

TOP SECRET

nd but
1/63

RESTRICTED DATA

TAB I

BOMBS FOR TURKISH STRIKE AIRCRAFT

As part of the overall program of our nuclear relationship with Turkey, there is the question of Mk 28 bombs for Turkish strike aircraft. The first Turkish F-100 squadron of 18 aircraft completed training and was fully ready to take over its assigned strike role on 1 July 1962. The second F-100 squadron completed training and was ready on 30 November 1962.

Because of restrictions contained in NSAM 143 on the further dispersal of nuclear weapons for use by Turkish forces, the Mk 28 bombs for these aircraft have not been moved to Turkey. This failure on the part of the U.S. to provide the promised weapons for these aircraft has caused concern in recent months among prominent Turkish officials including the Commanding General of the Turkish Air Force. So far, U.S. statesmen have not been in a position to give an explanation for this delay.

Now the U.S. is initiating steps to remove the Turkish Air Force JUPITER missiles with a target date for their removal of 1 April 1963. It would seem probable that this action, coupled with the U.S. failure to provide the nuclear bombs for Turkish strike aircraft, would have an unfortunate effect on U.S.-Turkish relations and possibly cause the Turkish government to question some of the other cooperative arrangements we have with Turkey, such as the basing on a rotational basis of 2 USAF nuclear strike squadrons at Adana or certain communication facilities in Turkey.

Therefore, it would appear desirable to proceed promptly with the dispersal of Mk 28 bombs to Turkey for use by their strike aircraft squadrons. Concern has been expressed, however, over the security of these weapons and the possibility of unauthorized use by Turkey, particularly those placed on Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) aircraft.

The Permissive Action Link (PAL) which will soon be available for Mk 28 bombs can provide a partial solution to this problem. Properly used it can insure against unauthorized use for a period of at least 2 hours. This device will not be available, however, until the summer of 1963 and then only in sufficient number to permit installation on those bombs actually hung on QRA aircraft.

As

TOP SECRET

RESTRICTED DATA

Handwritten notes at the bottom of the page, including "1963" and "Reference must be made to the Strategic Air Command for the distribution of any such material."

TOP SECRET
RESTRICTED DATA

-2-

As one alternative, we could delay dispersal of the weapons to Turkey until the PAL's are available at least in sufficient quantities to have all QRA bombs equipped and tell the Turks we will disperse weapons for use by their aircraft by 1963.

A second alternative, which is really a modification of the above, would be to disperse the bombs to Turkey now, but keep them in storage sites and not permit them to be used on QRA until the PAL's have been installed. This alternative would probably be more satisfactory to the Turks than alternative one, since it would be an immediate step toward giving their strike aircraft a nuclear capability. In both these alternatives, however, the Turks are bound to note the fact that other NATO countries, including the Greeks, now have strike aircraft on the QRA with nuclear bombs that do not have PAL's installed. This discrimination against Turkey in our policy could best be explained by pointing out our intention to limit buildup of QRA forces until PAL's are available and to retrofit those now on QRA as soon as production of PAL's permits.

A third alternative and the one that would be most acceptable to the Turks would be to proceed immediately with the promised dispersal, permit the bombs to be used on QRA and then retrofit with PAL's as soon as possible. Security of the bombs might be enhanced somewhat by increasing the number of U.S. custodial personnel, but the fact remains, that in the face of a concerted effort by the Turks to use the QRA weapons without authority, they could probably do so, even with greatly increased numbers of U.S. custodians. The only way to prevent this would be for the U.S. custodial personnel to have the capability to immediately destroy the weapons if their unauthorized use appeared imminent. This capability does not now exist and as far as we know, is not planned in the near future.

The first alternative is recommended.

Therefore, it is recommended that we advise the Turkish Government that we will disperse nuclear weapons to Turkey for their strike aircraft during 1963.

It should be noted in connection with the above recommendation that Presidential approval will be required before these bombs can be dispersed to Turkey.

TOP SECRET-RESTRICTED DATA

113/69

TOP SECRET

January 3, 1963

To : **The Secretary**

From : **Jeffrey C. Kitchen**

Subject: **Removal of Jupiter Missiles**

Development of a policy package on removal of Jupiters from Italy and Turkey has moved rapidly and well. A concept paper and instructions for the two Ambassadors, plus the texts of letters from Mr. McNamara to the respective Secretaries of Defense indicating that further negotiations will be in the hands of the Ambassadors, will be ready for final State-Defense approval at a meeting of the Steering Group at 5:00 o'clock this afternoon.

There is only one point at issue between the two Departments and this rests squarely with Mr. McNamara personally. This is his present insistence that April 1 be included in the instructions as the target date for beginning actual removal of the missiles.

By agreement with Mac Bundy, after learning of your plans to depart on Friday afternoon, we do not now contemplate a Cabinet-level meeting this week-end to go over any of the Nassau follow-up. However, since he feels so strongly about the April 1 date, it is quite possible that Secretary McNamara may telephone you. The attached memorandum sets forth our strong view that we should not confine ourselves to an arbitrary date but should move as quickly as diplomatically possible taking into account the need to preserve our psychological and political relations with the Turks.

You will recognize that Secretary McNamara may believe that we have a mandate from the President to accomplish

the removal

TOP SECRET

January 3, 1963

the removal beginning no later than April 1. There may be, therefore, a requirement to assure both the President and Secretary McNamara that injecting April 1 into our planning serves no useful purpose.

If Mr. McNamara does not telephone you, you may wish to have Mr. Ball deal with this as necessary over this week-end.

Manual of Jupiter Missiles

Development of a policy package on removal of Jupiters from Italy and Turkey has moved rapidly and will include a concept paper and instructions for the two states. The Secretary of Defense is indicating that the instructions will be in the hands of the Commanders in Chief and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their approval at a meeting on 1/3/63.

Attachment:

Memorandum re Jupiters dated 1/3/63, SECRET

There is a possibility that the Secretary of Defense may have decided that the removal of Jupiters should begin on April 1. This is his present intention and is included in the instructions as the target date for beginning actual removal of the missiles.

By agreement with Mac Bundy, after learning of your plans to depart on Friday afternoon, we do not now consider it necessary to have you attend this meeting this week-end to go over any of the issues involved. However, since he feels so strongly about the April 1 date, it is quite possible that Secretary McNamara will want you to attend. The attached memorandum will advise you of the situation and you should act accordingly.

cc: **The Under Secretary**

JCKitchen:rp
1/3/63

It will be recognized that Secretary McNamara may believe that it is a necessary step for the President to accomplish the removal

1/3/63

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY

G/PM

January 3, 1963

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

TO: Jeffrey C. Kitchen
FROM: Mr. Weiss *Wey*
SUBJECT: Jupiters - 5:00 p.m. Steering Group Meeting

1. You will find that there is only one split between State and Defense on the Jupiter problem. This has to do with the question of whether or not an April 1 target date for dismantling of the Jupiters should be explicitly included in our Concept Paper, in the Instructions to the Ambassadors, and in the discussions with the Turks and Italians.

2. It was the unanimous conclusion of our working group that this date should not appear. However, in our last meeting Harry Rowen reluctantly reported that Mr. McNamara was going to insist upon its inclusion "unless Secretary Rusk could talk him out of it."

3. I strongly recommend that we go to the mat on this one for the following reasons:

a. The judgment is entirely one of tactics and, so far as I am aware, has no direct military significance.

b. The question of negotiating pace and attitude, especially with the Turks, may be important to accomplishing a successful outcome. While perhaps slightly less true of the Italians, with the Turks, appearance of putting them under pressure and forcing them to act under duress would be highly counter-productive.

c. On the other hand, if the negotiation process proceeds naturally and normally at a rapid pace, there is no reason why we cannot shoot for April 1, or even sooner. Freddy Reinhardt told me that he thought the Italians might beat the April 1 date. The point is that the specification of the date of April 1 should not be the determinant but rather the judgment of how fast a process is consistent with accomplishment of the objective.

d. In regard to that latter point, our Committee concluded, that it would be helpful in our negotiations with the

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

Turks if some progress could first be made with the Italians -- this may or may not permit the April 1 date for the Turks.

e. An explicit date might leak with all sorts of undesirable implications. First of all, it smacks of a US ultimatum -- I can just see the Alsop or Pearson column right now. Moreover, and this is an important point, April turns out to be just six months from October, a nice round figure for a "deal" if one were of a suspicious mind. Plenty of unsympathetic observers will be.

f. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that we do not know how long it will take to complete certain stages of the negotiations. For example, what will happen in the discussions in NATO? It is possible that Stikker, or the Germans, or the French, or others, may raise hell over our proposed extraction of the missiles, given their sensitivities on the US attitude toward NATO's nuclear strategy, in which event the whole process could be slowed down.

g. The one request which Ray Hare has made -- and I must say he has been extremely conservative and in no way alarmist in his analysis of the problem presented in negotiating this matter with the Turks -- is that we never force ourselves into a box of insisting on a time schedule which has the result of forcing the issue in such a way that the Turks confront us with a flatly negative position. In other words, we should have the latitude to feel our way through the situation, backing off and leaving time for thought and discussion if this seems in our interest. This is not consistent with an arbitrarily established April 1 date.

h. I believe there is solid and convincing evidence that we have moved very rapidly to develop a government position on the Jupiters with all parties including the Ambassadors clearly aware of the sense of priority accorded this effort by the Secretaries of State and Defense. The time schedule envisaged by our scenario bears this out. This, after all, should be the focal point of attention for senior level review unless there is some particular justification for the establishment of an April 1 date. If there is, it has not been conveyed to our group.

4. In the absence of a clear and convincing justification in support of the specification of an April 1 date by DOD,

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

despite the fact that this date was previously mentioned by Mr. McNamara in his discussions with the Turks and Italians, I would oppose its inclusion in further communications with the two governments unless the Ambassadors, in the course of the negotiations, judge that insertion of such a date would facilitate the accomplishment of the desired objective.

cc: WE - Mr. Meloy
Ambassador Hare
Ambassador Reinhardt

G/PM/Weiss/v1

SECRET

1/3/63
4
kg

TOP SECRET
IND/Min/2

STEERING GROUP ON IMPLEMENTING
THE NASSAU DECISIONS

Minutes of Second Meeting
Held January 3, 1963 at 5:00 p.m.

Present:	Mr. Kitchen, Chairman	Mr. Garthoff
	Mr. McNaughton, Vice Chairman	Mr. Klein
	Ambassador Hare	Mr. Spiers
	Ambassador Reinhardt	Mr. Orwick
	Ambassador Finletter	Mr. Weiss
	Mr. Meloy	Mr. Yarmolinsky
	Mr. McGeorge Bundy	Mr. Rowen
	Mr. Rostow	General Emrick
	Mr. Brubeck	Mr. Popper
	Mr. Chayes	Mr. Schaetzel

Agenda Item 1 - Mr. Meloy's Planning and Objectives Paper on the
Jupiter Missiles.

Mr. Kitchen opened the meeting by welcoming Ambassadors Hare and Reinhardt who had been asked to participate in the discussion on Jupiter missiles. He then asked Mr. Meloy to comment on his Sub-Group's paper on this subject which had been distributed to Members at the meeting. Mr. Meloy pointed out they had avoided use of the word "withdrawal" and were using the word "replace" in respect to the removal of the missiles. At the end of the paper there was a proposed time schedule of actions which he thought would be realizable. There was an unresolved point, namely, although it was proposed most moves would be completed by mid-March, there was a question about the desirability of an April 1 deadline, particularly from the point of view of publicity resulting from leaks. As a result of the ensuing discussion, it was agreed:

1. that the April 1 deadline should be removed wherever it appeared in the paper;
2. that it should be fully understood by Members that it was a U.S. deadline for internal use only;
3. that it was not to be mentioned to either the Italians or the Turks.

Mr. McNaughton then related the deadline to the statement in the letter to the Italian Minister of Defense that the Polaris force would be on station by April 1. He believed meeting this deadline was not a problem. Mr. Rowen suggested it perhaps would be better to say "on station by April".

Ambassador

TOP SECRET

JAN 14 1963

TOP SECRET

-2-

Ambassador Reinhardt suggested that the vessels be shown to the Italians by paying calls at Italian ports before the Jupiters were dismantled. Mr. Rowen replied there would be no problem in their visiting Italy before going on station.

Mr. Meloy concluded his comment by pointing out that the letters to the MODs would go forward as soon as possible after approval and preceding the return of the Ambassadors. Future communication would be through the Ambassadors and their instructions would follow shortly. In respect to Tab E - Public Affairs Problems - the actual papers would be drafted after this paper as a whole had been approved. It was noted that Tabs I and J were not ready for submission.

Mr. McNaughton stated he wished to raise a problem. In moving back the deadline to supply F-104Gs to Turkey to May 1963, it would be necessary to take planes away from the Republic of China, Norway, Denmark and Greece. Ambassador Hare interjected a question on assisting the Turks on their public stance on the whole Jupiter replacement issue as soon as possible and mentioned he was planning to return on the 9th. Ambassador Reinhardt commented on this point that from the Italian view there were two serious aspects. First, the removal of the Jupiters would leave a gap in their weaponry. However, he thought the Polaris by being on station would solve this problem. Second, there would be a gap in Italian participation in the exercise. They have participated in manning the Jupiters. What would replace this cooperation? They will undoubtedly raise the issue of equipping the Garibaldi and two submarines with Polaris racks. There is also the question of nuclear propulsion for their submarines. This makes it imperative that we move on multilateral force and that within months we have men selected for training, otherwise the Italians may interpret our actions as moving backwards. In reply, Mr. Kitchen referred to the Nassau Communique, and Mr. Rowen stated that, in theory, Italian and Turkish officers participate in targeting in SHAPE. Ambassador Hare raised a question on the meaning of staged evolution. It was concluded that the Ambassadors could best answer questions on the points raised by referring to the Nassau Communique and to the statements which Mr. Ball will make at the forthcoming NAC meeting.

Ambassador Hare asked if a non-nuclear country could in any way contribute to a mixed-manned force. Mr. Bundy replied affirmatively and commented that the Turks might participate in a mixed-manned force sooner than the French if the French do not react positively to our approach on this matter.

Mr. Kitchen

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

-3-

Mr. Kitchen asked General Emrick for his comments from the JCS view on the paper. General Emrick noted that in the letter to the Italian MOD submarines were to be "assigned" to SACEUR rather than "earmarked" for SACEUR and that Secretary McNamara had approved this designation. He continued by saying we should remove any implication under the modernization of SETAF that we are replacing the Corporals one for one with Sergeants. It was generally agreed that the insertion of the phrase "furnishing a suitable force" should remove this implication. He also commented that in the last paragraph of both letters the words "this proposal" should be plural.

Mr. McNaughton questioned support of SETAF "for at least an interim period" and related it to the problem of Italianization. Ambassador Reinhardt commented that support of SETAF should be left vague with an option for Italianization.

Returning to the letter to the Turkish MOD, General Emrick commented that the JCS wished to maintain the present schedule of deliveries of F-104Gs. Advancing delivery of the planes to the Turks would not mean they would be effective militarily, because the Turks would not be trained to either fly or to maintain them. It was pointed out that Secretary McNamara wanted the planes there in May. Mr. Kitchen commented we would prefer this for political reasons. It was agreed that Mr. McNaughton would clarify this point with Secretary McNamara.

On the question of nuclear bomb dispersal, it was stated that four MK 28s would be in Turkey by July and the remainder by the end of the year. Dispersal would require Presidential approval. Mr. Bundy stated the President was against new deployment of nuclear bombs without permissive links. It was suggested that the problem could be avoided by transferring the bombs to igloos, with the links supplied as soon as possible. Mr. Rowen said he would work out a schedule on delivery of the links and we could merely inform the Turks that nuclear bombs would be delivered by the end of 1963. He was asked to hedge the assurance so no extensive deliveries would be made before the links were available. Mr. Bundy commented that he thought Presidential approval could be obtained under the circumstances, i.e., with some links to be delivered by the end of 1963, but that the President would also wish to know whether provision to the Turks would defer installation of links on weapons scheduled for other recipients. Mr. Rowen agreed to obtain a comprehensive report on the permissive link picture.

Mr. Bundy

TOP SECRET

Mr. Bundy pointed out that presentation of the Jupiter package to the President was scheduled for Saturday morning in Palm Beach. It was agreed that Mr. Kitchen and Mr. McNaughton would coordinate any revisions and the amendments to the package (being carried by courier on Friday) would be wired.

Agenda Item 2 - Mr. Rostow's Paper and Summary on Post-Nassau Strategy (Sub-Group V)

Mr. Kitchen asked Mr. Rostow to comment briefly on his Basic Strategy paper. Subsequent discussion revealed that Defense had not received copies of the basic paper. Mr. Yarmolinsky suggested that Defense prepare a written comment on Mr. Rostow's paper and Mr. Rowen accepted responsibility for preparing this. It was agreed that Mr. Rostow's paper would be discussed at a later meeting.

Mr. Bundy brought the attention of the members to the President's backgrounder and commented that the press had not made as good use of it as they should have. He asked that there be wide distribution of the backgrounder within both the Departments of State and Defense.

Agenda Item 3 - Progress Reports by the Chairmen of the Sub-Groups I, II, III, and VI.

Mr. Kitchen referred to the reports from Chairmen of Sub-Groups which had been attached to the Agenda. There were no comments in addition to the written reports.

Mr. Kitchen referred to the appointment of Mr. Armstrong within Sub-Group I to consider all alternatives in making arms deliveries to the British.

Mr. Weiss referred to Mr. Rostow's paper and raised the question of whether its treatment of the "NATO Executive Committee" concept should not be picked up by Sub-Group II. After some discussion, Mr. Popper agreed to work up a paper on the subject although it would, as a matter of priority, have to follow his Sub-Group II paper. He also noted it would probably require a different approach and, therefore, require different membership within his Sub-Group.

General Emrick reported that JCS was working on a paper considering what could be done to establish a nuclear force. Its concept was divided into two stages: First, what can be done with material available now for the experience for future use? Second, what could possibly be done under a multilateral force?

Mr. Schaetzel

TOP SECRET

-5-

Mr. Schaetzel commented that in Sub-Group III they were attempting to determine where the French could begin in order to gain parity with the UK. He stated he would expect a series of flash communications from Ambassador Bohlen on what we intend to offer the French. He stated the Defense Department would have a first cut at this problem, the AEC would refine it, then the Sub-Group would expand and refine on these papers. Mr. McNaughton commented that as a mode of operation it was acceptable to DOD to proceed as Mr. Schaetzel had suggested, i.e., papers would be exchanged until the problem required more comprehensive treatment in a full Steering Group or Sub-Group forum.

Note was taken of Sub-Group IV's meeting at 10 o'clock on Monday and of the Sub-Group VI paper which would be available shortly for the Steering Group.


Other Business

Mr. Kitchen said he has asked INR to prepare papers on the reaction to Nassau in other NATO countries.

Mr. Schaetzel asked that Mr. Dutton be cut in on the work of the Steering Group because of eventual Congressional consideration of some aspects of its work.


Mr. Schaetzel added that Mr. Ball, in going to Paris for the NAC presentation, would also visit London and Bonn and possibly Rome.

Mr. Brubeck asked all members to keep as much material as possible out of the "Eyes Only" category, using "Limit Distribution S/S" as much as possible as an alternative, in order to ease distribution of papers.



John Lloyd III
Executive Secretariat (S/S)
Room 7313, Ext. 8171

TOP SECRET



113/69

TOP SECRET

January 3, 1963

To : **The Secretary**

From : **Jeffrey C. Kitchen**

Subject: **Removal of Jupiter Missiles**

Development of a policy package on removal of Jupiters from Italy and Turkey has moved rapidly and well. A concept paper and instructions for the two Ambassadors, plus the texts of letters from Mr. McNamara to the respective Secretaries of Defense indicating that further negotiations will be in the hands of the Ambassadors, will be ready for final State-Defense approval at a meeting of the Steering Group at 5:00 o'clock this afternoon.

There is only one point at issue between the two Departments and this rests squarely with Mr. McNamara personally. This is his present insistence that April 1 be included in the instructions as the target date for beginning actual removal of the missiles.

By agreement with Mac Bundy, after learning of your plans to depart on Friday afternoon, we do not now contemplate a Cabinet-level meeting this week-end to go over any of the Nassau follow-up. However, since he feels so strongly about the April 1 date, it is quite possible that Secretary McNamara may telephone you. The attached memorandum sets forth our strong view that we should not confine ourselves to an arbitrary date but should move as quickly as diplomatically possible taking into account the need to preserve our psychological and political relations with the Turks.

You will recognize that Secretary McNamara may believe that we have a mandate from the President to accomplish

the removal

TOP SECRET

January 3, 1963

the removal beginning no later than April 1. There may be, therefore, a requirement to assure both the President and Secretary McNamara that injecting April 1 into our planning serves no useful purpose.

If Mr. McNamara does not telephone you, you may wish to have Mr. Ball deal with this as necessary over this week-end.

Manual of Jupiter Missiles

Development of a policy package on removal of Jupiters from Italy and Turkey has moved rapidly and will include a concept paper and instructions for the two states. The Secretary of Defense is indicating that the instructions will be in the hands of the Commanders in Chief and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their approval at a meeting on 1/3/63.

Attachment:

Memorandum re Jupiters dated 1/3/63, SECRET

There is no need for haste in this matter. The instructions will be in the hands of the Commanders in Chief and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their approval at a meeting on 1/3/63. This is his present intention that April 1 be included in the instructions as the target date for beginning actual removal of the missiles.

By agreement with Mac Bundy, after learning of your plans to depart on Friday afternoon, we do not now consider a Sublevel meeting this week-end to go over any of the issues involved. However, since he feels so strongly about the April 1 date, it is quite possible that Secretary

cc: **The Under Secretary**

JCKitchen:rp
1/3/63

It will be recognized that Secretary McNamara may believe that a date is required from the President to accomplish

the removal

1/3/63

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY

G/PM

January 3, 1963

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

TO: Jeffrey C. Kitchen
FROM: Mr. Weiss *Wey*
SUBJECT: Jupiters - 5:00 p.m. Steering Group Meeting

1. You will find that there is only one split between State and Defense on the Jupiter problem. This has to do with the question of whether or not an April 1 target date for dismantling of the Jupiters should be explicitly included in our Concept Paper, in the Instructions to the Ambassadors, and in the discussions with the Turks and Italians.

2. It was the unanimous conclusion of our working group that this date should not appear. However, in our last meeting Harry Rowen reluctantly reported that Mr. McNamara was going to insist upon its inclusion "unless Secretary Rusk could talk him out of it."

3. I strongly recommend that we go to the mat on this one for the following reasons:

a. The judgment is entirely one of tactics and, so far as I am aware, has no direct military significance.

b. The question of negotiating pace and attitude, especially with the Turks, may be important to accomplishing a successful outcome. While perhaps slightly less true of the Italians, with the Turks, appearance of putting them under pressure and forcing them to act under duress would be highly counter-productive.

c. On the other hand, if the negotiation process proceeds naturally and normally at a rapid pace, there is no reason why we cannot shoot for April 1, or even sooner. Freddy Reinhardt told me that he thought the Italians might beat the April 1 date. The point is that the specification of the date of April 1 should not be the determinant but rather the judgment of how fast a process is consistent with accomplishment of the objective.

d. In regard to that latter point, our Committee concluded, that it would be helpful in our negotiations with the

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

Turks if some progress could first be made with the Italians -- this may or may not permit the April 1 date for the Turks.

e. An explicit date might leak with all sorts of undesirable implications. First of all, it smacks of a US ultimatum -- I can just see the Alsop or Pearson column right now. Moreover, and this is an important point, April turns out to be just six months from October, a nice round figure for a "deal" if one were of a suspicious mind. Plenty of unsympathetic observers will be.

f. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that we do not know how long it will take to complete certain stages of the negotiations. For example, what will happen in the discussions in NATO? It is possible that Stikker, or the Germans, or the French, or others, may raise hell over our proposed extraction of the missiles, given their sensitivities on the US attitude toward NATO's nuclear strategy, in which event the whole process could be slowed down.

g. The one request which Ray Hare has made -- and I must say he has been extremely conservative and in no way alarmist in his analysis of the problem presented in negotiating this matter with the Turks -- is that we never force ourselves into a box of insisting on a time schedule which has the result of forcing the issue in such a way that the Turks confront us with a flatly negative position. In other words, we should have the latitude to feel our way through the situation, backing off and leaving time for thought and discussion if this seems in our interest. This is not consistent with an arbitrarily established April 1 date.

h. I believe there is solid and convincing evidence that we have moved very rapidly to develop a government position on the Jupiters with all parties including the Ambassadors clearly aware of the sense of priority accorded this effort by the Secretaries of State and Defense. The time schedule envisaged by our scenario bears this out. This, after all, should be the focal point of attention for senior level review unless there is some particular justification for the establishment of an April 1 date. If there is, it has not been conveyed to our group.

4. In the absence of a clear and convincing justification in support of the specification of an April 1 date by DOD,

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

despite the fact that this date was previously mentioned by Mr. McNamara in his discussions with the Turks and Italians, I would oppose its inclusion in further communications with the two governments unless the Ambassadors, in the course of the negotiations, judge that insertion of such a date would facilitate the accomplishment of the desired objective.

cc: WE - Mr. Meloy
Ambassador Hare
Ambassador Reinhardt

G/PM/Weiss/v1

SECRET

TOP SECRET

-2-

Ambassador Reinhardt suggested that the vessels be shown to the Italians by paying calls at Italian ports before the Jupiters were dismantled. Mr. Rowen replied there would be no problem in their visiting Italy before going on station.

Mr. Meloy concluded his comment by pointing out that the letters to the MODs would go forward as soon as possible after approval and preceding the return of the Ambassadors. Future communication would be through the Ambassadors and their instructions would follow shortly. In respect to Tab E - Public Affairs Problems - the actual papers would be drafted after this paper as a whole had been approved. It was noted that Tabs I and J were not ready for submission.

Mr. McNaughton stated he wished to raise a problem. In moving back the deadline to supply F-104Gs to Turkey to May 1963, it would be necessary to take planes away from the Republic of China, Norway, Denmark and Greece. Ambassador Hare interjected a question on assisting the Turks on their public stance on the whole Jupiter replacement issue as soon as possible and mentioned he was planning to return on the 9th. Ambassador Reinhardt commented on this point that from the Italian view there were two serious aspects. First, the removal of the Jupiters would leave a gap in their weaponry. However, he thought the Polaris by being on station would solve this problem. Second, there would be a gap in Italian participation in the exercise. They have participated in manning the Jupiters. What would replace this cooperation? They will undoubtedly raise the issue of equipping the Garibaldi and two submarines with Polaris racks. There is also the question of nuclear propulsion for their submarines. This makes it imperative that we move on multilateral force and that within months we have men selected for training, otherwise the Italians may interpret our actions as moving backwards. In reply, Mr. Kitchen referred to the Nassau Communique, and Mr. Rowen stated that, in theory, Italian and Turkish officers participate in targeting in SHAPE. Ambassador Hare raised a question on the meaning of staged evolution. It was concluded that the Ambassadors could best answer questions on the points raised by referring to the Nassau Communique and to the statements which Mr. Ball will make at the forthcoming NAC meeting.

Ambassador Hare asked if a non-nuclear country could in any way contribute to a mixed-manned force. Mr. Bundy replied affirmatively and commented that the Turks might participate in a mixed-manned force sooner than the French if the French do not react positively to our approach on this matter.

Mr. Kitchen

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

-3-

Mr. Kitchen asked General Emrick for his comments from the JCS view on the paper. General Emrick noted that in the letter to the Italian MOD submarines were to be "assigned" to SACEUR rather than "earmarked" for SACEUR and that Secretary McNamara had approved this designation. He continued by saying we should remove any implication under the modernization of SETAF that we are replacing the Corporals one for one with Sergeants. It was generally agreed that the insertion of the phrase "furnishing a suitable force" should remove this implication. He also commented that in the last paragraph of both letters the words "this proposal" should be plural.

Mr. McNaughton questioned support of SETAF "for at least an interim period" and related it to the problem of Italianization. Ambassador Reinhardt commented that support of SETAF should be left vague with an option for Italianization.

Returning to the letter to the Turkish MOD, General Emrick commented that the JCS wished to maintain the present schedule of deliveries of F-104Gs. Advancing delivery of the planes to the Turks would not mean they would be effective militarily, because the Turks would not be trained to either fly or to maintain them. It was pointed out that Secretary McNamara wanted the planes there in May. Mr. Kitchen commented we would prefer this for political reasons. It was agreed that Mr. McNaughton would clarify this point with Secretary McNamara.

On the question of nuclear bomb dispersal, it was stated that four MK 28s would be in Turkey by July and the remainder by the end of the year. Dispersal would require Presidential approval. Mr. Bundy stated the President was against new deployment of nuclear bombs without permissive links. It was suggested that the problem could be avoided by transferring the bombs to igloos, with the links supplied as soon as possible. Mr. Rowen said he would work out a schedule on delivery of the links and we could merely inform the Turks that nuclear bombs would be delivered by the end of 1963. He was asked to hedge the assurance so no extensive deliveries would be made before the links were available. Mr. Bundy commented that he thought Presidential approval could be obtained under the circumstances, i.e., with some links to be delivered by the end of 1963, but that the President would also wish to know whether provision to the Turks would defer installation of links on weapons scheduled for other recipients. Mr. Rowen agreed to obtain a comprehensive report on the permissive link picture.

Mr. Bundy

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

-4-

Mr. Bundy pointed out that presentation of the Jupiter package to the President was scheduled for Saturday morning in Palm Beach. It was agreed that Mr. Kitchen and Mr. McNaughton would coordinate any revisions and the amendments to the package (being carried by courier on Friday) would be wired.

Agenda Item 2 - Mr. Rostow's Paper and Summary on Post-Nassau Strategy (Sub-Group V)

Mr. Kitchen asked Mr. Rostow to comment briefly on his Basic Strategy paper. Subsequent discussion revealed that Defense had not received copies of the basic paper. Mr. Yarmolinsky suggested that Defense prepare a written comment on Mr. Rostow's paper and Mr. Rowen accepted responsibility for preparing this. It was agreed that Mr. Rostow's paper would be discussed at a later meeting.

Mr. Bundy brought the attention of the members to the President's backgrounder and commented that the press had not made as good use of it as they should have. He asked that there be wide distribution of the backgrounder within both the Departments of State and Defense.

Agenda Item 3 - Progress Reports by the Chairmen of the Sub-Groups I, II, III, and VI.

Mr. Kitchen referred to the reports from Chairmen of Sub-Groups which had been attached to the Agenda. There were no comments in addition to the written reports.

Mr. Kitchen referred to the appointment of Mr. Armstrong within Sub-Group I to consider all alternatives in making arms deliveries to the British.

Mr. Weiss referred to Mr. Rostow's paper and raised the question of whether its treatment of the "NATO Executive Committee" concept should not be picked up by Sub-Group II. After some discussion, Mr. Popper agreed to work up a paper on the subject although it would, as a matter of priority, have to follow his Sub-Group II paper. He also noted it would probably require a different approach and, therefore, require different membership within his Sub-Group.

General Emrick reported that JCS was working on a paper considering what could be done to establish a nuclear force. Its concept was divided into two stages: First, what can be done with material available now for the experience for future use? Second, what could possibly be done under a multilateral force?

Mr. Schaetzel

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

-5-

Mr. Schaetzel commented that in Sub-Group III they were attempting to determine where the French could begin in order to gain parity with the UK. He stated he would expect a series of flash communications from Ambassador Bohlen on what we intend to offer the French. He stated the Defense Department would have a first cut at this problem, the AEC would refine it, then the Sub-Group would expand and refine on these papers. Mr. McNaughton commented that as a mode of operation it was acceptable to DOD to proceed as Mr. Schaetzel had suggested, i.e., papers would be exchanged until the problem required more comprehensive treatment in a full Steering Group or Sub-Group forum.

Note was taken of Sub-Group IV's meeting at 10 o'clock on Monday and of the Sub-Group VI paper which would be available shortly for the Steering Group.

Other Business

Mr. Kitchen said he has asked INR to prepare papers on the reaction to Nassau in other NATO countries.

Mr. Schaetzel asked that Mr. Dutton be cut in on the work of the Steering Group because of eventual Congressional consideration of some aspects of its work.


Mr. Schaetzel added that Mr. Ball, in going to Paris for the NAC presentation, would also visit London and Bonn and possibly Rome.

Mr. Brubeck asked all members to keep as much material as possible out of the "Eyes Only" category, using "Limit Distribution S/S" as much as possible as an alternative, in order to ease distribution of papers.



John Lloyd III
Executive Secretariat (S/S)
Room 7313, Ext. 8171

TOP SECRET



SECRET

1/3/63

30

SECRET

January 3, 1963

IND/P/3

STEERING GROUP ON IMPLEMENTATING
THE NASSAU DECISIONS

POST-NASSAU STRATEGY

Summary and Conclusions

Submitted by Sub-Group 5

SECRET

Ball Pp 1154

SECRET

January 3, 1963

POST-NASSAU STRATEGY

Summary and Conclusions

I. U.S. Objectives

1. U.S. strategy post-Nassau should be controlled by two basic U.S. interests: (a) that an increasingly wealthy and assertive Europe move towards both intra-European unity and close partnership with the U.S. in the performance of common tasks, within the North Atlantic community and outside; (b) as part of the Atlantic partnership that Europe come to share U.S. doctrines of defense as they relate to both nuclear and conventional forces; devote a fair share of its total resources to the common defense in ways which reflect these doctrines; and employ those resources with efficiency.

2. From these two objectives flow the following five criteria which should govern the end position we seek as a result of the complex transitional process on which we are now launched. We wish:

a. Europe to emerge with a sense that it has achieved a self-respecting nuclear status permitting it some meaningful elements of participation in the manning, ownership, control and production of weapons which will determine its survival.

b. The several European nations to emerge with a sense of equity about their relative role in nuclear affairs.

c. To

SECRET

c. To avoid an achievement of equity via a proliferation of national nuclear programs damaging to both our objectives of intra-European unity and the Atlantic partnership.

d. To European nuclear role to develop in relation to the U.S. in ways which will be unifying for the Alliance rather than divisive.

e. The gap to be narrowed or closed between U.S. military doctrine (with its emphasis on the controlled use of nuclear power and the importance of conventional forces) and European thought and dispositions in these matters.

3. The Present Situation. In moving towards a situation which would reflect these five criteria we begin from a position which meets none of them. On the other hand, forces are in play within Europe sympathetic to the outcome we seek. The problem of U.S. diplomacy is, therefore, so to tilt the transitional arrangements under each of the four major subheadings of policy considered below to achieve an end result which would meet U.S. interests and criteria as summarized in Paragraphs 1 and 2, above.

4. Elements of Policy for the Transition. The end product which would best satisfy U.S. interests and criteria is a multilateral force in which the European countries can participate

participate - preferably with the U.S. - on a basis which satisfies their long run aspirations to share equitably and in some meaningful way in nuclear business; which makes for cohesion rather than division within the European community; which involves close relationship between this force and U.S. strategic forces on the basis of an agreed doctrine governing not merely the planning, targeting, and control of these forces but also a new appreciation for the role in the common strategy of conventional forces. A variety of factors now make it unlikely that this final purpose could be achieved without mixed manning of a European or NATO multilateral force, with nationals from at least three nations on each vessel.

Transitional arrangements in developing such a force are clearly called for to respond to the developing situation of the UK, France, and Germany and other nuclear arrangements. But these arrangements should be viewed as a means of moving towards the end result which best meets U.S. interests.

Implications of this strategy for the initial steps to be taken with respect to each of the post-Nassau issues follows.

II. Implications

5. UK Arrangements. Negotiations with the UK should reflect

SECRET

-4-

reflect both loyalty to the Nassau bargain and avoidance of subsidy to a UK national deterrent. Staff work should put us in a position of flexibility should it appear to be possible and in our interest to press Britain towards enlarged outlays for conventional forces or towards specific moves to reinforce the movement towards multilateralism.

6. French Arrangements. Staff work should put us in a position to engage in a wide-ranging post-Nassau dialogue with the French should de Gaulle indicate that he is prepared to discuss the full range of cross purposes which have arisen between us, and, in particular, if he is prepared in any serious way to throw his weight behind a truly multilateral force (European or NATO) and to contribute positively to its creation. This dialogue should be initiated and conducted, however, with an acute sense of the extremely sensitive issues of domestic and European policy which would be involved in strengthening our support for the French national deterrent without radical compensatory change in de Gaulle's policy towards NATO and the trans-Atlantic connection.

7. Assignment (or Earmarking) of Forces: Command and Control. The decision at Nassau to assign strategic and perhaps tactical nuclear weapons in being to NATO immediately raises problems of the locus of their assignment; targeting; and political

SECRET

and political control of their disposition at a time of cold war crisis or during a war itself.

a. With respect to the locus of assignment various alternatives need careful staffing, although there appears to be a prima facie case for assignment, in the first instance, to SACEUR.

b. Whatever the locus of assignment the Nassau decision provides the occasion to expose Europeans to increased knowledge of the full range and flexibility of U.S. strategic deterrent and thus to strengthen their understanding of why a separate nuclear defense of Europe is neither feasible nor desirable. To this end a special NATO targeting staff might be set up at Omaha.

c. There may be occasion in the post-Nassau period to explore the acceptability of a NATO Executive Committee to be located either in Paris or Washington and to embrace US, UK, France, Germany, Italy and one rotating smaller country.

8. Multilateral Mixed Manning Force. It is critical to U.S. post-Nassau strategy that the emergence of the multilateral mixed manned force be shifted from association in European minds with third class Alliance status to its being the wave of the future. Our potential assets here are three: speed;

SECRET

-6-

speed; direct U.S. involvement; and financial incentives as compared to the mounting of national forces. We might promptly approach the three countries which have already approved the multilateral force in principle (Germany, Italy and Belgium) and propose that they and we now take the following immediate steps, while a working group which includes them and any other interested NATO countries, hammers out a detailed plan for a multilateral force:

- a. ordering a specified number of ships and missiles,
- b. agree that each participating country would now send personnel for training in U.S. schools.

Agreement now to go forward on this basis would start the long lead-time items (construction and training), while these - and perhaps other interested - countries then considered at greater length how to set up an international agency to manage the force; what long-term control formula they favored; etc.

It is essential, for basic political reasons, that the possibility of the mixed-manned force evolving into a European force (linked to NATO and SAC) not be excluded at this time; and that our partners feel that the U.S.-- in all its arrangements with this force -- reflects a basic preference for the multilateral solution.

SECRET

TOP SECRET

*nd
part 1/63*

RESTRICTED DATA

TAB I

BOMBS FOR TURKISH STRIKE AIRCRAFT

As part of the overall program of our nuclear relationship with Turkey, there is the question of Mk 28 bombs for Turkish strike aircraft. The first Turkish F-100 squadron of 18 aircraft completed training and was fully ready to take over its assigned strike role on 1 July 1962. The second F-100 squadron completed training and was ready on 30 November 1962.

Because of restrictions contained in NSAM 143 on the further dispersal of nuclear weapons for use by Turkish forces, the Mk 28 bombs for these aircraft have not been moved to Turkey. This failure on the part of the U.S. to provide the promised weapons for these aircraft has caused concern in recent months among prominent Turkish officials including the Commanding General of the Turkish Air Force. So far, U.S. statesmen have not been in a position to give an explanation for this delay.

Now the U.S. is initiating steps to remove the Turkish Air Force JUPITER missiles with a target date for their removal of 1 April 1963. It would seem probable that this action, coupled with the U.S. failure to provide the nuclear bombs for Turkish strike aircraft, would have an unfortunate effect on U.S.-Turkish relations and possibly cause the Turkish government to question some of the other cooperative arrangements we have with Turkey, such as the basing on a rotational basis of 2 USAF nuclear strike squadrons at Adana or certain communication facilities in Turkey.

Therefore, it would appear desirable to proceed promptly with the dispersal of Mk 28 bombs to Turkey for use by their strike aircraft squadrons. Concern has been expressed, however, over the security of these weapons and the possibility of unauthorized use by Turkey, particularly those placed on Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) aircraft.

The Permissive Action Link (PAL) which will soon be available for Mk 28 bombs can provide a partial solution to this problem. Properly used it can insure against unauthorized use for a period of at least 2 hours. This device will not be available, however, until the summer of 1963 and then only in sufficient number to permit installation on those bombs actually hung on QRA aircraft.

As

TOP SECRET

RESTRICTED DATA

*nd
part 1/54
tab I, Ref. Book for steering group...*

-2-

As one alternative, we could delay dispersal of the weapons to Turkey until the PAL's are available at least in sufficient quantities to have all QRA bombs equipped and tell the Turks we will disperse weapons for use by their aircraft by 1963.

A second alternative, which is really a modification of the above, would be to disperse the bombs to Turkey now, but keep them in storage sites and not permit them to be used on QRA until the PAL's have been installed. This alternative would probably be more satisfactory to the Turks than alternative one, since it would be an immediate step toward giving their strike aircraft a nuclear capability. In both these alternatives, however, the Turks are bound to note the fact that other NATO countries, including the Greeks, now have strike aircraft on the QRA with nuclear bombs that do not have PAL's installed. This discrimination against Turkey in our policy could best be explained by pointing out our intention to limit buildup of QRA forces until PAL's are available and to retrofit those now on QRA as soon as production of PAL's permits.

A third alternative and the one that would be most acceptable to the Turks would be to proceed immediately with the promised dispersal, permit the bombs to be used on QRA and then retrofit with PAL's as soon as possible. Security of the bombs might be enhanced somewhat by increasing the number of U.S. custodial personnel, but the fact remains, that in the face of a concerted effort by the Turks to use the QRA weapons without authority, they could probably do so, even with greatly increased numbers of U.S. custodians. The only way to prevent this would be for the U.S. custodial personnel to have the capability to immediately destroy the weapons if their unauthorized use appeared imminent. This capability does not now exist and as far as we know, is not planned in the near future.

The first alternative is recommended.

Therefore, it is recommended that we advise the Turkish Government that we will disperse nuclear weapons to Turkey for their strike aircraft during 1963.

It should be noted in connection with the above recommendation that Presidential approval will be required before these bombs can be dispersed to Turkey.

TOP SECRET

11/3/63
January 3, 1963

To : The Secretary
From : Jeffrey G. Kitchen
Subject: Removal of Jupiter Missiles

Development of a policy package on removal of Jupiters from Italy and Turkey has moved rapidly and well. A concept paper and instructions for the two Ambassadors, plus the texts of letters from Mr. McNamara to the respective Secretaries of Defense indicating that further negotiations will be in the hands of the Ambassadors, will be ready for final State-Defense approval at a meeting of the Steering Group at 5:00 o'clock this afternoon.

There is only one point at issue between the two Departments and this rests squarely with Mr. McNamara personally. This is his present insistence that April 1 be included in the instructions as the target date for beginning actual removal of the missiles.

By agreement with Mac Bundy, after learning of your plans to depart on Friday afternoon, we do not now contemplate a Cabinet-level meeting this week-end to go over any of the Nassau follow-up. However, since he feels so strongly about the April 1 date, it is quite possible that Secretary McNamara may telephone you. The attached memorandum sets forth our strong view that we should not confine ourselves to an arbitrary date but should move as quickly as diplomatically possible taking into account the need to preserve our psychological and political relations with the Turks.

You will recognize that Secretary McNamara may believe that we have a mandate from the President to accomplish

the removal

Bill M. / 154 / ML
Ref. BR An. Stearns
Gentry
TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

2.

the removal beginning no later than April 1. There may be, therefore, a requirement to assure both the President and Secretary McNamara that injecting April 1 into our planning serves no useful purpose.

If Mr. McNamara does not telephone you, you may wish to have Mr. Ball deal with this as necessary over this week-end.

Attachment:

Memorandum re Jupiters
dated 1/3/63, SECRET

cc: The Under Secretary

JCKitchen:rp
1/3/63

TOP SECRET

1/4/63

2

SECRET

January 4, 1963

IND/P/4

STEERING GROUP ON IMPLEMENTATING
THE NASSAU DECISIONS

SOVIET REACTIONS TO NATO DEVELOPMENTS

Submitted by Sub-Group VI

SECRET

Ball Pp/154 / References Book for the Steering Group...
on implementing the Nassau Decisions

SECRET

January 4, 1963

SOVIET REACTIONS TO NATO DEVELOPMENTS

The Soviet leaders will undoubtedly be very attentive to new NATO developments in the post-Nassau period. On the one hand they will be alert for frictions within the Alliance which they can hope to exploit; on the other, they will be concerned (a) over political and military strengthening of the Alliance, and (b) with any signs of spreading nuclear capabilities, particularly involving or suggesting West German acquisition of control over nuclear weapons. In addition, they look for any changes, real or supposed, in over-all US policy implied in changes on such matters as non-proliferation of nuclear capabilities. Finally, the Soviet leaders will consider possible USSR or Warsaw Pact political and military responses or countermeasures to NATO political and military developments and programs. The present paper briefly outlines the chief considerations and probable responses of the Soviets to certain proposals concerning NATO now under consideration in the US Government.

General Considerations

The Soviets have long been impaled on a dilemma in assessing US and NATO policy. On the one hand, they assume that the US is the only real Western decision-maker, and will naturally jealously guard its prerogatives and its power, including unilateral disposition of strategic nuclear strength. On the other hand, they also believe that the major

Western

SECRET

SECRET

-2-

Western powers are beset by "contradictions" and rivalry, and they fear that Germany in particular may maneuver itself into a position of influence, perhaps through acquisition of a nuclear capability, in which it can in effect swing the Alliance into a hard policy toward the USSR or even trigger war. Accordingly, various proposals for a multilateral force have probably been alternately judged by the Soviets (and have certainly been so reflected in their propaganda treatment) either as American subterfuge to retain full control of nuclear capabilities, or as a means for spreading nuclear weapons to the Germans and others, perhaps with the ultimate ulterior American aim of the sitting out a Soviet-European nuclear exchange. That these interpretations are inconsistent may only be a flaw in their propaganda image, but they probably also reflect a real perplexity and unresolved problem for the Soviet leaders themselves.

Our own uncertainties and inclarities on the future of NATO's nuclear blueprint, then, are bound to be suspiciously received and distorted by the Soviets. They will probably give undue weight to the more dire (for them) of alternative explanations for various developments. In general, this bias will lead to exaggerating the likelihood of West German acquisition of control over nuclear weapons. From Moscow's viewpoint, the transition from, say, a German-Italian-Belgian NATO Polaris to a German Polaris capability is bound to appear to be a

short

SECRET

SECRET

-3-

short step. They recall the transition from US and other declarations as late as 1950 that West Germany should never be rearmed, through the EDC to the 1954 WEU accords, and on to nuclear-armed German fighter-bombers on strip alert today.

Soviet Responses

Granted that the Soviet leaders will be suspicious and unhappy over a multilateral or multinational NATO nuclear force, what can they do about it? And what can we do to forestall or to mitigate those of their reactions which are adverse to our interests?

It may be useful to pose two "extreme" cases, Soviet reactions to which we can then sketch out. Case I is the "most favorable" from our point of view, the smoothest start of a truly multilateral force. Case II can represent the most rocky and unfavorable situation. The actual course of events, and the actual Soviet reaction, would almost certainly lie between these cases. It is recognized that in any event negotiations are likely to be drawn out, and that the Soviets would expect to do what they could to derail NATO from the track.

Case I - General agreement within NATO to create a multilateral force, including the US, with Germany and Italy explicitly opting for participation in such a force in lieu of national forces, and the UK and France promising to support and participate, including association of their national components, all in a multinational NATO nuclear force.

The

SECRET

SECRET

-4-

The Soviets would probably make no real political or military "countermeasures," beyond perhaps some shuffling of the administrative facade of the Warsaw Pact to have a "multilateral force" which would in fact be exclusively Soviet so far as nuclear forces were concerned, and probably not involving any changed deployment. The creation of the multilateral force in itself would not lead to any changes in Soviet and Satellite military programs.

In intensifying efforts to reopen divisions within NATO, the Soviets might offer new arms control measures such as an expanded Rapacki Plan. Even though they could not expect such measures to block the multilateral force, they might hope to stir up differences and to stimulate the idea that all nuclear weapons could be removed from Central Europe.

The Soviet propaganda response would probably stress such themes as: (a) at least equal and adequate USSR and Warsaw Pact strength, (b) US attempts by a sham "multilateral" force to get European payment for part of the nuclear forces which would still be controlled by Washington, (c) the danger of letting the Germans play any nuclear role at all, (d) US riding roughshod over French attempts to steer an independent policy, and (e) US and NATO stirring up the arms race instead of pressing ahead on disarmament; new moves show Western insincerity on disarmament. This propaganda line would, in other words, seek to reassure the Bloc, to castigate the West in general, and to play on residual divergences among the Western Allies.

SECRET

The

SECRET

-5-

The Soviet reactions would not, however, pose any new or very serious problems in this general case.

Case II - A melange of various proposals and differing understandings within NATO, leading to an uncertain agreement to coordinate national components of a NATO force, with France and even the UK stressing residual national control, and Germany hinting at renunciation of the WEU restrictions on her production and possession of nuclear weapons.

Disarray within NATO would be eagerly seized upon for divisive propaganda, variously oriented to inflame all concerned. This is a standard Soviet technique, but it is important to note that the issues here involved might provide broad scope for effective Soviet exploitation.

The Soviet Bloc would react to any indication of West German intention to obtain nuclear weapons with a broad and violent propaganda onslaught. They would seek to exploit concern and opposition to such a move in other Western countries, and might expect to find a major political pay-off in the effect of such a move on the unity of NATO.

The Soviets would probably threaten the possibility of providing nuclear weapons to their Warsaw Pact allies, though they would almost certainly not in fact follow through. It is quite possible that they would, however, deploy tactical nuclear warheads forward into Eastern Europe (where none have been identified to date) for the political-military effect of such a move.

Depending

SECRET

SECRET

-6-

Depending in large measure on the extent of division in Western positions, the Soviets might attempt to step up pressure on the Berlin issue. It is even possible that they might provoke some military incident with the West Germans in order to raise the specter of reckless or revanchist German responsibility for a future East-West clash.

At the same time, while stirring up tension, the Soviets would probably redouble their efforts to get limited arms control measures in Central Europe, and they might suddenly accept and surface the US proposal for an agreement on nuclear non-diffusion.

US Nuclear Assistance to France

A reversal of US policy on assistance to French nuclear weapons development would not in itself greatly trouble the Soviets, but it would excite their fears that we probably could not and would not continue long to deny such assistance also to Germany, even assuming such aid were predicated on French support of a multilateral force concept. Other aspects of increased US cooperation with France would probably not pose special problems or provoke strong Soviet Bloc reactions.

US-UK Arrangements

Further clarification and amplification of the Nassau Accords would not, we believe, draw new Soviet Bloc reactions.

German

SECRET

SECRET

-7-

German Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons

While current US planning does not provide for German acquisition of nuclear weapons, since this prospect is the focal point of Soviet concerns we feel it may be useful to pose it as a hypothetical case.

If the Germans were actually to take steps to acquire nuclear warheads and delivery means (either through their own production, cooperation with the French, or otherwise), the Soviets would feel a strong compulsion to try to prevent this from coming about. They would probably be inclined to increase pressures on Berlin and willing to take greater risks in the new context, particularly if the major NATO allies were not united in support of the new German policy. We regard the possibility of an ultimatum and preventive military action as remote--most of us would say exceedingly remote. They might be led to appraise with agony their whole German policy; Soviet espousal of a neutral, denuclearized, but unified and free Germany (perhaps with existing "social and economic institutions" preserved in present East Germany) is possible, though it also seems to us not probable. We believe that only an actual German acquisition of nuclear power would even pose the possibility of such drastic "hard" or "soft" Soviet reactions. They do not appear to have effective intermediate measures. We do not believe the Soviets would be impelled toward a more reasonable general disarmament position. Even in this extreme case, it is therefore unlikely that the Soviets

would

SECRET

SECRET

-8-

would be led to alter radically their general line of policy, either toward war or toward real peace. They might reappraise the danger of war in Central Europe, but it is not clear what longer-run changes in their own military and political dispositions in Eastern Europe they might adopt.

Conclusion

It is, perhaps, premature to consider long-term Soviet reactions to a policy successfully creating a NATO nuclear force in the context of our broader objectives. In general, it would--as it is designed to do--reduce the opportunities for Soviet Bloc political or military pressures and maneuvers in Europe.

The rub is in getting from here to there. The stirring up of live issues, as Nassau has done and as other recent and future airings of differences in policy and strategic concept in NATO cannot fail to do, exposes raw nerves. With the surgical skill of a vivisectionist, the Soviets will test out political and propaganda exploitation of major differences within NATO. They have in a way the easier task--to exacerbate such wounds and ills; our task is to cure them.

Soviet Bloc reactions should be taken into account, but the basic effect is merely to reinforce efforts undertaken on their own merits to reduce frictions and divergences within NATO. While our objective of strong NATO unity is of course not shared by the USSR, our specific objective of preventing proliferation of national nuclear capabilities does coincide with a Soviet aim.

SECRET

Drafting Officer - G/PM - R. Garthoff

Clearances - S/P - M. Harvey
SOV - D. Henry
RSB - H. Sonnenfeldt
DEFENSE - ISA - Col. T. Wolfe
DEFENSE - ISA - Col. F. Yeager
JCS - Col. K. Kolb
DIA - Col. W. Holomon

11/2/63

TOP SECRETSecretary of Defense Staff Meeting7 January 1963

Mr. McNamara	Mr. Hitch
Mr. Gilpatric	Mr. McNaughton
Mr. Ailes	Mr. Gibson
(for Mr. Vance)	(for Mr. Morris)
Gen. Hamlett	Mr. Nitze
(for Gen. Wheeler)	Mr. Gorham
Mr. Korth	(for Mr. Paul)
Adm. Anderson	Mr. Pittman
Mr. Zuckert	Mr. Rubel
Gen. LeMay	Mr. Sylvester
Gen. Goodpaster	Mr. McGiffert
(for Gen. Taylor)	Mr. Loftis
Gen. Munn	Gen. Brown
(for Gen. Shoup)	Capt. Houser
	Mr. Livesay

1. Nassau Pact (Top Secret)

Mr. McNamara began the meeting at 0930. He stated that he thought it would be of interest to all to hear from Mr. Nitze on the Nassau Pact and its background.

Mr. Nitze said the Pact consists of three documents. The first is the Statement on Nuclear Defense Systems attached to the Joint Communique, dated 21 December 1962. The second is a Minute from President Kennedy to Prime Minister Macmillan, dated 21 December 1962; and the third is a Minute from Mr. Macmillan to President Kennedy, dated 20 December 1962.

Mr. Nitze said the public Statement on Nuclear Defense Systems is composed of three parts. The first four paragraphs deal with background material. The first paragraph refers to the review of the SKYBOLT program. The second paragraph discusses the U.S. decision not to proceed with SKYBOLT for its own forces. It recognizes the UK's particular interest in extending the life of the V bomber force, and the U.S. offer to share 50/50 in continuing SKYBOLT development. The third paragraph discusses Mr. Macmillan's declining of this offer; and the fourth paragraph discusses the U.S. offer of HOUND DOG and the British declining of this offer.

Cy 6 of 25 copies

TOP SECRET

RC-218 / 23 / 337 Sec of Def Staff 1/1/63

DECLASSIFIED
BY 2411/1
NARS, Date

TOP SECRET

2

Mr. Nitze said the next four paragraphs of the statement are devoted to POLARIS and the multilateral NATO force. In the fifth paragraph, the Prime Minister raised the possibility of the provision of the POLARIS missile to the U.K. by the U.S. The President and the Prime Minister agreed that a decision on POLARIS must be considered in the widest context -- both the future defense of the Atlantic Alliance and the safety of the whole free world. They concluded that the POLARIS issue provided an opportunity for closer arrangements for Western cohesion and unity. In the sixth paragraph, the Prime Minister suggested, and the President agreed, that a start could be made toward a multilateral force with existing strategic forces; for example, an allocation from SAC, the U.K. bomber command, and tactical nuclear forces now in Europe. In the seventh paragraph, the President and the Prime Minister agreed that the U.S. would make POLARIS, less warheads, available for British submarines.

Mr. Nitze said the last two paragraphs of the statement cover the general strategic framework under which the deal would be worked out. In paragraph nine, the President and the Prime Minister feel that this new plan would strengthen the nuclear weapon defense of the Alliance, and that the unity of the West provides the best protection. In paragraph ten, it is recognized that in addition to the nuclear shield, we need the non-nuclear sword, but the phrase is added that this is needed "on a world-wide basis."

Mr. Nitze said that the Minute from President Kennedy to the Prime Minister consisted of three paragraphs. In the first paragraph, the U.S. proposes to offer to the French an opportunity to participate in the multilateral force on a basis similar to that under which the U.K. is invited to participate. The second paragraph notes that the U.S. view that participation in the multilateral force available to non-nuclear NATO members would be through the provision of personnel and resources. The third paragraph defines the assistance to be given by the U.S. to the U.K. in the POLARIS field, i. e., equipment for fire control, launching, guidance and navigation.

Mr. Nitze said that the Minute from the Prime Minister to the President recalls the long-standing arrangements between the U.K. and the U.S. worked out during the Eisenhower Administration and continued during the Kennedy Administration, whereby neither the U.S. nor the U.K. will use their nuclear forces without consultation, and that there will be advance notice of any U.K. independent use of their force.

DECLASSIFIED
By <u>AK</u>
DATE <u>7/21/77</u>
NARS. Date <u>2-7-74</u>

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

3

Mr. Nitze emphasized that these three documents comprise the totality of the Nassau agreement. Mr. McNamara agreed with this statement. He noted that the two Minutes were still private. Mr. Nitze said that each was classified Secret. Mr. McNamara said that their existence should not be discussed publicly at this time. This does not mean that some of the provisions will not be made public at some future date. We do not feel that the exact specifics of what we will provide in connection with the POLARIS program (fire control, etc.) should be discussed in advance of our presentations to the Congress.

Mr. Nitze said he would now discuss the background of the Nassau Pact. There are a number of conflicting situations which he would break down into six elements. The first element is the long-standing special U.S. relationship with the U.K. -- for example, exchange of atomic information, the Holy Loch and SKYBOLT arrangements, etc. Also, there have been special arrangements in the political field. Opposing views were held in State and elsewhere as to whether these special arrangements should be continued or weakened.

The second element is the U.S. objective of European integration within the framework of the Atlantic Community. This involves the U.K. adherence to the European Economic Community. The maintenance of U.S. special relationship with the U.K. might inhibit the growth of integration and U.K. participation in the EEC. The U.K. took the view that they were the ones negotiating with the EEC, and primarily with the French, and they did not feel that these new arrangements affect the negotiations. Mr. Nitze said we believe that they took this view as a trading position in the negotiations, but that they really feel that the special relationship does affect these negotiations.

The third element is Germany and weaving her into participation in NATO nuclear defenses without creating an independent German nuclear force. Among things to be considered here would be the Soviet reaction to such a development.

The fourth element is the problem of France, and particularly de Gaulle. The basic NATO problem is de Gaulle and such French actions as the withdrawal of the French fleet, not allowing the stationing of U.S. atomic weapons on French soil, etc. France could make

DECLASSIFIED
BY 4.8
DATE 7/4/67
NARS, Date

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

4


the needed contribution to strengthen NATO. De Gaulle is building French nationalism. The problem of France is the reason for the President's offer of POLARIS to France on a similar basis to the offer being made to the U.K. The French have no grounds for objecting to the U.S.-U.K. arrangements. The President's offer should smoke out whether they are prepared to cooperate or not.

The fifth element is the point that Mr. McNamara has been making in various speeches to NATO: the indivisibility of NATO nuclear strategy. It is unthinkable that there be piecemeal nuclear action within NATO.

The sixth element is the U.S. decision to reduce the range of contingencies in which the only effective course of action would be nuclear action, and to increase the force and effectiveness of non-nuclear means.

Mr. Nitze said the six elements were handled in one way or another in the final agreements. The agreements continued the special U.S. relationship with the U.K. He believes that this relationship is stronger since Nassau. There was a concession to the U.K. of the right to withdraw their strategic nuclear force in the event of an extreme national emergency. This was not a military consideration, but was caused by overpowering U.K. political considerations. Advancement of European integration is emphasized by the proposed multilateral force with proposed participation by all NATO members in one form or another. The offer to France has already been mentioned. Paragraph nine of the Statement on Nuclear Defense Systems deals with the indivisibility of NATO nuclear strategy, and paragraph ten deals with the strengthening of non-nuclear forces.

Mr. McNamara said he would like to add a few comments. The Nassau Pact was brought into being by the SKYBOLT problem. But if it hadn't been SKYBOLT, there would have been some other means. We were supporting what he feels was an unsupportable program. As an example, he would cite the financial arrangements associated with SKYBOLT. The U.S. should never enter into such an arrangement again. The press has repeatedly emphasized that the SKYBOLT development was a joint one. This is not true. It was a U.S. development, paid for by the U.S. The benefits of the program



TOP SECRET

117/63

TOP SECRET

were to be made available to the U.K. at no cost. Their costs were associated with adapting it to their delivery system. This was not a partnership arrangement, but a charitable contract. We cannot and should not make such an arrangement in the future.

Another unsupportable aspect of our program is that of penalizing our allies and ourselves by withholding knowledge and technology that the U.K. and France, for example, could and would use for our benefit. They are going ahead on their own, wasting their resources and ours, and weakening the defense of the West thereby. We cannot support NATO by ourselves. An untenable aspect of our military and foreign policy is this aspect of the program.

We have now stated to our allies that we are willing to join with them in owning and operating nuclear systems only if they bear their share of the costs and support increased conventional forces. Many U.S. representatives have strongly believed that the only way to prevent a German independent nuclear force is the multilateral force concept. We have emphasized restrictions in implementing these programs, which cannot be met by our NATO allies. We want them to bear the major costs of the nuclear forces and, at the same time, build conventional forces to an acceptable level, but we have been unwilling to ease the burden of developing nuclear forces by sharing our technology. The Europeans have recognized these contradicting facets of the problem.

Mr. McNamara said to some of us it seemed we needed to modify our policy. The SKYBOLT problem and the Nassau meeting allowed an opportunity to cast off the old program and to begin the new. There are many unanswered questions. In the case of the agreement with the U.K., there is the question as to what kind of POLARIS force they will build. What will be the needed legislative changes to provide this force? He feels our objective should be to assist Britain and France to acquire, at the least possible cost, the nuclear force which each is determined to develop anyway. He is not sure what this implies until we sit down with them and analyze what technology, equipment, skills, etc., they already have. By minimum costs, he is not suggesting a gift. There must be full sharing of future R&D costs. He is willing to give to our allies the benefits of our past R&D up to 1 January 1963. To digress for a moment, if we

DECLASSIFIED
BY: H.S. D. 74187
NARS, Date: 5-2-94

TOP SECRET

6

should develop an A-4 (A-3A) POLARIS and it should cost us, for example, \$1.6 billion to buy 300 missiles, and then if our allies want to buy a hundred, they would have to pay one-fourth the cost of the 400 missiles. We need an understanding of cost-sharing in NATO which is not now there. NATO has depended on the U.S. more than both they and we realize. In essence, we have assisted their economic growth by bearing the major share of the defense costs of the Alliance. This is one reason why we have the balance of payments problem with us.

Mr. McNamara said that we should take every step we can to minimize the cost to the U.K. for the POLARIS force. Further, he believes we should share our support facilities with them. First, this would minimize the costs. There should be no need for a separate U.K. Holy Loch type of facility if the present Holy Loch facility is capable of handling both forces. And second, this is a way to get integration of forces. There was a long argument at Nassau over "supreme national interest." As Mr. Nitze pointed out, the exception clause in the agreement was important to Mr. Macmillan because of domestic political purposes. We cannot, however, allow ourselves to be dragged into nuclear war by independent action of a NATO ally. For this purpose, we have to insist upon advance notice of any use of nuclear forces. We must make perfectly clear to our allies and the world that we will reserve the right to withdraw from such an independent action. We have not fully exposed this view, although the U.K. understands it, and the French understand it.

Mr. Nitze said that the Germans have raised the question, not discussed at Nassau, as to whether the exception clause could be used in reverse; i. e., could the U.K. nuclear force be withdrawn in case of a Soviet attack on NATO?

Mr. McNamara said he felt we should tie the U.K. POLARIS force so closely to ourselves that their capability of independent action would be minimized. This is another reason to tie it to our support forces. If their force was withdrawn, it would have either no capability or a lesser one because of the lack of support.

DECLASSIFIED
BY 44
DATE 11/16/01
NARS, Date 5-2-74

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

7

Mr. McNamara said we did not yet know what would be the design of the U.K. weapons system. We have talked about a POLARIS system, but not necessarily a duplicate of the U.S. system. The British have mentioned the possibility of only 8 or 4 missiles per submarine. He doesn't know whether 8 vs. 16 missiles per submarine is a good thing or not. If there were lesser numbers of missiles per submarine, this would inevitably raise the costs. He is unwilling to joint with the U.K. in an uneconomic enterprise. At Nassau, there were discussions of the U.K. defense budget. The British say they will maintain it at 7% of their GNP. The first claim on their budget will be their strategic nuclear force. If there are inefficiencies in their nuclear program, it will affect their costs and ours in other areas of defense.

Mr. McNamara said consideration may be given to the Air Force MMRBM development for use in the U.K.'s submarine force. It is smaller and lighter than POLARIS, and might have more application to shallow European waters. At least we ought to consider this alternative.

Mr. McNamara said with regard to France, Ambassador Bohlen had an interesting conversation with de Gaulle last Friday. De Gaulle didn't turn down our POLARIS proposal. He wants us to spell out the details of the proposal, and this we should do. Although we have withheld from France our technology, they have gone ahead with their program anyway. During the past year, we have taken a number of small steps to assist them. We have provided tankers for the Mirage bomber force. We expect to offer to sell them a nuclear-powered submarine. We think we now see the way to assist further the French and allied unity. To achieve this objective, however, we will have to examine legislative restrictions.

Mr. McNamara said that in the case of West Germany, there is no doubt that within 10-20 years they will have an independent nuclear force unless we tie them within the next 24 months to a multilateral force. Our best bet would be to do this while Adenauer is still in power, which means within the next nine months. We need to get the Germans to increase their defense budget. The West Germans have men under arms, per unit of population, equal to only one-half the number that we have. We have more troops in Germany

*shows work
with the
understood*

DECLASSIFIED
BY 411
DATE 7/4/67
NARS. Date 8 2 77

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

8


than the Germans. Either they must increase, or we will reduce. Their defense budget needs to be increased 30% to equal the level of the U.K. and France. Although we criticize the way the U.K. and France spend their defense budgets, their budget levels are reasonable. We have been criticizing the French, for example, for deploying their NATO divisions in France rather than in Germany, and the inadequate logistical support they provide. Germany is not making nearly the effort it should. We must insist that they increase their military effort. If they will go through with these increases, and pay their share of the multilateral force, then we can join with them in such an effort.

Mr. McNamara said we have talked of a sea-borne MRBM force of surface ships manned by crews of mixed nationality. Forces on surface ships are more vulnerable than in submarines. This is the reason why our own Navy has developed the POLARIS submarine force. He thinks we should go the route of a submarine system. Since it appears that no other NATO nation except Germany could join such a force immediately, maybe we should enter into bilateral arrangements with West Germany. He would emphasize that these questions are under discussion and are not U.S. government policy, but represent his own personal feelings.

Mr. McNamara said one final point he would make relates to the assignment of existing nuclear forces. One paragraph in the Statement on Nuclear Defense Systems relates to this. Some press interpretations of this paragraph refer to bomber forces as the only U.S. contribution. He would suggest that U.S. bomber forces not necessarily be introduced. It would be better to emphasize the deployment of POLARIS to the Mediterranean. The U.K. is thinking of assigning their bombers to the multilateral force.

Mr. McNamara emphasized that, depending on how it is implemented, the Nassau Pact is a major event in the integration of NATO defenses.

Mr. McNaughton said the British would be here Wednesday to begin talks. Mr. McNamara said there were five groups, composed primarily of State and Defense representatives, working on the implementation of the Nassau Pact. Mr. McNaughton is general program



TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

9

director of this work for Defense. There are various responsibilities assigned to the military departments; however, many of these are overlapping, and there is a need for close coordination; Mr. McNaughton will be the coordinator. So far nothing firm has resulted from the efforts of the working groups.

Mr. Gilpatric noted that there were firm proposals relating to JUPITER missiles. Mr. McNamara agreed, but said this is the work of a sixth group, and has been taken out of this part of the work. Navy will be the primary contact in working out the POLARIS matter. Adm. Anderson said that Navy was all set on the technical level, but the financial arrangements should be handled at a higher level. He said he also hoped they would not get involved in new POLARIS developments at the present, and particularly in making these available without proper cost sharing. Mr. McNamara said our allies must pay their proper share.

Adm. Anderson asked as to the British attitude on the mixed manning of forces. Mr. McNamara said that Mr. Macmillan favors nationally manned forces. Actually, Mr. Macmillan has two contradictory objectives: support of a U.K. independent force to meet political considerations, and support of integration of U.K. with NATO for military reasons. Our State Department is for mixed manning of the force. Mr. McNamara said he personally doubts whether we can secure this objective; for example, in the case of a U.S./West German bilateral.

Mr. Nitze said, in defense of the State Department position, it would look better if more countries than the U.S. and Germany manned the proposed force -- a mixed crew of U.S., German, Italian, Belgian, etc. Mr. McNamara said we need only look at the P-1127 to see the problems involved. This was first a U.S./U.K. effort, then the Germans were brought in. They have still not signed the necessary papers. A multilateral nuclear force will be much harder to negotiate than a bilateral one. Mr. Nitze said there will be a battle on the NATO mixed manning force vs. a NATO-controlled nationally manned force. Incidentally, the German Ambassador, at his noon meeting with Mr. McNamara today, will have a list of questions on these matters.

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

10

Mr. McNaughton mentioned that there was a regular donnybrook in State Department over aid to France. Mr. McNamara said that anything we do will not change de Gaulle; however, we must try to help our allies to reduce waste and take actions to support NATO. Although we don't know all the French are doing, we do know enough to know that they are wasting hundreds of millions of dollars.

Mr. McNamara said the Nassau Pact will remain one of the major work projects of the DoD over the next two years. It must receive top level attention, and the best men must be assigned to this work. He is anxious that these matters be brought up to the top level of the department any time that decisions need to be made by Mr. Gilpatric or himself.

2. Schedule of Congressional Hearings (Official Use Only)

Mr. McNamara discussed the following prospective Congressional action. (All dates are approximate only.)

1. Congressional Organization Congress convenes January 9. The House fight over the Rules Committee will start on that day, but regardless of outcome it will take two to three weeks for House to organize. The Senate operates under continuing rules and reorganization is not necessary. An effort to change the cloture rule may, however, be the first item of business.
2. Presidential Messages
 - a. State of the Union January 14
 - b. Budget January 17 or 18
3. Legislative Program
 - a. Posture and Budget Hearings Scheduled to start January 21 before Senate Armed Services Committee; to be immediately followed by House Armed Services Committee hearings, and then Appropriation Committee.

DECLASSIFIED

BY 41 NARS, Date 2-7-74

TOP SECRET

COMMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

PERMANENT RECORD COPY

167/69

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE
MESSAGE CENTER
SECRET

36-32

Action

EUR

Info

SS

SR

G

SP

L

H

DAC

SCI

P

IOP

INR

RMR

1962 DEC 7 AM 10 10 Control:
Rec'd:

3069
JANUARY 7, 1963
8:10 AM

FROM: BONN

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1712, JANUARY 7, 1 PM

PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT 1712, INFORMATION PARIS 439, LONDON 440

PARIS ALSO PASS USRO

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

Handwritten notes: *rs*, *1/7*, *1/11/63*

I HAD LONG TALK WITH SCHROEDER THIS MORNING, BUT DISCUSSION ADDED LITTLE TO IMPRESSIONS REPORTED PREVIOUSLY. (SEE EMBTELS 1709 AND 1710). SCHROEDER DID SAY IT WAS BASIC GERMAN POSITION THAT U.S. NUCLEAR DOMINANCE, AS WELL AS U.S. CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WAS EASILY ACCEPTABLE, BUT THAT U.S./UK -- OR U.S./UK/FRANCE -- DOMINANCE IN NUCLEAR REALM WAS NOT REPEAT NOT BASIS ON WHICH GERMAN DEFENSE POLICY COULD BE FOUNDED. SECOND POINT HE MADE STRONGLY WAS THAT FEDREP COULD NOT RPT NOT ACCEPT ANY LONG-RUN DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN ITSELF AND OTHER EUROPEAN NATO POWERS. HE EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT SUBJECT TO CLARIFICATION WHICH HE HOPED COULD BE OBTAINED IN COURSE OF NATO DISCUSSIONS, HE REGARDED NASSAU AGREEMENT AS ADVANCE TOWARDS NATO MULTI-LATERAL FORCE AND INDIVISIBLE WESTERN DEFENSE. I UTILIZED INFO DEPTTEL 1505 AND PREVIOUS TELEGRAMS, AND SAID I WAS CONFIDENT MANY QUESTIONS IN GERMAN MINDS COULD BE RESOLVED DURING NATO DISCUSSIONS AND THE UNDER SECRETARY'S VISIT.

AT THIS POINT, SCHROEDER ASKED IF HIS UNDERSTANDING WAS CORRECT THAT NASSAU AGREEMENT DID NOT RPT NOT INVOLVE U.S. ASSISTANCE TO UK ON NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR POLARIS MISSILES, AND WHEN I REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY, WENT ON TO SAY HE ASSUMED WE WOULD SIMILARLY NOT RPT NOT OFFER SUCH ASSISTANCE TO FRANCE. AGAIN I AGREED.

Handwritten notes: *611.41*, *1/24/63*, *375811*, *RM/R destroyed*, *Info filled by RM/R*

This copy must be returned to RM/R Central files with notes

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY PROHIBITED UNLESS AUTHORIZED

ACTION ASSIGNED TO:	EUR	ACTION TAKEN:	
NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL:	RAM/Popper	DATE OF ACTION:	
		DIRECTIONS TO RM/R:	

611.41 / 1-767

Handwritten mark: *et*

SECRET

-2- 1712, JANUARY 7, 1 PM, FROM BONN

I AGREED, WHEREUPON HE COMMENTED THAT HE WONDERED WHETHER THIS DID NOT RPT NOT GIVE SOME IMPETUS TO POSSIBLE UK-FRENCH NUCLEAR COLLABORATION IN FUTURE.

TURNING TO STIKKER'S VISIT JANUARY 4, SCHROEDER SAID HE WAS UNABLE TO GIVE ME DETAILED REPORT OF CONVERSATION WITH ADENAUER, SINCE HE HAD MISSED MUCH OF IT OWING TO HIS DELAYED ARRIVAL IN BONN THAT MORNING. HE FELT, HOWEVER, THAT STIKKER'S POSITIVE ATTITUDE HAD BEEN HELPFUL IN ALLAYING SOME OF CHANCELLOR'S INNATE CONCERN. IN RESPONSE MY QUERY, HE SAID THAT ASIDE FROM RESENTMENT TOWARDS U.S. AND UK FOR CONCLUDING AGREEMENT, WHICH CHANCELLOR FELT HAD SUCH FAR-REACHING CONSEQUENCES FOR ALLIANCE, WITHOUT PRIOR NATO CONSULTATION, CHANCELLOR SEEMED MAINLY PREOCCUPIED BY POSSIBLE CHANGE IN U.S. STRATEGIC CONCEPT, AND SECONDLY BY IMPLICATIONS OF LONG-RUN DISCRIMINATION AGAINST FEDREP. IN RESPONSE TO MY ARGUMENT THAT PERHAPS GERMANS HAD NOT RPT NOT ADEQUATELY APPRECIATED EVOLUTION IN MILITARY THINKING, AND WERE STILL TOO MUCH INCLINED TO CLING TO CONCEPT OF "MASSIVE RETALIATION", SCHROEDER AGREED THAT GERMANS NEEDED TO STUDY DEFENSE PROBLEM ANEW, AND INDICATED HE FELT SUCH STUDY MIGHT BE FRUITFUL UNDER NEW DEFENSE MINISTER.

IN CONCLUSION, SCHROEDER SAID HE WELCOMED UNDER SECRETARY'S VISIT AS OPPORTUNITY TO INITIATE DISCUSSIONS ON QUESTIONS GERMANS HAD RAISED, AND AGREED WITH ME THAT BASICALLY THERE WAS LESS DIVERGENCE IN U.S. AND GERMAN DEFENSE AIMS THAN HEAT OF DISCUSSIONS AT TIMES SEEMED TO INDICATE.

DOWLING

HLN

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY

7/9/63

January 9, 1963

the McN line -
exp a Ar.

To:

From:

Subject

1. Ball

We b... include in Mr. Ball's NAC presentat... one possible early participation in the NATO 1... Forces, to be established by assignment of matching U.S. and UK strategic (bomber) elements, of some of the existing tactical nuclear forces of the "have not" European Allies (Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy, etc.).

2. Degree of assistance to be given immediately to U.K. and to France.

In all his directives for staff work in the Pentagon, Mr. McNamara is not just exploring possible alternatives; but is putting emphasis on the alternatives as the preferred line of action. His staff phrase this: "Our policy should be to take early action to - a) get Britain into a Polaris capability as quickly and economically as possible; and b) to bring France up to parity with Britain by 1970, as economically as possible. "In other words, our objective is to do this, not to develop a public excuse for not doing it."

3. Tactics and timing for dealing with the "have-not" multi-lateral area.

The Italians last week formally requested a Polaris type submarine. Deputy Secretary Gilpatric will visit Italy in February and will be expected to discuss the request. McNamara now sees our policy as permitting bilateral U.S.-Italian or U.S.-German "mixed-manning".

742-5611/1-963

(1)

SECRET

1/10/63

~~TOP SECRET~~

January 10, 1963

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
December 27, 1962 -- 10:45 AM - Palm Beach

Others present: Secretary McNamara
Deputy Secretary Gilpatric
General Taylor
General Wheeler

JFK understanding of the
no-invasion pledge

Ever getting a "free ride" -
need to change & change
(5/10)

ad discussed
Service
forehand.
ng and they

uded the
of transition
nry were
re approach-

ing a point where both sides hold a Sword of Damocles (in the nuclear sense) over the Soviet and the free world heads which could inhibit the use of nuclear weapons against each other's homeland while fairly large-scale war with conventional forces -- including war at sea -- might take place.

Although this is the 1964 budget, Admiral Anderson pointed out, it really forecasts in many respects what the 1968-70 capabilities would be. Consequently, it has long-range connotations. For the Navy, he found two major difficulties for Fiscal 1964: personnel is too limited to be really adequate, and the funds for operations, spare parts and maintenance were less than required. In spite of this, however, they were going to do the job and meet commitments. To meet one of these problems, he hoped to reduce the tempo of operations wherever possible. He pleaded that in these areas, the Navy be given more control over the decisions about their operations and about the handling of

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLK-90-77
By MMB NARA, Date 7/29/94

NSA / 745 / Conference w. the Pres - JCS

W

12162-1165
0X 545

The President pointed out to the Joint Chiefs and Secretary McNamara that although we feel that the present Cuban situation is dormant, we must assume that someday we may have to go into Cuba, and when it happens, we must be prepared to do it as quickly as possible, with a minimum of destruction. Therefore, they must provide for this contingency as they look into one, two, three, or four years ahead.

The President pointed out that he felt this was a possibility in the next few years whether he was President or not, and that they had to plan for this.

Discussion of Cuba followed which included a statement by the President that in any planning we must make sure that our "political work" is well done. If there are defections to our side we must be ready to handle them and exploit them.

The discussion which followed involved the "civil affairs and military government" planning, as well as the special forces planning, in connection with Cuba.

The President then discussed the Cuban Brigade, and the training of Cubans that is now taking place.

An additional note on the budget was raised by Admiral Anderson. He pointed out that our military construction was going to be a problem that would not go away. Even though we are holding it to a minimum at the present, eventually all the Services would need some new facilities.

In summary, the President asked that they look over the situation in Europe, that they review the transport situation, that they maintain their present efforts on communications, and that they search for even other occasions to prevent the balance of payments from getting out of control.

As to Nike-Zeus, the President stated that it was his decision to stay with the budget as it is now proposed.

Finally, the President said that it would almost seem that Europe is getting a "free ride" and that on both the political and defense side, this situation with our NATO allies had to be changed this year.

"Oral Presentation" made to
D. Rusk by Andr. Dobrynin
covering memo: 1/10/63

1/10/63
3a

The Soviet Government to which considerations of the U.S. Government on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons were transmitted at the request of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, appreciates such step of the U.S. Government which it had taken in a preliminary and confidential manner before the discussion in the NATO Council. The Soviet Government has studied these considerations with all attention and would like, on its part, to give its view on this important question.

We understand the situation in such a way that the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. are in agreement in principle as to the necessity of preventing, in the interests of reducing risk of thermonuclear war, further proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is important that an agreement on this question should lead precisely to this aim and should not create possibilities for actual proliferation of nuclear weapons among other states under this or that pretext.

I. The American draft declaration speaks of the commitment on the part of the U.S., U.S.S.R., Britain and France "not to transfer any nuclear weapons - directly or indirectly through military alliances - into the national control of individual states not now possessing such weapons" and of the commitment not to render assistance to these states in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. The direction this wording gives corresponds in general to the aim which was meant in the course of the Soviet-American exchange of opinion. More attentively thus one should see to it that the aim of non-proliferation of nuclear

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4
By <u>hxm</u> NLW-81-133 NARA Date <u>7/88</u>

NSA 1184 / USSR Orlovskaya Corres
1/4/63 - 4/11/63

weapons among non-nuclear states is achieved in practice. But here we have several essential remarks to make in connection with the U.S. proposals.

At present there are two main nuclear powers - the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. A certain nuclear potential has been created by Britain. Some types of nuclear weapons are possessed by France. Judging from the mentioned text and commentaries on it the American draft does not prevent the U.S., Britain and France from placing nuclear weapons in the custody of units of "a multinational defense force" within the framework of NATO. In this way through the NATO machinery is allowed actual equipment with nuclear weapons of forces of the non-nuclear states of this military bloc and, above all, of those of the FRG which has the largest forces assigned to the NATO command and which especially seeks after nuclear weapons.

Reservations to the effect that nuclear weapons could not be deployed or used on the basis of national decision of any government not now possessing such weapons scarcely change the state of things because after all he commands the weapons who has them in his hands. Obviously no systems of paper or verbal control would provide adequate guarantee that, for instance, the FRG which openly expresses territorial claims to neighboring states and which takes a manifestly hostile position toward the GDR, the Soviet Union and other peaceful states would not commit to action nuclear weapons even if it had received them on the

so-called "multinational basis" when it considers the moment appropriate for realizing its plans of revision of the results of World War II.

For the Soviet Union these or those agreements within the NATO concerning nuclear weapons cannot serve as guarantee of its interests. And even those people in the West who set hopes on such agreements could be reminded of the perfidy committed not once in history by German militarist circles against peaceful nations. A striking example of that is the policy of the Hitlerite Germany which broke one international agreement after another and then unleashed World War II.

It is not difficult to see that the realization of the provisions, envisaged in the American draft declaration and in the commentaries on it would, in practice, mean further drifting away from the position of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons to the position of their actual proliferation, i.e. to the transfer of them into the hands of those who now do not have such weapons, and into the hands of West Germans as well. But this corresponds neither to the interests of security of both our powers, nor to the interests of the entire world.

It was more than once said by the American side that the U.S. also took into account the danger of growing expansionist tendencies in the policy of the FRG and the necessity to contain such tendencies. The U.S. Government, and governments of other Western countries as well, more than once stressed that the Paris Agreements allowing in certain framework, arming the FRG, at the same

time set up restrictions for it in this field, especially with respect to weapons of mass annihilation and that in this sense the Soviet Union's interests were even taken into account. The Soviet Government criticized the Paris Agreements pointing out that they opened gates for restoration of militarism in Western Germany.

But in fact the U.S. Government is going further and further away even from the principle of military restrictions for the Federal Republic of Germany declared by the Western powers in the Paris Agreements and more and more often one can hear talk in the NATO about "equal rights" for the FRG in military matters including nuclear armaments as well. Unfortunately, this is reflected in the American draft in question.

The Caribbean crisis indicated how thin is the line which in the present international situation separates humanity from catastrophe of rocket-nuclear war. Isn't it clear that peoples and states may find themselves on the edge of abyss if militaristic and revanchist forces of Western Germany manage to acquire in fact, by whatever means, possession of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Government deems it necessary to stress with all possible clarity that transfer of nuclear weapons to West German military forces disregarding the means of its realization would change the already existing situation in Europe in the field of armaments and would affect vital interest of the Soviet Union and other peaceloving states. The world would face a new series of dangers and a grave international crisis. One cannot but see that

in this case the nuclear arms race would be even more intensified, accompanied by more aggressive attitude on the part of West German militarism and by growth of dangers for the European peace, and it would be difficult in such case to find ways and means to turn the arms race downward. The U.S.S.R., naturally, cannot reconcile itself to such situation and would be obliged without delay to undertake all ensuing measures.

2. If both sides begin to transfer their nuclear weapons to others, it is difficult to say when the movement in this direction will stop and whether there will remain any obstacles whatsoever against non-restricted dissemination of nuclear weapons in the world.

In the opinion of the Soviet Government - and this point of view is well known to the U.S. Government - an indispensable element of an agreement between nuclear powers should be an obligation of non-transfer of nuclear weapons to the troops of non-nuclear states also in case when those troops make part of multinational armed forces of military alliances. This would be real non-transfer of nuclear weapons, indirectly as well. Thus the point is that in military blocs nuclear weapons should be only with the troops of the nuclear powers. The access to such weapons of military personnel of other countries should be completely excluded disregarding the fact whether it means permanent or temporary or even episodic access, such as rotation of

guards, watches etc. Indeed today one needs only several minutes if not seconds to unleash total war.

And reaching such accord would give necessary effectiveness to the agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

3. The American draft seems to allow a possibility to exchange information on the manufacture of nuclear weapons and to exchange those weapons themselves among the U.S., Britain and France as nuclear powers that are allies in NATO while the U.S.S.R. actually would assume commitment not to transfer such information or weapons to its allies. This would be inequality in commitments. Exchange of such information or nuclear weapons among the U.S., Britain and France would lead to increase international tension and to change the balance of power, to which the U.S.S.R. cannot agree. Hence it is necessary that corresponding provisions of the agreement on non-transfer of nuclear weapons and information on their manufacture cover also the relations among nuclear powers themselves.

4. In the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as in other international questions the Soviet Union cannot speak in the name of other socialist states which themselves set forth their position. So far as the People's Republic of China is concerned - as a result of the U.S. policy it has been deprived of a possibility to take part in the work of the U.N. and negotiations on disarmament including the questions related to nuclear weapons. That is why it is the U.S. that bears the responsibility for the consequences of such situation.

5. From Mr. Rusk's explanation one might get an impression that the U.S. makes the solution of the question of prevention of nuclear armament of the two German states dependent on the achievement of global agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and accession to this agreement of one or another country. Seeking after achievement of general agreement on the non-transfer of nuclear weapons the Soviet side at the same time considers that if achieving comprehensive international agreement is protracted then regardless of such agreement commitment must be formally reaffirmed and fixed in an appropriate agreement on non-arming with nuclear weapons of the two German states.

6. As is seen from Mr. Rusk's explanations, the American side stands for the right to deploy its nuclear weapons on the territory of countries - members of NATO even if now there are no such weapons in those countries. - In other words what is meant here is expansion, as compared to what exists now, of the sphere of deployment of American nuclear weapons, in Europe included. It does not correspond to the line for reduction of rocket-nuclear bases which has been brought about now by life itself as one of the most important tasks persistently demanding its solution in the interests of securing peace.

It is true Mr. Rusk spoke of giving the same opportunity to the Soviet Union. But the Soviet side proceeding from the task of lessening international tension does not strive for this. And in general such development would not facilitate normalization

the
of situation in Europe. On the contrary this might make the
relations between NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organization even more
acute.

7. The Soviet Government is ready to continue to search for
a mutually acceptable agreement which would prevent further pro-
liferation of nuclear weapons in the world. One cannot permit
such situation when, using the words of a prominent American
journalist, as time passes, even Paraguay can trigger world
thermonuclear war. And this is where it would lead if necessary
measures are not taken. To prevent such development is in the
interests of both the Soviet Union and the United States which
shoulder special responsibility for the destinies of universal
peace.

RELEASED
1/17/83

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

This document consists of 2 pages, No. 4 of 6 copies. Series A.

00545 1/10/63
E20

Approved in S
1/16/63

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: January 10, 1963
12:00 Noon
Secretary's office

SUBJECT: Germany and Berlin

complete Dist. made by s/s-cms 1/17/63 orig. D. Rm/jr for filing only.

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.
The Secretary
John C. Guthrie, Director, SOV

U.S.S.R.
Vasilii Vasilyevich Kuznetsov,
First Deputy Foreign Minister
Anatolii F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador
Lev Isaakovich Mendelevich,
Assistant to Kuznetsov
Viktor Pavlovich Karpov,
First Secretary of Embassy (Interpreter)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COPIES TO:	G	GER			
S/S-3	S/AL	INR/D-2	Amembassy MOSCOW	Amembassy LONDON	
EUR	BTF	The White House	Amembassy BONN	USBER BERLIN	
S/P	SOV		Amembassy PARIS		

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RELEASE
 EXCISE
 DENY
 DELETE Non-Responsive
FOIA Exemptions
PA Exemptions

IN PART
 DECLASSIFY
 DECLASSIFY

MR Cases Only:
EO Citations

TS authority to:
 S or C OADR
 S or C OADR

IS/FP/CDR M W
Date: 1/14/94

Mr. Kuznetsov observed that as he had said to the President yesterday, the USSR and the United States must put more effort into the attempt to solve outstanding international problems. He said that he had mentioned the two most important as those of a German peace treaty and general and complete disarmament. With regard to Germany, he wished to stress that in the Soviet view the necessity of solving this question and removing the last traces of World War II must have priority as life requires this. It was clear, in Europe at least, he said, that without a solution of this problem a hotbed of war will continue to exist. The situation is now ripe for the conclusion of a German peace treaty. In fact, the viewpoints of the two sides are now much closer than they were a couple of years ago. It is now possible to reach an agreement and very little remains to be done. If both governments show a sincere desire, it should not take long to come to an agreement. Such an agreement would be useful for lessening tension in Europe while the problem of disarmament would be easier of solution. Kuznetsov added that he was not linking the German and disarmament problems.

The Secretary said that he would not attempt to review the 100 hours of talks on Berlin and Germany which had taken place over the last year or two. He would, however, urge again that Moscow approach the problem of Berlin with a general sense of reciprocity. What has caused the United States difficulty, he said, had been aptly expressed by the President's expression "What is mine is mine; what is yours is negotiable". Looking back to 1945, the Secretary observed, and throughout the whole postwar period there have been very few

bilateral

FORM DS-1254(T)
3-61

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

GPO 908991

NGA

11167

ACTION COPY

GRAM 4/ Department of State **PERMANENT RECORD COPY**

SECRET

Control: 6546
Rec'd: JANUARY 11, 1963
12:25 PM

1963 JAN 11 AM 7 30
DEPT OF STATE

OFFICE OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
WEST BANGOR CENTER

PARIS

2748

FROM: PARIS
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 2748, JANUARY 11, 3 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

ACTION DEPARTMENT 2748, INFORMATION BONN 194, LONDON 411.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

FROM STOESSEL

STIKKER HAS GIVEN GENERAL LEMNITZER FILL-IN ON HIS TALKS IN BONN JAN 4 WITH ADENAUER AND OTHER FRG OFFICIALS. IN GENERAL, RECORD OF CONVERSATIONS INDICATES ADENAUER EXTREMELY CONCERNED RE US EMPHASIS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS, IMPLICATIONS OF NASSAU ACCORDS AND LACK OF CONSULTATION WITH FRG. SCHROEDER, HOWEVER, SEEMED MORE RELAXED AND TOOK MORE CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH. HIGHLIGHTS OF CONVERSATIONS AS RELATED BY STIKKER FOLLOW (PLEASE PROTECT SOURCE

IN FIRST CONVERSATION WITH ADENAUER, AT WHICH STRAUSS AND HOPF WERE PRESENT, STIKKER LED OFF WITH DISCUSSION OF DEFENSE MATTERS AT DECEMBER MINISTERIAL MEETING. HE EXPRESSED DOUBTS ABOUT PRACTICALITY OF US APPROACH FOR GENERAL 200/0 DEFENSE BUDGET INCREASE AND EXPLAINED HIS THOUGHTS ON INTERMEDIATE COURSE OF ACTION ALONG LINES REPORTED IN POLTO 740. STIKKER WAS CONCERNED THAT SECRETARY MACNAMARA'S CONCEPTS SEEMED TO ATTACK ACCEPTED NATO STRATEGY. FOR THE MOMENT, ONE THING ALL COUNTRIES COULD AGREE ON WAS PRINCIPLE OF FORWARD STRATEGY AND HE FELT PRIORITY ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THIS.

STIKKER THEN RAISED NASSAU ACCORDS. HE FELT MULTILATERAL NATO FORCE SHOULD NOT BE CONFINED TO THREE POWERS (UK, US, FRANCE). TWO OTHER COUNTRIES SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN OPERATION, CONTROL, MAINTENANCE AND FINANCING OF FORCE. THUS, THERE WOULD BE FIVE FIGERS ON TRIGGER. SYG MIGHT WELL BE ADDED. THIS FORCE SHOULD BE UNDER SACEUR, EITHER AS SEPARATE GROUP OR IN SOME OTHER FORM.

• This copy must be returned to RM/RE central files with notes. REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS AUTHORIZED.

info
SS
SR
G
SP
L
H
SAL
BTF
NEA
DAC
SCI
P
LOP
INR
RMR

740. 5/11/63
7405611

3

ACTION TAKEN		DIRECTIONS TO RM/R	
SIGNED TO:	DATE OF ACTION		
NAME OF OFFICER			
OFFICE SYMBOL			

SECRET

-2- 2748, JANUARY 11, 3 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM PARIS

STIKKER ADDED THAT THIS WAS ALSO GENERAL LEMNITZER'S VIEW.

STIKKER SAID ATHENS GUIDELINES WERE ALL RIGHT SO FAR AS THEY WENT, BUT NOTHING WAS SAID ABOUT FINAL DECISION IN DOUBTFUL CASES. THIS IS WHERE HIS PROPOSAL FOR DECISION ABOUT FIVE OR SIX PARTICIPANTS CAME IN. HE THOUGHT IT ESSENTIAL THAT US SHOULD LOOSEN UP ON RIGHT OF VETO AND BELIEVED THERE WERE SOME SIGNS OF THIS. IN FACT, UK SEEMED MORE INSISTENT ON ITS OWN VETO POWER.

ADENAUER STATED WHOLE ALLIANCE SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN CONSULTATION, NOT JUST US AND UK. OTHERWISE, HARD DECISIONS AFFECTING LIFE AND DEATH OF COUNTRIES OF ALLIANCE MIGHT BE TAKEN. HE WAS MOST CRITICAL OF US LINE ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

ADENAUER DOUBTED IF SECRETARY MCNAMARA TOOK EUROPEAN INTERESTS SUFFICIENTLY INTO ACCOUNT. GERMANS NOW FURNISH BULK OF NATO TROOPS; THEY CANNOT BE ASKED TO BLEED TO DEATH IF GERMANY HAS NO VOICE IN DECISION ON ATOMIC WEAPONS. HE HAD TOLD PRESIDENT KENNEDY IN WASHINGTON THAT SOVIET ATTACK COULD NOT BE STOPPED WITHOUT ATOMIC WEAPONS. WHEN GENERAL TAYLOR AND GENERAL HEUSINGER HAD TALKED ABOUT THIS PROBLEM LATER AT PRESIDENT'S SUGGESTION, TAYLOR ASSURED HEUSINGER THAT GERMAN TROOPS BE GIVEN RIGHT TO USE TACTICAL ATOMIC WEAPONS AT SAME TIME AS US TROOPS. HOWEVER, GERMANS HAVE NO CONTROL OF THESE WEAPONS AND ADENAUER WAS NOT SURE TAYLOR'S WORDS WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY ACTIONS, "ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF WAY IN WHICH ALLIES HAD RECENTLY BEEN TREATED IN CERTAIN MATTERS".

STRAUSS ASKED NUMBER OF QUESTIONS CONCERNING MEANING OF NASSAU ACCORDS. HE WONDERED WHICH TACTICAL ATOMIC WEAPONS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN AND PLACED IN NEW NATO COMMAND. IF THESE WERE TAKEN FROM PRESENT DIVISION AND CORPS AND TACTICAL AIR FORCE, THIS, IN GENERAL NORSTAD'S WORDS, WOULD BE "MILITARY NONSENSE". STRAUSS ASKED WHAT WAS MENT BY US REVERSAL OF SWORD AND SHIELD CONCEPT. HE THOUGHT THIS COULD BE END OF DETERRENT.

HOPF ALSO ASKED NUMBER OF QUESTIONS AND STRESSED VIEW THAT ANY
SECRET

SECRET

-3- 2748, JANUARY 11, 3 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

SAID ATHENS GUIDELINES WERE ALL RIGHT SO FAR AS THEY WENT, NOTHING WAS SAID ABOUT FINAL DECISION IN DOUBTFUL CASES. THIS WERE HIS PROPOSAL FOR DECISION ABOUT FIVE OR SIX PARTICIPANTS IN. HE THOUGHT IT ESSENTIAL THAT US SHOULD LOOSEN UP ON RIGHT OF VETO AND BELIEVED THERE WERE SOME SIGNS OF THIS. IN FACT, UK SEEMED MORE INSISTENT ON ITS OWN VETO POWER.

ADENAUER STATED WHOLE ALLIANCE SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN CONSULTATION, NOT JUST US AND UK. OTHERWISE, HARD DECISIONS AFFECTING LIFE AND DEATH OF COUNTRIES OF ALLIANCE MIGHT BE TAKEN. HE WAS MOST CRITICAL OF US LINE ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

ADENAUER DOUBTED IF SECRETARY MCNAMARA TOOK EUROPEAN INTERESTS SUFFICIENTLY INTO ACCOUNT. GERMANS NOW FURNISH BULK OF NATO TROOPS; THEY CANNOT BE ASKED TO BLEED TO DEATH IF GERMANY HAS NO VOICE IN DECISION ON ATOMIC WEAPONS. HE HAD TOLD PRESIDENT KENNEDY IN WASHINGTON THAT SOVIET ATTACK COULD NOT BE STOPPED WITHOUT ATOMIC WEAPONS. WHEN GENERAL TAYLOR AND GENERAL HEUSINGER HAD TALKED ABOUT THIS PROBLEM LATER AT PRESIDENT'S SUGGESTION, TAYLOR ASSURED HEUSINGER THAT GERMAN TROOPS BE GIVEN RIGHT TO USE TACTICAL ATOMIC WEAPONS AT SAME TIME AS US TROOPS. HOWEVER, GERMANS HAVE NO CONTROL OF THESE WEAPONS AND ADENAUER WAS NOT SURE TAYLOR'S WORDS WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY ACTIONS, "ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF WAY IN WHICH ALLIES HAD RECENTLY BEEN TREATED IN CERTAIN MATTERS".

STRAUSS ASKED NUMBER OF QUESTIONS CONCERNING MEANING OF NASSAU ACCORDS. HE WONDERED WHICH TACTICAL ATOMIC WEAPONS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN AND PLACED IN NEW NATO COMMAND. IF THESE WERE TAKEN FROM PRESENT DIVISION AND CORPS AND TACTICAL AIR FORCE, THIS, IN GENERAL NORSTAD'S WORDS, WOULD BE "MILITARY NONSENSE". STRAUSS ASKED WHAT WAS MENT BY US REVERSAL OF SWORD AND SHIELD CONCEPT. HE THOUGHT THIS COULD BE END OF DETERRENT.

HOPF ALSO ASKED NUMBER OF QUESTIONS AND STRESSED VIEW THAT ANY
SECRET

SECRET

-3- 2748, JANUARY 11, 3 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM PARIS

NEW NUCLEAR COMMAND SHOULD BE UNDER SACEUR. HE COMPLAINED OF US TREATMENT OF ALLIES, SAYING THAT FOLLOWING MCNAMARA'S APPEAL IN PARIS TO INCREASE DEFENSE BUDGETS, FRG HAD MADE BUDGETARY ARRANGEMENTS TO STRENGTHEN CONVENTIONAL FORCES. FEW DAYS LATER, HOWEVER, NASSAU ACCORDS WERE ANNOUNCED EMBODYING VITAL DECISIONS TAKEN OVER HEAD OF FRG.

THE
SHIVERS

ID: NUM

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 94 9520
By KBS NARA Date 2/7/88

ND STRESSED VIEW THAT ANY

SECRET

-3- 2748, JANUARY 11, 3 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM PARIS

NEW NUCLEAR COMMAND SHOULD BE UNDER SACUR. HE COMPLAINED OF US TREATMENT OF ALLIES, SAYING THAT FOLLOWING MCNAMARA'S APPEAL IN PARIS TO INCREASE DEFENSE BUDGETS, FRG HAD MADE BUDGETARY ARRANGEMENTS TO STRENGTHEN CONVENTIONAL FORCES. FEW DAYS LATER, HOWEVER, NASSAU ACCORDS WERE ANNOUNCED EMBODYING VITAL DECISIONS TAKEN OVER HEAD OF FRG.

ADENAUER THOUGHT IT WAS DANGEROUS THAT US COULD UPSET STRATEGY OF ALLIANCE SO SUDDENLY "AT DROP OF HAT" WITHOUT CONSULTATION. HE REVERTED TO NEED FOR ATOMIC WEAPONS IN COUNTERING SOVIETS, SAYING IT WOULD BE "CLEAR MURDER" FOR US AND FRG PRACTICALLY ALONE TO ATTEMPT HOLD OUT FOR THREE WEEKS AGAINST SOVIETS WITHOUT ATOMIC WEAPONS.

BOHLEN

BAP

SECRET

SECRET

Control: 6566
Rec'd: January 11, 1963
12:47 p.m. 001

1963 JAN 11 12:47
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE
RECORDS CENTER
38

FROM: Paris

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2748, January 11, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF TWO).

ACTION DEPARTMENT 2748, INFORMATION BONN 194, LONDON 411.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION.

FROM STOESSEL.

Stikker stressed key role of Germany in alliance and said German reactions are always seriously considered in Washington. Adenauer brushed this aside, indicating this was once case but no longer.

Stikker thought Nassau accords in some respects represented improvisation and all implications had not yet been worked out. Adenauer countered that accords had been suggested by UK and therefore had been well thought out in advance by UK.

Adenauer was concerned about working groups set up in Washington on Nassau accords and wondered how these groups could be influenced from alliance point of view. It was agreed that best procedure (#) or Germans to pose questions regarding accords which would be indicative of European views. List of questions was then worked out which formed basis for questions sent January 5 to German Embassy Washington (Bonn's 1710 to Department).

"At present" would be -en

In second conversation with Adenauer later in day, Chancellor told Stikker that German Army is short 20,000 noncoms and 6,000 officers. He said this should be borne in mind in dealing with US demands for increase in number of German divisions.

In conversation with Schroeder, Stikker expressed view that Nassau accords could be improved by interpretation and that it would

* This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation "REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS UNCLASSIFIED"

SECRET

ACTION ASSIGNED TO.	ACTION TAKEN	DATE OF ACTION	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R
	Noted	1/12/63	File
NAME OF OFFICER	OFFICE SYMBOL		
Page	204/100		

Info
SS
SR
G
SP
L
H
SAL
BTF
NEA
DAC
P
IOP
INR
RMR

16

SECRET

-2748, January 11, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF TWO) from Paris.

would be unwise to oppose them outright. He envisaged two working groups in NATO; one on Nassau accords and one on strategic requirements, economic and political capabilities. After six months, these two groups could be combined.

Schroeder said he was not worried by US position at December Ministerial meeting, engaged in European defense through stationing bulk of its forces in Europe. US expectations of European contributions are probably excessive, but Schroeder felt Europeans still should do more.

Schroeder believed Nassau accords were step in right direction. He agreed questions should be proposed concerning accords; but the aim should be to advance multilateral concept and not to torpedo Nassau accords. He thought French would pose difficulties, especially since they were behind UK in atomic development. He thought it would be hard for Germany to influence France to take favorable stand regarding Nassau.

In Schroeder's view, it would not be wise to put veto problem in foreground. This is most difficult of all. First objective should be to establish a NATO force; thereafter solution would impose.

In discussion of US desire for increasing conventional forces, Schroeder said US had never denied that allies should have balanced armament. He did not feel McNamara had departed from basic principles of MC 26/4. Ambassador Grew, who present at conversation, said US has accepted only 50 percent of MC 26/4. Now the emphasis of the US has shifted. It is contemplated that conventional war would be fought involving 40/60 divisions on enemy side. Bundeswehr cannot fight conventional war, Grew said.

Schroeder said his comments should not be misunderstood. Europeans cannot double their division strength. Possibilities of improving conventional forces are more limited than pure arithmetical

calculations

SECRET

SECRET

-3-2748, January 11, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF TWO) from Paris.

January 11, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF TWO)
unwise to oppose them outright. He envisaged two working
NATO; one on Nassau accords and one on strategic
elements, economic and political capabilities. After six
months, these two groups could be combined.

Schroeder said he was not worried by US position at December
Ministerial meeting, engaged in European defense through stationing
bulk of its forces in Europe. US expectations of European
contributions are probably excessive, but Schroeder felt Europeans
still should do more.

Schroeder believed Nassau accords were step in right direction.
He agreed questions should be proposed concerning accords, but the
aim should be to advance multilateral concept and not to
torpedo Nassau accords. He thought French would pose difficulties,
especially since they were behind UK in atomic development.
He thought it would be hard for Germany to influence France to
take favorable stand regarding Nassau.

In Schroeder's view, it would not be wise to put veto problem
in foreground. This is most difficult of all. First objective
should be to establish a NATO force; thereafter solution would
impose.

In discussion of US desire for increasing conventional forces,
Schroeder said US had never denied that allies should have
balanced armament. He did not feel McNamara had departed from basic
principles of MC 26/4. Ambassador Grew, who present at
conversation, said US has accepted only 50 percent of MC 26/4.
Now the emphasis of the US has shifted. It is contemplated that
conventional war would be fought involving 40/60 divisions on
enemy side. Bundeswehr cannot fight conventional war, Grew said.

Schroeder said his comments should not be misunderstood. Europeans
cannot double their division strength. Possibilities of improving
conventional forces are more limited than pure arithmetical

calculations

SECRET

SECRET

-3-2748, January 11, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF TWO) from Paris.

calculations might indicate. However, there would be better
chance of influencing US if all obligations were fulfilled.
Schroeder regretted best means of US-European consultation had
not yet been found. He thought first step would be to make
sure of facts and then jointly to work out common strategy.

AT THE
ARCHIVES

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 94 9520
By KCS NARA Date 2/7/98

possibilities or improving
pure arithmetical
calculations

SECRET

SECRET

-3-2748, January 11, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF TWO) from Paris.

calculations might indicate. However, there would be better chance of influencing US if all obligations were fulfilled. Schroeder regretted best means of US-European consultation had not yet been found. He thought first step would be to make sure of facts and then jointly to work out common strategy.

BOHLEN

JAK

(#) Omission, correction to follow.

SECRET

1/20/63

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

PERMANENT RECORD COPY

W
Action
SS
Info

EYES ONLY
FROM: BONN

~~TOP SECRET~~

Control: 12496
Rec'd: JANUARY 20, 1963
9:10 AM

TO: Secretary of State
NO: 1851, JANUARY 20, 2 PM

MICROFILMED FOR
KENNEDY LIBRARY
MAY 1964

NIACT

ACTION DEPARTMENT 1851, INFORMATION LONDON 482, PARIS 484

EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY

LONDON FOR AMBASSADOR ONLY

PARIS FOR AMBASSADOR ONLY

REF DEPTTEL 1667

Downgraded To: ~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL
EO 11652: XGDS (C) 2 (3) 4
Authorized By: H. D. Braggier
August 4, 1975 *tray*

①

RATHER THAN RISK POSSIBLE PUBLICITY RE LAST-MINUTE VISIT TO CHANCELLOR AT HIS HOME IN RHOENDORF BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR PARIS THIS AFTERNOON, I SAW CARSTENS THIS MORNING AT HIS HOUSE TO GIVE HIM SUBSTANCE OF REFTEL FOR ADENAUER'S INFORMATION. CARSTENS IMMEDIATELY SAW VALUE OF CHANCELLOR HAVING THIS INFORMATION, AND ASKED IF IT COULD BE CONVEYED TO HASSEL ALSO, SINCE LATTER TOO IS ACCOMPANYING CHANCELLOR TO PARIS AND CARSTENS BELIEVES MESSMER WILL UNDOUBTEDLY SPEAK ALONG SAME LINES WITH HIM. I SAID I WOULD ASK DEPARTMENT'S APPROVAL IMMEDIATELY AND LET HIM KNOW IN PARIS. I RECOMMEND THAT WE AGREE.

CARSTENS ADMITS HE AND SCHROEDER ARE MOST APPREHENSIVE RE PARIS VISIT. HE FEARS THAT MOST LIKELY OUTCOME WILL BE EITHER 1) THAT CHANCELLOR WILL DISREGARD COUNSEL OF HIS ADVISORS AND ACCEPT DEGAULLE'S IDEAS ON FRANCO-GERMAN COOPERATION; OR 2) THAT ADENAUER, IN ATTEMPT TO INTRODUCE ELEMENT OF SANITY AND OBTAIN FRENCH AGREEMENT TO FURTHER REALISTIC NEGOTIATIONS ON UK ENTRY INTOUC EEC, WILL ALIENATE DEGAULLE TO POINT WHERE

Bonn 1851
740.5611
1-2063

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

• This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

ACTION ASSIGNED TO NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL		ACTION TAKEN		DIRECTIONS TO RM/R	
DATE OF ACTION					

EYES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIAL

-2- 1851, JANUARY 20, 2 PM FROM BONN

AGREEMENT ON FRANCO-GERMAN COOPERATION WILL BECOME IMPOSSIBLE. (HE ANTICIPATES THAT DEGAULLE IS PREPARED TO EXERT EXTREME PRESSURE TO OBTAIN ACCEPTANCE HIS VIEWS, EVEN TO POINT OF THREATENING TO BREAK UP CLOSE RELATIONS ACHIEVED THUS FAR AND SO ESTEEMED BY GERMAN OPINION.) CARSTENS SAYS THAT GREATEST HOPE FOR AVOIDING EXTREME RESULTS LIES IN FACT THAT FOREIGN OFFICE, AFTER CAREFUL STUDY, FINDS THAT ANY AGREEMENT AT PARIS, EITHER WRITTEN OR ORAL, MUST BE SUBMITTED TO BUNDESTAG FOR APPROVAL, SINCE CONSTITUTION IS STRICT ON THIS POINT. HE AND SCHROEDER ARE USING ARGUMENT WITH CHANCELLOR THAT BUNDESTAG WILL HAVE TO BE PERSUADED REAL EFFORT HAS BEEN MADE AT PARIS--AND INDEED SOME MEASURE OF SUCCESS ACHIEVED-- IF IT IS NOT TO HOLD UP ANY AGREEMENT MADE WITH DEGAULLE. OTHERWISE, HE SAYS, BUNDESTAG WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY TAKE POSITION THAT WHILE FRANCO-GERMAN AGREEMENT IS ACCEPTABLE, FINAL APPROVAL SHOULD BE WITHHELD PENDING DECISION ON UK ENTRY. CARSTENS ADDED "FOR MY PERSONAL INFORMATION," THAT HE WAS ENDEAVORING TO PERSUADE CHANCELLOR TO INCLUDE SCHROEDER IN ANY DISCUSSIONS OF UK AND EEC WITH DEGAULLE, ARGUING THAT, AS ADENAUER, HIMSELF ADMITS, HE IS UNFAMILIAR WITH DETAILS OF BRUSSELS NEGOTIATIONS, AND ALSO THAT SCHROEDER'S PRESENCE IS NECESSARY TO DEMONSTRATE TO BUNDESTAG THAT EVERYTHING POSSIBLE WAS DONE TO INFLUENCE DEGAULLE RE UK ENTRY.

