

Cab 129/9

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TOP SECRET.

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C.P. (46) 186.
3rd May, 1946.

CABINET.

POLICY TOWARDS GERMANY.

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE attached paper sets out some of the problems facing us in Germany, with particular reference to the question whether we should continue to work towards a unified (though federalised) Germany or whether, in view of the Russian attitude and the danger of Communist domination of Western Germany, we should regard this as dangerous and work towards a Western German State or States which would be more amenable to our influence. Our present policy in our own Zone is compatible with an eventual German federation with regional units having wide autonomous powers co-ordinated in certain restricted matters by a federal body at the centre. I shall be grateful for an expression of the views of my colleagues on the questions raised in this paper. My own feelings at present are that the general dangers of splitting Germany now are greater than those of continuing our present policy and that we can hope to avoid many of the dangers of centralisation by insisting on political development along federal lines.

It is very likely that I shall have to deal at the present Conference in Paris with some of these general German questions. The French Government are very keen on the idea of federalisation, while the United States Government have hitherto strongly advocated the immediate introduction of certain central administrations. I would propose that when it became necessary to discuss these questions here I should take roughly the following line:—

“ The objective to be aimed at by all four Occupying Powers in guiding constitutional and administration developments in Germany should be a decentralised federal structure based on regional units with considerable autonomous powers. When it is agreed between the Four Powers that the time has come to set up a central German Government, they will consult together again as to the means of doing this, but the central government will in no circumstances be given such powers as would restrict the autonomous status already given to the regional units. Meanwhile, there will be no objection of principle to the establishment of such German central administrations as may be found absolutely essential for the purpose of treating Germany as an economic whole. The central administrations should be restricted to co-ordinating the activities of the regional units. They should act through the local German governments and their activities in each Zone would be subject to the control of the respective Zone commanders. If the Four Powers agreed on principles of this nature the detailed application of them would be referred for study to the Allied Control Commission in Berlin.”

It seems that a proposal on these lines might go some way towards reconciling the French and American points of view and would not altogether exclude the possibility of splitting Germany into two parts if, owing to Russian non-co-operation, this latter became inevitable.

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Policy towards Germany.

1. I circulate as an Annex to this paper a survey of the present situation in Germany. Its salient features are the following: -

(a) *Conditions in Germany.*

Though a beginning has been made with reconstruction, nevertheless practically every German town is still in ruins; communications are far from fully restored; industrial production in the western zones is at about 15 per cent. of pre-war; there is a grievous shortage of food and coal; the population is swollen, by forced immigration from the east. Political parties and trade unions are emerging, after an initial period of political apathy. The Communists have captured the east. Though they are active and well organised in the west, they are, as yet, only a minority.

(b) *Potsdam Agreement.*

The Potsdam Agreement set out drastic principles for the destruction of German militarism and National Socialism. It removed from Germany an area in the east amounting to about a fifth of the pre-war territory. It provided for payment of reparation by the removal of Germany's industrial equipment to a point which would leave her standard of living not higher than the average European standard. The plan subsequently agreed for this purpose will reduce the general level of industry to about half that of 1938, and reduce the heavy industries to about a third. Potsdam postulated political decentralisation and economic unity. Germany was to be treated as an economic whole and central German administrations were to be established to deal with economic matters, but for the time being no central German government would be established. When accepting the level of industry plan subsequently drawn up by the Control Commission, the British representative made the reservation that it would need to be reconsidered if the assumptions on which it was based were not fulfilled. One of these assumptions was that Germany would be treated as an economic whole.

(c) *Allied administration.*

The central German economic administrations have not yet been set up, nor is Germany being treated as an economic whole. Four-Power government at the centre is beginning to creak and the burden of government to flow to the zones which are tending to become quasi-independent.

(d) *Russian attitude.*

Three main elements may be seen in Soviet policy:—

- (i) to prevent at all costs the revival of a strong and independent Germany;
- (ii) to prevent western Germany with the Ruhr, or even the Ruhr alone, being brought into any close grouping of the western democracies;
- (iii) to ensure that Germany eventually looks east and remains under strong, and if possible exclusive, Russian influence.

The Russians have not yet come down in favour either of a unitary Germany or a zonal Germany. They are, at present, hedging and making the best of both worlds. They have established themselves securely in their own zone, are making a strong bid to capture Berlin for the Communists, and are preparing to launch out on a more forward policy in the west.

(e) *The British zone.*

The economic difficulties fall most hardily on the British zone which is mostly an industrial area and never self-supporting in food. The industries are broken and food imports hard to come by. The cost this year to the British Exchequer will amount to at least £80 millions net. We are creating German authorities to take over responsibility for the administration and endeavouring to build up democracy from the bottom. It is proposed to hold borough elections this autumn and plans have been laid for the holding of other elections up to the province level in the course of the next year. These developments would be compatible with the eventual introduction of a federal system for the whole of Germany. Whatever the speed of these constitutional developments may be, however, both our troops of occupation and our Military Government personnel will be greatly reduced by the end of this year.

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2. Up till recent months we have thought of the German problem solely in terms of Germany itself, our purpose having been to devise the best means of preventing the revival of a strong aggressive Germany. At times the emphasis has been on re-education, though usually on controls and measures of security. This purpose can clearly not be discarded. It is one which we have in common with the Russians. But it can no longer be regarded as our sole purpose, or, indeed, perhaps as our primary one. For the danger of Russia has become certainly as great as, and possibly even greater than, that of a revived Germany. The worst situation of all would be a revived Germany in league with or dominated by Russia. This, of course, greatly complicates an already complicated problem. It involves avoiding measures which would permanently alienate the Germans and drive them into the arms of Russia. It involves again showing sufficient purpose not to let it appear that Russia, when it comes to the point, always gets her way in four-Power discussions about Germany. It involves showing ourselves to be no less constructive in our approach to the problems in our zone than the Russians loudly proclaim themselves to be in theirs. And, above all, it involves maintaining a sufficiently high standard of living in western Germany to prevent the Communists from exploiting to their advantage the economic hardships suffered by the population. All this calls not only for the highest qualities of resource and tenacity but also for a readiness to use the necessary man-power and resources to uphold our purpose.

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3. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, in his budget speech, pointed to our expenditure of £80 million this year on civil administration and on food for the Germans in our zone, and described this as in effect paying reparations to Germany. This revelation has caused considerable consternation to the public, and the first question for decision is therefore whether we are to go on using our man-power and resources to uphold our position in Germany or whether we are prepared to see Russia absorbing western Germany as she has already to all practical purposes absorbed the east. It should be borne in mind that Russia can absorb countries without spending money on them, but we cannot. The western way of life demands a minimum of material wellbeing.

4. As an occupying Power we maintain our claim to repayment and have better opportunity to enforce it. At the same time it is obviously essential to consider every possible means of reducing such expenditure to the minimum. We might, for example, invite our western Allies to contribute to the renovation of the Ruhr coal industry on which they so greatly depend. We can insist with the Russians that Germany must in reality be treated as an economic whole, and that the surpluses in the east are used for the benefit of the whole country. Nevertheless, however great our persuasive ability and our efforts to develop the production of our zone, there is no likelihood of its being self-supporting for some time, or of our being able to avoid the major part of the burden of meeting its deficiencies. Not even the modification of the reparation plan would ease the immediate liabilities, since for some years to come there is no possibility of industrial activity rising to the permitted level.

5. It is easy to over-simplify this issue and regard it as one between continuing our occupation and control with all the expense that is involved in that responsibility and withdrawing from Germany and so saving our pockets. But even if we were to evacuate Germany completely, we should hardly be prepared to see the country rotting in starvation. Disease knows no frontier. By withdrawing from Germany we could no doubt save ourselves some expense, but not the whole bill, and we should have little control over the manner in which the money was used or what type of authority in Germany, e.g., Nazi or Communist, had the use of it.

6. On the assumption that we are not prepared to leave the field to Russia, the question arises whether we should be best advised to maintain and develop the present policy of Potsdam or to throw it overboard and organise our own zone as an independent unit according to our own ideas, bringing in the other western zones as we can. The Potsdam Agreement provides for the decentralisation of the German political structure but also for the establishment of central German administrations for certain economic purposes. The Agreement provides that no central German government will be established for the time being, but it must be assumed that the establishment of central economic administrations would logically lead in due course to the establishment of a central Government,

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though the powers of the latter might be considerably limited by reinforcing the autonomy of regional units in some kind of federal structure. Allied control may continue in some form for many years, but one cannot expect the indefinite prolongation of Allied government. The Control Machinery Agreement on which it is based was only designed for the initial period of occupation. Sooner or later the Germans will have to govern themselves, whether under a central government (albeit of a federal character) or state or zonal governments.

7. So far as our short-term interests are concerned there can be little doubt that they would be best served by the establishment of central administrations without further delay. They are essential to the treatment of Germany as an economic whole, and their absence gives the Russians a ready excuse for maintaining their zone as a closed area. As it is a larger food producing area than western Germany, the barrier makes for better economic conditions in the east than in the west, at any rate so long as food shortages continue. It is of course impossible to feel any assurance that, even if central administrations were set up, the Russians would work the system honestly and would not merely try to use them to infiltrate into western Germany, while taking good care that they were not used by the western Powers to infiltrate into the east. Constant vigilance would have to be exercised to see that there was complete reciprocity between the Russian and the western zones in carrying out the policy of a unitary Germany. But the existence of central administrations would at least fortify our claim, which we cannot at present assert, to penetrate the iron curtain economically, and to draw any surpluses from the east into the hard-stricken western zones. At present the Russians are using their zone not only to feed the Red Army but to send home food-stuffs and manufactured goods as reparation.

8. But one cannot think of the problem solely in terms of its immediate effects, seeing that central administrations would logically develop in due course into a central government. It is therefore of importance to estimate in which direction a central German government would be likely to turn, at the same time bearing in mind that even if western Germany were set up as a separate state, that state might itself succumb to the communist pressure which would certainly be directed against it. No firm answer can be given on the possible complexion of a central German government. The Russians are probably as doubtful about it as are we ourselves. If a central government were set up during the present period of Allied occupation and four-Power control, its composition would presumably depend on the result of nation-wide elections, conducted under four-Power supervision. It may be assumed that the Communists, or the new Socialist Unity Party, would gain the upper hand in the Soviet zone. The same is also probable, though not so certain, in Berlin. According to present indications in the United States zone and in regions of North Rhine and Westphalia of the British zone, the Christian Democratic Union would probably be the largest party. In Hanover Region and Hamburg the Social Democrats would probably be the strongest, with in Hamburg a substantial communist and in Hanover Region a substantial right-wing runner up. In Schleswig-Holstein the right-wing parties would probably prevail. If the German government in Berlin fairly reproduced the outlook of the country it would be neither wholly eastward looking nor wholly westward looking. The question would then turn on whether the western democracies or the Soviet Union would exercise the stronger pull. On the whole the balance of advantage seems to lie with the Russians. It is highly unlikely that the western democracies would be able to exercise any influence in the east, at any rate outside Berlin itself. On the other hand, Communism already has its addicts in western Germany, and the liberal attitude of the occupying authorities in the west would allow them a free hand. Added to this would be the constant pressure of propaganda and of agents from the east. And the prevailing material conditions would give them an excellent ground for their activities. They would find the position favourable both in the short-term and in the long-term. For the next year or so, no matter how great our efforts, one must expect hunger, cold and lack of shelter. Later on the level of industry plan will take effect, causing large-scale unemployment and preventing any rapid reconstruction. In such conditions Communism will have an obvious appeal and, with its emphasis on strong authoritarian government, can be plausibly represented as the only kind of system which can possibly cope with so desperate a situation. Even if the first national elections gave the democratic parties the advantage, one must feel greater doubt about the subsequent ones.

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9. A federal system for Germany would minimise these dangers. It would be based on the grant of considerable autonomous powers to the provinces with a co-ordinating body at the centre whose powers would be strictly limited. It would be necessary to examine exactly what division of powers would be most suitable, with a general tendency to restrict the powers of the centre to the barest minimum necessary for its co-ordinating function. The powers reserved for the centre would be mainly those concerned with economics and finance, though there might be no objection to leaving even certain financial powers to the provinces, which might, for instance, be allowed to organise their own social security services. Under a scheme of this kind central administrations, whether set up now under the Allied Control machinery or later under a federal German government, would act through the local German governments and would be prevented so far as possible from organising a network of their own agencies throughout Germany. It may be objected that a federal structure of this kind would not be likely to offer serious resistance to communist influence at the centre, since the latter would be able, with even a small amount of military or para-military force (organised no doubt with Russian assistance) to swallow up the disarmed and divided regional units one by one. This danger exists, but on the whole it seems less serious than to provide the communists with a centralised machine ready to hand, such as Hitler found when he came to power as a result of the centralising tendencies which had operated in Germany since the time of Bismark.

10. In seeking a solution of our dilemma the following considerations should be borne in mind. Though we could argue that the principles laid down at Potsdam were only designed for the initial control period and are therefore now due for reconsideration, nevertheless to throw the Potsdam policy overboard entirely and organise our zone as an independent unit would have very grave consequences:—

- (a) We should be unable to retain for long even the façade of four-Power co-operation in Germany and should soon find ourselves forced out of Berlin.
- (b) The hopes we still entertain of breaking down the iron curtain would have to be abandoned. The whole of eastern Germany and indeed of eastern Europe would be irretrievably lost to Russia.
- (c) We should also have to defend our zone (or western Germany) from the infection of political and economic influences from the east. For example, we should have to set up a separate currency and almost certainly a separate nationality.
- (d) All this—which would in effect amount to bringing western Germany into a western anti-Soviet *bloc*—would mean an irreparable break with the Russians, who would go all out to destroy our policy in western Germany and turn the population against us. This task would not be difficult in an industrial area in a period of acute food shortage. They would, no doubt, also redouble their attacks on us in all other parts of the world, and the prospect of U.N.O. continuing in such circumstances would be slender.
- (e) The Americans are probably not yet ready for this. Certainly their leading representatives in Germany would oppose it tooth and nail. In any case one could not count on continued American support even if they came to agree to it. But full American support would be essential.
- (f) The French might or might not support us, depending on the strength of communism in France. In any case Communist influence would be strong enough to make their support an uncertain factor.
- (g) The Belgians and Dutch (as indeed all minor Allies) would be distressed by any reduction of reparation which would be involved in organising western Germany for prosperity; but the prospect of restoring a prosperous trade with Germany might reconcile them to the loss to some extent. They would be less easily reconciled to the "forgive and forget" attitude towards the western Germans which our new policy would necessarily involve. Their love for German Socialists is no greater than their love for other Germans.
- (h) We should find ourselves at the mercy of German blackmail—"We must be given this and that, or we shall be overwhelmed by the Communists." We should probably soon have to accept a German army.

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- (i) The fear and contempt which Germans feel for Russia, coupled with their unforgiving resentment at the loss of the eastern provinces, might keep them content for a time with holding Russia at the Elbe. But, whether we like it or not, the conception of German unity is a basic fact which has survived many centuries and is unlikely to be destroyed by any artificial creation established to-day. Sooner or later the east and the west would join up again.
- (j) Meanwhile we should have lost the one factor which *might* hold us and the Russians together, viz., the existence of a single Germany which it would be to the interest of us both to hold down.

11. The foregoing are powerful arguments against abandoning the Potsdam policy and setting out to organise our own zone or western Germany as a separate unit. On the other hand a "western" policy, if developed with determination and subject to the conditions mentioned in paragraph 12 below, could have certain attractions:—

- (a) It would be clear both to the Russians and to the Germans that we were determined to resist the further westward expansion of Russian influence and of communism. In this we could expect the support of the great majority of Germans, whose assistance we should have in resisting the infiltration of agents from the east.
- (b) By denouncing the level of industry plan and limiting reparation to more reasonable proportions we should give the western Germans a hope for the future even though it would in itself bring them little immediate material benefit.
- (c) If the German population became more contented by seeing our determination to save them from the Russians and restore their economy, the tasks of our authorities would be lightened, as also would those of the German authorities as they take over responsibility for administration.

12. It must, however, be stressed that two conditions are essential to the success of a "western" policy. The first is that we should give an immediate fillip to the population by raising the food ration and maintaining it at a satisfactory level. Even if the level of industry plan was discarded, we must reckon with an interval of two or three years before German industries could be so far rehabilitated as to render western Germany self-supporting. Secondly, we must be assured of full and continued support from the United States.

13. Whatever decision be taken on this fundamental problem, there are certain matters which we should keep to the forefront of our policy. These are:—

- (a) to concentrate on constructive measures in our zone, both political and economic, and refuse to be deflected from our course by the Russians or such satellites as the World Federation of Trade Unions;
- (b) to accelerate constitutional development in our zone and to develop the local autonomy of the provincial governments, giving them the widest practicable powers and organising them in such a way that they will fit into a federated structure either for the western zones or for Germany as a whole;
- (c) to maintain and, if possible, increase the present food ration in the British zone and western Germany as a whole, and to use every pressure to extract food surpluses from the Russian zone for the benefit of the rest of Germany;
- (d) to take every possible step to increase coal production and see that a sufficient proportion is devoted to the re-activation of German industry;
- (e) to apply the economic principles of Potsdam to the western zones even if the Russians refuse to collaborate, and in any case to foster the solidarity of the western zones;
- (f) to act in fullest collaboration with the Americans;
- (g) to maintain our position in Berlin.

14. The measures suggested in the preceding paragraph are not a substitute for a permanent policy, but until we see more clearly what is likely to be the future of the Ruhr, the most important single problem affecting our position in Germany, it is difficult to come to a final decision. It must be recognised, however, that the question of central economic administrations, which the United

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States Government still feel to be one of the most urgent requirements for Allied policy in Germany, raises the fundamental issue whether Germany is to be a single state or split into eastern and western Germany corresponding to the Russian Zone and the three Western Zones respectively. If agreement was reached between the four Powers that we should all gradually work towards a federal system in Germany, into which the proposed new Province of the Ruhr would fit, this might allow the decision to be somewhat postponed, but it cannot be indefinitely avoided. If it was felt that we had to abandon the idea of a unified Germany, even with a federal system, it would be most important to ensure that responsibility for the break was put squarely on the Russians.

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E. B.

Foreign Office,
3rd May, 1946.

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which she would exchange for raw materials of equivalent value. The amount of equipment to be removed from the western zones would be determined within six months, viz., by the 2nd February, 1948. It was also laid down that during the period of occupation Germany would be treated as a single economic unit and that primary emphasis would be given to the development of agriculture and peaceful domestic industries.

6. It was decided at Potsdam to transfer to Polish administration the former German territories east of the Oder-Western Neisse line (except for the area around Königsberg which would be handed over to Russia). It was agreed that the German populations of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, would be transferred to Germany in an orderly and humane manner in accordance with a plan to be drawn up by the Control Council. The Control Council agreed on a plan to this effect in November 1945.

II.—GENERAL SITUATION TO-DAY.

Four-Power co-operation.

7. The end of the war left Germany a vacuum. The question still to be decided is how this vacuum is to be filled, and the answer will be a touchstone of Great Power collaboration. The general conception at the planning stage was that the four Powers should fill the gap by jointly exercising the supreme authority until such time as Germany had been purged of her vices and could safely be permitted to resume her own independent place in the European structure. The first essential to the success of this policy is, of course, that the four Powers should maintain a united front and, so long as matters of high policy have not supervened, harmony has not been lacking. Personal relations are for the most part good, and in certain important matters the interests of the four Powers coincide. There is, for example, no disagreement in principle on the need to disarm Germany. Agreement has been reached on such big issues as denazification, the reform of the judicial system and the future level of German industry. Nevertheless, the spirit of co-operation has tended to weaken as fundamental issues arise involving national interests and ideologies. No Power is at present strong enough to capture Germany as a whole, nor is the organisation for so doing at present in existence. But in its own zone each Power is doing its best to sow its own beliefs which, in so far as the East and West are concerned, are diametrically opposed.

8. This fundamental antagonism between the totalitarian and the liberal creeds, both of which claim to represent the true democracy, has been somewhat overclouded by extraneous disputes. The French, not having been invited to the Potsdam Conference, were critical of its conclusions from the start and, in particular, of the decision to set up German central administrations. They argued that the existence of such administrations, if given authority over the whole of German territory, would inevitably prejudice their aim to detach the Ruhr and the Rhineland from Germany. For this reason they have used their veto on the Control Council to block the establishment of these administrations. Their intransigence has exasperated the Americans whose great purpose it is to get the main Potsdam objectives, such as disarmament and denazification, finished off as quickly as possible and then hand over the administration to the Germans. American exasperation has not been limited to criticism of the French. We, too, have had our fair share of it, owing to our slower and more cautious approach deriving from our long-term interest in the future of Germany. But the Americans in Berlin have usually been careful to keep on the right side of the Russians, with the unfortunate result that there has at times been almost a Russo-American bloc in the Control Commission. This, of course, has suited the Russians very well, and they have exercised much ingenuity in singling us out for criticism and, at the same time, flattering the Americans.

Central and zonal administration.

9. Quadripartite government is itself an unprecedented experiment. In this troubled atmosphere and unaided as it is by any central German administrative authority, it is bound to creak and the burden of government to flow to the zones which tend to become quasi-independent, each administered according to the views of the occupying Power. This tendency is furthest advanced in the Russian zone and, though their unit of administration still remains the "Land," they have gone so far in the process towards zonal

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C.M.(46) 43RD CONCLUSIONS, MINUTE 1

Confidential Annex

(7th May, 1946 - 11.0 a.m.)

GERMANY

(Previous Reference: C.M.(46) 36th Conclusions, Minute 3)

The Cabinet had a preliminary exchange of views on a memorandum by the Foreign Secretary (C.P.(46) 186) on future policy towards Germany.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that this memorandum posed the alternatives of continuing to work towards a unified (though federalised) Germany or seeking to promote the formation of a Western German State or States which would be a bulwark against the spread of Communist influence from the east. He did not at this stage seek final conclusions, but he wished to have a preliminary exchange of views with his Cabinet colleagues before these issues were discussed with the Dominion Ministers. His own view was that, both on general grounds and because we had not the resources necessary to organise the British zone of Germany as a stable separate unit, the Foreign Secretary was right in suggesting that the general dangers of splitting Germany were greater than those of continuing our present policy and that we might hope to avoid the dangers of excessive centralisation by encouraging political development along federal lines. He had recently received from the Deputy Military Governor of the Control Commission an appreciation, dated 5th May, of the effect of a further reduction or cessation of imports of food grains into the British zone. This appreciation (which was read to the Cabinet) showed the magnitude of the problems confronting our administration in Germany, and afforded a striking illustration of the economic and political difficulties with which we should be faced if we attempted now to build up Western Germany as a separate unit.

THE LORD PRESIDENT said that our acceptance of the conclusions of the Berlin Conference had put us in a very weak position. He believed that, as time went on, it would be generally recognised that the Berlin conclusions regarding Germany had been unsound. Meanwhile, the Russians were maintaining their zone as a closed area and denying to Western Germany a fair share of the food from the east; and the execution of the agreed policy for reparations and for the

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reduction of the level of German industry, coupled with the inevitable food shortages, was creating conditions in our zone for which the blame was being laid at our door. He was in general agreement with the Foreign Secretary's view that we should continue to work towards a unified Germany, though there should be a much greater degree of decentralisation than in the past. He felt strongly, however, that in pursuing any such policy we must, while seeking to preserve good relations with the Russians, point out to them firmly and publicly the consequences of their policy. It was time that the Germans themselves and our other partners in the occupation of Germany should clearly understand where the fault lay. At the same time, we should adopt a more positive and progressive socialist policy in our zone, in both economic and social matters, so that the democratic forces in Germany should be encouraged and that we should stand out as the natural leaders of progressive democracy. He did not accept the view that a clash with Russia was inevitable and he felt that it would be possible for us, while recognising the dangers inherent in the present Russian policy and developing a livelier leadership in Europe, to keep the way clear for the re-establishment of more harmonious relations with the Soviet Union.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER said that he was concerned about the present position in Germany. Both politically and economically we seemed to be getting the worst of both worlds. He believed that our financial liabilities might even be increased if the policy of a unified Germany were adopted, and he felt that this aspect of the matter would have to be considered before a final decision was reached. Apart from this, the arguments set out in paragraph 10 of C.P.(46) 186 in favour of working towards a unified Germany seemed to him conclusive. He was strongly of opinion that we should avoid drifting into an anti-Soviet policy. He did not agree with the statement in paragraph 2 of C.P.(46) 186 that "the danger of Russia had become certainly as great as, and possibly even greater than, that of a revived Germany"; though he agreed with the statement in the following sentence that "the worst situation of all would be a revived Germany in league with or dominated by Russia". He hoped that any scheme for a unified Germany would provide for a large measure of decentralisation to Provincial Governments and for the establishment of the Ruhr as a separate province in which the industries would be owned by an international consortium.

THE MINISTER OF HEALTH said that the scheme favoured by the Foreign Secretary seemed to be based on the grant of considerable autonomous powers to the provinces, with a general tendency to restrict the powers of the centre to the barest minimum necessary for its co-ordinating function. A constitution imposed by the

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victorious Powers would be unpopular; and it was mistaken to suppose that we could establish and maintain a Federal system in Germany against the will of the German people. The fears expressed in C.P.(46) 186 with regard to Russia seemed to be exaggerated and insufficient recognition had been given to the fact that the influence of Russia inevitably weakened as it penetrated further to the west. He agreed with the Lord President that we should adopt a more positive and progressive policy in Germany and should back this up with suitable publicity. Above all, it should be recognised that in the end the German people would evolve their own political structure and that any attempt to impose on them conditions alien to their natural development would fail.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR said that, while he recognised the force of the arguments advanced by the Minister of Health, he was in general agreement with the conclusions reached in the Foreign Secretary's memorandum. It was impossible in present conditions to determine our final policy. For the moment we must temporise. He agreed, however, that more vigorous steps should be taken to publicise the British case.

THE MINISTER OF FUEL AND POWER said that it was difficult to reconcile our two aims of preventing the revival of Germany as a military power and encouraging the growth of a vigorous democratic system in Germany. There would also be some difficulty in reconciling a federal political system with a unified economic system. On balance, however, he saw no alternative to the line suggested by the Foreign Secretary, short of abandoning our zone in Germany. Russian interests in other parts of the world would probably limit their penetration into western Europe.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR said that if the proposal for a unified though federalised Germany were accepted as our aim, we should have a stronger case to put to the world. Though it was attractive to contemplate the early withdrawal of British troops from Germany, he himself believed that we should have to maintain an Army of occupation there for some years if we were to maintain conditions favourable to the establishment of a strong social democracy in Germany.

THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS pointed out that any apparent inconsistencies in the policy suggested in C.P.(46) 186 were due to the need to steer a course among the conflicting aims and policies in Germany. Thus, the French had always opposed political unification, while the Russians were in practice failing to carry out the agreement for economic unification. He did not believe that publicising our case would suffice to remedy this situation unless we could secure more satisfactory economic conditions, and he attached

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great importance to our insisting that Russia should treat Germany as an economic unit. In the last resort, we might for this purpose have to suspend the operations for reducing the level of German industry in our zone which we had undertaken in accordance with the Berlin Agreement. With regard to the point made by the Minister of Health, he was sure that the Foreign Secretary had no intention of seeking to impose a constitution on Germany against the will of the German people.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER said that he was in general agreement with the Foreign Secretary's suggestion, provided that in carrying out any scheme of unification account was taken of the views of the German people themselves. He thought it important, however, to avoid any scheme under which the central administration would consist of purely co-ordinating bodies without effective control, or the separate provinces would remain under the control of the separate Zone Commanders, since in either case there could be no prospect of building up an effective central administration.

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Byrnes 5/15/46
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TOP SECRET.

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ANGLO-AMERICAN DISCUSSIONS.

Minute by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

In my talk with Mr. Byrnes today we covered a very wide field affecting the policy of both nations. I first asked him if he could give me an account of what really took place with M. Molotov last Sunday, April 28th, when I had had to go to London, so that I could get my mind clear as to the real attitude of the Russians.

2. Mr. Byrnes said that M. Molotov had complained very bitterly of the American attitude to the Persian question. He felt that Great Britain and America had endeavoured to organise the whole world against them on the issue of non-withdrawal of their troops. Mr. Byrnes had asked him what he could expect. On Christmas Eve, the last time he had met with Generalissimo Stalin, he had pointed out that if the troops were not withdrawn by March 2nd, the matter would go to the United Nations and Russia would put the United States in a very embarrassing position because under no circumstances could they accept a position in which a treaty was violated. The Generalissimo had then stated that he did not mind the question going to U.N.O. at all. Mr. Byrnes had pointed out that if it did go to U.N.O. and the terms of the treaty were not carried out, then the Generalissimo must remember that the United States would be against him and he could have to face that fact. Mr. Byrnes also pointed out to M. Molotov that M. Gromyko had had plenty/

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plenty of chances not to keep raising the question and to leave it on the agenda, but he had persisted in endeavouring to take it off the agenda. The United States would not and could not agree to that but would wait to see what happened on May 6th.

3. Mr. Byrnes said that he and M. Molotov had next discussed the Mediterranean question and that Mr. Byrnes had said that he could not look with favour upon Russia in an individual capacity coming anywhere into Africa or the Middle East. The United States could not regard that with favour or stand idly by. M. Molotov rather indicated that they did not want to come into the Middle East but there were other matters, which he did not enumerate, needing settlement.

4. Mr. Byrnes asked me what I thought was the real Russian attitude. I said that the deductions I had drawn were that they wanted Trieste as a great shipping, military and naval base, Pola as a subsidiary base and Fiume similarly. They would thus have at the back of them all the Slav States. I thought that their purpose would then be to keep Italy in virtual subjection by this overwhelming power in the Adriatic. In addition, I thought that when we came to the Bulgarian treaty and the Greco-Bulgarian frontier was raised (which it would have to be) we should be countered by a demand to allow Bulgaria to have an outlet to the Aegean Sea. The next position was the Dardanelles and there we would be pressed for a base. The arguments advanced would be that the Allies in the last war gave the

Czar/

Czar Constantinople and why could they not have a base there now. The difficulty was, however, that if they had the bases they proposed, then Turkey would become a satellite state. She would have no independence and she would be almost in the position of Azerbaijan, and the solidarity of the Middle East would be undermined. On the other hand, without committing myself, I said I had been studying the possibility of a United Nations base and keeping the Dardanelles always open until it was decided otherwise by the United Nations. But it was difficult to arrive at a conclusion without knowing what the effect on Turkey would be; I was giving this further thought. I realised that if this were proposed it would be immediately countered by an enquiry what we would do with the Suez Canal. That would be a matter for Egypt because it was in her territory, although we did hold the major shares. The sovereignty belonging to Egypt, it would be a question whether Egypt would agree that the Canal should always be open on similar terms to those I had suggested for the Dardanelles. Mr. Byrnes showed great interest in this, but then I reminded him that he might be asked what was going to happen to the Panama Canal, because these three waterways, curiously enough, stood in relation to one another; what would be the American attitude if that question arose. I indicated that I would not raise the Panama Canal, but I anticipated that Stalin would and it would have to be met. I then said that I thought it would be a good thing if, quite privately, there were a close analysis between Admiral Nimitz and Admiral Cunningham, and the Chiefs of Air Staffs particularly,

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on what the effect of a base in such waterways would be in relation to the development of atomic energy. Mr. Byrnes said he would consider this. I said I thought there should be no formal or public announcement of this but it was a matter on which the Chiefs of Staffs should advise us as to how great the risks really were. I had been told that a base was not so important now in the Dardanelles as it would have been 20 years ago. Mr. Byrnes indicated that their military authorities were no longer worried about a base in the Dardanelles and that that had been the background of Truman's attitude at Potsdam.

5. With regard to the Italian colonies, I said I had studied this question very carefully. It might be possible (I could place it no higher) to give Italy a trusteeship for a strip of land with the bulk of the Italians, Jews and others round Tripolitania and down to the French frontier of Tunis, which might satisfy M. Bidault. But our guarantees to the Senussi should apply to the remainder of the territory on the basis of a Class A mandate, the nature of which it appeared to me from his talk Mr. Dunn must have explained to him. In any case, we should resist Russia coming into North Africa. With reference to Somaliland and Eritrea, that was a separate subject. The Negus had made a claim and had a right to be heard and I felt bound to press for some method of hearing his claim. Mr. Byrnes was not averse to this.

6. Mr. Byrnes then pressed me on the question of India. He said that if the United States were to take their place/

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place in the Middle East and in India, could they not retain on a rental basis the facilities that they now had in Calcutta and Karachi. If they were given no facilities in India - and all they asked for was that these places should be maintained and that they should have landing rights in case of necessity just as we were asking for facilities in Egypt; - he hoped that the British Government would pay special heed to this request because the United States felt they could provide the greatest aid in case of trouble to us in the Indian Ocean by having the necessary facilities. I would like the views of the Chiefs of Staff in the light of this.

7. I then raised the question of what the American view was of north-west India, and Mr. Byrnes said their Chiefs of Staff had been waiting for that magic word to be mentioned and they did not know what studies we had made. I said we had looked at our new lines of communication in Africa and the difference in the situation which would arise if we withdrew from Egypt, also the defense of the Indian Ocean; in all these places we felt that collaboration with the United States was absolutely essential. Mr. Byrnes said that their Chiefs of Staff felt the same. I asked whether there was a chance of a very private exchange of views about the whole thing. He said he would consider it.

8. We then turned to the question of Trieste. Mr. Byrnes said that before he left America he had met the whole of the publishers and principal editors of the

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United States, off the record, and had told them that he did not expect any settlement, and that he would have to consider separate treaties. He wanted to know from us where we stood if that eventuality arose. I replied by asking him what he felt the obligations were to consult Russia and to take as an example the case of Italy. He said he thought that the agreement not to make a separate peace applied to the war and not now. I said I was not quite clear about this but I would ask for it to be looked up. On the matter of Trieste he said they could not give way, but if there were no settlement he would propose that in the case of the colonies they should be renounced by Italy. They should adjourn discussion for a year. He should remain in occupation during which time many things might happen, and if there were no settlement the disposal of the colonies should be dealt with by the Assembly. With regard to Trieste he said he thought of proposing that a line - and he was quite prepared to take the French line - should be adopted and that if there were then a dispute about it it should be dealt with by the Assembly under Article 14. He did not think that would be accepted. In reply I said I believed that, if he drew Russia on the question of the Dardanelles, so keen were they about it that they might even give up Trieste to get it.

9. We next turned to the question of reparations from Italy. Mr. Byrnes said they had had another examination in Washington with the Italian Embassy and the amount of Italy's foreign assets which had not been seized was over one hundred/

hundred million dollars and therefore Russia herself if given these assets could be satisfied. If they gave the Albania coalfield and the other assets in Yugoslavia, it more than met the claim of Yugoslavia.

10. Then there was the question of Greece. There was certain merchant tonnage under American control which they might consider giving to Greece as a substitute for reparations, as well as the cruiser and all the other naval items, and he thought that the United States of America might be willing to help Greece in other ways too.

11. Mr. Byrnes paid little attention to Albania. He did not think the claim was justified.

12. We then turned to the question that W. Molotov had raised of the events in the German zones and demilitarisation and he showed me a secret document which revealed General Clay's attitude. He had authorized Clay to take the line that there was to be no more delivery of reparations until the problem of Germany as a whole was settled and a system arrived at which provided for exports to pay for imports. He welcomed Mr. Dalton's statement in the House that the British occupation of Germany was costing eighty million a year. They had not made a statement but it had set America thinking and now there was considerable pressure as to what was happening. Russia was not contributing one iota to Germany as a whole, neither were they allowing any inspection, or anybody, if allowed to go in at all had so many obstacles put in his way that he really saw nothing; and the United States were going to have/3

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have a show-down. I promised to let him have the advantage - as he had shown me his secret document - of seeing Field-Marshal Montgomery's most recent report.

13. Mr. Byrnes said in addition that his greatest anxiety was France. Bidault was weak, and had no political stability behind him; therefore the United States could not make a very great move with France (and he had told Bidault this) until they knew better where they stood. But they were prepared to assist France to their utmost when they knew whether France was going to remain with western civilisation or going Communist.

14. Another point Mr. Byrnes raised was the question of Manchurian reparations. He was hoping that, as a result of the action which might be taken in the next 24 hours by General Clay, this question would come up; he intended to have a show-down on the Manchurian question by relating it to what Molotov was claiming for Germany.

15. Mr. Byrnes on the whole appeared to be very stiff. As I entered the room Senators Connally and Vandenberg were leaving with Mr. Dunn and in the whole discussion there was a welcome sign of willingness to grapple with these problems. But, as he stated, the difficulty was to get the Russians to say what they wanted or to see whether we could meet them as a whole. I explained to him our position in Egypt and told him of the announcement which we hoped would be made shortly. The effect of the announcement would be to indicate to Russia that we were not keeping troops in Egypt against the will of the Egyptian nation and I thought that this would have a very salutary effect.

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16. Mr. Byrnes' final words to me were that if he pressed for twelve months' grace for the colonies, he hoped I would support him, which would mean that British troops would remain there during that period.

R.B.

PARIS.

5th May, 1946.

10/21/46

Printed for the Cabinet. October 1946

SECRET.

Copy No. 43

M. (46)

Conclusions

CABINET 89 (46)

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the Cabinet held in the Prime Minister's Room at the House of Commons, on Monday, 21st October, 1946, at 4 p.m.

Present:

- The Right Hon. C. R. ATTLEE, M.P., Prime Minister (*in the Chair*).
- The Right Hon. HERBERT MORRISON, M.P., Lord President of the Council.
- The Right Hon. ARTHUR GREENWOOD, M.P., Lord Privy Seal.
- The Right Hon. Sir STAFFORD CRIPPS, M.P., President of the Board of Trade.
- The Right Hon. J. CHUTER EDE, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department.
- The Right Hon. A. CECIL JONES, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies.
- The Right Hon. E. SHINWELL, M.P., Minister of Fuel and Power.
- The Right Hon. ANEURIN BEVAN, M.P., Minister of Health (*Item 4*).
- The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
- The Right Hon. HUGH DALTON, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.
- The Right Hon. A. V. ALEXANDER, M.P., Minister without Portfolio.
- The Right Hon. LORD PRETHICK-LAWRENCE, Secretary of State for India and Secretary of State for Burma.
- The Right Hon. G. A. ISAACS, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.
- The Right Hon. ELLEN WILKINSON, M.P., Minister of Education.
- The Right Hon. T. WILLIAMS, M.P., Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries.

