
Army Staff.

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1. At a preliminary restricted meeting MR. WATKINSON began by giving M. Messmer a resumé of his discussion with M. Debré the previous evening (Mss. 25/61) and said that M. Debré had appeared to welcome the possibility of closer informal links between the two countries on defence matters. If M. Messmer was agreeable, he would raise the question with the Chief of the Defence Staff on his return.

2. M. MESSMER said that he was entirely in favour and that he thought the recent defence reorganisation in his country, with greater centralisation, would facilitate such contacts. He was sure that the close links already established in NATO could with advantage be complemented by bilateral discussions, particularly as the North Atlantic Treaty did not cover Africa and Asia.

3. MR. WATKINSON then repeated the brief account of U.K. defence priorities which he had given M. Debré, and in response to questions, outlined our plans for our independent contribution to the West's strategic deterrent over the next decade - first with the V-bombers and BLUE STEEL and later with SKYBOLT. We were also, he said, developing the TSR.2 for low-level attack and were studying the possibility of low-level missiles. We had no present intention of going for POLARIS submarines, which presented great difficulties of communication and control and were also very expensive. It was not our policy to make NATO a fourth strategic nuclear power and we did not like the HERTER/GATES offer in its original form. But we would not necessarily be opposed to some form of nuclear trusteeship, under which those NATO countries which had nuclear weapons agreed to use them on behalf of the Alliance in accordance with ground rules worked out by NATO. Article V of the Treaty could perhaps be reinterpreted for this purpose.

4. M. MESSMER said that he wished to clear up straight away a misconception which appeared to be common in the United States and was perhaps also held by some in the United Kingdom. French plans for an independent nuclear striking force were in no sense negotiable. Those who imagined that they were a sort of blackmail and would be abandoned in return for concessions by France's Allies were completely mistaken. It had been decided, after difficult debates and careful consideration, that these weapons were essential for the defence of France and there would be no going back on that decision. France was utterly opposed to making NATO a fourth or fifth nuclear power. The reasons which impelled her to create her own "force de frappe" were, he imagined, very similar to Britain's - finance, manpower, and the conviction that the Russians and the smaller NATO countries would attach greater credibility to an independent deterrent in Europe than to one on the other side of the Atlantic. A small deterrent in Europe could be as effective as a very much larger deterrent in America, because the Russians knew that France could not tolerate Russian troops on the Rhine but might suppose that the Americans would accept this, if faced with a "fait accompli", rather than risk the devastation of the United States. He was aware of the danger that a future German administration might well wish to be a member of the nuclear club when the French had their own deterrent; but he was certain that at present the Germans were making no preparations, even covert, to become a nuclear power and was confident that with the help of a nuclear test

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agreement the Germans could be kept out. Certainly France would not help the Germans in.

5. M. MESSMER went on to say that France's acquisition of a kiloton nuclear capacity was imminent; and with the functioning of their isotope separation plant it was also certain that they could eventually develop a megaton capacity, perhaps in three or four years. They planned to have a force of 50 MIRAGE IV aircraft for high altitude nuclear strike; the first aircraft would enter service in 1963 and the force would be complete in 1966. If they were offered nuclear weapons without strings by their Allies, they would in principle be prepared to accept them; but they had no intention of asking for help.

6. Discussion then turned briefly to Mr. Watkinson's recent talks with Mr. McNamara and the new attempt, as recorded in Mr. Watkinson's letter to M. Messmer of 6th April, to reduce duplication between the U.K. and the U.S. in defence research, development and production. It was decided to leave discussion of Anglo-French progress in the same field to the main meetings which were to follow (LHM.27/61 and LHM.28/61).

Ministry of Defence, S.W.1.
18th April, 1961.

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4. In the discussions I specifically mentioned the position of the Germans, and said my fear was that if we accepted France, would we not then encourage Germany to follow very quickly? Messmer's position on this is that he fears such a consequence as much as we do. He believes, as I do, that the Germans at this moment have made no preparations even in secret to acquire a nuclear capacity. He equally, I think, sees the attractions of a test agreement in stopping the Germans once the French have got into the club. I think he is under no illusions that the Americans are likely to welcome his country as a nuclear power, although I think he might hope that we might be willing to help with the Americans over this. There are thus many unresolved issues here, but I thought you might like to have this report.

5. Messmer said that he would be talking over these problems with De Gaulle and Debré in the next few weeks. He said that he would like to have any further thoughts that I might have on our reactions to the military aspects of the French acquisition of nuclear capacity. It will be easy for me to drop these informal discussions, which have committed neither of us, at this point. I have a feeling, however, that if we have to accept the unpleasant fact that the French have got there, and I think we do, this sort of discussion might be the way of finding out the least price we can pay to live with them. Whether it will make the General more amenable in other directions is of course another question which I am not qualified to answer.

6. I asked Messmer whether our abandonment of the nuclear deterrent or "giving it to NATO" would make it possible for the French to give up their own programme. He said that he had faced these problems during their own debates on the Force de Frappe. What we did was our own concern, but as to giving V-Bombers to NATO, this would not make the slightest difference to the French determination to proceed. They were in any case strongly opposed to giving NATO a strategic nuclear capacity.

7. I am sending a copy of this minute to the Foreign Secretary.

14th April, 1961.

Watkinson (M20) → Maxmillan
(exhaust)

4/21/61

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1. THE SITUATION IN LAOS

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2. MR. ACHESON'S CONCEPT OF CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS - UNITED KINGDOM MILITARY IMPLICATIONS

SECRET
UK EYES ONLY

(Previous Reference: C.O.S. (61) 26th Meeting, Minute 5)

J.P. (61) 46 (Final)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a report by the Joint Planning Staff examining the military implications for the United Kingdom of Mr. Acheson's concept of operations.

SIR THOMAS PIKE (Acting Chief of the Defence Staff) said that the report before them was intended to provide comment on the military implications of Mr. Acheson's proposals for inclusion in a paper to be prepared by the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence for the consideration of the Defence Committee in the first week in May. Although the Foreign Ministers at their meeting in Oslo were not expected to discuss the substance of Mr. Acheson's proposals, nor even the United Kingdom memorandum, but rather to confine themselves to consideration of procedure for handling these papers, it would nevertheless be necessary to provide the Foreign Secretary with a brief in case Mr. Dean Rusk should wish to discuss these proposals with him.

In discussion the following points were made:-

- (a) It was not at all clear what motive lay behind Mr. Acheson's proposals, nor why he had stated the need for the ability to hold a conventional attack specifically of 20 divisions, nor why this attack should be held for two to three weeks. The first aim should therefore be to seek further explanation on these points. In this connection, although the paper suggested that the object of the proposals might be to revitalise NATO and share the defence burden more equitably, it should be remembered that Mr. Acheson had held these views three years ago and that they rested on a military case, whose theme was that in some way or other the onus of initiating nuclear warfare should be placed on Russian shoulders.
- (b) The statement in paragraph 6 of the report that the Russians could bring to bear some 40 divisions in Central Europe without mobilisation or at short notice was inaccurate. The Russians could deploy 40 divisions along the NATO periphery and only 20 in Central Europe. Moreover the use of a force of this size by the Russians would indicate an aim much more serious than limited aggression. This paragraph should be amended accordingly.

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Reference: DEF 4/135

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1. THE SITUATION IN LAOS

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2. MR. ACHESON'S CONCEPT OF CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS - UNITED KINGDOM MILITARY IMPLICATIONS

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- (c) Mr. Khrushchev was on record as saying that he would reply to any use of tactical nuclear weapons with megaton retaliation. Nevertheless, the aim behind our use of tactical nuclear weapons should still be to make the Soviet Government realise that it had miscalculated NATO's will to resist and to give their forces time to withdraw before both sides were destroyed in all-out war. The timing of the use of these weapons was all important: the more both sides were committed, the more difficult it would be for either to withdraw, and the more likely it would become that the use of tactical nuclear weapons would lead to escalation. Thus there was considerable danger in a delay of two to three weeks.
- (d) The first sentence of paragraph 13 gave the impression that recourse to nuclear weapons by either side would automatically enable it to avoid defeat. This was not necessarily so but nonetheless, in any protracted battle of the scale envisaged, it was unlikely that either side would accept defeat without first having recourse to these weapons.
- (e) The size of the NATO shield must be determined not only by the requirements listed in paragraph 2 of the Appendix to the report, but also by the need to convince Russia that a limited aggression could not succeed in seizing an objective quickly enough to present the West with a fait accompli before the decision to use nuclear weapons could be taken. An additional sub-paragraph should therefore be added to paragraph 2 to make this point.
- (f) A number of other amendments were agreed in discussion⁶.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (1) Approved the report by the Joint Planning Staff, subject to amendment as agreed in discussion.
- (2) Instructed the Secretary to forward it to the Ministry of Defence as an expression of their views, and
- (3) Invited the Ministry of Defence to take these views into account in drafting the paper for the Defence Committee.

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3. NATO STRATEGY AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

SECRET

(Previous Reference: C.O.S. (51) 25th Meeting, Minute 5)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a Secretary's Minute covering a draft Defence Committee paper on NATO Strategy and Nuclear Weapons.

SIR THOMAS PIKE (Acting Chief of the Defence Staff) said that the paper before them was a draft memorandum for the Minister of Defence to table in the Defence Committee on the 3rd May, 1961, and the present was the Committee's last opportunity to influence its contents. The paper stemmed from the answers produced by the Hattershead Working Party to the United Kingdom questions on NATO Strategy and Nuclear Weapons, and took account of their previously expressed views on those answers.

In discussion the following points were made:-

- (a) The paper before them was not intended for tabling in NATO. It was designed purely as a brief for United Kingdom representatives in the NATO Council and elsewhere in the ensuing months when NATO Strategy was discussed.
- (b) The Committee had not yet had an opportunity of studying the military implications of the answers to the questions set out in Annex A to the draft paper. These implications might have profound repercussions upon our future force contributions to NATO and consequently upon the size and shape of our forces and on our defence policy generally. The Committee could not therefore unreservedly endorse the main principles which the memorandum as a whole sought to establish, and paragraph 6 of the cover note should be reworded so as to make this clear.
- (c) The Joint Planning Staff should press forward their current study of these implications with a view to the Committee considering them at their meeting on 2nd May, 1961.
- (d) Paragraph 3 of the cover note should also stress that an efficient and rapid control system for nuclear weapons was vital to the success of the concept.
- (e) Paragraph 11 of the cover note defined only the political aim of NATO, whereas paragraph 9 of the previous draft had also set out the military aim. This change had been made for the sake of brevity but it would seem preferable to restore it.

✓ COS.451/20/L/61
 * C.O.S. (61) 131
 @ JPS.66/21/H/61
 G. Annex to COS.453/12/L/61

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- (f) The second sentence of paragraph 12 of the cover note might be taken to imply that, by using tactical nuclear weapons, NATO could defeat a large scale Soviet conventional attack. This was not necessarily so, particularly if the enemy retaliated in kind. The best that could be hoped for was that we might avoid defeat ourselves and force a pause.
- (g) Whilst paragraph 16 should make it clear that the use of tactical nuclear weapons would in the first instance have the political and psychological aims of forcing a pause, rather than the purely military aim of destroying the enemy forces, at the same time it was important that the NATO forces on the ground in Europe should believe that they were using their weapons in order to win the battle.
- (h) The second sentence of paragraph 17 took insufficient account of the view which the Committee had previously expressed* on the need to negotiate from a position of strength.
- (j) The words "without making this apparent to the Soviets" should be added to paragraph 17(c).
- (k) They had previously agreed* that the words "or to accept defeat", which still appeared at the end of paragraph 3 of the answer to question 17(f) on page 15 of the draft memorandum, were objectionable and should be omitted; the Committee adhered to this view.

Summing up SIR THOMAS PIKE said that whilst the Ministry of Defence could not undertake to amend the draft Defence Committee paper so as to take account of all the views expressed in discussion, it was important that their views, if not incorporated in the paper, should at least be set out by the Ministry of Defence in their covering note forwarding the draft paper to the Minister.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (1) Invited the Ministry of Defence, in preparing the final draft of the Defence Committee paper, to take account of their views as expressed in discussion and of the proposed amendments which had been circulated.
- (2) Instructed the Joint Planning Staff to take action as at (c) above.

* C.O.S. (C1)131

4. THE SITUATION IN ALGERIA

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CIRCULATED FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF

JP(61)46(Final)
21st April, 1961

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COPY NO. 43

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE
JOINT PLANNING STAFF

MR ACHESON'S CONCEPT OF CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS
Report by the Joint Planning Staff

In accordance with the instructions of the Chief of the Defence Staff, we have examined the military implications of Mr. Acheson's concept of operations.

2. We have consulted the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence and a representative of the Chief Scientific Adviser to the Minister of Defence.

3. Our study, at Annex, answers the question put at paragraph 13 (b)(i) of the Joint Memorandum⁺ by the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence. The questions at 13 (b) (ii) and (iii), which cannot be directly related to the Acheson proposals, are discussed at Appendix.

Recommendation

4. We recommend that, if they approve our report, the Chiefs of Staff should forward it to the Ministry of Defence as an expression of their views to be reflected in the draft Defence Committee paper being prepared by the Ministry of Defence.

(Signed) D.L. POWELL-JONES
E.B. ASHMORE
E.V.M. STRICKLAND
D.G. STAPLETON

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

6 Telegram No. 241 Saving Washington to
Foreign Office
+ COS: 472/17/4/61

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Annex to JP(61)46(Final)

MR. ACHESON'S CONCEPT OF CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

On 5th April, 1961, Mr. Acheson, as adviser to the President of the United States on NATO affairs, made known in a presentation to the Prime Minister the lines on which he had made his report on NATO strategy to the President. A record of this presentation is contained in a telegram^d from Washington.

2. A joint Memorandum^e by the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence has been considered^f by the NATO Policy Committee; this has the ultimate aim of concerting an Anglo/American approach to the Acheson proposals before the Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Oslo on 8th-10th May.

AIM

3. To examine the military implications of Mr. Acheson's concept of operations.

THE ACHESON PROPOSALS

4. The report of the presentation^d, amplified by another telegram^g, contains a number of salient points which, if adopted, would materially affect current NATO strategy, particularly as regards the functions of the shield forces in ACE. The following are, in summary, the points of significance:-

- (a) The nuclear threshold should be raised and conventional forces strengthened so that NATO would be able to hold off for some two to three weeks with conventional forces alone a Soviet aggression mounted by, say, twenty divisions.
- (b) Persistence in the aggression beyond these limits would mean nuclear war.
- (c) The first priority would be the rapid build-up of conventional forces to meet present commitments, including modernization and improved mobility.
- (d) There was no intention of withdrawing either existing nuclear weapons from Europe or the offer of five Polaris submarines.
- (e) SACEUR's bid for MRBM is regarded as far too expensive and a dangerous way of putting fire-power into Europe.
- (f) Use of nuclear weapons under American command in Europe would be authorized if the shield forces were subjected to nuclear attack or to a conventional attack beyond their capacity to contain. There should be strict technical control, with which NATO would be associated, against the risk of unauthorized use. NATO proposals for guide-lines for use by the President should be considered.

- ^d Telegram No. 241, Savary, Washington to Foreign Office
- ^e COS.472/17/4/61
- ^f HDC(61)3rd Mtg.
- ^g Telegram No. 695, Washington to Foreign Office.

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Annex (Continued)

- (g) There should be some provision if possible, although at about the lowest priority, for continued operations in Europe after a strategic nuclear exchange.

Interpretation of the Proposals

5. It will be seen that the presentation was made in broad-terms only and that many of the above points are so imprecise as to permit wide interpretation.

6. With regard to the scale of attack suggested as that which NATO should be capable of containing, it is not clear whether Mr. Acheson assumes that the aggression would be concentrated in the Central Region only, or whether it might be supported by attacks on the flanks. Though the Russians could bring to bear some 40 divisions in Central Europe without mobilization or at short notice, the figure of 20 divisions, which is mentioned, represents the maximum force which they could launch at present in a surprise attack. This force would also represent the basis from which a limited aggression or test probe could be mounted. A greater force would at present indicate a Russian aim much more serious than a limited aggression.

7. The reasoning behind the proposed requirement for such an attack to be held off for 2 or 3 weeks is not apparent. The Acheson proposals appear to envisage a conventional trial of strength of significant duration which, if unsuccessful, would be followed by the tactical use of small yield nuclear weapons. Should this be necessary, the concept accepts the probability but not the inevitability of escalation. We presume the term "hold off" to mean to oppose and contain an attack before a degree of penetration has been achieved which is unacceptable on military or political grounds.

8. Although Mr. Acheson accepts that SACEUR's force requirements for 1966 are larger than NATO countries can afford, it appears that he visualizes approximately MC 70 conventional goals, modernized and with improved mobility; for land forces, this would amount virtually to the 1966 requirements.

9. Lastly, the arguments against providing MRBM to SACEUR are that it would be undesirable and dangerous to have a high concentration of these weapons in the forward areas of Germany; SACEUR's range requirements, however, were stated to be based on the necessity to deploy the weapons in depth.

IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO

10. It would need detailed study by the commanders concerned to assess the size of the NATO forces which would be required, in the different possible circumstances, to hold off a concentrated Soviet attack in Central Europe by some 20 divisions for 2 or 3 weeks. Meanwhile, we take it (see paragraph 3 above) that Mr. Acheson visualizes approximately MC 70 conventional forces, fully subscribed, modernized and with improved mobility. We consider the implications for NATO as a whole, as they will also be applicable, in lesser degree, to the United Kingdom.

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Annex (Continued)

11. The implications for NATO forces in Europe may be summarized as follows:-

- (a) Nations would have to provide in full their MC 70 conventional commitments but with modernized and fully mobile forces. This cannot but entail additional manpower and financial burdens, beyond the resources which most of the nations have been prepared to allot up till the present.
- (b) Forces would have to be maintained at high states of readiness entailing still further manpower and financial requirements.
- (c) Additional conventional air forces would be required, whilst retaining a nuclear capability.
- (d) ACE nuclear capability would need to be rendered invulnerable during the period of conventional operations.
- (e) The shield forces would have to be able to switch rapidly between conventional and nuclear postures.
- (f) Large resources would have to be expended, for all these reasons, in providing the appropriate logistic backing, infrastructure, equipment and communications.

Wider Implications

12. A host of wider implications could flow from a concept which envisaged a war in Europe for as long as three weeks; for example, the credibility and security of the strategic deterrent, the security of sea communications, the unity of NATO and the will of the people of the United States would all come into question during the course of this period.

13. It is difficult to see either side accepting defeat after a major conventional battle of 2-3 weeks without resorting to nuclear weapons. In these circumstances, tensions and commitments would be so great that the risk of escalation would be much more serious than if the initial nuclear weapons had been used much earlier. Furthermore, at this stage, the use of tactical nuclear weapons would have to be on a proportionately greater scale to achieve military effects on the battle. We therefore find it difficult to visualize how a pause could be imposed by the use of tactical nuclear weapons after the failure of a conventional battle on the scale and of the duration envisaged.

14. On the other hand, it may be wrong to explore too deeply the implications of actually fighting such a conventional war. The object of the Acheson proposals may be to reinforce the deterrent effect of NATO shield forces, and it is against this criterion they should perhaps be judged. It is difficult to make this assessment on purely military grounds since it is its influence on the Russian mind which has to be estimated but we are not convinced that the deterrent effect of NATO shield forces would be increased by attempts to raise the nuclear threshold in this way.

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Annex (Continued)

FEASIBILITY OF THE ACHESON PROPOSALS

15. Even if we assumed that NATO countries could provide sufficient forces to hold a concentrated attack of 20 divisions for 2 or 3 weeks without significant loss of territory, it is inconceivable that the Russians would allow such an attack to be held without introducing reinforcements which they had readily available. If the attack were only a probe of Western intentions, it would not have been made on such a scale, and if it were more than a probe it must be directed towards some significant objective. In face of such a clear intention the West could not afford to delay in deciding whether its response should include the use, albeit discriminate, of tactical nuclear weapons; to defer this decision for anything like 2 or 3 weeks could only encourage persistence and extension of the aggression.

16. If, however, we assume that what Mr. Acheson has in mind is the MC 70 conventional forces, these, even fully subscribed, modernized and with increased mobility, would provide no guarantee that they could hold off, for 2 or 3 weeks, a Soviet attack with limited objectives. For example the Russians could concentrate their 20 divisions for a surprise assault at a time and place of their own choosing, or alternatively they could launch two or more separate thrusts simultaneously. On the other hand NATO forces would necessarily be less ready at the place selected by the enemy, uncertain at first of the nature of the attack they were facing (whether nuclear or otherwise), limited in the territory which it would be politically acceptable for them to surrender, and would therefore be faced with a difficult readiness and deployment problem. We believe that they would have to resort very early to nuclear weapons. Perhaps the biggest factor in this is that, committed to a forward strategy, they would be inhibited by their inability to yield ground tactically, because of the effect this would have on the unity of NATO and on the credibility of the deterrent. Therefore, whether the attack were concentrated or not, forces greatly in excess of NATO force goals would be required if a conventional defence for an appreciable time had to be ensured in the forward area.

17. Mr. Acheson implies that the practical limits of conventional forces which NATO countries could be expected to produce - having regard to the planned build-up of German forces, and the reduction of French and perhaps British commitments elsewhere - will not, in his view, exceed for land forces the MC 70 requirements, which have not so far been met. In our view, forces even of this size, would not suffice to meet his concept in full. However, incidental to, if not underlying, the Acheson proposals, there may be an American intention to secure a more equitable sharing of NATO's defence burden.

OUR VIEWS

18. Mr. Acheson has produced a philosophy, a threat and a force requirement; in the form reported to us they appear to be incompatible one with another. The motives for these proposals may well be to revitalize NATO by improving the

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Annex (Concluded)

efficiency of the NATO forces, setting at rest the doubts of the allies, and sharing the defence burden more equitably. The proposals affecting the NATO forces appear to be based on raising the threshold by building up conventional forces and on establishing a control system in which NATO allies could share.

19. We think that this philosophy of raising the threshold by increasing the size of conventional forces is fallacious in the context of improving or preserving the deterrent because this would raise doubts in Russian minds about the Western determination to resort to nuclear weapons and would open up the possibility of conventional operations amounting to limited war in Europe. We consider that the larger the conventional battle we allow, the less we can hope to gain from a discriminate tactical use of nuclear weapons and the more we are in danger of being unable to avoid the process of escalation to all-out war.

20. The basis of a command and control system, which would bring confidence to the allies in the circumstances that might occur in Europe, is a compound of political and military factors. In essence, politically it must satisfy the allies that the USA can neither withdraw her involvement nor be precipitate in the use of nuclear weapons and it must safeguard their own interests. The military requirement is that the system must be adequate to enable the reaction of the enemy to an effective demonstration of our reliance on nuclear weapons to be obtained before circumstances make it essential to launch the strategic nuclear attack.

21. We welcome the American initiative towards revitalizing NATO, by attempting to clarify NATO strategy and to define afresh the purpose of its forces. They at least evoke the issues which, if tackled vigorously by NATO, could lead rapidly to a more realistic foundation for the concept of NATO strategy and for the command, control and provision of its forces. We do not, however, see that Mr. Acheson's present proposals would make war in Europe any less likely. While the time which they might buy might be valuable politically, militarily we see no advantage which would compensate for the additional risks which would be incurred.

CONCLUSIONS

22. We conclude that:-

- (a) From the military point of view we are unable to accept that the strategic concept for NATO as expounded in the Acheson proposals would lead to an improvement in the security of NATO.
- (b) To implement the Acheson proposals in full would require conventional forces, on our understanding, greater than the MC 70 M-Day totals.
- (c) The costs involved for the United Kingdom could not be faced without a complete reappraisal of our defence policy.

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Appendix to Annex to
JP(61)46(Final)

CONVENTIONAL WAR IN EUROPE

1. In assessing the duration of conventional Soviet attack that NATO should aim to hold conventionally, we consider that the shield forces should be capable of resisting and delaying a surprise attack by up to 39 divisions, regardless of their potentiality for build-up, for long enough to enable a decision to use nuclear weapons to be made and implemented. This period would be unlikely to exceed 24 hours in the case of a full-scale attack, while any lesser scale of attack would be capable of being contained conventionally for a longer period.

2. The size of the NATO shield would be determined by the requirements to:-

- (a) Counter intimidation on the borders of the NATO area.
- (b) Identify aggression on whatever scale.
- (c) Deal immediately with infiltration or small-scale conventional aggression without necessarily having recourse to nuclear weapons.
- (d) Be capable of resisting and delaying a larger scale conventional attack, using at least tactical nuclear weapons if the attack were persisted in.

Composition of the conventional elements of the Shield Forces in ACE

3. To assess precisely the size of the forces required to fulfil the roles set out above is a NATO problem which the United Kingdom cannot solve in isolation. There is no doubt, however, that, whatever their size, the shield forces should be more mobile and more flexible than they are at present.

4. On the composition of these forces we would suggest the following as a basis for examination:-

- (a) Reconnaissance Screen. This need only be of sufficient strength to ensure adequate frontier surveillance and quick reaction to, and rapid identification of, any form of aggression.
- (b) Mobile Support Forces. These forces would be composed of battle formations of all arms, with appropriate air support. They would have the tasks of dealing with small conventional aggression and of resisting and delaying a major land invasion conventionally, at least until resort had to be made to nuclear weapons. These forces must be capable of giving immediate support to the reconnaissance screen.

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Appendix (Concluded)

- (c) Mobile Central Reserve. This force should be air transportable and should possess a nuclear capability; it would need tactical air support. Such a force is, in our view, necessary to support operations in areas where normal defence deployment may be thin, e.g. on the flanks.
- (d) Command Structure. A command structure and communications system adapted to suit the role and characteristics of these forces and to match the far more critical requirement for speedy decisions would have to be established.

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GEN.734/1st Meeting

CABINET

AUTHORITY FOR BRITISH COMMANDERS IN
N.A.T.O. TO LAUNCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS

MINUTES of a Meeting held in the Prime
Minister's Room, House of Commons, S.W.1.
on THURSDAY, 27th APRIL, 1961 at 4.35 p.m.

PRESENT:

The Rt. Hon. Harold Macmillan, M.P.,
Prime Minister

The Rt. Hon. Selwyn Lloyd,
Q.C., M.P., Chancellor
of the Exchequer

The Rt. Hon. Harold Watkinson,
M.P., Minister of Defence

The Rt. Hon. Edward Heath,
M.P., Lord Privy Seal

Admiral of the Fleet
The Earl Mountbatten
of Burma, Chief of the
Defence Staff

SECRETARIAT:

Mr. F.A. Bishop
Mr. W. Geraghty
Major-General G.S. Cole

S U B J E C T:

AUTHORITY FOR BRITISH COMMANDERS IN
N.A.T.O. TO LAUNCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS

TOP SECRET

AUTHORITY FOR BRITISH COMMANDERS IN N.A.T.O. TO LAUNCH
NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The Meeting considered a minute to the Prime Minister from the Minister of Defence dated 19th April, 1961 about the issue to British Commanders in N.A.T.O. of instructions regarding authority to open fire or to initiate nuclear operations.

THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE recalled that on the 5th December, 1960 the Defence Committee had discussed his proposal that he should discuss with the three major N.A.T.O. Commanders a draft instruction for the Commanders of British forces in N.A.T.O. which would say that although every effort would be made, if communications permitted, to inform them through British channels of Her Majesty's Government's agreement that they should open fire or launch nuclear weapons, they could nevertheless assume, even without such notification, that an order from their N.A.T.O. major commander to do either should be obeyed.

(D.(60) 12th Meeting, Minute 4). The Defence Committee had felt that it might be desirable, before issuing any such instructions, to seek to make arrangements for authorising the use of nuclear weapons which could be identical in all three N.A.T.O. commands. These studies might well take some time to complete and the Lord Privy Seal had suggested that it was inadvisable that meanwhile British commanders should have no instructions on this important subject. Since President Kennedy had recently confirmed the understandings relating to consultation between the President and the Prime Minister before the use of nuclear weapons was ordered, it might now be acceptable to authorise British commanders under SACEUR to obey his order to use their nuclear weapons. This principle could similarly be applied in the case of SACLANC's command, provided that satisfactory procedures were first established to ensure that Her Majesty's Government had given political authority before British nuclear forces in ACLANT were brought into action; it would be appropriate for this authority to be conveyed through the President of the United States. Since CINCHAN had as yet no nuclear weapons it was unnecessary at present to discuss procedures in his command. It was further proposed to inform commanders that their forces, if attacked, could open fire to defend themselves, but that they should not in any circumstances use their nuclear weapons unless they had received the appropriate authority to do so.

The Minister of Defence therefore proposed that the draft letter of instructions which he had previously submitted to the Defence Committee (D.(60) 58) should now be discussed with SACEUR and SACLANC and, if these exploratory discussions proved satisfactory, issued to British commanders.

In discussion the following points were made -

(a) If British commanders were to be authorised, as proposed, to open fire or to launch nuclear weapons on SACEUR's or SACLANC's authority even though they had received no separate notice from Her Majesty's Government, there seemed little point in adding to their instructions the information they would be notified direct of British authority if circumstances permitted. No commander could be sure that a failure to receive notification through British channels was due simply to communications difficulties.

(b) In the case of SACEUR, authority to launch nuclear weapons would be conveyed by the declaration of R-hour. It was highly probable though not necessarily certain, that the declaration of R-hour would have been preceded by the declaration of the general alert, which could be established only on the authority of governments. It might be advisable to stipulate that the instructions proposed in the draft applied only if the general alert had been given.

(c) Although N.A.T.O. forces as such were not authorised to use nuclear weapons before the declaration of R-hour (requiring the approval of N.A.T.O. governments) it was conceivable that American forces could receive orders direct through American channels to use nuclear weapons without waiting for R-hour.

(d) Since the procedures proposed depended in large measure on the understanding which had been reached with the United States President, it was important to ensure that the authority to British commanders to use nuclear weapons should come direct from SACEUR (or SACLANC) who were in direct touch with the President. We could not accept a situation in which a nuclear weapons commander would be required to obey an order to use nuclear weapons from, for instance, a French or German superior commander, unless he had also received authority to do so from the British Government. The actual means of transmitting authority should be investigated to determine whether British commanders could be assured that their authority did in fact come direct from SACEUR (or SACLANC) himself.

(e) It would be advisable, before issuing instructions to discuss the matter with the United States administration so that they should be aware of the extent to which we relied on the understandings between the Prime Minister and the President in this respect.

The Meeting --,

- (1) Invited the Minister of Defence to confirm that British commanders would receive instructions for the launching of nuclear weapons (in the case of SACEUR the declaration of R-hour) direct from their N.A.T.O. Supreme Commander, and to inform the Prime Minister.
- (2) Subject to (1) above, invited the Minister of Defence to discuss with SACEUR and SACLANC the form in which instructions might be given to British commanders on the circumstances in which they could accept orders to open fire and to initiate nuclear warfare.
- (3) Invited the Foreign Secretary, in consultation with the Minister of Defence after he has completed the discussion in (2) above, to discuss the draft instructions with the United States administration.
- (4) Invited the Minister of Defence to report to the Prime Minister before issuing instructions to British commanders on this subject.

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

28th April, 1961

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COPY NO. 36

G.O.S.(61)138

27TH APRIL, 1961.

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CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

MR. ACHESON'S CONCEPT OF CONVENTIONAL
OPERATIONS

Note by the Secretary

At their meeting on Tuesday, 25th April, 1961, the Chiefs of Staff approved the report at Annex, which:-

- (a) Examines the military implications of Mr. Acheson's concept of operations.
 - (b) Answers two questions* in the joint Memorandum by the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence on the size and duration of conventional Soviet attack which NATO should seek to hold and the size and form of NATO conventional forces required for the purpose.
2. In approving the report the Chiefs of Staff:-
- (a) Instructed the Secretary to forward it to the Ministry of Defence as an expression of their views, and
 - (b) Invited the Ministry of Defence to take these views into account in drafting the paper for the Defence Committee.

(Signed) G.S. COLE

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

27TH APRIL, 1961.

* COS(61)27th Meeting, Minute 2.
* Paragraph 13(b)(ii) and (iii) of
Annex to COS.472/17/4/61.

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ANNEX TO COS(61)138

MR. ACHESON'S CONCEPT OF CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

On 5th April, 1961, Mr. Acheson, as adviser to the President of the United States on NATO affairs, made known in a presentation to the Prime Minister the lines on which he had made his report on NATO strategy to the President. A record of this presentation is contained in a telegram from Washington.

2. A joint Memorandum⁺ by the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence has been considered⁶ by the NATO Policy Committee; this has the ultimate aim of concerting an Anglo/American approach to the Acheson proposals before the Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Oslo on 8th-10th May.

AIM

3. To examine the military implications of Mr. Acheson's concept of operations.

THE ACHESON PROPOSALS

4. The report of the presentation⁶, amplified by another telegram⁶, contains a number of salient points which, if adopted, would materially affect current NATO strategy, particularly as regards the functions of the shield forces in ACE. The following are, in summary, the points of significance:-

- (a) The nuclear threshold should be raised and conventional forces strengthened so that NATO would be able to hold off for some two to three weeks with conventional forces alone a Soviet aggression mounted by, say, twenty divisions.
- (b) Persistence in the aggression beyond these limits would mean nuclear war.
- (c) The first priority would be the rapid build-up of conventional forces to meet present commitments, including modernization and improved mobility.
- (d) There was no intention of withdrawing either existing nuclear weapons from Europe or the offer of five Polaris submarines.
- (e) SACEUR's bid for MRBM is regarded as far too expensive and a dangerous way of putting fire-power into Europe.
- (f) Use of nuclear weapons under American control in Europe would be authorized if the shield forces were subjected to nuclear attack or to a conventional attack beyond their capacity to contain. There should be strict technical control, with which NATO would be associated, against the risk of unauthorized use. NATO proposals for guide-lines for use by the President should be considered.

⁶ Telegram No. 241 Saving, Washington to Foreign Office

⁺ COS.472/17/4/61

⁷ NDC(61)3rd Mtg.

⁸ Telegram No. 695, Washington to Foreign Office.

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- (g) There should be some provision if possible, although at about the lowest priority, for continued operations in Europe after a strategic nuclear exchange.

Interpretation of the Proposals

5. It will be seen that the presentation was made in broad terms only and that many of the above points are so imprecise as to permit wide interpretation.

6. With regard to the scale of attack suggested as that which NATO should be capable of containing, it is not clear whether Mr. Acheson assumes that the aggression would be concentrated in the Central Region only, or whether it might be supported by attacks on the flanks. Though the Russians could bring to bear some 40 divisions along the NATO periphery without mobilization or at short notice, the figure of 20 divisions, which is mentioned, represents the maximum force which they could launch at present in a surprise attack in Central Europe. This force would also represent the basic from which a limited aggression or test probe could be mounted. Even this force would indicate a Russian aim much more serious than a limited aggression.

7. The reasoning behind the proposed requirement for such an attack to be held off for 2 or 3 weeks has not been stated. The Acheson proposals appear to envisage a conventional trial of strength of significant duration which, if unsuccessful, would be followed by the tactical use of small yield nuclear weapons. Should this be necessary, the concept accepts the probability but not the inevitability of escalation. We presume the term "hold off" to mean to oppose and contain an attack before a degree of penetration has been achieved which is unacceptable on military or political grounds.

8. Although Mr. Acheson accepts that SACEUR's force requirements for 1966 are larger than NATO countries can afford, it appears that he visualizes approximately MC 70 conventional goals, modernized and with improved mobility; for land forces, this would amount virtually to the 1966 requirements.

9. Lastly, the arguments against providing MRBM to SACEUR are that it would be undesirable and dangerous to have a high concentration of those weapons in the forward areas of Germany; SACEUR's range requirements, however, were stated to be based on the necessity to deploy the weapons in depth.

IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO

10. It would need detailed study by the commanders concerned to assess the size of the NATO forces which would be required, in the different possible circumstances, to hold off a concentrated Soviet attack in Central Europe by some 20 divisions for 2 or 3 weeks. Meanwhile, we take it (see paragraph 8 above) that Mr. Acheson visualizes approximately MC 70 conventional forces, fully subscribed, modernized and with improved mobility. We consider the implications for NATO as a whole, as they will also be applicable, in lesser degree, to the United Kingdom.

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11. The implications for NATO forces in Europe may be summarized as follows:-

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- (b) Forces would have to be maintained further forward and at high states of readiness entailing still further manpower and financial requirements.
- (c) Additional conventional air forces would be required, whilst retaining a nuclear capability.
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19. We think that this philosophy of raising the threshold by increasing the size of conventional forces is fallacious in the context of improving or preserving the deterrent because this would raise doubts in Russian minds about the Western determination to resort to nuclear weapons and would open up the possibility of conventional operations amounting to limited war in Europe. We consider that the larger the conventional battle we allow, the less we can hope to gain from a discriminate tactical use of nuclear weapons and the more we are in danger of being unable to avoid the process of escalation to all-out war.

20. The basis of a command and control system, which would bring confidence to the allies in the circumstances that might occur in Europe, is a compound of political and military factors. In essence, politically it must satisfy the allies that the USA can neither withdraw her involvement nor be precipitate in the use of nuclear weapons and it must safeguard their own interests. Militarily it must be adequate to enable the reaction of the enemy to be obtained of our reliance on nuclear weapons to withhold conventional attack; and it must be able to do so in the short time that might be available before the situation had so deteriorated that we were forced to launch the strategic nuclear attack.

21. We welcome the American initiative towards revitalizing NATO, by attempting to clarify NATO strategy and to define afresh the purpose of its forces. They at least evoke the issues which, if tackled vigorously by NATO, could lead rapidly to a more realistic foundation for the concept of NATO strategy and for the command, control and provision of its forces. We do not however see that Mr. Acheson's present proposals would make war in Europe any less likely. While the time which they might buy might be valuable politically, militarily we see no advantage which would compensate for the additional risks which would be incurred.

CONCLUSIONS

22. We conclude that:-

- (a) From the military point of view we are unable to accept that the strategic concept for NATO as expounded in the Acheson proposals would lead to an improvement in the security of NATO.
- (b) To implement the Acheson proposals in full would require conventional forces, on our understanding, greater than the MC 70 W-Day totals.
- (c) The costs involved for the United Kingdom could not be faced without a complete reappraisal of our defence policy.

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APPENDIX TO ANNEX TO COS(61)138

CONVENTIONAL WAR IN EUROPE

1. In assessing the duration of conventional Soviet attack that NATO should aim to hold conventionally, we consider that the shield forces should be capable of resisting and delaying a surprise attack by up to 39 divisions, regardless of their potentiality for build-up, for long enough to enable a decision to use nuclear weapons to be made and implemented. This period would be unlikely to exceed 24 hours in the case of a full-scale attack, while any lesser scale of attack would be capable of being contained conventionally for a longer period.

2. The size of the NATO shield would be determined by the requirements to:-

- (a) Counter intimidation on the borders of the NATO area.
- (b) Identify aggression on whatever scale.
- (c) Deal immediately with infiltration or small-scale conventional aggression without necessarily having recourse to nuclear weapons.
- (d) Convince Russia that a limited aggression could not succeed in seizing an objective quickly enough to present the West with a fait accompli before a decision to use nuclear weapons could be made.
- (e) If necessary be capable of resisting and delaying a larger scale conventional attack using at least tactical nuclear weapons if the attack were persisted in.

Composition of the conventional elements of the Shield Forces in ACE

3. To assess precisely the size of the forces required to fulfil the roles set out above is a NATO problem which the United Kingdom cannot solve in isolation. There is no doubt, however, that, whatever their size, the shield forces should be more mobile and more flexible than they are at present.

4. On the composition of these forces we would suggest the following as a basis for examination:-

- (a) Reconnaissance Screen. This need only be of sufficient strength to ensure adequate frontier surveillance and quick reaction to, and rapid identification of, any form of aggression.
- (b) Mobile Support Forces. These forces would be composed of battle formations of all arms, with appropriate air support. They would have the tasks of dealing with small conventional aggression and of resisting and delaying a major land invasion conventionally, at least until resort had to be made to nuclear weapons. These forces must be capable of giving immediate support to the reconnaissance screen.

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- (c) Mobile Central Reserve. This force should be air transportable and should possess a nuclear capability; it would need tactical air support. Such a force is, in our view, necessary to support operations in areas where normal defence deployment may be thin, e.g. on the flanks.
- (d) Command Structure. A command structure and communications system adapted to suit the role and characteristics of these forces and to match the far more critical requirement for speedy decisions would have to be established.

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Appendix to Annex I to
JP(61)48(Final)

SUMMARY OF UNITED KINGDOM VIEWS
ON NATO STRATEGY

Major Principles

1. Stage A. (In the period after it had been determined that aggression could not be countered by conventional means alone and before all-out nuclear war had begun, i.e. before the launching of the strategic nuclear forces).

- (a) The conventional shield forces must be capable of dealing with any minor probe or skirmish; they would not be capable of defeating a large-scale conventional attack without resort to nuclear weapons. However, they must be capable of resisting and delaying such an attack long enough to enable the decision to resort to nuclear weapons to be taken as soon as it became clear that it would not be possible to halt the attack by conventional means and before vital interests were in grave risk of loss.
- (b) It need not be assumed that any use of nuclear weapons must inevitably lead to all-out nuclear war, but it would be unwise to count on this.

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Appendix to Annex I (Continued)

- (c) Militarily, it is clearly undesirable that nuclear fire should necessarily be restricted to battlefield targets on NATO territory. It is a political question whether the engagement of obviously tactical targets in advance of NATO territory would carry any appreciably higher risk of escalation.
 - (d) Preliminary warning rounds (i.e. "shot across the bows") should not be fired.
 - (e) The purpose of using nuclear weapons selectively in Stage A would be to persuade the enemy at least to desist from aggression and negotiate. This purpose must condition the military use of those weapons.
 - (f) There is no need to provide nuclear weapons for any protracted nuclear exchange; the period would be days rather than weeks.
 - (g) Although missiles are unlikely to be suitable for use in this stage, because of their long range and consequent low accuracy and high yield, nevertheless some provision of them will need to be made for deterrent purposes.
2. Stage B. (In conjunction with the launching of the strategic nuclear forces).
- (a) The role of the shield forces, at this stage, would be of secondary importance and would depend on the circumstances at the time.
 - (b) The shield forces would not need to be provided with any nuclear weapons for this stage additional to those provided for Stage A.

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Appendix to Annex I (Concluded)

3. Stage C. (For continuing any operations there might be after the strategic nuclear exchange).

(a) Any operations in Europe after the strategic nuclear exchange could be continued only by units and groups of individuals without coherent directions from any central political authority.

(b) There is no need to make specific provision of nuclear weapons for use at this stage.

4. The circumstances envisaged above all relate to the possible use of nuclear weapons. However, the prime needs for deterrence, and the undesirability of attempting to force a pause from other than a position of strength, demand that the shield forces be sufficiently strong in tactical nuclear weapons. These must include nuclear strike aircraft, with their manifest flexibility, and missiles, together with an effective system of surveillance and control.

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national capacity, but rather to make a contribution as a Great Power to the Western deterrent as a whole. This is increasingly the British view of their nuclear capacity.

15. On this basis the three nuclear Powers of the West might enter into an agreement for consultation before nuclear weapons are used and for joint arrangements about their use in case of need. These arrangements, in which all three would join on equal terms, would ensure that their joint nuclear strength would be directed towards supporting the Western Alliance as a whole. In that event the United States and Britain would be prepared to consider what help they could give to enable France to develop this potential.

TRIPARTITISM

16. The unity of the Western world will not be achieved unless a lead is given by the great Powers. France has her natural place as one of these. Regional alliances and groupings are required to knit together countries which have common interests in various areas of the world; but these will not work harmoniously together in pursuit of our common world purpose unless they are guided and inspired by the leading countries of the West.

17. The Governments of the United States and Britain recognise that, for this purpose, there is need of a more regular system of contact and consultation between the three Powers whose interests are not confined to any single

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1. As France is determined to acquire a nuclear capacity it is preferable that this should be developed, not as an independent national force, but as a contribution to a joint Western deterrent held in trust on behalf of the free world as a whole.

2. This joint basis could be achieved if:-

(a) arrangements which have already been accepted by the United States and United Kingdom Governments for applying their strategic nuclear forces to the support of the Western Alliance as a whole could be developed and extended to include France. In such an arrangement each of the three Governments might undertake:-

(i) to agree that they would not use their strategic nuclear forces except after consultation with the other two Governments;

(ii) to participate in tripartite arrangements for the use of these forces, including joint arrangements for the selection and allocation of targets.

(b) the French, like the British, committed to NATO and placed under the operational

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control of SACEUR any tactical nuclear weapons developed for use by French forces in NATO.

3. The United Kingdom would have no objection to publication of these agreements.

4. If arrangements were concluded on the general lines contemplated in paragraph 2 above, the United States might be willing to give France such assistance in developing her nuclear capacity, whether by provision of technical information and "know how" or by the provision of warhead as would make it unnecessary for France to continue an independent programme of nuclear tests. The United Kingdom would be willing to co-operate in this, if desired.

5. The United Kingdom would also favour discussions with France on the production of means of delivery of nuclear weapons.

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British & German Defence
Staffs*Appendix to Annex I to
JP(61)48(Final)*25 Apr 1961*SUMMARY OF UNITED KINGDOM VIEWS
ON NATO STRATEGYMajor Principles

1. Stage A. (In the period after it had been determined that aggression could not be countered by conventional means alone and before all-out nuclear war had begun, i.e. before the launching of the strategic nuclear forces).

- (a) The conventional shield forces must be capable of dealing with any minor probe or skirmish; they would not be capable of defeating a large-scale conventional attack without resort to nuclear weapons. However, they must be capable of resisting and delaying such an attack long enough to enable the decision to resort to nuclear weapons to be taken as soon as it became clear that it would not be possible to halt the attack by conventional means and before vital interests were in grave risk of loss.
- (b) It need not be assumed that any use of nuclear weapons must inevitably lead to all-out nuclear war, but it would be unwise to count on this.

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- (c) Militarily, it is clearly undesirable that nuclear fire should necessarily be restricted to battlefield targets on NATO territory. It is a political question whether the engagement of obviously tactical targets in advance of NATO territory would carry any appreciably higher risk of escalation.
 - (d) Preliminary warning rounds (i.e. "shot across the bows") should not be fired.
 - (e) The purpose of using nuclear weapons selectively in Stage A would be to persuade the enemy at least to desist from aggression and negotiate. This purpose must condition the military use of these weapons.
 - (f) There is no need to provide nuclear weapons for any protracted nuclear exchange; the period would be days rather than weeks.
 - (g) Although missiles are unlikely to be suitable for use in this stage, because of their long range and consequent low accuracy and high yield, nevertheless some provision of them will need to be made for deterrent purposes.
2. Stage B. (In conjunction with the launching of the strategic nuclear forces).

- (a) The role of the shield forces, at this stage, would be of secondary importance and would depend on the circumstances at the time.
- (b) The shield forces would not need to be provided with any nuclear weapons for this stage additional to those provided for Stage A.

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UK EYES ONLYAppendix to Annex I (Concluded)

3. Stage C. (For continuing any operations there might be after the strategic nuclear exchange).

(a) Any operations in Europe after the strategic nuclear exchange could be continued only by units and groups of individuals without coherent directions from any central political authority.

(b) There is no need to make specific provision of nuclear weapons for use at this stage.

4. The circumstances envisaged above all relate to the possible use of nuclear weapons. However, the prime needs for deterrence, and the undesirability of attempting to force a pause from other than a position of strength, demand that the shield forces be sufficiently strong in tactical nuclear weapons. These must include nuclear strike aircraft, with their manifest flexibility, and missiles, together with an effective system of surveillance and control.

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Annex to JP(61)Note 11

NATO STRATEGY AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS
MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE HOTTERSHEAD REPORT

INTRODUCTION

1. A United Kingdom questionnaire on NATO Strategy and Nuclear Weapons was submitted to the NATO Council in January, 1961, and draft answers to the questions in it have been produced in the Hottershead Report. We have already commented broadly on the philosophy these draft answers outline, subject to further study of their military implications.

AIM

2. To examine, in broad terms, the military implications of accepting the principles contained in the draft answers in relation to force requirements for NATO as a whole.

THE HOTTERSHEAD REPORT

3. We interpret the essence of the Hottershead concept as follows.

4. Deterrence is achieved by maintaining in the mind of the enemy the conviction of the West's:-

- (a) Capability of nuclear retaliation.
- (b) Determination to do so if necessary.
- (c) Cohesion in its alliance.

5. As long as the strategic nuclear forces of the United States and the United Kingdom remain effective, there is little danger of the Soviet Union resorting to all-out war or deliberately pursuing aims which would make all-out war probable.

6. However, in a period of nuclear equipoise, the Soviet Government might assume that these countries would not risk destruction in all-out war in order to defeat a minor aggression. For deterrence in Europe, NATO forces must therefore be deployed, organized, equipped and controlled in such a way that the Soviets could never be certain that they could not, by an aggression, unleash a major war and thereby have to pay an unacceptable price.

7. As long as this manifest capability is maintained, hostilities are unlikely to break out except in the following circumstances:-

- (a) By accident.
- (b) By miscalculation of NATO's determination (we consider that this includes a test probe).

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7 COS.402/21/3/61
8 COS.410/28/3/61
9 COS(61)131

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8. NATO forces must be able to deal with both these eventualities. Conventional opposition should be enough to identify an accident. It may also suffice to identify and defeat a miscalculation in the form of a minor probe. But, if it could not, NATO forces should be able to use nuclear weapons very quickly. This use would be against military targets, but discriminate and primarily for the purpose of making the Soviet Government realize their miscalculation about NATO's determination to use nuclear weapons in its defence. The conventional forces would still have to be strong enough to resist and delay Soviet aggression, supported by nuclear weapons used only in this way, long enough for the Soviet Government, warned of NATO's determination, to have the opportunity to withdraw before NATO was forced to resort to the unrestricted use of nuclear weapons.

9. As the outcome of all-out war would be determined by strategic nuclear forces, it is not necessary for NATO shield forces to be equipped specifically to continue operations during or after the strategic nuclear exchange.

10. The core of the concept, so far as the military implications are concerned, is to rely on deterrence; and within that to attempt to exclude the possibility of an accident or miscalculation leading to all-out war by using tactical nuclear weapons discriminately to impose a pause.

EFFECT ON NATO STRATEGY

11. Although the NATO Strategic Concept is capable of wide interpretation, in order to implement the Mottershead Concept it would be necessary to modify existing NATO strategy to the extent that:-

- (a) The immediate response to aggression will no longer be instant resort to all-out war.
- (b) Provision would have to be made for a NATO response to scales of aggression larger than that of a local hostile action without initiating all-out nuclear war, but including the discriminate use of tactical nuclear weapons if necessary.
- (c) The concept of a shield force which is able, after an all-out strategic nuclear exchange, to maintain territorial integrity and sustain operations until the will and ability of the enemy to pursue global war is destroyed, is abandoned.

BASIS FOR ASSESSING NATO FORCE REQUIREMENTS

Requirements for Deterrence

12. We consider that in the context of the general deterrent the allied forces in Europe - and for that matter in the Atlantic - are complementary and not alternative to the strategic nuclear forces. In this context we see no substitute

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for forces equipped, trained and deployed as though to fight from the outset with tactical nuclear weapons. We reject that these forces should be so small as to constitute only a screen, the breaking of which will lead to a rapid loss of territorial integrity and the inevitable use of strategic nuclear forces as the only means for reply. We also reject the "threshold" argument for increasing the size of conventional forces as being fallacious in so far as it would be an encouragement to conventional adventures and would weaken the impression of the Western will to use nuclear weapons. The size and composition of NATO forces must be finally resolved by judgement of their effect on the Russians and it follows that these forces should possess a reasonable balance of conventional and nuclear weapons.

13. Assuming that these premises for the primary role and therefore for the basic structure of the NATO forces are correct, we examine below what, if any, additional capacity it is necessary to incorporate in them to exclude all-out war by accident or miscalculation.

Requirements for Forcing a Pause

14. The first requirement is to identify the nature of the incident. For this, surveillance, prompt contact and opposition by conventional forces are essential.

15. The size of the incident could vary within wide limits. The accident is no longer a danger when identified as such. In the event of miscalculation, its scale may exceed the capability of our available conventional forces to delay for the period required to impose an effective pause. In this case a concept - such as SACHER now holds - of relying on the tactical use of nuclear weapons for military purposes is required. This carries high risks of escalation, though it means immense reinforcement of the nuclear deterrent. Whatever the size of our conventional forces the Russians could match them in the miscalculation, which is a political as opposed to a military one. We will therefore be confined in our attempt to deal with a miscalculation to situations in which the size of the aggression can be held by our forces deployed in the deterrent role for the period of a pause which the Mottershead concept would require.

16. The military criterion for forcing an effective pause in terms of the Mottershead Concept must therefore be determined by the time that must elapse between the military appreciation that conventional forces alone cannot halt the enemy, and verification of the enemy's intention after the explosion of the first nuclear weapon.

17. Until this time has been determined, no calculation of the duration of conventional operations (and therefore of force requirements) can be made. We make assumptions below for this time factor and on these assumptions we examine the implications on force levels.

Time Factor

18. The elements of this most important time factor are as follows:-

(a) There may be no warning.

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- (b) The process of identification may be as short as a few minutes but would not extend to more than a few hours.
- (c) Depending on the scale of attack identified, the Commander primarily concerned would need yet further time to assess whether or for how long he could hold the attack by conventional means alone.
- (d) A request by the Commander to use nuclear weapons discriminately and his choice of targets would be reviewed by SACEUR and, if agreed, forwarded to governments for political authority. This process might well be completed very quickly.
- (e) The time taken to obtain North Atlantic Council and, through them, government agreement would be conditioned, among other things, by the need for:-
 - (i) Consultation.
 - (ii) Assurance of the safety of their nuclear forces.
 - (iii) Political estimates of the effect of nuclear explosions on the targets proposed by SACEUR, followed by a selection of those to be engaged in the first nuclear strike.
- (f) Once obtained, the authority could be conveyed and the weapons fired within about an hour.
- (g) Once the weapons are fired, the reaction of the enemy must be obtained and interpreted in terms of his further intentions.

19. The process from (a) to (d) above could, we estimate, be completed within 24 hours, this time varying inversely with the size of the attack. A precise estimate should be obtained from SACEUR. The factors in (e) and (g) above are, however, imponderable at present. We discuss them below.

20. The time required for the process of Western political decision cannot, for military reasons, be left imponderable. The time element must be finite because:-

- (a) The Commander's appreciation in requiring the use of tactical nuclear weapons will set a time after which these weapons will cease to be militarily effective.
- (b) Without it, one element of the calculation to determine the size of the conventional forces required to oppose the initial aggression will be absent.

21. If we assume the period of 24 hours for the process of Governmental decision defined in paragraph 17(c) above, this would entail providing conventional forces capable of opposing an aggression for 48 hours.

22. When considering the time to be allowed for Russian reaction the only practicable approach would appear to be to establish an arbitrary limit beyond which we are not prepared to delay a

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decision if the aggression continued. If it does not, no problem arises. If it does, short of the initiation of global war by the Russians (and we assume that we will continue to maintain a sufficient margin in our strategic nuclear strike capability to allow us to accept a reduced efficiency indefinitely), the time we can afford to wait for a different Russian reaction is determined by the latitude which we are prepared to allow them. This will vary over the NATO front and with the extent of enemy air action. It would seem, however, that the point at which a decision to resort to a strategic nuclear response would be made would have to be established in advance. This could be in terms of geography, time or acceptable damage.

The Control System

23. Our assessment of the time factor has assumed a physical control and command system of unquestionable speed and reliability. This is the vital prerequisite to any refinement of NATO Strategy to avoid massive retaliation from the outset.

APPLICATION TO LAND AND AIR FORCES

24. As stated before it is necessary for NATO shield forces in Europe to be composed and deployed to lend conviction to the general deterrent policy. They would at the same time have to be ready for operations on the much smaller scale discussed for conventional operations. This is a dilemma in that they would have to be able to fight conventionally from a nuclear posture.

Land Forces

25. To give effect to this concept land forces would have to be ready to meet either conventional or nuclear attack and to switch between conventional and nuclear operations while under attack. This would give rise to problems of deployment and equipment; the shape and character of the forces might well have to be changed in the way we have already discussed. Since terrain is a prime factor, a full analysis can only be made by SACEUR for NATO forces generally and by the C-in-C for BAOR.

26. Though the present locations of the various components of the NATO forces are dictated largely by administrative considerations, its planned tactical deployment is based on fighting a nuclear battle. As part of the deterrent this must be maintained. However, the process now in train to make them more mobile would need to be accelerated and they would require more conventional fire support. SACEUR's detailed estimates of the forces he would require under these conditions to resist and delay conventionally for 48 hours would not, in our opinion, differ greatly from those on which he should now be able to count.

Air Forces

27. The first problem is whether or not air forces should be used conventionally at all, if aggression occurs without enemy air support. In these circumstances, the use of allied air forces, particularly on an extensive scale, might turn an accident into something much worse. But whether or not the aggression was accompanied by air support, a requirement for air reconnaissance would exist to help determine the nature of the aggression. It may be necessary to extend reconnaissance

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beyond allied territory to obtain this information and, in the face of enemy air defences over their own territories, to fight for it. If the aggression was accompanied by air support, allied air forces would be required to fight conventionally in support of land operations for approximately 48 hours. This raises three problems:-

- (a) How is nuclear readiness to be maintained during this period?
- (b) Are there enough aircraft to achieve this and provide sufficient conventional air support?
- (c) How do we preserve the essential nuclear delivery forces in the face of conventional air attack?

28. At present the role of NATO air forces is to provide a nuclear capability in the context of deterrence. The reconnaissance, fighter and fighter-bomber aircraft of these forces could undertake the conventional task but would need suitable training and weapons to make them effective in this role. The extent to which other types were required or could be adapted would need to be the subject of study by SACEUR.

Nuclear Weapons for the Shield Forces

29. The requirement for nuclear weapons for the shield forces will range from missiles to replace a proportion of SACEUR's vulnerable manned aircraft to weapons capable of discriminate use on the battlefield. We consider that the type of missile required may have to be determined at least as much by the need for quick response, accuracy and flexibility as by yield or range consideration. The choice of weapon system must depend on the task and no weapon system should be arbitrarily excluded at this stage. The numbers and types of weapons actually required must be the subject of detailed study which will take into account the problem of deterrence and the operational needs indicated above.

Logistic Support

30. The logistic backing required to support this concept for the shield forces could be much lower than the present 90 days required by NATO although it would have to be calculated on a different basis. Some reduction in the size of the repair organization and in certain types of infrastructure should also be possible. We see the need, however, for units and formations to be more self-contained logistically than at present and for improved mobility and flexibility in the supply system, the basis of which must take into account a limited conventional battle.

COST

31. A detailed forecast of the cost to the United Kingdom cannot be made at this stage. Should however the Mottershead concept be adopted, no great economies can be looked for in any field - other than that of logistics - compared with our present expenditure. Depending on further study, this is likely to be more than offset by the extra cost of different types of aircraft, weapons and equipment to meet the requirements of the conventional battle.

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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ALLIANCE

32. The implications outlined above have been assessed on a purely military basis. We believe, however, that this complex problem cannot be solved solely on these grounds and must have regard for the morale of NATO forces, the confidence of our allies - in both military and political fields - and the continued belief of the Russians in our resolution. These factors suggest that, although it is militarily correct to rate the land battle in Europe during and after the strategic nuclear exchange as of secondary importance, it might be psychologically wrong to make no additional military provision for it or to say that we should not attempt to defend the territory of our allies to the best of our joint abilities, even after a strategic exchange. To do less than this might well appear to show a lack of determination, which could only weaken the deterrent, the most important factor in NATO strategy.

CONCLUSIONS

33. We conclude that the Mottershead concept is essentially compatible with SACEUR's present strategic guidance. Subject to its practicability being established by further study in NATO, it offers a good prospect of allowing us a stage intermediate between conventional resistance and full military use of nuclear weapons, which will demonstrate our determination in nuclear terms without greatly increasing the risk of escalation. It should not alter the need for NATO force requirements to be determined primarily by the deterrent role. It will be limited in its application to the conventional capability that these forces can have against the Russian effort encountered.

34. Any attempt to add conventional strength to NATO specifically to increase the period of possible conventional operations introduces disadvantages in the role, equipment and costs of land and particularly air forces, would reduce the credibility of the deterrent and would add nothing to the benefits offered by the Mottershead Concept.

35. We finally conclude that, subject to these qualifications, the Mottershead Concept is worth pursuing within NATO. It should be made perfectly clear that it is not incompatible with SACEUR's basic strategic guidance and, we believe, should fall within his present force levels.

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C A B I N E T

DEFENCE COMMITTEE

U.K. VIEWS ON N.A.T.O. STRATEGY AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Memorandum by the Minister of Defence

1. At the Ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council on 16th December, 1960, the Foreign Secretary said, "... the time has come when there should be a comprehensive study of the purposes, control and deployment of the nuclear armoury in support of NATO with the object of making the deterrent as effective as possible without waste of resources".

2. On 18th January, 1961, the Defence Committee approved a memorandum on NATO Strategy and Nuclear Weapons (D(61)2) for circulation to the North Atlantic Council. The memorandum set out a series of questions which we proposed should be examined for the purpose stated by the Foreign Secretary.

3. An interdepartmental Working Party has since prepared answers to the questions in paragraphs 17, 18, 19 and 21 of the British memorandum. These answers are set out in Annex A to this memorandum. The answers to the various questions cover some of the ground more than once and, in the following paragraphs, I, therefore, set out the arguments and conclusions therein.

Background

4. The British memorandum to the NATO Council pointed out the risk that, when each side could devastate the other ("nuclear equipoise"), the deterrent might cease to be credible unless we could devise a strategy which would provide for whatever degree of force, not excluding nuclear weapons, might be required to induce an aggressor to abandon his aggression while minimising the risk of precipitating all-out nuclear war.

5. The memorandum assumed that there was no question about the need for forces which could devastate the U.S.S.R. and that the existing strategic nuclear forces would continue to be available for this purpose. The questions in the memorandum, therefore, relate to nuclear weapons for tactical purposes.

6. The primary purpose of all nuclear weapons was stated to be to deter a potential aggressor from using force or the threat of force in support of his aims. But because the weapons would deter him only if he considered that there was an unacceptable risk that they could and would be used against him to whatever extent was necessary to induce him to abandon his attack the questions were principally concerned with the way in which nuclear weapons might be used.

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7. The memorandum considers three stages at which nuclear weapons might be used for tactical purposes:-

Stage A. In the period after it had been determined that aggression could not be countered by conventional means alone and before all-out nuclear war had begun (i.e. before the launching of strategic nuclear forces).

Stage B. In conjunction with the launching of the strategic nuclear forces.

Stage C. For continuing any battle there might be after the strategic nuclear forces had been launched.

The Answers to the Questions

8. The answers to the questions at Annex A are in broad and general terms. When the main principles are established, more detailed studies will be required on the control, deployment, numbers and types of the nuclear weapons to be provided. A list of subjects for such further study is at Annex B.

THE AIMS OF N.A.T.O. AND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

9. The Soviets seek to avoid all-out war and if they engaged in limited aggression their reaction to any Western response is still likely to be guided by that aim.

10. Thus, a deliberate global war starting between NATO and Soviet Russia is extremely unlikely so long as NATO retains substantially its present cohesion and strength. Less unlikely possibilities are:-

- (a) A Soviet probe to test NATO's determination to resist, if necessary with nuclear weapons.
- (b) Hostilities arising from miscalculation or accident.

11. In either case, the political aim of NATO would be to persuade the Soviet Government to withdraw its forces from NATO territory with the minimum of damage to NATO. The military aim in support of the political aim would be to resist and delay the aggression in such a way as to minimise the risks of escalation to all-out war and long enough to enable the Soviet Government, realising its miscalculation, to withdraw.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES OF NATO

12. The conventional forces of NATO must be capable of dealing with any minor probe or accidental incursion. They would not be capable of defeating a large-scale Soviet conventional attack without resort to nuclear weapons but must be capable of containing such an attack long enough to enable the decision to resort to nuclear weapons to be taken as soon as it became clear that it would not be possible to halt the attack by conventional forces and before vital interests were in grave risk of loss. The possible consequences of resorting to nuclear weapons are referred to below.

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STAGE A

13. The broad objectives to be sought in this period are:

- (a) To convince the Soviet Government that NATO would not shrink from the use of nuclear weapons to whatever extent was necessary to defend its interests.
- (b) To provide a period of time before resort to all-out war in which the Soviet Government would realise that it had miscalculated the determination of NATO to resist, and would decide with the aid of whatever diplomatic and other pressures could be brought to bear to withdraw rather than risk all-out nuclear war.

Escalation

14. It need not be assumed that any use of nuclear weapons must inevitably lead to all-out nuclear war. The likelihood of escalation would depend largely on the circumstances in which hostilities broke out. Escalation would be highly probable if there were anything more than the most limited nuclear exchange. Thus, any use of tactical nuclear weapons must be expected to lead rapidly either to a conclusion of operations or to escalation to all-out nuclear war.

15. The best hope of reducing the risk of escalation would be to confine nuclear weapons to battlefield targets on NATO territory in restricted numbers, yield and type of burst.

Numbers, Types, Deployment and Control of Nuclear Weapons for the Shield Forces

16. Delay in deciding to resort to nuclear weapons would not only increase the risk of escalation but might reduce the military and political effectiveness of their use. In order to achieve the objectives in paragraph 15, nuclear weapons would be used in the first instance under strict limitations of numbers, target, yield and type of burst and, although they would be directed against military targets, they would be intended at this stage primarily to influence the Soviet Government rather than to achieve strictly military aims. An efficient and rapid control system is essential to the success of the concept.

17. It is of over-riding importance for the West to maintain, in Soviet eyes, the credibility of the deterrent to all forms of aggression. For their part in this deterrent, NATO shield forces should be equipped with nuclear weapons of such types and on such a scale that, while the functions of the strategic nuclear forces were not duplicated, the Soviet Government would be convinced that any aggression would be met by the necessary degree of force, culminating, if necessary, in all-out war. It was also necessary that NATO should be able to negotiate from a position of strength. Subject to this, the other considerations are:-

- (a) The operational needs to enable conventional Soviet aggression to be contained until either negotiations can be opened or the decision taken to resort to all-out war.

