

wd but prob Apr 62
~~3/15/62~~ 9
~~any other name~~
WJPK

~~SECRET~~

PROPOSED DRAFT

The United States should outline the following elements in NAC, at appropriate times and in suitable detail. These elements should be discussed in the context of revised strategy. Within this framework, the need for improved conventional forces should be stressed and elaborated in necessary detail, and the extent to which the nuclear proposals are dependent on an adequate conventional program should be made clear.

1. NATO Participation: Measures should be instituted to give NATO greater information about US nuclear strategy, and greater participation in the formulation of that strategy. (Specific actions to this end currently under study by the State and Defense Departments should be included, if they are found to be useful.) As part of these measures:

(a) Procedures should be instituted in which we would share information about our nuclear forces and consult about basic plans and arrangements for their use in the NAC and the Standing Group of the Military Committee. Although we should withhold highly sensitive operational information concerning sorties commitments, time on target, penetration tactics and the like, we can and should provide a considerable body of information, including targetting policy, nuclear force strengths, analysis of the force capabilities, some intelligence on Soviet Bloc strengths, and constraint policies. In putting forth this information, the US

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.0
NLP 94-36
By *[Signature]* NARA, Date 12/97

NSP 1216 / MLP: *[Signature]* 1/26/62

SECRET

would stress the extent to which planned uses of this US strategic force are devoted to European as well as North American interests, the importance of responsible, centralized control over nuclear forces, the strength of the present and future nuclear capabilities of the US, and the probable consequences if a nuclear war were to occur. To facilitate this enlarged participation by NATO in over-all nuclear planning and operations, increased functions regarding these matters could be assigned to appropriate bodies, such as a small special group and the NATO Standing Group-Military Committee.

(b) An attempt should be made to work out NATO guidelines, which the US President would agree to observe, regarding use of all US nuclear weapons in defending NATO.

2. US Forces Outside the Continent:

(a) The US should indicate to its allies that an appropriate portion of US external forces will be directed against targets of special concern to Europe.

(b) The US should state that it is prepared to commit US nuclear forces outside the European continent to NATO (additional to those already committed, in amounts to be determined). This might be the force indicated under (c).

(c) To meet on an interim basis any political need for having

SECRET

SECRET

MRBM's based in the European area which would come under NATO wartime military command, Polaris submarines should, as promised by the President in May 1961, be committed to NATO. The US should furnish NATO with a schedule calling for the progressive commitment of Polaris submarines as the total Polaris force grows.

(d) To meet on an interim basis any political need for multi-lateral political control over MRBM's based in the European area, the US should indicate its willingness to consider proposals for some form of multi-lateral NATO control (such as indicated under 3 f below) over the Polaris submarines committed to NATO, if this is strongly desired by our allies. It should make clear that it could not consider proposals which would limit the operational effectiveness of this vital element of the free world deterrent or prevent the US from using these submarines in self-defense whenever it felt compelled to do so. The US should also make clear that the timing of any US decisions on these proposals would have to be determined by the US in the light of operational considerations at the time the proposals were made. Any multilateral control over these Polaris submarines would lapse when they were replaced by a multilateral MRBM force.

3. Multilaterally Manned NATO Force: The US should indicate its willingness to join its allies, if they wish, in developing a modest-sized (on the order of 200 missiles) fully multilateral NATO sea-based MRBM

SECRET

SECRET

force. It should not urge this course, and should indicate its view that MRBM forces are not urgently needed for military reasons, in view of already programmed US strategic forces; it should make clear that it would be prepared to facilitate procurement of MRBM's only under multilateral ownership, control, and manning.

(a) Targeting and Weapons. The question of the targeting for a multilateral force, and the question of the kind of missile and vessel to be used in the force, should be determined in the light of NATO's continuing consideration of strategy, the role of the force in that strategy, and other relevant factors.

(b) Participation. The US should only be prepared to proceed if the venture had adequate allied participation, so that it did not appear to be a thinly disguised US-German operation.

(c) Costs. The costs should be equitably shared. The US should make clear that it would not be prepared to make a major contribution to the cost but would expect the greater part of the burden to be borne by the allies.

(d) Mixed Manning. The US should require a sufficient degree of mixed manning to ensure that one nationality does not appear to be predominant in the manning - and is not, in fact, in control - of any vessel or of the missiles aboard any vessel in the multilateral force.

SECRET

SECRET

Members of the mixed crews would be recruited from national armed forces into the NATO MRBM force and would thereafter be under the control of that Force; for trial and punishment of major crimes, they would be returned to their country of origin.

(e) Custody. Ways should be found to safeguard design data, e. g., US custodians could remain aboard any multilaterally manned NATO vessels, with standing orders to release the warheads in case a properly authenticated order to fire was received through agreed channels (see g, below).

(f) Centralized Command. In presenting these views, the US would stress its belief that the defense of the NATO area is indivisible and that a NATO Force, if one is created, could not fragment this unified task. Planning for its use should, therefore, assume that it would be employed in integral association with other alliance nuclear forces. Construction of such a Force along the lines suggested above would thus not imply that the separate defense of Europe was its purpose or likely effect. On the contrary, our willingness to join in creating such a force should be dramatic evidence of our unconditional commitment to the defense of the entire alliance.

(g) Control. The US should indicate that it wishes to ascertain the views of its allies concerning the control formula. In

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

the ensuing discussion, it should be receptive to a control formula along the lines of that on which they are most likely to agree:

(i) Advance delegation to some person or group of authority to order use of the MRBM Force (in conjunction with other nuclear forces available to NATO), in the clearly specified contingency of unmistakable nuclear attack on NATO.

(ii) Agreement that the decision to order use of the force in other contingencies should be based on a pre-arranged system of voting in the NAC.

In connection with allied consideration of the NAC voting system, which a majority of our allies will almost certainly wish to include provision for voting by unanimity or by a group including the US, the US should make plain that there are serious legislative and other obstacles to excluding a US veto. It should indicate that it is willing, however, to consider any proposal which is put to us by a clear majority of the alliance.

SECRET

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

PERMANENT RECORD COPY

E3 1/3/62 EUL

L
Action
SS
Info

SECRET

Quotation removed per 4/5-1 3/13/91

Control: 1001

Rec'd: January 3, 1962
3:39 pm

FROM: Moscow

MICROFILMED

TO: Secretary of State

KENNEDY

NO: 1854, January 3, 5 p.m.

~~EYES ONLY~~

APRIL

LIBRARY

1962

1834
Moscow

ACTION DEPARTMENT 1854; INFORMATION LONDON 335, PARIS 371, BONN 288, BERLIN 212.

~~EYES ONLY~~

Although in our discussion Berlin problem yesterday Gromyko mentioned in passing removal of deadline I was struck by fact that he showed no disposition to be in any hurry or interest in how long present phase might continue. Also notable he did not use abusive language re West Germans.

It is clear he will maintain position he cannot discuss details of access until he has fairly clear idea of what access is to. Question arises as to what I should say about our thinking on status of West Berlin. For example if I am to reveal non-negotiable points in Section 2, Annex 3 of Working Group Report, particularly point D concerning West Berlin relationship to DRG, I am afraid discussions would be over. Maintenance of present situation would be more advantageous to Soviets than what we propose. As a minimum I believe Soviets will insist upon our willingness to discuss a new status for West Berlin but might accept arrangement whereby they would be free to state occupation status ended by their separate treaty while we would maintain that our occupation rights continued to exist. In any event believe they will insist that it be made clear West Berlin is not part of West Germany. Believe we have strong argument for reserving occupation rights in order to ensure that no future West Berlin regime engage in provocative actions.

762.00/1-

REVIEWED BY *[Signature]* Date 4/11/91
FOI, EO or PA exemptions
() CLASSIFY as
() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C, etc.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CJ/C/MR
() RELEASE () DECLASSIFY
() EXISE () DECLASSIFY in PART
() DENY () DELETE
() Non-responsive info.

[Handwritten mark]

SECRET

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY PROHIBITED UNLESS UNCLASSIFIED

* This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken *

ACTION ASSIGNED TO:	ACTION TAKEN	DATE OF ACTION	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R
NAME OF OFFICER			
OFFICE SYMBOL			

SECRET

-2- 1854, January 3, 5 p.m. From Moscow

Gromyko based objection to all-Berlin solution on grounds different social system. In order keep ball in play on this issue would it be possible for us to suggest willingness consider establishment "Confederation of West and East Berlin" with each side maintaining its own security, economic and currency arrangements, etc., but with some overall body to handle certain common problems such as transportation, sewage disposal, etc. with possibility a few of its functions could be expanded by mutual agreement. Arrangement would provide for freedom of movement within Greater Berlin and presumably wall would have to be built around rather than across Berlin. In view Soviet endorsement Ulbricht's Confederation proposal for Germany might be awkward for them to object and could be useful device for them to have excuse for removing wall. This would also cover their demand for change in status Berlin and they would share occupation rights by occupation their sector, in any case I need something positive to say about our thinking on status West Berlin at next session and would appreciate as precise guidance as Department can give.

THOMPSON

FH/9

SECRET



Record Number 58712

<u>SET</u>	Berlin Crisis
<u>BC1</u>	Yes
<u>DOCUMENT TYPE</u>	Cable
<u>DATE</u>	01/03/1962
<u>CIRCD</u>	
<u>TIME</u>	
<u>CABNO</u>	1854
<u>DOCNO</u>	
<u>ORIGIN</u>	United States Embassy. Soviet Union
<u>SIGNATOR</u>	Thompson, Llewellyn E.
<u>DESTO</u>	United States. Department of State
<u>DESTP</u>	
<u>DRAFT</u>	
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	Secret
<u>TITLE</u>	
<u>CTIT</u>	[Discussion of Meeting with Andrei Gromyko on Berlin]
<u>NAMES</u>	Gromyko, Andrei A.
<u>NAMES</u>	Ulbricht, Walter
<u>TERMS</u>	
<u>ORGAN</u>	
<u>PGS</u>	2

1/3/62
EG

SECRET

S/O:GER - Martin J. Hillenbrand
(Drafting Office and Officer)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXCISE

Approved in S
1/10/62

Memorandum of Conversation

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

DATE: January 5, 1962
Place: Secretary's Office
Time: 4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Berlin

January 16, 1962

PARTICIPANTS: United Kingdom

United States

Ambassador Sir David
Ormsby-Gore

The Secretary
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Hillenbrand

COPIES TO: S/S 2cc SOV - 2
G 66 GER-2 - 7 - 7
S/B - 1 S/O - 7
S/P - 2 WH-Mr. Bundy - 2
EUR-2 - 3 - 4 10-11
RA - - -

Ambassy Bonn (The Ambassador) - 12
Ambassy Moscow (The Ambassador) - 13
Ambassy Paris (The Ambassador) - 14
Ambassy Paris (USRO) - 15
USBER-Berlin (Mr. Lightner) - 16
Ambassy London (The Ambassador) - 17

The British Ambassador said he had come to discuss the two British memoranda on aspects of Berlin which had been handed to Mr. Bohlen by Lord Hood earlier in the day (copies attached). He was interested in knowing whether the first memorandum on how Prime Minister Macmillan and Lord Home should develop their forthcoming discussions with Chancellor Adenauer and Foreign Minister Schroeder jibed with American thinking about the development of the Thompson talks with Gromyko. The Secretary said this British memorandum posed no basic problems for us. However, the points in paragraph 3 (a) and 3 (b) touched on areas of German sensitivity. As to the question of Western dealings with the East German authorities and acceptance of their existence, in his first talk with Ambassador Thompson Gromyko had said that the U.S. had already recognized the GDR de facto. He wondered if Western conduct which confirms the existence of East Germany is all that is wanted rather than a more formal kind of de facto recognition. The Secretary noted certain differences between the Anglo-Saxon and the continental law tradition, with the latter stressing the significance of "informal formalities" to which we paid little attention. Moreover, he continued, the area of Western dealings with the East Germans would be affected by any arrangements made with respect to an International Access Authority. The state of discussion of this subject therefore might make it inappropriate to press too hard during the Bonn visit on the subject covered in 3 (a).

SECRET

CLASSIFIED FILE

REVIEWED by [Signature] Date 4/11/91
FOI, EO or PA exemptions 51 A5, 75
() CLASSIFY as
() DOWNGRADE TO () Sor () C, U, etc.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CIC/MR
() RELEASE
() DECLASSIFY
() DECLASSIFY IN PART
() DENY
() DELETE
() Non-responsive info.

102-501-562

B1 A3 A5

Approved by [Signature]

SECRET

- 2 -

[The Secretary commented that it would be in our interest to let it become clear that on some of these points the basic argument of the Germans and French was not with what de Gaulle called the Anglo-Saxons but with the Soviets.]

Referring to the seven alternative formulae in the substantive paper which had been developed by the Ambassadorial Group, []

[] The Secretary remarked that it was probably not desirable at the present stage to spell out this sort of thing too precisely. As to paragraph 3 (b), the Secretary continued, this could be affected by the Soviet attitude if the abstract from the Khrushchev memorandum to Kroll attached to the British memorandum were correct. If the Soviets included political and cultural links between West Berlin and the Federal Republic among those which they considered permissible this would have a bearing on 3 (b). We were agreed that we will press for as close links between the two as the traffic will bear. Certainly we do not want to close the door for the broadest kind of links.

[] The Secretary said that this was a matter which had to be talked over with the Germans to see how strongly they felt. They were playing it both ways in a sense. They had many dealings with the GDR but did not want to be caught at it. He hoped we could in the next Thompson talk with Gromyko present the International Access Authority in a simpler fashion to the Soviet than in the form of the full draft agreement. []

[] The Secretary commented that, at the outset, the Soviets will demand more in any event. Some East German connection with the International Access Authority was essential, given the fact that we would operate over East German territory. This might be accomplished either by GDR participation on the Board of Directors or by having a Four-Power Board of Directors with some system for GDR liaison.

With

SECRET

SECRET

3

With respect to the British paper on Occupation Rights, the Secretary said he hoped some way could be found to deal with this without the necessity of any formal steps by the West Berliners or by us to set up a trusteeship. This word carried too many connotations. There were perhaps two ways of achieving this:

(a) There might be a Four-Power agreement which was silent on the question of Western occupation rights. We would say we were prepared to operate on the basis of such an agreement. If anything happened to the agreement, this would restore the direct application of occupation rights. One agreement would, in effect, be superimposed on the other system rather than superseding it. The Soviets could concentrate on the second. We would not wear occupation rights on our sleeves but they would be there.

(b) We could ourselves declare that we consider our position in Berlin to be based on more than occupation rights. We were holding the Western sectors in trusteeship for the German people and at the desire of the West Berliners. This would combine the elements of trusteeship and self-determination.

We would be reluctant, the Secretary continued, to see a formal trusteeship established which would give the Berliners the impression that the basis of our rights had been radically changed. Sir David said the idea of the British paper was that new relations stem from Western rights but are expressed in new terms. The new status would not supersede the previous one which would be in abeyance until reunification, or the remainder of the agreement were violated. In the latter case, we would go back to the original rights. But the purpose would be to create a different status. This new entity could then have contractual relations with the Federal Republic, perhaps along the lines suggested in the Khrushchev memorandum to Kroll. Everything the Soviets have said has implied that no agreement would be possible unless a different term is used than occupation regime.

The Secretary said we would consider the British paper, but we would be worried about taking a formal step in 1962 which would completely substitute for what happened in 1945. [

B1A3

The Secretary commented that he did not feel that occupation rights withered away with time. Should we accept the Soviet thesis regarding the obsolescence of occupation rights? [

B1A3

SECRET

SECRET

[The Secretary noted that, in our new draft instructions to Ambassador Thompson, we would suggest that the element of a plebiscite be injected. Sir David said the second British paper was not urgent and he would report that we had certain hesitations about it,]

[The Secretary said we did not like the idea of a change of status, but the thought in paragraph (c) might be used if it could be suitably incorporated in a Western declaration. Going back to the Khrushchev memorandum to German Ambassador Kroll, the Secretary said he did not believe this inclusion of the word "political" could have been accidental. He referred to how Stalin's omission of the word "currency" in a document in 1949, gave an indication of the Soviet shift of position which led to the Jessup-Malik talks. Sir David agreed that inclusion of the word "political" was significant if the contents of the memorandum had been directly reported.]

B1A

B11

SECRET

SECRET

BERLIN

B/A

SECRET

7
→

SECRET

2

4

SECRET

SECRET

ANNEX

7

B143
A5

SECRET

SECRET

BERLIN: OCCUPATION RIGHTS

B.

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

B1A3
A5

SECRET

Record Number 58714

<u>SET</u>	Berlin Crisis
<u>BC1</u>	Yes
<u>DOCUMENT TYPE</u>	Memorandum of Conversation
<u>DATE</u>	01/05/1962
<u>CIRCD</u>	
<u>TIME</u>	
<u>CABNO</u>	
<u>DOCNO</u>	
<u>ORIGIN</u>	United States. Department of State. Bureau of European Affairs. Office of German Affairs
<u>SIGNATOR</u>	Hillenbrand, Martin J.
<u>DESTO</u>	
<u>DESTP</u>	
<u>DRAFT</u>	Hillenbrand, Martin J.
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	Secret
<u>TITLE</u>	Berlin
<u>CTIT</u>	[Discussion of Two British Memoranda on Berlin]
<u>NAMES</u>	Ormsby-Gore, David
<u>NAMES</u>	Thompson, Llewellyn E.
<u>NAMES</u>	Adenauer, Konrad
<u>NAMES</u>	Douglas-Home, Alexander Frederick
<u>NAMES</u>	Bohlen, Charles E.
<u>NAMES</u>	Schroeder, Gerhard
<u>NAMES</u>	Khrushchev, Nikita S.
<u>TERMS</u>	
<u>ORGAN</u>	
<u>PGS</u>	9

January 4, 1962.



PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Lucius:

Your much appreciated year-end letter has touched me deeply. I agree wholly with your analysis of the trend in our own and in allied countries; and, perhaps, take a darker view than you do of the prospects of a change in it. Specifically, and immediately, I am gloomy about the outcome of the confrontation over Berlin, since we and our allies have not taken the action necessary to change the environment in which it takes place. By this I mean action which would convince the Russians that the phrase "firm about Berlin," would mean the use of all means at our disposal to prevent them having their way and to preserve the status quo ante the wall. Only if they are so convinced, can all of us hope to go ahead toward the unity of the West and the reunification of Germany within it. This would call for immediate (as of this January) build-up to the NATO force goals in Europe (including five more divisions of ours) with the evident and real intent to use them, if necessary, with SAC in support. Without giving hostages to performance, the threat to use SAC carries no conviction.

Perhaps, indeed probably, our allies would have been scared to death and unwilling to go through with such a program; but, even so, it is better to have the followers desert the leader, than to have the leader follow the followers. Who then picks up the pieces? Who is trusted to lead in a new start?

The Honorable
Lucius D. Clay,
c/o The Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

Acheson 10/65 / State Dept & WH Advisor 1962. Jan - Dec 1



I have always thought that the expression, "There is no alternative to negotiations," was a silly one, because there are the obvious alternatives to fight and to surrender. If we are not prepared for the first of these, it seems pretty likely we will end up with the second.

Alice and I are off on Sunday for a month in the Far East, where the prospect, if no more pleasing, is, at least, different.

With warm regards.

Sincerely,

1/5/62 8

Hold for Kagan

1/5/62

ELEMENTS OF A POSSIBLE DEAL WITH THE FRENCH RE NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Hold for Wednesday meeting with Paris

1. In a NATO war, external nuclear forces including SAC, the RAF and the French Air Force (when the French Mysteres and French nuclear weapons are operational), should all have appropriate roles. There should be prior coordination of these roles. This would require a certain degree of coordination of targetting.
2. There should be prior commitment of SAC, RAF and FAF forces adequate to assure execution of these roles in support of NATO in the event of a NATO war. Each country would retain certain powers of withdrawal, or alternatively the right to reserve a portion of their forces for national purposes. It should not be necessary to emphasize or advertise these rights. A principal point is that if each nation maintains physical control over its own delivery vehicles and its own warheads, it retains the effective power to divert them to national purposes.
3. The U. S. should have the right to stockpile U. S. nuclear weapons in support of its forces stationed in France. Release of such U. S. warheads would require the joint determination of France and the United States.
4. The U. S., U. K. and France would agree: (a) That nuclear warheads would not be transferred to fourth powers without prior agreement among them; and (b) Nuclear information would not be transferred to fourth powers without such prior agreement.
5. The U. S. Government will make available to France nuclear information as permitted under the McMahon Act, on the assumption that France

MSF 1216 / MCF: 602

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958-1
1/4/94 94-36
By: [Signature] 12/97

qualifies as a country having made "substantial progress". France would agree that it would fulfill its commitments to NATO with respect to the non-nuclear build-up of its forces.

6. The above arrangements would be contingent on German concurrence. To obtain this concurrence, the following commitments would be made to Germany:

(a) After a review of the MC-96 target requirements, based upon the capabilities not only of SACEUR and SACLANT, but also of external forces, new nuclear force requirements would be established. The three powers would agree to meet their respective portions of these requirements and would agree not to withdraw these forces without prior German agreement.

(b) A method for German participation in the development of guidelines for the use of nuclear forces would be agreed.

(c) A method for appropriate German participation in the actual decision to use nuclear forces outside the guidelines or within the guidelines, time permitting, would be agreed.

1/5/62
E6
762.00/1-562

This document consists of 9 pages
Number of copies of this document, Series B

~~SECRET~~

S/O:GER - Martin J. Hillenbrand
(Drafting Office and Officer)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Approved in S
1/10/62

Memorandum of Conversation

~~LIMIT DISTRIBUTION~~

DATE: January 5, 1962
Place: Secretary's Office
Time: 4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Berlin

January 16, 1962

PARTICIPANTS: United Kingdom

United States

Ambassador Sir David
Ormsby-Gore

The Secretary
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Hillenbrand

COPIES TO: S/S 2cc SOV - C
GCE GER-2 - 7 - 8
S/B - 1 S/O - 9
S/P - 2 WH - Mr. Bundy - 2
EUR - 2 - 3 - 4 10 - 11
RA - 5

Ambassy Bonn (The Ambassador) - 12
Ambassy Moscow (The Ambassador) - 13
Ambassy Paris (The Ambassador) - 14
Ambassy Paris (USRO) - 15
USBER - Berlin (Mr. Lightner) - 16
Ambassy London (The Ambassador) - 17

The British Ambassador said he had come to discuss the two British memoranda on aspects of Berlin which had been handed to Mr. Bohlen by Lord Hood earlier in the day (copies attached). He was interested in knowing whether the first memorandum on how Prime Minister Macmillan and Lord Home should develop their forthcoming discussions with Chancellor Adenauer and Foreign Minister Schroeder jibed with American thinking about the development of the Thompson talks with Gromyko. The Secretary said this British memorandum posed no basic problems for us. However, the points in paragraph 3 (a) and 3 (b) touched on areas of German sensitivity. As to the question of Western dealings with the East German authorities and acceptance of their existence, in his first talk with Ambassador Thompson Gromyko had said that the U.S. had already recognized the GDR de facto. He wondered if Western conduct which confirms the existence of East Germany is all that is wanted rather than a more formal kind of de facto recognition. The Secretary noted certain differences between the Anglo-Saxon and the continental law tradition, with the latter stressing the significance of "informal formalities" to which we paid little attention. Moreover, he continued, the area of Western dealings with the East Germans would be affected by any arrangements made with respect to an International Access Authority. The state of discussion of this subject therefore might make it inappropriate to press too hard during the Bonn visit on the subject covered in 3 (a). The British Ambassador said that the two points in paragraph 3 were intended to be kept in the back of the Prime Minister's and Lord Home's mind rather than to be specifically raised. They might wish to take the position that a formula to describe "permissible dealings" should be agreed. He assumed from what

REVIEWED by Hillen Date 1/11/62
FOI, EO or PA exemptions B1, A3, A5
CLASSIFY as
DOWNGRADE TO () S or () C, U, AL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
() RELEASE
() DECLASSIFY
() DENY
() DECLASSIFY IN PART
() DELETE
() Non-responsive info.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
APPEALS REVIEW PANEL, DATE 10/04/92
() RELEASE () ENCLAVE () DENY
() Non-responsive information
FOIA Exemptions ()
PA Exemptions ()

Classification Review By fwl
the Secretary
() DECLASSIFY
() DECLASSIFY IN PART
() RETAIN CLASSIFICATION (a)
() CLASSIFY AS
() DOWNGRADE TO () S, () C, OADR

B1 A3 A5
CLASSIFIED FILE
NSA

762.00/1-562

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

With respect to the British paper on Occupation Rights, the Secretary said he hoped some way could be found to deal with this without the necessity of any formal steps by the West Berliners or by us to set up a trusteeship. This word carried too many connotations. There were perhaps two ways of achieving this:

(a) There might be a Four-Power agreement which was silent on the question of Western occupation rights. We would say we were prepared to operate on the basis of such an agreement. If anything happened to the agreement, this would restore the direct application of occupation rights. One agreement would, in effect, be superimposed on the other system rather than superseding it. The Soviets could concentrate on the second. We would not wear occupation rights on our sleeves but they would be there.

(b) We could ourselves declare that we consider our position in Berlin to be based on more than occupation rights. We were holding the Western sectors in trusteeship for the German people and at the desire of the West Berliners. This would combine the elements of trusteeship and self-determination.

We would be reluctant, the Secretary continued, to see a formal trusteeship established which would give the Berliners the impression that the basis of our rights had been radically changed. Sir David said the idea of the British paper was that new relations stem from Western rights but are expressed in new terms. The new status would not supersede the previous one which would be in abeyance until reunification, or the remainder of the agreement were violated. In the latter case, we would go back to the original rights. But the purpose would be to create a different status. This new entity could then have contractual relations with the Federal Republic, perhaps along the lines suggested in the Khrushchev memorandum to Kroll. Everything the Soviets have said has implied that no agreement would be possible unless a different term is used than occupation regime.

The Secretary said we would consider the British paper, but we would be worried about taking a formal step in 1962 which would completely substitute for what happened in 1945. Sir David said the unilateral declaration aspect of the British paper was intended to take care of this point. It redefined the reasons for our presence, setting up a new and peacetime regime until German reunification. The Secretary commented that he did not feel that occupation rights withered away with time. Should we accept the Soviet thesis regarding the obsolescence of occupation rights? Sir David observed that, if the West Berliners were our partners, this would

be more

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

BERLIN

[Subject to Mr. Rusk's views, Lord Home proposes that the Prime Minister and he should develop their discussions with Doctor Adenauer and Herr Schroeder along the following lines:

1. Mr. Thompson seems to have made a fairly promising start. Gromyko has confirmed Soviet willingness to consider a quadripartite agreement on access in advance of a Peace Treaty and has not rejected the idea of some sort of international access authority. The Russians also seem readier to accept that the Western Powers will not accord diplomatic recognition to East Germany. It is fair to say that there are signs of flexibility on the Soviet side. In this connection we will also mention the hint in Khrushchey's private memorandum to Kroll that the Russians would be ready to accept political ties between West Berlin and the Federal Republic provided they were on a contractual basis. (See Annex).
2. Some further probing of Soviet views on free access and on ties between West Berlin and the Federal Republic is clearly necessary. Mr. Thompson should go ahead with this and should be free to answer questions about the Western attitude on matters of interest to the Soviets. There is a limit, however, to what can be expected from exploratory talks. We would like to know whether the Chancellor shares our impression that the point will probably soon be reached at which a basis for a negotiation can be said to exist and that we should then go ahead and suggest a quadripartite negotiation.
3. It is obvious that the Russians will want Western counter-concessions in return for their concessions. It is not necessary for the Western Powers to agree in advance of negotiation exactly what these should be. It is becoming clearer from Gromyko's attitude that the areas in which concessions will be needed are two-fold:
 - (a) The area of Western dealings with the East German authorities and acceptance of their existence and
 - (b) The area of Federal German links with West Berlin.

The Prime Minister and I would say that we hope the Chancellor recognises that in actual negotiation with the Russians it will be in the Western interest to be more flexible on these questions than is the "substantive paper" of the Ambassadorial Group. We might seek to draw him on these points. At the same time we might say that we hope it will be possible

to avoid 7

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ANNEX

E Translation of Extract from Khrushchev's
private memorandum to Kroll

BIAS
AS

"No-one is threatening the population of West Berlin or attempting to interfere with their rights or interests. With the conclusion of a peace treaty with the D.D.R. and the conversion of West Berlin into a free city the people of West Berlin would be guaranteed the right and the possibility to live as they please and to entertain the links and relations they wish with all states. The Western powers rejected the Soviet proposal because they do not seek a solution to the Berlin problem. The claim of the Federal Republic that West Berlin is part of the Federal Republic complicates the position still further. We have no objection to the closest links between West Berlin and the Federal Republic in the economic, political and cultural fields. But these links must be based on the corresponding legal foundation and on the respect of the sovereignty and rights of other states, independently of the nature of the relations which the Federal Republic has established with them. The wall cannot come down for the time being and normal relations for the population of West Berlin can only be restored when the occupation régime ends and when Berlin's economy stands on its own feet and is not kept going by subsidies."

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

~~E~~ not alter the existing relationship between West Berlin and the Federal Republic. B1113
A5

(e) Consent of the people of West Berlin to this change in character of our authority could be obtained through a plebiscite or by other means.

6. In announcing this change the Western Powers would state that they now regard the régime in West Berlin as no longer being an occupation régime though the powers which they would exercise under the new system would still be regarded as recurring from their original rights which would not have been abrogated.

7. There would be no need for the Soviets specifically to underwrite this change but an agreement with them guaranteeing military and civilian access would be a necessary prerequisite. 7

~~SECRET~~

65 D 330, 7145 1/5/62

SECRET

Secy's M of C

3/O:GER - Martin J. Hillenbrand
(Drafting Office and Officer)

724 ETOD R

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

10

January 5, 1962
Place: Secretary's Office
Time: 4:30 p.m.

Berlin

United Kingdom

United States

Ambassador Sir David
Ormsby-Gore

The Secretary
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Hillenbrand

DEPARTMENT OF STATE *J.C.* IS/FPC/CDR Date: 3/9/92

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only:
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations _____
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART	
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info		TS authority to _____
FOIA Exemptions _____	<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	<input type="checkbox"/> S or <input type="checkbox"/> C OADR
GA Exemptions _____	<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to <input type="checkbox"/> S or <input type="checkbox"/> OADR	

RM/R-(?)
mu.

The British Ambassador said he had come to discuss the two British memoranda on aspects of Berlin which had been handed to Mr. Bohlen by Lord Hood earlier in the day (copies attached). He was interested in knowing whether the first memorandum on how Prime Minister Macmillan and Lord Howe should develop their forthcoming discussions with Chancellor Adenauer and Foreign Minister Schroeder jibed with American thinking about the development of the Thompson talks with Gromyko. The Secretary said this British memorandum posed no basic problems for us. However, the points in paragraph 3 (a) and 3 (b) touched on areas of German sensitivity. As to the question of Western dealings with the East German authorities and acceptance of their existence, in his first talk with Ambassador Thompson Gromyko had said that the U.S. had already recognized the GDR de facto. He wondered if Western conduct which confirms the existence of East Germany is all that is wanted rather than a more formal kind of de facto recognition. The Secretary noted certain differences between the Anglo-Saxon and the continental law tradition, with the latter stressing the significance of "informal formalities" to which we paid little attention. Moreover, he continued, the area of Western dealings with the East Germans would be affected by any arrangements made with respect to an International Access Authority. The state of discussion of this subject therefore might make it inappropriate to press too hard during the Bonn visit on the subject covered in 3 (a). The British Ambassador said that the two points in paragraph 3 were intended to be kept in the back of the Prime Minister's and Lord Howe's minds rather than to be specifically raised. They might wish to take the position that a formula to describe "permissible dealings" should be agreed. He assured from what

the Secretary

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

the Secretary had said that we did not think that this should now be pressed. The Secretary commented that it would be in our interest to let it become clear that on some of these points the basic argument of the Germans and French was not with what de Gaulle called the Anglo-Saxons but with the Soviets.

Referring to the seven alternative formulas in the substantive paper which had been developed by the Ambassadorial Group, Sir David said he wondered whether it would not be a good idea for Prime Minister Macmillan to ask the Germans which of these seven they preferred and then abandon the other six. The Secretary remarked that it was probably not desirable at the present stage to spell out this sort of thing too precisely. As to paragraph 3 (b), the Secretary continued, this could be affected by the Soviet attitude if the abstract from the Khrushchev memorandum to Kroll attached to the British memorandum were correct. If the Soviets included political and cultural links between West Berlin and the Federal Republic among those which they considered permissible this would have a bearing on 3 (b). We were agreed that we will press for as close links between the two as the traffic will bear. Certainly we do not want to close the door for the broadest kind of links.

Sir David said he assumed that the point should not be pressed at this stage that the Soviets would attach importance to GDR participation on the International Access Authority. This would be one way of according a certain measure of recognition to East Germany. The Secretary said that this was a matter which had to be talked over with the Germans to see how strongly they felt. They were playing it both ways in a sense. They had many dealings with the GDR but did not want to be caught at it. He hoped we could in the next Thompson talk with Gromyko present the International Access Authority in a simpler fashion to the Soviet than in the form of the full draft agreement. Sir David asked whether it could be assumed that the International Access Authority was so important to the West that it might be necessary to bend a bit in order to achieve it. Without saying anything to the Germans now, he wondered whether we had in mind keeping the point of some GDR participation in reserve in order to make it more attractive. The Secretary commented that, at the outset, the Soviets will demand more in any event. Some East German connection with the International Access Authority was essential, given the fact that we would operate over East German territory. This might be accomplished either by GDR participation on the Board of Directors or by having a Four-Power Board of Directors with some system for GDR liaison.

With

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

With respect to the British paper on Occupation Rights, the Secretary said he hoped some way could be found to deal with this without the necessity of any formal steps by the West Berliners or by us to set up a trusteeship. This word carried too many connotations. There were perhaps two ways of achieving this:

(a) There might be a Four-Power agreement which was silent on the question of Western occupation rights. We would say we were prepared to operate on the basis of such an agreement. If anything happened to the agreement, this would restore the direct application of occupation rights. One agreement would, in effect, be superimposed on the other system rather than superseding it. The Soviets could concentrate on the second. We would not wear occupation rights on our sleeves but they would be there.

(b) We could ourselves declare that we consider our position in Berlin to be based on more than occupation rights. We were holding the Western sectors in trusteeship for the German people and at the desire of the West Berliners. This would combine the elements of trusteeship and self-determination.

We would be reluctant, the Secretary continued, to see a formal trusteeship established which would give the Berliners the impression that the basis of our rights had been radically changed. [Sir David said the idea of the British paper was that new relations stem from Western rights but are expressed in new terms. The new status would not supersede the previous one but would be in abeyance until reunification, or the remainder of the agreement were violated. In the latter case, we would go back to the original rights. But the purpose would be to create a different status. This new entity could then have contractual relations with the Federal Republic, perhaps along the lines suggested in the Khrushchev memorandum to Kroll. Everything the Soviets have said has implied that no agreement would be possible unless a different term is used than occupation regime.]

The Secretary said we would consider the British paper, but we would be worried about taking a formal step in 1962 which would completely substitute for what happened in 1945. [Sir David said the unilateral declaration aspect of the British paper was intended to take care of this point. It redefined the reasons for our presence, setting up a new and peacetime regime until German reunification. The Secretary commented that he did not feel that occupation rights withered away with time. Should we accept the Soviet thesis regarding the obsolescence of occupation rights? Sir David observed that, if the West Berliners were our partners, this would

be more

SECRET

SECRET

- 4 -

be more respectable. The Secretary noted that, in our new draft instructions to Ambassador Thompson, we would suggest that the element of a plebiscite be injected. Sir David said the second British paper was not urgent and he would report that we had certain hesitations about it, and that we did not care much for the trusteeship concept. The Secretary said we did not like the idea of a change of status, but the thought in paragraph (e) might be used if it could be suitably incorporated in a Western declaration. Going back to the Khrushchev memorandum to German Ambassador Kroll, the Secretary said he did not believe this inclusion of the word "political" could have been accidental. He referred to how Stalin's omission of the word "currency" in a document in 1949, gave an indication of the Soviet shift of position which led to the Jessup-Malik talks. Sir David agreed that inclusion of the word "political" was significant if the contents of the memorandum had been directly reported.

SECRET

E100B
R

SECRET

ANNEX

Translation of Extract from Khrushchev's
private memorandum to Kroll

"No-one is threatening the population of West Berlin or attempting to interfere with their rights or interests. With the conclusion of a peace treaty with the D.D.R. and the conversion of West Berlin into a free city the people of West Berlin would be guaranteed the right and the possibility to live as they please and to entertain the links and relations they wish with all states. The Western powers rejected the Soviet proposal because they do not seek a solution to the Berlin problem. The claim of the Federal Republic that West Berlin is part of the Federal Republic complicates the position still further. We have no objection to the closest links between West Berlin and the Federal Republic in the economic, political and cultural fields. But these links must be based on the corresponding legal foundation and on the respect of the sovereignty and rights of other states, independently of the nature of the relations which the Federal Republic has established with them. The wall cannot come down for the time being and normal relations for the population of West Berlin can only be restored when the occupation régime ends and when Berlin's economy stands on its own feet and is not kept going by subsidies."



DEPARTMENT OF STATE *D. R...* IS/FPC/CDR Date: 3/18/92

RELEASE DECLASSIFY
 EXCISE DECLASSIFY
 DENY IN PART
 DELETE Non-Responsive Info

MR Cases Only: _____
 EO Citations: _____

TS authority to _____
 CLASSIFY as () S or () OADR
 DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () OADR

FOIA Exemptions _____
PA Exemptions _____

SECRET

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE BY CHECKING
 CHARGE TO

1/10/62
E14
JAN 10 6 02 PM '62
04088

SECRET

Classification
~~SECRET~~
PRIORITY 1615
PRIORITY 1883
PRIORITY 3795
PRIORITY 3687
PRIORITY 899

MICROFILMED FOR
KENNEDY LIBRARY
APRIL 1964

Origin: ACTION: Embassy MOSCOW
INFO: Embassy BONN
Embassy PARIS
Embassy LONDON
USBR BERLIN

Eyes only
EXDIS REVIEW

- Cat. A - Caption removed; transferred to O/FADSO
- Cat. B - Transferred with additional access controlled by S/S
- Cat. C - Caption and custody retained by S/S

PARIS PASS FINLETTER - EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY

Reviewed by: Elijah Kelly Jr.
Date: 4/14/62
Following are your instructions for next meeting with Gromyko (which you should request for early date) containing minor amendments to take account of

points made by Germans and British.

You should seek further appointment with Gromyko and conduct discussion along following lines:

1. US Government considers that initial exchange of views with Soviet Foreign Minister on January 2 was useful in helping further to clarify positions of both parties and in providing occasion for each to stress certain questions which considered of particular importance. There also seemed to be agreement that both wanted to settle issues involved by peaceful means, though it is obvious that real substantive differences continue to exist.

2. In first discussion number of principles were stated which we believe are essential for progress towards an acceptable agreement. There is no need to repeat them at length but they should not be overlooked. No particularly stressed that the practical point in Berlin situation is acute, for it is on this point that unilateral action by one side could have highly dangerous results.

REVIEWED BY: [Signature] Date: 4/11/62
FOI, EO or PA exemptions
CLASSIFY as
() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C, OADs
DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
RELEASE
() EXISE
() DENY
() DECLASSIFY
() DECLASSIFY in PART
() DENY
() Non-responsive info.

Drafted by: [Signature]
S/O: [Signature] GERMANY/FRANCE/BRITAIN 1/13/62
Approved by: [Signature] [Signature] [Signature]
Fay D. Kohler

S/S - [Signature]
The White House - [Signature] Bundy
Classification
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED".

EYES ONLY

611-611-1108
762-0021
762-0021

SECRET

Classification

3. While Soviet Foreign Minister gave his preliminary reactions to presentation of US position, he also indicated that US statements would require serious thought and consideration. We will therefore be interested in hearing his further views on various points raised.

4. In this connection it might be well to begin by eliminating one subject on which it is obvious from outset that no meeting of minds is possible, and from what Gromyko has said can be set aside. Proposal for single peace treaty with both GDR and Federal Republic or for a separate peace treaty with GDR is not acceptable to West. We believe that any action which attempts formally to legalize division of Germany would be serious mistake, even regarded from Soviet viewpoint. However, we know that Soviet Union holds other views, and it is clear from our present actions that we are living with this situation and do not contemplate any use of force to change it. Entire NATO posture is based on this approach.

5. In referring to possibility of all-Berlin solution, Soviet Foreign Minister took position that this question could not be discussed and that East Berlin is completely integrated into GDR. He also stated that construction of wall was necessary to combat threats emanating from West Berlin. To take latter point first, it is not purpose of present discussion to analyze motivations for action which took place on August 13. As Gliboff in his December 30 PRAVDA article virtually admitted that wall was directed not so much at outer world but at inhabitants of GDR, who continued to express desire to leave. Be that as it may, fact of wall and of ensuing actions directed towards sealing off East Berlin from rest of city has, in practice, constituted considerable unilateral change of status in further disregard of

SECRET

Classification

SECRET

Classification

Soviet obligations. While US Government, therefore, continues to consider that all-Berlin solution based upon recognition of continuing Four-Power responsibilities, is best and most logical approach to problem, it cannot help but draw certain conclusions from fact that these unilateral actions have been taken. One of these conclusions is that Soviets, having attempted to dispose of their sector of city without consent of West, now claim right to have determining voice in disposition of Western sectors of city. Not only is there lack of logic in Soviet approach, but pressure which is being brought on Western Powers to consent to modifications of situation in the form of threat of further unilateral abandonment of its responsibilities by Soviets to GDR -- in this case these relating to Berlin access.

6. A noteworthy example of such lack of logic is what Soviets say regarding alleged effect of peace treaty on occupation rights in West Berlin. West Berlin has never been part of GDR. No treaty between Soviet Union and GDR can, therefore, terminate occupation rights of Western Powers. Question may further be asked why, if Soviet Union has in mind agreement with respect to Western position in West Berlin, so much importance is attached to distinction between such agreement and occupation rights. Conclusion might be drawn that this is because Soviets believe that, in some way, rights under agreement would be less securely based than occupation rights. It is our suggestion, therefore, that since Soviets understand we are not prepared to abandon our rights in and access to West Berlin, discussion of basis these rights is unnecessary and most not worth difficulties.

7. Given these considerations, we would be particularly interested in further explanation of what in the Soviet view the situation in West Berlin would look like.

SECRET

Classification

SECRET

Classification

Soviets continually attack Western occupation as obsolete. ~~The presence of Western troops might be undesirable if they remain in face of opposition of civilian population and if they no longer serve a function which we and that population consider essential.~~ There can be no question but that, in both respects, Western forces are far from obsolete. If there is any question -- and we do not believe Soviets really seriously doubt this -- about desires of West Berlin population, Western Powers would be glad at any time to have properly supervised plebiscite held in West Berlin. Moreover, experience of Berliners over years has confirmed their conviction that presence of Western forces is necessary guarantee of continuing freedom. Experiences of blockade and of continual harassments, pressures and threats from GDR since then could have no other effect. Western Powers do not consider, therefore, that their continuing presence is negotiable. As pointed out in January 2 conversation, Western Powers have never negotiated with Soviets on occupation rights but only on exercise and implementation of those rights. They do not expect that Soviet Union will specifically reaffirm continuation of occupation rights, but they do expect that it will conduct itself in such a way as to take practical cognizance of the facts of life as they exist in West Berlin -- including presence of Western protective forces.

8. After you have made statement along foregoing lines, we assume Gromyko will be prepared to make further comments on your presentation of January 2. These may merely repeat points made in his "preliminary reaction" or may provide basis for further probing on your part. This is matter which we leave largely to your judgment. You are still both exchanging views and putting forward suggestions which do not commit either side. Essential purpose is still to find out whether and in what area basis for negotiations can be found.

SECRET

Classification

SECRET

Classification

9. Two points on which Soviet have insisted in past which particularly require clarification are changed status for West Berlin and "respect for GDR sovereignty". Going back to Gromyko's remarks on these subjects during January 2 conversation, you should if this seems appropriate, attempt to draw him out further on his statement to you that it would be wrong to conclude that Soviets are prepared to leave West Berlin situation unchanged in view of threat present situation in Central Europe. We do not understand what threat present situation in West Berlin poses to Eastern Europe unless Soviets consider very existence of a free West Berlin to be such a threat. In putting questions, impression must, of course, be avoided that Western presence is in any way negotiable beyond points in para 3 of Annex III to Working Group Report of December 10, 1961.

✓ 10. As to "respect for GDR sovereignty", your efforts should be directed towards attempting to nail down whether this criterion can be met largely in procedural terms by having GDR concur in arrangements on access made by Four Power agreement or whether some GDR role in access is what Soviets have in mind. You might refer to fact that Soviet Union has frequently used expression "respect for sovereignty of GDR" which we hope can be clarified. In this connection, on January 2 Soviet Foreign Minister took exception to what American Ambassador said regarding de jure and de facto recognition of GDR by citing Soviet acceptance of existence of certain countries with which it does not have relations. Similarly, Soviet Foreign Minister claimed that in actual fact US has already recognized GDR de facto. This suggests to us that what Soviet Foreign Minister has in mind is that we not act as if we deny existence of East Germany, as indeed we do not. Since Soviet Foreign Minister and Chairman Khrushchev have emphasized

SECRET

Classification

SECRET

Classification

emphasized factual situation, we see no problem arising from our inability to accord some kind of formal de jure or de facto recognition which would go beyond that factual situation. On "respect for sovereignty of GDR" as it relates to Berlin access, we understand Soviets wish to ensure that access rights do not in fact interfere with authority or life in East Germany. This creates no problems for us because we do not wish so to interfere; what we want is access which is not interfered with by East Germany. There are numerous cases in which means of transit across territory or through air space are used without any interference in the affairs of the territory transited. We suggest that Soviet Foreign Minister accept as point of departure concept that guaranteed access would not interfere with affairs of East Germany and that East Germany would not interfere with freedom of access.

11. Although your efforts to pin down Gromyko specifically on whether "free access" would envisage freedom for anyone to travel back and forth were not successful, you should make further effort towards this end. You might make point that we assume Soviet Government is sincere in its stated intention of permitting a viable and supportable existence for West Berliners. Soviets must realize as well as we do that this requires continuation of their relations with outer world on really free basis not subject to control of any third party.

12. If in your judgment you need to say more about status of West Berlin than contained above in order to accomplish objective, you may find it useful to set forth present US understanding of legal status of Western sectors of Berlin. These sectors are an area in which supreme authority continues to be exercised by three Western Powers. Relationship which has grown up between Federal Republic and Berlin in various areas of

SECRET

Classification

SECRET*Classification*

areas of activity has been on permissive basis subject to this authority. While Constitution of Federal Republic provides that West Berlin is Land of Federal Republic by virtue of suspension of pertinent articles of Bonn Basic Law in 1949 this portion of Constitution is inoperative in Berlin. If you deem it desirable further to spell out US understanding of present status West Berlin you may draw on BTF-34 as appropriate (copies pouched to you January 4 - Registry No. 526272). It may be worth pointing out that one of effects of termination of Western occupation would automatically be to end suspension these articles of Bonn Basic Law referred to above. You might remind Gromyko logical response to Soviet unilateral action directed towards incorporation of East Berlin into GDR would have been incorporation of West Berlin in Federal Republic. However, Western Powers have refrained from considering this action as not contributing to achievement of mutually acceptable arrangement under present circumstances.

13. Should Gromyko insist that Berlin cannot be discussed in isolation but must be related to broader questions aimed at "drawing line under World War II", you should state that, in our view creation of barriers against World War III is more important than drawing purely technical line under World War II. We must, therefore, consider issues in light of what is possible now in terms of vital interests of each side. If Gromyko responds to this by repeating usual charges against alleged West German militarism and expansionism, you might take line that, while Soviet leaders have placed great stress in recent years on rejection of Stalinism, it must nevertheless be pointed out that the Soviets first began postwar rearmament of Germany by rearming East Germans over Western protests. Western actions have been defensive and designed purely for

SECRET*Classification*

SECRET

Classification

for nonaggressive purposes. You may also find it useful in this context to draw on relevant points made by President in his interview of November 23 with Adzhubei and emphasize conviction of US that present Germany is thoroughly peaceful.

14. If Gromyko continues to insist on discussion of "broader questions" you might observe that every subject can obviously not be discussed simultaneously. We have placed initial stress on Berlin access which we believe critical issue for reasons indicated. He should understand, however, that what US would be prepared to say on other subjects will depend to great extent on reasonableness of Soviet position on Berlin access which we consider to be most appropriate question on which to focus at outset.

15. Re International Access Authority, we are sending in separate message summary of proposal which you may find useful in further discussion with Gromyko. Do not believe, however, that specific language of formal agreement should be tabled pending further explorations. To degree necessary, however, you may also draw for details on draft charter in BQB-37 revised November 30, 1961. In view of German reserve on Board of Governors, you should be cautious in discussing this aspect of Authority not to give impression that composition represents agreed Western position and should indicate that other formulas may be possible.

Rusk RUSK
(FOL)

SECRET

Classification

Seems like opening possible

Record Number 58718

<u>SET</u>	Berlin Crisis
<u>BC1</u>	Yes
<u>DOCUMENT TYPE</u>	Cable
<u>DATE</u>	01/10/1962
<u>CIRCD</u>	
<u>TIME</u>	
<u>CABNO</u>	1615
<u>DOCNO</u>	
<u>ORIGIN</u>	United States. Department of State
<u>SIGNATOR</u>	Rusk, Dean
<u>DESTO</u>	United States Embassy. Soviet Union
<u>DESTP</u>	
<u>DRAFT</u>	Hillenbrand, Martin J.
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	Secret
<u>TITLE</u>	
<u>CTIT</u>	[Instructions for the Next Meeting with Andrei Gromyko]
<u>NAMES</u>	Gromyko, Andrei A.
<u>TERMS</u>	
<u>ORGAN</u>	
<u>PGS</u>	8

1/5/62
E6
762.00/1-562

The document consists of _____ pages
Number _____ of _____ Series A

~~SECRET~~

S/O:GER - Martin J. Hillenbrand
(Drafting Office and Officer)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Approved in S
1/10/62

Memorandum of Conversation

~~LIMIT DISTRIBUTION~~

DATE: January 5, 1962
Place: Secretary's Office
Time: 4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Berlin

January 16, 1962

PARTICIPANTS: United Kingdom

United States

Ambassador Sir David
Ormsby-Gore

The Secretary
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Hillenbrand

COPIES TO: S/S 2cc SOV - C
GCG GER-2 - 7 - 8
S/B - 1 S/O - 9
S/P - 2 WH - Mr. Bundy - 2
EUR - 2 - 3 - 4 10 - 11
RA - 5

Ambassy Bonn (The Ambassador) - 12
Ambassy Moscow (The Ambassador) - 13
Ambassy Paris (The Ambassador) - 14
Ambassy Paris (USRO) - 15
USBER - Berlin (Mr. Lightner) - 16
Ambassy London (The Ambassador) - 17

REVIEWED by Wick Date 4/10/91
FOI, EO or PA exemptions B1 A3 A5
CLASSIFY as
DOWNGRADE TO () S or () C, U, AL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
() RELEASE
() EXEMPT
() DENY
() DECLASSIFY
() DECLASSIFY IN PART
() DELETE
() Non-responsive info.

The British Ambassador said he had come to discuss the two British memoranda on aspects of Berlin which had been handed to Mr. Bohlen by Lord Hood earlier in the day (copies attached). He was interested in knowing whether the first memorandum on how Prime Minister Macmillan and Lord Home should develop their forthcoming discussions with Chancellor Adenauer and Foreign Minister Schroeder jibed with American thinking about the development of the Thompson talks with Gromyko. The Secretary said this British memorandum posed no basic problems for us. However, the points in paragraph 3 (a) and 3 (b) touched on areas of German sensitivity. As to the question of Western dealings with the East German authorities and acceptance of their existence, in his first talk with Ambassador Thompson Gromyko had said that the U.S. had already recognized the GDR de facto. He wondered if Western conduct which confirms the existence of East Germany is all that is wanted rather than a more formal kind of de facto recognition. The Secretary noted certain differences between the Anglo-Saxon and the continental law tradition, with the latter stressing the significance of "informal formalities" to which we paid little attention. Moreover, he continued, the area of Western dealings with the East Germans would be affected by any arrangements made with respect to an International Access Authority. The state of discussion of this subject therefore might make it inappropriate to press too hard during the Bonn visit on the subject covered in 3 (a). The British Ambassador said that the two points in paragraph 3 were intended to be kept in the back of the Prime Minister's and Lord Home's mind rather than to be specifically raised. They might wish to take the position that a formula to describe "permissible dealings" should be agreed. He assumed from what

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
APPEALS REVIEW PANEL, DATE 100492
() RELEASE () EXEMPT () DENY
() Non-responsive info.
FOIA Exemptions ()
PA Exemptions ()

Classification Review By fwl
the Secretary
() UNCLASSIFY
() DECLASSIFY IN PART
() RETAIN CLASSIFICATION ()
() CLASSIFY AS
() DOWNGRADE TO () S, () C, OADR

B1 A3 A5
CLASSIFIED FILE
WST

762.00/1-562

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

[The Secretary had said that we did not think that this should now be pressed. The Secretary commented that it would be in our interest to let it become clear that on some of these points the basic argument of the Germans and French was not with what de Gaulle called the Anglo-Saxons but with the Soviets.] B1/A

Referring to the seven alternative formulae in the substantive paper which had been developed by the Ambassadorial Group, Sir David said he wondered whether it would not be a good idea for Prime Minister Macmillan to ask the Germans which of these seven they preferred and then abandon the other six. The Secretary remarked that it was probably not desirable at the present stage to spell out this sort of thing too precisely. As to paragraph 3 (b), the Secretary continued, this could be affected by the Soviet attitude if the abstract from the Khrushchev memorandum to Kroll attached to the British memorandum were correct. If the Soviets included political and cultural links between West Berlin and the Federal Republic among those which they considered permissible this would have a bearing on 3 (b). We were agreed that we will press for as close links between the two as the traffic will bear. Certainly we do not want to close the door for the broadest kind of links.] B1/A

[Sir David said he assumed that the point should not be pressed at this stage that the Soviets would attach importance to GDR participation on the International Access Authority. This would be one way of according a certain measure of recognition to East Germany. The Secretary said that this was a matter which had to be talked over with the Germans to see how strongly they felt. They were playing it both ways in a sense. They had many dealings with the GDR but did not want to be caught at it. He hoped we could in the next Thompson talk with Gromyko present the International Access Authority in a simpler fashion to the Soviet than in the form of the full draft agreement. Sir David asked whether it could be assumed that the International Access Authority was so important to the West that it might be necessary to bend a bit in order to achieve it. Without saying anything to the Germans now, he wondered whether we had in mind keeping the point of some GDR participation in reserve in order to make it more attractive. The Secretary commented that, at the outset, the Soviets will demand more in any event. Some East German connection with the International Access Authority was essential, given the fact that we would operate over East German territory. This might be accomplished either by GDR participation on the Board of Directors or by having a Four-Power Board of Directors with some system for GDR liaison.] B1/A

With

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

With respect to the British paper on Occupation Rights, the Secretary said he hoped some way could be found to deal with this without the necessity of any formal steps by the West Berliners or by us to set up a trusteeship. This word carried too many connotations. There were perhaps two ways of achieving this:

(a) There might be a Four-Power agreement which was silent on the question of Western occupation rights. We would say we were prepared to operate on the basis of such an agreement. If anything happened to the agreement, this would restore the direct application of occupation rights. One agreement would, in effect, be superimposed on the other system rather than superseding it. The Soviets could concentrate on the second. We would not wear occupation rights on our sleeves but they would be there.

(b) We could ourselves declare that we consider our position in Berlin to be based on more than occupation rights. We were holding the Western sectors in trusteeship for the German people and at the desire of the West Berliners. This would combine the elements of trusteeship and self-determination.

We would be reluctant, the Secretary continued, to see a formal trusteeship established which would give the Berliners the impression that the basis of our rights had been radically changed. Sir David said the idea of the British paper was that new relations stem from Western rights but are expressed in new terms. The new status would not supersede the previous one which would be in abeyance until reunification, or the remainder of the agreement were violated. In the latter case, we would go back to the original rights. But the purpose would be to create a different status. This new entity could then have contractual relations with the Federal Republic, perhaps along the lines suggested in the Khrushchev memorandum to Kroll. Everything the Soviets have said has implied that no agreement would be possible unless a different term is used than occupation regime.

The Secretary said we would consider the British paper, but we would be worried about taking a formal step in 1962 which would completely substitute for what happened in 1945. Sir David said the unilateral declaration aspect of the British paper was intended to take care of this point. It redefined the reasons for our presence, setting up a new and peacetime regime until German reunification. The Secretary commented that he did not feel that occupation rights withered away with time. Should we accept the Soviet thesis regarding the obsolescence of occupation rights? Sir David observed that, if the West Berliners were our partners, this would

be more

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

[be more respectable.] The Secretary noted that, in our new draft instructions to Ambassador Thompson, we would suggest that the element of a plebiscite be injected. Sir David said the second British paper was not urgent and he would report that we had certain hesitations about it, [and that we did not care much for the trusteeship concept.] The Secretary said we did not like the idea of a change of status, but the thought in paragraph (c) might be used if it could be suitably incorporated in a Western declaration. Going back to the Khrushchev memorandum to German Ambassador Kroll, the Secretary said he did not believe this inclusion of the word "political" could have been accidental. He referred to how Stalin's omission of the word "currency" in a document in 1949, gave an indication of the Soviet shift of position which led to the Jessup-Malik talks. Sir David agreed that inclusion of the word "political" was significant if the contents of the memorandum had been directly reported.

BIA

BIA

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

BERLIN

Subject to Mr. Rusk's views, Lord Home proposes that the Prime Minister and he should develop their discussions with Doctor Adenauer and Herr Schroeder along the following lines:

1. Mr. Thompson seems to have made a fairly promising start. Gromyko has confirmed Soviet willingness to consider a quadripartite agreement on access in advance of a Peace Treaty and has not rejected the idea of some sort of international access authority. The Russians also seem readier to accept that the Western Powers will not accord diplomatic recognition to East Germany. It is fair to say that there are signs of flexibility on the Soviet side. In this connection we will also mention the hint in Khrushchev's private memorandum to Kroll that the Russians would be ready to accept political ties between West Berlin and the Federal Republic provided they were on a contractual basis. (See Annex).
2. Some further probing of Soviet views on free access and on ties between West Berlin and the Federal Republic is clearly necessary. Mr. Thompson should go ahead with this and should be free to answer questions about the Western attitude on matters of interest to the Soviets. There is a limit, however, to what can be expected from exploratory talks. We would like to know whether the Chancellor shares our impression that the point will probably soon be reached at which a basis for a negotiation can be said to exist and that we should then go ahead and suggest a quadripartite negotiation.
3. It is obvious that the Russians will want Western counter-concessions in return for their concessions. It is not necessary for the Western Powers to agree in advance of negotiation exactly what these should be. It is becoming clearer from Gromyko's attitude that the areas in which concessions will be needed are two-fold:
 - (a) The area of Western dealings with the East German authorities and acceptance of their existence and
 - (b) The area of Federal German links with West Berlin.

The Prime Minister and I would say that we hope the Chancellor recognises that in actual negotiation with the Russians it will be in the Western interest to be more flexible on these questions than is the "substantive paper" of the Ambassadorial Group. We might seek to draw him on these points. At the same time we might say that we hope it will be possible

to avoid 7

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

[to avoid dealings on European security in the Berlin context. B11A3
AS

4. If the Germans, Americans and British agree that we ought to propose a negotiation to the Russians, the great problem will be how to persuade General de Gaulle to agree. We might suggest to the Chancellor that it would be helpful if he could rid the General of his obsessive fear that, if changes are made at Berlin, the Federal Republic will gradually abandon the Western Alliance.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ANNEX

[Translation of Extract from Khrushchev's
private memorandum to Kroll

B1A3
AS

"No-one is threatening the population of West Berlin or attempting to interfere with their rights or interests. With the conclusion of a peace treaty with the D.D.R. and the conversion of West Berlin into a free city the people of West Berlin would be guaranteed the right and the possibility to live as they please and to entertain the links and relations they wish with all states. The Western powers rejected the Soviet proposal because they do not seek a solution to the Berlin problem. The claim of the Federal Republic that West Berlin is part of the Federal Republic complicates the position still further. We have no objection to the closest links between West Berlin and the Federal Republic in the economic, political and cultural fields. But these links must be based on the corresponding legal foundation and on the respect of the sovereignty and rights of other states, independently of the nature of the relations which the Federal Republic has established with them. The wall cannot come down for the time being and normal relations for the population of West Berlin can only be restored when the occupation régime ends and when Berlin's economy stands on its own feet and is not kept going by subsidies."

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

BERLIN: OCCUPATION RIGHTS

[Great emphasis is being placed by Khrushchev on the need to terminate the occupation régime and draw a line under the war. BIA

2. We cannot accept that our rights would be abrogated by any Peace treaty signed with G.D.R.
3. We cannot abandon the position that our presence in West Berlin is rooted in our rights of occupation i.e. right acquired by conquest (though we are agreed that we need not ask the Russians to confirm this).
4. But could we find a formula which, without damage to the legal basis of our presence in West Berlin and without altering the existing relationship between West Berlin and the Federal Republic, would go some way to meek Khrushchev's demand that West Berlin should no longer be under "an occupation régime?"
5. A possible idea is as follows. The Western Powers would make a unilateral decision or statement containing the following elements:
 - (a) Our presence in Berlin is rooted in right of occupation. This right cannot be abrogated.
 - (b) We recognise however, that with the passage of time, the concept of occupation is becoming generally regarded as not altogether appropriate or sufficient for the situation as it exists.
 - (c) We therefore propose under rights which we hold to re-define the authority which we exercise in West Berlin. In future we propose to exercise our authority in the form of a trust on behalf of the German nation and pending reunification to regard ourselves as trustees for continued independence and viability of West Berlin.
 - (d) We would make contractual agreements with the West Berlin Senate under which they would formally recognise the trusteeship and give irrevocable assent to powers which we exercise as trustees pending reunification. These powers would be the same as those which we now have in the city and would include the right to station garrisons in West Berlin. They would

not

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

not alter the existing relationship between West Berlin and the Federal Republic. B1178
145

(e) Consent of the people of West Berlin to this change in character of our authority could be obtained through a plebiscite or by other means.

6. In announcing this change the Western Powers would state that they now regard the régime in West Berlin as no longer being an occupation régime though the powers which they would exercise under the new system would still be regarded as recurring from their original rights which would not have been abrogated.

7. There would be no need for the Soviets specifically to underwrite this change but an agreement with them guaranteeing military and civilian access would be a necessary prerequisite. 7

~~SECRET~~

1/10/62

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: State-Defense Study Group on NATO's Nuclear Role
Including KRMs.

By my letter of December 28 to Secretary Makozara, I proposed the establishment of a State-Defense Study Group to consider a range of problems relating to NATO nuclear strategy. This is in keeping with the intensive analysis of these problems you have directed and of which you informed General de Gaulle.

My staff has had a number of meetings with the Defense staff and they have now agreed to the scope of the joint study as well as a time schedule for its progress. We have also agreed on how to proceed in the NSC during the time of the study and how to conduct discussions with Secretary-General Stikker who will visit Washington early in February, primarily to discuss this subject.

It is our hope that by about March 1 Secretary Makozara and I will be in a position to forward final recommendations for your approval. If this schedule can be kept, we should be in a position to take at least some decisions in NATO by the time of the Spring Meeting in Athens. During the course of the study I will endeavor to keep you informed of any particularly noteworthy developments.

Evans Bush

RA:RNRanich/G/PM:SWeiss:te
1/10/62

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec 3.4
NLR-94-37
RNRK Date 7/29/95

mark (draft) to JPR / NSF (2/6/MLP)
Gen, 1/61-6/62

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 10, 1962

110627
Start a permanent
file on
MR. B.M. put
them in it

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

Attached is a slightly amended version of the memorandum we discussed at the meeting in your office this afternoon. Present were Foy Kohler, Bob Bowie, Henry Owen, Paul Nitze and Harry Rowen.

The discussion made clear a number of points. Nitze is still unwilling to give from his present position. His basic concern appears to be that any arrangement which gives the Europeans an independent capability to initiate general nuclear war will ultimately lead to our withdrawal from Europe. He clearly thinks this is so, if the European capacity arises from a European NATO nuclear force independent of American control. Whether he thinks that guidelines for agreed targeting and use of an all-NATO force which in fact is largely American, but which did not involve an American veto would have the same results, is less clear, but this appeared to be the direction of his argument.

Kohler argued that there are two fundamental questions. As seen from Moscow, are two forces, one European, the other American, more of a deterrent than one. Second, as seen from both Europe and the U. S., would a European strategic nuclear blow trigger general nuclear war in which the U. S. would be involved? He thought the answer was "yes" to both.

Bowie-Owen-Kohler view hold that we should begin the exploration with our Allies of alternative (d) and the problems it involves without at this time committing ourselves to a final goal, exploring the alternatives of increasing European participation from discussion of guidelines through commitment of American owned and manned forces to SACEUR, organization of jointly owned and manned forces committed to SACEUR, to the final stage represented by alternative (d). We could then stop in this process at that point at which European political needs appeared to be met. If we follow that path, the problem of British and French forces will disappear, because

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLK-94-36
1/10/97

NSA (216 / MCLP 1/62 - 6/62

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

their owners will see their inadequacy and essential irrelevance.

Nitze continues in his unique view of the political problem. He fails to see anything but European concern over the adequacy of the total deterrent which he thinks can be cured by more discussion with them of the nature of our force and our targeting philosophy.

I agree substantially with the State view, and I think that the key to any proposal about NATO guidelines is a division of those cases which require very prompt response from those which don't. The latter would permit a fairly elaborate discussion of machinery; the former would require some well-defined delegation of political decision-making authority with respect to predetermined tasks. This in effect rules out an effective European first-strike capability, I think properly so.

Kohler and Co. propose as a next step a Rusk-McNamara meeting, perhaps plus Kohler, Bowie and Owen, and Nitze and Rowen. Their concern, rightly, is to keep McNamara from hardening his views before he hears their side.

CK
Carl Kaysen

~~SECRET~~

10
1/11/62 290

MEMORANDUM

Mr. K...
10 - MRGM
JAN 11 1962

TO: The Secretary
THROUGH: C - U. Alexis Johnson
E/S
FROM: BME - Foy D. Kohler
SUBJECT: State-Defense Study Group on NATO's Nuclear Role including MRESA

1. On December 28 you signed a letter to Secretary McNamara proposing that a State-Defense Study Group be established to study NATO nuclear questions. In following up on your letter to Secretary McNamara we have had a number of meetings with DOD personnel and have now reached agreement on the scope of the study to be undertaken, as well as its timing. Attached is a copy of my letter to Paul Nitze which, with its attachment, describes the State-Defense agreement on scope and timing (Tab A). As you can see, we anticipate having final recommendations which can be jointly forwarded by you and Secretary McNamara to the President by March 1. This timing may be difficult to accomplish both because of the complexity of the subject matter as well as because of the possibility of basic differences between ourselves and Defense. In the event this letter occurs however, we would not hesitate to forward divergent proposals which would then have to be reconciled at your level and/or with the President.

2. In light of the fact that the U.S. will be subjected to increasing pressure to discuss different aspects of this subject in early NAC meetings, we have instructed Ambassador Finletter to inform the Permanent Representatives of the U.S. review and its timing, and to make certain procedural proposals in relation to the conduct of the anticipated discussions within the NAC (Tab B). USNSC has already responded by indicating its enthusiastic acceptance of these proposals.

3. We are also preparing to have frank and forthcoming discussions with Secretary-General Stikker on the scope, objectives, and even tentative conclusions, if any, of the U.S. study when he visits Washington in early February. As you know, the main purpose of his visit is to discuss this subject and we feel Mr. Stikker can be most useful in guiding Council discussion to fruitful conclusions. We would suggest, however, that NAC discussion should get started even prior to the Stikker visit.

4. While

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec 34
NLK-94-37
BY: [unclear] DATE: 7/24/95

NSA/216 / MLD Gen 1/61-6/62

4. While I have sent to ~~the~~ Bundy copies of my letter to Paul Nitze, it occurred to me that you might wish to keep the President generally informed of our progress. This seems to me to have some merit, first, because the President in his letter to de Gaulle referred to the review of NATO nuclear policy which he had directed, and second, because we would think it desirable to have the President fully appreciate that we have gone fully into the matter in order to ensure that the problem is being treated in a well-organized and coordinated fashion amongst the agencies. Secretary McNamara has already asked the Defense staff to provide him with a series of studies on the range of issues involved in the subject in anticipation of discussions within the Executive Branch. Attached is a proposed memorandum to the President for your signature (Tab C).

Attachments:

- Tab A - Letter to Mr. Nitze
- Tab B - ~~SECRET~~ 968
- Tab C - Memo to the President

cc: White House - Mr. Bundy
 Mr. Kaysen
OSD/ISA - Mr. Nitze
S/P - Mr. Owen
G - Mr. Kitchen
D - Mr. Baum
U - Mr. Bowie
S/AE - Mr. Farley
L - Mr. Meeker
RA - Mr. Fessenden

Clearance:

RA - Mr. Fessenden

HA:HE:Sanich/O/PS:Stoles:ts
1/10/62

1/13/62

NND 949602

B.L. 7/2/55

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

ACTION COPY
PERMANENT RECORD COPY

PARIS

65 SECRET

Action Control: 7161
EUR Rec'd: January 13, 1962
Info FROM: Paris 1:53 AM

SS TO: Secretary of State
SR
G
SP NO: 3442, January 12, 9 P.M.
L
H
IO

DAC LIMIT DISTRIBUTION
SAE FROM STOESSEL.

RMR GENERAL NORSTAD DINED WITH DE ROSE, CIVILIAN DEPUTY TO
GENERAL PUGET, CHIEF OF DEFENSE GENERAL STAFF, JANUARY 10.
IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION FOLLOWING DINNER, DE ROSE TOOK
INITIATIVE IN DISCUSSING PRESENT STATE OF FRENCH-US AND
FRENCH-NATO RELATIONS.

DE ROSE FELT THAT CRUX OF PROBLEM BETWEEN FRENCH AND US IS
THAT OF COOPERATION IN NUCLEAR FIELD. FOR FIRST TIME
IN GENERAL NORSTAD'S EXPERIENCE WITH DE ROSE, LATTER SPOKE
IN TONE OF SOME DISCOURAGEMENT AND PESSIMISM ABOUT
FRENCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM HE SEEMED SOMEWHAT
RESIGNED TO FACT THAT US WOULD NOT AID FRANCE DIRECTLY
IN WEAPONS FIELD AND HE DEPLORED FACT THAT, AS RESULT,
FRENCH, AFTER PUTTING GREAT EFFORT AND MONEY INTO NUCLEAR
WEAPONS PROGRAM, WILL END UP WITH SYSTEM WHICH IS OBSOLETE
AND INEFFECTIVE.

GENERAL NORSTAD COMMENTED THAT FRENCH SHOULD REALIZE
THAT FEELING OF PEOPLE OF US -- NOT ONLY OF GOVERNMENT
-- IS VERY STRONG AGAINST TURNING OVER NUCLEAR WEAPONS
TO OTHER COUNTRIES. DE ROSE SAID HE COULD UNDERSTAND
THIS POSITION CONCERNING TURN-OVER OF WEAPONS, BUT HE
ASKED WHY US COULD NOT GIVE SOME HELP TO FRENCH IN CONNECTION
WITH KNOW-HOW AND CRITICAL MATERIALS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
NORSTAD REITERATED HIS VIEW THAT PEOPLE OF US ARE BASICALLY
AND FUNDAMENTALLY OPPOSED TO PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS AND TO ANY ACTION WHICH WOULD ASSIST ANOTHER
COUNTRY TO BECOME A NUCLEAR POWER OR WHICH WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY
SHORTEN PERIOD IN WHICH COUNTRY COULD BECOME NUCLEAR POWER.

JM - Let's discuss B

3442

611.51/1-1262

375
757.56/1

7/2/55

611.51/1-1262
DUS Central M4, Rb 59

3

SECRET

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

NND 949602

7/2/75

SECRET

-2- 3442, January 12, 9 P.M., from Paris

DE ROSE ARGUED THAT, IF US WOULD ASSIST FRANCE IN NUCLEAR FIELD AND IF FRENCH COULD PARTICIPATE AS EQUAL IN GENEVA TALKS, FRANCE COULD BE HELPFUL HERSELF IN PREVENTING ADDITIONAL PROLIFERATION. HE SAID THAT FRANCE HAS LEGITIMATE INTERESTS WHICH US SHOULD MEET. IF FRANCE'S LEGITIMATE INTERESTS ARE NOT MET, THEN FRANCE MIGHT BE IN POSITION WHERE IT WOULD HAVE TO ASSIST PROLIFERATION.

NORSTAD ASKED IF DE ROSE MEANT THAT FRANCE WOULD HELP GERMANS TO ATTAIN NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. DE ROSE GAVE EQUIVOCAL ANSWER.

NORSTAD URGED DE ROSE TO THINK ALONG LINES OF FRENCH JOINING IN NATO ATOMIC DELIVERY PROGRAM. HE SAID THAT NATO IS ALREADY A GREAT ATOMIC POWER. IT WOULD SERVE FRANCE'S INTERESTS NO JOIN IN WITH THIS POWER AND, IF FRANCE DID SO, HER INFLUENCE WITHIN GROUP WOULD BE IMPORTANT AND PERSUASIVE.

DE ROSE EXPRESSED DOUBTS THAT THIS WOULD MEET MINIMUM NEEDS OF FRANCE. IN ANY CASE, HE SAID, THERE CAN BE NO SOLUTION FOR NATO WITHOUT FRANCE.

GENERAL NORSTAD COMMENTED THIS WAS NOT RPT NOT NECESSARILY TRUE AND THAT, WHILE GOOD SOLUTIONS WERE NOT POSSIBLE WITHOUT FRANCE, SOLUTIONS OF SOME SORT WOULD BE FOUND AND HAVE BEEN FOUND IN PAST WITHOUT FRANCE. IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE FOR FRENCH TO BASE THEIR CALCULATIONS ON SUCH REASONING. DE ROSE REVERTED TO NUCLEAR QUESTION AND SAID THAT, IF US COULD NOT HELP FRANCE IN NUCLEAR FIELD, THEN IT SEEMED QUITE CLEAR THAT FRANCE WOULD HAVE TO "CLOSE DOOR" EVEN FURTHER IN NATO. NORSTAD INDICATED THT, GIVEN STATE OF FRANCE'S CURRENT EFFORT IN NATO, THIS WAS NOT PERSUASIVE ARGUMENT.

ON MRBMS, DE ROSE SAID FRANCE, IF NOT AIDED, WOULD HAVE TO DEVELOP HER OWN MRBM. NORSTAD SAID HE HAD HOPED IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE CONSIDER A EUROPEAN CONSORTSUM OF COUNTRIES TO PROCURE OR PRODUCE MRBMS. HE WONDERED HOW FRANCE COULD

SECRET

NND 949602

Bdy

7/1/55

~~SECRET~~

-3- 3442, January 12, 9 P.M., from Paris

AFFORD TO STAY OUT OF SUCH GROUP IF IT WERE CREATED. DE ROSE DID NOT ANSWER DIRECTLY BUT SAID HE DOUBTED IF US WOULD EVER PROVIDE KNOW-HOW TO EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO ENABLE THEM MANUFACTURE MISSILES IN EUROPE. GENERAL NORSTAD THOUGHT THAT, IF EUROPEANS CAME UP WITH FIRM PROGRAM IN THIS RESPECT, US MIGHT WELL BE PREPARED GIVE IT FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION.

DE ROSE CLOSED CONVERSATION BY SAYING HE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS NUCLEAR AND RELATED PROBLEMS FURTHER WITH NORSTAD AND WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH HIM SOON.

DESPITE EXTREME FRANKNESS OF EXPRESSION, THIS CONVERSATION, WHICH WAS ONE OF SCORES THAT NORSTAD HAS HAD WITH DE ROSE ON THESE SUBJECTS OVER THE YEARS, WAS MARKED BY LESS INTENSITY AND FRIENDLIER TONE ON PART OF DE ROSE THAN EVER BEFORE.

GAVIN

MJA

SECRET

Control: 7161
Rec'd: January 13, 1962
1:53 AM

3442

*JM - tells
discuss 6*

EUR
Info
SS
SR
G
SP
L
H
IO
DAG
SAE
P
TOP
INR
RMR

FROM: Paris
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 3442, January 12, 9 P.M.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION
FROM STOESSEL.

GENERAL NORSTAD DINED WITH DE ROSE, CIVILIAN DEPUTY TO GENERAL PUGET, CHIEF OF DEFENSE GENERAL STAFF, JANUARY 10. IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION FOLLOWING DINNER, DE ROSE TOOK INITIATIVE IN DISCUSSING PRESENT STATE OF FRENCH-US AND FRENCH-NATO RELATIONS.

DE ROSE FELT THAT CRUX OF PROBLEM BETWEEN FRENCH AND US IS THAT OF COOPERATION IN NUCLEAR FIELD. FOR FIRST TIME IN GENERAL NORSTAD'S EXPERIENCE WITH DE ROSE, LATTER SPOKE IN TONE OF SOME DISCOURAGEMENT AND PESSIMISM ABOUT FRENCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM HE SEEMED SOMEWHAT RESIGNED TO FACT THAT US WOULD NOT AID FRANCE DIRECTLY IN WEAPONS FIELD AND HE DEPLORED FACT THAT, AS RESULT, FRENCH, AFTER PUTTING GREAT EFFORT AND MONEY INTO NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM, WILL END UP WITH SYSTEM WHICH IS OBSOLETE AND INEFFECTIVE.

GENERAL NORSTAD COMMENTED THAT FRENCH SHOULD REALIZE THAT FEELING OF PEOPLE OF US -- NOT ONLY OF GOVERNMENT -- IS VERY STRONG AGAINST TURNING OVER NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO OTHER COUNTRIES. DE ROSE SAID HE COULD UNDERSTAND THIS POSITION CONCERNING TURN-OVER OF WEAPONS, BUT HE ASKED WHY US COULD NOT GIVE SOME HELP TO FRENCH IN CONNECTION WITH KNOW-HOW AND CRITICAL MATERIALS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS. NORSTAD REITERATED HIS VIEW THAT PEOPLE OF US ARE BASICALLY AND FUNDAMENTALLY OPPOSED TO PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND TO ANY ACTION WHICH WOULD ASSIST ANOTHER COUNTRY TO BECOME A NUCLEAR POWER OR WHICH WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY SHORTEN PERIOD IN WHICH COUNTRY COULD BECOME NUCLEAR POWER.

611.571/1-1262

375-7571.56/1

*72 days
4/1/62*

3

SECRET

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken

ACTION ASSIGNED TO	ACTION TAKEN	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R	RM/R Files (No reply necessary)
NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE OF ACTION		

RG 59, Central Dec. 611.51/1-1262

DE ROSE ARGUED THAT, IF US WOULD ASSIST FRANCE IN NUCLEAR FIELD AND IF FRENCH COULD PARTICIPATE AS EQUAL IN GENEVA TALKS, FRANCE COULD BE HELPFUL HERSELF IN PREVENTING ADDITIONAL PROLIFERATION. HE SAID THAT FRANCE HAS LEGITIMATE INTERESTS WHICH US SHOULD MEET. IF FRANCE'S LEGITIMATE INTERESTS ARE NOT MET, THEN FRANCE MIGHT BE IN POSITION WHERE IT WOULD HAVE TO ASSIST PROLIFERATION.

NORSTAD ASKED IF DE ROSE MEANT THAT FRANCE WOULD HELP GERMANS TO ATTAIN NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. DE ROSE GAVE EQUIVOCAL ANSWER.

NORSTAD URGED DE ROSE TO THINK ALONG LINES OF FRENCH JOINING IN NATO ATOMIC DELIVERY PROGRAM. HE SAID THAT NATO IS ALREADY A GREAT ATOMIC POWER. IT WOULD SERVE FRANCE'S INTERESTS TO JOIN IN WITH THIS POWER AND, IF FRANCE DID SO, HER INFLUENCE WITHIN GROUP WOULD BE IMPORTANT AND PERSUASIVE.

DE ROSE EXPRESSED DOUBTS THAT THIS WOULD MEET MINIMUM NEEDS OF FRANCE. IN ANY CASE, HE SAID, THERE CAN BE NO SOLUTION FOR NATO WITHOUT FRANCE.

GENERAL NORSTAD COMMENTED THIS WAS NOT RPT NOT NECESSARILY TRUE AND THAT, WHILE GOOD SOLUTIONS WERE NOT POSSIBLE WITHOUT FRANCE, SOLUTIONS OF SOME SORT WOULD BE FOUND AND HAVE BEEN FOUND IN PAST WITHOUT FRANCE. IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE FOR FRENCH TO BASE THEIR CALCULATIONS ON SUCH REASONING. DE ROSE REVERTED TO NUCLEAR QUESTION AND SAID THAT, IF US COULD NOT HELP FRANCE IN NUCLEAR FIELD, THEN IT SEEMED QUITE CLEAR THAT FRANCE WOULD HAVE TO "CLOSE DOOR" EVEN FURTHER IN NATO. NORSTAD INDICATED THAT, GIVEN STATE OF FRANCE'S CURRENT EFFORT IN NATO, THIS WAS NOT PERSUASIVE ARGUMENT.

ON MRBMS, DE ROSE SAID FRANCE, IF NOT AIDED, WOULD HAVE TO DEVELOP HER OWN MRBM. NORSTAD SAID HE HAD HOPED IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO CONSIDER A EUROPEAN CONSORTIUM OF COUNTRIES TO PROCURE OR PRODUCE MRBMS. HE WONDERED HOW FRANCE COULD

SECRET

AFFORD TO STAY OUT OF SUCH GROUP IF IT WERE CREATED. DE ROSE DID NOT ANSWER DIRECTLY BUT SAID HE DOUBTED IF US WOULD EVER PROVIDE KNOW-HOW TO EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO ENABLE THEM MANUFACTURE MISSILES IN EUROPE. GENERAL NORSTAD THOUGHT THAT, IF EUROPEANS CAME UP WITH FIRM PROGRAM IN THIS RESPECT, US MIGHT WELL BE PREPARED GIVE IT FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION.

DE ROSE CLOSED CONVERSATION BY SAYING HE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS NUCLEAR AND RELATED PROBLEMS FURTHER WITH NORSTAD AND WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH HIM SOON.

DESPITE EXTREME FRANKNESS OF EXPRESSION, THIS CONVERSATION, WHICH WAS ONE OF SCORES THAT NORSTAD HAS HAD WITH DE ROSE ON THESE SUBJECTS OVER THE YEARS, WAS MARKED BY LESS INTENSITY AND FRIENDLIER TONE ON PART OF DE ROSE THAN EVER BEFORE.

GAVIN

MJA

SECRET

Caption removed per S/S 4/4/91

- RELEASE
- EXISE
- DENY
- DECLASSIFY
- DECLASSIFY in PART
- DELETE
- Non-responsive info.

FOI, EO or PA exemptions

TS authority to:
 CLASSIFY as _____, OADK
 DOWNGRADE TS to S or C, OADR

E20

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL

05966
 JAN 13 2 52 PM '62

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS

Classification
Topol 944
POLTO

Info:

INFO: Amembassy MOSCOW
 Amembassy LONDON
 Amembassy BONN
 USHER BERLIN

1266 1636
3753
1921
913

MICROFILMED FOR
 KENNEDY LIBRARY
 APRIL 1964

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADORS AND LIGHTNER

Kohler today briefed Quadripartite Ambassadorial Group on second Thompson-Gromyko talk as reported Moscow's 1936 (not sent other posts) along following lines:

1. Gromyko gave Thompson drafts of proposed statute for Free City and protocol containing guarantees therefore.
2. Gromyko then stressed orally that formalization present German border, respect for sovereignty GDR, prohibition ~~on~~ nuclear arms for both GDR and FRG, plus non-aggression pact between NATO and Warsaw ~~nations~~ nations must be dealt with at same time as Free City proposal.
3. In addition, Gromyko said Soviets want to negotiate on thinning out or withdrawal foreign troops and creation atom free area after conclusion West Berlin agreement.
4. Gromyko rejected idea international access authority as violation GDR sovereignty and said free access in Soviet view means access with accepted international standards for such communication.

5. Gromyko

(6)

7626 Barry/1-13-62

49762 B.00

Prepared by: S/O: EUR:GER: JKL: [Signature] 1/13/62

Classification approved by: GER H.J. Hillenbrand

Clearance:

RA - Mr. Van Hollen

SOV - Mr. Klein (in substance) S/S - Mr. Rogers

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED".

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

5. Gromyko repeated demand for Soviet troop presence West Berlin if Allied troops remain.

6. Gromyko introduced proposal UN membership for West Berlin.

Other Soviet points which arose from Thompson's rebuttal of these points were refusal to consider access as key question, sharp rejection of any idea of Berlin plebiscite on troop presence, rejection any exclusion access from GDR rights of sovereignty, refusal to consider any all-Berlin solution, defense of wall as legitimate border protection and emphasis that free city and access thereto were proposed on basis ~~respect~~ respect for GDR sovereignty, not at its expense.

Gromyko also stressed that West would QTE regret it very much UNQTE if lifting of treaty deadline were interpreted as anything other than a Soviet step taken QTE to facilitate agreement on logical basis UNQTE.

After hearing Thompson regrets that Soviets taking QTE backward step UNQTE Gromyko said that study of documents and his remarks would show no backward step.

Kohler said US had not considered view as yet on this perceptible hardening of Soviet position. We did suspect it was related Soviet pressures and motivations partly in other than Berlin and German context. Nuclear testing results, Molotov's apparent rehabilitation, etc. may well be involved.

Others agreed Gromyko line QTE pretty chilly UNQTE and that motivation obscure. Also agreed with Kohler suggestion that documents be studied for evidence Soviets intend to publish so that West (or US unilaterally) might prepare publish similar maximum public positions.

Eyes only For USRO.

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

(S) Copy removed:
1. 1-1-73 FADAC
2. 1-1-73 FADAC
with additional access
controlled by S/S
Copies and custody
retained by S/S
Reviewed by: *Ek*
Eliot Kelly Jr.

Date: 4-4-91

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

OSCAR BERLIN

POST MARKS

For USRO:

At next NAC meeting of PermReps plus one you may use gist of forgoing as briefing with continued caveat of secrecy. You should not RPT that paragraph immediately preceding. Question of providing Soviet drafts to NAC cannot be answered at this time and you should avoid any rejection or commitment to do so.

RUSK
(Pa)

RUSK

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

Record Number 58723

<u>NET</u>	Berlin Crisis
<u>BCI</u>	Yes
<u>DOCUMENT TYPE</u>	Cable
<u>DATE</u>	01/13/1962
<u>CIRCD</u>	
<u>TIME</u>	
<u>CABNO</u>	944
<u>DOCNO</u>	
<u>ORIGIN</u>	United States. Department of State
<u>SIGNATOR</u>	Rusk, Dean
<u>DESTO</u>	United States Embassy. France
<u>DESTP</u>	
<u>DRAFT</u>	Holloway, J.K.
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	Confidential
<u>TITLE</u>	
<u>CTIT</u>	[Briefing of the Quadripartite Ambassadorial Group on the Second Thompson-Gromyko Talks]
<u>NAMES</u>	Gromyko, Andrei A.
<u>NAMES</u>	Thompson, Llewellyn E.
<u>NAMES</u>	Kohler, Foy D.
<u>TERMS</u>	
<u>ORGAN</u>	
<u>PGS</u>	3

11/15/62

OF STATE IS/FPC/CDR *McGeorge Bundy* Date: *9/9/62*

DECLASSIFY
 DECLASSIFY
 DECLASSIFY IN PART
 DELETE Non-Responsive Info

MR Cases Only: _____
 EO Citations: _____

CLASSIFY as _____ TS authority to _____
 DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C OADR

FOIA Exemptions _____
 PA Exemptions _____

REFUSE 21A *Adverse*

THE WHITE HOUSE
 WASHINGTON

(21)

January 15, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR
 THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Over the week end I wrote the President a memorandum on Berlin negotiations, but before I had it typed he talked to me this morning and gave me precise instructions for the attached three-point memorandum from him to you. In the circumstances, I did not pass him my memo, but I send it along to you because it relates to the same range of problems.

h.p. B.
 McGeorge Bundy

SECRET ATTACHMENT

#678

762.00/1-15-62

NSA

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/REG/CONF/Date 9-9-62

() RELEASE () DECLASSIFY
() EXCISE () DECLASSIFY
() DENY IN PART
() DELETE Non-Responsive Info
FOIA Exemptions B1, 7, 5
PA SECRETs

NR Cases Only:
EO Citations _____
_____ TS authority to.
() CLASSIFY as () S or () C OADR
() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C OADR

21B

Ref NSC

Excise
EXCISE

January 15, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

RE: BERLIN NEGOTIATIONS

Gromyko's last performance suggests that the Soviets are a long way from serious negotiation. This could be for a number of reasons. Not all of them are gloomy.

B1A5

So we are not doing the two things that need doing:

(1) Bringing home to the Soviets the dangers for them as well as for us, of a separate treaty with no preceding agreement.

(2) Giving them some hint of the advantages for them and for us of a decent agreement now. We need to do some pretty frank talking about their Germans and our Germans, their prestige and our prestige, their power and our power, in a way that only really private talks would permit.

The dangers are not hard to spell out (and could perhaps be emphasized within the current framework of Thompson-Gromyko talks). They relate to German revanchism, our own ability to step up our armaments, the diffusion of nuclear weapons, the possibility of integrating West Berlin in West Germany, and the hazards of uncontrollable escalation -- quite aside from our clear determination to remain where we are.

SECRET

828
#6

1-15-62

SECRET

declarations against inflammatory propaganda, UN agencies in Berlin, and the like. When these are added in, we could, I think, present to the Soviets possibilities that they would weigh very carefully as against a separate treaty with no prior agreement. But unless we change our present course, we may never get these options up where they can be considered.

And then there is the largest point of all: degree of "respect for the sovereignty of the GDR." We can buy more of this than we have yet let on -- and so can the Germans if they have to. But it can only be done in the context of improvements for West Berlin. In the current dialogue there is no way to make this vital point to the Soviets.

For these reasons I believe that we should promptly decide to initiate genuinely private and bilateral talks with the Soviets. I doubt if Thompson is the best channel -- though that is open to argument: my own suggestion is that we get someone like Bohlen or Beam to talk privately with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin.

McG. B.

SECRET

#678

~~SECRET~~

1/16/62
cc by Mrs

327

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 16, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: State-Defense Study Group on NATO's
Nuclear Role Including MRBMs

On December 28, I proposed to Secretary McNamara the establishment of a State-Defense Study Group to consider a range of problems relating to NATO nuclear strategy. This is in keeping with the intensive analysis of these problems you have directed and of which you informed General de Gaulle.


My staff has had a number of meetings with the Defense staff and they have now agreed to the scope of the joint study as well as a time schedule for its pursuance. We have also agreed on how to proceed in the NAC during the time of the study and how to conduct discussions with Secretary-General Stikker who will visit Washington early in February, primarily to discuss this subject.

It is our hope that by about March 1 Secretary McNamara and I will be in a position to forward final recommendations for your approval. If this schedule can be kept, we should be in a position to take at least some decisions in NATO by the time of the Spring Meeting in Athens. During the course of the study I will endeavor to keep you informed of any particularly noteworthy developments.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

~~SECRET~~



NSA/216 / MLD, Gen, 1/16/62

DRAFT

~~TOP SECRET~~

1/16/62

1991 / 3578

Outline for Talk to NSC, January 18, 1962

1. Object of the talk:

a. to be sure that the senior officers of the Executive Branch, in National Security affairs, all have some understanding of our major policies. We are a team -- and it is essential that all of us work together in the same direction. You and your immediate subordinates have a real need-to-know what we are trying to do.

b. to ensure that we are all clear about the basic positions we shall be urging and explaining with Congress and with public opinion. I know that each of you gets regular information on decisions and policies in his own area, but it is important for those of us who circulate among members of Congress and the press and foreign embassies to be sure we know the Government's policy.

2. Basic Foreign Policy:

It is not just talk when we say in the State of the Union message that our object is a world of free and interdependent states. That is exactly what we want and what the Communists cannot tolerate.

Nor is it just talk that we can stand to have them choose for themselves. We are proud of our improved relations with countries like India, in spite of the Goa episode; and the annoyance of the Belgrade meeting does not prevent us from seeking useful connections even with

DECLASSIFIED

- 2 -

We do not recognize any flat priority as between one group of friends and another. Circumstances will have to guide us in individual cases. Nevertheless we do rate very highly the problem of

3. Unity and Strength in the Atlantic Community:

You all know of the trade fight that is ahead, and you know also of the standing test in Berlin. Let me just say that these are obviously of the first importance.

referred to in

At the same time, we must all be alert against the self-interested noises made by even friendly governments from time to time -- we must not be pushed around by German or French or British propaganda, and we must be careful to frame our policies in terms of American interests and American leadership. We are bound to pay the price of leadership -- we may as well have some of its advantages. So it is American policy that we must work for. Fortunately, in Europe, it is pretty clear. We mean to hold our own in Berlin; we mean to work for increased European unity; we mean to strengthen conventional forces; we mean to keep the nuclear deterrent up-to-date. This last one, I know, opens complex problems, and I am glad that many of you are at work on them.

4. Basic Military Policy (this is an edgy one, but I believe a few sentences would be enormously helpful in setting the stage for further work by others):

51

We have, as you know, greatly reinforced the national defense forces. We have done this both in conventional and in nuclear forces. But you should understand that I do not believe in general war as the answer to every situation in which we have a temporary or local inferiority. I believe in maintaining our nuclear forces: first, as a deterrent against any nuclear madness by the enemy and, second, as a restraint upon adventures that would be so important as to require drastic response from us. But I do not believe in any full first-strike capability, and I do not subscribe to ^{the long-range term} any doctrine of "nuclear superiority." I am always ready to hear argument on these matters, but what I have heard so far convinces me that ^{in the long run} we are headed for a nuclear stalemate -- always assuming we can avoid a nuclear holocaust. It is for this reason that I am so strong a supporter of revived and reinforced conventional forces. And for similar reasons I am a strong believer in a really drastic increase in our counter-guerrilla, counter-insurgency, anti-subversive military and para-military capabilities. ↑ This is the real threat we face today -- as long as we maintain effective deterrent strength we need not worry about general war, in my judgment -- and on this one we need to do a lot more than we yet have.

I have
just
signed
a memorandum
from special
duties in
this area to
an inter departmental
group under
General

This military policy is likely to involve us in some ~~(sure)~~ combat with the Congress this year. Sentiment for more missiles and more nuclear weapons is pretty strong -- I don't think ^{such sentiment} it can be

61

We have, as you know, greatly reinforced the national defense forces. We have done this both in conventional and in nuclear forces. But you should understand that I do not believe in general war as the answer to every situation in which we have a temporary or local inferiority. I believe in maintaining our nuclear forces: first, as a deterrent against any nuclear madness by the enemy and, second, as a restraint upon adventures that would be so important as to require drastic response from us. But I do not believe in any full first-strike capability, and I do not subscribe to ^{the} ~~any~~ ^{long-term} doctrine of "nuclear superiority." I am always ready to hear argument on these matters, but what I have heard so far convinces me that ^{in the long run} we are headed for a nuclear stalemate -- always assuming we can avoid a nuclear holocaust. It is for this reason that I am so strong a supporter of revived and reinforced conventional forces. And for similar reasons I am a strong believer in a really drastic increase in our counter-guerrilla, counter-insurgency, anti-subversive military and para-military capabilities. ↑ This is the real threat we face today -- as long as we maintain effective deterrent strength we need not worry about general war, in my judgment -- and on this one we need to do a lot more than we yet have.

I have
just
signed
a memorandum
from special
director in
the area to
an inter departmental
group under
General
P

This military policy is likely to involve us in some (sure) combat with the Congress this year. Sentiment for more missiles and more nuclear weapons is pretty strong -- I don't think ~~it~~ ^{such sentiment} can be

51

We have, as you know, greatly reinforced the national defense forces. We have done this both in conventional and in nuclear forces. But you should understand that I do not believe in general war as the answer to every situation in which we have a temporary or local inferiority. I believe in maintaining our nuclear forces: first, as a deterrent against any nuclear madness by the enemy and, second, as a restraint upon adventures that would be so important as to require drastic response from us. But I do not believe in any full first-strike capability, and I do not subscribe to ^{the long-range term} any doctrine of "nuclear superiority."

I am always ready to hear argument on these matters, but what I have heard so far convinces me that ^{in the long run} we are headed for a nuclear stalemate -- always assuming we can avoid a nuclear holocaust. It is for this reason that I am so strong a supporter of revived and reinforced conventional forces. And for similar reasons I am a strong believer in a really drastic increase in our counter-guerrilla, counter-insurgency, anti-subversive military and para-military capabilities. ↑ This is the real threat we face today -- as long as we maintain effective deterrent strength we need not worry about general war, in my judgment -- and on this one we need to do a lot more than we yet have.

have
it
great
memorandum
in general
is on
are to

inter departmental
y miles
of

This military policy is likely to involve us in some (sure) combat with the Congress this year. Sentiment for more missiles and more nuclear weapons is pretty strong -- I don't think ^{such sentiment} it can be rationally defended, but there it is. You should all know that

is urgent effort here by all concerned.

-4-

Mr. McNamara and I have set our force goals after a most careful analysis of all that the potential enemy is doing or may be able to do.

The totals we have set are all we need -- with a comfortable margin of safety. To be honest with you, we would probably be safe with less -- but we believe in an ample safety factor. The United

States is in no danger whatever of falling "behind" in this area. *Set our intelligence reports, and our accelerated programs, give ground for confidence in this & other matters.*
We plan to keep ahead -- as far ahead as it makes any sense to try to be, in the thermonuclear age.

5. Basic Economic Policies:

This Administration is strongly in favor of foreign aid -- and we are asking a lot of it this year. Let me emphasize, however, that our whole position on this one is a cool and practical one. I do not want to find any of us backing programs that just cannot be defended in Congress, and I think our whole policy on AID should be to show that businesslike, hardheaded, energetic, and practical administration is not only what we intend -- but what gets results.

Just as an example of what I mean: I think that as far as possible our Development Loans should carry some visible rate of interest. It is not the money that matters; it is the evidence of hard-headed seriousness. It is easier not to charge interest, ^{but} but it is shortsighted ^{from} from the point of view of long-term Congressional support.

On the other hand I do not expect our Administration to shy away from all unpopular decisions in the AID field on domestic political grounds.

5

It is a matter of judgment. Training Yugoslav pilots turns out to be more trouble than it's worth -- we can and will stop that, with the full support of Ambassador Kennan. But modest development loans for Yugoslavia are another matter; I believe we should go ahead with them.

When you are in doubt on a matter of this sort, take the time to send

the question upstairs -- that is the sort of judgment I get paid to make, and the White House is now going to arrange prompt decision. (FYI, this is said by the

But our biggest problem is TRADE. Here we have a

proposal
old hands to
in a margin
change from
the olden
time.)

major set of proposals to put through, and the whole Administration

will be needed. But rather than make a speech about that today, I am

asking Mr. Ball and Mr. Petersen to make very sure that all of you --

and many more of our senior officers -- are fully informed of the

contest so that you can bear a hand whenever you get a chance.

6. Some Specific Current Problems:

a. The Congo

We have every reason to be clear and proud about our Congo policy, but we also need to speak about it with one voice. The object has not been to "crush Tshombe," or to back every last action of the UN.

The object has been to find a decent path toward peace and to prevent Soviet infiltration. In this the UN ^{has been} is indispensable, unless we ^{are} to have ^{a dangerous} great-power confrontation, ^{or a split between Europeans & blacks.} Adoula has proved himself our best hope

and we strongly back him; we are now making real progress with Tshombe, and Gizenga is at a low point. We must avoid recrimination with ^{Stratton} Stratton

or with anyone else. We shall support the UN, without at all giving up

- 6 -

51

our own independent right of judgment and counsel. We should see to it, however, that our case in the Congo is strongly and continuously put forward. It is a clear and practical policy, and at the moment it seems to be working.

b. Laos

When we say that we are working for a "neutral and independent Laos," we mean that. This policy implies a Souvanna government -- but a Souvanna government with strong Vientiane participation. We will not support Boun Oum and Phoumi in what we consider to be unreasonable insistence, ^{and} here again it is fundamental that all parts of the government speak with one voice. I count on each department and agency concerned to support this policy in every way. The alternative was a losing war, in which we should have been without allied support. Governor Harriman ^{in Washington} here, and Ambassador Brown in Laos -- under my direction -- are the center of our policy and I expect the fullest support for them.

c. Cuba

We are on the eve of the Punta del Este meeting, and I have little to add to what I said in my press conference ^{Monday} yesterday -- except this: that the elimination of Castro communism remains a clear purpose of this Administration. ^{What we do, and do not do,} in this area must be guided by the interests of the U. S. as a whole -- but I hope no one will get the notion that this is a matter of indifference to the Government.

5

f. a. Berlin

Alternative 1: This is the greatest issue of all. We are on difficult ground in Berlin -- the advantages of local geography and of dictatorial authority are with the Soviets. But we have on our side the rights of the matter, and a preponderance of strategic power. This makes for a test of wills. Our will is strong, and our will, not that of our Allies, is what counts. The Germans who count most, next to us, will follow our lead. We will continue to insist on our basic rights; we will react very strongly to any assessments of them. We will also continue to keep talking with a view to an honorable settlement. Since the Soviets do not want a war, we do not expect one. But we must leave them in no doubt of our determination. *At the moment the talks in Moscow are getting nowhere, but we think it wise to keep talking.*

Alternative 2: This is the greatest and difficult struggle. Our Allies have no real stomach for war, and we cannot and will not fight harder for Berlin than the Germans. So in the end I expect a compromise settlement, and it is essential that the Germans not be in a position to blame us for it. It is essential meanwhile to avoid provocations that divide the Alliance, and give excuses to the Soviets. *At the moment the talks in Moscow are getting nowhere, but we think it wise to keep talking.*

F. & Berlin

Alternative 1: This is the greatest issue of all. We are on difficult ground in Berlin. -- the advantages of local geography and of dictatorial authority are with the Soviets. But we have on our side the rights of the matter, and a preponderance of strategic power. This makes for a test of wills. Our will is strong, and our will, not that of our Allies, is what counts. The Germans, who count most, next to us, will follow our lead. ¶ We will continue to insist on our basic rights; we will react very strongly to any harassments of them. We will also continue to keep talking with a view to an honorable settlement. Since the Soviets do not want a war, I do not expect one. But we

At the moment the talk in Moscow are getting nowhere, but we think it wise to keep talking.

Alternative 2: This is the greatest issue of all, and I expect a long and difficult struggle. Our Allies have no real stomach for war, and we cannot and will not fight harder for Berlin than the Germans. So in the end I expect a compromise settlement, and it is essential that the Germans not be in a position to blame us for it. It is essential meanwhile to avoid provocations that divide the Alliance, and give excuses to the Soviets.

At the moment the talk in Moscow are getting nowhere, but we think it wise to keep talking.

7. Some Problems of Administrative Practice:

We have been at work for a year now, and I think all of us are doing our jobs better. We know each other better; we are more familiar with the problems. I myself am getting better help and response from all the Departments concerned with National Security affairs.

But there is ^{the} one practice that I want to warn against.

Several times in recent months I have asked for recommendations on a problem and had to wait for weeks -- or even months -- for a proper response. The reason, I think, has been disagreement among participating agencies. Let me emphasize to all that I do not mind divided recommendations; I much prefer them to compromises that hide the real issues. I am asking my own staff to keep prodding so that such issues are forced up where I can see them -- and I count on all of you to see to it that the temptation to keep such matters away from the White House is resisted. It is much better to lose a case or two over here than to hide your problems in compromise.