The following were also present:

- The Right Hon. F. J. BELLENGER, M.P., Secretary of State for War (*Items 3-4*).
- The Right Hon. A. BARNES, M.P., Minister of Transport (*Items 3-4*).
- The Right Hon. G. TOMLINSON, M.P., Minister of Works (*Items 3-4*).
- The Right Hon. WILLIAM WHITELEY, M.P., Parliamentary Secretary, Treasury (*Items 1-2*).
- The Right Hon. JOHN WILMOT, M.P., Minister of Supply (*Items 3-4*).
- The Right Hon. JOHN STRACHEY, M.P., Minister of Food.
- Mr. J. B. HYND, M.P., Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (*Items 3-4*).
- Sir ORME SARGENT, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (*Items 3-4*).

Secretariat.

- Sir EDWARD BRIDGES.
- Sir NORMAN BROOK.
- Mr. C. G. EASTWOOD.

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India.
Establishment
of Interim
Government.
(Previous
Reference:
C.M. (46) 76th
Conclusions,
Minute 8.)

1. *The Prime Minister* said that it had been suggested to him by the Secretary of State for India that a message should be sent to the Viceroy conveying the Cabinet's congratulations on the successful achievement of a Coalition Government in India. The Viceroy might also be authorised to read, at the first meeting of his new Council, a message of greeting and good wishes from His Majesty's Government. The Prime Minister read to the Cabinet the text of the proposed messages.

The Cabinet—

Invited the Secretary of State for India to despatch telegrams to the Viceroy in the terms of the drafts read to them by the Prime Minister.

Parliament.
Business in
the House of
Commons.

2. *The Lord President* informed the Cabinet of the business which it was proposed to take in the House of Commons in the following week.

The debate on *Welsh Affairs* would be taken on 28th October. The President of the Board of Trade would open, and the Minister of Health would reply to, the debate.

On 29th and 30th October there would be a debate on the White Paper on *Central Organisation for Defence*. It was agreed that the Prime Minister should open this debate, that the Minister of Supply should speak first on the second day, and that the Minister without Portfolio should reply to the debate.

The debate on the *Press* would be taken on 31st October. The Lord President would reply to the debate. There would be advantages in leaving the decision to a free vote of the House; and the Lord President undertook to consider this point.

On 1st November progress would be made with legislation received from the House of Lords, and certain financial business would also be taken.

Date of
Intimation.

The Lord President said that he proposed to announce on 24th October that it was contemplated that Parliament would be prorogued on 6th November and that the new Session would be opened on 12th November.

Germany.

(Previous
Reference:
C.M. (46) 60th
Conclusions,
Minute 1.)

3. The Cabinet considered the following memoranda:—

C.P. (46) 383: by the Foreign Secretary, seeking authority for the broad lines of policy to be advocated in the discussions on Germany to be held with United States officials in Washington and at the November meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

C.P. (46) 385: by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the net cost of Germany to the United Kingdom Exchequer.

C.P. (46) 384: by the Lord President, suggesting that the planning of the future German economy should be co-ordinated with that of the United Kingdom.

C.P. (46) 392: by the Minister of Food on the pooling of cereal supplies to the British and United States Zones.

The Foreign Secretary said that the economy of the British Zone of Germany had steadily deteriorated, as stocks held at the time of surrender became exhausted. The population were living on a very low calory standard and in wretched housing conditions. Too little coal was being retained in the Zone to provide renewals for essential plant and allow substantial progress in the repair of war damage; and the permitted level of industry was not proving adequate to enable the Zone to pay its own way. It had been increasingly clear for some months that this situation could not be allowed to continue much longer, but it had been difficult hitherto to recommend any drastic alteration on account of political considerations. It had been necessary to make a determined

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attempt to work in concert with the other occupying Powers; but the Russians had been unwilling to treat Germany as an economic whole, the Americans had until recently favoured the "pastoralisation" of Germany, the French had made it their first object to secure the detachment of the Ruhr and the Rhineland from Germany, and France and other countries of Western Europe had insisted on obtaining coal from the Ruhr in quantities which precluded the restoration of the German economy. The time had now come to take stock of the position afresh. Discussions were shortly to take place between officials in Washington on the means of treating the British and United States Zones as an economic unit; and these would be followed by special sessions of the Council of Foreign Ministers to discuss German questions.

A large capital investment would have to be made in the British Zone before it could become self-supporting and begin to repay the money borrowed. He estimated that £250 millions might be needed for the British Zone and £125 millions for the American Zone. He proposed that an endeavour should be made to persuade the United States to provide the greater part of this capital. He had set out in C.P. (46) 383 the measures of rehabilitation to be taken. We must press for a substantial upward adjustment of the permitted level of industry in Germany: it was known that the United States and the Russian Governments were in favour of some increase. It would also be essential to retain more coal in the British Zone, though he had undertaken that no public announcement to this effect should be made before the French elections in November. And we must be prepared to encourage German exports. The British Zone could not pay its way without enough exports to finance imports, and some relaxation of the present restrictions was inevitable.

The Foreign Secretary recommended that it should be our policy to proceed with the socialisation of heavy industries in Western Germany and, if the Cabinet agreed, he proposed to make a statement to this effect in the House of Commons on the following day.

On constitutional questions, while conditions did not yet exist in which a central government could be set up in Germany, he recommended that it should be our aim that, when it was set up, it should deal only with certain reserved subjects, and that extensive powers should be left to the Governments of the Länder. He proposed that the British Zone should now be organised in three Länder, namely North Rhine-Westphalia, Schleswig-Holstein, and Lower Saxony. Hamburg and Bremen should each be given an independent status. Nominated governments should be set up as soon as possible in all the Länder and in Hamburg and Bremen, with instructions to draft constitutions for submission to their Parliaments as soon as these had been elected.

In the course of a full discussion the principal points raised were as follows:—

(a) *Finance*

The Chancellor of the Exchequer drew attention to the heavy burden which these proposals would involve for the British taxpayer. The net cost of the British Zone in 1946-47 was now thought likely to amount to £120 millions, which was the equivalent of 1s. in the £ on the income tax. The Foreign Secretary estimated that, in order to restore the economy of the British and United States Zones, further expenditure would be required over the next three years amounting to £375 millions. A determined effort must certainly be made to persuade the United States Government to assume the larger share of this burden. The Chancellor said that during his recent visit to Washington he had suggested that the United States Government should assume responsibility for four-fifths of the net expenditure on the two Zones, and the United States authorities had not finally rejected that suggestion. If, however, this expenditure could properly be represented as a capital investment, he was disposed to suggest that it might be treated as

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a loan. The United States might then be asked to find the greater part of the money, and some of the countries which had been neutral in the war might also be asked to make a contribution.

The Foreign Secretary pointed out that our net expenditure on Germany would be less if we were not deliberately limiting her economic revival in the interests of our security and the protection of British industry and exports. It would be interesting if the financial benefit accruing to us under both these heads as a result of our policy towards Germany could be assessed and offset against our expenditure on the British Zone. It would also be reasonable to offset against that expenditure the value which we had obtained from the employment of German prisoners of war in this country. We had always insisted that the value of reparations labour should be debited against the Soviet claim to reparations from Germany.

(b) *Exports*

The President of the Board of Trade, while agreeing that steps should be taken to increase the total volume of exports from Germany, suggested that there would be advantages in controlling the destination of those exports. It would be advantageous to British export trade if arrangements could be made to use a substantial proportion of Germany's exports in this country and to send British products to those countries which would otherwise have taken exports from Germany. There was much that we could buy from Germany, as was shown by the fact that a British purchasing agency which had been sent to Germany with authority to spend up to £10 millions had so far placed orders for only £50,000 worth of goods. It would also be in our interests if the export of German goods to Eastern Europe could be encouraged.

It was agreed that it would be helpful if the suggestions made by the President of the Board of Trade could be worked out in detail, and if the Board of Trade and Ministry of Supply could also specify what types of German exports could be developed with least detriment to British industry. This represented the short-term aspect of the proposal put forward in the Lord President's memorandum (C.P. (46) 384) that German industry should be so developed that her exports became complementary to, rather than competitive with, British exports. It was desirable that this problem should be examined in detail both from the short-term and the long-term point of view.

As regards the second proposal in the Lord President's paper (C.P. (46) 384), it was thought unlikely that the British Zone in Germany would be able to make any substantial contribution, during the next few years, of goods required for the economic development and maintenance of the United Kingdom. This part of the Lord President's proposals might, however, be considered as part of the long-term problem.

(c) *Re-equipment of German Industry*

There was general agreement that it would be necessary to import machinery into Germany if the efficiency of her industry was to be restored without undue delay. We should, however, be careful to avoid finding ourselves in a position where German industry, re-equipped with up-to-date machinery, was in a better competitive position than our own. Thus, it might be better to send some of our surplus machine tools to Germany and to import new tools for our own use, rather than to permit the new tools to be imported into Germany.

(d) *Reparations*

The President of the Board of Trade and the Minister of Supply urged that there should be early delivery of reparations plant allocated to this country. This plant was rapidly deteriorating in Germany and much of it was urgently required here for both civil and defence industries.

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The Foreign Secretary explained that the United States authorities had refused to proceed further with the allocation and dismantling of reparations plant until a decision had been reached on the economic unity of Germany. He proposed that the question should be discussed with them in November. Meanwhile, individual items of capital equipment which were urgently needed in the United Kingdom might be removed from the British Zone.

(e) *Socialisation*

The Cabinet favoured an early declaration that the heavy industries in the British Zone would be socialised. Such a statement should strengthen Socialist parties in Europe. It should also encourage the Social Democrats in Germany. The Christian Democrats had also obtained a considerable number of votes in the recent elections in Berlin and were likely to be the dominating party in two out of three Länder in the British Zone; they would, moreover, be strengthened by fusion with the American Zone, where the party was already strong. But there was little doubt that the Social Democrat Party was the more solidly grounded organisation and a more effective barrier against a revival of German nationalism.

It was important that the socialised industries should be run by the Germans themselves, under supervision. The iron and steel industry and the coal industry had been vested temporarily in the Commander-in-Chief; and, now that the elections had taken place, it should be possible to hand them over to an appropriate German organisation.

(f) *Coal*

An adequate supply of coal was fundamental to any improvement in the economy of the British Zone. Political considerations had hitherto prevented any considerable reduction in the volume of coal exports, but it was hoped that after the French elections it would be possible to retain a substantially greater proportion of the Ruhr coal production for use in Germany.

(g) *Pooling of Food Supplies*

The Minister of Food drew attention to the prospect of a serious shortage in supplies of cereals to the British Zone over the next few months. From October to December, the United States proposed to ship only 140,000 tons to the British Zone, whereas 425,000 tons were to be sent to the smaller American Zone. If no more was provided for our Zone, rationing there must break down. On the other hand, a supply of 565,000 tons to the two Zones might enable them both to get through the year if it was shared equitably between them. It was important, therefore, that the United States Government should be induced to agree that this quantity should be divided proportionately between the two Zones. He did not suggest any addition to the total to be sent to Germany. The United States Government would argue that we should obtain supplies for our Zone from Canada, but shipments from Canada were already behind schedule and supplies could only be diverted to Germany at the expense either of the United Kingdom, where a reduction in the bread ration might then be involved, or of the British Colonies, where already it was only with great difficulty that famine was being avoided.

The Foreign Secretary undertook to arrange for urgent representations to be made to the United States Government on this point.

The general conclusion of the Cabinet was that our policy in respect of Germany should now be redirected along the lines recommended in C.P. (46) 383. While all agreed that Germany must be rendered incapable of launching another aggressive war, there had been a conflict between the other objectives of the Allied Powers in relation to Germany. On the one hand, her industrial structure was being crippled by the removal of reparations plant and by

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other measures designed to bring immediate advantage to Allied countries. On the other hand, it was desired that Germany should be enabled to maintain a tolerable standard of life and that the great industrial potentialities of the Ruhr should be used for the benefit of Europe as a whole. These two objectives could not be wholly reconciled. There could now be little doubt that the emphasis should be on the latter objective, if only on financial grounds. Unless the Allies made a serious attempt to put Germany on her feet again, each Zone would remain a continuing charge upon the occupying Power.

The Cabinet—

- (1) Approved in principle the broad lines of policy recommended in C.P. (46) 383 as a basis for the forthcoming negotiations in Washington and at the Council of Foreign Ministers.
- (2) Took note that the Foreign Secretary would announce, in his speech in the House of Commons on the following day, the Government's intention to proceed with the socialisation of heavy industry in Germany.
- (3) Agreed that officials of the Board of Trade, Foreign Office, Control Office, Ministry of Supply and other Departments concerned should consider the points noted in paragraph (b) above and should prepare a report for submission to the Cabinet after consideration by the appropriate Ministerial Committee; this might, perhaps, be the Committee on Overseas Economic Policy, which the Prime Minister was proposing to set up.
- (4) Invited the Foreign Secretary to make urgent representations to the United States Government that the supplies of cereals from the United States to the British and United States Zones of Germany during the next three months should be pooled, so that a breakdown in the rationing system in the British Zone might be avoided.

Supply of
timber from
Germany.

Previous
Reference:
C.M. (46) 73rd
Conclusions,
Minute 7.)

4. The Cabinet had before them memoranda by the Lord President (C.P. (46) 388) and the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (C.P. (46) 390) regarding the supply of timber from Germany to the United Kingdom.

The Prime Minister suggested that, before this question was further considered by the Cabinet, a preliminary inquiry should be held to establish the facts. It would be convenient if the Cabinet could have before them an agreed statement showing what action had already been taken to obtain adequate supplies of timber from Germany, what further measures could be taken to secure increased supplies and what would be the cost of those measures, particularly in terms of other United Kingdom resources.

The Cabinet—

Invited the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in consultation with the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and other Ministers directly concerned, to hold an inquiry on the lines suggested by the Prime Minister into the possibility of increasing the supply of timber from Germany to the United Kingdom, and to submit a report for consideration by the Cabinet.

Cabinet Office, S.W. 1,
21st October, 1946.

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TOP SECRET

Copy No. 29

C.F. (47) 68
20th February, 1947

CABINET

MAIN SHORT-TERM PROBLEMS CONFRONTING US IN MOSCOW:
SUMMARISED CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. I ask my colleagues to agree:—
 - (i) That we should resist any claims which may be put forward for current reparation deliveries either from Eastern or Western Germany.
 - (ii) That as a principal condition of economic unity we should obtain Russian agreement to bearing a reasonable share in the burden already borne and to be borne by the Occupying Powers in respect of relief imports and external costs of occupation of Germany as a whole.
 - (iii) The demand for reparations from current production should not be refused outright. It should, however, be made clear that it cannot be considered until Germany has established a favourable foreign exchange balance and has met the expenses incurred by the Occupying Powers.
 - (iv) That we should insist on an upward revision of the level of Industry Plan with a minimum steel production level of 10 million tons, the steel using industries being adjusted to a level appropriate to this steel output.
 - (v) That we should insist on associating the discussion of economic problems with the consideration of the future political structure of Germany.
 - (vi) That for the purpose of dealing with points raised in (i)-(iv) above we shall table, at the earliest opportunity in Moscow, a new set of political and economic principles dealing with the treatment of Germany during the second control period. A draft statement along the general lines contemplated is contained in Appendix "A."

2. The most crucial part of the Moscow discussions is likely to concern the short-term problems of Germany, political and economic. The political problems, so far as they can be treated independently, are discussed in detail in separate papers circulated in the O.R.C. At the same time, the immediate political problems are very closely connected with the immediate economic problems and can only be considered in relation to them. The main economic topics likely to be discussed in Moscow are three, namely, economic unity, level of industry and reparations. The historical background of these subjects is dealt with in Appendix "B."

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3. The background of long-term policy against which these immediate problems must be viewed is as follows: Our aim in Germany is the creation of a single State decentralised on federal lines, with her pre-war boundaries substantially unchanged except for the cession of some territory to Poland and Russia in the east, and the inclusion of the Saar in the French Economic area. She should be left with a sufficient industrial potential to ensure a reasonable standard of living, but this should be so designed as to interfere as little as possible with our own export policy. German basic industries should be socialised. The west bank of the Rhine and the Ruhr should be occupied, the former by the forces of the limitrophe Powers and the latter by the forces of the western Powers, the United States and the United Kingdom. An international control should be set up over the socialised industries of the Ruhr. The question of Russian participation in this control should be deferred for later consideration.

4. The first problem with which we are likely to be faced in Moscow is the demand by Russia that we should recognise her right to take current reparation deliveries from her own zone and should agree to her receiving current deliveries from the Western Zones in exchange for an upward revision of the Level of Industry Plan. These demands can only be met at the cost of considerable additional sacrifice by the British taxpayer. In our fusion agreement with the Americans we accepted with some misgiving certain financial commitments which in our present economic condition represent the absolute limit to which we can afford to go. The Russian demands must therefore be rejected.

5. In the unlikely event of the Russians being prepared to accept economic unity and waive their claim to reparation deliveries, both from Eastern and Western Germany, there is still no guarantee that economic unity would cost us less than it would if we were to continue to run the British and American zones as a combined area separated from the rest of Germany. Although on present ration standards the Russian zone has a surplus of food-stuffs, it is substantially deficient in industrial raw materials. Moreover, industry in the Russian zone has been largely depleted and what is left is badly in need of repair. Under these circumstances, there is likely to be a net outflow of goods from the Western Zone and, if Russia were in practice to ignore the powers of German Central Administrative Agencies throughout the whole country, these goods from the Western Zones could easily be shipped across the Eastern borders of Germany into Poland and Russia. In other words, Russia would continue to take reparation deliveries from current production but in a disguised form.

6. To safeguard ourselves against this position we should only accept unity if Russia is prepared to bear a fair share of the net liability of the Occupying Powers as a whole, including a share of the liability that has already been incurred by the United States and this country. This share might be equivalent to her 50 per cent. claim of total reparation deliveries from Germany or at least equivalent to the proportion of the population of her zone to the population of the whole country.

7. We should further insist on a substantial upward revision of the Level of Industry Plan to ensure that Germany is left with sufficient industrial capacity to render her economically viable. While we should not try to settle the details of the plan in Moscow we should at least seek to reach agreement on the level of German steel capacity and of the related steel-using industries. We should not accept a lower figure for steel production than 10 million tons.

8. We shall almost certainly be faced with demands for current reparations at some future date. We should not refuse these demands altogether; but should take the line that the question cannot be considered until Germany has established a favourable foreign exchange balance and the expenses incurred by the Occupying Powers have been repaid. Should this position ever be reached the question could then be re-examined.

9. Further general points on which we must insist as preconditions for economic agreement are the removal of restrictions on the inter-zonal movement of German and Allied personnel and of goods, and the establishment of genuine freedom of assembly and expression, subject to the minimum agreed requirements of security.

10. Agreement on the terms outlined above will certainly meet with strong Russian opposition. We may find ourselves faced with a position in which we are urged to make small financial sacrifices in exchange for certain politico/economic

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concessions. The attitude of the other Occupying Powers and of the Germans and an account of the particular problems with which we are faced are elaborated in Part II of the attached paper. In brief they suggest that if the discussions were to be confined to economic unity alone we might in certain circumstances find ourselves in a minority of one and in the eyes of the world opinion which is anxious to see unanimity amongst the Four Powers, regarded as the country responsible for failure.

11. It is most important that this position should be avoided and that the responsibility for failure of Potsdam and of quadripartite agreement should be placed fairly and squarely on the shoulders of the Russians, who are entirely responsible for the present state of affairs. To achieve this end, it will be necessary to widen the discussion in order to cover the whole field of the Potsdam Agreement. By ensuring that the field of discussion is extended to the political and economic principles which we wish to establish, we shall reduce the risk of finding ourselves in a minority of one on economic questions. The Russians are known to favour a centralised form of German Government. On the other hand, the American views are very similar to our own, while the French, who favour a confederate rather than a federal form, would support us against the Russians if faced with an exclusive choice.

12. A comprehensive account of our policy towards Germany, which must emerge from such discussions would be desirable not only for immediate tactical reasons. By taking the initiative and putting forward comprehensive proposals, both political and economic, with regard to Germany, we will supply a need long felt by the British public and anticipate what will be an increasingly lively demand for a further statement of policy.

13. We should, therefore, table at an early opportunity a statement of the political and economic principles which, in our view, should govern Germany during the second period of control. This will be a logical sequel to the Potsdam Agreement which covered the initial control period and should be designed to lead up to an eventual peace treaty. A draft statement of the general sort which I have in mind is attached at Appendix "A." This is based on the broad lines of policy already laid down, which, so far as the economic sphere is concerned, are discussed in detail in Appendix "B" and so far as concerns the political sphere, in the papers submitted to the O.R.C. on the political organisation of Germany, the constitutional organisation of Germany, and interim central administrations.

14. In the event of Russian acceptance of these new political and economic principles I should feel that we had made considerable progress. In the event of failure, the Russians are far too concerned with preventing Germany from being split into two and the resources of the Ruhr from being incorporated within a Western bloc, to counter a failure to reach agreement by abandoning the principle of quadripartite control. They would prefer to continue under the present uneasy arrangements and would probably try and avoid loss of face by asking that certain contentious points should be referred to the Deputies. In the meantime, we and the Americans, perhaps with the French, would continue to operate Western Germany independently of the East, bartering the steel and industrial products of the Ruhr for food-stuffs and other essential relief imports from the East. This would reduce our dollar commitments and thereby hasten the recovery of our Zone. As this economic recovery developed we should find ourselves in a stronger bargaining position with the Russians, whose one zone of occupation is likely to change from an asset to a liability as time goes on. If events take this course, greater economic co-ordination will be necessary, and the consequent problem of closer political co-ordination will have to be faced.

Foreign Office, S.W. 1,
20th February, 1947.

E. B.

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to the West an immediate improvement in the standard of living would result. Both the Social Democratic and Communist Parties are in favour of a strong central Government. Certain elements in Christian Democrat and Right-wing Parties are more ready to accept a system which gave greater powers to the Länder. Almost all Germans are united in their opposition to the loss or cession of any further territory and there is undoubtedly a strong irredentist feeling towards areas ceded to Poland and Russia in the East. In the economic field there is a great antagonism to the policy of dismantling plant and equipment and a desire at least to know as soon as possible where they stand in this matter. In Western Germany, particularly the more industrialised parts of the British Zone, the economic difficulties of the last eighteen months have brought about a state of depression and indifference. The Germans are becoming increasingly inclined to lay at the door of the occupying Powers the blame for their present plight. The absence of any solution or immediate prospect of a solution for the economic crisis is already driving some more politically-minded Germans to adopt extreme political views. There can be little doubt that present conditions are favourable to the spread of Communist doctrine and that the Russians are well aware of their opportunities and there are already signs that they are exploiting them.

The British View

19. British policy is to a large degree similar to that of the United States. It differs from it, however, in the following respects:—

- (i) We are not prepared to make concessions for the sake of achieving economic unity which would involve us in any additional financial commitment over and above that to which we are already committed under the fusion agreement with the United States.
- (ii) We go further than the Americans, particularly in the case of steel, as regards the level of industrial capacity which Germany needs to become self-supporting.
- (iii) We feel that it is essential that Germany's basic industries should be socialised and not be allowed once again to be controlled by private interests even if those interests are decartelised.

Our position in regard to these three problems can be summarised as follows:—

Current Reparations

20. In one important respect our position in Germany is different from that of either France, Russia or the United States. Neither the Russian nor the French zones of occupation is involving the two occupying Powers concerned in any financial commitment; Russia, indeed, is making money out of her zone through her policy of taking reparation deliveries from current production, while the French at worst are breaking even and at best have a small favourable balance. Although the United States are sharing equally with us the deficit of the combined zones the cost to them is relatively insignificant compared with the cost to the United Kingdom. Moreover, since the bulk of German imports at present consist of foodstuffs which must be derived, at least for the time being, from dollar sources of supply, the occupation of Germany constitutes a real threat to the dollar resources of the United Kingdom. For this reason one standard by which we are bound to measure the policy advocated towards Germany at Moscow is whether it would cost us more or less than our present occupation commitment. Current reparation deliveries from all four zones would clearly cost us more. It would be impossible to agree to Russia taking current deliveries from the Western Zones without extending the same rights to the Western reparation claimant Powers, including ourselves, who are entitled to receive three times the Russian share. These current reparation deliveries would reduce the volume of commercial exports and render it even more difficult to find a market for the latter.

21. Economic unity with no current reparation deliveries would, indeed, probably cost us more than a continuation of the present arrangements whereby goods from the combined zones are only delivered to the other zones in exchange for goods or cash of an equivalent value. It is true that the food resources of the Eastern Zone are greater than those of the west, and that given a common ration scale throughout the country of, say, 1,800 calories per day, certain food surpluses should be available from the east; on the other hand, from the little we know

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about the Russian zone, it appears that her industrial capacity has been reduced below the level necessary to render that area self-supporting, and that those factories which have been left are being seriously overdriven with insufficient attention paid to the maintenance of their capital equipment. Thus, if the zones were thrown open the industrial products of the West would flow East while, judging from Russian policy in other parts of Europe, and in her own zone hitherto, there can be no certainty that surpluses from the East would ever flow westwards. Although Russia may pay lip-service to the principles of economic unity and the conception of German central administrative agencies having real control throughout the whole country, the very existence of a Soviet Military Administration in the East would make it difficult for us to ensure that the Russians were living up to their bargain. If they failed to do so industrial goods from the West might easily pass into the Russian Zone and beyond it into Russia, and Russia would have succeeded in having her cake and eating it as well, *i.e.*, in getting current reparation deliveries from the West in exchange for an empty offer of unity.

22. For these reasons I feel that besides opposing current reparation deliveries we must also make it a condition of economic unity that Russia and France should share with us and the Americans in the deficit financing of Germany, including the liabilities already incurred. What this share should be requires careful consideration. It would be logical for Russia to accept a portion equal to the benefit which she derives from the reparation agreement. At Yalta, and later at Moscow, she claimed that she was entitled to 50 per cent., and the reparation agreement signed at Potsdam recognises this claim; she should, therefore, be asked to accept a similar share of the deficit financing. This need not, however, be regarded as a hard-and-fast formula, and I should be content if she were to accept a share equivalent to the proportion of the population of her zone to the total population of Germany.

23. Although, for the reasons I have stated, we must take a firm stand against current reparation deliveries being made until Germany has become self-supporting and has repaid all the sums for which she is liable on account of imported supplies for the German population and of the external costs of occupation, we must consider what our attitude should be towards current reparation deliveries after these repayments have been made. A large number of the Allied countries in the papers which they have submitted to the Deputies on Germany have included in their claims on Germany claims for current reparation deliveries. The Western European countries recognise that these claims can only be met at the cost of the occupying Powers, and for this reason probably do not expect them to be considered seriously, at any rate at present. But to inform these countries that they will never at any stage obtain current reparation deliveries from Germany is an entirely different matter, and if we were to adopt such a policy it would raise strong protests from the Western and Eastern European countries alike. Germany's commitments to ourselves and the United States are very considerable, and even if we succeed in getting our money back it will take us a long time to do so. I should, therefore, be reluctant to come to any final decision at this stage as to the quantity of reparation deliveries that Germany must eventually make from current production or the period over which such deliveries should be made. Instead, I should prefer to agree a general statement to the effect that when Germany's obligations to the occupying Powers have been fully satisfied and when Germany has achieved a favourable export-import balance, the occupying Powers, in consultation with the other Allies, will consider what further reparation payments Germany should make.

Level of Industry

24. With regard to the future level of German industry I am convinced that the capacity agreed under the Level of Industry Plan is not sufficient to provide both for a reasonable standard of living for the Germans and for the repayment of past and present indebtedness on account of civilian imports and external occupation costs. I think we must press most strongly for its upward revision, irrespective of whether or not when these costs have been repaid, current deliveries are to be allowed over a limited period. In particular we should ensure that the level of German steel industry is substantially increased. During my conversation with Mr. Byrnes in New York last December, General Clay stated that in his view as high a figure as 11 million tons which I mentioned in the Foreign Affairs Debate on 28th October would be danger to security. 1

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have now, after expert advice, revised this figure downwards to 10 million tons. I am satisfied that this level does not constitute a danger to security and I do not think that we should go below it.

25. In connexion with this problem there is one other point to which I should draw attention. The Russians, as I have already mentioned, have taken over in their own zone a number of German factories and are claiming extra-territorial rights in respect of the operation of those factories. It is clearly of great importance that this practice should cease and that whatever industry is left to Germany should be subject to German law, the foreign owners of such enterprises receiving no preferential treatment over the owners of German enterprises except in so far that some arrangement will be necessary to permit of the eventual transfer of dividends across the exchanges.

Socialisation of Industry

26. The financial devastation caused by the war and by our reparation policy calls for drastic financial reform in Germany, involving the redistribution of the capital wealth of the country as evenly as possible over the whole community. To allow the basic industries of the country to remain in private hands would clearly involve great inequalities in the treatment of the various sections of the community and would certainly lay us open to charges of supporting the reactionary elements in the country.

27. There can, I think, be no doubt that in view of the extraordinarily difficult economic conditions in Germany our declared policy of socialisation is the only sound and practical one. Our plans would only raise contentious points between the Americans and ourselves if we forced them through regardless of German opinion. It may be remarked that in the American Zone the constitutions of the Länder make provision for public ownership of certain industries in the British Zone serious. German opposition is in my view unlikely to arise, although of late there have been signs of the S.P.D., which has always favoured the principle of socialisation, criticising our execution of the policy.

28. The C.D.U., however, of which certain Right-Wing elements once appeared likely to oppose socialisation and to carry the party with them, has recently bowed to the views of its Left Wing and declared itself in favour of a considerable measure of socialisation. On 3rd February a conference of the C.D.U. Leaders in the British Zone agreed upon a party economic programme in which one of the eight points was that the iron and steel industries should be nationalised. We can thus, in my view, rely upon a vigorously executed socialisation policy meeting with the approval of the majority of Germans.

29. An additional complication has recently been raised by the objections to our programme lodged by the Western Allies. The Allies object that we are placing too much economic power in the hands of Germans, and particularly that we are placing Allied property in German hands. It is, however, to be hoped that they can be met without a radical change of policy on our part.

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and Country Planning Act, 1944, and such other orders as they might consider it desirable to bring within the scope of the legislation.

**Parliament.
Business in
the House of
Commons.**

2. The Cabinet were informed of the business to be taken in the House of Commons in the following week.

On 3rd March, unless it were found possible meanwhile to reach a voluntary agreement with the Opposition Leaders, the Lord Privy Seal would introduce a Motion for a compulsory time-table for the *Transport Bill* and the *Town and Country Planning Bill*. The Minister of Health would be prepared to intervene in this debate if required. Further progress would also be made with outstanding *Supplementary Estimates*.

On 4th March it was hoped to pass the *Summer Time Bill* through all its stages in the House of Commons. The Home Secretary would be in charge of the Bill. The Minister of Agriculture and the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Labour should be in attendance during the debate. The Report and Third Reading of the *Polish Resettlement Bill* would also be taken on that day.

On 5th and 6th March there would be a debate on *India* on a Government Motion inviting the House to approve the policy set out in the Prime Minister's statement of 20th February. The President of the Board of Trade would introduce the Motion, the Minister of Defence would speak on the second day, and the Prime Minister would reply to the debate.

On 7th March the House would discuss *Supplementary Estimates* for the Ministry of Food and Board of Trade and other outstanding Votes.

**Germany.
Meeting of
Foreign
Ministers
in Moscow.**

3. The Cabinet considered a memorandum by the Foreign Secretary (C.P. (47) 68) summarising the general line which he proposed to take at the Moscow Conference on questions affecting the future of Germany.

The Foreign Secretary said that papers setting out his proposals in greater detail had been considered by the Overseas Reconstruction Committee. The main objects of his policy fell under two heads. First, he wished to prevent the resurgence of a strong centralised Germany. For our future security and for the development of a healthy democracy in Germany it would be preferable to lend our support to the growth of a federal system under which substantial powers would be devolved on the Land Governments. The Russians favoured the establishment of a centralised régime, in the expectation that this would be a Communist régime. He believed, however, that a totalitarian Germany of any type would be a serious menace to world peace and, indeed, to the security of Russia itself. Secondly, he sought an upward revision of the agreed level of German industry. This question raised a delicate balance of considerations; the need for preventing the revival of Germany as a menace to world peace must be balanced against the need for restoring her economy to a point at which she would be self-supporting. The proposals outlined in his memorandum, which were based on a steel-producing capacity of 10 million tons a year, gave scope for the rebuilding of a peaceful economy while denying to Germany the industrial means of future aggression. A fundamental consideration must be that no scheme should be accepted which would involve an additional charge on the British Exchequer.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer and *The President of the Board of Trade* supported the Foreign Secretary's proposals as outlined in C.P. (47) 68. They agreed that no proposals should be accepted at Moscow which would increase the drain on British resources, particularly in dollars, in supporting the German economy.

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(Previous Reference: C.M. (47) 2nd Conclusions, Minute 2.)

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The Minister of Health expressed the view that the general policy outlined in C.P. (47) 68 would prove impracticable. On the economic side, it would be found impossible to concede self-government and at the same time maintain an artificial limit on industrial expansion. On the political side, he did not believe that Germany could be prevented from attaining the type of constitution which she desired. This attempt to prevent the creation of a central Government in Germany would break down within a few years and would have provided meanwhile an effective stimulus to the growth of a neo-Fascist movement.

Against this, it was pointed out that the level of industry proposed in C.P. (47) 68 represented a substantial improvement on the existing limits, which were the highest we had hitherto been able to persuade the other occupying Powers to accept. It was not contemplated that a detailed control over German industry could be maintained indefinitely. It was, however, essential that we should concert with our Allies a policy designed both to maintain security and to ensure that the removal of industrial plant and equipment by way of reparations did not proceed to an extent which would preclude the reconstruction of Germany as a viable economic unit. On the political side, the history of Germany's political development showed that there was likely to be substantial German support for a federal system. There was still a strong public opinion in Germany against the centralisation of political power, which had in the past given a preponderant influence to Prussia. It was not our policy to impose a constitution contrary to German wishes, but to establish federal institutions, during the period of Allied occupation, which would afford the best prospect for the development of an effective democracy. The views of France and other Western European countries had also to be taken into account; their support would certainly not be forthcoming for proposals involving the establishment of a strong central Government in Germany.

The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster said that he had always been doubtful about the wisdom of imposing artificial restrictions on Germany's industrial production. Such restrictions could not be maintained indefinitely. For this reason he doubted whether sufficient emphasis had been laid in C.P. (47) 68 on the political aspects of the German settlement. The constitutional proposals contained in this paper were very similar to proposals which had been put forward by a German Committee set up under the Weimar Constitution; and this in itself indicated that they were likely to command the support of important sections of German political opinion. Further encouragement for this policy could be found in the developments so far achieved in the British Zone. Both the Land Governments and the Trade Unions had already sufficient power to be able, if they wished, to frustrate British policy; but they had in fact co-operated with us and had shown themselves suspicious of centralisation. An excessively harsh economic policy might prejudice our relations with them and drive them to look to Russia for support. In general, however, he thought that the proposals outlined in the paper represented a substantial advance on the present position. He hoped that they would be put forward at Moscow as our minimum demands and that, if this minimum were not accepted, we should feel free to adopt a unilateral policy in the British and United States Zones.

The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster drew attention to a specific point on paragraph 8 (b) of Appendix A to C.P. (47) 68. It was there contemplated that the power of the provisional central Government in Germany to enact legislation should be subject to veto by the Controlling Powers. In Austria a similar procedure had resulted in deadlock, since it enabled one Power to hold up any measure. He hoped that the Foreign Secretary would consider whether, as an alternative, it could be proposed that the power of veto should be exercisable only by a *majority* of the controlling Powers.

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The Foreign Secretary undertook to consider this suggestion. He feared, however, that if he were to secure agreement at Moscow he might have to accept, for the earlier stages, the disadvantages of a provision for veto by a single Power.

Procedure at Moscow Conference.

The Foreign Secretary said that the Foreign Ministers' Deputies had been unable to reach agreement on the extent to which belligerent States other than the Four Great Powers should participate in the early stages of formulating the peace settlement for Germany. The Deputies would therefore be unable to present agreed recommendations regarding the procedure to be followed at the Moscow meeting; and each of the Four Powers would be free to submit its own recommendations. In these circumstances he had asked his Deputy to prepare, in consultation with Dominion High Commissioners in London, a report embodying, so far as practicable, the suggestions made by Dominion Governments in this matter; and he would thus be in a position to present at Moscow the views of the British Commonwealth as a whole on this procedural problem. He also proposed that Dominion Governments should be kept informed, through their representatives in Moscow and through the High Commissioners in London, of the progress of the discussions at the Moscow Conference.

The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs said that he was grateful to the Foreign Secretary for the steps which he had taken already, and was proposing to take in Moscow, to keep Dominion Governments in touch with the progress of these discussions. It would also be helpful if he could now communicate to Dominion Governments a digest of the memorandum now before the Cabinet, and of the more detailed memoranda which had been submitted to the Overseas Reconstruction Committee, so that they might be fully aware of the objectives with which the United Kingdom Government were embarking on the discussion of this peace settlement. The material to be communicated to Dominion Governments would be prepared in consultation with the Foreign Office and the Treasury.

The Cabinet—

- (1) Approved the general statement of policy in respect of the future treatment of Germany outlined in C.P. (47) 63, as a basis for the Foreign Secretary's approach to the forthcoming discussions at Moscow on the formulation of the peace settlement for Germany; and authorised the Foreign Secretary to put forward at the Moscow Conference a new statement of political and economic principles governing the treatment of Germany during the second control period in the terms of the draft embodied in Appendix A of C.P. (47) 68.
- (2) Authorised the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to communicate to Dominion Governments a digest of the material contained in C.P. (47) 63 and in the papers recently considered by the Overseas Reconstruction Committee (O.R.C. (47) 7-16), so that they might be fully aware of the objectives which the United Kingdom Government were seeking to attain in the forthcoming discussions on the peace settlement for Germany.
- (3) Noted with approval the arrangements which the Foreign Secretary proposed to make to keep Dominion Governments informed of the progress of the discussions at the Moscow Conference.