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- (b) The maximum physiological effects of the use of nuclear weapons that would be politically acceptable in any particular area.
 - (c) The need to minimise the risk of escalation, without making this apparent to the Soviet Government.
18. Preliminary warning rounds should not be fired.
19. There is no need to provide nuclear weapons for any protracted nuclear exchange: the period would be days rather than weeks.

STAGE B

20. The launching of strategic nuclear forces is the start of all-out nuclear war and the outcome would be determined by those forces. The role of the NATO shield forces at this stage would be of quite secondary importance and would depend on the circumstances at the time. The shield forces would not need to be provided with any nuclear weapons for this stage additional to those provided for Stage A.

STAGE C

21. Any fighting in Europe after the strategic nuclear exchange could be continued only by units and groups of individuals without coherent direction from any central political authority. In the absence of a home base, there could be no sustained operations. There is no need to make specific provision of nuclear weapons for use at this stage.

POLITICAL CONTROL

22. The objectives of political control (which may conflict) should be:-
- (a) to maintain the credibility of the deterrent;
 - (b) to satisfy the European members of NATO that they have some real control over the use of nuclear weapons;
 - (c) to convince the European members that the U.S.A. is fully committed to NATO;
 - (d) to reassure members of NATO that no member will act irresponsibly or without consultation;
 - (e) to avoid any impression by the Russians that the weapons might be used aggressively or not at all.
23. In the case of an overwhelming attack on Western Europe, the problem of political control over nuclear weapons would be academic. The question only arises over a limited attack which could not be contained by conventional means.

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24. To preserve credibility, a sufficient tactical nuclear armory must remain effectively under the control of the U.S.A. Subject to this, there would be no military objection to part of the tactical nuclear armory being under the joint political control of a number of NATO members, thus giving NATO governments a collective say in authorising the use of part of the nuclear armory. It should be possible to present such an arrangement so that it would appear fairly innocuous to our non-NATO allies and to most, though not all, uncommitted countries. The element of control which Germany would gain over nuclear weapons would be a difficulty. The Russians would not feel obliged to follow the NATO lead and their reaction would be what Mr. Krushchev wanted it to be at the time.

25. Greater knowledge of the distribution of nuclear stockpiles and the introduction of new weapons would be welcome to European members, especially if the arrangements enabled other NATO governments to prevent the Americans from withdrawing some proportion of their nuclear arms from Europe. These arrangements by themselves would not affect the credibility of the deterrent and any international repercussions would be negligible.

RECOMMENDATION

26. It seems clear that the American proposals on NATO strategy (referred to in D(64)..... to be circulated) will now take the leading place in the consideration of this subject by the NATO Council. The U.K. memorandum has already played an important part in focusing and perhaps guiding thought on this matter but it now seems unlikely that we shall be required to table formal replies to the questions contained in it. It has not yet been possible to consider the full military implications of the principles set out in this memorandum but this study is in hand. Until it has been completed, I do not wish to ask my colleagues to commit themselves to the principles set out in the memorandum. All I am seeking approval for at present is that the general arguments and principles therein may be used as a brief by our representatives in the North Atlantic Council and elsewhere when these matters are discussed, on the understanding that these discussions imply no commitment.

H.W.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.
 28th April, 1961.

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ANNEX 'A' to D(61)23

STAGE A

Question 17(a)

Q. At what stage and by what means would NATO decide that Soviet aggression could not be countered by conventional means alone?

A.1. If any Soviet aggression occurred, the NATO political aim would be to induce the Soviet Government to withdraw its forces from NATO territory with the minimum of damage to NATO lives and property. The immediate military task in support of this aim would be to seek to halt the aggression. The decision to release nuclear weapons would be a political one.

2. If the Soviet Government were to embark on all-out war it would be clear from the outset that they could only be countered by nuclear weapons. In other cases of aggression it might not be clear whether nuclear weapons must be used, for example, if the aggression was the result of an accident or no more than a test of NATO's will to resist. In such a case the role of the NATO shield forces would be, in the first place, to identify the intentions behind the aggression by opposing it with sufficient force, to contain the attack. The Soviet reaction to NATO opposition would be a test and perhaps the only test of their ultimate intentions, and on this the decision whether to use nuclear weapons would in part be based.

3. It would, however, be dangerous to base the decision to release nuclear weapons solely on an assessment of Soviet intentions. It would have to depend also on the assessment of the consequences of not using them and of the difficult choices that would confront NATO thereafter. The decision must be guided by an appreciation of the military situation, taking into account that any gain by the Russians would encourage persistence in the attack. The greater the gain the more difficult it would become for the Russians to

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withdraw. Any considerable Soviet attack must therefore be stopped as early as possible and before the tactical situation became so fluid that the most favourable opportunities for the tactical use of nuclear weapons were lost. A further consideration would be the hazarding of NATO vital interests, for example the danger of losing the nuclear weapons of the shield forces.

4. The political decision that Soviet aggression could not be countered by conventional means alone could therefore only be made in the light of military advice derived from a continuing military appreciation of developing situation. Delay in decision would not only increase the risk of escalation but could nullify the purpose of the tactical nuclear weapons both politically and militarily.

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STAGE A

Question 17(b)

Q. Must it be assumed that any use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances and of any size - even sub-kiloton weapons - would inevitably lead to all-out nuclear war?

A. 1. The UK intelligence assessment is that the Soviets are unlikely to start global war as a deliberate act of policy and will avoid situations which carry an undue risk of such a war. If, however, they decided to embark upon limited aggression, their subsequent reaction to Western response could still be expected to be guided by the need to minimize the risk of all-out war. Otherwise they would risk being drawn into all-out war without the advantage of the strategic initiative.

2. The Russians can, therefore, be expected to take no calculated initiative which they believed would make escalation inevitable. For example, it is extremely unlikely that they would start a conventional attack on a scale which, in their judgement, would be likely to force the West to nuclear response. If, nevertheless, by miscalculation, they did start such an attack and the Western response included the discriminate use of nuclear weapons, there would be two possible reactions open to the Russians:-

- (a) Because they doubted NATO's ultimate determination, or for some other reason, they might respond with nuclear weapons. Assuming the Russians had efficient control arrangements, the scale of their return would depend on the degree of their doubt and on their own ultimate intentions. This might lead to further exchanges but, ultimately would result in all-out war unless negotiations for peaceful settlement were opened by one side or the other or through a third party (which, in the circumstances is perhaps unlikely).

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- (b) They might decide to halt the operation, probably exploiting the political benefits of what they would try to represent as Western irresponsibility, and thus extricate themselves from the results of their miscalculation.

We do not believe that they would continue purely conventional operations in the face of sustained nuclear fire directed to halting the attack.

3. The likelihood of escalation to all-out nuclear war would depend largely on the circumstances in which hostilities broke out. At one extreme escalation would probably not occur if hostilities began as the result of an accident or were confined to a clash between two smaller members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact at a time of détente. At the other extreme all-out war would be inevitable as the result of a massive Soviet aggression in Europe. Between these two extremes there is a grey area in which it is difficult to predict whether escalation would inevitably occur. It is highly probable that it would if there were anything more than the most limited exchange of nuclear fire. The short answer to the question is therefore that escalation to all-out war is not inevitable but it is so likely that it would be unwise to plan to fight a nuclear war in Europe on the assumption that escalation can be avoided.

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STAGE A

Question 17(c)

Q. If not, what arrangements should be made for the control, deployment and use of nuclear weapons to give the best chance of inducing the Soviet Government to withdraw while minimising the risk of all-out war?

- A.1. The risk of all-out war could only be lessened by discrimination in the application of nuclear weapons. Nuclear attack on Soviet territory and to a lesser extent on Satellite territory is clearly the course most likely to lead to strategic nuclear retaliation. But if nuclear fire was confined to battle-field targets on NATO territory and restricted in terms of numbers, yield and type of burst, the risk would be less. The political implications within NATO (particularly for the European members) of a strategy based on such an assumption would, however, be grave.
2. The question arises whether there would be any advantage in giving warning of the Western intention to resort to nuclear weapons before they were fired. It might be argued that this would reduce the risk of escalation, especially if a clear indication of discriminate use were given; on the other hand it might be taken as a sign of Western irresolution, and thus tend to reduce the credibility of the general deterrent. We believe, that, so long as it is publicly and frequently stated that the West would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons to whatever extent was necessary to counter any form of aggression, it would be disadvantageous to make any announcement of our intentions once aggression had actually taken place.
3. Decisions on the types, deployment and control of nuclear weapons for the shield forces should take account of the overriding need to maintain the credibility of the deterrent to aggression though without duplicating the functions of the strategic nuclear forces. In addition, they should take account of:-

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- (i) the operational needs to enable conventional Soviet aggression to be effectively countered or held until either negotiations can be opened or the decision taken to resort to all-out war;
- (ii) the maximum physiological effects arising from the use of nuclear weapons that would be politically acceptable in any one area;
- (iii) the need to minimise the risk of escalation.

Planning for the use of nuclear weapons should be determined in the light of these factors. The problem is to present to the Soviets the picture that any aggression by them carries a grave risk of escalation and, at the same time, to reassure NATO that our deployment and control are such as to permit the discriminate use of nuclear weapons with the object of reducing the chances of escalation.

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STAGE AQuestion 17(a)

Q. Should the first use of nuclear weapons by NATO take the form of "a nuclear shot across the bows"?

A.1. This amounts to the suggestion that a nuclear weapon might be used primarily to serve notice of Western determination. By the expression "a nuclear shot across the bows", we mean a nuclear explosion which could be seen and felt by enemy commanders and troops engaged in the battle but which was designed as far as possible to avoid casualties and damage (e.g. a high air burst in the battlefield area). To use nuclear weapons in this way might be regarded by Russia as evidence of weakness rather than resolution, particularly in what would probably be a rapidly deteriorating situation. We believe, therefore, that this course should not be adopted under any circumstances.

2. The military necessity for the use of nuclear weapons tactically only arises when aggression has taken place and it has become apparent that it cannot be dealt with by conventional means. If the political decision is made to release nuclear weapons at all therefore, they should be used with the aim of halting the aggression, and we have already pointed out in the answer to 17(a) the consequences of delaying this decision.

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STAGE A

Question 17(e)

Q. What scale and duration of nuclear conflict in Stage A should be assumed for planning purposes, before it must be held to have failed in its purpose?

Question 17(f)

Q. What are the specific military aims to be sought in this period?

A.1. The broad objectives of this period are suggested in paragraph 16 of the United Kingdom Memorandum on NATO Strategy and Nuclear Weapons, (See Note at foot of this answer).

2. We have already expressed the view that any use of tactical nuclear weapons must lead rapidly either to a conclusion of operations or to escalation to all-out nuclear war. We therefore reject any thought that NATO shield forces should be provided with nuclear weapons on a requirement to continue a protracted nuclear exchange - days rather than weeks. We do not believe that the mere threat of the use of nuclear weapons in the tactical role would increase the ability of NATO to hold a purely conventional attack which is backed by a potential nuclear threat, because if the threat alone were enough the attack would never have begun.

3. Nuclear weapons would be required by the Shield forces to defeat any conventional aggression which had proved to be beyond the capacity of our conventional forces, or at least to halt the attack long enough to allow time for a decision to be made whether to resort, at once to strategic nuclear retaliation, to seek negotiations.

4. Militarily the initial use of nuclear weapons by NATO would be directed to halting the Soviet advance. This might conflict with the aim of showing the Soviet Government that NATO was determined to resist aggression without immediately resorting to all-out war. In practice, however, these two aims could be reconciled if the number of weapons used initially was small and directed at military targets in the battlefield area (see paragraph 1 of the answer to 17(c)). In the hope of reducing the risk of escalation the targets, type of burst, yield etc., of the weapons should be carefully controlled.

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5. The factors governing decisions on numbers of nuclear weapons are those set out in paragraph 3 of the answer to question 17(c). The actual requirement can be determined only after a detailed study of Soviet intentions and capabilities and the needs of deterrence. When translating this assessment into provisioning scales it must be borne in mind that in practice the deciding factor might well be the requirement for deterrent purposes or present and prospective resources, or both.

NOTE

Extract from United Kingdom Memorandum
on NATO Strategy and Nuclear Weapons

The broad objectives during
Stage A of war in Europe

Stage A

16. Should the broad objectives of this period be:
- (a) to convince the Soviet Government that NATO would not shrink from the use of nuclear weapons to whatever extent was necessary to defend its interests?
 - (b) to provide a period of time before resort to all-out nuclear war in which the Soviet Government would realise that it had miscalculated the determination of NATO to resist and would decide, with the aid of whatever diplomatic and other pressures could be brought to bear, to withdraw rather than risk all-out nuclear war?

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STAGE A

Question 17(a)

Q. What kind of nuclear weapons (range, yield etc.)
would be needed?

A.1. It is not possible to foresee with certainty either the scale or nature of aggression, the circumstances in which it may start, or the progress made before the decision to release nuclear weapons. This question like the question of what the Soviet Government may be expected to regard as an adequate deterrent, calls for further detailed study, and all that can be said for the purposes of this paper is that:-

- (a) Nuclear weapons should be used only on targets in the battlefield area and its immediate vicinity.
- (b) The principal means of delivery might be the shorter-range missiles, but coverage of particular targets and the application of constraints, as well as the need to avoid the risk of the weapons being quickly overrun by conventional attack, may call for delivery by aircraft and even by missiles of sufficient range (say up to 200 miles) to allow them to operate from more secure bases in the rear. All such action might, however, need to be restricted to avoid the risk of misinterpretation that a strategic attack had been launched.
- (c) From the military point of view yield requirements must be related to specific targets. Generally speaking, the delivery system with the greatest accuracy would have to be selected in order to keep the yield to the minimum. NATO must therefore be

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provided with weapons of appropriate accuracy, yield and flexibility to cover the periphery of NATO Europe. Apart from military consideration, there will need to be political restrictions on yield in order to reduce both risks of escalation and unnecessary hazard to civil populations.

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STAGE B

Question 18(a)

Q. What would be the military purpose of weapons used at this stage?

A. The launching of strategic nuclear forces is the start of all-out nuclear war, and the outcome would be determined by those forces. The role of the NATO shield forces at this stage would be of quite secondary importance and would depend on the circumstances at the time. The military object would be to halt any attacks the Soviet forces in Europe might press despite the devastation of the Soviet homeland, although we cannot say to what extent in practice the shield forces might be able to pursue this aim.

Question 18(b)

Q. Is there any purpose that would require weapons different from those required for Stage A?

A. As the military objects of the shield forces would remain the same in Stage B as in Stage A, there would be no requirement for providing them with nuclear weapons different from those needed in Stage A. Although the restrictions imposed by the discriminate use of nuclear weapons would be lifted at this stage, there would be no need to provide more nuclear weapons than those required in Stage A or for deterrence, as the outcome of the war would depend on the strategic nuclear forces. For example, the operations of these forces would make the need for deep interdiction attacks by the shield forces superfluous.

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STAGE CQuestion 19(a)

Q. What form and extent of military conflict involving the shield forces should we contemplate in this period?

A. Although strategic nuclear weapons on each side would be primarily employed against the other's nuclear strike potential and "will to fight" targets, it is inconceivable that this would not have a very quick, if indirect, effect on the forces facing each other in Europe. Any fighting in Europe could be continued only by units and groups of individuals without coherent direction from any central political authority. There could be no question of sustained operations in the absence of a home base.

Question 19(b)

Q. Is there any case for providing for it any other nuclear weapons other than those provided for Stages A and B?

A. There appears to be no need to make specific provision of nuclear weapons for use at this stage, as they would do little more than add to the devastation without affecting the outcome of Stage B.

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Question 21(b)

Q. Can arrangements be devised whereby political control is shared more widely amongst NATO Governments without defeating the basic deterrent purpose for which the weapons are to be provided?

A.1. In answering this question, political control has been taken to mean authority to initiate the use of the weapons and warheads and not the kind of administrative control of stockpiles discussed in Question 21(c) below. Political control in the latter sense would not affect the basic deterrent purpose for which the weapons are to be provided.

2. In the case of overwhelming attack on Western Europe whether conventional or nuclear, the problem of political control over nuclear weapons would be academic. In such circumstances the initiation of the nuclear arms would be automatic and a proviso to this effect would have to be written into any system for giving a wider share of political control to NATO Governments. Though the problem of definition might well prove difficult, it seems unlikely that any member of NATO would challenge the principle itself. In this context the credibility of the deterrent would not be affected.

3. Nor would the problem arise in the case of any incident which could clearly be contained by local conventional forces alone. The Russians know that the West would not use nuclear weapons to throw back a small Satellite probe. The question is at what point a build up of enemy forces would necessitate the firing of nuclear weapons because conventional forces could not hold the aggression.

4. The fear that political control by the NATO Governments would defeat the "basic deterrent purpose" would relate therefore only to a limited attack which could not be contained by conventional means. If one assumes that political control was such that a veto by any one member country was enough to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, then the likelihood of NATO employing such weapons tactically would be decidedly diminished.

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5. Would this amount to the defeat or even serious impairment of the "basic deterrent purpose"? The primary purpose of providing nuclear weapons for tactical use would be to deter the Soviet Government from making any attack or from pressing a conventional attack beyond the point at which NATO could counter it by conventional means alone. If the use of nuclear weapons could be vetoed by any one, or all, or a considerable number of NATO countries, including the U.S.A. the Soviet Government are more likely to believe that NATO would flinch from using nuclear weapons or at least be unable to reach a decision to use them in time (see answer to question 17(a)), than if decision rested with the U.S.A. alone. The Russians might therefore be more likely to put the matter to the test, in the belief that if their attempt succeeded they would gain a decisive victory over the West, and if it failed it would not be too late for them to withdraw.

6. To preserve the credibility of the deterrent it is necessary that a sufficient tactical nuclear armoury should effectively remain under the control of the U.S.A. We can see no military objection, however, on this account to part of the tactical nuclear armoury being under the joint political control of all or a number of NATO members. Moreover so long as the Americans are in Europe with a wide range of nuclear weapons amongst their forces, the Russians are unlikely to believe that any public arrangements for collective NATO control would really inhibit the Americans (perhaps in conjunction with the Germans) from using these weapons if they felt impelled to do so.

7. The short answer to this question is therefore "yes", subject to the Americans retaining sole control over a sufficient part of the nuclear weapons in the shield forces. The net effect would be to introduce a slight element of doubt in the Soviet mind about the credibility of that part of the Western nuclear armoury which had been placed under NATO collective political control.

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Question 21(c)

Q. What kind of "control" would be involved under (b)? would it necessarily mean a collective say by all NATO Governments in the use of nuclear weapons? Or would it mean a greater knowledge of, and say in, the distribution of the nuclear stockpiles and the introduction of new weapons, and administrative control over the withdrawal of the warheads from the stockpile?

A.1. In the previous answer it has been assumed that NATO Governments could have a collective say in authorising the use of part of the nuclear armoury. Greater knowledge of the distribution of the stockpiles and the introduction of new weapons would be a useful and welcome corollary of the above and might go far to satisfying the European members. (The current French dissatisfactions are partly of a different order, relating to the provision of strategic nuclear weapons which are not covered in the NATO questionnaire). In the long run, it would probably not be for them a complete substitute for a control over use.

2. Under these arrangements other NATO Governments would be able to prevent the Americans from withdrawing some proportion of their nuclear arms from Europe. If this is so, this provision would certainly give those Governments fresh confidence that they would not be abandoned to face the Russians alone. This would be a considerable gain.

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Question 21(a)

Q. What would be the international effect (e.g. on Soviet policy) of giving NATO Governments more control over nuclear weapons in the NATO area? Would this be mis-represented as a step towards wider dissemination of nuclear weapons?

A.1. If the extension of control were only in the administrative sense discussed in the previous answer, the international repercussion would be minimal. The following answer, therefore, refers to control over the initiation of the use of nuclear weapons,

2. In the extreme case the result would be that the use of some of the nuclear weapons which would today be decided upon more-or-less exclusively by the Americans, would become the object of consultation by NATO and a common decision by fifteen Governments, all with right of veto. The result would be that the weapons were less likely to be used. It would not be as if the Americans were giving up control to NATO: they would be allowing fourteen of their friends to share it. It should not be too difficult to present this change in such a way as to appear fairly innocuous to our non-NATO allies and to most of the uncommitted countries. Nevertheless, those uncommitted countries which are distrustful of U.S. policies and susceptible to Soviet propaganda would be inclined to regard the change as an irresponsible spreading of nuclear weapons.

3. A difficult point would undoubtedly be the element of control which Germany would thereby gain over nuclear weapons. This would cause genuine fears in countries such as Poland who have considered each successive step in German rearmament as a fresh betrayal. This would be an argument against entrusting the control of the weapons to a small "inner circle" within NATO since Germany would almost certainly have to be included and would appear in hostile eyes to have acquired a degree of direct control over nuclear warheads and weapons.

4. The likely effect on Soviet policy is hard to estimate. It is highly improbable that the Russians would feel obliged to

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follow suit in some way, by sharing control of their weapons with the Chinese or with one or more members of the Warsaw Pact, though, in fact, if they did so on the same terms as the Americans would be doing under the proposed arrangements, it need not give us much cause for anxiety.

5. But the Russians are concerned at the prospect of a militant, aggressive Germany, which might one day embark on Eastern adventures and start a war in Europe. They are also always ready to exploit the fears of the Poles and the Czechs with the bogey of a rearmed Germany possessing her own nuclear weapons. The Soviet reaction would be what Mr. Khrushchev wanted it to be at the time. If he were seriously seeking a détente with the Americans, he would probably let it pass with a more-or-less taken protest. But if, as with the U2, he wanted a pretext to make an uproar, then he would use the changes in NATO to do so. It would be the German aspect on which he would fasten. In any case, it would be desirable for the Americans (and ourselves) to give the Russians a frank preview of our intentions, and an explanation of the reasons for the change, some time before any public announcement. This would be all the more necessary if we were at the time engaged in serious disarmament negotiations or if such negotiations were in prospect.

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ANNEX 'B'
to D(61)23

QUESTIONS REQUIRING MORE DETAILED STUDY

1. The maximum speed of a Russian advance.
2. The definition of discriminate nuclear fire in various circumstances.
3. An analysis of the extent to which nuclear weapons could be used without unacceptable consequences.
4. The numbers of nuclear weapons required in Stage A in relation to Soviet intentions and capabilities and the needs of deterrence.
5. Distinction between requirements of nuclear weapons for deterrent purposes and for containing the Russians.
6. The kinds of nuclear weapons required in Stage A.
7. To what degree would the use of aircraft in Europe be inhibited by the need to avoid the risk of all-out war?
8. Various forms of political control over the initiation of the use of nuclear weapons (e.g. the Strauss proposal) and how this control might be passed on to military authorities.
9. The possibility and consequences of the discriminate use of nuclear weapons for strategic purposes.

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COPY NO. 86

C.O.S. (61) 146

3RD MAY, 1961

U.K. EYES ONLY

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

NATO STRATEGY AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS - MILITARY
IMPLICATIONS OF THE MOTTERSHEAD
REPORT

Note by the Secretary

At their meeting⁺ on 2nd May, 1961, the Chiefs of Staff approved the report at Annex which examines in broad terms the military implications of accepting the principles established in the Mottershead report².

2. In approving the report, the Chiefs of Staff took note that the Chief of the Defence Staff would forward it to the Minister of Defence as an expression of their views.

(Signed) J.D. WARNE

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

3RD MAY, 1961

+ COS(61)28th Meeting, Minute 6
% COS.402/27/3/61
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ANNEX TO COS(61)146

NATO STRATEGY AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS
MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE NOTTERSHEAD REPORT

INTRODUCTION

1. A United Kingdom questionnaire¹ on NATO Strategy and Nuclear Weapons was submitted to the NATO Council in January, 1961, and draft answers to the questions in it have been produced in the Mottershead Report². We have already commented³ broadly on the philosophy these draft answers outline, subject to further study of their military implications.

AIM

2. To examine, in broad terms, the military implications of accepting the principles contained in the draft answers in relation to force requirements for NATO as a whole.

THE NOTTERSHEAD REPORT

3. We interpret the essence of the Mottershead concept as follows.

4. Deterrence is achieved by maintaining in the mind of the enemy the conviction of the West's:-

- (a) Capability of nuclear retaliation.
- (b) Determination to do so if necessary.
- (c) Cohesion in its alliance.

5. As long as the strategic nuclear forces of the United States and the United Kingdom remain effective, there is little danger of the Soviet Union resorting to all-out war or deliberately pursuing aims which would make all-out war probable.

6. However, in a period of nuclear equipoise, the Soviet Government might assume that these countries would not risk destruction in all-out war in order to defeat a minor aggression. For deterrence in Europe, NATO forces must therefore be deployed, organized, equipped and controlled in such a way that the Soviets could never be certain that they would not, by an aggression, unleash a major war and thereby have to pay an unacceptable price.

7. As long as this manifest capability is maintained, hostilities are unlikely to break out except in the following circumstances:-

- (a) By accident.
- (b) By miscalculation of NATO's determination (we consider that this includes a test probe).

1 COS.36/6/1/61
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8. NATO forces must be able to deal with both these eventualities. Conventional opposition should be enough to identify an accident. It may also suffice to identify and defeat a miscalculation in the form of a minor probe. But, if it could not, NATO forces should be able to use nuclear weapons very quickly. This use would be against military targets, but discriminate and primarily for the purpose of making the Soviet Government realize their miscalculation about NATO's determination to use nuclear weapons in its defence. The conventional forces would still have to be strong enough to resist and delay Soviet aggression, supported by nuclear weapons used only in this way, long enough for the Soviet Government, warned of NATO's determination, to have the opportunity to withdraw before NATO was forced to resort to the unrestricted use of nuclear weapons.

9. As the outcome of all-out war would be determined by strategic nuclear forces, it is not necessary for NATO shield forces to be equipped specifically to continue operations during or after the strategic nuclear exchange.

10. The core of the concept, so far as the military implications are concerned, is to rely on deterrence; and within that to attempt to exclude the possibility of an accident or miscalculation leading to all-out war by using tactical nuclear weapons discriminately to impose a pause.

EFFECT ON NATO STRATEGY

11. Although the NATO Strategic Concept⁴ is capable of wide interpretation, in order to implement the Mottershead Concept it would be necessary to modify existing NATO strategy to the extent that:-

- (a) The immediate response to aggression will no longer be instant resort to all-out war.
- (b) Provision would have to be made for a NATO response to scales of aggression larger than that of a local hostile action without initiating all-out nuclear war, but including the discriminate use of tactical nuclear weapons if necessary.
- (c) The concept of a shield force which is able, after an all-out strategic nuclear exchange, to maintain territorial integrity and sustain operations until the will and ability of the enemy to pursue global war is destroyed, is abandoned.

BASIS FOR ASSESSING NATO FORCE REQUIREMENTS

Requirements for Deterrence

12. We consider that in the context of the general deterrent the allied forces in Europe - and for that matter in the Atlantic - are complementary and not alternative to the strategic nuclear forces. In this context we see no substitute

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for forces equipped, trained and deployed as though to fight from the outset with tactical nuclear weapons. We reject that these forces should be so small as to constitute only a screen, the breaking of which will lead to a rapid loss of territorial integrity and the inevitable use of strategic nuclear forces as the only means for reply. We also reject the "threshold" argument propounded by Mr. Acheson for increasing the size of conventional forces to the level required to hold an attack by 20 Soviet divisions for a period of 2 or 3 weeks; we consider this argument fallacious in so far as it would be an encouragement to conventional adventures and would weaken the impression of the Western will to use nuclear weapons. The size and composition of NATO forces must be finally resolved by judgement of their effect on the Russians and it follows that these forces should possess a reasonable balance of conventional and nuclear weapons.

13. Assuming that these premises for the primary role and therefore for the basic structure of the NATO forces are correct, we examine below what, if any, changes might be necessary in the size and shape of the forces in order to exclude all-out war by accident or miscalculation.

Requirements for Forcing a Pause

14. The first requirement is to identify the nature of the incident. For this, surveillance, prompt contact and opposition by conventional forces are essential.

15. The size of the incident could vary within wide limits. The accident is no longer a danger when identified as such. In the event of miscalculation, its scale may exceed the capability of our available conventional forces to delay for the period required to impose an effective pause. In this case a concept, such as SACMUR now holds - of relying on the tactical use of nuclear weapons for military purposes is required. This carries high risks of escalation, though these in turn would commensurately increase the overall deterrent. Whatever the size of our conventional forces the Russians could match them, and might well do so if they doubted our will to resist. We should therefore rely on our forces deployed in the shield-deterrent role to deal with miscalculation also, accepting that the scale of aggression which these forces can hold for the period of the pause required by the Mottershead concept would be limited.

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16. The military criterion for forcing an effective pause in terms of the Mottershead Concept must therefore be determined by the time that must elapse between the military appreciation that conventional forces alone cannot halt the enemy, and verification of the enemy's intention after the explosion of the first nuclear weapon.

17. Until this time has been determined, no calculation of the duration of conventional operations (and therefore of force requirements) can be made. We make assumptions below for this time factor and on these assumptions we examine the implications on force levels.

Time Factor

18. The elements of this most important time factor are as follows:-

(a) There may be no warning.

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- (b) The process of identification may be as short as a few minutes but would not extend to more than a few hours.
- (c) Depending on the scale of attack identified, the Commander primarily concerned would need yet further time to assess whether or for how long he could hold the attack by conventional means alone.
- (d) A request by the Commander to use nuclear weapons discriminately and his choice of targets would be reviewed by SACEUR and, if agreed, forwarded to governments for political authority. This process might well be completed very quickly.
- (e) The time taken to obtain North Atlantic Council and, through them, government agreement would be conditioned, among other things, by the need for:-
 - (i) Consultation.
 - (ii) Assurance of the safety of their nuclear forces.
 - (iii) Political estimates of the effect of nuclear explosions on the targets proposed by SACEUR, followed by a selection of those to be engaged in the first nuclear strike.
- (f) Once obtained, the authority could be conveyed and the weapons fired within about an hour.
- (g) Once the weapons are fired, the reaction of the enemy must be obtained and interpreted in terms of his further intentions.

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19. The process from (a) to (d) above could, we estimate, be completed within 24 hours, this time varying inversely with the size of the attack. A precise estimate should be obtained from SACEUR. The factors in (e) and (g) above are, however, imponderable at present. We discuss them below.

20. The time required for the process of Western political decision cannot, for military reasons, be left imponderable. The time element must be finite because:-

- (a) The Commander's appreciation in requiring the use of tactical nuclear weapons will set a time after which these weapons will cease to be militarily effective.
- (b) Without it, one element of the calculation to determine the size of the conventional forces required to oppose the initial aggression will be absent.

21. It will not be possible for the political decision to cover details of the targets because of the changing battle situation. We consider that if there is to be a timely political decision, guide-lines must have been previously agreed authorising a certain scale of discriminate nuclear response, based upon numbers of weapons, yield, system of delivery and area of use.

22. If we assume that the period required for the process of Governmental decision defined in paragraph 18(c) above could not be less than 24 hours this would entail providing conventional forces capable of opposing an aggression for 48 hours or so.

23. When considering the time to be allowed for Russian reaction the only practicable approach would appear to be to establish an arbitrary limit beyond which we are not prepared to delay a

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decision if the aggression continued. If it does not, no problem arises. If it does, short of the initiation of global war by the Russians (and we assume that we will continue to maintain a sufficient margin in our strategic nuclear strike capability to allow us to accept a reduced efficiency indefinitely) the time we can afford to wait for a different Russian reaction is determined by the latitude which we are prepared to allow them. This will vary over the NATO front and with the extent of enemy air action. Whilst Russian reactions are being assessed it may be necessary to continue with the discriminate use of nuclear weapons in which case their authorisation would be based on similar guide lines. It would seem, however, that the point at which a decision to resort to a strategic nuclear response would be made would have to be established in advance. This could be in terms of geography, time or acceptable damage.

The Control System

24. Our assessment of the time factor has assumed a physical control and command system of unquestionable speed and reliability. This is the vital prerequisite to any refinement of NATO Strategy to avoid massive retaliation from the outset.

APPLICATION TO LAND AND AIR FORCES

25. As stated before it is necessary for NATO shield forces in Europe to be composed and deployed to lend conviction to the general deterrent policy. They would at the same time have to be ready for operations on the much smaller scale discussed for conventional operations. This is a dilemma in that they would have to be able to fight conventionally from a nuclear posture.

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Land Forces

26. To give effect to this concept land forces would have to be ready to meet either conventional or nuclear attack and to switch between conventional and nuclear operations while under attack. This would give rise to problems of deployment further forward and of equipment; the shape and character of the forces might well have to be changed in the way we have already discussed. Since terrain is a prime factor, a full analysis can only be made by SACEUR for NATO forces generally and by the C-in-C for BAOR.

27. Though the present locations of the various components of the NATO forces are dictated largely by administrative considerations, its planned tactical deployment is based on fighting a nuclear battle. As part of the deterrent this must be maintained. However, the process now in train to make them more mobile would need to be accelerated and they would require more conventional fire support. SACEUR's detailed estimates of the forces he would require under these conditions to resist and delay conventionally for 48 hours or so would not, in our opinion, differ greatly from those on which he should now be able to count.

Air Forces

28. The first problem is whether or not air forces should be used conventionally at all, if aggression occurs without enemy air support. In these circumstances, the use of allied air forces, particularly on an extensive scale, might turn an accident into something much worse. But whether or not the aggression was accompanied by air support, a requirement for air reconnaissance would exist to help determine the nature of the aggression. It may be necessary to extend reconnaissance

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beyond allied territory to obtain this information and, in the face of enemy air defences over their own territories, to fight for it. If the aggression was accompanied by air support, allied air forces would be required to fight conventionally in support of land operations for approximately 48 hours or so. This raises three problems:-

- (a) How is nuclear readiness to be maintained during this period?
- (b) Are there enough aircraft to achieve this and provide sufficient conventional air support?
- (c) How do we preserve the essential nuclear delivery forces in the face of conventional air attack?

29. At present the role of NATO air forces is to provide a nuclear capability in the context of deterrence. The reconnaissance, fighter and fighter-bomber aircraft of these forces could undertake the conventional task but would need suitable training and weapons to make them effective in this role. The extent to which other types were required or could be adapted would need to be the subject of study by SACEUR.

Nuclear Weapons for the Shield Forces

30. The requirement for nuclear weapons for the shield forces will range from missiles to replace a proportion of SACEUR's vulnerable manned aircraft to weapons capable of discriminate use on the battlefield. We consider that the type of missile required may have to be determined at least as much by the need for quick response, accuracy and flexibility as by yield or range consideration. The choice of weapon system must depend on the task and no weapon system should be arbitrarily excluded at this stage. The numbers and types of weapons actually required must be the subject of detailed study which will take into account the problem of deterrence and the operational needs indicated above.

Logistic Support

31. The logistic backing required to support this concept for the shield forces could be much lower than the present 90 days required by NATO although it would have to be calculated on a different basis. Some reduction in the size of the repair organization and in certain types of infrastructure should also be possible. We see the need, however, for units and formations to be more self-contained logistically than at present and for improved mobility and flexibility in the supply system, the basis of which must take into account a limited conventional battle.

COST

32. A detailed forecast of the cost to the United Kingdom cannot be made at this stage. Should however the Mottershead concept be adopted, no great economies can be looked for in any field - other than that of logistics - compared with our present expenditure. Depending on further study, this is likely to be more than offset by the extra cost of different types of aircraft, weapons and equipment to meet the requirements of the conventional battle.

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UK EYES ONLYIMPLICATIONS FOR THE ALLIANCE

33. The implications outlined above have been assessed on a purely military basis. We believe, however, that this complex problem cannot be solved solely on these grounds and must have regard for the morale of NATO forces, the confidence of our allies - in both military and political fields - and the continued belief of the Russians in our resolution. These factors suggest that, although it is militarily correct to rate the land battle in Europe during and after the strategic nuclear exchange as of secondary importance, it might be psychologically wrong to make no additional military provision for it or to say that we should not attempt to defend the territory of our allies to the best of our joint abilities, even after a strategic exchange. To do less than this might well appear to show a lack of determination, which could only weaken the deterrent, the most important factor in NATO strategy.

CONCLUSIONS

34. We conclude that the Mottershead concept is essentially compatible with SACEUR's present strategic guidance. Subject to its practicability being established by further study in NATO, it offers a good prospect of allowing us a stage intermediate between conventional resistance and full military use of nuclear weapons, which will demonstrate our determination in nuclear terms without greatly increasing the risk of escalation. It should not alter the need for NATO force requirements to be determined primarily by the shield-deterrent role. The scale of aggression that the forces could hold for the period of the pause required by the concept would be limited.

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35. Any attempt to add conventional strength to NATO specifically to increase the period of possible conventional operations introduces disadvantages in the role, equipment and costs of land and particularly air forces, would reduce the credibility of the deterrent and would add nothing to the benefits offered by the Mottershead Concept.

36. We finally conclude that, subject to those qualifications, the Mottershead Concept is worth pursuing within NATO. It should be made perfectly clear that it is not incompatible with SACEUR's basic strategic guidance and, we believe, should fall within his present force levels.

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THE NUCLEAR

From what you said last night I understand that the ^{suggestion} ~~situation~~ is that the French should enjoy much the same position over the nuclear as we have today. They would have independent control of their weapons subject only to a general obligation to consult us before using them. ~~and~~ In addition they would have access to Anglo-U.S. "know how" and Anglo-U.S. targetting plans. All this is really independence plus, not independence minus. But, if the President sticks to the brief, the inevitably slightly hypocritical talk about trusteeship, contribution to the Western deterrent, etc., may make the suspicious French feel that they are being fobbed off with something less than an independent deterrent.

2. One way of correcting this possible false impression would be to bring the French C.A.S. over here to visit Bomber Command and, without revealing any Anglo-American secrets, give him a clear idea of the nature of our relations with the Americans in the nuclear field. We could make it plain that we were volunteering this information in case it ~~could~~ be of use to de Gaulle in his discussions with the President.

3. If you thought there was anything in this idea, I could easily arrange for the invitation to be made on the Service net. Alternatively, if you wanted to give

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Prem 11/3311

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DRAFT TELEGRAM FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

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8th May, 1961.

Please pass following personal message from Norman Brook to Bundy. Begins.

We have received from Caccia an account of the talk which you had with him on 4th May. We are most grateful for this indication of the way in which the President's thinking is developing. The Prime Minister has always realised that the suggestion which he put forward about the French nuclear would present special difficulties, particularly in connection with Congress, and he has never underrated these. But, as against the difficulties which you mentioned in your talk with Caccia, there are other considerations which ought to be carefully weighed.

2. We fully recognise that France is not yet a nuclear Power. But the suggestion which we put forward was not made for the purpose of increasing the nuclear strength of the West: no French help is needed for that. Its object was to divert France from developing an independent national nuclear capacity. From that point of view the important thing is to get France to declare now that, when she has developed nuclear weapons, she will commit them to the Western alliance to be held on trust for the free world as a whole. In other words the objective is to persuade France to forego her ambition to create an independent national nuclear capacity. We attach great importance to this, because we can see no other way of preventing the emergence of further nuclear Powers. And from that point of view it seems essential to us that France should make such a public declaration now, before she has developed a nuclear capacity. For, if we wait until she has done so, it may be too late to prevent or divert others from

following the course on which France is now embarked.

3. We are also concerned of course about the continuance of an independent French programme of nuclear tests. This is not only prejudicing the chances of a tests agreement: it will also increasingly complicate our efforts to win the sympathy and understanding of neutral and uncommitted countries, especially those in Africa.

4. We too are anxious about the Germans; but, for the moment at any rate, they are in a different position. They are not at present inclined to follow an independent line. They need Allied support over Berlin, and they are in any event bound by the W.E.U. Treaty. If we could find means of diverting the French from pursuing their nuclear ambitions, we could look to them to use their influence in restraining the Germans. On the other hand, if we leave the French to go on alone and they find it too difficult or expensive, as you fear, may they not turn to the Germans for help? I think it was Dean Acheson who said, during the Washington Talks, that the ultimate practical danger was an independent Franco-German nuclear capacity.

5. These are the reasons why we think it urgent to find a means of diverting the French now, before their nuclear capacity has developed much further. If you come to the conclusion that the particular means which we have suggested is impracticable, we hope you will consider whether there are other methods of achieving the same objective. Ends.

Mem 11/3311

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5/8/61

TOP SECRET

QUOTE

May 8, 1961

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am most grateful for your thoughtful and helpful letter of April 28 and the memorandum attached thereto.

I may shortly send you my thoughts on the several issues which these papers raise. There is one question, however, which I would like to clarify now.

After careful review of the problem, I have come to the conclusion that it would be undesirable to assist France's efforts to create a nuclear weapons capability. I am most anxious that no erroneous impressions get abroad regarding future U.S. policy in this respect, lest they create unwarranted French expectations and serious divisions in NATO.

If we were to help France acquire a nuclear weapons capability, this could not fail to have a major effect on German attitudes.

The fact that the Germans are not now tempted to join or imitate the French program is due, in no small part to U. S. opposition to nth country programs and to the uncertain prospects of the French (or any other) program in the absence of U.S. aid. If we were now to provide aid to France, and thus signify a major reversal in our opposition to nth country programs, the likelihood that the Germans would eventually wish to acquire a nuclear weapons capability would be significantly increased.

Any such German intent would, of course, shake NATO to its foundations--not to mention the other serious dangers attendant on proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities. The damaging effect of stirring up German interest in acquiring a nuclear weapons capability would not, I believe, be offset by a French agreement to consult about use of French nuclear forces or to commit these forces to NATO, in return for our aid.

/I believe

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I believe, therefore, that we should try to respond to some of the concerns underlying the French program, instead of helping that program. This may tend to reduce the pressures behind the French program, at least in the long run. It will strengthen, rather than weaken, the Chancellor in resisting any pressures in Germany to create a nuclear weapons capability. And it will enhance, rather than undermine, the cohesion of the alliance as a whole.

An effort to respond to underlying French concerns might involve such steps as:

1. Guaranteeing that the U.S. will continue to maintain an effective nuclear capability in NATO Europe for the life of the treaty.
2. Sharing information about the extent of that capability, i.e., the number and the power of the weapons which comprise it, in greater degree with our allies, particularly the French.
3. Giving our allies an opportunity to share in the control of this capability, to the degree consistent with its military effectiveness. The French might be invited to take the lead with our allies in devising specific proposals to this end. Such proposals might eventually lead to North Atlantic Council agreement, both on guidelines concerning use of these weapons and on a political method for concerting about that use in an emergency.
4. Committing more U.S. and U.K. nuclear forces in NATO Europe to NATO command. We have in mind committing a number of U.S. Polaris submarines to NATO. I hope that, as we do, you will be able to give serious consideration to committing U.K. strategic nuclear forces in the U.K. to NATO. I welcome the indication in your memorandum that you increasingly view the British nuclear capability as being designed to make a contribution to the Western deterrent as a whole.
5. Giving the French more explicit and high-level assurances, such as we have given you, concerning the U. S. intent to consult, if time permits, about use of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world.

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6. Perhaps most important of all: Intimate political consultation with the French, consistent with the rights and interests of our other allies, in order to make clear our desire to secure French participation in the formulation of global policy. As you know, one of the arguments sometimes given for the French nuclear program is that only thus can France secure a voice in framing worldwide policies.

I realize that these measures will not dissuade General DeGaulle from pressing his nuclear program, but I am hopeful that they will diminish, at least in the post-DeGaulle period, the vigor with which France prosecutes that program. In the meantime, measures such as these will permit us to develop a useful, close, and constructive partnership with France in other vital respects and they will offer the best chance of maintaining NATO cohesion over the long term.

I may send you further thoughts on the other useful and interesting proposals in your letter. Again, let me tell you how grateful I am for your wise counsel.

Sincerely yours,

John F. Kennedy

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May 6, 1961

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Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am most grateful for your thoughtful and helpful letter of April 28 and the memorandum attached thereto.

I may shortly send you my thoughts on the several issues which these papers raise. There is one question, however, which I would like to clarify now.

After careful review of the problem, I have come to the conclusion that it would be undesirable to assist France's efforts to create a nuclear weapons capability. I am most anxious that no erroneous impressions get abroad regarding future U.S. policy in this respect, lest they create unwarranted French expectations and serious divisions in NATO.

If we were to help France acquire a nuclear weapons capability, this could not fail to have a major effect on German attitudes.

The fact that the Germans are not now tempted to join or imitate the French program is due, in no small part, to U.S. opposition to Nth country programs and to the uncertain prospects of the French (or any other) program in the absence of U.S. aid. If we were now to provide aid to France, and thus signify a major reversal in our opposition to Nth country programs, the likelihood that the Germans would eventually wish to acquire a nuclear weapons capability would be significantly increased.

Any such German intent would, of course, shake NATO to its foundations - not to mention the other serious dangers attendant on proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities. The damaging effect of stirring up German interest in acquiring a nuclear weapons capability would not, I believe, be offset by a French agreement to consult about use of French nuclear forces or to commit these forces to NATO, in return for our aid.

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An effort to respond to underlying French concerns might involve such steps as:

1. Guaranteeing that the U.S. will continue to maintain an effective nuclear capability in NATO Europe for the life of the Treaty.
2. Sharing information about the extent of that capability, i. e., the number and the power of the weapons which comprise it, in greater degree with our allies, particularly the French.
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4. Committing more U.S. and U.K. nuclear forces in NATO Europe to NATO command. We have in mind committing a number of U.S. Polaris submarines to NATO. I hope that, as we do, you will be able to give serious consideration to committing U.K. strategic nuclear forces in the U.K. to NATO. I welcome the indication in your memorandum that you increasingly view the British nuclear capability as being designed to make a contribution to the Western deterrent as a whole.
5. Giving the French more explicit and high-level assurances, such as we have given you, concerning the U.S. intent to consult, if time permits, about use of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world.

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- 3 -

6. Perhaps most important of all: Intimate political consultation with the French, consistent with the rights and interests of our other allies, in order to make clear our desire to secure French participation in the formulation of global policy. As you know, one of the arguments sometimes given for the French nuclear program is that only thus can France secure a voice in framing worldwide policies.

I realize that these measures will not dissuade General de Gaulle from pressing his nuclear program. But I am hopeful that they will diminish, at least in the post-de Gaulle period, the vigor with which France prosecutes that program. In the meantime, measures such as these will permit us to develop a useful, close, and constructive partnership with France in other vital respects, and they will offer the best chance of maintaining NATO cohesion over the long term.

I may send you further thoughts on the other useful and interesting proposals in your letter. Again, let me tell you how grateful I am for your wise counsel.

Sincerely yours,

The Right Honorable
Harold Macmillan
Prime Minister
London, England

TOP SECRET

EYES ONLY

NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE, 1755 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20036

5. There is one further point I ought to make about your letter. It is paragraph 4, page 2. I confess I am very doubtful about "committing" nuclear forces "to NATO command". The strategic nuclear deterrent, whether British or American, is really held in trust not merely for the NATO area but for the world as a whole. It may have to be used anywhere, inside or outside the NATO area. [Of course a fleet which is mobile is rather different.] ^{Of course the difficulty} ~~Nor does it~~ apply to tactical forces. We both of us I think have tactical bombers under SACEUR. ^{But} There are valid objections to SACEUR having a strategic nuclear force of ^{his} own, and I think that is one of the reasons you did not continue your predecessor's proposals for the missiles under SACEUR. In any case it is a very big question which we must think further about, so I hope you will not use this point in your discussions in Paris. I do not think omitting it would weaken your chance of persuading de Gaulle to be more co-operative generally. Nor do I think that the idea of handing over all or part of the expensive French force to NATO would attract him at all.

6. Failing direct assistance to help France to achieve a nuclear weapons capability, my own judgment is that the only hope of persuading de Gaulle to forego his ambition for complete independence in this field must be by giving him a formula about consultation and control which would satisfy his sense of honour and in which he could join. I have not given up hope that something on these lines might be devised.

7. I am sorry to burden you with this further letter, but I believe it is only right to let you know my thoughts about this most important aspect of our problem. Naturally if

copy of letter from Macmillan to JFK 5/11/61
before it was sent, 5/16 JFK letter rec'd.

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CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX

TO

C.O.S. (61) 32ND MEETING HELD ON
TUESDAY, 30TH MAY, 1961

2. BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

(Previous Reference: C.O.S. (61) 21st Meeting, Minute 1)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a minute^x by the Secretary circulating a draft memorandum prepared by the Foreign Office, covering all aspects of Berlin Contingency planning. A further minute[@] by the Secretary and a note by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff^c were relevant to their discussion.

A. Memorandum by the Foreign Office

LORD MOUNTBATTEN said that the paper by the Foreign Office had been prepared on the instructions of Ministers^d in preparation

Ref 4/136

6/20/61

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CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX

TO

C.O.S. (61) 38TH MEETING HELD ON
TUESDAY, 20TH JUNE, 1961

1. BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

(Previous Reference: C.O.S. (61) 34th Meeting, Minute 9)

LORD MOUNTBATTEN, welcoming Sir Frank Roberts and Sir Christopher Steel to the meeting, said that the most urgent problem before the Committee at present was that of Berlin Contingency Planning. He invited Sir Frank Roberts to give his latest assessment of Soviet aims and intentions over Berlin. He hoped that subsequently both Ambassadors would remain when the Committee went on to discuss the future of Berlin Contingency Planning.

A. Soviet Aims and Intentions Over Berlin

SIR FRANK ROBERTS said that he believed the West should be guided by the basic assumption that Khrushchev had meant exactly what he had said at his recent meeting with President Kennedy and subsequently; i.e. he would take action with a view to resolving the Berlin problem from his point of view before the end of 1961. Whilst he had offered to negotiate over Berlin, there was reason to believe that he no longer expected or even wanted such negotiations. It seemed probable therefore that at the Communist Party Congress in October, 1961, if not before, he would announce the summoning of a peace conference to which both parts of Germany and all the nations who had fought against Germany in the last war would be invited. If the Federal Republic of Germany and the West generally declined to attend this conference, the Russians and their satellites would proceed to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany alone. Once this treaty was concluded, the Russians would make it plain that thereafter the West must deal with the East Germans over access to Berlin; it was probable however that the Russians would urge the East Germans not to go out of their way to make difficulties, at least at the outset.

shchnev to take this line. First, he had initiated the sent Berlin crisis in November 1958, and was being criticised home because as yet he had made no progress. Secondly, the flow of refugees from East Germany was having serious consequences. Thirdly, the Russians were probably genuinely concerned about the policy which might be followed by future governments of the Federal German Republic; it was probable that their primary aim was not so much to get Western troops out of Berlin as to put us in a position where our presence in Berlin could do the Russians less damage.

As for the situation within the USSR and the state of public feeling there, Russia was certainly becoming steadily stronger economically, apart from difficulties over agriculture, and the younger generation especially were conscious of this and of their great achievements in science and technology. The resultant confidence, combined with reduced fear of the USA, could be dangerous. Recent events in Cuba, which had shown that the USA were not prepared to take strong action even on their own doorstep, whereas the USSR in similar circumstances would certainly have done so, had made a profound impression. These factors had probably led Khrushchev to believe that he could pursue his aims over Berlin without risk of war.

SIR CHRISTOPHER STEEL said that the official German attitude to the question of Berlin and on German reunification was frozen because of the elections which were due in September, 1961. He believed that in the past few years German opinion generally had accepted that there was little hope of achieving the reunification of Germany on acceptable terms, unless there was a major shift of the balance of forces in the world.

The Germans certainly believed that if Berlin was lost to the West, morale not only in Western Germany but in the free world at large would suffer a severe blow. They would not regard the signature of a peace treaty between the Communist bloc and East Germany as constituting the loss of Berlin, and indeed in that event they would expect access for civilian traffic to continue very much as at present. However they would expect their Allies to react strongly to unilateral action by the Russians over Berlin, especially if military traffic was obstructed; but since they were officially excluded from Berlin Contingency Planning they could if they wished adopt an ostrich-like attitude.))

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (1) Took note

B. Procedure For Future Planning

LORD MOUNTBATTEN recalled that the Committee, whilst fully endorsing the concept of a probe to establish Soviet intentions, had always taken the view that land operations on a large scale were militarily unsound and, moreover, could not succeed in their object unless it was made clear that they were backed by the threat of nuclear striking power and that the West was in all respects prepared to go to war. They had, however, been restrained by Ministers from making their views known in full to General Norstad lest he should gain the impression that we were dragging our feet; moreover, in view of the structure of this contingency planning there had been no requirement to express United Kingdom military views direct to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Agency Planning could no longer be delayed. The Minister of Defence had accepted that this was so, and was prepared to leave the matter up with his colleagues. The Committee should therefore now consider the lines on which they should recommend the Minister to proceed. The Committee would have seen the telegrams* in which Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh had reported on his recent talks with the State Department in Washington, and he (Lord Mountbatten) invited him to make a statement on these talks.

SIR EVELYN SHUCKBURGH (Foreign Office) said that one of his main objectives in his Washington talks had been to bring about an exchange of views between the United Kingdom and United States Chiefs of Staff. He had told Mr. Kohler frankly that we regarded the military plans produced by Live Oak as unsound and counter-productive. The Pentagon's view was that Live Oak was the proper forum in which to thrash out any difference of view which existed on these military plans. He had succeeded in showing Mr. Kohler that plans produced by Live Oak were prepared at the instance of General Norstad himself and that such plans did not represent the agreed position of the tripartite military authorities nor of the Governments. The Americans argued that there must be a series of military plans between a preliminary probe and all-out war which should provide for a number of measures involving a progressive degree of force, thereby compelling the Russians to take a series of decisions, each more dangerous than the last.

In discussion the following points were made:-

- (a) Mr. Khrushchev had stated that there would be no blockade of our troops in Berlin, but that we should have to arrange our access to them through the East German authorities; if, however, difficulties were placed in our way, and we then used force, we must expect to be met by force. There was much to be said in these circumstances for the garrison airlift plan, which would compel the Communists to take the first warlike action if they wished to interfere, and the Americans seemed now to accept this.
- (b) The East Germans were unlikely, for political reasons, to interfere with essential civil traffic between West Germany and Berlin, and the need for the civil airlift was unlikely to arise. They might, however, by carefully selected and progressively applied measures of control, attempt to orientate West Berlin's economy away from the West and towards the Soviet bloc.
- (c) There was reason to believe that General Norstad's own views on measures to restore ground access were in some ways very close to those of the Committee's; on the other hand, he was currently thinking in terms of a corps operation along the autobahn, a concept which, in the Committee's view, was even more unsound than the divisional operation. There was no evidence to show to what degree General Norstad was guided by instructions from the Pentagon.

* Washington to Foreign Office Nos. 1470, 1485 and 1500

- (d) The Americans were strongly in favour of full German participation in Berlin Contingency Planning. The Committee also were now of the same opinion since the security objections no longer had the same force. There was reason to believe that the French would also agree.
- (e) The conflict of views between the United Kingdom and the United States on these matters could only be resolved at a high level, preferably by discussions between a representative of the Committee and equivalent representatives of the United States, France and Germany; General Norstad should also participate. The Live Oak forum would not be suitable since its level was too low, but SHAPE might be a suitable venue since talks held there would not necessarily disclose their substance.
- (f) It must be recognised that military plans were but a part of the problem and must not be considered in isolation. However, since the Americans had said that they were not ready for wider discussions there was a case for making a start on the military side.
- (g) The main difficulty over the proposed military talks, apart from the venue, was the question of how they were to be arranged and who should take the initiative. If Ministers approved that they should take place, and that the United Kingdom should take the lead, it would be best for the Foreign Office to make the initial approach to the other countries concerned.
- (h) Apart from the possible military measures which had so far been proposed by Live Oak, Mr. Acheson, after consulting General Norstad, had produced a list of a completely new class of military measures. These would be intended to act as a deterrent to unilateral Russian action over Berlin, and to convince the Russians of Western determination to go to war if necessary, rather than to restore the situation after access to Berlin had been obstructed. These new measures, which were at present in the form of a list of possibilities rather than of a plan, would have more chance of achieving their object if the Russians came to know of them through their intelligence sources rather than through open pronouncements by the West. The proposed military talks should cover this new class of measures as well as the former.
- (j) In assessing the prospects of deterring the Russians from unilateral action, it should be borne in mind that the new Berlin crisis was different from previous crises in that Mr. Khrushchev was more openly and publicly committed to his policy.

understood that Berlin Contingency Planning on its present lines was unlikely to carry conviction with Mr. Khrushchev, and that only an obvious state of readiness for full-scale war on the part of the West was likely to make any impression. Whilst the President had probably not yet settled his policy, it seemed unlikely that he would accept the full list of measures proposed by Mr. Acheson, but rather would seek a less drastic programme whilst retaining the same objective.

- (1) A wide field of non-military measures had been considered at official level on a tripartite basis. Some of these measures could have a highly damaging effect on the Soviet bloc, although their effect should not be over-estimated. The ultimate aim should be to produce a comprehensive and concerted plan for submission to the Governments concerned, covering the whole field of military, political and economic measures which could be taken. The preparation of this plan could best be undertaken by the Ambassadorial Group in Washington. The effect of the progressive implementation of this concerted plan should be such as to leave the Russians in no doubt of Western determination to go to war over Berlin if necessary. This comprehensive plan must be thought right through to its probable consequences and to the likely reactions of the other side and of world opinion.
- (m) It chanced that later in this meeting the Committee were to consider, amongst other subjects, planning for military intervention in Laos the stationing of a semi-permanent garrison in Zanzibar; and the possible need to reinforce Northern Rhodesia. All these contingencies would involve the dispersal of United Kingdom forces in a way which, if we were to adopt the Acheson concept of deterrent measures, ran counter to the dispositions which we should then make.

Summing up, LORD MOUNTBATTEN said that their submission to the Minister of Defence should include an historical review of the development of Berlin Contingency Planning, and should emphasise the views which the Committee had consistently put forward. They should say that they had discussed the matter with the Ambassadors in Moscow and in Bonn, and with Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh, and had heard a report of the private views of General Norstad. They should then inform the Minister of their opinion that high-level military talks with the Americans, the French, the Germans and General Norstad should be held at an early date, and should recommend that the United Kingdom should take the initiative in this matter, having in mind that this was a first step towards the production of a comprehensive political, economic and military plan.

- (2) Warmly thanked Sir Frank Roberts and Sir Christopher Steel for attending their meeting.
- (3) Agreed with the remarks of the Chief of the Defence Staff in his summing up.
- (4) Instructed the Secretary to prepare a draft memorandum to the Minister of Defence accordingly, taking account of the points made in discussion, and to circulate it to them and to the Foreign Office for approval.
- (5) Took note that the Chief of the Defence Staff would subsequently forward the memorandum to the Minister of Defence.
- (6) Took note that Sir Christopher Steel would brief the Commander-in-Chief, British Army of the Rhine, and the Commander-in-Chief, Royal Air Force, Germany, on the lines of their discussion.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

20TH JUNE, 1961.

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BRITISH EMBASSY,
PARIS.

TOP SECRET

June 29, 1961.
27 JUL 1961

Dear Eddie, G.

Now that Evelyn has gone on leave and that according to what he was told by Kohler the Americans will not be ready for a further round of tripartite discussions about Berlin until the end of July, I suppose that nothing very much will be happening in the immediate future in the way of inter-governmental preparation. However we shall have to go on seeing Laloy and can hardly avoid talking to him from time to time about the various aspects of the Berlin problem which have been under discussion in Washington. Therefore at the risk of unnecessarily adding to your labours in the Foreign Office I would like if I may to put some questions to you upon which it would be useful to have your guidance.

Yes
There is hardly
nothing
there

2. First of all there is this very point about the programme of preparations. Kohler tells Evelyn that the Administration are unlikely to reach a clear position before the end of July. According to Acheson's Assistant, Owen (see Thomson's letter of June 20), Acheson is expected to have finished his report early in July and it is expected to address itself not only to contingency planning but also to tactics and to a Western negotiating position. Would we be right in supposing that what we are now doing is simply waiting for Acheson's report to be finished and for a consequent summoning by the Americans of a further meeting to consider the new positions adopted by the Administration as a consequence of the report, and that apart from continuing to clear our own minds at home we are not for the present engaging in any other international confabulations? Or is the Live Oak group at work and if so is it on any new basis? I suppose that we hope that the Administration will be quicker in making up their minds than Kohler led Evelyn to expect that they would be but that anyway there is nothing that we can do to accelerate their thought processes. What are we to say to the French if anything about this question of the programme of work? Are we just to deplore the slowness of the Americans or is there any aspect of the work that you would like us to pursue bilaterally with them in order to fill in time while the Americans are thinking?

CG 1015/1138

Nothing the
French can
well really
fight

Yes

No

No - we don't
Kelly mind

This is a
good idea
which can't
be handled

3. The second topic on which we would like some guidance is what has now come to be known as "preparatory military measures". Apparently Acheson outlined what he had in mind in the way of preparatory military measures to the Secretary of State. Their conversation on this point is recorded in a telegram which was not repeated to us. I assume that the measures contemplated by Acheson include such steps as the flying of American reinforcements to Europe, civil defence measures and so forth. They seem to be rather more than the "quiet precautionary and preparatory measures" contemplated in the original contingency planning document, many of which have, I think, already been put into force; but rather less than the "more elaborate military measures" which were intended

E.E. Tomkins Esq., C.M.G., C.V.O.,
Western Dept.,
Foreign Office.

TOP SECRET

/to



TOP SECRET

2.

to "compel the Soviets to face the unmistakeable imminence of a general war". In fact I imagine that you have got away from the old contingency planning texts on this point and that Acheson (quite rightly) is not paying much attention to what his predecessors worked out. I have no doubt that the Newsweek story, though denied by the White House, is based on a genuine leak. Kohler seems to have accepted as a sort of obligation on the part of the Administration that they would not undertake any preparatory measures even on a national basis without giving us the chance to comment first. He is also quoted as saying that they ought to be put in train without waiting for the Acheson report. My first question therefore is whether the Americans have in fact already, with or without our agreement, begun to take any of the steps which even the newspapers assume to have been under discussion. If not do you suppose that they will be likely to want to do so soon? The idea of not waiting for Acheson's report is slightly absurd if the report is expected "early in July"; and in any case the measures are in a sense a part of contingency planning and would or should be the reflection of a particular policy and attitude towards the crisis. And yet if the famous report is to deal with precisely these matters of policy and attitude it seems untidy, to put it no worse than that, that the military measures should be taken before its contents are known and accepted.

4. More important for us than any of these questions is to know what you wish us to say to the French on the subject of preparatory measures. In particular may we emphasise not only in talking to Laloy but also in talking to others what the Americans, according to Evelyn, have already said to Laloy, i.e. that "standing firm" would necessitate some additional military contribution from France in the defence of Europe? The latest guess about the Algerian problem is that the General has set a timetable for himself which would permit him to bring a number of troops back from North Africa during the last quarter of this year. (He has now announced the intended withdrawal of a division.) This will be a little late if it is to do any good in frightening Khrushchev. And more pertinently may we have your permission to say to the French that the best contribution they could make to the policy of standing firm would be to permit the American strike bombers to base themselves again in France with their piles of atomic warheads and so revert to the position which obtained before the General turned them out? This would be the best proof that the French meant business. According to Newsweek the General promised Kennedy that this would be done but we have no evidence of this here. As things are France is one of the countries in NATO which the Russians would have no urgent incentive for trying to knock out if a general war were to be brought about since there is nothing in France by which the Russian homeland can be hit. Leaving aside the part that the French might play I suppose that you would wish us to appear keen rather than lukewarm about the idea of preparatory measures in general?

5. Thirdly there is the general question whether we ought to try to bring on the inevitable negotiation or whether, as Laloy thinks we ought, rather to sit tight and hope that events will produce favourable conditions for it. The American view on this

/point

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3.

Yes | point does not yet seem at all clear but as far as I can make out they tend to side with us rather than with the French. Perhaps we had better stick to the line taken yesterday by the Prime Minister?

6. Connected with this point is the view which Evelyn implies was at the back of Laloy's mind that any sign of wishing to involve the United Nations in the Berlin problem is equivalent to acknowledging in advance that the West is not going to stand up to the famous test of wills. I imagine that you would like us to be non-committal about the timing of the negotiations but not go so far in our non-commitment as to admit that any idea of bringing in the United Nations was equivalent to wishing to accelerate the negotiations. Indeed we could if you wished take the line with the French that since the Assembly begins in September and someone is bound to raise Berlin we ought to reach agreement soon on the kind of resolution which would be both satisfactory and saleable.

7. You will remember in this connection that although Evelyn reports that he put into the minds of the Americans the idea of a solution involving the actual establishment of the United Nations headquarters in Berlin and reports the Americans as not having been shocked by the idea it is not one which we have ever mentioned to the French. I have no doubt that sooner or later it will get back to them that it was we who thought of it but perhaps this does not matter very much. Should you wish seriously to pursue this idea you will I am sure bear in mind that it will be extremely difficult to sell it to the French. Laloy's view is (a) that the Russians would never agree to an all-Berlin solution of any kind; (b) that if the United Nations were nevertheless planted in Berlin one effect would be to enhance Ulbricht's powers of mischief.

64, one question!
our paper
8. Finally we would of course be very interested to know in very general terms what kind of end-result we hope to have achieved by the end of the winter. After the "negotiation" has taken place (and I suppose it may take any form from that of a conference to that of an exchange of ultimata) do we hope in the best possible circumstances to have made a settlement of Europe or do we set our sights no higher than that of doing some temporary repairs to Berlin alone? I thought it was very interesting that Rusk should have spoken "several times" (see Washington telegram No. 1454) of "going further back than our peace plan", because although Evelyn commented on this that he was not sure what Rusk had in mind it seemed to me that he can only have had in mind some negotiation "de grande envergure" not just confined to questions connected with access routes and garrisons. Berlin is after all only the symptom of the disease whose essence is that we are not agreed between ourselves let alone with the Russians on how Central Europe can most safely be organised. Although I am not suggesting that there is anything on this sixty-four dollar question that we could possibly have to say to the French at this particular moment it would be extremely interesting if you could indicate whether it is the symptom or the illness that we are hoping to cure during the next few months.

Yours ever,

Tony

7/4/61

Defe 4/136

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CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX

TO

C.O.S.(61)42ND MEETING HELD ON
TUESDAY, 4TH JULY, 1961

4. BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

(Previous Reference: C.O.S.(61)38th Meeting, Minute 1)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a minute* by the Secretary covering three letters from General Norstad; the first, proposing that LIVE OAK be augmented notably by the addition of a British major-general and a German liaison officer; the second, stressing the need to carry out full scale training of the TRADE WIND force and instructing Commander-in-Chief, BAOR to report when it could start; and the third, informing Commander-in-Chief, BAOR of the forces likely to be available for a divisional operation and urging him to complete the preparation of a basic plan expeditiously. A telegram^o from Commander-in-Chief, BAOR and a draft telegram by the Foreign Office containing instructions to Her Majesty's Ambassador in Washington on future discussions were also relevant.