Second, I am strongly against inter-agency or inter-bureau fighting in the press. We have had less of this than other Administrations, but even a little is too much.

Third, there is still too much confusion leading to the press. Some of it is vicious, but most of it is merely foolish. I believe in open doors to the press, but it is always important to be able to say nothing when you shut your eyes. I release the quiet men, and I am beginning to know what they are.

COPY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1/17/62

January 17, 1962

~~SECRET~~

Outline for Talk to NSC, January 18, 1962

1. Object of the talk:

a. to be sure that the senior officers of the Executive Branch, in National Security affairs, all have some understanding of our major policies. We are a team -- and it is essential that all of us work together in the same direction. You and your immediate subordinates have a real need-to-know what we are trying to do.

b. to ensure that we are all clear about the basic positions we shall be urging and explaining with Congress and with public opinion. I know that each of you gets regular information on decisions and policies in his own area, but it is important for those of us who circulate among members of Congress and the press and foreign embassies to be sure we know the Government's policy.

2. Basic Foreign Policy

It is not just talk when we say in the State of the Union message that our object is a world of free and interdependent states. That is exactly what we want and what the Communists cannot tolerate.

Nor is it just talk that we can stand to have them choose for themselves. We are proud of our improved relations with countries like India, in spite of the Goa episode; and the annoyance of the Belgrade meeting does not prevent us from seeking useful connections even with noisy neutrals.

We do not recognize any flat priority as between one group of friends and another. Circumstances will have to guide us in individual cases. Nevertheless we do rate very highly the problem of

3. Unity and Strength in the Atlantic Community

You all know of the trade fight that is ahead, and you know also of the standing test in Berlin. Let me just say that these are obviously of the first importance.


SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

Additional material has been released as a result of this review.

NLK-90-52

SCE NARA Date 1/21/91



00RS 1991/12/28
talk beginning

TOP SECRET

At the same time, we must all be alert against the self-interested noises made by even friendly governments from time to time -- we must not be pushed around by German or French or British propaganda, and we must be careful to frame our policies in terms of American interests and American leadership. We are bound to pay the price of leadership -- we may as well have some of its advantages. So it is American policy that we must work for. Fortunately, in Europe, it is pretty clear. We mean to hold our own in Berlin; we mean to work for increased European unity; we mean to strengthen conventional forces; we mean to keep the nuclear deterrent up-to-date. This last one, I know, opens complex problems, and I am glad that many of you are at work on them.

4. Basic Military Policy

(This is an edgy one, but I believe a few sentences would be enormously helpful in setting the stage for further work by others)

We have, as you know, greatly reinforced the national defense forces. We have done this both in conventional and in nuclear forces. But you should understand that I do not believe in general war as the answer to every situation in which we have a temporary or local inferiority. I believe in maintaining our nuclear forces: first, as a deterrent against any nuclear madness by the enemy and, second, as a restraint upon adventures that would be so important as to require drastic response from us. But I do not believe in any "full first-strike capability," and I do not subscribe to the doctrine of long-term "nuclear superiority." I am always ready to hear argument on these matters, but what I have heard so far convinces me that in the long run we are headed for a nuclear stalemate -- always assuming we can avoid a nuclear holocaust. It is for this reason that I am so strong a supporter of revived and reinforced conventional forces. And for similar reasons I am a strong believer in a really drastic increase in our counter-guerrilla, counter-insurgency, anti-subversive military and para-military capabilities. I have just signed a memorandum giving special duties in this area to an interdepartmental group under General Taylor, and I expect urgent effort here by all concerned. This is the real threat we face today -- as long as we maintain effective deterrent strength we need not worry about general war, in my judgment -- and on this one we need to do a lot more than we yet have.

This military policy is likely to involve us in some combat with the Congress this year. Sentiment for more missiles and more nuclear weapons is pretty strong -- I don't think such sentiment can be rationally defended, but there it is. You should all know that Mr. McNamara and I have set our force goals after a most careful analysis of all that the potential enemy is doing or may be able to do. The totals we have set are all we need -- with a comfortable margin of safety. To be honest with you, we would probably be safe with less -- but we believe in an ample safety factor. The United States is in no danger whatever of falling "behind" in this area. Our intelligence reports, and our accelerated programs, give ground for confidence on this vital matter. We plan to keep ahead -- as far ahead as it makes any sense to try to be, in the thermonuclear age.

5. Basic Economic Policies

This Administration is strongly in favor of foreign aid -- and we are asking a lot of it this year. Let me emphasize, however, that our whole position on this one is a cool and practical one. I do not want to find any of us backing programs that just cannot be defended in Congress, and I think our whole policy on AID should be to show that businesslike, hardheaded, energetic, and practical administration is not only what we intend -- but what gets results.

Just as an example of what I mean: I think that as far as possible our Development Loans should carry some visible rate of interest. It is not the money that matters; it is the evidence of hard-headed seriousness. It is easier not to charge interest, but it is shortsighted from the point of view of long-term Congressional support.

On the other hand I do not expect our Administration to shy away from all unpopular decisions in the AID field on domestic political grounds. It is a matter of judgment. Training Yugoslav pilots turns out to be more trouble than it's worth -- we can and will stop that, with the full support of Ambassador Kennan. But modest development loans for Yugoslavia are another matter; I believe we should go ahead with them. When you are in doubt on a matter of this sort, take the time to send the question upstairs -- that is the sort of judgment I get paid to make, and the White House is now geared to arrange prompt decisions. (FYI, this is said by the old hands to be a major change from the olden times.)

~~TOP SECRET~~

But our biggest problem is TRADE. Here we have a major set of proposals to put through, and the whole Administration will be needed. But rather than make a speech about that today, I am asking Mr. Ball and Mr. Petersen to make very sure that all of you -- and many more of our senior officers -- are fully informed so that you can be a hand whenever you get a chance.

Some Specific Current Problems

a. The Congo

We have every reason to be clear and proud about our Congo policy, but we also need to speak about it with one voice. The object has not been to "crush Tshombe," or to back every last action of the UN. The object has been to find a decent path toward peace and to prevent Soviet infiltration. In this the UN has been indispensable, unless we were to have a dangerous great-power confrontation, or a split between Europeans and blacks. Adoula has proved himself our best hope and we strongly back him; we are now making real progress with Tshombe, and Gizenga is at a low point. We must avoid recrimination with Struelens or with anyone else. We shall support the UN, without at all giving up our own independent right of judgment and counsel. We should see to it, however, that our case in the Congo is strongly and continuously put forward. It is a clear and practical policy, and at the moment it seems to be working.

b. Laos

When we say that we are working for a "neutral and independent Laos," we mean just that. This policy implies a Souvanna government -- but a Souvanna government with a strong Vientiane participation. We will not support Boun Oum and Phoumi in what we consider to be unreasonable intransigence.

Here again it is fundamental that all parts of the government speak with one voice. I count on each department and agency concerned to support this policy in every way. The alternative was a losing war, in which we should have been without allied support. Governor Harriman in Washington, and Ambassador Brown in Laos -- under my direction -- are the center of our policy and I expect the fullest support for them.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Central Files

copy 4 of 4 files

copy 1 - Mr. R.E. Nicalo, Mr. Barga

TOP SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED

c. South Viet-Nam

We are embarked on a major effort here, and it is not going to be an easy one. I particularly urge on all senior officers the liveliest attention to day-to-day action in this area. I am glad to see that Bob McNamara is visiting Honolulu at frequent intervals, and I hope that at all levels, and in all fields, our officers in South Viet-Nam will have prompt and active support. Initial reports from the Vietnamese task force show that we are making progress in this area -- but we need to make more.

d. West Irian

We are putting a lot of heat on both parties to get together and reach a peaceful solution through the good offices of U Thant. There are difficult men on both sides. But I think we all have to understand that the real issue here is not West Irian; it is the future of Indonesia.

.....
..... our real purpose must be to prevent Indonesia from slipping toward Communism. This may involve us in "unfairness" to the Dutch -- but the stakes here are very high indeed, and the interests of freedom would not be served by a narrow policy of abstract virtue which resulted in turning the rich prize over to the Communists.

e. Cuba

We are on the eve of the Punta del Este meeting, and I have little to add to what I said in my press conference Monday -- except this: that the elimination of Castro communism remains a clear purpose of this Administration. What we do, and do not do, in this area must be guided by the interests of the U. S. as a whole -- but I hope no one will get the notion that this is a matter of indifference to the Government.

f. Berlin

Alternative 1: This is the greatest issue of all. We are on difficult ground in Berlin -- the advantages of local geography and of dictatorial authority are with the Soviets. But we have on our side the rights of the matter, and a preponderance of strategic power. This

SECRET

s. for a test of wills. Our will is strong, and our will, not that of Allies, is what counts. The Germans, who count most, next to , will follow our lead.

We will continue to insist on our basic rights; we will react very strongly to any harassments of them. We will also continue to keep talking with a view to an honorable settlement. Since the Soviets do not want a war, I do not expect one. But we must leave them in no doubt of our own determination. At the moment the talks in Moseow are getting nowhere, but we think it well to keep talking.

Alternative 2: This is the greatest issue of all, and I expect a long and difficult struggle. Our Allies have no real stomach for war, and we cannot and will not fight harder for Berlin than the Germans. So in the end I expect a compromise settlement, and it is essential that the Germans not be in a position to blame us for it. It is essential meanwhile to avoid provocations that divide the Alliance, and give excuses to the Soviets. At the moment the talks in Moscow are getting nowhere, but we think it wise to keep talking.

Col. Davis
Col. McCarthy
STRATEGY BOARD
Reading Files
Central Files
TOP SECRET (1967)

w 6 of 6 Copies



Some Problems of Administrative Practice

We have been at work for a year now, and I think all of us are doing our jobs better. We know each other better; we are more familiar with the problems. I myself am getting better help and response from all the Departments concerned with National Security affairs.

But there are three practices that I want to warn against. Several times in recent months I have asked for recommendations on a problem and had to wait for weeks -- or even months -- for a proper response. The reason, I think, has been disagreement among participating agencies. Let me emphasize to all that I do not mind divided recommendations; I much prefer them to compromises that hide the real issues. I am asking my own staff to keep prodding so that such issues are forced up where I can see them -- and I count on all of you to see to it that the temptation to keep such matters away from the White House is resisted. It is much better to lose a case or two over here than to hide your problems in compromise.

Second, I am strongly against inter-agency or inter-bureau fighting in the press. We have had less of this than other Administrations, but even a little is too much.

Third, there is still too much careless leaking to the press. Some of it is vicious, but most of it is simply foolish. I believe in open doors to the press, but it is always important to be able to say nothing even when it hurts one's ego. I value the quiet men, and I am beginning to know which they are.

SANITIZED COPY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 17, 1962

~~TOP SECRET~~

Outline for Talk to NSC, January 18, 1962

1. Object of the talk:

a. to be sure that the senior officers of the Executive Branch, in National Security affairs, all have some understanding of our major policies. We are a team -- and it is essential that all of us work together in the same direction. You and your immediate subordinates have a real need-to-know what we are trying to do.

b. to ensure that we are all clear about the basic positions we shall be urging and explaining with Congress and with public opinion. I know that each of you gets regular information on decisions and policies in his own area, but it is important for those of us who circulate among members of Congress and the press and foreign embassies to be sure we know the Government's policy.

2. Basic Foreign Policy

It is not just talk when we say in the State of the Union message that our object is a world of free and interdependent states. That is exactly what we want and what the Communists cannot tolerate.

Nor is it just talk that we can stand to have them choose for themselves. We are proud of our improved relations with countries like India, in spite of the Goa episode; and the annoyance of the Belgrade meeting does not prevent us from seeking useful connections even with noisy neutrals.

We do not recognize any flat priority as between one group of friends and another. Circumstances will have to guide us in individual cases. Nevertheless we do rate very highly the problem of

3. Unity and Strength in the Atlantic Community

You all know of the trade fight that is ahead, and you know also of the standing test in Berlin. Let me just say that these are obviously of the first importance.

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLK-90-52

EXF, NARA Date 1/7/91

Additional information has been released as a result of this review.

1/18/62
NSP/313 / NSC Mtg #496 A

~~TOP SECRET~~

2 1981 version

At the same time, we must all be alert against the self-interested noises made by even friendly governments from time to time - [we must not be pushed around by German or French or British propaganda,] and we must be careful to frame our policies in terms of American interests and American leadership. We are bound to pay the price of leadership -- we may as well have some of its advantages. So it is American policy that we must work for. Fortunately, in Europe, it is pretty clear. We mean to hold our own in Berlin; we mean to work for increased European unity; we mean to strengthen conventional forces; we mean to keep the nuclear deterrent up-to-date. This last one, I know, opens complex problems, and I am glad that many of you are at work on them.

4. Basic Military Policy

(This is an edgy one, but I believe a few sentences would be enormously helpful in setting the stage for further work by others)

We have, as you know, greatly reinforced the national defense forces. We have done this both in conventional and in nuclear forces. But you should understand that I do not believe in general war as the answer to every situation in which we have a temporary or local inferiority. I believe in maintaining our nuclear forces: first, as a deterrent against any nuclear madness by the enemy and, second, as a restraint upon adventures that would be so important as to require drastic response from us. But I do not believe in any "full first-strike capability," and I do not subscribe to the doctrine of long-term "nuclear superiority." I am always ready to hear argument on these matters, but what I have heard so far convinces me that in the long run we are headed for a nuclear stalemate -- always assuming we can avoid a nuclear holocaust. It is for this reason that I am so strong a supporter of revived and reinforced conventional forces. [And for similar reasons I am a strong believer in a really drastic increase in our counter-guerrilla, counter-insurgency, anti-subversive military and para-military capabilities. I have just signed a memorandum giving special duties in this area to an interdepartmental group under General Taylor, and I expect urgent effort here by all concerned.] This is the real threat we face today -- as long as we maintain effective deterrent strength we need not worry about general war, in my judgment -- and on this one we need to do a lot more than we yet have.

2 1981 version

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 3 -

This military policy is likely to involve us in some combat with the Congress this year. Sentiment for more missiles and more nuclear weapons is pretty strong -- I don't think such sentiment can be rationally defended, but there it is. You should all know that Mr. McNamara and I have set our force goals after a most careful analysis of all that the potential enemy is doing or may be able to do. The totals we have set are all we need -- with a comfortable margin of safety. To be honest with you, we would probably be safe with less -- but we believe in an ample safety factor. The United States is in no danger whatever of falling "behind" in this area. Our intelligence reports, and our accelerated programs, give ground for confidence on this vital matter. We plan to keep ahead -- as far ahead as it makes any sense to try to be, in the thermonuclear age.

5. Basic Economic Policies

This Administration is strongly in favor of foreign aid -- and we are asking a lot of it this year. Let me emphasize, however, that our whole position on this one is a cool and practical one. I do not want to find any of us backing programs that just cannot be defended in Congress, and I think our whole policy on AID should be to show that businesslike, hardheaded, energetic, and practical administration is not only what we intend -- but what gets results.

Just as an example of what I mean: I think that as far as possible our Development Loans should carry some visible rate of interest. It is not the money that matters; it is the evidence of hard-headed seriousness. It is easier not to charge interest, but it is shortsighted from the point of view of long-term Congressional support.

On the other hand I do not expect our Administration to shy away from all unpopular decisions in the AID field on domestic political grounds. It is a matter of judgment. [Training Yugoslav pilots turns out to be more trouble than it's worth -- we can and will stop that, with the full support of Ambassador Kennan. But modest development loans for Yugoslavia are another matter; I believe we should go ahead with them.] When you are in doubt on a matter of this sort, take the time to send the question upstairs -- that is the sort of judgment I get paid to make, and the White House is now geared to arrange prompt decisions. (FYI, this is said by the old hands to be a major change from the olden times.)

~~TOP SECRET~~

But our biggest problem is TRADE. Here we have a major set of proposals to put through, and the whole Administration will be needed. But rather than make a speech about that today, I am asking Mr. Ball and Mr. Petersen to make very sure that all of you -- and many more of our senior officers -- are fully informed so that you can bear a hand whenever you get a chance.

6. Some Specific Current Problems

a. The Congo

We have every reason to be clear and proud about our Congo policy, but we also need to speak about it with one voice. The object has not been to "crush Tshombe," or to back every last action of the UN. The object has been to find a decent path toward peace and to prevent Soviet infiltration. In this the UN has been indispensable, unless we were to have a dangerous great-power confrontation, or a split between Europeans and blacks. Adoula has proved himself our best hope and we strongly back him; we are now making real progress with Tshombe, and Gizenga is at a low point. We must avoid recrimination with Struelens or with anyone else. We shall support the UN, without at all giving up our own independent right of judgment and counsel. We should see to it, however, that our case in the Congo is strongly and continuously put forward. It is a clear and practical policy, and at the moment it seems to be working.

b. Laos

When we say that we are working for a "neutral and independent Laos," we mean just that. This policy implies a Souvanna government -- but a Souvanna government with a strong Vientiane participation. We will not support Boun Oum and Phoumi in what we consider to be unreasonable intransigence.

Here again it is fundamental that all parts of the government speak with one voice. I count on each department and agency concerned to support this policy in every way. The alternative was a losing war, in which we should have been without allied support. Govern~~or~~ Harriman in Washington, and Ambassador Brown in Laos -- under my direction -- are the center of our policy and I expect the fullest support for them.

~~TOP SECRET~~

c. South Viet-Nam

We are embarked on a major effort here, and it is not going to be an easy one. I particularly urge on all senior officers the liveliest attention to day-to-day action in this area. I am glad to see that Bob McNamara is visiting Honolulu at frequent intervals, and I hope that at all levels, and in all fields, our officers in South Viet-Nam will have prompt and active support. Initial reports from the Vietnamese task force show that we are making progress in this area -- but we need to make more.

d. West Irian

We are putting a lot of heat on both parties to get together and reach a peaceful solution through the good offices of U Thant. There are difficult men on both sides. But I think we all have to understand that the real issue here is not West Irian; it is the future of Indonesia.

..... our real purpose must be to prevent Indonesia from slipping toward Communism. This may involve us in "unfairness" to the Dutch -- but the stakes here are very high indeed, and the interests of freedom would not be served by a narrow policy of abstract virtue which resulted in turning the rich prize over to the Communists.

e. Cuba

We are on the eve of the Punta del Este meeting, and I have little to add to what I said in my press conference Monday -- except this: that the elimination of Castro communism remains a clear purpose of this Administration. What we do, and do not do, in this area must be guided by the interests of the U. S. as a whole -- but I hope no one will get the notion that this is a matter of indifference to the Government.

f. Berlin

Alternative 1: This is the greatest issue of all. We are on difficult ground in Berlin -- the advantages of local geography and of dictatorial authority are with the Soviets. But we have on our side the rights of the matter, and a preponderance of strategic power. This

2 1981 5

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 6 -

6

((makes for a test of wills. Our will is strong, and our will, not that of our Allies, is what counts. The Germans, who count most, next to us, will follow our lead.

We will continue to insist on our basic rights; we will react very strongly to any harassments of them. We will also continue to keep talking with a view to an honorable settlement. Since the Soviets do not want a war, I do not expect one. But we must leave them in no doubt of our own determination. At the moment the talks in Moscow are getting nowhere, but we think it well to keep talking.

Alternative 2: This is the greatest issue of all, and I expect a long and difficult struggle. Our Allies have no real stomach for war, and we cannot and will not fight harder for Berlin than the Germans. So in the end I expect a compromise settlement, and it is essential that the Germans not be in a position to blame us for it. It is essential meanwhile to avoid provocations that divide the Alliance, and give excuses to the Soviets. At the moment the talks in Moscow are getting nowhere, but we think it wise to keep talking.

8 1941

└

7. Some Problems of Administrative Practice

We have been at work for a year now, and I think all of us are doing our jobs better. We know each other better; we are more familiar with the problems. I myself am getting better help and response from all the Departments concerned with National Security affairs.

But there are three practices that I want to warn against. Several times in recent months I have asked for recommendations on a problem and had to wait for weeks -- or even months -- for a proper response. The reason, I think, has been disagreement among participating agencies. Let me emphasize to all that I do not mind divided recommendations; I much prefer them to compromises that hide the real issues. I am asking my own staff to keep prodding so that such issues are forced up where I can see them -- and I count on all of you to see to it that the temptation to keep such matters away from the White House is resisted. It is much better to lose a case or two over here than to hide your problems in compromise.

YUGOSLAVIA

Second, I am strongly against inter-agency or inter-bureau fighting in the press. We have had less of this than other Administrations, but even a little is too much.

Third, there is still too much careless leaking to the press. Some of it is vicious, but most of it is simply foolish. I believe in open doors to the press, but it is always important to be able to say nothing even when it hurts one's ego. I value the quiet men, and I am beginning to know which they are.

417/02

EXCISE

CATEGORY "A"

Completely de-sensitized
Transferred to O/FADRC
by S/SF date 9-5-73

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

REVIEWED by [Signature] DATE 4/17/90
() RELEASE () DECLASSIFY Bureau of Intelligence and Research
() EXCISE () DECLASSIFY in PART
() DENY () Non-responsive info
FOI, EO or PA exemptions (b)(1)
TS authority to:
() CLASSIFY as _____, OADR
() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C, OADR

Research Memorandum
RSB 3.18, January 17, 1962

F3
E
blat
blat

ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT SOVIET INTENTIONS IN THE BERLIN CRISIS
January 11-17

DEVELOPMENTS OF THE WEEK

Negotiations. The second Thompson-Gromyko conversation on January 12 introduced no substantive change of importance in the Soviet negotiating position on Berlin and Germany. [As was the case with the first conversation, however, the Soviet Foreign Minister indicated the USSR expected the discussions to continue.] No mention of the talks has as yet appeared in the Soviet press and bloc commentaries have been relatively few.

blat 3

Soviet and bloc media, particularly those of the GDR, continued to exploit the December 27 Soviet memorandum to the FRG, stressing the advantages to the FRG of closer ties with the Soviet Union, with special emphasis on the economic advantages of such ties. The West German communist party added the note that trade relations with the bloc could counteract the disadvantages West Germany would suffer in the Common Market.

The reference to a peace treaty in 1962 reportedly made by GDR Volkskammer President Dieckman in a speech January 9 did not appear in the summaries of the speech published in the GDR press.

There have been some recent hints that Moscow may be seeking some improvement in the international atmosphere. Khrushchev is reported to be hinting for an invitation to visit Italy. Gromyko apparently surprised the Greek ambassador to Moscow at a recent meeting with friendly overtures and hopes for improved relations between the two countries. The friendly tone was in marked contrast to the tenor of the recent series of Soviet demarches and notes to Greece protesting NATO missile installations in the country. Soviet officers in Berlin were demonstratively friendly in offering to assist US military personnel in East Berlin whose car had broken down. The GDR suddenly released, in an "act of mercy," American citizens Ferry and Pankey, jailed in East Berlin since last September. The Soviet Embassy in East Berlin is also reportedly continuing its efforts to cultivate social contact with West German and West Berlin journalist circles.

762.00
1-17-62

Military Preparations and Demonstrations. No changes in the Soviet and bloc military posture relating to Germany were reported during the past week.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE	Classification Date <u>4/7/91</u>
APPEALS REVIEW PANEL, DATE <u>4/7/91</u>	() DECLASSIFY
() RELEASE () EXCISE () DENY	() DECLASSIFY IN PART
() Non-responsive information	() RETAIN CLASSIFICATION (a)
FOIA Exemptions (s)	() CLASSIFY AS _____, OADR
PA Exemption (a)	() DOWNGRADE TO () S, () C, OADR

USA

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

GDR Minister of Defense Hoffmann's January 12 assertion that East German workers had allegedly been calling for universal conscription was not contained in the summaries of his speech published throughout East Germany. Only Neues Deutschland printed the passage in question.

For the first time in about a month, East German security officials stopped and damaged a vehicle of the US Potsdam military mission and manhandled one of the occupants. US protests to the Soviets elicited the most categorical and complete apology received from the Soviets in recent years.

Bloc reporting on the "Long Thrust" exercise has been extensive but relatively restrained. Editorial comment in general has referred to the "tension heightening" aspects of the exercise in a comparatively routine fashion.

Berlin and Germany. No changes in the access procedure to and within Berlin developed during the week. Construction was begun on several small buildings at three of the Berlin sector crossing points but no official explanation of their intended function was forthcoming.

Both the Soviet and GDR media continue to charge that the presence of NATO parliamentarians and FRG Bundestag members in West Berlin constitutes an act of aggression but threatened no counteraction.

Internal dissatisfaction and unrest within East Germany continues to be extensive and no immediate improvement in the economic situation appears likely. There are some indications the regime may now be under pressure from the USSR to move more cautiously and placate the population.

A communique issued by the GDR Council of State January 15 implied that GDR diplomatic overtures to Finland, Ceylon and the UAR had met with a certain amount of success. The communique stressed the prospects of military neutrality in Germany and the link between the views of the neutral states and the GDR's own policy line.

ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET INTENTIONS

Gromyko's exposition of the Soviet position in his second talk with Thompson was an elaboration of Moscow's "sub-maximum" negotiating position unveiled last September. In general, the Soviet performance was more or less what was to be expected at this stage of the talks, with Gromyko continuing to probe the firmness of the Western position while himself appearing unyielding. It seemed evident, however, that the USSR was interested in having the talks continue.

b1a3

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

Bloc exploitation of the Soviet memorandum to Bonn appears to be a concerted effort to woo various influential elements within the FRG not necessarily to a pro-Soviet view but to a position less firmly committed to the West. The memorandum is evidently a companion piece to the note on General Heusinger which aimed at fostering suspicion of the FRG within the Western alliance. There is also probably a link between the GDR's renewed diplomatic efforts among the uncommitted states and the Soviet memorandum, since in both, the FRG Hallstein doctrine plays a role. Closer ties between the FRG and the bloc would tend to undercut the Hallstein doctrine, still the major obstacle to the GDR's efforts to gain diplomatic recognition outside the bloc.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~"EYES ONLY"~~

Special Supplement to RM RSB 3.18, January 17, 1962:

Analysis of Thompson-Gromyko Talk, January 12

Gromyko's major effort in his January 12 talk with Ambassador Thompson was to elaborate and table formally the USSR's now-standard "sub-maximum" proposals for an agreement on a West Berlin "free city" and other issues (German borders, nuclear weapons, "respect for GDR sovereignty," and NATO - Warsaw Pact treaty). Also, Gromyko in effect dismissed or disputed all major points raised by the US in the previous discussion.

At the same time, Gromyko indicated the USSR's desire to have the discussions continue. He stated the USSR regarded the conversations as a continuation of the whole series of talks preceding them and found in the series "certain indications" that an agreement on Berlin was possible. He repeated his earlier remark that it should be possible to work out an agreement on access which "did not prejudice the GDR's sovereignty" and commented that Thompson's impression of the second meeting as a "step backward" may prove to be a "hasty" verdict.

bls

Gromyko's elaboration of the issues he had declined to specify January 2 proved to be little more than a repetition of earlier formulations. Several other aspects of the exchange are of special interest, however. Gromyko's emphatic reaction to the plebescite proposal revealed not only a sensitivity to the Soviet vulnerability there but also produced an indirect reaffirmation of ultimate Soviet responsibility in Berlin and Germany. ("The Germans were not asked when the troops entered and they will not be asked when they leave.")

Gromyko's complete lack of reaction to Thompson's statement that only an Allied suspension of an article of the West German constitution kept Berlin out of the FRG and FRG troops out of Berlin was also interesting. Gromyko was evidently unprepared for the point (it being hardly likely the USSR would have no objections) and will probably refer to it in a later session.

Soviet treatment of the proposed international access authority still remained ambiguous. Gromyko's argumentation did not reject the idea per se but rather rejected "any agreement which would damage the sovereignty of the GDR."

In general, Gromyko's performance at the second talk appears to represent neither a hardening nor a softening of the Soviet position; on the whole, it was remarkably consistent with traditional Soviet tactics in such negotiations. It was evident the Soviets were interested in continuing the exchange and were probing the depth and firmness of the Western position with that in mind.

~~SECRET~~
~~"EYES ONLY"~~

[This conjecture is borne out not only by Gromyko's statements but by the fact the Soviet side tabled two papers which were almost certainly expected to provoke counterproposals. Also, Gromyko mentioned no deadlines, made no attempts to hurry or retard the pace of the talks and conveyed, deliberately or otherwise, the impression that considerable elasticity existed with respect to possible forms and content of any arrangement to be achieved on Berlin.]

b1a3
b1a5

No conclusive evidence emerged as to the precise tactics the Soviets are likely to pursue in further talks; they still have leeway for a move in any one of several directions. In any event, the Soviets give no indication of being committed to a course which poses a peace treaty as the only alternative to the Berlin arrangement they are now proposing. For the time being at least, they appear desirous of probing the possibility of agreement with the West over Berlin without a rigid timetable. Nor have they restricted their ability to prolong the talks indefinitely if they so desire. It may well be that the USSR is as yet undecided as to its own future policy line in Berlin and will await development of the talks before coming to any conclusions.

EXCISE

CATEGORY "A"

SECRET Completely de-sensitized
Transferred to O/FADRC
by S/ST date 9-5-23

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

REVIEWED by [Signature] DATE 1/17/62

() RELEASE () DECLASSIFY Bureau of Intelligence and Research
() EXCISE () DECLASSIFY in PART
() DENY () Non-responsive info

FOI, EO or PA exemptions (b)(1)

Research Memorandum
RSB 3.18, January 17, 1962

TS authority to:
() CLASSIFY as _____, OADR
() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C, OADR

ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT SOVIET INTENTIONS IN THE BERLIN CRISIS
January 11-17

DEVELOPMENTS OF THE WEEK

Negotiations. The second Thompson-Gromyko conversation on January 12 introduced no substantive change of importance in the Soviet negotiating position on Berlin and Germany. b1a3

No mention of the talks has as yet appeared in the Soviet press and bloc commentaries have been relatively few.

Soviet and bloc media, particularly those of the GDR, continued to exploit the December 27 Soviet memorandum to the FRG, stressing the advantages to the FRG of closer ties with the Soviet Union, with special emphasis on the economic advantages of such ties. The West German communist party added the note that trade relations with the bloc could counteract the disadvantages West Germany would suffer in the Common Market.

The reference to a peace treaty in 1962 reportedly made by GDR Volkskammer President Dieckman in a speech January 9 did not appear in the summaries of the speech published in the GDR press.

There have been some recent hints that Moscow may be seeking some improvement in the international atmosphere. Khrushchev is reported to be hinting for an invitation to visit Italy. Gromyko apparently surprised the Greek ambassador to Moscow at a recent meeting with friendly overtures and hopes for improved relations between the two countries. The friendly tone was in marked contrast to the tenor of the recent series of Soviet demarches and notes to Greece protesting NATO missile installations in the country. Soviet officers in Berlin were demonstratively friendly in offering to assist US military personnel in East Berlin whose car had broken down. The GDR suddenly released, in an "act of mercy," American citizens Ferry and Pankey, jailed in East Berlin since last September. The Soviet Embassy in East Berlin is also reportedly continuing its efforts to cultivate social contact with West German and West Berlin journalist circles.

Military Preparations and Demonstrations. No changes in the Soviet and bloc military posture relating to Germany were reported during the past week.

SECRET

(F3)

E
blat
blat

b1a3

1-17-62

1-17-62

SECRET

- 2 -

GDR Minister of Defense Hoffmann's January 12 assertion that East German workers had allegedly been calling for universal conscription was not contained in the summaries of his speech published throughout East Germany. Only Neues Deutschland printed the passage in question.

For the first time in about a month, East German security officials stopped and damaged a vehicle of the US Potsdam military mission and manhandled one of the occupants. US protests to the Soviets elicited the most categorical and complete apology received from the Soviets in recent years.

Bloc reporting on the "Long Thrust" exercise has been extensive but relatively restrained. Editorial comment in general has referred to the "tension heightening" aspects of the exercise in a comparatively routine fashion.

Berlin and Germany. No changes in the access procedure to and within Berlin developed during the week. Construction was begun on several small buildings at three of the Berlin sector crossing points but no official explanation of their intended function was forthcoming.

Both the Soviet and GDR media continue to charge that the presence of NATO parliamentarians and FRG Bundestag members in West Berlin constitutes an act of aggression but threatened no counteraction.

Internal dissatisfaction and unrest within East Germany continues to be extensive and no immediate improvement in the economic situation appears likely. There are some indications the regime may now be under pressure from the USSR to move more cautiously and placate the population.

A communique issued by the GDR Council of State January 15 implied that GDR diplomatic overtures to Finland, Ceylon and the UAR had met with a certain amount of success. The communique stressed the prospects of military neutrality in Germany and the link between the views of the neutral states and the GDR's own policy line.

ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET INTENTIONS

b1a3

SECRET

SECRET

Bloc exploitation of the Soviet memorandum to Bonn appears to be a concerted effort to woo various influential elements within the FRG not necessarily to a pro-Soviet view but to a position less firmly committed to the West. The memorandum is evidently a companion piece to the note on General Heusinger which aimed at fostering suspicion of the FRG within the Western alliance. There is also probably a link between the GDR's renewed diplomatic efforts among the uncommitted states and the Soviet memorandum, since in both, the FRG Hallstein doctrine plays a role. Closer ties between the FRG and the bloc would tend to undercut the Hallstein doctrine, still the major obstacle to the GDR's efforts to gain diplomatic recognition outside the bloc.

SECRET

SECRET

*Amber goes
to be asked of Gen N.*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 1/17/62
For Russian Duty - [unclear]
11:00

ALERT PROCEDURES
and
JCS EMERGENCY ACTIONS FILE

Question Number 1.

Assuming that information from a closely guarded source causes me to conclude that the U.S. should launch an immediate nuclear strike against the Communist Bloc, does the JCS Emergency Actions File permit me to initiate such an attack without first consulting with the Secretary of Defense and/or the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Question Number 2.

I know that the red button on my desk phone will connect me with the White House Army Signal Agency (WHASA) switchboard and that the WHASA switchboard can connect me immediately to the Joint War Room. If I called the Joint War Room without giving them advance notice, to whom would I be speaking?

Question Number 3.

What would I say to the Joint War Room to launch an immediate nuclear strike?

Question Number 4.

How would the person who received my instructions verify them?

Question Number 5.

Can the Joint War Room always connect me with the Secretary of Defense or one of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Question Number 6.

a. If the Secretary of Defense contacts me by telephone and requests authority to use nuclear weapons, and I grant this authority, how would the message

*MSF/2
JCS/10*

1/17/62

January 17, 1962

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Secretary of Defense

Subj: JCS Emergency Alerting Procedures

The President discussed JCS Emergency Alerting Procedures with General Lemnitzer and General Wheeler on January 16, 1962. It was apparent from this meeting that the President expects to be able to initiate, as well as to participate in, an emergency conference with the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

McGeorge BUNDY

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLX-87-23

McSke _____, NAFA, Date 4/89

NK-78-598

1/18/62 (7)

DISSEMINATED BY <u>JR</u>

~~SECRET~~

NO DISTRIBUTION

**SUMMARY OF THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS
TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL -- JANUARY 18, 1962**

7

The President began his general discussion of policy problems by expressing his gratitude to all for their work during 1961. He expressed the hope that all concerned would move ahead in the same spirit of increasing cooperation during 1962.

The President referred to the Council's responsibility for integrating the work of the Departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency, with the participation of the Treasury Department and other agencies when matters of interest to them were being considered. He asked the members to cooperate in making the Council meetings useful, and ensuring that decisions arising out of the Council meetings were effectively carried out.

The President remarked that he had stated the objective of the United States in his State of the Union Message as being the encouragement of a world of free and independent countries. The independence of countries sometimes created problems like those of Yugoslavia and Ghana. Our relations to such countries could never be like those of the Soviet Union to its satellites. We would simply have to live with those difficulties.

Moreover, we have an enormous task, in that our responsibilities are world-wide and of great complexity. The British and the French, formerly world powers, are concentrating more and more on problems of Europe, especially as the Common Market develops. This throws increasing weight on us, and it is no wonder that we do not always succeed. When you think only of our problems in Laos, Ghana, the Congo and Latin America, you can recognize the magnitude of the limitations upon what a country with only 6% of the world's population can accomplish.

6/18

These problems have a high degree of interrelation, in that the political and military factors tie closely together. Thus, for example, the coming fight on U.S. trade policy involves military interests very directly. If we cannot keep up our export surplus, we shall not have the dollar exchange with which to meet our overseas military commitments. We are spending \$3 billion a year abroad to maintain our international security position. We must either do a good job of selling abroad or pull back. Our balance of

SANITIZED

NSC file (NK-78-598)
 BY YWH NARS, DATE 6/8/81

NSF/313 / NSC memo 1962. No 496 1/18/62 (7)

7

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~NO DISTRIBUTION~~

payments position has put a strain on our gold reserves, and while we are not at a point of danger, we are at a point of concern. If confidence in the dollar is not maintained, those holding dollar and gold obligations against us could easily create grave difficulties for us. Any bank in which confidence is weakened faces great dangers. The over-all importance of the balance of payments position to our military security can be understood still more clearly by noting the British experience. The British pull-back of forces from numerous bases throughout the world in the years since World War II has been very largely a response to balance of payments difficulties. We see further pressure of this sort causing British planners to undertake further military reductions overseas.

Turning to basic military policy the President remarked that we relied on our nuclear deterrent. There are a number of places where our strength on the ground does not match what the Communists can bring to bear.

*com. fr. quonla
20*

Because

Soviet nuclear strength is developing, great emphasis must be placed on other kinds of reinforcement of our military position.

In commenting on the nature of the Soviet threat, the President called attention to the January 6, 1961, speech by Khrushchev, which he described as possibly one of the most important speeches of the decade. Khrushchev had made clear the pattern of military and paramilitary infiltration and subversion which could be expected under the guise of "wars of liberation." The President believed that in response we must strengthen our conventional forces and our capability for military leadership in dealing with that kind of war. This was a matter which required imaginative and outstanding new efforts by all forces.

The President specifically praised the discussion of this problem in the January 1962 issue of the Marine Corps Gazette. He felt that all forces -- Army, Marine, Air and Navy -- must learn how to fight on the edges of the world. The record of the Romans made clear that their success was dependent on their will and ability to fight successfully at the edges of their empire. It was not so clear that we were yet in a position to do the same.

7

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NO DISSEMINATION~~

Moreover, there were special unsolved problems. When the Chinese get missiles and bombs and nuclear weapons, for example, what effect will that have on our dispositions in Southeast Asia?

Turning to aid policy, the President emphasized that we wanted to be sure to have military aid programs and military aid officers who would be alert to the real problems faced in the countries to which they were assigned. The basic danger was usually that of seizure from inside by Communist forces supported by military or paramilitary efforts within and without. The President believed that U. S. military personnel should establish the closest possible relations with military men in the countries to which they are assigned so that there could be mutual trust and, above all, understanding of the real dangers with which the military forces in that country must be prepared to cope -- the dangers of subversion and Communist insurgency within the country. The President believed in particular that more emphasis was needed on military assistance to Latin America. He cited the example of President Betancourt of Venezuela who needs such assistance to safeguard his position with the military which may hold the balance of power in that country.

The President emphasized that chiefs of U. S. military missions and U. S. Military Attaches occupy extraordinarily important positions. Such U. S. officers should not act as lobbyists against Washington by always seeking increasing amounts of military assistance. The task of U. S. military officers is to influence their opposite numbers. For example, in Iran we would not wish our military men encouraging the Shah of Iran in resisting a decision to reduce their armed forces to 150,000 men. We do not want our military men making the Iranians any more unhappy than they already are.

In concluding this section of his remarks, the President emphasized again the importance of cooperation among all departments and agencies concerned with national security. He thought such cooperation had been very good and he was grateful for it. He cited as an example the interdepartmental efforts to improve the situation in the Dominican Republic. "We are partners," he said, "by necessity and choice."

In a brief response, the Secretary of State expressed the gratitude of all present for the chance to serve under the President in working on these great issues. The Secretary noted the surging thrust of nationalism throughout the world and expressed his belief that it was proving a tough and resistant force against Communist imperialism. He noted in particular the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

President's policy of understanding and support for free and independent nations in all continents, and he said that all would wish to commit themselves afresh to the service of the Administration in these purposes.

The President then spoke about the following specific items:

West Irian. The area is a most unsuitable one for a war in which the United States would be involved. We would not wish to humiliate the Dutch, but on the other hand it would be foolish to have a contest when the Dutch really do want to get out if a dignified method can be found. We should recognize that this territory was likely eventually to go to Indonesia, even though we ourselves might deeply dislike Sukarno as an individual. The real stake here was not West Irian but the fate of Indonesia, the most rich and populous country in the area and one which was the target of energetically pursued Soviet ambitions.

Viet-Nam. A really tough case in which the immediate problem is how to cut off a Communist supply line, and in which he knew there was intense and cooperative effort by the departments concerned.

*depart of Army
by Army suggestion
in 1/15/62*

Laos. A problem on which there might be serious disagreement. After careful weighing of the risks and an examination of the supply problem, where there was no seaport, we have decided to disengage -- to move toward a solution in terms of a neutral and independent Laos. We are continuing in this direction, and we hope that Governor Harriman, who is working on this problem, will be able to work out an effective solution.

Cuba. We hope that Castro can be effectively isolated at the coming meeting at Punta del Este, but we expect this to continue to be a very large problem on which further action might be necessary. The time has not yet come when we must force a solution to the Cuban problem.

Berlin. There had been no progress in the negotiation up to this point. If that situation persisted, the Soviets could be expected to proceed with a separate peace treaty and there might be a direct test of nerves in the Spring. At such a point the responsibility on the military would be increasingly great. We have to control the developing situation from Washington and a heavy responsibility would rest on the President, the Secretaries of

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~RESTRICTION~~

State and Defense, and the military commanders.

see FRV 61:14/762

The President then turned to the subject of relations with the press. He thought there were still too many stories appearing which should not have been given to reporters. We do better than others, and the President referred specifically to Bonn and Paris as the worst offenders. But we should improve our own security. We ought not to circulate important papers and cables in a casual way. We ought to be sure that matters on which there may be differences in the Government are not made public if we can avoid it. The President believed that there had been fewer inter-agency struggles and squabbles in this Administration than in any of which he was aware in recent times. He hoped that this good record could be maintained and improved.

Finally, in remarks that were actually given at the opening of the second part of the meeting, the President stated that there were still a number of problems on which study, recommendation and decision took too long. He noted in particular the case of policy toward Yugoslavia. Recommendations had been requested at an NSC meeting three months before, and the matter had come to him for decision only this week. Yet it was not that difficult, and the solution was a relatively simple compromise. The President instructed his own staff and the departments concerned to avoid such delays in the future.

1/15/62
M/Raysen

~~TOP SECRET~~
COPY NO. _____

January 18, 1962

Dear Harry:

Let me add a word to our discussion on your thoughtful and thought-provoking paper. As I think Walt said, the balance of advocacy and objectivity was admirable. Let me try to strike a similar balance. Your fundamental concern with an independent, i.e., veto-free NATO force, is that it could start a war when we didn't want one and, further, in a way that was to our disadvantage if we were to start one. I do not deny that this is a genuine problem. What I do worry about is whether there aren't worse alternatives to which we might be pushed which have the same undesirable features from a military point of view, plus others, both military and political.

It seems to me we can move nearer to agreement by distinguishing in our discussions the tasks which we conceive to be assigned to this NATO force. Let us for the moment assume that it operates under the following scheme. The Europeans are free to use it as a second-strike force on targets which we jointly agree in our own planning be treated as among those to be attacked by the hold-back reserve, and not use it for Task 1 and in either first or second-strike circumstances. Under these assumptions, I would argue that this force adds to deterrence and does not subtract from the war-fighting capability of the Alliance. If in fact war comes, and we have done any kind of job on the task we all agree needs doing--namely, getting the European members of the Alliance to understand our targeting philosophy--and they are reassured that we are in fact attacking the targets of special concern to them with external forces, they will be content. A similar way of putting this, perhaps, is that we can assign part of our hold-back force to SACEUR, or to an alternate European command mechanism. Under these circumstances, it will add to the deterrence confronting the Soviets, and it will provide reassurance for the Europeans without subtracting from our own capacity to fight a well-planned nuclear war.

Now, it is of course clear that the existence of a force which the Europeans can launch makes it possible for them to throw the carefully

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
MLK-94-76
By <i>[Signature]</i> NARA, Date 10/79

NSA/216/MCA 1162-6162

~~TOP SECRET~~

thought out and well planned--we hope--lessons on targeting into the ash can and do something irresponsible which damages them and us. It is hard to conceive of any arrangement which doesn't have this capability for mischief except one in which there are no nuclear forces in Europe at all. Certainly the present arrangement does nothing to reassure us on this score. Now you may argue that this will not provide the Europeans what they desire politically; that unless we give them a force on which there is no formal U.S. veto on initiation by them for a first-strike situation, they will not have what they want. At this point, I think we come to the question of process and timing which Henry Owen raised in our discussion. What they ultimately want is not now clearly determined, but will come about as a result of the style and substance of our discussions with them as we go forward.

A last word. One of the virtues of a Polaris force is precisely that it is suitable for employment in the way I suggested and would hardly provide the weapons of choice for initiating Task 1, especially in terms of the problem of achieving as good an approximation to simultaneity as possible.

Cordially yours,

Carl Kaysen

Mr. Henry S. Rowen
 Office, Secretary of Defense
 Room 3E-274, The Pentagon
 Washington 25, D.C.

Copy furnished:
 Mr. Henry Owen

~~TOP SECRET~~

18162

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

MICROFILMED

KENNEDY 4138ARY

APRIL 1964

E26

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHANGE TO

SECRET

Classification

ACTION: Embassy MOSCOW PRIORITY VERBATIM TEXT 1681 JAN 10 8 06 PM '62

EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR

Cat. A - Caption removed; transferred to O/FADRC
 Cat. B - Transferred to O/FADRC controlled by S/S
 Caption and custody retained by S/S
 Reviewed by: *EJC*

Following is text of proposed instructions for next meeting with Gromyko which we are giving to British and Germans for comment.

BEGIN TEXT

1. We are, of course, disappointed that your last round with Gromyko led to nothing more than restatement both orally and in writing of standard Soviet position on Berlin. We also note that you are inclined to consider that Soviets wish to break off Moscow talks so that they may proceed with signature of peace treaty. Whether this view correct or whether hard Soviet position can be explained at least partly in terms of negotiating tactics, we can all agree that West has no overriding interest in accelerating pace of talks or in pushing them towards break-down. Although present indeterminate position creates difficulties in terms of required US decisions on military build-up, these are not governing at present stage. On other hand time seems to have come to put certain questions which may cause movement in one direction or another.

2. You might begin by stating that Soviet Foreign Minister, in last discussion, seemed to have put forward extreme Soviet position. Logical response

EYES ONLY

REVIEWED BY: *[Signature]* Date: *1/11/62*
 FOI, EO or PA exemptions
 TS authority to: OADR
 CLASSIFY as: OADR
 DOWNGRADE TS to: () S or () C, OADR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
 RELEASE
 EXISE
 DENY
 DECLASSIFY
 DECLASSIFY in PART
 DELETE
 Non-responsive info.

Moscow-1681

762.00/1-1862

TO: EUR (18162) Embassy Moscow, 1/10/62

The Secretary

EUR - Mr. Kohler
U - Mr. Hall

1/2 - Mr. Hohlen

3 - Mr. Swank

WHITE HOUSE

S/S - Mr. Colopy

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET
Classification

[Handwritten initials]

SECRET**Classification**

response would be to put forward extreme Western position. Counterpart to Soviet stress on Western participation in peace treaty with GDR would be Western Peace Plan. Counterpart to Soviet emphasis on free city proposal would be Western stress on all-Berlin solution.

3. In presenting para 4 of previous instructions contained DEPTTEL 1615, you have already laid ground work for elimination of further discussion of Western role in peace treaty. You should reiterate this point, adding that we are refraining from putting forward extreme Western position in all-German field because we continue to assume that Soviets recognize that no meeting of minds is possible on peace treaty and that they are prepared to take this into account. As to free city proposal contained in Soviet memorandum, you should say that you will be giving Soviet Foreign Minister paper setting forth Western views on subject of appropriate arrangement for Berlin. (Decision still to be made whether this will be memorandum with all-Berlin proposal attached or simply all-Berlin proposal.) It is obvious, however, that between points of view set forth in US and Soviet documents no apparent basis exists for agreement. We assume that Soviets proceed from principle that great power cannot be expected ^{simply} to accept extreme position of other side. If Soviets are not prepared, as seems to be case, to discuss seriously an all-Berlin arrangement they cannot seriously believe that US should be expected to accept Soviet proposal for free city which, despite verbal assurances, would represent substantial repudiation of position which Western powers have consistently maintained during numerous exchanges and discussions with Soviets since November 1958. Proposal would deprive West Berliners of essential protection they now enjoy, provide for constant

SECRET**Classification**

~~SECRET~~
~~Classification~~

constant interference in their internal affairs by Four Powers and make their contacts with outer world subject to whims of East Germans.

4. Question therefore arises whether any useful basis for further discussion can be found. US is prepared to continue explore this possibility. Our belief is that appropriate place to begin, since this obviously critical point at issue, would be means of assuring free access to and from West Berlin. In this connection, Western Powers put forward suggestion for International Access Authority. Soviet Foreign Minister has said this unacceptable as inconsistent with QUOTE sovereignty of GDR UNQUOTE. Perhaps there is element of misunderstanding here. Soviets seem to be overlooking some basic facts:

- a. West Berlin and our access thereto were not subject to any Soviet occupation rights.
- b. There is no way by which Soviet Union can confer on GDR rights which it does not have.
- c. Any attempt to confer QUOTE sovereignty UNQUOTE must therefore be limited by fact of Western position in Berlin.
- d. We are prepared to discuss how Western rights can be exercised so as not to interfere with GDR authorities but not how these rights are to be handed over to those authorities. (In pursuing this line of argument you may as you see fit draw on paras 6 and 10 of DEPTTEL 1615, as well as US note of July 19, 1961.)

5. Moreover, International Access Authority would not run counter to procedure which Soviet Foreign Minister in first talk described as consistent with

GDR

~~SECRET~~
~~Classification~~

SECRET

Classification

GDR QUOTE sovereignty UNQUOTE, namely, that agreement between four occupying powers should subsequently be accepted by GDR in arrangement between and Soviet Union. Access Authority would provide solution to problem which would be compatible with interests of all parties concerned and remove standing source of disputes between them. It need be no more inconsistent with QUOTE sovereignty UNQUOTE than any SUCH international transit arrangements/as those established under Montreux Convention or overflight provisions International Air Service Agreement are with QUOTE sovereignty UNQUOTE of areas concerned. You might at this point hand Gromyko paper summarizing concept of International Access Authority noting that if Soviets wish to pursue matter further we would be glad to provide draft of possible agreement.

6. In likely event that Gromyko shows no interest in International Access Authority or continues to argue that entire concept is unacceptable as inconsistent with GDR sovereignty, you might point out that, just as Soviets say they cannot accept idea of International Access Authority, or apparently of all-Berlin solution, we find it impossible to accept Soviet proposal for free city as contained in draft statute. Where does this leave us? Purpose of present exploratory talks is to establish whether basis for more formal negotiations exists. Such basis clearly does not exist in terms of talks so far.

7. After pointing out that we would want to explore further whether there is, you therefore, any intermediate point which might provide a basis for negotiations, ~~we~~ might try to pin down Gromyko on whether Soviets insist on discussion of their free city proposal as prerequisite for further discussion of access question. In attempting this, ~~we~~ stress should be on point that one great power simply cannot expect other great

SECRET

Classification

~~SECRET~~
~~Classification~~

great power to capitulate in face of demands which are clearly unacceptable. We have left certain documents with Soviets presenting our views. If these are not acceptable to Soviets, we are willing to discuss possible modifications on general subject of West Berlin arrangement further.

8. If Soviets have problems with respect to West Berlin they can raise them. They have said they cannot be expected to confirm Western occupation rights. We are not asking for confirmation of occupation rights because these require no such confirmation, but acceptance, as one of facts of situation, of presence of Western forces in Berlin, and we are prepared to work out new arrangements to deal with problems involved. If we can assume, as seems to be case, that both sides have over-riding interest in avoiding collision course on Berlin, then it is only reasonable to expect that both sides will be willing to concentrate on those areas where at least some working arrangement might be possible.

9. You might then go on to point out that, lest there be any misunderstanding as to how we see present situation in West Berlin, status of Western sectors is as set forth in para 12 of DEPTTEL 1615.

10. You might conclude by expressing hope that Soviets will reflect upon situation which their position is creating. You will report to your government and after receiving further instructions, will ask for further meeting during which you hope Soviet position will reflect more appropriately importance of arguments which you have presented.

11. To degree desirable in meeting specific points made by Gromyko or in spelling out US views, you may draw on previous instructions. Since Soviets show no hesitation

~~SECRET~~

~~Classification~~

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

Page 6 of telegram to

SECRET
Classification

hesitation in repeating stale arguments over and over again, you should feel no inhibitions in this regard. Purpose of exchange would not, however, be to lead to break in discussions but, hopefully, to encourage Soviet reflection upon impasse reached and necessity for some give on their part if any progress to be made.

END TEXT

Rush
RUSH
(R)

Record Number 58729

<u>SET</u>	Berlin Crisis
<u>BC1</u>	Yes
<u>DOCUMENT TYPE</u>	Cable
<u>DATE</u>	01/18/1962
<u>CIRCD</u>	
<u>TIME</u>	
<u>CABNO</u>	1681
<u>DOCNO</u>	
<u>ORIGIN</u>	United States. Department of State
<u>SIGNATOR</u>	Rusk, Dean
<u>DESTO</u>	United States Embassy. Soviet Union
<u>DESTP</u>	
<u>DRAFT</u>	Hillenbrand, Martin J.
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	Secret
<u>TITLE</u>	
<u>CTII</u>	[Proposed Instructions for Next Meeting with Andrei Gromyko]
<u>NAMES</u>	Gromyko, Andrei A.
<u>TERMS</u>	
<u>ORGAN</u>	
<u>PGS</u>	6

~~SECRET~~

425
1/22/62

January 22, 1962

Subject: Questions for discussion on U. S. Policy re NAC's and Nuclear Sharing

1. All the projected courses of action assume a U. S. ability to educate the Europeans to a more favorable view of our revised NATO strategy, which would upgrade the role of non-nuclear forces while continuing to maintain a strong nuclear posture to deter or cope with expansion of the conflict.

Query: Is the assumption realistic? How can we more systematically explore their state of knowledge and their concerns? What kinds of steps hold greatest promise of bringing the Europeans around to our view?

2. There seems to be general agreement that one useful means of responding to European concerns in the nuclear field would be to give NATO greater information about U. S. nuclear capabilities and strategy and to engage in more consultation in the formulation of that strategy. One objective would be to give the Europeans concrete evidence that Soviet forces threatening Europe are well covered militarily by U. S. forces. Another would be to demonstrate further our continuing commitment to Europe's defense and our recognition that our overall security interests and their's must be jointly managed.

Query: What specific steps to this end would be both feasible and significant?

a. Having the NAC meet periodically in Washington? Setting up NAC sub-committee which we could keep informed and with which we would consult about strategic matters? Strengthening the International Staff? Composition? Location?

b. Greater NATO participation in overall planning and execution: e.g., targetting, nuclear attack policy, top level operations control? Making the Standing Group and the Military Committee the locus of this more extensive and detailed consultation?

c. Attempt to work out agreed NATO guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons?

3. These steps emphasize the interdependence of the security of Europe and North America and are intended both to reassure the Europeans and impress the Russians.

Query: a. Given the existing favorable strategic balance, U. S. strategic doctrine, and greater European knowledge of it in some degree, can we objectively say that there has been a decline in credibility of our nuclear deterrence or that it will in next five years?

b. If the steps in paragraph 2 do not satisfy European security concerns, what further steps might be taken in the direction of closer consultation and greater integration of forces and their command so as to meet these demands?

S. Brown

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLK-94-35
By MMK NARA Date 10/30/95

RECEIVED
JAN 24 1962
100-100000-10

1/22/62 M/LF General 1/61-6/62

4. Alternatively, depending on our assessment of the nature of the residual pressures, we might stress European theater command and deployed forces.

Query: Should the U. S. be prepared to segregate a portion of the U. S. strategic force (including Polaris), assigning it to cover Soviet forces threatening Europe not to be withdrawn without allied consent (as Secretary McNamara suggested to Strauss as one hypothetical possibility), and putting it under SACEUR's command instead of SACLANC's or SAC's? If so, with what size of force, how targeted? Pro's and con's?

5. A further step in the direction of greater European nuclear independence would be to give the Europeans greater control over U. S. forces or to help them have a multilaterally owned force of their own.

Query: a. How strong are the pressures for physical possession of weapons or for control over their use free of a U. S. veto? What is the evidence: in the UK, FRG, France?

b. Should the U. S. accept some form of multilateral control over its forces, beyond that already existing, if this is strongly desired by our allies and if they can work out the practical problems involved? How important is it that this force be free of a U. S. veto over use?

c. Should the U. S. accept multilateral ownership and mixed manning of the force if this is desired by our allies and if they can work out the serious problems involved? Should we make a condition of U. S. acceptance: (1) veto power by a considerable number of European countries; (2) giving up of national nuclear forces by European members of NATO; (3) provision for centralized wartime command over all NATO nuclear forces? Some relevant considerations are:

i. What is the probability that a European multilateral force may break up, by joint agreement, into national units at some future time?

ii. How might the creation of a multilateral force affect the likelihood that the alliance will achieve greatly reduced reliance on nuclear weapons?

iii. In, say, 1966, what probability would the Soviets and the Europeans give to a U. S. retaliation to a sudden nuclear attack on Europe with (1) presently programmed forces and controls; (2) with a European multilateral force. Same with respect to an overwhelming non-nuclear attack.

iv. What arms control issues are raised by this proposal?

v. What is the estimate of the U. S. willingness to remain firmly committed to defense of Europe, including retention of 700,000 U. S. military and dependents there, if independent European force set up?

~~SECRET~~

VI. If it were to become unmistakably clear that the Europeans want their own strategic nuclear capability is it necessarily in the U. S. interest to assist them to get it?

vii. How much of a deterrent are the Europeans likely to think they have in the mid 1960's if they are capable of destroying 50 Russian cities but not of doing serious damage to Russia's military power? What would be the consequences if the Russians deploy a ballistic missile defense, offensive against NATO's and other low payload missiles, around these cities?

6. If we decide now that we are willing to accept some version of the position described in paragraph 5:

a. Should we so indicate to our allies at the outset or not?

b. What should our position be on the U. S. veto? Clearly we should not propose any veto-less control and we should make clear that such control procedure would not be feasible under present U. S. legislation, and we should not encourage our allies to raise the possibility of such a procedure at this time. But should the U. S. also specifically and explicitly exclude the possibility of even considering such an arrangement in discussions with our allies? Or should the U. S. only present its external position of this point if and when our allies push for veto-less control, forming a U. S. judgment then as to whether the allied pressures behind this proposal were sufficiently vigorous to spill over into national programs if the proposal were rejected?

7. If we reject the position of paragraph 5 should our position be:

a. To stand firm on the arrangements contemplated in paragraphs 2 and 3, and rely on costs and difficulties to deter any European attempts to prosecute national programs? Pro's and con's?

b. To provide assistance for nationally named nuclear capabilities? Trilateral - US, UK, and France - with German exclusion? NATO-wide, as proposed by General Horst? What are the pro's and con's of each?

IA Files, ~~McL...~~, DCI Mfr/w/President 12/1/61-6/30/62

175(62)
NSEC 181A

TOP SECRET

JOB: 80801285A

Box 6, Folder 1

NOFORN/NO DISSEM ABROAD/LIMITED/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

PR: CHICKADEE

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

TCS-11099-62
25 January 1962

259.

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : New Emphasis on Strengthening Soviet Strategic Missile Capabilities

1. Enclosed is another of the special series of CS reports bearing the codeword CHICKADEE. These reports, the product of a sensitive operation to which we wish to afford maximum security, are being distributed on a MUST KNOW basis within the TALENT CONTROL SYSTEM. Arrangements for utilizing any part of this material in any other form must be made with the originating office.

2. Information in the enclosed report was obtained by a senior Soviet official who has provided reliable information in the past. Questions regarding this report should be referred to Mr. Maury, Code 143, extension 2421.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

Richard Helms

RICHARD HELMS

Enclosure

CSDB-3/649,186

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Copy No. 18

PLS 6/63 7-9

HANDLE IN TALENT CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY

ST/DM/105
10/14

TOP SECRET

NOFORN/NO DISSEM ABROAD/LIMITED/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

NEC 181A/3

TOP SECRET
NOFORN/NO DISSEM ABROAD/LIMITED/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

PROJECT CHICKADEE

TCS-11099-62
CSDB-3/649,186
25 January 1962

NOTE: The codeword CHICKADEE designates unevaluated material from a sensitive Clandestine Services operation which is being distributed on a MUST KNOW basis within the TALENT CONTROL SYSTEM. This material also carries the dissemination controls NOFORN/NO DISSEM ABROAD/LIMITED/BACKGROUND USE ONLY. Requests for a waiver of any of these controls or for extra copies of the reports should be directed to Mr. Maury, Code 143, extension 2421, with reference to the CSDB number of the pertinent report.

COUNTRY : USSR
SUBJECT : New Emphasis on Strengthening Soviet Strategic Missile Capabilities
DATE OF INFO: Mid-January 1962
APPRAISAL OF CONTENT : 2
SOURCE : A senior Soviet official who has provided reliable information in the past (B), from various senior officers concerned with the Soviet missile program.

1. A certain "evolution" has taken place in the policies of Khrushchev and his government. Unable to resolve the Berlin problem to his taste and wishes by means of shouting threats and similar pressures, Khrushchev continues to fight to win time, which he will use for a further frantic missile and atomic arms race.

2. Khrushchev has decided to complete the production of the required number of strategic missiles with nuclear warheads this year, so that when they are added to the means of mass destruction already available, he will have the capability of covering all NATO countries and bases with these weapons. Such missiles are

-1-

Copy No. 18

30/84

HANDLE IN TALENT CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY

TOP SECRET
NOFORN/NO DISSEM ABROAD/LIMITED/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

include with printed text

AW 5 6-07 7-9

PROJECT CHICKADEE

TCS-11099-62
CSDB-3/649,186

already targeted against West Germany and France in large numbers, and to some extent against England, Italy, and the USA; ballistic weapons have been brought to combat readiness. A large number of launching sites targeted against West Germany are located in the Carpathians.

3. A final decision has been made in favor of Marshal of the Soviet Union Kirill S. Moskalenko's forces (strategic missiles). His headquarters and directorates will not be combined with the headquarters of Chief Marshal of Artillery Sergey S. Varentsov (tactical missiles). Infantry and tanks will no longer receive as great attention and appropriations as was the case last year. Moskalenko's forces will be built up rapidly, and an enormous part of the budget is allotted to them. In the immediate future new units (chast) will be deployed (razvertyvatsya) under Moskalenko's command. It is considered that the tanks and other ground troops' weapons already available in large numbers are sufficient for the present time, and that it is necessary to effect a major shift of the material and technical potential of the country to production of weapons for Moskalenko's forces. This does not mean that the production of missiles and other armament for the ground army will be stopped completely, but its scale will be cut down.

4. The decision has already been made, and has begun to be carried out, to release 400,000 soldiers and sergeants. The release of these men was held up several months ago. This demobilization will also result in great savings, which will be applied to strategic weapons.

1. Cf. para 3 of CSDB-3/647,716 (TCS-9708-61), issued 4 August 1961, for source's comment about the possibility that the commands of Moskalenko and Varentsov would be combined under Varentsov.

-2-

[Handwritten signature]

HANDLE IN "ALENT"
CONTROL SYSTEM
ONLY

1129/62

E35

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

1-3407
R

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHANGE TO

SECRET
Classification

VERBATIM TEXT

Origin

ACTION: Embassy MESSGN

PRIORITY

1767 JAN 29 7 39 PM '62

Eyes only
EXEMPT REVIEW
Cat. A
Cat. B
Cat. C

INFO: Embassy BONN
Ambassy PARIS
Ambassy LONDON
USER BERLIN

PRIORITY
PRIORITY
PRIORITY
PRIORITY

2062
4089
4044
969

MICROFILMED FOR
KENNEDY LIBRARY
APRIL 1964

EYES ONLY

Cat. A - Caption removed;

transferred to O/EADRO

Cat. B - Transferred to O/EADRO

with additional access

control

Cat. C - Caption and custody

retained by S/S

Reviewed by:

Elijah K. Following are agreed instructions for your next meeting with Gromyko which

Date:

4-4-91

you should request for early date. You will note minor amendments in text contained DEPTEL 1681 to take account of points made by you and British and Germans.

Instructions contemplate that you will leave with Gromyko text of memorandum ~~microfilm copy of text of memorandum DEPTEL 1681~~ as well as text of all-Berlin proposal (proposal for reunification of Berlin) and summary of International Access Authority transmitted to you DEPTEL 1617. You will receive separate cable regarding amendments to be made in these texts.

You will have noted that text of memorandum to be left with Gromyko while consistent with instructions in present cable, also contains certain arguments and language from basic instructions for first two conversations with Gromyko. While we assume you will wish to read entire memorandum, we leave it to your discretion to edit any portions in your oral remarks which might seem advisable in light of possible interpretation by Gromyko or any exchanges which

REVIEWED BY: *[Signature]*
FOI, EO or PA exemptions
TS authority to
CLASSIFY AS
DOWNGRADE TO () S or () C, OADK

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CID/MR
RELEASE () DECLASSIFY
EXEMPT () DECLASSIFY IN PART
DENY () DELETE
NO FORN DISSEM () NO FORN DISSEM INFO

S/O: EUR:GER:R/HJHillebrand:all 1/29/62

EUR - Foy D. Kohler

The Secretary
U - Mr. Ball
S/S - Mr. Veljotes

S/B - Mr. Bohlen
SOV - Mr. Guthrie

EYES ONLY
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

SECRET

762.0221/1-1062

which might take place between you before you have finished. Hence use of expression QUOTE record and amplify the opening remarks of UNQUOTE in first para of memorandum.

BEGIN TEXT OF INSTRUCTIONS

1. We are, of course, disappointed that your last round with Gromyko led to nothing more than restatement both orally and in writing of standard Soviet position on Berlin. We also note that you are inclined to consider that Soviets wish to break off Moscow talks so that they may proceed with signature of peace treaty. Whether this view correct or whether hard Soviet position can be explained at least partly in terms of negotiating tactics, we can all agree that West has no over-riding interest in accelerating pace of talks or in pushing them towards breakdown. Although present indeterminate position creates difficulties in terms of required US decision on military build-up, those are not governing at present stage. On other hand time seems to have come in this round to present Western case strongly and to put certain questions which may cause movement in one direction or another.

2. You might begin by stating that Soviet Foreign Minister, in last discussion, put forward position known to be unacceptable to Western Powers. In presenting para 4 of previous instructions contained in DEPTTEL 1615, you have already laid groundwork for elimination of further discussion of Western role in peace treaty. You should reiterate this point, adding that we are refraining from putting forward Western position in all-German field because we continue to assume that Soviets recognize that no meeting of minds is possible on peace treaty and that they are prepared to take

SECRET

Classification

take this into account. As to free city proposal contained in Soviet memorandum, you should say that you will be giving Soviet Foreign Minister paper setting forth Western views on subject of appropriate arrangement for Berlin.

3. It is obvious, however, that between points of view set forth in US and Soviet documents no apparent basis exists for agreement. We assume that Soviets proceed from principle that great power cannot be expected simply to accept extreme position of other side. If Soviets are not prepared, as seems to be the case, to discuss seriously an all-Berlin arrangement, they cannot believe that US should be expected to discuss Soviet proposal for free city which, despite verbal assurances, would represent substantial repudiation of position which Western powers have consistently maintained during numerous exchanges and discussions with Soviets since November 1958. Having attempted to dispose of East Berlin without Western concurrence, Soviets appear to be seeking basis on which they could interfere in affairs of West Berlin. Proposal would deprive West Berliners of essential protection they now enjoy and make their contacts with outer world subject to whims of East Germans. There can be no question but that people of West Berlin oppose concept of Free City. If there is any doubt in anyone's mind on this point, Western Powers would be glad, as previously stated, to have properly supervised plebiscite held in West Berlin. It would be difficult enough to establish entity comprising ~~all~~ all Berlin as a viable, independent city, but this would be almost impossible for a portion of city.

4. It follows that unacceptable positions of both parties should be set on one side for the present and attention should be directed towards finding a common ground

SECRET

Classification

~~SECRET~~
Classification

ground on practical matters. We are prepared to consider any such possibility. Our belief is that appropriate place to begin, showing the obvious critical point at issue, would be means of assuring free access to the four West Berlin. In this connection, Western Powers put forward suggestion for International Access Authority. Soviet Foreign Minister has said this unacceptable as inconsistent with QUOTE sovereignty of GDR UNQUOTE. Perhaps, there is element of misunderstanding here. Soviets seem to be overlooking some basic factors of possible agreement.

- a. West Berlin and our access thereto were not subject to any Soviet occupation rights.
- b. There is no way by which Soviet Union can confer on GDR rights which it does not have.
- c. Any attempt to confer QUOTE sovereignty UNQUOTE must therefore be limited by fact of Western position in Berlin.
- d. We are prepared to discuss how Western rights can be exercised so as not to interfere with GDR authorities but not how these rights are to be handed over to those authorities. (In pursuing this line of argument you may as you see fit draw on paras 6 and 10 of DEPTTEL 1615, as well as US note of July 17, 1961.)

5. Moreover, International Access Authority would not run counter to procedure which Soviet Foreign Minister in first talk described as consistent with GDR QUOTE sovereignty UNQUOTE, namely, that agreement between four occupying powers should subsequently be respected by GDR in arrangement between it and Soviet Union. Access Authority would provide solution to problem which would be compatible with interests of all

of all parties concerned and remove standing source of disputes between them. It need be no more inconsistent with GDR sovereignty than any international transit arrangements such as those established under Montreal Convention or over-flight provisions International Air Service Agreement are with GDR sovereignty UNQUOTE of areas concerned. You might at this point hand Gromyko paper summarizing concept of International Access Authority noting that if Soviets wish to pursue matter further we would be glad to provide draft of possible agreement.

6. In event that Gromyko shows no interest in International Access Authority or continues to argue that entire concept is unacceptable as inconsistent with GDR sovereignty, you might point out that, just as Soviets say they cannot discuss idea of International Access Authority, or apparently of all-Berlin solution, we find it impossible to discuss Soviet proposal for free city as contained in draft statute. Where does this leave us? Purpose of present talks is to establish whether basis for negotiations exists. Such basis clearly does not exist in terms of talks so far.

7. After pointing out that we would want to explore further whether there is, therefore, any intermediate point which might provide a basis for negotiations, you might try to ascertain from Gromyko whether Soviets insist on discussion of their free city proposal as prerequisite for further discussion of access question. You should stress point that one great power simply cannot expect another great power to capitulate in face of demands which are clearly unacceptable. We have left certain documents with Soviets presenting our views. If these are not acceptable to Soviets, we are willing to discuss possible modifications or general subject of West Berlin arrangement further.

8. If Soviets

8. If Soviets have problems with respect to West Berlin, they can raise them. They have said they cannot be expected to confirm Western occupation rights. We are not asking for confirmation of occupation rights because they require no such confirmation, but acceptance, as one of the facts of situation, of presence of Western forces in Berlin, and we are prepared to work out new arrangements to deal with problems involved. If we can assume, as seems to be the case, that both sides have over-riding interest in avoiding collision course on Berlin, then it is only reasonable to expect that both sides will be willing to concentrate on those areas where at least some working arrangement might be possible.

9. You might then go on to point out that, lest there be any misunderstanding as to how we see present situation in West Berlin, status of Western sectors is as set forth in para 12 of DEPTTEL 1615.

10. You might conclude by saying that you will report to your Government and after receiving further instructions, will ask for further meeting during which you hope Soviet position will reflect more appropriately importance of arguments which you have presented. If you consider it feasible, in rounding out response to Gromyko declaration at previous meeting to deal with his emphasis on QUOTE broader questions UNQUOTE, you may repeat language along lines para 14 of DEPTTEL 1615.

11. To degree desirable in meeting specific points made by Gromyko or in spelling out US views, you may draw on previous instructions. Since Soviets show no hesitation in repeating stale arguments over and over again, you should feel no inhibitions in this regard. Purpose of exchange would not, however, be to lead to

break

SECRET

Classification

SECRET

Classification

break in discussions but, hopefully, to encourage Soviets to accept that it is in common interest of both great powers to find a Berlin settlement, that they share responsibility for avoiding an impasse and that there is necessity for some give on their part if any progress to be made.

END TEXT

Ball
Acting
(FBK)

BALL

SECRET

Classification

I
I
L
P
S/
S/
S/
S/i
AF_
ARA
EUR
E_
EA_
/PF
opi

Record Number 58732

<u>SET</u>	Berlin Crisis
<u>BC1</u>	Yes
<u>DOCUMENT TYPE</u>	Cable
<u>DATE</u>	01/29/1962
<u>CIRCD</u>	
<u>TIME</u>	
<u>CABNO</u>	
<u>DOCNO</u>	
<u>ORIGIN</u>	United States. Department of State
<u>SIGNATOR</u>	Ball, George W.
<u>DESTO</u>	United States Embassy. Soviet Union
<u>DESTP</u>	
<u>DRAFT</u>	Hillenbrand, Martin J.
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	Secret
<u>TITLE</u>	
<u>CTIT</u>	[Agreed Instructions for the Next Meeting with Andrei Gromyko]
<u>NAMES</u>	Gromyko, Andrei A.
<u>TERMS</u>	
<u>ORGAN</u>	
<u>PGS</u>	7

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED by *[Signature]* Date *4/11/91*

11/29/62
E 36

() RELEASE () DECLASSIFY
() EXISE () DECLASSIFY in PART
() DENY () DELETE
() Non-responsive info.

FOI, EO or PA exemptions _____
TS auth. _____
() CLASSIFY as _____
() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C, OADR

MR

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

13408

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

SECRET
Classification

Origin

ACTION: **Embassy MOSCOW**

PRIORITY *1768*

JAN 29 7 43 PM '62

Info:

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR

EYES ONLY

MICROFILMED FOR KENNEDY LIBRARY

APRIL 1964

Eyes only

This telegram deals with three aspects of your next meeting with Gromyko:

- Cat. A - Caption retained transferred to S/S (a) General purpose of next round (paras 1-3);
- Cat. B - Transferred to S/S with additional acct controlled by S/S (b) Contingency instructions in event discussion goes very badly (paras 4-7);
- Cat. C - Caption and custody retained by S/S (c) Comments on your telegram 1988 (para 8).

762.00 / 1-1962

Reviewed by: *Elijah Kelly Jr.*

Date: *4-4-62*

1. We have given thought to your suggestion that we should now state to Soviets that their proposal does not form basis for negotiation and that perhaps we should turn to discussion of what will happen when they sign separate QUOTE peace treaty UNQUOTE in order to avoid highly dangerous situation. Although under any realistic assumption our purpose in trying to make an arrangement with Soviets is to provide for situation after signature of their QUOTE peace treaty UNQUOTE, we are inclined to believe that, for next meeting at least, we should still keep discussion within broader framework and not yet indicate we have come to conclusion that all hope of arrangement other than for an extreme situation has been abandoned. This is intent of basic instructions which you will be receiving in separate telegram.

EYES ONLY

Drafted by: *[Signature]*

S/O: EUR:GHR: *[Signature]* 1/25/62

Classified by: *[Signature]*

MR - Roy D. Kohler

Clearance:

The Secretary *[Signature]*

White House *[Signature]*

Kaysen

S/B - Mr. Bohlen

c/c - Mr. Elliot *[Signature]*

SOV - Mr. Guthrie

REPRODUCTION FROM 1 COPY IS PROHIBITED

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

Embassy 100157

SECRET
Classification

2. We see purpose of such result, therefore, as essentially to impress on Soviets that rigid maintenance of their present position will prevent agreement but that some flexibility on their part may provide basis for progress. Moreover, meeting will provide occasion for us to get certain documents on record which will be helpful in building public case in event of continuing deadlock and Soviet decision to publish their declaration together with Free City Statute and Protocol of Guarantees.

3. As you are aware, there has been considerable speculation that Soviets really want to bury Berlin issue and that their seemingly unhurried approach to Gromyko's exchanges with you reflects desire to talk subject to death. We know you do not share this view and evidence is certainly lacking to substantiate it. If anything Gromyko says or which comes to your attention from other sources tends to confirm such an intention, report it immediately.

4. We would, therefore, want to avoid at present stage, if at all possible, any implication that we considered talks had reached complete impasse and that only thing left was to proceed to improvisation for crisis situation after peace treaty. Should, however, your discussion with Gromyko on basis of instructions go very badly and should he clearly indicate that Soviets desire to break off talks so that they may proceed to signing of peace treaty, you may, if you consider it essential, observe that perhaps differences are so great between two positions that only practical course seems to be to focus on situation which will arise when Soviets sign separate QUOTE peace treaty UNQUOTE. Highly dangerous confrontation would inevitably result

if effects

SECRET
Classification

~~SECRET~~

Classification

if effects of that ~~QUOTE~~ treaty ~~UNQUOTE~~, without prior understanding, were to be what Soviets allege. ~~function of presence of Western Powers in Berlin, and we are~~

5. You might then raise question of status of West Berlin after signature of ~~QUOTE~~ peace treaty, ~~UNQUOTE~~ between Soviets and GDR. Soviets claim that effect will be to terminate occupation and that arrangements for access to city must be made directly with GDR. As Soviet Foreign Minister well knows, Western Powers do not accept premise from which this description of events derives, namely, that Soviets by an agreement with East German regime can dispose of Western rights in Berlin which was never part of GDR. Soviets have implied, however, that as a matter of procedure, a prior agreement between four occupying powers might be envisaged which would be subject of subsequent agreement between Soviets and GDR. Soviets have indicated what they think should be content of such prior agreement. This initial Soviet position on content is clearly unacceptable to West. Since we cannot agree on status of West Berlin, or on guaranteed form of access such as International Access Authority would provide, and since Allies cannot negotiate with GDR, it would seem important to avoid dangerous situation that we attempt to find agreement on how access to Berlin will be administered after peace treaty. If we can agree that this would be useful subject for discussion, we would be prepared to proceed on this basis.

6. You might then reiterate point contained in para. 6 of basis instructions that, if Soviets have other problems with respect to Berlin they can raise these. You might also note that they have said they cannot be expected to confirm Western occupation

~~SECRET~~

Classification

SECRET

Classification

We are not asking for confirmation of occupation rights
 occupation rights, which do not require such confirmation but for acceptance, as
 one of facts of situation, of presence of Western forces in Berlin, and we are
 prepared to work out new arrangements to deal with the problems involved. If you
 consider it useful, you may also wish once again to briefly review how we see
 present situation in West Berlin last there be any misunderstanding on part of
 Soviets as to status of Western sectors (para 12 of DEFPOL 1615).

7. You might then conclude by again making point about avoidance of collision
 course in Berlin contained in para 8 of instructions and expressing hope that Soviets
 will reflect upon situation which their position is creating along lines para 10 of
 instructions.

8. Following are comments on specific points raised in your 1988:

(a) Since your discussions with Gromyko do not purport to be on behalf
 of French and since we are showing them your instructions only for information at
 same time they are sent to you, see no reason why summary of International Access
 Authority proposal and all-Berlin proposal should not be put forward, as provided
 in instructions, as proposals for purposes of discussion in same way as you originally
 raised question of International Access Authority. Although distinction between ex-
 ploratory talks and negotiations at times seems metaphysical, Soviets presumably aware
 that neither side is making binding commitments to other at present stage. As you
 are aware, all-Berlin proposal in form suggested for presentation to Soviets is
 agreed Four-Power document and is Annex in Washington Working Group Report as
 approved by Foreign Ministers in September 1961.

(b) Text of

SECRET

Classification

(b) Text of proposed statement to be made by you and left in writing with Gromyko is being sent in separate telegram.

(c) As you will note, language in parts 2 and 9 of draft instructions (which also being sent you in separate message) has been modified to play down emphasis on QUOTE extreme UNQUOTE positions. However, logic of argument being put to Soviets is precisely that we are being more reasonable than they by not advancing positions which we believe to be correct but which other side maintains is totally unacceptable; this shows sincerity of our desire to reach agreement. You will note that arguments against free city have been expanded along lines suggested by you.

(d) We wonder whether our point on compatibility of International Access Authority and of overflights with QUOTE respect for GDR sovereignty UNQUOTE is not relevant. As we understand their position, Soviets have maintained that need for such QUOTE respect UNQUOTE might be met by prior Four-Power agreement which Soviets would then undertake to have GDR accept. However, they appear also to have made additional argument to you that very concept of International Access Authority, with its excision of area of sovereignty from GDR control, is incompatible with that sovereignty. Similar argument has been made in attacking unregulated air access to West Berlin. Purpose of argumentation in para 5 of present instruction and on overflights in previous instruction was to make point that, even judged by existing practices elsewhere, such Authority or overflights are not per se incompatible with sovereignty. This fact, combined with Soviet agreement with GDR on basis of prior Four-Power understanding, should, therefore, presumably take care of all aspects of QUOTE
respect for

(c)

SECRET

12200M

USSR, MOSCOW

PRIORITY

SECRET

Classification

respect for sovereignty of GDR UNQUOTE. While we believe foregoing argument is persuasive, and would be effective in oral statement if this subsequently published, we would not want insist on its inclusion if you believe this would really be counterproductive. Please advise us urgently if this is your conviction.

(e) Language along lines suggested by you regarding discussion of QUOTE other problems UNQUOTE has been inserted.

(f) If Gromyko should attempt to pin you down on composition Board of Governors Access Authority, you are authorized respond along lines suggested para 5 your 1988.

9. We are commenting separately on your 2026.

BALL

Ball
Acting
(FOW)

SECRET

Classification

Record Number 58734

<u>NET</u>	Berlin Crisis
<u>BC1</u>	Yes
<u>DOCUMENT TYPE</u>	Cable
<u>DATE</u>	01/29/1962
<u>CIRCD</u>	
<u>TIME</u>	
<u>CABNO</u>	1768
<u>DOCNO</u>	
<u>ORIGIN</u>	United States. Department of State
<u>SIGNATOR</u>	Ball, George W.
<u>DESTO</u>	United States Embassy. Soviet Union
<u>DESTP</u>	
<u>DRAFT</u>	Hillenbrand, Martin J.
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	Secret
<u>TITLE</u>	
<u>CTIT</u>	[Three Aspects to be Discussed for the Next Meeting with Andrei Gromyko]
<u>NAMES</u>	Gromyko, Andrei A.
<u>TERMS</u>	
<u>ORGAN</u>	
<u>PGS</u>	6

11/21/62

(271)

NLK NS FBK 533

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

January 31, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Possible Points to make to Adzhubel on Berlin

This memorandum suggests 4 notions (paras. 1, 2, 3 & 4 below) that might be pointed out to Adzhubel in appropriate language. All of them rest upon an initial reassertion of our basic rights, as follows:

A. The fundamental interests of the West, which are the same as the fundamental interests of the U. S., are 3:

- a. Effective access to West Berlin as it was on July 1, 1961 (a day for convenience).
- b. Western troops at present levels as long as West Berliners want them there (Soviet troops unacceptable in West Berlin, as we have explained).
- c. The maintenance of effective ties of all appropriate sorts between the West and West Berlin (this language is designed to avoid either stating or explicitly omitting the word "political").

B. We believe that these real interests do not clash with those of the Soviet Union, and we think it is appropriate to make the following comments about matters which may be of concern to the Soviet Union in connection with these interests:

- (1) If this basic situation is effectively maintained, it is a matter of much less importance to us what the arrangement is called and whether or not it is said to rest on any particular status. The terms "free city" and "occupation rights" should not be allowed to obscure fundamental realities or to become touchstones of prestige. What matters to us is the real situation (this is a way of offering them some hope on the matter of "occupation status").
- (2) We are quite willing to discuss arrangements by which these basic interests can be reconciled with a transfer of local responsibility from the Soviet Government to other authorities. We cannot give formal recognition to the East German regime, but we are quite willing to find ways of doing our business on the basis of its existence as an authority exercising present control over certain parts of Germany. (This is a

[]

FND
to JFK
MC w A

WFA FND me sup

SECRET

-2-

1/31/62

way of framing the "degree of recognition"; one might add here that the international access authority seems to be a good way of protecting the interests of all political entities in whose territory it would function.)

- (3) As part of a decent understanding on Berlin, we would be glad to talk about other questions, and we believe that progress could be made on such matters as limiting the diffusion of nuclear weapons, declarations of non-aggression, agreement on the eventual borders of Germany, and other subjects.

C. These are the three areas in which we can offer Adshubel something. On the other hand, you may want to add a stick to go with these three carrots:

- (4) If there is not an understanding on Berlin, we believe that the present situation is likely to develop in ways that are not in the interest of either of us. Continued tension and uncertainty in Berlin will lead to increased tension and uncertainty in other areas as well. There may follow an intensification of rearmament, and it will be increasingly difficult to restrict the diffusion of nuclear weapons. The two parts of Germany may well be tempted to dangerous courses, and larger powers on each side may feel a need to respond in turn. The Soviet side talks of dangers from Western Germany; Mr. Adshubel can be assured that we for our part see very great danger in what an East German regime might try to do, if there is not a clear agreement on Berlin among the Great Powers.

McG. B.

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

PERMANENT RECORD

E38 *2/1/62* *Evla*

12
Action
58
Info

CONFIDENTIAL

Control: 720
Rec'd February 1 1962
7:00 PM

R

FROM: MOSCOW
TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2100, FEBRUARY 1, 9 P M (SECTION ONE OF THREE)

REVIEWED
Caption controlled by S/S
Classified to O/P/AD/EC
with additional access
controlled by S/S
Cat. C - Caption and customary
retained by S/S
Reviewed by: Eliah Kelly
Date: 4-4-91

2100

Washington

61161/2-164 PR 769.00

PR 762.0221

PRIORITY

EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY

I OPENED MEETING WITH GROMYKO WITH BRIEF SUMMARY MY INSTRUCTIONS. I THEN TURNED OVER THE TEXT OF OUR MEMORANDUM WHICH WAS TRANSLATED IN FULL BY THE TRANSLATOR, ON COMPLETION OF TRANSLATION I PRESENTED TEXT OF THE ALL-BERLIN PROPOSAL AND THE SUMMARY PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL ACCESS AUTHORITY, THE LATTER OF WHICH I ALSO HAD ORALLY TRANSLATED. IN PRESENTING DOCUMENT ON ACCESS AUTHORITY I READ PARA FIVE MY INSTRUCTIONS.

GROMYKO RESPONDED THAT HE WOULD COMMENT ON THE DOCUMENTS AND MY STATEMENTS BUT RESERVED THE RIGHT TO COMMENT LATER AT A LATER DATE. HE ADDED, "THIS, HOWEVER, DOES NOT MEAN THAT SIGNIFY OUR ATTITUDE IS IN ANY DEGREE FAVORABLE TO THE DOCUMENTS OR WHAT YOU HAVE SAID TODAY."

GROMYKO STATED HE MUST ASSUME THAT THE USG APPARENTLY DOES NOT MEAN NOT HAVE ANY INTENTION OF DISCUSSING SERIOUSLY THE MATTERS UNDER QUESTION. THIS IS CONFIRMED, HE SAID, BY THE FACT THAT THE DOCUMENTS PRESENTED CONCERN ACCESS AND PROPOSE CREATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY RESPONSIBLE FOR ACCESS. THESE PROPOSALS, HE CONTINUED, ARE NOT MEAN NOT AT ALL REALISTIC AND SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD THEM IS WELL KNOWN. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS STRONGLY OPPOSED TO CREATION OF ANY INTERNATIONAL POLICEMAN, BARRAGE, FEE COLLECTOR, TRAFFIC REGULATOR, OR ANY KIND OF BARRIER OF THE WESTERN POWERS TO REGULATE TRAFFIC

CONFIDENTIAL

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken

ACTION ASSIGNED TO	ACTION TAKEN	EYES ONLY
NAME OF OFFICER	DATE OF ACTION	
OFFICE SYMBOL		INSTRUCTIONS TO RM/R

REVIEWED BY *Blushy* Date *4/1/62*

FOL, EO or PA exemptions
CLASSIFY as
DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () SC () ABK

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
RELEASE () DECLASSIFY
CLASSIFY () DECLASSIFY IN PART
REMOVE () DELETE
Non-responsive info:

2

CONFIDENTIAL

EXCLUDED UNDER PROVISIONS OF THE ATIA
EXCLUDED UNDER PROVISIONS OF THE ATIA

-2- 2100 FEBRUARY 1, 9 P.M. FROM MOSCOW (SECTION ONE OF THREE)

TO WEST BERLIN. GROMYKO THEN ALSO REJECTED ANY ALL-BERLIN PROPOSAL AS COMPLETELY UNREALISTIC, AND EXPRESSED REGRET NEGATIVE ATTITUDE USG TOWARD PROPOSALS WHICH SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD PUT FORTH IN ORDER TO FACILITATE PROGRESS TOWARD AGREEMENT.

GROMYKO CRITICIZED WHAT HE CALLED US RPT US CONCENTRATION ON ACCESS QUESTION. "YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT AND YOUR ALLIES IN NATO MAY THINK AND CONSIDER THIS THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE, BUT THE ATTITUDE OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT DIFFERS BASICALLY. SUCH APPROACH OFFERS ONLY A VERY NARROW AREA FOR UNDERSTANDING AND IN FACT PRECLUDES AGREEMENT ON NEGOTIATIONS." HE ADDED, ACCESS IS ONLY ONE QUESTION. I HAD NOT RPT NOT TOUCHED ON THE OTHER QUESTIONS HE HAD RAISED SUCH AS FRONTIERS AND EUROPEAN SECURITY. THERE ARE MANY OTHER QUESTIONS AND ISSUES WHICH WILL ARISE INEVITABLY WHEN A PEACE TREATY IS CONCLUDED WITH THE GDR RPT GDR. MAKING THE FIRST OF SEVERAL REFERENCES TO A SEPARATE PEACE TREATY GROMYKO SAID, SINCE THIS TREATY WILL INEVITABLY BE CONCLUDED, THESE QUESTIONS WILL COME UP. THIS ATTEMPT TO CONCENTRATE ON ACCESS IS ONE-SIDED, HE COMPLAINED, AND DOES NOT RPT NOT OFFER A CHANCE FOR NEGOTIATIONS.

GROMYKO CONTINUED BY RE-STATING POINT WHICH HE EMPHASIZED IN FIRST MEETING REGARDING ACCESS. HE SAID WE HAVE SPOKEN OF ACCESS MANY TIMES. WE CONSIDER IT IS POSSIBLE AGREE ON QUESTION OF UNLIMITED AND UNRESTRICTED ACCESS PROVIDING AGREEMENT IS SIMULTANEOUSLY REACHED ON RESPECT FOR SOVEREIGNTY OF THE GDR RPT GDR. SUCH AGREEMENT WOULD BE IN ACCORD WITH CENTURIES OLD INTERNATIONAL LAW. HOWEVER, HE CHARGED, "ALL YOUR ARGUMENTS FOCUS ON A FEAR YOUR OCCUPATION RIGHTS WILL BE GIVEN TO--OR CONFERRED ON--THE GDR". GROMYKO REJECTED THE USE OF "CONFER" IN THIS CASE, INSISTING THAT THE RIGHTS IN QUESTION WAS NOT RPT NOT THE ISSUE AND DID NOT RPT NOT PRETEND THAT THESE WERE A SUITCASE WHICH CAN BE SIMPLY HANDED OVER FROM ONE TO ANOTHER. HE DECLARED THAT A NEW SITUATION MUST BE ESTABLISHED IN WEST BERLIN AND THAT THE COMMUNICATIONS

cc
re dia
sc
w/...

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

-3-, 2108, FEBRUARY 11, 9 P.M., FROM MOSCOW (SECTION ONE OF THREE)

ROUTES FROM AND TO WEST BERLIN WHICH ARE LOCATED ON GDR TERRITORY OR IN AIR CORRIDORS WHICH GO OVER ITS TERRITORY, OR CANALS WHICH RUN THROUGH ITS TERRITORY CANNOT RPT NOT POSSIBLY EXIST WHILE IGNORING GDR SOVEREIGNTY. "IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO SIGN AN AGREEMENT ON THIS QUESTION WHICH IS NOT RPT NOT IN ACCORD WITH GDR SOVEREIGNTY."

GROMYKO THEN ADDRESSED HIMSELF TO QUESTION OF OCCUPATION STATUS. HE STATED IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO REPLACE OLD SITUATION WHICH EXISTED UNDER OCCUPATION STATUS AND WHICH RESULTED FROM CAPITULATION WHICH TOOK PLACE 17 YEARS AGO. HE INSISTED IT WAS NOT RPT NOT SOVIET UNION WHICH INITIATED PRACTICE VIOLATING ALLIED AGREEMENTS. THE FACT IS, HE STATED, OCCUPATION RIGHTS ARE COMPLETELY DIVORCED FROM LIFE TODAY. HE TOOK ISSUE WITH US RPT US CHARGE SOVIETS DESIRE WESTERN POWERS GIVE UP THEIR RIGHTS WHILE SOVIETS RETAIN THEIRS. EVERYTHING WE SUGGEST, HE STATED, IS IN CONFORMITY WITH FACTS OF SITUATION TODAY AND DIRECTED TOWARD IMPROVEMENT RELATIONS AND PEACE. DISPLAYING SENSITIVITY HE SAID, "YOU SAY WESTERN POWERS NEVER SPOKE OF GIVING UP THEIR OCCUPATION RIGHTS, BUT ONLY OF EXERCISING THESE RIGHTS. THIS IS YOUR POSITION, MR. AMBASSADOR, BUT NOT RPT NOT OURS." HE CLAIMED US RPT US PROPOSALS AIM AT MAINTAINING AND IMPROVING WESTERN POSITION AND RETAINING OCCUPATION RIGHTS. "WE SHALL NEVER SIGN, AND I MEAN THIS FIGURATIVELY AS WELL AS LITERALLY, ANY DOCUMENT WHICH BACKS THESE OCCUPATION RIGHTS, NOR AGREE TO SIGN ANY DOCUMENT FAVORING RETENTION OF OCCUPATION REGIME IN WEST BERLIN."

THOMPSON

MGG

CONFIDENTIAL

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

PERMANENT RECORD COPY

52

Action
SS

Info

21

CONFIDENTIAL

Control: 721

Rec'd: February 1 1962

Eyes only

6:45 pm

1

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2100, FEBRUARY 1, 9 PM (SECTION TWO OF THREE)

PRIORITY

WHEN A COPY IS REMOVED
 transferred to O/EADPC
 Cat. B - Transferred to O/EADPC
 controlled by S/S
 Cat. C - Caption and custody
 retained by S/S
 Reviewed by: Elijah Kelly Jr.
 Date: 4-4-91 16

2100
moscow

611.61/2-162

EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY.

GROMYKO THEN REFERRED TO US PROFESSION WE DO NOT DESIRE INTERFERE INTERNAL AFFAIRS GDR RPT GDR AND ARE PREPARED ORGANIZE INTERNATIONAL BODY HANDLE ACCESS. GROMYKO CLAIMED THIS REPRESENTS VERY NARROW UNDERSTANDING GDR SOVEREIGNTY AND STATED "THE VERY ESTABLISHMENT OF SUCH AN INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY WOULD CONSTITUTE INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS GDR". GROMYKO ALSO REFERRED TO WESTERN RELUCTANCE DEPEND ON "WHIMS" OF GDR. HE COMPLAINED SUCH FORMULATION CONSTITUTES ATTITUDE OF "LOOKING DOWN ON GDR" AND IS BASICALLY IMPROPER. HE CONTINUED UNDER PEACE TREATY WITH GERMAN STATES, GDR AS WELL AS ALLIES WILL ASSUME CERTAIN OBLIGATIONS INCLUDING QUESTION OF ACCESS. SUCH ASSUMPTION OF OBLIGATIONS BY GDR HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH WHIMS. REFERRING TO OUR STATEMENT RESPONSIBILITY RESTS WITH SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO INSURE INTERESTS OF WESTERN POWERS WILL NOT BE VIOLATED FOLLOWING CONCLUSION PEACE TREATY, GROMYKO STATED IF INTERESTS OF WESTERN POWERS ARE BROAD AND INCLUDE INTERESTS OF PEOPLE, NORMALIZATION RELATIONS BETWEEN GDR AND FRG, LIQUIDATION OCCUPATION REGIME WEST BERLIN, INTERESTS OF EUROPE, THEN SOVIET PROPOSALS ARE IN ACCORD WITH THESE INTERESTS. HOWEVER, IF YOUR INTERESTS ARE NARROW, IN OTHER WORDS MEAN THE RETENTION OF ~~SELECTED~~ RIGHTS, MAINTENANCE WEST BERLIN AS SOURCE OF TENSION AND UNREST, AND THEY OPPOSE DRAWING A LINE UNDER AM 11, THEN IT IS TRUE OUR INTERESTS DIFFER.

CONFIDENTIAL

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken

ACTION ASSIGNED TO:	ACTION TAKEN:		
NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE OF ACTION	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R	

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- 2100, FEBRUARY 1, 9 PM (SECTION TWO OF THREE) FROM MOSCOW

GROMYKO THEN COMPLAINED THAT MY STATEMENT AND RECENT STATEMENTS BY CERTAIN AMERICAN STATESMEN SUGGEST "THAT IF NO AGREEMENT REACHED AND SOVIET GOVERNMENT TAKES CERTAIN ACTIONS, IN OTHER WORDS, CONCLUDES A PEACE TREATY WITH THE GDR--AND A PEACE TREATY WILL BE CONCLUDED-- IN THIS CASE THE WEST WOULD STOP SHORT OF NOTHING, INCLUDING FORCE." GROMYKO WARNED THAT IF THE WEST IS SEEKING A TEST OF STRENGTH AND TRYING TO GET WAR, THEY MAY VERY WELL SUCCEED. SUCH LANGUAGE, HE STATED, SHOULD NOT BE SPOKEN WHEN NEGOTIATING WITH THE USSR, AND WILL NOT FRIGHTEN THE SOVIET UNION. HE CONCLUDED WITH STATEMENT IT UNFORTUNATELY SEEMED CLEAR US DOES NOT INTEND DISCUSS SERIOUSLY MATTER IN QUESTION. "HOWEVER, I REPEAT I RETAIN THE RIGHT TO COMMENT FURTHER, AS I SAID EARLIER. WE CAN ARRANGE A DATE LATER."

I RESPONDED REGRETTING VERY MUCH THAT GROMYKO'S PRELIMINARY REMARKS HAD BEEN SO NEGATIVE. I THEN TOOK UP HIS REFERENCE TO THE INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY AS AN EMPLOYEE OF THE WESTERN POWERS EMPHASIZING SOVIETS, AS WELL AS WESTERN POWERS WOULD PARTICIPATE AND STATED WE WERE PREPARED WORK OUT ARRANGEMENT FOR SOME PARTICIPATION OF EAST GERMANS AND EAST BERLINERS, AS WELL AS WEST GERMANS AND WEST BERLINERS. (WHEN INTERPRETER USED EXPRESSION "REPRESENTATIVES" OF EAST GERMANY ETC I CORRECTED HIM.) AUTHORITY WOULD NOT BE EMPLOYEE OF ANYONE, BUT AN IMPARTIAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION. REGARDING RECOGNITION OF THE GDR, I POINTED OUT THAT WHILE WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO RECOGNIZE IT, IT IS NOT OUR PURPOSE DEMONSTRATE THAT WE DON'T RECOGNIZE IT, AND WE HAVE FRAMED OUR PROPOSALS WITH THIS IN MIND. I THEN RECALLED THE REFERENCE TO THE INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICE AGREEMENT AND POINTED OUT THAT THIS INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT IS SUBSCRIBED TO BY SOME 60 COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO PERMIT OVER-FLIGHTS AND EMERGENCY LANDINGS IN THEIR COUNTRIES. I REMINDED

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-3- 2100, FEBRUARY 1, 9 PM (SECTION TWO OF THREE) FROM MOSCOW

GROMYKO OF HIS EARLIER STATEMENTS AND ADDED WE HAD THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE REACH AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON ACCESS UNDER PROCEDURE WHICH HE HAD INDICATED AND THAT THIS AGREEMENT WOULD THEN BE RECOGNIZED BY THE GDR WHICH WOULD COVER THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY.

I ALSO STATED THAT THESE PROPOSALS WERE DEVISED IN ORDER TO AVOID FRICTION BETWEEN US AND TO PREVENT ANY TEMPTATION OF EAST GERMANS TO BRING PRESSURE ON WEST BERLIN OR INTERFERE WITH ITS ACCESS. THIS WAS IN INTEREST ALL PARTIES CONCERNED.

I STATED THAT WE HAVE MADE CLEAR THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF SOVIET FREE CITY PROPOSAL BUT THAT IF SOVIETS HAD PROBLEMS REGARDING WEST BERLIN WE WERE READY TO DISCUSS THEM. I POINTED OUT THAT IT IS THE SOVIET SIDE WHICH RAISED THIS WHOLE PROBLEM. WHILE WE DO NOT CONSIDER SITUATION IN GERMANY AND BERLIN COMPLETELY SATISFACTORY WE HAD BEEN ABLE TO LIVE WITH IT. I CONTINUED, THAT SINCE SOVIETS RAISED THIS PROBLEM WE HAVE TRIED TO FIND WAYS DEAL WITH IT BY AGREEMENT, AND OUR PROPOSALS REPRESENT SUCH EFFORTS.

THOMPSON

GDW

CONFIDENTIAL

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

PERMANENT RECORD COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

H
Action

Control: 722

Rec'd: February 1, 1962
6:58 p.m.

SS
Info

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2100, FEBRUARY 1, 9 PM (SECTION THREE OF THREE)

Eyes only

(Cat. W) Caption removed
 transferred to O/TADPC
 with additional access
 controlled by S/S
 Cat. C - Caption and custody
 retained by S/S
 Reviewed by: *Ek* Elijah Kelly Jr.
 Date: 4-4-91 19

1
Moscow

2100

611.61/2-162

PRIORITY

EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY.

REGARDING GROMYKO'S REMARKS ABOUT THE USE OF FORCE, I STATED, "YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT HAVE SAID AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE TREATY WITH EAST GERMANY WESTERN RIGHTS WOULD BE ENDED. WE HAD TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THESE STATEMENTS AND CONSIDER WHAT POSITION OF OUR WEST BERLIN TROOPS WOULD BE. APPARENTLY YOU CONSIDER THEY WOULD BE THERE ILLEGALLY." I ASKED GROMYKO WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO THESE TROOPS, AND STATED "WE DID NOT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE IN INTEREST OF PEACE IF YOU DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHAT OUR TROOPS WOULD DO IF ANYONE TRIED TO THROW THEM OUT. THE SAME APPLIES TO THEIR ACCESS TO AND FROM BERLIN." CERTAINLY, I CONTINUED, IT CANNOT BE CONSIDERED A THREAT TO STATE THAT IF OUR TROOPS WERE ATTACKED THEY WOULD DEFEND THEMSELVES. I AGREED WE SHOULD FIX ANOTHER MEETING WHEN MUTUALLY CONVENIENT. I ADDED HOPE GROMYKO WOULD FURTHER CONSIDER OUR PROPOSALS WHICH WE BELIEVE WOULD BE IN THE INTEREST OF ALL THOSE CONCERNED.