CARSTENS EXPECTS GERMAN DELEGATION TO RETURN TO BONN LATE WEDNESDAY, AND WE HAVE AGREED TO MEET EARLY THURSDAY FOR SURVEY OF SITUATION THEN.

DOWLING

DT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIAL



Classified by CIA Report


Notes on Remarks by President Kennedy before the National Security Council
Tuesday, January 22, 1963

I will start by reviewing areas of policy which will be before us in the coming months and indicate the general attitude which I have toward them and to emphasize where we might put our emphasis in the next few months.

The responsibilities of the United States are worldwide and the U.S. is the only country which is recognizing its wide responsibilities. We are part of NATO, SEATO, etc. and support other pacts even though we are not a part of them. Other nations are not doing their share.


Would like to say a word first about Cuba.

The indications are that the importance of timing is of paramount importance in reaching judgments — both by the USSR and the US. Our big problem is to protect our interests and prevent a nuclear war. It was a very close thing whether we would engage in a quarantine or an air strike. In looking back, it was really that it presented us with an immediate crises and the USSR had to make their judgment and come to a decision to act in twelve hours. In looking back over that four or five day period, we all changed our views somewhat, or at least appreciated the advantages and disadvantages of alternate courses of action. That is what we should do in any other struggle with the Soviet Union — and I believe we will be in one in the future. We should have sufficient time to consider the alternatives. You could see that the Russians had a good deal of debate in a 48 hour period. If they had only to act in an hour or two, their actions would have been spasmodic and might have resulted in nuclear war. It is important that we have time to study their reaction.



SANITIZED

NW 84-117
BY *[Signature]* NARS, DATE 3/85



In the matter of Europe, the US has been faced since 1958 with deGaulle's position. . . . nuclear veto by French President Eisenhower reviewed the problem and took the position that it should be reviewed by the NATO nations -- the NATO nations would not act. ... no agreement between the Three. That decision this Administration also supported. However, this decision has not produced the present contention with the French. Even when I was in Paris last June, de Gaulle said he would make some proposal in regard to NATO itself. All through his speeches and his memoirs he indicates it is his desire to have a Europe in which France would be a dominant power speaking to the USSR and to the Western World as an equal. If we had given him atomic weapons he would be difficult to deal with.

De Gaulle did not question our support of Western Europe because we have maintained strong representation there, but the French have not. They have not been aggressive as we have been and, therefore it is not a distrust of us that we will desert Europe but it is that he feels that France should assert a position as a strong France and cease its growing reliance on the U.S.


Having made such proposals to the US and Great Britain and been turned down, he has made the same turn to Germany.

There is not much harm to us in this position. With Great Britain joining the Common Market, this would strengthen Europe but France will not let them in at this time. If G.B. does go in, it will cost us a good deal in trade, but it will be good for the stability of Europe. France keeping Britain out is a setback for us, but a more severe setback for G.B. They are going to have a difficult time in Europe. It is our interest to strengthen Europe and the unilateral concept, and deGaulle is opposed to this. By strengthening the multilateral concept, it strengthens NATO and increases their dependence on us. This strengthens our influence in Europe and gives us the power to guide Europe and keep it strong. The events of the past two weeks makes it important for us to support the multilateral concept and that is why deGaulle is more opposed to it. It will be difficult to work this out, but it is important that we do so. But we should not be wholly distressed.


After all we have done for France in so many ways, deGaulle has opposed us in many places throughout the world - in NATO, in the Congo and other places -- but he is there and we have to live with it. One way we can do so is to strengthen the multilateral force and NATO.

Our negotiators on trade matters will have to be very careful to protect our interests. Our trade balance is of great concern and is not under control. If we get down to the \$12 billion coverage of our national reserve we will be in trouble. We will have pressure on the dollar and pressure from the Congress and they will begin to follow a much narrower policy. We will

We will be very tough about the actions that Europe takes. We maintain large forces in West Germany. If West Germany does not maintain sufficient forces but instead concentrates on agricultural production for instance to our detriment, we must take a strong position.




In the coming months we must concentrate on how we can protect the interests of the United States. We have pursued a very generous policy. We have lost our economic power over these countries.



Do not think that the Europeans will do anything for us even though we have done a lot for them. So we must have all our representatives looking out very strongly for the U.S. interests. We must be sure our economic house is in order and use our military, political power to protect our own interests.

Regarding our attitude toward the neutrals. There is criticism about our lack of difference between the Allies and the neutrals. The Pakistanis are critical, but we must recognize the importance of the Indians. If they joined the Chinese we would have no free south Asia. The Pakistanis are struggling against the Indians and the Afghans. They will use or attempt to exploit our power. Our interest is to make a strong sub-continent.



While doing this we have moved away from the Pakistanis and they are moving closer to the Chinese and against the Indians. We have not been able to persuade

the Pakistannis or the Afganistans to chance their policy on India.

These forces were there long before we came on the scene and we cannot do much about it -- we cannot settle all the disputes, but we want to keep them free from the Communists. We cannot permit those who call themselves neutrals to be completely taken into the Communist camp.

We must keep our ties with Nassir and others,

With regard to AID which is going forward under General Clay, we hope we can tie this whole concept of aid to the safety of the United States. This is the reason we give aid. The test is whether it will serve the United States and if we can equate it to that. AID is not a good word. Perhaps we can describe it better as Mutual Assistance -- though this is an old term. Some countries can go it alone, but we must do all we can. We must make every effort to keep a country out of the communist bloc. It is more difficult to get a country out of a communist bloc once it is in. It sometimes seems hopeless. The Congress may cut the heart out of Foreign Aid and this is a great danger to the safety of the United States. Even the French give more aid than we do on a per capita basis. We will probably take a cut, but we do not want to hurt our Defense effort. We would not like four or five countries to suddenly turn communist just because we did not give a certain amount of aid. We must look this over very carefully and put aid on the basis it will best serve our own interest.

Turning to the domestic scene, we will have a deficit of about \$12 of \$12½ billion. We have made an effort to hold the deficit down and we have in the past three years. Except for Defense and Space and Interest on the Debt we have ~~not~~ increased the National Budget but it has been increased less than it was under the previous Administration. With the tremendous movement from the country to the cities, we have had many problems. While the costs have increased, the receipts have dropped. We have only increased about 1% a year in the growth rate during the past ten years. This is serious, particularly with the great increase in population.

I think this Tax Bill is very important. If we get another recession in this country it will ~~taxation~~ have a bad effect on the gold reserve. It will have a bad psychological effect on the people of the U.S. And when we see the strong position that Mr. Khrushchev is taking with regard to agricultural and other domestic sections of the economy — and if we just drift, we will look very bad to other nations.

Furthermore, the deficit is a reflection of the fight in the hot and cold war we have been fighting during the past fifteen years. If we go to a deficit of \$12 billion, this would be a most serious affair for the United States. If we can go forward with the present Tax Bill, we will be in much better shape. All of these matters — the tax program, AID, defense, etc. are all related.

The Military are disturbed because of our failure to go forward with certain programs. For instance: The B-70, Nike-Zeus, Skybolt. As a matter of fact, we are going forward with a large program and there is a limit to how much we can do, and if the necessity develops we will do more.

This Administration has spent a good many millions more than has been appropriated for Space and Defense -- and perhaps we should spend more.

One of our big jobs will be to persuade our colleagues in Europe to do a better job themselves. If we maintain six divisions in Europe and they only maintain a force which will permit them to fight only two or three days -- if we have sufficient force to fight and supply for ninety days and those around us can only fight for two or three days, then we should take another look. France carries their burden abroad, but not in Europe. We should consider very hard the narrow interests of the United States as well as the interests of the Free World. If we grown weak economically, our influence will grown less and less and if that happens, our Free World's position will grown weaker. De Gaulle is basing his whole position on the position of the United States. He can do this because he feels we will maintain our military power in Europe and he can bank on it.

Mr. Foster is engaged in the Test Ban. We might be successful here if the Russians need it

If the Test Ban Treaty is successful it will inhibit the Russians from starting a nuclear war and if so we should make every effort to conclude the treaty. But if the nuclear test ban includes only the Russians and the U.S. it is not worth very much. We should support Foster all we can until we see where it is going. If we get a successful treaty, we will fight it through if it will help us. (On the Hill ?)

Thanks for your cooperation. All worked well together and harmoniously. Hope we can maintain the mutual relations which have been so good in this Administration.

EXCISED COPY FOLLOWS

WLK-78-493

done by CIA reports

Notes on Remarks by President Kennedy before the National Security Council
Tuesday, January 22, 1963

NSC (Case, 1/2/63)
SP

SANITIZED

NSC (Case, 1/2/63)
BY MLK/PM NARS, DATE 10/6/80

In the matter of Europe, the US has been faced since 1958 with deGaulle's position. . . . nuclear veto by French President Eisenhower reviewed the problem and took the position that it should be reviewed by the NATO nations — the NATO nations would not act. ... no agreement between the Three. That decision this Administration also supported. However, this decision has not produced the present contention with the French. Even when I was in Paris last June, de Gaulle said he would make some proposal in regard to NATO itself. All through his speeches and his memoirs he indicates it is his desire to have a Europe in which France would be a dominant power speaking to the USSR and to the Western World as an equal. J

3.

4



Regarding our attitude toward the neutrals. There is criticism about our lack of difference between the Allies and the neutrals. The Pakistanis are critical, but we must recognize the importance of the Indians. If they joined the Chinese we would have no free south Asia. The Pakistanis are struggling against the Indians and the Afghans. They will use or attempt to exploit our power. Our interest is to make a strong sub-continent.

While doing this we have moved away from the Pakistanis and they are moving closer to the Chinese and against the Indians. We have not been able to persuade

the Pakistannis or the Afganistans to chance their policy on India. These forces were there long before we came on the scene and we cannot do much about it -- we cannot settle all the disputes, but we want to keep them free from the Communists. We cannot permit those who call themselves neutrals to be completely taken into the Communist camp. We must keep our ties with Nassir and others.

With regard to AID which is going forward under General Clay, we hope we can tie this whole concept of aid to the safety of the United States. This is the reason we give aid. The test is whether it will serve the United States and if we can equate it to that. AID is not a good word. Perhaps we can describe it better as Mutual Assistance -- though this is an old term. Some countries can go it alone, but we must do all we can. We must make every effort to keep a country out of the communist bloc. It is more difficult to get a country out of a communist bloc once it is in. It sometimes seems hopeless. The Congress may cut the heart out of Foreign Aid and this is a great danger to the safety of the United States. Even the French give more aid than we do on a per capita basis. We will probably take a cut, but we do not want to hurt our Defense effort. We would not like four or five countries to suddenly turn communist just because we did not give a certain amount of aid. We must look this over very carefully and put aid on the basis it will best serve our own interest.

Turning to the domestic scene, we will have a deficit of about \$12 of \$12½ billion. We have made an effort to hold the deficit down and we have in the past three years. Except for Defense and Space and Interest on the Debt we have ~~xxx~~ increased the National Budget but it has been increased less than it was under the previous Administration. With the tremendous movement from the country to the cities, we have had many problems. While the costs have increased, the receipts have dropped. We have only increased about 1% a year in the growth rate during the past ten years. This is serious, particularly with the great increase in population.

I think this Tax Bill is very important. If we get another recession in this country it will ~~have~~ have a bad effect on the gold reserve. It will have a bad psychological effect on the people of the U.S. And when we see the strong position that Mr. Khrushchev is taking with regard to agricultural and other domestic sections of the economy -- and if we just drift, we will look very bad to other nations.

Furthermore, the deficit is a reflection of the fight in the hot and cold war we have been fighting during the past fifteen years. If we go to a deficit of \$12 billion, this would be a most serious affair for the United States. If we can go forward with the present Tax Bill, we will be in much better shape. All of these matters -- the tax program, AID, defense, etc. are all related.

The Military are disturbed because of our failure to go forward with certain programs. For instance: The B-70, Nike-Zeus, Skybolt. As a matter of fact, we are going forward with a large program and there is a limit to how much we can do, and if the necessity develops we will do more.

Administration has spent a good many millions more than has been appropriated for Space and Defense -- and perhaps we should spend more.

One of our big jobs will be to persuade our colleagues in Europe to do a better job themselves. If we maintain six divisions in Europe and they only maintain a force which will permit them to fight only two or three days -- if we have sufficient force to fight and supply for ninety days and those around us can only fight for two or three days, then we should take another look. France carries their burden abroad, but not in Europe. We should consider very hard the narrow interests of the United States as well as the interests of the Free World. If we grow weak economically, our influence will grow less and less and if that happens, our Free World's position will grow weaker. De Gaulle is basing his whole position on the position of the United States. He can do this because he feels we will maintain our military power in Europe and he can bank on it.

T

J

Thanks for your cooperation. All worked well together and harmoniously. Hope we can maintain the mutual relations which have been so good in this Administration.

1/22/63
Crawley ✓
Done by CIA Reporter


Notes on Remarks by President Kennedy before the National Security Council
Tuesday, January 22, 1963

I will start by reviewing areas of policy which will be before us in the coming months and indicate the general attitude which I have toward them and to emphasize where we might put our emphasis in the next few months.

The responsibilities of the United States are worldwide and the U.S. is the only country which is recognizing its wide responsibilities. We are part of NATO, SEATO, etc. and support other pacts even though we are not a part of them. Other nations are not doing their share.

Would like to say a word first about Cuba.

The indications are that the importance of timing is of paramount importance in reaching judgments — both by the USSR and the US. Our big problem is to protect our interests and prevent a nuclear war. It was a very close thing whether we would engage in a quarantine or an air strike. In looking back, it was really that it presented us with an immediate crises and the USSR had to make their judgment and come to a decision to act in twelve hours. In looking back over that four or five day period, we all changed our views somewhat, or at least appreciated the advantages and disadvantages of alternate courses of action. That is what we should do in any other struggle with the Soviet Union — and I believe we will be in one in the future. We should have sufficient time to consider the alternatives. You could see that the Russians had a good deal of debate in a 48 hour period. If they had only to act in an hour or two, their actions would have been spasmodic and might have resulted in nuclear war. It is important that we have time to study their reaction.




SANITIZED

PRO SEYMUR - A286 has by jms-efk

NW 84-47

BY mm NARS, DATE 3/85



In the matter of Europe, the US has been faced since 1958 with deGaulle's position. . . . nuclear veto by French President Eisenhower reviewed the problem and took the position that it should be reviewed by the NATO nations — the NATO nations would not act. ... no agreement between the Three. That decision this Administration also supported. However, this decision has not produced the present contention with the French. Even when I was in Paris last June, de Gaulle said he would make some proposal in regard to NATO itself. All through his speeches and his memoirs he indicates it is his desire to have a Europe in which France would be a dominant power speaking to the USSR and to the Western World as an equal. If we had given him atomic weapons he would be difficult to deal with.

De Gaulle did not question our support of Western Europe because we have maintained strong representation there, but the French have not. They have not been aggressive as we have been and, therefore it is not a distrust of us that we will desert Europe but it is that he feels that France should assert a position as a strong France and cease its growing reliance on the U.S.

Having made such proposals to the US and Great Britain and been turned down, he has made the same turn to Germany.

There is not much harm to us in this position. With Great Britain joining the Common Market, this would strengthen Europe but France will not let them in at this time. If G.B. does go in, it will cost us a good deal in trade, but it will be good for the stability of Europe. France keeping Britain out is a setback for us, but a more severe setback for G.B. They are going to have a difficult time in Europe. It is our interest to strengthen Europe and the unilateral concept, and deGaulle is opposed to this. By strengthening the multilateral concept, it strengthens NATO and increases their dependence on us. This strengthens our influence in Europe and gives us the power to guide Europe and keep it strong. The events of the past two weeks makes it important for us to support the multilateral concept and that is why deGaulle is more opposed to it. It will be difficult to work this out, but it is important that we do so. But we should not be wholly distressed.

After all we have done for France in so many ways, deGaulle has opposed us in many places throughout the world - in NATO, in the Congo and other places -- but he is there and we have to live with it. One way we can do so is to strengthen the multilateral force and NATO.

Our negotiators on trade matters will have to be very careful to protect our interests. Our trade balance is of great concern and is not under control. If we get down to the \$12 billion coverage of our national reserve we will be in trouble. We will have pressure on the dollar and pressure from the Congress and they will begin to follow a much narrower policy. We will

be very tough about the actions that Europe takes. We maintain large forces in West Germany. If West Germany does not maintain sufficient forces but instead concentrates on agricultural production for instance to our detriment, we must take a strong position.

In the coming months we must concentrate on how we can protect the interests of the United States. We have pursued a very generous policy. We have lost our economic power over these countries.

Do not think that the Europeans will do anything for us even though we have done a lot for them. So we must have all our representatives looking out very strongly for the U.S. interests. We must be sure our economic house is in order and use our military, political power to protect our own interests.


Regarding our attitude toward the neutrals. There is criticism about our lack of difference between the Allies and the neutrals. The Pakistanis are critical, but we must recognize the importance of the Indians. If they joined the Chinese we would have no free south Asia. The Pakistanis are struggling against the Indians and the Afghans. They will use or attempt to exploit our power. Our interest is to make a strong sub-continent.

While doing this we have moved away from the Pakistanis and they are moving closer to the Chinese and against the Indians. We have not been able to persuade

Pakistannis or the Afganistans to chance their policy on India.

These forces were there long before we came on the scene and we cannot do much about it -- we cannot settle all the disputes, but we want to keep them free from the Communists. We cannot permit those who call themselves neutrals to be completely taken into the Communist camp.

We must keep our ties with Nassir and others,



With regard to AID which is going forward under General Clay, we hope we can tie this whole concept of aid to the safety of the United States. This is the reason we give aid. The test is whether it will serve the United States and if we can equate it to that. AID is not a good word. Perhaps we can describe it better as Mutual Assistance -- though this is an old term. Some countries can go it alone, but we must do all we can. We must make every effort to keep a country out of the communist bloc. It is more difficult to get a country out of a communist bloc once it is in. It sometimes seems hopeless. The Congress may cut the heart out of Foreign Aid and this is a great danger to the safety of the United States. Even the French give more aid than we do on a per capita basis. We will probably take a cut, but we do not want to hurt our Defense effort. We would not like four or five countries to suddenly turn communist just because we did not give a certain amount of aid. We must look this over very carefully and put aid on the basis it will best serve our own interest.

Turning to the domestic scene, we will have a deficit of about \$12 of \$12½ billion. We have made an effort to hold the deficit down and we have in the past three years. Except for Defense and Space and Interest on the Debt we have ~~not~~ increased the National Budget but it has been increased less than it was under the previous Administration. With the tremendous movement from the country to the cities, we have had many problems. While the costs have increased, the receipts have dropped. We have only increased about 1% a year in the growth rate during the past ten years. This is serious, particularly with the great increase in population.

I think this Tax Bill is very important. If we get another recession in this country it will ~~be a disaster~~ have a bad effect on the gold reserve. It will have a bad psychological effect on the people of the U.S. And when we see the strong position that Mr. Khrushchev is taking with regard to agricultural and other domestic sections of the economy -- and if we just drift, we will look very bad to other nations.

Furthermore, the deficit is a reflection of the fight in the hot and cold war we have been fighting during the past fifteen years. If we go to a deficit of \$12 billion, this would be a most serious affair for the United States. If we can go forward with the present Tax Bill, we will be in much better shape. All of these matters -- the tax program, AID, defense, etc. are all related.

The Military are disturbed because of our failure to go forward with certain programs. For instance: The B-70, Nike-Zeus, Skybolt. As a matter of fact, we are going forward with a large program and there is a limit to how much we can do, and if the necessity develops we will do more.

Administration has spent a good many millions more than has been appropriated for Space and Defense -- and perhaps we should spend more.


One of our big jobs will be to persuade our colleagues in Europe to do a better job themselves. If we maintain six divisions in Europe and they only maintain a force which will permit them to fight only two or three days -- if we have sufficient force to fight and supply for ninety days and those around us can only fight for two or three days, then we should take another look. France carries their burden abroad, but not in Europe. We should consider very hard the narrow interests of the United States as well as the interests of the Free World. If we grown weak economically, our influence will grown less and less and if that happens, our Free World's position will grown weaker. De Gaulle is basing his whole position on the position of the United States. He can do this because he feels we will maintain our military power in Europe and he can bank on it.

Mr. Foster is engaged in the Test Ban. We might be successful here if the Russians need it

If the Test Ban Treaty is successful it will inhibit the Russians from starting a nuclear war and if so we should make every effort to conclude the treaty. But if the nuclear test ban includes only the Russians and the U.S. it is not worth very much. We should support Foster all we can until we see where it is going. If we get a successful treaty, we will fight it through if it will help us. (On the Hill ?)

Thanks for your cooperation. All worked well together and harmoniously. Hope we can maintain the mutual relations which have been so good in this Administration.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



It

*has threatened NATO which
de Gaulle strongly opposed*

[p. 1a]

SECRET


FAVY
Verms
p. 457

Remarks of President Kennedy to the National Security Council
Meeting of January 22, 1963

The President began his discussion of national security problems by calling attention to the worldwide responsibilities of the United States. While we fully recognize our responsibilities, other states are not carrying their fair share of the burden.

Cuba

The major lesson of the Cuban crisis, the President said, was the paramount importance of timing. Both sides, the United States and the USSR, need sufficient time to consider alternative courses of action. Our objective was and is to protect our national interests while trying to avoid a nuclear exchange which, if it happened, would be a defeat for both sides. In handling crises, it is important that the Russians have enough time to debate their action. If they are forced to react in an hour or two, they may react in a spasm and resort to nuclear war. We, too, looking back on the quarantine vs. air strike decision, took several days to discuss and understand the advantages and disadvantages of the alternatives. The reason for building up NATO conventional forces is to gain greater control over the timing of a showdown in Europe provoked by the Russians.



Western Europe

Turning to Europe, the President recalled that de Gaulle's current policy is no different than that he has been advocating since 1958 when he first proposed to President Eisenhower a U. S. -U. K. -France directorate giving France, in effect, a veto on our use of nuclear weapons. The suggestion was turned down because it would have broken up NATO. This Administration agrees it was a correct decision. The turndown of de Gaulle's proposal was not, however, the reason why he is behaving as he now is. Even if we had given France nuclear weapons, de Gaulle would have tried to restore France to a predominant position in Europe. For years, in speeches and in his memoirs, de Gaulle

SANITIZED

~~SECRET~~

NW-84-47
BY RM/m NARS, DATE 3/85

~~SECRET~~

-2-

has expressed his view that France must be a dominant power speaking to the USSR and the West as an equal, dependent on no one.

In analyzing de Gaulle's present actions, the President said de Gaulle did not question our support of Europe. The proof that he does not fear we would desert him is the deployment of only a small number of French troops opposite the Russians in Germany. He relies on our power to protect him while he launches his policies based solely on the self-interest of France. Having been turned down by the U.S. and U.K. on the directorate, de Gaulle turned to Germany.

As to the Common Market, the President said that if Great Britain joined, Europe would be strengthened and stabilized. We favor the U.K. joining even though it will cost the U.S. considerable trade. If France keeps Britain out, this will be a setback for us but a more severe setback for the U.K.


Our interest, the President continued, is to strengthen the NATO multilateral force concept, even though de Gaulle is opposed, because a multilateral force will increase our influence in Europe and provide a way to guide NATO and keep it strong. We have to live with de Gaulle; ~~even though he is opposing us after all we have done for France.~~ One way to respond is to strengthen NATO and push for a multilateral nuclear force which will weaken de Gaulle's control of the Six. We should not be overly distressed because the problems caused by de Gaulle are not crucial in the sense that our problems in Latin America are.

U.S. Trade Negotiations

The President then summarized the guidelines for forthcoming trade negotiations. In the present situation, we must be very careful to protect U.S. interests. Our balance of payments problem is serious, it is not now under control, and it must be righted at the latest by the end of 1964. If we do not do so, there will be pressure against the dollar and Congress will be demanding reductions in our foreign programs.

~~SECRET~~

One effort we must make, the President continued, is to seek to prevent European states from taking actions which make our balance of payments problem worse. For example, we maintain large forces in Germany. We must firmly oppose West Germany if, ~~in place of~~ supporting adequate military forces, it increases its agricultural production to our detriment.


We have been very generous to Europe and it is now time for us to look out for ourselves, knowing full well that the Europeans will not do anything for us simply because we have in the past helped them. No longer dependent on the U. S. for economic assistance, the European states are less subject to our influence.

Attitude Toward Neutrals

*but we should not do
we are not to do
not do*

Referring to criticism by those who say we are treating neutrals as favorably as allies, the President said he did not believe such criticism was sound. For example, the Pakistanis oppose our giving military assistance to the Indians. Despite the fact that the Pakistanis are our allies, we must recognize the importance of India. If the Indians joined the Chinese, we would have no free South Asia. Our aim is to make the sub-continent of Asia strong. Even under present Indian leadership, we can work with India just as we must use our ally Pakistan to achieve our aim of keeping the sub-continent out of the Communist camp. We cannot permit all those who call themselves neutrals to join the Communist bloc. Therefore, we must keep our ties to Nasser and other neutralists even if we do not like many things they do because, if we lose them, the balance of power could swing against us.

Assistance to Foreign Countries

The President said he wanted to make clear that we are giving aid to foreign countries in order to increase the security of the United States -- not primarily for humanitarian reasons. AID programs should be tested against the contribution they make toward improving

our national security. Recalling that the military could always get Congress to appropriate funds for military assistance, the President asked that Defense Department officials help sell Congress on economic assistance. Some Congressmen will try to cut the heart out of the AID program. Should they succeed, we would be in real danger. A major effort is required to prevent this. We must make every effort to keep countries out of the Communist bloc. Once a country is in, we know from experience that it is very difficult to get it out. We cannot risk the possibility of four or five countries suddenly turning Communist just because we did not give them economic and military aid. An outside group is now reviewing the existing AID program for the purpose of ensuring that our assistance to foreign countries will best serve our own national interest.

Domestic Issues

In introducing his remarks on domestic issues, the President emphasized the major effort which has been made to hold down the budget deficit now estimated at about \$12 billion. The current budget shows increases only for defense, space and the fixed charge of interest on the national debt.

Our economic growth rate over the past ten years, he continued, has been too slow, particularly in view of the great increase in our population.

We must avoid another recession which would endanger our gold position and have a bad psychological effect on the American people. In comparison with the Russians who are making a major effort to improve their domestic economy, we must not give the impression of just drifting lest other states draw the conclusion that we cannot deal with our domestic economic problems.

An unbalanced budget as such is not worrisome especially when we realize that our present deficit is a reflection of the hot and cold war we have been fighting during the past fifteen years. The new tax bill is very important in this respect because if it is passed by the Congress we will be in much better shape.

It is unnecessary to point out that all these matters, AID, defense, economic growth and the tax program are all related. If we become weaker economically, our influence abroad will be reduced. If this happens, the entire Free World position weakens. It is basic to our national security to have a strong domestic economy.

Defense Problems

Recalling recent decisions limiting or halting certain military programs, e.g. the B-70, Skybolt, and Nike-Zeus, the President said we are going forward with large defense and space programs. If the necessity develops, we will do even more, but there is a limit to how much we can do.

One of our big tasks is to persuade our colleagues in Europe to increase their defense forces. If we are to keep six divisions in Europe, the European states must do more. Why should we have in Europe supplies adequate to fight for ninety days when the European forces around our troops have only enough supplies to fight for two or three days? Our forces in Europe are further forward than the troops of de Gaulle who, instead of committing his divisions to NATO, is banking on us to defend him by maintaining our present military position in Europe. While recognizing the military interests of the Free World, we should consider very hard the narrower interests of the United States.

Test Ban Negotiations

The President reviewed the background of the current negotiations with the USSR on a test ban treaty.

[REDACTED]

A test ban including only the USSR, the British, and the U.S. would not be very meaningful.

[REDACTED]

If we get a treaty we think we can live with, all of us must support it in order to overcome Congressional opposition which undoubtedly will develop.

Concluding his remarks, the President thanked the assembled officers for their cooperation, commented on the harmonious relations which exist among the Departments and Agencies, and expressed the hope that during the coming year we could build on the solid foundation which now exists.

6-

decision. The turndown of de Gaulle's proposal was not, however, the reason why he is behaving as he now is. Even if we had given France nuclear weapons, de Gaulle would have tried to restore France to a predominant position in Europe. For years, in speeches and in his memoirs, de Gaulle has expressed his view that France must be a dominant power speaking to the USSR and the West as an equal, dependent on no one.

In analyzing de Gaulle's present actions, the President said de Gaulle did not question our support of Europe. The proof that he does not fear we would desert him is the deployment of only a small number of French troops opposite the Russians in Germany. He relies on our power to protect him while he launches his policies based solely on the self-interest of France. Having been turned down by the U.S. and U.K. on the directorate, de Gaulle turned to Germany. (This helps to keep Germany from looking to the Russians. It does threaten NATO, which de Gaulle strongly opposes.) *3 emm*

As to the Common Market, the President said that if Great Britain joined, Europe would be strengthened and stabilized. We favor the U.K. joining even though it will cost the U.S. considerable trade. If France keeps Britain out, this will be a setback for us but a more severe setback for the U.K.

Our interest, the President continued, is to strengthen the NATO multilateral force concept, even though de Gaulle is opposed, because a multilateral force will increase our influence in Europe and provide a way to guide NATO and keep it strong. We have to live with de Gaulle. One way to respond is to strengthen NATO and push for a multilateral nuclear force which will weaken de Gaulle's control of the Six. We should not be overly distressed because the problems caused by de Gaulle are not crucial in the sense that our problems in Latin America are.

U.S. Trade Negotiations

The President then summarized the guidelines for forthcoming trade negotiations. In the present situation, we must be very careful to protect U.S. interests. Our balance of payments problem is serious, it is not now under control, and it must be righted at the latest by the end of 1964. If we do not do so, there will be pressure against the dollar and Congress will be demanding reductions in our foreign programs.

weaker economically, our influence abroad will be reduced. If this happens, the entire Free World position weakens. It is basic to our national security to have a strong domestic economy.


Defense Problems

Recalling recent decisions limiting or halting certain military programs, e. g. the B-70, Skybolt, and Nike-Zeus, the President said we are going forward with large defense and space programs. If the necessity develops, we will do even more, but there is a limit to how much we can do.

One of our big tasks is to persuade our colleagues in Europe to increase their defense forces. If we are to keep six divisions in Europe, the European states must do more. Why should we have in Europe supplies adequate to fight for ninety days when the European forces around our troops have only enough supplies to fight for two or three days? Our forces in Europe are further forward than the troops of de Gaulle who, instead of committing his divisions to NATO, is banking on us to defend him by maintaining our present military position in Europe. While recognizing the military interests of the Free World, we should consider very hard the narrower interests of the United States.

Test Ban Negotiations

The President reviewed the background of the current negotiations with the USSR on a test ban treaty. (Our primary purpose in trying to get a treaty with Russia is to halt or delay the development of an atomic capability by the Chinese Communists.)



If we get a treaty we think we can live with, all of us must support it in order to overcome Congressional opposition which undoubtedly will develop.

Concluding his remarks, the President thanked the assembled officers for their cooperation, commented on the harmonious relations which exist among the Departments and Agencies, and expressed the hope that during the coming year we could build on the solid foundation which now exists.

WJ
FR

2 early

FRK
almost
certainly →

Telephone: (617) 929-4582
929-4500

March 11, 1985

Mandatory Review Case: NLK-84-47

Marc Trachtenberg
Department of History
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, PA 19174

Dear Mr. Trachtenberg:

Mandatory review of the following White House-originated document(s) has been completed. It has been determined that:

Document(s) _____ may be
declassified in full. Copy(ies) are enclosed.

✓ Document(s) 4 and 5 _____ may be
declassified in part. Portions remain classified under Section
1.3 of EO 12356 as indicated on the attached submission list.
Sanitized version(s) of the document(s) are enclosed.

✓ The Library will bill you for the enclosed document copy(ies)
at the rate of \$.25 per page. Total pages enclosed: 13.

Document(s) _____ remain
classified in full under Section 1.3 of EO 12356 as indicated on
the attached submission list.

If there are exemptions you wish to appeal, you should direct your letter of appeal to the Deputy Archivist of the United States and send it to me at the above address within sixty days of receipt of this letter. The Library will forward your appeal to the Deputy Archivist who will notify you directly of the final decision.

If you have any questions concerning this case or the mandatory review process, please contact me.

Sincerely,

Suzanne K. Forbes
Suzanne K. Forbes
Classified Materials Archivist

Enclosure(s)

JFK NSC comments 1/63

NSI 314 NSC

11. SEC 24011

286.

"Done by CIA Report" ✓

1/22/63

Notes on Remarks by President Kennedy before the National Security Council
Tuesday, January 22, 1963

I will start by reviewing areas of policy which will be before us in the coming months and indicate the general attitude which I have toward them and to emphasize where we might put our emphasis in the next few months.

The responsibilities of the United States are worldwide and the U.S. is the only country which is recognizing its wide responsibilities. We are part of NATO, SEATO, etc. and support other pacts even though we are not a part of them. Other nations are not doing their share.

Would like to say a word first about Cuba.

The indications are that the importance of timing is of paramount importance in reaching judgments -- both by the USSR and the US. Our big problem is to protect our interests and prevent a nuclear war. It was a very close thing whether we would engage in a quarantine or an air strike. In looking back, it was really that it presented us with an immediate crisis and the USSR had to make their judgment and come to a decision to act in twelve hours. In looking back over that four or five day period, we all changed our views somewhat, or at least appreciated the advantages and disadvantages of alternate courses of action. That is what we should do in any other struggle with the Soviet Union -- and I believe we will be in one in the future. We should have sufficient time to consider the alternatives. You could see that the Russians had a good deal of debate in a 48 hour period. If they had only to act in an hour or two, their actions would have been spasmodic and might have resulted in nuclear war. It is important that we have time to study their reaction. (We should continue our policy even though we do not get Europe to go along with us. 185)

SECRET

NSEC 1700

The time will probably come when we will have to act again on Cuba. Cuba might be our response in some future situation -- the same way the Russians have used Berlin. [We may decide that Cuba might be a more satisfactory response than a nuclear response. We must be ready -- although this might not come. We should be prepared to move on Cuba if it should be in our national interest.] The planning by the US, by the Military, in the direction of our effort should be advanced always keeping Cuba in mind in the coming months and to be ready to move with all possible speed. We can use Cuba to limit their actions just as they have had Berlin to limit our actions.

File 185

In the matter of Europe, the US has been faced since 1958 with deGaulle's position. . . . nuclear veto by French President Eisenhower reviewed the problem and took the position that it should be reviewed by the NATO nations -- the NATO nations would not act. ... no agreement between the Three. That decision this Administration also supported. However, this decision has not produced the present contention with the French. Even when I was in Paris last June, de Gaulle said he would make some proposal in regard to NATO itself. All through his speeches and his memoirs he indicates it is his desire to have a Europe in which France would be a dominant power speaking to the USSR and to the Western World as an equal. If we had given him atomic weapons he would be difficult to deal with.

De Gaulle did not question our support of Western Europe because we have maintained strong representation there, but the French have not. They have not been aggressive as we have been and, therefore it is not distrust of us that we will desert Europe but it is that he feels we should assert a position as a strong France and cease its growing dependence on the U.S.

This Administration has spent a good many millions more than has been appropriated for Space and Defense -- and perhaps we should spend more.

One of our big jobs will be to persuade our colleagues in Europe to do a better job themselves. If we maintain six divisions in Europe and they only maintain a force which will permit them to fight only two or three days -- if we have sufficient force to fight and supply for ninety days and those around us can only fight for two or three days, then we should take another look. France carries their burden abroad, but not in Europe. We should consider very hard the narrow interests of the United States as well as the interests of the Free World. If we grown weak economically, our influence will grown less and less and if that happens, our Free World's position will grown weaker. De Gaulle is basing his whole position on the position of the United States. He can do this because he feels we will maintain our military power in Europe and he can bank on it.

Mr. Foster is engaged in the Test Ban. We might be successful here if the Russians need it and if they know that we will change this if the Chicomps develop an atomic capacity. If they do we will have great difficulty in protecting Asia. If the Test Ban Treaty is successful it will inhibit the Russians from starting a nuclear war and if so we should make every effort to conclude the treaty. But if the nuclear test ban includes only the Russians and the U.S. it is not worth very much. We should support Foster all we can until we see where it is going. If we get a successful treaty, we will fight it through if it will help us. (On the Hill ?)

Thanks for your cooperation. All worked well together and harmoniously. Hope we can maintain the mutual relations which have been so good in this Administration.

TOP SECRET

NSEC 199/1
Tov... Paris

285

22 January 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting, 22 January 1963

1. The meeting was primarily a 40-minute monologue by the President. He was very impressive, using no notes, and speaking lucidly and clearly. He went across the board of international issues.

2. Cuba. He said that one of the lessons from Cuba was the importance of giving the other side time to consider alternatives. He referred to the heated debates in ExCom as to whether we should execute an air strike at once against the Soviet missiles or first blockade the Island. The advantage of taking the second course was the fact that the Soviets had time to consider alternatives and to turn back the ships, thus avoiding a spasmodic response which might have initiated nuclear war. For that reason he is pressing hard for conventional forces since he feels that their use have the unique quality of gaining time for a consideration of alternatives. A nuclear exchange would defeat all parties, and only through proper utilization of conventional forces can we avoid such an exchange.

3. He said the time may come for intervention in Cuba, perhaps in the form of a blockade more intense than the previous one, of an invasion or of a reprisal against Cuba in compensation for Soviet aggression elsewhere, possibly in Berlin. He said military action against Cuba is always within the area of possibility; therefore, the military must always be prepared to move rapidly on Cuba. He said we should be ready for military intervention in Berlin and Cuba at the same time.

4. Europe. The President discussed at length the French situation and DeGaulle. Looking back on relations with DeGaulle, he felt there was nothing he could have done by way of reconciling DeGaulle to prevent the present situation. If he had made concessions in the nuclear field they would have been to no avail since DeGaulle had long since been committed to a Western Europe under French leadership. Any concessions would have been interpreted as appeasement and would not have diveded DeGaulle. Thus, the present conflict was inevitable.

unappreciated

Copy ___ of 5 copies.

Page 1 of ___ pages

TOP SECRET

10001-75-004-89

TOP SECRET

NSEC 199/2

5. The President noted the efforts of DeGaulle to pull the Germans closer to him. This does not really worry him so long as Germany faces the West and is not attracted to the East. The exclusion of Britain from the Common Market is unfortunate but we can live with this exclusion. As a matter of fact, we would have to make rather substantial economic sacrifices if Britain joined the Market. We were for it in order to strengthen the European economic stability. If the Europeans cannot work out the admission of Great Britain, he was sorry but this was not critical. In view of these trends, our policy should be the strengthening of NATO and the development of the multilateral concept. (He did not define the multilateral concept). It is through the multilateral concept that we increase the dependence of the European nations on the United States and tie these nations closer to us. Thus, we thwart DeGaulle who wants to cause a split between Europe and the United States.

6. Economic matters. He urged that all US representatives in economic negotiations be alert for those things which might work against our need to control the gold outflow. He noted that the downward trend in gold continues and that by 1964 this must be under control. By that time, if the rate continues, the dollar will be in real trouble. He said he was not worried about the domestic deficit in the budget but does worry about the international deficit. He reverted to the fact that we were spending too much relatively for the defense of Europe. We must resist any proposal adversely affecting the gold reserves. A great deal of our loss of gold was due to the unfair division of effort in the NATO area. If we allow our economic strength to be drained off, we will lose our hold on Europe and will end up at the mercy of our former clients.

7. Neutrals. The President said he was aware of criticisms that we are going to the aid of neutrals at the cost of our allies. The fact is that we are proceeding in accordance with the interests of the United States. He didn't approve of the leadership of India but it is to our interest to have a sub-continent that can defend itself. The US can't undertake to settle all quarrels between third parties but it is our policy to keep important neutrals out of the Communist camp. It would look very bad indeed if in the next few years five or six countries would fall to Communism because of the failure of the United States to give them aid.

8. Aid. The President then talked about military and economic aid. He is very much afraid Congress will want to cut the heart out of the aid program. He asked all representatives, particularly the military, to stress

TOP SECRET Copy of 5 copies.
Page 2 of pages

TOP SECRET

NSEC 199/3

the security interest of the United States in this program. We don't aid countries because we like them but because it is necessary to our security. He is counting on getting help from a report by General Clay on this subject.

9. Budget. It looks as though there will be a 12 to 12-1/2 billion dollar deficit in the budget. He is not concerned about the deficit, but he is concerned about the lack of economic growth. On a per capita basis, we have not grown more than 1% per year for the last 10 years. The national debt has increased only 7% in 15 years, whereas the debt of the State of Virginia has increased 300%. He fears another recession which would result in continued gold outflow and loss of morale in the economic field. Hence, the tax cut was very important.

10. Military programs. He realized there is disappointment in some quarters that some programs are not being funded, such as the RS-70, Zeus, and Skybolt. He hoped that the military criticisms would take into account the global effect of the budget in spite of the omission of some programs.

11. Disarmament. He spoke of the importance of a test ban treaty if we could get a serious response from the Soviets. Such a ban would be instituted only with the understanding that if the Chinese started testing, the ban would be lifted. He hoped that a test ban agreement with the Soviets might act as a restraint on the Chinese and either prevent or retard them from becoming a nuclear power. If this potential exists, such a ban might be worthwhile.

12. In closing, the President expressed appreciation for the help in the past year and said he hoped that mutual confidence had increased. He asked that procedures be improved for speedy decision making.

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Copy of 5 copies

Page 3 of 3 pages

TOP SECRET

1123163

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Paris, January 23, 1963

Participants: M. André Malraux, Minister for Cultural Affairs
Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen

Malraux began the conversation by asking me how I found Paris in general on my return. I told him that from a personal point of view it was extremely pleasant; that everyone had been most kind and hospitable to us since our arrival here. I then went on to say that I find a very peculiar situation in the French Government, however, which is in contrast to my previous experience. For example, while I had known a number of de Gaulle's Ministers quite well in the past and still did, it seemed to me that his Ministers were very much in the dark as to the ultimate intentions of the General, particularly as to what he would decide on a given question. I mentioned in this connection the January 14 press conference, some aspects of which had apparently come as a considerable surprise to many of the Ministers who normally would have been in a position to know.

Malraux agreed that there was some truth in what I said and mentioned that he had been completely surprised by de Gaulle's shift of position on the Nassau Accords. He said that when he left Paris on the 7th of January he had had a discussion with the General who had maintained the posture of keeping the door open for further discussion with the United States on this subject, and that Malraux had so informed President Kennedy while in Washington. He had returned on the morning of the press conference and had had no advance indication that de Gaulle was going to shift his position. He said he was sure that there had been some event that had happened between the 7th and the 14th which had caused the General to adopt this position and mentioned as a possibility Mr. Ball's statement to NATO. He said he had no hard information on this point but believed that it had had something to do with de Gaulle's change of attitude.

In regard to the force de frappe, Malraux said he felt that the American view was too strictly military in terms of a Soviet attack on

SECRET

enclosed in Bohlen to DUS
2/2/63 MCL FR-VJ

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

Page 2 of
Enclosure No. 1
Airgram No.

this subject, and that we seem to be thinking as to the efficacy of a French force de frappe in the event of some Soviet threat or actual attack against the nations of Western Europe. He said that from his association with the General he felt that this was too rigid an understanding of the reasons why de Gaulle wished to have an independent nuclear force. In addition to his long-held and deeply felt view that each country, if it were to maintain its personality as a national state must be able to control its own defenses, de Gaulle, he felt, was thinking more in terms of a political development, involving any of the countries or areas of Western Europe, which would have military overtones. For example, he said, suppose a country or part of a country in Western Europe should become the object of a subversive coup which the Soviets would then try to protect with the threat of its nuclear power. He said it was by no means certain that the United States would consider an incident of this kind sufficient to invoke general nuclear war, but France, with her independent nuclear force, might be disposed to take conventional military action and use her nuclear force to offset any Soviet nuclear threat. I replied that this of course was a hypothetical case, but that should it occur as he described it, the United States would undoubtedly go along with its NATO allies in the nature of the response.

In further describing de Gaulle's psychology, Malraux mentioned that he was one of the very few Ministers that he felt enjoyed de Gaulle's confidence. Malraux said it must always be remembered that de Gaulle was a product of the French military system as it existed before World War II, and particularly of the French military schools. He said this tended to give him a somewhat rigid form of analysis of the structure and hence the policies of other countries. In regard to the United States, he said that while de Gaulle was generally familiar with the long struggle of President Kennedy to achieve the Presidency and had the greatest respect for him as an individual, he doubted if de Gaulle really had any knowledge of the constitutional structure and particularly the separation of powers in the United States. I agreed with him on this, stating that I had found very few Europeans who really did have a clear understanding of the effect of the separation of powers or, for example, the conduct of foreign affairs, pointing out in this connection that the United States Government was probably the last government in the world which could seriously conduct any secret diplomacy. I said, referring to my original statement in this conversation, that I felt the particular circumstances of the French Government made it very easy for reports or rumors of one kind or another from whatever source to be accepted by the Head of the State without any real opportunity for discussion and evaluation. I had noticed since I had been here a number of reports in the press in regard to American actions which were completely untrue, mentioning in this

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

Page 3 of
Enclosure No. 1
Airgram No.

connection recurring reports of some special secret deal between the United States and the Soviet Union, and even one stating that by accepting Polaris submarines the receiving nation will be completely under the control of American communications.

Malraux said that following his return from the United States, he was going to take the occasion in talking with de Gaulle to emphasize to him the great importance he attached to the possibility of a Kennedy-de Gaulle meeting. He said he had found the President in complete command of his job and desirous in effect, of having the kind of discussions on basic policy, the future of the world, and matters which he knew to be of interest to the General. He felt that only through a Kennedy-de Gaulle meeting could there be much chance of de Gaulle's exposing his views on general world problems, including the nuclear question. I pointed out the President had been most anxious to meet with General de Gaulle, but the General had felt that for reasons of public opinion a meeting without specific subjects to be decided might be disadvantageous. Malraux said he knew of this attitude on the part of the General but still felt that a meeting would be desirable. He, however, agreed with me that it would be necessary to let the repercussions from his press conference die down and to observe the development of events before there could be any question of a meeting.

COMMENT: Malraux, while obviously talking from a Gaullist point of view and seemingly rather anxious to indicate the intimacy of his association with de Gaulle, nevertheless seemed genuinely concerned at the possible drift of events since the press conference and was casting around for some means of checking this drift. He expressed on several occasions during this conversation his deep admiration for the President, which I felt was genuine, and seemed disposed to speak with considerable frankness.

AMB:CEBohlen:jd

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

1/25/63
Page 1 of
Enclosure No. 2
Airgram No.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: M. Habib Deloncle, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen

Date: January 25, 1963

M. Habib Deloncle was fairly recently appointed Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. During my call on him there was considerable exposition on his part of de Gaulle's views and motivations in regard to international affairs. Habib Deloncle has been a consistent Gaullist from the very beginning and was obviously expressing views which are in effect de Gaulle's party line. The points he made were as follows:

1. He said that de Gaulle had been extremely put out and distressed by the failure of the United States to make any adequate reply to his message of September 1958 to President Eisenhower. He said that this action taken by de Gaulle within a few months after his return to power and in the midst of the Algerian question had offered in his opinion a very good start towards a new relationship with the United States. He said he realized that this was the action of a previous administration, but emphasized the fact that this still played a great part in de Gaulle's psychological approach. When I pointed out to him the difficulty of accepting a directorate of three powers at that time or subsequently in view of the disparate engagements which the three powers had in various parts of the globe, also pointing out that the United States had solemn treaty commitments to a number of countries in the Far East and to the entire Latin American area to which France for example was not a party, and that it would be extremely difficult to work out any coordination of policies in those circumstances, Habib Deloncle replied that he had not understood the proposal to be one quite so concrete in nature but merely to recognize that the Communist danger was world-wide and that it should have been at least a point of departure in an endeavor to work out some coordinated action in the face of a threat, wherever it was.

I told him that in principle there could not be much objection to this statement of the case but in practice it would really come down to

SECRET

enclined w Bohlen to DUS
1/25/63 POL FR-US

1/25/63

~~TOP SECRET~~

Summary Record of NSC Executive Committee Meeting No. 38 (Part II)
January 25, 1963, 4:00 PM

The following were present:

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| The President | The Ambassador-at-Large |
| The Vice President | The Deputy Under Secretary of State |
| The Secretary of State | The Acting Director of USIA |
| The Secretary of the Treasury | Mr. Robert Manning |
| The Secretary of Defense | The Deputy Secretary of Defense |
| The Attorney General | The Asst. Secretary of Defense (ISA) |
| The Director of Central Intelligence | Mr. McGeorge Bundy |
| The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff | Mr. Sorensen |
| The Under Secretary of State | Mr. Bromley Smith |

(Attached to these notes is a copy of the intelligence report which prompted the President's discussion of European policy.)

At the conclusion of the discussion of Cuba, the President asked the members of the Executive Committee to remain for a discussion of our policy toward Europe. He said that our relations with de Gaulle during the next few months may be in for very heavy going. Now that de Gaulle will soon have his own nuclear force, he may make major policy changes, including possibly a French/Russian agreement. During the past few days he has tried to lock the British out of Europe and he may begin shortly trying to lock us out. At present de Gaulle is cooperating with us in none of our policies.

The President said that in the past we had two sanctions which could be applied against European states. The first was financial assistance. Now that we are no longer giving aid to Europe, this means of exerting pressure has disappeared. The second was our military defense of Europe. This sanction is wasting away as the French develop their own nuclear capability.

The President thought that we should look now at the contingency of de Gaulle trying to run us out of Europe by means of a deal with the Russians. He thought we ought to think now about how we can protect ourselves against actions which de Gaulle might take against us.

The President said that if de Gaulle did make a deal with the Russians, it is possible that the Germans would go with the French. He noted that in the present situation we cannot help the Germans very much. He referred to Ambassador Dowling's report of a conversation with Adenauer upon the

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PUBLISHED IN FRUS 1961-63
VOL XIII DOC # 169
By MMK NARA, Date 12/29/95

NSP 1316

... A A

Chancellor's return from his discussions with de Gaulle in which the Chancellor reported that de Gaulle had said the British had turned down his suggestion that their nuclear deterrent be committed to a European defense system and instead, at Nassau, had agreed to turn over their nuclear force to the U.S.

The President said he was disturbed by Adenauer's reference to a European defense system. He did not know what this was. Possibly he was referring to a defense system in which only the Six would benefit.

De Gaulle may be prepared to break up NATO. He may be thinking of neutralizing Europe by supporting a plan similar to the Rapaki Plan. If the French do move in this direction, we must be prepared to react immediately. For example, the French may suddenly decide to cash their dollar holdings as a means of exerting economic pressure on us.

The President said he had tried to understand de Gaulle's reaction to Cuba. He thought that the only logical way to explain de Gaulle's reaction was French belief that their support of us in the Cuban crisis involved a commitment which might get them into war arising out of American actions not directly involving French interests. He said that de Gaulle may have come to the conclusion that the security of France would increase if the French had no ties to the U.S. If there were no U.S. ties, U.S. difficulties outside of Europe would not endanger French security. The President asked Secretary McNamara to look closely at any U.S. funds being spent for NATO, including our share of infrastructure costs.

As soon as the French have a nuclear capability, the President continued, we have much less to offer Europe and the Europeans may conclude that continuing their ties with us will create a risk that we will drag them into a war in which they do not wish to be involved. If we are not vital to Germany, then our NATO strategy makes no sense.

The President said we must not permit a situation to develop in which we would have to seek economic favors from Europe. He thought we should think now about how we can use our existing position to put pressure on the Europeans if the situation so demands. De Gaulle now banks on our protecting him. We should be thinking of how we can react in an effective way in Europe; for example, withdrawing our tactical air force to bases outside France. He asked the Defense Department to look very carefully at current proposals to provide additional planes to French forces and to other NATO powers. He thought we should be prepared to reduce quickly, if we so decided, our military forces in Germany.

The President summarized by repeating that de Gaulle may have thought, during the Cuban crisis, that he was tied to the U.S. and that the Skybolt decision which resulted in the Nassau agreement had tied the U.K. to the U.S. Therefore, since the U.K. had chosen the U.S., France could keep the U.K. out of the Common Market as a non-European power.

The President concluded by asking that the Departments of State, Defense and Treasury look at all aspects of the possibilities he had described so that we would be prepared in the event any of these contingencies became reality.

Secretary Dillon referred to the President's statement that France was opposing every U.S. policy and noted that in the financial field there was no lack of cooperation by French financial officials. He said the explanation for this may lie in the fact that de Gaulle pays very little attention to economic matters.

The President recalled the U.K./France cooperation in the research and development of a supersonic airplane, the Concord. He said he had appointed a group to review the question of whether or not we should set out to develop a supersonic air transport. In this connection, if the French initiate active measures against us, he did not want our air transport companies to have to go begging to France for a supersonic transport.

Secretary Rusk said that de Gaulle's reaction to Cuba may have arisen from a sudden realization that the French "might fry" as a result of their commitment to us, which was called into force as a result of a non-NATO situation. He felt that de Gaulle's present fever might be short-lived. He said no sensible person failed to realize that Europe is lost to the Communists if Europe, without our strategic missiles, confronts Soviet missiles.

The President repeated again his concern that we may be facing very heavy weather in our relations with Europe. He recalled that de Gaulle had mentioned to him that France would be making some proposals about NATO, but that we had never received these proposals. Perhaps de Gaulle would be confronting us with a plan to set up a European defense system in which we would have no part. He repeated that we should get ready with actions to squeeze Europe. He said there is not much we can do against France, but we can exert considerable pressure on the Germans. We should make no threats to any European state but merely act in such a way as to convey our intentions. For example, we might close down U.S. installations in France and Germany. Perhaps de Gaulle is not interested in a multilateral NATO force if he succeeds in obtaining a

treaty with Germany. The President doubted that Germany could participate wholeheartedly in a NATO multilateral force at the same time it was so intimately tied to France.

The President urged that we take a cold, hard attitude toward the situation which may develop in Europe. He said we can take care of ourselves and are not dependent upon European support.

Ambassador Thompson said he wished to discuss at a later time with the President his view that the situation described by the President might call for us to adopt an entirely opposite course of action. The President said that he thought we should look at all possibilities, as far as he was concerned, the way he had described his thinking was the only speculation which made sense to him.

Secretary Ball said he wished to point out that Adenauer was entirely out of tune, not only with other Germans, but with other European countries. He said that the treaty with France means everything to Adenauer. However, Adenauer may soon be out of power, sooner than he had planned. In addition, the German legislators may refuse to ratify the treaty with France if de Gaulle insists on keeping the British out of the Common Market.

The President said the next three months would be a crucial period and he wanted us to be prepared to respond immediately if de Gaulle and those tied to him act against us.

Secretary McNamara said there were two ways of dealing with such a development. One way would be to disengage entirely from Europe. The other would be to tie ourselves much more closely to the European powers other than France. He said that there were certain actions we could take in the immediate future which would contribute to either of the two courses of action he described. These actions include disparaging French nuclear capabilities; pulling our tactical fighters out of France and basing them in the U.K. or Spain or returning them to the U.S.; and drastically reducing our logistical base in France.

Mr. Bundy said he wondered whether we should move the headquarters of NATO and thought that a location in one of the low countries might be preferable.

The President said that if it appears that the Europeans are getting ready to throw us out of Europe, we want to be in a position to march out.

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 5 -

Secretary Rusk said that de Gaulle's view is not the view of most Europeans. He recalled that during the Cuban crisis de Gaulle had immediately and flatly given us the fullest support in the event our actions resulted in war.

The Attorney General asked whether we actually thought we would be better off if we got out of Europe. He suggested that a paper be written stating the advantages and disadvantages of our leaving Europe. Secretary Ball said the State Department is already preparing a paper on this subject, and he recalled that our policy has always been one of removing our troops from Europe as soon as we were certain that Europe could defend herself.

The President concluded the discussion by saying we should look now at the possibility that de Gaulle had concluded that he would make a deal with the Russians, break up NATO, and push the U.S. out of Europe.

Bromley Smith

~~TOP SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

✓

34

~~SECRET~~

Action

Control: 17108
Rec'd: JANUARY 26, 1963
12:45 PM

SS

Info

FROM: MOSCOW
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 1840, JANUARY 26, 6 PM

NIACT

POLICY

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION - S/S

GROMYKO CALLED ME IN AT 2:30 PM MOSCOW TIME TODAY AND MADE TWO ORAL STATEMENTS: (1) PROPOSING CONTINUATION SOVIET-US TALKS ON GERMAN PEACE SETTLEMENT, AND (2) PROTESTING LARGE-DIAMETER PIPE EMBARGO. HE ASKED I TRANSMIT THESE TO PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY WHEN I RETURNED WASHINGTON. I SAID I WOULD DO SO AND NOTED TIMELINESS THEIR PRESENTATION, SINCE THIS WOULD GIVE US CHANCE DISCUSS THEM WHILE I WAS IN WASHINGTON.

GROMYKO SAID THAT SOVIETS DID NOT INTEND GIVE EITHER STATEMENT PRESS (ADDING THAT THEY SOMETIMES THOUGHT COMMUNICATION WITH USG WAS CONFIDENTIAL AND THEN FOUND THAT LEAK HAD TAKEN PLACE "ON OTHER SIDE ATLANTIC.")

WE AGREED TO TELL PRESS ONLY THAT I HAD BEEN CALLED IN TO SEE GROMYKO AND WE HAD DISCUSSED MATTERS BILATERAL INTEREST.

TEXT GROMYKO'S STATEMENT ON GERMAN PROBLEM FOLLOWS.
(PIPE PROTEST CONTAINED NEXT FOLLOWING TEL.)

BEGIN TEXT. IN CONNECTION WITH DISCUSSION OF JANUARY 18, I INFORM YOU THAT SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS READY TO CONTINUE SOVIET-AMERICAN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON QUESTIONS RELATING TO GERMAN PEACE SETTLEMENT AND NORMALIZATION ON THAT BASIS OF

DECLASSIFIED
PUBLISHED IN FRUS 1981-63

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

VOL XV DOC # 171
By MMK NARA, Date 8/9/95

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1840, JANUARY 26, 6 PM; FROM MOSCOW

SITUATION IN WEST BERLIN, WITH A VIEW TO CONCLUDING THESE NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH ATTAINMENT IN NEAR FUTURE OF APPROPRIATE UNDERSTANDING.

REGARDING METHODS OF CONTINUING EXCHANGE OF VIEWS, FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS ARE OFFERED.

WE SHOULD FIND ACCEPTABLE TALKS IN WASHINGTON, THROUGH SOVIET AMBASSADOR, OR HERE, IN MOSCOW, THROUGH AMBASSADOR OF USA. IF AMERICAN SIDE AGREES THAT EXCHANGE OF VIEWS SHOULD BE CONTINUED IN MOSCOW, WE SHOULD WELCOME THAT.

OF COURSE, WE ARE READY TO RECEIVE OTHER SPECIAL AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVES AS WELL, WHOSE PARTICIPATION IN DISCUSSION OF GERMAN PROBLEM PRESIDENT OF USA MIGHT FIND USEFUL.

SOVIET GOVERNMENT WILL GIVE INSTRUCTIONS TO ITS REPRESENTATIVES TO CONTINUE DISCUSSION OF CONCRETE QUESTIONS, RELATING TO GERMAN PEACE SETTLEMENT AND NORMALIZATION OF SITUATION IN WEST BERLIN, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WHICH HAS ALREADY TAKEN PLACE, WITH THE GOAL OF PREPARING DRAFTS OF APPROPRIATE AGREEMENTS.

WHEN SUCH DRAFTS HAVE BEEN AGREED UPON, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON PROCEDURE AND MEANS FOR THEIR DEFINITIVE APPROVAL. END TEXT.

KOHLER

JTC

Note: Advance copies to SS-0 and SS. 1-26-63 CWO-M.

~~SECRET~~

1/28/69

TOP SECRET

TAB A
28 Jan 1963

NUCLEAR FORCES OF THE ALLIANCE

NUCLEAR FORCES COVERING SACEUR'S THREAT LIST

NATO COMMITTED MISSILES AND AIRCRAFT

		<u>Total</u>
Missiles	Jupiters	45
	Mace	90
	Polaris	<u>144</u>
		<u>279</u>
	US Strike Acft	598
	UK Bombers	63
	Other Non-US Strike Acft	<u>94*</u>
		<u>755</u>
Total		<u>1034</u>

* 25 Greece
 25 W. Germany
 44 Netherlands

About 600 US aircraft located in Europe, as indicated below, are committed to the SACEUR strike plan and those pretargeted or part of the Scheduled Program are coordinated with the US SIOP. The squadrons in Italy and Turkey are rotational squadrons while the other squadrons are permanently assigned to the theater.

	<u>UK</u>	<u>US AIRCRAFT</u>			<u>6th Fleet</u>	<u>Total</u>
		<u>Germany</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Turkey</u>		
F-100, 101	206	64	18	35		323
F-105		187				187
A-3D					17	17
A-4D					48	48
A-D					<u>23</u>	<u>23</u>
	<u>206</u>	<u>251</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>88</u>	<u>598</u>

Ball Pp 154 / Reference Book For the Steering Group...

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
 REGRADING; DOD DIR
 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY.

TOP SECRET

Page 1 of 3 Pages

TAB A

*Tab A+B to DND/D/6 "Assignment of Nuclear Forces to NATO"
 ... on Implementation of Nuclear Design*

TOP SECRET

TAB A

NATIONAL NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPEAN AREA NOT COMMITTED TO SACEUR STRIKE PLAN

UK forces in these categories consist of the following approximate numbers of delivery vehicles:

<u>Type Force</u>	<u>No. Delivery Vehicles</u>	<u>Nuclear Payload</u>	<u>Weapons Capability</u>
Valiant Aircraft	61	2 weapons	122
Vulcan Aircraft	70	1 weapon	70
Victor Aircraft	64	1 weapon	64
Canberra Aircraft	79	1 weapon	79
THOR IRBM	<u>55</u>	1 weapon	<u>55</u>
	329		390

EXTERNAL FORCES-STRATEGIC & TACTICAL NOT FORMALLY COMMITTED TO NATO

The external forces consist of POLARIS, ATLAS, TITAN, and MINUTEMAN missiles, B-52's and B-47's and Fleet Aircraft not formally committed to NATO.

US-UK THORS	55	B-47's in Europe & Africa	127	<u>Total Missiles & Aircraft</u>
ATLAS	141	Other US Strategic Bombers	1278	
TITAN	61			
MINUTEMAN	30	Other <u>US Navy/USAF</u>		
HOUNDDOG	563	Tactical Strike Aircraft	600 (Approx)	
REGULUS	<u>42</u>			
Total Missiles	892	Total Aircraft	2005	
				<u>2897</u>
		NATO Committed		1034
		Other		<u>329</u>
		Total nuclear vehicles (excl. Pacific & Marines)		4260

TOP SECRET

TAB A

B-47 aircraft of SAC are deployed overseas and assume an alert status immediately upon arrival. Each aircraft and crew maintain this alert until relieved by another aircraft and crew. B-47's maintaining this posture are referred to as Reflex aircraft. B-47 Reflex aircraft are deployed in the number and at locations as follows:

<u>Africa</u>	<u>A/C</u>	<u>Spain</u>	<u>A/C</u>	<u>United Kingdom</u>	<u>A/C</u>
Nousseur	8	Torrejon	9	Greenham Common	18
Sidi Slimane	18	Moron	17	Upper Heyford	9
Ven Guarir	<u>9</u>	Zaragoza	<u>18</u>	Brize Norton	9
				Fairford	<u>12</u>
<u>Totals</u>	35		44*		48 127

Current DOD programming phase out the B-47 aircraft in FY 1965.

* 20 of these B-47's are "temporarily" committed to the SACEUR Strike Plan, pursuant to the Berlin buildup.

TOP SECRET

SACEUR THREAT LIST AND TARGETING OPTIONS

1. Threat List

The NATO Threat List of targets contains approximately 632 targets.

a. Current planning covers them with the following forces:

9 - are collocated with other DGZ's in the SIOP.

59 - are completely covered by SACEUR forces in ACE.

356 - are completely covered by External forces.

208 - are attached by SACEUR and External forces combined to attain sufficient expectancy of damage.

632 - total DGZ's

b. The 623 separately located DGZ's are located and covered as follows:

	<u>Satellites</u>	<u>Russia</u>	<u>Total</u>
By SACEUR Forces	53	6	59
By External Forces	9	347	356
By Combination	<u>83</u> 145	<u>125</u> 478	<u>208</u> 623

2. Relation to the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP)

a. There are at the present time in SIOP approximately 1250 DGZ's to which are assigned about 4100 weapons. The division between those that are a threat to Europe and those that are a threat to North America is not sharp. However, 632 of the total number of DGZ's are identified by SACEUR as being a particular threat to Europe (Para 1 above) and are covered by approximately 2300 weapons. Of the weapons now allocated to these targets of

special concern to the Europeans, 1000 are contributed by forces now committed to NATO as follows:

Weapons

<u>SACEUR</u>	
Strike Aircraft	400
Mace Missiles	54
Jupiters*	45
B-47**	40
<u>SACLANT</u>	
Aircraft	75
Polaris	<u>144</u>
Total	758

* Assigned to NATO

** 20 B-47's (2 bombs per bomber) committed to SACEUR targets but not formally committed or assigned.

b. The remaining 1800 weapons now targeted against SACEUR's threat list are contributed by forces not committed formally to NATO ("External Forces").

3. Targeting Options

a. General

Under the present arrangement, the basis for SACEUR's targeting is to the SACEUR Threat List. However, the currency and adequacy of the SACEUR Threat List is limited on occasion by the fact that certain sensitive intelligence is not adequately available to non-US officers on the SACEUR staff. Further, the optimum application of all weapons to the targets selected for attack will require access to Restricted Data, which is now not available to non-US personnel. Therefore the international targeting section within the SACEUR staff may not have all factors necessary for arriving at an

optimum alignment of forces against the Soviet threat. A study of possible revision in current policy could be instituted concerning the intelligence information now not available to Europeans that might be made available. Action has already been taken in connection with the NATO Defense Data Program to permit some release of Restricted Data. With these impediments overcome, several alternatives are available with respect to the targeting of an expanded NATO Nuclear Force.

b. Alternative Targeting Systems

1) SACEUR's international targeting staff under a Deputy SACEUR could target the appropriate NATO nuclear forces against the SACEUR Threat List in accordance with SACEUR's Nuclear Strike Plan. Under this alternative the SACEUR Nuclear Strike Plan and the US SIOP could be coordinated under current procedures or as shown in 2, below. However, it is unlikely that forces made available to SACEUR will ever be capable of targeting the entire SACEUR Threat List, without additional coverage provided by external forces targeted outside his control in the JSTPS.

2) The SACEUR liaison group at Omaha could be expanded in conjunction with the foregoing alternative to include non-US officers as members of a SACEUR international staff working in coordination with the JSTPS. This would permit non-US officers under SACEUR to know that proper attention is given its threat list by external forces. However, the

access of non-US officers within the JSTPS would have to be circumscribed because of the collocation of the JSTPS with the Strategic Air Command and because of the sensitive unilateral US data maintained at that location.

3) A completely new international targeting staff could be organized to provide for the targeting of an expanded NATO Nuclear Force including SACLANT and SACEUR Forces. Such an organization could embrace, on a full NATO basis, the responsibilities of the SACEUR international targeting staff. The manning of this organization could reflect the contribution of the NATO nations to the NATO Nuclear Force. Under this alternative, the NATO Nuclear Strike Plan could be coordinated with the SIOP as indicated above.

4) The preferred NATO targeting organization is dependent in some degree on the organizational structure adopted for the NATO Nuclear Force. If a separate NATO Nuclear Command is created, the assignment of the targeting function to the new organization would be a logical measure. However, if control is exercised essentially through the existing structure, a change in present NATO targeting arrangements may not be warranted. In either case, in order to insure an orderly transition, the initial step should be taken if requisite intelligence and weapons data can be provided on an international basis.

FORM OF COMMITMENT TO NATO

The following definitions are those used in various NATO documents:

1. Committed Forces. The word "committed" is a generic term to indicate the intention of the nations to make forces available to the NATO Commander. National forces may be committed to NATO under any one of the following categories:

a. "Assigned Forces" - Strictly interpreted, this definition refers to forces in being which have been placed under the operational command or operational control of a NATO commander in peacetime and during war. The only examples today of forces assigned to SACEUR in peacetime are certain combat air defense units stationed in Allied Command Europe. However, the Order of Battle is currently inaccurate in carrying most land and air forces, including German and US divisions as well as the Jupiters in Italy and Turkey as assigned, where in fact SACEUR will assume operational control of these units only upon declaration of Reinforced or Simple Alert.

b. "Earmarked for Assignment" - Forces which nations have agreed to assign to the operational command or operational control of a NATO commander at some future date in peace or in the event of war. Other NATO forces are earmarked for assignment. Example: The US Sixth Fleet (Mediterranean), the US Second Fleet (Atlantic), and the 7th Army in Germany are committed under this category. Germany has agreed to place all forces under SACEUR upon declaration of Simple Alert.

c. "Full Command" - is the military authority and responsibility of a superior officer to issue orders to subordinates, and covers every

SECRET

-2-

aspect of military operations and administration. It exists only within national services. The term, command, as used internationally implies a lesser degree of authority than when it is used in a purely national sense. It follows that no NATO commander has full command over the forces that are assigned to him. This is because national, in assigning forces to NATO, assign only operational command or operational control.

d. "Operational Command" - is the authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as may be deemed necessary.

e. "Operational Control" - is the authority granted to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned.


2. Multilateral. This pertains to forces which are contributed to an international command subject to international control, whether nationally owned and nationally manned or integrated.

3. Integrated. This is a force with international manning, ownership, and control.

4. References:

MC 57-1 Definitions
MC 67-1 Alert Document
MC 54-1 Air Defense
MC 53-1 SACEUR Terms of Reference
MC 58-1 SAACLANT Terms of Reference

SECRET



1128/63

TOP SECRET

Secretary of Defense Staff Meeting
28 January 1963

EYES ONLY

Mr. McNamara
Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. Ignatius
 (for Mr. Vance)
Gen. Hamlett
 (for Gen. Wheeler)
Mr. Korth
Adm. Anderson
Mr. Zuckert
Gen. LeMay
Gen. Taylor
Gen. Shoup
Dr. Brown
Mr. Hitch

Mr. McNaughton
Mr. Morris
Mr. Bundy
 (for Mr. Nitze)
Mr. Paul
Mr. Pittman
Mr. Sylvester
Mr. Yarmolinsky
Mr. McGiffert
Mr. Horwitz
Mr. Loftis
Gen. Brown
Capt. Houser
Mr. Livesay

1. Implementation of the Nassau Pact

Mr. McNamara began the meeting at 0930. He said he had asked Mr. McNaughton to report today on the status of the implementation of the Nassau Pact.

Mr. McNaughton briefly referred to the Nassau Pact itself. The statement issued with the Communique in the first part covered SKYBOLT; para. 6 covered the assignment to NATO of certain existing forces; para. 7, the creation of the "multilateral force"; and para. 8, the assignment of the new UK submarines, as well as the "supreme national interest" clause. Paras. 6, 7 and 8 are the three key ones commanding our attention. Para. 10 covered the importance of increasing the effectiveness of conventional forces.

President Kennedy's Minute to Mr. Macmillan covered the making of a similar offer to the French, and the establishment of units of mixed nationality. Prime Minister Macmillan's Minute to the President noted that we do have arrangements that we will not use nuclear weapons without cross-consultation, and that withdrawal of the UK weapons assigned under the Nassau Pact will not occur without consultation with the President.

DECLASSIFIED
DATE 4/11/67
BY [signature]

Cy 6 of 25 copies

TOP SECRET

100-218 / CPCS copy 6 / 23 / 337 See by [signature]

TOP SECRET

9

Mr. McNaughton said in the case of the multilateral force, there may be no U.S. custody of warheads. Mr. McNamara said that the warheads will be U.S. manufactured, that we will expect them to pay for the warheads, and that we would have a veto over their use. He said that there is no use complicating our relations with the Congress. Mr. McNaughton said State is assuming that the laws will be changed, and that there may be no U.S. custody aboard the submarine. Gen. Taylor suggested that a special State/Defense (JCS) committee be set up to get agreement on these problems. Mr. McNamara said we will have to isolate the use problem. With regard to command and control, we can apply past procedures. All of this involves how NATO goes to war, and this has not been solved in 15 years. Gen. Taylor said the Germans will not be enthusiastic unless they can see clearly the answers to these questions. Mr. McNamara said we will have to have symmetry of authority, or the application of unanimous agreement to the use concept. Gen. Taylor said that this principle is clear enough for him, but may not be clear to the others. Mr. McNamara said that Mr. Rusk agrees. Mr. McNamara said, with regard to policy, are we going to insist on a U.S. veto? The answer is yes. Gen. Taylor asked, one veto? Mr. McNamara said yes, on the use of the missiles. State says if the U.S. insists on a veto, we will have to give the others the same right. This is what is meant by symmetry of authority. Gen. Taylor suggested that all of this should be written down. Another fuzzy area is the need for a specific organization and agency for administration. Mr. McNamara said he wouldn't like to see a NATO Navy Department set up. His suggestion is that whatever command arrangements are set up, this command should handle these matters. Once we get a NATO commander set up, he should contract for these force

Mr. McNamara cautioned that the agreement with the U.K. relating to the R&D costs should not be discussed outside this room. He asked if it was agreeable with the Navy to have Adm. Mott serve as the negotiator. Mr. Korth said yes.

The meeting adjourned at 1035.

R. Eugene Livesay
R. Eugene Livesay
Staff Secretary

Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
not automatically declassified.
DoD Dir. 5200.10

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
BY: A.D. 1/4/87
NARS, Date: 1/4/87

CONFIDENTIAL

170/63

January 30, 1963

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

The German Ambassador, Mr. Knappstein, called at eleven a.m. to deliver to me the attached communication from the Chancellor in response to my attached telegram to him of January 18, 1963.

After I had read the communication, the Ambassador referred to the second paragraph on page 2 and said that, since the Chancellor had written that paragraph, it had developed that he had not succeeded in persuading General DeGaulle to refer the matter to the EEC Commission.

The Ambassador then proceeded with a justification of the Chancellor's actions, along the lines of the communication, stating that all arrangements had been made in advance, including the dates; that the press conference came as a surprise; that the Chancellor believed that it would be worse not to sign the treaty than to sign it; and that signing did not indicate endorsement of the General's policy, as Germany had made very clear at the Brussels meeting. He felt that Germany was being unfairly criticized as having some responsibility for the result at Brussels.

I decided not to mince words with the Ambassador, who was altogether too smug. I told him that his words carried no conviction whatever to me, and I felt sure that they would convince no friend of Germany in the United States. I asked him whether the German Government was a railroad train which was determined to run on time, or whether it was conducted with some appreciation of the significance of its actions in relation to other actions. Whether or not the German Government endorsed DeGaulle's attitude, the signing of the treaty was not the best method I could think of to indicate strong disapproval. Words were cheap; it was action which counted; and, when it came to action, the Germans followed meekly along behind a man who was publicly stating his hostility to the United States and to friends of the United States. I had hoped that Germany was as good a friend of the United States as was Britain; why was it afraid to say so publicly?

The Ambassador said that the treaty really meant nothing; that it only called for consultation; and, as everyone knew, consultation did not connote agreement. In the next sentence he went on to say that Franco-German rapprochement had been, since 1945, the great aim of the Chancellor's policy, and it would have seemed to him tragic not to have signed the treaty.

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved

92-13

By

CS

8-10-92

AD/SD+WHA/1963/HSTL

I obviously pointed out that he could not have it both ways. The treaty was either unimportant and, hence, there was all the more reason for avoiding the appearance of agreement with France by signing it; or it was important, in which case there was even more reason for not signing it.

The Ambassador said that Germany should not be held responsible for other people's misconceptions of its motives. I told him that I thought this statement was an insult to my intelligence; that one of the fundamental principles of law was that everyone was responsible for the ordinary interpretations of his actions. I could not and would not accept the implication that the German Government was conducted by fools. If it had not expected an uproar over the signature, this was too stupid a conclusion for the Chancellor, who was not stupid at all. The Ambassador agreed that he himself had foreseen the uproar which occurred.

He then suggested that the German leaders did not see eye-to-eye with the Chancellor on many questions. I asked whether the signing of this treaty was one of them. He said that we should have to see; the vote on its ratification had been postponed until June or July. I said that we would indeed have to see, and that, if the leaders followed as meekly behind Adenauer as Adenauer had followed behind DeGaulle, it would seem to me that the unity of the West was in pretty bad shape.

With this exchange the interview concluded.

Dean Acheson.

~~SECRET~~

630
from - Dean Acheson

January 31, 1963

being Bundy
Kend Cy - Jansen
Ray

REFLECTIONS ON THE JANUARY DEBACLE

From one point of view DeGaulle's press conference, followed by the veto of Britain's application to the Common Market and by the signing of the Franco-German treaty, has presented Europe and North America with a wholly changed situation. From another point of view these events have revealed much but changed little. Both views present facets of the truth, and the total truth requires in some instances the continuation of policy; in others, the initiation of new policies.

One cannot say that the West has not had ample warning of the French and German action; yet it has been caught unprepared and been thrown into confusion. What was unexpected was not DeGaulle's wishes and desires; but that he acted, and acted so brazenly and revealingly. And what was surprising about Adenauer was that he acted so submissively in signing a treaty of Franco-German rapprochement and unity in effect as an acceptance of DeGaulle's anti-American, anti-Atlantic policy.

What supports the view that the European situation is substantially unchanged or is unchanged in substance is that both DeGaulle and Adenauer have had these hopes,

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
JNLK-93-36
By AT NARA, Date 7/20/06

N9F/316/EX Comm Mtg 38-42/JAKL

policies, and attitudes for a long time, have revealed them fairly openly, but never with such brazen defiance as in the past two weeks. But the very revelation of these attitudes is a change in substance; just as the act of declaring war is a change, even after a considerable period of intense hostility.

These actions of public disclosure and defiance require counter-actions. The termination of whatever prior possibility there was of accepting Britain into the Common Market requires new policies. The prevention of a Gaullist Europe, united upon Gaullist policies, requires both an intensification of former policies designed to strengthen the Western European-North American nexus, as well as new and vigorous analysis of the possible failure of this policy and of the actions required in such event.*/

I

Actions Required by the Public and Defiant Disclosure of Gaullist Policy and of Adenauer's Ambivalent Position

DeGaulle took no pains to obscure or soften his rejection of Britain or the reasons for it. His reasons were, as plainly stated, that the admission of Britain would constitute a strengthening of American influence

*/ This latter analysis is not attempted in this paper. The consequences of failure of our present policy are only suggested, in part.

in Europe; that Britain was not truly European in outlook, but represented a wider and more amorphous grouping; that DeGaulle wished Europe to be solely European, and he wished it to be a Europe extending from the Atlantic to the Urals, managed by France and Russia; and that to accomplish this the acceptance of the idea by Germany and the elimination of the United States from Europe were necessary.

Adenauer protests that the coincidence of the treaty signing with DeGaulle's acts was purely fortuitous; that he has registered his disapproval of them by the attitude he took at Brussels and by his approval of the Nassau agreements. Nevertheless, he signed the treaty when he did, knowing full well the necessary interpretation of his act; and he proclaims the Franco-German rapprochement the most important development in the century, though he knows that DeGaulle regards and treats the rapprochement as an instrument for eliminating the American presence in Europe.

The treaty is thus a political act, and a political act which, if carried to its conclusion, means far more than the words written upon the paper. It means that Germany wants the best of all worlds. It wants to ride along with conflicting interests as far as possible,

without choosing and being in a position as long as possible to play one interest off against the other. To allow this is not in American interests.

The German Government must be made to see clearly and at once what is the road along which DeGaulle wishes it to embark and that the United States Government does not propose to cooperate in any way with its desire to explore this road. And it must be made to see also that this is not a matter to be obscured by words or to be left for vague future developments; but that its action on the treaty itself will be regarded here as the manifestation of a choice which will have instant effects on American policy.

Already radio reports emanating from Bonn are describing the popularity of the treaty and the desire to ratify it at once. The first aim of policy should be to prevent this early ratification. The effect of mere postponement will be beneficial. The next aim of policy should be to use the treaty to rebuke both Adenauer and DeGaulle and to range Germany against acceptance of the policy as outlined above. If rejection of the treaty is not regarded as practicable, it should be amended by the Bundestag when considered later this year, so as to

require both signatories to reaffirm their adherence to NATO and specifically to the unified force and defense of Europe; also, if possible, adherence to use of the three communities of Europe to strengthen the Atlantic Community and repudiate narrow and exclusive European policy.

In order to do this, broad decisions, supplementing and reinforcing existing policies, should be made as soon as possible. The policy represented by these decisions should be presented vigorously and plainly to all German leaders, and not merely to the Chancellor, by the one person ideally equipped to do this, Mr. John J. McCloy.

II

Long Range Policy Toward Europe

In order that the Germans may see that they are required to make a choice, and make it now, they should be given (a) analysis of Gaullist policy and our reasons for rejecting it, and (b) American long range policies for European-North American collaboration.

(a) Gaullist Policy.

As indicated above, Gaullist policy plainly aspires to the elimination of American influence from Europe and, of course, with the influence, the withdrawal of American military forces. However, it seems inconceivable that General DeGaulle could expect to bring this about as promptly or suddenly as he has brought about the rejection of Britain from the continent. He would doubtless wish to rely upon the preventive and defensive effect of American military formations in Europe until he had something better. If and when he had something better, he undoubtedly expects that, if the western portion of his Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals found itself in danger of being swallowed by the eastern portion, he would still have the political commitment of the NATO treaty and the deterrent effect of American nuclear power to fall back on. It will, of course, be clear to the Germans that it will be years before France can produce an army which is either politically reliable or militarily effective. This is even more obvious when one considers the amount of the French military budget which General DeGaulle will have to contemplate expending for nuclear weapons. It will also be clear to the Germans

that France, even with the help of all of Europe, cannot ever produce a nuclear armament which will be significant, apart from association with American nuclear power.

And, if it is not apparent to the Germans, it should be made so that the United States could never accept the political commitment of NATO under a situation in which its troops were required to be withdrawn from Europe, its influence terminated, no adequate military substitute provided for them, and a small and inadequate European nuclear force created, the sole purpose and capability of which was to "trigger" nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. Any other conception would credit the United States with a naïveté which is not flattering to its intelligence.

In the economic field the lessons of the press conference and of Brussels are particularly poignant. United States policy has been to regard Europe and North America as two great world markets, both for raw materials and manufactured goods, which, working for similar goals, with similar principles, and harmonizing their economies, could produce profoundly beneficial results, not only for the people within their own geographical borders,

but for the whole free world. However, a common market with narrow and exclusive policies, now disclosed as those of a Gaullist Europe, and the United States can carry on no such common endeavors. Furthermore, its sense of concern for the interests of other allied, friendly, and developing nations must cause it to re-develop its program so that these other nations may not be subjected to undue hazard and hardship by the exclusive policies now forecast. Whether this can be done in consonance with what has always been a cornerstone of American policy, the most favored nation doctrine, so far as an exclusionary common market is concerned, is not immediately clear. Nor is it clear how an American trade policy can be adapted to the conception of a Europe extending from the Atlantic to the Urals. One thing, however, is clear; the needs of nations outside of the Common Market are immediate and pressing; they cannot wait upon long, complicated negotiations, ultimately to be frustrated by a French rejection, even though France's partners may shed sympathetic tears.

(b) Alternatives.

We said at the outset that recent events had in some respects not changed, but only revealed more clearly, existing situations. This is plainly true so

far as France in NATO is concerned. It would be hard for Gaullist France to be any more obstructive there than it has been in the past. Its open hostility requires not novel policies and plans, but the intensification of old ones, their adaption to the declared absence of France from planning or consideration, and getting on with those tasks which have always been neglected.

Broadly speaking our policy in NATO should be to go ahead, not closing any doors to future French participation and cooperation, but realizing that France has made mightly little contribution for a decade and under the best of circumstances could not have been expected to make much more for another decade. Furthermore, whatever France does in the way of reorganizing her army, navy, and airforce will not be wasted, since with a different political direction new and better French forces could be easily attached to the NATO operation. Furthermore, whatever France does in the nuclear field cannot be stopped anyway, and the less time we spend worrying about it the better.

What is needed now is a series of decisions regarding American policy, both for immediate action and for development and planning over the intermediate future;

that is, for the next two to six years. All of these decisions cannot, of course, be absolutely final. But they can be given a higher degree of finality than is common; that is, they should be final, as against whimsical change, or change because of minor circumstances, or change because of changed personalities; and they should furnish a basis for coherent and continuous action.

The most immediate of these have to do with the military and economic spheres, although there is some necessity for prompt decision in the political field.

In the Military Field

1. We need a firm governmental decision to stabilize our military position in Europe for a definite period, say, 18 months, during which time there shall be no changes introduced into it by any extraneous factors, such as variation in the balance of payments, substitution of weapons, annoyance with this or that government in Europe. The purpose of this decision is to maintain the most favorable environment for keeping the Germans tied into NATO and for developing and for maintaining an Atlantic rather than a Gaullist Europe. We should do our best to persuade the British to maintain their Army of the Rhine steadily for a similar period.

2. We should get the discussion of the multi-national program out of the theoretical and gadgetary phase and into a phase where something practical, useful, and valuable can develop at once. It is important to permit the Germans, and perhaps the Italians, to gain something which they value and which they may lose. This something is participation, knowledge, and training at various levels in the nuclear war problem. This means in the extent of our nuclear capabilities and those of the Russians, in the cost of developing and maintaining these capabilities, in the nature and consequences of nuclear war and, hence, in the desirability of other options, and in actual training aboard one of our Polaris submarines.

It might be proposed that for those nations who have accepted the multi-national force in principle that a primarily experimental program might be undertaken as soon as suitable officers can be selected from the point of view of security, command of English, etc.; that some be instructed in the financial, strategic, and general command factors involved and that others be instructed in the operational side. This is a difficult decision, but it is one which we must ultimately face. If grasped and decided now, it will give our allies something infinitely more tangible and absorbing than anything that France can offer.

3. We should make a decision now that we are willing, provided Germany takes an unequivocal position to remain firmly in NATO, to undertake informal and close staff work outside SHAPE between the U.S. staff in Europe and the German staff and between high defense officers of both countries for (i) the use of existing forces, including technical and strategic nuclear forces, for emergency defense in Europe; (ii) for the creation of additional forces, their nature and priority, and their deployment in Europe; and (iii) ultimately for participation in the development of the combined strategic plan discussed in the next sub-division.

The idea of this suggestion is not to by-pass or weaken NATO in any way; it is quite the contrary. It is based on the ideas, first, of recognizing the reality that the American and German forces constitute the bulk of those available for defense and that those primarily responsible should initiate plans; second, that the presence of France in any such attempt to initiate is only disruptive; third, that such a plan would offer Germany a consultative relationship with the nation which has power instead of with a nation which has no power;

and, four, that anything which required NATO approval would be submitted for it.

4. As has been so often pointed out, NATO defense cannot progress beyond the most rudimentary form unless a militarily and politically sound strategic plan is fully worked out. Such a plan cannot be worked out at all unless the United States first provides one. The United States cannot and will not provide one until the military department is ordered to do so and is told what political purposes are sought to be achieved, the limits of resources practicably available, and that the use of nuclear weapons is to be deferred in favor of as many as possible less drastic options. Like architects, they must be told what kind of a house one wants designed, rather than to design the perfect house.

If we cannot prove to our allies that Europe can be defended without certain extermination, we have no answer to DeGaulle's proposal of a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

In the Economic Field

1. With the collapse of Britain's Common Market negotiations, we should offer to her, as nearly as our legal and political situation permits, what she was striving for in the disrupted negotiations. I take it.

that she was seeking an opportunity to compete in a large market, competitive pressure from this large producing area to get her own costs down and her own labor more effective, a stimulus furnished by this same competition to modernize her plant, and pressure upon her government to revise the tax system to permit the accumulation and investment of capital.

Is it possible for us to offer a deal which would

- (i) accomplish as much of the foregoing as possible;
- (ii) in doing so, help prepare Britain for subsequent entry into the Common Market by improving her competitive position and continuing the pressure to solve her agricultural problem; and
- (iii) to do this in such a way that we would not be giving away to the Common Market through most favored nation treatment bargaining strength which we might wish to use for our own interests and for the interest of other friendly countries?

After DeGaulle's rejection of Britain, it would be unwise to conduct business as usual with those countries as though nothing had happened. It is equally necessary not to engage in purely vindictive reprisals. What is needed is a trade policy which will help control the damage caused by French action and will help create a situation in which reversal of that action is possible.

2. Harmonization of economic policies. We need decisions which will introduce new activity and energy into the OECD in an effort to reach fiscal and financial arrangements which will tend toward expansionist policies in all the countries, but especially in England and the United States. If France cannot be associated in these endeavors, we should quite frankly continue our efforts without France, and we should, by all means, include Japan in plans and action.

The Political Field

The recent debacle in Europe carries a clear and stern warning that we cannot compete with Gaullist policy in Europe unless we are ready to face squarely up to unequivocal decisions on our policy toward Central Europe and German reunification. This, in turn, underlies the whole question of Berlin. American and European interests, when seen without the fog of illusion around them, are united in requiring the reunification of Germany within a unified Europe, which, in turn, is within an Atlantic Community, and the increase in national identity and independence of the Eastern European nations.

That this policy is difficult of achievement is no grounds for accepting the disaster of a Soviet-dominated

Europe. This is what Gaullist policy offers. We must not only make this clear to the Germans, but we must be prepared to align ourselves (in the event that Germany repudiates Gaullist policy) in favor of reunification of Germany within the structure indicated above. And we must be prepared to show the Germans that the only way of obtaining ultimate Russian acceptance of this situation, other than by conceding her the ultimate domination of Europe, is by increasing the economic strength and vitality and by denying the Soviet Union military superiority upon its western front so that it has no alternative but to withdraw. Such a situation will then make possible for the first time a real limitation of armaments from the Alleghenies to the Urals.

1/31/63 3

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

Summary Record of NSC Executive Committee No. 39,
January 31, 1963, 6:00 PM

The President said today's meeting was preliminary to numerous ones which he thought should be held during the next two weeks on the subject of our European policy. He said the meetings would be most confidential and should not be known to any one. He hoped that it would be possible for us to conduct the reappraisal of our policy without it becoming known because, following a reappraisal, we may decide to make no major change in our existing policy. He said the purpose of the current exercise was to try to see where we are going in Europe without the public surmising that we would be studying proposals for drastic changes in our relation with Europe. The President read the following questions which he said we should seek to answer in the near future.

1. U.S. trade negotiations with the Common Market
We need to decide what our tactics should be and which questions we should negotiate about first.
2. Spaak's political future
Can Spaak survive in Belgium if he continues to advance his anti-de Gaulle position? He is under attack because of his standing with us on the Congo as well as for the position he has taken following France's rejection of UK membership in the Common Market.
3. Will the African countries now apply for admission to the Common Market?
Do we think the Belgians and the Dutch would hold up their admission as a means of applying pressure on the French? Would this action come before we know what effect the Common Market tariffs will have on Latin American economies?
4. What is the future of the NATO multilateral force?
Should we go ahead along this line? Will the French seek to include nuclear arrangements in their new Franco/German treaty? Should Mr. Merchant push forward negotiations for the establishment of the NATO multilateral force or should he wait until we know better what we want to do?
5. Should we wait for the German Defense Minister to come here or should we send Mr. Merchant to talk to him in Bonn about a U.S./German bilateral arrangement?
6. How can we get our view to American reporters in Europe so that their stories do not reflect the French point of view?

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED
PUBLISHED IN FRUS 1961-63
VOL XIII DOC # 464
By MMK NARA, Date 12/29/95

NSA 1316
13. 150 PA

7. Can we improve liaison with Washington correspondents of foreign newspapers to ensure that our view is presented and the French press line is countered?
8. How can we improve our techniques of being certain that U.S. reporters understand our policy and the reasons behind our actions?
9. What kind of a deal can de Gaulle make with the Russians which would be acceptable to the Germans?
10. What are the prospects for a tripartite deal with de Gaulle?
Does he still want this? Should we try now to go for a tripartite directorate?
11. Balance of payments problem
How do we defend ourselves if the French decide to create problems for us in connection with the one billion dollar balances which they now control?
12. What are the prospects for a French nuclear force?
When will it be a deterrent, even in a limited sense? Would even a few weapons in fact be a deterrent to the Russians?
13. What should we propose at the NATO meeting in May?
Should we reduce the number of our divisions in Europe and bring them home? Should we close U.S. installations in France?

The President interjected an additional question following point number 9. He wondered if the Soviet position was hardening in view of the fact that the Russians had broken off the current test ban discussions. He asked whether the French had been talking to the Russians and whether Soviet decision to end the test ban talks now had anything to do with the division existing among the NATO allies.

The President said we should concentrate our intelligence resources on finding out everything we can about discussions and negotiations between the French and the Russians. The President concluded his remarks by saying that we can go in four different directions but that, following our study, perhaps our decision would be to make no changes and await further developments in Europe. It was important, however, to deal with the multilateral nuclear force proposal in such a way as not to commit us before we knew exactly which direction we wished to take.

In response to a suggestion by Secretary Rusk, Assistant Secretary Tyler said he had heard from an allied diplomatic source that when the Soviet Ambassador in Paris talked to de Gaulle he presented a fourteen page letter attacking the Franco/German treaty, especially the defense arrangements included in it.

Secretary Rusk said de Gaulle's January 14 press conference had caught everyone by surprise, including close friends and intimates of de Gaulle. Even de Gaulle may have failed to anticipate the worldwide reaction to his press conference.

Secretary Rusk said our relations with the French were proceeding along several tracks, none of them dependent on UK admission to the Common Market. He recalled that we knew there was a possibility that the UK might not be taken into the Common Market, but even so, we had proceeded in NATO to discuss the buildup of conventional forces and ways to improve consultation among the allies. In addition, in the OECD we had seen French support for our efforts to improve economic cooperation among the allies. He urged that we avoid fighting the French in those areas where they are cooperating with us, i. e. in Africa, except in the Congo; in financial matters; and to an extent, in Southeast Asia. He expressed his view that we should not start a vindictive chain of reaction, that we not block every line of policy we are now following toward France.

The President replied that while we did realize that the UK might not get into the Common Market, we did not expect the rejection to be accomplished in the way de Gaulle had done it. In addition, he said the Franco/German treaty had created a new situation. He felt that de Gaulle, certain of our willingness to go to the defense of Europe, was attempting to exploit us. He wondered whether de Gaulle's next move would be a treaty with Italy. Conceivably, de Gaulle might try to organize the Six and create a nuclear force responsible to this grouping. He said we might not get into an across-the-board battle with de Gaulle but he wanted to be certain that if de Gaulle did continue to harass us, we would be in a position to defend ourselves. The U.S. military position is good but our financial position is vulnerable. Our influence in Latin America has been decreased by the French actions. He hoped for the best but said we must look at all aspects of the current situation. Perhaps the NATO multilateral nuclear force idea is finished. De Gaulle may appeal to Italy and Belgium and the others on the Continent and possibly win them to his European idea.

Secretary Dillon said he agreed that we were weak in the financial area but strong in the political and military fields. He felt that if the French did attack our financial stability we should consider ways of responding by actions in the military and political areas. He noted that the British economic position, as reflected in the market, had already been weakened by de Gaulle's action. One British reaction might be to withdraw their forces in Germany in order to defend the British balance of payments position. Whether this was a good or bad move, we should be prepared to make our position known.

The President thought that the British, in an attempt to gain the support of Germany, might decide to keep British troops in Germany.

Secretary Ball suggested that we ought to look at our assets as well as the French assets in viewing the future of Europe. De Gaulle is a European and the head of a metropolitan country. In addition, he has the advantage of being able to act irresponsibly. The U.S., on the other hand, is a world power while France is not. The U.S. now has nuclear strength but the French only hope to have a nuclear force later. Since the war, the U.S. has filled the vacuum created by a weak Europe. We have been leading the Europeans back into a wider world. The Europeans need a sense of participating in world problems. Failing to have this sense, they become psychotic.

Secretary Ball said that we turned down de Gaulle's proposal for a tripartite directorate in 1958 because (a) there was no place in the scheme for the Germans, (b) de Gaulle was presuming to speak for all of Europe, and (c) the scheme was limited to planning military strategy. Mr. Ball said we should now envisage some mechanism which would make possible systematic political cooperation with competent European states. His proposal would mean that Europe would take over from us some of the burdens we have been carrying worldwide and at the same time they would be participating in military planning and control of a nuclear force. He said one way would be to take the proposed Executive Committee which was devised to provide political control of a NATO nuclear force and add to it responsibility for political consultation. The Executive Committee, holding regular meetings, would be available for consultation in crisis situations, such as Cuba and the Congo, and, in addition, could work out a new allocation of responsibility of the European powers for countries in which we are now carrying the entire burden. He envisaged a planning board of directors for world problems.

Mr. Ball said de Gaulle cannot offer the Europeans this kind of participation because France is not a world power. Such an offer by us to the Europeans would have great appeal to the Europeans because it would be a meaningful partnership. Mr. Ball admitted that during the past fifteen years we have gotten into some bad habits and have been carrying all the burden. We would now ask the Europeans to take real responsibility by turning over to them certain countries or allies and telling them we would help the European states on the assumption that they would be in charge of the operation. We would be in the position not of asking them to help us run an area but of offering to help them if they would take on the responsibility of running the area. We would thus be able to exploit the resource of our world power position.

The President replied that apparently de Gaulle does not want to associate with us. Some European states may be prepared to follow de Gaulle while others may not want to get out from under our shelter. We face the decision as to whether we should go around de Gaulle or whether we should wait and then propose to him establishment of the three-power directorate. However, we must avoid an appearance of trying to enter the back door when the front door is closed. We must also recognize that anything we propose may arouse the full force of de Gaulle's opposition.

Mr. Nitze felt that Secretary Ball's proposal to expand the terms of reference of a NATO executive committee would cause great confusion. He did not think that political consultation should take place in the Executive Committee because it would mix up the handling of the NATO multilateral nuclear force. He suggested instead that the North Atlantic Council was the proper forum to use for political consultation.

The President said it was mandatory that we get foreign states to help share free world burdens. He said Congress might well conclude that we should not help Europe if de Gaulle continues to act as he has been. He felt that we must get the Europeans to share in the free world programs in Latin America, Africa and Asia.

Secretary Rusk said we must plan for the worst case but we should not adopt a policy based on an assumption that de Gaulle has declared war on us across the board.

The President said what we must figure out is what does de Gaulle want during the next two years, recognizing that he would proceed to achieve it step by step. No one, including intimates, knew what de Gaulle was going to say in his January 14 press conference. The President recalled that a sizeable part of the Nassau arrangements were designed to please the French. We did not know how the French would react and we must do better in trying to find out how de Gaulle will act in the future.

Secretary Rusk pointed out that we are in Europe not because the Europeans want us there but because we believe our presence there is essential to the defense of the U.S. He said we cannot permit de Gaulle to force us out of Europe without the greatest effort to resist such a move.

The President said NSC Executive Committee should look at all aspects of the European problem. He thought we ought to have an estimate of the political effect on each European country of de Gaulle's current policy.

Secretary Dillon asked that we examine the question of how many forces the U.S. must have in Europe. In view of the \$750 million cost of our military effort in Europe and the impact of these expenditures on our balance of payments, he wondered whether withdrawal of U.S. forces would be the disaster some say it would or whether Europe could now, by itself and without the U.S. troops on the ground, hold back the USSR.

Mr. Bundy noted that Secretary Rusk was planning to hold a press conference the following morning.

The President felt that the timing of the press conference was not good and he wondered whether the conference would be useful.

Secretary Rusk said that to call off the conference would create a great deal of speculation. He felt that the conference would be useful in order not to heat up the Common Market problem. He said he did not intend to strike at de Gaulle or aim barbs at the British for the remarks which Macmillan made about national control of UK nuclear forces to be included in the NATO force.

The President said he thought that the Secretary should not give the impression that nothing has been changed in the past few days. He added that if de Gaulle got very rough we would be required to deal with him. He said he believed that after the Skybolt development de Gaulle thought that the British would offer the French a deal or accept de Gaulle's offer of Franco-British nuclear cooperation but Macmillan had not done so. The Nassau agreement followed and de Gaulle must have decided to act at once. The President said that we had narrowly averted a disaster which would have occurred if the British had decided to join with de Gaulle in a nuclear arrangement. He believed that Macmillan had not understood that de Gaulle was offering the British a French/British nuclear arrangement. He added that Macmillan must now be kicking himself for not having realized that de Gaulle was offering him this arrangement. The President concluded that we had dealt with Skybolt as a weapons problem and that the reaction had surprised all of us.

Secretary Ball said there was one problem which needed prompt attention, i. e. should we try to get the Germans to amend the Franco-German treaty in such a way as to link the Franco-German arrangement to NATO? Secretary Rusk said the Dutch wanted us to try to persuade the Germans to postpone ratification of the treaty or amend it.

The President said we cannot let the Germans think we are telling them what to do, but on the other hand, we cannot let them think nothing has changed. He referred again to "the Mansfield effect," i. e. the U.S. has done much to help Europe and now the Europeans are acting in this way toward us.

Secretary Dillon said he had been asked by a Congressional Committee about the effect of de Gaulle's actions on our new trade act and on economic relations in general. He said he told the Committee to look to the State Department for an answer.

The President thought that we should exert pressure on Germany by means of trade proposals instead of asking them to postpone or revise the treaty.

The President said that his list of questions should be revised in the light of the discussion and circulated to the Executive Committee members.

Secretary Ball said that as a result of the breakdown of the Brussels negotiations certain advantages would accrue to us. The Common Agricultural Policy would probably not now go into effect. The agricultural problems, which were Secretary Freeman's worries, would now be greatly eased. In addition, the Latin American aspect of the problem would not become serious because the Dutch, if they chose, could block the association of African countries with the Common Market.

The President expressed reservations about using Dutch Foreign Minister Luns and preferred to work closely with the British.

Secretary Rusk noted that under no circumstances would the British break their ties with us in order to join the French.

The President responded that the British might have joined the French on the condition that the two of them then come to us jointly. At Nassau they could have proposed establishment of the directorate.

The President said again that the Franco-German treaty is aimed at us, particularly the clause which calls for German/French consultation on NATO matters. He said he realized that others disagreed with him and he hoped they were right.

Secretary Ball handed the President a draft letter to Adenauer. The President, upon reading it, commented that it was too nice and that he preferred to hold it over night, revising it in the morning. He thought that we ought to suggest to Adenauer some of the dangers which Europe would face if we were separated from it. He cited (a) the opportunity to the Russians to fish in troubled waters, (b) reaction in the U.S. which might result in a public demand to get out of Europe, harking back to the major fight which it took to persuade the American people to enter Europe, and (c) the difficulty of exploiting the Sino-Soviet split. The President said de Gaulle can't move without Adenauer's agreement, but

if we tell Adenauer that he has done fine, he may well think that he can continue to support de Gaulle. The President thought we must tell the Germans that they can't have it both ways.

The President said we should draw up precise assignments for the studies he requested, review them with the Secretary of State, and circulate them to the Executive Committee members. On Monday or Tuesday the Committee should meet again to see where we are going. On Saturday he would have a chance to talk with Ambassador Bruce. Mr. Bundy said the problems could not be handled in separate compartments but that part of the work could be done by the State group, which is already working.

The President summed up by saying that the basic theme is, given the existing balance of power, a division between the U.S. and Europe can only help the Russians. Our problem is to find out how we can continue to work with the Europeans. If the Europeans do not wish to continue with us, then, indeed, a turning point is here.

As the meeting broke up, the President looked at recent aerial reconnaissance photographs of Cuba and agreed, in the light of Senator Keating's statement that afternoon, to release some of them to the press. Director McCone was authorized to confront Senator Keating with all our current reconnaissance intelligence in the hope that the Senator would correct his statements of yesterday with respect to the continued existence of missile bases in Cuba.

Bromley Smith

Questions to be settled by the United States
in the coming months.

1. Trade negotiations with the common market. Priority of various goods.
2. Spaak's political stability. Can he continue to sustain anti-deGaulle position in Belgium. How far can he go in this attack.
3. When will the African countries apply for admission to the common market. Can we expect them to be held up by the Belgians and Dutch as a reprisal?
4. What is the multi-lateral's future now. Should we proceed ahead? Will deGaulle top us - the Germans being bilateral.
5. Should we wait for the Defense Minister to come here, or should we send Merchant on the road?
6. How can we improve the American line from the various embassies so that there will not be as much pro-deGaulle stories i.e. Sulzberger, etc.
7. How can we improve the Washington liaison with foreign correspondents here.
8. How can we improve the technique with those State Department personnel who give out information and talk to members of the press.
9. What kind of a deal can deGaulle make with the Russians which would be acceptable to the Germans.
10. What are the prospects for a tripartite with deGaulle.
11. What defense can we build with the dollar to maintain our balance of payments in the next 18 months.
12. What are the prospects for the French nuclear force. When will it be a deterrent, even in a limited sense.
13. What should be our proposals for NATO in May - change of the number of our divisions. Should we bring out the divisions that we have there.

CATEGORY "A"

EYES ONLY

Completely de-sensitized

Transferred to O/FADRC

by S.B.T. date 9-9-73

January 31, 1963

REFLECTIONS ON THE JANUARY DEBACLE

From one point of view DeGaulle's press conference, followed by the veto of Britain's application to the Common Market and by the signing of the Franco-German treaty, has presented Europe and North America with a wholly changed situation. From another point of view these events have revealed much but changed little. Both views present facets of the truth, and the total truth requires in some instances the continuation of policy; in others, the initiation of new policies.

POL
FR-DK

One cannot say that the West has not had ample warning of the French and German action; yet it has been caught unprepared and been thrown into confusion. What was unexpected was not DeGaulle's wishes and desires; but that he acted, and acted so brazenly and revealingly. And what was surprising about Adenauer was that he acted so submissively in signing a treaty of Franco-German rapprochement and unity in effect as an acceptance of DeGaulle's anti-American, anti-Atlantic policy.

What supports the view that the European situation is substantially unchanged or is unchanged in substance is that both DeGaulle and Adenauer have had these hopes,

EYES ONLY

policies, and attitudes for a long time, have revealed them fairly openly, but never with such brazen defiance as in the past two weeks. But the very revelation of these attitudes is a change in substance; just as the act of declaring war is a change, even after a considerable period of intense hostility.

These actions of public disclosure and defiance require counter-actions. The termination of whatever prior possibility there was of accepting Britain into the Common Market requires new policies. The prevention of a Gaullist Europe, united upon Gaullist policies, requires both an intensification of former policies designed to strengthen the Western European-North American nexus, as well as new and vigorous analysis of the possible failure of this policy and of the actions required in such event.

I

Actions Required by the Public and Defiant Disclosure of Gaullist Policy and of Adenauer's Ambivalent Position

DeGaulle took no pains to obscure or soften his rejection of Britain or the reasons for it. His reasons were, as plainly stated, that the admission of Britain would constitute a strengthening of American influence

^{*/} This latter analysis is not attempted in this paper. The consequences of failure of our present policy are only suggested, in part.

in Europe; that Britain was not truly European in outlook, but represented a wider and more amorphous grouping; that DeGaulle wished Europe to be solely European, and he wished it to be a Europe extending from the Atlantic to the Urals, managed by France and Russia; and that to accomplish this the acceptance of the idea by Germany and the elimination of the United States from Europe were necessary.

Adenauer protests that the coincidence of the treaty signing with DeGaulle's acts was purely fortuitous; that he has registered his disapproval of them by the attitude he took at Brussels and by his approval of the Nassau agreements. Nevertheless, he signed the treaty when he did, knowing full well the necessary interpretation of his act; and he proclaims the Franco-German rapprochement the most important development in the century, though he knows that DeGaulle regards and treats the rapprochement as an instrument for eliminating the American presence in Europe.

The treaty is thus a political act, and a political act which, if carried to its conclusion, means far more than the words written upon the paper. It means that Germany wants the best of all worlds. It wants to ride along with conflicting interests as far as possible,

without choosing and being in a position as long as possible to play one interest off against the other. To allow this is not in American interests.

The German Government must be made to see clearly and at once what is the road along which DeGaulle wishes it to embark and that the United States Government does not propose to cooperate in any way with its desire to explore this road. And it must be made to see also that this is not a matter to be obscured by words or to be left for vague future developments; but that its action on the treaty itself will be regarded here as the manifestation of a choice which will have instant effects on American policy.

Already radio reports emanating from Bonn are describing the popularity of the treaty and the desire to ratify it at once. The first aim of policy should be to prevent this early ratification. The effect of mere postponement will be beneficial. The next aim of policy should be to use the treaty to rebuke both Adenauer and DeGaulle and to range Germany against acceptance of the policy as outlined above. If rejection of the treaty is not regarded as practicable, it should be amended by the Bundestag when considered later this year, so as to

require both signatories to reaffirm their adherence to NATO and specifically to the unified force and defense of Europe; also, if possible, adherence to use of the three communities of Europe to strengthen the Atlantic Community and repudiate narrow and exclusive European policy.

In order to do this, broad decisions, supplementing and reinforcing existing policies, should be made as soon as possible. The policy represented by these decisions should be presented vigorously and plainly to all German leaders, and not merely to the Chancellor, by the one person ideally equipped to do this, Mr. John J. McCloy.