A. Training for TRADE WIND

LORD MOUNTBATTEN recalled that they had discussed General Cassel's telegram^o with the Minister of Defence that morning and the Minister had agreed that General Cassels should be instructed to reply to General Norstad's letter; he should be told that he should impose the maximum reasonable delay in the selection of his date for the commencement of live training. He (Lord Mountbatten) circulated a draft telegram.

* COS.813/4/7/61
% GESEC 25

- (a) The representative of the Ministry of Defence said that, at a subsequent meeting between the Minister of Defence and the Foreign Secretary, he understood that it had been agreed that although General Cassels should reply to General Norstad's stating the date when training could begin, he should not at this stage be authorised to implement it if ordered to do so. Ministers hoped that H.M. Ambassador in Washington would have time to get Mr. Rusk to agree to the suspension of Live Oak planning before General Norstad issued further orders on training.
- (b) Whilst accepting the position at (a) above, the Committee were strongly of the opinion that General Cassels should not be placed in a position of having to hesitate to obey an order from General Norstad. They therefore urged upon the Foreign Office the need for great speed in sending instructions to H.M. Ambassador in Washington.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (1) Approved the telegram[@] to the Commander-in-Chief, British Army of the Rhine as amended.
- (2) Invited the Foreign Office to take note of the point at (b) above.

[@] Subsequently despatched as COSGE 1

B. Future Discussions

SIR THOMAS PIKE said that he had discussed the question of Berlin contingency planning, with particular reference to autobahn operations and the garrison airlift, with General Lemnitzer on the previous Friday, 30th June, 1961.

The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff were firmly opposed to any concession to the Russians over access to Berlin; they maintained that since our rights had been settled at the Conference table, at which all four allies had been present, it was insulting of the Russians to suggest that they could unilaterally put an end to the rights of the Western allies. The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that the time for a show-down with the Russians was at hand, and they were prepared to go the lengths of a real test of strength, up to the point of "losing a division or two", to show their determination. They were hardly prepared to discuss whether their plans made military sense, but were obsessed by the need to maintain their right of access by road, no matter the cost. They would not look at a garrison airlift, since they believed that to resort to it would be a sign of weakness and acceptance of a unilateral denial by the Russians of our rights of land access. They realised that it would not be militarily sensible to become involved in a NATO war which followed from purely tripartite action, but they did not accept this as a reason for desisting from such operations.

...they believed it was essential to demonstrate by military force our determination to uphold our position over Berlin or else, in their view, NATO would crumble away.

LORD MOUNTBATTEN recalled that the Committee had previously recommended that, since comprehensive economic, political and military talks could not be put in hand, a start should be made with military talks only and that these should be on a tripartite basis. However, in view of the opinions expressed by General Lemnitzer in his talks with Sir Thomas Pike, it seemed fruitless to pursue the matter on a purely military basis. The Committee had discussed this problem with the Minister of Defence that morning and had agreed that an effort should be made to mount quadrupartite talks on a politico/military basis. Since the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff had said that they wanted political direction, and since such direction could only be properly framed against the background of military feasibility, there was good reason for conducting these talks on such a basis.

In discussion the following points were made:-

- (c) The Foreign Office agreed with the proposal outlined by the Chief of the Defence Staff, insofar as politico/military talks were concerned, but were not entirely satisfied that it would be wise to admit the Germans to these talks until Anglo/American differences had been settled.
- (d) It was known that both Herr Strauss and General Foertsch strongly supported British views on the impracticability of autobahn operations. If, therefore, the point at (c) above was not considered to be overriding, there would be much merit in initiating the talks on a quadrupartite basis.
- (e) A brief should be prepared forthwith setting out the objections to the various Live Oak plans for autobahn operations. This brief should also include an examination of plans for air access (JACK PINE) and should give the supporting facts necessary to refute any United States suggestion that an airlift was technically impracticable.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (3) Invited the Foreign Office to take note of their views.
- (4) Instructed the Joint Planning Staff to prepare a brief as at (c) above.

C. LIVE OAK STAFF

LORD MOUNTBATTEN recalled that the Minister had said earlier that day that it would be inadvisable to implement General Norstad's proposals to augment the LIVE OAK staff since this would be taken as another sign of our agreement to LIVE OAK plans. It was hoped that if the United States agreed to quadrupartite talks the request for more LIVE OAK staff would fade into the background. Nevertheless it was necessary to reply to General Norstad's letter and he proposed therefore to say that steps to select a suitable Major-General had been put in hand, but that it would take time to find the right man. As far as the German Liaison Officer was concerned the Committee had already agreed that previous security objections no longer obtained and he accordingly proposed to inform General Norstad that this proposal had our full approval.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (5) Agreed with the views of the Chief of the Defence Staff and took note that the Chief of the Defence Staff would seek the approval of the Minister of Defence.

D. Recorded in Secretary's Standard File.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

4TH JULY, 1961.

7/7/61

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JP(61)68(Final)
7th July, 1961

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CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE
JOINT PLANNING STAFF

NATO STRATEGY
BRIEF FOR SIR GEORGE MILLS

Report by the Joint Planning Staff

In accordance with the instructions of the Chief of the Defence Staff, we have prepared a brief for use by Sir George Mills when the Standing Group consider what advice they should give to the Secretary General in the preparation of his paper on NATO Strategy.

2. Appendix 'B' contains an outline of the NATO Strategic Concept, Supreme Commanders' interpretations of it and established United Kingdom views. This is intended as a background and need not accompany the brief.

3. In preparing the brief, which is at Annex, we have consulted the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Joint Intelligence Staff.

4. You will remember that Sir Paul Mason has been giving United Kingdom views on NATO Strategy to the NATO Council in June. Ministers approved briefs for this.

5. We are considering certain longer-term proposals for NATO and we will report separately on these in due course.

Recommendation

6. We recommend that, if they approve our brief, the Chiefs of Staff should authorize its use by the United Kingdom member of the Standing Group.

(Signed) D.J. POWELL-JONES
E.H. ASHMORE
E.V.M. STRICKLAND
D.C. STAPLETON.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

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Annex to JP(61)68(Final)

NATO STRATEGY
BRIEF FOR SIR GEORGE MILLS

INTRODUCTION

1. The purpose of this brief is to assist you when the Standing Group consider the advice they will give the Secretary General in connection with his study on future NATO military requirements and how they should be met. It is intended to crystallize the military position within the guidelines provided by the statement¹ by the Minister of Defence in December, 1959, and the United Kingdom thoughts² now being put forward by Sir Paul Mason, and to provide you with a brief as to how the current interpretation of NATO strategy could be adapted to meet conditions of nuclear equipoise.

UNITED KINGDOM COMMENTS ON SUPREME
COMMANDERS' INTERPRETATION OF NATO
STRATEGY

Deterrence

2. The UK view is that NATO strategy must be directed towards maintaining an effective deterrent to war in all its forms rather than to preparations for fighting a protracted war in Europe. Conditions of nuclear sufficiency reinforce this view, especially if it is accepted that the Russians might be tempted to limited conventional action on the assumption that the West would not resort to massive nuclear retaliation in such circumstances. An effective deterrent is achieved in those conditions when the potential aggressor is confronted by NATO forces which are so organized, disposed, trained, equipped and supported that he will conclude that fatal risks would be involved in attacking, despite superior numbers and the advantage of surprise. The principal elements of the deterrent are adequate nuclear and other ready forces and the manifest determination to retaliate against any aggressor with an appropriate degree of force, including if necessary the use of nuclear weapons, with all the risks of escalation which this would entail. On this basis we outline below the differences which appear to exist between us and the NATO military commanders at present.

Allied Command Europe

3. We are in agreement with what we understand to be SACEUR's views in the following respects:-

- (a) That forces required for deterrence (which we interpret to include those for the initial phase) should have priority over those required for any subsequent operations.

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Annex(Continued)

- (b) That ACE forces must be able to meet a variety of possible Russian actions without necessarily resorting immediately to all-out war; in particular:-
- (i) ACE forces must be capable of responding to attack with conventional weapons when these are adequate to the situation.
 - (ii) The possibility of the selective application of tactical nuclear weapons in response to attack by superior conventional forces.
- (c) The idea of greater mobility for his forces.

4. In addition we consider that SACEUR should be encouraged to pursue to their logical conclusions the following points, which he already seems to accept in part. Firstly, a conventional Soviet or satellite attack in ACE, if met by determined opposition, would in our opinion either be abandoned or, if pressed, would rapidly escalate to all-out war. Secondly, it is both unnecessary to plan and impracticable to fight a battle in Europe after the strategic exchange, since the devastation in Western Europe could quickly make co-ordinated large-scale operations impossible. For this reason we believe that the size and shape of the forces and stockpiles which SACEUR proposes should be revised.

Allied Commands Atlantic and Channel

5. We are in agreement in the following respects:-

- (a) That forces should only be provided to meet the requirements for deterrence and operations in the initial phase.
- (b) That operations in the initial phase should include the control and exploitation of vital sea areas, the location and destruction of enemy naval forces and their sources of support, the protection of sea communications, and support for adjacent NATO commands.

6. We do not see military re-supply operations in the subsequent phase as being justified since we consider practicable military operations on land to be irrelevant after the nuclear exchange. The battle then to be fought is of survival. To the extent that political and humanitarian considerations cause us to accept this as a requirement, survival will depend on re-supply, mainly by sea. If it is to be successful, it must be conducted under military control and there would be a requirement for Naval forces to ensure this; the majority should then be found from those required for the operations in the initial phase but the national needs of the survival phase must also be borne in mind.

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Annex (Continued)

The Ballistic Missile-Firing Submarine

7. SACLANT, SACEUR and the Channel Committee have not yet taken full account of the influence of the ballistic missile submarine on their interpretation of NATO strategy. This is because both American and Russian deployment of these vessels is still in the build-up phase and probably, in part, because the Polaris submarines do not operate under SACLANT or SACEUR command.

8. We foresee two effects as the strength of missile submarine forces increases. On the one hand, the Polaris submarines should in due course acquire all the pre-planned nuclear targets - including those on the NATO list - at present assigned to Attack Carriers. This will free the Striking Fleets to concentrate on naval and possibly land contingency targets, including operations in circumstances in which the discriminate use of nuclear weapons or strike subject to recall may be authorized. On the other hand, the Soviet missile submarine threat to the United States and primarily to the bases of Strategic Air Command is already recognized by the considerable NATO forces deployed in WESTLANT. As this Soviet force builds up, a similar threat to Bomber Command bases is foreseen.

9. We, therefore, foresee a changed requirement for Attack Carriers. This is likely to be reflected first in SACEUR's Command and to result in the deployment of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean being determined more by cold and limited war requirements than by those of NATO. The effect on the Striking Fleet Atlantic will be less marked because of the contingency targets to be expected in the area in the initial phase of global war, but a reduced force should become acceptable.

10. By about 1965* CINCEASTLANT will be faced with the problem which now confronts CINCSOUTH in endeavouring to detect, track and, in the event of war, sink Soviet missile-carrying submarines before they fire. It is arguable whether this task is primarily a NATO one.

11. In general we feel also that there is room in NATO naval planning for economies on projects at present designed to fight a long maritime war. The reduced risk of escalation at sea may justify these projects but only if some probability of limited war at sea is accepted.

THE UNITED KINGDOM APPROACH

The Threat

12. The UK assessment is that, because of their recognition of the calamitous results of global war, the Soviet leaders are unlikely to start one as a deliberate act of policy, and will avoid embarking on courses of action which carry the risk of global war, unless they are certain that they can retain control of the evolving situation. In any case, if they were determined to pursue their aims by the use of force and thought there was a serious risk of the aggression escalating to global war, the Russians would hardly be likely to sacrifice the advantages that an all-out surprise attack would give them. There would seem to be little likelihood, therefore, of their

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Annex (Continued)

deliberately undertaking any conventional aggression which they calculated might induce NATO to resort to strategic nuclear weapons. However this may be, the possibility of miscalculation must always remain.

13. We must therefore continue to convince the Russians that any form of aggression, however limited, will be met by the West with the appropriate degree of force, including if necessary nuclear weapons, and accepting the risk of escalation to all-out war, which is itself a powerful deterrent. The force levels resulting from a reassessment of the threat must therefore be related to the overriding need to maintain a credible deterrent. Providing that this is done, future force requirements might reasonably be based more on their effect on probable Soviet intentions and less on maximum Soviet military capability.

Probable Duration of Operations

14. In the case of general war the current Strategic Concept envisages intensive land, sea and air campaigns being conducted in conjunction with the nuclear strategic offensive over a period not likely to exceed thirty days. If it is accepted that the strategic nuclear exchange would be short, devastating and decisive, it is illogical to plan even for thirty days of intensive operations. Although the surviving NATO forces might well fight on it would be equally illogical to make costly preparations for any subsequent phase. It is impossible to offer a precise estimate of the total duration of Phase One but we have estimated in the probable sequence of events that land forces might be required to fight conventionally for about forty-eight hours before resorting to nuclear weapons, the use of which would then result either in a pause for negotiations or in rapid escalation to all-out war. Other nations may put forward different ideas on the time scale, but we consider that the total duration of Phase One would be a matter of days, rather than weeks. We suggest that the requirement for stockpiles should be reviewed accordingly; certainly the present 90 days requirement can be reduced.

15. A strategic nuclear exchange, though decisive, would not have the same direct effect on the war at sea as it would on the land campaign, and we agree with SACLANC that there will be no clear division between the phases of this aspect of the war.

16. A re-appraisal in NATO is therefore required of the probable duration and nature of operations in Phase One and the effect on force requirements in ACE, ACLANT and AGCHAN.

Reorganisation of Forces

17. If NATO strategy were interpreted on these lines we would expect a considerable resultant effect on force organization and command structure. In this connection you may be able to put forward the proposals which we endorsed in our last examination of NATO strategy of the ACE Shield Forces being organized on the basis of a Reconnaissance Screen, Mobile Support Forces, Nuclear Strike Forces and a Mobile Central Reserve. (The explanation of this concept and the tasks of the component forces are given at Appendix 'A').

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Annex (Continued)

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Annex (Concluded)

18. A reorganization of forces would call for a revision of the ACE command structure, which we have already agreed⁹ must provide for a highly centralized control of nuclear weapons. Some reduction in the present chain of headquarters should be possible, but this would need further examination within NATO. The naval command structure is currently being examined by the Supreme Commanders and no comment is called for at this stage.

19. The higher defence organization has recently been examined by the NATO Defence Policy Committee, who concluded¹⁰ that, since the Secretary General was himself taking action in this respect, we should see how things developed during the next six months before considering whether we should press for any changes.

Priorities

20. The burden of defence at the present time is such that very serious regard should be had to the economic capabilities of member countries in estimating future force requirements. This is in line with the concept¹¹, and we should ensure that in laying down priorities the Secretary General should be firmly guided on this aspect. We suggest that your advice should be based on our views set out above.

21. The need is to decide what is essential, as distinct from desirable, for continued deterrence in the NATO area. The allotment of commitments to member nations should be adjusted in accordance with realistic and up-to-date national capabilities.

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Appendix 'A' to Annex to
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SUGGESTED COMPOSITION OF THE SHIELD FORCES IN ACE

1. Clearly it will be very difficult to assess precisely the size of the forces required to fulfil the roles envisaged in the revised strategy. This is a NATO problem which the United Kingdom cannot solve in isolation. There is no doubt, however, that, whatever their size, the shield forces should be more mobile and more flexible than they are at present.
2. On the composition of these forces we suggest the following as a basis for examination:-
 - (a) Reconnaissance Screen. This would be a ground force acting in conjunction with national frontier forces. It need only be of sufficient strength to ensure adequate frontier surveillance and quick reaction to any form of aggression. A nuclear capability would not be necessary.
 - (b) Mobile Support Forces. These forces would be composed of battle formations of all arms, probably organized in brigade groups or divisions according to local conditions. They would have the tasks of dealing with small conventional aggression, without necessarily using nuclear weapons, and of resisting and delaying a major land invasion, using all weapons including nuclear ones. These forces must be capable of giving immediate support to the reconnaissance screen.
 - (c) Nuclear Strike Forces. These would consist of the tactical air forces and associated missile units necessary for the support of the Mobile Forces referred to in (b) above. The main requirements would be quick reaction time, best possible pre-launch invulnerability and capability of striking targets appropriate to the scale of attack and the probable duration of operations.
 - (d) Mobile Central Reserve. This force should be air-transportable and should possess a nuclear capability; it might include tactical air support. Such a force is, in our view, necessary to support operations in areas where normal defence deployment may be thin, e.g. on the flanks. The development of such a force conforms with SACEUR's present plans for an international mobile task force.

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Appendix 'B' to Annex to
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SUMMARY OF PRESENT NATO STRATEGY AND UNITED
KINGDOM VIEWS

PRESENT NATO STRATEGY

Overall Strategic Concept

1. The Overall Strategic Concept¹, which was approved in 1957, emphasizes that the main object is to prevent war by creating an effective deterrent to aggression. It also envisages, inter alia:-

- (a) In case of general war the conduct of a series of mutually dependent land, sea and air campaigns of maximum intensity, including the nuclear strategic campaign, the object of which would be to defend the populations, territories, vital sea areas and offensive striking power of NATO, and to destroy the ability and the will of the enemy to pursue general war.
- (b) Subsequent operations of indeterminate duration after a period of reorganization and rehabilitation, to take immediate advantage of the superiority gained in the initial phase, in order to accomplish the remaining necessary military tasks leading to a termination of hostilities.
- (c) Preparations to deal immediately with infiltrations, incursions or hostile local action in the NATO area without necessarily having recourse to nuclear weapons.

2. It assumes that the period of operations referred to in (a) above is unlikely to exceed thirty days, the first few days of which would be characterized by the greatest intensity of nuclear exchange. It does not attempt to define the period of (b), but accepts that large scale operations during the second phase will be precluded by the devastation caused by an all-out nuclear exchange; and states that priority must be given to the provision of forces-in-being capable of effectively contributing to success in the initial phase.

3. The concept emphasizes that the maintenance of adequate military strength to prevent war should be consistent with economy of effort, resources and manpower; that defence planning must combine maximum efficiency with maximum economy; and that the maintenance of economic stability constitutes an important element of national security. It also accepts that certain NATO nations may need to retain flexibility in order to meet military situations short of general war outside the NATO area.

SACEUR's Implementation of the Strategic Concept

4. In furtherance of the Overall Strategic Concept SACEUR plans to conduct an immediate, massive nuclear offensive aimed at destroying the enemy's nuclear capability, forces, resources and communications; to contain the enemy land advance as far forward as possible; to reduce his naval potential by

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offensive naval operations; to take any opportunity to regain the initiative through the conduct of offensive operations; and to reorganize and rehabilitate available forces as soon as possible as a pre-requisite for the conduct of the offensive leading to the termination of hostilities.

5. However, SACRUR has also recently issued a statement⁴ of strategic guidance for ACE from which it is apparent that he does not intend to resort to the immediate use of nuclear weapons unless forced to do so by enemy action. His forces are to be capable of fighting with conventional weapons initially, and he is taking steps to safeguard his nuclear armoury during such a period. (He has, however, expressed doubts whether his nuclear weapons could survive a protracted period of conventional operations.) He considers that the selective use of limited atomic firepower will not necessarily result in total war, although it may heighten the degree of risk.

SACLANT's Implementation of the Strategic Concept

6. SACLANT interprets⁵ his mission as protecting the SACLANT area for NATO use and denying its use to the enemy as a means of bringing the war to a successful conclusion. He sees his tasks as follows:-

- (a) To control and exploit vital sea areas.
- (b) To locate and destroy enemy naval forces.
- (c) To engage in the nuclear counter-offensive.
- (d) To support adjacent NATO commands.
- (e) To preserve, protect and maintain sea communications.
- (f) In the subsequent phase, to conduct the tasks required for reorganization, re-supply and the accomplishing of necessary military tasks leading to the conclusion of war.

7. Except for sub-para (f) above this concept of operations is based on D-Day tasks to be undertaken during Phase One, and SACLANT's force requirements are based on these tasks only. Emphasis is placed on the need for early offensive action to enhance the ability of NATO naval forces to undertake subsequent tasks. Such action will include nuclear strikes against naval targets, anti-submarine operations which would include an intensive transit offensive, and submarine and mining operations. At the same time defensive operations would be undertaken to control and protect allied merchant shipping.

UNITED KINGDOM VIEWSThe Minister of Defence's Statement

8. In December, 1959, the NATO Council discussed the need to adapt the structure of NATO forces to changes in weapons and

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5 SACLANT's EDP

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UK EYES ONLYAppendix 'B' (Continued)

techniques of warfare. The Minister's statement[©] at this meeting concluded by suggesting that emphasis should be placed on the prevention of war and on dealing immediately with limited aggression by concentrating on the shield and sword elements of the deterrent, if necessary at the expense of preparations for the conduct of the later stages. He believed that these principles followed logically from the agreed basis of NATO planning, and could usefully be taken as a guide to planning in general - especially in assessing force goals and deciding priorities for meeting them.

Previous Examination of NATO Strategy

9. In September, 1960, a study[§] of NATO strategy in the light of present and foreseen circumstances suggested that changed conditions affected the NATO Strategic Concept to the extent that:-

- (a) The need to prevent war becomes of even greater importance.
- (b) The concept of a shield force which is able, even after a strategic nuclear exchange, to maintain territorial integrity and sustain operations until the will and ability of the enemy to pursue global war is destroyed, is no longer valid.
- (c) The size of the ACE shield forces would be determined by the requirements to:-
 - (i) Counter intimidation on the borders of the NATO area.
 - (ii) Identify aggression on whatever scale.
 - (iii) Deal immediately with infiltration or small-scale conventional aggression without necessarily having recourse to nuclear weapons.
 - (iv) Be capable of resisting and delaying a larger-scale conventional attack, using at least tactical nuclear weapons if the attack were persisted in. This would both make clear to the Russians that such an attack might escalate to global war and give the West time for making the necessary decisions.

The Mottershead Working Party

10. The Working Party started from the premise that in an era of mutual nuclear sufficiency the nuclear deterrent might cease to be credible unless a strategy could be devised which provided for whatever degree of force, not excluding nuclear weapons, might be required to induce an aggressor to abandon his aggression. In order to implement the concept[§] which they put forward it would be necessary to modify existing NATO strategy to the extent that:-

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Appendix 'B' (Concluded)

(a) The immediate response to aggression will no longer be instant resort to all-out war.

(b) Provision would have to be made for a NATO response to scales of aggression larger than that of a local hostile action without initiating all-out nuclear war, but including the discriminate use of tactical nuclear weapons if necessary.

The Working Party also concluded⁸ that the role of the shield forces during the nuclear exchange would be of quite secondary importance and that there would not be a need for additional nuclear weapons either for this stage, or after it - when any fighting could only continue without coherent central direction.

11. The Chiefs of Staff concluded that, subject to certain reservations⁹, the Mottershead concept was worth pursuing in NATO. Some of the views expressed in it have been discussed⁶ in the North Atlantic Council, and appear to have been received favourably.

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AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY, CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEESPECIALLY RESTRICTED CIRCULATIONCHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEECONFIDENTIAL ANNEXTOC.O.S. (61) 32ND MEETING HELD ON
TUESDAY, 30TH MAY, 19612. BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING(Previous Reference: C.O.S. (61) 21st Meeting, Minute 1)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a minute¹ by the Secretary circulating a draft memorandum prepared by the Foreign Office, covering all aspects of Berlin Contingency planning. A further minute² by the Secretary and a note by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff³ were relevant to their discussion.

A. Memorandum by the Foreign Office

LORD MOUNTBATTEN said that the paper by the Foreign Office had been prepared on the instructions of Ministers⁴ in preparation for a review of the whole field of contingency planning which was to be undertaken with the Americans. He believed that the paper, which had since been approved by the Foreign Secretary, reflected the Committee's views on Berlin Contingency Planning generally. In particular it clearly stated the Committee's aversion to plans designed to re-open autobahn access and gave, as they did, preference to airlift plans. There was one aspect which, he believed, should be included in the paper. This was the increased danger of war breaking out by miscalculation since both the Americans and the Russians believed that the other would not resort to global war over Berlin. It was precisely in these circumstances that a war was most likely to begin. He believed the Committee would wish to endorse the Foreign Office paper subject to the inclusion of this point and it would thereafter be put to Ministers for use as a brief for the discussions between the Prime Minister and the President of the United States, due to take place on Monday, 5th June, 1961.

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THE COMMITTEE:-

- (1) Agreed with the views of the Chief of the Defence Staff.
- (2) Took note that the Foreign Office would highlight the point at (1) above in the final version of their memorandum.
- (3) Took note that the Chief of the Defence Staff would inform the Minister of Defence of their views.

B. Note by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff

LORD MOUNTBATTEN said that ground access plans had recently been discussed by Ministers who held the same views as those expressed in the Note before them. He suggested that the Committee should do no more than take note of the C.I.G.S.'s views pending the outcome of the United Kingdom discussions with the Americans.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (4) Took note of the Note by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
£ CIGS/PP/121

C. Visit by Sir Frank Roberts

LORD MOUNTBATTEN said that the Committee would have seen the telegram[®] from H.M. Ambassador to Moscow on the possible action the Russians might take over Berlin. Sir Frank Roberts would be in the United Kingdom in June and it might be advisable to invite him to attend their meeting on Tuesday, 20th June, 1961, when they could discuss the question with him.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (5) Invited the Ministry of Defence to arrange for an invitation to be sent to Sir Frank Roberts.
• Moscow to Foreign Office No.997.

D. State of LIVE OAK Planning

COLONEL R.J. CHAUNDLER (Chief of the United Kingdom Delegation to LIVE OAK) said that there were four matters of which the Committee should be aware. First, the French team had recently stated that their Government was unable to provide any forces for the divisional size operation. He had that day been informed that General Norstad was considering issuing an instruction to the Commander-in-Chief, British Army of the Rhine, to continue planning for this operation based on a US/UK force. Secondly, General Norstad had told LIVE OAK to prepare an instruction to CINC,BAOR to carry-out live training of the TRADE WIND (battalion group) force as soon as possible. Thirdly, LIVE OAK had been studying the type of organisation that would be required to implement any of the military contingency plans. The American and French delegations were of the opinion that the LIVE OAK Group with a small increase, notably that of a British Major-General, would be the best

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instrument for this purpose and it was proposed to inform General Norstad accordingly. Lastly, the French team had prepared a study on the need to co-ordinate all plans for Berlin, including those sponsored by LIVE OAK, Berlin Defence Plans, and Allied Command Europe Emergency Defence Plans. The French proposal was that all these plans should be co-ordinated by the LIVE OAK Group.

In discussion the following points were made:-

- (a) General Norstad had so far only been authorised to make a plan for the composition, assembly and logistic support of a divisional size operation on a tripartite basis; no governmental authority existed for such a plan to be made on a US/UK basis. In view of the recent telegram sent to C-in-C BAOR, he would no doubt seek guidance from the Committee on receipt of these new instructions.
- (b) C-in-C BAOR had been instructed, following Ministers' recent discussions, not to carry out training of the TRADE WIND forces, but to refer any new orders on this matter to the Committee. An awkward situation would arise if General Norstad pursued his intention of ordering such training for he had been previously informed of Her Majesty's Government's consent to it.
- (c) Whilst the Committee would consider any requests by General Norstad for an increase in the LIVE OAK staff for the implementation of Berlin Contingency plans, it might be preferable if the necessary action were taken through the normal NATO chain of command. A decision on this matter - which was not required immediately - would depend on the outcome of the next round of US/UK talks on Berlin Contingency Planning as a whole.
- (d) The French study recommending the co-ordination of LIVE OAK plans with SACEUR's Emergency Defence Plans would emphasise the need for NATO as a whole to be brought in to Berlin Contingency Planning. Our representative in LIVE OAK should accordingly encourage the French to launch their study officially.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (6) Took note that the Chief of the Defence Staff would inform the Minister of Defence of these developments in LIVE OAK.
- (7) Instructed Colonel Chaundler to take note of their views.

SEC 5

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

30TH MAY, 1961.

- 3 -

TOP SECRET

CIRCULATED FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF

JP(61)82(Final)

14th July, 1961

UK EYES ONLY

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

JOINT PLANNING STAFF

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING
BRIEF ON PLANS TO RESTORE ACCESS TO BERLIN

Report by the Joint Planning Staff

In accordance with the instructions of the Chief of the Defence Staff, we have prepared a brief setting out the United Kingdom views on the various LIVEOAK plans. The paper includes at Appendix 'A' a summary of the LIVEOAK plans, and at Appendix 'B' suggested answers to some questions which might be posed by the Americans.

2. In preparing the brief, which is at Annex, we have consulted the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Joint Intelligence Staff.

Recommendation

3. We recommend that, if they approve our brief, the Chiefs of Staff should authorize its use by their representative during any discussions on Berlin contingency planning with United States authorities.

(Signed) D.L. POWELL-JONES
E.B. ASHMORE
E.V.M. STRICKLAND
D.C. STAPLETON.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING
BRIEF ON PLANS TO RESTORE ACCESS TO BERLIN

Amex 6
JP(61)82 (Amex)

AIM OF OPERATIONS

1. LIVEOAK recognizes* that no military action could by itself re-open access to Berlin if the Russians were determined to resist. The aim of all operations after the initial probe is, therefore, to provide circumstances in which negotiations might prove fruitful and to compel the Russians to face the unmistakable imminence of general war.

PLANS FOR GROUND ACCESS OPERATIONS

The Initial Probe (FREESTYLE)

2. This is a tripartite military probe⁺ solely to determine whether the Russians would use or permit the use of force to prevent passage. The plan covers three alternative courses of action, to be decided at the time, ranging from a small unarmed convoy to one supported by troops of about company strength and armoured cars. Fire would only be opened in self defence and the force would attempt to withdraw if opposed or obstructed.

UK View

We support this operation%.

Battalion Group Operation (TRADE WIND)

3. This is a tripartite operation which would be mounted only after the initial probe had shown Russian/GDR intention to obstruct access by force, and would be backed by the threat of nuclear operations.

UK View

We do not believe that tripartite land operations on a battalion or higher level would either convince the Russians of our determination or achieve the object of maintaining access to Berlin.

4. We commented[£] to General Norstad that this operation should only be undertaken when NATO was fully prepared for global war. In December, 1959, United Kingdom approval[£] was given for C-in-C BAOR to make detailed plans without commitment. Subsequently, War Office examination[£] of CINCPAC's plan showed that TRADE WIND could not be regarded as a sound military operation, mainly because of the ease with which it could be blocked fore and aft by demolition and thus placed in an ignominious position from which extrication would be difficult (there are forty-eight bridges between the frontier and Berlin). We accepted this view and informed the Minister of Defence that the operation could only result in a military disaster, but decided that it

- * COS(59)199
- + COS(59)173
- % COS.773/23/6/61
- £ COS.1205/23/9/59
- £ SEC SHAP 33
- & COS(60)213

- 2 -

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TOP SECRET

would be undesirable so to inform General Norstad officially⁸. Subsequently, however, the Chief of the Defence Staff did express⁹ some doubts to him. We have now signified agreement that training should be carried out and CINCPACOR has suggested¹⁰ to General Norstad that it should take place at Sennelager in late September or October this year.

Division Size Operation

5. When considering an operation on divisional scale, the original LIVEOAK Study¹¹ concluded that, since it would be militarily ludicrous to confine such a force to the autobahn, violation of territory covered by the Warsaw Pact would be involved; further, the removal of a force of this size from NATO would also have serious effects on the shield; finally, the logistic difficulties would be sufficient to eliminate this idea from further consideration. Notwithstanding these conclusions, General Norstad, in August 1960, requested permission to plan for the use of a force of divisional size. We considered that a divisional operation would be even more unsound than a battalion one and asked¹² that LIVEOAK should first undertake a feasibility study. This study¹³, on which General Norstad has based his instructions¹⁴ to CINCPACOR to plan for the use of a division-size force, visualized the following possible missions:-

- (a) To provide additional evidence of our determination to maintain ground access to Berlin, by its presence West of Helmsdorf, before and during the TRADE WIND operation.
- (b) After TRADE WIND has achieved its first objective, by providing circumstances in which negotiations might prove fruitful, to take physical control of vulnerable points on the ground access route and to escort surface traffic. While negotiations are in progress, to support and maintain the TRADE WIND force in position and to provide cover for its disengagement.

General Norstad has suggested that nuclear weapons may need to be provided in support but has left the detailed composition of this force to CINCPACOR.

UK View

claimed for
The merit of this particular concept is that, without violating GDR territory (i.e. by "picketing the route"), it could provide the TRADE WIND force with the backing it would need to prevent the autobahn being cut without Russian/GDR resort to force. It is claimed that it would provide evidence of a firm decision to maintain access by ground as well as by air, and that it would also help to maintain the Western military position while any negotiations were in progress. We believe that it would not appear convincing unless accompanied by Western mobilization and readiness for war, which in fact it would

8 COS(60)50th Mtg.
9 COS. 1467/9/11/60
10 GESEC 28
11 COS(59)199
12 COS. 1242/22/9/60
13 Annex to COS. 29/6/1/61
14 Appendix to COS. 182/10/2/61

- 3 -

UK EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET

significantly impair; further, such operations could be contained in circumstances which would either force the West to fire first or bring them to an ignominious halt, and would not necessarily re-open access or contribute anything to the viability of Berlin.

AIR ACCESS PLANS

6. Tripartite plans (JACK PINE) provide for air transport operations to cover a civil airlift, a garrison airlift, a combination of the foregoing, the evacuation of allied non-combatants and selected aliens, and air tactical operations. There is also a quadripartite plan (QBAL) for the supply by air of Berlin.

UK View

We have agreed to these plans, the United Kingdom contribution for which is within our capability.

Feasibility of Plans

7. Air/ground communications and navigation aids for these operations are vulnerable to Electronic Counter Measures (ECM), especially so in the circumstances of an airlift, when they could be attacked both from the ground and from the air at very short range. Only in the case of VHF ground/air communications is there a specific counter-countermeasure, in the form of high-power transmitters which could be used for broadcast control. There are, however, large numbers of aids and communications channels and the aircraft fit varies between types. The denial of all aids and communications channels would require a major and sustained Russian ECM effort. The West Germans consider that alternative routings will provide adequate point-to-point communications.

8. Serious and sustained electronic countermeasures could reduce our rate of effort considerably during bad weather and at night. On this account, airlift force requirements have been geared to operations in visual or marginal weather conditions (averaging 20 days out of 30) to guarantee the success of the airlift in the face of Russian jamming.

EFFECT ON THE RUSSIANS

9. A factor which would weight heavily with the Soviet Government would be their assessment of the staunchness of Western public opinion in support of their governments' policy. If the operations were not preceded by a general mobilization of NATO they would probably decide that the West was bluffing and was not prepared to accept the ultimate risk of global war. In this case they would exploit the West's action accordingly. They would manoeuvre us, so far as ground operations are concerned, into the position of having to be the first to shoot if we wished to proceed; and would then oppose the operation by such conventional military force as was necessary, which would not be much, meanwhile denouncing us as aggressor.

✓ JIC(60)40
 ✗ JIC(61)42

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10. The LIVEOAK plans are such that it would be difficult to convince the Russians of our determination and we could not hope to do so unless the operation was seen to be preceded by full scale (and popularly accepted) preparations for war - mobilization, with all the disruption to national economies involved. The danger of miscalculation would then be at its greatest.

SUGGESTED LINE TO BE TAKEN

11. The merit of air operations, as opposed to ground operations, is that, if successful, they contribute directly to the material support of Berlin and cannot be stopped by any means short of overt aggressive action. Any such attack would lend support to the Western position and could be used to justify whatever subsequent measures might be decided upon. We therefore maintain our view that once the initial land probe (FREESTYLE) has been tried, airlift operations provide the best hope of re-opening access to Berlin.

12. However, we believe that NATO readiness for war ought to precede all action other than an airlift, after FREESTYLE. If we went so far, the risks of war would be grave indeed. If we are not prepared to face these risks, the LIVEOAK ground access plans subsequent to FREESTYLE are militarily unjustifiable. If we are prepared for these risks, this is not the best way to face them.

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Handwritten notes:
 We will not say we are willing
 to face all the risks of war
 to support our position against
 a Russian move. Even the
 risk of miscalculation is a
 serious one. They would be
 down to this would mean risk
 of not knowing.

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

SUMMARY OF PLANS TO RESTORE ACCESS TO BERLIN

GROUND ACCESS PLANS

The Initial Probe (Operation FREESTYLE)

1. This is a tripartite military operation⁺ in the form of a probe along the autobahn to determine whether the Russians would use or permit the use of force to prevent Allied access to Berlin. The force would be organized on a tripartite basis and would be capable of three courses of action, to be selected in the light of circumstances at the time. CINCPAC is the field commander designate and responsible for the detailed planning.

Course A. An unarmed test convoy of four vehicles which would attempt passage. If obstructed, the convoy would withdraw.

Course B. An unarmed test convoy of three vehicles supported by armed troops. If obstructed, the convoy would after due warning, attempt to remove the obstruction. If forcibly obstructed, it would withdraw. Fire would only be opened in self defence.

Course C. An unarmed test convoy of three vehicles supported by armed troops of about company strength, armoured cars and engineer equipment to surmount obstacles. If obstructed, the convoy would, after due warning, attempt to surmount any obstacle within its capability. If forcibly obstructed, the convoy would withdraw under such fire from the armoured cars as might be necessary to disengage.

Battalion Group Operation (Operation TRADE WIND)

2. LIVEOAK considers^{*} that a tripartite battalion group operation along the autobahn would represent a serious military effort to re-open access in that it would be capable of maintaining contact with enemy forces which blocked its path or attacked it, and could not easily be engulfed. CINCPAC is the field commander designate and responsible for detailed planning.

3. The battalion group, organized¹ on a tripartite basis and including tanks, armoured cars, artillery and engineer support, would proceed from Helmstedt to Berlin along the autobahn, surmounting en route as many obstacles as its resources permitted. The actual method of operation would depend on factors which can only be determined at the time. However, the following guidance

+ COS(59)173
4 COS(60)187
* COS(59)199
1 COS(60)169

- 6 -

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is laid down for training and preparation:-

- (a) The force would be prepared to fight Russian/GDR forces if necessary.
- (b) The force would not open fire until fired on.
- (c) Russian/GDR use of firepower to close the autobahn would be met by maximum aggressive action within the resources of the force.

4. The Battalion Group would be assisted by air reconnaissance and, should it be attacked, Allied aircraft would also provide the necessary close air support to permit its disengagement.

Division Size Operation

5. General Norstad, although not prepared to give precise instructions, envisages the following possible missions for a tripartite division-size force:-

- (a) Prior to and during the TRADE WIND operation, provide additional evidence, by its presence in the area West of Helmstedt, of our determination to maintain ground access to Berlin.
- (b) After TRADE WIND has achieved its first objective, i.e. has provided circumstances in which negotiations might prove fruitful:-
 - (i) Take physical control of vulnerable points on the ground access route and escort surface traffic.
 - (ii) Support and maintain the TRADE WIND force in position while negotiations are in progress.
 - (iii) Provide cover for the disengagement of the TRADE WIND force.

6. In his instructions to CINCPAC who is responsible for detailed planning, General Norstad also included the following guidance on the composition and organization of the force:-

- (a) It should be of approximately division size, e.g. 10,000 to 12,000.
- (b) It should be capable of a variety of missions.
- (c) Planning consideration should include the use of tactical nuclear weapons in support, though General Norstad would retain direct control of their use.
- (d) The personnel to be provided by the three countries should be approximately equal in number.
- (e) Apart from air reconnaissance, combat air support should be restricted to supporting disengagement, although it should be readily available.

Q Appendix to COS.182/10/2/61

- 7 -
UK EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET

- (f) Consideration should be given to including a light airlift capability in addition to liaison aircraft.
- (g) The TRADE WIND Battalion may be included as part of the division.

AIR ACCESS PLANS

7. Tripartite air access plans, grouped under the code name "JACK PINE", provide for air transport operations to cover a garrison airlift, a civil airlift, a combination of the foregoing, the evacuation of Allied non-combatants and selected aliens and air tactical operations designed to maintain air access through the corridors to Berlin. There is also a quadripartite plan for the supply by air of Berlin. Operational control would be centralized under CINCUSAFE.

Air Transport Operations

8. Garrison Airlift (DARK BOTTLE). Provides for the logistic support of the Berlin garrisons by air should military surface traffic be interrupted. Each nation would be responsible for its own element. The UK daily commitment would be 5 MRT sorties, allowing for operations taking place only in visual or marginal weather conditions.

9. Civil Airlift (BROKEN BOTTLE). Provides for the substitution of civil by military aircraft to maintain air services to Berlin should scheduled commercial flights cease. The task would be shared equally between the Three Powers, the UK daily commitment being 9 MRT sorties.

10. Garrison/Civil Airlift (DOUBLE BOTTLE). A combination of these two airlifts, for which the UK daily commitment would be 12 MRT sorties.

11. Air Evacuation of Non-Combatants (TRIPLE PLAY). Provides for the air evacuation of Allied non-combatants and selected aliens from Berlin. The Three Powers have agreed to carry out the operation simultaneously, but with the reserved right to take unilateral action, subject to prior notice. The UK commitment would be a total of 33 Britannia sorties, which could be reduced by the backlift of aircraft engaged in other JACK PINE operations if these were in progress.

12. Quadripartite Berlin Airlift - QBAL(TUMBLE). Provides for the air supply of Berlin, with the Tripartite powers providing the airlift and West Germany providing the cargo, airfield facilities and logistic/administrative support. The UK contribution would be met by 12 MRT aircraft (plus 7 in reserve) from Transport Command and 39 aircraft from civil charter.

13. Air Tactical Operations (SHARP LANCE). These are tripartite operations by tactical aircraft, following interference with transport aircraft, to make unmistakably clear that the Three Powers are determined to maintain their right of air access within the corridors to Berlin and compel the Russians to face the imminence of war should they persist in obstructing access.

Under this concept, transport aircraft would fly in the corridors in accordance with existing procedures and fighter aircraft would provide either direct support, escort or cover within corridors, or indirect support by patrols at the Western ends of the corridors. The UK could meet its tactical air commitments during 1961 by the fighter squadrons in Germany reinforced by one Javelin squadron from Fighter Command. After the withdrawal of the fighter squadrons from Germany, planned for end-1961, Fighter Command would have to provide all the aircraft for the British contribution; this may become progressively more difficult.

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SUGGESTED ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS WHICH
MIGHT BE RAISED BY THE AMERICANS

Q.1.

You seem to assume that the TRADE WIND force will be obstructed or cut off. Is it not possible that this demonstration of determined action will be allowed free passage?

A.1.

We accept that the Russians or GDR might let an armed or escorted force pass. However, such passage would achieve nothing permanent, would prove nothing conclusive about the Russian intentions and merely gets the force at the wrong end of the autobahn. If the Russians or GDR understood, as is probable, that this was a battalion force and not a supply convoy they might well allow it to pass, but this would not help to get supply convoys through.

Q.2.

Could not a TRADE WIND force deal with any obstruction without fighting?

A.2.

The ability to deal with obstacles will depend upon the scale of engineer effort in the force. (It may be argued that the Russians/GDR are unlikely to destroy autobahn bridges and thereby permanently obstruct civilian traffic and alienate world opinion). However, even if they can deal with obstructions without fighting, this will not by itself guarantee autobahn access to subsequent supply convoys.

Q.3.

If you don't think the TRADE WIND force is adequate, what size of force do you suggest? (or - Don't you think one or two divisions in support of TRADE WIND would achieve the object?)

A.3.

Whatever the size of force, and the larger the more likely it would be to provoke hostilities, it could not guarantee access if the enemy did not wish it to.

Q.4.

Don't you see the need for some intermediate operation between the initial probe and the threat of all-out war?

A.4.

In our view the ultimate threat of all-out war must be clearly evident from the time the initial probe has failed. We see any intermediate ground operation resulting either in military defeat for the force involved or manifest failure to achieve any lasting advantage with obvious propaganda gain to the Russians and diminution of the credibility of the ultimate threat.

Q.5.

What if an airlift starts in November or December when the weather factor does not allow contact flying for 20 days out of 30?

A.5.

I agree that if a QBAL airlift starts in late autumn there might be a shortfall for the first month or two. The stocks in Berlin are such that a slow start should be acceptable provided the required average rate of supply over a period of six months is achieved. This should allow time to bring United Nations and world opinion to bear in persuading the Russians to abandon their obstruction.

Q.6.

What if the Russians obstruct an airlift by means other than ECM, e.g. by balloons, by air activity in the landing approaches or corridors, or by smoke generation around the Berlin airfields?

A.6.

Most possible forms of air obstruction have already been considered by the appropriate experts, who have suggested action to overcome them. In general, we must be prepared to lose aircraft by an overtly aggressive action which would be tantamount to shooting down.

COS. 1003/30/7/59

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Date 4/13/77
7/18/61

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CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX

TO

C.O.S.(61)45TH MEETING HELD ON
TUESDAY, 18TH JULY, 1961

2. BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

(Previous Reference: C.O.S.(61)43rd Meeting, Minute 3)

A. J.P.(61)82(Final)

THE COMMITTEE considered a report by the Joint Planning Staff setting out the United Kingdom views on the various Live Oak plans in the form of a brief for the use of the Military Representative at future tripartite and quadripartite meetings on Berlin Contingency Planning.

LORD MOUNTBATTEN said that the Committee would have seen from various Foreign Office telegrams* that meetings between the United States, United Kingdom, French and German Foreign Ministers were to take place in Paris between 4th and 8th August, 1961, and that military representatives were to participate in these discussions. The Committee had previously agreed that the Chief of the Imperial General Staff should represent them at such talks. He suggested, however, that should the United States not be represented by one of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it would be preferable if the Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff attended in his place. He believed that the report before them would serve as a satisfactory brief for either the Chief of the Imperial General Staff or the Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff; but he recommended that it should be read against the background of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the various plans, which he invited Sir George Mills to explain.

* Foreign Office to Washington Nos. 4870, 4871
Washington to Foreign Office Nos. 1171, 1734, 1739

SIR GEORGE MILLS (Chairman, British Defence Staffs, Washington) said that the problem of autobahn access must be seen in its true perspective as a small part of the broad canvas of military, political and economic measures which might be applied during a period of mounting crisis; it would be wrong to judge the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff views on land operations in isolation. The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff had made it quite clear to him that they fully appreciated that both the battalion and larger scale operations were militarily unsound; he also understood that they had informed the State Department that, in their view, autobahn access could not be restored by measures short of all-out war. Nevertheless, they were under an obligation to propose military action, and it was in fulfilment of this obligation that they had put forward General Norstad's plans for FREE STYLE, TRADE WIND and the divisional operation, which they considered to be the best military solutions short of fighting all-out war. They felt that it would not be realistic to jump straight from the probe to nuclear war, and they regarded successive operations on an increasing scale as a method of proving allied determination. Finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff constantly reiterated that the Western allies had rights of access to Berlin by both land and air, and they felt that if they were to take no action on land, in the event of obstruction, but to proceed straight to an airlift, they would thereby be surrendering their land access rights.

hard to believe

seems to contradict a solve

In discussion the following points were made:-

- (a) Whether or not we should try to maintain our rights of access by land, and whether these could be deemed to be surrendered by recourse to an airlift, was a political matter which was outside the competence of the Chiefs of Staff.
- (b) If the sole aim of land operations was to compel the Russians to be the first to resort to military force, then the size of the force used was irrelevant, for the aim could be as well achieved by a company as by a division.
- (c) It was understood that Brigadier General Richardson, the temporary United States Chief of Live Oak Staff, had put forward the theory that it would be wrong to proceed direct to all-out war without suitable graduated escalation. Militarily this theory made less sense even than the plans for road access. Whether or not it was acceptable politically to proceed from a small beginning direct to war without intervening steps was a political decision to be taken by Governments in the light of the success of other political and economic counter-measures.
- (d) The crux of military operations lay in the Russian determination to deny access; if they were firm they would be able to stop a division or a greater force. Apart from the fact that it was militarily unsound to misuse military formations in the way that the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff had in mind for the divisional operation, NATO land forces were not strong enough to be able to afford the loss of one or more divisions.

... gravely interfere with the later implementation of NATO war plans, should the crisis escalate to war, if we had first to commit our forces tripartitely in the ways suggested by Live Oak.

*An attempt
it had
gravelly...*

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (1) Approved the report by the Joint Planning Staff and authorised its use by the United Kingdom Military Representative at the forthcoming meetings in Paris.
- (2) Instructed the Secretary to send a copy to the United Kingdom National Military Representative, SHAPE, for use as a brief by Major-General Baker.
- (3) Took note of the provisional arrangements for the Conference*.

* Foreign Office to Washington Telegrams Nos. 4870 and 4871
Washington to Foreign Office Telegrams Nos. 1171, 1734 and 1739

B. Live Oak Studies

THE COMMITTEE had before them a Minute⁺ by the Secretary covering two memoranda by Brigadier General Richardson, the temporary Chief of Staff to Live Oak, on future studies to be undertaken in the Live Oak group.

LORD MOUNTBATTEN recalled that the Committee had not informed^o General Norstad whether they agreed to his proposals[%] that Live Oak should act as an operating staff to implement any of the Berlin Contingency Plans, should this be necessary, but had confined their reply to informing General Norstad of the appointment of Major General Baker as Chief of Staff; and of their agreement to a German Liaison Officer being included in Live Oak. It would be for Ministers to decide whether Berlin Contingency Plans should be implemented by Live Oak rather than through the normal NATO chain of command; it would first be necessary to obtain further details of the requirement. This information would emerge from studies 1(a) and 1(b) in Brigadier General Richardson's memorandum.

In discussion the point was made:-

- (e) It would be most difficult, in the present manpower situation, to provide any large increase in the Live Oak staff; this would particularly apply to signals specialists.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (4) Agreed with the views of the Chief of the Defence Staff.
- (5) Instructed Major General Baker to take note of their views.

+ COS.876/17/7/61
o COS.858/12/7/61
% Annex A to COS.813/4/7/61

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C.O.S. (61) 230

19TH JULY, 1961.

U.S. EYES ONLY

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

NATO STRATEGY - BRIEF FOR THE CHAIRMAN,
BRITISH DEFENCE STAFFS, WASHINGTON

Note by the Secretary

At their meeting* on Tuesday, 13th July, 1961, the Chiefs of Staff approved a report at Annex 'A' and a summary of present NATO strategy and United Kingdom views at Annex 'B'.

2. In approving the report at Annex 'A' the Chiefs of Staff:-
- (a) Authorized its use as a brief by the Chairman, British Defence Staff, Washington, in discussion in the Standing Group.
 - (b) Instructed the Joint Planning Staff to prepare a supplementary brief on priorities.

(Signed) G.S. COLE

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

19TH JULY, 1961.

* COS(61)45th Meeting, Minute 1

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Reference: DEFE 5/115

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ANNEX 'A' TO C.O.S.(61)230

NATO STRATEGY - BRIEF FOR THE CHAIRMAN,
BRITISH DEFENCE STAFFS, WASHINGTON

INTRODUCTION

1. The purpose of this brief is to assist you when the Standing Group consider the advice they will give the Secretary General in connection with his study on future NATO military requirements and how they should be met. It is intended to crystallize the military position within the guidelines provided by the statement² by the Minister of Defence in December, 1959, and the United Kingdom thoughts² now being put forward by Sir Paul Mason, and to provide you with a brief as to how the current interpretation of NATO strategy could be adapted to meet conditions of nuclear equipoise.

UNITED KINGDOM COMMENTS ON SUPREME
COMMANDERS' INTERPRETATION OF NATO
STRATEGY

Deterrence

2. The UK view is that NATO strategy must be directed towards maintaining an effective deterrent to war in all its forms rather than to preparations for fighting a protracted war in Europe. Conditions of nuclear sufficiency reinforce this view, especially if it is accepted that the Russians might be tempted to limited conventional action on the assumption that the West would not resort to massive nuclear retaliation in such circumstances. An effective deterrent is achieved in these conditions when the potential aggressor is confronted by NATO forces which are so organized, disposed, trained, equipped and supported that he will conclude that fatal risks would be involved in attacking, despite superior numbers and the advantage of surprise. The principal elements of the deterrent are adequate nuclear and other ready forces and the manifest determination to retaliate against any aggressor with an appropriate degree of force, including if necessary the use of nuclear weapons, with all the risks of escalation which this would entail. On this basis we outline below the differences which appear to exist between us and the NATO military commanders at present.

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Allied Command Europe

3. We are in agreement with what we understand to be SACEUR's views in the following respects:-

- (a) That forces required for deterrence (which we interpret to include those for the initial phase) should have priority over those required for any subsequent operations.

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g PNWN/P(61)21
E C-R(61)23

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- (b) That ACE forces must be able to meet a variety of possible Russian actions without necessarily resorting immediately to all-out war; in particular:-
- (1) ACE forces must be capable of responding to attack with conventional weapons when these are adequate to the situation.
- (11) The possibility of the selective application of tactical nuclear weapons in response to attack by superior conventional forces.
- (c) The idea of greater mobility for his forces.

4. In addition we consider that SACEUR should be encouraged to pursue to their logical conclusions the following points, which he already seems to accept in part. Firstly, a conventional Soviet or satellite attack in ACE, if met by determined opposition, would in our opinion either be abandoned or, if pressed, would rapidly escalate to all-out war. Secondly, it is both unnecessary to plan and impracticable to fight a battle in Europe after the strategic exchange, since the devastation in Western Europe could quickly make co-ordinated large-scale operations impossible. For this reason we believe that the size and shape of the forces and stockpiles which SACEUR proposes should be revised.

Allied Commands Atlantic and Channel

5. We are in agreement in the following respects:-

- (a) That forces should only be provided to meet the requirements for deterrence and operations in the initial phase.
- (b) That operations in the initial phase should include the control and exploitation of vital sea areas, the location and destruction of enemy naval forces and their sources of support, the protection of sea communications, and support for adjacent NATO commands.

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6. We do not see military re-supply operations in the subsequent phase as being justified since we consider practicable military operations on land to be irrelevant after the nuclear exchange. The battle then to be fought is of survival. To the extent that political and humanitarian considerations cause us to accept this as a requirement, survival will depend on re-supply, mainly by sea. If it is to be successful, it must be conducted under military control and there would be a requirement for Naval forces to ensure this; the majority should then be found from those required for the operations in the initial phase but the national needs of the survival phase must also be borne in mind.

A COS. 44/6/1/61

- 3 -

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The Ballistic Missile-Firing Submarine

7. SACLANT, SACEUR and the Channel Committee have not yet taken full account of the influence of the ballistic missile submarine on their interpretation of NATO strategy. This is because both American and Russian deployment of these vessels is still in the build-up phase and probably, in part, because the Polaris submarines do not operate under SACLANT or SACEUR command.

8. We foresee two effects as the strength of missile submarine forces increases. On the one hand, the Polaris submarines should in due course acquire all the pre-planned nuclear targets - including those on the NATO list - at present assigned to Attack Carriers. This will force the Striking Fleets to concentrate on naval and possibly land contingency targets, including operations in circumstances in which the discriminate use of nuclear weapons or strike subject to recall may be authorized. On the other hand, the Soviet missile submarine threat to the United States and primarily to the bases of Strategic Air Command is already recognized by the considerable NATO forces deployed in WESTLANT. As this Soviet force builds up, a similar threat to Bomber Command bases is foreseen.

9. We, therefore, foresee a changed requirement for Attack Carriers. This is likely to be reflected first in SACEUR's Command and to result in the deployment of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean being determined more by cold and limited war requirements than by those of NATO. The effect on the Striking Fleet Atlantic will be less marked because of the contingency targets to be expected in the area in the initial phase of global war, but a reduced force should become acceptable.

10. By about 1965^x CINCEASTLANT will be faced with the problem which now confronts CINWESTLANT in endeavouring to detect, track and, in the event of war, sink Soviet missile-carrying submarines before they fire. It is arguable whether this task is primarily a NATO one.

11. In general we feel also that there is room in NATO naval planning for economies on projects at present designed to fight a long maritime war. The reduced risk of escalation^o at sea may justify these projects but only if some probability of limited war at sea is accepted.

THE UNITED KINGDOM APPROACH

The Threat

12. The UK assessment is^o that, because of their recognition of the calamitous results of global war, the Soviet leaders are unlikely to start one as a deliberate act of policy, and will avoid embarking on courses of action which carry the risk of global war, unless they are certain that they can retain control of the evolving situation. In any case, if they were determined to pursue their aims by the use of force and thought there was a serious risk of the aggression escalating to global war, the Russians would hardly be likely to sacrifice the advantages that an all-out surprise attack would give them. There would seem to be little likelihood, therefore, of their

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deliberately undertaking any conventional aggression which they calculated might induce NATO to resort to strategic nuclear weapons. However this may be, the possibility of miscalculation must always remain.

13. We must therefore continue to convince the Russians that any form of aggression, however limited, will be met by the West with the appropriate degree of force, including if necessary nuclear weapons, and accepting the risk of escalation to all-out war, which is itself a powerful deterrent. The force levels resulting from a reassessment of the threat must therefore be related to the overriding need to maintain a credible deterrent. Providing that this is done, future force requirements might reasonably be based more on their effect on probable Soviet intentions and less on maximum Soviet military capability.

Probable Duration of Operations

14. In the case of general war the current Strategic Concept envisages intensive land, sea and air campaigns being conducted in conjunction with the nuclear strategic offensive over a period not likely to exceed thirty days. If it is accepted that the strategic nuclear exchange would be short, devastating and decisive, it is illogical to plan even for thirty days of intensive operations. Although the surviving NATO forces might well fight on it would be equally illogical to make costly preparations for any subsequent phase. It is impossible to offer a precise estimate of the total duration of Phase One but we have estimated in the probable sequence of events that land forces might be required to fight conventionally for about forty-eight hours before resorting to nuclear weapons, the use of which would then result either in a pause for negotiations or in rapid escalation to all-out war. Other nations may put forward different ideas on the time scale, but we consider that the total duration of Phase One would be a matter of days, rather than weeks. We suggest that the requirement for stockpiles should be reviewed accordingly: certainly the present 90 days requirement can be reduced.

15. A strategic nuclear exchange, though decisive, would not have the same direct effect on the war at sea as it would on the land campaign, and we agree with SACLAN that there will be no clear division between the phases of this aspect of the war.

16. A re-appraisal in NATO is therefore required of the probable duration and nature of operations in Phase One and the effect on force requirements in ACE, ACFLANT and ACCMAN.

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Priorities

17. The burden of defence at the present time is such that very serious regard should be had to the economic capabilities of member countries in estimating future force requirements. This is in line with the concept⁴, and we should ensure that in laying down priorities the Secretary General should be firmly guided on this aspect. We suggest that your advice should be based on our views set out above.

18. The need is to decide what is essential, as distinct from desirable, for continued deterrence in the NATO area. The allotment of commitments to member nations should be adjusted in accordance with realistic and up-to-date national capabilities.

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ANNEX 'B' TO C.O.S.(61)230

SUMMARY OF PRESENT NATO STRATEGY AND UNITED
KINGDOM VIEWS

PRESENT NATO STRATEGY

Overall Strategic Concept

1. The Overall Strategic Concept⁺, which was approved in 1957, emphasizes that the main object is to prevent war by creating an effective deterrent to aggression. It also envisages, inter alia:-

- (a) In case of general war the conduct of a series of mutually dependent land, sea and air campaigns of maximum intensity, including the nuclear strategic campaign, the object of which would be to defend the populations, territories, vital sea areas and offensive striking power of NATO, and to destroy the ability and the will of the enemy to pursue general war.
- (b) Subsequent operations of indeterminate duration after a period of reorganization and rehabilitation, to take immediate advantage of the superiority gained in the initial phase, in order to accomplish the remaining necessary military tasks leading to a termination of hostilities.
- (c) Preparations to deal immediately with infiltrations, incursions or hostile local action in the NATO area without necessarily having recourse to nuclear weapons.

2. It assumes that the period of operations referred to in (a) above is unlikely to exceed thirty days, the first few days of which would be characterized by the greatest intensity of nuclear exchange. It does not attempt to define the period of (b), but accepts that large scale operations during the second phase will be precluded by the devastation caused by an all-out nuclear exchange; and states that priority must be given to the provision of forces-in-being capable of effectively contributing to success in the initial phase.

3. The concept emphasizes that the maintenance of adequate military strength to prevent war should be consistent with economy of effort, resources and manpower; that defence planning must combine maximum efficiency with maximum economy; and that the maintenance of economic stability constitutes an important element of national security. It also accepts that certain NATO nations may need to retain flexibility in order to meet military situations short of general war outside the NATO area.

SACEUR's Implementation of the Strategic Concept

4. In furtherance of the Overall Strategic Concept SACEUR plans⁺ to conduct an immediate, massive nuclear offensive aimed at destroying the enemy's nuclear capability, forces, resources and communications; to contain the enemy land advance as far forward as possible; to reduce his naval potential by

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offensive naval operations; to take any opportunity to regain the initiative through the conduct of offensive operations; and to reorganize and rehabilitate available forces as soon as possible as a pre-requisite for the conduct of the offensive leading to the termination of hostilities.

5. However, SACEUR has also recently issued a statement of strategic guidance for ACE from which it is apparent that he does not intend to resort to the immediate use of nuclear weapons unless forced to do so by enemy action. His forces are to be capable of fighting with conventional weapons initially, and he is taking steps to safeguard his nuclear armoury during such a period. (He has, however, expressed doubts whether his nuclear weapons could survive a protracted period of conventional operations.) He considers that the selective use of limited atomic firepower will not necessarily result in total war, although it may heighten the degree of risk.

SACLANT's Implementation of the Strategic Concept

6. SACLANT interprets his mission as protecting the SACLANT area for NATO use and denying its use to the enemy as a means of bringing the war to a successful conclusion. He sees his tasks as follows:-

- (a) To control and exploit vital sea areas.
- (b) To locate and destroy enemy naval forces.
- (c) To engage in the nuclear counter-offensive.
- (d) To support adjacent NATO commands.
- (e) To preserve, protect and maintain sea communications.
- (f) In the subsequent phase, to conduct the tasks required for reorganization, re-supply and the accomplishing of necessary military tasks leading to the conclusion of war.

7. Except for sub-para (f) above this concept of operations is based on D-Day tasks to be undertaken during Phase One, and SACLANT's force requirements are based on these tasks only. Emphasis is placed on the need for early offensive action to enhance the ability of NATO naval forces to undertake subsequent tasks. Such action will include nuclear strikes against naval targets, anti-submarine operations which would include an intensive transit offensive, and submarine and mining operations. At the same time defensive operations would be undertaken to control and protect allied merchant shipping.

UNITED KINGDOM VIEWS

The Minister of Defence's Statement

8. In December, 1959, the NATO Council discussed the need to adapt the structure of NATO forces to changes in weapons and

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techniques of warfare. The Minister's statement⁹ at this meeting concluded by suggesting that emphasis should be placed on the prevention of war and on dealing immediately with limited aggression by concentrating on the shield and sword elements of the deterrent, if necessary at the expense of preparations for the conduct of the later stages. He believed that these principles followed logically from the agreed basis of NATO planning, and could usefully be taken as a guide to planning in general - especially in assessing force goals and deciding priorities for meeting them.

Previous Examination of NATO Strategy

9. In September, 1960, a study¹⁰ of NATO strategy in the light of present and foreseen circumstances suggested that changed conditions affected the NATO Strategic Concept to the extent that:-

- (a) The need to prevent war becomes of even greater importance.
- (b) The concept of a shield force which is able, even after a strategic nuclear exchange, to maintain territorial integrity and sustain operations until the will and ability of the enemy to pursue global war is destroyed, is no longer valid.
- (c) The size of the ACE shield forces would be determined by the requirements to:-
 - (i) Counter intimidation on the borders of the NATO area.
 - (ii) Identify aggression on whatever scale.
 - (iii) Deal immediately with infiltration or small-scale conventional aggression without necessarily having recourse to nuclear weapons.
 - (iv) Be capable of resisting and delaying a larger-scale conventional attack, using at least tactical nuclear weapons if the attack were persisted in. This would both make clear to the Russians that such an attack might escalate to global war and give the West time for making the necessary decisions.

The Mottershead Working Party

10. The Working Party started from the premise that in an era of mutual nuclear sufficiency the nuclear deterrent might cease to be credible unless a strategy could be devised which provided for whatever degree of force, not excluding nuclear weapons, might be required to induce an aggressor to abandon his aggression. In order to implement the concept¹¹ which they put forward it would be necessary to modify existing NATO strategy to the extent that:-

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- (a) The immediate response to aggression will no longer be instant resort to all-out war.
- (b) Provision would have to be made for a NATO response to scales of aggression larger than that of a local hostile action without initiating all-out nuclear war, but including the discriminate use of tactical nuclear weapons if necessary.

The Working Party also concluded^g that the role of the shield forces during the nuclear exchange would be of quite secondary importance and that there would not be a need for additional nuclear weapons either for this stage, or after it - when any fighting could only continue without coherent central direction.

11. The Chiefs of Staff concluded that, subject to certain reservations^o, the Hottershead concept was worth pursuing in NATO. Some of the views expressed in it have been discussed^e in the North Atlantic Council, and appear to have been received favourably.

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British Embassy,

MOSCOW.

10 JUL 1961

July 19, 1961.

CA1071/159

My dear Evelyn.