4. The Cabinet considered a memorandum by the Foreign Secretary (C.P. (47) 64) covering the draft of a Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the United Kingdom and the French Republic.

The Foreign Secretary recalled that the proposals for the conclusion of such a Treaty had arisen from the visit which M. Blum, then Prime Minister of France, had paid to this country in January.

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Anglo-French Treaty of Alliance.

(Previous Reference: C.M. (47) 2nd Conclusions, Minute 5.)

He drew special attention to Articles I and III of the draft Treaty. The French had been anxious that we should be committed to come to their aid if Germany should infringe any of the obligations, political or economic, imposed on her by the peace settlement. While he desired to reassure France that we should not again stand aside, as we had when Germany re-occupied the Rhineland, he had been anxious to avoid any automatic commitment and the draft ~~Treaty contained the words "agreed action" as might be required to deal with such a situation.~~ Article I also safeguarded the proposed Four-Power Treaty for the disarmament of Germany.

In discussion it was pointed out that Article II of the draft required us to come to the aid of France if she should be the victim of an armed attack by Germany. Would this Article involve us in war if France had herself provoked the aggression by pursuing an unreasonable policy towards Germany? It was pointed out, in reply, that Article II applied only in the event of "armed attack" within the meaning of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Moreover, if France should adopt a provocative policy towards Germany, the situation created thereby could be brought before the Security Council before it developed to the point of an armed attack by Germany in retaliation.

The Cabinet were informed that the Chiefs of Staff raised no objection to the conclusion of a Treaty in the terms of the draft annexed to C.P. (47) 64.

The Foreign Secretary said that he was anxious to sign the Treaty before he left for Moscow. Before the Treaty was signed, however, he proposed that the text should be communicated to Dominion Governments and that his intention to conclude the Treaty should be notified to the United States and Soviet Governments.

The Cabinet—

- (1) Authorised the Foreign Secretary to conclude a Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance with the French Republic, in the terms of the draft annexed to C.P. (47) 64, subject to any minor drafting amendments which might be desired by the Foreign Secretary or suggested by the French Government.
- (2) Took note that the Foreign Secretary would notify the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union of our intention to conclude this Treaty.
- (3) Authorised the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to communicate the text of the draft Treaty forthwith to Dominion Governments, so that they might have an opportunity of commenting before the Treaty was concluded.

Cabinet Office, S.W. 1,
27th February, 1947.

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Exhibit
4/30/47

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TOP SECRET

Copy No. *27*

C.P. (47) 143

30th April, 1947.

CABINET

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FUSION ARRANGEMENTS
IN THE BRITISH AND UNITED STATES ZONES OF GERMANY

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

My colleagues should know that a fundamental difference of opinion has arisen between the Americans (or, more exactly, General Clay) and ourselves on the steps to be taken to remedy the shortcomings of the organisation set up in Germany to carry out the Fusion Agreement of last December. We are all agreed that shortcomings exist and must be put right; but, whereas we think that the remedy lies in a more effective control and planning both by the Control authorities and German agencies, of the economic life of the combined zone, General Clay does not accept the necessity of central planning and is unwilling to restrict the rights of the individual Länder in favour of the (German) bi-zonal organs we have created.

2. I had some discussion of this vital question with Mr. Marshall in Moscow and agreed with him that General Robertson and General Clay should endeavour to reach agreement. So far the results have been disappointing owing to the intransigence of General Clay. Subject to the endorsement of my colleagues I have therefore authorised General Robertson to bring the issue to a head by presenting to General Clay the proposal reproduced in Appendix A. My colleagues will observe that this contemplates the establishment of a Bizonal Economic Council with advisory functions and certain powers of direction, and that the whole proposal is consistent with the principles which they approved, and which were generally agreed at Moscow (subject to agreement on other outstanding issues) for the eventual constitution of a central German administration.

3. General Clay has intimated that he would be more ready to agree to effective central control in the combined zone if it were exercised under the direction of a bi-zonal parliament. Complete political fusion on this scale would in my view prejudice the chances of agreement with Russia when the Council of Foreign Ministers resumes discussion of the German question in November. I therefore ask my colleagues -

- (a) To approve the proposal at Appendix A as a basis of negotiation;
- (b) To agree that the constitution of a bi-zonal parliament would be premature;
- (c) To agree that if no satisfactory agreement can be reached with General Clay in Berlin, the question should be taken up with Mr. Marshall in Washington.

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financial considerations involved were very different, the basic petrol ration and the foreign travel allowances were closely linked in the public mind; and the Government would find it difficult to make a concession on one of these points without making any concession on the other.

The Cabinet agreed that in these circumstances they could not usefully continue their discussion of the proposals in C.P. (48) 11 until they had also before them a memorandum on the possibility of restoring a basic petrol ration.

The Cabinet—

Invited the Minister of Fuel and Power to submit a memorandum on the possibility of restoring a basic petrol ration; and agreed to continue at their meeting on 13th January, in the light of that memorandum, their discussion of the proposals in C.P. (48) 11 for relaxing the restrictions on the use of foreign exchange for tourist travel.

Germany.
 (Previous Reference: C.M. (47)96th Conclusions, Minute 8.)

3. The Cabinet considered a memorandum by the Foreign Secretary (C.P. (48) 5) reviewing the situation resulting from the breakdown of the last meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers and outlining the policy which he proposed to follow in seeking the reconstruction of western Germany.

The Foreign Secretary said that the guiding principle of his policy was to foster the creation of a truly democratic Germany. While nothing should be done to preclude the eventual emergence of a united Germany, it was important that the Germans should be made more effectively responsible for managing their own affairs in the western Zones. He therefore proposed that the scope of the bizonal economic organisation at Frankfurt should be extended, both in numbers and in powers and responsibility, and that plans should be made for the holding of elections and the establishment later in 1948 of German bodies exercising most of the functions of a Government and Parliament. All possible steps should be taken to raise the level of production in western Germany and to improve the German standard of living. Measures should also be taken to increase trade between western and eastern Germany and between western Germany and the countries within the Russian sphere of influence. We should continue to carry out the reparations plan and should resist any proposal to suspend deliveries to the Soviet Union and her satellites. By suspending those deliveries, while continuing deliveries to the countries of western Europe, we were unlikely to induce the Soviet Government to be more co-operative in other spheres and should weaken our case for withstanding their claim to reparations from current production.

Discussion showed that the Cabinet were in agreement with the general policy outlined in C.P. (48) 5.

The particular suggestion was made that the authorities in the western Zones might now seek to drive harder bargains in their trade negotiations with the Soviet Zone. Thus, it was suggested that larger supplies of food-stuffs could be extracted from eastern Germany in return for the substantial amounts of steel which were now being sent there from the western Zones.

The Cabinet—

Approved the policy, set out in C.P. (48) 5, which the Foreign Secretary proposed to follow in seeking the reconstruction of western Germany.

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Palestine.
(Previous Reference: C.M. (48) 33rd Conclusions, Minute 7.)

1. *The Foreign Secretary* informed the Cabinet of the course of the discussions which had taken place with the United States and French Governments before the British resolution on Palestine had been put before the Security Council on 29th May. This resolution called on Jews and Arabs to accept a truce in Palestine for four weeks on specific terms which were designed to ensure that during that time no fighting men or war material would be introduced into Palestine or into any of the Arab States, and that the Holy Places would be safeguarded. The Council had accepted a French amendment providing that any men of military age who entered Palestine during the truce period should not be mobilised or put under military training during that period. This amendment would be unpopular with the Arab States, since it contemplated the continuance of Jewish immigration; but it was hoped that, despite this, the resolution would be accepted by the Arabs. They had been assured that all transfers of Jewish immigrants from Cyprus to Palestine would be suspended for four weeks. This decision to suspend the transfers from Cyprus had been taken with the knowledge and assent of the Jewish Agency.

In discussion there was general support for the policy underlying this resolution. It was recognised that compliance with the embargo on the movement of war material might involve some breach of our existing contracts for the supply of arms to Arab States. *The Foreign Secretary* confirmed, however, that there was no intention of modifying our long-term obligations under our Treaty of Alliance with Transjordan.

There might be some pressure for an early statement in Parliament. It was agreed that the Foreign Secretary should not make a statement that day, when the Jews and Arabs were considering what reply they should make to the Security Council's resolution; and *The Prime Minister* undertook to explain to the House of Commons why no statement was to be made that day.

The Cabinet—

Took note of the Foreign Secretary's statement and endorsed his action in putting forward the resolution passed by the Security Council on 29th May.

Germany.
(Previous Reference: C.M. (48) 33rd Conclusions, Minute 8.)

2. The Cabinet considered a memorandum by the Foreign Secretary (C.P. (48) 134) reporting the position reached in the informal discussions on the future of Germany which were being held in London between delegations representing the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg.

These discussions had been concerned with three major problems: the political structure of western Germany, the international control of the Ruhr, and the maintenance of security against future German aggression. On the two latter questions agreement had been reached, but it had not been possible to reconcile the views of the French with those of the other Governments on the future political structure of Germany.

Political Structure.

The Cabinet first discussed the political structure of Germany. Agreement had been reached on a plan for establishing a provisional German Government in the three western Zones. Under this plan, the three Military Governors would, not later than 15th June, authorise the Ministers President in these Zones to arrange for a Constituent Assembly to be convoked by 1st September, and to make proposals for the reorganisation of the present inter-Land boundaries. These proposals would, after scrutiny by the Military Governors, be submitted for approval by popular vote in the affected areas before the Constituent Assembly was established. The Assembly itself would proceed to draft a constitution in close consultation with representatives of the Western Powers; for, while

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the greatest possible freedom would be left to the Germans to choose their own type of governmental structure, it would be necessary to ensure that certain minimum requirements, agreed in advance by the occupying Powers, would be safeguarded in the constitution, and these principles would be set out in a letter of advice to be sent to the Military Governors for their guidance during the consultations. At the same time, consultations would take place between Allied and German representatives on a new definition of the relationship between the Military Government and the new German Government to be established under the constitution. The draft constitution would in due course be referred to the Military Governors and, subject to their approval, submitted for ratification by the German people by public referendum. In a memorandum of 20th May addressed to the United Kingdom and United States Governments, the French Government had suggested that these proposals should not be communicated to the Germans until the autumn, and that the members of the Constituent Assembly should be chosen from the Land Parliaments and not by direct election. In support of these suggestions the French Government had argued that the early establishment of a Constituent Assembly in western Germany might provoke hostile reactions from the Soviet Government, and that the creation of an elected body would give a stimulus to German nationalism. The French Government were undoubtedly in a difficult political position; for any proposals emerging from the London talks would have to be debated in the Chamber of Deputies and the Government were likely to encounter strong opposition both from the Left and Right-Wing Parties. On the other hand, it was important that early progress should be made with the political and economic reorganisation of western Germany: the German people were anxiously awaiting a lead and a clear programme, and further delay would have serious effects on the situation in Germany. Moreover, the Soviet Government would be quick to deduce that our reluctance to take effective action sprang from a sense of weakness and would be encouraged thereby to increase their pressure on the western Allies. In these circumstances, the Foreign Secretary suggested that it should be made clear to the French Government that His Majesty's Government could not agree to any postponement which would have the effect of delaying until next year the establishment of a Constituent Assembly, though they would not object to the postponement of the notification to the Germans from 15th June to, say, 1st July and of the summoning of the Constituent Assembly from 1st September to 1st October. In order to assist the French Government, however, it would not be unreasonable to accept the compromise suggested by the United States Government that it should be left to the Land Parliaments to decide whether the elections to the Constituent Assembly in each Land should be by the people of each Land or by the Parliament in each Land. If, in the last resort, it was not possible to obtain the agreement of the French Delegation to these proposals, or if they were rejected by the French Government after debate in the Chamber, it was recommended that the United States Government should be informed that His Majesty's Government were prepared in principle to proceed with the carrying out of the constitutional programme in the combined British and United States Zone.

Ministers were in general agreement with the policy proposed by the Foreign Secretary. The adoption of a firm policy by the United Kingdom and United States Governments might give the French Government the leadership and support that it needed.

In discussion, the following further points were made:—

(a) Attention was drawn to the suggestion in the Military Governor's telegram No. 2888 of 30th May that the announcement of the proposals for currency reform and constitutional reform ought to be made simultaneously. *The Foreign Secretary* said that in his view the scheme for currency reform could, and should, proceed independently.

(b) While the German people were naturally anxious for a unified Germany, they would welcome the present constitutional proposals for western Germany as providing scope for increased German participation in the management of their own affairs.

(c) The French argument that the establishment of an elected Constituent Assembly would stimulate German nationalism was not well-founded. Totalitarian elements in Germany were more likely to be encouraged by the continued denial of the normal outlets provided by democratic political activity.

(d) The British Military Governor was confident that, if it were left to the Land Parliaments to decide whether the members of the Constituent Assembly should be chosen by direct or indirect election, the majority of these Parliaments in both the British and the United States Zones would decide in favour of direct election. The French authorities would no doubt ensure that a decision in favour of indirect election was reached in their Zone, but the representatives of this Zone would form only a small minority of the membership of the Assembly.

(e) It was proposed that direct elections for the Constituent Assembly should be conducted on the same basis as elections for the Land Parliaments. This system contained an element of proportionate representation, but it had so far worked fairly well. Some Ministers expressed anxiety lest the new German constitution should reproduce the central weakness of the Weimar Constitution which had so fostered the creation of a multiplicity of parties as to render effective government virtually impossible. Was it possible to ensure the adoption of an electoral system which would not lead to the excessive fragmentation of political parties? *The Foreign Secretary* undertook to circulate a paper on this subject to the Cabinet.

(f) Ministers assumed that, if the French Government ultimately declined to associate themselves with these constitutional proposals, the United Kingdom and United States Governments would be free to revert to their original proposals for direct election to the Constituent Assembly. *The Foreign Secretary* undertook to reach a clear understanding on this point with the United States Government.

(g) *The Foreign Secretary* undertook to consider whether the Constituent Assembly should be debarred from discussing the revision of the inter-Land boundaries.

The Cabinet—

- (1) Approved the recommendations in paragraph 7 of C.P. (48) 134, regarding the policy to be pursued in respect of the future political structure of Germany.

International Control of the Ruhr.

The Cabinet were informed of the agreement provisionally reached for the establishment of international control over the Ruhr industries. The French had found no support for their view that control should extend to the detailed management of particular firms; and they had now agreed that international supervision should be exercised through a general control over the allocation of the production of the Ruhr industries. The provisional agreement contemplated the establishment of an international Authority (consisting of representatives of the United Kingdom, United States, France, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Germany) which would allocate between home consumption and export the production of coal, coke and steel by the Ruhr industries. During the period of military occupation this Authority would submit its recommendations to the Military Governors. Thereafter, the German Government would be responsible for giving effect to its decisions; and the Allied Governments would, if necessary, apply sanctions to ensure that these decisions were carried out. After the end of the military occupation this Authority could take over the supervision of German disarmament, if no other international body were established for that purpose.

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The following points were raised in discussion:—

(h) Although the agreement set no term for the duration of this international control, it clearly contemplated that it would continue after the end of the military occupation of Germany.

(i) It would not be possible to include in this agreement any statement about the socialisation of the Ruhr industries. It had, however, been made clear throughout the conference that it remained the policy of His Majesty's Government that the German people should be free, if they so desired, to bring the Ruhr industries under some form of public ownership. And there was in fact little doubt that this issue would be pressed by the German trades unions.

(j) It was important that the establishment of this control should not be thought by the German people to be a purely punitive measure. For this reason it had been suggested that the agreement might include a statement to the effect that the Allied Powers regarded this as a first instalment in a general policy for co-ordinating the production of the principal industries of Western Europe. *The Foreign Secretary* said that such a declaration could not appropriately be included in the report of a conference limited to the Powers concerned with the occupation of Germany; but the essence of this point was met by the statement, already included in the draft agreement, that the work of the new Ruhr Authority would be fully co-ordinated with that of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation.

The Cabinet—

- (2) Approved the proposals outlined in C.P. (48) 134 for the establishment of international control of the Ruhr industries.

Security against Germany.

The Cabinet were informed that the French Delegation had made it clear, at an early stage in the conference, that their concurrence in any recommendations made would be conditional upon their receiving satisfactory assurances that effective measures would be taken to protect them against the threat of future German aggression. The United States Government had been unexpectedly forthcoming in offering such assurances. As a result, it had been agreed that United States forces would remain Germany until peace was secured in Europe; that the occupation would last for a long period and that none of the western occupying Powers would withdraw its forces without first consulting the other Powers; that the Governments concerned would consult together if any of them thought there was a danger of the resurgence of German military power; and that a Military Security Board would at once be established to assist the Military Governors in enforcing the disarmament and demilitarisation of Germany.

In discussion it was suggested that, if public opinion in Germany was not to be alienated, it might be expedient to modify the statement that "the occupation would last for a long period." It might be preferable to refer to "a considerable period." *The Foreign Secretary* undertook to consider this point.

The Cabinet—

- (3) Took note with approval of the terms of the provisional agreement for providing security against future aggression by Germany.

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GEN. 241/4

4TH FEBRUARY, 1949

CABINET

COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS ON GERMANY

GERMANY AND BERLIN

Memorandum by the Secretary of State
 for Foreign Affairs

We are now in a position to assess the present situation as the result of the recent exchange of telegrams between the Military Governor and the Foreign Office (please see Foreign Office telegram No. 87 to Berlin and Berlin's replies Nos. 114 and 115; and Foreign Office telegram No. 139 and Berlin's reply No. 124 - all circulated under Berlin Secret). We have also to take into account the third question addressed to Mr. Stalin by Mr. Kingsbury Smith and accepted by the former which read as follows :

"If the Governments of the United States, Britain and France agree to postpone the creation of a separate West German Government, pending a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to consider the German problem as a whole, will the Government of the U.S.S.R. be prepared to lift the restrictions on communications between Berlin and the Western Zones of Germany? - Provided the three Governments concerned observe the conditions mentioned in this question, the Soviet Government sees no objections to lifting transport restrictions, provided that restrictions on transport and trade imposed by the three Powers are lifted at the same time".

I. SUMMARY OF THE PRESENT POSITION

2. This can be considered under the following headings:

Airlift

3. The information in the telegrams from Berlin shows that the airlift is now more efficiently organised and is working better than at any time hitherto. It has reached the target of 5,620 tons per day at present of which the United Kingdom contribute about 1250-1500 tons, and subject to weather conditions during the next month it should be possible to maintain this. Nevertheless both General Robertson and General Clay have agreed that with a stronger organisation and better maintenance of aircraft even the present airlift

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- (5) We should press on as fast as possible with the establishment of a Western German Government. If we are to succeed we must take a very firm line with the French while trying to persuade the United States Government to adopt a reasonable attitude to French susceptibilities on minor points.
- (6) We should recognise that the policy outlined above does not represent a long-term solution of the German problem. In particular the unification of Germany and the difficulties it will cause will have to be faced some day. Our aim should be to obtain a solution on Western rather than Eastern lines.
18. In arriving at these conclusions, the following considerations have been taken into account :-
- (1) Provided that the airlift can be increased and that steps can be taken fairly soon to put the currency of the Western sectors on to a better basis, the situation in Berlin can be held.
- (2) If progress can be made during the next few months towards establishing the Western German Government we shall be in a stronger position versus the Soviet Government.
- (3) If there is a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, agreement will only be possible on the basis of a politically and economically united Germany. This will give rise to most difficult questions such as the future status of Berlin, the Ruhr Agreement, the application of E.R.P. to Germany as a whole, the formation of an all-German Government, the conclusion of a Peace Treaty, the evacuation of the occupying troops, etc. To reach a settlement on these problems now would involve endless delays to our present plans.
- (4) But our immediate aim is the incorporation of Western Germany as soon as possible in our Western European system. The French have been brought to accept this policy in respect of a Federal Western German Government controlled by the Western Powers through an Occupation Statute. We must recognise that a united Germany and the establishment of a Central German Government not under the control of the Western Powers is another matter. A centralised Reich with 65 million inhabitants would tend to swamp at present the present Western system, and there is every reason to believe that the French Government and indeed the Benelux Governments would decline to admit such a Germany into Western Union. From this point of view the division of Germany, at all events for the present, is essential to our plans.
- (5) If we agreed to postpone our programme for Western Germany whilst we held a Council of Foreign Ministers, and tried to reach agreement with the Russians, the effect on the Western German politicians and people would be very bad. Even if we did not agree to postpone the programme in Western Germany, the programme would certainly hang fire whilst the meeting was going on. In either event, once the programme laid

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down in the London decisions was arrested, it is most unlikely that it would ever be resumed without making an entirely fresh start, a prospect which would cause interminable delays and much difficulty.

- (6) If we broke off our programme for Western Germany now for the sake of trying to reach a settlement with the Russians on the problem of Germany it would have a serious effect in the United States. It might cause confusion and prejudice the prospects of Congressional approval for the Atlantic Pact and E.R.P. It would also undermine their present robust attitude to world problems.

On the other hand,

- (7) We must recognise that the vast majority of all Germans, except perhaps those in Bavaria, want a re-unified Germany and would never face the odium of associating themselves with a policy under which the Soviet Zone was permanently divided from Western Germany. What we have to ensure, therefore, is that if and when Germany is re-unified, this is done under the auspices of the West and not under Communist or nationalist German auspices. We must be careful not to place ourselves in the position of admitting publicly that we favour the division of Germany.
- (8) Owing to the attitude of the French it is unfortunately by no means certain that we shall succeed in drawing up agreed plans for a Western German Government which would be acceptable to the Western German politicians. If there were to be a deadlock on this issue our position versus the Russians would be very much weaker than it is now.
- (9) If we decide to go ahead with our plans for Western Germany, it seems unlikely that the Russians will agree to lift the Berlin blockade on any terms acceptable to us. And in that event we should have to resolve to continue the policy of the airlift without any immediate prospect of a settlement, and indeed without knowing how or when we could extricate ourselves from the present position.
- (10) As regards the United Kingdom contribution to the airlift, the United States will probably not expect us to make a great increase in our share. The task will be rather to ensure that the present level of 1000 - 1500 tons a day is maintained. It is important that our absolute figure should at least be maintained for political reasons so that we can retain our right to have a powerful voice in the general policy for Berlin.

Germany.
(Previous
References:
C.M. (50) 56th
Conclusions,
Minute 6 and
59th Con-
clusions,
Minute 1.)

3. The Cabinet had before them two memoranda by the Foreign Secretary (C.P. (50) 222 and 223) summarising the results of the recent discussions in New York on German problems generally and on the particular question of Germany's participation in the common defence of Europe.

The Foreign Secretary said that at the London meeting of the North Atlantic Council in May it had been his primary object to convince the Americans that European defence could not be built up on the basis that in a future war the European Powers would again hold the front alone until such time as American support was forthcoming: Europe must now be able to count on having effective support from the United States and Canada from the very outset of a future war. At the opening of the Council's meeting in New York in September it had at once become clear that the Governments of the United States and Canada had accepted the need for giving this assurance to Europe. The United States Secretary of State had put forward his plan for the creation of an integrated force for the defence of Western Europe, and his proposal that for this purpose substantial United States forces should be stationed in Europe in time of peace. The United States Government were in fact prepared to shoulder their full share of responsibility for the defence of Europe. This was a very significant development in American policy, and one of very great importance and value to the United Kingdom. It was, however, based on a careful and realistic appreciation of European strategy. The Americans recognised that the battle for the defence of Europe should be fought as far to the east as possible. This meant that it ought to be fought on German soil, and this in turn raised the question what rôle Germany should play in the defence of Europe. The Americans had reached the conclusion that the proper course was to invite Germany to contribute units to an integrated army for the common defence of Europe. The Foreign Secretary said that he himself accepted that conclusion; but, throughout the conversations in New York, the representatives of the French Government had declined to accept the principle of German participation in this European defence force. They preferred the alternative approach of raising in Germany an effective force of armed police which might be used for defence purposes in an emergency. This proposition would, however, give rise to conflict with the Social Democrats in Germany, who were likely to insist that a gendarmerie should be organised and used for the sole purpose of maintaining law and order within Germany and that any German contribution towards European defence should be made separately and openly by raising army units for purposes of external defence.

The Foreign Secretary said that the problem was largely one of timing. He sympathised with the French feeling that the pace and extent of German rearmament should be kept in step with the progress made by other Western European countries in raising and equipping forces for their common defence, and also with the arrival in Europe of forces from North America. At the same time he was most anxious lest the invaluable offer of North American assistance in the defence of Europe should be withdrawn by reason of French reluctance to accept the corollary of German rearmament. The offer had been made conditional upon this and, because of the attitude of the French Government, it was now in suspense. It would be a tragedy if this great opportunity were lost by reason of French reluctance to accept the lesser of the risks which Europe was now facing. He therefore proposed that further pressure should be brought to bear on the French Government, and he laid before the Cabinet the draft of a message which he proposed to send to M. Schuman through His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris.

The Minister of Defence said that French Ministers had from the outset taken the line that they could not agree to any rearmament of Germany until further progress had been made with the strengthening and re-equipping of their own forces. This, he thought, was

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Parliament.
Business in
the House of
Commons.

1. The Cabinet were informed of the business to be taken in the House of Commons in the week following the Christmas Recess.

Housing.
(Previous
Reference:
C.M. (50) 71st
Conclusions,
Minute 1.)

2. The Cabinet considered a memorandum by the Minister of Health and the Secretary of State for Scotland (C.P. (50) 314) seeking authority to announce that it was the policy of the Government to build as many houses as possible within the limits imposed by the capital investment programme and by supplies of materials and that, in view of the adoption of incentive bonus schemes on house-building, it should now be possible to obtain more houses for the same amount of capital expenditure.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that he was content that a public statement should be made in the terms set out in paragraph 8 of C.P. (50) 314. It was, however, important that Ministers should adhere closely to the precise terms of that statement, which had been very carefully considered.

The Cabinet—

Authorised the Minister of Works to include, in a public announcement which he was proposing to make on 15th December regarding his recent consultations with the building industry, a statement on house-building in the terms set out in paragraph 8 of C.P. (50) 314.

Germany.
Soviet Proposal
for Meeting of
Council of
Foreign
Ministers.
(Previous
Reference:
C.M. (50) 84th
Conclusions,
Minute 3.)

3. The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Foreign Secretary (C.P. (50) 312) covering the draft, prepared at the Paris meeting of official representatives of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and France, of the reply to be returned to the Soviet proposal for a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

The Foreign Secretary said that, since his memorandum was circulated, the United States and French Governments had proposed various amendments of the draft. He drew the Cabinet's attention to these, and handed round a revised version of the draft, subsequently circulated as C.P. (50) 319.

In discussion of the revised draft the following points were made:—

(a) Was it necessary, in paragraph 3 of the draft, to place so much emphasis on the allegation that the armed police in the Soviet Zone of Germany had been trained on military lines with artillery and tanks? Might not this be regarded by the Soviet Government as a provocative statement? In particular, was there clear evidence that this force was armed with tanks?

The Foreign Secretary said that it was essential to deal firmly with the Soviet allegation that the democracies were preparing to rearm western Germany, while eastern Germany had been demilitarised. He would, however, be prepared to dispense with the final sentence in paragraph 3 of the revised draft, if he found that the two other Governments were not attaching special importance to its inclusion. He would also verify, before the note was despatched, that there was ample evidence to support the statement that the armed police in eastern Germany were provided with tanks.

(b) Was it necessary to state, in the second sentence of paragraph 5 of the draft, that the existing international tension arose from the general attitude adopted by the Soviet Government

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(d) *The Minister of Labour* was doubtful whether statutory protection against loss of employment or holidays should be extended to volunteer members of the Auxiliary Forces. Employers had been helpful in giving facilities to employees belonging to the Territorial Army; and it might do more harm than good to place them under a statutory obligation of this kind. *The Secretary of State for War* said that his Territorial Army advisers were of this opinion. It was, however, agreed that there might be need to give reinstatement rights to officers from the Emergency List of the Royal Navy who volunteered for eighteen months' service.

The Lord President said that he was anxious that the Bills should, if possible, come before the Legislation Committee on Tuesday, 13th February, with a view to its introduction in the course of the Defence debate or shortly afterwards.

The Cabinet—

- (1) Agreed that definite assurances should be given in Parliament that no Class Z or Class G reservist called up for fifteen days' training in 1951 would be called up for similar training in a subsequent year; and that men who volunteered in future for the Royal Auxiliary Air Force would not be liable to be called up for the three months' training.
- (2) Invited the Minister of Labour and the Minister of Defence to give further consideration to the proposal that statutory protection should be given to members of the Auxiliary Forces in respect of their annual period in camp and, if necessary, to consult informally with the two sides of industry on this proposal.
- (3) Invited the Legislation Committee to consider the remaining questions raised in C.P. (51) 42.

Germany.
Rearmament.
(Previous
References:
C.M. (50) 86th
Conclusions,
Minute 4 and
C.M. (51) 11th
Conclusions,
Minute 6.)

4. In their discussion on 1st February of the Soviet proposal for a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Cabinet had agreed that, while they were committed to the principle of a German contribution to the defence of Western Europe, they would need to give very careful consideration to all the issues involved before reaching a final decision on the manner and timing of Germany's rearmament. The Cabinet now had before them a memorandum by the Minister of State (C.P. (51) 43), to which was annexed a statement summarising the successive steps leading up to the current discussions with the German Federal Government. This showed that each of these steps had been fully endorsed by the Cabinet; that the timing of further moves towards the rearmament of Germany could still be regulated at the will of the North Atlantic Treaty Powers; that the need for caution in the timing of these further moves had been recognised by those Powers and by General Eisenhower; and that the discussions now proceeding in Bonn could not result in any new commitment by the United Kingdom Government or in any final decisions.

The Minister of State said that the discussions with the German Federal Government fell under two heads—first, the details of the military contribution which Germany might make; and, secondly, the political conditions on which the Germans might be prepared to make that military contribution. There was no likelihood that the discussions would reach an early conclusion; for the Americans were now relaxing some of their earlier pressure for speed in the military talks, and the Germans had made it clear that they would insist a satisfactory political settlement as a condition precedent to the conclusion of any military agreement. General Eisenhower, in public reports in Washington on his recent visit to Europe, had given the impression that he was not in favour of pressing forward rapidly with German rearmament until the North Atlantic Powers

themselves built up more substantial forces in Europe. The United Kingdom High Commissioner in Germany had reported that this had been eagerly welcomed by Germans of many different shades of political opinion, and that in Germany the sense of urgency about the problem of German rearmament had largely disappeared. Three separate sets of discussions would have to be completed before the North Atlantic Treaty Powers were confronted with the need to take final decisions—(i) the discussions on the scale and method by which a German military contribution might be made; (ii) the discussions regarding the replacement of the Occupation Statute by contractual obligations; and (iii) the forthcoming conference in Paris to discuss the French plan for a European army. The High Commissioners had been instructed to proceed urgently with the first group of discussions; but the second and third were bound, by their nature, to be prolonged. And there were two further factors which would make for delay. First, the impression created by General Eisenhower's reports, to which he had already referred. Secondly, the attitude of the German Federal Government, who were claiming that, before any scheme of rearmament could proceed, it would be necessary, not only to secure a political settlement which would give the German forces genuine equality of status with other national contingents, but also to convince the German people that the Allied forces in Germany had been substantially strengthened. Thus, there was no practical prospect that the North Atlantic Treaty Powers would be invited to approve, at any early date, proposals for implementing their decision of principle in favour of Germany's rearmament. But, if the Cabinet were not content to rely on the delays which seemed bound to arise from the very nature of the current discussions with the Germans, they might consider, in consultation with the United States Government and thereafter the French Government, whether any positive steps should be taken to slow down the course of those discussions.

The Minister said that another risk might arise if there were a breakdown in the negotiations for a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers or if such a meeting were held and proved inconclusive. The Soviet Government had already described as "intolerable" the preliminary steps which the North Atlantic Treaty Powers were taking towards the rearmament of Western Germany; and they might regard such a breakdown as a decisive moment.

The Prime Minister said that it had always been his view that the Allied forces in Europe should be substantially strengthened before any German units were added to them; and that on this account the negotiations with the German Federal Government about a German contribution towards the defence of Western Europe should be spun out. There was now an additional reason for delay, since we were anxious to use German rearmament as a bargaining counter in the discussions at the proposed meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. If it were true that the Soviet Government were genuinely apprehensive about the rearmament of Western Germany, we might now be in a position to extract some real concession from them. He was, therefore, in favour of consulting with the United States Government on the basis suggested in paragraph 9 of C.P. (51) 43.

In discussion there was general agreement with the view expressed by the Prime Minister. The following particular points were made:—

(a) *The Minister of Defence* recalled the circumstances in which the North Atlantic Council had been asked to accept the principle of a German military contribution towards the defence of Western Europe. The original strategic plan had been to defend the line of the Rhine; but it had become clear that it would be difficult to secure the co-operation of the Dutch and the Danes on that basis. A new concept had then been formulated for the defence of a line further east, in Germany. As soon as it was contemplated that the battle would be fought on German soil, it became evident that the Germans must take some part in it; and it followed that, in principle, Western

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Germany should make some military contribution towards the defence of Europe. Provided, however, that this decision of principle was maintained, there was at the moment obvious political advantage in delaying its practical application.

(b) There was widespread anxiety among Government supporters about the risk of proceeding at this stage to put into practice a plan for the rearming of Western Germany. General Eisenhower's report was therefore to be welcomed. Public anxiety would be allayed by the knowledge that he saw no early prospect of absorbing German units into an integrated Atlantic force in Europe. In these circumstances it was clearly reasonable to prolong the current conversations with the German Federal Government.

(c) The Cabinet were reminded that there were large sections of responsible public opinion in this country which had never favoured the rearmament of Germany. The view was therefore expressed that, although the Government had accepted the principle of rearming Western Germany, in the face of very strong pressure from the United States Government, there would be great political advantage in delaying the application of this principle for as long as possible. Any military forces raised in Western Germany were bound to include many former Nazis and other dangerous elements; and, once the Germans were allowed to raise any military forces, it would be difficult to prevent the recreation of a German General Staff. It would also be a mistake at this stage to provide military equipment for German units: such equipment as was available should be reserved for the forces of the Atlantic Treaty Powers. Grave risks would be involved in proceeding now with the rearmament of Western Germany, in face of the declaration of the Soviet Government. It was illogical to say that a German contribution was essential to the defence of Western Europe, and at the same time to pursue a policy which might provoke an attack on Western Europe long before any German military units could be raised.

(d) As against this, attention was drawn to the action already taken by the Soviet Government in raising and equipping a para-military force in Eastern Germany. Was nothing to be done in Western Germany to counter-balance this? If Western Germany were left wholly unarmed, would the Atlantic Powers be prepared to offer armed resistance to any attack by the *Bereitschaften*?

Moreover, were the Atlantic Powers to leave unnoticed the impudence of the Communist claim that the peace of the world was threatened by the rearmament of Western Germany, while the Soviet Government proceeded steadily with their rearmament of Eastern Germany? The anxieties which Government supporters felt about German rearmament would certainly be fostered assiduously by Communists in this country, and Ministers should not hesitate to expose this manoeuvre.

(e) The view was expressed that the eventual rearmament of Germany was inevitable. Ministers should not hesitate to support in principle the rearmament of Western Germany as a contribution towards the defence of Europe. That need not mean that hasty or precipitate action should be taken to put that principle into operation at the wrong moment. There was bound in any event to be a considerable delay before a practical start could be made with the raising of military units in Western Germany.

(f) The point was made that, while there would be obvious advantages in reaching some general settlement which would relieve the present state of international tension, there was as yet no evidence that the Soviet Government had any sincere desire to reach such a settlement. Moreover, while we might be prepared to use German rearmament as a bargaining counter in negotiations with them, we had no very clear idea about the specific concessions which they might be asked to make in return. Nor could we be sure that the United States Government would agree that any Soviet concession would justify the abandonment of German rearmament unless it were sufficient to warrant the abandonment of the whole scheme for

building up the defensive strength of the West under the North Atlantic Treaty.

The Cabinet—

- (1) Invited the Minister of State to arrange for His Majesty's Ambassador in Washington to make known to the United States Government their anxiety regarding the timing of the next positive move towards the rearmament of Western Germany, as proposed in paragraph 9 of C.P. (51) 43.
- (2) Invited the Minister of State to inform the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Germany that he should now seek to prolong the current discussions with the German Federal Government.

War Crimes.
(Previous
Reference:
C.M. (51) 11th
Conclusions,
Minute 5.)

5. In the course of the discussion recorded in the preceding Minute it was pointed out that the current anxiety among Government supporters about German rearmament had been enhanced by the recent announcements regarding the exercise of clemency towards Germans convicted of war crimes. The suggestion that military units were to be raised in Western Germany was being connected in people's minds with the release of German generals and other former Nazis; and as a result the impression was growing that the Western Powers were ready to acquiesce in a resurgence of German militarism. There was special misgiving about the action of the United States High Commissioner in Germany in releasing Alfred Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach and in cancelling the order for the confiscation of his property. It would be useful if the Prime Minister could make a reassuring statement on this point in the course of the debate on foreign affairs in the House of Commons on 12th February.

The Cabinet—

- (1) Took note that they would have before them at their meeting on 12th February memoranda (C.P. (51) 38 and 45) on the exercise of clemency towards Germans convicted of war crimes.
- (2) Invited the Minister of State to provide the Prime Minister with material for a statement to be made on this subject in the foreign affairs debate in the House of Commons on 12th February.

Sulphur.

6. The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the President of the Board of Trade (C.P. (51) 39) drawing attention to the grave shortage in this country of supplies of sulphur and sulphuric acid.

