

F0771 / 148773
(5)

2/11/59

BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND
DER BUNDESKANZLER

Bonn, den 11. Februar 1959

Seiner Exzellenz
dem Premierminister
des Vereinigten Königreiches
von Grossbritannien
Herrn Harold Macmillan

London
Downing Street 10

Lieber Freund !

Als Ihr Botschafter mir Ihren freundlichen Brief am 5. Februar übergab, in dem Sie Ihren Entschluss, nach Moskau zu reisen, mitteilten, haben wir ein längeres Gespräch über die ganze Situation geführt. In diesem Gespräch machte Sir Christopher Steel eine Bemerkung etwa folgenden Inhalts:


"Dass das Vorhandensein der DDR ein Faktum sei, an dem man nicht vorbeigehen könne, und dass die DDR immer wieder von anderen Staaten anerkannt würde. Die westlichen Mächte müssten sich wohl auch einmal über diese Frage der Anerkennung der DDR beraten."

Da unsere Ansicht in der Angelegenheit bekannt ist, habe ich Sir Christopher Steel darauf nichts erwidert.

Ich möchte aber ganz persönlich doch Ihnen über diese Frage schreiben. Sobald die westlichen Alliierten sich mit der Frage einer etwaigen Anerkennung der DDR beschäftigen, wird dadurch die ganze außenpolitische Situation, soweit Europa und soweit wir in Frage kommen, völlig verändert. Jedenfalls würde der Verhandlung wegen eines Friedens mit Deutschland dadurch vorgegriffen werden. Es könnte sein, dass Sie von Chruschtschow auf diese Frage bei Ihrem Aufenthalt in Moskau angesprochen werden.

FO 371 / 148773
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2/11/59
p.w.



Western Department

The German Ambassador called on me this afternoon and raised a number of detailed questions about which I am making separate records. At the end of our talk, as he had told me that he was on the point of leaving for Bonn, I suggested that it would not be a bad thing when he was there if he warned people to pay a little more attention to Anglo-German relations. There had been a good deal of criticism aroused in this country over the Krupp affair and other various reports about anti-Semitism and undue softness towards former Nazis, etc. Some of this criticism had no doubt been due to the professional anti-German element in this country but all the same quite strong feelings against Germany had been aroused. The next few months were likely to be critical not only for Germany but also for the relations between the U.K. and the rest of Europe and it was important that during this period the German authorities should pay particular attention to British public opinion. Otherwise there was a risk that the two countries might get seriously out of step. I

many concluded by saying something to the effect that there were a ~~good deal~~ of stories going about that the Chancellor was showing himself unduly susceptible to French influence and ~~that~~ it would not be a bad thing if the Ambassador, when he saw Adenauer, was to remind the latter of the importance of paying proper attention to British views.

2. The Ambassador took all this in quite good part and said that he would certainly speak on these lines in suitable terms when he was in Bonn. He admitted that the Krupp case was an awkward one and I think took the point when I said that ~~any~~ further action in the near future about Bochumer Verein merger would be badly received in this country.

R. H. H.

February 11, 1959

Copy to:

Private Secretary

I understand that our notes on these subjects went across to No 10 at lunch time yesterday & that the Prime Minister was seeing the Ambassador at 5 pm.

Sir A. Rambold *AR*
Mr. Bridham

Jd
12/2

FO 371 / 148773
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2/3/59

SECRET

FROM BONN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET)

Sir C. Steel

DISTRIBUTION

No. 160

D: 6.45 p.m. February 3, 1959

February 3, 1959

R: 7.18 p.m. February 3, 1959

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

Your telegrams Nos. 308 and 319: Prime Minister's Visit to Moscow.

The Chancellor was in Committee all this morning and I was not able to see him until half past four. Brentano was away, but Scherpenberg attended.

2. I gave the Chancellor a copy of the Prime Minister's message and a translation. He began to read it, but after a minute or two looked up and said that we had known each other for a number of years and could he ask me a straight question. I replied "of course", to which he said "was this an election manoeuvre?" I said that this would no doubt be suggested in some quarters, but it seemed to me unjustified. No election could take place until this visit was overlaid by numbers of other events including probably a conference with the Russians. The real [? Gp. omitted] for the visit seemed to me to be contained in the fourth paragraph. British public opinion must be convinced of the importance of the crisis and that everything possible had been done by way of negotiation before the necessary measures could be undertaken to convince the Russians that we were in earnest. Scherpenberg intervened helpfully at this point to say that he had been much impressed by this factor in London.

3. The Chancellor however did not agree. He considered that the unity of the West was the prime consideration. He was afraid that every kind of suspicion would now be aroused and that opinion, instead of being consolidated, would become more than ever confused and irresolute. I said our opinion was not like that as had been shown in the past. The Chancellor then embarked on a dissertation on the hopelessness of dealing with Khrushchev. I said the Prime Minister did not propose to deal with him, but to find out what was in his mind and try to impress on him the solidarity of our position. The Chancellor said the effect on Khrushchev would be that of a major triumph for

In front - see Scherpenberg's comment in notes on Lloyd Pp (copy in Mr. 25)

6:54

SECRET

Bonn telegram No. 160 to Foreign Office

-2-

side. The Russians had gratuitously denounced a solemn agreement with the Western Powers and we were now running to them to negotiate about it. Nevertheless, if this meant that the Conservative Party would win the election there was some point in it. Paris was worth a mass [sic] and he would be happy if this was the result.

4. Scherpenberg then suggested that at least on the German side they must show solidarity and to this the Chancellor consented. He sent for Eckardt and said that they would of course say that they had been informed previously. I warned him of the Brussels leak and he said they would be ready for it if it were quoted to them. At the end he reverted to the reception among the other Allies and asked me if I knew what the French and American reactions would be. I said I did not know, but I did not imagine that the Americans would be unsympathetic. The Chancellor said he felt sure the French would be very intractable and it would be difficult to hold the Allied front.

5. I am afraid this was far from a happy interview and the Chancellor's suspicions will grow as usual unless Mr. Dulles is able to reassure him over next week-end. Throughout the discussion he displayed total inflexibility and there was no sign of the more comprehending line of which Eckardt and Blankenhorn have told us. He is probably still groping for some alternative firm ground. I expect the official German reaction to be correct when it emerges, but I fear his private doubts and suspicions will not be long in reaching the outside world.

[Copies sent to No. 10 Downing Street]

ADVANCE COPIES

Private Secretary

Sir F. Hoyer Millar

Sir A. Rumbold

Mr. O'Neill

Head of Western Department

Head of Northern Department

P P P P

SECRET

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2/16/59

AMENDED DISTRIBUTION

February 16, 1959.

SECRET

FROM BONN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET) AND
WHITEHALL (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION


Sir C. Steel

No. 227

February 14, 1959

PRIORITY

SECRET



D. 12.2.p.m. February 14, 1959

R. 11.46.a.m. February 14, 1959

Herwarth dined with me alone on Thursday immediately after seeing the Chancellor. I found him more than usually depressed. He said that while the Chancellor maintained his admiration and personal liking for the Prime Minister, he had persuaded himself that British policy is, nevertheless, unreliable and anti-German. Specifically he suspects us of preparing to sell out over the recognition of the D.D.R. and this, I gather, is partly my fault since I needled him the other day about contacts with the East Germans. (I did not mention recognition). For him any dealings with them by the Federal Republic are unofficial and harmless, whereas the slightest allied nod is fatal. His main source of disquiet of course is the variety of legitimate speculation in the British Press.

2. It appears to me that there may be an opportunity during the debate on February 18 to say something reassuring on all this. It would be useful to try and create a better atmosphere before you and the Prime Minister come here after the Moscow talks, because Adenauer's initial apprehensions about your trip have evidently not diminished and have inevitably leaked into the better informed newspapers.

3. Herwarth's account is confirmed to us by other friends on the fringes of the Chancellor's entourage. At present we have not many of these, since the whole Government machine is faithfully following the watchword of "stick to the French and refuse to contemplate any change in the arrangements for Germany". He seems to have quelled the rising uneasiness in his party over the inflexibility of his policy and the completeness of his personal autocracy actually encourages the Byzantine suspicions and rumours on which he feeds.

/ 4. Herwarth's

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Bonn telegram No.227 to Foreign Office.

- 2 -

4. Herwarth's conclusion was that it will be all right when the Prime Minister can talk to him again and I have great hopes that this may be so, but the situation is not one which should be allowed to go too far on the eve of the difficult negotiations before us. Apparently his suspicions of the Americans are almost as deep and anything that can be done during the next month to give reassurance will be to the good.

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SECRET.

WG1051/15.

Mr. [unclear] 19/2  
Mr. [unclear] 19/2  
entr  
[unclear]  
17 11

Please see Sir C. Steel's telegram No. 227 attached, about Dr. Adenauer's suspicions of British policy. It is important that this country and Federal Germany should be on good terms, that we should be friends with Dr. Adenauer and that the policies of the two Governments should be closely aligned. It is therefore a pity that the Federal Chancellor has got in to one of his bouts of suspicion.

2. On the other hand, however much we may regret this, we should not forget:-

- (a) Dr. Adenauer thinks a lot about his own difficulties, but he does not think at all about ours. As Sir C. Steel says, his watchword is "stick to the French and refuse to contemplate any change in the arrangements for Germany". Is there any indication that he has given any heed to the difficulties in which the adoption of such a policy would land this country?
- (b) In what other directions has Dr. Adenauer made any adjustment of his policy in order to help us? What about the Free Trade Area? What about Krupp?
- (c) If Sir C. Steel is apparently responsible in that he needed Dr. Adenauer about contacts with the D.D.R., then Sir C. Steel was perfectly right to do so. I was doing exactly the same thing in the Working Group in Washington. The fact is that, unless a major European explosion is to take place, there must be an extension of contacts between the two Germanies. If Dr. Adenauer does not realise this, then he is simply burying his head in the sand.
- (d) If Dr. Adenauer had really wanted to come and talk to the Prime Minister, he could easily have done so.

3. In the circumstances, I do not see any reason why we should go out of our way to say anything in the Foreign Affairs Debate which we should not otherwise have said. I think that the German Ambassador's conclusion is right viz that it will be all right when the Prime Minister can talk to Dr. Adenauer again after the Moscow trip. That will be quite soon enough. Dr. Adenauer's suspicions are chronic, but I do not think that the treatment administered personally by the Prime Minister has ever failed to ~~sure~~ <sup>allay</sup> them, yet.

*allay*

*P. F. Hancock*

(P. F. Hancock)  
February 16, 1959

Sir A. Rumbold.

*I agree. We can't be expected to adjust our policies or what we say about them to meet every twist and turn*

of the old man's moods.

F.R. 16/2

P0371 / 145 73  
8  
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Confidential

2/2/59



British Embassy,  
Bonn.

March 2, 1959.

1046/2

Dear David

On getting back from leave I found Foreign Office Despatch No. 43 (WG/1051/9) of February 18 reporting your conversation and that of the Prime Minister with Johnny Herwarth about Anglo-German relations. While I am extremely glad that you spoke to Johnny seriously and that he thought he had made some impression in reporting your words I must admit of a little surprise at the subjects on which you took him to task. Quite honestly the Federal Government have not really been the principal culprits in the Krupp case. The whole thing has been mismanaged in a number of directions and notably by Herr Beitz. However, I agree that from the point of view of the British public the Germans are of course very much in the wrong and to this extent it is good that they should realise the position. On the other hand over the employment of Nazis and anti-semitism I really do think that the excitement in the British press is factitious. A lot is being done at the present moment to pursue concentration camp guards and other embusqués and anti-Nazi feeling is remarkably vocal in the press and elsewhere. This applies even more to anti-semitism. Whoever heard of anyone in England being sentenced to a year in gaol for calling somebody a dirty Jew?

2. On the other hand we have real grievances against the Germans which you do not mention, I suppose for tactical reasons. I mean the obvious and disingenuous refusal of the Chancellor to help us over the Free Trade Area after he had at two meetings with the Prime Minister expressed his conviction of its desirability. Not only this but he knows perfectly well that the great bulk of opinion in Germany is for it. He has in fact completely set his course for Little Europe and prefers not to worry about splitting the continent at this rather crucial juncture. I sincerely hope that when the Prime Minister comes next week Berlin and Germany will not be the only topics and that this aspect will be frankly dealt with. There is also the coal quota, on which we could easily have been given satisfaction, as even Herwarth himself realised.

for info  
1/15/59  
2/5/59

Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar, GCMG, CVO,  
Foreign Office,  
London, S.W.1.

Confidential



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3. The whole situation as far as the Chancellor is concerned is of course conditioned by his current enthusiasm for the French and de Gaulle. It is an enthusiasm which is by no means shared in influential quarters outside the Chancellery. Blessing for instance the other day was quite open to me about it but equally resigned to its continuance for a while, the implication being that either the old man would find out his mistakes or must in the long run disappear. My chief anxiety is that the revulsion when it comes will be too strong and spoil the results of our own efforts for Franco-German understanding!

*Yours ever*  
*Kit*

Christopher Steel

Confidential

F0371 / 148778

VV

3/4/59

WESTERN DEPARTMENT.

WG 1051/18.

1959

GERMANY

FROM Sir C. Steel  
Bonn.

Secret

No. 287.

Dated March 3.

Received " "

SUBJECT:

States that Dr. Adenauer is still hostile ~~to~~ over British policy but he is slightly reassured. Much depends on P.M.'s visit. - Conversation with Scherpenberg.

References

-/n

MINUTES

I understand from the Private Secretaries that we may expect to receive a letter from No. 10 asking for a brief for the Prime Minister on the subject of this telegram. It may therefore be helpful to set out the story.

2. This misunderstanding about dealings with the D.D.R. arose at a meeting between Sir C. Steel and Dr. Adenauer on February 3. In his report of this conversation (Flag A) Sir C. Steel made no mention of having discussed relations with the D.D.R. and it only emerged that he had made some remarks on the subject when he later discovered from Herr Herwarth that the Chancellor had become very suspicious on the subject (see Flag B). This was indeed confirmed when the Chancellor sent the Prime Minister a personal letter on February 11 (Flag C) in which he quoted Sir C. Steel's remarks as he had understood them, and earnestly asked the Prime Minister to bear in mind that it would be essential to be extremely circumspect in Moscow if he should have to say anything on the subject. This letter called for no reply but Sir F. Hoyer Millar dealt with it in some detail in a conversation with Herr Herwarth on February 18 (Flag D). His remarks will obviously have been reported to the Chancellor and Sir C. Steel was of course informed of them. It now appears that much of the misunderstanding was due to Dr. Adenauer's conviction that Sir C. Steel had referred to "recognition" of the D.D.R., whereas he himself is quite certain, and is supported in his view by Herr van Scherpenberg, that he referred only to "dealings".

3. It is perhaps a pity that no reply was sent to Dr. Adenauer's letter, although it certainly did not appear to call for one at the time. It is presumably too late to send a reply now and indeed Sir C. Steel does not suggest this. Clearly, however, if Dr. Adenauer does not bring up the subject again during the Prime Minister's visit to Bonn, we should brief the Prime Minister to raise it himself in an attempt to clear the matter up once and for all.

(Action completed)

RW  
19/3

(Main Indexed)

9/13/1/59

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
*J. E. Killick*  
(J. E. Killick)  
March 4, 1959.

*Scherpenberg*  
S. iii

New letter

F0371 / 105 145774

3/31/59 to ...



British Embassy,  
Bonn.

March 31, 1959.

Dear Brock

W91051/30G B  
1051/309

X

I expect you were inclined to think my telegram No. 374 rather alarmist but I am afraid we are really reaching the long expected crisis here over the Chancellor. I noticed during the meetings with the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State on March the 12th and 13th how flushed and excited he got over comparatively minor points. Moreover his recollections of what has passed now seem to get so mixed up with his imagination that misunderstandings are the order of the day. For instance his belief, which I am told he still maintains, that I talked to him about recognising the DDR and his equally firm conviction that the Prime Minister agreed with him on trying to extract a four or five years' standstill from the Russians. Scherpenberg has, as I reported, supported me on the first as he was present. On the second, after begging me to treat the matter as purely personal, he said he must inform me that the Chancellor stuck to his guns but suggested that we should both let the matter drop. As the notes to the Russians had ~~not~~ been completed by then I said this seemed to me much the best idea.

2. However we are informed that there were no less than twenty misunderstandings between the Chancellor and de Gaulle as to what they had said and agreed upon and on this count alone business is becoming very difficult. But not only business of this kind. The old man seems to have finally made up his mind that British policy is fundamentally perfidious. He refers to us in private conversation as "Verräter" and is letting himself go more and more in the interminable Vorstands- and Fraktions- meetings which seem to occupy so much of his time. I doubt very much whether even the Prime Minister can effect any more magic transformations in his thinking and I feel that what we must now do is to aim at holding the position here

Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar, GCMG, CVO,  
Foreign Office,  
London, S.W.1.

Secret & Personal





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at least during the dangerous months of negotiations ahead of us. It is quite possible that the emotional strain under which Adenauer is now labouring may result in his fading away or disappearing quicker than now seems likely. On the other hand his physical toughness is extraordinary and his dominance over his party and his colleagues still complete. I have little doubt that all are expecting him to go before very much longer but none is going to be the first to break the line and Strauss of course is even more openly anti-British than the Chancellor.

3. In these circumstances the first thing for us to do as I said in my telegram under reference is to let the others make the running in the coming negotiations for the present both West and East - West. Meanwhile let us demonstrate in such ways as we can our opposition to appeasement. Secondly I will try to get at some of the other ministers such as Schröder, who no doubt see themselves in more important roles when Adenauer goes. For us to be able to maintain a show of solidarity and western unity however I do think that official comment on awkward questions like disengagement must be held to a very robust minimum and that if possible we should start some other hare which will divert attention to more important matters such as preparedness.

4. I fear most of the above is rather general but if I have conveyed the seriousness of the situation that is perhaps enough for the present. It is more serious than I thought when the Prime Minister's visit ended apparently so amiably. For that the Gettysburg press conference is chiefly to blame. But whatever the cause the position here is not one which can be dismissed as Adenauer's tantrums and I think we are entering, as I said above, a most difficult phase.

*Yours ever  
Kit*

Christopher Steel

Secret & Personal

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original

7/21/59 (2)

SECRET

FROM BONN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

31 MAR 1959

W6/1051/30/5

Cypher/OTP

P R I S E C

Sir C. Steel

No. 374

March 31, 1959

D: 12.15 p.m. March 31, 1959

R: 11.40 a.m. March 31, 1959

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 374 of March 31.  
Repeated for information Immediate to: Washington for  
Secretary of State.

All our information supported by copious leaks in the Press goes to show that the Chancellor's suspicions of us are not only still alive but more rampant than they have ever been. Eckhardt reports that he is unapproachable on the subject of the United Kingdom and is convinced that we are preparing to sell Germany down the river. Our friends such as we have are reduced to trimming.

2. This is the inevitable result of a series of incidents in which we have appeared as weaker brethren, i.e. the original Foreign Office memorandum and the conclusion that recognition of the D.D.R. was preferable to war, our opposition to the Americans on contingency planning, the Moscow communiqué on a zone of limited armaments and the Gettysburg Press Conference with the suggestion that we would sacrifice German atomic armament.

3. The Chancellor also resented, as you know, only hearing at the last moment of your Moscow visit, especially as Scherpenberg had been in London such a short time before. In fact the situation here is potentially explosive and Adenauer must now be considered abnormal in his reactions. For this reason I hope that it will be possible for us to leave the initiative and particularly pressure on the Germans to the others during your Washington conversations. You may be sure that the French will keep the Germans informed of the tripartite session for their own purpose and the more robust we  
/can show

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Reference:- Prem 11/3713 8179

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6/20/59

E.R.

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER

European Rocket Project  
(D.(59) 21)

The Minister of Defence in this memorandum, while professing to support any practicable application of interdependence, is opposed to this project for the joint development and production of an I.R.B.M. by France, Germany and the United Kingdom (with United States technical and financial help).

There are tactical and military arguments against the project but these are somewhat inconclusive, particularly so far as they assume (what is not really settled policy) that BLUE STREAK is to go ahead.

But the dominant fact is that this proposal must be viewed against the background of the current Geneva negotiations on Berlin and the future of Germany. The Brussels Treaty has throughout been presented as an effective safeguard against the dangers inherent in a re-armed Western Germany. An amendment to this Treaty to enable the Federal German Republic to take part in the development of a long-range offensive weapon might well bring these negotiations to an abrupt and unsuccessful end.

We should therefore try to kill this project. But we ourselves should not openly take the initiative to do so if we are to avoid accusations by the French that we are sabotaging the principle of interdependence, and the risk of worsening our relations with the Federal Republic, whose present Government are looking forward to the time when all restrictions on German arms production will have been removed.

The best course, therefore, seems to be, as the Minister of Defence suggests and the Foreign Secretary is expected to recommend, that we should put all these arguments frankly to the United States Government and persuade them to withdraw their support of the project.

30th June, 1959

SECRET

*JB*  
*Norman Brock*

cab 29/98

SECRET

6/13/59  
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C. (59) 102

COPY NO. 86

13th June, 1959

CABINET

FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCE

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

I will try to set out on paper for my colleagues my impressions of the present situation in the Geneva Conference.

2. We spent the first fourteen days solemnly expounding our positions on German reunification. It could not be called a debate; it was a series of prepared speeches delivered in a large chamber containing about 120 people. 800 copies of each statement were delivered promptly to the attendant journalists. There were two or three dinner parties during this period at which there was some private discussion, but without much profit.

3. Then came the intermission caused by Mr. Dulles' death.

4. Since then, we have spent fourteen days meeting privately at one another's villas about a dozen people in all being present, without any Germans. There has been an occasional formal session at Soviet request to remind us that the East Germans are in Geneva. The private meetings have been conducted in a friendly atmosphere. There have been real discussions and remarkable secrecy about their substance.

5. These private discussions were concerned with Berlin, and were concentrated on four points:-

- (a) the juridical position, or Western rights as it has come to be called;
- (b) the number and status of Western troops in Berlin;
- (c) espionage and propaganda activities in Berlin; and
- (d) the problem of access.

6. My purpose has been to get agreement upon these matters along the following lines:-

(a) As to the juridical position, there could be a statement that the Western Powers maintain their rights both basic and contractual, which cannot be extinguished by unilateral action by the Soviet Union: however this might be, both sides agree upon certain improved arrangements for West Berlin and access thereto, which by agreement should continue until the reunification of Germany. At the beginning of our talks the other delegations were very far from accepting such a formulation. My impression now is that they have come some way towards it.

SECRET

(b) As to the position of Western troops in Berlin, I have sought agreement on the basis of our troops remaining there with a ceiling fixed as to their numbers and perhaps some limitations on their equipment (for example nuclear weapons). As to the numbers of troops, I think that the Western Ministers would accept an overall ceiling of 7,500, provided that agreement to this reduction would be part of an agreement which would strengthen rather than weaken West Berlin morale. Although the idea of a reduction has been vaguely mentioned, no figures have been put to Mr. Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister. Mr. Gromyko still presses for the admission of Soviet troops into West Berlin. I feel, however, that provided the question of status can be satisfactorily presented from the Soviet point of view, the Soviet will agree to a limited number of Western troops remaining, without a Soviet contingent.

(c) With regard to espionage and propaganda activities, my purpose has been to get some reciprocal declaration on this matter, together perhaps with the acceptance of some quadripartite body possibly with "advisers" from East and West Berlin to hear complaints. We must insist on a measure of reciprocity; we have to be careful about the extent to which we permit interference by the Soviet Government in the affairs of West Berlin. There is really already agreement in principle about this: the difficulties will arise if and when the attempt is made to work the details out in practice. The United States delegation have not made as much objection to all this as I had expected, but they regard the retention of R.I.A.S. (the United States <sup>radio</sup> station) in West Berlin as vital for the morale of the West Berliners.

(d) With regard to access, I have been seeking an agreement reaffirming the rights of free access for military and civilian traffic of all sorts, expressed in clear terms including a provision that they will continue until reunification. For such an agreement, I would be prepared to accept East German operation of the control system provided the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics guarantee the rights and accept the ultimate responsibility. I have not been at all moved by questions as to who stamps what documents, and I have told my United States and French colleagues that no-one is going to fight or even risk a war on that sort of question.

7. The United States and French thinking in Geneva has developed considerably towards our position. Provided the West does not have to make these agreements with the Deutsche Demokratische Republik (D.D.R.) as a co-signatory, and provided complaints are not to be dealt with directly with the D.D.R. Government, I do not expect difficulty with the United States or France. The West Germans have kept fairly quiet, but I infer that they also have come some way towards our view. With regard to the Soviet position, I believe that if they are satisfied on other points, they will guarantee the freedom of access: they will accept the association of the D.D.R. by some separate declaration and will help to save the Western face over the way in which the inevitable direct dealings with the East Germans are presented.

8. The crux is whether the Soviet Government can present any agreement made as a change in the status of West Berlin, and the West can present it as a maintenance of their rights. I have tried to persuade Mr. Gromyko that it is what actually happens that matters, and that what we have been talking about would in fact amount to a change. Therefore, he need not make all this fuss about status.

-2-

9. Up to the end of a private conversation with Mr. Gromyko on Tuesday, 9th June I was not without hope of achieving a composite agreement on the above lines.

10. Then at the private meeting of the four Ministers on Tuesday afternoon, Mr. Gromyko produced his latest plan. It pocketed all the Western concessions about Berlin, but said that the modified arrangements could only last for twelve months. During that twelve months the Federal German Republic and the D.D.R. must negotiate, in the manner prescribed by the Soviet, the reunification of Germany. If they fail, the Soviet Government will sign a separate peace treaty with the D.D.R. That will lead to mounting pressure on the Allies to leave West Berlin and no doubt greater difficulties for the West Berliners.

11. This plan was repeated at a formal session on 10th June and rejected by the four Western Powers.

12. Mr. Herter, the United States Secretary of State, went with our approval to see Mr. Gromyko on Thursday to say that we could not continue to negotiate under the threat of a time limit. Mr. Gromyko speedily climbed down in private and rather less graciously in public. He made a tough speech about ending the occupation status.

13. All this has brought corresponding rigidity from the French and to a considerable extent the United States. It will now be much more difficult to get them to make any concessions over form or substance. Their view is that if Mr. Gromyko does not show willingness to make real progress on Monday or Tuesday, these talks should be proclaimed a failure and be adjourned for at least one month. M. Couve de Murville, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, says it should be two months.

14. The following questions therefore present themselves:-

What further effort should we make to salvage something from these present talks and for how long?

Is there any new approach to be made?

Is there any point in trying to get the Conference back to broader issues than Berlin, e.g. disarmament, security zones, non-aggression pact, etc.?

If these talks cannot be salvaged in what form should they end?

Should the West play for a break-down on the ground that the Soviet proposals of 9th June have spoilt the prospect of agreement?

Should we seek an adjournment on the ground that the dust must be allowed to settle after the Soviet threat?

If so, for how long should the adjournment be?

What about the summit?

What do we expect to happen there in the light of what has taken place at Geneva?

When do we want it to take place?

S.L.

Foreign Office, S.W.1.

13th June, 1959

PREM 11/3002

Frank Roberts (NATO amb) to Selwyn Lloyd,  
"General de Gaulle's attitude to NATO"

12/13/59

NUN 11922/189

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of French ideas on the organisation of world-wide security (see extract 1)—which was repeated by the French Permanent Representative to NATO in the context of the storage of atomic weapons in France (end of extract 3). As a senior French official in the International Secretariat said to me recently, it is not so much that General de Gaulle is hostile to NATO as that he is indifferent to it and pursues his major ends with scant regard to NATO or to France's dependence upon the NATO shield.

8. All the French actions described in paragraph 2, which have cut across NATO planning in many fields over the past year, clearly follow from the first of the two principles given above. Before the speech to the Ecole Militaire, it might have been thought that these actions were purely obstructive tactics, a kind of bluff or blackmail intended to produce results other than those stated—e.g., to get more attention paid to France's demand for political consultation, to extract firmer support for France's Algerian policy, to have some improved arrangement for control by France over the nuclear weapons held by United States forces, or to obtain nuclear information from the United States or the United Kingdom—and that once satisfaction had been obtained the tactics would be changed and the hatred of "integration" would be forgotten. Some Gaullists may believe this and in supporting General de Gaulle say "we shall go on being as tiresome as possible until you listen to our just demands". A senior member of the Quai d'Orsay has even hinted (in the strictest confidence) that perhaps the same was true of (ii) and that there was a possibility that the General, his honour once satisfied by a successful test explosion in the Sahara, could be induced to change his line. But can we dismiss a statement by General de Gaulle in this way? Although this is a matter for Sir Gladwyn Jebb to pronounce upon, my belief is that, in the light of his past career, and of the considered pronouncements in his published works, he must be given credit for meaning every word he says and for having weighed it beforehand. I submit that under both heads we must act on the assumption that in his statement to the Ecole Militaire and in his Press conference he meant exactly what he said and that these are and will continue to be his views. The rest of this despatch is therefore based on the assumption that these principles will continue to guide French policy as long as General de Gaulle remains in power.

#### Co-ordination and Integration

9. NATO is the first alliance in history to have established in peacetime an agreed system of command and control of forces in war and to have agreed on the assignment or earmarking (the words have different meanings in technical NATO language, explained below) of major forces of the member countries to this command system. This was justified on grounds of military effectiveness, but it has also served the great political end of enabling German armed forces to be associated in Western defences, of which they should soon be the major factor on land in Europe. A year ago the NATO military authorities devised an even closer system of integrated control to be imposed in peacetime in the vital sector of air defence, with the aim of ensuring the effective defence of the Alliance against surprise attack from the air. This is in suspense because of the refusal of France to participate. Without going into too much technical detail, I summarise below the main principles of command and control in NATO as they apply to the four categories of air defence, land forces, navies, and strike air forces. The quotations are from NATO Military Committee papers. I would emphasise that no NATO measures for "integration" prevent national units within NATO from remaining entirely national so far as their essential spirit, traditions and characteristics are concerned, a point to which de Gaulle attaches such importance.

10. *Air Defence.*—In their report on integration of air defence in NATO Europe (MC 54/1), which was completed in November 1958, the NATO Military Committee reported that experience had shown that co-ordination alone of air defence was not sufficient and that an integrated system was required to meet the needs of the Alliance. This would mean that SACEUR would have the operational command and control of the air defence forces in NATO Europe (including the United Kingdom) in peace and war.

11. *Land Forces.*—The "ready" forces on the continent of Europe (so-called "M-Day" forces) are normally assigned to SACEUR. "Assignment" means that they "are in being and have been placed under the operational command or

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Operational control of SACEUR. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned; neither does it of itself include administrative or logistic control" (MC 57/1).

12. *Naval Forces.*—Ships committed to NATO are normally "earmarked for assignment", that is, it has been agreed that they "will be assigned to the operational command or operational control of the NATO Commander concerned at some future date in peace or in the event of war" (MC 57/1).

13. *Strike Air Forces.*—In addition to the strategic United States and United Kingdom bomber forces which are independent of NATO control, there is a tactical bomber force assigned to SACEUR consisting of United States and United Kingdom units, some of them stationed in the United Kingdom. There are arrangements for the co-ordination of strike plans between the United States and United Kingdom authorities. This is not a "NATO" arrangement and there is perhaps some scope here for new arrangements which would make such of these units as are on this side of the Atlantic, e.g., United Kingdom Bomber Command, more obviously part of the NATO military machine and therefore less of a target for critics of the "special" Anglo-Saxon position within the Alliance.

14. The original military conception of NATO was in itself a novelty in the degree of military unification in peacetime that it demanded. In the ten years of its existence this trend has continued. It cannot be explained away as a mere consequence of the fact that the main nuclear armoury of the Alliance is in the hands of one Power. It is a quite straightforward technical consequence of the increased speed of modern warfare and the increased violence of modern weapons. Air defence is the most obvious case. If you have central control both of the information that is coming in from the long-range early-warning system that guards the Alliance and of the fighter forces and surface-to-air missiles that are ready to fight off an attack, you have some hope of success. If each country relies on the information available to itself and on the forces it can itself put into the air, the attack will be over in most cases before anything can be done to repel it. General Norstad has made it clear more than once that no progress can be made towards an effective air defence unless the crucial step is taken to accept the command and control system summarised in paragraph 10. Anything short of this would be a "loose ineffective co-ordination of forces". All the NATO countries except France are ready to accept this.

15. It is true also of land forces that, if a general attack were launched with very little warning, the separate national forces in Western Europe would have little chance of making an effective contribution unless their chain of command up to and including the Supreme Commander was perfectly understood and agreed before attack started, and the communications network in use. There would be no time to improvise afterwards. Still less is there time for the long-drawn-out diplomatic negotiations by which a Marlborough assured himself of the eventual co-operation of his Dutch or other allies in this or that campaign. There is however nothing in the NATO command system that causes the individual units to become "denationalised", to use one of General de Gaulle's own phrases about senior officers at NATO commands.

16. For navies a permanent peacetime command by an international headquarters over all the ships made available by member countries would not be practicable because of their frequent movements from area to area and from sea to sea. Indeed, in reply to questions from enthusiasts in the W.E.U. Assembly, the following has recently been said: "The NATO military authorities do not agree that it would be of appreciable military advantage to the Alliance for naval forces to be assigned in peacetime to the Allied naval commands". However, a unified command and control is necessary as soon as an emergency occurs so that the vast initial deployment of forces to counter the submarine menace in the Atlantic can be quickly made, and so that there can be the greatest possible flexibility in the use of the limited total forces to meet threats as they arise. The Commanders need plans on which they can rely absolutely and which would not be dependent upon a last-minute decision by one of the parties whether to place NATO or national commitments first.

17. Overriding all these considerations there is the fact that, considered as a deterrent, which is their primary purpose, the forces of the Alliance must be seen by enemies and friends alike to be ready to repel the aggressor, and the organisation

of command and control must be such as to give conviction. Air defence on a national basis would not be a convincing defence of the bomber bases from which the retaliatory force would have to act. A shield force consisting of national components under no agreed single command would less convincingly perform its deterrent role: that of causing the aggressor to pause for thought before launching an all-out attack. There is unified control on the Soviet side, and if the Soviets were to contemplate an attack, they would be well aware of the importance of unified control or the lack of it in the dispositions of the Western side.

18. So much for the actual command and control of forces. In other fields, too, de Gaulle's "wind of time" is surely blowing towards closer co-ordination or integration of defence. A number of proposals in this direction—some of them wide-ranging—were put forward by Governments at the NATO Ministerial Meeting in December 1957. They concerned logistic support (at present a national responsibility for all forces), training, and the concept of balanced collective forces, according to which each country would deliberately concentrate on the fields of defence for which it was best suited, leaving it to their allies to provide the necessary defence in other fields. It cannot be said that much progress has been made in turning these ideas into practice, although a small step forward has been taken by the Belgian and Dutch air forces which have agreed to joint arrangements for the training of pilots, the basic training being done in the Netherlands and the advanced training in the Belgian Congo.

19. The other main field in which great efforts have been made to co-ordinate defence efforts more closely is in the development and production of weapons. The object is to make the most of the research, development and production capacities of the industrialised countries of the Alliance and to unite their efforts in supplying NATO forces with advanced modern weapons as quickly and economically as possible. In this co-operative effort, France has played an active part and indeed has made a valuable contribution to NATO for which she was recently praised by Mr. Fiske, the Chairman of the NATO Armaments Committee, during the 1959 Annual Review examinations. France is taking a leading or a useful part in various NATO production groups such as those for the Hawk Missile, the Maritime Patrol Aircraft and the Mark 44 Torpedo. In many fields she exchanges information on weapons and equipment with her NATO colleagues energetically and fairly freely and has herself produced a few first class weapons and equipment in use by NATO forces. This is to her direct advantage and moreover the schemes on which she has embarked with her NATO partners should on balance bring profit to her own armaments industries. Above all, co-operation in armaments development and production does not imply any integration of forces or of strategy. The weapons and equipment which France is producing or developing with her Allies can be used directly or indirectly to meet her own national requirements. Common development and production has certainly not reached a stage in which France is dependent on her Allies for vital weapons to an extent which limits her independence.

20. It can well be argued that if the trend towards greater unification of defence is an inevitable consequence of modern technical developments, then some loss of political sovereignty is also inevitable if we are to be effectively defended. Indeed, the subjection by sovereign nations of their forces to the peacetime control in certain respects of American Supreme Commanders already implies a certain acquiescence in this fact of life—and has definite political advantages where Germany (and perhaps other countries such as Turkey) are concerned. But General de Gaulle has put the argument the other way round: that since France has always been a sovereign State, she must always remain one if she is to have a *raison d'être* and that therefore no military integration is possible. His Foreign Minister has even made the startling claim that France, alone in NATO with the United States and the United Kingdom, has a national military tradition of her own, which must apparently be maintained pure and undefiled by integration. From this it seems to follow that if France is to retain her personality in the sense intended by General de Gaulle, then she must renounce any hope of being effectively defended, more especially so long as her forces are concentrated in North Africa.

21. It is hard to see how the Alliance can permit its military planning to remain for much longer in the doldrums, nor ignore for much longer the insistent demands of its military advisers for greater unification of the command and control arrangements. As far as the French forces themselves are concerned, there is perhaps nothing NATO can do but make the best of a bad job and patch up such

Arrangements for co-ordination as the French are willing to accept: though it should be noted that *no* progress whatever has been made since March 1959 in the discussions between NATO and French military authorities to arrange co-ordination between the French and NATO naval forces in the Mediterranean. The difference in principle between the French attitude and the needs of NATO make it unlikely that any co-operation arrangement agreed to by the French will give much comfort to the NATO military authorities.

22. In other fields where progress at present depends on unanimity it may be necessary to take definite decisions to carry on without the French. A moderately satisfactory air defence of Western Europe could be organised that excluded both French forces and French territory. If surface-to-surface missile sites cannot be commonly financed under infrastructure rules, it may be necessary to have them financed under a new formula excluding France, although there is no knowing what harm this would do to the foundations of infrastructure. If this process of "carrying on without the French" went very far, it might reach a point where France participated so little in the important decisions, and contributed so little to the common defence, that her membership of the Alliance might seem to have little meaning, and might be called in question by her allies.

#### A French Nuclear Strike Force

23. Let us suppose that nothing happens to interrupt the present determination of France to become a nuclear Power in the sense of having an independent nuclear strike force at her disposal. What would be the effects of this, firstly on the peace of the world and secondly on the other members of NATO?


24. General de Gaulle has made it clear (extract 6) that he thinks a French nuclear strike force would be a definite contribution to the peace of the world. It can be argued generally that the more independent deterrents there are—even little ones—the better, since anyone contemplating an attack will have to calculate the chances of each one of them being provoked into retaliatory action. Circumstances in which the United States Strategic Air Command might be thought likely not to intervene might yet set off R.A.F. Bomber Command; circumstances in which neither of these were set off might bring the French bombers into play, and so on. I do not need to rehearse here the arguments against the ever-increasing distribution of nuclear weapons, nor to draw any conclusion under this heading. I will only add that the criticism of the policy in France is not so much that a further independent deterrent would be a bad thing, but that France, being so far behind in the nuclear race, could not hope to produce an effective deterrent in any sense of the word, and that by the time she had built up at enormous expense over some 10 years her own nuclear weapons delivery system, developments of the other Powers would have rendered it obsolete and ineffective.

25. France's own action in going ahead with her nuclear programme will give a strong incentive to do likewise to those of her allies who are in a position to do so. This probably applies within NATO only to Germany and perhaps also to Italy within the next 15 years. Germany at least, I should have thought, will be unlikely, if the de Gaulle concept of the alliance persists, to acquiesce indefinitely (*i.e.*, after she has reached her present army target of 12 divisions) in a situation in which she was entirely dependent for her defence on the action of independent United States, British and French bomber forces, or rather on the Soviet belief in their readiness for action. If she were to follow France's lead literally and develop nuclear weapons herself, in defiance of the Paris Agreements and of her own repeated affirmations, the political consequences in other member countries (including France) would shake the Alliance to its foundations.

26. Are there any intermediate forms of dispersion of control over nuclear weapons which would make France's pursuit of an independent nuclear force tolerable to the other members of the Alliance? There are two that occur to me:—

- (i) A NATO stockpile strictly under NATO, as distinct from United States, control could be set up on lines that have been indicated in recent months by General Norstad.
- (ii) The United States and United Kingdom could agree to put some or all of their strategic deterrent forces under NATO control.

I take it that we can rule out the possibility of the United States (or the United Kingdom) giving or selling nuclear weapons to other members of the Alliance. Nor



Prem 11/2987  
de Fulveta

12/14/59

For Paris Box

TOP SECRET

PRIME MINISTER

Paris Talks with President Eisenhower  
and President de Gaulle

You were considering possibly taking the following line:-

While the principle of the Atlantic Alliance is clearly still of great value in containing the Russians unifying Europe and uniting Europe and America, it is becoming increasingly doubtful whether the present military organisation of NATO is sensible. In the first place, the Russians seem increasingly unlikely to embark on an aggressive war and the greater economic and political strength of Europe, which NATO has done so much to create, provides in itself a strong deterrent. Consequently, the conception of a military "shield" is becoming more questionable; the real military deterrent is provided by the U.S. Strategic Air Force with British help. Secondly, the organisation of NATO's armies for war, which has never been tested in battle, is becoming

increasingly distasteful to some of the continental powers, and even the United States is beginning to wonder whether the cost of their great installations in Europe represents real value for money.

The framework of the Atlantic Alliance must clearly be preserved. But perhaps the time has come to examine its structure and organisation more critically. Is it any longer of value to have American and British land and air forces in Germany? And if we agreed that their withdrawal and the consequent reshaping of the Alliance would be in the interests of the whole, could we not in exchange obtain some price from the Russians? Provided that the military commitment of the NATO Alliance was preserved and U.S. forces had adequate bases from which to defend Europe and the U.S. itself, would it not be a gain to us to offer to the Russians some system of limited forces, perhaps excluding foreign forces from the territory of each nation state in an area extending from the Urals to the Atlantic? The theoretical diminution of military strength which the

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West would suffer would surely be compensated by the reduction in Soviet aggressive potential; and the political gains in Eastern Europe might be very great indeed.

You agreed that if you were to put these ideas forward in a tentative way, it would be wise first to mention to President Eisenhower that you might speak to President de Gaulle somewhat on these lines. To President Eisenhower you would presumably say that the French seemed to be thinking in this sort of way and might it not be worth facing them with the reality? At any rate, you did not feel that NATO could continue to exist with President de Gaulle adopting his present attitude (which Algeria will no doubt have made worse). To President de Gaulle you might speak more or less as I have suggested above.

The possibility of taking this line with the French and Americans really brings to a head the dilemma which we shall have to try to resolve in the next few months.

- 4 -

This is whether we can continue to make the best of the existing organisations in spite of the changed circumstances in Europe, or whether we must re-cast all our alliances. The attraction of the second course is that it is the only one which allows us to use the asset of British troops in Germany and to use it not against our European friends but against the Russians. The disadvantage is that it will be unpopular with the Americans (at least at first) and will be strongly opposed by the embattled NATO bureaucracies.

P.de

December 14, 1959



## PARIS

### 1. Berlin

If Americans have shown "surprising resolution" we must support them.

### 2. Disarmament

- a) Italian
- b) When shall 10 Power Committee start? March 15th or before?
- c) U.K. plan.

### 3. Geneva Tests

- a) Shall we ask France to join? "accede in due course".
- b) What do I say exactly to President Eisenhower?

### 4. European I.R.B.M.

- a) Germany
- b) Do we join?
- c) Senior Scientific adviser to SHAPE says Polaris not good and will not go 1500 miles.  
What is American position?

### 5. NATO

- a) Shall I suggest that perhaps it would be a good thing if British and American forces went home?
- b) What price could we get for this?
- c) General Twining

### 6. Anglo-American Defence Talks

Mention to President my satisfaction at good start.

12/19/59

RECORD OF A MEETING AT THE ELYSEE  
at 9.30 a.m. on Saturday, December 19, 1959

Present:

President de Gaulle  
President Eisenhower  
The Prime Minister  
Chancellor Adenauer  
and Interpreters

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President de Gaulle began by welcoming the other Heads of Government, and in particular hoping that President Eisenhower had had a good voyage. President de Gaulle felt that this journey had been of value to all the West.

President Eisenhower said that the object of his journey had been to show peace and goodwill. In addition he wanted to see whether people as well as Governments could be brought to a feeling of kinship. He had tried to carry the message that peace was not something which came as a present, but had to be worked for each day and from a position of strength. He had also tried to show that the West had a great interest in the Asiatic countries and wished to make dependable agreements with them.

President de Gaulle said that Mr. Macmillan had been to Moscow and had started the idea of the Summit meeting and all that accompanied it in principle. It was necessary to fix a date which would be agreeable to all.

would be to give Mr. Khrushchev an opportunity to refuse. It might also leave the Summit Powers open to the suspicion that they were organising world Government. President Eisenhower said that this was perhaps true but if the capital of one country concerned was proposed then there must be a hint of rotation, otherwise Mr. Khrushchev could not be expected to agree. The Prime Minister said that there was also the consideration that the possibilities of future Summits might make Mr. Khrushchev behave better, not worse. The important thing now was to set a team to work to provide a Note. Perhaps it would be possible to ask the Foreign Secretaries to provide a suitable draft Note for discussion at the Plenary session - although as they had now begun their meeting it might be necessary to leave this until the afternoon.

President de Gaulle said that he felt that the four Heads of Government should now consider the question of Germany. On this he would ask Chancellor Adenauer to speak. Chancellor Adenauer said that although it was not probable that the seventeen millions of Germans in the Eastern Zone would be liberated soon, nevertheless it was important not to neglect the link between these people and Berlin. There could be no question of de jure recognition of Eastern Germany. Whether some de facto arrangement for treating with them should be worked out was another matter which would have to be examined in the light of developments. So far as Berlin itself was concerned, the Federal Republic and Western Berlin are clear that there should be no change

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in its present legal status. Any adjustments made could only be contemplated on the basis of a continuation of the present legal status, although some <sup>declaratory</sup> ~~detailed~~ modifications might take place. In particular, neither the Federal Republic nor West Berlin would welcome it if the proposals of July 28\* came up for discussion again. In the view of Chancellor Adenauer these proposals represented the absolute limit of what was tolerable and left no margin for bargaining. What was suggested in Geneva for the peace treaty was discussed in Geneva as a whole - the Peace Plan. This must be regarded as one package. There was this danger in any idea of an all-German Committee; this was that from the East German side only Communists would come, while on the West German side there would not only be Communists but all other parties would be represented, and the West German Socialists had put forward a plan which would inevitably lead to the Communisation of all Germany. There was therefore a danger of a Communist majority on the Committee. The Working Party in Washington had not clarified this and were said to be waiting for instructions from their Governments.

President Eisenhower said that there was of course no question of any concessions to the Russians which involved abandoning a principle. Berlin had become a symbol of Western determination to maintain its positions and to honour its agreements. This must be in accordance with right thinking. There was one matter however on which he wished to be clear. The West had made a separate peace treaty with Western Germany. The President could see no legal bar to Mr. Khrushchev making a Treaty with

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\* i.e. proposals presented at Geneva Foreign ministers' conference. (-M?)

East Germany, even though the West said that notwithstanding such a treaty they would maintain their position in Berlin by force if necessary. But supposing the West got into the position of maintaining themselves in Berlin by force, what would happen to the relations between Berlin and East Germany? While the West must be very firm in sustaining the principles invoked since 1945, they must also be clear what exactly they were doing in the field of practical politics and what the position of West Berlin would be. The Soviet Union had said that the West would lose all its rights. The West would stand by its principles, but must be clear what the life of West Berlin would then be. It seemed to the President that there might be an awful diminution in the standard of living in West Berlin because of trade. The Russians could annoy West Berlin by blocking the normal civilian communications with West Germany. Was there any answer to this? It was necessary to think how this situation could be dealt with.

Chancellor Adenauer said that he would like to point out that the NATO countries had decided to defend Berlin on the present legal basis. If the present legal basis were removed, the NATO guarantee would be wiped out and it would be very difficult to obtain a new guarantee from the NATO countries. He would also point out that the Western Powers had not yet concluded a peace treaty with West Germany. They had certainly concluded several treaties but these were not peace treaties and the Paris Agreements had been intentionally arranged in this way. As regards Berlin itself, there was naturally always some

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risk in the situation, but Chancellor Adenauer did not himself believe that Mr. Khrushchev would start a war over Berlin. Mr. Khrushchev did not want a war at all and certainly not over Berlin. The Russians regarded East Germany as a satellite, <sup>and</sup> ~~of~~ the treaty between the D.D.R. and the Soviet Union still allowed some Soviet divisions in East Germany. In international law the Soviet Union had promised to keep communications open with Berlin and if the Soviet Union was to hand over its powers to East Germany it would also have to hand over its obligations. The Berlin Senate and the population of West Berlin were united in preserving freedom, come what might. Berlin was supplied with food and raw materials for twelve months, and if there were complications they would have to see how things went. If the West gave up the present position, it would be a symbolic act and it was impossible to see the consequences of such action for Germany as a whole. It would therefore be better to see whether Mr. Khrushchev in fact carried out his threats.

President Eisenhower said that he had said nothing about any change in the status of Berlin. The question he wished to ask was what the West did if the Communists wished to hold Berlin. The Russians surrounded Berlin and it depended for much of its prosperity on raw materials coming from the countryside of East Germany. Of course it was necessary to maintain the juridical position, but he was concerned with a practical question. Chancellor Adenauer said that the prosperity of West Berlin depended on its trade with Western Germany and

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the Western world. Life was not without risk and Berlin was prepared to take a risk for its liberty and freedom. It would be wise therefore to wait and see what Mr. Khrushchev did. President de Gaulle said that the ~~xxx~~ position of Berlin was of course very difficult; this was an indisputable fact. It seemed however that it was not possible to allow the Communist situation to improve as regards Berlin. Even a small retreat might have a <sup>very serious</sup> ~~bad~~ effect on Germany and even on France. If one day Germany, because it was ill-treated over Berlin, changed its position, then Soviet power might be next to France, and this would have a very grave effect. For this reason the German question was the test of Soviet intentions. If Mr. Khrushchev wanted peace then he would not make trouble. But undoubtedly the position was difficult. Berlin would be the test of what Mr. Khrushchev wants to do.

President Eisenhower said that this was true, but that he still wished to consider practical questions. The West could ~~maintain~~ maintain its garrison and say that it was maintaining the freedom of Berlin, but when we thought of what the Russians might do, all we could say was that if they acted this would mean that Mr. Khrushchev did not want peace. The position in Berlin derived from what the President believed to be Allied mistakes in the past in allowing the Russians too much occupation status, and it was clearly the duty of the West to stand by their position. He was still however worried about what would happen to Berlin. He was no more fearful than any other Head of Government of the consequences of his own acts

and no more inclined to give in to threats by Mr. Khrushchev. It now appeared that there was no possibility of a German peace treaty for a long time. Was the West able to stand the economic stranglehold on Berlin, thus losing the economic well-being of the city in the name of its freedom? Chancellor Adenauer enquired if President de Gaulle was not correct in thinking that the test of Mr. Khrushchev's intentions would be his attitude on Berlin at the Summit Conference, whenever that might be. ~~Agreements with~~ <sup>the whole Conference</sup> ~~Mr. Khrushchev~~ <sup>Mr. Khrushchev</sup> would be ~~useless~~ useless if in the case of Berlin, ~~he~~ <sup>he</sup> was to break his commitments. If he did this, it would show that he did not want peace. In any case, if he was given a concession over Berlin the world would only gain a temporary respite and the Soviet Union would then come back again. The effect of concessions would be to cause a terrible loss of prestige for the West in the world and certainly for Germany. There were elections in Germany in 1961, and at that time if there was any doubt about the firmness of the Western position then the result might be to swing the balance in Germany in favour of the Social Democrats. If the Social Democrats came to power in Germany in 1961 then the balance of power in Europe would be shifted in favour of the Russians, who would then be up to the Rhine. Considering all these aspects of the question, the only solution was to stand on the Western position, and see if Mr. Khrushchev really wanted peace.

President Eisenhower said that he still could not get his question answered. Perhaps he had not expressed it clearly. Chancellor Adenauer said that if Mr. Khrushchev



succeeded in his aims then Berlin would not be prosperous. President Eisenhower said that the whole question was how to supply Berlin. Chancellor Adenauer said that the Western rights were well known and agreed by the Russians. The thing to do now was to wait and see what they did. President Eisenhower said that this was still not an answer to his point. President de Gaulle said that if Mr. Khrushchev wished to make Berlin Communist, he would go on wanting it, even with a change of status. As Mr. Khrushchev had raised the question of Berlin, he should be the one to make proposals. President Eisenhower said that he still wished to know what would happen if all the West could do was to stand on their position. Chancellor Adenauer said that he remembered the days when Russian tanks were expected on the Rhine at any moment. West Germany had stood firm during those days and would stand firm now. If some concessions were made, the Russians would continue to make demands on the West. But if they wanted peace, they would not move.

The Prime Minister said that the difficulty was that, as he understood the position, the West only had the legal rights to supply their troops in Berlin. This had been extended by a sort of tacit agreement to cover the civilian population, but the legal rights only covered the supply of troops. The extension was simply an acceptance of a de facto position. Thanks to the skilful way in which the Western hand had been played in Geneva, with the help of German representatives, the Conference had nearly come to a fair agreement about Berlin. The Prime Minister had always felt that agreement might have been reached on Berlin, but the Russians had not come up to the final decision. This had not

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altogether surprised the Prime Minister, since he had always supposed that only Mr. Khrushchev himself would take such a decision.

Chancellor Adenauer said that he would like to remind the other Heads of Government of the Berlin airlift of 1953, during which not only the garrisons had been supplied.

President Eisenhower said that he had been talking about the difficulties of the Western juridical position. What would be the position, for example, if Berlin was reduced to 1,000 calories a day? This was not a situation for which the West could go to war. Chancellor Adenauer said that Berlin was

supplied for twelve months. President Eisenhower said that he quite realised this, but he was thinking of the longer term.

Chancellor Adenauer said that much could happen in twelve months. President de Gaulle said that of course if Mr.

Khrushchev wished to cause difficulties for Berlin, he would do so. President Eisenhower said that his difficulty was that the West had said that they were merely sticking by their juridical rights. But there was no treaty to say that all the roads and avenues of supply must be kept open. He wished to know what the situation was outside the juridical rights.

President de Gaulle suggested that it would be for the West to consider any proposals put forward by Mr. Khrushchev about Berlin; after all, he had first raised the subject.

It would not be for the West to raise the matter. President Eisenhower said that in his view Mr. Khrushchev wished to eliminate West Berlin, which was like a sore thumb.

President de Gaulle said that of course Mr. Khrushchev could either accept the existence of West Berlin or torture it.

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President Eisenhower said that, as he understood it, Mr. Khrushchev's argument was that as a result of the last war, West Berlin was a city inside a nation hostile to its form of government. Therefore he had proposed his plans for a free city with every sort of guarantee, the United Nations' presence and so forth, but no longer tied up with the Occupying Powers, nor having a Western garrison. The West had rejected this proposal, but as soon as this had happened, the President himself had begun to study what could be done for Berlin if international rights were obeyed. It was clear that the Russians could do a great deal against Berlin which would not give the West cause for war because it would not involve the Soviet Union breaking any treaty. President de Gaulle said this indeed was the whole question. Either Mr. Khrushchev wanted peace, or his main idea was to force concessions on Germany and Berlin.

Chancellor Adenauer enquired if the other Heads of Government had heard what Mr. Khrushchev had said to the Austrian President and Dr. Kreisky. He had said that he wished to make all Germany Communist. President Eisenhower observed that Mr. Khrushchev obviously wanted to do this. Chancellor Adenauer said that that was why he thought disarmament was important. President Eisenhower said that if he was in Chancellor Adenauer's place he would not be thinking about M.C.70 but would be trying to raise forty divisions. Chancellor Adenauer said that it was necessary to do one thing at a time. President Eisenhower said that the West must let Mr. Khrushchev make his proposals and not reject them in advance.

The Prime Minister said that the Geneva Conference had broken down on what was to be the position at the end of an interim period for Berlin. If the rights of both sides were to be preserved, then at the end of an interim period everyone must be where they were before. Geneva really broke down on this. It was possible that along these lines there might be a solution.

President Eisenhower said that one thing that the Russians would not accept, as they had explained to him, was a junction between West Berlin and West Germany. Chancellor Adenauer said that Mr. Khrushchev's view would change if all Germany became Communist. President de Gaulle said that everything depended on what Mr. Khrushchev wanted. If he wanted peace, then Berlin would not be all important. Perhaps what he wanted was some international understanding, real co-existence and a period of peace. Later, of course, after a detente, then perhaps the problem of Berlin would not seem so important. President Eisenhower said that he was afraid that, if we relaxed for five years, at the end of that time the Russians would not have changed. The Prime Minister said that this indicated the advantage of not pressing questions of principle. Perhaps the best hope was to urge a provisional arrangement which might perhaps last indefinitely. What would be important would be to find out whether the Russians would agree with this or not. Chancellor Adenauer said that he would like to ask why Mr. Khrushchev wanted Germany. Of course, he wanted it because of his idea of economic war against the United States. In 1955 Mr. Khrushchev had offered Chancellor Adenauer an alliance with the Russians against the United States. President de Gaulle said that if Mr. Khrushchev wanted war, then there would

be war. If he wanted peace then he would let the German question rest. The German question was the test.

The meeting ended at approximately 11.45 a.m.

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12/20/59

RECORD OF A MEETING AT RAMBOUILLET

at 10.15 a.m. on Sunday, December 20, 1959

Present:

President de Gaulle

President Eisenhower

The Prime Minister

Monsieur Debre

and Interpreters.

President de Gaulle said that he was glad that at last the representatives of the three Western Summit Powers were met together. He wished to discuss the best method of cooperation between the Three Powers, the United States, the United Kingdom and France. There were a large number of subjects in which they were interested upon a world-wide basis, beyond the present limitations of NATO. One of the most important of these was Africa; then there was the question of Germany and its future; there was the question of military cooperation throughout the world. These Three Powers had world-wide responsibilities which was not true of the other Powers in NATO, such as Germany, which had now no colonies, or Italy. We Three had to consider the Far East, the Middle East and Europe as a whole.

President Eisenhower said that he would like to suggest the establishment of a tripartite machinery to operate on a clandestine basis with the object of discussing questions of common interest to the three Governments. The group which he had in mind might meet in one of the three capitals, personally the President preferred London, but which capital was immaterial provided that there was no question of any contact

with NATO. Such an organisation would have many advantages; in particular it would ensure that at least there was some agreement between the three Governments on the facts of any given situation. The Prime Minister said that he quite agreed with this suggestion. President Eisenhower continued that his idea was that each country should supply one or two men who should not only be competent but also of specially good judgment and of reasonably high rank. There might perhaps  
be someone on



the political side, a military figure and an economist. President de Gaulle expressed himself very satisfied with this idea.

Turning to Germany, President de Gaulle enquired what the West would really accept. President Eisenhower said that he felt that for the next few years at least there could be no question of any move which might be interpreted as a Western retreat. This was not a situation such as the West faced in the field of the nuclear tests negotiation, in which there was room for manoeuvre in the details of the technical and scientific situation. As regards East/West relations generally, the President felt that there might be a beginning of co-operation between the two sides; the important thing was to have a situation in which bargains were honourably observed. The whole process would have to continue step by step.

President de Gaulle said that he felt that the manner in which one approached Mr. Khrushchev was of great importance. One should not allow Mr. Khrushchev to adopt an attitude of superiority to the West over Berlin. It would be wrong to admit that the Berlin situation was abnormal; the true position was that the D.D.R. was the cause of the Berlin situation. It would be most important not to allow Mr. Khrushchev to say that the Berlin situation needed changing. This was a tactic which he was most successfully employing. The East German regime was quite artificial. The Prime Minister said that in a sense all Communist Governments were artificial, and President de Gaulle agreed. President Eisenhower said that he accepted this, but the argument which Mr. Khrushchev would

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use was that West Germany was equally an abnormality created by the West. President de Gaulle pointed out that West Germany was the result of the application of the principle of self-determination. President Eisenhower said that this was true, but brought the argument back to a basic difference with the Russians. This was that they had no respect for the principle of self-determination, and indeed laughed at it. They said that the people in the Soviet Union were happy and contented and going ahead; they had no intention of changing their Government. The Prime Minister said that of course the West should not accept Mr. Khrushchev's moral position but should reject it. This however did not help with the facts of the Berlin situation, which was a difficult one. President de Gaulle enquired how the West could strengthen it. The Prime Minister said that he thought the West had done well at the Geneva meeting of Foreign Ministers, and should stand on the position adopted on that occasion. The conference of Foreign Ministers had broken down on what was in a sense a metaphysical argument. The Western Powers had said that at the end of an interim period the situation would revert to what it was at the moment; the Russians on the other hand said that the position would not be quite the same. At one time the Prime Minister had thought that the Russians would come to accept the Western position, and when they did not he formed the view that possibly the reason was that Mr. Khrushchev wished to reserve this concession and to make it himself if he got the Summit Meeting which he

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desired. It was possible therefore that at a Summit meeting Mr. Khrushchev might accept the Western thesis. What was important was that the West should not move back from the Geneva position, as Dr. Adenauer had seemed to suggest on December 19 when he had talked about the proposals of July 28. President de Gaulle said that perhaps the position of July 28 should be the final Western position and not the initial one. President Eisenhower said that we could indicate to the Russians that we could make no concessions beyond this position. President de Gaulle suggested that the West should also add that they would regard the Soviet attitude on Berlin as the test of their general intentions. President Eisenhower said that he agreed generally with this view but that it was very important not to introduce any suggestion of a Western ultimatum. After all, the recent trouble about Berlin had begun with what the West had thought to be an ultimatum from Mr. Khrushchev, although he denied this. President de Gaulle agreed but suggested that the West could point out to Mr. Khrushchev that he had asked for a Summit meeting and could therefore reasonably be required to give an indication of his good intentions at it.

President de Gaulle enquired what was the attitude of the West to be about the frontiers of Germany. The Prime Minister enquired if President de Gaulle meant the eastern frontiers, i.e. the Oder/Neisser line, or whether he included the frontiers with Czechoslovakia, which some Germans sometimes mentioned. President de Gaulle

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said that the main question was the so-called Oder/Neisser line. He had referred to the frontiers of Germany in general because there were other questions. President Eisenhower said that he had not talked about this with Mr. Khrushchev. Chancellor Adenauer however had recently indicated to him that he accepted the present frontiers of Germany as a fait accompli. They regarded this acceptance as a useful bargaining or debating point. Bonn had been full of placards about frontiers when he visited it in the autumn but Dr. Adenauer had not seemed to take this seriously. President de Gaulle enquired if the West wanted Germany to have the present frontiers and what they thought could be said to the Russians, if they raised the question at a Summit meeting. The Prime Minister suggested that the West should reply that this was a matter to be settled after unification. M. Debre suggested that it might be dangerous to take this view, since it would leave a major question unsettled after the unification of Germany. The Prime Minister enquired if France wanted Germany to be reunified. M. Debre indicated dissent. President Eisenhower said that the trouble was that if Germany remained divided for a long time this would mean the continuance of an abnormal situation in Europe, which could cause trouble. M. Debre said that the problem of reunification was a theoretical one. The practical question was what attitude the three Powers adopted towards the Russians over Germany. If they showed weakness over the status of Berlin or Germany in general there would be dangers. In spite of Chancellor

*Handwritten notes:*  
Eisenhower  
de Gaulle  
Adenauer  
Debre

Adenauer Germany was still very fragile politically. If West Berlin seemed to be abandoned, and if an agreement with the Russians appeared to be reached at the expense of Germany, then West Germany's opinion would deteriorate very fast. That was the reason for remaining firm on the future of Berlin. The Prime Minister said that this was a reason for not raising the frontier question. The best course was to stand on the Geneva position. President de Gaulle said that he agreed and that the status quo was really what should be preserved. President Eisenhower enquired if the price of this might be a guarantee of the present borders. This had not yet been raised.

President de Gaulle enquired what the Western attitude should be about the Soviet offer on West Berlin. President Eisenhower said that it was of course impossible to stop Mr. Khrushchev signing his treaty with Eastern Germany but he could not be allowed unilaterally to cut down the rights. He had said this very firmly to Mr. Khrushchev at Camp David and had warned him that if he attempted unilateral action of this sort the result would be a war. President de Gaulle said that it seemed clear therefore that the West should try to keep the status quo and tell Mr. Khrushchev that his attitude on Germany would be regarded as the crucial test of his intentions. The Prime Minister asked what should be the position about reunification of Germany. President de Gaulle said that he would not say that there was to be no reunification, nor should the West specifically refuse special arrangements for Berlin. The argument with Mr. Khrushchev might be that as he wanted a detente, and so did the West, it would be better tacitly

to preserve the status quo in Germany. Of course later on, after the detente had been achieved, it would be possible to examine the position. President Eisenhower said that in that case it might be as well not to mention Germany and Berlin at the Summit but to talk instead on disarmament. The Prime Minister said that Berlin and Germany were bound to be discussed. It all depended on one's estimate of what would happen. President de Gaulle said that if Mr. Khrushchev wanted to make trouble then he would no doubt do so; then there would not be a detente. The Prime Minister agreed and said that this was a situation which the West must face as a possibility. President de Gaulle said that the West should perhaps enquire Mr. Khrushchev's intentions, and, if he expressed a wish for a detente, suggest more contacts, cultural exchanges and so on, adding perhaps the suggestion of Summit meetings every year, and then see what Mr. Khrushchev replied. The Prime Minister said that he feared that this was not a realistic approach to the facts of the situation, but only time would show what ought to be done.

President Eisenhower said that Mr. Khrushchev had created the problem of Berlin by his speech of 1958. If it was possible to go back to the position of July 28 we could perhaps say that we could stand no further concessions. At Camp David he had spoken to Mr. Khrushchev about Red China and they had been frank in their views about the two Chinese regimes. However, he had pointed out to Mr. Khrushchev that there would be war in the Pacific if an attack was made on General Chiang Kai Shek. Mr. Khrushchev had then dropped the subject. The same <sup>lines</sup> facts might be <sup>adopted</sup> implied about Berlin. He agreed that there should be no move away from the position adopted at Geneva but at the same time the position taken by the West there should be regarded as representing the limit of concession.

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The Prime Minister said that the true position would only become clear at the Summit Meeting. There must be further discussion about the position beforehand. Of course, it would be best if the Russians would accept the Western position, if necessary with some tiny adjustment.

President Eisenhower said that of course the Summit Meeting would begin with each side taking their prepared positions. The Prime Minister agreed but added that it would be impossible to refuse to discuss Berlin. President Eisenhower said that Mr. Khrushchev had told him quite frankly that it would take ten years of education before he would allow free elections in the Satellites. He also said that Chancellor Adenauer did not want reunification, except for fear of a Socialist majority in a reunified Germany.

*President de Gaulle said that*  
Germany was always unfathomable. France was not in a hurry for the reunification of Germany. He did not say that someday there would not be reunification, but there was no reason to press the matter to any immediate issue.

President Eisenhower said that the West should therefore wait to see what a Summit produced. They should try to take the line that it would be better to avoid, or at least not to pursue, controversial questions which were likely to worsen relations because of rigid positions. The Prime Minister said that he would like to make one observation. The present situation was not a detente; it was simply the removal of the ultimatum which Mr. Khrushchev had presented in November 1958, and which he had then postponed and finally given up after his talks at Camp David. In other words, after November 1958 there had not been a detente

but a worsening in relations and the present relaxation was only relative. President de Gaulle suggested that this was only part of Mr. Khrushchev's tactics. He first created an artificial crisis and then claimed that the calming of it was a detente. If the present situation was settled Mr. Khrushchev would no doubt create another crisis later on.

President de Gaulle said that he would now like to say a little about Africa. France realised that there was going to be an evolution in Africa; they accepted this and hoped to guide the emerging people on the ~~right~~<sup>road</sup> to self-determination. They felt that it was very important that the evolution should take place in alliance with the West and not against it. Some African nationalists, like M. Sekou Toure, were hostile to the West. M. Debre said that there was a Communist plan for subversion in Africa. There were many indications of this, especially the numbers of young students in Moscow and Peking. He had spoken twice to the Prime Minister about the necessity for Anglo-French co-operation in Africa and this was something which affected all the West. President de Gaulle said that France agreed that the African peoples must take their destiny in their own hands and France was not Colonialist. It was however most important to ensure that the development of these countries was in association with the West. Some Americans thought that the United States might be able to replace France in Africa, but they were wrong. If "the old Colonial Powers" were excluded, the new countries would fall to Communism. President Eisenhower said that he did not understand President de Gaulle's suggestion.



Turkey, Greece, Pakistan, Iran and even Italy. This was a terrible burden and therefore the United States were very glad to share it with other countries. Germany for example ought to be brought to give more. The Prime Minister said that Germany had a lot of money and could certainly help. President de Gaulle said that the proposed Western Committee on under-developed countries might be very useful. President Eisenhower agreed but said that this Committee, perhaps under O.E.E.C., would have to be quite separate from the tripartite committee which he had proposed. This tripartite group should, he thought, meet in London and the members of each country should be attached to their Embassies. Secrecy was all-important. The Standing Group in Washington should be preserved, however, if only as a "front". In any case, this would not matter since the instructions to the National representatives were sent by their Governments. President de Gaulle said that there should also be a tripartite group to discuss NATO problems. The Prime Minister said that although the tripartite group might discuss these problems it would be unwise to say this, even privately, and it would be better to take the line that the tripartite group would ~~discuss~~ discuss problems of common interest to the United States, France and the United Kingdom.

President de Gaulle said that France was not happy with the present organisation of NATO, with its Committees and interminable discussions, and with the numerous small member States which made things awkward. France hoped in the next year to bring back a substantial number of troops and aircraft from Algeria. When this had happened it might be desirable to change the present NATO arrangements.

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The French representative on any tripartite group would produce detailed proposals. The United States, the United Kingdom and France really bore the burden of the Alliance, admittedly in different proportions, and they should discuss these problems together. President Eisenhower said that this might be true but that other countries were very sensitive about the position. It would be a great mistake ever to allow these countries to think that a Western triumvirate had been established. For this reason the proposed committee should be formed only to discuss problems in which the three countries had a common interest. President de Gaulle said that he agreed.

President Eisenhower said that he wished to raise a matter which was causing very serious concern to the military in NATO. He wished to reassure them about the question of unifying the air defence of NATO. He quite agreed that it might be desirable to have a review of NATO's organisation, but until this was possible the Western countries would only be hurting themselves and NATO unless they were able to settle the problem of integrated air defence. Western Europe was too small to have separate arrangements. He did not suggest that all aircraft should be assigned to NATO, but he did not think that there was any way of defending Europe without a unified Command. President de Gaulle said that he agreed that this was an important question and France was prepared to agree to co-ordinated radar and to central information. France was also quite happy that her tactical air force in Germany should be in NATO. France must however reserve to herself the right to decide the employment of the rest of

her airforce. The Prime Minister said that there were two sorts of aircraft; those assigned to NATO and those outside the NATO Organisation. The United Kingdom had very few of the latter left; in fact no more than enough to defend the deterrent. M. Debre said that France had strategic responsibilities which went beyond the NATO area; other Powers had not this commitment. The Prime Minister said that the British forces assigned to NATO had of course to be placed under NATO Generals. President Eisenhower said that he agreed that a scheme of reorganisation for NATO might be prepared but the difficulty was that as he understood it France was holding back from the NATO Command structure some aircraft which had been allocated to NATO. President de Gaulle said that he did not think that this was quite accurate. In any case, the position of France would be quite different, for France had no nuclear weapons. But as the United States and the United Kingdom kept nuclear weapons for themselves, France was put in a position which was untenable in the long term.

President Eisenhower said that he could not speak for the long term; things had a way of changing. But the United States could not move faster than Congress would allow. As regards nuclear missiles, France could at any time have the same arrangement as the United Kingdom under which missiles were given subject only to the "key of the cupboard" arrangement. In fact it would not be too difficult to obtain a key in a real emergency. As regards nuclear information, the United States could only give this to a country which had demonstrated a nuclear capacity. This was a somewhat absurd position since it meant only giving help to those who did not want it. At the same time, President de Gaulle must realise that there was as much nationalism in the United States

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as elsewhere. His own view had always been that Allies should be helped if they were to remain allies, and he had tried to combat the various arguments used against giving information to France. Some people said that things leaked in Paris, but he did not believe this to be true, but he was bound ~~by~~ by the legal position. He himself would like to see NATO armed with the best weapons as a deterrent, and an atomic stockpile under NATO. President de Gaulle said that he hoped that cooperation on nuclear matters with the United States would improve. France would explode her first atom bomb in March; he was told that this would be 40 times more than the bomb exploded at Hiroshima. President Eisenhower said that from memory this would be a megaton bomb. President de Gaulle said that the explosion would be a ~~megaton~~ <sup>atomic</sup> one. President Eisenhower said that this was a large atomic bomb, since the biggest American one was 600,000 tons. But when one got to these figures, differences meant little. He had fought a battle for liberalisation in the United States since 1946, and was gaining ground. Meanwhile, it was important to have the best coordination of the troops of all the NATO countries. President de Gaulle said that he understood the position of Congress as regards the general run of countries, but France was different.

The Prime Minister said that he would like to ask <sup>further</sup> President de Gaulle about the NATO Command structure. There would soon be 12 or more German Divisions. Was it not advisable that these should be placed under some general system of international command in different groups? He was thinking of the years ahead. It was tiresome for national forces to be mixed up with others but it had certain advantages nevertheless. President Eisenhower said that as

long as there was no integration below divisional level, no problem arose. President de Gaulle thought that when Herr Strauss had his own Divisions he would want his own command area. The Prime Minister enquired if President de Gaulle wanted ~~this~~ this to happen. President de Gaulle enquired how one could prevent it. President Eisenhower said that it would seem to him wrong to have all the German forces in one area; they should be strung out along the front. Four strong corps was what was necessary, not an army. The Prime Minister said that he agreed and that was why he felt that it was important to keep the spirit of international command going. President de Gaulle said that these questions could perhaps be worked out in the secret Tripartite Group. President Eisenhower said that the Tripartite Group should have a military representative; he specifically did not wish to suggest that there should be three representatives, one for each Service, but thought that one representative would be enough. The Group must not be too big. The Prime Minister said that no doubt the suggestion of a Tripartite Group would need to be worked out in detail and thought about. The President said that in the United States Administration no one would know of this arrangement except Mr. Gates and Mr. Herter. The Prime Minister repeated that this was a serious matter which should be studied further.

President de Gaulle enquired what the position in India was and President Eisenhower gave an account of his talks with Mr. Nehru. He said that his attitude to the Chinese had altered although he did not accept that their aggressiveness was due to their communism. One advantage of the present situation was that India and Pakistan might agree to more co-operation and might station their troops on their northern frontiers instead of along their common boundaries.

Mr. Nehru had said that all problems between India and Pakistan should be solved by negotiation and this suited the Indians better than the Pakistanis. The head waters of the three main rivers were held by India and all hopes of co-operation were based upon some arrangement about these. The President had himself sent messages to General Ayub and to Mr. Nehru urging them to make progress in co-operation. Mr. Nehru had not asked for military guarantees since he was unwilling to abandon his attitude of neutrality.

President de Gaulle said that as regards Laos he felt that it was important to damp things down and not to exacerbate them. President Eisenhower said that in his view the Laotian situation was better and he agreed that it should be calmed down as much as possible. The problem of little land-locked countries was very difficult as the United States had found in the case of Jordan.

The Prime Minister said that he wished to say a word about economic matters. Just as President de Gaulle was anxious about nuclear weapons, so the United Kingdom were worried about economic matters in Europe and the division between the Six and the Seven. A solution to this must

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be found; perhaps a start could be made between the United Kingdom, France and the United States. President Eisenhower said that the United States was somewhat on the sidelines in this question. The Prime Minister said that he must really speak out about this. The situation was very serious and if allowed to develop might lead to the United Kingdom having to leave NATO. It was impossible to keep troops and aircraft in Germany at a cost of £60 million a year if France and Germany were waging an economic war against the United Kingdom. A solution to this problem must and would be found. M. Debre said that there was no discrimination yet between the Six and the Seven. President de Gaulle said that the Prime Minister had seemed always to think that the Six wished for an economic war on her but this was not true. The Prime Minister said that he knew this was not the intention of the Six, but it was what would happen. President de Gaulle said that since he had assumed power France had been able to liberalise her trading policy. The Prime Minister said that the Six and the Seven must work together and not separately. President Eisenhower said that he had always felt that the strength of Western Europe should be united and not divided in the economic field. He had always ~~regretted~~ <sup>regretted</sup> that an all-European organisation had not proved possible. It should not be impossible to succeed. The Prime Minister said it was not impossible but it was certainly essential. M. Debre said that there had been no discrimination up to now.