II

Long Range Policy Toward Europe

In order that the Germans may see that they are required to make a choice, and make it now, they should be given (a) analysis of Gaullist policy and our reasons for rejecting it, and (b) American long range policies for European-North American collaboration.

(a) Gaullist Policy.

As indicated above, Gaullist policy plainly aspires to the elimination of American influence from Europe and, of course, with the influence, the withdrawal of American military forces. However, it seems inconceivable that General DeGaulle could expect to bring this about as promptly or suddenly as he has brought about the rejection of Britain from the continent. He would doubtless wish to rely upon the preventive and defensive effect of American military formations in Europe until he had something better. If and when he had something better, he undoubtedly expects that, if the western portion of his Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals found itself in danger of being swallowed by the eastern portion, he would still have the political commitment of the NATO treaty and the deterrent effect of American nuclear power to fall back on. It will, of course, be clear to the Germans that it will be years before France can produce an army which is either politically reliable or militarily effective. This is even more obvious when one considers the amount of the French military budget which General DeGaulle will have to contemplate expending for nuclear weapons. It will also be clear to the Germans

that France, even with the help of all of Europe, cannot ever produce a nuclear armament which will be significant, apart from association with American nuclear power. And, if it is not apparent to the Germans, it should be made so that the United States could never accept the political commitment of NATO under a situation in which its troops were required to be withdrawn from Europe, its influence terminated, no adequate military substitute provided for them, and a small and inadequate European nuclear force created, the sole purpose and capability of which was to "trigger" nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. Any other conception would credit the United States with a naïveté which is not flattering to its intelligence.

In the economic field the lessons of the press conference and of Brussels are particularly poignant. United States policy has been to regard Europe and North America as two great world markets, both for raw materials and manufactured goods, which, working for similar goals, with similar principles, and harmonizing their economies, could produce profoundly beneficial results, not only for the people within their own geographical borders,

but for the whole free world. However, a common market with narrow and exclusive policies, now disclosed as those of a Gaullist Europe, and the United States can carry on no such common endeavors. Furthermore, its sense of concern for the interests of other allied, friendly, and developing nations must cause it to re-develop its program so that these other nations may not be subjected to undue hazard and hardship by the exclusive policies now forecast. Whether this can be done in consonance with what has always been a cornerstone of American policy, the most favored nation doctrine, so far as an exclusionary common market is concerned, is not immediately clear. Nor is it clear how an American trade policy can be adapted to the conception of a Europe extending from the Atlantic to the Urals. One thing, however, is clear; the needs of nations outside of the Common Market are immediate and pressing; they cannot wait upon long, complicated negotiations, ultimately to be frustrated by a French rejection, even though France's partners may shed sympathetic tears.

(b) Alternatives.

We said at the outset that recent events had in some respects not changed, but only revealed more clearly existing situations. This is plainly true so

far as France in NATO is concerned. It would be hard for Gaullist France to be any more obstructive there than it has been in the past. Its open hostility requires not novel policies and plans, but the intensification of old ones, their adaption to the declared absence of France from planning or consideration, and getting on with those tasks which have always been neglected.

Broadly speaking our policy in NATO should be to go ahead, not closing any doors to future French participation and cooperation, but realizing that France has made mightly little contribution for a decade and under the best of circumstances could not have been expected to make much more for another decade. Furthermore, whatever France does in the way of reorganizing her army, navy, and airforce will not be wasted, since with a different political direction new and better French forces could be easily attached to the NATO operation. Furthermore, whatever France does in the nuclear field cannot be stopped anyway, and the less time we spend worrying about it the better.

What is needed now is a series of decisions regarding American policy, both for immediate action and for development and planning over the intermediate future;

that is, for the next two to six years. All of these decisions cannot, of course, be absolutely final. But they can be given a higher degree of finality than is common; that is, they should be final, as against whimsical change, or change because of minor circumstances, or change because of changed personalities; and they should furnish a basis for coherent and continuous action.

The most immediate of these have to do with the military and economic spheres, although there is some necessity for prompt decision in the political field.

In the Military Field

1. We need a firm governmental decision to stabilize our military position in Europe for a definite period, say, 18 months, during which time there shall be no changes introduced into it by any extraneous factors, such as variation in the balance of payments, substitution of weapons, annoyance with this or that government in Europe. The purpose of this decision is to maintain the most favorable environment for keeping the Germans tied into NATO and for developing and for maintaining an Atlantic rather than a Gaullist Europe. We should do our best to persuade the British to maintain their Army of the Rhine steadily for a similar period.

2. We should get the discussion of the multi-national program out of the theoretical and gadgetary phase and into a phase where something practical, useful, and valuable can develop at once. It is important to permit the Germans, and perhaps the Italians, to gain something which they value and which they may lose. This something is participation, knowledge, and training at various levels in the nuclear war problem. This means in the extent of our nuclear capabilities and those of the Russians, in the cost of developing and maintaining these capabilities, in the nature and consequences of nuclear war and, hence, in the desirability of other options, and in actual training aboard one of our Polaris submarines.

It might be proposed that for those nations who have accepted the multi-national force in principle that a primarily experimental program might be undertaken as soon as suitable officers can be selected from the point of view of security, command of English, etc.; that some be instructed in the financial, strategic, and general command factors involved and that others be instructed in the operational side. This is a difficult decision, but it is one which we must ultimately face. If grasped and decided now, it will give our allies something infinitely more tangible and absorbing than anything that France can offer.

3. We should make a decision now that we are willing, provided Germany takes an unequivocal position to remain firmly in NATO, to undertake informal and close staff work outside SHAPE between the U.S. staff in Europe and the German staff and between high defense officers of both countries for (i) the use of existing forces, including technical and strategic nuclear forces, for emergency defense in Europe; (ii) for the creation of additional forces, their nature and priority, and their deployment in Europe; and (iii) ultimately for participation in the development of the combined strategic plan discussed in the next sub-division.

The idea of this suggestion is not to by-pass or weaken NATO in any way; it is quite the contrary. It is based on the ideas, first, of recognizing the reality that the American and German forces constitute the bulk of those available for defense and that those primarily responsible should initiate plans; second, that the presence of France in any such attempt to initiate is only disruptive; third, that such a plan would offer Germany a consultative relationship with the nation which has power instead of with a nation which has no power;

and, four, that anything which required NATO approval would be submitted for it.

4. As has been so often pointed out, NATO defense cannot progress beyond the most rudimentary form unless a militarily and politically sound strategic plan is fully worked out. Such a plan cannot be worked out at all unless the United States first provides one. The United States cannot and will not provide one until the military department is ordered to do so and is told what political purposes are sought to be achieved, the limits of resources practicably available, and that the use of nuclear weapons is to be deferred in favor of as many as possible less drastic options. Like architects, they must be told what kind of a house one wants designed, rather than to design the perfect house.

If we cannot prove to our allies that Europe can be defended without certain extermination, we have no answer to DeGaulle's proposal of a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

In the Economic Field

1. With the collapse of Britain's Common Market negotiations, we should offer to her, as nearly as our legal and political situation permits, what she was striving for in the disrupted negotiations. I take it

that she was seeking an opportunity to compete in a large market, competitive pressure from this large producing area to get her own costs down and her own labor more effective, a stimulus furnished by this same competition to modernize her plant, and pressure upon her government to revise the tax system to permit the accumulation and investment of capital.

Is it possible for us to offer a deal which would

- (i) accomplish as much of the foregoing as possible;
- (ii) in doing so, help prepare Britain for subsequent entry into the Common Market by improving her competitive position and continuing the pressure to solve her agricultural problem; and
- (iii) to do this in such a way that we would not be giving away to the Common Market through most favored nation treatment bargaining strength which we might wish to use for our own interests and for the interest of other friendly countries?

After DeGaulle's rejection of Britain, it would be unwise to conduct business as usual with those countries as though nothing had happened. It is equally necessary not to engage in purely vindictive reprisals. What is needed is a trade policy which will help control the damage caused by French action and will help create a situation in which reversal of that action is possible.

2. Harmonization of economic policies. We need decisions which will introduce new activity and energy into the OECD in an effort to reach fiscal and financial arrangements which will tend toward expansionist policies in all the countries, but especially in England and the United States. If France cannot be associated in these endeavors, we should quite frankly continue our efforts without France, and we should, by all means, include Japan in plans and action.

The Political Field

The recent debacle in Europe carries a clear and stern warning that we cannot compete with Gaullist policy in Europe unless we are ready to face squarely up to unequivocal decisions on our policy toward Central Europe and German reunification. This, in turn, underlies the whole question of Berlin. American and European interests, when seen without the fog of illusion around them, are united in requiring the reunification of Germany within a unified Europe, which, in turn, is within an Atlantic Community, and the increase in national identity and independence of the Eastern European nations.

That this policy is difficult of achievement is no grounds for accepting the disaster of a Soviet-dominated

Europe. This is what Gaullist policy offers. We must not only make this clear to the Germans, but we must be prepared to align ourselves (in the event that Germany repudiates Gaullist policy) in favor of reunification of Germany within the structure indicated above. And we must be prepared to show the Germans that the only way of obtaining ultimate Russian acceptance of this situation, other than by conceding her the ultimate domination of Europe, is by increasing the economic strength and vitality and by denying the Soviet Union military superiority upon its western front so that it has no alternative but to withdraw. Such a situation will then make possible for the first time a real limitation of armaments from the Alleghenies to the Urals.

not to
5/16/63

THIS DOCUMENT
REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING



MASTER FILE
COPY

(A) DESCRIPTION: _____

REFLECTIONS ON THE JANUARY
DEBACLE 1/31/63

by Dean Acheson to
the Secretary.

(B) DISTRIBUTION: (4 copies)

~~Original~~
Copies ----

TO	CY.NO.	DESTROYED
U -Mr. Ball		10/24/63
EUR-Mr. Tyler		
Amb. Bruce		6/26/63
(R.G. [unclear])		
W. [unclear]		
EUR 4/7/63	1, 2, 3	#3, #1 8/23/63

THIS COPY MUST BE RETURNED
TO - L. D. [unclear] William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary
Department of State
Room 7224 NS/E
Do Not File

THIS DOCUMENT
REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

✓ 1/31/63

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 31, 1963


Possible Check List for the Executive Committee Meeting at 6 PM

1. Report by the Department of State on current situation on public information and on diplomatic representations.

- a. Summary of our current posture in major capitals;
- b. Plans for increasing the effectiveness of these presentations;
- c. Proposed themes for the Secretary's press conference tomorrow.

2. Report by Mr. Ball on the state of special studies begun at the President's direction last week:

- a. Plans for trade negotiations;
- b. Plans for multilateral negotiations;
- c. Other political questions --



3. Finally, there are a number of points on which we should be sure that the necessary studies are in train. For example:

Up to date estimates on French nuclear progress, fully current estimates on German attitudes toward nuclear defense, estimates of the economic bargaining counters which are held respectively by ourselves, the

SANITIZED

NY-83-106

BY mm NARS, DATE 4/13/84

115 E / 316 file on ExCom Mdy

British, the Five, and France;
contingency planning for the defense of the dollar on
narrow and broad bounds;
examination of the ways and means of eventually balancing
our conventional contribution with that of others;
and continuing review of the terms and conditions in
which control and direction of the multilateral force
might be made "more European."

McG. B.

2/2(6)

February 2, 1963

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

By Kayser

SUBJECT: Acheson on the January Debate

1. With his customary brilliance, Acheson states the problem in terms of the balance between two contrary viewpoints: the first, that what happened in January presented Europe and North America with a wholly changed situation; the second, that these events, though they have revealed much, have changed little. Acheson's own view of the mixture of old and new elements is best seen in his proposals for action.

2. His central proposals for action in the military (pages 10 to 13), and economic fields (pages 13 to 15), contain precisely the opposite distribution of emphasis between old and new from that which I believe correct. Acheson wants us to persist vigorously with our "old" military policy, i.e., the one we have adopted since the spring of 1961 (page 13). On the other hand, in the economic field, he looks for us to do something new, i.e., offer market and competitive benefits to the U.K., in some other framework than non-discriminatory general reduction of trade barriers. To do this would be to abandon the policy we have pursued steadily since the end of World War II.

3. This is a mixture of what, in the military field, has contributed substantially to the political problems we now face in Europe, and, in the economic field, a course whose dangers and disadvantages continue to remain what they have been all along. The vigor of our argument on the need for building up conventional forces because our previous reliance on massive nuclear response was both dangerous and ineffectual, and the unwillingness of the Europeans to listen to it have been directly proportionate. The

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLK-94-50
By *[Signature]* NARA Date *3/1/97*

SECRET

Ex Com [Signature]

-2-

~~SECRET~~

combination of their refusal to respond to our arguments and our persistence in urging them has played a large role in producing those suspicions of our intentions with respect to the defense of Europe to which De Gaulle appeals. It is unlikely that the recent events in Europe will have increased the receptivity of the Germans and others to our arguments. Rather, the contrary is true, and if we desire to build up the multilateral forces with new speed as a counter to De Gaulle's implicit offer of a (Gaullist) European nuclear force, we may have to do so at the cost of ungrudgingly accepting the present level of European conventional forces as the maximum near-term contribution they can make.

4. In the economic field any relations we seek to shape between ourselves and others take some time to grow and have their effects. Unless we are contemplating a permanent change in the pattern of trading relations, we desire between Europe, the U.K., the white Commonwealth countries, the U.S. and the underdeveloped countries, it is undesirable to attempt to work out ad hoc arrangements which help the U.K. without benefitting the common market. It is clear that an artful selection of commodities for exclusion and inclusion in the list of items to be considered in our general tariff negotiations can have some impact in the direction which Acheson suggests. Here again, however, prospective dangers outweigh prospective gains. Any number can play at the game of artful selection, and once the game starts, it is hard to see where it will end. We must continue to keep before us the important fact that we have a healthy trade surplus. Our more or less consistent effort toward reducing trade barriers as widely as possible rests on reasons that go beyond our disinterested dedication to the ideals of economic efficiency.

5. The preceding comments go to some of the most important of Acheson's specific recommendations. There are others with which I do not argue. Certainly the importance of keeping the Germans in tune with our views and actions in the next months is greater than ever. The necessity for showing the Europeans concrete progress on our solution to the problem of the relation of Europe to the nuclear deterrent is equally clear. So is the desirability of casting

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

our actions in a way that does not exclude France in a long-run sense.

Nonetheless, there is a broader and less definite aspect of Acheson's attack on the question which I find troubling. His memorandum may correctly describe De Gaulle's aims and desires. Whether or not they are indeed as sharply formed and as definite as the argument makes them, it is clear that we must provide for the likelihood that they may be. Nonetheless, the frame in which the problem of the "debacle" is put seems to invite a response by us of a dangerous and undesirable sort. If De Gaulle's purpose is indeed to pose for Europe the alternative of France or the United States, we would only serve that purpose by engaging him in the same terms. Our answer must always be: Europe and the United States, and let us discuss the terms of the relation. By highlighting the anti-American aspect of De Gaulle's purpose, the memorandum serves as a useful warning against the dangers inherent in that purpose. By failing to examine the extent to which De Gaulle's appeal is based on features of the European situation which can be exploited for anti-American purposes, but can also be met by an adaptation of American policy to them, Acheson's perspective increases the danger that we will consolidate a diverse set of European impulses in De Gaulle's favor.

6. The problems of the relation between American nuclear forces, Soviet nuclear forces and the defense of Europe are genuinely difficult, and they give De Gaulle something to work with. One way of looking at the military argument underlying De Gaulle's appeals is that he is now relying on what we ourselves have told the Europeans over a long period of time, until very recently; namely, that the threat of massive retaliation is sufficient to deter Soviet military action against Western Europe, and that conventional forces play a secondary role. We convinced the Europeans of this by both our statements and our behavior in the eight years from 1952 to 1960. We are painfully conscious of our failure to reverse these convictions in the last two years. Is it surprising that De Gaulle finds them useful to him?

Further, there are new elements in the situation which strengthen the appeal of this argument. There is the Cuban experience, which has been widely read as a demonstration of the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence. The fact that just what was deterred in Cuba, and

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

how, is not directly parallel to the European problem is clear to us; it is not clear to the Europeans. Further, De Gaulle may calculate that, given some kind of nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, the force de frappe will be an effective trigger for our force simply because of inevitable American and Soviet uncertainty about each other's responses, whether or not we wish it to be so.

Finally, De Gaulle may argue that, given a German settlement, Western Europe is indeed defensible without substantial conventional forces. This is not necessarily wrong. If to this we add an assessment that the Soviets may be willing to make the settlement in the near future on terms which the Germans can accept, De Gaulle may be trying to capture the gains of being the first to act on the realization of these possibilities. But if these possibilities are indeed present, perhaps we should be equally willing to act on them.

It might be that the only circumstances under which the Soviets would offer acceptable settlement terms are those which give them the extra reward of having driven American troops out of Europe. Conceivably this is what De Gaulle could count on as what he alone can offer the Soviets. Our withdrawal under such circumstances could create a dangerous situation, and tempt the Soviets to try to take advantage of it. Yet it is equally plausible that if the Germans and we were able to accept the settlement itself, we could manage affairs so that we could accept the withdrawal of American troops as agreed and voluntary, and therefore, not a victory for the Soviets.

At its broadest, the Acheson attitude which rests on the need to re-solidify the ties of NATO takes no account of the inter-action between NATO solidity and Soviet threat. Do we need more of the latter to get more of the former? Do we want now to do what we need to do to get more of the latter? Is the price of re-uniting NATO reuniting the Sino-Soviet bloc?

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

7. . . The points that are raised in the preceding paragraph obviously require more analysis, but what they suggest to me is the proposition that it is more useful to examine what it is in De Gaulle's program that is appealing to the Europeans, and what we might potentially do both to utilize and to cooperate with it, rather than merely reacting in terms of its threat of replacing our leadership by his.

C. K.

SECRET

2/5/63

SANITIZED COPY

[REDACTED] T - [REDACTED]

Summary Record of NSC Executive Committee Meeting No. 40,
February 5, 1963, 4:30 PM - Second Portion: U.S. Policy Toward Europe

The President opened the discussion of U.S. policy toward Europe by commenting on the attached draft instructions from him to Ambassador Bruce with respect to the subjects which would be discussed in the immediate future as we proceed with our reappraisal. His first question concerned our plans for a multilateral mixed manned seaborne Polaris force. He suggested that Ambassador Merchant not proceed too rapidly with his discussions with the Europeans about this force. He thought that de Gaulle would probably oppose it, that it might turn out that the proposal was not very attractive to other Europeans because it did not have enough in it to interest them.

A second question involved the relationship of our foreign economic policy to our political objectives in Europe. The President asked Secretary Acheson to look at our balance of payments problem, consulting with Treasury, Defense, State, and Governor Herter.

Parenthetically, the President asked for a recommendation as to whether we should take an initiative now, wait to see how things developed, or go on as we now plan. He asked Secretary Acheson to concern himself with this problem as well.

The President said he did not want us to appear as if we were approaching the Europeans hat in hand. Possibly it would be best for the U.S. to negotiate alone, but he also wanted the views of those present as to whether it would be best to go forward with a group consisting of the British and other Europeans except France.

Governor Herter said de Gaulle's position was not yet clear and would not be in the immediate future. The situation in Europe had not yet jelled and the views of European powers other than France were changing rapidly.

.....
..... The Dutch were now blocking discussions with the French, but the Italians appeared to be going one way, while the Belgians were going another way. If we decide to go with the Six, that would be one thing, but if we decide to support some kind of a trade association between the U.K., the EFTA countries, and the Common Market, a different way of proceeding would be necessary.

SANITIZED
O. 12356, Sec. 3,4
NLK-89-33

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
NSF 12/16 AULL: (RUCS 61-63) (B:174) AR

[REDACTED] ET - [REDACTED]

Secretary Rusk said we did not know which way the Five would go. One way they could move in the political area would be to use the Western European Union structure, and economically, some association with the Common Market. (Earlier the President had stated that if the U.K. in some way joins in an economic association with Europe, but is not a part of the political structure of Europe, the U.S. would get the worst of both worlds.)

The President's next question concerned our stance in negotiations with the Russians. He noted that Gromyko had made a specific approach to Ambassador Kohler, and that we must shortly give instructions to our Ambassador. The President said the Germans appeared to be relaxed on this issue because the Russians were not now exerting pressure on Berlin. He asked whether we were consulting our allies on the proposal made by the Russians.

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

Assistant Secretary Tyler explained that he would make known to the French and the British Ambassadors here the proposal which Gromyko had made. (The Germans have already been informed.) The Ambassadors would seek instructions from their governments as to whether they wished to make the negotiations tripartite. A variant of this suggestion would be for a quadripartite group to approve positions which we would take as the sole negotiator with the Russians.

The President's next question concerned our relations with Germany.
.....
.....
.....
.....

[REDACTED] T - [REDACTED]

.....

Parenthetically, the President asked Secretary Dillon why the Spanish were buying gold. Secretary Dillon replied that they were doing so primarily for psychological reasons, i. e. they had always hoped to regain the amount of gold they had prior to their civil war.

The President did not specifically discuss questions five and six on the attached list covering our relations with the U.K. and our relations with France.

..... He said that Ambassador Bruce and Secretary Acheson would be looking at these questions for the next two weeks. They would be free to do this outside of the day-to-day routine which other officials were obliged to follow. The objective would be to agree on a plan covering our relations with Europe during the next five or six months.

Ambassador Dowling, who had just arrived from Bonn, expressed his view that the Germans would not lead the Five in opposition to de Gaulle unless we keep them nervous about our relations with them.

.....

The President asked Ambassador Dowling whether we should ask the Germans for something specific. The Ambassador responded that we could not become specific until we had answered some of the questions raised by the President.

Secretary Dillon said an item of interest as to existing European attitudes had arisen in connection with our efforts to increase European subscriptions to IDA. In the past, the French had been willing to try to persuade the Germans to subscribe larger amounts. The Germans

had been resisting larger subscriptions. The French were still putting pressure on the Germans to add to their IDA subscription.

Ambassador Bruce said that some of the questions the President had raised required immediate answers, i. e. our attitude toward the Franco-German treaty and our stance toward the USSR. Other questions were not so immediate. He said he wanted to feel free to deal with the short term questions promptly and take more time to provide replies to other questions.

The President asked how the WEU would solve any problems which arose following the veto of British membership in the Common Market. Ambassador Bruce replied that the British could get a political tie to the Continent via WEU. If the French refused to go along with such a political tie, the other members of the WEU could go forward with the British. He cautioned that no European government had yet chosen its course of action.

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

The President pointed out that we cannot be in the position of keeping the British from joining some economic association with the other European powers. He asked for an estimate of the economic effect on the U.S. if the British did accept some form of association with the Common Market. If it turned out that the economic effect on us would be bad, then we would be in a most difficult position, i. e. opposing British association with the Common Market, having supported British membership in the Common Market.

Governor Herter reported that the British had flatly rejected association with the Common Market, but added that the EFTA powers favored an association and were anxious to work out economic arrangements with the Common Market.

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

Ambassador Bruce felt that despite what the British had said so far, they would consider some type of association with the Common Market and that the EFTA countries would exert strong pressure on them to do so.

Governor Herter pointed out to the President that a year from this April is the earliest time when we can begin the Kennedy round of trade negotiations. He said we were in a very difficult box and could not proceed promptly. The EEC is now studying our tariff simplification proposals and we cannot move until they have completed this study. They will then ask for recompense as a result of our tariff simplifications. Following that, we must hold public hearings, make our proposals, and then table them in Congress sixty days prior to negotiations.

Following an exchange between the President and Mr. Bundy, it was agreed that we should not let the Germans make a proposal in the mistaken belief that it would please us. In effect, we must try to see that no state makes any proposal which we are not aware of in advance.

General Taylor gave a brief report of his discussions with Lord Mountbatten:

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

.....
.....
.....

Secretary Acheson referred back to the Bruce instructions and said he did not think we would get answers to these questions and that the effort to do so would bog down in futile discussions involving national sovereignty questions and other unrealistic issues. He asked whether the memorandum he had written on the January debacle had been read by those present. He urged that a decision be taken now to give the Germans and Italians something which, if they did not follow our leadership, we could take away from them. He urged that we initiate training of foreign officers for the NATO nuclear force now while we are discussing the longer range proposal of a multilateral force.

Ambassador Dowling noted that the multilateral force has appeal for the Germans, even if we keep the veto, as long as we set up something like the NATO Executive Committee in which they would have a role.

General Taylor asked that we talk to the German military leaders as we are now doing with the British.

Ambassador Dowling said the Germans do want to participate in the manning of the multilateral force, they want a voice in the Executive Committee, and they are quite prepared to contribute to the cost of the multilateral force.

The President said that before we undertake any discussions with the Germans we should firm up our multilateral proposal. He thought that Ambassador Merchant should work on this proposal, consult with Ambassador Bruce, and then we could discuss the proposal again. The President pointed out that Secretary Acheson had recommended that we tell everyone we will not remove our troops from Europe for at least eighteen months. He said the threat of withdrawing our troops was about the only sanction we had, and, therefore, if we made such a statement, we would give away our bargaining power.

Secretary Acheson said he had not recommended that we guarantee we would not withdraw our troops from Europe, but merely that we would let the Europeans know that we would not fiddle with this force for eighteen months for peripheral reasons, i. e. budgetary or balance of payments. Any action looking to troop withdrawal would rock the

[REDACTED] T - [REDACTED]

boat and convey to the Europeans uncertainty as to our intentions. At the end of eighteen months, we could examine the situation, and, if, during this period, the Europeans had not come around to supporting us fully, then we could consider withdrawal. He opposed conveying to the Germans the thought that unless they acted in a certain way they could not be sure of our continued support.

The President asked then how we could put any pressure on the Germans.

Ambassador Dowling said that those Germans who are our friends say we will not pull out of Europe. If by our actions we caused the Germans to doubt that we would remain in Europe, de Gaulle could take great advantage of the uncertainty created.

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

Secretary Rusk pointed out that if the Germans insisted on making clear the continued existence of their pledge to NATO, de Gaulle would be influenced.

Ambassador Dowling emphasized that the Germans looked at the Franco-German treaty as the way to acquire equal partnership for Germany. At the same time, he acknowledged that the German association with the U.S. is very meaningful to them.

Secretary Acheson gave additional details of his conversation with Carstens. He said he bluntly told Carstens that Adenauer's agreeing to the Franco-German treaty and statements to the effect that this action made no real difference meant that the Germans either thought the Americans were stupid or that the Germans were admitting they were duplicitous.

Bromley Smith

[REDACTED] T [REDACTED] E

215/62
(6)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

February 5, 1963

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING
February 5, 1963 - 4:00 P.M.
TENTATIVE AGENDA

- 1. Soviet Military Forces in Cuba
- 2. Cuban Intelligence Requirements -- Preliminary Discussion
- 3. U.S. Government Shipments by Foreign Flag Vessels in the Cuban Trade
- 4. U.S. Policy Toward Europe



Information Policy
Cottrell Report

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLX-94-50
By: <i>[Signature]</i> NARA Date: 1/31/97

NIA / 316 / *[Handwritten]*

215 (63) (8)

February 5, 1963

SECRET

INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE PRESIDENT TO AMBASSADOR BRUCE


After discussion with Secretary Rusk, and on his recommendation, I request that you make a review of certain of our leading policies toward Europe and make recommendations for action in the coming months. In this review you should feel free to request reports or studies or other assistance from any Department, and you should act directly for me and for Secretary Rusk. When your recommendations are in preliminary form I shall plan to meet with you to determine what further study they may require before decisions are taken.

The following list sets forth some of the topics which seem important to me and in which I hope for your specific comment. But you should not feel limited by this list, if other elements of the problem seem of equal importance to you. You should understand that I am asking other officers to review the broad problems of our military posture in Europe and our monetary relations in that area. Progress of these other studies will be reported to you through Mr. Bundy's office.

Questions for your consideration:

1. I would like you to review our plans for a NATO Nuclear Force, and in particular the plans for a multilateral, mixed-manned sea-borne Polaris force. I would like your judgment of this plan not only in terms of its immediate political attraction, but also in terms of its durable value as an instrument for strengthening the alliance. I want your judgment on the preferred means of command and control -- and in particular your opinion of the value of this force if it is organized with -- and without -- a U. S. veto. I also wish your judgment of the proposal that this force, in whole or in part, might be organized under European multilateral arrangements, integrated with ours much as we now expect British forces to be integrated -- possibly under the

~~SECRET~~



NIA 1216 / A.L.P. Com Mtg

auspices of WEU. In the light of Soviet complaints about the Franco-German treaty and its possible relation to a German nuclear capability, I should also like your judgment of the relation between our effort for a multilateral force and a possible Soviet reaction. Finally, I should like to have your judgment on the best way of using this and other instruments to produce a shared sense of understanding, responsibility, and confidence with respect to the nuclear defense of the alliance.

2. What plan is recommended for coordinating our foreign economic policy with our political objectives in Europe? This question includes such matters as our own negotiating requirements, our views of a possible UK economic association with the Five or the Six, the varied relations between commercial and political issues, and important problems of domestic political pressure. Mr. Herter has leading responsibilities here, and I would like to have recommendations, coordinated with him, which connect these matters firmly to our European policy as a whole.

3. What should be our stance in negotiations with the Russians? This problem is one of substance, on such questions as Berlin, testing, and German reunification. It is also one of tactics, including such questions as the use of the Ambassadorial Group, and the degree of British, French and German participation in such discussions.

4. What combination of actions will be most effective in our relations with Germany? What should be our position toward the Franco-German Treaty? How far can we ensure German cooperation in other fields, like finance, as a price for our own steadfast presence?

5. What policy should we follow with respect to the UK, on economic, political and military problems? I assume that our negotiations on Polaris will proceed on the lines already approved, but it is clear that we need decisions also on economic relations and on processes of political cooperation.

6. I do not wish to lose sight of the continuing problem of our relations with France. I should like to have your recommendations for ways and means of sustaining such cooperation as may be possible with France, while at the same time limiting the damage that may be done to our policy and to the alliance by General de Gaulle's

(8)

commitment to purposes which are not readily aligned with ours. What is your judgment of the eventual prospects for a new relation with General de Gaulle, in political consultation or nuclear co-operation, which might be to our interest, and what preparations would you recommend for such a possibility?

pers of:
Dean Acheson

2/15/63

(2)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 5, 1963

UNCLASSIFIED

INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE PRESIDENT TO AMBASSADOR BRUCE

After discussion with Secretary Rusk, and on his recommendation, I request that you make a review of certain of our leading policies toward Europe and make recommendations for action in the coming months. In this review you should feel free to request reports or studies or other assistance from any Department, and you should act directly for me and for Secretary Rusk. When your recommendations are in preliminary form I shall plan to meet with you to determine what further study they may require before decisions are taken.

The following list sets forth some of the topics which seem important to me and in which I hope for your specific comment. But you should not feel limited by this list, if other elements of the problem seem of equal importance to you. You should understand that I am asking other officers to review the broad problems of our military posture in Europe and our monetary relations in that area. Progress of these other studies will be reported to you through Mr. Bundy's office.

Questions for your consideration

I would like you to review our plans for a NATO Nuclear Force, and in particular the plans for a multilateral, mixed-manned sea-borne Polaris force. I would like your judgment of this plan not only in terms of its immediate political attraction, but also in terms of its durable value as an instrument for strengthening the alliance. I want your judgment on the preferred means of command and control -- and in particular your opinion of the value of this force if it is organized with -- and without -- a U. S. veto. I also wish your judgment of the proposal that this force, in whole or in part, might be organized under European multilateral arrangements, integrated with ours much as we now expect British forces to be integrated -- possibly under the

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

74785-24 (nsc 4/11/89)
7/31/89
cc

AP / SD + WHA / 1963

UNCLASSIFIED

- 2 -

auspices of WEU. In the light of Soviet complaints about the Franco-German treaty and its possible relation to a German nuclear capability, I should also like your judgment of the relation between our effort for a multilateral force and a possible Soviet reaction. Finally, I should like to have your judgment on the best way of using this and other instruments to produce a shared sense of understanding, responsibility, and confidence with respect to the nuclear defense of the alliance. //

2. What plan is recommended for coordinating our foreign economic policy with our political objectives in Europe? This question includes such matters as our own negotiating requirements, our views of a possible UK economic association with the Five or the Six, the varied relations between commercial and political issues, and important problems of domestic political pressure. Mr. Herter has leading responsibilities here, and I would like to have recommendations, coordinated with him, which connect these matters firmly to our European policy as a whole.

3. What should be our stance in negotiations with the Russians? This problem is one of substance, on such questions as Berlin, testing, and German reunification. It is also one of tactics, including such questions as the use of the Ambassadorial Group, and the degree of British, French and German participation in such discussions.

4. What combination of actions will be most effective in our relations with Germany? What should be our position toward the Franco-German Treaty? How far can we ensure German cooperation in other fields, like finance, as a price for our own steadfast presence?

5. What policy should we follow with respect to the UK, on economic, political and military problems? I assume that our negotiations on Polaris will proceed on the lines already approved, but it is clear that we need decisions also on economic relations and on processes of political cooperation.

6. I do not wish to lose sight of the continuing problem of our relations with France. I should like to have your recommendations for ways and means of sustaining such cooperation as may be possible with France, while at the same time limiting the damage that may be done to our policy and to the alliance by General de Gaulle's

UNCLASSIFIED

Papers of:
Dean Acheson

CLASSIFIED

- 3 -

commitment to purposes which are not readily aligned with ours. What is your judgment of the eventual prospects for a new relation with General de Gaulle, in political consultation or nuclear co-operation, which might be to our interest, and what preparations would you recommend for such a possibility?



UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED -

DECLASSIFIED

This document consists of 3 pages
No. 4 of 9. Copies, Series

AC E22
01882 2/16/69

EUR:GFP:EMbrandin:gv.
Approved in S
2/7/63

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

S/S

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: February 6, 1963
Breakfast - State
8:45 a.m.

SUBJECT: Soviet Overtures on Berlin

PARTICIPANTS: Germans

State Secretary Karl Carstens
Ambassador Karl Heinrich Knappestein
Counselor Svddbert Schmippenkoetter

*Orig. to RMR for distillation
2/8/63*

~~XXXXXXXX~~ Americans

The Secretary
Assistant Secretary William H. Tyler, EUR
Ambassador Walter C. Dowling, Bonn
Mr. Robert M. Brandin, EUR/GER

COPIES TO: (See page 3)

The Secretary said it was necessary to consider the recent overtures about Berlin which the Soviets had made to Ambassador Kohler, noting that these would be discussed in the Ambassadorial Group later in the day.

Dr. Carstens cautioned against any haste. There seemed to be no present danger of a separate treaty. The posture of Western unity was not imposing at the moment. Moreover, as the President had said in November, the USSR must clearly accept Western presence in Berlin. On this last point the USSR was still rather evasive, apparently having said nothing about it.

The Secretary clarified that what the President meant in November was that no arrangement could be concluded that did not accept Western presence in Berlin. The President did not insist that such recognition be a precondition to discussions. We seemed to feel we should not talk under pressure and that it was not necessary to talk if things were quiet.

Dr. Carstens said this was the situation we all had to live with in view of Berlin's exposed and isolated position. This tactic had been successful so far.

The Secretary asked whether there was a danger of steady erosion in Berlin in the absence of clarification of its status.

Dr. Carstens replied that an improvement in the situation of Berlin would have a good effect, but it was doubtful we could achieve such improvement. Therefore, it was better to live with what we had. He did not think there was a danger of serious erosion in Berlin. The population had decreased slightly, but this

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RELEASE
EXCISE
DENY
DELETE Non-Responsive Info
FOIA Exemptions
PA Exemptions
MR Cases Only:
EO Citations
CLASSIFY as
DOWNGRADE TS to
S or
C OADR
C OADR
TS authority to
IS/FPC/CDR
Date: 7/29/92

DECLASSIFIED

MSA

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

- 2 -

was an inevitable consequence when cities were isolated from their natural hinterlands.

Mr. Tyler wondered what the effect would be within the Western Alliance if we did not respond to the Soviet overtures to Ambassador Kohler.

Dr. Carstens thought there was little hope of finding an agreed basis for negotiations among the members of the Western Alliance as a whole.

The Secretary noted there was a difference between expecting or hoping for a solution and keeping channels open. Our idea in proposing that the Berlin problem be discussed by Deputy Foreign Ministers was simply to keep discussions going, as in the case of Austria.

Ambassador Dowling said the conversations with the USSR had helped to prevent an erosion of the situation. He thought we should keep the talks going along quietly without being adamant or hasty.

The Secretary stressed the importance of a united front to keep Khrushchev from getting the wrong ideas. The Secretary referred to Gromyko's hint that talks should be on a broader basis. Khrushchev had also said that West Berlin was not important to the Allies who were only echoing Adenauer. There was also a report that de Gaulle had told Khrushchev that France did not need West Berlin. To deal with these Soviet tactics, the United States had always stressed its own national interest in Berlin.

Dr. Carstens said there was a question of what should be discussed with the USSR -- the German problem or the Berlin problem. There was much in favor of re-introducing the German question.

The Secretary recalled this possibility had been discussed among the Foreign Ministers in December. Soviet propaganda emphasized that the USSR alone was making proposals. Perhaps we should present counterproposals at all levels -- e.g., All-Germany, All-Berlin, modus vivendi, etc. There was a danger of a psychological erosion in the attitude of the rest of the world toward the Berlin question. If the USSR proposed changes in the status quo for its purposes, why should we not propose changes for our purposes?

Dr. Carstens said such an approach would have the advantage of reintroducing the proposals made by the West in 1959 about Germany. He emphasized that there was more confidence in West Berlin now as a result of Cuba than there had been at any time in the last four years.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

-3-

COPIES TO: S/S-3
S/P
G
WE
BNA
BTF-2
INR/D
GER-2
EUR-2
S/AL

White House

Aembassy Bonn
Aembassy Paris
Aembassy London
Aembassy Moscow
USRO
USBER

SECRET

RELEASED

DECLASSIFIED

2/11/63
2/12/63
STE M/C
2100
A
E21
S

EUR:SOV:Guthrie:sj:AMR

SECRET -

APPROVED IN S

2/13/63

February 9, 1963

Discussions with the Soviets over Berlin

U.S.

The Secretary
William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR
John C. Guthrie, Director, SOV

France

Herve Alphand, French Ambassador
Bruno de Leusse, French Minister

COPIES TO:

S/S-2	EUR-2	S/AL
G	BTF	Amembassy Paris
S/P	ACDA	Amembassy Bonn

*complete
Dist. made
By S/S- 2/14/63
Only 2 per/2 for
only only*

Ambassador Alphand said it was French opinion that it was not desirable to have further exploratory talks with the Soviets over Berlin until there is a real change in the Soviet position concerning the status of Berlin. If, however, the U.S. wishes to continue such talks, the French would not object. Alphand asked whether it would not seem strange to talk about Berlin in the light of the current discussion over the Soviet presence in Cuba. He felt it would be better to tell the Soviets that we would talk about Berlin when other problems, such as disarmament and Cuba, are in good shape.

The Secretary replied that the Soviets would be pleased to have us link Cuba and Berlin, and that we have gone to extraordinary lengths to avoid linking Cuba with anything.

Alphand asked whether the U.S. Government had taken a position yet concerning these exploratory talks with the Soviets, to which the Secretary replied that we were awaiting the reactions of the others concerned before reaching a decision. He continued that if we decide to conduct further talks with the Soviets we

would

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

NGA

IS/FPC/CDR
Date: 2/13/63
MR Cases Only:
EO Citations
TS Authority to
CLASSIFY as () S or () O
DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () O
CLASSIFY () DECLASSIFY IN PART
FOIA Exemptions
PA Exemptions
RELEASE () EXCISE () DENY
DELETE Non-Responsive Info

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

-2-

would be in touch with the Ambassadorial Group with regard to the modalities. The Secretary concluded that he would have supposed that one of the best ways to conduct a dilatory action would be to talk, noting that some take the position that one should not talk when tensions are high since this would appear to be negotiating under duress, while on the other hand, the same people take the position that when there is no pressure there is no need to talk.

NOV 11 1973

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET/NOFORN

10y Bunker
59
February 7, 1963
IND/P/7

File

STEERING GROUP ON IMPLEMENTING THE
NASSAU DECISIONS

Integrated Seaborne Polaris Force

Submitted by Sub-Group IV

In order to respond to European aspirations for a nuclear role in a way which will support European integration and Atlantic partnership and which will reinforce our policy against diffusion of national atomic weapons capabilities, an integrated seaborne Polaris Force should be discussed by the United States with its allies along the lines set forth in this paper.

1. Participation. Participation in the Force will be open to all NATO nations and at least three nations must participate from the start.
2. Size. The objective should be an integrated Polaris Force which will, together with any national (US-UK) contributions to the NATO Nuclear Force, total at least 200 weapons. If the European countries are disposed to do more, and can do so without jeopardy to needed conventional programs, the upper limit should be a total Force of about 600 weapons.
3. Targeting. The Force would be targeted, in accordance with existing NATO procedures, as an integral element of the total nuclear delivery forces available to the Alliance. Its missiles should be assigned to targets against which they would be most effective.
4. Control. In following up on the views which the U.S. presented to its allies in the NAC on October 22, the U.S. should discuss various consultative processes by which control

over the

SECRET/NOFORN

DECLASSIFIED	
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6	
MLK/94-50	
By <i>[Signature]</i>	NARA, Date 12/1/97

NRF/316/Ex Comm 11095 38-40

over the Force might be exercised by the participants, e.g., in a committee of the participants or a NATO Executive Committee, which would consist of the big power members of the integrated Force and -- on a rotating basis -- one of the small power members of the Force. The U.S. should be prepared to consider, if our allies raise the issue, whether some form of advance agreement regarding use of the Force in case of unmistakable large-scale nuclear attack would be feasible. The foregoing does not modify or withdraw the official position already taken with our allies that we will consider any control formula favored by our allies even if it involves a change in U.S. law. The U.S. objective remains, of course, to participate authoritatively in any decision to fire the missiles.

5. Design Data. It should be a U.S. objective to limit sharing of design data to the minimum consistent with an effective Force. Substantial sharing with personnel of the Force of design data on nuclear propulsion (if submarines are elected) and on missiles would be required for training purposes. In the field of weapons design we should seek to limit sharing to the access permitted under current agreements. Specific procedures to this end should be developed in negotiations with other participants in the Force. In subsequent years more extensive sharing may prove necessary.

6. Legislation. Existing legislation is designed to prevent the transfer of possession of atomic weapons and nuclear materials and the transfer of nuclear reactor technology. A number of arrangements have been suggested, as possibly meeting existing legislative requirements. These expedients would be inadequate in the case of nuclear weapons design. Moreover, it would be unwise to try to carry out a program of this novelty and importance without explicit Congressional authorization -- by treaty or legislation, or both.

7. Ships. Deployment will be in submarines or surface ships. The choice between the two will rest with the participating nations. U.S. representatives will submit data which

are relevant

are relevant to all aspects of this choice to our allies; they will indicate the survivability advantages of the submarines. Some combination of submarines and surface ships is not precluded. However, the added expenses and complication of administration of such a combination should be carefully considered.

8. Manning. No ships of the integrated Force will be manned with personnel representing less than three nationalities, and no nationality will be relegated to inferior tasks. Not more than 40% of the personnel of any vessel, or of the entire Force, will be of one nationality. At least initial planning will assume that no submarine will be manned with personnel of more than three nations; and sub-units aboard a submarine will be manned by personnel of common background.

9. Financing. The prices charged by the U.S. for material, facilities, and services provided for the Force should include a fair share of all U.S. research and development work carried on after January 1, 1963, from which the Force directly benefits. We have not so far estimated the amount of this R&D cost. Without allowance for it, the costs of the Force might be:

(a) A recommended submarine program (8 SSBN; 128 Polaris A-3 2500 mile missiles): investment costs of \$1770 million spread out over several years, and an annual operating cost of \$160 million once the Force was set up.

(b) A recommended surface ship program (25 missile ships; 200 Polaris A-3) might involve investment costs of \$1650 million and annual operating cost of \$90 million.

Participants should be made to understand that above costs (and the projected R&D add-on) are only investment and operating costs, and that modernization, changes in Force composition, and the development and procurement of improved systems (not only for the Force itself, but also for such related purposes

as command

as command and control) will add substantially over time to the required expenditures. The U.S. negotiators should indicate the U.S. view that the average annual expenditure over the long term is likely to approximate \$5 million per missile.

U.S. and allied shares should be allocated among the participants by international negotiation and agreement. The U.S. should insist that at least 60% of the cost of the initial integrated Force be met by the other participants; it should make clear that there can be no allied "free ride" on U.S. resources.

No country's contribution should exceed 40% of the total. Adequate evidence should be submitted by each of the participants as to how it proposes to finance its contribution to the Polaris force over the period of several years which will be involved; financial contributions to the Polaris force shall not be at the expense of conventional forces.

Although the U.S. should hold to its previous position that the option of eventually converting the Force into a European force by our allies buying out the U.S. share is not precluded, it should be a U.S. objective to ensure substantial continuing U.S. participation in the Force, and we should seek to keep our allies of the same view by continuing discussion of the facts of nuclear indivisibility and other related issues with them.

10. Manpower/Financing Ratio. The numbers of men to be provided by different nations should be determined by international negotiation and agreement. In such negotiations, primary emphasis should be placed on resource contributions of the participants -- in money, equipment, and facilities -- especially where this will help to elicit maximum financial contributions. Account should also be taken of other relevant factors, e.g., the ratio between each country's financial contribution and GNP, the need for the Force to avoid the

appearance

appearance of a thinly disguised U.S.-German operation, and the need for equitable personnel allocation by function as well as by numbers (i.e., some responsible and technically advanced billets for all participating nations).

11. Administration of the Integrated Force.

(a) The participating governments will have to set up some mechanism, e.g., a committee of governmental representatives, to develop Force policy and to supervise, in general terms, the actions of the Force Commander and/or agency in the fields referred to under (b), below. The political and organizational relation to NATO remains to be determined and will depend, in considerable degree, on the attitude that non-participants (particularly the French) take toward the Force. The military relation of the Force to NATO is discussed under (12), below.

(b) A workable solution delineating responsibilities among the Force Commander, the national authorities, and the NATO operational commanders will have to be carefully developed. The Force Commander designated by the participating governments might be made responsible for personnel, logistic, budgetary, disciplinary, etc., functions required for effective management of the Force. He could perform some of these functions through his immediate staff, or via existing national agencies (where this would not prejudice the multilateral character of the Force). Some of these functions might also be performed through an international agency, if further study and allied discussion indicate that it is necessary to set up such an agency.

(c) The command headquarters and support establishments would be manned by nationals of all the participating nations.

12. Military Control. The Force Commander would conduct the force's military operations under the following arrangements:

Weapons control

Weapons control (i.e., planning, targeting, and -- subject to agreed political control -- firing of missiles) would at all times be as directed by SACEUR. Other aspects of the operations of the Force would be as directed by the commanders of the areas in which the ships were operating (SACEUR, SACLANT, CINCCAN), subject to meeting SACEUR's weapons requirements.

13. Substitution. The U.S. will consider multilateral weapons of the mixed-manned Force as full substitutes for an equal number of ready weapons in the U.S. "approved 5-year programs." The latter could be reduced accordingly. The U.S. will retain in its own program, and under U.S. control or withdrawal authority, weapons needed to cover targets of direct U.S. concern.

14. Immediate Action. We should work in Paris and capitals to negotiate as soon as possible, and preferably prior to the Italian elections in April, a Preliminary Agreement with governments that are now ready to proceed (e.g., FRG, Italy, Belgium, and possibly U.K.), which would involve:

(a) A declaration of intent by these countries to set up an integrated Polaris Force.

(b) The establishment of a Preparatory Commission to negotiate over a longer period a detailed agreement on the Force for later ratification by governments.

(c) The designation of an executive agent of the participating powers (preferably the U.S. Secretary of Defense) to take certain initial low-cost planning and other measures which must be set in motion for timely creation of the Force while the detailed agreement is being negotiated and ratified.

Congressional consultation should be undertaken, and continued as may seem desirable and necessary in the light of progress being made in international negotiations. Care should be taken not to allow these negotiations to get too far out in advance of Congressional consultation. Consideration should be given, at an appropriate stage in negotiations, to seeking Congressional advisers.

REVIEWED BY DATE 3/25/87RDC or XDC DATE TS AUTH. REASON(S) ENDORSE ENDORSE MARKING DECLASSIFIED RELEASABLE RELEASE DENIED PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS C O P Y~~SECRET~~

February 8, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR AMBASSADOR BRUCE

SUBJECT: Soviet Reactions to Multilateral Force

1. You have asked my view of the Soviet reaction to a sea-based Polaris force under multilateral ownership, manning, and control.

2. The Soviets are in deadly earnest in their concern over the possibility of eventual German control over nuclear delivery systems (MRBM's) capable of effectively penetrating the USSR.

3. If events were set in motion which the Soviets believed likely to have this effect, I believe that they might well take counter-actions which would significantly increase tensions and perhaps even the risk of conflict.

4. The Soviets would view tangible and substantially increased Franco-German collaboration in the defense field as the possible harbinger of such events. They will watch for any possible development along these lines with utmost concern, in the wake of the Franco-German treaty.

5. The Soviets would also consider plans for creating a nationally manned and owned German Polaris force as likely to lead to effective German control over weapons of strategic range. They would not be impressed by likelihood that either permissive links or US custodians could prevent German crews from eventually diverting vessels or submarines which they manned to national purposes. They would react to plans for such an MRBM force, even if it were termed "multilateral" with considerable alarm and perhaps with specific counter-actions.

6. The

~~SECRET~~

Harram Vp 1540/TBT. Background (B)

SDV + Goh h w

~~SECRET~~

-2-

6. The Soviets would probably conclude that a force under multilateral manning, ownership, and control was less likely than the alternatives mentioned in para 4 and 5, above, to bring effective control over strategic weapons within the Germans' reach. They might even consider that such a multilateral force would divert German energies from these alternatives. Nonetheless, they would see substantial propaganda opportunities. They would, therefore, protect and declaim.

7. In all of this it is well to bear in mind that we are leaning on a very sensitive Soviet nerve. The Soviet leaders will probably exaggerate, in their own calculations, the likelihood of any given Western course of action leading to a German national nuclear capability. Only a multilateral program which is clearly incapable of fragmenting into national units in time of crisis will avoid introducing a new and highly dangerous element into their plans for the future. And even such a program will cause them some concern and uneasiness.

Foy D. Kohler

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

2/9/63 2
February 9, 1963

INTRODUCTION

I would like today to discuss four subjects:

First: Our objectives in Europe.

Second: The obstacles which recent events have interposed to the attainment of these objectives.

Third: The basic US strategy required to overcome these obstacles.

Fourth: Some specific tactical steps which should now be taken to carry forward this strategy.

I. Our Objectives

I turn first to the matter of our objectives in Europe.

The most fundamental of them has always been to deny Europe to Communist control.

It was that objective, more than any other, which moved us to launch the Marshall Plan and NATO.

As these economic and military programs achieved their purposes, we conceived a second objective: to mobilize our resources in combination with Europe to serve the whole free world.

It soon became apparent, however, that this second objective could not be fulfilled without greater progress toward European unity. Only a united Europe was likely to generate the confidence, the sense of responsibility, and the resources required to project its power outside of Europe.

European unity was also judged, from the early days of the Marshall Plan and NATO, the most effective framework within which to contain and provide a creative outlet for a West Germany which might be tempted to seek reunification with East Germany through bilateral arrangements with Moscow, or otherwise prove a disruptive element in the world power balance.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED	
U.S. Archivist (NLR 79-81)	
By <u>fmj/m</u>	NARS, Date <u>10/24/79</u>

NSA (314) / NSR 01/15/1963 No 570. / [David Bruce] (ident on another or previous (old) memo)

We recognized that an integrated Europe would pose dangers, if it struck off on its own, seeking to play a role independent of the US. To minimize the chances of such a split, and to ensure that the resources of a uniting Europe were used to best effect, we sought to strengthen the instruments of partnership between Europe and the US, e. g., NATO and OECD, at the same time as we promoted and encouraged the process of European integration.

The first task of my review, as I conceived it, was to estimate whether these goals of European unity and Atlantic partnership are still valid.

As to European integration: Are the reasons still sound which persuaded us that attainment of this goal was in the US interest? And is that attainment still feasible?

The US needs European resources to promote the defense, security, and trade of the free world. And it remains true that only a united Europe is likely to generate adequate resources. Individual European countries see their national contributions, at best, as being too small to be worth while; a resulting sense of futility discourages them from additional effort.

The goal of European unity thus remains in our interest. But is it feasible?

My own belief is that the process of European integration is an imperative of modern history.

We have seen the process gather strength steadily over the last fifteen years -- gather strength not only in terms of institutions and programs but, more importantly, of European attitudes.

I believe that the process will continue to gather strength, because it is solidly grounded in both European needs and European thinking.

Europe needs unity to enhance its security, its well-being, and its sense of purpose on the world scene. These needs are recognized in the thinking of the broad mass of European peoples, for whom national symbols have lost much of their appeal, in the wake of two disastrous world wars.

A US policy which backed away from the goal of European integration because of fear that it was not feasible would be based on a misreading of the main trends at work in Europe today.

SECRET

As to our second goal: that of US-European partnership: Is it still feasible and in our interest to seek a close US connection with Europe?

It is certainly in our interest.

We cannot accept the prospect of the US and Europe going their separate ways. Such a split would endanger both of our overriding postwar objectives: that of denying Europe to the Soviets, and that of mobilizing European resources for common tasks.

Moreover, no matter how deep our withdrawal, our national interest would continue to be profoundly affected by what happened in Western Europe. A fragmented or adventurist Western Europe might make all manner of trouble for us, quite aside from the danger of Communist takeover. In a nuclear age, especially, we must have a voice and play a stabilizing role in European affairs.

As to feasibility: There is, of course, considerable anti-Americanism in Europe. I shall speak shortly of its bases, and what it suggests as to our own actions. But we should recognize that this feeling is outweighed and overshadowed by a deeper European feeling of shared values and interests with the US. A close US-European tie is not made inevitable by this deeper feeling, but it is at least brought within our reach.

To say that it is still practical and desirable to pursue both of our operational goals -- European unity and US-European partnership -- is not to say that we should stand, without change, on the course we were following before recent events.

For it is clear that these events have created new obstacles to our pursuit of these goals. Shifts of emphasis and tactics are required to deal with such obstacles.

II. Obstacles

De Gaulle has created three obstacles to the attainment of our objectives: he has excluded Britain from the Common Market; thrown a block across the Common Market as a route to European political unity; and placed before Europe an image of intra-European and Atlantic relationships contrary to our interest and conceptions.

Playing upon the European desire for a larger voice in world affairs, he has, in fact, proposed that Europe be built around a Paris-Bonn axis

which he expects to dominate, to which Italy and the other continental powers might attach themselves as satellites, and from which U. S. power and influence would be progressively withdrawn. As that withdrawal proceeds, he undoubtedly looks to an accretion of resources from Europe in support of a French Continental System, including the Force de Frappe.

In prosecuting this effort, de Gaulle has both liabilities and assets.

His liabilities include the fact that European desires for early U. S. military and political withdrawal from Europe are weak, if non-existent; and that Europe -- including West Germany -- does not show a willingness to accept de Gaulle's hegemony.

His assets include the fact that there are strong European desires for a larger European voice in nuclear affairs, in broader military strategy, in East-West negotiations, and in political policy in regions outside the NATO area. The present predominant US role in all these fields is increasingly resented; a professed US intent to share this role with Europe, if it unites, is thought to be belied by our current actions. There is a growing fear that we may want to control a strong and united Europe by smothering it in the Atlantic Community. This resentment of our role, and distrust of our ultimate intentions, breeds anti-Americanism which de Gaulle can exploit.

It also, paradoxically enough, breeds a sense of dependence on the US which makes it more difficult to move Europe to expanded effort; and the absence of this European effort, in turn, creates a necessity for unilateral US action, which intensifies European resentment.

Thus the greatest need in framing a policy which would successfully outflank de Gaulle, and move us toward our goals, is twofold:

First: To make more clear than we have to date our willingness to treat a uniting Europe as an equal partner, provided it is prepared to assume the burdens involved.

Second: To break the deplorable interaction between present European dependence and US predominance, a consequence of which is enhanced European frustration, anti-Americanism, and unwillingness to assume enlarged responsibility in money, men, and political commitment.

SECRET

III. Proposed Strategy

A strategy to this end requires that in the areas of initiative open to us -- mainly in fields where the US and European countries must act together -- we move forward in a demonstration that the vicious circle can be broken and a true partnership can be built. The two critical areas (aside from trade negotiations) are:

First: the multilateral mixed manned Force, which holds real promise as a response to European aspirations for a greater nuclear role.

Second: Political consultation, as it derives directly from the multilateral force, and in other respects.

It is essential that, while moving forward with these Atlantic actions, we also dramatize more successfully our willingness -- indeed, our desire -- to see a united Europe eventually act as an equal partner with the U. S.

To make this willingness credible, we should do two things:

First: We should support, in every way we can, the movement toward European unity. Basically, of course, progress toward unity must depend on the European themselves. Still our own influence is considerable; we have put that influence to good use in support of European integration over the past ten years, and we should continue to do so. This has implications for our posture toward the UK and toward any sound new initiatives which supporters of European integration may propose, e. g., a European Parliament.

Second: We should leave open -- in the fields of nuclear policy and political consultation -- the possibility of arrangements in which an effectively unified Europe would play a larger role than will be possible so long as these arrangements must run between the US and separate European nations.

In nuclear policy this means making more explicit our eventual willingness to consider allowing a united Europe to buy out the US share in the multilateral mixed manned force. This underlines the importance of setting up the force in a way that it is so integrated, through mixed manning and other means, as to preclude national withdrawal or any national use of elements of the force.

In political consultation, this means making clear our willingness eventually to replace a five or six member NATO Executive Committee with a two member committee -- the US and Europe.

The broad strategy outlined above is designed to frustrate de Gaulle's efforts to convince the Europeans that immediate Atlantic cooperation and progress towards European unity are mutually antithetical. This is the heart of his case to Europe.

It is also designed to break the interaction, already mentioned, between European weakness and US predominance which is frustrating movement toward both European unity and Atlantic partnership.

And it is designed to maintain allied cohesion for constructive purposes in the period immediately ahead, while holding out to de Gaulle the opportunity to rejoin the Western coalition on terms which would meet those of his aspirations that are most widely shared, thus permitting renewed progress toward European unity -- which cannot, in the long run, be achieved without France.

Two of these de Gaulle concerns, evident since 1958, are worth particular note: his desire to end the US nuclear monopoly, and his desire for a larger European voice in a process of political consultation extending beyond the NATO area. If, through the multilateral force and various devices of political consultation, we can demonstrate to de Gaulle that we are drawing Europe, and especially Germany, into these two areas of activity on an Atlantic basis, he will be faced with the following choices:

1. To attempt by veto and other means to disrupt these Atlantic ventures;
2. To maintain his isolation passively, while these ventures move forward;
3. To find a dignified way to come to terms.

If he seeks to disrupt NATO, at the present stage of European dependence on U. S. military strength, he will almost certainly run into much more severe reactions in Europe, and even in France, than he faced as a result of his recent actions. We should be prepared to face such tactics with confidence.

If he remains in passive isolation, his bargaining position will become progressively weaker, to the extent that Atlantic arrangements gather momentum and prove successful. This success will depend, as indicated above, on a clear US indication that the end goal is to create a sounder basis for a partnership of equals between the US and a uniting Europe, not to blanket Europe indefinitely in wider Atlantic arrangements.

Despite de Gaulle's stubbornness and loyalty to his own vision of affairs, it is not altogether to be ruled out that, if the multi-lateral force succeeds in drawing Germany wholeheartedly into the nuclear business, and if the various processes of political consultation gain substance, he will decide that he should pursue his objectives within the club rather than outside.

But this will only happen if we now move vigorously to carry out the strategy outlined above, without being diverted from this course by:

-- an attempt to mount punitive or harassing action against de Gaulle, or

-- an excessive anxiety to come to terms with him before this strategy has created conditions more conducive to reasonable negotiations than those now existing.

If this is the strategy to be followed, it is essential that all our actions -- in Washington and Europe, in both the political and economic fields, in both the State and Defense Departments, and at every level of both Departments -- be geared to this strategy. We must act with consistency of purpose, and minimize disturbing pronouncements and initiatives capable of misinterpretation. We must ensure that proposed military moves are carefully reviewed from a political standpoint before being taken. We cannot make progress toward complex objectives, in the face of major obstacles created or compounded by de Gaulle, without an effort which is as persistent and consistent, over a sustained period of time, as his own.

IV ACTIONS

In execution of this strategy we need to mount certain specific actions. In discussing them, I will follow the general division indicated

in the President's instruction to me:

1. Multilateral Force:

(a) We should set a target date for completion of Ambassador Merchant's negotiations with the multilateral force's initial prospective members -- Germany, Italy, Belgium, and the UK. These negotiations should seek a Preliminary Executive Agreement, which would permit training and other low-cost activities to begin. This date should be before the Italian elections in later April.

(b) Even before we clarify our policy toward intensified political consultation with Europe, we should begin regularly to demonstrate that we shall seek before the event understanding, and, if possible, consensus with Europe on proposed US actions, where vital European interests are involved.

2. Foreign Economic Policy:

(a) We should speed up the Trade Expansion Act negotiations, both by exploring ways to reduce time-consuming preparations on our side and by beginning talks soon with the UK and the Common Market on how the negotiations will be conducted.

(b) We should not now establish a definitive U.S. position on UK "association" proposals. My present view is that the kind of "association" likely to be acceptable to France in existing circumstances would not be to the advantage of the U.S. or UK. If a serious proposal, appearing to meet genuine British economic and political needs were offered, we should consider it in the light of whether our own broad interests could be fully protected.

(c) We should re-examine recent US restrictive actions. We must seek to resist or accommodate the demands of domestic pressure groups in ways which do not throw excessive burdens on our European policy at this critical juncture.

3. Negotiations with the Soviets:

We should, in whatever manner seems appropriate, manifest U.S. determination to protect the freedom of West Berlin -- if necessary, by unilateral action. At the same time, we must scrupulously preserve,

SECRET

through consultation, the closest understanding with our interested allies.

The wisdom, at this time, of our putting forward any new proposals in regard to Berlin seems to me highly questionable -- in the absence of clear evidence of Soviet concessions on the basic issues.

4. Germany:

(a) The President should send a letter to the Chancellor centering on this theme: the continuity of our joint commitment to a close U.S. relationship with a uniting Europe. The letter would emphasize these specific points:

(i) U.S. determination to maintain forces in Germany as long as the threat remains.

(ii) Strong endorsement of the Merchant mission; the importance of an early Preliminary Agreement; and U.S. willingness to remain a full participant in the multilateral force so long as this is desired by the other participants.

(iii) Reiteration of U.S. support for continuance of efforts to bring the UK fully into Europe.

(b) We should not make an attempt to prevent ratification of the Franco-German treaty. We should, on the other hand, make absolutely clear to Adenauer, his government, and Parliament that the stability of U.S.-German relations requires unambiguous German commitment, in words and deeds to: 1. NATO; 2. the multilateral force -- rather than to national or Franco-German nuclear programs; and 3. British accession to the Common Market.

Discreet support should be extended for a Bundestag Resolution to this effect, to accompany passage of the Treaty.

5. United Kingdom

(a) We should quickly reach agreement with the British on the necessity for close, unobtrusive consultation between us as they chart their course, so that we will not be faced with fait accomplis.

~~SECRET~~

- 10 -

(b) We should encourage the British to consider what unilateral adjustments they might make to bring their economy into conformity with developments in the EEC, so that if later an opportunity is presented for them to enter the Common Market, many of the former impediments will have been removed.

(c) While assuring the British of our support, we should do nothing publicly to reinforce the appearance of special ties.

(d) We should encourage the UK to exploit whatever opportunities may exist for closer ties with the continent, and leadership in the process of European integration. More specifically, we should encourage the UK to play a substantial and active part in the multilateral mixed manned force. Such questions as the political activation of the WEU should be left for the European countries to resolve.

(e) We should suggest that the British Government, by whatever means appear effective, do whatever it can to mitigate excessive British hostility to the Germans. In short, the British should stop being beastly to the Germans.

6. France.

I recommend no immediate positive actions in regard to France. It is important that our posture be one of impeccable politeness without indulgence in recrimination or threats, while making clear the basic contrast between our goals and those of de Gaulle. No effort either to isolate France or to seek a U.S.-French accommodation should now be made; moves toward such an accommodation would almost certainly fail at this stage, and would only demoralize the other European countries. Our tactic with France must be to provide a counter attraction, not aimed at France, but at the legitimate ambitions of Europe. The opportunity for France to join in these efforts must always remain open. In the meantime, we should have well-informed contingency plans against a de Gaulle assault on NATO, our trade negotiations, or our balance of payments.

~~SECRET~~

2/12/63

SANITIZED COPY

SANITIZED	
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3,4	
NLK-89-33	
By <u>SME</u>	NARA, Date <u>3/13/91</u>

[REDACTED] T

Summary Record of NSC Executive Committee Meeting No. 41
February 12, 1963 - 10:00 AM -- Multilateral Nuclear European Force

The President said he wished to discuss the question of a multilateral nuclear force for NATO. We first needed to agree on what it is we will propose to NATO, how soon we should initiate these discussions, and how much success we expect to achieve in the political area as a result of our offer. He asked Ambassador Merchant, who is to be the chief negotiator, to state his views on this problem.

Ambassador Merchant said he approved in general of the basic document. (A copy of the document entitled "Integrated Seaborne Polaris Force" is attached.) He said he believed that the sooner he began discussions with the NATO powers in Europe the better. He acknowledged that further guidance was needed on two questions: (a) control of the multilateral force, and (b) whether the force should consist of submarines or surface ships. Personally, he recommended that the President stand by a statement made by U.S. officials to NATO on October 22nd to the effect that the U.S. would consider any proposal for control of this force suggested by the Europeans, including the possibility of no U.S. veto over the firing of the missiles of this force. He urged that this offer be left open-ended.

With respect to the choice between submarines and surface ships, he said he favored giving the Europeans an option to choose surface ships if they so desired.

Describing his forthcoming European trip as a reconnaissance in force, Ambassador Merchant requested latitude in discussing both the control and subs vs. surface ship questions.

The President summarized his recent conversation with Admiral Rickover who opposed our offering to put Polaris subs in a multilateral force because:

1. The Polaris submarine is a dangerous instrument which requires highly trained crews. We have had several close escapes even with U.S. crews.
2. There is a grave danger of compromising our nuclear reactor technology. We are ahead of the Russians in this field and cannot afford to take the risk of losing our secrets by offering to allow the Polaris submarines to be operated by mixed European crews.

The President recalled the opposition of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee to our offer of Skipjack to the French. He felt that the Committee might strongly oppose our offering Polaris submarines to the Europeans. He did

Author: PARUS 61-62 (B) SOI (Av 88 (yellow))
NTP/316
 [REDACTED] T

not wish to get into a position of making a proposal to the Europeans on which we could not deliver because of Congressional opposition. He felt that the problem of security could be dramatized by opponenets of a multilateral NATO Polaris force.

Secretary McNamara said he favored proposing a NATO surface force for the following reasons:

1. A submarine force would cost almost twice as much as a surface force.
2. The survivability of a surface ship is one-half to two-thirds that of a submarine.
3. Admiral Mountbatten has stated to General Taylor his belief that a mixed crew could not operate a Polaris submarine efficiently, although Admiral Anderson has said, in opposition to Admiral Rickover, that a Mixed crew could be trained to operate a Polaris submarine.
4. The attraction of a surface force could be increased by offering the new MRBM missile now under development which is expected to be better and cheaper than the Polaris.

Secretary McNamara concluded that in his view we should lay out all the arguments in favor of a surface force and seek to present the subject in such a way that the Europeans will choose a surface force.

Secretary Rusk said that we must support a multilateral force in order to avoid the development of national nuclear capabilities. Political as well as security reasons require us to seek some form of multilateral force acceptable to the Europeans.

The President pointed out that Congress felt it had practically invented the Polaris. If we did decide to offer the Europeans a surface force, we would have greater latitude than if we had to ask Congress to make Polaris submarines available to NATO.

Secretary McNamara reflected his deep concern about current Republican efforts to dictate military policy to the Administration. He said he had originally opposed the surface force concept, but he had now come to the conclusion that we should offer the Europeans a surface force rather than take on a major fight with the Republicans who would be quick to exploit a proposal to share Polaris submarines with European members of NATO.

He doubted that it would be possible to sell Congress on a NATO Polaris multilateral force. He recounted his unsuccessful effort to convince a Republican Congressman that our present nuclear strategy was not a "no win" policy or an "underdog" strategy.

Mr. Bundy said another additional advantage of proposing a surface force now is that we can have an operational surface force much faster than a submarine force.

The President concluded the discussion of this question by saying we should limit our offer to that of a surface force.

Mr. Bundy said the next question involved the control of this force. Everyone agreed that the U.S. must retain an authoritative voice in the control of the force, but there were differing views as to whether we should support a European force without a veto or an Atlantic force with or without a veto.

The President recalled that de Gaulle had told someone that one way to deal with the problem of control would be to give the Germans control of nuclear weapons upon the outbreak of war. The President asked what we could offer the Europeans to convince them that they had a substantially increased voice in the control of nuclear weapons.

Ambassador Merchant said we would be offering the Germans the following:

1. Reassurance that the U.S. was staying on the European Continent.
2. Participation in the control of nuclear force. Possession of nuclear weapons has become the touchstone of political power and greatly overemphasized.
3. An alternative to de Gaulle's plan for Franco-German cooperation.

Ambassador Merchant said he believes that the multilateral force would have strong appeal for the Europeans. We would be able to make more nuclear knowledge available to them at the same time as we were giving them a sense of participation in the nuclear field. In the course of this activity, the European leaders would face some of the problems of nuclear warfare which are not now understood by them. It is possible when they see the price tag and all of the problems involved in a multilateral nuclear force, they may lose interest in it.

SECRET

Secretary Acheson agreed with Ambassador Merchant's statement that the problem of controlling a nuclear force had been blown up by the Europeans out of all proportion to its importance. He said the discussion of a "voice" in the use of nuclear weapons had become a catch phrase. The question was a "voice" in what? The "voice" that is meaningful involves the question of whether or not to go to war, not whether or not to use a specific weapon. He stated that in his view a nuclear force without a U.S. veto on the use of that force made no sense. He believed we should tell the Europeans that if they contributed to the nuclear force they would be given a "voice" in decisions involving its use. He urged that we avoid discussion of ultimates and start immediately to get Europe mixed up in the process of learning the facts about nuclear war. He urged that we tell the Europeans we had concluded that a surface force was the best and that we were prepared to start training their nationals to participate in the operation of such a force at once. During this process, their military officers would learn the facts of nuclear war. We could also tell the Europeans, if they insisted on discussing the question of control, that control would depend on what they put into the nuclear force, i. e. if their contribution buys 2% of the force they would have a 2% voice in deciding when it would be used.

Secretary Acheson's view was that our offer of a nuclear surface force would be meaningful to the Europeans because de Gaulle had no alternative to offer, i. e. his proposal would not be realized for a long period of time.

Secretary Rusk pointed out that in his view, when the Europeans learned the facts of nuclear warfare, they will discover that it makes no sense for them to launch nuclear weapons without the U.S. In addition, he believed that the Russians would be reassured if we insisted on a veto over the use of a nuclear NATO force because the Russians have an overriding fear that the Germans will somehow manage to obtain control of nuclear weapons which they can fire on their own decision. For these reasons, Secretary Rusk said he opposed a European force in which we would not have a veto.

Ambassador Bruce pointed out that if the Europeans actually come to the conclusion that nuclear war is indivisible and that it makes no sense for them to think of a force which could be used independently of the U.S. force, he believed that the Europeans would then say there was no point in paying for a multilateral force. Possibly we should not go down the road of a multilateral force but place our emphasis instead on the Paragraph 6 or "first" phase force.

General Taylor reported that both the Germans and the British military wanted to talk about Paragraph 6 forces immediately. The Germans appeared ready to put into Paragraph 6 forces their F-104s and their Mace missiles. Firing of

SECRET

this force would be done under the same rules which now apply to NATO forces, i. e. SACEUR. A Deputy SACEUR nuclear commander would control the multi-lateral nuclear force. All participants would thus be brought into training and planning activity quickly in Omaha and in the SACEUR staff.

Secretary Ball said that the State Department sees the political problem first while the military stresses the practical aspects of the military force. He said he believed that Paragraph 6 forces would probably satisfy military officers, but he did not believe that it would satisfy the politicians to a degree which would prompt them to oppose de Gaulle's plan.

The President reminded the group that more than a year ago we had asked the Europeans to come forward with their proposal for the control of nuclear forces. We now have to take the initiative because the Europeans did not come forward and de Gaulle has forced us to advocate a particular plan. He repeated his question as to what the Germans will see in the force control proposal being discussed.

Ambassador Dowling said the Germans will see these advantages:

1. The answer to de Gaulle's allegations that the U.S. will leave the European Continent.
2. Equal status in the nuclear field with the British and the French.
3. Participation in a nuclear force which will meet the immediate need because the Germans do not yet expect to share in controlling the trigger.
4. The appearance of immediate movement toward participation in a multilateral force.

He added that the multilateral force proposal provided for mixing Atlantic nationals together promptly in the development of a NATO system based on nuclear warfare.

Mr. Murrow, citing Secretary McNamara's comment that the surface system would in effect be a second-rate system, expressed his view that a surface system would not give the Europeans a true sense of participation. They would feel that we were below the water with the real weapon and they were on the surface with a facade weapon. He feared the Soviets would exploit this situation.

Secretary McNamara replied by saying we could offset such reactions by stressing to the Europeans the new missile which they would use in the surface force. We have \$800 million in the FY '64 budget to develop this missile, which will be more accurate than the Polaris, and, when in production, will cost less per missile.

Ambassador Dowling said he did not feel that the surface force would be unsaleable to the Germans.

Mr. Bundy said that if the British support a surface force, the Europeans would be more favorable toward it. In addition, he said the true test would be whether we were buying the weapon. The reason Skybolt was unsatisfactory was because the Europeans knew we did not think enough of this weapon to purchase it for our own forces.

Secretary Rusk said we may have been overestimating the European's desire to share in the control of the nuclear force. In his view, the Europeans did not expect equality with the U.S., but they did want equality with their neighbors. He hoped that our emphasizing Paragraph 6 forces might take the steam out of their desire to participate in the control of a multilateral force.

General Taylor hoped that Ambassador Merchant could relate the Paragraph 6 forces to the second-phase forces in such a way as to encourage the Europeans to accept a surface force.

The President asked whether we could respond to the fear of the Europeans that the U.S. will withdraw from Europe by making an agreement with them that if we do withdraw we would not do so before we had assisted them in developing their own nuclear force. In addition, he wondered whether we could not satisfy the Germans by agreeing to reduce the time between the use of non-nuclear forces and the firing of nuclear missiles. We could overcome their doubt that we would fire nuclear missiles by making clear now when we would resort to nuclear warfare in a given situation.

Secretary Rusk expressed his doubt that the Europeans would ever support a purely European nuclear force.

Secretary Acheson expressed his view that it was hopeless for the Europeans to

[REDACTED] T

Europeans are trained to participate in its manning. As to the use of the force and its control, he said we should tell the Europeans it will be used as any other weapon now in the NATO combined force. The Europeans know that the use of any weapons, even rifles, makes no sense unless we too are involved.

The President asked Secretary Acheson how we would avoid the European reaction if what we are proposing is not a real force but merely a facade.

Secretary Acheson repeated his earlier statement that the concept of a "voice" in the use of the force is merely an illusion -- the question is one of going to war, not the use of nuclear weapons. He repeated again his view that we must consider the use of nuclear weapons the same as non-nuclear weapons now under NATO control. He pointed out that what we were offering was something meaningful while de Gaulle has nothing to shoot now and only a hope of getting something later.

Secretary Rusk said the Europeans do not really understand what nuclear war means. The idea that de Gaulle wants a nuclear force for the purpose of triggering our nuclear force is silly because it means that de Gaulle's use of nuclear weapons would result in the total destruction of France. Hence, what they are really talking about is destroying all of France to get the U.S. into a nuclear war.

Ambassador Dowling felt that our present proposal should go only as far as is necessary to answer the questions which the Europeans now have in their minds. As they learn about nuclear warfare, we can go forward with plans which would be more acceptable to them because of their acquired knowledge.

In response to the President's request for his views, Governor Herter made the following points:

1. We are committed to discuss a multilateral force with the Europeans, even if our hope is that the Europeans would not accept it.

2. We should initiate consultation with the Europeans and bring them in to participate in nuclear force planning in every way we can.

fair that the Europeans know what we are asking them to join. If it our view that we are not going to offer them Polaris submarines, then we should tell them now so that they cannot in the future say that we promised something which we did not carry out. The President thought that one way of moving from a submarine to surface force would be to have the British and the German military officers consider which force was preferable and, if, as we anticipate, they would conclude that a surface force is preferable, then politically it would be easier for us to tell the Europeans that we favored a surface force. Convincing the Germans would be the key to this situation. The Italians have already discussed the use of the Garibaldi in a surface force.

In response to his question, Secretary Acheson was informed that the security factor with respect to the nuclear reactor would disappear after four or five years, even though Admiral Rickover believed it would always be with us.

Ambassador Merchant said we might get the military to say that mixed manning of submarines was impossible and dangerous. However, we must avoid the Europeans then asking for Polaris submarines nationally manned. He felt that if we think we cannot deliver Polaris submarines because of Congressional opposition, we ought to tell the Europeans so.

Secretary Rusk cautioned that we must move off the submarine offer with great care.

Secretary Ball said we should advance the reasons why a surface force is preferable, i. e. we can get it faster, it costs less, and it will have new missiles. This would appeal to the Europeans who want something fairly fast.

In response to the President's question, Mr. Bundy said no legal problem was involved in offering a surface nuclear force if the U.S. keeps custody of the nuclear warheads. If the Europeans ask for control of the weapons, then we could not give this to them without changing the existing law or by a treaty.

Ambassador Bruce doubted that there would be any difficulty in Europe because the British would have the Polaris missile and no other Europeans would. . . .

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

..... What we are seeking is a political solution, not a military answer. No solution will be perfect. No solution can allow the Germans to gain possession of nuclear weapons. What we are trying to do is to overcome the present political uneasiness about the nuclear force problem in the hope that the uneasiness will vanish within five years. Everyone in Europe knows that Europe is not going to be able to build a huge nuclear force. Ambassador Merchant should not leave for Europe until he has our full answer to this existing situation.

The President repeated his view that if military officers, including Germans and Italians, would tell us we should go for a surface force instead of submarines, it would be much easier to change our offer.

Secretary McNamara suggested that State and Defense work out the tactics before Ambassador Merchant leaves for Europe. In his view he said we must decide whether we do or do not want a multilateral force. If we do, we may well have to help Europe pay for the cost of this force. If we decide to pay the cost, then we ought to draw up a package offer which is truly attractive to the Europeans.

Secretary Rusk expressed his doubt that security problems raised by Admiral Rickover and Congress should control our policy.

Secretary McNamara said it was not the security problem which had prompted him to shift from favoring a submarine force to favoring a surface force, but rather the domestic political problems which he had encountered so forcibly during Congressional hearings in the past week.

The President asked that a brief of the advantages of a surface force be drafted by Defense. He believed that we must, with great caution, shift from the submarine offer to a surface ship offer, primarily because of the ease with which the submarine offer could be attacked in Congress.

Secretary Acheson suggested that we tell the Europeans now we are prepared to support a surface force and that we will talk to them about submarines later.

The President hoped that the surface force decision could be held very tightly so that when we do make the offer we do so in a clean fashion.

Mr. Bundy said the problem for consideration by the group at its next meeting would be that of the control of the Paragraph 6 forces.

Bromley Smith

2/12/63

SANITIZED COPY

SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3,4
NLK-89-33
By <u>SME</u> NARA, Date <u>3/13/91</u>

[REDACTED] T

Summary Record of NSC Executive Committee Meeting No. 41
February 12, 1963 - 10:00 AM - Multilateral Nuclear European Force

The President said he wished to discuss the question of a multilateral nuclear force for NATO. We first needed to agree on what it is we will propose to NATO, how soon we should initiate these discussions, and how much success we expect to achieve in the political area as a result of our offer. He asked Ambassador Merchant, who is to be the chief negotiator, to state his views on this problem.

Ambassador Merchant said he approved in general of the basic document. (A copy of the document entitled "Integrated Seaborne Polaris Force" is attached.) He said he believed that the sooner he began discussions with the NATO powers in Europe the better. He acknowledged that further guidance was needed on two questions: (a) control of the multilateral force, and (b) whether the force should consist of submarines or surface ships. Personally, he recommended that the President stand by a statement made by U.S. officials to NATO on October 22nd to the effect that the U.S. would consider any proposal for control of this force suggested by the Europeans, including the possibility of no U.S. veto over the firing of the missiles of this force. He urged that this offer be left open-ended.

veto

With respect to the choice between submarines and surface ships, he said he favored giving the Europeans an option to choose surface ships if they so desired.

Describing his forthcoming European trip as a reconnaissance in force, Ambassador Merchant requested latitude in discussing both the control and subs vs. surface ship questions.

The President summarized his recent conversation with Admiral Rickover who opposed our offering to put Polaris subs in a multilateral force because:

1. The Polaris submarine is a dangerous instrument which requires highly trained crews. We have had several close escapes even with U.S. crews.
2. There is a grave danger of compromising our nuclear reactor technology. We are ahead of the Russians in this field and cannot afford to take the risk of losing our secrets by offering to allow the Polaris submarines to be operated by mixed European crews.

The President recalled the opposition of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee to our offer of Skipjack to the French. He felt that the Committee might strongly oppose our offering Polaris submarines to the Europeans. He did

NSF 1316 / [unclear] 38-42

[REDACTED] T

Agrowth, huller
veto - P A U S 13/494

not wish to get into a position of making a proposal to the Europeans on which we could not deliver because of Congressional opposition. He felt that the problem of security could be dramatized by opponenets of a multilateral NATO Polaris force.

Secretary McNamara said he favored proposing a NATO surface force for the following reasons:

1. A submarine force would cost almost twice as much as a surface force.
2. The survivability of a surface ship is one-half to two-thirds that of a submarine.
3. Admiral Mountbatten has stated to General Taylor his belief that a mixed crew could not operate a Polaris submarine efficiently, although Admiral Anderson has said, in opposition to Admiral Rickover, that a Mixed crew could be trained to operate a Polaris submarine.
4. The attraction of a surface force could be increased by offering the new MRBM missile now under development which is expected to be better and cheaper than the Polaris.

Secretary McNamara concluded that in his view we should lay out all the arguments in favor of a surface force and seek to present the subject in such a way that the Europeans will choose a surface force.

Secretary Rusk said that we must support a multilateral force in order to avoid the development of national nuclear capabilities. Political as well as security reasons require us to seek some form of multilateral force acceptable to the Europeans.

The President pointed out that Congress felt it had practically invented the Polaris. If we did decide to offer the Europeans a surface force, we would have greater latitude than if we had to ask Congress to make Polaris submarines available to NATO.

Secretary McNamara reflected his deep concern about current Republican efforts to dictate military policy to the Administration. He said he had originally opposed the surface force concept, but he had now come to the conclusion that we should offer the Europeans a surface force rather than take on a major fight with the Republicans who would be quick to exploit a proposal to share Polaris submarines with European members of NATO.

He doubted that it would be possible to sell Congress on a NATO Polaris multilateral force. He recounted his unsuccessful effort to convince a Republican Congressman that our present nuclear strategy was not a "no win" policy or an "underdog" strategy.

Mr. Bundy said another additional advantage of proposing a surface force now is that we can have an operational surface force much faster than a submarine force.

The President concluded the discussion of this question by saying we should limit our offer to that of a surface force.

Mr. Bundy said the next question involved the control of this force. Everyone agreed that the U.S. must retain an authoritative voice in the control of the force, but there were differing views as to whether we should support a European force without a veto or an Atlantic force with or without a veto.

The President recalled that de Gaulle had told someone that one way to deal with the problem of control would be to give the Germans control of nuclear weapons upon the outbreak of war. The President asked what we could offer the Europeans to convince them that they had a substantially increased voice in the control of nuclear weapons.

Ambassador Merchant said we would be offering the Germans the following:

1. Reassurance that the U.S. was staying on the European Continent.
2. Participation in the control of nuclear force. Possession of nuclear weapons has become the touchstone of political power and greatly overemphasized.
3. An alternative to de Gaulle's plan for Franco-German cooperation.

Ambassador Merchant said he believes that the multilateral force would have strong appeal for the Europeans. We would be able to make more nuclear knowledge available to them at the same time as we were giving them a sense of participation in the nuclear field. In the course of this activity, the European leaders would face some of the problems of nuclear warfare which are not now understood by them. It is possible when they see the price tag and all of the problems involved in a multilateral nuclear force, they may lose interest in it.

Secretary Acheson agreed with Ambassador Merchant's statement that the problem of controlling a nuclear force had been blown up by the Europeans out of all proportion to its importance. He said the discussion of a "voice" in the use of nuclear weapons had become a catch phrase. The question was a "voice" in what? The "voice" that is meaningful involves the question of whether or not to go to war, not whether or not to use a specific weapon. He stated that in his view a nuclear force without a U.S. veto on the use of that force made no sense. He believed we should tell the Europeans that if they contributed to the nuclear force they would be given a "voice" in decisions involving its use. He urged that we avoid discussion of ultimates and start immediately to get Europe mixed up in the process of learning the facts about nuclear war. He urged that we tell the Europeans we had concluded that a surface force was the best and that we were prepared to start training their nationals to participate in the operation of such a force at once. During this process, their military officers would learn the facts of nuclear war. We could also tell the Europeans, if they insisted on discussing the question of control, that control would depend on what they put into the nuclear force, i. e. if their contribution buys 2% of the force they would have a 2% voice in deciding when it would be used.

Secretary Acheson's view was that our offer of a nuclear surface force would be meaningful to the Europeans because de Gaulle had no alternative to offer, i. e. his proposal would not be realized for a long period of time.

Secretary Rusk pointed out that in his view, when the Europeans learned the facts of nuclear warfare, they will discover that it makes no sense for them to launch nuclear weapons without the U.S. In addition, he believed that the Russians would be reassured if we insisted on a veto over the use of a nuclear NATO force because the Russians have an overriding fear that the Germans will somehow manage to obtain control of nuclear weapons which they can fire on their own decision. For these reasons, Secretary Rusk said he opposed a European force in which we would not have a veto.

Ambassador Bruce pointed out that if the Europeans actually come to the conclusion that nuclear war is indivisible and that it makes no sense for them to think of a force which could be used independently of the U.S. force, he believed that the Europeans would then say there was no point in paying for a multilateral force. Possibly we should not go down the road of a multilateral force but place our emphasis instead on the Paragraph 6 or "first" phase force.

General Taylor reported that both the Germans and the British military wanted to talk about Paragraph 6 forces immediately. The Germans appeared ready to put into Paragraph 6 forces their F-104s and their Mace missiles. Firing of

this force would be done under the same rules which now apply to NATO forces, i. e. SACEUR. A Deputy SACEUR nuclear commander would control the multi-lateral nuclear force. All participants would thus be brought into training and planning activity quickly in Omaha and in the SACEUR staff.

Secretary Ball said that the State Department sees the political problem first while the military stresses the practical aspects of the military force. He said he believed that Paragraph 6 forces would probably satisfy military officers, but he did not believe that it would satisfy the politicians to a degree which would prompt them to oppose de Gaulle's plan.

The President reminded the group that more than a year ago we had asked the Europeans to come forward with their proposal for the control of nuclear forces. We now have to take the initiative because the Europeans did not come forward and de Gaulle has forced us to advocate a particular plan. He repeated his question as to what the Germans will see in the force control proposal being discussed.

Ambassador Dowling said the Germans will see these advantages:

1. The answer to de Gaulle's allegations that the U.S. will leave the European Continent.
2. Equal status in the nuclear field with the British and the French.
3. Participation in a nuclear force which will meet the immediate need because the Germans do not yet expect to share in controlling the trigger.
4. The appearance of immediate movement toward participation in a multilateral force.

He added that the multilateral force proposal provided for mixing Atlantic nationals together promptly in the development of a NATO system based on nuclear warfare.

Mr. Murrow, citing Secretary McNamara's comment that the surface system would in effect be a second-rate system, expressed his view that a surface system would not give the Europeans a true sense of participation. They would feel that we were below the water with the real weapon and they were on the surface with a facade weapon. He feared the Soviets would exploit this situation.

Secretary McNamara replied by saying we could offset such reactions by stressing to the Europeans the new missile which they would use in the surface force. We have \$800 million in the FY '64 budget to develop this missile, which will be more accurate than the Polaris, and, when in production, will cost less per missile.

Ambassador Dowling said he did not feel that the surface force would be unsaleable to the Germans.

Mr. Bundy said that if the British support a surface force, the Europeans would be more favorable toward it. In addition, he said the true test would be whether we were buying the weapon. The reason Skybolt was unsatisfactory was because the Europeans knew we did not think enough of this weapon to purchase it for our own forces.

Secretary Rusk said we may have been overestimating the European's desire to share in the control of the nuclear force. In his view, the Europeans did not expect equality with the U.S., but they did want equality with their neighbors. He hoped that our emphasizing Paragraph 6 forces might take the steam out of their desire to participate in the control of a multilateral force.

General Taylor hoped that Ambassador Merchant could relate the Paragraph 6 forces to the second-phase forces in such a way as to encourage the Europeans to accept a surface force.

The President asked whether we could respond to the fear of the Europeans that the U.S. will withdraw from Europe by making an agreement with them that if we do withdraw we would not do so before we had assisted them in developing their own nuclear force. In addition, he wondered whether we could not satisfy the Germans by agreeing to reduce the time between the use of non-nuclear forces and the firing of nuclear missiles. We could overcome their doubt that we would fire nuclear missiles by making clear now when we would resort to nuclear warfare in a given situation.

Secretary Rusk expressed his doubt that the Europeans would ever support a purely European nuclear force.

Secretary Acheson expressed his view that it was hopeless for the Europeans to

Secretary McNamara replied by saying we could offset such reactions by stressing to the Europeans the new missile which they would use in the surface force. We have \$800 million in the FY '64 budget to develop this missile, which will be more accurate than the Polaris, and, when in production, will cost less per missile.

Ambassador Dowling said he did not feel that the surface force would be unsaleable to the Germans.

Mr. Bundy said that if the British support a surface force, the Europeans would be more favorable toward it. In addition, he said the true test would be whether we were buying the weapon. The reason Skybolt was unsatisfactory was because the Europeans knew we did not think enough of this weapon to purchase it for our own forces.

Secretary Rusk said we may have been overestimating the European's desire to share in the control of the nuclear force. In his view, the Europeans did not expect equality with the U.S., but they did want equality with their neighbors. He hoped that our emphasizing Paragraph 6 forces might take the steam out of their desire to participate in the control of a multilateral force.

General Taylor hoped that Ambassador Merchant could relate the Paragraph 6 forces to the second-phase forces in such a way as to encourage the Europeans to accept a surface force.

The President asked whether we could respond to the fear of the Europeans that the U.S. will withdraw from Europe by making an agreement with them that if we do withdraw we would not do so before we had assisted them in developing their own nuclear force. In addition, he wondered whether we could not satisfy the Germans by agreeing to reduce the time between the use of non-nuclear forces and the firing of nuclear missiles. We could overcome their doubt that we would fire nuclear missiles by making clear now when we would resort to nuclear warfare in a given situation.

Secretary Rusk expressed his doubt that the Europeans would ever support a purely European nuclear force.

Secretary Acheson expressed his view that it was hopeless for the Europeans to

Europeans are trained to participate in its manning. As to the use of the force and its control, he said we should tell the Europeans it will be used as any other weapon now in the NATO combined force. The Europeans know that the use of any weapons, even rifles, makes no sense unless we too are involved.

The President asked Secretary Acheson how we would avoid the European reaction if what we are proposing is not a real force but merely a facade.

Secretary Acheson repeated his earlier statement that the concept of a "voice" in the use of the force is merely an illusion -- the question is one of going to war, not the use of nuclear weapons. He repeated again his view that we must consider the use of nuclear weapons the same as non-nuclear weapons now under NATO control. He pointed out that what we were offering was something meaningful while de Gaulle has nothing to shoot now and only a hope of getting something later.

Secretary Rusk said the Europeans do not really understand what nuclear war means. The idea that de Gaulle wants a nuclear force for the purpose of triggering our nuclear force is silly because it means that de Gaulle's use of nuclear weapons would result in the total destruction of France. Hence, what they are really talking about is destroying all of France to get the U.S. into a nuclear war.

Ambassador Dowling felt that our present proposal should go only as far as is necessary to answer the questions which the Europeans now have in their minds. As they learn about nuclear warfare, we can go forward with plans which would be more acceptable to them because of their acquired knowledge.

In response to the President's request for his views, Governor Herter made the following points:

1. We are committed to discuss a multilateral force with the Europeans, even if our hope is that the Europeans would not accept it.
2. We should initiate consultation with the Europeans and bring them in to participate in nuclear force planning in every way we can.

fair that the Europeans know what we are asking them to join. If it our view that we are not going to offer them Polaris submarines, then we should tell them now so that they cannot in the future say that we promised something which we did not carry out. The President thought that one way of moving from a submarine to surface force would be to have the British and the German military officers consider which force was preferable and, if, as we anticipate, they would conclude that a surface force is preferable, then politically it would be easier for us to tell the Europeans that we favored a surface force. Convincing the Germans would be the key to this situation. The Italians have already discussed the use of the Garibaldi in a surface force.

In response to his question, Secretary Acheson was informed that the security factor with respect to the nuclear reactor would disappear after four or five years, even though Admiral Rickover believed it would always be with us.

Ambassador Merchant said we might get the military to say that mixed manning of submarines was impossible and dangerous. However, we must avoid the Europeans then asking for Polaris submarines nationally manned. He felt that if we think we cannot deliver Polaris submarines because of Congressional opposition, we ought to tell the Europeans so.

Secretary Rusk cautioned that we must move off the submarine offer with great care.

Secretary Ball said we should advance the reasons why a surface force is preferable, i. e. we can get it faster, it costs less, and it will have new missiles. This would appeal to the Europeans who want something fairly fast.

In response to the President's question, Mr. Bundy said no legal problem was involved in offering a surface nuclear force if the U.S. keeps custody of the nuclear warheads. If the Europeans ask for control of the weapons, then we could not give this to them without changing the existing law or by a treaty.

Ambassador Bruce doubted that there would be any difficulty in Europe because the British would have the Polaris missile and no other Europeans would.

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

..... What we are seeking is a political solution, not a military answer. No solution will be perfect. No solution can allow the Germans to gain possession of nuclear weapons. What we are trying to do is to overcome the present political uneasiness about the nuclear force problem in the hope that the uneasiness will vanish within five years. Everyone in Europe knows that Europe is not going to be able to build a huge nuclear force. Ambassador Merchant should not leave for Europe until he has our full answer to this existing situation.

The President repeated his view that if military officers, including Germans and Italians, would tell us we should go for a surface force instead of submarines, it would be much easier to change our offer.

Secretary McNamara suggested that State and Defense work out the tactics before Ambassador Merchant leaves for Europe. In his view he said we must decide whether we do or do not want a multilateral force. If we do, we may well have to help Europe pay for the cost of this force. If we decide to pay the cost, then we ought to draw up a package offer which is truly attractive to the Europeans.

Secretary Rusk expressed his doubt that security problems raised by Admiral Rickover and Congress should control our policy.

Secretary McNamara said it was not the security problem which had prompted him to shift from favoring a submarine force to favoring a surface force, but rather the domestic political problems which he had encountered so forcibly during Congressional hearings in the past week.

The President asked that a brief of the advantages of a surface force be drafted by Defense. He believed that we must, with great caution, shift from the submarine offer to a surface ship offer, primarily because of the ease with which the submarine offer could be attacked in Congress.

Secretary Acheson suggested that we tell the Europeans now we are prepared to support a surface force and that we will talk to them about submarines later.

The President hoped that the surface force decision could be held very tightly so that when we do make the offer we do so in a clean fashion.

Mr. Bundy said the problem for consideration by the group at its next meeting would be that of the control of the Paragraph 6 forces.

Bromley Smith

~~SECRET~~

*Vice Pres Johnson
att. Col Bureau*

3

DECLASSIFIED

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Authority OSD ltr 1/2/77

WASHINGTON

By MMG, NARS, Date 6/21/77

D R A F T

12 Feb 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons With and Without a Test Ban Agreement

I. Prospects With Unrestricted Testing

1. Country Capabilities

a. Probably about 8 countries, in addition to the four present nuclear countries, will be able to acquire at least a few nuclear weapons and a crude delivery capability during the next ten years assuming no basic changes in technology. (See attached table). During this period and with present technology, the cost for one of these countries to develop and produce a few weapons would come to about 150-175 million dollars. (Some of this cost might be charged to a nuclear power program.) A program for producing about 1000 weapons would approach a billion dollars in cost. Delivery systems are much more costly; a modest aircraft and medium range missile program including the production of a small force would cost around two billion dollars or more. Simpler, less reliable, and effective delivery methods using aircraft or rockets would cost much less.

b. The costs of nuclear weapons can be expected to decline over time through the diffusion of present weapon technology, through the wider distribution of research and power reactors, and through advances in technology resulting from continued testing.

c. The time required from decision to undertake a program until the first crude weapons are produced would vary from ~~three~~^{one} to ten years depending on level of technology, industrial strength, and resources allocated to the task. The table shows dates both at which a first nuclear test could occur and a first crude delivery capability could be operational assuming a decision to proceed now.

*Box 7
VPSF / Nat. Sec. Riv / Disarmament
Proposals, Feb 1963.*

~~SECRET~~

Excluded from automatic regrading: DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

COPY LBJ LIBRARY

~~SECRET~~

2. Motivations for and Against Possession

a. Most of the countries able to undertake a program have not done so. The motivations not to undertake programs are clearly strong. They include the high cost of weapons (and especially of sophisticated delivery systems), lack of a clear military need, legal restrictions, concern for international repercussions, moral pressures, lack of effective independence in the case of the satellites to undertake a program, and hope that diffusion will be halted. This combination of motives has clearly been effective in such countries as Canada, Germany, India, Japan, Italy and the European satellites. The pressures for possession: ~~pressure~~, ^{prestige} coercive and deterrent value, and military utility have overridden inhibitions, apart from the two super powers, only in the case of the UK, France, almost certainly China, and probably, Israel.

b. Many countries have reduced the lead time and cost of acquiring weapons by getting research reactors and starting nuclear power programs. The technology involved is directly related to weapons program and a decision to initiate a "peaceful" program provides a lower cost option, later, to have a military program.

3. Diffusion Over the Next Ten Years

a. It is highly improbable that all the countries able to produce nuclear weapons by 1972 will do so even if testing continues. In addition to the present possessors, China almost certainly will do so. Israel is likely to do so and Sweden and India may. Chinese possession may also lead the Australians and the Japanese to try to obtain nuclear weapons. A Union of South Africa nuclear program cannot be ruled out. None of these countries is likely to have more than a rudimentary operational delivery capability in this time, although the ability to deliver nuclear weapons by short or medium range rockets appears feasible.

b. The pressure on Germany, and in turn Italy, to acquire or share in control of nuclear weapons is likely to build up substantially. While the inhibitions in both countries, especially in Germany, are strong, European political developments such as the multilateral nuclear force, may succeed in lessening the pressures for acquisition.

4. Diffusion Beyond Ten Years

a. A projection fifteen, twenty or more years ahead is extremely difficult. However, with unrestricted testing it appears certain that the cost of acquiring nuclear weapons will go down, perhaps substantially, during this period. Recent US tests have shown that it is possible to reduce the expensive fissile material component of weapons; future tests

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

COPY LBJ LIBRARY

~~SECRET~~

may show that in terms of nuclear material, an extremely cheap all-fusion weapon is feasible. The overall dollar cost of weapons may come down by a factor of 2 to 5 times. (Today a representative cost for a US weapon is about \$250,000.) Moreover, the number of countries with a scientific community and industry to support nuclear programs will go up. For example, Argentina, Brazil, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Yugoslavia would appear to have such capability. And over a 15 year period, political developments in the Bloc might remove the present Soviet restrictions on satellite nuclear programs.

b. In the 1970's it appears that power from nuclear reactors will become competitive in many countries. This development will not only lead to the production of large quantities of plutonium but it will be associated with the spread of reactor technology and skilled nuclear scientists and technicians. Much of the fissile material produced by these reactors will be controlled by international agreement, but the "starting up" costs for weapons programs will be much lower than today - apart from cost reducing technological developments.

c. Advances in technology made by the US and other testing countries diffuse into the general body of technology accessible to all nations. Even the knowledge that a breakthrough has occurred (e.g., the development of a fission-free bomb), without knowing how it was done, eases the task of others who try independently. Moreover, the process of diffusion would accelerate as the number of nuclear powers increased. Components of weapons, or, in time, complete weapons, might be available for purchase.

II. Prospects With a Test Ban

1. A Comprehensive Ban

a. A comprehensive test ban agreed to by the US, USSR and UK will work in the direction of slowing diffusion. It is probably not an exaggeration to say that it is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for keeping the number of nuclear countries small.

b. A ban on testing would not prevent the continued diffusion of knowledge of existing nuclear technology; for example, in a nuclear power program. However, it would slow the trend towards cheaper nuclear weapons.

c. Even with a comprehensive ban, laboratory experimentation would be legal. Such work will lead to increased knowledge applicable to nuclear weapons but at a greatly reduced rate as compared with a situation with testing.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

d. China would almost certainly not wish to sign an agreement. Some other countries, such as France or Israel, would require a mixture of positive incentives (e.g. sharing of weapons information) or penalties (economic or military) before signing. In some cases it might take the joint action of the US and USSR to coerce states into signing and/or observing the agreements. In most cases, a combination of rewards and sanctions by one of the major powers would be sufficient and preferable.

e. Even without testing, it is feasible for a country to produce and stockpile nuclear weapons. (So far as is known, all first tests have been successful.) However, to be sure of its weapons, a country would either have to receive detailed designs of previously tested weapons or test its own. Since a treaty may be abrogated, either for aggressive or defense reasons, some countries may carry forward a program to develop and even to produce weapons without testing them.

f. Neither the Geneva nor the National Systems will reduce the detection threshold to a level that would detect significant classes of militarily useful underground tests in alluvium. However, the possibilities of getting agreements on much more effective systems for inspecting non-Bloc countries are generally favorable. Inside the Bloc, China will be a major problem both with respect to adherence and to inspection.

2. Atmospheric Ban Only

a. A ban only on atmospheric tests would have a much more limited effect on diffusion than a comprehensive ban. It would not increase greatly the cost of getting a relatively simple capability (which would be the goal of most of the countries likely to try) and it would not make testing "illegal". The continuation of testing underground legitimizes this activity. It weakens the inhibitions to acquire weapons on the part of the considerable number of countries that are likely to be on the margin of decision at some point during the next few decades.

3. Conclusion

a. The continued diffusion of nuclear weapons is clearly not in the interest of the US. Even if these weapons are not used, diffusion will make existing disputes more acute and will generate new ones. And although their use by a weak power will be irrational, such action cannot be ruled out. Moreover, the existence of additional nuclear countries would make the course of a major crisis involving the US less predictable and more dangerous.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b. Even with unrestricted testing, the number of new nuclear countries during the next decade is not likely to be large. It probably will be a good deal smaller than the potential number able to produce weapons. Beyond about ten years, however, there are likely to be many more nuclear countries unless some effective action is taken.

c. Although the ending of tests would have an important effect on diffusion (especially a comprehensive ban) a more important factor will be the pressures the US, the USSR and others are willing to employ in restraining others from testing. The cooperation that may develop between the US and USSR, as a result, has a potential importance. In some cases, we, and others, would probably have to employ stronger incentives and sanctions than has seriously been considered so far. However, a comprehensive test ban would make it more likely that stronger steps could be taken and would be effective.

- 5 -

~~SECRET~~

COPY LBJ LIBRARY

TABLE ONE
COUNTRY NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITIES

	xxx Major	xx Moderate	x Small	P Potential	---	No Estimate		
							IRBM	
Country	Domestic Availability of Uranium	Nuclear Research Program	Nuclear Power Program	Industrial Resources Capability	Time Required to First Test	Aircraft Operational Capability	Missile Operational Capability	Motivation To Make Decision
France	xx	xxx	xxx	xxx	done	1964	'69	High
West Germany	---	xxx	xx	xxx	4-5 yrs	6 yrs	7 yrs	Moderate
Italy	x	xx	xx	xx	5-6 yrs	7 yrs	8 yrs	Low
Belgium	---	xx	P	xx	---	---	---	Low
Netherlands	---	xx	P	xx	---	---	---	Low
Canada	xxx	xxx	xx	xxx	1-2 yrs	6 yrs	7 yrs	Very Low
Sweden	xx	xxx	xx	xxx	2-3 yrs	5 yrs	8 yrs	Evaluating
Switzerland	---	x	P	xx	---	---	---	Low
Japan	x	xx	x	xxx	5-6 yrs	6 yrs	8 yrs	Very low but depends on China
India	xx	xx	x	xx	4-5 yrs	5 yrs	8 yrs	Low but depends on China
Israel	x	xx	P	xx	2-3 yrs	1968	1968	Moderate to High
UAR	---	x	P	x	Over 10	Over 10	Over 10	Moderate to High
Brazil	x	x	P	x	Over-10	Over-10	Over-10	Low
Australia	xx	x	P	xx	---	---	---	Low
Norway	---	xx	x	xx	---	---	---	Low
ChiCom	xx	xx	P	xx	1963	1970	1972	High
East Germany	xxx	xx	xx	xx	(Possible)	USSR Prohibits	USSR Prohibits	---
Czechoslovakia	xxx	x	xx	xx	" "	" "	" "	---
Poland	x	x	P	x	" "	" "	" "	---

COPY LIBRARY

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Memorandum of Conversation in the President's Office
Friday, February 15, 1963, 10:00 a.m.

Present: The President
Secretary Rusk
Ambassador Thompson
Ambassador Dowling
William Tyler
McGeorge Bundy

Subject: Berlin

The President raised for discussion our response to Gromyko's proposal to Ambassador Kohler for the resumption of bilateral discussions on Germany and Berlin. The President said he was concerned because the Germans and the French were not in favor of further exploratory talks and, given Chancellor Adenauer's present mood and suspicions, the Chancellor could at any time attempt to exploit these discussions to our detriment. The President said for our own protection it was necessary to have the French and the Germans as fully locked into these talks as possible. He suggested that if this were not possible, we might tell the Soviets that we could not carry on with the talks in the absence of Allied support.

The Secretary argued that discussions with the Soviets on Berlin were necessary if only to keep the Berlin situation under control. Moreover, it was important to keep the channels of communication with the Soviets open to determine what was in the Soviet mind. In any event, he did not think it possible to refuse to discuss Berlin with the Soviets on the ground that our Allies were opposed to such talks.

The President, however, wondered whether there was any advantage in moving ahead without the Germans fully in tow. Unless they were fully locked in, the Germans would be in a position to take advantage of the accomplishments of the talks, but remain ever ready to criticize us if things went wrong. The President also questioned whether there was any real advantage in putting ourselves in an exposed position vis-a-vis our Allies in the absence of indications that the Soviets were prepared to come up with constructive Berlin proposals. He asked whether a

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLK-93-104
By MMB NARA, Date 6/23/94

NSA/317/MBS w/Pres 1/1/63 -
2/17/63

more profitable course might be to try to get from Gromyko some indication of Soviet thinking before again raising the question of Berlin discussions with the Allies. Unless the Soviets were prepared to be forthcoming, he saw no useful purpose in continuing a dialogue bound to arouse the suspicion, even the antagonism, of our Allies.

Ambassador Thompson interjected to say that it would be awkward for the U. S. to say it was not prepared to continue exploratory talks with the Soviets on Berlin. Moreover, if we refused to meet the Soviets' request now, they could heat up the situation and put us in a position where we would be forced to discuss the problem under pressures they deliberately created.

After further discussion, the President laid down the following course of action:

1. He asked that Foy Kohler be instructed not to reply to Gromyko's overture on Berlin until we had a further opportunity to attempt to reconcile our position with that of the Germans. (Ambassador Dowling thought he might be able to discuss this matter with the Chancellor on Tuesday.) If Ambassador Kohler had to speak to Gromyko before we talked with the Germans, Kohler should say he was awaiting instructions.
2. He directed Ambassador Dowling to see the Chancellor immediately on his return to Bonn to discuss the question of further exploratory talks on Berlin with the Soviets. He asked that Ambassador Dowling make it clear to the Chancellor that we did not relish the idea of talking with the Kremlin if the Germans objected to our doing so. If the Chancellor objected to the talks in the context of the Gromyko proposal, the President would again review the situation.
3. In this connection, the President suggested that Ambassador Dowling assure the Chancellor that the President attaches great importance to close and mutual cooperation with him and make clear that if there are to be further exploratory talks with the Soviets on Germany and Berlin, we would like to be sure the German Government considers such talks worthwhile.
4. The President also suggested Ambassador Dowling tell the Chancellor that Ambassador Thompson thought that if we refused to

5

~~SECRET~~

Speak with the Soviets now, they might apply new pressures on Berlin and force us to talk with them under less favorable circumstances.

The Secretary undertook to instruct Ambassadors Kohler and Dowling accordingly.

David Klein

03 Klein

Memo of Conf w/ Rusk 5
~~SECRET~~
2/15/63

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Memorandum of Conversation in the President's Office
Friday, February 15, 1963, 10:00 a.m.

Present: The President
Secretary Rusk
Ambassador Thompson
Ambassador Dowling
William Tyler
McGeorge Bundy

Subject: Berlin

The President raised for discussion our response to Gromyko's proposal to Ambassador Kohler for the resumption of bilateral discussions on Germany and Berlin. The President said he was concerned because the Germans and the French were not in favor of further exploratory talks and, given Chancellor Adenauer's present mood and suspicions, the Chancellor could at any time attempt to exploit these discussions to our detriment. The President said for our own protection it was necessary to have the French and the Germans as fully locked into these talks as possible. He suggested that if this were not possible, we might tell the Soviets that we could not carry on with the talks in the absence of Allied support.

The Secretary argued that discussions with the Soviets on Berlin were necessary if only to keep the Berlin situation under control. Moreover, it was important to keep the channels of communication with the Soviets open to determine what was in the Soviet mind. In any event, he did not think it possible to refuse to discuss Berlin with the Soviets on the ground that our Allies were opposed to such talks.