GROMYKO AT THIS POINT REITERATED HIS DISAPPOINTMENT IN OUR PROPOSALS, CLAIMING THEY ARE NOT REALISTIC AND APPARENTLY THE USG IS NOT SERIOUS ABOUT TRYING TO REACH AGREEMENT AT PRESENT TIME. HE THEN RETURNED TO PEACE TREATY QUESTION, REPEATING STANDARD POSITION THAT BEST SOLUTION WOULD BE CONCLUSION TREATY WITH BOTH GERMAN STATES. HE INSISTED SOVIET GOVERNMENT NOT PURSUING SELFISH SOVIET INTEREST IN WEST BERLIN. "WE DON'T WANT WEST BERLIN, NOT

CONFIDENTIAL

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

• This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

ACTION ASSIGNED TO:	ACTION TAKEN:	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R
NAME OF OFFICER	DATE OF ACTION	
& OFFICE SYMBOL		

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- 2100, FEBRUARY 1, 9 PM (SECTION THREE OF THREE) FROM MOSCOW

ONE WEST BERLIN STREET, NOT ONE HOUSE IN WEST BERLIN. WHAT WE DO WANT, HE SAID, IS SOLUTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH FACTS OF LIFE IN EXISTING SITUATION. "IF YOU DON'T AGREE TO TREATY WITH BOTH GERMAN STATES, SOVIET UNION WILL SIGN A TREATY WITH THE GDR."

GROMYKO THEN TURNED TO QUESTION WEST BERLIN PLEBISCITE. HE REPEATED EARLIER DENUNCIATIONS OF PROPOSAL AND ARGUMENT THAT TROOPS STATIONED IN WEST BERLIN WERE NOT INVITED INTO BERLIN FOLLOWING A GERMAN VOTE. IN FACT, HE SAID, THEY ARRIVED EVEN AGAINST THE WILL OF THOSE WHO WERE RUNNING THE HITLER GOVERNMENT.

I RECALLED THAT GROMYKO CLAIMED PRESENT CONDITIONS DEMANDED CHANGE. HOWEVER, I SAID, ONE FACT OF LIFE TODAY IS PEOPLE OF WEST BERLIN WANT US TO REMAIN. OUR OFFER REGARDING A PLEBISCITE, I EXPLAINED, WAS MADE IN CASE THERE IS ANY DOUBT ON THE SOVIET SIDE ABOUT THIS FACT. GROMYKO INSISTED QUESTION OF WEST BERLIN DOES NOT DEPEND ON WILL OF WEST BERLINERS BECAUSE IT IS AN INTERNATIONAL QUESTION AND THE INTEREST OF SEVERAL STATES ARE INVOLVED. I AGREED THIS WAS INTERNATIONAL QUESTION BUT POINTED OUT THAT WHEN WE DECIDED ON THIS MATTER THE WISHES OF THE PEOPLE SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT AND REITERATED THAT IF THERE IS ANY DOUBT ON THE SOVIET SIDE ABOUT THE WISHES OF WEST BERLINERS, A PLEBISCITE COULD RESOLVE THOSE DOUBTS. GROMYKO THEN CONCLUDED STATING HE WAS SORRY WE HAD MADE NO PROGRESS IN OUR WORK AND, ON THE BASIS OF WHAT IS KNOWN ABOUT THE US POSITION, IT SEEMS CLEAR IT IS NOT DESIGNED TO PERMIT AGREEMENT. I CONCLUDED THAT I HAD TO AGREE WITH THE FIRST HALF OF HIS COMMENT, BUT OF COURSE COULD NOT ACCEPT THE LAST HALF.

THOMPSON

GDW

CONFIDENTIAL

Record Number 58736

<u>SET</u>	Berlin Crisis
<u>BC1</u>	Yes
<u>DOCUMENT TYPE</u>	Cable
<u>DATE</u>	02/01/1962
<u>CIRCD</u>	
<u>TIME</u>	
<u>CABNO</u>	2100
<u>DOCNO</u>	
<u>ORIGIN</u>	United States Embassy. Soviet Union
<u>SIGNATOR</u>	Thompson, Llewellyn E.
<u>DESTO</u>	United States. Department of State
<u>DESTP</u>	
<u>DRAFT</u>	
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	Confidential
<u>TITLE</u>	
<u>CTIT</u>	[Summary of Meeting with Andrei Gromyko]
<u>NAMES</u>	Gromyko, Andrei A.
<u>TERMS</u>	
<u>ORGAN</u>	
<u>PGS</u>	8

2/2/62

E40

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

PERMANENT RECORD COPY

L
Action
SS
Info

FROM: MOSCOW
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 2103, FEBRUARY 2, 6 PM

~~SECRET~~

Eyes only

Control: 1407
Rec'd:

EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY SECRETARY

1) I SUGGEST WE WAIT FOR GROMYKO TO CALL NEXT MEETING. POSSIBLE THAT HE MIGHT DO SO SHORTLY. WHILE I COULD STAY WITHIN FRAMEWORK PRESENT INSTRUCTIONS AND MERELY STATE I WOULD INFORM MY GOVT HIS REMARKS, WOULD BE HELPFUL TO KNOW PROMPTLY WHETHER I SHOULD DO THIS OR USE CONTINGENCY INSTRUCTIONS WHICH WERE PREPARED FOR MY LAST MEETING IN EVENT DISCUSSION WENT BADLY.

2) I BELIEVE GROMYKO WILL TAKE PRACTICALLY SAME LINE AS HE DID IN HIS PRELIMINARY REACTION. WE ARE UNLIKELY TO GET ANY REAL READING OF SOVIET POLICY UNTIL RETURN OF KHRUSHCHEV NOW RUMORED TO BE IN SOCHI.

3) I AM SOMEWHAT CONCERNED THAT SOVIETS MAY CONCLUDE THAT UNDER PRESSURE FROM ADENAUER AND DEGAULLE OUR POSITION HAS HARDENED SINCE RUSK-GROMYKO TALKS AND THAT ANY AGREEMENT INVOLVING "OTHER QUESTIONS" CAN BE RULED OUT. THEREFORE SUGGEST IN OUR NEXT ENCOUNTER I MIGHT SAY TO GROMYKO THAT OUR UNWILLINGNESS DISCUSS THESE QUESTIONS IN ADVANCE OF KNOWLEDGE GENERAL OUTLINE BERLIN SETTLEMENT DOES NOT MEAN ANY CHANGE IN OUR POSITION BUT THAT IT WOULD BE OBVIOUSLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO GET FULL AGREEMENT OF OUR ALLIES ON SUCH MATTERS UNTIL WE KNOW FAIRLY DEFINITELY THE SHAPE OF A POSSIBLE BERLIN AGREEMENT PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO ACCESS.

4) WHEN I BRIEFED MY GERMAN, FRENCH AND BRITISH COLLEAGUES TODAY ALL APPEARED THINK SOVIETS UNLIKELY ACCEPT INTERNATIONAL ACCESS AUTHORITY IN ABSENCE MAJOR CONCESSIONS ON OUR PART. KROLL THOUGHT SOVIETS HAD MORE INTEREST IN PEACE TREATY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken.

ACTION ASSIGNED TO	ACTION TAKEN	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R	
NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE OF ACTION		

REVIEWED BY *[Signature]* Date *4/11/91*
 FOI, EO or PA exemptions
 TS author:
 CLASSIFY as
 () DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C, OADR
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CIDC/MR
 () RELEASE () DECLASSIFY
 () EXISE () DECLASSIFY IN PART
 () DENY () DELETE
 () Non-responsive info.

162
2163
moscow

611.61/2-262
762.02

SECRET

SECRET

-2- 2103, FEBRUARY 2, 6 PM, FROM MOSCOW

WITH WEST GERMANY THAN IN BERLIN AND CONTINUED THINK SUGGESTION HE HAD PUT TO KHRUSHCHEV WAS PROMISING APPROACH. I SAID I BELIEVED SOVIETS WOULD PAY EXTRA PREMIUM FOR PEACE TREATY WITH BOTH GERMANIES BUT PROBLEM WAS WHETHER UNDER ANY CONDITIONS WEST GERMANY COULD ACCEPT PROCEDURE WHICH CARRIED STRONG IMPLICATIONS OF PERMANENT DIVISION OF COUNTRY. ROBERTS SAID SOVIETS HAD AGAIN NEEDLED HIM ON FAILURE BRITISH PLAY ROLE IN CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS. IN THIS CONNECTION DEPUTY CHIEF OF BRITISH SECTION SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY HAD REFERRED TO MACMILLAN LETTER TO KHRUSHCHEV OF DEC 22. ROBERTS POINTED OUT BRITISH BEING FULLY CONSULTED AND MY TALKS REPRESENTED AGREED POSITION. ROBERTS SAID BRITISH CORRESPONDENT HAD INQUIRED OF BRITISH EMBASSY BONN RE MACMILLAN LETTER STATING HIS SOURCE WAS NON-GERMAN. ASSUMPTION IS IT WAS SOVIET.

THOMPSON

BAP

SECRET

SECRET

Record Number 58738

<u>SET</u>	Berlin Crisis
<u>BC1</u>	Yes
<u>DOCUMENT TYPE</u>	Cable
<u>DATE</u>	02/02/1962
<u>CIRCD</u>	
<u>TIME</u>	
<u>CABNO</u>	2103
<u>DOCNO</u>	
<u>ORIGIN</u>	United States Embassy. Soviet Union
<u>SIGNATOR</u>	Thompson, Llewellyn E.
<u>DESTO</u>	United States. Department of State
<u>DESTP</u>	
<u>DRAFT</u>	
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	Secret
<u>TITLE</u>	
<u>CTIT</u>	[Future Strategy for the Discussions with Andrei Gromyko]
<u>NAMES</u>	Gromyko, Andrei A.
<u>NAMES</u>	Adenauer, Konrad
<u>NAMES</u>	Khrushchev, Nikita S.
<u>NAMES</u>	Kroll, Hans
<u>NAMES</u>	Macmillan, Harold D.
<u>TERMS</u>	
<u>ORGAN</u>	
<u>PGS</u>	2

491/2543

2/3/64

2543

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

EUR

This document consists of 1 page.
No. 1 of 8 copies. Series A.

~~SECRET~~

1885
file

154

TO : The Under Secretary

FEB 3 1964

THROUGH: S/S ()

FROM : EUR - William R. Tyler *WRT*

SUBJECT: INFORMATION MEMORANDUM: Response to General de Gaulle's
Memorandum of September 17, 1958

You have asked about the response to General de Gaulle's proposals of 1958 and what action was taken on them. A reply was sent by President Eisenhower and the proposals were the subject of discussion and correspondence over an extended period.

The widespread impression that the US never replied to de Gaulle, and that this accounted for his lack of cooperation in NATO, may have been due to the manner in which the Presidential correspondence was closely held.

General de Gaulle was in effect seeking a special relationship with the US which we were unwilling to grant. He particularly sought a US commitment to seek French agreement to the use of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world.

The 1958 proposals were not designed to set up a "directorate" within NATO but rather to engage the US in a tripartite arrangement addressed especially to political and military decisions outside the NATO area.

I am attaching a staff study in some detail of the exchanges and actions taken subsequent to receipt of the de Gaulle memorandum in 1958. In view of his interest in the subject, I am also sending a copy of this memorandum to Mr. Rostow.

Attachment:

Staff study

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 90-182

By WRT, NARA. Date 10-1-90

~~SECRET~~

FEB 8 1964

~~SECRET~~

1 7 6 A

Action Taken on De Gaulle Memorandum
of September 17, 1958

When Secretary Dulles made a special trip to Paris to see de Gaulle in July 1958, shortly after the General returned to power, de Gaulle emphasized the importance of France feeling that it was a great power, and said that unless the French people felt this, the country would quickly degenerate. Dulles said he recognized that this was in the French tradition and its preservation was in the interest of Western civilization, but that a world role for France could only come about with the internal strength and recovery of France. He added that France would also encounter great jealousy from Germany and Italy and anything France could do to allay this would be helpful. De Gaulle said that he would be loyal to treaties that had been made by France but he felt that the right way was to build on the basis of nations and cooperation between nations but not to get into the supra-national field.

At the July meeting there was a dialogue about the Lebanon and Dulles said there might have to be Western intervention. He also argued the reasons why France should remain aloof from any intervention. De Gaulle said that France would be present if there was an intervention. When the intervention later took place without French participation, it marked the first of several examples in which there had been advance consultation with France but a failure to agree on the course of action. Subsequent French complaints about failure to consult were in reality complaints about our failure to agree with France.

In his September 17 letter to President Eisenhower, de Gaulle referred to his talk with Dulles and said that the subsequent landings in the Lebanon had reinforced the convictions outlined in the memorandum enclosed with the letter. The memorandum referred to the risks that France was running as a treaty ally of the United States and complained that France did not enjoy cooperation on decisions taken even though it had worldwide interests and responsibilities. It said that delegation to the United States of decision-making about world defense is no longer justified by reality. It concluded that there must be a tripartite organization on the level of world policy and strategy to take joint decisions on questions affecting world strategy, and to establish and put into effect strategic plans of action notably with regard to the employment of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world. De Gaulle was later to allude to this in a public speech when he said that "if, unhappily, nuclear bombs should be set off anywhere in the world" this should be done "only in agreement with France and with her cooperation."

De Gaulle

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

De Gaulle concluded his memorandum with a remark that henceforth he would subordinate French participation in NATO to the fulfillment of his demands regarding a global role for France.

In his reply of October 20, President Eisenhower agreed that the threat to the free world's defenses was global but that the US had already adapted its policies to this situation, such as through a series of regional defense pacts in two of which the US and France were both members. The reply then concentrated on NATO and said that the habit of consultation among the NATO members must be further broadened, but cannot be forced, and in any event we could not "afford to lose any of this developing intimacy among all the members of NATO and the closer bonds it forges."

The reply went on to emphasize that "we cannot afford to adopt any system which would give to our other allies, or other free world countries, the impression that basic decisions affecting their own vital interests are being made without their participation." The reply concluded with the statement that "a community association to live must constantly evolve and find means to make itself more useful" and "I am quite prepared to explore this aspect of the matter in appropriate ways". This statement was designed to avoid rejection of the French proposals "out of hand", as the President was to tell the Italian Ambassador, since France occupied an important position in Europe with many of our supply lines passing through it.

De Gaulle had privately explained his proposals to a visiting British political leader, reportedly saying that each of the three powers "should have a veto on the use of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world except in the case of direct attack on any of the three, when the victim would naturally be expected to retaliate."

The President authorized Dulles to hold tripartite discussions at the sub-Secretary level, provided it was made clear to the Germans and Italians in advance that the meetings were for the purpose of discussing the de Gaulle proposals and were not the beginning of carrying them into effect. Two tripartite meetings were held in December by Murphy with the two ambassadors at which Alphand made clear that the French had in mind an arrangement that involved joint strategic war planning by combined staffs on a world-wide scale. When he met with de Gaulle in Paris later that month Dulles said that in the Washington meetings there had only been "some sparring" going on, and de Gaulle replied that the present functioning of the alliance gave no assurance that if war broke out the proper decisions would have been arranged in advance.

As

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

As a diversion, Dulles then referred to French responsibilities in Africa, thought that Africa was particularly suited to tripartite study, and said that he would endeavor to see what more of substance could be given to tripartite talks along this line. De Gaulle replied that a common tripartite policy in Tunisia and Morocco would have resulted in vastly different conditions in those countries, adding that such a common policy "would necessarily be a French policy". A few weeks later, de Gaulle revealed that he was about to remove the French fleet units in the Mediterranean from NATO commitment, and this action shortly thereafter led the US to suspend negotiations, which had been nearly completed, for a nuclear submarine cooperation agreement with France.

Two further tripartite meetings were held in Washington in February 1959 at the same level as before, but with attendance by general staff officers, to discuss the Far Eastern situation. Alphan pressed for a study of courses of action by a tripartite military group, to which we replied that the SEATO planners were concerned with the subject.



(S)

De Gaulle next wrote to the President in March, 1959, to advocate firmness in the Berlin crisis and to express the need for "our cooperation at the world level" in the political and strategic fields, to which the President replied that he "attached the greatest importance to maintaining the strength of our military posture through the fullest and closest cooperation in NATO".

Another series of tripartite talks was held in April at the Murphy level and with military advisers present to consider African problems. The military advisers discussed their respective strategic concepts with regard to Africa and the French again pressed for contingency strategic planning in that area. The JCS indicated to us that they would be willing to hold discussions at the two-star level on a "piecemeal" basis but they were reluctant to produce combined papers. We then agreed to hold "exploratory military talks" on areas of the world not covered by regional treaty arrangements on the understanding there would be no drafting of strategic military plans and no commitments for joint actions, or the division of command responsibility, all of which the French had pressed for. We said that

the military

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

the military discussions should lead to the formulation of the "strategic views" of each participant to the exclusion of "military plans". We heard nothing more from the French about proceeding with such talks.

In the summer of 1959, the French informed the Standing Group that they intended to explode their first nuclear device before the end of that year (it took place in February 1960) and proposed that tripartite agreement be reached regarding the use of nuclear weapons in the NATO area and that no responsibilities for such decisions be delegated to any NATO commanders.

(a)(5)

The two Presidents met twice in the fall of 1959 and twice in the spring of 1960 and agreed that political consultations would continue regularly at their level, at the Foreign Minister level and at the sub-Secretary level. General de Gaulle wrote to Eisenhower in June, 1960, that this system of political consultations was fine but that "an essential aspect of our problems" is cooperation "in the field of strategy". The President in reply recalled that our offer to have military talks on Africa the year before had not been followed up by the French, and he assumed the basis that had been envisaged had not met the French desire. He then suggested an approach "not to contemplate formal combined staff planning but to have our military representatives engage in talks on all military and strategic questions of interest to you in various parts of the world, primarily outside the NATO area." The President suggested a meeting of senior military representatives of the three Powers in Washington. De Gaulle did not respond to this proposal. Instead he wrote about the lack of "true" political and strategic cooperation and proposed a meeting of the three heads of government "to work out a joint plan for organizing our united action on world problems and for reorganizing the Alliance."

The President agreed in principle to hold another meeting and asked that in order to prepare for such a meeting de Gaulle should put his thoughts on NATO into a memorandum, as he had twice before promised to do. The President then set forth at some length a defense of US policy toward NATO and reemphasized our worldwide system of defense arrangements, in many of which France is not present, as well

as our'

~~SECRET~~

as our need to take into account the views of smaller powers. He expressed dismay regarding the opposition of de Gaulle to the NATO system of integration; again criticized the breach created by the withdrawal of the Mediterranean fleet; and raised questions about French thinking on the mechanism for intra-European consultation and its possible effect on NATO. De Gaulle did not reply to this letter and instead spoke out at his September 5, 1960, press conference regarding the need for revision of NATO in order to establish the "national character" of defense; and to ask "if there is no agreement among the principal members of the Atlantic Alliance on matters other than Europe, how can the Alliance be indefinitely maintained in Europe?" On his last day in office Eisenhower cabled de Gaulle that he regretted that "we have not been able to realize your hope for formal organization of concerting our plans and programs to the far reaches of the earth."

De Gaulle told Gy Sulzberger early in 1961 that he did not intend to renew his proposals to President Kennedy. Alphan therefore pressed in all quarters in Washington to assure that the President would take the initiative on this subject when he met with de Gaulle in Paris. The President did so and in their conversation on June 2 suggested that military representatives of the three countries should "study strategic commitments of the three nations and prepare common positions wherever possible on questions such as Berlin, Laos, or others." General de Gaulle agreed to this and it was left for the three Foreign Ministers to work out the precise arrangements. We later asked the French to designate a military representative but heard nothing further about this from them.

In the course of a letter to the President in August, 1961, de Gaulle again referred to the need for "establishment of frank political cooperation between us, as a prelude to--if the future should bring a world conflict--strategic cooperation. Common organizations to prepare the decisions would obviously be necessary." [redacted]

[redacted] At the end of the year the President wrote to General de Gaulle regarding Berlin [redacted] (u)(s)

[redacted] In his reply, de Gaulle wrote: "I say yet again how I regret that the three Great Western Powers should not institute an organized concert independently of the world or Atlantic organizations." He suggested that a tripartite permanent political commission and military staff should be established to prepare decisions and follow up their execution. He said that he would write again to give his views on what the three Powers should do in common in the non-aligned world. He never did so, and the President did not further respond. (u)(s)

There

~~SECRET~~

- 6 -

There has, over the years, been a widespread notion that the US never responded to the 1958 memorandum. This undoubtedly resulted from the fact that the White House and the Department handled all of the foregoing information with the greatest discretion. Despite his continuing personal relationship with de Gaulle, Cy Sulzberger frequently repeated this canard. The last time he did so, in a series of articles following his interview with de Gaulle early last year, we authorized Ambassador Bohlen to acquaint Sulzberger with the facts, which he published on March 18, 1963. Even this received very little distribution here because of the New York newspaper strike.

56
EUR:WE:EJBeigel:rs
1-31-64

~~SECRET~~

215/62

NATO GEN

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

RA: R Fessenden; ack
Dist. Officer and Officer

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

This document consists of 3 pages. Number of 48 copies.

67

Memorandum of Conversation 375 / 2-562

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

20

DATE: February 5, 1962
Time: 9:30 A.M.
Place: Mr. Kohler's Office

SUBJECT: NATO Nuclear Questions.

PARTICIPANTS: United States

NATO

Mr. Foy D. Kohler
Amb. Thomas K. Finletter
Mr. Russell Fessenden

Mr. Dirk U. Stikker, NATO Secretary-General
Mr. George Vest, Special Assistant to the Secretary-General
Mr. David Bendall, Assistant to the Assistant NATO Secretary-General for Economic Affairs

COPIES TO: Mr. Bowie CINCEUR
S/S-2 RA G/PM CINCLANT for Collins
C GER ACDA The White House-Mr. Kaysen
S/P WE Defense POLAD/SAC for Freers (Offutt AFB)
EUR S/AE The White House (continue distribution on page 3)

28

Mr. Kohler welcomed Mr. Stikker and expressed our great interest in his visit.

Mr. Stikker then gave Mr. Kohler an outline of the topics he hopes to cover during his visit. Mr. Stikker stressed that the general theme of Alliance unity must of course be the dominant one; his principal task as Secretary-General is to maintain that unity.

Mr. Stikker mentioned the question of wartime arrangements for consultation briefly, saying that he had earlier discussed this with Secretary Rusk, Macmillan and de Gaulle. Since the French were not interested in pursuing this question and the British were content to have bilateral talks between himself and the U.S., he saw no obstacle to continued bilateral pursuit of this subject with the U.S.

Mr. Stikker said that the principal subject of his visit would be peacetime arrangements for organizing defense matters, and divided the subject up into five headings: a) Strategic concept; b) Political control of nuclear weapons; c) Conventional forces; d) "Missile X"; and e) POLARIS submarines. NATO is embarked on a comprehensive approach to this interrelated range of questions. Now that these subjects are opened up, it is essential that the Alliance come to some kind of agreement on them. Failure to do so would have very serious effects. The key problem is Germany. Solutions must be found which will combat the danger of Germany taking a nationalistic course in the future. An underlying cause of the difficulty is a split in basic strategic thinking


~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

Noted 10/40/ NATO General (v)

DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS

thinking, which has given the impression that the U.S. position is pitted against that of Europe. It is essential that the question of strategy be approached pragmatically.

Mr. Kohler agreed with the pragmatic approach and stressed the importance of dealing with the problem from the point of view of facts, rather than theory. We are not trying to bring about a theoretical debate on the Political Directive. It may be, however, that a thorough discussion of the facts will lead to Alliance-wide conclusions which will cause the Political Directive to "rewrite itself."



Mr. Kohler said that the U.S. felt much education and facing up to facts is necessary among our Allies. This is the kind of process that has been going on intensively in the U.S. Government over the past year. Something similar is required in the Alliance. It was only recently that NATO discovered that we really did not have a forward strategy. This is clearly a situation which must be corrected and it is all to the good if General Forstad proceeds along the pragmatic lines he has proposed. Mr. Stikker said that the important thing was not to challenge now the Political Directive. The effort would be counter-productive. Perhaps at some future date it will be possible to do so.

On the political control of nuclear weapons, Mr. Stikker said that the two immediate steps should be to agree on something with respect to guidelines on the use of nuclear weapons and guarantees regarding their maintenance in Europe by the U.S. A U.S. guarantee that targets of prime interest to Europe will be taken care of is also required. Mr. Stikker stressed the importance of finding ways for countering European concerns that U.S. strategic forces will not adequately take care of targets required for the defense of Europe. He cited rumors that SAC gives a second priority to such targets.

Mr. Kohler agreed that Mr. Stikker's proposal to discuss political control of nuclear weapons is a good start to the handling of the nuclear and strategic questions.

Mr. Stikker said he now prefers the term "Missile X" to define the missile which will deal with the former "MRUM" requirement. Mr. Stikker stressed that a solution to this question is particularly important from the German point of view.

SECRET

Mr. Stikker also referred to some recent talks he had had with Strauss which cause him to be especially concerned that an early answer be found to this problem.

Mr. Kohler questioned whether the facts really require an early decision. The targets involved are presently covered by strike aircraft and in the months to come can be covered by POLARIS submarines. At the present time "Missile X" itself is in the research and development stage in the U.S. The weapon, if it were to be introduced, would not be introduced until 1965. Mr. Kohler therefore asked why it was necessary to rush a decision on this subject.

Mr. Stikker said that it is largely a question of advanced military planning. It must be recalled that forward military planning in the Alliance was completely interrupted for a whole year until the fall of 1961. It is essential that the member countries know reasonably soon for planning purposes whether they should in the future count on next-generation aircraft or on "Missile X" to meet the extended battlefield requirement. Mr. Stikker also recalled that Deputy Secretary Gilpatric had earlier told him that it would most probably be possible for the Alliance to make a decision on this question in February or March of 1962.

With respect to the buildup of Alliance forces, Mr. Kohler said that the real problem, we are coming more and more to realize, is the U.K. position. Mr. Kohler said that we are making no secret of the fact that the present trend of U.K. defense planning is directly counter to what we strongly feel is required.

Mr. Stikker said that results of the buildup in the Alliance have not been entirely bad.

COPIES TO: CONTD.

Amembassy Paris
Paris for USDO
Paris for Steensel

Amembassy Bonn
Amembassy London
Defense/ISA

* Under FORCES 7 MAR 62, see Norstad's disagreement and Stikker's denial

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

215/6

NATO GEN

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

Responsible: [unclear]
[unclear] Office and Office

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

This document consists of 3 pages. Number of 43 copies.

Memorandum of Conversation 375/2-562

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

20

DATE: February 5, 1962
Time: 9:30 A.M.
Place: Mr. Kohler's Office

SUBJECT: NATO Nuclear Questions.

PARTICIPANTS: United States

NATO

Mr. Foy D. Kohler
Amb. Thomas K. Finletter
Mr. Russell Fessenden

Mr. Dirk U. Stikker, NATO Secretary-General
Mr. George Vest, Special Assistant to the Secretary-General
Mr. David Bendall, Assistant to the Assistant NATO Secretary-General for Economic Affairs

~~XXXXXXXX~~

COPIES TO: Mr. Bowie CINCCEUR
S/S-2 RA G/PM CINCLANT for Collins
C GER ACDA The White House-Mr. Kaysen
S/P WE Defense POLAD/SAC for Freers (Offutt AFB)
EUR S/AR The White House (continue distribution on page 3)

23

Mr. Kohler welcomed Mr. Stikker and expressed our great interest in his visit.

Mr. Stikker then gave Mr. Kohler an outline of the topics he hopes to cover during his visit. Mr. Stikker stressed that the general theme of Alliance unity must of course be the dominant one; his principal task as Secretary-General is to maintain that unity.

Mr. Stikker mentioned the question of wartime arrangements for consultation briefly, saying that he had earlier discussed this with Secretary Rusk, Macmillan and de Gaulle. Since the French were not interested in pursuing this question and the British were content to have bilateral talks between himself and the U.S., he saw no obstacle to continued bilateral pursuit of this subject with the U.S.

Mr. Stikker said that the principal subject of his visit would be peacetime arrangements for organizing defense matters, and divided the subject up into five headings: a) Strategic concept; b) Political control of nuclear weapons; c) Conventional forces; d) "Missile X"; and e) POLARIS submarines. NATO is embarked on a comprehensive approach to this interrelated range of questions. Now that these subjects are opened up, it is essential that the Alliance come to some kind of agreement on them. Failure to do so would have very serious effects. The key problem is Germany. Solutions must be found which will combat the danger of Germany taking a nationalistic course in the future. An underlying cause of the difficulty is a split in basic strategic thinking

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

Handwritten notes on the right margin: "NATO GEN", "215/6", "23", "USA - awarded to [unclear] by [unclear] of [unclear] - [unclear]"

UNCLASSIFIED

thinking, which has given the impression that the U.S. position is pitted against that of Europe. It is essential that the question of strategy be approached pragmatically.

Mr. Kohler agreed with the pragmatic approach and stressed the importance of dealing with the problem from the point of view of facts, rather than theory. We are not trying to bring about a theoretical debate on the Political Directive. It may be, however, that a thorough discussion of the facts will lead to Alliance-wide conclusions which will cause the Political Directive to "rewrite itself."

Mr. Kohler said that the U.S. felt much education and facing up to facts is necessary among our Allies. This is the kind of process that has been going on intensively in the U.S. Government over the past year. Something similar is required in the Alliance. It was only recently that NATO discovered that we really did not have a forward strategy. This is clearly a situation which must be corrected and it is all to the good if General Forstad proceeds along the pragmatic lines he has proposed. Mr. Stikker said that the important thing was not to challenge now the Political Directive. The effort would be counter-productive. Perhaps at some future date it will be possible to do so.

On the political control of nuclear weapons, Mr. Stikker said that the two immediate steps should be to agree on something with respect to guidelines on the use of nuclear weapons and guarantees regarding their maintenance in Europe by the U.S. A U.S. guarantee that targets of prime interest to Europe will be taken care of is also required. Mr. Stikker stressed the importance of finding means for countering European concerns that U.S. strategic forces will not adequately take care of targets required for the defense of Europe. He cited rumors that SAC gives a second priority to such targets.

Mr. Kohler agreed that Mr. Stikker's proposal to discuss political control of nuclear weapons is a good start to the handling of the nuclear and strategic questions.

Mr. Stikker said he now prefers the term "Missile X" to define the missile which will deal with the former "MUM" requirement. Mr. Stikker stressed that a solution to this question is particularly important from the German point of view.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

Mr. Stikker also referred to some recent talks he had had with Strauss which cause him to be especially concerned that an early answer be found to this problem.

Mr. Kohler questioned whether the facts really require an early decision. The targets involved are presently covered by strike aircraft and in the months to come can be covered by POLARIS submarines. At the present time "Missile X" itself is in the research and development stage in the U.S. The weapon, if it were to be introduced, would not be introduced until 1965. Mr. Kohler therefore asked why it was necessary to rush a decision on this subject.

Mr. Stikker said that it is largely a question of advanced military planning. It must be recalled that forward military planning in the Alliance was completely interrupted for a whole year until the fall of 1961. It is essential that the member countries know reasonably soon for planning purposes whether they should in the future count on next-generation aircraft or on "Missile X" to meet the extended battlefield requirement. Mr. Stikker also recalled that Deputy Secretary Gilpatric had earlier told him that it would most probably be possible for the Alliance to make a decision on this question in February or March of 1962.

With respect to the buildup of Alliance forces, Mr. Kohler said that the real problem, we are coming more and more to realize, is the U.K. position. Mr. Kohler said that we are making no secret of the fact that the present trend of U.K. defense planning is directly counter to what we strongly feel is required.

Mr. Stikker said that results of the buildup in the Alliance have not been entirely bad.

COPIES TO: CONTD.

Aembassy Paris
Paris for USED
Paris for Steessel

Aembassy Bonn
Aembassy London
Defense/ISA

* Under FORCES 7 MAR 62 see Norstad's disagreement and Stikker's denial

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

FORM 47C

U. S. MISSION TO NATO AND EUROPEAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

TELEGRAM CONTINUATION SHEET CONTROL 900

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REC'D FEB. 8. 1962
4:58AM

2053

NO : TOPOL 1142
Feb. 7. 6PM

CORRECTION NOTICE - Jan 1 (A)

FROM: WASHINGTON

CORRECTED PAGE ONE

TO : USRO PARIS FOR ACTION

ACTION PARIS TOPOL 1142 INFORMATION LONDON 4201 BONN 2152 ANKARA
ATHENS, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, LISBON, LUXEMBOURG, OSLO, OTTAWA,
REYKJAVIK, ROME, THE HAGUE UNN CINCLANT FOR POLAD UNN

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION - PARIS FOR EMBASSY, USRO AND STOESSEL

SUBJECT: STIKKER VISIT

ACTION:
POL-5
INFO:
DES-5
SCON-2
DEF-7
IN
IC-1
F

Secretary-General Stikker, in three-day visit Washington February 5-7, held meeting with President, Secretary and Under Secretary McNamara, Dillon, other key US officials, quadripartite Ambassadorial group and NATO Standing Group. Conversations covered wide variety subjects, but dealt mainly with principal purpose of visit, NATO nuclear questions. Full Memoranda of conversations being prepared and will be pouched USRO.

MB
LIN
LINECCN
IN-1
STOESSEL
HAPET
UCOML-1
OL-5
LMER
AS
INCEUR-8

1. NATO Nuclear Questions: Stikker was given fairly full rundown current US thinking and we believe has good appreciation US views. For his part, he expressed complete satisfaction with direction current US thinking. Stikker said positive US approach necessary to success of exercise and it is vitally necessary that exercise succeed. Stikker said that NAC, once having opened up this range of sensitive and difficult questions, must pursue subject to successful conclusion.

Generally agreed that Stikker would proceed along course he has set for NATO discussions. First step would be: (A) US guarantees regarding maintenance nuclear weapons for defense of NATO and coverage of targets threatening NATO; and (B) US effort to provide more information to our allies on targeting and other nuclear matters, designed to reinforce European assurance that US prepared defend Europe. Also agreed that Stikker would further pursue efforts to increase conventional capability of alliance, using tactic of stressing specific actions required to bring about forward strategy. Political directive and strategic concept would be left aside and not at this time be opened, although US made clear view, that, after facts

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

CAUTION - REMOVE PROTECTION SHEET BEFORE TYPING, REPLACE IT WHEN TYPING IS COMPLETE

DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS
Agency Case State 8901879
NLE Case 89-221*5

Electrostatic reproduction made by the Eisenhower Library for preservation purposes.

PAGE TWO

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

of overall strategic situation had been made clear and NATO discussions progressed further, might well be possible and desirable to change political directive. Political directive would, in effect, "rewrite itself". MRBM's also discussed and generally agreed that targets, both tactical and strategic, should be covered and that they must in some measure be covered by missiles in European area. Multilateral "Ottawa force" should be used for this purpose. US did not, however, agree MRBM requirements, as set forth in MC/26/4.

2. Berlin: Various aspects Berlin problem discussed. Stikker stressed importance fullest possible consultation with alliance on discussions with Soviets, stressing that this necessary to insure alliance support for build-up and countermeasures. Agreed that Berlin situation remains dangerous and that continued efforts for military build-up essential.

4. NATO-Tripartite Berlin planning: Stikker discussed with quadripartite Ambassadorial Group some of problems to be anticipated when this subject introduced in NAC (Separate message follows).

5. Aid to Greece and Turkey: Stikker laid special stress on importance adequate aid to Greece and Turkey from point of view of maintaining solidarity of alliance.

6. Discussion of Punta Del Este OAS meeting in NAC: Secretary proposed to Stikker early full NAC discussion recent OAS meeting Punta del Este, and possibility high level Department official presenting US views to NAC. (see separate message). US presentation, currently under preparation, will cover not only analysis of OAS meeting, but also possibility NATO countries aligning their policies with OAS system.

7. Balance of Payments Problems: Secretary Dillion gave Stikker fairly full but generalized account of recent arrangements worked out between US and Germans and stressed importance US endeavor obtain relief on balance of payments generally. Urged that US-German arrangements

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

CAUTION - REMOVE PROTECTION SHEET BEFORE TYPING, REPLACE IT WHEN TYPING IS COMPLETE

PAGE THREE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

arrangements not be described to others at present in view German desire avoid spreading information before further completion UK-German discussions same subject.

8. Soviet oil penetration: Stikker described at some length difficulties with Italians and compromise he is now working out with them. We informed Stikker his compromise appears satisfactory, provided reporting on Soviet oil is not delayed.

RUSK

Electrostatic reproduction made by the Eisenhower Library for preservation purposes.

hb

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

U. S. MISSION TO NATO AND EUROPEAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
TELEGRAM CONTINUATION SHEET

CONTROL 980

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

RECD FEB. 8. 1962
4:58AM

NO : TOPOL 1142
Feb. 7. 6PM

CORRECTION NOTICE - Jan 1 (A)

FROM: WASHINGTON

CORRECTED PAGE ONE

TO : USRO PARIS FOR ACTION

ACTION PARIS TOPOL 1142 INFORMATION LONDON 4201 BONN 2152 ANKARA
ATHENS, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, LISBON, LUXEMBOURG, OSLO, OTTAWA,
REYKJAVIK, ROME THE HAGUE UNN CINCLANT FOR POLAD UNN

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION - PARIS FOR EMBASSY, USRO AND STOESSEL

SUBJECT: STIKKER VISIT

TION:
L-5
IFO:
S-5
ON-2
F-7
-1

Secretary -General Stikker, in three-day visit Washington
February 5-7, held meeting with President, Secretary and Under
Secretary McNamara, Dillon, other key US officials quadripar-
tite Ambassadorial group and NATO Standing Group. Conversations
covered wide variety subjects, but dealt mainly with principal
purpose of visit, NATO nuclear questions. Full Memoranda of
conversations being prepared and will be pouched USRO.

1. NATO Nuclear Questions: Stikker was given fairly full
rundown current US thinking and we believe has good appreciation
US views. For his part, he expressed complete satisfaction with
direction current US thinking. Stikker said positive US
approach necessary to success of exercise and it is vitally
necessary that exercise succeed. Stikker said that NAC, once
having opened up this range of sensitive and difficult ques-
tions, must pursue subject to successful conclusion.

IB
N
NECCN
N-1
STOESSEL
LAPEL
COML-1
L-5
MER
S
NCEUR-8

Generally agreed that Stikker would proceed along
course he has set for NATO discussions. First step would be:
(A) US guarantees regarding maintenance nuclear weapons
for defense of NATO and coverage of targets threatening NATO;
and (B) US effort to provide more information to our allies
on targeting and other nuclear matters, designed to reinforce
European assurance that US prepared defend Europe. Also
agreed that Stikker would further pursue efforts to increase
conventional capability of alliance, using tactic of stressing
specific actions required to bring about forward strategy.
Political directive and strategic concept would be left aside
and not at this time be opened, although US made clear view,
that, after facts

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

NSA-over

PAGE TWO

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET

of overall strategic situation had been made clear and NATO discussions progressed further, might well be possible and desirable to change political directive. Political directive would, in effect, "rewrite itself". MRBM's also discussed and generally agreed that targets, both tactical and strategic, should be covered and that they must in some measure be covered by missiles in European area. Multilateral "Ottawa force" should be used for this purpose. US did not, however, agree MRBM requirements, as set forth in MC/26/4.

2. Berlin: Various aspects Berlin problem discussed. Stikker stressed importance fullest possible consultation with alliance on discussions with Soviets, stressing that this necessary to insure alliance support for build-up and countermeasures. Agreed that Berlin situation remains dangerous and that continued efforts for military build-up essential.

4. NATO-Tripartite Berlin planning: Stikker discussed with quadripartite Ambassadorial Group some of problems to be anticipated when this subject introduced in NAC (Separate message follows).

5. Aid to Greece and Turkey: Stikker laid special stress on importance adequate aid to Greece and Turkey from point of view of maintaining solidarity of alliance.

6. Discussion of Punta Del Este OAS meeting in NAC: Secretary proposed to Stikker early full NAC discussion recent OAS meeting Punta del Este, and possibility high level Department official presenting US views to NAC. (see separate message). US presentation, currently under preparation, will cover not only analysis of OAS meeting, but also possibility NATO countries aligning their policies with OAS system.

7. Balance of Payments Problems: Secretary Dillion gave Stikker fairly full but generalized account of recent arrangements worked out between US and Germans and stressed importance US endeavor obtain relief on balance of payments generally. Urged that US-German arrangements

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET

PAGE THREE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
secret

arrangements not be described to others at present in view German desire avoid spreading information before further completion UK-German discussions same subject.

8. Soviet oil penetration: Stikker described at some length difficulties with Italians and compromise he is now working out with them. We informed Stikker his compromise appears satisfactory, provided reporting on Soviet oil is not delayed.

RUSK

Electrostatic reproduction made by the Eisenhower Library for preservation purposes.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

EUR, RA: RFessenden: mck
(Drafting Office and Officer)

~~SECRET~~

2/18/62 2609 1316 HP

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

This document consists of 3 pages; #1 of 3 copies.

Approved in S
2/18/62

Memorandum of Conversation
LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

325 / 2562

2055

(3)

(2)

11 - 12

DATE: February 5, 1962
TIME: 4:00 P.M.
PLACE: Secretary's Office

SUBJECT: NATO Nuclear Questions

PARTICIPANTS: United States

NATO

for

The Secretary of State
Mr. Foy D. Kohler
Amb. Thomas K. Finletter
Mr. Russell Fessenden

Mr. Dirk U. Stikker, NATO Secretary-General
Mr. George Vest, Special Assistant
to the Secretary-General

COPIES TO:

S/S: Mr. Bowie	ACDA	Amembassy London	POLAD/SAC for Freers
G GER	Amembassy Paris	Defense/ISA	(Offutt AFB)
S/P WE	Paris for USRO	<u>The White House</u>	The White House -
EUR S/AE	Paris for Stoessel	CINCEUR	Mr. Kaysen
RA G/PM	Amembassy Bonn	CINCLANT for Collins	(24)

In response to the Secretary's question, Mr. Stikker said that the atmosphere in the NATO Council today is good and progress is being made, with the exception of remaining difficulties over economic countermeasures for Berlin. The important discussions of nuclear questions and strategy have started well; however, it will be vitally important that these discussions be pursued to a successful conclusion. Opening up this range of very sensitive questions in NATO requires that there be some form of decision; otherwise, the effect on the Alliance could be very damaging indeed.

Mr. Stikker then described his plans for handling NATO discussion of these matters. Mr. Stikker said that he felt it most important not to challenge the existing Political Directive. He argued for the pragmatic approach, as contrasted with the theoretical. He admitted that it might, after the practical problems of providing for a forward strategy had been solved, be possible to change the Political Directive. Mr. Stikker said that he planned to start the effort to increase the conventional capability of the Alliance by having General Norstad, during his February 14th briefing on Berlin contingency planning, stress the fact that we today have no forward strategy and then to outline the specific steps required to make it a reality.

The next step, Mr. Stikker said, will be discussion of political control of nuclear weapons. In this connection, Mr. Stikker said he hopes it will be possible for the U.S. to agree on something with respect to (a) guarantees on

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec 34
11/16/94-37
By: JMK MARA 7/24/95

none
26/2055

16
2609

~~SECRET~~

the maintenance of US nuclear weapons; (b) guarantees that the US will take care of targets directly relating to the defense of Europe; and (c) guidelines with respect to the use of nuclear weapons. Prompt agreement on these matters will provide time for more gradual consideration of some of the more difficult questions. Agreement on these matters would also provide something specific for the Athens meeting. Mr. Stikker said that he had also listed for the Council's consideration various ideas which have been proposed on decision-making, including weighted voting and a smaller group. He had done this because he had thought it was necessary for the Council to consider all these matters thoroughly; he did not anticipate, however, that any of these would be agreed on.

Mr. Stikker stressed very strongly that the main reason for rapid progress on NATO nuclear questions was to find a counter to reviving German nationalism. Mr. Stikker said that the signs of this are becoming more and more apparent. There is an increasingly urgent need to find a NATO solution if we are to head off an independent German nuclear capability. Mr. Stikker said that even Adenauer is showing signs for the first time of "throwing Germany's weight around". He said that, during his most recent meeting with Adenauer, Adenauer had been concerned about the emphasis in the State of the Union message on the UN. Adenauer had said that, "If the President says he is 100 per cent for the UN, then I will say that I am 100 per cent for NATO." In a speech which Adenauer had made shortly after this, he went too far in stressing Germany's military strength. The speech had to be toned down somewhat before it was released to the press. Mr. Stikker stressed that time is very short--only Adenauer is capable of restraining independent German tendencies. No successor of Adenauer will be capable of doing it.

Mr. Stikker briefly mentioned the mechanism for wartime consultation. He said that he had mentioned this subject to Macmillan, who had told him to discuss it bilaterally with the United States. He had also mentioned it to the French NATO Ambassador twice and had told him that he would be willing to discuss this subject with de Gaulle at any time; however, de Gaulle had shown no sign of interest.

The Secretary asked Mr. Stikker whether it would be desirable for the US itself to come forward with a specific US plan on NATO nuclear questions. The Secretary thought such a move by the US could be deeply divisive within the Alliance. Because of the dangers of the US prematurely backing any specific plan it might be better to have the subject discussed thoroughly by others first.

Mr. Stikker agreed, but added that someone must start matters going and this is what he had attempted to do in his recent paper on political control of nuclear weapons. Mr. Stikker said that he did need to know, however, whether the US attitude on finding a solution to the NATO nuclear questions was a positive one. He also needed more information on these matters which could be obtained only from the US. In this connection, he mentioned a comprehensive list of questions he had submitted on MRBMs.

The Secretary said that there were two matters that he wanted to stress on which the US was very sympathetic:

a)

~~SECRET~~

16
2609
SECRET

PAGE 3

a) On the exercise of the Presidential authority, we were prepared to agree to the two guidelines which had been cited in the Secretary's presentation to the December Ministerial meeting. We were also prepared to consider very sympathetically any further guidelines which could be agreed among the Allies.

b) We were also prepared to consider with interest and sympathy any proposals on which the Allies could agree, which would be an alternative to the present de facto arrangement in which the decision essentially rests with the US.

The Secretary said that he wanted to comment on European doubts concerning our determination to use nuclear weapons. He said that, if tomorrow all access to Berlin were stopped, he had the feeling that no NATO Government would ask us to go to nuclear war. The Secretary said that he had the feeling—stressing that he was speaking quite informally and unofficially—that the fact of what nuclear war really means hasn't "bitten home" in most NATO countries.

Mr. Stikker said that he felt the uncertainty, regarding our determination to use nuclear weapons, exists in Europe. He agreed with the Secretary that no country would ask us to go to nuclear war if access were blocked in Berlin, but said that it is really a matter of how hostilities develop and how they progress. The uncertainty in Europe today is perhaps addressed more to the question of how far the US would let matters deteriorate before using nuclear weapons. Mr. Stikker criticized recent talk about large-scale limited war in Europe. Mr. Stikker said that something of a paradox exists: If the Europeans are not sure that the US will use nuclear weapons and are not certain that we will maintain and improve those weapons that now exist in Europe, they will not agree to a conventional build-up. If, however, they are reassured about our attitude on these nuclear matters, then the atmosphere will be much better for a conventional build-up.

Mr. Stikker cited again the talk about changing the Political Directive as a cause of the uncertainty. The Secretary commented that he saw a danger in attempting to rewrite the Political Directive because of the effect on the Soviets interpretation of the Alliance's intentions.

SECRET

...:mck
...ing Office and Officer)

SECRET

2/9/62 2609 1316/10

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

This document consists of 3 pages; #1 of ___ copies.

Approved in S
2/18/62

Memorandum of Conversation
LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

325 / 2-562
SECRET B

(3)
(2)

DATE: February 5, 1962
TIME: 4:00 P.M.
PLACE: Secretary's Office

11-12

SUBJECT: NATO Nuclear Questions

PARTICIPANTS: United States

NATO

for

The Secretary of State
Mr. Foy D. Kohler
Amb. Thomas K. Finletter
Mr. Russell Fessenden

Mr. Dirk U. Stikker, NATO Secretary-General
Mr. George Vest, Special Assistant
to the Secretary-General

COPIES TO:

S/S	Mr. Bowie	ACDA	Amembassy London	POLAD/SAC for Freers
G	GER	Amembassy Paris	Defense/ISA	(Offutt AFB)
S/P	WE	Paris for USRO	<u>The White House</u>	The White House -
EUR	S/AE	Paris for Stoessel	CINCEUR	Mr. Kaysen
RA	G/PM	Amembassy Bonn	CINCLANT for Collins	(24)

In response to the Secretary's question, Mr. Stikker said that the atmosphere in the NATO Council today is good and progress is being made, with the exception of remaining difficulties over economic countermeasures for Berlin. The important discussions of nuclear questions and strategy have started well; however, it will be vitally important that these discussions be pursued to a successful conclusion. Opening up this range of very sensitive questions in NATO requires that there be some form of decision; otherwise, the effect on the Alliance could be very damaging indeed.

Mr. Stikker then described his plans for handling NATO discussion of these matters. Mr. Stikker said that he felt it most important not to challenge the existing Political Directive. He argued for the pragmatic approach, as contrasted with the theoretical. He admitted that it might, after the practical problems of providing for a forward strategy had been solved, be possible to change the Political Directive. Mr. Stikker said that he planned to start the effort to increase the conventional capability of the Alliance by having General Norstad, during his February 14th briefing on Berlin contingency planning, stress the fact that we today have no forward strategy and then to outline the specific steps required to make it a reality.

The next step, Mr. Stikker said, will be discussion of political control of nuclear weapons. In this connection, Mr. Stikker said he hopes it will be possible for the U.S. to agree on something with respect to (a) guarantees on

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec 3.4
NLR-94-37
By MMK NARA Date 7/24/95

none
... destroyed

NSR/266/MLP; Gen, 1/61-6/62

~~SECRET~~

2609

the maintenance of US nuclear weapons; (b) guarantees that the US will take care of targets directly relating to the defense of Europe; and (c) guidelines with respect to the use of nuclear weapons. Prompt agreement on these matters will provide time for more gradual consideration of some of the more difficult questions. Agreement on these matters would also provide something specific for the Athens meeting. Mr. Stikker said that he had also listed for the Council's consideration various ideas which have been proposed on decision-making, including weighted voting and a smaller group. He had done this because he had thought it was necessary for the Council to consider all these matters thoroughly; he did not anticipate, however, that any of these would be agreed on.

Mr. Stikker stressed very strongly that the main reason for rapid progress on NATO nuclear questions was to find a counter to reviving German nationalism. Mr. Stikker said that the signs of this are becoming more and more apparent. There is an increasingly urgent need to find a NATO solution if we are to head off an independent German nuclear capability. Mr. Stikker said that even Adenauer is showing signs for the first time of "throwing Germany's weight around". He said that, during his most recent meeting with Adenauer, Adenauer had been concerned about the emphasis in the State of the Union message on the UN. Adenauer had said that, "If the President says he is 100 per cent for the UN, then I will say that I am 100 per cent for NATO." In a speech which Adenauer had made shortly after this, he went too far in stressing Germany's military strength. The speech had to be toned down somewhat before it was released to the press. Mr. Stikker stressed that time is very short--only Adenauer is capable of restraining independent German tendencies. No successor of Adenauer will be capable of doing it.

Mr. Stikker briefly mentioned the mechanism for wartime consultation. He said that he had mentioned this subject to Macmillan, who had told him to discuss it bilaterally with the United States. He had also mentioned it to the French NATO Ambassador twice and had told him that he would be willing to discuss this subject with de Gaulle at any time; however, de Gaulle had shown no sign of interest.

The Secretary asked Mr. Stikker whether it would be desirable for the US itself to come forward with a specific US plan on NATO nuclear questions. The Secretary thought such a move by the US could be deeply divisive within the Alliance. Because of the dangers of the US prematurely backing any specific plan it might be better to have the subject discussed thoroughly by others first.

Mr. Stikker agreed, but added that someone must start matters going and this is what he had attempted to do in his recent paper on political control of nuclear weapons. Mr. Stikker said that he did need to know, however, whether the US attitude on finding a solution to the NATO nuclear questions was a positive one. He also needed more information on these matters which could be obtained only from the US. In this connection, he mentioned a comprehensive list of questions he had submitted on NREMs.

The Secretary said that there were two matters that he wanted to stress on which the US was very sympathetic:

a)

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 3

a) On the exercise of the Presidential authority, we were prepared to agree to the two guidelines which had been cited in the Secretary's presentation to the December Ministerial meeting. We were also prepared to consider very sympathetically any further guidelines which could be agreed among the Allies.

b) We were also prepared to consider with interest and sympathy any proposals on which the Allies could agree, which would be an alternative to the present de facto arrangement in which the decision essentially rests with the US.

The Secretary said that he wanted to comment on European doubts concerning our determination to use nuclear weapons. He said that, if tomorrow all access to Berlin were stopped, he had the feeling that no NATO Government would ask us to go to nuclear war. The Secretary said that he had the feeling—stressing that he was speaking quite informally and unofficially—that the fact of what nuclear war really means hasn't "bitten home" in most NATO countries.

Mr. Stikker said that he felt the uncertainty, regarding our determination to use nuclear weapons, exists in Europe. He agreed with the Secretary that no country would ask us to go to nuclear war if access were blocked in Berlin, but said that it is really a matter of how hostilities develop and how they progress. The uncertainty in Europe today is perhaps addressed more to the question of how far the US would let matters deteriorate before using nuclear weapons. Mr. Stikker criticized recent talk about large-scale limited war in Europe. Mr. Stikker said that something of a paradox exists: If the Europeans are not sure that the US will use nuclear weapons and are not certain that we will maintain and improve those weapons that now exist in Europe, they will not agree to a conventional build-up. If, however, they are reassured about our attitude on these nuclear matters, then the atmosphere will be much better for a conventional build-up.

Mr. Stikker cited again the talk about changing the Political Directive as a cause of the uncertainty. The Secretary commented that he saw a danger in attempting to rewrite the Political Directive because of the effect on the Soviets' interpretation of the Alliance's intentions.

SANITIZED COPY

EUR:RA:RHKranich:ta
(Drafting Office and Officer)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

This document consists of 3 pages; #1 of 3 copies.

Approved in S
2/18/62

Memorandum of Conversation

375/2-762

White House
2056

DATE: February 7, 1962
Luncheon-1:00 PM

COPY NO. 12 SERIES B

SUBJECT: NATO's Nuclear Role

<u>NATO</u>	<u>White House</u>	<u>State</u>
PARTICIPANTS: Secretary-General Stikker	Mr. Carl Kaysen	The Secretary
Mr. David Bendall	<u>Defense</u>	Mr. Ball
Mr. George Vest	Mr. Rowen	Mr. Kohler
<u>USRO</u>	Admiral Lee	Mr. Bowie
Ambassador Finletter	<u>ACDA</u>	Mr. Fessenden
	Mr. Adrian Fisher	Mr. Owen
		Mr. Weiss
COPIES TO:		Mr. Kranich
S/S. Mr. Bowie	ACDA	The White House-Mr. Kaysen
G GER	Defense	POLAD/SAC for Freers (Offutt AFB)
S/P WE	<u>The White House</u>	Amembassy Paris
EUR S/AE	CINCEUR	Amembassy Bonn
RA G/PM	CINCLANT for Collins	Paris for Stoessel
		Defense/ISA

Secretary Rusk welcomed Secretary-General Stikker and then invited him to make any comments or raise any questions he desired to have settled before departing Washington.

Mr. Stikker reported great satisfaction with his visit thus far. He reviewed the problem of German pressure for a share in nuclear matters and expressed his conviction that NATO must come up with some kind of multilateral solution if possible German national effort is to be headed off. He said now that this whole problem had been reopened in the NAC the discussions must proceed to successful conclusions, otherwise the repercussions would be disastrous. He had come to the U.S. therefore to assure himself that there were no fundamental disagreements on basic attitudes or approaches. He was happy to report that "we were all on the same wave length."

Mr. Stikker then addressed himself to a series of specific points, asking as he went along for the Secretary's confirmation of his (Stikker's) understanding of the U.S. formative views in relation to these points.

With respect to consideration of NATO strategy, Mr. Stikker asserted that a "pragmatic approach" would be far more productive than a "philisophical" one. He asked that the Political Directive not be brought into question at this time; the only result would be a divisive and inconclusive debate. Secretary Rusk agreed that there should be no theoretical discussion of strategy

and that

SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLK-94-37
By: NYK NARA, Date 7/24/95

15

[REDACTED]

and that primary reliance should, for the present, be placed on the "pragmatic" approach. He did suggest, however, that it would be desirable to have a fuller appreciation in the Alliance as to what the operational problems are in the event the nuclear deterrent fails. There is a real need to face up to the facts of nuclear warfare in all its implications. Mr. Stikker agreed this would be most useful. Reverting to the question of the "pragmatic" approach, he said he was convinced that only in this manner could General Norstad raise the additional conventional forces needed to provide a real forward strategy.

Turning to the subject of U.S. guarantees, Mr. Stikker said he was gratified to learn that the U.S. believed it could agree to maintaining an adequate level of nuclear weapons in Europe and to cover targets of interest to Europe. He indicated his belief that providing the necessary information to some kind of NATO body to support guarantees on adequate nuclear stocks and on target coverage should not be too difficult to work out, since all would agree that this information should be given to a most restricted group. Secretary Rusk said he believed the U.S. could agree in principle to providing guarantees and the requisite information, but that the U.S. would want to be sure that the security problem was fully met. The information involved is obviously of the highest sensitivity and the greatest care should be taken in protecting it.

Ambassador Finletter commented on another aspect of the security problem by suggesting that the Permanent Representatives, who it has been agreed will be supported in the NAC discussions by experts from capitals, meet not only in restricted sessions but keep very limited records -- perhaps only by letter to capitals -- of such discussion. Mr. Stikker stated he agreed fully to the concept of using experts and to limited records and would seek to persuade other governments to this view. Secretary Rusk added further that the security problem was very difficult for the U.S., for as Stikker well knew the provision of nuclear information was ultimately controlled by legislation.

Turning next to the subject of guidelines, Mr. Stikker said he had found unanimous accord to the concept of agreeing to NATO guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons. Secretary Rusk said we all were anxious to push for guidelines and hoped in the process of so doing that much education would result. He felt that many in the Alliance had not yet really come to comprehend what was involved in nuclear war, -- what magnitudes of destruction were involved.

Referring to his paper (NDP/62/2) Mr. Stikker said he hoped that consideration of control measures could proceed to some conclusions and perhaps agreement on measures that could be applicable not only to existing forces, but any future MRBM force. The question, of course, was how far do we need to go with an "Ottawa Force" in view of German pressures. He said he was very happy to learn in Washington therefore that the U.S. was going ahead with "Missile X" and that Secretary McNamara had stated that Defense studies of

types and

[REDACTED]

types and specifications for such a missile would be completed by May 1. He voiced his understanding that the U.S. was prepared to accept in some measure the requirements for MRBM's as set forth in MC/26/4.

Mr. Stikker then turned to the problem of Greece and Turkey, which countries he reported feel slighted and anxious in view of all the recent attention given to the problems of defending the central front. Secretary Rusk said that the U.S. was prepared to give special attention to the Greeks and Turks concerning their defense on the southern flank. He recalled the commitment in his NATO speech and said we could consider further commitments, if necessary. He added, however, that Congress was cutting down Defense Support funds and that support of Greece and Turkey should be more than just a U.S. problem. The larger countries in Europe should also now assist, including defense support and economic assistance.

Reverting to the question of an MRBM force, Secretary Rusk stated the U.S. was prepared to proceed with a NATO approach to the MRBM problem and we were accordingly speeding up our considerations. However, he said he wished to make clear that we do not want national proliferation of nuclear weapons. This was fundamental to our policy. National ownership of MRBM's by Germany might be considered casus belli by the Soviets; it might also have serious repercussions within the Alliance itself.

Mr. Kohler stated that he wished Secretary-General Stikker to have no misunderstanding on one point: in proceeding with consideration of an MRBM force,

..... the U.S. would determine the type and specifications of the missile by May 1. He asked Mr. Vest and Mr. Kranich to bear witness to what he had been told.

Mr. Kohler explained further that we were still prepared to go forward with consideration of a multilateral MRBM force because a political requirement may exist for such a force. We are not, however, prepared to proceed on the assumption that there is a military requirement pending the completion of our studies.

Secretary Rusk emphasized that the U.S. would continue to provide adequate target coverage.

The Secretary-General said he was now satisfied. He added that for his purpose it was sufficient to know that the U.S. was prepared to proceed with a multilateral MRBM force.

(In leaving)



15

(In leaving the dining room the following exchange took place between Mr. Stikker and Mr. Kaysen.)

Mr. Kaysen said it was very important that it be understood that the agreement not to raise the Political Directive nor challenge the existing strategic concept per se should not provide an excuse to prevent consideration or discussion of the factors surrounding the use of nuclear weapons, which might lead ultimately to the modification of the present strategy. The Secretary-General said he agreed fully.

(After the luncheon, the Secretary asked Mr. Bowie to run over for Mr. Stikker once again the U.S. views on MRRM. Attached is a memorandum of conversation covering Mr. Bowie's presentation.)



ATTACHMENT

C
O
P
Y

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

At the end of the luncheon with Stikker, the Secretary drew Stikker and me aside and asked me to restate for Stikker our position on the MRBM's to ensure clear understanding. I did so as follows:

1. The targets in Europe will be covered by programmed capabilities.
2. The U.S. recognizes that there may well be a political need for a NATO MRBM force.
3. Any such MRBM force for the European theatre will have to take the form of a multilateral Ottawa-type force.
4. We have been concerned that SACEUR has stated that an Ottawa-type force should be treated as separate from the proposed MRBM requirement in 26/4 to modernize existing forces. We do not accept this way of formulating the issue. Any requirement will have to be met through the multilateral Ottawa-type force.
5. Accordingly, it should not be assumed that the size and kind of such a force will be measured by the proposed requirement of 26/4.

Stikker said he fully understood these points and that he did not accept Norstad's way of formulating the problem.

Robert R. Bowie

EXCISE

2/7/62

OF STATE A/CDC/MR

CATEGORY "A" 75

CLASSIFIED BY [Signature] DATE 4/17/70 **SECRET**

Completely de-sensitized
Transferred to O/FADRC
by S/S-T date 9-5-23

RELEASE
 EXCISE
 DENY
FOIA, EO or PA exemptions

DECLASSIFY
 DECLASSIFY in PART
 Non-responsive info.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
TS Authority: Intelligence and Research

F6
E
blaz
blaz

R

CLASSIFY as _____, OADR
DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C, OADR

Research Memorandum
RSB-3,21, February 7, 1962

ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT SOVIET INTENTIONS IN THE BERLIN CRISIS

FEBRUARY 1-7, 1962

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

Negotiations. The third of the Thompson-Gromyko talks revealed no changes in the Soviet position on Berlin, but it was evident Moscow was still determined to keep the talks going. Thompson tabled two proposals for Soviet consideration, one outlining an all-Berlin solution, the other summarizing an international access authority plan. The date of the fourth of the series of exchanges would now appear to depend on Soviet initiative.

Soviet propaganda media continued to prod the West for a more forthcoming attitude in the talks and criticized US concentration on the access issue, but continued to avoid any discussion of substance. There were increasingly broad hints that should the US persist in its rigid posture, a solution could be found which bypassed the US and its allies entirely.

Soviet overtures to the FRG during the week remained chiefly on the propaganda plane. A sudden rash of historical articles dealing with the Rapallo period has appeared in Soviet media recently, and the Soviet Embassy in Bonn is reportedly continuing its proselytizing activities among German political circles, with particular attention to the FDP.

Military Preparations and Demonstrations. There were no changes in Soviet or bloc military posture related to Germany reported during the past week. The only information available to date on the purpose of the Prague meeting of the Warsaw Pact defense ministers (January 30 - February 1) was that contained in the official communique of the meeting: that the participants studied "current questions on the strengthening of the united armed forces."

Concomitantly with the introduction of universal military conscription in East Germany, there has been a marked increase in GDR propaganda denying the right of any GDR citizen to be a Conscientious Objector. The need to be prepared to fight West Germans is characterized as necessary because the Bundeswehr is training Germans to fight Germans.

All indications are that conscription will take place in East Berlin exactly as elsewhere in the GDR.

762.00/2-7-62

DEPARTMENT OF STATE	Classification Exempt By <u>Paul</u>
APPEALS REVIEW PANEL, DATE <u>12/17/91</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE <input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE <input type="checkbox"/> DENY	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY IN PART
<input type="checkbox"/> Non-responsive information	<input type="checkbox"/> RETAIN CLASSIFICATION (a)
FOIA Exemption(s) _____	<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY AS _____, OA
PA Exemption(s) _____	<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TO () S, () C, OADR

NSA

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

There are indications that 1962 GDR economic plans will provide for a volume of trade with the Federal Republic which is not substantially below the 1961 level. However, it is expected that firm orders will be placed mainly in the second half of the year.

The Iraqi airlines and East German Lufthansa have concluded an agreement whereby the Iraqi Baghdad-to-London flight is allegedly to be routed via Berlin, presumably East Berlin.

ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET INTENTIONS

The course of the Moscow talks and the continuing Soviet efforts to smoke out Western intentions indicate the USSR maintains its preference for negotiations. Also, the scope and depth of Soviet appeals to the FRG suggest a longer range program, rather than a temporary phenomenon.

At the same time, the East Germans are completing physical preparations for possible imposition of tighter controls on the sector and zonal borders and are continuing their usual sporadic harassments of traffic to and from Berlin. They have laid, or are engaged in laying, the propaganda groundwork for a variety of moves, ranging from exploitation of the smallpox scare to interference with air traffic. There are, however, no indications that the implementation of any such move is imminent. (In view of the poor state of GDR health facilities and the serious shortage of medical personnel, GDR attention to the smallpox outbreak may actually represent honest fears rather than politically motivated maneuvering.)

The GDR Lufthansa agreement with the Iraqi air lines may provide the East Germans with their first breakthrough in the civil air field since the Iraqi lines would thereby be the first non-bloc airline to use Schoenefeld as a regular stop-over on a scheduled international flight.

GDR efforts to eliminate West Berlin from East German commercial contacts with the FRG would appear to be an obvious maneuver to isolate the city as much as possible from the Federal Republic. However, the possibility exists that the tactic is Soviet-inspired and represents a long-range program of curtailing GDR economic ties with West Berlin to a minimum, with the Soviets taking over the leading role in West Berlin's commercial relations with the bloc. Reports circulated several months ago that a Soviet trade office was being transferred from Cologne to East Berlin for the purpose of developing trade contacts in West Berlin. Other reports at the year's end indicated alleged Soviet plans to place large-scale industrial orders in West Berlin in midsummer of 1962.

~~SECRET~~

EXCISE

DEPT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

CATEGORY "A" 75

VIEWED BY [Signature] DATE 4/17/70
() RELEASE () DECLASSIFY
() EXCISE () DECLASSIFY in PART
() DENY () Non-responsive info.
FOI, EO or PA exemptions (b)(1)

Completely de-sensitized
Transferred to O/FADRC
by S/SJ date 9-5-23

F6
E
blaz
blaz

TS Authority: Intelligence and Research
() CLASSIFY as _____, OADR
() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () G, OADR

Research Memorandum
RSB-3,21, February 7, 1962

ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT SOVIET INTENTIONS IN THE BERLIN CRISIS

FEBRUARY 1-7, 1962

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

Negotiations. The third of the Thompson-Grosyko talks revealed no changes in the Soviet position on Berlin, but it was evident Moscow was still determined to keep the talks going. Thompson tabled two proposals for Soviet consideration, one outlining an all-Berlin solution, the other summarizing an international access authority plan. The date of the fourth of the series of exchanges would now appear to depend on Soviet initiative.

Soviet propaganda media continued to prod the West for a more forthcoming attitude in the talks and criticized US concentration on the access issue, but continued to avoid any discussion of substance. There were increasingly broad hints that should the US persist in its rigid posture, a solution could be found which bypassed the US and its allies entirely.

Soviet overtures to the FRG during the week remained chiefly on the propaganda plane. A sudden rash of historical articles dealing with the Rapallo period has appeared in Soviet media recently, and the Soviet Embassy in Bonn reportedly continuing its proselytizing activities among German political circles, with particular attention to the FDP.

Military Preparations and Demonstrations. There were no changes in Soviet or bloc military posture related to Germany reported during the past week. The only information available to date on the purpose of the Prague meeting of the Warsaw Pact defense ministers (January 30 - February 1) was that contained in the official communique of the meeting: that the participants studied "current questions on the strengthening of the united armed forces."

Concomitantly with the introduction of universal military conscription in East Germany, there has been a marked increase in GDR propaganda denying the right of any GDR citizen to be a Conscientious Objector. The need to be prepared to fight West Germans is characterized as necessary because the Bundeswehr is training Germans to fight Germans.

All indications are that conscription will take place in East Berlin exactly as elsewhere in the GDR.

762.00/2-762

SECRET

SECRET

Berlin and Germany. Beginning February 1, GDR officials have been requiring non-Allied foreign nationals to fill out currency declaration forms on entering East Berlin. The form must also be surrendered as the individual leaves the East Sector.

Slalom barriers on the East Berlin side of the Bornholmerstrasse crossing point were removed from the lane leading to West Berlin. The barriers on the incoming lane remain intact. No explanation was offered for the removals. On the other hand, eight new barricades have now been erected at the Helmstedt-Marienborn checkpoint on the Berlin autobahn; the two steel lift gates installed in each lane are equipped with a hinged ground-level bar in which four-inch steel spikes are embedded. (The spikes are apparently adequate to destroy any average tire.) The barriers along the zonal border between East and West Germany are also apparently being reinforced in depth: five barbed wire installations extending one mile deep have been reported in one area.

The East German railway administration has also introduced new security guards on the S-bahn installations in West Berlin -- patrols of two or three Reichsbahn employees (West Berlin residents) wearing armbands reading "Railway Police" (Bahnpolizei). The BAPO's have been reported on the station platform as well as on S-bahn property.

Two former refugees from East Germany, now Munich residents, were arrested on the autobahn while traveling to West Berlin and their car confiscated. One has since been released.

Delays of up to ten hours in truck clearances at the Babelsberg checkpoint were reported the night of January 31. No explanations were forthcoming and the backlog cleared up the following morning.

GDR health authorities have again issued an appeal to the West Berlin Senat for joint anti-smallpox measures in view of the continuing smallpox epidemic in Europe. Despite the appeal, however, the East Berlin Health Department has still not answered a week-old message from the West Berlin medical officer offering cooperation in health measures if the need arose. The GER meanwhile has barred at least one Dusseldorf resident from entering East Berlin during the past week, and has now extended its vaccination certificate requirement to residents of the Monschau area in West Germany where the disease allegedly has also been reported.

Information from GDR trade organs indicates East German trade representatives are under instructions to curtail their contacts with West Berlin business representatives and concentrate instead on those from the FRG. West German firms are to be advised the GDR prefers dealing with West German agents of said firms and not with their West Berlin representatives.

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

There are indications that 1962 GDR economic plans will provide for a volume of trade with the Federal Republic which is not substantially below the 1961 level. However, it is expected that firm orders will be placed mainly in the second half of the year.

The Iraqi airlines and East German Lufthansa have concluded an agreement whereby the Iraqi Baghdad-to-London flight is allegedly to be routed via Berlin, presumably East Berlin.

ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET INTENTIONS

The course of the Moscow talks and the continuing Soviet efforts to smoke out Western intentions indicate the USSR maintains its preference for negotiations. Also, the scope and depth of Soviet appeals to the FRG suggest a longer range program, rather than a temporary phenomenon.

At the same time, the East Germans are completing physical preparations for possible imposition of tighter controls on the sector and zonal borders and are continuing their usual sporadic harrassments of traffic to and from Berlin. They have laid, or are engaged in laying, the propaganda groundwork for a variety of moves, ranging from exploitation of the smallpox scare to interference with air traffic. There are, however, no indications that the implementation of any such move is imminent. (In view of the poor state of GDR health facilities and the serious shortage of medical personnel, GDR attention to the smallpox outbreak may actually represent honest fears rather than politically motivated maneuvering.)

The GDR Lufthansa agreement with the Iraqi air lines may provide the East Germans with their first breakthrough in the civil air field since the Iraqi lines would thereby be the first non-bloc airline to use Schoenfeld as a regular stop-over on a scheduled international flight.

GDR efforts to eliminate West Berlin from East German commercial contacts with the FRG would appear to be an obvious maneuver to isolate the city as much as possible from the Federal Republic. However, the possibility exists that the tactic is Soviet-inspired and represents a long-range program of curtailing GDR economic ties with West Berlin to a minimum, with the Soviets taking over the leading role in West Berlin's commercial relations with the bloc. Reports circulated several months ago that a Soviet trade office was being transferred from Cologne to East Berlin for the purpose of developing trade contacts in West Berlin. Other reports at the year's end indicated alleged Soviet plans to place large-scale industrial orders in West Berlin in midsummer of 1962.

SECRET

SECRET/EYES ONLY



b1a3
b1a5



SECRET/EYES ONLY

This document consists of 1 page.
No. 2 of 12 copies, series A.

SANITIZED COPY

...nich:ta
... Office and Officers

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

This document consists of 5 pages; #1 of ___ copies.

Approved in S
2/18/62

Memorandum of Conversation

375 / 2-762

(67) White House
(2)

DATE: February 7, 1962
Luncheon-1:00 PM

COPY NO. 12 ¹³ SERIES B

SUBJECT: NATO's Nuclear Role

<u>NATO</u>	<u>White House</u>	<u>State</u>
PARTICIPANTS: Secretary-General Stikker	Mr. Carl Kaysen	The Secretary
Mr. David Bendall	<u>Defense</u>	Mr. Ball
Mr. George Vest	Mr. Rowen	Mr. Kohler
<u>USRO</u>	Admiral Lee	Mr. Bowie
Ambassador Finletter	ACDA	Mr. Fessenden
	Mr. Adrian Fisher	Mr. Owen
		Mr. Weiss
COPIES TO:		Mr. Kranich
S/S Mr. Bowie	ACDA	The White House-Mr. Kaysen
G GER	<u>Defense</u>	POLAD/SAC for Freers (Offutt AFB)
S/P WE	<u>The White House</u>	Amembassy Paris
EUR S/AE	CINCEUR	Paris for USRO-
RA G/PM	CINCLANT for Collins	Paris for Stoessel
		Defense/ISA

FBI

(26)

Secretary Rusk welcomed Secretary-General Stikker and then invited him to make any comments or raise any questions he desired to have settled before departing Washington.

Mr. Stikker reported great satisfaction with his visit thus far. He reviewed the problem of German pressure for a share in nuclear matters and expressed his conviction that NATO must come up with some kind of multilateral solution if possible German national effort is to be headed off. He said now that this whole problem had been reopened in the NAC the discussions must proceed to successful conclusions, otherwise the repercussions would be disastrous. He had come to the U.S. therefore to assure himself that there were no fundamental disagreements on basic attitudes or approaches. He was happy to report that "we were all on the same wave length."

Mr. Stikker then addressed himself to a series of specific points, asking as he went along for the Secretary's confirmation of his (Stikker's) understanding of the U.S. formative views in relation to these points.

With respect to consideration of NATO strategy, Mr. Stikker asserted that a "pragmatic approach" would be far more productive than a "philisophical" one. He asked that the Political Directive not be brought into question at this time; the only result would be a divisive and inconclusive debate. Secretary Rusk agreed that there should be no theoretical discussion of strategy

and that



None

NFA 12/6 / MGA, Gen, 1161-6/62

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4
NLK-94-37
By: MMK NARA, Date: 7/24/95

and that primary reliance should, for the present, be placed on the "pragmatic" approach. He did suggest, however, that it would be desirable to have a fuller appreciation in the Alliance as to what the operational problems are in the event the nuclear deterrent fails. There is a real need to face up to the facts of nuclear warfare in all its implications. Mr. Stikker agreed this would be most useful. Reverting to the question of the "pragmatic" approach, he said he was convinced that only in this manner could General Norstad raise the additional conventional forces needed to provide a real forward strategy.

Turning to the subject of U.S. guarantees, Mr. Stikker said he was gratified to learn that the U.S. believed it could agree to maintaining an adequate level of nuclear weapons in Europe and to cover targets of interest to Europe. He indicated his belief that providing the necessary information to some kind of NATO body to support guarantees on adequate nuclear stocks and on target coverage should not be too difficult to work out, since all would agree that this information should be given to a most restricted group. Secretary Rusk said he believed the U.S. could agree in principle to providing guarantees and the requisite information, but that the U.S. would want to be sure that the security problem was fully met. The information involved is obviously of the highest sensitivity and the greatest care should be taken in protecting it.

Ambassador Finletter commented on another aspect of the security problem by suggesting that the Permanent Representatives, who it has been agreed will be supported in the NAC discussions by experts from capitals, meet not only in restricted sessions but keep very limited records -- perhaps only by letter to capitals -- of such discussion. Mr. Stikker stated he agreed fully to the concept of using experts and to limited records and would seek to persuade other governments to this view. Secretary Rusk added further that the security problem was very difficult for the U.S., for as Stikker well knew the provision of nuclear information was ultimately controlled by legislation.

Turning next to the subject of guidelines, Mr. Stikker said he had found unanimous accord to the concept of agreeing to NATO guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons. Secretary Rusk said we all were anxious to push for guidelines and hoped in the process of so doing that much education would result. He felt that many in the Alliance had not yet really come to comprehend what was involved in nuclear war, -- what magnitudes of destruction were involved.

Referring to his paper (NDP/62/2) Mr. Stikker said he hoped that consideration of control measures could proceed to some conclusions and perhaps agreement on measures that could be applicable not only to existing forces, but any future MRBM force. The question, of course, was how far do we need to go with an "Ottawa force" in view of German pressures. He said he was very happy to learn in Washington therefore that the U.S. was going ahead with "Missile X" and that Secretary McNamara had stated that Defense studies of

types and

types and specifications for such a missile would be completed by May 1. He voiced his understanding that the U.S. was prepared to accept in some measure the requirements for MRBM's as set forth in MC/26/4.

Mr. Stikker then turned to the problem of Greece and Turkey, which countries he reported feel slighted and anxious in view of all the recent attention given to the problems of defending the central front. Secretary Rusk said that the U.S. was prepared to give special attention to the Greeks and Turks concerning their defense on the southern flank. He recalled the commitment in his NATO speech and said we could consider further commitments, if necessary. He added, however, that Congress was cutting down Defense Support funds and that support of Greece and Turkey should be more than just a U.S. problem. The larger countries in Europe should also now assist, including defense support and economic assistance.

Reverting to the question of an MRBM force, Secretary Rusk stated the U.S. was prepared to proceed with a NATO approach to the MRBM problem and we were accordingly speeding up our considerations. However, he said he wished to make clear that we do not want national proliferation of nuclear weapons. This was fundamental to our policy. National ownership of MRBM's by Germany might be considered casus belli by the Soviets; it might also have serious repercussions within the Alliance itself.

Mr. Kohler stated that he wished Secretary-General Stikker to have no misunderstanding on one point: in proceeding with consideration of an MRBM force,
.....
..... the U.S. would determine the type and specifications of the missile by May 1. He asked Mr. Vest and Mr. Kranich to bear witness to what he had been told.

Mr. Kohler explained further that we were still prepared to go forward with consideration of a multilateral MRBM force because a political requirement may exist for such a force. We are not, however, prepared to proceed on the assumption that there is a military requirement pending the completion of our studies.
..... Secretary Rusk emphasized that the U.S. would continue to provide adequate target coverage.

The Secretary-General said he was now satisfied. He added that for his purpose it was sufficient to know that the U.S. was prepared to proceed with a multilateral MRBM force.

(In leaving)

(In leaving the dining room the following exchange took place between Mr. Stikker and Mr. Kaysen.)

Mr. Kaysen said it was very important that it be understood that the agreement not to raise the Political Directive nor challenge the existing strategic concept per se should not provide an excuse to prevent consideration or discussion of the factors surrounding the use of nuclear weapons, which might lead ultimately to the modification of the present strategy. The Secretary-General said he agreed fully.

(After the luncheon, the Secretary asked Mr. Bowie to run over for Mr. Stikker once again the U.S. views on MRBM. Attached is a memorandum of conversation covering Mr. Bowie's presentation.)

ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

At the end of the luncheon with Stikker, the Secretary drew Stikker and me aside and asked me to restate for Stikker our position on the MRBM's to ensure clear understanding. I did so as follows:

1. The targets in Europe will be covered by programmed capabilities.
2. The U.S. recognizes that there may well be a political need for a NATO MRBM force.
3. Any such MRBM force for the European theatre will have to take the form of a multilateral Ottawa-type force.
4. We have been concerned that SACEUR has stated that an Ottawa-type force should be treated as separate from the proposed MRBM requirement in 26/4 to modernize existing forces. We do not accept this way of formulating the issue. Any requirement will have to be met through the multilateral Ottawa-type force.
5. Accordingly, it should not be assumed that the size and kind of such a force will be measured by the proposed requirement of 26/4.

Stikker said he fully understood these points and that he did not accept Norstad's way of formulating the problem.

Robert R. Bowie

EXCISE

2/7/62

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MB

CATEGORY "A" 75

CLASSIFIED by [Signature] DATE 4/17/70 **SECRET**

Completely de-sensitized
Transferred to O/FADRC
by S/S-T date 9-5-73

RELEASE
 EXCISE
 DENY
FOIA, EO or PA exemptions

DECLASSIFY
 DECLASSIFY in PART
 Non-responsive info.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
TS Bureau: Intelligence and Research

F6
E
blaz
blaz

CLASSIFY as _____, OADB
 DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C, OADB

Research Memorandum
RSB-3,21, February 7, 1962

ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT SOVIET INTENTIONS IN THE BERLIN CRISIS

FEBRUARY 1-7, 1962

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

Negotiations. The third of the Thompson-Cromyko talks revealed no changes in the Soviet position on Berlin, but it was evident Moscow was still determined to keep the talks going. Thompson tabled two proposals for Soviet consideration, one outlining an all-Berlin solution, the other summarizing an international access authority plan. The date of the fourth of the series of exchanges would now appear to depend on Soviet initiative.

Soviet propaganda media continued to prod the West for a more forthcoming attitude in the talks and criticized US concentration on the access issue, but continued to avoid any discussion of substance. There were increasingly broad hints that should the US persist in its rigid posture, a solution could be found which bypassed the US and its allies entirely.

Soviet overtures to the FRG during the week remained chiefly on the propaganda plane. A sudden rash of historical articles dealing with the Rapallo period has appeared in Soviet media recently, and the Soviet Embassy in Bonn is reportedly continuing its proselytizing activities among German political circles, with particular attention to the FDP.

Military Preparations and Demonstrations. There were no changes in Soviet or bloc military posture related to Germany reported during the past week. The only information available to date on the purpose of the Prague meeting of the Warsaw Pact defense ministers (January 30 - February 1) was that contained in the official communique of the meeting: that the participants studied "current questions on the strengthening of the united armed forces."

Concomitantly with the introduction of universal military conscription in East Germany, there has been a marked increase in GDR propaganda denying the right of any GDR citizen to be a Conscientious Objector. The need to be prepared to fight West Germans is characterized as necessary because the Bundeswehr is training Germans to fight Germans.

All indications are that conscription will take place in East Berlin exactly as elsewhere in the GDR.

762.00 / 2-7-62

DEPARTMENT OF STATE	Classification Exempt By <u>fwl</u>
APPEALS REVIEW PANEL, DATE <u>12/19/79</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE () EXCISE () DENY	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY IN PART
() Non-responsive information	<input type="checkbox"/> RETAIN CLASSIFICATION (a)
FOIA Exemption(s) _____	<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY AS _____, OA
PA Exemption(s) _____	<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TO () S, () C, OADR

NSA

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Berlin and Germany. Beginning February 1, GDR officials have been requiring non-Allied foreign nationals to fill out currency declaration forms on entering East Berlin. The form must also be surrendered as the individual leaves the East Sector.

Slalom barriers on the East Berlin side of the Bornholmerstrasse crossing point were removed from the lane leading to West Berlin. The barriers on the incoming lane remain intact. No explanation was offered for the removals. On the other hand, eight new barricades have now been erected at the Helmstedt-Marienborn checkpoint on the Berlin autobahn; the two steel lift gates installed in each lane are equipped with a hinged ground-level bar in which four-inch steel spikes are embedded. (The spikes are apparently adequate to destroy any average tire.) The barriers along the zonal border between East and West Germany are also apparently being reinforced in depth: five barbed wire installations extending one mile deep have been reported in one area.

The East German railway administration has also introduced new security guards on the S-bahn installations in West Berlin -- patrols of two or three Reichsbahn employees (West Berlin residents) wearing armbands reading "Railway Police" (Bahnpolizei). The BAPO's have been reported on the station platform as well as on S-bahn property.

Two former refugees from East Germany, now Munich residents, were arrested on the autobahn while traveling to West Berlin and their car confiscated. One has since been released.

Delays of up to ten hours in truck clearances at the Babelsberg checkpoint were reported the night of January 31. No explanations were forthcoming and the backlog cleared up the following morning.

GDR health authorities have again issued an appeal to the West Berlin Senat for joint anti-smallpox measures in view of the continuing smallpox epidemic in Europe. Despite the appeal, however, the East Berlin Health Department has still not answered a week-old message from the West Berlin medical officer offering cooperation in health measures if the need arose. The GER meanwhile has barred at least one Dusseldorf resident from entering East Berlin during the past week, and has now extended its vaccination certificate requirement to residents of the Monschau area in West Germany where the disease allegedly has also been reported.

Information from GDR trade organs indicates East German trade representatives are under instructions to curtail their contacts with West Berlin business representatives and concentrate instead on those from the FRG. West German firms are to be advised the GDR prefers dealing with West German agents of said firms and not with their West Berlin representatives.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

There are indications that 1962 GDR economic plans will provide for a volume of trade with the Federal Republic which is not substantially below the 1961 level. However, it is expected that firm orders will be placed mainly in the second half of the year.

The Iraqi airlines and East German Lufthansa have concluded an agreement whereby the Iraqi Baghdad-to-London flight is allegedly to be routed via Berlin, presumably East Berlin.

ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET INTENTIONS

The course of the Moscow talks and the continuing Soviet efforts to smoke out Western intentions indicate the USSR maintains its preference for negotiations. Also, the scope and depth of Soviet appeals to the FRG suggest a longer range program, rather than a temporary phenomenon.

At the same time, the East Germans are completing physical preparations for possible imposition of tighter controls on the sector and zonal borders and are continuing their usual sporadic harrassments of traffic to and from Berlin. They have laid, or are engaged in laying, the propaganda groundwork for a variety of moves, ranging from exploitation of the smallpox scare to interference with air traffic. There are, however, no indications that the implementation of any such move is imminent. (In view of the poor state of GDR health facilities and the serious shortage of medical personnel, GDR attention to the smallpox outbreak may actually represent honest fears rather than politically motivated maneuvering.)

The GDR Lufthansa agreement with the Iraqi air lines may provide the East Germans with their first breakthrough in the civil air field since the Iraqi lines would thereby be the first non-bloc airline to use Schoenefeld as a regular stop-over on a scheduled international flight.

GDR efforts to eliminate West Berlin from East German commercial contacts with the FRG would appear to be an obvious maneuver to isolate the city as much as possible from the Federal Republic. However, the possibility exists that the tactic is Soviet-inspired and represents a long-range program of curtailing GDR economic ties with West Berlin to a minimum, with the Soviets taking over the leading role in West Berlin's commercial relations with the bloc. Reports circulated several months ago that a Soviet trade office was being transferred from Cologne to East Berlin for the purpose of developing trade contacts in West Berlin. Other reports at the year's end indicated alleged Soviet plans to place large-scale industrial orders in West Berlin in midsummer of 1962.

~~SECRET~~

THIRD THOMPSON-GROMYKO MEETING FEBRUARY 1, 1962

The third Thompson-Gromyko meeting February 1 resulted in no progress, but Gromyko was careful to indicate Soviet interest in a continuation of talks. Gromyko's purpose to date appears to be to conduct a holding operation, defending the outposts of the Soviet position while determining the firmness of that of the West. His several references to a possible separate treaty seem designed to prod the West to back away from the proposals tabled by Ambassador Thompson (the Soviets almost certainly do not regard them as representing final positions) and probably are not a reflection of Soviet intent.

Gromyko repeated his disparaging assessment of the international access authority but again carefully stopped short of rejecting it flatly. Izvestiya editor Adzhubei, meanwhile, injected a hint of a specific shift in the substance of the Soviet position when he broached to the President the possibility of GDR control of the Berlin access routes under international supervision. Also, Gromyko's references to the need of respect for GDR sovereignty seemed to be more pro forma than before (e.g., his view that the US attitude of "looking down on the GDR" was basically improper).

b1a3
b1a5

In contrast to his relatively routine defense of GDR sovereignty, Gromyko again objected vigorously to a West Berlin plebiscite and insisted once more that a Berlin settlement will not depend on the will of the West Berliners. His reaction indicates Soviet sensitivity to any such demonstration of "self-determination" in Berlin, if for no other reason than for the repercussions it could have in East Berlin and East Germany. Gromyko's position, incidentally, partially contradicts the communist line that the disposition of East Berlin is exclusively the concern of the East German regime.

While Gromyko rejected the plebiscite suggestion contained in the US position, he did not comment on the point that an end to the occupation status would automatically end Allied suspension on Berlin's integration into the Federal Republic, which was also mentioned by Ambassador Thompson. Gromyko had also failed to respond on this issue at the second meeting as well. Whether this silence points to a possible shift in hitherto firm Soviet opposition to West Berlin's integration remains to be seen.

*point mentioned before -
point at US-Sov. Commission
on pending for...
interest
...
...*

2/10/62 17

~~SECRET~~

February 9, 1962

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Nuclear Sharing And MRBM's

I. The Problem

1. NATO and the U.S. are now grappling with the question of MRBM's and nuclear sharing for two reasons:

(a) SACEUR has convinced many European countries, notably Germany, that large numbers of MRBM's are required in Europe in support of the 1957 NATO strategic doctrine. This doctrine suggests that any fighting above the level of minor incursions would involve use of nuclear weapons from the outset. Its execution thus requires numerous tactical nuclear weapons, including MRBM's, in order to fight a tactical nuclear war in Europe.

(b) There is growing European concern about exclusive dependence on the U.S. for nuclear deterrence. This concern results from a wide variety of factors, which are as yet imperfectly defined and understood. The desire for prestige and "first class" status, and recurrent Soviet nuclear threats against Europe (now backed by Soviet MRBM deployments) appear to be among these factors.

2. European concerns on these points are reflected in various ways: in prosecution of the British and French national

nuclear

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
ALR 794-36
2/97
NARA, DRR

NSF/216/MLR: ber

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

- 2 -

nuclear programs, in the strong German drive for nationally manned and owned MRBM's, and in the evident desire of SYG Stikker and others to get on with an MRBM program.

3. If we do not deal with these European concerns in an effective way, they are likely to become more serious and lead to intensified drives for national nuclear programs, culminating in German entry into the field. These trends could have extremely grave effects on NATO and Western security:

(a) They would generate divisions in Europe and the alliance which would pose a serious - if not insuperable - obstacle both to European integration and to efforts to create a fruitful partnership between US and an integrated Europe.

(b) They would spread the ability to initiate strategic nuclear war and thus increase the chance of such war coming about, if only by accident or miscalculation.

(c) They would divert attention and resources from building up European conventional forces and thus limit our ability to deter limited aggression.

II. Criteria for US Response

4. Our response to these European concerns must meet two criteria:

(a)

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

(a) It must be militarily valid, i.e., it must be consistent with effective defense of the NATO area.

(b) It must be politically valid, i.e., it must foster Atlantic cohesion and retard, rather than hasten, the drive toward national nuclear capabilities.

5. At the NATO meeting in Paris, the Secretary of Defense stated that the US strategic effort would continue to provide needed coverage of targets which threaten Europe. There is, of course, inevitable uncertainty about the future Soviet posture, and the best combination of NATO forces for the mid-1960's is not altogether clear. As of this date, however, an urgent military requirement for MRBM's in the European area cannot be assumed, although they would be useful.

6. The more urgent factor is, therefore, the political need to meet concerns of the other NATO partners over their exclusive dependence on U.S. for nuclear deterrence. That need is apparently not being adequately met by present arrangements. The rest of this paper considers alternative means of supplementing these arrangements which would be consistent with the military considerations indicated above.

III. U.S. Response

7. State and DOD are agreed on part of the required response:

(a)

SECRET

SECRET

- 4 -

(a) The U.S. must undertake a concerted and continuing campaign to educate the Europeans into accepting our new NATO strategic doctrine: that NATO should be able to meet conventional hostilities short of all-out attack by non-nuclear means, with nuclear weapons being held in reserve to deter expanded hostilities. This new strategic concept does not necessarily require large numbers of MRBM's to be deployed in the European area to strike at battlefield targets, as SACEUR has proposed. It does require the Europeans to build up conventional forces - which some are reluctant to do; and they use the 1957 NATO doctrine to excuse their reluctance.

(b) The U.S. should give NATO more information about U.S. nuclear capability, and greater participation in planning for its use. Promising measures to this end are being developed.

8. We cannot now confidently estimate that these measures of education about our new strategic concept and greater NATO participation in planning and targetting will prove adequate to stem the concerns in NATO or the drive for national capabilities. These measures are most likely to have this effect if we make clear at the outset that we are prepared to take further steps, should our allies desire it.

9.

SECRET

SECRET

- 5 -

9. Various further measures have been suggested. In general they are of two types:

(a) MRBM's for some or all national forces, committed to NATO, with U.S. warhead custody;

(b) multilateral forces in terms of control and operation.

IV. National NATO-Assigned Forces

10. In effect, SACEUR has proposed that MRBM's be provided to forces of individual NATO countries (including Germany) and committed to NATO. Technical safeguards are planned against withdrawal from NATO control of these nationally manned and owned MRBM's (which would contain their own warheads). Regardless of whether these technical safeguards would, in fact, withstand a sustained attempt to overcome them by a technologically advanced country, neither our allies nor the USSR would believe that such safeguards gave them adequate assurance against diversion to national purposes of nationally manned German MRBM's. Provision of MRBM's to the forces of individual countries would thus be tantamount - insofar as political effect is concerned - to creation of national strategic nuclear capabilities. German participation would clearly create very severe divisive strains within NATO.

11.

SECRET

SECRET

- 6 -

11. To counter this problem, a trilateral system has been proposed: Under it, the US, UK, and France would commit strategic nuclear forces to NATO; the U.S. would help the UK and France maintain these forces; and Germany would be refused such forces. But even if the Germans initially agreed to a US-UK-French NATO strategic force, they would almost certainly clamor for equal treatment once the force came into being. We would then be in a hopeless dilemma: The Germans would consider the denial of MRBM's to them as making them second class members of the alliance and, indeed, the help to the British and French would undercut the basis for such refusal to the Germans. Creating a parallel German force by providing MRBM's for national German manning, on the other hand, would raise the divisive issues mentioned already.

V. Multilateral Solution

12. The multilateral route described in the President's Ottawa speech is believed to offer the best prospects for meeting European concerns without disrupting the political unity or military strategy of NATO. Under this solution, the US would state to its allies that it:

(a) will progressively commit U.S. sea-based MRBM's to NATO, under any guidelines agreed by NATO as to use;

(b)

SECRET

SECRET

- 7 -

(b) is willing to join our allies in developing a multilaterally owned and manned NATO sea-based force, if our allies wish to do so and can work out the practical problems.

In regard to step (a), the U.S. should set out a schedule for assignment.

In regard to step (b), the U.S. should indicate its willingness to cooperate, without urging its adoption. It is essential that the Europeans should decide for themselves, instead of our holding them back. To make this politically possible, they must have before them a clear US indication of willingness to proceed with the whole package, if they desire. The extent to which they proceed will hinge on how strong the pressures are which would otherwise be reflected in national programs; the package is thus only likely to be executed in the degree needed to head off these programs.

13. A multilateral MRBM force might pose questions as to the US part in control of the force.

(a) The formula for control on which our allies are most likely to agree would probably not directly raise the issue. Such a formula would likely divide the question of use into two categories:

(i)

SECRET

SECRET

- 8 -

(i) In the clearly specified case of large-scale nuclear attack on the NATO area, the formula might provide for delegated authority to some person or group to release the NATO MRBM force to SACEUR. The U.S. might well be prepared to agree to such a delegation in advance.

(ii) For all other cases the formula might provide for decision by unanimity or by a specified group including the U.S. With adequate NATO conventional forces there would be time for such a collective procedure to work, since there would not be a need for instantaneous nuclear response to non-nuclear attack. Our allies would be highly unlikely to press for U.S. exclusion from such a collective procedure.

(b) The U.S. should indicate, however, that it would be prepared to consider whatever control formula a majority of the other NATO members might propose. We should make clear that existing U.S. law would not now allow us to transfer control and indicate the problems and obstacles involved. It is highly unlikely that a majority of our allies would propose a formula which would involve transfer
of control

SECRET

SECRET

- 9 -

of control at any time in the foreseeable future, if we follow this tactic.

(c) To indicate explicitly to our allies from the outset, on the other hand, that any possibility of ever considering such an arrangement was excluded would gravely weaken the political effects of the proposals outlined in paragraph 12. The NATO debate would then focus mainly on this "veto issue", and European opponents of national programs could argue that US insistence on the veto suggested that our other proposals were insincere. Obviously this would dilute and obscure the political impact of these proposals. Indeed, it could so stimulate European doubts and pressures as ultimately to force us to the very choice which we want to avoid: between accepting some veto-free form of multilateral control and standing aside and allowing a series of veto-free national forces to develop.

(d) The course proposed under (a) and (b) on the other hand, would (i) leave European proponents and opponents of a veto-free arrangement free to fight it out among themselves, - a contest in which the proponents of a veto-free force would be unlikely to prevail; (ii) maximize the political impact of our initial proposals; (iii) retain genuine freedom for the U.S. to decide the veto issue - if it should ever arise -

in

SECRET

SECRET

- 10 -

in the light of conditions and alternatives (i.e., the possibility of a national German program) as they emerge at the time.

14. In presenting these views, the US would stress its belief that the defense of the NATO area is indivisible and that a NATO Force, if one is created, could not fragment this unified task, since its use would eventually involve all U.S. forces. Planning for its use should, therefore, assume that it would be employed in integral association with US nuclear forces. Construction of such a Force along the lines suggested above would thus not imply that the separate defense of Europe was its purpose or likely effect. On the contrary, our willingness to join in creating such a force should be dramatic evidence of our unconditional commitment to the defense of Europe.

15. In outlining these views, the US should hold firmly to sea-based deployment for any NATO MRBM force, whether it is manned by US or mixed crews. Such deployment would be more compatible with the multilateral route than land-based deployment, and would avoid the serious political problems associated with deployment on the territory or national governments:

(a) Governments would demand a special national role in the peacetime deployment and control of any missiles on their territory; the possibility of national seizure of

such

SECRET

SECRET

- 11 -

such missiles in war time would frustrate the whole point and purpose of a multilateral force.

(b) Serious European concerns would be generated by the prospect of deploying MRBM's on German territory.

(c) The evident presence of MRBM's with the war-heads aboard travelling about European roads might stimulate neutralist and anti-nuclear sentiment and demonstrations in some countries. There would be fear that those weapons would draw down nuclear fire on the countries in which they were deployed.

(d) If an accident (possibly induced by sabotage) involving even the threat of nuclear contamination occurred, the political damage to NATO could be serious.

(e) In wartime the threat of sabotage and of enemy action against land-based missiles might generate growing pressure to fire the missiles prematurely (e.g., during conventional hostilities) in order to ensure that they were not destroyed.

Sea-based deployment would not be subject to these disadvantages in the same degree, and thus offers the best chance of launching and maintaining a genuinely cohesive, effective, and multilateral venture.

16.

SECRET

SECRET

- 12 -

16. A U.S. policy along the lines indicated above would not quickly cause the British and French to abandon their national programs - even if it were complemented, as it should be, by continuing refusal of help to the French and holding our aid to the British national nuclear program to the fulfillment of existing commitments. Over time, however, this policy would probably weaken the drives behind these national programs. More importantly, it would probably satisfy a sufficient segment of German opinion (e.g., the Chancellor and those who think like him) to prevent more nationally-minded elements from creating a consensus in favor of a national German program. For these reasons:

(a) The opportunity to participate in the manning, ownership, and control of a strategic nuclear force close at hand on a basis of equality with the US and other NATO countries would meet some of the very real, if intangible, "prestige" considerations which help to motivate national programs.

(b) The opportunity to face up to and decide control of such a force on their own would remove the allies' feeling that US insistence - rather than their own assessment of the substantive considerations involved - is what determines

control

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

- 13 -

control of nuclear weapons in NATO.

(c) Advance delegation to use the multilateral force in case of massive nuclear attack would remedy the growing sense of European vulnerability to Soviet ballistic blackmail.

17. The attached memorandum outlines the course of action proposed above in more detail.

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

PERMANENT RECORD

2/9/62
E75

H
Action
SS
Info

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2175, FEBRUARY 9, 7 PM (SECTION ONE MICROFILMED FOR

PRIORITY

EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY.

CONFIDENTIAL

Eyes only

Control: 5884
Rec'd: Feb. 9, 1962
3:08 pm

Reviewed by: [Signature]
Date: 4-4-91

KENNEDY LIBRARY
APRIL 1964

EYES ONLY

GROMYKO OPENED MEETING WITH 15-PAGE DECLARATION (SENT BY SEPTEL, ORIGINAL TEXT POUCHED TO KOHLER TODAY). I THEN TOLD GROMYKO I HAD FOLLOWING PRELIMINARY REMARKS TO MAKE AND EXPRESSED GENERAL DISAPPOINTMENT CONTENTS HIS DECLARATION. REGARDING THE OBJECTIVE OF OUR TALKS, I STATED OUR AIM HAS BEEN TO SEEK AGREEMENT AND TO REDUCE TENSIONS. "WE WOULD PREFER A TREATY WITH A REUNIFIED GERMANY. SINCE THAT DOESN'T NOW SEEM POSSIBLE, WE HAVE TRIED TO FIND AN ARRANGEMENT WHICH WOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF EXISTING REALITIES AND TO REDUCE TENSIONS". AS FAR AS PROCEDURE IS CONCERNED, I REITERATED THAT WE HAVE MADE CLEAR WHY WE BELIEVE ACCESS QUESTION LOGICALLY SHOULD BE DEALT WITH FIRST. IN SO FAR AS OTHER QUESTIONS GROMYKO RAISED ARE CONCERNED, SUCH AS FRONTIERS, I STATED THERE HAD BEEN NO RPT NO CHANGE IN OUR POSITION SINCE HE HAD TALKED WITH SECRETARY AND PRESIDENT. I EMPHASIZED TO HIM THAT WHILE WE ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS SUCH QUESTIONS IN DUE COURSE, IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT WITH OUR ALLIES ON THESE QUESTIONS UNTIL WE KNOW FAIRLY PRECISELY THE NATURE OF AGREEMENT ON BERLIN.

I DENIED CATEGORICALLY GROMYKO'S CONTENTION THAT WE DESIRE RETAIN WEST BERLIN AS A MILITARY SPRINGBOARD. REMINDED HIM KHRUSHCHEV HIMSELF HAD ONCE POINTED OUT WESTERN TROOPS IN BERLIN HAVE NO RPT NO MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE AND IN CASE OF CONFLICT HE WOULD PREFER HAVE AS MANY THERE AS POSSIBLE SINCE THEY WOULD ALL BE TAKEN PRISONER. I EMPHASIZED THAT OUR OBLIGATIONS TO PEOPLES OF WEST BERLIN MAKE IT NECESSARY RETAIN OUR TROOPS THERE.

EYES ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken.

ACTION ASSIGNED TO	ACTION TAKEN	DATE OF ACTION	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R
NAME OF OFFICE & OFFICE SYMBOL			

REVIEWED BY: [Signature] Date: 1/10/91
FOI, EO or PA exceptions: []
CLASSIFY as: []
DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C, OADR []
DEPARTMENT OF STATE / CDC/MR
() RELEASE
() EXISE
() DENY
() DECLASSIFY
() DECLASSIFY in PART
() DELETE
() Non-responsive info.