The Swedish Ambassador, who is Dean of the Cops and has been here for some fourteen years, called this morning to discuss the Berlin situation. His immediate purpose was to check up on what he had read from Joe Alsop in the Herald Tribune and from Drew Middleton in the New York Times on my Ballet conversation with Khrushchev on July 2. I told him quite honestly that both these eminent journalists had presented a very partial and misleading account - indeed I am surprised that Drew Middleton, with his good London contacts, should have got the whole thing so wrong. I then told Sohlman in general terms the gist of what had passed, saying that Khrushchev had in fact confirmed in private what he has constantly been saying in public. I asked Sohlman whether he, with his incomparable experience here, could give me any indication of what Soviet intentions really were. Sohlman replied by telling me of an interesting conversation he had about ten days ago with Koslov, who is generally regarded as the most powerful man here after Khrushchev. They had met at a big reception and Koslov had opened the conversation by asking Sohlman point blank whether he thought there would be war this autumn. Sohlman replied that there would not be if the decision were left to Sweden. Koslov retorted that on the contrary, Sweden bore a very heavy degree of responsibility for the deterioration in East-West relations. Hammarskjold was a Swede and it was his partial attitude in favour of the West which had destroyed Soviet confidence and exacerbated the whole international situation. If it had not been for Hammarskjold the Soviet Union and the West would now be on far better terms. After this unpromising opening, Sohlman got the conversation back to Germany and Berlin. Koslov then made the interesting statement that it had long been clear to the Soviet leaders that the only possible basis for peace in Europe was the status quo. If the Russians were to attempt to advance their interests westwards, there would be a third world war. They therefore had no intention of taking any such risk. But they considered it equally self-evident that any attempt on the part of the West to move eastwards or to attack the Soviet bloc would mean a nuclear world war.

Koslov had gone on to say that in this situation the obvious course was to give formal recognition to the present de facto situation and so avoid any possible risk of misunderstanding in the future. Koslov maintained that this was the main Soviet objective. The Soviet leaders fully recognised that they could not in essentials modify

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Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh, K.C.M.G., C.B.,
Foreign Office, S.W.1.

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the present Western position even in regard to Berlin, except in so far as there must be some formal if only de facto consolidation of the position of the D.D.R. Koslov had gone on to speak on much the same lines as Khrushchev had to me about the impossibility of German reunification, at least for a long time to come. When pressed on this, he had admitted that in the Soviet view reunification would only be possible when the West German social structure had changed and, when further pressed, had said this meant when West Germany had become Communist.

Sohlman added that he had received similar indications from influential Soviet "backroom boys". In this context he told me that he had discovered to his surprise that important foreign policy decisions were handled not only in the Central Committee and in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but also in an important committee under the Council of Ministers (I suppose a rough equivalent would be our Cabinet Offices), which in effect transmitted instructions which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs carried out. Gromyko is of course in all three bodies.

I asked Sohlman why, if the Soviet objective was simply to confirm the status quo, they made so much noise about West German rearmament and also why they had chosen to stir up the Berlin crisis at this moment insisting that it must be settled before the end of the year. Sohlman told me that his impression, based upon many conversations with many Russians, was that the Russians were genuinely concerned over the growing strength in the Western Alliance of the Federal Republic. They were equally concerned over the bad state of affairs within the D.D.R. Despite their real confidence in their own future progress, they were afraid that the local situation in both parts of Germany was likely to deteriorate from their point of view if nothing were done in the relatively near future. Feeling as they do that the present relationship between the Soviet Union and the West is relatively favourable so long as they do not openly attack us, they therefore regarded this year as the best and perhaps the last year in which to stabilise the whole German situation and so avoid future complications which might well lead to a third world war. They realise of course that this stability will be only relative and probably only temporary but they seem to think that the advantages outweigh the risks, which they do not rate very highly, of the Western reaction resulting in war.

I myself find it difficult to pronounce clearly on Russian motives. They are no doubt mixed. There are certainly long- and short-term objectives and it would be in keeping with the Soviet character if they have not themselves decided where the boundary line should be drawn between what they would like to get and what they will settle for this year. This clearly depends upon their

/assessment

Interdependence in Defence Research, Development and Production

MR. WATKINSON, welcoming Mr. McNamara, said that he understood that memoranda of understanding on four non-controversial items - mortars and mortar ammunition, anti-tank weapons, drone equipment, and silver zinc batteries - were nearly ready for joint signature, which would mark the end of the first round of the Rubel/Zuckerman exercise. The exercise had gone well so far; but from now on, if more controversial items were dealt with, it was likely to impinge on national economic interests; it might also be necessary to extend it to include other countries, such as Germany and France. In this case, two questions would arise: first, how to proceed with the long-term items where little money or effort had so far been expended by either side; and secondly, how to avoid direct and open competition in NATO over those major items - BLUE WATER and SERGEANT were examples - which would be due for settlement in the near future, when Mr. Garrett reported. It was the answer to the second question that he regarded as crucial. It could not, in his view, safely be left to the existing machinery in NATO. It was very important, particularly at this juncture, to avoid any course of action that might be taken by the Russians or by our friends to indicate a rift in the Alliance.

2. MR. McNAMARA said that he was in general agreement with Mr. Watkinson's analysis. He favoured a three-pronged approach to the problem. First, continued use should be made of the Rubel/Zuckerman channel. Mr. Rubel and Sir Solly Zuckerman should press on with additions to the list of items which, without too much difficulty, could be covered by relatively uncontroversial understandings of the sort that were about to be signed; every addition would strengthen the base of mutual confidence on which the longer term agreements must rest. But it was most important to avoid leakages to the Press and public speculation about where the process would lead in twenty years' time. Secondly, and simultaneously, some way must be found of strengthening the existing NATO machinery for interdependence. The decision making processes in NATO were slow and ineffective and the staffs inadequate. He thought it might be worthwhile to add a strong technical director to the NATO organisation, possibly on General Norstad's staff. Meanwhile, until the NATO machine had been strengthened in some such way, it would be necessary to continue bilaterally, but at the same time - and this was his third line of approach - to bring in other NATO countries, in particular the Germans. Germany was by far the largest potential customer for conventional weapons, and was spending very little on Research and Development. If the Germans were brought in promptly, before they were tempted to start independent development, it could be of considerable help to the United Kingdom and the United States. Mr. McNamara went on to say that he saw no particular need to associate the Canadians with the exercise at this stage; they were well pleased with a United States/Canadian agreement which had been reached a few months previously on joint production of the F.104.G; and in any case he believed that the value of these arrangements tended to diminish as the square of the number of participating countries.

3. SIR SOLLY ZUCKERMAN said that if space research and strategic systems were excluded, there was little disparity between United States and United Kingdom expenditure on Research and

Development.

4. MR. WATKINSON said that he, too, recognised the importance of bringing in the Germans. As to the Canadians, he had kept Mr. Harkness informed in a general way about what was going on and would, if necessary, write to him again to bring him up to date. But he did not see in Mr. McNamara's proposals any solution to the BLUE WATER/SERGEANT controversy, which was bound to come up in NATO before measures to strengthen NATO procedures and staff could take effect. Would it be possible for the United Kingdom and the United States to reach some kind of market sharing agreement over BLUE WATER and SERGEANT and to tell the Germans so?

5. SIR SOLLY ZUCKERMAN said that BLUE WATER/SERGEANT brought out very well the inadequacy of NATO's arrangements in this field - for example, nobody in NATO was prepared to decide whether or not a NATO war would be fought in an E.C.M. environment.

6. MR. McNAMARA proposed that Mr. Rubel and Sir Solly Zuckerman should be authorised, in addition to the work already laid on them, to examine and report on some of the more contentious items, including BLUE WATER/SERGEANT. They should prepare a statement of the problem, an agreed analysis of the facts, the differences between the two sides, and possible solutions. This would provide a proper basis for decision. At the same time the United Kingdom and United States Ambassadors to NATO should be consulted about strengthening the NATO machinery for co-ordinated Research and Development and Production. Sir Solly Zuckerman should get in touch with the Minister to the United States Ambassador to NATO who was already concerning himself with this problem.

7. MR. WATKINSON endorsed these proposals.

NATO Strategy

8. MR. McNAMARA said that he believed that the immediate emphasis in any discussion of NATO strategy should now be on Berlin rather than on the longer term problems, such as the control and use of nuclear weapons and the role of conventional forces.

9. MR. WATKINSON, summarizing United Kingdom views on NATO Strategy, said that we were concerned to find the right balance between nuclear and conventional forces in NATO. The conventional forces must be capable of dealing with minor probes or accidental incursions; and also of containing a larger conventional attack until the decision to use nuclear weapons had to be taken. But they would not need to be capable of defeating a full scale conventional Soviet attack without resort to nuclear weapons. There were military dangers, as well as political advantages, in "raising the threshold". The credibility of the deterrent might thereby be weakened; and prolonging the conventional battle would make escalation to all-out war more likely. He did not however, dissent from Mr. McNamara's emphasis on the Berlin situation at this time. Indeed, he had understood from recent conversations with Dr. Stikker that as Secretary General he might soon ask the Council to postpone for the time being the problems raised in the United Kingdom memorandum on

nuclear strategy, in the interests of NATO unity. But there was one pressing question to which his attention had been drawn during his recent visit to B.A.O.R., namely the weakness in the chain of command and communications for the control of nuclear weapons in NATO.

10. THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF said that he had for long been concerned about the problem of special communications, both at the highest political level and in the field. He recognised that NATO Commanders were under positive control, that is, they could not initiate the use of nuclear weapons without a positive instruction to do so. But if a Commander in an outlying sector failed to receive instructions because of a breakdown in communications and found himself about to be overrun, was there not a risk that he would take matters into his own hands? The possibility, which had been canvassed, of the discriminate use of nuclear weapons would only aggravate the problem. A solution would be found; but it was not going to be easy.

11. MR. WATKINSON and MR. McNAMARA agreed that for the time being the communications problem should be studied nationally and that the number of people engaged on the study should be kept as small as possible.

12. Concluding this part of the discussion, MR. WATKINSON said that though he accepted that this was not the moment for pressing the broader questions of NATO strategy in the Council, he feared that the Germans would nevertheless press for more megatons in Europe. It would not be possible for the United Kingdom to acquiesce in this.

Berlin

13. MR. McNAMARA opened by summarizing the defence sections of the United States Memorandum on Measures for Dealing with the Berlin Situation. He said that a request would be made to Congress on 26th July for a budget supplement of \$ 3.2 billion for FY.1962; this would be in addition to supplements already requested earlier this year totalling some \$ 3 billion. The bulk of this money would go on substantial increases in conventional forces; in particular, it would give the United States a capability, by 1st January, 1962, for moving an additional six divisions to Europe, should the situation warrant it. But it would also strengthen the credibility of the strategic nuclear deterrent by making it possible to retain 6 wings of B.47 bombers and to accelerate existing plans for increasing from 33% to 50% the proportion of B.47s and B.52s that could be put into the air in a 15-minute alert. Air lift capacity would be enlarged by an additional 6-8 transport squadrons; and there would be 24 additional fighter squadrons. The main purposes of the programme were to give evidence of determination, to strengthen the position for negotiation, and to introduce a series of military options between a small probe and nuclear action.

14. In response to questions, MR. McNAMARA said that the United States were not aiming at building up NATO forces to the point where victory could be assured, against whatever the Russians could bring up, by conventional forces alone. But the balance, even now, with 20 NATO divisions and 20 Russian divisions on the central front, was not as disproportionate as

was sometimes supposed. He also emphasised that the build-up was not aimed at any particular D-day but rather at a permanent strengthening of posture. It was important to have available a series of military options that could be exercised at a time of our own choosing, as responses to political aggression. He envisaged, for example, that a land probe would not take place until all other reasonable courses had failed; certainly, it should not be an automatic response to the signing of a peace treaty with East Germany. The question of training for a land probe he regarded as relatively minor; it was but one of a great many alternatives, some of them much more difficult to work out. He went on to say that the United States attached importance to bringing the Germans into Berlin planning as soon as possible and hoped that the United Kingdom would support the proposed meetings of Senior Officials and Western Foreign Ministers in Paris.

15. MR. WATKINSON said that he and the British Chiefs of Staff fully supported the proposals for meetings in Paris. He hoped, with Mr. McNamara, that quadripartite military discussions would continue after these meetings. He wished to stress, however, that in the United Kingdom view, it was of overriding importance that the Russians, not the West, should be clearly seen, in the United Nations and by our Commonwealth partners, to be the ones to make the first aggressive move. It was on this score that he had doubts about, for example, a divisional operation up the autobahn. The division would be bound, as a measure of common military prudence, to straddle the autobahn and this would constitute a violation of East German territory. This was why United Kingdom thinking favoured an airlift as a means of testing Russian intentions.

16. MR. McNAMARA said that it was partly with an airlift in mind that the United States were proposing to increase the number of tactical air squadrons by about 30. But it was important to have a wide range of responses in order to retain flexibility. The United States proposals would add greatly to their own sea power and anti-submarine power and make it possible to consider measures such as closing the exit from the Baltic. Stopping Russian use of civil airfields was another possibility. But to be credible all these measures, including economic counter-measures, had to stem from a position of basic military strength.

17. SIR SOLLY ZUCKERMAN emphasised that the long-term effects of these changes would be to alter the spectrum of force within the armed Services. By strengthening the conventional element we would provide for greater flexibility of response as opposed to an immediate recourse to the threat of nuclear war.

18. THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF said that priority should be given to measures which harmed the East Germans, because that would frustrate the Russian claim to be acting out of consideration for East Germany's interests.

19. MR. McNAMARA then gave a brief account of the ways in which the United States expected her allies to strengthen their contribution to NATO. The main immediate contribution should come from Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, and should take the form of an increase in land forces and the making good of deficiencies in POL, ammunition and weapons. The Federal Republic

would be expected to bring her 8 divisions to combat readiness and to add a ninth by January, 1962, and it would be necessary to extend the period of enlistment beyond 12 months. He had talked with Herr Strauss, who appeared to accept that increased orders of equipment and supplies from abroad would be needed to remedy logistic weaknesses. France must re-equip and man the division from Algeria and deploy one more division. The United Kingdom, it was hoped, would build up her manpower strength in B.A.O.R. to 55,000 men and would have deployable, though not necessarily in Germany, the units needed to bring B.A.O.R. up to three full divisions. As to stocks, there were apparently differences in NATO in the method of calculating the number of days' supplies. The United States were certainly not pressing for stock levels based on fighting on after a nuclear exchange. But it was important to reach reasonable stock levels quickly. Apart from these immediate measures, to be carried through by the end of 1961, a second round of force increases might be necessary later if the crisis developed.

20. MR. WATKINSON said that various measures to strengthen British forces in Germany were already under consideration, e.g. the addition of a THUNDERBIRD regiment; and the withdrawal of the remaining fighter squadrons had been stopped. Moreover, the Strategic Reserve was readily transportable to Germany, though at present we had more men tied up in Kuwait than we would like. But he must make it clear that the United States proposals would present us with very difficult manpower problems, which would have to be considered. Measures such as the calling up of reservists and the embodiment of the T.A. were short-term solutions and only made sense if it was intended to use the troops for a particular emergency.

21. MR. McNAMARA said that the United States faced a similar problem and because of the difficulty of retaining reservists for any length of time, had decided against any large scale call up of reservists. The additional manpower needed would be found in the main by stepping up the draft. He hoped, too, that when it became known in a day or two that the President had no intention of declaring a state of emergency and calling up large numbers of reservists, that would be a factor making for calm.

22. SIR EVELYN SHUCKBURGH said that it was important not to do anything that might make Khrushchev speed up his plans or alarm the neutrals. In that connection how did the Americans intend to present to public opinion the accelerated increase in the number of bombers on ground alert status? Was this a long-term measure?

23. MR. McNAMARA explained that it was intended to maintain the 50 % ground alert indefinitely, but that it was a defensive measure, against surprise attack, which he thought would be well understood.

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G.O.S. (61) 239

25TH JULY, 1961

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE CONTROL OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS IN NATO

Note by the Secretary

At their meeting⁺ on Tuesday 20th July, 1961 the Chiefs of Staff approved the report at Annex. In approving the report they authorised the despatch of the telegram[@] at Appendix.

(Signed) G.S. COLE

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

25TH JULY, 1961.

+ CCS(61)46th Meeting, Minute 3
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ANNEX TO COS(61)239

MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE CONTROL
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN NATO

INTRODUCTION

1. When the MC/CS discussed a paper^a on this subject at the 26th Meeting, they instructed^b the Standing Group to rewrite it in the light of their discussion, extending its scope to include the whole NATO area and the control of nuclear weapons at sea. The Standing Group were also to ensure that the revised paper provided a full military background to the problem so that the Military Committee and members of the North Atlantic Council should have adequate knowledge of this vital subject. BDS, Washington, has now asked^c for comments on the revised draft Memorandum^d which has also taken account of the points raised in our paper^e on the subject. They also state that, as the Secretary General has requested early transmission of the document to the Council, it is proposed^f that the MC/PS shall take processing action rather than delay till the December meeting of the MC/CS.

AIM

2. To examine and comment on the revised draft Memorandum^g.

THE REVISED DRAFT MEMORANDUM

3. The paper recognizes the need for any system of control to reconcile the military requirement to use nuclear weapons when needed with the sovereign political responsibility of member nations. It examines the more important military aspects of control, particularly those affecting the decision-making processes governing the uses of nuclear weapons. It makes no attempt to deal with the political decision-making process, but it is intended to reflect the military circumstances in which political decisions must be made.

The Strategic Concept

4. The discussion is based on the existing Strategic Concept (MC 14/2). In general war NATO defence would depend on the immediate exploitation of its nuclear capability. Limited Russian aggression in the form of infiltrations, incursions or hostile local actions must be met without necessarily using nuclear weapons, although NATO must be prepared to resort quickly to nuclear weapons, should the situation require it. If, however, the Russians sought to broaden or prolong an incident the situation would call for the utilization of all weapons as there is no NATO concept of limited war.

Comment

5. Whilst this might be interpreted as precluding a flexible response to limited aggression, the Memorandum later recognizes a possible case for the discriminate use of nuclear weapons.

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Forms of Russian Aggression

6. The paper goes on to consider four forms of Russian aggression: nuclear surprise attack, nuclear attack after strategic warning, conventional attack and hostile action. In the case of surprise attack the need to ensure the survival and effectiveness of the retaliatory forces severely limits the time available for any decision-making, even at the military level, and points to the need for adequate authorization machinery or, if not feasible, for advanced delegation of authority from the sovereign political level. Although strategic warning would provide more time for consultation and military preparation, it may fail to indicate whether the attack will be nuclear or conventional and thus the requirement remains the same. In the case of conventional attack, it is argued that, if NATO is not overrun, there should be time for reaching decisions but a local breakthrough might give only a fleeting moment when the immediate use of nuclear weapons would be effective. In addition, the Russians in calculating the risks of their aggression might at any time resort to nuclear weapons; this would be analogous to a surprise attack and equally demands the ability and authority for quick reaction. In the event of local hostile action, the paper envisages the timely use of a few tactical nuclear weapons to "force a pause" and recognizes that there may be time for decisions. In this case, Supreme Commanders would need to exercise close control to minimize any risk of escalation but would not require delegated authority before the event.

Comment

7. We see military justification in applying these principles in the case of nuclear surprise attack and nuclear attack after strategic warning. However, in the case of conventional attack, while we recognise the military advantages of advanced delegation, and the need if possible to provide guide-lines to assist the military commanders, political control will need to be applied if nuclear weapons have to be used. The nuclear control system for these circumstances is in need of further study, particularly the critical aspect of the time factor in the light, among other things, of the survivability of the nuclear retaliatory forces, and the type of control feasible above the level of the supreme commanders.

Delegation of Authority for Defence in Specific Situations

8. The paper also raises the question of possible delegation of authority for Commanders to use nuclear weapons in purely defensive roles against specific hostile acts within the NATO area, where the risks associated with their use should be less than in other circumstances. Any such use would be governed by closely defined rules of engagement and the degree of authority to use specific weapons would depend upon the potential risks as compared with the probable consequences of inadequate action. The paper quotes illustrative examples.

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Comment

9. Such a concept would not only meet with political objections but would demand some relaxation of custodial safeguards, thus increasing risks of unauthorized use. It is likely, therefore, to be subjected to critical argument in the Council and it is unlikely that delegated authority could be justified in any situation where the threat was not vital to the survival of NATO. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the problem exists and we consider that the question is properly included for discussion.

Military Command and Control Organization

10. The paper emphasizes that the command and control organization must be positive and immediately responsive to Supreme Commanders. Control must balance the need for swift decision with the need to ensure the minimum essential use of nuclear weapons. The control system must be invulnerable and absolutely reliable and this demands secure, high-capacity communications. Any shortcomings in these complex facilities could only be offset by some degree of delegation of military decision.

Comment

11. These principles are in accord with United Kingdom views⁺.

Safeguards against Unauthorized Use of Nuclear Weapons

12. The paper explains the present custodial system in NATO and claims that it is effective in the present situation. It then suggests that the same degree of control might be desirable even if the present national custodial system should disappear, but will be more difficult in the face of increasing numbers, dispersal and mobility of nuclear weapons. The need for further study of this problem is pointed out.

Comment

13. We have already concluded⁺ that, although the risk of unauthorized use of nuclear weapons is lessened by the custodial system, there remains some risk, which would be much increased if nuclear weapons were placed under NATO control without a similar custodial system. We agree that further study is necessary.

Military Controls and Constraints

14. The application of constraints rules in general war, in order to limit attacks on densely populated areas and to safeguard friendly and neutral populations, is explained. The paper considers that similar controls to meet other circumstances, particularly hostile local actions, are both possible and necessary.

Comment

15. We consider that these controls and constraints are of even greater importance in the discriminate use of nuclear weapons.

Communication Requirements

16. The paper elaborates the need for a communications organization which must be capable of promulgating immediately all

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available intelligence, transmitting orders in a matter of seconds and enabling the military commanders to control their forces in situations ranging from global war to hostile local actions.

Comment

17. We have already supported^g the NATO basic military requirement for a comprehensive communications system. Discussion should be related to technical feasibility.

CONCLUSIONS

18. We conclude that the draft Memorandum provides a comprehensive military background to the problems of control over the use of nuclear weapons, and is, therefore, suitable as a basis for discussion in the MC/PS and subsequently in the NATO Council.

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Nor in East, do we really want Ger reunif, at least for the time being, though we cannot

abandon the principle of self-determination for the Germans. The same is probably true of the rest of the North Atlantic Alliance, including the West Germans. German reunification now would upset what has been achieved in Western European integration since the war. We are not seeking to bring about the collapse of the East German régime through the departure of its most valuable citizens; on the contrary, we (and this includes the Federal Republic) are embarrassed by the greatly increased flow of refugees. If it were a question of a general stabilisation of the existing division in Europe, at least for a period of years, we should presumably have no reason to object; indeed, given the strength of the Soviet position on the ground we should probably consider ourselves lucky to obtain it. Unpleasant though it would be to have to bolster up a Communist dictatorship like that of Herr Ulbricht, it is not necessarily the case that in the long run a peace treaty with that régime would be detrimental to freedom in Germany. For the East German régime will not reach the end of its troubles merely by acquiring a degree of international recognition, nor even by reducing the nuisance of Berlin. It is at least arguable that the influence of the 47 million West Germans could be brought to bear more effectively on the 17 million East Germans if the Federal Government would pursue a different policy and be prepared to enter into closer relationships with the East German régime. They have hitherto shown remarkable lack of courage in this respect.

10. In other words, it seems not inconceivable that we could build a negotiating policy on the broad principle of stabilisation for a period of years, say for the next five years, and that we could reach a practical deal with Mr. Khrushchev on this basis without either side being compelled to abandon any really crucial position. It must be recognised that under any such deal the West would have necessarily abandoned a certain number of principles which have hitherto been strongly held. Such a policy would mean placing the Berlin problem in a wider frame and attempting a general - if provisional - stabilisation of the German situation. Possible elements out of which such a deal might be constructed are as follows:-

(a) We should accept the decision of the Soviets and their friends to sign a peace treaty with East Germany and be willing to deal with the D. D. R. as the de facto authority in East Germany.

(b) We need not ourselves sign a peace treaty with East Germany or recognise it de jure. It would probably be necessary, however, for the Federal Government to abandon the "Hallstein" doctrine whereby they refuse diplomatic relations with any country which enters into similar relations with the D. D. R. The result of this will be a great increase of East German diplomatic activity throughout the world. A longer term result might be a move for the admission of both Germanys into the United Nations.

(c) We might urge the Federal Government to consider the possibility of establishing contacts with East Germany which would go some way in the direction of the confederal relationship between the two Germanys which the Russians urge.

C (61) 116 July 26, 1961. ⁻³⁻ "Berlin," Lord Howe. *Open esp. in notes*

(d) We could recognise the overall frontiers of Germany (Oder-Neisse line).

(e) Our conditions for all this would be a guarantee by the Russians that the present status of West Berlin would be preserved (i. e., no free city in the Russian sense and no Russian troops) and that Western access to West Berlin, both civilian and military, would be fully and freely maintained by their clients, the D. D. R. authorities. We would not insist on regarding the D. D. R. personnel as agents of the Russians; we would deal with them on their own merits as de facto German authorities; but the Russians would have undertaken a contractual obligation towards us to see that our access was not interfered with and we would seek redress of grievances from them and not from the D. D. R. Government. We would claim that our existing rights remained valid at the same time, but we need not insist on their admitting it.

(f) The Russians would not give such guarantees regarding the behaviour of their German allies without asking us for guarantees about the behaviour of ours. We might be able to contemplate agreements on the following points:-

- (i) That there will be no manufacture or possession of nuclear weapons by Germans in any part of Germany during the lifetime of the arrangement.
- (ii) That no missiles or nuclear weapons will be brought within X miles of the demarcation line or into Berlin.
- (iii) That certain activities of a propagandist nature will not take place in any part of Berlin. We might admit United Nations or neutral (but not Russian) observers into West Berlin to confirm that these undertakings were being observed (with reciprocal arrangements for East Berlin).
- (iv) That West Berlin might offer space and accommodation on an extra-territorial basis to certain organs of the United Nations. This might both make it easier for the Russians to justify granting a guarantee of access and offer them some assurance of responsible behaviour in West Berlin. There might possibly be a similar arrangement in East Berlin.
- (v) It is for consideration whether there is any means of limiting the flow of refugees which would be tolerable from the Western and from the humane point of view. At present the refugees are being flown out of West Berlin in allied aircraft as if they were allied traffic. This is legally tenable but seems to be stretching our rights rather far; but it is apparently hallowed by usage and would be very difficult to end. The very fact of a settlement having been reached would tend to reduce the flow.

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(g) It is worth examining whether, in this connection, some kind of nuclear disengagement on a wider basis could be proposed and whether plans for an area of limitation of armaments and armed forces or the prevention of surprise attack, with mutual air inspection of both sides of the line, might not also be revived.

(h) A non-aggression agreement between the North Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact, though fairly meaningless, might be added for good measure.

How to bring about negotiation

11. It must not be supposed that we shall have an easy task in persuading our allies that a deal of this kind is even desirable and our most difficult problem in the coming weeks will be to decide how and when it is safe even to hint to them that we are thinking along these lines. Nor have we any idea whether this sort of solution would meet Mr. Khrushchev's demands, though the most recent indications from Moscow suggest that it might. Clearly it would be very wrong to let him have sight of any of the concessions which are involved in this plan in advance of real negotiation.

12. Our aims for the time being must therefore be limited:-

- (a) To ensuring that the door is left open to negotiation and Mr. Khrushchev given no excuse for premature unilateral action before the German elections.
- (b) To ensuring that the West is ready by the end of September with an agreed proposal for negotiations or for a summit meeting. We shall have to pursue this aim with great discretion.
- (c) To keeping up a certain pressure on Mr. Khrushchev and strengthening our hand for eventual negotiations by maintaining a posture of unity and strength in the Alliance.

13. The latest American memorandum describes in acceptable terms the line to be pursued in the immediate future. It suggests:-

- (a) Informal and quiet probing of the Soviet position through the diplomatic channel in Moscow "to warn of possible consequences of that position in terms of Allied military build-up, and to take advantage of any opportunities which might appear to move towards a subsequent understanding on an arrangement which might be acceptable".
- (b) Exploration of opportunities for Western political initiatives "at an appropriate time" - depending of course partly on Soviet moves and partly on the timetable of the German elections.

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CIRCULATED FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF

JP(61)97(Final)

31st July, 1961

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CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

JOINT PLANNING STAFF

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING
SUPPLEMENTARY BRIEF

Report by the Joint Planning Staff

In accordance with the instructions of the Chief of the Defence Staff, we have prepared a supplementary brief to our previous paper⁺ on LIVEOAK planning, to take account of the United States Memorandum[®] on measures for dealing with the Berlin situation.

2. In preparing the brief, which is at Annex, we have emphasized those aspects of the United States proposals which we consider require elucidation. We have consulted the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence.

Recommendation

3. We recommend that, if they approve our report, the Chiefs of Staff should authorize its use by their representative, in amplification of the main brief, at the forthcoming quadripartite talks on Berlin Contingency Planning.

(Signed) D.L. POWELL-JONES
E.B. ASHMORE
D.C. STAPLETON
W.C. SMITH.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

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BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING
SUPPLEMENTARY BRIEF

INTRODUCTION

1. This brief is supplementary to the one which we have already prepared⁺, and has been written to take account of the United States Memorandum[@] on measures for dealing with the Berlin situation. We have separately examined[£] this Memorandum and given our general comments and the military implications for the United Kingdom of accepting the American proposals.

2. The basis of American policy over Berlin is that there should be negotiations; their proposals, however, are primarily designed to ensure that these would be undertaken from a position of increasing military strength, permitting a wide choice of options. Specifically in relation to Berlin the United States believe that the following precautionary and planning efforts should be undertaken within the next few weeks:-

- (a) Strengthen the position of West Berlin, to sustain an interruption of access, by reviewing and improving airlift procedures and the stockpile as necessary.
- (b) Review our Berlin contingency planning in the light of the present situation.
- (c) Complete Allied plans for use of a wide range of non-military counter-measures, including economic sanctions, upon interruption of access to Berlin or earlier as a warning and deterrent.

EFFECT OF AMERICAN PROPOSALS
ON THE UNITED KINGDOM LINE

3. The United States proposals, in so far as they refer to plans for access to Berlin, are more in harmony with our own views, although they are based on an approach to NATO strategy still very different from our own. However they either omit or are indefinite about certain matters which need to be clarified. These are discussed below.

Ground Operations

4. No specific mention is made of division sized operations but the Americans are obviously concerned over the gap between TRADE WIND and the use of nuclear forces. Although the position of strength which they intend to build up is primarily intended for deterrence it is clear that they do not exclude offensive operations, presumably with the object of re-opening access.

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Annex (Continued)

On the other hand, General Norstad has stated² that he does not advocate access operations on a large scale.

5. We appreciate that this gap in military measures does exist and consider that plans should be prepared to deal with any situation which might develop from interruption of access. These should be in a NATO context but we must maintain our view³ that access to Berlin cannot be restored by an isolated military operation if the Russians are determined to prevent it.

6. If this is accepted, the difference of views about access operations may now be capable of reconciliation.

Air Operations

7. The American view that an airlift has more meaning against a background of increasing military strength brings them much closer to our own position than hitherto. However the place in the sequence of events which the Americans give to an airlift is not clear. The line given in our main brief⁴ should be followed in discussing this point.

8. We agree that airlift resources and procedures should be reviewed.

Naval Action

9. The only naval tasks which the Memorandum envisages are described as "naval harassment and even naval blockading actions". These, it claims, are more likely to be suffered without major retaliation in a situation of growing Western power. Such actions do not appear to be related to any economic counter-measures listed elsewhere in the Memorandum, which are administrative in character, but they could be related to certain of the original LIVEOAK more elaborate military measures⁷. It would be advisable to ascertain what the United States have in mind, since further detailed planning would be necessary before any such actions could be implemented.

Planning and Operational Implications

10. It is implicit in the American proposals for NATO involvement that tripartite planning for direct military measures for Berlin will need to be related to wider NATO planning to meet Soviet reactions. General Norstad's opinion is that NATO should be brought in operationally at the earliest possible moment. This raises questions of co-ordination and access by non-tripartite nations to LIVEOAK plans and to JACK PINE/QBAL operations which are on a quadripartite basis.

11. Responsibilities for Berlin Contingency Planning are as follows:-

- (a) Overall co-ordination - the tripartite Ambassadorial Group in Washington.

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/ Annex to COS(60)58

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- (b) Air access planning and certain special responsibilities concerning movements to Berlin - the tripartite Ambassadorial Group in Bonn. CINCUSAFE is responsible for implementation of air access plans.
- (c) Preparatory and more elaborate military measures - the LIVEOAK Group in Paris. General Norstad is responsible for overall planning supervision and CINCPACOR is responsible for the detailed planning and training for ground access operations.
- (d) Operational measures in Berlin - the tripartite Allied Staff, Berlin.

Thorough co-ordination between these widely spread groups has hitherto been difficult, and stringent tripartite security regulations have precluded the passing of LIVEOAK plans to other nations and NATO staffs. However, in 1960, CINCENT, COMLANDCENT and COMAIRCENT were informed personally; the German National Military Representative at SHAPE has received briefings from the LIVEOAK Group, and we have recently agreed to a German liaison officer for LIVEOAK. We have resisted French proposals that all planning should be done by a single high level group since we prefer military planning to be in General Norstad's hands from the outset, in view of his NATO responsibilities; and we consider that a great deal of other planning must inevitably be done in Bonn and Berlin where alone the necessary expert or local knowledge is available.

12. General Norstad has submitted proposals for LIVEOAK to be used as an operating staff if Contingency Plans are implemented, envisaging an augmented staff for continuous operations, though with SHAPE and USEUCOM providing intelligence support and SHAPE a public relations element. We now have reason to believe that General Norstad himself would welcome a broader approach.

UNITED KINGDOM VIEWS

13. We see the approach to the Berlin problem in two related parts. Access and the maintenance of a Western military presence in the city is a tripartite responsibility. The achievement of a position of strength from which, if negotiations fail, operations to re-establish access should be mounted, should be a NATO responsibility. We believe that the very specialized nature of the autobahn operations justifies both the planning functions of the LIVEOAK Group and the initial operational responsibility which General Norstad is anxious that they should have. We therefore consider that LIVEOAK planning must remain a separate entity, although working in close contact with SHAPE, and that no nation other than the tripartite powers and Germany should participate.

14. Any wider participation in military planning without responsibility for execution, before the stage at which NATO as a whole needs to become directly involved, would not only complicate planning but would also infringe the responsibility of the Three Powers. We consider, however, that Belgium, Canada and the Netherlands, all of whom contribute forces to the Central Region, should be made aware of the plans. We feel

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Annex (Concluded)

that adequate liaison could be maintained through their National Military Representatives at SHAPE.

15. We believe that LIVEOAK should not be responsible for planning beyond what is required for access to, and maintenance of, a Western military presence in Berlin. The wider military plans needed to achieve and exploit a general position of strength should be concerted on a NATO basis. The whole subject of the transition and inter-relationship between LIVEOAK and NATO planning responsibilities is in need of urgent clarification. It is desirable that such a study be set in train at the forthcoming meeting.

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CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX

TO

G.O.S.(61)49TH MEETING HELD ON
TUESDAY, 1ST AUGUST, 1961

1. BERLIN

(Previous Reference: G.O.S.(61)17th Meeting, Minute 2)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a draft paper for the Defence Committee, prepared by the Ministry of Defence, dealing with the measures which would be necessary to meet the American proposals, so far as they affected the United Kingdom, for strengthening the forces of the West in order that the West could deal with the Berlin situation from a position of strength. Two reports by the Joint Planning Staff and a Secretary's Minute were relevant to their discussion.

LORD MOUNTBATTEN said that the Committee had been due to consider the two reports by the Joint Planning Staff: the first examining the military aspects of the United States proposals and the resulting implications on United Kingdom defence policy; and the second examining how best the strategic reserve in the United Kingdom could be built up to divisional strength by the end of 1961, including possible withdrawals of land force units from overseas theatres. He thought that the Joint Planning Staff should be congratulated on their reports which had been produced at short notice and which constituted valuable background.

Both reports had, however, been overtaken in that the Minister of Defence had that morning called the Committee to a meeting at which a draft paper for the Defence Committee, prepared by the Ministry of Defence and based on the two reports, had been tabled. The Ministry of Defence had since revised the draft in the light of the morning's discussion, and the revised draft, which had already been seen and amended by the Minister, was now before them.

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The Committee's final views on the draft must be presented to the Minister immediately in order that the paper in its final form could be circulated that afternoon for consideration at the Defence Committee meeting on the morning of Thursday, 3rd August, 1961.

LORD MOUNTBATTEN said that with one reservation, relating to paragraph 8, he believed that the Committee would have no comments on the revised draft. Whereas the draft paper said, in paragraph 8, that the despatch of two or three additional units to B.A.O.R. and the recall of some units from abroad would have a profound public impact at home, albeit a lesser impact in the United States of America, he doubted whether moves of a small number of units would make a great impression on the British public; if the aim was to create a profound impression at home, there was no doubt that the best means of doing so would be by the reintroduction of national service in some form. Moreover since this would also solve the Army's interim manpower problem and would be seen by the Army to do so, it would be doubly beneficial. It appeared, however, that Ministers were not prepared to consider any form of national service at the present time; nevertheless, the Ministry of Defence should represent this point to the Minister, with the suggestion that it might be reflected in paragraph 8 of the draft paper.

In discussion the following points were made:-

- (a) Any moves of units which might be approved by Ministers could not be announced before Parliament rose for the recess on Friday, 4th August, since they would first have to be put to the Americans in the form of an offer of what the United Kingdom could do; but an announcement shortly after Parliament had risen would create an unfortunate impression. The timing of any announcement would therefore need careful consideration; moreover, it was important that when any moves were announced they should be seen to be related to the situation then prevailing.
- (b) The draft paper only proposed the move of one LAA regiment to B.A.O.R., although two were available, in case a requirement for L.A.A. arose in Kuwait. However, the Royal Air Force could provide up to two LAA squadrons if the Commander-in-Chief required them, and accordingly both LAA regiments could now be earmarked for B.A.O.R.; there would be some inconvenience, and possibly extra cost, since both these regiments were due to re-equip in the autumn.
- (c) The withdrawal of the personnel of the armoured regiment from Hong Kong would denude the garrison of armour and would have important implications: first, on purely military grounds, the lack of armour would leave a serious gap in our order of battle in the Colony; secondly, the effect on public opinion and morale in Hong Kong might be considerable; and

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thirdly, the Government of Hong Kong might wish to reduce the scale of their financial support for the garrison, even if the regiment could be replaced by an infantry or commando unit.

- (d) These paragraphs of the draft paper which dealt with the naval and air contributions to an improved military posture required some amplification. In the case of the Royal Navy, it should be made clear, first, that whilst the recall of selected reservists and pensioners could be done without proclamation, it could not escape publicity; and secondly, that the curtailing of training in order to man additional ships would have a cumulative deleterious effect on long term efficiency.
- (e) In addition to the measures for improving the strength of the Royal Air Force already covered in the paper, it would be possible to add eight additional Javelin aircraft to the fighter strength in Germany by using aircraft thrown up from Fighter Command squadrons re-equipping with Lightnings. The cost of this would be confined to that of operating the additional numbers of aircraft.
- (f) A number of factual amendments to the report by the Joint Planning Staff* on the military implications for the United Kingdom of the United States proposals were agreed (Annex).
- (g) A reply was outstanding to the telegram[®] from the Commanders-in-Chief Committee, Germany, on the measures which could be taken to improve the state of readiness of B.A.O.B. and Royal Air Force Germany from their own resources. A draft reply was circulated and agreed, subject to the approval of the Minister of Defence.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (1) Took note of the two reports by the Joint Planning Staff, subject to amendment as at Annex.
- (2) Agreed with the views of the Chief of the Defence Staff in his opening statement.
- (3) Invited the Ministry of Defence to represent their views on the draft Defence Committee paper to the Minister of Defence in the light of their discussion.
- (4) Invited the Ministry of Defence to seek the approval of the Minister of Defence to the draft telegram as at (g) above.

/s/ J.P.(S1)98(Final)

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[Note: The Secretary was subsequently informed that the Minister of Defence did not wish the telegram to be sent until he had had an opportunity to discuss it with the Chief of the Defence Staff]

- (5) Invited the Air Ministry to be prepared to move two Royal Air Force Regiment LAA squadrons to the Persian Gulf as at (b) above, if required.
- (6) Took note that the Chief of the Imperial General Staff would use the report by the Joint Planning Staff² on the military aspects of the American proposals as background in the forthcoming quadripartite talks in Paris.
- (7) Invited the Admiralty and the Air Ministry to arrange for the Chief of the Imperial General Staff to be given further briefing on matters affecting their Services arising from the United States proposals.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

1ST AUGUST, 1961.

J.P.(51)98(Final)

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TOP SECRET

PU 301 / 160541

8/15/61

~~TOP SECRET.~~

Registry
No.

~~Top Secret.~~
~~Secret.~~
~~Confidential.~~
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Draft.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

RETYPE D

Record of Conversation between the
Secretary of State and Mr. Rusk
~~at Breakfast at the United States
Embassy in Paris on August 5, 1961.~~

The Secretary of State had breakfast
alone with Mr. Rusk at the American
Embassy in Paris on Saturday, August 5.

~~The main points of the conversation were:~~

Mr. Rusk said that during the
preparation of a basis for negotiation
with the Russians about Germany and
Berlin, the West Germans were going to
have to swallow a lot of things that they
had hitherto maintained were entirely
unacceptable to them. The Americans were
in fact to be much tougher with the
Germans than we had thought. During
the Foreign Ministers' talks in Paris
it would probably not be necessary for
the Secretary of State to do much more
in this particular field than give general
support to the Americans, whose ideas
were now very close to our own.

Mr. Rusk's idea of timing was that
in the next few weeks the United States
Ambassador in Moscow should quietly
probe the Russians' intentions and that
before the meeting of the Conference of
Uncommitted Countries at Belgrade on
September 1, the West should announce
that they would like to hold a Conference
of Foreign Ministers with Russian
participation. They would offer to /hold

or at any rate before the General Assembly

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Record of

Report on Quadri-partite Meeting at the
Quai d'Orsay at 3.30 p.m. on August 5, 1961PRESENT:

The Secretary of State
Field Marshal Sir F. Festing
Sir E. Shuckburgh
Mr. J. E. Killick

M. Couve de Murville
M. de Carbonnel
M. Lucet
M. Laloy

Herr von Brentano
Herr Carstens
Herr Ritter
General Schnez

Mr. Rusk
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Cash
and (variously)
Mr. Nitze
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Fowler

.....

Soviet Aims and Intentions

After usual courtesies discussion opened on Section I of the report of the quadri-partite Working Group. It was agreed after brief discussion that this ^{was} ~~reported~~ a valid assessment as at the present time but that it ought to be reviewed periodically in order to bring it up to date. This should be the task of the Ambassadorial Steering Group in Washington.

22. There was some discussion of the situation in Berlin and Eastern Germany. Herr von Brentano gave a brief account of East German actions over "border crossers" living in ^{the Eastern} ~~one~~ sector and working in ^{West Berlin} ~~another~~. He said that the Federal Government had no ^{indication} ~~intention~~ that any sort of uprising was likely in East Germany and the Federal Government for their part were doing everything possible not to encourage the refugee flow. However, ^{East German} ~~the~~ measures taken ^{and in prospect concerning} at the inter-sector boundary in Berlin had increased fears that this escape route for refugees might be closed and hence increased the flow.

/Mr. Rusk

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- 3.3. Mr. Rusk drew attention to the danger of an explosion in East Germany which could precipitate a crisis earlier than expected. He suggested that the Ambassadorial ^{Steering Group} Committee in Washington be used as a clearing-house for the exchange of up-to-date information on developments and intelligence so as to ensure that the West was if possible not taken by surprise.
- 4.4. The Secretary of State mentioned that British reports were now being made daily on the Berlin and Soviet Zone situation and he would be glad to share them through the Ambassadorial ^{Steering} Working Group.
- 5.5. Herr Von Brentano suggested that there ought to be discussion of how the West would react if there were an uprising like the Hungarian affair. It seemed in his own personal view impossible that the West should just take note of it and issue a formal protest. The public opinion problem in Germany would be acute. There would be great criticism if the Federal armed forces and police simply stayed in their barracks. The Secretary of State said he hoped there would be immediate and urgent consultation if anything of this sort occurred before any action was taken.
- 6.6. Mr. Rusk asked if he was right in supposing that the Federal Government was not only not encouraging the refugee flow but would in fact prefer the population of East Germany to stay where it was in the interests of long term developments. For his part he felt that we might want to ^{stick} ~~store~~ up the East Germans at a certain stage of ^a ~~any~~ crisis but certainly not now.
- 7.7. It was agreed that urgent consideration should be given to the problem of what the Western reaction should be in the event of serious trouble in East Germany. This should be done in the Ambassadorial Steering Group in Washington.

/The Military

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he Military Build-Up

6. Mr. Rusk felt that although the paper on tactics came next in the Working Group report, this was not really the proper order for discussion. He felt ^{that} discussion should ^{first concentrate on} ~~center on~~ the serious and substantial Western efforts to strengthen the alliance as a basis for negotiation, ^{and} in preparation for contingency military action if the worst happened.

7. The new Administration had concluded in June and July that negotiations would not be productive on the basis then existing. It was necessary to do something to influence Khrushchev's position, not only by direct U.S. action, but indirectly through parallel action throughout the Alliance. In the situation which had existed, Khrushchev knew that in the present nuclear balance he could discount any possibility of nuclear war. On the Western side, nobody had believed that there would be any move by the West straight to nuclear war in the event of interference with access to Berlin. Thus it was clearly necessary to back the ultimate nuclear capacity with a convincing conventional capability. This could be backed up by economic measures, in the event of a crisis, which would amount progressively to a situation equivalent to blockade. Finally, a great deal more could be done in the propaganda field in order to reinforce the general impression of firmness which these other measures would create. American thinking now aimed at establishing ^{the} ~~this~~ basis for strength on which these tactics could be based. It was already clear that there was full harmony with this approach, therefore this might be discussed briefly while the more complex problems of tactics and negotiating problems could be left over until the next meeting.

/The Secretary of State

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The Secretary of State

10. The Secretary of State drew attention to the difficulties facing the United Kingdom arising from commitments all over the world. H.M.G. did not want to remove forces from the Far East, for example, while there was still a threat of trouble in Laos. They could not withdraw from Kuwait until and unless some effective action was taken by the Arab League. But they could do some things which would be intended, and would be seen to be intended, to improve the position of their forces in Germany. The Secretary of State then detailed the ^{following} measures ^(INSERT A) listed in Paris telegram No. 426, adding ^{He added} that we intended to withdraw one armoured regiment from Hong Kong and a brigade headquarters from Cyprus for the purpose of paragraph 4(e) ^{above} of ~~that~~ telegram. He said that all these things would happen in an unostentatious but quite visible manner throughout the ~~week~~ ^{weeks &} coming months. They would be phased in this way to give an impression of continuing build up. Furthermore H.M.G. had made clear when Parliament rose that they were ready to recall reservists and to mobilise the Territorial Army, if the allies agreed that the situation warranted it. Reservists could not of course be retained for a long ^{time} ~~period~~ and this measure would have to be reserved for a more critical period. They could be with their units in Germany in about 17 days from the date of their recall.

11. M. Couve de Murville said that France had a problem somewhat similar to that of the U.K. except that her overseas commitment was concentrated in Algeria. Developments in Algeria had not gone as they had hoped, but the decision had already been taken to recall one division from Algeria. It was a good division which was now being reconverted for European warfare and would be available in early September. The recall of a second division was already under consideration. The necessary number of men was being withdrawn from the Air Force in Algeria in order to put the

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-) Steps to bring forces in B.A.O.R. up to a higher state of operational readiness by sending to Germany one S.A.G.W. Regiment and two L.A.A. Regiments;
-) The maintenance in Germany of the three fighter squadrons which, as the N.A.T.O. Council had been informed, were to have been withdrawn at the end of this year;
-) The supplementing our fighter strength by sending an additional squadron of Javelins to Germany;
-) A further squadron of Canberra tactical bombers with nuclear capacity will be ear-marked for S.A.C.E.U.R.'s support;

The formation of a new division in the United Kingdom, including armour, which can be held available as reinforcement for our forces in Germany.

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French Tactical Air Force in Germany on a 24-hour operational basis.

If the situation become more serious, reservists could very quickly be called up (probably in about a week) in order to bring the French divisions in Germany up to strength. Then in the autumn Army deployment in Algeria could ~~then~~ be reconsidered and the necessary men ~~be~~ brought back to be used, with further reservists^r called to the Colours, to bring other units in France up to the strength. In general the French Government were taking all these measures very seriously.

12. Mr. Rusk, in further elaboration of the American position, explained that the U.S. Government had rejected "national emergency" type of measures such as calling up the National guard. They did not want at present to create a mobilisation psychology -- only to take steps that were sustainable over a period of time.

13. The President had authority to declare a national emergency and to order the extensive recall of reservists promptly. This might be necessary in the autumn.

14. The important immediate problem now was supporting action throughout the Alliance. Mr. Khrushchev was watching developments carefully. If only one or two of the NATO allies took significant measures, this would carry no conviction, nor would Khrushchev be fooled if new divisions were created but nothing was done to put in hand the production of the equipment they would need in war. We must produce forces which could in fact fight.

15. How should the alliance now co-ordinate the measures which its members were going to take? Perhaps the Ministers of Defence could meet before the end of August. His hope was that everything done would be visible, impressive, and not subject to being discounted because essential elements were lacking.

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part would argue the necessity for this ^{strongly} ~~strength~~ within the cabinet. He too agreed on the necessity for coordination of future efforts. He thought that talks among Defence Ministers would be a good thing.

20. Mr. Rusk said that while he understood the electoral problem, in terms of the picture which we wanted the alliance to present to Mr. Khrushchev, the next 5 weeks were crucial and he hoped that something could be done in the Federal Republic.

21. Herr von Brentano said that the ^{Federal} ~~Foreign~~ Ministry of Defence had already made a clear general statement to the press. ^{He} ~~He~~ ^{had} ~~just~~ ^{just} been discussing the problem with the Federal Chancellor, and it was the intention at any rate to place orders for the supplies and armaments required to meet Germany's target. He did not wish to give the impression that all action would be postponed until after the elections. Furthermore he had no worries that the German people as a whole would fail to react in the right way. Visible and concrete moves would therefore be made and would be followed up after the elections.

22. There was general agreement that the present one year term of service was inadequate but legislation would be required to ^{extend it} ~~put this~~ ^{into effect}. This again must await till after the elections. But the gap between now and then could be filled by prolonging ^{by 3 months} the term of service of ^{40,000} conscripts now with units and perhaps by an interim call-up of reservists for earlier annual training.

23. The Secretary of State said it seemed to him that Herr von Brentano wished to avoid making any startling moves before the elections. In the light of this consideration, was there any objection to the proposed move of British units to Germany which he had announced? Herr von Brentano said emphatically Not.

The Secretary of State emphasised that in the U.K. the legislative

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and customary position was such that reservists could not be recalled to the Colours unless the situation became much more critical.

24. In reply to a question from Mr. Rusk, Herr von Brentano said he could not at present say whether it could ^{become} publicly known that the Federal Government proposed to have 9 combat-ready divisions by the end of the year. Public opinion needed to be prepared for this, and it was probably unwise to make any announcement before the elections.

25. This part of the discussion concluded with an exposition by Mr. Rusk in elaboration of the approach described in President Kennedy's speech. The U.S. Government regarded as vital national interests of the U.S. the following aspects of the German/Berlin problem:-

- (a) the continued presence of Western forces;
- (b) the viability of West Berlin;
- (c) physical access from the Federal Republic and the world to West Berlin.

If there were any attempt to destroy these positions, the U.S. would fight to retain them - not just because of the people of West Berlin or Western rights or even the NATO alliance (although these were all valid reasons) but because, given the development of the policies of the Sino/Soviet bloc, this would be an historical turning point in the confrontation between that system and the free world. Despite the things Mr. Khrushchev had said about Berlin (some of which had not been very exactly stated) he was not sure that Mr. Khrushchev had finally made up his mind exactly how he would act. At all events, the blocking of access to Berlin and the establishment of D.D.R. sovereignty were utterly unacceptable. If Mr. Khrushchev were serious in his intention of pursuing these aims, it could only be because of certainty that the West would not go to nuclear war. Responsible statesmanship had the task of protecting these interests without war if possible. The consequences /of nuclear

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of nuclear war were obvious. Every possibility of dealing with the situation without major nuclear war must be tried.

16. There was a danger that Mr. Khrushchev was basing himself on a wrong judgement. If so, his error must be brought home to him before the nuclear bombs fell. Hence the necessity for increasing the strength of the West in the conventional field so that both sides would know that, beyond a certain point, the use of nuclear weapons was inevitable.

27. The other 3 Foreign Ministers expressed their general agreement with this statement. They agreed to consult together further informally about the best way of following up the programme of military build-up.

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countermeasures

session then turned to Section V of the report of the Working Group.

Secretary of State, with reference to paragraph 4 of the led minute on the subject of economic countermeasures, that NATO as a whole would not understand this as it stood as important to get the presentation to NATO right since operation in putting these measures into effect was ry. He had very much liked the form of words used earlier Rusk when he had talked of a series of economic measures would amount progressively to the equivalent of a total trade go. We did not really wish to give the impression to NATO we had decided to mount a total blockade from the start, though this might in the event prove necessary. It was important at a programme of possible measures built up in the right way the NATO Council. So far as H.M.G. were concerned, there were number of measures which could be taken at short notice and a er of others for which all the necessary preparations could be for taking powers in Parliament when Parliament was recalled. Mr. Rusk said that he agreed with this approach. He felt it d be desirable to agree in the sense of paragraph 2 of the mended minute upon what we might have to do in the most re circumstances. There could also be agreement on the iation of certain warning measures (Annex B to the recommended te). But the series of measures to fill the gap between still ed to be worked out.

M. Couve de Murville pointed out that the terms "embargo" and ckade" had been rather ^{lo}osely used in discussion. They were the same thing and in his view blockade would be better. In private conversations Mr. Krushchev had said that he expected

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out the idea that what was needed was a wide range of measures to choose from; and that para. 3 should be redrafted to meet the point made by Herr von Brentano about the continuation of inter-zonal trade.

40. Mr. Rusk finally made the point that blockade as such was really a military and not an economic countermeasure and should be dealt with under that heading. Embargo represented the extreme limit of economic countermeasures. This was agreed.

Contingency Planning

41. Discussion then turned to the first section of Part VI of the Report of the Four-Power Working Group (Ground Access Procedures).

42. Mr. Rusk explained American thinking as set out in para. 3 of the report. He said it was a waste of time to think about agency theories since there seemed no prospect of the Russians accepting any arrangement on such lines. The new approach was based on the assumption by the West that whoever was at the checkpoint was only an instrument of the Soviet Union. It was impossible to go to war merely on the question of the substitution of somebody else for the Russians. He recognised that the new American proposal was very different from past American thinking but perhaps it was sounder.

43. M. Couve de Murville thought that there was very little difference in substance between what was now proposed and existing contingency planning on the subject. He thought there was a lot to be said for continuing to use present travel documents unchanged.

44. Herr von Brentano agreed. He would be quite happy with the procedure suggested if the essential result were obtained - namely that it worked and traffic continued.

45. Paras. 2 (a) (b) and (c) of Part VI were therefore agreed.

46. As for para. 2 (d), Mr. Rusk emphasised that most of the traffic to and from West Berlin already came under arrangements

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made between West and East Germans. It was therefore conceivable that these arrangements could be expanded a little to cover all traffic. The East Germans would demand, after a unilateral peace treaty, that everybody wanting to move to and from Berlin must make the necessary arrangements with them. If the arrangements could be made on the East/West German net, the Western Powers, who would prefer not to talk to the East Germans, could avoid doing so. There was also the argument that Western access to West Berlin passed through the Federal Republic as well as East Germany. In so far as the East Germans claimed authority so far as East German territory was concerned, it could logically be put to them that the West Germans were entitled to make arrangements with them in so far as the rest of the access routes lay through Federal territory.

44. Herr von Brentano understood the idea behind the proposal, but doubted if it was practicable. The trouble was that the Federal Republic had no rights of its own to go to Berlin. Their right of travel flowed from Allied rights. Furthermore, for his own part, he had never much liked existing East/West German arrangements. The D.D.R. would insist that the Allies dealt direct with them. It was not only unrealistic but might be dangerous to put this new proposal to them. However, this was only his first reaction and he agreed to further study.

1. 45. M. Couve de Murville pointed out that Allied traffic did not use the waterways to Berlin. So far as the railways were concerned, all arrangements were already made, even as regards Allied trains, by East and West Germans through Reichsbahn channels. Here there was no need for any change. In the air, the Germans, West or East, played no part at all and no German aircraft flew to and from West Berlin. This could remain a purely quadripartite business. It was interesting to speculate that if the new proposal worked and

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quadripartite arrangements for air traffic broke down, whether the situation for 1948 might be reversed in that Allied traffic by road could continue while it had to be suspended in the air.

16. Mr. Kohler gave a brief description of present contingency planning regarding the Berlin Air Safety Centre and explained that the Americans have concluded that these should remain unchanged.

17. It was agreed that this point should be further studied in Bonn among the three Ambassadors and the Federal Government since it was clearly necessary to base any work on detailed knowledge of existing arrangements.

Press Guidance

51. The meeting concluded with a brief discussion of what the four Press Officers should separately say to the press about the meeting.

Approved by the
Secretary of State

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8/6/61
17 AUG 1961

MEMO DATED TO FOREIGN OFFICE

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FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET) AND
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DISTRIBUTION

Sir P. Dixon

No. 432

D. 11.00 a.m. August 6, 1961

August 6, 1961

R. 11.17 a.m. August 6, 1961

IMMEDIATE
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Following for Prime Minister from Foreign Secretary.

I had a private talk with Rusk today which was entirely satisfactory on all points.

2. First, the Americans are now very keen on negotiation (almost too keen as you will see below) and secondly he accepted that our military moves which I outlined to him were a reasonable response to the President's speech and American action provided they were backed in emergency by calling up the reserves. I am not sure how the American soldiers will react to our proposals; there is a real weakness in the position of our forces in Germany due to lack of administrative backing. But Paul Hson thinks that what we are doing will go down all right in M.I.F.O. The French are certainly promising no more and the Germans say they cannot do anything about additional manpower for their 9 divisions before the elections. So far so good.

3. It is the proposal to negotiate which is causing trouble. The French think that Rusk's proposal that we should tell Khrushchev and the World soon that we want a Foreign Ministers' meeting round about October 1 is much too precipitate. We had a long argument about this at the tripartite meeting this morning. Couve argued that it would weaken the effect of the American decision to build up strength if we offered a negotiation within a few weeks of beginning the programme. He thinks that Khrushchev will assume we are preparing to surrender to his terms and he is worried about going into a negotiation before we have agreed upon the conditions we want. He is also very concerned that we carry the Germans with us in any move of this kind.

4. It seems, however, that Rusk has instructions from the President to press very hard for an early offer to Khrushchev to negotiate. I have warned him not to press this so hard that the French and the Germans are driven together into opposing any negotiation at all, and we agreed not to raise this matter at all at this afternoon's Quadripartite talk. Tomorrow we will resume on this and it may be that Rusk will have obtained new instructions.

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Paris telegram No. 432 to Foreign Office

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5. My own view is that there is something in what Couve says and that we should not be in too much of a hurry to make a specific offer for negotiation. I think that if our replies to the latest Soviet Notes, which should go off within a week or so, can keep open the prospect of negotiation, that should be sufficient to keep the ball in play until much nearer the German elections. We might agree upon a plan for another Western Foreign Ministers' meeting in September immediately after the German elections at which (depending on the results of any informal probings that might have taken place in the meantime) a decision could be taken to offer a conference and a date. All this has to be played very carefully as the French and the Germans, if they banded together on this, could make things very awkward indeed with bad effects on our other projects in Europe.
6. Rusk is playing a double hand. He has gone very far in saying Berlin is a vital American interest and that the United States is prepared to fight to preserve the Western position there and the independence and viability of the City, which of course includes access. He believes that if Khrushchev is made to understand this clearly it will be the best insurance that he will not carry out his threats of unilateral action. On that basis he believes that negotiation is possible.
7. There was one very significant decision today. The Germans agreed without a murmur that it was of no consequence at all who stamped the ticket. So now even if negotiation with the Russians fills the crunch need not come unless the East Germans are looking for immediate trouble.
8. Also the Americans agreed to an air-lift.
9. I will send you another bulletin tonight as this will be an interesting day.

[Copies sent to Prime Minister's Office]

ADVANCE COPIES

Sir F. Rundall
Mr. Crawford
Head of Central Department
Resident Clerk

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FOREIGN OFFICE TO PARIS

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Following for Foreign Secretary from Prime Minister.

I have seen your telegram No. 432. I quite realise the dangers of going too far in either direction. We must try and all keep in step. However I think it is very gratifying that people are beginning to talk sense.

2. I leave you to play the hand.

3. If you want to communicate with me I shall be available at any time before you leave Paris.

B.

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C.O.S. (61) 268

U.K. EYES ONLY

14TH AUGUST, 1961.

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

NATO STRATEGY -
SUPPLEMENTARY BRIEF FOR SIR GEORGE MILLS

Note by the Secretary

At their meetingⁿ on Thursday, 10th August, 1961, the
Chiefs of Staff approved the supplementary brief at Annex on
NATO Strategy.

2. In approving the brief, the Chiefs of Staff:-

- (a) observed that in order to give effect to the principles set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the brief, priorities should be established within NATO as a whole, so that the relative priorities of ACE and ACCEAF/ACCEN forces may be determined. They appreciated however, that little progress can be made in this direction at present.
- (b) authorised its use by the Chairman, British Defence Staffs, Washington, in discussion in the Standing Group.

(Signed) G.S. COLT

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, J.W.1.

14TH AUGUST, 1961.

* COS(61)52nd Meeting, Minute 2

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UK EYES ONLY

ANNEX TO C.O.S. (61)268

NATO STRATEGY
SUPPLEMENTARY BRIEF FOR SIR GEORGE MILLS

1. This brief is supplementary to the general one contained in Annex 'A' to COS(61)230. Its specific purpose is to assist you when the Standing Group considers priorities of forces.
2. We do not disagree with those countries which maintain that the only way of preventing all-out war is to be prepared for it. We also accept that such preparedness can, with reasonable adjustments, cover all lesser threats, but this approach could result in demands for the provision of forces above what is in fact the minimum requirement. We maintain that, from consideration of the likely threat and of the probable duration of operations, and by emphasizing the decisiveness of the strategic nuclear exchange, it should be possible to establish priorities which would enable force requirements to be kept within the economic capabilities of member nations without jeopardizing the security of NATO.
3. We believe that NATO strategy should continue to be firmly based on deterrence. The UK and US strategic nuclear forces are the primary elements of the strategic deterrent on which NATO security must rely in the last resort. Although these forces are not under NATO control we believe that NATO force requirements and priorities should be gauged within the context of strategic deterrence and of the risks of escalation resulting from either conventional or nuclear aggression.
4. On the basis that forces required for deterrence, including those for the initial phase, have priority over those for any subsequent operations we suggest below how NATO force requirements should be assessed.

ACE Forces

5. The minimum level of the shield conventional forces should be determined by the requirement to counter intimidation, identify aggression, deal with infiltration or small-scale aggression and resist a larger-scale conventional attack long enough to enable the decision to resort to nuclear weapons to be taken before vital interests are in grave danger of loss. We should not attempt to add conventional strength specifically to increase the period of major conventional operations beyond this point since the credibility of the deterrent would thereby be reduced. We should not, however, exclude strengthening the existing conventional forces by improved mobility and firepower.
6. The Shield forces should be equipped with nuclear weapons of such types and on such a scale that, while the function of the strategic nuclear forces was not duplicated, the Soviet government would be convinced that any aggression would be met by the appropriate degree of force including, if necessary, nuclear force with all the risks of escalation that this would entail. SACUER's nuclear armory should be tailored to this purpose only and kept effective.

G.M. 188

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7. In the light of the concepts set out above, and of providing appropriate nuclear backing for conventional forces, we consider that the priorities in meeting SACBUR's requirements, if they cannot be met in full, should be:-

- (a) Measures to establish a system for the efficient control of nuclear weapons in the field.
- (b) Measures to increase the effectiveness of existing shield forces in terms of conventional firepower and mobility.
- (c) Modernisation of the battlefield nuclear weapons, especially all those suitable for discriminate use.
- (d) Measures to maintain the effectiveness of the higher yield long-range nuclear weapon systems.

8. Maritime Forces

- (a) Because of their relative invulnerability, ballistic missile-firing submarines may be expected to play an increasing part in the strategic nuclear deterrent and thus must be given first priority. As more of these submarines become operational it should be possible to effect some reduction in the carrier strike fleets whose main task would then become the location and destruction of enemy naval forces and their afloat support and possibly support for land operations.
- (b) The second priority would be to provide a strong deterrent to submarine operations including those of missile-firing submarines by an evident ability to harass, intercept and sink submarines.
- (c) In a short war involving a nuclear exchange there is little place for mining; therefore some shortfall in this capability and in mine counter-measures which are, however, primarily a national responsibility, can be accepted.

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8/15/61

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CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX

TO

C.O.S.(61)53RD MEETING HELD ON
TUESDAY, 15TH AUGUST, 1961

1. THE SITUATION IN BERLIN
- A. Military and Political Control

(Previous Reference: C.O.S.(61)51st Meeting, Minute 2)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a minute* by the Secretary covering a Note on a meeting held in the Ministry of Defence on 11th August, to consider the arrangements for the preparation of briefs for the United Kingdom member of the Ambassadorial ~~Group~~ Group in Washington. A further Secretary's minute covering a Note by the Foreign Office was relevant to their discussion.

SIR WILLIAM PIKE (representing the Chief of the Imperial General Staff) said that the Western Foreign Ministers had asked the Ambassadorial Group in Washington to consider the four points set out in the Annex to the minute* before them. The purpose of their discussion, which was of a preliminary nature, was to determine what military guidance was required by the Foreign Office at this stage, and thereafter to put the necessary examinations in hand so that direction could be available to the United Kingdom representative in the Ambassadorial Group when required. Of the four points in question, Item B - The Means of Ensuring Continuity of Military Control during a Transition from Tripartite Measures to Control by NATO - and the first part of D - Preparation of a New Directive for Live Oak - were already being studied by the Joint Planning Staff; their report was to be considered by the Committee at their meeting on 22nd August, 1961. As for the remaining items, the Joint Planning Staff did not at present possess the background information necessary to complete a satisfactory examination.

* COS.1001/14/8/61
% COS.1010/14/8/61

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He appreciated that the Foreign Office Note was intended to provide the political framework for a study of the machinery for higher political and military direction in a developing Berlin crisis (Item C) but he did not believe that as it stood it would meet this requirement. Moreover, it was impossible to consider the means for concerting and co-ordinating the planning and execution of military measures beyond the competence of Live Oak (Item A) or the preparation of directives for other military authorities (second part of Item D) until the machinery for higher direction had been decided.