The President, however, wondered whether there was any advantage in moving ahead without the Germans fully in tow. Unless they were fully locked in, the Germans would be in a position to take advantage of the accomplishments of the talks, but remain ever ready to criticize us if things went wrong. The President also questioned whether there was any real advantage in putting ourselves in an exposed position vis-a-vis our Allies in the absence of indications that the Soviets were prepared to come up with constructive Berlin proposals. He asked whether a

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLK-93-104
By MMB NARA, Date 6/23/94

- 1 -

~~SECRET~~

NSA 1317 / MMB 11/1/63 - 2/17/63

more profitable course might be to try to get from Gromyko some indication of Soviet thinking before again raising the question of Berlin discussions with the Allies. Unless the Soviets were prepared to be forthcoming, he saw no useful purpose in continuing a dialogue bound to arouse the suspicion, even the antagonism, of our Allies.

Ambassador Thompson interjected to say that it would be awkward for the U. S. to say it was not prepared to continue exploratory talks with the Soviets on Berlin. Moreover, if we refused to meet the Soviets' request now, they could heat up the situation and put us in a position where we would be forced to discuss the problem under pressures they deliberately created.

After further discussion, the President laid down the following course of action:

1. He asked that Foy Kohler be instructed not to reply to Gromyko's overture on Berlin until we had a further opportunity to attempt to reconcile our position with that of the Germans. (Ambassador Dowling thought he might be able to discuss this matter with the Chancellor on Tuesday.) If Ambassador Kohler had to speak to Gromyko before we talked with the Germans, Kohler should say he was awaiting instructions.
2. He directed Ambassador Dowling to see the Chancellor immediately on his return to Bonn to discuss the question of further exploratory talks on Berlin with the Soviets. He asked that Ambassador Dowling make it clear to the Chancellor that we did not relish the idea of talking with the Kremlin if the Germans objected to our doing so. If the Chancellor objected to the talks in the context of the Gromyko proposal, the President would again review the situation.
3. In this connection, the President suggested that Ambassador Dowling assure the Chancellor that the President attaches great importance to close and mutual cooperation with him and make clear that if there are to be further exploratory talks with the Soviets on Germany and Berlin, we would like to be sure the German Government considers such talks worthwhile.
4. The President also suggested Ambassador Dowling tell the Chancellor that Ambassador Thompson thought that if we refused to

5

~~SECRET~~

Speak with the Soviets now, they might apply new pressures on Berlin and force us to talk with them under less favorable circumstances.

The Secretary undertook to instruct Ambassadors Kohler and Dowling accordingly.

David Klein

cc: Berlin

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

POL 4 FR-WGE

38 Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: February 21, 1963

SUBJECT: Franco-German Treaty

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Egon Bahr, Berlin Senat Press Chief
Mr. Hillenbrand, BTF
Mr. Creel, GER

COPIES TO: S/S - 1cc
S/AL 1
EUR (advance)
GER (advance)
BTF (advance)
WE 2
INR 5

RPM 3
RPE 4
American Embassy, Bonn 6
American Embassy, Paris 7
American Embassy, London 8
US Mission Berlin 9

FEB 28 1963

12

Spans 10, 11, 12

After a larger meeting with members of the Berlin Task Force had concluded (see separate Memorandum of Conversation), Dr. Bahr spoke privately with Mr. Hillenbrand and Mr. Creel. He seemed mainly interested in ascertaining their views on the Franco-German Treaty, with particular reference to possible action which Mayor Brandt might take at the March 1 meeting of the Bundesrat which was to consider this treaty. As Dr. Bahr had indicated at the earlier meeting, Mayor Brandt is rapporteur of the committee which will report to the Bundesrat on the treaty and make appropriate recommendations. Mr. Creel and Mr. Hillenbrand indicated to Dr. Bahr that he might also appropriately discuss this subject with Mr. Cleveland of RPE, who was very much closer to developments on the EEC side, and arrangements were made for a subsequent meeting with Mr. Cleveland.

Mr. Hillenbrand and Mr. Creel went over the same general ground with Dr. Bahr which Mr. Tyler and the Secretary had previously covered with State Secretary Carstens during the latter's visit here, stressing that while there was deep sympathy in the US for Franco-German reconciliation per se, the peculiar circumstances attendant upon the signature of the treaty and the posture assumed by de Gaulle on various basic issues had caused us certain difficulties which were now well known to the Germans. In response to Dr. Bahr's inquiry, Mr. Hillenbrand and Mr. Creel took the position that we did not want to suggest specifically how the Germans should handle this matter in their ratification process. We had confidence that, knowing the whole situation as we now saw it, they would be able best to judge themselves as to what measures might be best to clarify that German adherence to NATO and

FILED

FEB 27 1963

SECRET

-2-

other common US-German goals remained unchanged.

After an exchange on President de Gaulle's basic objectives for Europe, it became clear that there was little difference of view between Mr. Creel and Mr. Hillenbrand and Dr. Bahr. Dr. Bahr agreed that, in many public statements and in his writings, de Gaulle had clarified these objectives and that they in many respects were incompatible with the goals which the Federal Republic and the US had shared during the post-war period.

Dr. Bahr raised the subject of the Berlin clause in the Franco-German treaty. He wondered whether failure on the part of the US to object to it would not be interpreted as approbation for the treaty itself. Mr. Hillenbrand observed that, as Dr. Bahr was undoubtedly aware, the Secretary of State had expressed certain reservations about the Berlin clause to Ambassador Knappstein but had taken no final position. It was true that a problem existed. We were now studying this matter intensively and in due course would have official views. Without implying that this was necessarily what we intended to do, Mr. Hillenbrand asked Dr. Bahr whether the Berliners would be shocked by a refusal to accept the Berlin clause. While he did not answer directly, Dr. Bahr gave the impression that this would not come as a great shock and would be understood by the Berliners.

2/26/63

SECRET

GERMANY 2/26/63 1142
(5)

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 26, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Possible Joint French-German
Arrangements in Nuclear Weapons Field

With reference to your memorandum of February 20, we have no evidence that the Germans have any intention of joining with the French, openly or secretly, in any joint arrangements for development of nuclear warheads or associated weapons systems.

Subsequent to the signing of the French-German Treaty last month the Germans have taken great pains to emphasize to us, both to our Embassy in Bonn and through such spokesmen visiting the United States as State Secretary Carstens and Defense Minister von Hassel, that the provisions of the Treaty calling for joint efforts "in drawing up appropriate armament plan in preparation of plans for financing them" have absolutely no application to the field of nuclear weapons. Minister von Hassel went out of his way to stress this point to me during our meeting yesterday afternoon, and I in response made it clear that we would take a very serious view of any such arrangement between the Germans and French. I understand that von Hassel spoke in the same terms in his meetings at the Defense Department.

The subject has not previously been raised with the Germans in the context of Franco-German relations because until recently the matter has not been under discussion. The Germans should be well aware of our views. We will, however, find further means of communicating our concern with this issue. In the meantime, it might be well for you to take advantage of your meeting with Minister von Hassel tomorrow morning to reinforce the point.

As concerns

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5(b)

Department of State Guidelines

SECRET

By NA NARA, Date 3/30/87

10P/117/ Germany - Security - Jan-Mar 1962

SECRET

-2-

As concerns what we have done with the French to make this point clear, we have repeatedly expressed to them our view that one reason why we did not wish to support the French nuclear program was that this could lead to further proliferation, possibly including the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the Germans on a national basis to which we were opposed. You also made this point in a letter to General de Gaulle of December 31, 1961, in which you said, "What troubles us, decisively, in the case of a specifically French nuclear capability, is that if we should join in that effort, we would have no ground on which to resist certain and heavy pressure from the Germans for parallel treatment. Yet it is imperative that the Germans not have nuclear weapons of their own; memory is too strong, and fear too real, for that."

You may find this further background useful. At the time of the Federal Republic's accession to NATO in 1954, the Federal Republic undertook a solemn obligation to the Brussels Treaty (WEU) Powers "not to manufacture in its territory any atomic weapons, chemical weapons or bacteriological weapons." This undertaking is still binding today and has never been brought into question publicly by any German political or military figure. You will recall, however, that the Chancellor himself suggested the possibility of a revision when in a conversation with you in November 1961 he claimed that Mr. Dulles had told him at the time of the 1954 declarations that the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus applied to the declarations. At that time you

indicated that

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

-3-

indicated that you felt the German pledge should remain in effect, at least for the next few years. The Chancellor raised this with me in Bonn in the same terms in June 1962. There is also a school of right wing CDU politicians in Germany who discuss among themselves the day when the Germans will have their own nuclear weapons. The Chancellor has maintained that the 1954 pledge does not prohibit the Germans from stockpiling nuclear weapons or using nuclear weapons given to the Germans. He made both these points to you in November 1961. There is no evidence, however, that this is a practical issue in the context of Franco-German cooperation at the present time.

Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk *grs*

~~SECRET~~

2/28/63

103 ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

OFFICE OF THE

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

28 February 1963

Refer to: I-35241/63

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PLACE: On the plane going to and from Omaha

TIME: 26 February 1963

PRESENT: Mr. McNamara Minister Von Hassel
 Mr. Gilpatric General Heusinger
 General Taylor
 Mr. Nitze

Mr. McNamara suggested that we might begin with a discussion of NATO strategy and invited Minister Von Hassel's views.

Von Hassel said he was absolutely persuaded that it is essential to stick to NATO. NATO was the thing that bound the U.S. and Canada to Europe. General Lemnitzer had recently been in Bonn to discuss NATO strategy. General Lemnitzer's ideas completely coincided with theirs. The first point they discussed was the forward defense. There was no dispute except for one question regarding the Weser Elbe area. But even with respect to that area, General Lemnitzer was developing plans for Dutch troops to move forward there.

Von Hassel said that in the German view it was important that tactical weapons be maintained in the forward areas. The question had arisen in their minds whether the NATO nuclear force would cause a withdrawal of such weapons including the Pershings. There was a special problem with respect to the 104-Gs which he would discuss later. He thought there might be one difference of view between the U.S. and Germany and that was with respect to the use of tactical nuclear weapons. He agreed that tactical nuclear weapons should not be considered a replacement for conventional forces. But no matter how strong NATO's conventional forces might become, the Soviet's will always be superior. Therefore, NATO must be ready

Copies 1 of 9

Page 1 of 11 Pages

~~TOP SECRET~~

Def Control No. *106590*

REPRODUCED AT 10 YEAR
INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY
DECLASSIFIED. DOD DIR 3800.10

*Re-200 McNamara / 133 / Memcons w Germans
Items 1-11 vol 1 ok*

Polaris missile has gone through three versions. The A-3 version alone will cost \$400 million. Warheads must be re-designed. All these items are included in the estimate of \$5 million per missile per year.

To say that this is what NATO should think of is not to say that this is what we would propose to charge. We would not propose to include indirect costs or costs of past research and development. But the direct costs of 25 ships, with 8 missiles per ship, would be approximately \$2 billion, or \$10 million per warhead. This would just include hardware. To operate it would cost approximately a million and a quarter per warhead per year. Research and development, including that unique to the surface ship version of Polaris and including research and development on the A-3 system after the first of this year, would amount to approximately \$300 million. Research and development prior to January 1st on Polaris would amount to \$600 million, but this he would propose be forgotten.

These figures included only procurement cost and research and development cost. How about the future? Shouldn't one work on modernizing whatever force one built? In five or ten years the Soviets will have an AICBM. Shouldn't we begin to modernize in advance to take care of this probability? Parts of the system may have a life of one year, some of five years, some of fifteen years, or even twenty years. We think of the life of the system as being eight years on the average. We think of a billion and a quarter as a rough estimate of the modernization which should be contemplated over an eight year period. The U.S. now spends \$7.5 billion on R&D. At least 60% of this is for strategic nuclear forces. This would amount to \$4.5 billion. How much of this expenditure would they want to benefit from? If they do not wish to benefit from it, they can let the force over time become obsolete.

As to the question of submarine mode vs surface mode, McNamara said we are inclined to think that the surface mode would be more sensible for them than it was for us. We have to contemplate operations world-wide, for example, off the coast of China. A surface mode would be cheaper, and the Europeans could build some of the ships in Europe. This is a matter which Merchant will be prepared to go into fully.

McNamara suggested that he be permitted to argue against the MLF. He wished to point out that the U.S. was not trying to sell the MLF. We were only willing to participate in it if the Europeans truly wish it. In arguing against it, he would raise three questions. The first was how can one say there is a military purpose for the MLF? The U.S. has said it is providing enough

2/28/67

nuclear power to take care of the Soviet target system. It is trebling its alert forces between 53 and 60. The second question would be, since the U.S. is providing this force, at its expense, why should we Germans or we Belgians pay for what the U.S. will pay for anyway? A third question is how does this force fulfill any political purpose? The U.S. will still have a veto over its use. Granted that the U.S. can't use the force without concurrence of the European participants, neither can the Europeans use it without the consent of the U.S. McNamara said he didn't want to be misunderstood. He favored the MLF because it integrates Europeans and Americans in the same vessel in a significant political way, but we don't wish to have to defend ourselves against the three arguments he suggested. Unless the Europeans really desire the force despite the three arguments, we cannot expect a defense against them.

General Taylor suggested a fourth argument against MLF. This was that the U.S. had been urging the importance of conventional forces, and the MLF will be a diversion of funds from conventional forces.

McNamara said he would like to hear Von Hassel's answers to these four questions. Von Hassel offered a counter question; that was why did we propose the MLF at Nassau? McNamara said the President hasn't proposed the MLF, he has said that our policy is based on support for NATO. If our other NATO partners desire a MLF, we are willing to join with them. Gilpatric commented that if they desire to participate in the strategic nuclear business, we believe the MLF is a better way than for a proliferation of national force. Therefore, we think an integrated MLF is essential.

we do not know what they are doing

General Heusinger said that his understanding was that the question about a MLF arose after SACEUR had said he needed 600 MRBMs. The MLF would take over certain of the targets SACEUR had had in mind. Heusinger said that the NATO Alliance was based on nuclear confidence; confidence that nuclear weapons would be used if needed. If this confidence could be restored, then perhaps one could contemplate a clearer division of missions. The French have raised doubts as to whether the U.S. can be trusted. The thing to do is to eliminate the mistrust. Nuclear confidence must be restored. Nitze asked Heusinger what he thought the reason for French statements of mistrust was. The French, the British and the Germans all knew that we were firmer in the Berlin crisis than any of them. Heusinger said he had no idea as to the reason for French statements of mistrust. Nitze suggested that they spring not from genuine doubt but from political motivation.

General Taylor asked whether the Germans would want use of the force to be authorized on European unanimity without the

~~TOP SECRET~~

necessity for U.S. concurrence. To this, neither Von Hassel or Heusinger replied. Gilpatric asked whether Von Hassel did not believe the political reasons for the MLF were more important than the military. Von Hassel agreed. He said it was important for the Europeans and the Americans together to share costs and participate in command and control. He emphasized that he had been in office only seven weeks, but he took it for granted that from the political point of view, the MLF was important. From the military point of view, it might contribute only 7% of the total nuclear force in the Alliance. Nitze commented that the NNF, including the British, U.S. and possibly French components, as well as the MLF, might amount to 15% of the strategic nuclear force of the Alliance, and be enough to give triple coverage of the aiming points comprising the Soviet IRBM-MRBM system.

Von Hassel re-stated his view that it was important to have one political responsibility (that of the U.S. and those European countries that wish to join) over a force which would be under SACEUR's command and under the control of the group. This would constitute a body of perhaps five - six - seven countries, or perhaps a smaller number. From the Europeans' point of view, Paris, not Omaha, would then be the focus of responsibility for the security of the European countries participating. The group would control and command a mixed force of weapons including, perhaps bombers, MINUTEMEN, sea-based and land-based MRBMs. Then the Europeans would know that they had immediately available in Europe a large force dedicated to their defense. The Russians would know this and take this into account.

Von Hassel said they can now understand the trouble we have been having with de Gaulle. They are having similar trouble, but where would Europe be if they didn't try to come to an understanding with de Gaulle. There then wouldn't be any understanding at all. They know that this will increase the burden upon them. They do not know where to find the money. They think they can give us Americans confidence that they really are trying to stick together. This makes their responsibility larger. He said he knew that what he was saying might not be politic or diplomatic, but this was the situation as he saw it. It was difficult for him to defend de Gaulle but if, in '58, de Gaulle hadn't gotten things straightened out, what would have been the resulting situation? At that time Von Hassel was visiting General Valuy, and General Stehlin had invited him for dinner. Stehlin was forced to disinvite him because one of the guests had been arrested, another had disappeared, and the third said that it was impossible to sit at a table with him. The essential question is how do we get de Gaulle to lessen his mistrust?

McNamara said he thought the important objectives of policy for us were first to do everything we could to unify the Alliance

3264
106

Approved in S
March 6, 1963

February 28, 1963
Secretary's Office
5 pm

Non-Transfer of Nuclear Weapons

The Secretary

Ambassador Hervé Alphand, French Embassy

Mr. William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR
Mr. Johannes V. Imhof, WE

COPIES TO:	S/S	EUR	BTF	USBER Berlin
	S/P	WE	GER	Amembassy Paris
	G	SOV		Amembassy Bonn
	S/AL	ACDA		Amembassy Moscow
		WHITE HOUSE		Amembassy London

Among the subjects discussed was non-transfer of nuclear weapons. The Secretary observed that the U.S., several weeks ago, had asked for French comments on a draft proposal for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We had received no reply and did not know how to interpret French silence. He said that this case typified what he considered a lack of communication. Ambassador Alphand said that Ambassador Bohlen had seen Coeur de Marville today on that subject. He read from a telegram and said that the French position was that the French had no objection to our discussing this proposal with the Soviets but that they could not give us a commitment that they approved in principle. It was not "their" negotiation, but "ours". The French could not give their formal consent in advance to a negotiation in which they are not taking part.

The Secretary said that there was no plan on our part to keep this a bilateral negotiation. We were not asking to act as France's agent. Ambassador Alphand suggested that we should undertake discussions with the Soviets on this subject; if the Soviets asked about the French position we should ask about the Soviet position. The Secretary said that we would not act as go-between Moscow and Paris. He pointed out that we would be in an impossible situation if, in discussing this problem with the Soviets, we were completely uncertain about the position of one of our allies. We had received substantive comments on the proposal from the British and from the Germans. We had received no substantive comment from the French.

Ambassador Alphand gave his opinion that the French saw the following difficulties: 1) if Sino-Soviet relations do not improve, the Chinese

DECLASSIFIED

EO 11652, SEC. 3(E), 5(D), 5(E) AND 11

State NLK-77-823
BY MYM DATE 3-28-78

different from ARUS version (P760)
NSF(72) / France-Germany

Communists

Communists would not sign the proposal and there would be no agreement; on the other hand if these relations were to improve the agreement risked to be merely a piece of paper without much value. 2) The Soviets interpretation about non-proliferation differed from that of the U.S. The Soviets were opposed to nuclear weapons in the hands of other countries no matter where ultimate control rested. Consequently, the Soviets would insist on not stationing nuclear forces outside the territorial limits of the nuclear powers. For example, the Soviets have already said that they are opposed to the concept of the multilateral force.

The Secretary noted that this was a substantive comment. Ambassador Alphand said that these views had been expressed to the Secretary by Couve when he saw him last December. The Secretary said the Soviets might be prepared to withhold nuclear cooperation from the Chinese if the West withheld nuclear cooperation from the Germans. Ambassador Alphand asked whether the Soviets had said so. The Secretary said that the Soviets had not specifically said so but that there was a strong implication that this would be their position.

Ambassador Alphand asked whether the non-proliferation proposal was linked to the Berlin talks. The Secretary said that it was precisely in order to avoid such a link that we proposed to take up non-proliferation in a wider framework. Obviously, we certainly did not wish to conclude a bilateral agreement with the Soviets on non-dissemination of nuclear weapons to Germany.

Ambassador Alphand noted that the subjects that could be discussed with the Soviets were Berlin, the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, arrangements between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, and the problem of frontiers. He wondered which of these subjects would be discussed at this stage. The Secretary said perhaps eventually there could be exploration on other subjects than Berlin but only after considerable progress had been made on Berlin and then only after closest consultations with our allies. For example, we could hardly be expected to undertake exploratory talks on arrangements between the Warsaw Pact and NATO without having first obtained the full consent of NATO. Our purpose was to see what the Soviets had to propose with regard to access to Berlin and Western troop presence.

80 10 28
4 11 23

DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL
AIR FORCE



2/28/63
S/S

100

Approved in S
March 6, 1963

February 28, 1963
Secretary's Office
5 pm

U.S.-French Relations.

The Secretary

Ambassador Hervé Alphand, French Embassy

Mr. William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR
Mr. Johannes V. Imhof, WE

FILE

COPIES TO:	S/S-2	S/AL	White House
	S/P	RPM	Amembassy Paris
	G		Amembassy London
	EUR		
	WE		

Ambassador Alphand referred to discussions with the Secretary and with the Attorney General on US-French relations and on the lack of communications between the two governments. He said he had written about this to Couve de Murville and had received a reply. Couve de Murville had said that he did not feel that this was a problem. Ambassador Bohlen was an excellent ambassador and would have access, whenever he desired, to the French Government and to General de Gaulle. Ambassador Alphand said he hoped that this would also apply to him. If we had something we wished to discuss we should avail ourselves of these channels.

The Secretary asked whether this meant that we were supposed to take the initiative. Ambassador Alphand replied evasively. He referred to the exploration which took place after the Nassau conference, pointing out that Ambassador Bohlen was immediately received by Foreign Minister Couve de Murville and by General de Gaulle but that there had been no indication of a special offer to France. Ambassador Alphand added that of course the French had not asked for anything. The Secretary said that we had no information that a different offer to France would have been appropriate. We had expected that there would be a discussion. There had been none. Ambassador Alphand said that the French Government had made its position clear. After General de Gaulle's press conference, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and he (Alphand) had repeatedly clarified the French position. Ambassador Alphand referred to the positive points in President de Gaulle's press conference, including de Gaulle's offer to cooperate in the strategic and technical field, if asked. Ambassador Alphand said that with regard to the multilateral force the French had informed us that they would not block the discussion. On the other hand, it was not appropriate for the French to make proposals of their own.

The Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, SEC. 3(E), 5(D), 5(K) AND 11

State NLK-77-823
BY MM MARS DATE 3-28-78

NSF/72/France General 7/1/67 - 7/9/67

The Secretary said that as a result of recent French decisions, France now had some difficulties in her relations with some of her allies, including the U.S. Nevertheless, it seemed to be the French position that all the others would have to come to Paris and that it was not up to France to take the initiative. The Secretary noted that General de Gaulle had often made a distinction between the Atlantic Alliance, the importance of which he recognized, and NATO which he felt should be reformed. Nevertheless, General de Gaulle had never made proposals concerning a reorganization of NATO. Ambassador Alphand said he thought that the French had no blueprint for a reorganization of NATO. He also thought that everybody agreed that NATO was in need of reform but that it was difficult to decide precisely what to do about it. He added that the French had taken the initiative many times and had made a great number of suggestions in the past but that most of these suggestions had not been considered, an exception being the case of Laos.



SECRET
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

Approved in S
March 6, 1963

3264
106

February 28, 1963
Secretary's Office
5 pm

Non-Transfer of Nuclear Weapons

The Secretary

Ambassador Hervé Alphand, French Embassy

**Mr. William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR
Mr. Johannes V. Inhof, WE**

COPIES TO:	S/S	EUR	BTF	USBER Berlin
	S/P	WE	GER	Amembassy Paris
	G	SOV		Amembassy Bonn
	S/AL	ACDA		Amembassy Moscow
		WHITE HOUSE		Amembassy London

Among the subjects discussed was non-transfer of nuclear weapons. The Secretary observed that the U.S., several weeks ago, had asked for French comments on a draft proposal for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We had received no reply and did not know how to interpret French silence. He said that this case typified what he considered a lack of communication. Ambassador Alphand said that Ambassador Bohlen had seen Couve de Murville today on that subject. He read from a telegram and said that the French position was that the French had no objection to our discussing this proposal with the Soviets but that they could not give us a commitment that they approved in principle. It was not "their" negotiation, but "ours". The French could not give their formal consent in advance to a negotiation in which they are not taking part.

The Secretary said that there was no plan on our part to keep this a bilateral negotiation. We were not asking to act as France's agent. Ambassador Alphand suggested that we should undertake discussions with the Soviets on this subject; if the Soviets asked about the French position we should ask about the Soviet position. The Secretary said that we would not act as go-between Moscow and Paris. He pointed out that we would be in an impossible situation if, in discussing this problem with the Soviets, we were completely uncertain about the position of one of our allies. We had received substantive comments on the proposal from the British and from the Germans. We had received no substantive comment from the French.

Ambassador Alphand gave his opinion that the French saw the following difficulties: 1) if Sino-Soviet relations do not improve, the Chinese

Communists

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, SEC. 3(E), 5(D), 5(E) AND 11

State NLK-77-823
BY MAM DATE 3-28-78

Communists would not sign the proposal and there would be no agreement on the other hand 1) these relations were to improve the agreement risked to be merely a piece of paper without much value. 2) The Soviets interpretation about non-proliferation differed from that of the U.S. The Soviets were opposed to nuclear weapons in the hands of other countries no matter where ultimate control rested. Consequently, the Soviets would insist on not stationing nuclear forces outside the territorial limits of the nuclear powers. For example, the Soviets have already said that they are opposed to the concept of the multilateral force.

The Secretary noted that this was a substantive comment. Ambassador Alphan said that these views had been expressed to the Secretary by Cove when he saw him last December. The Secretary said the Soviets might be prepared to withhold nuclear cooperation from the Chinese if the West withheld nuclear cooperation from the Germans. Ambassador Alphan asked whether the Soviets had said so. The Secretary said that the Soviets had not specifically said so but that there was a strong implication that this would be their position.

Ambassador Alphan asked whether the non-proliferation proposal was linked to the Berlin talks. The Secretary said that it was precisely in order to avoid such a link that we proposed to take up non-proliferation in a wider framework. Obviously, we certainly did not wish to conclude a bilateral agreement with the Soviets on non-dissemination of nuclear weapons to Germany.

Ambassador Alphan noted that the subjects that could be discussed with the Soviets were Berlin, the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, arrangements between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, and the problem of frontiers. He wondered which of these subjects would be discussed at this stage. The Secretary said perhaps eventually there could be exploration on other subjects than Berlin but only after considerable progress had been made on Berlin and then only after closest consultations with our allies. For example, we could hardly be expected to undertake exploratory talks on arrangements between the Warsaw Pact and NATO without having first obtained the full consent of NATO. Our purpose was to see what the Soviets had to propose with regard to access to Berlin and Western troop presence.

1962 FEB 4 AM 10 28

U.S. STATE
DEPARTMENT
RECEIVED

original

March 2, 1963

SECRET - PERSONAL

Dear Mac:

I am writing you directly because of the subject matter which I am particularly anxious should not in any form leak out but do wish to get it to the eyes of the President.

You will have seen the telegram that I sent Eyes Only for the President concerning an extremely confidential conversation I had had with Louis Joxe, giving a few of his personal opinions in regard to the present state of mind of de Gaulle. I certainly hope that this message will be kept as labelled since any leakage would be ruinous for Joxe.

I had lunch with Joxe last Tuesday following his talk with de Gaulle on Monday. The first item of direct interest to us is that Joxe is cancelling his proposed trip at the end of March to New York under the auspices of France-Amérique, during which he expected, as you know, to come to Washington to see you and presumably the President. The reason for the cancellation was obviously his talk with de Gaulle who seemed to have objection to his going to Washington on the grounds that a visit by a French Cabinet Officer might give rise to speculations of an unnecessary character. This is obvious nonsense and Joxe virtually admitted it to me and in the circumstances asked my opinion of the desirability of his making a trip just to New York. I told him that I thought it would be better to cancel the entire trip since to go only to New York and not to Washington would create more speculation than if the entire visit were cancelled. He is sending a message to Bill Burden in New York giving the excuse of some general work here and holding out the hope of some future date later on.

The Honorable
McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Bulken Vp / 11 / Research material

I hate to belabor the point but I do wish to emphasize how extremely important it is that the de Gaulle element in this matter be kept quiet since, as Joxe told me, should it leak he would be in very serious trouble with the General.

In addition to this, Joxe told me he found General de Gaulle in a very bad humor; he seemed to be suspicious of virtually everyone and everything and appeared to be brooding about something. Joxe said he was unable to extract from him any information of any value on international affairs and was of the private opinion that de Gaulle is thinking of some move in this field. Joxe admitted that he had no evidence or reason to support this view which appeared to have been based entirely on his past knowledge and association of de Gaulle's character. He, however, ruled out completely again any question of any "deal" with the Soviet Union unless de Gaulle became absolutely convinced that a US/USSR deal was about to be announced, in which case, according to Joxe, he might try and move first. However, this probability was dismissed as a complete fabrication by both of us.

We ran through a number of other subjects which might be conceivable, such as some move for the reorganization of NATO, some move towards the Six or even one toward England, but could find no satisfactory explanation. The only thing that is certain is that according to Joxe de Gaulle was in an extremely bad frame of mind and seemed to be brooding over some possible move.

The thing that strikes me most about the present governmental situation in France is the extraordinary ignorance of de Gaulle's Ministers, even those with whom he has had long and relatively intimate association, and who like Joxe have performed great services for him, of de Gaulle's intentions on any given question, particularly in international affairs. This certainly goes for Couve de Murville, who is extremely agreeable personally but obviously has very little knowledge as to what the General will or will not do. This, as you can well imagine, sets up a situation which makes it very difficult for a foreign diplomat, especially in present circumstances an American one, to operate at all with this government.

I have, I suppose, talked in the last month with at least ten Cabinet Officers in general on the subject of French policy and the General's intentions and have received almost as many different interpretations as there were people asked.

1) I am reasonably convinced, however, that our estimate of de Gaulle is not perhaps as accurate as it could be. He is not, I am

convinced, a Machiavellian plotter who thinks through his various moves in foreign affairs with any calculated purpose to be immediately achieved in mind. He has, as demonstrated by his various writings, particularly "The Edge of the Sword" written in 1932, and his "War Memoirs", set forth I think in considerable clarity some of these simple conceptions that he has in mind. In the first place it is important to remember that de Gaulle is distinctly a part of that half of France (or less than one-half) which has been since 1789, and still is, conservative, hierarchical, religious and military. This was one of the reasons for his bitterness against Pétain. He is also the produce of French military training pre-World War I and II in that he tends to approach a given problem from a highly analytical and rather simple point of view. His ignorance of the operation of other countries is, I would say, very great, and this is particularly true of the United States. I am sure he has no understanding or indeed interest in the constitutional structure of the United States and its bearing on foreign affairs. He is a man of considerable natural courtesy on the surface but extremely cold-blooded and even brutal in his handling or dismissal of immediate subordinate officials if he considers that the need of the country or of the regime requires it. His central thought seems to be that the State (Etat) is the natural and indestructible unit in national affairs. Ideologies - le communisme passera mais la France restera - are passing phenomena which change, but the State as an entity as it has been understood in Europe, is the infrangible permanent unit upon which I would say all of de Gaulle's policy is based.

2) It follows from this conception that he would be very much against any form of integration -- anything that would water down the authority of the fundamental unit. He is, as I have said in an earlier telegram, prepared to combine French power with that of other countries in the classic form of alliance, but is not ever disposed to merge or share French power with the power of others, especially if the latter is superior.

3) He views the present situation in Europe as an abnormal one stemming from the particular circumstances of World War II. He unquestionably looks forward to some distant time in the future when there will be a disappearance of the Soviet menace as it is today, i. e., the ideological content will gradually pass away from the Russian scene and Russia the State will resume the normal pursuit of its national interests. At that time de Gaulle envisages the retreat of the United States from Europe since the need would no longer exist. Whether this will take 10, 20, 30 or 40 years, I think to de Gaulle it is relatively unimportant. This habit of talking

in general terms about the future with no indication of time is one of de Gaulle's puzzling habits. The press and many people often think he is speaking of actual policy when he is really talking about events which may be half a century off. When this happens it would be extremely important for France to have its own nuclear power which, in my opinion, he envisages not so much for eventual use against Russia but as a means for French security and assurance against Germany. And it is here that I believe that the least thought out or the least deeply felt of de Gaulle's policies is to be found. He obviously believes in Franco-German cooperation and harmony with, however, a healthy dose of suspicion stemming from the past. He believes this union or cooperation to be the cornerstone of the future Europe, but he has not fully thought through or indeed in all probability does not have any definite clue as to the resolution of the nuclear problem with Germany. As you will recall in his interview with me in early January he spoke of the inevitability of Germany acquiring the bomb, but here again the time element was extremely fuzzy and the circumstances even more so.

4) On the subject of his opposition to Great Britain's entry into the Common Market, this is certainly no new factor in his thinking, but I now believe it possible to set forth relatively clearly why he chose January 14 to announce this fact to the world. It must be remembered that de Gaulle found upon his return to power in 1958 France already engaged by the Rome Treaty. He therefore accepted the situation which would have been too difficult to have attempted to change. He did, however, successfully veto the institution of any supranational authorities in Europe (again because of his belief in the eternal, basically unalterable nature of the State). In short, I am convinced that by January 14 he had come to the conclusion (in part because of the Nassau Agreement) that England was not genuinely ripe to become part of Europe and he was definitely concerned lest the other five members of the Common Market for political reasons were prepared to compromise the one economic aspect of the Common Market which was of genuine interest to France, namely agriculture. What was surprising about this press conference was less the content than the tone and final brutality with which he raked Great Britain over the coals and the general nastiness of his comments about the United States. The Nassau shift is more difficult to analyze, but my best guess is that it was George Ball's statements re MLF, plus the President's background press conference in Palm Beach.

As to Franco-American relations and American relations to Europe as a whole, I would like to make a few observations which really are for your and the President's eyes, although I certainly have no objection to your showing this letter -- indeed I wish you

would -- to Dean Rusk personally.

Insofar as Franco-American relations are concerned, I see very little that can be done at the present time to improve them. My relations as far as I can make out with all the French officials continue to be good, and it is, of course, possible for me to see de Gaulle at any time when I have anything particular to take up with him. On the other hand, I think it would be a great mistake to endeavor to see him just for the sake of seeing him when I would have no particular subject for discussion to bring up. Therefore, insofar as France and the United States are concerned, for the immediate future I can see no particular moves that we can make beyond going on with day to day questions and matters as they come up. I see no prospect of any real dialogue developing between the President and de Gaulle and I am reasonably certain that de Gaulle does not wish to meet with the President because he is not by nature a dialoguist or a discussor. He apparently will often listen to his Ministers but does not ever seriously discuss questions with them, and in his meetings with Macmillan and Adenauer the circumstances have been so different that they would not be applicable to a Kennedy/de Gaulle encounter. Insofar as Europe as a whole -- and particularly NATO -- are concerned, I would strongly agree with the merits of a multilateral nuclear force, but only if we are able to obtain from Congress the abolition of the American veto power inherent in the idea of unanimity in the body that would exercise supreme decision over the use of that force. As I have already said, if this veto remains, it will be regarded by every European (even though some governments for political and other considerations find it desirable to go along with us) as confirming the correctness of de Gaulle's view about American monopoly and control of nuclear matters. It seems to me so obvious that it must be just as apparent to you as it is to me.

The French have constantly maintained and many Europeans believe that there will be American reluctance to use the nuclear weapon in the event of a Soviet attack on Europe because increasingly nuclear conflict would mean the destruction of many American cities. Therefore, anything that gives us the power to prevent nuclear action under certain circumstances feeds this thought and tends to confirm it. The fact that our veto over the use of a multilateral force would be shared with other members of the council or command structure would not affect this basic principle. It is no longer as it was several years back -- the European fear that American "irresponsibility" or "hot headedness" would lead us to premature use of the nuclear weapon, but rather the opposite.

I fully realize how terribly difficult it may be to obtain any Congressional consent to the removal of the veto and, as reported

in my discussion with Livie Merchant and others with him, I gather this came out rather bleakly in the Congressional discussions they had before coming over. In fact, you will have seen it has appeared already in the French press as part of the American existing position. But it seems to me that we should be very careful that we do not get ourselves out on any limb if in our very best and considered judgment it is impossible to remove the veto. Any other form of voting, whether by three-fourths majority or majority vote minus one, or any other gimmick of this nature, would resolve the problem since it is not the operation of the system in the real event of war that is of importance but its appearance and the interpretations that might be read into it in time of peace. I merely state this as a serious warning and one to be kept in mind as we go down the road.

It seems to me that basically the difficulty of our policy in regard to Europe is that we have not fully adjusted to the fact of European recovery. I do not mean only the economic and financial recovery, but also the moral and spiritual vigor that seems to have accompanied this process, coupled with a very serious but nonetheless real line of thought to the effect that the danger of a Russian attack (particularly after the Cuban crisis) has greatly diminished and, in fact, is non-existent in the eyes of many Europeans. Incidentally, I am sure that it is a factor in de Gaulle's thinking which tends to regard the Cold War as over and the beginnings of the process that he sees for the long-distance future as already in operation.

I have also heard the arguments, and they are extremely convincing, of those who believe that to let Europe leave the existing situation unchanged from a military point of view (i. e., abandon the MLF if we can't get the veto removed) would be a dangerous if not suicidal policy on the grounds that sooner or later we would find ourselves building for the Germans the medium ranged ballistic missiles which they would then man while keeping control of the warheads, as is now the case with tactical weapons in some countries. This is conceivably true but I am not quite able to understand why we would have to agree to make available MRBM's to the Germans although admittedly there are some six hundred Soviet missiles that could rain down on Europe. It should, however, be possible to offset the effect of the Soviet missiles with the increase of our Polaris submarines and, of course, further and continued evidence of our willingness to go to general nuclear war in the event of any attack on Europe. I do not for one minute suggest the withdrawal of any of our forces from Europe unless our dollar balance position makes this an absolute necessity and the Europeans genuinely wench on their defense commitments. We would still have the problem of the French force de frappe but I am afraid this will be a problem no matter what we do, whether we succeed with

the MLF or not. I am well aware of the President's thinking, as it was up to the time I left Washington, on the consequences of a French force de frappe, with which I fully agree, but this will take a good many years to develop and there are also all sorts of possibilities that might occur in the intervening period.

In other words, what I am suggesting as a possible alternative in the event that the MLF, because of the presence of the American veto, proves to be unworkable is really in effect to leave Europe alone politically and, in large measure, unchanged militarily. I would not continue to press the Europeans hard for an increase in conventional forces because certainly conventional and nuclear forces are very closely interrelated.

The question of conventional forces by themselves is very little understood or appreciated by European governments who merely see in them (the nuclear situation being as it is) an element of increased costs without any really convincing military advantage. It is a very hard point to argue since it is extremely difficult to see that there is any probability at all of a Soviet military action (short of an accidental brush of no consequence) which is likely to occur. I realize, of course, the importance of the Berlin question and the need for a certain amount of conventional forces in order to carry out existing plans. I have just seen a summary of Paul Nitze's speech, made out West somewhere, on this subject and it seemed to me that it represents a viewpoint which will have little positive effect here.

I have not dealt with the aspect of the European picture insofar as economic matters are concerned or, in fact, in general with the problem of Great Britain (since I think we can accept as reality that there is no prospect of Britain's joining the Common Market within any reasonable future.) Others I know are working very closely on this problem. There is one possibility in regard to France which I have considered somewhat and which might help matters, but I am by no means sure on this point. This would be for the President to sit down and write a very thorough and detailed analysis of United States policy towards Europe which would deal very thoroughly and very carefully with:

1) Our entire defense interests and posture in regard to Europe;

2) Our economic policy present and future in regard to the "Atlantic Community". It would be very important in this point to make clear in irrefutable terms that we had no hidden purpose of domination of European markets, etc., etc.

3) Some thoughts on the problem of the Soviet Union. If there is one factor that seems to crop up rather continuously in French thinking it is that the U. S. and U. S. S. R. are in some fashion either actually negotiating under the table or definitely intend to. I fully realize the difficulty of disproving something that does not exist by mere words, but I would think it would not be too difficult to work out something in this field.

In short, what I have in mind now is the trying out of a dialogue in writing between the President and de Gaulle, not so much for the purpose of attempting to change de Gaulle's attitude but rather to attempt to avoid a deepening of his suspicion and an increasing tendency to take every minor action of the United States and feed it into a preconceived pattern. This is somewhat of an afterthought to the rest of this letter but I would appreciate very much your views and, of course, those of the President on any such possibility.

I hope you do not think that my analysis of de Gaulle in any sense means that I agree with him, because I distinctly do not, but he is, however, a factor which we will have to contend with for a good many years to come and the better we can understand him, the better off we will be.

I am sure there are absolutely no new thoughts in this letter but I wanted to get it off my chest.

I am completely recovered now with only a slightly dimmed sight in one eye, but otherwise just as well as I have ever been -- in fact possibly better since I am off smoking.

Incidentally, I was very pleased to see the nice article in NEWSWEEK on you which I read with great pleasure.

Yours,

A. J. A. J.

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

PERMANENT RECORD COPY

3/6/67

32

SECRET

Action

Control:
Rec'd:

3908
MARCH 6 11 1963
11:43 AM

Eern

Handwritten notes and signature

SS
Info

FROM: PARIS
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 3521, MARCH 6, 5 PM

EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY

FOR SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

SINCE I HAVE BEEN IN FRANCE I HAVE DISCOVERED THAT ONE OF THE MOST WIDESPREAD ILLUSIONS AMONG RESPONSIBLE FRENCH OFFICIALS AND OTHERS, INCLUDING LEADING AMERICAN NEWSPAPER CORRESPONDENTS, IS THE BELIEF THAT DE GAULLE'S PROPOSAL TO PRESIDENT EISENHOWER OF SEPTEMBER 1958 WAS ALLOWED TO GO UNANSWERED. THE FILES OF THIS EMBASSY MAKE IT PLAIN THAT NOT ONLY WAS AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT GIVEN ON OCTOBER 21 BUT THAT THE REPLY STATED COURTEOUSLY AND SUBSTANTIVELY WHY WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL FOR A THREE-POWER DIRECTOIRE.

see April 1/5/67

POL FR-US

THIS SUBJECT CAME UP TODAY AT LUNCH WITH SULZBERGER, WHO TOLD ME THAT DE GAULLE HAD THREE TIMES TOLD HIM HE HAD NEVER HAD EVEN AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT. I HAVE SHOW SULZBERGER IN THE UTMOST CONFIDENCE THE EXCHANGE OF COMMUNICATIONS IN 1958 AND HE HAS AGREED TO WRITE NOTHING UNLESS HE RECEIVES PERMISSION FROM THE US TO DO SO AND THEN ONLY ON THE BASIS OF THE LINE WE WOULD PREFER TO HAVE TAKEN. I WOULD LIKE YOUR AUTHORIZATION TO HAVE SULZBERGER WRITE A SUITABLE CORRECTION TO THE WIDESPREAD BELIEF THAT THE US WAS SO DISCOURTEOUS AS TO NOT REPLY TO DE GAULLE'S MEMO OF SEPTEMBER 1958 WITHOUT GOING INTO ANY TEXTUAL MATERIAL BUT ALONG GENERAL LINES. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR INSTRUCTIONS.

SCP-1

EYES ONLY

BOHLEN

JTC

SECRET

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken.

ACTION

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

March 11, 1963

MEMORANDUM TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Meeting on Wednesday, March 13, at 4:30 PM

The President has asked me to call this meeting for the purpose of having a general discussion of U.S. policy in two large areas, Latin America and Europe. It is not his purpose in this meeting to attempt detailed analysis of immediate questions such as the program for the San Jose meeting or the next steps in the post-Nassau negotiations. He desires instead to have a broader exchange of views, in which it would be open to any member to propose quite new levels or directions of policy as deserving further study.

Members of the Council are familiar with the main lines of current policy in these two areas, but the two papers which are attached may be of some interest to those who have not seen them. One is a talking paper on Cuba used by the Secretary of State in a recent talk to the Cabinet. The other is an abridgment of an informal talking paper on European policy presented to the President by Ambassador Bruce. The documents do not have the authority of formal State papers, but each is a responsible statement of the main lines of our present course; alternative views might well respond to them. It should be added that the Secretary of State's paper, in that it centers on Cuba, covers a field less broad than that of hemispheric policy as a whole. It is the broad field that the President has in mind for the first item on this simple agenda:

1. Latin American Policy
2. European Policy

McGeorge Bundy
McGeorge Bundy

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

EO 11652 Sec. 3.2(b) and 5(b)

NSC NLK-TQ-80

11/31/77

1963

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 22, 1963

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 230

TO: The Vice President, (as Chairman, National
Aeronautics and Space Council)
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Commerce
Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
Administrator, National Aeronautics and
Space Agency
Director, Bureau of the Budget
Director, Office of Emergency Planning

SUBJECT: Assignment of Highest National Priority to
Project PAL (Permissive Links for Nuclear
Weapons in NATO)

In response to a recommendation by the Atomic Energy Commission, the President under the authority granted by the Defense Production Act of 1950 today established the program listed below as being in the highest national priority category for development and production.

Project PAL (Permissive Links for Nuclear
Weapons in NATO)

Carl Kaysen
for McGeorge Bundy

cc: Mr. Bundy
Mrs. Lincoln
Mr. Kaysen
Mr. Johnson
NSC Files

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4 NLK-87-197 By <u>StF</u> NARA, Date <u>9/90</u>
--

NSF/340

Despatched 3/22/63

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

E15

R 7/22/63

11754

INDICATE: collect
 CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

Mar 22 8 06 PM '63

21

ACTION: AmEmbassy BONN 2245

- INFO: AmEmbassy PARIS via pouch ✓
- AmEmbassy LONDON via pouch ✓
- AmEmbassy BRUSSELS via pouch ✓
- AmEmbassy MOSCOW via pouch ✓
- AmEmbassy ROME via pouch ✓
- AmEmbassy The Hague via pouch ✓
- AmEmbassy LUXEMBOURG via pouch ✓
- USBER BERLIN via pouch ✓
- USRO via pouch ✓
- BUSEC via pouch ✓

Circular America #

Form 2245

DATE 11/27/90

REVIEWED BY: [Signature]

DECLASSIFICATION: RELEASE EXCISE DENY

FOI, EO or PA exemptions

TS authority to: [Signature]

CLASSIFY AS: [Signature]

LOW GRADE INFO () & () C, OADR

(Fol summary is FYI only. It is unclassified and subject to amendment upon review and should not RPT not be disclosed to foreign nationals.)

Secretary had 90 minute ^{Heinrich} talk with von Brentano on current European political economic and defense matters. Under Secretary also present part of time.

Brentano referred to unfortunate coincidence of de Gaulle's press conference Franco-German Treaty and Brussels Conference and assured Secretary Treaty would not RPT not change German policies on NATO and European matters. Germany wanted UK in EEC. No RPT no German wanted Franco-German bloc in Europe or NATO. Only fool would sacrifice anything on altar of Franco-German reconciliation. German parties realized Europe's freedom depended on cooperation with US decisions on MLF and pipe embargo confirmed this.

Secretary noted historic US decision 1948-49 linking European and US security. Said danger of de Gaulle press conference was American people might get

American

ALL DEF

FR - W GER

FR - W GER

FR - W GER

FR - W GER

Drafted by: [Signature] EUR: GER: RMBrandin: gw. 3/22/63

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: EUR - WILLIAM R. Tyler

S/S - PWK [Signature]

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~SECRET~~
Classification

American connection not RPT not wanted in Europe, which would make it impossible maintain US troops there. Attitude of five at Brussels was very important in averting this danger.

Brentano said all parties were resolved make it clear ratification of Franco-German Treaty would not RPT not change German policies. Alternative procedures were paragraph in ratification law or Bundestag resolution. Possibility of former uncertain under international law but latter would be authentic interpretation of Treaty which Govt would have to accept before ratification. French irritation possible but Germany could not afford ambiguity with friends or opponents.

Secretary stressed importance clear legislative record that would prevent another interpretation by future French or German Govts.

Secretary then mentioned lack of contact with de Gaulle since we had rejected his tripartite directorate proposal. De Gaulle personally isolated self within own Govt as well from foreign govts. Like others we had found January press conference very informative. Secretary said high-level contacts among leaders were necessary to NATO. In present situation things were all right when conclusions coincided but when they did not there was drawing away. Secretary hoped we could talk out things with de Gaulle, but difficult find way. Not RPT not possible through normal diplomatic channels or ForMins.

Secretary added we prepared cooperate with France wherever possible. Perhaps there was no fundamental change in de Gaulle's views, but we were puzzled about what he had in mind and relationship between his long-range ideas and current problems. ForMins. had to live with latter.

Brentano said same applied to FRG. Contact with de Gaulle was strange one.

CONFIDENTIAL

He

~~SECRET~~
Classification

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

He said no to everything, especially concerning NATO, and had isolated himself from US, UK, Italy and Benelux. Brentano thought de Gaulle should be made to fear isolating himself from Germany too. Germans would try to influence him but would not go wrong way with him.

Secretary raised question where we go after Brussels. Europe was unanimous that US stay out of UK/EEC negotiations. Part of US/European relations problem, however, was sharing leadership. We recognized special postwar situation of European recovery and reconstruction was at end and realized importance of new role for Europe. This was relevant to question of initiative after Brussels and we were reluctant inject ourselves into matters largely of European character such as shape of future European arrangements.

Brentano said SIX should continue efforts fulfill Rome Treaty, holding France to its responsibilities but maintaining contact with UK to assure parallel decisions in London and Brussels and to avoid decisions that would make more difficult UK entry into EEC. Talks should also continue with Herter. Brentano welcomed recent initiative of Foreign Trade Committee of European Parliament in forming subcommittee to contact US on TEA.

Secretary observed that TEA based on expectation UK would join EEC and expressed regret trade negotiations could not move as fast as Act permitted.

Brentano described de Gaulle's views on economic autarchy as fatal to foreign trade which essential to Germany. Said Germany would follow liberal trade policy and would not RPT not permit EEC develop inward-looking policy.

Brentano expressed opposition to German, French and European nationalism, stressing friendship with US as essential. Said problems of trade and payments balances should be solved cooperatively since any serious payments deficit of one country harmed others.

CONFIDENTIAL

Secretary

~~SECRET~~

Classification

CONFIDENTIAL ~~SECRET~~

Classification

Secretary said we would try to avoid unwise action to solve our payments deficit but problem would have to be solved soon. Promised we would keep in touch with Allies.

Re successorship question Brentano limited himself to promising his party would work for continuation of present policies and preconditions for such continuity under any Chancellor.

Brentano expressed satisfaction with German-Polish trade treaty, stressing importance encouraging liberalizing trends in Poland and facilitating Polish contacts with Free World. It remained to be seen how agreement worked out, but it was gratifying that it had been signed without raising questions of diplomatic relations and recognition of GDR. USSR probably did not RPT not like agreement but could not RPT not block it because of Polish economic problems, particularly demand for improved living standards, which USSR could not RPT not meet.

Under Secretary commented on Berlin discussions with USSR, noting considerable disarray inside USSR with strong forces moving against each other --- e.g., reconciliation with China, agricultural problem, increasing consumer demand, pressure to allocate resources to military production. Conflict between apparently sincere desire for testing agreement and rigid position on number of on-site inspections also puzzling. Khrushchev obviously unhappy and we were waiting to see what would happen. We got impression no RPT no strong sense of purpose re Berlin talks, but thought internal reasons might induce USSR put forth new proposals.

Brentano said FRG fully agreed resumption Berlin talks necessary and could not RPT not be rejected a priori. FRG not RPT not optimistic however because willingness to talk did not RPT not indicate change in position. USSR position burdened by internal problems and conflict with China. Peaceful coexistence line difficult explain to

CONFIDENTIAL

supporters

~~SECRET~~

Classification

Classification

supporters at home and abroad in view of dynamic rationale of Communism and in face of CHICOM criticism that peaceful solutions were treasonable. Brentano thought critics might be more dangerous in USSR today than in Stalin's time.

Brentano said only unsolved US-German problem concerned MLF. He professed inability comprehend complicated problems of mode, multilateral versus multinational force, command and control. Suggested less public talk about these problems and stressed importance reaching impressive agreement that would show US-European cooperation and NATO ability meet any aggression. Details, including veto problem, could then be worked out more quietly. Everyone knew US Congressional problem and talk about veto should be dropped.

Secretary noted that MLF was more political than military problem because Khrushchev was aware of US nuclear power. He conceded possibility constructing independent nuclear deterrents but said independent use inconceivable.

Brentano said talk about MLF often became divorced from reality. Nuclear force was only one instrument of Alliance. Germany liked people at Luxembourg but wanted US general as SACHUR and for nuclear force. Brentano thought nuclear force should be open to all wishing share control and responsibility with appropriate legal arrangements under NATO. He scoffed at parcelling out a few missiles to each country.

Secretary stressed importance Soviet views on Western unity, but said USSR knew West united on matters of security and no RPT no evidence USSR would seek take advantage of West on such matters. He cited de Gaulle's support of US on Cuba.

Secretary said we understood de Gaulle's experiences, patriotism and desire bolstered France's morale. Question was of method. Full cooperation in EEC would have built up

French

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classification

Classification

French prestige; isolation might not.

Brentano said de Gaulle was awkward partner, thought in nationalistic terms, but was intelligent and showed courage in solving Algerian problem and dealing with erst-while supporters. De Gaulle felt need for national prestige to rebuild French confidence and meet accusations of treason concerning Algeria. Brentano said Germany understood de Gaulle but that did not mean Germany would follow him or make his mistakes. It was necessary to be understanding, however, in order to persuade him.

Secretary noted favorable improvement in Germany's relations with UK and other European countries, despite de Gaulle problem.

Ambassador Knappstein expressed hope UK would not RPT not deliver pipe to USSR.

Secretary concurred and mentioned friction caused because Western Europe traded heavily with USSR while US did not. Said some people in UK thought a fat Communist was a peaceful Communist.

Brentano disagreed. Fat Nazis were as bad as thin ones. He urged discussion this problem in NATO which tended talk too much about strategic and military problems and not enough about political questions.

Secretary said our view on this problem might not RPT not seem reasonable at times but had rationality of politics. US had over one million men in uniform overseas and suffered casualties every week from engagements with Communists. Hence we would not RPT not sell pipe to USSR. One could analyze problem from technical viewpoint but popular feeling had to be taken into account. If Soviet pressure increased on Berlin, we would see whether trade made for peace.

Brentano said he always opposed trade with USSR. It was unwise to sell tankers and freighters to USSR so Soviet yards could build warships. Because of his views

CONFIDENTIAL

he

~~SECRET~~
Classification

Classification

he was able to speak clearly and convincingly on pipe embargo in Bundestag. Brentano criticized contractual obligation argument citing French strikes which prevent coal deliveries to USSR and poor Soviet performance on contracts. Added that UK pipe deliveries to USSR would cause bad repercussions in Germany.

Secretary thanked Brentano for strong efforts in Bundestag on pipe issue and expressed hope FRG like US was making representations to UK.

Secretary concluded conversation by mentioning he expected discuss Berlin with Soviet Ambassador next week.

End.

SCP-4.

J. W. Bundy
3/29/63
March 23, 1963

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.

For your convenience, I am recording the decisions reached at your meeting with the President on NATO Nuclear Forces on March 22. The President has reviewed this record.

1. The State Department should draft letters from the President to Adenauer and Fanfani as soon as possible, indicating the terms on which we are willing to make a firm commitment to the MLEF, and stating that, on these terms, we were in fact eager to go ahead and we invite their acceptance. The central points are:

- a. The force must be surface borne
- b. The control system must be such as to retain the U.S. veto

It appears preferable to propose now the kind of control arrangements which the Europeans would prefer, rather than to insist on the principle of unanimity if that means that we have to provide for a re-examination of control arrangements at a definite time in the future.

The possibility that a future expansion or modernization of the Force could involve submarines rather than surface ships can be raised.

2. The letters should invite a positive response and offer immediate technical discussions on any technical problem that arises.

~~TOP SECRET~~

1987/3549

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 1.4
NW-85-28
By: <i>[Signature]</i> NARA Date 7/87

3. Some thought must be given to the method of conveying these messages to their addressees in view of the Italian election situation and Chancellor Adenauer's absence in Cadenabbia. An answer from the Italians may not be necessary.

4. There is to be no Congressional consultation on these matters before a response is received from the Germans. If a response is not forthcoming promptly, and Congressional pressure mounts, the two Departments will consult further with the President on the nature of the presentation to be made to the interested Congressional committees.

5. The two Departments should prepare recommendations for action in the event that a negative or a noncommittal response is received from the Germans. In particular, the question of what further can be done on Paragraph 6 forces and whether a new political control mechanism can usefully be associated with them should be examined. So should any other alternatives which appear fruitful. The question of whether an indefinite or ambiguous response should be taken as a signal to halt U.S. efforts on the MLF should also be examined.

Carl Kayson

Copy furnished;
Addressees
Mr McCone, Dir, CIA
Mr Bundy
Mr Kayson

~~TOP SECRET~~

TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

PERMANENT RECORD COPY

OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
MESSAGE CENTER

SECRET

1007 MAR 27 AM 7 41

Control: 19630

Rec'd: MARCH 26, 1963

5:18 P.M.

001

Action

EUR
Info
SS
SR
G
SP
L
H
SAL
BTF
AF
FE
NEA
IO
SMF
DAC
SIL
E

FROM: PARIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 3864, MARCH 26, 6 P.M.

STEVENSON, FINLETTER AND I HAD LUNCH WITH COUVE DE MURVILLE MARCH 23. FOLLOWING IS STEVENSON SUMMARY OF HIS SEPARATE TALK WITH COUVE.

COUVE ASKED IF STEVENSON WANTED TO SEE POMPIDOU AND STEVENSON REPLIED THAT, OF COURSE, HE WOULD BE GLAD TO SEE HIM BUT THAT HE HAD NO MESSAGE TO DELIVER AND NO MISSION TO PERFORM AND THEREFORE HAD NO OCCASION TO ASK FOR APPOINTMENT. COUVE SAID STEVENSON SHOULD SEE HIM ALL THE SAME AND THAT HE WOULD ARRANGE IT. APPOINTMENT FIXED BY POMPIDOU OFFICE FOR TUESDAY AT 5:30 P.M.

COUVE SAID THAT WHILE FRANCE DID NOT APPROVE MLF IDEA HE FELT THAT US SHOULD CONTINUE EXPLORATORY DISCUSSIONS. HE SAID HE SAW NO WAY TO PREVENT PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS EXCEPT BY SOME PROGRESS TOWARD NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. IF UK SHOULD RENOUNCE ITS NUCLEAR CAPABILITY UNDER A LABOR GOVERNMENT, FRANCE WOULD NOT FOLLOW. SAID FRANCE AGREED THAT US SHOULD NOT CARRY ENTIRE BURDEN ANY LONGER, AND THAT FRANCE WOULD MAKE ITS CONTRIBUTION TO COMMON NUCLEAR DEFENSE. HE FURTHER INSISTED THERE WAS NO ANTI-AMERICAN FEELING IN FRANCE, MINIMIZED EMPHATICALLY PROPAGANDA IN FRANCE THAT US WAS UNRELIABLE ALLY, AND SEEMED TO APPRECIATE US REACTIONS AND DANGER OF ISOLATIONIST SENTIMENT DEVELOPING. IMPRESSED STEVENSON AS TRYING VIGOROUSLY TO REASSURE US ON OFFICIAL FRENCH CONFIDENCE IN RELIABILITY AND CONSTANCY OF US ALLIANCE.

COUVE DOUBTED DE GAULLE WOULD CONSIDER RE-ELECTION BUT COULD DESIGNATE HIS SUCCESSOR IF HE WISHED. WOULD NOT SPECULATE AS TO

copy # 2 destroyed, RM/R
RM/R
3/29/63
active

15-3864

15-1

FILED

This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation for reproduction from this copy

ACTION ASSIGNED TO	ACTION TAKEN	DATE OF ACTION	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R
NAME OF OFFICER			

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY PROHIBITED UNLESS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

-2- 3864, MARCH 26, 6 P.M., FROM PARIS

AS TO THE MAN. FELT FRANCE WAS GOING TO GO MORE IN THE DIRECTION OF THE US PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION SYSTEM.

COUVE SAID THE TALK ABOUT EXCLUDING THE US FROM EUROPE WAS FOOLISH; THAT FRANCE HAD TO EXPORT TO LIVE AND WOULD NOT GO PROTECTIONIST OR LET THE EEC LOOK INWARD, RATHER THAN OUTWARD; THAT THE POULTRY CASE WAS TOO BAD AND THERE WOULD NOT BE OTHERS LIKE IT, HE HOPED. HE ANTICIPATED SATISFACTORY RESULTS FROM THE KENNEDY ROUND OF TARIFF TALKS, BUT SUBJECT TO THE TECHNICAL DIFFICULTIES THAT ALWAYS ACCOMPANY TARIFF DISCUSSIONS. FRANCE WOULD STRONGLY RESIST PRICING FEED GRAINS AT A LEVEL THAT WOULD EXCLUDE US FROM EUROPEAN MARKET.

SAID DE GAULLE WAS DEEPLY ENGAGED IN THE COAL STRIKE, THAT THERE WAS MUCH JUSTICE IN THE MINERS DEMANDS AND THAT ANY AGREEMENT ON WAGE INCREASES WOULD BE EXTENDED TO OTHER SECTORS OF GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY WHERE WAGE RATES WERE ALSO OUT OF BALANCE.

GERMANY: COUVE SEEMED APPREHENSIVE ABOUT GERMANY AND SAID WITH COMING END OF THE ARMY BUILD-UP IN GERMANY IT WOULD WANT NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WHICH HE FOUND VERY DISQUIETING BUT UNAVOIDABLE. HE FELT THAT GERMANY WELCOMED MLF ONLY AS A FIRST STEP AND WOULD THEREAFTER DEMAND MORE AND MORE. TALKED AS IF MORE CONCERNED ABOUT DANGER FROM REARMED GERMANY THAN EVEN SOVIET UNION. HE DOUBTED IF RUSK-DOBRYNIN TALKS WOULD BE PRODUCTIVE.

UNITED KINGDOM: COUVE SAID THAT IN CONTRAST TO FRANCE, THE UK WOULD BE GLAD TO HAVE US CARRY THE WHOLE BURDEN OF DEFENSE. ALSO SAID WITH EMPHASIS THAT UK WOULD BE IN THE COMMON MARKET AND CLOSE RELATIONS WITH FRANCE WOULD BE RESTORED WHEN THE UK MADE UP ITS MIND TO BE A REAL EUROPEAN POWER INSTEAD OF TRYING TO LIVE IN THREE WORLDS-- THE COMMONWEALTH, THE SPECIAL RELATION WITH THE US,

AND

SECRET

SECRET

-3- 3864, MARCH 26, 6 P.M., FROM PARIS

AND EUROPE. WAS NOT VERY PRECISE AS TO WHAT FRANCE EXPECTED UK TO DO.

USSR: KHRUSHCHAV, HE SAID, HAS FAILED AT HOME AND ABROAD AND WILL HAVE TO PLAY IT TOUGH FOR A WHILE TO PROTECT HIS OWN POSITION, BUT HE DID NOT THINK HE PLANNED TO DO ANYTHING SPECTACULAR ABOUT BERLIN AT THIS TIME. HE HAD NO DOUBT THAT CHINA WOULD BE A SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR SOVIET UNION FOR A LONG TIME UNLESS CHIANG-KAI-SHEK SPOILED THINGS BY SOME INTEMPERATE ACTION. SEEMED TO BE APPREHENSIVE THAT REPUBLIC OF CHINA MIGHT BE PLANNING SOME ADVENTURE AND WAS RELIEVED BY STEVENSON'S ASSURANCE THAT NOTHING WAS BREWING.

YEMEN: COUVE SEES MORE HOPE IN THE UNITED STATES THAN IN THE UNITED NATIONS DISENGAGEMENT EFFORTS WITH CAIRO AND SAUDIS BECAUSE OF SPECIAL US INFLUENCE WITH SAUDI ARABIA AND INCREASING INFLUENCE WITH NASSER.

ALGERIA: HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT ALGERIANS WOULD NOT BE DOMINATED BY NASSER AND FELT FRENCH RELATIONS NOW GOOD WITH ALGERIA.

MIDDLE EAST: COUVE DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT NASSER CAN UNITE IRAQ AND SYRIA AND ANTICIPATES NO PRESSURES ON JORDAN FOR THE PRESENT.

UNITED NATIONS: HE REPEATED FRENCH POSITION THAT AFRICA SHOULD HAVE A PERPETUAL SEAT IN SECURITY COUNCIL WHICH MIGHT ALTERNATE BETWEEN FRENCH AND ENGLISH SPEAKING AFRICANS, AND SUGGESTED THAT COMMONWEALTH SEAT ALTERNATE BETWEEN COMMONWEALTH COUNTRY OUTSIDE AFRICA AND AN EASTERN EUROPE COUNTRY. FRANCE WAS PLEASED, HE SAID, WITH THE CONCLUSION OF THE SECESSION IN KATANGA AND HE WAS AT PAINS TO MAKE CLEAR THAT FRANCE HAD NEVER PUBLICLY OPPOSED UN ACTION IN CONGO. HE SPECULATED THAT KATANGA'S SECESSION HAD COLLAPSED ONLY

WHEN

SECRET

SECRET

-4- 3864, MARCH 26, 6 P.M., FROM PARIS

WHEN UNION MINIERE WAS FINALLY CONVINCED THAT KATANGA INDEPENDENCE WAS IMPOSSIBLE. WHEN STEVENSON ASKED ABOUT POSSIBLE FRENCH SUPPORT FOR CONGO ECONOMIC FUND, HE SEEMED UNFAMILIAR WITH IT AND EXPRESSED CURIOSITY. INDICATED FRANCE READY TO COOPERATE IN REBUILDING CONGO STATE AND WOULD HELP WHERE POSSIBLE WITH TECHNICIANS AND AID IN FISCAL, TRANSPORTATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE FIELDS. SUGGESTED THAT DELINQUENT FRENCH CONGO ASSESSMENTS SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED UNTIL LATER IN THE YEAR AND INFERRED THAT SATISFACTORY SOLUTION MIGHT BE POSSIBLE. EXPRESSED NO OPPOSITION TO UN COORDINATION OF SECOND PHASE ACTIVITIES IN CONGO AND FULLY UNDERSTOOD ADMINISTRATIVE DEFICIENCIES AND WEAKNESS ADOULA GOVERNMENT.

TUNISIA: WAS WELL SATISFIED WITH RELATIONS WITH TUNISIA AND CONFIDENT EVACUATION OF BIZERTE BASE WOULD BE CONCLUDED WITHOUT DIFFICULTY.

MOROCCO: COUVE EXPRESSED EMPHATIC APPROVAL STEVENSON'S VISIT TO MOROCCO AND HIS REGARD FOR MOROCCAN FM.

SCP-3.

BOHLEN

PLH

SECRET

3/26/63

FILE COPY

- BUNDY-SMITH
- BELK
- BURRIS
- DAVIS
- DUNGAN
- FELDMAN
- FORRESTAL
- HIRSCH
- JOHNSON
- JENSEN
- KILDUFF
- KLEIN
- KROMER
- LEGERE
- PARROTT
- SAUNDERS
- SCHLESINGER
- WIESNER

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

17a

53

~~SECRET~~

Control: 19630
Rec'd: MARCH 26, 1963
5:18 P.M.

Action

EUR

FROM: PARIS *(Chatter)*

Info

TO: Secretary of State

SS

SR

G

NO: 3864, MARCH 26, 6 P.M.

SP

L

H

SAL

BTF

AF

FE

NEA

IO

SMF

DAC

SIL

E

AIDA

STR

P

IOP

INR

AGR

COM

CEA

LAB

TARY

TRSY

RMR

STEVENSON, FINLETTER AND I HAD LUNCH WITH COUVE DE MURVILLE MARCH 23. FOLLOWING IS STEVENSON SUMMARY OF HIS SEPARATE TALK WITH COUVE.

COUVE ASKED IF STEVENSON WANTED TO SEE POMPIDOU AND STEVENSON REPLIED THAT, OF COURSE, HE WOULD BE GLAD TO SEE HIM BUT THAT HE HAD NO MESSAGE TO DELIVER AND NO MISSION TO PERFORM AND THEREFORE HAD NO OCCASION TO ASK FOR APPOINTMENT. COUVE SAID STEVENSON SHOULD SEE HIM ALL THE SAME AND THAT HE WOULD ARRANGE IT. APPOINTMENT FIXED BY POMPIDOU OFFICE FOR TUESDAY AT 5:30 P.M.

COUVE SAID THAT WHILE FRANCE DID NOT APPROVE MLF IDEA HE FELT THAT US SHOULD CONTINUE EXPLORATORY DISCUSSIONS. HE SAID HE SAW NO WAY TO PREVENT PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS EXCEPT BY SOME PROGRESS TOWARD NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. IF UK SHOULD RENOUNCE ITS NUCLEAR CAPABILITY UNDER A LABOR GOVERNMENT, FRANCE WOULD NOT FOLLOW. SAID FRANCE AGREED THAT US SHOULD NOT CARRY ENTIRE BURDEN ANY LONGER, AND THAT FRANCE WOULD MAKE ITS CONTRIBUTION TO COMMON NUCLEAR DEFENSE. HE FURTHER INSISTED THERE WAS NO ANTI-AMERICAN FEELING IN FRANCE, MINIMIZED EMPHATICALLY PROPAGANDA IN FRANCE THAT US WAS UNRELIABLE ALLY, AND SEEMED TO APPRECIATE US REACTIONS AND DANGER OF ISOLATIONIST SENTIMENT DEVELOPING. IMPRESSED STEVENSON AS TRYING VIGOROUSLY TO REASSURE US ON OFFICIAL FRENCH CONFIDENCE IN RELIABILITY AND CONSTANCY OF US ALLIANCE.

COUVE DOUBTED DE GAULLE WOULD CONSIDER RE-ELECTION BUT COULD DESIGNATE HIS SUCCESSOR IF HE WISHED. WOULD NOT SPECULATE AS TO

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, SEC. 3(E), 5(D), 5(E) AND 11

Dept. of State (WJK-47-826)
BY *MCM* NARS, DATE 12/19/77

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

NSF/72/France - General

17a

~~SECRET~~

-2- 3864, MARCH 26, 6 P.M., FROM PARIS

AS TO THE MAN. FELT FRANCE WAS GOING TO GO MORE IN THE DIRECTION OF THE US PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION SYSTEM.

COUVE SAID THE TALK ABOUT EXCLUDING THE US FROM EUROPE WAS FOOLISH; THAT FRANCE HAD TO EXPORT TO LIVE AND WOULD NOT GO PROTECTIONIST OR LET THE EEC LOOK INWARD, RATHER THAN OUTWARD; THAT THE POULTRY CASE WAS TOO BAD AND THERE WOULD NOT BE OTHERS LIKE IT, HE HOPED. HE ANTICIPATED SATISFACTORY RESULTS FROM THE KENNEDY ROUND OF TARIFF TALKS, BUT SUBJECT TO THE TECHNICAL DIFFICULTIES THAT ALWAYS ACCOMPANY TARIFF DISCUSSIONS. FRANCE WOULD STRONGLY RESIST PRICING FEED GRAINS AT A LEVEL THAT WOULD EXCLUDE US FROM EUROPEAN MARKET.

SAID DE GAULLE WAS DEEPLY ENGAGED IN THE COAL STRIKE, THAT THERE WAS MUCH JUSTICE IN THE MINERS DEMANDS AND THAT ANY AGREEMENT ON WAGE INCREASES WOULD BE EXTENDED TO OTHER SECTORS OF GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY WHERE WAGE RATES WERE ALSO OUT OF BALANCE.

GERMANY: COUVE SEEMED APPREHENSIVE ABOUT GERMANY AND SAID WITH COMING END OF THE ARMY BUILD-UP IN GERMANY IT WOULD WANT NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WHICH HE FOUND VERY DISQUIETING BUT UNAVOIDABLE. HE FELT THAT GERMANY WELCOMED MLF ONLY AS A FIRST STEP AND WOULD THEREAFTER DEMAND MORE AND MORE. TALKED AS IF MORE CONCERNED ABOUT DANGER FROM REARMED GERMANY THAN EVEN SOVIET UNION. HE DOUBTED IF RUSK-DOBRYNIN TALKS WOULD BE PRODUCTIVE.

UNITED KINGDOM: COUVE SAID THAT IN-CONTRAST TO FRANCE, THE UK WOULD BE GLAD TO HAVE US CARRY THE WHOLE BURDEN OF DEFENSE. ALSO SAID WITH EMPHASIS THAT UK WOULD BE IN THE COMMON MARKET AND CLOSE RELATIONS WITH FRANCE WOULD BE RESTORED WHEN THE UK MADE UP ITS MIND TO BE A REAL EUROPEAN POWER INSTEAD OF TRYING TO LIVE IN THREE WORLDS-- THE COMMONWEALTH, THE SPECIAL RELATION WITH THE US,

When?

AND

~~SECRET~~

-Bdler

3/28/62

~~TOP SECRET~~

March 29, 1962

Minutes of the Meeting of the National Security Council
Wednesday, March 28th, 10:30 AM

The President opened the meeting by saying he was glad to have the Secretary of State and his team back; that they had done a good job and he had heard from the Secretary, in particular, of the helpfulness of Dr. Wiesner, Commissioner Haworth and Dr. Press.

The Secretary of State said he wanted to report on three topics: testing, general disarmament, and Berlin. On testing, it was utterly clear that the Soviets would accept no inspection in the USSR, in any way, shape or form. They had made this position plain in public and in private; Gromyko had told the Secretary privately that even one foreigner loose in the Soviet Union could find things out that could be most damaging to the USSR. There seemed no room to negotiate on this point, nothing to talk about and no Soviet proposal except a draft of November which contained no provision whatever for inspection. The Soviets had argued that inspection was not necessary, adding hints that they had special instruments which could provide all the necessary information, but they had refused the challenge of Lord Home to produce their instruments or to deal with the arguments of Western Scientists on this point.

Thus the problem was that of getting our position clear to other countries. The Secretary felt able to report that in Geneva at least two points had now been made clear. One was that the notion of espionage is nonsense. The Secretary referred to the paper, prepared for his use by the U. S. Delegation, which made clear the impossibility of serious espionage under the system of control and inspection of the April treaty. Secondly, he thought the Neutrals now understood the difference between detection and identification. In making this distinction clear, the support of the scientific group had been particularly helpful. As a result, the Burmese had told the Secretary that a secret vote on these issues would go 12-3 for us against the Soviet Union, although

~~TOP SECRET~~

MSF / 3/17 / 1 copy in files 2/62 - 5/62

for political reasons many delegations could not make a public statement on our side. The Secretary thought Brazil and Mexico might be very helpful. But he thought we had much more work to do with the nonaligned countries in general.

The President asked whether we should plan to make a statement on these matters, and after some discussion it was agreed that a draft should be prepared for possible use in the President's press conference on Thursday, March 29th. Such a statement might be based on a welcome to the Secretary and then go on to make some of these basic points in support of the U. S. Position and in clarification of the adamant Soviet refusal to accept any inspection whatever.

The Secretary then pointed out that we would get pressure to delay our tests. Some delegations will urge us not to "wreck" the conference by testing. The Secretary remarked that Soviet testing had not wrecked discussion in 1961 nor had we received pressure from other countries not to talk to the Soviet Union because of its tests. We thought the Disarmament Committee's work would go on for a very long time indeed, although there would be interim pauses like the reporting dates scheduled for June let. He had looked at the forward calendar and it looked to him that there would never be a really good time for testing. We must resist such pressure for delay.

Turning to the problem of general disarmament, the Secretary remarked that the Soviets had brought in a complete treaty covering complete disarmament by stages. But the Soviet position clearly allows only for inspection of disarmament and not of retained armaments. Gromyko had remarked to the Secretary that the attitude toward inspection which was evident on the testing issue would be multiplied many times in the field of general disarmament. The Secretary himself believed that the requirement for inspection would be much greater in the general disarmament field. There is thus no sign of an agreement on this critical point in the field of general disarmament.

There remained what the conference had taken to calling "collateral points" on which some agreement could perhaps be reached: examples were outer space, surprise attack, and the non-diffusion of nuclear weapons. But in the latter case the Secretary foresaw complex and tough negotiations with respect to our possible need for a

NATO deterrent force. Gromyko had said that we must not use third parties in order to provide weapons to Strauss. He also noted that the Soviets wished a non-diffusion agreement to be quite specifically limited to the two Germanies, perhaps because a more general agreement might collapse for reasons external to Europe, like a Chinese failure to conform.

Mr. Foster, in response to a request for a comment by the Secretary, said he had only two additional points to make; one was the moderation of the slight neutrals, which was in large part the result of the Secretary's own effective presentations. The second was that we did perhaps make a slight advance in keeping the conference on the procedural tracks we wanted instead of those desired by the Soviets. We have avoided making the Soviet treaty the main item on the agenda, and we are securing agreement to our proposal to have two permanent co-chairmen, U.S. and USSR. On balance, the tone of the meeting was better than we had expected.

The Secretary then made the comment that from a number of sources the delegation had received the impression that Soviet Armed Forces may be significantly weaker than we think. Thus it had been argued that our proposal of a 30% reduction would create an imbalance against the Soviet Union, and some of the satellites had indicated that this imbalance would be produced because we were stronger in strategic forces than the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government also seemed embarrassed by our proposal for handling over 50,000 kgs. of nuclear materials because they did not wish to admit an inferiority of nuclear resources -- so they had taken the strange course of asserting that 50,000 kgs. is an insignificant amount.

Mr. McCone asked the Secretary to comment on the difference between the present Soviet position of inspection and the position in favor of inspection that had been stated very plainly by Khrushchev in a letter to President Eisenhower in 1959. The Secretary said that the Soviets had clearly reversed themselves.

Then followed a discussion of means of influencing neutral opinion. It was suggested that one important forum was the UN, and Dr. Wisner also urged visits to leaders of selected countries, because without face-to-face encounter one could not tell just what kind of ignorance or misunderstanding one might need to deal with.

The Secretary then turned to Berlin. Here we are no nearer the substance of an agreement but there is a change in tone. At the beginning of the meeting the Soviets had been willing to talk, but the initiative for conversations had come from us. At the end of the meeting the initiative had come from them, and Gromyko had made it plain in his closing statements that they are committed to further bilateral conversations. Yet they are still trying to convert us to their basic view and have not yet really considered our arguments in favor of a modus vivendi which recognizes the fact of basic disagreement.

But the Soviet Union has made proposals on occasions which, if they could be separated from their unacceptable position on Western troops in West Berlin, would be helpful and worth considering carefully. They also showed some interest in our notions of a modus vivendi.

On the other hand, we did not get much help from Gromyko on harassment in Berlin. He professed ignorance of these harassments both at the beginning and the end of the meeting. The Secretary recalled his firm dealings with Gromyko on the chaff issue and remarked that he had been troubled to discover only later that chaff had been dropped in these areas many times before, although perhaps in not so dangerous or calculated a fashion. The President remarked that he also was troubled, and in response to the President's question the Secretary said that Lord Howe seemed also not to have known the history of chaff when he made a still stronger statement to Gromyko. The Secretary remarked that he had made it plain to Gromyko at the end that we would listen both to what the Soviets said and to what happened in Berlin.

In summary, the Secretary indicated his belief that we must match the Soviets in patience and in persistence in these discussions. They were quite willing to play their long-playing record over and over again, and we should be ready to do the same thing. We should keep at it, clearly and continuously. These discussions had not moved very far because Gromyko had been bound closely by his instructions, but we had kept right on showing our views of the way of moving the problems forward. The conversations had been courteous and sober. Gromyko had personally been affable and friendly. The meeting took place with no indication of an impasse. The Secretary reported that the Germans and the French

had been kept informed -- although he later advised all concerned to protect the fact of contact with the French (because General de Gaulle is not informed of it).

Mr. Kohler added that the German attitude had been excellent. The Secretary concluded by saying that there was a lot of raw material from these conversations and that he and his associates hoped to study it closely in the next few days and see if we could formulate new proposals which might remove some suspicions. But progress would be slow. The Secretary believed he had brought back a thin piece of bacon, but we could go on from here.

After thanking the Secretary, the President asked for a brief discussion of a number of separate subjects.

1. On the space negotiations, he was informed that the Department was considering the recommendation of a senior negotiator to take over from Dr. Dryden if the first preliminary soundings with the Soviets are encouraging.
2. On British Guinea, the President asked about the dispatch of an economic mission, and Mr. Ball replied that we are seeking a formula that will not build up Jagan but which will show sympathy with the people of British Guinea. The President reiterated his desire to move forward toward a mission. Secretary Rusk reported Lord Howe's desire to see the problem "Tousled up" by confusions and complexities that might allow the British to escape from it.
3. The President asked about Indonesia and it was agreed that a draft letter to Sukarno would be coming over today. Meanwhile, the Dutch are moving naval forces and it is clear that we cannot stand further in their way without assuming a direct responsibility for the lives of the Dutch citizens in West New Guinea.
4. On Laos, the President asked when Harriman would return, and it was agreed that the matter would be discussed very promptly after his arrival, which was scheduled for mid-day.

PHOTOCOPIED BY THE KENNEDY LIBRARY DUE TO THE VALUE OF THE ORIGINAL

3519

SECRET

25

7/29/63

~~SECRET~~

March 29, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM R. TYLER

1. The purpose of your mission is to obtain from the Chancellor an early decision with respect to German participation in a Multilateral Force. This is necessary if such a Force is to become a reality in the usefully near future. You should make clear the United States position on the two principal outstanding issues relating to the establishment of such a Force: (a) the problem of political control, and (b) the problem of submarines versus surface ships.

2. You should convey to the Chancellor our view that the MLF would be of major political importance and that it would also constitute a significant contribution to the military strength of the Alliance. You should also make clear our view that the concept of an MLF is valid only if in fact it meets European aspirations for a greater degree of participation in the nuclear defense of the Alliance, and that the United States does not seek the establishment of such a Force for the advancement of its own interests. We view the MLF as an opportunity whereby European aspirations for a greater nuclear role can be channeled into constructive and useful directions that will contribute to and reinforce the goal of European political unification and Atlantic partnership.

3. The United States believes that if a decision is to be made to proceed with the establishment of an MLF, the time factor is most important. We would hope to be able to present to our Congress for consent to ratification by September a final treaty establishing such a Force. This would mean that a Preparatory Commission, consisting of the major prospective participants, should meet by about July 1 for the purpose of drafting such a treaty. This, in turn, would mean that a Preliminary Agreement, which would settle certain key issues and serve in effect as a "letter of intent" to establish such a

1487/3519

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, SEC 1.3
by <i>msm</i> NOK-85-37 NARA Date 7/87

~~SECRET~~

PHOTOCOPIED BY THE KENNEDY LIBRARY DUE TO THE VALUE OF THE ORIGINAL

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

force, must be signed in June. Before instructions can be given to Ambassador Merchant to complete negotiation of such a Preliminary Agreement, it will be necessary for the Administration to undertake intensive Congressional consultations, on the basis of a firm plan, setting forth how the MLF would be composed, and how it would operate. The United States Administration should be in a position to initiate such consultations in April. Otherwise the schedule will have to be deferred and momentum will be lost in a degree which could jeopardize the success of the entire venture.

4. You should inform the Chancellor of the basic positions which the United States Administration is now prepared to put before the Congress if we know that these positions constitute an acceptable basis for proceeding to our major allies:

a. Submarines versus Surface Ships. The United States would be prepared to participate in the MLF if the initial mode is surface ships. This is in part because of the practical military and economic considerations which lead us strongly to favor surface ships, and in part because the lack of clear military and economic advantage for submarines would make it difficult, if not impossible, to convince the Congress, at least within an early time frame, that the nuclear-powered submarine should be adopted as the initial deployment mode. This is not a matter of enforcing a selection of surface ships for solely political internal U.S. reasons, however. As Ambassador Merchant has explained, our strong preference for the surface ships is based essentially on:

*1. Census?
a. Census
copy to
from*

(i) The advantages of starting such a complicated venture as the MLF in a mode of deployment which does not unduly compound the problems posed by this novel enterprise;

(ii) The possibility of achieving an important division of labor among the participants in ship construction, which would allow the Force to be more truly a common venture;

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

this would probably be effectively precluded in the case of submarines;

(iii) The earlier availability of surface ships;

(iv) The fact that surface ships, operating as they would in the context and locale of European territorial waters, have no important disadvantages in terms of vulnerability as compared with submarines, and will create new and serious targetting problems with which the Soviets will have to cope and for which there is no known counterforce;

(v) The cost advantages of surface ships. These considerations, together with the necessity of persuading Congress of the desirability of U.S. participation, which will in any event involve amendment of the Atomic Energy Act to allow transfer of U.S. nuclear weapons to the MLF, lead us to believe that insistence on the nuclear-powered submarine as the initial mode of deployment could make agreement in the foreseeable future highly uncertain. The MLF would either not be approved by the U.S. Congress or two or three years would be added to getting the Force started, particularly since 1964 will be an election year. We therefore hope that the German Government would opt for surface ships as the initial mode for the Force. In this case the United States is prepared to put a definite proposition for the initial Force before the U.S. Congress in the near future. (The figure of 25 surface ships for the initial Force is not immutable, although the initial Force should make a substantial contribution to the Western deterrent if it is to serve our objectives.) You should indicate, in accordance with the White House memorandum of March 23 to the Secretaries of State and Defense: "the possibility that future expansion or modernization of the Force could involve submarines, rather than surface ships."

~~SECRET~~

PHOTOCOPIED BY THE KENNEDY LIBRARY DUE TO THE VALUE OF THE ORIGINAL

*War heads
Control*

~~SECRET~~

PHOTOCOPIED BY THE KENNEDY LIBRARY DUE TO THE VALUE OF THE ORIGINAL

b. Political Decision Regarding Release and Use of Nuclear Weapons in the MLF. The views on control outlined by Ambassador Merchant remain valid. The initial control system should be such that the basic decision to fire would require U.S. concurrence. We believe that the principle of unanimity, at least among major participants, in this decision offers equal control to all participants and does not perpetuate a U.S. monopoly -- especially since all participants will share in possession and control of the warheads. However, we do not object to arrangements among the European participants in the MLF whereby their own participation in the decision on release and use of weapons would be made on a basis other than that of unanimity among themselves. The Chancellor should understand that we see the MLF as the start of an evolutionary process toward new military arrangements within the Atlantic Community. In this connection, you should indicate, in accordance with my instructions of February 21 to Ambassador Merchant, that: "Any initial arrangements reached about control, as about other aspects of the Force, could, of course, be re-examined and reopened as we all gain experience with the MLF." This assurance has already been given to the Federal Republic of Germany. We are not able, however, to agree at this point that at some defined point of time, another system for political control would be instituted.

5. You should make clear that it is not our intention or desire to impose a choice upon Germany or the other prospective participants in these two areas. You should stress, however, that the United States Administration believes that it will be possible to achieve Congressional support for initiation of the MLF on the basis of the surface ship platform and on the basis described in respect of the political decision on release and use of weapons. If the Federal Republic of Germany is ready to move ahead on the basis outlined, we will promptly begin Congressional consultations and instruct Ambassador Merchant to seek to negotiate by June a Preliminary Agreement incorporating these points. If, on the other

~~SECRET~~

PHOTOCOPIED BY THE KENNEDY LIBRARY DUE TO THE VALUE OF THE ORIGINAL

hand, our allies do not wish to act now and desire to delay a decision at this time, we are prepared to accept such a judgment and look to the future.

6. It is recognized that the Chancellor will not probably be able to give a definite and clear-cut answer in the course of your discussions with him. Nevertheless, you should be able to get a considerable impression of the bent of his mind. If in your judgment there is a considerable chance that his eventual decision will be negative, you should make it plain to him that in the event that the German Government is unwilling to proceed, both the U.S. and the Federal Republic will face a serious problem for developing an alternative course of action which will meet the legitimate interests of Germany and the common concern for reinforcing NATO.

*Induced views
for use etc.
I used cover*

3/29/63 (4)
46

~~SECRET~~

March 29, 1963

Dear Mr. Chancellor:

Ambassador Merchant has given me a full report of his conversation with you in Bonn and his discussion with other high officials of the Federal Republic.

I am glad to know that your Government supports the concept of a multilateral force and is prepared to join in its development.

Your country and mine -- along with other members of the Alliance -- have the opportunity to mount a powerful military force of a nature unique in the history of the world -- one which would respond to the increasing threat of Soviet nuclear capabilities.

Such a force -- organized on a multilateral basis -- would have more than military significance. It would meet the healthy desire of the great nations of Europe for a larger role in nuclear defense without contributing to the dangerous situation in which many nations throughout the world would own separate national nuclear forces. It would make a long further step toward effective Atlantic cooperation, and give body and substance to the Atlantic partnership. I am happy to think that Germany and the United States can act together with other allies in the creation of this great enterprise.

My Government is prepared to join in pressing ahead with this venture immediately, and it has occurred to me that you and I and the other heads of governments might be able to sign a general preliminary agreement during my forthcoming visit to Europe. Our two Governments and others have already been discussing the possibility of reaching such

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5(b)

White House Guidelines

By NARA, Date 4/30/97

POF 117/Germany - Security 4/63-11/63

~~SECRET~~

agreement in June, and if we can meet this schedule I think we can sustain the sense of momentum which is essential in these great new international ventures.

But for me there is one important political problem here at home. The multilateral force will require major legislative action in this country, and before I can properly sign a general preliminary agreement, I must have thorough consultation with the Congress and indeed with the American public as a whole. I am ready to undertake this consultation promptly, and, as I say, it is a necessary step on the way to the preliminary agreement which we envisage for June.

But for this consultation to be effective, I must be able to say firmly that this proposal will in fact meet the requirements of the principal prospective participants -- and most of all of the Federal Republic. The Congress will be much more likely to accept the principles of this radical development in our own policy if it can be confident that the prospect of the multilateral force is real and the need in Europe urgent.

On the basis of what you and your colleagues have stated in messages and discussions in recent months, I believe that I might now give this assurance, but I would not think it proper to do so without your express approval, especially with respect to two specific questions which were not fully resolved during Ambassador Merchant's visit. One of these is the mode of deployment of the force -- whether on surface ships or submarines -- and the other the mechanism for political control. Let me set forth my thoughts on each of these issues for you.

I am sure you know that arrangements governing nuclear weapons have been a matter of great national sensitivity in this country from the beginning. We have invested tens of billions of dollars and two decades of effort in the development

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

- 3 -

of our vast atomic arsenal. The American people have learned to think of the American strategic force not only as a great national asset but also as the principal bulwark of Free World defense.

I can lead them to understand that the time has come -- for many reasons -- when we must begin to share nuclear military responsibility with the now strong nations of Europe. But I know that you will appreciate how great a change in traditional American habits of thought is involved in the kind of sharing of nuclear responsibility envisaged in the multi-lateral force.

Against this background I have given the matter careful thought. I am convinced that the initial force should be based on surface vessels. I am convinced further that from the point of military effectiveness we can build a first-class force in this manner. Secretary McNamara -- who has made the most thorough analysis of the problem -- has advised me that, for the uses intended, the balance of advantage clearly weighs in favor of a surface-borne system -- particularly when the factors of timing, ease of operation, and costs are taken into account.

The multilateral force would operate in an environment quite different from that which dictated the design of our United States Polaris submarine system. That system was developed to meet the problems of operating over long distances and in all geographical and military situations around the world. But, in our view, the multilateral force should be specifically related to the defense of Europe. It would deploy in a highly favorable situation where its operating areas would be behind the shield of NATO. It would thus automatically be protected by distance, and by the full air, surface, and anti-submarine defenses of the Alliance, including the Greenland-Iceland-UK barrier. Further, the

SECRET

areas of its intended operation have extensive shallow-water zones, straits, inlets, islands, and long, irregular coastlines. All of these factors could be used to advantage by surface forces.

I recognize that some commentators in Europe are suggesting that surface ships are somehow inferior to submarines and that, therefore, the multilateral force may seem to be a second-class force. I want you to know that our own conviction of the quality of the surface force is so clear that we expect, if this force is agreed on, to be able to make substantial savings in the provision of additional U. S. strategic striking forces which might otherwise be needed to cover the same targets. This Government would not consent to the very substantial investment which it is now willing to make for this force except on the basis of a clear conviction of its first-rate quality.

In order to make progress with this matter, I propose that we now agree on surface ships for the initial multilateral force. The number of ships can be mutually agreed; the force must make a substantial contribution to the Alliance deterrent in order to support the objectives we both have in mind, but the figure of twenty-five ships and two hundred missiles is not immutable.

A decision to go forward now with a surface force would not preclude consideration of submarines at a later stage, if this seems wise, after we have gained operating experience in mixed-manning and other features of joint ownership and control.

Let me turn to the second issue, the question of political control. Ambassador Merchant has already discussed with your Government the method by which the political decision would be taken to release the force for military use. The proposal we have made would call for the unanimous

46

agreement of all major participants. In view of the enormous importance of any decision to use strategic nuclear weapons in the NATO area, it has been our belief that every government playing a major role in the provision of such forces would wish to have a right of concurrence in any such decision to fire. Obviously each government must make its own best judgment on this important matter, but speaking for my country, I must say that in our judgment it is essential that a decision to fire should have the concurrence of the United States. In this judgment I am greatly influenced by the fact that any use of the multilateral force would almost inevitably require the immediate support of the full strategic strength of the Alliance as a whole. Since the overwhelming proportion of this total strategic strength is American, the American Government must have a particularly intense concern with any decision to fire any NATO strategic forces.

Let me point out here that this right of concurrence is one which I should think that your Government too will wish to insist on for itself. In the light of the substantial proportion of the force which your Government is thinking of contributing, and in the light of the exposed forward position of Germany, I should think that any German Government would wish to be assured that the multilateral force would be fired only with its consent. In this respect, I think it is clear that in the current stage of the affairs of the Alliance our two Governments must have a most powerful concern with any decision to use such a force.

But within this limit, I can tell you that we are quite prepared to accept whatever arrangement best suits the other major participants. One method would be the unanimous decision of the major participants which Ambassador Merchant has already suggested. But if other major participants do not insist on the right of concurrence that such a procedure would give each of them, we would support an initial control scheme which required the concurrence of the United States and any combination of the other participants. All that is

~~SECRET~~

- 6 -

necessary at this stage, I think, is that our two countries should be prepared to move forward on this problem on the broad basis which I have outlined above.

With these considerations in mind we have prepared a list of points to be covered in a preliminary agreement, which I am asking Mr. Tyler to show you. I hope you will let me know promptly and candidly whether your Government can go ahead with an agreement along this line. If so, I would be glad immediately to undertake the necessary discussions with Congressional leaders that would make it possible for me to be able to conclude a preliminary agreement in Europe in June.

I have read with interest comments of all sorts on the multilateral force, and I know how easy it is to find weaknesses or limitations in any new arrangements for the nuclear defense of the Alliance. But in these matters it is much easier to be a critic of any proposal than it is to produce a better one, and all of the alternatives which I have heard of seem to me to be much less satisfactory in the long run for the Alliance in general and for our two countries in particular. Thus, it seems to me that it is the proper course now for us to move firmly forward on the basis of a proposal which is clearly good, and not to get bogged down in a profitless search for ideal answers which do not exist.

I am convinced that if we can act promptly together we have a chance now to set in train an enterprise that can fix the direction of nuclear defense along safe and sound lines for future generations -- a direction that will assure the security of the West while, at the same time, preventing developments that might undermine the safety of the world. In addition, we may recapture the momentum toward trans-Atlantic unity which has unhappily been arrested by recent events.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

- 7 -

It is my deepest hope that you and I can now join in this common effort which has such portent for the Atlantic Community as a whole.

Sincerely,

John F. Kennedy

His Excellency Dr. Konrad Adenauer
Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany
Bonn, Germany

SECRET


GERMANY 4/11/63 Mr. Gilpatric R

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

①

51
Action
SS
Info



SECRET

Control: 777
Rec'd: APRIL 1, 1963
4:53 PM

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2593, APRIL 1

PRIORITY
EYES ONLY



FOR SECRETARY FROM TYLER

HAD USEFUL CONVERSATION ON BOARD PLANE SATURDAY NIGHT WITH GENERAL STEINHOFF (GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE WASHINGTON) WITH WHOM I DISCUSSED PURPOSE MY TRIP. HE STRESSED THAT MAJOR ISSUE TO BE RESOLVED IS SURVIVABILITY SURFACE VESSELS. THIS WAS CONFIRMED IN MY CONVERSATIONS TODAY WITH SCHROEDER, WHOM I SAW FOR ONE HOUR WITH AMBASSADOR PRESENT AND STATE SECRETARY GLOBKE. I ALSO HAD SEPARATE CONVERSATIONS WITH FRANZ KRAPP (IN CHARGE NATO AFFAIRS) AND KRONE (MINISTER FOR SPECIAL AFFAIRS). AT EMBASSY LUNCH HAD FURTHER OPPORTUNITY DISCUSS MLF WITH SEVERAL OTHER SENIOR GERMAN OFFICIALS.

- R-1
- O. S. D.
- STRIIBUTION
- Def. ✓
- I. Sec. X
- n. Sec.
- I. Lang. Info
- not.
- Power
- R-1
- CJCS ✓
- E.
- A.
- L.
- m. E.
- S.
- S.
- A.
- A.
- D.
- S.
- ny
- vy
- Force

AFTER I HAD OUTLINED PURPOSE MY VISIT AT SOME LENGTH, SCHROEDER EXPRESSED STRONG SUPPORT FOR MLF WHICH HE SEES PRINCIPALLY IN TERMS OF ITS POLITICAL ADVANTAGE AS IMPARTING NEW STIMULUS TO TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIPS. HE WAS MUCH INTERESTED IN POSSIBILITY OF EXPANDING AND MODERNIZING MLF SO THAT IT COULD ULTIMATELY INCLUDE SUBMARINES, AND SAID THIS QUOTE CHINK OF LIGHT END QUOTE WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN OBTAINING POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR THE FORCE IN GERMANY. TAKING NOTES AS I SPOKE, HE WENT INTO THE POLITICAL CONTROL QUESTION IN SOME DETAIL, AND RAISED NO OBJECTION TO THE FORMULA WHICH I DESCRIBED IN CONFORMITY WITH MY INSTRUCTIONS. HE SAID HE HAD SPOKEN ON THE TELEPHONE WITH THE CHANCELLOR BEFORE MY VISIT, AND THAT HE

DECLASSIFIED

WOULD

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5(b)

Department of State Guidelines

SECRET

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

By: [Signature] NARA, Date: 1/30/97

POP 1117 / Germany - Security 4/63 - 11/63

3

~~SECRET~~

-2- 2593, APRIL 1, FROM BONN

WOULD BE TALKING TO HIM AGAIN BEFORE AMBASSADOR DOWLING AND I ARRIVE AT CADENABBIA. TO SUM UP: SCHROEDER WAS GENERALLY FORTHCOMING, CLEARLY IN FAVOR OF MLF FOR POLITICAL REASONS, AND WHILE HE GAVE NOTHING AWAY IN THE NATURE OF A GOVERNMENT POSITION, SAID NOTHING WHICH LEADS ME TO SUPPOSE THAT HE IS NOT REPEAT NOT IN FAVOR OF A POSITIVE RESPONSE BY THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT TO THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE.

AT ONE POINT, SCHROEDER RAISED THE SUBJECT OF RATIFICATION OF THE FRANCO-GERMAN TREATY. HE OUTLINED THE PRESENT PARLIAMENTARY SITUATION, AND SAID THAT THERE WAS SOME PRESSURE IN CERTAIN QUARTERS (OBVIOUSLY MEANING BRENTANO) FOR AN AMENDMENT TO THE PREAMBLE ON THE TREATY SO AS TO INCLUDE A REFERENCE TO NATO. HE SAID HE WAS PERSONALLY OPPOSED TO THESE IDEAS BECAUSE HE FELT GERMANY'S ADHERENCE TO AND SUPPORT OF OUR COMMON ATLANTIC POLICIES COULD BE BETTER AND MORE CONVINCINGLY EXPRESSED IN THE FORM OF A STRONG RESOLUTION BY THE BUNDESTAG, ENDORSED BY THE GOVERNMENT, AT THE TIME OF RATIFICATION. ADDING THAT HE WAS ASKING THE QUESTION UNOFFICIALLY, HE WONDERED IF I COULD PERSONALLY INDICATE TO HIM WHETHER THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAD A PARTICULAR PREFERENCE. I REPLIED WE CONSIDERED THIS A MATTER FOR THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT TO DECIDE, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALL THE FACTORS WITH WHICH IT WAS ALREADY FAMILIAR. HE DID NOT PRESS THE POINT FURTHER.

I WENT OVER MUCH THE SAME GROUND, THOUGH IN LESS DETAIL, SUBSEQUENTLY WITH KRAPP, WHOSE REACTION WAS GENERALLY SYMPATHETIC. KRAPP RAISED THE QUESTION OF COSTS, AND SAID THAT OWING TO TIGHT BUDGETARY SITUATION, HE THOUGHT THAT FIGURE 800,000,000 DM PER ANNUM WAS LIMIT TO WHICH GERMAN GOVERNMENT COULD GO. LIKE SCHROEDER HE WAS MUCH INTERESTED IN RATIONALE OF TIMETABLE, AND ALSO FELT THAT POSSIBILITY OF REVIEW AT SOME LATER DATE OF COMPOSITION OF FORCE, AND OF FORMULA FOR POLITICAL CONTROL WOULD BE EXTREMELY VALUABLE IN MEETING DOMESTIC POLITICAL RESISTANCE.

CONVERSATION

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

-3- 2593, APRIL 1, FROM BONN

CONVERSATION WITH GLOBKE AGAIN REFLECTED IMPORTANCE WHICH GERMANS ATTACH TO CLARIFICATION OF SURVIVABILITY ISSUE. HE SEEMED FULLY TO APPRECIATE SIGNIFICANCE AND URGENCY OF TIMETABLE, AND RAISED NO OBJECTION TO THE IDEA OF MOVING AHEAD NOW. WHILE LAST WORD OF COURSE RESTS WITH CHANCELLOR, CONSIDER IT POSSIBLY ENCOURAGING THAT NEITHER SCHROEDER NOR GLOBKE FLAGGED ANY DIFFICULTY ON THIS POINT. GLOBKE SHOWED PARTICULAR INTEREST IN POLITICAL CONTROL FORMULA AND SAID THAT GERMAN GOVERNMENT FULLY REALIZED THAT MLF WOULD REPRESENT ONLY SMALL FRACTION OF TOTAL NUCLEAR RESOURCES OF ALLIANCE. THIS, HE SAID, MADE IT NATURAL THAT U.S. SHOULD RETAIN RIGHT OF CONCURRENCE IN UTILIZATION OF FORCE, AND THAT FORCE SHOULD NEVER BE ABLE TO BE USED INDEPENDENTLY OF U.S., NOR HAVE A VETO OVER U.S. NATIONAL STRATEGIC WEAPONS.

IN ALL MY CONVERSATIONS, I STRESSED THAT WE ARE DISPOSED TO PROCEED IMMEDIATELY WITH TECHNICAL CONSULTATIONS IN ORDER TO CLEAR UP SURVIVABILITY ISSUE, AND THAT WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO HOLD THESE EITHER IN WASHINGTON OR BONN. THIS OFFER WAS OBVIOUSLY WELL RECEIVED BY THOSE I TALKED WITH.

MY FINAL TALK WAS WITH KRONE, WHO IS LESS WELL INFORMED ON MLF. HOWEVER HIS ATTITUDE WAS GENERALLY ENCOURAGING, AND THIS IS OF IMPORTANCE BOTH BECAUSE HE IS EXTREMELY CLOSE TO THE CHANCELLOR PERSONALLY, AND BECAUSE HE HAS BEEN ASKED BY HIM TO TAKE OVER CHAIRMANSHIP OF NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL WHICH COULD PLAY IMPORTANT ROLE IN RELATIONS TO MLF IN COMING MONTHS. KRONE EXPRESSED GREAT PLEASURE AT PROSPECT COMING OVER TO U.S. SOME TIME LATE MAY FOR INFORMAL VISIT AND TALKS IN WASHINGTON.

MY GENERAL IMPRESSION ON BASIS MY TALKS TODAY IS POSITIVE, AND THAT IF THERE ARE ANY SERIOUS DOUBTS OR NEGATIVE ATTITUDES WITHIN THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT, THEY MUST BE LURKING SOMEWHERE IN NORTHERN ITALY RATHER THAN ON THE BANKS OF THE RHEIN AT THIS TIME. BELIEVE THAT RAPID AND EFFECTIVE DISSIPATION OF RESERVATIONS ON

PART

SECRET

SECRET

-4- 2593, APRIL 1, FROM BONN

PART OF GERMAN MILITARY WITH REGARD TO SURVIVABILITY SURFACE
MODE POLITICALLY ESSENTIAL IF WE ARE TO OBTAIN RESPONSE FROM
GERMANS WHICH WE ARE SEEKING, AND I RECOMMEND THAT PREPARATIONS
BE UNDERTAKEN IMMEDIATELY FOR CONSULTATIONS TO BE HELD EITHER
IN WASHINGTON OR BONN. MY PERSONAL RECOMMENDATION WOULD BE FOR
LATTER BECAUSE OF PROXIMITY TO GERMAN GOVERNMENT AND TO MILITARY
ELEMENTS WHICH NEED TO BE CONVINCED.

DOWLING

KEA

SECRET

U 19 (63)
M. V. 1/1/63

~~TOP SECRET~~

April 5, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: The MLF and the IANF

Participants: The President; Undersecretary Ball, Messrs. Tyler, Merchant, Smith, Weiss and Admiral Lee of the Department of State; Messrs. Nitze, McNaughton and General Goodpaster of the Department of Defense; Mr. Bundy. (April 5, 1963 - 10:15)

Bill Tyler reported to the President on his MLF discussions with the Germans and the Italians.

He was optimistic about possible German participation. The Germans are supporting the MLF for political reasons. (According to Ambassador Dowling, Schroeder told Adlai Stevenson that if the MLF did not materialize, the Germans would be forced to seek equal status with the British and French.) However, to make the MLF politically viable, the German Government has to be able to make a convincing case for a surface as opposed to a submarine force.

As for the Italians, Bill Tyler felt the principal consideration was German participation. So long as there is no German decision, the Italians will continue to agitate on the issue of the surface vessel vs. the submarine. Bill Tyler said Fanfani also had reservations about mixed manning. He appears particularly concerned about the possible distribution of tasks and wants some assurance that Italian mariners will have the same opportunities as the others.

To deal with the problems created by submarine vs. the surface vessel debate, the President approved a suggestion that Admiral Ricketts lead a mission to Bonn early next week for technical discussions with German officials -- to make the case for the surface ship MLF and give the German Government the arguments it needs to rally the necessary political support for the MLF. The President agreed to Mr. McNaughton's joining Admiral Ricketts and added that Ambassador Dowling should provide the political guidance for the group. He asked also that the Ricketts' mission be adequately staffed with submariners.

To avoid a combined German and Italian maneuver against the surface force, the President decided against joint technical briefings for the

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLK-93-104
By MMB NARA, Date 6/23/94

~~TOP SECRET~~

cc:

NSF 1315 / MAM, mdr in Pres 4/63

Germans and Italians. In fact, the question of arrangements for technical discussions with the Italians was left open since the Italians, unlike the Germans, have not asked for them and in this pre-election period seem reluctant to have them.

Mr. Merchant asked for and was given authority to resume his visit to capitals, going to those he did not reach the last time. The President, however, asked him to by-pass Paris on this round to avoid resurfacing the MLF in NAC at this time.

In view of continued Congressional interest in the Merchant mission, Mr. Bundy undertook to inform the Chairmen of the Joint Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, at an appropriate time, about Merchant's plans to return to Europe.

Before leaving the MLF and the question of the survivability of the surface vessel, there was an inconclusive discussion about the possibility of substituting a Savannah type ship or a conventionally powered submarine for the surface vessel. However, DoD undertook to discuss the security problems of a nuclear powered surface vessel with Admiral Rickover.

It was also agreed to cease calling the surface ships merchant ships and instead refer to them as "surface missile warships". In this connection, Bill Tyler indicated that in his talks with the Europeans, he left open the possibility of considering at a later date -- after the MLF was operational -- the possibility of including nuclear powered submarines in the MLF.

Mr. Nitze took the opportunity to bring the President up to date on the progress of the IANF negotiations. He said he felt the formula now under discussion eliminated the control problem and was less likely than the earlier British blueprint to encounter French obstructionism. In response to the President's question about making the IANF more attractive, Mr. Nitze said he would recommend against considering any changes in the IANF plans prior to the Ottawa meeting, although expansion and/or modification could be considered after that meeting, and particularly if MLF seemed to be failing.

The President also asked about possible tactics for dealing with French obstructionism in NATO. Mr. Nitze said a scenario was under


consideration calling for Mr. Finletter to do some preliminary work with the French and for Secretary Rusk to follow through when he reached Paris.

As a result of this morning's meeting, John McNaughton was asked to prepare necessary instructions for the Ricketts' mission and to send them to the President for approval after the details were worked out by State and Defense.

The Department of State was asked to notify Ambassador Dowling immediately of the Ricketts' mission to assure there was a clear understanding that these meetings would be held in Bonn, rather than in Washington, and get from the Ambassador some sense for timing and arranging the mission.

David Klein





RELEASED

DECLASSIFIED

Sec M 012

5 copies, Series A

3/21/63

S/S

[Handwritten wavy line]

4367

E23

Brandin: jmr

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals; declassified after 12 years

Approved in S 3/26/63
Approved in U 3/26/63

March 21, 1963

TIME: 2:30 p.m.

PLACE: Under Secretary's Conference Room

Berlin

Germans

Dr. Heinrich von Brentano, Chairman, CDU Bundestag Faction
and former German Foreign Minister
Heinrich Knappstein, German Ambassador
Mr. Hermann Kustarar, Interpreter

XXXXXXXX

Americans

The Secretary
The Under Secretary
Mr. Robert M. Brandin, GER

COPIES TO:

See page 3.

During the meeting with Dr. von Brentano, the Secretary had to leave briefly and Dr. von Brentano asked Mr. Ball how the U. S. assessed the Soviet willingness to resume talks on Berlin.

Mr. Ball replied it was hard to say. We sensed a considerable disarray inside the USSR with strong forces moving against each other. For example, there was a force for reconciliation with China which might indicate a hard line on Berlin. There was pressure to allocate resources for military purposes. Agricultural policies had failed and there was increasing consumer demand. These forces apparently distracted the USSR from other problems. We did not get the impression of a strong sense of purpose on the Soviet side regarding Berlin talks but there might be internal reasons which would induce the USSR to put forth new proposals. We are also puzzled by conflicting Soviet actions-- e.g., the apparently sincere Soviet interest in a test agreement versus the rigid position on limiting on-site inspections to two or three rather than ten, which was really a relative matter. Khrushchev was obviously not happy. We did not know why but we were waiting to see what would happen. Mr. Ball asked what Bonn's appraisal was.