President Eisenhower;

President Eisenhower said that he was still worried about the question of NATO air defence. Would President de Gaulle agree that General Norstad should be asked to call on some competent French personality who could put his doubts at rest and clarify the position? President de Gaulle said that as regards the French tactical air force the French government were quite content with the present command arrangements. They did not however wish to change the arrangements for the rest of their air forces. When the forces came back from Algeria there could be a re-examination of NATO. France wanted to keep her air defence under her own control but was prepared to make an agreement on co-operation with NATO for the use of these forces. In the same way when the French fleet had been withdrawn they had been and were ready to make an agreement about its co-operation with NATO. France was also prepared to accept unified radar and communications. President Eisenhower said that as he understood modern war everything would happen in an hour or so. ) If France came in she would of course have the right to withdraw her air force if necessary but if there were different commands the dangers to Europe were much increased. The position would be quite impossible if all the NATO countries kept a large proportion of their own air forces separate; under such circumstances NATO would break up. The United Kingdom had accepted the proposed arrangement. The Prime Minister said that this was the case although the United Kingdom had memories of 1940. President de Gaulle suggested that the United Kingdom had no

integrated/



integrated forces. The Prime Minister said that this was not correct. The bulk of the United Kingdom Air Force was under NATO command, to say nothing of the Army in Germany. General de Gaulle said that he did not challenge the idea of a Supreme Command in war, nor would he object to this being an American. He had also to consider however the French national point of view. This was very important. In the secret Tripartite Group the French representatives would present some specific proposals for the military reorganisation of the Alliance if this was desired.

President Eisenhower said that these questions could be studied but study would take at least six months. What was important was to remove now the doubts and worries of the NATO Military Commanders <sup>who carried out</sup> ~~to carry out~~ great responsibilities. Otherwise there were more difficulties. For example the Germans were saying that they did not know to whom they should give their growing air force.

President de Gaulle enquired why the question of air defence had suddenly become so important. President Eisenhower said that he had no desire for a United States command and indeed would welcome a Commander of some other nationality since when there was an American commander other countries looked too much to the United States to help them and did not accept their own responsibilities.

President de Gaulle said that General Norstad could certainly come and explain his proposals. President Eisenhower said that, going back to 1949, he had then found that the various NATO countries were too weak on their own and NATO had grown up in an attempt to create a more effective defence for the whole than could be

provided/

provided by individual powers. All countries had nationalist feelings and for that reason the NATO Command structure was perhaps more complicated than was strictly desirable on military grounds. In an alliance of 15 nations however some compromise was essential.

Mr. Debre said that France was in a special position because of her responsibilities abroad and because of the fact that her objectives in certain places had not always been agreed by the other NATO countries. The Prime Minister enquired if France was in a different position from the United Kingdom in this regard. The United Kingdom had committed large forces to NATO but he was quite prepared to withdraw these since it would save considerable sums of money. President Eisenhower said that he did not like to think in terms of breaking up NATO. If any country was able to stand on its own for a time it was the United States. But he believed in a co-operative effort. Of course he agreed that France was not in the same position as Holland, Italy or Germany but national feelings must be subordinated to the interests of the alliance

at  
The meeting ended/about/12.30 p.m.

Prem 11/2987

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12/20/59  
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SECRET

Record of Conversation between the  
Secretary of State and Mr. Herter  
at the American Embassy in Paris  
on Sunday, December 20, 1959.

(Break/late record)

After the President and the Prime Minister had left I stayed on for a few minutes to talk to Mr. Herter. I gave him a copy of the record taken at the meeting on Saturday morning. He said he was certain that the President would not mind that so full a record had been made of the discussions, and it would be the greatest help to him, Mr. Herter, to have it. Their trouble ~~allways~~ was to find out what had taken place at meetings where the President had only been accompanied by an interpreter.

Mr. Herter said he was very glad that we had raised with the President the question of the Nuclear Tests Conference. The President was going to have to take a very tough political decision and that was why he wanted Wadsworth and Fisk to put the matter very clearly to him as soon as he got back to the U.S. He said one trouble was that there was no doubt that the President would have a considerable reaction to the exertions of his tour; would want a ~~considerable~~ period of re

/Mr. Herter

Mr. Herter said that it was obvious that Dr. Adenauer was trying to pin the West down to a position of complete rigidity before the Summit talks. On the other hand Dr. Adenauer himself had said that there could not be a nuclear war over Berlin. He thought the French toughness over Berlin was because they thought that it was the only issue on which the Americans would really fight. They would not fight to prevent the ~~Austrification~~ <sup>attrition</sup> of Western Germany, but they would to defend the freedom of the West Berliners. Mr. Herter said the point, however, was that there would not be a military attack upon West Berlin, but it would be worn down by other sorts of pressures.

Mr. Herter said that one idea which he was now considering for handling the German problem at the Summit Conference was for the West to take up the idea of the peace treaty with East Germany, put forward our ideas and challenge the Russians to agree to a referendum under proper control in East Germany on certain specific matters, saying that if the referendum went against us then we would recognise East Germany as a separate state. He did not think that

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the Russians would accept this, but it would put us in an impregnable position so far as public opinion was concerned. He thought the Russians would then revert to Berlin themselves and he was rather in favour of us trying to work out a guaranteed status until reunification for West Berlin. // <sup>UP</sup> We had a discussion on the advantages of an interim settlement.

I said that I thought that if the Russians were convinced that the West would negotiate in good faith for a new guaranteed status, they would probably be quite reasonable over an interim arrangement. The advantage of an interim arrangement~~s~~ would be that it would get us over the 1961 German elections. I thought that in the Chancellor's present frame of mind there could be no rational negotiations about a new status for Berlin until after those elections. He was already becoming obsessed with them. We did not discuss at all what might be the basis of a new guaranteed status, except that Mr. Herter said that he thought that the Soviet willingness at Geneva that West Berlin should keep all its economic ties with the Federal Republic

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the Federal Republic's insistence on political links. We did not have time to discuss the matter further.

FO 371 / 152095

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12/21/59  
(2)

Extract from Record of Conversation between the  
Secretary of State and Mr. Herter at the American  
Embassy in Paris on December 21, 1959.

Summary

The general impression left by this discussion was that Mr. Herter was unaware of how far the President appeared to have gone in suggesting rather more formal arrangements on a clandestine basis for tripartite discussions in the future. Mr. Herter clearly felt that continuation of the present system should be our aim and should suffice.

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Mem 11/29/59

Copy No. 4

12/21/59

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RECORD OF A CONVERSATION IN THE PALAIS D'ELYSEE

at 8.45 p.m. on Monday, December 21, 1959.

Present:

President de Gaulle

The Prime Minister

and Interpreters

Copy on Foreign Policy  
Talks with Gen de Gaulle  
Free trade Area  
Germany status of

President de Gaulle began by saying that the press for the Heads of Government meeting seemed to be very good. The Prime Minister replied that he had seen this, especially in Paris Soir. He thought that the meeting had certainly been a good one. President de Gaulle said that he had particularly liked the meetings at Rambouillet.

The Prime Minister said that he wished just to try to clear up a misunderstanding which he believed existed about British policy towards Europe. Politically, the United Kingdom welcomed the Six. He himself felt that one could never be quite certain about Germany. Consequently it was very useful to have Germany tied in with the Six. He assured President de Gaulle that it suited the United Kingdom that France should be the first of the Six. Of course the Prime Minister liked some Germans; Dr. Adenauer for example was a good man. President de Gaulle agreed that Dr. Adenauer was good. The Prime Minister said that with some other Germans one could not be quite so sure. President de Gaulle agreed that one could never be sure of Germans. The Prime Minister continued that now that he had four or five years of power ahead of him things were easier. He felt that in the Western European Union there was a good opportunity for consultation and in addition to that there were



the Anglo-American contacts. It was therefore not true that the United Kingdom was opposed to the Six. This was particularly true of those people in the United Kingdom who had thought about the past and who had anxieties for the future of their children and grandchildren. Of course in the discussions, particularly when Dr. Adenauer was there, it had been necessary to be very discreet but he would like to know what President de Gaulle really thought about the reunification of Germany. Dr. Adenauer was very old; and after his death there was perhaps a danger that the German Government would be a Socialist one, or at any rate a weak one, and that there might be a policy of neutrality, or perhaps making an arrangement with the Russians, or possibly buying reunification from the Russians at a political price. For all these reasons it was better that Western Germany should be tied in with a strong France.

President de Gaulle said that he was no more reassured than the Prime Minister about the future of Germany. However he felt that perhaps after Dr. Adenauer the German Government would continue in a sensible way because the German Socialists fortunately were not of high calibre. It was true that, apart from Dr. Adenauer, the Christian Democrats were not much better. Consequently, in President de Gaulle's view, Western Germany might remain in a state of political mediocrity for a long time. There would be little battles between little people; Christian Democrats on one side, and Social Democrats on the other. But it was not really possible for them to go over to the Russians because to do so would be too silly. The only thing which might make them do this would be if they were abandoned <sup>cut</sup> by the West. Then, on the economic plane, it

was very important that West Germany should be tied in with France so that there could be no economic "Drang nach Osten". For that reason President de Gaulle had approved the Common Market, although before he had not been in favour of it. If the Six was to <sup>be purely</sup> have an economic arrangement he thought that it had advantages because it provided another reason why the West Germans would not do a deal with the Russians. The United Kingdom had not joined the Common Market, although she could have done so, because of the Commonwealth. President de Gaulle quite understood that this was a real difficulty for the United Kingdom. Nevertheless he saw no reason for an economic war, indeed this would be absurd. Apart from anything else it was necessary now to help to carry the United States. The Americans were spending too many dollars and they could not go on doing so and needed to be helped; their prices were too high and then Europe was herself manufacturing so much more.

The Prime Minister said that the Americans still had a very large surplus in trade but they spent much more than their surplus in giving aid of various sorts. All these economic questions were very complicated. A solution for the difficulties of the Six and the Seven must be found in the political and not in the economic field, because the Prime Minister agreed with President de Gaulle that politics dominated economics. If a political arrangement was possible then the position would be that France would have the Six, central Europe and Germany. Then there would be the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth. The United States would follow a parallel path. With these arrangements it would be possible to make a good future.

President de Gaulle said that there would be negotiations. He felt that these were practical questions which must be decided day by day, and a practical solution must be produced for each type of goods or manufacture. The Prime Minister said that for example there was List G, which was being discussed at the moment and concerned itself with raw materials. The important thing was that these things should not be settled on a doctrinaire basis but on a practical and political plane. In this matter of the Six and the Seven the United Kingdom felt that it was the attitude of France and the French Government -- and above all President de Gaulle -- that would be decisive. Naturally there would be many meetings and discussions and working parties and experts, but if the President and the Prime Minister agreed, then all would agree. President de Gaulle said that one would have to see how matters could be arranged. The Prime Minister said that he would like to feel that if difficulties arose over these questions he might get in touch with the President. President de Gaulle said that this would certainly be all right. The Prime Minister said that then there would always be the possibility of discussions in the group which had been suggested by President Eisenhower. In many ways the position was easier than it had been after the last war because there had been no diktat, the Germans had had no Versailles imposed on them, and indeed they were very rich. Therefore the dangers of their retaking East Germany by force were not very great. How did President de Gaulle think that Germany would be reunited? Would this ever happen?

TOP SECRET

President de Gaulle said that he did not think that reunification would occur in his own life time. Of course for centuries Germany in fact had not been united. There was Prussia, the Rhineland, the Free Cities and so on. In this regard Germany was quite unlike the centralized countries such as France and England. The only awkward thing about the division of Germany was that East Germany was Communist, otherwise it would not be important. But as it was the Communists tormented the East Germans and they were very unhappy, and this naturally made the West Germans very angry. But in fact West Germany could and did live without Prussia. The Prime Minister enquired if Dr. Adenauer was worried about his Communists.

President de Gaulle said that he was not, but that they were nevertheless clever and active, and in a way all the more dangerous for being driven underground. The position was rather the same in the United States, where the Communists held considerable influence in the trade unions. The Prime Minister said that they were also ~~anxious about~~ <sup>numerous</sup> Communists in British trade unions, ~~but~~ <sup>and</sup> that they were really more dangerous when engaged in clandestine activities.

President de Gaulle said that of course before Hitler there had been a very strong Communist party in Germany and for that reason they still had considerable strength there. The fellow-travelling Socialists were as stupid in Germany as elsewhere and did not always understand that they were being used by the Communists.

President de Gaulle said that he would now soon see

Mr. Khrushchev. We did not propose to give him much publicity, although he would let him go about a bit. The main part of the time would be devoted to talk. He regarded the visit with considerable distaste. All that the West really wanted from Mr. Khrushchev was that he should not start a war and would agree to work out some sort of a modus vivendi. The Prime Minister agreed and said that he had noticed that in fact since the various exchanges of visits Mr. Khrushchev had become rather less tiresome and that was one advantage of seeing him. He had pursued a less active policy in the Far East and elsewhere. President de Gaulle said that this was true and at the moment Mr. Khrushchev did not seem very worked up. The Prime Minister said that he was a man of no education or training and therefore very sensitive. President de Gaulle said that of course Mr. Khrushchev had had a miserable life. He had been humiliated and insulted and generally badly treated, and until now had never been in a good position.

/The Prime Minister

The Prime Minister said that he would give an example of Mr. Khrushchev's sensitiveness. One day in a dacha in Russia he had explained to Mr. Khrushchev that he was not prepared to negotiate but only to talk and then, with reference to Berlin, he had explained that if Mr. Khrushchev pushed things too far, the West would resist and there would be war. Then Mr. Khrushchev had got very angry and said that he was insulted; this was perhaps partly a genuine misunderstanding, partly extreme touchiness and partly done for effect. Mr. Khrushchev had then said that he would not accompany the Prime Minister on his journey to Kiev, nor would Mr. Mikoyan. However, at Kiev he had sent a message about his tooth being cured by an English drill. The Prime Minister was still not certain whether this had been a joke or not. However, the Prime Minister had observed that the Russians were normally very correct in all matters of protocol.

President de Gaulle said that he had accepted the Prime Minister's point of view about dealing with the Russians and agreed that it was a good thing to have general talks with them. The Prime Minister said that he believed that there was a real chance now of a good future. The political unity of the Six was good for the United Kingdom. In the past things had always gone well for England when she was in alliance with France, and badly when the two countries were separated. Economically, he looked to President de Gaulle to help. It should be possible to talk together with the United States about political questions such as Africa and the Far East and other places. He would not bother President

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de Gaulle about NATO except to say that he felt it very important to keep the present structure of NATO together. President de Gaulle said that he agreed. The Prime Minister said that the small countries in NATO were very sensitive. They must not think that the three Powers were trying to manage NATO. It was very important therefore to explain that any <sup>bipartite</sup> conversations related <sup>only</sup> to the common interests of the three countries outside the NATO area, <sup>for example in Asia or Africa.</sup> ~~should be secret.~~ He did not want to have difficulties with M. Spaak and the other NATO countries. President de Gaulle said that this exactly coincided with his ideas. The conversations could be about Africa and Asia and other areas.

President de Gaulle said that he knew that in the United Kingdom people did not like grandiose schemes and indeed this was a sensible point of view since grand designs were seldom realised. However, he felt that looking ahead it might one day be possible to make a real arrangement with the Russians. They might become rather more bourgeois; they would have intellectuals, men of letters, doctors, and students; after all, the Russians were human beings. Then the Poles and the Czechs and the other Eastern Europeans and the Prussians would still retain their national characteristics <sup>in spite of</sup> ~~instead of~~ Bolshevism. Perhaps one day, if there was no war, there would be a real change ~~and~~ to peaceful existence. If so, it would be very important for Western Europe to be together. The United States was far away and Asia was very difficult. Europe was very important.

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good young man who worked hard. The Prime Minister agreed and said that he was dining with M. Debre. He was very useful to the President because he ran Parliament. President de Gaulle said that clearly Parliament was disagreeable, but it was not dangerous. Now it was very hard to overturn a government. And in any case, France was very calm.

The Prime Minister said that he had been very happy over the last few months at the cooperation between the British and French delegations at the United Nations. The French and the British delegates were both very good. President de Gaulle said that he wished to say how much he appreciated the British attitude at the United Nations both over the bomb and over Algeria. It was a pity that the United States had abstained about Algeria. President Eisenhower, who had seemed rather annoyed by the position, had explained that the United States vote had little importance. It seemed that the United States was a very difficult country to govern. The Prime Minister said that Mr. Cabot Lodge had to think of the large negro vote and that when self-determination was mentioned the Americans became unreasonable. President de Gaulle said that he quite understood this and indeed the principle of self-determination had to be adopted. The Prime Minister said that in the debate on the nuclear tests, M. Moch had given some very good statistics. If possible, the Prime Minister would like to have some more



would like to have the opportunity of making some counter propaganda. This would be very useful with people like the Nigerians, so as to explain how small the French bomb would be in relation to all the other explosions which had taken place. President de Gaulle said that it would certainly be quite small by comparison and that the explosion would take place in two months in the Sahara because that was the most convenient place, being a long way away from any inhabited locality.

The Prime Minister said that he was very glad to have the opportunity of working again with President de Gaulle; it was a long time since they had last worked together. President de Gaulle said that he had been very happy indeed about the Prime Minister's success at the elections. It was a very good thing for their two countries. The Prime Minister said that the political and economic future could now be good. He would, however, not like President de Gaulle to think that he was exaggerating the importance of the economic question. The economic problem in Europe must be solved if he was to hold the British people; the United Kingdom attached this great importance to trade because they lived by it. Of course he recognised the importance of keeping Germany tied in, because he was sometimes rather worried at the prospect of 12 German Divisions and indeed that was why he thought it better for them to be dispersed under international commands, rather than put together in one army. President de Gaulle said

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be armed too much.

The meeting ended at about 6.15 p.m.

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12/22/59



SECRET

FOREIGN SECRETARY

PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE

PERSONNEL UNIT

SERIAL NO. 1505/59

10, Downing Street,

Whitehall

205/2

Secretary of State

Paris Conference -  
December 19 - 21, 1959

Copy sent to  
Mr. F. W. Meyer  
Mr. P. Dean  
Mr. P. Gore Booth  
Mr. O'Neill  
Mr. H. Rumbold

Our objectives

1. The Summit

To agree the date and character of a Summit Conference to be offered to Khrushchev. To agree on its composition. To agree that quadripartite working parties should discuss the plans to be put up.

I think we have achieved all these objectives, with perhaps some doubt about the working parties' discussions on Berlin. On the other hand, the public confusion about Berlin is from our point of view well compensated for by the apparent American determination not merely to start where Geneva left off but to make further constructive suggestions.

On the Summit therefore, particularly on the idea of a series of Summits - assuming Mr. Khrushchev accepts - we have achieved our objectives.

2. Nuclear tests negotiations at Geneva

I certainly got the impression that both the President and Mr. Herter were going to face the political decisions involved. They spoke of making a final agreement, if necessary at the Summit, and going to Congress immediately after that. But it would be a bad thing if Geneva broke down and it will not be easy to keep it running from January

to the end of April. Would there be a possibility of working on the basis of getting everything agreed in a draft treaty except two or three points which would remain for bargaining at the Summit?

3. NATO

I suppose it was our objective to do something towards restoring its strength. I really think so long as we do not in any way desert the Americans it is best to leave them to make the running, and clearly President Eisenhower was not anxious to make any very strong running over his disagreements with de Gaulle.

4. The Six and the Seven

I think we have done as well as anybody could have hoped on this, and the committee which is being set up elevates the O.E.E.C. position as high as we could expect. Everything of course depends on what they are able to do. I am writing you a separate minute about this.

5. Restoration of our good relations with France

I think we have certainly achieved this and brought the French back to thinking of us as her main ally, and of Germany as a country that must be looked after for the general benefit. We have persuaded them that we are not opposed to the political work of the Six, and indeed like to see a strong France in Central Europe. I think we also made some progress in persuading them that our fears of the economic Six were well founded and must be removed.

I think this fairly summarises what has been achieved.

*Jm*

FO 371 / 152 095


TOP SECRET

12/22/59

to the possible ways in which the tripartite group should be established "clandestinely" in London. Supposing that we both feel ~~in a general way~~ that the best thing in practice would be to use the French and American Embassies (perhaps reinforced at a fairly low level) for the purpose of such discussions, I imagine that we shall not however take the initiative in proposing this with the French but rather leave it to them to put forward anything which they may have in the way of concrete suggestions? If it should be found that the French do have any concrete suggestions I imagine that they will be put forward in circumstances of the utmost secrecy ~~however~~, perhaps even avoiding the diplomatic channel altogether, anyhow in London! One means of handling the situation might conceivably be for me to deal directly with Courcel on the assumption, of course, that Couve would be kept informed. Alternatively, it is I suppose conceivable that Joxe might be brought into the picture. I merely suggest this because I think ~~in the circumstances~~ it might be rather ~~less~~ embarrassing for you ~~then~~ to cope with some emissary of General de Gaulle in London who might quite well not be the Ambassador.

5. To resume, I should be most grateful if I could be told -

- (a) whether the situation is as described above in paragraph 2:
- (b) whether our intention is to talk over the matter first of all with the Americans in order to try to get a common line:
- (c) Whether, so far as the French are concerned, we do nothing whatever until they take the initiative: and
- (d) Whether you think there is anything in the idea of a special channel as proposed in paragraph 4 above?

  
December 22, 1959.

= J. Webb

Sir F. Hoyer Hillar

prem 11/2996

12/22/59  
(2)

EXTRACT FROM MINUTE TO THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER  
OF DECEMBER 22

TOP SECRET

CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

Of the talks in Paris, far the most important from our point of view - I mean the economic side - was the tripartite Rambouillet discussion on Sunday and my talk with de Gaulle. I believe that de Gaulle will play the game, and at any rate I am now in a position to bring a lot of pressure on him. At the right moment I must be able to make practical proposals. It seems to me vital therefore that we should study just what it is we want. Of course in principle we want the Free Trade Area, but since we cannot get this, at least for the moment, what safeguards and protection for our trade interests are most vital to us? Is it List C (Raw Materials)? Is it the tariffs on certain particular British exports?

I want, as you can see, to play the political support that I am now - owing to President Eisenhower's rather unexpected attitude - in a position to give to de Gaulle, without disloyalty to the Americans. I must play this to the full in order to get an economic quid pro quo. But I must be in a position to say to de Gaulle exactly what I want, almost on a half-sheet of notepaper. Can human ingenuity deal with this problem?

H.M.

FO 371 / 152095

12/22/59  
(9)



SECRET

FOREIGN SECRETARY

PRIVATE & CONFIDENTIAL

PLEASE RETURN TO THE

SERIAL No. 4506/59

*Secretary of State*

10, Downing Street,

Whitehall,

*Copy sent to Sir  
F Hope Miller.*

*ZPS/3*

You will have seen the record of my talk with President de Gaulle. For a long time I have been puzzled as to how to use my old friendship with de Gaulle and how to restore our old relations with the French without disloyalty to the Americans. It is this that has made me so uncertain in recent weeks, and even months.

From Bermuda I set myself to rebuild the Anglo-American Alliance to its former strength. This has been achieved and must never be abandoned. The President spoke very warmly about the Anglo-American Defence talks and it is quite clear that he wishes to preserve the special Anglo-American relationship.

At the same time de Gaulle passionately wants the tripartite discussions to elevate France out of the ruck of European countries, including Germany, and to put her in a different category. But there was no possibility of our agreeing to this at the cost of our relations with the Americans. The President's ready acceptance of de Gaulle's proposals on Sunday morning at Rambouillet seemed at first rather astonishing. Herter may regard it as a blunder - many in the State Department will hold this view. But the President, although inexperienced in negotiation, has some very firm ideas of his own. The fact that he refused to have a serious row with de Gaulle about NATO, and the fact that he so readily agreed to the tripartite and so-called "clandestine" (this was his own word) discussions in London

may well represent not a blunder but a definite decision. He may be wiser than the State Department. At any rate from our point of view he has done exactly what I wanted. He enabled me to have a conversation with de Gaulle on Monday night which would have been quite impossible without disloyalty to the Americans if the President had not taken this line on Sunday morning.

I hope therefore - and I really do regard this as of vital importance - that we shall do nothing in private talks or arrangements with the State Department to reduce the importance of the position taken at Rambouillet or to try to get out of it. If de Gaulle thought that we were trying to get out of it he would not forgive me and would change his whole opinion. When therefore the French come forward with suggestions as to how the Rambouillet agreement is to be carried out I hope we shall be forthcoming. If there is any hesitation let it be the Americans and not ourselves. I am quite entitled surely to work upon what the President said and proposed. It is not my object to pull him back because the State Department think he may have gone too far. As for the reactions in other NATO countries, I am not so much concerned about that. With good management by Roberts it can surely be explained that this tripartite relationship is largely related to areas of the world not covered by NATO, e.g. Africa, the Far East, etc.

Now I come to the vital point. My purpose now must be to support de Gaulle on the political front and his desire to join the ranks of the Great Powers, and to encourage him to get the fruits of his famous memorandum, and so forth.

or they can be treated



In return he must give to me the greatest practical accommodation that he can on the economic front. The future of British trade in Europe is far more important than whether a few French fighters are or are not to be put under the command of SACEUR. If there is a global war the fighters will be useless anyway. As we do not believe there will be a global war, what is really important is British trade interests. I am therefore very anxious indeed about how the Rambouillet agreement is to be handled. We must carry out this agreement honourably and not allow it to be whittled away by the Americans - or, if they do the whittling, it must be clear that we stand by our undertaking.

*HAM*

Decer.

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TOP SECRET

REC'D  
ARCHIVE/W  
11 JAN 1962 P/B/4  
ZPS/4 (E) (A)

TRIPARTITE GROUP

As I understand it, President Eisenhower, General de Gaulle and the Prime Minister have agreed that tripartite machinery should be established in London to operate on a "clandestine" basis, with the object of discussing "questions of interest in common to the three Governments".

2. It has not been agreed how this body should operate; who exactly should participate and how they should be camouflaged; nor even exactly what subjects they should discuss (with the exception of Africa which was, I think, generally agreed upon). But if I am not wrong such a body would have to be established in the comparatively near future in London, or General de Gaulle will think that our obligations towards him are not being met.

3. It also seems clear that once the body is established it would be in order for it to discuss, on the initiative of any one member, matters coming directly within the NATO sphere, though if it does so this should be kept absolutely dark. Certainly the General expects at some stage to submit to this group proposals for reorganising NATO, and unless I am mistaken he believes that this point also has been accepted by his colleagues. I know, of course, that the Prime Minister put in serious reservations and said that the proposed tripartite body "would need to be worked out in detail and thought about". He also said that it was "a serious matter which must be studied further". But what I feel is that General de Gaulle may think that these reservations relate to the details about how the proposed tripartite group should be organised, rather than to the establishment of the group which he presumably believes has been definitely decided on together, in a broad way, with its provisional agenda.

4. I should be most grateful if I could be informed in due course on the general way in which we now propose to handle the matter of the tripartite group. If the Americans should be found to have the same impression as regards the facts to that recorded above, I suppose that we should have preliminary discussions with them as

/to the


FO 371/154084

SECRET



1072/95G

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
BONN.



Dear Tony

Thank you for sending me a copy of your very clear and informative letter (WG 1074/1G) of January 13 to Sammy Hood, which contained instructions on how to handle the subjects of Germany and Berlin during the Summit preparations.

*wg 1074/15*

In paragraph 5 of your letter, you asked for my comments on the suggestion that the Germans might be invited to contribute a paper on the existing links between West Berlin and the Federal Republic. At the moment the Germans are hard at work trying to establish that Berlin is an integral part of the Federal Republic and that their consent must be obtained before the allies negotiate any change in Berlin's status (see, for instance, Marten's letter 10130 of January 19 to John Killick). The disadvantage of inviting the Germans to write a paper is that they will seize the opportunity to consolidate their case in an attempt to tie their allies' hands before East/West negotiations begin. The possible advantage would be that it would force the Germans to think out how their point of view can be justified against the Soviet contention that it is illegal. If consideration of the paper took place in Washington, as I imagine it would, the Americans and we might be able to make some impression on the Germans there. But that would not necessarily make the Chancellor budge an inch. On the contrary, he is absolutely opposed to any concession on Berlin, he fears that if negotiations on Berlin once get going with the Russians they will inevitably lead to concessions and therefore his whole aim is to restrict the scope of negotiations as rigidly as possible in advance.

If therefore, the Germans are invited to produce a paper, I think the Chancellor will make sure that the opportunity is used to make obstacles for us. However, we have somehow or other got to surmount these obstacles in the end. We are bound to consult the Germans on Berlin and it may be that the sooner we start the process, the further we shall get in the end. They will be able

/to ...

Sir Anthony Rumbold, Bart., C.B., C.M.G.,  
Foreign Office,  
London, S.W.1.

S E C R E T



to make out a good case for their economic links, which the three allied powers want them to maintain, but they will have some difficulty in defending their constitutional pretensions. It would be a good thing if they could be made to realise this - though I fear the Chancellor will be deaf to legal arguments (especially if they go against his general thesis). On balance, I am inclined to agree that the tactical advantage lies in asking them to produce a paper.

May I also comment on your other suggestion (in paragraph 3 of your letter) that the Germans should also be asked to produce a paper on communications between the Federal Republic and Berlin? There is no paper agreement providing for West German civilian and commercial traffic between West Germany and West Berlin. Since the whole morale and economy of West Berlin depends on this traffic, this is Berlin's Achilles heel, as no doubt the Russians and East Germans realise. To my mind one of the aims of any Summit negotiations on Berlin should try to be to get the Russians to accept that this traffic should be provided for in some form of contractual arrangement - and it would be worth making concessions of the kind contained in the western proposals of July 28, 1959, at Geneva to obtain this. The Federal Government would certainly like to have the conditions governing access codified and agreed - but on this point they have one of their worst blind spots. They think that if only the west is firm enough, they will get guarantees on access without making concessions of the July 28 kind. They further think that if the Russians and East Germans will not give guarantees, it does not matter - the other side will not (again provided we are "firm" enough) dare to put the squeeze on. We on the other hand see all too clearly that the Russians and/or East Germans could put the squeeze on at short notice, without risk to themselves and most effectively - and that there would be precious little we could do about it. Therefore I see considerable advantage in getting the Germans to produce a paper, which would show the vulnerability of their access to Berlin and the need to obtain guarantees for it in the future. I hope, however, that we could keep the three allied powers' access, which is an altogether different matter, resting on quadripartite agreements, out of the scope of the German paper. They have never had anything to do with the arrangements for our access and I do not think the present

/would ...

S E C R E T



would be a good moment for them to start learning this intricate business, on which our views and the Americans' are not completely aligned.

I am sending copies of this letter to Sammy Hood, Gladwyn Jebb, Frank Roberts and Tommy Tomlinson.

*Yours war  
Kit*

Christopher Steel

FD 371 / 152095

~~12/23/59~~ 23/59

Copy 10/11

P.D.

27.XII.1959

Sir E. Hoyle Miller  
Mr. Ramsay  
Sir A. Rambold  
10 Downing Street

Whitehall



TOP SECRET

FOREIGN SECRETARY

ZPS/3 / G

PERSONAL MINUTE

Serial No. M.520/59

I think that I have already recorded that I did mention to President Eisenhower in the car on the way to Rambouillet how pleased I was with the start which had been made in the Anglo-American Defence and Strategic Talks.

The President expressed his gratification, and said that he wished the Talks to continue. They should go on in Washington where there was complete cover because of all the staffs already there. I think that it was this last thought which prompted him to propose that the Tripartite Anglo-French-American Group should meet not in Washington but in London; as we value our Anglo-American Co-operation so much we should not be obstructive about establishing the Tripartite Group in London, tiresome though this may be for us in some ways.

HM

23.12.59.

A 371/152095

Copy kept  
PD  
27.11

Sir F. Hogan Mellor  
Sir R. Rams to the  
Sir A. Rambold

12/23  
G.M.O.



JAN 1960  
ZPS (3)

10 Downing Street  
Whitehall

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MINUTE

SECRET

FOREIGN SECRETARY

SERIAL No M. 522/59

1. I have heard rumours that the Americans are backpedalling the result of the Rambouillet meeting to the extent of even denying that the President agreed to the tripartite discussions in London. I am absolutely certain that if the President were appealed to he would confirm de Zulueta's account as completely accurate. I myself remember the actual words he used, for some of them stick in my mind as being rather unusual for him: clandestine, for instance. He even enumerated the kind of people he might send, a General, etc. All that part of the record is absolutely correct.
2. It would be fatal for our relations with de Gaulle if the Americans tried to backpedal; still more if they were to deny the truth of what the President said.
3. It would be still more fatal for us. For de Gaulle.

who now thinks that I have some credit in the President's willingness to meet his point of view, would be filled with suspicion and would think that I had doubled-crossed him.

4. If, therefore, there is any sign of the Americans backing out of what actually took place and was agreed, I think we must make it clear to the Americans that we cannot rest under the imputation of bad faith and will inform the French accordingly. I feel my personal honour is involved.

5. I did certainly at the end try to make some noises in favour of a bit of caution in organising the tripartite discussions. I said we must think over just how it was to be done, etc., etc.; but that is not denying the whole plan.

6. I do not think we need to be under any illusion. While de Gaulle no doubt thinks that some practical results may follow this kind of discussion, e.g., not pursuing contradictory policies in Africa, or helping to straighten out Laos, or certain broad strategic decisions, I do not suppose that he expects it to be



more than a useful piece of machinery if at any time he wants to use it. He might, for instance, use it after his explosion, to discuss his nuclear needs. But he knows quite well that from this triangle of Ambassadors, Generals, economists, etc., he would have to appeal for the great decisions to the great men, the President, etc. I therefore feel that de Gaulle is more interested in the fact of creating this tripartite machinery than in what it will do: while the President wants it to be clandestine and secret, de Gaulle wants it to be generally known to exist, for that, of course, gives him the necessary prestige.

7. If we and the Americans were really so afraid of tripartite discussions on the lines of de Gaulle's original memorandum, why did we agree to the Rambouillet timetable? When the three of us met from 10.30 a.m. to 12.30 p.m. and Chancellor Adenauer was only asked for cocktails at 12.30, the tripartite system came into being. If we or the Americans felt so strongly about it we should have objected to this.

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1/10/60

ZPSIS (G)

January 10, 1960.

1/4/6

In my letter of December 31 I said I hoped to give you an answer shortly to the question raised in your memorandum of December 22 about "tripartite consultation", and to tell you how things were developing on this subject.

There was a good deal of discussion about this question between the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State before the former left for Africa. The Prime Minister was at one moment inclined to think that we ought to take some initiative but in the end it was agreed that for the time being we should do nothing, but should wait until either the French or the Americans made some proposals for the setting up of these tripartite consultations. We here felt that the establishment of any kind of a formal organisation with high level ~~special~~ ~~permanency or some permanency~~ should be avoided - of only because its existence would be bound to become known and because the other NATO Governments would bitterly resent anything so closely resembling the creation of a political "standing group". We thought that what we should aim at was an extension of the existing system whereby we, the French and the Americans have for some months past been discussing matters of mutual interest - e.g. Laos, the Horn of Africa, etc., - in Washington. The talks would, however, take place in London and would be conducted clandestinely between the appropriate people from our side and members of the French and American Embassies or perhaps suitable individuals from Paris and Washington who could come to London from time to time quite privately.

permanent representatives

/Rather

Sir Gladwyn Jebb, G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.,  
C.B.,  
PARIS.

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Rather to our surprise we have heard nothing more on the subject since the Paris meeting. The Americans have, however, now taken the initiative and put forward certain proposals in a letter addressed to the Secretary of State by Herter on December 30 - though not delivered here until January 6. I enclose a copy of Herter's letter herein. From this you will see that his views are very much in line with ours and that he suggests that these tripartite conversations be conducted on quite informal lines. The Secretary of State feels that we should support Herter's proposals and has written to him accordingly. I enclose a copy of this letter from the Secretary of State herein.

In his letter of December 30 Herter told the Secretary of State that he was writing on similar terms to Couve. The Secretary of State would, therefore, like you now to see Couve as soon as possible and give him the substance of his letter of January 8 to Herter. He would have no objection to you reading this letter out to Couve but thinks it would be rather discourteous, actually to give Couve a copy of it.

In speaking to Couve the Secretary of State would like you to try to find out the French reaction to Herter's letter. In making your enquiries, he asks that you should not give the impression that we are disposed to drag our feet in any way, but at the same time you should also not give the impression that we are eagerly accepting the American proposals because they do not go so far as we had at one time feared they might. Our objective should be to get the French freely to accept what Herter has proposed as being the best way of carrying

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out the Rambouillet discussions. So in your talk with Couve you will, no doubt, be careful to avoid giving him any encouragement to suggest that Herter's proposals are inadequate.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Caccia.

(F. Hoyer Millar)

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12/30/59

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

December 30, 1959

*The S/S's reply is  
immediately behind.*

*Handed to S/S by Mr.  
Walworth Barbour*

*Kerboilford  
J 42*

*Sir F. Hoyer Millar*

SECRET

Dear Selwyn:

At the meeting of the Chiefs of State and Heads of Government of Great Britain, France, and the United States at Rambouillet on Sunday morning, December 20, there was, as you know, discussion of an arrangement for secret tripartite talks in London on matters of common concern, with the emphasis on subjects in this connection which are beyond the scope of NATO. President Eisenhower and I have discussed this, and in consequence I am writing to you and similarly to Couve de Murville to confirm our readiness to participate and to indicate to you the fashion in which we think such talks should be conducted in order to avoid the risk of their attracting public notice.

Our plan would be to name as our Senior Representative, Mr. Walworth Barbour, who is our Minister in the London Embassy. He would be assisted by the senior Economic Officer in the Embassy and by a military officer already stationed in London. In London, only these three participants and our Ambassador would have knowledge of the fact that talks were being held and we would arrange a secure line of communications for the dispatch of instructions from Washington and receipt of their reports.

It also occurs to me that in the interest of genuine privacy, the meetings as they are held from time to time might be in the form of private dinners in a residence, with the evening devoted to discussion.

For

The Right Honorable  
Selwyn Lloyd, C.B.E., T.D., Q.C., M.P.,  
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,  
London.

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For our part, we would be prepared to meet at any date agreeable to you and to Couve. It would be helpful, I think, if well in advance of the first meeting there could be an exchange among the three of us with respect to particular topics which one or the other desired to have raised.

I would appreciate a word from you by private letter when you have had a chance to consider the thoughts I express above. I have written Couve similarly and presume I will also be hearing from him. Ambassador Houghton and our Minister Cecil Lyon are the only two individuals in our Paris Embassy aware of these contemplated arrangements.

With every wish for a very happy New Year, I am

Sincerely,



Christian A. Herter

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17th May 1959  
12/20/59  
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Sent to Parsons,  
Warrens and Pogue.

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12/12/59

A ZONE OF INSPECTION OR LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS

Speaking in the House of Commons on December 4, the Secretary of State said:

"The first element, I repeat, in a stable Europe, is a reunified Germany under the military conditions to which I have just referred. The second element is that, as part of the security measures to allay any Soviet apprehensions, there should be a control system in Europe to guard against surprise attack - a control system that would consist of ground controls and of aerial inspection. I shall not go into the technicalities of this, because a conference of experts in Geneva is very laboriously seeking to get going a practical discussion upon what, from a technical point of view, this means. Thirdly, we believe that as part of a European settlement, including the reunification of Germany, it should be possible, in spite of all the difficulties about regional reductions of armaments, to have, in an area as large as possible, a system of agreed numbers and agreed levels of armaments. If it was too difficult to get that straight away - because of all the complications of agreeing the various levels, particularly those of armaments - we could start with a system of inspection of existing armaments. Indeed, the anti-surprise attack measures, and possibly even this idea of inspection, of existing armaments, might be attainable without a general European settlement."

2. Speaking in the House of Commons on February 19, Mr. Ormsby-Gore reverted to the idea in these terms:

"One of the elements in a system of security that would offer the Soviet Government relief from their apprehensions could be a control system to guard against surprise attack. The larger the area covered, the better it would be. There could also be a system of agreed numbers and agreed levels of armaments - again, over as wide an area as possible. Both these systems, one to provide against surprise attack and the other to provide for a controlled limitation of armaments, could be established before there was a general European political settlement .....

Mr. Gaitskell: Does that mean that the Right Honourable Gentleman would be prepared to support the proposals for controlled disarmament of East and West Germany - and Czechoslovakia and Hungary - without any agreement on German reunification?

Mr. Ormsby-Gore: I have said that a proposal for a zone of limited and controlled armaments is something that we can see as forming part of a process of reducing tension in Europe, and it would be part of a process for improving the present situation with regard to European security. I think that it would be a mistake for me to try to say this afternoon precisely at what stage this zone of limited armaments would be set up, but this, together

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with, perhaps, a much wider zone guarding against surprise attack, would, we believe, make a very definite contribution to allaying the perhaps reasonable apprehensions of the Soviet Government.

Mr. Gaitskell: But the Right Honourable Gentleman does not rule out agreement on this particular point, supposing we could not reach agreement on the wider issues?

Mr. Ormsby-Gore: I think that it would be a mistake to say where one would go if one did not get exactly what one would wish to get at any conference, but I have stated in fairly precise terms that we do favour a zone of controlled limitation of armaments such as I have described."

3. The communiqué issued at the end of the Prime Minister's visit to the Soviet Union contained a paragraph about the discussions which took place during the visit on questions relating to Germany. This paragraph ended as follows:

"In this connexion they agreed that further study could usefully be made of the possibilities of increasing security by some method of limitation of forces and weapons, both conventional and nuclear, in an agreed area of Europe, coupled with an appropriate system of inspection."

4. There was no detailed discussion of this idea with Mr. Khrushchev or Mr. Gromyko. However, Mr. Gromyko asked whether any distinction should be drawn in this context between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. To this question the Foreign Secretary made no reply. When the Russians asked what zone the British envisaged they were told that in 1957 we had accepted a zone from the Urals to the Atlantic and that that would still do. No specific proposals were made to the Russians for a smaller zone.

5. In public and in exchanges with our Allies, we have explained that the opening phrase in the passage quoted above, viz "in this connexion", means that a zone of the sort mentioned would have to be connected with a political settlement.

Visits to Paris, Bonn and Washington

6. In this series of visits the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State informed the other three Governments of what had passed while they were in the Soviet Union, including a reference to the question of a zone of inspection and limitation.

7. In Paris the Prime Minister presented the idea to General de Gaulle as something which would be, in a sense, the beginning of disarmament and also an anti-surprise attack measure. He also made the point that it was not quite true to say there would be no military significance in the idea. Inspection and control might be of value to us in gaining knowledge of Soviet aggressive intentions. The Prime Minister described as follows the three requirements which he thought must be made before we could agree to a zone of limitation of armaments. First, the balance of military advantage must not be disturbed. Secondly, such a zone must not result in the break-up of NATO. Thirdly, it must not involve United States ground forces leaving Europe.



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8. In Bonn, Dr. Adenauer was very worried about a zone of limitation. He saw no more than a difference of degree between this idea and that of disengagement. He thought the idea would reduce the defensive strength of the West. He regarded it as useless to set up measures against surprise attack in Europe when the Russians could flatten us with rockets from behind the Urals. He questioned whether we wanted store-houses for nuclear warheads, which are to be set up in Germany in the next few years, inspected by the Russians, when we could not inspect their rocket sites. The Prime Minister assured Dr. Adenauer that he was exaggerating the significance of what had passed between us and the Russians on this subject. The idea would help to meet propaganda in favour of disengagement and had indeed been attacked in the United Kingdom as a repudiation of the Rapacki Plan. Herr von Brentano said subsequently that he entirely understood our position and had no doubt or anxieties about it. In reply to his question the Secretary of State told him that we thought that an area of limitation of armaments should form part of a political arrangement.

9. In Washington the Prime Minister emphasised our dislike of disengagement, but explained that since it attracted worthy people it was necessary to put forward a constructive alternative. Hence his idea. The area he had in mind would not be coterminous with any political area and the limitations would not distinguish between nationalities or types of weapon. Acceptance of the principle of inspection would be a gain. The larger the area the better. President Eisenhower said that this sort of scheme might have advantages from the psychological angle. As a general principle it was desirable to obtain agreement on any mutually satisfactory scheme of inspection that could be devised in any context.

NATO Meeting in Washington

10. The following is a summary of the relevant part of the Secretary of State's speech:

"There has been much misunderstanding of our views. In our view any such plans must not discriminate against troops of particular countries or against particular weapons. It is not our intention to prevent German forces from being armed with nuclear weapons. We are not suggesting disengagement or anything like it. We regard disengagement as extremely dangerous. But we do think that inspection and limitation of armaments in an agreed area would provide some safeguard against surprise military action by the other side. It would also provide for the establishment of a control system which would be of value in itself and which could lead to increased confidence if it worked effectively. Finally it would give us a positive answer and not just a negative one to those who favour disengagement."

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Appendix 'B' to JP(60)16(Final)

MILITARY STRATEGY  
FOR CIRCUMSTANCES SHORT OF GLOBAL WAR  
1960 - 1970  
A JOINT STUDY

APPENDIX 'B'

A STUDY ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS

INTRODUCTION

Her Majesty's Government and the Western Allies believe in the policy of deterrence to war. The ultimate sanction of this policy is the strategic nuclear deterrent. They appreciate, however, that the strategic nuclear deterrent is not enough and that in conjunction with our Allies it must be supported by other forces. It is generally accepted that Russia will respect these complementary forces, in the knowledge that failure to do so will involve the unacceptable risk of a resulting global war. The possibility of war with Russia confined to Europe is therefore ruled out and is not considered further in this paper.

Emergence of Other Nuclear Powers

2. France has recently conducted her first nuclear test. China is likely to be the next nuclear power. She has indicated her aim to produce nuclear weapons and she could achieve a capability of military significance by the latter half of the 1960s. West Germany, Sweden and Canada are countries which, if the decisions were taken now, could likewise produce nuclear devices in some numbers by the later 1960s. There are a number of other potential, though less likely, nuclear powers and we cannot discount the possibility that nuclear weapons may become available to the armed forces of many countries.

3. The first nuclear devices produced by a country without external assistance may be expected to be relatively unsophisticated and are unlikely to be complemented for some time by advanced systems of delivery. An agreement between the USSR, USA and UK to ban nuclear tests would undoubtedly result in strong political pressure being brought to bear against any other power which sought to conduct nuclear tests. Although a crude type of weapon might be developed and stockpiled without testing, it is difficult to believe that any country would be willing to incur such an enormous expense for such an uncertain asset unless they felt strongly that their future position or future aims demanded on it.

The Problem

4. Views on the need for nuclear weapons and their possible uses are widely divergent and often emotional or prejudiced. Further, the complete lack of any precedent for their tactical employment - the use of nuclear weapons against Japan in 1945

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Appendix 'B' (Continued)

is not a valid analogy since at that time nuclear weapons were exclusively possessed by one country - and the vast number of associated political, psychological and ethical factors makes it difficult to formulate even a strictly military policy in this field. Yet the consequences of an incorrect appreciation of the need for them in circumstances short of global war could be so disastrous that it is essential for His Government to be fully advised on the military factors involved. We recognise, of course, that this is a problem which cannot be finally resolved on military grounds alone, and that even a military view cannot be formed without taking political factors into account.

#### PRELIMINARY POLITICAL ARGUMENTS

##### Influence with the United States and the Commonwealth

5. It is highly unlikely that the United Kingdom would ever engage in a war in which there was any question of using nuclear weapons unless the United States was in it too. On this basis it could be argued that the United States would have ample weapons for the support of the whole alliance and if she alone used them she would be the only country to attract the political odium involved; and that, in these circumstances, the United Kingdom would be ill-advised to spend vast sums of money on equipping her forces with these weapons. This argument may be countered as follows: the United Kingdom would be less likely to exert influence on United States policy for the use of nuclear weapons in conflicts short of global war, or indeed in other fields, if United Kingdom forces did not themselves have an appropriate and independently controlled nuclear capability.

6. We consider that His Government would always wish to retain as far as possible the ability to influence decisions of her allies which might result in the United Kingdom being exposed to the direct impact of nuclear warfare. In fact, arguments similar to those for an independently controlled contribution to the strategic deterrent to global war hold good for the provision of nuclear strike forces for other purposes. This argument should not be carried to extremes. So long as the United Kingdom has enough of her own weapons to ensure that due consideration is given to her views, His Government need not feel restrained from accepting some American nuclear weapons even with strings attached.

7. We believe that the existence of a United Kingdom contribution to the Western nuclear forces in the Far East would to some extent enhance our influence with certain members of the Commonwealth, particularly Australia and New Zealand.

##### Defensive Use in the Air and at Sea

8. One specific problem is whether a distinction can be drawn between the use of nuclear weapons against targets on land - with all the consequent dangers to non-combatants - and their defensive use against attacking aircraft or

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Appendix 'B' (Continued)

submarines in ways which could not directly damage non-combatants. In view of the far greater effectiveness of these weapons compared with high explosive, there would obviously be a strong military case for obtaining authority for their use from the outset, at least defensively, against targets in the air and/or at sea. This would be particularly so if the enemy could not reply in kind. We feel that HM Government might be less reluctant to give authority for their use defensively in the air and at sea, than they would be for their use against targets on land. It might be possible to go further and draw a distinction politically between their use at sea and their use from land bases against targets in the air.

9. However, if the enemy had nuclear weapons but had not used them, it might be militarily unwise to initiate their use in the defensive rôle if there were a danger of significant offensive retaliation. There would in any case be a risk of escalation, and to initiate their use would inevitably attract odium, even if they were used only in a limited and defensive rôle.

10. The control of nuclear weapons is an immense problem in itself. Once the decision had been made to use nuclear weapons, it is reasonable to assume that unrestricted authority could be delegated to the military commanders for their defensive use at sea and possibly high in the air over land bases. But we must assume that the employment of nuclear weapons against targets on land would continue to be subject to detailed political control, if only in the negative form of limitations on numbers and yield of weapons or on types of targets that might be engaged.

Credibility

11. If the leaders of the West were unable to decide between initiating the use of nuclear weapons and accepting defeat in limited war, they might well be tempted to resort to issuing an ultimatum to the enemy in order to gain time. Clearly, however, it would be folly to threaten the use of nuclear weapons if the responsible governments were not prepared to carry out their threats if the ultimatum failed. Such a bluff, once successfully called, would destroy all further hope of influencing affairs by the threat of nuclear attack, and therefore by any means at all. It might ultimately even affect the credibility of the strategic deterrent to global war. In fact a nuclear deterrent on any scale and in any circumstances must not only appear to be valid; it must genuinely be valid.

NATURE OF POSSIBLE WARS SHORT OF GLOBAL WAR

12. We have already examined the nature of the possible wars, short of global war, against which we ought to prepare. In

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Appendix 'B' (Continued)

this paper we refer to them only from the point of view of nuclear weapons.

Middle East and Africa

13. We doubt if Russia would allow herself to become involved in any operations in the Middle East since there could be no question of the war remaining limited. Either disengagement by one side or the other or swift escalation to global war would probably be inevitable. On the basis of present information we assume that no other potential enemy in the Middle East would have nuclear weapons by 1970 unless they had been supplied by Russia - a most unlikely possibility, as Russia could hardly accept the risks involved. However, even if Russia had supplied nuclear weapons, we cannot visualize the West initiating nuclear warfare in the Middle East or Africa, not only because of world opinion but because of the likely reaction in the United Kingdom. Neither can we visualize any Middle Eastern country initiating nuclear warfare against United Kingdom or other Western forces, if only because they would be inviting retaliation on a much larger scale. We do not therefore envisage the use of nuclear weapons in the kind of warfare we foresee in the Middle East or in Africa, and we doubt if the West's ability to deter aggression there - by any country other than Russia - would be strengthened if our forces in the area were known to be equipped with a more comprehensive nuclear capacity than we already commit to CENTO.

The Far East

14. It is only in the Far East, if deterrence were to fail and if aggression by China were to lead to war, that we see some possibility of nuclear weapons having to be used. Their use would carry the risk of escalation to global war, but since it would clearly be in the interests of Russia and the West to prevent the war spreading, on balance we think it would be wrong to assume that Russia would necessarily intervene.

15. Believing, as we do, that China will continue to wish to expand her influence in South East Asia and the Far East generally, we find it difficult to accept that she would hazard the hard-won material development of her homeland by resorting to direct aggression of a type which in her estimation carried the risk of nuclear retaliation. It is far more likely that she will continue to try to achieve her aims by all means short of this kind of aggression. We may expect her to rely on political penetration and covert infiltration or on direct intervention in circumstances which could be disowned or legally obscured, but backed by the implicit threat of her enormous conventional army.

16. The possibility remains that the leaders of China might assess that the risks of nuclear retaliation to open aggression were small, and that even if it did happen, in view of her vast size and growing population, she would be able to absorb it. The danger of open military aggression by the Chinese therefore remains, even though, for the benefit of world opinion, it would be likely to be dressed up as coming at the invitation

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Appendix 'B' (Continued)

of a 'legitimate' government in an arranged civil war. In this danger may lie the real nuclear dilemma for the West.

The Problem for the West

17. If the Chinese forces had no nuclear weapons and still launched open military aggression under any guise, the leaders of the West would be faced with the following possible courses of action:-

- (a) To abandon allies and interests and withdraw with ignominy in the face of the Chinese threat. This would lead to such a loss of confidence in the West and such a strengthening of world Communism that it would be a major disaster for the Free World.
- (b) To fight the Chinese with conventional weapons only. Even if HE was used without restriction this would inevitably lead to ultimate defeat in the field and, unless the Chinese aims were strictly limited, would lead to expulsion from the mainland of Asia before very long. The results of this course of action would be unlikely to be less disastrous than those of (a) above and would be much more expensive.
- (c) To use nuclear weapons but to limit their use strictly in scale and scope to the minimum thought necessary to enforce a pause - the kind of pause which would give time for international negotiations. In deciding on the scale and scope for nuclear attack, it would have to be remembered that, if nuclear weapons were not used in support of our land forces, the latter could well be lost. There could be some political merit in restricting the use of nuclear weapons to attacks on forces which had actually invaded allied or protected territory. On the other hand some countries might prefer occupation by the Chinese to damage from nuclear weapons, e.g. Laos or Thailand. If a pause were achieved by these means there is no guarantee that a favourable outcome for the West would follow. In fact the reverse might be the case if world opinion was so solidly against the Western powers concerned because they had initiated the use of nuclear weapons, that the West would feel inhibited from using them again on any future occasion.
- (d) To use nuclear weapons on military targets including military targets in China, on such a scale and over such an area as to defeat the Chinese aggressive plan decisively. This course of action might put an end to the open use of force for a very long time. On the other hand, the leaders of the West who agreed to order devastation on this scale would be faced with the odium of World opinion - at least in the short term - and, of course, they could not be sure how Russia would react.

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(e) Strategic nuclear attack on China. The dangers of the course of action in (a) above would apply to an even greater extent.

18. If, on the other hand, the Chinese had nuclear weapons, as they might well have by the end of the period, we feel that it is highly unlikely that they would be the first to use them. The advantage in conventional war is so obviously with the "big battalions". Besides this, we believe that political pressures, not least from Russia, would prevent the Chinese from initiating the use of nuclear weapons during the decade. At the same time the danger of Chinese retaliation with nuclear weapons must influence the decision of the West on their course of action.

19. It is abundantly clear from all this that the West would be faced with grave and difficult decisions if the Chinese were to initiate open offensive action. What is necessary is for the West to do everything it can to deter such Chinese action. This deterrent, to be credible in Chinese eyes, must consist of nuclear and conventional forces, which are seen to be capable of rapid reaction.

20. As already suggested in paragraph 5 above, there is another important reason for United Kingdom forces to be well equipped with nuclear weapons. In the Far East, whether or not the Chinese had nuclear weapons, there is a clear possibility of divergent views between the United States and the United Kingdom. And it is in this theatre that these divergences may be most pronounced and potentially dangerous. The possession there, under independent control, of nuclear weapons, with a means of delivery readily available, is necessary to ensure an effective voice for the United Kingdom in the determination of policy in this part of the world.

MILITARY REQUIREMENTS

21. If a genuine agreement on comprehensive disarmament comes about, and can be properly controlled and enforced, it may be assumed that the problems outlined above would not arise, or, if they did, that they would be on a scale with which some competent International Force - yet to be devised - could cope. But there is little, if any, prospect of a comprehensive disarmament agreement in time to affect the equipment of our forces in the next decade; so the rest of this paper will be based on the assumption that this possibility may be ignored.

22. We have ruled out the possibility of war with Russia confined to Europe and we see no need for our forces in the Middle East to be equipped with a more comprehensive nuclear armoury than we already commit to CENTO. But in the Far East two general ~~Western~~ requirements have been deduced. The first is to maintain a deterrent to open Chinese aggression which has the greatest possible chance of appearing credible in Chinese eyes. The second requirement is for the forces constituting this deterrent to be so equipped and capable of deployment that effective action could be ensured if the deterrent were to fail. In the latter case it would be

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fully for the West to have tied its hands in advance, by denying itself the choice of courses of action which it might want to take. It is therefore necessary to have forces which would enable the West to take nuclear action on the appropriate scale - from minimal to crushing (see paragraph 17 (c), (d) and (e)).

Nuclear Weapons for United Kingdom Forces

23. Strike Forces. It has already been deduced that the West as a whole must have a nuclear strike capability in the Far East, to which the United Kingdom must make an independently controlled contribution (paragraphs 19 and 20 above). This contribution will come from the nuclear strike forces of the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force.

24. Land Forces. So far as United Kingdom land forces are concerned, we are not convinced that the possession by them of tactical nuclear weapons would add appreciably to the credibility of the general deterrent to open Chinese aggression, nor to the United Kingdom's influence on the Americans. On the other hand, as the United States - and possibly at some later time the Chinese - land forces will be equipped with these weapons, there is a case for them if only on grounds of the morale of the United Kingdom forces concerned. Again, the prestige of the United Kingdom land forces might suffer, particularly in the eyes of Commonwealth countries, if we did not have these weapons. Obviously the possession of these weapons could not but greatly strengthen the fighting value of our small land forces should they have to fight an enemy of overwhelming conventional strength, but we are under no illusion that, even so, they would by themselves affect the eventual strategic outcome. Should these factors be considered important, and we think that they are, then a small number of short range weapons of low yield and limited range, for use only in the contact battle area, should be made available to our land forces. Given the availability of an independently controlled United Kingdom nuclear strike force, there would be no need for these particular weapons to be British.

Nuclear Air Defence

25. There are complex arguments for and against providing nuclear weapons in the Far East for the air defence of United Kingdom nuclear strike forces, including those which are carrier borne. On grounds of technical effectiveness there is no doubt that they are required against the far seen scale of Chinese air attack, especially when this could become nuclear. Our nuclear strike forces and their bases - on land or at sea - represent an enormous investment in terms of defence effort and military power, which warrants the best defence that can be provided. To some extent also the known existence of nuclear air defences might deter China from attacking these ships and bases, and would add to the credibility of the deterrent to Chinese aggression.

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UK EYES ONLY

Appendix 'B' (Continued)

26. It could be argued that the provision of such air defences is not vital because the credibility of the overall deterrent does not depend on them. On the other hand it is most important that the nuclear strike forces of the United Kingdom in the Far East should be seen by the Americans to be reasonably invulnerable to any possible Chinese action. On this account we take the view that they should be provided with nuclear air defence. This should apply to bases to be used by nuclear bombers, and to aircraft carriers with an actual or potential nuclear strike capability.

27. It is only our knowledge of political restrictions and financial limitations that has stopped us from recommending a more extensive scale of nuclear air defences which, on technical grounds, is so clearly desirable. The case we have made hinges on the overriding importance of preventing war and on the national importance of the United Kingdom nuclear strike forces, as an independent contribution to the Western deterrent, being seen to have the best possible defences.

#### Depth Charges

28. A convincing case based on technical effectiveness can also be made for the provision of nuclear depth charges. Their known existence could help to restrain and might even prevent submarine warfare by China. Moreover, initiation of their use by the West might not involve the same degree of political odium as the use of other nuclear weapons; on the other hand, if China had nuclear weapons, their use might result in an extension of nuclear warfare. On balance, we believe that the provision of such weapons is justified, but that there is no need for them to be British. We can accept "strings".

#### Alternative HE/Nuclear Weapons

29. HM Government would have much greater freedom of political manoeuvre if United Kingdom forces were equipped both for nuclear and for conventional warfare and could be used in either role. As far as practicable and economic, means of delivery should be capable of use with either type of weapon.

#### FINAL POLITICAL FACTORS

30. Local Reactions to Nuclear Weapons. The Colonial Office has pointed out that there is a risk that to equip forces based overseas with nuclear weapons might have adverse local repercussions. This, they consider, would particularly apply to Army weapons, which would be so much more obvious to the population; they would be bound to know of, resent and fear their presence. Generally the effect might be to reduce our security of tenure. This is clearly a factor to be borne in mind in considering the deployment of nuclear weapons in peace.

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Appendix 'B' (Continued)

31. Political Authority. The initial use of nuclear weapons, even in self defence, must be subject to political authority and HM Government cannot under any circumstances afford to take the risk of the premature detonation of nuclear war. This will pose a special difficulty for a unit or formation commander when faced with the choice of destruction by the enemy or of anticipating Government authority to use his nuclear weapons in a defensive role. To safeguard against the possibility of human fallibility, special controls will be required. We see no clear cut solution to this problem and it requires detailed examination.

32. Suspension of Nuclear Tests. An international agreement to suspend nuclear tests which is accepted by all countries including China would, provided it is properly safeguarded, be to the advantage of the West in the circumstances we have discussed in this paper. We consider that with the exception of weapons for air defence, the essential minimum of British made types of nuclear weapon, for purposes short of global war, can be met from those that have already been developed. The requirement for other weapons may be met from the United States.

CONCLUSIONS

General

33. A nuclear deterrent on any scale and in any circumstances must not only appear to be valid; it must genuinely be valid.

34. As far as is practicable and economic, means of delivery of nuclear weapons should also be capable of delivering high explosive weapons.

35. The risk of adverse local repercussions must be borne in mind when considering the deployment of nuclear weapons, particularly for the Army, in overseas bases in peacetime.

36. It is only in the Far East that we see any possibility of nuclear weapons having to be used.

Far East Theatre

37. It is important for the United Kingdom to have, in the Far East theatre, an effective and independently controlled nuclear capability, with a means of delivery readily available, in order to be able to influence United States policy and to contribute to deterring China from open aggression. This contribution will come from the nuclear strike forces of the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force.

38. The United Kingdom land forces in the Far East should have a small number of nuclear weapons of low yield and limited range capable of use only in the contact battle area. These weapons could be American with political strings attached.

39. Nuclear weapons are required in the Far East for the air defence of United Kingdom nuclear strike forces, including those which are carrier borne.

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Appendix 'B' (Concluded)

40. The provision of nuclear depth charges is justified in the Far East but there is no need for them to be of British manufacture.

41. A properly safeguarded agreement to suspend nuclear tests, which is accepted by all countries including China, would be to the advantage of the West in the circumstances we have discussed in this paper. With the exception of weapons for air defence, the essential minimum of British made types of nuclear weapon can be met from those that have already been developed.

Governmental Authority and Control

42. It is reasonable to assume that, once His Government had authorised the use of nuclear weapons, unrestricted authority would be given for their defensive use at sea and/or high in the air in ways which could not harm non-combatants; their use against land targets would still be subject to detailed political control.

43. To guard against the possibility of human fallibility leading to the unauthorised use of nuclear weapons and the consequent risk of the involuntary outbreak of nuclear war, special controls will be required. This problem should be examined in detail.

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PERSONAL  
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January 10, 1960.

You will have seen from the record of the talks at Rambouillet on December 20 between the President, General de Gaulle and the Prime Minister that in response to some remarks by de Gaulle about his desire to see closer cooperation between the three Governments, the President - rather unexpectedly - suggested that tripartite machinery should be established, on a clandestine basis, for discussing questions of common interest to the three Governments. He went on to suggest that these discussions might most suitably take place in London between suitable representatives of the three Governments including perhaps a service representative and an economic expert. The Prime Minister said that he agreed with this proposal.

We were rather surprised in Paris that the President had been so quick to respond to de Gaulle's suggestion and that he had gone so far to meet the French wishes, and a subsequent conversation between Herter and the Secretary of State in Paris suggested that the former had not then been aware of quite how far the President had gone. However that may be, it was clear that the President had in fact committed himself at Rambouillet to some kind of tripartite conversations in the future, provided these were kept secret; and it was equally clear that the President, having done this, it was out of the question for us to hang back or for the Prime Minister to withhold his agreement.

/Nothing

Sir Harold Gaccia, G.C.B., K.C.V.O.,  
WASHINGTON.

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Nothing more was said on the subject in Paris and it was not at all clear when we left what the next steps would be. There has been a good deal of discussion on the subject during the last few weeks between the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State. The former was at one time inclined to think that we ought perhaps to take some initiative in the matter but it was finally agreed that we for our part should do nothing for the time being, but wait until the French or the Americans made some proposals as to how these tripartite conversations should be held. It was our feeling here that anything like a formal organisation or ~~a~~ piece of machinery should be avoided, if only because it would be impossible to keep its existence secret. Furthermore, the other NATO countries would certainly bitterly resent anything like this, as was made very clear from what was said at the last meeting of the NATO Council in Paris. We thought, therefore, that the right thing to aim at was not the establishment of any formal group but the extension of the existing system whereby we, the French and the Americans have for some months past been discussing matters of mutual interest - e.g. Laos, the Horn of Africa, etc., - in Washington. Under the new arrangements the talks would take place in London and would be conducted clandestinely or discreetly by the appropriate people from our side and members of the French and American Embassies or perhaps suitable representatives from Paris and Washington who could come to London privately from time to time.

We also felt it very important that these tripartite discussions should not in any way come to be regarded as a substitute for, or more important than, the Anglo/American exchanges which we now have with them on a variety of subjects and in particular on defence matters. Fortunately

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the President had assured the Prime Minister in Paris that he was very pleased with the start which had been made in the recent Anglo/American defence talks and clearly indicated that he wished these to go on unimpeded in Washington. Indeed it was perhaps for this reason that he suggested that tripartite talks should take place in London. Herter made it equally clear when talking to the Secretary of State that the present system of Anglo/American consultation should not be affected by the setting on foot of any tripartite consultations.

... Rather to our surprise we have heard nothing more from the French since the Paris meeting. The Americans have, however, now taken the initiative, in the form of a letter to the Secretary of State from Herter dated Dec. January 30 (though only delivered on January 6). As you will see from the enclosed copy of this letter Herter's proposals are very much in line with our own thinking. He does not propose the establishment of any formal machinery, is insistent on the importance of secrecy and contemplates that the United States representatives will be individuals already stationed in London. The American proposal is in fact very much the kind of thing that we ourselves were thinking of and the Secretary of State feels that we should give it our support. He has, therefore, written accordingly to Herter and I enclose his letter herein together with a copy of it for your information. Would you please see that Herter gets the letter as soon as possible.

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I also enclose a copy of a letter to ~~Sir~~ Gladwyn Jebb asking him to give Couve de Murville the substance of the Secretary of State's reply to Herter.

(F. Hoyer Miller)

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FO 771/152095

1/17/60

Secretary of State

Please see the attached letter from Sir H. Caccia giving the initial reactions of Mr. Merchant (in Mr. Herter's absence) to your recent letter to Mr. Herter about the Rambouillet discussions. You will see from this that the Americans are inclined to leave it to the French to suggest both the date and the agenda for the first meeting, and that they are not inclined to take any further initiative themselves until they have got some definite indication of General de Gaulle's views. This is, I think, in line with our own thinking. Sir H. Caccia will by this time have got direct a copy of Sir G. Jebb's letter giving him an account of M. Couve's preliminary reactions. I do not think there is anything more for us to do in the meantime while we are waiting to hear what General de Gaulle's later views are, except to send a copy of this Washington letter to Sir G. Jebb - and to No. 10 if the Secretary of State agrees to my earlier suggestion that copies of the various letters be sent to them.

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2. On the subsidiary point raised by Mr. Merchant about the records of the Rambouillet talks, it will be remembered that our record, as first drafted by Mr. de Zulueta, implied that it was very definitely President Eisenhower who took the initiative in suggesting these tripartite conversations. This record was subsequently altered, on I think the Prime Minister's instructions, to show that General de Gaulle opened the conversation by some general remarks about the common interest of the three powers and the importance of them working closely together. Our record still, however, shows that the first mention of "tripartite machinery" came from the President, and suggests that he jumped in at once with this concrete proposal as soon as General de Gaulle had mentioned the matter in general terms.

*H. H. H. H. H.*

January 13, 1960

L. J. ... PD 14.1. N 13)  
 L. J. ... has seen  
 L. J. ... (for ... X)



FD 371 / 152-095

7/23/60

Paris, January 23, 1960

TRANSLATION

My dear Chris:

Christmas and New Year's delayed considerably the reply I owe you to your letter concerning the tripartite talks in London handed to me January 7 by Amory Houghton. As a matter of fact, the proposal you made raised a certain number of questions, and for this reason deserved reflection.

The establishment of tripartite meetings in London was suggested at Rambouillet December 21 by President Eisenhower and was accepted in principle by General de Gaulle and Mr. Macmillan. The follow-up to this decision in principle poses an organizational problem on the subject of which you were good enough to make some suggestions to me, and at the same time to Selwyn Lloyd. There is likewise a basic problem involved, that of determining the purpose of these meetings; and it is on this, it seems to me, we should come to agreement beforehand.

I do not believe that you envisaged the discussion of current affairs which are dealt with normally on a bilateral or triilateral basis, whether through our embassies or when our representatives or we ourselves meet. Our cooperation in this respect is now well enough established, whether we are dealing with a Summit Conference, Berlin, specific problems of Asia or Africa, economic matters, etc.

If we create a new procedure which would be both specific and secret, it can only be for different purposes, i. e., to deal with that which up to the present has either not been dealt with at all between us, or insufficiently, in other words - matters other than those of everyday concern. In our view, it is a question of political and, eventually, strategic coordination among the three countries on a global basis within the spirit of the memorandum which General de Gaulle sent to President Eisenhower and Mr. Macmillan on September 17, 1958. Such a task is obviously one which cannot be successfully carried out except at a high level, and it is for that reason the committee to be set up at London had been envisaged in the conversations at Rambouillet.

I would be pleased to know what you think of the foregoing considerations which, without raising major objections to the proposals you have outlined, are designed above all to seek to bring things as close as possible to the spirit of the discussions last December between our Heads of State.

Yours very sincerely,

Sgd. COUVE DE MURVILLE

FD 321/154083

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By Bag

INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

WG 1074/3

Sir H. Caccia

FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET) AND  
WHITEHALL (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION

No. 38 Saving  
January 26, 1960.

R. January 28, 1960

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 38. Saving of  
January 26.

Repeated for information Saving to: Paris  
Bonn  
Berlin  
Moscow  
UKDEL N'TO

SUMMIT - GERMANY AND BERLIN

The first meeting of the Working Group on Germany and Berlin took place yesterday afternoon, January 25. The four Governments were represented by Mr. Kohler (United States), M. Laloy (who had come from Quai d'Orsay), Herr Krapf (Germany) and Lord Hood.

2. Three papers were presented:-

(a) a United States paper entitled "Tactical Possibility" Relating to the German Peace Treaty issue, which sets out the idea of proposing the holding of a plebiscite in the two parts of Germany (text in my immediately following Saving telegram);

(b) a German "Analysis of the Situation" (text in my second immediately following Saving telegram); and

(c) a German paper on "Western Positions and Tactics".

3. The meeting left discussion of these papers until later, but, commenting on the German analysis paper, Mr. Kohler asked what would happen if after no progress had been made on the Berlin problem at the Summit, Khrushchev signed the Peace Treaty with

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Washington telegram No. 38 Saving to Foreign Office

- 2 -

the D.D.R. We would then have to act on our contingency plans and risk a major war. Later he asked the German representative whether his Government believed the Western proposals of July 28 to be inconsistent with the maintenance of Allied rights in Berlin. To this the German representative replied that they regarded them as the limit to which the Allies should go, and that at the Summit the Allied starting position should be such that it would be difficult for Khrushchev to force the Allies back to them.

4. M. Laloy made the following points:-

(a) We could hope at the Summit to arrive at certain limited agreements on subjects other than Germany and Berlin which would be sufficiently attractive to Khrushchev that he would not risk jeopardizing them by, for example, signing a separate Peace Treaty.

(b) The German tactics paper had suggested certain features that might be worked into proposals on Berlin in order to prevent the Russians pushing us beyond the July 28 proposals.

Two other ways of doing this might also be considered:-

(i) The West could tell Khrushchev that they are content with the present situation in Berlin and the onus is on him to produce new proposals.

(ii) The West could revive its proposals for a solution for all Berlin, taking them out of the Western peace plan. This would give room for manoeuvre, and would also re-establish the idea of reciprocal concessions.

The July 28 proposals had been one-sided.

/ (c).....

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Washington telegram No. 38 Saving to Foreign Office

- 3 -

(c) The West should be ready at the Summit to refute in public the Soviet argument that the Japanese Peace Treaty gives them a precedent for a separate treaty with the D.D.R.

(d) As it is unlikely that much more than one day's discussion could be given to Germany and Berlin at the Summit, proposals should be stated in the simplest terms and tactics need not be elaborate. Proposals involving machinery to continue study after the Summit would be useful.

5. M. Laloy is remaining in Washington until the end of this week. The next meeting of the Working Group will be on the afternoon of January 27.

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FO 371 / 154083

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BY BAG

INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir H. Caccia.

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND  
WHITEHALL SECRET DISTRIBUTION

No. 50 SAVING  
of January 28, 1960.

R. January 30, 1960.

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 50 SAVING  
of January 28, 1960.

Repeated for information Saving to:

|            |        |
|------------|--------|
| Paris      | No. 37 |
| Bonn       | No. 22 |
| Berlin     | No. 7  |
| Moscow     | No. 34 |
| UKDEL NATO | No. 33 |

My telegram No. 38 Saving / of January 26 / 241074/3

Summit - Germany and Berlin.

The Working Group on Germany and Berlin met on January 27 to discuss the three papers tabled at the last meeting.

United States paper on "Tactical Possibility Relating to the German Peace Treaty Issue" (text in my telegram No. 39 Saving).

2. M. Laloy welcomed the idea of a diversionary proposal to counter the Soviet Peace Treaty proposal. This was certainly better than considering a Peace Treaty of our own. As regards proposing a plebiscite, he thought we would have to be very careful about the formulation of any proposal, as the Russians might try to bring in some awkward subject like the rearmament of the Federal Republic. Lord Hood said he thought the American suggestion might give useful tactical advantage to the Western Heads of Government at a Summit meeting. We could not be sure that the Russians would reject it out of hand, and we would have

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- 2 -

Washington telegram No. 50 Saving to Foreign Office

to be satisfied that we could secure adequate supervision. Herr Krapf welcomed the paper. Mr. Kohler said that the proposal had been made with the idea that if it was rejected by the Russians, the West could get propaganda advantages from the principle of self-determination invoked in it, but they had in mind that the proposal must be one that we could live with, in case the Russians accepted it.

German paper on "Analysis of the Situation"

(my telegram No. 40 Saving).

3. Lord Hood said that this paper omitted mention of the ability of the Russians to cause a crisis without risking war. It did not bring out that the Russians are able to put the onus for starting a war on the West. He noted the German view that the objective of the Soviet Union at the Summit conference might be an interim agreement.

4. There was a discussion of whether the Russians were more likely to interfere with civil traffic between Berlin and the Federal Republic or with Allied communications. The French seemed to think that we should pay most attention to the possibility of interference with Allied traffic, where any attempt by the Russians to interfere (e.g. by changing the nature of stamps) could be built up into a crisis. Though the military balance in Berlin might look bad, the political balance was more in our favour. Mr. Kohler said that, nevertheless, we should face the possibility that interference would be with German civilian traffic. Herr Krapf said there must be some limits to the price we should pay to buy off the Russians. We should engage them in a war of nerves and emphasize the danger of pressing us / too hard.

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- 3 -

Washington telegram No. 50 Saving to Foreign Office

too hard. To this Mr. Kohler replied that our actions must be seen to suit our words. He quoted the German delay in making alert preparations as something which is bound to lead the Russians to think that we did not mean business.

5. It was agreed that this paper should be co-ordinated with the paper on Soviet intentions prepared for the Western Heads of Government meeting.

German paper on Tactics (my telegram No. 41 Saving).

6. The Germans explained that the reference in paragraph 2 to the proposal to form a four-power group was a reference to the Bundestag Resolution of 1958. M. Laloy pointed out the danger that the Russians might agree to such a proposal and then just fail to attend. The role of the four powers would then be frustrated, and we would be left with something very like an all-German Committee.

7. Lord Hood questioned the paper's conclusion that new proposals on Berlin alone were ruled out. He asked why the paper implied criticism of the July 28 proposals. Herr Krapf said that the last line of retreat should not be occupied too early. In any case, the July 28 proposals contained features which the Federal Government could not easily accept:-

(a) Any reduction in the strength of Allied troops in Berlin would suggest that they would slowly disappear. They carried out important police functions which would not be adequately done by the Berlin police who were less insulated from Communist influence.

(b) The proposals on propaganda activities would give / opportunity

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Washington telegram No. 50 Saving to Foreign Office

opportunity for the Communists to interfere with the freedom of the West Berlin press.

- (c) By comparison with the proposals of June 16 the duration of the arrangement would be much shorter. Any reference to a short period of years would inhibit investment in Berlin.

8. M. Laloy argued that there was little difference between the July 28 proposals and the June 10 proposals, even as regards duration. He accepted the need to gain room for manoeuvre; there might not, however, be much time for manoeuvre at the Summit, and it might be better for the Heads of Government to confine their discussion to essential principles which must underlie any solution and not get into detail. They would avoid the appearance of deliberately introducing complications. Lord Hood said that, nevertheless, it would be useful, even as background, to have a study made of the political and economic links between Berlin and the Federal Republic. M. Laloy agreed, and suggested that in addition a tripartite military study should be made of the possibility of reducing Allied troops in Berlin. The recent flag incidents might have provided relevant experience.