2175
512
2-9-62

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- 2175, FEBRUARY 9, 7 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM MOSCOW

REGARDING INTERNATIONAL ACCESS AUTHORITY, I CONFESSED COULD NOT RPT NOT UNDERSTAND INCOMPATIBILITY THEREOF WITH SO-CALLED SOVEREIGNTY OF GDR RPT GDR SINCE SOVIET PROPOSAL ALSO WOULD APPARENTLY PROVIDE ACCESS GUARANTEES FOR WEST BERLIN. ADDED, IN OUR OPINION, IAA RPT IAA WOULD PREVENT TENSIONS OVER ACCESS.

I STATED WE COULD NOT RPT NOT OF COURSE AGREE WITH GROMYKO'S CLAIM THAT EAST BERLIN WAS PART OF GDR RPT GDR. POINTED OUT THAT IF WE COULD REACH AGREEMENT ON BERLIN QUESTION IT WOULD IN ITSELF REDUCE MOST OF THE TENSION THERE. IT IS BECAUSE WE ARE UNABLE TO AGREE, THAT MUCH OF THE TENSION PRESENT EXISTS.

I EXPRESSED SURPRISE GROMYKO AGAIN RAISED QUESTION OF SYMBOLIC SOVIET CONTINGENTS IN WEST BERLIN, POINTING OUT THAT MY GOVERNMENT HAS MADE ITS POSITION ON THIS QUESTION CLEAR ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS. I REPEATED THAT WE ARE UNABLE TO SEE HOW SOVIETS CAN FIRST DISPOSE OF THEIR PART OF BERLIN AND THEN PRETEND TO HAVE RIGHTS IN THE OTHER PART. ALSO QUESTIONED WHY SOVIETS FEEL IT NECESSARY PLACE DEADLINE ON PRESENCE FOREIGN TROOP CONTINGENTS, EVEN UNDER THEIR PROPOSAL, SINCE TROOPS ARE AND WOULD BE TO GUARANTEE BERLIN SECURITY. THIS SECURITY WOULD REMAIN IMPORTANT UNTIL A FINAL RESOLUTION OF GERMAN QUESTION.

I THEN STATED THAT GROMYKO HAD SPOKEN OF A PEACE TREATY, EVEN A SEPARATE PEACE TREATY, AS MEANS REDUCE TENSION. I QUESTIONED HOW ANY ACTION WHICH WOULD THREATEN VITAL RIGHTS WESTERN POWERS CAN CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCING TENSION. REMINDED GROMYKO THAT WE HAVE NEVER SAID WE WOULD OPPOSE MERE CONCLUSION OF A PEACE TREATY WITH FORCE BUT THAT THEY CLAIM THIS ACTION WOULD LIQUIDATE OUR RIGHTS. I AGAIN ASKED WHAT THEN WOULD BE POSITION OF OUR FORCES THERE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-3- 2175, FEBRUARY 9, 7 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM MOSCOW

GROMYKO EXPRESSED INABILITY UNDERSTAND HOW, IF WESTERN POWERS ALSO HAVE AIM OF REDUCING TENSION, THEY CAN OPPOSE SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR PEACE TREATY AND FREE AND DEMILITARIZED CITY OF WEST BERLIN. HE INSISTED RETENTION OF "THE REMNANTS OF WW TWO AND THE OCCUPATION REGIME" IS NOT RPT NOT MEANS OF REDUCING TENSION AND IMPROVING RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO STATES. "SOVIET GOVERNMENT CATEGORICALLY REFUSES AGREE TO MAINTENANCE EXISTING SITUATION IN GERMANY--ABSENCE PEACE TREATY AND MAINTENANCE OCCUPATION REGIME, WHICH WE ARE CONVINCED ARE SOURCE OF TENSIONS AND POSSIBLE CONFLICT." HE CONTINUED, SOVIET GOVERNMENT CANNOT AGREE PROCRASTINATION PRESENT SITUATION.

GROMYKO, AS IN EARLIER MEETINGS, THEN EXPRESSED REGRET THAT SO FAR RPT SO FAR IT HAS NOT RPT NOT BEEN POSSIBLE ACHIEVE PROGRESS DUE TO US RPT US POSITION.

THOMPSON

BAP

CONFIDENTIAL

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

PERMANENT RECORD

M
Action
SS
Info

CONFIDENTIAL

Control: 5953
Rec'd: February 9, 1962
6:05 p.m. 001

FROM: MOSCOW
TO: Secretary of State

EYES ONLY

NO: 2175, FEBRUARY 9, 7 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO)
PRIORITY
EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY.

HE STATED HE ACCEPTED MY EXPLANATION THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE IN USG POSITION SINCE HIS TALKS WITH SECRETARY AND PRESIDENT, BUT HE SAID MY STATEMENT THAT AGREEMENT WITH ALLIES IMPOSSIBLE UNTIL ACCESS AGREED ATTESTS TO FACT WE ARE TRYING TO IMPOSE A PLAN ON THESE TALKS TO EFFECT THAT THEY MUST REVOLVE AROUND ACCESS QUESTION. WHILE THIS IS WESTERN POSITION, HE CONTINUED, SOVIET POSITION DIFFERS. "WE CONSIDER IT NECESSARY THAT ALL QUESTIONS INCLUDING PEACE TREATY AND WEST BERLIN PROBLEM BE DISCUSSED." HE REITERATED THAT SOVIET GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING KHRUSHCHEV HIMSELF, DOES NOT REJECT DISCUSSION ACCESS QUESTION WHICH HE HAD ALREADY DISCUSSED WITH ME.

GROMYKO THEN TURNED TO MY REFERENCE TO KHRUSHCHEV STATEMENT REGARDING WESTERN TROOPS IN BERLIN. HE AGREED KHRUSHCHEV HAD MADE SUCH STATEMENT TO PRESIDENT IN VIENNA, BUT, HE SAID, THAT IS EXACTLY WHY WE ARE DOUBLY SURPRISED WEST ATTEMPTING MAINTAIN OCCUPATION REGIME IN WEST BERLIN, AND SO OPPOSED TO THEIR WITHDRAWAL OR ADDITION SOVIET CONTINGENTS IF TROOPS HAVE NO MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE. "THEY DO, HOWEVER, HAVE SIGNIFICANCE BECAUSE THEY TURN WEST BERLIN INTO SERIOUS CENTER OF DANGER BY THEIR PRESENCE. GROMYKO CLAIMED MY STATEMENT THAT FORCES PRESENT IN BERLIN IN RESPONSE OBLIGATIONS TO DEFEND WEST BERLIN POPULATION IS SIMPLY AN ARGUMENT TO SUPPORT US DESIRE RETAIN OUR TROOPS IN WEST BERLIN. HE DECLARED "WE HAVE NO RELATIONSHIP TO THESE OBLIGATIONS." WESTERN TROOPS CAME TO WEST BERLIN UNDER ENTIRELY DIFFERENT OBLIGATIONS--

EYES ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS UNCLASSIFIED

* This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with PROHIBITED UNLESS UNCLASSIFIED

2175
MOSCOW
762.0221
2-9-62

ACTION ASSIGNED TO: NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL	ACTION TAKEN DATE OF ACTION	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R
---	--------------------------------	--------------------

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- 2175, FEBRUARY 9, 7 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO) FROM MOSCOW

THOSE ASSUMED BY THE ALLIANCE AGAINST HITLER GERMANY. HE INSISTED ALLEGED OBLIGATIONS WESTERN POWERS TO WEST BERLIN POPULATION ARE NOT LEGITIMATE AND ARE WITHOUT ANY INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FORCE. "THEY ALSO DO NOT REDUCE TENSION, BUT RUN CONTRARY TO THE AIMS ASSUMED BY ALLIANCE AFTER DEFEAT HITLERITE GERMANY, THAT IS, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PEACE-LOVING DEMOCRATIC STATE OF GERMANY". LEAVING ASIDE FACT NO ONE INTENDS DISTURB WEST BERLIN ORDER, GROMYKO STATED, SUCH OBLIGATIONS DO NOT ARISE IN POTSDAM AGREEMENT OR ANY OTHER AGREEMENT WE HAVE PARTICIPATED IN. HE ADDED AFTERTHOUGHT, "WHICH YOU HAVE BROKEN."

GROMYKO THEN TURNED TO MY QUESTION, WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS "VARIANT", WHY DEADLINE NECESSARY ON TROOPS IN WEST BERLIN SINCE PURPOSE IS TO GUARANTEE SECURITY. HE STATED SOVIET GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS INDEFINITE RETENTION WESTERN FORCES AND SOVIET FORCES IN WEST BERLIN QUITE IMPOSSIBLE. SUCH SITUATION DOES NOT MEET INTERESTS OF OUR TWO SLATES OR OF PEACE AND SECURITY.

GROMYKO CRITICIZED MY STATEMENT USG NOT SO MUCH CONCERNED WITH SOVIET PEACE TREATY WITH GDR, AS WITH ITS AFFECT ON POSITION OF WESTERN POWERS IN WEST BERLIN. "SUCH A SITUATION UNTHINKABLE SINCE CONCLUSION PEACE TREATY IS NOT SIMPLY FORMALITY, BUT A MAJOR STEP FROM WHICH WOULD FLOW IMPORTANT MEASURES." HE CONCLUDED BY REITERATING SOVIET GOVERNMENT PREFERENCES AGREED SOLUTION BUT AGAIN SAID, "UNFORTUNATELY, SO FAR POSITION OF USG OFFERS NO HOPE FOR SUCCESS."

I REPLIED WITH: REGARD QUESTION OF FREE CITY, I HAD ALREADY EXPRESSED MY VIEWS AND MY GOVERNMENT UNDOUBTEDLY WILL COMMENT FURTHER; REGARDING QUESTION OF AGREEMENT WITH OUR ALLIES, I POINTED OUT I HAD NOT REFERRED JUST TO ACCESS, BUT TO NATURE OF THE WHOLE SETTLEMENT OF BERLIN PROBLEM; REGARDING HIS REMARKS ON OUR OBLIGATIONS

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

-3- 2175, FEBRUARY 9, 7 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO) FROM MOSCOW

TO POPULATION OF BERLIN HAVING NO LEGAL FORCE WITH SOVIETS, I POINTED OUT THIS MIGHT BE, BUT HE HAD SAID SOVIETS COULD NOT CONSIDER ALL BERLIN SOLUTION BECAUSE EAST BERLIN IS THE CAPITAL OF GDR. WE DID NOT AGREE WITH THIS AND "THIS CLAIM HAS NO LEGAL FORCE WITH US"; I REPEATED THAT US ATTACH IMPORTANCE MAINTENANCE OUR TROOPS IN WEST BERLIN UNTIL RESOLUTION GERMAN QUESTION, BUT DENIED ANY INTENTION CREATEA "SPRING-BOARD". GROMYKO BEGAN TO DEVELOP HIS PREVIOUS ARGUMENTS THAT BASIC SOCIAL DIFFERENCES WHICH HAVE EMERGED BETWEEN WEST AND EAST BERLIN ARE BASIS (#) BUT HE APPARENTLY THOUGHT BETTER OF IT, AND WE CLOSED THE MEETING WITH MY REITERATION ASSURANCE I WOULD TRANSMIT HIS DECLARATION SOONEST.

THOMPSON

GDW

(#) OMISSION. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

NOTE: RELAYED WHITE HOUSE 2/9/62. per SS

CONFIDENTIAL

Record Number 58743

<u>SET</u>	Berlin Crisis
<u>BC1</u>	Yes
<u>DOCUMENT TYPE</u>	Cable
<u>DATE</u>	02/09/1962
<u>CIRCD</u>	
<u>TIME</u>	
<u>CABNO</u>	2175
<u>DOCNO</u>	
<u>ORIGIN</u>	United States Embassy. Soviet Union
<u>SIGNATOR</u>	Thompson, Llewellyn E.
<u>DESTO</u>	United States. Department of State
<u>DESTP</u>	
<u>DRAFT</u>	
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	Confidential
<u>TITLE</u>	
<u>CTIT</u>	[Summary of Meeting with Andrei Gromyko]
<u>NAMES</u>	Gromyko, Andrei A.
<u>TERMS</u>	
<u>ORGAN</u>	
<u>PGS</u>	6

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

04914

FEB 10 5 36 PM '62

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

Eyes only
Cat. A - Caption removed transferred to [redacted]
Cat. B - Transferred to [redacted] with additional access controlled by S/S
Cat. C - Caption and custody retained by S/S
MICROFILMED FOR KENNEDY LIBRARY
Reviewed by: Elijah Kelly Jr. *EL*
Date: *4-4-91* 13

ACTION: **Embassy PARIS** **TOPOL 1165**

INFO: **Embassy BONN**
USSR BERLIN
Embassy LONDON
Embassy MOSCOW

2194
1024
4272
1868

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADORS AND LIGHTNER

Kohler briefed the Ambassadorial Group today on latest Thompson-Gromyko talk: Gromyko read Thompson 15 page declaration (being sent separate tel). Thompson expressed disappointment in declaration's contents. He reiterated our aim was to seek agreement and reduce tensions on basis peace treaty with unified Germany. As this not possible, we now seek agreement on access because this is potentially the most dangerous point of friction. On wider issues, frontiers etc., our position has not changed since Gromyko talked to the President i.e. we are prepared discuss these in due course but not until our Allies, as well as ourselves, know *consultant different - in fact had been before* satisfactory agreement on Berlin possible. Thompson went on that presence Western troops in Berlin was no military threat, ~~xxxxxxx~~ recalling that Khrushchev had said that these troops had no military importance (Gromyko later admitted Khrushchev said this in Vienna but commented that it was because of this lack military significance that the Soviets were surprised we did not agree to the withdrawal of the troops or to addition of symbolic Soviet detachments). On IAA, Thompson questioned Soviet claim that this interferes with sovereignty as Soviets claim their proposal also provides guarantee free access to West Berlin. Thompson

REVIEWED BY *[Signature]* Date *9/10/91*
FOI, EO or PA exemptions
CLASSIFY as
DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C, OAI
DEPARTMENT OF STATE/CDC/MR
RELEASE ()
EXEMPT ()
DENY ()
DECLASSIFY IN PART ()
DELETE ()
Non-responsive info. ()

Drafted by: S/O: **GER:JKE** / *[Signature]* Date: *2/10/62*
Classification Approved by: **GER - Mr. Hillenbrand**

Enclosures: **MR - Mr. Miller** (*[Signature]*) **SOV - Mr. Klein** (*[Signature]*)
IA - Mr. Van Hollen **S/S - Mr. Pezullo**

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED".

7621-291-1062

RECEIVED DCB
1942140010W
CONFIDENTIAL
Classification
10-22-45

ALSO refused Gromyko's claim that West Berlin not part of QTE and expressed surprise at repetition already rejected Soviet proposal for station symbolic troop contingents in West Berlin. Thompson again pointed out he had never said would oppose conclusion GBR/USSR peace treaty with force but cannot accept Soviet claim that this treaty would liquidate Western rights in Berlin.

Gromyko replied that he understood the US position on inclusion frontiers and other issues negotiations had not changed but that our ^{insistence} ~~insistence~~ on access agreement first shows we are trying to impose our plan on these talks. He said QTE we consider it necessary that all questions including peace treaty and West Berlin problem be discussed UNQTE.

Gromyko also referred to Thompson's rejection of deadline on troop presence in West Berlin, saying that Soviets consider indefinite retention Western or Soviet forces in West Berlin quite impossible as it does not meet interests of West or Soviets or of peace and security. Gromyko criticized Thompson statement on peace treaty and its effect on position of West in Berlin by saying that conclusion of such a treaty is not a simple formality but ~~is~~ QTE a major step from which would flow important measures UNQTE. Gromyko ~~concluded~~ concluded that Soviet Government wants a solution but QTE unfortunately so far position of US Government offers no hope for success UNQTE.

Thompson replied (a) ^{although our views already well-known,} further US comments would probably be forthcoming on Free City proposal; (b) on wider issues US and Allies concerned not only access agreement but whole settlement Berlin problem; ~~and~~ (c) on presence Western forces Berlin, West considers it has obligation to protect population of Berlin whether this has any legal force with Soviets or not, adding that Soviets claim they cannot consider all-Berlin

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~Classification~~

solution because East Berlin has been incorporated in the GDR which QTE has no legal force with us UNQTE; (d) repeated that US attaches importance to maintenance troops in Berlin until resolution of German question.

Kohler commented that this round came sooner than we expected and that it was a stiff reply to our proposals. However, while US had no considered reaction as yet, it seemed we were coming close to complete impasse. In principle, we are inclined to have another round, possibly also in memorandum form. In particular seems necessary rebut on record Soviet contention that QTE peace treaty UNQTE is equivalent of QTE peace UNQTE and that resistance to force is aggression. Lord Hood seemed to agree with this and noted that Gromyko's position seemed QTE very familiar UNQTE. Schnippenkoetter commented that this early reply seemed to cut across speculation that the Soviets are anxious to draw out talks. Kohler agreed it was not consistent but that we were very much in the dark on Soviet motivations at this time. Alphanth declined invitation to comment but did express interest in possible relationship of Powers/Abel exchange to Soviet posture on Berlin and Germany. Kohler said that these were not related and that exchange culminates considerable period of preparation although obviously there might be some relationship as far as timing goes. Both Germans and French seemed to feel that press likely attribute sensational significance to exchange.

For USRO: You may use Kohler briefing for NAC, PermReps plus one, without reference to prisoner exchange. Also authorized distribute text Gromyko declaration when received. Again, please enjoin secrecy.

RUSK
(RM)

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

Record Number 58744

<u>SET</u>	Berlin Crisis
<u>BC1</u>	Yes
<u>DOCUMENT TYPE</u>	Cable
<u>DATE</u>	02/10/1962
<u>CIRCD</u>	
<u>TIME</u>	
<u>CABNO</u>	1165
<u>DOCNO</u>	
<u>ORIGIN</u>	United States. Department of State
<u>SIGNATOR</u>	Rusk, Dean
<u>DESTO</u>	United States Embassy. France
<u>DESTP</u>	
<u>DRAFT</u>	Holloway, J.K.
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	Confidential
<u>TITLE</u>	
<u>CTIT</u>	[Foy Kohler Briefs the Ambassadorial Group]
<u>NAMES</u>	Kohler, Foy D.
<u>NAMES</u>	Gromyko, Andrei A.
<u>NAMES</u>	Khrushchev, Nikita S.
<u>NAMES</u>	Thompson, Llewellyn E.
<u>TERMS</u>	
<u>ORGAN</u>	North Atlantic Council
<u>PGS</u>	3

2/14/62
001
11

9-32

SECRET

Action

Control: 8342

Rec'd: FEB. 14, 1962
1:37pm

EUR

FROM: PARIS

Info

SS.

TO: Secretary of State

SR

NO: ~~3764~~ 3864, FEBRUARY 14, NOON

G

SP

L

E

SO

DAC

SAE

F

IOP

INR

RMR

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

I CALLED ON COUVE YESTERDAY TO GO OVER MATTERS I ANTICIPATE DISCUSSING WITH DE GAULLE NEXT TUESDAY. I BEGAN BY OUTLINING TO HIM MY CONCERN FOR ROLE FRANCE WILL PLAY IN NATO AFTER ALGERIA. I TOLD HIM ALSO THAT I FELT THERE WOULD BE ULTIMATELY SOME RELATIONS BETWEEN COMMUNITY OF SIX AND NATO IN THAT TO INCREASING EXTENT SIX WOULD SOONER OR LATER BE INTERESTED IN MILITARY QUESTIONS SINCE MEMBER COUNTRIES WILL BE PRODUCING COMMON ITEMS OF MILITARY HARDWARE. HE RESPONDED BY SAYING FRENCH BELIEVES IN NATO. THERE ARE SOME ASPECTS OF US THINKING ABOUT NATO, HOWEVER, THAT FRANCE DOES NOT UNDERSTAND. HE REPEATED AGAIN THAT THEY DID NOT UNDERSTAND AND I BELIEVE THIS IS EXACTLY WHAT HE MEANT. HE SAID STIKKER HAD TALKED TO FRENCH AMBASSADOR AT NAC ABOUT A NATO MULTI-NATIONAL NUCLEAR MRBM FORCE. HE SAID THERE ARE TWO QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS THAT ARE NOT AT ALL CLEAR TO FRENCH.

IN FIRST PLACE, TO SELL NUCLEAR WARHEADS TO NATO, AND THIS IS WHAT FRANCE UNDERSTANDS WE WILL DO, WOULD REQUIRE A CHANGE IN MACMAHON ACT. FRANCE DOES NOT BELIEVE CONGRESS WILL AGREE TO SUCH A CHANGE. NEXT, EVEN IF CHANGE WERE PASSED AND WEAPONS WERE THEN PLACED IN HANDS OF NATO, IT WOULD STILL BE NO DIFFERENT THAN IT IS NOW. I REPLIED BY SAYING THAT IF ANY CHANGE WAS REQUIRED IN ORDER TO PROVIDE A MULTI-NATIONAL NUCLEAR FORCE I FELT IT COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED. HE REPEATED THAT HE STILL DID NOT THINK CONGRESS WOULD AGREE TO IT. NEXT, I SAID I FELT SURE AN ARRANGEMENT COULD BE FOUND WHEREBY WEAPONS COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO NATO

Copy No(s) 80

Destroyed in RM/R

Date

Name

microfilmed by RMR

FILED
APR 16 1962

SECRET

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken.

ACTION ASSIGNED TO.	EUR/WF	ACTION TAKEN	noted
NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL	Jmkof	DATE OF ACTION	2/26/62
		DIRECTIONS TO RM/R	file

375/2462

W

41
INCOMING TELEGRAM

X
SECRET

CONTROL: 8342
CORRECTION ISSUED:
2/15/62, 3:25 p.m. FH

-2- 3864. FEBRUARY 14 NOON; FROM PARIS - CORRECTED PAGE 2

Action
EUR
Info
SS
SR
G
SP
L
H
SO
DAC
SAE
P
IOP
INR
RMR

FOR USE INSUCH A WAY THAT US WOULD NOT VETO THEIR USE IF NATO FELT IT NECESSARY. HE REPLIED BY SAYING HE FELT WE WERE NOT REALISTIC ABOUT THIS, THAT HE DID NOT THINK AMERICAN CONGRESS WOULD EVER RELINQUISH AUTHORITY TO INITIATE A NUCLEAR WAR TO A NATO BODY. EVEN IF THEY DID, FRANCE DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY ANY EUROPEAN NATION WOULD BE EXPECTED TO BUY NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO BE GIVEN TO SOMEONE ELSE TO USE.

HE CONCLUDED IN SUMMARY BY SAYING THAT THEY DO NOT UNDERSTAND HOW US FEELS IT CAN BRING SUCH A MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE INTO BEING AND MAKE IT WORK EVEN IF THERE WERE THE NEED FOR SUCH A FORCE. I ASSURED HIM THAT WE THOUGHT A WORKABLE ARRANGEMENT IS POSSIBLE ALTHOUGH IT WOULD TAKE CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION ON PART OF ALL OUR ALLIES. I EMPHASIZED NEED FOR A MULTI-NATIONAL SOLUTION TO DEAL WITH THE NUCLEAR ASPIRATIONS OF THE HAVE NOT NATIONS SUCH AS GERMANY, FOR EXAMPLE. HE AGREED WITH THIS, STILL EXPRESSING DOUBTS ABOUT WORKABILITY OF A NATO PLAN. I ASKED HIM IF HE THOUGHT FRANCE AND GERMANY MIGHT GET TOGETHER TO PRODUCE THEIR OWN NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AS AN ALTERNATIVE. HE SAID THAT PERHAPS 5 YEARS FROM NOW, OR EVEN 10 YEARS, BUT NOT NOW. WE THEN TALKED ABOUT COMMUNITY OF SIX. HE SAID IN HIS OPINION MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS WILL CERTAINLY BECOME VERY IMPORTANT TO SIX SINCE THEY WILL BE PRODUCING AND DISCUSSING COMMON ITEMS OF MILITARY HARDWARE, AS WELL AS CONSIDERING STRATEGIC PROBLEMS. I ASKED HIM IF HE FORESAW GROWTH OF SIX AS MILITARY ENTITY ATTAINING SUCH STATURE THAT IT WOULD BE CONSIDERED AS A POWER BLOCK DISTINCT FROM BUT PERHAPS RELATED TO NATO. HE SAID, "POSSIBLY, BUT WHO KNOWS?"; THE FRENCH THINKING IN THIS AREA IS NOT FAR ALONG AT THE MOMENT. HE AGAIN REITERATED HIS BELIEF THAT NATO WILL CONTINUE AS AN INSTITUTION. WE DISCUSSED BRIEFLY THE PRESENT NATO DISPOSITIONS AND HE OBSERVED THAT THE HEAVY CONCENTRATION OF HEAVY FORCES IN GERMANY APPEARED TO BE IN A VERY VULNERABLE CONDITION AND THAT FRANCE RETAINING THREE DIVISIONS IN FRANCE WOULD HAVE SOME MERIT. I POINTED OUT THAT THIS WOULD HAVE SOME MERIT BUT THAT NEVERTHELESS, IF, FOR EXAMPLE, THE BERLIN SITUATION GOT WORSE IT WAS QUITE UNREALISTIC OF FRANCE NOT TO ALLOW DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR-EQUIPPED NATO FORCES IN

SECRET

*file noted
2-16-62
WE*

11

W

SECRET

-3- 3764, FEBRUARY 14 NOON; FROM PARIS

FRANCE. HE REPLIED BY SAYING PERHAPS THIS WAS SO, BUT IF WE WERE ON THRESHHOLD OF WAR THEN FRANCE WOULD NOT OBJECT TO NATO NUCLEAR FORCES BEING DEPLOYED IN FRANCE.

HE SAID THAT IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE WAR WHEN US HAD PRACTICALLY ALL THE POWER, THE ORGANIZATION OF A MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURE SUCH AS THAT OF SHAPE MADE A GREAT DEAL OF SENSE. NOW, HOWEVER, WITH GROWING STRENGTH OF GERMAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT AND OF FRENCH MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT SHAPE WAS NOT VERY REALISTIC. IN FRENCH OPINION IT IS AN AMERICAN HEADQUARTERS THAT, AS A CONCEPT, WAS VALID WHEN ESTABLISHED BUT HAS NOW BEEN OVERTAKEN BY CHANGING EVENTS. I PRESSED FOR HIS THINKING ON WHAT MIGHT TAKE PLACE OF NATO AND ENIGMATICALLY HE RESPONDED, AS HE HAD SEVERAL TIMES, THAT NATO WILL PROBABLY ALWAYS EXIST AS AN INSTITUTION AND FRENCH HAVE NOTHING IN MIND TO REPLACE IT.

IN CONCLUSION, EVEN THOUGH WE DISCUSSED, WITH COMPLETE CANDOR, A NUMBER OF SENSITIVE SUBJECTS, COVERED IN SEPARATE TELEGRAMS, CHARACTERISTICALLY COUVE AVOIDED ADVANCING ANY NEW IDEAS. I THINK HE GAVE ME QUITE A FEW OF DE GAULLE'S IDEAS WARMED OVER BUT HESITATED TO GO BEYOND THE SPECIFIC IDEAS HE HAS HEARD DE GAULLE EXPRESS, EVEN IN AN EXPLORATORY MANNER.

GAVIN

JTC

(#) OMISSION, CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

SECRET

Eyes only
 2/15/62
 E50
 RSB-MM-62-13
 February 15, 1962
 Date: 4-4-91 19

SECRET
 "EYES ONLY"

FOURTH THOMPSON-GROMYKO MEETING, FEBRUARY 9, 1962

The fourth Thompson-Gromyko meeting February 9, convened at Soviet initiative, appears to have been intended by the Soviets not as a give-and-take negotiating session but as an occasion to underscore the incompatibility of the present US and Soviet stands on Berlin. The document tabled by the Soviet Foreign Minister did not attempt a serious answer to the argumentation of the US papers submitted February 1. Nor did Gromyko venture into any new territory. Indeed, his exposition of the standard Soviet line was even more categorical than before.

Thus the Soviet declaration departed from the normal Soviet contention that a "free city" status for West Berlin would be the "best possible solution", to assert that a free city is "the sole solution which would not cause damage to any of the interested parties." Gromyko underlined Soviet rigidity on the free city proposals with his statement that "the USSR categorically refuses to agree to the maintenance of the existing situation in Germany" and that the "indefinite retention of...troops in West Berlin is quite impossible." And while the Soviet memorandum expressed willingness to "combine interests of unobstructed access" with free city status and respect for GDR sovereignty, it took a more rigid position than before on the question of an international access authority and made no effort to explore the possibilities for some type of agreed arrangement on access. The document stated merely that the "Soviet Government is not in agreement with these proposals" advanced by the US. Finally, the declaration repeated the separate treaty threat (though with no indication of imminent action) and concluded by asserting that "we want peace, but if the Western powers carry matters to war,...we are prepared to stand up for ourselves."

The fact that Gromyko carefully made no attempt to end the talks indicates that this rigid Soviet stance is not designed to produce an impasse in negotiations. Presumably the Soviets have one of two objectives in mind.

First, they may hope to move the West off its present position on a Berlin settlement by assuming a tough stance and calling attention to the possible consequences of a failure to move toward the Soviet position. In particular, they may hope to induce the West to discuss Berlin's status simultaneously with the question of access, or to discuss an "interim" settlement. The Soviets almost certainly regard the proposals tabled by the

SECRET
 "EYES ONLY"

This document consists of 2 p. number 11 of 15 copies, Series A

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
 REVIEWED BY *[Signature]* Date *4/1/62*
 FOL, EO or PA exemptions
 TS author:
 () CLASSIFY as
 () DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C, OAD/A
 () RELEASE () DECLASSIFY
 () EXEMPT () DECLASSIFY IN PART
 () DENY () DELETE
 () Non-responsive info.

E

mon t
611. 10-1
2-15-62

SECRET

"EYES ONLY"

- 2 -

US at the last session as an opening bargaining counter. They may also believe that any indication of a softening of the Soviet position at this time would be premature.

Or, Moscow may have concluded that no agreement on West Berlin is likely to emerge from the present exchanges and, by crystallizing an impasse on this issue, hopes to direct talks to other issues. Noteworthy in this regard were Gromyko's several pointed references to borders. Gromyko asserted that access is too narrow a basis for talks, and that "without introduction of the necessary clarity into the question of German borders... and also into other questions brought up by the Soviet Government, no exchange of opinions can be productive."

Similarly noteworthy may be the statement in the Soviet document that "we consider the presence of foreign troops in any country in general undesirable as this infringes to some extent upon the sovereignty of a given country." The interjection of this idea could presage some Soviet initiative with regard to foreign troops in Europe.

SECRET

"EYES ONLY"

Record Number 58747

<u>SET</u>	Berlin Crisis
<u>BC1</u>	Yes
<u>DOCUMENT TYPE</u>	Minutes
<u>DATE</u>	02/15/1962
<u>CIRCD</u>	
<u>TIME</u>	
<u>CABNO</u>	
<u>DOCNO</u>	
<u>ORIGIN</u>	United States. Department of State
<u>SIGNATOR</u>	
<u>DESTO</u>	
<u>DESTP</u>	
<u>DRAFT</u>	
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	Secret
<u>TITLE</u>	Fourth Thompson-Gromyko Meeting, February 9, 1962
<u>CTIT</u>	
<u>NAMES</u>	Thompson, Llewellyn E.
<u>NAMES</u>	Gromyko, Andrei A.
<u>TERMS</u>	
<u>ORGAN</u>	
<u>PGS</u>	2

- RELEASE
- EXISE
- DENY
- DECLASSIFY
- DECLASSIFY in PART
- DELETE
- Non-responsive info.

FOI, EO or PA exemptions _____
 _____ TS authority _____
 CLASSIFY as _____
 DOWNGRADE TS to S or C, OADR

Carroll 1

(5)

CONFIDENTIAL

~~EYES ONLY~~

February 16, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MCCORMACK BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Instructions for
Ambassador Thompson

Enclosed for your consideration
is an advance copy of the draft
instructions for Ambassador Thompson
for the next round of discussions
with Mr. Gromyko. This draft has
not yet been approved by the
Secretary.

L. D. Battle

Enclosures:
As noted

~~SECRET ENCLOSURE~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

Eyes only

2/16/62 Rel USC

(E 51)

Releasable

762.00/2-1662

Classification Authority
 Original to O/FAD/DC
 Copy 2 - To be referred to O/FAD/DC
 with additional access
 controlled by S/S
 Copy C - Caption and custody
 retained by S/S

Reviewed by: *SK* *EJH*
 Date: *4-4-91*

- RELEASE
- EXISE
- DENY
- DECLASSIFY
- DECLASSIFY in PART
- DELETE
- Non-responsive info.

FOI, EO or PA exemptions _____
 TS authority _____
 CLASSIFY as _____ GADR
 DOWNGRADE TS to S or C, GADR

SECRET
 DRAFT

ACTION: Embassy MOSCOW
 INFO ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR

Caption removed
 If referred to O/FADRC
 or O/FADRC
 EYES ONLY
 Personal access
 controlled by S/S
 Capt. D. - Caption and custody
 retained by S/S
 Reviewed by: [Signature] SK
 Date: 4-9-91 19__

Eyes Only

51R

Releasable

Ref W/SC

FW 76202/2-1662

1. Although your exchanges with Gromyko seem to be approaching stage of formalistic ritual dance, we believe that they should be allowed to follow their course and that you should accordingly request further meeting with him. Moreover, recent Soviet statements in air corridors have added dangerous new element of which we must take account both in assessing Soviet intentions and in developing our own tactics.

2. We shall provide you in separate telegram with text of memorandum to be handed Gromyko to establish record for eventual possible publication should Soviets decide release various documents they have given you.

3. If prior to your next session arrangements have been completed for convening of Foreign Ministers in Geneva in connection eighteen-power disarmament talks and you make no progress with Gromyko, you should towards end of conversation indicate that you will shortly be returning to Washington on consultation to assist in preparations for forthcoming discussions at Geneva. Secretary is looking forward to opportunity which presence in Geneva will provide to meet privately with Gromyko in effort to see whether some way towards mutually acceptable accommodation on Berlin cannot be found. Although present series of talks in Moscow have given little cause for optimism, perhaps break of some weeks during which both sides can reflect on arguments presented may be

SECRET

a good

SECRET

-2-

a good thing. In meantime it will be, of course, incumbent on both sides to avoid any unilateral acts which would only further exacerbate situation.

4. In view of air corridor harassments, you should begin by observing that Soviet attempts to restrict Allied air access in Berlin corridors and to alter established procedures has created a highly dangerous situation which cannot but affect our appraisal of Soviet intentions and good faith. You should refer in this connection to protests submitted by three powers to Soviet Foreign Ministry on February 15, making particular reference to passage stating that attempt to force changes in established procedures is incompatible with Soviet Foreign Minister's apparent agreement in talks with President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk that both sides should refrain from QUOTE actions which might aggravate international tensions UNQUOTE and with explicit commitment to this effect in joint statement of September 20, 1951 on principles for disarmament negotiations. To degree necessary you may draw on factual contents of note plus subsequent reporting telegrams from Berlin and LIVE OAK, but it would not be purpose of present meeting to engage in prolonged debate on situation in air corridors. Discussion this subject might be terminated by comment that highly volatile situation in air corridors underlines essential correctness of Western emphasis on access problem as requiring primary attention. This is area of activity where

both

SECRET

SECRET

both sides might more quickly find themselves in escalating situation involving grave risks.

5. Apart from foregoing and necessary refutation of certain points made by Gromyko during your last session, meeting should be directed primarily towards ascertaining whether Soviets leave any opening for progress in direction suggested by President to Adenauer, i.e., that since final solution of Berlin problem seemed impossible, both sides should seek to find accommodation which would prevent tensions from mounting.

6. With reference to Gromyko's claim that US Government apparently does not have any intention of discussing seriously matters under question, you should observe that we are indeed very serious about these matters. QUOTE Discussing seriously UNQUOTE in Soviet definition apparently means accepting their formulation of the problem and their proposal for a solution. For various reasons, including those stated in memorandum handed Soviet Foreign Minister during your third meeting, US proceeds from assumption that discussions between Great Powers must start with admission by both sides that neither one can expect other simply to accept either its formulation of problem or proposed solution. Serious discussion means finding some middle ground which is consistent with professed intentions and basic interests of both sides, and, if that is not possible, at least finding some modus vivendi which will

avert

SECRET

SECRET

-4-

avert grave risks of destructive war inherent in dispute.

7. Exchanges so far between Soviet Foreign Minister and American Ambassador have created impression that no basis for accommodation exists. We find it difficult to believe that Soviet Government is so unaware of US position, or so unwilling to take it into account, that it can expect us to accept claims and proposals which American leaders have repeatedly stated are clearly unacceptable. Point has now apparently been reached where Soviets do not feel they can even follow up earlier indications that some procedural formula might be found within which possibility of an arrangement on Berlin could be further explored, and that this formula envisaged that basic arrangement must be between Soviet Union and Western Powers and not between latter and QUOTE GDR UNQUOTE. Instead we now have renewed Soviet emphasis on need for a GDR role in working out access arrangements which would leave entire situation at mercy of regime, leaders of which have made many statements about intentions which are completely incompatible with that freedom of access for West Berlin which Soviets have said they favored. Does all this mean that Soviets have given up idea of finding an accommodation on Berlin? We trust this is not case, and therefore once again suggest that most practicable way to begin would be to try to find some solution to access question. Soviet Foreign Minister has criticized US concentration on access. We have stressed this problem precisely

because

SECRET

because it seems to us that possibility of conflict between USSR and US is likely to arise over misunderstanding regarding access. Soviets have said they do not like idea of International Access Authority which we believe most useful approach to problem and practicable way of avoiding confrontation over it. We would, of course, be glad to discuss any variations in Access Authority proposal which Soviets have in mind. Incidents of kind we have had recently in air corridors would be avoided under International Access Authority proposal. We would appreciate having specific ideas from Soviets as to how they think confrontation over access might be avoided which go beyond generalities about QUOTE respect for GDR sovereignty UNQUOTE.

3. You might take up Gromyko's words as quoted in your 2100 regarding Soviet intention never to sign any document which would back occupation rights or favor retention of occupation regime in West Berlin, noting that this is not what we are proposing Soviets should do. As pointed out in our earlier memorandum, our rights in Berlin do not derive from Soviets and we are not asking that they sign their name to a document containing a term which seems to have acquired unpleasant associations for them. What we are asking is that they accept fact of Western presence in Berlin and draw appropriate conclusions from that fact without engaging in debate over

differing

differing legal views.

9. In this connection, you might observe, we have come to reluctant conclusion that Soviets have not addressed themselves directly to a number of important points made by American Ambassador or in US memorandum handed him at meeting before last. We hope that Soviet Foreign Minister will carefully reexamine this document.

10. You might conclude opening remarks by handing Gromyko memorandum which, you may point out, is intended to deal with a number of points made by Soviets in documents they have given us.

11. In unlikely event that Gromyko unveils any new element of flexibility in Soviet position, you should endeavor to draw him out to extent possible, and at appropriate point, indicate that you will report his statement back to your Government where it will be carefully considered.

12. During course of discussion you might, if appropriate, make some or all of following additional points in commenting on Soviet memorandum or Gromyko's arguments which, we assume, will follow their stereotyped course:

13. To all intents and purposes QUOTE peaceful coexistence UNQUOTE prevailed in Berlin for decade between Soviet imposed blockade and November 1958 when Soviets without any provocation again challenged Western position with threat of unilateral action. There is nothing explosive about West Berlin. Only threats to peace over

the

the years have come from Soviet side moves against what they call QUOTE alien body UNQUOTE with implications of intentions to seek to suppress and absorb it.

14. Soviets are violating past commitments to single peace treaty and reunification while accusing us of preventing a partial peace treaty which would perpetuate the division of Germany. Soviet talk of peace treaty is not equivalent to wanting peace because claimed effects of peace treaty can only produce mounting tensions and threat to peace. Soviets should not forget that it is they - not we - who threaten to change existing situation and interfere with exercise of our rights. We are not aggressing against, or threatening, them in Berlin. It is they who are threatening us. If worse comes to worst, the world will easily understand that defending the exercise of one's rights and responsibilities is not aggression, but that what is being resisted is aggression.

15. As Khrushchev himself told President in Vienna, Western troops in Berlin are not important militarily, surrounded as they are by 20 Soviet divisions and 6 East German divisions, but are important as guarantee of our readiness to meet our obligations. Anyone seeking to remove this protection inevitably raises doubts as to his real intentions.

Record Number 58749

<u>SET</u>	Berlin Crisis
<u>BC1</u>	Yes
<u>DOCUMENT TYPE</u>	Memorandum
<u>DATE</u>	02/16/1962
<u>CIRCD</u>	
<u>TIME</u>	
<u>CABNO</u>	
<u>DOCNO</u>	
<u>ORIGIN</u>	United States. Department of State. Executive Secretariat
<u>SIGNATOR</u>	Battle, Lucius D.
<u>DESTO</u>	
<u>DESTP</u>	Bundy, McGeorge
<u>DRAFT</u>	
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	Secret
<u>TITLE</u>	Instructions for Ambassdor Thompson
<u>CTIT</u>	[Draft Cable Attached]
<u>NAMES</u>	Thompson, Llewellyn E.
<u>NAMES</u>	Gromyko, Andrei A.
<u>NAMES</u>	Kennedy, John F.
<u>TERMS</u>	
<u>ORGAN</u>	
<u>PGS</u>	8

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

SECRET
 Classification

Eyes only
 (A) Caption removed transferred to O/TAD
 Cat. B - Transferred to O/TAD with additional access controlled by S/S
 Cat. C - Caption and custody retained
MICROFILMED FOR LIBRARY
 Reviewed by: *Elijah Kelly*
KENNEDY
 Date: *4-4-91*
APRIL 1964

E58
RR



Origin
 Info
 TS author
 FOL, EO or PA exemptions
 CLASSIFY as
 DOWNGRADE TO
 DECLASSIFY as
 EXISE
 DENY
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
 REVIEWED by *[Signature]* Date *4/1/64*

SENT TO: Amembassy MOSCOW - PRIORITY 1498
 RPTD INFO: Amembassy PARIS - PRIORITY 4664
 Amembassy LONDON - PRIORITY 4615
 Amembassy BONN - PRIORITY 2395
 USBER BERLIN - PRIORITY 1118
 PARIS PASS FINLETTER - EYES ONLY
 EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADORS AND LIGHTNER
 VERBATIM TEXT

1. Although your exchanges with Gromyko seem to have reached stage of formalistic ritual we believe that you should request further meeting with him both to put our further comments on record and to link discussions with possible talks at Geneva.
2. You already have text of memorandum, as amended to take account of British and German comments, to be handed Gromyko.
3. If prior to your next session arrangements have been completed for convening of Foreign Ministers in Geneva in connection 18 power disarmament talks and you make no progress with Gromyko, you should towards end of conversation indicate that you will shortly be going to Geneva to assist Secretary in forthcoming discussions. Secretary is looking forward to opportunity which presence in Geneva will provide to meet privately with Gromyko in effort to see whether some way towards mutually acceptable accommodation on Berlin cannot be found. Although present series of talks in Moscow have given little cause

6/11.6/13-162
XR 396.12 GF
762.10

Drafted by: *[Signature]* S/O:EUR:GER:MJHillenbrand:cb 3/1/62
 Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: *[Signature]* EUR - Foy D. Kohler

Clearances:
 The Secretary (in draft) *[Signature]* S/B - Mr. Bohlen *[Signature]*
 S/S - Mr. Manfull *[Signature]* The White House
 SOV - Mr. Gathrie *[Signature]*

7

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED".

SECRET
 Classification

SECRET

Classification

For optimism, perhaps break during which both sides can reflect on arguments presented may be a good thing. In meantime it will be, or course, incumbent on both sides to avoid any unilateral acts which would only further exacerbate situation.

4. If Geneva situation is still unclear when you see Gromyko, you should instead say that US Government is hopeful that Soviet Foreign Minister will be in Geneva for opening of disarmament talks and that, under such circumstances, Secretary would look forward to opportunity to discuss with him other subjects of mutual concern such as Berlin. You might then pick up line in balance of preceding paragraph. In event that Gromyko says he is not going to Geneva and will not therefore be seeing Secretary, you should say that your government will no doubt wish to give consideration to other ways of resuming contact and that you suppose Soviets will be doing same.

5. In view of recent air corridor harassments, you should begin by observing that Soviet attempts to alter established procedures in Berlin air corridors threatened to create a highly dangerous situation. You might refer in this connection to protests submitted by three powers to Soviet Foreign Ministry on February 15, making particular reference to passage stating that attempt to force changes in established procedures is incompatible with Soviet Foreign Minister's apparent agreement in talks with President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk that both sides should refrain from QUOTE actions which might aggravate international tensions UNQUOTE and with explicit commitment to this effect in joint statement of September 20, 1961 on principles for disarmament negotiations. To degree necessary you may draw on factual contents of note plus subsequent reporting telegrams from Berlin and LIVE OAK, but it would not be purpose of present meeting to engage in prolonged debate on situation in air corridors.

Discussion this Subject might be terminated by comment that highly volatile situation in air corridors underlines essential correctness of Western emphasis on access problem as requiring primary attention. This is area of activity where both sides

SECRET

Classification

SECRET*Classification*

might most quickly find themselves in escalating situation involving grave risks.

6. Apart from foregoing and necessary refutation in memorandum of certain points made by Gromyko during your last session, meeting should be directed primarily towards emphasizing desirability that progress be made in direction suggested by President to Adzhubei, i.e., that since final solution of Berlin problem seemed impossible, both sides should seek to find accommodation which would prevent tensions from mounting.

7. With reference to Gromyko's claim that US Government apparently does not have any intention of discussing seriously matters under question, you should observe that we are indeed very serious about these matters. QUOTE Discussing seriously UNQUOTE in Soviet definition apparently means accepting their formulation of the problem and their proposal for a solution. For various reasons, including those stated in memorandum handed Soviet Foreign Minister during your third meeting, US proceeds from assumption that discussions between Great Powers must start with admission by both sides that neither one can expect other simply to accept either its formulation of problem or proposed solution. Serious discussion means finding some ground which is consistent with professed intentions and basic interests of both sides, and, if that is not possible, at least finding some modus vivendi which will avert grave risks of war inherent in dispute.

8. Exchanges so far between Soviet Foreign Minister and American Ambassador yet have created impression that no basis for systematic negotiation/exists. We find it difficult to believe that Soviet Government is so unaware of US position, or so unwilling to take it into account, that it can expect us to accept claims and proposals which American leaders have repeatedly stated are clearly unacceptable.

SECRET*Classification*

~~SECRET~~
~~Classification~~

Point has now apparently been reached where Soviets seem unwilling to follow up earlier indications that some procedural formula might be found within which possibility of an arrangement on Berlin could be further explored, and that this formula envisaged that basic arrangement must be between Soviet Union and Western Powers and not between latter and QUOTE GDR UNQUOTE. Does this mean that Soviets have given up idea of finding an accommodation on Berlin? We trust this is not the case, and therefore once again suggest that most practicable way to begin would be to try to find some solution to access question. Soviet Foreign Minister has criticized US concentration on access. We have stressed this problem precisely because it seems to us that possibility of conflict between USSR and US is likely to arise over misunderstanding regarding access. Soviets have said they do not like idea of International Access Authority which we believe most useful approach to problem and practicable way of avoiding confrontation over it. We would, of course, be glad to discuss any variations in Access Authority proposal which Soviets have in mind. Incidents of kind we have had recently in air corridors would be avoided under International Access Authority proposal. We would appreciate having specific ideas from Soviets as to how they think confrontation over access might be avoided which go beyond generalities about QUOTE respect for GDR sovereignty UNQUOTE.

9. You might take up Gromyko's words as quoted in your 2100 regarding Soviet intention never to sign any document which would back occupation rights or favor retention of occupation regime in West Berlin, noting that this is not what we are proposing Soviets should do. As pointed out in our earlier memorandum, our rights in Berlin do not derive from Soviets and we are not asking that they sign their name

~~SECRET~~
~~Classification~~

SECRET

Classification

to a document containing a term which seems to have acquired unpleasant associations for them. What we are asking is that they accept fact of Western presence in Berlin and draw appropriate conclusions from that fact without engaging in debate over differing legal views. They, on their side, are asking us to proceed on basis of what they call "facts" of the situation where these facts are to their liking.

10. In this connection, you might observe, we have come to reluctant conclusion that Soviets have not addressed themselves directly to a number of important points made by American Ambassador or in US memorandum handed him at meeting before last. We hope that Soviet Foreign Minister will carefully reexamine this document.

11. You might conclude opening remarks by handing Gromyko memorandum which, you may point out, is intended to deal with a number of points made by Soviets in documents they have given us.

12. In unlikely event that Gromyko unveils any new element of flexibility in Soviet position, you should endeavor to draw him out to extent possible, and at appropriate point, indicate that you will report his statement back to your Government where it will be promptly considered.

13. During course of discussion you may, as appropriate, draw on memorandum or previous instructions in commenting on Gromyko's arguments which, we assume, will follow their stereotyped course. END VERBATIM TEXT

END

SECRET

Classification

Record Number 58751

<u>SET</u>	Berlin Crisis
<u>BC1</u>	Yes
<u>DOCUMENT TYPE</u>	Cable
<u>DATE</u>	03/06/1962
<u>CIRCD</u>	
<u>TIME</u>	
<u>CABNO</u>	1998
<u>DOCNO</u>	
<u>ORIGIN</u>	United States. Department of State
<u>SIGNATOR</u>	Rusk, Dean
<u>DESTO</u>	United States Embassy. Soviet Union
<u>DESTP</u>	
<u>DRAFT</u>	Hillenbrand, Martin J.
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	Secret
<u>TITLE</u>	
<u>CTII</u>	[Further Meetings with Andrei Gromyko are Suggested]
<u>NAMES</u>	Gromyko, Andrei A.
<u>TERMS</u>	
<u>ORGAN</u>	
<u>PGS</u>	5

INCOMING TELEGRAM

~~EVER ONLY~~
Department of State

Bundy

L

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

Control: 11109

Rec'd: February 17, 1962

S/S

11:33 p.m.

032

Info

FROM: BONN

TO: Secretary of State


NO: 1934, FEBRUARY 17, 2 PM

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

WHEN KISSINGER AND I CALLED ON STRAUSS FEB 15, KISSINGER OPENED CONVERSATION BY REFERRING TO SOME EUROPEAN CRITICISM THAT UNITED STATES RETALIATORY FORCE WAS GROWING VULNERABLE, AND ALSO THAT OUR TARGETING WAS DESIGNED TO MAKE US A SANCTUARY. WITH RESPECT TO US VULNERABILITY, HE TOLD STRAUSS IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE SOME OF MATERIAL THAT HAD BEEN SHOWN TO STIKKER ABOUT OUR STRATEGIC PROGRAM WHICH HAD BEEN CLEARED BY HENRY ROWEN, CARL KAYSEN AND FOY KOHLER. HE STRESSED THAT ON ANY FORESEEABLE PROJECTION NUMBER OF US WEAPONS AND DELIVERY VEHICLES REMAINING AFTER USSR FIRST STRIKE WOULD BE GREATER THAN THAT REMAINING FOR SOVIET UNION.



KISSINGER STRESSED THAT US OBJECTIONS TO MULTIPLICATION OF NATIONAL FORCES HAD TO BE SEEN IN THIS CONTEXT.



NATIONAL FORCE IF USED ALONE WOULD DECREASE CREDIBILITY AND IF USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH US, IT WAS WASTEFUL DUPLICATION. SOLUTION WAS TO WELD THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY INTO UNIT AND DEAL WITH NUCLEAR PROBLEM ON NATO BASIS.

SANITIZED

NW-85-29

~~TOP SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

NARS DATE 1/88

EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 1934, FEBRUARY 17, 2 PM FROM BONN


STRAUSS' MOOD WAS EXTREMELY FORTHCOMING. HE SAID THIS INFORMATION, EVEN THOUGH EXPRESSED IN PERCENTAGE TERMS, WAS ENTIRELY NEW TO HIM. IT SET AT REST FEAR HE HAD HAD WITH RESPECT TO AMERICAN NUCLEAR AND MILITARY POLICY.

KISSINGER STRESSED THAT MATERIAL HE PRESENTED INDICATED INTEGRAL CONNECTION BETWEEN AMERICAN AND NATO PLANNING. HE POINTED OUT IT WOULD NOT BE WISE TO CREATE IMPRESSION THAT THESE TWO WERE DIFFERENT.

STRAUSS AGAIN SAID HE AGREED COMPLETELY. HE INDICATED HE WAS VERY RECEPTIVE TO NOTION OF NATO FORCE AS MEANS TO STRENGTHEN THIS CONNECTION.



KISSINGER THEN ASKED ABOUT SUGGESTION TO CREATE AN MRBM SEA-BASED FORCE ON MERCHANT SHIPS. HE SAID THAT IN HIS JUDGMENT IT WOULD RECEIVE VERY CAREFUL CONSIDERATION.




~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- 1934; FEBRUARY 17, 2 PM FROM BONN



KISSINGER ASKED ABOUT CONVENTIONAL BUILD-UP. STRAUSS SAID HE WOULD SUPPORT IT ENTHUSIASTICALLY WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK. HIS HESITATIONS PREVIOUSLY HAD BEEN CAUSED BY THE CONFUSION PRODUCED BY CONFLICTING REPORTS FROM WASHINGTON AND BY HIS INABILITY TO GET AUTHORITATIVE EXPLANATION OF OUR THINKING.

ATMOSPHERE AT THIS MEETING WAS DRAMATICALLY DIFFERENT THAN ON THE OCCASION OF KISSINGER'S PREVIOUS VISIT. STRAUSS SEEMED EXTREMELY PLEASED BY CONFIDENCE SHOWN TO HIM

HE STRONGLY AGREED WITH ATTEMPTS TO BUILD UP CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND WITH USING NUCLEAR WEAPONS ONLY AFTER CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE HAD FAILED.

DCWLING

GDW

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

from JFKL 2 (15/62) 4

Bundy

~~TOP SECRET~~

H
Action

Control: 11120
Rec'd: February 18, 1962
2:53 AM

SS
Info

FROM: Bonn

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1935, February 17, 2 p.m., (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

Kissinger and I had valuable talk with Chancellor February 16. Conversation lasted over two hours and became progressively more cordial as it proceeded. It was ended by us because we were already half an hour late for luncheon engagement with Mende.

Kissinger began conversation by telling Chancellor that he understood latter was concerned about vulnerability of the United States retaliatory force. He was only part-time consultant to US Government, under no obligation to defend American policies, and Chancellor should therefore understand that everything presented to him in endorsement of these policies reflected Kissinger's personal views.

Kissinger began by saying that American strategic planning was based on premise that even after a Soviet first strike US would have more weapons and delivery vehicles remaining than Soviet Union.

2 156

(Chancellor interrupted somewhat impatiently and said he had already heard this in Washington and it did not mean a great deal to him then or now.) Kissinger then went over some of figures contained in our military budget with respect to our strategic forces. He explained concept of a mixed force. He also explained nature and significance of hardening of bases and role of Polaris forces. He explained why combination of these factors would permit significant percentage of US retaliatory force to survive. He gave some indication of

kind of forces

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLK-92-131
By SE NSA Date 9/9/93

~~TOP SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

EYES ONLY

n 97A

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 1935, February 17, 2 p.m., from Bonn (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

kind of forces which would survive and damage these could inflict on the Soviet Union.

Chancellor grew progressively more interested and cordial as exposition progressed. He explained that he had never understood degree of thought that went into our planning. He stressed repeatedly how enormously reassuring this exposition was.

8 46
Kissinger then turned to question of whether United States planning involved making United States and Soviet Union a sanctuary and causing burden of conflict to fall on western Europe and satellites. [He explained in percentage terms degree of overlap between SACEUR and SAC targeting. SACEUR had targets in the USSR and SAC had targets within the satellite areas.] He suggested that it was extremely important in any future planning to leave no doubt about availability of total force for retaliation. United States recognized that a political requirement might conceivably exist for a NATO force but it did not think that there was a military requirement. United States concern about multiplication of national forces was not designed to keep Europe in a second class status. Rather it reflected conviction that national forces were bound to be ineffective compared to the kind of forces Kissinger has just described. Solution was not a fragmentation of NATO but welding together of Atlantic Community following course Chancellor has so wisely chosen in relations of European nations among each other.

h
Chancellor agreed enthusiastically. He said in defense of French national effort that United States had not adapted NATO as rapidly to new conditions as had been desirable. In particular, Norstad's proposal for MRBM forces had been before American Government for two years without being acted upon.

Kissinger stressed

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- 1935, February 17, 2 p.m., from Bonn (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

Kissinger stressed that objections to Norstad's proposal in Washington concerned not principle but particular technical conclusions Norstad drew from it. United States was in principle prepared to proceed with creation of a multilaterally controlled, multinational NATO force if it seemed to our NATO partners to be desirable. Particular nature of that force was still open for discussion, but he thought that Strauss at discussion yesterday saw matters in a very similar light to that of many of our people.

Chancellor again indicated that he was very pleased. (He then mentioned that impressed as he was he would like to raise a number of points. He said it was in his nature to be mistrustful and Kissinger should therefore forgive him. He said that he still had some concern about what would happen if the President were assassinated or if there were some other interruption in communication. Kissinger stressed that he could not conceive any failure of communication of this kind. We were, however, prepared to consider any proposal that would reduce this concern.

Chancellor then turned to quadripartite planning. He said that he had read the papers of Ambassadorial group and found them both boring and superficial. In particular, he was concerned about the process of clearing proposals through all of NATO. Kissinger asked him to be more specific. Chancellor referred to the idea of economic countermeasures specifically his proposal for a naval blockade as well as to military contingency planning. Chancellor stressed that he disagreed with intelligence estimate about Soviet conventional strength in eastern Europe. His own estimate was that ~~rather than~~ 26 divisions, Soviet Union had closer to 80 divisions in this area, including Russian border regions. He therefore thought that conventional action was bound to lead to disaster or to humiliation or to nuclear war. This is why he had proposed a blockade, an

important stage

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECRET

4

~~TOP SECRET~~

-4- 1935, February 17, 2 p.m., from Bonn (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

h important stage along way to ultimate confrontation. He added that American conventional forces were far less well equipped than Soviet conventional forces. This made a conventional action particularly foolhardy.]

DOWLING

LM

~~TOP SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

4

~~TOP SECRET~~

H

Action

Control: 11121

Rec'd: February 18, 1962
2:52 AM

SS

FROM: Bonn

Info

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1935, February 17, 2 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

Kissinger replied that after his conversation with German Defense Minister last May he had looked into the question of equipment of conventional forces (and our best military judgment was quite different from what Chancellor had just stated.) In any case our conventional forces were being substantially modernized. Kissinger also pointed out that Chancellor had neglected to mention one possible outcome of a conventional conflict in central Europe, and one that was most likely: That if the United States committed substantial forces to a conventional action, risk of general war would become too great for Soviet Union and it would agree to a negotiated settlement. This was particularly true in view of the relation of strategic forces that Kissinger had outlined earlier. Kissinger added that concept of a conventional build-up was designed to prevent Soviet Union from obtaining hostage such as Hamburg or Munich and holding it while nuclear retaliation was taking place.

86

Chancellor said that this concept put a different complexion on things. (He still wondered, however, whether it would not be better to begin with a sea blockade, a field which utilized a source of western strength, rather than with ground action. Kissinger replied he wanted to be quite frank and perhaps somewhat undiplomatic. It was possible to construe this proposal of Chancellor's as an attempt by Federal Republic to shift burden and risk of any countermeasures to other members of the Alliance. It might indicate that Federal Republic was unprepared to fight for Berlin if ground action

86

~~TOP SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

4

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 1935, February 17, 2 p.m., from Bonn (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

or a nuclear war might result.

The Chancellor denied this vehemently. He said that the Federal Republic was prepared to accept any burden and run any risk. However, one should not engage in a conventional action without being prepared for a nuclear war. And consequences of nuclear war were incalculable. Therefore every other measure should be tried before resorting to a nuclear war. If a blockade failed, however, the Federal Republic would support both conventional ground action and whatever results might flow from it.

Chancellor then turned somewhat philosophical. He spoke of historic accomplishment of United States in helping its defeated enemies to regain self-respect. As a good friend of United States he had to add, however, that he was deeply worried by the decline of prestige of United States. It was noticeable in Europe, in Latin America and in Asia. In many parts of world, America seemed to lack an ideology in the name of which to fight Communism. Kissinger said that Americans were a pragmatic people whose values were more likely to be expressed in deeds than in words. However, he had never seen a greater unanimity among Americans that future of freedom depended on cohesion of west. Speaking as a friend and admirer of the Chancellor, he wanted to say that an historic opportunity now existed to weld Europe and the United States together by concrete measures. Chancellor asked whether Kissinger's observations were held at highest level of State Department as well. Kissinger emphatically confirmed this.

Kissinger also stressed that choice before us was very similar to that faced by the Chancellor himself in 1949. We had chance of affirming a general theoretical goal or else we could take specific steps together with our European friends

to create a

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- 1935, February 17, 2 p.m., from Bonn (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

to create a framework for common action whenever this was possible. It was Kissinger's opinion that wiser course was one charted by Chancellor himself with respect to European integration, namely, to work on specific measures for common action rather than to use up energies in theoretical dispute. This was spirit which animated our proposals within NATO.

Chancellor indicated his enthusiastic support for this approach. On two occasions when Kissinger and I sought to leave he asked us to stay in order to give him another opportunity to express his gratitude for what had been said and his strong concurrence with it. He said he was relieved to see that strength existed to defend freedom and that main task was to see to it that there would be no human failings. Upon leaving, Kissinger said that he wanted the Chancellor to understand that when we spoke of our power and our dedication to Atlantic Community these were not simply idle phrases. Chancellor replied, "Thank God for this!" On this note the meeting broke up.

DOWLING

LM

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED by *[Signature]* Date *4/11/91*

E 53

- () DECLASSIFY
- () DECLASSIFY in PART
- () DELETE
- () Non-responsive info.

FOI, EO or PA exemptions _____
 TS authority _____
 () CLASSIFY as _____
 () DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C, OADR

Only in Navy
US-USSR
app.atory
2/19/62

CONFIDENTIAL - EYES ONLY

TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM: EUR - Foy D. Kohler

SUBJECT: Transmitting Draft of Proposed Memorandum to be Handed Gromyko

There is attached a draft of a proposed memorandum to be handed Gromyko by Ambassador Thompson during their next meeting. This might be considered along with the draft instructions which you already have of the White House meeting tomorrow (advance copies have been sent to Mac Bundy). A draft of a supplementary and unilateral instruction is also being prepared and should be ready late today.

Attachment:

Proposed Memorandum

CATEGORY "A"
 Completely de-sensitized
 Transferred to O/FADRC
 by *S/S-I* date *9-5-73*

6/11/61
2-19 62

[Handwritten mark]

CONFIDENTIAL - EYES ONLY

S/O:EUR:GPH:MW:Millenbrand:LL
 2/19/62

RR

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

1. Throughout the exchanges that have taken place between the Soviet and US Governments on the questions of Germany and Berlin, the US Government has for its part earnestly sought to find a basis for agreement which would meet the legitimate needs of all parties concerned. In this endeavor, the US Government has had as its aim to promote peace and tranquility in Central Europe without sacrificing such basic principles as the right of self-determination.

2. The US Government remains convinced that the best solution to the German and Berlin questions would be the signing of a peace treaty with a Germany reunified on the basis of self-determination and the restoration of Berlin as the capital of a free, peaceful, and democratic Germany. Because it believes that a lasting European settlement cannot be achieved on the basis of a divided Germany, the US Government could never join in any move which would legitimate the division of Germany.

3. Nevertheless the Western Powers have made clear in actions and in words that they are living with the present situation and do not contemplate any use of force to change it.

4. It is, and has been, the sincere desire of the US Government to ascertain whether or not there exists a basis for negotiations on Berlin. It is equally true that the US Government is convinced that the appropriate place to begin, since this is obviously the critical point at issue, is

with

CONFIDENTIAL

REVIEWED BY: [Signature] Date: 4/1/91
 FOI, EO or PA exemptions: _____ TS authority: _____
 CLASSIFY as: _____
 DOWNGRADE TO: () S or () C, OADR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
 () RELEASE () DECLASSIFY
 () EXEMPT () DECLASSIFY IN PART
 () DENY () DELETE
 () Non-responsive info.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

with the assurance of free access to and from Berlin. For this reason we proposed the International Access Authority, which would operate without prejudice to the divergent positions of the various parties in interest.

5. The US Government would like to think that it is possible to solve more than simply the problem of access to West Berlin, and it was for this reason that it proposed an all-Berlin solution. It is not convinced by the Soviet argument that such a solution "is not in the nature of things". However, should it not be possible for whatever reason to solve larger questions at this time, the US Government considers that the question of access, which is the only area of acute danger, is the sensible place to begin in the conviction that if some tentative understandings can be reached here, it would then be possible to move to agreement on other questions.

6. It is obvious that all questions in issue cannot be discussed and decided simultaneously, but this is no reason why discussions on one or two aspects should not take place to the point where the outline of a possible agreement begins to take shape. It might then prove easier to discuss the remaining questions. Far from attempting to exert pressure or impose preconditions, the US Government was in this way--by choosing a logical starting point--attempting to avoid the vicious circle or marking of time which the Soviet Government indicates it seeks to avoid. Access was not intended to be the sole subject of all negotiations but, because of its over-riding importance to the maintenance of peace, to serve as a starting point for what agreement appeared possible. This

importance

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

importance has been underscored by Soviet actions in the last two weeks in violation of the long-standing agreements and procedures governing use of the air corridors.

7. The goal of the US in these discussions is the equitable and peaceful settlement of controversies existing between it and the Soviet Union, and it had hoped that the Soviet goal is the same .

8. While recognizing the desirability of tidying up "the remnants the Second World War", the US is far more interested in the immediate problem of preserving the peace and preventing a Third World War.

9. The Soviet Government is quite right in saying that the Western Powers cannot prevent the Soviet Union from concluding a so-called "German Peace Treaty", and this they have never sought to do. What the Soviet Government cannot do is to affect thereby the legal rights of the Western Powers. The US Government wishes to make it quite clear that, by virtue of the unconditional surrender of the Third Reich, the US, UK, and France are entitled to be present in Berlin and to have wholly unimpeded access thereto. The Three Powers do not exercise these rights on the ~~différance~~ of the Soviet Union or the East German authorities. No treaty between the Soviet Union and East Germany can terminate the occupation rights of the Western Powers.

10. It should be added that the presence of the Western Powers has the whole-hearted support of the Germans most directly affected, the people of

CONFIDENTIAL

people of West Berlin. This is a fact which could be demonstrated at any time by means of a properly supervised plebiscite. Contrary to the assertion of the Soviet Foreign Minister, it would be entirely possible to hold a plebiscite while Western troops remain in Berlin. The purpose of adequate international supervision is precisely to ensure that no possibility of pressure on the free expression of popular will can exist.

11. If, as the Soviet Foreign Minister has stated, Berlin harbors a "threat of explosion" or has become "a dangerous knot of international tension", it is because the Soviet Government and its allies have chosen to make it so. It should not be forgotten that for the decade between the Soviet-imposed blockade of Berlin and the Soviet ultimatum of November 1958, Berlin existed in a situation of relative peace and quiet and was not a threat to world peace.

12. The US Government is persuaded that the Soviet proposal for Berlin would produce a city that was neither peaceful nor independent.

13. The Soviet Government has stated that it has examined the Berlin question in light of the city's situation within a sovereign state--a situation, it should be pointed out, created by the Soviet Union--and concluded once again that there is no better basis for agreement than the transformation of West Berlin into a free, demilitarized city. In this Soviet proposal an effort has been made to weave beguiling words such as "free", "demilitarized", and "normalizing" into a document which would

seem

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

..... 5

seem designed, in fact, to subvert the freedom of West Berlin. This proposal has been examined and found unacceptable many times since it was first put forward and rejected three years ago. It is still unacceptable in the form of the Statute and Protocol which the Soviet Foreign Minister handed to the American Ambassador in Moscow on January 13, 1962.

14. Among the many objections to the Soviet proposals are the following:

15. Above all else is the fact that these proposals are overwhelmingly opposed by the vast majority of the West Berliners, a fact which can be substantiated by a properly supervised plebiscite at any time. The West Berliners would be deprived of the essential security they now enjoy through the creation of uncertainty as to how long the protecting forces would remain.

16. The Soviet Government and the East German regime would be interfering constantly in the internal affairs of West Berlin. The Soviet proposals would permit the proscription of legitimate activities of individuals or organizations in West Berlin by labeling them "fascist and militaristic", or engaged in "revanchism and war propaganda". It is well-known how these terms can be applied freely to any activity - however praiseworthy - of which the Soviet or East German regime disapprove.

17. The Soviet proposals would require West Berlin to enter into "appropriate agreements" with East German authorities in order to obtain access to the Federal Republic "based on generally accepted international norms regulating transit through foreign territory". The immediate effect would be to make traffic between West Berlin and the rest of the world

subject

.....
CONFIDENTIAL
.....

CONFIDENTIAL

- 6 -

subject to the whims of the East German regime. One has to take only a brief glance at the long list of wholly legitimate visitors whose presence in West Berlin the West German authorities have violently protested, including President and Mrs. Laebke, Chancellor Adenauer, Bishop Dibelius, the Reverend Billy Graham and the NATO parliamentarians, to see how much free travel would be permitted under such an arrangement.

18. The proposals would prohibit "activity or propaganda hostile toward any state". It has long been clear that the mere existence of a free press and radio in West Berlin are considered as "hostile" to its interests by the East German regime.

19. With regard to the proposed United Nations membership for West Berlin, this is merely a further confirmation of the Soviet thrust towards the permanent division of Germany.

20. The Soviet Government proposes that the "freedom" which it seeks to confer upon West Berlin be guaranteed by various governments, including the Soviet Union. There would be a "joint guarantee" and in the event of a "threat" the parties would consult regarding measures to eliminate such threat. They would adopt "concerted measures" to insure the neutrality of the Free City.

21. Proposals for establishing joint controls with regard to Berlin bring vividly to mind the protracted and frustrating efforts of the American British and French authorities to cooperate with Soviet authorities both in
Germany

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Germany, and in Berlin itself pursuant to quadripartite agreements. It became clear at that time that such an arrangement could not be made to operate effectively in the face of differing national objectives. Thus the US, UK, and France originally shared occupation rights in all of Greater Berlin with the Soviet Government. Unilateral and illegal Soviet actions have now all but excluded the other Three Powers from East Berlin.

22. The reasoning underlying the Soviet proposal that West Berlin be "demilitarized" is obscure. West Berlin is a relatively small area, populated by some two million people. It is completely surrounded by a hostile East German regime, which has frequently boasted of its military might and of its designs on West Berlin. The present security of West Berlin is guaranteed by the presence of an Allied garrison of about 12,000 which are surrounded by more than 26 Communist divisions.

23. Under these circumstances, the US Government cannot assume that the Soviet Government seriously expected it to agree to leaving the city defenseless. The Western Powers are firmly convinced--as are the West Berliners--that, stripped down to essentials, the single element which contributes most to the continued freedom of West Berlin is the presence there of the troops of the Three Powers. Far from contributing to tensions, these troops are an assurance against provocative actions against West Berlin and thus contribute greatly to the preservation of world peace.

24. The withdrawal of these troops or the entry into West Berlin of

Soviet troops

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

8

Soviet troops would accordingly be unacceptable to the Western Powers and to the West Berliners. It is difficult to see how the Soviet Government can maintain that the US, UK, and France have no role to play in East Berlin and at the same time propose a large role for their troops in West Berlin. As the American Ambassador has previously stated, the Western Powers can scarcely be expected to give up their position while the Soviets maintain and improve the essentials of their position.

25. The US Government is mindful of the fact that the Soviet Union had already, in 1944 and 1945, entered into agreements with the US, UK, and France regarding Berlin and Germany. The Soviet Government now takes the position that not only is it no longer bound by those agreements relating to Berlin, but that it also has the legal right to determine the present rights of the other states which participated in the war against Germany with respect to Berlin. Faced with such assertions, the United States could envisage entering into new agreements only if they were so framed as to ensure their effectiveness and permanence.

26. The Soviet Government contends that it is being requested "to place its signature literally or figuratively under an agreement which would perpetuate the presence of troops of the Western Powers in West Berlin". The US Government has not requested that this be done because, among other reasons, it is unnecessary. As pointed out previously, Western rights in Berlin do not derive from the Soviet Government, and that Government is not being asked to sign any document containing terms which seem to have acquired unpleasant associations for it. What the Soviet Government is being

asked

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

asked to do is to accept the fact of the Western presence in Berlin and to draw the appropriate conclusions from that fact.

27. Finally, these discussions can achieve nothing if they should begin to revolve about threats to resort to force. The Western Powers have no desire whatsoever to attempt to solve any questions by force, though they are prepared to take whatever steps may be necessary to fulfill their responsibilities. They remain convinced, however, that reasonable men and nations can resolve the issues which divide them without the use of force if good will is shown on both sides. It is in this spirit that the Western Powers will continue to attempt to resolve their difficulties with the Soviet Government, with confidence that there are no inevitable obstacles to arriving at a peaceful and honorable solution given Soviet cooperation.

In the memorandum handed to the Soviet Foreign Minister on February 1, 1962, the US Government suggested a number of possibilities which might be explored. In his response, the Soviet Foreign Minister did not address himself to a number of important points made in this memorandum. It is hoped that the Soviet Foreign Minister will carefully re-examine this document with a view to ascertaining whether, as it suggests, a useful discussion cannot be conducted by concentrating on those areas of activity where at least some working arrangement might be possible.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 10 -

Meanwhile, the US Government again draws the attention of the Soviet Government to the necessity that both sides refrain from unilateral action that aggravates tensions and involves grave risks. The Soviet Government must recognize that such aggressive harassment of Allied planes by Soviet military aircraft as has been taking place in the Berlin air corridors since February 7 creates the danger of a serious incident or incidents which could rapidly develop into major proportions. The US Government cannot too much stress the seriousness of this situation and the responsibility which the Soviet Union has been assuming in permitting these incidents to occur.

CONFIDENTIAL

Record Number 58542

<u>SET</u>	Berlin Crisis
<u>BC1</u>	Yes
<u>DOCUMENT TYPE</u>	Memorandum
<u>DATE</u>	02/19/1962
<u>CIRCD</u>	
<u>TIME</u>	
<u>CABNO</u>	
<u>DOCNO</u>	
<u>ORIGIN</u>	United States. Department of State. Bureau of European Affairs
<u>SIGNATOR</u>	Kohler, Foy D.
<u>DESTO</u>	
<u>DESTP</u>	Rusk, Dean
<u>DRAFT</u>	Hillenbrand, Martin J.
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	Confidential
<u>TITLE</u>	Transmitting Draft of Proposed Memorandum to be Handed Gromyko
<u>CTIT</u>	
<u>NAMES</u>	Gromyko, Andrei A.
<u>NAMES</u>	Thompson, Llewellyn E.
<u>NAMES</u>	Adenauer, Konrad
<u>NAMES</u>	Dibelius [Bishop]
<u>NAMES</u>	Graham, Billy
<u>TERMS</u>	
<u>ORGAN</u>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<u>PGS</u>	10

SANITIZED

February 21, 1962

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

From: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Summary of Conversations in Germany about Negotiations

The following represents a summary of my conversations on the subject of negotiations with various German officials and political leaders. I am presenting it chronologically.

On Thursday morning, February 15th, I saw Strawson. At the end of our conversation, he said he was now very reassured about the problem of military integration. He was, however, very worried about political unity. In particular, he was concerned about the procedure which had been adopted with respect to negotiations with the Soviet Union.

While he could understand our desire to negotiate, the process of bilateral negotiations was very dangerous. He was very concerned that the Soviet Union would now encourage Great Britain to make a try, and afterwards demand that the Federal Republic negotiate bilaterally. In this manner, the Soviet Union could achieve the objective outlined in their note of December 27th, and force the Federal Republic into bilateral negotiations. They could then make proposals which could only deeply embarrass the Federal Republic or else make it appear the villain if the negotiations broke down. We should keep in mind these observations for the future.

There was no time for me to explore this subject further.

On Thursday evening, February 15th, I met at dinner

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLK-89-67

By SKF NARA, Date 3/90

CONFIDENTIAL

[Redacted text block]

On Friday, February 16th, I had lunch with the

made the following points: It was essential for the Federal Republic to negotiate directly with the Soviet Union. The goal of these negotiations should be to obtain an amelioration of the Ulbrich regime. Of course, the Federal Republic was an ally of the United States and would undertake no actions which we opposed. However, it should be

[Redacted text block]

CONFIDENTIAL

able to have a certain freedom of action vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

I asked him what concessions they were willing to offer in return for an amelioration of the Ulbricht regime. replied vaguely and suggested that no outsider really had the right to ask such a question. I persisted and asked whether they might recommend the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line. This, they maintained, was absolutely unacceptable. It was a concession totally out of proportion to a Berlin settlement, not even acceptable in return for the amelioration of the East German regime. They replied in either a confused or deliberately ambiguous way that the concessions should be sought in Germany's military status.

In the afternoon of the 16th, I met with *Director Adenauer* I have reported part of this conversation elsewhere. I asked him how he envisaged the future negotiations if there were an impasse in the Gromyko-Thompson talks. He replied that a German memorandum was going to the Soviet Union in reply to their note of December 27th, and that the FDP had approved it.

I asked him what he thought of the question of federal offices in Berlin. He replied that he was personally opposed to removing any, but that in any case, this was an unimportant nuance compared with the issues still dividing the negotiators.

He then said that very often the Germans were being asked to assume responsibility for negotiations and to demonstrate greater initiative. He said, "Let us be frank. Whenever we are asked to show greater initiative, what you really mean is that we should make concessions. You don't want us to show initiative on the issue of German unification. You want us to show it on the issue of rights to concede to the Soviets. I always tell

CONFIDENTIAL

my British friends who say the same thing to me that am a very stupid person, but you British are very clever. Why don't you give me a small hint as to the direction in which my thinking ought to go, and perhaps I will then be able to show a little more initiative."

He then launched into a discussion of DeGaulle's views on negotiations, which I have reported separately.

In the evening of February 16th, I met for dinner with a group of German industrialists, roughly the constituency of the right wing of the CDU and the FDP. Most of the conversation concerned strategic matters.

I asked whether the Oder-Neisse line could be recognized in return for improving the status of Berlin. The unanimous opinion, which was quite violently expressed, was that this could not be done. Some of those present suggested that the United States was pressing for a conventional build-up so that it could accept a conventional defeat as a means of getting out of Berlin gracefully.

They also stressed that no reduction of the political ties between Berlin and the Federal Republic was acceptable to them.

On Saturday, February 17th, I had lunch with
 stressed that any negotiation had to retain a demand for German unification. He said that the younger generation in Germany would not accept indefinitely the argument that they had to pay for the crimes committed by their fathers. He also vehemently rejected my suggestion that the Oder-Neisse line be accepted in return for access guarantees. He said that this was paying rent for Berlin and would merely lead to new demands. Finally, he opposed any effort to increase the status of the East German regime.

CONFIDENTIAL

The afternoon of the 17th, I flew to Paris. One of the passengers on the plane was

[Redacted content consisting of multiple lines of dotted lines]

Comment: These conversations suggest the following dilemma: The parties in Germany who are essentially pro-Western alliance are opposed to negotiation while those who favor negotiations are essentially nationalist. As long as this attitude persists, the French have a certain leverage.

Progress in our NATO planning depends also to a considerable extent on the ability to keep the present psychological state in Germany. Any deterioration in this respect might induce the Germans to pick up their French option. And such a deterioration could occur if we do not make sure to bring the Germans along and make them assume responsibility in the negotiations over Berlin.

CONFIDENTIAL

Record Number 53153

<u>DOCUMENT TYPE</u>	Memorandum of Conversation
<u>DATE</u>	02/21/1962
<u>CIRCD</u>	
<u>TIME</u>	
<u>CABNO</u>	
<u>ORIGIN</u>	United States. Office of the White House
<u>SIGNATOR</u>	Kissinger, Henry A.
<u>DESTO</u>	
<u>DESTP</u>	
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	Confidential
<u>TITLE</u>	Summary of Conversations in Germany about Negotiations
<u>CTIT</u>	
<u>NAMES</u>	Ulbricht, Walter
<u>TERMS</u>	
<u>ORGAN</u>	Christian Democratic Union (Federal Republic of Germany)
<u>ORGAN</u>	Free Democratic Party (Federal Republic of Germany)
<u>ORGAN</u>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<u>PGS</u>	5

COMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

2/22/62
James Bundy 4

46-48

Action

EUR

Info

SS

SR

G

SP

E

P

IOP

INR

RMR

FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 3973, FEBRUARY 21, 8 PM

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

DURING TOUR D'HORIZON WITH DE GAULLE YESTERDAY, I STATED I WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN POLITICAL UNION OF SIX AND MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THAT UNION, SPECIFICALLY THE RELATIONSHIP IT WOULD HAVE TO NATO.

DE GAULLE SAID THAT PURPOSE OF POLITICAL UNION OF SIX WAS TO FORM A CONCERT OF NATIONS, TO ESTABLISH A COMMON VIEW ON POLITICAL MATTERS OF CONCERN TO ALL. ONE PURPOSE ALSO IS TO ENCOURAGE CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC EXCHANGES. HE SAID THAT THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT IT HAS DEFENSE IMPLICATIONS BUT THESE HAVE NOT BEEN SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED SO FAR. IN TIME THEY WILL BE BUT FRENCH THINKING HAS NOT GONE VERY FAR ON MILITARY MATTERS. THEY HAVE NOT EXAMINED RELATIONSHIP OF SIX TO NATO, BUT IN ANY CASE, HE SAID, THE POLITICAL UNION WOULD STRENGTHEN THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY. HE OBVIOUSLY DID NOT WANT TO GO ANY FURTHER IN DISCUSSING THE PROBLEM WITH ME.

THE FOREGOING IS IN ESSENCE WHAT HE SAID ON SIX ALTHOUGH WE TALKED ABOUT IT FOR QUITE SOME TIME. I AM SATISFIED THAT DE GUALLE'S THINKING AS EXPRESSED IN HIS MEMORANDUM OF 25 SEPT 1958 AND, IN PART, REAFFIRMED IN HIS LAST LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT, REMAINS UNCHANGED. HE CONSIDERS NATO INADEQUATE TO DEAL WITH PREVAILING CONDITIONS AFFECTING THE VITAL INTERESTS OF US, UK AND FRANCE AND, WHEN ALL IS SAID AND DONE, HE CONSIDERS NATO TO BE A US HEADQUARTERS IN EUROPE. NOW, WHETHER OR NOT WE RESPOND TO HIS DESIRES FOR A TRIUMVIRATE ORGANIZATION HE WILL PROCEED TO ORGANIZE EUROPE ON HIS OWN, INSOFAR AS HE CAN DO SO.

IN SEPTEMBER 1958

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, SEC. 3(E), 5(D), 5(E) AND 11

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

Dept. of State (WIK-77-687)
ET MFM NAOS, DATE *4/14/78*

WSP/71 / Fr. Gen 2/17/62 - 3/10/62

Control: 13770

Rec'd: February 22, 1962
7:42 a.m.

FILE

*"Sent to P. B. via
Courier - 2/24/62"*




-2- 3973, FEBRUARY 21, 8 PM FROM PARIS

IN SEPT 1958 MEMORANDUM HE ENVISIONED THE ORGANIZATION OF THEATERS OF OPERATION WITH, I BELIEVE, RESPONSIBILITY FOR THESE AREAS BEING GIVEN TO SPECIFIC GREAT POWERS. EUROPE, HE BELIEVES, SHOULD BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF FRANCE. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THEREFORE THAT HE HAS TAKEN INITIATIVE, REPEATEDLY, IN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS. I AM CONVINCED THAT HIS THINKING ON SUBJECT OF SIX HAS GONE FAR BEYOND WHAT HE WAS WILLING TO DISCUSS WITH ME YESTERDAY AND, FURTHER, THAT HE DOES FORESEE CLEARLY ORGANIZATION OF SIX AS ULTIMATELY A STRONG MILITARY BLOC.

I BASE THIS UPON DISCUSSIONS WITH HIS MINISTERS AND WITH OTHERS HERE IN FRANCE. LOOKING BACK ON HIS HANDLING OF ALGERIAN SITUATION, FOR EXAMPLE, ONE IS IMPRESSED BY HIS CLEVERNESS IN MOVING INEXORABLY TOWARDS HIS OBJECTIVE, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME GIVING OUT ONLY AS MUCH INFORMATION AS WAS NECESSARY, FROM TIME TO TIME, TO MEET A PARTICULAR TACTICAL NEED OR TO SATISFY INSISTENT DEMANDS THAT WOULD NOT BE DENIED. IT SEEMS OBVIOUS TO ME THAT HE WILL NOW DEVOTE MOST OF HIS TIME TO STRENGTHENING FRANCE IN A UNIT OF SIX AND STRENGTHENING THE SIX POLITICALLY, ECONOMICALLY AND MILITARILY. IF THESE VIEWS ARE VALID THEN IT WILL AVAIL US LITTLE TO CONTINUE TO TRY TO PERSUADE HIM AND PREVAIL UPON HIM TO BE MORE COOPERATIVE IN NATO AFFAIRS. REALISTICALLY, WE SHOULD REALIZE THAT AS LONG AS HE IS PRESIDENT OF FRANCE WE ARE GOING TO HAVE TO BE PREPARED TO DEAL WITH SIX IN WHICH FRANCE IS PLAYING A POWERFUL ROLE ON ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL MATTERS AND ANTICIPATE THE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WHICH ULTIMATELY MAY COME INTO BEING. IT IS VERY LIKELY THAT OTHER MEMBERS OF SIX WILL OPPOSE THE FRENCH INITIATIVE AND THEY WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT FULLY THEIR COMMITMENTS TO NATO. I DOUBT THAT THIS WILL DETER DE GAULLE AND FURTHER, I DOUBT ALSO THAT HE WILL ATTACK NATO OR TAKE ANY OVERT ACTIONS AGAINST NATO. IN FACT, FOR TACTICAL REASONS, HE WILL CONTINUE TO GIVE LIP SUPPORT TO NATO WHILE HE MOVES TOWARD HIS OWN OBJECTIVE, A STRONG EUROPEAN POWER BLOC IN WHICH FRANCE WILL PLAY LEADING ROLE. HE BELIEVES THAT THIS WILL BEST SERVE THE INTERESTS OF FRANCE IN OPPOSING SOVIET POWER AND, FINALLY, HE RATIONALIZES

THIS VIEW



Handwritten mark or signature at the bottom left corner.



-3- 3973, FEBRUARY 21, 8 PM FROM PARIS

THIS VIEW TO POINT WHERE HE BELIEVES IT BEST SERVES THE INTERESTS OF NATO AND ATLANTIC COMMUNITY. TO HIS MIND, THERE IS NO DICHOTOMY IN THIS THINKING. WITH AN AWARENESS OF THIS, AS ONE COURSE OF ACTION DE GAULLE IS LIKELY TO FOLLOW, WE SHOULD CONDUCT OUR RELATIONS WITHIN NATO AND WITH NATO POWERS, OTHER THAN FRANCE, IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO MAINTAIN CLOSE TIES WITH NATO AND ITS INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS. IN THIS RESPECT, GERMANY IS IN A PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE POSITION FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF HER RELATIONS WITH THE USSR AND HER NUCLEAR ASPIRATIONS.

OUR RELATIONS WITH GERMANY SHOULD BE SUCH IN MY VIEW THAT WHENEVER SHE IS CONFRONTED WITH A CHOICE BETWEEN ALIGNING HERSELF WITH FRANCE OR THE US, SHE SHOULD CHOOSE THE US. THIS WOULD OBVIOUSLY INFLUENCE OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIETS ON BROAD PROBLEMS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY AS WELL AS ROLE GERMANY WOULD PLAY IN A MULTI-NATIONAL NATO NUCLEAR FORCE. (THE FOREGOING GOES WELL BEYOND THE CURRENT DAY TO DAY SITUATIONS WITH WHICH WE NORMALLY DEAL HERE IN PARIS, BUT I BELIEVE IT DESERVES OUR CAREFUL THOUGHT. TO CONTINUE TO DEAL WITH DE GAULLE IN ANTICIPATION THAT HE WILL BE RESPONSIVE TO OUR CURRENT DIPLOMACY, SEEMS TO BE UNREALISTIC TO ME. OUR OWN INTERESTS WILL BEST BE SERVED, AS WELL AS THOSE OF OUR ALLIES, WHEN WE UNDERSTAND WHERE DE GAULLE IS GOING AND THEN, WHILE NOT IGNORING HIM NEVERTHELESS TAKE SUCH ACTIONS AS WE CONSIDER ADEQUATE TO SERVE OUR INTERESTS AND THOSE OF OUR ALLIES WITHOUT NECESSARILY BEING TOO CONCERNED WITH OR RESPONSIVE TO INTRANSIGENCE OF DE GAULLE OR TO ROADBLOCKS HE MAY PLACE IN OUR WAY. WHEN ALGERIA IS SETTLED, HE IS GOING TO BE FAR MORE DIFFICULT TO DEAL WITH AND THIS, IF WE UNDERSTAND IT, SHOULD NOT IN ANY WAY DISTURB US. OUR OWN OBJECTIVES CAN BE SOUGHT AND OUR OWN INTERESTS SERVED EFFECTIVELY DESPITE DIFFICULTIES HE MAY INTERPOSE.)

GAVIN

JVC/21



FILE
MRS M
MLFVS

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 22, 1962

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

Mac:

Yesterday there was another State-Defense meeting on NATO MRBM's. The participants were Nitze, Rowen, Col. Adams, and Capt. Shane, all of ISA from Defense; and Alexis Johnson, Bowie, Owen, Fessenden, Kranich, Weiss, and Dana Orwick from State. Kohler appeared only to say he could not appear, and Johnson stayed for only part of the discussion. The meeting lasted for about an hour and a half. The differences between State and Defense have narrowed very considerably and the present state of the discussion is as follows:

1. Defense accepts in principle the political utility of the NATO MRBM force even though it considers its military utility small.
2. Defense is willing at the staff level to recommend that the decision be made now that the force should be seaborne (with some reservations on ICEWORM, but agreement that there should be no land-based force in Europe). The cheapest and quickest means of achieving a seaborne force would be to mount Polaris missiles in surface ships. The next best means would be to mount Polaris missiles in non-nuclear submarines. Nuclear submarines are much more expensive; and their long-range cruising capability is not needed for the purpose of a European MRBM force.
3. Defense agrees that mixed manning is feasible, and is prepared to accept whatever degree State thinks desirable and achievable.
4. Defense and State agree that it might be better to have a new NATO command distinct from SACEUR and SACLANT for the multilateral force. In addition, it would be desirable to commit existing national forces to this command. In particular, Defense agrees that U. S. should be prepared to commit some Polaris

~~SECRET~~

~~MLF~~ 1216 / ~~MLF~~ ben

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NW-94-36
By: [Signature] NARA Date: 12/97

SECRET

submarines starting in 1964 and suggests that the British V-bomber force be likewise committed to this command. The committed forces would be capable of withdrawal for national use as is presently the case with forces committed to NATO.

5. Defense and State are not quite at one on the issue of how much European participation is necessary in order to achieve the political goals of the enterprise. They agree that we want something more than an American-German force. Defense initially wanted to make the initial participation of one of UK or France -- in effect UK -- a condition for our acceptance of the NATO invitation. State argued that if there was participation in Germany, Italy, and Benelux, the UK would certainly follow and therefore it was undesirable to impose such a condition. It was not perfectly clear whether Defense was convinced on this point.
6. The major point of disagreement between Defense and State was the question of the U. S. veto. Initially, the Defense position at the meeting was that a U. S. veto was necessary. Simultaneously, they advanced the slightly inconsistent position that, in any event, the U. S. should make up its own mind on the veto question within the government before the discussions in NATO went further. State and I joined in rejecting this proposition. We argued that a statement by us at this time opposing a veto free force might kill the whole discussion, and thus prevent any progress toward a more rational disposition of nuclear forces in Europe. We suggested that the U. S. refrain from making up its mind now and that in our discussion in NAC, and privately with the individual members as well, we make two points:
 - (a) There are serious obstacles in U. S. legislation and past policy to the creation of a force the use of which is not subject to veto;
 - (b) If, however, the European members of NATO express a clear desire for such a force, we would be prepared to give the question the most serious consideration.

At the meeting Defense appeared to accept this formulation of our tactics and agreed that it avoided the need for an internal governmental decision now.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Bob Bowie and I talked with Henry Rowen after the meeting. We got the impression that, whether or not Paul had indeed changed his view on the veto, the Secretary of Defense himself is strongly convinced that we should not relinquish the veto and that we should so conclude within the government now. Further, the Secretary sees a connection between the creation of a veto free force of any non-trivial magnitude and a partial disengagement of U. S. from Europe by reduction in number of U. S. troops. This connection was not apparent to the rest of us.

Foy Kohler and Bob Bowie have agreed that the next step should be a small meeting between the two Secretaries and a few others. On the State side these would be Kohler and Bowie. On the Defense side, probably Nitze and Rowen. The meeting will be scheduled for Wednesday or Thursday of next week since these are the days Bowie will be in town. You or I or both should be present. A State proposed draft of an agreed position is in preparation and I will get one as soon as it exists.

CK

~~SECRET~~

NLK-77-693 32.131
3/5/62
March 5, 1962
WE (7) - P.L.
P-3

BALANCE SHEET

OF U.S. AND FRENCH REQUESTS IN MILITARY FIELD

I - FRENCH REQUESTS

1. The following French requests are of a bilateral U.S.-France nature and do not directly raise NATO aspects.

2. Recognition by U.S. of "Substantial" French Nuclear Progress.

French believe they are entitled to same treatment by U.S. as is accorded U.K. because of French progress in nuclear field, i.e., success in exploding at least five nuclear devices, advanced research and scientific level, availability of fissionable materials. U.S. President should therefore apply Sec 91(c)(4) of Atomic Energy Act.

U.S. Position. France does not qualify under political tests required by Act, particularly since France wants an independent, national force not committed to NATO.

B-3

Embassy Comment. Embassy believes French are taking necessary steps following security inspections by Washington agencies. "Political tests" required by Atomic Energy Act do not seem precise.

3. Enriched Uranium for Weapons.

France has on number of occasions asked U.S. to sell France U-235 of weapons grade. France started its own isotope separation plant (through gaseous diffusion process) in 1958 and expects to finish it by about 1965 at cost of about \$700 million. Plant will produce at capacity about three tons of U-235 a year.

U.S. Position.

~~SECRET~~

E O. 11652

~~SECRET~~

Dept. of State (NLK-77-693)
BY [Signature] RARS DATE 3/16/78

NSA/71a/Pr Gen 4/1 - 4/12/61

U.S. Position. U.S. cannot by law transfer special nuclear material for weapons purposes where there is no presidential determination of "substantial progress". U.S. policy opposes spread of nuclear weapons.

Embassy Comment. Sale of U.S. U-235 to France would enable France to divert important resources to other defense objectives. Embassy believes, however, that France has gone so far on its plant construction that it would not abandon this project now, particularly since France doubts the likelihood of U.S. assistance. Embassy telegram 2542 of November 14, 1961 gives a full discussion.

4. Nuclear Technology - Compressors for Gaseous Diffusion Plant.

French have asked to be allowed to buy compressors in current discussions with Department of Defense. Westinghouse representative indicates these would cost about \$30 million.

U.S. Position. U.S. has not replied but it seems likely that French proposal will be turned down because these compressors involve classified technological information and such technology would assist French in developing an independent nuclear deterrent.

Embassy Comment. Compressors are a vital component in the isotope separation process. Other equipment and information desired by France for its nuclear program are not directly related to development of a weapons capability, and in these latter areas U.S. policy should be carefully re-examined because, 1) such equipment and information do not involve application of the Atomic Energy Act, 2) important French financial resources useful for other defense purposes are being consumed in the acquisition of such know-how, 3) sales of such items would have valuable balance of payments benefits to the U.S., and 4) France will develop the required technology whether we help or not. See Embassy telegram 3906 of February 16, 1962.

5. Missile Technology.

French have sought to buy technological information and equipment for ballistic missile development, such as guidance information, communications, and computers.

U.S. Position

U.S. Position. French requests have been rejected on ground U.S. will provide no assistance significantly helping France to attain a ballistic missile capability. U.S. does provide assistance such as guidance systems aiding France's development of manned aircraft.

Embassy Comment. This is another important area where U.S. policy should be re-examined since U.S. is not under legal compulsion to withhold assistance. Such assistance would not directly help France attain a nuclear weapons capability, and the French feel we are going well beyond our legal and security requirements to discriminate against them. Here also sales of U.S. technology could have important balance of payments value for the U.S. In any case the French are determined to develop ballistic missile technology whether we help or not. U.S. assistance to the French (and European) peaceful space research program should also be considered.

6. Reactor and Enriched Uranium Fuel for Nuclear Submarine.

French want reactor and fuel for nuclear submarine they are building.

U.S. Position. AEC Chairman Strauss in 1957 and Secretary Dulles in 1958 told French (Dulles told de Gaulle) we would provide France assistance for their nuclear submarine. Negotiations were suspended in 1959 after the French withdrew their Mediterranean fleet from NATO. Negotiations have not been resumed both because of Congressional opposition and because of uncertainty whether France would commit finished submarines to NATO. We have provided such assistance to the U.K. We have also provided fuel to France for a land-based prototype submarine reactor.

Embassy Comment. If the U.S. offer were to be renewed, we should propose that the submarine should be assigned NATO. It is uncertain whether the French would accept such a conditional offer. Embassy telegram 4956 of May 12, 1961 gives a full discussion.

II - U.S. REQUESTS

7/6/62

(E59)

H Action
SS Info

CONFIDENTIAL

Control: 3850

Rec'd: MARCH 6, 1962
12:27 PM

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2350, MARCH 6, 4 P.M.

EYES ONLY
(SECTION ONE OF TWO)

Caption removed;
transferred to O/FAORC
Transferred to O/FAORS
with additional access
controlled by S/S
Caption and custody
retained by S/S

Reviewed by: Elijah Kelly Jr.

Date: 4-4-91

PRIORITY

EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY

AT MEETING WITH GROMYKO THIS MORNING I READ OPENING STATEMENT COMPOSED FROM POINTS 5, 7, 8, 9, AND 10 OF MY INSTRUCTIONS, DEPTTEL 1998. HOWEVER, IN OPENING PARAGRAPH, IN ADDITION REFERRING TO SEPTEMBER 20 JOINT STATEMENT REGARDING NEED REFRAIN FROM ACTIONS AGGRAVATING INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS, I ADDED WE ARE SURPRISED SOVIETS HAVE ATTEMPTED TO DISRUPT EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS IN AIR CORRIDORS JUST AT TIME WHEN WE ARE DISCUSSING POSSIBILITY OF NEW ARRANGEMENTS. "THIS IS CERTAINLY NOT CALCULATED TO INSPIRE CONFIDENCE IN ANY SUCH NEW ARRANGEMENTS." I SOFTENED SOMEWHAT SECTION IN POINT 8 OF INSTRUCTIONS ON SOVIET INTENTIONS, STATING IT "NOW APPEARS TO BE IN DOUBT" WHETHER PROCEDURAL FORMULA CAN BE FOUND.

I THEN PRESENTED MEMORANDUM WHICH WAS READ BY INTERPRETER.

GROMYKO RESPONDED FIRST ON AIR CORRIDORS. HE INSISTED THAT THE TENSIONS IN THE AIR CORRIDORS, WHICH "LIE IN THE AIR SPACE OF THE GDR", HAVE NOT BEEN CREATED BY SOVIETS, BUT BY WESTERN SIDE. HE SAID SOVIET ACTIONS ARE NOT IN CONTRADICTION TO EXISTING UNDERSTANDINGS AND THAT THEY CORRESPOND TO THE ESTABLISHED PRACTICE. IT WAS VAIN FOR WESTERN POWERS TO CLAIM THESE WERE UNEXPECTED AS IF THEY FELL DOWN FROM THE SKIES. IT IS CLEAR, HE CONTINUED, FROM YOUR STATEMENT THAT WESTERN SIDE HOLDS RATHER DIFFERENT VIEWS ON THIS. "BUT WE DENY TO WESTERN POWERS THE RIGHT OF ARBITERS IN THAT QUESTION AND CANNOT AGREE THAT ONLY ONE SIDE--THE WESTERN SIDE--WILL ESTABLISH THE TRUTH." HE ADDED SOVIET POSITION IS LAID DOWN IN THEIR NOTE (FEBRUARY 17) AND SOVIET GOVT WILL CONTINUE ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS POSITION. WARNED THAT IF ATTEMPTS ARE MADE AGGRAVATE SITUATION, SOVIET SIDE WILL DULY REPLY TO THEM.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
REVIEWED BY: [Signature] Date: 9/14/91
FOI, EO or PA exemptions
() CLASSIFY as
() DOWNGRADE IS to () S or () C, O, A, L
() RELEASE
() EXEMPT
() DENY
() DECLASSIFY
() DECLASSIFY IN PART
() DELETE
() Non-responsive info.

(2)

762.12
762.0221
3-6-62

CONFIDENTIAL EYES ONLY REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

• This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

ACTION ASSIGNED TO:	ACTION TAKEN	DATE OF ACTION	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R
NAME OF OFFICER			
OFFICE SYMBOL			

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- 2350, MARCH 6, 4 P.M. (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM MOSCOW

GROMYKO THEN TURNED TO MY REMARKS THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD REFRAIN FROM ACTIONS LIKELY AGGRAVATE TENSION. HE CLAIMED SOVIET SIDE IS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, AND BERLIN IN PARTICULAR, TENSION HAS ARISEN. THIS FACT, HE CLAIMED, ONLY UNDERLINES NECESSITY RESOLVE PRESENT DANGER SITUATION INVOLVING EXISTENCE ABNORMAL OCCUPATION REGIME. HE CONTINUED THAT SOVIET PROPOSALS WERE DESIGNED PRECISELY TO NORMALIZE THIS PROBLEM IN THE INTEREST OF REDUCING TENSION IN GERMANY, EUROPE, AND WHOLE WORLD.

GROMYKO EXPRESSED HOPE THAT AGREEMENT BETWEEN US WILL BE REACHED ON ALL MATTERS RELATED TO CONCLUSION GERMAN PEACE TREATY. AGAIN WARNED THAT IF THIS IS NOT DONE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER STATES WILL SIGN PEACE TREATY WITH GDR. "THIS IS ABSOLUTELY INEVITABLE." GROMYKO SAID IT WOULD BE A GOOD THING IF WESTERN POWERS WOULD APPROPRIATELY EVALUATE FACT SOVIET UNION HAS NOT YET SIGNED PEACE TREATY. THIS IS BEING DONE IN ORDER FACILITATE AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, POSITION USG AND STATEMENTS MADE TODAY, HE CONTINUED, INDICATE THAT THE SOVIET POSITION IS NOT PROPERLY UNDERSTOOD. GROMYKO THEN REPEATED THAT SOVIET GOVT WILL NEVER AGREE TO ANY ARRANGEMENT WHICH WILL PERPETUATE MAINTENANCE OCCUPATION REGIME WEST BERLIN OR THE ABNORMAL SITUATION IN EUROPE CHARACTERIZED BY ABSENCE PEACE TREATY. HE EMPHASIZED A PEACE TREATY WOULD NOT BE MERELY SLIP OF PAPER WITH SIGNATURES, BUT WOULD BE AN ACTION BY WHICH APPROPRIATE QUESTIONS WOULD BE SOLVED.

GROMYKO THEN STATED SOVIET POSITION WEST BERLIN ALREADY QUITE CLEAR. FREE CITY PROPOSAL IN SOVIET VIEW WOULD VIOLATE INTEREST OF NEITHER SIDE. THAT IS, IF THESE INTERESTS ARE UNDERSTOOD CORRECTLY, NAMELY THE INTEREST OF REDUCING TENSION AND STRENGTHENING PEACE. SOMETIMES, HOWEVER, PEOPLE SPEAK OF INTEREST ONLY IN A VERY NARROW WAY. HE COMPLAINED DOSSIERS OF WESTERN POWERS APPEAR TO BE FULL OF UNFOUNDED SUSPICIONS WHICH WOULD BE BETTER ELIMINATED.