SIR EVELYN SHUCKBURGH (Foreign Office) said that the problem of higher direction required more detailed study than it had yet been possible to give it. The solution put forward in the Foreign Office Note was designed to stimulate thought rather than to state the Foreign Office position in the matter. He was by no means sure that the arrangements described therein would prove practicable; for example, it would almost certainly be necessary to establish the machinery for the overall direction in Washington rather than in Paris, since the United States influence and the authority of the President would be decisive. These broader problems, including that posed by the Prime Minister, could not be resolved at this stage, nor were they likely in the first instance to be discussed in the Ambassadorial Group. It had been agreed in Paris that the Ambassadorial Group should be the initial co-ordinating body, and he therefore believed that the Committee should give their attention to the question of providing military advice for the United Kingdom representative.

In discussion the following points were made:-

- (a) Sir George Mills was well versed in the views of the Committee and those of H.M. Government on the Berlin question; moreover, he was in touch with United States opinion. He would accordingly be in a strong position to provide Sir Harold Gaccia with the military advice he required. It would nevertheless be necessary, when major issues were under discussion, for a member of the Committee to attend in person. At a later stage the question of corporate tripartite or quadripartite military advice to the Ambassadorial Group would probably arise. It would then be for consideration whether the members of the Standing Group together with General Heusinger, present Chairman of the Military Committee, in a corporate capacity, should fulfil this function. At first sight there would appear to be considerable merit in such an arrangement; the Standing Group was in close touch with the Major NATO Commanders and, because of its links with the Military Committee and the NATO Council, could serve a useful function in bridging the gap between the quadripartite powers and NATO as a whole. It should not, however, be overlooked that there might be valid objections to the use of the Standing Group in the manner envisaged.

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Although it might be considered to be the heir to the wartime Combined Chiefs of Staff organization, its status was not of the same order since its members were no longer drawn from those who achieved positions of high command in the last war. Moreover, the Standing Group, by its location in Washington, might be thought to be unduly influenced by the American point of view. The Joint Planning Staff should widen the scope of their existing examination to embrace the two aspects of military advice for the Ambassadorial Group.

- (b) It might be necessary to consider at an early date in the Ambassadorial Group the co-ordination of measures outside the competence of Live Oak (Item A). Military advice for such discussions could be provided on an ad hoc basis directly from the United Kingdom, and further examination of this matter was not necessary at this stage.
- (c) The Foreign Office would consult Sir Harold Caccia on the provision of military advice for the Ambassadorial Group; until his views were known, it would be inappropriate to consult Sir George Mills.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (1) Agreed with the views of the Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
- (2) Took note of the statement by the representative of the Foreign Office.
- (3) Instructed the Joint Planning Staff to take action as at (a) above.

& JP(61)107

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B. Training for TRADE WIND

(Previous Reference: C.O.S. (61)42nd Meeting, Minute 4A)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a minute⁺ by the Secretary covering a letter from General Norstad which stated that he had instructed Commander-in-Chief, B.A.O.R. to plan and conduct training of the TRADE WIND force during the period 24th September, to 7th October, 1961.

SIR WILLIAM PIKE (representing the Chief of the Imperial General Staff) said that the present situation differed markedly from that obtaining in May when Ministers directed that General Cassels should refer to London for instructions should General Norstad give the executive orders for such training. At that time, it had been hoped that it might be possible to persuade the Americans to drop all airborne access plans beyond the initial probe. It had now been agreed that such planning should continue, although it was recognised that the West should develop non-military measures to the maximum before resorting to military action. General Cassels, at Ministerial direction, had already imposed a delay of three months in the training of the battalion group involved. General Norstad had accepted without question the dates selected by General Cassels and had agreed that the training should take place under cover of a brigade exercise of the 4th British Division, which both General Norstad and General Cassels considered would give adequate security cover. He believed the Committee would agree that General Cassels should be authorised to carry out the instructions he had received and circulated a draft minute to the Minister of Defence seeking his covering authority.

In discussion the following point was made:-

- (d) Should the Berlin situation deteriorate or should negotiations be in progress or projected at the time, it might be necessary to reconsider the question; this point should be included in the minute to the Minister of Defence.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (4) Agreed with the statement by the Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
- (5) Took note that the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff would forward the minute as amended in discussion to the Minister of Defence.

+ COS. 978/5/8/61

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C. Strengthening of British Forces in Germany

COS(64)274

THE COMMITTEE considered a Note by the War Office on the move of certain units and aircraft to Germany.

SIR WILLIAM PIRGO (representing the Chief of the Imperial General Staff) said that at a meeting on the previous day he had asked the Prime Minister to clarify the position on the timing of moves of the SAGW Regiment and two LAA Regiments from the United Kingdom to Germany. The Prime Minister had stated that his present view was that the SAGW Regiment should move to B.A.O.N. in mid-September, and that preparations should begin now to move the two LAA Regiments as soon as possible thereafter without recourse to emergency measures; the final decision on the latter moves would however depend of future developments. The Prime Minister had subsequently asked for a comprehensive timetable for the moves, and the Minister of Defence was to discuss this question at a meeting on the following day. He understood that the draft minute to the Minister of Defence attached to the Note was insufficiently detailed, and he accordingly circulated a revised version; this would serve as a basis of discussion at the Minister's meeting.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (6) Took note of the Note by the War Office.
- (7) Approved the revised minute to the Minister of Defence, subject to minor amendment, and took note that the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff would forward it to the Minister.

D. Vehicles for the British Garrison in Berlin

SIR ALFRED EARLE said that he understood that, in response to a long standing request from the British Commandant in Berlin, it was planned to send to the city by rail on the night of Friday, 18th August, 18 one ton armoured vehicles and 16 Ferrets. The desirability of sending these vehicles to Berlin at the present time was likely to be discussed at the meeting which the Minister of Defence had called for the following afternoon. It would be grateful if the Foreign Office would confirm before that meeting that they had no objection to the vehicles moving, as planned.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (8) Took note.
- (9) Invited the Foreign Office to inform the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff of their views on this matter.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.4.1.

15TH AUGUST, 1961.

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Amended.

(CIRCULATED FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF)

JP(61)107(Final)

17th August, 1961

SPECIALLY RESTRICTED
CIRCULATION

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

JOINT PLANNING STAFF

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Report by the Joint Planning Staff

In accordance with the instructions⁺ of the Chiefs of Staff, we have examined the future relationship between LIVE OAK and SHAPE, drawn up a draft directive for LIVE OAK, indicated what future directions will be required from the Ambassadorial Group, Washington or Governments to LIVE OAK, and examined the provision of military advice for the Ambassadorial Group.

2. In compiling our report, which is at Annex, we have consulted the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence.

Recommendation

3. We recommend that, if they approve our report, the Chiefs of Staff should authorize its use, when appropriate, in any future discussions on Berlin Contingency Planning.

(Signed) E.V.M. STRICKLAND
D.C. STAPLETON
W.D. O'BRIEN.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

+ COS(61)53rd Mtg., Min. 1(CA)

Also in COS(61)284 Aug 24 1961 in DEFE 5/116

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BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

INTRODUCTION

forward to
JG(61)107 (Final)

1. At the preliminary meetings of the Working Group in Paris the United States delegation tabled two draft papers¹ in preparation for the meeting of Foreign Ministers:-

- (a) Military Planning and Preparations towards a Berlin Crisis.
- (b) Draft instructions to the Military Authorities of France, the United Kingdom and the United States.

2. These papers are attributed to Mr. Paul Nitze, United States Assistant Secretary for Defence, and it would appear that they have not been agreed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff². They were discussed by the Working Group but were not accepted for tabling to the Foreign Ministers; it is likely however that the Ambassadorial Group in Washington will consider the questions raised in the papers of the future relationship between LIVE OAK and SHAPE and the issue of a new directive for the former.

3. The preliminary and unofficial reactions of General Norstad to the papers have been received³. We agree with him that it is essential first for the political aim to be clearly defined, and then for military decision on the type and scope of military activities to meet the aim.

4. From the Foreign Ministers' Meeting at Paris the following four issues emerged:-

- (a) The means for concerting and co-ordinating the planning and execution of military measures beyond the competence of LIVE OAK.
- (b) The means of ensuring continuity of military control during a transition from tripartite Berlin measures to control by established NATO mechanisms, if and when necessary.
- (c) The means of effecting co-ordinated political guidance and control of military activity world-wide during the Berlin crisis.
- (d) The preparation of a new directive for LIVE OAK and other military authorities.

5. Our examination excludes 4(c) above and the new directive to other military authorities referred to in 4(d).

AIM

6. To define the future relationship between LIVE OAK and SHAPE; to draw up a draft revised directive for LIVE OAK; to indicate what future direction will be required from the Ambassadorial Group in Washington or Governments to LIVE OAK and to examine the provision of military advice for the Ambassadorial Group.

① COS 964/4/8/61, Annex A and B
② Paris to Foreign Office Telegram No. 412
of 3rd August, 1961
③ UKMNR 334

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LIVE OAK
AND SHAPE

General

7. The instructions for LIVE OAK in the original directive^x were that the Tripartite Staff in Paris, under the supervision of General Norstad, should:-

- (a) Be responsible for planning and co-ordinating quiet preparatory and precautionary military measures which would not create public alarm but would be detectable by Russian intelligence (Paragraph 1(a)).
- (b) Plan more elaborate military measures in Europe which would be generally observable including:-
 - (i) Measures to be implemented after the Soviet Government has turned its functions over to the GDR.
 - (ii) Measures to be implemented after allied traffic has been forcibly obstructed. (Paragraph 1(b)).
- (c) Plan the initial probe of Soviet intentions to be made in the event of interruption of allied surface access (Paragraph 9).
- (d) Study the measures required to restore freedom of passage (Paragraph 11(a)).
- (e) Assist the Three Embassies at Bonn to plan air access measures (Paragraph 12(b)). The LIVE OAK responsibility was subsequently defined^o as contingency planning for air access after the Soviets or GDR have attacked or physically obstructed tripartite aircraft in the air corridors.
- (f) To assist the three Embassies at Bonn to carry out their responsibilities under the directive (Paragraph 13(c)).

Planning

8. In a supplementary brief^z for the use of the CIGS in Paris, we considered that the approach to the Berlin problem was in two related parts. Access and the maintenance of a Western military presence in the city was a tripartite responsibility. The wider military plans needed to achieve and exploit a general position of strength should be concerted on a NATO basis. Thus LIVE OAK should remain responsible as a separate entity as at present for planning ground access measures and some aspects of air access in conjunction with CINC BAOR and CINCUSAFE. Any wider participation (apart, of course, from the Federal Republic which has a special position) in military planning without responsibility for execution, before the stage at which NATO as a whole needed to become directly involved, would not only

^x Annex to COS 541/10/4/59
^o COS(59)199
^z COS(61)252

complicate planning but would also infringe the responsibility of the Three Powers. We considered, however, that Belgium, Canada and the Netherlands, all of whom contribute forces to the Central Region, should be made aware of the plans through their National Military Representative at SHAPE, and the Germans through their LIVE OAK Liaison Officer.

9. We had also previously concluded⁸ that if the Russians were to be convinced of Western determination to re-establish access by military means, the timely placing of NATO forces on a full war footing would be essential. General Norstad is also concerned⁹ that the quiet precautionary measures considered to date are not orientated towards deterrence. We therefore consider that SHAPE should assume the responsibility for military preparedness particularly as this must be related to SACEUR's Alert Measures.

10. The original directive⁴ requires LIVE OAK to plan more elaborate military measures in Europe and LIVE OAK have prepared a study⁵ of countermeasures which could be taken throughout Europe and in the adjoining seas to induce the USSR to desist from threatening attitudes or aggressive acts, although they planned in detail only for Berlin ground and air access measures. We consider that such measures, to be effective, would have to be implemented on a NATO basis, that the planning should therefore be the responsibility of the appropriate NATO headquarters, and that LIVE OAK should be limited to planning for operations directly concerned with re-opening access to Berlin.

11. In order to ensure that the views of the three Governments on military matters concerning Berlin are adequately represented, we consider that the Chief of Staff, LIVE OAK, should have direct access to General Norstad. This is necessary and justifiable as long as LIVE OAK retains its separate entity in the planning phase.

Operations

12. General Norstad has submitted proposals⁶ for LIVE OAK to be used as an operating staff if Contingency Plans are implemented, envisaging an augmented staff for continuous operations, though with SHAPE and USWUCOM providing intelligence support and SHAPE a public relations element. He also thinks⁷ it possible that, if operations become necessary, elements of LIVE OAK staff would have to be used to augment the existing staffs of certain field commanders, such as General Cassells.

13. The initial probe (FREE STYLE) is planned for an early stage when circumstances might not justify NATO intervention; it requires careful timing in relation to other access measures which LIVE OAK will have studied and necessitates close liaison with the Three Embassies in Bonn. The LIVE OAK staff could be used as a separate operations staff from SHAPE to meet the wishes of General Norstad, but in these circumstances we think it should be confined to the FREE STYLE operation only. It would be better in our view to integrate the LIVE OAK staff with SHAPE for the execution of all operations in Europe for the following reasons:-

(a) NATO should be in a state of readiness when

- ⁸ COS(61)228
- ⁹ Annex A to COS 876/17/7/61
- ⁴ Annex to COS 541/10/4/59
- ⁵ Annex to COS 977/9/8/61
- ⁶ Annex A to COS 813/4/7/61

ground operations including the initial probe take place.

- (b) Any possible Russian action against air access operations could very quickly affect NATO as a whole. This could even precede FREE STYLE.
- (c) The air and ground operations need to be co-ordinated with SACEUR's Emergency Defence Plans.
- (d) It would in any case be advisable to use the NATO command and communications channels.

DIRECTIVE FOR LIVE OAK

14. The revised Directive for future Berlin Contingency Planning must provide the general political guidance which General Norstad requires, and this must come from the Ambassadorial Group in Washington. However, in order that the United Kingdom representative may table a draft, the Foreign Office have prepared guidance, which is incorporated with our views on future planning and operations, in a draft revised Directive at Appendix. Account has also been taken in the Directive of the United States memorandum^Ø and of the American change of view over airlift operations.

FURTHER DIRECTIONS REQUIRED FROM THE AMBASSADORIAL GROUP OF GOVERNMENTS TO LIVE OAK OR SHAPE

15. Now that there is general agreement between the four Powers on political aims there is an urgent need for clear political guidance from which LIVE OAK and SHAPE can proceed with military planning within limits acceptable to the three Powers. This necessary political guidance for LIVE OAK has been included in the draft revised Directive at Appendix.

16. There will also be the need for additional guidance as planning proceeds and problems of political rather than military complexity arise. Such guidance would obviously become more necessary and urgent in the event of any military measures being put into operation. Some procedure, therefore, is required whereby direction can be co-ordinated between the Tripartite Powers and the NATO Council without interruption or interference with either political purpose or military planning.

17. General Norstad will require an additional directive in his capacity as SACEUR in regard to those measures which are to be taken on a NATO basis and for which SHAPE is to have planning responsibility. This directive would have to be issued by the Standing Group on behalf of the Military Committee and after approval by the North Atlantic Council, when they have been informed formally of the details of Tripartite Contingency Planning for Berlin.

MILITARY ADVICE FOR THE AMBASSADORIAL GROUP IN WASHINGTON

18. It was agreed⁺ at the Paris meeting of Foreign Ministers that the Ambassadorial Group in Washington should be the initial

Ø COS 904/24/7/61
+ COS(61)53rd Mtg. Min 1.CA.

co-ordinating body for the higher direction of measures relating to Berlin. Although under the terms of its 1959 directive this Group was made responsible for the overall co-ordination of Berlin contingency planning, the relationship of General Norstad to the Group was not clearly defined and no system for the provision of military advice to it was established. Both omissions must now be remedied urgently. The relationship of General Norstad has been dealt with in the draft revised Directive at Appendix. It now remains to decide how military advice should be provided to the Ambassadorial Group.

19. This problem includes the following aspects:-

- (a) Representation of national views on military measures.
- (b) Military advice on ideas arising in the Ambassadorial Group which may include proposals for action outside the NATO area.
- (c) Advice on proposals submitted by executive commanders, such as General Norstad.
- (d) Assistance in formulating directives by the Ambassadorial Group to executive commanders.

20. There are four ways in which military advice could be provided to the Ambassadorial Group to cover the requirements in paragraph 19. These are:-

- (a) By using existing national military representatives in Washington to advise their own Ambassadors individually.
- (b) By appointing separate officers to advise Ambassadors individually.
- (c) By establishing a separate military advisory group by special appointment. This body would require a separate staff. (Its members would of course still be able to advise their Ambassadors individually.)
- (d) By using the members of the Standing Group with the addition of a German (logically their representative on the Military Committee) in a separate corporate form for corporate advice to the Ambassadorial Group making use of existing organizations and staff. (Again, its members would still be free to advise their Ambassadors individually.)

The French and German Governments seem already to have adopted course (b) but we do not know which of the above methods they favour as a permanent solution.

21. The appointment of national military representatives to advise the Ambassadorial Group on an individual basis, or the establishment of a separate military advisory group, i.e. 20(a), (b) and (c) above, would in our view undermine the confidence required of NATO and confuse the responsibilities for planning

and operations, particularly as we consider that any operation in Europe that may arise over the Berlin issue should be the responsibility of SACEUR. There is considerable merit if the members of the Standing Group, who have both NATO and national responsibilities, together with General Heusinger, present Chairman of the Military Committee, fulfil this function since the Standing Group is in close touch with NATO major Commanders, and through its links with the Military Committee and the NATO Council could bridge the gap between the quadripartite powers and NATO as a whole. Moreover, if advice is required on ideas in the Ambassadorial Group arising from action outside the NATO area, this could be provided by members of the Standing Group in their national capacity, as at present.

22. We consider that the need for military measures to be closely related to political guidance will necessitate a direct link between the Ambassadorial Group and General Norstad, or any other major commander acting in a tripartite capacity.

CONCLUSIONS

23. We conclude that:-

- (a) The LIVE OAK Group should confine its responsibilities, under General Norstad, to the planning of access operations to Berlin, and that any operations arising therefrom in Europe must be the responsibility of SACEUR.
- (b) In the event of operations the LIVE OAK staff could be used by General Norstad as the operational staff to cover FREE STYLE but in our view should be integrated with SHAPE operational staff from the outset.
- (c) A new directive based on this division of responsibility and containing the directions required from the Ambassadorial Group is urgently needed. Draft proposals are at Appendix.
- (d) Military advice to the Ambassadorial Group could best be provided by the members of the Standing Group, enlarged to include the Germans, acting as a separate corporate body but with no change to the existing arrangement for individual advice to national political representatives. This would cover, as at present, problems which may arise outside the NATO area.

DRAFT DIRECTIVE TO GENERAL NORSTAD
FROM AMBASSADORIAL STEERING GROUP

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

1. The Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, after consultation with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, have, in the exercise of their special responsibility for Germany, including Berlin, approved the issue of the following directive for the future work of the LIVE OAK Planning team under your supervision. You will continue, until further notice, to act upon this directive and on such further instructions as may be agreed jointly by the Three Governments. This directive supersedes the relevant sections of the tripartite directive of 4th April, 1959.

2. The decisions on the implementation of any course of action arising from this directive, whether political, military, economic or other, must remain the responsibility of the three Governments after due consultation with the Federal Government and other Government members of NATO.

Political Aim

3. Subject to the foregoing paragraph, these Governments are agreed upon the following general principles:-

- (a) Their essential requirements in regard to Berlin are:-
 - (i) The maintenance of the presence and security of their forces in West Berlin.
 - (ii) The maintenance of the freedom and viability of West Berlin.
 - (iii) The maintenance of freedom of physical access to West Berlin.

All plans will be directed to securing these requirements.

- (b) Although every reasonable effort will be made to arrive at a peaceful settlement of the Berlin question with the Soviet Government, pending such a settlement they will take all necessary and appropriate steps to demonstrate their determination to secure their requirements, at the risk of war if necessary.
- (c) These steps will be designed to render them, and the NATO alliance, better able to deal with a conflict if the Soviet Government is not deterred from action which threatens the essential requirements set out above.

The Principles Governing Berlin Contingency Planning in the Military Field

4. In the event of substantial and continuing Soviet or East German interference with access to and from West Berlin, Allied

and/or civilian, Allied counter-action will have the following objects:-

- (a) So far as possible, to place on the other side the onus of being the first to take aggressive action.
- (b) To avoid a situation arising in which the West has the choice only between humiliation and all-out nuclear war.
- (c) To retain as great a range of choice as possible both as regards the type of counter-action taken and its timing.
- (d) To leave the Soviet Government as many opportunities as possible to pause and reassess the desirability of continuing on a dangerous course of action.
- (e) To leave the Soviet Government under no illusion that it can expect to restrict hostilities which may break out to a limited conventional engagement in which East German forces alone, or Soviet conventional forces in limited numbers, can deal successfully with Western military operations, and without risk of escalation.
- (f) To avoid prejudicing the ability of NATO forces to undertake their assigned tasks if more general hostilities occur.
- (g) To avoid any infringement of East German territory or air space (i.e. leaving the air corridors or the autobahn) until enemy action leaves no alternative.
- (h) Until hostilities become general, to use only forces of the Three Powers in operations.

The Outline of Planning

5. Planning should take account of the following factors:-

- (a) An initial probe of Soviet intentions may be required to establish deliberate physical obstruction of Allied access.
- (b) The establishment of adequate stockpiles in West Berlin, and the possible use of garrison/civil airlifts, would provide the West with the time required to consider further moves.
- (c) An airlift would be accompanied by significant economic counter-measures and intensified military preparations.
- (d) In the event of threats to flight safety or interference with flight in the air corridors, suitable action should be taken to provide air support.
- (e) As wide a variety as possible of more elaborate military measures on the ground access route should be planned but their implementation would be delayed until all other reasonable alternative courses had failed. They could not, of themselves, re-open access

prevent it, and must be planned so as not to prejudice wider NATO operations should the need for these occur.

The Tasks and Planning Responsibilities of LIVE OAK

6. The LIVE OAK Group is responsible to you for plans to cover the following contingencies:-

- (a) Initial probes of Soviet intentions.
- (b) More elaborate military measures.
- (c) Measures in support of air access.

7. Plans for precautionary and preparatory measures previously the responsibility of LIVE OAK will henceforth become the responsibility of SACEUR who will also assume responsibility for planning counter measures in Allied Command Europe which are outside the Central Region.

8. LIVE OAK should remain a separate planning group within SHAPE, with direct access to yourself and to CINCEAOR and CINCUSAFE for planning purposes.

9. The conduct of any operations that may arise from these plans will be under the command and control of SACEUR through his operations staff at SHAPE.

10. You are requested to:-

- (a) Re-examine existing plans in the light of this directive and to make such recommendations to the Three Governments as you consider necessary, and inform the Federal Government through the German Liaison Officer at LIVE OAK.
- (b) Prepare and submit plans for the integration of the LIVE OAK staff into NATO Headquarters at the appropriate level and time and to ensure the continuity of military control during the handover to SACEUR.
- (c) Establish appropriate arrangements for liaison with the Ambassadorial Steering Group in Washington.

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CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX

TO

C.O.S. (61) 54TH MEETING HELD ON
TUESDAY, 22ND AUGUST, 1961

3. BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

(Previous Reference: C.O.S. (61) 53rd Meeting, Minute 1)

J.P. (61) 107 (Final)

THE COMMITTEE considered a report by the Joint Planning Staff on the future relationship between LIVE OAK and SHAPE, the additional political guidance which might be required from the Ambassadorial Group in Washington or Governments for LIVE OAK, the provision of military advice to the Ambassadorial Group and, a revised directive for LIVE OAK. A note^x by the Joint Planning Staff commenting on a draft directive^x submitted by General Norstad to the Ambassadorial Group and telegrams[@] from the Chairman, British Defence Staffs, Washington, and H.M. Ambassador to Washington[£] were relevant to their discussion.

SIR WILLIAM PIKE (representing Chief of the Imperial General Staff) said that the report before the Committee was intended as guidance for the United Kingdom representative on the Ambassadorial Group and in consequence, subject to any comments by the Minister of Defence, it would be for the Foreign Office to make such use of the report as it considered necessary in the formulation of guidance for Sir Harold Caccia. There was however a requirement to send Sir George Mills their views on the report and this should be done in parallel with any instructions sent by the Foreign Office. The Committee had also to consider the draft directive^x submitted by General Norstad and the Joint Planning Staff comments^x thereon; he believed the Committee would agree that these comments were acceptable and that the objections to General Norstad's draft directive would be self-evident when it was discussed in the Ambassadorial Group. The draft prepared by the Foreign Office and attached to the Joint Planning Staff report was, in his view, better in every way.

^x JP(61) Note 36

^x COS.1041/21/8/61

[@] GM.191 and GM.192

[£] Washington to Foreign Office No.1988

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He suggested therefore that it would be preferable for it to be tabled at the Ambassadorial Group and to form the basis for discussion of the revised directive for LIVE OAK. The Committee would appreciate that this directive dealt only with General Norstad's responsibility to the Tripartite Powers. Confusion could arise from the duality of General Norstad's responsibilities for planning to meet the developing Berlin crisis and the NATO Council should issue the necessary parallel directive without delay.

SIR EVELYN SHUCKBURN said that the Ambassadorial Group was proceeding by stages and in the first instance was giving immediate attention to the LIVE OAK directive. The NATO directive would come next and an early opportunity would be sought to raise this question in the NATO Council.

In discussion the following points were made:-

- (a) So long as the official co-ordination of measures relating to Berlin remained a quadripartite responsibility, it would be clearly improper for a NATO organisation, such as the Standing Group, to give it advice. In any case, Sir Harold Caccia's view that the Ambassadorial Group was unlikely to require corporate military advice was clearly correct. Military advice could best be provided by existing national military representatives in Washington advising their own Ambassadors individually. There would be merit in these representatives being the members of the Standing Group, and the German representative on the Military Committee, acting in an individual and national capacity. The report should be amended accordingly.
- (b) As at present drafted paragraph 5(e) of the Directive would allow General Norstad to press forward with ground access plans which were known to be militarily unsound and which would moreover place a very great burden on the staffs of the British Army of the Rhine. It was impossible however entirely to remove this objection to this paragraph since one of the aims of the directive was that planning which infringed the East German sovereignty, i.e. which was not confined to the autobahn, should in future be carried out by SHAPE rather than LIVE OAK. An amendment to delete "access route" and to substitute "to restore access" though not entirely meeting the difficulties would be an improvement.
- (c) The Joint Planning Staff's comments on the draft directive* prepared by General Norstad were acceptable with the exception that the last sentence overstated the case. The Note should be amended to read "We remain unconvinced, however, that the countermeasures envisaged by General Norstad would, if implemented, achieve the Allied aim".

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (1) Agreed with the statement of the Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

* COS. 1041/21/6/61.

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C.O.S.(61)285

24TH AUGUST, 1961

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

GENERAL NORSTAD'S PROPOSED DIRECTIVE FOR
CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Note by the Secretary

At their meeting⁺ on Tuesday, 22nd August, 1961, the
Chiefs of Staff approved the report at Annex commenting on
a proposed Directive for contingency planning, submitted by
General Norstad to the Ambassadorial Group in Washington.

2. In approving the report, the Chiefs of Staff:-

- (a) Invited the Ministry of Defence to forward
it to the Foreign Office as an expression
of their views.
- (b) Instructed that a copy should be despatched
to the Chairman, British Defence Staffs,
Washington.

(Signed) J.D. WARNE

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

24TH AUGUST, 1961.

+ C.O.S.(61)54th Meeting, Minute 3

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ANNEX TO C.O.S. (61)285GENERAL NORSTAD'S PROPOSED DIRECTIVE
FOR CONTINGENCY PLANNING

General Norstad has forwarded his Proposed Directive for Contingency Planning⁺ to the Chairman of the Military Sub-Committee of the Ambassadorial Group, Washington. This directive was prepared by Brigadier-General Richardson with the assistance of the LIVE OAK Staff, using as a basis General Norstad's redraft of the Nitze paper⁺, a copy of which was given to the CIGS while he was in Paris. Major-General Baker, Chief of Staff, LIVE OAK, does not appear to have been present when the directive was prepared, and the United Kingdom and French representatives at LIVE OAK have made it clear that it does not necessarily reflect national viewpoints.

2. We examine below the proposed directive, particularly in relation to our own draft directive⁺. References in brackets are to paragraphs of the former⁺.

SCOPE OF DIRECTIVE

3. After dealing with current LIVE OAK planning, the directive begins with a statement that Allied Governments consider that a list of measures should be invoked concurrently or individually in the event of Communist acts of aggression that demand strong allied response (paragraph 6 and 7).

4. It then directs (paragraphs 8(a) and (b)) General Norstad to:-

- (a) Extend the scope of current Berlin access plans to give the Allies the capability to determine the range of force which the Soviets/GDR are willing to employ in order to block Allied access, and to

⁺ Annex to COS.1041/21/8/61

⁺ Annex 'B' to COS.964/4/8/61

⁺ Appendix 'A' to COS(61)284

determine that the Soviets are willing to commit their own forces for this purpose.

- (b) Plan for selective offensive operations which might be undertaken in or from CE.

5. The last section of the directive lists the factors to be considered in the preparation of military plans and which, if beyond the scope of LIVE OAK, can be considered as falling within SACEUR's terms of reference. (paragraphs 9 and 10).

OUR COMMENTS

Precedence of Allied Action

6. In the first place this section contains points of a political magnitude extending beyond the competence of the existing political machinery, and requiring Allied governmental consideration and agreement at the highest level. Secondly, even if we assume that such political agreement can be achieved, it is not within the competence of NATO to plan for some of the military measures listed.

7. Finally we consider that a directive for General Norstad and LIVE OAK from the Tripartite Powers could not include direction on operations to be mounted on a NATO basis, since these would have to be approved by the North Atlantic Council and should be issued as a directive from the Standing Group on behalf of the Military Committee.

Future Contingency Planning

8. This part of the directive does not define the relationship of LIVE OAK to SHIP, nor whether LIVE OAK or NATO staffs should do the planning, since it merely assumes (paragraph 9) the understanding of the Quadripartite Governments that planning which might be beyond the scope of LIVE OAK can be considered as falling within SACEUR's terms of reference. Colonel Chaundler has indicated⁸, however, that General Norstad envisages paragraph 4(a) above falling to LIVE OAK and 4(b) to NATO staffs.

9. The NATO Strategic Concept⁹ is capable of such wide interpretation that we consider General Norstad is correct in his assumption that the planning falls within SACEUR's terms of reference; it is, however, essential that any directive for LIVE OAK should define planning responsibility in order to determine the source of political direction (Tripartite or NATO). Our recommendations appear to be in accordance with General Norstad's thinking as indicated by Colonel Chaundler.

General Considerations

10. The list of factors in this section (paragraph 10) provides guidance on some critical issues, namely the Allied response required to localize Communist acts of aggression, the means of inducing the Soviets to negotiate, the discriminate use of nuclear fire power, and the military plans required in the face of escalation.

⁸ UKLO/18 dated 10 Aug 61

⁹ MC14/2 (Revised)

¹⁰ Appendix 'A' to COS(61)284

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11. We have previously noted[@] that the directive to LIVE OAK would need to be followed by a directive to General Norstad in the capacity as SLOCEUR, in regard to those measures which are to be planned on a NATO basis and for which SHAPE is to have planning responsibility. The planning factors outlined in the proposed directive fall within the latter category. The inclusion now for the first time of military counter-measures for offensive operations and the employment of tactical nuclear weapons, although intended to convince the Russians of Western determination, would create new situations well beyond the scope of presently agreed NATO strategy. The measures, if ever implemented, would at best carry a serious risk of a limited war in Europe and at worst immediate escalation to global war.

12. Up to now Allied military planning has not proceeded beyond that undertaken in LIVE OAK for ground and air access to Berlin. We agree that the issues now presented should be covered by NATO military plans, because it has always been our view that NATO should, from the outset, be prepared to meet any eventuality arising from the Berlin crisis. We remain unconvinced, however, that the counter measures envisaged by General Norstad would, if implemented, achieve the Allied aim.

@ Appendix 'A' to COS(61)284

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This document was considered at COS(61) 56th Meeting, Minute 1 CA
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JP(61)Note 37

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27th August, 1961

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BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Note by the Directors of Plans

In accordance with the instructions⁺ of the Chief of the Defence Staff, we examine below two draft directives[@] to General Norstad, dealing with Berlin Contingency Planning. They have been prepared by the Quadripartite Military Group in Washington for consideration by the Ambassadorial Group on Monday 28th August. It is not clear whether the JACK PINE directive^c is intended to be added to the broad directive[@]. Our comment on the former is in paragraph 10 below.

2. The new draft directive[@] to General Norstad covering general planning is a compound of the draft directive^{*} prepared by General Norstad himself, and the proposed United Kingdom directive^ø to the LIVE OAK staff.

3. The United Kingdom Ambassador in Washington[£] and the United Kingdom Member of the NATO Standing Group[%] have urged acceptance of the new, much broader, directive in order to ensure our participation in United States planning which is now proceeding rapidly.

4. It can be inferred from the first three paragraphs of the new directive that it will be issued by the Ambassadorial Group to General Norstad in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief, United States Forces, Europe.

5. Our comments below are related to the sections and paragraphs of the new directive[@].

Allied Aims and Responsibilities (Paragraphs 1-3)

6. Our only comment is about responsibilities. Many of the plans required by the directive will be beyond the scope of the LIVE OAK staff to prepare. If, as is later implied, it can be left to General Norstad to allocate responsibilities and work as he chooses between LIVE OAK and NATO staffs, the Nations outside the Quadripartite Powers must be clear where they stand both in planning and operational responsibilities. See paragraph 12 below.

- + COS.1080/27/8/61
- @ Annex 'A' to COS.1080/27/8/61
- £ Annex 'B' to COS.1080/27/8/61
- * Annex to COS.1041/21/8/61
- ø Appendix to Annex to COS(61)284
- £ Washington to Foreign Office No.2092
- % GM 194

Attached to COS (61) 56

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General Considerations (Paragraph 4)

7. Paragraph 4(a). This seems out of place. The integration and timing of military and non-military measures and their application over Berlin is for decision by Governments advised by the Ambassadorial Group. We suggest this paragraph should either be deleted or left in the informatory sense i.e. in the fourth line "will have to be" instead of "must be".

8. Paragraph 4(c). We have commented previously^X that because of the dangers of rapid escalation, and as an earnest of the West's intentions, NATO must be on a war footing from the outset of any operations to restore access to Berlin. We therefore suggest in the second sentence that the words from "consistent with" to the end of the sentence be deleted and the following substituted: "co-ordinated with NATO preparations to undertake their assigned tasks if more general hostilities occur".

9. Paragraph 4(d). This outlines the circumstances of recourse to nuclear weapons. As a matter of military prudence we agree that plans to employ nuclear weapons should be made. The possibility of their use is correctly made subject to political authorization, but obviously in the circumstances envisaged an agree control system is urgently required. General Norstad should be asked to submit recommendations on this system.

Present and Additional Plans (paragraphs 5 to 7 and the JACK PINE draft directive)

10. Paragraph 5. The revision of present plans lists those undertaken by the LIVE OAK staff but proposes extension to the JACK PINE plans to include counter action against enemy airfield, AAA and missile sites and ground installations. This extension and the priority proposed for airlift plans arises from the contents of the recent Soviet Note over air access. We agree both the extension and priority on the grounds of the need for preparedness for any eventuality arising from hostile air action.

11. Paragraph 6. The additional military plans proposed in this paragraph are undoubtedly those which must fall within the responsibility of NATO and include expanded non-nuclear air and ground operations, and the selective use of nuclear weapons. Naval studies are proceeding in Washington and General Norstad is to be informed of their progress.

12. Paragraph 7. The responsibilities for both the planning and the conduct of operations, either for restoring access to Berlin or for those of wider scope, are not clear. They are, however, referred to in paragraphs 7(b) and (c) which require General Norstad to make recommendations about the means of assuring continuity of military control during the transition from tripartite to NATO control, and which state that the Tripartite Governments will effect co-ordination with the NATO authorities over matters within their competence. We still adhere to the view^z that should operations occur on any scale greater than TRADE WIND, they will require the resources of NATO and should therefore become the responsibility of SACEUR. We feel, however, that at this stage no amendments need be proposed to the new directive. Our views can be represented later either by the UKNMR at SHAPE or after General Norstad's recommendations are known.

X JP(61)Note 36
z COS(61)284

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Conclusions

13. We conclude that:-

- (a) Because of the over-riding need to proceed urgently with military plans to meet the Berlin situation, the new draft directives to General Norstad should be accepted, subject to the points made in paragraphs 7 to 9 above.
- (b) Comment on the definition of responsibilities for planning and the conduct of operations as between LIVE OAK and the NATO staffs, and between the Tripartite and NATO Nations, should be withheld until General Norstad's recommendations are received.

Recommendation

14. We recommend that, if they approve our report, the Chiefs of Staff should forward it to the Foreign Office as an expression of their views.

(Signed) D.C. STAPLETON
W.D. O'BRIEN
B.N.L. DITMAS.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

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CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX

TO

C.O.S. (61) 56TH MEETING HELD ON
MONDAY, 28TH AUGUST, 1961

1. BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

(Previous Reference: C.O.S. (61) 54th Meeting, Minute 3)

A. Draft Directive to General Norstad Prepared by the
Ambassadorial Group in Washington

J.P. (61) Note 37

THE COMMITTEE had before them a Note by the Directors of Plans examining two draft directives⁺ to General Norstad, dealing with Berlin Contingency Planning, which had been prepared in Washington for consideration by the Ambassadorial Group on Monday, 28th August, 1961. A telegram[%] from the Chairman, British Defence Staffs, Washington, was relevant to their discussion.

MR. KILLICK (Foreign Office) said that as a result of an initiative by Mr. Rusk and Mr. McNamara at a meeting of the Ambassadorial Group on Saturday, 26th August, 1961, the Military Group had drafted two directives to General Norstad, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief, United States Forces, Europe: the first amplified and modified the terms of reference for tripartite Berlin Contingency Planning agreed by the three Powers in April, 1959, and the second called for an extension of JACK PINE plans. The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary had been informed of the contents of the various telegrams from Washington on these matters over the weekend, and had discussed both the main points of principle and the one point of substance - nuclear planning - raised in them; they had agreed that at this stage there was no alternative but to accept the directives. The Foreign Office recognised that this decision perpetuated the unsatisfactory basis for planning which had always characterised LIVE OAK and, in particular, that once again a British Commander-in-Chief would be required to prepare plans which did not enjoy the support of H.M. Government.

+ COS. 1030/27/8/61

% GM 194

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In discussion the following points were made:-

- (a) The United States military staffs and General Norstad, in his United States capacity, were already examining unilaterally the question of more extensive operations, including the use of nuclear weapons. There was therefore every advantage in the United Kingdom agreeing to take part in such planning or we should otherwise be unable to influence its course.
- (b) It was difficult to see how limited operations elsewhere in Germany would contribute to re-opening access to Berlin; indeed, the Russian reaction to such pressure might be to use it as an excuse to seize the whole of Berlin. Whilst those dangers were recognised, the United States attached importance to these wider operations as a means of proving to the Russians that they regarded Berlin as the focus of the East/West conflict and that they were determined to maintain their rights in the city.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (1) Took note of the statement by the Representative of the Foreign Office and of the points made in discussion.

The Committee then considered the Note by the Directors of Plans paragraph by paragraph, and the following points were made:-

- (c) Paragraph 7. The comment on paragraph 4(a) of the first draft directive was agreed.
- (d) Paragraph 8. The substance of the comment on paragraph 4(c) was agreed, but it was thought that it would be sufficient if the words "and co-ordinated" were inserted after the word "consistent" in the second sentence of paragraph 4(c) of the first draft directive.
- (e) Paragraph 9. It was considered inappropriate to make the comment suggested by the Directors of Plans on paragraph 4(d) of the first draft directive.
- (f) Subject to the above comments, the Committee approved the Note by the Directors of Plans, but agreed that Sir George Mills should be instructed not to press for the inclusion of the amendments in (c) and (d) above against opposition.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (2) Approved the Note by the Directors of Plans, subject to their comments at (c), (d), (e) and (f) above.
- (3) Instructed the Secretary to inform⁸ Air Chief Marshal Mills accordingly.

The Committee then discussed the second directive.

SIR EDMUND HUDLESTON said that the Air Ministry had already initiated a review of current plans under JACK PINE, to take account of possible counter-action against enemy airfields, anti-aircraft guns, missile sites and ground installations, which could directly interfere with an airlift; he proposed that it should now be expanded to include the threat of fighter attack, which might be mounted from airfields up to about 200 miles from the air corridor.

⁸ Subsequently despatched as COS(W)23

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THE COMMITTEE:-

- (4) Took note of the statement by the Vice Chief of the Air Staff and agreed to consider the report by the Air Ministry at their meeting to be held at 1100 hours on Friday, 1st September, 1951.

MR. KILLICK (Foreign Office) said that the Foreign Office would now pursue with the Ambassadorial Group the question of informing NATO, in accordance with paragraph 7(c) of the first draft directive.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (5) Took note.

B. Single Allied Commander for Berlin SECRET

SIR WILLIAM PIKE asked whether there was any sign that the Americans would shortly request the implementation of the agreement whereby, in a time of crisis, the United States Commandant in Berlin would be appointed as the single Allied Commander.

MR. KILLICK (Foreign Office) said that there was no indication that the Americans were thinking of suggesting the implementation of this agreement. The arrangement was designed to meet a military emergency and from the United Kingdom point of view it was politically most undesirable to upset the present status of the three Allied Commanders in Berlin unless it was militarily essential to do so.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (6) Took note.

C. SHAPE Directive to CINCENT on Possible Military Counter-measures TOP SECRET

THE COMMITTEE had before them a Secretary's minute covering a directive by General Norstad to CINCENT instructing him to plan for certain selected and limited offensive operations on East German territory; and a telegram² from the U.K.N.M.R. SHAPE giving the text of a directive in which General Norstad had instructed C-in-C, U.S.A.F.E., first, to bring up to date his plans for maintaining air access to Berlin, and secondly, to maintain specified numbers of fighter aircraft at an enhanced state of readiness.

In discussion the following point was made:-

- (g) This development emphasised the importance of bringing NATO fully into Berlin contingency planning on the political side as soon as possible.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (7) Took note.

✓ COS. 1070/28/8/51
@ UKNMR 342

8/31/61

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JP(61)97(Final)

1st July, 1961

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CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

JOINT PLANNING STAFF

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING
SUPPLEMENTARY BRIEF

Report by the Joint Planning Staff

In accordance with the instructions of the Chief of the Defence Staff, we have prepared a supplementary brief to our previous paper⁺ on LIVEOAK planning, to take account of the United States Memorandum² on measures for dealing with the Berlin situation.

2. In preparing the brief, which is at Annex, we have emphasized those aspects of the United States proposals which we consider require elucidation. We have consulted the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence.

Recommendation

3. We recommend that, if they approve our report, the Chiefs of Staff should authorize its use by their representative, in amplification of the main brief, at the forthcoming quadripartite talks on Berlin Contingency Planning.

(Signed) D.L. POWELL-JONES
E.B. ASHMORE
D.C. STAPLETON
W.C. SMITH.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

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Annex to JP(61)97(Final)

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING
SUPPLEMENTARY BRIEF

INTRODUCTION

1. This brief is supplementary to the one which we have already prepared⁺, and has been written to take account of the United States Memorandum[®] on measures for dealing with the Berlin situation. We have separately examined² this Memorandum and given our general comments and the military implications for the United Kingdom of accepting the American proposals.

2. The basis of American policy over Berlin is that there should be negotiations; their proposals, however, are primarily designed to ensure that these would be undertaken from a position of increasing military strength, permitting a wide choice of options. Specifically in relation to Berlin the United States believe that the following precautionary and planning efforts should be undertaken within the next few weeks:-

- (a) Strengthen the position of West Berlin, to sustain an interruption of access, by reviewing and improving airlift procedures and the stockpile as necessary.
- (b) Review our Berlin contingency planning in the light of the present situation.
- (c) Complete Allied plans for use of a wide range of non-military counter-measures, including economic sanctions, upon interruption of access to Berlin or earlier as a warning and deterrent.

EFFECT OF AMERICAN PROPOSALS
ON THE UNITED KINGDOM LINE

3. The United States proposals, in so far as they refer to plans for access to Berlin, are more in harmony with our own views, although they are based on an approach to NATO strategy still very different from our own. However they either omit or are indefinite about certain matters which need to be clarified. These are discussed below.

Ground Operations

4. No specific mention is made of division sized operations but the Americans are obviously concerned over the gap between TRADE WIND and the use of nuclear forces. Although the position of strength which they intend to build up is primarily intended for deterrence it is clear that they do not exclude offensive operations, presumably with the object of re-opening access.

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Annex (Continued)

On the other hand, General Norstad has stated² that he does not advocate access operations on a large scale.

5. We appreciate that this gap in military measures does exist and consider that plans should be prepared to deal with any situation which might develop from interruption of access. These should be in a NATO context but we must maintain our view that access to Berlin cannot be restored by an isolated military operation if the Russians are determined to prevent it.

6. If this is accepted, the difference of views about access operations may now be capable of reconciliation.

Air Operations

7. The American view that an airlift has more meaning against a background of increasing military strength brings them much closer to our own position than hitherto. However the place in the sequence of events which the Americans give to an airlift is not clear. The line given in our main brief⁺ should be followed in discussing this point.

8. We agree that airlift resources and procedures should be reviewed.

Naval Action

9. The only naval tasks which the Memorandum envisages are described as "naval harassment and even naval blockading actions". These, it claims, are more likely to be suffered without major retaliation in a situation of growing Western power. Such actions do not appear to be related to any economic counter-measures listed elsewhere in the Memorandum, which are administrative in character, but they could be related to certain of the original LIVEOAK more elaborate military measures⁷. It would be advisable to ascertain what the United States have in mind, since further detailed planning would be necessary before any such actions could be implemented.

Planning and Operational Implications

10. It is implicit in the American proposals for NATO involvement that tripartite planning for direct military measures for Berlin will need to be related to wider NATO planning to meet Soviet reactions. General Norstad's opinion² is that NATO should be brought in operationally at the earliest possible moment. This raises questions of co-ordination and access by non-tripartite nations to LIVEOAK plans and to JACK PINE/QBAL operations which are on a quadripartite basis.

11. Responsibilities for Berlin Contingency Planning are as follows:-

- (a) Overall co-ordination - the tripartite Ambassadorial Group in Washington.

- x UKNMR 333
- & COS 1205/22/9/59
- + COS(61)228
- } Appendix 'B' to COS(59)199
- 0 Annex to COS(60)58

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UK EYES ONLYAnnex (Continued)

- (b) Air access planning and certain special responsibilities concerning movements to Berlin - the tripartite Ambassadorial Group in Bonn. CINCSAFE is responsible for implementation of air access plans.
- (c) Preparatory and more elaborate military measures - the LIVEOAK Group in Paris. General Norstad is responsible for overall planning supervision and CINCPACOR is responsible for the detailed planning and training for ground access operations.
- (d) Operational measures in Berlin - the tripartite Allied Staff, Berlin.

Thorough co-ordination between these widely spread groups has hitherto been difficult, and stringent tripartite security regulations have precluded the passing of LIVEOAK plans to other nations and NATO staffs. However, in 1960, CINCENT, COMLANDCENT and COMAIRCENT were informed personally; the German National Military Representative at SHAPE has received briefings from the LIVEOAK Group, and we have recently agreed to a German liaison officer for LIVEOAK. We have resisted French proposals that all planning should be done by a single high level group since we prefer military planning to be in General Norstad's hands from the outset, in view of his NATO responsibilities; and we consider that a great deal of other planning must inevitably be done in Bonn and Berlin where alone the necessary expert or local knowledge is available.

12. General Norstad has submitted proposals for LIVEOAK to be used as an operating staff if Contingency Plans are implemented, envisaging an augmented staff for continuous operations, though with SHAPE and USEUCOM providing intelligence support and SHAPE a public relations element. We now have reason to believe that General Norstad himself would welcome a broader approach.

UNITED KINGDOM VIEWS

13. We see the approach to the Berlin problem in two related parts. Access and the maintenance of a Western military presence in the city is a tripartite responsibility. The achievement of a position of strength from which, if negotiations fail, operations to re-establish access should be mounted, should be a NATO responsibility. We believe that the very specialized nature of the autobahn operations justifies both the planning functions of the LIVEOAK Group and the initial operational responsibility which General Norstad is anxious that they should have. We therefore consider that LIVEOAK planning must remain a separate entity, although working in close contact with SHAPE, and that no nation other than the tripartite powers and Germany should participate.

14. Any wider participation in military planning without responsibility for execution, before the stage at which NATO as a whole needs to become directly involved, would not only complicate planning but would also infringe the responsibility of the Three Powers. We consider, however, that Belgium, Canada and the Netherlands, all of whom contribute forces to the Central Region, should be made aware of the plans. We feel

2 COS(61)42nd Mtg.
1 Annex to COS(60)58
1 Annex 'A' to COS.813/4/7/61
1 UKNMR 333

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that adequate liaison could be maintained through their National Military Representatives at SHAPE.

(5. We believe that LIVEOAK should not be responsible for planning beyond what is required for access to, and maintenance of, a Western military presence in Berlin. The wider military plans needed to achieve and exploit a general position of strength should be concerted on a NATO basis. The whole subject of the transition and inter-relationship between LIVEOAK and NATO planning responsibilities is in need of urgent clarification. It is desirable that such a study be set in train at the forthcoming meeting.

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Annex to JP(61)93(Final)

NATO STRATEGY
SUPPLEMENTARY BRIEF FOR SIR GEORGE MILLS

1. This brief is supplementary to the general one contained in Annex 'A' to COS(61)230. Its specific purpose is to assist you when the Standing Group considers priorities of forces.
2. We do not disagree with those countries which maintain that the only way of preventing all-out war is to be prepared for it. We also accept that such preparedness can, with reasonable adjustments, cover all lesser threats, but this approach could result in demands for the provision of forces above what is in fact the minimum requirement. We maintain that, from consideration of the likely threat and of the probable duration of operations, and by emphasizing the decisiveness of the strategic nuclear exchange, it should be possible to establish priorities which would enable force requirements to be kept within the economic capabilities of member nations without jeopardizing the security of NATO.
3. We believe that NATO strategy should continue to be firmly based on deterrence. The UK and US strategic nuclear forces are the primary elements of the strategic deterrent on which NATO security must rely in the last resort. Although these forces are not under NATO control we believe that NATO force requirements and priorities should be gauged within the context of strategic deterrence and of the risks of escalation resulting from either conventional or nuclear aggression.
4. On the basis that forces required for deterrence, including those for the initial phase, have priority over those for any subsequent operations we suggest below how NATO force requirements should be assessed.

ACE Forces

5. The minimum level of the shield conventional forces should be determined by the requirement to counter intimidation, identify aggression, deal with infiltration or small-scale aggression and resist a larger-scale conventional attack long enough to enable the decision to resort to nuclear weapons to be taken before vital interests are in grave danger of loss. We should not attempt to add conventional strength specifically to increase the period of major conventional operations since the credibility of the deterrent would thereby be reduced. We should not, however, exclude strengthening the existing conventional forces by improved mobility and firepower.
6. The Shield forces should be equipped with nuclear weapons of such types and on such a scale that, while the function of the strategic nuclear forces was not duplicated, the Soviet government would be convinced that any aggression would be met by the appropriate degree of force including, if necessary, nuclear force with all the risks of escalation that this would entail. SACUER's nuclear armoury should be tailored to this purpose only and kept effective.

← G.M. 188

- 2 -

UK EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET

Reference: DEFE 4/137

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UK EYES ONLYAnnex (Concluded)

7. In the light of the concepts set out above, and of providing appropriate nuclear backing for conventional forces, we consider that the priorities in meeting SACEUR's requirements, if they cannot be met in full, should be:-

- (a) Measures to establish a system for the efficient control of nuclear weapons in the field.
- (b) Measures to increase the effectiveness of existing shield forces in terms of conventional firepower and mobility.
- (c) Measures to maintain the effectiveness of nuclear weapon systems.

8. Maritime Forces

- (a) Because of their relative invulnerability, ballistic missile-firing submarines may be expected to play an increasing part in the strategic nuclear deterrent and thus must be given first priority. As more of these submarines become operational it should be possible to effect some reduction in the carrier strike fleets whose main task would then become the location and destruction of enemy naval forces and their afloat support and possibly support for land operations.
- (b) The second priority would be to provide a strong deterrent to submarine operations including those of missile-firing submarines by an evident ability to harass, intercept and sink these vessels.
- (c) In a short war involving a nuclear exchange there is little place for mining; therefore some shortfall in this capability and in mine counter-measures which are, however, primarily a national responsibility, can be accepted.

UK EYES ONLY

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B. Air Access Planning

Def 4/13/8 *9/1/81*
(Previous Reference: C.O.S. (61) 56th Meeting, Minute 1A).

C.O.S. (61) 299

THE COMMITTEE had before them three telegrams^{+%} from the United Kingdom National Military Representative, SHAPE, on air access planning, and a Note by the Air Ministry on the same subject.

LORD MOUNTBATTEN said that the most important single factor to be considered in the telegrams before them was that contained in paragraph 3D of UKNMR 344, in which General Norstad had said that attacks on Soviet surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft sites in or near the air corridor would be subject to his decision. This point had been inserted by General Norstad in the final version of the telegram before them because he did not want to risk having his hands tied by the United States Government. It would be necessary for the Committee and the Foreign Office, respectively, to give advice to Sir George Mills and Sir Harold Caccia on General Norstad's proposals as a matter of urgency. To this end, the Joint Planning Staff should examine the two telegrams^{%@} and prepare draft guidance to Sir George Mills for telephone clearance that afternoon. He understood that the Foreign Office were taking similar action regarding advice to Sir Harold Caccia and that they would send a copy to the Secretary before despatching it.

In discussion the following points were made:-

- (e) It was most unlikely that it would be possible to identify the particular gun position or missile site which had engaged our aircraft; failing such identification, counter attacks could therefore only be regarded as political gestures of our determination. In addition, in view of the number of such installations, attacks on selected sites would in no way maintain our freedom of passage through the air corridors. Similarly, there were a large number of Soviet and Satellite airfields at distances up to 200 miles from the air corridors from which fighter attacks could be mounted. In sum, it would not be feasible to maintain regular services to Berlin in the face of air and ground opposition, but it might be possible to push through individual escorted convoys.
- (f) In paragraph 6 of UKNMR 344, General Norstad had proposed to continue to assert civil air rights by mounting a civil transport probe with fighter support. The Committee considered that it was unlikely that civil operators would be prepared to continue flying once safe passage was no longer guaranteed by the Russians.

+ UKNMR 343
% UKNMR 344
@ UKNMR 345

- 3 -

From: Confidential Annex to COS (61) 57 (1), Berlin
Contingency Planning
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PO 371 / 160548

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FROM MOSCOW TO FOREIGN OFFICE

9/15/61 C
9/15/61

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET) AND
WHITEHALL (SECRET)(CABINET)
DISTRIBUTION

Sir F. Roberts

No. 1628
September 5, 1961

D: 9.19 p.m. September 5, 1961
R: 10.09 p.m. September 5, 1961

Caution/255G.

PRIORITY
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1628 of September 5
Repeated for information to : Washington
Bonn
And Saving to : Paris
UKDel N.A.T.O.

GUARD

Berlin

United States Ambassador returned from leave over the weekend and I saw him yesterday. He had less background information than I had and no specific instructions except a garbled telegram which he thought precluded him from asking to see Khrushchev, who is now back in Moscow, or even Gromyko specifically, but left him to pursue informally the question whether the latter would be going to New York or not in a fortnight. Khrushchev of course knows of the Western meeting in Washington on September 14, but his present tactics seem to be to goad us into negotiation by repeated faits accomplis in the absence of any initiative on our part. In present circumstances neither United States Ambassador nor I seem to be in a position to play any active or very useful rôle here.

I have seen no Soviet officials for over a fortnight and am reluctant to take the initiative, when I have nothing to say to them other than obvious criticism of recent Soviet steps.

2. The German Ambassador called yesterday on his return from a short visit to Bonn where he had seen Adenauer, Strauss, Brentano and other leading figures. He first told me that Kutnetsov had

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Moscow telegram No.1628 to Foreign Office

-2-

confirmed to him before he left that the Soviet Government were still looking to early negotiations on the basis of their own proposals or of Western counter-proposals.

3. Kroll said in great confidence that Adenauer had been disturbed by Khrushchev's recent behaviour and had asked him whether Khrushchev still wanted a settlement by agreement. Kroll had replied that he thought Khrushchev's pressure tactics, however misguided, were meant not to avoid negotiation but to force us into one and to frighten the neutrals into using their influence to this end. (This is also my view, although he is I think growing more sceptical of getting results from negotiation and is preparing Soviet public increasingly for unilateral Soviet action and the ensuing risks). Adenauer had accepted this and confirmed his wish for negotiations as soon as possible after his elections. He had said he was worried about the effect of Khrushchev's recent steps in the United States, where he understood there were not only large sections of public opinion inflamed against the Soviet Union, but also important pressure groups arguing in favour of a preventive war now. The Federal Republic had no desire to be the first victim of such a war. Adenauer had also been rather put out by the timing of the Clay appointment to Berlin, which looked like a concession to Brandt, more especially as he was due to take up his post on September 15.

4. Kroll had then discussed with Adenauer the possible basis of a negotiation. He had told him that the Russians would probably insist as a minimum upon some de facto recognition of the D.D.R. by the Western Powers and the removal of the Federal Agencies from West Berlin. They would demand less insistently recognition of the Oder-Neisse line, at least by the three Western Powers, and perhaps that West Germany should open relations with Poland and Czechoslovakia. All this would confirm the status quo in Eastern Europe. Finally they would no doubt try hard to obtain the renunciation of nuclear weapons by the Bundeswehr. This again seems to me a reasonable forecast.

5. Kroll said that Adenauer had realised that Germany would have to make sacrifices to avoid the very real danger of war and to save the freedom of West Berlin. Adenauer had said that it would be very difficult to move the Federal Agencies without inflicting a heavy blow on West German morale but had agreed that they were not in themselves necessary for that purpose. Where Adenauer had

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Moscow telegram No.1628 to Foreign Office

-3-

refused to contemplate any concessions was over the armament of the Bundeswehr. He and Strauss considered that discrimination in this respect would make it impossible to achieve the necessary military integration under N.A.T.O. and would inevitably lead to the break-up of the Alliance.

6. It had been agreed with Adenauer that Kroll would not try to see Khrushchev or other senior Soviet figures before the German elections and that he would probably return to Bonn immediately after then for further consultation with Adenauer.

7. Speaking for himself alone Kroll then canvassed with me the idea of moving the United Nations to West Berlin. He said that, if the West Berlin population were not gradually or even suddenly to lose heart and abandon the city, they must be given some new role now that the city was no longer a magnet for East Germany and would probably soon be formally separated from West Germany. The presence of the United Nations might achieve this. I said that such an idea need not be excluded, but there were very obvious objections to uprooting the United Nations from New York and putting it within the Soviet bloc. Another of Kroll's ideas was to persuade Khrushchev that the Ulbricht régime should be liberalized to the same extent as in Poland, so that present dangerous strains and pressures should be relieved.

8. Finally Kroll again expressed anxiety about the delays in agreeing upon a Western negotiating position and in taking some initiative with the Soviet Union. Khrushchev, never a very patient man, was now doing foolish and dangerous things in the absence of any such initiative. The effect upon the American public would probably make negotiation more difficult, when it came.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington and Bonn as my telegrams Nos. 281 and 89 and Saving to Paris and UKDel N.A.T.O. as my telegrams Nos. 282 and 402 respectively].

[Repeated as requested].

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2/7/61

I recently submitted to the Secretary of State a paper outlining what I thought might possibly be an eventual arrangement for West Berlin which would be acceptable to us. I have not sent copies outside the Foreign Office because it has been rightly pointed out to me that there is danger in the existence of a "British paper" containing such an advanced series of concessions to the Soviet point of view. We will keep this paper on ice, but bring it up to date in the light of comments received.

2. In the meantime a more immediately necessary and safer exercise is to clear out ideas on the tactics to be used in any negotiation with the Russians. The attached paper is an attempt to supply this. Annexed to it is a summary of the elements in a possible negotiating position, drawn from our Cabinet paper of July last. I propose to use these papers as background guidance for my discussions in Washington next week. My idea would be to try to get my three colleagues to agree upon a paper for submission to the Foreign Ministers, containing some at least of the ideas in these two papers. No doubt any Foreign Office comments could be telegraphed to me in Washington or incorporated in briefs for the Secretary of State.

E. Shuckburgh

(Evelyn Shuckburgh)
September 7, 1961.

Permanent Under-Secretary

Copies to:-
Private Secretary
Lord Privy Seal
Minister of State
Sir P. Reilly
Central Dept.
Northern Dept.

*This seems a good
paper from which to take
in T. Shuckburgh's dimensions
sent over in Washington.*

*The copies to
for a study
H*

*Adrian Brown
P.D.*

TOP SECRET

A POSSIBLE NEGOTIATING POSITION

Any negotiation on the subject of Germany and Berlin at the present time will be extremely tough and difficult, since Khrushchev's aims are far-reaching, his position strong and his self-confidence very great. Leaving aside long-term Soviet objectives for Germany and any hope he may have of inflicting a humiliation on the Western Powers, it is probably fair to say that his minimum requirement will be a result which stabilises the D.D.R. to a sufficient degree to lay the spectre of a unified, anti-Communist Germany. The weakness and instability of the D.D.R. (so long as free West Berlin prevents its total isolation from the free world) is probably the main driving force behind Soviet insistence upon a change.

2. Putting the most charitable interpretation on Soviet motives, one can see their fear that an increasingly powerful and prosperous West Germany, clearly devoted to the concept of German reunification, may prove too powerful a magnet for all Germans and end by undermining the existence of the D.D.R. unless the latter can be artificially stabilised and strengthened. If this is so, Khrushchev's immediate objectives will be closely related to strengthening the D.D.R. They will be such things as:- forcing international recognition of the Ulbricht régime and the pigeonholing of German reunification as an aim; acceptance of the Eastern frontiers of Germany (Oder-Neisse line); elimination of the Berlin escape route for refugees; reduction of the worst effects of the Berlin "example" on Eastern Germany and rendering the Western garrisons incapable of discharging their present task and loosening Berlin's ties with the Federal Republic. Behind these immediate objectives will lie the further longer-term hope of eliminating the Western garrisons altogether, incorporating West Berlin in East Germany and loosening the Federal Republic's ties with the West, stopping the nuclear rearmament of Germany and, by breaking up the NATO alliance, bringing to an end American participation in Europe's defence.

3. Amongst the immediate (as opposed to the longer-term) Soviet objectives can be detected some things which are not wholly irreconcilable with Western policy. We do not, for example, envisage any major change in the German-Polish frontier; in principle, therefore, we could accept its stabilisation on the Oder-Neisse line. Nor do we in fact believe German reunification to be practically possible, at least for the time being. (This is not inconsistent with continued insistence on the principle of self-determination for the German people.) We have not sought to bring about the collapse of the East German régime through the departure of its most valuable citizens; on the contrary, we (and this includes the Federal Republic) were embarrassed by the greatly increased flow of refugees. This problem has been to a large extent solved by the controls of August 13. If it were a question of a general "stabilisation" of the existing division in Europe, at least for a period of years, we should presumably have no reason to object. Unpleasant though it would be to have to bolster up a Communist dictatorship like that of Herr Ulbricht, it is not necessarily the case that in the long run a peace treaty with that régime would be detrimental to freedom in Germany. For the East German régime will not reach the end of its troubles merely by acquiring a degree of international recognition, nor even by reducing the nuisance of Berlin. It is at least arguable that the influence of the 47 million West Germans could be

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brought to bear more effectively on the 17 million East Germans if the Federal Government would pursue a different policy and be prepared to enter into closer relationships with the East German régime. They have hitherto shown excessive delicacy in this respect.

4. In other words it seems not inconceivable that we could build a negotiating policy on the broad principle of "stabilisation" for a period of years, say for the next five years, and that we could reach a practical deal with Khrushchev on this basis without either side being compelled to abandon any really crucial position. It must be recognised that in any such settlement the West would have given up its insistence on some less essential principles to which it has previously attached importance. Such a policy would mean placing the Berlin problem in a wider frame and attempting a general, if provisional, stabilisation of the German situation. Possible elements out of which such an arrangement might be constructed are as follows:-

(a) We should accept the decision of the Soviets and their friends to sign a peace treaty with East Germany and be willing to deal, where dealings are essential, with the D.D.R. as the de facto authority in East Germany.

(b) We need not ourselves sign a peace treaty with East Germany or recognise it de jure. A logical corollary of (a) above however, would be abandonment of the Hallstein doctrine by the Federal Government, which would lead to a great increase of East German diplomatic activity throughout the world.

(c) We might urge the Federal Government to consider the possibility of establishing contacts with East Germany, which could be represented, without danger to the Federal Republic, as going some way in the direction of the "confederal" relationship between the two Germanys which the Russians urge.

(d) We could recognise the overall frontiers of Germany (Oder-Neisse line), but not, of course, the zonal border nor the boundaries round or in Berlin.

(e) Our conditions for all this would be a guarantee by the Russians that the present status of West Berlin would be preserved (i.e. no "free city" in the Russians sense and no Russian troops) and that Western access to West Berlin, both civilian and military, would be fully and freely maintained by their clients, the D.D.R. authorities. We would not insist in regarding the D.D.R. personnel as agents of the Russians, on the basis that it was a matter of indifference to us who operated the machinery for maintaining access; we would rather deal with them on their own merits as de facto German authorities but the Russians would have undertaken a contractual obligation towards us to see that our access was not interfered with and we would seek redress of grievances from them and not from the D.D.R. Government. We would claim that our existing rights remained valid at the same time, but we need not insist on their admitting it.

(f) If the Russians would not give such guarantees

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regarding the behaviour of their German Allies without asking us for guarantees about the behaviour of ours, we might have to contemplate agreements on such points as the following:-

to be handled
(i) That there will be no manufacture or possession of nuclear weapons by Germans in any part of Germany during the lifetime of the arrangements. As to manufacture, this would be no more than a Western guarantee of the German declaration in the W.E.U. Treaty.