9. The Americans asked the Germans to clarify some of the underlying implications of their two papers. Did they hold that no solutions of the problems of Germany and Berlin could be negotiated? If so, what would follow the break off of negotiations? Would it be a freeze as followed the 1949 blockade of Berlin or would the Russians proceed to hand over controls to the East Germans? They also asked the Germans to say whether they supported argument used in the German press (Der Mittag was mentioned, but see also Article in Die Welt

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- 5 -

Washington telegram No. 50 Saving to Foreign Office

enclosed in Marten's letter to Killick of January 19) that no change could be made in Berlin without the approval of the Federal Government. M. Laloy said that the issue was not really whether the crisis would continue or not, but whether we could live with the crisis. He thought it might be possible to persuade the Russians that any change in the situation in Berlin would be for the worse.

10. Discussing tasks of the Working Group, M. Laloy said that he thought they should aim at giving the Heads of Government brief statements of the principles involved with more detailed annexes attached.

He tabled two preliminary drafts:-

- (a) Principles of the Allied position (text in my immediately following Saving telegram).
- (b) Advantages and disadvantages of the suggestion of a new agreement for Berlin (text in my second immediately following Saving telegram).

The Americans tabled a paper comparing the Japanese Peace Treaty with the Soviet Peace Treaty proposal (text in my third immediately following Saving telegram), and said they would put in a paper on minimum requirements to be secured by any Berlin settlement. The Germans undertook to produce a paper on the relations between Berlin and the Federal Republic and how the Russians might interfere with them. The next meeting will be held on January 29.

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INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

RECEIVED  
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By Bag

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND  
WHITEHALL SECRET DISTRIBUTION

Sir H. Caccia  
No. 51 Saving  
January 28, 1960

R. January 30, 1960

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 51 Saving of  
January 28.

Repeated for information Saving to: Paris  
Bonn Berlin  
Moscow UKDEL N.A.T.O.

WG1074

My immediately preceding telegram [January 28].

Summit: Berlin and Germany.

Following is text of French paper on principles of the  
Allied position in Berlin:-

Principes de la position alliée

- Maintien de la position juridique (à défaut de laquelle les garnisons alliées n'ont plus de raison d'être).
- Maintien des troupes.
- Liberté des communications alliées et allemandes.
- Maintien des liens existants entre Berlin et la République Fédérale.
- Maintien des responsabilités alliées à l'égard de la réunification (pas de reconnaissance de la RDA).
- L'accord ne peut être dénoncé que par consentement mutuel.

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FD 371 (154083)

1/28/60

1 FEB 1960  
WG 1074/9.

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INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

By Bag

FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET) AND  
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Sir H. Caccia  
No. 52 Saving  
January 28, 1960

R: January 30, 1960

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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 52 Saving of  
January 28.

Repeated for information Saving to: Paris. Bonn.  
Berlin. Moscow. U.K. Del. N.A.T.O.  
WG 1074

My two immediately preceding telegrams [January 28].

SUMMIT: BERLIN AND GERMANY

Following is text of French paper on the advantages and disadvantages of a new agreement for Berlin:-

HYPOTHESE D'UN NOUVEAU STATUT

Inconvénients:

- consacre la division du Grand-Berlin
- entraîne la participation de la DDR qui conduit à sa reconnaissance par les Alliés
- annule la garantie de l'OTAN
- n'apporte pas de sécurité supplémentaire car, plus que le précédent, il dépend de la bonne volonté soviétique.
- supprime la justification de la présence des troupes alliées.

Avantages:

- peut améliorer les modalités de communications
- évite une crise.

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FD 371/154084

1/30/60

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INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

LOG 1074/12

By Bag

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Sir H. Caccia

No. 62 Saving

January 30, 1960.

R. February 1, 1960.

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 62 Saving of  
January 30.

Repeated for information Saving to: Paris Bonn  
Berlin Moscow  
UKDEL NATO

My telegram No. 50 Saving of January 28: SUBMIT - GERMANY  
AND BERLIN.

M. Laloy returns to Paris this weekend. To take advantage of his presence, a third meeting of the Working Group was arranged for this afternoon, January 29.

French Papers (texts in my telegrams Nos. 51 Saving and 52 Saving).

2. We were asked for our views. We agreed that the Working Group should discuss the propositions put forward. It would have to discuss whether the present legal basis was the only one which the allied position, and in particular the presence of allied troops in West Berlin, could be maintained. Herr Krapf said that any new arrangement could be easily terminated by the Russians. If it involved any reduction in the present level of allied troops in Berlin, West Berliners might no longer feel that the NATO shield protected them. M. Laloy said that every attempt to find an alternative basis for the presence of allied troops in Berlin had come up against the difficulty that if they were not there as occupation troops it was very difficult to find any reason for their presence which the Russians could be expected to accept.

3. The Americans said that in their study of minimum requirements to be secured by any Berlin settlement (which they now apparently do not intend to table but to draw upon in discussion) they had dealt with practical matters rather than principles. They had thought that there were ten things which any settlement must secure for West Berlin:-

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Washington telegram No. 62 Saving to Foreign Office

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- (a) Internal security.
- (b) Some "trip-wire" arrangement.
- (c) A guarantee that any Russian interference would meet the retaliation of the Western Powers.
- (d) Machinery for redress of grievances of the West Berliners.
- (e) Relative freedom of access.
- (f) Currency, banking and Customs Union with Federal German Republic.
- (g) Economic Support.
- (h) Representation abroad. (The German representatives looked puzzled at this, and the Americans added "of course, this was done at present by the West Germans".)
- (i) Procedure for applying to West Berlin treaties and legislation of the Federal German Republic.
- (j) High morale and forward motion.

American paper on comparison with Japanese Peace Treaty (text in my telegram No. 53 Saving).

4. M. Laloy wondered whether something could not be made of the fact that the Treaty had not affected the Russian occupation of certain Japanese islands; the Russians were at this moment making use of their position in those islands in their relations with Japan. Mr. Kohler recalled that Khrushchev had said that he personally thought that the Russians ought to have signed the Japanese Peace Treaty.

5. The Americans then tabled a paper on the alleged parallel between the failure to hold free elections in Vietnam and the failure to hold free elections in Germany (text in my immediately following Saving telegram). They admitted that the situation disclosed in the paper was far from satisfactory.

6. Mr. Kohler referred to an article by Sydney Gruson in today's "New York Times" reporting from Bonn that the Federal Government were about to claim a right of veto on any Berlin settlement. He said the State Department had been told to expect a paper from the Federal Government on the legal status of Berlin. He read out

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Washington telegram No. 62 Saving to Foreign Office

-3-

guidance to United States press officers (see my telegram No. 171). Herr Krapf said he had no indication that it was the intention of his Government to make this claim, and he did not think it was made in the paper the Federal Government were drafting.

Mr. Kohler added that in effect all four Governments had a veto, but for the Federal Government to advance a formal claim to one based on the alleged incorporation of West Berlin into West Germany would only undermine the occupation rights to which the Federal Government attached so much importance.

7. In a discussion about future work it was suggested that the Western peace plan might be looked at a little later on when it might be possible to know whether developments in the disarmament field might necessitate changes.

8. It was agreed that the Working Group should meet in future at least once a week. Next week's meeting will be to receive considered comments on any of the papers tabled so far.

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INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM  
FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

LOG 1674/13

By Bag

FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET) AND  
WHITEHALL (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION

Sir H. Caccia

No. 63 Saving  
January 30, 1960

R. February 1, 1960

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 63 Saving of  
January 30.

Repeated for information Saving to:

- Paris
- Bonn
- Berlin
- Moscow
- U.K. Del. N.A.T.O.

My immediately preceding telegram [January 30]:

Summit - Germany and Berlin.

Following is text of the United States paper on "Alleged parallel between the failure to hold free elections in Viet Nam and the failure to hold free elections in Germany":-

Begins.

Anticipated Soviet Position

The West cannot criticise Soviet reluctance to hold free elections to achieve German reunification because the West itself has not permitted the holding of free elections in Viet Nam, as required by the Final Declaration of the 1954 Geneva Conference.

Discussion

The Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference called for a settlement of the Viet Nameese problem which, among others, would permit the Viet Nameese to enjoy the "fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result of free general elections by secret ballot." It was indicated, more implicitly than explicitly, that the general elections were to help bring about the unification of Viet Nam. The elections were scheduled for 1956, and an international commission was to supervise both the elections and the preparations therefor. Consultation between the two zones of Viet Nam was to take place.



S E C R E T

Washington telegram No. 63 Saving to Foreign Office

- 2 -

The elections did not take place in 1956, and there is no prospect that they will be held in the near future. The principal obstacle has been the forceful opposition of the Viet Nameese to holding free elections as long as the northern part of Viet Nam is Communist-controlled and as long as the people of the area therefore cannot enjoy democratic freedoms permitting democratic organization for the elections. (There is also real concern that elections under existing situations would result in sizeable if not predominantly pro-communist returns. It should also be noted that in regard to both population and economic capacity, South Viet Nam is definitely in a far weaker position vis-à-vis North Viet Nam than is West Germany vis-à-vis East Germany.) The Viet Nameese protested at the Geneva Conference the inclusion of provisions concerning elections as not considering the "deep aspirations" of the Viet Nameese people. Since it was not a signatory to the agreements of the Conference, the Viet Nameese Government also does not consider itself legally bound to accept the decisions or suggestions of the International Supervisory Commission.

The idea of "free elections" was first suggested by the Communists, and it has been supported extensively in Soviet propaganda output. North Viet Nameese have also repeatedly pressed for the development of contacts and negotiations to "normalize" relations between the two Governments and have generally held the initiative. In the last several years, the South Viet Nameese have tended to express publicly somewhat less disregard for the decisions of the Geneva Conference than previously, but they have also tended to impose conditions requiring generally free elections which have not been accepted by North Viet Nameese representatives.

The United States is not a signatory to the agreements of the Geneva Conference, although it did declare unilaterally that it would refrain from the "threat or the use of force" to disturb the armistice and other Geneva agreements. Thus its responsibilities in Viet Nam are somewhat different from those of the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union, who were signatories. The United States does not oppose free elections in Viet Nam provided the freedom of such elections can be fully guaranteed. The United States has reiterated its traditional position that peoples are entitled to determine their own future, and that it would not join in agreements which might hinder this. The United States feels that the desires of the South Viet Nameese regarding the measures to achieve the unification of their country cannot be neglected.

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S E C R E T

Washington telegram No. 63 Saving to Foreign Office

- 3 -

In general, the strongest counter to the anticipated Soviet argument would seem to be that none of the Four Powers - the United States, the United Kingdom, France, or the Soviet Union - has responsibilities in Viet Nam comparable to those which all bear for the reunification of Germany, the latter stemming as they do from conquest and occupation. This might succeed in refocussing attention on the discussions of the German problem. It might also forestall anticipated Soviet charges that the West in fact fears strong Communist gains would result from elections in Viet Nam and that the West is therefore taking no significant steps to carry out the provisions of the Geneva Conference.

Western attempts to counter the Soviet argument by referring to the necessity for the Viet Nameese to settle their own problems would inevitably invite Soviet responses that the East and West Germans should also settle their problems themselves. (There has been concern, for example, that "consultations" envisaged between the two zones of Viet Nam would result in the establishment of a de facto government prior to the holding of elections.) This approach might also induce Soviet suggestions that the West is really seeking to distance itself from a solution of the Viet Nameese problem, which in turn might invite further Soviet comment that it was seeking to do just that vis-à-vis the German problem by signing a separate peace treaty with the East Germans and leaving the rest to the "two Germanies".

Undue Western stress on the South Viet Nameese attitude as the impediment to holding free elections might permit the Soviet Union to counter with the comment that it could not therefore be expected to permit free elections in Germany when it was so obvious that the citizens of West Germany were not imbued with "true" democratic and socialistic concepts - as defined by the Communists.

In countering Soviet stress on the Viet Nam analogy, little would be gained by a Western response that it favours free elections in Viet Nam as it does in all of Germany (subject, of course, to appropriate safeguards), and then seeking to return the discussions to Germany. Not only would this tactic probably result in a resumption or continuation of past semantic battles regarding the definitions of "free elections" and "appropriate safeguards"; any discussion of free elections in Viet Nam would almost certainly affect adversely, and be affected by, the extreme sensitivities of the Viet Nameese on this issue.

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Fo 321/154084

2/2/60

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OUTWARD SAVING TELEGRAM

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

By Bag

WG-1074/114

No. 478 Saving

February 2, 1960

OUTFILE

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND

WHITEHALL SECRET DISTRIBUTION

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Addressed to Washington telegram No. 478 Saving of February 2.

Repeated for information Saving to Paris No. 231

Berlin No. 11

Ukdel N.A.T.O. No. 223

Bonn No. 117

Moscow No. 113

Your telegrams Nos. 38-41, 50-53 and 62-64 Saving of January 26 - January 30: Summit - Germany and Berlin.

It is satisfactory that the Americans are so clearly prepared to take the lead in the Four Power Working Group.

You should allow the process to continue.

2. We find their statement of the minimum requirements to be secured by any Berlin settlement (paragraph 3 of your telegram No. 62 Saving) to be the most interesting part of the discussions so far and you should say that you accept it. We imagine that the Americans will make it a point of departure for the development of their ideas about the possibility of reputation even status. (see also paragraph 7 below).

3. As none of the papers so far tabled are designed for actual use at the Summit, we see no need for you to comment on them in detail. You may however make use of some of the comments given below. You should continue to refrain from tabling any paper of your own.

4. We agree with the comments already made (paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 50 Saving) on the American paper "Tactical Possibility Relating to the German Peace Treaty Issue". Even if this is accepted as a purely propaganda exercise, there is the danger that the Russians may counter by proposing a plebiscite, not merely about the nuclear arming of the two parts of Germany but also about the possibility of an All-German Committee. The East Germans are actively demanding a referendum on both these subjects in their own propaganda, there is also the objection

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Foreign Office telegram No. 478 Saving to Washington

- 2 -

that given the limited time likely to be available at the Summit there will not be the same scope for propaganda gambits as there was, for example, at Geneva. But you should not pour too much cold water on the American idea.

5. The two fundamental weaknesses of the German paper "Analysis of the Situation" are (a) that it takes no account of Soviet/D.D.R. non-military pressure on Berlin, and (b) that it simply does not face up to the difficulties which would arise from unilateral Soviet action. You have already made the first point and it is clear that the Americans are determined to make the Germans face up to the realities of the second problem. I doubt therefore whether there is any need to say anything more about this paper.

6. As regards the German paper on "Western Position and Tactics", you should challenge the statement in the first sentence of paragraph 7. It is quite untrue that it was agreed in Paris last December that "negotiations at the Summit should on no account begin where the Geneva negotiations ended". The point was never discussed and you should ask the Germans for an explanation. The third suggestion in paragraph 8 of this paper provides a suitable opportunity to suggest that the Germans should produce a paper on improved communications between West Berlin and the Federal Republic about which you are already briefed.

7. We think that the American statement on minimum requirements in paragraph 3 of your telegram No. 62 Saving is a better way of approaching the problem than the French paper on "Principles of the Allied Position". The former really deals with principles whereas the French paper jumps straight to conclusions about how the minimum requirements should be met. It may be that the French conclusions are correct but it would be better to argue the point from fundamentals which is what the American list does.

8. As regards the other French paper, we think that every French proposition on the disadvantages of a new agreement for Berlin is questionable. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that we would be sanctifying the division of Berlin because there could be provision in the agreement for the maintenance of free movement within the city. Moreover the agreement can be framed in such a way as to be without prejudice to the question of East Berlin. Similarly the Russians have repeatedly made it plain that

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Foreign Office telegram No. 478 Saving to Washington

- 3 -

the question of our difficulties regarding D.D.R. recognition could be overcome. The question of the N.A.T.O. guarantee could be dealt with by altering the form of the guarantee. We see no reason for the proposition that a new agreement would depend more on Soviet goodwill than the present position. Indeed, we would have thought that an up-to-date agreement with the Russians would make it more, rather than less, difficult for the Russians to upset it. The whole trouble relates to the nature of what is to be agreed. Finally, we should have thought it quite possible, provided that the Russians were prepared to agree, to find a new justification for the presence of Western troops e.g. the wish of the West Berliners or simply the terms of the quadripartite agreement itself. We leave it to you to decide whether you think it would serve any useful purpose to make these points in the specific context of the French paper.

9. We have no comments on the American papers in your telegrams Nos. 53 and 63 Saving but they provide useful background information.

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Oct 30

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

February 3, 1960

TOP SECRET

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Dear Selwyn:

For your most confidential information I am enclosing a copy of a letter Couve wrote me on January 23 which came in a little over a week ago, together with a copy of my reply.

It seems to me that there has been some misunderstanding on the French side. From Couve's letter their purpose is the establishment of the sort of tripartite machinery which General de Gaulle proposed to the President and to Harold Macmillan in September, 1958, and which we both found unacceptable. Accordingly, what I have done in my reply is to attempt to sidestep this proposal while meeting in substance what the French have in mind. I would appreciate your thoughts on the matter as it now stands.

With warmest personal regards,

Most sincerely,

Christian A. Herter

Enclosures:  
As stated.

The Right Honorable  
Selwyn Lloyd, C.B.E., T.D., Q.C., M.P.,  
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,  
London.

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

February 3, 1960

Dear Couve:

Thank you for your letter of January 23 which has just arrived. I have been reflecting on your comments concerning the possibility of tripartite meetings in London. Incidentally, it was the President who suggested the place but it was General de Gaulle who raised at Rambouillet on December 21 the desirability of holding private tripartite talks along the lines we have been discussing.

I agree with you that we have been talking together bilaterally and with the British on a variety of matters of common concern during recent months, and, as you say, our cooperation is well enough established, employing the level and place of discussion most suitable for the topic at hand. Certainly we have felt that the tripartite talks in Washington in which Mervé Alphand, supported from time to time by officials from Paris, has represented France have been extremely valuable, and, if you have no desire to shift the location for this sort of tripartite consultation away from Washington, we for our part are only too happy to leave matters as they now stand.

In light of what you say concerning consideration of global political and strategic matters, I am inclined to think that the suggestion which I made to you in my letter of December 30 is inadequate. By their very nature, periodic talks on such subjects I suppose would best be dealt with by you, Selwyn, and myself together with high ranking military officers as occasion might demand. Tripartite discussions at this level on any regular basis could scarcely fail to attract public notice and, in any event, given the demands on all three of us, would be difficult to arrange with regularity. Moreover, as you know, we are anxious to avoid pursuing our consultations, intimate as we wish them to be, in a manner which would distress our other allies.

His Excellency  
Maurice Couve de Murville,  
Minister of Foreign Affairs  
of the French Republic,  
Paris.

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In light of these thoughts, my suggestion would be that we retain our present tripartite consultative arrangements in Washington and hold such meetings more rather than less frequently. In this connection, for example, we have not completed the exchanges we visualized on Africa and have been rather waiting for further word from you. This informal machinery, supplemented by special working groups as, for example, have been made necessary by preparations for the Summit Conference, should, I think, assure that you, we, and the British keep closely in touch with the development of each other's thoughts on a whole range of matters in which we share a common interest or responsibility. Then, for more rarefied exchanges of views on policy and strategy around the world, I would suggest that we three depend on informal dinners and evenings together in a very restricted group on occasions which bring us together for other purposes such as NATO meetings or other conferences.

I am passing on to Selwyn the further development of my thinking as I have outlined it above after reflecting on your letter and I assume that you have been keeping Selwyn informed of your own thoughts.

with warmest personal regards,

Most sincerely,

Christian A. Herter

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INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM

BY BAG

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir H. Caccia

FOREIGN OFFICE AND

No. 73 Saving

WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

February 3, 1960.

R. February 5, 1960

PRIORITY

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 73 Saving of February 3.

Repeated for information Saving to: Paris No. 63  
UKDEL NATO No. 54.

PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE

Defence Cooperation in the Nuclear Field.

At his press conference today the President was asked questions in the light of a report in the New York Times to the effect that the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy had held a secret hearing to discuss "whether the Administration planned to place atomic weapons in the hands of certain military allies". The following are extracts from his reply:-

"The atomic energy law says what information the Executive can give to particular nations and it defines rather accurately the nations to whom we can give it. As far as giving away the bombs, this cannot be done under existing law. I believe that where we are allied with other nations and are trying to arm ourselves to make certain of our defence we should try to arm them in such ways as to make that defence more strong and more secure. I would never

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Washington telegram No. 73 Saving to Foreign Office

- 2 -

give any information, even if the law permitted, that was still, in our opinion, not available to the Russians. But in cases where the Russians have the information it is pretty hard for me to understand why we don't do something with our allies so long as they themselves stand with us firmly against the probable aggressive intent of Communism."

"I have always believed that we should not deny to our allies what our enemies or potential enemies already have. Allies should be treated as allies, not as junior members of a firm who are to be seen but not heard. So I think it would be better, in the interests of the United States, to make our law more liberal as long as we apply it to countries which we are confident would stand by us in time of trouble."

Prem 11/293)

INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM

By Bag

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

FOREIGN OFFICE AND  
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir H. Caccia

No. 84 Saving  
February 6, 1960

R. February 9, 1960

PRIORITY

My telegram No. 222 /of February 5/.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS COOPERATION

Following is text of statement issued by Senator Anderson, Chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, on February 3:-

My attention has been called to the President's statement at his press conference today in reply to a question as to whether he favored changing the atomic laws so that he could provide allies with custody of weapons that Russia has or knows how to make. I have also noted Mr. Hagerty's statement that the administration is considering the possibility of recommending to Congress that the law be changed to permit sharing of atomic weapons.

An amendment to the Atomic Energy Law as suggested by the President might well be the proper way to consider the matter of arming our allies. I would hope however that he now go ahead and disclose to the American public the full details of his thinking on this subject and that he request his desired change in the law so that the tremendously important question may be fully considered by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the Congress, and the Public.

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Washington telegram No. 84 Saving to Foreign Office

- 2 -

If and when a proposal to change the law comes to our Committee its general nature and implications must be understood by the Congress and the American people. The Chairman and members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy stand as guarantors to the Congress and the public that secret activities in the atomic energy field are carried on properly and in accordance with the law.

When the present law was adopted in 1958 (P.L. 85-479) the officials testifying to the Joint Committee time after time stated that it was not intended and that the law, if amended in accordance with their recommendations, would not permit completed nuclear weapons or the nuclear components of weapons to be transferred to a foreign country or to get beyond the custody of United States forces. In turn, the Joint Committee in its report, and members of the Joint Committee on the Floor of the Congress, defended the amendments to the law and the agreements thereunder, stating that no transfer of weapons or nuclear components was intended or permitted and that the United States would maintain custody of such weapons.

At that time strong assurances were given on the floor of both the Senate and the House that under the terms of the amendments then being proposed to the law we could transfer to Great Britain non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons and special nuclear material and in addition could transfer detailed information on how to construct and fabricate atomic weapons, but not complete weapons or nuclear components.

We therefore have a right to assume that any program the President may have to share our arms with our allies will not violate this provision, unless a change in the law is requested by the President and approved by the Congress.

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FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

RECEIVED  
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12 FEB 1960  
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Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND  
WHITEHALL SECRET DISTRIBUTION

Sir H. Caecia

No. 275

February 11, 1960

D:1.29 a.m. February 12, 1960

R:2.53 a.m. February 12, 1960

PRIORITY

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.275 of February 11.

Repeated for information to: Paris

UKDel. N.A.T.O.

and Saving to: Bonn

Berlin

Moscow.

My immediately preceding telegram, WG1074/

Following is text of American draft report to N.A.T.O.:

Draft Report to N.A.T.O.

Work of the Quadripartite Group on Germany, including Berlin.

The Quadripartite Group met five times in the three week period between January 25 and February 11. Development of new material has been rather slow and this will probably continue to be the case for some time. This is due primarily to the fact that, while its terms of reference urge it to discuss all possible avenues of approach to the problems of German unity and Berlin, the Group considers that the broad lines of the Western position have already been established, and that its main task will be to produce usable suggestions on tactics which will reflect the actual situation at the outset of the Summit discussions. Second, its final recommendations on both tactics and substance of the Western position on Berlin and Germany will have to take into account the results of other working groups, primarily that on disarmament and, to a lesser degree, on East-West relations. Given this situation, the Group proposes to N.A.C. that its future reports be made only when substantive progress justified them; it is expected that the number of reports will increase in the later, more intensive stages of preparation.

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Washington telegram No. 275 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

The Group has continued work on its revision of the Soviet intentions paper submitted to N.A.C. in December. The work thus far has tended to point up the renewed emphasis placed by the Soviets on the conclusion of a separate peace treaty with the Soviet zone régime in the event of failure to agree on Berlin.

The Group has begun a review of the Western Peace Plan to determine whether it can be improved or made more easily understandable to public opinion. The initial phase of this review has indicated general agreement among the participants that the Peace Plan is sound in its essentials. The Group would welcome proposals for amendment or refinement of the Plan from any N.A.T.O. member.

As one approach to its work, the Group is attempting to isolate the requirements of access and status for Berlin which are essential to maintenance of the freedom of the city. The Group is also engaged in a study of the exact nature of present political and economic ties between the Federal Republic and West Berlin since this seems likely to be a major point of Soviet attack.

Foreign Office please pass to Paris, UKDel. N.A.T.O. and Saving to Bonn, Berlin and Moscow as my telegrams Nos. 39, 38, 36, 19 and 87 respectively.

[Repeated as requested]

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FO 371/152096

PERSONAL AND SECRET

1. Sir F. Henry Miller  
2. Mr. Ramboillet  
E.L.C.

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A  
23 FEB 1960  
2PS/18/G



U.K. Delegation to NATO,  
Paris.

February 12, 1960.

My dear Pat, 2PS/18/G

I was interested to see your despatch No. 57 to Washington of February 11 about tripartite consultation and particularly glad to note from paragraph 3 that we were insisting upon keeping Spaak in the picture if and when new machinery is set up.

2. From my NATO angle I was even happier to note that the Americans had seized upon the inconsistencies in the French position as explained in successive conversations by Couve de Murville to pour as much water as possible into the rather heady wine of the Eisenhower proposals of last December. Now that the French have shown quite clearly that General de Gaulle's memorandum of September 1958 is to be the main, if not the sole, agenda for the proposed discussions, there seems good reason to proceed as cautiously as Mr. Herter has now suggested. Since we took the line in December that, although surprised by the President's attitude, we could not do less than he had suggested, I hope that we shall continue to see advantage in keeping pace with the Americans when their foot is on the brake rather than upon the accelerator.

3. There is, I admit, some risk that General de Gaulle might once again work himself into a mood of frustration as in the winter of 1958/59 and argue that we and the Americans are going back upon what was agreed at Rambouillet. But the Rambouillet proposals were after all mainly an agreement between the two Presidents in which we naturally acquiesced, and there was surely never any question at Rambouillet of reviving de Gaulle's ill-fated memorandum which, whatever its intrinsic merits, is by now the red rag for the NATO bull. In any event Mr. Herter's proposals to the French in his letter of February 3 surely offer a practical method of discussing current matters at the appropriate levels, which would in this case presumably include the discussion of military matters by the Standing Group nations in Washington, without any of the risks and disadvantages of the alternative procedures put forward as a result of Rambouillet.

4. But however this may be, I assume that our main priority at present is to ensure a relatively successful Summit next May, for which purpose a united North Atlantic Alliance is an important prerequisite. We have quite enough difficulties at present in maintaining the minimum degree of unity without adding a major stumbling-block. It is arguable that de Gaulle might once again become such a stumbling-block, but, quite apart from his other current preoccupations (Algeria etc.), he has surely received ample satisfaction on the prestige front. The arrangements for

/ the Summit

Sir Patrick Dean, K.C.M.G.,  
Foreign Office, S.W.1.

PERSONAL AND SECRET

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the Summit with continuous Three-Power consultation at diplomatic level, plus personal visits to London and Washington by de Gaulle and by Khrushchev to France, plus the Foreign Ministers' Meeting in April, and eventually the Western and the Final Summits in Paris in May, surely provide the French with everything they could possibly require in the way of opportunities for tripartite consultation over the next few months.

5. But the position of our other NATO allies is infinitely less happy. There are going to be plenty of complaints, many no doubt sotto voce and not only from the Turks, between now and May against directorates of three and four and even perhaps five. I think however that as things now are and with Spaak's help we should be able to deal with them all and as in the past bring a united NATO up to the last fence in mid-May. But I should be very much less confident of this if it became known that we and the Americans had meanwhile accepted the proposal in Couve de Murville's letter of January 23 to Chris Herter, instead of the admittedly watered-down version of it contained in Herter's reply of February 3. In this context may I draw your attention to the following sentence in the Annual Review I have just sent to London:-

"This mood (of indignation, irritation and suspicion within NATO) can be dissipated if the sensible arrangements agreed in December for consultation within NATO on the preparations for the Summit Meeting in May 1960 work effectively, and above all if nothing further happens to renew the suspicion that General de Gaulle has effectively persuaded his major allies to concentrate all important work in a small group outside NATO."

6. I am sending copies of this letter to Harold Caccia in Washington and Gerry Young in the Embassy here.

*Yours ever*

*Frank Roberts*

PERSONAL AND SECRET



RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE  
AND AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR GEORGE MILLS ON FRIDAY,  
12TH FEBRUARY, 1960

1. The meeting considered a paper prepared by the Chief of Defence Staff, in consultation with the Foreign Office, recommending future action for continuing the private Anglo-American defence talks. The paper dealt with such problems as the British independent contribution to the deterrent and SACEUR's proposals for a European I.R.B.M.

European I.R.B.M.

2. In discussion of SACEUR's proposals for a European I.R.B.M., the following points were made:-

(a) There was little doubt that SACEUR had persuaded the United States military authorities and NATO Ministers of his need for ballistic missiles to replace his medium-range strike aircraft for tactical use in Europe. Moreover, by the Heads of Government decision of 1957, it had been agreed that he should have I.R.B.M.s placed at his disposal. Sir Solly Zuckerman, however, considered that there were valid military objections to providing SACEUR with ballistic missiles for tactical purposes.

(b) There were serious political objections, which had been emphasised in the recent Foreign Affairs Debate, to German participation in the production and operation of intermediate range ballistic missiles. As it would be embarrassing, if not impossible, to discriminate against Germany in this respect in NATO, it would be better from our point of view if the project were dropped. Moreover, the proposal would give rise to further controversy on the control of nuclear weapons in NATO.

3. The American State Department had not yet made up their minds about the European I.R.B.M. project and, before doing so, they would consult us. Sir Harold Caccia had been instructed to tell the Americans only that we were opposed to the manufacture of ballistic missiles in Europe.

4. In the light of this discussion, the Minister invited:

(i) Mr. Chilver to prepare, in consultation with the Foreign Office, a draft paper setting out the political and military issues arising from the proposal to manufacture and deploy NATO mid-range ballistic missiles in Europe for circulation to the Defence Committee on 24th February.

(ii) Mr. Chilver to arrange for the Foreign Office to send a telegram to Sir Harold Caccia, informing him that, in addition to objecting to the manufacture of an I.R.B.M. in Europe, we had strong political misgivings about the whole proposal.

(iii) The Chief of Defence Staff to give further thought, in consultation with the Chief Scientific Adviser, to the purely military aspects of the proposal to furnish SACEUR with mid-range missiles for tactical purposes, regardless of where they were manufactured.

(iv) Mr. Chilver to consult Sir Frank Roberts about the desirability and possibility of keeping this subject off the agenda for the NATO Defence Ministers meeting at the end of March.

W.S. 138A

5. A draft paper on the British nuclear deterrent was in preparation for the Minister to circulate to the Defence Committee on 24th February. This paper would have annexed the Chiefs of Staff paper on the British nuclear deterrent. Before final recommendations could be made to the Defence Committee, it would be necessary to know whether W.S.138A would be available to extend the life of the V-Bomber force until a Polaris type weapon was ready.

6. In discussion, the following points were made:

(i) The United States authorities had approved that research and development on W.S. 138A should go ahead and \$100m. had been allocated to this project in the first year. Although it was not yet certain that this weapon could be developed to full operational capability, there was little doubt that with such vast research and development resources, the Americans would succeed. It might be useful if Air Chief Marshal Mills discussed informally at the earliest opportunity with Mr. Yorke whether there had been any reservations in the American decision to proceed with W.S. 138A and reported the outcome of this discussion to the Chief Scientific Adviser.

(ii) A draft paper outlining the instructions to be sent to Sir Harold Caccia after the Defence Committee had considered the paper on the British nuclear deterrent was circulated to the meeting. This paper set out the lines on which it was proposed that Sir Harold Caccia should speak to the Americans, with a view to testing their re-actions to the possibility of our replacing BLUE STREAK with an American weapon system (less warhead) of which we should have independent control. It was agreed that this paper should also be annexed to the Defence Committee paper on the British nuclear deterrent.

(iii) It was important that the Ministry of Defence should have enough information about W.S. 138A to be able to decide whether, in fact, it was likely to meet our requirements, both technically and politically.

## German Frigates

7. AIR CHIEF MARSHAL MILLS said that the American representative on the Standing Group had now agreed that the Germans should be told that CINCHAN had a greater need for the frigates they were offering to SACLANT, but he took the view that, if the Germans insisted on ear-marking these ships to SACLANT, it was not for the Standing Group or the Military Committee to oppose them. In the circumstances, therefore, it might be necessary, however embarrassing, to oppose the German proposals in the North Atlantic Council. In discussion, the following points were made:-

- (i) Although the Government were opposed to German naval expansion, particularly into the high seas, they were less concerned about building German military strength in Allied Command Europe, within the framework of the Brussels Treaty. There was, therefore, no illogicality between offering to share the production of a short-range missile such as BLUE WATER and opposing the German proposal to allocate two frigates to SACLANT.
- (ii) SACLANT wished to have a German Staff Officer on his staff in Norfolk, Virginia as an expert on anti-shipping tactics. Provided no German ships were ear-marked for SACLANT, there was no British objection to SACLANT having German officers on his staff.
- (iii) Admiral Boone and Admiral Wright would be relinquishing their posts at the end of the month and would be replaced on the Standing Group and to SACLANT by a soldier and by Admiral Dennison respectively. It might, therefore, be easier to achieve our aim by delaying consideration of this matter in the Standing Group until next month. In the meantime, the First Sea Lord would try to persuade Admiral Ruge to ear-mark the frigates to CINCHAN in return for which a German Officer would be accepted on CINCHAN's staff.

Ministry of Defence, S.W.1.

16th February, 1960.



PO 371 / 154085  
SECRET

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

WG-1074/27

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET)  
AND WHITEHALL (SECRET)  
DISTRIBUTION

Sir H. Caccia

No. 311

February 16, 1960

D. 12.14 a.m. February 17, 1960

R. 12.50 a.m. February 17, 1960

PRIORITY

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 311 of February 16  
Repeated for information to: Bonn

and Saving to: Berlin, Paris, UK Del. NATO and Moscow.

My immediately preceding telegram.

Following is revised text.

Begins:

Minimum requirements for a new arrangement regarding Berlin.

1. A Free Democratic City Government.
2. A Security Force. This force must be adequate not only to maintain internal order and to repel small incursions, but also to assure a defense against massive aggression sufficient to perform a "trip-wire" function.
3. A Western guarantee. It must be clear that an attempt to swallow up Berlin by force will bring retaliation against the aggressors.
4. A procedure for redress of grievances. West Berlin must have some mechanism for dealing with complaints and harassments short of these which would call a Western military guarantee into play.
5. Relative freedom of access. West Berlin must have at least its present freedom of communication with the outside world in order to maintain its internal freedom and security.
6. A currency, banking and customs union with the Federal Republic.
7. Economic support. West Berlin needs not only a source of raw material and a market for its products but also a large

/annual

SECRET

SECRET

Washington telegram No. 311 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

annual subvention to cover its budget deficit as well as other forms of economic aid.

8. Representation abroad. There has to be some provision under which Berlin's interests and citizens are looked after outside Germany.

9. Some procedure for adoption in Berlin of relevant legislation and treaties of the Federal Republic.

10. Maintenance of high morale and a sense of forward motion among the people of West Berlin.

Ends.

Foreign Office pass to Bonn and Saving to Berlin, Paris, UK Del. NATO, Moscow, as my telegrams Nos. 44, 21, 112, 102 and 105.

[Repeated as requested.]

SECRET

-.-.-. .

PO 371/154085

2/16/60

W

SECRET

WG1074/26

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET) AND  
WHITEHALL (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION

Sir H. Caccia  
No. 310  
February 16, 1960

D: 12.23 a.m. February 17, 1960  
R: 1.35 a.m. February 17, 1960

PRIORITY  
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 310 of February 16.  
Repeated for information to: Bonn.

and Saving to: Berlin. Paris.  
U.K. Del. N.A.T.O.  
Moscow.

WG1074/24

My telegram No. 274: Summit - Germany and Berlin.

Today's meeting of the Working Group was rather more interesting. The Americans tabled a slightly revised version of their ten requirements (paragraph 3 of my telegram No. 62 Saving). Revised text is in my immediately following telegram. They said that they had not themselves any proposal for a new arrangement for Berlin, but if anyone else had, it would be a suitable subject for discussion in the Group. They suggested that their list of minimum requirements could be discussed at the next meeting. They explained that their list had been drawn up to apply to any arrangement for Berlin, whether completely new or based on the existing one, and it might apply to the whole of Berlin though it had naturally been drawn up with an eye to the requirements of West Berlin. -/12

2. The French stated again their preference for their principles (my telegram No. 51 Saving). In their view the West should tell the Soviet Union at the Summit that we did not see any need to change the status of Berlin, but we would consider any proposals they wanted to make. To meet this situation the Western Heads of Government should be armed with a simple statement of principles against which they could examine any Soviet proposals that were put forward.

3. We said we already knew what the Soviets were likely to put forward - the Peace Treaty and the Free City proposals. In any case, the French principles were only one way of meeting the requirements; there might be others. We liked the American approach. It was agreed that the French principles and the American requirements could both be discussed at the next meeting.

4. When the German paper on the legal status of Berlin was discussed, the Americans recalled that there had for a long time

SECRET

Washington telegram No. 310 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

Republic over the legal interpretation of the actions of the Military Commanders and of the Kommandatura in 1949. Hitherto this had not been a practical issue. It was important to avoid it becoming so. There must be no public airing of this difference and no assertion of a right of veto. We spoke in support, asking to what use the Federal Government intended to put the paper. The German representative replied that it was certainly not intended for public discussion. It was strictly for internal use. Its purpose was to present the Federal Government's view to the Working Group. He explained that the Federal Government did not challenge the supreme authority of the Occupying Powers, which they were entirely free to exercise to the fullest extent, subject to prior consultation with the Federal Republic. No right of veto was claimed. It was the Federal Government's intention to emphasise that under the supreme authority of the Occupying Powers, strong ties had developed between the Federal Republic and Berlin. They showed interest in our suggestion that it would be more profitable to develop a similar argument in relation to economic ties. Detailed discussion of the paper was deferred, but the Americans promised to put in a paper next week dealing with certain legal aspects, including a consideration of the consequences of following the German argument, which would probably bring out the point that the German paper would lay the Western Allies open to the accusation that they had first broken the principle of Four-Power responsibility for Berlin.

5. The draft report to N.A.T.O. (my telegram No. 275) was somewhat revised. The new text will be telegraphed to the United States permanent representative. It was suggested that he should make the report at the meeting of the Council on February 17.

6. The meeting next week will consider the German tactics paper (my telegram No. 47 Saving), the two French papers (my telegrams Nos. 51 and 52 Saving) and the American minimum requirements. We shall try to find out whether the Americans are holding back some proposal for a new arrangement, or whether they really do not have one. In the meantime I shall be grateful for any comments you would wish me to make on the text in my immediately following telegram.

Foreign Office please pass to Bonn and Saving to Berlin, Paris, U.K. Del. N.A.T.O. and Moscow as my telegrams Nos. 43, 20, 111, 101 and 104 respectively.

[Repeated as requested]

JJJ

SECRET



FO 371 /152096

P.O.S. Dw.  
Green

2/17/60

SECRET

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

Cypher/OTP

PRISec

No. 680

D. 9.46 p.m. February 17, 1960

February 17, 1960

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

Please pass following message to President Eisenhower from Prime Minister.

Begins.

Dear Friend,

On my return home I have been trying to pick up the threads of the various international problems and I thought that it might be helpful if I sent you a few thoughts about the world position as it seems to me coming back as it were fresh to them.

I am worried about the Geneva nuclear test negotiations. We must certainly keep these going and maintain the negotiation in being. I am still studying what has been happening there and particularly the Soviet reaction to your proposals. As you know, I feel very deeply what a frightful responsibility you and I have to prevent the spread of these weapons and I am sure that we must really not lose the chance of calling a halt.

In this connexion I saw a report about what you said at your Press Conference. This is a very difficult question, especially now that the French have let off their bomb. Have you any particular line of action in mind?

I have also been looking into the matter which we discussed at Rambouillet, namely the idea for some secret tripartite machinery in London. There seems to have been a lot of

/correspondence

SECRET

SECRET

Foreign Office telegram No. 680 to Washington

-2-

correspondence especially about what we should discuss, and Couve de Murville now talks about at least the "spirit" of de Gaulle's Memorandum of 1958. My concept had been that these tripartite talks would be our way of dealing with the Memorandum, and I had thought that the agenda for particular meetings of the group of officials would form itself as we went along. My own preference would be to get away from arguments about the Memorandum and what it did or did not mean and try to concentrate on practical discussion of questions of current interest, however wide these might be. As in fact the three of us seem likely to meet pretty often, the officials in this secret group could do a good job doing preparatory and follow-up work. Selwyn is writing to Chris about this.

While I was in Africa, de Gaulle sent me an invitation to go and spend two days with him quietly in the country before Khrushchev goes to France. I think I had better accept this and propose to do so for March 5 and 6. This will give me an opportunity to explore his mind. I should be very grateful for your thoughts on these problems and any others which de Gaulle is likely to raise.

I am having a lot of trouble about Cyprus. These people are very difficult to deal with but we shall not give up.

There are plenty of other problems, in particular, the Defence question and the deterrent is quite difficult. We have quite recently suggested through Caccia that our joint talks on defence matters should start up again in Washington next month. I very much hope that this proposal will be agreeable to you and that these talks will prove fruitful. In the meantime, I hope to make some progress with our own ideas in the course of the next week or so. Then we can discuss them together.

With warm regard,

As ever,

Harold.

Ends.

[Copies sent to No. 10 Downing Street].

7777777

SECRET

from 11 (293)

Defence Organisation

2/17/60

6/24/60  
252.60.

INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

By Bag

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL  
DISTRIBUTION

Sir H. Caccia  
No. 122 Saving  
February 17, 1960

R: February 19, 1960

PRIORITY

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 122 Saving of  
February 17.

Repeated for information Saving to: Paris.  
U.K. Del. N.A.T.O.

PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE: FRENCH NUCLEAR TESTS.

At his Press Conference today the President was asked whether he was concerned about the first French nuclear test and reports that another, and possibly the explosion of a hydrogen device later on, might follow; or whether he regarded these developments as strengthening the "overall defensive capacity" of the West.

2. After referring to the 1947 Baruch Plan and pointing out that one of the objects in putting forward the plan had been to avoid "many nations" developing nuclear weapons the President said:

X |

"I think it is only natural that first Britain and France have done this in the circumstances of life as we now know them. I would hope that we could get the kind of agreements among the larger nations that have already [exploded nuclear] devices to make sure that other nations don't want to go into the expense of this kind of an armament race. That would stop this whole thing in its tracks. But it is not easy. We must realise that this spirit of nationalism, of which we hear so much, is not just felt by the under-developed countries. Pride and national prestige impel people to do things, I think, at times that would not be necessary. Our great hope is for agreement that we can stop the thing where it is."

JJJJJ

*It would be wrong to remove  
John Whiteley, in connection with this  
extraneous remark, as  
Fulle always was a British nuclear*



*Mr. Dumbell*  
*Reply sent*  
*with son*  
BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D.C. *(JW) 22/2*

AIR BAG

SECRET

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES  
23 FEB 1960  
WG 1074/30

February 17, 1960.

*My dear Tony*

Working Group on Germany and Berlin

In our telegram No. 310 of February 16 we said we would try to find out whether the Americans had some proposal on Berlin up their sleeves.

2. I took this up with Foy Kohler today and did not get a straight answer. We had, however, some useful talk about future tactics in the Working Group; Kohler said that he hoped there would now be a full discussion of the American paper on minimum requirements (our telegram No. 311). This would serve to clear up misconceptions e.g. about the N.A.T.O. guarantee. Once we had established an agreed list of requirements we could then discuss how these could be met in practice: whether indeed the existing juridical position (the first French principle) was the only way of fulfilling the requirements or whether there were others. (Perhaps at this point the Americans would unfold any new plans they may have).

3. Kohler asked me whether the paper I gave to Livia Merchant in October (based on Foreign Office telegram No. 4565, of October 21) still represented our thinking on the possibility of reaching an interim agreement on Berlin. I replied that I thought it did, but I would check with the Foreign Office. Will you let me have your instructions? In the Working Group we shall have to discuss, in view of the German proposals, how the July 28 proposals might be improved and expanded. As a result we may, I suppose, produce "maximum" proposals, representing a possible opening position. But there might be no harm to discuss, on the side, with the Americans our minimum proposals or what the final position might be.

*J. Hood*  
*Sunny*  
(Hood)

Sir Anthony Rumbold, Bart., C.B., C.M.G.,  
Foreign Office,  
London, S.W.1.

*WG 1074/22*

*WG 1072/1265*

*WG 1074/26*

P0371/152096

TOP SECRET

2/18/60  
Sent to hq. 10.  
1pm 18/2

DRAFT LETTER TO:

Mr. Christian A. Herter

FROM: Foreign Secretary.

Thank you very much for your letter of February 3 and for sending me copies of the latest letters exchanged between yourself and Couve de Murville about the suggested secret tripartite conversations. I have not myself had any recent communication from Couve on this subject but the French Ambassador here has spoken to us about the matter more than once lately and has given us a copy of the French text of Couve's letter to you of January 23.

The French Ambassador, who was in Paris last week, has told us that he had discussed this whole question, not only with Couve but with de Gaulle himself. From these conversations, he had formed the distinct impression that de Gaulle had now rather lost interest in this matter and was not pressing for anything very sensational to be done about these tripartite conversations in the immediate future. Furthermore, Chauvel has expressed his opinion that de Gaulle does not attach much importance to conversations at the official level and is only really interested in talks at his own or at least Ministerial level. X He obviously was not much attracted by the idea of tripartite conversations in London of the kind which we had originally envisaged and would not regard them as

TOP SECRET

anything like adequately satisfying his wishes for closer consultation between our three Governments on important matters of mutual concern.

In the circumstances, although I am perhaps not quite so concerned as you are about the consequences of becoming involved in high level discussions with the French about global political matters, I agree that the best thing to do for the time being might be to go along on the lines suggested in your letter to Couve of February 3, - all the more so since the three Heads of Government or their Foreign Ministers will in any case be meeting fairly often during the next few months. I would however like to put in a caveat in respect of what you say in your letter to Couve about tripartite conversations at the lower, official level. I am all for encouraging and increasing the frequency of these conversations. But I would hope that they need not always be held in Washington as your letter rather suggests and that they may quite often take place in London or Paris. For some subjects, e.g. Africa - it would be a good deal easier for us and perhaps the French to assemble the necessary expertise on this side of the Atlantic rather than in Washington.

Apart from this point, however, I think that in view of de Gaulle's attitude, the arrangements set out in your letter to Couve might meet the case very adequately, at all events for the time being - especially since they are not likely to attract much publicity or upset our NATO Allies, a point to which I know you attach as much importance

TOP SECRET

as I do. In this last connection I think, as I told Jock Whitney the other day, that at some stage Spaak should be put in the picture. The moment for this might be if and when we decide to have any tripartite discussions between yourself, Couve and myself during the Western Foreign Ministers' meeting in Paris in the middle of April.

I understand that you told Harold Caccia that you hoped that we would be able to say something to Couve in support of your letter to him of February 3. Since, as I have explained above, Couve has not made any approach recently to us on the subject, it is a little difficult for me to say anything to him direct. However, the Prime Minister will be seeing de Gaulle early in March and that will give him an opportunity of hearing what the General has to say on this question of tripartite consultations. Until we hear the result of these talks, and know whether Chauvel's estimate of de Gaulle's feeling is right, I should prefer not to express a more definite opinion.

approached to draft letter  
to Herby 2/18/60

PO 371/152096

(2/18/60)

SECRET

DRAFT MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT EISENHOWER

Dear Friend,

On my return home I have been trying to pick up the threads of the various international problems and I thought that it might be helpful if I sent you a few thoughts about the world position as it seems to me coming back as it were fresh to them.

I am worried about the Geneva nuclear test negotiations. We must certainly keep these going and maintain the negotiation in being. I am still studying what has been happening there and particularly the Soviet reaction to your proposals. As you know, I feel very deeply what a frightful responsibility you and I have to prevent the spread of these weapons and I am sure that we must really not lose the chance of calling a halt.

In this connection I saw a report about what you said at your Press Conference. <sup>low</sup> [This perhaps ties in with what I recall you saying at Rambouillet about your desire to help your allies, but I suppose that you were not thinking of any very wide extension beyond, say, the French. In fact very much on the lines of what you said to de Gaulle and myself on December 20.] ~~ov~~ ~~106~~

I have also been looking into one of the other matters which we discussed at Rambouillet, namely the idea for some secret tripartite machinery in London. There seems to have been a lot of correspondence especially about what we should discuss, and Conve de Murville now talks about at least the "spirit" of de Gaulle's Memorandum of 1958. My concept



COPY

SECRET

February 18, 1960.

Dear Harold:

Of course I share your concern about the nuclear test negotiations. We are now studying the latest Russian proposal.

As to my own suggestion, the scheme was one on which we had been working for a long time and we felt it would stand any kind of critical examination as long as the analysis was fairly made. I am very much afraid that the Soviets are back at the old game of disarming by "pronouncement". The fact that they imply that only a very limited number of on-site inspections would be permitted is seemingly throwing a road block in the way of real progress.

X  
Respecting the matter we discussed at Rambouillet, I am quite astonished at the atmosphere of formality with which the French seem to view the matter and the difficulties they see of putting the simple plan into action. You will recall that General de Gaulle wanted to have some way of conducting three-way consultations on any subject of common interest. I suggested that we might have one or two junior but capable staff officers from each country keeping abreast of the questions that might call for such consultation and that when the occasion so demanded, conferees at higher level could get into the picture. But such consultations would always be so conducted as to avoid even the appearance of venturing unjustifiably into the affairs of others. When our conversation took place, I thought that General de Gaulle was in complete accord and seemed to agree that the scheme could be set afoot without fanfare and without trouble. Just where it jumped the track I do not know.

I quite agree with your statement that we should get away from the arguments about the memorandum and what it did or did not mean, and try to concentrate on practical discussions of current interest. Y

I am glad that you accepted General de Gaulle's invitation to meet with him for a couple of days at some spot in the country. It appears from my informal reports that the negotiations looking toward the clarification of command structures in NATO show signs of improvement. It would be good to get that problem out of the way.

I am not clear as to your exact meaning in referring to the "defense question and the deterrent". In our own case the measures we are taking seem to us to be sound and though the circumstances of an upcoming Presidential campaign have stimulated a lot of demagogic shrieks and cries of alarm, the fact is that our defenses and our deterrent are not only strong but grow more powerful day by day. On the other hand I am very much worried that the Congress will again cut back on

If they do, I think the western powers will be faced with a very difficult situation.

In my family and, indeed, I think in all Washington, we are examining news bulletins every hour, on the hour, in our anxiety to learn that the new member has joined the Queen's family. I do most sincerely pray that all goes well.

It is good to have you back in London where we can get in touch whenever we choose.

With warm regard,

As ever,

IKE.

P.S. Before I could get this off, I was able to send to Her Majesty a cable of congratulations. I know that all England is very happy as indeed we are.

The Right Honorable Harold Macmillan, M.P.,  
The Prime Minister,  
London.

Paris, le 18 février 1960.

Mon Cher Chris,

Je vous remercie de votre lettre du 3 février et des suggestions qu'elle contient concernant l'organisation de nos conversations tripartites. Il me semble que nous sommes d'accord sur la distinction qu'il convient d'établir entre d'une part les problèmes politiques courants, d'autre part les problèmes touchant ce que vous appelez la politique et la stratégie globales.

Quant aux premiers je verrais sans inconvénient qu'ils continuent à être, en principe, discutés régulièrement à Washington. Ceci n'exclut naturellement pas d'autres procédures, mais il est bon qu'il y ait une organisation de base. Ces contacts peuvent porter sur des questions particulières, et cela se fait tous les jours, ou sur des questions plus générales : il y a déjà eu en 1959 des réunions de cette nature sur l'Asie et sur l'Afrique. Comme vous-même, je verrais avantage à ce qu'ils se poursuivent dans l'une et l'autre direction.

En ce qui concerne les questions générales, nous pourrions envisager d'avoir une nouvelle réunion sur

Son Excellence  
Monsieur Christian Herter,  
Secrétaire d'Etat,  
WASHINGTON

.../

l'Afrique : depuis l'année dernière l'Afrique française et l'Afrique britannique ont évolué rapidement et je comprends, d'autre part, que votre Administration s'intéresse de plus en plus au continent africain. Il y aurait donc ample matière à confrontation et ajustement de nos politiques. Peut-être le mieux serait-il d'envisager une telle réunion après la Conférence au sommet, par exemple dans la première quinzaine de juin.

La discussion des problèmes qui se posent à nous sur le plan mondial est, je le reconnais, plus difficile à mettre sur pied ; elle n'a d'ailleurs pas encore été entreprise. Vous savez que, dans notre esprit, il s'agit d'abord de l'organisation de la défense d'une manière globale, c'est-à-dire non seulement dans la zone couverte par le pacte atlantique, mais dans le reste du monde, par exemple en Afrique, et en Asie. Un problème essentiel est naturellement celui des décisions à prendre concernant le déclenchement éventuel de la guerre atomique.

Nous serons naturellement toujours d'accord pour en parler au niveau des Ministres des Affaires Etrangères. S'il peut y avoir une première conversation sur ces sujets lorsque nous nous rencontrerons les 13 et 14 avril à Washington avec Selwyn Lloyd pour la préparation de la Conférence au sommet, j'en serais très heureux.

Mais il convient aussi de prévoir un échelon militaire. Vous savez sans doute que nous avons, pour notre part, toujours pensé que le groupe permanent de Washington fournirait à cet effet une base satisfaisante, non pas le groupe permanent en tant que tel aussi longtemps que subsistera l'organisation actuelle de l'OTAN, mais la réunion ad hoc de ses membres britanniques et français auxquels

.../

seraient joints des représentants américains de même qualification.

Je fais parvenir à Selwyn une copie de cette lettre, au sujet de laquelle je serai heureux de connaître vos réactions, en même temps que les siennes./.

*signé : Louis de Broglie*

P0371 / 152096

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES  
26 FEB 1960  
295/16/6

W.R. Rumbold  
PW - 1/6

2/19/60

(A)

I happened to see both the U.S. Ambassador and Mr. Barbour yesterday evening and took the opportunity of telling them that the Secretary of State had now sent an answer to the message from Mr. Herter about the tripartite conversations which Mr. Whitney had given him some days ago. I also gave them a very rough idea of the substance of the Secretary of State's reply.

2. Both the Ambassador and Mr. Barbour (to whom I spoke separately) said that their information was also to the effect that General de Gaulle seemed to have lost his interest in this matter for the time being and as far as the French were concerned, "the heat was off". Mr. Whitney made no further comment though he seemed a little disappointed that the Secretary of State should have sent his answer to Mr. Herter so quickly and rather implied that he had expected to discuss the matter further with the Secretary of State before the latter answered Mr. Herter's message. Mr. Barbour said nothing to this effect but he did say that he very much hoped that the Prime Minister's coming visit to de Gaulle would not result in reviving the General's interest in tripartite conversations and "turning the heat on again". From the way in which Mr. Barbour spoke, it was pretty plain that the State Department felt no enthusiasm for these tripartite talks and rather regretted the readiness with which President Eisenhower agreed to them.

*L. H. ...*

February 19, 1960

W 29/2

no 371 / 154 095

2/19/60

Dud.

SECRET

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

February 19, 1960.

WG1074/30

OUTFILE

Working Group on Germany and Berlin

Thank you for your letter of February 17 reporting your conversation with Kohler in which you tried to find out the present state of American thinking.

2. We find it very interesting that Kohler should have thought that the two points of importance to be raised in connexion with the American paper reported in your telegram No. 311 were the question of the N.A.T.O. guarantee and the possibility of altering the juridical status. These are of course the two crucial points if the Americans are moving towards a new agreement based on a change of status. In connexion with the N.A.T.O. guarantee, I imagine that they will wish to point out that it is perfectly possible for N.A.T.O. to guarantee a West Berlin which has a new status in much the same way as they now guarantee to come to the aid of the Western forces in Berlin if these forces are attacked. It remains to be seen whether the Americans are thinking of Western forces remaining under a new "juridical hat" or whether they are prepared to envisage a United Nations or neutral force.

3. As regards the question of changing the juridical status, I need hardly say that you will be discreet.

4. You ask whether our telegram No. 4565 of October 21 still represents our thinking. I am afraid I cannot give you a snap answer. You probably know that the Secretary of State was not at all happy when he heard that our thinking had actually been incorporated into a paper and handed over to the Americans. I think that the answer will be that this does still represent our thinking but I will confirm this as soon as possible.

5. You will be receiving our instructions on how to deal with the American paper, and the other subsidiary papers, in the Working Group by Saving telegram.

(E. E. Tomkins.)

The Viscount Hood, C.M.G.,  
Washington.

P0 371 /154 085

2/19/60

SECRET  
OUTWARD SAVING TELEGRAM  
FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

By Bag

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND  
WHITEHALL SECRET DISTRIBUTION

WG-1074/27

No. 716 Saving  
February 19, 1960

OUTFILE

SECRET

Addressed to Washington telegram No. 716 Saving of  
February 19

Repeated for information Saving to Bonn No.186 Berlin No. 33  
Paris No.470 UKDEL NATO No.435  
Moscow No. 221

Your telegrams Nos. 310 and 311 of February 16: Summit preparations - Four-Power Working Group on Germany and Berlin.

We agree that the new American paper is interesting. It looks as though it may be part of an American plan which will end with a definite proposal regarding a new agreement.

2. You should continue to let the Americans take the initiative and should not respond to their invitation for proposals to be made about a new arrangement for Berlin. You should not give any impression that we like the American paper because we believe it to be the first step towards a definite American proposal for a new agreement involving a change of status. At the same time you should do what you can to ensure that the American paper is used as the basis for serious discussion and is not pushed on one side by the French and the Germans. You will have to strike a delicate balance.

3. We leave it to you to decide how best to do this. But we suggest that you might take the following line. You could say that you assume that discussion of the paper will not in any way commit anyone. On this assumption we think that the American paper is valuable because it attempts to rethink the whole problem from a new angle. But we think that at this stage the American paper, should be studied on its own merits without regard to the use to which it might subsequently be put. This falls in the realm of Summit tactics on which we think it is too early to have considered views.

4.

SECRET



Foreign Office telegram No. 716 Saving to Washington

- 2 -

4. In discussion of the American paper you may make the following points except for those in brackets which are for your own information:

Point 1. We assume that by "free democratic city government" the Americans mean a city government brought into being by free elections. It might be worth being more specific. (It is interesting that the Americans do not say that the agreement must be acceptable to the West Berliners, unless Point 10 is intended obliquely to cover this point. The Germans may well draw attention to this. One difficulty is that if the West Berliners really had freedom of choice they would probably opt to join the Federal Republic with Western troops remaining in West Berlin in a N.A.T.O. capacity).

Point 2. We think it unrealistic to imagine that a Berlin Security Force could "assure a defence against massive aggression sufficient to perform a trip-wire function". Surely the point is that the composition of the Security Force should be of such a nature as to convince the Russians and East Germans that the Western guarantee (Point 3) would certainly be honoured. (It is noteworthy that the Americans leave open the possibility of a United Nations or neutral force replacing Western troops).

Point 5. Might not some "mechanism" be required to deal with complaints concerning freedom of access as well as in the context of West Berlin itself (Point 4)?

Point 7. (It is noticeable that the Americans leave it open for economic aid to come from elsewhere than the Federal Republic.)

Point 8. (See above. Clearly this was deliberate. See paragraph 3(h) of your telegram No. 62 Saving. Presumably the Americans will elaborate on this in their own time.)

5. We think that the French paper on principles (your telegram No. 51 Saving) should be merged into the American paper. You have already said that we prefer the American paper as a method of approach. You should therefore try to avoid commenting on the individual points in the French paper and let their substance be argued in the context of the American paper.

6. We have already, in paragraph 8 of our telegram No. 478 Saving, given you our comments on the other French paper (your telegram No. 52 Saving).

7. As regards the German paper on tactics (your telegram No. 41 Saving) you should make the point in paragraph 6 of my telegram No. 478 Saving as amended by my telegram No. 459. We should like to see this paper quietly forgotten. We do not wish it to be used

S E C R E T


Foreign Office telegram No. 716 Saving to Washington

- 3 -

as the basis for the report of the Working Group on Tactics to the Foreign Ministers. If necessary you should take the line that the paper has been a useful contribution to the work of the Working Group which will of course be taken into account when the question of tactics at the Summit comes to be considered, but that it is too early for the Group to start thinking about tactics.

bbbb

S E C R E T



British Embassy,  
Paris.

February 19, 1960.

Dean Pat,

295/13/G

(4)

295/156

On my return from my African tour I have been ploughing through the papers about the tripartite machinery to be established in London as a result of the Presidential colloquy at Rambouillet last December. I now see from your despatch No.57 of February 11 that I am alarmed by Couve's suggestion (apparently first mentioned by him in his conversation with me of January 11 last - see my letter to Derick Hoyer Millar of that date) that the first subject to be discussed at the proposed dinner parties should be the General's memorandum itself, the Americans are shying off tripartite discussions altogether.

I do not know what the reaction of the General will be to Herter's letter to Couve of February 3 last, but I can only imagine that it will be unfavourable. The General, having got what on the face of it appeared to be an important concession from President Eisenhower, will not presumably abandon it except in return for some quid pro quo. It may even be that his recent more forthcoming attitude towards NATO (though no doubt principally inspired by the desire to get some atomic concessions out of the Americans) was partly due to his thinking that tripartite consultation was in the bag. At any rate we shall shortly presumably know what his reaction is and I imagine that when I next see Couve there would be no objection to my enquiring what is the present state of the market? Supposing that the General does cut up rough, is it really to be excluded that we should agree that his Memorandum should be discussed in the machinery in which it was, after all, definitely agreed should be set up in London? I have always been my feeling that we should have avoided a lot of difficulties if we (or rather the Americans) had taken up the question inherent in his Memorandum with the General himself at a fairly high level a long time ago.

/It

Sir Patrick Dean, K. C. M. G. ,

SECRET AND PERSONAL

It seems that progress was only made on the NATO front when this procedure was at long last adopted by the Americans. If we meet to discuss his Memorandum it would, after all, not mean that either we or the Americans agreed to the proposals made therein. But at least the General would have the impression that he was being taken seriously. And in any case it would not be the Memorandum as such but rather the matters raised in it which would be discussed by the officials.

Of course if de Gaulle now agrees to drop the whole thing so much the better for all of us, but I must say that I should be rather surprised if he does.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Frank Roberts.

Yours ever  
A. A. G. J. J. J.

Registry  
No.

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| Top Secret.   |
| Secret.       |
| Confidential. |
| Restricted.   |
| Open.         |

JKD  
24/2

Draft letter to:

The Viscount  
Hood, C.M.G.,  
Washington,

from:

Mr. Tomkins

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

In paragraph 4 of my letter of February 19 I promised to let you know whether our telegram No. 4565 of October 21 still represents our thinking. The answer is that it does and you may inform Kohler accordingly. Paragraph 4 of that telegram is of course the controversial issue. The point is that we simply do not believe that it would be realistic to assume that we can get away without provision being made for some sort of inter-German talks. That is why we wish to think about how this can be done in as acceptable a way as possible (see also paragraph 3 of our telegram No. 4587 Saving of November 3).

2. It is satisfactory that the Americans now seem to be beginning to consult us bilaterally again. <sup>I think that we should be</sup> But you ~~should still leave~~ <sup>would be better</sup> ~~it to them to make the running and~~ <sup>to refrain from</sup> ~~should not~~ make any new proposals <sup>for the moment.</sup>

3. <sup>Tracy is away on sick leave at the moment</sup> ~~Tracy is away on sick leave at the moment~~ <sup>and will be back for another week or so.</sup>

HT?



PO 371 / 154 085

2/24/60

Already

RECEIVED  
AND  
26 FEB 1960  
WG-1074/32

SECRET

By Bag

INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir H. Caccia

FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET)  
AND WHITEHALL (SECRET)  
DISTRIBUTION

No. 136 Saving  
February 24, 1960.

R. February 25, 1960

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 136(S) of February 24.  
Repeated for information Saving to:

Bonn  
Paris  
Moscow

Berlin  
UKDEL NATO

Your telegram No. 716 Saving of February 19:

SUMMIT - GERMANY AND BERLIN

The Four-Power Working Group met again on February 23.

2. At the request of the French representative, the French papers (my telegrams Nos. 51 and 52 Saving of January 28), were discussed first (There was no discussion of the German papers). Referring to the French statement of principles (my telegram No. 51 Saving), the Americans said that they had no objection to the paper, provided it was understood that it did not commit the Working Group to adhere in their work to the principles stated in it, in particular to the principle of maintaining the present legal position. We supported the Americans. The Germans said they accepted all the French principles including the first.

3. Turning to the French paper in my telegram No. 52 Saving, the American representative challenged the assumption that a new agreement would terminate the NATO guarantee. He pointed out that by Article VI of the NATO Treaty as amended by the London Protocol of October 17, 1951, any attack on an area in Europe in which occupation forces were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force was regarded as an attack on the parties to the Treaty...

For: report pursuant to - part late

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Washington telegram No. 136 Saving to Foreign Office

-2-

Treaty. Lord Hood pointed out that the London Agreement of 1954 and the NATO Resolution of October 22, 1954, went further and affirmed that any attack against Berlin would be regarded as an attack upon the Three Powers. At the request of the French, the Americans undertook to put in a paper on this. The Germans agreed that it was wrong to argue that a new agreement would terminate the NATO guarantee. They appeared to take responsibility for the mistake by saying that they had discovered an error in the German translation of the Protocol of 1951.

4. As to the rest of the second French paper, the Americans doubted the value of listing the theoretical advantages and disadvantages of a new agreement; at least the argumentation in the French paper should be filled out. We said that the disadvantages listed would not necessarily flow from a new agreement. It would depend what was in the agreement. A new agreement could continue to provide justification for the presence of Allied forces in Berlin. We could also expect that the Soviet Union would observe it better than they would observe the existing arrangements.

5. The German representative said he thought the objections to a new agreement in the French paper were fully justified. His Government disliked consideration of any new agreement. They did not see how a new agreement would be possible without recognition of the DDR. In any case, a new agreement ought to apply to the whole of Berlin.

6. The French representative said his Government attached importance to maintaining the present legal status. The Soviet Union <sup>repeatedly</sup> said that it was obsolete. We must counter this and not allow the maintenance of our present legal rights to be relegated to a position of

/secondary...

SECRET



SECRET

Washington telegram No. 136 Saving to Foreign Office

-3-

secondary importance. If they were not preserved, the freedom of Berlin would be difficult to ensure and its future would become very fragile. It was, however, not the French intention that the principles set out in the first French paper would freeze the work of the Working Group. Both the French and the American approaches should be discussed, and a full study should be made of the consequences of adhering to the existing basis in Berlin and of considering a new approach. He undertook to fill out the French papers at the next meeting.

7. The American representative then said that the two questions which he had put to the Germans in connexion with their papers (paragraph 9 of my telegram No. 50 Saving of January 28) applied also to the French in connexion with their papers. Did they believe that no solution of the problem could be negotiated? If so, what were the consequences? To this the French said that they did consider a negotiated agreement over Berlin was possible, but it was the Russians who should come forward with proposals. If the Soviet Union did not propose anything which the West could accept, the West should not be ready with concessions but should show great determination in the face of Russian pressure. This was the only way to avoid war or a crisis. The Germans said that a negotiated solution was theoretically possible, but the West would have to pay too high a price for the benefits they would derive from it. A negotiated agreement would not maintain the freedom of West Berlin; a new crisis would follow in a year or so. The Russians would allege some violation of the agreement to give them a pretext for not observing it. A negotiated agreement would have a bad psychological effect in Berlin. The German Government considered it a matter of principle that there should be no new negotiated settlement; that was why they attached importance to the maintenance of the present legal position.

/8. ...

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Washington telegram No. 136 Saving to Foreign Office

-4-

8. The American representative remarked that the French were more optimistic than the Germans. He asked the French representative whether they thought a modus vivendi could be negotiated without breaking any of the French principles, and whether this meant that at some stage at the Summit we might have to revert to the Geneva proposals. The French representative agreed this was so.

9. The Germans then said that they realized there must be an agreement to keep the present arrangements in Berlin working, but it should be on the present legal basis. Otherwise, the Russians could easily break it. We questioned whether the Russians would find it any easier to break a new agreement than to depart from the existing arrangements. We also challenged the assumption that a new agreement would necessarily mean the abandonment of our present rights of conquest.

United States paper on Minimum Requirements (my telegram No. 311 of February 16).

10. In order to meet some criticism already made by the French and German Embassies, the Americans suggested that the title of the paper should be altered to "Minimum Requirements for Maintenance of Allied Position in Berlin." Although in some places in the paper the context required reference to West Berlin only, in other places the whole city could be intended. This was a matter which would have to be worked out. Further, the Americans wished to deny any implication in the paper that they contemplated dealings with the DDR.

11. It was agreed that the American paper should be discussed in detail at the next meeting, together with the French proposals.

SECRET

Washington telegram No. 136 Saving to Foreign Office

-5-

The French indicated some questions they would want to ask.

Would the minimum requirements be met by Khrushchev's Free City proposal? Was a security force other than that furnished by the Three Powers contemplated? Would the machinery for redress of grievances mean dealing with the DDR? Similarly, would the DDR come into arrangements for freedom of access? How would the present ties between West Berlin and the Federal Republic be preserved? What would be the duration of a new arrangement?

12. The German representative also raised some questions which amounted to a re-statement of his Government's position. They thought the present arrangements were the best for ensuring a free democratic city government. The security force must be the military presence of the three Western Powers. The best Western guarantee was the NATO guarantee. Representation abroad is the responsibility of the Federal German Republic. The current procedure (Mantelgesetz) for the adoption of Federal legislation and treaties should be maintained. Any arrangement relating to Berlin should have the consent of the population.

13. The American representative said he would be willing at the next meeting to examine in further detail the implications of his paper, but remarked that it was intended only to state the requirements. Many of the points mentioned by the French and Germans related to the later phase of deciding how the requirements were to be met.

14. At this point the German representative put in a paper (copies by bag) giving their version of principles for a Berlin settlement. It is heavily weighted to lead to the conclusion that the present legal basis must be maintained. As the American

Washington telegram No. 136 Saving to Foreign Office

-6-

representative remarked, it asks more of the Russians than do the present arrangements, e.g. in connexion with freedom of civilian traffic.

15. The Americans distributed a paper giving their views of the legal relationship between the Federal German Republic and Berlin. (Copies also by bag to Western Department, Bonn and Berlin and United Kingdom Delegation NATO only.) They explained that this was prepared for their own use. A further paper would follow commenting on the German paper on this subject.

16. The next meeting of the Working Group will be on March 1.

R0 371/152096

TOP SECRET

2/27/60

I have sent copies of this letter, with translation, to No. 10 and to the Private Secretary. Copies have also gone to Sir H. Caccia, Sir G. Jebb and Sir F. Roberts.

2. I understand from the Private Office that the Secretary of State is unlikely to be free to lunch with M. Chauvel next week. In any case it will be difficult to say anything to him about this letter until we know what Mr. Herter thinks.

Flag A.

3. The correspondence shows that the French have been edging Mr. Herter further towards the proposals in General de Gaulle's memorandum of September, 1958, for "a new body, consisting of the U.S.A., Great Britain and France, which should be responsible for taking joint decisions on all political matters affecting world security and of drawing up and, if necessary, putting into action, strategic plans, especially those affecting invoking the use of nuclear weapons."

Flags B & C.

4. M. Couve de Murville seemed to favour Mr. Herter's first proposal for private official talks in London on "matters of common concern with the emphasis on subjects which are beyond the scope of NATO."

Flag D.

5. But, after consulting de Gaulle, he came back with a suggestion (his letter of January 23) that the Rambouillet conversations envisaged something different, i.e. "political and, eventually, strategic, coordination on a global basis in the spirit of the Memorandum of September 1958". But he still seemed to imply that the "Committee to be set up in London" would act as an official group for the high-level exchanges.

Flag E

6. Mr. Herter, in his letter of February 3, hoped to meet this by suggesting that global, political and strategic problems might be discussed tripartitely at informal dinners when the Foreign Ministers meet at international Conferences. But M. Couve de Murville's latest reply makes only a passing reference to this idea - he suggests a first discussion between the three Foreign Ministers when they meet in Washington on April 13 and 14. He has now come clearly into the open with a reminder that the French still want the "new body" suggested in the original memorandum (paragraph 3 above), e.g. the British, French and American members of the Standing Group in Washington - to deal with global problems about the organisation of defence, especially "decisions concerning the possibility of launching an atomic war." This would be a separate body from the tripartite meetings of Ambassadors to discuss current political problems, and to arrange reviews of general problems, e.g. policies in Africa and Asia.

Flag F

7. M. Couve de Murville asks for the Secretary of State's reactions to these proposals. We shall no doubt wish first to consult Mr. Herter, who is playing the hand. In the Secretary of State's message of February 18 he said he would prefer to await the results of the Prime Minister's talks with General de Gaulle on March 12 before expressing more definite opinions on the proposals in Mr. Herter's letter of February 3. But, in view of M. Couve de Murville's latest letter, we should seek to obtain Mr. Herter's views before March 12. It would be unwise for us to act as a go-between. To try and do so

/might

might prejudice the prospective U.S.-U.K. defence talks, which we hope will start in Washington in about a week's time. Nor should we be likely to get any tangible concession from de Gaulle, if we did so.

8. It does not now look as though de Gaulle will be satisfied with the concept described in the Prime Minister's message to the President of February 17 (PRISEC 680), viz: to get away from arguments about the Memorandum and try to concentrate on "practical discussions of current interest, however wide these might be".. But Sir G. Jebb may well be right in saying that the General is hurt that neither the President nor the Prime Minister has ever talked to him seriously about his Memorandum. Moreover, the Prime Minister can hardly avoid discussing the ideas in it if the General asks him.

Flag G

Flag H.

9. On the assumption, therefore, that the President will not be prepared to go further than Mr. Herter's proposals of February 3, the best line for the Prime Minister to take on March 12 might be

(a) to show sympathy with the General's desire to build up a position of confidence and close consultation with the Americans, similar to our own, but

(b) to advise him not to force the issue but to let it develop gradually. The other NATO powers, who are particularly sensitive about the creation of a Tripartite Directorate, are already beginning to accept the idea that the three powers have a special position in the preparations for the Summit (provided that NATO is brought in at some stage); if there is a series of Summits, this special position may gradually crystallise without harm to NATO.

*P. Ramsbotham*

(P.E. Ramsbotham)  
February 27, 1960.

Foreign Office Secret  
and Whitehall Secret  
Distribution.

February 29, 1960.

Summit: Germany and Berlin

The following is the text of the German paper referred to in paragraph 14 of Washington telegram No. 136 Saving of February 24 to the Foreign Office:-

Principles for a Berlin settlement

A. Motives.

Berlin constitutes the test case for the West's resolve

- to resist any further expansion of Communism into the sphere of the free world;
- to close ranks for the protection of a population which has rejected a Communist regime in no uncertain manner and which has exposed itself through many years personally in the struggle against Communism and in cooperation with the Western occupation authorities;
- not to submit to blackmail at a sensitive spot, - a surrender which can be exploited for ever more efforts of blackmail.
- not to disappoint the hopes of the people of Central Germany and Eastern Europe, living under a Communist regime, for whom Berlin represents an important meeting place for the exchange of information and contacts with the western world and for refugees a last loophole through the iron curtain.

B. Objectives.

Accordingly, the following are the fundamental objectives of Western policy in Berlin.

- I. The preservation of freedom, security, a democratic form of government and the basis of economic existence for West Berlin;
- II. Maintenance of the principle of the restoration of the unity of Berlin as a whole and of those components still remaining of the unity of Berlin;
- III. Maintenance of the common principles of policy on Germany laid down in the Paris Treaties of 1954.

C. Minimum requirements.

For the achievement of these objectives it is considered indispensable that any Berlin settlement which should be submitted for negotiation should satisfy the following minimum requirements.