Dr. von Brentano said the Federal Government fully agreed that the resumption of talks was necessary because the world situation would not permit a priori rejection. The Federal Government was not optimistic, however, because willingness to talk did not indicate a change in position. Soviet policy was burdened in

two

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RELEASE
 EXCISE
 DENY
 DELETE Non-Responsive Info
FOIA Exemptions _____
PA Exemptions _____

DECLASSIFY
 DECLASSIFY IN PART

IS/FPC/CDR *[initials]*

MR Cases Only: *[initials]*

EM Citations _____

DECLASSIFY as _____
DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C OADR
TS authority to () S or () C OADR

Date: 1/24/92

ORIG TO RMR FOR DISTRIBUTION 3/27/63

NSA

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

two ways. First there was the internal criticism against the agricultural situation, production priorities and administrative policies, which indicated unrest. The economic situation was bad. Second there was the conflict with China. The Communist system could not admit peaceful co-existence because by nature it had to be dynamic. This made it difficult for Khrushchev to explain his views to his supporters inside Russia and abroad. Tagliatti and other foreign communists in turn had difficulty in justifying their position. At the same time there was steady Chinese criticism that it was treasonable to believe in peaceful solutions. Dr. von Brentano observed that critics inside the USSR might be more dangerous today than under Stalin.

Later the Secretary said that he expected to see the Soviet Ambassador next week to discuss the Berlin question. He noted that the USSR did not seem to be in a hurry and had framed the objective of the talks in the same old words.

Dr. von Brentano agreed it was the same old formula and not the better for repetition.

The Secretary humorously added that it was his ambition to hand Berlin to his successor.

Dr. von Brentano replied that the Federal Government was also modest in its aims.

GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3-year intervals.
Declassified 12 years after
date of origin.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

COPIES TO:

S/S2^{cc}
G
S/P
S/AL
EUR
BTF
GER-2
SOV
INR

DOD/OSD
DOD/MSA
White House^{cc}

Amembassy MOSCOW
Amembassy LONDON
Amembassy BONN
Amembassy PARIS
USBER-BERLIN
USRO-PARIS

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

RELEASED

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
LIMIT DISTRIBUTION - S/S
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1522
3/26/63
E24

Approved by S
3/28/63

Memorandum of Conversation

2

DATE: March 26, 1963

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FPC/CDR

Date: 3:13 p.m. 9/20/92

SUBJECT: Berlin

RELEASE
 EXCISE
 DENY
 DELETE Non-Responsive Info
FOIA Exemptions _____
PA Exemptions _____

DECLASSIFY
 DECLASSIFY
IN PART

MR Cases Only:
EO Citations _____

TS authority to:

CLASSIFY as S or C OADR
 DOWNGRADE TS to S or C OADR

PARTICIPANTS: US

The Secretary
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. Hillenbrand

Anatolij F. Dobrynin, Ambassador of USSR
Georgi M. Kornienko, Counselor, Embassy

COPIES TO:

S/S-2	S/AL	White House	Ambassy PARIS
S/MF	EUR	DOD/OSD	USBER Berlin
G	BTF	Amembassy MOSCOW	
Gov. Harriman	SOV	Amembassy BONN	
S/P	GER	Amembassy LONDON	

After an initial exchange of pleasantries, Ambassador Dobrynin read a prepared statement along the following lines (translation from Russian text handed us informally):

"In connection with the agreement reached with the Ambassador of the United States in Moscow, Mr. Kohler, the Soviet Government has instructed me to continue, taking into account the exchange of opinions which took place in 1961 and 1962, the discussion of concrete questions in connection with a German peace settlement and normalization of the situation in West Berlin. For its part, the Soviet Government will strive to make the discussion of these questions constructive. It would like to express the hope that this attitude toward the matter will also be shown on the part of the United States and that the exchange of opinions will be concluded in the nearest future with the achievement of the agreement necessary in the interests of strengthening peace and security in Europe.

"In the course of the earlier exchange of opinions the parties succeeded in reaching definite results on well-known questions in connection with a German peace settlement. There was also achieved definite mutual understanding concerning the necessity for normalization on this basis of the situation in West Berlin taking into account actually existing conditions which came about on German territory as a result of the past war.

"The main question on which it was not possible to overcome differences is the question of the presence of foreign troops in West Berlin. The Chairman

of the

FORM 3-61 DS-1254(T)

SECRET

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION - S/S

DECLASSIFIED

GPO 808891

N38

DECLASSIFIED

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION S/S

SECRET

- 2 -

of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, N.S. Khrushchev, has pointed out repeatedly that the Government of the USSR in principle is not against the presence in West Berlin of troops of the three powers, if the Western powers attach importance to this at the present time. However, the troops which may be stationed in West Berlin for purposes of guarantees must be there not under the NATO flag, but under the UN flag. Their stay in West Berlin, of course, must not be permanent. The occupation regime in this city has outlived itself, and it must be liquidated. In order to impart a truly international character to the guarantees for West Berlin it is necessary, as the Soviet Government has emphasized many times, to include in the composition of UN troops in West Berlin also military units of certain other UN member states, according to an appropriate agreement.

"The Soviet Government is convinced that this proposal is a good basis for reaching an agreement on this most difficult and acute question. Unfortunately, the Government of the USA still has not expressed its attitude toward this proposal, and this proposal still has not been subjected to concrete discussion.

"The Soviet Government, as in the past, maintains the opinion that the most sensible solution of the question of the normalization of the situation in West Berlin, and a solution which corresponds most to the conditions of peace time, would be its transformation into an independent political entity--a free, demilitarized city. Such a solution would also take into account the wishes of the Western powers with regard to freedom of access to West Berlin consonant with requisite respect for the sovereignty of the GDR and guarantee to the population of this city the right to decide by itself questions of its social-economic system, to retain that way of life which it most prefers.

"Naturally, we proceed from the fact that in appropriate form those positive results will be realized which were achieved by the previous exchange of opinions by the parties on the questions of: finalizing and strengthening of the existing German borders; guarantee of free access to West Berlin; respect for the sovereignty of the GDR; precluding the armament of the FRG and the GDR with nuclear weapons; conclusion of a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty organization.

"We hope that the resumption of the Soviet-American exchange of opinions will be a step forward in the direction of a solution of the problem of drawing a line under the Second World War, the fundamental improvement of the situation in Europe and the consolidation of universal peace.

"An agreement on a German peace settlement and a normalization on this basis of the situation in West Berlin would have great significance also from the point of view of creating more favorable conditions for solving the problem of disarmament and strengthening confidence between the USSR and the USA, as well as among other states.

"We understand

SECRET

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION S/S
DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION - S/S

SECRET

- 3 -

"We understand that, in such important international questions as the question of a German peace settlement and normalization of the situation in West Berlin, there are many aspects which have to be considered in working out agreed decisions. But given the presence of good will and a sincere desire for reaching agreement, without a doubt it would be possible to overcome existing difficulties and to come to an agreement which would take into account the interests of all parties.

"The Soviet Government anticipates that the results of the exchange of opinions will be fruitful and, after they have been agreed upon by each of the parties with its allies, arrangements can be made concerning the manner and method for definitive formulation of agreement."

The Secretary commented that, as far as we are concerned, we are prepared to explore the present situation. Although Berlin is a subject which is a vital matter to both sides, we thought it should not be allowed to assume crisis proportions. Although there were some in the West who questioned the value of these discussions, as far as the President was concerned, we were willing to explore the subject further. It should be no surprise that we do not accept the specific Soviet formula regarding a peace settlement and the normalization of the Berlin situation on that basis as an appropriate description for the exercise. We would describe it in more general terms. We think there is a point in exploration, if thereby the question can be reduced in size and importance. This does not mean that the subject is less serious to us than before as a major US responsibility. Ambassador Dobrynin was familiar with the inherent difficulties in the problem.

The Secretary continued by asking whether, in Ambassador Dobrynin's judgment, there had not been a reduction in the tensions surrounding Berlin during recent weeks and months. There seemed to be somewhat less tension in the GDR and the relations between the Germans themselves likewise seemed to be somewhat less tense. We were interested in the agreement between the Federal Republic and Poland for the establishment of trade offices as indicative of a reduction of tension in the area. Ambassador Dobrynin said he could accept this assessment but would not over-emphasize the easing of the situation. Basically the situation was still an uneasy one since it was unbalanced with the essential issues remaining unsolved. He said he would like to explore with the US the Soviet proposals for the replacement of the NATO flag in Berlin by the flag of the United Nations. This exploration could take place in a concrete way, on an item by item basis, either in connection with a Soviet proposal or "in connection with your list."

The Secretary asked whether Dobrynin had any further idea with respect to the UN involvement contemplated? Did he have any further thoughts on this?

Ambassador Dobrynin

SECRET

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION - S/S

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION - S/S

SECRET

- 4 -

Ambassador Dobrynin said he was prepared to discuss the question fully. How the Soviets felt about the role of UN troops had been mentioned to Ambassador Kohler on December 3, 1962 by Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov. What the Soviets propose is to replace the troops presently in West Berlin with, say, a force made up one half of troops of the three Western powers and the other half of troops from other UN countries (perhaps one or two neutral countries, one or two other NATO countries and one or two other Warsaw Pact countries). These troops would stay there on the basis of a guarantee. But this subject had never been discussed concretely. The Soviets had never received a detailed reply on this issue. They wanted to start from the point where the talks with the US had left off, that is to start with an exploration of the last Soviet offer.

The Secretary observed that this proposal was one of several which the Soviets have made over a period of time. Thus, for example, they had started with the idea of Western and Soviet troops in West Berlin, then introduced the idea of NATO-Warsaw Pact troops, and then the UN had been brought into the picture. The difficulty about these proposals, the Secretary continued, is that they are unbalanced. They did not seem to show that element of reciprocity which he had stressed before. A basic factor on the German scene since the end of the war is that the Four Powers were to hold Berlin in trust for the German people. It had been the capital of Germany and in all likelihood would be again. The Four Powers were to hold it for this purpose. To forget Berlin and to take only West Berlin destroyed this basic idea. To dilute the Western forces worked against the security of Berlin. When he had inquired, the Secretary noted, the Soviets had made clear that they were referring only to West Berlin. This was the reason why the discussions had not gone very far forward. It is difficult to find a solution to the whole without thinking of the parts, but it is also difficult to find a solution for the parts without reference to the whole. The Soviets have left open the possibility of the Germans coming together to discuss reunification. The Soviets have suggested one procedure to achieve reunification, we another. In any event Berlin belongs to the Germans. We have tried not to tear it out of context. If there is to be a change, we have felt it should apply to Berlin as a whole and an imbalance in proposals created a serious problem for us.

We have not understood, the Secretary continued, what is "really in your mind" on the point which the Soviets have made about the Western troops in Berlin being NATO troops. In the sense that the US is a member of NATO they might be considered to be such. But the Berlin garrison has never been assigned to or constituted a part of the NATO forces. To think of West Berlin as a NATO base is not realistic on either military or political grounds. If we were looking for a NATO base, we wouldn't put it in West Berlin. We wondered if there were something here which we had not fully understood. Why was this NATO aspect of such concern to the Soviets? The presence of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in the Berlin area was, if anything, a stabilizing factor. The Secretary said he did not think the Soviets wanted a situation

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION - S/S

where the

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION - S/S

SECRET

- 5 -

where the Four Powers did not share the responsibility for a final settlement in Germany. We attached some importance to the Four Power responsibility as a stabilizing element pending a final settlement of the German question.

The Secretary went on to say that we had not replied in detail with respect to a particular UN formula for reasons which he had mentioned. Another way to test such a formula would be to put oneself in the position of a West Berliner. What would he think of it?

At one point, the Secretary continued, Gromyko and he had been considering whether it would be useful to talk further on the access problem and to see what might be worked out on this subject. However, this broke down because it quickly became a question of access to what. The Secretary said he did not know if it would be useful to think of the access problem a bit. Today the Ambassador and he were just exploring.

As an analogy, the Secretary observed, we thought it useful to complete the nuclear test treaty even though we did not know the precise number of inspections which could be agreed. An arrangement could be discussed to protect our security interests as against Soviet interest in avoiding espionage. We still thought it useful to complete the treaty text, although there was still no agreement on the number of inspections. We might likewise consider whether there was any point in talking about the access problem. He did not, however, see quite how to take hold of this. In the background there was always the problem of troops. The Soviets have said that the presence of some Western troops is not an obstacle, but the dilution of that presence, not on the basis of reciprocity and for a limited time, makes this a real problem. The Soviets had proposed a period of four years, for example. The Secretary said he did not know a better way to undermine the confidence of the West Berlin population than this.

Ambassador Dobrynin said he could not accept what the Secretary had said about Four Power responsibility. The fact is that West Germany, East Germany and West Berlin exist as "separate states," if one could use this term. After 17 years the responsibility of the Four was not the same as in 1945. Their responsibility then was to conclude a peace treaty with Germany. The Soviets have nothing against reunification or against finding a formula which would mention reunification. The Soviets would not oppose agreement between the two Germanies on this subject.

As to access, Ambassador Dobrynin continued, since the main point at issue was the troop question, that is the question of access to whom, it would be easier to find a solution to the access problem after the troop question were settled. The analogy which the Secretary had drawn with the nuclear test discussions proved just the opposite of what the Secretary had indicated. There was a need to reach agreement on specific figures first, the nuclear test discussions has shown. Therefore, the Soviets felt the troop question was the most difficult and that the question was how to substitute

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION - S/S

the UN flag

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION - S/S

SECRET

- 6 -

the UN flag for the NATO flag. The Soviets were prepared to discuss this item by item. They were prepared to continue discussions to find a way to an agreement. Their suggestion is that the two sides begin with a more detailed discussion of the Soviet proposal, item by item. Then they could take a look at the status of West Berlin and discuss this item by item. The Soviets did not refuse to discuss the access question but they thought that the two should begin with the most difficult question: access to whose troops and the basis of a change from NATO to the UN.

The Secretary said he considered the conversation today in the nature of a preliminary exploratory talk. We had wanted to hear from Dobrynin the basis on which Foreign Minister Gromyko had raised the Berlin question with Ambassador Kohler. We would expect to go over these matters again. Ambassador Dobrynin commented that the discussion was preliminary to the preliminaries.

The Secretary noted that he was not talking about delay as such but he could remember saying to Gromyko at one point that time has a way of taking care of some of these questions. He was not sure that there were not developments in Central Europe, to which the Soviets presumably agreed and to which we had no objections, which tended to take some of the danger from the situation. For example, there was the agreement between Poland and the Federal Republic to exchange trade missions. A few years ago, the Poles seemed to have more concern about the Federal Republic than today in the light of their present willingness to establish relations of this kind. The Secretary asked what elements Dobrynin saw as imposing urgency in the present situation. After all, there was nothing magical about 17 years.

Ambassador Dobrynin said the recent agreement between Poland and the Federal Republic was perhaps a hopeful but certainly an isolated sign. Such improved trade relations were not tantamount to a real improvement in basic factors. Although he did not want to raise this question now, he could only cite the famous pipe example. Today the West Germans make an agreement with Poland; tomorrow Adenauer might overturn this agreement. There was no stability in the present situation. He could not agree that everything was moving in one direction. Other developments were moving in an unfavorable direction, for example with respect to non-proliferation or the West German claim to have rights in West Berlin. The question of a multilateral force was certainly not a hopeful one. Delay could not be justified in the hope of improvement. The situation might be even more complicated in a year or two. The Secretary commented that he himself thought that the trend was not in an unfavorable direction. Dobrynin cited the growing influence of the Federal Republic in NATO as another unfavorable trend. He went on to say that the unsettled question of Berlin affected relations between the US and Soviet Union.

In response to the Secretary's query as to how he saw developments in East Germany, Dobrynin said that the GDR was more actively participating in

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION - S/S

SECRET

CEMA.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET DISTRIBUTION - S/S
SECRET

- 7 -

CEMA. It was joining other Eastern European countries in increasing economic specialization.

The Secretary asked what the Soviet Government had in mind when it talked of a limited time for any arrangement on Berlin. What happened thereafter? Dobrynin said that West Berlin would then become a free neutralized city with some UN presence and certain guarantees given by "your country and my country." The Soviet Union was prepared to give guarantees. The UN headquarters could be put near Mayor Brandt's office, if this were desired. The limited time, therefore, referred to the Western troop presence, the Secretary observed. Dobrynin noted that the time period was to be four years in the Soviet proposal. The Soviets were prepared to discuss all of this.

The Secretary said that perhaps we had better plan to sit down for a systematic review of these points to see if there are any possibilities. Dobrynin asked whether the US would prepare a list. The Secretary observed that, as Dobrynin had gathered, the question of Western troop presence is a fundamental point for us. We were responsible for the security of West Berlin. He wanted to mention again the importance of reciprocity. Ambassador Dobrynin suggested that they take item by item during the next discussion. The Secretary assented and noted that our purpose was to talk about anything reasonable. Both he and Ambassador Thompson stressed that this did not mean acceptance of the presence of a UN flag in West Berlin for a NATO flag which was not there. The question of a UN flag for the Warsaw Pact flag in East Berlin would also have to be discussed.

Ambassador Dobrynin commented that the Secretary knew the Soviet position with respect to East Berlin. It was a part of East Germany both practically and juridically. On the other hand, from the Western viewpoint, West Berlin had a special status and was never part of the Federal Republic. He was not instructed to discuss the situation in East Berlin point by point. There was nothing new in this Soviet position.

The Secretary observed that this is where the point of reciprocity came in. The Soviets did not want to discuss those subjects about which they had tied a string. Yet they did not have any responsibilities in West Berlin which we did not have in East Berlin. Ambassador Dobrynin commented that the situation was different. Ambassador Thompson noted that the situation was different because we had kept it different. Dobrynin said that East Berlin was part of the GDR, and the Secretary pointed out that it was a part of the city of Berlin. Dobrynin said that the Soviet Union did not oppose the unification of Berlin as a capital of a reunited Germany. The Soviets had nothing against reunification, though it was difficult to discuss practical points as to how it could be achieved.

The Secretary said that, in the next talk, each should review the position from his point of view. Acceptance of such a review would not mean acceptance

SECRET DISTRIBUTION - S/S
SECRET

in principle

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION - S/S
SECRET

- 8 -

in principle of the other's position. They could spend some time in a systematic review. Dobrynin suggested that, in order to begin with something, they should start with the Soviet proposal.

The Secretary recalled that, from time to time, we had mentioned three levels of discussion: a final settlement of the German question, a factual solution and a modus vivandi. Did Ambassador Dobrynin see any remote possibility that we could find a final solution to the German question, for example along the lines of our 1959 proposal? Dobrynin said he did feel we could reach some practical arrangement. The Secretary said both should review the background of the talks and go over them systematically.

The Secretary and Ambassador Dobrynin agreed that, in response to press inquiries, they would say merely that they had begun their exchange of views. If queried as to whether any new proposals had been made, they would say that this was just the beginning of talks and no papers had been exchanged.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION - S/S

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

TELEGRAM

Department of State

248

Replaces
earlier
copy

4/8/63

10

Action
SS

Control: 6212
Rec'd: APRIL 8, 1963
4:31 PM

Info

FROM: PARIS
TO: Secretary of State
NO: SECTO 9, APRIL 8, 9 PM

Cy # 3 dist 4/9/63

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

EYES ONLY FOR PRESIDENT AND ACTING SECRETARY FROM SECRETARY

TOGETHER WITH AMBASSADOR BOHLEN WE HAD ABOUT AN HOUR'S CONVERSATION WITH DE GAULLE. THE ATMOSPHERE WAS EASY AND RELAXED. HE SENT HIS REGARDS TO YOU AND SAID THAT HE THOUGHT OF YOU OFTEN AND ALWAYS WITH FRIENDSHIP. DE GAULLE GENERALLY AGREED WITH MY OUTLINING OF THE THREE POINTS OF DANGER IN THE WORLD - LAOS, CUBA AND BERLIN. ON LAOS HE SAID THAT FRANCE OF COURSE WAS NOT THINKING OF ANY DIRECT MILITARY INVOLVEMENT BUT THAT IF SOUVANNA PHOUMA WHOM WE ALL SUPPORTED ASKED FOR SOME ASSISTANCE OF MATERIAL, ETC., WE SHOULD TRY AND GIVE IT TO HIM. ON CUBA HE MERELY THANKED ME FOR THE INFORMATION BUT STATED THAT IN HIS VIEW THERE SEEMED TO BE VERY LITTLE CHANCE OF ANY IMMEDIATE DANGER. HE REPEATED HIS DECLARATION OF LAST OCTOBER THAT IF CUBA SHOULD INVOLVE WORLD WAR, FRANCE WOULD BE WITH THE US. HE AGREED WITH MY ANALYSIS OF BERLIN AND SAID HE HAD ALWAYS THOUGHT THERE WOULD BE NO AGREEMENT WITH THE RUSSIANS UNLESS THE ALLIES WERE PREPARED TO CONCEDE ONE. WE SHOULD MAINTAIN OUR PRESENT POSITIONS BOTH DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY.

DE GAULLE LISTENED TO MY ACCOUNT OF THE QUESTION OF NON-PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS BUT THEN ASKED BLUNTLY IF WE REALLY BELIEVED THAT SOONER OR LATER GERMANY WOULD NOT HAVE THEIR OWN NUCLEAR WEAPONS NO MATTER WHAT WE OR THEY DID AND ALSO THE SAME IN REGARD TO CHINA. IN REGARD TO THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY QUESTION OF REASSIGNMENT OF FRENCH

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, SEC. 3(E), 5(D), 5(E) AND 11

/PLANES

State NLK-77-852

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

BY *MM* NARS, DATE 4-13-78

NSP/72/ France - Geneva

~~SECRET~~

-2- SECTO 9, APRIL 8, 9 PM, FROM: PARIS

PLANES IN GERMANY WITH AMERICAN NUCLEAR WARHEADS TO PARAGRAPH SIX FORCES, DE GAULLE SAID DEFINITELY IN THE FRENCH VIEW IT WAS BEST TO LEAVE THESE PLANES UNDER PRESENT COMMAND, THAT IT WOULD BE MORE INCONVENIENT AND COMPLICATED TO CHANGE PRESENT ORGANIZATIONS. I DID NOT MYSELF GO INTO DETAILS OF ORGANIZATION BECAUSE MY MOST RECENT UNDERSTANDING OF DISCUSSIONS OF PARAGRAPH SIX FORCES SUGGESTS NO REASSIGNMENTS MAY NOW BE CONTEMPLATED. IN REPLY TO MY REFERENCE TO HIS PRESS CONFERENCE OBSERVATION CONCERNING STRATEGIC TARGETTING HE SAID THAT AS SOON AS THE FRENCH HAD A SMALL STRATEGIC FORCE WHICH THEY DID NOT HAVE NOW THEN WOULD BE THE TIME FOR CONTACT BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND PARIS TO WORK OUT THE COORDINATED TARGETTING. I CALLED HIS ATTENTION TO US-UK POLARIS SALES AGREEMENT AND TOLD HIM WE WERE MAKING COPIES AVAILABLE.

SCP 1

RUSK

CC-21

Note: Advance copies 8/8 - 4/8

~~SECRET~~

ACTION COPY

TELEGRAM

Department of State

PERMANENT RECORD COPY

SECRET

Control: 6212
Rec'd: APRIL 8, 1963
4:31 PM

tion
SS
Info

FROM: PARIS
TO: Secretary of State
NO: SECTO 9, APRIL 8, 9 PM

*Paris Sect 9
4-8-63*

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

EYES ONLY FOR PRESIDENT AND ACTING SECRETARY FROM SECRETARY

TOGETHER WITH AMBASSADOR BOHLEN WE HAD ABOUT AN HOUR'S CONVERSATION WITH DE GAULLE. THE ATMOSPHERE WAS EASY AND RELAXED. HE SENT HIS REGARDS TO YOU AND SAID THAT HE THOUGHT OF YOU OFTEN AND ALWAYS WITH FRIENDSHIP. DE GAULLE GENERALLY AGREED WITH MY OUTLINING OF THE THREE POINTS OF DANGER IN THE WORLD - LAOS, CUBA AND BERLIN. ON LAOS HE SAID THAT FRANCE OF COURSE WAS NOT THINKING OF ANY DIRECT MILITARY INVOLVEMENT BUT THAT IF SOUVANNA PHOUMA WHOM WE ALL SUPPORTED ASKED FOR SOME ASSISTANCE OF MATERIAL, ETC., WE SHOULD TRY AND GIVE IT TO HIM. ON CUBA HE MERELY THANKED ME FOR THE INFORMATION BUT STATED THAT IN HIS VIEW THERE SEEMED TO BE VERY LITTLE CHANCE OF ANY IMMEDIATE DANGER. HE REPEATED HIS DECLARATION OF LAST OCTOBER THAT IF CUBA SHOULD INVOLVE WORLD WAR, FRANCE WOULD BE WITH THE US. HE AGREED WITH MY ANALYSIS OF BERLIN AND SAID HE HAD ALWAYS THOUGHT THERE WOULD BE NO AGREEMENT WITH THE RUSSIANS UNLESS THE ALLIES WERE PREPARED TO CONCEDE ONE. WE SHOULD MAINTAIN OUR PRESENT POSITIONS BOTH DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY.

*A.2
FR-NS
A.2
FR-NS
A.2
FR-NS*

DE GAULLE LISTENED TO MY ACCOUNT OF THE QUESTION OF NON-PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS BUT THEN ASKED BLUNTLY IF WE REALLY BELIEVED THAT SOONER OR LATER GERMANY WOULD NOT HAVE THEIR OWN NUCLEAR WEAPONS NO MATTER WHAT WE OR THEY DID AND ALSO THE SAME IN REGARD TO CHINA. IN REGARD TO THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY QUESTION OF REASSIGNMENT OF FRENCH

/PLANES

This copy must be returned to RM/R Central files with notation of action taken. REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS UNCLASSIFIED

ACTION ASSIGNED TO		ACTION TAKEN	
NAME OF OFFICER		DATE OF ACTION	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R
OFFICE SYMBOL			

SECRET

-2- SECTO 9, APRIL 8, 9 PM, FROM: PARIS

PLANES IN GERMANY WITH AMERICAN NUCLEAR WARHEADS TO PARAGRAPH SIX FORCES, DE GAULLE SAID DEFINITELY IN THE FRENCH VIEW IT WAS BEST TO LEAVE THESE PLANES UNDER PRESENT COMMAND, THAT IT WOULD BE MORE INCONVENIENT AND COMPLICATED TO CHANGE PRESENT ORGANIZATIONS. I DID NOT MYSELF GO INTO DETAILS OF ORGANIZATION BECAUSE MY MOST RECENT UNDERSTANDING OF DISCUSSIONS OF PARAGRAPH SIX FORCES SUGGESTS NO REASSIGNMENTS MAY NOW BE CONTEMPLATED. IN REPLY TO MY REFERENCE TO HIS PRESS CONFERENCE OBSERVATION CONCERNING STRATEGIC TARGETTING HE SAID THAT AS SOON AS THE FRENCH HAD A SMALL STRATEGIC FORCE WHICH THEY DID NOT HAVE NOW THEN WOULD BE THE TIME FOR CONTACT BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND PARIS TO WORK OUT THE COORDINATED TARGETTING. I CALLED HIS ATTENTION TO US-UK POLARIS SALES AGREEMENT AND TOLD HIM WE WERE MAKING COPIES AVAILABLE.

SCP 1

RUSK

CC-21

Note: Advance copies S/S - 4/8

<input checked="checked" type="checkbox"/>	SR	<input checked="checked" type="checkbox"/>	M	<input checked="checked" type="checkbox"/>	U	<input checked="checked" type="checkbox"/>	K	<input checked="checked" type="checkbox"/>	R	<input checked="checked" type="checkbox"/>	S
No. Copies Receiver											
Master File Cop.											

EY

SECRET

2076
4/9/63



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY (Attachment)

File

April 9, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Attached is an original and one copy of the official translation of Chancellor Adenauer's letter to the President dated April 4, 1963, which was hand delivered to the White House by the German embassy April 5, 1963.

(still classified - NLR 77-40)
no Henderson

William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

As stated.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED PORTIONMENTS

By SC NARA, Date 5/5/97

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY (Attachment)

POF/117/Genany Security 4/63 - 11/63

Mrs. Lincoln
4/10/63

April 10, 1963

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CABINET COMMITTEE ON THE
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

I wish to meet again with the Committee on Thursday, April 18th, at 10:00 A. M. for a thorough discussion of the alternative proposals for further actions to reduce or finance the anticipated balance of payments deficit in the next two years.


At this meeting, I want a review of the alternative proposals which were discussed at the Committee meeting on April 9. For this purpose, I would like those who have put forward proposals on which there is not general agreement to be prepared to explain and defend them at the meeting. Accordingly, I request:

1. The Department of State: to be prepared to discuss:
 - a. the methods of restricting the sale of foreign securities in U.S. markets and the magnitude of benefits we can expect therefrom if we apply the proposed controls;
 - b. a proposal for negotiation of an over-all financial arrangement with the major European countries, which we could use when we judged the political situation in Europe permitted. The proposal should show in as much detail as possible with whom we would negotiate, on what basis and what specifically we would ask for.

2. The Council of Economic Advisers: to be prepared to discuss:

when, how much and how we could draw on the IMF in the next two years.

~~SECRET~~



POA /90/ treasury 4/63

~~SECRET~~

3. The Treasury Department: to be prepared to discuss:

the possibilities of a travel tax or other taxation for restricting U. S. tourist expenditures abroad.

While I wish to examine these questions in some detail, I do not expect that the discussion will necessarily be restricted to them, and I would like to be ready to explore other possibilities raised in the Cabinet Committee's paper and earlier discussions which appear relevant.

/S/ John F. Kennedy

Copy furnished:

The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Commerce
The Under Secretary of State
The Administrator, AID
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
The President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations
Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Mr Bundy
Mrs Lincoln
Mr Kaysen

~~SECRET~~

720174
81 934

Refer

for continuation

E47

4/11/67
S/S
4-11-67
S/S

THURSDAY
APRIL 11, 1963
6:20 p. m.

TELEPHONE CALL TO MR. BUNDY (WH)

The Sec said he was getting ready to call the President and Bundy said he hoped he would. The Sec. said if the Soviets would accept our piece of paper on non-transfer as a basis for negotiation it looked as though the French would play. This would seriously change the situation and the Sec. said he thought he might try this on Dobrynin tomorrow. Bundy asked the Sec. if he had seen the outgoing and the Sec. said he had. Bundy said the answer must be cleared at the Presidential level. The Sec. asked how things were back here and Bundy said they looked pretty good, the general effect was healthy. The Sec. said the French were laying themselves out. They discussed what had appeared in the press. Bundy said he had discussed with Tyler the Berlin thing. The Sec said he had just talked to Ball on this. Sec. said he hated to see us turn back on something, adding he wanted to see the state of the commitment. Bundy said Gilpatric thinks it is clear. The Sec. said it was cleared with him and Bundy said it was cleared with Anderson. Bundy said we ought to have a look at it next week.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

15, FPC/CDR

Date.

9/11/92

RELEASE DECLASSIFY
 EXCISE DECLASSIFY
 DENY IN PART
 DELETE Non-Responsive Info
FOIA Exemptions _____
*A Exemptions _____

MR Cases Only:
EO Citations _____

_____ TS authority to
 CLASSIFY as S or C OADR
 DOWNGRADE TS to S or C OADR

S ma

4/12/63
2294
32

Hill
Hillenbrand:cb
(Working Office and Officers)

~~SECRET~~-LIMITED DISTRIBUTION S/
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

5487

Dobrynin

Approved in S - 4/18

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: April 12, 1963

*(Cy included in
Pres. meet. and
reading dtd 4/20-21/63
10 Sab 3)*

SUBJECT: Nuclear Non-proliferation

PARTICIPANTS: US USSR

The Secretary Anatoly F. Dobrynin, Ambassador of USSR
Ambassador Thompson George M. bassy
Mr. Hill

COPIES TO:

Like Gant...

y

After Dobrynin (said he was worried about nuclear proliferation between the US and France, in any other country looking ahead to the 1970s and seeing the prospect of as many as ten to fifteen countries coming into possession of nuclear weapons, the prospect for peace was not good. An element of unpredictability would be added. We therefore have a common interest in avoiding nuclear proliferation.

It was against this background, the Secretary continued, that he had talked with Gromyko at Geneva and urged that the Soviet Union and the United States concentrate specifically on the question of non-diffusion of nuclear weapons on a national basis, that is concentrate on governments which could develop national capacities on their own. We believe that we should concentrate on this central point and not try to solve all related matters. If agreement were reached on this point, it would make further steps possible in the disarmament field. With reference to the Western Alliance, the Secretary said that he had pointed out to Gromyko that we did not have in mind the transfer of nuclear weapons directly or indirectly through this Alliance. But he had also pointed out to Gromyko that the expression "directly or indirectly through a military alliance" might lead to misunderstanding and would require further discussion. With this in mind we had drafted a

FORM 3-61

125
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
Shelley Glickler
By *[Signature]* NARA, Date 8/5/96

~~SECRET~~-LIMITED DISTRIBUTION S/S

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

*cy filed nuclear
diffusion
E.O. 12958-2*

also see / ...

SECRET-LIMITED DISTRIBUTION S/S

- 2 -

declaration on nuclear non-transfer of two paragraphs and had also appended a clarifying minute to explain what would or would not be covered. Our language is illustrative but serious and does not necessarily cover all of the points we would like to discuss at the time of the declaration. However, there are enough points in the minute to show that our stress is on the extension of national capabilities. We believe this to be not just another piece of paper but an arrangement that would actually prevent the proliferation of weapons on a national basis.

Ambassador Dobrynin asked whether the Secretary had discussed the declaration with the French and the British and whether they had agreed to it. The Secretary said we had given them copies but that he was not acting as their agent today. He did want to say, with a full sense of responsibility, that if the Soviets felt that our paper provided a basis of negotiations, the Allies would take this as a very serious step and we could take up the subject with them. We could not commit them today, the Secretary added, but he was encouraged to find out if the Soviets did consider the paper as a basis for negotiations.

After Dobrynin had carefully read the paper which the Secretary had handed him (text attached), the Secretary observed that some of the discussion in the West over the past few years on nuclear matters, and the increase in consultation among the Western powers on this subject, was due to the change brought about in the nuclear situation when in 1956-57 the USSR had made clear that it was targeting a considerable number of nuclear weapons on Western Europe to be delivered either by bombers or by missiles. This brought the question to the forefront in the thinking of Western European governments. The Soviets had stressed the point either to visitors in Moscow or during visits of Soviets leaders to the West, emphasizing that one or more countries would be destroyed. It was only natural for the countries threatened by nuclear weapons to want to know something more about them. Thus the increase in the discussion of nuclear problems in the West was the direct result of the developments which he had mentioned in the nuclear field.

Furthermore, the Secretary went on, he sincerely asked the Soviet government to believe that we ourselves are opposed to placing nuclear weapons in the hands of national governments and national forces. This is a matter of our interest. We have pursued this policy even though some of our Allies have disagreed with it. There is nothing in the background which cuts across this most elementary policy of the US government. Although the Soviets may have expressed concern from time to time with regard to something

which

SECRET-LIMITED DISTRIBUTION S/S

~~SECRET-LIMITED DISTRIBUTION S/S~~

3 -

which has not yet come into being, this is US government policy. What he was saying today, the Secretary pointed out, was not our answer to the recent Soviet note on the multilateral force. We would deal with this in due course, but Ambassador Dobrynin would not be surprised to hear that we disagree with many points in the Soviet note. The Secretary said he did have one immediate comment. The note mentioned the multinational as well as multilateral force. The former was mainly the British V-bombers and US Polaris submarines. These were the principal elements along with the coordination with other elements which might have related missions. The multinational force does not change the existing situation as far as the spread of weapons is concerned. Our view is that this is also true of the multilateral force. The key point about the latter is that national governments will not be able to employ it on a national basis by their own decision or that of their armed forces. The main objective is to prevent the spread of national nuclear capabilities. We are not interested solely in one, two or three countries but on a world wide basis. After all, countries not allied either with the US or the USSR may be planning to acquire nuclear capacities. Hence we think that a four-power agreement along the lines of the declaration would be great progress.

After some discussion of Berlin at this point (covered in separate memorandum of conversation), Dobrynin commented that the main point about the non-transfer declaration proposed by the US is that to which Gromyko had objected previously. Dobrynin said he had also made the same point in an earlier conversation and his government had likewise had done so in a note some months ago as well as in its recent note. This was not purely a matter of propaganda but the way the Soviet government felt. The US was actually beginning the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Chairman Khrushchev had welcomed President Kennedy's remarks regarding US policy on non-proliferation, but what has been going on since last summer is the actual proliferation of nuclear weapons. Without even speaking of Germany, a country like Italy which has not had nuclear weapons will now have them in the so-called multilateral units. The policy of the USSR is to have no nuclear weapons except in national units of the USSR. The US has had the same within the NATO framework. This the Soviet Union could accept. But when the US speaks of so-called multilateral teams made up of countries who do not now possess nuclear weapons, this is a new and dangerous step. It marks a real difference in quality. In a year or two the situation will further change and then there will be proliferation. Dobrynin repeated that the multilateral force would put the control of nuclear weapons in the hands of other countries which did not have them now. He recalled that before the Paris Agreements

in 1954,

~~SECRET-LIMITED DISTRIBUTION S/S~~

SECRET-LIMITED DISTRIBUTION S/S

in 1954, the Western countries had claimed that they were going to prohibit the Germans from having all sorts of weapons, even heavy conventional armaments, but in a few years this was pushed aside. The Germans had complained that they were not being given equal treatment. Now they have the biggest army in NATO, and where were the Paris Agreements? Now the first step in satisfying West German nuclear demands was to be the multilateral force. This was only the beginning, the Soviets felt. The US was on a dangerous path on which it could not stop. The Germans would always try to bring about changes. The first step would be to change the rule of unanimity to decision by majority and thus eliminate the US veto. The only solution would be for the USSR and the US to keep their monopoly. This was the basic position of the Soviet government. The US-proposed declaration, Ambassador Dobrynin continued, dealt with everything except the multilateral force or the multinational force. He could only note the reservations in the minute, and felt that the US was really proposing nuclear proliferation both quantitatively and qualitatively.

The Secretary said he would try to distinguish the two things. From the quantitative aspect, the question of disarmament applied to both sides. The USSR had built up a substantial nuclear force requiring a substantial nuclear force on our side. It appeared from a recent Khrushchev speech that important decisions had been made to allocate a considerable amount of new resources to military purposes. The question of quantity should be grappled with in the disarmament context. In this sense, quantitative proliferation needs serious attention.

On the qualitative side, we were opposed to putting other governments in a position, not merely on paper, to hold and employ nuclear weapons. We have no arrangements in mind towards this end. This was an important point which the Soviets should remember. Dobrynin commented that this was where the US and the USSR differed. The Soviets could not see how a development could be prevented over the years which would lead to real control of nuclear weapons in the hands of the members of the multilateral force. The Secretary said we were sure that this would not happen with respect to the NATO countries. But there were also other countries which would move towards possession of nuclear weapons in the next ten years or so unless there were some such agreement as we had proposed. Dobrynin said he was not so sure about the NATO countries. Unless, the Secretary continued we can combine a NATO arrangement with a larger agreement, the question will get out of control. Dobrynin observed that the multilateral force was a process of

proliferation.

SECRET-LIMITED DISTRIBUTION S/S

SECRET-LIMITED DISTRIBUTION S/S

- 5 -

proliferation. The Secretary responded that we were quite certain that this was not so as far as NATO was concerned.

Dobrynin said that when he looked at the post-war history of West Germany, recalling for example statements made by Mr. Dulles in 1954 and how the Germans now had the strongest army in NATO, he could only wonder where we would be in five years. The Secretary commented that he did not want to go over the whole history of the post-war period, but it was a fact that the West Germans had not begun to arm until after the East Germans had started. The East Germans had been permitted to begin arming one year before the West Germans over the protests of the Western powers. Dobrynin injected that he could produce a list. The Secretary observed that if the Soviets maintained twenty divisions in East Germany, we could not maintain that many in the Federal Republic. Dobrynin said the Soviets were prepared to withdraw from East Germany anytime the US was prepared to withdraw from the Federal Republic.

The Secretary stated that we would have no objections if the Soviets were to make arrangements within the Warsaw Pact similar to those we were proposing to make within NATO. Dobrynin responded that the Soviets did not want this. The Secretary said he wanted to ask the Soviet government to study the draft declaration against the background of his statement to Ambassador Dobrynin. The latter said he would of course refer the text to his government, but he was sure that it would be found unsatisfactory. He inquired as to what we understood by the term "minute" to be attached to the declaration. Ambassador Thompson said it was a document intended for purposes of explanation. Referring to the text of the draft non-transfer declaration, the Secretary noted that Gromyko had raised the point about using the device of an Alliance to achieve something indirectly. The Secretary recalled that he had told him that it was not our intention to transfer nuclear weapons through a military alliance to national control. But since the expression "indirectly through a military alliance" does not carry a full explanation on its face we must be clear what it means. It would therefore be important to append a minute to avoid misunderstanding. Dobrynin said he could recall what Gromyko had said about indirect transfer. He had been against precisely what was going on in connection with the multinational and multilateral force, although what the US proposed to do had not been very clear at the time. The Secretary said the issue was the ability of national governments to use their own national forces to launch nuclear weapons. He recognized that there might be political reasons why the Soviet Union did not want other NATO countries to consider themselves part

of an

SECRET-LIMITED DISTRIBUTION S/S

~~SECRET-LIMITED DISTRIBUTION S/S~~

- 6 -

of an Alliance which has nuclear weapons at its disposal. However this question of national nuclear capacity was so important that it was worth taking hold of the particular point and stopping that at least. We were prepared to enter into an agreement on this. Dobrynin said there were no specific political reasons for the Soviet position. The USSR was against proliferation in any Alliance.

The Secretary observed that President Kennedy had already clarified the point that these arrangements would be in no way separated from the responsibility of the United States. Dobrynin injected that the fact was that other countries would possess nuclear weapons. The Secretary responded that no other country would come into their possession. Dobrynin repeated that they would have possession. The US might not be in a position to be fully responsible. The USSR already felt that the West Germans were exercising a strong influence on US policy, for example in the negotiations on Berlin and German problems. This influence would increase in years to come. One read that the Germans would be paying one-third of the cost of the multilateral force. They would try to acquire a decisive voice. The Secretary said that if he really believed this he would sign the agreement today so that in five or ten years from now the governments would be bound. What the Soviets fear would then not be possible. Dobrynin said that the fact was that through a rather complicated scheme the US was going to give other countries nuclear weapons. Who was proliferating? You or we?

The Secretary observed that the Soviets should look at the alternative. It was either this arrangement or no arrangement. The security of the Soviet Union and of the US demanded the arrangement. Dobrynin merely repeated that the Germans would be tempted to acquire nuclear weapons. The Secretary pointed out that they would sign paragraph two of the declaration. Dobrynin said that he did not know whether they would sign. The Secretary responded that he thought that they would sign. He thought that a lot of countries should sign, for example the Chinese. Dobrynin commented that the Soviet Union had no multilateral force with the Chinese. The Secretary asked whether the Chinese would sign. Dobrynin said he did not know, but the Soviets were not proposing a multilateral force to them. However the US was inviting the USSR to do this. If the US continued, the Soviet Union would have no alternative but to do the same for its friends.

The Secretary said he wanted to suggest that this subject was one of importance both to the US and the USSR. It should be discussed seriously

on this

~~SECRET-LIMITED DISTRIBUTION S/S~~

SECRET-LIMITED DISTRIBUTION S/S

- 7 -

on this kind of basis and not get caught up in public exchanges of notes. Dobrynin observed that the Soviet note dealt with the general subject and contained some of the same ideas that he had expressed, but the Soviets had not published their previous discussions. However, the whole subject was out in the open and was being discussed in the Western press. The Secretary observed that a curious thing about the multilateral force was that those who criticized it in the West were those who wanted national nuclear forces. Dobrynin said this merely illustrated that those who wanted this would press for more tomorrow. The Secretary noted that the Soviet criticism of the multilateral force was for opposite reasons. The fact was that those who want national nuclear capacities tomorrow should be pinned down by a signed agreement today. The multinational force was not really involved in the issue, the Secretary added, despite the rude comments on it in the Soviet note.

After a brief discussion of Berlin at this point, the Secretary said he did hope that Ambassador Dobrynin would urge that his government give serious attention to the draft declaration against the background of the Secretary's statement. We are seriously interested in avoiding proliferation of nuclear weapons into national hands. There is no question about President Kennedy's central purpose on this question.

SECRET-LIMITED DISTRIBUTION S/S

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DRAFT NON-TRANSFER DECLARATION

Desiring to promote international peace and security,

Desiring, in particular, to refrain from taking steps which will extend and intensify the arms race,

Believing that the creation of nuclear weapons forces by additional states will jeopardize these ends,

Recalling that General Assembly Resolution 1665 (XVI) urges all states to cooperate for these purposes,

Reaffirming their determination to achieve agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

1. The Governments of France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics solemnly declare that they will not transfer any nuclear weapons directly, or indirectly through a military alliance, into the national control of individual states not now possessing such weapons, and that they will not assist such other states in the manufacture of such weapons;

2. The other signatory Governments solemnly declare that they will not manufacture nuclear weapons and that they will refrain from acquiring directly, or indirectly through military alliances, national control of any nuclear weapons, and that they will not seek or receive assistance from other states in the manufacture of any such weapons;

3. This declaration, which shall be deposited with the Government of _____, shall be open to signature by all Governments. It shall remain in effect indefinitely, subject to the right of any signatory to be relieved of its terms if another signatory fails to observe them or if any other Government takes action which signatories have declared they will not take;

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this declaration.

DONE AT _____, this _____ day of _____,
one thousand nine hundred and sixty-_____.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Guidelines
By *[Signature]* NARA, Date 8/5/96

CONFIDENTIAL

MINUTE FOR POSSIBLE USE IN
DISCUSSION WITH DRAFT NON-
TRANSFER DECLARATION

The United States is proposing for consideration a declaration dealing with the non-diffusion of nuclear weapons. The principal operative sentence of this declaration, insofar as the nuclear powers are concerned, reads as follows:

"The Governments of France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics solemnly declare that they will not transfer any nuclear weapons directly, or indirectly through a military alliance, into the national control of individual states not now possessing such weapons, and that they will not assist such other states in the manufacture of such weapons."

This language is meant to make more precise the third point in the message from the Foreign Minister of the USSR which states that: "There should also be excluded the transfer of nuclear weapons through military alliances to those states which do not possess them, i.e., the transfer of such weapons in an indirect manner, irrespective of whether or not the national armed forces of these states are component parts of the armed forces of any military alliance."

The US draft declaration applies the following test to actions respecting the disposition of a nuclear weapon in connection with a regional arrangement: Such actions are prohibited if they would give to any state which is a member of the regional arrangement and which does not possess nuclear weapons the ability to make a determination to use these weapons on the basis of its national decision alone. A few illustrations may suffice:

1. The declaration proposed by the U.S. would prohibit the U.S. or the Soviet Union from placing nuclear weapons under the control of units of national forces of nations in the NATO or Warsaw Pact which do not now possess nuclear weapons even though those units are assigned

to the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

to the NATO or Warsaw Pact command-structure.

2. The declaration proposed by the United States would not prevent the United States or the Soviet Union from deploying nuclear weapons in support of the forces of member nations which are assigned to the forces of the NATO and Warsaw Pact, respectively, even though these members do not themselves have such weapons. The arrangements would be such that the U.S. and USSR, respectively, retain control over the weapons so that they could not be deployed or used solely on the basis of the national decision of any government not now possessing them.

3. The declaration proposed by the United States would not prevent the U.S. or the USSR from placing nuclear weapons in the custody of units of a multinational defense force within the framework of NATO, or Warsaw Pact defense forces, respectively, if weapons could not be deployed or used on the basis of the national decision of any government not now possessing them.

4. The declaration proposed by the U.S. would not prevent the U.S. or the Soviet Union from entering into multinational consultative procedures with respect to the deployment and use of nuclear weapons with countries not now possessing such weapons.

5. The declaration proposed by the U.S. assumes adherence to the declaration by all potential nuclear states or authorities. It would not become operative until both the United States and the USSR were satisfied that such adherences had been obtained, and until both had ratified it pursuant to their constitutional processes.

CONFIDENTIAL

Hillenbrand:cb:m
(acting Office and Officer)

SECRET

White House

5535

31

4/12/63
2294

proved in S - 4/18

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION S/S

DATE: April 12, 1963

SUBJECT: Berlin

*cy included in Pres
week end reading
dtg 4/20-21/63 - Tab 13*
9

PARTICIPANTS: US

USSR

The Secretary
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. Hillenbrand

Anatoly F. Dobrynin, Ambassador of USSR
Georgi M. Kornienko, Counselor, Embassy

COPIES TO:

- S/S
- S/P - Mr. Rostow
- G - Mr. Johnson
- INR/D - Mr. Hughes
- EUR - Mr. Tyler
- GER - Mr. Creel
- BTF - Mr. Hillenbrand
- White House - Mr. Bundy
- S/AL - Ambassador Thompson

The Secretary began by referring to certain language with which Ambassador Dobrynin had opened their previous meeting, specifically his statement that "In the course of the earlier exchange of opinions the parties succeeded in reaching definite results on well-known questions in connection with a German peace settlement. There was also achieved definite mutual understanding concerning the necessity for normalization on this basis of the situation in West Berlin taking into account actually existing conditions which came about on German territory as a result of the past war." This general language was a little hard to read, the Secretary observed. He wanted to enter an early reservation so that the Soviets would not think we had agreed to something to which we had not agreed.

We would like to see the Berlin problem cleared up, the Secretary continued. There was perhaps no other problem which was so disruptive of relations between the two countries. In this connection the Secretary referred to the continuous exchanges and the many incidents over Berlin. As he had told Mikoyan recently, he hoped the question could be resolved by agreement and thus a crisis be avoided. This would be possible if both sides would be willing to take account of the vital interests of the other. As he had said before, the Secretary went on, this taking into account of "actually existing conditions which came about on German territory as a result of the past war" included our position in Berlin. This also had to be taken into account. Normalization does not apply only to Berlin but also to the division of Germany which has existed since the end of the war.

The Secretary then referred to the remarks in Dobrynin's opening statement at their last meeting to the effect that the Soviet Government proceeded "from

the fact

FORM DS-1284
3-61

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
Staff Guidelines
By *[Signature]*
NARA, Date *8/5/96*

SECRET

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

cy file Berlin
GPO 808882

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

the fact that in appropriate form those positive results will be realized which were achieved by the previous exchange of opinions by the parties on the questions of : formalizing and strengthening of the existing German borders; guarantee of free access to West Berlin; respect for the sovereignty of the GDR; precluding the armament of the FRG and the GDR with nuclear weapons; conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty organizations." It was true, the Secretary said, that, as indicated in the Statement of Principles which he had handed to Gromyko in Geneva, we felt that some real progress had been made on these points. But we did want to note some possibility of misunderstanding. We want it to be understood that these are subjects which would require discussion before any agreement could be reached.

With reference to "respect for the sovereignty of the GDR", the Secretary noted that he had previously said that we did not see how a satisfactory arrangement on access need interfere with GDR sovereignty. The two could be mutually non-interfering in character. Access to Berlin need not involve interference with or intrusion into East German affairs. The Secretary said he had pointed out that many States by agreeing to transit rights over them do so without interfering with their sovereignty, for example in the case of aircraft overflights. We would not want to leave the implication, however, that we are talking about the political question of recognizing GDR sovereignty. We understand that there is such a place as East Germany and we do not act as if we did not understand this. But that is another matter.

At this point the Secretary began a lengthy discussion of nuclear non-proliferation (covered in a separate memorandum of conversation). During the course of this, Dobrynin came back to the Secretary's remarks on his Berlin statement made at the previous meeting. He said that he wanted to clarify the Soviet reference to "positive results" point by point. As to borders, his government proceeded from the assumption that there was a sort of understanding between the Secretary and Gromyko and the President and Gromyko on this subject. The Secretary asked whether the Soviet language was intended to apply to the borders of Germany as a whole. Dobrynin answered in the affirmative. Ambassador Thompson's remark that the word "formalizing" was broad in its meaning led to a brief discussion whether this was the best translation from the Russian. The Embassy had apparently translated the key word as "fixing" rather than "formalizing". In response to the Secretary's query whether the Soviets were also referring to the demarcation line between East and West Germany, Dobrynin said that the Soviets were aware that the United States did not recognize the GDR but this demarcation line was a border. He assumed that the Secretary did not wish to add anything new to what he had discussed with Gromyko. The Secretary said there was no change in the conversation from our side but we did not want this to be understood as anything like formalizing or that we considered it would lead to formalizing. The Secretary noted that we had talked of a parallel arrangement. The three Western powers would agree with the Soviet Union on access.

SECRET
NOFORN

END SECRET
NOFORN

SECRET

The Soviets

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

The Soviets would speak to the East Germans and this would take care of GDR sovereignty. This would be non-interference. Dobrynin commented that the Secretary knew the Soviet position; it was not a question of formal recognition.

The Secretary observed that he had also said that, if the central question of our vital interests were solved, he saw no difficulty in these other questions falling into place. He wanted to point out that various aspects of these matters were not agreed, though there had been some progress or movement. Dobrynin commented that this is why the Soviets had used the expression "positive results". The Secretary noted that the Soviet Ambassador in Paris had said that the Soviet Union and the United States had reached agreement. That was why the Secretary felt that he had to say that we had not reached agreement. Our Allies had come to us and said that we should show them the agreement. He did not want any general formula to conceal a misunderstanding as to what had actually been said on these various points. Dobrynin agreed there had been no formal agreement but merely what the Soviet language stated.

Returning to the first quotation from the Soviet statement which he had noted, the Secretary pointed out that this was nothing but the same old Soviet formula which turned up everywhere. Dobrynin said that the subject had been discussed many months. The Secretary responded that no agreement had yet been found that fitted this language. Dobrynin said that the language merely described the situation. The Secretary observed that the Soviet reference to "actually existing conditions" was undermined in the next paragraph directed against the presence of foreign troops in West Berlin. Dobrynin commented that he did not see anything new here.

At this point the discussion of nuclear non-proliferation resumed.

Just before the end of the meeting, Dobrynin asked about future discussions on Berlin. How did the Secretary feel about an exchange of views on the troop question and related matters. The Secretary responded that these could be discussed in the near future. On the troop issue, he might say that difficult questions for us were involved in dealing with this issue solely in terms of West Berlin, substituting a UN flag for the NATO flag, diluting our forces in West Berlin, or the limited time period involved. How could we consider that our vital interests were met thereby? Dobrynin suggested that they go through the subject point by point and that the Secretary say what was wrong with the Soviet proposals.

~~SECRET~~

4/17/67



THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 17, 1963.

Dear Mr. President:

I feel it is incumbent on me in my capacity as chief financial officer of the government, and as Chairman of your Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments, to give you a full and frank exposition of my personal views on the balance of payments situation. Accordingly, I am attaching two memoranda, one dealing with the situation in general, as well as with policies to be avoided under present circumstances, and the other dealing with my recommendations for action.

Faithfully yours,

Douglas Dillon

The President
The White House.

POF/90/Treasury. Balance of Payments. "President's Memo"

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12856, Sec. 3.4
NLK-91-132
SF MARA 8/17/92



THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 17, 1963.


MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Action Program for Balance
of Payments.

The action program recommended by the Cabinet Committee should be adequate to carry us through 1964 and is an essential prelude to more drastic action should it ever become necessary. Its implementation will build confidence in the dollar and ease the problem of financing the remaining '63-'64 deficit. It is designed to reduce the 1963-64 deficit by about \$1-1/2 billion bringing it well within the range of the \$4-\$5 billion of financing expected to be available.

Comments on its major elements follow:

1. Defense. A continuation of the program adopted last summer is recommended. Without such action net defense expenditures for 1963 and 1964 are expected to be about \$1.8 billion a year. Defense feels that \$50 million can be trimmed from this figure in 1963 and \$300 million in 1964. By the end of calendar 1964, the annual rate of net military expenditure might be reduced to \$1.4 billion. Defense feels that this can all be accomplished at little or no military cost. Such reductions will naturally involve some political explaining, but this should not be overly difficult in view of the fact that Europeans generally believe that our military effort overseas is carried on in a highly luxurious fashion. In addition, further streamlining of our military forces overseas would give a strong boost to those who believe that the U.S. is really determined to solve its balance of payments problems. Secretary McNamara has said that he will be prepared to present detailed recommendations to you by July 1st. He should have your full support in proceeding with the preparation of these recommendations. When the recommendations are received it is important that decisions be taken promptly so that savings of the order of magnitude indicated can actually be achieved.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

2. Aid. Further tying of aid is expected to amount to \$425 million over the two year period. This will help the balance of payments to a lesser degree since a portion of the funds would have been spent in the U.S. even on an untied basis. The net help to our balance of payments can be expected to be between \$200 and \$300 million. Mr. Bell should be instructed to move ahead vigorously on this program.

3. Gold Budget Savings. By carrying out the program envisaged last fall, \$15 million can be saved this year and another \$75 million in 1964. The Director of the Budget should be requested to carry out this program beginning with fiscal 1964.

4. Agricultural Programs. It is felt that up to \$35 million a year can be saved by better programming. More important is the adoption of a new cotton sales program along the lines presently under study in the Department of Agriculture that would ensure the U.S. a fair share of foreign purchases. This could assist our balance of payments by over \$100 million a year.

5. Monetary Policy. It is necessary to save some \$700 million in this area over the next two years if we are to achieve our target of \$1.5 billion in savings over present projections. The Treasury is confident that this is feasible, granted our willingness to increase short term rates by up to 1/2%. While the effectiveness of action in this area has been questioned by some, almost everyone with practical operating experience in this field, both here and abroad, is in general agreement with the Treasury view. Short term flows amounted to 85% of our 1961 overall deficit and to 75% of our 1962 deficit. The figures were \$2 billion in 1961 and nearly \$1.7 billion in 1962. Unless these totals can be substantially reduced it will be impossible to achieve the necessary improvement in our payments. There are a variety of reasons for this outflow. Some of it is due to repatriation of capital that fled Europe many years ago. Such repatriation will gradually come to an end but will probably continue during the 1963-64 period. A better investment climate in the U.S. would be

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

helpful in slowing such outflows. Some of it is probably due to the bias in our balance of payments statistics which fail to net out realizable U.S. short term assets against our liabilities.

But high among the reasons for short term outflows is the disparity between short term interest rates in the U.S. and those available abroad. The first quarter saw a covered outflow of \$100 million to Canada. It should be a high priority to persuade the Canadians to reduce their short term rates by 1/2% which should effectively terminate such covered outflows. Covered outflows to Europe have already largely ceased. However, there are still substantial flows to the Euro-dollar market, where 90 day dollar deposits yield 3-3/4%. A rise in U.S. short term rates of up to 1/2% would not result in an equivalent rise in Euro-dollar rates. Such a rise in U.S. rates may well be necessary to obtain the necessary reduction in short term outflows. While U.S. longer term rates might rise a bit, there is no reason to believe that they would increase as much as short term rates. The Treasury is confident that a 1/2% increase in short term rates would produce a balance of payments saving of about \$400 million a year. Such a rise would also be regarded both at home and abroad as proof of our determination to redress our payments deficit. It would greatly increase the willingness of European countries to come to our assistance. Under present circumstances they feel that they would merely be subsidizing unrealistically low short term rates which they are not able to match. Willingness to act in this area, when and if necessary, may well become the key to success of our efforts. Such modest action should have little or no effect on our domestic economy, particularly if it is delayed until after enactment of the tax bill.

6. Exports and Price Stability. It is highly important that we intensify our export promotion efforts. Everything possible should be done to obtain the needed extra funds for the Department of Commerce. We must also continue our campaign for price stability which is basic to good export performance.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-4-

7. Promotion of Capital Imports. We should increase our effort to promote foreign investment in the United States. The sale of Mutual Fund shares in Europe could become an important source of capital inflow and should be facilitated in every way.

8. Promotion of Tourism in the U.S. We should make a substantial effort to persuade our own citizens to "See America First". The balance of payments could well be mentioned as a patriotic reason for vacationing at home rather than abroad. It is not possible to quantify the results of such an effort, but it is clear that a program of this sort would greatly facilitate a move to restrict tourism by taxation of travel should such a measure later become necessary.

It is the opinion of the Treasury that the implementation of this program will both carry us through 1964 without impairing our longer term objectives, and set the stage properly for further action should this become necessary at some later date.



Douglas Dillon



THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

April 17, 1963.


MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Overall Recommendations on
Balance of Payments.

We face today two separate but closely connected problems in the balance of payments field. First and most important is the maintenance of confidence. This in turn has two facets, the confidence of our own citizens and the confidence of foreigners. In the present era of convertibility in which American business, banks and citizens have lost their fear of foreign currencies and have become accustomed to holding them, a loss of confidence by our own citizens in the government's capacity to handle the situation could readily assume catastrophic proportions. Experience shows that the major danger facing any currency is massive capital flight brought on by loss of confidence on the part of the citizens of the country concerned. During the past two years we have developed new and strong defenses against international speculative raids but nothing that could withstand a major loss of confidence in the dollar by our own citizens.

We must also retain the confidence of foreign holders of dollars, both the central banks which hold some \$12 billion, and private persons who hold about \$8 billion. Great progress has been made in the official area in the past two years, and it is fair to say that there is now far greater recognition of the need for international financial cooperation than at any time in the past. The foreign private area is somewhat more volatile, but is potentially far less dangerous to the dollar than possible action by our own citizens. Here too, there is, at present, greater confidence in the U.S. than at any time in the past few years.

The maintenance of confidence, which is all important in the balance of payments field, depends on our following policies designed to steadily reduce our current deficit and bring it



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

into balance over the next three to five years. Equally, and for the present even more important, it depends on our refraining from actions that would frighten the financial community and lead its members to the conclusion that we were in danger of losing control of the situation. If we are to retain the confidence of the private business community we must show reasonable confidence in ourselves.

This background clearly points the way to what we should do and to what we should not do during the coming months. Our best estimates point to a gross deficit to be financed in the two years, 1963-1964, of some \$6 billion. This includes an estimate of at least \$2-1/2 billion for short term outflows which are exceedingly difficult to predict. The best available judgment, both here and abroad, expects that our payments situation will show considerable improvement in 1965 and thereafter. This judgment makes it inadvisable to take drastic action now of a nature that would be inimical to our long run interests. It focuses our attention on the need to handle the deficit during the next two years.

It is our estimate, in which the Treasury has full confidence, that we can finance a \$4-\$5 billion payments deficit over the two year period 1963-1964 by utilizing our present techniques and limiting the loss of gold to \$1 billion a year or \$2 billion for the period. The only caveat is that we must take actions that will continue the improvement in our basic payments situation that has characterized the past two years. Thus, we must find ways to reduce the prospective \$6 billion deficit to a size that can be handled by the \$4 to \$5 billion of potentially available financing. This can be done by vigorous implementation of the action program outlined in the April 6 report of the Cabinet Committee and further described in the attached memorandum. Implementation of this program will strengthen our ability to obtain financing and is likely to reduce the need for gold sales, particularly in 1964.

While this action program is, in my view, essential, it is every bit as important that we refrain from actions that would weaken or destroy confidence in our ability to handle the situation. Frankly, speaking, a number of the suggestions

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

that have recently been put forward are likely to have just such an effect. Specifically, there is great danger in any attempt to limit capital flows, to have resort to the IMF, except on an emergency basis, or to ask for governmental assistance from other countries. These are all actions which habitually are only taken at a time of severe balance of payments crisis. Action by the U.S. in any of these fields at this time could well bring on the very danger we are all trying to avoid. Action to tax tourist travel would be somewhat less dangerous, but would be likely to raise very difficult problems in the Congress and in general public opinion.

My detailed views on a program designed to limit foreign borrowings in the New York market are contained in the Treasury paper on this subject. Suffice it to say here that I see very little to be gained by a successful effort over and above what is already in sight. The danger of setting off an uncontrollable run against dollars by our own citizens is, on the other hand, very great. Long term borrowings by Canada in our market have averaged some \$350 million a year for many years. These borrowings are closely related to Canada's trade deficit with the U.S. Indeed, even including \$350 million in long term borrowings, Canada's balance of payments deficit with the U.S. has averaged \$200 million a year. Any action on our part to shut off Canadian access to our capital markets would force Canada to undertake reprisals against our trade. Two other points are important. First, Canada has always been a willing holder of dollars, and increases in Canadian reserves do not lead to gold sales. And second, the recent large volume of Canadian sales of bonds in New York include two large, unusual and one time issues totalling \$550 million. There is no reason to expect the rate of the past six months to be continued.

European use of the New York market is now mostly by the Scandinavian countries. Public sales of their bonds usually result in about half the issues being sold abroad, thus reducing the impact on our balance of payments. The same is true to a somewhat smaller degree of Australian issues. The net drain from these two sources over the next two years can be estimated at something between \$100 and \$200 million. This is the area in which controls would be effective. It seems perfectly clear that such a small gain could not possibly be worth the risks of provoking a run on the dollar in which we could lose the entire gain in a day or two. It may be possible for the Treasury to encourage the investment banking community in New York to favor public offering of such issues over private placements in which the entire issue is placed in the United States.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-4-

The present situation, where possible action is under serious study, is highly dangerous. The danger is unnecessary and of our own deliberate creation. It is most important that a firm decision against any action in this field be promptly taken. Such a decision will not prevent the Treasury from continuing its policy of making clear to the surplus countries of Europe the inappropriateness of their using the New York market as a source of capital.

Political borrowings are not an immediate issue because there is general agreement that the present time is not propitious for approaches to European governments. Even if it were, I would be very much opposed to any such action under present circumstances. In the first place, it is most unlikely to be productive, and, in the second place, it would arouse doubts of our willingness and determination to defend the dollar by the simpler and more orthodox means recommended in the action program. This could provoke a loss of confidence in the dollar here and abroad that could easily cost us far more than we could possibly hope to obtain in the way of long term governmental loans. The two year credits which we are presently obtaining from Central Banks are considered as a new form of normal investment. As such they have no budgetary effect on the countries concerned. Governmental loans, on the other hand, would not only require parliamentary approval abroad, but would have to be financed either by increased taxes, or by internal borrowing and increased budgetary deficits. It is simply impossible to conceive of any foreign government considering a significant loan of such a character to the U.S. until and unless we have used all the means at our own disposal to defend the dollar. This is clearly not the case today and will not be the case until and unless we have taken action in the monetary field along the lines recommended in the action program. Even then a successful result would be most doubtful.

Use of the IMF for a first tranche drawing of \$1 billion or so should also be avoided under present circumstances for a number of reasons. First of all, the IMF is looked upon as a resource of last resort for countries with convertible

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-5-

currencies. A drawing of the gold tranche, approximately \$1 billion, would be unsettling to confidence and thus self-defeating. One reason for this attitude is that leaving aside sterling, Japanese yen and Canadian dollars there is only approximately \$3-1/4 billion of gold and convertible currencies available for our use in the IMF. Of this amount some \$2-1/4 billion represents the current gold holdings of the IMF. Fund standby liabilities are approximately \$1-1/3 billion of which \$1 billion is the U.K. standby, a large part of which is expected to be needed later this year. Thus, unless we requested the activation of the new borrowing arrangements carrying with it an examination of our policies by both the IMF and the potential lenders, a \$1 billion drawing by the U.S. would probably involve the Fund's gold stock. Although this is available we must remember that the Fund has \$800 million of its gold invested in U.S. Treasury bills. This is a part of our \$16 billion gold stock. Any U.S. drawing that involved the Fund's gold stock would almost inevitably lead to a discussion in the IMF Board of the wisdom of this investment and could well lead to the withdrawal of part or all of this gold. This could mean a substantial gold loss for the U.S. This problem would tend to disappear in time of recognized crisis, but would be very real if the U.S. asserted the right to a drawing which other countries considered unjustified, as would be the case with a drawing under present circumstances. Finally, a drawing from the IMF can in no circumstances be considered as a substitute for action to reduce our deficit. Any such idea by the U.S. would gravely undermine confidence in our determination to correct our payments situation.

The long and the short of it is that it could be truly disastrous for the United States, under present circumstances, to embark on a course of action that would only be appropriate to a major crisis. Our present course of action should be to vigorously pursue the policies which are readily available and which would be well understood throughout the world. These policies, as outlined in the action program, should be adequate to carry us through 1964, by which time the longer term favorable factors which the experts foresee should be in evidence.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-6-

If they are not, and a crisis becomes inevitable, then, of course drastic measures will be in order and the necessity for them will be understood by all. Their effectiveness will not be minimized in any way by waiting until it is appropriate to use them. And meanwhile we will continue to preserve the longer term liberal values of a free economy that are and have been the heart of U.S. foreign economic policy.



Douglas Dillon

602 2/63



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Group 3

Research and Reference Service

SOME CURRENT PUBLIC OPINION TRENDS IN WESTERN EUROPE

February 1963

Preliminary Report Based Upon Early Returns

Presented are preliminary indications from February surveys still in progress. Unless there are significant public opinion changes between early and late February, the final results are unlikely to vary from the figures presented by as much as five per cent. Italian returns are not presently available and will be supplied later.

Special Memorandum
Survey Research Division

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Group 3

NY 100
NSA-84-111 (S/17/84)
NARA Date 3/88

NSF / 302 / Opinion Polls 1961-1963

LCC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SIDING WITH THE U.S.

Finally, on a question that has been used to assay the extent of "neutralist" inclinations in Western Europe, West Germany registers a record high in professed allegiance to the U.S. side and Great Britain continues at a majority, or near majority level of support. France continues to evidence -- as it has without exception in surveys since 1955 -- a predominant inclination toward non-alignment with either of the two power blocs. This provides, of course, fertile soil for thoughts about a third force.

Table 7 "In the present world situation, do you personally think that, on the whole, (survey country) should side with the United States, with the U.S.S.R., or with neither?"

	Great Britain				West Germany			
	May '60	Jun/Jul '61	June '62	Feb. '63	May/June '60	Jun/Jul '61	June '62	Feb. '63
No. of cases	(1150)	(1283)	(1261)	(400)	(1010)	(1145)	(1234)	(600)
U.S.	42%	50%	51%	52%	64%	77%	75%	81%
U.S.S.R.	2	3	2	2	*	-	1	*
Neither	46	39	38	38	22	18	18	14
No opinion	10	8	9	8	14	5	6	5
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
Net Favorable ¹	-6	8	11	12	42	59	56	67

	France				Italy		
	(1000)	(1330)	(1307)	(633)	(1011)	(1200)	(1344)
U.S.	30%	31%	29%	27%	33%	35%	45%
U.S.S.R.	7	5	4	5	6	5	3
Neither	51	49	53	56	44	43	36
No opinion	12	15	14	12	17	17	16
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
Net Favorable	-28	-23	-28	-34	-17	-13	6

¹ "Net Favorable" equals "U.S." minus "Neither" and "U.S.S.R."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Survey Branch
11 West - Can down on by a survey
strength
Feb '63*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

U. S. VERSUS SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH...

Over a period marked by the U.S. show of strength in the Cuban crisis, judgments about U.S. military power vis-a-vis that of the Soviet Union appear to have improved in all three countries surveyed. But except in West Germany the changes since the last survey are small, and only in West Germany is the U.S. predominantly seen as ahead in military strength at the present time.

Table 1 "All things considered, which country do you think is ahead in total military strength at the present time -- the U.S. or the U.S.S.R.?"...

	Great Britain				West Germany			
	May '60	Jun/Jul '61	June '62	Feb. '63	May/June '60	Jun/Jul '61	June '62	Feb. '63
No. of cases	(1150)	(650)	(647)	(400)	(1010)	(573)	(620)	(600)
U.S. ahead	12%	15%	22%	28%	26%	26%	39%	53%
U.S.S.R. ahead	55	56	47	45	23	38	21	16
Neither ahead	5	8	7	5	16	17	15	15
No opinion	28	21	24	22	35	19	25	16
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
Net Favorable	-43	-41	-25	-17	3	-12	18	37
	France				Italy			
	(1000)	(671)	(615)	(633)	(1010)	(600)	(672)	
U.S. ahead	25%	12%	20%	24%	30%	22%	29%	
U.S.S.R. ahead	40	43	33	28	22	29	29	
Neither ahead	--	20	17	20	21	11	8	
No opinion	35	25	30	28	27	38	34	
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	
Net Favorable	-15	-31	-13	-4	8	-7	0	

¹ The question was phrased somewhat more generally in the 1962 survey (Communist vs. Anti-Communist countries), so these readings should be taken as only approximately comparable to the others.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GERMANY 2/1/63

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

February 1, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your meeting with Ambassador Kohler at 12:15 today

Taking advantage of Foy Kohler's presence here, we have arranged for him to meet with you, Secretary Rusk, Tommy Thompson and Bill Tyler to discuss recent Soviet developments and the handling of outstanding problems between us and Moscow.

Initially Foy's return was set up for a discussion of bilateral US-Soviet problems, and some of these are listed later in the memorandum. But you will probably want to begin by asking him for anything he may have to say on the Soviet view of the troubles in our own alliance and possible Soviet interest in playing one side against the other. There is also, of course, the new development in the test ban negotiations, which will very much change most of the presuppositions on which Foy and Tommy and others of us have been working with respect to the Soviets in recent weeks.

An immediate point at issue is Gromyko's proposal for the resumption of bilateral US-USSR discussions on Germany and Berlin (Moscow's 1840, attached). Foy has believed the Soviets may now be seriously interested in a modus vivendi and that we may possibly have a useful dialogue with them this time. The tests talk break-off may well change his view. Up for debate is the locus of the talks. Gromyko said he was prepared to have them go on in Moscow or Washington, although he clearly preferred Moscow. There are, however, good and sound reasons for having them here in Washington and you may wish to discuss this.

In addition to these general questions, Foy has several bilateral problems he would like to raise with you.

- a. Soviet Protest of the Large Diameter Pipe Embargo
(Moscow's 1841, attached)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5(b)

White House Guidelines

By:MMK NARA, Date 5/5/97

~~SECRET~~

100 F 117 / Germany - Security, Jan - Mar 1963

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Foy was asked to bring this matter to your attention in view of Khrushchev's personal interest in it.

On this issue, the Department feels -- and I sense Foy shares this feeling too -- we have hit a sensitive Soviet nerve. Moreover, the consensus in the Department is that we have taken this exercise too far down the pike to turn back now. The original decision to ban shipments of large diameter pipe to the Soviets was taken in NATO, and we have exerted considerable pressures to force German and Italian adherence to the commitment and to get Japan to go along too. The immediate problem is to determine the stand we will take on the demarche and the content of the reply.

b. Communications

As you are aware, we have not made any progress with the Soviets on the communications issue. But at his last meeting with Foy, Gromyko suggested a possible tie in between a go-ahead on our communications facilities and our readiness to conclude the bilateral air agreement we both initialled in the summer of 1961. However, there is strong feeling here that it would be a mistake to permit the Soviets to tie together these two unrelated propositions, especially since we have bargaining leverage in that the Soviets already have such equipment in New York.

c. Bilateral Air Agreement

This still leaves open bilateral air arrangements in which the Soviets apparently have a continuing interest. Foy, I gather, thinks this is something on which forward motion might have been possible after the signing of the test ban agreement.

hcf. B.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

ORIGIN/ACTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

(Departmental and Foreign Service)

802 FR-US

REP	AF
EUR	FE
CU	INR
FBO	ICA
COM	FEB
LAB	TAR
XMB	AIR
CIA	NAVY
USIA	NSA

A-1868
NO.

SECRET

COPY NO. 1

SERIES A

TO : Department of State

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

1963 FEB 4 AM 10 26

Info: London

EUR INEX
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy, PARIS

DATE: Feb. 2, 1963

SUBJECT : Views on General de Gaulle's Press Conference, January 14

REF :

There are enclosed Memoranda of Conversation with the following French officials:

1. M. André Malraux, Minister for Cultural Affairs.
2. M. Habib Deloncle, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
3. M. Jean-Claude Winckler of Habib Deloncle's Office, Quai d'Orsay

They are forwarded because of their general interest in regard to the views as given of General de Gaulle's attitude and motivations.

1. In the case of Malraux, it will be noted he expressed the view that a meeting between the President and General de Gaulle at some time in the future was extremely important for the future of relationships between our two countries.

2. M. Habib Deloncle gave what to me was a plausible explanation of de Gaulle's statements at his recent press conference on January 14. These views of course may have been ex post facto but at least they seem to have a certain reality.

3. The brief conversation with M. Winckler was only of interest in that he asserted that de Gaulle had made a suggestion to Macmillan at Rambouillet in regard to cooperation in the nuclear field. I have had confirmation of this from another Quai d'Orsay official who said that the offer related primarily to the development of missiles, but agreed that Macmillan had in effect brushed off the suggestion and proceeded to Nassau to make the arrangements with the United States.

SECRET

FORM DS-323 11-61

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

In Out

Drafted by:

AMB:CEBohlen;jd

1/31/63

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

X
RL
EB

Malraux conversation

filed

3/7/63

SECRET

✓ Mr Bundy 3
Mays w/ Pres
4/24/63

April 24, 1963

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President, April 18, 1963, 10:00 A. M.,
to 12 Noon - Balance of Payments

The President opened the meeting by asking Secretary Dillon what was the basis for the assumption that our balance of payments would be in good shape in 1965. He referred to the different view that Mr. Acheson's paper suggested. Secretary Dillon responded that it was the general opinion that there would be a substantial improvement in evidence by 1965 or perhaps late 1964, although it was not expected that our accounts would be in balance by then. This opinion had been expressed in the Brookings report. It was shared by the staff of the IMF, the IMF officers and most of the important European central bankers with whom he was in touch. Secretary Dillon then listed the major developments which were prospectively favorable. As far as trade went, European prices could be expected to increase relative to those of the U. S. The possibilities of the continued squeezing of European business profits between rising costs and less rapidly rising prices were about exhausted, and this and other forces would continue to drive European prices up. We could also expect improvements in the investment account. Much of the U. S. investment in Western Europe has been a one-time matter in response to the new political stability in Western Europe and the reappearance of convertibility for European currencies. This was already beginning to decline. Further, higher rate of economic activity in the U. S. would make investment here more attractive. On the other side of the ledger, income from assets held abroad was rising and would continue to rise. Each of the years 1961 and 1962 had shown a \$300 million increase in net income from foreign investments over its predecessors. The basic deficit which had been less than a billion dollars in 1961 and was a little over a billion dollars in 1962 could thus be expected to decline. On the other hand, short term capital movements were unpredictable and still presented a problem. Our out-flows on short term capital account had been \$2 billion in 1961 and \$1.7 billion by last year. Here the question of interest rates was important, but even in the short-term accounts there

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356 Sec. 3.4
NLK-92-43
By SF NARA DATE 1/6/94

1/27/77 / Mays w/ Pres. Gen 4/67

~~SECRET~~

were countervailing factors. For instance, there had been in the last year a return of flight capital to Europe, much of which was probably concealed in the "errors and omissions" category. It was Secretary Dillon's judgment that this too was coming to an end. These optimistic forecasts were based on the assumption that U. S. foreign expenditures in the military and foreign aid fields continued to be held down. In sum, daylight some time in the period 1965-66-67 was perfectly visible, and accordingly there was no reason for drastic actions now which would upset the dollar and have an adverse reaction on the whole international payments situation. On the other hand, if by the end of 1964 progress was not in accordance with expectations, we would have another look at the problem. It had clearly been a mistake to fix on 1963 as a definite target year in which balance would come.

The President then turned to Secretary Ball and asked him to summarize the State Department paper on restricting the access of our capital market for foreign security quotations. Secretary Ball opened by saying that the notion of restricting foreign security sales was not one in which he saw any positive merit. For example, he thought it should be much lower on the priority list than either an IMF drawing or a political negotiations for substantial government loans. However, if these are not possible, then the proposal should be given serious consideration. Secretary Ball reviewed the factual situation as set forth in his memorandum, with emphasis on the increasing use of the U. S. market, especially by Canadians. It was clear that we could not make a blanket prohibition and would have to find some way of dealing with genuine Japanese and Canadian needs. What was needed was some machinery for selective control. In his judgment, this could be accomplished without legislation; and simultaneously, informal talks could be had with the Canadians on what their needs were, but rigorous standards applied to the Europeans. On this basis he thought we might save something between \$400 - \$600 million annually on the investment account. Secretary Ball noted that the next Finance Minister of Canada, Walter Gordon, was in favor of "buying back Canada" and therefore might well be sympathetic to the program. He was confident that if we had the control machinery to back up our position, we could come to an understanding with the Canadians.

While he recognized the dangers of any restrictive action, Secretary Ball gave his judgment that it would be much better to restrict foreign securities flotation than to make any large troop redeployments or to impose regressive taxes on tourism. Responding to the President's

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

question, he said that foreign securities sales amounted to about ten per cent of total flotations in our markets.

Secretary Dillon, responding to the President's request for criticism of the proposal, made two chief points. First, he does not share the State Department estimate of the savings the proposed measure would yield. Second, the risk that any restriction would provoke a general capital flight was simply not worth taking. He then went on to develop his points in further detail. Most of the potential yield was in Canada. Canadian loans last year were exceptional in volume and character, and he did not expect they would be repeated on a similar scale. If we restricted Canadian borrowing, there would be an adverse effect on U. S. exports to Canada, since Canada itself had anything but an easy balance of payments situation and we were their major supplier. Further, the Canadians did not demand gold, but held their dollar balances cheerfully. The Japanese situation was similar. As for the rest, other than Canada and Japan, there was little in it. With respect to international institutions, we already had controls. Last year's European borrowings of \$200 million will decline. Secretary Dillon has already made informal representations to some European governments and he will make further representations. Of the rest, Israel took \$50 million, and thus would be politically difficult to cut down. Australia and New Zealand, which had taken \$80 or \$90 million last year were already reaching the limitation of their capacity to carry external debt. Further, the New York insurance companies who were the chief buyers of this kind of security were nearing their own limitations on further holdings. In sum, the whole enterprise would yield at most \$200 million a year. Since he thought the chances were 100 to 1 that this activity would trigger a mass capital out-flow in which we could lose \$1 or \$2 billion in assets, and in turn force us to an IMF drawing with all that it implies, he could not see why we should consider it seriously. Further, there was a legal problem. We might need a proclamation of a new emergency which in itself would have an effect on confidence. The classification of our allies as "enemies" to be dealt with under the Trading With the Enemy Act was troublesome.

Secretary Dillon then asked Chairman Martin for his view. Chairman Martin talked about the evanescent character of business confidence. We were facing the real possibility of a crisis. While he did not want to be a Cassandra, he thought it was necessary to warn of what could happen. Liberal policies in trade and in investment

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

matters have been our tradition. We should have the strength and the courage to follow them. If that tradition were impaired, we would start undermining the entire fabric of our liberal policy and all that goes with it, and the confidence which rests on that policy. His own experience with operating voluntary credit controls during the Korean War made him aware of the great difficulties that the operation of a Capital Issues Committee would involve. If this were a dramatic move which added to our resources, Chairman Martin could see some argument for it. But since the forces of the market are working with us we should cooperate rather than oppose them. We should not show the white feather unless we are against the wall.

The President asked what happens when our gold reserves get down to \$13 billion. Of course we can suspend the reserve requirement but what effect will that have on confidence? Chairman Martin said that we had to hold clearly to our 1961 policy statement: no embargo on gold movements; no direct controls. There was virtue in maintaining a strong line; as soon as we weaken foreign speculators and central banks would doubt our determination and confidence would drop. Liberal trade policies were, after all, our ultimate goal. If foreign countries had different trade and investment policies, we should not by any means follow their bad example. If necessary, we may have to take the risks of putting deflationary pressure on the economy through monetary policies. But since the favorable forces of expansion were operating to make investment in the U. S. more attractive, it seemed unwise to interfere with them by imposing direct controls. In sum, we should hold the line on our liberal policies. We need the courage and guts to stick to our policy and not allow ourselves to be put on the defensive.

At this point, the President asked Secretary Ball for his comments. Secretary Ball said that his chief difference with the Secretary of the Treasury was with respect to the amount of risk we should be prepared to accept. He shared Secretary Dillon's assumptions as to the favorable outlook for the future. However, we need a prudent policy which guards against the possibility of a worse outcome. It is clear that we have been too optimistic since 1961. If we are forced to take measures to defend the dollar under pressure it will be dangerous from the point of view of the national interest. We need to act now so as to provide a greater margin within which we can rely on the long range forces to improve our position. Further, we had to look to the future of the international payments system, especially in relation to the situation when we move

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

late surplus. An American surplus might well aggravate liquidity problems. As far as the issue of confidence and leadership went, he thought that departure from the strict fidelity to free capital movement was much less of a threat than the possibility that we might deflate our domestic economy. Secretary Ball stressed that he was not in any way suggesting restriction on foreign flotations in the U. S. as a matter of first priority, and repeated his concern that the policies advocated by the Secretary of the Treasury involved an unnecessarily large measure of risk.

Secretary Dillon agreed that the margin on which we were operating was narrow. However, it was he and the Treasury who were conservative, and Secretary Ball's proposal which was reckless. He and Secretary Ball, however, agreed that the issue was really one of priority. In his view once we start down the road of exchange controls and the like, it would be very difficult to stop and the effects on confidence would be clear.

The President then turned to the question of a possible drawing on the IMF. He read from paragraph A. of the Council paper and noted the assumptions contained therein that we would face a gross deficit of \$6 billion in the period 1963-64 and that we had to manage our affairs so that we financed no more than \$1 billion of this deficit each year through gold losses. Secretary Dillon commented that the figure of \$6 billion was inaccurate. We proposed to reduce the out-flow as the Cabinet Committee paper showed, so that the deficit was in fact less than that. If we were successful in reducing the out-flow we could finance the deficits on the present basis for as long a period in the future as necessary. He called on Under Secretary Roosa to comment on this point. Secretary Roosa defined our problem as that of any other borrower -- how to keep our credit standing good. This meant primarily two things. First, general confidence in our financial policy and second, clear evidence that the government is doing a comprehensive job in reducing unnecessary expenditures abroad. While he professed no expertise in these matters, Secretary Roosa thought it was highly desirable that if there was any excess fat in our military abroad, we should trim it off. This would have a favorable effect on the opinion of the European financial community. A reduction in tourist expenditures would likewise have a favorable effect on the European financial community. The President asked if this would also be true of U. S. foreign investment. Secretary Roosa replied that it would, but this was a

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

matter on which the Europeans will be taking action. He then stressed the importance of interest rates and quoted Van Lennep (the Director General of the Dutch Ministry of Finance and the Chairman of Working Party #3) to the effect that a half percent rise in the U. S. short rates would be a very important demonstration of our determination to deal with the balance of payments problems. Secretary Roosa went on to talk about the difficulties of estimating what gold sales would be and how un dependable the figure was on the distribution of deficits and surpluses in Europe. The Swedes, for example, had just told him that they were willing to hold their dollar balances without asking for gold, and as long as confidence in our policy existed, it was clear they would continue to do so. The President asked Secretary Roosa what was his estimate of the gold loss for 1963-64. Secretary Roosa responded that he thought it would be of the same order of magnitude as in the last two years -- about \$850 million per year or perhaps less. However, he did not wish to promise that the figure would not exceed this, because there were so many variables involved. He reported on his recent favorable discussions with the French, but pointed out that a change in French political attitudes in respect to financial questions might lead to a change in French behavior and a corresponding increase in our loss of gold. Nonetheless, we could sustain gold losses up to \$1 billion per year with no strongly adverse effects. Secretary Roosa stressed the crucial importance of avoiding in any way the suggestion that we had lost our nerve. He said that the efforts of the last two years have saved us at least \$3 billion in gold in a direct sense. If we had lost the extra \$3 billion we would have in fact lost much more because of the alarm that this would have created.

Secretary Dillon observed that the program of action that the Committee was presenting to the President would take effect primarily in Calendar 1964 because of the lags involved. The same thing would be true of the change in monetary policy which was proposed for the fall of 1963. Thus his estimate was that while the gold loss would be between \$800 million and \$1 billion in 1963, it would drop off to something between \$500 million and \$600 million in 1964.

The President returned to the question of an IMF drawing. Secretary Roosa said we should certainly bear the possibility in mind but at present he would like to save it. We have already worked out the arrangements with Per Jacobsson of the IMF for making a drawing. His own soundings in Europe on the advisability of a drawing were still producing negative results. It would take more time to prepare the Europeans.

~~SECRET~~

The Italians, in particular, have already warned us against making a drawing on the grounds that it would shock Europe if the U.S. and UK draw at the same time. All the Europeans expected the UK would be forced to draw. Secretary Dillon distinguished between the action of a large drawing either up to our gold tranches of approximately \$1 billion or up to our \$1.5 billion credit tranches of approximately another \$1 billion, and the idea of an ice-breaking small technical drawing in violation of Canadian repayment. He was strongly against a big drawing. The Council's analysis of the resources of the Fund was incorrect. The UK must draw and will probably draw \$1 billion since the Fund's assets are \$2.2 billion in gold and \$1.2 billion in hard European currencies. The reserves of hard currencies after a UK drawing would be small. The Fund could sell some gold but if we came in for a drawing on top of a British drawing the Fund would have to sell substantial amounts of gold or activate special borrowing arrangements. If so, our whole financial program would have to be examined at greater detail under the terms of the special arrangements. If the Fund sold gold in any substantial amounts, it would almost certainly ask for the return of the \$100 million in Fund gold on deposit with the U.S. This would cancel the gain to us of the drawing. The Canadian situation has changed and the Canadians are not planning to make any repayment this year except for \$25 million in gold. Therefore, the occasion for a technical drawing will not present itself now. However, if the British make a drawing we should then examine the situation and see whether a technical drawing was possible. None of this, of course, was a substitute for the action program. In this respect Secretary Dillon called attention to the fact that the \$1 billion in the Council memo assumed that there was no action program.

Chairman Heller reminded the group that our basic goal was not merely to draw gold, but to do it in a way that kept domestic expansion going and our liberal international policies intact as well. We see all occurring that what we are faced with is a transitional problem rather than a permanent one. In this case it is wise to take the easy measures first and to be sure that the more distasteful measures are available and arranged in order of priority. In his view there was no easier way to get \$1 to \$2 billion additional in foreign resources than to make a drawing on the IMF, at least up to our gold tranches. His analysis of the IMF reserves was different than the Treasury's. There was \$4.4 billion in gold and hard currency. \$1 billion drawn by the UK and \$1 billion drawn by the US would still leave \$2.4 billion in ready IMF reserves in addition to the \$3 billion which the standby agreement would provide if necessary. Thus both we and the UK could draw and still

—SECRET—

~~SECRET~~

leave an emergency reserve of nearly \$5.5 billion. The President asked what advantage there would be in an IMF drawing. Secretary Dillon interrupted to remark again on the futility of drawing \$1 billion if the result was that the IMF withdrew its deposit with the U.S. of \$800 million in gold. Chairman Heller responded that this was an unrealistic view. Per Jacobson favored active use of the Fund, and he would not act so as to stand in the way of it. Secretary Dillon said that a technical drawing on the Fund was acceptable. Any big drawing, however, must wait on the actions of the UK. In the meantime we must continue to talk to the Europeans and the New York financial community to prepare them for the possibility of drawing. After all, we could not take actions which would lead to headlines of the "U.S. Admits Bankruptcy; Goes to IMF" sort.

Chairman Heller pointed out that we could draw European currency and at the same time the Fund could sell gold to the Europeans. This would have the double advantage of increasing our supply of European currencies at the same time that their hunger for gold was appeased. Secretary Roosa responded that the IMF does not think that their present gold stock is large. Furthermore, since they don't expect any further payments in gold they want to hang on to their present holdings. He again raised the question of what must sooner or later happen to the \$800 million in gold that the Fund has on deposit with the U.S. Mr. Tobin pointed out that it is hard to believe that the IMF would be acting against us at the same moment that we make a drawing. This simply was not sensible. Further, he was not proposing that the U.S. draw \$1 billion all at once, but rather that we make drawings over a period of time, in installments which would total between \$1 and \$2 billion in the course of the next two years.

The President asked Mr. Tobin whether he was in favor of a drawing. Mr. Tobin responded yes, of course. Our ability to make use of the Fund in a technical way as we did in the past is now at an end because the Fund's holdings of dollars are up to its limit. Drawings in small amounts as a regular routine matter would simply represent a continuation of our past policies in the new technical situation. Mr. Jacobson and Secretary Dillon could make it perfectly clear to the financial community what was happening, and the whole operation could be carried on in a way that would not shake confidence any more than it has done in the past.

The President then moved to the question of political loans. He asked Secretary Roosa what the prospects were for funding existing dollar holdings and for additional five-year loans along the lines suggested in

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Secretary Ball's paper. Was there a parliamentary problem? Secretary Ball interrupted to remark that the proposal envisioned financing that would be done by central banks and not through government budgets. The basic question, however, was the necessity for a political decision by governments to ask their central banks to go beyond existing practices with respect to financing U. S. deficits. He said this was something which we obviously would start with the Germans and then the Italians. He sketched the plan further, along the lines of his paper. Secretary Dillon pointed out that in his judgment it would be very difficult to achieve these arrangements, and further, with all the difficulty, it would accomplish nothing beyond what we already have done. The present two year loans will be rolled over and renewed as long as necessary. In fact, the amounts we now have outstanding and the agreements for further amounts up to our needs go to the full extent of the future surpluses of the Germans, Italians, French and Belgians. Thus the \$1.2 billion mentioned in the Cabinet Committee paper as the available magnitude of financing of this nature does not accurately reflect the maximum amount that will in fact be available.

Secretary Ball noted that the Treasury was addressing itself to the easy case of the financing which would be available if the US balance of payments was moving in a favorable way. The problem was, however, what would happen if we did not do well. It was in these circumstances that advance agreement was important and it was precisely in these circumstances that the arrangements we now have might prove unreliable. Secretary Dillon responded that it would undoubtedly be desirable to get the kind of commitments of which Mr. Ball had spoken, but he did not think it possible. We now have oral, informal understandings. Any formal contracts were much more difficult to achieve, and if achieved, they would probably involve much harder terms. The Bundesbank was at least as independent as the Federal Reserve System. (laughter) Secretary Roosa noted that the Bundesbank and the subsidiary of the Italian central bank which deals with foreign exchange have full authority in the foreign fields and are not subject to instruction by the government. In particular, the head of the Italian activity was independent of the government. He had pointed out to Mr. Roosa in conversation that he was satisfied with the present arrangements, but if the politicians get into it there would be no money.

The President asked whether it was clearly the Treasury's position that we could not go in any formal way beyond what we now have in either standstill understanding and lines of credit? Under Secretary Roosa responded affirmatively. The President asked whether this

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

statement applied to 5 year loans. Under Secretary Roosa responded that we could edge up toward 5 year loans slowly and in one country at a time, but we could not get there in one or a few large leaps.

Secretary Ball called attention to page 5 of the Cabinet Committee report and stated again that this was a good financing scheme if things went well. What if they did not? Messrs. Dillon and Roosa said we would call on the IMF. Chairman Heller remarked that they pictured this as an extreme emergency measure. What was in between the emergency measure and the favorable situation anticipated in the Cabinet Committee report? Roosa responded that what we are now doing can handle such a situation.

Secretary Ball asked what would happen if in the middle of 1964 the situation was no better than it is now. Wouldn't it then be harder to try to make any new arrangements? Wouldn't it be more difficult to go to the Fund than it is now? We have been talking about a great catastrophe, but this is unlikely. What is likely is the continuation of our past experience of over-optimism and failure to be able to take measures unilaterally which meet the deficit in the next short period. Secretary Dillon said that world opinion was favorable to the United States. We had either to take advantage of this and continue what we are doing or immediately do a handful of major operations at the risk of changing the favorable opinion abroad. The President observed that this was precisely the central point. He then referred to the very difficult experiences of the fall of 1960 and asked whether the fall of 1964 and the discussion incident to another campaign might not bring a similar experience. Do we have the groundwork laid in the London gold market to avoid this? Secretary Dillon responded affirmatively. In 1960 we were totally unprepared to deal with gold speculation. We now have an understanding with all the major countries, and we could and would keep prices in the London gold market down so that another speculative burst like that of the fall of 1960 will not recur.

The President then asked Secretary McNamara what his plans were with respect to Defense outlays on foreign account. What was the present situation and what did he have in mind? Secretary McNamara responded that as of FY 1963 he expected to be losing about \$1.6 to \$1.7 billion on foreign account. With present programs, and on the

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

assumptions that the Germans continue to buy about \$600 million a year under the offset agreement, this figure would be constant for the next two or three years. However, he was doubtful whether in fact the Germans would continue to purchase at this rate for more than another year, and we must be prepared to meet the contingency of decreased income from that source. The only way to improve our position was to reduce troop deployments. It was his judgment that this can be done without reducing our effective military strength; the problem was largely political rather than military. In response to the President's question, he said that half of the expenditures were for NATO; the other half all around the rest of the world with Japan being one of the major areas. The President asked how we could put the political issue to the Europeans. He then referred to the conversations that he, the Secretary of Defense and the Chiefs had had on troop deployments in December. Secretary McNamara responded that it was not the time to raise the issue that was then discussed. What we can do now is thin out our deployments in Europe in terms of troops per combat unit, without reducing the number or strength of our combat units. Thus we would reduce the supporting forces and accompanying dependents. On this basis he expects to be able to reduce the annual rate of net foreign outlays by \$300-\$400 million below the current one by the end of Calendar 1964. These reductions will take place mainly in the UK, Germany, France, Spain and Japan.

The President then asked Mr. Bell about AID's plans. Mr. Bell responded that in the same period their net outlays would be reduced to an annual rate of \$590 million or below.

The President turned to the question of the future growth in our export trade. What were the prospects for agriculture and for exports of aircraft? Secretary Dillon commented on our cotton sales, and the loss in market share over the last several years due to a poor pricing method which had made us the residual supplier. The Department of Agriculture was now moving to selling on an auction basis, in an attempt to get back to our previous position of 5 million bales from our present sales of 4 million bales per year. The President asked whether this was enough and what the broader prospects for agricultural trade were. Governor Herter spoke of the Japanese commitments to increase their imports of U. S. agricultural products as the only cheery note in an otherwise not very encouraging picture of the agricultural scene. In response to the President's question, Secretary Ball said that the change in cotton marketing practices would go into effect this year.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The President remarked that the Treasury has certainly done an excellent job to date. As far as the weapons we had against adversity, they seem to boil down chiefly to a change in interest rate with the difficulties that this might bring for the domestic economy and Chairman Heller. The President remarked that we seem to be faced with a screwy system, in which we had to squeeze important public activities in the spheres of defense and aid in order to let the private activities of tourism and foreign investment go forward untouched. However, that was how life was, and how the system operated.

Secretary Dillon observed that it was important for us to organize a promotional campaign for Americans to see America first, and for more foreign travel in the United States. There was then an exchange between Secretary Ball and Secretary Dillon on the relative merits of restricting tourist expenditures and the flow of investment capital. Ball thought the former an undesirable and regressive policy which no Democratic administration should undertake. Secretary Dillon considered that restriction of tourism, especially by taxes, would be much less a blow to confidence and therefore much more desirable than restrictions on the sale of foreign securities.

The President observed that the Treasury was very skillful in shooting down, every three months or so, the balloons which other departments had floated. Secretary Dillon observed that this reflected the Treasury's realism, its understanding that there were no panaceas and its cool assessment of the facts. As for the reductions in defense expenditures which must form the major part of our forward program, he considered that selling the Europeans on it would not be difficult.

The President asked what else we had beyond the reductions in defense and aid expenditures abroad and the possibility of raising interest rates later in the year. What about a tax on the use of capital markets by foreigners? Secretary Roesa indicated that the Treasury was exploring this possibility but was encountering many difficult technical problems. Secretary Dillon said that a tax did not have the selectivity of the kind of control system which Secretary Ball had proposed. In his judgment, if we do anything to restrict foreign securities sales, controls are better than taxes. He added a last word on the need for a citizens committee to promote foreign investment in the United States and said that he would send a proposal along to the President on this.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Secretary Hedges spoke of the need for being tough abroad and for pushing in a number of areas including more competitive agricultural prices, the reduction of petroleum imports, a general export drive, providing tax advantages to importers, an examination of what could be done to implement a revised Webb-Pomerene Act, and what impact a change in our ocean shipping rate policies would have on the competitiveness of domestic production against certain imports such as Canadian lumber. In response to the President's request, Secretary Hedges promised a memorandum on this last point.

~~SECRET~~

4/24/63 4

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 24, 1963

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President on the Multilateral Force, Wednesday, April 24, 1963, 10:30 A.M., in the Cabinet Room

PRESENT: Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Ball, Messrs. Tyler, Chayes, Kitchen, and Gerard Smith; Messrs. Nitze and McNaughton, Admiral Ricketts, Admiral Anderson; Mr. Bundy and Mr. Kaysen

The President opened by praising Admiral Ricketts and Mr. McNaughton for their effective missionary work in Germany. In response to Secretary Rusk's suggestion, Admiral Ricketts said that he had no doubt that the German Navy and the Ministry of Defense were both unequivocally behind the surface ship mode. This was also true of the Deputy Foreign Minister. The Germans were sending a team of technical people, both military and civilian, who will arrive on Monday to look into matters of ship construction, equipment, costs and training. They are doing this for technical reasons and because they need material to convince the German legislature. Admiral Anderson observed that underlying all the discussions in Germany was the hope that in the future the door could be opened for the additional nuclear submarines in the force. Admiral Ricketts observed that he had told the Germans that, although he had no authority to commit the government on this point, he was sure that there could be a future evolution of the force. However, the immediate issue was the surface ships, and he had urged the Germans to go ahead with the surface ships now without worrying about how it would evolve. Mr. Tyler pointed out that his instructions had directed him to say the same thing and that, in speaking with Schroeder and Adenauer, he had. Secretary Rusk remarked that it was clearly necessary to hold out this hope. The President observed that there was a delicate matter of wording involved, and we had to be careful just how we said what we said, but

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLK-93-104
By MMB NARA, Date 6/23/84

NCF 1317 / Mtg w Rusk 4/63

~~SECRET~~

he agreed that something had to be said. Admiral Ricketts said that in his discussions he had put no date to the process of evolution into another mode--neither five, nor seven years, nor any other time.

The President turned to the question of size of the force. Did we need to maintain 25 ships for technical reasons, and would this be a sticking point? Secretary Rusk said that he could not speak to the technical point, but that politically there was no need for a force as large as 25 ships, carrying 200 missiles. We wanted to be sure that the cost question wasn't a barrier to membership in the force, especially for the Italians and the Germans, and that therefore it might be desirable to have some flexibility on the size of the force. Mr. Nitze observed that the vulnerability problem, which was related to the size of the force, affected its political credibility. If the force were too small in technical terms, then the political effect we were seeking would be lost, because it would not be considered an effective force by the Europeans. Secretary Rusk asked whether we could at some later stage talk of a range of 15 - 25 ships, rather than stick with 25 as the necessary minimum size. Mr. Nitze wondered whether 15 ships were enough from the military point of view. Admiral Ricketts said that as long as we talked in terms of a pure surface ship force, a force of fewer than 20 ships raised technical questions.

The President asked how important in mathematical terms was the increase in vulnerability if we talked about a smaller force as compared to a 25 ship force. Admiral Ricketts said that he could not give a precise answer. Many variables, including the ability to deploy ships in different kinds of waters, make 20 a good minimum figure. The President asked for a detailed examination of the relative vulnerability of 15, 20 and 25 ship forces, and Admiral Anderson agreed that the Navy would be responsible for one. Mr. Bundy suggested that we stay with 25 as a number for public discussion now, but we take no fixed positions within the Departments concerned as to whether, how, and when to fall back to a lower number.

Secretary Rusk said that the next step was to see what points had to be covered in a preliminary agreement, and he went over the nine points of Mr. McNaughton's draft memorandum. Our immediate problem was the question of consultation with Congress. He expected that he would have a response from Adenauer on May 3. He thought that we should talk

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

with the Congressional leaders, at least, before that. The President asked whether Adenauer's response on control would be satisfactory. Mr. Bundy replied that he was certain it would be, and that what we had to say to Congress is that we had agreement on unanimity, or, if there was something less than unanimity, the change would be on the European side and would in no way limit the U.S. veto. The President asked again whether the Germans would agree to this, and Mr. Bundy said "Yes." Mr. McNaughton observed that perhaps the Germans were not quite as firm as was suggested. The conversations on control in Germany took the shape of Ambassador Dowling's asserting the U.S. position, and the Germans offering no objection. This was a shade less affirmative than a position in which the Germans had spoken out positively on the issue. Mr. Bundy observed that the Germans, however, had no worry about the U.S. veto. Any worries they had about unanimity arose from the possibility of a Harold Wilson veto. Secretary Rusk said that he had put our position perfectly plainly to Schroeder in a private conversation in Paris, and Schroeder had expressed no objection. The President said he did not want to talk to Congress until the German agreement was in hand. He feared the discussion with the Congress would leak, and the Germans would react to the reports by denying that what they heard was what they had agreed to. Therefore, he wanted to wait on Adenauer's letter.

The President then turned to the questions of ownership, custody and security of the warheads, and asked whether they would continue to be in U.S. custody. Mr. Chayes said "No." The whole crew would in effect be the custodians. It was clear that we would want to have a transfer in ownership, and this would require legislation. We had a semantic problem of how we wished to describe the new situation. Secretary Rusk said that it was much more desirable for the warheads to be owned by the force as such, and not by any of the individual nations in the force. It was certainly clear that in relation to the Soviet Union, we didn't want a situation in which the Germans own warheads themselves. The President asked whether it was necessary to transfer ownership explicitly. Messrs. Chayes and Smith both responded strongly that it was. There was a great expectation in Europe that ownership would be transferred. Meeting this expectation was a necessary condition for a political deal. Mr. Nitze

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

observed that the Europeans wanted the transfer of ownership, and that of course the Russians would be content to see us continue ownership. Secretary Ball and Mr. Chayes remarked that what we wanted was corporate ownership by the MLF as such, rather than a partnership in which each partner participated in ownership. Mr. Bundy remarked that Congressman Holifield would probably be on the side of the Russians in respect to ownership, and that this was a symbol of the problems we have to deal with in changing the law. Mr. Smith observed that we would probably have to have agreements with the MLF similar to the agreements we had with some of our NATO Allies. We would probably have to have an atomic energy agreement with the MLF which provided for the disclosure of certain restricted data to the MLF.

The President asked whether we could give ownership to the MLF which in turn would entrust custody to the United States. This appeared to be excessively complicated to several in the group. Admiral Anderson observed that the process of inspection and maintenance of the warheads would have to remain in U.S. hands. Mr. Chayes pointed out that there were various technical guards that were possible against tampering, photography and the like while the warheads were on the ship.

The President asked what provisions for security would be made on the ship itself, in the way of custodial guard. Secretary Rusk and Mr. Chayes pointed out that U.S. personnel could continue to be part of the custodial group. Mr. Smith emphasized that there was a difference between the question of legal custody, which should be in the MLF as such, and the practical involvement of U.S. officers and crew members in the custodial and safety forces aboard the ship. Secretary Rusk said that the indirect method of U.S. involvement was preferable from a political point of view. Mr. Bundy asked whether the physical security of the warheads and design data would be as good in the MLF as under present NATO arrangements.

There was a great deal of discussion on this point between Messrs. Chayes, Smith and Bundy. The President remarked that it is clear that we need to be well prepared on this matter in detail before we go to the Congress, and we have to compare the risk potentials in the present NATO arrangement with those in prospect

~~SECRET~~

JFK wants
US to have
Admiral Anderson

~~SECRET~~

under our proposed arrangements with the MLF. We must respond in some detail on matters like photography, opening of the warheads and the like. Before we went to Congress, we had to settle at least the political control question with the Germans and, if possible, the Italians, and we had to be fully prepared on the issue of security. He asked who should do it. Mr. Bundy observed that the matter should be under the general direction of Ambassador Merchant, but that on the security and design consideration, it would be most helpful to involve Commissioner Ramey as a participant. The President agreed on this point. He asked Secretary Rusk to organize a meeting to cover these points with him before there was any Congressional consultation.

Mr. Bundy observed that in addition to this question there is a further question of just what we should set as a goal for June--achieve the preliminary agreement on the detailed observations by Mr. McNaughton, or something less. He remarked that Ambassador Finletter and Ambassador Merchant had certain differences of view in this matter, and that they should be heard. The President responded that he would like to hear them next week when they are both here. He remarked that we have open to us a choice in the whole range from a communique to a detailed preliminary agreement as a goal to achieve by the time of his visit, and we need not necessarily choose now.

The meeting ended about 11:00 o'clock.

CK.
C. K.

~~SECRET~~

KU172
BT 934

R (EG9)

4/25/63
S/S
Mine
4-25-63
JR

THURSDAY
APRIL 25, 1963
9:58 a. m.

TELEPHONE CALL TO AMB. THOMPSON

The Sec asked if he would give some thought to the question of whether he should see Dobrynin before he left tomorrow for CENTO. The Sec said he had been holding off on Berlin until we got an answer. Sec said he still thought it was the thing to do. Thompson thought the Sec should not see him - the way Khrushchev has been talking.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		IS/FPC/CDR <i>John</i> Date: <i>4/10/99</i>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only:
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations _____
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART	
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non Responsive Info		TS authority to
FOIA Exemptions _____		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as <input type="checkbox"/> S or <input type="checkbox"/> C OADR
PA Exemptions _____		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to <input type="checkbox"/> S or <input type="checkbox"/> C OADR

S ma

MSA

F7E2205-0830

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

50

SECRET

Classification

00685

MAY 1 7 48 PM '63

Origin
Info

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS TOPOL 1620 OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

INFO: USBER BERLIN ROUTINE 744
 Amembassy BONN " 2658
 Amembassy LONDON " 5773
 Amembassy MOSCOW " 2373
 US Mission GENEVA TODIS ROUTINE 947

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION S/S

PARIS ALSO FOR EMBASSY

PARIS DELIVER FARLEY 8:00 AM May 2

Re POLTO 1416 *re*

26 —

Following is report Harriman-Khrushchev discussion April 26 as given by Under Secretary Harriman today to German, British, French Embassy representative

For USRO: You may draw on following in POLAD.

1. LAOS

Harriman reported that, in discussion on Laos, which only subject on which he authorized negotiate with Khrushchev, latter reaffirmed support for Geneva agreement and Vienna understanding that Soviets support principle of neutral and independent Laos.

Harriman commented that major questionable aspect is Khrushchev's ability to influence situation in Laos even if has will. Obviously does not have authority or influence had during Geneva discussions. Then Pushkin, though

Drafted by: *72E*
BTF:FEcash:b

5/1/63

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

REM - Mr. Van Hollen *CVT*

Clearances:

S/AL - Amb. Thompson (in draft) *REC* M - Mr. Sullivan *72E*
S/S - Mr. Lubkeman *WR*

SECRET

Classification

REPRODUCTION OR COPY IS PROHIBIT UNLESS "UNCLASS"

le on ChiCom attitudes. Even some indications that North Viet-Namese
ing toward ChiComs. During Geneva period Pathet Lao and North Viet-Namese were
entirely dependent on Moscow for supplies. Now that fighting has ceased questionable
how much influence Khrushchev has on Laotian situation.