(ii) That no missiles or nuclear weapons will be brought into Berlin.

(iii) That anti-surprise attack measures should be applied in a zone of inspection in Central Europe.

(iv) That certain activities of a propagandist nature will not take place in any part of Berlin. We might admit United Nations or neutral (but not Russian) observers into West Berlin to confirm that these undertakings were being observed (with reciprocal arrangements for East Berlin).

(v) That West Berlin might offer space and accommodation on an "extra-territorial" basis to certain organs of the United Nations. This might make it easier for the Russians to justify granting a guarantee of access and offer them some assurance of responsible behaviour on West Berlin. There might possibly be a similar arrangement in East Berlin.

This would have to be done jointly with the German Government
(g) It is worth examining whether in this connexion plans for an area of limitation of armaments and armed forces might not also be revived, in addition to the measures at (f) (ii) and (iii) above. Any realistic scheme providing for the limitation of missiles and nuclear weapons within the zone would have particular attractions for the Russians.

(h) A non-aggression agreement, though fairly meaningless, might be added for good measure.

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JP(61)Note 38

LIMITED CIRCULATION

10th September, 1961

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

JOINT PLANNING STAFF

AIR ACCESS TO BERLIN

Note by the Directors of Plans

The Prime Minister has requested^① certain information in connection with both the military measures which we have so far agreed for the protection of aircraft in the Berlin corridor and what measures for the defence of access to Berlin by air we may be asked to consider if these already authorized prove insufficient.

2. We set out as an Annex to this Note, a draft Memorandum for the Prime Minister.

(Signed) J.M. TOWNLEY
W.C. SMITH
P.A. KENNEDY.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

① COS.1135/10/9/61

TOP SECRET

AIR ACCESS TO BERLINDraft Memorandum for the Prime Minister

1. Tripartite air access plans, grouped under the code name JACK PINE provide for air transport operations to cover a garrison airlift, a civil airlift, a combination of the two, the evacuation of non-combatants and selected aliens and air tactical operations designed to maintain air access through the corridors to Berlin. There is also a quadripartite plan for the supply of Berlin by air. Under these plans allied escorts may engage and open fire if our aircraft are attacked by hostile aircraft and may pursue attackers to a limited extent. Operational control would be centralised under CINCUSAFE. H.M. Government has agreed to these plans without commitment.
2. General Norstad has been concerned that Allied response to interference with air access would not be immediate or properly concerted, and made various proposals to overcome these difficulties. These were being considered when it became apparent that an emergency might arise in connection with a German rally in Berlin (Tag der Heimat). To deal with this situation the three Governments decided to use military transports if the emergency materialised, escorted if necessary and operating in our case under JACK PINE rules of engagement. The Americans issued more restrictive rules unilaterally.
3. Further proposals were then received from General Norstad and H.M. Government's decisions so far are reflected in the answers to your specific questions.

The Military Measures So Far Agreed

4. The measures specifically agreed by H.M. Government are:-

- (a) The necessary communications essential to the operation of the JACK PINE Command post at Ramstein be installed immediately and that the post be manned on a minimum basis.
- (b) In the event of an emergency this command post will be used to co-ordinate and control the movement of all transports in the air corridor.
- (c) When General Norstad considers the situation warrants a part of the JACK PINE transport and fighter force may be brought to an appropriate state of readiness.

Permitted Limits of Counter-Attack

5. Under present JACK PINE plans tripartite fighters are authorized to engage and open fire on USSR/GDR aircraft only when the latter actually fire at or in the direction of tripartite fighter or transport aircraft, or as may be specifically authorized or directed by CINCUSAFE acting in compliance with instructions of the designated overall commander.
6. In the event of unprovoked armed attack against tripartite aircraft engaged in operations under this plan, IMMEDIATE PURSUIT is authorized. IMMEDIATE PURSUIT will be limited to the degree necessary to protect tripartite personnel, property, and to

Annex (Continued)

achieve the plan objectives. It is subject to the following restrictions:-

- (a) IMMEDIATE PURSUIT will not include prolonged pursuit deep into hostile airspace.
- (b) Commanders will not be authorized to organize a pursuing force deliberately.
- (c) IMMEDIATE PURSUIT authority will apply only to specific incidents.

7. In the event of allied aircraft coming under Ground to Air fire, they will take evasive action and withdraw. The incident will be reported and further Governmental guidance will be provided. The decision to attack ground targets is reserved to Governments.

Measures awaiting Agreement

8. The United Kingdom view is that subject to tripartite agreement being reached on the following principles, and if JACK PINE is brought into effect, the instructions issued unilaterally by the United States to meet the emergency mentioned in paragraph 2 would be acceptable to us for extension to British aircraft participating in the operation:-

- (a) If civil flights cease, either because clearance has been refused or because for other reasons the airlines decide it is too dangerous to fly, military transport aircraft should immediately be sent in but without fighter escort.
- (b) If the civilian flights are suspended as a result of physical action against a civilian aircraft (e.g. forcing down) the military aircraft should be accompanied by fighters.
- (c) Fighter aircraft would be supplied immediately there were any harassment of military transports.
- (d) If any of our aircraft, civil or military, are forced down we should make an immediate appeal to the Security Council under Chapter 6 (Threat to Peace). Escorted flights by military transport planes would continue.

The American instructions are in fact virtually in line with these principles.

Possible Further Measures

9. We may be asked to mount a civil aircraft probe manned by a service crew in the event of a Soviet/GDR threat to close the air corridor. The purpose of this would be to ensure that a military air lift was not implemented as a result of an accident or false alarm and to prevent loss of civil access by default. This might have to be continued under military arrangements.

10. The new directive to General Norstad from the Ambassadorial Group envisages extending present JACK PINE plans to include a large number of possible measures, such as attacks on S.A.M. sites

Annex (Concluded)

A.A. sites and airfields outside the corridor. He may also wish to neutralize such targets as balloons, and other possible obstructions in the corridor, or artillery sites threatening our airfields in Berlin.

11. With regard to direct measures of interference we would be unlikely to achieve our aim of keeping open the air corridor by attempting to maintain local air superiority because of the superior numbers of Soviet/GDR fighters, A.A. and S.A.M.. A token attack could be mounted against a selected airfield, A.A. or S.A.M. site but this could be no more than a gesture to demonstrate our strength of purpose. If this stage is reached air access to Berlin will have been effectively blocked and a new political situation will have arisen.

80371 / 160550

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9/17/61

13 SEP 1961

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cmher/OTP

Sir H. Caccia

FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET) AND
WHITEHALL (SECRET) (CABINET)
DISTRIBUTION

No. 2381

September 12, 1961

D. 12.25 a.m. September 13, 1961

R. 1.53 a.m. September 13, 1961

IMMEDIATE

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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2381 of September 12.

Repeated for information to: Bonn

U.K. Del N.A.T.O.

Moscow

U.K. Mis New York

Paris

Following from Shuckburgh.

It is still not easy to see clearly what the Foreign Ministers will be able to accomplish when they meet this week. In our Working Group there has been a notable reluctance (which will doubtless be reflected at the Ministerial Meeting) to press the Germans very far. Carstens has been very cautious and conventional except on one point which may possibly herald a more flexible attitude all round after the elections. This is a proposal put forward by him yesterday, that three or four all-German Technical Commissions should be set up, appointed by the two German Governments and making no bones about parity of representation. These Commissions would deal with:-

- (i) Freedom of communications between the two Germanys;
- (ii) Maintenance of human rights in the two Germanys;
- (iii) Economic relations;
- (iv) The drawing up of an electoral law preparatory to free elections and a peace treaty.

This proposal goes further towards de facto recognition of the DDR than the Germans have hitherto ventured. Carstens admits this and Laloy has been looking very dubious about it.

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Washington telegram No. 2381 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

2. We have not yet discussed the essential question of tactics with a view to negotiation. I tabled this morning a paper on this subject, in a form which would serve as guidance to Mr. Rusk from his three colleagues for his talk with Gromyko next week. It will be discussed this afternoon. The main point I have tried to bring out is that before we embark on the presentation (either in the United Nations or at a conference of Foreign Ministers) of the whole range of our standard policies on Germany we should make a serious effort, through discreet discussions with the Russians, probably on a bilateral basis (e.g. Rusk/Gromyko or Thompson/Khrushchev) to reach a modus vivendi for West Berlin on the assumption that a separate peace treaty will be signed by the Russians. I have argued that none of what I might call the public relations proposals which we have in our locker (e.g. an all-German plebiscite, an all-Berlin solution, etc.) should be used until this serious attempt to reach an accommodation with the Russians has failed. Kohler seems, so far, to be very receptive to this approach.

3. In the meantime, Kohler has made it clear that Mr. Rusk is anxious to be able to make a public statement, immediately after the Foreign Ministers' Meeting, redefining the Western peace plan in comprehensible terms and presenting it as the result of new and constructive thought by the new Administration. He hopes that the other three Foreign Ministers will make similar declarations, in speeches or in Parliament as they wish, so that the West can be seen to have an effective alternative to the Soviet proposals for a peace treaty. We have been preparing a draft outline but I have reserved your position about making any such statement on the grounds that the Foreign Ministers must decide their tactics for negotiation before they commit themselves to public statements.

4. Two other interesting points have been made by Mr. Kohler:-

- (a) He suggested yesterday to the Germans that they might consider making a spectacular offer to abandon German sovereignty over Berlin in order to establish the whole city as the first international capital, into which the Headquarters of the United Nations would be transferred from New York. The Federal Government might build a new city in a place of their choice which they would call Berlin

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Washington telegram No. 2381 to Foreign Office

- 3 -

and describe as the future capital of a united Germany, Carstens was a bit surprised by this but took the first part of it quite calmly. He objected to the idea of building a new city on the grounds that there are plenty of German cities with historic claims to be capitals. He undertook to have the idea seriously studied by his government and von Brentano will no doubt revert to it. It was clear I think that Kohler had been discussing this idea with Mr. Rusk and perhaps the President, though he said he was just thinking aloud;

- (b) Kohler also said that the United States Government felt it to be extremely important that Western publicity should begin at once to prepare against the danger that the signature of a separate peace treaty with the DDR would be presented as another major defeat for the West. He thought we should take the line with public opinion that it was an act of little consequence which could not affect Western rights in Berlin. I supported this, but suggested at the same time that we must make it clear that we would not ourselves sign a treaty with a régime such as Ulbricht's and that we expected that other nations which have a respect for self-determination would not do so either. This will be reflected in our report to the Ministers.

5. We are being pressed for information about Nehru's reactions to his visit to Moscow. I have seen Moscow telegram No. 1661 but you will certainly be pressed for more detail and I hope that if Nehru sends any message to the Prime Minister it may be repeated to you here.

6. I am satisfied that you will not need to bring a senior military adviser with you. I understand that Norstad has been given until September 22 to produce his plans and there is a proposal that these should then be examined at a special meeting of Chiefs of Staff and perhaps Ministers of Defence.

Foreign Office pass to Bonn, Paris, Moscow and U.K. Del N.A.T.O. as my telegrams Nos. 311, 527, 514 and 337 respectively.

[Repeated as requested]

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9/14/61
Wife 4/178

C. SHLO 9 - 0006
SHLO 9 - 0012

MAJOR-GENERAL BAKER (Chief of Staff, LIVE OAK) said that General Norstad was of the opinion that the next Soviet move was likely to be against our air access rights and that it might well be initiated during the period of the forthcoming German elections. General Norstad also felt strongly that, first, any Western counter-action should be tripartite and not unilateral; and, secondly, that we should respond to any such action immediately; he believed that the delay caused by reference to Governments was not acceptable. It was for these reasons that the two telegrams under consideration had been initiated. The Committee would now have seen a telegram from the Ambassadorial Group* which had arrived that morning and gave some answers to General Norstad's request. A number of points remained to be resolved; first, the position in regard to the operation of civil aircraft if the companies considered it was unsafe to continue flying; secondly, the difference between the rules of engagement which had previously been agreed by Her Majesty's Government and those issued unilaterally[@] to CINCUSAFE; and, thirdly, the question of delegating authority to General Norstad to order the destruction of balloons and other obstacles within the air corridors and to attack ground targets.

In discussion the following points were made:-

- (c) The Air Ministry had completed arrangements with BEA for the training of 5 air crews on Viscounts and this would be completed by Tuesday, 19th September, 1961. It was the intention that these crews should be kept available to take over Viscount services at short notice and that two of the crews would fly supernumerary with BEA air crew on Berlin services. Final details of financial arrangements and compensation were not complete but in an emergency it would be possible to put the procedure into effect at very short notice. It was important that the procedure for military crews to take over civil aircraft should be incorporated in JACK PINE to avoid any possibility of unilateral implementation. The Ambassadorial Group and LIVE OAK should be informed accordingly.
- (d) The rules of engagement as agreed by H.M. Government differed from those ordered by the Americans in that the latter permitted a U.S.A.F. pilot to fire first. This was contrary to the U.K. policy which sought to force the other side to fire the first shot and which had previously been tripartitely agreed in the rules embodied in JACK PINE. It was highly desirable to adopt the JACK PINE rules forthwith.

* Washington to Foreign Office 2397
/ Foreign Office to Washington No.6395
@ UKNMR 351

From Confidential Annex to COS (61) 61 (1)
Berlin Contingency Planning. 9/14/61

- (e) Balloons could be considered under two categories: those flown in the corridors and those placed on the approaches to the Berlin airfields (say, within 10 nautical miles thereof). But both types had one thing in common in that they evidenced a conscious decision to attempt to obstruct air passage. The former need give little cause for anxiety, since they would need to be flown in large numbers seriously to hinder passage and since they could be circumnavigated or overflowed. It was therefore not necessary to delegate authority to destroy them should they materialise. However, those placed on the approaches to the Berlin airfields were a different proposition and would, in certain weather conditions, present a dangerous obstacle; General Norstad should accordingly have delegated authority to destroy them when they appeared. Other obstacles, such as high towers, would take time to materialise, and accordingly no delegated authority was called for.
- (f) Gun and missile sites differed from balloons in that it was possible in a period of tension for a commander at a low level to open fire without authority. There was thus a chance that an isolated shot might be fired, and it was highly undesirable to give delegated authority for counter-action whilst this possibility existed. Moreover, there were a large number of such sites near the corridor, and it was most unlikely that an aircraft fired upon in this way would be able to identify the site from which the shot had been fired. It was understood that Ministers had already decided that General Norstad should not be given the authority he sought to attack ground targets, and there was no military justification for recommending to Ministers that they should reconsider this decision.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (5) Invited the Air Ministry to prepare a draft telegram covering the point at (c) above for the Foreign Office to despatch to H.M. Ambassador, Washington, and to the United Kingdom Delegation in Paris for LIVE OAK.
- (6) Invited the Foreign Office to take note of their views as at (d), (e) and (f) above.

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CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX

TO

C.O.S. (61) 62ND MEETING HELD ON
TUESDAY, 19TH SEPTEMBER, 1961

1. TRAINING FOR TRADE WIND

(Previous Reference: C.O.S. (61) 53rd Meeting, Minute 1B)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a minute by the Secretary on training for TRADE WIND.

LORD MOUNTBATTEN recalled that the Foreign Secretary in withdrawing his objections to training for TRADE WIND, had stipulated that the question should be reconsidered nearer the time in case the prospect of negotiations should make such training undesirable. On purely military grounds he believed that there was considerable merit in training taking place as planned since it would increase our operational readiness to counter Soviet moves against Berlin; moreover if the Russians learnt of this training they might regard it as a further demonstration of Western determination. The only way to stop this training would be for the Ambassadorial Group to issue the necessary orders to General Horstad. Time was short since the assembly of forces for training was due to start on Friday, 22nd September.

MR. TOMKINS (Foreign Office) said that he would put this question to the Foreign Secretary by telegram immediately after the meeting. In view of the fact that no definite arrangements for negotiations on Berlin had been made at the Washington meeting he did not believe it would be considered necessary to stop the training. He would inform the Committee of the Foreign Office decision as soon as possible.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (1) Agreed with the statement by the Chief of the Defence Staff.

/ COS. 1067/25/8/61

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CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX

TO

C.O.S.(61)62ND MEETING HELD ON
TUESDAY, 19TH SEPTEMBER, 1961

2. THE BERLIN SITUATION

(Previous Reference: C.O.S.(61)61st Meeting, Minute 1)

A. UKNMR 356 - Engagement of Ground Targets.

LORD MOUNTBATTEN recalled that the Committee had previously concluded that there was no essential military need to justify the delegation of authority to General Norstad for fighters to engage ground positions identified as firing against our aircraft in the corridors, and indeed that it might be dangerous to do so. This view had been passed to the Ambassadorial Group by the Foreign Office and although General Stockwell had seen the telegram concerned he had now asked the Committee to reconsider the question and had added that General Norstad had asked for U.S. authority on a unilateral basis. Whilst he (Lord Mountbatten) appreciated General Norstad's difficulties and his concern as the military commander responsible, he did not believe the Committee would wish to alter their decision. It was entirely possible for a pilot to mistake flashes or smoke on the ground for gunfire. The results of such an error could be very serious and he believed the Committee would not wish to recommend Ministers to change their decision on the matter.

MR. TOMKINS (Foreign Office) said that the Foreign Secretary had spoken* on this matter during the Foreign Ministers meeting in Washington when he had stated that immediate reaction to ground anti-aircraft fire was the wrong riposte and had put forward an alternative course of action. This was that if such fire was part of a deliberate attack on our access, a more appropriate response might be to issue a warning to the Russians that, if it continued, a ground installation, not necessarily the offending one, would be taken out. The operation could then be properly planned to ensure maximum effectiveness and the dangers of hasty or mistaken action would be minimised. If the Committee agreed he would prepare a draft telegram endorsing the Foreign Secretary's proposal and clear it with the Secretary before despatch.

* Foreign Office to Washington No.6543

x Washington to Foreign Office No.2499

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THE COMMITTEE:-

- (1) Agreed with the statement by the Chief of the Defence Staff and took note that he would inform General Stockwell accordingly.
- (2) Took note of the statement by the representative of the Foreign Office.

B. UKNMR 356 - US Unilateral Instructions

LORD MOUNTBATTEN said that he was concerned at the statement in paragraph 3 of General Stockwell's telegram that General Norstad, having failed to get the tripartite authority he wished, had now asked for the same authority unilaterally. This was a serious matter and moreover would not be the first occasion on which unilateral instructions had been issued by the Americans in default of tripartite agreement; such unilateral instructions had been issued in the case of the rules of engagement for fighter aircraft. He believed the Committee would wish to bring this matter to the attention of the Minister of Defence and he circulated a draft minute for consideration. The Foreign Office might also wish to consider whether it should be raised in the Ambassadorial Group. He appreciated that the question was complicated by the negative attitude of the French who were proving somewhat obstructive. Nevertheless, as the matter stood, there was a growing danger that H.M.G.'s attempts to reach a reasonable agreement with the Americans might be pre-empted.

MR. TOMKINS (Foreign Office) agreed that the question of U.S. unilateral instructions required examination.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (3) Agreed with the statement by the Chief of the Defence Staff and took note that he would forward the minute to the Minister of Defence.
- (4) Invited the Foreign Office to take note of their conclusion at (3) above.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

19TH SEPTEMBER, 1961.

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UK EYES ONLY

Def: 6/21 7/17/61
Briefs for Anglo-French
Staff talks
Appendix 'B' to Annex I to
JF(61)83(Final) 4/15/61

CONCEPT OF LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR IN THE
CENTRAL EUROPEAN THEATRE

&
1. We do not believe that any use of nuclear weapons must inevitably lead to all-out nuclear war, but escalation would be highly probable if there were anything more than the most limited nuclear exchange. The circumstances in which hostilities break out will depend on Russian intentions. If they were determined to pursue their aims by the use of force and thought that there was a serious risk of the aggression escalating to global war, they would not be likely to sacrifice the advantages that an all-out surprise attack would give them. It is also unlikely that the Russians would start a conventional attack on a scale which, in their judgment, would be likely to force the West to nuclear response. If, nevertheless, by miscalculation they did start such an attack and the Western response included the discriminate use of nuclear weapons, the Russians would either:-

- (a) Respond with nuclear weapons, the scale of response depending on the degree of their doubt of Western determination and on their own intentions. This might lead to further exchange, but, ultimately, would result in all-out war unless negotiations for peaceful settlement were opened.
- (b) Decide to halt the operation, and exploit the political benefits of what they would represent as Western irresponsibility.

2. One way of reducing the risk of escalation would be to confine nuclear weapons to battlefield targets on NATO or satellite territory in restricted numbers, yield and type of burst, making use of the most accurate delivery system.

& Annex 'A' to PNWN/P(61)21
& JIC(60)77(Final)

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UK EYES ONLY

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19 July 1961

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**RESTRICTED MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS HELD AT THE
STATE DEPARTMENT AT 3.30 p.m. ON SEPTEMBER 15, 1961**

Present:

The Secretary of State	Mr. Dean Rusk
Her Majesty's Ambassador	Mr. Kohler
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh	Mr. Nitze
Herr von Brentano	M. Couve de Murville
Dr. Grewe	M. Alphand
Professor Carstens	M. Lucet

Mr. Rusk began the meeting by asking *M. Couve de Murville* in what circumstances he would think it profitable or possible to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union. Putting the worst interpretation on *Mr. Khrushchev's* statements one could conclude that the Soviet Union and the Western Powers were on a collision course. We were committed to maintain our rights in Berlin, while *Mr. Khrushchev* was maintaining that, when he signed his treaty, our rights would be cancelled.

2. *M. Couve de Murville* replied that he did not exclude the idea that some day some kind of discussion with the Russians would be acceptable. But it could not be on the basis of a peace treaty and a free city. There must be some acceptance of the idea that our status in Berlin would not be violated. That was what the French Government meant when they said that they thought it proper to have negotiations only if the Russians would renounce their threats and show that discussion was likely to be profitable.

3. *Mr. Rusk* asked to what threats *M. Couve de Murville* referred. *M. Couve de Murville* replied that he meant their statement that they would sign a treaty and give control to the D.D.R. and that thereafter the Three Western Powers, each on its own (or possibly jointly), would have to discuss their access with the D.D.R. If we accepted this, no one would have the right to go to Berlin without the permission of the D.D.R., and the USSR were ready to support the D.D.R. Thus *Khrushchev* was saying that if we opposed this D.D.R. control there would be war and that the USSR was powerful enough to destroy the Western world. That was the threat. Consequently, *M. Couve de Murville* continued, if there are to be talks—and there are to be talks on United States initiative which the French Government do not criticise—they should be aimed at avoiding this situation of negotiating under threat and the full implications of the negotiation should be clearly understood on both sides. The West was agreed that it would not give up on vital issues, but there were two possibilities about the Russian attitude and we did not know which was the true one. Either they were ready coldly to envisage the risk of war, or they did not think that there was any risk, because the West was too divided and weak. Our first task, therefore, must be to convince the Russians that it is a serious and risky business. If we began to talk to *Gromyko* now it would be bound to be a continuing process and the first task should be to try to bring the Soviets back to reality.

4. *The Secretary of State* said that he entirely agreed with the last sentence of *M. Couve de Murville's* statement. He hoped that *Mr. Rusk* would indeed be able to convince *Mr. Gromyko* of the seriousness of our attitude. He noted that the Russians had been saying that access to Berlin might be guaranteed. He did not, therefore, exclude the possibility that there might be some room for agreement. He did not think, however, that *Mr. Rusk* would get very far on these lines with *Mr. Gromyko* and the essential thing would be to get an agenda agreed for a Foreign Ministers' meeting to which we might look forward, say, in a couple of months.

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5. *M. Couve de Murville* said the Russians were doing very good propaganda. They were saying that they had made proposals and that it was now up to the West. Having decided that matters should be settled their way, they were inviting the West to make slight adaptations of their plan but were not ready to consider the Western position. As regards access to Berlin, when they spoke of guaranteeing this they meant guaranteeing our military needs but suppressing the free air corridor.

6. *Mr. Rusk* then asked the following question. He was going to see *Mr. Gromyko* and he would then report to his colleagues. What would they consider he must be able to say to them in order to convince them that negotiations were possible? He felt that if there was to be any prospect of solving this problem without war there must be negotiation between the Four Powers. It was difficult to see in advance whether this would be successful. What would *M. Couve de Murville* regard as evidence of likely success?

7. *M. Couve de Murville* replied that he envisaged two stages in the discussions with *Mr. Gromyko*, of which the first was an essential preliminary to the second. The first consisted of warning the Russians of the seriousness of Western intentions and readiness to go to war. At the second stage they could begin to discuss substance and search for solutions designed to avoid a Soviet attack on our rights and positions in Berlin. In regard to this, he thought the most optimistic (and unrealistic) hope of a solution would be the recognition of D.D.R. sovereignty, with the exception of an arrangement on the lines of the Bolz-Zorin exchange of letters governing our rights. The question was whether the Russians would be rigid in insisting on discussing their type of peace treaty and its declared consequences for us or whether they would be willing to include some other type of discussion.

8. *Mr. Rusk* said that he felt some of the "pre-conditions" of negotiation which *M. Couve de Murville* had mentioned should rather be regarded as the outcome of a successful negotiation. He wondered whether anything less than the substance of a successful result would make *M. Couve de Murville* comfortable.

9. *M. Couve de Murville* replied that he thought the conversation with *Gromyko* would be the beginning of a negotiation and that this was the proper way. The Soviets had repeated without change that they wanted to discuss a peace treaty only. What we wanted to know was whether there was any change in that position. If *Mr. Rusk* were to agree with *Mr. Gromyko* on a conference beginning in November with a vague agenda, then everything would be frozen in the meantime and the situation would be highly dangerous at the end.

10. *The Secretary of State* asked why things should be frozen. Could not the *Rusk-Gromyko* conversations carry them further?

11. *Mr. Rusk* asked how important it would be to have assurances regarding our rights before the conversation.

12. *M. Couve de Murville* said it would be dangerous to put both sides into a position where the unexpected, i.e., outbreak of war, might occur at any time between now and November. If we arranged a conference we would merely reassure the Russians that we were not going to take a firm line and everybody on our side would assume that the impending conference would settle everything, then suddenly, after the failure of the conference, there would be a showdown.

13. *The Secretary of State* asked whether we did not face this anyhow at the moment when *Mr. Khrushchev* made his separate treaty without prior discussion. If it was to be a negotiation both sides must be allowed to discuss what they want. The formula ("... that both sides will jointly search for a solution of the problem of the conclusion of a German peace treaty and settlement on that basis of the Berlin question") which *Mr. Khrushchev* had used in his recent statement in reply to the President, seemed to be a slight improvement on previous statements. In any case we would be forced into some kind of negotiation, either a conference or the United Nations. People would simply not stand it if we held back and *Khrushchev* would have no reason for not harassing us.

14. *Mr. Rusk* said that *Mr. Khrushchev's* latest statements seemed to concentrate on our rights. The D.D.R. had after all been treated as sovereign since 1954; therefore the signature of a peace treaty would not materially change the situation. The main difference, therefore, between signing and not signing would be the effect upon our rights (possible exception to this were the Oder-Neisse line and the turning of the zonal border into a real frontier). Why therefore

Should Mr. Khrushchev be making all this fuss if it were not for the sole object of doing away with our rights?

15. Mr. Rusk asked Mr. Kohler whether there was any consensus in the Working Group as to what kind of status Mr. Khrushchev expected for the D.D.R. Evidently he was not asking us to shake Ulbricht's hand or to grant *de jure* recognition.

16. Mr. Kohler replied that he thought the main purpose was to strengthen the D.D.R. by bringing about a situation in which everything affecting its life was under its direct control. If Ulbricht had that control he would have it in his power to break the ties between West Berlin and the Federal Republic. It did not seem certain, however, that Mr. Khrushchev would insist on our actually negotiating with the D.D.R.

17. Dr. Carstens said that Mr. Khrushchev had two purposes (1) that we should accept the D.D.R. as a State and (2) that we should agree that they have competence to deal with the access problem to West Berlin. The second was the more important of the two.

18. Mr. Rusk asked why purpose number (2) should be important if it was not in order to destroy West Berlin.

19. Herr von Brentano replied that certainly Mr. Khrushchev had no intention of seeing the D.D.R. continue acting exactly as the USSR had done up till now, but he would give them discretion as to how they handled our access. First, they might make no difficulties and then later on they would say that what they had agreed to yesterday was no longer valid to-day; that Mr. X might go through but not Mr. Y; that certain goods might be transhipped but not others, &c. This would be a dangerous and fatal progression for West Berlin. In reply to a question whether the main purpose would not be to break the political links of West Berlin with the Federal Republic, Herr von Brentano said that this would only be the beginning. It would lead to a mass migration from West Berlin as life became more and more restricted. He urged that we should not try and interpret Mr. Khrushchev's statements but simply read what he said. He was saying that the day a peace treaty was signed access to Berlin would be a matter for the sovereign D.D.R. If the Russians were to agree to "guarantee" allied access it would simply mean that they would guarantee whatever the D.D.R. would agree to; they would not be guaranteeing the present *status quo*. From that moment onwards the West would have no rights but only an *ad hoc* arrangement which could be changed at the will of the D.D.R.

20. Mr. Rusk then asked Herr von Brentano a leading question. He said that one of the *de facto* aspects of the situation was that Germany was not unified and had no immediate prospect of being so. In these conditions how did Herr von Brentano see the relations of the Federal Republic developing over the next four to five years with East Germany and with West Berlin?

21. Herr von Brentano in effect evaded this question. He said that present developments would continue and pressures become sharper. The separation between East and West Germany would become more acute and human contact be reduced. Only trade would be allowed to continue.

22. The Secretary of State interjected that he had noted the German proposal for setting up joint commissions. Could these not be used to improve communications between the two Germanys?

23. Herr von Brentano said that he agreed to these commissions, with the exception of No. 3 dealing with human rights. He was prepared to admit that these commissions, if the D.D.R. accepted them, might make minor improvements in the situation. But basically they were not likely to achieve much, particularly in the political field, because they were composed of two irreconcilable types—representatives of the people on one side and puppets of Communism on the other. Certainly the commission on the electoral law would not make an inch of progress. He did think, however, that there was a possibility that the commission on movement might be one way of obtaining a satisfactory access programme provided that the arrangements it made were guaranteed by the Powers.

24. Mr. Rusk then asked another leading question. Supposing at some stage Mr. Khrushchev signed his piece of paper with the East Germans; supposing that this peace treaty contained some reservations of allied rights with regard to Berlin (as in the Bolz-Zorin exchange); suppose therefore that there was no question of

having to deal with the East Germans about the rights themselves but simply make arrangements about the exercise of those rights; and supposing there were a public reaffirmation of the rights, but someone had to do something about exercising them, which of the following three alternatives would seem best to the Germans?

- (a) some United Nations machinery to take over some responsibility;
- (b) for the allies to exercise the responsibility independently of the Germans; or
- (c) for the East and West Germans to pick up these rights and fix the exercise of them in addition to the other functions which they are already handling together.

25. *Herr von Brentano* replied that the situation would indeed be different if the allies' access rights were made the subject of a reservation in the treaty. This would mean that the rights were recognised and implementation of them would be the only question at issue. But the D.D.R. would then say that whoever wanted to use these rights must negotiate with them. Certainly this would not be the same thing as negotiating the rights themselves, but it would be a razor-thin distinction.

26. *Mr. Rusk* said that he was thinking of leaving the way open for others to have as little to do with the East Germans as possible. Allied rights, after all, lay in one sense against Germany as a whole. Could they not be worked out by the Germans?

27. *Herr von Brentano* said that the Federal Republic would gladly accept this function, but would the D.D.R.?

28. *Mr. Rusk* said he wished to return to another point. *M. Couve de Murville* had spoken at the President's luncheon of the importance of making clear to the Soviets what would be the *casus belli* for the West. We had said there were three things, namely:

- (i) our presence in West Berlin;
- (ii) the ability of West Berlin to thrive;
- (iii) physical access to West Berlin.

Unless we defined these three points more clearly Gromyko might say to him that we could have all three of them under the free city concept.

29. *Herr von Brentano* agreed and said that it must be made very clear that our idea of freedom for a city was quite different from the Communist; it included freedom of association, political parties, freedom of movement, as well as links with the Federal Republic. Perhaps we could say that we were ready to discuss Gromyko's proposals and see whether what we meant by freedom was included in his free city idea.

30. *Herr von Brentano* said he wished to speak frankly. Many people were unwilling to go to war for Berlin and thought the present situation was the Germans' fault, &c. He could only say that the stake at issue was not Berlin, but the whole position of the West. If we were forced to liquidate the status of Berlin, unsatisfactory as it might be, this would be a major defeat from which there would be no return. There would be an exodus by tens and hundreds of thousands. We should be liquidating an advance post of the free world and the lack of confidence and terror which this would cause would spread rapidly. Other Ministers of Foreign Affairs would soon be going to Moscow, even if only to negotiate a delay in their own execution.

31. *Mr. Rusk* agreed that if he spoke to Gromyko he would have to enlarge on the three points and it was agreed that the United States delegation would attempt to set out a definition of the essential freedoms upon which we must insist.

32. *M. Couve de Murville* said that *Herr von Brentano* had been right in laying stress on the links between West Berlin and the Western world, particularly the Federal Republic. He agreed that the economic, financial and currency links were essential, but what about the political links? In 1959 in Geneva we had told Gromyko that Berlin was not a part of the Federal Republic. The Russians always came back to this point and undoubtedly Gromyko would bring up with *Mr. Rusk* the question of the political activities of the Federal Republic in West Berlin. This was part of the access problem, not of the allies, but of the Germans. (It was not clear whether *M. Couve de Murville* intended to suggest that these political links might be expendable because at this point *Mr. Rusk* broke up the discussion.)

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3. Mr. Rusk did not dissent from this as a possible procedure but he wondered whether the European countries would be ready to trust the U.S.A. to act in this way on behalf of the West. The Secretary of State thought the U.K. could help in this. If we made it clear that we accepted bilateral U.S./U.S.S.R. talks it would make it more difficult for others to object and in any case all the NATO countries, except perhaps for France were only too anxious to see the Berlin question settled by negotiation.

4. With regard to Germany, Mr. Rusk thought we would see a change after the German elections. Dr. Adenauer had only recently woken up to the real risks of war over Berlin and in order to avert one he was likely to be ready to go much further than ever before in the direction of de facto relations with the East Germans and the recognition of the Oder-Neisse frontier.

5. It would undoubtedly be difficult to bring the French along but in the final analysis they would have to toe the line if the U.N. and U.S.A. were determined to go ahead.

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the Party Congress. After some discussion the general feeling was that the right procedure would be for Mr. Rusk to indicate to Mr. Gromyko that the West wanted serious negotiations and had no intention of spinning them out. He would ask Mr. Gromyko for suggestions as regards the date and forum for negotiations. A suitable date might be October 30, and if an announcement were made that a Foreign Ministers' meeting would be held at that time this would satisfy Western public opinion and probably deter the U.S.S.R. from further unilateral action. The Secretary of State suggested that between now and October 30 discussions with the Russians might be pursued either by Mr. Rusk himself or through the diplomatic channel, to try to work out the basis of an agreement on Berlin which might then be carried further at the Foreign Ministers' meeting. It was probable that final agreement could only be clinched in discussion with Mr. Khrushchev himself and it was therefore necessary to envisage a Summit meeting as the final step in the process. If an agreement on Berlin could be reached in this way, it might pave the way for wider agreements.

/s. Mr. Rusk

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C.O.S. (61) 332

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15TH SEPTEMBER, 1961

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

LIVE OAK STATUS REPORT

Note by the Secretary

At their meeting* on Thursday, 14th September, 1961, the Chiefs of Staff took note of the LIVE OAK Status Report attached at Annexes I to III. The Chiefs of Staff also noted that LIVE OAK would be providing the necessary amendments to keep the Status Report up to date.

(Signed) G.S. COLE

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

15TH SEPTEMBER, 1961.

* COS(61)61st Meeting, Minute 1E.

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ANNEX I TO C.O.S. (61)332

SITUATION AS OF 27TH NOVEMBER, 1961

CONTINGENCY PLANNING STATUS REPORT

SERIAL (a)	PLANS (b)	PURPOSE (c)	IMPLEMENTING AUTHORITY (d)	UK POSITION (e)	FR POSITION (f)	US POSITION (g)	US UNILATERAL PLANS (h)	REFERENCES AND REMARKS (i)
1	FREE STYLE	Initial ground probe.	Tripartite Governmental					COS(61)322
2	TRADE WIND	Battalion Combat Team to re-open ground access.	Tripartite Governmental				USCINCEUR OPLAN 200-10 US Governmental authority required.	COS(61)335
3	JACK PINE I	a. Civil Airlift (Replacement for civil airlines)+ b. Garrison Airlift (Supply of Berlin Garrison) c. Triple Play (Dependent Evacuation) d. Military Sponsored Air Service (Substitution of Crews)	a. Tripartite Governmental b. Tripartite Governmental c. Tripartite Governmental d. US and UK Governmental (FR Government no objection)				CINCUSAFE OPLAN 157-60, US Governmental authority required.	COS(60)153
4	JACK PINE II	Air Tactical Operations	Tripartite Governmental				CINCUSAFE OPLAN 157-60, US Governmental authority required.	
5	QBAL	Full-scale Airlift	Quadripartite Governmental.					
6	JUNE BALL	Division-size Force to re-open autobahn access (still in planning stage)	Tripartite Governmental				USCINCEUR OPLAN 200-10, calls for up to a division size force. Planning in progress for a corps size force.	
7	BACK STROKE	Initial ground probe from Berlin Corresponding to FREE STYLE.	Still being planned by Commandants Berlin.					} Still being planned by Berlin Commandants.
8	LUCKY STRIKE	Ground Force from Berlin similar to TRADE WIND.	Still being planned by Commandants Berlin.					} SHLO 9-0030

+ NOTE: U.K. and U.S. agree that General Norstad can implement "Civil Airlift" without further reference to governments. French position is that implementing authority must remain with Governments.

AIR ACCESS CONTINGENCY PLANNING STATUS REPORT

CONTINGENCY	RESPONSE	POSITION OF GOVERNMENTS	STATUS OF ACTION BY ALB GP	LIVE OAK ACTION/REFERENCE
1. Harassments not affecting flight safety.	(a) Continue present civil and military flights.	Agreed	NIL	NOTED
	(b) Fighter aircraft excluded from air corridors on political grounds but legal rights to do so maintained.	Agreed	NIL	NOTED
	(c) Continue current practice of flying high FRG Government officials in military transport under instructions to avoid, if possible, landing in East Germany.	Agreed current practice.	NIL	NOTED
2. Harassments without use of force affecting flight safety.	Continue civil flights as long as practicable from flight safety views.	Agreed	NIL	NOTED
3. a. Airline and/or technical authorities determine regular civil flights unsafe or impractical.	(1) Continue civil flights on reduced scale with military air crews in uniform. (Flights on this basis may be instituted for individual airlines). General Norstad at his discretion may fly probe flights without passengers.	UK - US agreed position. For the present the UK would only be able to fly civil aircraft probes without passengers. UK discussions are still in progress on the legal, financial and administrative arrangements for flying UK civil aircraft with passengers and military crews. French position stated in 3.a. (7).	The UK to complete legal and financial arrangements with civil air carriers.	Proposals for inclusion in JACK PINE. Submitted as SHLO 300/508, 25 Nov 61, Subj: "Operation JACK PINE Expanded."
	(2) Supplement such flights with military transports as practicable and necessary to maintain traffic as required.	UK and US consider General Norstad has discretion. French position stated in 3.a. (7)	Ambassadorial Group seeking tripartite agreement.	NOTED
	(3) Civil and military flights under operational control of JACK PINE Command Post.	US, UK and French agree for military flights. (French reserve position on civil flights)	Ambassadorial Group seeking tripartite agreement.	NOTED
	(4) Take action to prevent hi-jacking (armed guards and locked cockpits) of civil aircraft with military crews.	US and UK agree General Norstad has discretion. French no objection.		NOTED USAF and RAF actioning
	(5) Fighters placed on air alert at corridor entrances, if circumstances require.	US and UK agree General Norstad has discretion to complement on basis of JACK PINE II. French position: Decision to use fighters for indirect protection will be taken by Governments with announcement.	Ambassadorial Group seeking tripartite agreement.	JACK PINE II

CONTINGENCY	RESPONSE	POSITION OF GOVERNMENTS	STATUS OF ACTION BY AMB GP	LIVE OAK ACTION/REFERENCE
	(6) Before flights initiated Governments through Ambassadors in Bonn issue statement on following lines: Because of Soviet/GDR action the governments of the US, UK and France have found it necessary to assume some additional responsibilities for safe continuation of air traffic to Berlin. Accordingly, the Governments concerned will take appropriate measures to achieve this, including as necessary, the provision of fighter protection, and in some cases, military crews to fly civil air transport. The three Governments hold the Soviet Union responsible for any incidents which follow.	US and UK agree. French position under consideration.	Ambassadorial Group seeking tripartite agreement.	NOTED SHLO 9-00035, 15 Nov 61, to Amb Group.
	(7) <u>French Approach</u> Shift to military transport. Continue civil flights without passengers on reduced scale with requisitioned civilian crews.	French Position: shift to unescorted transport while continuing a few civil flights without passengers with requisitioned civilian crews as long as military transports meet with no opposition. Decision to shift to military aircraft will be taken by the French Government.	Ambassadorial Group seeking tripartite agreement.	
3. b. Soviet/GDR physical harassment of civil flights with military crews or military transports.	General Norstad at his discretion authorized to use fighter protection on basis of JCS instructions of 31st August 1961 and JACK PINE II rules of engagement.	US - UK agreed position. French position: decision to introduce escorts will be taken by governments.	Ambassadorial Group seeking tripartite agreement.	NOTED Proposed amendment to JACK PINE Rules of Engagement Air-to-Air. SHLO 9-00040, 25 Nov 61.
4. A civil or military transport is shot down or forced down by military action.	If in these circumstances General Norstad considers it appropriate to proceed as in 3 above, shift to military transport on a tripartite basis. General Norstad at his discretion may initiate fighter protection on the basis of the JCS instructions of 31 August 1961 and the JACK PINE II Rules of Engagement. First flight may be unescorted and without passengers. Before flights started, three Governments through their Ambassadors at Bonn would issue appropriate public statement to effect that airlift will continue to be taken to protect transports.	Agreed by US - UK. French position: Shift to military transports should be announced by three Governments which would point out that military flights will be escorted if there are obstacles to their passage and that there will be a reply in case of attack. The actual decision to introduce escorts will be taken by Governments. French position "governing principles": 1. Legitimate defense can be envisaged only in the case of an aircraft which, when attacked in the air, is able to defend itself; this is the individual reply to an attack which is normally admitted. 2. Response in the air should of course be prepared, but such response could actually take place only after agreement between the Govern-	Ambassadorial Group seeking tripartite agreement.	JACK PINE I and II JCS message of 31 August 1961 referred to under response is understood to be JCS 1329 as amended.

CONTINGENCY	RESPONSE	POSITION OF GOVERNMENTS	STATUS OF ACTION BY AMB GP	LIVE OAK ACTION/REFERENCE
5. Ground-to-air action against flights in corridors by obstacles and surface-to-air firing.	To destroy barrage balloons or other obstacles within the corridors or the Berlin Control Zone which are endangering safety of flight and to attack those ground targets, excluding airfields, in or immediately adjacent to the air corridors which can be specifically identified in the act of firing at Allied aircraft.	US and UK agree General Norstad has discretion to destroy barrage balloons. Governmental decision with respect to attack on ground targets is awaiting General Norstad's proposals for expansion of JACK PINE. French position: In the case of balloons which might be flown around Berlin to block our airports, they might have to be destroyed, but this would be done only after government decision and announcement. In the case of ground-to-air attack against air transports or fighters, no decision is taken for the moment. General Norstad should be requested to elaborate on the measures he is contemplating before formalizing his plans. French position "governing principles": 1. Legitimate defense can be envisaged only in the case of an aircraft which, when attacked in the air, is able to defend itself; this is the individual reply to an attack which is normally admitted. 2. Response against the ground should of course be prepared, but such response could actually take place only after agreement between the governments concerned.	Ambassadorial Group seeking tripartite agreement.	NOTED Expansion to JACK PINE proposals. SHLO 300/508, 27 Nov 61, Subj: "Operation JACK PINE Expanded."
6. Soviet/GDR measures to endanger flight safety by ECM activity.	Improve VFR capability in area and institute newest ECM equipment and procedures.	Agreed by US and FRG. Under urgent consideration by UK and French governments.	US to provide requisite information, plans and equipment to accomplish this subject to conclusion of necessary arrangements between Governments.	NOTED BAMBOO TREE
7. Expansion of air-to-air or air-to-ground conflicts beyond the level listed above.	Planning by LIVE OAK for large scale military operation with transition from LIVE OAK responsibility to NATO	Under consideration by Governments.		Planning now undertaken by NATO.

JACK PINE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

1. In the event of unprovoked armed attack against aircraft engaged in operations under this plan, IMMEDIATE PURSUIT is authorized. IMMEDIATE PURSUIT will be limited to the degree necessary to protect personnel, property, and to achieve the plan objectives. It is subject to the following restrictions.
 - a. IMMEDIATE PURSUIT will not include prolonged pursuit deep into hostile airspace.
 - b. Commanders will not be authorized to organize a pursuing force deliberately.
 - c. IMMEDIATE PURSUIT authority will apply only to specific incidents.
2. Fighter aircraft will be under the operational control of the JACK PINE Command Post and will receive instructions through AULENHAUSEN GCI (Central Corridor) and TELEGRAM GCI (Southern Corridor). Communications will be between the flight leader and the GCI Controller.
3. Tripartite fighters are authorized to engage and open fire on USSR/GDR aircraft only when the latter actually fire at or in the direction of tripartite fighter or transport aircraft, or as may be specifically authorized or directed by CINCUSAFE acting in compliance with instructions of the designated overall commander.
4. Any deviation from the above Rules of Engagement required at the time of the operation will be authorized only by CINCUSAFE from the JACK PINE Command Post on the instruction of the designated overall commander.

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C 91071/328

Mr. Kohler asked me to call on him this morning to run over the results of the Foreign Ministers' meeting on Berlin. Later he took me in to see Mr. Rusk. Our conversations were mainly about the line which Mr. Rusk should take with Mr. Gromyko next week in New York.

Mr. Kohler said the Secretary was not expecting quick results. He imagined that the first two or three meetings would be mainly shadow-boxing. He had in mind to start by drawing attention to Mr. Khrushchev's various statements about negotiations and endeavouring to obtain clarification as to what they really meant. He would, for example, point to statements which said that negotiations could take place on a basis which safeguarded everyone's interests and to other statements which indicated much more rigid terms of reference, limited to the signing of a peace treaty with two Germanies and the establishing of West Berlin as a "free city". He would also refer to the fact that whilst Khrushchev sometimes said that there would be no blockade and that access could be guaranteed, at other times he maintained that all this would be under Ulbricht's control. Ulbricht himself made statements which suggested that there would be no genuine freedom of access once he was sovereign.

Having attempted to clarify these divergent interpretations of the Soviet attitude, Mr. Rusk would go on to take the position that negotiations, if they were to be acceptable, must enable both sides to develop their views on the problem of Germany as a whole. He would point out that the Soviet position was concerned with the future of Germany as a whole and that consequently the West was entitled to develop its ideas on this subject. From this Mr. Rusk would go on to develop general arguments on the danger of the present situation regarding Germany and this would lead him into warnings about the extreme seriousness of misunderstanding as to the determination of the U.S. to defend its vital positions.

He then asked me whether I thought that the French would acquiesce in 4-Power negotiations if Mr. Rusk was able to come back from his talks with Gromyko with the assurance that the terms of reference would be reasonably open as described above. I said that this was hard to answer, and that I would like to obtain an opinion, for example, from Sir P. Dixon. It might be difficult for the French to stand out in such conditions; but on the other hand I feared that de Gaulle might be thinking ahead to the time when the Germans were confronted with the fact that negotiations had resulted in a substantial deterioration in their position and that a myth might develop that Germany had been let down by her allies. He might then want to claim that it was the Anglo-Saxons alone who

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-2-

be responsible. Mr. Kohler thought this very probable and so did Mr. Rusk when I later mentioned the same point to him. They both made the point, with which I entirely agreed, that this made it extremely necessary to keep the Germans on board" at every stage. They said that the Federal Government had in their view come along very nicely so far and that they expected a considerably more flexible attitude after today's elections, though naturally this would depend on the outcome. I said that I thought the one point on which the Federal Government would probably remain very stiff was any form of discussion against German forces in the matter of arms. Mr. Kohler agreed, but thought that even on this point pressure might have to be applied. *(Handwritten: Rusk for Rusk)*

Mr. Kohler said that Mr. Rusk had considered bringing Thompson back to New York to assist him at the time of his talks with Gromyko but had decided against it. They thought that they might well want at some stage to ditch the discussions to Moscow and possibly to send Thompson direct to Khrushchev if Gromyko proved immobile. Mr. Dick Davies would accompany Mr. Rusk to New York.

Mr. Kohler then turned to the military build-up and said that he hoped that H.M. Government realised that the U.S. Government would be undertaking the present great increase in their conventional forces quite regardless of Berlin. They were seriously concerned by the increasingly arrogant posture of power which the Soviets were adopting throughout the world and by the impression they were creating that they were more to be feared than the West. The renewal of tests before the Belgrade conference had been successful for the Russians from this point of view. The U.S. Government felt that in concentrating on nuclear deterrence the Western powers had allowed their conventional power to lag behind in the most dangerous way, so that now there was almost no choice between surrender and nuclear war. They hoped that the allies would look upon this in the same way and do their utmost to increase conventional strength as an aid to negotiations.

Mr. Kohler then took me up to see Mr. Rusk and we went over most of this ground again. Mr. Rusk made the following additional points:-

- 1) he thought there might be something to be said for "pre-empting" the Soviet proposal for a peace conference by calling for one on our own terms. This is, in fact, the Brandt proposal

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which Adenauer had condemned but which might be revived once the German elections are over. We might put our own proposal for a German settlement before such a conference and the onus would be on the Soviet side to refuse to attend or to leave the conference. He thought we should be extremely careful about going to any conference organised by the Soviets as he was certain that they were going to follow the procedure set by the San Francisco conference for the Japanese Peace Treaty, where they themselves had been outmanoeuvred by procedural devices.

- 2) Mr. Rusk said that he thought it very important in our statements about possible arrangements for Berlin to "louse up" the concept of de facto recognition. The more confusion and doubt we could create as to what is meant by that term the better, since this was the most promising area for compromise.

E. Shumilov

September 17, 1961.

copies to

Mr. Ambrose

Mr. Sullivan

Mr. Kitch

F.O. (Central Room)

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CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX

TO

C.O.S. (61) 63RD MEETING HELD ON
THURSDAY, 21ST SEPTEMBER, 1961

2. THE BERLIN SITUATION

(Previous Reference: C.O.S. (61) 62nd Meeting, Minute 2)

A. Attacks on Ground Targets

THE COMMITTEE had before them a proposal* by the Foreign Secretary outlining an alternative method of replying to hostile anti-aircraft fire in the corridors. This suggested that if it was clear that anti-aircraft fire was part of a deliberate attack on our air access, a warning should be issued to the Russians that if this continued, a ground site, not necessarily the offending one, would be attacked.

SIR EDMUND HUDLESTON recalled that the Committee had recommended to Ministers that authority should not be delegated to General Norstad to give permission to his pilots to retaliate immediately against hostile gun positions. Ministers had endorsed this recommendation and the Foreign Secretary had informed Mr. Rusk of the reasons behind the British point of view. He (Sir Edmund Hudleston) believed that this proposal by the Foreign Secretary had considerable merit for whilst it avoided the danger of a rash act by a pilot, it would nevertheless enable General Norstad to retaliate quickly once it had been clearly established that the Russians were intending to impede access by this means. It was unlikely that it would be possible for a pilot to identify the guilty site, and hence it was quite sensible to suggest that a deliberate attack should be made against a selected gun position. Nevertheless, it should be clearly understood that in view of the large number of gun sites in the corridors and missile sites outside them which could engage our aircraft, retaliation of this nature would not be effective in keeping the corridors open.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (1) Agreed with the statement of the Vice Chief of the Air Staff.
- (2) Invited the Foreign Office to take note of their views.

TOP SECRET

B. Strengthening of NATO Forces

THE COMMITTEE had before them a minute^o by the Secretary on SACEUR's evaluation^o of national responses to his proposals for strengthening the forces of Allied Command Europe. A telegram^o from the Chairman, British Defence Staffs, Washington, was relevant to their discussion.

SIR EDMUND HUDLESTON recalled that when Sir George Mills had asked^o for guidance on SACEUR's evaluation, he had explained the reasons for the Military Committee wishing to forward their comments upon it to the NATO Council with great speed. In the event, the document had not arrived in the United Kingdom in time for the necessary guidance to be despatched, and the Military Committee had formulated their comments without awaiting national guidance. Both SACEUR's evaluation and the Military Committee comments thereon were now to be considered by the NATO Council on Friday, 22nd September, 1961. Accordingly, it remained to consider if further guidance was required for Sir Paul Mason's use during these discussions.

MR. SABATINI (Ministry of Defence) said that he did not believe the Council would consider individual country's responses to SACEUR's request for strengthening his forces. They were more likely to be concerned with their overall effect and to deal mainly with the short term. He had discussed this matter with the Foreign Office and it was proposed to inform Sir Paul Mason that there was no change to the guidance already approved^x. SACEUR was well aware that the United Kingdom reply was only of an interim nature.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (3) Took note of the statement by the Representative of the Ministry of Defence.

Ø COS.1167/20/9/61
@ COS(61)342
% GM 207
& GE 204
x COS(61)305

C. Communications with LIVE OAK

AIR COMMODORE MORTON (Chairman, British Joint Communications Electronics Board) said that, as instructed by the Committee, he had investigated the establishment of a telegraphic link between the Ministry of Defence and LIVE OAK. He could now report that, arrangements had been made to accommodate the SHAPE terminal adjacent to the LIVE OAK offices and that financial approval had been secured. The provision of equipment was now the only matter which would delay the circuit being opened. This equipment would need to come from the production line and could not be obtained before 28th or 29th September, 1961. Accordingly, the circuit could not be in operation before 9th October, 1961. When established, it would provide direct US/UK EYES ONLY telegraphic and tele-conference facilities between the Ministry of Defence and LIVE OAK.

FO 321 / 160553 9/25/6

that while the House cannot in these circumstances be told any details (nor have confirmation of any press reports about American policy) they may be assured that very serious attempts to bring about negotiation are being made. This will not satisfy the Zilliacuses and Silvermans, but I hope nobody really cares about them. Meanwhile, the tone of statements from Moscow about negotiation (and to-day, I hear, about agenda, too, although I have not yet seen any text) and time-limits ought to help both with Parliament and perhaps with the French.

As for American policies, one continues to be staggered by the lengths to which they seem prepared to go over the Oder/Neisse line, de facto dealings with the DDR (particularly on the German net), and security measures in Europe. There seems absolutely no need for us to take any initiative in any of these fields, and indeed there would be considerable disadvantage in our doing so, particularly in the last. We need do no more than back up the Americans suitably. To take the lead (unless the Americans ask us to do so for tactical reasons) will only cause an unnecessary Anglo-German (or Anglo-French) row, at a time when, for EEC reasons, we least want to have one.

While on the subject of backing up the Americans, I remain very concerned at our obvious eagerness to support those parts of their policies which we like, and even more obviously reluctant to back those which we dislike (such as economic counter-measures and military build-up). You should read the enclosed article by Scotty Reston, which I find impressive. Ian is showing it to the S. of S. It is true that the finger is not put on us alone, but in fact we have made a considerably worse showing than the French, who like economic counter-measures, and have brought home two divisions from Algeria. And for us to plead inability to call up reservists and the T.A. when the Americans are doing just that simply will not wash. We had Rusk's appeal in Washington on this subject, and I see that the President reverted to it during Harold Caccia's farewell call. I am afraid our assurances that Britain will be 'all right on the night' don't cut much ice either, even if they are true. Present-day circumstances surely no longer permit of a policy which seems to rely on somebody else bearing the brunt while we at leisure prepare a B.E.F. to join a bit later on in a situation which we still somehow do not seem to regard as our affair in the first instance. (Incidentally, I hope the President of the Board of Trade gets hell in Washington this week on economic counter-measures - I shall never forgive the B. of T. for their volte-face on the subject. A year ago, when we were discussing the possibility of DDR interference with German access only, they argued most strongly in NATO

extract Killick to Schuckburgh re Berlin NYT art 9/24/6

that economic counter-measures against the DDR alone were out of the question; only measures against the Soviet bloc as a whole would be effective).

Really two essential points arise from Reston's article. We need to help Kennedy over his problem with the Republican Party by showing that the European allies are bearing a fair share of the expensive and unpleasant burden arising from Berlin. It is in our own interests to do so, because the danger otherwise will be that his policies will become less flexible as a result of internal political pressures. Secondly, I feel sure that there is no danger of isolationism in the old sense of the world. But there may be a real danger (which we see graphically illustrated from time to time in Norstad's actions and thinking, in his U.S. capacity as CINCEUR) of the Americans saying 'to hell with the Allies' and going it alone over Berlin. It is all very well ~~from~~ for us to insist that nothing is done over Berlin except on the basis of tripartite agreement, but if we withhold our agreement all the time to the nasty things (obviously it may sometimes or even often be right to do so) we shall only encourage a mood of desperation in the Pentagon or even chez Norstad.]

I apologise for this presumptuous letter, which covers a lot of very weighty issues on which it is certainly not my place to express views (although I hope I may be permitted to hold them!). Naturally it is not intended to serve as more than possibly useful background and ammunition to yourself.

Yours ever,

John.

P.S. The S. of S. has read, and been impressed by, Reston's article, and is having it sent home to the P.M.

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the appointment of a Military Attaché.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (6) Endorsed the remarks of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and instructed the Secretary to despatch a telegram accordingly.

2. DEFENCE OF HONG KONG - US/UK TALKS

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3. THE BERLIN SITUATION

TOP SECRET

4. Berlin - Quadripartite Naval Blockade

~~(Quadrant R. P. 1959 (61) 6th Meeting, Minutes 3)~~

J.P.(61)128(Final)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a report by the Joint Planning Staff examining a letter from Her Majesty's Embassy, Washington, a report of the Interdepartmental Blockade Working Group and a list of maritime actions, prepared by the Americans, which might be taken in reprisal against Soviet actions in Berlin and assessing the military feasibility of the proposed measures and their practical effects.

LORD MOUNTBATTEN said that the report by the Inter-departmental Blockade Working Group outlined limited maritime control measures which might be put into effect at the stage when limited land and air measures were also taking place. He felt that whereas Items 5(a), (b) and (d) of Part I might be carried out without leading to global war, there was little doubt that this did not apply to the other measures.

SIR CASPAR JOHN recalled that in April 1958, during a previous Berlin crisis, a similar study had been carried out by the Foreign Office and similar conclusions to those in the report before the Committee had been reached. Even Items 5 (a), (b) and (d) would involve every country in the world and present many legal problems; furthermore, the United Kingdom would suffer great economic loss.

He had always considered that the Russians would find a limited war at sea attractive and they would undoubtedly welcome an opportunity to launch a major submarine attack against our seaborne trade. A limited war under these conditions could hardly be undertaken in more unfortunate circumstances since it would be impossible to attack Russian bases ~~which was the only way to deal effectively with a submarine threat of this nature.~~ Since

which it was necessary to do to help deal effectively with a submarine threat of this nature."

From: COS (61) 64
Sept 26, 1961

there would be a great risk of global war it would be necessary to place NATO forces on a war footing before undertaking any of these measures.

It was clear that Russia was not a suitable target against which maritime action could be used effectively and that none of the measures would achieve the aims for which they were designed.

In discussion the following points were made:-

- (a) It might be unwise to seek the advice of the major NATO Commanders since they might well seize the opportunity to press their bids for increased naval and air forces. The last sentence of paragraph 16(c) of the Annex to the report should therefore be deleted.
- (b) Although it was agreed that no detailed planning could be justified at this stage, even on a basis of no commitment, it would be inappropriate to resist the progressing of the report by the Inter-departmental Blockade Working Group since the United Kingdom would lay herself open to the inevitable charge of dragging her feet. It would be better if the United Kingdom representative on the Working Group should attempt to steer future discussions towards the conclusions in the report by the Joint Planning Staff.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (1) Approved the report as amended at (a) above
- (2) Invited the Ministry of Defence to forward the report to the Foreign Office as the basis of a brief for use as at (b) above.

D. UKNMR 373

SIR THOMAS PIKE said that in this telegram General Norstad made proposals to the Ambassadorial Group on the circumstances in which fighters should be placed on air alert at the entrances to the air corridors, and those in which fighter escorts should be introduced. It also contained a request from General Norstad that he be delegated the authority to implement the air tactical operations phase of JACK PINE II. In addition, it contained General Norstad's proposals for the Rules of Engagement to be used by our fighter aircraft. There was only one point amongst these proposals in respect of which H.M. Government had not already signified agreement; this was on the question of instructions to pilots on opening fire. The Committee had previously agreed^a, and Ministers had endorsed, the principle that pilots should not be permitted to open fire until a Russian or D.D.R. plane had fired first. General Norstad, in paragraph 6, now proposed a modification to these Rules which would allow allied pilots to open fire in certain defined circumstances which would not necessarily require hostile aircraft to fire first. Whilst he (Sir Thomas Pike) had at first felt reluctant to support General Norstad's proposals, on reflection he felt that the

& COS(61)58th Meeting, Minute 1D

Committee should recommend to Ministers that they should agree to them. He took this line not because he wished to avoid the continual accusation of foot-dragging, but because he believed that once matters had come to the stage described in paragraphs 3(A) and (B) of General Norstad's telegram, we could no longer reasonably expect our pilots to hold back if another of our aircraft were threatened.

MR. TOMKINS (Foreign Office) said that it now appeared that there might be no interference with our air access before the Russians had signed a peace treaty with the East Germans. General Norstad was therefore unlikely to need to invoke the authority he requested in the near future. Moreover, in the changed circumstances that would follow the signing of a peace treaty, there would be little room to doubt the hostile intentions of any Soviet or D.D.R. fighter which adopted an attacking position against our aircraft in the corridors.

In discussion the following point was made:-

- (c) While the Committee felt similar hesitation to that expressed by the Chief of the Air Staff in accepting General Norstad's proposals, it was generally agreed that, in the circumstances defined, it was right to accede to his request.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (3) Agreed with the statement by the Chief of the Air Staff.
- (4) Took note that the Chief of the Defence Staff would seek the approval of the Minister of Defence accordingly.
- (5) Invited the Foreign Office to take note of their views and of the action being taken at (4) above.

4. GHANA

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5. LIMITATION OF THE FUTURE COST OF DEFENCE

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Recorded in the Secretary's Standard File

Defc 4/131
1/27/61THE BERLIN SITUATIONTOP SECRETA. Contingency Planning

SIR GEORGE MILLS said that a number of contingency plans which had been commissioned by General Norstad or the Ambassadorial Group would soon be ready for national consideration. It would be most important that these plans should be viewed in the right light. The basic tenet of United States thinking was that the Soviet Union would not be prepared to go to the lengths of nuclear war. The object of United States policy was accordingly to convince the Russians that if Western vital interests were in jeopardy we would resort to all-out nuclear warfare; at the same time the Russians should not be so inexorably engaged initially that they could not compromise or withdraw without an unacceptable loss of face. It was these considerations which had led the Americans to propose a catalogue of plans of an increasingly aggressive nature designed at each stage to convince the Russians that they were really running the risk of all-out war. In these circumstances it would be futile to comment on the plans in a strictly military context since it was fundamental that they involved the risk of nuclear war and had psychological rather than strictly military objectives.

In discussion the following points were made:-

- (a) Whilst the above considerations would undoubtedly have to be borne in mind and whilst the United States "catalogue" concept was fully realised it was important that it should also be clearly understood that there was another point of view. The United States concept took no account of Russian reactions to the various measures and there was no guarantee that these would not involve a chain reaction and subsequent loss of control. It would moreover be folly to ignore completely the military feasibility of the various measures since we might very soon find that Russian countermeasures would place us at a serious military disadvantage; this could not but jeopardise the psychological or political credibility of the various measures.
- (b) Whilst action against the Russians in the maritime sphere might appear superficially to be attractive, such measures were, in fact subject to serious disadvantages as a means of bringing the pressure to bear upon the Russians. The latter would be largely invulnerable to a blockade, whilst the West would suffer severe economic dislocation; the neutral nations would be alienated; and since we could not, short of all-out war, attack the Russian submarine bases, we should face the prospect of war at sea at a severe and sustained military disadvantage. The Committee had agreed that the report of the Blockade Working Group should be discussed in the Ambassadorial Group but only to avoid an accusation that we were once more dragging our feet and because there was a chance of demonstrating the futility of a naval blockade.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (1) Took note.

- 2 -

From: COS (61) ~~65~~ 27 Sept 1961

TOP SECRET

B. Attacks on Ground Installations

Sir George Mills referred to General Norstad's request⁺ for delegated authority to attack those ground targets, excluding airfields, in or near the air corridors specifically identified in the act of firing at Allied aircraft. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were in favour of granting this delegated authority whilst hitherto France and the United Kingdom had opposed it. The Ambassadorial Group was at that moment discussing the Foreign Secretary's alternative proposal whereby, rather than immediate retaliatory action, the Russians would be warned following an attack on a transport aircraft that if such attacks persisted an attack would be launched against a Russian site. In the United States view immediate retaliatory action would be likely to have a very much greater impact upon the Russians; Western passivity, in the face of Russian provocation of this nature, could only be interpreted by them as a sign of weakness. A premeditated punitive attack sometime after an incident would furthermore, in their view, involve considerably greater dangers of escalation. It was clear that Her Majesty's Government could not accept General Norstad's proposal unless adequate safeguards against unjustified or misdirected retaliatory action could be devised. The Americans, however, could not understand our present attitude and he believed that the position of Her Majesty's Government would in no way be prejudiced if General Norstad were instructed to make proposals as to the safeguards he would embody in his instructions to pilots. The question of delegated authority could then be considered again in the light of these specific proposals.