/At J:

At I:

1. Continuing presence of Western forces in adequate strength and under the exclusive responsibility of the three Western powers which have dispatched these forces (no subordination to the United Nations Command; any substantial reduction in the strength of the forces would run counter to the mission of the forces of maintaining internal order, of repulsing minor attacks and of acting as a "tripwire" in the event of major aggression).
2. Guarantee of free access for the forces and for their supplies to and from Berlin while the Soviet responsibility for removing obstacles to free access is maintained.
3. Guarantee of free access to and from Berlin for German and foreign civilians at least on the existing scale, and of the Soviets' responsibility for the prevention of obstacles and additional difficulties.
4. Maintenance of the three power and NATO guarantees in case of an aggression.
5. Maintenance of the existing legal, political, economic and cultural ties between the Federal Republic and West Berlin (in particular, equality of treatment in monetary, banking and customs matters; economic and budgetary assistance; external representation by the Federal Republic; continuation of the present procedure for the application in Berlin of the laws and treaties of the Federal Republic).
6. Avoidance of any settlement which would not meet the approval of the Berlin population and which would be designed to undermine their morale and confidence.

At II:

7. Rejection of any proposal which would provide - contrary to the principles of the four power status - for different treaties for the two parts of Berlin and which would discriminate, in particular, against West Berlin.
8. Maintenance of the contacts still remaining between the various sectors of Berlin, especially the freedom of movement for the Berlin population throughout the city area.

At III.

9. Rejection of any settlement which would be tantamount to direct or implied recognition of the German Democratic Republic.
10. Rejection of any settlement presupposing the unlimited continuation of the partition of Germany and of Berlin or the consolidation of this partition.

D. Conclusions.

The above mentioned objectives and minimum requirements can be attained most certainly and for the future most unassailably on the basis of the present status under occupation law of Berlin. Therefore, this status must be maintained.



FO 371/152046  
returned early March 1960  
from Ramsbottom's "The British Visit to Gen de Gaulle  
March 12-13" briefing paper

Ale under  
3/1/60

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

(a) State of Play

1. The two main questions under discussion at present are the re-organisation of the O.E.E.C. and the setting-up of the Trade Committee of Twenty which will probably meet in Paris on 29th March. No difficulties have arisen in regard to the O.E.E.C. On the Trade Committee the French are being reasonable and we have just agreed the Agenda with them. The only point on which they are particularly sensitive is that we should not try to launch at this stage negotiations for a European free trade area. We have agreed with them that our first objective must be to try to devise reasonable arrangements for dealing with the situation which will arise on July 1st next, when the first E.F.T.A. tariff cuts take place and further tariff cuts take place among the Six.

2. Our main objective must be to get the French to accept free trade in Europe. Even if de Gaulle were to agree in principle with this objective, such agreement would not amount to very much, since it is in working out the details that the difficulties arise.

3. In fact, however, it is highly unlikely that the French will agree even in principle. In the first place, the French Government have made it quite clear that they do not even wish to discuss the question at present. Secondly, they have the full support of the Americans. The Americans seem to have two main objectives at present. One is that the Treaty of Rome should be consolidated as rapidly as possible so that Germany and France may become so closely interlocked during Adenauer's life-time that there is no danger of their springing apart again. The other is to have a calm period in Europe during which the GATT negotiations of 1960 and 1961 can fruitfully take place and lead to general tariff reductions on a

FO 371/152096

2/7/60

SECRET AND PERSONAL

*Eric F. Moran Hillman*  
*W. Ramsbotham*



BRITISH EMBASSY,  
PARIS.

*P/W*

March 3, 1960.

*S.P.B.*  
*H. St. John*

*Dear Pat,*

*4.3.*

*215/186*

With reference to my letter to you of February 19 last, I write to say that I have now read Couve's letter to Herter of the previous day sent me under cover of Ramsbotham's letter of February 26. Wonders will never cease! It certainly does look as if de Gaulle had now dropped the whole idea of Tripartite consultations in London. The alternative suggestion that they should be discussed between members of the Standing Group not acting in their official capacity was one, I should have thought, that might well be accepted.

If, however, he does not get any particular satisfaction there I have no doubt that the General will continue to press his ideas somehow. However, it looks at the moment as if he has no real intention of doing so in a serious way before the Summit.

*Yours ever*  
*Cladys Pett*

Sir Patrick Dean, K. C. M. G. ,

SECRET AND PERSONAL

Defe 5/100

7/7/60

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It is issued for the personal use of.....S.....

**TOP SECRET**

Copy No..84..

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C.O.S.(60)58

**U.K. EYES ONLY**

7TH MARCH, 1960

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING - FRENCH PROPOSALS

Note by the Secretary

The Chiefs of Staff have approved<sup>+</sup> the report an Annex which examines the recent French proposals suggesting a radical change in the organisation for contingency planning for Berlin.

2. In accordance with the instructions of the Chiefs of Staff the report has been forwarded to the Ministry of Defence as an expression of their views.

(Signed) G.S. COLE

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

7TH MARCH, 1960

<sup>+</sup> C.O.S.(60)16th Meeting, Minute h

**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET

UK EYES ONLY

ANNEX TO C.O.S.(60)58

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING  
FRENCH PROPOSALS

INTRODUCTION

1. In November, 1959 the United Kingdom Team, LIVE OAK, reported that there was evidence that the French intended to suggest at governmental level that further work should be carried out on the "More Elaborate Military Measures", and also that they were thinking in terms of increasing the size of the LIVE OAK group. The French have now suggested to the Foreign Office\* and to the State Department that a new group be set up in Paris to replace the three main groups in the existing planning organisation.

2. Preliminary views on these proposals have been received from the British Embassy in Bonn@ and the United Kingdom Delegation to NATO& together with indications of the view of the State Department.+ Preliminary Foreign Office views have also been expressed.£

AIM

3. The aim of our report is to examine the French proposals.

BACKGROUND

Berlin Contingency Planning Responsibilities

4. The allocation of responsibility for Berlin Contingency planning is laid down in paragraph 13 of the Basic Document.¶ The authorities concerned are listed below with a brief indication of their main tasks:-

- (a) The Tripartite Ambassadorial Group in Washington.  
Overall co-ordination of Berlin planning.
- (b) The Three Embassies in Bonn. Special responsibilities concerning movements to Berlin; air access planning.
- (c) The Tripartite Staff in Paris (LIVE OAK GROUP).  
Planning of preparatory and more elaborate military measures; assistance to the Embassies in Bonn.
- (d) The Representatives of the Three Powers at the United Nations. Recommendations to governments on any possible approach to the United Nations.

X COS. 1460/24/11/59  
/ Annex 'B' to COS.112/25/1/60  
@ Bonn to Foreign Office Telegram No. 70  
& UKDEL NATO to Foreign Office Telegram  
No. 18 Saving  
+ Washington to Foreign Office Telegram  
No. 47 Saving  
£ FO to Washington Telegram No. 309 Saving  
¶ COS. 541/10/4/59

- 2 -  
UK EYES ONLY

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UK EYES ONLY

- (e) Headquarters of the Three Powers in Berlin.  
Assistance to the Embassies in Bonn.
- (f) Military Authorities of each of the Three Powers.  
National military planning in support of tripartitely planned measures.

Progress Towards Objectives

- 5. Hitherto, military planning, with the exception of that concerned with maintaining air access, has been carried out within the LIVE OAK Group in Paris while other aspects have been dealt with by the Ambassadorial Groups in Bonn and Washington.
- 6. Planning by the LIVE OAK Group for "More Elaborate Military Measures"<sup>q</sup> has been carried as far as it can be at present and is being followed up at the operational level, and plans for maintaining air access, prepared by the Embassies in Bonn, are in the process of being co-ordinated by General Norstad. Although some possible Countermeasures<sup>Z</sup> were listed by the LIVE OAK Group no attempt was made to evaluate their relative effectiveness as it was appreciated that this could only be accurately determined in the light of the political and military situation existing at the time of proposed implementation. Furthermore, all three Powers<sup>xx</sup> are in broad agreement that the measures are political rather than military.

THE FRENCH PROPOSALS

7. The French maintain<sup>^</sup> that none of the three main groups set up in Washington, Paris and Bonn have been able completely to reach the objectives assigned to them and that the distribution of tasks between these groups is no longer valid. They propose that these tasks should be reallocated to a single new group of high-ranking diplomats and general officers assisted by some experts. This group would be established in Paris to facilitate liaison with SHAPE.

8. No detailed argument is put forward by the French to support their proposals, which appear to be based mainly on political grounds. Their major points are:-

- (a) The dispersion of the various planning groups makes co-ordination of work more difficult.
- (b) Distribution of tasks between the groups no longer corresponds fully to the present situation.
- (c) Since the LIVE OAK Group is essentially military it is not competent to deal fully with measures which have important non-military implications.

q COS.541/10/4/59  
Z COS(59)199, Appendix 'B'  
xx COS(59)280, COS.1205/23/9/59,  
COS(59)264  
^ Annex 'B' to COS.112/25/1/60

- 3 -

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- (d) Air planning would benefit from central political and military direction.

OUR VIEWS

Military Implications

9. In theory, the French proposal that all planning should be done by a single group would seem a logical way of overcoming difficulties such as have arisen because of the geographical dispersion of the various groups. However, we see no military problems remaining which would call for the creation of such a high level group.

10. Furthermore, although in their proposals the French recognise the importance of General Norstad's role and the need for liaison between the new group and SHAPE, it is not clear how his present responsibilities for contingency planning would be affected. We have from the outset preferred military planning to be in General Norstad's hands and any disruption of existing arrangements when planning has reached such an advanced stage would be highly undesirable.

Political Implications

11. Preliminary Foreign Office<sup>£</sup> and Ambassadorial views from Washington<sup>+</sup> and Bonn<sup>@</sup> are unanimous in their opposition to the French proposals. They state that a great deal of planning must inevitably be done in Bonn and Berlin, where the necessary expert knowledge is available, and mention the undesirability of replacing the present American influence, disproportionate though it may be, by that of the French. The existence of such a group would be impossible to conceal and would attract embarrassing attention from members of the NATO Council at a particularly sensitive period of preparation for the Summit meeting. Moreover, even if a centralised politico-military planning organization were set up, planning problems similar to those now experienced would still be likely to arise from the inevitable wish of Governments to reserve their positions on far-reaching issues of foreign policy.

CONCLUSION

12. We conclude that the French proposals are unnecessary, and, having certain undesirable features, should not be accepted by the United Kingdom.

- £ Foreign Office to Washington Telegram  
No. 309 Saving  
+ Washington to Foreign Office Telegram  
No. 47 Saving  
@ Bonn to Foreign Office Telegram No. 70

- 4 -

UK EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET

Mem 11 / 2986

7/8/60  
(1)

*Spoken*  
*Mr Whitney - we*  
*To come*  
SECRET  
PRIME MINISTER

*Prime Minister Foreign Policy*  
*You were going to discuss*  
*the idea of seeing Mr Whitney*  
*with the Foreign Secretary.*  
*P.W.S.*  
*9/3*

I think that you have been concerned since you got back from Africa by the feeling that we were drifting away from the United States Administration. Examples of this are readily to hand:

- a) The United States are said to be preparing a new plan on Germany, but have not consulted us about it.
- b) They have not really taken us into their confidence about the conduct of the Summit generally.
- c) They are not being helpful in the European Economic talks, and indeed seem in some ways to be favouring the Six, or at least to attach overriding importance to keeping the Six together.
- d) In the Nuclear Tests Conference they have not really answered our points, and do not discuss their difficulties very frankly.

- e) On Disarmament they took a very long time to come up with their proposals, and only the Foreign Secretary's intervention with Mr. Herter has prevented what might have been an Anglo-American disagreement.
- f) In dealings with the French over the tripartite consultations, the Americans have tended to reply to the French first and send us a copy of their letters afterwards.

As against this, we are about to have what promise to be intimate and useful defence talks in Washington. General Norstad has told the Foreign Secretary that he does not think we are really drifting apart from the United States; and in the last resort the Americans made a reasonable concession to our point of view on the 'Link'. It may therefore be that <sup>The</sup> slight malaise in our relations with the Americans is really due more to the



inertia of the United States Administration in its last year of office, than to any worsening in Anglo-American relations.

Nevertheless, I think it is for consideration whether you should not take some initiative about the whole range of problems with the President. I do not know how you could arrange to see the President alone before the Summit, and your last letter to him has remained unanswered (I have asked the Foreign Office to get Sir Harold Caccia to find out about this). But I do feel that something should probably be done; and wonder if a start might be made by talking to Mr. Whitney?

*P de Z*

March 8, 1960

*Yes: we might try this?  
HM*

Philly de Zulueta

Prem 11/2986

3/8/60 (2)

SECRET

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ZP 1/35 G

Departmental Distribution

### THE FUTURE OF ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

For the last two years Anglo-American relations have been extremely good. We have succeeded in consolidating and extending our position as the first ally of the United States and the co-ordination of policy between the two Governments has never been so far-reaching and satisfactory.

PF  
for  
back  
need  
done

2. As long as this situation continues, the basis of our position in international affairs will remain sound. Apart from economic considerations, it could be argued that our interests might not perhaps be seriously harmed if we remained on indifferent terms with France and outside the increasing intimacy of the Common Market countries, provided that the Americans continued to attach paramount importance to their relations with us. But this is a big proviso since Anglo-American partnership is not a law of nature, and our present position is one which we could lose. Unless we are careful to shore it up, it may run into danger over the next few years. There are several reasons for this:—

#### Possible Causes of Friction

##### (a) Europe

3. The attitudes of the two Governments towards the problems of Russia in Europe are fundamentally the same, though they differ in their tactical approach. An eventual return to power of the Labour Party with its somewhat different approach might aggravate these differences. But the same danger exists to some extent for Her Majesty's present Administration, as the differences of opinion in 1958-59 over European security and Berlin made clear. These differences might matter less if Western Europe were largely in favour of our own more flexible approach. But despite recent indications that the Americans themselves are now ready to admit the need for some flexibility, the French and Germans are at one in regarding the flexible approach with some suspicion; there is a risk therefore that our position may come to suffer from their counsels being once more preferred to ours.

4. In particular, at any rate so far as the French and Germans are concerned, there is a tendency to suspect our reliability in the sphere of NATO strategy. Our move to reduce the number of United Kingdom troops stationed in Germany began this process; our ideas about thinning out and control (widely misinterpreted as betraying a sneaking desire for disengagement) continued it. This is not to say that such ideas are politically or strategically unsound; our strategic and political thinking rightly changes with a changing situation. But these changes give our allies an impression of restlessness—an irksome quality in an Alliance where there is a premium on not making trouble. Admittedly, our willingness to accept United States air squadrons which the French have refused should help us here; so should the general lack of co-operation which the French have on occasions been showing. There are also indications that the United States Government is moving towards our point of view. Nevertheless, over the long term this remains a thing to be watched, bearing in mind that, if we are unlucky or unskilful in our tactics, we may cause doubts in American minds about the reality of our opposition to Communism.

5. Secondly and more importantly the Americans are basically unsympathetic to our attitude towards Europe integration. This lack of sympathy is due to the great importance which they attach to the ideal of a Europe made immensely more powerful by greater economic and political unity; we cannot expect them to take as full account as we must of our own Commonwealth and domestic difficulties. Their vision is moreover affected by their own federal achievement; they think that what was right for the United States must be right for Europe. They blame us for standing aside.

6. Anglo-American relations may therefore suffer if Western Europe remains split into two groups, i.e., the European Economic Community and the Stockholm

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FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

Cypher/OTP and By Bag

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WG-1074/36.  
No. 980  
March 8, 1960

OUTFILE

D: 7.00 p.m. March 8, 1960

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

Addressed to Washington telegram No. 980 of March 8.  
Repeated for information Saving to: Bonn No. 241.  
Berlin No. 43. Moscow No. 351. Paris No. 722.  
U.K.Del. N.A.T.O. No. 634.

Your telegram No. 160 Saving [of March 3: Working Group on Germany and Berlin].

We agree generally with American ideas about the future programme of the Working Group and with the proposed outline of a report to be submitted to Ministers. Drinkall will come out and help you with the work beginning on April 4. Provision ought also to be made in the programme of work for the revision of the Western Peace Plan if only in order to bring it into conformity with the latest Western Disarmament proposals. In the report to Ministers the Peace Plan would presumably have to be mentioned in the paper on tactics since it would only be as a tactical exercise that the West would table it again.

2. The German paper on the dangers of an interim agreement is of little value except as an illustration of the current German state of mind (which we hope of course that the Americans may succeed in shaking when Dr. Adenauer visits Washington). As usual we would like you to leave it to the Americans to lead the attack on this paper in the event of its being seriously considered by the Working Group. The two main answers to it are:-

(a) that it ignores the greater dangers resulting from no agreement being reached at the Summit and the possibility that an interim agreement might be the only kind which we would be able to get

and

/(b)

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PO 377 / 154 086

2/9/60

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BY BAG

INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE W6-1044/45.

Sir H. Caccia

FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET)  
AND WHITEHALL (SECRET)

No. 177 Saving  
March 9, 1960.

R. March 11, 1960

DISTRIBUTION

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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 177 Saving of  
March 9, 1960.

Repeated for information Saving to: Bonn No. 51 Berlin No. 35  
Moscow No. 195 Paris No. 204  
UKDEL NATO No. 184

My telegram No. 499 of March 9/: Working Group on Germany  
and Berlin.

The following matters were also discussed at the meeting  
of the Four-Power Working Group on March 9.

2. There was some discussion of the German paper on the  
dangers of an interim settlement. The Americans questioned  
whether it was compatible with the earlier German paper (my  
telegram No. 41 Saving of January 26) where the Germans had  
seemed prepared to fall back to something like the July 28  
proposals. Moreover, the second paper did not do justice  
to the July 28 proposals, particularly in regard to the advantages  
to the West in arrangements for access to Berlin. The Germans  
thought the two papers were compatible, and explained that the  
second paper was aimed only at stressing the dangers of an interim  
settlement; it was admittedly one-sided. The French representative  
welcomed the second German paper, and stressed the dangers of  
reducing the level of troops and of giving the Russians and East  
Germans an opportunity to interfere through the arrangements  
for restricting press and radio activities. The danger of further  
/reducing

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Washington telegram No. 177 Saving to Foreign Office

-2-

reducing the morale of West Berlin by an interim settlement should not be under-estimated. Already many young people were leaving. The July 28 proposals represented the rock bottom we could offer. He added, however, that all four Foreign Ministers had agreed at Geneva that in order to get agreement on access to Berlin it would be worth running these risks. We said we saw the German paper simply as a list of objections to an interim settlement, which must be balanced against the disadvantages of no settlement. These emerged in the paper about Berlin contingency planning which the Americans had tabled.

3. We were all able to agree to the arrangements suggested by the Americans for a period of intensive study beginning April 4. Lord Hood made the points in paragraphs 5 and 6 of your telegram No. 980 of March 8.

4. The Americans also tabled a paper on the "Status of Berlin in Relation to the North Atlantic Treaty" (see paragraph 3 of my telegram No. 136 Saving of February 24), and a further paper on the plebiscite proposal, designed to combine earlier American and German papers. Copies of these papers follow by bag.

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3/10/60

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10 MAR 1960  
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FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET) AND  
WHITEHALL (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION

Sir H. Caccia

No. 500  
March 9, 1960.

D: 12.23 a.m. March 10, 1960.  
R: 2.07 a.m. March 10, 1960.

PRIORITY  
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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 500 of March 9

Repeated for information to : Bonn Berlin  
and Saving to : Moscow Paris  
UKDEL N.A.T.O. W41074

My immediately preceding telegram : Working Group on  
Germany and Berlin.

Following is text of American paper entitled "modus vivendi in Berlin".

Begins.

The present paper is an attempt to synthesize the Working  
Group discussions of the principles of the Allied position in  
Berlin and the minimum requirements for Berlin as outlined in  
II WWG/5.3, II WWG/1.9, and II WWG/1.11.

There can be no real, satisfactory and lasting solution to  
the problem of Berlin except through the reunification of Germany  
in peace and freedom. Under present circumstances, the Western  
peace plan is the most appropriate approach to a solution of the  
problem.

Continuation of the existing situation in Berlin may therefore  
be regarded only as a modus vivendi in a situation in which such a  
real solution does not appear negotiable. The question arises  
whether it might not be possible to negotiate, for the interim  
until reunification, some modus vivendi which would be more  
satisfactory or more likely to be durable than the present one.  
If such a new modus vivendi cannot be achieved, an effort will have  
to be made to maintain the status quo against intensified efforts  
by the Soviet Union and the "German Democratic Republic" to undermine  
it.

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Washington telegram No. 500 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

A modus vivendi acceptable to the Western Powers must rest on certain basic principles, and these principles in turn impose certain minimum requirements which would have to be met by any new proposal worthy of consideration. These principles, the requirements which flow from them, the manner in which these requirements are being met at present, and some questions which should be asked in examining new proposals are summarized below. (The word "Berlin" in the minimum requirements below refers to all four sections if a proposal for another modus vivendi is meant to apply to all Berlin, but only to the three Western sectors if such a proposal does not contemplate the reunification of the city.)

1. Political Freedom

Minimum Requirement - a modus vivendi must assure the continuance of a constitutional government based on free elections and guaranteeing democratic process and civil rights.

Present Situation - This requirement is met by the Berlin Government founded on the constitution of 1950. However, this Government has not been permitted to exercise authority in the Soviet sector.

2. Security

Minimum Requirement - a modus vivendi requires an international guarantee of Berlin's integrity and its freedom of access plus a security force adequate not only to maintain internal order but also to ensure the operation of the international guarantee (including a N.A.T.O. guarantee).

Present Situation - Berlin's security is maintained by 10,000 Western Allied troops in occupation status, by the Berlin police and its para-military units, and by the moral suasion of the Allied and N.A.T.O. guarantees for Berlin.

Question for Working Group Discussion - Must the security force be a Western occupation force or is there some acceptable substitute therefor? Must an international guarantee, to be meaningful, necessarily be associated with the present status of the Western Powers in Berlin?

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Washington telegram No. 500 to Foreign Office

- 3 -

3. Recourse.

Minimum Requirement - a modus vivendi must provide some procedure for the arbitration of complaints, including complaints about infringements of freedom of access.

Present Situation. The remnants of Four-Power occupation provide such a mechanism but this mechanism has been of limited use and the Soviets have increasingly rejected responsibility and invoked the "sovereignty" of the G D R.

Question for Working Group Discussion - What is the necessary rôle of the Soviets in such a procedure?

4. Freedom of Access.

Minimum Requirement - a modus vivendi should if possible reduce existing obstructions to the free movement of persons and goods between Berlin and the West; at least it should maintain freedom of access at its present level.

Present Situation - all surface traffic --except that of the Allied occupation forces -- moves only with the permission and under the control of the G D R. Although the city's transport and communication requirements have generally been met, harassment is chronic and some types of traffic are entirely blocked. Air traffic moves freely, but is carried only by Allied aircraft operating on the basis of occupation rights and quadripartite agreements...

Question for Working Group Discussion - What is the necessary rôle of the Soviets in connexion with freedom of access?

5. Economic Capabilities.

Minimum Requirements - a modus vivendi must ensure that Berlin's economic life is maintained at least at present levels; in practical terms this means that Berlin must be incorporated into the economic area of the Federal Republic.

/ Present

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Washington telegram No. 500 to Foreign Office

- 4 -

Present Situation - The almost complete economic separation of the Western sectors from the surrounding area is compensated for by the incorporation of the Western sectors into the monetary, fiscal and economic systems of the Federal Republic and by a budget subsidy and other forms of economic assistance from the Federal Republic. Economically, the Soviet Sector has become a part of the Soviet zone.

6. German Unity.

Minimum Requirement - a modus vivendi should avoid the creation of new obstacles to reunification and must not sever the ties which have been maintained or freely established between one part of Germany and another (i.e., between Berlin and the Federal Republic) and must do nothing incompatible with Berlin's rôle as the future all-German capital.

Present Situation - The Western Powers have permitted the closest association of Berlin with the Federal Republic compatible with Berlin's special status as an area under military occupation. Nearly all Federal laws and treaties apply in Berlin and Berlin is represented abroad by the Federal Republic. Berlin's rôle as a symbol of national unity has been stressed. However, the separation of East from West Germany is almost complete and only limited freedom of circulation remains between East and West Berlin.

7. Reduction of Tension

Minimum Requirement - a modus vivendi should, to the extent possible reduce the tension which arises as a result of Berlin's position between the free and Communist worlds.

Present Situation - Tension has been chronic in Berlin since 1946, led to a grave crisis in 1948-49, and has again approached the critical stage with the Soviet threats of November, 1958.

Questions for Working Group Discussion - are Berlin's security and freedom likely to be undermined by increasing Communist pressures? Can tensions be reduced only at the price of weakening Berlin's security and freedom?

8. Self-Determination.

Minimum Requirement - a modus vivendi must be acceptable to the people of Berlin.

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Washington telegram No. 500 to Foreign Office

- 5 -

Present Situation - The existing status of Berlin has been approved expressly by the Berlin Senate and indirectly by the population through its support in elections of parties which approve this status. However, this approval tends to be obscured by the emphasis given to Allied occupation rights.

Question for Working Group Discussion - What would be considered a satisfactory expression of acceptance by the people of Berlin ?

Ends.

Foreign Office pass Bonn and Berlin and Saving to Moscow, Paris, and UKDEL N.A.T.O. as my telegrams Nos. 61, 20, 192, 201 and 183.

[Repeated as requested]

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1 JAN 1960

SECRETARY OF STATE

BERLIN

WG 1074/40 (A)

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FLAG B  
FLAG C.

We have been asked by our Embassy in Washington for any instructions or comments on the new American paper entitled "Basis for a Modus Vivendi in Berlin". I attach a draft reply to this request.

2. The principal feature of the new American paper is that it practically says (a) that it would be better to negotiate an entirely new status for Berlin to last until reunification than to continue to try to defend the existing status and (b) that under such a new status it would be perfectly possible to conceive of a security force in Berlin composed of troops other than troops of the three Western powers. It does not actually say any of these things but the implication seems to me very clear. What the Americans seem to be trying to do is to attempt to set out all the theoretical background which would lead any inquirer to reach conclusions such as these in the hope that one or other of their allies will be the first to formulate the conclusions which they have themselves privately reached.

3. We must not fall into this trap. On the contrary we must hold out until the last minute, at least until April 12, in the hope that the Americans will themselves say what they mean. There is another point too. The paper entirely overlooks the possibility of our being able to negotiate an interim agreement with the Russians to last for a few years only of the kind which we thought we nearly succeeded in concluding at Geneva. We must not by failing to comment on this omission give the impression that we ourselves, as the Americans have done, have dropped all idea

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of trying to negotiate such an agreement for a limited period.

FLAG D

W'for Tel  
nos 504  
Flag F

4. I also attach a draft reply to Mr. Herter's inquiry, made through the Embassy, for suggestions as to what the President should say to Dr. Adenauen next week. I think we must respond to this if only because we have been pressing the Americans to respond to our request for suggestions as to what the Prime Minister should say to General de Gaulle.

....

5. Finally I attach with suitable flags the main papers submitted to the Working Group by the Americans, the French and the Germans. None of these papers proposes any actual "solution". to the Berlin problem. They simply reveal the tendencies of the three Governments. The Germans want nothing to be negotiated, being reluctant even to contemplate that we should at any time re-table anything like what we tabled in Geneva. The French are primarily concerned to prevent the proposing to the Russians of a new status, and the Americans, as mentioned above, are trying to push their allies towards accepting and themselves advancing the idea that perhaps after all a new status is what we should go for.

*A. Rumbold*

A. Rumbold.

March 11, 1960

Copies to:-

Sir P. Dean  
Western Dept.

*Draft reply to W'for ltr Nos 499 & 500  
changed into a letter.*

*jud 16/3*



TOP SECRET

Points discussed with General de Gaulle  
at Rambouillet on March 12 and 13, 1960

1. Summit

General de Gaulle agreed that it was desirable to reach some agreement at the Summit; he felt that Mr. Khrushchev would also want this. On Berlin he thought that some provisional arrangements might perhaps be made to last for a limited number of years, leaving the status quo more or less unaltered. He was anxious that nothing should be decided which would disturb German morale. For this reason he did not think that the ideas which he had had earlier about zones of inspection in Europe could be pursued; the Germans were too worried about this and would want too big a zone to be practicable. He agreed that the final decision on Berlin could probably only be taken at the very end of the Summit meeting and that meanwhile the West should appear very firm.

2. The Bomb

General de Gaulle said that if all nuclear armament was abandoned he would be quite content to

renounce French ambitions in this respect. He would himself like complete nuclear disarmament and felt that this did not present the same danger for the West as it might have done ten years ago when Europe had not recovered from the war. If, however, there was no general nuclear disarmament, and he doubted if the Russians for reasons of prestige really wanted this, then France would continue to try to obtain a nuclear armament. The Americans had refused to give any help. He would be glad if it was possible for the United Kingdom to assist even with means of delivery only. The Prime Minister explained the complications of the United Kingdom arrangement with the United States. General de Gaulle understood this. The Prime Minister said that the conclusion of the Geneva Tests agreement might provide an opportunity for some arrangement being made. General de Gaulle seemed attracted by this plan.

### 3. European Economic Problems

The Prime Minister explained the dangers which he saw in a division of Europe between the Six and the Seven, and in particular urged that the programme of the Six should not be accelerated because this would increase the

measure of discrimination. General de Gaulle said that he regarded the Six as a commercial treaty; he would not have signed it but he accepted it. It had had certain good effects, particularly on French industry which had been forced to make itself more competitive. As it was a commercial arrangement it should be possible to make a commercial bargain between the Six and the Seven. He did not commit himself about accelerating the Six's programme.

4. Tripartite Talks

General de Gaulle said that he attached the greatest importance to the arrangement proposed by President Eisenhower at Rambouillet, but he had been disappointed by the American proposals in this respect. The Prime Minister suggested that there should in fact be fairly frequent meetings between the three Heads of Government and that perhaps this would be more fruitful if specific subjects were chosen for each meeting. General de Gaulle seemed attracted by this idea and by the suggestion of having another meeting of the three Heads of Government



after the Summit and perhaps also in the autumn. He was not, however, content that the tripartite conversations should be continued by a group of officials except perhaps Ambassadors. He did, however, hope that there might be some very small continuing method coming out of the discussions at the level of Heads of Government.

5. Anglo-French Relations

General de Gaulle said that he thought that the United Kingdom was always unwilling to choose between being part of Europe and having a special connection with the United States. The Prime Minister explained the special position of the United Kingdom, which France in many ways shared. The United Kingdom would like to see a renaissant Europe led by France.

6. N.A.T.O.

General de Gaulle said that the whole military structure of NATO as at present constituted seemed to him absurd. But as there was no French Army in Europe he could not do much about this at the moment. When the French Army come back from Algeria however he would

hope that the military arrangements could be altered. He did not think that troops should be under international commanders; French soldiers at least would never fight well under such a system. He thought that Germany should be the advance guard of the Alliance, France should provide the main armies, and the United Kingdom should be the protector of the coastal flank. The United States would provide the reserve. He did not think that the United Kingdom and France need keep more than some elements of their troops in Germany; the United Kingdom should keep her base at Antwerp.

7. Algeria

General de Gaulle said that he had not changed his policy at all during or after his Algerian visit. He had, however, been very struck by the military success which the French were having and by the diminution of incidents. He hoped that by the end of the year the war would be practically over. The future was difficult to foresee; it was fortunate that most of the French were grouped round Algiers itself, and round Oran. It was possible

Embryonic form of the  
should find advance of war have now's?

that some sort of partition or federal constitution for Algeria could be a solution although Ferhat Abbas would strongly oppose this.

8. Africa Generally

General de Gaulle said that the various states of the French community would gradually demand independence and he would not object. Some of them might not really exist in any effective way, but they would no doubt manage somehow. He was worried about the position in Guinea and the help which Mr. Nkrumah was giving to Mr. Sekou Toure, who was slipping into the Communist camp. It was very important to have continuing Anglo-French contacts about Africa.

9. Relations with the Russians

General de Gaulle believed that it was in the interests of the West to keep relations with the Russians going and to develop cultural contacts, exchanges of students and so forth. This would have two objects. First, it would help to civilize the Russians and encourage their development into a more bourgeois frame

of mind. Secondly, it might help to encourage them to accept the idea of a Concert of great powers to run the world. It was in pursuit of the second objective that General de Gaulle had suggested his plan for some joint economy built by the Western powers and the Russians in some matter, such as an anti-leprosy campaign. General de Gaulle felt that such a co-operative project might encourage the Russians to start them more in terms of joint control of the world. He did not therefore wish any such project to be operated through the United Nations since the political content of the arrangement would then be lost.

#### 10. Channel Tunnel

There was some desultory discussion about this. President de Gaulle said that it would be a fine thing. The Prime Minister said that it would be better if it did not need trains. President de Gaulle did not seem to attach any urgency to the Channel idea.

FD 321 / 154086

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*pl's, by an emra  
154096 seems  
more likely*

3/15/60

(WG 1074/40)

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

March 15, 1960.

OFFICE

*Dear Sammy.*

I am sorry that we have not replied sooner to your telegrams Nos. 499 and 500 of March 9, asking for comments on the American paper entitled "Basis of a modus vivendi in Berlin" which has been tabled for the working group on Germany and Berlin. We had hoped to get something away to you before the weekend, but the Secretary of State wished to discuss the whole question of Berlin with the Prime Minister before the latter's visit to General de Gaulle. In fact they did not specifically discuss this American paper and the following comments have not been directly approved by the Secretary of State.

2. In discussion of the new American paper we suggest that you should be guided by the general comments in our telegram 716 Saving of February 19 which gave our views on the earlier American paper on this subject. Paragraph 2 of that telegram is especially relevant.

3. It seems to us that the most notable feature of the new American paper is that it omits any reference to the possibility of a modus vivendi valid for a specific number of years, i.e. a period less than German reunification. We doubt whether there is any particular significance in this omission because we realise that the essential purpose of the American paper is to float the idea of a change of status. But we think that, without pressing the point, you ought to suggest that mention of the possibility of an interim agreement for a limited number of years ought logically to be included in the American paper, perhaps at the end of paragraph 3.

4. One vital question is of course the first one asked under Section 2, i.e. whether the security force must be a Western Occupation force. You should limit yourself to saying that the important thing is that the composition of the security force should be of such a nature as to convince the Russians and East Germans that the international guarantee would certainly be honoured (see paragraph 4, point 2, of my telegram No. 716 Saving). You should not be drawn into volunteering the thought that circumstances could be imagined in which a force other than one composed of the three allies might fulfil this requirement. We want the Americans to be the first to say this. Our impression is that they are on the point of saying so.

/5.

Viscount Hood, C.M.G.,  
Washington.

5. We are inclined to doubt whether "recourse" is necessary except in the case of infringements of freedom of access. We do not, for example, consider that "recourse" is vital in the case of "subversive activities". If this is accepted we think that the section on "recourse" might come after the section on "freedom of access" and relate only to infringements of freedom of access.

6. We find the wording of the questions asked in Section 3 and 4 rather obscure. Perhaps your discussions may bring out what the Americans have in mind. As we see it, the rôle of the Russians must be to act as an intermediary with the D.D.R. over Western allegations of D.D.R. infringements. The Russians would of course be a direct party to any modus vivendi on Berlin itself and we assume that they would have to be a direct party to the guarantee relating to freedom of access.

7. The questions in Section 7 are curiously worded. The first question ought in our opinion more properly to read "Are Berlin's security and freedom more likely to be undermined by increasing Communist pressure if there is no modus vivendi or if there is a modus vivendi? The second question is "loaded". It could equally well be rephrased in the opposite sense, i.e. "Would not the weakening of Berlin's security and freedom result in increased tension? Our answer to the question as it stands is that we see no reason why Berlin's security and freedom cannot be strengthened at the same time as tensions are reduced.

8. We have no other comments but imagine that the paper is likely to be substantially redrafted as a result of French and German comments.

9. I am sending copies of this letter to the Chanceries at Bonn, Paris, UKDel N.A.T.O., and Moscow and Political Branch Berlin.

Yours  
Sgd) Tony.  
(A. Rumbold)

7/19 = 7/19/60

*E. Pl. Ar. Co. 1/3 sent  
copies of 572, 573 + 582  
to C.O.D.*

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FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

*2/13*  
*Dept.:*  
*1. Important.*  
*2. Workable copy for*  
*with 572 + 573*  
*C.S.*  
*Am*  
*2/13*

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL  
DISTRIBUTION

Sir H. Caccia

No. 573  
March 18, 1960  
PRIORITY  
TOP SECRET

*10/7/60*

D. 3.22.a.m. March 19, 1960  
R. 4.28.a.m. March 19, 1960

*37/19/60*

My immediately preceding telegram: Defence Talks.

On the production of M R B M s in Europe we deployed the arguments against. The Americans countered by minimizing the objections and urging that a scheme for production was the best way of inducing European countries to meet the costs. They emphasized, however, that they had not yet cleared their minds on the subject, which they found exceptionally difficult. They recognized that Mr. Gates would have to say something at the meeting of the N.A.T.O. Defence Ministers.

2. We emphasized once again the importance of further United States/United Kingdom discussion before they made a pronouncement to other countries. We warned them that they could not assume that if they felt obliged to promote a scheme for European production, Her Majesty's Government would wish to participate, or would support any amendment of the Brussels Treaty.

3. On Skybolt and Polaris, they said that they were not yet ready to say whether they would allow us to purchase supplies. They regarded the question as connected with the M R B M problem. When asked to explain the link, they said that it was merely that both formed part of a large area on which policy was unresolved, and went on to speak vaguely and confusedly of such matters as the "N.A.T.O. strategic deterrent" and the allocation of Bomber Command to N.A.T.O. or the use of Bomber Command for SACEUR's tasks. They also said that there was the direct link that, if we wanted Polaris, we should have a very good justification for investing heavily in a scheme for making Polaris in Europe. They said that they recognized that the Minister of Defence would be expecting Mr. Gates to give him an answer when they met in Paris.

/ 4. On the

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Washington telegram No.573 to Foreign Office.

- 2 -

4. On the question of SACLANF's R-hour, they said that, on further study, they did not think that the Murphy/Dean agreement was applicable. We agreed and said we would not now press for any change in SACLANF's N.A.T.O. arrangements, provided that there was some private arrangement to ensure that Her Majesty's Government would be consulted before British-assigned nuclear forces were committed. It was agreed that SACLANF and the Admiralty should be asked to consider whether any new procedure was needed.

5. On N.A.T.O. "button-pressing", we agreed that existing arrangements should be maintained as long as possible and that we should jointly consider how this position could best be put over. We gave the Americans a note of relevant public statements made by the Secretary of State. We also gave them the formula suggested in your telegram No.1090. Mr. Merchant was grateful for these contributions and undertook to study them.

6. Full record follows.

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Atomic Energy and Disarmament Department  
Western Department

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Seen by the Secretary of State.

Copied to No 10 (who have not yet had the original) and for H. Caccia.

QUOTE.

March 19, 1960.

Dear Harold:

- 1. Gen A. Rambold M 23/3
- 2. J. D. Nell A... S. 24/3
- 3. Gen P. De...
- 4. Gen Rambold } on release

I have taken a copy of the 4<sup>th</sup> para. of this for the working trip. It becomes rather significant in the light of former lies. No. 25 of to-day.

Thank you very much for your letter. Frankly, no prior tour of mine in the past fifteen years has been so tiring as the one I completed in South America. The combination of dust, crowded days and summer heat persuaded me that I am not as young as I was when we were together in Algiers.

CSZ  
 25.3.  
 Mr. Hambrick  
 s.l.c. r.m.  
 JCH  
 25/3

I have not read General de Gaulle's memoirs - but I shall make an effort to get the third volume of which you speak. It has been a source of amazement to me that he seems to be unable to fathom the methods by which our three governments could easily keep in close touch on main issues. I explained to him how you and ourselves used both normal diplomatic exchanges, personal communications and, in acute cases, ad hoc committees to keep together. I think that the difficulty may lie in his memory of the British-American "Combined Chiefs of Staff" of World War II days, and his resentment that the French staffs were not integrated into that body. In any event, I have always made it clear that I was ready to do anything reasonable to maintain contacts and mutual understandings among us three; I adhere to this policy. But I think I made it also clear to him that it was impractical to have frequent "Heads of Government" conferences and yet, as you say, he seems to prefer this kind of approach to any on our common problems.

The Chancellor and I got along famously. While I had been informed, a day or so in advance of our meeting,

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that he had expressed a great deal of uneasiness to friends in New York concerning Western firmness in preserving our rights in Berlin, he did not raise this question with me. I conversationally reassured him on the point, as I have often done before, and he seemed pleased that I had mentioned the matter. He did not show any concern about it. A day or so later, the Chancellor went to a dinner with Secretary Herter and I hear that some misunderstandings arose which seemed to annoy him. I do not believe, however, that the points of difference involved fundamentals.

☪ All of us - including Mr. K. - seem in accord on one subject: the need for progress in controlled disarmament. We seem to be as far apart, as between East and West, as we possibly can be, on the procedures for attaining the objective. I would derive tremendous satisfaction out of seeing some specific practical step agreed upon at the Summit, and initiated as soon as practicable. Such an accomplishment would be tangible evidence of some real progress in a knotty problem that has engaged your effort and mine for a number of years. It would be a ray of light in a world that is bound to be weary of the tensions brought about by mutual suspicion, distrust and arms races. Strangely, I never lose my conviction that sooner or later in some fashion or other, we shall bring about some rift in the clouds. But at the same time I must confess at times to a great feeling of impatience.

I forgot to say that the Chancellor is very much preoccupied with the 1961 elections in his country. He

TOP SECRET.

made a point of saying that even the Opposition agrees with him that all of us, and particularly all of Germany, must be adamant concerning the allied occupational rights in Berlin. Any seeming weakening of this position would, he believes, have a most damaging effect on his party's position next year. When we finally get together, maybe we will have an opportunity to compare notes on these journeys that we have been making here and there about the world.

With warm regard, as ever,

IKE.

UNQUOTE

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3/20 = 3/21/60

TOP SECRETFROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Sir H. Caccia

No. 582

March 20, 1960

D: 2.22 a.m. March 21, 1960

R: 3.04 a.m. March 21, 1960

IMMEDIATETOP SECRET

My telegram No. 572, paragraph 3: United States/United Kingdom Defence Talks.

Having cleared up some of the unclear points in private conversations yesterday between Mr. Chilver and Mr. Irwin of the Defence Department, and between Mr. Ramsbotham and Mr. Gerard Smith of the State Department (records by bag) I went over the main points with Mr. Herter this afternoon.

2. He had clearly been given an accurate account of our position and was well aware that the Americans had to decide urgently what to say on the M.R.B.M. question before the N.A.T.O. Defence Ministers' meeting. The President would, in his view, have to make some offer which would at least appear to be honouring the pledge of December 1957, but he himself expected that the form of the offer would not be sufficiently attractive to be taken up. They had not yet worked out a specific proposal but the offer might well be tied to conditions which, while reasonable in themselves, would be unlikely to prove acceptable to European N.A.T.O. Governments. The sort of conditions he had in mind were:

(a) that the missiles produced in Europe with American assistance should be exclusively for SACEUR's requirements and not, at any time or in any circumstances, for the national requirements of any contributing country and

(b) that those participating in the scheme would have to pledge themselves in advance to accept SACEUR's military judgment regarding the deployment of the missiles themselves and of the stockpile for the warheads.

3. Mr. Herter said that he was not at all sure whether there was any real pressure from N.A.T.O. countries for a European production programme of this kind. The French, however, had been badgering the Americans about it for some time and Mr. Burgess was continually after them.

Heard  
Heard  
from  
with  
R. Graham

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/4.

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TOP SECRETWashington telegram No. 582 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

4. I pointed out that if SACEUR was to get the weapons he needed for the period 1963 to 1965, any American offer to N.A.T.O. would have to be fitted in to a fairly close timetable. Mr. Herter agreed and was also fully aware that the negotiations for joint manufacture in Europe of Hawk and Sidewinder showed how long this sort of thing took to get off the ground. His personal view was that it would be an absurd waste of money to set up a new production line in Europe. But he was convinced that SACEUR had a genuine requirement which must be met. If the President decided that he was under an obligation to make some offer to N.A.T.O. the Americans would certainly consult with us again before any action was taken.

5. I then raised the question of our own requirements for future missile delivery systems. I explained that our problem was simply that we wished to extend the life of our strategic nuclear force in being to be an effective contribution to the overall deterrent. We had the bombers and the warheads and we believed that on military and economic grounds the sensible thing would be to purchase Skybolt missiles for the period 1965 to 1970.

6. Mr. Herter did not dispute this but said that we should have to allow the Americans a chance to show their readiness to meet their 1957 pledge before they committed themselves bilaterally with us. If any United States M.R.B.M. offer met with the result he expected, the way would be clear for bilateral arrangements with us to meet our requirements. It had, however, struck him as it had the Defence Department that Polaris might be a better weapon for our purposes simply because of its high degree of mobility and the fact that it would be operationally available in the comparatively near future. His personal view was that Polaris should be provided by the Americans as a N.A.T.O. weapon for SACEUR's purposes.

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FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

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FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET)

DISTRIBUTION

Sir H. Caccia

No. 547

March 15, 1960

D. 1.30 a.m. March 16, 1960

R. 2.28 a.m. March 16, 1960

IMMEDIATE

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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 547 of March 15

Repeated for information to: UK Del. NATO  
and Saving to: Moscow

Exchange of messages between Mr. Khrushchev and President Eisenhower.

Her Majesty's Minister, together with his French and Italian colleagues, was invited to call at the State Department today for a briefing on Mr. Khrushchev's message of March 3 (which, owing to the President's trip to South America, was only delivered to him on March 8) and the President's reply, which was delivered in Moscow on March 13. A similar briefing is being given to German and Canadian Representatives here; and the United States Permanent Representative to NATO will be making a statement tomorrow at a restricted session of the North Atlantic Council. The State Department emphasized the strict view taken by the President of the personal character of messages he exchanges with other Heads of State and asked that we should carefully respect the confidential nature of the following information.

2. In his message Mr. Khrushchev said he felt impelled to write a letter to the President because of what the President and Mr. Herter had said at Press conferences during the month of February. Their statements had been widely interpreted as indicating that it was United States policy to supply nuclear weapons to their NATO allies. Mr. Khrushchev expressed his concern at any increase in the number of nuclear powers (amongst whom he apparently included France) and his disquiet that the United States should take so dangerous a step as to allow nuclear weapons to pass into the hands of other countries. Mr. Khrushchev singled out Dr. Adenauer as likely to be encouraged thereby to fulfil "the mission" of which he had spoken in Rome. If the United States Government took this step, the Soviet Government would be justified

TOP SECRET

Washington telegram No. 547 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

3. The President, in his reply, said he welcomed an opportunity to clear away the misconceptions under which Mr. Khrushchev was labouring. The United States shared Mr. Khrushchev's concern about any increase in the number of nuclear powers. The United States Government was in fact precluded by present legislation from transferring either nuclear weapons or know-how to other countries and had no intention of seeking to amend that legislation. At the same time, the members of NATO were faced by military forces which, on Mr. Khrushchev's own showing, were armed with nuclear weapons. It was only right and natural that the members of NATO should do that they could to protect themselves. NATO weapon stockpiles had therefore been established, but the nuclear warheads remained in United States custody. There was thus no increase in the number of countries actually holding nuclear weapons. The President also rejected the allegations about the aggressive intentions of the Federal Republic.

4. In the concluding portion of his message, the President suggested the ways by which Mr. Khrushchev could cooperate in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. These were:

- (a) to conclude an agreement for the cessation of nuclear tests under adequate supervision;
- (b) to work in the I.A.E.A. for an agreement on safeguards; and
- (c) to cooperate in the ten-Power Conference in Geneva.

5. In communicating this information the State Department suggested that the significant fact about Khrushchev's message was less its content than the very moderate and sincere tone in which it was couched. The language of the message also suggested that it was not intended for publication, though this had not been confirmed by the Soviet Ambassador.

Foreign Office please pass to UK Del.NATO and Saving to Moscow as my telegrams Nos. 74 and 203 respectively.

[Copies sent to No. 10 Downing Street]  
[Repeated as requested.]

ADVANCE COPIES TO:

Private Secretary

Sir R. Stevens

Sir P. Dean

Head of Atomic Energy and

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Copy to SecretaryC.D.G.  
C.S.A.MINISTER

10/10/60

Discussions with the Americans on M.R.B.M.s  
and on deterrent weapons

The upshot of the discussions we had with the Americans last week was that they were not ready to tell us their views about M.R.B.M. production in Europe or about letting us have SKYBOLT; and they realise that you will expect to resume the discussion when you meet Mr. Gates in Paris at the end of the month.

2. They think it very important that SAGEUR should have his M.R.B.M.s. They have still not agreed among themselves whether production in Europe is desirable. In favour of it, they argued that it was the best way to induce European countries to pay for and house the missiles; that schemes of this kind had a unifying effect; that without it the French would go on independently, whereas they would be handicapped by participating in a joint scheme; and that the President's pledge of 1957 could not be ignored. They listened to the arguments on the other side, and were forced to admit that the argument about handicapping the French was unconvincing and that the Brussels Treaty could not really survive German participation in producing these missiles; but the Pentagon representatives at any rate still believe that production in Europe is desirable. The Ambassador stated explicitly at the end that they would be wrong to assume that if they insisted on a European production scheme the United Kingdom would participate or would support a curtailment of the Brussels Treaty. They should assume that we might not do either.

3. We have put it on record that we are not agreeing to the figure of 300 missiles until we have seen a convincing case for it.

4. Although it has been left that the Americans will consult us further, we must recognise that once they have completed the exhausting process of resolving their own differences they will not really be open to argument, especially as they are under such vigorous pressure from the French to announce their decision. My guess is that Mr. Gates will tell you what the decision is on the evening you arrive, and tell the others the following day. They will certainly take our arguments into account. Their decision will probably turn on whether they believe a European production scheme would be a real incentive to continental countries, as the, say the MARK and SIDEWINDER schemes have been. I believe we have sown some doubt in their minds on whether this would apply to an M.R.B.M., except with the French.

5. They have not given much thought yet to the question of allowing us to buy strategic missiles. They said that they regarded it as connected with the M.R.B.M. question. They explained that this was partly because they thought we wanted POLARIS rather than SKYBOLT, and would be interested in obtaining supplies from a European production line, and partly because they were afraid that if we spent too much on the strategic deterrent we should not be able to afford a handsome subscription to the M.R.B.M. scheme. They did not go so far as

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to say that a condition of the supply of strategic weapons would be that we should contribute adequately to the M.R.B.M. scheme, but they came close to it.

6. Neither the Pentagon nor the State Department showed the slightest inclination to make concessions to the desire of the French to have a say in the control of the deterrent. They have no intention whatsoever ~~the~~ supporting any organisational device that purports to give N.A.T.O. control over American nuclear weapons, or of giving the French warhead information. They say that ~~neither~~ would be permitted by their legislation. They confused us at first by asking whether we did not think that a "N.A.T.O. deterrent" would help to preserve the loyalty to N.A.T.O. of the countries that do not have nuclear forces of their own; but we discovered later that they meant by this the M.R.B.M. scheme, and that they believed that there was psychological value in there being some weapons under SAGEUR's control that had megaton heads and could reach Russia, especially if the weapons were made in Europe. They do not draw a sharp distinction between deterrent weapons and tactical weapons. They say that what matters is the total offensive capability of the West, which is at present diminishing relative to the East's. They also point out that M.R.B.Ms of no more than 1000 mile range could reach Russia from Turkey and Greece, and that as time goes on the M.R.B.Ms will acquire ranges up to 2000 miles or more. But while they believe it will encourage the non-nuclear countries to have weapons under the control of SAGEUR, as the "N.A.T.O." commander par excellence, there is no thought at all of his taking his orders from anywhere but Washington.

7. You will of course be receiving a brief for your meeting with Mr. Gates. We are not going to have an easy time. It is far from certain that the Americans will drop the idea of European production of M.R.B.Ms. Whether they do or not, they will expect us to contribute heavily. In fact, if there is no production scheme and if no Continental country wants to contribute, they may feel it is our fault. They will be in no hurry to tell us we can buy SKYBOLT.

8. There was no mention in Washington of the GARELOCH project. ~~production.~~

9. There was some reasonably satisfactory discussions on button-pressing, about which I need not trouble you at this stage.

21st March, 1960

SIGNED. R. G. CHILVER

Reference:--

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7/24/60

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Office of the United Kingdom  
National Military Representative

S.H.A.P.E.

British Forces Post Office 6

Our reference: UKNMR/8/6(431)

Your reference:

Telephone: Galvani 3000 Ext. 4029

24th March, 1960.

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SECRETARY,  
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE,  
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE,  
LONDON, S.W.1.

Copy to UK Delegation to NATO.

cos. 412/28/3/60  
refer

MRBMs in Allied Command Europe

1. The Chiefs of Staff have recently discussed the question of how SACEUR would justify the figure of 300 MRBM required in his Command by 1963.
2. I have made a few discreet enquiries from British officers in SHAPE and have been informed that there is a SHAPE letter to the Standing Group now in draft which attaches a long study of some 20 pages besides annexures.
3. The study establishes an initial ACE requirement for about 300 second-generation mid-range missiles, a substantial proportion of which should be operational not later than 1963. It confirms the desirability of a range of 1500 nautical miles but points out that the ACE military requirement beyond about 900 nautical miles is limited. It adds that the requirement for MRBM is not considered to be an addition to the IC 70 requirement but as a substitution for other strike weapon systems programmed for the same targets.
4. Copies of the study when approved will, I understand, be sent to Ministries of Defence on a limited distribution. In the meantime, I have made a few notes on some of the main points of the study as described to myself, and attach these at annex in case they may be of value as advance information.

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Brigadier,  
U.K.N.M.R.

*Handwritten signature*

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ANNEX TO UKNMR/8/6(431)

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E.R.

The MRBM requirement for ACE is established from:-

the mission and capabilities of ACE and external forces;  
 the threat as given in the target system;  
 the characteristics of ballistic missiles as opposed to other strike vehicles; and political considerations. Each of these is analysed in the study.

2. The area of interest to SACEUR for target purposes is defined as:-

that portion of the USSR from which nuclear weapons could readily be launched against ACE territory; all European satellite nations, also the neutral countries and areas of ACE which might be over-run.

3. The value of external forces is recognised but ACE is said to be bound to have the power to attack certain targets immediately; therefore external forces cannot be relied upon.

4. The current target system, vide ASP, contains 305 targets at ranges up to 600 miles from sites west of the Iron Curtain. This is projected forward to a total of 800 at ranges up to 1500 miles for the period 1963-68. Both figures, i.e. 305 and 800, are broken down by ranges. The 800 figure includes:-

air bases and naval bases; army bases and forces;  
 military and governmental centres; air defence centres;  
 interdiction targets; and estimated missile bases.

In subsequent explanatory paragraphs it is said (a) that the targets suitable for MRBM are mostly those connected with the enemy's aircraft strike force. This includes stockpiles of nuclear weapons, control centres, air defence centres (b) ports are included (c) ground forces are not suitable targets; (d) population centres are excluded as not being directly connected with the enemy's offensive power (e) Soviet missile bases are not "feasible" targets therefore are excluded. If they became "feasible" they would be an added commitment.

5. (a) The paragraphs on the statistical calculation start by stating that there is an actual shortfall of 100 MRBMs to meet the threat envisaged in MC 70. This shortfall is based on delays in programmed IRBM squadrons, missile submarines and on air-breathing SSM.

(b) The calculation then, after deleting enemy ballistic missile bases and ground force targets, assesses the number of fixed targets for 1963 as 480 from 0-1500 miles. Of these 480, 90 are then deleted as being primarily governmental

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Control and population centres (but there is a note that of these 45 might be later assigned to ACE). A further 100 are deleted as being under 300 miles range in the satellites and therefore within the optimum range of other weapon systems. This brings the total to 290, which is rounded off to 300.

NOTE - The paper at one stage mentions a requirement for 2 missiles per target but dismisses it because of the possibility that survival measures and improved reliability will make this factor excessive.

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I attach my first draft of the brief on Germany and Berlin for use in the forthcoming meetings in preparation for the Summit. Also attached is the copy of the brief prepared for the December meetings.

2. You will see that I have cast the brief in the form of a prophesy of what will finally emerge as the report of the Four Power Working Group. I think that this is the only way in which we can proceed. There are, however, certain deliberate omissions on which you may have views.

3. I have not mentioned the possibility of a zone of inspection cropping up. Indeed I have not referred at all to the question of European security. My own feeling is that that this question of zones of inspection should not be included in the brief, partly because it is so tentative and partly because it is so secret.

4. I have included a reference to the December brief but you will see that I have not debated the problems of how to secure a Geneva type of agreement in the way in which we have done in the December brief. Thus there is no mention in the brief of the proposal which we put to the Americans last October (see paragraph 7 of the December brief). I have left this out because I do not think that there will be any detailed discussion on this until the very last moment and that, if there is, we can always do some quick briefing on the spot. In any case the Secretary of State knows the general background very well.

5. I have not mentioned "subversive activities". Indeed, this seems to me to be a significant omission from the work of the Working Group so far. I propose to raise this point in the Working Group as it seems to me that we ought to have some sort of general brief for Ministers. This can be one of the background documents. But I do not think that we need include anything about it in the brief.

6. You will see that I have annexed a paper giving details of useful documents. Is the sort of thing which you had in mind? And do you think that it should be annexed to the brief?.

A short separate brief will be needed.

except in the Annex

right

It's the point on which the Germans seem most sensitive.

*J. K. Drinkall*  
(J. K. Drinkall)

March 25, 1960.

Sir A. Rumbold.

APR 28/60



ARCHIVED

30 MAR 1960 BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

AIR BAG

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WG1074/53

March 25, 1960.

*Mz des Ton*

*WG1074/49*

Working Group on Germany and Berlin

You will have seen our telegram No. 196 Saving of March 22 reporting on our last meeting. Though a drafting sub-group is still at work, the main Group is unlikely to meet again until the "intensive" phase starts on April 4.

2. The discussion in the Group has been pretty unproductive up-to-date. The Americans have been marking time and in view of your general instructions I have sat back. So far so good, but we shall soon be in the foothills to the Summit and it will be useful if you can send us, via John Drinkall, a general idea of what you hope might be achieved during the forthcoming intensive phase of the Working Group and at the April meeting of Foreign Ministers.

3. Particular points on which we shall need guidance are:-

(a) New Status for Berlin

*No*

It seems pretty clear by now that the Americans, though they have been careful to leave open the possibility of a new status for Berlin, have no concrete ideas or proposals to put forward. That being so, have we any interest in pursuing this particular hare any further, at any rate in the context of the May Summit meeting? During the forthcoming discussions in the Working Group, the British line might be any one of the following:-

*Yes*

(i) to follow the American lead;

*Not as far as  
prop. "New Status"*

(ii) to suggest that since nobody has any new ideas for a new status there is no point in arguing the case for a new status at great length in the Working Group report;

*No*

(iii) to urge that the possibility of a new status should be left open and that the case for and against should be fully argued in the report;

*No*

(iv) to suggest that one of the questions we should put to the Ministers is whether they wish the Working Group to spend any more time studying the possibility of a new status.

Sir A. Rumbold, Bart., C.B., C.M.G.,  
Foreign Office,  
London, S.W.1.

(b)/



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(b) The July 28 Proposals

There has been no real discussion of these, nor of how they might be brought up-to-date for use at the May Summit. Am I right in assuming that you would prefer such discussion not to take place during the forthcoming intensive phase of the Working Group, since you would rather leave it to a later stage of the Summit preparations?

*R. L. V.*

(c) Solution C of the London Working Group Report of April, 1959

What should we say about this? Should we revive Solution B also? Are there any other solutions you would like us to suggest as alternatives to the July 28 proposals?

*No.  
Nixon  
"at summit"  
12 July 59*

(d) The possible outcomes of a Summit meeting so far ventilated in the Working Group have been:-

- (i) a new status for Berlin;
- (ii) an interim solution;
- (iii) no solution.

There is, I suppose, theoretically yet another possible outcome, something intermediate between (ii) and (iii) i.e. a procedural solution: agreement to study the Berlin question further and to set up some body for that purpose, even though there had been no meeting of minds at the Summit on the substantive issues. The revised draft on Soviet intentions which you sent us under cover of Drinkall's letter of March 18 suggests that you are not optimistic that Khrushchev would accept a gimmick of this kind; and since it is essentially a fall-back position it might be premature to mention it in the Working Group at this point.

*The case is if  
the procedural aspect  
was proposed  
before substantive.*

*Yes*

*-144-*

*James  
S. Hood*  
(Hood)

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DRAFT

March 25, 1960

THE BERLIN QUESTION

- A. Advantages and Disadvantages of Seeking an Agreement on Berlin
- B. Advantages and Disadvantages of Possible New Arrangements for Berlin
- C. Minimum Requirements for a Modus Vivendi in Berlin
- D. Conclusions and/or Questions to be Put to the Foreign Ministers

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A. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF SEEKING AN AGREEMENT ON BERLIN

1. Introduction

Berlin cannot perform its natural role as the capital of Germany until the Four Powers can agree on reunification. Until then, the Western Powers can accept without change the existing situation, under which West Berlin has achieved a measure of prosperity. It is the Soviet Union who have proposed change. The Soviet Union may now be so committed to signing a separate peace treaty that it may do so whether or not a new agreement is made on Berlin. The first question for the Western Powers to consider is whether the balance of advantage lies in seeking an agreement on Berlin, or in resisting Soviet attempts to modify the existing situation.

2. Advantages of Seeking an Agreement

The general advantages to the West of reaching agreement on Berlin are:

a) Berlin is situated over 100 miles the wrong side of the Iron Curtain. Communication between Berlin and the West is always under the threat of Soviet interference or disruption. This situation can only be improved with Soviet consent.

b) An agreement would give renewed validity to the Western position and would enable the West to defend that position more effectively. The Allied position in Berlin, however sound legally, is based on occupation rights acquired in 1945 in circumstances very different to those of today. Many people regard this as an anachronism and are thus susceptible to Soviet propaganda which plays on this theme.

c) The Soviet Union would hesitate to risk damaging their reputation in the world by open breach of an agreement, at least until they could claim that it had become obsolete. The period during which the Soviet Union might observe an agreement could be sufficiently long for progress to be made on other world problems, and for moderating influences to gain ground in USSR and the Satellites.

d) To the extent that an agreement imposed obligations on the Soviet Union, they would be denied some of the pressures which they are now free to use on Berlin and on the Allied position there. In particular, an agreement

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which provided for continuing access on terms acceptable to the West would draw the sting from the Soviet threat to sign a peace treaty with East Germany.

e) The Western Powers cannot prevent the USSR from abandoning their occupation rights in Berlin. After withdrawal, unless it takes place by agreement with the Allies, the Soviet Union would be less inhibited from exerting pressures (either directly or through the "GDR") and the Allies would be less able to resist them. The effect of these pressures on the economy of West Berlin could be particularly severe. Such a withdrawal would create a situation of friction and tension not only in Berlin but generally.

f) Resistance to Soviet attempts to modify the existing situation would involve a series of tests and challenges and could, inadvertently or otherwise, lead to war.

g) An attempt to reach an agreement on Berlin would be regarded by Western opinion as a better test of Soviet intentions than insistence on maintaining the existing situation. If it proves true that Russian designs on West Berlin can only be opposed by force, the Allied public would be more likely to be ready to face the consequences if an attempt to make an agreement had been made, and world opinion would be more sympathetic.

3. Disadvantages of Seeking Agreement

The general disadvantages of seeking an agreement are these:

a) The Soviet Union may be bluffing when they threaten to sign a peace treaty. Such a treaty would in itself bring them little advantage which they do not enjoy already. It is the threat of doing so which is of advantage to them in their relations with the West. The card may be more valuable in their hand than in play.

b) The aim of the Soviet Union is to undermine the Allied position in Berlin. It would therefore be difficult to conclude an agreement as favorable to the West as the situation existing up to now.

c) In order not to be seriously hampered in their designs on Berlin, the Soviet Union might only be prepared to enter an agreement of very short duration.

d) If the Soviet Union obtained an agreement which they considered assisted them in their aims, they would register a success for their policy of ultimata and threats and would be encouraged to pursue that policy with the West in the future.

e) Any agreement which could be negotiated might be regarded by world opinion as evidence of a shift in the balance of power to the advantage of the

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Soviet Union.

Soviet Union.

f) Eastern European opinion would regard an agreement which could be negotiated as a sign that the West was prepared to come to an accommodation with the Soviet Union.

g) The mere discussion of any arrangement which would put into question the continued validity of Allied rights in Berlin would raise the question whether the occupation regime was anachronistic and would have an adverse psychological effect on the population of Berlin and on those who do business with Berlin.

h) It is certain that any negotiation will be exploited by the Communists to attempt to force de facto recognition of the "GDR".

i) It would be extremely difficult to spell out any proposal for a new arrangement for Berlin in adequate detail to meet the needs of so complex a situation.

j) The Soviet Union's bad record of violations of earlier agreements on Germany and Berlin raises the question whether any new agreement would be enforceable or durable.

B. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF POSSIBLE NEW ARRANGEMENTS FOR BERLIN

1. Introduction

Assuming that the decision is taken that the Western Powers should be prepared to make an agreement or arrangement with the Soviet Union about Berlin, it is next necessary to consider what should be put forward or what could be accepted. The possible new arrangements fall into two genera: (1) arrangements which would substitute some new status for the occupation regime in Berlin and (2) arrangements which would be based upon the occupation regime. The latter can be divided in turn into two species: (a) agreements which would revise the basic Four-Power agreements while providing a basis for the continued presence of Western forces and (b) agreements which would modify or confirm certain aspects of the existing situation without changing the basic arrangements of the occupation.

The advantages and disadvantages of a new arrangement must be examined separately according to whether the new arrangement provides for a new status, a new contractual basis for the occupation, or modifications of the existing situation without changing the basic arrangements of the occupation regime.

2. Change in Berlin's Status

a) Possible Proposals

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Apart from the incorporation of Berlin into the "GDR" and the Soviet "free city" proposal, which are so obviously undesirable as to require no further discussion, the broad possibilities for terminating the occupation and negotiating for a new status for Berlin would be:

i) Incorporating Berlin fully into the Federal Republic in which case the Allied forces could remain on the basis of the Contractual and Status of Forces Agreements or could be supplanted by the Bundeswehr;

ii) Putting Berlin under the authority and protection of the United Nations, in which case Allied forces, if they remained, would merely constitute or be a part of a United Nations security force; and

iii) Establishing a sovereign "free city" of West Berlin in which Allied troops would remain as a security force.

b) Advantages of Changing the Status

i) The termination of the occupation regime, and especially the removal of the Allied forces, might reduce in the Soviets' eyes the urgency of new efforts to undermine Berlin's freedom.

ii) The United Nations solution might permit the maintenance of the unity of Berlin.

iii) Uncertainties about access might be eliminated by spelling out conditions of transit through the Soviet Zone.

c) Disadvantages of Changing the Status

i) The occupation regime which, whatever its faults, has maintained West Berlin's security and freedom through 15 years of Soviet harassment would be replaced by a new status the effectiveness of which would be unproven.

ii) The Federal Republic or the United Nations would probably be under constant pressure as a result of its Berlin responsibilities to give "de facto recognition" to the "GDR"; it is questionable whether either would be able to resist these pressures as well as the Western occupying powers.

iii) The Federal Republic solution would probably result in the ending of the remaining freedom of circulation in Berlin.

iv) The removal of the Allied forces would nullify the "NATO guarantee" for Berlin unless they were replaced by forces from other NATO countries. In any case, it would reduce the credibility of such a guarantee.

v) Insofar as the United Nations solution involved breaking existing ties between Berlin and the Federal Republic, it would be a step away from German reunification.

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vi) The United Nations solution would make Berlin's fate dependent in part on nations which are Soviet-dominated or which have shown little comprehension of the issues underlying the Berlin question.

vii) The United Nations machinery would introduce the probability of unacceptable delays in the execution of any international guarantee.

viii) Any arrangement which included the relinquishment of Allied occupation rights in Berlin, unless it were obviously a step in the direction of German reunification, would be regarded by the world as a Western abandonment of Berlin (for example, if considered in connection with the Allied declarations of 1958 and 1959) and would thus probably have serious repercussions in Berlin and Germany and throughout NATO and other free world alliances.

3. New Contractual Basis for the Retention of Western Forces

a) Possible Proposal

It is theoretically possible (although very unlikely) the Four occupying powers could negotiate among themselves a new agreement, supplanting earlier agreements and precedents, which would restate explicitly the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers with respect to Berlin, including access to Berlin.

b) Advantage of Seeking New Contractual Basis

i) Such an agreement would amount to an express reaffirmation by the Soviet Union of the right of the Western Powers to maintain their forces in Berlin.

ii) If thus confirmed, the idea of the continuation of an occupation regime in Berlin would appear less anachronistic to world opinion. The use of the word "occupation" might be avoided.

iii) It might be possible to include in an arrangement of this sort some provision for ratification by the Government or population of Berlin, thus strengthening the moral position of the occupation regime by showing that it enjoyed the consent of the governed.

c) Disadvantages of Seeking New Contractual Basis

i) An agreement which would confirm Western occupation rights is very unlikely. Even if Western occupation rights were reaffirmed, they would probably be reduced quantitatively. Specifically, it would probably be impossible to include provisions guaranteeing German access to Berlin.

ii) An agreement of this nature would probably have to have a shorter duration than any other type of new agreement.

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iii) The

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iii) The arrangement would undoubtedly be confined to West Berlin; the Soviets would thus have a role in the occupation of the Western Sectors while the Western Powers would be giving up their original rights to a corresponding role in the Soviet Sector.

iv) An almost certain Soviet requirement would be the severance of some of the most important ties between Berlin and the Federal Republic, conceivably jeopardizing the political and economic viability of West Berlin.

4. Modifications in Existing Situation without Changing Basis of Occupation

a) Possible Proposals

A great number of arrangements of this type are theoretically possible. Specific proposals which have been discussed are:

i) The Western proposals of July 28, 1959 at the Geneva Foreign Ministers' meeting; and

ii) Solutions "B" and "C" of the April 1959 London Working Group Report.

The German paper on "Germany and Berlin - Western Position and Tactics" (II WWG/5.2) contains suggestions, which have not yet been discussed, for a proposal which would contain fewer Western concessions and make more demands on the Soviets than the July 28, 1959 proposal.

b) General Considerations

Seeking an arrangement in this category would offer certain advantages in comparison with seeking a new status for Berlin or a new contractual basis for the occupation as discussed under B.2. and 3. above. These advantages are:

i) The validity of the occupation regime and the basic rights of the Allied Powers would not be put in question, even if the Western Powers advanced the proposal.

ii) As a tactical device, such a proposal might suffice to deter the Soviet Union from concluding a separate peace treaty with the "GDR" or, if such a treaty is concluded, from implementing it in a way to interfere with Western access to Berlin or the remaining freedom of circulation between West and East Berlin.

iii) If an arrangement of brief duration were envisaged, it might be possible to limit Western concessions to:

A) The abandonment of practices which have not proved effective in accomplishing Western aims in Berlin; and

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C) The

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C) The abandonment of claims of rights to do certain things which the Western Powers would be unable to do in any case.

Additional advantages or disadvantages can only be discussed in the light of specific proposals.

c) Proposals of July 28, 1959

i) Advantages

A) This proposal has already been submitted to the Soviets and thus involves no risks in addition to those already incurred.

B) This proposal was, when made, acceptable to the Government and people of Berlin, although it was generally considered to represent the limit to which the Western Powers could go.

ii) Disadvantages

A) Any new arrangement of brief duration might be regarded only as a period of grace by the Berlin population and by investors in Berlin.

B) Any declaration of readiness to reduce the Allied forces in Berlin might be regarded as the first step towards their eventual withdrawal in toto.

C) The renunciation of nuclear weapons for the Allied Forces in Berlin might provide the Soviets a pretext for claiming a right to inspect Allied traffic to Berlin.

*argument* D) A commitment to restrict propaganda would be a continued source of ~~agreement~~ and could help sap the Berliners' and the East Germans' spirit of resistance.

d) Solution "B" or "C" of London Working Group Report

i) Advantages

A) These proposals were designed to meet specifically the threat to freedom of access and would minimize discussion of other aspects of the Berlin situation.

B) Rights of access would be frozen in their existing form.

C) Direct negotiations with the "GDR", which would imply de facto recognition, might be avoided.

ii) Disadvantages

A) Solution "B" may have little chance of being accepted by the Soviets.

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B) In the case of solution "C", there would be difficulties in maintaining a modus vivendi which was based on a series of unilateral declarations rather than a negotiated agreement among parties.

C) Although the question of negotiation with the "GDR" would be evaded, the "GDR" would necessarily acquire a right or role in connection with Allied access by virtue of its control activities at the checkpoints and (in the case of Solution "C") the acceptance of its unilateral declaration.

D) This development would assist the "GDR" in its efforts to obtain international recognition, to make permanent the division of Germany, and to convince the East German population of the inevitability of Communist rule.

C. MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR A MODUS VIVENDI IN BERLIN [This section is a liminary draft which has not been discussed.]

1. General Negotiating Principles

Any change in the current arrangements concerning Berlin which would lessen Western ability to maintain the freedom of the City must be counter-balanced by an advantage which will demonstrably provide protection for the City to at least the same extent as the right which is modified.

The counter-balancing protection need not be of the same nature as the modified right: e.g., limitations on dissemination of propaganda might be exchanged for codification of access rights.

Under these principles it might be possible to avoid discussion of problems in the abstract and evolve a series of negotiating positions based upon concrete proposals.

Adoption of the principles would subject any proposal on Berlin to the following tests:

- a) Does the proposal immediately or potentially affect existing rights respecting Berlin or access thereto?
- b) If so, what are the probable consequences of accepting the proposal?
- c) If the consequences are adverse, what counter-advantages are presented by the proposal or should be required in order to protect the position of Berlin?

The general objective of any new arrangement is to ensure the security and freedom of Berlin as well as possible for as long as possible. The minimum requirements for accomplishing this objective will, however, vary somewhat according to whether a new arrangement provides for a new status or maintains the occupation regime.

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2. Basic Requirements for Any New Arrangement

a) Political Freedom - A modus vivendi must assure the continuance of a constitutional government based on free elections and guaranteeing democratic process and civil rights.

b) Security - A modus vivendi requires an international guarantee of Berlin's integrity and its freedom of access, plus a security force adequate not only to maintain internal order but also to ensure the operation of the international guarantee.

c) Freedom of Access - A modus vivendi should if possible reduce existing obstructions to the free movement of persons and goods between Berlin and the West; at least it should maintain freedom of access at its present level.

d) Economic Viability - A modus vivendi must ensure that Berlin's economic life is maintained at least at present levels; in practical terms this means that Berlin must be a part of the economic area of the Federal Republic.

e) Unity of Germany and Unity of Berlin

i) Unity of Germany - A modus vivendi should avoid the creation of new obstacles to reunification. The "GDR" must not be recognized as a de facto regime, and the principal of continuing Soviet responsibility in Germany must be maintained. A modus vivendi must not prejudice Berlin's role as the future all-German capital.

ii) Berlin and Federal Republic - A modus vivendi must not sever the ties which exist between Berlin and the Federal Republic.

iii) Unity of Berlin - A modus vivendi should prevent any further erosion of the principle of the unity of Berlin. Where it is not possible to deal with the city as a whole, changes made within the Western Sectors to satisfy Soviet demands should be accompanied by changes within the Soviet Sector acceptable to the Western Powers.

f) Self-Determination - A modus vivendi must be acceptable to the people of Berlin.

g) Reduction of Tension - A modus vivendi should, to the extent possible, reduce the tension which arises as a result of Berlin's position between the Free and Communist Worlds.

3. Additional Requirements if Berlin's Status is to be Changed

a) Security - Some security force must be established which is an adequate substitute for the Allied occupation forces. An effective NATO guarantee must be assured.

b) Recourse

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b) Recourse - There must be a method for expeditious settlement of disputes, including any interference with access or communications.

c) Freedom of Access - Rights of access and communications must be spelled out to ensure the maintenance of Berlin's political freedom and of its economy.

d) Duration - The new status must be either a step towards the reunification of Germany or valid until reunification.

4. Additional Requirements if the Occupation Regime is to be Maintained

a) The continuing validity of basic Allied occupation rights until changed or terminated with the consent of the Occupying Powers must be recognized, at least by implication.

b) Allied forces must be maintained at the appropriate strength to carry out their mission in Berlin.

5. Now Minimum Requirements are Met at Present

An important element of difficulty in the problem is that certain of the "minimum" requirements mentioned above are not being met at present and that it is becoming increasingly more difficult to maintain the status quo in the face of increasing Communist pressures. The existence of such a situation is an important part of the argument for seeking an agreement with the Soviet Union as discussed under A.2. above. For example:

a) Political Freedom - The legitimate government of Berlin is not allowed to exercise its authority in the Soviet Sector.

b) Freedom of Access - All surface traffic -- except that of the Allied Occupation Forces -- moves only with the permission and under the control of the "GDR". Harassment is chronic and some types of traffic are entirely blocked. Allied access is substantially dependent on continued Soviet compliance with existing arrangements.

c) Unity of Germany and Unity of Berlin - The separation of East from West Germany is almost complete, and only limited freedom of circulation remains between East and West Berlin. East Berlin has become "the capital of the GDR".

d) Self-Determination - The Berlin population's approval of the status quo tends to be obscured by the emphasis given to Allied occupation rights.

e) Reduction of Tension - Tension has been chronic in Berlin since 1946 and the situation has been critical since November 1958.