Khrushchev did not criticize US Government's role in Laos. Seemed quite concerned
over assassination Foreign Minister. Felt police and military forces in charge Vientiane
security should be integrated. In response Harriman's request Khrushchev agreed
Soviet Ambassador in Vientiane should cooperate with British, French and US Ambassadors.
Harriman told Washington group that in recent weeks Soviet Ambassador has been more
cooperative than Pole.

He added that Laos situation not very healthy. Geneva agreement had transferred
struggle from military to political arena. But Pathet Lao had attempted take over
Kong Le forces. Were able get relatively few defectors. Then tried starve Kong Le
forces out but supplies got through. Recently proposed partition plan only another
attempt take over Kong Le forces and should be rejected.

Khrushchev did not seem very interested in Laos. Seemed preoccupied with other
matters. His possibilities of intervening in Laos seem very limited although as
co-chairman Soviets could be far more cooperative. Khrushchev and Gromyko insisted
there were no Viet Minh in Laos. US does not agree.

It is useful to have reiteration Khrushchev's personal stand but must accept
with some reserve. Important for Western Ambassadors to work to strengthen Souvanna
Phouma encouraging him to stay and maintain existing situation. Conflict now between

SECRET

Classification

and neutralists. ...
blot out Kong Le and Meo tribesmen.

2. Cuba

Discussion of Cuba was inconclusive as Harriman not authorized to negotiate on this subject. Khrushchev did not seem overly concerned about retaining Soviet military personnel in Cuba and said wanted get them out as rapidly as they finished training Cubans to operate weapons. Refused give figures but contended more Soviet military personnel had left Cuba than Western press reported.

Harriman commented to Washington group that Castro reception in USSR means Soviets place great importance on their relations with Cuba perhaps because it was only place where they had any apparent success. Ambassador Thompson added that Castro speech did nothing to build up Khrushchev and was rather restrained in praise of Soviets.

3. TEST BAN AND GERMANY

Test ban discussion, during which Khrushchev indicated unacceptability "espionage inspections" and that he expects no great success in this field, led to mention of German problem. Khrushchev seemed not as interested in test ban agreement as in possible German settlement. Germany came up indirectly. Khrushchev said thought Lippmann right in saying Wall had improved situation. Pointed out Wall had stopped refugee flow and brought more benefits to East than peace treaty would have. Harriman asked Khrushchev why then could not Berlin problem be put on ice. Khrushchev said problem was not Berlin problem but German problem. Said agreement should be reached normalizing two Germanies as they are now. He implied Soviets might agree to test ban to Western liking if West would agree to situation accepting two Germanies as they are.

SECRET

Classification

ful that suggestion meant seriously. Harriman replied could not buy "pig-in-poo".

In reply to German Ambassador's question Harriman said Khrushchev had spoken of accepting two Germanies as they are rather than legal recognition.

4. MISCELLANEOUS

Khrushchev said Soviets had just discovered extraordinarily rich deposit copper and gold as well as large new oil reserves. Added economy in good shape and West should not misinterpret Soviet economic self-criticism.

Ambassador Thompson commented to ~~Wash~~ Washington Group that Soviet failure to mention Rusk-Dobrynin talks indicates they are not pressing in this area.

Harriman's personal impression is Khrushchev not worried about own position but concerned over position Communist Party in world and over ChiCom challenge to Moscow's leadership among Communists around world. He seeking some success. Rather pathetic that ~~Castro~~ Castro only available exhibit for success Khrushchev's policy.

END

SCP-1

BALL

SECRET

Classification

33
TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

PERMANENT RECORD CO

50-W

SECRET

Action
SS

Control: 20677
Rec'd: APRIL 26, 1963
9:43 p.m.

Info

FROM: MOSCOW
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 2755, APRIL 27, 1 a.m.

1

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

ACTION DEPARTMENT 2755; INFORMATION PRIORITY LONDON 287, PARIS 322,
PRIORITY VIENTIANE 47.

FROM HARRIMAN FOR PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION S/S

I SPENT THREE AND ONE HALF HOURS THIS AFTERNOON WITH KHRUSHCHEV. KOHLER, FORRESTAL AND SULLIVAN WERE PRESENT DURING CONVERSATION WHICH WAS CORDIAL THROUGHOUT AND AT TIMES GENIAL. KHRUSHCHEV LOOKED VERY TIRED. HERE FOLLOW BRIEF SUMMARIES OF THE SUBJECTS DISCUSSED. MORE DETAILS WILL BE CABLED ON EACH LATER, REPEATING TO ADDITIONAL POSTS INTERESTED IN EACH SUBJECT.

LAOS:

IN CONTRAST WITH MY MEETING WITH GROMYKO THIS MORNING, KHRUSHCHEV FEELINGS ABOUT LAOS CAME THROUGH WITH MORE CLARITY. FIRST AND FOREMOST HE IS FED UP WITH THE SUBJECT AND WISHES IT WOULD GO AWAY. IT IS A SITUATION OVER WHICH HE CONTENDED SOVIET UNION HAS LITTLE OR NO CONTROL AND LACKS INFORMATION. I PRESSED KHRUSHCHEV PARTICULARLY TO EXERT HIS INFLUENCE TO GET THE ICC PDJ TO CONTROL CEASE FIRE. KHRUSHCHEV AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE MOST PRACTICAL THING TO DO BUT MAINTAINED THAT NEITHER THE U.S. NOR THE SOVIET UNION COULD FORCE THE ICC TO MOVE; ONLY THE RL COULD DO THIS. I UNDERLINED SOUVANNA, PHOUMI WILLINGNESS TO ICC ROOM WHERE THEY WISHED. ONLY PL BLOCKED. KHRUSHCHEV SPECIFICALLY SAID QUOTE TELL THE PRESIDENT THAT WE ARE STILL TRUE TO OUR WORD GIVEN IN VIENNA; BUT THE SITUATION IS VERY DELICATE. WE HAVE GIVEN OUR WORD IN REGARD TO A THIRD PARTY THIS MAKES FOR REAL PROBLEMS UNQUOTE. MY IMPRESSION IS THAT KHRUSHCHEV PROBABLY WOULD LIKE TO LIVE UP TO HIS VIENNA AGREEMENT BUT HAS DIFFICULTY KEEPING IT PRINCIPALLY BECAUSE OF CHICOM

2

microfilm by RM/R

SECRET

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCL"

* This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken.

ACTION ASSIGNED TO:	ACTION TAKEN	DATE OF ACTION:	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R
NAME OF OFFICER	<i>EWA</i>	<i>6/13</i>	<i>file</i>
OFFICE SYMBOL			

SECRET

-2- 2755, APRIL 27, 1 a.m., FROM: MOSCOW

AND NORTH VIETNAMESE. HE MAY ATTEMPT CONVINCE US OF HIS BONA FIDES BY KEEPING HIS AMBASSADOR WORKING WITH BRITISH AND US IN VIENTIANE. WHETHER HE WILL OR CAN INFLUENCE PL OR POLE IN UNANSWERED.

CUBA:

THE DISCUSSION OF CUBA CENTERED AROUND MY URGING KHRUSHCHEV TO REMOVE ALL SOVIET FORCES FROM THE ISLAND. HE MAINTAINED WITH SOME HEAT THAT OUR PAPERS HAVE NEVER CREDITED HIM WITH THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF TROOPS HE HAS ALREADY WITHDRAWN. HE CLAIMS TO HAVE PULLED OUT QUOTE THREE OR EVEN FIVE TIMES UNQUOTE THE NUMBER MENTIONED IN THE PAPERS. WHEN I TRIED TO PIN HIM DOWN A PRECISE FIGURE, HE REFUSED WITH SOME EMOTION, SAYING THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT BE ACCOUNTABLE TO THE US IN ITS DEALINGS WITH CUBA, AND EVEN IF HE DID TELL US WE WOULD ONLY BOAST ABOUT IT AND SAY IT WAS ANOTHER CONCESSION BY KHRUSHCHEV. HE ALSO SAID THAT ALL TROOPS WHICH GUARDED THE ROCKET BASES HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN AND NONE HAVE BEEN REPLACED. I DESCRIBED TO HIM THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE UNITED STATES WHICH HE SEEMED TO UNDERSTAND SURPRISINGLY WELL, QUOTING LIBERALLY FROM GOLDWATER, KEATING, AND NIXON. HE WAS PLEASED, HOWEVER, WITH THE PRESIDENT'S AND THE SECRETARY'S RECENT STATEMENTS ON CUBA WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS SOBER AND HELPFUL IN SPEEDING UP THE TIME WHEN REMAINING SOVIET QUOTE INSTRUCTORS UNQUOTE CAN BE REMOVED FROM CUBA.

GERMANY AND TEST BAN TREATY:

AFTER K RPT K KIDDED ME AT LENGTH ABOUT MY FAILING TO ACCEPT HIS GENEROUS OFFER OF FOUR YEARS AGO TO APPOINT ME HIS ECONOMIC ADVISER, I TOLD HIM THAT IF I ACCEPTED THIS JOB MY FIRST ADVICE WOULD BE TO AGREE ON TEST BAN SO THAT HE COULD DEVOTE MORE RESOURCES TO CIVILIAN PRODUCTION. I SAID THE PRESIDENT WANTED GTO REACH AN AGREEMENT. QUOTE WE WANT IT TOO UNQUOTE HE REPLIED, BUT HE LATER LINKED IT WITH GERMANY, SAYING SOVIETS WISHED NORMALIZATION OF EUROPE, WHICH HE THEN DEFINED AS QUOTE LEGITIMIZATION UNQUOTE OF TWO GERMANIES. QUOTE ENORMOUS RESULTS UNQUOTE HE SAID QUOTE WILL COME NOT ONLY FOR US BUT THE WORLD UNQUOTE.

HE SEMI-SERIOUSLY PROPOSED A DEAL IN WHICH HE WOULD UNDERTAKE TO QUOTE FIND BASIS FOR TEST BAN SATISFACTORY TO BOTH SIDES UNQUOTE, WHILE I WOULD QUOTE WORK OUT BASIS FOR GERMAN SETTLEMENT RECOGNIZING THE TWO GERMANIES AS THEY NOW EXIST UNQUOTE.

SECRET

BY 417 NARA Date 3-13

SECRET

-3- 2755, APRIL 27, 1 a.m., FROM: MOSCOW

THIS REMARK, WAS IN CONTRAST TO AN EARLIER ONE IN WHICH HE HAD STATED WITH SOME EMPHASIS THAT HE WOULD SIGN A TEST BAN AGREEMENT QUOTE BUT WITH NO ESPIONAGE INSPECTIONS--EVER UNQUOTE. HE SAID HE WAS PREPARING WRITTEN REPLY TO PRESIDENT'S LETTER.

CONCLUDING REMARKS:

AFTER WARM REMARKS ABOUT ROOSEVELT AND SOME OF THE REST OF US DURING PERIOD OF US-USSR WARTIME COLLABORATION, K RPT K ASKED ME TO CONVEY BEST WISHES FOR SUCCESS TO PRESIDENT, HIS WIFE AND HIS MOTHER, WHOM HE HAD MET, AND TO TELL PRESIDENT HE WISHED CONTINUE COOPERATING WITH US IN FINDING QUOTE REASONABLE LANGUAGE AND IN SEARCH FOR SOLUTION OF ALL THE WORLD'S PROBLEMS UNQUOTE.

HE READILY AGREED TO INCLUSION REFERENCE GENEVA ACCORDS AND VIENNA AGREEMENTS IN PRESS STATEMENT RELEASED BY FONOFF AFTER OUR VISIT

SCP-4

KOHLER

MRJ

NOTE: RELAYED WHITE HOUSE, 4/26/63.

SECRET

4/30/63 8
France

April 30, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

RE: YOUR MEETING WITH RAYMOND ARON at 5 PM

Aron is very cordial to the administration, and has many personal friends in it -- people like George Ball, Arthur Schlesinger and myself. He is very perceptive about the current situation in France and does not think that there is any present prospect of effective negotiations with the French.

His one difference with us is the multilateral force, which he thinks we have pushed too hard and too fast. But he recognizes that the Nassau offer to France was genuine, and his one astonishment is that Macmillan would have thought that Nassau would have no effect on Brussels.

Aron was not strongly opposed to the argument I made that "we had made fair offers to all concerned after Nassau and that it was hardly our fault if the French had refused to discuss the matter while the Germans had shown great receptivity and pressed the discussions energetically."

Aron echoed the point made in an earlier visit by Servan Schreiber that absolutely nothing is gained by criticism of de Gaulle in public -- it simply builds him up. He recognizes that you yourself have behaved with great restraint on this point and I told him to make the same argument with George Ball.

I myself think Aron is the most perceptive political observer in France and perhaps on the continent, and I know you will have a good time with him.

McG. B.

NSA/72/France - General

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State FILE COPY

5/1/63

50-52

Action
508

Control: 595
Rec'd: May 1, 1963
2:47 PM

Info
SS
BEE
OTC
FR
P
NOP
TK
KIR

FROM: BERLIN
TO: Secretary of State
NO: ¹¹²²
~~1120~~, MAY 1, 6 PM

¹¹²²
ACTION DEPARTMENT ~~1120~~, INFORMATION BONN 1007, USAREUR UNNUMBERED
USAREUR FOR POLAD

RE DEPTTEL 734.

1. PRESIDENTIAL VISIT BERLIN OBJECTIVES.

WE ENVISAGE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO BERLIN AS OPPORTUNITY (A) TO DEMONSTRATE ANEW AND UNMISTAKABLY BREADTH AND DEPTH OF US-BERL. SOLIDARITY; (B) TO UNDERLINE TRIPARTITE UNITY OF WESTERN RESPONSIBILITY HERE; (C) TO REASSURE THOUGHTFUL BERLIN LEADERS WHO STILL MAY BE APPREHENSIVE OVER LONG-RUN PROSPECTS FOR CITY; AND (D) TO GIVE PRESIDENT REPRESENTATIVE IMPRESSION OF BERLIN SETTING AND SPIRIT. WE BELIEVE PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM SHOULD BE DESIGNED WITHIN LIMITS OF TIME AVAILABLE TO SERVE THESE OBJECTIVE IN ACTIONS WHICH COULD BE UNDERLINED AND POINTED UP IN WORDS AS APPROPRIATE.

2. POPULAR PARTICIPATION.

WHILE US-BERLIN SOLIDARITY ALREADY WELL KNOWN, ITS REAFFIRMATION IN IMPRESSIVE AND PERSONALIZED FORM ON JUNE 26 SEEMS LIKELY TO PRODUCE ADVANTAGEOUS POLITICAL IMPRESSION INTERNATIONALLY AND TO GIVE BERLINERS THEMSELVES HELPFUL (ALBEIT AT MOMENT NOT ESSENTIAL) PSYCHOLOGICAL LIFT. THEREFORE, WE ESPECIALLY INTERES IN MAXIMUM (PREFERABLY RECORD) PUBLIC ATTENDANCE. WHILE THERE LITTLE DOUBT BERLINERS WILL WISH TURN OUT IN RECORD NUMBERS TO SEE, HEAR AND CHEER PRESIDENT, IT NECESSARY PROGRAM BE ARRANGED TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO DO SO. THIS REGARD WE NOTE THAT PRELIMINARY PROGRAM SET FORTH IN REFTTEL PROVIDES (A) FOR ONLY BRIEF CITY TOUR; (B) FOR ONLY ONE MASS PUBLIC APPEARANCE AT CITY HALL SQUARE WHERE CAPACITY CROWD FREQUENTLY REGISTERED IN RECENT YEARS; AND (C) FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE-THIRD ENTIRE BERLIN VISIT INSIDE CITY HALL. WE CONSIDER PREFERABLE (A) TO PLAN MORE EXTENSIVE CITY TOUR; (B) TO SELECT ADDITIONAL CROWD CAPACTTY AREAS ALONG ROUTE SUITABLE FOR SUPPLEMENTAL MASS APPEARANCES; AND (C) TO INCREASE EXPOSURE OF IMPORTANT TARGET GROUPS TO THE PRESIDENT.

BUNDY-SMITH
BELK
BURRIS
CHASE
DINGEMAN
DUNCAN
FELDMAN
FORRESTAL
HINSCH
JOHNSON

~~KEEL~~
KOMER
LEGERE
PARROTT
SAUNDER
SCHLESING
WIESNER

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

DECLASSIFIED

Group 4
attribution

VOR 1121
Berlins - ...

[REDACTED]

-2- 1120, MAY 1, 6 PM, FROM: BERLIN

3. SYMBOLIC AND QUALITATIVE ASPECTS.

CAREFUL ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN CERTAIN QUALITATIVE ASPECTS OF PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM, SUCH AS APPEARANCES AT IMPORTANT SYMBOLIC SITES AND PARTICIPATION IN SIGNIFICANT REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS. OUR PRELIMINARY VIEWS THIS REGARD ARE REFLECTED IN PROGRAM SUGGESTED BELOW. SEVERAL ASPECTS DESERVE SPECIAL MENTION AT THIS TIME BECAUSE THEY CLOSELY RELATED TO OUR PRIMARY OBJECTIVES, AND THEY COULD IN MEANINGFUL WAY PUT PERSONAL MARK OF PRESIDENT ON OCCASION, THESE ARE (A) SPECIAL FOCUS ON YOUNG LEADERSHIP-- WE ARE EXPLORING POSSIBILITY OF COMBINED UNIVERSITY PARTICIPATION AT FREE UNIVERSITY HONORARY DEGREE CEREMONY, WITH REMARKS BY PRESIDENT TO STUDENT AND OTHER YOUTH LEADERS AT SUITABLE SITE; THIS REGARD, WE WOULD PROPOSE LONGER STOP THAN ENVISAGED IN REFTEL AND ALSO SPEECH BY PRESIDENT STRESSING FAVORABLE LONG-RUN PROSPECTS FOR YOUTH AND CULTURE IN BERLIN; (B) EMPHASIS ON TRIPARTITE UNITY BY TRANSIT OF FRENCH AND UK SECTORS AND SUBSTANTIAL TRIPARTITE (PLUS WEST BERLIN POLICE) HONOR GUARDS AT ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE CEREMONIES; AND (C) RECOGNITION OF VITAL ROLE OF BERLIN WORKERS THROUGH APPEARANCE AT MAJOR INDUSTRIAL PLANT.

4. PROPOSED TENTATIVE BERLIN PROGRAM (JUNE 26)

IN LINE WITH ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS MISSION PROPOSES FOLLOWING TENTATIVE PROGRAM. AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, MOTORCADE ROUTE UTILIZES WIDE THOROUGHFARES THROUGH POPULOUS AREAS.

1000 - ARRIVE TEGEL AIRPORT (FRENCH SECTOR). GREETINGS BY SENIOR REPRESENTATIVES ALLIES, CITY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND HONOR GUARDS OF US, UK, FRENCH AND WEST BERLIN POLICE.

1030 - DEPART TEGEL AIRPORT IN MOTORCADE. TRAVEL SOUTH ON KURT SCHUMACHERDAMM. PASS FRENCH HEADQUARTERS (NAPOLEON BARRACKS) AND LARGE LOW-RENT HOUSING DEVELOPMENT NEARING COMPLETION, PROCEED PAST SCHERING DRUG FACTORY.

1050 - ARRIVE AEG TURBINE PLANT WHERE PRESIDENT WOULD SPEAK BRIEFLY TO LARGE ASSEMBLAGE INDUSTRIAL WORKERS.

1110 - CONTINUE TO ERNST REUTER PLATZ; HARDENBERGSTRASSE PAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY; DOWNTOWN BUSINESS AREA--AMERICA HOUSE-- ZOO STATION; KAISER WILHELM MEMORIAL CHURCH AND TAUENTZIENSTRASSE THENCE TO VICTORY COLUMN (GROSSER STERN), FOR SWING AROUND HANSA QUARTER (CONTEMPORARY RESIDENTIAL SECTION DESIGNED BY LEADING INTERNATIONAL ARCHITECTS); BELLEVUE CASTLE, CONGRESS HALL, REICHSTAG BUILDING.

[REDACTED]

CONFIDENTIAL

-3- 1120, MAY 1, 6 PM, FROM: BERLIN

1140 - ARRIVE BRANDENBURG GATE FOR STOP AND FIRST LOOK AT WALL AND EAST BERLIN FROM PLATFORM.

1150 - ROUTE APPROXIMATES EAST SECTOR BOUNDARY TO CHECKPOINT CHARLIE FOR 10-MINUTE STOP.

1210 - MOTORCADE CONTINUES PAST US MEMORIAL LIBRARY, AIRLIFT MEMORIAL TEMPELHOF) ALONG MAJOR THOROUGHFARES TO WEST BERLIN CITY HALL.

1230 - ARRIVE CITY HALL WHERE PRESIDENT AND GOVERNING MAYOR WOULD SPEAK BRIEFLY TO CAPACITY CROWD IN SQUARE.

1300 - GOLDEN BOOK CEREMONY IN PRESENCE OF LEADING CITY OFFICIALS, ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES, DIPLOMATIC CORPS AND PRESS; REMARKS BY GOVERNING MAYOR AND RESPONSE BY PRESIDENT.

1330 - LARGE BANQUET HOSTED BY GOVERNING MAYOR IN GREAT HALL OR ALTERNATIVELY, SMALLER LUNCHEON DURING MEETING WITH GOVERNING MAYOR, HIS CABINET, AND CHANCELLOR.

1430 - LEAVE CITY HALL FOR DRIVE THROUGH DENSELY POPULATED AREAS TO FREE UNIVERSITY.

1500 - PRESIDENT RECEIVES "HONORARY CITIZENSHIP" (HIGHEST AWARD FREE UNIVERSITY CAN BESTOW) AND ADDRESSES REPRESENTATIVE AUDIENCE BERLIN UNIVERSITIES AND YOUTH GROUPS.

1540 - LEAVE UNIVERSITY AND DRIVE TO US HEADQUARTERS.

1545 - PRESIDENT WOULD GREET US HEADQUARTERS STAFF AND TROOPS ASSEMBLED ON SPORTSFIELD OR, IF TIME PROHIBITS, GREET STAFF AT HEADQUARTERS COMPOUND AND DRIVE PAST TROOP UNITS FORMED ALONG ONE SIDE CLAYALLEE.

1605 - MOTORCADE PROCEEDS ALONG HOHENZOLLERN DAMM AND CITY EXPRESSWAY.

1645 - ARRIVE TEGEL FOR FAREWELL CEREMONY.

1700 - DEPARTURE.

5. BERLIN COORDINATION.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-4- 1120, MAY 1, 6 PM, FROM: BERLIN

A. US COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT (CHAIRMAN AND CONTROL OFFICER CHARLES HULICK) HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED AND ALSO A WEST BERLIN CITY COMMITTEE. UK AND FRENCH HAVE DESIGNATED LIAISON OFFICERS.

B. PROGRAM OUTLINED ABOVE REPRESENTS COORDINATED US PRELIMINARY VIEW IN WHICH GENERAL POLK FULLY CONCURS. IT WILL BE REFINED AND IS BEING COORDINATED WITH WEST BERLIN, BRITISH AND FRENCH AUTHORITIES ON CONDITIONAL BASIS PENDING DEPARTMENT ADVICE AND ADVANCE PARTY VISIT.

C. MEANTIME, WE WOULD APPRECIATE VIEWS CONCERNING

(1) TYPE OF CAR FOR PRESIDENT: GIVEN IMPORTANCE OF PRESIDENT BEING SEEN AND SINCE ONLY SUITABLE CAR HERE IS WEST BERLIN CITY OPEN MERCEDES 300 (WITH REAR STANDING ROOM FOR ONLY TWO PERSONS) MAY BE NECESSARY IMPORT SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL CAR, WHICH WE WOULD FAVOR IN PRINCIPLE.

(2) USE OF HELICOPTERS; NOT PRESENTLY PLANNED, BUT COULD BE UTILIZED BY LIMITED NUMBER OF PARTY FOR FINAL LEG TO TEGEL IF DESIRED.

(3) SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF PRESIDENT'S PARTY; ALSO ACCOMPANYING WHITE HOUSE PRESS.

(4) ETA AND ANY SPECIAL PRELIMINARY ARRANGEMENTS NEEDED FOR ADVANCE PARTY.

(5) PREPARATION OF DRAFTS OF PRESIDENT'S REMARKS IN BERLIN.

SCP-4 HULICK

CC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5/4/63

May 4, 1963

~~SECRET~~

Dear Mr. Chancellor:

I am delighted to have your last letter about the multilateral nuclear force. It is clear that our two Governments are approaching this important matter with very similar views.

I am glad that the mission of Admiral Ricketts has led to agreement between us that the multilateral force should start with surface ships, and I understand and agree with the Federal Government's view that when appropriate experience has been gained, it will be reasonable to consider whether the force should also be equipped with submarines.

It appears also that we are in agreement on the basic principles for political control of the multilateral force, and here again I agree that this arrangement should be open to reconsideration in the light of experience.

Thirdly, I agree with you that we should next discuss the points which should be included in any preparatory understanding on the multilateral force, so that an appropriate statement can be made during my visit to Europe in June. I do not think we should make any final decision now as to the exact form in which our common purposes should be registered then, but clearly it is to our advantage to continue discussions without losing time. In particular, I think our representatives should go ahead with closer estimates of cost and with further discussion of appropriate shares.

Fourth, I agree that it is important now for other NATO states to indicate their readiness to participate in the multilateral force. In particular, I think we should now discuss this matter intensively with the Government

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5(b)

White House Guidelines
By Mms NARA, Date 5/5/82

AD 1.17/Genung - Security 4/63 - 11/62

~~SECRET~~

-2-

FOR MR. GEORGE BUNBY
The White House

FROM
The United Kingdom, and I propose to begin such discussions at a high level promptly. I think that the plan for a multilateral force will be greatly advanced if we can get clear agreement among three powers as important as Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, and I believe that the progress which has been made in discussions between the Federal Republic and the United States offers a good basis for serious discussions with the British.

Because of the importance of seeking additional support, I am instructing the members of my Administration not to begin extensive discussions with Committees of the United States Congress in the next week or two. Such discussions will inevitably produce some confusion at BRST, so I think that it is better to go further with intensive private discussions among the governments most concerned before we take the important proposal to our legislative bodies and to the public. I know that you have a similar problem with the Bundestag, and if it should be possible for you to defer discussion with members of that body in the immediate future, it might be easier for us to make progress with other countries. In closing, let me say how encouraging it is to know that our two Governments are in such good agreement on this subject. I feel sure that we are well set on a promising road forward.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Dr. Konrad Adenauer
Chancellor of the Federal Republic
of Germany,
Bonn.

~~SECRET~~

9a
5/9/63

Translation of Raymond Aron letter

May 9, 1963

Dear Friend:

Forgive me for not having written you to thank you for your warm welcome which deeply touched me. But since my return to Paris I have been wholly caught up in the turmoil of politics and University life.

It occurs to me that I forgot to give you one report which you probably have already, to which you may not have paid much attention: the withdrawal of ballistic missiles from Turkey so few months after the Cuban crisis has been widely interpreted as the result of a secret agreement between Mr. Khrushchev and President Kennedy. I have even heard important Americans (not officials, obviously) voluntarily supporting this hypothesis, whose psychological effects are clearly deplorable. I am aware of the technical and military arguments in favor of this withdrawal, which was planned before the Cuban crisis. But the withdrawal has nevertheless been widely used by all those in Germany and France who see in the present strategic doctrine of the United States a weakening of the deterrent and an increased risk for the European allies.

You know how much I regret the present tension between Paris and Washington, and how much I was embarrassed in talking with the President, struggling between my wish not to criticize the government of my own country, and my wish to be faithful to my own convictions.

My best wishes to Mrs. Bundy, etc.

Sincerely,

Raymond Aron

NSF/72/Arone - General

523

H.

NSA 242 12
3
5/11
53/1

SECRET

May 10, 1963

McGB

SUBJECT: Redeployment of U. S. Forces in Europe

Last Saturday the Department of State was asked by Defense to concur in a proposed reduction of USAREUR strength -- a move scheduled to take place in July, August and September of this year -- by 15,600 spaces. Unlike the last withdrawal from Europe, this one would affect combat strength.

Defense's rationale is that these units were put in Europe "on a temporary basis" during the 1961 Berlin emergency and are not part of "our NATO commitment"; the action is "acceptable from the viewpoint of our combat posture both in Europe and worldwide"; and the net result would be a significant gold flow savings, estimated at \$4.7 million!

Three days earlier Defense proposed the reorganization of the Berlin garrison -- a reorganization which would result in the reduction of our forces in that city by 700 men.

These separate actions may not be part of a single plan. (The Berlin exercise could be a separate and distinct operation.) But the fact is, the several major projects are interrelated in that the net effect could be a major reduction of our forces from Europe.

There is a balance of strategy of Defense has used is also an Army reorganization of forces. This, of course, in this situation there has been a situation now, has been looking for a Battle Group put the usefully employed in the United States. But the situation is untidy, and is relatively ready bottled up in

When the original of our policy

which the Secretary savings. There is a need to strengthen the force. However, the force, for sometime the Augmentation of troops are less effective in Germany or the force is not administratively manageable force al-

Over and above all conventional force proposition that unless the force is reduced to NATO's conventional strength, the United States will reexamine its own commitments with a view to reducing its conventional force contribution.

CH 69 10/2-9 me. 5/11/63 322

GENRL 53/2

SECRET

As I understand the situation, the Secretary of State was asked to produce a political judgment in the context of the balance of payments exercise. One fact that stands out, however, is that certain projects are already under way in Defense in advance of any discussions with the Secretary of State. And to avoid some of the obvious pitfalls of this kind of an arrangement, I would urge strongly an early meeting of the two Secretaries with the President to discuss the issues in their broadest context, and to do so before too much fat is in the fire.

We have succeeded in putting a hold on the Berlin operation, with Defense now looking to some action in early September.

The Department still has under consideration the proposed 15,000 man withdrawal from USAREUR.

But the major problems are still ahead of us and some hard discussions are needed in which the Department should be given the opportunity to make its position known. For even if the judgment is made that financial and military considerations are over-riding, the Department of State should have the opportunity to come up with ideas on timing and the political context in which the military moves might be made.

To state it quite crudely, this is what we seem to be about at this juncture. We are calling for the creation of the MLE, with the proviso that the contributions to the conventional forces will not be reduced. But then we go on to say, either you put more into the conventional pot, and support our strategy, or we'll pull back and support your strategy. And then before the Europeans can respond, we go on to the or of the either-or condition, and come out looking like good Gaullists.

In short, there are very significant political problems here which must be raised and considered; it is better to look at them now rather than later, when it will be considered more difficult to pick up the political pieces.

David Klein

5/17/63
9

14

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~

WASHINGTON

May 14, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Dr. Heinrich Krone, May 15, 10:00 a.m.

Dr. Krone is one of West Germany's most respected political figures. In the Weimar Republic he was a leader in the Catholic Center Party, and a close friend of Chancellor Bruenning. Although he withdrew from active political life during the Nazi period, he apparently was involved in the July 20 plot to assassinate Hitler. After the war he helped found the Christian Democratic Party, setting up the Berlin branch with the help of Jacob Kaiser.

Over the years he has become a principal figure in the CDU and one of the Chancellor's closest collaborators. However, his approach to people and politics bears little resemblance to that of the Chancellor. He is a moderate conservative who has consistently avoided hard and extreme positions. He has no driving personal political ambitions and, as a result, has friends in all of Bonn's political factions and is acceptable to all. Despite his relationship with the Chancellor, he has been an avowed and consistent Erhard supporter, and is expected to play an important role in the immediate post-Adenauer period.

The State Department's briefing paper (Tab A) for this meeting is fairly well done. However, before your meeting you might also want to look at Bonn's telegram 1127 (Tab B) as well as the text of the proposed Preamble to the Franco-German Treaty (as approved by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Bundestag (Tab C), both of which are attached.

One item likely to be raised, but not mentioned in the briefing material, is Krone's concern about the Vatican's policy toward the Soviet bloc. Krone, according to a close friend, is in possession of recent exchanges between the German and Polish bishops expressing alarm about the Vatican's dealings with the Communists which both consider "politically naive and dangerous".

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5(b)

- 1 -

~~SECRET~~

White House Guidelines

By [Signature] NARA, Date 6/30/97

PDF 115 / Germany - security 4/63 - 11/63

14

SECRET

Dr. Krone's English is quite poor and he, therefore, will be accompanied by the Chancellor's interpreter, Herr Heinz Weber.

McG. B.
McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

answer 5/14/67

TALKING POINTS

Purpose of Visit

Dr. Krone's delayed unofficial visit to the United States (at Assistant Secretary Tyler's invitation) is his first since 1956. Coalition problems connected with the Spiegel affair compelled him to remain in Bonn rather than to accompany Chancellor Adenauer to Washington last November. Less concerned with the prestige value of a Washington visit than his more peripatetic colleagues on the German political stage--he has not encouraged Adenauer's attempts to maneuver him toward the Chancellorship--Dr. Krone's principal concern will be to convince us that the forthcoming transition from Adenauer to Erhard will entail no basic changes in German policies, in particular with respect to the NATO-orientation of German defense policy.

Opportunity for Us

Dr. Krone, a firm friend of the US, will play an important role during the transition and beyond. His acknowledged talents as a mediator among the diverse elements of the CDU, between the coalition parties, and in bridging the Adenauer-Erhard rift, may be much in demand in the coming months. Although long recognized as one of Chancellor Adenauer's closest advisers, "father Krone" has real stature of his own among German political leaders. A man of great integrity, he represents the continuity of the Catholic Center, a moderating influence in German political life over many decades.

Dr. Krone also has important substantive responsibilities. As Federal Minister for Special Tasks and CDU Representative (non-voting) to the Bundestag from Berlin, Krone participates in the formulation of all important foreign policy decisions affecting Berlin and serves as the German Government's primary liaison official to the Bundestag. As Deputy Chairman (Adenauer is Chairman) of the National Defense Council he is directly concerned with major defense and foreign affairs matters.

Items for the President to Raise

1. MLF

In his capacity as Deputy Chairman of the National Defense Council, Dr. Krone is thoroughly familiar and fully associated with the German Government's decision to accept, initially at least, the surface mode and the unanimity principle. He may nevertheless welcome hearing directly from the President an exposition of the rationale behind our thinking.

2. Franco-German Treaty

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5(b)

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Department of State Guidelines

By mmk NARA, Date 5/5/97

Henry - Security 4/67-11/67

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

2. Franco-German Treaty

Dr. Krone reportedly believes that the initial US reservations regarding the treaty have now been eliminated (presumably by the Carstens-von Brentano Washington visits and the Government decision to reaffirm in the preamble of the Ratification Law the FRG's commitment to the NATO and Rome Treaties). We should stress that the implementation of the treaty rather than the mechanics of its ratification will be the true test. [We do not distrust the Germans' intentions; we just wonder what de Gaulle's are.]

3. Future of the European Community

In view of de Gaulle's reiterated emphasis (April 19) on nationalism as the central ingredient in international life, what does Krone see as the future of the European Community. Will it be inward or outward looking? Will it be possible for the Community to recover confidence and move ahead along liberal lines?

4. President's Trip

Dr. Krone will be particularly interested in the Berlin schedule.

Items Dr. Krone May Raise

1. The Succession

As the first member of the German Government to visit Washington since the nomination of Dr. Erhard as the CDU/CSU choice to succeed Adenauer, Dr. Krone may be expected to voice assurances that the transition will entail no basic changes in German policies. Does he expect the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition to remain viable? What additional personnel changes in the Cabinet does he expect?

2. Berlin

It appears that the USSR does not intend to pose a sharp and direct challenge in the near future to the Western position in Berlin. Khrushchev's remarks in East Berlin last January and Soviet observance of the May 8 anniversary of VE Day support this conclusion. It also seems to be buttressed by Under Secretary Harriman's April 26 discussion with Khrushchev, in which, incidentally, contrary to one story which has apparently been circulating, no Berlin agreement was reached or even discussed, and a UN presence was not mentioned. (FYI: The US Mission in Berlin reports that Krone is apparently interested in learning whether there is

any truth

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

any truth to this story). Although the Soviets initiated the current talks on Berlin, they do not seem too interested in pressing them. Khrushchev did not even mention them to Harriman. The Soviets have had nothing to offer beyond the repetition of their UN suggestion, which is totally unacceptable. Our only possible line of policy is to be firm, but receptive toward openings that might lead to agreements.

3. Bundestag Session in Berlin

Two points underlie our thinking on this question: The Western Powers with joint responsibilities in Berlin should have a joint position, and the decision should be taken, each time the question comes up, in light of the circumstances existing at the time. We are aware of the adverse reaction in Germany to the recent expression by the Three Powers of serious reservations about the holding of such a session in the existing circumstances. We were concerned about the effect such a session might have on the recently reopened talks with the Soviets on Berlin and did not want to provoke a controversy with the Soviets just prior to the President's trip to Berlin.

~~SECRET~~

well in progress
✓
5/15/63
France

May 15, 1963

Dear Raymond:

I am grateful for your letter of May ninth, and while I am glad to know of your concern about the withdrawal of missiles from Turkey, you are right in suspecting that I have already heard about European rumors on this point, as on others relating to our strategic posture. The probability that such rumors would be generated was much in our minds when we decided to go ahead with the move from Jupiters to Polaris at the end of last year, but rightly or wrongly we decided that we must not let this move, so highly desirable on technical and military grounds, be frustrated by fear of rumors. This consensus was intensified, at the top levels of government, by our conviction that in the October crisis the Jupiters were a real source of danger, in both military and political terms. People who would spread rumors of this sort, of course, must be pretty far gone in their mistrust of the United States to start with. I continue to think that the best answer is to try to give sympathetic, reasonable, and complete explanations of what we are doing, but not to be bent too far from sensible courses in the fear that they may be misinterpreted. The current nuclear plans and proposals of the United States, taken as a whole, do not leave much room for doubt of our determination to take our full share in the defense of Europe. And over the long pull, as the history of the Skybolt so dramatically demonstrates, weapons which do not make military sense cease to make political sense either.

It was a delight to see you, and I have just read with profit your searching analysis of the different schools of thought which you discovered here. I think in some ways you know us better than we know ourselves.

Sincerely,

McGeorge Bundy

Mr. Raymond Aron
10, Rue Monsieur le Prince
Paris 6^e, France

WSP/72 [Handwritten signature]

5/16/63

FKaufman
5/16/63
DRAFT 2

Recommendations

The Department recommends ~~on the basis of the CIA~~ ^{that:} ~~AEC report and other pertinent data relating to Franco-German nuclear cooperation that:~~

I. The Department and AEC discuss during the June 1-5 visit of ranking German Science Ministry officials all aspects of Franco-German nuclear cooperation including the French approach on Pierrelatte.

II. CIA establish a top priority on obtaining information as to French, German and Italian industrial, scientific and military interest in bilateral financial or technical participation in Pierrelatte. A similar priority should be established with respect to interest in overall peaceful and military nuclear planning, research and plant construction on a bilateral basis.

III. Assuming the results of I and II above confirm in greater detail the ~~apparent success of recent~~ ^{conclusions noted,} ~~efforts by representatives of French government-dominated industry and science, as well as the French Science Ministry, to circumvent the political levels of German Government and~~ ~~often by using the "spirit" and letter of the Franco-German Treaty as a vehicle and to~~ ~~and to~~ ~~the interest of their German counterparts in the alleged advantages of exclusive Franco-German nuclear cooperation,~~ the President during his June ^{23rd} ~~14th~~ visit to Bonn, or the Department in an approach to the Foreign Office, should express high level U.S. concern as to the adverse military, political and

Fr. interests in energy by
interest in Fr-Ger nuclear coop.

economic consequences that might ~~eventuate~~ ^{result} from this misapplication of the Franco-German Treaty.

We might point out that should the French succeed in establishing more or less exclusive relationships with German science and industry the Community basis for European economic and political integration might be undermined in an important sphere. ~~At the same time the~~ ^{efforts to develop a} French national nuclear deterrent ~~would~~ ^{would} be ~~at least~~ ^{at least} assisted indirectly. We should suggest that the German Government take whatever steps necessary to prevent ~~any~~ ^{formal or informal German} participation in projects such as Pierrelatte which have an essentially nuclear weapons raison d'être for the French and also use its influence to discourage ~~the~~ ^{widespread} acceptance of the thesis that exclusive Franco-German industrial or scientific cooperation is good for Europe. ~~It is~~ ^{we} should ~~state our~~ ^{urge} ~~belief that it would be appropriate to~~ ^{moreover, that the Germans} attempt actively to channel ~~German~~ ^{their} industrial and science efforts into multilateral or highly diversified bilateral cooperation with other members of the Six and the UK.

In conclusion we ~~should~~ ^{ought to} assure the Germans that ^{should} they take decisive action as suggested and the French thereafter make approaches to the Italians, for example, as to a joint Franco-Italian program, we would ^{if necessary} exert pressure at the highest level to prevent extensive Franco-Italian nuclear cooperation ^{from taking}.


IV. Depending upon the confirmation of French approaches being made to the Italians, ^{the Department should} inform the Italians that we have registered our concern with the German Foreign Office specifically pointing out that we are firmly opposed to bilateral European

participation in Pierrelatte or any other project that ~~seems~~
essentially ^{contributes to} the French goal of producing nuclear weapons for
their ^{national deterrents.} ~~force de frappe~~ We also ^{should note our belief} ~~might mention our suggestion~~
that more or less exclusive bilateral relationships between
two members of the European Community in such an important
~~sphere~~ ^{area} as nuclear energy ^{is} likely to have the long-term ef-
fect of undermining the Community basis for European political
and economic integration. To assuage German fears ^{regarding} ~~as to a~~
possible Franco-Italian program should they ~~reject~~ French approaches,
we might suggest that the Italians communicate to the Germans
the assurance that Italy has no intention of engaging in ex-
tensive bilateral cooperation with the French.

^{V.} The AEC consider ways ^{in which the Executive Branch may assure} and means ~~of assuring the passage~~
~~that the~~ ^{passes} ~~this session of Congress of~~ ^{this session which would} legislation providing for toll en-
richment of foreign source ~~natural~~ ^{Plutonium byproduct and} uranium and ~~guaranteed long-~~
~~term~~ ^{other legislation which would guarantee foreigners long-term} supplies of enriched material ~~to members of the community~~

~~to EURATOM.~~ Passage of such legislation would enable us to
demonstrate to the Germans, Italians and other Europeans that
they will have guaranteed long-term sources of enriched uranium
available on the same basis as it will be domestically. More-
over, we can point out that the British will not serve as an
additional non-US source of supply.

VI. At the April 22-23 meeting of the EURATOM Consultative Committee on Nuclear Research ~~xxxx~~ the Germans announced that the FRG had decided to construct a plant for reprocessing highly enriched fuel ~~xxxxxx~~ elements ^{probably} at Karlsruhe. ~~and~~ Franco-German discussions are ^{now} in progress ^{relating to} the construction of ~~xxx~~ a joint facility designed to reprocess 5-10 kgs. of plutonium daily. The stated cost of the ~~plutonium reprocessing plant~~ ^{is} between ~~£~~ \$ 10 and 15 million of which EURATOM probably ^{would} ~~will~~ be asked to contribute \$5 million. The Luxembourg delegate ^{with} ~~the~~ support ^{of} ~~from~~ others expressed considerable astonishment at the

announcement of the proposed Franco-German project in the light of the ^{possibilities} ~~proposals~~ offered by the [Italian] FUREX (~~initial trials for which were scheduled in early 1964~~) and ^[Belgian] EUROCHEMIC facilities (the latter ^{of which} is already under construction). 

~~Comment:~~
The Dutch, Italians and EURATOM President Chatenet pointed out that there was yet another possibility of using the British facility at ~~Dunne~~ ^{Dounreay} ~~and~~ the Italians ^{qualified} their support for ~~Dunne~~ ^{Dounreay} by pointing out that use of British/facility would ~~not~~ ~~promote~~ the development of industry in EURATOM member countries. ~~xxxxxx~~ ~~the question~~ ^{although} ~~was~~ left completely unresolved after considerable ~~discussion~~. ~~our mission in Brussels~~ that The EURATOM Commission ~~now~~ tends to favor the development of EUREX and the interim use of British facilities.

Comment:

TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

-4-

NON-TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

I told Dobrynin that I thought the Soviet Union ought not to let the MLF discussion in NATO get in the way of a prompt agreement along the lines of the paper we submitted on the non-transfer of nuclear weapons. I said I could understand why the Soviets might be nervous about arrangements which have not yet been concluded and the details of which cannot therefore be known. I told him that I thought that when such arrangements were known that the Soviets would be much more relaxed about them because it would be clear that they would reflect our own fundamental policy against the proliferation of national nuclear forces. I said that it would help the atmosphere of our discussions if the Soviets were to bear in mind that they themselves have gone much further in contribution to the proliferation of nuclear weapons than we have done or intend to do -- namely, in furnishing China with a plutonium plant. I said this put the Chinese in a position to produce nuclear weapons regardless of the attitude of the Soviet Union itself. I said to Dobrynin that "you have already lost your virginity on this point and we are still trying to preserve ours". He laughed and said that I should say that to Mr. Khrushchev, who would greatly appreciate it.

When he emphasized that their concern is that the MLF is only a first step toward full proliferation, I said that nothing could better insure that any such first step would be the last step than a solemn international agreement of just the sort we had proposed. Indeed looking ahead for the next ten or twenty years, I said that the possibilities of proliferation are in no sense limited to NATO countries but exist in the Near East and among unaligned countries who would not take guidance from this matter from either the Soviet Union or the United States. We ourselves believe, therefore, that we need the help of the Soviet Union in halting proliferation, help which could be provided by the kind of agreement we have proposed. He commented that he thought it would be helpful if we were in a position, say by late July, to offer somewhat more detail about the MLF arrangements which would prevent their resulting in additional national nuclear capabilities.

BERLIN

There were only glancing references to Berlin. I did mention the possibility of some United Nations presence in Berlin with Soviet token forces

TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

PDL US-USA

Extract from

1/18/67 in WT 8, PALS 61-67 - This extract is there -

in East Berlin and our present token forces in West Berlin. He listened attentively, did not reject the idea, but it was quite clear that no significance ought to be attached to his failure to reject my comment out of hand. I added that I thought an earlier remark of mine to Mr. Gromyko two years ago had proved to be well founded, namely, that more time could serve to reduce tensions in Central Europe and that frictions surrounding the Berlin question could become more manageable. I pointed to the easing of pressures on East Germany after the Wall and to such developments as the improvement of relations between West Germany and Eastern European countries.

NATO-WARSAW PACT NON-AGGRESSION TREATY

Dobrynin emphasized very strongly the psychological importance of a NATO-Warsaw Pact Non-aggression Agreement. He said that it did not mean very much in practice but that it could do no harm and that it would be important for those in the Soviet Union who were supporting the view that some sort of agreement with the West is possible. I told him that the Soviet proposal on this subject presented at Geneva had been discussed in NATO and that the general reaction had not been entirely negative. Dobrynin said they understood that there might be some problems about the form of such an agreement because of problems of recognition but that this was something which the Soviets were prepared to discuss. When I asked whether, for example, an exchange of letters between the Secretaries General of the two organizations would present any problem of form for them, he said this was entirely discussable and left the impression that this would be no particular obstacle. I told him that there was considerable skepticism about a pact which might seem to be as empty as the Kellogg-Briand Pact proved to be and that there were some in the West who felt that if we entered into such an agreement and this were followed by a severe Berlin crisis that we should all look like fools. He said, and I thought with some significance, that such a pact would make such a crisis far less likely. I repeat that Dobrynin pressed this point of a NATO-Warsaw Pact Non-aggression Arrangement as though it were now number one priority for those in the Soviet Union who were trying to show that some agreement with the West is possible and that its psychological importance far outweighed its practical insignificance.

*Bechtel
NAP*

TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

DISCUSSIONS WITHIN WESTERN ALLIANCE

At one point Dobrynin asked me what was the significance of the discussions of differences among NATO members. I smiled and said whatever the meaning that it had nothing to do with the attitude of the Alliance toward the Soviet Union and that Moscow would make a great mistake if they should misunderstand this. Dobrynin not only admitted that this was so but said that Moscow's appraisal was so much in the same direction that they were frankly puzzled about the underlying meaning of the differences being expressed in the West. I commented briefly to the effect that it had much to do with the future internal organization of Europe and some special views of President DeGaulle as to the relative position of France in Western affairs. I added that I thought that it was of great importance to all of us, including the Soviet Union, that Germany be fully integrated into the main body of Western Europe and that this was a development in the general interest of peace.

OUR 1964 ELECTION AND CUBA

Dobrynin said that he would be closely questioned about how he saw the forthcoming Presidential campaign in the United States and the basis upon which President Kennedy would conduct the campaign on matters affecting the Soviet Union. I told Dobrynin that I could not, of course, speak for the President on a matter which is still more than a year in the future but that I thought that the President would continue to be himself and follow his own deep convictions. In general, I felt that this meant he would recognize fully the solemn obligations which he and Chairman Khrushchev have toward the preservation of peace, that he would continue to strive to maintain close contacts with the Soviet Government in an effort to resolve outstanding issues, and that he would continue his search for particular points at which agreement might be possible. I said the great exception to this general approach was still Cuba, that Soviet military presence in Cuba was not acceptable to the American Government or the American people and that this was a matter of highest sensitivity which deeply impairs an attempt to develop normal and improving relations between our two countries. I said it was not in our mind to invade Cuba last year, that if we had wished to do so with American forces we would

I. Introduction and Assumptions

There have been reports of French efforts to secure German and perhaps Italian financial and technical participation in completion of the French plutonium diffusion plant at Pierrelatte. The estimated cost of this plant, as announced by the French, is 1.2 billion dollars and its estimated output when in full production is to be ten kilograms per day of highly enriched U-235. It is now estimated that top product will not become available until 1967.

Based on current United States experience, the reported plant cost and its estimated operational cost and capacity, it is estimated that the cost of U-235 to the French would be two to three times that to the U.S. -- although it is difficult to determine, in light of French lack of technological background in this field, the actual cost of U-235 to the French. However, on the basis of U.S. experience it would appear that a plant of the cost estimated by the French could, through gradual improvement, achieve a substantially greater output. On the basis of its currently estimated output capacity, the plant would not make a major contribution to projected French or German civil requirements for enriched uranium, even if its output were entirely available for these purposes. (Estimated German cumulative requirements alone for U-235, as estimated by a recent European Community study, are in the range of 30 to 35 thousand kilograms of U-235 by 1975 and annual production should rise rapidly thereafter. Cumulative production from the Pierrelatte plant by this time would have been less than 37,000 kilograms of U-235.)

It is reported that the German interest in participation is based on their desire to have a source of U-235 for civil purposes independent of the United States. It must be assumed, however, that any such participation would result in Germany having a source of U-235 which would be available to them for either civil or military purposes.

II. Possible Basis for German Interest in Alternate Source of Supply of U-235

The United States has recognized for some time the reluctance on the part of other nations to depend on a sole foreign source of supply for a vital energy resource such as U-235. As a consequence, U.S. U-235 distribution policies have been repeatedly modified to strengthen assurances as to the availability of U-235 from the United States. At the present time, AEC policies provide for entering into long-term contracts for the supply of U-235 corresponding to the economic life of the reactors to be supplied. Uniform prices, based on cost, apply domestically and abroad, and have been reduced significantly over the last two years. 65,000 kilograms of U-235 have been allocated by the

This material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

extract

*N.S.
N.A.*

*but covering info from Robert Rayman (C-101)
of 5/2/67 says this is important
AEC paper re Pierrelatte*

RELEASED

DECLASSIFIED

Secy's Mtd 5/21

001

E26

Approved in S - 5/28/63

SECRET

US/MC/10

UNITED STATES DELEGATION
TO THE
THIRTY-FIRST MINISTERIAL MEETING
OF THE
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Ottawa, Canada, May 22-24, 1963

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: May 21, 1963
Time: 8:00 p.m.
Place: US Embassy

Participants:

United States

The Secretary of State
Ambassador Butterworth
Mr. Tyler
Mr. Cash

United Kingdom

Foreign Secretary Home
Defense Minister Thorneycroft
Lord Hood
Mr. Thomson

Germany

Foreign Minister Schroeder
Herr Krapf
Ambassador Grewe
Herr Kusterer

France

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville
M. Lucet
M. Gillet
M. Lebel

Subjects: Berlin and Germany

Copies to:

- S/S - 5
- S/AL - 6
- S/P - 7
- G - 4
- EUR (2) - 9-10
- GER - 11
- SOV - 12
- WE - 13
- BTW (2) - 14-15
- RPM - 16, 26
- ACDA - 17
- INR/D - 15
- Ambassy Bonn - 19
- US Mission Berlin - 20
- Ambassy Paris - 21
- Paris for USRO - 22

Ambassy London - 2
Ambassy Moscow - 2
CIA - 25

WH
000/OSD
000/ISA
JO
RMIR-2

The Secretary opened with an account of his May 18 discussion with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin. The latter's principal effort was to get across the idea that this is a crucial time of policy

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification.

re-examination

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

EXCISE
 DENY
 DELETE Non-Responsive Info
 FOIA Exemptions
 PA Exemptions
 DECLASSIFY
 DECLASSIFY IN PART
 CLASSIFY as
 DOWNGRADE TS to () S () C OADR
 () S () C OADR
 () C OADR
 TS authority to
 MR Cases Only:
 EO Citations:

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

-3-

by letters from the respective Secretaries General denouncing aggression and calling for the settlement of all disputes by peaceful means. It is just possible that this would be of interest to the Soviets. The US Government has reached no conclusions. We have been skeptical since 1945. However, Dobrynin left the impression that this might be a good time for the Soviets to have something to point to in the way of an agreement with the West which would be of psychological, rather than practical, importance. We have, of course, during the last two years of talks on Berlin thought of an NAP as the end of the trail rather than the beginning.

Couve remarked that as the Soviets don't seem particularly interested in discussing Berlin, this problem is more or less liquidated.

Lord Home asked whether an NAP wouldn't make it easier for the Soviets to leave Berlin alone.

Couve commented that an NAP might very well lead to recognition of the East German regime.

The Secretary replied that Dobrynin seemed to be saying that nonrecognition would not be an obstacle. At this point the Secretary read some excerpts from the NAP text the Soviets submitted in Geneva on February 20, 1953, and circulated a copy. He remarked that the formalities could be discounted. An NAP might be in the form of simultaneous declarations from each side with no direct connection.

Schroeder said he felt the Soviets were seeking something which would to some extent cement the status quo. Even without a peace treaty and recognition of the East German regime, an NAP would go far toward stabilizing the status quo. An NAP is very important to the Soviets as proven by their bringing it into the Geneva discussions. Such a pact should be the end of a chain of events, not the beginning. Khrushchev, incidentally, thinks he invented the NAP in Geneva in 1955 and therefore has a special interest in it.

Lord Home asked what sort of declarations of nonaggressive intent could be made by NATO which would go further than what has already been done.

The Secretary read the operative portions of the Soviet NAP draft of February 20 as a possible example.

Schroeder remarked that for the first time this would get the basic conflict out of a Four Power context into somewhat of a UN context.

The Secretary

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

-5-

Grewe said consideration of a POLAD report on this subject was interrupted by the current meeting in Ottawa but would soon be resumed.

The Secretary said it might be well for the Ambassadorial Group to study this problem before NATO froze it one way or the other. He was not prepared to give a firm view of the US Government, which has been very skeptical about an NAP, but in view of Dobrynin's remarks and what is probably going on in Moscow, we should not fail to examine the problem.

Lord Home asked if Dobrynin had given the impression that an NAP would make it easier for the Soviets to leave Berlin alone.

The Secretary said the Ambassador had not put it that way but had said it would make a Berlin crisis far less likely. We can't simply brush this aside.

Lord Home asked how contact would be maintained with the Soviets on this subject.

The Secretary said either side could make the next move. No specific arrangement was made to pursue this topic. It is likely that the Soviets will revert to this before their talks with the Chinese now slated to begin on July 5. We should be ready with an answer.

Couve said the real issue was what was in the best interests of the West -- not of the USSR. The two are not necessarily identical.

The Secretary said the Ambassadorial Group should be asked to pull together as much information as possible concerning what is going on in the Bloc with the changes in military command, the Kozlov illness, the Rumanian refusal to accept its assigned role in the economic plans, etc. We don't have a really good idea of what has happened since October 22.

Krapf asked if an NAP was the cheapest concession that could be made to the Soviets.

The Secretary said Dobrynin had mentioned the civil air agreement, which seems to be of some importance to the Soviets, although Khrushchev is not particularly interested. They have made some gestures concerning outer space, and have even hinted that maybe the US and the USSR should combine their efforts to put men on the moon.

They

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

-7-

The Secretary suggested that the Ambassadorial Group examine alternate forms for an NAP.

Greene reminded the Ministers that the NAP was still being discussed in Paris and Geneva. It will be difficult, he added, to continue to refuse to discuss it substantively in the Geneva KHDC.

The Secretary agreed that the whole NAP subject, including the Geneva and Paris aspects, should be studied promptly.

USDEL:PECash:mt

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

KL
CATEGORY "A"

Completely declassified
Transferred to C/FADRC
by J/S date 9-2-23

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
PARIS
May 25, 1963

5/25/67
5/8
~~##~~
~~##~~
8/8

PERSONAL - SECRET

9588

Dear Dean:

When I submitted my recommendation in regard to the possibility of seeing de Gaulle I was really motivated by the desire not to let too long a period elapse without seeing him. I had no special message or anything of that kind in mind but thought that a review of our opinion of current Soviet developments and in the Communist camp might be useful. As you probably know, there is continuing evidence here that de Gaulle is deeply suspicious of all of our dealings with the Soviets and is very inclined to suspect a large scale Soviet/American bilateral deal. This, of course, is nonsense, but it seems to me worth giving it a little routine treatment from time to time. The danger, as I see it, of allowing too long a time to elapse without any contact with the General is that in those circumstances when I should go to see him it would be a very big news story and would be interpreted probably far out of its real context.

Since I didn't have any very strong views on the matter I am perfectly prepared to accept your judgment on the matter and will make no steps of course in that direction. I was, however, a little bit puzzled to learn through the grapevine that you (and I believe George Ball) had thought it undesirable to even send a recommendation for me to see de Gaulle to the White House on as reported the grounds that you didn't want to take up "controversial" issues with the White House. This puzzles me a great deal and is in effect why I am writing you.

The Honorable
Dean Rusk,
Secretary of State.

MAY 26 1963

not true
JK

POL FR-45 XR POL WS-25SR

2

PERSONAL - SECRET

- 2 -

When I was home in April I discussed with the President the desirability of seeing de Gaulle every few months and mentioned specifically to him the question of our estimate of Soviet developments as a possible topic. The President seemed to be in complete agreement with this approach. I therefore cannot understand why my suggestion should be "controversial". You might wish to give George Ball any thoughts you may have on the subject for transmission to me when he comes over on the 29th.

Yours,

Chip

(Amb. Gollan)

D R A F T

SUBJECT: NASAM No. 241 - Report on French Gaseous Diffusion Plant

The Department has concluded on the basis of the CIA - AEC report and other data, ^(see attachment) relating to Franco-German nuclear cooperation that:

II. ~~Recently, it has become increasingly evident that there is a concerted French effort to push the Germans into nuclear plant construction, planning, research, and participation without "artificial" distinctions between peaceful and military aspects of a particular project.~~ ^{may exist} ~~One French tactic is to use French industrialists and scientists (who are highly susceptible to French Government influence) to convince their German counterparts that it is in their commercial and technical interest to exert pressure on the German Science Ministry (which is highly susceptible to German industry influence) to speed up this bilateral nuclear cooperation. Another French tactic is to promote French and German Science Ministry-sponsored exchange of visits between high level officials of public and private scientific research organizations.~~ ^{drive} ^{exclusive Franco-German bilateral} ^{across-the-board nuclear} ^{nuclear plant construction.} ^{participation without "artificial" distinctions being made} ^{seemingly} ^{apparently numerous} ^{This relationship has been formalized in the Franco-German Treaty of 1964.} ^{Finally, the French appear to} ^{may} be using the threat of collaboration with the Italians to speed up German commitments in this area. (While the French Foreign Office undoubtedly would prefer from a political standpoint to cooperate with the Germans, the French Atomic Energy Commission might very well prefer to cooperate with its Italian counterpart which is organized along similar lines that stress governmental rather than private nuclear efforts.) ^{At no time has there been any indication of German Foreign Office participation in these discussions. On the contrary, it once professed to have no knowledge of the exploratory talks that}

while the extremely low cost of US production:

The Germans (or Italians) are not likely to give serious consideration to participation in Picvelatte unless the French should decide to provide valuable commercial or scientific benefits in exchange for a moderate financial contribution and/or substantial technical expertise. However, the French tactic of using a commercial-scientific approach does allow them

to camouflage and the Germans to ignore the political and military considerations

This is demonstrated by the fact that although involved. Although the Picvelatte gaseous diffusion plant has as its primary purpose the production of highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons, the German Science Ministry reportedly rebuffed an initial French approach for German participation solely on the grounds that the costs would be high

and the scientific advantages too few. At the same time the ~~scientific~~ ^{material} advantages too few. There is no reason to believe that should the French offer greater ~~technical~~ ^{material} benefits in return for less

Ministry admitted in

and substantial German technical expertise, money the German Science Ministry might not reverse its position since it admitted an interest in an additional non-U.S. source of enriched uranium. No mention has been made of German Foreign Office involvement in this decision.

~~On the contrary, the Foreign Office once professed to have no knowledge of the exploratory talks that followed the initial de Gaulle-Adenauer mandate to seek close scientific, technical and educational cooperation between the two countries.~~

This situation would seem to require that we inform the German Foreign Office of US opposition to bilateral German participation in Picvelatte regardless of any alleged commercial or scientific advantage. Moreover, we ought to demonstrate to the German Science Ministry that there is no necessity for an additional non-US source of enriched nuclear fuel.

WRTyler:mt
(Deputy Chief of Office and Officer)

6025 5/25/63
2a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

Approved by White House
5/31/63

The White House
11 a.m.

DATE: May 25, 1963

SUBJECT: Review of French Foreign Policy

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, SEC. 3(E), 5(D), 5(F) AND 11

State NLK-77-869
BY MPM NARS DATE 3-28-78

PARTICIPANTS: <u>US</u> The President William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary	<u>France</u> Foreign Minister Couve de Murville Ambassador Hervé Alphand Charles Lucet, Director of Political Affairs, Foreign Office
--	--

COPIES TO: S/P S/AL S/MF EUR WE RPE S/S(2)	SOV INR/D G Amemb. Paris Paris for USRO Amemb. Moscow RPM	Amemb. London Amemb. Bonn White House (2)
--	---	---

The President greeted the Foreign Minister and said he was glad to see him. He asked how things were going on in France. The Minister said the economic situation was generally favorable, but there was a danger of inflation. The government was taking certain measures such as limiting credit, increasing taxes, and liberalizing imports. The President stressed the importance the United States Government attaches to increasing the volume of trade. He said he thought so long as the interest rates and the costs of France and the United States remained relatively stable, we could look forward to such an increase. The Foreign Minister said he thought that the greatest need of the West was to have a sound monetary policy. This aspect of the common interest of the West was not being adequately discussed. The President agreed and said that matters of this sort tended to be treated too technically and to remain too much in the hands of the bankers, who do not see them in terms of the national interest.

The President then turned to the US balance of payments difficulties. He said that the United States would be short another \$2.5 billion this year. The danger was not so much a matter of loss of dollars, as the possibility of a run on gold. This was our big problem. The President said that every time it was proposed that

FORM DS-1254
2-61

we take

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and

GPO 902992

NSA 172/ France. Geneva 6/1/63 - 6/4/63

we take some steps to bring our payments into balance, we were exposed to loss of confidence in our currency which took the form of a run on the dollar. Couve asked whether the United States Government had ever considered changing the international price of gold. The President asked in turn whether this would not cause a run on the dollar. Couve said it would not, because everyone would have already agreed on the new price beforehand, and each currency would be pegged to it when it came into effect. He went on to say that he thought that the United States was dealing with the problem of the balance of payments piecemeal. The United States, he said, does not have a real deficit. It has a foreign trade surplus. He said he thought that tourists should be counted under trade. He said the real trouble was that there was too much export of US capital abroad. The President agreed that tourists are a form of trade. He pointed out that we lose \$1.5 billion under this category in addition to our expenditures for military and foreign aid programs. Couve observed that tourists represented something more than trade, that they played an important political and psychological role in international relations.

The President asked the Foreign Minister what are the objectives of French foreign policy. Couve replied that France's first task was to bring about some kind of union of Western Europe. A start had been made with the Common Market and other international institutions. In the long run one must foresee the existence of the two big powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, as the result of the last war, now found itself partly in Europe. It was important that Europe help to keep the balance with the assistance of the United States. He thought that the present Soviet position and role in Europe would not last forever, perhaps 50 years or 20 years. In any case the only thing to do was to build up European unity and strength. Europe would never be able to fight alone or to provide by itself for its security. It would always need US support. Eventually, there would have to be some form of accommodation in Europe by the Soviet Union. This was what General de Gaulle meant when he said "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals." He said Europe had begun the process of unification in the economic field and this would be followed by progress

in the

[REDACTED]




in the political and military fields, but this would not be outside the framework of the Atlantic alliance. It was important that ties within Europe between the various countries be multiplied. The Franco-German pact was an example of such drawing together. Couve said that the pact itself added nothing substantive to the relations between the two countries but tied them more closely to one another. He said that the object of French policy in Europe was to link Germany so tightly to the West that she would never be in a position to fight a war in Europe without French consent. There was increasing training of German troops, and stockpiling of supplies for the German armed forces in France. Couve said that the UK was part of Europe and in the long run must join Europe. The breakdown of negotiations in Brussels had been unfortunate but the real reason for this was that the EEC did not want the participation of the United Kingdom to change the nature of the European Economic Community. The UK was still subject to a conflict between its relations with the EEC, with the Commonwealth, and with the United States. Couve said he had already felt as long ago as last October that the UK would find itself unable to join the Common Market.

Couve then discussed the charges which were frequently aired publicly that France was promoting an inward-looking Europe. Some people continued to say this and thereby created misunderstanding. The facts were that Europe was only inward-looking politically to the extent that it was trying to find itself and to create its unity. In the economic and commercial fields, however, Europe was outward-looking in relation both to the liberalization and increase of trade, and its responsibilities toward the less developed countries. He pointed out that the common external tariff of the EEC was lower than that of the British, and relatively lower than the US tariff average. Couve then repeated again that Europe could only be said to be inward-looking in a very limited sense, and that in any case the United States could not be left out of the life of Europe in the political and defense fields.

The President thanked the Foreign Minister for his remarks and asked why it was that these thoughts which all sounded very

reasonable



reasonable seemed to take the form of being directed against the United States. The President mentioned specifically General de Gaulle's press conference of January 14, which had created this impression over here. The President said that the danger of a Soviet attack against Europe nowadays was minimal. He thought that Europe was quite secure militarily now. The Soviet Union's problem, he said, lay in the direction of Communist China rather than Europe. There were really no problems of major importance between the United States and France, and yet the general atmosphere seemed to reflect a situation in which there were basic differences and disputes between the two countries.

Couve agreed that the interests of France and the United States were essentially the same. He said he thought the only area in which there was a real dispute was in the nuclear field. He said that the United States felt that since it had more than enough to deter the Soviet Union, it was a waste for others to build nuclear weapons. France also understood the US position on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. However, France had a different position because France is a different country, and because she must herself look to her own future. From the French point of view there was a strong argument to be made in favor of her having nuclear weapons, just as the British had them. France, he said would never help the Germans to make nuclear weapons.

The President said he understood that these were the reasons why France had made the decision to be a nuclear power. We recognized this fact of life and he wondered just where it was that France and the United States were at odds. Couve said he did not think they were. The President said Western Europe was as militarily secure as any place could be these days. The nuclear matter has been settled. It is now merely a question of whether the United States was right or wrong. He didn't think there was any dispute at this time. Monetary policies were much more important. He thought the thing we must do a little later was to agree on the coordination of our nuclear forces. The President said that it seemed to him that the US decision to make an offer to the French on Skipjack, plus the open door

held

[REDACTED]

2W



held out to France at the time of the Nassau meeting represented a beginning of movement on what might have been a useful road of cooperation in the nuclear field. He said that the United States also felt that the concept of the MLF was responsive to major German and Italian concerns and desires to play a part in nuclear defense. The Nassau Agreement was not preventing Prime Minister Macmillan from fighting a campaign against Harold Wilson on the basis of maintenance of the national nuclear deterrent, which was what de Gaulle himself would be arguing for.

The Foreign Minister said that there was a basic difference in psychology between France and the UK. The French agreed to, or disagreed with, a proposition on the basis of principle. The British, on the other hand, made the decision on the basis of convenience, and then made the adjustment of a factual situation so as to conform to principle. The President pointed out that Macmillan had had a problem on his hands as a result of the failure of Skybolt. He had come to Nassau with a statement by over a hundred backbenchers protesting against the cancellation of Skybolt. Couve said France had nothing against the UK's special relationship to the US, which was understandable because of the special ties of language and tradition between the two countries. It was only when this special relationship intruded into problems of immediate concern to the UK and to Europe that there were difficulties. Ambassador Alphand at this point injected the remark that France does not oppose the idea of nuclear cooperation with the United States. Couve said that France did not wish to join the MLF, but was not opposed to it. The President mentioned the value of the idea of the MLF in relation to the German problem. Couve said he had misgivings on this point because he thought the MLF would look increasingly like an essentially US-German business, with a few other much less important countries "such as the Italians" added. He was not sure that the MLF really met German requirements, and feared that it would rather whet the German appetite in the direction of an increasing nuclear role, particularly in view of the size of the German contribution. The President observed that he thought the French force de frappe was a far greater incentive to Germany to play a national nuclear role, than the MLF. Couve said he was convinced that the Germans

with



with their twelve divisions and their important share in the MLF would want to increase their nuclear role. He said it might be true that France was giving Germany a bad example, but France had done everything by herself and on her own. How could Germany do likewise? Where could she get uranium or testing sites? The President said that Israel was able to get uranium. Couve said that even if the Israelis get an atomic device they would be able to make trouble but they would not be able to wage nuclear war in the real sense of the word. The President asked Couve if it was his judgment that we would do better not to go ahead with the MLF. Couve said that from all the reports he had of what the Germans were saying about the MLF, he had doubts and apprehensions about it. The President asked if France would help the Germans in the nuclear field if the US gave up the MLF. Couve replied certainly not. He said that people speak about a European nuclear force but this could only happen if there existed a European political power. This might perhaps come about in 10 or 15 years' time. In that event the German problem would be a different one and Germany would be part of the European political power. In the meantime, there are the French and the UK independent deterrents with national vetos on their use.

The President said he hoped one day we could discuss with France what should be done about China. He asked what was the view of General de Gaulle. Couve said the French Government thinks that China's rift with the Soviet Union will develop and increase and will be a major factor in the next ten years. The President asked Couve what he thought the policies of the West should be in SEATO and in Southeast Asia. Couve said one should also consider the role of Japan, which considers herself as being the most knowledgeable of the Western-oriented powers about China. The President asked what should be done about Southeast Asia, and whether India should be built up. Couve said France did not think that China wanted to take over Southeast Asia but rather to establish a buffer region between the United States and China. If this view was correct, the best thing would be to achieve a political solution of the problems in that area. The President asked about Laos and what should be done there. He said that if things went

on

on deteriorating as they are now we would all be in serious trouble. Couve said he did not think that much could be done other than to go on "with patience and modesty." He did not think that it was possible to pursue a major policy or that there was much that could be done.

The President brought up again the Israeli nuclear problem. He said he hoped that Couve would have an opportunity to discuss it with the Secretary of State. Couve said that France had made a mistake in having furnished Israel with plutonium. Now France was only leasing, and not selling, uranium to Israel. He went on to say that the "only cheerful area" was Africa. France had recently signed a good agreement with Guinea. He thought that things were going along pretty well with Algeria. The President mentioned that there were great difficulties in Haiti and asked about the French position there. Couve said there were several hundred French nationals in Haiti. He said that the message which de Gaulle had sent to Duvalier in reply to his letter had been sent off by coincidence at the time of the crisis. The President said we were watching the situation closely and that we could not allow the creation of another Castro-type regime in this hemisphere. Should this occur, we would have to intervene.

The President again asked the Foreign Minister what could be done to improve the image of our relations with France. He referred to the recent GATT Ministerial Meeting, and said that that had finally gone off all right after some difficulties. The President referred to rumors that France was contemplating taking more of her ships out of NATO. The Foreign Minister refrained from commenting on this last remark by the President, but said that France attached very great importance to the GATT meeting and to the trade field as a whole. The President recalled that he had told General de Gaulle when he had seen him in Paris in 1961 that the United States would welcome an increased European role in Latin America, and that France, because of her great cultural tradition, as well as her economic and commercial role, could play a considerable part in our efforts to improve and stabilize economic and political conditions in that area. The Foreign Minister agreed that this was in France's interest as well as ours.

The conversation came to an end at about 12:15.

[REDACTED]

5/25/63
8025

Memorandum of Conversation

The White House
11 a.m.
DATE: May 25, 1963

SUBJECT: Review of French Foreign Policy

<u>US</u> PARTICIPANTS: The President William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary	<u>France</u> Foreign Minister Couve de Murville Ambassador Hervé Alphand Charles Lucet, Director of Political Affairs, Foreign Office
--	--

COPIES TO: S/S (2) S/P S/AL S/MF EUR WE RPE	RPM SOV INR/D G Amembassy Paris Paris for USRO Amembassy Moscow	Amembassy London Amembassy Bonn White House (2)
---	---	---

The President greeted the Foreign Minister and said he was glad to see him. He asked how things were going on in France. The Minister said the economic situation was generally favorable, but there was a danger of inflation. The government was taking certain measures such as limiting credit, increasing taxes, and liberalizing imports. The President stressed the importance the United States Government attaches to increasing the volume of trade. He said he thought so long as the interest rates and the costs of France and the United States remained relatively stable, we could look forward to such an increase. The Foreign Minister said he thought that the greatest need of the West was to have a sound monetary policy. This aspect of the common interest of the West was not being adequately discussed. The President agreed and said that matters of this sort tended to be treated too technically and to remain too much in the hands of the bankers, who do not see them in terms of the national interest.

The President then turned to the US balance of payments difficulties. He said that the United States would be short another \$2.5 billion this year. The danger was not so much a matter of loss of dollars, as the possibility of a run on gold. This was our big problem. The President said that every time it was proposed that

NIA/72 / Fr - Gen

we take some steps to bring our payments into balance, we were exposed to loss of confidence in our currency which took the form of a run on the dollar. Couve asked whether the United States Government had ever considered changing the international price of gold. The President asked in turn whether this would not cause a run on the dollar. Couve said it would not, because everyone would have already agreed on the new price beforehand, and each currency would be pegged to it when it came into effect. He went on to say that he thought that the United States was dealing with the problem of the balance of payments piecemeal. The United States, he said, does not have a real deficit. It has a foreign trade surplus. He said he thought that tourists should be counted under trade. He said the real trouble was that there was too much export of US capital abroad. The President agreed that tourists are a form of trade. He pointed out that we lose \$1.5 billion under this category in addition to our expenditures for military and foreign aid programs. Couve observed that tourists represented something more than trade, that they played an important political and psychological role in international relations.

The President asked the Foreign Minister what are the objectives of French foreign policy. Couve replied that France's first task was to bring about some kind of union of Western Europe. A start had been made with the Common Market and other international institutions. In the long run one must foresee the existence of the two big powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, as the result of the last war, now found itself partly in Europe. It was important that Europe help to keep the balance with the assistance of the United States. He thought that the present Soviet position and role in Europe would not last forever, perhaps 50 years or 20 years. In any case the only thing to do was to build up European unity and strength. Europe would never be able to fight alone or to provide by itself for its security. It would always need US support. Eventually, there would have to be some form of accommodation in Europe by the Soviet Union. This was what General de Gaulle meant when he said "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals." He said Europe had begun the process of unification in the economic field and this would be followed by progress

in the

in the political and military fields, but this would not be outside the framework of the Atlantic alliance. It was important that ties within Europe between the various countries be multiplied. The Franco-German pact was an example of such drawing together. Couve said that the pact itself added nothing substantive to the relations between the two countries but tied them more closely to one another. He said that the object of French policy in Europe was to link Germany so tightly to the West that she would never be in a position to fight a war in Europe without French consent. There was increasing training of German troops, and stockpiling of supplies for the German armed forces in France. Couve said that the UK was part of Europe and in the long run must join Europe. The breakdown of negotiations in Brussels had been unfortunate but the real reason for this was that the EEC did not want the participation of the United Kingdom to change the nature of the European Economic Community. The UK was still subject to a conflict between its relations with the EEC, with the Commonwealth, and with the United States. Couve said he had already felt as long ago as last October that the UK would find itself unable to join the Common Market.

Couve then discussed the charges which were frequently aired publicly that France was promoting an inward-looking Europe. Some people continued to say this and thereby created misunderstanding. The facts were that Europe was only inward-looking politically to the extent that it was trying to find itself and to create its unity. In the economic and commercial fields, however, Europe was outward-looking in relation both to the liberalization and increase of trade, and its responsibilities toward the less developed countries. He pointed out that the common external tariff of the EEC was lower than that of the British, and relatively lower than the US tariff average. Couve then repeated again that Europe could only be said to be inward-looking in a very limited sense, and that in any case the United States could not be left out of the life of Europe in the political and defense fields.

The President thanked the Foreign Minister for his remarks and asked why it was that these thoughts which all sounded very

reasonable

reasonable seemed to take the form of being directed against the United States. The President mentioned specifically General de Gaulle's press conference of January 14, which had created this impression over here. The President said that the danger of a Soviet attack against Europe nowadays was minimal. He thought that Europe was quite secure militarily now. The Soviet Union's problem, he said, lay in the direction of Communist China rather than Europe. There were really no problems of major importance between the United States and France, and yet the general atmosphere seemed to reflect a situation in which there were basic differences and disputes between the two countries.

Couve agreed that the interests of France and the United States were essentially the same. He said he thought the only area in which there was a real dispute was in the nuclear field. He said that the United States felt that since it had more than enough to deter the Soviet Union, it was a waste for others to build nuclear weapons. France also understood the US position on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. However, France had a different position because France is a different country, and because she must herself look to her own future. From the French point of view there was a strong argument to be made in favor of her having nuclear weapons, just as the British had them. France, he said would never help the Germans to make nuclear weapons.

The President said he understood that these were the reasons why France had made the decision to be a nuclear power. We recognized this fact of life and he wondered just where it was that France and the United States were at odds. Couve said he did not think they were. The President said Western Europe was as militarily secure as any place could be these days. The nuclear matter has been settled. It is now merely a question of whether the United States was right or wrong. He didn't think there was any dispute at this time. Monetary policies were much more important. He thought the thing we must do a little later was to agree on the coordination of our nuclear forces. The President said that it seemed to him that the US decision to make an offer to the French on Skipjack, plus the open door

held

held out to France at the time of the Nassau meeting represented a beginning of movement on what might have been a useful road of cooperation in the nuclear field. He said that the United States also felt that the concept of the MLF was responsive to major German and Italian concerns and desires to play a part in nuclear defense. The Nassau Agreement was not preventing Prime Minister Macmillan from fighting a campaign against Harold Wilson on the basis of maintenance of the national nuclear deterrent, which was what de Gaulle himself would be arguing for.

The Foreign Minister said that there was a basic difference in psychology between France and the UK. The French agreed to, or disagreed with, a proposition on the basis of principle. The British, on the other hand, made the decision on the basis of convenience, and then made the adjustment of a factual situation so as to conform to principle. The President pointed out that Macmillan had had a problem on his hands as a result of the failure of Skybolt. He had come to Nassau with a statement by over a hundred backbenchers protesting against the cancellation of Skybolt. Couve said France had nothing against the UK's special relationship to the US, which was understandable because of the special ties of language and tradition between the two countries. It was only when this special relationship intruded into problems of immediate concern to the UK and to Europe that there were difficulties. Ambassador Alphand at this point injected the remark that France does not oppose the idea of nuclear cooperation with the United States. Couve said that France did not wish to join the MLF, but was not opposed to it. The President mentioned the value of the idea of the MLF in relation to the German problem. Couve said he had misgivings on this point because he thought the MLF would look increasingly like an essentially US-German business, with a few other much less important countries "such as the Italians" added. He was not sure that the MLF really met German requirements, and feared that it would rather whet the German appetite in the direction of an increasing nuclear role, particularly in view of the size of the German contribution. The President observed that he thought the French force de frappe was a far greater incentive to Germany to play a national nuclear role, than the MLF. Couve said he was convinced that the Germans

with

with their twelve divisions and their important share in the MLF would want to increase their nuclear role. He said it might be true that France was giving Germany a bad example, but France had done everything by herself and on her own. How could Germany do likewise? Where could she get uranium or testing sites? The President said that Israel was able to get uranium. Couve said that even if the Israelis get an atomic device they would be able to make trouble but they would not be able to wage nuclear war in the real sense of the word. The President asked Couve if it was his judgment that we would do better not to go ahead with the MLF. Couve said that from all the reports he had of what the Germans were saying about the MLF, he had doubts and apprehensions about it. The President asked if France would help the Germans in the nuclear field if the US gave up the MLF. Couve replied certainly not. He said that people speak about a European nuclear force but this could only happen if there existed a European political power. This might perhaps come about in 10 or 15 years' time. In that event the German problem would be a different one and Germany would be part of the European political power. In the meantime, there are the French and the UK independent deterrents with national vetos on their use.

The President said he hoped one day we could discuss with France what should be done about China. He asked what was the view of General de Gaulle. Couve said the French Government thinks that China's rift with the Soviet Union will develop and increase and will be a major factor in the next ten years. The President asked Couve what he thought the policies of the West should be in SEATO and in Southeast Asia. Couve said one should also consider the role of Japan, which considers herself as being the most knowledgeable of the Western-oriented powers about China. The President asked what should be done about Southeast Asia, and whether India should be built up. Couve said France did not think that China wanted to take over Southeast Asia but rather to establish a buffer region between the United States and China. If this view was correct, the best thing would be to achieve a political solution of the problems in that area. The President asked about Laos and what should be done there. He said that if things went

on

on deteriorating as they are now we would all be in serious trouble. Couve said he did not think that much could be done other than to go on "with patience and modesty." He did not think that it was possible to pursue a major policy or that there was much that could be done.

The President brought up again the Israeli nuclear problem. He said he hoped that Couve would have an opportunity to discuss it with the Secretary of State. Couve said that France had made a mistake in having furnished Israel with plutonium. Now France was only leasing, and not selling, uranium to Israel. He went on to say that the "only cheerful area" was Africa. France had recently signed a good agreement with Guinea. He thought that things were going along pretty well with Algeria. The President mentioned that there were great difficulties in Haiti and asked about the French position there. Couve said there were several hundred French nationals in Haiti. He said that the message which de Gaulle had sent to Duvalier in reply to his letter had been sent off by coincidence at the time of the crisis. The President said we were watching the situation closely and that we could not allow the creation of another Castro-type regime in this hemisphere. Should this occur, we would have to intervene.

The President again asked the Foreign Minister what could be done to improve the image of our relations with France. He referred to the recent GATT Ministerial Meeting, and said that that had finally gone off all right after some difficulties. The President referred to rumors that France was contemplating taking more of her ships out of NATO. The Foreign Minister refrained from commenting on this last remark by the President, but said that France attached very great importance to the GATT meeting and to the trade field as a whole. The President recalled that he had told General de Gaulle when he had seen him in Paris in 1961 that the United States would welcome an increased European role in Latin America, and that France, because of her great cultural tradition, as well as her economic and commercial role, could play a considerable part in our efforts to improve and stabilize economic and political conditions in that area. The Foreign Minister agreed that this was in France's interest as well as ours.

The conversatbn came to an end at about 12:15.

CONFIDENTIAL

2a

3036 44
✓ 2A

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

*Rosenberg (3A)
dist 3/19/64*

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATIONS
BETWEEN
FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER COUVE DE MURVILLE
AND
UNDER SECRETARY BALL
SATURDAY, MAY 25, 1963

The following notes report two conversations which took place on the Patrick J. The discussion regarding nuclear policy includes an additional conversation at the French Embassy, when the Fonmin took me aside after dinner with the obvious purpose of expanding and clarifying his earlier statements.

1. Nuclear Policy

I told the Fonmin that I thought it was important that we try to define with some precision the areas of disagreement with regard to nuclear policy. I was disturbed by the fact that France seemed to be systematically undercutting our efforts to bring about a multilateral force for Europe. He asked me in what way this was being done, and I told him it seemed clear to me that the briefings of the Quai d'Orsay and the expressions of view by French officials were more systematic and deliberate than one might expect if all that was involved was a mere difference as to the usefulness of the MLF.

The Fonmin replied that the French Government did not object to the MLF but it did not believe in it. There was no way in which the French Government could keep its officials from expressing their views on any subject and all that was involved was a mere difference of opinion. He understood, and could sympathize with, the motivation that had led the Americans to put this

proposal

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, SEC. 3(E), 5(D), 5(E) AND 11

Dept. of State (DLK-77-866)
BY MGM DATE 5/11/78

*Att Ball 4/153
=153*

CONFIDENTIAL

NLP/72/ Fr Gen 5/29/63 - 5/31/63

proposal forward but he did not think it was useful.

In the course of our discussion we attempted to define the main area of disagreement. It appeared to narrow down primarily to a differing appraisal as to the ability of France and the other Western allies to keep Germany permanently in a second-class position. There was no difference between us as to the catastrophic consequences of a German national nuclear system. It would, the Fonmin said, cause almost insoluble difficulties with the East while at the same time creating great anxieties in the West. I told him that I had been surprised that General de Gaulle had accepted the apparent inevitability of a German national system. He questioned this, but then admitted that de Gaulle had said as much to Secretary Rusk. However, he could not take the German deterrent as inevitable. Certainly the French would never lend any assistance to Germany in developing a national deterrent.

He kept reiterating that, under the WEU arrangements, Germany had promulgated a self-denying ordinance against the manufacture of nuclear weapons and this was a solemn commitment. I told him that there had been a similar situation after World War I and that we should not be so foolish as to make the same mistake twice. The Germans would never be content with a permanent position of discrimination. Once the force de frappe became a reality, the pressures within Germany for a national system would become increasingly difficult to deal with. This would particularly be true of a post-Adenauer Germany where the old Chancellor would no longer serve as a restraining influence, and no one could predict the kind of government that might be in power in Germany in a few years.

The Fonmin admitted all this but said that within ten years Europe might well be able to move toward the kind of political unity that could absorb the German effort in an European deterrent. He admitted, of course, that this was not the case now since there was no political Europe.

I replied

CONFIDENTIAL

24

- 3 -

I replied that I agreed that there was no political Europe now. Moreover I felt that a political Europe capable of making the life and death decisions involved in the management of atomic weapons system was not going to emerge on the basis of a Europe des patries. How could he then feel that if General de Gaulle's own European ideas prevail, there would be any solution for the Germans other than a national system?

He offered no direct answer, merely repeating that the Germans were bound by solemn commitments. I said again that I thought that we should all be too intelligent to repeat our old mistakes, and that if we had learned one thing from experience of the wars it would be that Germany would never accept permanent discrimination. I said I had the uncomfortable feeling that the course he was suggesting was a deadend. It offered no hope. Under those circumstances it seemed to me useful to try to put forward some initiative such as the MLF. While the MLF was admittedly not perfect, it was the best that could be done -- given the realities of present institutional progress. At this point the conversation was interrupted and Couve did not seem to be anxious to continue it on this line.

Later, at the French Embassy dinner, he drew me aside with an obvious desire to expand and clarify his earlier comments.

Developing the ideas that he had started to outline on the boat, the Fenmin said that the only solution to the nuclear problem was the renunciation of nuclear weapons in some kind of pact with the Soviet Union. Anyone who rejected this possibility, rejected all hope for the future. If the present arms competition kept on, not only would civilization be stultified because a larger and larger proportion of available intellectual effort would be concentrated on building increasingly sophisticated weapons, but there would almost certainly be some kind of accident which could trigger a nuclear catastrophe.

I expressed

CONFIDENTIAL

I expressed my agreement with these views and indicated that this was precisely the reason why we felt it essential to keep working toward some arrangements for the control of nuclear weapons; first by means of a break-through in bomb-testing, and later through control of possession and use. This assumed, however, a common position -- at least on the Western side. I left it open for the Fonmin to respond with regard to bomb-testing but he did not do so.

I remarked that in my view the greatest peril to the possibility of effective control arrangements was proliferation. This was one of the major reasons why we had put forward the MLF, and we were doing everything in our power to prevent the development of further national nuclear systems.

He responded that he thought this danger was greatly overstated. After all, there was a problem of a Chinese independent capability. This was probably already so far on the way toward achievement that there was little we could do about it. The only other nation that we might view with some concern was India, and this was something we could manage. After all, the Indians were not technologically very efficient and we could have a good deal of control over their economic activities.

Apart from India there was Israel and perhaps Egypt. Israel, he said, was a common problem which France and the United States must tackle together, and the French Government, on its side, was prepared to do so. But even if Israel should develop a nuclear capability, that would not create much of a problem on the world scene. The troubles it caused would be localized. It would upset the balance in the Middle East, but it would not trigger a world catastrophe. As for Egypt, he thought it unlikely that the Egyptians would be able to go very far toward a nuclear capability for a long time to come. In this latter view I concurred.

I told

CONFIDENTIAL

I told him that, in our reading of the situation, the most urgent problem seemed to lie closer home. The central problem was Germany. If Germany began to develop a nuclear deterrent, we could expect Italy to follow suit within a relatively few years.

He emphatically rejected the idea that Italy had any interest in having a nuclear weapon. I told him I did not think we could afford to base our policies simply on an assessment of present attitudes. We should try to look forward to a possible future course of events. It seemed to me -- and we had given this careful consideration -- that if Germany were to develop a nuclear system, the Italians would feel compelled to march down the same road within a couple of years thereafter.

But even granting that he was right about the Italians, I still felt he must focus on the German problem as being central to the whole difficult question. How did he foresee the development of a post-Adenauer Germany?

He replied that Germany under Erhard would probably not change its policies very quickly, but that it would be leaderless -- and, therefore, dangerous. Erhard, in his view, would not be able -- or even try -- to influence the course of German policy except within narrow limits. Ever since the establishment of the Federal Republic, the German Government had been under the iron hand of the old Chancellor, and it was hard to predict how the Government would operate once political leadership was removed.

I repeated the concern I had expressed earlier in the afternoon -- that General de Gaulle had appeared to accept the inevitability of a German independent deterrent. In view of the comments the Fonmin was now making about the dangers of a post-Adenauer Germany, wasn't it clear that we could not afford to let this capability develop?

The Fonmin

The Fonmin commented that, of course, the Franco-German Treaty was intended precisely to enable France to keep a restraint on Germany against just such possibilities. However, the best solution was to have the Germans participate in a European nuclear deterrent, which would, of course, be closely tied to that of the United States. This would be possible where there would be a political power that could make the ultimate decision with regard to the use of the deterrent. This was, in fact, the only way the deterrent could be practicably managed.

I answered that I thought all this was extremely interesting, but I was baffled by it. After all, the General's concept of a Europe des patries seemed inconsistent with the creation of a political authority that could make a decision to use atomic weapons. It should be recognized, I said, that the decision to employ atomic weapons was an ultimate decision of life or death. It was the kind of decision that nations could entrust to a common political authority only at the end of the road toward political unity and not at the beginning. Yet I saw no real possibility of political unity in any significant sense resulting from the concept of a Europe des patries.

The Fonmin replied with some vehemence that I should not be so preoccupied with words and labels. It was quite possible that within ten years Europe could achieve exactly the kind of unity I was talking about -- the unity that could permit a single political authority to utilize atomic weapons. What was needed was the development of an effective European Council of Governments. That Council would elect a president, and that president would be, in effect, the President of Europe.

I asked if he contemplated the creation of a European parliament. He said that certainly the council would be supported by a European parliament. That was part of the concept. But the French Government was not sympathetic with the idea of a European parliament without a council, since it would be meaningless. I said that I wanted to be very

clear

*e had admitted
 as was found to
 + phony for (1-15)
 W JPC - see NY
 5/25/67
 SO. Mrs. ...
 100-M.R.*

*as def admitted
 to Shaker -
 get 5/1/67 375*

clear that I understood what he was saying. What he was proposing, as I understood it, was a kind of council of ministers for Europe which would have an elected president and be supported by a parliament directly elected by the people. He replied in the affirmative.

I said that I saw no signs of progress toward this in efforts that General de Gaulle had been making and that this seemed to me clearly inconsistent with the General's emphasis on nationalism.

The Fonmin replied that it was completely consistent, and that, in fact, this was exactly what the General had in mind when he talked about "confederation". Political progress, he thought, had to be made through the stage of "confederation" toward "federation". The General did not foreclose the possibility of an ultimate federation of Europe, so long as it proceeded through a confederal form as an intermediate phase.

I said I knew something about confederation, since we had had one for seventeen years in the United States. However, it had proved quite ineffective. The Fonmin replied that I should not take the American example as casting much light on the problems of Europe. After all, the United States had not existed as separate independent nations with centuries of independent national history behind them.

The General's ideas, he thought, were quite clear on this point. The General certainly contemplated the creation of a confederal system within the next few years. I asked him again if he didn't think that ten years was too short a time for evolution along the lines he was suggesting to result in institutional arrangements capable of managing a European atomic deterrent. He replied that he did not. At the same time, he indicated that he felt that progress toward effective political institutions lay along the lines he had outlined rather than through "technocratic" evolution.

I then

I then asked if the Fonmin contemplated any new and important French initiative toward the creation of the kind of European council he had been discussing. He replied that this was very difficult. As early as 1959 France had tried to arrange for a systematic meeting of Foreign Ministers, but the Dutch had always proved the principal obstacle. They had insisted that a meeting of Foreign Ministers be followed by a WEU meeting and the whole thing had fallen apart. It was going to be very difficult to bring about the creation of an effective council. I repeated my question as to whether he contemplated any initiative in this direction within the immediate future, and he replied again, "It is very difficult." I could not draw him out any farther.

2. Trade Negotiations

The Fonmin expressed gratification that a decision had been finally reached in Geneva. He said, however, that we should face the fact that this was only the first of many crises that would occur in the course of the negotiations. He thought that almost every major issue would mean a near crisis but that, in the long run, the negotiations would succeed.

I told him that we did not look forward to an easy negotiation. The problems presented were complex and the process would take time. At the same time we felt it essential that we agree on fundamental principles that could guide the negotiation. I thought we had succeeded in doing this in Geneva and from that point of view we were gratified by the conclusion.

The Fonmin then raised the question of agriculture. He indicated this was a question that could not be tackled along normal tariff-cutting lines, but required a global solution. I told him that I did not disagree with this comment. As he knew, many months ago we had talks with Wormser and Clappier about a global approach. We had later

discussed

CONFIDENTIAL

discussed this problem with Baumgartner, and we had also tried to develop these ideas with the Australians and Canadians.

I told him that I thought that with regard to the great cereal crops -- particularly wheat -- we ought to get on as soon as possible with an effort to work out a global solution. After all, American prices and French prices were much closer than German and American prices, and -- to an extent -- I felt that we were in position to make common cause with France on trying to resist the fixing of abnormally high wheat prices, which would only tend to encourage marginal production. I noted that our problem had been made somewhat more complicated by the failure of the wheat referendum, and he indicated his acquaintance with this development.

I told him that we had made progress in persuading the British of the need to join the global approach and that we were prepared to move forward in this direction promptly. He seemed in full agreement with this.

3. Monetary Policy

The Fonmin said that he thought that monetary policy was, in fact, more important in the long run than even nuclear policy. In suggesting to the President this morning that the gold price be raised, he was expressing his own views which were not the views of his Government. In fact they were contrary to the views held by those who have the direct responsibility for monetary matters.

He felt, however, that we should not wait too long before tackling the question of reforming the payments system. There were, he felt, only two possible approaches. One was an approach that would preserve the mystique and the automatic quality of the gold standard. This might be achieved by doubling the price of gold following an agreement among the principal nations. This would be a real contribution to the increase in liquidity which he felt was essential

if we

if we were to be able to finance the trading requirements of the future. Not only would it increase the value of national reserves but it would stimulate gold production.

I pointed out that doubling the price of gold would substantially benefit South Africa and the Soviet Union. He agreed but felt that this was incidental and not of significant importance.

The second possible approach was some variant of the Triffin Plan. Much could be said in favor of adopting a form of Triffin Plan. However, this placed responsibility on "technocrats", who would not have political rules to guide them. In fact, any system that was not based on some automatic control such as gold would have this defect. He was sympathetic with the objectives of the Triffin Plan but it frightened him because he would hate to trust to technocrats the decisions as to which country should be permitted to inflate which country should not, etc.

I pointed out that the present system was not, in fact, automatic since the real constraints imposed upon national policies were based upon the need to maintain "confidence" -- which, in the long run, was another name for the collective judgment of central bankers, commercial bankers, speculators and other members of the world financial community. He agreed but still felt that some kind of "automatic" system was better than trying to entrust responsibility to technocrats, since there were no world political institutions to give political guidance to the technocrats.

Both the Secretary and I suggested to him that France, because of its present position of ample reserves and a continuing payments surplus, was in a strong position to put forward proposals for monetary reform. It was pointed out that one of the difficulties of the British initiative at the time of the monetary conference had been the fact that the British were in a position where sterling was weak and there was an obvious self-interest on the British part.

The Fonmin

[REDACTED] AL

26

The Fonmin agreed that the British had been under this disability. After all, Britain was trying to maintain the sterling area with much too narrow a base. This was one of their perennial difficulties. Sterling was always overstrained because of the fact that the United Kingdom was not large enough to carry the sterling area. He had felt that this was one of the reasons why the British had been interested in gaining membership in the Common Market. They had felt that they could then use the reserves of the Common Market countries to support the sterling area. He had tried to raise this question with the British during the discussions but they had never been prepared to talk about it.

He countered the suggestion that France might be the one to take the initiative in the reform of the payments system by pointing out that France was faced with serious problems of preventing inflation and in fact they had never fully solved their own problems. The continued flow of dollars into France was a source of inflation. I asked the Fonmin if he would prefer to see the dollar flow dry up but he did not answer directly.

CONFIDENTIAL

15

5/27/63
7944

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

SECRET

May 27, 1963

To: The Secretary
Through: S/S ~~AAA~~
From: EUR - William R. Tyler *WRT*
Subject: Rumored Secret Military Annex to Franco-German Treaty

I believe the best thing to do is for me to call in the German Minister, von Liliensfeld, and tell him that we have a report that a well known German political figure (I would not mention his name), has stated that there is such an annex, and that it contains, among other things, provisions for cooperation in the nuclear field. I would add that this contradicts what we have been told explicitly by both the French and German Governments, and that we would therefore like to learn whether this rumor is true or false.

Approve _____

DR

Disapprove _____

Microfilmed by RM/R

(P)

File EUR:WRTyler:mt
4/23/63

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

*POC 4 FR-W GER
FR DEF 4 FR-W GER*

25

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

EUR
1110
May 29, 1963

SECRET

May 29, 1963

To: The Secretary
Through: S/S 5
From: EUR - William R. Tyler *WRT*
Subject: Rumored Secret Military Annex to Franco-German Treaty

Secretary, State

Reference my memorandum of May 27, 1963.

Minister von Lilienfeld informed me this afternoon that the German Embassy had just received a reply from Bonn in answer to the Embassy's query following my request for information about the report concerning a military annex to the Franco-German Treaty. The reply is a flat denial that there exists any secret annex, military or otherwise, to the Franco-German Treaty, coupled with a certain note of irritation that we should have given sufficient credit to such a report to consider it necessary to ask the German Government whether it was true or not, in the light of the assurances which had already been given to us.

I told the Minister I was glad to have the reply to our question. As for the note of irritation, I said that I thought it was better to clear up any such reports so as to dispel any possible lingering doubts which might otherwise subsist.

①

microfilmed by RMR

Full EUR:WRTyler:mt

4/13/63

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

POC
4 FR-W GER
4 KN DEF 4 FR-W GER

45

176/1

MLF 5/22/63
COPY NO. 10
of 11 copies
✓

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 27, 1963

~~SECRET~~

TO: The Secretary
THROUGH: S/S
FROM: S/P - W. W. Rostow
SUBJECT: MLF.

I should like to say a word about the decision we face on the letter to Macmillan in particular and the MLF in general.

As on most great occasions, this one is surrounded by confusion, doubt, and uncertainty. But I am convinced that history will measure this Administration substantially by whether, in these familiar circumstances, we go forward, procrastinate, or go back on the MLF.

So far as the British are concerned, there is no political or military future for them in the national nuclear capability; and the most thoughtful men in both parties know in their hearts that the multilateral solution is the correct one. Both we and the British paid an extremely high price at Nassau for failing then to bite the bullet; neither we nor they can afford the price of procrastination or drawing back at this crucial stage.

I have little doubt that if we go forward firmly the British will come with us. If they do not, their disarray and loss of direction is even greater than I believe it to be; but we cannot build our policy on such transient bankruptcy in London.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12 year intervals; not automatically declassified

Kennedy Library, National Security Files, MLF

PR 45 13-15 S/M

CONFIDENTIAL

NAC 116/2

~~SECRET~~

-2-

So far as the Continent is concerned, this is, quite simply, a test of whether the U.S. is still a leader that knows its own mind. The German political process has made a correct commitment, not without doubts and uncertainties; but the decision was made. If we go forward, the matter will be essentially settled in Italy; and a new situation will be created in France.

So far as the French are concerned, it is my conclusion from weekend talks that the Gaullists will know, if we go forward, that their hop-head dream is over. That dream has been spelled out to us over the weekend in great candor. It is to build around the force de frappe a political union on the Continent which Paris can dominate. The Gaullists are counting on: our doubts and uncertainties, as reflected in our current dialogue with London; on heightening European anxieties about Germans coming closer to strategic nuclear weapons; and on every other technical or political doubt they can muster.

If we do draw back, they have a chance to try for continental hegemony. It is my own conviction that such an effort would fail. What would happen, if we do draw back, would be a dangerous fragmentation of the Continent, based on differing mixtures of nationalism and neutralism in the various individual countries of Europe.

What is at stake is not de Gaulle against Kennedy: it is the continued unity of the Alliance under U.S. leadership; because the French do not have the strength or capacity to lead the Germans and Europe.

I believe, therefore, that we owe it to allies who are, in fact, as much dependent upon us for political as for military leadership at this stage in history -- including the French people -- that we go firmly forward.

WWRostow:rln

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND959235
By SPY NARA Date 4/11/97

5/28/67

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : EUR/RPE - Mr. Stanley M. Cleveland

DATE: May 28, 1963

FROM : EUR/RPE - George R. Kaplan

SUBJECT: Status of Pierrelatte Exercise.

The Pierrelatte papers went to the White House on Saturday, May 25, in final, cleared form. Dana Orwick performed yeoman service Friday in ramming clearances through MoCine and Seaborg. The only change was a minor (and constructive) one in the last paragraph (toll enrichment legislation) of the memo to the President.

Exempted from automatic control by George R. Kaplan.

GRK
Thank you
GRK - Pierrelatte file

N8a

EUR:RPE:GRKaplan/jm

5/28/63

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

1999

May 28, 1963

Lunch with General Paul Stehlin, Chief of the French Air Forces - May 25, 1963

General Stehlin began the conversation by recalling our talk of last January. Things had certainly gone from bad to worse since then. De Gaulle's nationalism was becoming more and more pronounced. People like Gallois were simply crazy. On the other hand, the practical effect of U.S. policies for all our good intentions was to magnify the divisions of Europe. The U.S. was suffering from a sense of superiority; De Gaulle was obsessed with a theoretical concern with national integrity. The Americans never engaged in a serious dialogue; our representatives always arrived with fixed ideas as salesmen for some preconceived scheme. Almost every American emissary with whom he talked gave the impression that fallibility was not a quality to which Americans might be subject. The possibility that they might change their mind or could be reached by the arguments of Europeans never seemed to enter the discussion.

De Gaulle, on the other hand, refused to talk at all or simply did not know how to negotiate. If it was any consolation to us he treated his own people the same way. No one knew how he made up his mind. For example, until three days before the press conference in January Stehlin thought that De Gaulle would be if not receptive at least noncommittal with respect to the Nassau offer. Then Secretary Ball had come to Paris with the proposed multilateral force. Using the word multilateral is like waving a red flag before De Gaulle. From then on De Gaulle permitted no further discussion of the Nassau offer.

Now De Gaulle seemed embarked on an extremely nationalistic course. In internal French governmental discussions De Gaulle treated forces "assigned" to NATO as lost to French control. He therefore tried to keep such assignment to an absolute minimum. Recently De Gaulle had decided to abolish the category

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec 3.4

N/K-95-126

WMMK HARA Date 12/21/95

1996/1999

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

of forces designated as "earmarked for assignment to NATO." This would become apparent during the next NATO annual review when France would simply fill in a zero for this category. Stehlin said that the units most immediately affected were several units earmarked for convoy duty in the Atlantic under SACLANT. However, he felt certain that none of the ground forces being built up in France would be earmarked for NATO. This did not mean that De Gaulle would try to stay neutral in case of war. However, he wanted to retain political control over France's armed forces and not be forced to go to war by an American general. I asked whether De Gaulle would feel happier if a French general were NATO commander. Stehlin smiled and said that De Gaulle distrusts French generals even more than American ones.

Stehlin thought De Gaulle was now going much too far. This is why he had refused De Gaulle's offer to be reappointed Chief of Staff of the Airforce. He did not think it was a good precedent to stay in office beyond the usual term and thus bloc somebody else's advancement. But above all he disagrees with the excessive effort to do everything on a national French basis. Stehlin agreed with De Gaulle that it was necessary to have another center of nuclear decision in the West in addition to Washington. However, France by herself could not achieve this.

The present French program was staggering along. The Mirage program was on schedule. Some trouble had developed with respect to the contour flying capability. But he was confident this could be remedied.

The real problem was in the missile field. French planes would have to rely for the foreseeable future on free-falling bombs. Air-to-ground missiles consisted only in the blueprint stage.

The problem was even more serious with respect to the second generation

French strategic weapons. De Gaulle had recently decided that these should be submarine-based. The French program projected five Polaris-type submarines with sixteen missiles each. These submarines were to be nuclear-powered and have their own communications network. Five billion new francs had been budgeted for this force including research and development costs.

Stehlin considered this scheme wildly unrealistic. France had not tested a single component of such a system from nuclear power plant to guidance. All the designs were simply blueprints. If anything went wrong anywhere along the line the most fantastic delays and breakdowns would result. France simply did not have the industrial base for such a program. Everything had to go right for it to succeed. This was unlikely. And he thought the financial estimates ridiculously low.

I said that if France was going the Polaris route why did it not accept the Nassau offer. Stehlin replied that he agreed with De Gaulle that the conditions had been too restrictive. I said that I did not understand this. As far as I could see the British Polaris force would remain under British command and the "emergency" clause covered the only condition in which a European nuclear force might be used. Stehlin replied that he might then ask me why we insisted on the Nassau terms. In any event, De Gaulle would never accept even a symbolic derogation of French sovereignty.

I asked Stehlin about his alternative to a French nuclear program. He replied that he favored a European nuclear program closely coordinated with that of the United States in some kind of Atlantic scheme. He objected to the narrow nationalism of De Gaulle not only because it was technically unsound but because it led to a split in Atlantic relationships. However, the United States would have to give up its insistence on a veto over nuclear strategy if his concept were to prevail.

Stehlin added that things had never seemed worse for European nuclear cooperation than at the moment. Everybody was to blame: De Gaulle's bull-headedness; British trickiness and ambivalence about Europe; and America's lack of understanding of Europe. I asked him what he meant by British trickiness. He replied that the meeting between De Gaulle and MacMillan at Rambouillet had to be seen in the context of a previous meeting in the summer at Chantilly. (I am not sure I got the name of the place right). On that occasion there was reason to believe that Britain's entry into the Common Market would be accompanied by an offer of nuclear cooperation with France. During the following months the British dropped occasional hints to that effect but always in a way that was as consistent with a fishing expedition as with a serious offer. MacMillan's reserve at Rambouillet followed by Nassau capped the process.

When British nuclear cooperation seemed unattainable, Stehlin had begun advocating a Franco-German nuclear effort. In November he had even sounded out his friend General Speidel about this, informally. He had also worked out an agreement with the Chief of Staff of the German Airforce for joint training of aircrews. The French Foreign Office had objected to a Franco-German arrangement as contrary to the Paris treaties of 1954. Finally, De Gaulle had given strick orders that there was to be no collaboration with Germany in the nuclear field.

As for the agreement between the French and German airforces, the Germans had been extremely evasive about it. Stehlin ascribed this to American pressures after De Gaulle's press conference and to the new German defense minister. One day the U.S. would regret having encouraged the Germans to maneuver between various groupings in the West. We would live to see the day when they would do this with the U.S.S.R. as well.

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3

The chief hope Stehlin saw now was in a less intransigent French policy coupled with a more understanding American one. France should take the lead in a European nuclear effort as an explicit step towards Atlantic partnership. This was impossible with De Gaulle. Stehlin was therefore looking to a new political grouping of the Center as an alternative. A group composed of Pleven, Maurice Favre, and Pflimlin with the friendly counsel of Jean Monnet was trying to bring this about. Stehlin had been asked to become the defense expert of this group and for the event that it came into power he was likely to be its chief defense planner.

The orientation of this group was close to Jean Monnet's European and Atlantic concept. However, this required a change of tone on the U.S. side of the Atlantic as well. The condescending procedure of always talking from American blueprints had to be abandoned. The Europeans had to be given real responsibility free of an American veto. This was, the best, indeed the only, basis for durable partnership.

2000

Copy No. 1 *RD*

✓

Pennington
9

5/28/63

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 28, 1963

Dinner with General Martin (Inspector General of French Armed Forces), M. Beaumarchais (Chief of the European Section of the Foreign Office), M. Manet (Secretary of National Defense) and General Gallois - May 23, 1963

Gallois began the evening with a vituperative account of his experiences with the U.S. Embassy. According to him, he had been asked by someone in the Naval Attache's office to come and see him. He did so bringing his charts along. While explaining the French nuclear program, he corrected some of the figures on the chart in the light of published presentations to the Assemblée Nationale. The naval attache getting the two sets of figures mixed up reported a French shortfall in its nuclear program. Somebody high up in the Administration thereupon decided to discredit Gallois adding some lies that were on the face of it absurd. Gallois was after all not likely to report to the U.S. Embassy the failure of a plant his own company was producing. In any event, the simultaneous publication of these falsifications in Newsweek, the New York Times, the Washington Post and the Corriere della Sera had to be orchestrated from Washington.