The President of the Board of Trade said that the annex to his paper explained the causes and the extent of the shortage, and in the paper he had outlined some of the effects which it would have on our economy. This was the most serious of the threats to our production in 1951 which had so far arisen from shortages of raw materials; and in this case, unlike some others, our deficiency could easily be met if the United States Government took appropriate action. There were large stocks of sulphur, amounting to 2.8 million tons, lying idle in the United States, and it seemed clear that their export was being prevented by the United States Government, probably on account of their stockpiling programme. Our additional need in 1951 was for not more than 135,000 tons, and he recommended that the United States Government should be strongly pressed to meet it. Lord Knollys, our representative on the Raw Materials Group Organisation, had recently arrived in Washington and had already had preliminary discussions with United States officials, but responsibility within the United States administration seemed to be divided and he

Chancellor. The French Minister agreed to this (as did Mr. Hooker on a personal basis). The French Minister added that Dr. Adenauer would in any case want to discuss the whole position with you and M. Schuman in Paris and we could hardly refuse to listen to him merely because no American representative was there. It was, therefore, surely essential for the Americans to be properly represented in Paris. Mr. Hooker said that he would see that the above points were made to the State Department.

yes
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I should be grateful for instructions on any points you may wish me to make at my further meeting with M. de Crouy-Chanel and Mr. Hooker on Monday morning.

Frank Roberts

15th March, 1952

The main line of our draft is ^(framed) in accordance with the policy about free elections which we have consistently advocated. But we are all conscious that if (though I still think this is unlikely) the Russians fully conceded our requirements in this sphere, the result of a free all-German election would probably be to establish a Schumacher Govt. in power, owing to the weakness of the C.D.U. in Eastern Germany. Such a Govt. would probably reverse Adenauer's policy

Copied to:
 Central Department

East and West.

Is this really so?
Are there not other conditions we could add?
of Austria?
I don't suggest mentioning that to allies at present.
AB

We have no alternative but to take this risk.

For the rest, I think that the additions ⁱⁿ paras 7 and 8 of the draft are an improvement. They make two very strong points.

I still think on the other hand that it would be a mistake at this stage to embark on the matters dealt with in paras 9-12. The reply is stronger and more effective without them.

W. Strang
1973

We must ensure that Americans are well represented in Paris.

W. Roberts and his colleagues here worked well. I am inclined to agree with Sir William Strang ^{b5K} about paras 7 & 8 & 9-12. We can talk about this with Ambassador tomorrow.

My marginal comment simply refers to the possibility that the Soviets really want to pursue this new policy. If they could reach it would it not have ^{important} ~~great~~ advantages for them?

AB 6 11

10/2/53

9. 0/0. P.L. D. 115. 200. 4/52. L.P. 100.

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C.O.S. (53) 490
2ND OCTOBER, 1953

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CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

SACEUR'S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION
AND FORCE REQUIREMENTS FOR 1956.

Note by the Secretary

At their meeting on 30th September, 1953, the Chiefs of Staff approved the attached paper commenting on SACEUR's Estimate of the Situation and Force Requirements for 1956++ as an expression of their views.

2. In accordance with the instructions of the Chief of Staff, the paper has been forwarded to Sir William Elliot who, however, will not initiate any further action on it at this stage.

3. The paper has also been forwarded to the United Kingdom Military Representative at SHAPS for his personal information.

(Signed) R.W. ZWBLANK

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

2ND OCTOBER, 1953

6 COS(53)110th Meeting, Minute 4
+ Annex
++ SHAPS 704/53 of 10th July, 1953

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SACEUR'S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION AND FORCE RE-
QUIREMENTS FOR 1956

Report of the Chiefs of Staff

General

1. The SHAPE concept is based on what is considered to be the most forward strategy practicable, combined with the fullest exploitation of Allied superiority in atomic missiles. This plan of defending the maximum NATO territory has the great advantages of:-

- (a) Being the most acceptable solution from the political point of view, and particularly in so far as Western Germany is concerned.
- (b) The main weight of the Allied atomic counter-offensive falling on non-NATO territory.
- (c) Giving the greatest possible depth and thereby greatly assisting the air defence problems of the NATO countries, particularly the U.K.
- (d) Controlling the exits from the Baltic and Black Sea.

2. The paper foresees the war in three phases:-

- (a) Phase 1. D to D + 30. The initial defensive period.
- (b) Phase 2. D + 30 to D + 90. Consolidation and build-up.
- (c) Phase 3. D + 90 onwards. The offensive period.

The paper is confined to the first phase only.

#SUMMARY OF THE PROPOSED STRATEGY

3. It is assumed that war is at the initiative of the enemy, who will have 30 days in which to mobilise and deploy his forces. It is also assumed that news of his mobilisation will reach the Allies in time for them to decide to mobilise some 7 days before the enemy's D Day and that during those 7 days the enemy will position his forces for the initial attack on all fronts and that the Allies will receive information of these movements. The Allies will therefore have 7 days in which to mobilise and deploy their forces. Deployment from peacetime locations will take place as late as possible before D Day to reconnoitred but unprepared positions along the frontiers, thus denying to the enemy detailed information as to our battle positions.

4. It is proposed to occupy strong natural positions in the south and south-eastern sectors, and in the north with the assistance of SACLANT. In the south the holding of Yugoslavia, the Struma line, Turkish Thrace, and Eastern Turkey is envisaged; the south-eastern flank of Turkey being supported by airborne atomic attack from 6th Carrier Task Force.

** S.H.P. 704/53 of 10th July, 1953.

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5. In the central sector a defensive-offensive strategy is proposed holding initially the line of the present border between East and West Germany. It is envisaged that the effect of atomic attacks on enemy troop concentrations placed by the Allies in defensive positions, in conjunction with similar attacks on airfields and communications, will effectively disrupt the enemy offensive and ensure air superiority for the Allies. Rapid but limited exploitations could then take place to enable our forces to secure the best possible defensive positions along the Elbe, including those parts which are inside the present Soviet zone. It is estimated that this line might be reached by about D + 14.

6. It is assumed that SACEUR's forces will have some 1,000 atomic missiles available for the tactical role and that they can be delivered by either aircraft, guided missile launchers or conventional artillery. The paper places great reliance on the flexibility of methods of delivery of atomic missiles. All missile launchers or conventional artillery are comparatively mobile and therefore relatively invulnerable to atomic attack.

7. It is envisaged that some 700 missiles will be expended on D and D + 1, rising to a total of 850 by D + 30 leaving 150 reserved for unforeseen targets. Of the 700 missiles used on D and D + 1 the large majority are for the destruction of the enemy's tactical airfields and his communications, only some 75 missiles being used on enemy troop concentrations.

8. On the other hand the Soviet forces are estimated to have some 500 to 800 bombs but no guided missiles, of which between 200 and 300 will be used in SACEUR's area.

9. Neither the effects of Allied or Russian strategic atomic air offensive have been taken into account.

(COMMENTS)

Timing of Attack

10. We consider that the assumption that a seven day period of preparation may be available if the Soviets start full scale mobilisation 30 days before D-Day, is reasonable, but we can never depend on the Soviets keeping to this time-table. In our view it is quite possible that during the process of mobilization they might decide to begin hostilities earlier, even at the cost of a reduced scale of attack. In this case the entire Allied force might be found in the process of deployment and not at war strength, with very dangerous consequences. Nor can we be certain that NATO powers will take the political decision to take such mobilisation measures as are practicable within this limited time.

Allied Atomic Capability

11. SHARP considers that the 1,000 missiles assumed to be allotted to SACEUR for the first thirty days of war are well within the planned production capability of the United States by 1956. SACEUR now, however, requires some confirmation of whether this assumption and that for the availability of atomic delivery units is valid for planning purposes. In present circumstances such guidance can only be made available by the Chiefs of Staff.

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Soviet Atomic Capability

12. U.S. forecasts of Soviet atomic missiles do not at present go beyond 1954. On the basis of this forecast we consider the SHAP estimate for 1956 to be rather high but not unreasonable.

is Superiority

15. SHAP estimates that some 36% of their aircraft in the Central Sector will be lost as a result of the initial Russian atomic attacks. On the other hand, the immediate atomic counter offensive is expected to inflict a higher rate of losses, some 47% on the Russian air force, due largely to the more flexible Allied methods of delivering atomic missiles. They thus assume that the Allies will establish a dominating position in the air after the initial exchange of atomic attacks. This assumption rests on many uncertainties, for instance whether the Soviet aircraft can be found on the ground and whether their airfields will in fact be effectively engaged by ground to ground atomic missiles. We therefore consider that it would be unwise to rely, to the extent which SHAP does, on the early neutralization of the Soviet air force.

Tactics

14. Lack of Prepared Positions. We have already pointed out the dangers of depending on a precise degree of warning for time to carry out the Allied deployment. While we appreciate the reason underlying the plan of occupying forward positions just before the outbreak of war, we consider that the lack of any prepared positions from which to start the war increases very considerably the risks of the suggested strategy. We also doubt the ability to conceal the identity of the Allied positions it is intended to occupy.

15. Reserves. We understand that the possibility of some initial Soviet penetration in the central sector has been envisaged by SHAP, and a small number of armoured divisions have been allotted to meet this. Apart from this reserve the whole success of the initial battle will depend on the Allied atomic counter-offensive preventing any major penetration. As the effect of atomic missiles in this role is as yet unknown we consider that it is quite a possibility that they will do no more than retard the enemy advance, and in our opinion it would be extremely unwise to depend upon an untried atomic technique without an adequate reserve.

16. Water Obstacles. SHAP attach extreme importance to the use of water obstacles as a means of inducing an enemy concentration suitable for an atomic attack. They believe that a comparatively narrow obstacle such as the Elbe/Trave canal could be easily held by small conventional forces backed by tactical atomic support. Again we consider that while such confidence may be justified in the case of the large obstacles it would be unwise to depend too much on the effectiveness of atomic support for smaller ones.

Logistics

17. The SHAP plan depends on 60 days stocks being available on the continent for the forces set out in the paper, after allowing for losses due to the initial enemy attack. A proportion of these would have to be a great deal farther east than at

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present planned. We consider that this is quite outside economic realities.

Estimates of Force Requirements

18. Air Forces. The study shows some major increases in MC 26/2 air forces particularly in day and ground attack fighters on the Central Sector. These increases are mainly because the force requirements include an allowance for the estimated allied losses which will be incurred in the initial Soviet atomic attack. The force requirement is also increased by the need to allow additional ground attack fighters to exploit the allied atomic counter attacks. In assessing the day fighter requirements, it has been assumed that no ground to air guided missiles will be available to S.C.MUR in 1956.

19. In view of the stated capabilities of allied "surface to surface" atomic guided missiles, it would be logical to expect a material reduction in the number of short range ground attack fighters required. However, as the study points out, while the new weapons will enable allied forces to accomplish their missions more effectively, the possession by the enemy of similar air weapons, together with the initiative, may subject the allies to very heavy losses early in the war.

20. We consider that, within the terms of the study, the air force requirements represent a reasonable figure. We agree with SHLPE that further and more exhaustive studies are required on the problem of reducing the vulnerability of the allied air force before firm requirements can be established.

21. Land Forces. The paper shows an overall increase of some ten divisions on D-Day over MC 26/2, including an increase of seven divisions in the Central Sector. On the other hand there is an overall decrease of some fifteen divisions by D + 30. We consider that in view of the strategy advocated these figures are probably justified. It has however already proved impossible to meet even the present D-Day requirements. All the more will it prove impossible to find the additional ten divisions now required.

22. Naval Forces. The force requirements are substantially the same as those contained in MC 26/2. Both the 1956, and the MC 26/2 requirements are related to what is in our opinion an optimistic view of the success of implementing a "forward strategy", and of holding the entrance to the Black Sea. The assessment of force requirements in the Mediterranean is obviously largely dependent on whether Russian naval forces emerge from the Black Sea.

Intelligence

23. Capabilities of Soviet Bloc Ground Forces. The plan assumes 55 Russian and 45 satellite divisions operationally available on D-Day. We agree with the total figure of 100 divisions, but consider that SHLPE has somewhat overstated the capabilities of the Satellites as a whole and of the East Germans in particular.

^ MC 26/2 para 2(c) of 9th April, 1953.

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24. Priorities of Attack. The paper has assumed that the Soviet force will attack in all sectors simultaneously. Although this is justified by the current version of S.G.161/3, Intelligence does indicate that certain campaigns may be deferred.

Political

25. West German Contribution. It is clear that the decision to adopt a forward strategy depending as much of Germany as possible was influenced very largely by the belief that unless this had done a full German contribution both on the ground and in the air could not be relied on. Whether or not this is so, we consider that the question of a German contribution essential as it is, should not impose a strategy which is militarily unsound.

26. Delegation of Authority to S.C.MUR. S.C.MUR points out that in order to make the plan fully effective it will be necessary to delegate authority to him, in advance, to put into effect his atomic counter-offensive immediately on the outbreak of war. It will furthermore be necessary to give him authority to stockpile, in peacetime, the atomic missiles required for his counter-offensive.

27. In the present international situation the political obstacles to giving this authority are likely to be great but we consider that on military grounds whatever plan is adopted S.C.MUR will require this authority.

28. Authority for Initial Deployment. It may be difficult to secure political approval to S.C.MUR's taking the preparatory measures essential to this plan, particularly the movement forward to advance positions in Germany, before the outbreak of war.

CONCLUSIONS

29. Our examination of the paper shows that, while the strategy proposed is at first sight attractive, it is, in our opinion, not militarily sound even if the forces required were available in 1956, for the following main reasons:-

- (a) It depends too much on the assumption that once our forces have started to deploy towards the frontiers, the Russians will adhere to their original D Day.
- (b) The lack of a prepared position in which the Allies can meet the enemy attack is a grave weakness should the Russians advance their timetable or should their initial attack prove more successful than the planners expect.
- (c) It depends too much on an unknown - the tactical effect of the atomic missile - with the result that in our opinion, the reserves on the Central Sector are inadequate.

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30. For economic and political reasons there is no chance of conventional forces of the size proposed being available in 1956. There is thus a danger that the attractions of the forward strategy expounded in the paper may obscure the realities of the situation with which we may be faced for some considerable time.

31. We consider therefore that there is a need for a realistic study to be undertaken taking into account the conventional forces and new weapons which are likely to be available. As mid-1956 is the date by which new weapons may be available to SACEUR in significant numbers this date would be appropriate to such a study.

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11/17/53

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE
PARIS, FRANCE

209

SHAPE/1001/53
AG 1240/5 PPO

17 November 1953

SUBJECT: Part I of SACEUR EDP 1-54

TO : See Distribution

1. Enclosed is Part I of SACEUR EDP 1-54 containing SACEUR's general instructions to subordinate commanders. It is being issued separately to assist commanders to expedite the preparation of their plans. French translation follows.

2. Part II of SACEUR EDP 1-54, consisting of more detailed instructions and the special annexes, will be issued shortly.

3. This covering letter may be downgraded to NATO RESTRICTED when separated from the Enclosure.

FOR THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE:

1 Encl
Part I of SACEUR EDP 1-54
(SHAPE/1000/53)

C. V. R. Schuyler
C. V. R. SCHUYLER
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

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By *C. V. R. Schuyler* *C. 7. 9. 7*
Historical Section, SHAPE

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Monte Po

SACEUR EMERGENCY DEFENSE PLAN 1954

(SACEUR EDP 1-54)

PART IInstructions by the Supreme CommanderMISSION

1. The mission of the forces assigned to my command is to defend the NATO nations against external attack within the area of my command responsibility.

Instructions Regarding the Carrying Out of the MissionGENERAL

2. If we are attacked, the superior potential strength of the NATO nations will enable them to win in the end, provided adequate protection is given while this potential is mobilized. It will be our task to withstand the initial enemy assault, hold the enemy attack, and gain the time needed to mobilize the full NATO potential.

3. The military operations entailed by our task will be joint operations. The services must work together from the outset in planning and executing operations in furtherance of the common mission.

4. One most important aspect of joint operations is the close co-operation of air and ground forces in the battle area. The degree and effectiveness of the air support which a land force unit will receive in battle is directly related to:

a. The knowledge and understanding by both air and ground units involved of the techniques and procedures of air support.

b. The experience gained in the use of these techniques and procedures in maneuvers and exercises.

AIR FORCES

5. I wish to emphasize to all commanders that a dominant factor in victory will be our ability to utilize effectively the full potential of our Air Forces. The greatest asset of air power is its flexibility, which allows it to be concentrated quickly at the time and place required by the situation. It follows that our plans and our command organization must be such as to permit us to exploit this flexibility to the maximum.

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6. Although certain air forces have been placed by me under the direct command of subordinate Commanders-in-Chief, it may be necessary in the interest of more effective use of these forces to employ a proportion of these forces in areas other than those to which they have been allotted.

7. The special task of the Air Deputy at SHAPE will be to ensure that the utmost flexibility exists in the handling of the available air forces, and that the necessary staff organization and communications are built up which will allow the principles in paras 5 and 6 to be implemented.

LAND FORCES

8. The D-day forces maintained in peace are weak compared to the enemy threat. The mission of these forces is to cover the mobilization and deployment of reserve forces so as to insure that the latter are developed and committed to battle according to a well ordered plan, rather than piecemeal, merely to "plug holes." In order to gain time, our forces will have to conduct, at least initially, fighting withdrawals, making maximum use of demolitions and delaying tactics generally. In these withdrawal actions, our aim will be to blunt the hostile attack and to create opportunities for aggressive air and ground counter-action.

9. Our D-day forces should be organized, trained and equipped for mobile warfare. Vital base areas must be held. Hard-hitting mobile and armored formations will counterattack the enemy when he has extended himself in his initial attack and is off-balance.

10. If we can move more quickly than the Russian forces and can concentrate hard blows against them when they are extended, we can gain and keep the tactical initiative. It must be thoroughly understood that without the initiative we cannot win. Therefore, our D-day forces must be able to fight effectively at once and they must be highly trained in mobile warfare. The smaller the size of these forces in comparison to the strength of the expected enemy, the greater must be their standard of excellence.

11. Land forces which have a high percentage of reservists cannot be expected to be at a high degree of effectiveness at the beginning of the war. Their entry into the battle must be organized with care and they should be used initially for defensive tasks in the battle area.

12. The reserve land forces of the NATO nations must be able to play their part in the battle area very quickly after mobilization. It follows that defensive tasks in national territories behind the battle area must be given to Local Defense units, Home Guards, and similar organizations of an auxiliary type. Although these auxiliary forces are under national control, Commanders-in-Chief should collaborate with national authorities to the greatest practicable extent in connection with the training, organization and role of these forces.

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NAVAL FORCES

13. The special task of CINCAFMED will be to ensure the use of the Mediterranean Sea for Allied shipping and convoys. The special naval task of CINCSOUTH is the support of his land/air operations, for which he has STRIKE FORCE SOUTH under command. Close cooperation between these two Commanders-in-Chief is essential to the effective accomplishment of their tasks.

14. SACLANT is responsible for controlling the Atlantic. But we have a vital interest in his work, since we must retain the capability of deploying in Europe the power made available from the American Continent. Close collaboration with SACLANT is essential to ensure the maximum practical air and sea support from his forces, without detriment to his primary mission in the Atlantic. This applies particularly to the Northern European Command.

15. A further task of the Commanders-in-Chief is to collaborate with national naval authorities and neighboring commands (including SACLANT and CHANGCOM as appropriate) with regard to the control and safety of harbors and of shipping in national waters.

FOUNDATIONS OF THE DEFENSE PLAN

16. In every theater of war there are certain areas, the retention of which is essential for ultimate success. These areas must be retained both to ensure survival and as bases for possible subsequent offensive operations. Within my area of responsibility, the essential defensive areas are as follows:

NORTHERN EUROPEAN COMMAND

17. In addition to ensuring the integrity of Norway and Denmark, it is essential to close the Baltic so that enemy surface and underwater naval forces cannot gain access to the open seas. The key to these tasks, and in fact to the security of the whole northern flank, is DENMARK.

18. With the small forces initially available, the defense of Denmark is difficult. It will become easier once German forces are available.

19. Commanders-in-Chief of the North and Central Europe Commands should develop coordinated plans, under my general direction, with a view to preserving the integrity of Denmark. My Air Deputy will participate in this action.

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CENTRAL EUROPEAN COMMAND

20. The land/air battle must be fought as far to the east as is possible.

21. In adverse circumstances the final position to be held will be astride the RHINE-IJSSEL line. Should the enemy be allowed to penetrate in strength beyond this line, the defense of Europe will be in grave jeopardy.

SOUTHERN EUROPEAN COMMAND

22. The overall objective in this area will be to prevent the enemy from gaining access to the northern shores of the Mediterranean, and to prevent the exit of his naval forces, principally submarine forces, from the Black Sea. In accomplishing this objective, the following areas are of primary importance:

a. ITALY - The more Yugoslavia becomes strong and Westward-oriented, the more the defense of Italy is facilitated.

b. The STRATTS AREA - The retention of this area prevents access to the Mediterranean of the Russian Black Sea naval forces.

c. The ANATOLIAN PLATEAU - The retention of this plateau prevents the overrunning of Turkey from the northeast.

23. It is clear that so long as Yugoslavia can successfully resist invasion, and so long as Turkish Thrace can be held, the defense of Greece is greatly facilitated. Close cooperation between the forces of Turkey and Greece is vital to the successful defense of both countries.

THE RIGHT FLANK OF NATO

24. Our right flank is open and must be watched. The Commanders-in-Chief, Southern Europe and Mediterranean, should maintain contact with the British Middle East Command Headquarters and should keep me informed of such problems and difficulties as may arise.

CIVIL DEFENSE

25. No Commander-in-Chief in the field can afford to ignore the impact of Civil Defense on his operations. An efficient Civil Defense organization is needed in all national territories. Commanders-in-Chief will take every opportunity of acquainting the national governments of this requirement in the areas of their command.

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LOGISTICS AND MOVEMENT

26. Our military plans will be ineffective unless they are sound logistically, unless sufficient stocks exist to supply the needs of our forces during the early phases of a war, and unless we can ensure free movement of our supplies and forces as required by the situation as it develops.

27. It is the responsibility of SHAPE to develop the overall logistic and movement policies and this is receiving my urgent attention. Such policies as are developed cannot be implemented without the close cooperation of national authorities. It is essential that subordinate commanders and their staffs be active in endeavoring to create the sound logistics organization necessary to enable our forces to operate successfully.

APPENDICES

28. For additional detailed information, see Appendices in Part II.

SUMMARY OF THE PROBLEM

29. If war comes we will face a gigantic task. We must guard against being overwhelmed by the enemy air; we must strike directly with our own air at those enemy forces which most critically threaten us; we must hold essential areas on land, while we mobilize our strength; we must keep our sea communications open, particularly to bring to the battlefield the military and industrial strength of America.

30. On the land, our task will be particularly difficult. The keys to our success will be the maintenance of highly trained mobile D-day forces, the retention of initiative and the ability to maneuver, the ability to mobilize and deploy our reserve divisions fit to fight at the times they are needed, and the ability to support our forces logistically on the battlefield.

31. In general, we must ensure that:

a. From the outset we deny mastery of the air to the enemy and seize it for ourselves as early as possible;

b. We maintain the integrity of our forces in face of the enemy's initial attack;

c. We counter-attack the enemy with swift, sharp blows delivered before he has had time to exploit any initial advantage he may have gained.

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32. I shall do all that I can to ensure that a major attack is not delivered against us without prior warning. We must, however, always be prepared for the warning to be short.

CONCLUSION

33. All planning for war and all operations if war should break out will be conducted in accordance with the instructions set forth in this Emergency Defense Plan during the period it is in effect.

Alfred M. Gruenther

ALFRED M. GRUENTHER
General, United States Army

14 November 1953

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Ministere de la Défense Nationale
et des Forces Armées

27 JUL 1953 ~~TOP SECRET~~

Etat-Major des Forces Armées

1ère Division

(WORKING TRANSLATION)

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25th November, 1953.

MEMORANDUM

1. By signing the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949, the countries concerned expressed their determination to unite for collective defence against armed attack and, accordingly, to build-up a military machine capable of ensuring their security in the event of aggression.

The "build-up" period has so far been notable for:

- the adoption of a common strategy
- the raising of a certain number of units and the development of an integrated command system
- the setting-up of a permanent North Atlantic Treaty Organization whose value and effectiveness can be gauged by the results it has already achieved.

Now, however, serious obstacles stand in the way of a further NATO military effort. If the Organization did no more than record their existence it would be failing in its duty and might find it difficult to justify its continued existence before public opinion. It must therefore address itself to the task of overcoming these obstacles and, to that end, devote all its energies to seeking new and constructive solutions to the problems with which it is faced.

The purpose of this Memorandum is to suggest the lines along which this action should be directed.

2. Two essential principles emerged from the last Council Meeting and the 1953 Annual Review.

a) First, in their defence efforts, the Western Powers must henceforth aim, not at the attainment of strength in a given year regarded as that of the greatest peril, but at ensuring the safety of the Free World for the longest possible period. It follows that the purpose of the build-up should be the establishment of forces which the countries will be able to maintain in peacetime without straining their economic or financial structure.

b) Secondly, a great many countries are nearing, or have already reached the limits of the economic and financial resources

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which they can devote to NATO defence in peacetime in the present political atmosphere. Further efforts might well endanger their internal stability and enable the Soviets to attain their ends by conducting the contest on the ground most favourable to their permanent action, without recourse to armed aggression.

The time has now come to examine the progress of our defence build-up in relation to these two principles.

3. It is beyond question that the forces now available are far smaller than those required to resist a Soviet attack, or to carry out the agreed strategy, whatever the method used to arrive at a reasoned estimate of Russia's intentions. Although such an essentially subjective assessment must play an important part in the formulation of our general policy, it remains nonetheless true that the military risk can only be measured by a straightforward comparison between the forces and capabilities of the prospective adversaries.

There are many causes of the present inferiority of the Western Powers compared with the invasion potential of the Soviet Union.

There is one cause, however, which can be removed, and that is the small return for our exertions in the military sphere. The French Government is convinced that raising this return would go a long way towards achieving the desired balance of forces while dispensing with the need to ask the Western Powers to endanger their economic stability in the attempt.

4. Efforts to obtain a better return should be made simultaneously in the military, the financial and the economic fields. However, this Memorandum is primarily concerned with what can be done in the military field.

a) In this area of investigation there should be two distinct aims:

- The coordination of plans for the defence of the NATO area with plans in existence or in preparation covering the overall strategic action of the Western Powers, particularly action designed to neutralise or destroy the ability of the Soviets to wage an offensive war;
- The improvement in the operational strategy of the major NATO Commands, to take account of the close operational interdependence between the new weapons and conventional arms, and to adapt the military efforts of each country more closely to operational requirements.

we need an coord. w SAC offensive

The essential feature of the first aim is to ensure that the various plans to be carried into effect in the event of a conflict brought about by Soviet aggression are mutually supporting, and, more especially, to review the contribution which a

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strategic offensive against the Soviets could contribute to NATO defence. Such an offensive is bound to have a direct effect on the operational capacity of the Soviet forces during the early stages of the conflict and, therefore, on the size of the covering force required to give the Western Powers the period of grace necessary to enable them to bring all their defences into play.

The second aim will be largely achieved by adapting the structure of the forces and of the military lay-out to an operational strategy embracing every possible means of action including the new weapons available to operational commands, by establishing the most satisfactory possible balance between regular and reserve forces. Steps should also be taken to ascertain whether simplification of the structure of major units would not give them greater flexibility by making them easier to deploy and by facilitating command functions. Such investigations would surely lead to qualitative improvement in the regular forces and the more rational and fuller use of reserves. Moreover, it would be desirable for these investigations to culminate rapidly in practical conclusions which might be taken into consideration by the European Defence Community as soon as it becomes effective.

b) In the financial field, one of the most important opportunities for improvement may well lie in a more judicious division of defence expenditure both between the different countries and between the different items in national programmes, viewed in the light of the investigations into operational strategy.

c) In the field of production, over-expenditure due to piecemeal research and manufacture, as well as to the excessive diversity of current types of equipment, should be cut out.

Central
The French Government is ready to give wholehearted support to any move by the Organization to work out and carry through a constructive and practical policy for standardisation.

5. If it is to be realistic and thus serve a practical purpose, the work on improving the return for effort expended should go hand in hand with exhaustive studies to determine the maximum peacetime financial effort which member countries can devote to the maintenance of their forces at a pitch involving no undue strain.

Comparison of the results of the two sets of studies should make it possible to determine the optimum volume and composition of the contribution in forces which each member country should maintain in peacetime for joint defence.

This should make it possible to achieve a better balance between the NATO defence forces on the one hand, those of the adversary on the other, and, at a later stage, to determine a combination of forces which would be of sufficient size and quality to ensure initial protection for the NATO countries, thus affording them an opportunity to muster without apprehension the additional forces necessary for the continuance of operations.

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Imperial War Museum

To assemble this combination of forces, together with the necessary Command resources and support and infrastructure facilities, would be a realistic move towards meeting the overall needs of the NATO countries, for they would be forces which, once their build-up was complete, could be held at a satisfactory level of maintenance and efficiency with countries' normal peacetime financial resources alone.

6. All this work would require close cooperation between national authorities and the highest NATO civilian and military agencies. It would be for the Secretary General and the Standing Group, as directed by the Military Committee, to lay down suitable procedures and supervise the progress of the work.

At a later stage, the Annual Review procedure should be amended to make it possible to fix not only the successive targets for the attainment of the combination of forces described above, but also to define the action required of member countries in planning the mobilisation of additional reserve forces.

7. The studies in question should be conducted without prejudice to the following principles:

- a) The fundamental NATO strategy of carrying the defence of the continent as far to the east as possible is as valid as ever;
- b) there is no question of defence "on the cheap" in the face of an undiminished threat by the Soviet Union;
- c) while the new weapons cannot work miracles or provide a pretext for slackening the joint effort of the NATO countries, every endeavour must be made to use to the full all available means and all forms of support likely to increase the returns from the defence effort.

In conclusion, the French Government trusts that the Council will see its way to approving the attached draft resolution.

THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Having examined the Report on the 1953 Annual Review,

Considering that the approved force goals and standards of readiness are still far below the levels required to ensure the effective defence of NATO member countries within the framework of the agreed strategy, which remains unchanged,

Considering, moreover, that the operational strategy should constantly be reviewed to take account of scientific and technical advances and of the need for relating them to national strategic plans,

Recognising, furthermore, that the military effort of member countries must be calculated in such a manner as not to endanger their internal economic stability, which is an essential

factor of their security;

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Believes, therefore, that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization must select as its prime objectives, on the one hand the most effective and economical use of the resources devoted to national defence by each country, and on the other the continuing expansion of a military force adequate to permit of the application of the agreed strategy, yet adapted to peacetime economic and financial capabilities;

To this end, directs the Secretary General and the Standing Group acting in consultation to take the following action:

- the Secretary General to study and promote all measures, more particularly in the fields of coordination and standardisation of research and manufacture of armaments, calculated to bring about a substantial improvement in the production of military equipment in NATO member countries,

- and, furthermore, to address to each member government at the required time, any recommendations that may be deemed desirable, on the defence effort it should achieve, and to determine mutually the resources it will devote to the build-up of its NATO forces and to their maintenance at "cruising" speed

- the Standing Group under the guidance of the Military Committee and with the cooperation of the member countries;

- to examine means for achieving better coordination between NATO operational strategy and the other means of defence of the Western powers and, within this framework, to define and promote an operational strategy capable of achieving the optimum use of all the means of defence at the disposal of NATO member countries;

- to study also, what improvements might be introduced into military layouts and force structures to take account, on the one hand, of advances in operational strategy and, on the other, of the capabilities and resources of member countries, particularly as regards the balance to be established between their active and reserve forces;

Invites governments to cooperate closely in the above work;

Invites the Secretary General and the Military Committee to report at the next Ministerial Council Meeting, on the various conclusions reached as a result of the above studies.

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CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX

TO

C.O.S. (53) 139th Meeting held on FRIDAY, 4th DECEMBER, 1953

3. NATO DEFENCE POLICY

THE COMMITTEE had before them the following papers relating to NATO Defence Policy.

- (i) A Note by Mr. Powell covering United Kingdom and United States draft resolutions on the 1953 and 1954 Annual Reviews.
- (ii) A Note by Sir Nevil Brownjohn covering a French memorandum on NATO Defence Policy.
- (iii) A Minute by Sir Nevil Brownjohn covering the proposals for a new policy directive for NATO as forwarded to H.M. Ambassador in Washington for discussion with the United States.

4. DRAFT RESOLUTIONS ON THE 1953 and 1954 ANNUAL REVIEWS

MR. POWELL (Ministry of Defence) said that the draft resolution on the 1953 Annual Review was to all intents and purposes identical with that proposed by the United Kingdom. The United States draft resolution on the 1954 Annual Review was their version of our proposals for a new policy directive for NATO. The United Kingdom had also submitted a draft resolution on the 1954 Annual Review. The Secretariat in Paris would not be able to produce a paper amalgamating the U.S. and U.K. drafts before the United Kingdom delegation left for Paris. He did not wish to raise any comments on either of the draft resolutions until the final draft had been prepared.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (1) took note of the statement by Mr. Powell regarding the draft resolutions on the 1953 and 1954 Annual Reviews.

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B. FRENCH MEMORANDUM ON NATO DEFENCE POLICY

SIR WILLIAM ELLIOT said that the French memorandum on NATO defence policy had been passed to him in Washington before discussions had started on the United Kingdom proposals for a new policy directive for NATO. He had discussed this memorandum with his colleagues on the Standing Group and it was clear that there was a good deal of common ground between the French outlook on the one hand and the United States and United Kingdom outlook on the other. This common ground included agreement that the limit of defence expenditure had been reached in most countries; the need for a forward strategy; acceptance of the "long haul" policy, and the necessity for the qualitative improvement in existing forces. In addition, however, the memorandum included three important points on which opinion was divided:-

- SAC
- (i) the French maintained that true NATO-wide planning could not be undertaken effectively without taking account of the world situation outside the NATO area and without co-ordination with the plans for national forces and in particular the United States Strategic Air Command. It was of interest that Lord Ismay had said that he also considered that NATO planning must be related to global planning.
 - (ii) the French asked for a greater exchange of information on Research and Production and emphasised the need for achieving more in the sphere of standardisation. The United States and United Kingdom were not however prepared at present to share their knowledge on research and production with the French. Lord Ismay, also feels strongly on the necessity for making standardisation more effective and had recently written to General Collins on the subject.
 - (iii) the French were still pressing for a common NATO defence budget. Neither we nor the United States could agree to this.

The French held interesting views regarding the means of increasing both the size and quality of existing forces. They suggested that the forces available to NATO could be made to appear greater by equipping a larger proportion of national reserves under NATO arrangements. They thought that the quality of forces could be improved by more decentralisation of command and better mobilisation methods. They were anxious for an early study to be made of the effect of new weapons on the composition and structure of forces. He (Sir William Elliot) considered that all the above points should be studied and in particular the effect of new weapons on the composition and structure of forces. In order to undertake such a study information must be obtained from the United States regarding the date by which new weapons were likely to have a significant effect. Our planning was becoming progressively less realistic because this essential information was denied us. There might be some relaxation in the New Year of the prohibition to divulge this information to us and our essential need for it should

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be stressed on the military level. In addition, information was required from the United States in order to enable us to make an accurate assessment of the Russian capability to produce atomic weapons. This assessment depended on the United States estimate of what weapons the Russians had exploded and was based on their "know-how" which was not available to us. However, it was unlikely that the United States could be very much more forthcoming in giving us information unless and until the McMahon Act was amended, which would take time. Nevertheless in view of the fact that the Russians had now exploded atomic weapons of advanced types it should be possible for the United States to release information on the effects of atomic weapons without including anything not already known to Russia. To date we had been trying to gain a privileged position with regard to the exchange of atomic information with the United States. However, it must be assumed that the Russians now had a wide knowledge of atomic weapons. Bearing in mind that realistic N.A.T.O. planning was becoming dependent on knowledge of the effects of atomic weapons, it might be for the good of N.A.T.O. countries as a whole if "effects" information was passed to all N.A.T.O. countries. It should surely now be possible to release such information without prejudicing the security of scientific knowledge.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (2) Took note of the French Memorandum on N.A.T.O. Defence Policy, together with the amplifying statement by Sir William Elliot.

C. NEW POLICY DIRECTIVE FOR N.A.T.O.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (3) Took note of the proposals for a new policy directive for N.A.T.O. as forwarded to H.M. Ambassador in Washington for discussion with the United States.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

4TH DECEMBER, 1953.

ISMAY III/12/17 12653

LORD ISMAY'S NOTES FOR MEETING ON SUNDAY, 6TH DECEMBER, 1953

Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives

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Just before I left Paris, I completed my report to Ministers on the progress that has been made by NATO since the last Ministerial Meeting. This will soon be in the hands of Ministers and I will therefore concentrate this afternoon on a topic which is not mentioned in that report, namely the suggestion for a "new look" at the defence build-up. This was raised by the Foreign Secretary of the U.K., supported by the Foreign Secretary of France, and I should like, if I may, to develop it a little further. It is most important that we should be quite clear in our minds not only about what we want to do, but also how we are going to set about it.

2. May I at the outset give you my assurance that the reason for pressing for a "new look" now is not because the decisions taken at Lisbon were wrong, or because we have failed. On the contrary, the defence build-up has been going along satisfactorily. First, we have an M-day force of 39 divisions and 25 brigade groups, increasing to 83 divisions and 42 brigade groups at M + 30. I ought to mention, of course, that SACEUR does not consider all these formations to be up to the required standard. At sea we have 874 ships at D-day, increasing to no less than 2,167 at D + 180. In the air we have 5,112 aircraft available at M-day, of which 4,090 are under NATO command.
3. Secondly, anyone who has been to international manoeuvres will realise what a great advance they have made in standardisation of procedure and general cohesion.
4. Thirdly, the equipment situation, taken by and large, has greatly improved.
5. Fourthly, there exists a well-integrated international command structure.
6. Fifthly, infrastructure is going along well. For example, we shall have 120 operational airfields at the end of this year, twice the number we had at the end of last year.
7. On the other hand, we have got to face the following facts:-
 - (i) Defence expenditures are levelling off. Every year since the Treaty was signed, the curve has been upwards. It is already flattening out and for the future it is likely to go down.
 - (ii) Our present forces are a great deal below stated military requirements and it is certain that these requirements can never be attained in full on a peace economy.