In discussion the following point was made:-

- (c) There was general agreement that immediate retaliatory action would be less likely to lead to escalation than a deliberate punitive operation and that accordingly General Norstad should be asked to make detailed proposals regarding safeguards. The Committee's previous objections were based on the difficulty of identifying the particular site engaging our aircraft and the uncertainty that the Russians were in fact "shooting to kill"; the case of AA practices such as had occurred during the Berlin airlift would have to be covered. General Norstad's proposal would have to be subjected to careful scrutiny when received and it would in particular be vital to ensure that immediate retaliatory action should only be directed against "offending" sites.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (2) Agreed with the views of the Chairman, British Defence Staffs Washington, subject to the point made in discussion.
- (3) Took note that the Chief of the Defence Staff would seek the approval of the Minister of Defence.

+ SHLO 9-0006


MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

28TH SEPTEMBER, 1961.

P0371/160554

9/27/61

1081/444/61



BRITISH EMBASSY,

PARIS.

September 27, 1961.

Dear Evelyn,

.....
You may like to read the enclosed copy of my record of a conversation I had yesterday with Courcel about Germany because it illustrates the hardness and irreality of the General's position. Since I dictated this record I have seen a further account of what de Gaulle said to the representatives of the MRP. This quotes him as saying:- "Perhaps we shall end up with a new Western retreat. If so France will not take part in it. France will remain firm on the position which she has never ceased to defend and for the future this is a very important thing". I suppose that the last few words might be read as meaning that the General is determined that if a new legend arises in Germany about a stab in the back by Germany's allies this should only be allowed to affect Germany's relations with the U.K. and the U.S. (paragraph 4 of the record of your conversation with Kohler and Rusk of September 17).

2. Michael Butler had a long and interesting conversation yesterday with the new Directeur d'Europe at the Quai d'Orsay, Soutou. I had been told before going on leave that Soutou was going to relieve Laloy of everything not connected with Berlin so that Laloy could devote his whole time to it. But it turns out that Soutou, though Laloy remains in charge of Berlin in the Quai d'Orsay, has thrown himself wholeheartedly into the subject and is determined to make his voice heard. As he is a man of many fertile ideas and plenty of courage this is a good development from our point of view. You will see from Butler's account of the conversation which he is sending separately that Soutou professes to have been appalled at the rigidity of the attitudes which he found in the Quai d'Orsay on his arrival and that he has all sorts of ideas for trying to influence French policy in a more useful direction.

Yours ever,

Copy

A. Rumbold.

Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh, K.C.M.G., C.B.,
Foreign Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

PO371/160553

would have to deal with the D.D.R. and would have to make the same arrangements with them as with any other sovereign State. For example, if Soviet aircraft flew to London across Denmark the Soviet Government had to reach an agreement with Denmark.

The Secretary of State had referred to a possible understanding on access separately from the problem of a peace treaty. But he had said nothing of the obligations to be undertaken by the Western Powers. He wanted an arrangement advantageous to the West but ignoring the interests of the other side. In the absence of agreed action on a peace treaty, this question could not be raised in isolation from that of Western undertakings. One of these would be respect for the sovereignty of the D.D.R. The Secretary of State had evaded the question of the sovereignty of the D.D.R. and that of the German frontiers.

The Secretary of State had mentioned the possibility of a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact Powers. This was the first he had heard of this from the British side and he would take note of the fact.

The Soviet Government had put forward more than one proposal in the field of security. They had made proposals for effective security in Europe, for a non-aggression pact and so on. So there was no need to persuade them of the need to sign a peace treaty and thus solve other problems in the security field. But it was impossible to make the conclusion of a peace treaty contingent on the conclusion of other agreements relating to European security. However, if the idea was to resolve other questions besides a peace treaty, this would be welcome. He had himself put forward several proposals in the General Assembly of the United Nations.

He could not say in isolation that the Soviet Government would not interfere with access. How could the Soviet Government make such a declaration as the Foreign Secretary had mentioned, if the Foreign Secretary made no statement of Western obligations? The Soviet Government would have to consider this in the context of obligations to be assumed by the Western Powers. Otherwise they could not make any such statement. He regarded this position as highly constructive and providing an opportunity to reach understanding if the desire for understanding existed.

As regards the Secretary of State's remarks about the dangerous situation which might develop, he could only repeat Mr. Khrushchev's words: if such a situation did develop it would be the fault and responsibility of the Western Powers.

The Secretary of State repeated that by insisting on linking access arrangements with a treaty, the Soviet Government could create a very dangerous situation. He accepted that a treaty would be signed with the D.D.R. Allied communications would then continue. Heaven knew what Ulbricht would then do. This was terribly dangerous and this was why he wished to make arrangements in advance with the Soviet Government. What were the obligations which the Western Powers were to undertake? The East and West Germans already had day-to-day contacts and worked out traffic arrangements. Did Mr. Gromyko have in mind an expansion of these or something more formal and juridical? The Secretary of State saw a distinction between the two.

Mr. Gromyko said if a peace treaty were signed unilaterally with the D.D.R., the West would have to settle access questions on the basis of arrangements and agreements with the D.D.R. It was impossible to say now how and on what basis this would be done. But there would be no question of the maintenance of occupation rights and the British Government, for example, would have to deal with a fully sovereign D.D.R.

He repeated that if there were to be any prior understanding as regards access before a peace treaty, there must also be prior agreement on questions of interest to the other side, such as respect for the sovereignty of the D.D.R., frontiers and the prevention of West Berlin being used as a centre of subversion. He did not exclude the possibility of such exchanges of views before the signature of a peace treaty. Indeed, the present discussions with the Secretary of State and Mr. Rusk constituted exchanges of this kind. The Secretary of State agreed that this was a beginning.

Mr. Gromyko said that the Secretary of State was raising only what was of interest to the Western side and ignoring the interests of the other side. If these

Exhaust
Record of conversation betw Sgts & Mr Gromyko, 9/28/61

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10/4/61

COS(61)368, 4 October 1961. Berlin Contingency Planning: Note by the Secretary

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX TO COS(61)368

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

INTRODUCTION

1. Neither the Ambassadorial Group directive⁺ to General Norstad nor the Draft Instructions⁺ to NATO Supreme Allied Commanders define the stage at which responsibility for the conduct of Berlin operations should pass from the Tripartite Powers to NATO. The Americans have now submitted proposals⁺ to the Ambassadorial Group, and intend to recommend them to the NATO Council if they are acceptable to the Four Powers, and to SACEUR. Since these proposals conflict with our views⁺ that all military operations in relation to the Berlin situation should be conducted by NATO, the Foreign Office have asked for comments.

AIM

2. To examine and report on the American proposals.

THE PROPOSALS

General Approach

3. The American approach is that, from the political/juridical viewpoint responsibility for planning and execution of initial operations must remain Tripartite. They therefore do not contemplate NATO conducting, from the outset, the military measures which have been planned by the Tripartite Powers in relation to Berlin. The Americans have consequently attempted to define the extent of Tripartite responsibilities for planning and operations, and the stage at which responsibility should be transferred to NATO. In doing so they have taken into account:-

- (a) The need to safeguard the security of all NATO nations by obtaining advance NATO approval in principle for Tripartite operations. This will ensure that the Tripartite Powers are able to act promptly and effectively when the need arises.
- (b) That for political reasons West German forces should not be committed until the NATO military authorities have assumed control.
- (c) The military view that NATO military authorities should conduct all operations from the outset.
- (d) The limitations of LIVE OAK staff and command channels.
- (e) General Norstad's views on planning and operational responsibility.
- (f) General Norstad's opinion that there are no major military problems in the transfer of control, provided that NATO forces are appropriately alerted.

+ Annex 'A' to COS 1080/27/8/61
 / UKDEL to Foreign Office 167
 / Appendix to COS 1195/27/9/61
 / COS(61)284

Planning Responsibility

4. The Americans recommend that General Norstad's proposed division of planning responsibility⁸ should be approved, i.e. that Tripartite planning by LIVE OAK should cease with the division-size operation (JUNE BALL) and related air support plans, and with JACK PINE II expanded only to deal with active anti-aircraft installations and obstacles, but not against airfields. They consider that NATO should be responsible for planning beyond these.

5. They also propose that the LIVE OAK staff should remain a separate entity, co-ordinating its planning with SHAPE as General Norstad considers appropriate. Only Tripartite commanders directly involved should have complete knowledge of initial LIVE OAK plans, but General Norstad should inform other NATO Commanders as he considers appropriate. However, the West Germans should continue to be fully associated with the planning.

Operational Responsibility

6. NATO Preliminary Measures. The Americans consider that NATO forces should be put in an appropriate alert condition prior to Tripartite operations. They do not define the extent of the measures they consider would be necessary to achieve this, but from their discussion of the problems involved it is apparent that they are thinking in terms of advance national consent to the declaration of Reinforced Alert by SACEUR.

7. Ground Operations. Control of ground operations should pass to NATO when Tripartite forces of battalion or greater size have been engaged in combat by GDR or Soviet forces and require reinforcement. The Americans consider that it would be advantageous for control to pass to NATO earlier but believe that questions of legal interpretation might arise should the Tripartite powers seek to invoke the NATO Treaty at an earlier stage.

8. Air Operations. In the case of air operations the Americans propose that control should pass to NATO at the point when deliberate planned attack (as distinct from the immediate return of the fire of anti-aircraft artillery or SAM) against ground installations has become necessary to maintain air access. They indicate, however, that the NATO Treaty might be invoked earlier in the event of violent Soviet/GDR air attack against our initial escort operations, or when there are indications that the Soviets are preparing for major air operations in the corridors.

OUR COMMENTS

General

9. We agree generally with the American analysis of the problem of defining the responsibility between the Tripartite Powers and NATO for Berlin planning and operations, subject to the outcome of a current Foreign Office examination of the juridical and procedural issues involved. Militarily we would still prefer NATO to conduct all operations from the outset, not least because of the aggravation of the constitutional difficulties which would occur if NATO had to assume responsibility for operations which were already being conducted on a Tripartite basis. If, however,

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we accept the implications of the political and juridical difficulties foreseen by the Americans, we should be prepared to support their views to the extent set out in the following paragraphs.

Planning Responsibility

10. We agree with the proposed division of planning responsibility. We also agree with the proposed relationship of LIVE OAK to SHAPE and with the continued association of the West Germans with LIVE OAK planning. We further agree that the extent to which NATO commanders should be made aware of LIVE OAK plans should be left to General Norstad's discretion.

Operational Responsibility

11. NATO Preparatory Measures. We agree the need for appropriate NATO preparatory measures before Tripartite operations are undertaken which, we consider, will involve advance NATO Council agreement on the circumstances in which member nations would be prepared to mobilize. It would be premature to comment further on this aspect until SACEUR has submitted the plans required by the Draft Instructions to NATO Supreme Allied Commanders.

12. Ground Operations. We agree with the proposed division of responsibilities.

13. Air Operations. We consider that it is desirable and may be possible to obtain NATO agreement to assume responsibility at an earlier stage than is proposed by the Americans - when, for example, a single escorted air probe has been unmistakably engaged in combat by Soviet/GDR aircraft or ground defences.

14. Speed of Decision. We agree that action must be taken promptly and effectively when the need arises, and that in order to ensure this it is necessary to obtain advance approval by the North Atlantic Council of Tripartite measures. The NATO Council are already aware of these measures^Q.

15. Use of FRG Forces. We agree that FRG forces should be considered as immediately available reserves and not actually committed until NATO military authorities have assumed control and specific political decisions have been made.

CONCLUSIONS

16. We conclude that:-

- (a) Subject to the outcome of a current Foreign Office examination of the juridical and procedural issues involved, the division of planning and operational responsibilities proposed by the Americans is acceptable in the case of ground operations. In the case of air operations control should pass to NATO at the earlier stage suggested in paragraph 13 above.

/ UKDEL to Foreign Office 167
Q UKDEL to Foreign Office 166

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this is not bad
Sir E. Hume Miller
Sec of State

Adenauer
co. co. 2/9/10

BRITISH EMBASSY,

BONN.

October 7, 1961.

Sir Evelyn,

When I was waiting for the Lord Privy Seal on the airfield yesterday, I was approached by Abs who for some reason happened to be hanging about there. He said he wanted to tell me of a three hours' conversation which he had had with the Chancellor two or three days ago. He wanted me to know that the Chancellor's ideas were definitely flexible. He had made two particular points. The first was that although he was not contemplating a coalition with the S.P.D., he intended to keep in close touch with them in foreign policy, in other words he has discarded his previous attitude that a bipartisan foreign policy was nonsense.

In the second place Adenauer had indicated that he was sympathetic to what Abs called the British line on Berlin. I asked him what was meant by this. Abs would not be very specific but indicated that Adenauer had been very much impressed by the Secretary of State's speech to the United Nations and indeed by his whole attitude. He felt that we were really firm on essentials even though we might be flexible on what was negotiable. In further conversation, although Abs is an adroit character and I could not pin him down, I had the distinct impression that in the matter of dealings of some kind with the D.D.R. the Chancellor was fully open to persuasion. I took the opportunity of telling Abs that I thought both we and the Americans were perfectly firm on the essentials in Berlin but the reunification was not an issue on which Governments could ask their peoples to fight, and it would be a pity if the impression were created that anyone in Germany expected this. Abs perfectly took this point.

A propos of the above, this morning's papers

/ all ...

Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh, K.C.M.G., C.B.,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

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all record that Adenauer when he saw Senator Humphrey yesterday gave him clearly to understand that there was to be no nonsense about atom-free zones etc. All the fire is concentrated on this, the security aspect and not a word is reported to have been said about recognition, de facto or de jure. I think this is a good sign and that Adenauer is almost certainly thinking on lines with which we could agree on the recognition question, but that on European security as I have already reported he will be very difficult indeed to move. In my opinion, we should be unwise to make the attempt until the whole question comes up from the Russian side.

I am sending copies of this letter to Sammy Hood in Washington, Paul Mason in Paris, Bob Dixon in Paris, and Frank Roberts in Moscow.

*Yours ever
Kit*

Christopher Steel

*P.S. You will know that Ato is
a very close friend of Adenauer*

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FROM PARIS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

C,pher/OTP

Sir P. Dixon

No. 563

October 9, 1961

IMMEDIATE

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FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET) AND
WHITEHALL (SECRET) (CABINET)
DISTRIBUTION

D. 9.10 p.m. October 9, 1961

R. 9.25 p.m. October 9, 1961

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 563 of October 9.

Repeated for information to: Washington

Moscow


Bonn

and Saving to: Berlin

U.K. Del N.A.T.O.

U.K. Mis New York

CG 1071/384



Washington telegram No. 2676 to Foreign Office : Berlin

I saw General de Gaulle today on another matter and when that had been disposed of he remarked that we were in a difficult situation in regard to Germany. He began by observing that it was not to be thought that the French Government disapproved of the discussions which had been conducted with Mr. Gromyko in the United States., he approved warmly. He did, however, doubt whether they had done much good. He added, almost as an after-thought, that perhaps the Russians had given some ground by not mentioning the date by which the peace treaty would have to be signed. In general, however, the effect of the talks had been to lead Gromyko to enlarge the area of discussion and stimulate Russian interest in the possibility of securing advantages on points which lay outside the immediate question of Berlin. He gave two examples. Gromyko had been led to show an interest in European security, and encouraged to revive the claim that foreign bases should be eliminated.

2. The General asked me how we saw the situation. I said that we felt that the sounding out of the Russians by Mr. Rusk had been useful. Nothing had in fact, we were sure, been given away and we, like the General, felt it significant that Gromyko had not mentioned a date by which the Russians intended to sign a peace treaty. The main value of the conversations had been to bring it

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Paris telegram No. 563 to Foreign Office

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home to the Russians that they would be running a grave risk if they went ahead in defiance of the vital interests of the West. You yourself had concentrated on this in your talks with Gromyko. The account given to the Ambassadors' Group of President Kennedy's interview with Mr. Gromyko showed that, while it might be the case that Gromyko had enlarged the Russian position, President Kennedy had effectively answered him.

3. The General smiled and said that he had been pleased to learn from M. Alphand of President Kennedy's remark about the apple and the orchard.

4. I said that it seemed to me that what was now necessary was that the West should work out its own negotiating position and reminded the General that he had often said that we ought not to enter into a negotiation until this had been done. General de Gaulle said that our position was already known. In any case he wondered whether any progress could be made in working out an Allied negotiating position seeing that there was no German government. We must realize that the trouble was about Germany. Great Britain could be relied on, he knew, to fight if necessary, and so could France. But how about the Germans?

5. I said that we were pressing for priority to be given to discussions in the Ambassadorial Group of problems of substance. Would it not be a good thing to continue these discussions or did he think that some other mechanism desirable, e.g. a Western Foreign Ministers' meeting? The General expressed no objection to the former and no comment on the latter. His whole attitude on future Allied consultation involving the Germans was one of indifference.

6. I understand from the Lord Privy Seal that the attitude of M. Couve de Murville whom he saw this evening was more appreciative of the Americans' effort with Gromyko and more positive towards the idea of pursuing substance in the Ambassadorial Group.

Foreign Office please pass Priority to Washington 218, Moscow 67, Bonn 72, and Saving to Berlin 20 and U.K. Mis New York 132.

[Repeated as requested]

ADVANCE COPIES:

Private Secretary
Sir F. Hoyer Millar
Sir E. Shuckburgh
Mr. A. Duncan Wilson
Head of Central Department
Head of W.O.P.D.
Head of News Department

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FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES 13 OCT 1961 CA1071/390 (K)
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The Viscount Hood

No. 2740
October 13, 1961

D. 4.39 a.m. October 14, 1961
R. 6.19 a.m. October 14, 1961

IMMEDIATE

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be by

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2740 of October 13.
Repeated for information to:- Paris Moscow

Bonn U.K. Mission New York
Berlin U.K. Del. N.A.T.O.

CA1071/390

My telegram No. 2726: Berlin.

The French Ambassador summoned an Ambassadorial Group meeting at short notice this afternoon. He said he had received instructions, which he hinted had come from a high source. He spoke as follows.

2. The French Government was still confused on the situation, and about the conclusions to be drawn from the exploratory talks so far. The United States agreed there was no basis for negotiation, but at the same time said that the shape of a future agreement was evolving. The French Government understood that the Russians were proposing some sort of understanding. The price for this was clear, but it was not evident what we were supposed to buy.

3. The French Ambassador continued that he had reported very fully on the discussions in Washington, but in the light of them his Government could not understand what the American position was and what conclusions they drew from the exploratory talks. The President had told Mr. Gromyko that Mr. Thompson would continue the exploratory talks in Moscow. This had been done without consulting the French Government. Such talks would certainly get into questions of substance and would, in fact, be the beginning of a negotiation. It would be impossible for France to participate until there was a basis for negotiation. At present there was none. Consequently France could give no mandate for the proposed exploration.

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4. The French Government did not see what the object of the proposed senior officers' meeting in London on October 19 would be. It might create the impression that a mandate was being given to Mr. Thompson. Accordingly, the French Government was not in favour at this time of any meeting of senior officers.

5. The French Government could not see clearly what was the policy of the United States Government. They understood from what had been said in Washington, and from the paper in my telegram No. 2715 (amended by my telegram No. 2725), that there was a possibility of a change of policy on a number of points. The French Government wished to know whether the position of the United States Government was the same as before the exploratory talks or whether it had changed. The United States was the leader of the West. It was very difficult for France to follow if she did not understand what the United States position was. The French Government would like more precision about the United States position before it gave its own views on various procedural matters. The French Ambassador was instructed to ask whether the French might be given a paper which would be an analysis of the situation and contain the conclusions which the State Department drew from the United States/Soviet meetings. CG 1071/396

6. Mr. Kohler said this was a very serious communication, and the French Government was assuming a very serious responsibility. He was surprised by the French attitude. The United States Government had gone to some lengths to explain their position. He would state it again. We were faced with a challenge which might lead to war. The United States Government had decided to go to war if necessary to preserve their vital interests. They had themselves made notable efforts to improve their military readiness. They had tried with indifferent success to get their N.A.T.O. allies to take similar steps. The President had looked over the brink. Perhaps not all his colleagues had done this. He felt that before the West came to the brink we should make it clear to our people that we had done the maximum with the instrument of diplomacy to reach a reasonable settlement. It was as simple as that. There was no change in United State policy. The alliance was faced with a decision of what it wants to go to war for and what it does not want to go to war for. The members of the alliance were in it together and must make the decisions together. The Americans, on /their

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their own, had explored with the Russians whether there was any reasonable basis for negotiations without threat or duress. As far as the procedural aspects were concerned, there seemed to be emerging a possibility that such a negotiation might take place. It was, of course, impossible to say whether a negotiation would be successful. The next step must be to establish what our minimum price for negotiation would be. Any further exploration would begin to get into substance. Although it was a common problem, it was particularly one for the Federal Republic. The United States Government was not in a position to dictate. The principal factor in their thinking was to sustain and support Western Europe and the present policy of integration. To a great extent the views of the Federal Republic were the touchstone of the United States position.

7. The French Ambassador said there were three questions:-

- (a) In the United States view what chance was there of negotiating with the Russians?
- (b) What was the object of negotiation?
- (c) What should the price be?

Since the talks with Mr. Gromyko had given no indication of a serious basis for negotiation the French Government did not know what the object of continuing talks with the Russians was.

8. Mr. Kohler repeated that if it was possible to negotiate in a reasonable and acceptable form we should do it, however dim the prospects of success, so that we might make absolutely clear that there was no prospect of a reasonable agreement with the Russians before we proceeded to a showdown of force.

9. I said in answer to the French Ambassador's questions that we believed there was a chance of successful negotiations because we had brought home to the Russians the very grave risks involved in a separate treaty with the East Germans leading to East German control over access. Our conclusion was that the Russians realized these risks and were therefore ready to enter into a negotiation with the three Western Powers. As for (b), our object was an honourable settlement which would avoid a war.

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We wished to maintain our vital interests and obtain a fresh Russian guarantee of our rights. It was surely the purpose of the proposed meeting in London to answer question (c). The Russians had given a fairly clear idea of the main elements in the price they were asking. We now had to determine how far we felt we could go compatible with an honourable settlement. I believed the United States Government had made their position clear.

10. Mr. Kohler agreed and said that what we needed to do was to define together what we regarded as a satisfactory basis for negotiation and then see if the Russians accepted it as such.

11. The French Ambassador said his Government could not be a partner in negotiation until they saw a basis for it and there was no such basis. Although they did not favour negotiation they were not opposed to it, and if the American Ambassador went ahead that was for the United States Government. It was, however, a bad tactic and not the way to deal with the Russians at the present stage. The French Government was not in favour of further explorations. When Mr. Kohler asked if the French Government wished explorations to stop, the Ambassador replied that they did. The Russians' price was fantastic and we must tell them so clearly.

12. Mr. Kohler said that the French Government could not deal themselves out of this hand. They were in Berlin. What did they propose to do if there was firing in the air corridor? It was not possible to go on with the French sitting on the side lines. If the only approach to the problem was through military means all of us needed to do very much more than we were doing today and to do it fast.

13. Mr. Kohler continued that it was unquestionable that the Russians would go ahead with their peace treaty at some point, whether or not we negotiated. If there were previous negotiations there would be either:

- (a) A reasonable modus vivendi which would forestall the result of the peace treaty; or
- (b) A failure of negotiations which would mean immediate mobilization.

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The question was whether there was a modus vivendi which was not too disrupting to the alliance or too disheartening to the Germans. The alternative was to sit on our hands and wait for the peace treaty, thus inviting a Russian initiative. In that case, would the situation be better or worse than it was today? Possibly there was a third course which was to decide not to follow a diplomatic path, to get ready for war in a big way, and thus to scare the Russians away from any initiative. This was not very conceivable.

14. The French Ambassador replied that his Government favoured a modus vivendi, but they did not think the sort of negotiations proposed would lead to one. If we wanted a modus vivendi a showdown was necessary.

15. Speaking personally, the German Chargé d'Affaires said that he would like to ask the same question as the French Ambassador had done. It would be very helpful to know the United States position on what would be a reasonable agreement. The problem boiled down to the question of which of the Allies would present their views first. He appealed to the United States Government to take the lead and asked for a United States paper. Since the basic difference was how to deal with the Russians, why should we not have quadripartite talks on the substance of the question before we attempted to consider the modalities of procedure?

16. I said there was a basic difference between the French and ourselves. The French did not believe in the second barrel of our policy. We thought it would be bad tactics at present to break off talks with the Russians. The situation would then get more tense and we would find ourselves forced to negotiate in less favourable circumstances. So long as public opinion was convinced that we were making a genuine effort to reach a reasonable settlement we could be tough negotiators. But if we were forced into negotiations after a separate peace treaty we should be in a much worse position vis-à-vis both the Russians and our own public opinion. We should now try to get an understanding on the basis of the existing facts of the situation.

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17. Mr. Kohler said that what was required was a statement by the French describing what they consider would be a satisfactory basis for negotiations. They should say what they wished clarified in further probing. The American Government had been prepared to have Mr. Thompson present in London so that he might be fully aware of the views of each of the four Governments. The United States Government could not continue exploratory talks, unless there were agreed guidelines.

18. The French Ambassador said it really did seem as if the United States Government was trying to commit the French Government. He must repeat that the French Government could give no mandate to Mr. Thompson. I said that if there were further exploratory talks they could, willy nilly, commit the French to some extent and therefore they should participate in the preparations.

19. The French Ambassador repeated that United States policy was not clear on a number of points. Nor was it certain that the Russians would accept a four-Power agreement before a peace treaty. Moreover, he was not sure that the Russians believed the United States would go to war to protect their rights. Mr. Kohler replied that the United States Government had very serious reason to believe that the Russians did think the United States would go to war for this reason, but they were encouraged by the attitude of other members of the alliance.

20. After a long discussion of the extent to which the United States Government had informed their Allies of the conversations with Mr. Gromyko and the provisional conclusions which they had drawn from them, Mr. Kohler finally agreed to produce a paper after the week-end for the French. He stressed that it would contain nothing new and it would be just the sort of paper which the French could compose for themselves from the information which the Americans had given them. The French Ambassador undertook to report.

21. Please see my immediately following telegram.

/Foreign Office

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Washington telegram No. 2740 to Foreign Office

- 7 -

Foreign Office pass immediate to Paris, Bonn, Routine
to Berlin, Moscow, U.K. Del. N.A.T.O. as my telegrams
Nos. 620, 404, 193, 566 and 426.

[Repeated as requested].

ADVANCE COPIES

Sir. P. Reilly
Mr. Crawford
Head of Central Department
Head of W.O.P.D.
Head of General Department

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SIR E. SHUCKBURGH'S VISIT TO
BONN AND PARIS

Sir E. Shuckburgh asked for certain background papers for his forthcoming visit to Bonn and Paris. Attached are:-

- (a) The document prepared by Mr. Kohler giving the American summing up of the position resulting from the exchanges with Mr. Gromyko, designed to meet the French objections to a Four Power meeting of senior officials in London, expressed on instructions by the French Ambassador in the Ambassadorial Group in Washington - Flag A.
- (b) The draft terms of reference for Mr. Thomson's further exploratory talks in Moscow as it at present stands following inconclusive discussion in the Ambassadorial Group. - Flag B
- (c) The full records of Mr. Gromyko's talks with the Secretary of State and Mr. Rusk in New York; with President Kennedy in Washington; and with the Prime Minister in London. - Flag C

2. Items (a) and (b) call for no further comment. Sir E. Shuckburgh's purpose in having item (c) available is to be able to demonstrate to the Germans (and perhaps also to the French) that paragraph 5 of Mr. Ledwidge's separate brief on the visit is a valid argument.

3. To this end I have marked the relevant passages in the various conversations as follows:-

- (a) The passages marked A in Mr. Rusk's first talk with Mr. Gromyko, and the Secretary of State's first talk with Mr. Gromyko bring out the classic Soviet position, namely:-
 - (i) The Soviet Government's first choice is to secure Western agreement to the signature of a peace treaty or treaties with the two German "states", which involves making West Berlin into a free, demilitarised city (in which Western forces, joined by Soviet forces, may perhaps remain temporarily).
 - (ii) If the Western Powers do not accept this, the only possibility is for the Soviet Government unilaterally to sign a peace treaty with the D.D.R. which would terminate Western occupation rights and rights of access and force the Western Powers to deal with the D.D.R. direct about the future. The Soviet Government would disown all further responsibility.
- (b) The Soviet step backwards first began to appear in Mr. Gromyko's first talk with the Secretary of State in the passage marked B (it is perhaps worth noting that we have presented this shift in the Soviet position as resulting from the warnings given to Mr. Gromyko by Mr. Rusk and the Secretary of State. In fact, however, the really explicit warnings only followed this first shift.)
- (c) The shift was confirmed to Mr. Rusk in Mr. Gromyko's second conversation with him - see the passage marked C. It is of course true that Mr. Gromyko has, probably deliberately, been vague and sometimes inconsistent throughout. In the passages marked B referred to above Mr. Gromyko talked of an understanding between the Western Powers and the D.D.R. In this passage marked C he talks of an agreed solution among the Western Powers, the

/Soviet

Soviet Union, the D.D.R. and all the other parties concerned.

- (d) By the time of his second conversation with the Secretary of State (see passage marked D) Mr. Gromyko is only talking vaguely of prior agreement before the signature of a unilateral peace treaty, the implication being that this agreement would be concluded between the Western Powers and the Soviet Government.
- (e) By the time of his third talk with Mr. Rusk (see passage marked E) Mr. Gromyko is moving even further. He does not rule out the possibility of the Soviet Government providing the guarantees required and admits that agreement is possible even if the West refused to sign a treaty with the D.D.R. (It is this point which is of particular importance to the thesis which Sir E. Shuckburgh will be propounding). He also demonstrates considerable flexibility in saying that the form in which Western obligations are assured in the context of any arrangement over Berlin will be "a matter for subsequent negotiation".
- (f) By the time he speaks to President Kennedy, Mr. Gromyko has moved further still. He says that an understanding on Berlin cannot only be worked out jointly before a unilateral peace treaty is signed but goes on to say that this understanding "should be reflected in the peace treaty or, alternatively, formalised in special documents which could be appended to the peace treaty." He also talks about the need for "compromise". (See passages marked F).
- (g) Finally, in talking to the Prime Minister in London (see passages marked H in the record attached), Mr. Gromyko again says his Government is in favour of reaching an understanding with regard to Berlin (although he evidently talks of a free city of Berlin) even if there is no agreement on the signature of peace treaties with the two Germanies and even in the event that the Western Powers do not participate in the conclusion of any peace treaty.


4. It may also be useful to draw Sir E. Shuckburgh's attention to the Soviet position regarding European Security in case this problem also arises in discussion.

- (a) In his conversation with President Kennedy (see passage marked G) Mr. Gromyko makes it quite clear that his Government do not wish the whole problem of European security to be bound up in one package in a Berlin settlement. These wider questions are envisaged as being dealt with at a later stage. Insofar as they are to be interrelated with a Berlin settlement and lend themselves to an early solution, the only two points which could be considered on the Soviet side are a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and agreement to prevent the transfer to both Germanies of nuclear and rocket weapons and their manufacture.
- (b) He said almost exactly the same to the Prime Minister (see passage marked I in that record).

J. E. Killick
(J. E. Killick)
October 18, 1961.

V. weibel
27/10.

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BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON, D.C.

October 20, 1961.

He should not exaggerate this. The Germans in Washington are very much under the influence of Grewe. It is a toss-up whether Grewe's visit to Bonn & Berlin will have made him more or less 'tough'.

Mr. Ledwith
Mr. Tomlinson

4/2
24/10
Dear John,

Here are a few straws in the wind which may be of no great significance.

2. Schnippenkoetter, the German Charge d'Affaires, had me to lunch yesterday and gave me the impression that the Germans regarded our position with a great deal of suspicion. In particular, he appeared to think that it was our view that the Russian ambitions were limited to Central Europe and Berlin, and that they did not have even as a long-range object the disruption of the Alliance. He also appeared to think that it was our view that it was essential to put forward all the concessions contained in the latest version of the guidelines paper we have been discussing here in order to prevent the Russians from moving away from a Four-Power understanding prior to a separate peace treaty. Needless to say, he also appeared to think that we were deeply committed to all sorts of undesirable schemes in the realm of European security. I hope he is now clearer about our position. But the talk left me with the feeling that it was a very good thing that Shuckburgh was at that moment speaking to Carstens in Bonn.

3. Speaking very personally, Schnippenkoetter said that he thought we ought to make larger concessions on one or two points in order to buy compensating advantages with them. The direction in which he appeared to think it would be easiest to make concessions was in recognition of the DDR. He clearly contemplated going a long way on this point. On the other hand, he was very stiff about the links between West Berlin and West Germany.

4. At dinner a couple of nights ago Sorenson, the President's alter ego, indicated that Mr. Kennedy was thinking of a meeting with Dr. Adenauer. He agreed that the appearance of twisting the arm should be avoided, but he added that we should be under no illusion that arm-twisting was in fact required.

5. This is only gossip of no necessary value, and I am therefore copying this letter only to Marten at Bonn.

Yours ever

John

(J.A. Thomson)

J.E. Killick, Esq.,
Central Department (Western Section),
Foreign Office,
London W.1

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Washington telegram No. 2904 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

4. It was agreed that these points were not appropriate for a narrow negotiation. The German Ambassador explained that (b) was meant to cover indigenous troops and (e) foreign troops.

Surprise Attack

5. Mr. Kohler thought that this too was hardly appropriate for a narrow negotiation.

Non-Transfer of Atomic Weapons and Rockets to other States.

6. The German Ambassador said that there was a big difference between unilateral United States policy (and at the present time the Federal Republic was not asking for any change in it) and the freezing of the status quo internationally. There might be a change in the basic situation in a few years and we should therefore keep flexibility in common Western defence arrangements. In reply to a direct question from Mr. Bohlen, the German Ambassador said that his Government had no present interest in altering their undertaking not to manufacture ABC weapons but they would like to keep the possibility open. Mr. Kohler made it very plain that United States policy was not to disseminate national control of nuclear weapons. The draft test ban treaty and the United States disarmament package were both plain on this point. But an agreement on these lines would not affect the United States offer for a multilateral N.A.T.O. nuclear force or the present arrangements on stockpiling. The German Ambassador stuck to his point but suggested that we should study the possibility of providing some sanction in case the three nuclear Powers made an agreement as proposed and the Russians infringed it. Mr. Kohler thought this was a good idea. Her Majesty's Minister observed that if we introduced a sanction against Russian infringements this would give them an opening for claiming Western infringements and interfering in the internal affairs of the Federal Republic.

7. The Germans undertook to table a paper reflecting the discussion in the Ambassadorial Group and in the light of it marrying their own memorandum and the Working Group paper.

Foreign Office please pass to Bonn, Moscow and Saving to UKDel NATO, Berlin and Paris as my telegrams Nos. 455, 594, 655, 137 and 583 respectively.

[Repeated as requested].

ZZZZZ


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BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

November 6, 1961

Mr. Lodge *UE 8/4*
Mr. Tomlinson *UE 9/11*
Sir E. Shepherd *UE 11/7*

- see particularly para 5.

Dear John,

You may be interested in the following scraps of information about Berlin.

2. Kohler told Hood today that he intended to speak to the French Ambassador in an effort to jog the French into a more forthcoming attitude on negotiations. He would say that it was the French who had insisted upon drawing up a substantive position before entering on any talks with the Russians, and now that we were trying to do just this they were taking no real part in the discussions.
3. Kohler asks the German Ambassador at virtually every meeting of the Ambassadorial Group what he can report about the formation of a German Government. The object clearly is to impress upon the Germans the need to get on as quickly as possible with substantive talks. In addition to this *usual* question about the formation of a German government, Kohler also asked the German Ambassador today about the agreement on foreign policy reached between the C.D.U. and the F.D.P. In a pointed way he asked whether it was a document on the lines of a United States party programme, i.e. something to which little attention was paid once it had served its immediate purpose, or whether it was likely to be binding upon the German government. The Ambassador replying in his quality as a constitutional lawyer said that it could not be binding upon the German government for the Constitution stated that the determination of policy lay with the Chancellor.
4. Kohler told Hood today that he was concerned about the German attitude both over the status of West Berlin and over nuclear weapons. On the latter point he thought the German Ambassador was taking a light hearted attitude to what was a very firm treaty commitment. It is perfectly plain that the Americans intend to be firm on both points. In addition Winckler told me today that the French thought that recognition of the Oder-Neisse line and an understanding on nuclear weapons were definitely items in the concessions column.
5. Kohler believes, probably correctly, that the German draft paper which we have been discussing here is Grewe's own work. No doubt he got clearance for it during his recent visit to Bonn, but the German government was in such a shambles at the time that there was no being certain that they would stick to what they agreed to then.
6. I am sending copies of this letter to Marten at Bonn, Hadow at Paris and Wright at Ukdel to NATO.

John
John

(J.A.Thomson)


J.E.Killick, Esq.,
Western Department,
Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

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Record of a Meeting between Monsieur
Couve de Murville
and the Lord Privy Seal on
Thursday, November 9, 1961.

When I saw Monsieur Couve de Murville at the opening of the Common Market negotiations in Brussels on Wednesday morning I suggested to him that we might try to find time for a talk about more general matters. He readily agreed. An opportunity offered itself when it was decided Ministers would not resume negotiations until noon on Thursday. I met Monsieur Couve de Murville at 11.15 at the French Embassy. During our talk we received a message that our meeting was postponed until 12.15 p.m. which enabled me to have a ½ hour discussion with him. As the time was limited I concentrated on three points: Berlin, South Vietnam and the American attitude towards the Common Market negotiations. My main objective was to obtain as much information as possible about his own views on these three points.

We started with Berlin. He said that the situation had changed in several respects since the meeting of the Foreign Ministers at the beginning of August, and indeed since he and I had last talked over the subject in Paris in September. In particular, the wall had been built across Berlin, no action had been taken by the West about this, and the implications of both these events could now be seen more clearly. Secondly, Khrushchev had again removed the ~~date-line~~ by which he had threatened to sign a peace treaty with East Germany. Thirdly, he had been advised while he was in Brussels that Mr. Khrushchev's speech on November 7 also denoted easing of his attitude over Berlin. It was, however, extremely difficult to decide what influences had been at work in leading to these shifts of policy. He was constantly being impressed with the lack of prior information about the actual changes in Russian policy possessed by the West, yet alone about the explanations for them. As far as he knew the West had no warning about the introduction of the policy of de-Stalinisation, neither had they received warning in advance of the events of August 13^{decision} in Berlin. The latter must have been a most distressing for the Russians to have to take because of their uncertainty about the reaction of the East German people and of the West to it. But in fact the East Germans had not revolted neither had the West done anything. The result was that the morale in West Berlin was now low and the people were leaving. In fact, by building a wall, the Russians had themselves solved more than half the problem of Berlin. They had dealt with most of the things which were objectionable to them. What

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remained for them was the problem of access to West Berlin. The French Foreign Minister commented that the removal of the time limit and the easing in tone of the last speech of Mr. Khrushchev seemed to be a good element in the situation. The next thing to happen would be the visit of Dr. Adenauer to Washington which he understood would take place about November 20. This was also a good thing. I asked him what he expected to come out of this meeting. Did he think that Dr. Adenauer would be able to agree with President Kennedy on a basis for the proposed probe by the American Ambassador in Moscow. Monsieur Couve said he simply did not know. The French had had no real contacts with the Germans over the past two months during which there had been no German Government. Of course there had been exchanges of views with Carstens but he was only an official. I remarked that there seemed to have been shifts in German policy as well over the last few months with which Monsieur Couve agreed. But in any case - implying that even if the Federal Chancellor did reach an agreement of substance about Berlin - he added very thoughtfully - he very much doubted whether we would get General de Gaulle to agree to the American Ambassador undertaking a probe.

Monsieur Couve went on to say that he knew the Americans the British were angry with the French. I remarked that we had in fact been irritated by the way the French had handled the announcement about the proposed meeting of Four Power officials in Europe, but what was really at the bottom of our anxieties over French policy was our uncertainty as to how they really wanted to play the hand. Mr. Couve said that as far as the meeting of officials was concerned this was probably due to a genuine misunderstanding. The French Ambassador in Washington may have got it wrong in some way or other; but after all this was only one incident in this long drawn out affair over Berlin. In reply to my more general question, he viewed this as a tactical situation by which he meant that the situation was constantly changing - as he had described at the beginning of our talk - and that our tactics should be continually adapted to meet the changing situation. I said I could agree with that but fundamentally did he believe that we could just allow the matter to drift on until the Russians signed a peace treaty with the East Germans and then face the consequences. That was a fundamental question. Monsieur Couve replied that no one could stop them signing a peace treaty if they wanted to. I said that of course this was so and perhaps my original question had been foolishly framed. Perhaps I should ask him whether he thought the Russians would eventually sign a peace treaty with the East Germans and if so, should they be allowed to do this without any attempt to have negotiations with them beforehand. After all Khrushchev might lose patience and

/himself

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himself invite the three Western powers to negotiations. Monsieur Couve said that if he did that it would of course have to be considered. I said I detected here perhaps a difference between the attitude of the French and the British. The French seem to be entirely opposed to any proposal for negotiations from our side but he had not taken up this attitude towards my comment that Mr. Khrushchev might himself propose negotiations. We felt the position would be much worse if Mr. Khrushchev made such a proposal himself. Monsieur Couve enquired very sharply why did we take such a view. To this I replied that we felt that in such a case we would ~~of have~~ lost the initiative and would appear to be playing to Mr. Khrushchev's tune, whereas if at some future point it was agreed that we could propose a meeting to discuss these things we should have the initiative from the beginning. But Monsieur Couve replied that on the other hand it was Mr. Khrushchev who was raising the problems and therefore it was up to him to take the initiative from the beginning, in proposing ways of settling them.

In fact, Monsieur Couve went on to say, he was coming to the conclusion that Khrushchev was much less interested in Berlin than in the wider European questions of the future of West Germany and Central Europe. The increasing emphasis in all the Russian speeches on German revanchism, the need to prevent the Germans having atomic weapons, European security and so on together with the note to Finland, which was really an attempt to brow-beat Norway and Denmark were clear indications of this. What he was really out to do was to undermine Western Germany and N.A.T.O. I asked him whether he thought Mr. Khrushchev really got all he could out of the crisis over Berlin itself. Had he squeezed the fruit dry? - to which Monsieur Couve replied that he thought this in part was the case. The other factor was that the Russians were very prestige conscious. They considered Berlin to be largely a matter of prestige for themselves but they also now recognised that it was to a large degree a matter of prestige for the Americans as well. I mentioned that this was undoubtedly the result of the Gromyko talks, with which Monsieur Couve rather half-heartedly agreed. He went on to say that he did not know ~~much~~ about the British view on Berlin but the Americans paid much more attention to it as a question of prestige than did the French. The main problem now was to safeguard Western Germany. The fate and freedom of 2,000,000 splendid West Berliners was of course important but after all, he said ~~xxx~~ with a shrug of the shoulders. He felt that ~~it~~ staking so much prestige on Berlin the Americans were taking Western Germany far too much for granted. We could all see the state the West Germans were in now.

/That was

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- 4 -

That was where the real problem lay. I should perhaps add that Monsieur Couve and I had a brief word about West Berlin before dinner on the previous evening. I asked him whether he had any news of interest during the day to which he replied that he had not. Nothing seemed to have happened in the world outside. I added that the Germans had still not been able to form a Government. Indeed, Muller-Armack had just told me that the situation seemed to have become more difficult again because Erhard, his own Minister, was taking a strong line about the proposal to set up a new department of development aid. Monsieur Couve commented that in that case there would hardly be a German Government at all. I then asked him which he considered to be the greater danger in the future. West Germany going neutralist or West Germany running amok. He said he thought it would be possible to combine both, but on reflection he rather doubted whether, despite what had happened and what might happen over Berlin, West Germany would go neutralist. I am recording the discussion on South Vietnam and the American attitude towards the Common Market negotiations separately.

A.H.

November 10, 1961.SECRETARY OF STATECopies to:-

Sir F. Hoyer-Millar
Sir E. Shuckburgh
Mr. A.D. Wilson
Mr. E.E. Tomkins
Mr. P.E. Ramsbotham

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QUOTE

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

The meeting with the Chancellor has been successful, in the main. He is clearly in favor of negotiation, and he has undertaken to do his best on this with General deGaulle, to whom he is sending a letter tonight by Carstens. He agrees with the plan for an effort to concert an agreed position at a meeting of Western Foreign Ministers in December in Paris, in preparation for talks with the Soviets early in the new year, probably at the Foreign Ministers level.

On substantive issues, too, we are closer to agreement, though differences remain. The Chancellor did not support the notion that the status of West Berlin is controlled by the basic* law, and he noted that the offices of West German Ministries in West Berlin could be reduced if at the same time the UN should put some offices in. He sees this as a problem of psychology, not principle.

On the Oder-Neisse, we still have differences. The Germans are willing to repeat their assurance that they plan no change by force. But they don't want to settle the Oder-Neisse matter in the context of Berlin. On our side we have indicated our support for deGaulle's formula, but we have both agreed not to make an issue of it for now. The Chancellor himself is quite realistic on this point, but problems of internal politics weigh heavily here.

On dealings with the GDR we had no real trouble. The Germans quite understand that practical dealings will be necessary; they would rather have us do it; we would prefer them.* I think it's not a serious difference. On recognition itself the Chancellor stands firm. I agreed with him.

On atomic weapons we have made clear our strong view that separate national nuclear capabilities on the continent are bad. We continue to press for a NATO solution instead. The Germans will stick to the policy stated in 1954, but again they don't want to make new statements in the context of a Berlin negotiation. The Chancellor made very clear his conviction that German unilateral ownership* control over nuclear weapons is undesirable, and Strauss expressed the same view; they agreed that their needs could be met within a multi-lateral framework.

* Assumed text. Corrections forthcoming.

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-2-

On one point we strongly agreed: Any negotiations must be directed firmly toward strengthened rights of access. The Germans ~~were~~ ^{are} quite forthcoming on other points, I am sure, if we can get something worth having on full and free access.

So we have come some distance and have still some distance to go. But the general tone of the meeting was good, and I believe we are now in a good position to work on General deGaulle. My general impression is that the German Government is now more flexible than it has been in the past.

The Chancellor was very open and friendly, and his associates made a favorable impression on us. It was a much better meeting than my first encounter with him last April.

Finally, I should report that we also discussed the military buildup. I was able to give the Chancellor an encouraging picture of our current estimate of the nuclear balance, but at the same time we agreed that the conventional buildup is of very great importance. I know the pressure and problems you face in this area, but I am sure you agree that the prospect of effective negotiation depends heavily on our ability to show unity and resolution on the military side. I know our military advisers are in close touch on technical aspects of these problems, but from the broad political point of view I think it is hard to overstate the value of any further military steps you can take as negotiations become more likely.

Sincerely,

John F. Kennedy

UNQUOTE

* Assumed text. Corrections forthcoming.

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JFK-Aden.

big conference

21.11.1961

Caillon/SSC

Cypher/OTP

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Sir P. Dix
No. 671
November 2

3, 1961
3, 1961

IMMEDIATE
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Add
Repeated

1 of November 23
Bonn
for
Ambassadors)

CG 1011/514 G - c/bur

Washington telegram No. 3161 to Foreign Office: Berlin.

Following from Rumbold.

Carstens brought the message addressed by Dr. Adenauer to General de Gaulle to Paris this morning and in the absence of the General delivered it to M. Couve de Murville to whom he also gave an oral account of what had passed between Dr. Adenauer and the President. I have had the following version of this account from Laloy.

2. The Chancellor expressed himself as being in favour of a negotiation with the Russians (Laloy's comment being that there was nothing new about this). As to method the Chancellor's preference as expounded to the President was for a formal offer to be made by the three Western Governments to the Soviet Government without any further preliminary diplomatic probing. The only reservation he made was that the four Western Governments, i.e. including the Federal Government, should first have reached agreement on the substance of the Western negotiating position. He hoped that they would succeed in doing this in the course of the December meetings. There had been no reference to the possibility of its being proposed to the Russians that the negotiations might begin at the level of senior officials.

3. Carstens confirmed that as Schroeder had indicated to the Press in Washington the United States Government had accepted the view that the West should in no circumstances give up the rights upon which their presence in West Berlin was based. On the other hand there had been quite an argument about the relationship between the Federal Government and West Berlin. In the course of this the Americans had advanced the possibility of some sort of treaty being concluded between the Federal Government and the authorities

/of West

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SECRETParis telegram No. 671 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

of West Berlin (which I would have thought implied that the Americans had not entirely discarded the possibility of the status of West Berlin being changed). There had been no clear conclusion to this particular argument. The Chancellor had said that apart from the demoralising effect of any change in the provisions which the Federal constitution now contains relating to Berlin it would be very hard to get the necessary two-thirds' majority. He had however said that he would be willing to contemplate some diminution in the outward and visible signs of the city's political links with the Federal Republic such as fewer Federal organisations in the city and no meetings in it of the Bundestag, but only as a quid pro quo for fortifying the access arrangements e.g. by an autobahn removed from the control of the G.D.R. or by the creation of an international access authority. In discussing the latter possibility he had expressed opposition to the idea of United Nations participation.

4. The President had pressed the Chancellor though not very hard about the Oder-Neisse Line, but the Chancellor had been unwilling to contemplate any concessions.

5. As regards nuclear matters the Chancellor had acquiesced in the United States Government pursuing the notion of some sort of agreement with the Soviet Government about not spreading nuclear weapons to countries which did not already possess them, but only in return for assurance by the United States Government that in the event of war or danger of war the Federal Government would not be deprived of the means of defending themselves by nuclear weapons. (Laloy was himself not at all clear what this meant but seemed to think that Dr. Adenauer had made quite a concession to American views on this point).

6. There had been nothing in Carsten's account to lead one to suppose that Dr. Adenauer had even mentioned the wall.

7. Carstens had said that the Chancellor had been delighted to have had such a long conversation alone with the President and that he had been once more greatly impressed by the latter's intelligence and resolution.

8. The conversation between the Chancellor and the President had according to Carstens been held against the background of fresh reports about a build-up of Soviet military effectives and the logistical support for them in Eastern Europe. But as against this the Americans including in particular Mr. McNamara had been at pains to comfort the Chancellor with the assertion that their nuclear superiority over the Russians was assured for at least two more years to come.

/9. Laloy

SECRET

SECRETParis telegram No. 671 to Foreign Office

- 3 -

9. Laloy was not present at the interview between M. Couve de Murville and Carstens and this account of what passed between Dr. Adenauer and the President is therefore only third-hand. It is therefore unlikely to be accurate in all respects.

10. Laloy said that apart from asking a few questions on points of detail M. Couve de Murville had necessarily limited himself to listening to what Carstens had to say. He had not been able to commit himself in talking to Carstens to any expression of view about what General de Gaulle might think.

11. I asked Laloy whether he himself thought that General de Gaulle would end by being prevailed upon to accept the arguments in favour of negotiation. He said that he had himself discussed this crucial point with M. Couve de Murville immediately after Carstens had left. M. Couve de Murville had expressed considerable doubt. Laloy told me that he himself thought the chances were certainly no better than even.

12. There is a passage in the General's speech today to the officers in Strasbourg which Laloy agreed with me in regarding as significant of his frame of mind about negotiations. The passage in question runs as follows:- "The importance of France is such that if she stands firm and straight the Free World may retain its hope and its cohesion whereas if she were to bend it would be all up with Europe and soon with the liberty of the world".

13. I should be grateful if Laloy's confidences could be very carefully respected.

Foreign Office please pass Immediate to Washington No. 249, Bonn No. 119 and Priority to Moscow No. 86,

[Repeated as requested]

[Copies sent to Prime Minister's Office]

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SECRETBerlin: U.S.-German Talks.

Mr. Hillenbrand had me to luncheon to-day, and told me the following.

The talks had lasted unusually long, and there had been an unusual amount of private conversation between the Chancellor and the President. At the formal meetings, on the American side there had been Mr. Rusk, Mr. Kohler, Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Hillenbrand, Mr. Bundy and, as occasion required, Mr. Hall, Mr. McNamara and Mr. Nitze. On the German side there had been Schroeder, Carstens, *Schney?* Gräfe, Krapf, Schnippenkoetter, General Schmitz and, as occasion demanded, Mr. Strauss and von Bokerman.

Both the Americans and the Germans thought the talks had gone well. The Americans had been pleasantly surprised at the amount of "give" in the German position on access procedures and on the status of West Berlin. On the latter point the Chancellor had pulled the rug from beneath Gräfe. The Americans had come to the conclusion that it would be wise not to press at present on the question of frontiers and nuclear arms. This was for tactical reasons, and did not concern the substance of their position.

The Americans had drawn up a paper representing the results of the conversations. There had not been time to get full German concurrence to it. They hoped it might be tabled in the Ambassadorial Group next week to assist in further work with the substantive paper.

The Americans thought that Adenauer had gone away reassured about the staunchness of the U.S. position. There had thus been an important psychological gain from the visit. This might have a practical importance when Adenauer came to visit de Gaulle.

Most of what the Germans had told us last week about tactics had been overtaken by the talks with the President. The Germans now thought that it would not be possible to negotiate effectively with the Russians in the first instance through an experts' meeting. There should be a full-scale Foreign Ministers' meeting, and this could perhaps be followed by a meeting of experts. There should be no further probes in Moscow. The Americans thought the German view sensible.

The Americans had given Adenauer a full-scale presentation of the military position. It had both reassured and sobered him. From subsequent remarks it was evident that he had taken in at any rate the salient points of what he was told.

Schroeder had made a better impression than was expected. It was difficult to assess his

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personality, but he was certainly an able man and a nimble tongue. He was a much better speaker than von Brentano, and would bring more precision than his predecessor to any statement of the German case.

The rivalry between Schroeder and Strauss was clear. This was the first time the latter had had a proper chance to meet the President. He had put on a virtuoso performance.

J.A. Thomson,
November 24, 1961.

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11/24/61

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C61071/5576

The German Ambassador this morning showed me a telegram which he had received from Bonn giving Dr. Carstens' first account of the Adenauer/Kennedy conversations in Washington.

2. The telegram said that the Chancellor had been delighted with his long talks with the President and that all misunderstandings between the United States and the Federal Republic had been eliminated. They had agreed to tell Mr. Macmillan and General de Gaulle about their conversations and this would be done in letters from Mr. Kennedy to Mr. Macmillan and from Dr. Adenauer to General de Gaulle. No details would be given to any other governments until the forthcoming Macmillan/de Gaulle and de Gaulle/Adenauer meetings had taken place.

3. There was general agreement on Berlin, particularly on the point that negotiations are necessary. On some points however, notably in regard to the handling of the Oder/Neisse line and the legal character of relations between West Berlin and the Federal Republic, there were still divergencies which would have to be cleared up. In the meantime, the telegram continued, "It could be assumed that the U.S. would not make proposals to the U.S.S.R. so long as the Federal Republic was not in a position to agree".

4. The Ambassador said that he might have further details over the weekend and would like to tell me about them on Monday. I said I too would give him an outline of what we had heard, and perhaps also some account of the de Gaulle visit to Birch Grove.

(Evelyn Shuckburgh)
November 24, 1961.

Central Department

Copies to:-

P. U.S.
Private Secretary
Lord Privy Seal
Sir P. Reilly
Mr. Wilson
W. O. P. Dept.

M. L. & W. B. C. 27/11.

M. K. & K.

24/11

24/11

F0311/160564

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11/25/61
(2)SECRETFROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

Sir D. Ormsby-Gore

No. 3184

November 24, 1961

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES

25 NOV 1961

CABOT/667

FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET) AND
WHITEHALL (SECRET) (CABINET)
DISTRIBUTION

P. 41 a.m. November 25, 1961

R. 5.20 a.m. November 25, 1961

IMMEDIATESECRETAddressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 3184 of November 24.Repeated for information to: Bonn Paris
Moscow UKDEL N.A.T.O.and Saving to: Berlin
UKMIS New York
Codel Brussels (for Sir P. Dixon)Adenauer-Kennedy Talks on Berlin

At the Ambassadorial Group meeting this afternoon, Mr. Kohler gave the following account of the talks, which was confirmed by the German representative.

2. Both sides agreed that the meeting was a success and the talk was unusually full and frank. The President was very pleased both at the atmosphere in which the talks had taken place and at the way in which the two sides had come to grips with the problems. The communiqué represented pretty fully what had passed with the exception of the discussion on the Western negotiating position on Berlin. Here the main points were:-

(a) Legal Position of Berlin

While emphasizing some of the constitutional difficulties involved, the Germans had recognised that for the purposes of negotiation and international law the tripartite concept of the present status of Berlin could be accepted. Berlin could be represented as "part of Germany currently under special occupation status." It had been agreed that West Berlin should be free to form and maintain relations with the outside world and especially with the Federal Republic. It had also been agreed that the ties (apparently unspecified) were essential to the viability of West Berlin. It was important that occupation troops should remain in West Berlin. If access conditions could be improved it would

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SECRETWashington telegram No. 3184 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

be easier for the Federal Republic to handle the internal constitutional problem. The removal in part or whole of the Federal offices in Berlin would strike a grave blow at morale, but from the psychological point of view this could be mitigated by the substitution of United Nations agencies.

(b) Access

It was agreed that civilian as well as Allied military access must be safeguarded, although there was no need to make specific mention of German access. It could be covered, e.g., by a reference to "non-military access". The two delegations would probably have an amendment to propose to the substantive paper on this point. The United States had confirmed that, in its view, civilian access was ultimately encompassed in the basic responsibilities of the Occupying Powers. The Germans would like specific mention of this in any understanding. Their point could, however, be met by a unilateral Allied statement that when they referred to access they meant the "full range" of access to the city. If, as was probable, the Russians would not agree to a specific confirmation of German access, the understanding should not be inconsistent with the view that such access was an Allied responsibility. At least one means of access, presumably in the air, must be absolutely free.

(c) Dealings with the G.D.R.

It would probably now be possible to remove several square brackets from the substantive paper. The West must continue to hold the Russians responsible for the maintenance of their rights. The Germans had pointed out that the more clearly access rights were defined in an understanding, the less need there would be for contacts with the G.D.R., but they recognised that some contacts would be inevitable. They were themselves willing to undertake technical talks with the G.D.R. on practical problems but not on access procedures, since these were closely connected with access rights. Despite the implications for recognition of the G.D.R., the West Germans would not raise objection to personnel

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SECRETWashington telegram No. 3184 to Foreign Office

- 3 -

of the three Allied Powers dealing with the G.D.R. as necessary on access procedures. The Americans were now preparing a codification of access procedures which would be useful as a background paper both in drawing up the Western position and in negotiations with the Russians.

(a) Rôle of the United Nations

The Americans and Germans agreed that certain United Nations institutions might move to Berlin. The United States was willing to consider the presence of a symbolic United Nations troop contingent provided its functions did not detract from those of Allied troops. The Germans opposed this idea. The United States contemplated the possibility of a rôle for the United Nations on the access routes provided there was some United Nations presence in Berlin. The Germans showed no enthusiasm for this idea. In short, it was agreed that United Nations activities might be useful but the Germans were opposed to the presence of United Nations troops.

(e) Boundaries

The Germans were willing to repeat to the Russians their undertaking not to use force. They were also willing to have this guaranteed by the three Western Powers. They were, however, unwilling either to accept the Oder-Neisse line themselves or to agree that the three Western Powers should say that they would uphold it as the frontier of Germany at an eventual peace conference. Accordingly, it would be possible to remove one of the brackets in the substantive paper and the Americans for their part would be willing to omit some of the other language on the Oder-Neisse line.

(f) European Security

There seemed to be some doubt as to what exactly had been agreed, but the Americans at any rate were fairly clear that there had been no change in the position on either side on

(i) non-aggression declarations and

(ii) nuclear warheads. It had, however, been agreed /that

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Was n-ton telegram No. 3184 to Foreign Office

- 4 -

that the latter question should be considered further during Mr. Strauss's present visit to Washington.

(g) Tactics

Dr. Adenauer had spoken strongly in favour of negotiations on reasonable terms. The Americans had not believed that the Russians would consider the West was serious in proposing negotiation at senior officers' level unless a Foreign Ministers' meeting had also been fixed. After some discussion, the Germans had agreed. It might well be that a Foreign Ministers' meeting might remit assignments to the senior officers. It was not excluded that the senior officers might meet first to prepare for the Foreign Ministers, but it seemed evident that the Americans did not favour this idea.

3. Instructions were being sent to the American and German representatives to brief the North Atlantic Council tomorrow morning, November 25. The N.A.T.O. Ambassadors in Washington would probably be briefed a few hours later.

Foreign Office please pass to Bonn, Moscow, Paris, UKDEL N.A.T.O., and Saving to Berlin, and Codel Brussels as my telegrams Nos. 514, 663, 731, 487, 159 and 2 respectively.

[Repeated as requested]

ADVANCE COPIES

Private Secretary
Sir F. Rundall
Mr. Marett
Head of Central Department
Head of W.O.P.D.
Head of General Department

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FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

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(A)

Sir D. Ormsby-Gore

No. 3190

D. 3.11.a.m. November 25, 1961

November 24, 1961

R. 4.49.a.m. November 25, 1961

IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 3190 of November 24.
Repeated for information to: Paris, Moscow and Bonn

My telegram No. 3184.

When I saw Mr. Rusk he had very little to add as regards details to the information given in the briefing to the Ambassadors' Group. He did, however, start by saying that they had detected some signs of decline in the Chancellor's powers. This may have been partly due to his cold, but he did not talk with the usual zest and when Strauss and Schreoder were present he hardly opened his mouth. He had arrived in a rather depressed condition owing to the fact that his advisers had given him a briefing on the military situation in Europe which had been pessimistic and misleading for instance, he had been told that the Russians had immediately available 40,000 tanks and N.A.T.O. only 4,000. On enquiry the Americans discovered that the 40,000 figure included all armoured vehicles, while the Western figure of 4,000 was strictly confined to tanks. On a fair comparison the two sides were much more nearly level. In these circumstances McNamara's briefing, both with regard to conventional and nuclear forces, had greatly heartened the Chancellor.

2. With regard to the level at which negotiations with the Russians might take place, Rusk confirmed that both they and the Germans felt that it would be a waste of time to suggest a meeting at any level lower than Foreign Ministers. Indeed, Rusk was doubtful how far Foreign Ministers would get and thought that an agreement would probably only be reached over Berlin, if reached at all, when Khrushchev himself had got into the act.

3. On the Oder/Neisse line, I said that I thought it was unrealistic to suppose that the Russians would keep quiet about this and I wondered what we were then expected to say. Rusk said that he agreed and had pointed out to the Germans that this was a card of only moderate value and he felt that this value would decrease as time

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/ went on.

TOP SECRETWashington telegram No. 3190 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

went on. The Americans had reserved their position on this to a greater extent than was disclosed in the Ambassadors' Group.

4. On nuclear weapons, I asked Rusk what was meant by the phrase in the President's message that the Germans did not want to make new statements on this in the context of a Berlin negotiation. Were they not even prepared to reaffirm their policy stated in 1954? Rusk said that this was so, and again agreed with me that this was not a very realistic position, and the Americans had therefore again reserved their position.

5. On the precise status of West Berlin, I asked how the Germans had reacted to the idea of it having some degree of separate sovereignty. I gathered from his reply that he thought the Germans might in the end be moved quite far in this direction, provided they received adequate guarantees about access. But clearly they had not been at all specific. In any case both they and the Americans felt that the idea of Four-Power responsibility for a final settlement of the German question, and therefore of the Berlin question, must be retained. That is to say that though in the context of West Berlin alone the Russians might not be asked to underwrite Western occupation rights, nevertheless these rights would remain in reserve.

6. At the end of all this I said that I wondered whether a negotiating position, such as was implied by these various German statements, would have any attractions for the Russians. An arrangement which gave them nothing on the Oder/Neisse Line, nothing on nuclear weapons for Germany and invited them to improve the position on access to West Berlin, which would remain occupied by the three Western Powers, would seem so little worth having that the Russians might decide to go ahead and sign a peace treaty with the DDR followed by continuing harassment of the lines of access to West Berlin. In these circumstances it seemed to us that there might be a very real danger of the local population deciding that there was not much future for them in the city and we would find ourselves in military occupation of an empty shell. Rusk said that he was aware of our preoccupations on this score, but he did not see why we should concede anything in a situation where we had indisputable rights. We agreed in any case that this was carrying us on to rather wider ground, and we did not have time to pursue this aspect of the matter on this occasion, but I think it may have done some good to implant the thought in his mind.

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/ 7. Finally,

TOP SECRETWashington telegram No. 3190 to Foreign Office

- 3 -

7. Finally, I asked him how strongly he felt the Chancellor would press de Gaulle about negotiations because our first indications from Paris did not encourage us to feel that de Gaulle had been much impressed by the results of this week's talks. Rusk said that they had had the most categorical assurance that the Chancellor would press de Gaulle as hard as he possibly could, and they had no doubt he meant it.

Foreign Office please pass to Paris, Moscow and Bonn as my telegrams Nos. 733, 666 and 516 respectively.

[Repeated as requested].

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Private Secretary

Sir F. Rundall

Mr. Marett

Head of Central Department

Head of W.O.P.D.

Head of General Department

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Meeting held Nov 24-25
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Register *15:*

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FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

Cypher/OTP

PRISEC

23 NOV 1961
C / G

No. 8711

November 27, 1961

D. 6.35 p.m. November 27, 1961

IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET

Addressed to Washington telegram No. 8711 of November 27.

Repeated for information (Personal for Ambassadors) to:-

Paris

Moscow

Bonn

U.K.Del. N.A.T.O. (Personal for Sir P. Mason) [Immediate to all].

My immediately preceding telegram.

Following is factual account of the conversation between the Prime Minister and myself and General de Gaulle about Berlin.

While President de Gaulle was staying at Birch Grove there were three periods of talks of which two were mainly concerned with Berlin. I was present at the second of these.

2. President de Gaulle explained that France was concerned above all, and perhaps even more than her British and American Allies, to ensure that Germany was tied in to the West. France looked on Berlin as one part of this problem, and not in itself of capital importance. Chancellor Adenauer might now be ready to contemplate negotiations with the Russians about Berlin, although President de Gaulle wished to see Dr. Adenauer first before he could be sure of this, but it was doubtful whether the maximum concessions to which the Germans would agree would be enough to satisfy the Russians. In fact once negotiations with the Russians began the Allied position would inevitably be eroded. In the circumstances he saw no advantage in embarking on negotiations at the present time. Even if the Federal German Government of the day accepted the concessions which would be asked of them, the German people would be left with a sense of betrayal. Whatever the United States and the United Kingdom might do France, although not proposing to fight a war with the Russians on her own, would not be a party to such an arrangement. The Germans would then in the future feel that at least they had one friend left in the West.