GROMYKO RESTATED EARLIER POINT THAT SOVIET POSITION SPECIFICALLY INCLUDES POSSIBILITY OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON ACCESS WHICH WOULD RESPECT GDR SOVEREIGNTY TOGETHER WITH RESOLUTION OF A NUMBER OF OTHER QUESTIONS WHICH HE HAD MENTIONED MANY TIMES. ALSO SAID SOME WESTERN CIVIL AND MILITARY LEADERS CONTINUE TO USE STRONG WORDS AGAINST SOVIET GOVT, OTHERS CONTRIBUTING TO EXACERBATION TENSIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-3- 2350, MARCH 6, 4 P.M. (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM MOSCOW

HE THEN CHARACTERIZED US MEMORANDUM IN GENERAL AS ATTEMPT TO BALANCE DISCUSSIONS HELD TO DATE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO SUPPORT US POSITIONS. THIS DID NOT FACILITATE AGREEMENT, BUT RATHER CONSTRUCTED A TRENCH DIVIDING OUR POSITIONS. ADDED HE WOULD NOT AGAIN REPEAT SOVIET POSITIONS ON ALL-BERLIN SOLUTION, PLEBISCITE PROPOSAL, OR IAA. CONCLUDED THAT IT IS CLEAR WE HAVE DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS QUESTION AND EXPRESSED DIFFICULTY IN RECONCILING ASSERTIONS IN MEMORANDUM WITH STATEMENT US SERIOUSLY SEEKING AGREEMENT. HE EXPLAINED THE ABOVE WERE HIS REACTIONS ON BASIS OF HAVING LISTENED TO HASTY TRANSLATION OF MEMORANDUM, IMPLYING THAT THIS MIGHT NOT EXHAUST SOVIET REACTION TO THE

THOMPSON

FH/4

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

32

Action

SS

Info

Control: 3861

Rec'd: MARCH 6, 1962

12:48pm

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2350, MARCH 6, 4 P.M. (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

PRIORITY

EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM.

Eyes only

transferred to C/4300
with additional access
controlled by S/S
Cat. C - Caption and custody
retained by S/S

Reviewed by: Elijah Kelly Jr.
Date: 4-4-91

2350

I RESPONDED BY FIRST TAKING UP GROMYKOS REFERENCES TO AIR CORRIDORS. I STATED SURPRISE AT HIS CONTENTION SITUATION RESULTS FROM WESTERN ACTIONS, POINTING OUT THAT SOVIETS HAD SUDDENLY CHANGED PROCEDURES WHICH HAD EXISTED 16 YEARS AND IN SUCH A WAY AS TO DISTURB OUR ACCESS. I NOTED HIS REFERENCE TO SOVIET FEBRUARY 17 NOTE AND STATED WE HAD FOUND THIS RESPONSE UNSATISFACTORY. I EXPLAINED I DID NOT INTEND TO TAKE THIS UP IN DETAIL TODAY BUT ADDED I HAD NO DOUBT MY GOVERNMENT WOULD PURSUE THE MATTER FURTHER. I POINTED OUT THAT THE AIR CORRIDORS WERE ESTABLISHED TO PROVIDE FREE ACCESS TO WEST BERLIN AND THAT RECENT SOVIET ACTIONS CLEARLY SEEMED DESIGNED TO INTERFERE WITH THIS FREE ACCESS. I WARNED THAT WE TAKE A MOST SERIOUS VIEW OF SUCH ACTIONS.

I EMPHASIZED OUR DESIRE AVOID LEGALISTIC DISCUSSION WHILE DEALING PRAGMATICALLY WITH FACTUAL PROBLEMS WHICH WOULD ARISE FROM ANNOUNCED SOVIET INTENTIONS. I REITERATED OUR CONVICTION THAT RESOLUTION PROBLEMS IN QUESTION IS IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT ON ACCESS. I STATED IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING YOU WOULD EXPECT TO HAVE DISCUSSIONS WITH GROMYKO ON BERLIN IN GENEVA AND, FURTHER, THAT YOU WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS WIDER SUBJECTS ON AN INFORMAL AND BILATERAL BASIS. I EMPHASIZED THAT DISCUSSION SUCH PROBLEMS WOULD REMAIN SUBJECT TO THE NEED FOR A STRONG AND CLEAR SETTLEMENT ON ACCESS AND PRESERVATION RIGHTS IN WEST BERLIN. I POINTED OUT THAT THIS DOES NOT REPRESENT ANY CHANGE IN OUR POSITION ON THE QUESTION OF ACCESS AS THE KEY PROBLEM WHICH MUST BE TAKEN UP FIRST BUT EXPLAINED THAT THE PRESIDENT PERSONALLY IS DETERMINED TO LEAVE NO METHOD OF DISCUSSION UNTRIED IN SEEKING A SENSIBLE ACCOMMODATION OF RIGHTS AND INTERESTS BOTH SIDES.

9621121
76210

CONFIDENTIAL

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken.

ACTION ASSIGNED TO:	ACTION TAKEN	DATE OF ACTION	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R
NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL			

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- 2350, MARCH 6, 4 P.M. (SECTION TWO) OF TWO FROM MOSCOW REGARDING GROMYKO'S REMARKS ABOUT NECESSITY RESPECT GDR SOVEREIGNTY, I COMPLAINED OF THEIR VAGUENESS AND FACT WE HAVE NEVER CLEARLY BEEN ABLE UNDERSTAND WHAT THIS INVOLVES. I POINTED OUT THAT WHENEVER WE SEEM TO REACH POINT OF ACHIEVING SOME AGREEMENT, GROMYKO RETURNS TO QUESTION GDR SOVEREIGNTY IN SUCH A WAY AS TO NEGATE WHAT SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN AN AGREEMENT.

I THEN EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER GROMYKO'S STATEMENT THEY WOULD NEVER AGREE TO ANY ACCORD WHICH WOULD RESULT IN PERPETUATION OCCUPATION REGIME OR "ABNORMAL SITUATION, I.E., ABSENCE PEACE TREATY." THIS POSITION, I STATED, IS THE MOST SERIOUS AND DISCOURAGING STATEMENT FROM SOVIET SIDE IF IT REFERS TO QUESTIONS OF FACT. I POINTED OUT WE HAVE EMPHASIZED WE WERE NOT ASKING FOR ANY FORMAL SOVIET ACTION CONNECTED WITH OCCUPATION REGIME, BUT IF ANY AGREEMENT BETWEEN US WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE IF AFTER IT THE OCCUPATION REGIME IN FACT CONTINUED TO EXIST, THEN WE WOULD SEEM TO HAVE REALLY REACHED AN IMPASSE. I CONCLUDED THAT WESTERN POWERS HAVE MADE IT ABUNDENTLY CLEAR THAT THEIR PRESENCE IN BERLIN WILL NOT BE GIVEN UP UNTIL THE GERMAN QUESTION IS FINALLY RESOLVED.

GROMYKO DID NOT PURSUE THIS LAST POINT BUT RETURNED BRIEFLY TO QUESTION AIR CORRIDORS, STATING HE WOULD NOT REPEAT HIMSELF WITH RESTATEMENT SOVIET POSITION. IT WAS WELL KNOWN AND THEY INTENDED TO ACT IN CONFORMITY WITH IT. AS TO MY ONE-SIDED ASSERTIONS THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD TAKEN NEW ACTION VIOLATING AGREED FOUR-POWER REGULATIONS, THEY HAVE STUDIED AGREEMENTS EXISTING SINCE WW II AND THEIR ACTIONS DO NOT CONFLICT IN ANY WAY WITH THE CONDITIONS EXISTING THERE. HE REPEATED, "WE DO NOT AGREE THAT THE ONLY ARBITERS IN THIS SITUATION SHALL BE THE WESTERN POWERS."

REGARDING MY COMMENTS ON GDR SOVEREIGNTY, GROMYKO RECALLED THAT WE OFTEN REFER TO SOVIET USE OF THE PHRASE CONCERNING NECESSITY RESPECT GDR SOVEREIGNTY. HE STATED THAT IS NOT ONLY A PHRASE, IT WAS AN IMPORTANT CONDITION. HE CLAIMED THAT SOVIET PROPOSALS WERE IN COMPLETE ACCORD WITH "INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE BAPTISED BY YEARS OF INTERNATIONAL USAGE." HE REPEATED THAT ANY AGREEMENT ON AIR, LAND, OR WATER ACCESS MUST BE IN ACCORD WITH RESPECT FOR GDR SOVEREIGNTY. "TO UNDERESTIMATE THIS WOULD BE A BIG MISTAKE WHICH WE HOPE WESTERN POWERS WILL AVOID." HE REITERATED THAT SOVIET GOVT BELIEVES IT IS POSSIBLE TO RECONCILE AGREEMENT FOR "UNRESTRICTED ACCESS" WITH GDR SOVEREIGNTY.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-3- 2350, MARCH 6, 4 P.M. (SECTION TWO OF TWO) FROM MOSCOW

GROMYKO WAS ABVIOUSLY PREOCCUPIED AND PRESSED FOR TIME AND I THEREFORE DID NOT PROBE FURTHER. I ANTICIPATE NO FURTHER MEETING BEFORE GENEVA ALTHOUGH WAY IS OPEN FOR HIM TO COMMENT FURTHER ON OUR MEMORANDUM IF HE SO DESIRES.

THOMPSON

FH/4

CONFIDENTIAL

Record Number 58748

<u>ET</u>	Berlin Crisis
<u>NC1</u>	Yes
<u>DOCUMENT TYPE</u>	Cable
<u>DATE</u>	03/06/1962
<u>CIRCD</u>	
<u>TIME</u>	
<u>CABNO</u>	2350
<u>DOCNO</u>	
<u>ORIGIN</u>	United States Embassy. Soviet Union
<u>SIGNATOR</u>	Thompson, Llewellyn E.
<u>DESTO</u>	United States. Department of State
<u>DESTP</u>	
<u>DRAFT</u>	
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	Confidential
<u>TITLE</u>	
<u>CTIT</u>	[Summary of Meeting with Andrei Gromyko]
<u>NAMES</u>	Gromyko, Andrei A.
<u>TERMS</u>	
<u>ORGAN</u>	
<u>PGS</u>	6

3/6/62 25

MF

March 6, 1962

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Suggested U. S. Program on NATO Nuclear Matters

After approval by the President, the United States should outline in NAC, at an appropriate time and in suitable detail, a package including the following elements, making clear its relation to revised NATO strategy - including the need for improved conventional forces:

1. NATO Participation: Measures should be instituted to give NATO greater information about U. S. nuclear strategy, and greater participation in the formulation of that strategy. Specific actions to this end currently under study by the State and Defense Departments should be included in the package outlined in this memorandum, if they are found to be useful. Broadly speaking, these measures should include:

a. Institution of procedures under which we would share information about our nuclear forces and consult about plans and decisions for their use in the NAC and the Standing Group of the Military Committee. Although we should withhold highly sensitive operational information concerning sorties commitments, time on target, penetration tactics and the like, we can and should provide a considerable body of information, including targeting policy, nuclear force strengths, analysis of the force capabilities, some intelligence on Soviet Bloc strengths, and constraint policies. In putting forth this information, the U. S. would stress the indivisibility of the defense of Europe and North America, and the extent to which plans for the use of this force are devoted to European as well as North American interests, the importance of responsible, centralized control over nuclear

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.0
NLK/94-36
By *[Signature]* NARA, Date 12/97

NSF(216) (MLP: bncraf

forces, the strength of the present and future nuclear capabilities of the U. S., and the probable consequences if a nuclear war were to occur.

b. To facilitate this enlarged participation by NATO in overall nuclear planning and operations increased nuclear functions would be assigned to the NATO Standing Group - Military Committee.

(1) Planning

(a) Receive information on Allied and Bloc nuclear forces.

(b) Analyze the nuclear situation; estimate results of nuclear hostilities under various contingencies.

(c) Advise the NAC of the nuclear status and prospects; receive political guidance in return.

(d) Originate guidance to NATO commanders for the preparation of their nuclear war plans, including basic tasks for nuclear forces, targeting policies, and constraints policies.

(e) Review, evaluate, and approve major NATO commanders' broad nuclear war plans.

(f) Make recommendations on matters of Alliance concern (or the concerns of individual Allies), relative to national nuclear war plans and plan guidance, to, especially, U. S. JCS, and also other national staffs with extra-NATO nuclear capability. Receive reports of response to such recommendations.

(2) Execution

(a) Man and operate needed control facilities, and maintain communication channels with the NAC, the President, and major NATO commanders, in order to direct execution (in full coordination with U. S. JCS) of political decisions on nuclear war.

2. U. S. Forces Outside the Continent:

a. At a minimum we could assure our Allies that an appropriate portion of U. S. external forces will be directed against targets of especial concern to Europe.

b. The U. S. should state that it is prepared to commit U. S. nuclear forces outside the continent (additional to those already committed, in amounts to be determined) to NATO, in the sense that these forces would come under NATO command in wartime. Three principal alternatives are open:

i. To commit to NATO all U. S. strategic retaliatory forces including SAC which would form a new NATO command. Its nuclear planning and operation would, as in the case of SACLANT, remain entirely in U. S. hands and the U. S. would have the right to withdraw the force from NATO command and use it unilaterally. This option supports most directly U. S. views on a centralized nuclear strategy and the indivisibility of defense of NATO area.

ii. To commit to NATO a level of strategic retaliatory force corresponding to the present and prospective level of force targeted against Soviet forces most directly threatening Europe. This option has the advantage of being related to an important function of our strategic retaliatory forces, but the specification of a particular set of vehicles for this purpose might introduce serious inflexibilities in command.

iii. To commit to NATO our Polaris force in the Atlantic and Mediterranean on the same basis as other U. S. naval forces in these areas.

SECRET

3. Multilaterally Owned and Manned NATO Force: The U. S. should indicate its willingness to join its Allies, if they wish, in developing a modest-sized fully multilateral NATO sea-based MRBM force. It should not urge this course, since there is not an urgent military need, but should make clear that it would only be prepared to facilitate procurement of MRBM's under multilateral ownership, control, and manning.

a. Targeting and Weapons. The question of the targeting for a multilateral force, and the question of the kind of missile and vessel to be used in the force, should be determined in the light of NATO's continuing consideration of strategy, the role of the force in that strategy, and other relevant factors.

b. Participation. The U. S. should only be prepared to proceed if the venture had adequate allied participation, so that it did not appear to be merely a thinly disguised U. S. - German operation. The costs should be equitably shared.

c. Mixed Manning. The U. S. should require a sufficient degree of mixed manning to ensure that one nationality does not appear to be predominant in the manning, and is not in control of, the vessels or missiles. Members of the mixed crews would be recruited from national armed forces into the NATO MRBM force and would thereafter be under the control of that force; for trial and punishment of major crimes, they would be returned to their country of origin.

d. Custody. Ways should be found to safeguard design data, e.g., U. S. custodians could remain aboard any multilaterally manned NATO vessels, with standing orders to release the warheads in case a properly authenticated order to fire was received through agreed channels (see 4 below).

4. Command and Control over Nuclear Forces:

a. An attempt should be made to work out agreed NATO guidelines, which the U. S. President would agree to observe, regarding the use of nuclear forces in defending NATO. These guidelines would apply to all forces, national or international, committed or non-committed.

b. The U. S. should make it clear that the defense of the NATO area is indivisible. Planning and command arrangements for a multilateral MRBM force should, therefore, assume that it would be used in integral association with U. S. forces and should reflect the need for centralized military command of all alliance nuclear forces during nuclear hostilities.

c. The U. S. is prepared to accept, where necessary, Allied control over that portion of its nuclear forces on foreign territory in the form of host country concurrence in their use. U. S. concurrence in the use of its nuclear weapons or forces and in the use of a multilaterally owned force in which the U. S. participates would also be required.

d. As to procedure in the NAC, the U. S. should indicate that it wishes to ascertain the views of its Allies concerning the control formula for the suggested multilateral force as well as for existing nuclear forces. In the ensuing discussion, it should indicate a willingness to consider proposals for control along such lines as:

(1) Adherence to agreed guidelines for all nuclear forces for the contingency of a major nuclear attack on NATO; and

(2) The use of nuclear forces in other contingencies should be based on political decisions taken at that time.

During Allied consideration of these proposals, in which a majority of our Allies will almost certainly wish to provide for voting by unanimity

or by a group including the U. S., the U. S. should make it plain that there are serious legislative and other obstacles to any system of voting which did not provide for U. S. concurrence. It should indicate that it is willing to consider any proposal which might further the interests of the Alliance as a whole.

SECRET EYES ONLY

DENY

GDC Unnumbered

March 7, 1962

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

CATEGORY "A"

Completely de-sensitized

Transferred to O/FADRC

by S/S-I date 9-5-73

Research Memorandum

RSB-67, March 7, 1962

TO : The Secretary
THROUGH: S/S
FROM : INR - Thomas L. Hughes

Thomas L. Hughes

SUBJECT: Gromyko's Exposition of the Soviet Position on Berlin and Germany
In His Conversations with Ambassador Thompson

The following paper has been prepared for background use in connection with the forthcoming meeting of Foreign Ministers in Geneva.

Gromyko indicated that the Soviet Government considered his conversations with Ambassador Thompson (January 2, 12, February 1, 9, and March 6) as a continuation of his earlier talks with the President and Secretary Rusk last fall.

"Submaximum" Position

In the course of the conversations, Gromyko reiterated the Soviet maximum position — that the "best solution" would be the signing of a peace treaty (or two parallel peace treaties) with the two existing German states by all countries which had fought in the anti-Hitler coalition. He then went on to describe in greater detail an alternative or, for want of a better word, "submaximum" Soviet position on the basis of which the Soviets apparently hope to carry out further negotiations.

The "submaximum" position, whose broad outlines were developed in Gromyko's talks with the President and the Secretary, provides that before the signature of a separate peace treaty with the GDR, the USSR would reach agreement with the West on the following matters: creation of a "free city" of West Berlin; "formalization and consolidation" of the existing German frontiers; "respect for" (but not specifically recognition of) the sovereignty of the GDR; non-arming of the two German states with nuclear weapons; and a NATO-Warsaw Pact nonaggression treaty. (Other European security issues — Soviet enumerations of them vary slightly but not significantly — are to be dealt with "subsequently" in a continued exchange of opinions.) These agreements, or at least the agreement on Berlin, would be "reflected" in a subsequent, presumably pro forma separate peace treaty which the USSR would conclude with the GDR.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

F10
D
blaz
uac
R

762.00/3-7-62

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

APPEARS REVIEW PANEL, DATE 2/27/74

() RELEASE () EXCISE () DENY

() Non-responsive information

FOIA Exemptions (a)

PA Exemption (a)

Classification Review By ful

() DECLASSIFY

() DECLASSIFY IN PART

() RETAIN CLASSIFICATION (a)

() CLASSIFY

() DOWNGRADE TO () S, () C, OADR

REVIEWED BY [Signature]

() RELEASE

() EXCISE

() DENY

FOI, EO or PA exemptions

() DECLASSIFY as

() DOWNGRADE TS to

() S or () C, OADR

DATE 1/17/74

() DECLASSIFY

() DECLASSIFY in PART

() Non-responsive info.

TS authority to:

OADR

() S or () C, OADR

At the January 12 meeting Gromyko handed Ambassador Thompson two documents committing to paper the Soviet proposals for a "free city"; one was a draft protocol guaranteeing the status of the free city and the other a draft statute. Between them the two documents contained the following principal provisions:

Garrisons. The "occupation regime" would be "terminated" and West Berlin declared to be both "neutral" and "demilitarized" (though it would have its own police force).

The Soviet documents provide for the "temporary" presence in the "free city" of foreign troops to the limit of "_____ thousand men," and offer three alternatives: (1) equal contingents from the USSR, US, UK, and France, (2) UN military contingents, or (3) contingents from neutral countries. In any case, details of the disposition of military contingents (including presumably their precise size and the duration of their stay) are left to be "regulated by special agreement." Military personnel and shipments would "freely avail themselves" of land and air communications and control over these movements would be carried out reciprocally by the four powers.

An International Entity. According to the Soviet proposals, the "free city" would in effect be a city state; it would appoint and receive diplomatic, consular, and other representatives (but no military representatives); conclude international agreements (except military or politico-military alliances); and participate in international organizations (the guarantors would support its application for UN membership).

Sociopolitical System. The Soviet drafts provide that the existing "sociopolitical system" in West Berlin would remain unchanged and human rights guaranteed. However, other provisions call for free functioning of "democratic" parties and organizations (a term which in communist parlance is often a euphemism for communist or communist-front) and for suppression of "fascist" and "militarist" activities as well as "activity or propaganda hostile toward any state."

Communication. The Soviet drafts provide for the "free city's" right of unobstructed communication with the outside world, but stipulate that use of the land, water, and air routes will be the subject of agreements between the "free city" and the GDR in accordance with "generally accepted international norms regulating transit through foreign territory," a term which Gromyko has been unwilling to define further.

Signatories. At no point during the talks did Gromyko raise any demand for the Western powers' signing any document with the GDR, and his statements on recognition suggest that the USSR does not intend to imply such a demand.

Gromyko specifically stated that the technical agreement on access procedures would be between the "free city" and the GDR. Gromyko did not specify who would be the signatories to the Protocol of Guarantees of the Status of the Free City or Statute of the Free City (also containing provisions on access), though he apparently assumed that they would be signed by the four powers (the US, UK, France and the USSR) and the obligations involved would be undertaken by the GDR and other peace treaty signatories by making these documents part of that treaty. (Gromyko explicitly stated his assumption that the West would not sign the peace treaty with the GDR.) However, the vagueness of the present draft documents contrasts with the June 1, 1959 Soviet draft protocol on guarantees which spelled out the four powers as guarantors and may be deliberate.

Gromyko also did not stipulate signatories for the agreement on military contingents presumably they would be between the guarantors and the "free city" administration.

Other Issues

On the other issues in the Soviet submaximum package — no nuclear weapons for either the GDR or FRG, a NATO-Warsaw Pact nonaggression treaty, recognition of frontiers and respect for the sovereignty of the GDR — Gromyko has not spelled out details, though he has maintained that all of these issues should be part of the settlement.

Gromyko did not specifically mention the nonaggression pact or non-nuclearization proposals in the two last conversations. In the February 9 talk he especially stressed the need for agreement on borders, including that between East and West Germany as well as the Oder-Neisse line.

Throughout the conversations Gromyko has emphasized the importance of the concept of "respect" for the sovereignty of the GDR, but has been deliberately vague about what this means. The January 2 meeting made it clear that the concept did not imply formal recognition of the GDR; Gromyko argued that the US already recognizes the GDR de facto; cited Khrushchev to the effect that the most correct solution to the question would be UN membership and diplomatic recognition of the two German states; but went on to say that the question of diplomatic recognition is one which each government decides for itself. He added, however, that the US should take a "more sober" position with regard to the existence of the GDR.

While it has remained ill-defined, the concept of "respect" for GDR sovereignty has been at the crux of Gromyko's argumentation on the access question. He has used this concept both to justify the terms of civilian access envisaged in the Soviet "free-city" proposal and to argue against the creation of an international access authority.

International Access Authority

Gromyko has consistently objected to US emphasis on the question of access, maintaining that it is only a portion of the larger question of changing the status of West Berlin and thus cannot be solved separately. On January 12 he suggested that agreement on access would be "far easier" if an agreement on West Berlin such as the Soviets had outlined were concluded.

From the first, Gromyko subdivided the US access proposal into two distinct elements, a corridor and an international access authority. He rejected the first out of hand at the January 2 meeting, but reserved comment on the idea of an international access authority. At the January 12 and February 1 meetings he was progressively more pointed in his statements that an international access authority would not be in accord with the sovereignty of the GDR, and on February 9 he lumped together the corridor and access authority ideas, rejecting them both.

Gromyko has continued to argue that the access provision of the Soviet "free-city" proposal offers both freedom of access and respect for the sovereignty of the GDR (which he tacitly assumes is unimpaired by the provision for transit of military goods and personnel). He has not, however, spelled out how this arrangement would operate, merely stating that all parties, including the GDR, would live up to their agreements.

An All-Berlin Solution. Plebiscite in West Berlin

Gromyko rejected the US proposal for reunification of Berlin, arguing that East Berlin is an "organic and inalienable" part of the GDR and that post-war developments left open only the question of West Berlin. He claimed that the putting forth of formulas for tearing the GDR away from its capital was evidence of unwillingness to conduct serious negotiations.

Gromyko was particularly sensitive to Ambassador Thompson's suggestion of holding a plebiscite in West Berlin, arguing that interests of other states and not just of the citizens of West Berlin were involved and that withdrawal of foreign troops would have to be a pre-condition for a plebiscite in order to assume a "really free" expression of popular opinion.

Expressions of Determination

During the course of the discussions, and particularly in the February 1, February 9, and March 9 sessions, Gromyko has expressed Soviet determination on three points.

He has stated that the Soviet Government will "never" sign a document endorsing the occupation rights of the Western powers. On February 9 he deprecated Western occupation rights, stating that the West had torn up all

the basic quadripartite agreements, but he stopped short of saying these rights did not in fact exist. Gromyko never answered Ambassador Thompson's argument that a lapse of the occupation regime would mean the reversion of West Berlin to the Federal Republic; presumably, he wished to avoid committing himself on the question, which was dealt with from another angle in the December 27 memorandum to West German Ambassador Kroll.

Gromyko has stated that if the West does not reach an agreement with the USSR, the latter will go ahead and conclude a separate peace treaty with the GDR, but he has given no date or other indication of when the Soviet Union might carry out its separate treaty threat.

Finally, Gromyko has warned that if the West sought a test of strength, the Soviet Union was prepared for it.

Drafted by:	Cleared by:
INR/RSB - Mr. Baraz	INR/RSB - Mr. Sonnenfeldt
	INR/RSB - Mr. Shaw
	GER - Mr. Hillenbrand
S/S-RO - Mr. Anderson, Room 7241B, NS, Ext. 4338	

Record Number 60262

SRT Berlin Office
ORNO
ORNO RRR-76
DOCUMENT TYPE Intelligence Memorandum
DATE 03/07/1952
CIRCD
TIME
ORIGIN United States, Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research

SIGNATURE
DETO
DESTP
CLASSIFICATION Secret
TITLE Gromyko's Exposition of the Soviet Position on Berlin and Germany In His Conversations with Ambassador Thompson

DTLT
NAMES Krull, Hans
NAMES Gromyko, Andrei A.
NAMES Thompson, Llewellyn E.
TERMS
ORGAN
RHS 5

2/7/62

From Eur: RA - R. H. Kranich

~~TOP SECRET~~

March 7, 1962

MEMORANDUM

TO: EUR - Mr. Kohler
FROM: RA - Russell Fessenden
SUBJECT: Nuclear Assistance to France

Downgraded To: SECRET ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
EO 11652: XGDS (1) (2) (3) 4
Authorized by: H. D. [Signature]
August 4, 1978

1. Under cover of a letter to the Secretary, Paul Nitze has attached a proposal to provide nuclear assistance to France. The content of his proposal is not new. In return for exchanging nuclear information up to the level of fission weapons (which would be based on a finding of "substantial progress" by France within the meaning of the Atomic Energy Act) the French would be asked to agree to (a) participate in an Ottawa-type multilateral MRBM force, (b) commit all of ~~its~~ nuclear forces to NATO Command, but subject to withdrawal for national purposes in an emergency, (c) accelerate ~~its~~ non-nuclear build-up, and (d) permit U.S. stockpiling of nuclear weapons in France.

2. What is new about the proposal is the implication in the covering letter that the President may be casting about for areas of cooperation with France in the nuclear weapons field.

3. Nitze's paper does not face up to the problem of what the implications would be for the Federal Republic in the event we assisted France in this manner. It should be noted, however, that the Adenauer Government would probably not at this time oppose such a move. In fact, it would probably endorse it on the grounds that not only would this foster better US-French relations, but that it would mitigate increasing pressure by de Gaulle on the FRG to cooperate in a nuclear program, which is something the Adenauer Government fears. There is, of course, the opposing argument which is that those forces in Germany harboring nationalistic tendencies would consider this a step further in creating a climate more conducive to an eventual German national nuclear program. Nor does the paper comment on the possibility that de Gaulle might not "trade" under these circumstances. He may consider the price somewhat high.

4. We have not yet had time to discuss this paper with other offices in EUR. I have, however, showed it to Henry Owen. He and I have serious reservations on the proposal. We both believe it would be useful to raise this in the meeting with the Secretary this afternoon because of its obvious relation to the whole problem of a NATO nuclear role. The meeting has, therefore, been set forward to 3:35.

5. One

~~TOP SECRET~~

(w) 957.5211/3-262

D

5

~~SECRET~~
TOP SECRET

it is
not conceivable
we should do
this in normal
channels for
security
JOB

5. One possible line to pursue, as an alternative to the Nitze proposal, is the possibility of helping the French in the safety aspects only, as was recently discussed in the JCAE Hearings. If in fact something can be done in this field without passing design information, it could conceivably be an acceptable form of "assisting" the French.

Attachment:

Nitze letter (OD EUR 6186)

RHK
EUR:RA:RHKranich:ta

~~SECRET~~
TOP SECRET

3/8/62 1729

S/O: EUP: G... (Distribution Officer)

~~SECRET~~

This document consists of 3 pages. Number of copies.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

223 27a
437.62241/3-862
x R 312
611.62231

Approved in S
3/14/62

Memorandum of Conversation

6

This document consists of 3 pages number of copies. Series DATE: March 8, 1962 Secretary's office, 2:30 P.M.

SUBJECT: Secretary's Forthcoming Meeting with German Foreign Minister. 600.0012 762.00
20

PARTICIPANTS:

US

Germany

10 fou

The Secretary
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Cash

Ambassador Grewe
Mr. Schippenkoetter

COPIES TO:

S/S-S	EUR	SOV	US Mission BERLIN
S/S-0	CMA	E	Amembassy MOSCOW
U	GER	INR/D	
G	IO	Defense/ISA - Mr. Nitze	
S/P	RA	ACDA - Mr. Foster	
ARA	UNP	Amembassy BONN	White House - Mr. Bundy

23

Ambassador Grewe began by saying he wished to discuss the Secretary's forthcoming meeting in Switzerland with the German Foreign Minister, but before doing so he had two other pieces of information he wished to pass on.

First of all, he wished to inform the Secretary that over the last three years the Federal Republic's trade with Cuba has sharply declined decreasing in volume by about 2/3's: 1959 - \$36.1 million; 1960 - \$21.6 million; 1961 - \$12.0 million. In addition, shipping to and from Cuba had been sharply reduced to the point where there has been almost none since the end of 1961.

The Secretary expressed his satisfaction with this development.

As his second subject, Ambassador Grewe said he wished to discuss the UN bonds and the vested assets. He had reported to Bonn the idea of approaching both problems in a positive way, and Bonn is prepared to purchase UN bonds if at the same time the assets problem could be picked up where it had been left in 1961 with the memorandum containing the basic idea of waiving the \$200 million. If it should be agreeable to continue negotiations on that basis, the Federal Government would be able to take the other step.

The Secretary asked if the Germans were linking the two questions.

Ambassador Grewe did not reply.

Mr. Kohler

~~SECRET~~

none
SECRET

NSP / 75 / Ger - Gen

Mr. Kohler asked why the two questions should be linked.

Ambassador Grewe replied that there was no legal, logical, or historical, but merely an accidental linkage.

The Secretary said we would have to consider this before giving the Germans a definite reply.

Ambassador Grewe said the Germans were in no hurry, but it would be helpful if a meeting with Undersecretary Ball could be arranged in the next two or three days.

The Secretary said he hoped there would be no publicity concerning the linkage.

To this Ambassador Grewe agreed.

The Secretary said he hoped the two matters were not organically linked, but perhaps we could comment on both and the Germans could make their decision. He added he would leave the assets question to the Undersecretary.

Ambassador Grewe asked the Secretary to inform Undersecretary Ball of the discussion with the President.

The Secretary agreed.

(After the meeting, Ambassador Grewe insisted to Mr. Kohler that the President had suggested the connection between the two items during their recent talk, and that he, the Ambassador, had reported the idea of the linkage to Bonn and had used this as an argument in favor of a purchase of UN bonds.)

Turning to the main purpose of the meeting, The Secretary said he would be lunching with Foreign Minister Schroeder in Lausanne on Sunday, and he felt this could be a very useful working lunch. He inquired in passing if the Germans had been inconvenienced by the denial that the Secretary would visit Bonn.

Ambassador Grewe said no. He said he could not add much information as to what his Foreign Minister would want to talk about. The German views on disarmament are contained in the memorandum they gave the US recently. The Minister would wish to conduct his own discussion concerning Berlin talks in Geneva. The Germans assume that the basis for talks will remain the "substantive paper", and if there is any movement therefrom they would wish the discussion to be bracketed.

The Secretary inquired as to how communications to Bonn should be handled in Geneva.

Ambassador Grewe said that in addition to their Consul General, the Germans will have a disarmament liaison man in Geneva and perhaps another for other topics.

Ambassador Grewe

Ambassador Grewe inquired as to whether the Secretary wished to raise any other questions with the Minister.

The Secretary said he thought the main topics were disarmament and Berlin. He said he would probably have two conversations with Gromyko before the Disarmament Conference began. He would want a general tour d'horizon as part of the context for the Disarmament Conference. There can be no disarmament if there is to be a period of sustained crisis concerning Berlin, Southeast Asia, and other issues. We wish to find out how Khrushchev looks at the world these days and where he thinks he is going. If there is to be no de-Stalinization of foreign policy, we must compete, and this we are prepared to do believing that we are stronger over a span of time. But if the Soviets wish to get on with disarmament they must be reasonable in other areas.

The Secretary said he understood the Germans were highly sensitive to the phrase "European security", and he was familiar with those aspects the Germans find most troublesome. He was, however, not sure that he knew all of their concerns. Disarmament does bear on European security. He gathered that the Germans did not object to our preference for disarmament over an arms race. He understands the German concern: 1) that disarmament produces no security disadvantages to the West; and 2) that there be no discrimination against Germany; but what about points 3, 4, and 5? There was, in addition, the question of the German attitude concerning what could be done in the context of disarmament and what could be done in the context of Berlin.

Ambassador Grewe said this was an important aspect to which he would draw the attention of his Government.

The Secretary said that the Germans seem sensitive about certain points which are not strong bargaining cards, e.g., nondiffusion of nuclear weapons. The US already has a national policy to this end. The Secretary also doubted that the Oder-Neisse line is very important to the Soviets. He doubted that they would pay much for it.

Ambassador Grewe agreed with the latter and said he wished to add two more points which concerned the Germans: 1) regional neutralized zones in Europe; and 2) security arrangements based on the demarcation line.

SP-INT 3/16/62 P

UNCLASSIFIED

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS

443/2509

USNMR SHAPE
UNITED STATES MESSAGE

1939
NATO Defence Policy

SECRET

OFFICIAL OUTGOING MESSAGE
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

USNMR SHAPE, PARIS, FRANCE
LAURIS NORSTAD, GEN, USAF

TO: CJCS

NR: ALO 225

08 March 62

EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN LEMNITZER FROM GEN NORSTAD.

Last night Secretary General Stikker discussed with me for upwards of two and a half hours the following draft paper, which he presented as the paper from which he would talk at the NATO Council meeting this afternoon and which would then be circulated on some basis. I requested that it not be used without further study, confirmation and consideration, and at the end of our discussion he agreed not to use it at this time. I suspect, however, that the delay would only be for a few days and I am therefore forwarding it to you for the consideration of the Chiefs of Staff. In a separate message to follow, I will raise some questions and make some observations on the Stikker draft.

QUOTE: "NATO DEFENCE POLICY

"Draft Statement by the Secretary General for the Council Meeting on Thursday 8th March.

2. The U.S. Representative has indicated that the United States will continue to place at the disposal of the Alliance nuclear weapons adequate in number and kind to meet the needs of NATO defence. I presume these will include warheads both for any nuclear delivery systems incorporated into the forces of the United States' NATO Allies, and for weapons systems in U.S. forces assigned or earmarked for assignment to SACZUR and SACLANT. The precise number and types of nuclear weapons required at any one time to implement this undertaking and the place of their deployment would be determined by the current operational needs of the Major NATO Commanders based on approved NATO plans.

ALO 225

(08 Mar 62)

Page 1 of 8

ACPARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION—PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION—NO UNCLASSIFIED REFERENCE IF THE DATE-TIME GROUP IS QUOTED.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS

COPY NR. 5

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS
69-MDR-012974

NLE Case 89-111-3
By [Signature] NLE Date 3/20/93

made for library

~~SECRET~~
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
USNMR SHAPE


SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS

UNITED STATES MESSAGE

ALO 225

OFFICIAL SECURITY MESSAGE

Page 2



"3. He has also recorded his Government's intention to ensure that its retaliatory power should grow faster than the Soviet striking power, and to continue to cover as fully as possible all key elements of the latter which could be used against the U.S. or its allies. To this end action is in progress to increase the capacity of the strategic forces to survive a Soviet nuclear strike and to improve the speed of retaliation.

"4. The U.S. Government is also, I understand, willing

"(a) to furnish to their NATO allies the fullest amount of information compatible with the requirements of security covering, as I understand it, types, numbers, striking power, deployment and targeting of nuclear weapons located within the NATO area and destined for the defence of NATO Europe;

"(b) to make comparable information available as appropriate, with regard to the plans and disposition of the strategic forces;

"(c) to participate with their allies in setting up a permanent system for the exchange and handling of the information referred to in (a) and (b) above. In anticipation of the establishment of suitable machinery for this purpose, the U.S. Government is willing, subject to suitable security arrangements to make all necessary information available in order to enable the Council to pursue its examination of the problems of overall NATO defence planning and control.

AC-PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION—PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION—NO UNCLASSIFIED REFERENCE TO THE DATE-TIME GROUP IS QUOTES

ALO 225

Page 2 of 2

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS

COPY NR.

~~SECRET~~
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS

USNMR SHAPE

UNITED STATES MESSAGE

ALO 225

PAGE 3

OFFICIAL OUTGOING MESSAGE

"5. These are all statements of the highest importance. The Council will, I am certain, share my appreciation of the clarity of the assurances indicated by Ambassador Finletter. These seem to me to correspond fully to the sense of paragraph 7 (a) and (b) of NDP/62/2 and to provide the indispensable basis for further progress in our discussions on NATO defence policy.

"6. In the meantime we received on the 2nd March the proposal for a Nuclear Committee in a note by the U.K. Delegation.

"As Permanent Representatives have not had the opportunity to express opinions of this document, I venture to make later on one or two comments myself in addition to those which I already made at the Council meeting of 2nd March.

"In order to bring the discussion a step further I would like to draw the attention of the Council to the following points which are based on opinions already expressed in the Council or on private discussions.

"7. In stating its willingness to make this information available to the Alliance, not only with regard to nuclear forces and weapons at the disposal of NATO, but also to the strategic forces which back them up, the United States has made clear its desire to associate its allies with its nuclear defence policies. It is equally clear that the sharing of responsibility would not be a reality if the United States' NATO Allies were not in possession of the requisite knowledge of the United States' nuclear capability and the basic plans and general arrangements for its use. Nor without such knowledge and possibility of reviewing the changing needs of the military situation would it be possible for the Alliance to ascertain what is the adequate level of nuclear weapons to which Mr. Finletter has referred.

"(a) This brings us then to the first question with which the Council is faced. We have to find a mean between the vital requirements of security and the need for the Council as a whole and for member countries individually to have all the information necessary to give them a proper insight into the problem of nuclear defence.

ALO 225

(08 Mar 62)

Page 3 of 8

AC-PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION—PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION—NO UNCLASSIFIED REFERENCE IF THE DATE-TIME GROUP IS QUOTED.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS

COPY NR. _____

HQ US EUCOM Form 34-D 1 Mar 56

UNCLASSIFIED

Library for
SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS

USNMR SHAPE

UNITED STATES MESSAGE

ALO 225

SECRET-NOFORN

Page 4

OFFICIAL OUTGOING MESSAGE

"(b) The second question which follows from the first is how far any collective mechanism set up for handling such information should also play an active consultative role in regard to the plans for nuclear defence.

"(c) The third question, which also follows from the first, is just how to tackle the security problem, since an agreement on this is a pre-requisite to the receipt of any information at all -- and the nature of the arrangements made will determine the amount of detail which the U.S. and no doubt the U.K. Governments are ready to give about their strategic forces, and the Supreme Allied Commanders about their planning.

"8. (a) To deal with the first question, I believe that we are all agreed that a special group or committee should be set up to handle the information which has been promised. But we are not yet entirely agreed on how it should be composed and organised. As I see it, there are three distinct needs. First to ensure that all member governments have enough general information about plans for the deployment and use of nuclear weapons to enable them to appreciate the problems involved in their control and to fulfill their responsibility for the implementation of the defence plans of the Alliance. Second, to provide that member countries whose interests lie primarily in one geographical area, are fully aware of the operational plans for that area which may involve their own forces or those of their neighbours. And third, to provide countries which have nuclear weapons stored on their territories, not only for their own, but for the forces of other member countries, with relatively detailed information about the numbers and types of weapons in question and the arrangements for their physical control and possible use.

"If we follow this pattern of thought it seems to suggest that we should establish a committee of the whole which should have access to general information on the whereabouts, quantities and striking power of nuclear warheads available to NATO; about over-all targeting arrangements; about the disposition of NATO nuclear forces stationed outside their own country; and about the nuclear capabilities of the strategic forces. This committee would be broken down into regional

ALO 225

(08 Mar 62)

Page 4 of 8

AC-PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION—PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION—NO UNCLASSIFIED REFERENCE IF THE DATE-TIME GROUP IS QUOTED.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS

HQ US EXCOM Form 34-D 1 Nov 56

UNSECRETIFIED

COPY NR. _____

action made
Library for

UNCLASSIFIED

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS

**USNMR SHAPE
UNITED STATES MESSAGE**

ALO 225

OFFICIAL OUTGOING MESSAGE

Page 5

sub-committees which would be the recipient and guardian of more detailed information of the kind indicated above affecting the particular area of interest of the participating countries. Finally, even more detailed information about the exact location, contents and handling arrangements in peace and war of nuclear weapon stockpiles would be made available on a bilateral basis.

"If this general principle is agreed, we could work out later exactly which countries should participate in the sub-committees. But subject to the approval of the Council it might be the best arrangement if the Secretary General were to take the chair of the committee of the whole and also preside over the various sub-committees. On the other hand, I am not sure that in view of the overriding interests of security, that there is any reason why the International Staff should be privy to the highly sensitive information which would be transmitted bilaterally, whether by the U.S. Government or the Major NATO Commanders, to individual member governments.

"(b). The second question is of a different order. It raises the issue as to whether the main committee and the sub-committees should play a merely passive part, confined simply to receiving, handling and keeping up to date the information made available to them, or whether they should have a more positive role. This is a question on which I should like to hear further views expressed. In their paper of March 2nd, the U.K. Delegation contributed some thoughts and suggestions on this. They foresaw, for instance, that the committee might become a focal point for the exchange of information on nuclear considerations underlying the defence of the free world as a whole, and for assessments of Soviet nuclear dispositions and planning and the effects on the Soviet Union of an attack by Western strategic forces. The same paper also suggested that the committee could have certain advisory functions with regard to the nature and deployment of nuclear warheads and delivery systems.

"I would appreciate it if Permanent Representatives would express their ideas on this suggestion. Personally, I do believe that, on receiving more information of the dispositions and plans for the use of nuclear weapons, members of the committee will have their word to say on the subject of 'adequacy', which I am sure is not intended to be a purely unilateral judgment.

ALO 225

(08 Mar 62)

Page 5 of 8

AC-PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION—PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION—NO UNCLASSIFIED REFERENCE IF THE DATE-TIME GROUP IS QUOTED.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS

COPY NR

SECRET

FORM 100-100000 Form 140-1 Nov 58

Classification made
Library for

~~SECRET~~

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS

USNMR SHAPE UNITED STATES MESSAGE


ALO 225

OFFICIAL OUTGOING MESSAGE

Page 6

"(c) On the third question I believe the whole problem of security to be so fundamental to the whole object of the present exercise that we should set up forthwith a working group -- to draw up a set of ground rules for the handling of the information which we are to receive. In earlier discussions a consensus of view seems to have emerged that any information transmitted to the committee should be restricted to the smallest number of individuals compatible with efficient operation. It was also agreed that information should only be transmitted to member governments by private letter or word of mouth, and that the number of individuals in capitals having access to it should be severely limited.

"But there is another whole series of questions of a practical nature which will have to be looked into, e.g. how information received should be processed; where it should be kept, exactly how it should be transmitted to member governments, whether some special staffing and classification arrangements are necessary; and so on. Some of these are relatively technical points and we may need security experts to advise us. If the Council would be agreeable to setting up a special working group on these lines, perhaps delegations would indicate which of them would like to participate. I would suggest that the chair might be taken by the Executive Secretary, who would have the Head of the Security Bureau present to advise him.



ALO 225

(08 Mar 62)

Page 6 of 8

AC-PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION—PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION—NO UNCLASSIFIED REFERENCE IF THE DATE-TIME GROUP IS QUOTED.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS

COPY NR. _____

NO US EUCOM Form 34-D 1 Nov 54

~~SECRET~~

Library for

SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS


USNMR SHAPE

UNITED STATES MESSAGE

ALO 225

OFFICIAL ~~SECRET~~ MESSAGE

Page 7



ALO 255

(08 Mar 62)

Page 7 of 8

AC-PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION—PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION—NO UNCLASSIFIED REFERENCE IF THE DATE-TIME GROUP IS QUOTED.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS

COPY NR.

HQ US EUCOM Form 34-D 1 Nov 56

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET


Library for
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS

USNMR SHAPE UNITED STATES MESSAGE

ALO 225

OFFICIAL OUTGOING MESSAGE

Page 8



ORIG: OSACEUR (USELM)

DIST: COBS, SPASAC-INT, DUSCINCEUR (P)

ALO 225

(08 Mar 62)

DTG: 081100Z
Page 3 of 8

AC-PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION—PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION—NO UNCLASSIFIED REFERENCE IF THE DATE-TIME GROUP IS QUOTED.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS

COPY NR. _____

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS

USNMR SHAPE
UNITED STATES MESSAGE

1939
NATO Atomic Policy
Wet

OFFICIAL OUTGOING MESSAGE
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

SECRET

USNMR SHAPE, PARIS, FRANCE
LAURIS NORSTAD, GEN, USAF

TO: CJCS

NR: ALO 225


08 March 62

EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN LEMNITZER FROM GEN NORSTAD.

Last night Secretary General Stikker discussed with me for upwards of two and a half hours the following draft paper, which he presented as the paper from which he would talk at the NATO Council meeting this afternoon and which would then be circulated on some basis. I requested that it not be used without further study, confirmation and consideration, and at the end of our discussion he agreed not to use it at this time. I suspect, however, that the delay would only be for a few days and I am therefore forwarding it to you for the consideration of the Chiefs of Staff. In a separate message to follow, I will raise some questions and make some observations on the Stikker draft.

QUOTE: "NATO DEFENCE POLICY

"Draft Statement by the Secretary General for the Council Meeting on Thursday 8th March.



ALO 225

(08 Mar 62)

Page 1 of 8

NO PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION—PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION—NO UNCLASSIFIED REFERENCE IF THE DATE-TIME GROUP IS QUOTED.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS

COPY NR. 5

UNCLASSIFIED

FORM NO. 104 1 Nov 55

NR 151-24 10/85 / Atomic Nuclear Policy 1962 (4)

Classification made for Library for purposes.

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET


SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS

USNMR SHAPE UNITED STATES MESSAGE

ALO 225

OFFICIAL ~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~ MESSAGE

Page 2



AC-PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION—PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION—NO UNCLASSIFIED REFERENCE IN THE DATE-TIME GROUP IS QUOTE: (S) UNQUOTE: (S)

ALO 225

Page 2 of 8

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS

COPY NR. _____

UNCLASSIFIED

USNMR SHAPE

UNITED STATES MESSAGE

ALO 225

PAGE 3

OFFICIAL OUTGOING MESSAGE

"5. These are all statements of the highest importance. The Council will, I am certain, share my appreciation of the clarity of the assurances indicated by Ambassador Finletter. These seem to me to correspond fully to the sense of paragraph 7 (a) and (b) of NDP/62/2 and to provide the indispensable basis for further progress in our discussions on NATO defence policy.

"6. In the meantime we received on the 2nd March the proposal for a Nuclear Committee in a note by the U.K. Delegation.

"As Permanent Representatives have not had the opportunity to express opinions of this document, I venture to make later on one or two comments myself in addition to those which I already made at the Council meeting of 2nd March.

"In order to bring the discussion a step further I would like to draw the attention of the Council to the following points which are based on opinions already expressed in the Council or on private discussions.

"7. [Redacted area]

"(a) This brings us then to the first question with which the Council is faced. We have to find a mean between the vital requirements of security and the need for the Council as a whole and for member countries individually to have all the information necessary to give them a proper insight into the problem of nuclear defence.

ALO 225

(08 Mar 62)

Page 3 of 8

AC-PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION—PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION—NO UNCLASSIFIED REFERENCE IF THE DATE-TIME GROUP IS QUOTED.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET

COPY NR.

Information made
Library for

SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS

USNMR SHAPE

UNITED STATES MESSAGE

ALO 225

SECRET-NOFORN


Page 4

OFFICIAL OUTGOING MESSAGE

"(b) The second question which follows from the first is how far any collective mechanism set up for handling such information should also play an active consultative role in regard to the plans for nuclear defence.

"(c) The third question, which also follows from the first, is just how to tackle the security problem, since an agreement on this is a pre-requisite to the receipt of any information at all -- and the nature of the arrangements made will determine the amount of detail which the U.S. and no doubt the U.K. Governments are ready to give about their strategic forces, and the Supreme Allied Commanders about their planning.

"8.



ALO 225

(08 Mar 62)

Page 4 of 8

AC-PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION—PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION—NO UNCLASSIFIED REFERENCE IF THE DATE-TIME GROUP IS QUOTED.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS

COPY NR.

UNCLASSIFIED

action made
Library for

SECRET


SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS

**USNMR SHAPE
UNITED STATES MESSAGE**

OFFICIAL OUTGOING MESSAGE
~~SECRET - NOT OMI~~

Page 5

ALO 225



(08 Mar 62)

Page 5 of 8

ALO 225
AC-PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION—PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION—NO UNCLASSIFIED REFERENCE IF THE DATE-TIME GROUP IS QUOTED.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS

COPY NR.

SECRET

Classification made for Library for

UNCLASSIFIED


SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS

USNMR SHAPE UNITED STATES MESSAGE

ALO 225

OFFICIAL OUTGOING MESSAGE

Page 6



ALO 225

(08 Mar 62)

Page 6 of 8

AC-PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION—PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION—NO UNCLASSIFIED REFERENCE IF THE DATE-TIME GROUP IS QUOTED.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET

COPY NR. _____

Library for

SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS


USNMR SHAPE

UNITED STATES MESSAGE

ALO 225

OFFICIAL ~~SECRET~~ MESSAGE

Page 7



ALO 255

(08 Mar 62)

Page 7 of 8

AC-PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION—PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION—NO UNCLASSIFIED REFERENCE IF THE DATE-TIME GROUP IS QUOTED.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS

COPY NR.

SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET

Electrostatic reproduction made
by the Eisenhower Library for
preservation purposes.


SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS

USNMR SHAPE UNITED STATES MESSAGE

ALO 225

OFFICIAL ~~OUTGOING~~ MESSAGE

Page 8



ORIG: OSACEUR (USELM)

DIST: COFS, SPASAC-INT, DUSCINCEUR (P)

ALO 225

(08 Mar 62)

DTG: 081100Z
Page 8 of 8

AC-PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION—PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION—NO UNCLASSIFIED REFERENCE IF THE DATE-TIME GROUP IS QUOTED.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS

COPY NR. _____

UNCLASSIFIED

2736 NO. FOFOL 1183

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DATE March 9, 1962	EC 98
FOR COMMUNICATIONS USE ONLY		

FROM: USRO PARIS

TO: ACTION; SecState WASHINGTON

102 MAR 9 PM 8 22
 2:53 DEFENSE

RECEIVED
 PARIS, FRANCE

See 21 Mar 62 for
 statement read to NAC

LCMT DISTRIBUTION

Re TOPOL 1342.

I appreciate understanding reflected, partial of problem with which we are faced here in pursuing our program of obtaining support for US policy in a way that will maintain confidence and momentum initiated by McNamara and Rusk statements in December. The problem that we have is to present our over-all strategy in a balanced way that will reflect an affirmative approach by the United States on all aspects of NATO defence strategy. It would be wrong,

in my view, to discuss only nuclear aspects discussed in TOPOL 1304 in interval before Athens meeting. We must and set stage for Athens meeting that will provide proper context for our discussion of nuclear aspects in order to be persuasive. Discussion in EAC March 8, particularly question raised by Germans, shows interrelationship of nuclear and non-nuclear aspects.

I think it very important that we start laying groundwork in our presentation which will carry over and provide framework for public relations at Athens meeting. By this I mean that we should not think that the EAC will be ready to take new decisions in principle at Athens, and that we should rather consider Athens meeting as a progressive step in our program leading to ultimate decisions.

CONCURRENCES:
 LHM: Mr. Durbrow

DRAFTED BY: GSmith
 POL: JJWolk/ma 3/9/62
 AUTHORIZED BY:
 Ambassador Filmer

- DISTRIBUTION ACTION TO:
- POL-5 INFO TO.
 - GES-7
 - ECOM-2
 - DEF-7
 - P7
 - AMB
 - LHM
 - MINSCON
 - POL-5
 - ULMER
 - STOESSER
 - SHAPOL
 - EOCCEN-1
 - HAS
 - CINCEUR-8

/3

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED

NOTE: ANY CORRECTIONS MADE ON THIS COPY MUST BE MADE ON ALL OTHER COPIES

DECLASSIFIED
 MAR 99-109-10
 3/12/89

1989/2736
 607-69
 101
 YLL MK Case No.
 Document No.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

Page 2

You have asked me in POLTO 1342 to suggest an alternative approach. I would hope you could authorize me, preferably at next Tuesday's meeting which will open further exploratory discussions on guidelines, to begin talking about US concept of the interrelationship between nuclear and non-nuclear aspects of required NATO deterrent strength. With respect to non-nuclear strength, I recall that Secretary Rusk's presentation to SAC on Berlin build-up spoke of MC/70 levels. Similarly, Secretary McNamara's presentation at December Ministerial Meeting spoke in order of magnitude of already agreed NATO forces. I would therefore like to begin talking about non-nuclear needs in terms of MC 25/4 levels and MC 55/3 standards. These are agreed NATO requirements, and are, generally speaking, with the additional factor of mechanization of divisions, the same levels referred to previously by Secretaries Rusk and McNamara.

I would then go on to attempt to deal with concern expressed by Germans in MC March 3 and to outline broader aspects of our policy, including points set forth below.

I am persuaded that only this sort of balanced presentation will create necessary framework for nuclear information you will be making available to me and for a sound consideration of our strategic thinking. Points I would make are:

.../

Electrostatic reproduction made
Library for

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

Page 3

The case for the conventional build-up.

1. American military policy is pragmatic. It is aimed at increasing the present factors which work to persuade the Communists that any resort to force will not pay -- while at the same time developing fighting forces which, if war comes, offer good ground of actually defending European territory.

2. [I will say categorically at the start - American military policy does not contemplate large scale, long continued non-nuclear fighting in Europe - and] In regard to my German colleague's recent question, the US does not propose that resort to nuclear war be deferred until "forward strategy" forces are overwhelmed - when it might be too late. With modern intelligence techniques, my Government is certain that the USSR cannot mount an overwhelming non-nuclear attack in secret. We propose that our known strategy will clearly signal to the communist planners that a massive non-nuclear attack would, if persisted in, trigger off general nuclear war in which all belligerents would suffer extensive devastation, and with massive destruction in the Soviet Union.

3. [^{to rely on nuclear weapons.} ~~U.S. strategy continues basically~~ ^{Insert} Our defence expenditures for nuclear weapons systems ^{have been substantially increased} have not been reduced.] This strategy is designed to reduce the chances that war will come - chances which we believe have increased as the Soviets become bolder - as over Berlin - with each passing year of their nuclear build-up.

4. Far from reducing the credibility of the nuclear deterrent, we are convinced that [a ^{greater} harder crust of] non-nuclear power is an essential element of a truly believable nuclear deterrent threat.

[This American strategy is not just rhetoric for foreign consumption.] The U.S. is banking on the correctness of this strategic view by spending and planning to spend tens of billions of dollars to implement it over the coming years.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
UNCLAS
SECRET

Library for preservation purposes

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

Page 4

We believe that unless we take this additional costly load, the communists, by nibbling aggressions, can cumulate great victories. We have seen enough evidence in Laos, South Vietnam, Cuba and Berlin to convince us that the threat of automatic nuclear retaliation for ^{limited} communist aggression is a wasting asset.

With all of us ⁱⁿ NATO now facing great Soviet nuclear strength, we think that a ^{approaching} detourment policy ^{would be} nuclear automaticity is both irresponsible and likely in the long term to be ineffective. *But my own counter to guideline idea is pg 3 above*

The United States' relatively long responsibility as trustee for each of the Alliance's nuclear power has generated full awareness of the awful nature of a decision to resort to nuclear force. If at all possible, any such decision should only be taken after consultation with Alliance members. This would require time.

And may I say that members of the Alliance who want to be assured of having a chance to influence any nuclear decision, can advance this interest best by working to increase the Tica factor - by building up ^{the required} a non-nuclear shield force. During this time, other pressures will hopefully also be taking place. The aggressor will have a last clear chance to stop and only thus avoid his own destruction.

A strong non-nuclear military supplement to our nuclear defense posture would relieve not only our defense but also our diplomacy from an inordinate dependence on the nuclear threat. For example the present great discrepancy between communist and NATO non-nuclear power in Europe has been an unnecessarily complicating element in our efforts to develop arms control plans under which security would not be prejudiced.

My government believes that at least the non-nuclear force strength called for in MC 26/4 is required to assure minimum needed continuing credibility for the all important nuclear deterrent. My government also believes that this message has been approved by Smith, Burke, Levy and this mission. MC 55/1 standards should be attained.

FINLETTER

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

MEANS
~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

Electronic reproduction made
by the Eisenhower Library for
preservation purposes.
9/9/62

FROM: GEN LEMNITZER, WASHINGTON
TO: GEN NORSTAD, PARIS
NR: JCS 0496-62

CIN: 18567
DTG: 090028Z MAR 62 ZFF1
TOR: 090138Z
TYPED BY: THM

ZDFI 090759Z

1. REF YOUR PRS 0567 YOU MAY BE SURE THAT I AM INSISTING ON COORDINATING THE SUBJECT PRESENTATION WITH YOU BEFORE IT IS PRESENTED TO ANYONE. I GAVE STRICT INSTRUCTIONS TO THAT EFFECT LAST WEEK WHEN I FIRST DISCOVERED THAT SUCH A PRESENTATION WAS BEING PREPARED IN ISA AND STATE. IN FACT, WHEN I HEARD ABOUT THIS PROJECT, I DEMANDED THAT THE DRAFT PRESENTATION (IN ITS THEN PRESENT FORM) BE GIVEN TO THE JCS. THIS WAS DONE AND WE PROMPTLY DISAPPROVED THE ENTIRE DRAFT. WE FOUND THAT WHAT HAD BEEN GINNED UP BY CERTAIN ACTION OFFICERS UPON DIRECTIONS FROM DOD AND STATE CIVILIAN OFFICIALS CONTAINED A GREAT AMOUNT OF VERY HIGHLY CLASSIFIED AND SENSITIVE DATA FROM THE SIOP AND YOUR CONTINGENCY PLANS.

2. AS THE RESULT OF THIS EPISODE THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS WERE TAKEN:

A. EVERYONE WHO HAD BEEN INSTRUMENTAL, EVEN REMOTELY, IN PROVIDING WAR PLANNING INFORMATION AND DATA FOR THE SUBJECT PRESENTATION CAUGHT HELL FROM THE JCS OR, IN THE CASE OF SERVICE PERSONNEL, FROM THEIR RESPECTIVE CHIEFS.

B. THE PRESENTATION WAS CATEGORICALLY REJECTED BY THE JCS AND OFFICERS WHO WERE WORKING ON THE PROJECT WERE GIVEN GUIDANCE AND DIRECTED TO UNDERTAKE A DIFFERENT APPROACH.

C. A DRASTIC TIGHTENING UP ON ALL WAR PLANNING INFORMATION AND DATA WAS IMMEDIATELY UNDERTAKEN.

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

Norstad P/85 / Admin Review Policy 1962 (4)
DECLASSIFIED

D. INsofar AS THE JCS CAN INFLUENCE THE MATTER--AND WE INSIST THAT WE HAVE AN IMPORTANT RESPONSIBILITY IN THIS REGARD--THE NEW EFFORT WILL BE COORDINATED WITH YOU BEFORE BEING PRESENTED TO ANYONE.

E. I HAD A CONFERENCE WITH NITZE AND ROWAN (WHO ARE THE TOP DOD REPRESENTATIVES INVOLVED) AND INFORMED THEM OF THE JCS VIEWS, ESPECIALLY ON THE WAR PLANNING INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE DRAFT, THE NEED TO COORDINATE WITH YOU AND THE SLOPPY MANNER IN WHICH THIS PROJECT HAD BEEN HANDLED TO DATE. THEY HAD TO ADMIT THAT I WAS RIGHT AND THAT THE PROJECT WAS PERMITTED TO GET FAR OFF THE TRACK. THEY AGREED TO THE RECYCLING EFFORT.

3. WHAT SHOOK US MOST WAS THE MEEK AND MILD MANNER IN WHICH OFFICERS IN UNIFORM DID THINGS DIRECTED BY CIVILIAN OFFICIALS WHEN THEY KNEW, OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN, THAT THEY WERE VIOLATING THE CARDINAL PRINCIPLE THAT WAR PLANNING INFORMATION AND DATA MUST BE TIGHTLY HELD ON A STRICT NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

4. NEW SUBJECT: REFERENCE OUR PHONE CONVERSATION THIS MORNING, I DIRECTED GENERAL GRAY (JCS REPRESENTATIVE) TO PRESS THE AMBASSADORIAL GROUP HARD AT TODAY'S MEETING TO APPROVE YOUR RECOMMENDATION ON THE AIR CORRIDOR SITUATION USING THE 24 SOVIET FLIGHTS IN THE NORTHERN CORRIDOR TOMORROW AS THE LEVER. AS YOU INDICATED, U.S. AND FRENCH APPROVAL OF YOUR PROPOSAL WAS CONTINGENT ON BRITISH APPROVAL WHICH HAS NOT AS YET BEEN OBTAINED.

UNSECRETIFIED

JCS 0496-62 CONTINUED

5. WE GOT LITTLE SUPPORT FROM STATE AND WERE UNABLE TO MAKE ANY HEADWAY. IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY SERIOUS DETERIORATION IN THE AIR CORRIDOR SITUATION IT WAS CONSIDERED BETTER TO LEAVE THE QUESTION OPEN FOR THE TIME BEING RATHER THAN FORCE BRITISH INTO A FLAT NEGATIVE DECISION WHICH MIGHT LATER BE DIFFICULT TO REVERSE. FOR THIS REASON, I AM INFORMED THAT AN AMBASSADORIAL GROUP MESSAGE TO YOU ON THE STATUS OF YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS WAS NEVER SENT.

6. IN ADDITION, STATE IS RELUCTANT TO ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL U.S. AUTHORITY ON THE EVE OF GENEVA WITHOUT VERY COGENT REASONS. I SUGGEST THAT ANY ADDITIONAL REASONS YOU MAY HAVE BASED ON THE CURRENT SITUATION BE FORWARDED FOR USE WITH THE BRITISH OR FOR OBTAINING POSSIBLE U.S. UNILATERAL AUTHORITY.

7/10/62

20

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

4255

RM/R

March 10, 1962

FILE

SECRET

Dear Bob:

On March 9 you discussed with the Secretary the question of possible help to the French in the missile field, in exchange for which the French would assist in our defense foreign exchange expenditures in the amount of \$250 million annually. The Secretary's answer on this was transmitted later in the day via Foy Kohler's telephone conversation with Paul Nitze. I wanted also, however, to state our position directly in a letter to you.

The basic point is that any assistance to the French in the missile field is just as important an aid to their independent nuclear program as assistance in the form of warhead technology or compressors for gaseous diffusion plants. The French effort to develop missiles is an integral part of their entire nuclear program, inseparable from the other aspects. Hence, aid to the missile program would be directly contrary to the basic policy of not aiding the French national program. Basic NSC policy of April 21, 1961, makes this clear by including aid to the French missile program in its general prohibition on aid to the French program. As you will also recall, this policy has twice been affirmed in personal messages to Ambassador Gavin.

I am afraid that the French, in connection with the Lavaud visit, are attempting to "buy" a change in our basic policy by offering substantial balance of payments relief.

Important as such relief may be, I am sure you agree that our policy in this field is of such importance to

our

The Honorable
Robert S. MacNamara,
Secretary of Defense.

microfilmed by RM/R

SECRET

751.56 11
3-10-62
XR-740.5
XR-711.5
XR-811.10

4


UNCLASSIFIED
Authority NND 94953 REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
By CEP NARA Date 2/21/95

SECRET

- 2 -

our whole position in the Alliance that it clearly is
of overriding importance.

Yours ever,


George W. Ball

SECRET

EUR:RA: Fessenden

3463

3/16/43
Get with
RP

26

SANITIZED COPY



MAR 16 1962

ANNEX A

NSC ACTION "NATO AND THE ATLANTIC NATIONS"

In reaching our recommendations on objectives and procedures the principal objective of the NSC policy directive has been interpreted to be consideration of allied positions looking toward cohesion of the Alliance.

Concerning nuclear forces, the NSC NATO Action provided that:

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

This policy was conveyed to the North Atlantic Council by Ambassador Finletter on April 26, 1961. The NAC has been briefed by General Norstad concerning the substantial nuclear capability that exists within NATO.

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that all reasonable command and control measures must be developed and employed consistent with operational requirements.

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3,4
NLK-88-77
By SE NARA, Date 3/16/43



1
Incl. to L

1523



To improve command and control, certain measures were indicated and actions have been taken. Steps have been taken to improve communications to the U. S. custodial units which control U. S. weapons for NATO.

After development of these devices, each weapon system used by NATO will be considered and, consistent with operational requirements, a decision will be made whether the device will be installed and at what level control of the link will be exercised.

In the meantime, General Partridge has suggested measures which should be taken immediately to:

- "b. Additional resources should be used to

The 1963 MC-70 goals, as well as the proposed 1966 goals, should be reviewed by the State and Defense Departments from this standpoint."



Such a review of U. S. and Allied commitments reveals a number of nuclear weapon system programs which are beyond recall without serious adverse political effects. These programs are not inconsistent with SACEUR's 1966 force requirements since in each case, the commitments are less than indicated as required in 1966.

"c. The Secretary of Defense should undertake a study of the extent to which nuclear weapons in NATO Europe could be made more secure.

Some possible safeguards to be considered in such a study are discussed in the body of this report. These include making SACEUR headquarters and communications more secure against wartime disruption."

These problems have been studied in detail by General Partridge's Committee and others as indicated previously. In addition, Dr. Johnson, The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy) and General Leon Johnson have made a thorough review of this matter. Both have supported the conclusions of General Partridge's study and the resulting action taken concerning the

This is a matter of continuing interest, however, and additional actions may be necessary in time.

"d.

Immediate actions have been taken in this regard as a result of the reviews conducted by General Partridge and Dr. Johnson. The dual channel for release of weapons and nuclear forces in use by SACEUR/USCINCEUR have been reviewed and actions have been taken to correct deficiencies and strengthen this system.

27-2533
Box 502
CF 2074

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED
(1)
(2)
FOR INFORMATION

SECRET
Sec/rel MC/10

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

() EASSETT cc

() DOWNGRADE TO SECRET

Date: March 11, 1962
Time: 12:00 Noon
Place: Hotel Beau Rivage
Lausanne

Participants:

United States

Mr. Foster
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Bohlen

Germany

Mr. Carstens
Mr. Krapf
Mr. von Hase
Mr. Foerster

Subject: Berlin and Disarmament

Copies to: S/S-AMER¹⁰⁴ DFR/D Embassy LONDON (For Amb.)
S/P Embassy BONN (For Amb.) DOD - Sec. McNamara
G SecDel CIA - Mr. McCone
S/B ACDA The White House
EUR Embassy MOSCOW (For Amb.)
GER Embassy PARIS (For Amb.)

Mr. Kohler said that he did not think it was possible to go on longer with the conversations between Thompson and Gromyko; that they had been pretty well used up and both had stated their positions. If there was to be any continuance of these talks, there would have to be a discussion of other subjects if only because the Soviets would surely bring them up. He mentioned in this connection security and the declarations of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. He thought it would be much better to make these part of the package on Berlin rather than leave them to the 17-power conference.

Drafted by: CEBohlen

Cleared by: Mr. Foster

SECRET

SECRET

Mr. Carstens agreed that the Thompson talks with Gromyko seemed to have run their course and he complimented Ambassador Thompson on his handling of the discussion, but wondered if there was not some desirability of continuing conversations for the sake of conversation. He mentioned that there was a new element in their paper, to which he had already referred, namely, the possibility of increased technical contacts with the East Germans. He said that the crucial point for them was whether it was wise to link Berlin and the disarmament question; that they felt that the Soviets might use any such connection as a basis for the right to intervene in Berlin affairs. For example, the Soviets could claim a breach of non-fulfilment of the other arrangements in order to denounce the agreement on Berlin.

Mr. Kohler replied that he thought it would work the other way around and that these supplementary arrangements would operate to hold the Russians to any agreement on Berlin.

there was some discussion in regard to the formulation of a Warsaw Pact-NATO Declaration which it was agreed would not involve the question of recognition.

Mr. Kohler remarked that their purpose was not to confine any agreement on security to the Federal Republic but rather to broaden it. It was his view that they should get something in return for a non-diffusion formula. Ambassador Thompson stated that in Moscow there were indications of some uncertainty in Soviet policy and that they were in effect balancing on the edge of some new decisions. It was clear, however, that the Soviets wished to continue the conversations. The party then broke up for lunch.

After lunch they reassembled except for Mr. Kohler who joined the Secretary and the Foreign Minister. Part III of the German paper, i.e., disarmament and security, was discussed.

Mr. Foster said he thought that this was very important in view of the attitude of other NATO countries, as well as the small size of the U. S. Delegation. He said that Mr. McIntyre had been designated regularly as an officer but that others of the Delegation could see the Germans depending upon circumstances. Mr. Krapf agreed with Mr. Foster's remarks and said they would have only one man at the Consulate General for the disarmament consultations and for the short period he and van Hase would be here for consultations on Berlin.

SECRET

SECRET

Mr. Porter inquired what was meant by the word "intercontinental" in Paragraph 9 and was told that this was taken from the Paris paper of last summer and meant that the scope of investigation would be intercontinental and that there could be some posts on the eastern U. S. seaboard as well as posts in the Soviet Union up to the Urals.

Mr. Porter then outlined the U. S. thought as to the possibility of progressive zones of inspection coupled with sampling techniques. He pointed out that they did not envisage a zone in the area of confrontation, i.e., Germany, and that the system would be applied generally. He said that we were working on this concept with our scientists and mathematicians, but that we did not have in mind any particular arrangements with Germany which would involve any form of discrimination. Ambassador Thompson remarked that he assumed that this would not apply to the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Berlin, to which von Hase agreed.

Mr. Porter said that the idea of these areas of inspection had been devised to meet the Soviet objection concerning the alleged American desire to engage in espionage throughout the entire country. It would in effect be a check on the honesty of the declarations which either side made; that this had been briefly discussed in the 1958 surprise attack negotiations. He pointed out that we were well aware of the dangers inherent in this system, particularly in its being transferred into special inspection zones as mentioned by the Germans. But he felt that by its widespread application this danger could be avoided. For example, he said if we agreed to cut nuclear delivery systems by 10%, then by an inspection in selected areas of the system, we could

7

B-1

c-3

test the honesty of the Soviet Declaration and eventually by progression this would end up with 100% inspection. He pointed out the difference between this and the so-called de-nuclearized zones which the Soviets were talking about.

Mr. Foster pointed out that the zone could not be local and that each side would offer several zones for selection by the other.

Mr. Foster pointed out that this project was subject to much study and was primarily to meet the charge that the United States was seeking 100% inspection. He also pointed out that the first zones very possibly might be in the United States and the USSR and that eventually might include the area of NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries. He also emphasized that sampling plus the zonal system would give a good deal of knowledge as to developments in other parts of the country. For example, if there were 20 zones an inspection of 25% of this number might approximate an over-all coverage of 50% and an inspection of 50% might actually approximate 80-90% coverage.

Mr. Foster concluded by saying that this idea had first been suggested in 1960 and that the combination of zonal inspection with sampling was a later development.

Mr. von Hase in conclusion said that he had one more point to raise, and that was the desire of the German Government to inform the neutrals, not here in Geneva but in their capitals, of the German view on disarmament. This would be merely for information and would not in any way interfere with the disarmament discussions. Mr. Foster said he thought that this would be a very useful move to make.

Attachment: German Paper.

CEB:elm:3-12-62

manly
~~SECRET/LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

SecDel MC/1

17

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: March 11, 1962
Time: 2:00 p.m.
Place: Hotel Beau Rivage
Lausanne, Switzerland

Participants:

United States

The Secretary
Mr. Foy D. Kohler
Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand

Germany

Foreign Minister Schroeder
State Secretary Carstens

Subject: Berlin

Copies to:

SecDel	INR/D	DOD - Sec. McNamara
S/S	S/B	CIA - Mr. McCone
S/P	Amembassy BONN for Ambassador	WH ✓
G	Amembassy LONDON for Ambassador	BSP
EUR	Amembassy PARIS for Ambassador	
GER	Amembassy MOSCOW for Ambassador	

After lunch the Secretary and Foreign Minister Schroeder resumed their conversation. The Secretary said we were inclined to believe that the Thompson-Gromyko talks have no future and that the possibilities in this forum have been exhausted unless there were to be some change in Soviet policy. Even if there were such a change, it would probably only be reflected at the Foreign Ministers' level or at the Summit. As we analyze the present situation in terms of what the Soviets are saying and doing, the Secretary continued, we conclude that they feel unable either publicly to change their position or to pass to the point of war. How, then, can we move to reduce tensions and to prevent a crisis? Perhaps some new and additional forum for discussion could be set up, not by all the participants in the disarmament meetings in Geneva but by the Big Four--possibly at the level of Deputy Foreign Ministers. The Deputies could gnaw and talk at various aspects of the situation with no sense of hurry, somewhat as in the Austrian

~~SECRET/LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

NSA/75/Gen-02

case. In such a forum a wide range of subjects could be considered.

As Ambassador Grewe has been told, the Secretary observed, we have a stated and long-standing national policy on the subject of nuclear non-diffusion. The Soviets have no doubts as to what this policy is. We, however, have no commitment from the Soviets on this subject. We are not of course so much interested in East Germany as in Red China. In this kind of framework we would talk only of transfer to national control, and must obviously protect ourselves against confusing this with the NATO problem. If we did not bring subjects of this sort up in the Deputy Foreign Ministers' forum, then they would have to be discussed in the disarmament context where we would get nothing for them.

Mr. Kohler noted that in the discussion which he, Mr. Bohlen and others had had with Dr. Carstens and others prior to lunch (while the Secretary was talking privately to Foreign Minister Schroeder), the subject had been carried somewhat further. He felt that the period which had extended from December 1958 up to the present had now come to an end. Soviet policy, which might be described as one of "Russia first", was affected by the Red China situation, and there was little question but that the Soviet Union was being more decisive in tightening up Eastern Europe. The idea of talking merely for the sake of talking was unacceptable. The possibility of talks focussed only on access had been exhausted in the Thompson-Gromyko exchanges. The same point had been made both with respect to nuclear non-diffusion and to a NATO--Warsaw Pact non-aggression agreement, namely, that our best interests would be served in ascertaining whether we could get something for these in the talks which we would have with the Soviets.

Referring to the nine-point paper which the Germans had handed us, Mr. Kohler said it seemed we could accept the German position on talks between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic.

Dr. Carstens said that in the pre-luncheon period there had been a long discussion about bringing the two subjects mentioned by Mr. Kohler into talks on Berlin with the Soviets. He had raised two objections: (a) the West did not want to give the Soviets an excuse for violating an arrangement on Berlin, and (b) if Berlin were linked to nuclear non-transfer the Soviets could say they agreed but the commitment must be confined to the two parts of Germany. On the first point Mr. Kohler commented that we thought of any link as working in precisely the opposite direction, that is, giving the Soviets a motive for observing a Berlin arrangement. Dr. Carstens

said he was impressed by this argument. The Secretary noted that the Soviets likewise may be stuck on the subjects of West Berlin and access. They had not picked up the general remarks on broader points which he had made during his talks with Gromyko last fall, and which Ambassador Thompson had made in the Moscow talks. On Dr. Carstens' second objection to linking Berlin to nuclear non-diffusion, the Secretary said we obviously could not accept confining a commitment only to the two parts of Germany since this would be contrary to our own fixed policy.

Foreign Minister Schroeder stated that, as Minister of the Interior, he had favored the idea of a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty organization in the Federal Defense Council. There were two recognized difficulties: recognition of the GDR and possible slackening of Western efforts to keep up NATO force levels. However, despite these, he favored moving ahead on such a non-aggression agreement. He was sure a formula could be found to avoid the GDR recognition problem. One country could sign for all, or some other arrangement could be worked out. The Secretary suggested that perhaps the Senior Permanent officials of both organizations could sign the Pact. Somewhat ironically, Schroeder observed, when he was Minister of the Interior his views on this subject had always been opposed by the Foreign Office. Now that he was Foreign Minister the idea still seemed acceptable to him. Perhaps the West could start by suggesting unilateral declarations. Even if such a pact were a mere formality, if the Soviets seemed to place value on it (given their penchant for formal pacts), he thought it would be good even from the NATO viewpoint to join in it. In a sense, it would have a cohesive effect on the NATO organization. Dr. Carstens said he wanted to point out that NATO as such was not a subject of international law and therefore could not itself conclude a treaty. The Secretary said at this point he wanted to give what he called his "Pufendorf lecture." As Pufendorf had said, there is no better source of international law than governments. If NATO and the Warsaw Pact organization were to enter into such an agreement then international law would grow correspondingly. The Secretary added that we have, of course, no illusions that this would give us any additional security. Schroeder commented that the Soviets have talked for more than five years about the desirability of such a pact. If it was so important to them and the recognition problem could be avoided, he did not think it was a bad idea. He noted that this and the nuclear non-diffusion point seemed to constitute two useful items. Dr. Carstens said he had finally come to the same conclusion.

Referring to the nine-point paper which he had given the

now

-4-

Secretary, Schroeder noted that it had only been written this morning after having been discussed with his advisers on the train from Bonn yesterday. He had not studied it carefully but he thought it provided a useful reflection of German thinking.

The Secretary said that he fully agreed with two points in the German paper, one stated and one implied. We could not afford to accept disarmament measures affecting the security of the West adversely, even though they might have propaganda value. Moreover, he did not see any profit in disarmament arrangements singling out Germany and therefore discriminating against Germany. The disarmament issues at the Geneva conference were a problem between Moscow and its allies and the United States and its allies. They encompassed the globe. However, they had more to do with what happens in the European area than elsewhere, because that is where the major confrontation of force is located. It was an inescapable fact about the arms situation that Europe was the area where the arms were brought to bear on each other. Anything accomplished on disarmament therefore must affect regional arrangements. We have nothing in mind which would discriminate against Germany or lead to disengagement. However any progress in the disarmament field is bound to affect the military situation in this part of the world. Schroeder observed that Europe was already too small in relation to the Soviet land mass to constitute a meaningful zone in any sense. He referred to the 1957 London conference proposal of a 5 degrees--40 degrees zone, which the Federal Republic and France preferred to amplify as the zone covering the Atlantic to the Urals. Anything narrower than this would be insufficient. The Secretary said that the zonal concept was necessarily enlarged by the greater range of modern missiles, as the President had indicated in his recent press conference.

Schroeder referred to the Secretary's statement made to him during the Adenauer visit last fall that surely the Germans did not want the some twenty-odd Soviet divisions forever in East Germany. This was certainly true, but every discussion of the subject inevitably raised the question of the British and American divisions in the Federal Republic. These could not be equated with the Soviet divisions, since they could not be kept in Europe once they were removed from Germany, and the net result would be greatly increased European vulnerability to conventional war. The Secretary commented that the Germans were understandably nervous about the strategic situation in Europe. However, take two hypothetical cases: (a) supposing we were to say that we will keep no more than five divisions in NATO countries if the Soviets would keep no more than five divisions in the Warsaw Pact area; if the Soviets accepted this, we would surely agree; (b) if, however, the Soviets said that they would take out ten divisions if we would take ten divisions out of NATO, this would obviously be unacceptable. The United States

-5-

is going to be adequately represented in the European defense establishment to ensure the safety of Europe, because this is both our policy and our need. If we in the West eventually find ourselves in the position where we can ensure our security with sea-borne missiles, then it would obviously be in our interest to thin out the Soviet-massed MRBM's. We cannot propose this now because we do not have the capacity, but it would be to our advantage to do something about this kind of Soviet missile deployment if we could. Schroeder commented that it would be impossible to get the Soviets to diminish the number of MRBM's on their own soil. This being the case the West needed more than just a few ships. He would prefer to know there were a few Western MRBM's on European soil. The Secretary said that some day, when he would no longer be in office, it would surely be to the advantage of Europe for the Soviets to know there were no MRBM's in Europe. In response to Schroeder's query as to how the West could have a deterrent under such conditions, the Secretary said that basically the deterrent was provided by an invulnerable weaponry. Schroeder said this might be true but people tended to believe more in the value of having something on solid ground.

Mr. Kohler said that the formulation on frontiers in the nine-point German paper was one which we could perhaps table. The Secretary observed that the frontier point was not worth much. The Soviets knew, after all, that the Oder-Neisse line was not going to be changed. Schroeder said that sound and consistent theory on reunification and an all-German peace treaty required that the final settlement of the border question be reserved until that peace treaty.

The Secretary said he had mentioned the possibility of Deputy Foreign Ministers' talking over this range of subjects for a protracted period. Did the Germans anticipate Soviet-Federal Republic talks at any stage? Schroeder said he really did not think so. He wanted to work out his ideas more precisely on talking to the Soviets generally but not specifically on Berlin. The Secretary observed that Gromyko might be very uncommunicative with him either because the Soviets were aiming at a Summit or because they wanted to try out talks with the Germans now that they recognized the Thompson-Gromyko talks had no future. Schroeder said there was no reason to believe the Soviets would do any differently with the Germans than they had in the Thompson-Gromyko talks. He would first prefer a modus vivendi on Berlin; thereafter he would be prepared to have talks with the Soviets. The Germans had to make clear that the Soviets could not have a European settlement not based on self-determination and expect to get a Federal Republic signature

thereto. The Secretary said that a basis for any further talks with the Soviets must be their abstention from unilateral harassments of Berlin access. Dr. Carstens said that Kroll had made this point when he handed over the German memorandum. Schroeder observed that a modus-vivendi on Berlin would open the way for the Germans to discuss all outstanding issues of mutual concern. Now they were reluctant to get into talks. The pressures on poor little Germany left all alone in this situation would be very intense. Picking up Schroeder's remark the Secretary said he wondered whether the Federal Republic realized how grown up it had become. Schroeder admitted this might be true, but added that the Germans only considered themselves to have the status of sub-lessees in Berlin.

With respect to East Germany, the Secretary stated, the attractions of the Federal Republic must be overwhelming. Schroeder said this would be true if there were a Western type regime in East Germany, but there was a totalitarian regime. He knew of no case where a democracy had successfully accomplished a peaceful penetration of a totalitarian state. The Secretary cited Poland and Mr. Kohler, Yugoslavia. Schroeder said he could not accept this since the developments in these countries had proceeded essentially from nationalistic causes. Mr. Kohler admitted that in Yugoslavia, at a given moment, something had happened which we did not control, but we had responded and exploited the possibilities. Our economic aid to Yugoslavia had so changed the system there that it would probably be impossible to revert back to a purely Marxist form of economy. Schroeder said that if the GDR system could be changed by economic aid, the Federal Republic would extend it. In response to the Secretary's statement that he thought there was some feeling of Germans as Germans in the GDR, just as Poles are Poles in Poland, Schroeder said the basic difference was that Germany was divided and that the intensity of bitterness between East and West Germans was intensified by this. The Secretary said he believed the East Germans would have the same desire to reestablish contacts with Western civilization that he had noted in Poland when he was still with the Rockefeller Foundation. Schroeder repeated his point about the division of Germany and how this had increased the level of bitterness. His government was obviously interested in doing everything to make the East Germans feel a common bond as Germans. Mr. Kohler remarked that, in this context, the establishment of technical commissions could be useful.

Record Number 59745

Berlin Crisis
 Memorandum of Conversation
 03/11/1962

DOCUMENT TYPEDATECIRCDLOCORCLLNOVARTYORIGIN

United States. Department of State

SIGNATORDESTODESTPCLASSIFICATION

Secret

TITLE

Berlin

CTIT

[German Position on Rusk-Gromyko Talks]

NAMES

Schroeder, Gerhard

NAMES

Thompson, Llewellyn E.

NAMES

Gromyko, Andrei A.

NAMES

Grewe, Wilhelm

NAMES

Kohler, Foy D.

NAMES

Bohlen, Charles E.

NAMES

Carstens, Karl

NAMES

Rusk, Dean

NAMES

Adenauer, Konrad

TERMS

Medium-range ballistic missiles

ORGAN

Warsaw Pact

ORGAN

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

LINEX

Ø

EXEMPPGS

6

ed in S, 3/12/62

65 D 330,7146 3/11/62
E118 (R) F
XN Secylo Mofe

STATE *[Signature]* IS/FPC/CDR

Date: 3/9/62

() DECLASSIFY
() DECLASSIFY
IN PART

MR Cases Only:
EO Citations

SECRET/LIMITED DISTRIBUTION
SecDel MC/1

1

DELETE Non-Responsive Info
EXEMPTIONS
A Exemptions

TS authority to
() CLASSIFY as
() DOWNGRADE TS to

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: March 11, 1962
Time: 2:00 p.m.
Place: Hotel Beau Rivage
Lausanne, Switzerland

Participants:

United States

Germany

The Secretary
Mr. Foy D. Kohler
Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand

Foreign Minister Schroeder
State Secretary Carstens

Subject: Berlin

Copies to:

P.W.-1-23	SECRET	INR/D -9	DOD Sec McNamara-1
	S/S-4-ANDERSON	S/B -10	CIA - Mr. McCone -16
	S/P-5	Amembassy BONN for Ambassador-11	WH -17
	G-6	Amembassy LONDON for Ambassador-12	BUM -18
	EUR-7	Amembassy PARIS for Ambassador-13	
	G-ER-8	Amembassy MOSCOW for Ambassador-14	

RMIR-2

After lunch the Secretary and Foreign Minister Schroeder resumed their conversation. The Secretary said we were inclined to believe that the Thompson-Gromyko talks have no future and that the possibilities in this forum have been exhausted unless there were to be some change in Soviet policy. Even if there were such a change, it would probably only be reflected at the Foreign Ministers' level or at the Summit. As we analyze the present situation in terms of what the Soviets are saying and doing, the Secretary continued, we conclude that they feel unable either publicly to change their position or to pass to the point of war. How, then, can we move to reduce tensions and to prevent a crisis? Perhaps some new and additional forum for discussion could be set up, not by all the participants in the disarmament meetings in Geneva but by the Big Four--possibly at the level of Deputy Foreign Ministers. The Deputies could gnaw and talk at various aspects of the situation with no sense of hurry, somewhat as in the Austrian

SECRET/LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

case. In such a forum a wide range of subjects could be considered.

As Ambassador Grewe has been told, the Secretary observed, we have a stated and long-standing national policy on the subject of nuclear non-diffusion. The Soviets have no doubts as to what this policy is. We, however, have no commitment from the Soviets on this subject. We are not of course so much interested in East Germany as in Red China. In this kind of framework we would talk only of transfer to national control, and must obviously protect ourselves against confusing this with the NATO problem. If we did not bring subjects of this sort up in the Deputy Foreign Ministers' forum, then they would have to be discussed in the disarmament context where we would get nothing for them.

Mr. Kohler noted that in the discussion which he, Mr. Bohlen and others had had with Dr. Carstens and others prior to lunch (while the Secretary was talking privately to Foreign Minister Schroeder, the subject had been carried somewhat further. He felt that the period which had extended from December 1958 up to the present had now come to an end. Soviet policy, which might be described as one of "Russia first", was affected by the Red China situation, and there was little question but that the Soviet Union was being more decisive in tightening up Eastern Europe. The idea of talking merely for the sake of talking was unacceptable. The possibility of talks focussed only on access had been exhausted in the Thompson-Bronsko exchanges. The same point had been made both with respect to nuclear non-diffusion and to a NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression agreement, namely, that our best interests would be served in ascertaining whether we could get something for these in the talks which we would have with the Soviets.

Referring to the nine-point paper which the Germans had handed us, Mr. Kohler said it seemed we could accept the German position on talks between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic.

See notes of 12 noon WGM

Dr. Carstens said that in the pre-luncheon period there had been a long discussion about bringing the two subjects mentioned by Mr. Kohler into talks on Berlin with the Soviets. He had raised two objections: (a) the West did not want to give the Soviets an excuse for violating an arrangement on Berlin, and (b) if Berlin were linked to nuclear non-transfer the Soviets could say they agreed but the commitment must be confined to the two parts of Germany. On the first point Mr. Kohler commented that we thought of any link as working in precisely the opposite direction, that is, giving the Soviets a motive for observing a Berlin arrangement. Dr. Carstens

said he was impressed by this argument. The Secretary noted that the Soviets likewise may be stuck on the subjects of West Berlin and access. They had not picked up the general remarks on broader points which he had made during his talks with Gromyko last fall, and which Ambassador Thompson had made in the Moscow talks. On Dr. Carstens' second objection to linking Berlin to nuclear non-diffusion, the Secretary said we obviously could not accept confining a commitment only to the two parts of Germany since this would be contrary to our own fixed policy.

Foreign Minister Schroeder stated that, as Minister of the Interior, he had favored the idea of a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty organization in the Federal Defense Council. There were two recognized difficulties: recognition of the GDR and possible slackening of Western efforts to keep up NATO force levels. However, despite these, he favored moving ahead on such a non-aggression agreement. He was sure a formula could be found to avoid the GDR recognition problem. One country could sign for all, or some other arrangement could be worked out. The Secretary suggested that perhaps the Senior Permanent officials of both organizations could sign the Pact. Somewhat ironically, Schroeder observed, when he was Minister of the Interior his views on this subject had always been opposed by the Foreign Office. Now that he was Foreign Minister the idea still seemed acceptable to him. Perhaps the West could start by suggesting unilateral declarations. Even if such a pact were a mere formality, if the Soviets seemed to place value on it (given their penchant for formal pacts), he thought it would be good even from the NATO viewpoint to join in it. In a sense, it would have a cohesive effect on the NATO organization. Dr. Carstens said he wanted to point out that NATO as such was not a subject of international law and therefore could not itself conclude a treaty. The Secretary said at this point he wanted to give what he called his "Pufendorf lecture." As Pufendorf had said, there is no better source of international law than governments. If NATO and the Warsaw Pact organization were to enter into such an agreement then international law would grow correspondingly. The Secretary added that we have, of course, no illusions that this would give us any additional security. Schroeder commented that the Soviets have talked for more than five years about the desirability of such a pact. If it was so important to them and the recognition problem could be avoided, he did not think it was a bad idea. He noted that this and the nuclear non-diffusion point seemed to constitute two useful items. Dr. Carstens said he had finally come to the same conclusion.

JRN

RECEIVED
JUL 2 1964

THE NEXT 1 PAGES HAVE BEEN
OMITTED AS THEY ARE OUTSIDE THE
SCOPE OF YOUR REQUEST.

I

XV
NR

Mr. Kohler said that the formulation on frontiers in the nine point German paper was one which we could perhaps table. The Secretary observed that the frontier point was not worth much. The Soviets knew, after all, that the Oder-Neisse line was not going to be changed. Schroeder said that sound and consistent theory on reunification and an all-German peace treaty required that the final settlement of the border question be reserved until that peace treaty

The Secretary said he had mentioned the possibility of Deputy Foreign Ministers' talking over this range of subjects for a protracted period. Did the Germans anticipate Soviet-Federal Republic talks at any stage? Schroeder said he really did not think so. He wanted to work out his ideas more precisely on talking to the Soviets generally but not specifically on Berlin. The Secretary observed that Gromyko might be very uncommunicative with him either because the Soviets were aiming at a Summit or because they wanted to try out talks with the Germans now that they recognized the Thompson-Gromyko talks had no future. Schroeder said there was no reason to believe the Soviets would do any differently with the Germans than they had in the Thompson-Gromyko talks. He would first prefer a modus vivendi on Berlin; thereafter he would be prepared to have talks with the Soviets. The Germans had to make clear that the Soviets could not have a European settlement not based on self-determination and expect to get a Federal Republic signature

thereto. The Secretary said that a basis for any further talks with the Soviets must be their abstention from unilateral harassments of Berlin access. Dr. Carstens said that Kroll had made this point when he handed over the German memorandum. Schroeder observed that a modus-vivendi on Berlin would open the way for the Germans to discuss all outstanding issues of mutual concern. Now they were reluctant to get into talks. The pressures on poor little Germany left all alone in this situation would be very intense. Picking up Schroeder's remark the Secretary said he wondered whether the Federal Republic realized how grown up it had become. Schroeder admitted this might be true, but added that the Germans only considered themselves to have the status of sub-lessees in Berlin.

With respect to East Germany, the Secretary stated, the attractions of the Federal Republic must be overwhelming. Schroeder said this would be true if there were a Western type regime in East Germany, but there was a totalitarian regime. He knew of no case where a democracy had successfully accomplished a peaceful penetration of a totalitarian state. The Secretary cited Poland and Mr. Kohler. Yugoslavia. Schroeder said he could not accept this since the developments in these countries had proceeded essentially from nationalistic causes. Mr. Kohler admitted that in Yugoslavia, at a given moment, something had happened which we did not control, but we had responded and exploited the possibilities. Our economic aid to Yugoslavia had so changed the system there that it would probably be impossible to revert back to a purely Marxist form of economy. Schroeder said that if the GDR system could be changed by economic aid, the Federal Republic would extend it. In response to the Secretary's statement that he thought there was some feeling of Germans as Germans in the GDR, just as Poles are Poles in Poland, Schroeder said the basic difference was that Germany was divided and that the intensity of bitterness between East and West Germans was intensified by this. The Secretary said he believed the East Germans would have the same desire to reestablish contacts with Western civilization that he had noted in Poland when he was still with the Rockefeller Foundation. Schroeder repeated his point about the division of Germany and how this had increased the level of bitterness. His government was obviously interested in doing everything to make the East Germans feel a common bond as Germans. Mr. Kohler remarked that, in this context, the establishment of technical commissions could be useful.

EI
3/11/62
EXCISE

4

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FPC/CDR

BT Date: 5/29/92

() RELEASE () DECLASSIFY
(X) EXCISE (X) DECLASSIFY
() DENY IN PART
() DELETE Non-Responsive Info
FOIA Exemptions B1
PA Exemptions _____

MR Cases Only:
EO Citations _____
TS authority to:
() CLASSIFY as () S or () C OADR
() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C OADR

SECRET
SecDel MC/6

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: March 11, 1962
Time: 12 noon
Place: Beau Rivage Palace
Hotel, Lausanne

Participants:

United States

The Secretary
Mr. Hillenbrand

Germany

Foreign Minister Schroeder

Subject: Berlin and Related Subjects

Copies to:

S/S Amembassy BONN
S/P Amembassy LONDON
G Amembassy PARIS
EUR Amembassy MOSCOW
GER USEER, Berlin
S/E SecDel
INR/D White House

Foreign Minister Schroeder began by saying that he had not had the slightest doubt about US intentions in the Berlin question. He believed that we approached the matter in the same spirit as during the November conversations in Washington. The Secretary said he appreciated his remarks. We have been disturbed in Washington over press stories and rumors regarding German distrust and suspicion of American policy. This sort of thing erodes the relationship between allies. It was a fundamental fact that the United States was as much interested in the defense of Europe as anyone else; in fact we have put more on the line than any other country in this connection. We also believe that the Federal Republic has the same interest as we in peace with the Soviet Union. Rumors of this kind should not

SECRET

MSA

SECRET

- 3 -

Schroeder said that to provide liaison during the Disarmament Conference he was leaving four men in Geneva to strengthen the German Delegation to the International Organizations in Geneva. The four would be: Von Hase, Krapf, Foerster and Balken. He would be grateful if they could be shown cooperation.

Noting that the Secretary had asked Ambassador Grews about the Chancellor's health, Schroeder said that the date for his vacation in Italy had not been fixed, but the Chancellor had hoped to spend four weeks there. He needed the rest and relaxation. He assumed he would go in a week or ten days. If the Secretary could leave via Cadinabbia, the Chancellor would like very much to see him. The Secretary said he did not know yet how long he would be in Geneva; he expected to go back in about 10 days. He probably could not go to Italy, for this would mean a trip to Rome would also be necessary. However, he was grateful for the invitation.

Schroeder then said he wanted to ask for advice. He was seeing Lord Home tomorrow night. He wondered whether it might be useful thereafter, since he had never met Gromyko, if he should take advantage of an opportunity which might arise to pay his respects. He wondered what the Secretary thought. He would not like to discuss Berlin or disarmament with Gromyko, but he did think he might explain about Kroll and refer to the German memorandum as representing his Government's views. He was not prepared to go to Geneva, however, since the Secretary and Lord Home would have come to see him somewhere outside of Geneva. He would in any case want to speak to the Chancellor about it first to avoid any misunderstanding. The Secretary said that Schroeder need have no concern over him or, he was sure, Lord Home. No discourtesy would be involved if Schroeder called on Gromyko in Geneva. Nor would the Secretary be disturbed if he discussed Berlin and disarmament with him. Schroeder commented that there were special reasons why he should not discuss these

SECRET

Baden meeting between the Chancellor and de Gaulle. Schroeder noted that he had been present at the entire meeting and in fact had had two hours alone with de Gaulle. The latter had been determined to have nothing to do with the Geneva talks, although at that time, the possibility of sending an observer had apparently not yet been ruled out. French absence was regrettable but there was nothing that could be done about it in a practical sense. De Gaulle was preoccupied with the Algerian problem and had given the impression that he anticipated that the hardest part was still to come. The Secretary commented that we need France's help and were not getting it. De Gaulle's insistence that the Three Powers direct the Free World was really a path to isolation. The Free World will not accept a tri-partite directorate. Schroeder said he also saw a contradiction in the French attitude relative to the Federal Republic. France knew that the concept of a Three Power directorate was painful to the Federal Republic. At the same time, the French doubted that the United States would remain in Europe and stressed, therefore, the need to build up the strength of Western Europe with France as the center of that strength. The Federal Republic and France could work together in the positive sense of developing Western Europe. He hoped that a meeting in early May of the Heads of Governments in Rome would make further progress towards cooperation. This, however, must be in addition to rather than in place of the integration already achieved by the Common Market Organization in the economic sphere.

After a discussion of the German vested assets question reported in a separate memorandum of conversation, the Secretary said that he wanted to discuss with Schroeder the question of where we go on Berlin in view of the fact that the Thompson-Gromyko talks have ended. Schroeder commented that the British differed a little on whether they had ended. At this point the Secretary and Foreign Minister Schroeder joined their colleagues for lunch.

Drafting Officer: Mr. Hillenbrand
March 12, 1962

SFC M of C

E116
Date: 3/11/62

Dist made
3/31/62
E. Evans

DEPARTMENT OF STATE	IS/FRC/CDR
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info	
FOIA Exemptions _____	TS authority to
PA Exemptions _____	<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as <input type="checkbox"/> S or <input type="checkbox"/> C OADR
	<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to <input type="checkbox"/> S or <input type="checkbox"/> C OADR

Approved in S
3/23/62

SECRET

SecDel M of C

1

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: March 11, 1962
Time: 4:00 p.m.
Place: U.S. Delegation Office
15 Mission Geneva

Participants:

United States

The Secretary of State
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Komer
Ambassador Thompson

United Kingdom

Lord Home
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh
Sir Frank Roberts

Subject: British-American Bilateral Talks

Copies to:

PW-1-2-3
S-ANDERSON-4
O-5
P-6
EAF-7
GER-8
WE-9
ENA-10
RA-11
L-12
INR/D-13

American Ambassador Moscow-18
American Ambassador LONDON-17
American Ambassador BONN-16
American Ambassador PARIS-15
SecDel
S/B-14
DOD-Sec. McNamara-19
CIA-Mr. McCone-20
The White House-21
RMIR-2

Negotiations with the Soviets

The Secretary opened the conversation by reviewing briefly his talk with German Foreign Minister Schroeder. Following this he set forth our estimate that while there had been absolutely no give in the Soviet position during the bilateral talks we have had with them, still there is no evidence they are preparing for a showdown. However, it seems likely that they consider that they are stuck with public positions. We had considered whether we could develop a sort of

generalized

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

generalized formula under which it would be possible to set up a continuing negotiating forum such as Deputy Foreign Ministers. Lord Home wondered whether this would fill the Soviet requirements since he felt that a summit conference was an immediate goal of Khrushchev. The Secretary replied that it might even be possible to have a Summit Conference which would serve to launch the continuing Deputy Foreign Ministers forum. In response to a further question from Lord Home as to the content of the formula, the Secretary said this might provide for a continuance of existing access procedures (that is, at a suitable date, not as now under harassment) to which could be added items regarding non-transfer of nuclear weapons, no use of force to effect boundary changes and a NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression arrangement. At least this would enable us to put forward an agenda broad enough to be of some interest to the Russians. This idea was based on an assumption that the Russians were not out really to take over access and that such a formula would give them a chance to draw away. If this assumption proved to be wrong then we were faced with a crisis and showdown in any event. Lord Home observed the Secretary's formula did not touch on the status of the city of West Berlin which seemed a prime Soviet point or the question of the presence of Allied troops in Berlin. He suggested that we might also be able to add something about practical dealings with the GDR. If we did not add such elements Lord Home feared we would simply face a Soviet charge that this was another Western delaying tactic.

Turning to Sir Frank Roberts, the Secretary asked his opinion as to whether the Soviets would be more receptive to his formula if it were launched at a Summit meeting in May. Sir Frank thought that this would enhance the attractiveness of the proposal. Ambassador Thompson agreed but went on to point out with reference to Lord Home's remarks that our position was that the matter of our staying in West Berlin was not negotiable and that this would have to be made clear. The Secretary resumed, saying that it might be possible to add to the formula some reference to the ultimate reunification of Germany and the setting up meanwhile of technical communications between the FRG and the GDR. Ambassador Thompson commented that two recent developments might be interpreted as a good sign. Khrushchev's speech to the Central Committee Plenum had made clear that the conflict with the Chinese would continue. Furthermore it seemed possible that the big Soviet loan to Ulbricht might be a sort of sop to him in lieu of positive action with respect to the peace treaty and status of West Berlin. Lord Home, who had been reflecting on the conversation, then agreed it would be useful to try out a formula along these lines. Sir Evelyn

Shuckburgh

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

Shuckburgh asked whether we would envisage the result of this as parallel declarations or what? The Secretary replied that he thought it was possible that a quadripartite paper could be developed to which all four powers would adhere. However he felt that there was no use to consult in any detail with the Germans and French unless there was some indication of Soviet interest.