(iii) No account has yet been taken of non-conventional weapons.

8. If it is agreed that a "new look" is essential, it is most important to decide by whom it should be undertaken. It is going to be a very considerable task and I do not believe that any of the existing bodies, or personnel drawn from those bodies, are suitable to undertake it alone, unless, of course, they abandoned their present work. It will be a whole-time job while it lasts, and it will take, at a conservative estimate, not less than three months.

9. I am not in a position to put forward concrete proposals, but it seems clear that the first essential is to find a suitable man to head the study. He should have a few assistants, and these should not be drawn exclusively from Standing Group countries. I believe that they should work under the general direction of the Secretary-General.

10. Their terms of reference would require deep consideration. Some of the points which occur to me are as follows:-

- (i) The build-up should be on the basis of a long haul, as was pointed out by all the speakers this morning:
- (ii) The strategy, i.e. to hold as far east as possible and to defend all NATO territory, must not be changed. This was also emphasised this morning.
- (iii) Assumptions as regards non-conventional weapons would have to be given.
- (iv) An order of magnitude for defence expenditures over a period of years must be agreed.

11. I believe that the suggestion should be put before the North Atlantic Council at their next Ministerial Meeting. I would therefore hope that one of the countries represented here would raise it next week in connection with the consideration of the Annual Review, and that the other two would support it.

11154

TRANSCRIPT OF REMARKS BY GENERAL ALFRED M. GRUENTHER

AT SHAPE CORRESPONDENTS' LUNCHEON, SHAPE, PARIS,

ON JANUARY 11, 1951

Some years ago, when cannibalism was still fashionable, a western news-
 paper correspondent found himself on a South Pacific island. He was picked
 up by a cannibal group, and in due course they brought out the big pot,
 filled it with water, and started the fire. Our correspondent's friend was
 very knowledgeable -- as are all correspondents -- and he had a pretty good
 idea of what was in store for him. He insisted that he be brought before
 the Cannibal Chief. After a heated argument, his request was granted. He
 complained bitterly to the Chief that this treatment was a violation of the
 freedom of the press. And he added, "Furthermore, if this outrage should
 take place, you will hang for it." The Chief, a very wise old man -- he
 had been to Oxford -- counseled the correspondent to calm himself. Then he
 asked him, "Now what is your job on your paper?" The correspondent replied,
 "I have a very important position; I am an assistant editor." Whereupon
 the Chief said, "I have some very good news for you. You are going to re-
 ceive a promotion. In a couple of hours, you will be an 'Editor in Chief'."

Your President, Louis de Roche, has been very generous in his remarks
 about me today. I have, however, an uneasy feeling -- very much like that
 correspondent had just before he got his "promotion." Louis has asked me
 and I have consented -- to expose myself to your tender mercies in an on-the-
 record question session. I can already sense that you -- like the cannibals --
 have concocted a celebration whereby I may well be exposed to some of the
 blessings of freedom of the press.

I am deeply honored to be your guest today. I am particularly pleased
 to have the opportunity to discuss with you the status of the defense of
 Western Europe, and to outline some of the problems which face us in the
 future. The progress that we have made during these three years, is much more
 that we thought possible on Sunday, January 7, 1951, the day General
 Eisenhower arrived in Paris.

Marty Pp DWM
 Ake "Rhapsody of NATO mid build-up"

- see Time next day

You will recall that in Korea, it was feared that the United Nations might be forced to evacuate from that peninsula within a few weeks. The general morale in Europe then was very very low.

You, as SHAPE correspondents, are aware - at least in general terms - of our accomplishments. I'd like to tell you what that means from the standpoint of our increased capabilities for defense. I believe it is fair to say that perhaps the outstanding development has been our increase in air strength, and particularly in the striking power of our long-range strategic air force. A portion of this element of our power potential is based in the United Kingdom and in French Morocco. It is not an integral part of the NATO forces because it is under U.S. control. But the accomplishments of this air force would affect vitally the fortunes of the SHAPE forces if a war should take place, and we would count heavily on the results of its efforts. Normally, its missions would be directed against targets deep in enemy territory. However, it is also available for the support of SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander, Europe) against appropriate targets which are closer to our front.

The technological developments are such that, under present conditions, offensive air power has a big advantage over the defense. By that I mean that the B-47 airplane can fly at such great speed and at such a high altitude, that the task of intercepting it is a tremendously difficult one. The Soviet Union has no real answer to that challenge at this time. This means, then, that air forces taking off from bases in this area can launch attacks with powerful effect against Soviet industrial and other suitable targets. The bombing techniques are accurate and can be expected to produce devastating results. Certainly this overwhelming retaliatory capability has a tremendous deterrent value and must be weighed soberly by a potential aggressor.

At the same time that we evaluate our long-range air situation, it is well to consider our other capabilities. Our defense perimeter from the northern tip of Norway to the eastern borders of Turkey extends over a distance of 4,000 miles. The strength which we have on that front is from three to four times as effective as it was when General Eisenhower came to Europe, although obviously there is no accurate arithmetical yardstick. But certainly the improvement is of

that order of magnitude. We then had - not counting the forces of Greece and Turkey, since those countries did not join NATO until later - a total of 15 divisions, some of them very weak. We had about 15 airfields. We had approximately 1,800 aircraft, of which 900 were in the United Kingdom. Of the 1,800, very few of them were jets. Those forces have now increased very considerably, and especially so in the area of Central Europe which covers a front of approximately 500 miles. We have there an air-ground shield which, although still not strong enough, would force an enemy to concentrate prior to attack. In doing so, the concentrating force would be extremely vulnerable to losses from atomic weapon attacks.

Our naval resources, although not yet strong enough to provide complete protection to our ports and sea lanes, are superior to Soviet naval resources. Moreover, we now have an efficient organization to utilize naval power effectively in an air-land battle.

We can now use atomic weapons against an aggressor, delivered not only by long-range aircraft, but also by the use of shorter range planes, and by 280 mm artillery.

This air-ground team constitutes a very effective shield, and it would fight very well in case of attack. We think that it is of such strength that the Soviets do not now have in occupied Europe - and by "occupied Europe," I refer to this general area (pointing on map to Satellite countries) - sufficient air and ground forces to be certain of overwhelming this shield. Of course, the Soviets can move in additional forces to overcome that deficiency. But if they do, we should be able to get some warning of an impending attack. As a result of that warning, we ought to be able to increase our defensive strength considerably. In particular, we should be able to alert our air forces.

Although we probably do not have adequate strength now to meet successfully a determined Soviet invasion, we certainly do have a force which can make that attack extremely costly for an aggressor. We have had in the past three years remarkable success in building our strength. Furthermore, we have emergency plans for the utilization of our air, ground and naval forces if we should be attacked. That fact certainly should cause the men of the Kremlin to ponder

intention, and I think we would know, because of the necessity of taking such factors into account in our advance planning work. As to the form that the U.S. reappraisal would take, if EDC does not pass, I don't know, and it would be inappropriate for me to make any speculation. I should like to make clear, however, that from the standpoint of creating a condition of strength in the important area of Central Europe, if we do not get the German forces to bolster it -- that is pep-up the strength in that area -- we will suffer a great deal more agony than Mr. Dulles indicated in his talk. He used the statement "an agonizing reappraisal", but I can assure you that we are going to be in great pain if we do not have that German contribution.

Q. Presumably the pain would be even greater if the U.S. pulled out two or three or four American divisions.

A. That is true.

Q. General Gruenther, in undertaking this "new look", are you taking into consideration the possibility that a stronger Soviet atomic arsenal, or some other factor may arise to prevent us from using atomic and hydrogen weapons?

A. We are assuming in our study that atomic weapons will be available to both sides. One of the questions which we are also asking ourselves is "Where would we be if a decision were made that atomic weapons would not be used by either side?" Naturally, that is another problem, and a very important one. Moreover, it is very complicated. The particular plan that you pull from the shelf may be well formulated, but if your forces have been built on the assumption that Plan A is going to be used, it is probable that you will not be able to put into effect Plan B if the forces available are those based on Plan A. In other words, the strategic concept, and the resulting composition of forces, for a plan in which atomic weapons are contemplated may -- and in all probability will -- be vastly different from a plan in which atomic weapons are not going to be used,

We're locked
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I am sure that our military potential - and especially our air power - is going to continue to improve. Of course the balance of power depends on more than military strength. We must first of all maintain a strong economy.

Q. I take it you feel we have the defensive balance at the moment, at least?

A. Certainly we have balance enough to create a very strong deterrent. We have an overwhelming capacity to retaliate. And that deterrent is probably our best defense. Now if, for example, an answer were found in the near future to the B-47 threat, and three out of every five B-47's that appeared over Soviet territory in the event of war were shot down - that would create a new problem and a very rugged one at that.

Q. General, if war came now, would we control the air over the battlefield?

A. That would depend largely on how the war started. War could break out as a result of a miscalculation - a mistake - or it could break out after a deliberate build-up. If it developed as a result of a mistake, meaning with Soviet air power in its present locations, we would have an excellent opportunity of having reasonably good control of the air over the battlefield. And, of course, a vital factor in securing that control would be the results of our attacks on enemy air bases. As you well know, the best way to get control of the air is to destroy enemy planes while they are on the ground. Under the second situation, namely war developing from a premeditated build-up, the Soviets today would have a fairly good chance of wearing us down, by causing great attrition to our tactical air forces. They would pay for the effort - and pay heavily. And all of that time we would be pounding unmercifully targets deep in enemy territory. In my opinion, eventually we would win the war. But that wouldn't necessarily mean that we would control the air over the Western European battlefield, which

was your question. I can assure you, however, we are in a much better position to gain that control than we were three years ago.

Q. Would you just as soon have the 1500 German tactical planes and let the divisions go for a while?

A. That's like asking whether you would rather lose your left leg or your right leg. We need both the ground and the air elements in our shield, and we would be most reluctant to do without either. I think if we were faced with that tough alternative, we would probably try to get some air forces and some divisions. But naturally that decision would be a tough one.

Q. General Gruenther, is the assumption that the Russians will mass for an attack, offering an atomic target, while we won't offer them an atomic target by massing, based on the idea that we will just stay behind defensive positions such as the Rhine, and not try to advance ourselves?

A. No. Initially of course we would be on the defensive, but as I said earlier, our objective is to create as small a target as possible. We create that situation by concealment, by dispersion, and by great mobility. But I can assure you that we are developing the counter offensive spirit and in no sense a Maginot Line type of defense. Now, you might ask "Will we ever go forward?" The answer is "yes". But, under the probable condition that we have to absorb a heavy blow initially we will probably do some falling back before we go forward. I do want to make clear, however, that in the training of our forces we continually stress the value of the offensive, even though we do envisage that we may have to go on the defensive initially.

Q. Don't we get hit by their atomic weapons?

A. Yes, that is certainly a great danger. That is the reason we are examining our tactics; that is why we are perfecting our training so that we will not suffer heavy casualties from an atomic attack.

27 JUL 1994

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NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
ORGANISATION DU TRAITE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

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PALAIS DE CHAILLOT
PARIS (XVI)

PRIVATE

Lord Ismay.

11th February, 1954.

I attach a copy of a note I gave to General Schuyler to try and obtain the answers which seem necessary to the letter which you handed to me. I hope that they are, in fact, the points required. General Schuyler was most helpful and is giving me a rather more full reply on a personal basis, he is not taking the matter any higher so that the matter has been confined to him and myself.

2. Answers to questions.

1. The Soviets have not moved any significant forces from their western front, eastward or northward.

2. There are no significant changes in SHAPE's estimate over the last two years of Russian strength on our front.

3. The correct figure of M-Day divisions estimated on the western front is thirty. It may be that confusion has arisen with satellite divisions or reserves which has thus given rise to the figure of eighty.

4. In his recent speech of 12 January, SACEUR was referring to tactical concentration and not strategic re-inforcement.

5. It is entirely agreed and necessary to have an Alert period and by so doing an immense strengthening of our power of resistance results. It is estimated that the figure is five to seven days. It is of interest that in SHAPE's first study on the "New Look" the conclusion was reached that certain forces would suffice to meet the initial shock given non-conventional weapons. If,

...../however,

27 JUL 1994

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however, the figure of ~~five to seven days~~ warning became smaller, the curve of the ~~actual forces required rises~~ extremely steeply. It is probable that any assessment of "New Look" will have to be based on the assumption of five to seven days warning. Moreover, this period is based on two further assumptions, namely that at the beginning of the warning the general Alert is given thus ~~beginning the order of~~ general mobilisation and secondly that the decision to use non-conventional weapons is made before either side opens fire.

ordering

3. Some further figures may be of use to you. At the end of 1953 we had eighteen M-Day divisions facing thirty Russian M-Day divisions. At M+30 this figure goes to thirty-three as against one hundred Soviet and satellite but, a number of the satellite divisions are not front line troops. It has to be noted also that these figures do not take account of the possible accession of twelve German divisions under E.D.C. beyond showing how important that acquisition of strength is as given in the foregoing figures.

4. I have only dealt with the central front but the same line of thought runs through the other sectors and my personal impression is that the situation is slightly better on the other fronts. The overall Russian strength in peacetime is estimated at one hundred and seventy-five divisions, of which only the thirty previously referred to are outside Russia proper. It will be seen therefore, that SACEUR's statement is not just an utterance designed for the public but has got considerable support, at least in the figures, but General Schuyler particularly stressed that when General Gruenther said that the "shield" was sufficient not to be overcome he meant not to be overcome within the first two or three weeks only.

5. The other point that needed emphasis was that there had been this sharp rise in our own NATO effective forces in the last two years. SHAPF has a graph showing this and it is striking.

6. I would be very glad to give you any further information personally, if you wish.

Roger Lick

2/11/54
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ISMAV I III 27 JUL 1994

**SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED POWERS EUROPE**

PARIS, FRANCE

11 Feb 54

GENERAL SCHUYLER:

General Schow furnished the
following information, per your request:

Soviet Divisions

East Germany	22
Poland	2
Hungary	2
Austria	2
Roumania	2
Outside Russia	30
Russia Proper	145
<u>Grand total</u>	175

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12th February, 1954

My dear Prime Minister,

Many thanks for your letter of 8th February. I will try to answer your questions in the order that you have put them.

The Soviets have not moved any significant forces from their Western front, either eastward or northward; nor have there been any significant changes in SHAPE's estimate of Soviet strength on our front in the last two years. This has always stood at 30 M-day divisions, and I do not know how the figure of 80 divisions crept in. It must have included satellite divisions or Soviet reserve divisions.

Before dealing with the vital question of an alert period, may I give you some further figures. At the end of 1953, we had 18 M-day divisions facing 30 Russian M-day divisions. By M+30 our figure goes to 33 divisions and the Russian to 100 Soviet and satellite divisions; but some of the satellite divisions are not first line troops. The

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12 German divisions contemplated under E.D.C. are, of course, not included in our order of battle, so you can see what an immense difference they would make.

The above figures relate only to the central front: but the general impression is that the situation is slightly more favourable to us on the other fronts. The overall Russian peace-time strength is estimated at 175 divisions, of which only the 30 that I have mentioned are outside Russia proper. Their believed dispositions are:-

East Germany	22
Poland	2
Hungary	2
Austria	2
Roumania	2
Outside Russia	30
Russia proper	145

So much for figures. Now to return to your other questions. When Gruenther used the word "concentrate", he meant tactical concentration not strategic reinforcement. I ought also to add that when he said that the "shield" was sufficiently strong not to be overcome, he meant not to be overcome within the first two or three weeks. But the way that I look at it is that the Soviets must realise that 18 good and ever improving divisions, plus atomic weapons, would not be easily brushed aside.

Defe 6/26

Annex to
J.P. (54)76(Final)

9/2/54
not in notes
1959 etc pr

STANDING GROUP REPORT TO THE MILITARY COMMITTEE ON
SACEUR'S CAPABILITY STUDY, 1957

INTRODUCTION

SACEUR's Capabilities Study⁺, based on the resources which it is anticipated will be made available in 1957, were received by the Standing Group in July, 1954.

2. The Standing Group have now prepared a draft report^x to the Military Committee on SACEUR's Study and this has been forwarded to the Chiefs of Staff of Standing Group countries for their approval.

AIM

3. The aim of this paper is to examine the Standing Group Draft and give the United Kingdom representative on the Standing Group the views of the Chiefs of Staff.

SACEUR'S CAPABILITY STUDY

4. We had examined SACEUR's Study prior to the arrival of the Standing Group Draft and concluded that SACEUR's concept, strategy and programme of recommendations are reasonably sound as a basis for further planning.

Our only major doubt is whether the land and air forces which SACEUR assumes to be available could carry out the forward strategy with the high degree of probability which SACEUR estimates. SACEUR was directed to base his capability study substantially on resources which nations are able to make available now. This rules out any major increases in SACEUR's forces. The many measures which SACEUR recommends should be carried out to improve the effectiveness and readiness of NATO forces raises the question as to whether the present size of nations' contributions can even be maintained.

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5. However, with the available resources it is difficult to see how SACEUR can greatly improve his actual ability to hold the Russians on the ground in Europe. Also the scale of nuclear weapons envisaged by SACEUR might cause such destruction as to make the operation of large land forces impracticable. In view of these considerations and because politically it is essential to maintain confidence in NATO, we consider that SACEUR's general conclusion on his capability to carry out a forward strategy can be accepted.

6. In examining SACEUR's Study we considered that there were certain points which should be included in Standing Group guidance to SACEUR. These points are:-

- (a) Authority to use nuclear weapons immediately.

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- (b) Tactical concept for land/air/atomic warfare.
- (c) Operational control and line of communication in Schleswig-Holstein.
- (d) SACEUR's tactical air capabilities.
- (e) Co-ordination of maritime mining measures.

THE STANDING GROUP DRAFTGeneral

7. We have examined the Standing Group Draft and the Memorandum to SACEUR in the light of our views on SACEUR's Study above.

The Main Paper

8. The major conclusion reached on the paper, which it is recommended that the Military Committee should accept, is that the Standing Group concur with SACEUR's concept of operations and general strategy and agree to take note of SACEUR's Programme of Recommendations as the basis for further actions. This conclusion is in line with that reached in our examination of SACEUR's Study.

9. Certain major points are raised in the paper with which we do not disagree in general but are of such importance that we have commented on them briefly below.

Authority to Use Nuclear Weapons in Immediate Retaliation

10. SACEUR's plan is based on Allied forces being organized and deployed for atomic warfare. As a final result of his studies he concludes that if this atomic posture is attained he could by mid-1967 carry out his main mission, and probably avoid defeat. He stresses, however, that in order to accomplish this "his authority to implement the planned use of atomic weapons must be such as to ensure that no delay whatsoever will occur in countering a surprise attack."

11. The Draft concurs with the necessity for using atomic weapons immediately on the outset of hostilities and proposes that "the commitment to action by NATO countries under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty should encompass full authority for the employment of atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons in their defense of these forces". It is suggested that this authority should be written into the General Alerts.

12. Under Article 5 of the Treaty each signatory retains the right to take such action as it deems necessary at that time. The general alert signifies the outbreak of hostilities and the consent of nations concerned would be obtained before the general alert was introduced. The proposed measures under the general alert do, however, include provisions for commanders of national forces attacked or menaced to conduct operations in accordance with the emergency plans. The implications of the proposal in the Draft appear to be that nations should agree in peacetime that the assignment of their forces under the general alert should automatically accept atomic warfare.

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13. Politically the implications of initiating atomic warfare are so grave that there would be the greatest objection to delegating the decision to use atomic weapons to SACEUR. Militarily there is no question now as to the importance of instant atomic retaliation to any major attack whether with or without the use of atomic weapons; this will be of even greater importance by 1957 since SACEUR's forces will be committed to atomic warfare strategy. We agree that where there is time for SACEUR to consult national authorities their consent should be obtained before he takes action which would include atomic attack. In the case of surprise, however, when the first intimation of attack might be a report of numerous enemy aircraft crossing the NATO frontiers, the result of the whole war might depend on SACEUR retaliating immediately with atomic weapons.

14. The proposal in the Standing Group Draft goes some way towards meeting SACEUR's requirement but still leaves open the question of what will happen in the event of there not being time for SACEUR to obtain the Council's consent to a General Alert. Militarily it is desirable to give SACEUR discretion in this event, politically this is probably impossible. It is therefore very likely that no agreed NATO decision on this question can be reached now, but it is desirable that a United Kingdom/United States private agreement should be arranged.

The Yardstick for Land/Air/Atomic Warfare (paragraph 28 of Standing Group Report)

15. The Standing Group Draft concurs in the concept of SACEUR's yardstick but indicates that considerable further study of the problem will be required, particularly the problem of holding wide frontages in the face of mass infiltration.

16. SACEUR intends to use his concept as a basis for further studies and we consider that the Military Committee should withhold judgement until these studies have been completed. We agree that there is a need for re-examination of the strengths of the forces proposed by SACEUR for holding such a small obstacle as the WESER. In addition we are very doubtful whether the forces envisaged for a counter-attack role would be sufficient to deal successfully with what the Russians can be expected to get across the obstacle.

The Cost of Implementing SACEUR's Recommendations (paragraph 33)

17. We consider that the treatment of the problem of cost in this section of the Report is somewhat over-optimistic. We agree with the final sentence that the cost factor does not invalidate the basic strategy and concept of operations. We feel that the second sentence of paragraph 33 is somewhat too definite at the present stage. We suggest that the cost problem should be plainly stated, but that any comment on the possibility of paying for SACEUR's Programme of Recommendations should be non-committal.

Implications on Future Warfare (paragraphs 34 to 36)

18. We agree with the implications set out in the Standing Group Draft and with the possible pattern of a future war indicated. We suggest that as the stockpiles of nuclear weapons held by each side increase it will become more likely that no second phase will occur. This view would tend to reinforce the necessity of giving priority to first phase forces. However, in view of the speculative nature of this problem we consider this section of the Draft is acceptable.

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Future NATO Force Patterns

19. The object of this section is to draw from SACEUR's Study a general pattern of NATO forces for the next few years, which is subsequently used as the basis for the Military Committee's Report to the Council on this subject. The Draft emphasises the primary importance of the deterrent and of giving priority in our peacetime preparations to the forces required in the first phase. This is in line with the Chiefs of Staff latest views on Global Strategy.

The Memorandum to SACEUR (Enclosure to Draft)

20. We feel that every effort should be made to give specific guidance to SACEUR, and we have suggested at Appendix possible ways by which the Standing Group Memorandum might be improved.

CONCLUSION

21. We conclude that the Standing Group Draft Report to the Military Committee is acceptable subject to our comments in paragraphs 16-18 above and at Appendix.

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Appendix to Annex to
J.P. (54)76(Final)

UNITED KINGDOM COMMENTS ON STANDING GROUP
MEMORANDUM TO SACEUR

Authority to Use Nuclear Weapons Immediately

1. No mention of this subject is at present made in the memorandum, although it is one of the major problems to which SACEUR has drawn attention. While we agree that this question must be referred to the Council before any precise information can be given to SACEUR, we suggest that some reference to the solution proposed by the Standing Group for the approval of the Council should be made. We further consider that SACEUR should be informed specifically that the Standing Group approve the immediate use by SACEUR of atomic weapons in retaliation, as a basis for further planning.

Cost of Implementing SACEUR's Recommendations (paragraph 4 of Enclosure)

2. Again this problem must be submitted to the Council before firm guidance can be given to SACEUR. However, the last sentence of paragraph 4 as at present worded is not very helpful and we feel that it would be possible to indicate, even at this stage, that priority must be given to measures applicable in the first phase.

Land/Air/Atomic Yardstick (paragraph 5(d))

5. We agree with this paragraph provided that judgement is reserved on the land/air yardstick, but consider that a reference should also be made on the need to re-examine the size of the counter-attack in the two subjects to which attention is drawn.

Operational Matters (paragraph 5(c))

4. We note that SA is concerned about the boundaries of the forces in Schleswig. *more for Korea hence quick escalation*

SACEUR

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- (b) Approximately 70% of the whole weight of SACEUR's atomic attack between D-Day and D plus 4 is scheduled to be delivered by fighter bombers. We are doubtful of the consistent ability of fighter bombers to find and attack targets involving deep penetration, particularly as meteorological conditions in Central Europe may be expected on 50% of occasions, to make the task of map reading and finding the target extremely difficult. SACEUR has assumed that two sorties by fighter bombers will be required to deliver one nuclear weapon. We feel a truer ratio might be in the order of two, three, or four to one.

We feel that SACEUR's attention should be drawn to these points.

Co-ordination of Maritime Mining Measures

6. In SACEUR's Programme of Recommendations he makes certain proposals with regard to the mining of the Mediterranean, Black Sea and Baltic. We consider that there is a major requirement for the co-ordination of mining in all these areas.

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Annex "A" to
J.P. (54) 77 (Final)

REPORT BY THE MILITARY COMMITTEE ON THE MOST EFFECTIVE PATTERN
OF NATO MILITARY STRENGTH FOR THE NEXT FEW YEARS

INTRODUCTION

The paper⁺ setting out the most effective pattern of NATO military strength for the next few years has been prepared by the Standing Group on behalf of the Military Committee for submission to the NATO Council, in accordance with the Council's instructions at the Annual Review Meeting in Paris in December, 1953.

2. The paper is based on certain broad conclusions stemming from consideration of the Capabilities Studies recently carried out by the Supreme Commanders and the Channel Committee.

THE MILITARY COMMITTEE REPORT

General

3. The paper has been prepared by the International Staff of the Standing Group and every effort has been made by the United Kingdom members of the Staff to ensure that, as far as possible, the recent views of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff on global strategy were incorporated.

4. We consider that in general the paper follows the United Kingdom views on the pattern of forces required for the next few years, as far as these can be applied to war in the NATO area.

5. We have commented below on certain portions of the Report of major importance.

Probable Nature and Duration of a
Future War involving NATO

6. The ideas contained in this section are in general derived from the concepts of a future war arising out of SACBUR's Capabilities Study. These ideas and the reasoning behind them are set out at some length.

7. In considering the circumstances in which a war might break out the Report refers to the impossibility of a preventive war (paragraph 6). We are in agreement that there is no likelihood that such a war would be started by NATO but we consider that the term "preventive war" is a misleading phrase. We assume that what is meant is a war deliberately begun by NATO to prevent the Russians from developing the capability to wage war. If this is the meaning "a forestalling war" might be more descriptive and less likely to be misinterpreted.

3. In referring to a preventive war the statement is made that "war can only come as a result of Soviet military aggression". As we have pointed out below we consider that the most likely way in which war might arise would be as a result of a miscalculation during a period of tension. Such a miscalculation might not be

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Annex "A" (continued)

confined to a result of Soviet actions and might occur as a result of Communist action elsewhere in the world. We would therefore prefer to see "Communist" substituted for "Soviet".

9. The paper shows the primary consideration is that, in any future war against Russia, both sides will possess an appreciable number of atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons. This is bound to revolutionise the concept of war and the conclusion is reached that any future war against Russia may be either of short duration or be characterised by two phases, viz. a short intense atomic exchange followed by an indeterminate period of less intensity. It is possible that the first phase will be decisive, or will produce a stalemate, and even that there may be no second phase at all. We agree, however, that at present NATO must plan on the possibility of a two-phase nuclear war.

10. The Report concludes that the primary aim of NATO must be to prevent war. Should war come however, our ability to defeat the enemy will depend on whether we can survive and gain a decisive superiority in the first phase. The peacetime forces of NATO must therefore be primarily designed so as to ensure success in this phase. This is in line with United Kingdom views and this conclusion is particularly applicable to the United Kingdom in that, in the face of nuclear attack expected on this country, it is probable that our contribution to a second phase, if it occurs, would be negligible. This must not however be interpreted in too literal or narrow a sense.

Examination of Soviet Capabilities and
Probable Strategy

11. The report makes certain assumptions as to Soviet Capabilities and probable strategy. The major assumption is made that in order to gain superiority in the vital air/atomic field their strategy would be based on surprise.

12. It has been appreciated[®] that during the next few years an indeterminate period of increasing tension is likely to precede any future war; further, that it is unlikely that the Soviets will deliberately resort to war until they can effectively carry out a decisive nuclear attack against North America, and we do not think they will possess this capability in the immediate future. Therefore the likelihood of war has receded for the moment. However, NATO plans must be based on the possibility of war, which could occur at any time through a miscalculation.

13. As regards surprise attack it appears possible that in order to gain the all important superiority in the initial atomic exchange, the Soviets would be prepared to make sacrifices in force deployments during a period of tension and open hostilities with an atomic attack without our being able to detect their military preparations. We agree with the Report therefore that NATO plans must be such as to be able to counter a surprise atomic attack, but we do not think that this would be a "bolt from the blue". We therefore suggest that the Report should include some mention of the probability of a period of political tension preceding a surprise attack.

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Annex "A" (continued)

The Task of the NATO Land/Air Forces in Europe

General Presentation

14. The Report emphasises that the main role of the NATO land/air forces is as a deterrent to war; these forces must therefore be forces in being. The Report then goes on to define the three tasks of these forces:-

- (a) Surviving the initial surprise attack.
- (b) Participating effectively in the battle for air/atomic superiority.
- (c) Arresting the advance of the Soviet land forces into Europe.

15. We consider that the wording of the section (paragraph 21(c)) on arresting the advance of the Soviet land forces into Europe is misleading. As it stands it gives the impression that the task of arresting the Soviet advance is comparatively simple. In fact the ability of the NATO forces to carry out this task in the first intensive phase is dependent upon the three major provisions in paragraph 22:-

- (a) The ability to make immediate use of nuclear weapons.
- (b) The provision of a German contribution.
- (c) The provision of certain essential measures necessary to enable our forces to fight effectively in a nuclear war.

16. Even if these provisions are wholeheartedly implemented by the NATO countries we consider that there is no more than a reasonable chance of preventing a Soviet land advance in Europe. To sum up therefore, we consider that the general tone of paragraph 21(c) is too optimistic and greater emphasis should be placed on the major provisions in paragraph 22.

Ability to Make Use of Nuclear Weapons Immediately

17. A major proviso of successful defence against the Soviets is the ability of SACEUR to use nuclear weapons immediately he is attacked. It is proposed that "in the event of a war involving NATO, the commitment to action of forces by countries under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty should encompass full authority for the employment of nuclear weapons in defence of those forces; this authority should be written into the terms of the General Alert."

18. We consider that this point is of fundamental importance and in our examination of the paper relating to SACEUR's Capability Study we have given our detailed reasons for supporting this proposal.

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Annex "A" (concluded)

Essential Measures for our Forces to Fight Effectively in Nuclear War

19. The essential measures necessary for our forces to fight in a nuclear war are set out at Enclosure to the Report. These are derived from SACEUR's Capability Study, and while we agree that all the measures are necessary we have set out at Annex "B" some implications on the United Kingdom if they are adopted. There may well be other measures arising out of SACLANE's and CHANCOM's revised studies. We consider this should be made clear in the Military Committee Report.

20. In our examination of the implications of these measures on the United Kingdom we were led to the conclusion that there might be some compensating savings due to reorganisation of the forces. We considered, however, it was inevitable that there would be a major financial expenditure to implement the measures. To avoid such an increase in defence costs it would be necessary to take some major steps such as considerably reducing the reserve forces, or even slightly reducing the active forces.

21. We feel that the references to "costs" in paragraph 22(c) of the Report are over-optimistic and to that extent misleading. While we would not wish to over-emphasise the problems of cost we feel that this will be a major problem and should be squarely stated; this could then be qualified by a reference to the possible means of reducing the problem. A reference might be made in this respect to the means in paragraph 20 above and the possible savings which might be obtained by the re-assessment of Allied shipping needs in a future war (paragraph 27 of the Report).

The Task of NATO Naval Forces

22. Whilst we agree with the conclusion of the Report that at this stage it is not possible for any conclusions of sound value to be made with respect to the present Capabilities Studies of the NATO Naval Commanders, we must be careful not to neglect the importance to the campaign in Europe of keeping the sea lanes and ports open, certainly after the first intensive phase.

CONCLUSION

23. We conclude that the Military Committee Report to the Council is acceptable subject to our comments in paragraphs 7 to 21 above.

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Annex "B" to
J.P. (54)77(Final)

IMPLICATIONS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF ACCEPTING SACEUR'S
RECOMMENDED MINIMUM MEASURES AT ENCLOSURE
TO THE MILITARY COMMITTEE REPORT

1. We have examined the measures at Enclosure to the Military Committee Report and have set out below the major implications of each measure.

Atomic Capability

2. SACEUR must be provided with an integrated atomic capability for use immediately in order for his plans to be effective.

3. Whilst the major part of the atomic capability must obviously be provided by the United States, the United Kingdom must provide nothing less than a worthwhile contribution in order to have an effective voice in the planning and conduct of these operations. In addition, it would clearly be unsatisfactory for the United Kingdom land forces in Northern Army Group to be entirely dependant on United States nuclear support.

Authority to Use Nuclear Weapons

4. Governmental approval will be required to obtain the Authority requested. We understand that the Foreign Office intend to submit this problem to Ministers in due course in order that a decision can be reached before the Annual Review Meeting in December.

Alert System

5. In view of the requirement for instant retaliation, and for adopting passive defence measures in the face of attack, a fully effective Alert System is required. In SACEUR's Capabilities Study various proposals are made towards reaching this objective, among them the superimposing of a military Alert System on the present political Alert System. We visualise that the only major difficulties which might arise out of this would be political ones connected with the problem in paragraph 4 above.

Warning of Attack

6. Implications of these proposals are:-

- (a) Extension of radar coverage and increased manpower for the extended radar system to enable a continuous watch to be kept.
- (b) Increased resources towards the Allied Intelligence system.

Forces in Being

7. The implications of this section are numerous and complex. The major ones are:-

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Annex "B" (continued)

- (a) Priority must be given to forces in being in peace who must be able to fight without reinforcement. This will affect the manpower for our active forces, our mobilisation policy and the plans for our reserve forces.
- (b) Our forces will require to be reorganised to survive in nuclear war. Further study of the land/air/atomic 'yardstick' will greatly affect this reorganisation.
- (c) Intensive training will be required to practice the new technique of nuclear warfare.
- (d) The adoption of a Weser Strategy may affect our present peacetime deployment in Germany and will certainly affect our logistic and maintenance plans.

Measures to Enable Allied Command Europe to Survive Soviet Atomic Attack

8. The principal effects of these measures will be on the tactical air forces, and to make the measures effective it is likely that these airforces will have to be made more mobile, have more alternative airfields provided with reserves of essential war materials, and take various other steps, all of which will be expensive in money, material and manpower.

9. For the land forces some technique will have to be devised to enable the initial deployment from peace to war stations to be carried out swiftly without providing good targets for nuclear attack.

10. For naval forces there will be a requirement for the dispersal of ships, both active and reserve, dispersal of reserve stocks, and the provision of alternative headquarters. Merchant shipping must be at sea or dispersed to escape the initial attack. Naval forces must be provided with dispersed bases, and must be at sea as soon as possible to seize the initiative from the outset.

Summary of Implications

11. While it is possible that some compensating savings may be obtained by the changed balance of forces which will be necessary in nuclear war, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the general implication of the measures, particularly those discussed in paragraphs 7 to 10 above, is increased expenditure. If this proves to be so it would seem that there may be only two ways in which additional expenditure can be avoided:-

- (a) Some reduction in the active forces in order to enable the remaining forces to be properly equipped for nuclear war. This course will be extremely unpalatable to the Supreme Commanders.

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- (b) Drastic reduction of the reserve forces.

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Action Required

12. It is proposed that the Military Committee should take note of SACEUR's Programme of Recommendations, in which these minimum measures are set out. In these Recommendations SACEUR indicates that he will wish to consult national authorities on them. We suggest that the appropriate military authorities in the United Kingdom should begin to examine concurrently with SACEUR certain of the major measures. These studies might cover:-

- (a) The land/air/atomic yardstick.
- (b) The organisation, training and equipment of our land and air forces in nuclear war.
- (c) Measures to enable our forces to survive Soviet atomic attack.
- (d) The implications of the Weser strategy and nuclear warfare on our logistic system.

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Circulated for consideration by the Chiefs of Staff

J.P.(54)86(Final)

21st October, 1954

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

JOINT PLANNING STAFF

THE MOST EFFECTIVE PATTERN OF NATO MILITARY
STRENGTH FOR THE NEXT FEW YEARS

Report by the Joint Planning Staff

The Standing Group paper^d on the most effective pattern of NATO military strength for the next few years has now been redrafted to take into account the views of the military authorities of the Standing Group countries. The current draft is in the form of a Staff Paper² since the United States Chiefs of Staff have declined to comment officially on the Standing Group paper until the problem of German re-armament has been resolved.

2. Sir John Whiteley feels⁺ that the redrafted paper takes into account the major views² of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff and asks for comments by 1st November.

3. In anticipation of instructions we have examined the Staff paper and our Report is at Annex "A". We have prepared a Draft Signal at Annex "B" to Sir John Whiteley setting out the United Kingdom views on the paper.

Recommendations

4. We recommend that the draft signal at Annex "B" be sent to Sir John Whiteley.

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+ JW 141.
COS(54)98th Mtg. of 13.9.54.
@ COS(54)300 of 10.9.54.

(Signed) H.C.D. MACLEAN
J.D. MILLER
T.H. HARDY

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

21st October, 1954.

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ANNEX "A" TO
J.F.(54)86(Final)

STAFF PAPER ON THE MOST EFFECTIVE PATTERN OF NATO
MILITARY STRENGTH FOR THE NEXT FEW YEARS

INTRODUCTION

In mid-September, 1954 the Chiefs of Staff informed General Whiteley of their views on the Standing Group paper^b setting out the most effective pattern of NATO military strength for the next few years. The paper was in the form of a draft report written on behalf of the Military Committee for the NATO Council, and was based on the conclusions stemming from the Supreme Commanders' Capabilities Studies.

2. Subsequently, owing to the non-ratification of the E.D.C. Treaty by the French Assembly, the United States Chiefs of Staff declined^c to comment officially on the Standing Group paper. It was agreed, however, that the original timetable by which the paper was to be circulated to the Military Representatives Committee for their comment by 15th November, should be adhered to; but that the paper should be circulated in the form of a Staff Paper instead of as an Official Standing Group Report.