D. CONCLUSIONS AND/OR QUESTIONS TO BE PUT TO FOREIGN MINISTERS / This section is to be drafted by the Working Group and might comprise the Berlin section of Working Group's report, the balance of the paper being attached as an annex.7

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Reference:-

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# Prime Minister's Visit to Washington

March 26-30, 1960

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## 5. NOTE ON SKYBOLT AND POLARIS

Because of discussions which had taken place in recent weeks in the United Kingdom, the Prime Minister wished to speak to President Eisenhower about the future of the British deterrent, and in particular to explain to him that the United Kingdom Government had come to the conclusion that the BLUE STREAK missile was no longer a suitable weapon and that its development for military purposes would stop. The Prime Minister hoped that President Eisenhower would be able to give some assurance about the possibility of supplying SKYBOLT and/or POLARIS missiles, if on examination these proved to be what the United Kingdom needed to replace BLUE STREAK. Because of Mr. Menzies' timetable in connexion with the Commonwealth Conference the Prime Minister wished also to secure President Eisenhower's agreement to an announcement about the possibilities of securing SKYBOLT or POLARIS missiles from the United States before April 13, 1960.

The Prime Minister spoke about the position to President Eisenhower at Camp David on Monday, March 28 and again on Tuesday, March 29. In consequence of this conversation the Prime Minister addressed a minute to President Eisenhower on March 29, and in return Mr. Dillon sent the Prime Minister a memorandum on the same subject. The President also agreed to a form of words which United Kingdom Ministers could use before April 13 about BLUE STREAK and its possible replacement. Copies of these memoranda are annexed.

Minute from the Prime Minister, handed to President Eisenhower on  
March 29, 1960

I was so grateful for what you told me to-day about our decision against a fixed site rocket and in favour of mobility. I am sure this was the right decision, but I was very heartened to hear you, with all your experience, confirm my view.

I was also grateful to you for expressing your willingness to help us when the time comes by enabling us to purchase supplies of SKYBOLT without warheads or to acquire in addition or substitution a mobile M.R.B.M. system in the light of such decisions as may be reached in the discussions under way in NATO. As you know, either I or the Minister of Defence must make an announcement about BLUE STREAK before April 13, and I was glad to have your confirmation that the following form of words would cause you no difficulty:

"The effectiveness of the V-Bomber Force will remain unimpaired for several years to come. The need for a replacement for BLUE STREAK is not, therefore, immediately urgent, nor is it possible at the moment to say with certainty which of several possible alternatives or combinations of alternatives would be technically the most suitable. The Prime Minister, after discussion with the President, understands that the United States Government will in any case be favourably disposed to the purchase by the United Kingdom at the appropriate time of supplies of a suitable airborne vehicle for the delivery of a British warhead. We shall also be considering the acquisition of a mobile M.R.B.M. system. Discussions are at present under way in NATO on this question and our decision will be taken in the light of the outcome of these discussions."

Minute from Mr. Dillon, handed to the Prime Minister on March 29, 1960

SKYBOLT and POLARIS

A. SKYBOLT

In a desire to be of assistance in improving and extending the effective life of the V-Bomber Force, the United States, subject only to United States priorities, is prepared to provide SKYBOLT missiles—minus warheads—to the United Kingdom on a reimbursable basis in 1965 or thereafter. Since SKYBOLT is still in the early stages of development, this offer is necessarily dependent on the

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successful and timely completion of its development programme. Sales will be without any conditions as to use other than a general understanding with respect to the North Atlantic Treaty and the M.D.A.P. Agreement with the United Kingdom similar to that provided in paragraph 9 of the agreed memorandum on THOR I.R.B.Ms.

#### **POLARIS**

As the United Kingdom is aware, the United States is offering at the current NATO Defence Ministers' meeting to make mobile POLARIS missiles—minus warheads—available from United States production to NATO countries in order to meet SACEUR's requirements for M.R.B.Ms. The United States is also offering to assist joint European production of POLARIS if our preference for United States production proves unacceptable.

It does not appear appropriate to consider a bilateral understanding on POLARIS until the problem of SACEUR's M.R.B.M. requirements has been satisfactorily disposed of in NATO.

#### **Scottish Ports**

We welcome the assurance that, in the same spirit of co-operation, the United Kingdom would be agreeable in principle to making the necessary arrangements for United States POLARIS tenders in Scottish ports.

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BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON, D.C.

March 26, 1960.

WG1074/52

Enter some  
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Dear John,

WG1074/47

I am sending you two copies of the latest draft of the document on which the sub-group of the Working Group on Germany and Berlin have been engaged (paragraph 2 of Washington telegram No. 195 Saving). The genesis of this paper is an attempt to collect together the points which had been made, often sweepingly, in the course of the discussions in the main Working Group, and to attempt to relate them to the proposition to which they were relevant. When the sub-group first met I found that the French and American representatives had independently evolved very similar ideas to my own about the lay-out of the paper. It tries to state the advantages and disadvantages first of seeking an agreement on Berlin (as an alternative to holding out for the status quo ante), then of completely or substantially new arrangements for Berlin, and finally of more limited arrangements. The American paper on the minimum requirements for a modus vivendi in Berlin has been incorporated in a somewhat new form.

2. The paper is far from satisfactory. It is much too long, but the more this sub-group works on it the longer it becomes. If it is of use at all in preparation for the next phase of the Working Group it will probably be as a catalogue of points expressed in more or less agreed language.

3. It seemed to me important from our point of view that the sections dealing with the advantages of seeking an agreement, and with the more limited arrangements, should be done as well as possible, and that the argument of the paper should lead towards the July 28 proposals, or their equivalent. I think the first section states the advantages of seeking an agreement fairly well. The disadvantages have been strung out by the German representative in an attempt to out-weigh the advantages, but when appropriate weight is given to each point, I think the advantages emerge the stronger - certainly, the Americans see it that way.

4. Section B of the report has been developed mainly by the Americans. It contains little of substance, because no one was able to put forward possible new arrangements with any clarity. You will see that the part dealing with more limited arrangements (paragraph 4 on page 6) now mentions Solutions "B" and "C" of the April 1959 London Working Group Report. It was the Americans who recalled Solution "C". Solution "B" was added for good measure when I asked whether it had been deliberately dropped.

J.K. Drinkall, Esq.,  
Western Department,  
Foreign Office,  
London. S.W.1.

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5. Section C is a new version of the United States paper on minimum requirements for a modus vivendi. We have not discussed it in its present form. We have expressed a preference for the simpler statement of minimum requirements contained in Washington telegram No. 311 of February 16.

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6. While no one believes that this paper sheds any new light on the problem, I think it is true to say that the Americans and the French are generally content with it as a working paper. The German representative is less happy about it, but from what Garstens said to Tony Rumbold and what Fechter said to me about the July 28 proposals, I think he is unduly worried.

*Yours ever*

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'D.A. Logan', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

(D.A. Logan)

WORKING GROUP ON GERMANY AND BERLIN

Registry No.

Top Secret.  
Secret.  
Confidential.  
Restricted.  
Open.

JKD

Draft. letter

To  
Viscount Hood,  
C.M.G.,  
British Embassy  
Washington.

From  
Sir A. Rumbold.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

when we might  
convincingly  
want to do it

Sir A. Rumbold

naturally  
have no  
objections

Thank you for your letter of March 25 explaining the points on which you would like further guidance before the Working Group "intensifies" its work on April 4.

2. Drinkall will be fully briefed to <sup>comment</sup> deal on all the points which you raise but you may like to have the following brief answers to your questions.

3. Your paragraph 3 (a). We do not wish to pursue the question of a new status for Berlin in the context of the May Summit meeting unless the Americans wish to do so (which <sup>now</sup> seems unlikely). We should follow the American lead. Insofar as <sup>you</sup>

(ii), (iii) and (iv) imply an individual initiative we do not like any of them. It seems to us that to press (ii) or (iv) could easily result in a situation in which <sup>we were</sup> the Working Group was precluded from considering <sup>responsibility of a new status</sup> this question at

some future date. To urge (iii) would result in <sup>our</sup> being suspected of "softness".

4. Your paragraph 3 (b). Yes, <sup>it by</sup> The Secretary of State ~~considers that this can probably only be dealt with at the Summit itself. It is of course, the crux of the question; hence our initiative with the Americans last October.~~

5. Your paragraph 3 (c). We ~~are not~~ <sup>accept</sup> Solution B; but there is no point in reviving it since it is a direct agency theory and therefore not ~~really~~ relevant to circumstances in which the Russians were wishing to give up their responsibilities. Solution <sup>C</sup> corresponds much more to the sort of circumstances with which we are likely to be faced. We do not consider Solution C <sup>in not an</sup> "alternative" to



the July 28 proposals. They cater for different circumstances. <sup>The</sup> former is applicable in the case of <sup>the</sup> Russians wishing to give up their responsibilities and the latter in the case of the Russians <sup>being willing</sup> ~~wishing~~ to retain them. In any case we do not wish you to make any new proposals.

6. Your paragraph 3 (d). We agree that we could ~~come~~ <sup>end</sup> up at the Summit with something intermediate between (ii) and (iii), i.e. a procedural solution. But ~~we think that the~~ "procedure" <sup>would</sup> ~~will~~ have to contain quite a degree of "substance" to make it <sup>e</sup> acceptable to the Russians. ~~In other words the procedure adopted must show a degree of concession to the Soviet view point on the questions at~~

~~issue.~~ I don't think Khrushchev would be satisfied with an agreement which simply provided for Berlin to go on being discussed in another forum.

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FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1.

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March 30, 1960.

WG1074/53

OFFICE

Working Group on Germany & Berlin

Thank you for your letter of March 25 explaining the points on which you would like further guidance before the Working Group "intensifies" its work on April 4.

- 2. Drinkall will be fully briefed to comment on all the points which you raise but you may like to have the following brief answers to your questions.
- 3. Your paragraph 3(a). We do not wish to pursue the question of a new status for Berlin in the context of the May Summit meeting unless the Americans wish to do so (which now seems unlikely). We should follow the American lead. In so far as your (ii), (iii) and (iv) imply an individual initiative we do not like any of them. It seems to us that to press (ii) or (iv) could result in a situation in which we were precluded from considering the possibility of a new status at some future date when we might conceivably want to do so. To urge (iii) would result in our being suspected of softness.
- 4. Your paragraph 3(b). Yes. They can probably only be discussed at the Summit itself.
- 5. Your paragraph 3(c). We naturally have no objection to Solution B; but there is no point in reviving it since it is a direct agency theory and therefore not relevant to circumstances in which the Russians were wishing to give up their responsibilities. Solution C corresponds more to the sort of circumstances with which we are likely to be faced. Solution C is not an "alternative" to the July 28 proposals. They cater for different circumstances. The former is applicable in the case of the Russians wishing to give up their responsibilities and the latter in the case of the Russians being willing to retain them. In any case we do not wish you to make any new proposals.
- 6. Your paragraph 3(d). We agree that we could end up at the Summit with something intermediate between (ii) and (iii) i.e. a procedural solution. But the "procedure" would have to contain quite a degree of "substance" to make it acceptable to the Russians. I doubt whether Khrushchev would be satisfied with an agreement which simply provided for Berlin to go on being discussed in another forum.

A. Rumbold.

The  
Viscount Hood, C.M.G.,  
Washington.

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REPORT OF  
WORKING GROUP ON GERMANY INCLUDING BERLIN  
April 9, 1960

POINTS WHICH MIGHT BE CONSIDERED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS

The Four Foreign Ministers might wish to discuss the following points arising out of the report of the Working Group on Germany including Berlin:

1. Should the report of the Working Group be transmitted to the North Atlantic Council immediately, or only after the Ministerial Meetings in Washington have been concluded? When the report is transmitted, should it be conveyed in toto, or with the discussion of tactics either excised or expurgated? How do the Foreign Ministers wish to report to NATO on their Washington talks?

2. Do the Foreign Ministers accept the basic approach of the Working Group in its discussion of tactics on Germany including Berlin at the Summit?

3. Should the Western Powers be prepared to advance a proposal at the Summit for a plebiscite on the relative merits of the Western and Soviet ideas about a peace treaty (see para 3a of Tactics Paper and Annex II)?

4. Should the Western Powers put forward a proposal for an all-Berlin agreement as part of their tactical plan (see para 6 of Tactics Paper and Annex III)?

5. Do the Ministers agree that the Working Group in the next phase of its work should draft (a) a directive for possible use at the Summit to request the USSR for her negotiations to a subordinate body, ~~as part of the Tactics Paper~~, (b) possible reciprocal arrangements ~~in the Tactics Paper~~, and (c) a version of the paper on administrative conditions of a young vigilante for West Berlin suitable for presentation to the Soviets (see para 8 of Tactics Paper) ~~and Annex III~~.

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COMMENTARY ON THE PAPER

"POINTS WHICH MIGHT BE CONSIDERED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS"

Question No. 1 "Should the Report of the Working Group be transmitted to the North Atlantic Council immediately, or only after the Ministerial Meetings in Washington have been concluded? When the Report is transmitted, should it be conveyed in toto, or with the discussion of factics either excised or edited? How do the Foreign Ministers wish to report to NATO on their Washington talks?"

The Working Group Report (or an edited version of it) ought to go forthwith to NATO. We are committed to this course of action because it was agreed at the NATO Ministerial Meeting in December that "Working Group reports would be available to the Council simultaneously with their submission to the three or four Governments". The French representative on the Working Group refused to agree that the Report should be sent to NATO before it had been seen by M. Couve de Murville. Privately, M. Laloy said that he had already pointed out to M. Couve de Murville that we were committed to this course of action, but M. Couve de Murville insisted that irrespective of what had been agreed he was determined to see the Report first. (The French try to wiggle out of this commitment by arguing either that reports are only in draft or that the commitment only applies to reports submitted to Governments, and not those submitted to Foreign Ministers.)

The other Foreign Ministers will probably agree to send to NATO the Annexes but may object to sending the Tactics Paper. The best solution may be for a bowdlerized version of the Tactics paper to go to NATO. Such a version could probably be produced overnight if precise instructions were issued by Ministers on Wednesday.

Provided that something substantial is sent to NATO without further delay we do not think that a written report of the results of the Ministers' discussions in Washington need be given

/to NATO..

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to NATO before the Istanbul meeting. Indeed there might be some disadvantage in submitting a written report because it could conceivably lead to complaints that NATO was being faced with hard and fast decisions before the other members could state their views. The best procedure would be for one of the Foreign Ministers to make an oral report to the Istanbul meeting to supplement the present Report. We consider that Mr. Herter would be the most appropriate person to do this (with the Secretary of State making the report on Disarmament and M. Couve de Murville the report on East-West Relations). We see no need for the terms of Mr. Herter's report to be concerted with the other three Foreign Ministers.

Question No. 2. "Do the Foreign Ministers accept the basic approach of the Working Group in its discussion of tactics on Germany including Berlin at the Summit?"

Yes.

Question No. 3. "Should the Western Powers be prepared to advance a proposal at the Summit for a plebiscite on the relative merits of the Western and Soviet ideas about a peace treaty?"

Yes. The proposal is attached to Annex II (The Question of Germany). It is purely a propaganda exercise.

Question No. 4 "Should the Western Powers put forward a proposal for an all-Berlin agreement as part of their tactical plan?"

Yes. The proposal is attached to Annex III (The Berlin Question). Again this is a purely propaganda exercise. The proposal is virtually the same as was elaborated by Mr. Herter at Geneva.

Question No. 5. "Do the Ministers agree that the Working Group in the next phase of its work should draft (a) a directive for possible use at the Summit to remand the task of further negotiations to a subordinate body, (b) possible reciprocal declarations that might accompany agreement on such a directive, and (c) a version of the paper on essential conditions for a modus vivendi suitable for presentation to the Russians?"

See the Tactics paper, paragraph 3(f). As regards (a) and (b) the answer is Yes. In effect the "directive" would

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probably consist of some sentences which could figure in the Final Communique. The "reciprocal declarations" would probably include material from the July 28 proposals. It is doubtful whether much useful work can be done on these points in advance of the Summit itself, but it is an American idea and we certainly should not oppose it.

As regards (c) we argued in the Working Group that the "Essential Conditions" paper, which is Attachment B to Annex III (The Berlin Question), in effect completed our work. The French disagree. They want the Western Powers to table at the Summit meeting a set of principles which would in effect act as guidance to the Foreign Ministers or any lower body which was set up to consider the Berlin problem. The main reason why the French idea is dangerous is that the statement of principles is bound to include a reference to the maintenance of the present juridical position and is therefore likely to tie our hands as regards the possibility of changing the status of Berlin in the future.

But this reason cannot, of course, be given. We might say that we do not favour the tabling of any such joint statement because we envisage the Summit meeting as being an informal discussion with the minimum of documentation. We therefore think that the Western Heads of Government should be free to express in their own way what we regard as the essentials of any modus vivendi (= interim agreement) on Berlin. For this purpose we think that they will find it useful to draw on the points made in the Working Group paper, but we see no reason for further study of this point by the Working Group. The Germans will probably support the French. The Americans are non-committal. In order to avoid suspicion we may have to give way.

/Question No.6

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INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM

FROM UNITED KINGDOM PERMANENT DELEGATION TO NATO PARIS TO  
FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir F. Roberts

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

No. 113 Saving  
March 31, 1960

R: April 1, 1960

PRIORITY  
TOP SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 113 Saving  
of March 31, 1960.

Repeated for information to:-

Telegraphically: Washington No. 44

Saving: Paris No. 157

My telegram No. 107 Saving of March 30.

MRBM's for NATO

In the course of a long conversation with the Minister of Defence at dinner on March 30, M. Messmer explained the attitude of the French Government to the American proposals about the NATO MRBM, which had been given to them in broad outline by Mr. Burgess:-

- (a) Their main aim of policy is to have a national missile under their own control. They expect to be able to produce their own warhead in about three years. Theirs would be the only finger on the button, though it appeared (not very clearly) that they would not reject co-operation with the Americans (not NATO) in button-pressing in exchange for co-operation in missile-producing.
- (b) They do not see how they could afford to buy MRBMs for NATO from America and also develop their national missile. The latter comes first, and therefore the first American alternative does not interest them.

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U.K. Del. N.ATO telegram No. 113. Saving to Foreign Office

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- (c) They would be interested in the second alternative (production in Europe) if and only if some of the missiles would be available for their national use.
- (d) As they rule out German production, they see European production in terms of an Anglo-French collaboration, if this can be arranged: it should save both time and money.

2. The Minister of Defence spoke discouragingly of the prospects of national development: England and France cannot afford to back more than one horse each, and this horse may be spavined at the start of the race after a long and expensive training. He said that on pure grounds of efficiency we preferred the first of the two American alternatives though we could not commit ourselves to participation until we knew more of the scale of deployment and the costs involved.

3. M. Messmer admitted the force of these arguments, but said that the French Government were committed to developing their weapon, with or without help from their allies. He agreed that to make Polaris in France from American designs was a second best, but they (unlike us) had no experience and would gain by trying it, provided that the Americans did not tie all the production to NATO use only. If the American conditions were maintained, neither alternative would be acceptable to them.

4. The Minister of Defence held out no hope of an Anglo-French project.

5. It was agreed that neither Minister could speak at all definitely about the American proposal (which had not been finalised when they met) at the Council Meeting; and that the matter should be pursued at a further meeting in London in the near future.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington as my telegram No.

44.

[Repeated as requested]

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Western Department

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REPORT OF  
THE WORKING GROUP ON GERMANY AND BERLIN

APRIL 9, 1960

Summary

Tactics on Germany Including Berlin at the Summit

Annex I - Probable Soviet Negotiating Intentions on  
Germany and Berlin

Annex II - The Question of Germany

Attachment - Proposal for Plebiscite in Germany

Annex III - The Berlin Question

Attachment A - Proposal for Reunification of  
Berlin

Attachment B - Essential Conditions of a  
Modus Vivendi for West Berlin

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REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON GERMANY INCLUDING BERLIN  
April 9, 1960

SUMMARY

1. The Four Power Working Group on Germany including Berlin has met in intensive session in Washington from April 4 to April 9, 1960. Prior to this period certain preparatory work was done during February and March by representatives of the British, French and German Embassies meeting with representatives of the Department of State.

2. In organizing its report, the Working Group has considered that the Four Power Meeting of Foreign Ministers scheduled to take place in Washington April 13-14, 1960 would wish to review the conclusions reached so far and to issue such directives for further work as their discussion might show to be necessary. The Working Group has also had in mind the need for consultation with NATO and recommends that this report be forwarded to the North Atlantic Council in order to assist in NATO discussion of the forthcoming Summit Conference which it understands is to take place primarily during the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Ministerial level in Istanbul early in May.

3. As a logical starting point, the Working Group has prepared an estimate of probable Soviet negotiating intentions on Germany and Berlin at the East-West Summit Meeting. This is attached as Annex I.

4. There is attached as Annex II a discussion of the question of Germany containing certain recommendations to the Ministers.

5. Annex III contains a discussion of the Berlin question, together with the conclusions of the Working Group following upon its analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of various possible approaches to an agreement on Berlin.

6. In view of the key role which the tactics of the West will play at the Summit, the discussion of this subject which follows provides a convenient synthesis of, as well as logically deriving from, the more detailed discussions and conclusions reached by the Working Group.

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TACTICS ON GERMANY INCLUDING BERLIN AT THE SUMMIT

1. The Working Group assumes that, from the Western point of view, discussion of subjects at the Summit should preferably be in the following sequence: (a) general opening statements; (b) disarmament; (c) Germany including Berlin; and (d) East-West relations. The general mood of the Summit will to some extent be influenced by the amount of agreement already reached or in prospect in the disarmament field. If the situation in this field is favorable, it would give the Western Powers a certain leverage to use in persuading the Soviets not to press too hard on the Berlin issue. However, the precise tactical interrelationship of the various subjects at the Summit can only be determined later in the light of the actual situation.

2. The aim of the Western Powers at the Summit Conference should be to eliminate the threat which the Soviet Union is exerting on Berlin without sacrificing the basis of their general policy in Germany (reunification in freedom and European cooperation). To reach that goal the Western Powers have three essential methods at their disposal:

a. To induce the Soviets to lift the threat to Berlin by means of agreements in other fields;

b. To maintain the present situation as it is by providing for continuing discussions.

c. To reach a modus vivendi on Berlin which, without altering the essentials would be mutually acceptable;

3. The tactical approach of the West might accordingly proceed as follows:

a. On the assumption that the Soviets start out by insisting on the necessity of a peace treaty with the two Germanies, the Western Powers would resubmit their Western Peace Plan. (See Annex II)

b. When the Soviets reject the Western Peace Plan, as may be anticipated, the Western Powers would advance their proposal for a plebiscite to be held in West and East Germany and in all Berlin. (See Annex II.)

c. When the discussion turns to Berlin proper, the Soviets will presumably reiterate the desirability of their "free city" proposal. The Western Powers would normally wish to start by restating their standard position that the only lasting and real solution to the Berlin problem must come within the framework of German reunification.

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d. At this point it might be tactically advantageous for the West to put forward an all-Berlin proposal (see Annex III), even if such a proposal is considered non-negotiable.

e. If the Soviets reject the proposal mentioned in 3.d., the Western Powers should not proceed to further discussions without making it clear that under prevailing circumstances the present situation in Berlin is tolerable and that from their point of view no change is necessary.

f. It might be possible to secure an agreement - perhaps no more than a tacit one - to preserve the existing situation for a period of time during which an attempt might be made to achieve progress towards a more formal agreement. One way of doing this might be to seek agreement at the Summit to remand the task of further negotiation to a subordinate group (perhaps Deputy Foreign Ministers), which would report back to a future meeting of the Heads of Governments. This might be accompanied by certain reciprocal declarations intended to reduce tensions, for example, to maintain unhindered access to Berlin, to avoid inflammatory propaganda, and to refrain from unilateral action affecting the rights of others. Such a remitting to a subordinate group by the Heads of Governments would presumably require some sort of directive which might be essentially procedural in nature. This would have to be drafted with great care to avoid the implication that Western rights in Berlin would be in any way affected during the period prior to the meeting of heads of governments to which the subordinate group would be reporting. The Western Heads of Governments might likewise wish to make a statement at the Summit stressing the essential conditions which they believe should govern any Berlin arrangement. If the Foreign Ministers agree, the Working Group in its next session could attempt to draft such a directive, the possible reciprocal declarations, and the Western statement of essential conditions.

g. In the light of the Soviet attitude it becomes unlikely at the Summit, the Western Powers should explore the possibility of concluding an acceptable arrangement as a possible development as (as suggested by Ambassador Salmov in Bonn) that the Soviets will attempt to reopen the discussion of an interim resolution for Berlin at the point where the Geneva discussions have left, stating that, while all Western proposals may be more or less satisfactory, they are willing to consider further changes if such can be made which might lead to a possible agreement. In any event, all Western proposals at this stage have to be prepared to discuss alternative proposals along the lines of the July 1951

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proposals, possibly improved by certain provisions aimed at ameliorating the existing situation in Berlin and safeguarding access thereto. A provision might also be envisaged committing all parties to refrain from any acts inconsistent with the terms of the agreement. ||

4. If it seems that an impasse has been reached and that the Soviets will proceed to take unilateral action purporting to end their responsibilities in the access field, the Western Powers might wish to consider making a proposal involving a series of interlocking but unilateral declarations on Berlin access, propaganda, etc. aimed at achieving a freezing of existing access procedures with ultimate Soviet responsibility being maintained although implementation might be by the East German authorities (along the lines of London Working Group Solution C of April 1959). If the Foreign Ministers agree, the Working Group could in its next phase undertake to further refine a proposal along these lines.

*i.e.  
a sat  
'agency'  
simulation.*

5. If the Soviets refuse further discussions, the Western Powers will have to consider how, while still at the Summit, they might best bring to the attention of the Soviets the serious hazards which unilateral action on their part might have. The Western Powers might likewise consider at this point the desirability of a Berlin plebiscite in the Western sector of the city, in order to provide a starting point for ensuing developments.

6. Some believe that a tactical question which might arise is whether, and if so at what point, the West should express willingness to discuss the principles of a peace treaty with Germany, either in a deputy or expert group or it appears at some point during the Summit Conference that a western offer to discuss peace treaty principles might tip the balance in favor of preventive, Soviet unilateral action directed at the Western position in Berlin. There are some important objections to such action by the Western Powers, as indicated in the discussion of advantages and disadvantages in annex II.

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Supplement to  
BRIEF ON GERMANY AND BERLIN  
FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING ON APRIL 13.

This brief supplements Brief No. 2 (on Germany and Berlin) which was written before the Working Group on Germany and Berlin had drafted its Report. The original brief is still valid except that the Report of the Working Group is slightly different in form from the forecast in the original brief and the questions to be considered by Ministers are more procedural than substantive.

2. The Report of the Working Group (copy attached) consists of the following:-

Summary, leading into

Tactics paper.

Annex I - Soviet Intentions.

Annex II - The Question of Germany.

Attachment - Proposal for Plebiscite in Germany.

Annex III - The Berlin Question.

Attachment A - Proposal for Reunification of Berlin.

Attachment B - Essential Conditions of Modus Vivendi for West Berlin.

The Tactics paper is the most important. The annexes need not be considered in detail except where reference is made to them in the paper on "Points which might be considered by the Foreign Ministers", which is in effect the agenda for the Ministers' Meetings. A copy of this paper and a commentary thereon are attached.

3. There were no surprises in the Working Group. The Americans made it clear that they were not prepared to suggest a new status for Berlin.

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The American representative did, however, in effect, say that the Americans did not themselves attach paramount importance to the question of status. They felt that the essential point was that the Russians should be convinced that the West intended to maintain its troops in Berlin. They recognized, however, that the point about not changing the status of Berlin was of "psychological importance" to some of their friends. The Working Group were then left with the possibilities of seeking at the Summit an interim agreement (or modus vivendi) on the lines of the Geneva proposals or a procedural agreement (see paragraph 3 (f) of the Tactics paper).

4. The main task at the Foreign Ministers' Meetings may be to frustrate attempts by Herr von Brentano to establish a Western position for the Summit which will be so rigid as to leave the three Western Heads of Government with no latitude for negotiation; e.g.

(a) He may try to retreat from the July 28 proposals.

At present the language of the Report (see paragraph 3 (g) of the Tactics paper) is satisfactory in this respect.

(b) The Germans have said that they do not wish the Western Peace Plan to be modified in any way. This point is dealt with on page 3 of the Working Group's paper on "The Question of Germany". See also paragraph 6 (b) of Brief No. 2. It would not seem worth arguing on this point.

(c) The Germans did not raise in the Working Group the question of Dr. Adenauer's proposal for a plebiscite in West Berlin. The only reference to this is in paragraph 5 of the Tactics paper.

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(d) The Germans admitted that they were anxious to retreat from the Geneva procedure whereby German advisers could attend Four-Power discussions on German questions. This point is discussed under Question No. 8 of the attached Commentary.

5. No mention was made in the Working Group of contingency planning or "subversive activities". We need not mention either. We have, in fact, recently asked the Americans whether they still hold the same views as at Geneva as regards those "activities" which are expendable and those which are not. We have not yet had a reply, but assume that their views have not changed.

WASHINGTON,  
April 11, 1960.



MEETING OF WESTERN FOREIGN MINISTERSWASHINGTON, APRIL 12-14, 1960TRIPARTITE CONSULTATIONS

In his letter of February 18 to Mr. Herter and the Secretary of State (Annex C), M. Couve de Murville suggested that the three Foreign Ministers should have an initial discussion of the organization of the proposed tripartite talks, when they met in Washington on April 13 and 14.

This proposal was accepted, and Mr. Herter will no doubt suggest a suitable time for the discussion.

2. Despite the extensive correspondence which has taken place since the conversations at Rambouillet on December 20 1959 and the Prime Minister's personal exchanges with General de Gaulle on March 12 and 13, we still have no clear idea of the kind of tripartite machinery which the latter would be willing to accept.

3. A summary of the history of this subject is given at Annex A. From this it will be seen that:

- (a) throughout the exchanges of letters, M. Couve de Murville continually reverts to the proposals in General de Gaulle's original Memorandum of September 17, 1958 (Annex B) for dealing with the problem of organizing defence on a global scale, and of "the decisions to take concerning the possibility of launching an atomic war";
- (b) we and the Americans have carefully avoided any reference to the proposals in the Memorandum; nor were they mentioned in the Prime Minister's conversation with General de Gaulle on March 12 and 13.
- (c) General de Gaulle himself seemed to be content with the prospect of more frequent meetings between the Heads of /Governments.

Governments. He was clearly not very interested in tripartite consultations between officials, except perhaps Ambassadors, and spoke vaguely about "a small continuing method of carrying further any discussions at the level of Heads of Governments". We do not know what he had in mind, but it may well be something similar to the proposal in his Memorandum of September 1958 that "consultations should take place in Washington initially through the channel of the Embassies and of the Standing Group". M. Couve de Murville in his letter of February 18 insisted that there must also be provision for military discussions and suggested that ad hoc meetings of the British, French and American members of the Standing Group, in their individual capacities, would provide a satisfactory basis for such discussions.

4. The formal French position rests with M. Couve de Murville's letter, which distinguishes between

- (i) tripartite discussions on current political problems, comprising both particular questions and general problems such as the "harmonization" of policies in Africa (these in the French view could continue to take place in Washington); and
- (ii) tripartite discussions on problems affecting global policy and strategy, which, in his view, should cover the subjects described at paragraph 3(a) above.

The letter also contains a specific proposal under (i) for a discussion on Africa after the Summit meeting, perhaps in the first fortnight of June, and under (ii) the suggestion for ad hoc meetings of members of the Standing Group.

5. Mr. Herter has agreed to M. Couve de Murville's suggested  
/arrangements

ANNEX AHISTORY OF THE PROPOSALS FOR  
"TRIPARTITE CONSULTATIONS"

The idea of Tripartite Consultations originated in General de Gaulle's memorandum of September 17, 1958 addressed to the Prime Minister, and President Eisenhower, in which he put forward proposals for "some rearrangement of the general conditions governing the defence of the free world." (Full text at Annex B). His specific proposal was the creation of a new body, consisting of the United States, Great Britain and France, which "should have the responsibility of taking joint decisions on all political matters affecting world security, and of drawing up and, if necessary, putting into action strategic plans, especially those involving the use of nuclear weapons." The memorandum declared that the French Government regarded such an organisation for security as indispensable and that, henceforth, the whole development of their present participation in NATO was predicated on this. It concluded with a request for very early consultations on these questions between the three Governments, and proposed that the consultations should take place in Washington, initially through the channel of the Embassies and of the Standing Group.

2. No substantive replies were given to this memorandum and neither the Prime Minister nor the President have ever discussed it personally with General de Gaulle. It was felt that the proposals were so inconsistent both with our policies towards NATO and with the United States Government's determination to retain sole control over the use of their strategic deterrent, that it would be better not to discuss them at all with the General.

3. Nothing more was heard about it until, at the meeting of the Western Summit powers at Rambouillet on December 20, 1959, General de Gaulle raised the question of world-wide tripartite cooperation "beyond the present limitations of NATO", including "the question of military cooperation throughout the world". President Eisenhower promptly suggested "the establishment of a tripartite machinery to operate on a clandestine basis with the object of discussing questions of common interest to the three Governments. The group might meet in London, so that there should be no contact with NATO, and each country might supply a team with political, military and economic representation. Both the Prime Minister and General de Gaulle welcomed this suggestion.

4. Mr. Herter took the next step in writing to his two colleagues on December 30, proposing private talks between officials in London on "matters of common concern, with the emphasis on subjects which are beyond the scope of NATO". The Secretary of State supported this proposal. M. Couve de Murville's initial reaction seemed to be favourable, but after consulting General de Gaulle he came back with a suggestion, in a letter of January 23, that the Rambouillet conversations had envisaged something different, namely, "political and, eventually, strategic, coordination on a global basis in the spirit of the Memorandum of September, 1958". He nevertheless still seemed to imply that "the Committee to be set up in London" would act

as an official group for the higher-level exchanges.

5. Mr. Herter tried to side-step this proposal, and in a letter of February 3 he suggested that global political and strategic problems might be discussed tripartitely at informal dinners when the Foreign Ministers met at international conferences, and that the existing arrangements for tripartite meetings at Ambassador level in Washington should be continued and the meetings held more frequently. The Secretary of State, in a message to Mr. Herter of February 18, reserved his opinion on the latter's proposal until the Prime Minister's prospective visit to General de Gaulle had taken place; he did, however, express the hope that the lower-level tripartite conversations would not be held exclusively in Washington and that they should quite often take place in London or Paris.

6. At the same time, the Prime Minister, in a message to President Eisenhower, dated February 17, stated that he would like to get away from arguments about the Memorandum and its meaning and to try to concentrate on "practical discussion of concrete questions of current interest, however wide these might be." In replying to this message on February 18, the President agreed with the Prime Minister's statement, and expressed his bewilderment at the formal attitude the French were adopting towards the simple plan he had put forward at Rambouillet, and with which he thought General de Gaulle had been in complete accord.

7. In the meantime, we had been told by the French Ambassador that General de Gaulle had rather lost interest in the whole subject and was not pressing for anything very sensational in the near future. But this was not borne out by M. Couve de Murville's next letter dated February 18. In it he made only a passing reference to Mr. Herter's proposals of February 3 (paragraph 5 above), suggesting that a first discussion between the three Foreign Ministers should take place in Washington on April 13 and 14. He accepted the idea that current political problems should continue to be dealt with tripartitely at Ambassadorial and official level in Washington - both as regards particular questions and more general ones, e.g. Asia and Africa, and proposed a meeting to discuss African policies in the first fortnight of June. But he reminded his colleagues that the French Government were primarily concerned with the problems of the "organization of defence on a global scale" and of "the decisions to take concerning the possibility of launching an atomic war"; and he made it clear that they were still thinking in terms of the original Memorandum and of its proposed "new body" consisting of the British, French and American members of the Standing Group in Washington. This would be a separate body from the tripartite meetings of Ambassadors or the periodical meetings of Foreign Ministers. (Full text of M. Couve de Murville's letter is at Annex C).

8. Mr. Herter replied to this briefly on March 9, agreeing to the suggested arrangements for tripartite discussions on current

/political problems

problems and to the specific proposal for a discussion on Africa after the Summit meeting. As to the "one remaining major problem", he agreed that the three Foreign Ministers should have "an initial thorough discussion" when they met in Washington in April. The Secretary of State sent an interim reply to M. Couve de Murville on March 3, postponing his comments on the latter's letter of February 18 pending the results of the Prime Minister's visit to General de Gaulle.

9. During this visit on March 12 and 13, the question of Tripartite Consultations was raised. General de Gaulle said he attached the greatest importance to the arrangements proposed by the President at Rambouillet, but he had been disappointed by the American proposals in this respect. The Prime Minister suggested that there should in fact be fairly frequent meetings between the three Heads of Government and that perhaps this would be more fruitful if specific subjects were chosen for each meeting. General de Gaulle seemed attracted by this idea and by the suggestion of having another meeting of the three Heads of Government after the Summit and perhaps also in the autumn. He was not, however, content that the tripartite conversations should be continued by a group of officials except perhaps Ambassadors. He did, however, hope that there might be some "very small continuing method" coming out of the discussions at the level of Heads of Government.

10. In reporting this conversation to President Eisenhower on March 14, the Prime Minister said he thought that General de Gaulle accepted the fact that the tripartite talks envisaged at Rambouillet were really going to take place because of all the meetings round and about the Summit. He preferred a talk with the Heads of Government rather than an elaborate machinery and seemed to accept that a new piece of mechanism was undesirable. At the same time he would like to see a very small continuing method of carrying further any discussions at the level of Heads of Government. This could easily be done by the Ambassadors in Washington, without any special staff. The Prime Minister went on to suggest that, in order to avoid vague discussions on general subjects, it might be better to have one or two matters only on which the three Heads of Government could concentrate.

11. The Secretary of State then wrote to M. Couve de Murville on March 17, referring to his interim reply to the latter's letter of February 18, and saying that he understood that, in his conversations with the Prime Minister, General de Gaulle had accepted that there would be various meetings between the three Heads of Government this year in connexion with the Summit and that similar meetings in future would be desirable. He also understood that General de Gaulle and the Prime Minister had agreed that, if the three Heads of Government did in fact meet more frequently, it would be useful if a method could be found for defining the subjects for discussion in advance of each meeting. The Secretary of State concluded by saying that he and Mr. Herter were ready to discuss the whole subject when the three Foreign Ministers met in Washington in April.

12. The latest contribution to these exchanges was contained in President Eisenhower's letter of March 19 in reply to the Prime Minister's message of March 14. The President again expressed his amazement that General de Gaulle seemed "unable to fathom the methods by which our three Governments could easily keep in close touch on main issues". The difficulty, he thought, might lie in General de Gaulle's memory of the British-American Combined Chiefs of Staff of World War II and his resentment that the French staffs were not integrated with that body. President Eisenhower added that he had always made it clear to General de Gaulle that he was ready to do anything reasonable to maintain contacts and mutual

/understandings

understandings among the three Heads of Government, but also that it was impractical to have frequent conferences at that level. Despite this, General de Gaulle seemed "to prefer this kind of approach to any of our common problems."

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RECORD OF A MEETING HELD AT 1776 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE AT 10 A.M. ON APRIL 13, 1960

Present:

|                   |                 |
|-------------------|-----------------|
| The Sec. of State | Mr. Herter      |
| H.M. Ambassador   | Mr. Merchant    |
| Lord Hood         | Mr. Kohler      |
| Sir A. Rumbold    | Mr. Hillenbrand |
| etc.              | etc.            |

|                      |                   |
|----------------------|-------------------|
| M. Couve de Murville | Herr von Brentano |
| M. Alphan            | Dr. Carstens      |
| M. Lucet             | Dr. Grewe         |
| M. Laloy             | etc.              |
| etc.                 |                   |

Preparations for the Summit

Germany and Berlin

The meeting considered the report of the Four-Power Working Group on Germany and Berlin. The discussions were based on a number of questions which had been previously formulated by the Working Group. The questions and the comments made on them were as follows:-

Question No. 1. "Should the Report of the Working Group be transmitted to the North Atlantic Council immediately, or only after the Ministerial Meetings in Washington have been concluded? When the Report is transmitted should it be conveyed in toto or with the discussion of tactics either excised or edited? How do the Foreign Ministers wish to report to NATO on their Washington talks?"

It was agreed that:-

- (a) the Tactics Paper should not be given to NATO;
- (b) the Working Group should revise certain parts of the Annexes to the Working Group's report;
- (c) thereafter, the Annexes should be sent direct to NATO as the

/Report ..

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 Northern  
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Report of the Working Group  
without further reference to  
Ministers;

- (d) the Foreign Ministers need not report to NATO before the Ministerial meeting at Istanbul from May 2-4. (At that meeting Mr. Herter would make an oral report on Germany and Berlin on behalf of all the four Foreign Ministers);
- (e) the Working Group should make clear to the NATO Council that the papers which constitute its report were prepared for possible use at the Summit but decisions as to their use could only be made in the light of developments at the Summit itself.

/Question No.2.



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~~the oral report on Germany and Berlin~~  
~~on behalf of all the four Foreign~~  
~~Ministers).~~

Question No. 2. "Do the Foreign Ministers accept the basic approach of the Working Group in its discussion of tactics on Germany including Berlin at the Summit?"

It was agreed that the basic approach of the Working Group was correct.

Question No. 3. "Should the Western Powers be prepared to advance a proposal at the Summit for a plebiscite on the relative merits of the Western and Soviet ideas about a peace treaty?" (Attachment to Annex II)

It was agreed that this plebiscite proposal might suitably be advanced at some stage of the Summit conference.

Question No. 4. "Should the Western Powers put forward a proposal for an all-Berlin agreement as part of their tactical plan?" (Attachment A to Annex III)

Herr von Brentano said that this proposal by had the general support of the Federal Government and of the Berlin Senat. He thought that the preamble and paragraph 8 of the draft proposal required amendment. He disliked the reference in the preamble as at present drafted, to the idea "of developing Berlin as a link between the separated parts of Germany". In his opinion there ought to be a reference in the preamble to the reunification of Berlin being the first ~~subje~~ step towards the reunification of Germany. In addition he thought that this proposal ought to be coupled with a request to the Soviet Government to begin Four-Power talks on the reunification of Germany on the basis of the ideas set out in the Western Peace Plan. The formulation

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of paragraph 8 ought to make provision for the continuation of the NATO guarantee. In addition it should be stipulated in the proposal that Four-Power decisions would be <sup>(following the precedent in Vienna)</sup> taken by a majority vote, i.e. there would be no Soviet veto.

M. Couve de Murville said that he agreed generally with Herr von Brentano. The proposal, as at present drafted, made no mention of the question of the legal status of a reunified Berlin. The proposal might well be taken to imply that we were in effect proposing the creation of a third German state and abandoning the juridical basis of our present right to be in Berlin.

It was agreed that the Working Group should study the preamble and paragraph 8 of the draft proposal and amend these sections before the draft was sent to NATO.

Question No. 5 "Do the Ministers agree that the Working Group in the next phase of its work should draft (a) a directive for possible use at the Summit to remand the task of further negotiations to a subordinate body, (b) possible reciprocal declarations that might accompany agreement on such a directive, and (c) a version of the paper on essential conditions for a modus vivendi suitable for presentation to the Russians?" (Tactics Paper, paragraph 3(f) and Attachment B to Annex III).

Herr von Brentano said that he thought that the Working Group might also consider the possibility of improving on the proposals put forward at Geneva on July 28, 1949, particularly as regards the question of Western rights at the end of the period of the agreement and freedom of communications between the Federal Republic and Berlin.

/M. Couve ..

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modified in any way to Soviet  
advantage.

It was agreed that the Working Group  
should consider both these points before  
their Report was submitted to NATO.

It was agreed that no further meeting  
on Germany and Berlin was required. Mr. Herter  
proposed the text of an informal press  
statement. The agreed text is at

The text of the Working Group's report  
is at Annex..... The Annexes to the Report  
are in the form in which they were presented  
to NATO after revision in the Four Power  
Working Group.

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Dangers of an interim agreement on the basis  
of the Geneva proposals of July 28, 1959.  
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1. Any Berlin agreement with the character of an interim settlement, without interpreting the term "interim" as meaning the period until the reunification of Germany, will have psychological dangerous effects. Any fixed time limit - be it 2,3 or 5 years from the time of the agreement and even though it might be meant only as time limit for a revision of the agreement then possible - will be looked upon by the population of West Berlin as period of grace. Outside Berlin too, such an interim agreement will not be regarded very differently. Investments in Berlin will ~~seize~~ <sup>be</sup>. A process of migration and displacement to the West will begin, paralyzing economic life of Berlin to an increasing degree. To anyone who does not believe that such an interim agreement will merely postpone the Communist subjugation of the city for a certain time, this idea will be suggested by Communist propaganda.
2. Any declaration of readiness to reduce the strength of the Western forces in Berlin will be regarded as the first stage in the final withdrawal of the forces. This applies even more to any reduction in the strength of the forces, however small. <sup>Chruschtschow</sup> will not fail to interpret any partial withdrawal of Western forces in this sense. The effect will be the same as described above (1).
3. It goes without saying that no one thinks of stationing major nuclear weapons in Berlin. No one knows, however, how rapidly the technology, f.i., of small nuclear weapons will develop. In any case, it would be unfortunate if it should appear after a time that the Western forces in Berlin - compared with the Red forces facing them - lack up to date equipment. Any renunciation of certain types of arms will also provoke a claim by the other side to control the effectiveness of the renunciati

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4. The guarantee of the possibility of the access facilities to and from Berlin existing at present against further deterioration is certainly an advantage. On the other hand, these facilities for access are most unsatisfactory. If they are consolidated in their present state ( or in the state existing in April 1959) this would exclude any chance of improvement.
5. Any treaty clause for the restriction of press and radio activities in any international supervisory organ to check on the observance of these restrictions will inevitably be misused by the Communist side for groundless accusations, charges and interference in the internal affairs of West Berlin. However obvious this misuse, it will produce an atmosphere of constant tension which can only work to the disadvantage of the West. The vigor of the Berliners', spirit of resistance - of vital importance in the propaganda and psychological warfare in Berlin - will be paralyzed in the long run, even if the international supervisory organ exercises its functions in a correct and neutral manner. The proposal for the establishment of an international supervisory organ is particularly questionable as long as the Soviets have not unambiguously agreed to accept the restriction of certain activities for East Berlin as well. Until such time there remains the danger that ultimately the supervisory organ shall be active, in West Berlin only, thereby causing a considerable deterioration in the position of West Berlin.
6. The Geneva proposals of July 28, 1959, did not contain any clause safeguarding against the danger that the Soviets, some time after accepting such an interim agreement, might yet conclude a separate peace treaty with the "GDR", thereby undermining the agreement entirely or partly. It should be among the fundamental conditions of any Berlin agreement that the Soviets renounce this step. Only thus will it be possible to ensure that the Soviets do not continue to avail themselves of the threat of the separate peace treaty as an ever-effective weapon in the political struggle against the West.

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Record of Conversation between  
the Secretary of State and M.  
Couve de Murville in Washington  
on Wednesday, April 13, 1960.

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Mr. Gusty for  
Sir A. Rambold  
Wesley Dept

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Couve repeated during our conversation in the interval that he was very much against the German problem as a whole being remitted to Deputies after the Summit. He said that it would be very bad for the Germans. It would make them jumpy, and there would be no prospect of agreement. We must realise that the only hope about progress on Germany either at the Summit or thereafter was for an interim agreement on Berlin.

I only record this as an interesting development. When we said the same thing months ago, we were accused of basic unreliability and of selling the pass.

*Handwritten signature*

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GUARDBRIEF ON GERMANY AND BERLINFOR THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING ON APRIL 13.General summary

There has been virtually no change since the Western Heads of Government discussed Berlin and Germany in Paris in December. During the past two months the Americans have clearly been debating whether or not to suggest that the Western powers could agree to change the occupation status of Berlin and substitute a contractual arrangement without thereby necessarily impairing their ability to protect the freedom of West Berlin. But in the face of strong French and German opposition to any change of status they seem to have decided not to make this suggestion. The report of the Working Group on Germany and Berlin will be written during the week before the Washington meeting. It is unlikely to contain any important new ideas. There is an American proposal for a supervised plebiscite throughout Germany on the rival merits of the Soviet and Western ideas of a peace settlement. This would be a propaganda exercise. And there is a German idea which they will probably not press for a plebiscite before the summit in West Berlin. The Americans may also revive a suggestion made last April before the Geneva Conference whereby, as a fall-back position, the West might propose an indirect "agency" theory, viz. Soviet/D.D.R. declarations that access would continue on the same basis as hitherto until reunification, followed by Western acceptance of de facto dealings with D.D.R. officials.

2. The four Western Governments have often tended to emphasise different aspects of the Berlin problem. The German line has been that there must be as little discussion about Berlin as

/possible

possible at the Summit and that no agreement at the Summit is imaginable which would not make the situation worse. The French line has been that we must say to the Russians that the fuss that they have made about Berlin is inconsistent with their professed intentions and that since it was they who raised the subject it is up to them to suggest a solution which would be acceptable to us rather than the other way round. The French have also said consistently that there must in any case be no negotiation about a new status for West Berlin. The Americans as mentioned above, have been casting around for new ideas but without any real success. As the date of the Summit approaches these differences in emphasis have however tended to diminish. It is coming to be more and more accepted in Paris and Bonn as well as here and in Washington that the Summit could very well end in an agreement on some sort of Geneva-type interim solution for Berlin or at any rate in an agreement about the principles of such a solution, the details being remitted for study to another conference at a lower level. There have been indications that the Russians themselves would regard this as an acceptable outcome. Admittedly Mr. Khrushchev has made it perfectly plain that unless he can achieve an agreement at the Summit which can be represented to his own people as progress in the right direction he will conclude his separate peace treaty with East Germany and turn over Russian obligations relating to Berlin to the D.D.R. He might not carry out this threat or even utter it in very precise terms until after President Eisenhower has visited Moscow in June. But it would be foolish to ignore what he has so often repeated. His understanding of the agreement at Camp David was that the Berlin negotiations "should not be prolonged indefinitely". He would not therefore simply accept failure to reach any agreement at the summit and acquiesce in an arrangement for

/Berlin



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Berlin to be discussed again at a subsequent meeting. But the West is not in too bad a position because Mr. Khrushchev will obviously prefer not to have to carry out his threat of a separate peace treaty and he might therefore go quite a way towards making the kind of concession which Mr. Gromyko was not able to make in Geneva. The points on which he would be expected to make most difficulty would be (a) the manner in which German questions should be discussed in the future and the "link" to be established between such discussions and an interim solution for Berlin (b) "subversive activities" in West Berlin (including in this concept the political links between West Berlin and the Federal Republic) (c) the way in which to express the situation which will arise at the end of the period of the interim agreement, i.e. Western rights.

3. The discussion at the Foreign Ministers' meeting on April 13 will presumably centre round the report of the Four Power Working Group. This will not be available until the Secretary of State and his party have reached Washington. But since it will be the main document before the meeting an attempt is made below to guess at what it is likely to consist of. It will probably include some leading questions. Paragraph 6 below includes some guesses as to what these questions are likely to be and suggestions as to what answers should be given.

4. The meeting will also have to decide what kind of report to make to the NATO meeting in Istanbul. The report of the Working Group will itself be forwarded direct to NATO in accordance with the arrangements agreed in December. The best thing seems to be for a rapporteur to be appointed to explain to the Council what conclusions the four Foreign Ministers had reached on the Working Group report. This rapporteur might well be Mr. Herter since

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the Americans have made all the running on Germany and Berlin (the sensible division of labour at Istanbul would in fact be Mr. Herter for Germany and Berlin for this reason, the Secretary of State for disarmament since his plan was the basis of the Western Disarmament plan and M. Couve de Murville for "East-West relations" since this is a field in which the French have produced a number of ideas).

5. The Report of the Four Power Working Group on Germany and Berlin to the four Foreign Ministers' meeting in Washington on April 12 is likely to consist of the following:

(a) An estimate of Soviet intentions at the Summit.

The paper will probably make the following points:

- (i) Mr. Khrushchev will concentrate on the questions of a Peace Treaty and West Berlin;
- (ii) he will emphasise the dangers inherent in West German "militarism", in the "perpetuation of the occupation regime" in Berlin, in Western "subversive activities" in Berlin and in the existing political links between the Federal Republic and West Berlin;
- (iii) in order to secure prestige for the D.D.R. he is likely to press for a follow-up conference, probably at Foreign Ministers level, in which the D.D.R. would participate.
- (iv) It is impossible to say whether he will be prepared to sign a Geneva-type interim agreement if the West refuses to agree in principle to change the status of Berlin.

This paper will not need to be considered in detail by Ministers.

(b) A paper about "principles and minimum requirements for the Berlin settlement, together with suggestions for possible agreements, interim or otherwise, their advantages and disadvantages."

This would follow an American proposal for a

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paper designed to amalgamate American, French and German papers already tabled in the Working Group about the basic principles which must govern any Berlin agreement. The paper is likely to be ambiguously worded because there is a basic difference of opinion about the whole exercise. The Americans originally tabled a paper on "Principles" because they were trying to stimulate Western thinking on the question of whether we could perhaps agree to change the status of Berlin without thereby necessarily impairing our ability to protect the freedom of West Berlin. The French and Germans partly out of suspicion of American motives and partly from a confusion of ends and means insist that the one basic principle must be "no change of status". At one time it looked as if the Americans might be prepared to say openly that they thought that this could be done, i.e. that the status of Berlin could be changed provided that provision was made for the retention of Western troops in a "non-occupation" capacity. It even looked as if they might be going to suggest that the liberties of the West Berliners could be preserved without allied troops. It may be that they will still make one or other such revolutionary suggestions before the Summit Meeting. But current indications are that they will not. We have always been completely non-committal on the question of status, and should continue to leave it to the Americans to make the first move towards suggesting a new status if they wish to do so. If the Americans are not prepared to make this move, the paper is unlikely to have immediate practical value.

/It may

It may include an inconclusive discussion of the merits of staying absolutely firm or negotiating a Geneva-type agreement.

(c) A paper on tactics at the Summit.

This paper will probably say that we should begin by re-tabling the Western Peace Plan (perhaps with some minor modifications), and that we should only reluctantly agree to the idea of an interim Berlin agreement. The paper will probably pay undue deference to German thinking but need not be taken very seriously because it will obviously be covered by a general proviso that tactics can in fact only be decided in the light of what actually happens at the Summit itself.

(d) A summary and list of background papers.

This should contain quite a useful list of talking points in summary form to rebut any points made by Mr. Khrushchev.

(e) Points for consideration by Ministers.

This will probably be the only part of the Working Group's Report which has to be considered by Ministers. It is likely to take the form of questions rather on the lines of the questions asked in Annex III of the Working Group's Report to the Meeting of the Heads of Government in Paris December 19-21, 1959. (page 21 of Confidential Print Volume No. 20865). Because of the different attitudes of the respective delegations and because of the desire not to appear to pre-judge the answers to the questions, it seems likely that some of the questions may be ambiguously expressed. But it is probable that the questions

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listed below cover most of the issues which the Report of the Working Group will suggest that Ministers should consider. Each question as listed is followed by a suggested answer or at least a comment.

6. These are the questions.

- a) On the assumption that Mr. Khrushchev will begin by tabling the Soviet Peace Treaty proposals, should the West respond by putting forward the Western Peace Plan?
- Yes.
- b) Should the Western Peace Plan be modified in any way? It ought to be modified to take account of the latest disarmament negotiations and the Working Group may have been able to suggest how this should be done (though the final text could not be settled until the adjournment in the disarmament negotiations). Logically, all the references to general disarmament in the Western Peace Plan could be taken out. This would make the Peace Plan a more streamlined document and therefore more suitable for public presentation. But the Germans are wedded to the idea that disarmament and a solution of political questions are linked together. They may well have resisted any proposal advanced in the Working Group for the deletion of the general disarmament clauses in the various stages of the Western Peace Plan. If this is the case an effort might be made to get Herr von Brentano to agree to delete these references on the ground that the preamble to the Western Peace Plan establishes the relationship

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of disarmament to the questions of European security and German reunification. But it is largely a question of presentation and if the Germans feel strongly about retaining the disarmament clauses there is no object in pressing them.

The Americans have suggested that we might propose a plebiscite under international supervision in both parts of Germany on the Soviet and Western views of how a peace settlement with Germany should be reached. The Working Group are likely to invite Ministers to endorse the plebiscite plan as something separate from the Peace Plan. It is obvious that Mr. Khrushchev would not accept the idea of a plebiscite. But it is purely a propaganda exercise and as such perfectly acceptable to us (incidentally it leaked to the Press in February).

If any attractive new ideas are thrown up between now and the summit they should not be buried in the Western Peace Plan. From the point of view of serious negotiation the Western Peace Plan is dead.

- c) Are we prepared to consider agreeing in principle to modify the status of West Berlin if it becomes clear that Mr. Khrushchev will only sign an interim Geneva-type agreement on West Berlin on this condition?

This is, in effect, the question which the Americans have been trying indirectly to ask in the Working Group. We should be non-committal. Only the Americans can take the lead in answering this question. The French and German reply would of course

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be strongly negative. The Secretary of State's conversation with Mr. Herter in Paris on December 20 is relevant in this connexion (Confidential Print Volume No. 20866, pages 18-19).

- d) Can new proposals be developed for an arrangement on Berlin designed to last until reunification which would be acceptable to the West and consistent with its obligations to maintain the freedom of the city?

This question was included in the December report of the Working Group. It follows on naturally if the answer to question (c) above is in the affirmative. In the unlikely event of this being the case discussion would probably centre round the "Principles" paper referred to in paragraph 5(b) above.

- e) What should be the attitude of the West if Mr. Khrushchev offered to apply his "Free City" proposal to the whole of Berlin?

There are indications that Mr. Khrushchev may conceivably do this. We know that certain East/German Ministries are almost ready to re-house themselves outside East Berlin. Such indications as we have suggest that two important conditions would be attached to any such suggestion:

- (a) the American broadcasting station RIAS would have to cease operation from Berlin and  
(b) the free city of all-Berlin would have to adopt what in effect was the currency of the D.D.R.

The test to be applied to any such proposal should be whether or not the freedom of the West Berliners would be safeguarded. Much the same considerations

/would

would apply to an all-Berlin free city proposal as to a West Berlin free city proposal.

f) Can the Geneva proposals of July 28 be re-drafted?

In order to avoid being suspected by the Germans of wanting to go straight back to these proposals at the summit it would seem best to take the line that there is no point in trying to redraft them now. There is general agreement on the basic ingredients of an interim agreement.

g) Apart from a Geneva-type agreement or an agreement to change the status of Berlin, is there any other "fall-back" proposal which the West might make?

The Americans have recently displayed new interest in an idea which they first put forward last Spring, before the Geneva Conference. This deals with the question of what we should do if the Russians indicate that they would like to negotiate an agreement which would enable them to give up their Four-Power responsibilities in Berlin without embarrassing us. M. Spaak himself has often pointed out that we should be in a poor posture if we seemed to be insisting that the Russians must remain in Berlin when they say that they wish to leave. It is generally recognised that the Russians would be most unlikely to announce that they were appointing the D.D.R. as their agents. The idea amounts in effect to an indirect agency theory by means of Soviet/D.D.R. declarations, viz:-

(i) The West reserves its legal position generally and states that it continues to hold the Soviet Government responsible for the fulfillment of its obligations in respect of Berlin.

/(ii)



GUARD

- (ii) The East Germans make a declaration that pending German re-unification, existing procedures will continue regarding Allied and German access to Berlin. The Russians associate themselves with this declaration.
- (iii) Thereafter the West deals with D.D.R. officials as regards access procedures.
- (iv) United Nations observers are established in Berlin and, among other functions, supervise access arrangements.

This idea is elaborated in the Berlin paper, prepared by the Four-Power Working Group on Germany and Berlin during its meeting in London from April 13-23, 1959 (Print volume No. 20714, pages 19 to 22). This paper was never discussed in detail by Ministers. It was simply agreed that it contained ideas which might prove useful at a later date. Any such proposal can certainly be endorsed.

#### 7. Berlin Contingency Planning

The Germans have been given the text of the basic tripartite Berlin contingency planning paper of April 14, 1959. This is the paper from which all subsequent tripartite planning has stemmed. The Germans are only associated with this planning on a need-to-know basis. The Americans were anxious to give the paper to the Germans for two separate (and slightly conflicting) reasons, first in order to show them that a serious situation could arise in the event of failure to reach agreement at the Summit (the Germans have

/never

never faced up to this issue), and secondly in order to demonstrate that they were prepared to be tough over Berlin. It is just possible that the Germans may press to be given further details of tripartite contingency planning. We and the Americans and the French agree in wishing to resist such pressure.

Mem 11/2992

4/20/60

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Foreign Policy subject  
(Western Summit Pt. 2)

PRIME MINISTER  
WESTERN SUMMIT

SECRET

SERIAL No. M. 114/60

FOREIGN SECRETARY

Copy on  
Germany  
(Peking)  
(Future of  
P.M.)

I noted with interest what Couve said to you about the German problem and the need for interim agreement on Berlin. Of course this is our position and it is interesting that the French have now reached it. What is worrying me is what I am going to say at the Western Summit in Paris before the actual Summit occurs. If I say what Couve says, I shall be denounced by Adenauer and perhaps not supported by de Gaulle. But if nobody says it we shall go into the real Summit with an equivocal position. I shall have to try to find out from the French whether de Gaulle is really prepared to try to get an agreement, even an interim agreement, and secondly find out from Eisenhower what the true American

position is. So far all your meetings with Foreign Secretaries have produced nothing but hawering around the issue, watching each other like cats. I am sure that what we have done has been prudent, <sup>because</sup> ~~but~~ every time we make any suggestion we are howled at as traitors.

HAROLD MACMILLAN

April 20, 1960

Mem 11/2982

4/22/60

COPY

The Secretary of State,  
WASHINGTON.

April 22, 1960.

SECRET ATTACHMENT.

Dear Selwyn,

At our last meeting in Washington I promised to forward to you the paper setting forth our concept of our basic purposes at the Summit.

I enclose this paper, which has been read by President Eisenhower. I believe that his general approach and statements at the Summit and in the interim will rest on the general philosophy expressed in it.

I should be grateful for any comment you may have.

With warmest personal regards,

Most sincerely,

(Sgd.) Chris

Christian A. Herter.

The Right Honourable

Selwyn Lloyd, C.B.E., T.D., Q.C., M.P.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, London.

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OUR SUMMIT PURPOSES

Introduction

1. Need to Define our Purposes

We have a fairly good idea of what the Soviets hope to obtain from the May meeting. We should be equally clear as to our own aims - over and above the negative one of frustrating Soviet purposes. It is now time to mature our own Summit philosophy.

2. Danger of Leaks

As we do so, we should redouble efforts to prevent leaks. Leaks prejudice diplomacy's chances and hence increase the risk of conflict.

3. Raising our Sights

We must overcome any tendency to look on the Summit as something of a chore, whose maximum result would be to leave us no worse off than we were before.

This is too modest an aim and would be too negative a result for such an important international meeting.

We should look upon the coming talks with the Soviets as a chance to achieve, or at least to champion, four affirmative purposes.

Our First Purpose: A Small Beginning toward Practical Controlled Disarmament

4. Specific Steps

We should press for Summit progress toward controlling the arms race. We should propose limited measures, which would reduce the risk of war by miscalculation.

Our proposals for prior notification of launchings of space vehicles and for safeguards against surprise attack are examples of such limited measures. These measures would not radically alter the military situation, but they could help to avert an unwanted

/conflict

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conflict, while we seek more extensive disarmament.

5. General Disarmament

The importance of any Summit discussion of general disarmament, on the other hand, will probably be its effect on world opinion. With this in mind, we should emphasise that progress toward general disarmament will have to go hand in hand with progress toward open societies. While recognising that this is for the Soviet Union to decide, we should stress that support of closed societies hinders the achievement of disarmament.

Our Second Purpose: Detering Communist Action Against Berlin and Paving the Way for an Eventual Acceptable Solution

6. The End in View

Our second major purpose at the Summit should be to seek an arrangement - explicit or tacit - to preserve the existing situation in Berlin for a period of time. During this period we could try to progress toward a more formal and definitive solution regarding Berlin.

7. The Means

To this end, we might seek either a temporary agreement or a very general Summit directive to a subordinate group, which would negotiate and report back to Heads of Government. In this latter case, reciprocal declarations to avoid provocative actions, e.g., interference with unhindered communication to Berlin, might also be exchanged at the Summit, in an effort to reduce tensions over Berlin during the period of negotiations that would then lie ahead, without our trying to work out a formal agreement, with all the attendant semantic and legal difficulties.

8. Deterrent

Success in this effort to "de-fuse" Berlin would only be possible if we made clear the grave view that

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we would take of any Communist action which threatened our access and purported to destroy our rights. We should emphasise, at least privately to Khrushchev, that any such action would seriously prejudice prospects for detente and for early disarmament. The Soviets seem to set some store on pushing for detente and on reducing their military burdens. They might prefer to have relaxation of tensions with progress on arms control than to have their own way over Berlin - if we made clear at a Summit that they could not have both.

Our Third Purpose: An Increase in the Confidence and Cohesion of the Western Alliance

9. Our Goal

The Communists traditionally use any international encounter to air their confidence in the ultimate triumph of their system. If they run true to form, at the Summit we should go them one better. We have good reason to do so.

10. Military Strength

Our position is strong in the military field. Our strategic deterrent is highly effective, and will remain so. The USSR, in spite of its missile boasts and accomplishments, is quite conscious of the restraint that this strength imposes on its aggressive designs.

11. Non-military Strength

Freedom's priority claim to the future in non-military competition was never so clear as during President Eisenhower's recent journeys through Asia and Latin America. The peoples of these areas just do not want totalitarianism; they know that their independence will die if the Free World does not thrive. Our countries can rightly enter the Summit with confidence that our three spokesmen of the free world represent



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12. Our Posture

We should use the Summit to manifest that confidence, to Khrushchev, to our own peoples, and to the world as a whole.

If the Soviets initiate a propaganda exchange at the Summit, we should stress our view that the future belongs to governments and ideologies firmly based on the principle of self-determination.

We should make clear that we welcome the intensified peaceful competition with Communism which lies ahead.

We should call on free peoples everywhere to mount the increased effort that this competition will require.

If we can use the Summit thus to mobilise the moral and physical energies of the free world for the coming serious economic and ideological struggle, this alone will have made the Summit worth while.

Our Fourth Purpose: Clarification of Our Posture towards the Communist Bloc in a Period of Apparent "Thaw"

13. Need For Clarity

We need to make clear at the Summit that the Western Powers are in deadly earnest, despite the moral difference between their system and that of the Soviets, in their desire to find ways of controlling the risk of nuclear war. We also need to make clear that this moral difference is not being narrowed in any way by the Summit dialogue.

14. Our Behaviour

Our behaviour should thus reflect the fact that we have come to the Summit in a businesslike attempt to reduce the risk of war - not to confuse our peoples by meaningless gestures. We want to make progress - on disarmament and on Berlin - which would make the forth-

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coming period of struggle a somewhat safer time for mankind. We want to maintain a friendly and courteous mien in seeking such progress; we do not want to gloss over the absence of progress or the difference between freedom and totalitarianism.

Conclusions

15. Affirmative Purposes

There are thus four affirmative purposes that we should set for ourselves at the Summit:

- (1) Forward movement toward controlling the risks of the arms race;
- (2) "De-fusing" Berlin;
- (3) Enhancing free world confidence and cohesion;
- (4) Clarifying our countries' posture toward the Bloc in a period of apparent "thaw".

16. Affirmative Stance

We should make clear, starting right now and through the Summit, that we do have these affirmative purposes and that we welcome the Summit as an opportunity to prosecute them. We should not give the impression that the Summit is something that the Soviets invented or that we have been dragged into against our will. We should be ready to take the initiative in proposing that another Summit be held, to receive the Berlin negotiating group's report if such a group is set up - or earlier if a threat to the peace or an opportunity for significant progress arises.

17. Outcome

If we can gear our actions at the Summit to these affirmative purposes, we will - while effectively seeking to reduce the risk of war - enhance worldwide respect for the Western alliances: its firmness, its

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clarity of purpose and its claim to the future. This kind of moral victory should help us to strengthen peace and get on with free men's efforts to remain free, whether or not we succeed in reaching agreements with the USSR.

18. Execu-  
tion

Our final preparations for the meeting should reflect these purposes and our representatives should concert on pre-Summit public information, as well as on Summit style and substance, with this in mind.

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## I. GERMANY AND BERLIN

A.—Restricted Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the United States, France and the Federal Republic of Germany, held at the German Consulate-General, Istanbul, at 10 a.m. 1.5.60.

Present:

UNITED KINGDOM  
Secretary of State  
Sir Anthony Rumbold

UNITED STATES  
Mr. Herter  
Mr. Merchant

FRANCE  
M. Couve de Murville  
M. Lucet

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY  
Herr von Brentano  
Herr Carstens

*Herr von Brentano* said that he wished to speak privately to his colleagues, before the larger meeting opened, about the paper entitled "Our Summit Purposes" of which Mr. Herter had sent each of them a copy. (See text at Annex I.) This paper had disturbed both the Chancellor and himself. Although they agreed with the introductory sentiments it seemed to them that it overlooked the report of the Working Group. There was no reference to the German problem as a whole and they did not like the reference in paragraph 6 to the situation in Berlin being preserved "for a period of time". Any agreement about Berlin ought to be made to last until reunification. Paragraph 8 was also not very happily formulated. It was not enough as a deterrent to Khrushchev to prevent him from taking unpleasant action over Berlin to tell him that if he did so this would prejudice the prospects for a *détente*. He had put these thoughts into a letter and this would reach his colleagues soon.

*Mr. Herter* said that Herr von Brentano was labouring under a misunderstanding. The paper was tactical and was not at variance with what the Working Group had recommended. Perhaps his paragraph 8 had been badly expressed. He had meant that if the Russians hinted at any sort of threat over Berlin they would be told that there would be no hope of progress on disarmament. The three Western Summit Powers would have to consider the tactical relationship of the disarmament question with that of the Berlin question.

*The Secretary of State* said that it was clear to him that Mr. Herter's paper did nothing to alter the tactics which had been agreed and which were set out in the report of the Working Group. He outlined what these were.

*Mr. Herter* then referred to a conversation between President de Gaulle and President Eisenhower in Washington in which they had agreed that it would be wise to enter into no commitment with the Russians on any subject until the very end of the conference.

To Herr von Brentano's question as to whether the tactics paper of the Working Group was then still valid the three other Foreign Ministers all indicated their assent.

*Herr von Brentano* asked why Mr. Herter had in that case felt it necessary to write a new paper.

*Mr. Herter* said that it had been written some time ago. One of its purposes had been to counter the idea which had been gaining ground that the whole business of the Summit was rather a "chore".

*M. Couve de Murville* then said that he had not interpreted paragraph 8 of Mr. Herter's paper as meaning that "contingency planning" in the sense in which this term was generally understood had in any way been replaced in the mind of Mr. Herter by the idea that we might meet Russian threats simply by statements to the effect that if they carried them out this would make the *détente* more difficult. As to Herr von Brentano's strictures on paragraph 6 of Mr. Herter's paper he said

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that it was his understanding that the Working Group's recommendation, which had been accepted by the Ministers in Washington, was that we should aim at an interim agreement along the lines of the July 28 proposals. But he thought that it would be out of the question for this agreement to be actually negotiated at the Summit. What would be important when it came to the negotiation of the agreement was to make sure that the position at the end of the period remained unaltered.

There was then some discussion about when the four Western Heads of Government should meet before the Summit. It was provisionally agreed that they should meet at 2 or 2.30 p.m. on Sunday, May 15.

Defe 4/126 Appendix IV 32<sup>nd</sup> Mtg. 5/11/60

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Appendix A to JP(60) Note 19

GENERAL NORSTAD'S VIEWS ON A EUROPEAN  
INSPECTION ZONE PROPOSAL

The various proposals of the past decade for establishing an internationally controlled zone in Europe have each contained features which made them unacceptable to the West, at least from the military standpoint. For example, the Eden Plan of 1955 envisaged a demilitarised zone which was too narrow to be of practical value in the rapidly moving situations of modern warfare. Furthermore, originally it would have used the boundary between East and West Germany as a line of departure, an aspect of the plan which appeared to sanction a divided Germany and was clearly unsatisfactory. The Rapacki Plan, in its 1958 modification, advocated a limited denuclearised zone in Central Europe which would essentially have deprived the NATO nations of their nuclear shield while leaving the massive forces of the Soviets poised within striking distance of Western Europe. At best it was dependent on confidence that the Soviets would carry out the terms of an agreement which could not be controlled or enforced. As for the recent Soviet disarmament proposals, it is not necessary to cite their ambiguity and impracticability.

The Western Nations are searching for and require measures which will maintain and guarantee security while reducing dangerous tensions. It was to this end that the 1957 Disarmament Conference in London discussed the establishment of an inspection and control system in various areas involving Europe, the Soviet Union, North America and the Arctic. From the military point of view, this was a satisfactory approach to the problem of security, and the present suggestions on control and inspection in the European area are related to the general discussions which took place at that time.

The basic thoughts on this subject were outlined to the NAC in June, 1957, and, since that time, a zonal system of military inspection and control focusing on Central Europe has been under study at SHAPE. The points hereafter outlined derive from this study. Six criteria were established as essential to any plan of this nature to be put forward by the West at this time:

1. It should strike public opinion in the West and neutral countries as an easily understandable and workable first step towards easing of tensions;
2. It should not prejudice adversely existing Western positions on Germany, Berlin or disarmament;
3. At same time, it should not be wholly dependent upon acceptance of broader Western objectives by the Soviets;
4. It should deliberately be framed to avoid any provisions requiring a change in the basic power balance between the West and the USSR at this stage;
5. It should serve a useful purpose by itself and abate tensions without further steps;
6. If found workable in practice over a period of time, it could lay the groundwork for consideration in the future of other proposals bearing on European security.

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Also: Defe 6/68 JP(60) Note 19, May 11, 1960

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Appendix 'A' (Continued)

Following immediately are the main features and operational elements recommended for a control and inspection system in Europe:

- A. Mobile ground inspection in as large an area as possible between the Atlantic and the Urals, but to include as an irreducible minimum the two Germanys, Poland, Czechoslovakia, BENELUX, and at least a part of Denmark, or the equivalent.
- B. Aerial inspection over an area not less than that covered by ground inspection.
- C. Overlapping radar stations, one line to be maintained by West on Eastern perimeter of inspection and vice versa.
- D. Scope of Inspection:
  - (1) Exchange of information on types and location of existing and firmly programmed forces.
  - (2) Verification of this information.
  - (3) Advance exchange of information as to movements.
  - (4) Periodic reports by mobile teams on ground and from aerial reconnaissance.
  - (5) Each side to have its own line of communications.
  - (6) Teams to have full access to areas of military significance but no right of entry into private buildings.
  - (7) No technical inspections of equipment or access to nuclear storage depots themselves.
- E. Size of inspection group:
  - (1) Not to exceed 3,000 inspectors (total both East and West), including staff.
  - (2) This would not include personnel for radar installations or aerial reconnaissance.
- F. Nature of Inspection Teams:
  - (1) Mixed East/West teams operating throughout entire inspection area (no line down the middle of Germany).
  - (2) Reports to their military superiors and possibly to appropriate UN organ (need to avoid any recognition of Warsaw Pact or East German regime).

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Appendix 'A' (Concluded)

Conclusions:

1. Danger of surprise surface attack should be greatly reduced if not eliminated.
2. Some increased security against surprise air attack would be achieved.
3. No surrender by NATO of its assets in maintaining deterrent and protecting Western Europe.
4. Soviet knowledge of NATO deployments would not constitute significant loss.
5. Inclusion of countries other than Western Germany, plus the device of mixed teams, would help make clear that plan involves no abandonment of goal of German unity.
6. Successful operation of this system could also lead to further steps in direction of effective control and reduction of armament.

This rough outline obviously offers wide latitude for change yet, the basic military purpose of the proposal should not be compromised. The danger of a surprise attack from within the zone subjected to inspection must be reduced substantially. It is recognized that a control and inspection system operating in the minimum zone indicated would not provide protection against surprise by air weapons launched from areas outside the zone. This fact does not invalidate the merit of the system proposed, which undertakes to provide no more and no less than a reduction of the chance of surprise attack from the zone agreed upon. If such a system should prove itself, it is not unrealistic to hope that it would become the nucleus of broader action to mitigate even greater dangers.

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Appendix B to JP (60) Note 19

NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING AT ISTANBUL

The Norstad Plan

The State Department have communicated to us and to the French and Germans the text (copy attached) of General Norstad's plan for a zone of inspection and control in Europe which the United States Government, with the approval of ourselves, and the agreement of the French and the Germans, had asked him to produce. Its basic machinery consists of mixed East-West mobile teams for ground inspection in as large as possible an area between the Atlantic and the Urals; aerial inspection over an area not less than that covered by ground inspection; and chains of radar stations on the extreme East and Western perimeters of the zone, to be managed by the "other side" in each case.