Gallois then turned to an exposition of his strategic views: the French nuclear force was essential because in the nuclear age alliances had lost their meaning. No country would permit itself to be destroyed for another, etc.

I replied that the contrary was the case. Though I took a much more favorable view of the French nuclear effort than the Administration I did not for a minute believe that national nuclear forces made alliances dispensable. On the contrary, it was precisely the U.S. guarantee which gave the French nuclear effort its strategic significance. Were the U.S.S.R. convinced that the U.S. would not support France, the force de frappe would be destroyed in a matter of hours. It was the fear that a Soviet preemptive strike against France would trigger SAC which deterred a Soviet attack.

1996/2000

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec 1.1
NLK-95-126
MOR... 12/21/95

Somewhat to my surprise, the others agreed with me. They argued that the force de frappe should not be seen as a device to do away with the Alliance. Rather it was designed to enable France to play a role with dignity in Allied councils. When France had fought its colonial wars, General Martin said, the United States had never tired of pointing out that national independence was inevitable whether or not the people were ready for it. Was not the same true in the nuclear field? Until the United States took a more understanding view of French purposes, relations would go from bad to worse.

I said that we could hardly compare France to an underdeveloped country. And the nuclear problem did have complexities and dangers transcending purely strategic relations.

General Martin then said that France needed nuclear weapons for strategic reasons as well. U.S. strategy seemed to envisage a nuclear disengagement from Europe. The withdrawal of Jupiter bases from Italy and Turkey was a straw in the wind. Even more worrisome were certain war plans of which General Martin had become aware while visiting the 4th U.S. Tactical Airforce in Germany. According to these plans, the nuclear strike element of the tactical airforces was to be withdrawn to Britain in the contingency of a Soviet attack short of general war. Britain with its own bomber force was to act as a nuclear sanctuary. At the same time, C-130's were to pick up nuclear warheads and either bring them to England or drop them into the sea. France had by all means to achieve the same sanctuary status for itself.

I replied that (a) I could not believe these war plans. It did not make any sense to position nuclear warheads in Germany only to pull them out in the face of a conventional attack. (b) If the plans were genuine, Britain was probably chosen not because of its bomber force but because France had refused

us permission to base our nuclear-armed planes on French soil. Martin disagreed and insisted on his own interpretation.

Beaumarchais then asked why the United States behaved in such a hostile fashion towards France when France was only following a path already charted by Britain. I replied that the difference in timing was of great consequence. By the time France entered the nuclear club a lot of people in the U.S. had become worried about Germany and the whole problem of nuclear diffusion. Beaumarchais said that it was galling for France that we could not recognize the distinction between a traditional ally and a defeated country prohibited by treaty from developing its own nuclear weapons. Moreover, why should France be the country which served as a guinea pig for our theories of nuclear diffusion? Did we really think that Israel or Egypt or China would be deterred from developing nuclear weapons by our policy towards France? Finally our policy towards Germany was more likely to spur nuclear diffusion than to arrest it.

I said that another explanation for our behavior was irritation at French tactics. Rightly or wrongly many Americans thought that it was impossible to negotiate with De Gaulle while the British were much more conciliatory in form. Beaumarchais said that negotiation was not De Gaulle's long suit. On the other hand, we constantly exacerbated relations by pressing for things to which De Gaulle was opposed in principle such as the so-called multilateral force.

Manet entered the conversation to point out that people who defended America's good faith were having an increasingly tough time in the French bureaucracy. For example, after Secretary Gilpatrick had offered assistance with the Skipjack nuclear submarine many French officials suspected a trick. Manet had argued that we were in good faith. Events since had justified the doubters. The Administration was still delaying and hiding behind Congressional

disapproval. I said that these Congressional doubts were real and had to be seen in the context of all events during this year.

Manet said he was concerned that we were facing a spiral of distrust. De Gaulle seemed to have no understanding of the impact he was making. Manet was very worried about U.S. reaction to an impending French move which De Gaulle had taken largely as a question of principle: the withdrawal of the remaining French naval units assigned to NATO. He hoped U.S. reaction would be low-key for De Gaulle was extremely stiff-necked. Moreover, he intended the move only to solidify political control over the French armed forces.

I asked Manet how De Gaulle made his decisions. Manet, who is working in the French equivalent of our NSC staff, said that he wished he knew. On economic matters De Gaulle often asks for advice. On political issues he simply made his decisions. He invited factual briefings but not recommendations. A great deal depended on bringing matters before De Gaulle at an appropriate moment and in the right way. Once he had said no he almost never changed his mind or even entertained a request for reconsideration. Also his reaction to critical views was extremely ambivalent. He was an exceptionally good listener and he had the ability to make his interlocutor believe that he was very sympathetic. However, if someone pressed his point too insistently he would suddenly find himself shunted off to some obscure post. The result was a tendency to tell De Gaulle what he liked to hear.

Beaumarchais asked me about my impressions of Europe. I said that I thought France was largely isolated. Beaumarchais said this was true as far as the governments and the press were concerned. However, the public mood was different. It was significant that no party in Germany dared vote against the Franco-German treaty. He thought similar pro-French attitudes existed in Belgium

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

- 5

and Italy. Moreover we should not take everything Europeans told us too seriously. A little flattery would bring Spaak around. As for the Germans while they no doubt told us that the preamble to the treaty neutralized its effect, they told the French that the preamble was a concession to American pressure and did not affect the significance of the treaty.

I said neither side would be able to draw much comfort from this state of affairs. Beaumarchais agreed and said that some day the Germans will turn on all of us.

At this point Gallois launched into a violent diatribe to the effect that the New Frontier was trying to bring Socialist governments to power all over Europe. They would bankrupt their countries in short order and then the U.S. would dominate Europe again. I said that Gallois gave us more credit for being able to affect events than was warranted. Gallois said he knew we had bought two papers in Paris, a weekly and a monthly. They were now pushing our line contrary to their previous policy. He knew for a fact that the same and worse was true in Italy.

Beaumarchais said that he had heard the same stories. He would not go so far as to say we wanted to beggar Europe. But the New Frontier had an affinity for European socialists for two reasons: (1) it thought erroneously that this was the best way of stopping Communism. (2) the socialist parties were more prepared to merge the national identity in some vague supra-nationalism which amounted to American hegemony.

I asked about the possibility of Franco-British nuclear cooperation as the beginning of a European effort. General Martin was very enthusiastic. Beaumarchais and Manet said they had been disillusioned by their experiences of the

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

past year. The British feelers had always been of a nature and on a level that made it impossible to come to grips with them. They doubted that in the present frame of mind of De Gaulle such an effort would be accepted.

SECRET

5/29/63
For + Le Secretary
Nga

PIERRELATTE GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT

Background

Recently the French have made approaches to the German Science Ministry, Atomic Forum and at least one industrial firm seeking a German financial contribution (allegedly \$250 million) to Pierrelatte). Dr. Sauer of the German Science Ministry has stated that although the Germans were interested in an additional non-U.S. source of enriched uranium, the sums involved were beyond German budgetary capabilities. We also have reports of similar French approaches to the Italians. The French may be using the threat of collaboration with the Italians in order to speed up a German commitment. The President has taken a serious interest in this matter as evidenced by the attached NSAM 241 and related documents.

Talking Point

The U.S. is concerned about recent French approaches seeking a German contribution to the Pierrelatte gaseous diffusion plant. Mr. Tyler is prepared to discuss the subject in detail with the Minister and his staff immediately upon conclusion of this meeting. We would be pleased to receive any comments or information the Minister may wish to provide on this matter.

Tyler does not want to discuss this. Secretary told Tyler he did not want to raise issue either because we had gotten the Germans on similar sensitive points twice w/i the last week.

EUR:RPE:REKaufman:spe
May 29, 1963

SECRET

(MUR 7/10/64) / 2 / Fromer

NLR NSF 321 Staff Memo K. [unclear]

5/30/67

Copy No. 1

419

2851284

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

May 30, 1963

Meeting with Chancellor Adenauer - May 17, 1963

After an exchange of pleasantries Adenauer asked me what I thought of the appointment of McGhee as ambassador. I said that I did not know McGhee very well but I always thought of him as extremely energetic and industrious. Adenauer smiled and said that it was his intelligence which worried him. He then asked whether I thought McGhee had been sent to Bonn to ease him out in Washington or whether his appointment was due to a desire to establish especially close relations with the Federal Republic. I replied that I had no way of judging McGhee's standing within the Administration having no longer any advisory functions. However, it seemed to me that the closest relations with the Federal Republic were a major goal of the Administration. I did know that McGhee was a close personal friend of Dean Rusk. Adenauer grinned slyly and said that it was the President he was concerned about and he did not think that close relations with Dean Rusk guaranteed influence with the President.

Adenauer then reminisced again about the good old days of Foster Dulles and his own difficulty in establishing communications with the new Administration. Things had greatly improved in the past year. Still we did have a tendency to react more brutally to Germany than to other countries.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Also, he thought our reaction to the Franco-German treaty incomprehensible and brutal. The treaty had a long time before De Gaulle's press conference in January. In the 1950s when they were together at Rhame the previous summer. It is clear that the actual signing of the treaty coincided with the rejection of Britain's entry into the Common Market. The two events were not related. The

4

15-1068

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

MT PRUS

2BF125/2

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

- 2

Franco-German treaty was not directed against the United States. It was designed to end an age-old rivalry to consolidate European unity. He considered it the culmination of his career and he was very happy that it had been ratified the previous day.

I asked Adenauer whether he was very unhappy that Britain had been excluded from the Common Market. He smiled and said that Britain had only itself to blame for its exclusion. De Gaulle had told him that he had expected an offer of nuclear cooperation from Britain at Rambouillet. Instead MacMillan was non-committal and did not even tell De Gaulle about the decision he had already taken to seek the Polaris from the United States. This was not a loyal policy. Moreover, Britain had haggled for 18 months over trivia and he still could not tell whether Britain wanted to enter the Common Market or not.

I asked why then was it necessary to veto Britain's entry? Would it not have been better to await developments? Adenauer replied that if the negotiations had been protracted much longer all progress on European integration would have stopped. He had offered a face-saving formula according to which the Common Market Commission should report about the state of negotiations. Britain had thwarted this by insisting that the report be made to the Seven instead of to the Six. (This distinction eluded me). Altogether Adenauer made it quite plain that he was not heartbroken about Britain's exclusion.

Adenauer then conducted a tour d'horizon of the international situation. He said that Khrushchev's reaction to the Cuban crisis indicated that he would respect superior force--a lesson which applied elsewhere, too, and especially in Berlin. He asked what I thought of statements by high Administration officials making a distinction between U.S. and European interests. I said that I was not aware of any such statements and thought them extremely unlikely. Informed opinion

2 BF 125 / 3¹⁰

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

in the United States was convinced of the indissolubility of our interests and those of Europe.

Adenauer then asked to what extent our policy over the next 18 months would be affected by the forthcoming elections. I replied that in my judgment the main lines of U.S. policy were not subject to partisan debate. The Administration would not be significantly hampered by the impending election. Adenauer said that in view of America's leadership position in the world a four-year term for the President was too short and placed a great burden on countries dependent on U.S. policy. I said that practically the President's term was eight years. Short of an inconceivable calamity, I thought President Kennedy would be reelected. Adenauer said he had been told Goldwater was a likely candidate and that he had powerful support. I replied that Goldwater's support though vocal represented a definite minority view. Adenauer asked how popular the President was. I replied that professors were ill-placed to judge the popular mood. It did seem to me, however, that he should assume the reelection of the President and in the unlikely event of an overturn, he could be sure of the continuity of the main lines of U.S. policy.

Adenauer then asked my views about the NATO multilateral force. I said that I had published an article criticizing some features of it. I did not want in a visit to a foreign leader to go beyond the points made in the article. Adenauer said that he had read the article. Frankly, technical discussions did not interest him. He doubted whether any of his people were capable of making a judgment about the proposal. He would not have requested such a force. However, once the United States had proposed it only one answer was possible for the Federal Republic. Germany would join the multilateral force in order not to lose contact with America. (Um den Anschluss an Amerika nicht zu verlieren.) Many of his advisors thought that a ship-based force would not provide the final

E-1090

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

2BF128/6

answer. They believed land-based missiles would have to be added. Also the question of control would have to be reexamined once the multilateral force existed. These issues could, however, wait till later.

Adenauer then asked me whether I had read an editorial in the London Times criticizing the multilateral force. What did I think of it? I replied that while I had not thought the multilateral force the best solution, once it became NATO policy I wanted it to succeed. I did not think NATO could afford too many failures of major projects. British participation seemed to me extremely important in order to avoid yet another European grouping. Adenauer indicated that he doubted British willingness to participate. He said Britain would repeat with the multilateral force its performance with the Common Market, i.e., it would haggle for so long that no one knew any longer what the issue was.

Turning to the state of NATO, Adenauer said things had improved in the past year. Stikker still complained about our high-handed practices. I said my impression was that Stikker had been brought much more into our planning. Adenauer replied that he had seen Stikker on his recent vacation in Italy and he still felt he was not being adequately consulted. Another difficulty was that in talking to American officials one never could tell whether they were pushing administration policy or their private views. Nevertheless he felt much better about NATO than the previous year.

Adenauer made a fleeting reference to the Geneva trade negotiations. He said he thought the forum too large. Also the United States had to understand that it could not act as spokesman for all the underdeveloped countries. Taking coffee, for example, was a major source of revenue for most European countries. They could not simply abolish this without hurting their financial structure. Moreover, such an act might lead to an overproduction of coffee and then everybody would be back when they started.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

2BF/178/5

Adenauer asked his usual question about the readiness of the President to
take the necessary steps in case of an attack on any Washington. I said this
was the easiest case. I thought the Russians knew we would retaliate and it was
best not to shake their conviction.

Adenauer then returned to the Franco-German treaty. He stressed once more
how important for the future of Europe he thought it. The objections of many
Europeans were self-serving. For example, Spaak who always attacked De Gaulle was
essentially a prima donna who wanted to be wooed. Spaak's major interest was
personal; He wanted to play in Europe a role denied to him in Belgium. There
was more support for De Gaulle's European conceptions in Europe than the press
and certain public figures might lead me to believe. In any event, he thought the
Franco-German treaty was in no way inconsistent with Atlantic ties. Both were
essential.

NOTE: Though Adenauer repeated many familiar criticisms his mood was much
mellowed than in previous years. His attitude was as if he were already a specta-
tor. His distrust seemed less pronounced. Physically he seemed fit and mentally
very agile.

Henry A. Kissinger

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

NLK NSF 321 Staff Memo Kissinger

5/30/63

Copy No. 1

419

ZBF:stt

10

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

May 30, 1963

Meeting with Chancellor Adenauer - May 17, 1963

After an exchange of pleasantries Adenauer asked me what I thought of the appointment of McGhee as ambassador. I said that I did not know McGhee very well but I always thought of him as extremely energetic and industrious. Adenauer smiled and said that it was his intelligence which worried him. He then asked whether I thought McGhee had been sent to Bonn to ease him out in Washington or whether his appointment was due to a desire to establish especially close relations with the Federal Republic. I replied that I had no way of judging McGhee's standing within the Administration having no longer any advisory functions. However, it seemed to me that the closest relations with the Federal Republic were a major goal of the Administration. I did know that McGhee was a close personal friend of Dean Rusk. Adenauer grinned slyly and said that it was the President he was concerned about and he did not think that close relations with Dean Rusk guaranteed influence with the President.

Adenauer then reminisced again about the good old days of Foster Dulles and his own difficulty in establishing communications with the new Administration. Things had greatly improved in the past year. Still we did have a tendency to react more brutally to Germany than to other countries.

Also, he thought our reaction to the Franco-German treaty incomprehensible and brutal. The treaty had been a long time before De Gaulle's press conference in January. He had the idea when they were together at Rheims the previous summer. It is evident that the actual signing of the treaty coincided with the rejection of Britain's entry into the Common Market. The two events were not related. The

4

B-1068

FA US 13-15 SUP

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

2BF128/2¹⁰

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

- 2

Franco-German treaty was not directed against the United States. It was designed to end an age-old rivalry to consolidate European unity. He considered it the culmination of his career and he was very happy that it had been ratified the previous day.

I asked Adenauer whether he was very unhappy that Britain had been excluded from the Common Market. He smiled and said that Britain had only itself to blame for its exclusion. De Gaulle had told him that he had expected an offer of nuclear cooperation from Britain at Rambouillet. Instead MacMillan was non-committal and did not even tell De Gaulle about the decision he had already taken to seek the Polaris from the United States. This was not a loyal policy. Moreover, Britain had haggled for 18 months over trivia and he still could not tell whether Britain wanted to enter the Common Market or not.

I asked why then was it necessary to veto Britain's entry? Would it not have been better to await developments? Adenauer replied that if the negotiations had been protracted much longer all progress on European integration would have stopped. He had offered a face-saving formula according to which the Common Market Commission should report about the state of negotiations. Britain had thwarted this by insisting that the report be made to the Seven instead of to the Six. (This distinction eluded me). Altogether Adenauer made it quite plain that he was not heartbroken about Britain's exclusion.

Adenauer then conducted a tour d'horizon of the international situation. He said that Krushchev's reaction to the Cuban crisis indicated that he would respect superior force--a lesson which applied elsewhere, too, and especially in Berlin. He asked what I thought of statements by high Administration officials making a distinction between U.S. and European interests. I said that I was not aware of any such statements and thought them extremely unlikely. Informed opinion

2 BF 128 | 3¹⁰

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

-3

in the United States was convinced of the indissolubility of our interests and those of Europe.

Adenauer then asked to what extent our policy over the next 18 months would be affected by the forthcoming elections. I replied that in my judgment the main lines of U.S. policy were not subject to partisan debate. The Administration would not be significantly hampered by the impending election. Adenauer said that in view of America's leadership position in the world a four-year term for the President was too short and placed a great burden on countries dependent on U.S. policy. I said that practically the President's term was eight years. Short of an inconceivable calamity, I thought President Kennedy would be reelected. Adenauer said he had been told Goldwater was a likely candidate and that he had powerful support. I replied that Goldwater's support though vocal represented a definite minority view. Adenauer asked how popular the President was. I replied that professors were ill-placed to judge the popular mood. It did seem to me, however, that he should assume the reelection of the President and in the unlikely event of an overturn, he could be sure of the continuity of the main lines of U.S. policy.

Adenauer then asked my views about the NATO multilateral force. I said that I had published an article criticizing some features of it. I did not want in a visit to a foreign leader to go beyond the points made in the article. Adenauer said that he had read the article. Frankly, technical discussions did not interest him. He doubted whether any of his people were capable of making a judgment about the proposal. He would not have requested such a force. However, once the United States had proposed it only one answer was possible for the Federal Republic. Germany would join the multilateral force in order not to lose contact with America. (Um den Anschluss an Amerika nicht zu verlieren.) Many of his advisors thought that a ship-based force would not provide the final

B-1070

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

2BF128/4

10

answer. They believed land-based missiles would have to be added. Also the question of control would have to be reexamined once the multilateral force existed. These issues could, however, wait till later.

Adenauer then asked me whether I had read an editorial in the London Times criticizing the multilateral force. What did I think of it? I replied that while I had not thought the multilateral force the best solution, once it became NATO policy I wanted it to succeed. I did not think NATO could afford too many failures of major projects. British participation seemed to me extremely important in order to avoid yet another European grouping. Adenauer indicated that he doubted British willingness to participate. He said Britain would repeat with the multilateral force its performance with the Common Market, i.e., it would haggle for so long that no one knew any longer what the issue was.

Turning to the state of NATO, Adenauer said things had improved in the past year. Stikker still complained about our high-handed practices. I said my impression was that Stikker had been brought much more into our planning. Adenauer replied that he had seen Stikker on his recent vacation in Italy and he still felt he was not being adequately consulted. Another difficulty was that in talking to American officials one never could tell whether they were pushing Administration policy or their private views. Nevertheless he felt much better about NATO than the previous year.

Adenauer made a fleeting reference to the Geneva trade negotiations. He said he thought the forum too large. Also the United States had to understand that it could not act as spokesman for all the underdeveloped countries. Taxing coffee, for example, was a major source of revenue for most European countries. They could not simply abolish this without hurting their financial structure. Moreover, such an act might lead to an overproduction of coffee and then everybody would be back when they started.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

2BF178/s

Adenauer asked his usual question about the readiness of the President to ~~the United States in retaliation to an attack on say Washington.~~ I said this was the easiest case. I thought the Russians knew we would retaliate and it was best not to shake their conviction.

Adenauer then returned to the Franco-German treaty. He stressed once more how important for the future of Europe he thought it. The objections of many Europeans were self-serving. For example, Spaak who always attacked De Gaulle was essentially a prima donna who wanted to be wooed. Spaak's major interest was personal. He wanted to play in Europe a role denied to him in Belgium. There was more support for De Gaulle's European conceptions in Europe than the press and certain public figures might lead me to believe. In any event, he thought the Franco-German treaty was in no way inconsistent with Atlantic ties. Both were essential.

NOTE: Though Adenauer repeated many familiar criticisms his mood was much mellowed than in previous years. His attitude was as if he were already a spectator. His distrust seemed less pronounced. Physically he seemed fit and mentally very agile.

Henry A. Kissinger

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

6/63 Teaching

Case #: NLK-91-99

<u>ITEM #</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>PAGES</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>ACTION TAKEN</u>
*1a	../.../..	Preface (Tab A)	6	S	DECLASSIFIED /10
*1b	../.../..	Conclusions	1	S	DECLASSIFIED /12
*1c	../.../..	"Introduction to NSAM 239 Review" (Tab B)	4	S	DECLASSIFIED /10
*1d	6/12/63	Draft memo for the President (Tab C)	6	S	DECLASSIFIED /10
*1e	../.../..	Table One	1	S	DECLASSIFIED /10
*1h	../.../..	"A US-USSR Enforced..." (Tab F)	11	S	DECLASSIFIED /10
1i	../.../..	"Australia" etc. (Tab G)	20	S	PENDING

NOTES FOR THE ARCHIVIST:

All items are from NSF:CARL KAYSEN:Nuclear Energy Matters, Nuclear Diffusion, Briefing Book, Vol. I, "On U.S.-Soviet Non-Diffusion Agreement 6/63, Box 376.

All items are also located in NSF:D&A:ACDA, Disarmament, Nuclear Test Ban, Harriman Trip to Moscow, Briefing Book, Vol. I, "On U.S.-Soviet Non-Diffusion Agreement 6/63, Box 275.

Item 1c is also located in NSF:M&M:NSAM 239, Box 340, as item 3.

~~SECRET~~

Preface

On July 15 high-level discussions will open in Moscow. At that time, the U.S. Government should be prepared to discuss not only a nuclear test ban, but also joint measures to limit the development, production, and testing of atomic weapons to the existing four nuclear powers.

There has been some discussion of the five-alternative approach to Moscow where the alternatives were:

1. Test Ban
2. Non-Diffusion Declaration
3. Non-Diffusion Agreement with Sanctions
4. Limitations on Strategic Vehicles
5. European Non-Aggression Pact

It is the conclusion of this paper that in view of the limited time prior to the President's departure for Europe, the Deputies and Principals Meetings should be focused on alternatives 1 and 3. On the other hand, it is clear that we cannot control the issues which the Soviet Union will raise in the Moscow discussions. Therefore, we must continue our studies on items 4 and 5 in order to be in the best possible position. The Soviet Union is almost certain to bring up these subjects in Moscow.

A non-diffusion agreement in which the nuclear powers agree not to assist in the development or procurement of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear powers and call upon the non-nuclear powers to agree not to obtain weapons might have some marginal utility. Unfortunately, this policy is one of hope rather than action. No one seriously believes that such an agreement

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLK-91-99
By <u>JA</u> NAFA, Date <u>1/20/97</u>

10
①

~~SECRET~~

would in itself stop the Chinese, Israeli, or other nations from developing weapons. The issue is not what we are prepared to say about nuclear diffusion but what we are prepared to do to stop nuclear diffusion. Therefore, we should shift our emphasis from alternative 2 to alternative 3.

ALTERNATIVE #1. TEST BAN.

During the past nine years, the U.S. Government has carefully analyzed the test ban issue and shifted its position to a point where, in the absence of broader agreements, further movement toward the Soviet position does not appear strategically sound. There appear to be three primary options which can be considered with respect to the test ban:

a. If agreement on other measures are achieved, the number of on-site inspections for test ban might be included in a larger total number of on-site inspections.

b. We could drop any requirement for unmanned seismic stations, or "black boxes." Analysis to date indicates that while the "black boxes" may help seismic identification, they can be rendered useless by the Soviet Union. Therefore, there is little advantage for unmanned stations over Soviet stations in the same areas which can be visited from time to time.

c. We should be willing to formulate the number of on-site inspections in terms of a 3 or 4 year period. One cannot underestimate the changes in political climate which may occur between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the next few years. It is conceivable that relationships may deteriorate. It is also conceivable that a significant political realignment might occur. In any case, flexibility to utilize our on-site inspection rights as frequently or infrequently as we choose, would be a

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

1a
①

distinct advantage. To take an extreme case, if tension rapidly increases, we might use half of a three year allotment in the first twelve months of a test ban if we had significant indications that covert testing was being conducted.

ALTERNATIVE #3. DIFFUSION AGREEMENT WITH SANCTION

When Averill Harriman visits Moscow in mid-July, he should be authorized to make the following statement:

"Premier Khrushchev, the United States believes that it is in the interests of the Soviet Union and the United States Government to take appropriate measures to insure that the development, production, testing, and possession of nuclear weapons does not extend beyond those nations presently possessing these weapons. A test ban would be a useful step in this direction and we hope that we may come to some agreement with you on that matter.

However, we are prepared to discuss broader measures to limit the diffusion of nuclear weapons. We are willing and prepared to cooperate with the Soviet Union to achieve such an objective. We are here to exchange views on this problem in considerable detail.

"The President has given me instructions and authorization to negotiate in detail a draft agreement to limit nuclear diffusion. We hope that we can complete such negotiations and return to Washington with a draft agreement for consideration by the President."

There is much work to be done if we are to be prepared for such negotiations. We must begin by identifying the issues.

~~SECRET~~

1a
①

~~SECRET~~

Issue #1. Incentives and Sanctions.

We must recognize that while we must be prepared to utilize sanctions to obtain compliance by the non-nuclear powers, we must also formulate incentives. Even after we have applied sanctions we should keep the offer of incentives open in order to make compliance attractive and thus hopefully to obtain compliance with minimum utilization of pressure. Certainly, for example, if we could obtain agreement from China to abandon nuclear weapons and permit adequate inspection, we should be prepared not only to grant UN membership but provide significant aid grants such as the Food for Peace program. We cannot afford to think of incentives merely in terms of our enemies, if economic sanctions have to be used against China, Canada undoubtedly would lose over \$100 million in credits on her wheat purchases, we may well have to compensate her for a portion of these losses.

Issue #2. Soviet Reversal of Policy Following Agreement.

For both the United States and the Soviet Union, agreement to stop nuclear proliferation would represent a political decision of major magnitude. The political price would be paid in large measure the moment the shift became known, therefore, if the Soviet Union agreed to such a program and then reversed their policies, the United States could be left with a divided alliance and no benefits whatsoever. On the other hand, it will be extremely difficult for the leaders of either the Soviet Union or the West to turn back once they became publicly committed to such a policy. Nikita Khrushchev, is undoubtedly reluctant to embark on another abortive policy such as occurred in Cuba. The principal danger would occur if a change of Soviet leadership occurred in the midst of negotiations before

~~SECRET~~

10
①

~~SECRET~~

international agreement had been obtained on these programs.

In order to protect itself against a Soviet policy reversal, U. S. policy and U. S. discussions must be based on a contingency basis. That is, if the Soviet Union obtains certain results then the U. S. Government will either respond or refrain from certain other contingency measures. It is important in our discussions with our NATO allies that we formulate this problem on a contingency basis -- that is, if the Soviet Union is willing not only to agree to such a thing but to carry it out -- then what should we in the West be prepared to do? A careful, chronological sequence of events between the Soviet Union, NATO, China, and the West should be prepared and analyzed.

Issue #3. The Basis for an Agreement

It is almost certain that the Soviet Union would not agree to exercising sanctions against other nations, unless there was an explicit agreement between the Nuclear powers limiting the production and testing of nuclear weapons. The Harriman mission therefore must be authorized to agree to: a) a test ban; b) a cut-off of production of fissionable materials for military purposes; and c) a declared and inspected inventory of nuclear warheads under adequate inspection. This would include permanent parties at key installations and a number of on-site inspections of suspected test or production facilities. (The inventory and control of the stockpiled warheads would be a low confidence measure due to our uncertainties in the existing stockpile, nevertheless these measures would increase our confidence in our stockpile figures.)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Issue #4. MLF and the NATO Nuclear Policy

There seems to be little doubt that the Soviet Union would not agree to join measures against China without significant modification or abandonment of a current U.S. position on the multilateral force. We are not prepared to argue the pros and cons of this case but it must clearly be recognized as an issue. We should face it and without prejudging it, prepare alternative plans which might provide a basis for meeting European security requirements. One formulation would be through an extension of U. S. commitment to Europe for a period, say 15 years, to attempt to freeze the distribution of nuclear weapons. Thus hopefully allowing the emergence of a unified Europe which could accept responsibility at the end of that time. Perhaps at that time nuclear weapons would not appear to be the major problems they appear to be today.

This series of papers is not an attempt to provide answers. It is an attempt to formulate the issues we must face in such negotiations. Guidance and further analysis are clearly required.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

1b
19

Conclusions:

1. The U.S. and Soviet Union have adequate economic and military power to force the Chinese to abandon the nuclear weapons program.
2. Prior consultation with our NATO allies is absolutely essential to gain their agreement to such a policy. Agreement can be obtained if we are prepared to offer added inducements to France and Germany in particular.
3. Soviet decision will be based upon their estimate:
 - a. Soviet leadership of the World Communist Party.
 - b. Soviet national security.
 - c. Sino-Soviet relations.
 - d. Soviet estimates of U.S. steadfastness when the inevitable crisis will arise. (If they believe that we would reverse our course once begun, this estimate in itself would be sufficient to kill any possibilities for such a plan.)
4. Chinese concurrence will be based upon:
 - a. Chinese estimates of U.S. and Soviet willingness to use the powers available to them.
 - b. Chinese estimates of their ability to win the leadership of the World Communist Party.
 - c. The incentives which are provided for compliance.
5. If compliance can be gained from China the remaining nations of the world do not appear to pose major problems.

Time:

If we embark upon this course, we may know whether we have succeeded or failed within 6 - 12 months; certainly, we will know for certain within 24 months.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLK-91-99
By <i>[Signature]</i> NARA, Date <i>1/23/97</i>

~~SECRET~~

1c
⑥

Introduction to NSAM 239 Review

Subject: Can the Genie Be Put Back in the Bottle?

The smooth road down versus the rough road up.

In NSAM 239, the President wrote to the Committee of Principals and the Director of ACDA calling for "an urgent reexamination of the possibilities of new approaches to significant measures short of general and complete disarmament." In doing so, he said: "The events of the last two years have increased my concern for the consequences of an unchecked continuation of the arms race between ourselves and the Soviet Bloc."

The first problem of such a policy review must be the identification and formulation of U. S. national interests. To date, U. S. nuclear policy for armament and disarmament has been based primarily on a bilateral analysis of U. S. and Soviet military capabilities. Accordingly, we find within the government a debate among those who argue for strategic superiority vis-a-vis the Russian's to advance national security and others who argue that we should negotiate reduction of strategic forces by 50 to 75% to increase our national security. Actually both may be profoundly wrong.

A bilateral analysis is not a sound basis for formulating U. S. thermonuclear policy. The world is no longer bilateral. Indeed, the most significant and potentially most dangerous fact of the nuclear world is that it is on the verge of forever losing its essentially bilateral character. The acquisition of even a small number of atomic weapons by China, Israel, or the UAR decreases the power, influence and security of both the U. S. and

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLK-91-99
By <i>AT</i> NARA, Date 1/23/97

1c
①6

~~SECRET~~

the Soviet Union. Chinese development of 5 fifty kiloton weapons decreases the security of the U. S. more than the addition of 5 one megaton weapons to the current Soviet inventory. The enforced limitation on the diffusion of atomic and thermonuclear weapons is therefore the prime question of U. S. national strategy and consequently a major portion of the NSAM 239 review should be focused on this problem. Clearly, if the U. S. can take steps to insure that other nations do not build atomic weapons, it would be in our interests to do so and we should be prepared to pay a significant price to achieve this objective. The overriding question is whether or not the U. S. government can stop diffusion. The honest answer is that we don't know. It is equally clear that it would be irresponsible not to try.

Such an agreement, to be meaningful to the U. S. and of interest to the USSR, should consist of three parts:

a. The nuclear powers should agree not to assist any non-nuclear power in the acquisition of nuclear weapons. (The acceptance by the USSR of France as a nuclear power is a mandatory requirement and is considered feasible provided the FRG is clearly estopped by the terms of the agreement from acquiring such weapons.

b. The nations not currently possessing nuclear weapons would have to agree not to acquire such weapons.

c. Initially on the basis of a private understanding between U. S. and USSR (to which we should make our principal NATO allies privy) and later through agreement by all states which have acceded to the treaty, there should be application of constraints adequate to insure that non-signatory states would not only sign but abide by the terms of the treaty. The non-signatory

[2]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

states would be induced by a combination of political and economic rewards and pressures to sign. The primary problem would, of course, be Communist China. In this case, it would probably be necessary to work out an arrangement with the USSR in which that country sought first to win Communist China's accession, but with the understanding that, should she fail, both super-powers would endeavor to apply trade restrictions including POL, chemical fertilizers, food stuffs, etc. Later, if necessary, military attacks could be carried out against nuclear production plants with the tacit consent of the USSR. In the case of the smaller nations such as Israel and the UAR, there would probably have to be a joint super-power guarantee of their borders or other satisfactory arrangements coupled with a clear signalling of intent by the super powers that these states must accede.

To date, there has been relatively little analysis of the possibilities of an enforced international agreement against the diffusion, testing, or production of nuclear weapons. Current strategy appears to be based on the assumption that modest steps such as the test ban are the best means to stop diffusion. There is little evidence to support this assumption and considerable evidence that it is not true. A broad U. S. - USSR agreement on an enforced diffusion treaty may be easier to achieve than the piecemeal approach which we are currently pursuing.

It is clear that the Soviet Union would not agree to enforcing a non-proliferation agreement without agreement on at least some of the other major issues. Therefore, it is the view of the Department of Defense that Presidential interest and the pace of events require a new initiative consisting of a four part inter-related proposal which should be communicated to the

[3]

1c
16

~~SECRET~~

Soviet Union at a high level at the appropriate time and place.

This package should consist of:

- a. A non-proliferation agreement including appropriate sanctions to win accession from recalcitrant states.
- b. An agreement to limit strategic vehicles to agreed force levels.
- c. An agreement on force levels in Europe combined with a European Non-Aggression Pact.
- d. A nuclear test ban.

In subsequent papers we propose to analyze such a set of proposals.

We recognize that it is easier to ignore these questions than to face the difficult issues they raise. Nevertheless, we would do well to remember the words of Winston Churchill shortly before World War II:

"Still, if you will not fight for the right when you can easily win without bloodshed; if you will not fight when your victory can be assured and not too costly; you may come to the moment when you will have to fight with all the odds against you and only a precarious chance to survive. There may be even a worse case; you may have to fight when there is no hope of victory and it will be better to perish than to live in slavery."

[4]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

13
10

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

D R A F T

12 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons With and Without a Test Ban Agreement

I. Prospects With Unrestricted Testing

1. Country Capabilities

a. Probably about 8 countries, in addition to the four present nuclear countries, will be able to acquire at least a few nuclear weapons and a crude delivery capability during the next ten years assuming no basic changes in technology. (See attached table.) The cost of acquiring an independent capability for the production of nuclear weapons will, of course, depend upon the level of economic development of the country involved, and upon the size and type of weapons program. Our most recent figures show that a program for the production of one or two fission weapons per year would probably cost between 140 and 180 million dollars for the detonation of a first device and perhaps 20 to 30 million dollars per year in subsequent operating costs. A program for producing two to four fission weapons per year would probably cost 170 to 220 million dollars for development and 25 to 35 million dollars per year in subsequent operating costs. The initial cost of a program for the production of fifteen to thirty fission weapons per year is estimated at 600 to 700 million dollars, with subsequent annual operating expenses of some 70 to 100 million dollars. None of these cost figures includes the production of thermonuclear weapons, or the cost of delivery systems. Delivery systems are much more costly. It might be useful, instead of citing general figures, to report on the cost of the French nuclear program to date. It is estimated that France has already expended some 2.5 billion dollars on its nuclear weapons program, including expenditures on delivery systems. Annual expenditures reached \$585,000,000 in 1962 and are expected to exceed \$1,000,000,000 per year by 1970. The gaseous diffusion plant at Pierrelatte is expected to cost one billion dollars initially, and to incur operational costs of some \$100,000,000 annually after it begins full production.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLK-91-99
By *[Signature]* NARA, Date 1/27/97

~~SECRET~~

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

~~SECRET~~

b. The costs of nuclear weapons can be expected to decline over time through the diffusion of present weapon technology, through the wider distribution of research and power reactors, and through advances in technology resulting from continued testing.

c. The time required from decision to undertake a program until the first crude weapons are produced would vary from one to ten years depending on level of technology, industrial strength, and resources allocated to the task. The table shows dates both at which a first nuclear test could occur and a first crude delivery capability could be operational assuming a decision to proceed now.

2. Motivations for and Against Possession

a. Most of the countries able to undertake a program have not done so. The motivations not to undertake programs are clearly strong. They include the high cost of weapons (and especially of sophisticated delivery systems), lack of a clear military need, legal restrictions, concern for international repercussions, moral pressures, lack of effective independence in the case of the satellites to undertake a program, and hope that diffusion will be halted. This combination of motives has clearly been effective in such countries as Canada, Germany, India, Japan, Italy and the European satellites. The pressures for possession (i.e., prestige, coercive and deterrent value, and military utility) have overridden inhibitions, apart from the two super powers, only in the case of the UK, France, almost certainly China, and probably, Israel. An important factor, as a motive for possession, is the impact that the development of a nuclear capability by one country could have on others, particularly where regional power balances are involved.

b. Many countries have reduced the lead time and cost of acquiring weapons by getting research reactors and starting nuclear power programs. The technology involved is directly related to weapons program and a decision to initiate a "peaceful" program provides a lower cost option, later, to have a military program.

3. Diffusion Over the Next Ten Years

a. It is highly improbable that all the countries able to produce nuclear weapons by 1972 will do so even if testing continues. In addition to the present possessors, China almost certainly will do so. Israel is likely to do so and Sweden and India may. Chinese possession may also lead the Australians and the Japanese to try to obtain nuclear weapons. A Union of South Africa nuclear program, although highly unlikely, cannot be ruled out. None of these countries is likely to have more than a rudimentary operational delivery capability in this time, although the ability to deliver nuclear weapons by short or medium range rockets appears feasible.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

1d
10

b. The pressure on Germany, and in turn Italy, to acquire or share in control of nuclear weapons is likely to build up substantially. While the inhibitions in both countries, especially in Germany, are strong, European political developments such as the multilateral nuclear force, may succeed in lessening the pressures for acquisition.

4. Diffusion Beyond Ten Years

a. A projection fifteen, twenty or more years ahead is extremely difficult. However, with unrestricted testing, it appears certain that the cost of acquiring nuclear weapons will go down, perhaps substantially, during this period. Recent US tests have shown that it is possible to reduce the expensive fissile material component of weapons; future tests may show that, in terms of nuclear material, an extremely cheap all-fusion weapon is feasible. The overall dollar cost of weapons for a country with a broad industrial-technological-resources base, and a large scale program may come down by a factor of 2 to 5 times. Also, the number of countries with a scientific community and industry to support nuclear programs will go up. For example, Argentina, Brazil, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Yugoslavia would appear to have such capability. And over a 15 year period, political developments in the Bloc might remove the present Soviet restrictions on satellite nuclear programs.

b. In the 1970's, it appears that power from nuclear reactors will become competitive in many countries. This development will be associated with the spread of reactor technology and skilled nuclear scientists and technicians. While a competitive power program cannot produce weapons grade plutonium, since the reactors are optimized for electrical power production, such reactors can be converted to the production of plutonium for weapons. Much of the fissile material produced by these reactors will be controlled by international agreement, but the "starting up" costs for weapons programs will be much lower than today - apart from cost reducing technological developments.

c. Advances in technology made by the US and other testing countries diffuse into the general body of technology accessible to all nations. Even the knowledge that a breakthrough has occurred (e.g., the development of a fission-free bomb), without knowing how it was done, eases the task of others who try independently. Moreover, the process of diffusion would accelerate as the number of nuclear powers increased. Components of weapons, or, in time, complete weapons, might be available for purchase.

II. Prospects With a Test Ban

1. A Comprehensive Ban

a. A comprehensive test ban agreed to and maintained by the

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

US, USSR and UK should work in the direction of slowing diffusion. It is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for keeping the number of nuclear countries small.

b. A ban on testing would not prevent the continued diffusion of knowledge of existing nuclear technology; for example, in a nuclear power program. However, it would slow the trend towards cheaper nuclear weapons.

c. Even with a comprehensive ban, laboratory experimentation would be legal. Such work will lead to increased knowledge applicable to nuclear weapons but at a greatly reduced rate as compared with a situation with testing.

d. China would almost certainly not wish to sign an agreement. Although difficult to foresee in the case of France and possibly Israel, countries other than China might respond to a mixture of positive incentives (e.g., sharing of weapons information, which of course accelerates diffusion) or penalties (economic or military) or sufficient time to complete a test program before signing. In some cases, it might take the joint action of the US and USSR to coerce states into signing and/or observing the agreements. In most cases, a combination of rewards and sanctions by one of the major powers would be sufficient and preferable.

e. Even without testing, it is feasible for a country to produce and stockpile nuclear weapons. (So far as is known, all first tests have been successful.) However, to be sure of its weapons, a country would either have to receive detailed designs of previously tested weapons or test its own. Since a treaty may be abrogated, either for aggressive or defense reasons, some countries may carry forward a program to develop and even to produce weapons without testing them. Such stockpiles would probably be small and the weapons unsophisticated. Pressures to test would undoubtedly be great, if only to demonstrate possession of a nuclear capability.

f. Neither the Geneva nor the National Systems will reduce the detection threshold to a level that would detect significant classes of militarily useful underground tests in alluvium. However, the possibilities of getting agreements on much more effective systems for inspecting non-Bloc countries are generally favorable. Inside the Bloc, China will be a major problem both with respect to adherence and to inspection.

2. Atmospheric Ban Only

a. A ban only on atmospheric tests would have a much more limited effect on diffusion than a comprehensive ban. It would not increase greatly the cost of getting a relatively simple capability

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(which would be the goal of most of the countries likely to try) and it would not make testing "illegal". The continuation of testing underground legitimizes this activity. It weakens the inhibitions to acquire weapons on the part of the considerable number of countries that are likely to be on the margin of decision at some point during the next few decades.

3. Conclusion

a. The continued diffusion of nuclear weapons is clearly not in the interest of the US. Even if these weapons are not used, diffusion will make existing disputes more acute and will generate new ones. And, although their use by a weak power will be irrational, such action cannot be ruled out. Moreover, the existence of additional nuclear countries would make the course of a major crisis involving the US less predictable and more dangerous.

b. Even with unrestricted testing, the number of new nuclear countries during the next decade is not likely to be large. It probably will be a good deal smaller than the potential number able to produce weapons. Beyond about ten years, however, there are likely to be many more nuclear countries unless some effective action is taken.

c. Although the ending of tests could have an important effect on diffusion (especially a comprehensive ban) a more important factor will be the pressures the US, the USSR and others were able effectively to employ in restraining others from testing. However, during the recent past, in the case of France, (when the objectives to which the US sought to win French assent were of much greater importance than the matter of a test ban treaty) the USG, after careful consideration, found it unwise to apply significant pressures. Therefore, it seems likely that similar reasons might motivate against the employment of important pressures upon France to accede to a test ban treaty. On the other hand, should the Government of France accommodate itself to US objectives with regard to support for NATO et cetera, a settlement could eventuate at that time which would give France sufficient technical assistance with her nuclear program so that she might be willing to accept a test ban.

With regard to Communist China, we would probably find that the USSR was as unwilling to cooperate with us in applying direct pressure as we would be to join with the USSR in applying such pressure on France.

d. The best possibility for bringing about a treaty would appear to be for the US and the USSR to sign a treaty in which there is an abrogational clause (perhaps to become operative only after 2 or 3 years) with the understanding that neither side would abrogate until a

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

"significant" series of tests had been conducted by France or Communist China. A still better position, if it could be negotiated, would be to reach an understanding that the treaty would not be abrogated should France as a current nuclear power complete a limited test program, but could be abrogated should nations which have not yet tested initiate a test series.

~~SECRET~~

101

PRESERVATION COPY

TABLE ONE
COUNTRY NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITIES

	xxx Major	xx Moderate	x Small	P Potential	--- No Estimate			
Country	Domestic Availability of Uranium	Nuclear Research Program	Nuclear Power Program	Industrial Resources Capability	Time Re-quired to First Test	Aircraft Operational Capability	IREM Missile Operational Capability	Motivation To Make Decision
France	xx	xxx	xxx	xxx	done	1964	'69	High
West Germany	---	xxx	xx	xxx	4-5 yrs	6 yrs	7 yrs	Moderate
Italy	x	xx	xx	xx	5-6 yrs	7 yrs	8 yrs	Low
Belgium	---	xx	P	xx	---	---	---	Low
Netherlands	---	xx	P	xx	---	---	---	Low
Canada	xxx	xxx	xx	xxx	1-2 yrs	6 yrs	7 yrs	Very Low
Sweden	xx	xxx	xx	xxx	2-3 yrs	5 yrs	8 yrs	Evaluating
Switzerland	---	x	P	xx	---	---	---	Low
Japan	x	xx	x	xxx	5-6 yrs	6 yrs	8 yrs	Very low but depends on China
India	xx	xx	x	xx	4-5 yrs	5 yrs	8 yrs	Low but depends on China
Israel	x	xx	P	xx	2-3 yrs	1968	1968	Moderate to High
UAR	---	x	P	x	Over 10	Over 10	Over 10	Moderate to High
Brazil	x	x	P	x	Over 10	Over 10	Over 10	Low
Australia	xx	x	P	xx	---	---	---	Low
Norway	---	xx	x	xx	---	---	---	Low
ChiCom	xxx	xx	P	xx	1963	1970	1972	High
East Germany	xxx	xx	xx	xx	(Possible) USSR Prohibits	USSR Prohibits		---
Czechoslovakia	xxx	x	xx	xx	" "	" "		---
Poland	x	x	P	x	" "	" "		---

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
N.L.K.-91-99
By: [Signature] NARA, Date: 12/19

~~SECRET~~

lh
(14)

A USSR-US Enforced Non-Proliferation Agreement -
the probable positions of the FRG, France, Italy,
Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands.

1. Norway, Netherlands, Belgium, Italy:

The positions of these four countries would be essentially similar. None of them seeks national nuclear forces of its own; each of them is concerned about the consequences of German nuclear weapons. Although precise positions would vary depending upon the breadth of the treaty, the methods of its enforcement, the manner of its negotiation, and the nature of any other US-USSR and US-NATO country agreements which might be associated with it - factors discussed below - their positions would be favorable and probably strongly so.

The reactions of Norway, given its strongly anti-nuclear views, would be least equivocal. Some elements in the Netherlands and more importantly in Belgium (La Libre Belgique) would be responsive to the likely French argument that any such agreement was proof of a "special relationship" between the US and USSR, and a US wish to dominate Europe. Neither the Netherlands nor Belgium, however, would regret the almost certain death of the MLF which such an agreement would involve - Belgian Francophile elements, in fact would take satisfaction in it. Italy, though more deeply involved in MLF planning, would also welcome its demise as the price of an assurance against FRG nuclear weapons. And such a development might well strengthen the center-left coalition by dampening the difference of views between its two wings as to Italy's military posture.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLK-91-99
By: <i>AS</i> NARA, Date: 1/27/97

~~SECRET~~

As to each of these countries, however, although a non-proliferation agreement would be viewed as an inherently favorable development almost irrespective of its terms, the manner of its negotiation would be important. The greater the degree of prior consultation with the US, the smaller the possibility of its bilateral nature having a divisive effect upon the alliance.

2. France.

It is necessary to distinguish the probable French government position toward a US-USSR Non-Proliferation Agreement from the probable French internal reaction to it; the latter would be largely favorable, the former is not likely to be.

A variety of French interests would be well served by such an agreement. Assuming that it was addressed to stopping additional nations from becoming nuclear powers, and not to stopping the present nuclear powers, of which France deems herself one, from producing additional or more sophisticated weapons, such an agreement would suit French interests in the following major respects. First, it would solidify the French position as a member of the now exclusive nuclear club, and in doing so appear to justify the expensive effort to qualify. Second, in preventing German acquisition of national nuclear weapons it would solve a problem which has concerned the French as deeply as the other NATO nations. Third, in precluding (as presumably it would) creation of the MLF, it would eliminate a device which would have tended to isolate France from the Five, and especially from Germany. Fourth, in placing responsibility for German exclusion from the nuclear club on the US, it would tend to orient more

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

12
(A)

firmly toward France those German elements which favor a nuclear role for the FRG, and might increase German interest in sharing at least in the technology - and in the costs - of the French nuclear program. Finally, such an agreement could be used, to a greater or lesser extent depending on its terms and methods of negotiation, as a further proof of US "collusion" with the USSR at the expense of its Allies, and US desire to maintain its nuclear dominance, and hence as a lever for the further reduction of US as against French influence on the Continent.

The official position taken by France might therefore be highly critical of the form of the agreement, especially if there is little prior consultation with France, and if bilateral enforcement provisions put the US in the role of monitor over the other NATO nations. It seems certain at least that France would insist on the inapplicability to itself of any such agreement to which it had not been fully a party. While both reserving its rights, and gaining whatever propaganda points it could, however, France would probably not seek to oppose the substance of the agreement, or its implementation.

If this analysis is correct, it suggests that seeking to make France a party to such an agreement would pay substantial dividends and involve little cost; French interests themselves argue for its support, and such support would undercut many if not all of the anti-US arguments that could be based upon it. If French concurrence were made conditional upon US nuclear concessions, the concessions required would probably be relatively minor, and agreements to provide a limited number of Polaris or Minuteman missiles, for example, or Polaris submarine technology would probably be both sufficient and, given the usefulness of French support, worthwhile.

~~SECRET~~ 3

~~SECRET~~

3. Germany.

Of all the NATO nations, the FRG would be most sensitive to the consequences of such an agreement; among the Western nations it would be directed primarily at Germany. It is therefore necessary to distinguish more exactly the context of such an agreement, and the other arrangements, both between the US and the USSR and the US and Germany or NATO, which might accompany or follow it.

If the Non-Proliferation Agreement were restricted solely to the prevention of new nuclear forces wholly controlled by nations not now possessing nuclear weapons, the FRG would probably neither oppose it nor seek significant new US-FRG or US-NATO arrangements as the price of its support. Germany formally renounced independent nuclear weapons in the WEU Agreement, and a variety of high officials have since reiterated that pledge both publicly and privately. The CSU is even more firmly committed to this policy than is the government.

Although there are undoubtedly German elements which will not be satisfied with anything short of absolute German control of nuclear weapons, and although there is industrial interest in the technology - and in the profits of a German nuclear program, it seems clear that the mass of German opinion would look with equanimity upon an agreement which precluded independent German nuclear forces so long as German military security seemed unimpaired. This is the key point: the German government and military establishment are now convinced that the effective defense of Germany against any significant Soviet attack requires the early use of nuclear

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

lh
(14)

weapons. The ownership and control of these weapons is of little importance so long as their use is assured. It would seem, therefore, that so long as such an agreement did not preclude a continued buildup and modernization of the nuclear forces under bilateral and multilateral control which were deemed necessary to German defense, German agreement could be secured. This would be as true for the renunciation of an MLF as for the renunciation of independent national nuclear forces. In return for such renunciation the Germans would probably seek at least the continued and perhaps increased presence of bilaterally-controlled nuclear weapons on German soil, and closer and more comprehensive German involvement in overall NATO and US nuclear planning and targeting. In addition, new US assurances of German security, probably extending beyond the 1969 termination of the initial NATO Treaty period, might be necessary. Both would seem acceptable prices, assuming that no new treaty commitments were to run more than 10 or perhaps 15 years.

It is important to note again that the manner in which such an agreement were negotiated and the nature of the provisions related to its enforcement might be critical. These are related problems; it is difficult to see how the US could agree to assure or to participate in the enforcement of such an agreement against the FRG without prior German agreement at a minimum, and formal German accession to the agreement itself would be preferable and might be necessary.

Although this paper is addressed only to the problem of a Non-Proliferation Agreement alone, it seems fair to speculate that unless, prior to such an agreement, the USSR had become convinced that Communist China must be dealt with as a potential enemy rather than as an ally, the

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Soviets would be unlikely to undertake the burden of enforcing or participating in the enforcement of such an agreement against China unless it achieved from the West at the same time a number of additional agreements. These might range from a NATO-Warsaw Non-Aggression Pact upward through modest European force reductions or a de-nuclearized Central Europe through some form of general and complete disarmament agreement. The German reaction to any such package cannot be even crudely estimated within the compass of this paper, but it is relatively clear that, depending upon their terms, any of these agreements, and particularly one creating a de-nuclearized zone to include Germany, might so undercut German confidence in the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons in her defense as to make the whole package unacceptable unless the US were prepared to make very sweeping guarantees of German security.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SWEDEN

1. Estimate of the Situation

Sweden has thus far avoided making any clear-cut decision in regard to a nuclear weapons program, but basic nuclear research is of such high quality that the country is clearly nearing the threshold of a weapons capability. Sweden, around 1965, will be faced with the decision whether or not to go ahead with the development of nuclear weapons. If the decision to continue is made, the Swedes could start testing by 1967-68. Moreover, if the Swedes decide to press ahead after the first detonation, Sweden could probably have a weapon deliverable by aircraft by about 1968, and a missile system carrying compatible fission warheads by 1970.

2. Assets

a. Reactors. Sweden has been operating research and test reactors for several years. A 65 mw natural uranium fueled power reactor is expected to go full power by mid-1963, while a 385 mw power reactor is scheduled for completion by 1967. A plutonium separation plant is under construction.

b. Personnel. Sweden is generously endowed with nuclear personnel of high caliber.

c. Industrial Resources. Sweden's economy can provide a base for developing a nuclear weapons capability without serious dislocation.

d. Foreign Assistance. Sweden's peaceful atomic program has benefited from U.S. assistance and European cooperation, but is headed toward at least partial self-sufficiency. No military assistance.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3. Political Motivation

The present Social Democratic Government, which is likely to remain in power for several more years at least, has indicated that some time this year and possibly again in 1965, Sweden will consider whether or not to direct its nuclear production toward the production of weapons. Given Sweden's strong disinclination to develop nuclear weapons, it is likely that the government will procrastinate in a final decision until the very last moment.

The basic pressures for and against Sweden's entry into the nuclear weapons field are quite evenly balanced. Favoring development of nuclear weapons is the argument that Sweden should not be without a nuclear deterrent capability to protect its independent status in Europe. Pressures against developing a nuclear capability rest in part on an expressed concern about the implications for arms control and disarmament, and more basically on a rarely spoken but deep awareness of implications for Sweden's delicate balancing act between Eastern and Western Europe, and particularly on concern about Finland's position.

4. Agreement on Non-Proliferation

Sweden has been an active proponent of nuclear disarmament measures, including some going beyond U.S. desires. She has been careful, however, to reserve her final decision on nuclear weapons until the final context of the decision becomes clear. With a tradition of armed neutrality and pervasive concern for her own (and Finland's) independent position between the bigger powers, Sweden will not rashly commit itself to forego these possibly effective arms.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

14
14

A non-proliferation agreement might face Sweden with the necessity for a final decision which it is not prepared to make. When a choice is demanded, however, Sweden would most likely go along with the proposal.

In any event, Sweden may be trusted to make the choice which it believes will best support its tenuous position between East and West. The direction of this choice could be effectively dictated by the Eastern and Western major powers, of whose ability to exert pressures Sweden is only too well aware.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SWITZERLAND

1h
14

1. Estimate of the Situation. Switzerland has a capability of acquiring nuclear weapons sometime after 1970. Despite internal pressures to obtain a nuclear capability, the Swiss have declined to do so in order to pursue their neutralist, peaceful policy, as has done Sweden. On the other hand they recently rejected by popular vote a proposed law which would have forbidden the development of atomic weapons.

2. Assets

a. Reactors

- (1) 1 teaching reactor, negligible power, 1959.
- (2) 1 megawatt reactor, 1959.
- (3) 1-20 watts reactor, 1959.
- (4) 1 KW reactor, 1959.
- (5) 1-20 MW reactor, 1962. (Test reactor)

Nuclear power program planned.

b. Personnel. Adequate scientific and technical personnel are available for a modest atomic weapon program.

c. Industrial resources. In a good economic position to support such a program. Has large industrial resources but dependent on imports of critical raw materials.

d. Foreign assistance. The U.S. has provided assistance to the Swiss in establishing a teaching reactor in 1958 and has built three of the four operable reactors. In addition it is supplying fuel subject to U. S. safeguards. No military-nuclear assistance.

3. Political Motivation. Has relatively low motivation for acquiring weapons capability. However, tradition of armed neutrality could spill over

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

14

into drive for atomic weapons if Swiss felt their neutrality threatened by an atomic power. Their position is less tenuous than that of Sweden, with which there are many parallels.

4. Agreement on Non-Proliferation. As with Sweden, can act independently in acceding to any agreement and would probably accede if agreement is reached. Some chance that the Swiss could take a second look at atomic weapons, and perhaps try to save the option of producing them, if a neighboring country (such as Germany) gained atomic weapons and adopted a more aggressive foreign policy.

Landlocked position and reliance on foreign imports provide almost ideal circumstances to exercise sanctions although unlikely that they would be required.

~~SECRET~~

Cy No. 001
d/6/63
N 8a

Research Memorandum
RREU-43, June 6, 1963

TO : The Secretary
THROUGH : S/S
FROM : INR - Thomas L. Hughes
SUBJECT : Franco-German Military Nuclear Cooperation

Widespread interest has been stimulated by recent reports of possible Franco-German cooperation in military and nuclear. We have, in this paper, reviewed the evidence of cooperation and present tentative conclusions drawn from it.

ABSTRACT

There is no proof or clear evidence of German collaboration or of agreement for future collaboration with France on the production or development of atomic weapons. However, relevant information is scanty and much of it is drawn from allusive remarks by French and German officials, whose meaning is ambiguous or which contradict one another.

It has been reported that French representatives have sought German financial participation in the French gaseous diffusion plant at Pierrelatte. Such participation would assist the French in their expensive program for the enrichment of source uranium in the isotope U-235. The Germans could be interested in cooperation with the French in order to provide a source of supply of enriched uranium for their nuclear power program. Such reports were denied by the head of one of the French groups alleged to have sought German participation and by French Embassy officials in Washington. However, the allegation was supported by German officials of the Ministry of Scientific Research who told our Embassy that the sums expected by the French are beyond German budgetary capabilities.

High level German officials have flatly told our Government that Germany has no intention of furthering French progress in the military nuclear field or in associated weapons systems. This position was stated by German Defense Minister von Hassel during his visit to Washington in February, 1963. In April, 1963, the Chief of the Policy Planning Staff of the German Foreign Ministry told Department officers that Germany sees its defense only in terms of the Atlantic Alliance and will never undertake any "flirtation" with France in the field of nuclear defense. This position does not necessarily remove the possibility of a German interest in Pierrelatte to increase supplies of fuel for nuclear power plants for civil uses.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

R.G. 59

EUR/OARCO AH Pol & Ec AF - Records re atomic energy (MLR 3104)

Box 2 / France

The Evidence

On April 5, 1963, the US Mission to the European Communities at Brussels was told by Dr. Flick, the Manager of the Deutsches Atomforum, a German counterpart of the U.S. Atomic Industrial Forum, that certain French representatives had sought German financial participation in the French gaseous diffusion plant at Pierrelatte. He said that the French initiative had been taken in December 1962 during a visit to the German Atomforum by an 18-man group from the French Atomforum. He added that the subject had also been discussed by representatives of Electricite de France with German representatives of the Rhine-Westphalia Electricity Works (RWE), presumably during recent talks of the possible joint power reactor project in the vicinity of Strasbourg. In commenting on this report, officials of the German Ministry of Scientific Research advised Embassy Bonn that a) the discussions were held at French initiative and b) the sums expected by the French were beyond German budgetary capabilities.

Any knowledge of a French approach to Germany has been denied by the French official heading one of the groups visiting Germany. In a discussion, reported by Embassy Paris on May 10, 1963, between a U.S. AEC scientific representative in Paris and Jean Lambertson, past president of the French Atomforum and head of the 18-man group which visited the Deutsches Atomforum in December 1962, the U.S. AEC representative was told that Lambertson knew of no request for German assistance or participation in Pierrelatte. Lambertson expressed surprise that one should believe that the French would ask participation of Germany in this program. He said the subject never came up in his presence during the French visit in Germany. He said that, as we well knew, German participation in Pierrelatte was solicited six or seven years ago when the construction of the French gaseous diffusion plant was first under active consideration but that the Germans declined to participate at that time and the question of their participation has not come up again.

Comment: A German financial and perhaps a technical contribution to the French plant would undoubtedly speed the availability of weapons grade uranium for the French nuclear weapons program. The Germans would benefit by helping to develop at Pierrelatte a secondary source of supply for nuclear fuel; that is, the Germans would then have an alternative to the U.S. supply on which they now depend exclusively for enriched uranium for use in German nuclear power plants, a dependence which the Germans find burdensome due to U.S. legislative and procedural requirements.

Further Evidence

Another report alleging French-German cooperation appeared in an April 20, 1963, message from Embassy Rome. The Embassy said it had received a report from the office of the Italian Prime Minister citing "an unspecified source" to the effect that a West German firm is producing, in

in conjunction with a French firm, Lithium-6 which "is known as a basic material used in the manufacture of hydrogen bombs". The German firm was said to have been allowed to use, for this purpose, experience gained by the French in their nuclear research center at Saclay. The Italian report also said that "the West German trust AEG is collaborating with the French company Tomson-Houston (sic, probably Thompson-Houston), which produces electronic equipment for nuclear reactors and plays a prominent role in the production of atomic bombs which are exploded in the Sahara." The Italian report added that "according to news in the press" French and German ministers have agreed to work on plans for further collaboration between Paris and Bonn.

Comment: Natural lithium hydroxide, which is rich in the lithium-6 isotope of weapons interest, also has civilian, non-weapons applications. Lithium ore is processed into lithium hydroxide mainly in the U.S., Canada, the UK and Germany. France has only a small capacity for the processing of ore. Germany is capable of supplying France with all the natural lithium hydroxide it may need, and German processors might do so for French civil uses.

Franco-German Talks

There were reports in 1961 that Strauss and Messmer had discussed German-French cooperation in the nuclear field in the course of their talks on cooperation in military matters. NATO Secretary General Stikker told a Departmental officer in February, 1962, that Strauss had confirmed to Stikker that there had been discussion of possible Franco-German nuclear cooperation during his talks with Messmer. No information has been obtained on the nature of the "nuclear cooperation" discussed or on what, if any, agreement was reached.

Other reports from our Paris and Bonn embassies during 1962 and 1963 also asserted that there was no evidence up to January 1963 of German-French collaboration in the atomic military field.

Embassy Paris reported on June 15, 1962, that there have been no "recent indications of possible Franco-German nuclear weapons cooperation." The Embassy added that a series of soundings with French officials in various parts of the French Government uncovered no evidence of such cooperation with the Germans. The Embassy pointed out that Germany and France were, of course, contributing to multilateral projects on the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

On July 25, 1962, Embassy Bonn reported that they had held an exchange of views with the British Embassy and had concluded that "at present there does not exist a deliberate intention in Germany to embark on a nuclear weapons program, either alone or with France." On December 10, 1962, Embassy Bonn stated, "developments have reinforced our view that no cooperation in the nuclear field is actively under consideration."

On January 3, 1963, Embassy Paris was informed by the British Embassy that the UK Scientific Attache in Bonn had visited the German Nuclear Research Center at Karlsruhe and had found no evidence of Franco-German cooperation.

Finally, Embassy Paris reported on May 10, 1963, that the Embassy had made discreet inquiries of French governmental and industrial sources which failed to confirm reports which failed to confirm reports of a French desire to bring in German industry and financing for the Pierrelatte plant.

French Government Position

When queried by Embassy Bonn on the Pierrelatte proposal to the Germans, a French official in Bonn, who is concerned with scientific cooperation and who has been in Germany since 1945, told our Embassy that, while cooperation with Germany in many fields is being explored, France is "still conscious of the past" and that joint R and D with Germany in the atomic weapons field is not consonant with French national policy.

Comment: Even if what this French official has said were the policy of his government, the French Government might well request German financial assistance for the Pierrelatte plant and still consider that France was not in any way assisting Germany in the atomic weapons field; the French could say that German benefit was limited to enriched uranium from Pierrelatte for peaceful uses.

At his January 14, 1963, press conference, General de Gaulle made statements which were taken to mean that he would not object to a German initiative to acquire an independent nuclear weapons capability. Immediately thereafter the French Foreign Office issued a clarifying statement which said, "General de Gaulle has confidence that the Germans will respect their obligations (under the WEU Treaty)".

The French Foreign Minister told the British Foreign Minister in a conversation in Paris on April, 1963, that France would not favor any arrangement which assisted the Germans in obtaining a national nuclear capability. In discussing the MLP with Couve de Murville on April 8 or 9, Lord Home made the point that the concept of the NATO nuclear force was mainly a political attempt to avoid a German interest in having a national atomic capability. Couve, as reported by the British Embassy, said one should not forget that the Germans have an "incipient" appetite for atomic armaments, and he consequently doubted whether this arrangement would satisfy them. In fact, he feared we might even be whetting the German appetite. Couve expressed the strong belief that, whatever we do, we must not end up giving in to the Germans.

During a conversation at the Department of State on April 10, 1963, between J. Robert Schaetsel, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Atlantic Affairs, and M. Pierre Pelen, Counselor of the French Embassy at Washington, Mr. Schaetsel asked if Pelen knew anything about the French having approached the Germans for a \$250 million contribution toward the costs of the Pierrelatte gaseous diffusion plant. Pelen denied knowledge of this and asked where the report originated. Mr. Schaetsel replied that a source connected with the German equivalent of our Atomic Industrial Forum had provided us with the information. Pelen alleged that the French definitely did not want technical German participation in the Pierrelatte project and probably would not even accept a financial contribution. M. Francois de Laage de Meux, Attache at the French Embassy, who was present, noted that in the past there had been some unsuccessful efforts to create a European gaseous diffusion plant. As for the future he was sure that if any international cooperation were to take place it would be on a European basis, not just between Germany and France alone.

German Government Position

German officials have stressed to US representatives on recent occasions that the FRG has no intention of assisting the French in their nuclear weapons program.

During a meeting in Bonn on February 14, 1963, Mr. Gilpatric, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, received a note from German State Secretary Volkmar Hopf of the German Ministry of Defense which said that Germany does not expect to receive a request from France to assist the French in the nuclear field, but, if asked, Germany would not assist.

German Defense Minister von Hassel told Mr. Gilpatric at the Pentagon on February 25, 1963, that the FRG does not intend to further French progress in the nuclear field through the German-French agreements.

On March 13, 1963, the West German press agency DPA reported that a spokesman for the German Defense Ministry had stated that Germany has neither the intention nor the possibilities of building up atomic armaments of its own. The German spokesman was quoted as saying that the German Government adheres to the WEU renunciation by Germany of the production of atomic, biological and chemical weapons. He added that "Germany is not cooperating with France or any other country in the sphere of atomic armaments."

On April 25, 1963, the Chief of the Policy Planning Staff of the German Foreign Ministry, Mr. Mueller-Roschach, told a group of officers at the Department that in his opinion de Gaulle would never ask Germany for assistance in developing the French force de frappe. In answer to a question as to what the German response would be should the French government request the German government for assistance in *the* field of nuclear development, Mr. Mueller-Roschach replied that the German position is clear -- Germany sees its defense in terms of the Atlantic Alliance only; Germany cannot expose itself to the risks of tying itself to any national program; Germany therefore will never undertake any "flirtation" with France in the field of nuclear defense.

Comment: It is possible that the FRG could decide to put funds into the Pierrelatte facility and argue that they were not making a direct a contribution to the French weapons program as was the U.S. in supplying enriched uranium fuel for the French submarine development program. The Germans could contend that assistance to the French is not military but civil cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Conclusion

There is no evidence to date that the Germans are presently collaborating with the French in the atomic military field or that they have agreed to do so. They have, of course, been cooperating in uses of nuclear energy peaceful purposes. A request from the French for financial assistance to the Pierrelatte plant could be justified on both sides as being a form of continued cooperation in the peaceful uses field. The French could say

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Copy of [unclear]

that the Germans were receiving enriched uranium for nuclear power plants, and the FRG could maintain that its assistance to the French was limited to increasing the available supplies of uranium for nuclear power.

German official statements to us suggest that the FRG recognizes the present political liabilities of cooperating with the French in the field of development of nuclear weapons. This does not remove the possibility that the Germans might participate in Pierrelatte or other gaseous diffusion plants to increase supplies of enriched uranium for civilian applications.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

6/3/63

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

June 3, 1963

Conversation with Franz-Josef Strauss - May 17, 1963


This was the first meeting with Strauss since his resignation. He seemed much less ebullient than formerly.

Strauss began by saying that he was the victim of the press which had a left-wing orientation and the cowardice of the Chancellor. If Adenauer had fought for him he would still be in office. What had happened to him would not only affect his own future but the future of any strong defense policy. Von Hassel would be much more careful in order to avoid concerted attacks which would follow any attempt to think through his own ideas. Strauss added that "certain quarters" in the United States, particularly in the Pentagon, had cooperated in the attack on him. He refused to elaborate or to specify.

Turning to NATO, Strauss said that he thought the NATO multilateral force was a fraud. I told him that I seemed to remember that he used to advocate it. He replied that he had been and still was in favor of land-based mobile missiles. Surface ships were ridiculous, too vulnerable, their missiles too inaccurate and their warheads too powerful. He said that most German officers at NATO shared his view. A recent presentation by an American admiral at NATO had been extremely unconvincing.

Moreover, Strauss continued, his objections had to be seen in terms of his assessment of over-all U.S. strategy. The primary purpose of U.S. strategy, according to Strauss, was three-fold: (a) to keep ultimate control of nuclear weapons, (b) to raise the threshold at which nuclear weapons would have to be used, and (c) to keep open the possibility of a separate accommodation with the Soviets in which the European allies would be consulted but which they would not be permitted to veto.

NSA (32) / Staff Memoranda: RISS/gh



PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

- 2

He had heard Dean Rusk say on three separate occasions that the United States had no quarrel with the U.S.S.R. All its disputes concerned other people. Such an attitude was untenable in the long run. The distinction between U.S. and European interests made by a U.S. Secretary of State was too dangerous for Europe. It made war again an instrument of policy. It could sacrifice European interests to an over-all accommodation. Thus Europe had to develop its own nuclear weapons to regain some control over its destiny.

I said that I had been told that during the Berlin crisis he had opposed all military countermeasures. How was it possible for him then to assume we would be less determined than the Europeans. Strauss replied that his opposition had been to our military plans which were nonsense. They proved his general point. The result would be a conventional defeat and perhaps the disintegration of NATO.

Strauss did not let himself be drawn into a closer definition of what he meant by a European atomic force. With respect to German national nuclear weapons he said that he saw no need for them as long as the NATO guarantee remained adequate. If that changed, Germany would have to reconsider its position. Even then he preferred a European to a national solution.

Henry A. Kissinger

6/3/63

Copy No. 1

2

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 3, 1963

Dinner May 17, 1963. Present: Fritz Berg, Kurt Birrenbach, Otto Wolff von Amerongen, Baron Oppenheim, Mrs. Focke


The dinner took place in the home of Otto Wolff. It was notable above all because of the rather unpleasant pushiness of most of the industrialists. Birrenbach who has long been associated with Jean Monnet was the exception. He deplored the blow to European integration inflicted by De Gaulle's veto of Britain's entry into the Common Market. He said that while the purely economic features of the Common Market would continue, political integration was for the time being inconceivable. France was too nationalistic for Europe. Having wrecked EDC and now Britain's entry, confidence had been severely dented. Birrenbach expressed the hope that Britain would find its way into Europe by means of a European atomic force. Birrenbach indicated that he would prefer this to a multilateral force.

Birrenbach spoke from a European perspective. The others spoke about France in a way that was more reminiscent of traditional German nationalism, a combination of disdain, lack of interest and even insolence. They clearly gloried in being the "good boys of Europe."

With respect to the United States, the consensus was that the United States was the only partner to which Germany could subordinate itself. There were general evocations of U.S.-German unity and great hopes were held out for the President's reception in Germany.

The only point of disagreement concerned our defense policy. Fritz Berg launched into a violent tirade against Adam Yarmolinsky who he claimed had advocated a purely conventional defense of Europe at a private dinner. Berg said this was unacceptable and would lead to the end of NATO. Berg, more

NSF (321) Staff Memoranda: R. Berg



2

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

- 2

or less supported by the others, also claimed that having the NATO multilateral force on surface ships was an insult to the intelligence of the Germans.

The rest of the discussion concerned German domestic politics. The consensus was that Erhard was already used up. If the CDU lost votes in the next election in 1965, he would be replaced. Otherwise he might stay in office though everybody present expressed the most serious doubts about his competence.

Henry A. Kissinger

INR/REU/RA - Mr. Arthur D. Foley

June 12, 1963

N/a

EUR/RPE - George R. Kaplan

Comments on RM REU-43

- 6/13/63

We appreciate having the opportunity to comment on RM REU-43. Bob Kaufman and I have reviewed it and would suggest the changes and substitutions set forth below. We realize that INR was seeking comments rather than concurrence or clearance.

1. Abstract

Suggest recasting as follows:

"There is no proof or clear evidence of actual German collaboration or of agreement for future collaboration with France on the production or development of atomic weapons. Relevant information is scanty and much of it is drawn from allusive remarks by French and German officials. Their meaning has often appeared to be ambiguous or contradictory.

"There has been some evidence, nevertheless, that French representatives have solicited German financial participation in the gaseous diffusion plant at Pierrelatte which is to be the principal producer of weapons grade enriched uranium for the French nuclear weapons program as well as of considerable quantities of U-235 for peaceful uses. Such participation, if it were to materialize, would be designed to assist the French programs, while the Germans would presumably be obtaining additional sources of enriched uranium for their peaceful nuclear power program. Although the French have steadfastly denied seeking such assistance, officials of the German Ministry of Scientific Research informed our Embassy in Bonn that discussions concerning German financial participation were in fact held at French initiative but that the sums involved were beyond German budgetary capabilities.

Things

"German officials including Defense Minister von Hassel, Science Minister Lenz and a senior Foreign Ministry official have informed us in categorical terms that Germany would not cooperate with France in the field of nuclear defense.

"These denials do not necessarily eliminate possible German interest in Pierrelatte as a source of fuel for nuclear power plants

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

*RG 59
EVR, AH, WJ + EC NA, rec. re atomic energy*

MR 3107

for civil uses. Nor can they be construed as foreclosing the possibility of eventual approaches by the French in the military field and conceivably, at a later date, of serious German consideration of such cooperation."

2. Page 3 - Comment (2nd par.)

In view of the information contained in the attached memo suggest substituting the following for the first sentence:

"Civilian users of lithium hydroxide normally purchase the cheaper depleted material from which part of the lithium-6 isotope has been already removed. Lithium hydroxide is not used in any significant quantities for peaceful nuclear uses. Lithium-6 is essential to production of thermonuclear weapons. Should a West German firm actually be producing lithium-6 for the French, it is probable that the material is intended for use in thermonuclear weapons."

*JFK
hand
push
pushed
Ray
at
revised*

3. Page 3 - Paragraph 6

"We assume that the December 10, 1962 Embassy Bonn statement referred to lack of cooperation in the nuclear weapons field. In any event since this paragraph mixed military and peaceful cooperation, suggest you add A-1389 of December 28, 1962 from Bonn which begins, "Evidence appears to be accumulating that a conscious effort is underway to develop closer cooperation between France and Germany in the atomic energy field."

4. Page 5 - Conclusion

Suggest recasting as follows, especially in light of recent remarks by Science Minister Lemaire.

"There is no evidence to date that the Germans are presently collaborating with the French in the atomic military field or that they have agreed to do so. While it could be argued that German financial assistance to the Pierrelatte plant would be merely another form of cooperation in the peaceful uses field, German official statements suggest that at least for the present the FRG recognizes the political liabilities of cooperating with the French in any way which might speed the availability of enriched uranium for the French nuclear weapons program."

GROUP 1

SECRET EYES ONLY

completely de-sensitized

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

retransferred to O/PADRC

THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

date 9-2-73

6/12/63

JUN 12 1963

1

19

TO : The Secretary
THROUGH: S/S *W*
FROM : Thomas L. Hughes *TH*

INTELLIGENCE NOTE: POSSIBLE SOVIET INITIATIVE ON NUCLEAR TEST BAN



61
13
15
16

JUN 18 1963

An Obscure Journal Article

The reference to a special role for the Kamchatka region in connection with the test ban may shed some light on an otherwise obscure article which recently appeared in the authoritative theoretical journal of the Soviet Communist Party.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic down-
grading and declassification.

1

SECRET EYES ONLY

Reference

document consists of _____ pages
number _____ of _____ copies, Series _____

SECRET EYES ONLY

FOIA 85 03143

SECRET EYES ONLY

- 2 -

The April 1963 Kommunist ran the text of what it stated was a newly discovered Lenin manuscript of December 21, 1920 justifying economic and other concessions to imperialist powers, and in particular a proposed agreement with the US for a concession on Kamchatka which would have included the right for the US to build a military and naval base there. The reference to a US military presence on Soviet soil was indeed striking, and we have toyed with a variety of hypotheses in an effort to explain it: The article may have been an effort to convince Party members that it was legitimate to make substantial concessions to capitalist countries to secure advantageous economic relations with them. It may also have been an argument addressed to the Chinese on the utility of negotiations with the "imperialists," perhaps specifically on the issue of disarmament inspection arrangements. It may have been intended for Cuban readers -- it appeared not too long before Castro's visit to the USSR -- to show them the Leninist orthodoxy of last autumn's compromise and perhaps to reconcile them to continued US tenure of Guantanamo.

Proposal May Be Under Official Consideration

While the foregoing possible reasons for the appearance of the Lenin document are sufficient to explain it, its publication may possibly have been stimulated by the fact that a proposal along the lines [] was under consideration in official circles. If so, publication of the document would represent an attempt to lend Lenin's sanction to the advocacy of the idea of an extra quota of inspections limited to Kamchatka.

SECRET EYES ONLY

SECRET EYES ONLY

6/13/63

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	THE DOCUMENTS IN THIS FOLDER ARE NUMBERED FROM 1 TO 2.		
ITEM #			
1a	EXEMPT NLK-76-115, 5/76 DECLASSIFIED NLK-91-99, 12/96 6pp S Defense "Preface"	5/1/63	A
1b	EXEMPT NLK-76-115, 5/76 DECLASSIFIED NLK-91-99, 12/96 1p S Defense "Conclusions"	5/1/63	A
1c	4pp S Defense DECLASSIFIED NLK-91-99, 12/96 "Introduction to NSAM 239 Review"	5/1/63	A
1d	6pp S Defense DECLASSIFIED NLK-91-99, 12/96 Memo for the President: "Subject: The Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons With and Without a Test Ban Agreement"	6/12/63	A
1e	1p S Defense DECLASSIFIED NLK-91-99, 12/96 Table One	5/1/63	A
1f	DECLASSIFIED NLK-76-115 7pp S Defense "Possible Soviet Outlook"	5/12/63	A
1g	EXEMPT NLK-76-115, 5/76 + NLK-88-34, 2/88; NLK-91-99, 6/91, SANITIZED NLK-94-76, 12/96 9pp S Defense DECLASSIFIED NLK-94-76, 12/96 Chinese analysis	6/12/63	A
1h	11pp S Defense DECLASSIFIED NLK-91-99, 12/96 European analysis	5/1/63	A
1i	20pp S Defense Diffusion in other areas/..	A
1k	6pp S Comments of Lord Home at the Ottawa NAC Meeting/..	A

→ 1f
→ 1g

1f
1g

FILE LOCATION

NSF:Carl Kayser:Nuclear Energy Matters:Nuclear Diffusion, Briefing Book, Vol I
"On U.S.-Soviet Non-Diffusion Agreement", 6/63, Box 376 Page 1 of 2

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

NA FORM 142

Aborting Chinese Nuclear -
2 docs

IN ORDER TO KEEP PAPER JAMS TO A MINIMUM,
PLEASE CLOSE THE COVER WHILE COPYING.

~~SECRET~~

19

ABORTING THE CHICOM NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

Problem: To develop a sequence of progressively scheduled coordinated US-USSR moves to abort the ChiCom nuclear capability.

Assumptions:

- The US and USSR are agreed that elimination of a ChiCom nuclear capability or potential is mutually desirable and are prepared to work in common to achieve this end.
- The NATO nations are sympathetic to such an undertaking and will support it at least in its economic aspects.

Discussion:

In a sequence of cooperative US-USSR moves to abort a ChiCom nuclear capability, respective US and Soviet roles should be worked out in advance as far as possible. Actions taken by either government should be agreed beforehand by the other. Some sort of combined politico-economic-military means of cooperation would probably have to be set up.

The USSR would serve best as the principal initial advocate vis-a-vis the ChiComs (as would the US in discussions aimed at preventing nuclear proliferation in the West). Application of

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLK-94-76A (pen)
By: MCVL/NARA, Date: 11/15/98

~~SECRET~~

Downgraded at 12 Year
Intervals: Not automatically
Declassified. DOD Dir 5200.10

IN ORDER TO KEEP PAPER JAMS TO A MINIMUM,
PLEASE CLOSE THE COVER WHILE COPYING.

SECRET

19

economic and possibly later of physical sanctions against the ChiComs would involve coordinated, mutually underwritten, but not necessarily always joint action.

The USSR can more convincingly than the US initiate discussions with the ChiComs concerning a quid pro quo for their abandonment of nuclear weapons development and the USSR might just possibly be able to negotiate an adequate and face-saving formula (acting somewhat in the role of a double agent or honest broker).

Collaterally, the US could seek through indirect channels, to backstop the Soviet presentation and to signal clearly the determination to carry the matter as far as necessary to achieve the objective.

If it became clear that discussions on the political level would not be productive by themselves, which would probably be the case, then later successive phases of increasingly strong concrete pressure by the US-USSR on the ChiComs would follow, each taken so closely in step that neither principal would be able credibly at any point to dissociate itself from the process.

The sequence of applications of incentives and pressures (progressively emphasizing the latter) would be designed to achieve through as low a level of coercion as possible the abortion of a ChiCom nuclear capability. With the progressive raising of the ante the public commitment of ChiCom prestige

2

SECRET

IN ORDER TO KEEP PAPER JAMS TO A MINIMUM,
PLEASE CLOSE THE COVER WHILE COPYING.

would mount, resistance would stiffen, and the risk of an irrational ChiCom response would correspondingly increase.

First Level: Political Persuasion -- The initial level of pressure would involve principally persuasion. Moscow, speaking for itself and the US but also as one element of the Sino-Soviet Communist axis, would seek to demonstrate to Peking the general advantages of an over-all curtailment of nuclear proliferation. The persuasiveness of this argument would be strengthened if the USSR could point to a US-Soviet agreement to cut back progressively existing stocks of strategic nuclear weapons.

The Soviets could make attractive specific offers: the removal of US and Soviet nuclear weapons from the Far East, and the offer of steps toward easing both Soviet and Western trade controls and barriers. ChiCom UN membership should be included as a possibility. The US, meanwhile, would have the task of giving firm and convincing reassurances to the GRC, the ROK and US SE Asian allies.

Underlying the Soviets' effort at persuasion would be a clear intimation of the firmness of the collective US-USSR resolve to halt nuclear proliferation. Privately, through appropriate channels, the US could complement the Soviet approach, corroborating both the determination on the main point and the readiness to offer valuable and meaningful advantages in exchange.

It would be a surprise, however, if the ChiComs did not scream bloody murder. They would tax the Soviets with final

however, compromise our freedom of action. If however the Chinese take no major moves and seem to be determined and able for some time to sit out the blockade, the US and the USSR must decide whether their own combination, a rather unstable entity in many ways, can in fact outlast the primitive and basically tough society which they seek to bring to its knees. They may well determine that an endurance contest contains too many dangers. This would lead to the fourth level of action -- the surgical excision of the nuclear installations.

Fourth Level: Destruction of Nuclear Installations --

The fourth level of action thus might be taken either deliberately or in connection with a containment of ChiCom offensive action. Jointly conducted US-Soviet air strikes, using conventional rather than nuclear weapons, would destroy a selected minimum complex of installations in China that would together constitute the actual or potential nuclear capability. This action would not involve invasion or land combat in China.

ChiCom military initiative taken at any point before this fourth phase would ease the justification for the strikes.

Continuing US-USSR Responsibility -- The US and USSR task of policing China would not necessarily end with the

~~SECRET~~

19

destruction of the nuclear installations. So long as the ChiComs continued intransigent, the need would remain to contain them through continued application, as necessary, of selective military and economic sanctions.

Prepared by: R. Zander
Dep Dir Sino-Soviet Region
12 June 1963

9

~~SECRET~~

IN ORDER TO KEEP PAPER JAMS TO A MINIMUM,
PLEASE CLOSE THE COVER WHILE COPYING.

~~SECRET~~

1h
(14)

A USSR-US Enforced Non-Proliferation Agreement -
the probable positions of the FRG, France, Italy,
Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands.

1. Norway, Netherlands, Belgium, Italy:

The positions of these four countries would be essentially similar. None of them seeks national nuclear forces of its own; each of them is concerned about the consequences of German nuclear weapons. Although precise positions would vary depending upon the breadth of the treaty, the methods of its enforcement, the manner of its negotiation, and the nature of any other US-USSR and US-NATO country agreements which might be associated with it - factors discussed below - their positions would be favorable and probably strongly so.

The reactions of Norway, given its strongly anti-nuclear views, would be least equivocal. Some elements in the Netherlands and more importantly in Belgium (La Libre Belgique) would be responsive to the likely French argument that any such agreement was proof of a "special relationship" between the US and USSR, and a US wish to dominate Europe. Neither the Netherlands nor Belgium, however, would regret the almost certain death of the MLF which such an agreement would involve - Belgian Francophile elements, in fact would take satisfaction in it. Italy, though more deeply involved in MLF planning, would also welcome its demise as the price of an assurance against FRG nuclear weapons. And such a development might well strengthen the center-left coalition by dampening the difference of views between its two wings as to Italy's military posture.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
N.K. 91-99
By: A NARA, Date: 1/21/97

~~SECRET~~

IN ORDER TO KEEP PAPER JAMS TO A MINIMUM,
PLEASE CLOSE THE COVER WHILE COPYING.

~~SECRET~~

11
12

As to each of these countries, however, although a non-proliferation agreement would be viewed as an inherently favorable development almost irrespective of its terms, the manner of its negotiation would be important. The greater the degree of prior consultation with the US, the smaller the possibility of its bilateral nature having a divisive effect upon the alliance.

2. France.

It is necessary to distinguish the probable French government position toward a US-USSR Non-Proliferation Agreement from the probable French internal reaction to it; the latter would be largely favorable, the former is not likely to be.

A variety of French interests would be well served by such an agreement. Assuming that it was addressed to stopping additional nations from becoming nuclear powers, and not to stopping the present nuclear powers, of which France deems herself one, from producing additional or more sophisticated weapons, such an agreement would suit French interests in the following major respects. First, it would solidify the French position as a member of the now exclusive nuclear club, and in doing so appear to justify the expensive effort to qualify. Second, in preventing German acquisition of national nuclear weapons it would solve a problem which has concerned the French as deeply as the other NATO nations. Third, in precluding (as presumably it would) creation of the MLF, it would eliminate a device which would have tended to isolate France from the Five, and especially from Germany. Fourth, in placing responsibility for German exclusion from the nuclear club on the US, it would tend to orient more

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

12
17

firmly toward France those German elements which favor a nuclear role for the FRG, and might increase German interest in sharing at least in the technology - and in the costs - of the French nuclear program. Finally, such an agreement could be used, to a greater or lesser extent depending on its terms and methods of negotiation, as a further proof of US "collusion" with the USSR at the expense of its Allies, and US desire to maintain its nuclear dominance, and hence as a lever for the further reduction of US as against French influence on the Continent.

The official position taken by France might therefore be highly critical of the form of the agreement, especially if there is little prior consultation with France, and if bilateral enforcement provisions put the US in the role of monitor over the other NATO nations. It seems certain at least that France would insist on the inapplicability to itself of any such agreement to which it had not been fully a party. While both reserving its rights, and gaining whatever propaganda points it could, however, France would probably not seek to oppose the substance of the agreement, or its implementation.

If this analysis is correct, it suggests that seeking to make France a party to such an agreement would pay substantial dividends and involve little cost; French interests themselves argue for its support, and such support would undercut many if not all of the anti-US arguments that could be based upon it. If French concurrence were made conditional upon US nuclear concessions, the concessions required would probably be relatively minor, and agreements to provide a limited number of Polaris or Minuteman missiles, for example, or Polaris submarine technology would probably be both sufficient and, given the usefulness of French support, worthwhile.

~~SECRET~~ 3

IN ORDER TO KEEP PAPER JAMS TO A MINIMUM,
PLEASE CLOSE THE COVER WHILE COPYING.

~~SECRET~~

1h
74

3. Germany.

Of all the NATO nations, the FRG would be most sensitive to the consequences of such an agreement; among the Western nations it would be directed primarily at Germany. It is therefore necessary to distinguish more exactly the context of such an agreement, and the other arrangements, both between the US and the USSR and the US and Germany or NATO, which might accompany or follow it.

If the Non-Proliferation Agreement were restricted solely to the prevention of new nuclear forces wholly controlled by nations not now possessing nuclear weapons, the FRG would probably neither oppose it nor seek significant new US-FRG or US-NATO arrangements as the price of its support. Germany formally renounced independent nuclear weapons in the WEU Agreement, and a variety of high officials have since reiterated that pledge both publicly and privately. The CSU is even more firmly committed to this policy than is the government.

Although there are undoubtedly German elements which will not be satisfied with anything short of absolute German control of nuclear weapons, and although there is industrial interest in the technology - and in the profits of a German nuclear program, it seems clear that the mass of German opinion would look with equanimity upon an agreement which precluded independent German nuclear forces so long as German military security seemed unimpaired. This is the key point: the German government and military establishment are now convinced that the effective defense of Germany against any significant Soviet attack requires the early use of nuclear

4

~~SECRET~~

IN ORDER TO KEEP PAPER JAMS TO A MINIMUM,
PLEASE CLOSE THE COVER WHILE COPYING.

~~SECRET~~

11
17

weapons. The ownership and control of these weapons is of little importance so long as their use is assured. It would seem, therefore, that so long as such an agreement did not preclude a continued buildup and modernization of the nuclear forces under bilateral and multilateral control which were deemed necessary to German defense, German agreement could be secured. This would be as true for the renunciation of an MEF as for the renunciation of independent national nuclear forces. In return for such renunciation the Germans would probably seek at least the continued and perhaps increased presence of bilaterally-controlled nuclear weapons on German soil, and closer and more comprehensive German involvement in overall NATO and US nuclear planning and targeting. In addition, new US assurances of German security, probably extending beyond the 1969 termination of the initial NATO Treaty period, might be necessary. Both would seem acceptable prices, assuming that no new treaty commitments were to run more than 10 or perhaps 15 years.

It is important to note again that the manner in which such an agreement were negotiated and the nature of the provisions related to its enforcement might be critical. These are related problems; it is difficult to see how the US could agree to assure or to participate in the enforcement of such an agreement against the FRG without prior German agreement at a minimum, and formal German accession to the agreement itself would be preferable and might be necessary.

Although this paper is addressed only to the problem of a Non-Proliferation Agreement alone, it seems fair to speculate that unless, prior to such an agreement, the USSR had become convinced that Communist China must be dealt with as a potential enemy rather than as an ally, the

5

~~SECRET~~

IN ORDER TO KEEP PAPER JAMS TO A MINIMUM,
PLEASE CLOSE THE COVER WHILE COPYING.

~~SECRET~~

Soviets would be unlikely to undertake the burden of enforcing or participating in the enforcement of such an agreement against China unless it achieved from the West at the same time a number of additional agreements. These might range from a NATO-Warsaw Non-Aggression Pact upward through modest European force reductions or a de-nuclearized Central Europe through some form of general and complete disarmament agreement. The German reaction to any such package cannot be even crudely estimated within the compass of this paper, but it is relatively clear that, depending upon their terms, any of these agreements, and particularly one creating a de-nuclearized zone to include Germany, might so undercut German confidence in the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons in her defense as to make the whole package unacceptable unless the US were prepared to make very sweeping guarantees of German security.

6

~~SECRET~~

IN ORDER TO KEEP PAPER JAMS TO A MINIMUM,
PLEASE CLOSE THE COVER WHILE COPYING.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON



June 17, 1963

WAT

6/17/63
6/20/63

File

File

note

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

TO: M - Under Secretary for Political Affairs
THROUGH: S/S
FROM: S/MF - Livingston T. Merchant
SUBJECT: The MLF and NON-Diffusion Agreements

L.T.M. (per WAT)

I understand that ACDA, in raising the question of MLF and NATO nuclear policy in connection with a possible US-USSR agreement to limit nuclear diffusion, has suggested that we be prepared to consider modification or abandonment of the current U.S. position on the multi-lateral force.

As you are aware, such a move would have the most grave and far-reaching implications for our relations within the NATO alliance and in particular with the countries with which we have discussed the MLF. Moreover, the MLF was designed especially to further U.S. non-proliferation policy. Accordingly, therefore, I hope that before you give serious consideration to the ACDA views on the relationship between non-diffusion and our present policy on the MLF, I might have the opportunity, along with Mr. Rostow and Mr. Tyler, to meet with you to discuss this important subject.

cc - S/P - Mr. Rostow
EUR - Mr. Tyler

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR	
REVIEWED BY <u>gld</u>	DATE <u>9/24/87</u>
RDS <input type="checkbox"/> or ADMINEXP. DATE _____	
TS AUTH. _____	RELSON(S) _____
ENCLOSURE ENDORSEMENT MARKINGS <input type="checkbox"/>	
DECLASSIFIED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASEABLE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
RELEASE DENIED <input type="checkbox"/>	
PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS _____	

REPRODUCED FROM THE COLLECTIONS OF THE MANUSCRIPT DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

MP/537 / TBT ① / CC

June 20, 1963

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dear Livie:

Thanks for your note. Don't worry --
I am not going to be negotiating in areas
that need bother you.

Warm regards,

Sincerely,

/s/ Averell

W. Averell Harriman

The Honorable
Livingston T. Merchant,
Special Assistant for NATO
Multilateral Force Negotiations,
Department of State.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY yes DATE 3/24/87

RDS or KDS EXT DATE _____

TS AUTH. REASON(S) _____

ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS

DECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASE DENIED

PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS _____

WAH:ml

NP/537/Te-1 Bm Treaty (1)
(=797)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Fischer (Fischer)
6/20/63

RCDA-971

THIS DOCUMENT CONSISTS OF
13 PAGES. COPY NO. 4
OF 15 COPIES. SERIES A.

TOP SECRET

POINTS TO BE COVERED IN PREPARATION OF FORTHCOMING
JULY 15 MISSION OF GOVERNOR HARRIMAN TO MOSCOW

In his discussions in Moscow, Governor Harriman will doubtless have to deal with the following four general subjects. There follows the suggested positions which should be taken:

I.

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY.

The initial part of the discussion should deal with a comprehensive test ban treaty. As part of that discussion an attempt should be made to resolve the differences which exist between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. as to the ability to detect and identify underground nuclear tests by seismic means alone. The difference relates to what is solely a scientific question -- the ability to make a distinction on the basis of seismic signals between underground nuclear tests and earthquakes, both of which produce seismic signals which often have similar characteristics.

In view of the U.S., events in the Soviet Union producing seismic signals in the range of 4.75 - 5.00 or below do not produce seismic signals which permit them to be identified as tests rather than as earthquakes. The seismic signals produced

~~TOP SECRET~~
SANITIZED VERSION
(NLK-76-112)

6/20/63

*Discussion on
Harriman Trip*

*we should
take this*

my O

June 20, 1963

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your 11:30 Meeting Tomorrow on the Harriman Trip

1. At 11:30 tomorrow morning you will be meeting with a small group (list attached) from State, ACDA, Defense and AEC for a preliminary discussion on Averell Harriman's trip to Moscow on July 15.

2. The attached paper is Fisher's report on the line of thought that has evolved from several discussions among Harriman, Thompson, Foster, Fisher, Nitze, Haworth, Bundy and myself. The purpose of the meeting is to go over this material in an informal way so that you can be prepared for your conversations with Macmillan on this subject.

3. It is clear that one of your problems with him will be the number of inspections for a test ban treaty.

The British delegation will be headed by Hallsham, but we have no knowledge of his views.

4. We plan another more formal review for the purpose of discussing Harriman's instructions after your return from Europe. At that time we will convene something more like a regular NSC, with Max Taylor and John McCone, among others, present.

C. K.

~~TOP SECRET~~

SANITIZED

NLX-85-171

BY *indm* NARA DATE 2/88

NSF 13651 ... Harriman Trip, Para 4/1

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON, D.C.

June 20, 1963

~~TOP SECRET~~

Mac:

The meeting is set up for tomorrow. I have invited the following:

State - Secretary Rusk, Ball, Foster, Fisher, Harriman, Thompson

Defense-Secretary McNamara, Gilpatric, Nitze, Harold Brown

AEC - Seaborg, Haworth

plus you and me.

I have made it clear that this is the limit of attendance. In discussions with Nitze, between Nitze and me and Nitze and McNamara, we have all agreed that this is a good time not to have the Chiefs. I have treated McCone along the same lines.

I proposed that Foster lead off the meeting, and that we have some kind of a paper from Fisher reporting the discussion of the other day. He has a draft which he is trying to do over this afternoon.

There is a question as to the composition of the Delegation. Averell has talked with Fisher and Bob McNamara about this, and so far the suggested list is: Harriman, Fisher, Kaysen, McNaughton, Frank Long, Frank Press, plus Akalovski and one of the ACDA's boys for the paper work. The McNaughton suggestion came out of a discussion between Harriman and McNamara. I am happy with it if we can hold it at that. The open question in my mind is whether we should add Keeny. You may remember I reported to you Harold Brown's judgment that Keeny would be his choice as the most generally knowledgeable man on the inter-relation between nuclear testing and weapons technology. Fisher responded that Bill Foster would have a strong negative reaction to this. On the other side we have Wiesner's problems.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4

TOP SECRET

NW-85-171

NSA Date 2/79

By Foster

~~TOP SECRET~~

If you approve, I propose to explore a little further on this during the course of the week and have a talk with Foster myself.

CK
C. K.

CK:

I approve
me. JB

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 8 -

A possible combination would be to establish a quota of 12 underground tests a year of explosions which would produce a seismic event of not greater than 4.75 and which would not vent radioactivity beyond the borders of the country. A treaty of this kind would permit the U.S. to relax its insistence on compulsory on-site inspections, in view of the fact that the effects of a violation would be much less critical. Under such a treaty it would probably still be advisable to have a provision for exchange of data from strengthened national seismic stations, and to have the national stations supplemented by automatic recording stations. It would probably be necessary to have a provision entitling the parties to demand data concerning events which were suspicious and the right to abrogate the treaty if it were to determine that its requests for data were not being complied with in a satisfactory manner or if it concluded that there had been a violation.

III.

RELATIONSHIP OF A TEST BAN TO NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

One of the principal interests of the United States in a test ban agreement is an interest in it as one of a series of steps designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the world. It is probable that the U.S.S.R.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 9 -

has a similar interest. It might be advisable to discuss this interest with the Soviet Union with relation to the interests of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in a test ban. In the first instance the U.S. should point out that the signing of a test ban treaty would mean that there would be no additional nuclear powers in our camp. We should point out that we would attempt to obtain adherence by the French and as a result a reduction of the intensity of the French nuclear development program. We could then point to the draft declaration on non-dissemination and point out that we would expect the French to sign not only the test ban treaty but the non-dissemination declaration as well.

The discussion of the non-dissemination will, of course, raise the question of the future of the NATO Multilateral Nuclear Force. We should point out that the multilateral nuclear force is a proposed substitute for the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability by individual NATO Countries. We should point out that in view of the continued Soviet nuclear threat to Europe, the MLF offered our European allies a substitute to the acquisition of their own nuclear capabilities and to that extent it was designed to prevent proliferation. ~~We should point out, however, that if we could work out an understanding that there would be no more nuclear~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 10 -

threat to Europe, the MLF offered our European allies a substitute to the acquisition of their own nuclear capabilities and to that extent it was designed to prevent proliferation. We should point out, however, that if we could work out an understanding that there would be no more nuclear powers in either the Western camp or in the Socialist camp perhaps the Western powers would not feel the need for an MLF but could work out some other arrangements for European security.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 11 -

As to what we were prepared to consider as a possible incentive to the Chinese, which would make it easier for the U.S.S.R. to obtain de facto adherence to a test ban, various possibilities should be considered.

IV.

NATO-WARSZAWA NON-AGGRESSION PACT.

The Soviet Union's interest in a NATO-Warsaw non-aggression pact is likely to be raised at the Moscow meeting. It was agreed at Ottawa that the various participants in the Ambassadorial group should study the situation in the Soviet Union and in the Communist bloc and in the light of their conclusions decide whether a NATO-Warsaw non-aggression pact is something which is worth exploring. No decision has been reached on this point and it is unlikely that by July 15 the matter will have progressed to a point where there can be an affirmative response to any Soviet suggestions. The U.S. response should not be one of a totally negative nature, however, but rather we should be prepared to identify those areas in which the pact would be inimical to our interests, would be superfluous or might be the basis for future negotiations.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 12 -

It might be indicated, for example, that to have any chance of favorable consideration a pact would have to be worded to the effect that nothing in the situation in Berlin and Germany could be changed without agreement.

V.

OTHER MEASURES OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT.

If it appears to be appropriate, the U.S. Delegation can discuss the measures which have been authorized for presentation at the Geneva conference but which either have not yet been presented or fully developed there. These include such measures as:

- a. Production stoppage of fissionable material for use in weapons.
- b. Transfer of given amounts of fissionable material from stockpiles to peaceful uses including different ratios for U.S. and U.S.S.R.
- c. Agreement not to place in orbit weapons of mass destruction.
- d. Agreement, as part of a first stage disarmament measure, to place certain limitations on military expenditures as part of other disarmament activities.

In addition, if it seems appropriate, the Delegation should be in a position to ask questions designed to elicit the Soviet

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 13 -

attitudes on such matters as substantial reduction of strategic nuclear vehicles, production stoppage of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, together with the verification machinery necessary for such measures. The purpose of these questions should be to aid the U.S. Government in arriving at a position in those areas in which active work developing possible measures is now in progress.

June 20, 1963

~~TOP SECRET~~

6/20/63

June 20, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached memorandum represents my best effort to think through the meaning of your European trip.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: 92-13
By: CB Date: 8/10/92



George W. Ball

Attachment:

As stated

AP/SOJ WH ADV / 1963 (HSTL)

U:GWBall:hc

June 20, 1963

~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

**Subject: The Mess in Europe and the
Meaning of Your Trip**

This paper is not written in the spirit of alarmism. Nor do I believe that pessimism is a useful working hypothesis. But if your European trip is to pay off fully, we must make a hard-boiled appraisal of what is going on in Europe today.

Unquestionably, Europe is in a mess, and it is not going to get out of that mess quickly. Never, at any time since the war, have European voices been so discordant, European opinions so confused, European Governments so lacking in direction.

Never, at any time since the war--and this is the main point--has Europe been in graver danger of back-sliding into the old destructive habits--the old fragmentation and national rivalries that have twice brought the world to disaster in the past.

Your trip must be planned in cold-blooded recognition of these lamentable facts.

The Nature of the Mess

I do not propose in this memorandum to undertake a full diagnosis of why Europe has gotten sick so fast.

The

UNCLASSIFIED
~~SECRET~~

UNSECRETED

-2-

The problem is necessarily complex and only the simple-minded would offer a pat answer. As the past few months have shown, political developments can be influenced by events as disparate as a Papal Encyclical and the occupational triumphs of a Christine Keeler.

But the over-riding change in the condition of Europe--and the change that has given other influences special force and meaning--has been the halting, and at least momentary reversal, of the drive toward unity in Europe. This has come about, as the whole world knows, from the abrupt reassertion of old-style competitive nationalism expressed in a new-style rhetoric.

Some interruption in the progress toward unity was to be expected--was perhaps overdue. Progress toward unity had come about from the fortunate convergence of a number of forces. Except for the defeat of the EDC in 1954, it had proceeded with deceptive speed and smoothness. The coincidence of accelerating economic growth with the progress of the Common Market had tended to create an impression of a wider and more solid political integration than in fact existed.

It was to be expected that this apparently smooth and rapid evolution toward European unity would at some point be challenged by a counter-revolution of nationalism. We hoped, of course, that the movement had obtained such momentum that once Europe had survived the parturition of British membership, the ultimate achievement of unity would be secure. We were betting that the addition of a third major pillar in the European edifice would render it structurally stable and proof against the erosion of any one pillar.

This was the postulate of American policy during the first two years of your Administration. It was a

sound

UNSECRETED

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET

-3-

sound postulate, and over the long pull, still is, since the European structure it envisaged would satisfy the requirements of scale demanded by the modern age.

Unfortunately, the nationalist counter-attack came at a particularly bad time. Not only did it frustrate-- or at least seriously postpone--British adherence, but it demoralized Europe just at the time when it was undergoing other major adjustments.

The Consequences

The mess that resulted is real enough. What are the dangers that it offers?

The Concealed Time Bomb of French Instability

Many of the Frenchmen who worked most ardently for European unity were moved by a deep conviction that France could never solve her own political problems within a national context. France concealed within her body politic deep divisive forces. Only by diluting those forces within the larger cauldron of Europe could Frenchmen achieve lasting political stability. This conviction was widely and firmly held, and I have no doubt that the promise and prospect of a European solution was a powerful element in keeping the ramshackle Fourth Republic from falling apart.

But--and this is one of its most dangerous consequences--de Gaulle's revival of nationalism has pushed French problems back into a narrowly French setting. In the process, it threatens to restore the disastrous cycle that has marked modern French history.

Precisely

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

-4-

Presumptively a country with an unassimilated revolution, France for two centuries has tended to oscillate between governments kept deliberately weak and vulnerable on the left and strong-man governments afflicted with a progressive absolutism. The pendulum has swung with monotonous regularity from an Impotent Directory to Napoleon I; from Louis Philippe to the Second Empire to the French Commune; from Leon Blum and the Front Populaire to Marshal Petain.

Each week de Gaulle's France grows perceptibly more absolutist, while the French people have packed off on a political holiday--an Indian Summer of political irresponsibility. By destroying the whole structure of parties except the Communist Party, the General has eliminated the institutional means for resisting Communism. Today the CP offers opponents of Gaullism the only visible center of effectively organized strength. As a result, the French Communists--demoralized only a short time ago--have been given a new lease on life. And the way once more lies open for a Front Populaire. This threat is vividly described in a Reporter article by Ed Taylor attached as Tab A.

We must never forget, therefore, that in spite of its material prosperity and the lack of visible political agitation, France conceals a profound political malaise. De Gaulle will not last forever and the hazards involved in France's ultimate return to constitutional government is an omnipresence that hangs heavily over Europe.

The Dangers of German Adrift

The second major motivation of the French "Europeans"--and the prime motivation of their German colleagues--was an anxiety to tie a truncated Germany firmly to the West within the framework of a united Europe.

This

UNCLASSIFIED

This involved, as an essential element, a Franco-German understanding, yet it was recognized from the beginning that a permanent understanding could never be achieved on a bilateral basis. Rivalry between France and Germany was too long-standing, history too bloody, for any resolution of their deeply-felt mistrust except in the cushioning presence of other nations that were prepared to subordinate individual national concerns to the common interest of a larger unity.

Handwritten: Understood

This view has been borne out by the events of the past six months. These events have provided persuasive evidence that Germany cannot be bound securely to the West by a bilateral agreement with a France determined to use that agreement to establish and maintain French hegemony.

Such an effort is more likely to repel Germany than attract it.

It was worth noting, for example, that the French officials who accompanied Couve to Washington took an almost anti-German tone, frankly expressing their annoyance at the lack of tangible benefits from the Franco-German Treaty. And it was conspicuous during the GATT negotiations at Geneva that, while the Six felt a strong desire to hold together because of their Rome Treaty commitments, it was the Germans who led the drive to dislodge the French from their obdurate position.

Unfortunately for the West, de Gaulle has chosen the worst possible moment for reviving nationalism-- just the moment when Chancellor Adenauer is relinquishing the reins in Germany. As a result, we face dangerous weather with the Federal Republic.

There are several reasons for this.

While,

SECRET

-6-

While nationalism is contagious, it is not a constructive element in the relations between nations. On the contrary, the assertion of a strong nationalism by one nation tends to produce an equal and opposite reaction in its neighbors.

This has dangerous implications for the future of Germany.

Nationalism in the past has led the Germans and the world into deep trouble. And the confluence of forces--the assault on the structure of European unity, the removal of the political direction of the Chancellor, and the contagious infection of resurgent nationalism--must be a cause for serious concern.

I am not overstating the dangers. No one can speak with assurance of the pressures and counter-pressures that may shape the future of a post-Adenauer Germany. We have simply had no experience of a Federal Republic freed from the Old Fox's iron discipline. Given the German capacity for self-delusion and the residuum of dark forces moving beneath the surface, we could make a tragic error if we took it for granted that events would go on as usual.

Here are some of the reasons for concern:

Erhard as Chancellor

Professor Erhard is a man of good-will. In many ways, we should find him easy to work with. He shares our interest in liberal trade (except in agriculture, where he has been content to say that "all nations are sinners") and he has always recognized the economic

advantages

SECRET

SECRET

- 7 -

advantages of an enlarged European community. In fact, he fought for British admission to the Common Market with energy and courage.

But Adenauer has had sound reasons for mistrusting Erhard, on the ground both of inadequate political comprehension and inadequate political will. I have learned from my own experience--after many hours of conversation with him, spread over a number of occasions--that, while he has great friendship for the United States, he has no well-defined political convictions by which to guide the Federal Republic.