3. We have now received the Staff Paper^{cc} which has been drafted as a result of considerable negotiation in Washington. The views of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff have been injected as far as possible, and we understand that although United States comment was ostensibly at planning level, in fact it probably represented the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff.

4. Sir John Whiteley has asked^t for United Kingdom views on the Staff Paper by 1st November since the Standing Group may try and get an agreed draft prior to considering the comments of the Military Representatives.

VIEWS OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF ON PREVIOUS DRAFT

5. The principal comment of the Chiefs of Staff on S.G. 241/3 concerned the war at sea[@]. It was considered that the paper was not satisfactory in this respect and detailed comments were prepared for the guidance of Sir John Whiteley in the redrafting of the paper.

6. Other major comments[^] made by the Chiefs of Staff concerned:-

- (a) authority to use nuclear weapons immediately;
- (b) warning of attack.

[^] S.G. 241/3. [^] F.O. Telegrams 171 and 173 from Paris.
[^] I.P.T. 178/15. + JW 141. @ COS(54)300 of 10th Sept. 1954.
[^] COS(54)98th Meeting of 13th Sept. 1954, Confidential Annex.

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Annex "A" (continued)

OUR VIEWS ON THE STAFF PAPER

General

7. The main change in the paper concerns the NATO naval forces which has been rewritten in an attempt to meet the United Kingdom views, not however without some opposition from the United States. Numerous other amendments have been made as a result of comments by the three Standing Group countries, but these do not alter the basic conclusions and recommendations of the original paper. While these amendments do not in all cases entirely meet our requirement, they probably represent the best compromise which can be achieved in the circumstances. We have drawn attention below however to certain aspects of the Staff Paper.

Presentation of Naval Problems

8. We consider that the Staff Paper goes some way towards meeting the views^{xx} of the Chiefs of Staff on the naval aspects of S.G. 241/3. We have set out below our detailed comments on the new presentation of the Naval problems.

9. Title. The title of the Staff Paper remains unaltered, but in the Introduction, the emphasis has been changed to offset any misleading effect the title may have. In paragraph 1 the Staff Paper states that the Military Committee after reviewing the first studies of Supreme Commanders have encountered certain problems, especially those relating to Sea Communications which should be investigated further.

10. Factors Affecting the Outcome of Subsequent Operations. We agree with the arguments and conclusions drawn in paragraphs 12, 13 and 14 of the Staff Paper, but in order that our ability to resupply the United Kingdom and Western Europe is assured we must achieve command of the seas from the outset, and furthermore maintain this naval supremacy. We consider that this section of the Staff Paper would be strengthened if this point was included at the end of paragraph 13.


11. Control of Sea Communications. We wish to emphasise that Sea Communications are the L of C of the land and air forces projected seawards from the ports and their protection is an integral part of the land and air battle. It is unfortunate that the control of Sea Communications has been treated as a separate issue in a separate section of the paper. As now written this section under its new title sets out the important naval problems in a future war, and emphasises the naval aspects of a nuclear war in both the initial and subsequent phases. Specific reference is made to the importance of naval forces-in-being capable of carrying out powerful offensive operations during the initial phase (paragraph 27). The necessity for forces for the defence of Sea Communications is not however mentioned in the conclusions.

12. Baltic Exits. We consider that mention of holding the Baltic exits should be made in paragraph 36.

xx } COS(54)96th Meeting
} COS(54)300 of 10th September, 1954
} COS(54)98th Meeting

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Annex "A" (continued)

Authority to Use Nuclear Weapons Immediately

13. This section (Paragraph 22(a) of I.F.T. 178/15) has been simplified to state the basic military requirement that NATO forces should be able to use atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons in their defence from the outset. This amendment is in line with the Chiefs of Staff views. However this requirement is fundamental to the whole new concept of operations in nuclear war, and the approval of the Council will have to be obtained specifically to this proposal as the basis upon which the Supreme Commanders will prepare their plans. We suggest therefore that this requirement should appear in the conclusions of the paper.

14. While the Council is likely to accept the above requirement it is most unlikely to agree to allow SACEUR to use atomic weapons, other than in retaliation, without reference to higher authority. We foresee that this problem will face the Council with most difficult decisions. Inter-related with it is the use of nuclear weapons by Strategic Air Command and Bomber Command. We suggest that as a first step in resolving these difficulties we should hold private discussions with the United States in the hope that a common line can be agreed before the Council is faced with this paper.

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Warning of Attack

15. The Section (Paragraph 10(b)) dealing with the likelihood of a surprise attack has not been altered to reflect the Chiefs of Staff views that some warning should be possible, or that at least a period of political tension is likely to precede the start of a war in the period under consideration.

16. We have no objections to the statement in the paper as it stands that a surprise atomic attack is the "most dangerous threat that the West has to face and that the Soviets would not jeopardise the attainment of surprise by any major pre-deployment of forces". We agree also that NATO plans should be based on this assumption that the Soviets will attempt to achieve surprise. But we feel that an effort should still be made to qualify this statement by an additional sentence to the effect that the Soviets will have difficulties in launching such a massive attack without our being able to obtain some warning, even if of very short duration, and every effort should be made to gain this vital information. The latter statement is in fact implicit in SACEUR's request for improved intelligence resources.

CONCLUSIONS

17. We conclude that:-

- (a) although the revised paper goes some way to meet the United Kingdom views we would still like the amendments indicated below to be incorporated. We feel that it should be left to Sir John Whiteley to decide how far they should be pressed. The amendments concern:-

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Annex "A" (concluded)

- (i) Naval Problems. It is unfortunate that the control of sea communications has been dealt with in a separate section of the paper and the importance of our ability to resupply our forces in Europe still requires more emphasis. The point that we must achieve command of the seas from the outset and maintain this naval supremacy needs to be made.
 - (ii) Authority to Use Nuclear Weapons Immediately. This basic military requirement should appear in the conclusions for consideration by the Council.
 - (iii) Warning of Attack. Mention should be made of the possibility of obtaining some warning.
 - (iv) Mention should be made of holding the Baltic exits.
- (b) The United States should be approached privately by the United Kingdom on the problem of giving SACEUR authority to use atomic weapons from the outset, so that a common line can be agreed before the Council is faced with this problem.

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ANNEX "B" TO
J.P.(54)86(Final)

DRAFT SIGNAL

FROM: MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, LONDON

TO : B.J.S.M., WASHINGTON

COS(W)

th October, 1954

for WHITELEY from CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Staff Paper on Most Effective Pattern of
NATO Military Strength

Reference: JW 141.

The Staff Paper, as redrafted, is an improvement on S.G. 241/3 and in general meets our views given to you at our 98th Meeting. We have pointed out below, however, some places in the paper where we would like amendments to be made.

2. Naval Problems. We feel that it is unfortunate that the control of sea communications has been dealt with in a separate section of the paper, and while we agree in general with this section we are still not satisfied that the remainder of the paper makes clear our view that the Allies must achieve and maintain command of the seas from the outset. On this depends our ability to continue to supply Europe in face of Russia's formidable sea power and to take advantage of any superiority gained in the initial phase. The demonstrable ability of the NATO powers to safeguard their vital sea communications is in itself part of the deterrent and forces capable of ensuring this must be included in our forces-in-being.

3. Baltic Exits. Mention of holding the Baltic exits should be made in paragraph 36.

- 6 -

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
Annex "B" (concluded)

4. Authority to Use Nuclear Weapons Immediately. We agree with the way in which this section (paragraph 22(a)) is amended, but since this requirement is fundamental to the whole new concept of operations in nuclear war, the approval of the Council will have to be obtained specifically to this proposal as the basis upon which Supreme Commanders will prepare their plans. This requirement should therefore appear in the conclusions of the paper.

5. Warning of Attack. We agree with the section of the paper (paragraph 10(b)) dealing with the likelihood of surprise attack, but we would still prefer that it was qualified by an additional sentence to the effect that the Soviets will have difficulties in launching such a massive attack without our being able to obtain some warning, however short, and every effort should be made to gain this vital information.

6. We realise that you may have difficulty in negotiating our points of view as above and only you can judge how far they should be pressed.

.....
Circulation:-



115/55

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OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1-5-55 10:11 a.m.
CORRECTED PAGE ONE

LMS:LQF

Control: 1705
Rec'd: January 5, 1955
6:49 p.m.

6-L

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FROM: Paris
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 2833, January 5, 8 p.m.



SENT DEPARTMENT 2833; REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 696, ROME 196
BONN 503, MOSCOW 257, BRUSSELS, HAGUE, LUXEMBOURG UNNUMBERED.

Embassy telegrams 1562, October 13, and 2438, December 8, 1954
and Embassy telegram 2819, January 5, 1955.

Course of assembly debate on Paris agreements indicates that,
while reasonable optimism continues to be warranted, ratifica-
tion is as yet far from assured.

We believe that idea of German rearmament has become increas-
ingly accepted and that assembly vote will tend to consolidate
this acceptance but that repugnance for it is still strong,
widespread and, more important, sentiment which most politicians
with eye on approaching elections are reluctant to back.

It is difficult to evaluate depth of desire and impatience for
talks with Russians. As our recent press telegrams have indi-
cated, press of all shades give impression that it has recently
been paramount in public mind. On other hand, it was rarely
mentioned in assembly corridors during debates. It probably
looms much larger in minds of many of Mendes entourage and
friends than among public generally.

How US and UK handle this problem will unquestionably have major
effect on ratification. Washington's silence and detached posi-
ture during recent months have obviously been far more effective
than any more active role. On other hand, Secretary's "agonizing
reappraisal" statement of year ago and recent British statement
that question, was not whether but how Germany would be rearmed
have both, while bitterly resented by French at time, continued
to have salutary effect. So has restraint of US Government in
batting down Russian gestures. Key reminder of Russian realities
is needed here but should certainly not come from US. Chomol
would be ideal source.

We believe that four numbered points in Embassy telegram 2438
continue to be applicable and suggest following additional one

(1) Discreet and unobtrusive reiteration, preferably by British

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that

Correction made
by D.C./Bent
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-2- 2833, January 5, 8 p.m., from Paris

that question is how rather than whether Germany is to be rearmed. In this connection, consideration might be given to leaking (at crucial time and preferably not (repeat not), before) preparations for urgent Dulles-Eden-Adenauer meeting had assembly voted otherwise.

(2) France's position in councils of great powers is also at stake.

(3) US, while continuing to regard Soviet intentions and danger as unchanged and determined to combat Russian propaganda efforts to undermine growing western strength of unity, is not (repeat not) being "dragged along" by French toward east-west talks but is, on contrary, sincerely anxious to develop possibilities of successful talks through careful preparation.

Naturally we should constantly stress that east-west talks are unthinkable prior to entry into effect of Paris agreements and our belief that, regardless of what Russians may say in meantime, prospects for successful talks will be greatly enhanced rather than diminished by their entry into effect.

DILLON

BJC/5

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Control: 1651
Rec'd: January 5, 1955
3:49 p. m.

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FROM: Paris

Info
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TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2832, January 5, 8 p. m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 2832 REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 695 BONN 502
ROME 195 MOSCOW 156 BRUSSELS, THE HAGUE, LUXEMBOURG UNNUMBERED.

Re EMBTEL 2819, January 5.

We believe Jebb overly optimistic in thinking demarche would
so put Russians on spot that either favorable or unfavorable
reply would facilitate ratification. On contrary we believe
that Russian reply either proposing meeting in very near future
or implying strongly they would refuse to attend meeting after
agreements entered into effect could be damaging here.

DILLON

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Department of State

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OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE
SECRET

Control: 2802

Rec'd: January 7, 1955
2:55 p.m.

FROM: Bonn

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1946, January 7, 4 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 1946; REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 437 MOSCOW
40 PARIS 453

Reference Paris telegram to Department 2847 repeated Bonn 507
London 699 Moscow 159

At diplomatic reception of President Heuss this morning, Chancellor mentioned to me Mendes-France's memorandum re talks with the Soviets. I subsequently, on confidential basis, showed him text of Paris 2847 to Department. Chancellor took strong exception to any unilateral action on part of France and said it would be disastrous to western unity and would render his position much more difficult and might well furnish an excuse for further delay in ratification by Bundestag. However, Blankenhorn quotes him as having no objection to a "well formulated" three-power approach to the Soviets in due course. It should be essential to state in the note that the conference could take place only after entry into force of the treaties and following extensive preparation through diplomatic channels. With reference to ratification, Blankenhorn said that the final debates in the Bundestag had been set for February 9, 10 and 11 and that, after a meeting with his coalition leaders yesterday, the Chancellor thought there would be no difficulty re a favorable vote for ratification.

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1 NOV 51

By *Evolution* 6.7.92

Historical Document, OAS, London, 1955

Address at Malta

25 Jan. 1955

The Possibility of War

1. Because of what has been achieved since 1948, the danger of war has receded.
Hot war is not likely today; it was likely in 1947. But if we weaken in the West, Communist tactics will be stepped up.

Military strength is necessary in peace, to give confidence to the peoples of the West. But war is a possibility so long as the world is split in two: with the aims of the two sides in direct and sometimes violent conflict.

Need for a global strategy

2. Unfortunately there is no agreed political policy or military strategy on a global scale.

There is only NATO.

No agreed policy or strategy in the Middle East, S.E. Asia, or Far East.

No aim or object, except to contain communism. That is a global problem and there is no global plan to achieve it.

NATO Strategy

3. In an East/West war, the West could not win unless it could operate freely its air and its sea power. Our strategy is therefore based on being able to operate freely and effectively our air power and sea power; and to protect with land forces the peoples and territories of the NATO nations while we gain the advantage in the war with our air power.

Monty Pp.
Ate "Visit to Malta, Italy" Jan 1955"

/Air Power ...

Air Power : Priority factor in modern war.
Must be used effectively.

Sea Power : If we cannot deploy in Europe the power
of the American continent, Europe would
fall.
Must control the oceans and major seas;
must cork up Baltic and Black Sea.

Land Forces: Must be able to hold the necessary land
areas, and prevent our bases being overrun
by enemy: and territories occupied.

Above strategy is based on holding, not liberating, and on wresting
the initiative from the enemy.

Without the initiative, we cannot win.

But there is a fourth factor. That factor is :-

Civil Defence. I do not like this term and it has lost
some of its hold on the population. We
need a new expression for it e.g. Civil
Preservation, or Human Existence.

The team is now four :

Air

Navy

Army

Civil Preservation.

Above four factors all inter-related, and all vital to survival in a
World War.

Some Basic Principles

4. Vital to understand and agree certain principles.

First

Nuclear weapons and the progress of science are going to have a tremendous impact on our current and future situation. Change is forced on us by the unprecedented power of the weapons.

Second

Major economic considerations force us to exploit this new source of destructive power in our defence. Without it we could not match the strength that could be brought against us. Also, Governments require adequate defence for less cost. By using nuclear weapons we can do with smaller land forces, but those we have must be more efficient and more immediately ready in peace.

Third

Ordinarily in the past, new weapons have been produced and issued between wars. It is difficult for the experienced commander to accept quickly and completely new weapons which involve radical changes in organisation, until he has seen, studied, and tested them. He is naturally reluctant to place full dependence on new and untried methods, which are probably inconsistent with his normal thought and experience.

But a study of history reveals one fact very clearly: victory goes to the nation which first accepted the new system, practised the new methods, and put them to the most effective use. This was clearly demonstrated by the Germans in World War II, and it took us four years to recover.

/5. Pattern of ...

Pattern of future War

5. With this general background, let us look at the future pattern of warfare.

We are in the midst of a revolution in military affairs, brought about by scientific advances in the development of nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them. These advances are still continuing and, as a result, the capability to destroy is rapidly reaching unprecedented proportions.

This can only result in certain changes in warfare.

What changes ?

The tempo of war

6. First and foremost there will be a change in the tempo of war.

In the past two wars we were faced with a long contest of attrition. The first phase lasted more than a year, in which we held the enemy and organised our manpower and production.

The second phase was one of embarking on decisive operations; this phase was of relatively long duration also.

Finally came exploitation, leading to victory in the field.

The total endeavour took four years or more.

In both cases we won the war, but made a sad mess of the peace and of subsequent events.

7. In a future war, stockpiles of nuclear weapons will provide the means for either side to enter the decisive phase on D Day, or very soon after.

Further, recent scientific developments make it probable that decisive operations will be completed in a matter of weeks: or even of days.

Exploitation may still be a long task. But the point I want to make is that the time period for decisive operations will be very short.

/8. You realise ...

8. You realise I am sure that today one jet fighter plane can deliver as much destructive force as the combined effort of 3000 of the largest World War II bombers - and this much more rapidly, in fact in a few minutes.

Also, that one modern bomber can deliver the explosive power equivalent to the total effort of all World War II bombers.

These facts point the road to the future.

9. The lesson is that in a future war it will be possible to expend, or have expended against us, tremendous military effort by relatively small forces which can be maintained readily in peace. This must have a material effect upon our defence organisation and preparations. A nation that is unprepared and unready, could be knocked out in a few hours.

Now as never before, real preparedness is vital to survival.

Readiness

10. Accepting this premis, it is clear we can no longer expect a period of grace during which we can organise and train reserve forces to be employed in the early stages of a war.
11. A study of all the factors involved in a war in which nuclear weapons are used, makes it clear that the events of the first few days or weeks will determine very largely the shape and course of the war after that period. The side which can give the advantage in those first days or weeks will be well placed to impose its will on the enemy and thus to influence the future course of the war in the way desired.

It is vital that we, the Western Powers, should gain that initial advantage in an East - West contest.

12. The forces which are essential for the conduct of operations during the first phase must be "in being" in peace, together with all the means

/to make ...

to make and keep them fully operational. This applies particularly to air forces, which are today the only means that can gain for us the early advantage by immediate offensive action.

If the forces are not "in being" in peace it is probable that our industrial potential will be destroyed and the required forces will never get produced.

If the forces are in being in peace, and are adequate, then an attack on our industrial potential can not result in immediate defeat - since the enemy could not afford to disregard those forces and attack our industrial potential only.

Command and Control

13. Because of the increased tempo of war, we must be able to execute our plans with speed and efficiency. We need a system of command and control which will ensure that our offensive power can be launched and sustained.

The side that "executes" the most effectively will win.

During the exchange of nuclear weapons, the dominating factors will be the ability to survive damage, to re-group, and to re-strike.

The time element will be most critical.

This will place high priority on communications, and on the mobility of all units - air, sea and ground.

The time element will place a particularly high premium on the effective command and control of air forces.

Surprise

14. We must not allow the enemy to surprise us.

It is easy to realise that with the nuclear fire-power available today, one well executed surprise attack could almost put us out of business on D - Day.

/We must ...

We must ensure that with the intelligence means at our disposal, the enemy cannot launch a decisive surprise attack.

There are two kinds of warning we need.

Strategic warning, which will tell us that war is probable, but it will not necessarily give us the exact indication D - Day or H - Hour.

Tactical warning, which comes from radar and other means, and should give us some hours warning before bombs are actually dropped.

Both kinds of warning are necessary for survival.

D - Day Survival

15. We must so arrange our military strength that we will be able to launch our offensive power within the period provided by the tactical warning.

It is natural to place undue emphasis on purely defensive measures as a means of survival. But it is quite possible to expend resources on defence to a degree where our actual overall military strength will suffer: i.e. offensive power launched from a secure base.

The winning combination must have the power balance between the required defensive measures and the necessary offensive power.

Our defensive measures are firstly a hedge against failing to receive adequate tactical warning, and secondly a means to limit damage to a manageable scale.

The main objective will always be to wrest the initiative from the enemy as soon as possible - preferably at H - Hour.

The War in Europe

16. Against this background we have to fit ourselves to fight the war in Europe. This war must be viewed as a whole, as one war, and not as individual conflicts by the various Services.

There is no such thing as an air war, a land war, or a naval war, e.g.

there is war in the air but not an air war. On the contrary, operations by air, sea and land simply constitute various aspect of the overall war in Europe.

Tasks to destroy the opposing forces and the enemy means of making war, will be undertaken by the component arms which are designed and equipped for the purpose and which together constituted a team under SACEUR.

Insofar as Allied Command Europe is concerned, there is only one team.

Command of the Air

17. Stated broadly, the military goal of the Western World is to neutralise the enemy's offensive capability as soon as possible after the war has begun. Allied global strategy is designed first to smash the enemy air power. Let us then discuss that problem.

Our first task, the first principle of our strategy, is to win command of the air. This task will be so difficult and so vital that it will be necessary to devote all available air resources to its accomplishment until it is clear that the situation will resolve in our favour.

18. The most effective approach to this object will be to concentrate our attack against his air base system i.e. his aircraft, airfields, personnel, and all the facilities which directly support operations. We will destroy numbers of aircraft on the ground and will damage others. By sustaining our attack we will force him to operate under increasingly unfavourable conditions. His operational losses will mount, and his control and logistics will become strained. Further attrition will be achieved by our air defence forces.

The enemy of course will be attacking us in the same way.

/It is through ...

It is through a superior capability to execute operations in the face of the difficulties I have described, that we expect to win.

19. If we fail to win command of the air, we lose the war - and lose it quickly. That is my very firm belief.

The influence of Sea Power

20. While we are fighting to win command of the air, two other tasks have to be carried out.

We must prevent the enemy land forces from occupying the territories of the NATO nations. I will not discuss that problem today.

We must ensure control of the oceans and seas, so that convoys can cross the Atlantic, traverse the Mediterranean, and deliver to the NATO land and air forces in Europe all they need to conduct the struggle, and also to give us increased flexibility in the conduct of operations.

Nothing so far invented, including stockpiling, can do away with the vital need to deploy in Europe the power of the American continent, and that could not be done if we lost control of the seas.

Later on, we may see a great air transport system developed which will help in the transport of our means of existence and of waging war. But that day is not yet in sight. As things stand today, if you sailors lose control of the seas - we would be done.

/Air Transport ...

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00330-00331

Control: 3922
Rec'd: JULY 8, 1955
10:27 P.M.

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FROM: PARIS

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 120, JULY 8, 9 P.M.

SENT DEPARTMENT 120, REPEATED INFORMATION BONN 3, LONDON
DEPARTMENT PASS DEFENSE.
FROM BEAM.

AT FIRST PLENARY MEETING TODAY GREWE GAVE DETAILED EXPLANATION OF BONN WORKING GROUP REPORT ON EDEN PLAN, WHICH WILL BE REFERRED TO GOVERNMENTS FOR APPROVAL. BRIEF REFERENCE TO MAIN POINTS OF REVISION OF EDEN PLAN WILL BE INCORPORATED IN GERMAN UNIFICATION SECTION OF PARIS GROUP'S REPORT.

REST OF MEETING DEVOTED TO ELUCIDATION OF PROCEDURAL POINTS (AS AGREED IN WASHINGTON W.G. REPORT) FOR BENEFIT OF BLANKENHORN AND EXTENDED DISCUSSION OF RELATION OF GERMAN UNIFICATION AND EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES.

THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT GERMAN PROBLEM CAN NOT BE SEPARATED FROM EUROPEAN SECURITY PROBLEM. BRITISH, HOWEVER, QUERIED POSSIBILITY OF PROGRESSING WITH BOTH PROBLEMS "AT SAME TIME", SINCE WE HAVE A PUBLISHED (EDEN) PLAN ON GERMAN REUNIFICATION WHEREAS THERE IS AS YET NOT AGREED PLAN ON SECURITY. BRITISH FELT THAT IF SOVIETS WERE COY ABOUT DISCUSSING GERMANY, THERE WOULD BE ADVANTAGE IN PRESSING GERMAN REUNIFICATION ISSUE FOR ITSELF. WE SUGGESTED THAT GERMAN UNIFICATION SHOULD BE PRESSED AS MOST URGENT ISSUE AT GENEVA ALTHOUGH WE DOUBTED WHETHER THERE WOULD BE MUCH OPPORTUNITY TO GET INTO DETAILS OF THIS QUESTION, MUCH LESS SECURITY QUESTION. WE COULD, HOWEVER, URGE THAT WORK ON BOTH PROBLEMS BE REMITTED TO THE FOREIGN MINISTERS, WHICH WOULD PERMIT A MORE DETAILED STUDY AND CONSULTATION WITH ALLIES NECESSARY ESPECIALLY RE SECURITY. TACTICS AT SUBSEQUENT MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS

WOULD BE

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-2- 120, JULY 8, 9 P.M., FROM PARIS

WOULD BE DIRECTED TOWARDS PRESSING FORWARD SIMULTANEOUSLY ON BOTH POINTS.

FRENCH, BRITISH AND GERMANS DID NOT DISAGREE WITH THIS POSITION, BUT FELT THAT IT WOULD NOT MEET PROBLEM THAT WOULD BE PRESENTED IF SOVIETS TOOK INITIATIVE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY SCHEME, PERHAPS SKIPPING OVER THE UNIFICATION PROBLEM. FELT THAT IT WOULD THEN BE NECESSARY FOR WEST TO HAVE POSITIVE RESPONSE, PERHAPS IN NATURE OF STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES (AS BLANKENHORN SUGGESTED) OR SUMMARY OUTLINE OF WEST SECURITY PLAN (AS BRITISH AND FRENCH PROPOSED). THEY OBSTENSIBLY AGREED THAT IF STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES WERE PRESENTED AT GENEVA, IT WOULD NOT BE FOR PURPOSE OBTAINING AGREEMENT THEN AND THERE BUT AS INDICATION OF LIMITS WITHIN WHICH WEST PREPARED TO EXAMINE SECURITY PROBLEM AT SUBSEQUENT CONFERENCE. FRENCH CHAIRMAN COMMENTED THAT UNLESS WE HAVE AT LEAST THIS MUCH, WE WOULD BE GOING TO GENEVA WITH EMPTY HAND AND POCKET. WE EMPHASIZED THAT ANY GENERAL DISCUSSION POSSIBLE WITHIN GENEVA TIME LIMITS SHOULD BE CONFINED TO SCOPE NECESSARY TO IDENTIFY PROBLEM FOR FURTHER STUDY. WITHIN THIS CONTEXT ELEMENTS WESTERN SECURITY POSITION SUCH AS THOSE OUTLINED PAGE 16 WASHINGTON W.G. REPORT MIGHT BE CONSIDERED. HEADS OF DELEGATIONS MEETING TOMORROW MORNING FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION THIS SUBJECT.

DILLON

WW

NOTE: PASSED DEFENSE 7/9/55, 5 A.M. WLB

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12/16/55

German Unity

THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR told me yesterday that he wished to make a particularly confidential communication to me on this subject. I would recollect that I had told him on my return from Geneva that I had come to the conclusion that we might eventually have to be more elastic than the Americans were prepared to be and that we might have to move to a position in which we declared that provided Germany was unified by means of free elections and provided the unified German Government had freedom in domestic and foreign affairs, we should sign any reasonable security treaty with the Russians.

2. The Ambassador told me that he had discussed this possibility very confidentially with the Chancellor. Dr. Adenauer wished me to know that he would deprecate reaching this position. The bald reason was that Dr. Adenauer had no confidence in the German people. He was terrified that when he disappeared from the scene a future German Government might do a deal with Russia at the German expense. Consequently he felt that the integration of Western Germany with the West was more important than the unification of Germany. He wished us to know that he would bend all his energies towards achieving this in the time which was left to him, and he hoped that we would do all in our power to sustain him in this task.

3. In making this communication to me the Ambassador naturally emphasised that the Chancellor wished me to know his mind, but that it would of course be quite disastrous to his political position if the views which he had expressed to me with such frankness ever became known in Germany.

J. Phillips

December 16, 1955.

I think it is better

HM

Germany / reported in Beschleunigung
from copy

ref 4/88

6/29/56

FORM D. 1146 60m 276 P. 1. Op. 1146-1

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CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX

TO

C.O.S. (56) 63RD MEETING HELD ON
FRIDAY, 29TH JUNE, 1956

2. NATO STRATEGY AND LEVEL OF FORCES

JP(56)120(Final)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a report prepared by the Joint Planning Staff for use as a military brief by the United Kingdom representative to the NATO Council on the proposed review of NATO strategy.

LORD MOUNTBATTEN said that although he had agreed with the decision taken by the Chiefs of Staff a year ago to give preparations for global war the lowest priority, he had never agreed, nor could he now agree, to dropping these preparations altogether, although such a decision would not in fact greatly influence the shape and size of the Navy to which we were now running down. In the proceedings of the Policy Review Committee, however, there were implications that all preparations for global war could be dropped. This was a matter of grave concern to the Board of Admiralty. If this thought were pursued too far, the Admiralty would require to be absolved of their traditional responsibility of safeguarding the seaborne supplies of the country. A limited war could possibly spread gradually without the moment ever being reached when Governments decided to use thermonuclear weapons. In these circumstances the Russians might be tempted to try to achieve victory by a major submarine offensive. They would not do this so long as they were convinced that the allied anti-submarine organisation remained adequate.

Although the paper itself was logically argued, its successful use as a brief in the NATO Council would have the effect of virtually abolishing all NATO navies except for United States striking fleet and its minor United Kingdom component. The destruction of long standing NATO naval co-operation and the abolition of SACLAN and COMCHAN might

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(u)

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U.K. EYES ONLY

in themselves bring down NATO. With our present reduced forces we relied on our existence in war on the assistance of our NATO allies. He did not consider that the paper in its present form should go to Ministers, but it should be re-written taking into account not solely military logic but all factors which might affect the future of NATO as an effective alliance.

SIR GERALD TEMPLER said that he agreed with the First Sea Lord about the effect on NATO of the naval reductions considered in the paper. He thought that the Chiefs of Staff were being pushed into a dangerous position by being forced for economic reasons into the hurried acceptance of a concept which they were not sure about. He felt that the first requirement was that some authority, presumably the Standing Group, should direct that the Russian threat to Europe should be analysed afresh. He himself thought that too much reliance was being placed on the theory that any Russian aggression in Europe would be met by a decision to use thermo-nuclear weapons. It was clear that these weapons would be used if indeed there were direct Russian aggression in Europe. That event was therefore most unlikely. It was quite possible, however, that some form of aggression by proxy might take place, such as an attempted East German occupation of Berlin. In such circumstances he did not think that any Ministers would take the decision to embark on thermo-nuclear warfare. We now therefore had to consider for the first time the possibility of a limited war in Europe in which we should need conventional forces from all three Services.

SIR DERMOT BOYLE said that he agreed largely with the First Sea Lord and the C.I.G.S. and felt that the paper failed to face the real issue which was whether we wanted to maintain large forces on the continent of Europe or not. The present NATO strategy was based on this concept, but it had failed in that the force levels laid down to implement it had never been reached and in the economic position of the European allies never could be reached. He therefore handed to Committee members a proposed revision of the first fourteen paragraphs of the brief in which the argument in favour of the "trip-wire" concept of ground defence in Europe was stated.

LORD HOOD (Foreign Office) said that it was intended to broach this matter with the German and French Governments as soon as the considered views of the United States and Canada had been received. These were expected within about fourteen days. It was then hoped to hold a Four Power meeting in July in order to prepare a paper for the Council. If the Chiefs of Staff, could give an estimate of the order of magnitude of the forces required by the new concept, it would be helpful even if these figures were only for United Kingdom consumption.

There was considerable urgency for action in this matter as, apart from our own economic reasons, there was considerable feeling throughout NATO that there was now less risk of a global war starting in Europe and that there was a thought that our present concept was unrealistic and that NATO strategy in Europe should be revised.

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U.K. EYES ONLY

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COPY NO. 34

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

CORRIGENDUM

TO

CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX

C.O.S. (56) 63RD MEETING, MINUTE 2

PAGE 2, STATEMENT BY SIR DERMOT BOYLE

Paragraph 5. Delete from "SIR DERMOT BOYLE" to "but it had failed", and substitute:

"SIR DERMOT BOYLE said that he agreed with much of what the First Sea Lord and the C.I.G.S. had said, but he considered that the main reason why the paper was unsatisfactory was because it tended to obscure inter-Service disagreement on strategic policy, and failed to face the real issue which was whether we wanted to maintain large forces on the continent of Europe, or not. The present N.A.T.O. strategy was based on the concept of large forces, but it had failed to some extent in that"

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

6TH JULY, 1956

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U.K. EYES ONLY

In discussion THE COMMITTEE agreed that:-

- (a) It was essential that no action should be taken by the United Kingdom which would have the effect of disrupting or weakening NATO with the possible resultant loss of the United States as an intimate and consulting ally.
- (b) That they would meet in private to reconsider and redraft the paper in the light of the amendments handed round by the Chief of the Air Staff and any comments to be circulated by the First Sea Lord and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
- (c) As it would be valuable to know SACEUR's reaction to the British proposals, it would be useful if they could discuss the matter with Field Marshal Montgomery at an informal meeting during his visit to this country next week.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (1) Invited the First Sea Lord and Chief of the Imperial General Staff to circulate their comments as agreed at (b) above.
- (2) Invited the Principal Staff Officer to the Chairman to make arrangements for their meeting as agreed at (c) above.
- (3) Instructed the Secretary to arrange a meeting in accordance with (b) above.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

29TH JUNE, 1956.

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U.K. EYES ONLY

AIR 8/2084 (h)

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MO 1/P(56)210

NATO STRATEGY AND LEVEL OF FORCES

Note by VCIGS

38/po

1. The arguments put forward to reduce the level of NATO forces are based on an assumption that the nuclear weapon will inevitably be used from the outset of any aggression and that there can be no limited war in Europe.

2. There is a danger that an incorrect deduction may be drawn from the build up of huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons by both the USA and Russia. The implications of nuclear war on a basis of parity between these two great Powers is now well appreciated. Whereas the American people might have been prepared to initiate a nuclear attack on China at a time when there was little fear of retaliation, there must at least be doubt that they would do so now. [It is hard to believe that a country such as America would willingly initiate the destruction of civilisation, as we know it, unless their own immediate and easily recognised interests were threatened. It is almost certainly true that Russia feels the same.]

3. Whereas the aims of the Allies are defensive, those of the USSR remain World Communism under the dominant influence of Russia. On the assumption that Russia does not want nuclear war we must expect that she would attempt to achieve her purpose by means which would not be interpreted as a direct threat to the USA. A step in this direction could for example be covert support for an East German "liberation" of the Federal Republic declared as a purely German affair. If successful it would have disastrous repercussions throughout Western Europe.

4. In spite of the supposed change in political climate, there is no evidence of Soviet intention to foresake armed force as a means of imposing their policy on neighbours. Our present information is that adequate offensive capability of up to date conventional forces is still maintained by both Russia and her Satellites suitably deployed for action against the West.

Build up West of Force "W"

5. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that there is no short cut to reducing the requirement of NATO nations for collective defence. We have failed to reach agreement on Disarmament because we could not secure proper safeguards for supervision. Yet the present proposal to reduce the NATO level of forces is a unilateral weakening of the defence capability of the West without any corresponding undertaking, let alone supervised guarantee, from the East.

6. Although the deterrent to nuclear war remains so long as the USA and Russia possess the nuclear weapon on the present scale, yet the possibility of aggression which is not answered by a Nuclear retort can no longer be completely ignored. The likelihood of such aggression may well increase as the stockpiles build up and the weapons become more powerful. NATO must therefore maintain a proper strength of up to date forces in being on the continent capable of preventing the encroachment of Soviet supported Satellites on their neighbours. < The UK must be prepared to make her fair contribution to this NATO commitment. The character and size of this contribution, however, will undoubtedly need adjustment if in the context of limited an attack without warning is judged to be less likely and if administrative support from the UK base is thought to be possible.>

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WO
Master

7. It is suggested therefore that the Chiefs of Staff should advise Ministers that the UK Government should go no further at the present stage than to invite the NATO Council to review the threat in the light of current conditions and of Soviet bloc deployments, and to report on any adjustments considered practicable to the strategic concept in Europe and to force requirements. The Chiefs of Staff would then be in a position to advise on whether the UK is bearing an undue proportion of the force requirements and how economies can be achieved.

8. I believe that this is the military advice which we should give to Ministers at the moment.

The War Office,
3rd July, 1956.

1. U.S. statement July
2. Any conventional aggression in Europe is our intention.
3. Do not agree that we should be prepared to fight a conventional war in Europe thereby ensuring defeat.

4. Economic

5. Air

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Copy No. 2 of 4

From: Lieutenant-General Sir William Oliver, KCB, OBE.

(UCIGS)

CIGS/BM/53/7743

10 July, 1956.

C.A.S.

PERSONAL COPY

In answer to the proposal made in your letter to CAS dated the 9th July, I am circulating the attached amendments to COS(56)259.

2. You will see that the two major points I would like to see cleared in the paper are as follows:

(a) The brief does not bring out that the Russian "Switching of Methods" (Para.1(e)) has not reduced the conventional threat facing the West. There is military justification for changing the concept to take account of the reduced likelihood of Global War, but the new concept must take care of the residual threat short of Nuclear War. There is no evidence that the Soviet offensive potential is in any way lessened by the recently proclaimed reductions in Soviet forces. In fact our appreciation is that the Soviet and Satellite forces now deployed facing the West are more powerful than they have ever been. I do not believe that this particular point is controversial and I have included an amendment to para. 2 to cover it.

(b) I think there may well be a serious difference between the Air Ministry and the War Office on the extent of the residual threat for which we need to provide. I regard it as necessary that the residual threat should be dealt with in para. 8 of the brief which is headed "The Effect of the Thermo-Nuclear Bomb". You will see in the proposed amendment the War Office view on this matter. To my mind this is a key feature of the brief and until the difference has been resolved it will not be possible to make further progress in drafting. I believe that if we write down this threat we shall be playing the Russian game and seriously endangering the safety of the West as well as the stability of NATO.

3. You will of course realise that the above are my own views and that C.I.G.S. has not yet had an opportunity of commenting on our previous discussions.

4. I am copying this minute to CAS and to General Stirling.

W. P. Oliver

Admiral the Right Honourable the Earl Mountbatten of Burma,
KG, GCB, GCSI, GCIE, GCVO, DSO, LL.D, DCL, DSc,
The First Sea Lord, The Admiralty, London, S.W.1.