2. From this machinery both sides would be provided with information on the location of existing forces, advance information on the movements of these forces and periodic reports on the results of their ground and aerial reconnaissance. Each side would have their own communications and the teams would be allowed access to all military areas but not to private buildings or to carry out technical inspections of equipment or nuclear storage depots.

3. The basic object of the plan is to increase confidence of both sides by reducing the danger of surprise surface attack and be a "pilot project" providing a foundation for much wider areas of control and inspection elsewhere.

4. This plan is not one for disengagement, demilitarisation or limitation of forces as proposed in other contexts on various occasions in the past. Anyone speaking for the United Kingdom should stress this point because of the deep suspicions entertained on the continent of British plans for disengagement and demilitarisation. If continental support for the Norstad plan is to be ensured the difference between it on the one hand and the various disengagement plans on the other must constantly be emphasised.

5. The United States Government are in principle in favour of some such plan as that now advanced but emphasise that the present paper sets out General Norstad's views and not the views of the United States Government. They have certain doubts about the area to be covered (see paragraph 10(b) below).

6. The plan was to be mentioned in the conversations between the President and General de Gaulle recently but we do not know what was said. Previous reports of the French attitude were that it was one of undisguised hostility particularly at the Quai d'Orsay.

7. The idea of such a plan was raised with Dr. Adenauer during his last visit to Washington and he exploded on the spot. However the Minister of Defence and the German military authorities have given it their full support and apparently there is some hope that they can get the Chancellor to agree.

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Appendix 'B' (Concluded)

The attitude of other NATO countries, particularly that of Benelux and Denmark, whose territory General Norstad proposes should be subject to international inspection, is of course important but they have not been given copies of the Plan.

Her Majesty's Government support the plan in general (subject to certain detailed remarks made below) but are not anxious to take the lead in advocating it owing to the continental suspicions referred to in paragraph 4 above. We have consistently tried to get the United States Government to take the lead.

The points of detail which concern us are as follows:

- (a) For the record we must point out an inaccuracy in the opening paragraph. The second sentence of this confuses Sir Anthony Eden's inspection plan of 1955 with another plan he put forward for a demilitarised zone presupposing the reunification of Germany. The first of these plans from which the Norstad Plan may claim descent, had nothing to do with demilitarisation;
- (b) Like the State Department, we have certain doubts about the area proposed for ground inspection. Politically General Norstad's suggestion that it should include both Germanies, Poland and Czechoslovakia, the Benelux countries and part of Denmark seems to make sense; but when the matter was considered by the Chiefs of Staff in the Spring of 1959 the area which they proposed did not include Benelux or Denmark; it consisted of the two Germanies, Poland, and Czechoslovakia; they might have difficulty in accepting General Norstad's addition on the Western side without some counter-balance from the East. On the other hand the State Department addition of Hungary does not appeal to the Ministry of Defence. If agreement is reached that the Norstad Plan or something like it should be tabled at the Summit, we might start with the area proposed by the Chiefs of Staff in 1959 and keep our minds open about adding Benelux and part of Denmark if the Soviet attitude appeared to warrant such a concession;
- (c) The Norstad Plan speaks of the zone of aerial inspection being not less than that of ground inspection. In fact the Chiefs of Staff last year considered that the zone of aerial inspection should coincide with that agreed to in NATO in 1957, namely 5° E. to 35° E, Southern and Northern limits to be negotiated.

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TOP SECRET



PRIME MINISTER

I have been thinking about what you and the Foreign Secretary might say if you find yourselves having discussions in the intervals of the Summit Conference about mid-range ballistic missiles for NATO or about our own strategic missiles.

2. I have circulated a report on M.R.B.M.s to the Defence Committee (D(60)20). I suggest in that paper that our tactics on M.R.B.M.s should be to play it long. However, there is a possibility that the Americans may want to force the pace so as to have something striking to announce before the Election. If so, we must protect ourselves as best we can without getting drawn into open disagreement. Although I think we ought to play some small part in the project if there is one, we must resist being forced to subscribe large sums to something whose military priority we regard as questionable and which is politically dangerous; and we must insist that we cannot have missiles deployed here unless they comply with our own ideas of mobility.

3. If you do find yourself being tackled about it by President Eisenhower, I suggest that, after making general points about more thought being needed and about priorities in defence expenditure, you should do some probing about control of the missiles. Will it be feasible, if SACEUR is to be given missiles with megaton heads capable of travelling 1,500 miles, to avoid discussion in NATO of how he gets his orders? Will not the outcome be a decision that all members of the North Atlantic Council must agree before the weapons can be used? Would not that be to proclaim to the Russians that the missiles were unlikely to be used until it was too late? Are these not weapons for fighting an all-out war, rather than preventing one? Our impression is that the Americans have not thought this through.

4. On strategic missiles for British use, as you say in your minute of May 10th, I should like to carry the question of SKYBOLT further. There are powerful forces in the POLARIS lobby that would like to get this project cancelled. It would, therefore, be very helpful if you could speak to the President as follows:-

- (i) I have written to Mr. Gates seeking the conclusion of a technical agreement between us to develop SKYBOLT for the Mark II V-bombers. So far I have had no reply. I hope that this agreement could now be settled.
- (ii) Something of the order of 100 missiles will be what we require under present commitments. It would show that we are serious in our intentions to mention this figure. Unless we show that we are serious, as you say, we may fall between two stools.

On Def Org.  
(RSM's  
p. 3.)

5. From the Chancellor's point of view, SKYBOLT is cheapest solution that he is ever likely to get to the of continuing the British ~~RUS~~ deterrent after, say,

Wattinson memo  
(extract)

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Extract from the Prime Minister's Conversation with  
President Eisenhower at 4 p.m. on Wednesday,  
May 18.

President Eisenhower opened a discussion as to how France, Britain, and the United States could keep closely together in the difficult period that was clearly lying ahead. It is obvious that President Eisenhower had been very favourably impressed by General de Gaulle and was willing to work more closely with him - in other words to revive the Rambouillet proposals. I said that I hoped he would say something on these lines at the 5 o'clock meeting, which he undertook to do.

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Prime Minister's  
Conversation with M. Debre on Thursday, May 19, at 11.15 a.m.

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23 MAY 1960

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I told M. Debre about my talk with President Eisenhower yesterday afternoon when I had asked him to raise again the possibility of the United States, France, and Britain keeping in close touch on how to deal with the major problems which would result from the failure of the Summit Conference. I had told President Eisenhower that I thought this could be done without attracting rivalry or dislike of other powers, even if our close conversations became known, because they would be related to the Summit. It was as victorious powers of the war that we three sat with Russia in the Summit at all. M. Debre said he was very pleased and so was the General at President Eisenhower having raised the question. We both agreed that we should make full use of this. Actually if our three countries operated closely together we could cover far more than the broad question of Western Europe, and really deal with Russian and Communist agitation and pressure in all parts of the world. M. Debre said he entirely agreed and this was the final conclusion:-

1. The cover ('parapluie', he called it) under which we should meet should be following the Summit. The Heads of Government might make lists of subjects for discussion - Africa, economics, etc. The Foreign Secretaries will meet frequently anyway and various organisations could take on the work of discussing them in detail. There might be one officer, <sup>perhaps a</sup> ~~a sort of~~ counsellor, <sup>rank</sup> in each Foreign Office, who would be specially charged with preparing the agenda, circulating papers, and these three officers would in fact become the Secretariat; but there

would be no formal Secretariat set up. M. Debre said he would speak to General de Gaulle on these lines and try over the weekend to produce a short paper. I said that I would try and do the same.

2. We then turned to the subject of Khrushchev's speech and the probabilities of Berlin. M. Debre expressed the view that it was clear from what President Eisenhower had said yesterday that the Americans were not thinking of any very violent reaction of a military kind against what Khrushchev might do. He had formed the view that they had (in his opinion rightly) decided not to have a nuclear war about access to Berlin; as long, at any rate, as there was no absolute oppression or conquest of the West Berliners. In these circumstances, and from the paper we discussed, it looked as if the only effective reaction was a sort of economic counter-blockade. This, in M. Debre's opinion, might do as an arguing-point for a few months, but could not be permanently effective. He therefore thought that as soon as we could without a great loss of face, it would be in our interests to resume negotiations perhaps at Foreign Secretary or at Ambassador level. We must, of course, wait and see what Mr. Khrushchev said in East Berlin tomorrow and what he did in the next few days. But he thought that the last paragraph of our declaration would justify us in taking some action to get negotiations going again.

3. In reply to some question of mine, he thought the economic difficulties and even divisions of Europe would tend to sink to a lower level as a result of this week's events.

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with Weber  
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would feel that we must get together against the stormy times  
that might be coming to us. I agreed with this.



PO 771 / (5209)

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TOP SECRET

FROM PARIS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

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FILES

Lord Gladwyn

No.187

D:10.35 a.m. May 19, 1960

May 19, 1960

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IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 187 of May 19.

Repeated for information to: Washington Bonn  
Berlin Moscow

and Saving to: UKDel. N.A.T.O.

Yesterday's meetings between the Western Foreign Ministers and Western Heads of Government were largely occupied with the discussion of Berlin contingency planning and "tripartism".

2. A paper was drawn up on contingency planning of which the Heads of Government took note. This paper summarized the existing position and made it clear that all decisions remained to be taken by the Governments. It also introduced two new thoughts, the first being that a study ought to be undertaken of the methods open to the Russians to exercise a gradual economic squeeze on Berlin and the second being that more work should be done on the possibility of counter measures against just such a squeeze. It was agreed that this additional work would best be centralized in Washington. Precise instructions will in due course be sent to Her Majesty's Embassy there.

3. The subject of "tripartism" came up following a remark by President Eisenhower to the effect that the events of the last few days had made him think that the three Governments ought to find methods of communicating more rapidly and consulting more intimately with one another. This led President de Gaulle to remind his colleagues of his memorandum of 1958, to which he said that little attention had been given. He said that he would shortly be addressing a further written communication to President Eisenhower and the Prime Minister in the same spirit as his memorandum of 1958, but in more precise terms.

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Paris telegram No. 187 to Foreign Office

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4. It was agreed that it should on no account be revealed that the subject of contingency planning for Berlin had been discussed by the Western leaders. The same degree of secrecy must, of course, be observed in relation to the subject of "tripartism".

Foreign Office please pass to Washington 38, Bonn 22, Berlin 3 and Moscow 19.

[Repeated as requested]

ADVANCE COPIES:

Head of Western Department.

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TOP SECRET

Prem 11/2893

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TOP SECRET

*Subject* *copy sent*  
*Sir N. Brock*

May 25, 1960.

FOREIGN MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL TELEGRAM

SERIAL No. T. 249160.....

Dear Friend,

Since our discussion in Paris with President de Gaulle about improving co-operation between our three Governments we here have been thinking about the methods to use. The United States, France and the United Kingdom have between them an overwhelming responsibility for the wise direction of Western alliances. We are also, as powers victorious in the last War, in a special position with regard to Germany. On the other hand, we do not want unduly to offend our various other allies by seeming ostentatiously to exclude them from our deliberations.

I expect that you and President de Gaulle will have ideas on all this, and I suggest that the Foreign Ministers should discuss the problem when they meet in Washington early next week. Meanwhile I thought it might be helpful to send to you and to President de Gaulle the enclosed memorandum which attempts

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to explore some of the possibilities as regards mechanics for consultation between us. I feel that by moving along the lines of this memorandum we should be able to develop better between us a common attitude towards the great global problems, upon our handling of which the peace of the world and the security of the West so much depend.

Yours ever,

H.M.

The President of the United States of America.

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MECHANICS OF TRIPARTITE CONSULTATION

(a) The main instrument of tripartite consultation, apart from personal meetings of Heads of Governments, to supplement normal diplomatic exchanges, should be meetings between the Foreign Ministers. They already meet four times a year; at the United Nations General Assembly, in May and December each year at NATO and also at the SEATO Ministerial Meeting. In the past there have been other additional meetings. The aim should be for them to meet about every two or three months, using these other occasions for the most part. When they meet adequate time should be set apart for tripartite discussion. Their agenda for such discussion should be prepared in advance with approval from the Heads of Governments, and any necessary papers should be prepared and circulated before each meeting. In arranging the agenda Ministers should feel free to suggest any subject or problem with which the three Governments were concerned. This would include both concrete and immediate problems, and also long-term questions of a more general character requiring harmonisation of the future policies of the three Governments.

Each Foreign Minister would designate a member of his Foreign Office - perhaps a Counsellor - to be directly responsible for preparing the agenda, circulating papers and ensuring that the subsequent follow up action is taken. These three officers could correspond directly with each other in the intervals between the Ministerial meetings but should not be regarded as constituting a formal Secretariat.

Should it be desirable or necessary for any preliminary work to be done on a tripartite basis before a meeting of Ministers, this should be performed in the place where the Ministerial meeting is to be held by a small working group of officials, i.e. representatives of the two Embassies and the home Ministry of Foreign Affairs, assisted where necessary by expert advisers.

The Foreign Ministers should report to the Heads of Governments the result of each meeting.

(b) The Heads of Governments might also supplement their direct correspondence by meeting either bilaterally or tripartitely in an informal way at intervals. Care will have to be taken, however, that such meetings do not upset the susceptibilities of other Governments and the aim should be to have it accepted that the Heads of Governments can meet without formality and without it becoming a State occasion, i.e. no Press Conferences or communiques or Parliamentary statements.



MM 24/60, Record of a Meeting between the Hon. Thomas Gates, United States Secretary of Defense, and the Rt. Hon. Harold Watkinson, United Kingdom Minister of Defence, in Washington on Monday, 6th June 1960

6/6 6/9/60

MEDIUM RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES FOR NATO

1. Mr. Gates and Mr. Watkinson discussed the question of MRBMs for NATO with a view to referring it to their Governments.
2. They acknowledged political implications and agreed the question must be handled with great care. They were also agreed that it is desirable that any Polaris proposal should be handled as a NATO programme. Bilateral arrangements could cause serious problems. It is most important to secure the participation, or at least the goodwill, of France. However, if France refused to participate in any way, the U.S. and U.K. should agree to examine the question of pushing ahead with the programme with the co-operation of other NATO nations, hoping that the French would come into the programme at a later date.
3. They agreed that it was advisable to concentrate attention at this time on a plan for the period through 1963. SACEUR has recommended to the Standing Group that he be provided with 80 missiles in 1963. It was recognised that for the period after 1963 there is no commitment to a rigid pattern technologically, politically or militarily. Secretary Gates believes, however, that acknowledgement must be made to a SACEUR 300 missile requirement and that a programme for the period 1964-1965 will have to be agreed to in the near future. Mr. Watkinson pointed out that to make firm plans for providing 80 missiles in 1963 need not imply acceptance of any particular concept or of any particular plan for subsequent numbers or types.
4. In the period through 1963 it seemed advisable to aim at the provision of 50 missiles on the continent of Europe, plus 32 missiles as provided in paragraph 5 below. These would be Polaris missiles which are the only suitable missiles that are certain to be available at that time.
5. As participation by the U.K. in this portion of the NATO MRBM programme, the U.K. would provide itself, as soon as construction lead time permits, with two nuclear submarines, each carrying 16 Polaris missiles. This would involve extensive co-operation from the U.S., and even then the submarines might not be available until the 1964-1965 time period. Subject to Congressional approval, and to the arrangements developed by NATO in establishing the MRBM Programme, the United States would be agreeable to the purchase by the United Kingdom from commercial sources in the United States of two Polaris submarines systems complete, or the missiles systems only, as a contribution to that programme. In any case U.K. warheads would be provided.
6. This would facilitate the implementation of the proposal agreed on in principle by President Eisenhower and Mr. Macmillan for the provision of facilities in the Clyde for missile-carrying submarines of the United States Navy, since these facilities could then be used jointly by the United States Navy and the Royal Navy. It would be very difficult to make this proposal acceptable to public opinion in the United Kingdom if it were not seen to be a co-operative programme rather than the concern of the United States alone.
7. If the United Kingdom could accept announcement of the grant of Polaris submarine facilities to the United States by 30 June 1960, the United States Navy would plan to sail a drydock to the Clyde in early July and place a tender in the



Clyde during the period October to December 1960. If it is not possible for the United Kingdom politically to make such a statement by the end of June 1960, the United States would place the drydock in the United States for a year, but this would only be done provided it could be assured that the tender could be berthed in the Clyde during the period October-December 1960. If the United Kingdom is unable to give assurance by June 30, 1960 that the tender can be berthed in the Clyde in the period October-December 1960, then the United States Navy must make arrangements for berthing both the drydock and the tender elsewhere.

8. Mr. Gates and Mr. Watkinson agree that neither will make a public announcement or advise other governments of these arrangements except by mutual agreement.

Ministry of Defence.

9th June, 1960.

Mem 11 (299)

6/10/60

LETTRE DU GENERAL DE GAULLE AU PRESIDENT EISENHOWER

---

10 Juin

Cher Monsieur le Président,

Lorsque nous nous sommes séparés à Paris le 18 Mai, nous avons convenu, vous-même, le Premier Ministre Macmillan et moi, qu'il convenait de rechercher rapidement les moyens de mieux organiser à l'avenir notre coopération, que les derniers événements ont rendue plus nécessaire que jamais.

Je vous avais indiqué que je me proposais de vous écrire pour vous faire part de quelques suggestions. Entre temps, M. Macmillan m'a écrit, comme à vous-même, pour formuler des propositions. Nos Ministres des Affaires Etrangères ont discuté de celles-ci lors de leur récente réunion à Washington et ont envisagé une organisation de leur travail qui serait très proche de celle que le Premier Ministre britannique avait lui-même prévue.

Je pense que le mieux que nous ayons à faire, pour le moment, c'est de prendre en considération les suggestions de M. Macmillan. Je vous adresse donc ci-joint le texte de la réponse que je lui ai faite à lui-même et qui expose ma propre manière de voir quant à la pratique d'une coopération plus régulière entre nous trois.

Veillez être assuré, Cher Monsieur le Président, de mes bien cordiaux et fidèles sentiments.

C. DE GAULLE

Mem 11/2997

R16 16

6/10/60

LE GÉNÉRAL DE GAULLE

Paris, le 10 juin 1960.

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL TELEGRAM

*Cher ami;* SERIAL No. *T. 367A/60*

Je vous remercie sincèrement de votre lettre du 25 mai dans laquelle vous m'avez fait part de vos vues sur la façon dont pourrait être améliorée la coopération entre nos trois gouvernements, coopération que les derniers événements ont rendue plus nécessaire que jamais, comme nous l'avons ensemble constaté lorsque nous nous sommes séparés à Paris le 18 mai.

J'attendais pour vous répondre que nos Ministres des Affaires Etrangères se soient rencontrés à Washington à l'occasion de la réunion du Conseil de l'Otase. Je sais qu'ils ont discuté de vos suggestions et ont envisagé d'un commun accord une organisation de leur travail qui, dans l'ensemble, serait très proche de celle que vous aviez vous-même prévue.

Ils ont constaté qu'eux-mêmes se réunissent assez souvent au cours de l'année pour qu'il leur soit possible de discuter entre eux, régulièrement, tous les grands problèmes politiques qui se posent dans le monde, et aussi les questions plus spécifiques qui sont d'un intérêt commun.

De telles discussions deviendraient, en quelque sorte, de règle et un temps suffisant serait prévu à cet effet.

Pour les préparer, chacun des Ministres désignerait un

Le Très Honorable Harold MACMILLAN  
Premier Ministre de Grande-Bretagne.

.../.

fonctionnaire de rang élevé ayant une compétence générale. Ces trois fonctionnaires, qui pourraient correspondre entre eux, seraient chargés d'établir les ordres du jour et de suivre les affaires.

A ces réunions périodiques des Ministres des Affaires Etrangères devraient s'ajouter, de temps à autre, comme vous le proposez, des réunions des trois Chefs d'Etat ou de Gouvernement. Nous avons pu constater, en décembre et en mai derniers, l'utilité de telles rencontres. Elles sont, à mon avis, essentielles.

De telles pratiques resserreraient dans une certaine mesure notre coopération dans le domaine politique. Mais elles laisseraient de côté notre coopération dans le domaine stratégique que je tiens, cependant, pour nécessaire et faute de laquelle la coopération politique perd beaucoup de sa portée. Je crois qu'il nous faut nous décider à considérer également ce côté essentiel de nos problèmes.

A cet égard, j'ai toujours pensé que de telles questions pourraient être préparées à Washington par discussions entre nos représentants militaires du groupe permanent, discussions tenues, toutefois, en dehors du fonctionnement de cet organisme lui-même. Dans certains cas, nous pourrions évidemment faire en sorte que nos chefs d'Etat-Major ou nos Ministres de la Défense se rencontrent. Finalement, nous en traiterions dans nos réunions à trois.

*Bien cordialement à vous.*

*E. La Fayette*

6/13/60

The Minister of Defence reported that the development of Blue Steel had been delayed by about a year and it would not be coming into service until 1962. Although we had decided to cancel Blue Steel Mark II it would be desirable in order to make full use of the Victor Mark II to stretch Blue Steel Mark I as far as possible to turn it into a 600-mile weapon. This Blue Steel Mark I star would not require very much development cost - perhaps about £2 million.

The Minister commented that we had not yet actually placed an order for Blue Steel Mark I and the Prime Minister asked that this should be looked into.

BOMBER FORCE

The Prime Minister asked the Minister of Defence to consider whether we had any plans with the Americans for the sharing of bombs, should the situation deteriorate. At present he understood that we had more aircraft available than bombs and the Americans had more bombs than aircraft.

POLARIS AND M.R.B.M.

It now appeared that the Americans wanted to sell some missile like Polaris to European countries and have this controlled by SACEUR (which might in practice mean by the President of the United States). This of course

*mtg at Birch Grove House  
June 13, 1960  
Prem 11 (3713)*

uld lead to a dangerous situation unless all the countries which had this weapon were completely trustworthy.

The Minister of Defence said that Mr. Gates was exceptionally keen on this so-called European M.R.B.M. project and we should have to take this into account in any decision that we reached on this general question.

Sir Solly Zuckerman thought that a European M.R.B.M. or NATO M.R.B.M. was a misconceived project. It was giving a strategic weapon to an organisation which was designed to deal with the tactical situation and the political control over which was woolly and diffuse. It was misguided to suppose that nuclear weapons could be used on interdiction targets.

*Is this problem too much or too little nuclear?*

The Minister of Defence said that we had in fact supported the NATO M.R.B.M. at the last NATO meeting on military grounds as something to take the place of the Tactical Air Force. The Prime Minister thought this did not necessarily commit us to supporting the project.

The immediate issue was the American request to base Polaris submarines in the Gaerloch. There were a number of important points that arose in this connection:-

(a) Siting

Gaerloch was very close to a large industrial conglomeration and to a heavy centre of population. Was it really acceptable to have nuclear-propelled ships and nuclear armed weapons in such a harbour.

6/13/62  
6/13/6

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6/28/60

This document was considered at COS(60) 35<sup>th</sup> Meeting

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CIRCULATED FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF

DP(60)63(Final)

UK EYES ONLY

26th August, 1960

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

JOINT PLANNING STAFF

NATO STRATEGY

Report by the Joint Planning Staff

Doubts which have arisen over the provision of Mid Range Ballistic Missiles and Surface-to-Surface Guided Weapons to Allied Command Europe have brought out into the open the fact that there are several fundamental aspects of the NATO strategic concept on which the United Kingdom's interpretation differs from that of the NATO military authorities. Furthermore, since this strategy was formulated, circumstances have changed in such a way as to throw doubts on its continuing validity, in at least some important respects.

2. In accordance with the instructions of the Chief of the Defence Staff, we have examined basic NATO strategy in the light of changing circumstances.

3. In preparing our report, which is at Annex, we have consulted the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence, the Joint Intelligence Staff and the Joint Administrative Planning Staff.

4. We attach at Appendix conclusions from approved JIC papers. It should be noted, however, that in none of these have the consequences of nuclear sufficiency been fully assessed.

Recommendation

5. We recommend that, if they approve our report, the Chiefs of Staff should:-

- (a) Forward it to the Minister of Defence as an expression of their views.

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UK EYES ONLY

- (b) Invite the JIC to give their views on:-
- (i) The date by which the Soviet leaders are likely to assess that nuclear sufficiency has been reached.
  - (ii) What changes may then follow in Soviet intentions.

(Signed) D.L. PG ELL-JONES  
J.P.D. GCHH  
S.J. DEVIS.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

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UK EYES ONLY

Annex to JP(60)63(Final)

NATO STRATEGY

INTRODUCTION

1. Doubts which have arisen over the provision of Mid Range Ballistic Missiles and Surface to Surface Guided Weapons to Allied Command Europe have suggested that there are several fundamental aspects of the NATO strategic concept on which the United Kingdom's interpretation differs from that of the NATO military authorities. Furthermore, since this strategy was formulated, circumstances have changed in such a way as to throw doubts on its continuing validity, in at least some important respects.

AIM

2. To examine present NATO strategy in the light of present and foreseen circumstances.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

3. Some of the terms used in our study can be variously interpreted. In order to avoid misunderstanding, the following definitions have been followed throughout the paper:-

- (a) General Deterrent. Those forces maintained by the West to deter all forms of military aggression by the USSR and/or her satellites. They include the West's strategic nuclear forces and NATO shield forces.
- (b) Strategic Nuclear Forces. Those long-range nuclear forces outside NATO control whose primary task in war would be strategic nuclear assault on Russia; i.e. Strategic Air Command, Bomber Command and certain naval strike forces. They do not include MRBM required by SACEUR for tactical tasks.
- (c) Shield Forces. Those forces assigned to SACEUR for the defence of Allied Command Europe and those naval forces required for the anti-submarine campaign and maintenance of sea communications in the NATO area.
- (d) General (Global) War. The NATO term "General War" corresponds with the United Kingdom definition of "Global War", i.e. an unrestricted conflict between the USSR and her allies on the one side and the USA and her allies on the other.
- (e) Limited War. Any international armed conflict short of global war. In this study, however, to avoid begging the question, this term has not been taken to include minor incidents or small-scale conventional aggressions of a localized nature which might occur in the Allied Command Europe area.
- (f) Pre-emptive Attack. An unrestricted attack, including the use of strategic nuclear forces, launched by one side to forestall a possible attack by the other.

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UK EYES ONLY

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Annex (Continued)

- (g) Nuclear Sufficiency. The possession by both sides of sufficient nuclear weapons, together with the necessary means of delivery, to inflict unacceptable damage on each other.
- (h) Mid Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM). A ballistic missile weapon system with a range bracket of approximately 500 to 1500 nautical miles.

PRESENT NATO STRATEGY

The Political Directive

4. The Political Directive<sup>o</sup> to the NATO military authorities assesses that the Soviet leaders would not deliberately embark upon general nuclear war as long as they believed that the West would devastate the USSR with nuclear weapons. It accepts, however, the possibility of war by miscalculation from a faulty Soviet appreciation of Western intentions. In this context it recognizes the possibility of Soviet general or local attacks with conventional weapons if Russian leaders estimated that NATO would not use nuclear weapons or defend itself against all types of limited aggression.

5. The Directive therefore requires a fully effective nuclear retaliatory force to be maintained and protected for NATO defence and as a major deterrent to Soviet aggression. Taking the role of this force into account, the land, sea and air forces available to NATO are to be designed to defend NATO territory and to meet all the following requirements:-

- (a) To keep confidence in the military effectiveness of the NATO defence organization and thereby to contribute to the deterrent to aggression, and to prevent external intimidation.
- (b) To deal with incidents such as infiltrations, incursions or hostile local actions by the Soviets or by satellites with or without overt or covert Soviet support.
- (c) To identify Soviet or satellite aggression (on land, sea or air).
- (d) To deal with armed aggression other than that referred to in (b) above in accordance with a "forward strategy" counting on the use of nuclear weapons at the outset, and to sustain operations, without any intention of making a major withdrawal, until the strategic counter-offensive has achieved its objective.
- (e) To protect and maintain sea communications as required in support of the above missions.

<sup>o</sup> C-N(56)158(Final)

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UK EYES ONLY

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UK EYES ONLY

Annex (Continued)

6. The shield forces are required to be able to respond quickly to any type of aggression, with nuclear weapons should the situation so require. They must also be able to deal with the situations envisaged in paragraph 5(b) above without necessarily having recourse to nuclear weapons.

7. The Directive acknowledges that certain N.T.O countries have defence commitments outside N.T.O which will need to be harmonized with the primary need to protect the N.T.O area, and also recognizes the economic aspects of defence and the necessity for N.T.O countries to maintain their economic stability.

The Overall Strategic Concept

8. The overall Strategic Concept\* formulated within the framework of this Political Directive is to confront the potential aggressor with N.T.O forces which are so organized, disposed, trained and equipped that he will estimate the chances of a favourable decision as too small to be acceptable, and conclude that fatal risks would be involved if he launched or supported an armed attack.

9. The chief object is laid down as being to prevent war by creating an effective deterrent to aggression. The principal elements of the deterrent are stated to be adequate nuclear and other ready forces and the manifest determination to retaliate against any aggressor with all available forces, including nuclear weapons.

10. In preparation for a general war, should one be forced on N.T.O, it is held that N.T.O must:-

- (a) First ensure the ability to carry out an instant and devastating nuclear counter-offensive by all available means and develop the capability to absorb and survive the enemy's onslaught.
- (b) Concurrently, develop the ability to use land, sea and air forces for defence of the territories and sea areas of N.T.O as far forward as possible to maintain the integrity of the N.T.O area, counting on the use of nuclear weapons from the outset.
- (c) Finally, be prepared for a period of reorganization, rehabilitation and the assembly of residual resources to accomplish the remaining necessary military tasks leading to an end to the fighting.
- (d) Throughout, protect and maintain sea communications as required in support of the above tasks.

11. A general war is foreseen as dividing itself logically into two main phases:-

"Phase I. A period of violent large scale organized fighting of a comparatively short duration, not likely to exceed 30 days, the first few days of which would be characterized by the greatest intensity of nuclear exchange.

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Annex (Continued)

"Phase II. A longer period of indeterminate duration for reorganization, resupply and the accomplishment of necessary military tasks leading to a conclusion of the war"

"There is, however, likely to be no such clear division between phases in the war at sea, where anti-submarine operations are likely to continue for an indeterminate period ..... in support of the above tasks".

12. There being a strong possibility that the nuclear exchange would preclude large scale sustained combat operations, priority is given to the provision of forces-in-being capable of contributing effectively to success in the initial phase.

13. In addition to preparations for a general war, NATO is required to be ready to react instantly and in appropriate strength to hostile local actions without necessarily having recourse to nuclear weapons. Should the Russians become involved in a local hostile action and seek to broaden its scope or prolong it, it is foreseen that the situation would call for the use of all weapons and forces at NATO's disposal since in no case is there a NATO concept of limited war with the USSR.

Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept

14. The measures<sup>o</sup> laid down to guide major NATO commanders and member nations in making their plans state the primary task of their forces in the event of general war to be: "to retaliate immediately with nuclear weapons from the outset and to contain the enemy's onslaught without any intention to make a major withdrawal". The following specific measures are detailed:-

"(a) Nuclear Retaliatory Measures. Fully effective nuclear retaliatory forces of all services ..... capable of the destruction of an aggressor in any circumstances, must be maintained and protected. Effective implementation procedures must be provided that will ensure the availability of nuclear weapons at the outset of hostilities. Of equal importance ..... is the manifest determination to employ them from the outset of general war.

(b) Shield Forces Measures. In addition to our nuclear retaliatory measures, our land, sea and air forces must be developed also to respond immediately to the task of defending the sea areas and NATO territories as far forward as possible in order to maintain the integrity of the NATO area, counting on the use of their nuclear weapons at the outset. We must have the ability to continue these operations in combination with the nuclear counter-offensive until the ability and will of the enemy to pursue general war has been destroyed."

NATO Interpretation of the Strategic Concept

15. General Norstad has stated<sup>o</sup> that with the forces available the most that could be attempted was a holding strategy and even

o MC/118/2 (Final Decision)  
o COS(56)86th Meeting

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Annex (Continued)

When the line to be held would be some way behind that which was desirable to hold. He rejected any suggestion of a "trip wire" strategy and stated that the shield force must be sufficiently strong to force the enemy to pause, think, and to make a "conscious decision" to launch a major attack, which would lead to war, or to accept the status quo. From a recent presentation<sup>x</sup> at SILPE it appears that S.CEUR sees nuclear weapons being used to "force a pause" and, if necessary, to halt any limited enemy penetration.

16. Current NATO strategy requires the shield forces to hold off a major Soviet attack at least until the full effects are felt of the strategic nuclear counter-offensive. Present operational plans envisage a major ground action being fought mainly along the line of the river Moser and taking the form largely of a battle of attrition which might last for upwards of 7 days. It is also a prolonged anti-submarine campaign is foreseen. Specific forces are called for both to conduct operations during the initial phase of global war and to protect shipping during the subsequent re-supply phase.

17. It is recognized within NATO that the attempt to implement all aspects of the strategic concept has resulted in shortcomings in units and equipment, including those required for the vital deterrent and first phase forces. These deficiencies have been analysed in Annual Reviews and the NATO Council has been informed<sup>6</sup> that they unacceptably reduce the ability of the Supreme Commanders to carry out their tasks and missions.

DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING NATO STRATEGY

18. The present NATO strategic concept was formulated at a time when the United States had overwhelming nuclear superiority. Since then conditions have changed and are continuing to change. The principal developments are discussed below.

Weapon Development

19. The outstanding development has been the number of nuclear warheads now possessed by both East and West. The next decade will be marked by the possession by both sides of a relative abundance of missiles of widely varying range, from ICBM carrying megaton warheads to short range weapons of sub-kiloton yield. Surface-to-air guided weapons have been developed to a stage at which present aircraft and cruise-type missiles are highly vulnerable to a well-organized defensive system, and this development has also created a demand for the partial replacement of tactical strike aircraft by MRBM. The most important consequences of these developments is that for the first time continental North America will be exposed to direct Soviet attack, both by ICBM and by shorter-range missiles launched from submarines. Thus the original concept of deterrence of Soviet aggression by threat of strategic nuclear retaliation with nuclear weapons has come into question, it being claimed that, as both sides face the possibility of nuclear devastation, a state of mutual deterrence has come about.

x COS 837/28/6/60  
S: AG 39/11

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UK EYES ONLY

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UK EYES ONLY

Annex (Continued)

20. The conclusions we draw from all the developments over the last few years are that:-

- (a) The consequences of global war now demand, more than ever before, the avoidance of any avoidable risk of starting it; the West can therefore no longer afford to place such complete reliance on the use of nuclear weapons from the outset.
- (b) Political restrictions which may be placed on the tactical use of nuclear weapons will mean that their possession will not lessen dependence upon conventional weapons to the extent that may once have been expected.
- (c) The strategic nuclear forces must in future have a reasonable pre-launch as well as in-flight invulnerability if they are to remain a credible part of the general deterrent; that is, they must have the ability to inflict unacceptable damage on the enemy even after a pre-emptive or surprise attack on themselves.

Nuclear Sufficiency

21. After about 1962 mutual devastation must result from a strategic nuclear exchange. Also, the increasing invulnerability of delivery systems will reduce the advantages which might be gained by surprise attack. It is, therefore, most unlikely that either side would think that their political aims could be achieved by initiating all-out war, at least until an effective defence against strategic nuclear attack is developed or a decisive technical break-through achieved in some other direction.

22. This consideration reinforces the primary N.A.T.O. aim of preventing war and emphasizes the importance of maintaining the credibility of the general deterrent. It is no longer valid, however, for the N.A.T.O. strategic concept to require shield forces to be able to bring global war to a successful conclusion, since the outcome of whatever operations might be possible after an all-out strategic nuclear exchange is irrelevant to all that N.A.T.O. seeks to preserve.

Dangers of Escalation

23. S.C.EUR's forces are equipped with nuclear weapons which, in accordance with the present N.A.T.O. concept, may be used at the outset to fulfil his tasks, though in certain circumstances there is an implied intention to resort to them only when conventional weapons have failed. In this context we have considered the alternatives of a Soviet attack in Europe with nuclear weapons and one with conventional weapons alone. In the first case there is no question but that S.C.EUR would have to respond with nuclear weapons from the outset, and indeed such a contingency would only be likely to arise as part of a deliberate attack on the West, including the use of strategic nuclear weapons. If, on the other hand, the Soviets were to challenge the Western deterrent by making a conventional attack in Europe for limited aims, the use of nuclear weapons at any stage by N.A.T.O. forces could not but introduce the risk of escalation to global war.

20a → risk must  
be avoided hence  
NW's not to be  
introduced if just  
conv - ce n/a

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Annex (Continued)

*so a bluff strategy*

24. This does not mean that N.A.T.O. forces should not be equipped with nuclear weapons; on the contrary, the deterrent partly depends for its credibility on the enemy's assessment of the risk of escalation that would arise from their use in any given circumstances. Strict measures of control will, however, clearly be necessary, which will be complicated if SACEUR is allowed to have weapons such as MRBM for "tactical" use.

*MRBM would undermine a bl/VAA strategy*

Limited War

25. It may be argued that the circumstances discussed above cast doubt on the N.A.T.O. doctrine that there can be no limited war in Europe, and that the Soviets might deduce that the Western nuclear powers would be prepared to accept a large scale conventional war in Europe rather than face general nuclear war. We consider that for N.A.T.O. to appear to be preparing to fight only with conventional weapons, would encourage Soviet doubts about the Western will to use the nuclear deterrent forces and would invite aggression on Soviet terms. Moreover, apart from the effect on N.A.T.O. morale of the abandonment of tactical nuclear weapons, the provision of conventional forces strong enough to defeat those which the Soviets could bring to bear would, in present circumstances, be likely to be quite unacceptable to N.A.T.O. countries on economic and political grounds. Nevertheless, the dangers of escalation make it desirable for N.A.T.O. to be equipped to fight, at least initially, with conventional weapons alone, if only on a scale sufficient to deal with minor incursions or to delay a major aggression.

Effect on N.A.T.O. Strategy

26. We believe that these changed conditions affect the NATO Strategic Concept to the extent that:-

- (a) The need to prevent war becomes of even greater importance.
- (b) The concept of a shield force which is able, even after a strategic nuclear exchange, to maintain territorial integrity and sustain operations until the will and ability of the enemy to pursue global war is destroyed, is no longer valid.

UNITED KINGDOM PERO. ON TO N.A.T.O. STRATEGY

27. From the foregoing we deduce the following principles:-

- (a) N.A.T.O. should direct its defence planning and apportion its effort primarily to deterring any form of aggression by the USSR and its satellites rather than to building up a capacity to continue to fight a war after a strategic nuclear exchange.
- (b) It is unrealistic for N.A.T.O. to plan to maintain sufficient forces to be able to resist a large scale Russian attack without resorting to the use of nuclear weapons.
- (c) Nevertheless N.A.T.O. should maintain shield forces sufficiently strong to demonstrate to the Soviets that they cannot hope to obtain objectives by conventional means unless they are prepared to overcome substantial resistance and accept that, if necessary, nuclear

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Annex (Continued)

weapons would be used by the West despite the attendant risk of escalation to global war.

*Shirley can't  
get out the  
way*

(b) and (c) are compatible with the present NATO concept; (a) is under examination at the United Kingdom's instigation.

Deterrence

28. For preventing war NATO must depend ultimately upon the strategic nuclear forces of the general deterrent, while taking every measure to avoid having to use them. As we have shown, the credibility of the strategic nuclear component of the general deterrent will depend on:-

- (a) A reasonable degree of pre-launch and in-flight invulnerability.
- (b) Our manifest determination to use these forces, if necessary, in defence of our vital interests.

Since these strategic nuclear forces are outside the control of NATO we do not consider them further in this study. But within NATO it is equally important to maintain the credibility in Soviet eyes of the general deterrent and, if possible, to increase that credibility. One obvious way to achieve this is by maintaining effective NATO shield forces which can be seen to be capable of resisting aggression. We discuss below the detailed functions and possible composition of these forces.

Function of the Shield Forces

29. The military purposes for which shield forces are now required are more complex than they were before nuclear weapons became available in quantity to both sides. While there is no evidence that the Russians are considering open military aggression in Europe - and indeed such action is considered very unlikely at present - we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that, under conditions of nuclear sufficiency, they might contemplate undertaking conventional operations with limited objectives in the hope of presenting the West with a fait accompli, and in the belief that the West lacked the determination to use nuclear weapons. They might instigate such aggression through the agency of a satellite country. Alternatively, if Soviet forces were involved, operations might be so controlled that withdrawal would be possible without unacceptable loss of face. Any failure by NATO to react firmly and promptly to aggression of this nature would encourage the Soviets to undertake further adventures, possibly larger in scale. To meet such aggression, and in order to keep war limited to something less than global, it may be argued that NATO should keep sufficient conventional forces to resist conventional aggression, whatever the scale. The Germans, for example, who will have an increasing voice in NATO, have specifically stated that the alliance must be prepared for every possible type and length of military conflict. The geographical position of Germany makes this view understandable. However, this would imply the provision of forces of the order of the Lisbon force goals, which NATO countries have already rejected and are unlikely to be prepared to afford in peacetime.

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1 JIC(59)69(Final)

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Annex (Continued)

30. The other extreme would be to maintain the bare minimum of shield forces capable of doing no more than provide proof of Soviet aggression, which would result, after due warning, in the inevitable launching of the Western strategic nuclear forces. Although this idea was tenable when the West had overwhelming nuclear superiority, in conditions of nuclear sufficiency the Soviets may doubt the determination of the individual N.T.O. nations to face total devastation as the price of resistance to limited aggression. The shield forces must therefore be able to do more than merely provide proof of Soviet aggression.

*trip wire  
obsolete*

31. We consider therefore that the practical solution must lie between these extremes; a shield of conventional forces backed by a tactical nuclear capability is still required as an essential part of the general deterrent. The size of these shield forces would be determined by the requirements to:-

- (a) Counter intimidation on the borders of the N.T.O. area.
- (b) Identify aggression on whatever scale.
- (c) Deal immediately with infiltration or small-scale conventional aggression without necessarily having recourse to nuclear weapons.
- (d) Be capable of resisting and delaying a larger scale conventional attack, using at least tactical nuclear weapons if the attack were persisted in. This would both make clear to the Russians that such an attack might escalate to global war and give the West time for making the necessary decisions.

32. The original concept of maintaining territorial integrity in Europe until the overwhelming nuclear forces of the West devastated the Russian homeland and the USSR collapsed led logically to the doctrine that the shield forces must be able to hold a major Soviet land attack. The successful conduct of this indefinite holding battle has therefore been accorded priority in operational planning of the shield forces and has largely dictated the deployment of the land forces in ACE. With the attainment of nuclear sufficiency, however, the nuclear destructive power which would be released by both sides in such circumstances would completely overshadow the effects of all other operations and make their eventual outcome largely irrelevant. We therefore consider that there is no requirement for the shield forces to be capable of fighting a prolonged major land campaign nor to hold a major Soviet land assault until the full effects of the strategic nuclear exchange are felt, particularly as neither of these capabilities would contribute to the deterrent value of the shield forces. The only requirement which is militarily, as opposed to psychologically justified is a capacity to resist and delay attack long enough to enable the West to launch the strategic nuclear forces.

*Airward  
defense  
obsolete*

33. The possible effects of a revised NATO strategy on the naval component of the shield forces are discussed in paragraphs 40 - 45 below.

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Annex (Continued)

Composition of the Shield Forces in ACE

34. Clearly it will be very difficult to assess precisely the size of the forces required to fulfil the roles set out above. This is a NATO problem which the United Kingdom cannot solve in isolation. There is no doubt, however, that, whatever their size, the shield forces should be more mobile and more flexible than they are at present. They must be capable of resisting and delaying attacks of varying scale, but only for some considerably shorter period than that envisaged in the present concept - perhaps a matter of days against large scale aggression in the centre; perhaps longer against small scale incursions on the flanks. If our general concept is accepted in NATO, detailed study by local Commanders should lead to revised force goals, following the established NATO procedures.

35. On the composition of these forces we would suggest the following as a basis for examination:-

- (a) Reconnaissance Screen. This would be a ground force acting in conjunction with national frontier forces. It need only be of sufficient strength to ensure adequate frontier surveillance and quick reaction to any form of aggression. A nuclear capability would not be necessary.
- (b) Mobile Support Forces. These forces would be composed of battle formations of all arms, probably organized in brigade groups or divisions according to local conditions. They would have the tasks of dealing with small conventional aggression, without necessarily using nuclear weapons, and of resisting and delaying a major land invasion, using all weapons including nuclear ones. These forces must be capable of giving immediate support to the reconnaissance screen.
- (c) Nuclear Strike Forces. These would consist of the tactical air forces and associated missile units necessary for the support of the Mobile Forces referred to in (b) above. The main requirements would be quick reaction time, best possible pre-launch invulnerability and capability of striking targets appropriate to the scale of attack and the probable duration of operations. Specifically we can see no justification for the inclusion of IRBMs in these forces; not only would their use be unlikely to be sanctioned before strategic retaliation were authorized, but, in the limited task that our concept allots to the shield forces, their use would not be likely to influence the eventual outcome decisively.
- (d) Mobile Central Reserve. This force should be air transportable and should possess a nuclear capability; it might include tactical air support. Such a force is, in our view, necessary to support operations in areas where normal defence deployment may be thin, e.g. on the flanks. The development of such a force conforms with SACREB's present plans for an international mobile land force.

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Annex (Continued)

- (e) Command Structure. Should the proposed reorganization of the forces outlined above be adopted, the present command structure may require revision though highly centralized control of nuclear weapons will continue to be necessary. It is possible that the present chain of Headquarters might be reduced.

Provision of Nuclear Weapons for the Shield Forces

36. The scale of provision of nuclear weapons for the shield forces is a most difficult problem. The complete lack of any precedent for the tactical employment of nuclear weapons, and the political, ethical and psychological problems associated with them, make it difficult to formulate even a strictly military policy in this field. However, it is clear that nuclear weapons are necessary for the shield forces as much to demonstrate the effectiveness of those forces to the Russians, as to enable them, in fact, to perform their tasks. The requirement will vary from missiles to replace SACUR's vulnerable manned aircraft - though excluding any for tasks which are not likely to have a significant and timely effect on the outcome of the battle in the more limited circumstances we envisage - to low-yield weapons applicable directly to the battlefield.

IMPLICATIONS ON NATO FORCES

Readiness

37. Our new concept in no way questions the existing NATO assumption concerning the warning period that will probably be available before hostilities begin; nor does it change the current NATO requirement for the necessary shield forces to be kept at an effective state of manning and readiness.

Logistic Support

38. Level of Backing. The logistic backing required to support this concept of the shield forces could be much lower than the present 90 days required by NATO. To give precise levels would require detailed study. With a lower scale of logistic backing, dispersion would be important to ensure survival of adequate stocks. Some reduction in the size of the repair organization, infrastructure and administrative backing generally should also be possible.

39. Organization. We see the need for units and formations to be more self-contained logistically than at present, and for improved mobility and flexibility in the supply system. At first sight an integrated logistic system on a NATO basis would seem to be needed. However, because of the considerable practical difficulties, the United Kingdom view is that this is unlikely to be feasible. This being so, continuing development of the present organization to achieve greater mutual logistic support should go a considerable way towards meeting the requirements of our concept.

Effect on ACLANT Forces and the Far at Sea

40. The NATO Strategic Concept states that the Allied strategic objective in the North Atlantic is to establish and maintain

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Annex (Continued)

control of the area and its sea and air communications in support of the overall strategy. No clear division is envisaged, however, between phases in the pattern of war at sea, where anti-submarine operations are likely to continue for an indeterminate period. The naval tasks include contributions to the deterrent forces, both in the nuclear strike role and as part of the shield forces.

41. Seaborne Nuclear Strike Forces. The proportion of the long range nuclear strikes provided by the carrier strike forces and missile submarines is at present small. Unless there is a technical break-through, the difficulty of detecting missile submarines is likely to make them increasingly important in conditions of nuclear sufficiency - indeed there is evidence that the Soviets are sensitive to this threat - and they should continue to form an element of the West's general deterrent.

42. Anti-Submarine Forces. It is believed that, in the initial phase of global war, a large proportion of Soviet submarine strength would be directed against the carrier strike forces. It follows therefore that, so long as they continue to be a valid part of the deterrent, strong anti-submarine forces are required for their defence. The detection of submarine deployment in a period of tension could be an important indicator of Soviet war preparations, and to exploit this other anti-submarine forces are required to detect and counter Soviet submarines in the transit areas. The conduct of an early transit offensive is a fundamental part of the successful prosecution of all aspects of the anti-submarine war. Forces are also required to ensure the safe passage of shipping, primarily in any period before a nuclear exchange.

43. The Second Phase. We have already emphasized that, in our planning, operations after the strategic nuclear exchange should be accorded no significance. This will also apply to the war at sea. The emphasis that should be placed on the provision of naval forces for Phase II depends almost entirely on the need to support the morale of NATO by showing that some resupply is planned and possible.

44. Minor Aggression at Sea. The present NATO concept does not take specifically into account the possibility of minor action with limited objectives at sea. Presumably, as on land, the Soviets could use their naval forces for limited action at sea. Theoretically, at least, such action might have many attractions to the Soviets, being flexible in its application and entirely in keeping with their economic policy. While it might initially only take the form of minor interference with allied shipping, it might well lead to dangerous developments if the West were seen to be patently unprepared. The naval component of the shield forces should therefore retain a capability to meet such action.

45. Force Requirements. The numbers of strike carriers and missile submarines must be related to their potential contribution to the general deterrent. The anti-submarine forces should consist of those required to carry out the tasks mentioned above. In addition, some minesweeping capability is required. Because of the probable effects of the strategic nuclear exchange the NATO reserve forces should consist only of those ships which can

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Annex (Continued)

be made operational within the likely warning period.

Implications for United Kingdom Forces

46. BAOR. The need to be able to react immediately to any aggression would require, as does the present NATO concept, that BAOR be maintained at all times as an effective force-in-being. Hitherto, however, the United Kingdom has in practice assumed a seven-day warning period to provide essential reinforcements. This could hardly be acceptable to NATO under the new concept. On the assumption that the United Kingdom would make a contribution to the reconnaissance screen as well as to both the mobile support force and the central reserve, there would certainly have to be some re-organization. Deployment in this way could not but mean a reduction in the scale of amenities, at least initially, and would have considerable financial and possibly recruiting implications.

47. Air Forces. So long as our contribution takes the form of manned aircraft and we do not have to provide SRBM units on the continent, no new implications are likely to arise beyond the manning problem already posed by SACEUR's introduction of quick-reaction states of readiness. The air forces will, however, be faced with serious manning problems in bringing the front-line units up to strength without reliance on post D-day reinforcements.

48. Naval Forces. The concept advocated in this paper does not recognize the need for forces to be specifically earmarked for any phase of global war after a nuclear exchange, though such naval forces as survive would clearly continue to fight and support whatever resupply proved possible. So far as United Kingdom naval forces are concerned, the policy of maintaining only those reserve forces which can be made operational within the likely warning period, or which are needed for other national purposes, remains valid. In view of the likely loss of shore base facilities, increased importance will be attached to afloat support.

THE PRESENTATION OF UNITED KINGDOM VIEWS TO NATO

49. The basic NATO documents are capable of varied interpretation. Those aspects of the strategic concept which emphasize the need to deter war are still valid and of supreme importance. If, however, our concept outlined above is accepted, there is no longer a requirement for NATO military forces to be able to bring a global war to a successful conclusion, nor would we claim to be planning to preserve the territorial integrity of NATO countries in such a war. Furthermore, NATO can no longer afford to place such complete reliance on the use of nuclear weapons from the outset of any hostilities as is implied in NATO documents. The strategy we have propounded amounts to a requirement to maintain and strengthen the credibility of the general deterrent and to maintain a quick and flexible response to any form of aggression without necessarily resorting immediately to nuclear weapons.

50. We of course recognize that, for differing reasons, our views are liable to provoke the suspicion, and possibly the active opposition, of the French, the Germans, the Americans and SACEUR personally. We must therefore take every care to present our views as a logical and realistic concept arising out of changed

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Annex (Continued)

circumstances which necessitate revision of basic NATO documents and strategy. The papers which the Minister of Defence has tabled in the North Atlantic Council has already given an indication of United Kingdom views. The burden of defence on NATO countries is so great that any suggestion for a more effective use of available resources should be welcome. Above all we must bear in mind the great psychological importance to our continental NATO allies of the Shield and must avoid any suspicion that our concept masks a loss of interest in the territorial integrity of Europe and a possible intention to withdraw our forces. It is important, therefore, in presenting our views to NATO, that the European nations are not given the impression of any impending reduction in United Kingdom involvement on the Continent or that the ultimate fate of Europe; particularly in the survival and rehabilitation phases, is not important.

CONCLUSIONS

51. With the coming of nuclear sufficiency, all-out nuclear war is no longer justifiable as the West's only reaction to minor aggressive acts.
52. In these conditions the prevention of war is of even greater importance than before and it is more than ever essential that the Russians should have no doubt that any aggressive act would be resisted and would carry the risk of escalation to global war.
53. To maintain the credibility of the deterrent the strategic nuclear forces of the West must have the ability to inflict unacceptable damage on the enemy even after a surprise attack on themselves.
54. The concept of shield forces which are able, even after a strategic nuclear exchange, to maintain territorial integrity or continue operations to a successful conclusion is no longer sustainable.
55. Short of this concept the shield forces should be able to:-
  - (a) Counter intimidation on the borders of the NATO area.
  - (b) Identify aggression, whatever the scale.
  - (c) Deal immediately with infiltration or small-scale conventional aggression, without necessarily having recourse to nuclear weapons.
  - (d) Resist and delay a larger scale conventional attack, using at least tactical nuclear weapons if the attack is persisted in, thus making clear to the Russians that such an attack might escalate to global war.
56. There is no military requirement for the shield forces to be able to fight a prolonged major land campaign or to hold a major Soviet land assault until the full effects of the strategic nuclear exchange are felt. Specifically there is no military requirement for

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Annex (Concluded)

the provision of MRBMs in ACE. Should the enemy use nuclear weapons the shield forces would of course resist with all the means at their disposal for as long as possible.

57. The NATO requirement for shield forces to be maintained at an effective state of manning and readiness remains.

58. The logistic backing for NATO forces is likely to be much lower than the present 90 day requirement.

Naval Forces

59. Naval shield forces should have the following roles:-

- (a) Provision of a contribution to the strategic nuclear forces. In this role missile submarines are likely to become increasingly important in the absence of a technical break-through.
- (b) Conduct of anti-submarine operations:-
  - (i) To detect submarine deployment in a period of tension.
  - (ii) To ensure the safe passage of shipping, primarily in any period before a nuclear exchange.
  - (iii) To defend the carrier strike forces.
- (c) Countering any minor action at sea.

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Appendix to JP(60)63(Final)

PROBABLE SOVIET POLICY UP TO 1970

The following conclusions concerning Soviet policy have been drawn by the JIS from approved JIC papers\*:-

- (a) Throughout the next decade Soviet policies will continue to be directed towards spreading Soviet influence and Communism throughout the world, preferably by means short of war, and Soviet conduct in any given situation will be guided by consideration of what course of action is most likely to make progress towards this basic aim.
- (b) Because of their recognition of the calamitous results of global war the Soviet leaders are unlikely to start such a war as a deliberate act of policy.
- (c) There is a danger of war as a result of political miscalculation between the Soviet Union and the West or possibly as a result of incorrect appreciation by one side that an attack had been launched. It is believed that the Soviet leaders are aware of this danger, will avoid situations which carry this risk of global war and will be very cautious about embarking on any direct military action anywhere except within the Soviet bloc. Nevertheless, at present Berlin remains a potential cause of war.
- (d) If hostilities did break out between the Soviet bloc and Western forces in Europe they would not remain limited.

\* Inter alia. JIC(59)80(Final)(Revise)  
JIC(59)63(Final)

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Annex to JP(60)72(Final)

MID-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES IN ACEBrief for discussions with General NorstadTHE SHAPE REQUIREMENT

1. The revised SHAPE requirement<sup>2</sup> of October 1959 stated a requirement for a ballistic missile weapons system to counteract the increasing vulnerability of ACE tactical aircraft and cruise-type missiles. The requirement is for a range bracket of 300 to 1500 nautical miles and the initial bid was for 300 missiles. SHAPE require the system to be operational in 1963 and would accept a phased programme providing for the deployment of about 80 missiles in 1963, a further 100 in 1964 and 120 more in 1965. SHAPE also consider that the final requirement might be in the region of 1000 missiles, although the exact number would depend on whether improved missiles become available after 1965.

THE UNITED KINGDOM POSITIONBackground

2. As a result of a conversation with the Secretary General, SACEUR recently gave a presentation to the North Atlantic Council on the military aspects of MRBM. From a preliminary telegram<sup>3</sup> from Sir Frank Roberts and a subsequent report of the presentation, the following points emerge:-

- (a) SACEUR's atomic strike forces were necessary for situations other than total war, e.g. in order to force a halt on an enemy penetration.
- (b) Soviet offensive capability would increase greatly by 1963; NATO weapons systems must be improved correspondingly to match the threat.
- (c) Some 300 fixed airfields and control centre targets, mostly within 900 miles of central Germany, would have to be neutralized if the NATO forces were attacked.
- (d) Existing aircraft and missiles were inadequate for this task, and POLARIS would be the best weapon available in 1963-5.
- (e) 300 missiles was not a final figure but merely General Norstad's estimate of a point on the requirements curve which matched the production possibilities of POLARIS.
- (f) A "one-for-one" substitution of aircraft by missiles was not always valid but there was no question of inflating demands for both. Aircraft displaced would be dropped or used for other roles within MC 70.

@ AG 6440/1 RANDP of 13 Oct, 1959  
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3. The United Kingdom has already agreed<sup>2</sup> that, under the present NATO concept, SACUR has a requirement on military grounds for MRBm, with the qualification that they are given the highest possible degree of mobility and hence of pre-launch invulnerability. Doubts have however been expressed concerning the proposed numbers and military value. They may be summarized as follows:-

- (a) Manned aircraft can reconnoitre, use Ha and small-yield weapons and engage opportunity targets; they can therefore be used in the identification and pause stage. MRBm cannot.
- (b) MRBm if used are more likely to precipitate the strategic nuclear exchange.

Furthermore, unlike aircraft, missiles once launched cannot be recalled.

4. On the other hand, missiles are less vulnerable in flight and are unaffected by weather (although aircraft of the TSR 2 type will also operate irrespective of weather) and, generally speaking therefore, may be considered to be more reliable for attacking certain fixed and predetermined targets.

5. To challenge SACUR's quantitative requirement for missiles an examination of his current target list would be necessary. The Air Ministry, under separate terms of reference<sup>3</sup>, has already been invited to make this examination. We understand, however, that owing to lack of specific target information the Air Ministry has not been able to reach a satisfactory conclusion. Without access to SACUR's detailed target information, therefore, it is not possible to put forward a reasoned argument against SACUR's figures. Nevertheless the following factors are relevant to the problem and could usefully be discussed with General Norstad.

Deterrent Value of MRBm in ACE

6. It would appear (paragraph 2(a) above) that SACUR intends to use MRBm "to force a halt on an enemy penetration". We have already stated<sup>4</sup> that, from the United Kingdom point of view, it is inconceivable that MRBm would be used except concurrently with, or after, strategic nuclear attack, that the whole proposal is a waste of money and that, whatever operations take place in conditions of global war, apart from the strategic nuclear exchange, it will be largely irrelevant. While this may be true in the event, it is misleading in that it could carry the implication that the NATO shield forces have no role to play. We consider that the Soviets will be aware that the Western long range nuclear forces must be, in the main, committed to the offensive against targets in the Soviet hinterland and that operations in the ACE tactical area are likely to be the sole concern of ACE forces. Thus, MRBm should be provided to ACE in sufficient numbers to maintain the credibility of the shield forces as a deterrent.

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Draft.

Letter to:-

Lord Gladwyn,  
GCMG, GCVO, CB.

From:-

Secretary of  
State

Letter despatched by  
Private Secretary's Dept.

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Thank you for your letter of May 30.

I am sorry that your earlier letter of March 17 was never acknowledged. In fact I had not seen it myself before.

As regards the specific questions which you ask, one of the main difficulties in the way of our helping the French to produce a bomb of their own lies, as you know, in our agreement with the Americans. We could not provide the French with the information they need without passing on to them a good deal of American know-how. We would not be prepared to do this without the agreement of the Americans and at present there seems no likelihood of the Americans being prepared to give their agreement.

It may of course be that a situation will arise in which the Americans would be prepared to agree to our passing on information, including information derived from American sources to the French. In that case we might be prepared to do so and thus help the French to make a bomb of their own. Whether or not we would in fact be prepared to act in this way would naturally depend to a large extent upon our relations

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with the French and here we would obviously be greatly influenced by the attitude of the French at the time to the question of the Sixes and Sevens and the U.K.'s economic relationship with the Common Market.

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- 3 -

9. We were also told at this Exercise that SACEUR required missiles "to hit those targets which pose the most direct threat to his plans"; and we were shown maps which indicate that these targets extend all the way from Eastern Germany, through Poland, deep into Russia. We were told, too, that steps had been taken to integrate SACEUR's target plan with that of S.A.C. and R.A.F. Bomber Command.

10. SACEUR's missiles are, in general, designed for "interdiction targets". More specifically, we were told that they would be directed against (i) the enemy's "atomic centres", (ii) centres of communication, (iii) centres of control, and (iv) air fields. We were also told that "each major commander would have a supply of these nuclear weapons which he could use at his discretion", authority being delegated automatically in the event of hostilities ever breaking out. The missiles would be held at five-minute readiness, and would be despatched, presumably in batches, against their pre-determined targets as soon as SACEUR gave the word.

11. In so far as they have been clearly stated, the military rationale for this policy is as follows:-

- (a) We have moved into a missile and nuclear age, and if SACEUR is to be up-to-date in his weapons systems, he must dispose of missiles with nuclear heads.
- (b) Aircraft are going to become increasingly vulnerable to active ground defences, and, therefore, need to be replaced by ballistic missiles.
- (c) Nuclear weapons are able to compensate for numerical inferiority on the ground.

12. These general concepts are so vague that it is prudent to ask whether anything deeper lies behind SACEUR's proposals. For example, if aircraft are becoming vulnerable to ground-to-air non-ballistic missiles, it does not necessarily follow that their functions can be discharged by ballistic missiles.

13. Defence strategy as summarised in Sir Frank Roberts' communication to the Foreign Secretary of the 28th June implies that our deterrent consists of three elements:-

- (i) the unity and confidence of the fifteen member countries (of NATO);
- (ii) the shield forces; and
- (iii) the retaliatory power of S.A.C. and Bomber Command, and also to a considerable extent of Allied Command Europe itself.

It is necessary to look at all of these three separately, and convenient to begin with (ii) - the shield forces.

14. As I understand it, the shield forces are there to impose a halt or pause on any penetration by the Russians beyond their present boundaries. They are not there either to initiate a major nuclear exchange, or to provoke one automatically, because of some unintended peculiarity in the military operations that might be mounted to oppose local aggression.

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FROM UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION  
TO N.A.T.O. PARIS TO  
FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET) AND  
WHITEHALL (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION

Sir F. Roberts

No. 174

D. 9.24 p.m. July 7, 1960

July 7, 1960

R. 10.07 p.m. July 7, 1960

PRIORITY

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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 174 of July 7.  
Repeated for information Saving to Washington

Guard.

My telegram No. 172: European MRBMs.

SACEUR made it clear to me this morning that this is one of the main subjects he will wish to discuss in London on July 11. He once again told me that he remained completely opposed to M. Spaak's proposal to give a special position to France because he was convinced that in the long run it would be fatal to the strength and unity of N.A.T.O. to give any special privileged position to one N.A.T.O. country. It was true that the United States and the United Kingdom to some extent already had such a position, but this dated back before the N.A.T.O. decisions of 1957 to introduce long range nuclear weapons into N.A.T.O. and the past could not be reversed. He had also strongly opposed M. Spaak's proposal because of his concern over the effects upon N.A.T.O. unity of the growing United States and United Kingdom tendency to appease General de Gaulle over tripartitism. So long as this was restricted to discreet consultation the dangers could perhaps be kept in check. But if France were with the United States and United Kingdom given a privileged position denied to all other member countries as regards United States

/assistance

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UKDEL N.A.T.O. telegram No. 17A to Foreign Office

-2-

assistance for an independent national deterrent force then tripartitism would have become such an obvious concrete reality that it might strain the Alliance to breaking point.

2. General Norstad remained convinced that his requirements for MRBMs must be met in some way or other. He realized that there might be a preference in individual N.A.T.O. countries including the United Kingdom for the United States to undertake the whole burden of providing Polaris. There was also a case which was being strongly argued by the United States Navy, no doubt with support from other navies, for the MRBM requirement to be met entirely through Polaris submarines and through other seaborne means. He would be the last to deny that United States and perhaps United Kingdom national interests required such weapons outside N.A.T.O. Equally in the last resort he would have to support a scheme under which the United States alone provided his own Polaris requirement. But he was convinced that this would mean a great weakening of the unity and sense of common purpose and responsibility between the member countries which was the main strength of N.A.T.O. Furthermore he suggested that we in the United Kingdom should reflect upon the senior danger, that, if the United States were left to provide MRBMs alone and not as part of a N.A.T.O. scheme, this would start an inevitable trend towards the "fortless America" concept. He therefore intended to continue to advocate a N.A.T.O. MRBM scheme, which he thought was also in the United Kingdom interest.

3. General Norstad also warned me that he intended to explain to the Minister of Defence why he could not regard the plan discussed with Mr. Gates, under which the United Kingdom might take 32 Polaris in two missile submarines, as a contribution to his S.H.A.P.E. requirements. He himself would have no control over submarines earmarked for SACLANT, more especially as naval forces were in any case much more loosely attached to N.A.T.O. than land or air forces. Any arrangement of this kind, which he agreed might be very desirable from the United States and United Kingdom point of view, could not be accepted as answering the requirements of Allied Command Europe.

/He pointed

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TOP SECRETUKDEL N.A.T.O. telegram No. 174 to Foreign Office

-3-

He pointed out that this was a simple matter of command structure. No commander could rely upon forces which were not even earmarked for his command.

4. General Norstad used with me some of the same arguments contained in my despatch No. 39 about the merits of a European MRBM scheme to keep Germany under control. His own position in regard to Polarises or similar weapons for Germany had been put clearly to the Chancellor, to whom he had sent a message that he would never agree to any specific arrangement prohibiting the deployment of Polarises or any other weapons on German soil. But he had equally made it plain that he had no intention whatever of advocating the stationing of Polarises in Germany.

5. I asked General Norstad when we might expect his paper on deployment. He did not directly answer this, but once again denied any intention of allotting specific numbers of Polarises to individual N.A.T.O. countries. He was thinking in terms of dividing his command into different geographical areas: for example one or more areas in the Mediterranean, where he would require X Polarises, some land-borne and seaborne; an area defined in terms of latitude and longitude in North Western Europe, comprising Eastern France, the Low Countries and part of Germany mainly west of the Rhine, in which he would want X Polarises, again with varying types of environment; and finally a mainly sea area comprising the North Sea, which might include the United Kingdom, the coastal areas of the Low Countries and Norway and Denmark. Here the Polarises could be mainly deployed in submarines and barges etc. When I suggested that the North Sea was not at present in Allied Command Europe. General Norstad said there was no reason why specified weapons such as Polarises under his command should not be stationed there. I had the impression however that these ideas were by no means crystallized.

Foreign Office please pass Saving Priority to Washington No. 272.

[Repeated as requested].

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NUMBERS AND TYPES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER SACEUR  
AND THEIR CONTROL

8 July 60

NUMBERS AND TYPES1. Means of Delivery

Details, by countries, of means of delivery of nuclear weapons held in Europe under SACEUR's control are at Annex. These figures are those which countries have undertaken to produce by the end of 1960. MC 70 force goals for 1963 are also included for comparison.

2. Nuclear weapons under SACEUR are organised into two main categories:-

- (a) Nuclear Strike Forces. These include manned aircraft and cruise type missiles with ranges of up to approximately 1,000 miles.
- (b) Ground Force Units. These include SAGW, mostly with ranges of under 100 miles, to provide support to the ground forces in the tactical battle.
- (c) Summary. A summary of the forces to meet these two requirements is below:-

| (1) <u>Nuclear Strike Forces</u> | <u>USA</u> | <u>UK</u> | <u>Others</u>   | <u>Total</u> |
|----------------------------------|------------|-----------|-----------------|--------------|
| Aircraft Squadrons               | 24         | 8         | 55 <sup>ⓐ</sup> | 87           |
| Medium Range SSM Units           | 3          | -         | 2               | 5            |

(MATADOR/MACE)

<sup>ⓐ</sup>It is not known which, if any, of these squadrons have been provided with nuclear warheads.

(ii) Short Range SSM Units

|                       |    |   |    |    |
|-----------------------|----|---|----|----|
| Range under 100 miles | 20 | 2 | 29 | 51 |
| REDSTONE (200 miles)  | 2  | - | 1  | 3  |

(d) In addition certain NIKE SAGW units will progressively be equipped with nuclear weapons.

3. Of the above the following are based in the UK but assigned to SACEUR:-

|                                |   |
|--------------------------------|---|
| RAF CANBERRA/VALIANT Squadrons | 4 |
| USAF Squadrons                 | 9 |

4. Warheads

Our information is limited to the means of delivery. National Authorities are not informed by SIAFE on the numbers and yields of the warheads, all of which are American, required to back these means of delivery. The numbers for the UK Corporal regiment can however be taken as a guide:-

|                         |                          |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1st Line<br>(with unit) | 3 missiles per launcher  |
| 2nd Line reserve        | 14 missiles per launcher |

/Maximum

|                                                                      |  |         |  |   |  |   |  |
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Maximum Yield 20 KT

CONTROL5. Custody of Warheads

All nuclear warheads for foreign assigned to SACEUR are of American manufacture and are held in peacetime in American custody ("Key of the Cupboard" system).

6. Release from Custody

Before any nuclear weapons can be used the warheads have to be released from US custody and "mated" with the means of delivery. How this is done depends on the type of weapon: the process may merely consist of the delivery by lorry of a complete nuclear bomb from a US store to an allied airfield and attaching the bomb to an aircraft; or a warhead has to be delivered from store and attached to a guided missile.

7. The rules governing the process of release and mating are embodied in bilateral agreements between the US and the ally operating the weapons.

8. The order to release warheads for mating is given by SACEUR (i.e. SACEUR in his US national capacity) on the authority of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff.

9. Planning for Use.

SACEUR was given authority in 1954 to plan for the use of nuclear weapons from the outset of hostilities. He has issued an "Atomic Strike Plan" which tells Commanders of nuclear weapon units what to do when ordered to start nuclear warfare.

10. Initiation of Nuclear Warfare

Nuclear weapons may only be employed on the "announcement by SACEUR of the outbreak of atomic warfare (R-hour)." SACEUR has made it clear in all his plans that, while he will do his best to issue a simultaneous announcement of General Alert and R-hour, they are and must be distinguished; hostilities in fact may begin (under the authority of General Alert) before nuclear weapons may be used (under R-hour).

11. Political Authority for R-hour

SACEUR has always made it clear that he will not and cannot declare R-hour without political authority. It is laid down that he may only declare General Alert by decision of the NATO Council, or with the approval of permanent representatives on behalf of their Governments. Nothing however is specified about the methods of getting political authority for R-hour.

12. So far as the UK is concerned, we recognise that general consultation with the President of the USA and the need for SACEUR to get our sanction for the use of US and UK nuclear equipped aircraft based in the UK requires that we shall have our say before R-hour can be declared.

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NUMBERS AND TYPES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER SACEUR AND THEIR CONTROL

8 JUL 1960

NUMBERS AND TYPES

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|----------------------------------|------------|-----------|-----------------|--------------|
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| Medium Range SSM Units           | 3          | -         | 2               | 5            |
| (MATADOR/MACE)                   |            |           |                 |              |

<sup>®</sup>It is not known which, if any, of these squadrons have been provided with nuclear warheads.

| (ii) <u>Short Range SSM Units</u> |    |   |    |    |
|-----------------------------------|----|---|----|----|
| Range under 100 miles             | 20 | 2 | 29 | 51 |
| REDSTONE (200 miles)              | 2  | - | 1  | 3  |

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|                                |   |
|--------------------------------|---|
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/Maximum

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12. So far as the UK is concerned, we recognise that general consultation with the President of the USA and the need for SACEUR to get our sanction for the use of US and UK nuclear equipped aircraft based in England ensures that we shall have our say before R-hour can be declared.

*This shows  
my reliance on  
Formal NATO  
procedures*

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ACE UNDER SACEUR'S OPERATIONAL CONTROL

ANNEX - Sheet 1

LAND FORCES

| COUNTRY        | TYPE OF WEAPON         |              |                                        |              |                          |              |                          |              |                              |              |                                         |              | Remarks                                                                                                          |
|----------------|------------------------|--------------|----------------------------------------|--------------|--------------------------|--------------|--------------------------|--------------|------------------------------|--------------|-----------------------------------------|--------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                | Little John Battalions |              | Lacrosse Battalions<br><i>15 miles</i> |              | Honest John (2 Launcher) |              | Honest John (4 Launcher) |              | Corporal/Sergeant Battalions |              | Redstone Battalions<br><i>200 miles</i> |              |                                                                                                                  |
|                | MC 70                  | Planned 1960 | MC 70                                  | Planned 1960 | MC 70                    | Planned 1960 | MC 70                    | Planned 1960 | MC 70                        | Planned 1960 | MC 70                                   | Planned 1960 |                                                                                                                  |
| BELGIUM        | 2                      | -            | -                                      | -            | 2                        | 2            | 1                        | 1            | 1                            | -            | -                                       | -            | Plus 1 x 8" How. Battalion.                                                                                      |
| CANADA         | 1                      | -            | -                                      | -            | 1                        | -            | -                        | -            | -                            | -            | -                                       | -            |                                                                                                                  |
| DENMARK        | 2                      | -            | -                                      | -            | -                        | 2            | 1                        | -            | -                            | -            | -                                       | -            | Plus 1 x 8" How. Battalion.                                                                                      |
| FRANCE         | 4                      | -            | 1                                      | -            | 4                        | 4            | 2                        | 2            | 2                            | 1            | 1                                       | 1            |                                                                                                                  |
| GERMANY        | 12                     | -            | 3                                      | -            | 12                       | 12           | 6                        | 3            | 6                            | -            | 1                                       | -            |                                                                                                                  |
| GREECE         | 2                      | -            | 1                                      | -            | -                        | -            | 2                        | 2            | 1                            | -            | -                                       | -            |                                                                                                                  |
| ITALY          | 3                      | -            | 1                                      | -            | -                        | -            | 2                        | 2            | 2                            | -            | -                                       | -            |                                                                                                                  |
| NETHERLANDS    | 2                      | -            | -                                      | -            | 2                        | 2            | 1                        | 1            | 1                            | 1            | -                                       | -            |                                                                                                                  |
| NORWAY         | 1                      | -            | -                                      | -            | -                        | -            | 1                        | 1            | -                            | -            | -                                       | -            |                                                                                                                  |
| TURKEY         | 4                      | -            | 2                                      | -            | -                        | -            | 4                        | 4            | 2                            | -            | 1                                       | -            | Plus 1 x 8" How. Battalion.                                                                                      |
| UNITED KINGDOM | 3                      | -            | 1                                      | -            | 3                        | -            | 1                        | (b)          | 2                            | 2(a)         | 1                                       | -            | (a) Includes 1 in UK, available in emergency.<br>(b) 3x Mixed (8" How. & Honest John) Regts. operational in '61. |
| UNITED STATES  | 5                      | -            | 6                                      | 4            | -                        | 5            | 5                        | 5            | 3                            | 8            | 5                                       | 2            | Plus 9 x 8" How. Battalion.                                                                                      |
| TOTALS         | 41                     | -            | 15                                     | 4            | 24                       | 27           | 26                       | 21           | 20                           | 12           | 9                                       | 3            |                                                                                                                  |

Note: Figures are taken from SGM-1-60 of 22nd January 1960.