Air Corridors

The Secretary then turned to the subject of the air corridors and reviewed briefly the very serious Soviet maneuvers and harassments of our access. He felt that the use of chaff to jam radars was particularly outrageous and little short of the actual use of firearms. Ambassador Bohlen commented on the surprising nature of this Soviet action contrary to their usual practice of trying to cover their acts with some semblance of legality and expressed the opinion that it would be important to hit Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on this promptly tonight. As evidence of the seriousness with which the US regarded this the Secretary then pointed out to Lord Home that if the dropping of chaff in the air corridors had happened two days earlier it was quite possible he would not be here today. However the news had been received too late to enable him to touch base with the British and others. After some further discussion of the details of the Soviet actions in the air corridors and particularly the filing of flight plans between the altitudes of 7500 and 10,000 feet, the Secretary suggested that the time had come when we should perhaps authorize Norstad to put flights ~~throughover~~ 10,000 feet. Mr. Kohler explained that the US had already given such authority to Norstad but that it was for the time being contingent on British and French agreement. The Secretary then gave Lord Home a copy of the talking points prepared for his meeting with Gromyko tonight. (Attachment) After they had been looked over by the British Delegation it was agreed that these talking points were very suitable for use with Gromyko tonight except for the last sentence of numbered paragraph (1). It was noted that the British could add specific incidents involving British aircraft. The Secretary then suggested a number of possible courses of action that might be taken as follows:

A. In the corridors:

- 1) schedule Allied flights in the same altitudes as Soviet flights, with ten minute time lags;
- 2) schedule Allied flights exactly to coincide in time and altitude with Soviet flights;
- 3) delay

SECRET

SECRET

- 3) delay schedules and inconvenience LOT flights in the same measure as the Soviets have affected our flights; and
- 4) orbit fighters at the entrance to the corridors at normal operational flight elevations.

B. Outside the corridors:

Harass Soviet flights over Western Europe, and over the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and North Sea with

- 1) regular fighter escorts;
- 2) fighter harassment, close buzzing to match Soviet actions with our aircraft; and
- 3) delay of airport clearances.

We could also harass Soviet bloc flights over Western Europe

These were discussed at some length. It was suggested during this discussion that many of these measures could be taken within Norstad's present authority if they were suggested to him by governments; also that the original British condition to authorize flights over 10,000 feet, i.e. that the Soviets attempt to preclude flights in the normal commercial channels of 7500 to 10,000 feet had now been met. While no definite decision was made on these proposed countermeasures it was agreed that the Secretary would serve notice on Gromyko before the dinner tonight of his intent to bring up this serious matter and that the Secretary and Lord Home sometime following the dinner take Gromyko aside and take this question up with him. Meanwhile the Secretary had been attempting to place a phone call to General Norstad. He finally reached the General though with a rather bad connection. General Norstad informed the Secretary that he had sent his recommendations with regard to the latest Soviet maneuvers which should reach us within the hour and that as of tonight he needed no new authority.

Attachment

USDEL:FDKohler :mt:sg

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE *D. Brown* IS/FPC/CDR Date: *3/9/92*

RELEASE DECLASSIFY
 EXCISE DECLASSIFY
 DENY IN PART
 DELETE Non-Responsive Info

MR Cases Only:
 EO Citations:

CLASSIFY as _____ TS authority to _____
 DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () OADR

FOIA Exemptions _____
 PA Exemptions _____

E116A
R

Attachment to
SecDel MC/4

SECRET

BERLIN AIR CORRIDORS

Talking Points

1. I have observed with increasing concern the activities of Soviet aircraft in the Berlin air corridors. We had hoped that it would be possible, in the course of the next week or ten days, to have some fruitful discussions with you regarding Berlin. We cannot and will not hold such discussions, however, when the Soviet Union is carrying on a policy of deliberate harassment of Allied flights through the Berlin air corridors.

2. I would like to leave you under no illusion as to the risk you are running in seeking to interfere with Allied exercise of their rights in the Berlin air corridors. This was brought to the attention of the Soviet Government as recently as February 15 following harassment of United States aircraft by Soviet fighters on February 14.

3. On February 14, 1962, Soviet aircraft on three occasions seriously threatened by close approach United States aircraft flying in the North corridor to Berlin in accordance with quadripartite flight rules under flight plans on which customary flight information had been made available to the Soviet element of the Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC). Soviet MIG's performed acrobatics around the nose of two United States Air Force C-124's, approaching at times as close as twenty feet. A Soviet MIG also approached to within one plane length of a Pan American World Airways aircraft loaded with passengers.

4. On February 19, the Soviet controller in BASC began to file individual flight plans for Soviet military transports. Although the Soviet Government has, in the past, flown occasional individual aircraft along the air corridors, this was the first time it was done on a systematic basis. The Soviet controller sought to portray these flights as "normal", but they were a patent attempt to preempt space in the corridors by flying unnecessary flights. This intention was clearly demonstrated on March 7 when the Soviet controller filed a flight plan for a Soviet II--2 at the same altitude and time that a scheduled Pan American World Airways plane was due in the corridor under a flight plan filed in BASC. When the United States controller asked the Soviet controller to refile his flight plan for another altitude, the Soviet controller refused. Although the Pan American plane reached Berlin safely, the Soviet flight was an obvious attempt to interfere with use by United States aircraft of the air corridors.

5. On March 9

SECRET

5. On March 9 on two occasions, Soviet aircraft made runs across the three air corridors some four miles west of Berlin, employing measures, including the dropping of chaff, designed to interfere with radar. This was a direct and deliberate effort to threaten the safety of flight. There can be no justification whatsoever of such practice in or near the corridors.

6. On March 10, the Soviet controller filed flight plans for Soviet aircraft for March 12, in the South corridor at altitudes between 7,000 and 10,000 feet which are those normally used by aircraft flying to and from Berlin. The Soviet Government knows that these flights will conflict with scheduled flights by Pan American World Airways and Air France aircraft. This tactic represents a further obvious attempt to inhibit legitimate air access to Berlin provided for under the quadripartite agreements.

7. The Soviet Government should not overlook the fact that up to this point the Allies have shown great restraint in the face of severe provocation. The Soviet Government should understand that the Allies have the means to respond with vigor and effectiveness, and that they are not prepared to tolerate persistent Soviet actions directed toward restricting exercise of their rights of air access to Berlin. We expect the Soviet Government to cease its interference in the air corridors. Allied aircraft will continue to fly in the corridors at times and altitudes deemed necessary. We will take the necessary steps to ensure the safety of such flights and will hold the Soviet Government responsible for the consequences of any incidents that might occur.

8. We note that these activities are being intensified on the eve of the Disarmament Conference. This Conference is being held pursuant to a statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations signed by both the US and the USSR and unanimously approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations. In this statement of principles it was agreed that, in order to facilitate the attainment of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, all states should refrain from any actions that might aggravate international tensions. Actions of the Soviet Union which deliberately interfere with well established rights of air access will make the achievement of this goal much more difficult. They will jeopardize the Conference, and threaten most seriously the prospects for discussions on Berlin and other important items.

9. I should add that the Soviet assertion of alleged "GDR" sovereignty over Berlin and over the air corridors overlooks the basic fact that the arrangements for both Berlin and the air corridors antedate by some years the setting up of the "GDR".

* * *

TELEGRAM Foreign Service of the United States of America

INCOMING U.S. MISSION GENEVA

ACTION: SS 5

CONFIDENTIAL OADR
TOP SECRET
Classification

Control: 473

Recd: March 11 1962
4:06 AM (3)

FROM : DEPT

THIS DOCUMENT CONSISTS OF 3 PAGES
No 3 of 6 COPIES, SERIES A.

NO : TOSEC 09, MARCH 10, 9 PM (SECTION 1 OF 2)

N I A C T

EYES ONLY

FOR SECRETARY,

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

Limit Dis/ays only

EXDIS REVIEW

Cat. A - Caption removed; transferred to O/FADRC

Cat. B - Transferred to O/FADRC with additional access controlled by S/S

Cat. C - Caption and custody retained by S/S

Reviewed by: *Ek* Elijah Kelly Jr.

Date: *5/12/92* 19__

VERBATIM TEXT

FOLLOWING IS EXCERPT FROM DOCUMENT MENTIONED , TELEPHONE CALL. BALANCE OF TEXT BEING SENT SUBSEQUENT TELEGRAM TOSEC 10

WE ARE PREPARED TO MEET HALFWAY THE DESIRE EXPRESSED BY YOU AND TO AGREE TO THE CREATION OF A SPECIAL INTERNATIONAL ORGAN ON THE ACCESS TO WEST BERLIN FOR THE PERIOD OF TIME THAT WILL BE DEFINED BY THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN US. THE ORGAN THAT I HAVE IN MIND WOULD ACT AS AN ARBITER IF DIFFICULTIES APPEARED DURING THE PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENTS ON FREE ACCESS TO AND FROM WEST BERLIN. IT WOULD NOT BE EMPOWERED WITH ANY ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS WHICH WOULD GIVE IT AUTHORITY TO DIRECTLY REGULATE TRAFFIC OR SET ITS OWN REGULATIONS ON THE TRAFFIC ROUTES CONNECTING WEST BERLIN WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD

IS/FPC/ODR Date: *5/28/92*

MR Cases Only: *5/28/92*

EO Exemptions: *5/28/92*

DECLASSIFY IN PART

DECLASSIFY

FOIA Exemptions

PA Exemptions

TS authority to () S or () C OADR (X) DOWNGRADE TS to () S or (X) C OADR

CONFIDENTIAL, OADR

TOP SECRET

REPRODUCTION FROM PROHIBITED UNLESS

NSA

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

INCOMING

~~CONFIDENTIAL, OADR~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
Classification

Control: 473

PAGE - 3 -

Recd:

SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT COULD THEN BE FIXED IN A PEACE TREATY WITH THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (OR IN AN ANNEX TO IT), WHICH WILL BE CONCLUDED BY THE SOVIET UNION AND A NUMBER OF OTHER STATES, IF THE WESTERN POWERS HAVE DEFINITELY DECIDED THAT AT THE PRESENT TIME THEY WILL NOT TAKE PART IN A GERMAN PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

UNDER AN AGREED SOLUTION OF ALL THESE PROBLEMS A PART OF WHICH WOULD BE AN AGREEMENT ON THE CREATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL ORGAN ON THE ACCESS TO WEST BERLIN, SUCH ACCESS THROUGH THE TERRITORY OF THE GDR WOULD BE EXERCISED ON THE BASIS OF AGREEMENTS, THAT IS WITH THE OBSERVANCE OF USUAL REGULATIONS AND FORMALITIES WHICH ARE APPLIED TO THE TRANSIT THROUGH THE TERRITORY OF SOVEREIGN STATES. WE KNOW THAT THE GDR IS READY TO ASSUME IN AN APPROPRIATE FORM THE OBLIGATIONS PROVIDING FOR AN UNIMPEDED ACCESS TO AND FROM WEST BERLIN. SHOULD ANY COMPLICATIONS OR FRICTIONS IN THE EXERCISE OF A FREE ACCESS TO WEST BERLIN ARISE, THE LAST WORD WOULD BE WITH THE INTERNATIONAL ORGAN -- ARBITER OF WHICH WE HAVE SAID ABOVE.

BALL

~~CONFIDENTIAL, OADR~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

elb 3/11 5:20am

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS UNCLASSIFIED

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

INCOMING

~~CONFIDENTIAL, OADR~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

Control: 473

PAGE-2-

Recd:

ACCESS. ON THE OTHER HAND, AN AGREEMENT WILL BE REACHED -- IF THE US IS NOT READY YET TO CONCLUDE A PEACE TREATY WITH BOTH GERMAN STATES -- THAT WITH THE CONCLUSION BY THE SOVIET UNION AND BY A NUMBER OF OTHER STATES OF A PEACE TREATY WITH THE GDR THE SITUATION IN WEST BERLIN IS NORMALIZED ON THIS BASIS BY TRANSFORMING IT INTO A FREE DEMILITARIZED CITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR MUTUAL AGREEMENT, AND OTHER QUESTIONS WHICH YOU KNOW ARE BEING SOLVED. THAT WOULD BE A GREAT VICTORY FOR THE CAUSE OF CONSOLIDATING PEACE AND EASING TENSION.

THIS IS A REASONABLE PROPOSAL AND IF WE COULD REACH AN AGREEMENT ON ITS BASIS IT WOULD HELP US TO TAKE OFF THE EXISTING HEAT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. OUR PROPOSAL IS A CONCESSION TO YOU. WE DO NOT WANT TO CREATE DIFFICULTIES FOR YOU, AND YOUR COUNTRY BECAUSE IN YOUR COUNTRY THERE ARE HOT-HEADS; MAY BE THERE ARE SOME AMONG YOUR ALLIES TOO. THESE QUESTIONS ARE CORRECTLY UNDERSTOOD IN OUR COUNTRY AND BY OUR ALLIES. LET US LEAVE THE TROOPS OF THE UN OR NEUTRAL COUNTRIES IN A FREE CITY OF WEST BERLIN FOR 3-5 YEARS TO ALLOW THE NERVES TO COOL DOWN DURING THIS PERIOD OF TIME AND THEN THE WHOLE SITUATION WILL LOOK IN A QUITE DIFFERENT LIGHT.

BALL

~~CONFIDENTIAL, OADR~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

BU 3/11 6:25 AM

FORM 89-11
2/7/58

REPRODUCTION FROM U.S. COPY
RECORDED AND INDEXED TO 815000

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

INCOMING

~~CONFIDENTIAL, OADR~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

Control: 474

Recd:

PAGE-2-

TO BE FRANK, I SIMPLY DO NOT UNDERSTAND SUCH AN APPROACH TO THE APPRAISAL OF THE MEANING OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS.

PERHAPS THE REASON FOR THAT IS THAT WE LOOK AT THINGS FROM DIFFERENT ANGLES, THAT WE VIEW THE SITUATION AND THE CAUSES THAT HAVE BROUGHT IT ABOUT IN A DIFFERENT WAY AND CONSEQUENTLY WE HAVE DIFFERENT VIEWS ON THE METHODS OF ELIMINATING THE EXISTING TENSION. IF YOU COULD DISTRACT YOURSELF FROM THE NOTIONS SO DEEPLY ROOTED OVERSEAS AND LOOK AT THE SITUATION IN THE WAY WE SEE IT AFTER ALL WE HAVE LIVED THROUGH, YOU WOULD PROBABLY SEE FOR YOURSELF THAT IN A GERMAN PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT NOBODY SELLS OR BUYS ANYTHING, NOBODY TRADES UNEQUAL VALUES.

NO, FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF COMMON SENSE THE SITUATION HERE IS QUITE CLEAR. A TERRIBLE BLOOD-SHEDDING WAR TOOK PLACE. THE PEOPLES OF OUR COUNTRIES FOUGHT SHOULDER-TO-SHOULDER AGAINST THE COMMON ENEMY - AGGRESSIVE HITLERITE GERMANY. BY A SUPREME EFFORT AND AT A COST OF COUNTLESS LOSSES WE ACHIEVED THE GOAL - DEFEATED THE ENEMY. BY RIGHT OF CONQUERORS THE FOUR ALLIED POWERS - THE USSR, THE USA, BRITAIN AND FRANCE - OCCUPIED TEMPORARILY, TILL THE PEACE TREATY IS SIGNED, THE TERRITORY OF GERMANY WHO HAD UNLEASHED WORLD WAR II.

AS A HERITAGE FROM OUR PREDECESSORS WE HAVE GOT A DELIMITATION OF OUR TROOPS, WHICH WAS NOT QUITE REASONABLE, AND THE DIVISION OF BERLIN INTO FOUR PARTS. I WAS TOLD THAT WHEN AT THE END OF THE WAR THE PLANS OF OCCUPATION OF GERMANY WERE DISCUSSED AT THE EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMISSION THE BRITISH PROPOSED TO SEAT THE ALLIED CONTROL

~~CONFIDENTIAL, OADR~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM 1/2 COPY
RECEIVED 1/27/50

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

INCOMING U. S. MISSION, GENEVA

ACTION: SS 5

~~CONFIDENTIAL, OADR~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

Control: 474

Recd: March 11, 1962
5:00 AM

THIS DOCUMENT CONSISTS OF 4 PAGES.
NO 3 OF 6 COPIES. SERIES A.

FROM : DEPT

NO : TOSEC 10, MARCH 10, 9 PM (SECTION 2 OF 5)

N I A C T

EYES ONLY SECRETARY, FROM BALL.

VERBATIM TEXT

IN ADDITION THERE EXISTS WEST BERLIN. THE POPULATION OF THIS CITY LIVES UNDER OLD CAPITALIST ORDER WHILE AROUND IT -- ON THE TERRITORY OF THE GDR -- SOCIALIST ORDER HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED. AND HERE WE ARE LOOKING FOR A SOLUTION -- HOW TO ENSURE PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES.

YOU ARE WELL AWARE, THAT BECAUSE OF THE ABSENCE OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AND THE CONTINUATION OF OCCUPATION WEST BERLIN HAS FOR MANY YEARS BEEN CAUSING SERIOUS AND DANGEROUS FRICTIONS BETWEEN US. I WILL NOT CONCEAL THAT WHEN YOU INSIST ON KEEPING YOUR TROOPS IN WEST BERLIN, WE UNDERSTAND IT AS AN EXPRESSION OF A DESIRE TO PRESERVE A NATO BEACHHEAD AND MILITARY BASE AGAINST US INSIDE THE GDR. WE ENTERED BERLIN AS ALLIES BUT WE ARE NOT ALLIES ANY LONGER. MOREOVER -- WE ARE IN DIFFERENT MILITARY BLOC -- YOU ARE IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC BLOC, WE ARE IN THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION -- ORGANIZATION OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES.

~~CONFIDENTIAL, OADR~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

REPRODUCE ON FROM TKS-CO :
NO REPORT UNLESS RELEASED

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

INCOMING

~~CONFIDENTIAL, OADR~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

Control: 474

PAGE - 3 -

Recd:

THE SOVIET UNION PROCEEDS FROM THE NECESSITY TO FIND SUCH A SOLUTION WHICH WOULD NOT CAUSE DAMAGE TO EITHER SIDE; WE MUST SOLVE THIS WHOLE PROBLEM AMICABLY AND, HAVING SOLVED IT, NOT COLLIDE WITH EACH OTHER IN THE FUTURE. IN SHORT, IT IS NECESSARY TO UNTIE KNOTS WHICH CREATE FRICTIONS BETWEEN OUR STATES.

I DO NOT KNOW, WHAT ELSE YOU COULD SUGGEST AS A SOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM. MY COLLEAGUES AND I COULD NOT FIND ANYTHING BETTER FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF POST-WAR RELATIONS OTHER THAN THE CONCLUSION OF A GERMAN PEACE TREATY AND THE NORMALIZATION OF THE SITUATION IN WEST BERLIN ON THIS BASIS. TO USE THE LANGUAGE OF YOUR REPRESENTATIVES, WE DO NOT SELL OR BUY THIS CITY AS A HORSE. WE DO NOT WANT TO OWN THIS HORSE AND IT IS NOT YOUR HORSE AFTER ALL. IT BELONGS TO NONE OF US.

WEST BERLIN HAS TURNED OUT TO BE A CAPITALIST ISLAND IN THE MIDST OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. SO, WHAT! LET IT REMAIN SUCH -- WE DO NOT WANT TO SEIZE THIS ISLAND OR TO LIQUIDATE THE CAPITALIST ORDER WHICH EXISTS ON IT. LET IT BE FIXED WHAT HAS BEEN GIVEN BY HISTORY.

YOU WRITE IN YOUR MESSAGE THAT TWO PRINCIPLES MUST BE TAKEN AS A STARTING POINT: (1) TO AVOID ANY SHIFT FAVORABLE TO ONE SIDE AND DETRIMENTAL TO THE OTHER, AND (2) TO ENSURE A GREATER DEGREE OF STABILITY AND TRANQUILITY IN THE ENTIRE GERMAN SITUATION.

IF ONE ADDS TO THIS THAT IT IS ALSO NECESSARY TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE REAL SITUATION IN GERMANY, I.E. THE EXISTENCE OF THE TWO GERMAN STATES, -- THEN ONE CAN SAY THAT THESE VERY PRINCIPLES FORM THE BASIS OF THE SOVIET PROPOSALS ON THE CONCLUSION OF A GERMAN PEACE TREATY. THE PEACE TREATY SHOULD FIX THE SITUATION WHICH REALLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL, OADR~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY
PROHIBITED UNLESS AUTHORIZED

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

INCOMING

U.S. MISSION GENEVA

~~CONFIDENTIAL, OADR~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

ACTION: SS 5

Control: 474

Recd: March 11 1962
5:23 AM

THIS DOCUMENT CONSISTS OF 3 PAGES
NO 3 OF 6 COPIES, SERIES A.

FROM : DEPT

NO : TOSEC 10, MARCH 10, 10 PM (SECTION 3 OF 5)

N I A C T

EYES ONLY SECRETARY, FROM BALL.

VERBATIM TEXT.

ONE OF THE IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF SUCH SOLUTION IS THE RESPECT FOR THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC. NO ONE DEMANDS FROM THE WESTERN POWERS TO DO MORE THAN OBSERVE GENERALLY ADOPTED NORMS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE WITH REGARD TO THE GDR. ONE CANNOT IGNORE THE DIGNITY AND SOVEREIGN RIGHTS OF A STATE, ESPECIALLY IF ONE WANTS TO USE THE ROUTES OF COMMUNICATIONS CROSSING ITS TERRITORY AS WELL AS ITS SERVICES, IF A DISPLAY OF GOOD WILL IS EXPECTED FROM IT. AND IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION BY PUSHING AGGRESSIVE CIRCLES OF THE FRG TO STILL NEW AGGRAVATIONS OF THE SITUATION IN THE CENTRE OF EUROPE.

YOU WRITE THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD REFRAIN FROM ACTIONS WHICH WOULD BURDEN THE PROCEEDING NEGOTIATIONS. THIS IS A RIGHT IDEA. UNFORTUNATELY, THE WESTERN POWERS ARE STILL TRYING IN EVERYTHING -- BOTH IN MAJOR AND IN MINOR MATTERS -- TO IGNORE AND TREAD ON THE RIGHTS OF THE GDR. THE NATO COUNCIL, -- NOT WITHOUT THE US PARTICIPATION,

~~CONFIDENTIAL, OADR~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS IT IS CLASSIFIED

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

INCOMING

CONFIDENTIAL, OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

Control: 474

Recd:

PAGE - 3 -

OF THE ATMOSPHERE AROUND THE BERLIN AIR ROUTES. TO OUR MIND, THE BEST THING TO DO WOULD BE NOT TO ENCOURAGE CERTAIN HOT-HEADS IN THE NATO, ESPECIALLY AMONG THE MILITARY, BUT TO COOL THEM OFF SO THAT THEY REALIZE AT LAST THAT NO INSTIGATING ACTIONS CAN CHANGE THE SITUATION AND DEPRIVE THE SOVIET UNION AND THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF WHAT THEY POSSESS. ABANDONING BY THE WESTERN POWERS OF THEIR ATTEMPTS TO VIOLATE THE LAWFUL INTERESTS OF THE GDR AND THE USSR WOULD CONSTITUTE THAT VERY ABSTENTION FROM UNILATERAL ACTIONS, CREATING THE DANGER OF OUTBREAK OF SERIOUS INCIDENTS, WHICH THE US GOVERNMENT CALLS FOR.

GENERALLY SPEAKING, IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO FIND IN THE DOCUMENT HANDED BY AMBASSADOR ON MARCH 6 A DESIRE TO FACILITATE AN AGREEMENT. THERE IS, HOWEVER, A STATEMENT IN IT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE US STANDS FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A JUST AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTED QUESTIONS DIVIDING OUR COUNTRIES. THIS STATEMENT IS CORRECT, BUT, UNFORTUNATELY, IT IS NOT SUBSTANTIATED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THE NECESSARY AGREEMENT.

BALL

CONFIDENTIAL, OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

Jlb/elb 3/11 7:45am
RUC 1 2011
2011-08

REPRODUCTION FROM 45 COPY
RECOMMENDED UTILITY CLASSIFIED

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

INCOMING

~~CONFIDENTIAL, OADR~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

PAGE - 2 -

Control: 474

Reed:

SOME PEOPLE ALLEGE THAT WE ARE ATTACKING SOMEONE, DEMANDING A PEACEFUL GERMAN SETTLEMENT. BUT NO SANE PERSON CAN CONSIDER AS AN ATTACK THE TALKS ON THE CONCLUSION OF A PEACE TREATY. AND THE CONCLUSION OF A PEACE TREATY MEANS PUTTING AN END NOT ONLY TO THE STATE OF WAR BUT ALSO THE THE STATE OF HOSTILITY WHICH RESULTS FROM AN UNACCOMPLISHED PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

I BELIEVE THAT WE, THE MEN VESTED WITH GREAT TRUTH AND RESPONSIBILITY BY OUR PEOPLES, SHOULD UNDERSTAND ALL THIS CORRECTLY AND SHOULD OPPOSE OPINIONS WHICH SOMETIMES PUSH US TO THE WRONG WAY. TO SAY IT STRAIGHT: LET US NOT FRIGHTEN EACH OTHER WITH WORDS. WE HAVE SEEN ENOUGH OF FRIGHTENING. YOU PARTICIPATED IN THE WORLD WAR II, I PARTICIPATED NOT ONLY IN THAT WAR. BOTH OF US ARE AWARE WHAT WAR MEANS AND AS THE LEADERS OF STATES WE KNOW WHAT MILITARY MEANS ARE NOW AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE USSR AND THE USA. LET US NOT COUNT BY PIECES WHO HAS MORE OR WHO HAS FEWER MODERN MEANS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. EACH OF OUR COUNTRIES HAS ALREADY STOCK-PILED MORE THAN ENOUGH MEANS TO INFLICT AN IRREPARABLE DEVASTATING BLOW.

THE SOVIET UNION INTENDS TO CONCLUDE A GERMAN PEACE TREATY. IF WE DO NOT FIND COMMON LANGUAGE WITH YOU AND YOU YOURSELF DO NOT WANT TO TAKE PART IN THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT THEN THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER STATES WILL SIGN THE PEACE TREATY WITH THE GDR.

MY COLLEAGUES AND I HAVE MUCH PONDERED -- HOW TO BRING CLOSER OUR POSITIONS ON THE QUESTIONS UNDER DISCUSSION INCLUDING THE PROBLEM OF ENSURING A FREE ACCESS TO WEST BERLIN. YOUR RECENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL, OADR~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

REPRODUCTION IN FULL COPY
RESTRICTED UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

INCOMING U.S. MISSION GENEVA

ACTION: SS 5

~~CONFIDENTIAL, OADR~~
~~TOP SECRET~~
Classification

Control: 474

Recd: March 11 1962
5:42 AM

THIS DOCUMENT CONSISTS OF 3 PAGES
NO 3 OF 6 COPIES, SERIES A.

FROM : DEPT

NO : TOSEC 10, MARCH 10, 9 PM (SECTION 5 OF 5)

N I A C T

EYES ONLY SECRETARY, FROM BALL.

VERBATIM TEXT.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

SPECIFICALLY I HAVE IN MIND THE FOLLOWING:

(INSERT IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TOSEC NINE)

I HOPE THAT THE THOUGHTS, EXPRESSED BY ME, WILL ALLOW US TO
CONCENTRATE OUR ATTENTION IN THE COURSE OF THE TALKS ON THE MAIN
QUESTIONS AND TO ACHIEVE A NECESSARY PROGRESS IN THE NEAREST FUTURE.

IT WAS MY INTENTION TO DWELL UPON IN THIS MESSAGE ONLY ON THE
GERMAN PEACE TREATY. BUT IN THE MEANTIME I WAS INFORMED ABOUT THE
CONFIDENTIAL CONVERSATION WITH YOUR BROTHER.

HE SAID THAT SINCE WE HAD NOT ACHIEVED ANY PROGRESS ON BERLIN
QUESTION, YOU CONSIDER IT NECESSARY TO MAKE AN EFFORT TO FIND THE

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL, OADR~~

REF: OADR 10 11 1962
TOP SECRET

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

INCOMING

~~CONFIDENTIAL, OADR~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Classification~~

Control: 474

PAGE - 3 -

Recd:

ACCOMMODATION ON A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS IS REACHED BEFORE IT BY OUR MINISTERS, THAT IS IF THE QUESTIONS ARE PREPARED FOR THEIR FINAL DISCUSSION, APPROVAL AND FORMALIZING AT THE MEETING OF THE HEADS OF STATE. I AM ALWAYS READY FOR SUCH A MEETING IN ORDER TO ENSURE A NECESSARY ACCOMMODATION. WHEN I AM SPEAKING ABOUT SUCH A MEETING AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL I BELIEVE THAT BOTH OUR PEOPLES ARE EQUALLY INTERESTED IN IT. AFTER ALL, WHEN THE FATE OF THE MANKIND IS AT STAKE WE AS STATESMEN, MUST USE ALL THE OPPORTUNITIES TO JUSTIFY THE GREAT TRUST PLACED UPON US. IT CERTAINLY HAPPENS SOMETIMES THAT EFFORTS OF MINISTERS ALONE ARE NOT ENOUGH AND THEN FOR THE SAKE OF SUCCESS AND IN THE INTERESTS OF PEACE THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT HAVE TO JOIN THE EFFORT.

OUR NEW AMBASSADOR WILL SOON ARRIVE. I RECOMMEND HIM TO YOU AND I AM CONFIDENT THAT HE WILL REPRESENT THE SOVIET UNION IN YOUR COUNTRY WELL. HE ENJOYS THE FULL CONFIDENCE OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND MY FULL CONFIDENCE. WHENEVER YOU NEED TO CONVEY SOMETHING TO ME IN A CONFIDENTIAL WAY HE WILL BE ABLE TO TRANSMIT THIS TO ME PERSONALLY.

DALL

~~CONFIDENTIAL, OADR~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Classification~~

bm/eib 3/10 5:15am

RECEIVED
MAR 10 1954

RECEIVED IN FOOT
FBI WASH DC

1 COPY
MAR 10 1954

31
ACTION
SS
Info

3/12/62
Bundy only P
WFF 2

Department of State

SECRET

Control: 7728
Rec'd: March 12, 1962 002
3:13pm

FROM: GENEVA
TO: Secretary of State
NO: SECTO 16, MARCH 12, 6 PM

EYES ONLY

3 destroyed 3/24
of sub's
of sub's
of sub's

NI ACT

EYES ONLY FOR PRESIDENT AND ACTING SECRETARY

NO OTHER DISTRIBUTION

REPORTING TELEGRAMS WILL GIVE NATURE OF CONVERSATIONS THUS FAR WITH GROMYKO AND HOME.

IN MY BILATERAL WITH GROMYKO TODAY I BEGAN UNFOLDING MODUS VIVENDI, USING PORTIONS ON BERLIN, NUCLEAR DIFFUSION AND NON-AGGRESSION AS EXAMPLES OF TECHNIQUES OF SOLUTION WE HAD IN MIND. AT SAME TIME I NOTED OTHER SUBJECTS COULD BE INCLUDED. GROMYKO NOTED ABSENCE OF "SOVEREIGNTY OF GDR" AND "STATUS OF WEST BERLIN". HE DID NOT CLOSE DOOR OF PROPOSED TECHNIQUE AND ATMOSPHERE ENTIRELY CALM DESPITE EFFORT MADE PREVIOUS EVENING BY HOME AND ME TO PRESS HIM ON BERLIN INCIDENTS. AM SEEING GROMYKO AGAIN AT TUESDAY LUNCH AND WILL CONTINUE WITH MODUS VIVENDI ALONG LINES INSTRUCTION. SINCE GROMYKO CLEARLY ACKNOWLEDGED I WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT ALLIES, BELIEVE I CAN GO SOMEWHAT FURTHER WITHOUT ALLIED CONSULTATION ON DETAILS. HOWEVER, DO NOT BELIEVE I SHOULD GIVE HIM A PIECE OF PAPER JUST YET.

ON NUCLEAR TEST BAN, BRITISH CONTINUE TO BELIEVE OUR AMENDMENTS LACK GLAMOR BUT THINK OUR GENERAL DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS HAVE MUCH SUBSTANCE AND GREAT APPEAL. THEY THINK, THEREFORE, MIGHT BE SOME MERIT IN NOT PRESSING GROMYKO ON NUCLEAR TESTS UNTIL AFTER WE HAVE DISCLOSED GENERAL DISARMAMENT PLANS. I WOULD PREFER TO MEET BRITISH ON THIS THAN ON MERITS OF TEST BAN PROPOSALS, ESPECIALLY THEIR HOPE THAT WE COULD RELY ON NATIONAL DETECTION CAPABILITIES. GROMYKO SEEMS FLATLY TO REJECT ANY TEST BAN INSPECTION IN USSR ON USUAL GROUNDS OF ESPIONAGE. WE NEED NOT FEEL UNDULY CONCERNED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

N5F/186/Gromyko-Push Zella

EYES ONLY

SECRET

-2- SECTO 16, MARCH 12, 6 PM, FROM GENEVA

ABOUT THIS BECAUSE IF THEY ARE UNWILLING TO SWALLOW GNAT OF TRIVIAL AMOUNT OF TEST BAN INSPECTION THERE IS LITTLE HOPE. THEY WILL SWALLOW CAMEL OF FAR-REACHING INSPECTION REQUIRED FOR GENERAL DISARMAMENT.

HAVE VERY MUCH IN MIND YOUR DESIRE TO SURFACE A REASONABLE NEW OFFER ON NUCLEAR TESTS BUT TIMING HAS NOW BECOME A FACTOR. ALSO AM TRYING TO COMBINE SERIOUS ATTITUDE ON BERLIN INCIDENTS WITH RECOGNITION OF IMPORTANCE LEAVING AVENUES OPEN FOR ADJUSTMENT BERLIN CRISIS.

MARTIN

BAP

THE ATTACHED COPY IS FOR THE DIRECTOR

SECRET

WIRING TELEGRAM

Department of State

Phas seen

~~SECRET~~

Control: 8791
Rec'd: March 13, 1962
6:45 pm

M
Action
SS
Info

FROM: GENEVA
TO: Secretary of State
NO: SECTO 26, MARCH 13, 11 PM

*Copy destroyed
5/23/64*

EYES ONLY FOR PRESIDENT AND ACTING SECRETARY

SEPARATE TELEGRAM CONTAINS BRIEF ACCOUNT ONE HOUR CONVERSATION WITH GROMYKO ALONE. TRANSLATION REDUCED THIS TO ABOUT FIFTEEN MINUTES EACH SIDE. I TRIED TO PRESS GROMYKO TO STATE SPECIFICALLY WHETHER SOVIET INTENTION WAS TO DIMINISH WESTERN POSITION IN BERLIN. HE EVADED DIRECT ISSUE BY SAYING (A) THERE IS NO FOUNDATION FOR SUCH AN IDEA BUT (B) SOVIET PROPOSALS INVOLVE NO SUCH EFFECT ON WEST. I PULLED (A) OUT OF CONTEXT AS SHOWN PARA 14 REPORTING TELEGRAM.

LORD HOME SPENDS THIS EVENING WITH GROMYKO AND WILL PRESS HIM FURTHER ON POINT THAT IF THERE IS CLEAR RECOGNITION OF WESTERN VITAL INTERESTS BY SOVIET UNION, MOST TROUBLESOME POINTS CAN FALL INTO PLACE.

I INTEND DEVELOP (MODUS VIVENDI) FURTHER WITH GROMYKO BECAUSE HE HAS SHOWN SOME INTEREST. HE CLEARLY ANTICIPATES FURTHER TALKS ON BERLIN DURING NEXT SEVERAL DAYS AND WILL NOT TAKE WEEKEND VACATION AS WILL MANY OTHER DELEGATES. IF GROMYKO HAS INSTRUCTIONS WHICH GO BEYOND POSITIONS ALREADY KNOWN TO US HE HAS NOT YET DISCLOSED THEM.

ON DISARMAMENT, AFTER DISCUSSION WITH FOUR WESTERN DELS, WE HAVE DECIDED TO HAVE BRIEF FORMAL OPENING ON WEDNESDAY WITHOUT SPEECHES. PROBABILITY NOW IS THAT BOTH GROMYKO AND I WILL SPEAK THURSDAY. NATO GROUPING AGREED IT BETTER FOR GROMYKO TO SPEAK FIRST TO ASSUME FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANY PROPAGANDA ATMOSPHERE AT OPENING PHASE OF CONFERENCE. I HAVE EMPHASIZED TO GROMYKO NEED

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

WSF/186/ Gromyko - Bank for the

~~SECRET~~

-2- SECTO 26, MARCH 13, 11 PM FROM GENEVA

FOR BUSINESS-LIKE BEGINNING AND INVITED HIM TO ESTABLISH SUCH A FRAMEWORK IN HIS OPENING STATEMENT. SINCE BUSINESS-LIKE OPENING IS OUR OWN PREFERENCE, THIS GIVES ME CHANCE TO PRESENT OUR POSITION CALMLY BUT TO ADD ANY REJOINDERS WHICH HE MIGHT FORCE UPON US. EVEN SO, I WOULD TRY TO CREATE REALIZATION AMONG ALL NON-COMMUNIST DELS THAT WE ARE HERE FOR SERIOUS WORK ON DISARMAMENT.

✓ SPECIFIC PRIVATE NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOVIETS ON NUCLEAR TEST BAN NOW LIKELY TO COME THURSDAY AFTERNOON OR FRIDAY. THERE WILL BE US-USSR-UK MEETING WEDNESDAY MORNING TO TRY TO CREATE BETTER ATMOSPHERE REGARDING VERIFICATION IN RELATION TO ALL DIS-ARMAMENT QUESTIONS BUT WE DO NOT EXPECT TO SURFACE OUR FULL POSITION ON TEST BAN TREATY AT THIS STAGE.

RUSK

GDW

Note: Advance copies to SS 3/13/62 CWO-M

~~SECRET~~

A. Akalovsky:cb
(Drafting Office and Officer)

~~SECRET~~ H. D. Thompson
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

✓ 3/10/62-2
E2

SecDel/MC/58

Approved in S
7/9/62

Memorandum of Conversation

001

Downgraded To: ~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL; March 12, 1962
EO 11652: XGDS ① 2 ③ 4 1:00 p.m.

Authorized By: H. D. Thompson
August 4, 1975
Soviet Mission,
Geneva, Switzerland

SUBJECT: Germany and Berlin

PARTICIPANTS: United States
The Secretary
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Kohler
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. Akalovsky

USSR
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Semenov
Mr. Kovalev
Mr. Bondarenko
Mr. Sukhodrev

COPIES TO:

- S/S - *Manning* - 1
- S/P - Mr. Rostow - 3
- G - Mr. Johnson - 4
- S/B - Mr. Bohlen - 5
- EUR - Mr. Kohler - 6
- INR/D - Mr. Hilsman - 7
- BTF - Mr. Hillenbrand - 8
- OSD - Mr. McNamara - 9
- Amembassy Moscow - Amb. Thompson - 10
- White House - Mr. Bundy - 11
- 7 Collocher - 13*
- #1 - File 7222f*

Mr. Gromyko hosted a luncheon at the Soviet Mission.

Mr. Gomyko opened the conversation by raising the question of Berlin. He referred to the US view that this question should be discussed here in Geneva, and said that since both sides had this desire, perhaps it would be worthwhile to do so.

The Secretary agreed that this would be useful to discuss this problem. He stated that the United States had reviewed the exchanges of views that had taken place on this subject since last June, some of them at the highest level and some at the diplomatic level, and had attempted to assess the current situation. He said he wished to comment on the more important elements of that situation.

The Secretary expressed regret that it had not been possible to find a way of resolving this problem so as to stabilize the situation and to remove the dangers involved. He expressed the view that it was important to place Berlin in the context of the broader positions of the US and USSR and their responsibility as great powers. He said he knew that the President Mr. Khrushchev understood the historical role they were to play and that the shape of history over the next decade may depend on how that problem. He recalled the President's conversation with Mr. Khrushchev about the ideological differences between them and their respective views, neither could change the views of the other. He expressed

CATEGORY "A"

FORM DS-1254
Sensitive Designation
Removed

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

P.W. (S/S) DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

FILE RS/R

- () RELEASE () DECLASSIFY
- () EXISE () DECLASSIFY in PART
- () DENY () DELETE
- () Non-responsive info.

- () CLASSIFIED
- () DOWNGRADE

SECRET-EYES ONLY

- 2 -

differences relating to the internal organization of the two states were not important to their relations. In this connection the Secretary observed that the leader of the USSR of the 1920's would not recognize the USSR of today; nor would the leaders of the US of that period recognize the US of today. Changes had occurred and would occur in both countries and they were not important to their mutual relation. The Secretary observed that the differences in the US and USSR outlook on the development of the international community, referred to by the President in his interview with Adzhubei, were perhaps more troublesome. The United States believed in the development of independent states under the Charter of the United Nations, whereas the USSR seemed to have commitments with regard to revolutionary movements. Even so, this was not fundamental in our problems.

The Secretary expressed the belief that the firmest basis on which the two sides should consider their problems was that of their common interests. Both sides had interests in their security, their future, and the development of the well-being of their peoples. They also had a great deal of unfinished business at home. For its part, the US would be only too glad to turn to those internal tasks. The USSR had also indicated a similar desire. At the same time, if the US and the USSR should turn to the resolution of the problems standing between them, that would bring important change in the international scene. Also, if progress were made in the disarmament field both sides could devote greater resources to their internal economic development. The Secretary stressed that the US had come to Geneva to engage in serious and careful negotiations to make steps in the disarmament field in spite of its disappointing experience over the past 15 years. He expressed the view that unless the US and the USSR succeeded in resolving this problem there would be competition in armaments and an increase in the dangers on the international scene. Although there were some people who apparently did not believe that peaceful coexistence was possible, the Secretary said he held the opposite view. In this connection, he cited the fact that the US and the USSR had lived in peace during a period of over 40 years. ✓

The Secretary recalled Mr. Khrushchev's remark that the Berlin situation had been inherited from the previous governments of the two countries. However, the Secretary said, he did not wish to go into the details of history. What he wished to stress was that both sides should proceed on the basis of their state interests in Central Europe. On that basis, the problem boiled down to the simple proposition that the USSR had been taking a one-sided approach when the West wished to take up its rights on land, in the air, and in Berlin on a juridical basis, the USSR said that we should proceed on the basis of facts; on the other hand, when the West cited facts,

SECRET-EYES ONLY

SECRET-EYES ONLY

13
stated that facts should be changed. The United States did not believe that relations between Great Powers were possible on the basis of such an approach. In fact, if the USSR should press this approach it would not be to its advantage either, because that might lead to a massive rearmament of the West and also give rise to extremists elements in the various countries which might be difficult to handle. Such a situation would require diversion of resources from the peaceful development of our two peoples.

The Secretary went on to say that the United States was aware that the situation in East Germany was not satisfactory from the standpoint of the USSR and the East German authorities. The fact that many people had left East Germany was probably a source of concern both to the USSR and the East German authorities. Thus the USSR appeared to believe that this unstable situation required solution. However, the US did not believe that the USSR had a right to transfer the burden of that situation to the West.

Referring to the US-USSR exchanges of views over the past months, the Secretary wondered whether both sides should not approach the problem on the basis of their total interests and on the basis of the points of agreement and disagreement between them. While the US could not speak for the USSR, it was convinced that both sides had a common interest in peace. If this was not the case, the Secretary observed, then the further remarks he was going to make would be irrelevant.

Noting that he was not suggesting any Western allied positions on any points, although the US was of course aware of the views of its allies, the Secretary stated that, speaking on behalf of the President, he wished to put forward certain thoughts designed to place the situation under control and to put the problem in proper perspective in the context of the broader interests of both sides. He suggested that perhaps an attempt could be made to find certain principles to which both sides could subscribe and a procedure for negotiations on the basis of those principles, and to undertake certain steps while negotiations were proceeding so that there would be no danger of crises.

Citing Berlin as an example, the Secretary said that both Governments had stated, although in different terms, that West Berlin should be free to choose its own way of life, that its viability should be maintained, and that access to it should be free and unhindered. Perhaps that is a general proposition to which both sides could give their accord. If such a general proposition were agreed, ways could be found of improving the situation in Berlin on the basis of these principles. In the meantime, both sides would also state that existing access procedures would remain in effect.

The Secretary

SECRET-EYES ONLY

The Secretary then referred to the problem of the diffusion of nuclear weapons and noted that the USSR had apparently expressed an interest in and concern about the US policy with regard to it. The United States, for its part, was also interested in and concerned about the Soviet policy in this respect. The Secretary expressed the belief that both sides had a common interest in not having nuclear weapons pass into the hands of others. He suggested that both sides could perhaps agree that further diffusion of nuclear weapons into the hands of national governments now not owning such weapons would not further the cause of peace. Then, in negotiations, a system providing for non-diffusion of nuclear weapons might be developed to which all states owning nuclear weapons, as well as those now not owning such weapons might subscribe. In the meantime, both sides would declare that they would not themselves relinquish control over any nuclear weapons to any individual state now not owning such weapons and would refrain from assisting any such state in manufacturing such weapons.

As a third example of the suggested approach, the Secretary referred to the problem of non-aggression. He noted that the US and USSR with their respective allies were not in a major confrontation in Central Europe and that it would be tragic if force were used and if uncontrollable events were set in motion. There would be few survivors to conduct a post mortem on our mistakes in dealing with this problem. Therefore, both sides could undertake the commitment not to use force to change the existing frontiers and demarcation lines and not to use force to bring about a change in the status quo. In further negotiations, a declaration by all NATO and Warsaw Pact members might be developed and specific measures by all governments might be considered to establish their non-aggressive intent and to reduce the risk of war by accident or miscalculation. In the meantime, both sides could undertake not to use force to change the existing borders or demarcation lines in Germany and would note with approval West Germany's declaration that it would not use force for those purposes.

Noting that Mr. Gromyko might have some additional points to suggest along the above-mentioned lines, the Secretary said that perhaps he and Mr. Gromyko could find a procedure for reaching agreement on a set of such principles and then heads of government might meet to conclude the agreement. Throughout this process, both sides would of course wish to remain in touch with their respective allies. As to the forum for future negotiations on the basis of those principles, the Secretary suggested that it could perhaps consist of the Deputy Foreign Ministers of the US, the USSR, the UK and France. However, that would be contingent upon substantial agreement in advance and on the absence of actions aggravating the international situation.

By way

SECRET-EYES ONLY

By way of a post script, the Secretary stressed that the United States wished to make very serious progress in the disarmament field and hoped to find ways of managing those serious problems which stood in the way to such progress.

Mr. Gromyko responded by stating that the Soviet Government deeply regretted that no agreement on a German peace treaty had been possible so far. In spite of Soviet efforts to reach agreement with the United States and its allies, the period elapsed had shown that agreement was still far away. He claimed that the reason for this situation lay in the US unwillingness to take into account the existing facts resulting from World War II, and in particular the existence of two sovereign German states. Whether the West liked it or not, the GDR existed, just as the FRG existed. He asserted that the authors of post war agreements could not foresee the situation existing now, since they had proceeded on the premise that there would be one, united, demilitarized, sovereign, and peaceful Germany. The situation was now different, and the world could see that there were two sovereign German states in existence. Mr. Khrushchev had pointed out this fact to the President in Vienna and had stressed that 16 years had passed since World War II and that the situation, which in the absence of a peace treaty had become bad and wrong, could not be left unchanged. This was why the USSR had proposed a two-fold formula for a German peace treaty: either two peace treaties -- one with each of the two Germanies, or a single treaty with both Germanies. Thus, when the USSR referred to a German peace treaty it had in mind these two formulae. Mr. Gromyko contended that the USSR still believed that the best solution would be if agreement were reached with the West to conclude a German peace treaty. However, since the US and its allies had stated that they would not participate in a peace treaty with the GDR, the Soviet Government was prepared to resolve the question on the basis of the USSR's, along with other states that might wish to do so, signing a peace treaty, accompanied by the settlement of a number of other problems, including West Berlin, on the basis of negotiations between the US and the USSR and their respective allies. He recalled his conversation with Ambassador Thompson on this subject in Moscow.

Referring to the general principles mentioned by the Secretary, Mr. Gromyko said they failed to include such an important principle as due respect for the sovereignty of the GDR. He stressed that the Soviet Union would not accept any arrangements infringing upon the sovereignty of the GDR. He said that this meant that the question of communications to West Berlin could be agreed only on the basis of respect for the sovereign rights

of the

SECRET-EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~
SECRET-EYES ONLY

- 6 -

Is he deep? (of the GDR, i.e., on the basis of the established international practice with regard to transit by land, air, and water. The question of communications was insolubly linked to the question of the status of West Berlin, a point which the Secretary had failed to mention. The status of West Berlin must be resolved on the basis of a peace treaty, although the US may not take part in such treaty. To the USSR West Berlin was only a part of the German problem, whereas the Secretary's general principles were limited to West Berlin alone. Mr. Gromyko then recalled the Soviet draft on the status of a free city of West Berlin and contended that the USSR did not seek to affect the social order in West Berlin established by the population of that city. He reiterated that two points were missing from the Secretary's list of general principles: (1) respect for the sovereignty of the GDR, and (2) status of West Berlin. He then recalled Mr. Khrushchev's statement that the USSR did not need West Berlin -- not a single acre, or street, or house in West Berlin was needed by the Soviet Union. Nor did the GDR have any need for West Berlin. At the same time, the GDR was making a great concession, even a sacrifice, in agreeing to West Berlin's becoming a free city.

(Mr. Gromyko then said that the Soviet Union was prepared to approach the question of a German peace treaty from any end, although it was not prepared to have that question approached in a one-sided manner. The Secretary had mentioned only questions of interest to the US and had failed to mention matters of interest to the USSR and its allies.

As to the substance of the status of a free city in West Berlin, Mr. Gromyko said that the Soviet proposals on this subject were well known and therefore there was no need for repeating them. The Secretary was familiar with the Soviet proposals with regard to the stationing of token contingents of troops in West Berlin and with the different variants of that proposal. The Secretary was also familiar with the Soviet position with regard to the question of access. As to the latter question, the USSR was convinced that the requirements of unrestricted access and of genuine respect for the sovereignty of GDR, a respect that should not be only on paper, could both be satisfied. Mr. Gromyko said that if the West were interested in unrestricted access and if it agreed to respect the sovereignty of the GDR, then the way to agreement was open. Otherwise, if the West were interested in unrestricted access but wished to ignore the sovereignty of the GDR, the way to agreement was closed.

Referring to the Secretary's suggestion with regard to general principles,

Mr. Gromyko

~~SECRET~~
SECRET-EYES ONLY

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Gromyko observed that this was something new, at least in form, and that he did not exclude the possibility of first reaching agreement on a set of general principles, then gradually developing those principles, and ultimately reaching agreement on a detailed basis. However, the interests of all parties concerned must be taken into account in that process, and therefore both sides should jointly consider the situation to develop a mutually acceptable set of principles.

With reference to the Secretary's general remarks, Mr. Gromyko stated that agreement between the US and the USSR would undoubtedly be of tremendous importance to the world situation. The Secretary had mentioned the US allies, but that, of course, was a matter for the United States itself to handle. As for the USSR, it wished to reach agreement. As Mr. Khrushchev had mentioned to the President in Vienna, US and Soviet interests were in direct confrontation only in one place on the international scene. That confrontation was due to the abnormal situation in Germany, which in turn had resulted from the fact that no peace treaty had been concluded so many years after World War II. Therefore, if that question were resolved on a mutually accepted basis, the international situation would be radically improved and the source of friction would disappear. Of course, there remained the disarmament problem. Mr. Gromyko asserted that as far as the USSR was concerned, it had come to Geneva to attempt to resolve that problem. But agreement on the question of a German peace treaty and the settlement of the West Berlin problem on the basis of such a treaty would certainly be of no detriment to the cause of disarmament. However, there must be a desire on the part of all parties concerned to reach agreement. Speeches such as those made by Mr. McNamara and other, even civilian, personalities in the United States brandishing nuclear arms were not conducive to positive results. Methods of threat were now outmoded and could not lead to any results. What both sides must do was seek to bring their respective positions closer together.

Finally, Mr. Gromyko said that the Secretary had correctly interpreted the spirit of the Vienna meeting as regards the lack of desire on either side to convert the other side to its views and ideology. Both sides could live in peace and their desire for peace must unite them in their work, including here in Geneva.

The Secretary said that all of us could remember that the former Germany had made the US and USSR allies, and noted that it would be a pity if the present Germany were to make them enemies. Referring to the fact that both sides had used the term "one-sided", the Secretary wondered whether the gap could be bridged if certain simple ideas were established. Mr. Gromyko had

mentioned

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

SECRET-EYES ONLY

8

mentioned the existence of two Germanies. The United States would certainly not deny that fact, but there were other facts, such as West Berlin, Western presence in West Berlin, and Western access to it. All these were facts as well. As to the question of a peace treaty; the Secretary said that the US was not deeply concerned about the Soviet intention to sign such a treaty, but we were deeply disturbed by what the USSR had stated it intended to do in that connection. The USSR had never disposed of our rights with regard to access and, therefore, it could not transfer them to East Germany. In fact, the Zorin-Bolz letters recognized that in 1955; that exchange of letters also recognized that there were international commitments with respect to Germany. However, since that time Soviet demands appeared to have risen, although there had been no change in the situation. This was what we called one-sided approach. Referring to Mr. Gromyko's contention that the Secretary had failed to take into account Soviet interests, the Secretary stated that we were prepared to talk about all of Germany, all of Berlin, or any aspect of the problem. As to the question of the so-called respect for the sovereignty of the GDR, the Secretary said that he did not believe there was great difficulty on this point, because no one in the West intended to have things happening in the corridors that would interfere with the affairs of East German authorities. On the other hand, the 1955 exchange of letters had not placed access under the GDR sovereignty and it was impossible to see how the USSR could do it now. The Secretary concluded the conversation by reiterating that our problem was not the Soviet intention to sign a peace treaty, but only what such a treaty would do to us.

SECRET-EYES ONLY

Record Number 59763

DOCUMENT TYPE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE

03/12/1952

CLASS

TYPE

OFFICE

United States. Department of State

SIGNATURE

DEPT

DEPT

CLASSIFICATION

Secret

TITLE

Germany and Berlin

CTI

(Rusk-Gromyko Talks at Geneva)

NAME

Rusk, Dean

NAME

Khrushchev, Nikita S.

NAME

Adzhubei, Aleksei

NAME

Gromyko, Andrei A.

TERM

ORGA

United Nations

PAGE

8

A. Akalovsky:cb
(Drafting Office and Officer)

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

9/19/62
S E3
001

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Approved in S
7/9/62

SecDel/MC/57

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: March 13, 1962

Downgraded To: ~~SECRET CONFIDENTIAL~~ 12 Noon
EO 11652: XGDS (1) (4) 4 The Secretary's S
Authorized by: H. D. [unclear] Hotel Richemond
August 4, 1975 *ITM* Geneva, Switzerland

SUBJECT: Germany and Berlin

PARTICIPANTS: United States
The Secretary
Mr. Akalovsky

USSR
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Soukhodrev

COPIES TO: S/S - *navy* - 2
S/P - Mr. Rostow - 3
G - Mr. Johnson - 4
S/B - Mr. Bohlen - 5
EUR - Mr. Kohler - 6
INR/D - Mr. Hilsman - 7

BTF - Mr. Hillenbrand - 4
OSD - Mr. McNamara - 4
Amembassy Moscow - Amb. Thompson - 10
White House - Mr. Bundy - 11
CC-13
Foodlotter-13
#1-7224 File

The Secretary and Mr. Gromyko met for one hour prior to the luncheon hosted by the Secretary.

The Secretary opened the conversation by expressing his appreciation of Mr. Gromyko's coming before lunch to talk very privately on one or two points.

The Secretary stated that he thought it might be useful to explore whether communications could be established across the gulf which appeared to separate the two sides. He observed that it was not clear what each side had precisely in mind when it made statements. Recalling the President's meeting with Mr. Khrushchev in Vienna and the subsequent exchanges of views, the Secretary stated the US had supposed that when Mr. Khrushchev raised the question of Berlin and Germany his problem was to stabilize the situation from the standpoint of Soviet interest, particularly with regard to those parts of Germany which were under Soviet control and responsibility. The United States has refrained from protesting or interfering unduly because it had recognized that the situation perhaps warranted attention from the Soviet viewpoint. However, the Secretary noted, the present situation no longer warranted this kind of assessment of what Mr. Khrushchev had meant. What was now being done and said indicated an intention to do what the President had said in Vienna the US could not accept, i.e., diminish the Western position in Berlin and Germany while strengthening the Soviet and Bloc position in that situation. The Secretary observed that if there were no intention to move against the vital interests of the West in Germany and Berlin, other things might fall in place

CATEGORY "A"
FORM DS-1254
Sensitive Designator
Removed AUG 17 1972

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

and

11 - DW. (S/SI) DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MK

FILE RS/R

() RELEASE () DECLASSIFY
() EXISE () DECLASSIFY in PART
() DENY () DELETE
() Non-responsive info.

Handwritten initials and signatures
GPO 908992
DATE 1979

SECRET-EYES ONLY

and could be adjusted. He stressed, however, that if there were an intention to drive the West out of Berlin, then there was a serious problem at hand both in Washington and Moscow.

Referring to the question of the so-called respect for the sovereignty of the GDR, the Secretary stated that this raised no problem if it meant that access should not interfere with the internal affairs of East Germany. On the other hand, there was a grave problem if this meant that East Germany could interfere with access. The Secretary stressed the view that both Mr. Gromyko and himself should be able to clarify the language they used with each other. If there was no problem, both sides could see what political action could be taken; conversely, if there was a problem, then one would have to proceed on that basis.

The Secretary went on to say that the same point could be illustrated in other ways. For example, Moscow had talked a great deal about a peace treaty. The Secretary said that a peace treaty between Moscow and Pankow was of no particular concern to the US if it was clear that such a treaty would not attempt to do what it could not do, namely, dispose of Western rights and access. He recalled in this connection that this had been recognized in the formula of the 1955 Zorin-Bolz understanding. A treaty with such a formula would not create crisis or tensions. Turning to the question of recognition of the GDR, the Secretary recalled Mr. Gromyko's statement to Ambassador Thompson that the West already recognized the GDR. He said that it was true that the US acted on the basis that there was a place called GDR and that there were authorities which were in control there. From that standpoint, there should be no problem. However, both sides should explore what lay behind their statements, so that they could see what each side had in mind and that they could communicate efficiently and see how to deal with the situation, rather than stay apart through lack of understanding.

Mr. Gromyko said he had listened attentively to the Secretary's remarks and that his impression was that the Secretary had essentially repeated what he had said before. Mr. Gromyko claimed that he had tried to detect new points in the Secretary's remarks but had failed to see such points. With reference to the meaning of the phrase "respect for the sovereignty of the GDR", Mr. Gromyko stated that both sides should agree that, in matters relating to communications and access to West Berlin, specific questions should be decided in accordance with the accepted international practice, i.e., all questions pertaining to transit by land, air, and water should be resolved in accordance with that practice. While that practice was a long established

one

SECRET
SECRET-EYES ONLY

SECRET-EYES ONLY

one and had concrete content, it might find different expression in different documents. In brief, it meant that states across whose territory transit took place must be respected and be allowed to live and develop as sovereign and independent states. Mr. Gromyko reiterated his view expressed previously that it was possible to reconcile such respect with the requirement of free access. Thus, if the United States Government and the other Western Powers were prepared to agree that in reaching an understanding on unrestricted access, an understanding must also be reached with regard to respect for the sovereignty of the GDR in accordance with International Law, then the way to agreement was open. Conversely, if the US sought agreement on free access which would ignore the sovereign rights of the GDR, then the way to agreement was closed. Mr. Gromyko said he did not know whether his remarks would dispell the Secretary's doubts, but said the Soviet Union did believe it possible to reconcile these two requirements. He said that when both sides got down to elaborating specific agreements, this would be formulated in specific language. In this connection, he noted that Ambassador Thompson had received the Soviet draft of a possible formula.

Referring to the Secretary's remarks regarding diminution of Western rights, Mr. Gromyko contended that they were unfounded and that it was wrong to pose the question in this manner. He claimed that assertions that the Soviet Union intended to drive the West out of West Berlin, to detract from the vital interests of the West, or even to take hold of West Berlin either for itself or East Germany were completely unfounded. The USSR was convinced that a German peace treaty and the settlement of the West Berlin question on the basis of such a treaty would not entail any loss for any of the Western powers. The USSR did not believe that a peace treaty and the creation of a free city of West Berlin would lead to the weakening of the Western position, or of the US position in particular. On the contrary, the USSR believed that such a settlement would strengthen the positions of all concerned since it would remove forever the source of tension and the fever now shaking all of Western Europe. He reiterated that it was incorrect to put the question in a way that implied that somebody was to take something and somebody was to give. He expressed the view that a settlement of this problem would lead to a settlement of relations between the US and USSR.

Mr. Gromyko then referred to the principle of respect for the existing way of life in West Berlin, which had been mentioned by the Secretary the day before. He claimed that this principle was part of the Soviet position, which was based on the premise that West Berlin should enjoy the social order desired by its population and that there should be no interference from the outside.

SECRET-EYES ONLY

SECRET

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

the outside. He professed bewilderment as to why the US had such "Mont Blancs" of doubts with regard to Soviet intentions and said he assumed the US had mountains of files with papers ascribing to the USSR the intention to dupe the other side and all sorts of other cunning motives. He recalled Mr. Khrushchev's efforts in Vienna to persuade the President that a settlement of this problem was in the interest of both sides.

The Secretary stated there was a big difference between the two types of approach. One thing was to propose a solution and say that it was good for the other side; it was another thing to recognize that each side had vital interests and to see how the problem could be resolved in what both sides believed to be in accord with their interests. He stressed that the US could not accept the Soviet proposition that the Soviet proposal was in the US interest. He expressed the view that both sides could accept that each of them had vital interests in Central Europe and that they should see how those interests could be adjusted.

Reverting to the question of the so-called respect for the sovereignty of the GDR, the Secretary noted the fact that the West had had over many years agreement with the USSR with regard to access rights. He stated that it was not incompatible with the sovereignty or rights of any authority to accept such an agreement. The understanding between Moscow and Pankow fully protected this point. As to access by air, the Secretary noted that it was proper practice today to have transit across territories take place without the slightest interference from those on the ground. Therefore, there should be no incompatibility in this matter, unless there was an intention to impose restrictions and control over such rights.

The Secretary said that we had no difficulty with the known fact that East Germans administered certain parts of access and coordinated traffic on water, rail, and the Autobahn. He noted that there was already a considerable amount of direct East German participation in this matter. Therefore, there should be no practical problem.

NOT quite
to head sand
to correct
hmm!

Finally, the Secretary stated that he could accept Mr. Gromyko's statement that there was no ground to suppose that the USSR was trying to diminish the position of the Western Powers. He expressed readiness to sit down and to discuss the problem on that basis. He recalled that he had mentioned several points the day before, although there might be some others, which needed to be discussed along these lines.

Mr. Gromyko said he wished the Secretary to understand correctly his
statement

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

statement that adoption of the Soviet proposals for a peace treaty, even if such a treaty were to be signed only by the Soviet Union with the GDR, for the creation of a free city of West Berlin, and for free access to that city under conditions of respect for the sovereignty of the GDR would be in the interest of all concerned. The Soviet Union believed that such a settlement would not undermine or diminish the position of any state because it would ease tensions rather than worsen the prospects for peace and security. Furthermore, the Soviet Union strongly believed that such a settlement would even strengthen the positions of all concerned since it was in the interest of peace.

Finally, Mr. Gromyko stated that he had noted that the Secretary, in referring to the sovereignty of the GDR, had used formulations which raised quite a few questions in his mind. The Secretary had mentioned that access had been operating so far and that there had been no problem. However, there were many things in the past which no longer existed. At one time, the Germans could not even cross the street without first obtaining permission from either American or Soviet soldiers. Those things were due to Germany's unconditional surrender. Yet the situation had changed, both in East and West Germany; therefore, we must proceed on the basis of the existing situation, although some may not like it, a situation which was highlighted primarily by the existence of two German states.

The Secretary interjected that there was also Berlin.

Mr. Gromyko continued that the Soviet Union did not wish to pocket anything as a result of a settlement. He observed that he liked the Secretary's statement of yesterday that the US and USSR had been allies against Germany and that Germany should not make them enemies. He concluded by saying that both sides had fought against Germany and must draw certain conclusions from that fact.

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

Record Number 60307

Berlin Crisis
Memorandum of Conversation
Yes
03/13/1962

INCIDENT TYPE

BCI

DATE

CIRCD

TIME

ADDND

VARTY

CABND

DCBND

ORIGIN

DESTD

DESTG

SIGNATOR

DRAFT

CLASSIFICATION

DISTR

TITLE

CTIT

LINEX

PBS

LOGOR

CLIND

Donation

United States. Department of State

Akalovsky, Alexander

Secret

(Rusk-Bromyko Conversations of March 13, 1962)

5

3/13/62
6

Akalovsky:cb
(Drafting Office and Officer)

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

011

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Appr. in S
1962

SecDel/M/57

Memorandum of Conversation

SUBJECT: Germany and Berlin

DATE: March 13, 1962
12 Noon
The Secretary's Suite,
Hotel Richemond
Geneva, Switzerland

PARTICIPANTS:	<u>United States</u>	<u>USSR</u>
	The Secretary	Mr. Gromyko
	Mr. Akalovsky	Mr. Soukhodrev

COPIES TO:

S/S	BTF - Mr. Hillenbrand
S/P - Mr. Rostow	OSD - Mr. McNamara
S - Mr. Johnson	Amb. Moscow - Amb. Thompson
S/B - Mr. Bohlen	White House - Mr. Bundy
EUR - Mr. Kohler	
INF/D - Mr. Hilsman	

The Secretary and Mr. Gromyko met for one hour prior to the luncheon hosted by the Secretary.

The Secretary opened the conversation by expressing his appreciation of Mr. Gromyko's coming before lunch to talk very privately on one or two points.

The Secretary stated that he thought it might be useful to explore whether communications could be established across the gulf which appeared to separate the two sides. He observed that it was not clear what each side had precisely in mind when it made statements. Recalling the President's meeting with Mr. Khrushchev in Vienna and the subsequent exchanges of views, the Secretary stated the US had supposed that when Mr. Khrushchev raised the question of Berlin and Germany his problem was to stabilize the situation from the standpoint of Soviet interest, particularly with regard to those parts of Germany which were under Soviet control and responsibility. The United States has refrained from protesting or interfering unduly because it had recognized that the situation perhaps warranted attention from the Soviet viewpoint. However, the Secretary noted, the present situation no longer warranted this kind of assessment of what Mr. Khrushchev had meant. What was now being done and said indicated an intention to do what the President had said in Vienna the US could not accept, i.e., diminish the Western position in Berlin and Germany while strengthening the Soviet and Bloc position in that situation. The Secretary observed that if there were no intention to move against the vital interests of the West in Germany and Berlin, other things might fall in place

and

FORM DS-1254
3-61

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

GPO 908992

NSF/146/Gromyko - Berlin talks

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

and could be adjusted. He stressed, however, that if there were an intention to drive the West out of Berlin, then there was a serious problem at hand both in Washington and Moscow.

Referring to the question of the so-called respect for the sovereignty of the GDR, the Secretary stated that this raised no problem if it meant that access should not interfere with the internal affairs of East Germany. On the other hand, there was a grave problem if this meant that East Germany could interfere with access. The Secretary stressed the view that both Mr. Gromyko and himself should be able to clarify the language they used with each other. If there was no problem, both sides could see what political action could be taken; conversely, if there was a problem, then one would have to proceed on that basis.

The Secretary went on to say that the same point could be illustrated in other ways. For example, Moscow had talked a great deal about a peace treaty. The Secretary said that a peace treaty between Moscow and Pankow was of no particular concern to the US if it was clear that such a treaty would not attempt to do what it could not do, namely, dispose of Western rights and access. He recalled in this connection that this had been recognized in the formula of the 1955 Zorin-Bolz understanding. A treaty with such a formula would not create crisis or tensions. Turning to the question of recognition of the GDR, the Secretary recalled Mr. Gromyko's statement to Ambassador Thompson that the West already recognized the GDR. He said that it was true that the US acted on the basis that there was a place called GDR and that there were authorities which were in control there. From that standpoint, there should be no problem. However, both sides should explore what lay behind their statements, so that they could see what each side had in mind and that they could communicate efficiently and see how to deal with the situation, rather than stay apart through lack of understanding.

Mr. Gromyko said he had listened attentively to the Secretary's remarks and that his impression was that the Secretary had essentially repeated what he had said before. Mr. Gromyko claimed that he had tried to detect new points in the Secretary's remarks but had failed to see such points. With reference to the meaning of the phrase "respect for the sovereignty of the GDR", Mr. Gromyko stated that both sides should agree that, in matters relating to communications and access to West Berlin, specific questions should be decided in accordance with the accepted international practice, i.e., all questions pertaining to transit by land, air, and water should be resolved in accordance with that practice. While that practice was a long established

one

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

- 3 -

one and had concrete content, it might find different expression in different documents. In brief, it meant that states across whose territory transit took place must be respected and be allowed to live and develop as sovereign and independent states. Mr. Gromyko reiterated his view expressed previously that it was possible to reconcile such respect with the requirement of free access. Thus, if the United States Government and the other Western Powers were prepared to agree that in reaching an understanding on unrestricted access, an understanding must also be reached with regard to respect for the sovereignty of the GDR in accordance with International Law, then the way to agreement was open. Conversely, if the US sought agreement on free access which would ignore the sovereign rights of the GDR, then the way to agreement was closed. Mr. Gromyko said he did not know whether his remarks would dispell the Secretary's doubts, but said the Soviet Union did believe it possible to reconcile these two requirements. He said that when both sides got down to elaborating specific agreements, this would be formulated in specific language. In this connection, he noted that Ambassador Thompson had received the Soviet draft of a possible formula.

Referring to the Secretary's remarks regarding diminution of Western rights, Mr. Gromyko contended that they were unfounded and that it was wrong to pose the question in this manner. He claimed that assertions that the Soviet Union intended to drive the West out of West Berlin, to detract from the vital interests of the West, or even to take hold of West Berlin either for itself or East Germany were completely unfounded. The USSR was convinced that a German peace treaty and the settlement of the West Berlin question on the basis of such a treaty would not entail any loss for any of the Western powers. The USSR did not believe that a peace treaty and the creation of a free city of West Berlin would lead to the weakening of the Western position, or of the US position in particular. On the contrary, the USSR believed that such a settlement would strengthen the positions of all concerned since it would remove forever the source of tension and the fever now shaking all of Western Europe. He reiterated that it was incorrect to put the question in a way that implied that somebody was to take something and somebody was to give. He expressed the view that a settlement of this problem would lead to a settlement of relations between the US and USSR.

Mr. Gromyko then referred to the principle of respect for the existing way of life in West Berlin, which had been mentioned by the Secretary the day before. He claimed that this principle was part of the Soviet position, which was based on the premise that West Berlin should enjoy the social order desired by its population and that there should be no interference from
the outside.

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

SECRET-EYES ONLY

the outside. He professed bewilderment as to why the US had such "Mont Blancs" of doubts with regard to Soviet intentions and said he assumed the US had mountains of files with papers ascribing to the USSR the intention to dupe the other side and all sorts of other cunning motives. He recalled Mr. Khrushchev's efforts in Vienna to persuade the President that a settlement of this problem was in the interest of both sides.

The Secretary stated there was a big difference between the two types of approach. One thing was to propose a solution and say that it was good for the other side; it was another thing to recognize that each side had vital interests and to see how the problem could be resolved in what both sides believed to be in accord with their interests. He stressed that the US could not accept the Soviet proposition that the Soviet proposal was in the US interest. He expressed the view that both sides could accept that each of them had vital interests in Central Europe and that they should see how those interests could be adjusted.

Reverting to the question of the so-called respect for the sovereignty of the GDR, the Secretary noted the fact that the West had had over many years agreement with the USSR with regard to access rights. He stated that it was not incompatible with the sovereignty or rights of any authority to accept such an agreement. The understanding between Moscow and Pankow fully protected this point. As to access by air, the Secretary noted that it was proper practice today to have transit across territories take place without the slightest interference from those on the ground. Therefore, there should be no incompatibility in this matter, unless there was an intention to impose restrictions and control over such rights.

The Secretary said that we had no difficulty with the known fact that East Germans administered certain parts of access and coordinated traffic on water, rail, and the Autobahn. He noted that there was already a considerable amount of direct East German participation in this matter. Therefore, there should be no practical problem.

Finally, the Secretary stated that he could accept Mr. Gromyko's statement that there was no ground to suppose that the USSR was trying to diminish the position of the Western Powers. He expressed readiness to sit down and to discuss the problem on that basis. He recalled that he had mentioned several points the day before, although there might be some others, which needed to be discussed along these lines.

Mr. Gromyko said he wished the Secretary to understand correctly his statement

SECRET-EYES ONLY

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

statement that adoption of the Soviet proposals for a peace treaty, even if such a treaty were to be signed only by the Soviet Union with the GDR, for the creation of a free city of West Berlin, and for free access to that city under conditions of respect for the sovereignty of the GDR would be in the interest of all concerned. The Soviet Union believed that such a settlement would not undermine or diminish the position of any state because it would ease tensions rather than worsen the prospects for peace and security. Furthermore, the Soviet Union strongly believed that such a settlement would even strengthen the positions of all concerned since it was in the interest of peace.

Finally, Mr. Gromyko stated that he had noted that the Secretary, in referring to the sovereignty of the GDR, had used formulations which raised quite a few questions in his mind. The Secretary had mentioned that access had been operating so far and that there had been no problem. However, there were many things in the past which no longer existed. At one time, the Germans could not even cross the street without first obtaining permission from either American or Soviet soldiers. Those things were due to Germany's unconditional surrender. Yet the situation had changed, both in East and West Germany; therefore, we must proceed on the basis of the existing situation, although some may not like it, a situation which was highlighted primarily by the existence of two German states.

The Secretary interjected that there was also Berlin.

Mr. Gromyko continued that the Soviet Union did not wish to pocket anything as a result of a settlement. He observed that he liked the Secretary's statement of yesterday that the US and USSR had been allies against Germany and that Germany should not make them enemies. He concluded by saying that both sides had fought against Germany and must draw certain conclusions from that fact.

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

7/15/62 10
MRB:13

March 15, 1962

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. Robert Bowie will be coming to see you with Mac Bundy and me this afternoon at 5:00. He is coming at our suggestion to talk about our relations with the European NATO nations and some of the policy decisions we face in this area. As you know, Bowie is now Director of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard, and he has long been a student of, and a participant in, NATO matters. In 1960 he did a study for Secretary of State Roster in which the idea of the Atlantic Community was put forward in something like the terms in which we now see it. Earlier he played a very important role in the organization of the European Economic Community.

2. The first decision you will be called on to make in this range of problems concerns our relation to a NATO MRBM force. The attached memorandum is a State Department draft of a position paper on this point. Its main ideas are: We should indicate our willingness to join in supporting a multilaterally owned and manned seaborne MRBM force with an initial size of some 200 missiles. In so doing, we recognize that the military need for such a force is not the important question, but rather the political need to provide an alternative to the creation of national forces by the leading European powers. The multilateral force would be subject to some kind of agreed control procedure operating in NATO. At the moment, we would avoid taking a position on whether or not the agreed control procedure would provide for a U.S. veto, in the expectation that European NATO members would in fact not wish to dispense with our veto if we left the decision up to them. In the interim period, before this force can be organized, we should offer to commit a certain number of Polaris submarines to NATO under the same control arrangements as are proposed for the new multilateral force.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
MLK/94-36
By <i>[Signature]</i>
MAR. DATE 12/97

NSF / 216 / MLP. Gen

415-
417 FR

SECRET

✓ The Defense Department is in fairly substantial agreement with this position except for the last point. At the moment, they are not willing to use our Polaris submarines under multilateral control; they would prefer to see them committed to NATO (under either SACEUR or SACLANF) but subject to US control only. In the same way that other nuclear-capable US forces are now subject to US control.

✓ Both State and Defense agree that the new step of indicating our willingness to support a NATO multilateral MRBM force should be taken in the context of a general discussion of NATO strategy and in particular the role of nuclear striking forces, both those in and outside of Europe, in NATO strategy, which is already under way.

✓ The two Departments have also discussed the possibility of the creation of a new command in NATO distinct from SACEUR to which all the nuclear strike forces in NATO could be committed.

3. It is likely that the particular issue of just how far we should go in offering support to NATO MRBM forces will come up to you some time next week. This, however, is only the first of a series of related issues on which decisions will be needed in the near future. All these issues turn on the question of the role of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy and NATO politics. One of the more immediate problems is the question of the dispersal of increased yield nuclear weapons for use by NATO strike aircraft. This problem is already under scrutiny now with respect to the remaining dispersals proposed for this fiscal year. It will become increasingly important in the next two fiscal years as the existing fighter planes are replaced by the new F104G aircraft in the forces of our allies. Another related question is the problem of whether we should give help to the French missile program in the way of technology, components, and the like.

✓ The broadest question we face is whether or not the organizational structure of NATO is really suitable for its present task. As your conversations with General Norstad earlier this year indicated, the problem of the political control to which SACEUR is responsible is a tricky one. How we could make sure that the military forces, especially the nuclear forces, under SACEUR's

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

control are as responsive to political direction as our own military forces is a problem we have yet to solve. //

- ✓ The sense of urgency that the Berlin situation creates probably makes it easier to face some of these questions than it would otherwise be. Yet, on the other hand, the dangers of rocking the boat in
- ✓ NATO are also magnified by the same situation.

Carl Kayser

~~SECRET~~

MEMO 3/16/62
✓ R. 2
Handy
= 3/15

March 16, 1962

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum of Meeting - 5:00 - 5:30 PM, March 15, 1962

Present: The President
Mr. Robert Bowie
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Mr. Carl Kaysen
Mr. Robert McNamara) for about the last
Mr. Roswell Gilpatric) half of the discussion

Mr. Bundy reviewed the calendar of decisions that are to come to the President with respect to NATO nuclear matters and indicated that none of these can be looked at individually. He mentioned the MRBM decisions, the problem of assisting the French missile development, the dispersion of additional tactical nuclear weapons to NATO strike aircraft. The President then asked whether Secretary Herter had not originally made the Polaris offer and he had not repeated it at Ottawa for two purposes: first, to dissuade the French from their course of building a national nuclear capability, and, second, to deal with the problem of whether the Germans would be stimulated to do the same thing. Since we are clearly failing in our first aim, is it wise to go ahead simply on the grounds of dealing with the Germans? Mr. Bowie responded by saying that he would put it in a somewhat different way. The French were by no means united in their support for a national nuclear capability. This was the idea of deGaulle and a rather small group around

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
M.K.-9436
By: NARA, Date: 1/16/82

~~SECRET~~

NRA / 216 / MLR 1/62-6/62 = 13: 366 RA

~~SECRET~~

him. Many other Frenchmen opposed it. One of our aims in making the original proposal to commit a Polaris force to NATO was to offer to those Frenchmen who opposed the present policy an alternative which they could support and which they could offer to France. Mr. Bowie then went on to discuss the technical problems of the French missile and nuclear weapons programs, in particular, the difficulties the French will have in making a warhead small enough to carry on the missile they are now developing. For this reason our own experts believe that it will take three or four years beyond the present target date of 1967 before the French will have a usable nuclear-armed missile. Further, it will cost much more than the French now expect to spend. The President asked whether the continued denial of France's wishes on our part won't simply stimulate the French to combine with the Germans, whatever we offer the latter. Mr. Bowie indicated that he did not think the present German Government would, in fact, behave this way. In his judgment that government was strongly oriented to the notion of collective defense in NATO, and if we could provide a collective nuclear defense, they would welcome it. De Gaulle, on the other hand, was clearly against a collective defense, and it was for this reason that it was

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

no use to attempt to move him toward a more cooperative relationship with NATO by meeting his desires in the nuclear missile field. These desires arise precisely from his preference for individual over collective defense and, therefore, it could not be in our interest if our policy had to be to out-wait deGaulle and provide an attractive alternative to individual defense which deGaulle's successors would welcome, especially under the pressures of mounting difficulties and costs in France's own program. The President asked whether we were not offering MRBM proposal basically to the French and Germans and whether the others were simply uninterested. He further expressed concern that we were pouring our money into the ocean in this proposition in order to satisfy a political need whose use was dubious. Mr. Bowie agreed that the need was primarily political and not military but urged its reality and importance nonetheless. The President asked whether the Europeans really would satisfy their political desires through a force on which the U.S. still exercised a veto. Mr. Bundy explained our thoughts on how the processes of discussion in the North Atlantic Council could educate the European governments to the facts of nuclear life in such a way that the force, even though under an American veto, would still meet their concerns. Mr. Bowie pointed out that it was more appropriate to use

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

the term "joint control" than the term "veto." He distinguished the case of response to general nuclear attack in which there could clearly be no discussion, and any other case in which there would be discussion in which the other European powers would certainly want us to join.

Secretary McNamara emphasized the consensus that there was no military need for the MRBM. He further stated that those who thought there was a military need by this indicated a lack of understanding of the nature of the nuclear control problem which was in itself dangerous. On the other hand, he did grant the political need. He cautioned, however, that there was a possibility that the creation of this force would compete with the increase in Europe in conventional capability that was far more important. There was some general discussion on the relation of this force to stated requirements of General Norstad for missiles and their implication in competing with the conventional forces, and then the discussion broke off.

CR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

19410 H.S.M. voreg 1 2/20/62
Atomic Policy
yes STRATEGY
HBBM

Date: March 20, 1962 US
6:00 p.m.

N
NA


PLACE : Mr. Durbrow's Residence

PARTICIPANTS: General Maxwell D. Taylor
Mr. Durbrow
Ambassador de Leusse
Sir Paul Mason
Ambassador von Walther
Mr. Levy
Mr. Wolf

The highlights of the conversation, which was informal and frank, were as follows.

The question of the US assurances (Paragraphs 7 a and 7 b of the Stikker paper) were generally discussed. Mr. Durbrow indicated that we had further instructions as to the maintenance of "adequate" nuclear stocks. The general impression was that there was no problem with regard to these statements.

The conversation then turned to guidelines. General Taylor pointed out that there was much thinking in the US that not only should the President be bound to release nuclear weapons, but that the European countries should agree to use them. (There was agreement there is no veto on use in NATO.) The point was made that Stikker's drafting was intended to arrive at this same result.



General Taylor indicated agreement. He said that what was needed was a shield force of truly dual capable nature, with a stock of atomic ammunition on one side of the gun and a stock of conventional ammunition on the

DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS
Agency Case stat 8900318
NLE Case 89-10946
By LWG NLE Date 5/13/89

SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED

Murphy (85)
Atom-NVC 62 (3)

Electronic reproduction made
by the Eisenhower Library for
preservation purposes

W

other side. He stressed that we were making great progress in the development of very small yield nuclear weapons and although (in response to a German question) he was not sure this would ever get down to the level of the rifle-man, it could and would be pursued and would be of major importance. In response to a German question, he indicated he was not concerned about the forward deployment of nuclear weapons in that they might be overrun and seized by the enemy. He indicated that there was a broad area in which nuclear weapons might not have to be used, but that they should be used early enough to insure that the sort of thing von Walther had talked about did not result in losing the war. Personally, General Taylor said he thought that the Supreme Allied Commander should have the discretion to use nuclear weapons when this was required to do the job.

General Taylor asked about views on a multilateral NATO force, saying that he thought the question of modernization was a separate question.

In response to a direct question from General Taylor about German willingness to accept MRBM's on German soil, von Walther said

General Taylor asked about how the Standing Group and Military Committee could be better drawn into NATO defense planning.

General Taylor suggested that one might move the Military Committee in effect to Paris by giving the Permanent Representatives high level military advisers.

2755

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

7/20/62
WJS
Atomic Policy
Ref STRATEGY
MRBM

N
M

Date: ~~March~~ 20, 1962 U's
6:00 p.m.


PLACE : Mr. Durbrow's Residence

PARTICIPANTS: General Maxwell D. Taylor
 Mr. Durbrow
 Ambassador de Lousse
 Sir Paul Mason
 Ambassador von Walther
 Mr. Levy
 Mr. Wolf

The highlights of the conversation, which was informal and frank, were as follows.

The question of the US assurances (Paragraphs 7 a and 7 b of the Stikker paper) were generally discussed. Mr. Durbrow indicated that we had further instructions as to the maintenance of "adequate" nuclear stocks. The general impression was that there was no problem with regard to these statements.

The conversation then turned to guidelines. General Taylor pointed out that there was much thinking in the US that not only should the President be bound to release nuclear weapons, but that the European countries should agree to use them. (There was agreement there is no veto on use in NATO.) The point was made that Stikker's drafting was intended to arrive at this same result.



General Taylor indicated agreement. He said that what was needed was a shield force of truly dual capable nature, with a stock of atomic ammunition on one side of the gun and a stock of conventional ammunition on the

SECRET UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS

Agency Case Stat. 8900313

NLE Case 89-10546

By [Signature] NLE Date 5/17/80

Electronic reproduction made by the Eisenhower Library for

SECRET

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

other side. He stressed that we were making great progress in the development of very small yield nuclear weapons and although (in response to a German question) he was not sure this would ever get down to the level of the rifle man, it could and would be pursued and would be of major importance. In response to a German question, he indicated he was not concerned about the forward deployment of nuclear weapons in that they might be overrun and seized by the enemy. He indicated that there was a broad area in which nuclear weapons might not have to be used, but that they should be used early enough to insure that the sort of thing von Walther had talked about did not result in losing the war. Personally, General Taylor said he thought that the Supreme Allied Commander should have the discretion to use nuclear weapons when this was required to do the job.

General Taylor asked about views on a multilateral NATO force, saying that he thought the question of modernization was a separate question.

In response to a direct question from General Taylor about German willingness to accept MDM's on German soil, von Walther said

General Taylor asked about how the Standing Group and Military Committee could be better drawn into NATO defense planning.

General Taylor suggested that one might move the Military Committee in effect to Paris by giving the Permanent Representatives high level military advisers.

SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED

Declassification made by the Defense Library for

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

PERMANENT RECORD COPY

ACTION COPY

ES E U

SECRET

H Action

SS Info

FROM: GENEVA

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 66, MARCH 19, MIDNIGHT

Control: 13012
Rec'd: MARCH 20, 1962
12:20 A.M.

*Captions removed by
Frederick Cook SS-1/TSP
3/14/91*

EYES ONLY

(R)

MICROFILMED FOR
KENNEDY LIBRARY
APRIL 1964

PRIORITY

EYES ONLY FOR PRESIDENT AND ACTING SECRETARY

FOLLOWING IS UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF TEXT OF PAPER HANDED
SECRETARY BY GROMYKO REFERRED TO IN IMMEDIATELY PREVIOUS
TELEGRAM.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY *[Signature]* Date June 26, 1991

BEGIN TEXT

- RELEASE
- EXISE
- DENY
- DECLASSIFY
- DECLASSIFY in PART
- DELETE
- Non-responsive info.

- FOL, EO or FA exemptions
- TS authority to:
- CLASSIFY as _____ OADR
- DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C, OADR

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

1. THE PARTIES PROCEED FROM THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET UNION, TOGETHER WITH A NUMBER OF OTHER STATES, WILL CONCLUDE A PEACE TREATY WITH THE GDR, AND THAT WHEN THE PEACE TREATY IS SIGNED, ACCOUNT WILL BE TAKEN OF THE PROVISIONS ON OTHER MATTERS AGREED BY THE PARTIES IN ADVANCE, AS SET FORTH BELOW.

2. WEST BERLIN WITHIN ITS PRESENTLY EXISTING BOUNDARIES WILL BE DECLARED A FREE DEMILITARIZED CITY. THE PARTIES WILL DEVELOP THEIR RELATIONS WITH WEST BERLIN AS WITH AN INDEPENDENT POLITICAL ENTITY.

WEST BERLIN SHALL BE FREE TO CHOOSE ITS WAY OF LIFE, THE PARTIES UNDERTAKING TO RESPECT THE SOCIAL ORDER THAT HAS TAKEN SHAPE THEREIN.

THE OCCUPATION REGIME IN WEST BERLIN WILL BE TERMINATED.

EYES ONLY

This copy must be returned to RM/Regional files with **REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS UNCLASSIFIED**

ACTION ASSIGNED TO: EUR	ACTION TAKEN: Noted	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R: File	
NAME OF OFFICER: GER-72 [Signature]	DATE OF ACTION: 20 Mar		
OFFICE SYMBOL: GER-72 [Signature]			

SECRET

-2- SECTO 66, MARCH 19, MIDNIGHT FROM GENEVA

THE PARTIES ARE IN AGREEMENT THAT NO INTERFERENCE MUST BE ALLOWED IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF WEST BERLIN, AND THAT RESPECT FOR THE BASIC RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS OF THE CITIZENS OF THE CITY MUST BE ASSURED, AND THAT IT IS THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF WEST BERLIN TO FREELY ESTABLISH FOREIGN TRADE, SCIENTIFIC, CULTURAL, AND OTHER NON-MILITARY TIES WITH ANY STATE, AS WELL AS TO DESIGNATE AND RECEIVE DIPLOMATIC, CONSULAR, AND OTHER REPRESENTATIVES, EXCEPT FOR MILITARY ONES.

THE NEED IS ALSO RECOGNIZED TO PRESERVE THE VIABILITY OF WEST BERLIN, AND TO PROMOTE THE STABILITY AND PROSPERITY OF ITS ECONOMY, AND THE FULL EMPLOYMENT AND WELFARE OF ITS CITIZENS.

WEST BERLIN WILL NOT TAKE PART IN ANY AGREEMENTS OR ALIGNMENTS OF A MILITARY OR MILITARY-POLITICAL NATURE WHATSOEVER, AND WILL PURSUE A POLICY OF NEUTRALITY.

THE PARTIES ARE IN AGREEMENT THAT WEST BERLIN WILL NOT ALLOW THE EXISTENCE OF ORGANIZATIONS, OR ANY ACTIVITY OF A FASCISTIC OR MILITARISTIC NATURE, INCLUDING THE PROPAGANDA OF WAR AND REYANCHISM.

3. IN CONNECTION WITH THE ABOLITION OF THE OCCUPATION REGIME IN WEST BERLIN, THE OCCUPATION TROOPS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND FRANCE WILL BE REPLACED BY TOKEN CONTINGENTS OF TROOPS OF THE UNITED NATIONS, OR OF NEUTRAL STATES, WHICH WILL REMAIN IN WEST BERLIN FOR A PERIOD OF TIME SPECIFIED BY THE PARTIES (3 TO 5 YEARS).

4. IN THE TRANSIT OF CIVILIANS AND FREIGHT THE FREE CITY OF WEST BERLIN WILL BE ASSURED OF THE RIGHT OF UNRESTRICTED COMMUNICATION WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD IN ACCORDANCE WITH GENERALLY ACCEPTED STANDARDS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SUBJECT TO THE NORMAL RULES AND FORMALITIES APPLIED IN TRANSIT ACROSS THE TERRITORY OF SOVEREIGN STATES. SUCH ACCESS TO WEST BERLIN WILL BE ASSURED ON THE BASIS, ON THE ONE HAND, OF RESPECT FOR THE SOVEREIGN RIGHTS OF THE

SECRET

SECRET

-3- SECTO 66, MARCH 19, MIDNIGHT FROM GENEVA

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC THROUGH THE TERRITORY OF WHICH RUN THE ROUTES OF SUCH ACCESS, AND, ON THE OTHER, OF THE OBSERVANCE OF THE UNRESTRICTED TRANSIT OF FREIGHT AND PERSONS BY LAND, WATER, AND AIR, UNDER APPROPRIATE AGREEMENTS WITH THE GDR, NAMELY:

THE AUTHORITIES OF THE FREE CITY OF WEST BERLIN WILL THEMSELVES DETERMINE -- GUIDED BY THEIR INTERNAL LEGISLATION AND BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE STATUTE OF THE FREE CITY -- WHO MAY OR MAY NOT VISIT THAT CITY. PERSONS GOING TO OR DEPARTING FROM WEST BERLIN WILL BE REQUIRED TO COMPLY WITH ESTABLISHED INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE AND WITH THE FORMALITIES REGISTERED IN APPROPRIATE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN WEST BERLIN AND THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC.

THE FREE TRANSIT OF FREIGHT, GOODS, BAGGAGE AND MAIL WILL ALSO BE EFFECTED UNDER APPROPRIATE AGREEMENTS WITH THE GDR, AND ON THE BASIS OF GENERALLY ACCEPTED INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE.

5. MILITARY TRAFFIC, TO ENTER WEST BERLIN OR TO DEPART THEREFROM THROUGH THE TERRITORY OF THE GDR VIA LAND ROUTES, THE PERSONNEL OF THE MILITARY CONTINGENTS REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 3, WILL SHOW THE AUTHORITIES OF THE COUNTRY OF TRANSIT DOCUMENTS CERTIFYING THAT THE PERSONS AND FREIGHT IN QUESTION BELONG TO THE TOKEN CONTINGENTS. FOR THEIR PART, THE SAID PERSONNEL WILL UNDERTAKE TO COMPLY WITH THE LAWS AND PROCEDURES OF THE COUNTRY OF TRANSIT AND WITH THE SANITARY AND OTHER RULES GENERALLY ACCEPTED IN INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE. THE VOLUME OF MILITARY TRAFFIC INCLUDING TRAFFIC BY MILITARY TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT, WILL BE DETERMINED BY THE ACTUAL NEEDS OF THESE CONTINGENTS.

6. IN ORDER TO ASSURE THE FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO AND DEPARTURE FROM WEST BERLIN A SPECIAL INTERNATIONAL ACCESS AUTHORITY WILL ACT AS AN ARBITER IN THE EVENT THAT ANY DIFFICULTIES SHOULD ARISE IN THE PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENTS ON ACCESS

IN THE TERRITORY OF THE GDR THE SAID INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY WILL HAVE NO ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS, NOR ANY POWERS TO DIRECT

SECRET

SECRET

-4- SECTO 66, MARCH 19, MIDNIGHT FROM GENEVA

CONTROL TRAFFIC OR LAY DOWN THE RULES ON THE COMMUNICATIONS PASSING THROUGH THE TERRITORY OF THE GDR AND LINKING WEST BERLIN WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD. HOWEVER, IN THE EVENT OF ANY COMPLICATIONS OR FRICTION ARISING IN THE COURSE OF FREE TRANSIT TO WEST BERLIN, THE INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY WILL HAVE THE LAST WORD.

THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ACCESS AUTHORITY WILL BE THE USSR, THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE, AND CERTAIN OTHER COUNTRIES, AS AGREED BY THE PARTIES.

7. THE PARTIES WILL AGREE NOT TO TRANSFER NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO THE FRG OR TO THE GDR, EITHER DIRECTLY OR THROUGH THIRD COUNTRIES OR THROUGH THE MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS IN WHICH THEY ARE MEMBERS, AND TO REFRAIN FROM THE TRANSFER TO THE GDR AND TO THE FRG OF INFORMATION NECESSARY FOR THE MANUFACTURE OF SUCH WEAPONS. THE PARTIES PROCEED FROM THE FACT THAT THE FRG AND GDR WILL, IN THEIR TURN, UNDERTAKE NOT TO MANUFACTURE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THEIR TERRITORIES OR IN THOSE OF OTHER STATES, AND WILL NOT SEEK TO ACQUIRE THEM BY ANY OTHER METHOD.

8. WITH A VIEW TO STRENGTHENING PEACE AND EUROPEAN SECURITY ALL STATES PARTIES TO NATO AND ALL STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY WILL CONCLUDE A NON-AGGRESSION TREATY WHICH WILL REGISTER THEIR MUTUAL RENUNCIATION OF THE USE OF FORCE FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS AND, NOTABLY, RENUNCIATION OF THE USE OF FORCE IN ORDER TO CHANGE EXISTING EUROPEAN BOUNDARIES.

IN CONNECTION WITH THE CONCLUSION OF A NON-AGGRESSION TREATY BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE FRG AND THE GDR WILL, IN ADDITION, MAKE A SPECIAL STATEMENTS, IN A BINDING FORM, TO THE EFFECT THAT THEY WILL NOT USE FORCE TO CHANGE EXISTING GERMAN FRONTIERS, INCLUDING THE FRONTIER BETWEEN THE GDR AND THE FRG, OR TO SETTLE ANY DISPUTE THAT MAY EXIST OR ARISE BETWEEN THEM.

9. IN ADOPTING THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES SET FORTH ABOVE, THE PARTIES PROCEED FROM THE FACT THAT AGREEMENT ON ALL THE MATTERS RAISED

SECRET

SECRET

-5- SECTO 66, MARCH 19, MIDNIGHT FROM GENEVA

IN THIS DOCUMENT WILL BE REACHED SIMULTANEOUSLY, AND THAT THE PARTIES WILL CONTINUE THEIR ENDEAVORS WITH A VIEW TO THE PROMPT ELABORATION OF CONCRETE AGREEMENTS TO BE SUBMITTED FOR CONSIDERATION AND ENDORSEMENT TO THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT.

END TEXT

RUSK

GDW

NOTE: RELAYED TO WHITE HOUSE 3/19/62 CWO-JRL

NOTE: S/S DO NOTIFIED 3/19/62 CWO/FMH

SECRET

Record Number 60308

<u>SET</u>	Berlin Crisis
<u>DOCUMENT TYPE</u>	Cable
<u>BCI</u>	Yes
<u>DATE</u>	03/19/1962
<u>CIRCD</u>	
<u>TIME</u>	
<u>ACCOM</u>	Donation
<u>UORTY</u>	
<u>CORNO</u>	SECTO 66
<u>DOCNO</u>	
<u>ORIGIN</u>	United States Consulate General, Geneva (Switzerland)
<u>DESTR</u>	
<u>DESTO</u>	United States, Department of State, Office of the Secretary
<u>SIGNATOR</u>	Rusk, Dean
<u>PROFT</u>	
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	Secret
<u>DISTR</u>	
<u>TITLE</u>	
<u>CTIT</u>	[Memorandum Handed to Rusk by Gromyko During Meeting of March 21 , 1962]
<u>LINEY</u>	17
<u>RGS</u>	
<u>LOCOR</u>	
<u>CLLNO</u>	

2/20/62 ✓

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

March 20, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

FROM: David Klein

SUBJECT: The Soviet's "General Principles" on the Berlin Issue
(SECTO 66)

The Secretary has already commented on the substance of Gromyko's "General Principles".

The paper is not forthcoming. The only hopeful signs, and these are indeed very few, include Gromyko's comment on a need for thorough discussion of the "Principles" in Geneva and his remarks concerning an ultimate endorsement of these "Principles" by heads of governments. At least discussions are still theoretically wide open.

On the substantive side, however, the Soviet peace treaty and "free city" proposals are very much intact. The Soviets did the expected about the NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression agreement, deliberately raising the issue of GDR recognition.

Also, paragraphs 4 and 5 of the referenced telegram seem particularly significant since they spelled out in some detail the ramifications of the concept of "respect for GDR sovereignty".

As Adzhubei indicated earlier to the President, the Soviets have redefined the International Access Authority to suit their own purposes. However, from their language, I would gather that there is considerable room for bargaining on this particular issue.

I personally am not as sanguine as our Delegation in Geneva seems to be about the question of Soviet troops in West Berlin. I think the formula for UN troops as opposed to neutral troops probably leaves the Soviet proposal ~~sentation~~ very much intact.

And one last point: from the context of paragraph 3 it seems that the Soviets are back on the gambit of a temporary arrangement lasting from three to five years.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12812, SEC. 3.4
SKE NLK - 86-257 MARA Date 3/90

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

If the Soviets move at all, they probably will move slowly. They are essentially oriental tradesmen, with tremendous patience, and I would expect that whatever concessions may be forthcoming will have to come from Khrushchev himself.

I have seen the suggested revisions in our modus vivendi paper which I understand the Secretary will probably table today. In view of the Soviet performance thus far, however, I think it extremely important that we hold back, until some later point, the proposal on our acceptance of East Germans at the access control points. This is an important concession and it would seem to me that it should be held until there is some give on the Soviet side. Perhaps it should even be delayed until we have fully played out the International Access Authority concept.

-2-

~~SECRET~~

Record Number 53166

<u>DOCUMENT TYPE</u>	Memorandum
<u>DATE</u>	03/20/1962
<u>CIRCD</u>	
<u>TIME</u>	
<u>CABNO</u>	
<u>ORIGIN</u>	United States. Executive Office of the President
<u>SIGNATOR</u>	Klein, David
<u>DESTO</u>	
<u>DESTP</u>	Bundy, McGeorge
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	Secret
<u>TITLE</u>	The Soviet's "General Principles" on the Berlin Issue
<u>CTII</u>	
<u>NAMES</u>	Gromyko, Andrei A.
<u>NAMES</u>	Adzhubei, Aleksei
<u>NAMES</u>	Khrushchev, Nikita S.
<u>TERMS</u>	
<u>ORGAN</u>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<u>ORGAN</u>	Warsaw Pact
<u>ORGAN</u>	United Nations
<u>PGS</u>	2

1/3 65 D 533
Box 502
CF 2077

E17
CF 2077 Vol.
7/4/62 5/5

CONFIDENTIAL

March 21, 1962

To: The Secretary
Through: W/S
From: Roy D. Kehler
Subject: "Draft Principles" Paper

I attach herewith for your possible use the revised version of the "Draft Principles" paper. The changes in the paper have been communicated to Washington and made available to George Ball, Bill Tyler, Mac Bundy and Henry Owen. The only observations received so far were those which came by phone from Mac Bundy through Henry Owen. I attach a memorandum from Hillenbrand relating to these points.

In revising the "Draft Principles" we looked into the possibility of using the language from the 1955 Geneva Directive of Heads of Government. I think you will agree after reviewing this (copy attached for reference) that this language would not be suitable and that we would do better to stick with the original modus vivendi language which was worked out carefully in the Department.

Attachments:

1. "Draft Principles" Paper.
2. Memo from Hillenbrand to Kehler, March 20, 1962.
3. Excerpt from Directive.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE - WASHINGTON

REVIEWED BY WR June 25, 1962

() RELEASE () DECLASSIFIED
 () EXCISE () DECLASSIFIED EARLY
 () DENTY () Non-FOIA/PA
 FOI, EO or PA exemption: _____

JKK:rlt
 () CLASSIFIED TO _____ OADR
 () DOWNGRADE TO _____ () C, OADR

CONFIDENTIAL

17A

REVIEWED BY *AD*

June 25, 1981

- RELEASE
- EXTEND
- DEFER

()
 ()
 ()

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FCI, EO or PA exempt
 Authority to:
 CLASSIFY as _____ OADR
 DOWNGRADE TO _____ S of _____ OADR

The FR and GR have been discussing a wide range of subjects. They have agreed in regard to certain of these subjects on (i) certain general principles to which their governments subscribe; (ii) procedures for continuing negotiations on the basis of these principles by a Committee of Foreign Ministers' deputies, which will be established specifically for this purpose, and which France and the FR will be invited to join; and (iii) certain interim steps to meet immediate dangers in the situation.

1. Berlin

(a) General Principles: They believe that West Berlin should be free to choose its own way of life, that its viability should be maintained, and that its access should remain free and unhindered.

(b) Future Negotiations: They agree to study proposals for improving the situation in Berlin consistent with these principles and the vital interests of both sides in the aforementioned committee of Foreign Ministers' deputies.

(c) Interim Steps: In the meantime, they declare that long established access procedures should remain in effect.

2. Germany

(a) General Principles: They believe that the German people have the right to determine their own future and to reestablish the unity of Germany if they so desire, and they wish to facilitate the exercise of this right in a way that will enhance the security of all European peoples.

(b) Future Negotiations: They agree that the authorities in East and West Germany should be invited to establish mixed technical committees, consisting of officials designated by these authorities, to discuss political and technical contacts, promote mutually beneficial economic exchanges, and consider a draft electoral law and other steps toward German unification.