Copy to: Air Chief Marshal Sir Dermot Boyle, KCVO, KBE, CB, AFC,
Chief of the Air Staff, Air Ministry, London, S.W.1.

Major-General W.G. Stirling, CBE, DSO,
Principal Staff Officer to Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee,
Ministry of Defence, Storey's Gate, London, S.W.1.

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APPENDIX

AMENDMENTS TO ANNEX II TO COS(56)259

1. Para 2. Delete first sentence and substitute the following:-

"There is no evidence that the Soviet offensive potential is in any way lessened by the recently proclaimed reductions in Soviet forces. In fact our appreciation is that the Soviet and Satellite forces now deployed facing the West are more powerful than they have ever been. We agree that there is a need to recast NATO strategy to take into account the reduced likelihood of Global War. The new concept, however, must provide against the residual threat short of Nuclear War."

2. Para 3. Second sub-para, second line, insert after "years" the following clause:- "although insufficient to meet the concept in full".

3. Para 7. Line 6 - delete from (inclusive) "maintaining" to the end of the para and substitute the following:- "Building up of such costly forces must be questioned".

4. Para 8. Second sub-para. Delete from third sentence inclusive to end of para and substitute the following:-

"When both sides approach parity and the development of the long range ballistic rocket makes AMERICA and RUSSIA equally vulnerable to devastating destruction, the possibility that the weapon will not be used anyway at the outset of an aggression, cannot be ignored. Since it is certain that Russia's long term aim will remain the same she may well then seek to achieve it by methods which do

not appear a direct threat to AMERICA. In these circumstances AMERICA may not be prepared to commit herself to nuclear war unless she recognises that her own safety is threatened. Thus in the era of nuclear parity or saturation a war by proxy developing into a limited war in EUROPE will become more likely".

5. Para 12. Delete from second sentence inclusive to end of para and substitute the existing text of para 14 with following amendments added before second sentence of text of para 14:- "On the assumption that there would be a period of warning or tension before such an attack". With this amendment para 12 would then read:-

"12. The present task of SACEUR's M-day forces is to detect and delay Russian attacks. Whereas today the NATO land forces are required to conduct sustained operations against a full scale Russian assault, under the proposed new concept they would need to be capable of fighting a limited war to defend NATO territory against aggression by a satellite power supported covertly by the Soviet Union. On the assumption that there would be a period of warning or tension before such an attack, this would result in considerable organisational and administrative savings. Such forces would also be sufficient to prove aggression in the event of direct Soviet attack or deal with local infiltration."

6. Renumber paras 15 and 16 to read 14 and 15.

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CIRCULATED FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF

J.P. (56)132 (Final)

10th August, 1956

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

JOINT PLANNING STAFF

OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC AREA

Report by the Joint Planning Staff

1. In anticipation of instructions* we have examined a draft paper^o on the Overall Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Area. The comments of the Chiefs of Staff on this draft paper are required by Standing Group by 15th August, 1956, so that the paper can be processed through the Military Representatives Committee in time to be taken by the Military Committee in October.

2. In the preparation of our report which is at Annex, we have taken account of proposed amendments^o, submitted by Supreme Commanders on the draft paper.

Recommendation

3. We recommend that if the Chiefs of Staff approve our Report they should send the signal at Appendix to B.J.S.M. Washington.

(Signed) D.S.S. O'CONNOR
L.W. NAPIER
J.H. GRESWELL

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

+ COS(56)71st Meeting, Item 2
© IFT 131/20 (Fourth Revised Final Draft)
& SHAPE 167/56, SACLANT Serial 915, CHANSEC 56/164

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Annex to J.F.(56)132 (Final)

OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFENCE
OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC AREA

INTRODUCTION

1. It has been decided to revise and re-edit the following NATO documents in order to eliminate certain repetition and duplication:-

- (a) The Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Treaty Area (MC3/5).
- (b) Strategic Guidance (MC14/1).
- (c) The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years (MC48 and MC48/1).

2. These documents are then to be issued as follows:-

- (a) The Overall Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Area (MC14/2). The draft^o of this paper is under examination and comprises those parts of the documents referred to in paragraph 1 above which relate to basic principles and the probable nature of war.
- (b) Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept (MC48/2). The contents of this document will comprise the remainder of the MC48 papers which relate to "minimum measures". It will be circulated in draft form for national comment in due course.

3. Admiral Denny has pointed out^o that the revisions are mainly editorial and that no "new look" is involved. He suggests that so long as the NATO Council instructions to the military authorities remain unchanged neither the strategic concept nor the measures to implement it are susceptible to material alterations. He appreciates that final action by the Military Committee and NATO Council on this paper may be overtaken by events.

AIM

4. The aim of this paper is to examine and comment on the draft paper^o "The Overall Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Area".

THE PAPER

5. The draft sets out the overall strategic concept for the defence of the North Atlantic Area and substantially consists of edited extracts from the NATO papers referred to in paragraph 1 above which have already been approved by the Chiefs of Staff. It deals with the subject under the following headings:-

@ IPT 134/20 (Fourth Revised Final Draft)
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Annex (Continued)

Section I	Preamble North Atlantic Defence Principles
Section II	The Probable Nature of a Future War ✓
Section III	Influence of Soviet Bloc Activities in Areas Adjacent to NATO
Section IV	The Strategic Concept ✓
Appendix	Area Planning Guidance
Annex	Geographical Definitions

6. There are however some changes in context. Those of importance are as follows:-

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- (a) The inclusion of Section III which states that NATO countries must co-operate in the preparation of plans to oppose the growth of Soviet influence in those non-NATO countries as yet outside the Soviet orbit.
 - (b) The inclusion of the Annex on geographical definitions of areas used in the strategic concept and area planning guidance.
 - (c) The previous reference (MC48, paragraph 6) to the "remote possibility" that Russia might attempt to overrun Western Europe with conventional weapons only, has been omitted.
 - (d) The previous statement (MC48, paragraph B) that in a war within "the next few years", NATO superiority in atomic weapons and its capability to deliver them should provide a major advantage in the initial phase, while leaving a number for use in the subsequent phase, has been dropped.
 - (e) Emphasis is no longer placed on the need for mobilising second line formations (MC44/1, paragraph 12). It is now only stated that provision must be made for subsequent operations.

7. The remaining alterations that are not editorial are designed to bring the paper up to date in the light of recent political developments, such as the signing of the Austrian peace treaty, the advent of the Baghdad Pact, the evacuation of the canal zone and the uncertain attitude of Yugoslavia.

Our Comments

- (8) The Chiefs of Staff have recently agreed^d that our aim is to persuade NATO to accept our concept of the need to concentrate on building up a strong deterrent with a

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minimum of essential sea and ground forces in support and that we do not necessarily accept either the present NATO strategy as being the most suitable and effective in present circumstances or the present NATO pattern of defence planning. In the meantime, however, pending the reappraisal of NATO strategy, we comment on the paper solely in its relation to the current NATO doctrine.

9. We consider that the paper fairly reflects the various changes that have taken place since the previous papers were issued and that it is acceptable as a statement of the current NATO strategy.

SUPREME COMMANDERS COMMENTS

SACEUR

10. SACEUR has submitted amendments designed to improve the draft and to highlight the following:-

- (a) The fact that NATO forces provide a deterrent as well as a means of defence.
- (b) The importance of the maintenance of order and morale on the home fronts.
- (c) The likelihood that any Soviet attack would take the maximum advantage of surprise.
- (d) The probability that organised major conflict would not last longer than about one month and that the second phase involving reorganisation, rehabilitation and operations of a limited nature would also not be of long duration.
- (e) The importance of the atomic retaliatory force.

11. SACEUR however objects to the inclusion of Section III, "Influence of Soviet Bloc Activities in Areas Adjacent to NATO", on the grounds that it is not appropriate to a military paper.

Our Comments

12. SACEUR's amendments do not propose any radical change in the strategic concept and we consider that their incorporation would on the whole improve the paper.

13. As regards SACEUR's objection to the inclusion of Section III, we feel that to dismiss it solely on the grounds that it is a political matter is to underrate its fundamental bearing on the military policy of NATO. The United States have however reserved their position regarding the acceptance of this section, which was originally included at the request of the French.

/ SHAPE/167/56

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SACLANT

14. SACLANT in his proposed amendments¹ suggests inter alia a change in strategic concept. Whilst supporting the maintenance of the deterrent he suggests the paper should include reference to the possibility that NATO might be faced with a limited war with Russia and should therefore have available sufficient conventional forces to serve as a deterrent to this form of war.

*As Amended
in Ex*

Our Comments

15. We consider that no attempt should be made to incorporate new strategic policy into this draft paper, since a complete review of NATO strategy is to be undertaken shortly. Discussion of such aspects should therefore be avoided on the grounds that they are premature.

CHANCOM

16. CHANCOM has submitted² an editorial revision of the proposed Area Planning Guidance for the English Channel and the North Sea, emphasising the importance of this area as a terminal for the support of the overall strategy.

Our Comment

17. We have no objections to this amendment.

CUSRFG

18. No comments are being submitted by CUSRFG.

CONCLUSION

19. We conclude that:-

- (a) The draft paper is acceptable as a statement of current NATO strategy.
- (b) In considering the amendments proposed by Supreme Commanders, the Standing Group should accept appropriate editorial revisions, but should reject those amendments proposed by SACLANT which materially alter the strategic concept.

¹ SACLANT Serial 915
² CHANSEC 56/169

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Appendix to Annex to
J.P.(56)132 (Final)

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DRAFT SIGNAL

FROM: MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, LONDON
TO: B.J.S.M., WASHINGTON

ROUTINE

COS(W)

August, 1956

For DENNY from Chiefs of Staff.

Subject: Revision of Basic Strategic Guidance ✓

Reference: IPT 131/20 (4th Revised Final Draft)

MD 5

1. As a re-edition based upon the current NATO concept, and subject to the need for further revision if and when this concept is changed, the paper is acceptable.
2. We have no objection to any of the detailed amendments proposed by SACEUR and CHANCON (SHAPE 167/56 and CHANSEC 56/164) and feel that they would tend to improve the paper. We do however, consider that the new Section III proposed by the French has a useful place in the paper.
3. When SACLANT's comments (SACLANT Serial 915) are discussed in SGN you can accept minor amendments but you should oppose the inclusion of his views on the possibility of the Russians launching a limited war against NATO, on the grounds that they introduce new thoughts into the current concept which is, in any case, due for complete review in the near future when the "new look" is being evolved. If you are unsuccessful in this, and SACLANT's views are considered in SGN, you should indicate that we reserve our position on this point. ✓

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N.A.T.O. Reappraisal - Military Strategic Concept
and New Political Directive

The following is a summary of the present state of play of the N.A.T.O. reappraisal to serve as background to the C.O.S. Committee meeting with Admiral Denny on Tuesday, 9th October.

Military Strategic Concept

2. The principal paper under discussion at the meeting will be J.P.(56) 150 (Final) which concerns the handling of I.P.T.131/20 (6th Revised Final Draft) (draft MC 14/2) in the Standing Group and subsequently in the Military Committee on 18th October.

3. For some months it has been the intention that I.P.T.131/20 should form the basis of the Military strategic guidance which would be issued by the Military Committee as M.C.14/2 to replace the outmoded strategic guidance issued in 1952 in M.C.14/1.

4. In the course of processing in the Standing Group I.P.T. 131/20 has taken the title of "Overall Strategic Concept for the Defence of the N.A.T.O. area".

5. In M.D.5 on 13th July, 1956, Admiral Denny summarised the Standing Group's intentions to produce two papers as follows:-

- (a) The draft M.C.14/2 as described above, incorporating those parts of M.C.3/5, 14/1, 48 and 48/1, which relate to basic principles and the probable nature of war.
- (b) A draft M.C.48/2, incorporating those other parts of the M.C.48 series relating to minimum measures, entitled "Measures to implement the Strategic Concept".

The emphasis was laid on both papers consisting of re-editing of old papers and it was understood that no "new look" would be involved.

6. The C.O.S. Committee gave their last guidance on M.C. 14/2 in C.O.S.(W) 62 on the 16th August when the 4th Revised Final Draft of I.P.T.131/20 was considered. C.O.S.(W) 62 re-emphasised the nature of M.C.14/2 as a re-editing of old ideas and resisted the inclusion of SACLANT's ideas of the possibility of a limited war between N.A.T.O. and Russia. It permitted, however, the inclusion of the French ideas concerning Russian activity outside the N.A.T.O.area in a new Section III of the paper.

7. The 6th Revised Final Draft which you will now be considering includes both SACLANT's and the French ideas in Section III for the reasons explained in Admiral Denny's signal M.D.33. This version of I.P.T.131/20 has been issued to all nations through the Military Representatives Committee and advance comments to the Standing Group have been asked for by 11th October.

Item 7 (1/10/61)
8. Z.O.890 received on 3rd October informed us that I.P.T.178/68 (Preliminary Draft), which is a first draft of M.C.48/2 "Measures to implement the Strategic Concept", was on the way from Washington as Admiral Denny wished to discuss this paper at your meeting on Tuesday. The papers have arrived but we have not yet fully studied them.

9. To complete the picture on the military rethinking, it is necessary to mention that long range planning teams at SHAPE and at SACLANT's H.Q. have been engaged on studies concerning the pattern of forces required by the N.A.T.O. Supreme Commanders up to about 1965. It is believed that the Supreme Commanders have virtually drafted for themselves new political directives to serve as a basis for their military studies. We have seen the kind of political background SACEUR has been using (D.SAC.1705/7 dated 10th September, 1956), but we can only guess where SACLANT is concerned. It seems however that SACLANT must have been using a background of the possibility of limited war between N.A.T.O. and Russia and the magnitude of the Russian S/M threat in that case as a basis for the maintenance of the allied navies at least at their present strength. SACEUR's paper - of which only three copies were received in the U.K. - has not yet been fully studied. The importance of this paper can not however be overestimated as a large part of the N.A.T.O. Council considers SACEUR as the final word in military advice irrespective of SACLANT, the Standing Group and the Military Committee, and will chop anything so long as SACEUR considers it all right.

*Now in
As Ministry.
I will speak to
CNS.*

/Political Directive

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Political Directive (proposed by the U.K. and formerly called loosely "The NATO REappraisal")

10. The final draft of the N.A.T.O. Council's political directive, which has been prepared in the U.K. was transmitted to Sir Roger Makins in Foreign Office Telegrams Nos. 4555 and 4556 on 2nd October, 1956.

11. The final draft differs in phrasing, but not in substance, from the draft agreed by the Chiefs of Staff at their 94th meeting on 18th September 1956.

12. It seems that Telegram 4555 may be ambitious in hoping for U.S. agreement to the draft directive at an early date. The tabling of the directive in the Council may therefore depend on unilateral action by the U.K. and the date given of Mid-October assumes considerable importance vis-a-vis the date of the Military Committee on the 18th October.

The Middle

13. Telegram No.698 Saving from Paris on 27th September, amplified in Admiral Denny's M.D.36 indicated that the Council is getting into a complete state of muddle over the N.A.T.O. reappraisal in its widest sense. They were summoning as a matter of urgency a number of Military Studies, none of which can be presented to them with a common up to date political basis. It almost seems as though the Council had hoped to rubber stamp the new military papers as an alternative to facing the difficult task of furnishing a new political directive to the military authorities.

14. In M.D.48 the Standing Group refused the Council's request for the early forwarding of these papers in draft form. We entirely agree with this, because if the Council's request had been acceded to it would have received papers in the following state:

- (i) Draft M.C.14/2. A supposed re-editing of existing strategic concepts based on an out of date political background into which have crept two new ideas (in Section III) which have no accepted political or military backing.
- (ii) SACEUR's study. An independent study of force requirements based on an independent, but unauthorised, new political background.

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- (iii) SACLANE's study. The same as (ii) above but the political background probably quite different in concept to SACEUR's.

The Future

15. If events, as now poised, are allowed to run on, it seems that the following may happen:-

A. In the Council

- (i) At a date in October (possibly 15th) the U.K. will table its draft political directive, possibly without prior U.S. and probably without French or German agreement.

Surely not - the directive is, it should be, the political foundation for military planning - not vice versa.

- (ii) The Council, having been refused by the Standing Group the draft new military papers (M.D.48) may feel itself unable to consider the U.K. draft political directive without military guidance.

B. In the Military Committee

- (i) I.P.T.131/20 6th version has already been issued to all nations with Section III included. Whatever differing views there may be on the desirability of its inclusion, it is probably too late for Section III to be taken out before the Military Committee meeting. As there is no authorised political background for Section III, the Military Committee will be unable to finalise M.C.14/2 with Section III in it. A rambling and fruitless discussion may result.

- (ii) There is no doubt that the Military Committee's future discussions of SACEUR's and SACLANE's studies, will only be both useful and valid if they are related to agreed political assumptions.

16. A course of events such as this involving rambling and fruitless discussions with a confused politico-military background could be dangerous, as well as frustrating, because in both the political and military fields positions could be taken up from which it would be difficult for nations to move subsequently, although they would have been assumed against a background of incomplete or even false data.

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A Solution

17. In seeking a solution we have considered how N.A.T.O. should handle its politico-military re-appraisal ideally before considering how a compromise can be reached between the ideal and the present confused situation.

18. Ideally we consider that:-

- (a) N.A.T.O. governments, at a meeting at which they are represented both politically and militarily, should seek agreement in the Council to a N.A.T.O. political directive similar to that contained in the U.K. draft.
- (b) The directive should be passed to the Military Committee, which should then draw up a definite framework and timetable for a N.A.T.O. strategic concept and its military implementation based on the political directive.

19. Relating the ideal to the practical we reach the following conclusions:-

- (i) It is too late to stop the Military Committee meeting on October 18th.
- (ii) Something, such as the tabling of the U.K. draft directive, must be put before the Council during the next few weeks.
- (iii) That proceedings both in the Council and the Military Committee may follow dangerous paths unless fresh and clear cut proposals for the future conduct of the N.A.T.O. reappraisal are tabled which co-ordinate action in the political and military committees. We suggest the U.K. should take the initiative.

20. These proposals should, we consider, consist of:-

- (i) An explanation of the present confused state of play.
- (ii) The need for getting back to sound principles.

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- (iii) A proposal for an early Ministerial meeting of the Council, with national military advisers present, to finalise a new political directive.
- (iv) A further meeting of the Military Committee to draw up a framework and time-table for implementing the new directive.
- (v) The need for tackling this whole vital problem with speed and imagination.

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C.O.S.(56)377

11TH OCTOBER, 1956

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

BRIEFS FOR THE 14TH SESSION OF THE NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE

Note by the Secretary

Des 10/11 - 7/11/56

At their meeting^d on the 9th October, 1956 the Chiefs of Staff approved a report⁺ in the form of a brief for Items 4 and 5 on the Agenda of the 14th Session of the NATO Military Committee and directed that a brief should be prepared for Item 3 on the lines of their discussion.

2. The Briefs are attached as follows:-

Annex 'I' - Item 6. The Overall Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Area. (IPT 131/20).

Annex 'II' - Item 4. The Overall Organisation of the Integrated Forces. (MC/57).

Annex 'III' - Item 5. The Divisional Responsibilities in Wartime Between National Territorial Commanders and the Supreme Commander and Subordinate Allied Commanders. (MC/36/1).

3. In accordance with the instructions^d of the Chiefs of Staff, copies have been forwarded to the British Joint Services Mission, Washington.

(Signed) D.J.P. LEE

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

11TH OCTOBER, 1956.

^d C.O.S.(56)97th Meeting, Minutes 1 and 2.

⁺ J.P.(56)157(Final).

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ANNEX 'I' TO C.O.S.(56)377

BRIEF FOR OUR REPRESENTATIVE AT THE FOURTEENTH
SESSION OF THE N.A.T.O. MILITARY COMMITTEE ON
"THE OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFENCE
OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION AREA"

AIM

The aim of this report is to provide a brief for our representative at the 14th Session of the NATO Military Committee for use when the draft paper⁺ on "The Over-all Strategic Concept for the Defence of the NATO Area" is discussed.

BACKGROUND

2. It was the original intention that this paper⁺ should be a revision and consolidation of existing NATO documents and that no new doctrine would be introduced. In the planning stages, however, new thoughts were inserted which are not included in the NATO documents which form the basis for the paper under review. These thoughts are:-

- (a) The effects on NATO of Soviet political and economic influence outside the NATO area (Section 3, paragraphs 19 and 20).
- (b) The possibility of the Russians launching a limited war with conventional weapons against NATO (Section 3, paragraphs 16-18; Section 4, paragraph 21(c)).

3. The United States representative on the Standing Group objected to the inclusion of these points.

OUR VIEWS

4. We consider that since political and economic factors as well as strategic should govern basic defence policy, the re-shaping of that policy should be the responsibility of the North Atlantic Council. Her Majesty's Government, therefore, intend to table a new political directive in the Council by mid-October. Regardless of the exact timing, we consider that the presentation of a new political directive would be influenced harmfully by the premature discussion of such undigested views as are contained in Section 3 of the draft paper. There would be no value in any discussion on a new concept which is not specifically related to the new political directive. If an attempt is made to introduce this new strategic thought in isolation the result would almost certainly be an unbalanced and incomplete paper since:-

- (a) The presentation of the subject would not be complete because other Commanders and nations have not necessarily submitted their views on a new strategic concept.
- (b) In any case the insertion of any radically new strategic thought would require much more detailed and lengthy discussion than could be achieved during the Military Committee meeting.

+ IPT.131/20 (6th Revised Final Draft).

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ACTION IN THE MILITARY COMMITTEE

5. At the meeting of the Military Committee our representative should not adopt from the start of any discussion a completely negative attitude by reserving our position straight away, but should attempt to point out the disadvantages of discussing one facet of a possible revised NATO strategy in isolation without full preparation. He should go on to stress that these and other related proposals would find their appropriate place in a new strategic concept which would follow a new political directive.

6. Our representative at the Military Committee should therefore take the following line:-

- (a) He should endeavour to convince his colleagues that it would be inappropriate to discuss IPT 134/20(6th Revised Final Draft) in its present form when the North Atlantic Council are about to undertake a complete re-appraisal of NATO strategy. He should recommend that the paper should be referred back to the Standing Group who should postpone further action on it until the North Atlantic Council had considered our draft political directive.
- (b) If agreement cannot be obtained to the course at (a) above, then our representative should try to get agreement to the deletion of Section 3 and paragraph 21(c). The paper would then be merely a statement of existing policy and as it contained nothing new it would not be necessary for it to go forward to the Council.
- (c) In the last resort if agreement cannot be obtained to courses (a) or (b) above, our representative should reserve the United Kingdom position on the paper.

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ANNEX II TO C.O.S.(56)E77

THE MILITARY COMMITTEE REPORT TO THE NATO COUNCIL ON THE OVERALL ORGANISATION OF THE INTEGRATED NATO FORCES (M. C. 57)

1. The object of the report is to obtain the approval of the Council for a revised document on the overall organisation of the integrated NATO forces.

2. The paper under brief is largely a revision of DG 24/3 (FINAL) - "The Creation of an Integrated European Defence Force; Establishment of a Supreme Headquarters in Europe, and the Organisation of the NATO Military Structure" - but includes related material from other approved NATO documents.

3. It covers four main subjects:-

- (a) A restatement of the structure and principles of NATO Higher Military Direction.
- (b) The definition of certain military terms used in connection with NATO Allied Commands and the categories of NATO forces.
- (c) A restatement of the broad principles concerning national force contributions.
- (d) A brief description of the command structure of the NATO organisation.

PREVIOUS UNITED KINGDOM GUIDANCE

1. An earlier draft¹ of the paper, was approved on our behalf by the Directors of Plans subject only to the suggestion that paragraph 10(c) (3), which contained an expansion of a Council ruling², should be referred to the Council.

2. This Council ruling³ is that when SACMUR wishes to approve the redeployment or operational use, within the area of Allied Command Europe, of forces under his command, he should, "when appropriate" seek political guidance of the Council. This ruling gives SACMUR discretion to interpret the term "when appropriate" as he sees fit.

3. The expansion to the Council ruling included in the IPT (which does not in fact differ from the paper under brief) stated that "such guidance will not be requested for moves of a routine administrative nature or in cases of emergency where the degree of urgency precludes following the full procedure. This expansion appears to be reasonable, and its reference to the Council is mainly a matter of procedure.

THE PRESENT PAPER

1. Apart from minor editorial amendments, the only way in which the present paper⁴ differs from the earlier draft¹ is that in paragraph 4 of the cover sheet, it is now recommended that the Council should approve the report. In the earlier draft it was recommended that the Military Committee approve the report and forward it to

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the Council for information. This change is entirely in line with previous United Kingdom guidance as described in paragraph 4 above.

OUR VIEWS

8. We consider that the paper, in its present form will, if approved, be a valuable reference document, and, in particular, the Definitions of command and control of forces, as set out in Section II, satisfy a long-standing requirement, since Supreme Commanders have hitherto had to bridge this gap by introducing their own definitions into their Emergency Defence Plans.

RECOMMENDATION

9. The United Kingdom representative should accept MC 57 as it stands.

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Considered at COS(56)124th Meeting Min. 2
CIRCULATED FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF

J.F.(56)162 (Final)
16th NOVEMBER 1956

**CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE
JOINT PLANNING STAFF**

SACEUR'S FORCE REQUIREMENTS 1960/62

Report by the Joint Planning Staff

At their meeting⁺ on 9th October, 1956, the Chiefs of Staff when discussing a study^o by SACEUR on his Force Requirements for 1960/62 agreed that:-

- (a) It might be necessary for their views on the study to be sent to their representative on the Standing Group at short notice.
- (b) An examination should be undertaken so that a report on SACEUR's requirements could be prepared quickly if required.

2. Since then the United Kingdom draft political directive has been presented to the Council, and we understand that the Council will have before them SACEUR's study and a parallel study by S/CLANT when they consider the question of a new political directive at their meeting in December. We have accordingly examined SACEUR's Force Requirements for 1960/62 and our Report is at Annex.

3. We have consulted the Foreign Office.

Recommendation

4. We recommend that if the Chiefs of Staff approve our report they should send the signal at Appendix to Admiral Denny.

(Signed) D.S.S. O'CONNOR
J.G. DAVIS
L.W. NAPIER

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

+ COS(56)97th Meeting, Min. 3(c)
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TOP SECRETAnnex to J.P.(56)162 (Final)SACEUR's FORCE REQUIREMENTS 1960/62

1. SACEUR on his own initiative has undertaken a study to determine the force posture of Allied Command Europe for 1960/62. The NATO Council have copies of this study, together with a parallel study by SACLANF, and they will be taken into account when the Council discusses the question of a new political directive.
2. Although the Council have instructed the Military Committee to submit reports on both these studies in time for consideration at their December meeting, we understand the Standing Group have agreed that time does not allow for this to be done. Largely at Admiral Denny's insistence the Standing Group have decided instead to prepare a report on these studies based on the current concept. We understand that it is intended that this report will be non-controversial and will do little more than highlight the principal features of the two studies. We also understand that the report may be prepared in the form of a brief for the Chairman of the Standing Group to read to the Council.
3. It may well be that the Standing Group report, and the studies, will inspire argument and discussion when considered by the Council in the light of a new political directive. Our representatives in Paris and Washington will therefore require the United Kingdom military comments on SACEUR's study, in its relation both to the existing concept and to the military requirements contained in the draft political directive forwarded by the United Kingdom.

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4. The aim of this report is to examine the SHAPE paper⁸ - "FORCE POSTURE ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE 1960/62" to determine the extent to which it conforms with:-
 - (a) Existing NATO doctrine.
 - (b) The military requirements contained in the United Kingdom Draft Political Directive.

SACEUR's COVERING REMARKS

5. In a covering letter⁹ General Gruenther says that his intention was to transmit the overall results by late 1957, but, in view of the great interest expressed by the Council, a study for the period 1960/62 was accelerated. The study, from which the paper under examination was derived was therefore neither as complete nor as precise as would result from the normal planning cycle; however, General Gruenther comments, he has confidence in the broad conclusions of the report.

* SHAPE/230/56
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Annex (Continued)

6. SACEUR after summarising the main conclusions of the paper states that the force requirements postulated for 1960/62 have been formulated "within the broad parameters established by the economic facts of NATO life" and that they do not, therefore, represent ideal requirements but rather "a level of forces established on a minimum adequate basis". He concludes that any appreciable shortfall in achieving the goals set out in the study might "involve dangerous risks to our security" and the study has added weight to his belief in the soundness of MO.48.

SACEUR's STUDY - PART IAim

7. The aim of the study is to evolve the force posture for Allied Command Europe for the period 1960/62.

Future Trends

8. SACEUR states that factors which may affect the force posture up to 1966 have been considered so that the posture evolved for 1960/62 will be suited to the future.

9. SACEUR appreciates that from 1960 onwards both sides will have "adequate" stockpiles of nuclear weapons, and believes that nuclear "sufficiency" will discourage Russia from resorting to nuclear war but that this "will apply only so long as the Allies are prepared to fight a general war". From this premise SACEUR argues that his Command can assist Cold War operations by "providing an environment of military security and confidence". "In particular", he argues, "the maintenance of adequate forces-in-being, properly positioned and fully trained, would constitute convincing evidence that any local aggression on a scale less than that likely to lead to general war, can be contained, and hence would be unprofitable". He concludes his examination of this aspect of the problem by saying that "the broad problem of meeting possible economic and political pressures must rest with individual governments".

The Threat

10. SACEUR appreciates that a general war would probably start with a massive nuclear offensive by the Russians and that there will almost certainly be accompanying land, sea and air campaigns to isolate and seize NATO Europe. He considers that the need for Russia to achieve surprise will limit pre D-day deployment of forces, particularly submarines and ground forces.

General War

11. SACEUR sees a general war in two phases:-

- (a) Phase 1. A period of violent organised fighting, not exceeding 30 days, the first few days of which would be characterised by the greatest intensity of nuclear exchange.

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Annex (Continued)

- (b) Phase 2. A period of re-organisation, re-supply and limited military operations leading to a conclusion of the war. A large scale invasion of the Soviet Union is not envisaged.

12. SACEUR states that in the "initial and decisive phase the Allies would need to conduct a series of overlapping mutually dependent campaigns of maximum intensity and of minimum duration" with the object of "defending the populations, territories, vital sea areas and offensive striking power of NATO, whilst launching an immediate nuclear retaliatory campaign designed to neutralise the opponent's military capability, initially through the destruction of his nuclear delivery systems". He further states that the "character and duration of the second and final phase cannot be predicted with any assurance of accuracy".

QUOTE

SACEUR's Mission

13. SACEUR states that the essential elements of his mission are:-

- (a) To assist in deterring aggression.
- (b) To assist in maintain confidence in Europe by providing an environment of military security.
- (c) To defend the peoples and territories of NATO Europe if attacked.

Requirements

14. SACEUR states that the primary task of his military forces is to deter aggression. He sees "the military establishment accomplishing this task by providing visible evidence of the Allied capability and manifest readiness to employ all measures, including nuclear weapons, to resist aggression." The deterrent must be such that Russia will always believe that resort to general war will certainly lead to the destruction of the USSR and it must also convince the Russians that they cannot attain even limited objectives.

15. SACEUR states that should the deterrent fail, the task is to defend NATO Europe. To accomplish this task in a situation where an aggressor would have the initiative, SACEUR's forces must be able:-

- (a) To obtain maximum warning of attack and to sustain least possible damage from the initial blow.
- (b) To apply immediate offensive nuclear firepower to destroy the enemy within the sphere of responsibility of Allied Command Europe.
- (c) To deploy and to manoeuvre quickly land, sea and air power to meet any form of enemy attack.

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Annex (Continued)

16. He states that five mutually supporting elements and conditions are essential. These are:-

- (a) Strategic and tactical intelligence systems capable of detecting impending attack.
- (b) An active and passive air defence, including associated early warning systems.
- (c) Nuclear strike forces, at a high state of readiness.
- (d) A strong SHIELD of land, sea and air forces.
- (e) Ready reserves which could be deployed quickly to reinforce an area.

17. Of these requirements SACEUR elaborates two: the SHIELD (the capitals are his) and the ready reserves. The SHIELD of land, sea and air forces, SACEUR states "must be in such strength and so deployed that there can be no hope in an aggressor's mind of limited gain or favourable compromise. The SHIELD must raise the stakes to a point where an aggressor who decides to attack, faces the devastating consequences of total nuclear war. In the event of war, the SHIELD, in conjunction with other forces, must defend the peoples and territories of NATO Europe. To do so under conditions of surprise attack the SHIELD forces must adopt a forward strategy". The ready reserve forces are required, SACEUR states, in order to add flexibility and depth to the SHIELD. In addition, certain units of SACEUR's forces should, he states, be trained for the additional mission of acting as a highly mobile reserve force, capable of immediate movement in peace and war to any threatened area within SACEUR's responsibility. The deterrent value of such a force, SACEUR states would be enhanced if its components could be drawn from two or more different national forces.

SACEUR's STUDY - PART II

Force Posture

18. In this part of his study SACEUR describes the force posture he requires to implement the concept and mission outlined in Part I. The principal changes required for this period are listed below:-

- (a) "Land Forces"
 - (i) A deployment forward and in depth of D-day forces, particularly in Central Europe.
 - (ii) Increased atomic integration and flexibility. ✓
 - (iii) The elimination of 3rd Echelon forces."

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TOP SECRETAnnex (Continued)(b) "Air Forces"

- (i) An increased nuclear strike capability
- (ii) A reduction of conventional strike forces.
- (iii) A large reduction in heavy anti-aircraft units.
- (iv) A substantial augmentation of the surface to air missile component of the air defence force.
- (v) A slight increase in the all-weather interceptor force.
- (vi) A considerable reduction in interceptor day fighters.
- (vii) A large augmentation of reconnaissance forces."

(c) "Naval Forces"

- (i) An increase in D-day availability of striking forces.
- (ii) A redeployment of D-day forces to assure adequate control of front line areas.
- (iii) A reduction in numbers of certain types of ships.
- (iv) Elimination of most categories of post D-day forces."

19. SACEUR in Enclosures 1-3 to this part of his study tabulates figures showing the net total changes between the planned force goals for 1956, 1958 and 1960/62.

Transition

20. Finally, SACEUR emphasises that the adoption of his new posture must be carefully phased over the intervening years so that major weaknesses are avoided during transition.

OUR VIEWSCOMPARISON WITH EXISTING NATO DOCTRINEMission

21. SACEUR's mission as contained in his Emergency Defence Plan for 1957, is stated as being to:-

"Defend the area of Allied Command Europe so as to provide essential protection and control of areas and LOC's of vital importance; provide protection of Allied

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Annex (Continued)

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mobilization and reinforcement preparatory to sustained defence and/or subsequent offensive operations; and conduct an air offensive and such other offensive operations, as forces available will permit, to attain Allied objectives."

22. His revised version (paragraph 13 above) emphasizes the greater deterrence value of his growing nuclear offensive capability, whilst at the same time it recognises the need to defend the peoples of Europe if attacked. It also takes account of the need to create an atmosphere of security in Europe. This is in accordance with the principles in MC 48, paragraph 2.

Discharging His Mission

23. SACEUR considers that his best chance of achieving his two primary aims of deterring aggression and creating an atmosphere of security, will be by displaying manifest readiness to fulfil his global war mission of defending NATO Europe. This is directly in line with MC 48 paragraph 3(a).

24. The three main pre-requisites (paragraph 15 above) which SACEUR says his forces must have to achieve his task of defending NATO Europe if attacked are in agreement with MC 48. Furthermore the first three of his five "essential mutually supporting elements and conditions" (see paragraph 16 above) are also in agreement with MC 48 and MC 48/1.

25. The two remaining "essential elements" (paragraphs 16(d) and (e) above) represent a shift of emphasis. Where SACEUR formerly spoke of "Forces in Being" he now speaks of a "Shield" and "Ready Reserves". In fact SACEUR says that his Shield must be capable of defending NATO Europe "in conjunction with other forces". By no longer stipulating the need for 3rd Echelon land forces he implies that there would be insufficient opportunity to mobilise such forces. We consider that SACEUR's "Shield" is not a departure from existing NATO doctrine, although his emphasis on "Ready Reserves" and increased M-Day forces arises from his belief that large-scale employment of nuclear weapons would compress the entire scope of a general war.

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26. As regards a second phase he does not emphasize, as MC 48 does, that "our forces must be prepared to conduct operations of a much longer duration", but remarks that the character and duration of the second and final phase cannot be predicted with any assurance of accuracy.

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27. Lastly SACEUR's requirement for forces for the additional mission of acting as a highly mobile reserve which can be moved rapidly in peace as well as war to any threatened area is one which has not been previously specified. It is no doubt linked to the idea of new Soviet tactics and contributes towards deterring "war by proxy" rather than all-out global war.

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28. We consider that SACEUR's study complies generally with the principles of MC.48. The main changes result from a revision of his concept of the form the war will take. One effect of this has been that SACEUR has, at any rate by implication, toned down the extent and intensity of operations in Phase 2. While this may be true of the land battle, we do not consider that the diminishing importance of the post-nuclear phase will necessarily apply to maritime operations. On the contrary those Soviet submarines which were at sea when the nuclear phase opened might continue operations against our shipping.

Force Goals

29. The net total changes between the planned force goals for 1956 and 1960/62 are summarized below:-

Increase or Decrease
of 1960/62 figures
compared with 1956

NAVAL FORCES

Attack Carriers	Plus 2 (D-Day figures)
ASW Carriers	Plus 1
Light Fleet Carriers	Minus 1
Cruisers	Minus 6
Destroyer Type	Plus 5
A/S Ships	Plus 8
Maritime Aircraft	Plus 42
Submarines	Plus 14
Fast Minelayers	No change
Coastal Minelayers	Plus 4
Minesweepers	Plus 18
Fast Patrol Boats	Plus 12

Comparison of D plus 30 figures show decreases in all cases except ASW Carriers, which is plus 1, and maritime aircraft, which is plus 24.