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AIR FORCES - STRIKE AND SUPPORT

ANNEX - Sheet 2

| COUNTRY           | LB/FB Strike(a) |              | LB/FB Attack(c) |              | LWSF(c) |              | Remarks                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
|-------------------|-----------------|--------------|-----------------|--------------|---------|--------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                   | MC 70           | Planned 1960 | MC 70           | Planned 1960 | MC 70   | Planned 1960 |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| BELGIUM           | 1/25            | 1/25         | 3/75            | 3/75         | -       | -            | (a) Nuclear strike forces.<br>(b) Included under LB/FB Strike.<br>(c) Not specifically earmarked as nuclear strike forces but could carry nuclear weapons if necessary.<br>(d) 2 Attack aircraft carriers (each 40 strike aircraft) of US 6th Fleet are also earmarked but not assigned to SACEUR.<br>(e) Norway does not accept nuclear warheads.<br>(f) Figures are taken from SGM-1-60 of 22nd January 1960.<br><br>LB/FB - Light bomber/fighter bomber.<br><br>LWSF - Lightweight strike fighter. |
| CANADA            | 1/25            | -            | 3/75            | -            | -       | -            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| DENMARK           | 1/25            | -            | 2/50            | 3/52         | -       | -            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| FRANCE            | 2/50            | 2/36         | 3/75            | 10/204       | 6/120   | -            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| GERMANY           | 2/50            | 2/50         | 6/150           | 8/200        | 8/160   | -            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| GREECE            | 1/25            | 1/25         | 3/75            | 4/100        | -       | -            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| ITALY             | 2/50            | 2/50         | 3/75            | 3/75         | 1/20    | 1/20         |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| NETHERLANDS       | 1/25            | 1/25         | 3/75            | 3/75         | -       | -            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| NORWAY (e)        | 1/25            | -            | 2/50            | 3/75         | -       | -            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| TURKEY            | 2/50            | 2/50         | 4/100           | 7/175        | 1/20    | 1/20         |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| UNITED KINGDOM    | 8/112           | 8/104        | -               | (b)          | -       | -            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| UNITED STATES (d) | 18/429          | 24/552       | 3/75            | (b)          | -       | -            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| TOTAL             | 40/891          | 43/925       | 35/875          | 44/1031      | 16/320  | 2/40         |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |

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AIR FORCES - SSM and SAM

ANNEX - Sheet 3

| COUNTRY        | SSM (a) |              | SAM (b) |              | Remarks                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
|----------------|---------|--------------|---------|--------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                | MC 70   | Planned 1960 | MC 70   | Planned 1960 |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| BELGIUM        | -       | -            | 4       | 1            | (a) MATADOR and MACE air breathing cruise type missiles with range of up to 900 n.m.<br>(b) Some equipments may later have a nuclear head.<br>(c) Assigned to US Army.<br>(d) TURKEY and ITALY have agreed to accept JUPITER IRBM with approximate range of 1500 n.m. Not planned to be operational before 1962.<br>(e) United Kingdom does not propose to supply these units to SACEUR.<br>(f) Figures are taken from SGM-1-60 of 22nd January 1960. |
| DENMARK        | 1       | -            | 3       | -            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| FRANCE         | 1       | -            | 4       | 1            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| GERMANY        | 2       | 1            | 28      | 3            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| GREECE         | -       | -            | 2       | 1            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| ITALY (d)      | 1       | 1            | 4       | 3            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| NETHERLANDS    | 1       | -            | 4       | 1            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| NORWAY         | -       | -            | 2       | 1            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| TURKEY (d)     | -       | -            | 2       | -            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| UNITED KINGDOM | -       | -            | 4(e)    | -            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| UNITED STATES  | 3       | 3            | 10(c)   | 6            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| TOTAL          | 9       | 5            | 67      | 17           |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |

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The Prime Minister

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**RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
AND GENERAL NORSTAD AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE ON MONDAY,  
JULY 11, 1960**

General Norstad came to see me before his lunch with the Minister of Defence. He arrived 20 minutes late, therefore our discussion had to be curtailed.

I spoke first about the German application with regard to the size of ships and influence mines. I said that we were in a difficult position. I thought it very important to keep our position co-ordinated with the French. On the other hand for some weeks past, I could tell him in confidence and on a personal basis, we had been advised by our military authorities to accept the German request. The French, however, were not willing to do so, and had suggested that the new German approach with regard to the size of their naval, army and air forces, should be examined together with the proposal for larger warships and influence mines. We had doubts about that because we thought the examination of the new German proposals would take many months and in the meantime considerable German ill will would be engendered by our refusal to give a decision on the previous request. General Norstad said that he was certain it would be a grave mistake to try to insist that the previous request should await an answer until the new proposals had been examined. He said that he felt that he would be bound to write a letter to the NATO Council next Monday at the latest stating that he had asked for the views of Governments on his own proposals and had received no answer from the British and French Governments. I asked whether he objected to my communicating that information to the French Government. He said he had no objection.

He said there had been a suggestion made by the Germans that the procedure was wrong for the Germans to approach him before they approached the W.E.U. Council on matters of this sort. I said the French had made the same point to me. He said that he felt strongly that the present procedure was right, that if everything went straight to the W.E.U. Council there might be many more political difficulties for us than would arise if he were given a chance of sounding people out beforehand.

We then proceeded to discuss M.R.B.Ms. I said that I thought it important to disentangle this matter from certain other matters. For example, I thought that it had nothing to do with tripartitism. General Norstad said that he was not certain whether I was right. We must realise the anxiety caused among the other members of NATO by tripartitism. He himself was very worried by the drift towards it which seemed to him apparent from the papers which he had read. He thought that the American and British Governments were acting in a very dangerous way in seeking to appease the French. He added that he thought that at the present time the Americans were more to blame than the British. I said that I thought that he was exaggerating the dangers. We were going through a peculiar phase in which people worried more about the form than the substance. NATO consultation was a good example. The NATO Council was continually discussing consultation without consulting. The other day when they forgot the word consultation and discussed disarmament they had had a very useful exchange of views. I thought in the same way they should not get psychologically mixed up about a word like tripartitism, but have regard to what actually took place and, in fact, there were not tripartite discussions. When we came to matters like disarmament, there was full discussion with NATO. Over preparation for the Summit and over our attitude to Berlin there had been full discussion, and there was no attempt to have a kind of tripartite "gang-up" on the Alliance as a whole. General Norstad said that he had no doubt that I was right in theory. But the anxieties of the smaller countries were very real and anyhow he did not see how

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we could handle the German problem except in NATO. He knew there were grave dangers over what might happen in Germany. If we tried to handle it tripartitely we should not succeed. It must be handled in the interests of all, including Germany, within the NATO framework. I said that I did not disagree with him at all on that.

I said that the next political aspect of M.R.B.Ms. was the stationing of them on German soil. Mr. Herter had repeatedly said to me that it was a major political decision to decide to put M.R.B.Ms. on German soil. I had always understood that when saying that he was referring to the reaction of such a policy upon the Soviet Union. What we could not understand was that after Mr. Herter had said that sort of thing many times, Mr. Brucker should go to Germany and say that he thought the Germans should have M.R.B.Ms. General Norstad said that Mr. Brucker was a very stupid man and we should have no regard for what he said about anything. I said that it was all very well for him to say that, but our Press did have regard to what he said and his statement had produced a position of considerable difficulty for us. General Norstad then said that the position with regard to M.R.B.Ms. on German soil was that the German Government had said in 1958 that they did not intend to have M.R.B.Ms. on their soil. Herr Strauss had recently repeated that statement, but (he added in strict confidence) Herr Strauss had now done a little flirtation with the idea of M.R.B.Ms. on German soil. So far as he, General Norstad, was concerned he had no intention of deploying M.R.B.Ms. in Germany. On the other hand he was determined not to say that he never would do that. He thought it would be quite wrong for him to impose a limitation of that sort upon any plan for future deployment. We then discussed the answers which were to be given in the House of Commons to questions on this matter, and we agreed the line of supplementary answer as set out in the Minister of State's brief.

I said that the third political point on this matter was the system of command and control. I was not sure that I fully understood what it would be. After further discussion he stated that if an M.R.B.M. was deployed in a European country, the warhead would remain an American warhead. There would be a veto on the use of the M.R.B.M. enjoyed by the "host" country, and there would be a veto enjoyed by the United States Government as the Government owning the warhead. I asked would there in addition be a NATO veto? Could this weapon only be used with the agreement of SACEUR, operating under the instructions of the NATO Council? General Norstad said emphatically that that would be the case. Threefold permission would really be required: the United States Government, the "host" country and NATO. I asked whether the United States Government had delegated authority to him on its behalf. He said the answer to that question depended upon the relationship between him and the President. He implied that his present relationship with President Eisenhower was such that no understanding was required, but he said that he thought that in the future the matter might have to be more closely defined, but he could not conceive of a United States Government delegating to him more than a strictly limited authority, very closely tied down. I asked him whether he thought that an arrangement whereby the 15 NATO countries would, as the Prime Minister said, have their fingers on the safety catch, was realistic. He said that he had his own ideas about that, but did not think it useful to probe into it too much. I asked whether he meant by that that he expected the NATO Council to delegate to him certain authority in certain circumstances. He was rather vague about whether that represented his opinion or not. I said that I was asking these questions not with a view to tying anyone's hands, but because I thought it was the essence of the deterrent that the Russians should know that there were not 15 vetos on its use.

I then said a few words about consultation in NATO and put to him the argument, much better put later by the Minister of Defence in proposing Norstad's health, that NATO should not be taking its own temperature the whole time.

I then said it was not for me to discuss the military aspects of this matter, but I thought we were in some confusion on this business of strategic weapons. I had thought that the idea was, say 10 years ago, that NATO forces should be a shield which would impose a certain delay upon Soviet aggression so that decisions could be taken elsewhere as to whether or not to declare global nuclear war. It was consistent with this that NATO forces should have atomic artillery. Was it consistent that they should have strategic nuclear weapons? General Norstad

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said that he had no desire to have a strategic nuclear deterrent in the hands of NATO. The word "strategic" anyhow was a misnomer. If he was to defend the NATO area he must have the power to do certain things. He said he did not want to bombard Moscow or Sverdlovsk, but there were certain military tasks, some of them just going over the Polish frontier into Russia, which had to be carried out. At the moment he relied upon his fighter-bombers and fighters to do them and he also had assigned to him a considerable element of SAC to take on specified targets. The fighter-bombers and fighters would soon be obsolescent and he had to have something to take their place. I asked whether it would be possible for SAC to replace his fighters and fighter-bombers in the sense of taking on their allotted targets. General Norstad said that if that was done there would not be any SAC left to take on anything else. At that moment we had to leave for lunch.

SELWYN LLOYD.

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I EUROPEAN MID-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES

THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE, after welcoming General Norstad, said that British defence policy for the next ten years was at present being thoroughly re-examined, and it would be helpful if they could have the benefit of General Norstad's views on major current problems and his comments on those aspects of British policy which impinged upon his Command.

2. GENERAL NORSTAD said that he had also set up within SHAPE, some six months ago, Study Groups to examine long-term trends and to make recommendations for the decade ending 1970. Although these Study Groups had thrown up various ideas, their proposals were by no means firm and it would be premature to discuss them. No reductions in MC.70 requirements were likely, provided his tasks remained the same. Nevertheless, there were some matters of great importance covering the next three to four years. In particular, he had in mind the problem of the European Mid-Range Ballistic Missile. As a starting point, he said that he fully accepted that there would be a continuing need for the retention of aircraft within the forces of Allied Command Europe for as long as he could envisage; however, since they would become increasingly vulnerable, not only to missile attacks on their bases but also to destruction in the air by surface-to-air guided weapons, a two-fold requirement arose. The first was to devise means for their survival on their bases, and he saw the development of the VTOL aircraft, and hence the disappearance of the need for elaborate airfields, as a means to this end. Nonetheless, despite the introduction of new types of aircraft, he did not foresee that they would be able to carry out their tasks in the defence of NATO Europe in the face of the deployment of SAGW, and accordingly he had a very definite military requirement for missiles to take over these tasks. The targets which he wished to attack extended to a depth of 700 miles beyond the Iron Curtain; thus, in order to allow deployment in depth it would be necessary to have a weapon with a range of some 12-1300 nautical miles.

3. In discussion, the following points were made:-

- (a) It should be recognised that, notwithstanding the article in "The Times", SACEUR was not trying to create for himself a new role by forming a third element of the Western nuclear strategic deterrent. Ever since 1957, his nuclear potential had been growing and he now had the means of making nuclear strikes with aircraft deep inside the Iron Curtain. In his view, it would be necessary for him to continue to have the capability of attacking these targets with nuclear weapons, since upon their neutralisation would depend his ability successfully to defend NATO Europe. His demand for missiles was designed solely to enable him to continue to maintain his present defensive capability, and did not imply any new role in the sphere of a nuclear strategic deterrent. In this connection, weapons themselves could not be clearly defined as strategic or tactical; such definitions could only be applied to the functions they fulfilled. In his view, the function of his MRBMs would form part of his tactical battle.

*Disorganised*

- (b) General Norstad expected that a land-based POLARIS

*Norstad - Gehlman Lloyd Mfg*  
*7/11/60*

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would be available in 1963, but it was a most unsuitable weapon on account of its high yield. This weapon had not been devised in order to meet any pre-determined operational requirements in Allied Command Europe, but had been proposed for this task simply because it was a weapon which was already in a high state of development. Moreover, on account of its size and weight, it could never become fully mobile in the sense that it could be deployed throughout the existing road networks in Europe. Recent indications showed that it might be possible to design from existing developments an entirely new weapon, which might be in service by 1965, to meet the operational requirements of a lower yield and a high degree of mobility on land.

- (c) The misgivings which had been voiced about the creation of the so-called NATO deterrent might be met to some extent if it proved possible to provide missiles of a low yield. General Norstad was not very specific by what he meant by low yield, but he referred to certain targets which were scheduled for attack by missiles with yields of between a few kilotons and 500 kilotons.
- (d) Studies were in hand in the United States to see to what extent the POLARIS could be deployed at sea by other means than the present concept of POLARIS-launching submarines. These studies included the possibility of mounting the weapons in cargo ships, on barges, and in submerged caissons. Any such diversification of deployment would materially contribute towards the acceptance of these weapons within NATO, since their deployment on land was not greatly favoured. Arising from this, General Norstad said that he would be prepared to accept from 10 to 15 POLARIS-launching submarines within Allied Command Europe.
- (e) In General Norstad's opinion, the French, to further their own national aims, would not participate and there was no point in trying to persuade them to do so. It should be made clear to them that NATO proposed to proceed without them, but that the door would be left open for them to join in later should they so wish. In a general survey of NATO, General Norstad's views were that Germany should not be asked to participate, and would not want to do so, but he did wish to commit himself to a deployment plan that would include or exclude Germany. As regards the other countries, Holland, Greece and Italy would probably be willing to join in provided they were given a strong lead. In these circumstances, it might be necessary to proceed by bilateral agreements under the auspices of NATO. In this connection, the point was made (although not by General Norstad) that Press comment and influential opinion in Great Britain was much more critical of the NATO MRBM proposal than in any other country of NATO, and it was even suggested that

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there would have been no doubts amongst the NATO powers (except France and Germany) had it not been for British opposition. Continental public opinion tended to be more robust than the better informed British public.

- (f) In the last resort, General Norstad felt that the United States might be prepared to go it alone, in which case he felt that there would be great pressure in the United States for a return to the concept of "Fortress America".
- (g) The NATO Council were awaiting further details from, first, the Americans on the characteristics of the weapon, and, secondly, from SACEUR on his proposed deployment, before they next considered this matter. It was accordingly unlikely that the Council would discuss it before some time in September.

4. Summing up, THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE said that he was glad of General Norstad's assurance that there was no need for any immediate further steps to be taken in this matter and to learn that no further development was expected before the NATO Council discussed the problem some time in September. Meanwhile, it would be very helpful to have further details of the suggestion to build a new weapon specifically designed to meet SACEUR's operational requirements, and he was glad that General Norstad had agreed to discuss this idea with Sir Solly Zuckerman.

II FRANCE AND NATO


5. GENERAL NORSTAD said that his Headquarters and the French Military Authorities had reached agreement on the integration of air defence on the basis that the French would receive identical treatment with the British, but General de Gaulle had refused to endorse it. Accordingly, he was proceeding with his plans excluding France, in the hope that the French would join in later.

6. As regards NATO Naval Commands, General Norstad said that it was unrealistic to expect the French to make any concession from their present position. In reply to a question from the Chief of the Defence Staff, he said that he had no objection to an overall review of allied naval commands within NATO as a whole.

7. THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE thanked General Norstad for attending the meeting.

Ministry of Defence, S.W.1.  
12th July, 1960.

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CIRCULATED FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF

JP(60)92(Final)

12th August, 1960

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

JOINT PLANNING STAFF

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING  
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION

Report by the Joint Planning Staff

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany have recently expressed disquiet at their exclusion from Berlin Contingency Planning and have formally requested that they should now participate in this planning. The Foreign Office have asked for the views of the Chiefs of Staff on whether this is advisable, from both the military and security points of view.

2. In accordance with the instructions of the Chief of the Defence Staff we have examined this question. In preparing our report, which is at Annex, we have consulted the Ministry of Defence and the British Joint Communications - Electronics Board.

Recommendation

3. We recommend that, if they approve our report, the Chiefs of Staff should forward it to the Foreign Office as an expression of their views.

(Signed) D.L. POWELL-JONES  
P.F. PHILLIOTT  
S.D. O'BRIEN.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

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Annex to JI(60)92 (Final)

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING  
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION

INTRODUCTION

1. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany have recently expressed<sup>+</sup> disquiet at their exclusion from Berlin Contingency Planning and have made<sup>2</sup> formal representation that there should be full German participation in this planning. We also understand<sup>3</sup> that a request may be expected shortly from General Norstad for the assignment of a German officer to the LIVE OAK group to act as an observer, having access to all planning papers but not injecting his Government's views. The Foreign Office have asked whether German participation is militarily desirable and acceptable from the security point of view.

II

2. To examine whether, from the military point of view, German participation in Berlin Contingency Planning is desirable.

PRESENT STATE OF MILITARY PLANNING

3. Since the United Kingdom approved<sup>4</sup> the relevant LIVE OAK planning papers, detailed tripartite plans have been prepared, though entirely without commitment, for the operations<sup>5</sup> listed below:-

(a) Operation to Restore Landholm Access to Berlin

This plan (TRIPARTITE) has been prepared by C-in-C BIOR, the field commander designate.

(b) Tripartite Plans for Berlin Airlift and Air Access Contingencies

This plan (JACK FIVE) has been prepared by C-in-C USAFE who would be responsible for the overall control of all air operations.

General Norstad has approved these plans and forwarded them to the three Ministers of Defense with a request for the preparation of national supporting plans.

4. A detailed plan<sup>6</sup> has also been prepared (FREE STYLE) for the assembly of the force to undertake the initial probe of Soviet intentions.

5. Detailed planning for proposed countermeasures<sup>7</sup>, which are political and psychological rather than military, has not yet been implemented.

IMPLICATIONS OF GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN MILITARY PLANNING

6. The Tripartite Powers have a special responsibility for Berlin which is not shared by the Federal Government, although

- + Telegram Bonn to Foreign Office, No. 614 of 15 Jul 60
- ② Telegram Foreign Office to Paris, No. 1474 of 22 Jul 60
- % UKIMR 304
- ^ COS.1205/2-19/59, 1(59)644 Htg., Item 2
- § COS(60)153, COS(60)169
- % COS(60)157
- £ COS(59)199

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Annex (Continued)

the Three Powers undertook, in the Bonn Conventions of 1954, to exercise this responsibility in consultation with the Federal Government. Thus the Federal Government have no legal right to a position of equality with the Three Powers over Berlin, and it follows that they may not provide forces for operations to maintain or restore access. On military grounds there is no justification for participation in planning by a nation which has no responsibility for the execution of those plans. We have always maintained that, since the execution of any of the Berlin contingency plans would involve a risk - possibly a grave risk - of war by miscalculation, the other members of the NATO Alliance would have to be consulted before any decision was taken to implement them. As regards more elaborate military measures, General Horstad has been informed that no such action should be taken before the NATO nations have been fully prepared for global war. If the Germans were permitted to join in the preparation of military plans, some, if not all, of the other members of the Alliance could equally claim the right to participate on the grounds that their vital interests were also affected. Any wider participation in military planning without responsibility for execution, before the stage at which NATO as a whole needs to become involved, would not only infringe the special responsibility of the Three Powers, but might well make it even more difficult to arrive at satisfactory plans.

7. We are advised that the state of security in Bonn is such that the fact of German participation in details of planning would be likely to leak to the Russians and would undoubtedly be exploited by Soviet propaganda. On security grounds there appear, therefore, to be strong reasons for maintaining the existing tripartite nature of contingency planning for Berlin.

8. Considerable compromise of views was necessary between the Tripartite Powers in order to reach an agreed basis on which detailed military plans could be prepared. Although the German military might be expected to support our views on certain aspects of planning (e.g. TIDE FIDU), we are advised that the Federal Government might, for political reasons, not only overrule such military advice but might call in question the procedures already agreed tripartitely for identifying military traffic and passing flight information.

9. The question is not so straightforward in relation to plans for a Berlin airlift and air access contingencies as these envisage the use of German, as distinct from NATO, airfields, navigational aids and communication circuits. These plans also involve the provision by the Federal Government of air control facilities to support operations. To consider that it will be necessary to inform the Federal authorities of the detailed requirements in advance, if the limits are to be met, apart from this we can see no military case for German participation.

10. We consider that, apart from the points raised in paragraph 9 above, the degree of disclosure to the German MHR already authorized by General Horstad should be adequate from a military point of view. We can find no military justification for extending this on the lines forehadowed by the UKPMB. In particular we do not believe that the appointment of attaching a German observer to the LIVE OER group would avoid any of the difficulties outlined above. However, we recognize that the ultimate decision in this matter is a political one.

✓ COS.1701/25/9/59  
β COS(60)153  
✓ COS.200/20/7/59  
% DEBR 304

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CONCLUSIONS

11. We conclude that from the military and security points of view:-

- (a) Full German participation in Berlin military Contingency Planning is not justified. There is, however, a need for the Federal authorities to be informed in advance of certain detailed support requirements for the proposed air operations.
- (b) We are not convinced that the Federal Government need be kept more fully informed than hitherto of progress in military planning. If, however, this were felt necessary on political grounds, the security risk of informing them will have to be carefully weighed.

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CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX

TO

C.O.S.(60)52ND MEETING HELD ON TUESDAY, 23RD AUGUST, 1960

3. BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING - MORE ELABORATE MILITARY MEASURES

(Previous Reference: COS(60)50th Meeting, Minute 3)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a minute<sup>4</sup> by the Secretary covering a draft telegram of guidance to the United Kingdom member of the LIVE OAK Planning Team on a proposal by General Norstad to prepare a contingency plan to reopen autobahn access to Berlin using a force of one division. Two telegrams<sup>5</sup> were also relevant.

SIR EDMUND HUDLESTON recalled that General Norstad had been informed that the United Kingdom had no comments to make on the Commander-in-Chief British Army of the Rhine's Orders for the operation to re-open autobahn access to Berlin using force of a battalion group (TRADE WIND). The United Kingdom member of the LIVE OAK group had now asked for guidance on General Norstad's proposal that a further plan should be made for the same operation using a division. General Norstad had already been informed<sup>6</sup> that it was the United Kingdom view that since no ground operation could by itself re-open the road to Berlin, plans should be restricted to a force of a battalion group. He believed the Committee would agree with the views expressed in the draft telegram but he suggested that they would not wish to press them to the point of a definite refusal since General Norstad already had authority to direct the LIVE OAK Group to undertake such planning.

In discussion the following points were made:-

- (a) General Norstad was likely to report the views given in the proposed telegram to the United States Military Authorities. This might produce a reaction from the State Department; this, however, could be accepted since there were a number of unsolved political issues which might eventually have to be taken up with the new United States Administration.

<sup>4</sup> COS.1092/19/8/60  
<sup>5</sup> UKFMR.305 and UKFMR.307  
<sup>6</sup> COS.1205/22/9/59

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JP(60)Note 35

UK EYES ONLY

11th August, 1960

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

JOINT PLANNING STAFF

NATO STRATEGY

Note by the Directors of Plans

In conveying<sup>(1)</sup> to the Chief of Defence Staff the latest draft of a report by the Military Committee on the Minister of Defence's Paper on NATO Defence Planning, Air Chief Marshal Mills has expressed<sup>+</sup> his concern that the draft shows the Military Committee views to be very much at variance with an early draft of our paper<sup>§</sup> on NATO Strategy, which he had seen. The British Defence Staff, Washington, have also commented<sup>§</sup> on the probable attitude of the NATO countries towards our proposals. This Note may be helpful when you discuss the telegrams concerned.

1. The major difference between present NATO Strategy and that proposed in the final version of our paper<sup>§</sup> (which in this respect is not much changed from the earlier draft) lies in the function and size of the shield forces in ACE. Current NATO strategy requires that these forces should be able to "maintain the integrity of NATO territory, counting on the use of nuclear weapons from the outset", and to continue operations "in combination with the nuclear counter-offensive, until the will and ability of the enemy to pursue general war has been destroyed". The draft Military Committee paper to which Air Chief Marshal Mills refers, further claims that there have been no political, technological or military developments since the present strategy was formulated which would give grounds for changing the primary NATO objectives and concepts.

2. We, however, consider that there have been developments towards a state of nuclear sufficiency which should have significant and formative effects on NATO Strategy. We have

- @ GM 125
- % C-M(60)29
- + GM 124
- § JP(60)63(Final)
- ¶ ZO 851

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concluded that the attainment of nuclear sufficiency with all its destructive potential for both sides will make it impossible to sustain the concept of shield forces bringing operations to a successful conclusion in global war, since the outcome of any operations after the nuclear exchange would be irrelevant to all that NATO seeks to preserve. We believe that, once it becomes clear that the USSR has embarked on major aggression, the only requirement which is militarily, as opposed to psychologically, justified is a capacity to resist and delay the attack long enough to enable the West to launch the strategic nuclear forces.

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4. Our proposed strategy also shows a slight change of emphasis from existing NATO strategy in the ability of the shield forces to meet a large-scale conventional attack. We consider that the need is for the shield forces to be able to resist and delay such an attack, using at least tactical nuclear weapons if it is persisted in, thus making clear to the Russians that any aggression would carry the risk of escalation to global war.

5. We have further deduced that the provision to SACOR of MRBMs of the range and yield at present planned, cannot be militarily justified. We base this on the following arguments:-

- (a) In the limited task that our concept allots to the shield forces, the use of MRBMs would not be likely to influence the eventual outcome decisively.
- (b) Their presence could not, therefore, contribute essentially to the general deterrent.
- (c) In any case, their use would be unlikely to be sanctioned before the strategic nuclear forces were launched.

6. We have recognized that some of our conclusions are likely to be unpalatable within NATO, as our paper has been written without regard to its political acceptability or timeliness. We felt, however, that an honest assessment of the realities of the problem had to be attempted even though, for overriding reasons of public and inter-allied relations, some other policy has, in the end, to be adopted.

7. You will not wish to come to any firm conclusions on these issues until you have had time to study our paper and have discussed all the implications with the Minister of Defence.

(Signed) D.L. POWELL-JONES  
J.F.D. BUSH  
...R. DAVIS.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

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CONFIDENTIAL INDEX

TO

**GUARD**

C.O.S. (60) 53RD MEETING HELD ON WEDNESDAY, 31ST AUGUST, 1960

3. BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

(Previous References: C.O.S. (60) 51st Meeting, Minute 4  
C.O.S. (60) 52nd Meeting, Minute 7.

THE COMMITTEE had before them three minutes<sup>1</sup> by the Secretary, covering letters from General Horstad, and draft replies thereto, concerning:-

- (a) A proposal to designate a single Commander for Berlin, who should be the United States Commandant.
- (b) A proposal that a Federal German Liaison Officer should be assigned to the Live Oak Group and that selected members of the Federal German Ministry of Defence should be briefed on the work of the Group.
- (c) A proposal that a tripartite plan for restoring road access to Berlin should be prepared using a force of the size of a division.

A. Designation of a Single Commander for Berlin

LORD MOUNTBATTEN recalled that this proposal had been raised before and the Chiefs of Staff had given their agreement<sup>2</sup> in principle to it. He had no objection to the wording of the draft reply, except that the last four words of paragraph 2 should be deleted.

In discussion it was stated:-

- (a) That the Foreign Office had consulted<sup>3</sup> the Ambassador in Bonn and General Delacombe on the terms of the draft letter to General Horstad. General Delacombe had replied<sup>4</sup> that it was desirable

<sup>1</sup> C.O.S. 1117/26/8/60  
 C.O.S. 1118/26/8/60  
 C.O.S. 1119/26/8/60

<sup>2</sup> C.O.S. (59) 103  
<sup>3</sup> Foreign Office to Four 1449  
<sup>4</sup> Berlin 290

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to make a distinction between the civil and military responsibilities of the single Commander. Those responsibilities should be confined to the military sphere; paragraph 2 of the draft letter should therefore be amended by the addition of the words "in so far as military responsibilities are concerned" after the word "designated" in the first sentence.

## THE COMMITTEE:-

- (1) Approved the draft reply to General Norstad incorporating the amendments proposed by the Chief of the Defence Staff, and the Foreign Office at (a) above.
- (2) Took note that the Chief of the Defence Staff would seek the approval of the Minister of Defence to the despatch of this reply to General Norstad.

B. Federal German Participation

LORD MOUNTBATTEN said that the draft reply could be a slight rebuff to General Norstad. Two British reasons for not wishing German participation in the defence plans were: first, the known lack of access to Berlin, and secondly, that if the Germans were invited to participate, there was no reason why all the other NATO countries should not feel equally entitled.

Mr. Khristchev said that the statement in the statement that if the East German Government were to be invited to participate in the defence plans of Berlin would be voted in by the NATO countries. The German Government were not invited to participate in the defence plans of Berlin because of the degree of recognition of the East German Government, however, that these arrangements for the defence of Berlin, the Prime Minister said, that he could not consider the question of inviting the East German Government to participate in such a minor issue. The Prime Minister said that if access to Berlin was restricted with respect to NATO, it could only be taken after consultation with the other members of NATO and after their proposals for defence.

## In discussion the following points were raised:-

- (1) The German National Military Representative, SHARK, had in the past received briefings from the Defence Staff and had been given the draft documents. It was important to continue to withhold the distribution of documents.
- (2) The Foreign Office had recently received a request from the Federal German Government requesting United Kingdom agreement to their participation in contingency planning. An amendment to paragraph 2 of the draft reply to General Norstad regarding this was proposed. The terms of this amendment would make the letter more acceptable to General Norstad and would be the following: "in so far as military responsibilities are concerned".

W. Annex

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THE COMMITTEE:-

- (3) Approved the draft reply to General Horstad, as amended, and took note that the Chief of the Defence Staff would seek the Minister's approval to its despatch.

C. More Elaborate Military Measures - Restoration of Ground Access with a Division-Sized Force

LORD MOUNTBATTEN invited the United Kingdom member of the Live Oak Group to give a resume of his conversation the previous day on this subject with General Horstad.

COLONEL CHAUNDLER (United Kingdom Member of the Live Oak Group) said that he believed General Horstad's thinking corresponded closely with that of the Chiefs of Staff. He could not foresee circumstances at present which would justify the use of a division-sized force, but he felt that it would be only prudent to prepare this plan in case future circumstances arose which made its use imperative as a last resort. He could not accept that a battalion-sized operation should be the last and largest in the series before posing the ultimate threat of nuclear war.

In discussion the following points were made:-

- (d) There were two principal objections to undertaking this planning, even though it would be without commitment. First, it would involve the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, British Army of the Rhine, in a great deal of work which, if it was agreed that this operation was unnecessary, would be entirely wasteful. Secondly, a stronger objection was that once such planning started, inevitably a degree of commitment became implied.
- (e) The Committee had previously agreed that Operation TRADE WIND, the battalion operation to restore access, was militarily unsound. A divisional operation was even more unsound. Instead of agreeing, therefore, to General Horstad's proposal, it would be better for a study to be made to demonstrate this point. It would be appropriate for the Live Oak Group to undertake the study. The reply to General Horstad should be redrafted accordingly.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (4) Instructed the Secretary to re draft the letter on the basis of their views at (e) above and took note that the Chief of the Defence Staff would seek the Minister's approval to its despatch.

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GUARDD. Current East German Moves in Berlin

LORD MOUNTBATTEN invited Mr. Killick, Foreign Office, to make a statement on the current East German moves in Berlin.

MR. KILLICK (Foreign Office) said that they did not expect any decisive moves by the Soviet Government over Berlin until a new United States Government was in office, but it was clear that the Russians were quite prepared to take measures to increase tension generally. The threatened closure of access between the two halves of the city was merely a device for this purpose. The pretext which had now been picked upon was some planned demonstrations by former East German refugees; many such demonstrations had taken place in past years. If this threat was carried out, it would not involve allied traffic entering Berlin, though West German civilian road and rail traffic would be affected; the East Germans had also threatened to take action against West air civil aircraft but it was difficult to see how they could put this threat into effect.

The Foreign Office had received a concurrent report of a Soviet Army alert in Eastern Germany, but since this was the time of year for Russian Army exercises they did not attach any great significance to this report.

In short, the Foreign Office were not at present unduly concerned by these moves.

THE COMMITTEE:-

(5) Took note of the views of the Foreign Office.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.S.I.

31ST AUGUST, 1960.

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MID-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES112  
18/13/6History

1. In December, 1957, the United States Government "suggested that the North Atlantic Council might desire to initiate in Europe a co-ordinated programme of research, development and production of a selected group of modern weapons systems, including Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles". They suggested that a temporary NATO ad hoc group should be formed to recommend "an initial group of modern weapons or weapons system suitable under NATO military planning for production in Europe". The United States indicated that they would be "willing to assist these endeavours and to support this effort more directly".

2. In June, 1959, this NATO Group recommended the production of a European Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile, and SACEUR subsequently indicated his requirement for such a weapon to be in service by 1963. In July and August, 1959, the United Kingdom expressed to the Americans anxiety about the manufacture of such a weapon in Europe, particularly in the event of German participation, but stated that the British attitude to the project would be greatly influenced by that of the United States Government and that the United Kingdom did not wish to discourage the project if the U.S.A. were going to support it. In December, 1959, the United States Government said that they had still not reached a firm decision on this matter. In January, 1960, H.M. Government agreed that SACEUR had a need for ballistic missiles for tactical purposes to replace some of his manned aircraft and cruise-type missiles, but said that they thought it would be a pity if the whole scheme was made dependent upon European production; they therefore suggested that the right course would be to use missiles manufactured in the United States. In the Standing Group we have also agreed in principle to SACEUR's need for this weapon.

3. It follows, therefore, that we have consistently opposed the production of an IRBM in Europe, and the Americans, to whom we have explained the reason for our opposition, have recognised the validity of our objections. Unfortunately, however strong the arguments we advance, the Americans will have to weigh them against the commitment

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they made to NATO in 1957 which was specific and categorical, mentioning IRBM's and their production in Europe by name. This commitment, moreover, was made by the President and Secretary of State in the presence of the other Heads of Governments and Foreign Secretaries of the NATO Alliance. On the purely military side, we have not at any time expressed any doubts about NATO's need for this weapon, although we have stated that the numbers to be deployed must be justified by facts. The Americans would undoubtedly be very surprised if we were to put forward through defence channels arguments for any change of policy which were not absolutely sound on strictly military grounds.

#### The NATO Requirement

4. In October, 1959, SHAPE issued the basic military requirement for a Mid-Range Ballistic Missile system. SHAPE pointed out that by 1963 the Soviets would have a powerful offensive capability, using ballistic missiles of various ranges with nuclear warheads of varying yield; they might also be expected to have an effective air defence system which would make penetration by manned aircraft and cruise missiles increasingly difficult. Since a major proportion of the Allied Command Europe striking force is of these types, it is evident that their effectiveness will decrease; also, in face of the increasing missile threat, the strike forces will become progressively more vulnerable to attack and destruction on the ground before they can be brought into action. SHAPE therefore concluded that it was of paramount importance to obtain an appropriate missile system and to integrate it into ACE forces not later than 1963. This weapons system was to have a capability for rapid action; be designed to strike targets of known position; be reasonably transportable; have a range from 300 to 1500 nautical miles; have warheads with yields from 1 mt. to 1 kt.; and finally consideration was to be given to the use of these weapons to fixed, hardened, or non-fixed, unhardened and dispersed sites - barges, trucks, trains, etc.

#### General Norstad's Views

5. General Norstad has recently made it quite clear that he has a very definite military requirement for missiles. He also fully

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Our Dilemma

7. We are in a most awkward situation. On the one hand we do not want SACEUR to have under his command a large number of long-range missiles with very high-yield warheads, the use of which would almost inevitably result in escalation to global war; we want to try and preserve the Brussels Treaty; and we cannot afford to contribute more money to NATO.

8. On the other hand, we have not at any time opposed SACEUR's plans for atomic strikes, indeed we have been largely unaware of the extent of his plans, and our tacit acceptance of this plan in the past makes it extremely difficult for us to question the need for it in the future since, as General Norstad has pointed out, he is not proposing to undertake any new tasks. It follows, therefore, that in challenging the MRBM concept we are treading on very delicate ground.

Our Approach

9. There are, I believe, two possible ways of tackling the matter: I propose to call them, for want of better titles, the "Weapons System Approach" and the "Target Zoning Scheme".

The Weapons System Approach

10. POLARIS appears to have been selected for NATO use merely because it is the only missile likely to be in production sufficiently early to meet SACEUR's date-line of 1963; it is, however, in many ways a most unsuitable weapon for the job, its two main drawbacks being its high yield and its relative immobility. SACEUR proposes to use POLARIS for attacks on "atomic centres, centres of communication, centres of control and airfields"; some of these are bound to be towns and, as has been pointed out by Sir Solly Zuckerman, the destruction caused by one 1/2 mt. head would be fabulous in terms of known experience. The detonation of 300 warheads of this yield within 700 miles of the Iron Curtain would produce unimaginable destruction and possibly an acute fall-out problem in the rest of Europe. To use POLARIS would seem to be like using a sledgehammer to crack a nut.

11. POLARIS, as at present designed, achieves mobility by being in an atomic submarine; so far as we are aware no attempt has yet been

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to give POLARIS a land-based mobility, though there has been vague talk of mounting it on barges, trains and small ships; on the contrary, Sir Solly Zuckerman was informed that it would take at least three years to produce a version of POLARIS suitable for NATO. We have just rejected BLUE STREAK because it was essentially a fixed-site fire-first weapon. We are therefore well placed to say that we see no merit in NATO having a weapon system that is not truly mobile.

12. We might perhaps approach the matter by re-affirming our support to the proposition that NATO should have MRBM's; we should follow this by saying that we wonder if POLARIS really is suitable for use in Europe, pointing out its shortcomings and suggesting that it would be much more satisfactory to have a truly mobile system with warheads commensurate for their particular tasks. We should say that we realise that the introduction of such a system will almost inevitably mean the slipping back of the 1963 date-line, and we should suggest that possibly aircraft fitted with stand-off bombs might be a suitable stop-gap.

*or Polaris  
submarine-launched*

#### The Target Zoning Scheme

13. General Norstad has accepted that there will be a continuing need for aircraft in NATO. It is suggested that our approach should be that, despite the extreme vulnerability of present day aircraft to ballistic missile attack while on the ground, and the increasing danger from SAGW during flight, we accept SACEUR's view since sophisticated air defence systems cannot be deployed everywhere, and in any case their effectiveness is unlikely to be very great against high-speed aircraft flying at very low level. We should go on to point out the versatility of aircraft when compared with missiles, and should emphasize that missiles, once launched, cannot be recalled.

14. We should follow up by suggesting that the targets in the ASP should be examined and earmarked for attack by either aircraft or missiles; this examination would probably result in the zoning of targets - those near the Curtain being taken on by aircraft, those further afield by missiles. An examination of this type would not question SACEUR's need to strike at the targets, nor would it cast

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doubt on his need to have some ballistic missiles; but it might give us grounds for challenging the stated requirement of 300 POLARIS missiles, and it would almost certainly enable us to refute arguments for NATO having 1000 missiles. As Bomber Command have a copy of the ASP this examination could be undertaken by ourselves.

#### Conclusions

15. Our method of tackling the problem must be governed by:-
- (a) The specific commitment made by the President of the United States to NATO in 1957, mentioning IRBM's and their production in Europe.
  - (b) The fact that we have at no time challenged SACEUR's ASP.
  - (c) The effect that our "unhelpful" attitude towards this problem may have on certain other matters of concern to ourselves and the Americans.
16. Our approach should be:-
- (a) Is POLARIS really the right weapon for this job? Would it not be better to wait two years and get a weapons system both mobile and having warheads of varying yield?

Either following the above or concurrently, suggest that:-

- (b) It is unthinkable that within the foreseeable future missiles can completely replace aircraft; would it therefore not be opportune to examine the ASP target list and zone targets into those suitable for attack by aircraft and by missiles?
17. The above would not run counter to anything we have said in the past and might result in the project being postponed; this would give us time to have the problem of MRBM's examined in parallel with the long term look at NATO, currently being studied by the Standing Group.

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TO

C.O.S. (60) 55TH MEETING HELD ON  
TUESDAY, 13TH SEPTEMBER, 1960

2. NATO STRATEGY

(Previous Reference: C.O.S. (60) 50th Meeting, Minute 14)  
J.P. (60) 63 (Final)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a report by the Joint Planning Staff examining the present NATO strategy in the light of present and foreseen circumstances. The following papers were relevant to the discussion:-

- (a) Two minutes<sup>4x</sup> by the Secretary covering draft memoranda on the reform of NATO strategy prepared by the Ministry of Defence on the instructions of the Minister of Defence.
- (b) Two telegrams<sup>5c</sup> from Sir Chief Marshal Sir George Mills giving the text of a draft report<sup>6</sup> by the NATO Military Committee to the NATO Council on the Minister's paper<sup>7</sup> on NATO Defence Planning, together with his comments<sup>8</sup> thereon.
- (c) A telegram<sup>9</sup> from the Chief of Staff to the Chairman, British Defence Staffs, Washington, commenting on ways and means of advancing United Kingdom views on the reform of NATO strategy.
- (d) A note<sup>6</sup> by the Directors of Plans giving their views on the telegrams<sup>7b</sup> at (b) above.

✓ C.O.S. 1134/30/8/60  
x C.O.S. 1198/12/9/60  
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e GM 125  
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5 JP(60) Note 35

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LORD MOUNTBATTEN said that the report by the Joint Planning Staff stemmed essentially from their dislike of General Norstad's proposals for the European Mid-Range Ballistic Missile. In parallel with the preparation of this report, the Minister of Defence had instructed the Ministry of Defence to prepare a paper on the reform of NATO strategy. Two versions of this paper had been prepared<sup>x</sup>; the earlier one<sup>a</sup> had been forwarded to the Minister and the second, shorter version<sup>x</sup> would be sent to him that evening. A further matter which they would have to consider was the request<sup>@</sup> for guidance from Sir George Mills on how he should handle in the Standing Group the draft report of the Military Committee commenting on the Minister's note on NATO Defence Planning. Sir George Mills had suggested three possible courses of action with regard to this paper; first, for the United Kingdom to present a split view to the NATO Council; secondly, for the United Kingdom to accept the draft Military Committee report, or, thirdly, for the Minister of Defence to withdraw his note stating that another note would be forwarded after further consideration in the United Kingdom.

Their discussion that afternoon was but the first of a series they would be having on this very difficult problem. A final decision on how the matter was to be pursued, if at all, could only be taken by Ministers; they were to discuss the problem with the Minister of Defence on Thursday, 15th September, 1960, and he believed that they would wish to forward the report by the Joint Planning Staff to him. He therefore tabled a suggested cover note under which the report might be sent.

In discussion the following points were made:-

- (a) It was important for the Committee to be quite clear as to the purpose of this examination of NATO strategy. There were three questions involved: first, to decide whether current NATO strategy was correct in present and future circumstances; secondly, if it was not correct, whether it should be reformed and, thirdly, if so how the reforms should be presented to NATO. Current strategy was based on the proposition that the shield forces of NATO should be sufficiently strong to enforce a pause to Soviet aggression; if the aggression was persisted in they should also be capable of holding the enemy until the allied strategic nuclear forces had done their work and thereafter they should carry out such actions as would be necessary to bring the war to a successful conclusion. The essence of this strategy was that of prevention of war by deterrence, and no-one doubted that the emphasis should continue on prevention rather than fighting the war. The dilemma, however, in an age of mutual nuclear sufficiency, was that if present strategy was continued with there were virtually but two courses of action, either to except defeat in the shield battle or else to release the full weight of strategic nuclear retaliation, which would

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result in complete mutual destruction. In the latter event there was little point in considering in detail the possible strategy of ground forces in Europe after the nuclear exchange, since they would be engulfed in this destruction. The report before them therefore proposed that there should be some re-organisation, both of the forces themselves and in their method of control in order to meet limited incursions by the Russians without immediate recourse to strategic nuclear retaliation, whilst making it clear to them that this would follow if they persisted in their aggression. The Committee were aware that General Norstad himself shared this view, which he had both privately to them and publicly declared as part of his concept of forcing a pause and making the enemy take a conscious decision to launch all-out war. However, NATO strategy as at present written contained no such philosophy of graduation and this was therefore the first point that needed attention, particularly since General Norstad's successors might not share his views.

- (b) The Joint Planning Staff report continued in logic to deduce that preparations for fighting an all-out war after the nuclear exchange should be abandoned. There was little doubt that the military logic of this thesis was impeccable, but the concept that the shield forces need prepare to do nothing once the nuclear exchange was released was taking logic to extremes and was untenable. Moreover, its presentation to the other NATO powers might seriously weaken their faith in British intentions and cause such dissension as to weaken their outward determination. This would quickly be appreciated by the Russians who might then gain the impression that NATO had lost the essential determination on which the whole deterrent philosophy rested. It followed that if the coherence of NATO was to be maintained, it would be necessary to subscribe to the intention to fight on after the nuclear exchange and, as far as possible, to maintain the integrity of Europe. An addition to the conclusions of the report should be made to this effect and the cover note should emphasize that the existing conclusions were strictly military.
- (c) On the other hand, it could be argued that NATO was not at present in a very confident state. Many countries had doubts whether, if faced with the choice between defeat or destruction, the NATO Governments would necessarily accept destruction. It could be further argued that the proposals in the report by the Joint Planning Staff and the memorandum by the Ministry of Defence were not in fact defeatist, but were in reality stronger than those contained in current strategy, since by making real and determined efforts to resist incursions, they might appear more convincing both to the allies and to the Russians.

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- (d) The Minister's original note on NATO Defence Planning had stemmed from his very serious doubt that, if current NATO strategy was continued, it might in the course of time increase the risk of war. The Russians might gradually come to appreciate that the democratic NATO Governments would procrastinate for so long before deciding on their only course of action, namely the release of strategic nuclear forces, that they could rely on this for a quick and decisive thrust into Europe. Considerations of defence economics were not of great consequence in this train of thought, though the Minister had hoped that should NATO come to accept reforms the money spent could be put to better advantage. There were two basic problems involved in implementing a new strategy. First, the problem of control of nuclear weapons; at present SACEUR in theory had complete freedom over their use once R-hour was declared. Secondly, the problem of the provision for fighting the land battle after the nuclear exchange. It was possible that a partial solution, for example, by more stringent control of nuclear forces, could be made to the first problem but the solution of the second was fundamental to the adoption of the reforms suggested in the two papers.
- (e) There was some urgency in deciding these very difficult questions; first because it was probable that any new United States administration would continue to support SACUR's MRW proposals and, secondly, because of the need to provide Sir George Mills with guidance for the handling of the Military Committee paper. The latter problem was one which only the Minister of Defence himself could decide, since it commented on his own note. It was agreed that the Ministry of Defence should prepare a draft reply for subsequent consideration by the Minister of Defence on this question.
- (f) Sir Frank Roberts had recently reported that General Norstad was considering a United States proposal to allot a number of POLARIS submarines to NATO to provide him with an MRW capability by 1963. An alternative being considered by SACEUR was the possibility of removing the MRW problem from NATO altogether by entrusting to SAC and Bomber Command the responsibilities at present held by SACEUR for attacking targets just over the Iron Curtain and into Russia. General Norstad had said that he could only agree to such a solution if SAC and Bomber Command put aside a proportion of their forces to guarantee that his targets would be met. General Norstad had also spoken, for the 1963/4 period, of the prospect of a much smaller and lighter version of POLARIS which could be truly transportable on land.

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THE COMMITTEE:-

- (1) Approved the report by the Joint Planning Staff subject to amendment to the conclusions as agreed at (b) above.
- (2) Took note of the draft memoranda by the Ministry of Defence.
- (3) Instructed the Secretary to prepare a draft cover note, forwarding for signature by the Chief of the Defence Staff, the report to the Minister of Defence.
- (4) Invited the Ministry of Defence to prepare guidance for Sir George Mills, for approval by the Minister, on the handling of the draft Military Committee paper on NATO Defence Planning in the Standing Group.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

14TH SEPTEMBER, 1960.

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C.O.S. (60) 258

19TH SEPTEMBER, 1960

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

BERLIN AIRLIFT CONTINGENCY PLANNING  
OPERATION "JACK PINE"

Memorandum (Reference D.D.Ops. (O)/TS.122  
dated 15th September, 1960) by the Air Ministry

Annex:- U.K. Air Effort Required to Meet "JACK PINE" Airlifts.

INTRODUCTION

Operation "JACK PINE" is the tripartite operational level plan for Berlin Airlift and Air Access Contingencies. This plan, already approved by General Norstad, has been referred to the Air Ministry for examination and report.

AIM

2. The aim of this Note is to examine and report on Operation "JACK PINE".

AIR TRANSPORT OPERATIONS

Airlifts

3. Operation "JACK PINE" covers plans for:-
- (a) Civil Airlift. Provides for the substitution of military for civil aircraft to maintain air services to Berlin should civil aircraft cease to operate.
  - (b) Garrison Airlift. Provides for the air transportation of military personnel and materials should allied military traffic to Berlin be interrupted.
  - (c) Garrison/Civil Airlift. A combined airlift of 3(a) and (b).
  - (d) "TRIPLE PLAY". A plan for the air evacuation of non-combatants from Berlin.

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4. In general, the "JACK PINE" plan merely collates existing U.K. airlift plans and so, with two possible exceptions, raises no serious points of principle. The two exceptions are:-

- (a) Under the existing plan, individual Governments have the right to evacuate their nationals from Berlin independently. However, "JACK PINE" infers that the unanimous agreement of the three Powers is required to carry out the evacuation of nationals.
- (b) The operational necessity for the Federal Government to participate in certain aspects of airlift planning.

5. Whereas the observation made in para. 4(a) is thought to be relatively unimportant to the operational planning of "TRIPLE PLAY", the extent to which the Germans assist in the planning of airlifts for which they will be providing facilities, is considered to be significant, as it is likely to affect the speed with which the operations are mounted.

6. For information the U.K. air effort required to support the "JACK PINE" airlifts is summarised at the Annex to this Note.

TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS

The Concept

7. Tactical Air Operations are planned to reflect the determination of the three Powers to maintain their right of air access to Berlin. There is a risk, however, that the adoption of such methods could precipitate war by miscalculation based on misunderstanding. It is therefore considered crucial that operations of this type should be conducted in such a manner that their purpose is made manifestly clear to all nations. Thus, any intervention by the Soviets would be seen to be deliberate and provocative. In support of this submission it is recommended that the "probe" force employed should not only be compact but be of sufficient size to be credible. It should have a close fighter escort which, although unlikely to be able to afford any significant protection to the transport aircraft within the confines of the Corridors, would nevertheless be plainly visible to the Soviet/German D.R.

8. In the light of this concept, Indirect Support operations, as detailed in "JACK PINE", are unacceptable as a possible course of action - being of little tactical value and too indeterminate in character to reflect their true purpose.

N.A.T.O. Preparedness

9. No mention is made in "JACK PINE" of the accepted view<sup>®</sup> that "more elaborate measures" will only be undertaken with the concurrence of other N.A.T.O. powers, and only after full preparation has been made for global war.

Soviet Air Intervention

10. It is not clear from para. 3(a) of Annex 'A' to "JACK PINE" whether the aircraft that is presupposed to have been shot or forced down is part of a probe flight or engaged in normal operations in one of the airlifts.

® C.O.S. 1205/23/9/59



Furthermore, no guidance is given as to what action should be taken by the transport aircraft when attacked - other than reporting the fact to the G.C.I. This has been the subject of some disagreement between the three Powers but it is important that it should now be resolved so that detailed national supporting plans may be completed.

#### G.C.I. Control

11. "JACK PINE" stipulates that the G.C.I. at Auenhausen is to exercise close control of fighters in the Central Corridor. Trials have shown, however, that when aircraft are restricted to 9,000 to 10,000ft. this cannot be achieved satisfactorily beyond 25 n.m. east of the zonal border. This limitation can be overcome either by positioning mobile radar equipment forward of the Type 80 Station or by flying the aircraft at 18,000 to 20,000ft. The first of these two alternatives is considered to be the best as it allows greater flexibility of aircraft operation, but it does have the disadvantage that whereas "JACK PINE" presupposes the use of existing N.A.F.O. lines of communication, an extension of these would be required to join the mobile radar unit with the Tactical Headquarters at Auenhausen.

12. It is noted that no mention is made in "JACK PINE" of the maximum altitude at which aircraft may operate or under what circumstances, if any, the accepted height of 10,000ft. may be exceeded.

#### Jet/Turbo-Prop Aircraft

13. It is considered that there would be a legitimate requirement for transport aircraft under close escort to be of the jet/turbo-prop type so that their speed may be compatible with that of the fighter.

#### RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR TRI-ROUTE FIGHTER AIRCRAFT

14. The Rules of Engagement detailed in "JACK PINE" are considered to be insufficiently precise. In the context of these Rules the terms "immediate pursuit" and "is authorised" cause confusion. It is not clear in the circumstances described whether fighters may of their own accord engage in immediate pursuit or whether authority from the G.C.I. is first required. Furthermore, it is not clear whether fighters do or do not require authority from the ground to open fire when engaged in immediate pursuit - a particularly relevant point if the pursuit has taken them outside the Corridor.

15. It is considered that the Rules of Engagement need to be re-drafted explaining clearly:-

- (a) That fighters may only open fire of their own accord if Allied aircraft are actually fired upon.
- (b) By whose authority the fighters may open fire in other circumstances, e.g., when in immediate pursuit or when enemy fighters assume a threatening position from which they could open fire.
- (c) The action to be taken if a transport aircraft is attacked after straying outside the Corridor.
- (d) The distance to which fighters may pursue enemy aircraft outside the Corridor.

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MISQUOTATION

16. The definition of "operational control" in para. 1(c) of the Basic Plan quoted from HC57/1 is incorrect.

SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS

17. It is considered that:-

(a) The Chiefs of Staff may wish to note the following points:-

(i) There is no major criticism of the plans for Air Transport Operations detailed in "JACK PINE" apart from the fact that the right of individual Governments to act independently in "TRIPLE PLAY" appears to have been withdrawn.

(ii) The G.C.I. at Aachenhausen does not provide satisfactory radar cover for aircraft flying at 10,000ft. throughout the length of the Central Corridor. Two possible courses of action to overcome this limitation are:-

(a) Aircraft to fly at 18,000 to 20,000ft.

(b) A mobile radar unit to be provided forward of the existing Type 80 Station.

(iii) It is considered that there is a legitimate requirement for jet or turbo-prop transport aircraft in operations which necessitate close fighter escort.

(iv) To implement satisfactorily and quickly the "JACK PINE" Air Transport and Air Tactical operations there is a need for Federal Government participation in certain aspects of the planning.

(v) HC57/1 has been misquoted in "JACK PINE" in the definition of "operational control".

(b) The Chiefs of Staff may wish to inform SACEUR of the following observations:-

(i) It is our view that mention should be made in "JACK PINE" that only with the concurrence of the N.A.T.O. powers and only after full preparation has been made for global war should tactical air operations be undertaken.

(ii) It is our belief that tactical air operations should be so planned that any intervention by the Soviets would be seen to be deliberate and provocative. To achieve this and to give credibility to these operations the "probe" should comprise a compact and sizeable transport force with fighters in Direct Support. Indirect Support should be excluded from the Plan as a possible course of action.

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- (iii) We consider that the instructions for transport aircraft in the event of attack should be more detailed; likewise, the Rules of Engagement for fighter aircraft should be more precise for the reasons given in paras. 13 and 14 of this Note.
- (iv) We recommend that as G.C.I. Auenhausen does not give satisfactory radar control throughout the length of the Central Corridor for aircraft flying at 10,000ft., it should be supplemented by a mobile radar unit positioned forward of this Type 80 Station. If this be accepted the "JACK PINE" communications network would have to be extended to support this unit.
- (v) We note that no mention has been made in "JACK PINE" of the circumstances in which aircraft may operate above the accepted height of 10,000ft. in the Corridors.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W. 1.

19TH SEPTEMBER, 1960.

NOTE 4 (129)

9/27/60

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CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX

TO

C.O.S. (60) 52TH MEETING HELD ON TUESDAY, 27TH SEPTEMBER, 1960

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

(Previous Reference: COS(60)57th Meeting, Minute 6)

1. SIR FRANCIS FRSTING recalled that at their meeting on Tuesday, 20th September, 1960, they had invited the Foreign Office to consider the desirability of making a new political approach on Berlin Contingency Planning to the other tripartite powers, without waiting until the new American administration assumed office. He invited the Foreign Office representative to give his views on this.

MR. KILLICK (Foreign Office) said that the Foreign Office shared the anxieties of the Chiefs of Staff over the continued political differences between the tripartite powers on Berlin contingency planning. The fundamental point of difference lay in the American belief that if the more elaborate military measures were carried out they would effectively call the Russian bluff and cause them to climb down, a belief which was not shared by the United Kingdom.

Recent events, such as Mr. Khrushchev's speech to the United Nations and current East German activities, had not caused the Foreign Office to change their view that the Russians did not intend to create a real crisis over Berlin until the new United States President was in office. For example, in recent diplomatic exchanges the Russians had in no way disclaimed their responsibility for Allied traffic. However, if they were to do this or to attempt to interfere with civil aircraft on the pretext of preventing meetings of "revanchistes", then the situation would be quite different. He believed that the Russian purpose in creating a new Berlin crisis would be to force the Western powers, particularly the United States Government, into a Summit Conference. In engineering this conference they would aim to create the maximum humiliation for the United States so as to gain the strongest moral position from which to obtain concessions.

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Turning to the question of the advisability of making a fresh approach to the Americans at this stage, he pointed out that the present U.S. Administration was on its last legs and the Foreign Office believed that it would be fruitless to attempt to thrash out any matters of major importance with them now. He had just returned from Washington where it was notable that the forthcoming election tended to make the Americans unwilling to discuss minor matters whilst on major matters they tended to take a much tougher line than usual. Berlin contingency planning was a major matter and if we attempted to discuss this problem with them now, he believed that they would adopt an even more inflexible attitude.

In discussion the point was made that there was evidence that the Russians were exercising restraint on the East Germans. It seemed improbable that Khrushchev was bluffing in his desire for a Summit Conference after the elections and accordingly it seemed unlikely that he would play his Berlin card before the New Year.

## THE COMMITTEE:-

- (1) Took note of the views expressed by the Foreign Office representative.

## 3. Operation JACK PINE

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(Previous Reference: CCS(60)51:1 Meeting, Minute 4)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a memorandum by the Air Ministry, which examined a tripartite plan (JACK PINE)X for Berlin Airlift and Air Access Contingencies which had been prepared by CINC USAF, approved by General Horstad and forwarded to the tripartite military authorities for the preparation of national supporting plans.

SIR THOMAS PIKE said that the JACK PINE Plan collated existing United Kingdom airlift plans and was generally acceptable subject to revision in the light of certain points made in the report by the Air Ministry. However, he wished to withdraw two of those points. ~~He first, at paragraph 7(b)(i), referred to the need to point out that the co-ordination of the NATO powers and full preparations for global war were required before medical air operations were undertaken; this view had already been expressed to General Horstad on another occasion, and he believed that it would be impolitic to restate it in this context. Secondly, paragraph 7(b)(ii), recommended that indirect support by fighter aircraft should be excluded from the plan; he believed that General Horstad should be allowed freedom of action in his contingency planning and that accordingly the Committee should not support this recommendation.~~

In discussion the following points were made:-

- (a) It was essential that the rules for engagement by fighters and the action to be taken by transport aircraft should be more precisely stated.

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x CCS(60)153

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- (b) The tripartite Governments had already agreed to the conclusion of a paper prepared by the Embassies in Bonn which stated that if Allied air contingency plans were put into effect the appropriate Allied Air Commanders should have discretion to order flights over 10,000 feet or below 2,500 feet in the Berlin corridors. This point should be mentioned in the letter to General Norstad.
- (c) Although JACK FINE inferred that the unanimous agreement of the Three Powers was required to carry out the evacuation of nationals, there was nothing to stop them acting unilaterally if they so desired. However, it was difficult to visualise circumstances when such unilateral action might be warranted.
- (d) The three Embassies in Bonn were responsible for dealing with the Federal German Republic over arrangements connected with Berlin contingency planning, and since they had approved the Plan it could be assumed that German participation in planning was adequately covered.
- (e) The speed of modern fighter aircraft made it impossible to guarantee that transport aircraft could be protected by these fighter aircraft. Moreover, the Russians might not need to resort to interception by fighters since it appeared that a SAGW complex was being constructed around Berlin.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (2) Approved the report of the Air Ministry, subject to deletion of paragraphs (i) and (ii).
- (3) Instructed the Air Ministry to prepare a draft letter to General Norstad, accompanied with their views as expressed in the report.
- (4) Took note that the Chief of the Defence Staff would submit the report to the Minister of Defence and seek his approval for the reply to be sent to General Norstad.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

27TH SEPTEMBER, 1960.

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CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX

IC

C.O.S. (60) 61ST Meeting held on  
TUESDAY, 4TH OCTOBER, 1960

2. MEETING WITH SIR FRANK ROBERTS

SIR FRANCIS PESTING welcomed Sir Frank Roberts, United Kingdom Parliament Representative on the North Atlantic Council, to the meeting and said that since this was the last opportunity open to them before he relinquished his appointment the Committee would welcome his views on the present Franco-German relations in NATO.

1. Recorded in the Secretary's Standard File

D. SIR FRANK ROBERTS said that the Committee would be aware that for a long time the French had refused to allow stockpiles of nuclear weapons, under United States control, to be established in France for their forces assigned to NATO since they considered that such an arrangement amounted to a surrender of French sovereignty over an area of French soil. In a recent telegram he had drawn attention to a Franco/United States agreement in which the French had now agreed to the stockpiling of nuclear weapons in Germany for their forces stationed there. This was a step forward, although objections to stockpiles in France still remained. He believed, however, that the precedent established by this agreement might be turned to advantage when the deployment of BR-1's came to be considered.

SIR FRANCIS PESTING thanked Sir Frank Roberts for attending their meeting. On behalf of the Committee he expressed his warm appreciation for the help and assistance they had received from him during his term as United Kingdom Parliament Representative on the North Atlantic Council, and he wished him every good fortune in his new and exciting appointment to which he was going.

THE COMMITTEE warmly endorsed the views of the Acting Chief of the Defence Staff.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S. 1. 1.

4TH OCTOBER, 1960.

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10/5/60

1. NATO POLICY IN EUROPE

THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE said he had decided to submit the paper before the meeting (COS 1283/30/9/60), subject to any amendments that might be agreed, to the Prime Minister as a statement of present thinking rather than as a submission to the Defence Committee. He would explain that the Chiefs of Staff were still working on some of the problems; that the ideas of the United States administration were known also to be in a state of flux and that he, the Minister, was to meet General Norstad on 10th October. His intention in discussion with General Norstad was to introduce some of these ideas in order to find out how General Norstad's thinking had developed rather than to attempt to impose on him specific revisions of NATO strategy. However, although for the moment our approach could be exploratory and without commitment, it would not be possible for us to continue to sit on the fence indefinitely and it would not be long before the Government would have to make up their minds on the questions raised in the paper.

2. THE CHIEF OF THE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF (representing C.D.S.) said that the Chiefs of Staff would support this approach. They had discussed it the previous day and would like to raise certain points.

3. In the ensuing discussion the following points were made:-

- (a) The paper should be entitled "NATO Policy in Europe".
- (b) It was undesirable to suggest that there were military grounds for resisting SACEUR's European MRBM scheme. The bracketed passage at the end of paragraph 2 (c) and paragraph 13(f) should therefore be deleted.
- (c) The last sentence of paragraph 6 should be deleted.
- (d) A sentence should be added at the end of paragraph 12 making it clear that even though the lowest priority would be given to preparing for continued attack after a nuclear exchange the West would in such circumstances continue to fight with whatever forces were available.
- (e) Paragraph 13(e) should be amended to make it clear that the United Kingdom and most other NATO countries had not in fact built up stocks for a ninety-day war so that savings from abandoning this concept would be more apparent than real.
- (f) Paragraph 15 could be shortened and should merely repeat the point in the Minister's brief for the Prime Minister on his visit to New York that any proposals for revising NATO strategy must be presented in such a way as to avoid any possible impression that we were wriggling out of our NATO commitments.

4. In a general discussion of the nuclear weapons that should be in the hands of SACEUR (paragraphs 8 and 9 of the paper) the point was made that it would be a mistake if it were taken as



dogma that the release of any nuclear weapon in Europe would necessarily lead to escalation; on the other hand this very fear was part of the effectiveness of the deterrent. In the subsequent discussion it was suggested that while the possibility of a "third course" between conventional war and all-out nuclear war should be examined, if it turned out that no such course existed it would follow that SACEUR must not be allowed to release a single nuclear weapon until the United States President and the British Prime Minister had decided to release the strategic nuclear forces. It was also suggested that doubts in the Russian mind about the effectiveness of the control mechanism might make a contribution to the deterrent.

5. THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE said that two problems could be distinguished:-

- (a) The tendency of United States thinking to return to the idea of stronger conventional forces, which we could support in principle but which might lead to demands on the United Kingdom and other NATO countries for very expensive additional contributions to the conventional shield.
- (b) The question of control over nuclear weapons, the distinction between tactical and strategic weapons and the problems of communication in a nuclear battle.

These questions were not ripe for discussion at the Chequers meeting. The paper as written did not prejudice the study of a possible "third course" and it could be argued that it was better to leave these questions of control in doubt and not to write the rules in advance.

6. THE CHAIRMAN, BRITISH DEFENCE STAFFS, WASHINGTON, said the paper as it stood would not cause him any difficulty. It did not contradict current NATO strategy except in saying that after the strategic deterrent had been unloosed "fighting as we know it will be over". This would not be acceptable to the Americans. It was clear in the light of discussion that he would have to continue to stall in discussion of the Minister's paper OM (60) 29 on NATO Defence Planning.

7. THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE

- (1) Approved the paper subject to the amendments agreed in discussion.
- (2) Said he would forward it under a suitable covering note to the Prime Minister.
- (3) Invited the Chairman, BDS, Washington to continue to stall on the draft Military Committee report on the Minister's paper on NATO Defence Planning (CM (60) 29).

Robert to Po (Robert)

10/7/60

U.K. Del. N.A.T.O. telegram No. 252 to Foreign Office

-4-

- (e) Norstad was definite that the only available weapon within the 1963 time period was Polaris, but he seemed equally confident that the proposed N.A.T.O. scheme for 1964, etc., should be based upon the new and smaller version which would then be available. With its truck it would weigh no more than the Polaris alone and could be moved on all European roads thus giving complete mobility. None, in his view, need be stationed in particular countries least of all in Germany but would move about within wider areas. He claimed that these weapons would be cheaper even than existing aircraft. A reliable costings expert had estimated the cost of each unit complete with truck, etc., at one million dollars, this cost being based upon a production line of 1,000.
- (f) General Norstad made it clear that he did not want to station medium-range missiles on German territory and that this was also the very strongly held position of the German Government although they could not refuse their cooperation in any agreed N.A.T.O. strategy. It was important to crystallize this position while Adenauer was still in control.
- (g) General Norstad thought that the Jupiters in Italy and Turkey already under his command might be brought into the new arrangements and suggested that it might be politically advantageous to us, as well as to other N.A.T.O. governments, if the United Kingdom based Thors were also brought in although Thors and Jupiters would be obsolescent by 1963.
- (h) General Norstad explained his "constraints" policy under which targets in the satellites and still more in East Germany are only subjected to a relatively low nuclear yield.

7. The telegram containing the agreed position of the State and Defence Departments concluded that the Administration would if necessary propose legislation to implement the above scheme. General Norstad explained that some legal advisers considered that the President could act on his own authority.

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E.R.

COPY

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON.

17th October, 1960.

In my letter of 5th October I reported American ideas on N.A.T.O. ten-year planning other than the military aspects. Today Kohler filled in this gap and gave me a preview of the U.S. proposals on M.R.B.Ms for N.A.T.O. He said that apart from M. Spaak I was the first person to be given this preview, although he believed General Norstadt had given a general idea to the Lord Privy Seal. He begged that we should keep all this for the moment on a strict need-to-know basis. He said he was still unable to give me a paper but he proceeded to expound the U.S. ideas orally.

2. The American aim was to produce a plan which would promote the cohesion of N.A.T.O. and give to the European countries the assurance that the necessary weapons for the defence of Europe would be available for the duration of the North Atlantic Treaty and that the U.S. Government could not block the use of those weapons in the event of an attack in Europe.

3. The American proposal was accordingly for the constitution of a permanent M.R.B.M. force under SACEUR. The targeting of this force would be co-ordinated by SACEUR with the U.K. Bomber Force and SAC.

4. The U.S.A. would offer to commit to N.A.T.O. five POLARIS submarines. These would be deployed before the end of 1963 at which moment they would represent half of the U.S. vessels of that type in service. These five submarines were intended to be a permanent contribution to N.A.T.O. and the U.S. Government would undertake not to withdraw them from N.A.T.O. without the consent of the North Atlantic Council.

5. Pending the establishment of the permanent force, these five submarines would represent an interim force which would be available for use:-

- (a) by order of SACEUR in the event of a Soviet nuclear attack on the N.A.T.O. area;
- (b) under existing N.A.T.O. procedures or any new procedures which might be agreed by the North Atlantic Council;
- (c) by the U.S.A. in self-defence. (Mr. Kohler said that strictly speaking this was unnecessary since it was covered by "existing N.A.T.O. procedures" in (b) above, but it seemed as well to spell it out).

Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh, K.C.M.G., C.B.,  
Foreign Office.

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Hand to  
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- E.R.

6. Mr. Kohler said the American lawyers were still considering whether the steps described above (notably the commitment of U.S. submarines and the delegation of authority to SACEUR) could be taken by the President on his own authority, or whether some legislation would be necessary. If the latter should prove to be the case, the U.S. Government pledged themselves to do whatever was necessary.

7. As regards the permanent force, the U.S. Government would expect other N.A.T.O. governments to contribute 100 M.R.B.Ms during the course of 1964 to supplement the five U.S. submarines. The Americans considered that this permanent force should be organised on the basis of multilateral ownership, financing and control and, to the extent feasible, mixed manning (i.e. international crews drawn from the various N.A.T.O. countries). In order that this force should constitute an effective deterrent the Americans suggest that the formula for its use should be:-

- (a) as in paragraph 5(a) above, i.e. that in the event of a Soviet nuclear attack on the N.A.T.O. area SACEUR would order the force into action without the need to obtain any further authority;
- (b) under any procedures which may be agreed by the North Atlantic Council.

Kohler remarked here that any provision comparable to paragraph 5(c) above would of course be inappropriate since national ownership would have lapsed.

8. If a plan on these lines was worked out and agreed by N.A.T.O. the U.S.A. would do its best to help with the supply of both missiles and equipment. The Americans thought that the entire force ought to be sea-borne though not necessarily in submarines. Surface vessels would be cheaper. Kohler quoted a figure of \$225 million for a surface vessel as opposed to \$750 million for a submarine. A sea-borne force would avoid the political complications involved in basing M.R.B.Ms on land.

9. The Americans would also indicate their readiness to discuss further possibilities, by which is meant not only the provision of new types of weapons but also the expansion of the permanent M.R.B.M. force to take in other types of nuclear weapons. What seemed to be in Kohler's mind was that if once a truly international N.A.T.O. force had been created under SACEUR this might well look after all the nuclear weapons in the N.A.T.O. Armoury, e.g. "Honest John" or "Thor" or "Jupiter". Kohler was however very insistent that the wider possibilities should not be allowed to prejudice the consideration of the immediate American proposal.

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10. I enquired what was the position about warheads. He replied that under the interim arrangements the warheads would of course remain in American custody, though SACEUR would have authority to mate them with the missile and without reference to the President. This arrangement might suffice also for the permanent force but the U.S.A. would be very ready to discuss this matter in the North Atlantic Council and they did not in any way rule out some arrangement whereby the warheads would be placed under N.A.T.O. custody.

11. The American paper when it finally appears, will also contain an injunction to all N.A.T.O. countries to strengthen their conventional forces.

12. Kohler said he hoped the French would be able to accept a plan of this kind. He attached great importance to French participation and suggested that, even if this was not forthcoming at the outset, we should leave the door open for them to come in later on.

13. So much for the substance of the American plan. Now, as regards the future timetable. Apart from the legal studies which are not yet complete (see paragraph 6 above) the Administration have still to take soundings with members of Congress. It is unlikely therefore that the plan will be finalised until round about the date of the Elections. At that point the next step would be an approach to General de Gaulle. This would probably take the form of a message from the President who would simultaneously send messages to the Prime Minister and Doctor Adenauer expressing the hope that they would use their influence with General de Gaulle to secure favourable reception for the American proposals. Communications to the North Atlantic Council would follow.

14. Kohler concluded his exposé by saying that he hoped very much that the American plan would commend itself to the U.K. and that he would warmly welcome any comments. I promised to report at once to London what he had told me and would hope to have something to tell him before long.

15. There may still be time to influence American thinking if we can give them our comments by the end of the month. My guess is however that they would not take kindly to any suggestions for drastic changes. I have no doubt that an immense amount of effort and inter-departmental discussion has gone into the production of this plan. They seem to have tried hard to meet some of the major objections we raised to earlier plans and I hope very much that we shall be able to go along with this one which contains a remarkably generous offer and some imaginative thinking.

I am sending a copy to John Shattock and to Peter Ramsbotham, and enclose two extra copies.

Defe 5/108

10/24/60

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G.O.S.(60)296

24TH OCTOBER, 1960.

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING  
ADVANCE TRAINING FOR OPERATION "TRADE WIND"

Note (MO1/P(60)356) by the War Office  
dated 24th October, 1960

Introduction

As a result of General NORSTAD's Chief of Staff asking<sup>+</sup> C-in-C BAOR to re-examine the possibility of advance training for the TRADE WIND force under cover of the SHAPE mobile force, C-in-C BAOR has written<sup>%</sup> to General MOORE reaffirming his belief<sup>@</sup> that such training should be limited to discussions of plans and possibly cloth model exercises.

- 2. C-in-C BAOR gives as his reasons for this:-
  - (a) His view that security would inevitably be jeopardised by more extensive training; and that this would be wrong.
  - (b) His belief that since the Tripartite Governments will take a long time to decide the launch operation TRADE WIND, there is no need, from a military point of view to try to shorten the time (16 days) required to mount it.
- 3. General NORSTAD has now asked<sup>§</sup> the Chief of the Defence Staff to agree to his ordering C-in-C BAOR to assemble and train the TRADE WIND FORCE.

Aim

- 4. To examine General NORSTAD's request and to draft a reply.

+ Appendix B to Annex to COS 1120/29/8/60  
 % COS 1334/11/10/60  
 @ Appendix A to Annex to COS 1120/29/8/60  
 § Annex B to COS 1334/11/10/60

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Comment.

5. We agree on military grounds with the view of C-in-C B/LOR that it would be wrong to sacrifice the security of Operation TRADE WIND in the interest of time saving. We further support his doubts concerning the feasibility of achieving security in the circumstances. We assume, however, that there would be overriding political objections<sup>a</sup> to our refusing, at this stage, General NORSTAD's request since it would imply rejection of his opinion and would probably reopen the whole issue of Operation TRADE WIND, detailed plans of which have already been approved by the UNITED KINGDOM.

6. In order to provide as much security as possible, we consider that the advance training should be conducted under a cover plan and that the SHAPE Mobile Force provides the best, though not ideal, solution.

7. Furthermore in view of General NORSTAD's reference to the implementation of Operation TRADE WIND immediately on the direction of the three Governments, we consider that we should remind him of our conviction that Operation TRADE WIND should only be implemented when the NATO nations have been fully prepared for Global War.

Recommendation.

8. The War Office recommends that the Chiefs of Staff agree to the despatch of the draft letter to General NORSTAD at Annex 'A'.

<sup>a</sup> COS(60) 59th Meeting, Item 1.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

24TH OCTOBER, 1960.

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Annex A

General LAURIS NORSTAD USAF.  
Commander in Chief UNITED STATES Forces, EUROPE.

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING.  
ADVANCE TRAINING FOR OPERATION TRADE WIND

1. The UNITED KINGDOM Chiefs of Staff have considered the proposal in your letter ECLO 600/73 dated 7th October 1960.
2. We now agree to your issuing a directive to the Commander in Chief British Army of the Rhine to assemble and train the TRADE WIND Force and to continue this training on a recurring basis as may be necessary.
3. We consider that a SHAPE Mobile Force Exercise would offer the best Cover Plan for this training although we doubt whether in practice this will achieve security.
4. We must, however, remind you of our view that Operation TRADE WIND should only be implemented when the NATO nations have been fully prepared for global war.



Defe 4/130

10/25/60

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CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX

TO

C.O.S. (60) 66TH MEETING HELD ON  
TUESDAY, 25TH OCTOBER, 1960

2. BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING  
A. Designation of: a Single Commander for Berlin

(Previous Reference: C.O.S. (60) 53rd Meeting, Minute 3 A)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a Secretary's Minute<sup>+</sup> covering<sup>\*</sup> a letter from General Norstad to the Chief of the Defence Staff on the proposal that a single Commander for Berlin should be designated in peacetime. Two further Secretary's Minutes covering<sup>\*</sup> a draft reply to General Norstad and<sup>o</sup> copies of two letters from General Ely to General Norstad were also relevant to their discussion.