(c) Interim Steps: In the meantime, they declare that they will ensure that any arrangements made which any of them may enter into with any part of Germany will be consistent with the declarations recorded in this announcement, and that any peace treaty which they may conclude with a united Germany will be consistent with the declaration noted under b and c, above.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

3. Nuclear Diffusion:

(a) General Principles: They believe that further diffusion of nuclear weapons into the control of national governments not now owning them would make more difficult the problem of maintaining lasting peace.

(b) Future Negotiations: They agree to seek, in the above-mentioned committee (or other appropriate forum) to develop policies regarding non-diffusion of nuclear weapons to which all states owning nuclear weapons might agree and to which states not now owning nuclear weapons might also subscribe.

(c) Interim Steps: In the meantime, they declare that they will not themselves relinquish control over any nuclear weapons to any individual state not now owning such weapons and will refrain from assisting any such state in manufacturing them.

4. Non-Aggression:

(a) General Principles: They believe that force should not be used to change existing frontiers and demarcation lines in Europe or for any other aggressive purpose.

(b) Future Negotiations: They agree to seek in the above-mentioned committee (or a sub-committee thereof) (i) to develop a suitable declaration regarding non-aggression between the NATO and Warsaw Pact Powers; and (ii) to consider measures which might be taken to enable the governments represented on that Commission to communicate and establish their non-aggressive intent in the event of grave crises and otherwise to reduce the risk of war by accident or miscalculation.

(c) Interim Steps: In the meantime, they declare that they will not themselves use or support use of force to change the external borders of Germany or the demarcation line inside Germany, and they note with approval past declarations of the Federal Republic that it will not use force to achieve the reunification of Germany or to settle international disputes.

5. Continuation

Once the proposed Committee of Foreign Ministers' Agencies has been established, the Foreign Ministers of countries represented on it should meet periodically, as seems useful, to review its work.

CONFIDENTIAL

119B

Mr. Kohler

March 20, 1962

Martin J. Hillenbrand

Questions raised by Mac Bundy with Henry Owen of State Department.

During a phone call on the KY9 Circuit with Henry Owen to convey to the Acting Secretary via him changes made in the text of the modus vivendi since the departure of the Secretary from Washington, Henry mentioned that two questions had been asked by Mac Bundy arising out of the discussions so far with the Soviet.

1. Are the Soviets aware that our modus vivendi approach is not intended to provide a rigid and definitive settlement but, through the establishment of a more or less institutionalized forum for discussion, to provide an opportunity for the discussion of other subjects of interest to the Soviets?

2. With the elimination of the clause in paragraph 1(b) of the draft principles, are the Soviets aware from what has been said that the purpose of our modus vivendi is not specifically to prevent their signing of a peace treaty with the GDR but to stabilize the situation within a context which allows for at least some token action on their part with respect to the GDR?

Since affirmative answers to both of these questions are inherent in the modus vivendi approach, you may want to suggest to the Secretary that, at a suitable point, he may wish to clarify the intent of our position on each of these matters to Gromyko.

USDal:MRHillenbrand:el:3/20/62

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

REVIEWED BY *AR*

June 25, 1991

() RELEASE

() EXCISE

() DISTR

FOL, EDC COPY

() CLASSIFIED

() DECLASSIFIED

17C

Excerpt from Geneva Directive of the Heads of Government of the Four Powers to the Foreign Ministers, July 23, 1955.

The Heads of Government, recognizing their common responsibility for the settlement of the German question and the re-unification of Germany, have agreed that the settlement of the German question and the re-unification of Germany by means of free elections shall be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security. The Foreign Ministers will make whatever arrangements they may consider desirable for the participation of, or for consultation with, other interested parties.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/OSD/OSD

REVIEWED by

VR

DATE

June 25, 1991

RELEASE

DECLASSIFY

EXTEND

DECLASSIFY DATE

DENY

MONITOR/RECLASSIFY

FOR USE OF PA SYSTEMS

CLASSIFIED BY

OADR

DATE

1998

Record Number 59765

DOCUMENT TYPE Memorandum
DATE 03/21/1962
CLASS
TIME
ORIGIN United States. Department of State
SIGNER OF Kohler, Foy B.
DEPT United States. Department of State. Secretary
DEETE
CLASSIFICATION Confidential
TITLE "Draft Principles" Paper
DTIT [With Attachments]
NAMES Ball, George W.
NAMES Bundy, McGeorge
NAMES Tyler, William R.
NAMES Hillenbrand, Martin J.
NAMES Owen, Henry
TERMS
ORIGIN Warsaw Pact
ORIGIN North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PGE 5

A. Akalovsky:cb
(Drafting Office and Officer)

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SecDel/MC/60

EG

Approved in S
7/9/62

Memorandum of Conversation

001

DATE: March 22, 1962

3:00 p.m.

The Secretary's Suite
Hotel Richemond,
Geneva, Switzerland

Downgraded To: SECRET ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EO 11652: XGDS (1) (2) (3) (4)

Authorized By: H. D. [Signature]
August 4, 1975

SUBJECT: Germany and Berlin

PARTICIPANTS: United States
The Secretary
Mr. Akalovsky

USSR
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Sukhodrev

COPIES TO: S/S - [Signature]
S/P - Mr. Rostow 5
G - Mr. Johnson 4
S/B - Mr. Bohlen 6
EUR - Mr. Kohler 6
INR/D - Mr. Hilsman 7
BTF - Mr. Hillenbrand 8

OSD - Mr. McNamara 9
Amembassy Moscow - Amb. Thompson 10
White House - Mr. Bundy 11
CL-12
Footlocker - 13
#1 File - 7224

The Secretary opened the conversation by saying that so much had been said by the two governments on Germany and Berlin at Vienna and since then that it was not easy to know where to turn now. He recalled Mr. Khrushchev's and Mr. Gromyko's statement that the Soviet proposals were not directed against the United States and were not designed to reduce the Western position in Berlin. While not wishing to talk about the intentions of the other party, the Secretary stated the US believed that the objective results of the Soviet proposals at Vienna and since then would indeed greatly reduce or at least limit the Western position in Berlin. He emphasized that it was the objective results we were most concerned about. The Secretary referred to the President's statement at Vienna that the effect of the Soviet proposals would be very far-reaching and negative not only in Berlin and Germany but also throughout the world. He stressed that we had commitments and responsibilities in Berlin and Germany and that they were fundamental to us. In the light of what we believed the direct and immediate effect of the Soviet proposals would be if we agreed to them, the US could not agree that those proposals would be beneficial to it, as Mr. Gromyko had contended. The United States had to look at its position and its interests. It had defined its vital interests and believed that the effect of the Soviet proposals, including some elaboration thereof in Geneva, would injure them deeply. For example, the presence of the West and its forces in West Berlin was of vital interest to us, but the Soviet Union had stated that they must be withdrawn or share their responsibility with Soviet troops.

Turning to the question of access, the Secretary recalled his earlier

statement

CATEGORY "A"

FORM DS-125 Designator
Sensitive
Removed AUG 17 1972

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

1.1 P.W. (S/SJ)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED by [Signature] Date June 26 1991 GPO 908992

FILE RS/R
 RELEASE DECLASSIFY
 EXISE DECLASSIFY in PART
 DENY DELETE
 Non-responsive info.

FOL EO or PA exception
TS authority to:
 CLASSIFY as GADR
 DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C, GADR

100-5-170

SECRET-EYES ONLY

statement that if our vital interests were recognized there would be no problem making access arrangements compatible with what the Soviet Union called respect for the sovereignty of the GDR. However, the Soviet paper on access indicated that there was apparently some misunderstanding on the Soviet part. The Secretary stated he had not meant that access should be subject to East Germans but that it could be compatible with the complete management of East German affairs by local authorities.

Referring to the question of the viability of West Berlin and the maintenance of its way of life, the Secretary stated that it was clear to us that the objective of the Soviet proposals was to undermine and destroy the freedom of West Berlin. This was implied not only in Soviet statements with regard to access, but also in those regarding the freedom of persons to travel to and from Berlin, as well as regarding West Berlin's relations with the outside world, particularly West Germany. Thus the Soviet proposals did not provide for the maintenance of the freedom of West Berlin for any period of time.

The Secretary continued by emphasizing that we of necessity must think very hard of the objective effect of the various proposals. The suggestion that a line be drawn under World War II sounded very good. However, when it turned out to be a reduction or even elimination of the Western position in West Berlin it was another matter. Some other phrases in Soviet proposals implied that they also would have a similar effect on the Western position. In the light of all this, the Secretary suggested that perhaps possible alternatives should be examined. The first alternative would be to do nothing. The second alternative would be to allow a dangerous crisis to develop. The third alternative would be to continue efforts along the lines of the efforts conducted so far and to see whether agreement was possible. Finally, the fourth alternative would be to look at the wide gap between the positions of the two sides, recognize that it was very difficult to reach agreement, and see how disagreement should be handled. Commenting on these alternatives, the Secretary stated that, although he believed that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States would shirk a crisis, he was confident that both recognized that a crisis was not in their interests. On the other hand, efforts to find agreement had not been productive thus far and it was difficult to say now whether they would be productive in the future. As to the question of how to handle disagreement, the problem was to find a method not involving the interests of the West or requiring a formal withdrawal of Soviet proposals.

Mr. Gromyko contended he regretted very much that negotiations had so far been unsuccessful. He claimed that in spite of the fact that the Soviet

Union

SECRET
SECRET-EYES ONLY

SECRET-EYES ONLY

Union had made certain proposals designed to facilitate agreement, the United States Government appeared not to be serious in its intention to strive for an understanding. Referring to the Secretary's statement that the Soviet proposals were objectively aimed at undermining the Western and, in particular, the United States position in Berlin, Mr. Gromyko asserted that the Soviet Government had believed and continued to believe that the solution of the problem of a German peace treaty and the settlement of the West Berlin situation on the basis of such a treaty would not lead to the undermining of the Western or US position, if that position was correctly understood. He recalled his statement that the United States should not fear anything from the implementation of the Soviet proposals if the United States was genuinely desirous of achieving a detente and of strengthening peace. Thus, he contended, if the interests of the big powers were understood correctly, the Soviet proposals would not lead to the undermining of the positions of any power, including the US. Moreover, the Soviet Union believed that a settlement on the basis of the Soviet proposals would be beneficial to all concerned and would be in the interest of peace. The Soviet union did not believe that withdrawal of Western forces from West Berlin and a settlement of the question of a free city of West Berlin on the basis of a peace treaty would in any way diminish the position of the Western powers; on the contrary, their position in Europe and throughout the world would be strengthened because that would be a major act by the Western powers to contribute to a relaxation of tensions and to the strengthening of peace. On the other hand, if the US proceeded from the premise that the situation should remain unchanged, i.e., that the occupation regime in West Berlin should remain as if nothing had happened since World War II, that the situation with regard to communications where the sovereignty of the GDR was being ignored should continue, and that there should be no peace treaty, then it must be stated categorically that the USSR would never agree to that. The USSR believed that changes were needed and it would be very good if an understanding were reached on those changes and if the changes were implemented on an agreed basis.

Mr. Gromyko then recalled the Secretary's remarks that it was possible to make freedom of access compatible with what the USSR called respect for the GDR sovereignty. He asserted that the USSR also believed this to be possible, but wondered what content the Secretary injected in his remarks. When the USSR said that there should be respect for the sovereignty of the GDR, it meant that such respect should be in deeds and not words. However, the Secretary appeared to inject a different content because he qualified his statement by saying there would be no interference in East German internal affairs, thus implying that questions of access were not related to the sovereignty of the

GDR.

SECRET-EYES ONLY

SECRET-EYES ONLY

GDR. If this interpretation of the Secretary's position was correct, then the US conception differed completely from the Soviet conception. In any event, the US position was not quite clear.

Mr. Gromyko continued by asserting that the USSR had given the US, both in Moscow and Geneva, clarification as to its understanding of all these problems, starting with the crucial problem of a German peace treaty and down to the problem of transit through the territory of the GDR. The USSR had given the US detailed views on these matters, including two papers here in Geneva. The USSR had done so in the hope that the US would duly appreciate it and believing that clarification would facilitate understanding. However, the Secretary's remarks seemed to indicate that the US failed to see the main point in the Soviet proposals, because the Secretary had implied that something like a blockade would be established around West Berlin as a result of Soviet proposals. Mr. Gromyko contended that the USSR had no such intention either with respect to the movement of freight or to the movement of persons. All the USSR called for was such respect for the sovereignty of the GDR as was accorded to all states through the territory and air space of which transit took place. Therefore the US should not look in the Soviet proposals for what was not there and what the USSR did not intend to include.

Commenting on the Secretary's alternatives, Mr. Gromyko asserted that he did not know why the Secretary had mentioned the first alternative. He said that there was no question of leaving the situation without change. The United States knew full well that the USSR, together with some other states, would sign a peace treaty with the GDR and any attempt by the US to convince the USSR to leave the situation unchanged, i.e., to put the matter of a peace treaty aside, would be futile. Referring to the Secretary's second alternative, Mr. Gromyko stated that if the US and its allies moved toward crisis, evidently a crisis would be precipitated, but it would be the responsibility of the Western Powers. With regard to the Secretary's third and fourth alternatives, Mr. Gromyko claimed that the distinction between the two was artificial and that they were practically the same. He said that both sides should see where they were close and what separated them. For its part, the USSR was prepared to seek a possibility of understanding and this was attested to by its patience in negotiations. If such readiness also existed on the other side, mutual efforts should be continued. Mr. Gromyko then said that, if he had understood the Secretary correctly, the Secretary appeared to have mentioned at the end of his remarks the possibility of the Soviet Union's withdrawing its proposals. He said that if the Secretary was joking then of course he could understand that remark; on the other hand, if the Secretary was serious, he

could

SECRET-EYES ONLY

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

could not possibly understand it. In any event, the correct assumption was that the Soviet would not withdraw its proposals.

Mr. Gromyko then asserted that the USSR was concerned about whether the United States Government believed, as the Soviet Government did, that it was best to seek an understanding on an agreed basis. If the United States did not wish to proceed on the basis of agreement, then the situation was quite different. However, Mr. Gromyko said, he accepted the Secretary's statement that it would be good to agree and to avoid complications between our two states. He said that he agreed with the Secretary's remarks that both countries had a great deal of work to do at home, and that Germany should not make them enemies. He wondered why then the United States took a position which was not facilitating agreement and why it was looking for devious schemes and motives in Soviet proposals. He reiterated his previous contention that neither the USSR nor the GDR needed West Berlin and that the GDR was making a sacrifice by agreeing to the creation of a free city of West Berlin on its territory. He called upon the United States to adopt a more sober position with regard to the Soviet proposals and the Soviet steps to meet the US half way. He observed that it was not useful to stay in place and that this was not the purpose of the USSR in Geneva. Of course, to stay put was better than to go backwards, but it was worse than to move toward understanding.

The Secretary emphasized that the President desired a solution of this and other problems on the basis of agreement. However, this was not possible by simply accepting Soviet proposals, particularly such proposals as cut at the heart of the interests of the West and of the US.

The Secretary expressed the hope that agreement could be reached on the basis of understanding and that the Soviet Union also desired understanding. This had been discussed in Vienna and there was no doubt as to the US position on this point. The Secretary also emphasized that he had no inclination to delve into Soviet motives; what we were concerned about were the objective effects of Soviet proposals, and those effects we must consider very seriously.

Referring to the so-called respect for the sovereignty of the GDR, the Secretary stated that he wished to remind Mr. Gromyko of the US view that, under the circumstances prevailing at the end of World War II and since then, no one was in a position to create sovereignty in East Germany which would have priority over our position in West Berlin and our rights of access. He emphasized strongly that this was not in the hands of the Soviet Union, who

position

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~
SECRET-EYES ONLY

position and interests in Germany stemmed from the same fact and stood on the same basis as our position and interests did, namely, the surrender of Nazi Germany.

The Secretary then recalled the US suggestion for an international access authority and stated that it had been made because we believed this was one way of reconciling freedom of access with East Germany's concern for its internal affairs. Noting that the international access authority would involve territories under three jurisdictions -- the FRG, East Germany, and West Berlin -- the Secretary stated there would be very simple arrangements with regard to jurisdiction to be accepted by the three government authorities. He observed that the very acceptance of such arrangements would be compatible with the notion of sovereignty and that there would be no interference with the day-by-day activities in the FRG, West Berlin, or East Germany. The Secretary then stressed that an international authority such as conceived by the US would be quite different from an authority under the administrative arrangements by East Germans and subject to a four-power commission which would probably operate under the rule of unanimity, although the Soviet proposal contained no specific reference to such rule. Such an arrangement would expose access to all the hazards to which Ulbricht might wish to subject it. There was no assurance that the four-power commission could resolve any problems that might arise. Although we were prepared to work on this and see whether it perhaps provided some possibility, we did not see in this arrangement adequate guarantees for West Berlin's future. Furthermore, the Soviet paper indicated that the establishment of an access authority was related to the withdrawal of Western forces from West Berlin, and this was of course a major obstacle from our standpoint. The Secretary then noted that the United States had never held the view that East Germany would not have a normal and active part in the provision of access facilities, such as rail, Autobahn, canals, and in the air. The latter would involve only the question of overflights. The Secretary said that exclusion of the East Germans in these matters would be impractical and unnecessary.

Turning to Mr. Gromyko's comments on the alternatives he had indicated, the Secretary stated that he wished to stress most emphatically what the President had told Mr. Khrushchev in Vienna, namely, that it was not the US who was pressing this problem to a crisis. It was not the United States who had brought up the problem in its present form and therefore we could not accept the responsibility. As to Mr. Gromyko's comment that the distinction between the third and fourth alternatives rested on weak ground, the Secretary said that he wished to illustrate his point. Thus far we had

apparently

~~SECRET~~
SECRET-EYES ONLY

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

apparently been working on the third alternative. There was no need to assume that the alternative was necessarily at a close, although it had not yielded much result. However, there was no agreement in sight today; nor was there a basis for agreement. Nevertheless, both sides must seek to resolve the problem. It was in the light of this that the possibility had been suggested to Mr. Gromyko of reaching agreement on certain simple and short principles, some of which our two governments had already agreed to quite recently, in any case more recently than at the end of World War II. If the heads of governments of our countries could agree on those principles, each principle would open the way for additional negotiations. There would also be stipulation as to what would happen in the meantime. The Secretary said that since Mr. Gromyko might not have obtained a clear picture of this idea when it was first mentioned to him, he had prepared a paper which would clarify what was meant. The paper covered several subjects of interest to both the US and the USSR. The Secretary then handed the paper to Mr. Gromyko, noting that it was being given as a working paper within the framework of personal conversation. He pointed out that the contents of the paper did not require confirmation by the USSR of Western occupation rights in West Berlin, rights which we believed needed no confirmation. The contents of the paper did not stand in the way of a peace treaty but provided for a framework where a peace treaty with East Germany would not inflame the situation.

Mr. Gromyko said he wished to make a few observations. Reverting to the question of access authority, he wondered why the Secretary had mentioned three jurisdictions. He professed that he could not understand the reason for mentioning the West German jurisdiction. He asserted that the question was that of the sovereignty of the GDR, but the US was trying to involve the jurisdiction of West Germany despite the fact that the Secretary himself had correctly stated that West Berlin was not related to West Germany.

As to the question of a peace treaty with the GDR, Mr. Gromyko recalled US statements to the effect that it was up to the USSR whether to sign such a treaty or not. However, he wished it to be clearly understood that the USSR did not regard the conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR merely as a formal act, but rather as a major political act which must be accompanied by certain changes, by certain measures, and by the solution of certain questions the USSR had repeatedly mentioned to the Western Powers. It would be one thing if the USSR signed a peace treaty with the GDR with prior understanding regarding the solution of other questions with the US and apparently its allies as well. Then everything would go smoothly. On the other hand, as the USSR had repeatedly stated, if there were no such understanding, the situation would be quite different. The US had stated on many occasions that when the Soviet Union signed

a peace

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

8

a peace treaty with the GDR, there should be a prior understanding as to what the situation would be and what measures should accompany such a treaty. The USSR agreed with this and this is why it was negotiating. It would be well if agreement could be found.

Referring to the Secretary's remark that it was not quite clear how decisions would be taken in the four-power commission of the access authority, Mr. Gromyko stated that there were of course certain aspects which would have to be resolved through additional consideration and discussion. However, he thought that in principle it was quite clear that the objective of that proposal was to facilitate agreement with regard to access and the status of West Berlin.

As to the paper given to him by the Secretary, Mr. Gromyko said that he was prepared to consider it as a working paper, just as the two Soviet documents were working papers, but wished to inquire whether the paper had been prepared with due account being taken of the two Soviet documents. He asserted that this was of substantial importance because the Soviet papers had been drafted with the objective of facilitating agreement. He said that he would have comments on the US paper at a later date and facetiously asked what he should tell to his allies now that he had received a US paper.

The Secretary replied that this was up to Mr. Gromyko himself. He said that his paper was not in direct response to the two Soviet papers. It was an illustration of the approach he had mentioned at his first meeting with Mr. Gromyko. The Secretary also observed that we could of course discuss access, perhaps within the context of the Soviet papers, but stressed that the linkage to the withdrawal of Western troops created a formidable problem.

Mr. Gromyko observed that there was not much point in exchanging papers unless account was being taken of their respective contents.

The Secretary reiterated that his paper was not in response to the Soviet papers but was rather in the context of earlier discussions. Noting that he had already made some observations on the two Soviet papers, the Secretary wondered whether it might perhaps be profitable if some of his and Mr. Gromyko's associates discussed them further, although he would be prepared to do that personally with Mr. Gromyko. He said that a number of points required clarification, such as, for instance, the question of the unanimity rule in the access authority, if we were fully to understand the Soviet papers.

Mr. Gromyko

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

Mr. Gromyko replied that either procedure was acceptable. Reverting to the question of access authority, he emphasized that the Soviet proposal was linked to the withdrawal of Western forces from West Berlin and their replacement with neutral or UN troops. The Soviet proposal for access authority could be considered only in that context, because it was not a separate proposal.

The Secretary replied that this was how we understood the Soviet proposal and that in that sense it did not advance us very far. He strongly emphasized that the presence of Western forces in West Berlin was fundamental to us.

Mr. Gromyko responded that if this was fundamental to the US, the USSR also believed that it was one of several fundamental questions, such as the question of a peace treaty, which was primary and decisive, the question of respect for the sovereignty of the GDR, the question of the status of a free city of West Berlin, etc..

((The Secretary concluded the conversation by recalling his statement that many problems would fall into place if the central questions were resolved.))

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

Record Number 59766

<u>DOCUMENT TYPE</u>	Memorandum of Conversation
<u>DATE</u>	03/22/1962
<u>OFFICE</u>	
<u>TIME</u>	
<u>OFFICE</u>	United States, Department of State
<u>SIGNATURE</u>	
<u>DEST</u>	
<u>DEST</u>	
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	Secret
<u>TITLE</u>	Germany and Berlin
<u>CTIT</u>	[Rusk-Gromyko Discussions at Geneva]
<u>NAMES</u>	Khrushchev, Nikita S.
<u>NAMES</u>	Rusk, Dean
<u>NAMES</u>	Kennedy, John F.
<u>NAMES</u>	Gromyko, Andrei A.
<u>TERME</u>	International Access Authority
<u>ORGR</u>	United Nations
<u>PBS</u>	9

3/22/62 16/3a

SANITIZED COPY

March 22, 1962

SUBJECT: Suggested NATO Nuclear Program

*with identical Prod as
McNamara's history
appended doc*

After approval by the President, the United States should outline the following elements in NAC, at appropriate times and in suitable detail. These elements should be discussed in the context of revised strategy. Within this framework, the need for improved conventional forces should be stressed and elaborated in necessary detail, and the extent to which the nuclear proposals are dependent on an adequate conventional program should be made clear.

1. NATO Participation: Measures should be instituted to give NATO greater information about US nuclear strategy, and greater participation in the formulation of that strategy. (Specific actions to this end currently under study by the State and Defense Departments should be included, if they are found to be useful.) As part of these measures:

(a) _____

SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3,4
NCK-88-23
By SCF NARA, Date 3/21/91

NATO Nuclear Program
NSF 336 / NSOM / 47
2/18/62

(a) Targetting and Weapons. The question of the targetting for a multilateral force, and the question of the kind of missile and vessel to be used in the force, should be determined in the light of NATO's continuing consideration of strategy, the role of the force in that strategy, and other relevant factors.

(b)



(c) Costs. The costs should be equitably shared. The US should make clear that it would not be prepared to make a major contribution to the cost but would expect the greater part of the burden to be borne by the allies.

(d) Mixed Manning. The US should require a sufficient degree of mixed manning to ensure that one nationality does not appear to be predominant in the manning - and is not, in fact, in control - of any vessel or of the missiles aboard any vessel in the multilateral force. Members of the mixed crews would be recruited from national armed forces into the NATO MRBM force and would thereafter be under the control of that Force; for trial and punishment of major crimes, they would be returned to their country of origin.

(e) -----

(f) Centralized Command. In presenting these views, the US would stress its belief that the defense of the NATO area is indivisible and that a NATO Force, if one is created, could

not



AM No. (177 4/18/62)
Sec 21
Sec Defense
Nato Nuclear Program

Program of March 22

The position on the paper "NATO Nuclear Policy" is as follows:

1. ~~U.S. policy on MRBM's will be governed by the provisions of this paper except that paragraph 2(d) should not be volunteered by the U.S.~~

a In handling ^{the MRBM} ~~this~~ issue in the NAC, ^{with Atomic Council} the U.S. should outline its views in accord with the contents of this paper, not as a U.S. proposal, but as a U.S. contribution to the resolution of the issues involved in this question.

b The Secretary of State will have the responsibility for handling tactics on this topic, consulting with the Secretary of Defense as appropriate.

The President has approved the recommendation of the Secretaries of State and Defense that U.S. policy on MRBMs ~~will~~ be ~~governed~~ governed by the provisions of their paper entitled "Suggested NATO Nuclear Program" dated March 22, 1962, except that Par. 2(d) should not be volunteered by the U.S.

ED 12357
NLK-86-23
DECLASSIFIED
DATE 05/21/91

3/22/62 23

~~SECRET~~

March 22, 1962

SUBJECT: Suggested NATO Nuclear Program

After approval by the President, the United States should outline the following elements in NAC, at appropriate times and in suitable detail. These elements should be discussed in the context of revised strategy. Within this framework, the need for improved conventional forces should be stressed and elaborated in necessary detail, and the extent to which the nuclear proposals are dependent on an adequate conventional program should be made clear.

1. NATO Participation: Measures should be instituted to give NATO greater information about US nuclear strategy, and greater participation in the formulation of that strategy. (Specific actions to this end currently under study by the State and Defense Departments should be included, if they are found to be useful.) As part of these measures:

(a) Procedures should be instituted under which we would share information about our nuclear forces and consult about basic plans and arrangements for their use in the NAC and the Standing Group - Military Committee. Although we should withhold highly sensitive operational information concerning sorties commitments, time on target, penetration

tactics

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLK 99-36
By *[Signature]* NARA Date 12/97

~~SECRET~~

NSA/216/MLA. Gen

SECRET

- 2 -

tactics and the like, we can and should provide a considerable body of information, including targetting policy, nuclear force strengths, analysis of the force capabilities, some intelligence on Soviet Bloc strengths, and constraint policies. In putting forth this information, the US would stress the extent to which planned uses of this US strategic force are devoted to European as well as North American interests, the importance of responsible, centralized control over nuclear forces, the strength of the present and future nuclear capabilities of the US, and the probable consequences if a nuclear war were to occur. To facilitate this enlarged participation by NATO in over-all nuclear planning and operations, increased functions regarding these matters could be assigned to appropriate bodies, such as a small special group and the NATO Standing Group-Military Committee.

(b) An attempt should be made to work out NATO guidelines, which the US President would agree to observe, regarding use of all US nuclear weapons in defending NATO.

2. US Forces Outside the Continent:

(a) The US should indicate to its allies that an appropriate portion of US external forces will be directed against targets of special concern to Europe.

(b) The US should state that it is prepared to commit

to NATO

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

to NATO US nuclear forces outside the European continent (additional to those US forces already committed, in amounts to be determined). This might be the force indicated under (c).

(c) To meet on an interim basis any political need for having MRBM's based in the European area which would come under NATO wartime military command, Polaris submarines should, as promised by the President in May 1961, be committed to NATO. The US should furnish NATO with a schedule calling for the progressive commitment of Polaris submarines as the total Polaris force grows.

(d) To meet on an interim basis any political need for multilateral political control over MRBM's based in the European area, the US should indicate its willingness to consider proposals for some form of multilateral NATO control (such as indicated under 3, g, below) over the Polaris submarines committed to NATO, if this is strongly desired by our allies. It should make clear that it could not consider proposals which would limit the operational effectiveness of this vital element of the free world deterrent or prevent the US from using these submarines in self-defense whenever it felt compelled to do so. The US should also make clear that the timing of any institution of any agreed multilateral control would have to be determined

by the

SECRET

SECRET

- 4 -

by the US in the light of operational considerations at the time the proposals were made. Any multilateral control over these Polaris submarines would lapse when they were replaced by a multilateral MRBM force.

3. Multilaterally Manned NATO Force: The US should indicate its willingness to join its allies, if they wish, in developing a modest-sized (on the order of 200 missiles) fully multilateral NATO sea-based MRBM force. It should not urge this course, and should indicate its view that MRBM forces are not urgently needed for military reasons, in view of already programmed U.S. strategic forces; it should make clear that it would be prepared to facilitate procurement of MRBM's only under multilateral ownership, control, and manning.

(a) Targetting and Weapons. The question of the targetting for a multilateral force, and the question of the kind of missile and vessel to be used in the force, should be determined in the light of NATO's continuing consideration of strategy, the role of the force in that strategy, and other relevant factors.

(b) Participation. The US should only be prepared to proceed if the venture had adequate allied participation,

so that

SECRET

SECRET

- 5 -

so that it did not appear to be a thinly disguised US-German operation.

(c) Costs. The costs should be equitably shared. The US should make clear that it would not be prepared to make a major contribution to the cost but would expect the greater part of the burden to be borne by the allies.

(d) Mixed Manning. The US should require a sufficient degree of mixed manning to ensure that one nationality does not appear to be predominant in the manning - and is not, in fact, in control - of any vessel or of the missiles aboard any vessel in the multilateral force. Members of the mixed crews would be recruited from national armed forces into the NATO MRBM force and would thereafter be under the control of that Force; for trial and punishment of major crimes, they would be returned to their country of origin.

(e) Custody. Ways should be found to safeguard design data, e.g., US custodians could remain aboard any multilaterally manned NATO vessels, with standing orders to release the warheads in case a properly authenticated order to fire was received through agreed channels (see g, below).

(f) Centralized Command. In presenting these views, the US would stress its belief that the defense of the NATO area is indivisible and that a NATO Force, if one is created, could

SECRET

not

SECRET

- 6 -

not fragment this unified task. Planning for its use should, therefore, assume that it would be employed in integral association with other alliance nuclear forces. Construction of such a Force along the lines suggested above would thus not imply that the separate defense of Europe was its purpose or likely effect. On the contrary, our willingness to join in creating such a force should be dramatic evidence of our unconditional commitment to the defense of the entire alliance.

(g) Control. The US should indicate that it wishes to ascertain the views of its allies concerning the control formula. In the ensuing discussion, it should be receptive to a control formula along the lines of that on which they are most likely to agree:

(i) Advance delegation to some person or group of authority to order use of the MRBM Force (in conjunction with other nuclear forces available to NATO), in the clearly specified contingency of unmistakable large scale nuclear attack on NATO.

(ii) Agreement that the decision to order use of the force in other contingencies should be based on a pre-arranged system of voting in the NAC, which a majority of our
allies

SECRET

SECRET

-7-

allies will almost certainly wish to provide for voting by unanimity or by a group including the US.

In connection with NATO consideration of the multilateral force the United States should make plain that transfer of nuclear warheads or procedures for using the force without United States concurrence would require amending existing United States law and could well entail other obstacles depending on the character of the arrangements. The United States should indicate, however, that it is willing to consider any proposal which is put to us by a clear majority of the Alliance.

SECRET

March 22, 1962


SUBJECT: Suggested NATO Nuclear Program

After approval by the President, the United States should outline the following elements in NAC, at appropriate times and in suitable detail. These elements should be discussed in the context of revised strategy. Within this framework, the need for improved conventional forces should be stressed and elaborated in necessary detail, and the extent to which the nuclear proposals are dependent on an adequate conventional program should be made clear.

1. NATO Participation: Measures should be instituted to give NATO greater information about US nuclear strategy, and greater participation in the formulation of that strategy.

(Specific actions to this end currently under study by the State and Defense Departments should be included, if they are found to be useful.) As part of these measures:

(a) Procedures should be instituted under which we would share information about our nuclear forces and consult about basic plans and arrangements for their use in the NAC and the Standing Group - Military Committee.



Authority: EO 12958, Sec. 3.4
92-12
NLT Date: 6-21-93

Declassified - Sanitized Copy
DECLASSIFIED

Reference No / SGT MHA 31962 / 65 / 1872

~~SECRET~~

[we can and should provide a considerable body of information, including targetting policy, nuclear force strengths, analysis of the force capabilities, some intelligence on Soviet Bloc strengths, and constraint policies. In putting forth this information, the US would stress the extent to which planned uses of this US strategic force are devoted to European as well as North American interests, the importance of responsible, centralized control over nuclear forces, the strength of the present and future nuclear capabilities of the US, and the probable consequences if a nuclear war were to occur. To facilitate this enlarged participation by NATO in over-all nuclear planning and operations, increased functions regarding these matters could be assigned to appropriate bodies, such as a small special group and the NATO Standing Group-Military Committee.] 991

(b) An attempt should be made to work out NATO guidelines, which the US President would agree to observe, regarding use of all US nuclear weapons in defending NATO.

2. US Forces Outside the Continent:

(a) The US should indicate to its allies that an appropriate portion of US external forces will be directed against targets of special concern to Europe.

(b) [The US should state that it is prepared to commit
to NATO

to NATO US nuclear forces outside the European continent (additional to those US forces already committed, in amounts to be determined). This might be the force indicated under (c).

(c) To meet on an interim basis any political need for having MRBM's based in the European area which would come under NATO wartime military command, Polaris submarines should, as promised by the President in May 1961, be committed to NATO. The US should furnish NATO with a schedule calling for the progressive commitment of Polaris submarines as the total Polaris force grows.

(d) To meet on an interim basis any political need for multilateral political control over MRBM's based in the European area, the US should indicate its willingness to consider proposals for some form of multilateral NATO control (such as indicated under 3, g, below) over the Polaris submarines committed to NATO, if this is strongly desired by our allies. It should make clear that it could not consider proposals which would limit the operational effectiveness of this vital element of the free world deterrent or prevent the US from using these submarines in self-defense whenever it felt compelled to do so. The US should also make clear that the timing of any institution of any agreed multilateral control would have to be determined

by the

proposed and by

by the US in the light of operational considerations at the time the proposals were made. Any multilateral control over these Polaris submarines would lapse when they were replaced by a multilateral MRBM force.

3. Multilaterally Manned NATO Force: The US should indicate its willingness to join its allies, if they wish, in developing a modest-sized (on the order of 200 missiles) fully multilateral NATO sea-based MRBM force. It should not urge this course, and should indicate its view that MRBM forces are not urgently needed for military reasons, in view of already programmed U.S. strategic forces; it should make clear that it would be prepared to facilitate procurement of MRBM's only under multilateral ownership, control, and manning.



J 9

(a) Targetting and Weapons. The question of the targetting for a multilateral force, and the question of the kind of missile and vessel to be used in the force, should be determined in the light of NATO's continuing consideration of strategy, the role of the force in that strategy, and other relevant factors.

(b) Participation. The US should only be prepared to proceed if the venture had adequate allied participation,

8

so that

so that it did not appear to be a thinly disguised US-German operation. J

(c) Costs. The costs should be equitably shared. The US should make clear that it would [not be prepared to make a major contribution to the cost but would] expect the greater part of the burden to be borne by the allies.

(d) Mixed Manning. The US should require a sufficient degree of mixed manning to ensure that one nationality does not appear to be predominant in the manning - and is not, in fact, in control - of any vessel or of the missiles aboard any vessel in the multilateral force. Members of the mixed crews would be recruited from national armed forces into the NATO MRBM force and would thereafter be under the control of that Force; for trial and punishment of major crimes, they would be returned to their country of origin.

(e) Custody. J
US custodians could remain aboard any multilaterally manned NATO vessels, with standing orders to release the warheads in case a properly authenticated order to fire was received through agreed channels (see g, below).

(f) Centralized Command. In presenting these views, the US would stress its belief that the defense of the NATO area is indivisible and that a NATO Force, if one is created, could

not fragment this unified task. Planning for its use should, therefore, assume that it would be employed in integral association with other alliance nuclear forces. Construction of such a Force along the lines suggested above would thus not imply that the separate defense of Europe was its purpose or likely effect. On the contrary, our willingness to join in creating such a force should be dramatic evidence of our unconditional commitment to the defense of the entire alliance.

(g) Control. The US should indicate that it wishes to ascertain the views of its allies concerning the control formula. In the ensuing discussion, it should be receptive to a control formula along the lines of that on which they are most likely to agree: 8

In connection with NATO consideration of the multilateral force the United States should make plain that transfer of nuclear warheads or procedures for using the force without United States concurrence would require amending existing United States law and could well entail other obstacles depending on the character of the arrangements. The United States should indicate, however, that it is willing to consider any proposal which is put to us by a clear majority of the Alliance.

93A

REVIEWED by JR DATE June 25, 1991

RELEASE DECLASSIFY
 EXCISE DECLASSIFY IN PLACE
 DENY Non-responsive
FOI, EO or PA exemptions

CONFIDENTIAL

Section 92

DRAFT PRINCIPLES

Geneva

3/23/62

TO and/or by: _____
CLASSIFY as _____ CODE _____
DOWNGRADE IS to _____

The US and USSR have been discussing a wide range of subjects. They have agreed, in regard to certain of these subjects on (i) certain general principles to which their governments subscribe; (ii) procedures for continuing negotiation on the basis of these principles by a Committee of Foreign Ministers' deputies, which will be established specifically for this purpose, and which France and the UK will be invited to join; and (iii) certain interim steps to meet immediate dangers in the meantime.

1. Berlin

(a) General Principles: They believe that West Berlin should be free to choose its own way of life, that its viability should be maintained, and that its access should remain free and unhindered.

(b) Future Negotiations: They agree to study proposals for improving the situation in Berlin consistent with these principles and the vital interests of both sides in the aforementioned committee of Foreign Ministers' deputies.

(c) Interim Steps: In the meantime, they declare that long established access procedures should remain in effect.

2. Germany

(a) General Principles: They believe that the German people have the right to determine their own future and to reestablish the unity of Germany if they so desire, and they wish to facilitate the exercise of this right in a way that will enhance the security of all European peoples.

(b) Future Negotiations: They agree that the authorities in West and East Germany should be invited to establish mixed technical commissions, consisting of officials designated by these authorities, to increase cultural and technical contacts, promote mutually beneficial economic exchanges, and consider a draft electoral law and other steps toward German reunification.

(c) Interim Steps: In the meantime, they declare that they will ensure that any arrangements into which any of them may enter with any part of Germany will be consistent with the declarations recorded in this announcement, and that any peace treaty which they may conclude with a united Germany will be consistent with the declarations noted under 3 and 4, below.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. Nuclear Diffusion:

(a) General Principles: They believe that further diffusion of nuclear weapons into the control of national governments not now owning them would make more difficult the problem of maintaining lasting peace.

(b) Future Negotiations: They agree to seek, in the above-mentioned committee (or other appropriate forum) to develop policies regarding non-diffusion of nuclear weapons to which all states owning nuclear weapons might agree and to which states not now owning nuclear weapons might also subscribe.

(c) Interim Steps: In the meantime, they declare that they will not themselves relinquish control over any nuclear weapons to any individual state not now owning such weapons and will refrain from assisting any such state in manufacturing them.

4. Non-Aggression:

(a) General Principles: They believe that force should not be used to change existing frontiers and demarcation lines in Europe or for any other aggressive purpose.

(b) Future Negotiations: They agree to seek in the above-mentioned committee (or a sub-committee thereof) (i) to develop a suitable declaration regarding non-aggression between the NATO and Warsaw Pact Powers; and (ii) to consider measures which might be taken to enable the governments represented on that Commission to communicate and establish their non-aggressive intent in the event of grave crises and otherwise to reduce the risk of war by accident or miscalculation.

(c) Interim Steps: In the meantime, they declare that they will not themselves use or support use of force to change the external borders of Germany or the demarcation line inside Germany, and they note with approval past declarations of the Federal Republic that it will not use force to achieve the reunification of Germany or to settle international disputes.

5. Procedures

Once the proposed Committee of Foreign Ministers' deputies has been established, the Foreign Ministers of countries represented on it should meet periodically, as seems useful, to review its work.

Record Number 59767

DOCUMENT TYPE Memorandum
DATE 03/23/1962
OFFICE
TIME
ORIGIN United States, Department of State
SIGNATOR
DEETO
DESTE
CLASSIFICATION Confidential
TITLE Draft Principles
DTIT
NAME
TERM
ORGA
PAGE 2

Akalovsky:cb
(Drafting Office and Officer)

~~SECRET~~ ~~RESTRICTED~~

Classification removed by
Friedrich Conk SS-1/FRJ
E 83/24/62

3/14/91

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SecDel/MC/59

Approved in S
7/9/62

Memorandum of Conversation

5 001

DATE: March 26, 1962
3:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Germany and Berlin

Downgraded To: SECRET ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Soviet Mission
Geneva, Switzerland

EO 11652: XGDS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 4

Authorized By: H. D. ~~...~~
August 4, 1975 *HMS*

PARTICIPANTS: United States
The Secretary
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Akalovsky

USSR
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Semenov
Mr. Sukhodrev

COPIES TO: S/S - *...* - 2
S/P - Mr. Rostow - 3
G - Mr. Johnson - 4
S/B - Mr. Bohlen - 5
EUR - Mr. Kohler - 6
INR/D - Mr. Hilsman - 7
BTF - Mr. Hillenbrand - 8

OSD - Mr. McNamara - 9
Amembassy Moscow - Amb. Thompson - 0
White House - Mr. Bundy - 11
CL - 12
700clothes - 13
#1 File 7224

Mr. Gromyko invited the Secretary to speak first, saying that it was an unwritten tradition in the Soviet Union to have the guest speak first.

The Secretary said he wished to make one or two preliminary comments. He said that we had not responded initially and immediately to the Soviet paper on access because it was our view that it contained a fatal defect, i.e., the link between access and withdrawal of Western forces from West Berlin. That link was also apparent in what Mr. Gromyko had said orally. The Secretary emphasized that any proposal contingent on the withdrawal of Western forces was impossible and misleading because of the importance we attached to the presence of Western forces in West Berlin. Referring to the US suggestion for an international access authority and to the Soviet suggestion for such an authority, the Secretary believed that it might be possible to explore this in order to see whether some solution could be found. but emphasized again the greatness of the problem created by the linkage.

The Secretary observed that this was an illustration of the fundamental problem in communications between our two governments. The Soviet proposals were obviously in conflict with the vital interests of the West. A series of communications and conversations both sides had had so far on these problems had made it obvious that there was no movement toward agreement. However, it was not in the interests of the two sides merely to say that no agreement was possible and let things develop toward a crisis. Therefore, the US had tried to list the points on which it believed agreement was possible, at least in

general

FORM DS-1254
3-61

~~SECRET~~

REVIEWED BY *R* Date *June 26, 1991*

GPO 90892

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

() RELEASE () DECLASSIFY
() EXISE () DECLASSIFY in PART
() DENY () DELETE
() Non-responsive info.

FOI, EO or PA exceptions
TS authority to:
() CLASSIFY as _____, OADR
() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C, OADR

102.00/3-2662

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

general terms. If both sides agreed on general principles, they could proceed to discuss other problems.

The Secretary said that personally he did not believe that there were many points of difference; however, they were points involving vital interests and if they could be handled and managed, other problems would fall into place. In spite of the differences of emphasis and detail, the Secretary thought agreement should be possible on the questions of the status of West Berlin, boundaries, non-aggression, practical arrangements to reconcile access and what Mr. Gromyko called the sovereignty of GDR, and non-diffusion of nuclear weapons. He stressed, however, that the stumbling block was what we considered our vital interests.

Referring to the US paper on general principles, the Secretary said that it was not in direct response to the Soviet papers on principles and access, but was designed for a different purpose. While the Soviet paper on general principles restated Soviet proposals, we believed that account must be taken of the differences existing on the various problems and that we must see how to handle them. Thus our paper did not require withdrawal of Soviet proposals or acknowledgement by the USSR of our vital interests in any new form. On the other hand, our paper contained points on which both sides should be able to agree and which could serve as a basis for further discussions.

Mr. Gromyko then launched into a lengthy statement frequently referring to what appeared to be a talking paper. He started out by restating the Soviet Government's belief that the Soviet proposals for a German peace treaty and the creation of a free city of West Berlin on the basis of such a treaty were aimed at a detente and at an improvement in international relations, particularly those between the great powers. He asserted that the Soviet Government wished good relations with the United States, including friendship, and that the peoples of our two countries would be grateful to their leaders if they were to bring about such relations. He stated that the Soviet Union had rejected and still rejected any attempts to depict the Soviet insistence on a peace treaty and on the creation of a free city of West Berlin as pursuit by the USSR of some narrow aims. The Soviet Government also flatly rejected assertions that the USSR or the GDR wish to take hold of West Berlin. Mr. Gromyko observed that such aims were alien to Soviet policy. He then said that the Soviet Union was proceeding on the basis of the fact that there was an absolutely abnormal situation in Germany and West Berlin, due to the fact that seventeen years after World War II there was still no peace treaty and the occupation regime continued to exist in West Berlin as if nothing had happened since the war.

The Soviet

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

SECRET-3

The Soviet Government believed that this abnormal situation was in conflict with the best interests of peace in Europe and throughout the world and was in conflict with the interests of improving relations among states, including those between the US and the USSR. He contended that the Soviet Government had never signed and could not sign a commitment providing for a perpetuation of the occupation of Germany or West Berlin, whereas what the Western Powers now sought in West Berlin was tantamount to the occupation of that city for an indefinite period. He reiterated that the Soviet Government could not agree to any such thing. Seventeen years had passed since World War II and a line should be drawn under that war; the drawing of such a line should not be a mere formal act but should involve changes stemming from a peace treaty.

Mr. Gromyko asserted that the Soviet Government proceeded from the facts of the existing situation, where two sovereign and independent German states existed, and suggested that all states must take account of those basic facts in shaping their policy with regard to Germany and, to a large extent, with regard to Europe in general. The Soviet Union proceeded from this basic fact and the purpose of a peace treaty was to bring the situation in Germany and Berlin into accord with the present as distinct from the past.

Mr. Gromyko continued that it was most important now to have a German peace treaty and to resolve the status of West Berlin on the basis of such a treaty by agreement of all states concerned. As to the contents of such status, the Soviet Government had made proposals on the subject and they were well known. He said that he wished to emphasize the Soviet Government's preference for an agreed solution of the problem of a German peace treaty and of the status of West Berlin on the basis of such a treaty. He stressed that the USSR would sign a peace treaty unilaterally and take appropriate steps without agreement on the part of the Western Powers only if the latter refused to reach agreement. However, the USSR preferred an agreed solution and the search for such a solution was the purpose of the present negotiations.

Mr. Gromyko then stated that the questions of a German peace treaty and of a free city of West Berlin were closely related to the question of respect for the sovereignty of the GDR. He said that the USSR could not accept any agreement not providing for such respect. The Soviet Union could not agree to any arrangements which would be based on a situation where certain states would completely disregard the sovereignty of the GDR because of their feeling of animosity toward that state. He said that while many countries had a social order and policies which the USSR did not like, the Soviet Government respected their sovereignty in dealing with them, and whenever the Soviet

Union

SECRET-EYES ONLY

Union had to resolve certain problems with those countries it did so on the basis of respect for their sovereignty. The GDR should not be an exception from that rule. The Secretary's statement that unrestricted access and transit of persons and goods could be reconciled with respect for the GDR's sovereignty represented a correct thesis. The Soviet Government held the same view and had said so in New York and to Ambassador Thompson in Moscow. However, the main problem was the content and the interpretation of this formula. He asserted that the Soviet Government feared there was an intention merely to pay lip service to the sovereignty of the GDR and to flout it in practice. If this was the case, it would be regrettable and it would not facilitate agreement.

Referring to the Soviet paper on transit, Mr. Gromyko claimed that it had been prepared in order to meet repeated US requests that the Soviet Union spell out its views with regard to the question of respect for the sovereignty of the GDR in connection with the transit of persons and goods. He contended that the paper set forth the detailed views of the Soviet Government on the subject of civilian transport, but the US pretended not to have noticed the paper and merely said that its main defect was the link to the Soviet proposals on the status of West Berlin. Although it was true that there was a Soviet proposal on the status, the US now had an opportunity of considering the problem of transit thoroughly and of replying to the Soviet views on transit as such. Of course, transit would be to such a West Berlin the status of which would have to be agreed. However, the Soviet Union had now stated its views on transit and on the question of how sovereignty and transit could be reconciled, as both sides had said that they could.

With reference to the question of the presence of Western forces in West Berlin, Mr. Gromyko said that the Soviet Government had proposed several variants of the solution of this problem, which were well known. He claimed that the Secretary's remarks indicated that the West regarded West Berlin only as a military springboard and a military base. The USSR was compelled to draw appropriate conclusions from this.

Mr. Gromyko then said that the Soviet Government had repeatedly stated its position with regard to the questions to be resolved in connection with a peace treaty, such as borders, non-transfer of nuclear weapons to and non-production of such weapons in the two Germanies, and non-aggression. That position was well known and there was no need to repeat it. The Soviet Union had tried to present its views on these matters in compressed form in the USSR working paper on general principles. Of course, that paper contained certain points which were not regarded favorably by the United States.

However,

SECRET-EYES ONLY

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

However, the US paper also included certain points representing US unilateral positions and took no account of Soviet positions. Furthermore, the US paper even represented a backward step in certain areas.

Mr. Gromyko then reviewed the US paper paragraph by paragraph. With regard to paragraph 1, he said that the title "Berlin" appeared to reflect a desire to slip in the idea of one Berlin, something which was not negotiable. He said the United States itself had admitted that West Berlin was a separate entity and he contended that East Berlin was an organic part of the GDR. Referring to the phrase "for improving the situation" in subparagraph (b), he wondered what it meant. He suggested that it might mean an increase in the number of occupation troops or agreement on a perpetuation of the occupation. He asserted that the real question was that of eliminating the occupation and of removing the situation fraught with dangers and risks; the present situation yielded no good to anyone, including the United States, from the political, military, economic, or any other standpoint. With reference to subparagraph (c), he said it emphasized preservation of the present access procedures whereas the USSR proceeded on the basis of the need for respect for the sovereignty of the GDR and of reconciling the concept of the GDR sovereignty with free access. He said it would be intolerable if the sovereignty of the GDR was not respected. Mr. Gromyko asserted that there was no justification for the US apprehensions with regard to possible actions by the GDR in the event that the Soviet proposal was adopted, because if the USSR reached agreement with the US and its allies, it would consult its own allies, including the GDR, and the GDR would undertake appropriate obligations. Therefore, there was no ground for fears. He expressed the hope that the US would study the Soviet proposals on access, including access authority, and duly evaluate them. He reiterated the Soviet desire to reach agreement and said he wished to stress again that only if there were no agreement between the two sides would the West have to deal with the GDR. He reiterated that the US should now carefully study the consideration expressed by the USSR.

Referring to paragraph 2 of the US Draft Principles, Mr. Gromyko noted that subparagraphs (a) and (b) referred to German unification. He said the Soviet Government's view was that this was an internal matter for the Germans themselves to resolve by agreement between the GDR and the FRG and asserted that conclusion of a single peace treaty or of two separate peace treaties would facilitate a rapprochement between the two German states. He claimed that this paragraph was an illustration of the incorrectness of the US assertion that the paper set forth agreed views. The Soviet views on the question of German unification were known to the US, but the paper set forth the US' own views. With reference to subparagraph (c), Mr. Gromyko said that it

was the

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

6

was the Soviet view that any agreement with any part of Germany must be consistent with the understanding, including the results of the present negotiations, between the two sides on the questions relating to a German peace settlement, if such an understanding was reached. On the other hand, if there were no such understanding, then the USSR would have no alternative other than to act on the basis of a peace treaty with the GDR. However, that would be the case only in the event that there was no agreement between East and West.

*M L P
Peers*

Commenting on paragraph 3, Mr. Gromyko contended that it substituted the question of non-armament of the two German states with nuclear weapons and of non-production of such weapons in those states with the question of a much broader, international scope. Yet conversations both here in Geneva and in New York had dealt with this problem with specific reference to the two Germanies. Mr. Gromyko said that the USSR was not opposed to the idea of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons on a global scale and noted that the Soviet vote for the respective UN general Assembly resolution, as well as the Soviet Government's communication on this question to the acting Secretary General of the United Nations, reflected that attitude. However, for reasons that were well known, it was important that one problem not be replaced with the other or made contingent upon its solution. Moreover, the formula in the US paper was unsatisfactory because it did not preclude such interpretation as would allow armament with nuclear weapons of such Bundeswehr and other non-nuclear nation forces as were formally not under the control of "national governments" but were considered as part of NATO forces. He stated that the language of this paragraph should not allow such interpretation. He noted, however, that the USSR would not object to the inclusion of such a broad formula in the principles, if they were agreed, provided that it contained the phrase "including the two German states." Furthermore, it must also be understood that the solution of the broad problem must not hold up the application of this principle to the two German states. Of course, if there were no delay with regard to the broad problem, there would be no difficulty. Mr. Gromyko then stated that the Soviet position was that nuclear weapons should not be transferred either directly, through third parties, or through military organizations; this should apply to both the universal formula and the formula restricted only to the two German states.

Turning to paragraph 4 of the US paper, Mr. Gromyko said that reference to non-use of force in sub-paragraph (a) was a minimum minimorum. On the other hand, the USSR believed that borders must be legally formalized. The positions of the two sides were also different with regard to the question of demarcation lines, because the USSR did not make any distinction between

external

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

external borders of and the line between the two Germanies. He contended that it would be in the interest of peace if the internal line were formalized as a border. Noting that so far neither side had proposed either orally or in writing any modus for such formalization, Mr. Gromyko thought that both sides would have to work out such a modus at a later date. As to sub-paragraph 4 (b), Mr. Gromyko said that a declaration on non-aggression was an acceptable form of obligation from the Soviet standpoint. However, he professed puzzlement in regard to the provision under (ii) and wondered why language causing puzzlement and even apprehension should be included. A non-aggression agreement was a clear commitment involving politico-moral obligations to which nothing should be added that complicated the matter. With respect to sub-paragraph (c), Mr. Gromyko said that the USSR could not accept reference to past statements by the FRG. He noted that this point related to paragraph 8 in the Soviet draft principles. It was quite evident that the two German states must make some kind of statements. Furthermore, in the spirit of fairness, if reference was made to past statements by the FRG, then past statements by the GDR should also be referred to.

Observing that those were the Soviet views on the US working paper, Mr. Gromyko said that he wished to point out that, in developing its own proposals, the USSR had attempted to narrow the gap between the US and the Soviet positions. He regretted that the Soviet action had not met with due response on the part of the US and expressed the hope that the US would pay greater attention to the study of Soviet proposals and would find in them what it had not yet been able to discern. Of course, it was possible that the US had already discerned certain points in the Soviet proposals but was unwilling to speak about them. Mr. Gromyko then claimed that the Soviet basic proposals for a German peace treaty and the solution of the West Berlin situation on the basis of such a treaty, as well as the additional Soviet proposals made here in Geneva in both written and oral form, were designed to facilitate an understanding between the two sides. He said that the main goal was to eliminate the differences between the two sides and to remove the obstacles to agreement between them in Europe, where their interests collided and where dangers existed.

Mr. Gromyko said that he wished to conclude by recalling Mr. Khrushchev's statement in Vienna that Central Europe, West Berlin, and the question of a German peace treaty and of the status of West Berlin on the basis of such a treaty were the only area in the world where the US and the USSR interests were in direct collision. If this problem were settled, that would lead to a radical improvement in the relations between our two states and in the situation in Europe generally. In this connection, he also recalled the Secretary's

statement

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

SECRET-EYES ONLY

statement in New York that an improvement in the relations between our two states would be of historic significance.

The Secretary responded by saying that he wished to reciprocate the comments Mr. Gromyko had made at the beginning and at the end of his remarks. He stated that the two Governments should try to reach agreement on these problems. Berlin and Germany were undoubtedly the most critical problems and if they were resolved prospects would open for an improvement in the relations between our two states with regard to many other matters. The Secretary felt that it was important that both countries reach agreement on these problems and not let them affect adversely their relations in other areas, including disarmament, where the US was determined to make every effort to reach positive results.

Noting that Mr. Gromyko had touched upon a great number of points, the Secretary said that he would not deal with all of them in detail, but wished to make certain observations on some of them. The Secretary appreciated Mr. Gromyko's detailed comments on the US paper on general principles. However, he wished to emphasize that Mr. Gromyko was not right in saying that our principles took no account of Soviet positions and even represented a backward step as compared to earlier discussions. In fact, discussions between our two sides over the period of the past months had been taking place in a somewhat one-sided manner which was disadvantageous to the US. The USSR had put forward proposals with regard to what it believed to be the right way of drawing a line under World War II. The United States had also had proposals as to how a line under World War II should be drawn, i.e., by unification through free elections, and with Berlin as the capital of a unified Germany. However, we were not putting those proposals forward because that would mean a mere exchange of proposals without agreement. Rather, we had based ourselves on the factual situation. On the other hand, when under these circumstances the Soviet Union said that a line should be drawn under World War II, it clearly had in mind changes which were to a serious disadvantage to the West. The Secretary observed that this brought him to the key point, i.e., the presence of Western forces in West Berlin. He stressed strongly that the US could not accept the view that there was an anomaly in the presence of Western forces in West Berlin; that was no more abnormal than any other aspect of the situation in Germany. Neither could the US accept the view that lines of influence had been drawn in Germany and that Western presence east of those lines was abnormal. Arrangements had been made at the end of World War II, and they provided for Western presence where it existed today. The Secretary recalled the clear and forceful statement by the President in Vienna with

regard

SECRET-EYES ONLY

SECRET-EYES ONLY

regard to the great effect on the Western position that would take place if we permitted ^{ourselves} to be driven out of that area. He observed ~~that~~ he did not say that the USSR intended to drive us out, but noted that the objective effect of the Soviet proposals would be just that. This had also been made clear by the President in Vienna.

The Secretary went on to say that he could not agree that there was ground for fears that West Berlin was a military base. The Western forces in West Berlin were minute in the present military situation. They had minor arms, no nuclear weapons, and insecure communications. No military leader in the East or the West would regard West Berlin as a military base. The troops in West Berlin were there exclusively for political purposes, namely, to stabilize the situation in Germany, and such stabilization worked to the advantage of both the USSR and the US. Mr. Gromyko and his colleagues had stated from time to time that the Soviet proposals concerning Berlin were good for the West. The Secretary said that he wished to tell Mr. Gromyko sincerely that the presence of Western forces in West Berlin was good for both the United States and the USSR. However, neither side should tell the other what was good for it; each of them should decide this for itself and then both should talk to each other on that basis.

Turning to the question of transit, the Secretary noted that Mr. Gromyko had used the phrases "transit as such" and "transit to such a Berlin the status of which was to be agreed upon". He also observed ~~that~~ any proposals on transit must not necessarily be linked to the withdrawal of Western forces from West Berlin. As to the compatibility of free access with the so-called sovereignty of the GDR, the Secretary said this was something both sides had said: should be possible, but he was not sure that a common formula had been found for working this problem out. He stated that the expressions "free access" and "exercise of sovereignty" contained the seeds of basic contradiction, unless agreement with respect to free access did not involve the exercise of sovereignty in any manner that would frustrate the agreement. In this connection, the Secretary referred to the first two sentences in paragraph 2 of the Soviet paper on transit and wondered how they could be reconciled. He supposed that both sides would work out a new understanding with regard to access, which would then be subject to agreement by East Germany. The Secretary recalled his remarks that East Germans would of necessity participate in access procedures; however, in a broader sense, the exercise of sovereignty, as far as East Germany was concerned, would consist in agreeing to access. On the other hand, if "sovereignty" meant assumption of control over access in any geographic area, then access would be vulnerable. The United States had

proposed

SECRET-EYES ONLY

SECRET - EYES ONLY

-16-

proposed an international access authority which it believed could overcome this problem. Mr. Gromyko had made a different proposal with regard to such an authority, which would not necessarily overcome that problem. The Soviet proposal assumed disputes and provided for a four-power commission to arbitrate. This, the Secretary noted, also involved the question of whether that commission would act under the unanimity rule. However, the Secretary stated, if transit was not dependent on the withdrawal of Western forces from West Berlin, then he thought that there were some points here which brought the two sides closer together and we could see how to move toward agreement, because he did not believe there was an inherent problem in the matter of reconciling access with the activities of the authorities in East Germany.

Referring to the US paper on principles, the Secretary said he supposed that the general principle under the heading "Berlin" was something both sides had said over the past several months. As to the word "improvement" in sub-paragraph (b), he said there was no basis for suspicion here, because if satisfactory arrangements were found, that would represent improvement; he could not imagine that arrangements agreed upon by both sides would not constitute improvement. As to paragraph 2, the Secretary recalled Mr. Gromyko's comment that it contained a one-sided formulation. However, the Secretary observed, Mr. Gromyko would surely recognize that this was basically what both sides had been saying, and had said more formally in 1955, although the paragraph omitted reference to free elections. The United States agreed that reunification was something for the German people to accomplish; however, we believed that the victorious powers had a residual responsibility for the solution of the German problem. In any event, the language of paragraph 2 was formulated in such a way as to reflect what we believed to be the Soviet position as well.

As to Mr. Gromyko's comments on the question of nuclear diffusion, the Secretary recalled Mr. Gromyko's statement in New York that the two Germanies should not have nuclear weapons and his own statement that this presented no problem because it was our national policy to oppose the proliferation of nuclear weapons to any national government, including the two Germanies. He expressed the view that this problem was something that could be worked out promptly. If there should be any delay because of some difficulties, we could see what could be done, but we preferred the general formula rather than to point at this or that individual state. As to indirect transfer, the Secretary stated we had no intention of giving nuclear weapons to the Bundeswehr or any other national forces, directly or through third parties. He reiterated that the US was opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and said that we had gone to considerable length to safeguard that policy.

The Secretary

SECRET
SECRET - EYES ONLY

SECRET-EYES ONLY

The Secretary then recalled the President's remark to Mr. Adzhubei to the effect that some questions might be easier to resolve with the passing of time. He said that he wished to note that this did not mean procrastination, because when two sides were in disagreement it was difficult to tell which side was procrastinating in not agreeing with the other. However, many things could happen with time and create a situation where problems would be easier to resolve. For instance, the situation in East Germany had been stabilized in many respects and the flow of refugees had been stopped. Steps could be made in the disarmament field which would create a situation where solution of various problems might be easier. Also, the confrontation in Berlin could be reduced. The Secretary noted that our main problem was that we were dealing here with a dangerous confrontation of interests and particularly with proposals which we believed seriously affected our interests. Both sides should avoid affecting their mutual interests and develop the situation with regard to Berlin on that basis.

The Secretary then observed that Mr. Gromyko had made some twenty-five points and that he had not responded to all of them. He said that he wished to study Mr. Gromyko's remarks against the background of the previous conversations and then report to the President. He expressed the hope that Mr. Gromyko would do the same and said that both sides should see how to move toward agreement on this critical question. Reverting to paragraph 1 of the US draft principles, the Secretary added that reference to "improving the situation in Berlin" related to possible arrangements with regard to traffic, family ties, and other possible improvements affecting both parts of Berlin. He noted that the first part of paragraph 1 referred to West Berlin. The Secretary observed that this wording was not an attempt to conceal an all-Berlin proposal, although the US was prepared to make such a proposal at any moment.

Mr. Gromyko said he wished to comment on some points made by the Secretary. Referring to the Secretary's remark with regard to the link between access and the status of West Berlin, Mr. Gromyko said that there was indeed such a link in the Soviet proposals. He said that transit arrangements would be superimposed on an agreed status of West Berlin and noted that the Soviet proposals with regard to transit did not exist outside such an agreement.

Mr. Gromyko then expressed satisfaction at the Secretary's remark that there were some points of a positive nature in the Soviet paper on access. As to the question of the voting procedure in the proposed four-power commission, Mr. Gromyko stated that this was a subject for later discussion and that he did not wish to commit himself now. However, he believed that the voting procedure should be such as to satisfy all parties and at the same time

not be

SECRET-EYES ONLY

SECRET
SECRET-EYES ONLY

- 12 -

not be in conflict with the sovereignty of the GDR. As to the purpose of the international authority, he viewed that authority as arbiter acting in situations such as those discussed in Geneva in 1959.

Referring to the Secretary's comment on the first two sentences in paragraph 2 of the Soviet paper on transit, Mr. Gromyko said that if there were no contradictions there would be no problem. He contended that such contradictions existed whenever international obligations were assumed: while one party must abide by its obligations the other party must respect its sovereignty. This was nothing new and was not an insoluble problem. In fact, the U.S. itself, through Ambassador Thompson, had referred to international agreements, in particular the Chicago Convention. Mr. Gromyko said he was happy to hear the Secretary say that such arrangements were made on a daily basis. He went on to say that it was inconceivable to imagine a situation where the GDR would take control over access in the face of such obligations as it would have assumed with regard to access arrangements, including international authority. Thus the Secretary's fears were not justified.

As to the duration of an agreement on transit, Mr. Gromyko said that the USSR proceeded on the basis that if there was agreement on the status of West Berlin, civilian transit arrangements would remain in force for the duration of the status.

Turning to the question of nuclear diffusion, Mr. Gromyko said he thought the Secretary apparently understood the difference between the two variants and the Soviet apprehensions in this matter. He reiterated that the Soviet Union did not wish any delay in the development of global arrangements to cause delay in the arrangements with regard to the two German states. He said that every effort should be made to develop global arrangements, but these two questions should not be linked.

As to the President's remark to Mr. Adzhubei, Mr. Gromyko said it was true that time could be an ally, but observed that sometimes it could also be an enemy and could work against the improvement of relations between our two states. The Soviet Government believed that time was ripe for removing the dangers inherent in the West Berlin situation. Therefore, both sides should seek methods of reaching a speedy agreement. However, the USSR was opposed to negotiations for the sake of negotiations; it was in favor of serious negotiations. The USSR had agreed to bilateral exchanges of views and continued to favor such exchanges. It hoped that such exchanges would lead to positive results which would provide a basis for agreement on the question of a German peace treaty.

SECRET

The Secretary

SECRET-EYES ONLY

SECRET-EYES ONLY

SECRET

The Secretary inquired what dangers Mr. Gromyko saw in the West Berlin situation and suggested surely it was not the presence of Western forces.

Mr. Gromyko responded by reiterating that the situation in West Berlin was an abnormal one, since it was frozen as it had emerged in the first days after the war. The US might like that situation, but the USSR did not. There were many unsatisfactory aspects to this situation, such as the presence of Western forces in West Berlin, the continuation of the occupation status in West Berlin, disregard for the sovereignty of the GDR, and many other questions still remaining unresolved -- such as frontiers, nuclear weapons, etc.

Perpetuation of this situation was not in the interests of the US either, as least as the USSR saw those interests; nor was it in the interests of peace in Europe. The Soviet Union proceeded on the basis of facts and wanted the present situation to be in line with the actual situation in Germany. Mr. Gromyko asserted that there were few examples in history where for seventeen years after the war there had been no peace treaty and where the situation, such as that in West Berlin, had been preserved in the same form as it had existed three days after the war. He contended that the acuteness of the abnormal situation was compounded by such factors as the existence of nuclear weapons, rockets, etc., which might give rise to accidents. He wondered why one should play with this kind of a situation and why one should not remove these time bombs left over from World War II, so that all nations could breathe freely and live in peace and tranquillity.

The Secretary referred to Mr. Gromyko's remark with regard to the link and said that he had understood ^{from} Mr. Gromyko's statements in earlier conversations that the Soviet proposal for access was specifically related to the withdrawal of Western forces. He observed that the presence of Western forces was considerably different from status and that it was conceivable to reach agreement on a status that would be different from removal of Western forces from West Berlin.

In response to the Secretary's question, Mr. Gromyko drew a diagram indicating three elements: access, status, and troops. He drew lines between access and status and between status and troops, but observed one could also draw a line directly from access to troops. He said that the USSR had given the US its views as to how it understood access in relations to status. Thus access would lead to such West Berlin the status of which had been agreed. As to the Soviet proposal on status, it was well known and it included substitution of Western forces with neutral or UN troops.

The Secretary

SECRET-EYES ONLY

SECRET

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

The Secretary observed that Mr. Gromyko's clarification was not very helpful, because it still very much linked access to withdrawal of forces, which was not negotiable. Referring to Mr. Gromyko's remark about tensions, the Secretary said that tensions arise from the fact that the USSR had been asking for something we could not give it. This was the heart of the matter. Furthermore, both sides had commitments concerning Germany and in that respect both of them were interested in the factual situation.

The Secretary reiterated that both sides would like to think about what had been said in Geneva and said he wished to report to the President upon his return to Washington. Referring to Mr. Gromyko's remark with respect to bilateral exchanges, the Secretary said both sides should get in touch after they had carefully reviewed what had been said, because it was in the interest of both sides to do everything they could in order to settle these problems. The Secretary noted that he was not suggesting any particular channel and invited Mr. Gromyko to make suggestions.

Mr. Gromyko said that the channel for bilateral contacts could perhaps be worked out later. He remarked in passing that if the US preferred to use Moscow there would be no objection. In any event, the USSR would wish to know what prospects there were and therefore the question of the form of contact should be considered by both sides in the near future. He said that this stemmed from the USSR's desire to have serious negotiations to seek possibilities for agreement rather than negotiations for the sake of negotiations.

The Secretary replied that the US was also against negotiations for the sake of negotiations and stressed the necessity of seeking solutions. He expressed the hope that he could come to Moscow some time, but said he was not sure if that fitted this situation.

Mr. Gromyko concluded the conversation by saying that the Secretary would be welcome if he found it possible to visit Moscow, including in connection with this problem. However, this was of course something for the Secretary himself to decide. He remarked that the Soviet foreign minister had been to Washington whereas the US Secretary of State had not been to Moscow.

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

Number 59770

Sum of Conversation
/1962

United States, Department of State
Bebelovsky, Alexander

Secret

Germany and Berlin

[Rusk-Bromyko Discussion at Geneva, ~~Talk at Geneva~~]

Rusk, Dean

Thompson, Llewellyn E.

Khrushchev, Nikita S.

Kennedy, John F.

Adzhubei, Aleksei

Bromyko, Andrei A.

Allied Berlin Garrison

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

United Nations, General Assembly

United Nations

14

ORGAN
ORGAN
ORGAN
ORGAN
ORGAN
ORGAN

alovsky:cb
(Acting Officer and Officer)

~~SECRET~~ (EYES ONLY)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SecDel/MC/59

Approved in S
7/9/62

Memorandum of Conversation

5 001

DATE: March 26, 1962
3:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Germany and Berlin

Downgraded To: SECRET ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
EO 11652: XGDS ~~1000~~ 4
Authorized By: H. D. ~~_____~~
August 4, 1975 *HMS*

Soviet Mission
Geneva, Switzerland

PARTICIPANTS: United States
The Secretary
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Akalovsky

USSR
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Semenov
Mr. Sukhodrev

COPIES TO: S/S - *Young* - 2
S/P - Mr. Rostow - 3
G - Mr. Johnson - 4
S/B - Mr. Bohlen - 5
EUR - Mr. Kohler - 6
INR/D - Mr. Hilsman - 7
BTF - Mr. Hillenbrand - 8
OSD - Mr. McNamara - 9
Amembassy Moscow - Amb. Thompson - 0
White House - Mr. Bundy - 11
CL - 12
7000/other - 13
#1 File 7224

Mr. Gromyko invited the Secretary to speak first, saying that it was an unwritten tradition in the Soviet Union to have the guest speak first.

The Secretary said he wished to make one or two preliminary comments. He said that we had not responded initially and immediately to the Soviet paper on access because it was our view that it contained a fatal defect, i.e., the link between access and withdrawal of Western forces from West Berlin. That link was also apparent in what Mr. Gromyko had said orally. The Secretary emphasized that any proposal contingent on the withdrawal of Western forces was impossible and misleading because of the importance we attached to the presence of Western forces in West Berlin. Referring to the US suggestion for an international access authority and to the Soviet suggestion for such an authority, the Secretary believed that it might be possible to explore this in order to see whether some solution could be found. but emphasized again the greatness of the problem created by the linkage.

The Secretary observed that this was an illustration of the fundamental problem in communications between our two governments. The Soviet proposals were obviously in conflict with the vital interests of the West. A series of communications and conversations both sides had had so far on these problems had made it obvious that there was no movement toward agreement. However, it was not in the interests of the two sides merely to say that no agreement was possible and let things develop toward a crisis. Therefore, the US had tried to list the points on which it believed agreement was possible, at least in

general

FORM DS-1254
3-61

~~SECRET~~ (EYES ONLY)

REVIEWED BY *JR* Date *June 26, 1991*

GPO 908992

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

() RELEASE () DECLASSIFY
() EXISE () DECLASSIFY in PART
() DENY () DELETE
() Non-responsive info.

FOI, EO or PA exceptions
TS authority to:
() CLASSIFY as _____, OADR
() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C, OADR

162.00/3-2662

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

general terms. If both sides agreed on general principles, they could proceed to discuss other problems.

The Secretary said that personally he did not believe that there were many points of difference; however, they were points involving vital interests and if they could be handled and managed, other problems would fall into place. In spite of the differences of emphasis and detail, the Secretary thought agreement should be possible on the questions of the status of West Berlin, boundaries, non-aggression, practical arrangements to reconcile access and what Mr. Gromyko called the sovereignty of GDR, and non-diffusion of nuclear weapons. He stressed, however, that the stumbling block was what we considered our vital interests.

Referring to the US paper on general principles, the Secretary said that it was not in direct response to the Soviet papers on principles and access, but was designed for a different purpose. While the Soviet paper on general principles restated Soviet proposals, we believed that account must be taken of the differences existing on the various problems and that we must see how to handle them. Thus our paper did not require withdrawal of Soviet proposals or acknowledgement by the USSR of our vital interests in any new form. On the other hand, our paper contained points on which both sides should be able to agree and which could serve as a basis for further discussions.

Mr. Gromyko then launched into a lengthy statement frequently referring to what appeared to be a talking paper. He started out by restating the Soviet Government's belief that the Soviet proposals for a German peace treaty and the creation of a free city of West Berlin on the basis of such a treaty were aimed at a detente and at an improvement in international relations, particularly those between the great powers. He asserted that the Soviet Government wished good relations with the United States, including friendship, and that the peoples of our two countries would be grateful to their leaders if they were to bring about such relations. He stated that the Soviet Union had rejected and still rejected any attempts to depict the Soviet insistence on a peace treaty and on the creation of a free city of West Berlin as pursuit by the USSR of some narrow aims. The Soviet Government also flatly rejected assertions that the USSR or the GDR wish to take hold of West Berlin. Mr. Gromyko observed that such aims were alien to Soviet policy. He then said that the Soviet Union was proceeding on the basis of the fact that there was an absolutely abnormal situation in Germany and West Berlin, due to the fact that seventeen years after World War II there was still no peace treaty and the occupation regime continued to exist in West Berlin as if nothing had happened since the war.

The Soviet

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

The Soviet Government believed that this abnormal situation was in conflict with the best interests of peace in Europe and throughout the world and was in conflict with the interests of improving relations among states, including those between the US and the USSR. He contended that the Soviet Government had never signed and could not sign a commitment providing for a perpetuation of the occupation of Germany or West Berlin, whereas what the Western Powers now sought in West Berlin was tantamount to the occupation of that city for an indefinite period. He reiterated that the Soviet Government could not agree to any such thing. Seventeen years had passed since World War II and a line should be drawn under that war; the drawing of such a line should not be a mere formal act but should involve changes stemming from a peace treaty.

Mr. Gromyko asserted that the Soviet Government proceeded from the facts of the existing situation, where two sovereign and independent German states existed, and suggested that all states must take account of those basic facts in shaping their policy with regard to Germany and, to a large extent, with regard to Europe in general. The Soviet Union proceeded from this basic fact and the purpose of a peace treaty was to bring the situation in Germany and Berlin into accord with the present as distinct from the past.

Mr. Gromyko continued that it was most important now to have a German peace treaty and to resolve the status of West Berlin on the basis of such a treaty by agreement of all states concerned. As to the contents of such status, the Soviet Government had made proposals on the subject and they were well known. He said that he wished to emphasize the Soviet Government's preference for an agreed solution of the problem of a German peace treaty and of the status of West Berlin on the basis of such a treaty. He stressed that the USSR would sign a peace treaty unilaterally and take appropriate steps without agreement on the part of the Western Powers only if the latter refused to reach agreement. However, the USSR preferred an agreed solution and the search for such a solution was the purpose of the present negotiations.

Mr. Gromyko then stated that the questions of a German peace treaty and of a free city of West Berlin were closely related to the question of respect for the sovereignty of the GDR. He said that the USSR could not accept any agreement not providing for such respect. The Soviet Union could not agree to any arrangements which would be based on a situation where certain states would completely disregard the sovereignty of the GDR because of their feeling of animosity toward that state. He said that while many countries had a social order and policies which the USSR did not like, the Soviet Government respected their sovereignty in dealing with them, and whenever the Soviet

Union

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

Union had to resolve certain problems with those countries it did so on the basis of respect for their sovereignty. The GDR should not be an exception from that rule. The Secretary's statement that unrestricted access and transit of persons and goods could be reconciled with respect for the GDR's sovereignty represented a correct thesis. The Soviet Government held the same view and had said so in New York and to Ambassador Thompson in Moscow. However, the main problem was the content and the interpretation of this formula. He asserted that the Soviet Government feared there was an intention merely to pay lip service to the sovereignty of the GDR and to flout it in practice. If this was the case, it would be regrettable and it would not facilitate agreement.

Referring to the Soviet paper on transit, Mr. Gromyko claimed that it had been prepared in order to meet repeated US requests that the Soviet Union spell out its views with regard to the question of respect for the sovereignty of the GDR in connection with the transit of persons and goods. He contended that the paper set forth the detailed views of the Soviet Government on the subject of civilian transport, but the US pretended not to have noticed the paper and merely said that its main defect was the link to the Soviet proposals on the status of West Berlin. Although it was true that there was a Soviet proposal on the status, the US now had an opportunity of considering the problem of transit thoroughly and of replying to the Soviet views on transit as such. Of course, transit would be to such a West Berlin the status of which would have to be agreed. However, the Soviet Union had now stated its views on transit and on the question of how sovereignty and transit could be reconciled, as both sides had said that they could.

With reference to the question of the presence of Western forces in West Berlin, Mr. Gromyko said that the Soviet Government had proposed several variants of the solution of this problem, which were well known. He claimed that the Secretary's remarks indicated that the West regarded West Berlin only as a military springboard and a military base. The USSR was compelled to draw appropriate conclusions from this.

Mr. Gromyko then said that the Soviet Government had repeatedly stated its position with regard to the questions to be resolved in connection with a peace treaty, such as borders, non-transfer of nuclear weapons to and non-production of such weapons in the two Germanies, and non-aggression. That position was well known and there was no need to repeat it. The Soviet Union had tried to present its views on these matters in compressed form in the USSR working paper on general principles. Of course, that paper contained certain points which were not regarded favorably by the United States.

However,

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

However, the US paper also included certain points representing US unilateral positions and took no account of Soviet positions. Furthermore, the US paper even represented a backward step in certain areas.

Mr. Gromyko then reviewed the US paper paragraph by paragraph. With regard to paragraph 1, he said that the title "Berlin" appeared to reflect a desire to slip in the idea of one Berlin, something which was not negotiable. He said the United States itself had admitted that West Berlin was a separate entity and he contended that East Berlin was an organic part of the GDR. Referring to the phrase "for improving the situation" in subparagraph (b), he wondered what it meant. He suggested that it might mean an increase in the number of occupation troops or agreement on a perpetuation of the occupation. He asserted that the real question was that of eliminating the occupation and of removing the situation fraught with dangers and risks; the present situation yielded no good to anyone, including the United States, from the political, military, economic, or any other standpoint. With reference to subparagraph (c), he said it emphasized preservation of the present access procedures whereas the USSR proceeded on the basis of the need for respect for the sovereignty of the GDR and of reconciling the concept of the GDR sovereignty with free access. He said it would be intolerable if the sovereignty of the GDR was not respected. Mr. Gromyko asserted that there was no justification for the US apprehensions with regard to possible actions by the GDR in the event that the Soviet proposal was adopted, because if the USSR reached agreement with the US and its allies, it would consult its own allies, including the GDR, and the GDR would undertake appropriate obligations. Therefore, there was no ground for fears. He expressed the hope that the US would study the Soviet proposals on access, including access authority, and duly evaluate them. He reiterated the Soviet desire to reach agreement and said he wished to stress again that only if there were no agreement between the two sides would the West have to deal with the GDR. He reiterated that the US should now carefully study the consideration expressed by the USSR.

Referring to paragraph 2 of the US Draft Principles, Mr. Gromyko noted that subparagraphs (a) and (b) referred to German unification. He said the Soviet Government's view was that this was an internal matter for the Germans themselves to resolve by agreement between the GDR and the FRG and asserted that conclusion of a single peace treaty or of two separate peace treaties would facilitate a rapprochement between the two German states. He claimed that this paragraph was an illustration of the incorrectness of the US assertion that the paper set forth agreed views. The Soviet views on the question of German unification were known to the US, but the paper set forth the US own views. With reference to subparagraph (c), Mr. Gromyko said that it

was the

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

6

was the Soviet view that any agreement with any part of Germany must be consistent with the understanding, including the results of the present negotiations, between the two sides on the questions relating to a German peace settlement, if such an understanding was reached. On the other hand, if there were no such understanding, then the USSR would have no alternative other than to act on the basis of a peace treaty with the GDR. However, that would be the case only in the event that there was no agreement between East and West.

Commenting on paragraph 3, Mr. Gromyko contended that it substituted the question of non-armament of the two German states with nuclear weapons and of non-production of such weapons in those states with the question of a much broader, international scope. Yet conversations both here in Geneva and in New York had dealt with this problem with specific reference to the two Germanies. Mr. Gromyko said that the USSR was not opposed to the idea of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons on a global scale and noted that the Soviet vote for the respective UN general Assembly resolution, as well as the Soviet Government's communication on this question to the acting Secretary General of the United Nations, reflected that attitude. However, for reasons that were well known, it was important that one problem not be replaced with the other or made contingent upon its solution. Moreover, the formula in the US paper was unsatisfactory because it did not preclude such interpretation as would allow armament with nuclear weapons of such Bundeswehr and other non-nuclear nation forces as were formally not under the control of "national governments" but were considered as part of NATO forces. He stated that the language of this paragraph should not allow such interpretation. He noted, however, that the USSR would not object to the inclusion of such a broad formula in the principles, if they were agreed, provided that it contained the phrase "including the two German states." Furthermore, it must also be understood that the solution of the broad problem must not hold up the application of this principle to the two German states. Of course, if there were no delay with regard to the broad problem, there would be no difficulty. Mr. Gromyko then stated that the Soviet position was that nuclear weapons should not be transferred either directly, through third parties, or through military organizations; this should apply to both the universal formula and the formula restricted only to the two German states.

Turning to paragraph 4 of the US paper, Mr. Gromyko said that reference to non-use of force in sub-paragraph (a) was a minimum minimorum. On the other hand, the USSR believed that borders must be legally formalized. The positions of the two sides were also different with regard to the question of demarcation lines, because the USSR did not make any distinction between

external

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

external borders of and the line between the two Germanies. He contended that it would be in the interest of peace if the internal line were formalized as a border. Noting that so far neither side had proposed either orally or in writing any modus for such formalization, Mr. Gromyko thought that both sides would have to work out such a modus at a later date. As to sub-paragraph 4 (b), Mr. Gromyko said that a declaration on non-aggression was an acceptable form of obligation from the Soviet standpoint. However, he professed puzzlement in regard to the provision under (ii) and wondered why language causing puzzlement and even apprehension should be included. A non-aggression agreement was a clear commitment involving politico-moral obligations to which nothing should be added that complicated the matter. With respect to sub-paragraph (c), Mr. Gromyko said that the USSR could not accept reference to past statements by the FRG. He noted that this point related to paragraph 8 in the Soviet draft principles. It was quite evident that the two German states must make some kind of statements. Furthermore, in the spirit of fairness, if reference was made to past statements by the FRG, then past statements by the GDR should also be referred to.

Observing that those were the Soviet views on the US working paper, Mr. Gromyko said that he wished to point out that, in developing its own proposals, the USSR had attempted to narrow the gap between the US and the Soviet positions. He regretted that the Soviet action had not met with due response on the part of the US and expressed the hope that the US would pay greater attention to the study of Soviet proposals and would find in them what it had not yet been able to discern. Of course, it was possible that the US had already discerned certain points in the Soviet proposals but was unwilling to speak about them. Mr. Gromyko then claimed that the Soviet basic proposals for a German peace treaty and the solution of the West Berlin situation on the basis of such a treaty, as well as the additional Soviet proposals made here in Geneva in both written and oral form, were designed to facilitate an understanding between the two sides. He said that the main goal was to eliminate the differences between the two sides and to remove the obstacles to agreement between them in Europe, where their interests collided and where dangers existed.

Mr. Gromyko said that he wished to conclude by recalling Mr. Khrushchev's statement in Vienna that Central Europe, West Berlin, and the question of a German peace treaty and of the status of West Berlin on the basis of such a treaty were the only area in the world where the US and the USSR interests were in direct collision. If this problem were settled, that would lead to a radical improvement in the relations between our two states and in the situation in Europe generally. In this connection, he also recalled the Secretary's

statement

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

statement in New York that an improvement in the relations between our two states would be of historic significance.

The Secretary responded by saying that he wished to reciprocate the comments Mr. Gromyko had made at the beginning and at the end of his remarks. He stated that the two Governments should try to reach agreement on these problems. Berlin and Germany were undoubtedly the most critical problems and if they were resolved prospects would open for an improvement in the relations between our two states with regard to many other matters. The Secretary felt that it was important that both countries reach agreement on these problems and not let them affect adversely their relations in other areas, including disarmament, where the US was determined to make every effort to reach positive results.

Noting that Mr. Gromyko had touched upon a great number of points, the Secretary said that he would not deal with all of them in detail, but wished to make certain observations on some of them. The Secretary appreciated Mr. Gromyko's detailed comments on the US paper on general principles. However, he wished to emphasize that Mr. Gromyko was not right in saying that our principles took no account of Soviet positions and even represented a backward step as compared to earlier discussions. In fact, discussions between our two sides over the period of the past months had been taking place in a somewhat one-sided manner which was disadvantageous to the US. The USSR had put forward proposals with regard to what it believed to be the right way of drawing a line under World War II. The United States had also had proposals as to how a line under World War II should be drawn, i.e., by unification through free elections, and with Berlin as the capital of a unified Germany. However, we were not putting those proposals forward because that would mean a mere exchange of proposals without agreement. Rather, we had based ourselves on the factual situation. On the other hand, when under these circumstances the Soviet Union said that a line should be drawn under World War II, it clearly had in mind changes which were to a serious disadvantage to the West. The Secretary observed that this brought him to the key point, i.e., the presence of Western forces in West Berlin. He stressed strongly that the US could not accept the view that there was an anomaly in the presence of Western forces in West Berlin; that was no more abnormal than any other aspect of the situation in Germany. Neither could the US accept the view that lines of influence had been drawn in Germany and that Western presence east of those lines was abnormal. Arrangements had been made at the end of World War II, and they provided for Western presence where it existed today. The Secretary recalled the clear and forceful statement by the President in Vienna with

regard

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

regard to the great effect on the Western position that would take place if we permitted ^{ourselves} to be driven out of that area. He observed ~~that~~ he did not say that the USSR intended to drive us out, but noted that the objective effect of the Soviet proposals would be just that. This had also been made clear by the President in Vienna.

The Secretary went on to say that he could not agree that there was ground for fears that West Berlin was a military base. The Western forces in West Berlin were minute in the present military situation. They had minor arms, no nuclear weapons, and insecure communications. No military leader in the East or the West would regard West Berlin as a military base. The troops in West Berlin were there exclusively for political purposes, namely, to stabilize the situation in Germany, and such stabilization worked to the advantage of both the USSR and the US. Mr. Gromyko and his colleagues had stated from time to time that the Soviet proposals concerning Berlin were good for the West. The Secretary said that he wished to tell Mr. Gromyko sincerely that the presence of Western forces in West Berlin was good for both the United States and the USSR. However, neither side should tell the other what was good for it; each of them should decide this for itself and then both should talk to each other on that basis.

Turning to the question of transit, the Secretary noted that Mr. Gromyko had used the phrases "transit as such" and "transit to such a Berlin the status of which was to be agreed upon". He also observed ~~that~~ any proposals on transit must not necessarily be linked to the withdrawal of Western forces from West Berlin. As to the compatibility of free access with the so-called sovereignty of the GDR, the Secretary said this was something both sides had said should be possible, but he was not sure that a common formula had been found for working this problem out. He stated that the expressions "free access" and "exercise of sovereignty" contained the seeds of basic contradiction, unless agreement with respect to free access did not involve the exercise of sovereignty in any manner that would frustrate the agreement. In this connection, the Secretary referred to the first two sentences in paragraph 2 of the Soviet paper on transit and wondered how they could be reconciled. He supposed that both sides would work out a new understanding with regard to access, which would then be subject to agreement by East Germany. The Secretary recalled his remarks that East Germans would of necessity participate in access procedures; however, in a broader sense, the exercise of sovereignty, as far as East Germany was concerned, would consist in agreeing to access. On the other hand, if "sovereignty" meant assumption of control over access in any geographic area, then access would be vulnerable. The United States had

proposed

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

SECRET - EYES ONLY

-10-

proposed an international access authority which it believed could overcome this problem. Mr. Gromyko had made a different proposal with regard to such an authority, which would not necessarily overcome that problem. The Soviet proposal assumed disputes and provided for a four-power commission to arbitrate. This, the Secretary noted, also involved the question of whether that commission would act under the unanimity rule. However, the Secretary stated, if transit was not dependent on the withdrawal of Western forces from West Berlin, then he thought that there were some points here which brought the two sides closer together and we could see how to move toward agreement, because he did not believe there was an inherent problem in the matter of reconciling access with the activities of the authorities in East Germany.

Referring to the US paper on principles, the Secretary said he supposed that the general principle under the heading "Berlin" was something both sides had said over the past several months. As to the word "improvement" in sub-paragraph (b), he said there was no basis for suspicion here, because if satisfactory arrangements were found, that would represent improvement; he could not imagine that arrangements agreed upon by both sides would not constitute improvement. As to paragraph 2, the Secretary recalled Mr. Gromyko's comment that it contained a one-sided formulation. However, the Secretary observed, Mr. Gromyko would surely recognize that this was basically what both sides had been saying, and had said more formally in 1955, although the paragraph omitted reference to free elections. The United States agreed that reunification was something for the German people to accomplish; however, we believed that the victorious powers had a residual responsibility for the solution of the German problem. In any event, the language of paragraph 2 was formulated in such a way as to reflect what we believed to be the Soviet position as well.

As to Mr. Gromyko's comments on the question of nuclear diffusion, the Secretary recalled Mr. Gromyko's statement in New York that the two Germanies should not have nuclear weapons and his own statement that this presented no problem because it was our national policy to oppose the proliferation of nuclear weapons to any national government, including the two Germanies. He expressed the view that this problem was something that could be worked out promptly. If there should be any delay because of some difficulties, we could see what could be done, but we preferred the general formula rather than to point at this or that individual state. As to indirect transfer, the Secretary stated we had no intention of giving nuclear weapons to the Bundeswehr or any other national forces, directly or through third parties. He reiterated that the US was opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and said that we had gone to considerable length to safeguard that policy.

The Secretary

SECRET
SECRET - EYES ONLY

SECRET-EYES ONLY

The Secretary then recalled the President's remark to Mr. Adzhubei to the effect that some questions might be easier to resolve with the passing of time. He said that he wished to note that this did not mean procrastination, because when two sides were in disagreement it was difficult to tell which side was procrastinating in not agreeing with the other. However, many things could happen with time and create a situation where problems would be easier to resolve. For instance, the situation in East Germany had been stabilized in many respects and the flow of refugees had been stopped. Steps could be made in the disarmament field which would create a situation where solution of various problems might be easier. Also, the confrontation in Berlin could be reduced. The Secretary noted that our main problem was that we were dealing here with a dangerous confrontation of interests and particularly with proposals which we believed seriously affected our interests. Both sides should avoid affecting their mutual interests and develop the situation with regard to Berlin on that basis.

The Secretary then observed that Mr. Gromyko had made some twenty-five points and that he had not responded to all of them. He said that he wished to study Mr. Gromyko's remarks against the background of the previous conversations and then report to the President. He expressed the hope that Mr. Gromyko would do the same and said that both sides should see how to move toward agreement on this critical question. Reverting to paragraph 1 of the US draft principles, the Secretary added that reference to "improving the situation in Berlin" related to possible arrangements with regard to traffic, family ties, and other possible improvements affecting both parts of Berlin. He noted that the first part of paragraph 1 referred to West Berlin. The Secretary observed that this wording was not an attempt to conceal an all-Berlin proposal, although the US was prepared to make such a proposal at any moment.

Mr. Gromyko said he wished to comment on some points made by the Secretary. Referring to the Secretary's remark with regard to the link between access and the status of West Berlin, Mr. Gromyko said that there was indeed such a link in the Soviet proposals. He said that transit arrangements would be superimposed on an agreed status of West Berlin and noted that the Soviet proposals with regard to transit did not exist outside such an agreement.

Mr. Gromyko then expressed satisfaction at the Secretary's remark that there were some points of a positive nature in the Soviet paper on access. As to the question of the voting procedure in the proposed four-power commission, Mr. Gromyko stated that this was a subject for later discussion and that he did not wish to commit himself now. However, he believed that the voting procedure should be such as to satisfy all parties and at the same time

not be

SECRET-EYES ONLY

SECRET
SECRET-EYES ONLY

- 12 -

not be in conflict with the sovereignty of the GDR. As to the purpose of the international authority, he viewed that authority as arbiter acting in situations such as those discussed in Geneva in 1959.

Referring to the Secretary's comment on the first two sentences in paragraph 2 of the Soviet paper on transit, Mr. Gromyko said that if there were no contradictions there would be no problem. He contended that such contradictions existed whenever international obligations were assumed: while one party must abide by its obligations the other party must respect its sovereignty. This was nothing new and was not an insoluble problem. In fact, the U.S. itself, through Ambassador Thompson, had referred to international agreements, in particular the Chicago Convention. Mr. Gromyko said he was happy to hear the Secretary say that such arrangements were made on a daily basis. He went on to say that it was inconceivable to imagine a situation where the GDR would take control over access in the face of such obligations as it would have assumed with regard to access arrangements, including international authority. Thus the Secretary's fears were not justified.

As to the duration of an agreement on transit, Mr. Gromyko said that the USSR proceeded on the basis that if there was agreement on the status of West Berlin, civilian transit arrangements would remain in force for the duration of the status.

Turning to the question of nuclear diffusion, Mr. Gromyko said he thought the Secretary apparently understood the difference between the two variants and the Soviet apprehensions in this matter. He reiterated that the Soviet Union did not wish any delay in the development of global arrangements to cause delay in the arrangements with regard to the two German states. He said that every effort should be made to develop global arrangements, but these two questions should not be linked.

As to the President's remark to Mr. Adzhubei, Mr. Gromyko said it was true that time could be an ally, but observed that sometimes it could also be an enemy and could work against the improvement of relations between our two states. The Soviet Government believed that time was ripe for removing the dangers inherent in the West Berlin situation. Therefore, both sides should seek methods of reaching a speedy agreement. However, the USSR was opposed to negotiations for the sake of negotiations; it was in favor of serious negotiations. The USSR had agreed to bilateral exchanges of views and continued to favor such exchanges. It hoped that such exchanges would lead to positive results which would provide a basis for agreement on the question of a German peace treaty.

SECRET

The Secretary

SECRET-EYES ONLY

SECRET-EYES ONLY

13

The Secretary inquired what dangers Mr. Gromyko saw in the West Berlin situation and suggested surely it was not the presence of Western forces.

Mr. Gromyko responded by reiterating that the situation in West Berlin was an abnormal one, since it was frozen as it had emerged in the first days after the war. The US might like that situation, but the USSR did not. There were many unsatisfactory aspects to this situation, such as the presence of Western forces in West Berlin, the continuation of the occupation status in West Berlin, disregard for the sovereignty of the GDR, and many other questions still remaining unresolved -- such as frontiers, nuclear weapons, etc. *not an answer*

Perpetuation of this situation was not in the interests of the US either, as least as the USSR saw those interests; nor was it in the interests of peace in Europe. The Soviet Union proceeded on the basis of facts and wanted the present situation to be in line with the actual situation in Germany. Mr. Gromyko asserted that there were few examples in history where for seventeen years after the war there had been no peace treaty and where the situation, such as that in West Berlin, had been preserved in the same form as it had existed three days after the war. He contended that the acuteness of the abnormal situation was compounded by such factors as the existence of nuclear weapons, rockets, etc., which might give rise to accidents. He wondered why one should play with this kind of a situation and why one should not remove these time bombs left over from World War II, so that all nations could breathe freely and live in peace and tranquillity.

The Secretary referred to Mr. Gromyko's remark with regard to the link and said that he had understood ^{from} Mr. Gromyko's statements in earlier conversations that the Soviet proposal for access was specifically related to the withdrawal of Western forces. He observed that the presence of Western forces was considerably different from status and that it was conceivable to reach agreement on a status that would be different from removal of Western forces from West Berlin.

In response to the Secretary's question, Mr. Gromyko drew a diagram indicating three elements: access, status, and troops. He drew lines between access and status and between status and troops, but observed one could also draw a line directly from access to troops. He said that the USSR had given the US its views as to how it understood access in relations to status. Thus access would lead to such West Berlin the status of which had been agreed. As to the Soviet proposal on status, it was well known and it included substitution of Western forces with neutral or UN troops.

The Secretary

SECRET-EYES ONLY

SECRET

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

The Secretary observed that Mr. Gromyko's clarification was not very helpful, because it still very much linked access to withdrawal of forces, which was not negotiable. Referring to Mr. Gromyko's remark about tensions, the Secretary said that tensions arise from the fact that the USSR had been asking for something we could not give it. This was the heart of the matter. Furthermore, both sides had commitments concerning Germany and in that respect both of them were interested in the factual situation.

The Secretary reiterated that both sides would like to think about what had been said in Geneva and said he wished to report to the President upon his return to Washington. Referring to Mr. Gromyko's remark with respect to bilateral exchanges, the Secretary said both sides should get in touch after they had carefully reviewed what had been said, because it was in the interest of both sides to do everything they could in order to settle these problems. The Secretary noted that he was not suggesting any particular channel and invited Mr. Gromyko to make suggestions.

Mr. Gromyko said that the channel for bilateral contacts could perhaps be worked out later. He remarked in passing that if the US preferred to use Moscow there would be no objection. In any event, the USSR would wish to know what prospects there were and therefore the question of the form of contact should be considered by both sides in the near future. He said that this stemmed from the USSR's desire to have serious negotiations to seek possibilities for agreement rather than negotiations for the sake of negotiations.

The Secretary replied that the US was also against negotiations for the sake of negotiations and stressed the necessity of seeking solutions. He expressed the hope that he could come to Moscow some time, but said he was not sure if that fitted this situation.

Mr. Gromyko concluded the conversation by saying that the Secretary would be welcome if he found it possible to visit Moscow, including in connection with this problem. However, this was of course something for the Secretary himself to decide. He remarked that the Soviet foreign minister had been to Washington whereas the US Secretary of State had not been to Moscow.

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

Record Number 59770

Memorandum of Conversation
03/26/1962

United States, Department of State
Akalovsky, Alexander

Secret

Germany and Berlin

[Rusk-Gromyko Discussion at Geneva] ~~Talk at Geneva~~

Rusk, Dean

Thompson, Llewellyn E.

Khrushchev, Nikita S.

Kennedy, John F.

Adzhubei, Aleksei

Gromyko, Andrei A.

Allied Berlin Garrison

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

United Nations, General Assembly

United Nations

14

TYPE
ORIGI
SIGNATE
DESTE
DESTE
CLASSIFICATION
TITLE
CTIT
NAMES
NAMES
NAMES
NAMES
NAMES
NAMES
NAMES
TERME
ORGA
ORGA
ORGA
ORGA
PSS

3/27/62

E9

ING TELEGRAM

Depa ~~EYES ONLY~~ of State

ACTION COPY

PERMANENT RECORD

32

SECRET

FOR
GENEVA
SECTO-116

Action

Control: 18445

SS

Rec'd: MARCH 27, 1962

Info

FROM: GENEVA

1:24pm

Captives remained
by Federal Court, SS-1
TAB 3/14/91

~~EYES ONLY~~

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 116, MARCH 27, 4 PM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/C/O/M/R
() RELEASE
() EXIST
() DENY
() DECLASSIFY IN PART
() DELETE
() Non-responsive info.

ACTION BERLIN PRIORITY 21, INFORMATION DEPARTMENT SECTO 716,
MICROFILMED FOR
EYES ONLY ACTING SECRETARY KENNEDY LIBRARY
EYES ONLY FOR CLAY FROM SECRETARY APRIL 1964

BEFORE LEAVING GENEVA, I WANTED YOU TO KNOW THAT, ALTHOUGH OUR TALKS WITH SOVIETS WILL CONTINUE, WE MADE NO REAL HEADWAY TOWARDS ANY SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT ON BERLIN WHICH WE COULD ACCEPT. AS INDICATED IN THE JOINT AMERICAN-SOVIET STATEMENT ISSUED THIS MORNING, IT IS FAIR TO SAY THAT SOME PROGRESS WAS MADE IN CLARIFYING POINTS OF AGREEMENT AND POINTS OF DIFFERENCE, BUT POINTS OF DIFFERENCE REMAIN FUNDAMENTAL.

I DID OBTAIN IMPRESSION, HOWEVER, THAT SOVIETS DO NOT WISH TO HAVE CONFRONTATION NOW AND DESIRE TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH US ON BERLIN. WHETHER THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH CONTINUING HARASSMENTS IN AIR CORRIDORS AND ON GROUND ACCESS ROUTES IS AN OBVIOUSLY RELATED QUESTION. I HAVE THIS MORNING EMPHASIZED TO GROMYKO THAT INCREASED SOVIET AIR CORRIDOR ACTIVITY TODAY IS INCONSISTENT WITH SPIRIT OF OUR JOINT STATEMENT AND THAT WE CANNOT HELP BUT DRAW JUDGMENTS NOT ONLY FROM WHAT SOVIETS SAY ABOUT DESIRING PEACEFUL SOLUTION BUT ALSO FROM WHAT THEY DO.

I HAVE NOT TRIED TO COMMENT SPECIFICALLY FROM GENEVA ON YOUR RECENT MESSAGES MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS TO DEPT AND USAREUR. HOWEVER, IN A RELATED MATTER, I HAVE TODAY EXPRESSED STRONGLY ON LONG RANGE DESIRABILITY OF OUR INSTITUTING CERTAIN NAVAL COUNTER MEASURES IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET HARASSMENTS OF BERLIN ACCESS.

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" WITH NOTATION OF ACTION TAKEN.

This copy must be returned to RM/R with notation of action taken.