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Foreign Office telegram No. 8711 to Washington

- 2 -

3. On the substance of a possible negotiating position, I indicated that a possible formula might cover:-

- (i) dealings with East Germany;
- (ii) frontiers;
- (iii) links between Berlin and the Federal Republic;
- (iv) nuclear weapons.

*For a harden
a deal*

President de Gaulle first questioned the whole basis of such an arrangement which he said involved unnecessary concessions to the Russians. He agreed that the division of Germany and the Oder-Neisse frontier were facts which could not be altered at least for the time being and about which an agreement could perhaps one day be reached with the Russians. But these facts were all more or less favourable to the Russians and there was no need to accept them unless at the same time the Russians would accept the situation in Berlin as it had existed since the War; this was a fact favourable to the West. However to raise all these questions would mean embarking on a very wide negotiation and it was inconceivable to embark on a wide negotiation in the present situation when the Russians were building their wall in Berlin, threatening to sign a peace treaty with East Germany, menacing Finland and generally behaving in aggressive way. It was quite arguable that the West might offer the Russians a wide negotiation on condition that they first changed this aggressive attitude but the West should at the same time make clear that if the Russians refused, they would not negotiate at all. In the French view the Russians had made no concessions of substance to the Western point of view in recent months and the time to negotiate had therefore not yet come.

4. We asked President de Gaulle how one could be sure what the Soviet attitude was if one was not prepared to discuss the matter with them. He replied that he would not object to further soundings of the Soviet position being carried out by British or American officials in order to verify the basis on which negotiations could begin. He accepted that such soundings would now soon get into substance. He would not be prepared for French representatives to take part in such exploratory exchanges nor

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Foreign Office telegram No. 8711 to Washington

- 3 -

would he agree publicly that these could gradually take on the character of a negotiation. He added that this procedure should not be too inconvenient for the Americans and ourselves since we were already negotiating with the Russians about nuclear tests and disarmament without French participation.

5. In reply to a question President de Gaulle agreed that the Russians could always squeeze West Berlin but he added that life in Berlin was always hazardous and was becoming more so. He did not accept the view that an agreement with the Russians would give renewed confidence to the West Berliners. He had no objection to the introduction of United Nations agencies into Berlin but the United Nations would not really affect the realities.

6. In view of the general French attitude we did not have a very detailed discussion about the possible elements in an arrangement. However, President de Gaulle did make the following points:

- (a) the D.D.R. should not be recognised in any way. All that could be recognised was the fact that one part of Germany was under the control of the Soviet Union but this was not something which the West should regard as permanent;
- (b) although the occupying Powers were on record as stating that Berlin was not a part of the Federal Republic, nevertheless it had in fact been regarded as such. For example, Dr. Adenauer was greeted in Berlin as Chancellor and Herr Brandt was leader of the German Socialist Party;
- (c) the idea of an agreement about nuclear weapons for Germany was a gratuitous present to the Russians. It was United States policy not to supply nuclear arms to other countries. But although France had no present intention of sharing nuclear knowledge with the Germans the French could not say that this would always be the case. The Russian menace was too great and

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Foreign Office telegram No. 8711 to Washington

- 4 -

the Rhine was too close to the Elbe for
France to give any such binding assurance.

7. As regards the immediate future, President de Gaulle wished to hear Dr. Adenauer's views. Meanwhile while he did not specifically object to the proposed programme of meetings in Paris next month of officials and then Foreign Ministers of the four Western Governments, he made it plain that the French representatives would not be able to make any positive contribution to the meetings and that he himself was still strongly opposed to negotiating with the Russians at this stage.

[Copies sent to Prime Minister's Office]

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11/27/61

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

Cypher/OTP

PRISEC

No. 8711

November 27, 1961

D. 6.35 p.m. November 27, 1961

IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET

Addressed to Washington telegram No. 8711 of
November 27.

Repeated for information (Personal for Ambassadors) to:-

Paris

Moscow

Bonn

U.K. Del. N.A.T.O. (Personal for Sir P. Mason)

[Immediate to all].

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Foreign Office telegram No. 8711 to Washington

- 2 -

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Foreign Office telegram No. 8711 to Washington

- 3 -

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Foreign Office telegram No. 8711 to Washington

- 4 -

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[Copies sent to Prime Minister's Office]

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14 DEC 1961

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Draft.

Record of Conversation between the
Secretary of State and Mr. Dean Rusk at
Dinner at the United States Embassy Paris
on December 10, 1961

Present:-

Secretary of State Mr. Rusk
Sir E. Shuckburgh Mr. Bruce

Berlin

I discussed with Mr. Rusk at dinner on December 10 the prospects for the forthcoming discussions in Paris on Berlin. He said that his intention was to let the French talk. He felt increasingly impatient with de Gaulle's detachment and refusal to co-operate, and he did not want to under-estimate the importance of the trouble which would ensue if this continued. The U.S. Government was (determined not to be cast into the role of the "fall guy" for the French and the Germans. In other words to be the ones who made concessions which were afterwards described as betrayals.) On the other hand, as a responsible great power, they were determined to maintain responsible contact with the Soviet Union right up to the last second before a conflict. He would have to make it clear at some point to the French Government that either they

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11 DEC 1961

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participated in this effort or the U.S. would start thinking of pulling out of Europe and the alliance would break up.

I then developed the various arguments which I thought we might use with de Gaulle in favour of negotiation and asked whether Mr. Rusk thought we should aim to get agreement ^{at} ~~on~~ a 4-Power Foreign Ministers' meeting or whether it would be better to go for the more limited objective of a continued exploration in Moscow. Mr. Rusk said that Dr. Carstens was, he understood, working on a formula under which the Russians might be asked to clarify a number of points in exploratory talks so that, when these showed progress, negotiation could take place. In reply to a ~~q~~ question he said that he understood that the French would be asked to participate in these explorations. He did not know how this would develop.

Mr. Rusk said that in their talks with Dr. Adenauer the U.S. Government had entirely reserved their position on the question of the Oder Neisse line and on the question of nuclear capability for Germany. He wished to develop to me

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BERLIN - PASSAGE FOR INSERTION IN
RECORD OF SECRETARY OF STATE'S
CONVERSATION WITH MR. DEAN RUSK AT
DINNER AT THE U.S. EMBASSY ON DEC. 10

At a later stage in the evening
Mr. Rusk said that he thought our
objective should be to work for a Foreign
Ministers' meeting, say about January 20,
in which responsibility of the French
and the Germans must be fully engaged.
I asked him whether he thought that the
Carstens' formula could possibly be
adopted without French participation. He
said he thought this would be very
dangerous. The Russians would charge
a higher price if the French were not
engaged in the negotiation. He said
that he was seeing de Gaulle on
Wednesday, December 13, and that it
might have to be a very rough
interview. He thought that the four
Foreign Ministers might have to continue
to hold meetings of their own during the
days in which NATO was meeting.

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more fully his thoughts on this latter topic. There was now a delegation of authority in the matter of the use of nuclear weapons to the President of the U.S. The U.S. Government would be prepared to look favourably at any arrangement which NATO could suggest whereby there could be a sharing of responsibility with NATO for some nuclear capability. In practice however he believed that this was impossible since no government could willingly delegate authority in a matter of this kind. The delegation of authority to the President of the U.S. was a fact, with which the other nations were presented by history and which they could not escape and therefore accepted, but he thought it would be very difficult for any plan to be worked out for the future. In any case, however, the U.S. Government would not lend themselves to any sham. For example, Herr Strauss had proposed to them that the Federal Republic should buy Polaris missiles from the U.S., put them into German submarines with German crews and with an American officer ~~x~~ holding the key of the cupboard, and then commit these submarines to NATO. This was a

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phoney and they would not contemplate it for a moment.

Continuing on this theme, Mr. Rusk said it was clear that the Germans were moving steadily towards a national nuclear capability. The activities of Herr Strauss and the industrial pressures in the Federal Republic were directed to this end. The U.S. Government opposed this development. For one thing they thought the development of a German national nuclear capability would be a shooting issue for the Russians. It must be watched very carefully. It had been noticeable that the Germans had been very unwilling to repeat their commitment not to manufacture or possess nuclear weapons. He had talked very frankly to the French Defence Minister, M. Mesmer, on this subject. He had said that if the French Government thought that a national nuclear capability would make France into a master nation they were quite mistaken. On the contrary it might give them servitude. For example, the U.S. Government could not allow one of its smaller allies to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union; this would be a direct menace to

/U.S. security

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U.S. security and he had told M. Mesmer that if the French Government contemplated having such a force they had better think of supplying themselves with inter-continental missiles directed across the Atlantic.

Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh said that there seemed some evidence of a danger that the French might be willing to co-operate with the Germans in the creation of a joint nuclear capability. General de Gaulle had made a remark in this sense at Birch Grove and Dr. Stikker, who admittedly had particular Dutch suspicions on the subject of German rearmament, told us that he had fears in this direction. Mr. Bruce said that it was certainly likely to be a temptation to the French to combine their know-how with German finance in this field.

Approved by the
Secretary of State.

[Signature]
13/11

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

STOREY'S GATE, LONDON, SW1

TOP SECRET

MM: 69/61

RESTRICTED CIRCULATION

COPY NO. 17

RECORD OF A RESTRICTED MEETING BETWEEN
THE RT. HON. HAROLD WATKINSON, M.P.,
UNITED KINGDOM MINISTER OF DEFENCE,
AND THE HON. ROBERT McNAMARA,
UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
IN LONDON, ON MONDAY 11TH DECEMBER, 1961

PRESENT

United Kingdom Representatives

The Rt. Hon.
Harold Watkinson, M.P.,
Minister of Defence.
(In the Chair)

Sir Robert Scott,
Permanent Secretary,
Ministry of Defence.

Air Marshal Sir Alfred Earle,
Deputy Chief of the
Defence Staff.

United States Representatives

The Hon. Robert McNamara,
Secretary of Defense.

Mr. Paul Nitze,
Assistant Secretary of
Defense, International
Security Affairs.

Berlin

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TOP SECRET

NATO Strategy

1. MR. MCNAMARA expressed complete agreement with the view that the present deployment of conventional forces in Germany as between Northern and Central Army Groups was out of balance and that Northern Army Group's area where the main threat lay needed strengthening. He also agreed that N.A.T.O. should aim to adopt a fully forward strategy. He was, therefore, in favour of reducing Northern Army Group's area by moving their southern boundary to the north and of reinforcing them with additional German troops to be stationed in the Hamburg/Lubeck area.

2. As regards the size of conventional forces; MR. WATKINSON suggested that these should be sufficient in size and equipment to prevent a cheap Soviet victory and also to delay the over-running of our nuclear forces for sufficient time for the position to be assessed and the decision to use nuclear weapons to be taken. Our view was that if the Russians launched a conventional attack we would sooner, rather than later, be faced with the likelihood of being overrun and that the next step would be to use the minimum number of relatively small yield nuclear weapons against essentially military targets with the object of removing any impression the Russians might have that the West were unwilling to resort to the use of nuclear weapons.

3. MR. MCNAMARA made it clear that while he did not dissent from the general views set out above, it was the United States' view that conventional forces of the order planned in MO:70; properly equipped and assisted by an air interdiction programme using conventional bombs, would be able to hold a Russian conventional attack for very much longer than Mr. Watkinson suggested. He talked in terms of weeks rather than days.

4. Discussion showed that whereas the British were thinking in terms of resisting Russian aggression the United States were much more concerned with a situation where Berlin had been isolated and the military efforts planned by LIVEO/K and the ensuing diplomatic and economic measures had failed to restore access. In such circumstances they envisaged military measures not necessarily confined to the area of the Autobahn using conventional forces as the next step.

Berlin main road called Autobahn
5. MR. WATKINSON pointed out the probability that any conventional aggression by the West could almost certainly be held and nipped off by the Russians and stressed that in no circumstances would Britain agree that the West should fire the first shot or place themselves in the position of being the aggressors. In our view the West must not, and could not, afford to be made to appear the aggressors. It was generally agreed that the action to be taken in such a situation required further study and that this could best be done in the quadripartite forum in Washington.

M.R.D.M.s

6. MR. MCNAMARA agreed with Mr. Watkinson that there was no urgency for further discussion of M.R.D.M.s. It was a problem which needed a great deal of further study, particularly on

12/11/61

DEFE 13/211 mm 69/61 Record of a Restricted Meeting Between the Rt. Hon Harold Watkinson, M.P., United Kingdom Minister of Defence, and the Hon. Robert McNamara, United States Secretary of Defense, in London, on Monday 11th December 1961
NATO Strategy

1. MR. MCNAMARA expressed complete agreement with the view that the present deployment of conventional forces in Germany as between Northern and Central Army Groups was out of balance and that Northern Army Group's area where the main threat lay needed strengthening. He also agreed that N.A.T.O. should aim to adopt a fully forward strategy. He was, therefore, in favour of reducing Northern Army Group's area by moving their southern boundary to the north and of reinforcing them with additional German troops to be stationed in the Hamburg/Lubeck area.

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5. MR. WATKINSON pointed out the probability that any conventional aggression by the West could almost certainly be held and nipped off by the Russians and stressed that in no circumstances would Britain agree that the West should fire the first shot or place themselves in the position of being the aggressors. In our view the West must not, and could not, afford to be made to appear the aggressors. It was generally agreed that the action to be taken in such a situation required further study and that this could best be done in the quadripartite forum in Washington.

M.R.B.M.s

6. MR. MCNAMARA agreed with Mr. Watkinson that there was no urgency for further discussion of M.R.B.M.s. It was a problem which needed a great deal of further study, particularly on

such points as political and psychological needs, as opposed to the purely military needs, for such weapons. At the N.A.T.O. Meeting he proposed merely to say that the United States were proceeding with research and development in connection with an M.R.B.M. against the possibility that further study might establish a requirement for such a weapon. It would, however, be several years before it could be available.

Strength of B.A.O.R. and Support Costs

7. MR. MCNAMARA said that the United States had not asked the Germans for direct help to meet the costs of the American forces stationed in Europe. They had looked for, and obtained, expanded sales of arms and payment for services, facilities and equipment which the Americans already had available in Germany surplus to their own requirements. This went far to cover their outgoings in Germany. He felt that a detailed study would show that there was considerable scope for more German purchases from the United Kingdom than were at present envisaged. He realised the difficulties we were facing in the light of our balance of payments difficulties and expressed the personal opinion, which he asked should not be quoted, that British troops were more useful where they were in other parts of the world and that they should not be removed in order to reinforce B.A.O.R. He also saw considerable value in highly trained, well equipped and mobile forces held at a high degree of readiness in the United Kingdom.

Ministry of Defence, S.W.1.
13th December, 1961

Plus de Gaulle vint (P. 2)
Le General De Gaulle

12/12/61

BT-7
COPY
Prem 11/3338

PARIS le 12 decembre 1961
PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL TELEGRAM
SERIAL No T.688 7/61

Cher Ami,

Gpy on
Gumaby
(Future of
1620)
+

Ainsi que vous le savez, j'ai vu longuement Samedi
dernier le Chancelier Adenauer. Comme nous en avions
convenu, je vous indique, des a present, les impressions
que j'ai retirees de nos entretiens.

Trade
(E.F.T.A. P. 21)

Naturellement, le Chancelier et moi-meme avons parle
de l'eventualite d'une negociation avec les Soviets sur
Berlin. A ce sujet, nous sommes tombes d'accord pour penser
qu'une telle negociation pourrait etre utile. Le Chancelier
a paru meme souhaiter qu'elle s'engageat des a present,
pourvu qu'elle fut limitee a Berlin. Il m'a semble qu'il
etait a cet egard mu principalement par le souci de tenir
compte des desirs manifestes par President Kennedy et par
vous-meme.

Vous connaissez l'opinion qui est la mienne a ce sujet,
notamment touchant l'inopportunite du moment present pour de
tels pourparlers. Je dois dire que j'en ai trouve une
confirmation dans le dernier discours de M. Krouchtchev,
qui nous a ete communique au cours meme de nos entretiens,
et dans lequel le Chef du Gouvernement sovietique affirme sans
ambiguite qu'une negociation qui s'engagerait ne pourrait
rester limitee a Berlin. En outre, pour ce qui est de
Berlin meme, il affirme de nouveau et formellement ses
exigences. Cette nouvelle indication me parait compliquer
encore les donnees de la tentative eventuelle, et je l'ai
dit au Chancelier.

Prem 11/3782

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12/19/61

TOP SECRETPRIME MINISTERBermuda

I have been thinking over what you want to get out of these talks. There is nothing very definite but the following points occur to me:-

A. Berlin.

You presumably want to ensure that President Kennedy is determined to conduct serious negotiations with the Russians soon on this, starting I imagine with an Ambassadorial probe and continuing, if necessary, with meetings at Foreign Minister or Head of Government level. I do not know whether it would be wise to say that you do not propose to go to war over Berlin; perhaps it would be better to ask the President privately whether he really believes that there is a "sticking point" beyond which nuclear war will have to be faced. Of course our public position will have to be rather tougher than the private one but it seems to me that there is a danger that the President's "double barrelled policy" may in fact be difficult to ^{maintain} ascertain (because of the expense and political complications of keeping reservists with the colours) and somewhat dangerous (in that a military build up on our side will encourage the Russians to be more belligerent).

It might also be worth asking the President whether he thinks there are any proposals for "thinning out" or inspection which might be of real advantage to the West and could be used in a negotiation. Or does he perhaps now think that any such plans will alarm the Germans so much

typical
appearance
of philosophy

extract
p. 2 memo

B.M.(G) 10 11 160000
BERMUDA MEETING, 1961

Register

RECORD OF A MEETING HELD IN GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
BERMUDA ON WEDNESDAY, 21st DECEMBER, 1961 at 4.00 P.M.

Present:

UNITED KINGDOM

The Rt. Hon. Harold Macmillan, M.P.
The Rt. Hon. The Earl of Home
The Rt. Hon. Sir David Gromby-Gore
The Rt. Hon. Sir Norman Brook
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh
Mr. A.C.J. Samuel

UNITED STATES

President Kennedy
Mr. Dean Rusk
Mr. David Bruce
Mr. McP. Bundy
Mr. Charles Bohlen
Mr. William T. Tierney

28 DEC 1961

SECRET

BERLIN

CC 1071/636

President Kennedy said that it was his intention that the United States Ambassador in Moscow (Mr. Thompson) should see Mr. Gromyko between Christmas and the New Year and begin the soundings designed to ascertain whether there was a basis for negotiation on the Berlin question. The President handed round a draft of the instructions to be sent to Mr. Thompson for this purpose.

Mr. Rusk said that all the N.A.T.O. countries except France were anxious for us to go ahead with this probe and even the French had acquiesced in it. Lord Home added that the French were even willing for the probe to go some way into questions of substance. Mr. Rusk made it clear that the draft instructions to Mr. Thompson were for the first talk only and therefore did not go into substance. We should have to consider on what basis we wanted to approach the substance of the matter and, secondly, what procedures we proposed to use in order to get negotiations going. He himself thought that the next stage might be a meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers. He feared that unless we pushed hard both on substance and on procedure little progress would be made.

President Kennedy asked whether any additions could be made to the draft instructions for Mr. Thompson's first talk with Mr. Gromyko. Lord Home said that he assumed that the Ambassador would first ask Mr. Gromyko what his ideas were on access to Berlin and would then himself put forward the

suggestion that there might be an international highway or an international authority over the autobahn. He might add that he knew that there were other matters in which the Soviet Government were interested and that he was prepared to talk about them as well.

President Kennedy asked whether it would be wise to suggest that any international highway should be international not only in East German territory but also for an equal distance into the Federal Republic. Lord Home replied that he doubted whether the idea of an international highway was likely to be acceptable.

Lord Home said that on the substance of the matter there were four points on which we might have to make some concession if a settlement was to be secured: first, some de facto recognition of the D.D.R.; second, recognition of the Oder/Neisse line; third, our occupation rights; and fourth, the links between West Berlin and the Federal Republic. So far as occupation rights were concerned, we obviously could not give them up but we might have to find a way of converting them into something else or superimposing something else on them. We might be able to present our position in West Berlin as that of trustees for the people of the city. In addition, we might strengthen our position by proving (by a plebiscite or otherwise) that we were in West Berlin by consent of its people.

Mr. Rusk said that the Soviet Government were always talking about recognising the facts of the situation. There were facts in our position too. It was a fact that we were in West Berlin and that we had access to it. They should be asked to recognise these facts just as we were willing to recognise that they were in East Berlin and in East Germany and that we had no intention of trying to force them out.

President Kennedy said that if we did find a way of converting our occupation rights into a trusteeship we could not agree that this should be limited in time or that it gave the

Soviet Government equal rights with us in West Berlin. They should not, for instance, be given a right to put their troops into West Berlin. Mr. Rusk said that there might be some possibility of keeping our occupation rights in the background while not departing from our claim that they were the basis of our presence, and the Russians might agree to the fact of our rights without raising the question of their origin. He thought that the Germans disliked the idea of bringing the question of frontiers into a negotiation that was confined to Berlin. They would be more likely to consider a concession on this point in the framework of an all-German settlement. There were a number of formulas for dealing with the Oder/Neisse line, one of which was to say that we would accept it as the Western frontier of Poland. Lord Home said that another was to say that we would recognize it as the eastern frontier of a united Germany. President Kennedy said that what the Russians wanted was a firm status for East Germany: he doubted whether they would be satisfied with formulas of this kind about the Oder/Neisse line: they were also interested in the demarcation line between East and West Germany. Lord Home said that Dr. Stikker had told him that Dr. Adenauer had said that he himself was willing to accept the Oder/Neisse line but that he could not say so in public. Mr. Rusk said that this was one of the few cards that the Germans had to play in their bid for an all-German settlement and they were anxious not to waste it.

In reply to a question by Mr. Macmillan Mr. Bohlen said that he thought the Russians would be very tough at first and it might seem that there was in fact no basis for negotiations. This was likely to confirm the French in their intransigence. Mr. Rusk said that the probe was aimed at the Russians and not at the French. We should try to find a modus vivendi which would preserve our rights without a war.

Lord Home asked when we could begin to reveal to

the Russians the elements of a deal, Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh thought that there should be a series of talks without commitment in which we would air our ideas about access, about how far we could go towards recognition of the D.D.R., what we could accept and what we could not. We should hope to elicit replies from the Soviet Government and in this way a pattern of views would be built up out of which we might be able to identify the elements of an agreement. Mr. Rusk agreed with this.

Discussion then turned on the question whether Thompson should conduct the probe alone or whether the other Western Ambassadors could help. Lord Home thought that Mr. Thompson should have whatever help he thought best. Sir Frank Roberts would be available and it was unlikely that Herr Kroll would be inactive. President Kennedy thought that, while Mr. Thompson might conduct the early talks, it would be difficult for him to go on alone as the substance of the matter was approached. This would give the Germans the opportunity to make difficulties. Mr. Bohlen thought that so long as Mr. Thompson operated within the framework of the working paper agreed by the four Powers, the Germans were unlikely to make difficulties, but Mr. Bundy remarked that Lord Home's four points were just the points which were not agreed by the four Powers.

Mr. Bohlen thought that if it came to a meeting of Foreign Ministers, the Germans might not want to take part and Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh suggested that a Foreign Ministers' meeting must be tripartite on the Western side, because if we had the West Germans with us the Russians would bring in the East Germans.

Lord Home said that Mr. Thompson would begin the probe by raising the subject of access. This would permit Mr. Gromyko to talk about recognising the sovereignty of the D.D.R. At this point Mr. Thompson might consult Sir Frank Roberts

and Herr Kroll to see whether an agreed formula could be found in reply to this. Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh did not think that agreement would be found on formulae for each separate element: the points in the four-Power working paper which were not agreed would never in fact be agreed in advance of formal negotiations.

President Kennedy then asked which would be the best, one Ambassador conducting the probe or a Foreign Ministers' conference which would include the Germans. Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh thought that the first step should be for Mr. Thompson to take the lead in the probe with Sir Frank Roberts and Herr Kroll helping where they could. Mr. Bohlen observed that the Germans' insistence on a narrow negotiation about Berlin alone meant that they would not be able to take part in negotiations with the Russians since they had no locus standi to discuss Berlin with the Russians.

Mr. Ruok said that in Paris he had got the impression from the Quai d'Orsay that French officials would like the Ambassadorial Group to continue so that the French could continue to play a part in this matter. He was anxious not to give the French and the Germans a chance of complaining that the whole thing was being conducted by the Anglo-Saxons nor did the United States want to carry alone an undefined responsibility.

Lord Home thought that the Germans really did want to get negotiations going. The Foreign Minister, Herr Schroeder, had expressed to him in Paris his fears that if things dragged on West Berlin might die.

Discussion then turned to the question whether Mr. Thompson should hold out to the Russians the prospect that, if the probe showed that there was a basis for negotiations, we would proceed to more formal negotiations, first at the level of deputy Foreign Ministers and then of Foreign Ministers.

Mr. Ruok said that he did not believe that a settlement could be achieved at a level lower than that of Foreign *ministers*

*Full
Guy*

or possibly even of Heads of Governments.

Mr. Macmillan said that we should be clear about our objective. If we wanted an agreement there must be a conference or a negotiation. The situation at present was dangerous. There was anxiety and tension. And yet we could see that there was a basis for a settlement. All were agreed in principle that Germany must ultimately be united, though some of us were not enthusiastic at the prospect. Even the Russians would probably accept that one day there would be a united Germany. Meanwhile we must make a practical agreement. This must be based on facts. First, it was a fact that East Germany existed. Its existence could therefore be recognised. In practice the Federal Republic accepted that East Germany existed and conducted large-scale trade with it. The Federal Republic already recognised the existence of East Germany and dealt with it as a fact. Second, it was a fact that we were in West Berlin and intended to stay there. We might be able to find a new formula to convert our occupation rights into a trust, but this trust would of course derive from our occupation rights: the Russians must accept this. Third, since we were in West Berlin we had to go in and out. The Russians themselves must guarantee our military access which was only 5 per cent of the traffic and they must arrange with the D.D.R. that the civilian traffic also continued as it was. Fourth in return for our acceptance of the Oder/Neisse line, the Russians must accept that one day there would be a reunited Germany.

But for the Germans and the French, we should go in and try to make a deal with the Russians on these lines at once. Instead we were starting a probe. What was the purpose of this probe? Was it intended that the probe should lead to a four Power conference? If so, it might take the form of five or six conversations which would be in the nature of preparation before the principals met. He was afraid that, if that was not made clear, the Russians would not be impressed by what Mr. Thompson

had to say and things would drift. The Russians would be the gainers from this drift. The Western Alliance would be more and more difficult to hold together; tension would increase and economic strain would become hard to bear. It was to our ^{benefit} advantage to bring this to a head.

In reply to a question from President Kennedy, Lord Home said that he thought the Germans were keen to have negotiations but were nervous about what a settlement would entail. They would have no locus standi in a negotiation confined to Berlin but Herr Kroll could help with the probe. Mr. Thompson could say to Mr. Gromyko that he would like to have a series of conversations to see whether it would be possible to get a formal conference. Mr. Macmillan agreed with this. The object of the probe would be to ensure that a subsequent conference was a success. Mr. Bohlen said it should be put to the Russians that there could be a conference only if the probe showed that there was a prospect of success. It would be better not to begin by saying that we wanted a conference. If we did, the Russians would give nothing away during the probe but would simply await the conference.

President Kennedy asked whether it would be possible to have a conference without the French. Mr. Rusk thought that if the British and the Americans and the Germans agreed that there was a basis for negotiation at a meeting of Foreign Ministers, the French would not stay out. In answer to Lord Home's question whether it would be possible to make an agreement on Berlin without the French, Sir David Ormsby-Gore and Mr. Bohlen pointed out that it was the British and the Americans who gave the French their rights in Berlin: the original agreement with the Russians had been made by the British and the Americans only and the French sector had come out of those allotted to the British and the Americans.

Mr. Macmillan asked what would happen if there was no conference. Lord Home replied that the next move would be

up to the Russians: they would have to decide whether to sign a separate peace treaty and hand over the control of access to West Berlin to the East Germans with all the possibilities that Herr Ulbricht might create a conflict. Mr. Rusk said that the trouble was that the East Germans might not create a conflict but might nibble away at West Berlin. The inhabitants would then start moving out.

President Kennedy asked what would happen if, after the probe had taken place, the French still maintained that there was no basis for negotiations. We should have to decide whether to move on to a Foreign Ministers' conference even if there had been no improvements at the lower level. He was inclined to think that this might be necessary. He had been struck by the fact that it was only after talking personally to Dr. Adenauer that he had realised that the German Chancellor was so keen on negotiations. These things did not become clear if we dealt with people at arm's length. As one of the main difficulties would be over recognition of the D.D.R., in which we could go only so far as the Germans would agree, the problem might have to be dealt with round a table. He agreed that we should make clear to the Russians that, although we were anxious for negotiations, they could not be held unless and until there was some promise of success. The Russians knew that we had difficulties with the French over this and there would be no point in concealing it.

It was then agreed that Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh and Mr. Bohlen would examine the draft instructions. Mr. Thompson with a view to making it clear in them that we were working towards a conference but that this must depend on whether the probe showed that there was any chance of success. They would also consider whether these instructions should be shown to the Germans and the French. Mr. Rusk's original idea had been that the general line should be cleared with the Germans and that the French should be offered a sight of them if they wished. There was, however, some doubt whether it would be politic to let the

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French know that the instructions were specifically aimed at achieving a four Power conference. Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh and Mr. Bohlen would consider whether this point should be put separately to Mr. Thompson. They would also consider whether it would be possible for Mr. Thompson's first contact with Mr. Gromyko to take place so early as the President had at first suggested. They would also look at the draft of a reply which Mr. Macmillan might send to Mr. Khrushchev's latest letter and would consider whether such a reply could usefully supplement the soundings which Mr. Thompson would be making in Moscow.

Prem 11/3782

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TOP SECRET-ATOMIC

RECORD OF A MEETING HELD IN GOVERNMENT HOUSE, BERMUDA,
ON THURSDAY, 21st DECEMBER, 1961, AT 5.15 p.m.

Present:

UNITED KINGDOM

The Right Hon. Harold Macmillan,
M.P.
The Right Hon. The Earl of Home
Sir William Penney
Mr. P. F. de Zulueta

UNITED STATES

President Kennedy
Mr. Dean Rusk
Mr. McG. Bundy
Mr. Glenn Seaborg
Dr. Harold Brown

Nuclear Tests

At Mr. Macmillan's request *Sir William Penney* gave an appreciation of the present position regarding nuclear tests. The vital question was whether it was possible for the Soviet Union in 5 or 10 years both to have a defence against missiles and at the same time to maintain their ability to devastate the United States. The answer to this question would depend on the balance between systems of missiles and of anti-missiles. It seemed clear that the Soviet Union and the United States were now approximately in nuclear balance. The United States had a technical advantage in the smaller missiles from a quarter to one megaton in explosive power and weighing between 200 and 600 lb. Such weapons seemed an essential part of any anti-missile system. The United States and the Soviet Union had reached practically the same stage in the range from two to five megatons. From 25 to 100 megatons, however, the Russians were superior if only because they had conducted tests in this range.

Some of the recent Soviet tests had been sophisticated, involving high altitude nuclear explosions and several missiles in the air at once; and the site of some of these particular tests had already been reported by intelligence sources as being the centre of an anti-missile experimental station. This development gave grounds for apprehension. It was true that, if a standstill in development now took place, the advantage would be with the West; but it was difficult to see how either the United States or the Soviet Union could avoid attempting to establish an anti-missile system. Although such a system would be highly complicated and might indeed seem impossible, it would be foolish to assume that it could not be achieved, given the enormous resources which the Soviet Union and the United States could devote to it. If the West did no more tests, the Russians might do another series in two or three years' time or even sooner, and then the United States would risk being two or three years behind. It was necessary to decide whether this risk of giving the Russians a start in anti-missile defence was acceptable. If the American technicians were now told definitely that tests would be made or were at least told to prepare against the possibility of holding them, the position in the laboratories would be tenable; but if the technicians were told that there would be no more tests then three or four years might be lost for the impetus of their work would inevitably decline.

The purpose of the Soviet 100-megaton test was debatable. No doubt the Russians had made it partly because they had suitable rockets under development. Secondly Mr. Khrushchev probably wanted to threaten the world. There was however a possible third motive. There could be military advantage in making an explosion something like 25 miles above the earth which would burn up an area below about 25 miles in radius. Polaris and Minuteman were designed to be exploded something like 6 miles away from the earth. With a 100 megaton weapon exploded 25 miles away the problem of an anti-missile defence system would be much more difficult to solve.

President Kennedy asked whether the United States ought to develop 100-megaton weapons. *Dr. Seaborg* said that this was a problem which ought to be faced. None of the tests now proposed was aimed at this objective. A decision to make this enormous bomb might have to be taken but it would be a grave decision. Certainly it seemed that the Soviet test of the 100-megaton bomb had a military value. All the tests at present proposed were particularly concerned with anti-missile systems, whether considered offensively or defensively. *Sir William Penney*

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suggested that in fact the West could build a 100-megaton weapon without further tests but at some sacrifice in weight efficiency. The Soviet missile had probably weighed about 10 to 12 tons.

Mr. Macmillan said that the difficulty with an anti-missile defence was that to be really valuable it had to be at least 90 per cent. efficient and of course the question of decoys had to be considered. In trying to develop such a defence system thousands of millions of dollars would be spent and even then the result would be in doubt. If the defence was unsuccessful, whole countries could quite easily be devastated. It was clear that the West would be justified in making further tests in view of what the Russians had done. But he did not feel that such a response would measure up to the level of events. Another problem was that although in 25 years perhaps only the United States and the Soviet Union would be able to produce the sophisticated types of nuclear weapons, many other countries by then would have acquired relatively unsophisticated nuclear armaments. He wondered whether the West, faced with this situation, should not combine with their attempt to settle the Berlin problem some new effort to end the nuclear arms race. It was terrifying and wrong that such vast resources should be devoted to these weapons of destruction. Each side was making this effort because it was frightened of the other. Two years ago it had seemed possible that a nuclear tests agreement could be concluded in Geneva. Unfortunately the "big hole" theory had been developed and underground tests had assumed great importance. Now it seemed that underground tests were not really vital and it was worth considering what loss there would be to the West if, in spite of an agreement, underground tests did continue. It was of course quite possible to decide now that Western tests would continue in Christmas Island or elsewhere. But the Western countries should consider the alternative of discussing the situation frankly with the Russians, with a view to stopping the nuclear arms race. Even if such an effort failed and the West lost a few months, they would gain a better moral position.

The present position seemed to be that the United States would like to make various types of test, all related in different ways to the possibility of an anti-missile system. There were certain high-altitude tests which would be useful for judging the effects on radar systems and communications generally, and for these Christmas Island was unsuitable. Secondly, there were tests of existing war-heads designed to reduce weight and so to allow counter-measure devices to be added. Then there were tests of various types of advanced designs, also with the object of reducing weight. For example, a one megaton explosion could perhaps be produced in a missile weighing as little as 400 lb. or less instead of the present 650 lb. Barge shots should be avoided because of the dangers of fall-out. It would take about three months to prepare such tests. Perhaps it would be right to make such preparations, but also to make simultaneously a new effort to bring the nuclear arms race to an end before actually conducting tests. Such an effort might lead to a return to the atmosphere of *détente* which had existed before the failure of the 1960 Summit meeting. The only alternative seemed to be an endless series of competitive developments in the nuclear field.

President Kennedy asked why the Soviet Union had resumed tests. *Sir William Penney* suggested that Russian military thinking had changed and they had become convinced of the overwhelming importance of nuclear weapons. *President Kennedy* asked why the Russians should be more prepared to make a genuine agreement at this time than they had been in the spring of 1961. *Dr. Brown* suggested that the reason for the reversal of the Soviet attitude towards a *détente* after the U-2 incident had been the sudden realisation of the amount of knowledge which the U-2 flights had brought to the West. Before that, the Soviet Government had relied on their more efficient security to assure secrecy for their weapon system and to conceal any nuclear inferiority. The U-2 incident had shown that defence by concealment was no longer possible and the Russians had decided that they had to develop new weapons.

Mr. Macmillan said that he could see no end to this competition. *Mr. Rusk* said that precisely because of the enormous difficulty of developing an anti-missile system it might be right to concentrate on the relatively less difficult problem of finding a political solution. *President Kennedy* suggested that in two or three years' time the age of nuclear power would have passed because the possibilities of devastation would be so equal that neither side would be prepared to use nuclear weapons. *Mr. Macmillan* said that another paradox was that, because of their

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concentration on nuclear power, the Great Powers were now unable to deal with acts of lawlessness by smaller countries. It was true that the Russians were theoretically committed to producing world revolution and did try to organise subversion but at the same time the Soviet system was evolving and the Russians were still orientated towards Europe. Their economic structure was of course different from that of the capitalist countries, but the differences were not as fundamental as they seemed and the Soviet people were beginning to become more bourgeois. The problem was how to get through the next 20 or 30 years. Was it not possible, without giving in to the Russians, to gain time to allow the natural human instincts of the Russian people to re-assert themselves. The present moment was crucial and perhaps presented a final opportunity of extricating the world from an increasingly dangerous situation. *Lord Home* suggested that the ideas which the Prime Minister had been outlining fitted in with the latest thinking on disarmament. It looked as though the views of the United States and the Soviet Union on this subject were closer together than they had been. Agreement had at least been reached on the composition of the Commission of Eighteen. When this body met it was conceivable that some measure of agreement could be reached, not over the whole range of disarmament, but at least in some limited fields. *Dr. Seaborg* said that it was becoming increasingly clear that the negotiations for a ban on nuclear tests would become more closely linked with the general disarmament discussions. *Lord Home* agreed that when the Eighteen met the problem of tests would inevitably become linked with that of general disarmament. Perhaps it would be possible to make the meeting of the Eighteen the occasion for a campaign to stop the arms race. An agreement might perhaps be reached between the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union not to use the meeting of the Eighteen as the occasion for propaganda speeches but for a genuine practical effort to get agreement. The nuclear arms race must be stopped.

President Kennedy said that the difficulty was that it was now clear that the Russians had used the last period of the Geneva Conference to prepare for their latest series of nuclear tests. He did not see how it was possible to be sure that this would not happen again. He did not wish to resume nuclear tests, but he felt that resumption would be inevitable in about four months' time unless before then some considerable change had occurred in the political situation, for example because of an agreement about Germany and Berlin. At the moment the Soviet Union and the West were roughly equal in nuclear weapons, but he did not wish to engage in long discussions with the Russians which would lead to no agreement and would end, perhaps in 1964 or 1965, in a renewed series of Soviet tests which might then put the Soviet Union ahead. It would be absurd for the West to be caught a second time in this way. *Mr. Macmillan* said that, if all nuclear weapons at present in existence were discharged, the Soviet Union, Western Europe and most of the United States would be devastated. When he had suggested to *Mr. Khrushchev* during his visit to Moscow that a nuclear war would result in the destruction of all mankind, *Khrushchev* had replied that some Chinese and Africans would be left and he had not seemed to relish the prospect. Perhaps, therefore, it might be possible to persuade the Russians to reach agreement both on Berlin and on disarmament by presenting them as different but related aspects of the problem of preserving peace.

President Kennedy repeated that he did not wish to resume tests but felt that it would be essential to do so unless the political situation changed. *Dr. Seaborg* said that the United States laboratories could not be kept working for another one or two years without further tests. *President Kennedy* said that he was at least clear that the only object of tests now was to see if the development of an anti-missile system was possible. *Mr. Macmillan* agreed and suggested that there was a large element of bluff in the position of both sides. *Lord Home* asked what political counterweight could be offered to public opinion to offset the disquieting effect of further nuclear tests. He felt that this must take the form of some public act in the field of disarmament. *President Kennedy* said that it was difficult to see how this could be arranged in time. The Committee of Eighteen met in April. There was no chance of making a very specific proposal so soon as that. He did not see why the Soviet Union should agree to accept now what they had previously rejected or only feigned to accept. He felt that there were three questions for decision. The first was whether the West should now make preparations to conduct a further programme of atmospheric tests unless some major change occurred in the political situation. Secondly, whether the West should concurrently take

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some initiative in the field of disarmament. Thirdly, whether the United Kingdom would join with the United States in preparing for, and if necessary making, atmospheric tests and whether they would make the facilities at Christmas Island available for the purpose; or whether the United States should go ahead on its own. Mr. Macmillan agreed that these were the questions at issue. He would like to reflect upon them and resume the discussion at a further meeting on the following day.

Bermuda,

21st December, 1961.

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RECORD OF A MEETING HELD IN GOVERNMENT HOUSE, BERMUDA,
ON THURSDAY, 21st DECEMBER, 1961, AT 5.15 p.m.

Present:

UNITED KINGDOM

The Right Hon. Harold Macmillan,
M.P.

The Right Hon. The Earl of Home

Sir William Penney

Mr. P. F. de Zulueta

UNITED STATES

President Kennedy

Mr. Dean Rusk

Mr. McG. Bundy

Mr. Glenn Seaborg

Dr. Harold Brown

Nuclear Tests

At Mr. Macmillan's request *Sir William Penney* gave an appreciation of the present position regarding nuclear tests. The vital question was whether it was possible for the Soviet Union in 5 or 10 years both to have a defence against missiles and at the same time to maintain their ability to devastate the United States. The answer to this question would depend on the balance between systems of missiles and of anti-missiles. It seemed clear that the Soviet Union and the United States were now approximately in nuclear balance. The United States had a technical advantage in the smaller missiles from a quarter to one megaton in explosive power and weighing between 200 and 600 lb. Such weapons seemed an essential part of any anti-missile system. The United States and the Soviet Union had reached practically the same stage in the range from two to five megatons. From 25 to 100 megatons, however, the Russians were superior if only because they had conducted tests in this range.

Some of the recent Soviet tests had been sophisticated, involving high altitude nuclear explosions and several missiles in the air at once; and the site of some of these particular tests had already been reported by intelligence sources as being the centre of an anti-missile experimental station. This development gave grounds for apprehension. It was true that, if a standstill in development now took place, the advantage would be with the West; but it was difficult to see how either the United States or the Soviet Union could avoid attempting to establish an anti-missile system. Although such a system would be highly complicated and might indeed seem impossible, it would be foolish to assume that it could not be achieved, given the enormous resources which the Soviet Union and the United States could devote to it. If the West did no more tests, the Russians might do another series in two or three years' time or even sooner, and then the United States would risk being two or three years behind. It was necessary to decide whether this risk of giving the Russians a start in anti-missile defence was acceptable. If the American technicians were now told definitely that tests would be made or were at least told to prepare against the possibility of holding them, the position in the laboratories would be tenable; but if the technicians were told that there would be no more tests then three or four years might be lost for the impetus of their work would inevitably decline.

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President Kennedy asked whether the United States ought to develop 100-megaton weapons. *Dr. Seaborg* said that this was a problem which ought to be faced. None of the tests now proposed was aimed at this objective. A decision to make this enormous bomb might have to be taken but it would be a grave decision. Certainly it seemed that the Soviet test of the 100-megaton bomb had a military value. All the tests at present proposed were particularly concerned with anti-missile systems, whether considered offensively or defensively. *Sir William Penney*

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suggested that in fact the West could build a 100-megaton weapon without further tests but at some sacrifice in weight efficiency. The Soviet missile had probably weighed about 10 to 12 tons.

Mr. Macmillan said that the difficulty with an anti-missile defence was that to be really valuable it had to be at least 90 per cent. efficient and of course the question of decoys had to be considered. In trying to develop such a defence system thousands of millions of dollars would be spent and even then the result would be in doubt. If the defence was unsuccessful, whole countries could quite easily be devastated. It was clear that the West would be justified in making further tests in view of what the Russians had done. But he did not feel that such a response would measure up to the level of events. Another problem was that although in 25 years perhaps only the United States and the Soviet Union would be able to produce the sophisticated types of nuclear weapons, many other countries by then would have acquired relatively unsophisticated nuclear armaments. He wondered whether the West, faced with this situation, should not combine with their attempt to settle the Berlin problem some new effort to end the nuclear arms race. It was terrifying and wrong that such vast resources should be devoted to these weapons of destruction. Each side was making this effort because it was frightened of the other. Two years ago it had seemed possible that a nuclear tests agreement could be concluded in Geneva. Unfortunately the "big hole" theory had been developed and underground tests had assumed great importance. Now it seemed that underground tests were not really vital and it was worth considering what loss there would be to the West if, in spite of an agreement, underground tests did continue. It was of course quite possible to decide now that Western tests would continue in Christmas Island or elsewhere. But the Western countries should consider the alternative of discussing the situation frankly with the Russians, with a view to stopping the nuclear arms race. Even if such an effort failed and the West lost a few months, they would gain a better moral position.

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Mr. Macmillan said that he could see no end to this competition. *Mr. Rusk* said that precisely because of the enormous difficulty of developing an anti-missile system it might be right to concentrate on the relatively less difficult problem of finding a political solution. *President Kennedy* suggested that in two or three years' time the age of nuclear power would have passed because the possibilities of devastation would be so equal that neither side would be prepared to use nuclear weapons. *Mr. Macmillan* said that another paradox was that, because of their

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concentration on nuclear power, the Great Powers were now unable to deal with acts of lawlessness by smaller countries. It was true that the Russians were theoretically committed to producing world revolution and did try to organise subversion but at the same time the Soviet system was evolving and the Russians were still orientated towards Europe. Their economic structure was of course different from that of the capitalist countries, but the differences were not as fundamental as they seemed and the Soviet people were beginning to become more bourgeois. The problem was how to get through the next 20 or 30 years. Was it not possible, without giving in to the Russians, to gain time to allow the natural human instincts of the Russian people to re-assert themselves. The present moment was crucial and perhaps presented a final opportunity of extricating the world from an increasingly dangerous situation. *Lord Home* suggested that the ideas which the Prime Minister had been outlining fitted in with the latest thinking on disarmament. It looked as though the views of the United States and the Soviet Union on this subject were closer together than they had been. Agreement had at least been reached on the composition of the Commission of Eighteen. When this body met it was conceivable that some measure of agreement could be reached, not over the whole range of disarmament, but at least in some limited fields. *Dr. Seaborg* said that it was becoming increasingly clear that the negotiations for a ban on nuclear tests would become more closely linked with the general disarmament discussions. *Lord Home* agreed that when the Eighteen met the problem of tests would inevitably become linked with that of general disarmament. Perhaps it would be possible to make the meeting of the Eighteen the occasion for a campaign to stop the arms race. An agreement might perhaps be reached between the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union not to use the meeting of the Eighteen as the occasion for propaganda speeches but for a genuine practical effort to get agreement. The nuclear arms race must be stopped.

President Kennedy said that the difficulty was that it was now clear that the Russians had used the last period of the Geneva Conference to prepare for their latest series of nuclear tests. He did not see how it was possible to be sure that this would not happen again. He did not wish to resume nuclear tests, but he felt that resumption would be inevitable in about four months' time unless before then some considerable change had occurred in the political situation, for example because of an agreement about Germany and Berlin. At the moment the Soviet Union and the West were roughly equal in nuclear weapons, but he did not wish to engage in long discussions with the Russians which would lead to no agreement and would end, perhaps in 1964 or 1965, in a renewed series of Soviet tests which might then put the Soviet Union ahead. It would be absurd for the West to be caught a second time in this way. *Mr. Macmillan* said that, if all nuclear weapons at present in existence were discharged, the Soviet Union, Western Europe and most of the United States would be devastated. When he had suggested to *Mr. Khrushchev* during his visit to Moscow that a nuclear war would result in the destruction of all mankind, *Khrushchev* had replied that some Chinese and Africans would be left and he had not seemed to relish the prospect. Perhaps, therefore, it might be possible to persuade the Russians to reach agreement both on Berlin and on disarmament by presenting them as different but related aspects of the problem of preserving peace.

President Kennedy repeated that he did not wish to resume tests but felt that it would be essential to do so unless the political situation changed. *Dr. Seaborg* said that the United States laboratories could not be kept working for another one or two years without further tests. *President Kennedy* said that he was at least clear that the only object of tests now was to see if the development of an anti-missile system was possible. *Mr. Macmillan* agreed and suggested that there was a large element of bluff in the position of both sides. *Lord Home* asked what political counterweight could be offered to public opinion to offset the disquieting effect of further nuclear tests. He felt that this must take the form of some public act in the field of disarmament. *President Kennedy* said that it was difficult to see how this could be arranged in time. The Committee of Eighteen met in April. There was no chance of making a very specific proposal so soon as that. He did not see why the Soviet Union should agree to accept now what they had previously rejected or only feigned to accept. He felt that there were three questions for decision. The first was whether the West should now make preparations to conduct a further programme of atmospheric tests unless some major change occurred in the political situation. Secondly, whether the West should concurrently take

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 some initiative in the field of disarmament. Thirdly, whether the United Kingdom would join with the United States in preparing for, and if necessary making, atmospheric tests and whether they would make the facilities at Christmas Island available for the purpose; or whether the United States should go ahead on its own. Mr. Macmillan agreed that these were the questions at issue. He would like to reflect upon them and resume the discussion at a further meeting on the following day.

Bermuda,

21st December, 1961.

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RECORD OF A MEETING HELD IN GOVERNMENT HOUSE, BERMUDA,
ON FRIDAY, 22nd DECEMBER, 1961, AT 10.30 a.m.

Present:

UNITED KINGDOM

The Right Hon. Harold Macmillan,
M.P.
The Right Hon. The Earl of Home
The Right Hon. Sir David Ormsby
Gore
The Right Hon. Sir Norman Brook
Sir William Penney
Mr. P. F. de Zulueta

UNITED STATES

President Kennedy
Mr. Dean Rusk
Mr. David Bruce
Mr. McG. Bundy
Mr. Charles Bohlen
Dr. Glenn Seaborg
Dr. Harold Brown

Nuclear Tests

Mr. Macmillan asked if *Dr. Seaborg* could explain again the importance of underground tests. *Dr. Seaborg* said that these were important for testing smaller weapons. The limit seemed at the moment to be about 20 bilotons. On the whole underground testing had proved more difficult than had been expected. *Mr. Macmillan* asked if it was possible to detect underground tests. This had been the great problem two or three years before when the Russians had been less advanced than the West. At that time there had seemed to be a possibility of reaching agreement to end tests. He had been interested in the theory which *Dr. Harold Brown* had put forward to the effect that the U-2 incident had made the Russians realise with alarm that they could not rely on concealment to protect their fixed emplacements in future. The question was how to stop tests in the present situation. As he understood the position, even though underground tests could not be detected, the advantage to be gained from them in the next phase would not be crucial because anti-missile tests had to be conducted in the atmosphere. He felt that the next two or three months might perhaps be the last moment at which it would be possible to put an end to the nuclear arms race. He would himself like to make one more major effort. He would have to consult his Cabinet colleagues about the resumption of Western nuclear tests and the use of Christmas Island for this purpose. He was certainly prepared to recommend this course if it was essential to maintain the nuclear balance. But he would like also to embark on an attempt to check the sterile escalation of nuclear weapons. He felt that the Western Governments ought to satisfy themselves beyond all doubt that this arms race was inevitable. He then read out the text of a possible declaration by President Kennedy and himself (Annex A). He explained that this was only a tentative draft. It might be worth putting off making tests for, say, a year, in order to put the West in a better moral position.

President Kennedy said that he felt that the West should now make preparations to test and carry out tests after some date in the late spring unless there had been a change in the political situation before then. He did not see advantage in waiting for a year; he doubted whether the moral position would be any better at the end of that time. He could not see why the Russians should agree in a year to what they would not accept at the moment. *Sir David Ormsby Gore* said that, if a year's delay was too long, six months might perhaps be accepted. *President Kennedy* asked if some new initiative on disarmament could be agreed upon and taken within that time. He doubted whether any detailed plan could be devised at such short notice, and the Russians would have the opportunity of spinning out negotiations indefinitely while preparing tests themselves. *Mr. Macmillan* said that it would always be possible for the Russians to make secret preparations but this was an argument against having any agreement with them at all. *President Kennedy* agreed that some risk of the Russians making secret test preparations would have to be accepted if there was a political agreement to suspend tests. *Sir David Ormsby Gore* asked if it was true that from some points of view the United States scientists would prefer tests to be held later than April 1962. *Dr. Seaborg* said that if it was known by then that the

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next series of tests would be the last which could be held in the atmosphere and that they definitely would be held, he would prefer that the tests should be postponed until the middle of 1962. *Mr. Macmillan* suggested that the positions of the West and the Soviet bloc on disarmament were closer together than they had been and that some agreement might now be possible. In any case the fact of taking an initiative with the Russians might offset the disheartening effect of an announcement that preparations were to be made for resuming tests.

President Kennedy said that he hoped it would be possible to decide that the facilities on Christmas Island could be used if it were decided to resume testing. No final decision to resume tests need be taken until the spring. However, if it were now agreed to make preparations for tests on Christmas Island, he would like to know whether the United Kingdom Government would wish to be associated with a final decision to undertake a further series of tests or whether they would be content to leave this decision to be taken by the United States Government. *Mr. Macmillan* said that wherever American nuclear tests were carried out the United Kingdom would be involved. The United Kingdom Government would have to decide whether to stand with the United States. That was why he was so anxious that any announcement should be not a threat but a hope for the future. *President Kennedy* said that it was very important not to use words in any declaration which might prove dangerous in the future. *Mr. Macmillan* said that his idea was that it might be possible to summon *Mr. Khrushchev* to a meeting about disarmament and then perhaps to hold a meeting of the Eighteen Nations as a high-level conference perhaps in some place like Geneva. *President Kennedy* feared that once such a meeting had begun, *Mr. Khrushchev* would be able to use it for the purpose of delaying any Western tests. *Mr. Rusk* said that it was very important not to use words which suggested that the West were starting a new series of tests. In fact the Russians by their last tests had begun a new round. *Mr. Macmillan* said that the wording of any declaration must of course be looked at very carefully. What was important was to try to draw a line so as to bring the nuclear race to an end. *Lord Home* said that he was interested in the suggestion that more tests would be unnecessary if there was an agreement about Berlin. Was this really the case? *President Kennedy* said that, while he would not say this in public, he felt that a significant change in the international climate might make it possible to dispense with further tests.

Mr. Macmillan said that he assumed that one difficulty confronting the West was that it was easier for the Russians to keep their scientific team together. *Mr. Rusk* said that the Russians would find it quite possible to agree not to test but to prepare for tests all the same. *Dr. Brown* added that the Russians had done this during the moratorium and could do it again. It had been very difficult to keep the United States team together during the moratorium and in future it would be even harder.

Mr. Macmillan said that he was prepared to consider a private agreement with the United States about the resumption of nuclear tests and the use of Christmas Island, although he would have to put this to the Cabinet. He hoped it would be possible also to make a public announcement of some new initiative on disarmament. He agreed that it would be wrong for the United Kingdom to expect the United States to waste time and money on preparations in Christmas Island if at the end of some months of work the United Kingdom Government could then veto the holding of tests. He would expect that if the United Kingdom Government decided to let tests begin on Christmas Island they would also have to accept that, although the United States would consult them about a decision actually to make the tests, the United Kingdom at that stage could not exercise a veto. *President Kennedy* expressed his thanks for this statement. *Mr. Macmillan* said that he would put the matter to the Cabinet as soon as possible after his return to the United Kingdom.

Bermuda,

22nd December, 1961.

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The Prime Minister's Visit
to Bermuda

20th-23rd December, 1961

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agreement work. The truth of the matter was that Adoula was not competent to run the whole country because he had no administration. There was no army, no police and no Civil Service. The United Nations ought to aim at replacing their 15,000 troops by 2,000 French-speaking administrators.

Mr. Rusk asked if Mr. Tshombe could control his own side and compel them to cease firing if the United Nations stopped. Lord Home said that he thought this would be possible if the United Nations troops left Katanga but until they did the mercenaries would go on making trouble. Mr. Rusk said that if the United Nations forces left Katanga, Tshombe would go back on any agreement for a settlement and would secede again. Lord Home agreed that this was a danger but said that in any case he did not believe that Katanga could be held down by force in present circumstances.

Mr. Macmillan said that he was worried about the reported agreement between Adoula and Tshombe because he felt that it was too far contrary to Tshombe's original line for him to have accepted it except under duress. Of course there might be some agreement about money which was not included in the seven points. Mr. Rusk said that he believed there was an exchange of letters but he had not yet got the text.

President Kennedy suggested that he and Mr. Macmillan should issue a statement which would make it clear that the United Kingdom and United States Governments were at one in seeking an agreement for an integrated Congo, and urging Adoula and Tshombe to continue to work together. He suggested waiting for an hour or so to see if there was further news from the Congo and then issuing a statement on these lines. Mr. Macmillan agreed.

Bermuda,
21st December, 1961.

(8)

RECORD OF A MEETING AT GOVERNMENT HOUSE, BERMUDA,
ON THURSDAY, 21st DECEMBER, 1961, AT 4 p.m.

Present:

UNITED KINGDOM	UNITED STATES
The Right Hon. Harold Macmillan, M.P.	President Kennedy
The Right Hon. the Earl of Home	Mr. Dean Rusk
The Right Hon. Sir David Ormsby Gore	Mr. David Bruce
The Right Hon. Sir Norman Brook	Mr. McG. Bundy
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh	Mr. Charles Bohlen
Mr. A. C. I. Samuel	Mr. William Tyler

Berlin

President Kennedy said that it was his intention that the United States Ambassador in Moscow (Mr. Thompson) should see Mr. Gromyko between Christmas and the New Year and begin the soundings designed to ascertain whether there was a basis for negotiation on the Berlin question. The President handed round a draft of the instructions to be sent to Mr. Thompson for this purpose.

Mr. Rusk said that all the NATO countries except France were anxious for us to go ahead with this probe and even the French had acquiesced in it. Lord Home added that the French were even willing for the probe to go some way into questions of substance. Mr. Rusk made it clear that the draft instructions to Mr. Thompson were for the first talk only and therefore did not go into substance. We should have to consider on what basis we wanted to approach the substance of the matter and, secondly, what procedures we proposed to use in order to get

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we could go towards recognition of the D.D.R., what we could accept and what we could not. We should hope to elicit replies from the Soviet Government and in this way a pattern of views would be built up out of which we might be able to identify the elements of an agreement. *Mr. Rusk* agreed with this.

Discussion then turned on the question whether Thompson should conduct the probe alone or whether the other Western Ambassadors could help. *Lord Home* thought that Mr. Thompson should have whatever help he thought best. Sir Frank Roberts would be available and it was unlikely that Herr Kroll would be inactive. *President Kennedy* thought that, while Mr. Thompson might conduct the early talks, it would be difficult for him to go on alone as the substance of the matter was approached. This would give the Germans the opportunity to make difficulties. *Mr. Bohlen* thought that so long as Mr. Thompson operated within the framework of the working paper agreed by the four Powers, the Germans were unlikely to make difficulties, but *Mr. Bundy* remarked that Lord Home's four points were just the points which were not agreed by the Four Powers.

Mr. Bohlen thought that if it came to a meeting of Foreign Ministers, the Germans might not want to take part and *Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh* suggested that a Foreign Ministers' meeting must be tripartite on the Western side, because if we had the West Germans with us the Russians would bring in the East Germans.

Lord Home said that Mr. Thompson would begin the probe by raising the subject of access. This would permit Mr. Gromyko to talk about recognising the sovereignty of the D.D.R. At this point Mr. Thompson might consult Sir Frank Roberts and Herr Kroll to see whether an agreed formula could be found in reply to this. *Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh* did not think that agreement would be found on formulae for each separate element: the points in the Four-Power working paper which were not agreed would never in fact be agreed in advance of formal negotiations.

President Kennedy then asked which would be the best, one Ambassador conducting the probe or a Foreign Ministers' conference which would include the Germans. *Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh* thought that the first step should be for Mr. Thompson to take the lead in the probe with Sir Frank Roberts and Herr Kroll helping where they could. *Mr. Bohlen* observed that the Germans' insistence on a narrow negotiation about Berlin alone meant that they would not be able to take part in negotiations with the Russians since they had no *locus standi* to discuss Berlin with the Russians.

Mr. Rusk said that in Paris he had got the impression from the *Qual d'Orsay* that French officials would like the Ambassadorial Group to continue so that the French could continue to play a part in this matter. He was anxious not to give the French and the Germans a chance of complaining that the whole thing was being conducted by the Anglo-Saxons nor did the United States want to carry alone an undefined responsibility. *Lord Home* thought that the Germans really did want to get negotiations going. The Foreign Minister, Herr Schroeder, had expressed to him in Paris his fears that if things dragged on West Berlin might die.

Discussion then turned to the question whether Mr. Thompson should hold out to the Russians the prospect that, if the probe showed that there was a basis for negotiations, we would proceed to more formal negotiations, first at the level of Deputy Foreign Ministers and then of Foreign Ministers. *Mr. Rusk* said that he did not believe that a settlement could be achieved at a level lower than that of Foreign Ministers or possibly even of Heads of Governments.

Mr. Macmillan said that we should be clear about our objective. If we wanted an agreement there must be a conference or a negotiation. The situation at present was dangerous. There was anxiety and tension. And yet we could see that there was a basis for a settlement. All were agreed in principle that Germany must ultimately be united, though some of us were not enthusiastic at the prospect. Even the Russians would probably accept that one day there would be a united Germany. Meanwhile we must make a practical agreement. This must be based on facts. First, it was a fact that East Germany existed. Its existence could therefore be recognised. In practice the Federal Republic accepted that East Germany existed and conducted large-scale trade with it. The Federal Republic already recognised the existence of East Germany and dealt with it as a fact. Second, it was a fact that we were in West Berlin and intended to stay there. We might be able to find

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probe showed that there was any chance of success. They would also consider whether these instructions should be shown to the Germans and the French. Mr. Rusk's original idea had been that the general line should be cleared with the Germans and that the French should be offered a sight of them if they wished. There was, however, some doubt whether it would be politic to let the French know that the instructions were specifically aimed at achieving a Four-Power Conference. Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh and Mr. Bohlen would consider whether this point should be put separately to Mr. Thompson. They would also consider whether it would be possible for Mr. Thompson's first contact with Mr. Gromyko to take place so early as the President had at first suggested. They would also look at the draft of a reply which Mr. Macmillan might send to Mr. Khrushchev's latest letter and would consider whether such a reply could usefully supplement the soundings which Mr. Thompson would be making in Moscow.

Bermuda,

21st December, 1961.

(9)

RECORD OF A MEETING AT GOVERNMENT HOUSE, BERMUDA, ON THURSDAY, 21st DECEMBER, 1961, AT 5.15 p.m.

Nuclear Tests

The record of this meeting has been printed separately.

Bermuda,

21st December, 1961.

(10)

RECORD OF A MEETING AT GOVERNMENT HOUSE, BERMUDA, ON FRIDAY, 22nd DECEMBER, 1961, AT 9.45 a.m.

Present:

UNITED KINGDOM

The Right Hon. Harold Macmillan,
M.P.

The Right Hon. The Earl of Home
The Right Hon. Sir David Ormsby
Gore

The Right Hon. Sir Norman Brook
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh

Mr. A. C. I. Samuel

UNITED STATES

President Kennedy
Mr. Dean Rusk

Mr. David Bruce
Mr. Charles Bohlen

Mr. McG. Bundy
Mr. William Tyler

Berlin

Mr. Rusk began by saying that the British redraft of the proposed instructions to Mr. Thompson indicated that we were looking forward to a long series of talks whereas the United States draft envisaged an early move to a more formal negotiation. Lord Home said that it was not the British intention that there should be a long drawn out series of talks: but we must ensure that there was not a break after only one talk. Mr. Rusk accepted this as long as it was quite clear that the probe was intended to lead to a conference. The American idea was that the Russians would be obliged to give a definite indication at an early stage but he certainly did not want an impasse after the first meeting.

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the Russians would refuse serious negotiations either for a settlement of the Berlin problem or, at the worst, about the measures that should be taken to deal with the crisis that would follow a breakdown. *President Kennedy* wondered how it would be possible to get the Germans to agree to anything beyond what was already in Mr. Thompson's instructions. Perhaps Mr. Thompson should go ahead as was now proposed but in the meanwhile the Americans and the British should be thinking how far they could go on such subjects as relations with the D.D.R. After that, Mr. Rusk should try to persuade Herr Schroeder to agree with what we proposed. The British and the Americans could also work out some way of converting our occupation rights into something more acceptable and put that to the Germans as well. *Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh* thought that this should perhaps await the result of Mr. Thompson's first conversation. *Lord Home* thought that instead of an approach by Mr. Rusk to Herr Schroeder it might be better for the British and American Ambassadors in Bonn to deal with him.

Lord Home asked how it would be possible to make use of Herr Kroll during the probe in Moscow. *Mr. Rusk* thought that he should be kept informed but not brought into the actual meetings with Mr. Gromyko.

President Kennedy asked whether Mr. Thompson's instructions should be shown to the Germans and the French. *Mr. Bohlen* suggested that the instructions should be shown to the Germans, who would not be likely to object to them as they did not go far into substance, but that the French should merely be informed of what was intended.

It was agreed that *Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh* and *Mr. Bohlen* should redraft the instructions in the light of the discussion and should in particular make it clear that Mr. Thompson's probe should not be long drawn out nor yet so brief as to risk a breakdown after a very short time.

It was also agreed that the draft reply to Mr. Khrushchev's letter to the Prime Minister was a good statement of the Western position and, with a few changes which could be worked out between the British and the Americans, it could be sent off. It was agreed too that it should contain a paragraph which would refer to the last NATO communiqué and would look forward to Mr. Thompson's probe. This would help with the problem of timing. *President Kennedy* thought that, even though Mr. Khrushchev had withdrawn his threat to sign a peace treaty by the end of the year, it would be best if the West showed some activity before then. Otherwise Mr. Khrushchev could say that we had made no effort at all. *Mr. Macmillan* agreed with this and it was decided that besides including a paragraph in the Prime Minister's reply to Mr. Khrushchev foreshadowing Mr. Thompson's approach, he should be instructed to ask before 31st December for an appointment with Mr. Gromyko, even though the meeting might take place after that date. There would be no need for the instructions to be put in final form here in Bermuda. They could be rewritten in Washington and passed to the British through *Sir David Ormsby Gore*.

Bermuda,
22nd December, 1961.

(11)

RECORD OF A MEETING AT GOVERNMENT HOUSE, BERMUDA,
ON FRIDAY, 22nd DECEMBER, 1961, AT 10.30 a.m.

Nuclear Tests

The record of this meeting has been printed separately.

Bermuda,
22nd December, 1961.

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