The French are reported to be preparing a campaign to win him over, but by temperament and intellect he is at the opposite pole from General de Gaulle. There will not be an easy working relation between a Gaullist France and a Federal Republic under Erhard.

Couve de Murville told me that Germany under Erhard would "receive no political direction". His prediction is probably correct. The most likely result is a Germany adrift--at least during Erhard's tenure as Chancellor--while an internecine power battle goes on in Bonn for the succession.

The Impact of the Force de Frappe

*NMS
vrry*
In an atmosphere of resurgent nationalism, the emergence of France as a nuclear power can have serious repercussions in Germany on two counts. It can stir competitive ambitions and revive a sense of resentment against discrimination.

It is no good saying that Germans do not want atomic weapons. Even if that were true today--and the evidence is confusing--what Germans will come to demand

in a

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

-8-

in a competitive Europe is power and equal treatment. Nothing is more dangerous than the bland assumption--detectable in both parties in Britain, as well as in France--that if the other Western allies gang up on Germany they can successfully hold the Federal Republic to her self-denying ordinances regarding atomic weapons. If the world learned anything from the experience between the wars, it should certainly have learned that. We cannot afford to make the same mistake twice.

I am attaching at Tab B a brief memorandum relating to the history of German rearmament following the First World War. It teaches two clear lessons.

The first is that Germany cannot over an extended period be kept in a position of discrimination. Not only will the effort fail, but it will lead to a festering resentment out of all proportion to the importance of the objective.

The second lesson is that a Germany not tied institutionally to the West is dangerous--and no one has offered an effective means of tying Germany to the West except through a unified Europe within an Atlantic Partnership.

The Danger of New Soviet Tactics

Up to this point, the Germans have been tractable largely because of their fear of the Soviet Union and the knowledge that we alone can provide an effective defense. But a process of shifts and changes is under way on both sides of the Iron Curtain, and the possibility of some Soviet overture to a post-Adenauer Germany must not be overlooked.

There


DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET

-9-

There is no imminent danger of any German diplomatic adventure with Moscow. The realities of nuclear dependence are too well known for that. But we must think in a longer time span. The geometry of power relationships is rapidly changing, and events set in train today can shape the conditions of tomorrow.

In these changed conditions a Germany not tied closely and institutionally to the West can be a source of great hazard. Embittered by a deepening sense of discrimination and bedeviled by irredentism, a Germany at large can be like a cannon on shipboard in a high sea.



POLICY BACKGROUND FOR YOUR TRIP

These are the background facts. The policies that flow from the implications of these facts can be easily stated:

1. The main thrust of our policy must be to provide the people of Europe--and particularly the people of Germany--with the opportunity to realize their aspirations on a basis of self-respect and no discrimination, but without the need to resort to a competitive drive for

domination.

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET

SECRET

-10-

domination. This means the strengthening and further development of European unity, the construction of an effective Atlantic Partnership, and--through the instrument of that partnership--the elimination of discrimination.

2. In the carrying out of that policy, we can expect little immediate help from the major European Governments. French policy is opposed to our objectives. The Macmillan Government is at bay, and even if Labour comes to power it is unlikely for some time that the UK will play a significant European role, not only because of the French veto, but because a Labour Government will tend to place prior emphasis on domestic affairs. Italy must first find a new alignment of political forces before an Italian Government can act with effectiveness.

3. Germany alone is capable of immediate constructive action--and Germany is just emerging from a long adolescence under stern parental guidance.

4. In this environment of impotence and confusion, de Gaulle's interjection of competitive nationalism--even though stated in perloined terminology--is a mischief and a danger. In facing this danger, we must never forget--or let others forget--that the General's brand of

nationalism

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET

-11-

nationalism can work in only one direction. It can push Europe back towards its old fragmentation, can reinstate old rivalries, revive old grievances. But it is a destructive force. It cannot build anything, since nationalism motivated by a desire for dominance or hegemony, no matter how deceptively decked out, is the negation of internationalism and supranationalism.



5. The last five months have proved the force of these assertions. De Gaulle has been able to veto and to confuse but he has wholly failed to launch any solid international arrangements. On the contrary, his attempts to coalesce European strength around France in order to advance parochial French interests have resulted only in his progressive isolation. The limited successes won for French policy have been achieved not through the agency of any new unity or allegiance, but rather through the fear that a frustrated French Government might wreck the structure of unity already created. Even this threat is a wasting asset, for the Europeans have recognized that, while de Gaulle has borrowed the vocabulary of European unification, he is peddling the same old pre-war merchandise.

6. Yet, while recognizing Gaullist policies for what they are and what they imply, we should not shape our own course in reaction to de Gaulle. Nothing could do us greater harm than to lead or join an anti-Gaullist cabal.

7. On the contrary, we must state clearly what we believe is good and right--state it repeatedly and with conviction and authority, and make it clear to all the world that we do not intend to waver or deviate from the directions we have so long taken with such great benefit to the world.

8. At

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET

TOP SECRET

-12-

8. At the same time, we must be on guard that our actions are at all times consistent with the policies we profess. Our ability to lead Europe and the Western Alliance depends upon our demonstrating by our actions that we know what is good for the Free World and will act accordingly.

9. Thus, while we should eschew any anti-de Gaulle campaign--or any appearance of such a campaign--we should, at the same time rigorously avoid any action that might give aid and comfort to the destructive policy of competitive nationalism which the General is seeking to impose.

10. This means in more specific terms that we must not yield to our insistence that further nuclear development in Europe take place in a multilateral context. We must do nothing that might facilitate--or even appear to facilitate--the creation of a force de frappe on a national basis. We must not, by any casual act such as the thinning out of forces, give strength to those who would undermine the credibility of our intentions.

THE APPLICATION OF THESE POLICIES
TO YOUR EUROPEAN TRIP

In your speeches and private conversations, I would suggest that the following considerations should control:

A. We should never forget that the United States is the leader of the Atlantic world and that the great mass of Europeans look to America--and especially to you, as President--for guidance and direction. This is for them a conditioned reflex and we should not be misled by brave talk to the contrary.

B. United

TOP SECRET

~~SECRET~~

-13-

B. United States influence will depend upon your being able to make it clear that we know what we want and that we are prepared to affirm our convictions with clarity and precision.

C. In principle, you should address your remarks to Europeans generally, rather than to Germans. But at the same time, there is a special effort to be made with the German people. There are several reasons for this:

1. The Federal Republic is the only major Government amenable to American ideas that is presently capable of effective action.

2. Over the next few years, Germany will be making her choice. Either she will elect to channel her energies within the framework of a unified Europe within an Atlantic Partnership, or she will choose the old way of competitive nationalism. The choice of the first course is vital to the safety of the world.

3. Finally, we still have great influence with the Germans. They are closest to the firing line. Berlin is a Soviet hostage, and the German people know that their only defense is the American strength and commitment.

D. But, while speaking with the German problem in mind, you should speak to Europe as a whole about European unity and the Atlantic Partnership. In doing so, you should make it clear that we Americans need have no reluctance to state our views on the issues of unity with force and conviction. In expressing our opinions on this matter, we are not acting--and you should make

it

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

It clear that we are not acting--merely as a disinterested friend. We have a stake in the shape of Europe and we should not hesitate to assert it. We have a vital self-interest in preventing retrogression toward a fragmented Europe which, on two occasions, has required the New World to redress the balance of the Old.

E. To the Germans specifically you should make it clear that with a ^{European framework and an Atlantic partnership,} Germany will be able to achieve her aspirations for full nondiscriminatory treatment without the need to dominate.

F. The elimination of discrimination means that Germany must play some part in nuclear defense. I feel that those who would deny this need are merely sticking their heads in the sand. At the same time you should indicate that the illusion that nuclear participation can be achieved within an exclusively European framework has no current relevance--although we should not foreclose the possibility for the future. The hard fact is that Europe is far less able today to organize the management of a nuclear deterrent than it appeared to be six months ago.

G. This leads inevitably to the MYP. It is--and remains--the one constructive idea anyone has put forward for assuring German participation in a nuclear deterrent without proliferation. This, I think, you should say clearly and firmly. America recommends the MYP because it is the best way to achieve a common goal. We believe Europeans should support it. We are asking no nation to participate in it to please us, but we are convinced it is a sound enterprise.

H. In quiet conversations with Adenauer and Erhard you should make it clear that we share their belief that a MYP in a bilateral German-American setting is not

good.

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET

-15-

good. Quite likely, neither Britain nor Italy will be in position to make a prompt decision with regard to membership, but the idea must be kept alive and forward progress must be made. You should propose to have arrangements for collective drafting go forward toward this end. At the same time, you should express confidence that within a reasonable period other European countries should be able to make a decision to join.

I. Finally, you should strongly urge the significance of the equal partnership which America is offering. This is the unique contribution that only we can make to Europe. It is a concept founded not on domination or hegemony, but on an equal sharing of the benefits and responsibilities between the "competent" halves of the Free World. Partnership and an organized Europe are not only compatible with, but essential to, one another, since neither Germany nor America wants to see a closed, autarkic, incestuous "continental" system.

George W. Ball

U:GWBall/vh
6/20/63

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

DEF 18

6/21/63

M

REVIEWED BY JDB

DATE 3/24/87

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

RDS or XDS EXT. DATE

TS AUTH. REASON(S)

ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS

DECLASSIFIED RELEASABLE

RELEASE DENIED

PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: June 21, 1963

SUBJECT: Luncheon at Soviet Embassy

WAH

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Georgi M. Kornienko, Charge d'affaires, Soviet Embassy
Mr. Jacob D. Beam, ACDA/IR

COPIES TO: ACDA (112)
EUR - Mr. Tyler
S/S
S/P
M - Mr. Harriman
Amembassy, Moscow

20

[Handwritten signatures and scribbles]

(copy sent CAC)

At Mr. Kornienko's invitation I had luncheon with him alone today at the Soviet Embassy.

Mr. Kornienko asked me about the composition of the Harriman mission. I replied that nothing was definite as yet, except for Mr. Harriman and Mr. Fisher. I said we were assuming the main emphasis of the talks would be on the test ban and asked him whether this was also his Government's view. Mr. Kornienko believed this was the case but he commented it would be impossible to prevent the Heads of Delegations from talking about anything they liked, especially since Mr. Harriman was "a broad-gauged man". He thought Kuznetsov would probably be the Soviet negotiator.

Nothing new came out of our discussion of test ban matters beyond the usual arguments on both sides for and against the need for on-site inspections. Mr. Kornienko said that should the Moscow talks concentrate on numbers, they would certainly fail and quickly. I did ask Mr. Kornienko whether his Government might be interested in a partial ban. He said he had noted press reports that Mr. Wilson had received the impression in Moscow that this might be so but according to all the information he, (Kornienko) had, there had been no change in Soviet opposition to a continuance of underground testing.

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals; declassified after 12 years

ACDA-1
2-62

APR 1989 387 0

Sov. Deal! MLP = ver nu (p2)
this then 'pre occupy' in test ban

REPRODUCED FROM THE COLLECTIONS OF THE MANUSCRIPT DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

Mr. Kornienko went to some lengths to denounce NATO plans for MLF as a development which poisoned the atmosphere and ruined chances for agreement on non-proliferation. He claimed that no nation really wished MLF except the Germans who welcomed it as a first step toward enlarging and ultimately acquiring their own control over nuclear weapons. He did not accept the argument that if, as was probable, the U.S. Congress would still insist on a United States veto, Germany's status within MLF would be little different from the present custodial arrangements. He said the Soviet Government would not be willing to sign a non-proliferation agreement now on the likely chance that the factual situation of denial to Germany of sole use of nuclear weapons would remain the same under MLF. According to him, the chief Soviet preoccupation was that West Germany must be excluded from both direct and indirect control of nuclear weapons.

I mentioned the report that there has been no Soviet jamming of foreign broadcasts for the last forty-eight hours. Pausing to count back to Wednesday, Mr. Kornienko said this was correct. He said the determining factor was the USSR's estimate of its own security but he acknowledged the step might produce an improvement in atmosphere between East and West. He did not reply when I asked him whether one reason might be that his country might expect to hear radio commentaries from the U.S. more flattering to the Soviet Union than to the Communist Chinese.

At the end of our talk Mr. Kornienko stressed the need for "something new" in the test ban area and, referring to the insinuations made against the Soviet delegate during the January talks in New York, said he hoped Mr. Harriman would "bring something in his baggage which would make his trip worthwhile".

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



651/63 (2)

This document consists of pages

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Assistant Secretary

Number 1 of 5 copies, Series

W. Averell Harriman 5031

TOP SECRET

JUN 21 1963 (12)

TO : M - Governor Harriman
THROUGH : S/S ~~MA~~
FROM : FE - Edward E. Rice *ER*
SUBJECT : Inhibiting Communist China's Making and Exploiting Nuclear Weapons

Carl Hooper
To not return
9367
work

The following thoughts are submitted as of possible use in connection with your forthcoming mission to Moscow.

It appears very unlikely that Communist China will be deterred from exploding a nuclear device merely because of a US-USSR test-ban agreement, even should such agreement be reached soon. Perhaps the USSR could not prevent the Chinese Communists also from going ahead with nuclear weapons production by any means short of direct action against Chinese nuclear installations or a credible threat of such action. We need not rule out the possibility that the USSR could be brought to take, or credibly threaten to take, such action--perhaps in the context of our assuming obligations to prevent West Germany's obtaining nuclear weapons. But it seems more likely it might be willing to take only steps of a less drastic nature designed to persuade the Chinese Communists they should not create nuclear weapons or to reduce their ability either to use them or credibly to threaten their use.

We need not assume that the Chinese Communists necessarily will be unalterably determined to make nuclear weapons. Once the Chinese Communists have exploded a nuclear device they will be in position at least to engage in political exploitation, vis-a-vis their neighbors and in international negotiations, of claims that they have entered the ranks of the nuclear powers. There is a slight possibility they might then be disposed to consider whether they should settle for these advantages and not press forward with a serious nuclear weapons program, as preferable to trying to compete in the expensive nuclear weapons field itself, if they encounter unexpected difficulties and costs in pursuing their intention of creating a nuclear weapons and missile capability. A US-USSR test ban, and the mobilization of world opinion for general

accession

TOP SECRET

HP/S39/
7/17/63
W.

attack on China may
ruled out - India w. her

REPRODUCED FROM THE COLLECTIONS OF THE MANUSCRIPT DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

142

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

accession to it, might then reinforce this disposition. So might a variety of other measures which the US and/or the USSR might undertake in support of a possible agreement designed to prevent a proliferation of nuclear weapons.

If the Chinese Communists nevertheless insist on making nuclear weapons against Soviet urgings and advice, as seems highly probable, the USSR may be willing to take steps which would reduce Communist China's ability to use them or credibly to threaten their use. It would seem to be in the Soviet interest to serve notice on Communist China that it cannot expect both to enjoy the Soviet nuclear umbrella and maintain freedom to use their own nuclear weapons irrespective of Soviet wishes--a situation which would increase the risk that Communist China would involve the USSR in nuclear war with the US. Such involvement might be brought about in a number of ways. An obvious one, together with a way in which the risk might be reduced, is discussed below.

With the US allied to the GRC and the USSR to the Peiping regime, there is a danger that the determined opposition of the two Chinese sides to calling off their civil war will involve the US and USSR in nuclear conflict. As Communist China gains in ability to project military power from its vast mainland, against its enemy on the island of Taiwan, the temptation for it to bring pressure on Taiwan is likely to increase. With us Khrushchev has taken the line that a Chinese Communist conquest of Taiwan would be an internal Chinese affair, in which US intervention would invite Soviet counter-action. Taken at face value, this would extend a Soviet nuclear umbrella over Communist China's pursuit of final victory in the GRC-Chinese Communist civil war.

It seems likely, however, that the Soviets have informed Peiping that their concurrence in particular military operations of this sort and in their timing would be required: it seems improbable that the Soviets would give the Communist Chinese a blank check to involve them in a nuclear war with the US. But so long as the USSR is overtly committed to the Chinese Communist objective of gaining Taiwan it is possible that Communist China could face the

USSR

~~TOP SECRET~~

REPRODUCED FROM THE COLLECTIONS OF THE MANUSCRIPT DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 3 -

USSR with a situation in which the alternatives were nuclear war or failing to back its public position.

It seems possible that the foregoing considerations of self-interest, perhaps coupled with further development of the Sino-Soviet split, may make the USSR willing at least to reverse its overt position regarding Taiwan. This would, in effect, mean that Communist China could not expect to use, or credibly threaten to use, nuclear weapons in the Taiwan area under cover of the Sino-Soviet alliance, for it would be faced with the uncheckmated and immensely superior US nuclear deterrent. In order to obtain Soviet agreement to this and other, perhaps more far-reaching measures designed to remove from the Chinese Communists the USSR's nuclear umbrella, we might reinforce Soviet self-interest by offering additional incentives. Thus we could offer to provide (in order of apparent difficulty for us): a secret undertaking not to support Chiang's efforts to return to the mainland; a public statement that we would not support them; or undertakings elsewhere-- e. g., a US willingness to live with continued two-Germanies situation in Europe. (Obviously, what we got in return would have to be sufficient to compensate for the seriously unsettling effects implicit for our alliances.)

Soviet moves which eliminated or cast public doubt on Communist China's ability to rely on the Soviet nuclear deterrent-- which is so clearly superior to any the Chinese are likely themselves to create for decades to come--would reduce both the threat posed by Chinese Communist nuclear weapons and also the dimensions of the non-nuclear threat which Communist China poses. Accordingly, if the objective of keeping the Chinese Communists from acquiring nuclear weapons proves to be unattainable, there will be much point in pursuing the lesser aim of removing from them the Soviet nuclear umbrella: they should not be allowed to have it both ways.

The foregoing has been discussed only with Mr. Whiting and Mr. Yager. Mr. Whiting agrees. Mr. Yager is in general agreement: However, he would not agree to giving anything so real as the suggested US undertakings in exchange for insubstantial Soviet

commitments;

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 4 -

commitments; he would favor a more general discussion with the Soviets of the problem of maintaining peace in the Far East after the Chinese Communists have nuclear weapons.

Before proceeding along a track such as that outlined above it would seem wise to explore in greater depth and detail the probable GRC and Chinese Communist reactions to US and Soviet moves of the sort suggested above. What we might lose and gain in consequence might then be better assessed. If you think it worth while to explore the matter, I will ask Mr. Whiting and Mr. Yager to do so. Since their attitudes differ, they probably would have to prepare either separate papers or one indicating where they agree and how they differ.

FE:EERice:hst
6-20-63

Copies to: EUR
ACDA
G
G/PM

~~TOP SECRET~~

REPRODUCED FROM THE COLLECTIONS OF THE MANUSCRIPT DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

6/24/63

For Marc

6/24/63

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-117

The Multilateral Force By ius, NARA Date 9-24-97

Where it came from - what it is - and what it is not

INTRODUCTORY

The management of nuclear weapons in NATO is self-evidently the most difficult question before the Western Alliance. In more than 20 years of trans-Atlantic negotiations no perfect solutions have been developed. The partial answers which have been found along the way have seldom served for more than a few years at a time, so rapidly and kaleidoscopically have the elements of the problem changed.

Now in 1963 it is no longer possible -- if it ever was -- to devise sweeping solutions to the whole nuclear defense of the Alliance. Past decisions, present attitudes, and the demanding requirements of up-to-date weapons systems all combine to ensure that any new program must be designed under constraints which prevent total answers and demand a sense of modesty in the planner.

Yet in the light of experience, new programs should meet the standard that they do not foreclose larger and better answers as time passes. As far as possible, the nuclear decisions of the mid-1960's should be so designed as not to become the hazards or obstacles of the 1970's.

NSF, Subject File, Multilateral Force - Bundy Paper, box 25, LBJ

Library

COPY LBJ LIBRARY

I. What is the military problem?

It is often said -- especially by military men -- that the current nuclear difficulties of NATO are not military. This statement is correct if it means merely that at the edges of argument and choice political factors are usually dominant and often decisive. But the statement can be dangerously misleading -- for it can lead to the wholly erroneous assumption that the military component in the problem is irrelevant. Nothing could be further from the truth.

At the very center of the nuclear problem of the Alliance is this cardinal military fact: the principal nuclear protection of the West, as far ahead as we can see, must come from the strategic forces of the United States of America. Without these strategic forces Europe cannot be defended, as even the advocates of separate national or European forces usually agree. Thus, the first military requirement of NATO is that it should be held together; all nuclear arrangements must be tested against this requirement. This military requirement at once states the central political problem: how do we sustain self-respect, confidence, and energy in an alliance where fourteen depend in the last resort on one?

There is another and more sharply defined sense in which all nuclear arrangements must meet military criteria; it is that the weapons and weapons systems deployed in such arrangements must in fact have, and be understood to have, a genuinely useful military role. This

proposition is so simple that it would not require restatement if it were not often forgotten. Caught up in the effort to hold the Alliance together, and beguiled by the undeniable importance of political considerations, planners can easily begin to think of weapons as mere political counters designed to meet this or that special need of one group or another within the Alliance. They can thus forget that if the weapon does not serve a proper military purpose, it can have no durable political value.¹

Military men seldom lose sight of the fundamental need for a sound military purpose in any recommended program. Unfortunately, it does not follow that they therefore tend to reach agreed and unanimous solutions. Military leaders tend to pose the military question not in terms of the Alliance as a whole, but in terms of the effectiveness of the forces under their own immediate command. What they command, moreover, is usually rated by them as first-class in general value, while alternative forces or systems which threaten their own access to resources are not

1/ The most notable error of this kind was probably the British decision of 1960 -- supported by the United States -- to protect the future of its national deterrent by exclusive reliance on an undeveloped, uncertain and technologically questionable weapon: the SKYBOLT. The French national force, at least in its first stage, runs a similar risk, though some American theorists have exaggerated its weakness.

usually popular. Thus there is an almost automatic difference of emphasis from country to country, service to service, and even command to command.² Moreover, even without these differences, military analysis is made difficult by the complexity of contemporary weapons systems and the very high rate of technological change. These natural differences and difficulties obstruct unanimity in the Alliance even on the purely military plane. It is most unlikely that there can ever be a single set of weapons systems which all military advisers will join in supporting as ideal.

Fortunately, however, the minimum military requirement for satisfactory nuclear arrangements is not so demanding. The Alliance does not require the very best, most modern and most economical of all conceivable defense systems. The real requirement is different and easier to meet: it is that the nuclear weapons of the Alliance be military effective. An effective nuclear defense of the West is possible under more than one possible arrangement. Within relatively wide limits, this defense can be assured by different combinations of weapons systems, different proportions of national responsibility, and different arrangements for planning

2/ SACEUR in Paris, even when he was a U. S. air officer, had a view of the military requirements of NATO which was quite different from that of U. S. air officers who looked at the world from Omaha.

and control. Among alternative systems each of which is satisfactory in military terms, it is not only proper but necessary to make political choices.

II. What is the political problem?

The political requirements of nuclear defense can be grouped in four categories: (1) to maintain the unity of the Alliance; (2) to deter the USSR; (3) to meet the needs of the U. S.; (4) to meet the varied needs of other allies. The first three are quite simple and the fourth is extraordinarily complex.

The political requirement to maintain the unity of the Alliance is simply the military requirement writ large. The Alliance must be held together because without it the basic national purposes of major members cannot be met. This requirement is as simple as the answers to it may be complex.

Toward the USSR, the political purpose of nuclear arrangements is hardly more complicated; it is to deter Soviet aggression by Western strength which is at once adequate and non-provocative. It is true that any form of strength, nuclear or not, will provoke routine verbal reactions from the Soviet Government, but this Pavlovian response is quite different from the real provocation that would be created, for example, by an independent German nuclear capability.

The American political purpose is a little less simple. The United States cannot escape the primary responsibility for maintaining the Western deterrent. In this effort it has developed a national nuclear capability which represents more than 95% of the nuclear strength of the

Alliance. American policy must preserve both the security of this overwhelming force and its integrity as an instrument under the President's personal command. Within these limits, and in the service of unity among allies, the U. S. Government has properly accepted responsibility for helping to find arrangements which will meet the political needs of other powers. There are great difficulties in finding such arrangements; certainly we Americans have our share of national narrowness and have made our share of mistakes. Nevertheless it remains true that the greatest source of political difficulty lies in the fourth and remaining category -- that of the political attitudes of other partners in the Alliance.

We can distinguish at least five political forces which operate in quite contrasting ways upon the problem of nuclear management in Europe and Canada. Together they pose a set of challenges to Atlantic policy which makes our continuing difficulties much less surprising than the degree of our success thus far in sustaining the internal cohesion of the Western alliance.

Beginning at the non-violent end of the spectrum, there are, first, those who do not choose to participate in nuclear defense. At the bitter edge of this group are those, led by Lord Russell, who campaign actively against all nuclear weapons. Their political influence is much less than they believe or than their level of noise-making suggests. Much more significant are those who simply prefer to leave it to the Americans --

this is the view of most Scandinavians and of many in the center-left of England and the Continent. This group, in the main, not only accepts but applauds a specifically American responsibility for the nuclear defense of the Alliance, but it is cool to other national forces and it is not keen on schemes under which U. S. weapons systems are shared with other countries.

A second and contrasting group is that of the fully trusting participants in forces which are centrally American in origin and in final control. Here we find the Turks and the Greeks, less certainly the Italians, and most important, the Germans. To members of this group, what is dangerous is not the nuclear weapon itself, but rather the possibility that there might be situations in which the principal Western nuclear power might somehow disengage. The first interest of this group, therefore, is the forward placement of American nuclear strength, so that the U. S. and its full power will always be committed when needed. Members of this group have accepted nuclear weapons, under ultimate U. S. control, both on their territory and in their forces. Their central concern is less with their own nuclear status than with the certainty of the American nuclear commitment.

Third, we find the opinion which is currently dominant in the United Kingdom. The British have developed and maintained a nuclear capability of their own over a period of more than fifteen years. Their Conservative Government is now preparing to fight a general election

largely on the theme of nuclear independence. Yet at the same time it has become more and more plain that the purpose of this nuclear independence is not to have a separate British capability, but rather to insure an effective voice for the U. K. in the nuclear councils of the West, above all through the closest consultation with the United States. And while the loyal and eager partners just described are worried mostly about the firmness of the American commitment, the standard British worry is that the Americans might fire too soon. Thus the normal field for British leadership in nuclear matters has been the search for nuclear disarmament. The characteristic posture of a British Prime Minister is, in crisis, to seek some honorable accommodation, and after the crisis to seek a test ban treaty.

Fourth, against the British,-- in tactics if not in basic sympathy -- are those who may be called the Good Europeans. They believe in -- at least they urge -- the need for a "European Deterrent."

The American deterrent, all alone, they now assess as a divisive force; they find that de Gaulle's doubts about the reliability of U. S. nuclear protection -- in extremis -- are widely shared. They themselves, without help from de Gaulle, have felt the tremor of unconsulted insignificance which came with Cuba. Rejecting national deterrents, and rejecting also any alienation from America, they reach the conclusion that the best way out is through some new, unified, European

force. This force they would place in the closest association with the Americans -- but it would not be under American control, or even American veto. It would be a European junior partner, in an Atlantic deterrent, and the hope is that it would either supplant -- or possibly grow out of -- the existing national efforts of the British and the French .

The last and least tractable of these five great forces is the Gaullist. General de Gaulle is not building his policy on a vacuum. It rests upon a strong earlier commitment by France to the development of independent nuclear strength. But under his leadership, French policy is unusually clear and sharp: it is to develop a wholly independent French force, which will be held and used under French authority alone. The French do not usually contend that their force can replace our own; they agree that their strength will always be small in comparison with that of the United States and the USSR. Moreover, they accept and even proclaim the continued necessity for the Western alliance. But in justifying their own effort, they have been driven to insistent and repeated expressions of doubt about the reliability of the American commitment to Europe. General de Gaulle himself, in every press conference, praises the alliance and questions the dependability of the U. S., both at once. Thus the entire French effort has come to constitute a continuous challenge of the central premise stated at the outset -- namely, that

the unity of the Alliance is indispensable to the defense of all its members. Unless that unity is in doubt, the usefulness of the French force remains in question, even to Frenchmen. Unless and until it is related in some new way to the Alliance as a whole, the French nuclear force must constitute a standing challenge to the basic principle of the Alliance.

* * *

Plainly, these five forces will not readily combine to recommend a single course. The reader who sets one of them against another will see for himself how every one of the five has some sharp edge of disagreement with each of the others -- though it is of course equally true that edges of surprising agreement also emerge in this process. American policy is required to deal with all five.

While the divisions just described are unusually sharp and pressing, in 1963, they are not new. Differences -- more or less quiet -- on atomic matters have existed among the Europeans for many years, and the Americans have necessarily had considerable experience in dealing with such differences. The characteristic American response is both interesting and important: it has been to deal with each European opinion separately. The United States has had not one but half a dozen nuclear policies for Europe. We have talked differently to different audiences. Our arrangements of all sorts have nearly always been bilateral.

The first of our bilateral connections was with the British, and it is still the most important. What governs this relation today (though not always in the past) is the shared conviction that what the two countries began together they should not finish separately. The enormous preponderance of the American effort has heavily tilted the balance of partnership, in the years since 1942, and the two countries cannot in simple honesty meet as equals. But the United States has felt bound to recognize both a historic connection and a political obligation. In 1963 the simplest way of stating this connection and obligation is that as long as Her Majesty's Government is determined to have -- and to pay for -- a British nuclear deterrent, the United States Government is bound in good faith not to withhold its reasonable cooperation to this end.

This is the central meaning of the Skybolt arrangement of 1960 and of its successor, the Polaris agreement of 1963.

With other countries our bilateral arrangements have less depth and strength. With no other country do we share the technology of nuclear weapons; with no other have we an inherited obligation to support a decision for an independent nuclear force. We have been opposed to accepting any new obligations of this sort -- but short of that, and within the terms of law, we have been able to develop a number of subtly different relationships. Some countries -- the willing non-participants -- we simply protect; they accept our nuclear responsibility and have no desire to share it --

this is the position of the Scandinavian members of NATO. It is generally preferred, in this group, that nuclear protection be given from a safe distance, and from its members one hears not criticism but praise of such shifts as that from land-based fixed Jupiters to sea-based mobile Polaris.

With the willing participants -- like the Greeks, the Turks, and the Germans -- it has been different. As we have already noted, this group is fearful not of nuclear weapons but of U. S. nuclear disengagement, and its members have accepted, and encouraged, the arming first of U. S. forces in Europe and then of other NATO forces, with U. S. weapons under U. S. control. They are untroubled by American hegemony as long as they can be confident of American presence. They fear not rashness but excessive caution. The Turks valued the Jupiters and were unworried by their vulnerability or their obsolescence; the switch from Jupiter to Polaris, clearly sensible as a matter of overall weapons policy, has required compensatory reassurances to Turkey to ensure that mutual confidence is not damaged.

Between the Scandinavians and the willing participants are a group of countries which have divided views on nuclear defense, sharing the attitudes of both Danes and Turks and seeking somehow to reconcile them. This is not a matter simply of internal division between one group and another. The same man, very often, will find himself believing all

of the following: that nuclear defense forces are essential for NATO and for the protection of his own country; that, in honor and in self-interest, his country should bear a hand in anything so deeply necessary to its safety; that, on the other hand, nuclear weapons are fearful and inhuman weapons, well left alone if possible, and that since the final defense of the Alliance inevitably rests with the Americans, the problem might as well be left to them. Cross-currents of this kind are strong in Italy, in the Low Countries, and in Canada; U. S. bilateral arrangements with these countries have been less readily settled than in cases where opinion is less divided. Yet satisfactory arrangements have in fact been made, in most cases; agreement is now in sight even in the especially interesting case of Canada, where the very nearness of the United States accentuates contrasting feelings of commitment, concern, and conscience. Yet there is an ambiguity in these arrangements which is well illustrated by the Italian view of Jupiter missiles. The Italian Government firmly agreed -- after careful study in each case -- to the deployment of Jupiters in 1959 -- and to their removal in 1963 -- but quite different Italian groups were eager and reluctant about the two decisions, and one may hazard the guess that shifts in U. S. nuclear policy can have particularly volatile effects in countries like these, where opinions, even among loyal friends of NATO, are divided.

The bilateral arrangements and unilateral U. S. dispositions which have been developed in response to these varied attitudes have

worked reasonably well till now. At regular intervals, of course, the alarm has been sounded and it has been asserted that the Alliance is in disarray. And it is true that NATO has never had a solidly agreed and fully executed policy for either conventional or nuclear weapons. But somehow the serious trouble has always been in the future; the Alliance has regularly refused to collapse, and it has proved equal to severe challenges like the Soviet pressure on Berlin from 1958 to 1962. Basic confidence in NATO's nuclear strength and determination has been a necessary element for this success. In 1963, still, there is little doubt of this present effectiveness of the Alliance. What creates the present concern is a set of new and special factors. One is the new self-consciousness of Europe; another is the gradually increasing sense of need for a major increase in strategic nuclear strength for European defense; a third is a limited but significant sense of separation from the United States which arises partly from reaction to new statements of U. S. policy and partly from a realization that in the gravest crisis of the nuclear age -- the Cuban missile affair -- the United States acted alone; and a fourth is the progress of the French nuclear effort under Gaullist leadership. No one of these forces, taken alone, would have any major impact on events or pose any serious question for the United States. It is their confluence that creates the problem of present

policy and makes it no longer certain that we can rely on a series of separately arranged and mainly bilateral arrangements. It is just conceivable that by European rejection, rather than American withdrawal, there might be a fatal weakening of NATO. If America were to seem to veto a new and truly European effort for nuclear strength; if the military leaders of NATO (American and European) were to conclude that all modern strategic weapons were to be held out of their hands under non-NATO U. S. control; if France under de Gaulle were to seem justified in its lonely nuclear effort and be elected by its firmness and foresight to Continental leadership; and if the United States were to make no effort to demonstrate that its necessarily lonely course in Cuba was the exception, not the rule -- if these things should happen, then indeed the Alliance might begin to come apart. And the great current question is what specific U. S. courses are most likely to prevent this result.

With this introduction, it will be well next to examine the unfolding of American policy chronologically, and the place to begin is with the meeting between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan at Nassau, just before Christmas 1962. Its main conclusions were and are central to American policy in the Atlantic.

The precipitant of Nassau was a politico-military mistake known as the Skybolt agreement, agreed in 1960 between the American President and the British Prime Minister. This agreement related to the possible future use of an airborne nuclear ballistic missile called Skybolt, then entering development under the U. S. Air Force. The agreement provided that if Skybolt should be successfully developed and produced by the United States, the United Kingdom should be free to purchase a number of missiles (at unit prices free of the costs of development). On this basis the British Government cancelled its own surface-to-air missile program, and so pinned the future of the British strategic deterrent to the future of an untried, complex and technologically suspect weapons system. In the atmosphere of 1960 it may have seemed a sound bet, resting as it did upon the known preferences of the U. S. Air Force, but the attitude toward weapons of the McNamara Pentagon and the Kennedy Executive Office made it plain, from 1961 onward, that each new U. S. weapons system must justify itself against all alternatives before entering production, and by this standard, Skybolt was never strong.

This is no place for a rehearsal of the assessments and considerations which led, in the fall of 1962, to a clear U. S. decision that Skybolt would not be bought for U. S. forces. Nor need we here examine the question whether the United Kingdom might have foreseen this development and so put itself in a position to react less emotionally to the

formal notification conveyed by Mr. McNamara in early December. What matters here is simply that by mid-December it was plain that the Americans were not going to purchase Skybolt for themselves, and while in theory this decision did not foreclose the possibility that the weapon might be developed and used by the British alone, in practice Mr. McNamara's argument against Skybolt, presented as it was with his usual energy and persuasiveness, killed that missile in England as well as in the United States. A weapon valued mainly for prestige could hardly sustain its usefulness after being rejected by the country which had dreamed it up in the first place.

So the first problem for the Nassau conference was the future of the British deterrent. The British Government's decision was clear. It wanted access to Polaris missiles, which it would arm with its own warheads and mount in its own nuclear submarines. The American position was more complex, as we shall see, but on the central point it was not hostile.

Not in law but in politics the Americans felt themselves obliged to respect the British decision to proceed with a national deterrent. If Mr. Kennedy at Nassau had refused to agree to the sale of Polaris missiles, the judgment of Englishmen would have been that an American fiat had put an end to the British deterrent. No amount of willingness to continue the Skybolt on British account would have reversed this political verdict.

The consequences of this judgment would have been severe. The British might have turned sharply toward the French, or toward a Scandinavian level of military effort, or even toward neutrality. And whatever this new direction, or even their inactivity, their view of the United States would have been bitterly changed. It is true that many Englishmen, including strong majorities in both opposition parties, and probably a majority also of the small group of Englishmen with any sophistication in nuclear strategy, were and are opposed to the British national deterrent, deeming it costly, marginal to Atlantic strength, and a bad example. But what these forces may yet decide, if they come to hold power and responsibility in England, they could hardly support if imposed from Washington, the twenty-year record of Anglo-American relations in atomic affairs required the sale of Polaris missiles, and Mr. Kennedy was wise and right in his refusal to accept the advice of some of his ablest and most disinterested counselors at the second level of the great departments, urging as they did that in the name of indivisibility, non-proliferation and Brussels,

the British request should be denied. ⁿ

What the President did insist on at Nassau -- and what the Prime Minister accepted, out of conviction as well as concession -- was that the replacement of Skybolt by Polaris should be accompanied by a new level of British commitment to NATO and a new British friendliness toward the political needs of non-nuclear powers -- especially Germany. The British Polaris submarines are to be assigned to NATO in a fashion which will plainly increase the nuclear role of the commanders and staff of the Alliance, and in addition the British Government agreed to reverse its long-standing opposition to the creation of a NATO strategic missile force going beyond the national contributions of the U.S. and the U.K. British support at Nassau for the mixed-manned venture that is now called the MLF did not then include an explicit British

n. This does not make the timing of the Polaris agreement ideal, and indeed the Americans at Nassau strongly urged the usefulness of deferring the decision by means of a careful study, expressing their fear that an immediate and strong reassertion of the special relation might have damaging repercussions on the Common Market negotiations. But the British view was that the military and economic issues were separate; they cited repeated assurances to this effect from French officials. In retrospect these assurances seem thin, but there seems an equal lack of substance to the notion that it was Nassau that kept Britain out of the Common Market; the French decision had deeper roots.

commitment to take part in the venture -- other than by the assignment to a NATO force of the British Polaris squadron. But what the British had opposed before, they now agreed to favor. The practical effect of this shift is still unsettled, but the obligation is clear, and recognized on both sides.

The second major element in the Nassau plan was an offer of "similar" assistance to France. The offer was not precise, since the quite different situations of Britain and France made it far from clear just what offer the Americans ought to make to the French; this imprecision could reasonably have troubled the French. Moreover, there are understandable difficulties in presenting any proposal to Frenchmen after an agreement has been made with Englishmen, and by the strange logic of resentment, it could only add to the trouble that General de Gaulle had politely but clearly rejected a warm informal invitation to visit the United States even before Nassau -- just as he had rebuffed a number of attempts to open a dialogue on these matters in earlier years.

Nevertheless to have made no offer at all would have been even worse, and the American offer to France after Nassau was real. // 2

It was presented in the genuine hope that the new British commitment to NATO might form a model within which French aspirations and the requirements of the Alliance could be served together.

The American hope, as the French Government short of President de Gaulle clearly understood, was that a dialogue might now be undertaken which would lead to a new level of understanding and cooperation. And as the French Government, short of General de Gaulle, also understood, the problem of nuclear assistance, as distinct from Polaris missile technology, was not excluded on the American side.

For the theory of this offer was that France was becoming a nuclear power; that her status as such should be accepted, and that therefore the United States should be willing to provide measured assistance in terms relevant to French needs and to the goal of unity. What these terms might be, and whether indeed the two governments could agree, were in the American view subjects for discussion. But France decided against a discussion.

No one in Washington -- and almost no one in Paris -- knows today exactly why General de Gaulle rejected the Nassau offer and refused to enter a discussion of its meaning. It is clear that most of his advisers proposed a different course, and at least one of the

reasons given in his press conference of January 14 is not persuasive. There he argued that the offer had no present relevance because French nuclear submarines were so far in the future. But subsequent formal statements by the French Minister of Defense have made it clear that it is precisely a submarine-based strategic missile system which is the present long-run object of the French defense nuclear effort. It thus appears that technically the American proposal was -- and still might be -- highly relevant, and there are indications that General de Gaulle was well aware of this relevance at the time. It is reasonable inference that something else in the post-Nassau package offended him, and it is at least a good guess that what bothered him most was the renewed and reinvigorated Anglo-Saxon commitment to a mixed-manned multi-lateral force. Friends and admirers of General de Gaulle have asserted that he was bound to regard the MLF as an encirclement, and to conclude as a result that all of Nassau was another Anglo-Saxon trick. These are things he has not said himself, but it would be wrong on that account to discount them entirely.ⁿ

n. What remains disturbing about this episode is the failure of communication between General de Gaulle and everyone else. On the question of nuclear policy within the Alliance -- even more than on other topics -- the method of General de Gaulle is not to communicate, but to decide. His closest advisers know astonishingly little of what determines his decisions, and the mystery which surrounds the days before January 14 is as thick in the Quai D'Orsay as in Washington. The method is dramatic, but it complicates the process of concerting the policy of the Alliance.

In any event it is true that the third major sector of the Nassau program was indeed a renewed commitment to a multilateral force, and the decision to make this new commitment was and is an essential part of the policy of the U.S. As we approach this decision we must recall the importance to U.S. policy in Europe of such non-nuclear powers as Germany, Italy, the Low Countries, Greece and Turkey. Among these nations, in different ways, have been those most reliant on American leadership and most responsive to American appeals for increased defense efforts in the conventional field after 1961. Both as trusting participants and as good Europeans they had a heavy claim to a responsible role in framing the nuclear defense of Europe in the coming age of ballistic missiles. An empty answer to them after Nassau was unthinkable. The United States simply could not accept a British Polaris proposal, make "a similar offer" to France, and omit the rest of the Alliance.

The MLF, both on its own merits and by a process of elimination, is the best arrangement for the active participation of non-nuclear powers that the American government has been able to devise. It has many imperfections and can be criticized in varied and even contradictory ways, but the first point worth making about it is that those who oppose it must remind themselves -- as in the case of the Polaris agreement with Britain -- of the

consequences of making no proposal at all. In Germany and Italy especially -- but to a significant degree in other countries too -- it would then have been said, and even believed, that the Americans, for all of their noisy opposition to national nuclear weapons, were in fact ready to surrender to those who defied them -- and unready to cooperate with those who followed their lead. It would have been said, and believed, that General de Gaulle and his Directorate were victors, and that the Americans were indeed prepared to leave all others in a permanently second-class status. To have made no serious proposal to the non-nuclear powers, in the wake of Nassau, would have been ungrateful and untimely folly. Something serious was needed, and out of two years of study, what was ready at Nassau and after was the MLF. Not all its necessary characteristics were clear in December, but its main outlines were and are plain. They are not as difficult to understand as some reporters have suggested -- and before arguing the merits and demerits of the proposal, it will help to consider exactly what it is.

The MLF is currently put forward as a NATO strategic missile force with the specific characteristics that it should be (1) seaborne, (2) in surface vessels, (3) with crews of mixed nationality, and (4) under a NATO military command in which an

order to fire would require the political approval of all major participants. The reasons for each of these four requirements are largely political, and mainly negative: other alternatives that are sound enough on military grounds are politically unworkable.

(1) The force is to be seaborne because there is no adequate land space in which its presence would not be politically difficult both within the Alliance and in relation to the Soviet Union. The sea is in any case a much better medium for a genuinely international force.

(2) The surface mode is recommended as against submarines for two reasons: first, because nuclear submarines are enormously complex, and therefore not a good place to begin with a mixed-manned force; second, because the special dependence of the U.S. and the West on the Polaris submarine system makes it unwise to hazard that system in the multilateral mode before appropriate experience has been gained.

(3) The force is to have officers and crews of mixed nationality because it is essential that no one nation should have authority or capability to fire its share of this force independently. As a practical matter it may well be argued that no member of the

NATO force would ever wish to act in this lonely and suicidal fashion, but as a practical matter, too, the mere existence of such a capability would be profoundly disruptive. This is particularly true of any German element of nuclear forces, as the Germans themselves honorably and explicitly recognize, but it could be true of others as well. Thus both in form and in reality the seaborne missile force must be international, and the only fully effective means of ensuring this result is that each ship should be itself an international enterprise.

(4) The requirement of unanimous concurrence in any decision to authorize firing is the only possible immediate answer to a problem which may have different solutions at a later time. The U.S. does not seek in this respect any right which it is not ready to grant to other major participants, but it cannot at present undertake to provide something like one-third of the resources, in addition to its unique knowledge of nuclear and missile technology, while giving up the right of an authoritative voice in the decision to fire. The word "veto" is as dramatic as it is inappropriate in this connection.ⁿ

n. President Kennedy himself has indicated that the provision of warheads without a formal right of concurrence in their use can well become possible for the United States if and when there is a decision-making authority of European scope with which such an arrangement could be made as to a close and equal partner. This U.S. position, it is worth noting, goes beyond anything yet proposed to other Europeans by either the U.K. or France; neither of these nuclear powers has ever shown any interest in sharing weapons on a "veto-free" basis with any ally.

What is at issue is that this new deterrent strength should be available for NATO as a reliable military force in support of the political will of a united alliance. If the Alliance were to split at a moment of desperate danger, the MLF would be only one of many forces whose effectiveness would come into question. But if the Alliance holds together, this force will add substantially to the strength and effectiveness of NATO at any moment of supreme test.

We have seen earlier that a nuclear weapons system designed to meet political guidelines must nonetheless meet the overriding requirement of military effectiveness. This test has been applied consistently to the MLF from its inception, and the firm judgment of the U.S. Navy and the American JCS is that a mixed-manned force of surface ships can in fact be made a militarily effective force. It is true that on strictly military grounds other kinds of forces would be preferable, but American military leaders have recognized that in this case as in so many others strictly military considerations are not enough. While international crews are an innovation, they are also a challenge and an opportunity, and it is the conviction of leading naval officers that with the prestige that would attach to a new NATO missile

force, the recruitment of outstanding crew members from a number of nations will be feasible. Allied naval officers of many countries have expressed their agreement -- and if there is some self-interest in the enthusiasm of these representatives of other non-nuclear navies, it is from just such enlightened self-interest that outstanding military units are best developed.

Even naval critics of a mixed-manned force agree that it can be made to operate if all concerned have a will. A more frequent criticism from opponents of the force is that surface ships may be unduly vulnerable. Repeated technical studies have indicated that this is not a valid criticism. The speed of the missile ships and the variety of available cruising space in the waters of Western Europe give these ships unusual opportunities of evasion and concealment. Moreover, if in fact the Soviet adversary should seek to develop a serious capability of trailing and covering the MLF force, it is the estimate of U.S. naval authorities that appropriate countermeasures could be developed at an expense to NATO very much less than the cost to the Soviets of such shadowing. In short, it appears to be substantially easier to defend this force than to shadow and cover it.

One final military criticism of the MLF deserves attention and refutation. It is that a force of this kind, internationally owned, manned and controlled, might not be a credible deterrent to the

Soviets. Would they believe in it? The simple answer on this point is to repeat that the force will be as believable as the determination of its members as a group. If NATO holds together, so will the MLF. And an elite force formed from the best and most dedicated manpower of the participating nations could be expected on the whole to be a reinforcement both of the cohesiveness of NATO and the collective will of the alliance.

In sum, then, the military estimate of the Government of the United States is that the MLF can be made a first-class operational, survivable, strategic missile force. Because of this conviction, it is the current plan of the USG to offset its own major investment in the MLF by at least corresponding reductions in its plans for other strategic missile systems. The particular shape of the force is designed to meet large political objectives, but both for military purposes and in the service of these larger objectives, it is designed to work.

Since January, the United States Government has been presenting its views on the multilateral force to all interested members of the Alliance. In this presentation it has been building upon earlier discussions dating back to 1960. For it is not correct to assert that the multilateral force is a brand new and sudden creation bought out of Nassau in haste and without earlier discussion or study. In its origins the proposal goes back to the later days of the Eisenhower Administration and it has been the preferred American response to a European need for reassurance on NATO's strategic missile strength ever since. What was new after Nassau is the acceptance of positive responsibility for preparing and presenting a fully developed plan. And as Chancellor Adenauer has remarked, this shift could only be welcomed in Europe, simply because the European members of NATO were not themselves capable of the necessary technical staff work or the necessary political initiative.

The responses to this American initiative have followed the lines that could reasonably be predicted in the light of the general attitudes toward the nuclear problem of the Alliance which were discussed in Part I. The Scandinavian partners have registered their own lack of interest and a considerable coolness toward the venture as a whole. As before, they continue to prefer a fully American responsibility.

In Greece and Turkey, at the other extreme, there has been enthusiasm in principle, but a fair warning that the economic costs of participation are beyond the reach of these countries; they will therefore require some support from the United States if they join, which they would like to do.

The French have stood apart. Their formal response is that they do not think the force useful but will not interfere with it; both their informal comments and the writings of commentators close to the government are more critical. The heart of the French attack is that because of the requirement of unanimity in firing, this force will be no different in its relation to the Alliance from existing U.S. strategic forces, and therefore contributes nothing.

The most clearly affirmative response has come from the Germans. While they would prefer a submarine mode and a more flexible method of control, they have accepted the American preference for surface ships and unanimous agreement as the starting points for the force. They have proposed, and the U.S. has agreed, that both of these questions can properly be reopened after operating experience has been gained. The German acceptance, added together with the American commitment, insure the subscription of something over two-thirds of the necessary resources. But the last 20-30 percent is essential, and more difficult.

Next to the Federal Republic, Italy is probably the country with the most considerable interest in the multilateral force, but a clear Italian decision has been prevented not only by continuing cross currents of opinion in that country, but more immediately by an unusually indecisive election, whose full political consequences have yet to be worked out as the principal non-Communist parties re-examine their own positions and their relations to one another. No Italian commitment can now be expected before the latter part of the summer, at the earliest.

Among other countries with mixed attitudes, there has been a similarly indecisive response. In the low countries and in Canada, the governments wish to know more about the MLF but they do not currently appear ready to invest in it. It appears likely that for them the question of participation is likely to be resolved only after it is clear whether or not the force will in fact come into being. They would probably prefer that the issue not be presented, but if the force becomes real, more than one of them is likely to buy a modest share.

In June the most interesting and significant of all the national positions, and the one under current Cabinet consideration, is that of Great Britain. The British commitment to support the MLF idea did not initially include any undertaking to participate directly in any internationally manned venture. Nevertheless, as events

developed through the winter, it became increasingly clear that the rest of the Alliance would not consider that the UK was in fact supporting this idea unless in fact Her Majesty's Government were prepared to buy a share in it. Thus the moral commitment of Nassau came increasingly to imply a need for British participation, and the statements made by responsible Cabinet officers in February and March implied an increasing acceptance of this position.

But the British Government is contending also with deep seated internal opposition to the MLEF on a number of counts. First, is the persisting British aversion to any encouragement of German military strength. Although the MLEF is designed, to prevent either the appearance or the reality of an independent German nuclear force, and also to forestall future political pressure for any such force, it can also be argued that such a force would merely whet the German appetite for more. The question, as with an untested vaccine, is whether the designed dose will be preventive or infectious. On such issues, at each point in relations with Germany since the Second War, the instinctive reactions of the British and the American Governments have been opposite, and the fact that the American position has been right so far does not make it more appealing to proud and vigilant Englishmen.

A more technical objection is that of leading British military men to the whole notion of putting sailors of different nationalities in the same vessel. Here again the difference is necessarily one of judgment, and while technical discussion may narrow, can hardly eliminate the area of disagreement. Yet it seems unlikely that the principle of mixed-manning, in and of itself, would be decisive for the UK in a judgment of such wide significance.

A more subtle and more powerful difficulty is political. For the British the first principle of Nassau was the preservation of a British deterrent, assigned to NATO, but available for national use at any moment of supreme national necessity. In the NATO Council, British representatives have emphasized "assignment." In British political discussions, they have emphasized that the government has preserved the "independent British deterrent." Facing an early election with a clear-cut -- and possibly impolitic -- decision by the Labor Party to oppose the British Polaris force, the British Government probably wishes to preserve the clarity of its commitment to a British deterrent; a further commitment to take part in the multilateral force may be held to blur a profitable difference between the two great British parties.

Finally, the British face the problem of cost. What is under discussion with the Americans is a 10 percent share in the MLF, and it is estimated that this might imply a cost averaging some 15 million pounds a year over a ten year period. The amount is not overwhelming, but the British defense budget already face stretching to build the Polaris submarines, and Her Majesty's Government, in any case, has never been persuaded in its heart that strategic missiles for NATO are a matter of important priority.

Left to its own free judgment, and unimpeded by the question of its obligations to the U.S. and its future relations to the Federal Republic, the British Government, in these circumstances, would almost surely prefer not to join in the multilateral force. But in the months after January 14 there has been a new appreciation in London of the importance of the Federal Republic, and it remains a fact that in the joint effort launched at Nassau the Americans, in June, have done their full part in support of those matters which were of greatest interest to the UK. Therefore it seems possible that if the United States Government insists with sufficient energy, the British will agree to join.

* * *

But the question which is posed after this review of the varied responses from Europe is whether in fact the U.S. does

now wish to "insist." The MLF has always been designed as a response to the needs and desires of Europeans. Would it meet this purpose truly if in fact it had to be called into existence by intense diplomatic pressure upon parties whose own judgment would not lead them freely to participate?

In facing this question, one particularly sobering element and one which was raised by every government without exception -- including the Germans -- is the element of cost. By American estimates the force over an eight-year period might have a total cost of something under \$3 billion, with annual operating expenses on the order of \$225 million thereafter. For Americans this is a modest sum; their own expenditure on their own strategic nuclear force is running at a level which has been estimated at \$15 billion a year. Even for Europeans, in gross terms, the expense is moderate. It implies an average addition of less than 5 percent to the military budgets of the principal possible participants, and these budgets, except for the British, are manifestly low by most standards. But even a 5 percent addition would fare heavy competition from other departments of government. Especially in a time of reinforced concern for social progress and reform,

such competition becomes important, and in the spring of 1963 this question of choice has been presented against a background of lowered tension and apparently reduced danger from the USSR.

In 1961 and 1962, and especially in the aftermath of the Cuban crisis, articulate European opinion had given strong expression to a need for larger participation in nuclear matters, but these expressions were somewhat muted in 1963 by the prospect of real costs, and in this context of course it became entirely understandable that Europeans should construe the MLF as no more than a device for collecting European resources for use under American control. If this construction is widely accepted, the MLF can hardly be expected to advance the interests of the Alliance.

15
Approved in S
7/4/63

6/24/63
2
SECRET

FRF/WK/3

PRESIDENT'S EUROPEAN TRIP
June 1963

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: June 24, 1963
Time: 10:15 - 11:30 a.m.
Place: Palais Schaumburg

Participants:

United States

The Secretary of State
Ambassador George C. McGhee
McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant
to the President
William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary
Robert C. Cross, Director, Office of
German Affairs

Germany, Federal Republic of

Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder
Vice Chancellor and Minister of
Economics Ludwig Erhard
Defense Minister Kai-Uwe von Hassel
Karl-Heinrich Knapstein, German
Ambassador to the United States
Karl Carstens, State Secretary for
Foreign Affairs
Mr. Ruesterer, Ministry for Foreign
Affairs (Interpreter)

Subject: Multilateral Force (MLF)

<u>Copies to:</u>	S/S	G/PM	GER	Amembassy BONN
	S/P	EUR	BTF	Amembassy LONDON
	G	RPM		Amembassy PARIS
	S/MF	RPE		USRO Paris

After the President and the Chancellor had started private discussions, Foreign Minister Schröder suggested that the other scheduled participants convene in a session. He started the meeting by saying that he wanted to stress what a great pleasure it was for the Germans to have the President here. Yesterday had been a wonderful day and the best possible beginning for the trip. A look at this morning's German press would confirm this. He thought it would be useful to have a brief of the major issues of current interest; the discussion could be continued when he joined the President and the Chancellor.

Group 3. Downgraded at 12-year
intervals, not automatically
declassified.

SECRET

1963
First

SECRET

-2-

First, he would like to take up the NLF. This was one of the major subjects in the foreground today. He thought it would be useful to review the present state of affairs and have a look at the future. He would be grateful if the Secretary would comment on this.

The Secretary said he would first like to say how happy we were to be here and how deeply impressed the President and the rest of us had been by his reception. There was a warmth in it which went straight to the heart. He welcomed this opportunity to go over current problems.

As for the NLF, the Secretary said that we have believed and continue to believe that the construction of a multilateral force within NATO is of the highest importance. For one thing, such a force would have great military utility in the face of increasing Soviet military strength. But even more important was the political significance of such a force, in that it would enable the members of NATO to join together in a coordinated way to defend themselves against the Soviet threat. It was not desirable that it be a special club within NATO composed only of nuclear powers. It was of the greatest importance that the NLF was conceived of as an instrumentality open to all members of the Alliance across the board. It had been hoped that by July serious work could be undertaken on the draft of a treaty establishing the NLF. This would obviously have involved very significant discussions on the part of the governments concerned. We were very much encouraged that the Federal Government was prepared to move forward. The Italians appeared also ready to move, but the picture there was complicated by internal political uncertainty. We would be discussing the matter with the Italians within the next few days. We would have to find out whether the new Government would be able to make any commitment now. It was in any case quite possible that the Italians would be ready to participate in the next stage.

Turning to the British attitude, the Secretary continued, the British Government had since the Nassau Conference given its general approval to the NLF project. Lord Howe appeared to support the NLF. There were, of course, two major obstacles to British participation: First, the cost factor, with the present British military budget already above 8% of GNP; secondly, the NLF had become the subject of internal political debate and controversy in England. We had noted uncertainty regarding Labor Party attitudes, and even some Conservatives were not too enthusiastic. We believed it was very important for Great Britain to take part in the NLF. We felt that if we moved ahead the British would come along with us. But we did not wish to drag them along; it was important that they come willingly. We would also be talking with them in London and Birch Grove. We might need to find a way for proceeding on a more informal basis with them.

The Secretary said our own attitude toward NLF had not changed. We were prepared to proceed. But we felt there was a great advantage in having Italian and UK participation in the Force. We should keep this target in front of us.

There

SECRET

SECRET

-3-

There had been some expressions of doubt in the US -- in Congress and elsewhere. The main question put to us at home was -- What is the European attitude toward the MLF? Should it turn out that the major European countries wished to participate, this would resolve the main problem for us domestically. The Secretary added that he had not made any mention of participation by Greece, Turkey and others; this was really secondary since the main thing was to have the participation of the major countries.

Foreign Minister Schroeder said he was glad to hear the Secretary's views, which appeared identical to what the Germans knew and thought. A difficult period, both politically and psychologically, lay ahead. The Germans considered the MLF very important from the standpoint of the integration, cohesion, and unity of the Alliance. It was also important to settle the nuclear weapons problem on a long-term basis. There were several difficulties at the present time. It would not be good to have the Federal Republic go into the MLF with the US alone. It was important to avoid the impression that only the Germans were pressing for the MLF, since this would give the Soviets too good an opportunity to discredit the project. Schroeder made reference in this connection to the bad effects of recent statements by Harold Wilson in Moscow and Warsaw about his concern over German participation in the MLF. In this way, the negative attitude of the Soviets had been reinforced by UK opposition -- which came together at a time when the British Government was in trouble. The latter appeared in any case to have only a short time in office.

The Italians, the Foreign Minister said, now had a transitional regime which could not undertake anything in the way of firm commitments. It was at least encouraging that the Foreign and Defense Ministers in the new Government had remained the same. In Britain there were strong Conservative elements, such as Macmillan and Hoen, who favored the MLF; but others such as Thorneycroft and some of the military were more reserved. The British had several problems about the MLF. One was the financial situation in the context of coming elections. Another was the political problem that British participation in the MLF would tend to dilute the Conservative electoral slogan about the need for a national nuclear force. There was after all a certain amount of nationalism in the UK, he added.

The Secretary agreed on this latter point, adding that when the Labor Party had indicated its readiness to give up a national nuclear force, this had given the Conservatives a political weapon for the coming elections.

Schroeder said that for the immediate future, which would be a period of transition, it would be hard to move ahead. What could we do in the face of this situation? The Secretary had put it on the basis of asking what the Europeans would do. Schroeder felt that this was not sufficient as concerned the principal need of the moment. This need was a psychological step forward on the keynote of further integration and closer coordination within the Alliance. What was required was a statement from both sides, both by the US as well as by the others, stressing the

factors

SECRET

SECRET

-4-

actors of closer integration and multilateralism within the Alliance. He must also get the British to emphasize the cohesion of the Alliance, even though they might have a problem in making a firm commitment. This kind of action would help bridge the difficult period of eighteen months or so lying ahead. This would make it clear to everyone that it was not just the Germans who favored the project. It was important that all members insist that what the Alliance needed was integration and unity -- and that this meant multilateralism.

The Secretary said he had been very much interested in having the Italians and British say they wished to participate. It was highly desirable from the standpoint of NATO and Atlantic solidarity to make clear it was not just the Americans who wanted the MLP. Otherwise we would give the Soviets, and even the French, an opportunity to divide the Alliance. As for our own interest in this type of project, we should not be called on to testify to this very loudly. One should look back over the last two years to see how far we had come in democratizing our interest in the multilateral aspect of the nuclear weapons problem. Much had been done by us in Paris, Athens, Osaka and other places to establish common guidelines and integrated strategic planning. It was in any case, however, not good for the European participants to come into the MLP "blinking and meekling."

Foreign Minister Schroeder said that the difficulty here was to define what was meant by "Europeanism" in this context. The Turks and the Greeks might be in favor of the MLP, the French might say one thing, and the British still another. Every country had different concepts. In any case, the Turks, the Greeks, the Arabs, and the Belgians were not really big or important enough. What counted was the British and Italians.

Schroeder said there was a further difficulty from the European standpoint. The French were preserving their force de frappe within the perspective of a European multilateral nuclear force. The concept of an independent defense role for Europe had some appeal to Europeans. The French thesis that Europe one day must have its own independent nuclear force had tended to obscure the MLP issue. There was a danger that every difficulty and setback encountered by the MLP would serve to make this French concept more attractive to the Europeans.

Also Chancellor Kerner interjected to state that leading to the future, no one thinks that Europe can become an effective third force. The responsibility given to President Kennedy indicated that the Germans fully trust the US as concerns their security and that they are confident that as long as the US is with them they will be all right. As for the MLP the important question was whether the people of Europe would be convinced that it would really work. Was it really the effective solution merely envisaged? It was essential, in Kerner's opinion, to spread the conviction among the Europeans that the MLP was the project which was needed for Europe.

Defense Minister von Harnack said that on the basis of his recent discussions with Thornycroft it appeared that the British had two objections to the MLP: (a) the problem of cost, and (b) the fact that they did not believe in surface

SECRET

VO 500010

SECRET

-5-

...sols but such preferred Polaris submarines, whether of US or UK manufacture. He had suggested to von Hassel an idea that might move us ahead. This idea would be to ask the British to sign up now to participate in the MLP on a basis whereby they could add their own Polaris submarines to it at a later date. These Polaris submarines could have a mixed manned force of UK and US personnel to serve as a part of the MLP. He thought we should find out if the UK would be willing to enter the MLP on this basis. Even though he himself felt that on submarines it would be possible to have mixed crews on a multilateral basis, there would in any case be no problem for anyone if only British and US sailors were involved. As for Italy, von Hassel said, the problem was one of the internal political situation. Italian Defense Minister Andreotti had asked him not long ago about the attitude of the German Socialists, adding that if the SPD should back the MLP this would make it easier to get the Italian Socialists on his side. Von Hassel had pointed out in reply that Fritz Erler was in favor of the MLP, if only because of the political aspects.

The Secretary said that as concerned von Hassel's suggestion re the MLP, the concept at Nassau had been that the nuclear force under NATO would have several component parts and that even national nuclear forces could become part of the total integrated effort. While von Hassel's idea was interesting, it was still desirable to have the UK participate on the same basis as the other members of the MLP.

Mr. Bundy said there was a danger that if the British participation were to be limited to submarines the surface part of the MLP would still meet strong criticism from military figures in the UK such as Lord Mountbatten. This sort of criticism complicated the problem for us. He agreed with Erhard that the best way to advance the MLP was to get the idea across in all countries that this was the best and most effective means of achieving our common objectives. All of the presently known alternatives to MLP had objectionable features.

Von Hassel said he was only trying to find out how to overcome the obstacles in the UK which had been underscored by Thomasycraft.

Mr. Tyler said he could see some political disadvantage in an arrangement which set up a force which was designed to defend Europe as a whole but which was not applicable to Europe as a whole. This would have in it certain objectionable elements of discrimination.

State Secretary Carstens said we should take measures to avoid the impression that the MLP project was just "dragging along." Foreign Minister Schroeder agreed and said that in the communique on these talks we must give the impression that we were going to move ahead. Mr. Bundy agreed but said we should not stress that we must get things done within the next few days, as for example by July 4.

The Secretary

SECRET

SECRET

-6-

The Secretary concluded the discussion of this point by saying that it was also important to avoid the impression that we considered the MLF as a US-German project. We must stress the positive aspect of integration within the Alliance. We would in any case be in touch with the Germans again re the MLF after our talks in the UK and Italy.

USDEL:RCC:real:raf:ret

SECRET

RELEASED

DECLASSIFIED

Jecy's 1110
6/24/92
EJF

Approved by S
7/9/63

PET/MC/11

PRESIDENT'S EUROPEAN TRIP

June 1963

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: June 24, 1963
Place: Palais Schaumburg

Participants:

United States

The Secretary of State
Ambassador George C. McGhee
McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to
the President for National Security
Affairs
William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary
of State for European Affairs
Robert C. Creel, Director, Office of
German Affairs

Germany

Gerhard Schroeder, Foreign Minister
Ludwig Erhard, Vice Chancellor and
Minister of Economics
Kai-Uwe von Hassel, Defense Minister
Karl Heinrich Knapstein, German
Ambassador to the United States
Karl Carstens, State Secretary for
Foreign Affairs
Mr. Kuesterer, Ministry for Foreign
Affairs (interpreter)

Subject: German Reunification

Copies to: G CIA
S/S-3 DOD/ISA
S/P Amembassy BONN
EUR-2 US Mission BERLIN
BTF Amembassy MOSCOW
GER-2
INR

RMIR -

CLASSIFICATION OF STATE
 RELEASE
 EXCISE
 DENY
 DELETE Non-Responsive Info
FOIA Exemptions
PA Exemptions

MR Cases Only:
EO Citations
Date: 9/24/92
TS authority to
() S or () C OADR
() S or () C OADR
() S or () C OADR
() S or () C OADR

Foreign Minister Schroeder said there was another point which he wished to raise which the Germans had very much at heart. This was how the problem of German reunification should be set forth publicly in the proper context. In recent US statements on the subject, the Germans had not seen many indications of specific reference to German reunification. More emphasis had been placed on the problem of Berlin and Berlin access. For us, Schroeder said, Berlin has significance only in the context of a policy aiming at German reunification. He was aware, of course, that this was a problem which presented practical difficulties to us in our relations with the Soviets. But could we not express this more in a positive way? Could we not try to convince the Soviets that the exercise of the right of self determination by the Germans was in the Soviets' own interest and need not have any unilateral adverse affect. The emphasis should be that to permit self determination to the Germans would help bring about a safer and more secure situation for the Soviets in Europe. If, however, we continued to talk about West Berlin and our rights there, this helped to maintain an atmosphere of tension.

N/A

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECLASSIFIED

- 2 -

The Secretary said he was glad to have these comments. There should be no question of the strength of our feelings about German reunification in the light of our attitude about self determination for all peoples everywhere, including at home. He had spoken to the Soviets, including Gromyko, on many occasions in these terms. He was convinced that we could not have peace in Europe in the absence of self determination, which included German reunification. It was important, however, to face up then to the next question which always came--What are you going to do about it? This applied both at home and to Europe, because since 1945 Europe had been asking of the US: What are you going to do about it? It would be well to consider what we could do concretely to help bring about German reunification. It should be borne in mind that the US had had the least to do of all NATO countries with East Germany and its regime. We should consider what specifically could be done toward reunification. Possibly inter-zonal trade might be an effective instrumentality, and in this area maybe the Federal Government had underestimated its own attractiveness to East Germans. He reiterated that it was not easy to repeat the slogan of German reunification each week without running into the question of what were we going to do about it.

Schroeder said he understood the difficulty of formulating specific measures. He felt, however, that there were several indirect steps which might be taken, even if in a negative sense. It was, for example, very important to prevent any further freezing or petrifying of the present situation. The more recognition the GDR was able to get, the more this strengthened the Soviet position about the existence of two Germanys. It was also important for the Western side to refrain from coming to any arrangement freezing the present situation even without increased recognition for the GDR. To the extent the present situation was frozen, the exercise of self determination by the Germans would be obstructed. The Soviets were aware of this and for this reason were trying to freeze the status quo. Another thing was for us to realize that Berlin was not a thing unto itself and that it had meaning only as a starting point. It was of importance for us to realize this and to make this viewpoint known to the people in East Germany.

As concerned FRG relations with the Soviet Zone, the Federal Government was always anxious to make use of its influence. This underlay the FRG's tactics on the matter of extending credits to the East zone. The same was true in the FRG's trade discussions and arrangements with Poland, Hungary and Romania. The FRG felt it could play a useful role in loosening up the situation behind the Iron Curtain, and the West Germans were trying to do this without damaging either their reunification policy or the situation in Berlin.

The Secretary inquired what had been the attitude of the Poles, Romanians and Hungarians in these discussions toward the Berlin problem. We had ourselves detected occasional notes of a counsel of migration from these countries to the Soviets. Schroeder replied that this might be true but only indirectly. There appeared to be some sort of common directive regarding Berlin and the German problem throughout the Soviet bloc which came from Moscow, but there were definitely at the same time variations and shadings among the various countries of Eastern Europe. There appeared in any case to be no great enthusiasm in these countries for the GDR or for the Soviet position on Berlin and East Germany.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

- 5 -

Ambassador McChes suggested the possibility of relieving pressure by trying to alleviate human suffering and taking specific actions on the humanitarian side.

Vice Chancellor Erhard agreed this was important. He also thought that the matter of trade and credits was something in which the Soviets were much interested and which could be useful. The question of German reunification obviously could not be removed from the political agenda, but the issue of self determination for the people of the Soviet Zone was one of the most difficult obstacles in the way of an understanding with the Soviet Union. They seemed to feel there was no way of granting this without suffering a serious loss of prestige. He had himself noticed how much emphasis the East Germans laid on the element of prestige in conducting trade negotiations. In the face of this insistence on maintaining prestige, it was difficult for the West Germans to know where to start. He felt that in any event it was desirable to have a clear-cut political program on the reunification issue.

At this point the meeting broke up in order to accompany the President and the Chancellor to Villa Kaszarschmidt and the ceremony establishing the German Peace Corps.

GHR:RCC:rel:6/24/63

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

6/25/63

White House - Mr. Klein

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY

3.18

3617
3a

~~SECRET~~

G/PM

June 25, 1963

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Mr. Horst Blomeyer-Bartenstein
First Secretary, German Embassy

9795

Mr. Jeffrey C. Kitchen, G/PM

Subject: NATO Conventional Forces, British Labor Party Statements, Moscow Test Ban Negotiations, and German Participation in Nuclear Matters

Blomeyer invited me to lunch prior to departing on four months home leave - his first in five years. He will return as a Counselor of Embassy, an on-post promotion unusual in the German diplomatic service. Having described the occasion as social, he proceeded to speak almost entirely of military and foreign policy problems.

In commenting on the first day of the President's visit, Blomeyer said he had not seen any official reports but he thought the President's statements directed at local interests of the cities he had visited had been most appropriate and effective. I said I had seen no official reports and foreclosed discussion on what the President might cover in his meetings with the Chancellor.

Blomeyer said that several months ago he had filed a long report to Bonn in which he rationalized sympathetically the American position on the requirement for NATO conventional forces and the American estimate that these forces could successfully deal with a Soviet conventional attack. His purpose had been to convey a U.S. estimate that NATO forces could hold against those Soviet divisions in the Satellites and East Germany which could be moved without strategic warning, taking into account the forces the Soviets would have to devote to maintaining order in the Satellites. His paper had come under strong attack in Bonn and General Steinhoff (German representative on the NATO Military Committee) had returned from a visit to Bonn and reported that "no one of importance" gave credence to the thesis Blomeyer had set forth. This had caused Blomeyer to reread his paper; he realized that he had failed to "deal adequately" with Mr. McNamara's statement of late January (Budget presentation before House Armed Services Committee) that NATO conventional forces could handle a Soviet conventional attack if NATO force goals were ~~group~~ Also,

MP/77/Germany

~~SECRET~~

Downgraded at 12 year intervals; not automatically declassified

had missed Mr. (Paul) Nitze's Cleveland speech in which he understood it was maintained NATO could put up a stout conventional fight along the frontiers but, again, only if NATO met its force goals. He commented that presumably all US statements referred to defense against ready Soviet divisions. An all-out Soviet attack based on Soviet mobilization was not what he had presented in his paper as representing the U.S. assumption, and "nobody" in Germany believed the West could deal with such an attack without resort to nuclear weapons.

I told Blomeyer I could not understand why the Germans ascribed so much strength to Soviet conventional capabilities and seemed to assume that tables of organization and equipment for all identified Soviet units were at 100 percent strength. We were aware how much effort and resources the Soviets were putting into their space program, into agriculture, and into meeting increased popular consumption demands. We knew that many of their divisions were at approximately half strength and that while their stocks in conventional equipment were large, the West was steadily improving its firepower capability. The Germans seem to have forgotten that they, only one nation of Western Europe, had fought a two-front war and still succeeded in going to Moscow. It was inconceivable that the Western Alliance, with its superior industrial base, could not produce sufficient men and a preponderance of equipment to do the job if the leaders of the Atlantic countries made up their minds to do it. In any case, I said, we look to the forthcoming NATO (Stikker) exercise on national force levels, capabilities and budgets as a useful device for further clarifying the rationale for conventional strength.

Blomeyer said that in addition to physical capabilities there were, in conventional warfare, also the functions of time and space. Timing created an advantage that lay with an aggressor. As for space, Germany had never had enough to maneuver its forces properly and for that reason had pursued an offensive policy of a quick strike in the world wars in order to "spring loose" its fighting forces. I commented that there need be no inhibitions on considering that the allies might fight east of the Iron curtain - that there was much to be said for making the best defense, in response to any attack, a good offensive. Blomeyer commented that this might be very practical and suggested that, if planning of this type were known to the enemy, it might have a valuable deterrent effect. However, he thought that practically no one in Europe believed the West had the capability or would have the capability even under fulfilled NATO force goals to carry out a retaliatory offensive.

Blomeyer next turned the conversation to the MLF. He was concerned about the doubtful prospect of any early indication of intention to participate by any other European country. I commented that Europe was in something of a turmoil with a new government coming up in Germany, no government in Italy and the British Conservative Government clearly in trouble with the prospect of an early change there. It was difficult to expect commitments to major policy ventures in such a climate.

My reference to the possibility of a Labor Government in Britain triggered an outburst by Blomeyer against the week-end statement by Harold Wilson that the Germans could not be trusted, had not yet achieved stability and that American prosecution of the MLF concept was arousing latent German interest in controlling nuclear weapons and that this was "dangerous" for Europe. He said this was the thanks Germany got for voluntarily giving up the right to possess nuclear weapons. The British would be participating in the test ban and related negotiations in Moscow; conversations which could vitally affect the future and welfare of Germany but in which Germany would not be taking part because it did not possess the right "membership card". The correctness of French logic on this issue was now apparent. One could count on the French to be logical to a conclusion whereas the British were not and he was afraid the Germans were like the British. Now Germany would be a bystander and simultaneously maligned, especially by the prospective British Government. The person he felt sorry for in the circumstance was Fritz Erler since the SPD, which had been developing "a realistic approach" to defense policy, and which had reached a recent agreement on European defense policy with the British Labor Party along with other Socialist parties, was now lumped by the statement as being equally "untrustworthy". He thought that Erler, who had been only lukewarm on the MLF, might now come out in more forthright support for it since it would seem to be the only avenue to link Germany to decision-making and strategy determination - which most Germans believed they should share. (This line of reasoning is not dissimilar from the "dialectical" approach used by Defense Minister von Hassel in his Kiel speech on June 13 as elaborated by Lt. Col. Viebig, Chief of the Press Section, Ministry of Defense).

I remarked it was doubtful the conversations in Moscow would lead to any major understandings with the Soviet Union; the U.S. was pursuing them mainly to keep the record clear on our willingness to seek a reasonable solution. The French, with or

... a nuclear bomb, were not participating. In any case, Germans could be assured that the U.S. would not agree to anything that jeopardized basic German security interests or those of the NATO alliance. I asked whether there were other Germans who shared his feeling that Germany was severely penalized by not possessing an atomic capability of its own. Blomeyer apparently started to dodge the question, then decided to be forthright. He said the belief was not widespread and the Germans were tired of hearing reports the MLF was being rationalized by the U.S. on the grounds that it was necessary to neutralize latent German "ambitions" in the nuclear field. However, "among the people who are informed - who count - and who have the power of personal position" there was a growing feeling that Germany should have an atomic capability or its voice would not be heard. For the second time in the conversation, he referred to the "self-castration" which Germany had undergone and the penalties incurred thereby.

I commented that since Blomeyer had not been home for five years, he surely would check his impressions on the current and developing attitudes of his German colleagues and that I would be interested in knowing, upon his return, if the feelings he described were indeed confirmed. He said he recognized that resentment against British attitudes most vocally reflected by Harold Wilson and George Brown was perhaps more noticeable in an international setting like Washington than it was in Germany itself. However, he thought personally that if the British continued to pursue such a bitter line there could not help but be a growing German reaction over a period of time.

Comment: Blomeyer previously has not discussed with me German feelings about British attitudes nor German attitudes regarding renunciation of a national nuclear capability. It was my strong impression that his remarks were carefully designed to imply that the Germans had decided to support the MLF as a hedge against continued exclusion from nuclear matters by allies they do not think they can rely on. As for the suggested growing demand by Germans for a national nuclear capability, presented without evidence, I took this to be a "threat" designed to put continuing pressure on the stated American rationale for the MLF - the same rationale Blomeyer had complained of earlier in our conversation. However, it is my estimate that Blomeyer believes his own argumentation about the German need for nuclear "bargaining" power and is highly nationalistic on this question.

G/PM:JCKitchen:rp

PW

The President's European Trip

Approved in S 7/5/63

June 1963

TOP SECRET
US/MC/6

Summary Record of Conversation

Subject: Tour d'Horizon

Date: June 28, 1963

Time: 1:00 p.m.

Place: 1 Carlton Gardens,
London

Participants:

U.S.

British

The Secretary of State
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Mr. Lewis Jones
Mr. William Burdett
Ambassador Bruce (later)

Lord Home
Minister of Defence Thorneycroft
Sir Harold Caccia
Ambassador Ormsby-Gore
Sir Robert Scott, Ministry of Defence
Lord Privy Seal Heath
Oliver Wright, Private Secretary to
Lord Home

For distribution see page 10.

Berlin:

The Secretary asked Lord Home whether he had seen the latest intelligence reports from Berlin. ~~He had seen the reports and they were very interesting.~~
The Secretary thought we might be in for a tense week-end.

Mr. Bundy's Visit to Paris

The Secretary suggested that Mr. Bundy tell the table what had transpired in the course of his talk with the French Foreign Minister. Mr. Bundy said that the French as usual were working on two levels. Couvé de Murville was very reassuring regarding the French attitude towards the United States generally and the President's visit to Europe, at the same time that Alain Peyrefitte was casting doubts upon the long range intentions of the United States. There was not much else to report.

TOP SECRET

POC 7 US/Kennedy
MR DEF(MLE)1
TOP SECRET

Iberiant Command

The Secretary said that an idea new to him had emerged from talks with French Minister of Defense Messmer, i.e., it might be possible to arrange for the French to have a new NATO command which would cover part of the channel and the coasts of France and Spain. Most of this new command, if created, would come from SACLANT. The French might then recommit naval forces to NATO. He wondered if the UK had any views on this possibility.

Thorneycroft said that he thought this idea was worth looking at closely. Sir Robert Scott agreed.

MLF

Lord Home said MLF has no parliamentary support and this was crucial to the UK moving forward. A new objection to MLF had arisen lately, i.e., that this new weapons system would create new East-West tensions at a time "when our purpose is by and large to calm things down." He said many parliamentarians think the German interest in MLF is merely a stepping-stone towards the possession of nuclear weapons.

Thorneycroft said that Admiral Ricketts' visit had been most useful and he believed that all those who had studied the matter now accepted MLF as a feasible system: the vessels could be made to work. However, there was the new political argument against MLF: i.e., the new system would exacerbate tensions. Moreover, the British military are not convinced that MLF will add measurably to Western defense. He said he knew of no parliamentarians prepared to say a word in favor of MLF.

Lord Home commented that he did not believe that the President would expect a British decision on MLF immediately. The President was going on to Rome and would be sounding out the Italians.

The Secretary commented that the President would not wish to "tie his hands" re MLF at Birch Grove, but he must say that among the alternatives available one is not sitting where we are.

Lord Home wondered whether the Germans might not be given what they wanted by giving them a share in the control of NATO nuclear weapons without getting Germans on ships.

Parti
U
The
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Am

F
I
R

The Secretary commented that any control given the Germans in the present systems would have to involve MRBM's, presumably in Germany.

Mr. Bundy ^{said} ~~made the point~~ that the British argument for nuclear submarines was primarily a political one. They did not argue that the new British submarines would contribute importantly to the mega-tonnage available to defend the West. Mr. Bundy said the United States is not in a tremendous hurry but it is highly important that we made the European conscious of their problems.

Lord Home suggested that a body might be set-up consisting of the three nuclear powers plus Germany "plus two rotators." This control mechanism might be the first thing to tackle.

The Secretary objected that this involved honorary membership of Germany in a club. This would not be very meaningful. Lord Home said that the nuclear powers would retain the veto.

Mr. Bundy said that it was important to avoid one thing: i. e., that the Germans would come to say that they were all set with the U.S. for the MLF but that at the last minute the British had stopped the project. If this idea became widely disseminated it would make for trouble in the future.

Lord Home asked the Secretary exactly why the U.S. objects to nuclear submarines. Did Dickie Mountbatten "bump" the U. S. off of the scheme for submarines? It might help the UK with its difficulties to know why the U.S. considered submarines not feasible.

The Secretary replied that the problems of surface vessels are much less than with sub-surface vessels. Another factor was the genuine U.S. fear that the security of the mechanism nuclear submarines might be compromised; some of the NATO partners have security systems less tight than our own.

Lord Home wondered aloud what would happen if the idea was "put into NATO" of some sort of mixed manned system without saying exactly what; he wondered whether anything would come out.

Thorneycroft said that anything put into NATO would raise the issue of France and the other countries.

TOP SECRET

-4-

The Secretary thought putting it into NATO would represent duplication of years of thought and effort which had already gone into MLF planning. He said that U.S. believes the USSR has made the decision to increase its armaments. This being so, he believed the West should increase its armaments and that the U.S. should assist in this endeavor.

Thorneycroft said that there was the unresolved problem of nuclear versus conventional weapons. He exclaimed "The U.S. is the only place in the world where the Congress urges more defense expenditures!" When the Secretary said "We need both conventional and unconventional", Thorneycroft replied "You will not get both from Europe."

Mr. Bundy commented that Europeans feel fully protected but not fully involved.

Lord Home asked whether we might get the French geared into some management machinery for nuclear weapons. It would be a good thing to get France in on jointly-managed forces.

Lord Home said that the prospects for parliamentary approval being so dim, he supposed that the U.S. might go ahead with the Germans and the Italians.

The Secretary said "If we did this, could you stay out?"

Lord Home in effect answered "Yes, since it is not possible for the UK to go in."

Nassau

The Secretary said it was important to get down to the "guts" of the matter. He recalled the agreement made at Nassau and wondered what the British attitude was to cutting the Germans into a role--a role British public opinion is not ready for? Wasn't that the problem?

Lord Home said it was partly the problem, but the idea that MLF would create new tensions was held very strongly in many quarters. It was a new angle - a new problem.

TOP SECRET

Thorneycroft said that if you are to create a European force you must have France in from the start: France is the heart of Europe. France is going ahead with developing the nuclear weapons. He thought the U.S. and the UK must do some sharing of knowledge with France if they are to achieve some cooperation on the nuclear side.

Mr. Bundy asked "What is there in that for the Germans?"

Lord Home seemed to say "nothing."

The Secretary said that if a European nuclear deterrent means that 5 percent of the West's total nuclear power can decide regarding the use of 95 percent of the West's nuclear power (i. e., U.S. power), Europe should recognize that this was just not a possibility. The U.S. would not stand for it.

Lord Home said that he thought the Secretary was perfectly right. The U.S. must, in any European effort, be a "leading member of the board."

Mr. Bundy said that Von Hassel has been talking for his European constituents of getting the American veto out and the Europeans in. However, the Germans would be more dangerous if left out of the party. He thought it was of importance to the Germans that the MLF be kept alive and "plainly on the table." He did not say that some way other than MLF might not be developed, but it was the best system yet devised.

The Secretary reiterated the point that 5 percent could never control the 95 percent.

Asked for his views, Mr. Heath said that he could see no complete or satisfactory answer. The Germans want a greater voice in nuclear weapons, but at the same time they want to retain their alliance with the U.S. The Germans have a psychological problem. They want to be able to say they have a share in the European nuclear deterrent. To Erhard and Schroeder the MLF is a part of the ideas for European integration.

The Secretary reminded the table that the Germans have profoundly resented, more deeply than many realize, the idea of these being tripartite meetings with regard to Germany and Berlin before there are quadripartite meetings. We have been able to get quadripartite action accepted by the French only recently.

11/16/61 Kennedy - 11/16/61 (MLF) TOP SECRET

Mr. Bundy said that he admitted the odds are against the MLF but it is important to keep the project alive and on the table. To the Germans, MLF is a touchstone of Western seriousness.

Lord Home asserted there were difficulties about the nature of the force: MLF ships would operate in the trade lanes of merchant vessels.

The Secretary said that the alternative was MRBM's in Germany in German hands.

Thorneycroft raised the question of a much-needed NATO strategic reexamination.

Mr. Bundy commented there was a paradox: the Germans already owned missiles (but not warheads). They were probably closer to a nuclear capability now in some ways than they would be under MLF.

Lord Home said that things would be much easier for HMG if a request were to come from NATO for seaborne surface missiles.

Mr. Bundy asked what he meant by NATO: surely not all 15!

Lord Home dodged the question and said that the request might come out of the "NATO alliance" following a strategic review.

Mr. Bundy said that the result of any strategic review in strictly military terms would be clear: the result would be a call for putting land-based missiles in France and on the canals. Mr. Bundy admitted that "ships look silly when you consider the alternatives."

Sir Robert Scott then said that he had been talking to the Germans lately and their principal preoccupation is to have a 100 percent U.S. involvement: at the same time they also want Europe to have its deterrent.

The Secretary commented that it was all right if Europe wants to organize its own forces but the problem for Europe is either interdependence or independence. The U.S. was not like the Hessian mercenaries brought to fight in America by Lord Home's ancestors.

TOP SECRET

-7-

Thorneycroft then said that France in four years or less will have its own deterrent, i. e., France will have a trigger. This means it is wise to get France in now.

The Secretary said that Mr. Thorneycroft had raised a problem so grave that he did not wish to comment on it at length, but he would like Mr. Thorneycroft to consider whether the U.S. would permit France's weapon to trigger U. S. nuclear might.

Sir Harold Caccia made the suggestion that France might participate in the control of the multinational forces. There were some nods at the table but this idea was not developed.

Lord Home coming back full circle then suggested the possibility of putting to the NATO committee whether NATO wanted seaborne MRBM's.

The Secretary replied firmly that he was skeptical of a NATO review of a subject such as this because the outcome will be the consensus of the voices of governments: it could not be otherwise. A review of this kind would not get anywhere.

Lord Home said that the MLF has divisive aspects: for example, the Norwegians and some of the other countries would like to veto MLF. They are happy with one finger on the trigger, i. e., the U. S. finger.

Mr. Bundy said we agree that the question should be studied, but the question should be the role of the Europeans in missile defense. We would be willing to see 5 or 6 NATO countries work on the problem seriously "within the NATO framework" but certainly not all 15. He was strongly against referring the problem to NATO proper. What should be considered by the five or six countries within the NATO framework was, "After present forces, What?"

The Secretary reminded the table that for a long time the U.S. said that it would be willing to look at European views on this question. But at Nassau something happened. After Nassau we felt that we had better be more specific re the MLF. The fact that the British are now raising far-reaching questions of principle places the U.S. in some embarrassment. We are embarrassed vis-a-vis the Germans, and vis-a-vis the Italians. We are also embarrassed vis-a-vis Paris since General de Gaulle can only

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

-8-

deduce that it lies in his power to stop MLF in its tracks. It would be a calamity if, after Nassau, it appears that the U. S. and the UK are in full retreat from MLF.

Thorneycroft said that in his view we should press on with strategic studies and then consider the weapons system needed to meet the established requirements.

The Secretary was rather scornful of this idea. He said that in this strategic business you can go round and round the barn and meet yourself. He was not sure that more strategic studies were required. He admitted, however, that the Berlin problem distorts the requirements of NATO.

Lord Home suggested that the French might be asked: Mr. Bundy thought that the French should be asked but strongly doubted that they would come in.

Thorneycroft said the question is whether MLF would unite or divide NATO.

Mr. Bundy said we are in a bad box if, having said publicly, we would use our best efforts to work towards MLF, we now back away. Mr. Bundy thought that British-French heart-to-heart talks would be highly illuminating to the UK. He did not think the French would give an inch.

The Secretary said that the French are sitting on the top of the mountain waiting for us to climb to them.

Thorneycroft said that intimate talks with France were required to which Bundy replied that the U. S. has tried six times to have special talks and has got nowhere.

Lord Home, having listened to this exchange, indicated that he did not agree with Thorneycroft in regard to talking with the French.

Ambassador Bruce reminded the table of the genesis of the MLF idea and the Secretary commented that the real genesis was an effort to keep 600 MRBM's out of Germany.

TOP SECRET

The Secretary said that he would like to put to Lord Home a rude question: "If an MLEF force comes into being, will HMG want to participate in it?"

Lord Home replied rather sadly that HMG has tried hard to sell the idea but it had been unsuccessful. The people were not prepared at this time to accept Germans on ships. It was acceptable to give the Germans a share in NATO planning but he did not see how the British Government can plump now for a new weapons system in which there would be physical German participation.

Mr. Heath commented that we were trying to solve a military problem by political means. The political difficulty for the UK was created by a combination of adverse factors: 1) underlying anti-German sentiment; 2) the U. S. origin of the plan; 3) the opinions of all retired military personnel led by Admiral Mountbatten; 4) finance.

The political difficulty for the United States arose from the following: 1) its own prestige was committed; 2) Germany was committed; 3) Italy was committed, or at least the previous government was; 4) France wanted to see the project fail. Some way must be found to reconcile these respective political difficulties.

The Secretary asked whether anti-German sentiments and costs were the most important factors in the British mind. Mr. Thorneycroft replied that the opinion of retired military personnel was the most important. While costs did not figure prominently at present, this aspect would explode when the problem was gone into more deeply.

Mr. Heath suggested that the MLEF should not be considered on its military merits, but in terms of whether there are political means to solve two very difficult sets of problems. Mr. Bundy agreed and added that the blessing of the Bonn conversations was that they took the time limit off. However, the Germans must show at least that something is under consideration; that the MLEF has not been forgotten. Consideration of the matter by NATO would smother it to death. We needed a special working group. Lord Home asked to see a written formula for such a group.

TOP SECRET

-10-

Mr. Thorneycroft asked whether the West did not have too many missiles already. Mr. Bundy replied that we could not get into a position where we think we need more, but that the alliance does not.

The Secretary again expressed his scepticism of the usefulness of the strategic studies approach. Such studies are made on instructions and take into account the decisions the Governments want to make. Mr. Thorneycroft differed, remarking that the study on strategy was a disembodied one.

Lord Home asked whether participation in international signals on land would satisfy the Germans. The Secretary said that if the MLF falls through, the Germans would go back to their demand for MRBM's in Germany, offer German-manned vessels for the paragraph 6 force, or make an agreement with the French. Mr. Bundy said that all the Germans asked today was that the British study the problem.

Lord Home again said that he would like to see a formula for a broad study and for a group to conduct it.

cc: G	S/MF
S/S-2	Amembassy Moscow
S/P	Amembassy Bonn
EUR	Amembassy Paris
GER	Amembassy London
DOD/ISA	USRO Paris

MIN - Lewis Jones
EUR - Mr. Burdett

TOP SECRET

Iberlant Command

The Secretary said that an idea new to him had emerged from talks with French Minister of Defense Messmer, i.e., it might be possible to arrange for the French to have a new NATO command which would cover part of the channel and the coasts of France and Spain. Most of this new command, if created, would come from SACLANT. The French might then recommit naval forces to NATO. He wondered if the UK had any views on this possibility.

Thorneycroft said that he thought this issue was worth looking at closely. Sir Robert Scott agreed.

MLF

Lord Home said MLF has no parliamentary support and this was crucial to the UK moving forward. A new objection to MLF had arisen lately, i.e., that this new weapons system would create new East-West tensions at a time "when our purpose is by and large to calm things down." He said many parliamentarians think the German interest in MLF is merely a stepping-stone towards the possession of nuclear weapons.

Thorneycroft said that Admiral Ricketts' visit had been most useful and he believed that all those who had studied the matter now accepted MLF as a feasible system: the vessels could be made to work. However, there was the new political argument against MLF: i.e., the new system would exacerbate tensions. Moreover, the British military are not convinced that MLF will add measurably to Western defense. He said he knew of no parliamentarians prepared to say a word in favor of MLF.

Lord Home commented that he did not believe that the President would expect a British decision on MLF immediately. The President was going on to Rome and would be sounding out the Italians.

The Secretary commented that the President would not wish to "tie his hands" re MLF at Birch Grove, but he must say that among the alternatives available one is not sitting where we are.

Lord Home wondered whether the Germans might not be given what they wanted by giving them a share in the control of NATO nuclear weapons without getting Germans on ships.

The Secretary commented that any control given the Germans in the present systems would have to involve MRBM's, presumably in Germany.

Mr. Bundy ^{said} ~~argued~~ that the British argument for nuclear submarines was primarily a political one. They did not argue that the new British submarines would contribute importantly to the megastorage available to defend the West. Mr. Bundy said the United States is not in a tremendous hurry but it is highly important that we made the European conscious of their problems.

Lord Home suggested that a body might be set-up consisting of the three nuclear powers plus Germany "plus two rotators." This control mechanism might be the first thing to tackle.

The Secretary objected that this involved honorary membership of Germany in a club. This would not be very meaningful. Lord Home said that the nuclear powers would retain the veto.

Mr. Bundy said that it was important to avoid one thing: i.e., that the Germans would come to say that they were all set with the U.S. for the MLP but that at the last minute the British had stopped the project. If this idea became widely disseminated it would make for trouble in the future.

Lord Home asked the Secretary exactly why the U.S. objects to nuclear submarines. Did Dickie Mountbatten "bump" the U. S. off of the scheme for submarines? It might help the UK with its difficulties to know why the U.S. considered submarines not feasible.

The Secretary replied that the problems of surface vessels are much less than with sub-surface vessels. Another factor was the genuine U.S. fear that the security of the mechanism nuclear submarines might be compromised; some of the NATO partners have security systems less tight than our own.

Lord Home wondered aloud what would happen if the idea was "put into NATO" of some sort of mixed manned system without saying exactly what; he wondered whether anything would come out.

Thornycroft said that anything put into NATO would raise the issue of France and the other countries.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

-4-

The Secretary thought putting it into NATO would represent duplication of years of thought and effort which had already gone into MLF planning. He said that U.S. believes the USSR has made the decision to increase its armaments. This being so, he believed the West should increase its armaments and that the U.S. should assist in this endeavor.

Thornycroft said that there was the unresolved problem of nuclear versus conventional weapons. He exclaimed "The U.S. is the only place in the world where the Congress urges more defense expenditures!" When the Secretary said "We need both conventional and unconventional", Thornycroft replied "You will not get both from Europe."

Mr. Bundy commented that Europeans feel fully protected but not fully involved.

Lord Home asked whether we might get the French geared into some management machinery for nuclear weapons. It would be a good thing to get France in on jointly-managed forces.

Lord Home said that the prospects for parliamentary approval being so dim, he supposed that the U.S. might go ahead with the Germans and the Italians.

The Secretary said "If we did this, could you stay out?"

Lord Home in effect answered "Yes, since it is not possible for the UK to go in."

Nassau

The Secretary said it was important to get down to the "guts" of the matter. He recalled the agreement made at Nassau and wondered what the British attitude was to cutting the Germans into a role--a role British public opinion is not ready for? Wasn't that the problem?

Lord Home said it was partly the problem, but the idea that MLF would create new tensions was held very strongly in many quarters. It was a new angle - a new problem.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

10.

Thorneycroft said that if you are to create a European force you must have France in from the start: France is the heart of Europe. France is going ahead with developing the nuclear weapons. He thought the U.S. and the UK must do some sharing of knowledge with France if they are to achieve some cooperation on the nuclear side.

Mr. Bundy asked "What is there in that for the Germans?"

Lord Home seemed to say "nothing."

The Secretary said that if a European nuclear deterrent means that 5 percent of the West's total nuclear power can decide regarding the use of 95 percent of the West's nuclear power (i.e., U.S. power), Europe should recognize that this was just not a possibility. The U.S. would not stand for it.

Lord Home said that he thought the Secretary was perfectly right. The U.S. must, in any European effort, be a "leading member of the board."

Mr. Bundy said that Von Hassel has been talking for his European constituents of getting the American veto out and the Europeans in. However, the Germans would be more dangerous if left out of the party. He thought it was of importance to the Germans that the MLF be kept alive and "plainly on the table." He did not say that some way other than MLF might not be developed, but it was the best system yet devised.

The Secretary reiterated the point that 5 percent could never control the 95 percent.

Asked for his views, Mr. Heath said that he could see no complete or satisfactory answer. The Germans want a greater voice in nuclear weapons, but at the same time they want to retain their alliance with the U.S. The Germans have a psychological problem. They want to be able to say they have a share in the European nuclear deterrent. To Erhard and Schroeder the MLF is a part of the ideas for European integration.

The Secretary reminded the table that the Germans have profoundly resented, more deeply than many realize, the idea of their being unipartite meetings with regard to Germany and Berlin before there are quadripartite meetings. We have been able to get quadripartite talks accepted by the French only recently.

TOP SECRET

SECRET

Mr. Bundy said that he admitted the odds are against the MLF but it is important to keep the project alive and on the table. To the Germans, MLF is a touchstone of Western seriousness. ||

Lord Home asserted there were difficulties about the nature of the force: MLF ships would operate in the trade lanes of merchant vessels.

The Secretary said that the alternative was MRBM's in Germany in German hands.

Thorneycroft raised the question of a much-needed NATO strategic reexamination. *change*

Mr. Bundy commented there was a paradox: the Germans already owned missiles (but not warheads). They were probably closer to a nuclear capability now in some ways than they would be under MLF.

Lord Home said that things would be much easier for NATO if a request were to come from NATO for sea-borne surface missiles.

Mr. Bundy asked what he meant by NATO: surely not all 15!

Lord Home dodged the question and said that the request might come out of the "NATO alliance" following a strategic review.

Mr. Bundy said that the result of any strategic review in strictly military terms would be clear: the result would be a call for getting land-based missiles in France and on the canals. Mr. Bundy admitted that "ships look silly when you consider the alternatives." ||

Sir Robert Scott then said that he had been talking to the Germans lately and their principal preoccupation is to have a 100 percent U.S. involvement: at the same time they also want Europe to have its deterrent.

The Secretary commented that it was all right if Europe wants to organize its own forces but the problem for Europe is either interdependence or independence. The U.S. was not like the Hessian mercenaries brought to fight in America by Lord Home's assertions. ||

SECRET

SECRET

TOP SECRET

Thorneycroft then said that France in four years or less will have its own deterrent, i.e., France will have a trigger. This means it is wise to get France in now.

The Secretary said that Mr. Thorneycroft had raised a problem so grave that he did not wish to comment on it at length, but he would like Mr. Thorneycroft to consider whether the U.S. would permit France's weapon to trigger U. S. nuclear might.

Sir Harold Caccia made the suggestion that France might participate in the control of the multinational forces. There were some nods at the table but this idea was not developed.

Lord Home coming back full circle then suggested the possibility of putting to the NATO committee whether NATO wanted seaborne MRBM's.

The Secretary replied firmly that he was skeptical of a NATO review of a subject such as this because the outcome will be the consensus of the voices of governments: it could not be otherwise. A review of this kind would not get anywhere.

Lord Home said that the MLF has divisive aspects: for example, the Norwegians and some of the other countries would like to veto MLF. They are happy with one finger on the trigger, i.e., the U. S. finger.

Mr. Bundy said we agree that the question should be studied, but the question should be the role of the Europeans in missile defense. We would be willing to see 5 or 6 NATO countries work on the problem seriously, "within the NATO framework" but certainly not all 15. He was strongly against referring the problem to NATO proper. What should be considered by the five or six countries within the NATO framework was, "After present forces, What?"

The Secretary reminded the table that for a long time the U.S. said that it would be willing to look at European views on this question. But at Nassau something happened. After Nassau we felt that we had better be more specific re the MLF. The fact that the British are now raising far-reaching questions of principle places the U.S. in some embarrassment. We are embarrassed vis-a-vis the Germans, and vis-a-vis the Italians. We are also embarrassed vis-a-vis Paris since General de Gaulle can only

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

-8-

Handwritten note:
Hand out of touch w JPK

deduce that it lies in his power to stop MLF in its tracks. It would be a calamity if, after Nassau, it appears that the U. S. and the UK are in full retreat from MLF.

Thorneycroft said that in his view we should press on with strategic studies and then consider the weapons system needed to meet the established requirements.

The Secretary was rather scornful of this idea. He said that in this strategic business you can go round and round the barn and meet yourself. He was not sure that more strategic studies were required. He admitted, however, that the Berlin problem distorts the requirements of NATO.

Lord Home suggested that the French might be asked: Mr. Bundy thought that the French should be asked but strongly doubted that they would come in.

Thorneycroft said the question is whether MLF would unite or divide NATO.

Mr. Bundy said we are in a bad box if, having said publicly, we would use our best efforts to work towards MLF, we now back away. Mr. Bundy thought that British-French heart-to-heart talks would be highly illuminating to the UK. He did not think the French would give an inch.

The Secretary said that the French are sitting on the top of the mountain waiting for us to climb to them.

Thorneycroft said that intimate talks with France were required to which Bundy replied that the U. S. has tried six times to have special talks and has got nowhere.

Lord Home, having listened to this exchange, indicated that he did not agree with Thorneycroft in regard to talking with the French.

Ambassador Bruce reminded the table of the genesis of the MLF idea and the Secretary commented that the real genesis was an effort to keep 600 MRBM's out of Germany.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

-9-

The Secretary said that he would like to put to Lord Home a rude question: "If an MLF force comes into being, will HMG want to participate in it?"

Lord Home replied rather sadly that HMG has tried hard to sell the idea but it had been unsuccessful. The people were not prepared at this time to accept Germans on ships. It was acceptable to give the Germans a share in NATO planning but he did not see how the British Government can plump now for a new weapons system in which there would be physical German participation.

Mr. Heath commented that we were trying to solve a military problem by political means. The political difficulty for the UK was created by a combination of adverse factors: 1) underlying anti-German sentiment; 2) the U. S. origin of the plan; 3) the opinions of all retired military personnel led by Admiral Mountbatten; 4) finance.

The political difficulty for the United States arose from the following: 1) its own prestige was committed; 2) Germany was committed; 3) Italy was committed, or at least the previous government was; 4) France wanted to see the project fail. Some way must be found to reconcile these respective political difficulties.

The Secretary asked whether anti-German sentiments and costs were the most important factors in the British mind. Mr. Thorneycroft replied that the opinion of retired military personnel was the most important. While costs did not figure prominently at present, this aspect would explode when the problem was gone into more deeply.

Mr. Heath suggested that the MLF should not be considered on its military merits, but in terms of whether there are political means to solve two very difficult sets of problems. Mr. Bundy agreed and added that the blessing of the Bonn conversations was that they took the time limit off. However, the Germans must show at least that something is under consideration; that the MLF has not been forgotten. Consideration of the matter by NATO would smother it to death. We needed a special working group. Lord Home asked to see a written formula for such a group.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Mr. Thorneycroft asked whether the West did not have too many missiles already. Mr. Bundy replied that we could not get into a position where we think we need more, but that the alliance does not.

The Secretary again expressed his scepticism of the usefulness of the strategic studies approach. Such studies are made on instructions and take into account the decisions the Governments want to make. Mr. Thorneycroft differed, remarking that the study on strategy was a disembodied one.

Lord Home asked whether participation in international signals on land would satisfy the Germans. The Secretary said that if the MLF falls through, the Germans would go back to their demand for MRBM's in Germany, offer German-manned vessels for the paragraph 6 force, or make an agreement with the French. Mr. Bundy said that all the Germans asked today was that the British study the problem.

Lord Home again said that he would like to see a formula for a broad study and for a group to conduct it.

- cc: PW - 1-3
- WH - 4-6
- G - 7
- S/S - 2-8-9
- S/P - 10
- EUR - 11
- GER - 12
- DOD/ISA - 13
- S/AF - 14
- Aembassy Moscow - 15
- Aembassy Bonn - 16
- Aembassy Paris - 17
- Aembassy London - 18
- USRO Paris - 19

RM 12-2

MIN - Lewis Jones
EUR - Mr. Burdett

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

S/S

6/29/63

SECRET

2

Approved by White House 7/12/63

PET/MC/17

PRESIDENT'S EUROPEAN TRIP
June 1963

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: June 29, 1963
Time: 10 a.m.
Place: Birch Grove

Participants:

United States

United Kingdom

The President
The Secretary of State
Ambassador Bruce
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Mr. William R. Tyler

Prime Minister Macmillan
Lord Home
Sir David Ormsby Gore
Lord Hailsham
Mr. Peter Thorneycroft
Sir Harold Caccia
Mr. Philip de Zulueta

Subject: MLF

Copies to:

G	BNA	Amembassy LONDON
S/S	RPM	Amembassy PARIS
S/P	INR	Amembassy BONN
S/AL	DOD/ISA	Amembassy MOSCOW
S/MF	DOD/OSD	USRO Paris
EUR		

The Prime Minister said there was a political problem of presentation rather than a military problem. He explained to the President the position of HMG on the eve of the House of Commons debate on Tuesday and Wednesday, July 2 and 3. He said the mood of the House was confused and that unless he had a clear statement

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12 year intervals; not automatically declassified.

SECRET

FILED
AUG 12 1963

(2)

SECRET

-2-

of the Government's position he didn't think that the Government would survive. He said that he intended to "attack the attackers" of the surface mode, for example, Field Marshal Montgomery and others. The Prime Minister was satisfied on the basis of the findings of the experts that the MLF plan was workable and "not to be laughed out of court." He had always said that sooner or later the question would arise whether the alliance would be able to survive, while its members were growing in strength, on the basis of nuclear forces being only in the hands of the two major parties. The problem was, he said, "how to NATOize the atom." The Prime Minister recalled the British commitment at Nassau to assign bombers to NATO. The MLF had also been discussed and the problem was a difficult one, but, he said, we must maintain our general attitude and go forward.

The Prime Minister said that it would not be possible for HMG to participate in a conference which discussed only the MLF. He said HMG could not take this politically. On the other hand if the talks were so generalized that it looked as though the MLF were being dropped, that would be bad for the President of the United States. He said he thought the best thing would be not to hold a formal conference with a lot of admirals in uniform present "to launch the fleet." He hoped it would be possible to create a framework of discussion within which each participant would explain what was on his mind in relation to the total NATO nuclear problem.

The President expressed understanding for the political situation in which HMG found itself. He said that the discussions at Nassau had their origin in the problem posed by the decision to give up Skybolt. He noted that people still talked of US bad faith with regard to Skybolt, but they did not realize how much money the US had put into Skybolt, roughly \$350 million. The President recalled that we had offered to participate with the UK in the cost of continuing Skybolt, that we had offered Skybolt to the French, and that we had developed the thought of the MLF as a step forward in the circumstances. The President said that maybe the MLF was not a satisfactory solution. However those who say this

haven't

SECRET

SECRET

-3-

haven't come up with a better alternative. He said the UK Labor Party wanted a NATO solution but never seemed to provide any details of how to achieve one. He thought it was desirable to continue to study the possibility of a NATO solution. He hoped that HMG would be prepared to study with other NATO powers, including the US and the FRG, along what lines progress could be made. The President said we were not thinking of a formal meeting in August, but rather how to keep the discussion going. It was important to agree on what the UK relationship to the US-FRG study would be. We were not pressing HMG necessarily to be part of this study.

The Prime Minister said he agreed that HMG did not want to participate in a regular conference. He thought he would say that the UK had long recognized that the basic problem which confronts the NATO powers is that of the relationship of non-nuclear powers to the nuclear deterrent. Nuclear weapons for the alliance were needed. He thought the thing to do was to study the problem of the organization of the nuclear deterrent and its relationship to the alliance. This would include a study of various solutions of which the MLF is one. At this point the President tried to get the Prime Minister to agree to saying that HMG was prepared to join in a study of matters "relating to problems connected with the MLF" but the Prime Minister said he couldn't go as far as this. The Prime Minister then outlined what he intended to say in Parliament in the following week, so as to avoid being pinned down on joining a study concerned exclusively with the MLF.

At this point Lord Hailsham said he thought it should be possible for HMG to say that it would be prepared to discuss matters relating to the MLF, without prejudice to the question of HMG participation. The Prime Minister said he would do what he could in this general sense.

The President said that unless it were properly handled, the present situation could develop analogously to the Skybolt problem. If the MLF were to fail, the Germans would then say that they must have land based MRBM's, to which the US was opposed.

(At

SECRET

SECRET

-4-

(At this point it was recognized that there was a problem of language of the communique, and that this had to be faced immediately. The President asked Mr. McGeorge Bundy to go off and draft some language with the British, which would be mutually satisfactory.)

Secretary Rusk warned against linking the MLF to the Moscow trip of Lord Hailsham and Under Secretary Harriman, lest this matter create the impression in the minds of the Soviets that the MLF was negotiable.

USDEL:WRTyler:mt

SECRET