LAND FORCES

Divisions	M-day	Plus 11 2/3
	1st Echelon	Plus 2
	2nd Echelon	Minus 5 2/3
	Total	Plus 8

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Aircraft (Squadrons)	Plus 13
Guided Missile (units)	Plus 34
Anti-aircraft (units)	Minus 25

30. In considering the above table we must take account of the German contribution. However even when this becomes available, it is unlikely that it will do more than make good the apparent deficit. It does not therefore appear that SACEUR's plan would offer much scope for reductions in individual force contributions. Further, the provision of up-to-date nuclear weapons will be an added burden for national defence budgets. We are doubtful therefore whether the expenditure necessary to achieve SACEUR's force goals would be politically acceptable to most NATO nations.

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OUR VIEWSCOMPARISON WITH THE MILITARY REQUIREMENTS CONTAINED IN THE UNITED KINGDOM DRAFT POLITICAL DIRECTIVEGeneral Considerations

31. In examining the study we have been mindful of the following fundamental principles which underlie the United Kingdom wish for a new political directive:-

- (a) In the light of recent Soviet tactics and the mounting cost of new weapons, a number of NATO countries, including the United Kingdom, must reduce their defence expenditure if Russia is not to achieve her ends by political and economic means.
- (b) The policy of the Western Powers is to devote first priority to preventing a global war since nuclear warfare would inevitably result in unprecedented destruction.
- (c) The primary deterrent to global war is the thermo-nuclear weapon, backed by the manifest readiness, determination and intention to use it.

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32. The United Kingdom therefore contends that apart from forces for the strategic air offensive, the military forces maintained by NATO should be the minimum needed to meet the following requirements:-

- (a) To keep confidence in the military effectiveness of the NATO defence organisation, and thereby contribute to the deterrent to aggression; and to prevent external intimidation.

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Annex (Continued)

- (b) To deal with local infiltrations and incursions.
 - (c) To enable Soviet or satellite aggressive intentions at sea, on land or in the air to be identified as such, to provide a shield against a Satellite attack, and to hold an identified Soviet aggression until the strategic counter-offensive becomes effective.
 - (d) To secure the radar facilities required for the full use of the strategic bomber forces.
33. SACEUR's study, is an exposition of the force requirements he considers necessary to defend territory in a land battle involving tactical atomic weapons. This conflicts with the above principles and requirements in certain respects which we elaborate below.

The Interdependence of the Economic, Political and Military Factors

34. We consider that SACEUR's statement that he has "worked within the broad parameters established by the economic facts of NATO life" is difficult to reconcile with the force requirements set out in his study. Although there are reductions in certain types of forces, the force requirement shows a small net increase over the 1956 figures. The German contribution will help to relieve other nations of this increased burden but since any reductions in conventional arms are likely to be offset by increases in nuclear and guided missile weapons, it is unlikely that any economy to national budgets would in fact be effected. Should SACEUR's study be approved it is difficult to see how nations could effectively meet the "Cold War" threat.

The Deterrent

35. The United Kingdom political directive recognises that it is the strategic nuclear capability of the West which provides the primary deterrent to Soviet aggression, and that its existence makes global war unlikely. SACEUR however believes that in addition to the strategic nuclear capability, the deterrent must include all measures to resist aggression, by maintaining in being a force capable of defending NATO Europe against a full scale Soviet attack. The United Kingdom directive requires that forces in Europe need only be capable of identifying aggression, and of holding an identified Soviet attack until the strategic counter-offensive becomes effective. SACEUR has thus over-emphasised the contribution his forces make towards supplementing the primary deterrent.

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The Defence of Europe

35. We are not in a position to criticise the size of the SHIELD he considers he needs even if his aim is modified to that stated in the United Kingdom draft directive. However, it appears that SACEUR's force requirement for 1960/62 may give over-insurance for the following reason. SACEUR

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envisages a war of two phases and considers that the first phase may last for 30 days. The United Kingdom directive specifically omitted any forecast of the duration of the first phase and contains no reference to the second phase. We consider that, bearing in mind the probable effects of the nuclear exchange in 1960/62, the first phase may be much shorter than SACEUR thinks. If this is correct, then it may be a further argument in favour of our contention that SACEUR's force requirements are an over-insurance.

CONCLUSION

37. We conclude that SACEUR's study is broadly in accordance with current NATO doctrine, but his toning down of the intensity and duration of the second phase does not necessarily apply to the war at sea, since those Soviet submarines which were at sea when the nuclear phase opened might continue operations against our shipping.

38. SACEUR's force requirements for 1960/62 may be an over-estimate of the land and air forces which might be needed to meet the military requirements set out in the United Kingdom draft political directive because:-

- (a) He over-estimates the contribution which his forces make to the deterrent.
- (b) He considers that his mission, should the deterrent fail, is to defend NATO Europe and postulates forces capable of "violent organised fighting" for 30 days, thereby implying that the nuclear counter-offensive may not become effective for a considerable time.

39. SACEUR postulates forces to fight a second phase of global war, whereas no mention is made of such a phase in the United Kingdom draft political directive. This question cannot be resolved until there has been agreement on a new political directive which would have to take into account what preparations, if any, should be made for a second phase.

40. We further conclude that the continued development of NATO strategy along these lines would perpetuate the political and economic difficulties facing us which, with the realisation of the implications of nuclear warfare, led the United Kingdom to propose a new concept of strategy.

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Appendix to Annex to JP(56)162 (Final)

DRAFT SIGNAL

FROM : MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, LONDON
TO : R.J.S.M., WASHINGTON

November, 1956

ROUTINE

COS(V)

For DENNY from Chiefs of Staff.

Subject: SACEUR'S FORCE REQUIREMENTS FOR 1960/62.

Reference: SHAPE/56/230 and 231.

We understand that the Standing Group has appreciated that time does not allow for preparation of complete papers on SACEUR's and SACLANC's studies for processing through the MC in time for the December Council meeting; and that instead they intend to prepare a non-controversial report on these studies, high-lighting the principal features and relating it to current doctrine.

2. We have examined SACEUR's study in the light of MC 48 principles and conclude that it is generally in line. The chief effect of SACEUR's study has been the toning down of the intensity and duration of the second phase. Whilst this may well be true of the land battle, it may not apply to the same extent to the war at sea where a Soviet submarine threat may continue beyond the nuclear phase. Apart from this we have no comment of substance.

3. We feel that the fact that the Standing Group report will presumably state that the studies are broadly in accordance with the current concept will tend, however illogically, to support any opposition to our new draft

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Appendix (Continued)

political directive. We therefore hope that the Standing Group report will be an entirely innocuous document.

4. We appreciate that you cannot obtain Standing Group approval to adopt the United Kingdom draft political directive as a basis for examining the long range studies, but you should be aware of our views about them so that you can influence, in the light of recent Council discussions, any part of the Standing Group report which may by implication prejudice consideration of the United Kingdom draft political directive by the Council.

5. We therefore summarise below our views on SACEUR's study in relation to the United Kingdom draft political directive.

6. We consider that SACEUR's force requirements for 1960/62 may be an over-estimate of the land and air forces which might be needed to meet the military requirements set out in the United Kingdom draft political directive because:-

- (a) He over-estimates the contribution which his forces make to the deterrent.
- (b) He considers that his mission, should the deterrent fail, is to defend NATO Europe and postulates forces capable of "violent organised fighting" for 30 days, thereby implying that the nuclear counter-offensive may not become effective for a considerable time.

7. SACEUR postulates forces to fight a second phase of global war, whereas no mention is made of such a phase in the United Kingdom draft political directive. This question cannot be resolved until there has been agreement on a new political directive which would have to take into account what preparations, if any, should be made for a second phase.

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Appendix (Concluded)

8. We further conclude that the continued development of NATO strategy along these lines would perpetuate the political and economic difficulties facing us which, with the realisation of the implications of nuclear warfare, led the United Kingdom to propose a new concept of strategy.

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12/19/56

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

The Minister of Defence called on Mr. Charles Wilson, the United States Secretary of Defence, on December 12th, 1956. Mr. Wilson was accompanied by Mr. Gordon Gray and Admiral Radford.

The Minister asked Mr. Wilson whether he could tell him how the United States intended to proceed with the introduction of atomic weapons into the Forces. Was it their view that all forces would eventually have an atomic capability and that it would thus become impossible for the United States to react to aggression in any way other than by the use of nuclear weapons of one sort or another. Mr. Wilson gave no clear reply to the Minister's question. Admiral Radford said that the United States would for an indefinite period retain forces equipped with conventional weapons. Mr. Wilson said that it was in his view unlikely that the United States would become involved in a small or limited war; any war in which the United States was engaged would be a big war.

The Minister told Mr. Wilson that he would like to examine with the United States Authorities whether there was scope for a greater measure of co-operation and pooling of defence research and development effort. He had in mind particularly work on ballistic and anti-aircraft missiles, where the United States was a good deal further ahead than the United Kingdom and there was a considerable duplication of effort. He would like to put to Mr. Wilson a list of fields of work in which he thought closer co-operation might be feasible and profitable, certainly to the United Kingdom and perhaps also to the United States. He would like to follow this up by paying a short visit to the United States, accompanied by the appropriate experts for further discussion. He suggested the latter part of January as a possible date.

Mr. Wilson said that he thought this would be a useful procedure, but that January would be a little early for him since the United States Administration would be heavily engaged on the Budget and preliminary presentations to Congress. He thought that the latter part of February might be more suitable but the Minister said that this would be difficult for him because of the imminence of the Defence Debate. It was agreed that Mr. Wilson would look into the matter on his return and let the Minister know what he thought would be the most suitable arrangement. In the meantime the Minister would proceed with the compilation of his list.

In the course of the discussion, the Minister mentioned warheads for the CORPORAL missiles which the War Office were buying from the United States. Owing to the limitations imposed on the United States Administration by legislation, it was not possible for the United Kingdom to acquire American warheads, and the United Kingdom had thus been forced to put research and development effort into a project which had already been completed in the United States. He wondered whether it would be possible for the United States to stockpile sufficient CORPORAL warheads on the Continent for release to the United Kingdom forces in the event of an emergency in which it was agreed that atomic weapons would be used. The custody of the warheads would be retained by the United States.

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Mr. Wilson thought that something on these lines might be feasible and undertook to go into the matter if the Minister would let him have a more precise proposal.

Mr. Wilson said that the United States was itself feeling the effect of overload of scientific manpower, and that competition between firms for scientists was going on on a large scale. He had recently put in hand studies with the object of eliminating something like one-third of the United States' guided missile programme. The United States had found that the cost of hardware for carrying out tests of missiles was extremely high. The United States was working on an anti-missile missile. The Minister said that a good deal of thought was being given to this also in the United Kingdom.

In the course of the conversation Mr. Wilson threw out a hint that the United States might be prepared to provide the United Kingdom with 1500-mile ballistic missiles on the understanding that the United Kingdom would acquire the land and provide the launching sites for these missiles in the United Kingdom. Some arrangement would have to be made for custody of the warheads, but he gave the impression that it might be possible to devise means of putting the warheads into the hands of the United Kingdom. I shall be following this up with Mr. Gordon Gray who had previously mentioned the matter to me.

(Signed) R.R. POWELL

13th December, 1956.

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12/14/56
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NOTE FOR THE RECORD

I saw Mr. Gordon Gray this morning in order to follow up the earlier conversation between the Minister and Mr. Charles Wilson about ballistic missiles and also to enquire how matters stood on the balance of Plan K Aid and the Javelin contract.

On the first subject, Mr. Gray informed me that the Americans had in mind a scheme for putting a 1,500-mile ballistic missile into the hands of a U.K. Service, which would have operational responsibility for it and would provide the necessary manpower launching sites and supporting organisation. Custody of the warheads would have to remain technically with the United States owing to the terms of their Atomic Energy Act, but I understood that this requirement could be complied with by stationing a few Army Ordnance personnel in this country. Mr. Gray did not indicate how many missiles the Americans had in mind to offer or when they would be available, but he confirmed earlier statements that a missile of this range would be ready for operational use in about 1959.

In return for a gift of missiles the United States would expect the United Kingdom to assume responsibility for certain functions now being carried out in the U.K. by U.S. armed forces. He mentioned specifically the light anti-aircraft defence of U.S. airfields, which he said at present absorbed 5,000 American Servicemen, and the functions of the U.S. fighter Wings stationed in this country which relate to air defence. He did not make it clear whether this comprised the whole of the functions of these Wings or whether they would remain here, possibly at reduced strength, after the transfer of function had taken place.

Mr. Gray emphasised that our discussion was on what he called a "technical level", since final policy clearance for making such a proposal to the U.K. had not yet been given. He did not however expect any difficulty here and thought that the State Department would be raising the matter with the British Ambassador in Washington in the near future.

On Plan K Aid, Mr. Gray told me that there was no disposition on the part of the United States Administration to deprive us of the second instalment, and gave me to understand that the United States Administration were now prepared to assume the financial liability for the CORPORAL missile being procured for the British Army. As regard to the balance of the money, which Mr. Gray estimated at \$68m. (I think that the correct figure is really \$78m., since the total due on the second instalment is \$108m. and CORPORAL accounts for only \$30m.), he told me that the United States had in mind a proposal to finance the construction in the United Kingdom of one of the Century Class of fighters now being produced for the U.S. Air Force. I told him that for technical and operational reasons, and particularly the inevitable delay before such an aircraft could get into the hands of the R.A.F., I considered a proposal of this kind would be impracticable. I stressed that in our view the right course would be to use the balance of the money to finance the procurement of further JAVELINS of later Marks for the R.A.F. The alternative was financing of some of the V-bomber programme, but this had not hitherto been regarded with any favour by the United States Government.

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I also told Mr. Gray that in my view the existing United States contract for JAVELINS should be allowed to stand, in spite of the fact that the United States did not regard it as having been satisfactorily evaluated. It was the only aircraft which could be put quickly into the hands of the R.A.F. and it seemed likely that the R.A.F. would be quite satisfied with it.

We agreed that I should write to Mr. Gray as soon as possible making firm proposals for settling the question of Plan K Aid, on the assumption that the United States had every intention of making the funds available to the United Kingdom.

(Signed) R.R. POWELL

14th December, 1956.

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C.O.S.(56)133RD MEETING

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

MINUTES of Meeting held on
TUESDAY, 18TH DECEMBER, 1956 at 2.45 p.m.

PRESENT

Marshal of the Royal Air Force
Sir William Dickson,
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff
Committee

Admiral of the Fleet
The Earl Mountbatten of Burma,
First Sea Lord and Chief
of Naval Staff

Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer,
Chief of the Imperial
General Staff

Air Chief Marshal Sir Dermot Boyle,
Chief of the Air Staff

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT

Major-General W.G. Stirling,
Principal Staff Officer
to the Chairman, Chiefs
of Staff Committee

Mr. D.M.H. Riches,
Foreign Office
(For Item 4)

Sir Frederick Brundrett,
Ministry of Defence
(For Item 8)

Major-General W.H.A. Bishop,
Commonwealth Relations
Office
(For Items 1, 2 & 3)

Mr. J.B. Johnston,
Colonial Office
(For Items 1, 2 & 3)

Mr. A. Campbell,
Colonial Office
(For Item 4)

Mr. G. Wheeler,
Ministry of Defence
(For Items 1, 2 & 3)

SECRETARIAT

Air Commodore D.J.P. Lee
Colonel H.G. Croly

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THE COMMITTEE:-

- (1) Instructed the Secretary to take the necessary action at (a) above*.
- (2) Invited the Principal Staff Officer to the Chairman to take the necessary action at (b) above.

* Subsequently despatched as COSKEY 102.

6. CLOSING DOWN OF A.F.H.Q.SECRET

THE COMMITTEE had before them a telegram⁺ from General Keightley giving his proposals for closing down and disbanding Allied Forces Headquarters and Task Force Headquarters.

SIR GERALD TEMPLER said that, in connection with these proposals, he intended that General Keightley should be relieved by General Bourns as Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Land Forces between 1st and 7th January, 1957.

THE SECRETARY informed the Committee that Colonel Hardy had received instructions from A.F.H.Q. to close down the Rear Link in the Ministry of Defence on Friday, 21st December. This would coincide with the move of A.F.H.Q. to Nicosia, at which time the direct communication link between Episcopi and the Rear Link would also close.

In discussion THE COMMITTEE agreed that:-

- (a) General Keightley should be informed that they approved the proposals in the telegram⁺.
- (b) The Rear Link should close down on 21st December, 1956.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Instructed the Secretary to take the necessary action*.

+ KEYCOS 144

* Subsequently despatched as COSKEY 103.

7. N.A.T.O. MEETINGSTOP SECRET

(Previous Reference: C.C.S. (56) 128th Meeting, Minute 1)

SIR WILLIAM DICKSON said that the Committee might like to have very briefly his impressions of the more important discussions which were held by the Military Committee and the North Atlantic Council in Paris during the last fortnight.

A. DIRECTIVE TO THE N.A.T.O. MILITARY AUTHORITIES

SIR WILLIAM DICKSON said that although the new political Directive had been approved by the Council and was now with the Standing Group for study, the next steps in military planning

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were not entirely clear. The Standing Group were now working on a revision of the Overall Strategic Concept Paper (MC 14/2) and would also have to prepare a new paper on the ~~Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the next few years~~ (MC 48/2). They would however have to refer to the Permanent Council to discover to what extent Member Nations would be adjusting the resources which they could make available to NATO, in view of the Council's acceptance of the fact that certain countries had large commitments outside the NATO area and that economic problems were affecting their ability to provide contributions of the same magnitude, in terms of numbers rather than effectiveness, as in the past. The Ministry of Defence would no doubt provide our representative on the Council with this information early next year.

SIR WILLIAM DICKSON said that the statement by the Minister of Defence had been well received. He had explained the manpower problems with which we were faced and the difficulty of maintaining forces of the present size in view of the increased cost of military weapons, but he had stressed that although some reductions in the overall size of our contribution to NATO might be necessary, we had every intention of improving the effectiveness of our forces and would continue to provide massive support for NATO forces on the Continent. The statement by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, drawing attention to the peculiar position the United Kingdom was in with regard to balance of payment problems and the fact that the United Kingdom had been contributing a much greater effort both overall and in proportion to our national resources than any other country in Europe, had also been most sympathetically received and had been supported by Mr. Dulles. The Council had been quite visibly impressed.

B. HIGHER NATO MILITARY STRUCTURE

SIR WILLIAM DICKSON said that although there had been a good deal of support for the Canadian proposals that a radical change in the military structure was necessary, the Military Committee had finally agreed that the Standing Group should examine those more evolutionary measures which were contained in Appendix A to the IPT Paper.

C. ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE COUNTER-SURPRISE MILITARY ALERT SYSTEM

The problem which confronted the Military Committee over SACEUR's proposals, which were militarily sound but open to some objection on political grounds, was to ensure that they were not thrown out by the Council. The Military Committee had therefore decided to authorise SACEUR to use his proposals as a basis for negotiation with National Authorities and informed the Council of their action. SACEUR was thus given a free hand to proceed with detailed planning.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note of the statement by the Chairman.

✓ IPT 20/24 (5th Final Revised Draft).
 ✓ AG 1401 PandP dated 22nd October, 1956.

8. OPERATION GRAPPLE

CONFIDENTIAL

Recorded in the Secretary's Standard File.

E.R.

PREM 11/2929

11/24

PRIME MINISTER

Germany and Nuclear Weapons
(D.(58) 54)

This memorandum considers whether we need oppose General Norstad's plans to equip the German forces with tactical nuclear weapons, the warheads for which would be supplied by the United States and would remain in United States custody. It concludes that, although there is some risk that these plans will increase the probability that Germany will eventually emerge as an independent nuclear power (with the resultant dangers outlined in paragraph 8), we should accept this risk in order to keep Germany in the Western camp as an equal partner. We should not, therefore, oppose General Norstad's plans or call for any debate in N.A.T.O.

It is difficult to quarrel with this conclusion. But two points are perhaps worth making:-

- (a) The memorandum appears to take only a short-term view - i.e., it does not explicitly look forward to the time (which may not be so very far ahead) when the Great Powers will have reached a position of nuclear stalemate and the I.C.B.M. will be a fully operational reality. In those circumstances the United States may be tempted to withdraw into Fortress America and to leave Europe to fend for itself; and if, by that time, Germany was well on the way to being an independent nuclear power in its own right, the danger noted in paragraph 8(a) might be increased - i.e. "Russia might be ready to pay a higher price to buy Germany out of the Western camp and Germany might be readier to accept such a price". In other words, if Germany had become a significant nuclear power by the time that America withdrew from Europe, it might be even more difficult than it would otherwise be to hold together any Western European alliance against Russia.
- (b) Even on the short-term view the risks may already be greater + they were when this memorandum was written. The latest concordat between Russia and Poland contains a hint (in its

E.R.

reference to the strengthening of the Warsaw Pact) of the possibility that the Russians may construct missile bases in Poland. It also foreshadows a Russian evacuation of Berlin, designed to compel the Western Powers to recognise the East German Government. Both developments could operate to increase the risk indicated in paragraph 8(c) (and recognised in paragraph 9 to be particularly serious), i.e., the danger of war by miscalculation "if there was rioting in East Germany, and West Germany, having nuclear weapons, could not be restrained from going to the rescue".

For these reasons the memorandum may, if anything, understate the dangers involved in allowing Germany to become an independent nuclear power. Nevertheless, there seems no escape from its recommendation that we should not oppose the measures which may prove to be the first steps in this direction. For what is the alternative? Only to resist General Norstad's proposals, to offend both Germany and the United States and to risk a breakdown of N.A.T.O. - not in five or ten years' time, but now.

L. Drew

12th November, 1958

Cyph. JTP

FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET) AND
WHITEHALL (SECRET) DISTRIBUTIONNo. 2459

November 24, 1958

D. 2.22 p.m. November 24, 1958

IMMEDIATESECRETAddressed to Bonn telegram No. 2459 of November 24.

Repeated for information to:

Paris [Priority]

Washington [Priority]

UKDel N.A.T.O. [Priority]

German Ambassador asked me on Saturday whether General de Gaulle had sent any further written communications to us about his ideas for reforming the alliance. I told him that he had not. We had, however, received various oral interpretations of his ideas from M. Couve de Murville and others. The Ambassador asked whether we could let the Federal Government have some account of these interpretations before the Chancellor saw General de Gaulle. I said that I thought that we had already given them the gist of what we had learned but undertook to send them a further message on the subject.

2. Please tell the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs that there are two points which have emerged from what the French have told us since the date of the original memorandum. The first point was that the General did not wish to establish any new body or institution. Still less was he thinking in terms of a tripartite directorate for N.A.T.O. But he did apparently think that there were some problems in the world which interested the three powers more directly than they interested others and he wanted a closer form of consultation about these problems. But here again the use of the expression "joint decisions" did not mean that he expected any one power to have the right of veto over any other. The second main point was that he was not thinking in terms of any kind of drastic re-organisation of N.A.T.O. He had some minor criticisms to make and the French apparently intended to submit these to N.A.T.O. in the ordinary way.

3. You can also tell the Ministry that the proposed tripartite discussions about the General's ideas have not yet started in

/ Washington

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~~SECRET~~

Foreign Office telegram No. 2459 to Bonn

- 2 -

Washington and are not likely to start for another few days at the earliest. We will of course keep the Germans informed.

4. We have passed on all the foregoing to the German Embassy at one time or another but the Ambassador seems to have forgotten it.

.....

red/w

~~SECRET~~Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

R. November 25, 1958.

Dear Philip,

You told me that the Prime Minister might be seeing General Norstad tomorrow morning. You asked if there were any points which we thought the Prime Minister might raise.

2. We suggest that the main points should be:-

(i) Berlin

(ii) General de Gaulle's proposals for N.A.T.O. etc.

3. On Berlin, the Prime Minister could reiterate our decision to stand firm against any encroachment on our position. We certainly do not wish to recognise the East German regime and would be reluctant to take any steps in that direction. On the other hand the alternative might be an air-lift. The Prime Minister might ask General Norstad's views on this. From what we know of General Norstad's views he is against an air-lift on the ground that it would be difficult to repeat a successful stunt. We rather incline to this view ourselves.

4. As regards General de Gaulle's plan, the latest situation is briefly set out in the attached telegram to Bonn. Perhaps the Prime Minister might say that he realised that General Norstad had been having a bit of trouble lately, first with General de Gaulle and then with Field Marshal Montgomery. As regards the latter

/we

P.F. de Zulueta Esq.

~~SECRET~~

we think it most unfortunate that he should appear to have contributed to General de Gaulle's move while he was still serving as Deputy Supreme Commander. As regards General de Gaulle, our object is in the course of the forthcoming Tripartite talks in Washington, to give the French an opportunity of watering-down their ideas, and in fact, casting them in to a more sensible form.

5. General Norstad may bring up the question of integrated air defence, which was discussed in the Cabinet today. In that case, perhaps the Prime Minister could say that no difficulty is anticipated in our agreeing to the N.A.T.O. proposals. It is not suggested that the Prime Minister should raise this question himself.

6. Finally, the Prime Minister may like to know that the N.A.T.O. Parliamentarians have recently been meeting in Paris. General Norstad's address to them was apparently a great success.

Yours ever,

Brooks Richards.

PREM 11 / 3701

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11SECRETNOTE BY THE PRIME MINISTER

General Norstad called to see me this morning.

1. I tried to say some soothing words about Field Marshal Montgomery's recent activities. General Norstad clearly appreciated this as he has been much hurt about what he calls the disloyalty which Lord Montgomery has shown to him and to NATO. However, he accepted the fact that the Field Marshal was an eccentric and he thought that he had already injured his position by the extravagance of his argument.

2. We then discussed Berlin. General Norstad believes that we should all stand firm together against any encroachment on our rights. This I said was our position. As regards an airlift he thought it was manageable but it was not a permanent solution. Very privately he told me that he thought we ought to take an absolutely tough line on our rights on the one side, and on the other make a proposal for a conference to discuss the German problem. He thought this dual approach was the right one. He had already privately sent these views to Dulles. He would not like to be quoted by us.

3. This led on to a discussion of the general question of disengagement and the Rapacki plan, etc. He had a year ago developed the theme that we ought to have a very large area subject to inspection and control but without alteration in the character of the arms or armies maintained.

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He said that the first point on our side was to know what the other side was doing. The area should be a large one - Poland, Czechoslovakia, all Germany, Belgium and Holland. He promised to send me some notes of his views on this. I said I should be very interested to study them.

4. We then spoke of General de Gaulle. He accepts de Gaulle as a new factor but feels he is completely ignorant of NATO, and indeed of anything that happened during the long years of his retirement. He, Norstad, had said quite firmly to the French that as they were always last in every contribution to the real power of NATO he did not see how they could claim the first place. de Gaulle was very scornful of the NATO Political Council. General Norstad's recent estimate is that what de Gaulle really wants to do is to get into the strategic problems - particularly the Strategic Air Force.

5. Very privately he told me - and he did not particularly wish this to be repeated to anyone or made the subject of telegrams between London and Washington - that he had been approached by Strauss, the German Defence Minister, asking for IRBMs to be stationed in Germany. While General Norstad thought that tactical atomic weapons should be supplied to the German army he was doubtful about the wisdom at this moment of putting two squadrons of IRBMs on Western German soil. I asked whether he was sure Dr. Adenauer had approved

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this and he said Strauss had told him that the Chancellor had agreed. General Norstad was however not quite convinced that the Chancellor had fully understood. He asked me my opinion and I said that without a good deal of thought I would not like to express one.

6. I explained to him the difficulties the British Government had had with M.C.54/1 and the impossibility of my defending a statement that the air defence forces of all NATO countries in Europe should be placed under the operational command of SACEUR in peace and war. I thought it should be possible to make the planning arrangements but to word this document without a sentence like this which - taken from its context - would be very difficult for a British Government to defend in the House of Commons. We had many memories of how the fighter Air Force had saved us because it was under our sole control. I explained to him the instructions given to Sir William Dickson this morning and I did not feel that General Norstad - although rather disappointed - took this decision of the Government as anything but quite reasonable in the circumstances.

7. Finally I asked General Norstad to keep in close touch with me personally whenever he wished and expressed the hope that he would always call on me when he came to London.

H.M.

November 26, 1958

November 26, 1958.

~~SECRET~~

Dear Sabatini,

I enclose a copy of a record which the Prime Minister made of his conversation with General Norstad this morning. This is sent to you for your Minister on a personal basis, and the Prime Minister would be grateful if it could be returned to this office in due course, since he does not like records containing "personalities" to be left in Departments.

Yours sincerely,

J.A.B.

J. Sabatini, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

returned

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H.M.

November 26, 1958

Defence Organisation
Prime Minister~~SECRET~~

PdZ

Foreign Office, 1/11
S.W.1.

December 1, 1958.

Dear Philip,

Freddie Bishop sent Denis Laskey, under cover of a letter dated November 26, a copy of the record by the Prime Minister of a conversation which he had with General Norstad on that day.

As far as stationing IRBMs in Germany is concerned, the position is simply that General Norstad has never wished to put these missiles in the Federal Republic, and he specifically told Tony Rumbold this on one occasion. He considers Germany to be much too near the front line. The only countries in which he at present contemplates stationing IRBMs are France, Italy and Turkey. At their meeting last December, you remember that the NATO Heads of Government agreed that IRBMs should be stationed on the territory of the countries of the alliance and that SACEUR should decide how to carry out this decision.

Strauss' desire to have IRBMs in Germany is no doubt a reflection of his ambitions for his country; he evidently shares the widespread belief that the possession of an independent deterrent raises the status of a country in the world. If General Norstad were to give in to these solicitations, Germany would not ipso facto have an independent deterrent since the war heads

/for

P.F. de Zulueta Esq.

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for the IREMs would still be under American control. But it would be a step towards Germany having an independent deterrent. The recent Cabinet Paper recognised that even to supply tactical atomic weapons for the use of the German army carried with it a risk that Germany would eventually emerge as an independent nuclear power.

The Secretary of State feels that we must be careful what advice we give to General Norstad about this lest the fact that we had given such advice should come to the ears of the Germans. He feels that in substance our advice ought to be that he should make his plans for the stationing of these weapons purely on military grounds and not allow what are obviously political considerations to enter into the matter.

In view of the very private nature of General Norstad's conversation with the Prime Minister on this point, the Secretary of State does not intend to pass on the information even to Sir Frank Roberts. He feels that sooner or later, if Strauss renews his request, it will no doubt come to our ears in circumstances which will enable us to express our opinion.

Yours ever,

Brooks Richards.

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SECRET

Defence Organisation
 Prime Minister
 Pdz
 Foreign Office, 1/11
 S.W.1.

December 1, 1958.

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Yours ever,

Brooks Richards.

Pres 11 / 7002

12/17/58

France

Extract of Foreign Secretary's conversation with General de Gaulle
at Hotel Matignon on December 17
1958

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The General's Plan

General de Gaulle rehearsed his plan at great length without adding anything very new to what he had already said. An end must be put to the system whereby the United States acted in isolation, particularly as regards strategic matters. France could not accept this. The NATO system was based on "integration". But the U.S. fleet in the Mediterranean had nothing to do with NATO. Nor, for that matter, had the British Bomber Command. But integration did apply to France save only of course in Africa, for which NATO did not provide at all, though it could be said to provide "very badly" for the Mediterranean. Therefore an entire reshaping of NATO must be undertaken quite soon and, indeed, must be accomplished before the Spring.

As for the new form of consultation proposed by him, what he had suggested was that the Ambassadors' Conference should meet in permanent session in Washington, and that if they got into difficulties there should, if necessary, be a tripartite Government conference. In addition, the

/Standing Group

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Standing Group should be stepped up and reinforced so as to consider world strategic plans. In this complete reorganisation of NATO the Treaty must also be amended so as to cover Africa north of the Sahara. Clearly, also, the Commands should be reshuffled and there should in addition be a "sharing" of atomic arms. The Secretary of State said that according to Mr. Dulles the General had repeatedly spoken of an "organism". For our part we thought it would be best not to institutionalise the General's proposal. Was the General really suggesting institutions? General de Gaulle said that if what he had already said involved institutions, then that was so. But he did not quite understand why we should use that word. The Secretary of State said that we might, for instance, approach problems as they came up, the Ambassadors possibly meeting from time to time to discuss individual questions. The alternative whereby they meet in permanent session seemed to him rather unrealistic. General de Gaulle said that he certainly thought the Ambassadors would have much to do. They should clearly consider political plans for Germany, Iran, the Middle East, the Pacific, North Africa and Black Africa. Whether in doing so they would have to regard themselves as an institution he could not say. He repeated what he had already said as regards his proposal and added that if it was not accepted the whole Alliance would be "devoid of real meaning". This would not mean, of course, that we should not

/defend

defend ourselves if attacked, but we should have to defend ourselves individually and without any co-ordinated plan.

The Secretary of State raised the question of German and Italian reactions. General de Gaulle said that Mr. Dulles had also mentioned the Germans. He expressed his respect for Chancellor Adenauer and for the German contribution to defence, and rehearsed his well known views about the present condition of Germany preventing her from taking part in any tripartite talks. He did not think that Germany would be really irritated if she were not included in his three power group. All he was proposing was something analogous to the Concert of Europe which had kept the peace between 1870 and 1914. Now it was necessary to have a World Concert. He seemed to think that our allies, on reflection, ought to accept this self-evident fact. Of course, he added, if they were particularly involved - and he instanced the Berlin question - they could be brought in at a suitable stage.

The Secretary of State said that as he understood it, the General had objected to the Alliance being founded on the principle of integration. What would it look like, in his view, if it were, so to speak, disintegrated? The General said that it would take a very long time to explain this thought, but broadly speaking it could be formulated as follows. At the head there would be a "world organisation" (organisation mondiale) or, if the Foreign Secretary objected to ^{the word} a "world something". Under this there would be "theatres d'operations" in (a) Europe, Africa north of the Sahara and the Middle East: (b) the Indian Ocean: (c) the Pacific: (d) the Arctic and part of the North Atlantic. /All this

All this would seem to be in accordance with mere common sense. Having set up these "theatres" it would be for the national forces in them to provide for their defence in time of peace under completely national commands. But at the same time (also in time of peace) there should be designated Commanders and staffs who would be prepared to take over in wartime, i.e. from the moment when war broke out. From that moment onwards the forces in the area would not be national. Such a set-up was essential for France at any rate because if a State did not feel that it was taking any real part in its own defence and that it was only, so to speak, a cog in a wheel, it would only fight badly when the moment came or not at all. All Europe suffered from this evil which he had now decided to cure. For instance, France still had a Fleet, an Army and an Air Force; but the Fleet was under foreign command, the units ^{stationed} ~~dispersed~~ ~~or in~~ ⁱⁿ bases which were at the disposal of NATO, and officers and men consequently felt rather humiliated. This applied also to the Air Force and, to some extent also the Army with the exception, of course, of those parts of the Army that were in Africa. They were all, he repeated, under foreign command, which was a terrible thing for anybody with any national feeling.

/Then again,

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Then again, NATO's area did not extend far enough to the south and as for the proposal to instal launching ramps and rockets, whose nuclear warheads were in the hands of the Americans, this was totally unacceptable to France. Moreover, the fact that the Americans had stockpiles of bombs in French territory meant that they could, if they liked, at any moment start a war from that territory. France could never accept this. At this point the Secretary of State said that in England, at any rate, we had a right of veto on the launching by the Americans of rockets from British soil or the use of British bases by American bombers for bombing purposes. Sir G. Jebb also observed that he did not quite see how the Americans could start a war from French territory when it was agreed that they could not take any offensive action from that territory except with French consent. General De Gaulle replied that this might theoretically be the case, but that he thought that the necessary decision would be taken "at the level of the NATO Council", which (he was understood to say) would decide whether the war should start or not.

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From 11/2929

COPY

DEFENCE (DM)
Prime Minister

12/18/5

You may wish to see this
note by Sir F. Roberts
about the position on
nuclear weapons in
W-Germany.

FB 23/12

TOP SECRET

SECRETARY OF STATE

General Norstad told me at an early stage in the dinner at my flat yesterday that he particularly wanted your advice on a matter which was very much disturbing him.

When he spoke to you after dinner, he explained that he was having considerable difficulties with Herr Strauss about the supply of nuclear weapons to the German forces. It emerged that the immediate issue was the supply of nuclear bombs for the German Strike Squadron, which has now been fully trained and is operational. These would of course be supplied in accordance with normal practice, i.e. under U.S. lock-and-key.

General Norstad also referred to the difficulties he had had with Herr Strauss about the latter's enquiry about the stationing of ICBMs in the Federal Republic, about which he had already spoken to the Prime Minister in London last month. Although Herr Strauss maintained that Dr. Adenauer was in agreement with him in raising this matter, General Norstad had his doubts.

I should perhaps explain that these issues also arose in my flat when the Minister of Defence and Herr Strauss were dining with me on Monday, December 15. Herr Strauss had come straight from a meeting with General Norstad and was very critical indeed of what he

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termed the surprising American refusal to place nuclear warheads in the Federal Republic for the use of the German forces, in accordance with agreed NATO strategy. He then explained that he was not so much concerned with IRBMs as with what might be called tactical weapons. If he could not have nuclear warheads, he saw no point in going in for the trouble and expense of equipping German forces with the complicated delivery mechanisms. As regards IRBMs, Herr Strauss took the line that he had only said that if the Alliance needed squadrons in Germany, then Germany, as a loyal member, would be prepared to find a place for them. When I mentioned this conversation to General Norstad on December 16, he said that there had been a complete misunderstanding with Herr Strauss as regards the supply of tactical nuclear warheads. On IRBMs, he was by no means sure that Dr. Adenauer really understood what Herr Strauss had said and he was sure that he did not really agree with any such proposal.

To return to your own conversation with General Norstad, he said that he was consulting you on a personal basis. Replying on the same basis, you took the line that there was no reason why nuclear warheads should not be placed in Germany at the disposal of the German forces in accordance with agreed NATO strategy. In the recent debates in London, you had made it clear that the Germans must have the same arms as any of the allies, but of course

TOP SECRET

under the usual NATO rules, i.e. U.S. lock-and-key. General Norstad said that this was his own view. On IRMS, you were, I think, in general agreement with General Norstad that there was certainly no need for the Germans to have them and that Herr Strauss was unlikely to have Dr. Adenauer's support in asking for them.

"Frank Roberts"

December 18, 1958.

TOP SECRET