LORD MOUNTBATTEN recalled that in the reply<sup>o</sup> which had been sent on the 19th September, 1960, to General Norstad's proposal to designate a single Commander for Berlin, the United Kingdom had agreed that the United States Commandant should be so designated in so far as military responsibility was concerned, but with the reservation that he should not be given executive responsibility without further consultation with the tripartite powers. General Norstad had now replied to the effect that he was concerned that the United Kingdom's reservation might result in unacceptable delay in setting up a unified command and that this would endanger West Berlin security; General Norstad believed that this danger might arise in the event of an overt armed attack on West Berlin or in the case of a sudden grave civil disturbance. General Norstad therefore requested that he should be authorised to give the United States Commandant in Berlin the executive responsibility in either of these two circumstances, if necessary without the prior approval of the Governments, although of course he would seek such approval in advance if the situation allowed time for consultation.

+ COS. 1335/11/10/60

\* COS. 1304/21/10/60

o COS. 1390/21/10/60

o Annex A to COS. 1242/22/9/60

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General Ely, in his two letters<sup>6</sup> to General Norstad, had said that his Government approved in principle the designation of the United States Commandant as the single Commander for Berlin; the French considered that the appointment should become effective automatically in the event that West Berlin was fired upon; but in the event of some other grave crisis only by decision of the three Governments. The French believed that it could be taken for granted that in time of tension, or in the event of a sudden emergency, the three Commandants would maintain such close liaison that the step from this to the unified command could be taken very quickly once governmental approval was given.

LORD MOUNTBATTEN said that he believed that General Norstad should be authorised at his discretion to give the United States Commandant in Berlin executive responsibility as the single Commander of the tripartite garrison in the event of an overt armed attack on any scale against West Berlin. He doubted, however, whether a grave civil disturbance was likely to occur so suddenly as to preclude prior consultation. The alternatives before the Committee were, first, to take the line followed by the French and subsequently, if pressed, to fall back on the line contained in the draft reply they had before them; or, secondly, to adhere to the views expressed in the draft reply regardless of the French views.

In discussion the following point was made:-

- (a) The draft reply took account of the views of Her Majesty's Ambassador in Bonn and of the General Officer Commanding Berlin, and they, as the men on the spot, were well qualified to advise on the best course. However, a final decision must lie with Ministers. A suitable compromise might be found by amending the penultimate paragraph of the draft reply to read as follows:-

"We would expect time to permit prior consultation with Governments in the event of sudden grave civil disturbance, but should time not permit, we are prepared to agree that you should act on the joint recommendation of the three Commandants."

THE COMMITTEES:-

- (1) Approved the draft letter as amended at (a) above,  
% COS.1390/24/10/60

B. More Elaborate Military Measures

(Previous Reference: C.O.S.(60)53rd Meeting, Minute 30)

THE COMMITTEES had before them a Secretary's Minute covering a letter from General Norstad to the Chief of the Defence Staff which asked for concurrence to the issue of instructions to the Commander-in-Chief, British Army of the Rhine, to carry out further planning for the composition, command, assembly and logistic support of a tripartite division sized force.

≠ COS.1336/11/10/60

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LORD MOUNTBATTEN recalled that they had informed<sup>Q</sup> General Norstad, in reply to his request<sup>a</sup> for United Kingdom concurrence in planning for the use of a force of divisional size in an operation to restore ground access to Berlin, that they held to their view that in the circumstances envisaged a force of battalion size, backed by the ultimate threat of nuclear power, would be sufficient to compel the Russians to face the imminence of nuclear war. They had suggested that the LIVE OAK Group should carry out a feasibility study of the proposed divisional operation before planning was started.

General Norstad had now replied<sup>x</sup> that he had no particular operation in mind, but that he felt that it would be prudent to prepare plans for the composition, command, assembly and logistic support of the tripartite force of divisional size since he could not rule out the possibility of a set of circumstances arising in which such a force could be employed.

Apart from the fact that it was a waste of effort, there was no particular difficulty involved in carrying out such planning. Moreover, the United Kingdom had agreed<sup>z</sup> in December, 1959, to the initiation of military contingency planning to cover any likely contingency, and it would be difficult now to deny General Norstad's right to order such planning as he deemed necessary.

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*Mrly  
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proposed*

In discussion the following points were made:-

- (b) The Committee had always considered that a divisional plan was even more militarily unsound than a plan for a Battalion operation. There was a risk that if CINC BAOR prepared such a plan, he would be regarded as the sponsor of it and would thereby be put in a difficult position.
- (c) If the LIVE OAK Group were to carry out a feasibility study of the divisional operation, and if they came to the conclusion that it was not a practicable proposition, the pressure on us to agree to the preparation of the plan would be eased.
- (d) The point made by General Norstad that he was not contemplating any particular operation was not compatible with his paper<sup>y</sup> on more elaborate military measures which specifically laid down the objective and mission for any tripartite military ground action.
- (e) In view of the delicacy of the subject it might be best not to send a formal reply to General Norstad on this matter at this stage; rather it might be preferable for the Chief of the Defence Staff to represent their misgivings verbally to General Norstad when he met him on the 4th November, 1950, and to seek again to persuade him to initiate the feasibility study. If, however, General Norstad would not give way, there would be no option but to agree to the preparation of the divisional plan, subject to the reservation that all such contingency plans were without commitment.

Q Annex G to COS.12/2/22/9/60  
& Annex to COS.1117/26/8/60  
x COS.1336/11/10/60  
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THE COMMITTEE:-

- (2) Took note of the points made in discussion.

C. Advance training for Operation  
TRADE WIND

(Previous Reference: C.O.S. (60) 50th Meeting, Minute 3)

C.O.S. (60) 296

THE COMMITTEE had before them a report by the War Office examining a proposal by General Norstad that training for operation TRADE WIND should take place and that the CINC BAOR, should be directed to assemble the force and to carry out such training. A Secretary's minute<sup>x</sup> was relevant to the discussion.

LORD MOUNTBATTEN recalled that in pursuance of General Norstad's desire to reduce the 14 days necessary to mount operation TRADE WIND, his Chief of Staff had requested the CINC BAOR to develop plans for advance training of the force. This training would be undertaken under cover of exercises for the mobile force which was being formed in Allied Command Europe. CINC BAOR had replied that he foresaw grave security risks to such training and since the cover plan suggested would not deceive a trained observer, training should be restricted to discussions and cloth model exercises for the unit and sub-unit Commander of the battalion group. General Norstad had now sought<sup>x</sup> the Committee's approval to the issue of a directive to CINC BAOR, instructing him to assemble and train the TRADE WIND forces. The Committee would be aware that the composition and equipment of the two forces were entirely different; the mobile force was designed to be air transportable and comprised complete units from NATO forces under SAGEUR's command except the French, whereas the TRADE WIND force was certainly not air transportable and would consist of mixed units from the Tripartite Powers. The risk that security would be broken by the proposed training was therefore very real. However, he did not believe that General Norstad's request could properly be resisted and accordingly he suggested that the Committee should endorse the recommendation of the report before them; but Ministerial authority would have to be sought before a reply could be made to General Norstad.

In discussion the following point was made:-

(f) The United States authorities might feel there was an advantage in the disclosure of the existence of a plan to restore autobahn access to Berlin. At present their policy was to take every opportunity to demonstrate the firmness of purpose and complete agreement of the allies in order to discourage the Russians from signing a separate treaty with East Germany. This had been reflected in the West German attitude to access to Berlin and to their trade with East Germany. However, in the particular context of Berlin Contingency Planning it was difficult to present a picture of allied unity so long as such planning was exclusive to the Tripartite Powers.

x COS. 1334/11/10/60

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THE COMMITTEE:-

(3) Approved the Note by the War Office.

Summing up the whole discussion, LORD MOUNTBATTEN said that the Americans had consistently pressed for energetic action in all fields of Berlin contingency planning and especially on the more elaborate measures. Their pressure on us was being strongly exerted at all levels: by General Norstad, who in turn was believed to be under pressure from the Pentagon; by Mr. Harter on the Foreign Secretary, and by the United States Ambassador in London and members of his staff on the Foreign Office. It was for consideration whether it was best to send formal replies to General Norstad now, or to wait until he, Lord Mountbatten, met General Norstad on the 4th November, 1960, when he would have an opportunity of explaining the United Kingdom views and of obtaining General Norstad's reactions; a formal reply could follow this discussion and would take account of its outcome. He suggested that he should seek the views of the Minister of Defence on the handling of these matters.

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THE COMMITTEE:-

(4) Endorsed the views of the Chief of the Defence Staff and took note that he would approach the Minister of Defence on the lines agreed in discussion.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.S.1.

25TH OCTOBER, 1960.

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Reference:-

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Defence Org.  
NATO-TRBT's (102)

PRIME MINISTER

N.A.T.O. M.R.B.M.

The United States plan, of which our Embassy has now been given an "official preview" by the State Department, is described in paragraphs 3 - 8 of P.N.W.N./P.(60) 3. The conclusions which officials of the Departments concerned have so far formed are set out in paragraphs 39 and 40 of the same paper. These sections are all that you need read of the report.

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Your meeting should concentrate on the nature of the response which we should now make to the United States authorities. Should we make a serious attempt to co-operate in some plan (though not their present one) to meet the aims which we have in view - to reassure the European members of N.A.T.O.? Or should we continue to do what we have so far done at various stages with this N.A.T.O. M.R.B.M. proposition, namely to avoid any commitment and to play the question along, in the hope that the project will die away?

Clearly we cannot accept the plan as it stands. Quite apart from the financial burden that it would entail there are strong political objections to it, particularly as regards the absence of any political control over SACEUR's use of nuclear weapons. These are summarised in paragraph 39 (h) - (i) of the report. In any case, there are grave doubts as to the value of any plan as unlikely as this one to have attractions for the French Government.

Nevertheless, the other Departments (and I) agreed with the Foreign Office view that we must take a constructive attitude towards this plan. Officials believe that the time has now come when we should be ready to consider transferring some part of our independent nuclear capability into N.A.T.O. This, I feel sure, is the way our policy is bound to develop. It may be that the time has already passed when we might have

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on their use in an emergency. On the other hand, the fact that some part of the nuclear power of the West was in the hands of NATO as a whole might make it appear to the Soviet leaders that, in circumstances short of global war, these weapons were more likely to be used than if control rested with the United States alone. They might therefore be less inclined to threaten the smaller NATO countries with nuclear retaliation if they thought these countries themselves had a call on nuclear weapons, particularly of this range and yield.

24. Nevertheless in view of the probable size of the proposed MRBM forces in relation to the Western nuclear deterrent forces as a whole the effect of the American proposals on the credibility of the Western deterrent, taking account of both of the allocation of the POLARIS submarines to SACEUR and of the proposed share of NATO in the control over the use of the MRBM forces, would be insignificant.

Control

25. The Americans have made it clear that their proposals to delegate authority to SACEUR to use the MRBM force at his own discretion will relieve him of any obligation to seek clearance from the President and the Prime Minister before declaring H-hour for that part of his forces. At present HM Government can say, in view of these arrangements with the Americans about consultation, that they exert political control over SACEUR over the initiation of the use of nuclear weapons. For the United Kingdom, at least, it would be politically very difficult to give SACEUR discretion to fire MRBMs or any other nuclear weapons without prior political authority, although if Russia made a massive nuclear attack it would hardly matter whether SACEUR had been given this discretion or not. Ministers will need to consider whether we can contemplate giving this discretion to SACEUR in any circumstances at all, and if so whether it should be extended to nuclear weapons based on the United Kingdom, e.g. the THORS.

Extract working party on Policy on Nuclear Weapons for NATO  
"United States Proposals for a NATO MRBM Force"







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- (iii) We should urge the Americans to give more thought:-
- (a) to the effect of their proposals on Soviet policy, especially as regards giving the Chinese and their countries nuclear weapons;
  - (b) to the effect on British and other public opinion of any plans that could be represented as giving Germany a share in the control of the use of nuclear weapons.
- (iv) From the U.K. point of view the proposed arrangements for allowing SACEUR to use MRBMs without political authority would be very difficult and Ministers will need to consider whether it can be contemplated at all.
- (v) The proposal might require large additional expenditure, mostly in dollars.
- (vi) If Ministers do not like the American proposals we would suggest the proposals set out in paragraph 37 as an alternative to put to them for their consideration.

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S. (through A.C.D.S.)

Copies to:- D.C.D.S.  
Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee  
Director of Plans  
Mr. Wright

SACEUR'S MRBMs

1. You asked for a note, before discussing MRBMs with SACEUR on 27th July, on the nuclear retaliatory tasks mentioned in MC 48/2.
2. MC 48/2 covers the measures needed to implement the NATO Strategic Concept during the five years following its approval by the NATO Council on 9th May 1957. It was approved without prejudice to the right of any delegation to ask for reconsideration of any part of the report at a later date. The Council approved the Strategic Concept (MC 14/2) on the same day and with the same caveat.
3. The purpose of MC 48/2 is to lay down measures in sufficient detail to enable Major NATO Commanders to formulate their plans and to develop the pattern of their defence effort. The following extract is particularly relevant:-

MEASURES REQUIRED

"6. In any examination of how these advantages can best be offset and overcome, it is essential to keep in mind that in the event of general war the primary tasks of the NATO forces would be, while surviving the enemy's initial attacks, to retaliate immediately with nuclear weapons from the outset and to contain the enemy's onslaught without any intention to make a major withdrawal. To be able to carry out these tasks successfully, even in the face of a surprise nuclear attack, and to meet other threats to NATO security, the following measures are required:-

- (a) Nuclear Retaliatory Measures  
Fully effective nuclear retaliatory forces of all services, provided with all the necessary facilities and capable of the destruction of an aggressor in any circumstances, must be maintained and protected. Effective implementation procedures must be provided that will ensure the availability of nuclear weapons at the outset of hostilities. Of equal importance to the possession of these forces is the manifest determination to employ them from the outset of general war.
- (b) Shield Force Measures  
In addition to our nuclear retaliatory measures, our land, sea and air forces must be developed also to respond immediately to the task of defending the sea areas and NATO territories as far forward as possible in order to maintain the integrity

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of the NATO area, counting on the use of their nuclear weapons at the outset. We must have the ability to continue these operations in combination with the nuclear counter-offensive until the ability and will of the enemy to pursue general war has been destroyed."

4. SACEUR's current Atomic Strike Plan, based largely on aircraft delivered weapons, and his plans for the replacement of some of these aircraft with MRBMs are entirely consistent with the above quoted tasks.

5. In discussion with the Foreign Secretary on 11th July SACEUR said that:-

"...he had no desire to have a strategic nuclear deterrent in the hands of NATO. The word "strategic" anyhow was a misnomer. If he was to defend the NATO area he must have the power to do certain things. He said he did not want to bombard Moscow or Sverdlovsk, but there were certain military tasks, some of them just going over the Polish frontier into Russia, which had to be carried out."

6. There is a tendency in Whitehall to lose sight of the retaliatory tasks imposed on SACEUR by MC 48/2 because:-

- (a) He himself tends to treat them more as anti-missile and interdiction tasks, in support of the shield force battle.
- (b) We regard "retaliation" as the sole prerogative of SAC/Bomber Command.

*R. E. Baker*  
Colonel  
L/W

21st July, 1960

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CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX

TO

C.O.S.(60)50TH MEETING HELD ON  
TUESDAY, 9TH AUGUST, 1960

3. BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

(Previous Reference: C.O.S.(59)73rd Meeting, Minute 1)

C.O.S.(60)213

THE COMMITTEE considered a report by the War Office on plans by CINC BAOR for the initial probe of Soviet intentions (FREE STYLE)<sup>@</sup> and the operation to restore autobahn access to Berlin (TRADE WIND)<sup>z</sup>.

SIR EDMUND HUDLESTON said that the plans had been prepared by CINC BAOR on the instructions of General Norstad<sup>+</sup> who had approved them both and had asked that national supporting plans should be prepared for operation TRADE WIND. The report suggested that an operation to restore access to Berlin by the autobahn, in the face of Soviet or GDR opposition, would result in a military debacle and that General Norstad should be informed accordingly. He recalled that they had already informed General Norstad<sup>z</sup> in September 1959 of their view that no ground military action could by itself, reopen the autobahn to Berlin if the Soviets were determined to prevent such access. He did not consider that it would be appropriate to repeat our misgivings on the feasibility of the operation, particularly since we had made it quite clear that military planning was entirely without commitment.

In discussion the following points were made:-

- (a) It was generally agreed that it would be undesirable to inform General Norstad of their opinion of Operation TRADE WIND, as suggested in the report; at the same time, it was essential that the Minister of Defence should be left in no doubt of their view that this Operation could only result in a military disaster.

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- (b) The assumption in the report that both Operations FREE STYLE and TRADE WIND might be required as quickly as possible, once access had been closed, was not necessarily valid. There would undoubtedly be a period of political interchange before any military operation was ordered. Moreover, there was good cause to plan on the basis of an appreciable delay between the closure of the autobahn and the launching of the operation, if only to ensure that sufficient time was available for political consideration of the issues involved. Accordingly, no steps should be taken to encourage General Norstad, nor the Commander-in-Chief, British Army of the Rhine, to re-examine the minimum time in which these operations could be launched.
- (c) General Norstad had already been informed of their view that any military operation could not be confined to the autobahn once fire had been opened. Moreover, he had taken account of this view in his letter of instruction<sup>x</sup> in which he had ordered the CINC, BAOR to "assume that the force to be planned will be allowed to depart from the autobahn and will be inclusive of the force required if confined to the autobahn." Although this instruction might be considered to be somewhat involved, it did in fact give sufficient guidance to enable the CINC, BAOR to prepare a plan, and there was no need to refer back to General Norstad on this point.
- (d) Irrespective of the points made in discussion, the orders prepared by the CINC, BAOR for FREE STYLE and TRADE WIND were not objectionable in themselves, and accordingly, since the United Kingdom had agreed to military planning, they should be approved.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (1) Approved the orders by Commander-in-Chief, British Army of the Rhine for Operations FREE STYLE and TRADE WIND, and invited him to develop any supporting plans, if necessary in conjunction with the Ministry of Defence.
- (2) Took note that the Chief of the Defence Staff would inform General Norstad accordingly.
- (3) Took note that the Chief of the Defence Staff would inform the Minister of Defence of their misgivings on the concept of Operation TRADE WIND.

/ COS(59)224

x Annex to COS.535/21/4/60, paragraph 2(b)

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

9TH AUGUST, 1960.

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THE COMMITTEE:-

- (1) Invited the British Defence Co-ordination Committee (Far East) to pass copies of plan NINEPIN to the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff for information and invited the Commonwealth Relations Office to inform the High Commissioner in Wellington and the Colonial Office the Governor of Fiji of this action.
- (2) Invited the Air Ministry to examine the problem of providing air transport for plan NINEPIN in the light of (c) above.
- (3) Took note of the point at (d) above.

4. BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING -  
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION

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U.K. EYES ONLY

(Previous Reference: C.O.S.(60)50th Meeting, Minute 3)

J.P.(60)92(Final)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a report by the Joint Planning Staff examining whether, from the military point of view, West German participation in Berlin contingency planning was desirable.

SIR EDMUND HUDLESTON said that the Federal German Government had asked formally to be allowed to participate in Berlin contingency planning and the Foreign Office had requested the Chiefs of Staff views thereon. The report concluded that from the military point of view there was no need to keep the German authorities any more fully informed than at present. The issues however were not completely straightforward. There were two plans involved; first TRADEWIND, the plan to preserve road access to Berlin which did not require any German co-operation; and secondly, JACK PINE, the air access plan which required some German assistance in such things as air navigation aids and radar facilities.

In discussion the following points were made:-

- (a) The Foreign Office had asked for this examination in order to build up a strong case with which to approach the Americans if the latter weakened in the face of the German desire to be brought more fully into LIVE OAK Planning. There were strong political reasons for refusing the German request besides the military ones stated in the report. Throughout the LIVE OAK planning the aim of Her Majesty's Government had been to maintain communications with Berlin without bringing about a showdown with the Soviet Union. In pursuance of this aim the Foreign Office had with great difficulty persuaded the United States Government that in circumstances in which the East German authorities did not obstruct road access, a degree of de facto



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recognition of the East German regime would be inevitable. For example, drivers of vehicles entering the autobahn would have to show papers to East German officials. If the Federal German authorities became aware that the LIVE OAK powers were prepared to accept even this degree of recognition, they would undoubtedly react strongly and might well persuade the United States Government to withdraw their acceptance.

(b) GENERAL NORSTAD had been informed that they could not agree to the mounting of any of the more elaborate measures without prior NATO consultation. Therefore the Federal Government need have no fear that LIVE OAK operations would be undertaken without their knowledge.

(c) The following amendments were agreed:-

(i) Annex page 3, paragraph 6, line 9 delete the words "any of the Berlin contingency plans" and substitute:-  
"TRADEWIND and JACK PINE".

(ii) Annex paragraph 11(b) delete all after first sentence and substitute:-  
"If, however, this were done, it must be recognised that the feasibility of the plans, which is already rather doubtful on military grounds, would be further jeopardized by security risks and by the introduction of potentially conflicting political considerations".

THE COMMITTEE approved the report by the Joint Planning Staff as amended and invited the Ministry of Defence to forward it to the Foreign Office as an expression of their views.



Pham 11 (2897)

8/9/60

LE GÉNÉRAL DE GAULLE

PARIS, le 9 août 1960

Cher Monsieur le Président,

Votre lettre du 2 août m'apporte des indications quant à la façon dont vous envisagez la coopération tripartite que j'ai à diverses reprises, proposée à vous-même et à M. MACMILLAN. Je note que vous prévoyez une rencontre de nos Ministres des Affaires Etrangères lors de la réunion de l'Assemblée générale de l'O.N.U. ; rencontre qui, à mon avis, peut en effet être utile et qui, d'ailleurs, doit avoir lieu de toute façon. Je vois aussi que vous faites allusion à une possibilité d'entretien entre nous trois, sans toutefois parler ni de date ni de sujets. Laissez-moi vous dire cependant, en toute amitié, que votre conception me paraît trop restrictive pour aboutir à l'action commune de notre Occident et rendre notre alliance réellement plus efficace.

Son Excellence  
Monsieur Dwight D. EISENHOWER  
Président des Etats-Unis d'Amérique

.../

En ce moment même, la crise du Congo fait ressortir notre discordance. Alors qu'il eût probablement suffi de l'accord des Etats-Unis, de la Grande-Bretagne et de la France pour amener ce tout jeune Etat à prendre une voie raisonnable, les divergences de notre Occident sont, au contraire, pour beaucoup dans le fait que cette nouvelle indépendance est tombée dès ses premiers pas, dans le désordre et l'anarchie. D'autre part, nous nous trouvons en ordre dispersé devant les menées et, le cas échéant, l'intervention des Soviets au coeur de l'Afrique. Dans cette affaire, tout se passe comme si l'Occident, qui est le foyer du bon sens et de la liberté, venait à noyer volontairement ses responsabilités dans le mélange composite de l'Organisation des Nations Unies.

Il me faut vous dire que la France, en évoquant une fois de plus à cette occasion la perspective d'un conflit international, ressent plus profondément que jamais ce qu'il y a de gravement défectueux dans l'organisation de notre alliance. Dans les événements qui se déroulent d'un bout à l'autre du monde mon pays constate à chaque instant que ceux qu'il tient pour ses alliés se comportent comme s'ils

.../

ne l'étaient pas. Mais comment des Etats pourraient-ils se sentir liés quand il n'existe pas entre eux de solidarité politique en présence de ce qui se passe sur les neuf dixièmes de la terre ? Le fait que l'Alliance atlantique, telle qu'elle est, ne couvre que le secteur étroit de l'Europe de l'Ouest, alors que l'Asie continentale, l'Asie du Sud-Est, l'Asie Mineure, l'Afrique du Nord, l'Afrique Noire, l'Amérique centrale, l'Amérique du Sud, sont pleines de problèmes et de dangers bouillonnants et deviendraient, éventuellement, des théâtres d'opérations de guerre, paraît à la France inadéquat aux réalités et incompatible avec ses responsabilités mondiales.

En outre, le système d'intégration militaire appliquée à l'Alliance atlantique qui attribue en fait, aux Etats-Unis la conduite éventuelle de la guerre en Europe, l'emploi des forces qui prendraient part, la disposition entière des armes atomiques qui en seraient les moyens essentiels, retire à la France, à son peuple, à son Gouvernement, à son Commandement, la responsabilité de sa propre défense. Compte tenu des données de la cause telles qu'elles se présentaient quand fut instituée l'O. T. A. N., cet état de choses a pu naguère s'expliquer dans une certaine mesure. Vous comprenez, j'ensuis sûr, pourquoi elle est devenue aujourd'hui

inacceptable pour mon pays.

Mon cher Président, mon cher ami, j'ai le sentiment que nous avons, vous-même, M. MACMILLAN et moi, la possibilité, à la fois certaine et passagère, d'organiser une réelle coopération politique et stratégique de notre Occident en présence des multiples et dangereuses menaces qui nous assaillent. Nous le pouvons d'autant mieux que, sur le fond des problèmes, nos vues et nos intentions sont sans doute assez rapprochées. Si, tous les trois ensemble, nous prenions cette affaire corps à corps, il me semble que nous pourrions aboutir à un plan commun pour établir notre concert vis-à-vis des problèmes mondiaux et de la réforme de l'Alliance. J'ajoute que notre accord produirait dans le monde une salutaire impression.

Pour le cas où vous voudriez entrer dans cette voie, je vous propose et, en même temps, je suggère à M. MACMILLAN que nous nous rencontrions au cours du mois de Septembre, aux lieu et date qui vous conviendraient.

Veillez croire, cher Monsieur le Président, à mes sentiments de très haute et bien cordiale considération.

Charles de GAULLE

---

Mem 11/295

8/9/60

Subject

Advance  
copy sent to  
Chequers 9/8  
SECRET

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL TELEGRAM

SERIAL No T.462/60

FROM PARIS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

PRISEC

Lord Gladwyn

No. 307  
August 9, 1960

D. 9. 40 p.m. August 9, 1960  
R.10. 8 p.m. August 9, 1960

IMMEDIATE  
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 307 of  
August 9.

Repeated for information to : Washington  
Bonn (personal for Ambassadors)  
and Saving to : U.K.Del. NATO (personal for  
Shattock)

My immediately preceding telegram.

Following is text of message to the Prime Minister:

My dear friend,

I had hardly closed the letter which I had written you on the 5th August when President Eisenhower's message was delivered to me, on the subject of our cooperation, of which he tells me he has informed you. Later, I received your own message, which, I note, adopts in essential the views of the President. I am today sending my reply to Mr. Eisenhower. It seems to me that the best thing I can do is to communicate the text to you; you will find it attached.

How can I say to you how much I hope that you can adopt, for your part, my idea of a meeting between us three in September, so as to arrive at a plan of real political and strategic cooperation, and that you will yourself, as I do, press the President to fall in with this idea?

It would clearly be necessary that such a meeting would not be only one of form but that we should get down to the very basis of things; which would imply that we should take some people with us and that we should take our time. In view of the American electoral period I would place myself entirely, as far as I am concerned, at the disposal of

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10/12  
10/27/60

E.R.

31.10.60  
in 12a-13a

Reference Orig.  
NATO-MRB's (102)

✓

PRIME MINISTER

N.A.T.O. M.R.B.M.

The United States plan, of which our Embassy has now been given an "official preview" by the State Department, is described in paragraphs 3 - 8 of P.N.W.N./P.(60) 3. The conclusions which officials of the Departments concerned have so far formed are set out in paragraphs 39 and 40 of the same paper. These sections are all that you need read of the report.

= 10/26/60  
att

Your meeting should concentrate on the nature of the response which we should now make to the United States authorities. Should we make a serious attempt to co-operate in some plan (though not their present one) to meet the aims which we have in view - to reassure the European members of N.A.T.O.? Or should we continue to do what we have so far done at various stages with this N.A.T.O. M.R.B.M. proposition, namely to avoid any commitment and to play the question along, in the hope that the project will die away?

Clearly we cannot accept the plan as it stands. Quite apart from the financial burden that it would entail there are strong political objections to it, particularly as regards the absence of any political control over SACEUR's use of nuclear weapons. These are summarised in paragraph 39 (h) - (1) of the report. In any case, there are grave doubts as to the value of any plan as unlikely as this one to have attractions for the French Government.

10/30  
Lambert  
report

Nevertheless, the other Departments (and I) agreed with the Foreign Office view that we must take a constructive attitude towards this plan. Officials believe that the time has now come when we should be ready to consider transferring some part of our independent nuclear capability into N.A.T.O. This, I feel sure, is the way our policy is bound to develop. It may be that the time has already passed when we might have

Lambert  
Nathan Brook  
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TOP SECRET

on their use in an emergency. On the other hand, the fact that some part of the nuclear power of the West was in the hands of NATO as a whole might make it appear to the Soviet leaders that, in circumstances short of global war, these weapons were more likely to be used than if control rested with the United States alone. They might therefore be less inclined to threaten the smaller NATO countries with nuclear retaliation if they thought these countries themselves had a call on nuclear weapons, particularly of this range and yield.

24. Nevertheless in view of the probable size of the proposed MRBM forces in relation to the Western nuclear deterrent forces as a whole the effect of the American proposals on the credibility of the Western deterrent, taking account of both of the allocation of the POLARIS submarines to SACEUR and of the proposed share of NATO in the control over the use of the MRBM forces, would be insignificant.

Control

25. The Americans have made it clear that their proposals to delegate authority to SACEUR to use the MRBM force at his own discretion will relieve him of any obligation to seek clearance from the President and the Prime Minister before declaring H-hour for that part of his forces. At present HM Government can say, in view of these arrangements with the Americans about consultation, that they exert political control over SACEUR over the initiation of the use of nuclear weapons. For the United Kingdom, at least, it would be politically very difficult to give SACEUR discretion to fire MRBMs or any other nuclear weapons without prior political authority, although if Russia made a massive nuclear attack it would hardly matter whether SACEUR had been given this discretion or not. Ministers will need to consider whether we can contemplate giving this discretion to SACEUR in any circumstances at all, and if so whether it should be extended to nuclear weapons based on the United Kingdom, e.g. the THORs.

Extract working party on Policy on Nuclear Weapons for NATO  
"United States Proposals for a NATO MRBM Force"  
P M W N / P (60) 3 Oct 26, 1960

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Effect on International Situation

26. The American proposals would mean giving their NATO allies at least an apparent share in the control of the MRBM force and would not improve the international atmosphere outside NATO. The Americans should be urged to give more thought to:-

- (a) the effect of their proposals on Soviet policy especially as regards giving the Chinese and other countries nuclear weapons;
- (b) the effect on British and other public opinion of any plan that could be represented by public opinion in the West as handing over control of nuclear weapons to the Germans.

27. The American scheme poses the dilemma that the more forthcoming it is in order to achieve its objective of allaying NATO Europeans' doubts about their call on nuclear weapons for the defence of Europe, the more valid Soviet criticism will seem to the rest of the world. Moreover, there might be difficulty in the United Nations over the Irish resolution which would require nuclear powers to undertake not to hand over control of their nuclear weapons to a non-nuclear power. This resolution is symbolic of a world-wide feeling against the further spread of nuclear weapons.

28. The conduct of NATO European countries would have a greater impact in the international field as a result of their having a call on nuclear weapons.

29. It is improbable that the American proposals in their present form would cause the Soviet Government to make similar arrangements with their satellites or with China. In view of their own reluctance to give nuclear weapons to the East Germans or to the Chinese, they might be cautious in claiming that the Americans had given the West Germans full control over their own nuclear weapons.





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**TOP SECRET***From Summary of COMCS.*

- (iii) We should urge the Americans to give more thought:-
- (a) to the effect of their proposals on Soviet policy, especially as regards giving the Chinese and their countries nuclear weapons;
  - (b) to the effect on British and other public opinion of any plans that could be represented as giving Germany a share in the control of the use of nuclear weapons.
- (iv) From the U.K. point of view the proposed arrangements for allowing SACEUR to use MRBMs without political authority would be very difficult and Ministers will need to consider whether it can be contemplated at all.
- (v) The proposal might require large additional expenditure, mostly in dollars.
- (vi) If Ministers do not like the American proposals we would suggest the proposals set out in paragraph 37 as an alternative to put to them for their consideration.

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11/14/60

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AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY, CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEEC.O.S. (60)32514TH NOVEMBER, 1960.LIMITED CIRCULATIONCHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEECORRELATION OF TRIPARTITE MILITARY ACTIONS THAT  
CAN BE TAKEN TO MAINTAIN ACCESS TO BERLIN (S)Copy of a letter (Reference ECLO 600/28) dated  
18th October 1960, from General Lauris Norstad  
U.S.A.F. to the United Kingdom, Chiefs of Staff

Inclosed is a LIVE OAK study correlating two earlier papers\* on tripartite military actions for maintaining access to Berlin. The conclusions reached may be useful to the Tripartite Governments in further planning on the Berlin issue.

2. I note particularly the conclusion that all military actions, from an initial probe of Soviet intentions on the autobahn to a final resort to thermonuclear war, must be incorporated in a single plan and not considered as separate, unrelated actions. Further, I note the conclusion that this plan should be ready for implementation before the probe is launched.

3. Next, while it is basic, LIVE OAK'S observation that military considerations must be integrated with political, economic and psychological factors underlines the need for early government-level planning.

4. With reference to Conclusions, paragraph 6a, concerning prior publicity for the probe, I have prepared proposals which I will forward by separate communication.

5. I consider that this study may be useful in completing integrated tripartite planning to maintain access to Berlin.

(Signed) LAURIS NORSTAD  
General USAF

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

14TH NOVEMBER, 1960.

\*LIVE OAK Study: "Initial Probe of Soviet Intentions," 13 May 59,  
and  
LIVE OAK Study: "More Elaborate Military Measures," 24 July 59.

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ECLO 300/135  
1 October 1960

CORRELATION OF LIVE OAK STUDIES  
RELATING TO MAINTAINING ACCESS TO BERLIN (S)

1. INTRODUCTION

a. To comply with the intent and purpose of the Tripartite Basic Document, "Berlin Contingency Planning", 4 April 1959. LIVE OAK produced two studies pertaining to Berlin access planning:

- (1) An Initial Probe of Soviet Intentions, 13 May 59.
- (2) More Elaborate Military Measures, 24 July 59.

b. A review of these studies indicated a need for two further studies:

- (1) Possible Soviet reactions to an initial probe.
- (2) Time required to implement each of the More Elaborate Military Measures.

These further studies have revealed the problem which is examined below.

2. PROBLEM. To correlate tripartite military actions that can be taken to maintain access to Berlin.

3. ASSUMPTION. The Three Governments intend to bring Berlin access planning to a state of completion and agreement from which any portions of the planning may be executed if required.

4. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM.

a. Paragraph 10 of the Tripartite Basic Document states that if an initial probe (to determine whether the Soviets are prepared to use force or to permit the use of force to prevent Allied passage on the autobahn to Berlin) is physically obstructed, the Three Powers will intensify their military preparations.

b. Paragraph 13c of the same document assigns to a tripartite military planning group (LIVE OAK) in Paris, responsibility for studying measures which might be taken to restore freedom of access.

5. DISCUSSION.

a. (1) A study has been made of possible Soviet reactions to an initial probe. This study is attached at Annex 1.

(2) A probe of Soviet intentions on the autobahn could be inconclusive unless facts concerning the probe and its objective were made public prior to launching this limited military effort. Were the circumstances surrounding the probe kept classified, or were the Kremlin to be notified of the probe only through covert diplomatic channels, the chance of accomplishing the objective would be minimized. If the probe were obstructed or assaulted, the Soviets could claim no prior

\* Berlin Contingency Planning; 4 April 1959 (French)  
COS.541/10/4/59 (United Kingdom)  
JCS SM 366/59, 7 April 1959 (United States)

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knowledge of this "apparent invasion of East Germany", while actually directing their own or East German elements to obstruct the probe. To avoid this, it seems essential:

(a) To warn the Soviets before a probe is launched that the Tripartite Powers will tolerate no further interference of any type on the autobahn, during or after the probe.

(b) To develop a tripartitely agreed public relations policy with regard to the probe well in advance of initiating any such effort.

(b) (1) A probe could meet with many pitfalls causing failure to achieve the object. For example:

(a) The Soviets could allow the probe to pass from Helmstedt to Berlin and immediately thereafter obstruct other traffic on the autobahn.

(b) The Soviets could block a lightly armed probe at some point on the autobahn refusing further movement and assert to the world that the probe had committed some illegal act enroute to Berlin.

(c) The Soviets could block the probe by using some form of traffic interference which would not clearly reveal a deliberate intention to be obstructive. Of the three types of probes (A, B and C) contemplated, A and B are not equipped to surmount major obstacles; Probe C, however, is designed either to break through or to by-pass any normal obstruction. Therefore, such a Soviet subterfuge would be more likely to succeed in blocking Probes A and B than Probe C.

(2) Before a decision is reached to execute a probe, it must be tripartitely understood that this action may lead to a final showdown with the Soviets and the Tripartite Powers must be agreed in their determination to assert their rights.

(3) The foregoing points to the need for a comprehensive plan for the implementation of selected more elaborate military measures to be ready before the probe is launched. This plan should cover the whole range from the probe to thermonuclear war.

c. A study of the time required to implement the More Elaborate Military Measures is at Annex 2. In this study the measures are grouped as capable of implementation in less, or more, than seven days. It is clear that some measures will not show practical results for a long time but the act of initiation will demonstrate tripartite determination and will, therefore, have some immediate effect. Although the great majority of the measures can be implemented in less than seven days, some important ones will take longer and should be ready prior to the execution of the probe.

d. To guarantee maintenance of access to Berlin, the military considerations must at some stage be integrated with political, economic and psychological factors.

## 6. CONCLUSIONS.

a. The initial probe needs prior publicity and for this an agreed tripartite policy is required.

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- b. Under certain circumstances the probe may not produce conclusive evidence of Soviet intentions to obstruct access. It should therefore, be considered the initial phase of a comprehensive plan whose aim would be to provide the Three Powers with a continuing military and psychological initiative over the Soviets and which should include a program of selected measures covering the whole range from probe to thermonuclear war.
- c. The program should be ready for implementation before the probe is launched.
- d. To guarantee maintenance of access to Berlin, pertinent political, economic and psychological factors must be integrated with military considerations prior to implementation of any of the latter.

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ANNEX I TO C.O.S. (60) 325

[ECLO 300/113]

A STUDY OF POSSIBLE SOVIET REACTIONS TO AN  
INITIAL PROBE(S)

A1

To determine possible Soviet reactions to a tripartite initial probe of Soviet intentions as outlined in LIVE OAK paper "Berlin Contingency Planning: Initial Probe of Soviet Intentions", 13 May 1959.

GENERAL

2. For this study the following assumptions have been made:
  - a. The Soviets desire to avoid general war.
  - b. The Soviets realize that if the Western Powers are driven to war, it must inevitably be nuclear/thermonuclear.
  - c. The Soviets may try to insure that interference with allied traffic is caused by, or appears to be caused by, the GDR.
3. The study commences from the point where Soviet/GDR action interfering with surface access has occurred to the degree justifying the mounting of a probe.

THE PROBE

4. The objective of the probe is to determine whether the Soviets are prepared to use force, or to permit the use of force to prevent the passage of an Allied convoy on the autobahn to Berlin. Force in this context is defined as any Soviet action which endangers the safety of the convoy or physically denies its passage by the use of obstacles including barriers, rubble, mines and civil or military forces. Threats will not be accepted as evidence of force.

5. Three alternative types of probes were considered. The Three Governments intend to select the most appropriate type of probe in the light of circumstances existing at the time. Each probe is basically a convoy of tripartite vehicles, Probe 'A' being the simplest and Probe 'C' the most elaborate (including engineer support). The conditions under which each may be considered to have achieved the objective can be summed up as follows:

- a. Probe 'A' - Withdraws if attacked. Accepts any obstacle/obstruction.
- b. Probe 'B' - Takes defensive action, firing only if fired upon. Accepts obstacles/obstructions which cannot be removed by unarmed soldiers.
- c. Probe 'C' - Takes defensive action, firing only if fired upon. Accepts obstacles/obstructions which cannot be breached or overcome by the convoy or its engineering equipment.

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6. Appendix 'A' shows in detail reactions which the Soviet/GDR could have to the probe and counteractions to be taken by the Probe Commander.

SOVIET APPRECIATION

7. Soviet Intelligence may or may not discover the assembly and training of the probe force and may or may not interpret tripartite intentions correctly. Possible reactions prior to the launching of the probe are studied in detail at Appendix 'B'. The composition of the probe and its available means of identification do not in themselves seem sufficient to insure Soviet/GDR recognition of the probe. Soviet failure, intentional or otherwise, to recognize the probe for what it is might result in it being treated in a way which could not be held indicative of Soviet intent. To give the probe the best chance of success, every possible measure must be taken to insure its certain identification for what it is. It will be essential to pass to the Kremlin, through diplomatic channels, full details of tripartite intentions before the probe is launched.

PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT

8. It will be highly desirable to make a public announcement:
- a. To provide correct information to the GDR.
  - b. To minimize the possibility of Soviet misrepresentation.
  - c. To provide the best conditions for obtaining a Soviet reaction clearly revealing their intentions.
9. The notification and announcement could range from a simple statement identifying the probe to a clear definition of the Soviet reactions which the Tripartite Powers would regard as intent to obstruct. The definition should not be in the form of an ultimatum forcing a Soviet choice between negotiation and war, since this is not the objective of the probe, nor can the probe guarantee in every circumstances an accurate indication of Soviet intent. The notification/announcement should be made in time to allow the Kremlin to issue orders concerning the probe but sufficiently late to minimize opportunity for Soviet propaganda.

TRIPARTITE PROGRAM

10. Following the tripartite decision to mount the initial probe, the likely program is:-

D minus 7 days - Probe force is called to assemble at Minden and commence essential training.

D minus 2 days - Public announcement of intent with a simultaneous diplomatic advice to the Kremlin.

D DAY - Probe launched.

SOVIET/GDR COURSES OF ACTION AGAINST THE PROBE

11. Three main courses of action are open to the Soviets:
- a. To block the probe completely.

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- b. To permit the probe uninterrupted passage.
  - c. To subject the probe to interference and delay but permit passage under protest.
12. To Block the Probe Completely.

This course is militarily feasible whatever the strength of the probe. It is a clearly defined action for which Soviet orders could almost certainly be issued in time after the tripartite announcement of D minus 2. This course implies Soviet acceptance or, or disbelief in, the likelihood of general war and its selection must rest on their political appreciation of these factors. From a tripartite standpoint this course would be a clear indication of intent, the aim of the probe would be achieved and more elaborate military measures should be initiated.

13. To Permit the Probe Uninterrupted Passage.

This is a militarily feasible course of action. Soviet orders for it could be issued in the time available after the tripartite announcement of D minus 2. Such a course might indicate indecision on the part of the Soviets or might arise from propaganda motives. It need not indicate any change of heart with regard to interference with normal traffic. To obviate this circumstances it must be made clear to the Soviets that any subsequent obstruction of traffic will be interpreted by the Tripartite Powers as evidence of Soviet intent to obstruct. If the Soviets adopt this course of action and then continue to obstruct traffic, it will be necessary to initiate more elaborate military measures.

14. To Subject the Probe to Interference and Delay but Permit Passage Under Protest.

This course of action is also militarily feasible. It might result from Soviet failure to issue any specific orders to the contrary or their non-receipt by executive personnel. It might also be the result of a deliberate political policy to ignore the probe. Possible Soviet actions under this heading range from those not readily identifiable as deliberate interference, such as obstacles, to more active police type action, such as patrols, extra checkpoints and imposition of procedures. Between these and the deliberate blocking of the probe there will be grades of forceful action and reaction governed more by individual human feelings at the time and place than by intent. Armed GDR personnel will surely use their arms in self-defense and must be expected to show some form of physical opposition to the forceful overriding of their orders by the probe. Local action and reaction of this sort might, in fact, lead to the blocking of the probe without deliberate Soviet intent to do so.

INTELLIGENCE

15. From the foregoing it is clear that the Soviets have a wide range from which to select their reaction to the probe. Political motives which would accrue to the Soviet advantage will undoubtedly influence their decisions in this regard. At this time it is impossible to forecast what their decisions will be, but a concentrated intelligence effort preceding the execution of a probe may well indicate the most probable Soviet reaction.





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Appendices A and B are to be circulated under cover of a Secretary's Minute COS. 1472/16/11/60.



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ANNEX II TO COS(60)325

ECLO 300/136

TIMING REQUIRED FOR IMPLEMENTING  
MORE ELABORATE MILITARY MEASURES (S)PROBLEM

To determine the time required to implement the More Elaborate Military Measures outlined in LIVE OAK paper "Berlin Contingency Planning: More Elaborate Military Measures (S)", revised version, 24 July 1959.

ASSUMPTIONS

2. a. That an initial probe of Soviet intentions has been taken along the autobahn from Helmstedt to Berlin and has shown that the Soviets intend to obstruct Allied traffic.

b. That the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States intend to employ More Elaborate Military Measures against the Soviets to:

(1) Provide circumstances under which negotiations with the Soviets to restore access to Berlin might prove fruitful.

(2) Compel the Soviets to face the unmistakable imminence of general war should they persist in obstructing access to Berlin.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

3. a. The LIVE OAK Group was instructed to study "More Elaborate Military Measures" in April 1959. (See paragraph 16, Tripartite Basic Document, "Berlin Contingency Planning", 4 April 1959)\*.

b. The LIVE OAK paper "Berlin Contingency Planning: More Elaborate Military Measures (S)", including as appendices five groups of proposed measures, was submitted by General Norstad to the Three National Chiefs of Staff under ECLO 600/7 on 5 August 1959.

DISCUSSION

4. a. In this study the time required to implement every measure listed in the appendices to the LIVE OAK paper "More Elaborate Military Measures" has been examined objectively. The measures have been grouped under two time headings, those requiring less than seven days to implement and those requiring a longer period. It is clear that some measures, although quick to initiate, will not show practical results for a long time but the act of initiation will demonstrate tripartite determination and must, therefore, have some immediate effect.

\* Berlin Contingency Planning, 4 April 1959 (French)  
COS.541/10/4/59 (United Kingdom)  
JCS SM 366/59, 7 April 1959 (United States)

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b. Many of the measures require a redeployment or reinforcement of personnel and the provision of material. It seems probable that there may be conflict between these needs and those of preparation for a major NATO war.

c. While the examination at the appendices has been applied to each measure individually, the LIVE OAK Group is convinced that application of a few selected measures will not achieve the desired pressure on the Soviets but that a high proportion of the measures must be applied together in a concerted effort.

d. Most of the measures have political, economic and psychological facets whose study is not possible within LIVE OAK

CONCLUSIONS

5. a. The great majority of the measures can be implemented in less than seven days but some important ones will take longer and may, therefore, have to be ready prior to the execution of the probe.

b. Almost all the measures have political, economic and psychological facets which cannot be studied within LIVE OAK

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C.O.S.(60)325

14TH NOVEMBER, 1960.

LIMITED CIRCULATION

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

CORRELATION OF TRIPARTITE MILITARY ACTIONS THAT  
CAN BE TAKEN TO MAINTAIN ACCESS TO BERLIN (S)

Copy of a letter (Reference ECLO 600/28) dated  
18th October 1960, from General Lauris Norstad  
U.S.A.F. to the United Kingdom, Chiefs of Staff

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(Signed) LAURIS NORSTAD  
General USAF

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

14TH NOVEMBER, 1960.

\*LIVE OAK Study: "Initial Probe of Soviet Intentions," 13 May 59,  
and  
LIVE OAK Study: "More Elaborate Military Measures," 24 July 59.



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ECLO 300/135  
1 October 1960

CORRELATION OF LIVE OAK STUDIES  
RELATING TO MAINTAINING ACCESS TO BERLIN (S)

1. INTRODUCTION

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These further studies have revealed the problem which is examined below.

2. PROBLEM. To correlate tripartite military actions that can be taken to maintain access to Berlin.

3. ASSUMPTION. The Three Governments intend to bring Berlin access planning to a state of completion and agreement from which any portions of the planning may be executed if required.

4. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM.

a. Paragraph 10 of the Tripartite Basic Document states that if an initial probe (to determine whether the Soviets are prepared to use force or to permit the use of force to prevent Allied passage on the autobahn to Berlin) is physically obstructed, the Three Powers will intensify their military preparations.

b. Paragraph 13c of the same document assigns to a tripartite military planning group (LIVE OAK) in Paris, responsibility for studying measures which might be taken to restore freedom of access.

5. DISCUSSION.

a. (1) A study has been made of possible Soviet reactions to an initial probe. This study is attached at Annex 1.

(2) A probe of Soviet intentions on the autobahn could be inconclusive unless facts concerning the probe and its objective were made public prior to launching this limited military effort. Were the circumstances surrounding the probe kept classified, or were the Kremlin to be notified of the probe only through covert diplomatic channels, the chance of accomplishing the objective would be minimized. If the probe were obstructed or assaulted, the Soviets could claim no prior

\* Berlin Contingency Planning, 4 April 1959 (French)  
COS.541/10/4/59 (United Kingdom)  
JCS SM 366/59, 7 April 1959 (United States)

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knowledge of this "apparent invasion of East Germany", while actually directing their own or East German elements to obstruct the probe. To avoid this, it seems essential:

(a) To warn the Soviets before a probe is launched that the Tripartite Powers will tolerate no further interference of any type on the autobahn, during or after the probe.

(b) To develop a tripartitely agreed public relations policy with regard to the probe well in advance of initiating any such effort.

(b) (1) A probe could meet with many pitfalls causing failure to achieve the object. For example:

(a) The Soviets could allow the probe to pass from Helmstedt to Berlin and immediately thereafter obstruct other traffic on the autobahn.

(b) The Soviets could block a lightly armed probe at some point on the autobahn refusing further movement and assert to the world that the probe had committed some illegal act enroute to Berlin.

(c) The Soviets could block the probe by using some form of traffic interference which would not clearly reveal a deliberate intention to be obstructive. Of the three types of probes (A, B and C) contemplated, A and B are not equipped to surmount major obstacles; Probe C, however, is designed either to break through or to by-pass any normal obstruction. Therefore, such a Soviet subterfuge would be more likely to succeed in blocking Probes A and B than Probe C.

(2) Before a decision is reached to execute a probe, it must be tripartitely understood that this action may lead to a final showdown with the Soviets and the Tripartite Powers must be agreed in their determination to assert their rights.

(3) The foregoing points to the need for a comprehensive plan for the implementation of selected more elaborate military measures to be ready before the probe is launched. This plan should cover the whole range from the probe to thermonuclear war.

c. A study of the time required to implement the More Elaborate Military Measures is at Annex 2. In this study the measures are grouped as capable of implementation in less, or more, than seven days. It is clear that some measures will not show practical results for a long time but the act of initiation will demonstrate tripartite determination and will, therefore, have some immediate effect. Although the great majority of the measures can be implemented in less than seven days, some important ones will take longer and should be ready prior to the execution of the probe.

d. To guarantee maintenance of access to Berlin, the military considerations must at some stage be integrated with political, economic and psychological factors.

## 6. CONCLUSIONS.

a. The initial probe needs prior publicity and for this an agreed tripartite policy is required.

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b. Under certain circumstances the probe may not produce conclusive evidence of Soviet intentions to obstruct access. It should therefore, be considered the initial phase of a comprehensive plan whose aim would be to provide the Three Powers with a continuing military and psychological initiative over the Soviets and which should include a program of selected measures covering the whole range from probe to thermonuclear war.

c. The program should be ready for implementation before the probe is launched.

d. To guarantee maintenance of access to Berlin, pertinent political, economic and psychological factors must be integrated with military considerations prior to implementation of any of the latter.

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ANNEX I TO G.O.S. (60) 325

[ECLO 300/113]

A STUDY OF POSSIBLE SOVIET REACTIONS TO AN INITIAL PROBE(S)

To determine possible Soviet reactions to a tripartite initial probe of Soviet intentions as outlined in LIVI OAK paper "Berlin Contingency Planning: Initial Probe of Soviet Intentions", 13 May 1959.

GENERAL

2. For this study the following assumptions have been made:
  - a. The Soviets desire to avoid general war.
  - b. The Soviets realize that if the Western Powers are driven to war, it must inevitably be nuclear/thermonuclear.
  - c. The Soviets may try to insure that interference with Allied traffic is caused by, or appears to be caused by, the GDR.
3. The study commences from the point where Soviet/GDR action interfering with surface access has occurred to the degree justifying the mounting of a probe.

THE PROBE

4. The objective of the probe is to determine whether the Soviets are prepared to use force, or to permit the use of force to prevent the passage of an Allied convoy on the autobahn to Berlin. Force in this context is defined as any Soviet action which endangers the safety of the convoy or physically denies it passage by the use of obstacles including barriers, rubble, mines and civil or military forces. Threats will not be accepted as evidence of force.

5. Three alternative types of probes were considered. The Three Governments intend to select the most appropriate type of probe in the light of circumstances existing at the time. Each probe is basically a convoy of tripartite vehicles, Probe 'A' being the simplest and Probe 'C' the most elaborate (including engineer support). The conditions under which each may be considered to have achieved the objective can be summed up as follows:

- a. Probe 'A' - Withdraws if attacked. Accepts any obstacle/obstruction.
- b. Probe 'B' - Takes defensive action, firing only if fired upon. Accepts obstacles/obstructions which cannot be removed by unarmed soldiers.
- c. Probe 'C' - Takes defensive action, firing only if fired upon. Accepts obstacles/obstructions which cannot be breached or overcome by the convoy or its engineering equipment.

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6. Appendix 'A' shows in detail reactions which the Soviet/GDR could have to the probe and counteractions to be taken by the Probe Commander.

SOVIET APPRECIATION

7. Soviet Intelligence may or may not discover the assembly and training of the probe force and may or may not interpret tripartite intentions correctly. Possible reactions prior to the launching of the probe are studied in detail at Appendix 'B'. The composition of the probe and its available means of identification do not in themselves seem sufficient to insure Soviet/GDR recognition of the probe. Soviet failure, intentional or otherwise, to recognize the probe for what it is might result in it being treated in a way which could not be held indicative of Soviet intent. To give the probe the best chance of success, every possible measure must be taken to insure its certain identification for what it is. It will be essential to pass to the Kremlin, through diplomatic channels, full details of tripartite intentions before the probe is launched.

PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT

8. It will be highly desirable to make a public announcement:
- To provide correct information to the GDR.
  - To minimize the possibility of Soviet misrepresentation.
  - To provide the best conditions for obtaining a Soviet reaction clearly revealing their intentions.
9. The notification and announcement could range from a simple statement identifying the probe to a clear definition of the Soviet reactions which the Tripartite Powers would regard as intent to obstruct. The definition should not be in the form of an ultimatum forcing a Soviet choice between negotiation and war, since this is not the objective of the probe, nor can the probe guarantee in every circumstance an accurate indication of Soviet intent. The notification/announcement should be made in time to allow the Kremlin to issue orders concerning the probe but sufficiently late to minimize opportunity for Soviet propaganda.

TRIPARTITE PROGRAM

10. Following the tripartite decision to mount the initial probe, the likely program is:-

D minus 7 days - Probe force is called to assemble at Minden and commence essential training.

D minus 2 days - Public announcement of intent with a simultaneous diplomatic advice to the Kremlin.

D DAY - Probe launched.

SOVIET/GDR COURSES OF ACTION AGAINST THE PROBE

11. Three main courses of action are open to the Soviets:
- To block the probe completely.

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- b. To permit the probe uninterrupted passage.
- c. To subject the probe to interference and delay but permit passage under protest.

## 12. To Block the Probe Completely.

This course is militarily feasible whatever the strength of the probe. It is a clearly defined action for which Soviet orders could almost certainly be issued in time after the tripartite announcement of D minus 2. This course implies Soviet acceptance or, or disbelief in, the likelihood of general war and its selection must rest on their political appreciation of these factors. From a tripartite standpoint this course would be a clear indication of intent, the aim of the probe would be achieved and more elaborate military measures should be initiated.

## 13. To Permit the Probe Uninterrupted Passage.

This is a militarily feasible course of action. Soviet orders for it could be issued in the time available after the tripartite announcement of D minus 2. Such a course might indicate indecision on the part of the Soviets or might arise from propaganda motives. It need not indicate any change of heart with regard to interference with normal traffic. To obviate this circumstances it must be made clear to the Soviets that any subsequent obstruction of traffic will be interpreted by the Tripartite Powers as evidence of Soviet intent to obstruct. If the Soviets adopt this course of action and then continue to obstruct traffic, it will be necessary to initiate more elaborate military measures.

## 14. To Subject the Probe to Interference and Delay but Permit Passage Under Protest.

This course of action is also militarily feasible. It might result from Soviet failure to issue any specific orders to the contrary or their non-receipt by executive personnel. It might also be the result of a deliberate political policy to ignore the probe. Possible Soviet actions under this heading range from those not readily identifiable as deliberate interference, such as obstacles, to more active police type action, such as patrols, extra checkpoints and imposition of procedures. Between these and the deliberate blocking of the probe there will be grades of forceful action and reaction governed more by individual human feelings at the time and place than by intent. Armed GDR personnel will surely use their arms in self-defense and must be expected to show some form of physical opposition to the forceful overriding of their orders by the probe. Local action and reaction of this sort might, in fact, lead to the blocking of the probe without deliberate Soviet intent to do so.

INTELLIGENCE

15. From the foregoing it is clear that the Soviets have a wide range from which to select their reaction to the probe. Political motives which would accrue to the Soviet advantage will undoubtedly influence their decisions in this regard. At this time it is impossible to forecast what their decisions will be, but a concentrated intelligence effort preceding the execution of a probe may well indicate the most probable Soviet reaction.



**TOP SECRET**CONCLUSIONS

16. From the wide selection open to the Soviets, it is not possible at this time to determine with certainty their exact reaction to an initial ground probe.
17. The Soviet reaction will be governed principally by political motives.
18. To provide indications of Soviet reactions a concentrated intelligence effort should be undertaken.
19. To insure identification of the probe, it is essential to give the Kremlin prior diplomatic notice.
20. A public announcement of the tripartite intentions is also highly desirable:
  - a. To provide correct information to the GDR.
  - b. To minimize the possibility of Soviet misrepresentation of the probe.
  - c. To provide the best conditions for obtaining a Soviet reaction which clearly reveals their intentions.
21. The notification and announcement can range from a simple statement identifying the probe to a clear definition of Soviet reactions (not amounting to an ultimatum) which would be regarded as a declaration of intent to obstruct.

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ECLO 300/1137

Appendices A and B are to be circulated under cover of a Secretary's Minute COS. 1472/18/11/60.

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ANNEX II TO COS(60)325

ECLO 300/136

TIMING REQUIRED FOR IMPLEMENTING  
MORE ELABORATE MILITARY MEASURES (S)PROBLEM

To determine the time required to implement the More Elaborate Military Measures outlined in LIVE OAK paper "Berlin Contingency Planning: More Elaborate Military Measures (S)", revised version, 24 July 1959.

ASSUMPTIONS

2. a. That an initial probe of Soviet intentions has been taken along the autobahn from Melnsedt to Berlin and has shown that the Soviets intend to obstruct Allied traffic.

b. That the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States intend to employ More Elaborate Military Measures against the Soviets to:

(1) Provide circumstances under which negotiations with the Soviets to restore access to Berlin might prove fruitful.

(2) Compel the Soviets to face the unmistakable imminence of general war should they persist in obstructing access to Berlin.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

3. a. The LIVE OAK Group was instructed to study "More Elaborate Military Measures" in April 1959. (See paragraph 16, Tripartite Basic Document, "Berlin Contingency Planning", 4 April 1959)\*.

b. The LIVE OAK paper "Berlin Contingency Planning: More Elaborate Military Measures (S)", including as appendices five groups of proposed measures, was submitted by General Norstad to the Three National Chiefs of Staff under ECLO 600/7 on 5 August 1959.

DISCUSSION

4. a. In this study the time required to implement every measure listed in the appendices to the LIVE OAK paper "More Elaborate Military Measures" has been examined objectively. The measures have been grouped under two time headings, those requiring less than seven days to implement and those requiring a longer period. It is clear that some measures, although quick to initiate, will not show practical results for a long time but the act of initiation will demonstrate tripartite determination and must, therefore, have some immediate effect.

\* Berlin Contingency Planning, 4 April 1959 (French)  
COS.544/10/4/59 (United Kingdom)  
JCS SM 366/59, 7 April 1959 (United States)

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b. Many of the measures require a redeployment or reinforcement of personnel and the provision of material. It seems probable that there may be conflict between these needs and those of preparation for a major NATO war.

c. While the examination of the appendices has been applied to each measure individually, the LIVE OAK Group is convinced that application of a few selected measures will not achieve the desired pressure on the Soviets but that a high proportion of the measures must be applied together in a concerted effort.

d. Most of the measures have political, economic and psychological facets whose study is not possible within LIVE OAK

CONCLUSIONS

5. a. The great majority of the measures can be implemented in less than seven days but some important ones will take longer and may, therefore, have to be ready prior to the execution of the probe.

b. Almost all the measures have political, economic and psychological facets which cannot be studied within LIVE OAK

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CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX

TO

C.O.S. (60) 73RD MEETING HELD ON  
TUESDAY, 29TH NOVEMBER, 1960

1. BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

(Previous Reference: C.O.S. (60) 53rd Meeting, Minute 3(b))

THE COMMITTEE had before them a telegram<sup>\*</sup> from the United Kingdom delegation to LIVE OAK. This informed them that Headquarters Land Forces Central Europe had prepared a "Study of the Military Situation in connection with the Berlin Problem" which was not unlike plans FREE STYLE and TRADE WIND and that, in consequence, General Norstad had asked LIVE OAK to recommend whether General Challe, CINCENT, and General Speidel, COMLANDCENT, should be briefed on current LIVE OAK planning.

LORD MOUNTBATTEN circulated two minutes which were relevant to the consideration of this proposal. In the first, the Prime Minister had expressed the view to the Foreign Secretary that we should not take the lead in opposing a German request that they should be informed of the state of Berlin Contingency Planning. In the second, the Minister of Defence had suggested to the Foreign Secretary that we should now consider with the Americans what further information we should let the other NATO nations have on this matter. In the light of these two minutes, he felt that the Committee should not oppose General Norstad's proposal.

In discussion the following points were made:-

- (a) There was no objection to Generals Challe and Speidel being informed of the work of the LIVE OAK Group; but this should be done orally and on the understanding that they were not being briefed as NATO Commanders but only on a personal basis. Colonel Chaundler should accordingly be informed that if France and the United States expressed their agreement, he should inform SACEUR of United Kingdom concurrence.

\* UKNMR.313

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- (b) The more general question of the disclosure of Berlin Contingency Planning to NATO would be considered by the Foreign Office in their reply to the minute from the Minister of Defence. It must be accepted that any such disclosure would most probably result in a leak to the Russians, but this itself might not be undesirable if it were correctly timed. The Foreign Office considered that the present time would not be very suitable for any such leak.
- (c) In a recent conversation with the Secretary, Colonel Chaundler had said that the Head of Plans and Policy Division, SHAPE, intended to recommend to SACEUR that an examination should be made of the effect of operations FREE STYLE and TRADE WIND, or alternatively of General Speidel's Study, on CINCENT's Emergency Defence Plan. Whereas General Norstad might find himself bound by tripartite agreement to resist any such examination if it was related to FREE STYLE and TRADE WIND, there would be nothing to prevent him approving it on the basis of a study prepared independently by General Speidel. It was generally agreed by the Committee that there would be no harm in such a step and that there was no cause for them to take it up with their representative in the LIVE OAK Group.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (1) Took note of the telegram from the United Kingdom delegation to LIVE OAK.
- (2) Took note that the Chief of the Defence Staff would inform the Minister of Defence of their views and would seek his approval to instruct Colonel Chaundler in the sense of (a) above.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

29TH NOVEMBER, 1960.

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MM 54/60, Record of a Meeting between the Rt. Hon. Harold  
Watkinson, M.P., United Kingdom Minister of Defence, and the  
Hon. Thomas Gates, United States Secretary of Defence in  
London on Monday, 12th December 1960

12/12/60

SKYBOLT

THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE opened the meeting by saying that the Douglas representatives in this country had told him that a substantial cut had been imposed on the SKYBOLT programme in the U.S. budget for FY 1962 (July 1961 - June 1962). He would be glad to learn from Mr. Gates what the position was, both because the Prime Minister regarded the SKYBOLT project as an important part of the understanding he had reached with President Eisenhower at Camp David and because any hint of trouble over SKYBOLT would be seized on by the Opposition in the Defence Debate the following day.

MR. GATES said that the position as he understood it was as follows. The original request for obligational authority for SKYBOLT for FY 1961 had been \$60M. This had in the first instance been raised somewhat arbitrarily to \$80M, and the USAF had later asked for a further \$70M, i.e. a total for FY 1961 of \$150M. What had now been decided, as part of an across the board reduction affecting a number of USAF projects in roughly similar proportions, was to seek no new obligational authority for SKYBOLT in FY 1962. This meant that expenditure over the two years 1961 and 1962 would be held down on average to a rate of \$70-80M. a year, which was no less than originally envisaged. It was possible, however, that the firm, without authority though perhaps with the backing of the USAF, had already stopped up expenditure to a rate closer to \$150M. a year. An Under Secretary from the Department of the Air Force was currently investigating the position and was expected to report to-morrow; but nobody at this moment knew exactly how expenditure had been running. If the firm were in fact over committed, then the recent decision would undoubtedly lead to some curtailment of their activities and to subsequent reprogramming. He considered that both the technical difficulties and the cost had originally been understated, and it was probable that reprogramming would delay the weapons entry into Service. But it would be wrong to conclude that the project had been relegated. The \$70M or thereabouts which it was hoped to carry forward into FY 1962 was far from a token figure. Room was being left for the new administration to reconsider the effort to be put into SKYBOLT. His own guess was that in two years' time it would be decided either to cancel the project or to step it up; for the time being the position was being kept open.

MR. GATES went on to say that in general U.S. effort was tending now to switch over to low-level delivery. The improved version of HOUND DOG was thought to be as good a penetration aid as SKYBOLT; and though they were not yet committed to the improved version, they were certainly committed to the present version, which was not only expensive but was due to come in in numbers at about the same time as SKYBOLT would start coming in if SKYBOLT was not delayed.

THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE said that we, too, had been impressed by the case for low-level delivery systems - hence the TSR 2. We were also looking into a project with a low level capability, flying at Mach 2, with a range of about 1000 miles. He would welcome an interchange of technical views on this subject.

Turning to the immediate problem of what could be said publicly in the Defence Debate on 13th December, the MINISTER OF DEFENCE said that he proposed to take the line that the agreement with the U.S. had been that if SKYBOLT was technically feasible



and the USAF got it, we would get it too. We had never expected to have it if the USAF did not. As with all R and D projects, costs and technical problems had started to escalate, and it was true that it no longer looked so hopeful as formerly. But we had been kept fully informed, other USAF projects had had comparable cuts, and SKYBOLT was still being given substantial support; moreover we had other alternatives of our own. Before taking this line, however, he would like to know first, how soon the news of the cut was likely to leak and secondly, whether failing SKYBOLT, the U.S. would be prepared to supply the U.K. with one or two Polaris submarines. The U.K. would propose in any circumstances to make her own warheads.

MR. GATES said that an immediate leak of some sort was likely following the current investigation of spending on SKYBOLT, but it was difficult to judge its extent. Full details would be publicly available in January when the budget was published. As to providing Polaris submarines, that raised the wider question of building up a NATO force of MRBMs. Though this was essentially a political matter on which he was less qualified than some to speak, he doubted whether supplying the U.K. with Polaris submarines for use outside a NATO force would be consistent with current State Department objectives as he understood them. If, however, discussion of the U.S. offer in Paris broke down, the U.S. might then be readier to contemplate bilateral arrangements, though such arrangements might not be confined to the United Kingdom.

#### NATO MRBMs

MR. GATES said that what the U.S. authorities intended to put forward at the NATO Ministerial meeting in Paris could better be described as a concept than a plan. The immediate offer would be to commit 5 Polaris submarines (80 missiles) to NATO for the time being, under existing control and command arrangements such as applied to the 6th Fleet. But this offer would be presented as part of a concept for a NATO MRBM force, and the U.S. would say that it expected other NATO nations to create and purchase a complementary 100 missile force, on the understanding that the U.S. would supply the necessary warheads. When the 80 missile force and the 100 missile force were in being, the U.S. would envisage the two elements being combined to make a NATO force, which by agreement would be multilaterally owned and controlled for the duration of the North Atlantic Treaty. But of course this final step would require fundamental changes in U.S. law, if not in the Constitution, and could not therefore be accepted as a commitment by the outgoing administration. A feature of the U.S. offer would be that other NATO nations were expected to have a say in the configuration and control of the force and Mr. Herter would accordingly not press for decisions at the December meeting though he would hope for some discussion. The 100 missile force would be presented as preferably sea-based, though it was known that General Norstad would like some of the missiles to be land-based. If the missiles were carried on surface vessels rather than submarines, the cost might be of the order of \$300-400m. for the period 1961-1964 - say \$20m. a year per nation if 5 nations participated. Mr. Herter would link the concept to SACEUR's requirement for a force of 300 missiles by 1965, though he, Mr. Gates, personally

thought of it as a deterrent rather than a tactical force. The U.S. would not regard the missile force as in any way alternative to the MC 70 requirements, which it would continue to expect NATO countries to meet.

Turning to the aims underlying the offer, Mr. Gates said that they were twofold - to counteract suspicions that the U.S. might become increasingly unwilling to risk nuclear devastation in defence of European countries; and to discourage the development of independent national nuclear forces. He believed this to be a generous and imaginative offer - there were those who saw in it the beginnings of the first world police force - but it was important that other NATO nations should be seen to press for its adoption, if it was to surmount the legal and other obstacles that would certainly arise within the U.S. For that reason, he hoped that the U.K. would give it support, which might also encourage the French to go along with it.

\* THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE said that he had two main observations. First, he hoped that the U.S., in putting forward the concept, would not go too much into detail. He was ready to welcome Mr. Herter's general initiative; but he could not, for instance, give full support to detailed advocacy of the case for Polaris submarines. Nor was he prepared to take part in a discussion of the composition of such a force without first considering its purpose and how it would be controlled, which were controversial questions which he would prefer not to raise at the December meeting. Secondly, he regarded it as most important that the deliberations on the U.S. offer should be kept within the NATO Council and not farmed out to the Standing Group or some ad hoc body. He would like to see the offer considered within the framework of the 10-year look.

MR. GATES said that the offer was indeed likely to be raised in the context of the 10-year look on Item II (a) of the agenda. It was not irreversibly tied to Polaris; but Polaris was chosen because it was the only system available to meet the military requirement up to 1965.

SIR EVELYN SHUCKBURGH enquired first, whether the U.S. had formed a view about likely Russian reactions to the American offer. What would be the effect on Soviet policy towards their own allies? Secondly, concerning the aims behind the offer, was there really any evidence of a demand in the European NATO countries for control over the use of nuclear weapons? He had never heard any complaint except from France, and that was because France wanted to be one of two or three, not one of fifteen. In any case, would the U.S. as one of 15 nations with a veto, really be surrendering control?

MR. GATES in reply said that the East European satellites already had short-range nuclear missiles though under tight Soviet control. China was the problem, but for Russia the military requirement, for reasons of geography, was not the same as that facing NATO. As to whether the U.S. offer would entail a real surrender of control, he could only say that there were many minds in the U.S. who were thinking in terms of delegating control to some smaller authority than the 15 nations in Council. It might be possible to waive the two-key system. It was all very well to say that what really mattered was to keep U.S. troops and weapons in Europe rather than to change the

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existing system of control over deterrent forces. But without doubling the U.S. defense budget it would be impossible to keep men in Europe in present numbers.

The Minister of Defence thanked Mr. Gates for the full and frank discussion they had had and said that in the Defence Debate he would take the general line that no specific U.S. offer had yet been received.



PO 371 / 15967

12/15/60

I talked with Herr Strauss for some two hours. We covered the following points.

First, Herr Strauss himself raised the question of financial arrangements with the Americans and the general issue of support costs. He told me quite freely that he had been subjected to very great pressure from the American State Department in the person of Mr. Irwin, to sign a secret Agreement with the American Government which would have committed the Federal Government to very large additional purchases of arms and equipment over the period of the next 5 years. He mentioned a spending of some \$600m. a year as being what the Americans were trying to secure. They had also presented him with a list of tanks and various other equipment which they wished him to buy. Apparently these efforts were still going on and he expected to be subjected to further pressure during the NATO Meeting. His reply had been that he could not break faith with France and the United Kingdom and the many other countries with which Germany had made, or was trying to make contracts to purchase armaments, and I would judge that he will not sign this Agreement at least with the present United States Administration.

We then went on to talk about NATO Strategy and he expressed his surprise at the way in which he thought American strategy and military thinking was changing. He said that in the days of the so-called "Radford Plan", the Americans seemed to be willing to go a good deal further than the Germans had liked. Admiral Radford's thesis in his view, had been, if the Russians moved any forces at all they would be immediately subjected to all-out nuclear attack by the Americans. He appreciated that the coming of nuclear sufficiency would have modified this view. He was surprised at certain views which he understood General Norstad was now mentioning in private to some members of the Military Committee, which would seem to indicate that General Norstad's present position was that he would not even use nuclear weapons unless the Russians used them first. Surely, he felt, this could only result in the Russians winning an easy victory or alternatively in Germany and the other European members of NATO having to consider reserve forces and conventional equipment on a scale which would far far exceed anything thought of in MC70 or any other NATO planning targets. I said that we were busily engaged in re-thinking our philosophy in the event of the changed nuclear position and we were not disposed, at the moment, to take a fixed view but that our position was probably somewhere mid-way between Radford and his reported statement from General Norstad, which I myself had not heard about. We did not disagree that the first task of NATO should be to try to enforce a pause by purely conventional means, but the nuclear weapons must be there and we felt that our present position should be that we would say that we must retaliate to an aggression by whatever means we thought appropriate in the circumstances.

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Herr Strauss then went on to talk about the "Bowie Plan" but agreed that all these matters might well be changed by the new Administration.

He then went on to discuss what their attitude might be to any proposals put forward by Mr. Herter. He said they would give these a general welcome because it did seem to them a possible safe-guard against an American refusal to use nuclear arms in the defence of Europe. This was something that he thought was worrying the smaller nations very much. He said he thought there were feelings in Belgium Holland and Italy, and to a lesser extent, Greece and Turkey, that American military thinking and policy was changing and that this might

render them much more vulnerable. He thought, however, that as there was no certainty that the new American Administration would back the present plans, it ought to be submitted without very much argument to the Military Committee, which would report to the NATO Council. He then thought there should be a meeting at heads of Government level as soon as possible next year, which would come to an agreement on general policy and this would then be remitted to a meeting of Defence Ministers to work out the details. We had a general discussion on what the end product might be and he did not disagree that a relatively small nuclear force under NATO control might be the answer. He said he did not mind whether it was called a NATO Striking Force, a NATO Pool or a NATO Stock-pile but he thought that NATO should have some control of a relatively small number of nuclear weapons of one kind or another and that this control should be exercised by 5 nations to whom would be delegated authority from the full NATO Council. I asked him whether he thought such a plan would have any effect on the French desire to build-up their own nuclear strike force. He said that in a private talk with M. Messmer, the French attitude had been explained as being one that could not be changed at this moment but that the creation of a NATO nuclear force might well be "the key to the door" at a later stage, that would enable France to extricate herself, Herr Strauss said he was quite clear that France had to choose between having a viable military force or some kind of limited nuclear force-de-frappe.

He spoke very scathingly of the present inefficiency of France's forces committed to NATO and their lack of equipment and said that the whole of the French military effort in Europe was nothing but a bluff, in his view this could not be improved if the French went ahead with their atomic plans.

I then asked him if such a NATO pool would affect German thinking on all these matters. He said he thought it would satisfy Germany and would avoid any demand in Germany for the creation of German nuclear forces.

We then turned to the question of bi-lateral Anglo-German arms deals and I said I must tell him quite frankly that the British Government was most disappointed with the rate of progress. He said he agreed and gave me a long dissertation on the difficulties he had with the German legal authorities who he said would never finalise anything and his own civil servants who had so far departed from the fuhrer concept, that they never wished to take any action at all. I said that that really did not help us and nothing would more improve the German reputation in the British public's opinion than a steady flow of orders for British equipment. I added that I thought the Minister of Aviation would be willing to discuss German participation in British research and development if this would help, by bringing German requirements in at an earlier stage in the production of a weapon. Herr Strauss replied that he was not anxious to get too deeply committed in this way because his policy remained what he had explained to me several times before, namely that he did not wish to encourage a large German armaments industry but rather to buy out-right the more advanced weapons which Germany need to equip her forces. Herr Strauss went on to say, however, that the Minister of Aviation came to Bonn, he would be willing to give a letter of intent for the Hawker P1127 on a bi-lateral basis, at the same time expressing full support for it as a NATO concept. I said I hoped at the same time he would also allow the Minister of Aviation to announce formal contracts for the British tank gun and the SEACAT missile. He said that he would try to do this and he was also saying to the French that they should give up their own tank gun and adopt the British gun, so that there could be complete NATO standardization. On BLUE he said that he had not written to Mr. Gates as he had promised but that he had spoken firmly to the Americans and said that the Germans were disposed to exchange SERGEANT for BLUE WATER as NATO seemed to