ACTION ASSIGNED TO:	ACTION TAKEN:	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R:
NAME OF OFFICER:	DATE OF ACTION:	
OFFICE SYMBOL:		

962.04/3-27-62

②

SECRET

-2- SECTO 116, MARCH 27, 4 PM FROM GENEVA

I SHALL NOW BE REPORTING TO PRESIDENT AND, AFTER CONSULTATION WITH OUR ALLIES, WE SHALL THEN HAVE TO GIVE THOUGHT TO NEXT DIPLOMATIC ROUND. I AM GLAD THAT, IN MEANTIME, FROM ALL EVIDENCE BERLIN MORALE AND PLAN REMAIN GOOD THOUGH SUBJECTED TO STRAINS AND DOUBTS OF WHICH YOU HAVE MADE US AWARE.

RUSK

WGM

NOTE: Advance copy to SS 3/27/62 LWH

SECRET

Record Number 53168

TYPE

Memorandum
03/26/1962

ORIGIN
SIGNATOR

United States. Executive Office of the President
Klein, David

ESTO
ESTP
CLASSIFICATION

Bundy, McGeorge
Secret

TITLE

The Kohler-Semenov Conversations

STIT
NAMES
NAMES
NAMES
NAMES
NAMES

Kohler, Foy D.
Semenov, Vladimir S.
Owen, Henry
Rusk, Dean
Dobrynin, Anatoly F.

TERMS
ORGAN
PGS

2

Klein
~~SECRET~~

March 26, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

FROM: David Klein ✓

SUBJECT: The Kohler-Semyenov Conversations

✓ The main impression I take from the Kohler-Semyenov conversations is the fact that the Soviets are interested in talking further about Berlin and they are trying to explore the thinking behind the modus vivendi paper.

It is clear that Semyenov was instructed to explore the principal elements of the paper without, in any way, committing himself. That presumably is being left for higher Soviet authority.

✓ One curious part of the conversation concerned the International Access Authority. Semyenov obviously was attempting to establish the seriousness of our proposal. Unfortunately I think he has the impression we are not really interested in it. Actually the International Access Authority is a good starting position for us and one which we should not drop prematurely.

✓ The question then arises - where do we go from here. We obviously are heading into pre-summit discussions. I would think that the paper which the Secretary tabled in Geneva is adequate for the present phase of discussions. The revision which Henry Owen and I worked on, which incorporates some of the Soviet language, would seem ✓ appropriate for the next phase.

✓ I do not know the thinking here but I would presume that perhaps the next phase might be a Rusk-Dobrynin exchange and during these conversations a revised modus vivendi paper might be tabled.

After that, perhaps another Rusk-Gromyko round, particularly if a summit meeting is in the offing.

✓ As for a summit meeting, the conditions under which it is arranged are perhaps as important as the meeting itself. If the decision is taken to go to the summit, we must give the Soviets and the public the impression

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.4
SKP NLK-86-259 NARA Date 3/90

4
~~SECRET~~

that we are going willingly and confidently, and are not being dragged. By the same token, we must do everything possible to avoid creating an impression of euphoria. The public should not become over-optimistic and by the same token the Soviets must clearly understand that the summit is not an instrument through which our rights are bargained away. This must be clear at the outset so there is no - to use an overused word - miscalculation. Otherwise we may have a repeat of the May 1960 fiasco.

~~SECRET~~

Record Number 60309

Berlin Crisis

Cable

Yes

03/27/1962

Donation

SECTO 116

United States Consulate General, Geneva (Switzerland)

United States, Department of State, Office of the Secretary

Rusk, Dean

Secret

Eyes

[Soviets Do Not Want a Confrontation Now and Want to Maintain Contacts on Berlin]

2

SENT TYPE

DATE

CIRCD

TIME

ROOM

WARTY

CABNO

ROOM

ORIGIN

DESTP

DESTO

SIGNATOR

DRAFT

CLASSIFICATION

DISTR

TITLE

OTIT

LINEX

PGS

LOCOR

CLLNO

3/29/62
2226

SECRET

March 29, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Suggested NATO Nuclear Program

1. We submit the attached memorandum concerning a suggested NATO nuclear program for your approval.
2. Paragraph 2(d) is disagreed.

(a) The Defense Department believes that subparagraph 2d should be deleted. There is no previous U. S. commitment to place these submarines under multilateral control, and such a commitment should not be made now. Working out the multilateral control arrangements will take time, and it is impossible to foresee how they will turn out. We should be sure of our ground before involving an existing essential element of our strength, possibly under provisions requiring Congressional action. The multilateral MRBM force provides a safe context for agreeing on multilateral controls.

(b) The State Department view is that this subparagraph does not commit the US to accept multilateral control over the US Polaris submarines; it merely indicates that we are willing to consider proposals to this end. It specifically states that we would not consider proposals which would either impair the boats' operational effectiveness or limit US ability to use them in self defense; and it makes clear that the timing of any US decisions would have to be determined in the light of operational considerations. A willingness to discuss and consider multilateral

control

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4
 NLK-91-97 (SF 9/22/92)
 By SF NARA, Date 4/21/94

NSA/2/6/Multilateral force for
 1/61-6/62

SECRET

-2-

control over these boats would help to meet European MRBM concerns on an interim basis, while creation of a fully multilateral force was being considered. This would reduce allied pressures for hasty decisions regarding the NATO MRBM force; we could then proceed with the care and deliberation that this important subject deserves.

3. We would like to meet with you privately to discuss the attached paper.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Robert S. McNamara

Robert S. McNamara

SECRET

7/21/62

89-264

File: ATOMIC POLICY

6

ref: ITALY

US-Spt of NATO (ITALIAN VIEW)

100016

31 Mar 62, msg. Rome to Washington, reports views of high Italian authorities on NATO Strategy, Nuclear force, and French Nuclear effort.

Gist: Italy understands and backs US position
NATO nuclear force useful and probably only way to deal w/ FRG
interest in and need for wps.
It should probably be controlled by small exec. comm. limited to
participants in force.
Favor present US approach to France re. latter's nat'l ambitions
"because of eventual implication w/ Germany...."

988/1247

DIR 39 2646
JK
4/22/90

7/26/62 (ET)

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY
PERMANENT RECORD

W

51
Action

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

Control: 17871
Rec'd: March 26 1962
8:06 pm

001
GENEVA SECTO-113H

55
Info

FROM: GENEVA

Downgraded To: SECRET ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
EO 11652: XGDS 1 2 3 4
Authorized By: H. D. Brewster

TO: Secretary of State

August 4, 1975
MICROFILMED FOR
KENNEDY LIBRARY
APRIL 1964

NO: SECTO 113, MARCH 26, MIDNIGHT

NIACT
EYES ONLY
*Captain removed by
Friedland Cook SS-1/TJB
3/14/91*

PRESIDENT AND ACTING SECRETARY FROM THE SECRETARY

NO OTHER DISTRIBUTION

AS I WIND UP THIS ROUND OF TALKS WITH GROMYKO ON BERLIN, I HAVE FOLLOWING SUMMARY REACTIONS PRIOR TO FULL REPORT ON MY RETURN:

1. SOVIETS HAVE NOT CHANGED THEIR PROPOSALS IN ANY SIGNIFICANT WAY SINCE VIENNA SUMMIT.
2. GROMYKO HAS CAREFULLY AVOIDED THREAT AND BLUSTER ON THE ONE SIDE AND ANY TEMPTATION TO DECLARE AN IMPASSE ON THE OTHER. BEARING IN MIND YOUR CONVERSATION WITH ME JUST BEFORE MY DEPARTURE, I PRESENTED GROMYKO WITH SEVERAL OPPORTUNITIES TO CLARIFY COMPLETELY THEIR REAL INTENTIONS, SPECIFICALLY TO DISCOVER WHETHER THEY ARE DETERMINED TO MOVE TO A CRISIS. HE CONSISTENTLY BACKED AWAY.
3. ALTHOUGH THEY CAN CHANGE THEIR MINDS OVERNIGHT, THEY CLEARLY LEFT THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY WISHED TO CONTINUE TALKS ON A BILATERAL BASIS AND ARE FLEXIBLE AS TO EXACT MEANS. GROMYKO UNDERLINED THAT WE COULD CONSIDER DOBRYNIN AS A FULLY RELIABLE CHANNEL WITH FULL CONFIDENCE KHRUSHCHEV. IN DOING SO, HOWEVER, HE DID NOT RULE OUT ANY OTHER CHANNEL AND RENEWED THIS MOST INFORMAL INVITATION TO ME, FOR EXAMPLE, TO VISIT MOSCOW IF IT SHOULD PROVE CONVENIENT.

765
-26602

679
Date: 9/25/91

REVIEWED BY: *WJK*
FOI, EO or PA exceptions

TS authority to:
CLASSIFY as OADR
DOWNGRADE TO () S or () C, OADR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
X RELEASE
() EXISE
() DENY
X DECLASSIFY
() DECLASSIFY in PART
() DELETE
() Non-responsive info.

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY
UNCLASSIFIED

This copy must be returned to ~~TOP SECRET~~ central files with notation that it is UNCLASSIFIED

ACTION ASSIGNED TO:	ACTION TAKEN:	DIRECTIONS TO PM/R
NAME OF OFFICER	DATE OF ACTION	
OFFICE SYMBOL		

NSA

SECRET
TOP SECRET

-2- SECTO 113, MARCH 26, MIDNIGHT FROM GENEVA

4. MY ASSOCIATES AND I BELIEVE THAT IN OUR TALKS HERE, INCLUDING EXPERT LEVEL CONSULTATIONS, WE ACCUMULATED A GREAT DEAL OF "RAW DATA" WHICH WE MUST CAREFULLY REVIEW TO DETERMINE WHAT THE MOST PROMISING LINE OF OUR NEXT APPROACH MIGHT BE.

5. ALTHOUGH GROMYKO DID NOT ACCEPT OUR MODUS VIVENDI APPROACH IN THESE DISCUSSIONS, HIS CRITICISMS OF OUR SO-CALLED PRINCIPLES WERE NOT FUNDAMENTAL AND I THINK SOME REVISION OF THIS APPROACH MIGHT BE A GOOD NEXT STEP WHATEVER THE CHANNEL.

6. DESPITE PRECEDING PARAGRAPH, SOVIETS ARE STILL PRESSING FOR MAJOR AGREEMENT ON ESSENCE OF THEIR PROPOSALS AND ARE RELUCTANT TO ABANDON THEM EVEN TACITLY FOR A MODUS VIVENDI. I AM MORE THAN EVER CONVINCED THAT WHAT WE HAVE DESCRIBED AS OUR VITAL INTERESTS IN BERLIN ARE JUST THAT AND THAT SOVIETS LOOK UPON OUR ATTITUDE AS A FORMIDABLE OBSTACLE AND ARE RELUCTANT TO CHALLENGE THESE INTERESTS FRONTALLY.

7. GROMYKO AND I DID NOT REACH FORMAL AGREEMENT ON ANY POINT BUT IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THERE ARE A NUMBER OF POINTS ON WHICH WE COULD AGREE. SIMILARLY, WE DID NOT REACH A DEGREE OF DISAGREEMENT ON ANY POINT WHICH PRECLUDES FURTHER DISCUSSION.

UPON MY ARRIVAL AT AIRPORT I PLAN TO MAKE MOST MINIMUM STATEMENT PENDING FULL REPORT TO YOU.

RUSK

MCM

Note: Passed White House per SS- Mr Pezzullo 3/26

SECRET
TOP SECRET



650533
BX 502

SECRET
SecDel MC/18

E13
3/15/62
R

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

4

Date: March 15, 1962
Time: 5:00 p.m.
Place: U.S. Delegation Headquarters
Geneva, Switzerland

Participants:

United States

Great Britain

Mr. Foy Kohler
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. M. J. Hillenbrand

Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh

Subject: Mr. Kohler's Meeting with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov,
and other matters relating to Berlin.

Copies to:	SecDel	EUM	INR/D	White House	
	S/S	GER	Ambassy Paris	Ambassy Bonn	CIA - Mr. McCone
	G	RA	Ambassy Paris for	Ambassy Moscow	BTF
	S/P	SOV	Ambassy London	Stoessel	
				DOD - Sec. McNamara	

Mr. Kohler briefed Sir Evelyn on the luncheon meeting which he had just completed with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov.

Sir Evelyn asked whether Mr. Kohler had any reason to believe that the Soviets would be coming up with a reply to the American suggestions next week. Mr. Kohler said he did not know. Ambassador Thompson commented that he thought they would. A line would probably be required for the speech which Khrushchev would probably make on Berlin in the next few days. He (Ambassador Thompson) also counted on the U.S. disarmament proposals to affect the Soviet attitude. Sir Evelyn mentioned that he was leaving Geneva for the weekend but would come back next Tuesday if any purpose would be served thereby. Referring to the earlier brief discussion he had had with the Secretary, he said he did not think a visit by the Secretary to Paris over the weekend would be a good thing. It would only play into the tendency de Gaulle might have to argue that the Americans would in any case come running after him.

Mr. Kohler explained to Sir Evelyn the informal arrangements which we have had for keeping M. Bour of the French Foreign Ministry briefed on the Geneva conversations relating to Berlin.

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

NS/PFC/CDR BT

Date: 5/29/92

RELEASE DECLASSIFY
 EXCISE DECLASSIFY
 DENY IN PART
 DELETE Non-Responsive Info
FOIA Exemptions _____
PA Exemptions _____

MR Cases Only:
EO Citations _____

TS authority to:
 CLASSIFY AS S or C OADR
 DOWNGRADE TS to S or C OADR

NSA

SECRET

- 2 -

Referring to the air corridor situation, Sir Evelyn expressed unhappiness at information received by the British regarding pressures which some were trying to exert on General Norstad to follow a different policy in Live Oak. London had asked him to express its full confidence in General Norstad's judgment and conduct during recent weeks, and asked that this be brought to his attention. The British felt that the course of action which he was following was entirely appropriate; more drastic measures were not called for unless something similar to that which happened on March 9 were repeated. The British were not impressed by arguments that Berlin morale required anything different. British officials both in Berlin and Bonn have reported to the contrary, indicating that Berlin morale is good, air line traffic and passenger flow continues normal, and that heating up the situation would only be harmful to morale. If there were any different views on this subject, the best way to verify or disprove them would be to ask the Germans themselves.

Sir Evelyn asked whether the Germans had approached us in Geneva to impress on the Swiss authorities the desirability of their refusing visas to East German officials who might wish to travel to Geneva. A British message from Bonn had apparently indicated that such an approach was to be made here, but none of those present was aware that it had been made, despite numerous opportunities which the Germans have had. Ambassador Thompson expressed the view that there was little chance that the Soviets would now wish to raise the question of having the East Germans invited to the Conference, since they have not done this at the outset. If the Soviet Minister wanted the Germans here to consult privately with them, that would be a different matter. The general consensus was that intercession with the Swiss authorities on the subject would probably be ineffective.

Drafted by: H. H. Miller
Date: 3-25-62

Cleared by: Mr. Schlier

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: MRBM Alternatives

1. Political. The broad political considerations which are involved are:

(a) We are here concerned basically with a political question. Presently programmed nuclear forces, and arrangements for their use, are adequate to the military need.

(b) The political problem stems from allied desires for greater participation in nuclear deterrence. These desires will probably grow as Europe continues to recover its strength and confidence. They are already reflected in UK and French national programs and in incipient - albeit unformed and low key - pressures for a German program.

(c) If we did not respond effectively to these desires, the Germans would eventually wish to follow in British and French footsteps, probably through Franco-German collaboration, and these German desires would gravely weaken NATO. The mere fact of German desires for a national program would stimulate neutralist tendencies in UK and a more aggressive Soviet policy in Central Europe. If the French indefinitely resisted these German pressures for nuclear collaboration, German resentment at discrimination would make it difficult to go forward with European and Atlantic integration. If the French acceded to German pressures, the situation would, of course, be even worse. The only constructive approach is one that will avert, or at least dampen, the German pressures.

(d) It is doubtful that European concerns which give rise to these pressures can be fully met merely by increased information and consultation about US nuclear forces, by commitment of more of these forces to NATO, or by deployment of more of these forces in the European area. For none of these moves go to the heart of the matter: the fact that Europe wants to participate in nuclear deterrence - not merely to know more about it, to be "consulted" about it, or see more of it close at hand.

*memorandum, h.d.
of all (M.C.P. only)*

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12358, Sec 3.4
NLK-94-37
MYNK 7/29/15

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

(e) We believe, therefore, that an additional step is essential; stressing the US willingness to join its allies in developing a multilateral NATO nuclear force, as suggested in the President's Ottawa speech.

(f) The essence of this proposal is that we indicate a willingness to consider whatever control formula a majority of our allies agree on. If they are given this freedom of choice, it is virtually certain that they will not propose a formula that would be unacceptable to us. They would probably choose a formula providing (i) advance delegation in case of massive nuclear attack, (ii) NAC voting (including US veto) in all other cases. But it is important that our allies reach the conclusion that they want a control formula thus involving US participation themselves, instead of having it imposed on them by the US. So long as they feel that US obstinacy, rather than their own free choice, denies them a veto-free force, so long will allied nuclear concerns continue to mount.

(g) Creation of a multilateral force would probably satisfy a sufficient segment of European - and particularly German - opinion to prevent growing pressures for new national programs. For three reasons: (i) The advance delegation to respond to Soviet massive nuclear attack would remedy the present European sense of vulnerability to Soviet ballistic blackmail. (ii) The opportunity for deciding the control question on their own would remove any feeling among the Europeans that they are under a US dictat in this respect. (iii) The opportunity to participate in the manning, ownership, and control of a strategic nuclear force on a basis of equality with the US and other NATO countries would meet some of the very real, if intangible, "prestige" considerations which help to motivate national programs.

(h) Creation of the multilateral force is feasible, even if the French do not participate. Germany, Italy, and some of the smaller countries have indicated approval. The

UK

~~SECRET~~

26

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

UK has indicated to us that, although it does not favor MRBM's for NATO, it would prefer a multilateral force to any other mode of deployment, if there are to be MRBM's. Over the long run, we believe that creation of the multilateral force might even weaken drives for national programs in the UK and France.

2. Military. The possibility has been raised that the US might offer NATO a choice between a US-manned, US-owned, US-controlled MRBM Force and the multilateral MRBM Force.

Presenting the alternative of a US Force would negate the political gains to be secured from the multilateral proposal without offering NATO a substitute which would adequately serve these objectives. For these reasons:

(a) Introduction of this US Force alternative would be taken as an indication of weakening US support for the multilateral concept, which we have not hitherto qualified by reference to a US alternative. Theoretically, we could advance both alternatives even-handedly; in practice the new option would - by reason of its assurance of complete US control - be considered the US favorite. Its presentation as an alternative would confirm allied suspicions that the multilateral concept is not seriously intended, and that the US insists on retaining exclusive control of nuclear weapons. In this atmosphere, the multilateral concept would generate little allied enthusiasm, i.e., little political advantage.

(b) Nor would the US MRBM Force constitute an effective replacement for the multilateral concept in terms of political impact. For it would not respond to underlying allies desires for participation in nuclear deterrence. Even if some of our allies opted for the US Force, as the only course they believed the US was really willing to push (and without any cost to them, at that), allied nuclear concerns would continue to mount. Despite creation of the US Force, we would still need an answer to these concerns. Sooner or later, therefore, we would have to come back to the multilateral proposal. We would then wind up with both a US and a multilateral force, but the political impact of the multilateral force would have been weakened for the reasons indicated.

For these

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

- 4 -

For these reasons, it would be politically undesirable to discuss with our allies the concept of a US MRBM Force as an alternative to the multilateral force. If DOD wants, on purely military grounds, to shift some of the US strategic forces from the US to the European area we can hardly object, but this should not be conceived as an alternative to the multilateral force - in either the US decision or in any discussion with our allies. And it should not be presented while the MRBM force is under consideration in NAC, for the reasons indicated above.

SECRET

33A 4/9/62

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

CLASSIFIED by HR DATE June 25, 1991 SECRET

RELEASE () DECLASSIFY
EXCISE () DECLASSIFY in PART
DENY () Non-responsive info.
EO or PA exemptions _____

Fifth Revision
April 3, 1962

TS authority to: _____, OADB
CLASSIFY as _____
DOWNGRADE TS to () S or (DRAFT) PRINCIPLES, PROCEDURES, AND INTERIM STEPS
(Amended to Reflect Geneva Discussions. New Language Underlined)

PREAMBLE

The parties have discussed certain issues related to the reduction of tensions and the strengthening of peace. They have sought to deal with these issues in a way which would accomplish two things:

First, it would create a useful framework for continuing negotiations concerning aspects of these issues on which differences remain to be resolved. To this end, the parties have agreed in regard to each of the issues under discussion: (i) on general principles, which will serve as a basis for continuing negotiations, and (ii) on procedures to govern these continuing negotiations. In this connection, a Committee of Foreign Ministers' Deputies will be established which France and the UK will be invited to join.

Second, it would permit them to take interim action concerning urgent aspects of these issues on which the parties are already of the same view. To this end, the parties have agreed on certain interim steps to deal with aspects of these issues that pose immediate dangers. These interim steps do not purport to settle the questions for all time but they are needed to meet pressing problems until more comprehensive agreements can be reached in the above-mentioned negotiations.

There follows, therefore, in regard to each of the issues under discussion, a statement of (i) general principles to serve as a basis for future negotiations; (ii) procedures for these future negotiations; (iii) interim steps to be taken in the meantime.

1. Berlin

(a) General Principles: They agree that the Committee of Foreign Ministers' Deputies should, in its continuing negotiations, take account of the general principles that, pending the reestablishment of German unity:

(i) West Berlin should be free to choose its own way of life;

(ii) the parties should undertake to respect the social order that has taken shape therein;

(iii) its viability -- including the stability and prosperity of its economy -- should be maintained.

SECRET

SECRET

(iv) Unrestricted communication will be assured between West Berlin and West Germany in a manner which respects the functions, activities, and prerogatives of the competent authorities and which permits the competent authorities in West Berlin to determine who may or may not enter West Berlin. Subject to the foregoing, an International Access Authority should be established to perform specified functions in order to ensure this unrestricted communication.

(b) Future Negotiations: They agree to study proposals relating to West Berlin in an effort to reach agreements which would give effect to these principles in a way consistent with the vital interests of all parties in the aforementioned Committee of Foreign Ministers' Deputies.

(c) Interim Steps: In the meantime, they declare that access procedures in effect on January 1, 1962, will remain in effect. Rules and regulations of the competent authorities, including sanitary laws and regulations, which the Committee of Foreign Ministers' Deputies agrees are compatible with the principle of free access between West Berlin and West Germany, will be respected. Included among procedures in effect on January 1, 1962, is the fact that transit will proceed along the same communication routes presently used, and will be subject to compliance with the existing procedures, whereby:

(i) transit vehicles and their passengers are not allowed to deviate from the established transit routes;

(ii) passengers in transit are not allowed to go beyond the limits of the communications routes used for transit;

(iii) passengers in transit are prohibited from giving or receiving any articles; and

(iv) no one may board vehicles in transit to Berlin.

They also declare that they will seek agreement of the authorities in West and East Berlin to establish an all-Berlin technical commission, to be composed of officials appointed by the Governments of West Berlin and of East Berlin, to deal with such matters as the handling of traffic, sewage, and public utilities.

2. Germany

(a) General Principles: They believe that the Germans have the right to determine their own future, and they wish to facilitate the exercise of this right in a way that will enhance the security of all European peoples.

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

(b) Future Negotiations: They agree that the authorities in West and East Germany should be invited to establish three mixed technical commissions, consisting of officials designated by these authorities, to increase cultural and technical contacts, to promote mutually beneficial economic exchanges, and to consider a draft electoral law or other steps toward German reunification, respectively.

(c) Interim Steps: In the meantime they declare they will insure that in any arrangements into which any of them may enter with any part of Germany account will be taken of the provisions in this paper agreed by the parties in advance, except to the extent that these provisions may be modified by agreement such as may result from the continuing negotiations within the Committee of Foreign Ministers' Deputies.

3. Nuclear Diffusion

(a) General Principles: They believe that further diffusion of nuclear weapons into the control of national governments not now owning them would make more difficult the problem of maintaining lasting peace.

(b) Future Negotiations: They agree to seek in the above-mentioned Committee (or other appropriate forum) to develop policies regarding non-diffusion of nuclear weapons to which all states owning nuclear weapons might agree and to which states not now owning nuclear weapons might also subscribe.

(c) Interim Steps: In the meantime, as states now owning nuclear weapons, they declare they will not themselves relinquish control over any nuclear weapons to any individual state or regime not now owning such weapons; including any state or regime exercising functions within the area referred to in 4.(c) below; they will not transmit to such state or regime information, equipment, or material necessary for their manufacture; and they will urge states or regimes not now owning nuclear weapons to undertake not to try to obtain control of such weapons belonging to other states or to seek or receive information, equipment, or material necessary for their manufacture.

4. Non-Aggression

(a) General Principles: They believe that force should not be used to change existing frontiers and demarcation lines in Europe or for any other aggressive purpose.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

(b) Future Negotiations: With a view toward strengthening peace and European security, they agree to seek in the above-mentioned Committee (or a Sub-committee thereof):

(i) to develop a suitable declaration which the NATO and Warsaw Pact Organizations might make to register their renunciation of the use of force for the settlement of international questions, and, specifically, the renunciation of the use of force to change existing boundaries and demarcation lines in Europe, and,

(ii) To consider measures to reduce the risk of war by accident or miscalculation.

(c) Interim Steps: In the meantime they declare they will not themselves use or support the use of force to change the external and internal borders of Germany including the existing borders of West Berlin, and they note with approval declarations by German authorities in the same sense.

5. Procedures

(a) The parties note with approval declarations by the competent German authorities, assuring their allies that they will act in conformity with the above provisions regarding access and other matters relevant to their functions and prerogatives.

(b) Once the proposed Committee of Foreign Ministers' Deputies has been established: (i) the Foreign Ministers of the countries represented on it would meet periodically as seems useful to review its work; (ii) if and as warranted, the Heads of Government could meet to consummate concrete agreements reached by the Foreign Ministers and their Deputies in the proposed Committee.

SECRET

SECRET

Record Number 59937

DOCUMENT TYPE
DATE
ORIG
FORM
ISSUE
ORIGINATOR
ESID
ESIS
CLASSIFICATION
TITLE
III
INDEX
FORM
ISSUE
ISSUE
IS

Miscellaneous Document Type
04/03/1962

Secret
Draft Principles, Procedures, and Interim Steps

Warsaw Pact
Committee of Foreign Ministers' Deputies
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
4



TOP SECRET

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT
IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED
EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF THE
ISSUING OFFICE

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

*Nuclear
Sharing*

5

Refer to: I-25,362/62
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

4 April 1962

Downgraded To: SECRET CONFIDENTIAL
EO 11652: XGDS (1) (2) (3) (4)
Authorized By: H. D. [Signature]
August 4, 1975 [Signature]

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

**SUBJECT: Meeting with General Norstad, Mr. Nitze's Office,
2:45 - 4:45 p.m., 23 March 1962**

Participants

General Norstad
Assistant Secretary Nitze
Mr. Lang, ISA
Capt Conkey, ISA
Mr. Barringer, ISA

Col Eaton, ISA
(in part)

Nuclear Sharing with France

Mr. Nitze referred to General Taylor's conversation with Mr. Messmer, in which the latter indicated that the Six are prepared to go forward as a block in the nuclear field. General Norstad observed that Mr. Messmer was a "hardware man" not entitled to express an opinion on policy issues of this type. General Norstad said he understood that the whole question of nuclear sharing with France was being reviewed.

Mr. Nitze said that the matter was being reconsidered as a way to get the French to move toward a solution of the MRBM problem. General Norstad said that he did not know whether the French would move forward on the question or face up to its implications. General Norstad said that he would like very much to be heard on this subject, as to which he had further views. On matters of this importance one must weigh what is to be bought and sold. He asked, thinking only in terms of the French, what would the U.S. be buying.

Mr. Nitze said that this fell into several categories. First, in the nuclear field, we would expect French support for a multilateral MRBM force, citing the conversation between General Taylor and Mr. de Rose. The second advantage would be commitment of the French national forces to NATO. They might be withdrawn, but it would still be a tangible achievement. The third advantage would be to preclude France from cooperating with Third countries, notably Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany.

General Norstad stated that in his view the U.S. would be only buying gold. Such a change in policy would be of world-wide significance. The

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADEING: DCD DLR 6200.10
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 931542
By RJA NARA Date 4-25-95

TOP SECRET

Copy 4 of 4 Copies
Page 4 of 7 Pages

711.5611/4-462 (7)

Handwritten notes and signatures on the right margin.

present policy is admittedly an irritant, but nothing more. A much more important question is the position of U.S. leadership within the Alliance. One of the main qualifications of leadership is the generation of confidence and a sense of responsibility on the part of those being led. The spread of nuclear capability creates a very great danger in the hands of dangerous people. The great question is what General de Gaulle would do with his nuclear weapons.

General Norstad said that some people think the French will cooperate if the U.S. shares nuclear information. In his view, however, even if President Kennedy offered de Gaulle a choice of anything in the U.S. nuclear stockpile, de Gaulle would simply accept the offer as something which was rightfully his. As a practical matter, the French are doing a great deal to strengthen the Alliance. They have returned two divisions from North Africa and two more are now being brought back. One of these will join the first two divisions; the second paratroop division will remain under French national control. It is always necessary to compare promise and performance when assessing French actions. On the whole, their performance has been good but their formal promises have been bad.

F-104G Aircraft for Norway and Denmark

Mr. Nitze recounted the efforts which Secretary McNamara and he had made to persuade Minister Harlem to accept F-104G aircraft. A reply from the Norwegians has not yet been received but is expected any day.

Greece

Mr. Nitze introduced this topic by stating that the Greek problem was very confused. AID basically desires to eliminate defense support, not only in Greece but in the other "steering group" countries as well. General Norstad said that AID appeared to want to eliminate military assistance as well. Mr. Nitze referred to Congressional opposition to defense support and indicated that AID wanted to turn the corner regarding economic programs. The people in AID do not really understand military assistance. General Norstad said that it was important to remember how the Greeks view the problem. Mr. Nitze said that as he understands it, of the \$18 million proposed for supporting assistance to Greece in FY-62, \$5 million would slip to FY-63. The net cut in defense support for FY-63 would be only about \$7 million, \$6 million of which could be absorbed by increasing the Greek defense budget proportionately to the increase in Greek GNP.

General Norstad said that the object of the ever-all exercise is to create strength in Greece. For this purpose, their own opinion is most important. The Greeks do not like the proposed cuts, particularly the cut of \$20 million in defense support. Last July the Greeks asked Secretary Rusk if the U.S. and Greece could look at the whole problem jointly. The U.S. reply was non-committal and the matter has been referred to the steering group. In General Norstad's view it is essential that we sit down with

DECLASSIFIED
Authority <u>NND 931542</u>
By <u>RJA</u> NARA Date <u>4-25-95</u>

SECRET
TOP SECRET

4 4
2 7

SECRET

8/1/62 WE
1-7
WE
F J F
I I

Control: 891
Rec'd: AUGUST 1, 1962
6:27 PM

1
un
EUR
Info
SS
G
RMR

FROM: PARIS
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 599, AUGUST 1, 8 PM

ACTION DEPARTMENT 599, INFORMATION MOSCOW 11, LONDON 62,
BONN 40.

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION - S/S.

RE SECTO 14, 30, 50 TO DEPARTMENT.

EMBOFFS REVIEWED WITH SOUTOU, DIRECTOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS,
AND FROMENT-MEURICE, EASTERN EUROPE, FONOFF, SUBSTANCE OF
REFTELS. THEY EXPRESSED GREAT PLEASURE AT FIRMNESS POSITIONS
TAKEN AND APPRECIATION BRIEFINGS.

375,708
127518
12611

WE DID NOT, HOWEVER, MENTION CONTENTS GENEVA'S SECTO 53,
WHICH TOUCHES AREAS OF EXTREME FRENCH SENSITIVITY. WE
HAVE IN MIND FRENCH ATTITUDE TOWARDS NON-DIFFUSION NUCLEAR
WEAPONS AND PARTICULARLY TOWARD ANY ARRANGEMENTS
WHICH WOULD AFFECT FRG. FRENCH, WE BELIEVE, WOULD RESIST
ANY ATTEMPT REACH EAST-WEST ACCORD PROHIBITING DIFFUSION
NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO WEST GERMANS AND DENYING THEM RIGHT
MANUFACTURE THESE WEAPONS INDEPENDENTLY, AND ESPECIALLY
JOINTLY WITH OTHER COUNTRIES. THIS BELIEF IS BASED ON
(A) REMARKS FONMIN OFFICIALS HAVE MADE TO EMBASSY AND SURO
OFFICER (EMBASSY DESPATCH 1515, MAY 16, 1962, EMBASSY
AIRGRAM A-209, JULY 27, 1962; PAGENHARDT MEMORANDUM OF
CONVERSATION, JULY 11, 1962), (B) IMPLICATIONS FOR WEST
GERMANS IN CURRENT WIDESPREAD FRENCH DEBATE OF A EUROPEAN
AS OPPOSED TO FRENCH NATIONAL NUCLEAR FORCE, AND (C)
CONTINUED FRENCH SENSITIVITY TO POSSIBILITY WE WILL
RESUBMIT OUR "GENERAL PRINCIPLES" TO SOVIETS AS BASIS FOR
REACHING ACCORD ON BERLIN.

Copy # 40 destroyed, RM/R
7-1-61
8/22/62

Aug 29 10 37 AM '62
FILED

240.5611/8-7-62
240.6014

SECRET

RM/R MEMO
(No reply necessary)

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken.

ACTION ASSIGNED TO: NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL	ACTION TAKEN DATE OF ACTION	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R

9700

599, AUGUST 1, 8 PM FROM PARIS

ONMIN OFFICIALS HAVE SHOWN LITTLE CONCERN RE CURRENT LEGAL RESTRICTIONS (IN FORM OF WEU AGREEMENTS) ON GERMAN RIGHT MANUFACTURE AND POSSESS NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HOWEVER, THEY TAKE SERIOUS VIEW OF THESE RESTRICTIONS BEING INCORPORATED IN EAST-WEST ACCORD AND BELIEVE ANY SUCH STEP ON PART OF WEST WOULD BE TREMENDOUS CONCESSION TO SOVIET SIDE AND NEEDLESS HINDRANCE ON WEST'S FREEDOM OF ACTION.
i.e. French

ALTHOUGH ALL OF FACETS OF EUROPEAN NUCLEAR FORCE QUESTION HAVE NOT YET BEEN REVEALED IN CURRENT DEBATE AND NATURE OF THIS FORCE WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE INFLUENCED BY ROLE BRITISH WILL PLAY IN EUROPE AND EUROPEAN ORGANIZATIONS, IT WOULD BE LOGICAL EXPECT FRENCH WOULD WANT TO BE FREE ADOPT ANY FORM OF THIS FORCE WHICH THEY FOUND CONVENIENT. THUS THEY OBVIOUSLY WOULD BE OPPOSED TO GQMBGN* OF ANY FURTHER RESTRICTIONS ON WEST GERMAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS RIGHTS WHICH WOULD REDUCE NUMBER OF FORMS EUROPEAN NUCLEAR FORCE COULD TAKE.

FINALLY, EMBASSY OFFICERS IN CONTACTS WITH FONMIN OFFICIALS FIND THAT LATTER STILL SHOW SENSITIVITY TO POSSIBILITY WE WILL RESUBMIT TO SOVIETS OUR "GENERAL PRINCIPLES" FOR AGREEMENT ON BERLIN WITH THEIR PROHIBITION OF DISSEMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO WEST GERMANS. ALTHOUGH THESE CONTACTS HAVE NOT PREDICTED HOW FRENCH WILL REACT IN CASE WE REOFFER THESE PRINCIPLES, IT IS CLEAR FROM THEIR ATTITUDE THAT WE WILL HAVE PLACED VERY SERIOUS STRAIN ON ATLANTIC ALLIANCE SHOULD PRINCIPLES BE RESUBMITTED.

GAVIN

GDW

* AS RECEIVED. WILL BE SERVICED UPON REQUEST.

SECRET

4/14/62
4/14/62

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

EXCISE

FILE

Research Memorandum
RSB. 83, April 4, 1962

R

TO : The Secretary
THROUGH: S/S
FROM : INR - Roger Hilsman

Roger Hilsman

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW

- Category A - Caption removed; transferred to O/FADRC
- Category B - Transferred to O/FADRC with additional access controlled by S/S
- Category C - Caption and custody retained by S/S

blab
blab
blab

SUBJECT: The Soviet Position on Berlin and Germany in the Geneva Conversations, March 11-26

This paper was prepared in response to a request from the Director of the Berlin Task Force. It is one of several similar analyses of the Soviet position in bilateral talks.

Reviewed by: _____

Date: 11-20-89

Modus Vivendi Neither Accepted Nor Rejected

The principal new element in the third round of US-Soviet conversations on Berlin and Germany was the idea of a modus vivendi broached by Secretary Rusk. Gromyko neither explicitly accepted nor explicitly rejected the general idea of a modus vivendi.

blab
blab

Gromyko carefully avoided any expression of agreement with the premise that an overall settlement of the problems of Berlin and Germany in the near future was unlikely. He refused to accept a distinction between continued efforts along the lines of earlier negotiations and a recognition of the fact of disagreement and discussion of ways to cope with it.

On the other hand, Gromyko did enter into a discussion of a possible initial agreement on broad general principles, giving the Secretary a paper on this subject on March 19 and offering detailed criticism of the paper handed him by the Secretary on March 22.

Submaximum Position Restated

While Gromyko's March 19 paper was in the form of a reply to the Secretary's oral suggestion of a modus vivendi, its content -- together with the Soviet comments on it and a companion paper of March 20 on access -- constituted a restatement of the Soviet "submaximum" position elaborated in the Thompson-Gromyko talks, January 2-March 6.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
APPEALS REVIEW PANEL DATE 12/2/84
 RELEASE EXCISE DENY
 Non-responsive information
 FOIA Exemptions (b) _____
 PA Exemption (a) _____
 () DECLASSIFY
 () DECLASSIFY IN PART
 () RETAIN CLASSIFICATION (a)
 () CLASSIFY AS _____
 () DOWNGRADE TO () S, () C, OADR
 OADR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY _____ DATE 1/17/90
 SECRET/EYES ONLY
 RELEASE DECLASSIFY
 EXCISE DECLASSIFY IN PART
 DENY Non-responsive info.
 FOI, EO or PA exemptions _____
 TS authority to: _____, OADR
 CLASSIFY as _____
 DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C, OADR

CATEGORY "A"
 Completely de-sensitized
 Transferred to O/FADRC
 by S/S-L date 9-3-73

N34

and Thompson, indicated that the USSR was not opposed to special ties between West Berlin and the Federal Republic and that an agreement on this point could be reached. Semenov's remark went further than Gromyko had ever gone in echoing the December 27 Soviet memorandum to Kroll in the US-Soviet bilateral exchanges. Failure of the March 19 draft to repeat the January 12 stipulation on the free functioning of "democratic" (a euphemism for communist or communist-front) parties and organizations in the "free city" may be indicative of Soviet flexibility on this demand.

Garrisons. The standing Soviet proposal, last committed to paper on January 12, had provided for three alternatives for the temporary presence of token garrisons in West Berlin: (1) equal contingents from the USSR, US, UK, and France, (2) UN contingents, or (3) contingents from neutral countries. Gromyko withdrew the first alternative, and the March 19 paper provided for the replacement of American, British, and French troops with token contingents of the UN or of neutral states. Gromyko never replied to the Secretary's March 20 question of whether UN troops might mean British, French, and American troops.

b1a3
D1a5

Along with the demand for withdrawal of Western troops, the March 19 paper also stipulated new restrictions on military access to the "free city." In the January 12 drafts it had been proposed that military personnel and shipments would "freely avail themselves" of land and air communications, and control over their movements would be carried out reciprocally by the four powers. The March 19 paper stipulated that military movements over land routes would involve inspection by GDR authorities of transit documents certifying that the persons and freight involved belonged to the token contingents. Personnel would undertake to comply with the "laws and procedures" of the country of transit and with sanitary and other rules generally accepted in international practice. Moreover, in an apparent effort to undercut the rationale for an arrangement like the present air corridors, the March 19 paper stipulated that the volume of military traffic including military transport planes would be determined by the "actual need" of the contingents. Although a detailed paper on civilian access was handed to the Secretary on March 20, there was none on military access.

Relation of Troop Withdrawal and Access Proposals. The nature of the relation between the Soviet demand for the withdrawal of Western forces from Berlin and the Soviet proposals on access was obscure at the end of the talks. As the talks concluded, Gromyko was unwilling to state categorically that the Soviet proposals on access either were or were not contingent upon Western troop withdrawals, and there appears to be a measure of Soviet flexibility in this regard.

Ulbricht's public exposition of the access authority idea differed in detail from the Soviet presentation. In his speech to the SED Central Committee Plenum, published in Neues Deutschland on March 24, Ulbricht explicitly stated that "of course such a concession requires that the occupation statute in West Berlin be eliminated and that the troops of the three Western Powers be withdrawn." He indicated that the agency to arbitrate possible disputes between the GDR and the US, Britain, or France would be a four-power body. He stated that it would be the Soviet Union's "responsibility," "together with the GDR," to settle a given dispute, but his statement did not elaborate on the nature of this "responsibility" and its possible implication of Soviet-East German control over the access authority. Ulbricht also announced that the GDR might accept recommendations regarding the guaranteeing of peaceful traffic to and from West Berlin from the guaranteeing powers or from an appropriate UN institution, but again did not spell out details.

Duration. For the first time in the present series of talks, the Soviet Union introduced two specific stipulations of duration which suggest the possibility that Moscow might revert to a form of an "interim agreement."

In the January 12 drafts handed to Ambassador Thompson, the Soviet Union proposed that the garrisons stationed in West Berlin would be "temporary." In the March 19 paper Gromyko stipulated that garrisons would be present for a period of time within the range of three to five years, to be specified by the parties. (Last summer GDR Politburo member Hermann Matern used the formulation "three to five years" as an acceptable limit for the stay of Western troops in West Berlin. In 1959 the basic problem respecting duration of an interim arrangement was what situation would obtain at the end of the period.)

bias
bias

In his March 26 conversation with the Secretary, Gromyko stated that the USSR assumed the duration of the agreement on transit would be the same as the duration of an agreement on status, thereby implying that both would be for some fixed period of time.

Civilian Access. Gromyko's March 20 paper on civilian access -- which he described as a working paper and not an aide-memoire or note -- was an elaboration of GDR demands for control over the access routes. In passing it to the Secretary, Gromyko may have hoped to elicit a response indicating the degree of East German control which the US might accept.

The paper provided that the GDR would provide free transit of civilians, baggage, freight, mail, trains, motor vehicles and vessels as well as civil air flights. However, such "free transit" would be carried

Non-Aggression and Frontiers. The March 19 paper in effect raised the question of recognition of the GDR in its provision that all states parties to NATO and the Warsaw Pact would sign a non-aggression treaty. But in his March 26 discussion of the US paper on principles, Gromyko stated that a declaration would be an appropriate form of obligation, thereby implying that explicit recognition of the GDR would not be a precondition for a non-aggression pledge.

Gromyko professed to be puzzled by the language of the US provision on discussion of measures to reduce the risk of war by accident or miscalculation, and stated that a non-aggression agreement was a clear commitment to which nothing should be added which complicated the matter. He did not comment on the idea of discussion of this topic apart from a non-aggression agreement.

In commenting on the US paper, Gromyko argued that the demarcation line should be formalized as a border, and stated that both sides would have to work out a modus for formalization of borders at a later date. The March 19 paper had provided for special statements on German borders and non-use of force in disputes on the part of the GDR and FRG, in addition to the general provision in the non-aggression pact on renunciation of the use of force to change existing European boundaries; in his comments on the US paper, Gromyko again stated that the two German states must make some statements in this connection.

b1c3
b1c5

Other Comments on the US Paper

In his March 26 review of the US draft paper, Gromyko covered a number of other points including:

Reference to "Berlin." Gromyko argued that the heading "Berlin" reflected a desire to introduce the idea of one Berlin which is not negotiable, and said that the US had admitted West Berlin was a separate entity.

"Improving the Situation". Gromyko objected to the phrase "improving the situation," saying that it might mean an increase in the number of occupation troops or perpetuation of the occupation. He also objected to the idea of an interim declaration that established access procedures would remain in effect; the USSR, he said, proceeded on the basis of need for respect for GDR sovereignty.

German reunification. Gromyko stated that reunification was a matter for Germans to settle by agreement between the two German states; he said the US paper reflected only the US and not the Soviet viewpoint.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

EXCISE

F14

21

Research Memorandum
RSP. 83, April 4, 1962

TO : The Secretary
THROUGH: S/S
FROM : INR - Roger Hillsman

Roger Hillsman

REVIEW
Action removed:
Transferred to O/FADRC
Transferred to O/FADRC
with additional access
Controlled by S/S
Cat. C - Caption and custody

E
U1a3
U1a2
U1a1

SUBJECT: The Soviet Position on Berlin and Germany in the Geneva Conversations, March 11-26
This paper was prepared in response to a request by the Director of the Berlin Task Force. It is one of several similar analyses of the Soviet position in bilateral talks.

Date: 11-20-89

Modus Vivendi Neither Accepted Nor Rejected

blat
blat
62.00
4-462

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MB

DATE 1/17/90

SECRET/EYES ONLY

REVIEWED BY
 RELEASE
 EXCISE
 DENY
FOI, EO or PA exemptions

DECLASSIFY
 DECLASSIFY in PART
 Non-responsive info.

CATEGORY "A"

Completely de-sensitized
Transferred to O/FADRC
by S/S-L date 9-5-73

TS authority to: OADR
 CLASSIFY as
 DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () G, OADR

CC CCC C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
C
C
C C

bias
bias

CC CCC C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
C
C
C C

SECRET/EYES ONLY

- 7 -

SECRET/EYES ONLY

b1c3
b1c5

SECRET/EYES ONLY

SECRET/EYES ONLY

SECRET/EYES ONLY

- 8 -

cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc
cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc
cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc
cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc

b1a3
b1a5

SECRET/EYES ONLY

cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc
cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc
cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc
cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc

SECRET

EXCISE

4/4/62

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

April 4, 1962

5680

Release

RM/R

FILE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Further Berlin Discussions with the Soviets

There is enclosed for your consideration a revised version of the "Draft Principles" paper which I gave to Gromyko in Geneva, now entitled "Draft Principles, Procedures, and Interim Steps". The extensive new language, which is indicated by underlining, is largely either drawn from Soviet texts or formulated to take at least verbal account of expressed Soviet views.

We have reviewed the Geneva discussions as they relate to the International Access Authority concept, and have concluded that, in principle, we should at least begin by putting forward the full text of our original International Access Authority proposal. You will recall that Ambassador Thompson gave the Soviets only a summary of this proposal in writing. We are reviewing the original document to see whether any changes can be made in it to take account of the Geneva discussions. Before using the proposal, we will have to go through an exercise with the Germans, since they have a reserve on two specific points: (a) the composition of the Board of Directors; and (b) the language safeguarding against the use of the autobahn to provide an escape valve for refugees.

I would propose that, once the content of our "Principles" paper has been agreed and prior to calling in Dobrynin to begin our discussions, we give the paper to the British, French and Germans. We would make the point that, while we intend to put this document forward as a further informal working paper in the context of our continuing discussions with the Soviets, we want to be certain that, if these discussions lead to something, we will have the broad substantive agreement of our Allies.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

S/S-RO

APR 4 1962

Is from copy of signed original

Enclosure:

As stated.

SECRET

N/A

REVIEWED BY: [Signature]
FOI/EO or PA exceptions: [Signature]
CLASSIFY as: OADR
DOWNGRADE/TS to: () S or () C, OADR
CLASSIFY ()
DECLASSIFY ()
DECLASSIFY IN PART ()
DELETE ()
Non-responsive info. ()
RELEASE ()
EXCISE ()
DENY ()

676

762.00 / 4-4-62

Processed by RM/R

1

4/6/62
Washington

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

66 D 124

SECRET

Berlin (I&R)

40

FIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

S-41 REVIEWED by S/S [Signature] DATE 1/17/70
U-42 () RELEASE () DECLASSIFY
M-43 () EXCISE () DECLASSIFY in PART
S/S-44 () DENY () Non-responsive info.

Research Memorandum
RSB-3.29, April 6, 1962

G/PM-45&50I, EO or PA exemptions
S/B-46 TS authority to:

C. Moor 47 () CLASSIFY as OADR
Dist. Made () ASSESSMENT ON CURRENT SOVIET INTENTIONS IN THE BERLIN CRISIS
MARCH 29 - APRIL 5

4/10/62

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

Negotiations. While Moscow continues to maintain virtual silence on the subject of negotiations over Berlin and Germany (and has not even commented on Ulbricht's access arbitration board proposal other than to report his speech factually), foreign journalists report a certain "optimism" emanating from official Soviet circles on the outcome of the Rusk-Gromyko exchanges in Geneva. A Yugoslav correspondent also cited official sources as hinting that de facto recognition of GDR sovereignty could be achieved by Western consent to a separate GDR-Soviet peace treaty and to a GDR role in regulating "free access to West Berlin as a free city under international supervision." According to these sources the nature of the "supervision was still to be thrashed out."

GDR Deputy Foreign Minister Sepp Schwab, in an interview with the Times of India April 4, is reported to have stated the Soviet proposal for an international control authority on Berlin access was only a first step and that further measures to meet Western objectives are "not excluded." He stated that not only was Pankov willing to accept such curtailment of its sovereignty but that it was also immaterial to the GDR who created the authority, how it was composed, or whether the GDR were included in the negotiations on access. His only condition was that "no espionage be carried on from West Berlin."

The same day the Schwab interview was published, Pravda printed a commentary on the West Berlin radio station RIAS, charging inter alia it was an American-operated organ for intelligence and subversion.

Military Preparations and Demonstrations. The USSR abruptly ceased filing flight plans for Soviet military flights in the Berlin air corridors on March 30. The eight flights already scheduled for that day were cancelled without explanation (four had taken place the previous day), and no subsequent plans had been filed by April 5. Soviet flight activity was noted across and in the corridor area, but no flights along the length of the corridors were reported.

The East Germans announced April 3 the conclusion of GDR ground maneuvers, noting that Soviet, Polish, and Czech officers had been in attendance.

Following Soviet rejection of the US protest concerning WOPC harassment of a US Potsdam Military Mission tour, US military authorities issued instructions that the Soviet Mission in Frankfurt could travel in the American zone only with an American escort. Marshal Konev retaliated by ordering the US mission confined to quarters in Potsdam and by forbidding the members to travel without specific permission of the Soviet authorities. On April 5, however, the US commander in Germany met Konev in Potsdam and the two agreed to permit both missions to resume normal operations the next day.

NSA

SECRET

Berlin and Germany. Reports indicate the GDR customs law, enacted March 28, is now expected to be implemented April 30. No text is yet available. Possibly in anticipation of implementation, East Berlin authorities revoked all entry permits for East Berlin held by West German truck drivers and by West Berliners working in East Berlin. New permits of limited validity were being granted to most of the individuals affected after a check of their bona fides. The entry permits of some West Berlin business representatives of West German firms have been permanently revoked, however, and the FRG firms advised to employ West German representatives for contacts with GDR trading organs. West German tourist buses were not permitted to enter East Berlin April 1 because "new entry forms" were allegedly not yet available for such tourist traffic.

A report that West German trucks would shortly be barred from the Berlin-Helmstedt autobahn on Saturdays and Sundays was denied by East German IZT officials.

There have been recent indications the West German communist party (KPD) is preparing to alter its administrative ties with the East German SED to permit more independent operations. A similar move on the part of the West Berlin SED, severing its ties with the East Berlin SED, has also been rumored. The motivation for the change is said to be the expectation that communications between the east and west groups will become progressively more difficult and dangerous.

GDR authorities announced that between January 1 and March 18, Scandinavian Airlines had been granted 52 permits to overfly or land in the GDR, KLM had had 13 flights to GDR destinations, and Sabena 12. On April 2, Soviet Aeroflot inaugurated thrice weekly jet (TU-104) flights between Moscow and Berlin-Schoenefeld.

Meat rations cards have reportedly been printed in East Germany, and rationing is expected to be introduced in late summer this year.

Stories emanating from Belgrade indicate the Yugoslav Government may be interested in re-establishing diplomatic contacts with the FRG and to that end might be willing to permit its relations with the GDR to deteriorate somewhat temporarily.

ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET INTENTIONS

The Moscow leaks through journalist circles, the Sepp Schwab interview, and Pravda's charges against RIAS suggest the USSR might intend to modify certain aspects of its position on Berlin and Germany in the next round of talks. In particular, it might seek to trade concessions on access and West Berlin status for American abandonment of RIAS. Moscow's public reticence on the entire German problem, which now dates back to the Ulbricht-Khrushchev talks at the end of February, and the marked change in the East German tenor on an access authority (it was still being flatly rejected as late as February) hints that some flexibility in the Soviet position might soon be revealed. The sudden cessation of Soviet air corridor harassment and the current lack of interference with autobahn traffic could be part of an attempt to set the stage for an improvement in atmosphere.

SECRET

- 3 -

Meanwhile, the GDR appears to be proceeding with its consolidation of an international frontier through Berlin. Revocation of current entry permits was motivated in part by security concerns (to halt use of such permits for smuggling out refugees) but the action also provided the regime with better oversight and control of daily border traffic which will be a major problem should formal customs and frontier controls be introduced at the sector crossings. The recent reticence of the regime on the entire subject of the customs law may reflect concern as to the consequences of its implementation -- whether the FRG will in fact retaliate with IZT restrictions as has been hinted.

Plans to separate the KPD and SED organizations and the West Berlin SED from the East Berlin party may stem from concern for communications. However, separation of the party structures is likely also to reflect long-range communist plans for three independent parties in line with Soviet acceptance of an indefinite division of Germany into three parts, the FRG, GDR, and West Berlin.

SECRET

4/9/62 24

This document consists of 1 pages.
Number 6 of 8 copies. Series A.

April 9, 1962

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Control Over Multilateral MRBM Force: NAC Tactics

1. The US would, in its initial MRBM presentation, speak as follows on the control question:

"The US would like to ascertain the views of its allies concerning the control formula. Any formula which involved transfer of nuclear warheads or procedures for using the force without US concurrence would require amending existing US law and could well entail other obstacles depending on the character of the arrangements. The US is willing, however, to consider any proposal which is put to us by a clear majority of the alliance."

Comment: This is the language in the paper that Secretaries Rusk and McNamara reviewed.

2. If the US is asked, in ensuing NAC discussion, to react to specific proposals put forward by individual NAC members for transfer of warheads or control, the US would repeat the foregoing and add that it is not willing to go further in commenting on any proposals for transfer of warheads or control except as these may be put to us by a majority of the alliance.

Comment: This answer serves US interests, since it avoids involving the US in a detailed hypothetical discussion of the infinite variety of control proposals for transfer of warheads and control which imaginative NAC members might invent. It thus conforms to the basic tactic proposed in the MRBM paper: That we leave proponents and opponents of US participation in control free to battle the issue out among themselves. In this way, any proposal for excluding US participation will be knocked down by free choice of our allies. If instead we knock it down, one of the political purposes of the multilateral proposal will not be achieved. That purpose is to force the Europeans to face up to and decide the control issue on their own, and thus discover that it is their own view of the substantive considerations involved-rather than US obstinacy-which precludes a force in whose control the US does not participate.

DECLASSIFIED
EO 12958 Sec 24
NLR-94-37
MINK JANA Goss 7/24/95

SECRET

NSA 1216/M... 1/61-6/62

AIRGRAM

(Departmental and Foreign Service)

7/5/4-7
XR 742
751-5 3

55

File Bundy
4/9/62

ARA	EUR	FE
IEA	CU	INR
E	P	IO
	FBO	20 AID 20
E	ACDA	10
I	COM	FRB
	LAB	TAR
	XMB	AIR
	CIA	NAVY
	USIA	NSA
		ASC

A-1870

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NO.

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1962 APR 9 PM 4:18

INFO : AmEmbassy BONN A-189

ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

FILE

- SMITH-BUNDY
- DUNGAN
- GILDNER
- KAYSEN
- PETERSEN
- SCHLESINGER
- BELK
- FORRESTAL
- KONER
- RASKIN
- SAUNDERS

FROM : AmEmbassy PARIS

DATE: April 7, 1962

SUBJECT : French Strategic Viewpoints

RETAIN OR DESTROY

REF :

PASS DEFENSE FOR ISA AND COMPTROLLER

Raymond Aron, the sociologist and writer, discussed French strategic viewpoints at a meeting Apr 4 with Dr. Alain Enthoven of the Dept of Defense and an Emb officer.

U.S. Strategic Policy in Europe.

Aron believes that U.S. military policy regarding Europe is based on technical considerations rather than an understanding of European political realities. Furthermore, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe is an American officer and Europeans have no illusions that he will be responsible to higher authority other than the President of the United States. This situation gives comfort and protection to a number of the smaller NATO nations but not to France and some of the others.

Spread of Nuclear Weapons.

Aron stated that the U.S. and the Soviet Union have in effect an unwritten agreement, the most stable agreement of the cold war, not to permit the spread of nuclear weapons technology and to avoid any situation which would result in attacks on each other's territory. This unwritten agreement perfectly suits Soviet interests, particularly as regards China, but the arrangement is absurd as far as the United States' European allies are concerned. These nations have the technology, manpower, and wealth to develop modern armaments and thus make an enormous contribution to Western defense which would help stabilize the world strategic situation. The U.S. refuses to permit them to develop this capability. The feeling is profound in France, being shared by de Gaulle,

FORM 11-61 DS-323

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

In Out

Drafted by: MAS:RBFinn/vdr

Contents and Classification Approved by:

RBFinn R B Finn

Clearances:

NSP/71a/Pr. Gen 4/11-4/12/62

that the U.S. and the Soviet Union would be willing to engage in a nuclear war confined only to Germany, thus sparing each other's territory. Aron observed that the MREMs in NATO territory are directed not against the Soviet Union but against the satellites; this statement was questioned but Aron said he had heard this from a very high French military source.

European Nuclear Capability.

Development of a European nuclear capability is the only practical solution in view of the present U.S.-Soviet accord. At the moment the British and the French are developing national nuclear forces but a more practical solution for the long range is a European force which could defend Western European interests. This force could take various forms: common production and national control, or common production with control on a rotating basis by commanders from the various nations.

French Nuclear Program.

Aron stated that even strong friends of the United States in France now believe that a French national program is a necessity for the defense of France and Europe. General de Gaulle is of course the leading proponent of a national force and after his eventual departure there would be some adjustments in French viewpoint, but the strategy and necessity outlined by de Gaulle are now accepted by most French.

Need for Central Control.

Discussion indicated that Aron does have an understanding, though perhaps not extensive or detailed, of the rationale for a centrally controlled nuclear strategy and for our stand against diffusion. Aron feels that the present trend toward national forces in Europe is unfortunate. But national programs are at present the only recourse available to the Europeans. A Western European force is now becoming inevitable and will be built on the basis of the existing national forces. Development of a NATO force with adequate command, consultation and sharing arrangements would be the ideal solution, using the present NATO framework as a foundation. Important but not basic changes in the NATO structure would be necessary and could be accomplished. Addition to the U.S. deterrent of a European deterrent would add flexibility and power to the Western deterrent force.

Germany.

Aron did not seem to feel, under questioning, that German participation in a NATO or European nuclear force presented insuperable problems. He noted that Germany is prohibited by treaties from possessing nuclear weapons. He agreed that this prohibition might not be effective indefinitely, but he seemed to feel that it reduced the threat of a German national nuclear program at least for the short run.

GAVIN

Copies 1 + 2 + 1 + 1 + 1
3 + 4 Files

This document consists of 1 page

Home Policy

1912
xmf MZBMA
NAC
US Sp of NATO
NORSTAD Research

NLE MR Case No. 89-107

NATO News Policy

Document No. 3

American Embassy, SHAPE/L,
Paris, France.

April 10, 1962.

SECRET

CLASSIFIED

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

Dear Russ:

USRO transmitted on March 31 a telegram (POLTO 1291) concerning the NAC "Defense Data Program" with suggestions for future presentations in the NAC on this subject. As the telegram indicated (somewhat disingenuously), Harry Rowen agreed with the views expressed therein; what was not indicated was that Harry Rowen actually drafted the whole message. As you might imagine from reading the cable, some of the views expressed in it did not sit very well with General Norstad. Also, he was somewhat disturbed by the idea of one of the Washington "experts" writing a cable from USRO signed by Finletter, which the same expert would then proceed to answer after his return to Washington. You are familiar with General Norstad's views on the whole "expert exercise", and I can only say that this particular example did nothing to improve them. Part of his concern about this particular message was also occasioned by the fact that, whereas much of the message concerns NATO military matters, Rowen during his stay in Paris made no attempt whatsoever to contact SHAPE and, indeed, I think General Norstad was never informed by the Defense Department directly that Rowen would be in his theater. Furthermore, although the message speaks of the possibility that certain military authorities might be invited to make presentations to NATO, no reference is made to any role that the regularly-constituted NATO military authorities might play in this effort. Although some of these reactions may seem overdrawn, they are nonetheless real and I felt you should be aware of them.

General Norstad sent off on April 9 a personal message to General Lemnitzer concerning POLTO 1291, which he noted had been written by Rowen. He said he did not wish to comment in detail on the message, but he called General Lemnitzer's attention to paragraph V of the telegram. General Norstad commented that the substance of subparagraphs 1 and 2 of V has long been accepted by the NATO countries and the repetition

Russell Fessenden, Esquire,
Director, Office of European
Regional Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington 25, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED
MR 89-108-3

Electrostatic reproduction made

1991/190

UNCLASSIFIED

Electrostatic reproduction made
by The Eisenhower Library for
preservation purposes.

-2-

and the repetition of the concepts would seem to add very little. The remainder of the sub-paragraphs under V, General Norstad said, refer to technical military matters which either should not be the subject of discussion by a political group such as the Council, or should be prepared and presented to the Council in the normal manner by NATO military authorities. General Norstad concluded by saying that he felt the JCS should be seriously concerned about this message.

Although General Norstad did not make a specific comment on the war-gaming suggestions presented in POLTO 1291, he has already stated his view (my letter to you of March 17, 1962) that it would not be appropriate to ask the Council to consider war games, since it did not have the technical competence necessary to evaluate them.

While I am discussing General Norstad's concerns regarding the information program, I should mention your letter of April 5 in which you set forth the view that General Norstad's "unyielding opposition" to giving the EAC a briefing on external forces is not helpful over-all and may, in fact, damage his own case. I certainly appreciate your point of view on this and I am aware of the possibly counter-productive results of some of General Norstad's positions. However, on this particular subject, I would point out that General Norstad has not in fact adopted a stand of "unyielding opposition" on the external forces presentation. I think the major thrust of his concern has been that the U.S. was misleading the Council as to the extent and detail of the information it would be receiving on external forces and on many other matters connected with nuclear problems. He thought the language we have used in the Council on these matters has not been carefully drawn and he feared that, as a result, we are heading into difficulties. I believe his concern on this aspect has proved to be justified (witness Stikker's blowup last week, which was probably the most serious to date). General Norstad feels that the new language on giving information to EAC regarding nuclear weapons and on external forces (POLTO 1508) is quite satisfactory and a considerable improvement over previous positions.

As you are aware, General Norstad also has felt that some of the language used in connection with proposed presentations to the Council regarding the role of external forces has been intended quite obviously to make a case against the need for MRGM's in Europe. Quite naturally, he has resented this, believing that if the U.S. is opposed to MRGM's it should come out and say so but should not attempt to slip the argumentation into ostensibly unbiased information presented to the Council in the guise of an "information program".

Your letter of April 5

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Electrostatic reproduction made
by the Eisenhower Library for
preservation purposes.

-3-

Your letter of April 5 mentioned the confusion and unrest which might be produced in the Council by further presentations on nuclear problems. You know General Norstad's views on this subject, and I can only say that he seems increasingly persuaded as the weeks pass that the main result of our efforts to date in the Council has been to contribute to this unrest and that there has been definite retrogression over the past year rather than progress in the NAC. As an example, he has mentioned to me on several occasions of late that, for the first time in his experience, he senses a spirit of questioning and lack of confidence in the SHAPE military staff regarding policy directives or pronouncements made by him as SACEUR. He says that whenever he mentions "conventional forces" these days, there are lifted eyebrows on the part of officers of other nationalities at SHAPE. Furthermore, he has been told on what he regards as very good French authority that Raymond Aron, who up until quite recently was opposed to the French force de frappe or a European deterrent, has now come around to being an outright advocate of a European nuclear force as a direct consequence of Aron's present feeling of confusion and uncertainty regarding U.S. policy toward NATO. Aron's most forthright expression of his present point of view was contained in his article in Figaro of February 27. This sort of thing, of course, is rather hard to pin down and its weight in the over-all scale may be marginal; nevertheless, General Norstad has been affected by it and his doubts regarding the presentation of the U.S. case in the Council have been increased thereby.

I fear that the general sense of this letter is rather gloomy. I wish I could conclude on a more optimistic note. Many of these things, of course, have a way of working themselves out and I trust that the situation will improve in the coming weeks. In any case, I thought it well to give you a fill-in on some of the concerns here.

Sincerely,

Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.

WJStoessel, Jr. :rajh

UNCLASSIFIED

4/18/62

89-264

File: ATOMIC POLICY

Ref: NAC Data No.

Ref: MREM

Defense Data Program

Document No. 4

NAC
US—Support of NA
HORSTAD, Personal

likely
released
~~to~~ after
appeal

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 Retain class'n Change/classify to _____
 With concurrence of _____
 Declassify In part and excise as shown
EO 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a) (_____)
FPC/HDR by gus 8/2/91

10 Apr 62 Ltr from Stoessel to Fessenden

Defense experts (Rowen)

Lack of enthusiasm for program of Def Data

Appearance that US using subversive means against MREM Prog.

"...main result of our efforts to date in the Council has been to contribute to this unrest...definite retrogression...rather than prog in the NAC."

Europe confused and uncertain as to US policy.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		Classification Review by <u>gus</u>
APPEALS REVIEW PANEL DATE <u>12/2/91</u>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE <input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE <input type="checkbox"/> DENY		<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY IN PART
<input type="checkbox"/> Non-responsive information		<input type="checkbox"/> RETAIN CLASSIFICATION (s)
FOIA Exemption (s) _____		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY AS _____
PA Exemption (s) _____		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TO () S, () C, OADR

297

TOP SECRET

6000/ 2438

Dear Lem:

Through many, many contacts, both political and military, on the subject of organization, command and control of nuclear weapons in NATO, I have acquired a great deal of detail but I have nothing to add to the general impression expressed to you in a message last week. At that time, as I recall, I said that most of the thinking here was now directed toward a European solution, a European "deterrent." The question seems to be whether there will be several individual and independent national nuclear capabilities over here -- at least the British and the French -- or whether the European effort will in some way be coordinated or controlled on a European bloc basis.

There is here, and perhaps also in the U. S., frequent use of the word "multilateral" in describing nuclear forces, without any very precise idea of what is meant, and this strikes me as being unfortunate since almost any useful solution would be multilateral, in some important respect. For the moment, however, it doesn't seem to be worthwhile to try to undertake to clarify this point.

Another subject in which there is increasing confusion, encouraged, I am afraid, by some American visitors over here, the last of which were Bowie and Rowen, is the nature of the MRBM requirement. The arguments, when stripped down to the bone, appear to be based solely on the matter of range; that is, if a weapon can reach a strategic target, it is therefore strategic regardless of the primary function for which it is intended. Fortunately, most informed and responsible Europeans feel that the label should spring from the function. I do not, of course, discourage them in this thinking. This also is a point which will have to be touched on later, but for the moment I think it would be useless to raise it. I may have to touch on some of these things in my presentation to the Council on 25 July but, if so, I will do so only very generally.

You will recall that Secretary Rusk discussed the subject of coordination of nuclear deterrent forces with Couve when he was here and was told that the French consider it premature to discuss

TOP SECRET

OSD 92-11-077/C
92-198-24
2/17/64

TOP SECRET

details which related to a force which was not yet in existence. I have subsequently learned that this was not a casual reaction on the part of the Foreign Minister but was, in fact, a position strongly advocated by several elements in the French Government, including the National Defense Staff. Puget, for instance, who had participated in the preparation of a recommendation to this effect, and who had discussed the matter with De Gaulle, feels very strongly that the best answer from the standpoint of France, the United States and NATO will come in a year or two, when there is something specific to coordinate and when there may be less emotion involved in this topic.

The Adenauer visit to France seems to have been most successful in every respect. As I reported to you by message, the Chancellor appears to have maintained his position that European development should be within the framework of NATO and that defense matters particularly must remain the responsibility of the Alliance. As far as I can learn from my faithful French and German helpers, the only mark on the week was De Gaulle's deliberate slight to Speidel. Before Adenauer arrived there were seven or eight German VIP's lined up waiting. De Gaulle shook hands and spoke a few words to each of the first four, but deliberately passed Speidel with no sign of recognition and continued the hand-shaking and speaking to the other people in the line. As a consequence of this, Speidel was advised by the Germans to stay out of sight for the rest of the week, which he did. It was not, however, a very pleasant occasion for him, nor in fact for anyone particularly interested in Franco-German relations. There have been some reports that Speidel would be extended beyond his legal retirement date, which is the 1st of April 1963; but this, in my mind, clearly puts an end to that. In response to a question, I have advised the Germans to think this over extremely carefully, since keeping Speidel on even when it was known that De Gaulle didn't like him was one thing, but to extend him beyond the legal limit could very well be taken as a direct affront.

~~TOP SECRET~~

I had been asked by President Luebke to have lunch with him on the 6th of July, which raised some questions in my mind, since Adenauer was, of course, planning to be in France on that date. There seems to have been some lack of coordination between the offices of the President and the Chancellor, and I was asked to change this to the 12th. I believe I will get a little bit of first-hand information from the Chancellor not only on his visit here, but also on his reaction to some of the U. S. initiatives which are currently under study. At dinner at the Elysee last Tuesday night, he did tell me that he was very pleased with Rusk's visit to Bonn. He said there had been, as I know, some trouble between him and Washington, but that Rusk's visit was a very useful gesture and that Rusk himself was a very "nice man," and he liked him. From the reports I have seen, no decisions of monumental importance were taken on the occasion of that visit, but it was very clear that the Secretary of State did a first-rate job in calming otherwise rather troubled waters.

There are two points which may be of interest to you, but which clearly fall within the realm of gossip. The first is that more and more people, who normally have some feel, if not inside knowledge, of French governmental affairs, say that Couve wants to leave the Government and return to Washington as the Ambassador. Supporting the idea that there would be a change is the understanding of these same people that De Gaulle is very anxious to reward Joxe for his Algerian efforts, and that Joxe, who has spent his career since the war as a diplomat, would like to be Foreign Minister.

The second point comes from more direct information. On Saturday, while talking to Stikker privately, he made several references to the problems of finding a successor to himself and the timing of a change, etc. He left me with a very clear impression that he has in mind staying on for another period of one and a half to two years. This would give him a total of three or three and a half years in office. I was rather surprised at this, because he has been increasingly preoccupied with his health over the last three months and he has just about convinced me that this was a real problem. My personal relationship with Stikker is so close that I ask you to protect both the information in this paragraph and the source.


DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

To conclude this long epistle, I tentatively plan to come to Washington for a day or two about the 26th or 27th of this month, and I would hope at that time to see you and the Chiefs of Staff, if that is convenient.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,



LAURIS NORSTAD
General USAF

General Lyman L. Lemnitzer
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

REF ID: A949520
NARA Date 2-15-95

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

4/12/62

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

TO : The Secretary
THROUGH: S/S
FROM : EUR - Foy D. Kohler
SUBJECT: Secretary McNamara's Views on Nuclear Sharing

11

4/12/62

OK

✓

I thought you might be interested in a brief recap of the personal views that Secretary McNamara and Mr. Gilpatric expressed in a meeting on the sharing issue just before we left for Geneva, since these may be the views on which they place maximum emphasis in any discussion with you.

1. Technical Effect. Mr. Gilpatric said that we could give missile help without hastening French achievement of a national nuclear capability, since that achievement must be geared to production of a suitable warhead.

Comment: The technical data we have about the French program are scarce and contradictory. On some assumptions missile help would hasten the program; under other assumptions it would not. Common sense suggests that help for either of the two key components of the French program - missiles or warheads - would contribute directly to that program's success, especially since both these elements of the French program are costing a lot more, and running into a lot more trouble, than the French expected. This judgment would, in any event, be the commonly accepted view in France and other NATO countries as to the effect of our help, and the political consequences of that help would be governed by this view. I do not think, therefore, that we need engage DOD in a debate on the technical facts to offer a judgment as to these political consequences.

770.5611/4-12-62

2

2. Balance of Payments. Secretary McNamara said that missile aid to France would be justified on balance of payments grounds alone.

EUR - Foy D. Kohler

Comment:

SECRET

11

SECRET

- 2 -

Comment: The French told a State-Treasury team in Paris last week that they would not extend any significant balance of payments aid, even if we gave them missile help. They spoke of a maximum of \$25 million additional purchases for each of three years. DOD argues that this is a French bargaining tactic, but the view of our man who was there is that this is, in fact, as much as the French could or would do, in view of the extent to which their programs are already fixed and to which the French Government is already committed to French suppliers. Past French statements in this general field have generally proven rather accurate. Whatever the sum the French have in mind, Mr. Ball is prepared to propose other means of securing it which, although painful, would do less damage to our security than missile aid.

3. Conventional Forces. Secretary McNamara spoke feelingly about the fact that missile aid would save French resources, which could then go to conventional forces.

Comment: Missile aid would reduce the cost of the research phase of the French missile program, and hasten the advent of its production phase. Since the production phase would be the most costly phase, this acceleration would probably mean that more - rather than less - French money would be going into missiles over the next few years. Moreover, if there were any saving in the French missile program, it would probably go to warhead production, which has top priority. If we are willing to make sacrifices to help French conventional programs, the US would be damaged less by our providing them conventional equipment out of our stocks on concessional terms than our providing missile aid. We could replenish the stocks; there would be no way to restore the integrity of our European policy once it had been compromised. That policy is worth a lot more to the US than any payment we might get from the French for the conventional equipment.

4. Variety of Missile Aid to France. Secretary McNamara spoke of the wide variety of aid that we already give the French and other countries for aircraft and other kinds of missiles, and asked why we draw the line at help for MRBM's.

Comment:

SECRET

CLASSIFIED

ND 949520

NARA Date 2-15-95

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

SECRET

- 3 -

Comment: MRBM's and warheads are the two essential components of an effective strategic nuclear capability, such as the French are trying to develop. We cannot provide either one without helping that French effort. The other types of aid we give France do not fully meet their needs for an effective delivery capability. These other types of aid do, however, underline the fact that we are being as responsive to the French as we possibly can be without jettisoning our basic policy of not helping them build an effective national capability.

5. Electronics: Secretary McNamara spoke of aid regarding "electronics."

Comment: Our position here is simple. If the electronic equipment is not primarily intended as help for the French MRBM program, we have no objection to its provision.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

(US - extract)
MRBM
force

4/12/62

89-264

1

ATOMIC POLICY

Ltr Stoessel, Fessenden, 12 Apr 62

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

- Retain class'n Change/classify to _____
- With concurrence of _____
- Declassify In part and excise as shown
- EO 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a) (_____)
- FPC/HDR by gld 8 1 2 1 9 1

This is another "Norstad needle." In connection with POLTO 1359 setting forth Ambassador Finletter's suggestions concerning the presentation to be made at Athens by the Secretary, General Norstad was particularly interested in that part of paragraph II concerning a conventional buildup limited essentially to the Central Front. He also remarked on the paragraph -- which I imagine was deliberately vague -- concerning the tactical nuclear weapon "idea."

General Norstad asked me to tell you that it is this type of thinking which contributes to his increasingly firm conviction that strategic/military appreciations should be made by the military and not by political representatives. General Norstad said that he disagreed with Ambassador Finletter's suggestions concerning concentrating on conventional buildup on the Central Front and that this concept may represent the "personal preoccupation" of the Ambassador, but certainly did not accord with approved NATO strategy and policy.

On the latter point, it may be of interest that, when General Norstad appeared April 10 at a session of the French Center for Political Studies, he was asked his views regarding the feasibility of separating nuclear and conventional forces. He replied that, ideally, he would welcome such separation. However, to accomplish this, he would probably need something on the order of 65 conventional divisions. Since he saw no possibility of achieving such a level, he thought that for the calculable future a compromise would have to be struck and existing forces would necessarily be equipped to fight either conventionally or with nuclear weapons. He said this was not ideal, but it was the only practical way of coping with the realities of the situation. In response to other questions, General Norstad stressed the need for tactical nuclear weapons in ACE, the need for balanced forces and the requirement for modernizing present delivery capabilities by introducing MRBM's.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE	Classification Review By <u>me</u>
APPEALS REVIEW PANEL, DATE <u>12/17/79</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE () EXCISE () DENY	() DECLASSIFY IN PART
() Non-responsive information	() RETAIN CLASSIFICATION (a) _____
FOIA Exemptions (s) _____	() CLASSIFY AS _____, OADR
PA Exemption (s) _____	() DOWNGRADE TO () S, () C, OADR

~~SECRET~~

NSA

SECRET

Dr. Bundy 11/10/62

*(2:00 PM you Taylor took back the original
he will give it to the Pres. himself)*

April 12, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: NRM Force for NATO

1. It is my understanding that Secretaries Rusk and McNamara will bring you today a recommendation of action with regard to the proposed NRM force for NATO. Their recommendation will be based upon or derived from a State Department paper, "Suggested NATO Nuclear Program," of March 22, 1962 (attached).

2. As I read this paper as presently drafted, the effects of its approval would include the following:

A. By implication, the disapproval of General Roberts's recommended use of NRM's to replace obsolete aircraft and cruise missiles. This requirement, which is supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by all or most of the North Atlantic Council, is awaiting the decision of the United States.

B. Setting of the pattern for the NATO NRM force as a reference force with a high degree of multi-national meaning.

Among the things the paper does not say are how the command of this missile force would be related to SACMIR, and the degree to which the United States is prepared to surrender controls over its use.

3. It is my opinion that we are not ready to take a definite position on many of the foregoing points. If the United States is going to turn down NATO's request for NRM's to modernize its forces, this is a serious decision and should be taken only after a careful consideration of military requirements. No such study of requirements has been made. Additionally, we have not explored the subject of the NATO force sufficiently with our principal allies, particularly the Germans. This whole concept has little, if any, military merit, and stands largely upon its value in retaining Germany in the alliance as a contented, non-nuclear power. If we go for this NATO force, the pattern to be taken should be the one most likely to satisfy the Germans.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

MLK-91436

By *[Signature]* NARA, Date 11/10/97

SECRET

NSP (2-16 / MLF 1/62 - 6/62

4. Before proceeding further, it seems to me that we should develop answers for the following questions in sequence:

a. To what extent is there a military requirement for this new missile system as a modernization for NATO and for our own national forces?

b. If there is a military requirement, how can we best combine some of these weapons in a NATO multilateral force in such a way as to get the most political mileage from it?

c. If there is no military requirement for a new MRBM, can we meet the political need through the use of nuclear weapons, present or future, for which there is a military requirement?

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

~~Attachment~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Telephone
Memorandum of Conversation
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

REVIEWED by JK

DATE June 25, 1971

DATE: April 13, 1962

- RELEASE DECLASSIFY
- EXCISE DECLASSIFY IN PART
- DENY Non-responsive info.

SUBJECT:

FOI, EO or PA exemptions _____

To authority to:

CLASSIFY as _____, OADR

PARTICIPANTS:

- Wilhelm Grewe, Ambassador of Germany
- Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary

COPIES TO:

- S/S (3)
- S/B
- White House
- EUR (2)
- GER (2)
- (17) Amembassy London
- Amembassy MOSCOW
- Amembassy BONN
- Amembassy PARIS
- USRO PARIS

Mr. Kohler telephoned the German Ambassador and began the conversation by saying he was very agitated, that all the main newspapers have, from what they say was a briefing in Bonn, all the main points from the documents we have been discussing with the Ambassador. They will be in the German papers and in the American papers tomorrow morning.

Mr. Kohler said he was instructed to tell the Ambassador that we are distressed at the top levels and that this seriously raises the question of whether purposeful consultation is possible.

The Ambassador asked where Mr. Kohler got this story. Mr. Kohler replied that all the newspapers have the story; it is on the tickers, and it is said that there was a briefing. The main points are all reported with accuracy -- they are all there and this was clearly not an accident.

The Ambassador said that he had transmitted Mr. Kohler's warning about secrecy in the most serious way at the top of his report and that he couldn't understand how such a thing could be.

Mr. Kohler repeated that he was told to pass on the high concern

and

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

-2-

and the almost hopeless feeling about whether we can do any real consultation.

The Ambassador said he would pass this on to Bonn.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Record Number 59773

Memorandum of Conversation
04/13/1958

United States Department of State

For Official Use Only

[Telephone Conversation between German Ambassador and Foy
Kohler regarding "Leak" to Newspapers of Main Points from
Documents that Were Being Discussed with the Ambassador]

Kohler, Foy D.

Grews, Wilhelm

2

TYPE
DATE
LINE
ORIGIN
SIGNATURE
DEPT
DEST
CLASSIFICATION
TITLE
CTIT
NAME
NAME
TERM
ORGAN
POS

4/14/62 14

Unofficial Translation

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR

Bonn, April 14, 1962

My dear Mr. President:

Up to now the repeated attempts to open negotiations with the Soviet Union on Berlin have failed. The latest proposals of the Department of State comprise decisive elements concerning not only Berlin but also the German question, which exceed all previous offers made to the Soviet Union. I have considerable objections against some of these proposals and I would urgently request you, my dear Mr. President, to consider interrupting, for the time being, the negotiations and using this time to reexamine all problems concerning Berlin in common with the three powers.

With kind regards,

Yours very sincerely,
(sgd.) Adenauer

Record Number 53180

TYPE

Letter
04/14/1962

ORIGIN

Germany (Federal Republic)

ORIGINATOR

Kennedy, John F.
Adenauer, Konrad
Non-Classified

STATUS

ESTD

CLASSIFICATION

TITLE

CTIT

[Chancellor Adenauer Wants Negotiations with the Soviets to Stop Until a Reevaluation of the Situation Can Take Place]

NAMES

Adenauer, Konrad
Kennedy, John F.

NAMES

TERMS

ORGAN

PGS

1

4/14/62
2726

~~SECRET~~



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

Refer to 1-16826/62

APR 26 1962

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION, Saturday, April 14, 1962

Participants:

German
Mayor Brandt

US
Mr. Nitze
Mr. Lightner
Gen. Hartel
Mr. Miller
Mr. McQuade

During and after dinner at Lightner's home, the following subjects were discussed.

Brandt said that it would be a good idea if the West had additional topics to raise with the Soviets when, in the course of the talks over Berlin, discussion of the main issues seemed to be at a temporary impasse. He thought, for example, that we could seek arrangements for more freedom of movement within the city of Berlin. This might mean any one of a range of alternatives between taking down the wall to more administrative leniency in allowing families separated by the wall to get together more often. The proposal would have the advantage of great humanitarian appeal and might perhaps even work out to some extent. It could be advanced in talks at both the local level and at the talks currently being held in Washington.

Nitze remarked that most Soviet basic decisions seem to be made clumsily and at virtually the highest levels. As a result, lesser officials sometimes err in carrying out such high level decisions by going farther than the decision makers may have intended. If the present thaw is a result of this kind of high level guidance, perhaps the lesser officials might construe the policy as authorizing them to agree to some form of Brandt's proposal.

Brandt said that more coordinated use of the economic interrelationships between the West and East Germany (and the Bloc) might be useful as a crowbar for prying loose political concessions. He pointed out that the problem of food is a very considerable one for the East Germans as it is for the Russians this year. He cited East German attempts to buy food in Denmark, in France, and in Berlin itself. For example, East Germany

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR
INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY
DECLASSIFIED. DOD DIR 5200.10

~~SECRET~~

NSA / Doc - 607273 / - Memcon 1961-62

~~TOP SECRET~~

wanted to buy 2000 tons of lard from West Berlin. West Berlin, in fact, does sell to East Germany including things from the blockade stockpile. Turnover of part of the stockpile helps avoid spoilage and contributes in a small way to economic leverage.
potential

Brandt said that he thinks well of Leopold, the man who negotiates on behalf of West Germany on matters of inter-zonal trade. Some of the lesser officials in the Bonn Economic Ministry disapprove of Leopold, but Erhard himself has a favorable opinion of him.

Nitze recalled a proposal he had once worked out (though it has never been adopted) for a single Western "corporation" which would coordinate all of the commercial relationships between the West and the Bloc. Through such an organization, our opportunity to use economic counter-measures for maximum Western political advantage could be much more effectively exploited. The proposition, of course, would run into a lot of political opposition. It is inconsistent with the doctrine of free enterprise. Nevertheless, it might be worthwhile to examine it again, for it might be appropriate in the highly specialized circumstances of East-West trade.

Brandt referred to the messages from Washington about the 5-5-3 directorate for the International Access Authority and the consternation it was causing in Bonn. He had talked about this with the Chancellor and with Carstens the day before. He knew that the Chancellor had talked to the Bundestag party leaders. The subject matter of such a conference was bound to leak to the press. Brandt said that he did not find the U.S. proposal so startlingly new. It had been implicit in a long series of proposals put forward over the past several years in connection with possible Berlin settlement. Neither he nor Mende objected to the U.S. position. It was really the CDU which objected. His primary concern was that the voting procedure might cast a doubt upon the validity of the tie between Berlin and West Germany. He noted reports that Rusk had told Gromyko in Geneva that Berlin was not a German question but a tripartite matter having nothing to do with the FRG.

Nitze pointed out that the U.S. believed that our primary interest was to maintain the validity of our legal rights in Berlin. These are based upon its occupation in time of war. We have foresworn these rights with respect to West Germany and it would hurt our legal position if we should accept the unambiguous proposition that Berlin and West Germany are the same political entity.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Brandt acknowledged the dilemma. He agreed with Nitze that the primary interest is maintenance of the legal justification for the presence of the three allied powers in Berlin.

There was general discussion about the merits of confining the Berlin conversations within narrow limits or putting them in a broader focus. It seemed generally agreed that the Russians were unlikely to acquiesce in the narrower focus and that subjects such as the Oder Neisse line and non-diffusion of nuclear weapons were bound to be brought into the conversation. Brandt indicated that he rather favored the broader framework. On the whole, he said, he would prefer some formal arrangement assuring access to Berlin rather than a mere reaffirmation of the status quo. He was clear on this, at least as to ground access, but less sure as to air access which is now wholly unfettered.

Miller asked what the price might be for a formal arrangement on access.

Brandt thought there were some issues in which the Communists could gain something they deem of benefit and which the West could accept without any serious detriment or perhaps without any detriment at all. There were other issues in which the Communists might gain something they deem of benefit and for which they might grant a return concession of at least equal importance to us. He seemed to feel that, in spite of all of the effort put into the Berlin problem since the end of World War II, there is still room for more imaginative exploration of possible alternative negotiating positions. He indicated that the talks with the Soviets over Berlin should not come to any decisions whatsoever without full consultation with the responsible officials in Berlin itself. Too many practical details with quite serious consequences can be overlooked by those not fully familiar with the local scene.

There was a discussion of the rights conferred by the 1947 agreement between the Soviets and the U.S. which has just been reaffirmed by General Clark and Marshall Koniev. Hartel said he thought that this agreement both provided for an exchange of military missions and included provisions assuring military access to Berlin. The others present did not recollect that this agreement included the second feature. All deemed it of importance if the second feature had such a provision.

((Signed) Paul H. Nitze

SANITIZED COPY

4/16/62
FRANCE

1442/1160

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 16, 1962

[REDACTED]

Minutes of meeting on April 16 at 10:30 a.m.

Present: The President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara,
and Mr. McGeorge Bundy

The meeting opened with discussion of the question of possibility of
sharing news with France

Secretary Rusk explained that this is not essentially a matter of our
having a special policy. We have rather a standing
policy which de Gaulle is now trying to get us to change, although
neither he nor his Foreign Minister has ever asked.

Secretary Rusk believed that centrally In his pursuit of this
objective he was standing alone among the

The Secretary believed we must recognize that if we go in
direction in these matters we will have very great difficulties with our
other Allies.

At the same time the Secretary believed that our existing policy should
be carefully delineated. He had restrained some of his own people
who wished to extend a policy

As for consultation, the Secretary felt that consulted only on
matters that were of primary interest to others. There had been no
consultation on such matters in his own sphere as

[REDACTED]

SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3,4
NY-8-23
By SAC JARA, Date 5/1/91

[REDACTED] T

4/11/62

In _____ he wished consultation without responsibility, since _____ himself had explained to the President that there would be no _____ in that part of the world.

Secretary McNamara, after remarking that he agreed that changing our attitude ~~on this weapon~~ would not change ~~the balance~~, advanced his position in terms of what he called a "narrow military view." The Defense Department believed _____

At the same time, the _____ posture has three disadvantages from the point of view of the Department of Defense. First, there is a persisting weakness _____

There followed some discussion of what _____ might think. _____

[REDACTED] T

SECRET

4/16/62

The Secretary of Defense asked if we could not undertake a probing discussion to see what we might obtain. The Secretary felt that it would be disastrous to do this bilaterally since it would have a very heavy impact on our other allies.

*bring
my
later*

The President indicated his own belief that it was wrong to move on this matter now. In the light of these conflicting considerations he was not prepared to authorize any change in our policy. He thought the only thing we could be sure of getting from _____ was money. He believed therefore that it was in our interest to have public speculation die down and he asked that guidelines be prepared accordingly.

The discussion then turned to the problem _____ policy. The Secretary of State, in urging adoption of the proposed policy, agreed with Mr. McNamara that _____

SECRET

4/16/62

Secretary McNamara believed for himself that there is no military requirement for such _____ but he pointed out that the Joint Chiefs and General Norstad disagree strongly. As to the cost of such a force, he thought it might run to about 2 billion dollars. The U. S. might contribute 600 million dollars, and _____ 400 million dollars, but he could not see who would pay for the other billion. Nevertheless, he was very enthusiastic about submitting the proposal for its political values.

Secretary McNamara then expressed his own preference for an American-manned and American-financed force which would be a genuine part of the American strategic deterrent. He thought such a force would be more justifiable in economic and military terms, and he believed that it might in the end meet the _____ political requirement too.

At the President's request, Mr. McNamara detailed the opposition of the Chiefs as follows:

1. _____

2. _____

3. _____

It was agreed that each Secretary would explain these matters to his own subordinates, and later the President approved the attached guidelines as guidance for all concerned.

McG. B.

SANITIZED COPY

FRANCE

4/16/62

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 16, 1962

~~TOP SECRET~~

Minutes of meeting on April 16 at 10:30 a. m.

Present: The President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara,
and Mr. McGeorge Bundy

The meeting opened with discussion of the question of possibility of
giving NWR to France

Secretary Rusk explained that this is not essentially a matter of our
having a special policy toward France. We have rather a standing
policy which de Gaulle is now trying to get us to change, although
neither he nor his Foreign Minister has ever asked. See meeting transcripts

Secretary Rusk believed that centrally -----
----- In his pursuit of this
objective he was standing alone among the -----

The Secretary believed we must recognize that if we go in de Gaulle's
direction in these matters we will have very great difficulties with our
other Allies. -----

At the same time the Secretary believed that our existing policy should
be carefully delineated. He had restrained some of his own people
who wished to extend a policy -----

As for consultation, the Secretary felt that de Gaulle consulted only on
matters that were of primary interest to others. There had been no
consultation on such matters in his own sphere as de Gaulle -----

SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3,4
NLR-88-23
By SOF NARA, Date 5/21/91

NRP/317 / mtg w the Pres (per. 2/62 - 5/62
(cont) MKR/PLD ~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

4/16/62

In _____ he wished consultation without responsibility, since _____ himself had explained to the President that there would be no _____ in that part of the world.

Secretary McNamara, after remarking that he agreed that changing our attitude _____ would not change _____, advanced his position in terms of what he called a "narrow military view." The Defense Department believed _____

At the same time, the _____ posture has three disadvantages from the point of view of the Department of Defense. First, there is a persisting weakness _____

There followed some discussion of what _____ might think. _____

[REDACTED]

Bundy

SANITIZED COPY

1442/1161

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

5/7/62



May 7, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Action on _____

In March and April 1962, the question of _____ became active. The principal sources of concern and advocacy were three.

First, there was General Gavin. He had become deeply bothered by the gradual deterioration Am-Am relations, and he was persuaded that the principal cause of this difficulty lay in the failure of the United States to meet the hopes of _____. He foresaw that with the ending of the struggle _____ would become not less but more difficult, and he believed, as Ambassadors _____ have characteristically believed, that a major improvement could be accomplished if only the United States would respond to the interests and desires _____.

The second main source of interest was in the Pentagon; it derived initially from a concern for practical relations with _____ in such fields as _____

_____ the senior civilians in the Pentagon (initially Paul Nitze and later Ros Gilpatric and Bob _____)



SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3,4
NLI-88-23
By 54 NARA, Date 5/21/91

McNamara in descending order of enthusiasm) joined in recommending that a serious approach be made _____

The third substantial voice raised on this side of the argument was that of General Taylor. In a visit _____ in the latter part of March, he was deeply impressed by the unanimity _____ with whom he talked, in passionate commitment _____

Many others, at other times, have shared these same concerns about our relations _____ and had asked whether some new relation _____ might not be worth seeking. At the President's direction members of the staff had encouraged Paul Nitze's inquiries earlier in the winter, and the President himself had written a most tentative letter of explanation to _____ at the turn of the year. _____ cool response had discouraged the White House, but there was general recognition that the matter should in fact be reviewed once more.

Among those who believed that the subject should be reopened, there was some difference on ways and means. There was little support for an immediate decision to provide _____ information _____

Most of those urging a new departure believed that we should initially seek an agreement in which _____ Assistance _____ would be dependent upon still further _____

[REDACTED]

----- concessions. But one of those in favor of a change in policy, Secretary Dillon, argued powerfully that it would not be possible to make a step-by-step set of bargains----- He believed that the whole question should be opened----- by the President himself on the broadest possible basis, with the US laying out----- as part of a comprehensive package.

----- would not substantially improve

[REDACTED]

pp 4-5 deleted

[REDACTED]

The President read and heard the arguments. He talked individually with Taylor; he also heard

Mr. Kennedy made his decision firmly -- in a sense he simply never unmade it.

There were other elements in the decision.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] T

----- he would have had to overrule the Secretary of State -- which he did not often do. These considerations could well have been overbalanced if there had been a great end in view; each of them after all had a minor counterbalance of its own.

But no one could offer him a solid and substantive return for this major change in policy, with all its evident disadvantages. No one could tell him that

* * *

Among those who greeted this decision with approval, and with a renewed awareness of the practical clarity of the President's mind, there was little delight. The ----- problem remained, and the ----- effort would almost surely continue in some form -- with or without ----- It was no answer ----- but what could be done?

Clear answers to this question had not emerged in early May. But a few preliminary points were plain:

[REDACTED]

Finally, we must increasingly press upon all our friends a deeper understanding of nuclear weapons as they look in the 1960's: numerous, deadly, and indivisible in their impact; costly, complex, and rapidly obsolescent in their technology; dangerous in their diffusion, and increasingly useless except in the single great goal of deterrence.

Above and beyond these immediate actions, we must persevere on the broader course of assisting and encouraging the movement toward European integration and Atlantic partnership. If that movement goes forward, the disadvantages of an unaided effort can be contained and limited; we can still make progress toward our basic goals, despite that effort. And in the degree that the forces making for European integration and Atlantic partnership prevail, come to recognize that she can play a larger role by assisting than by hindering the prosecution of this basic policy. At least this course seemed -- in May of 1962 -- to offer a better chance of promoting US objectives than any other at hand.

McGeorge Bundy

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR.

REVIEWED by WJB

DATE 3/26/91

() UNCLASSIFIED () DECLASSIFIED
(X) CONFIDENTIAL (X) DECLASSIFIED IN PART

CLASSIFIED BY 7/1/82/5

CLASSIFIED BY 7/1/82/5 AUTHORITY TO:

() CLASSIFIED TO () OADB April 16, 1962
() DOWNGRADE TO () S or () C, OADB 2:34 p.m.

Department of State

4/16/62 (2)
E1
E
b(1)(a)(5)

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH SOVIET
AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN

Participants: The Secretary of State
Ambassador Dobrynin

Downgraded To: SECRET ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
EO 11652: XGDS (2) (3) (4)
Authorized By: my
August 4, 1975

b(1)(a)(5)

The background of this particular conversation was that I had said to Mr. Dobrynin, during his call prior to the presentation of his credentials, that I hoped to have a talk with him to bring both of us fully up to date on the conversations at Geneva.

I first told Dobrynin that I was glad to be able to review with him the present status of our discussions of the Berlin and German questions and that lively press attention to our interview might have thrown this first talk somewhat out of proportion. I told him that we had not, for example, taken for granted that our two Governments had agreed that there would be a "new round of talks" in Washington between him and myself. My clear understanding of the way Mr. Gromyko and I left it was that we would be in touch with each other about how further discussions might best go forward. I told him that we had no overriding preferences about whether these matters should be pursued in Washington or in Moscow; as he knew, Mr. Khrushchev had indicated to President Kennedy that Mr. Dobrynin had the Chairman's full confidence and was available for any exchanges we wished to undertake; similarly, Ambassador Thompson had our full confidence and could be in touch with Soviet authorities in Moscow on the same basis. Mr. Dobrynin indicated that he had had no instructions from Moscow on this point but that he would ascertain whether Moscow had any preferences and would be in touch with me again.

100.00/4-1662

I then proceeded to outline briefly where I thought we were in our talks. I said that, in the interest of clarification, it might be useful to think of our exchanges at three different levels.

The first had to do with what the Soviets have called "drawing a line under World War II". The Soviets had made proposals in 1958, and again in June of last year in Vienna, about how the Soviet Government would like

CATEGORY "A"

Sensitive Designator

Removed AUG 17 1972

P.W. (S7ST)

FILE RS/R

EYES ONLY

SECRET

to proceed

~~SECRET~~
SECRET

- 2 -

to proceed with a permanent settlement on the German and Berlin questions. I told him that the West, too, had ideas about how this ought to be done. I mentioned proposals for reunification on the basis of free elections and related elements of previous Western positions with which he was familiar. I said that we had not pressed these proposals during this past year because we did not see, realistically, any prospect of agreement and that we did not think that it would improve the situation for the two sides simply to engage in a propaganda contest over irreconcilable positions.

The second "level" of exchanges had to do with the factual situation in Germany. When we on our side have mentioned such matters as reunification or all-Berlin arrangements, the Soviet side had spoken of existing facts. Usually, these facts were stated by Soviet representatives as meaning two Germanies. We, on the other hand, had insisted that there was another fact - our position in West Berlin and our free access to that city. I was glad that at Geneva the Soviet side seemed to recognize that the facts in the situation include both the two Germanies and West Berlin. One difficulty in our conversations thus far had arisen from the confusion between these two levels of discussion. When we talked about elements of a permanent solution, the Soviet side said, "But look at the facts". But when we turned to talking about facts, the Soviet side said, "But these must be changed".

A third level of discussion would concern itself with how we should manage the fact of disagreement if it became apparent that we could not come together either on a permanent solution or an agreement based upon existing facts. The working paper on general principles which I handed to Mr. Gromyko in Geneva was our suggestion as to how we might deal with the existence of underlying disagreement in such a way as not to move toward a dangerous crisis.

I then turned to the question of access and commented on the fact that we had not gone into considerable detail with each other on our respective proposals for an international access authority. Our difficulty with the working paper on this subject which Mr. Gromyko handed me at Geneva was that it was tied organically to the withdrawal of Western forces from West Berlin. We did not wish to leave any wrong impression through a detailed examination of a paper which seemed to be rooted in an underlying demand which we could not accept, namely, the removal of Western forces from West Berlin. I repeated to Mr. Dobrynin what I had said to Gromyko in Geneva, namely, that I did not see any fundamental difficulty in working out access arrangements which were consistent with what they called "the sovereignty of the GDR" and what we might call the responsibilities of local authorities. Our international access proposals were aimed at arrangements which would guarantee free access which would not interfere with activities in East Germany.

We

~~SECRET~~
SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

We still were of the opinion that this was not an insoluble problem unless the Soviet side had in mind a type of East German control over access which could be used to throttle West Berlin.

I told Mr. Dobrynin that we were not entirely clear from our talks at Geneva about the connection between access arrangements and Soviet proposals for the withdrawal of Western troops. Mr. Khrushchev had seemed to make this connection quite specific. At Geneva, Mr. Semenov had indicated to Mr. Kohler that this was something "for the Ministers". When I questioned Mr. Gromyko on this matter he used a diagram to show that access was linked to the status of West Berlin and that the question of status was, in turn, linked to the presence of Western troops.

At this point Mr. Dobrynin said that "as of now" he would have to say that the "present position" of the Soviet Government was that agreement on access is linked to the presence of Western forces in West Berlin. "What the further attitude of my Government might be, I would not be in a position to say", he added.

I told him that I thought there might be some point in our exploring further the question of access provided it was understood by the Soviet side that we were not thereby changing in any way our attitude on Western troops. The latter was not a negotiable problem from our point of view. But it might be worth finding out whether the question of access could move toward more agreement even though the major issue remained in the background.

He asked where I thought we stood on some of the other "broader questions" which had been mentioned both at Geneva and in recent press accounts. I repeated the point that I had made to Gromyko in Geneva, namely, that if we could find a way of dealing with the central issues of vital concern to the West, I felt that a number of these other matters would fall into place. As he knew from reading the press of the last few days, we were in the process of consulting our allies. He laughed and said, "That is very evident".

It became clear from Dobrynin's conversation that he had had no instructions to continue further from where Gromyko and I had left off in Geneva, or, if so, had been instructed not to pursue the matter in this particular conversation. We agreed therefore, not just to reiterate to each other what Gromyko and I had said to each other at Geneva. In the course of general conversation, however, the following additional points came up:

Dobrynin

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

~~SECRET~~
SECRET

- 4 -

Dobrynin said that West Berlin was an outpost of the West capable of causing real trouble between us. He was not thinking of it as a strong military base but as a situation which could cause accidents or incidents of a dangerous sort. Therefore, it was in the interest of both sides to eliminate this source of trouble. He said that he was not clear just why we attach so much importance to our position in West Berlin - whether it was a question of prestige or just what it was.

I said that President Kennedy had covered this point in considerable detail with Chairman Khrushchev in Vienna. The President had pointed out the nature of our commitment to West Berlin and the effect upon our entire position if we were to permit that position to be eliminated or diminished. It would be wrong for the Soviet side to build its hopes upon the results which President Kennedy had clearly indicated we could not accept. I said that we felt that there might be some wishful thinking in some quarters of Moscow derived from the geographic location of Berlin. I had earlier told Mr. Gromyko that they could think about the political problems of Berlin more accurately if they imagined Berlin to be located on the demarcation line between the Federal Republic and East Germany. The geographical isolation of West Berlin was irrelevant because the Western allies were there and would remain there. I said that it would not surprise me to know, for example, that some Soviet military advice might be that this should be an easy problem; but it was not an easy problem, from that point of view, because the United States is in West Berlin.

Mr. Dobrynin and I exchanged a few words about President Kennedy's remark to Adzhubei that time might make some of these problems easier to solve. Dobrynin recalled Gromyko's remark to me at Geneva that time could work the other way. I said that I recalled that remark and that I had passed it by because Mr. Gromyko had referred to Hitler and I was quite sure that he did not intend to equate us with Hitler. Mr. Dobrynin said he was quite sure that was not Mr. Gromyko's intention. He asked how I saw time working to improve this principal point of confrontation between the two Governments. I said that time might ease their own pressures in East Germany; that time might make practical relationships in Germany more feasible and more conducive to a normal atmosphere; that time might make it possible to make some significant advances in disarmament, about which we were very serious. He asked me whether Berlin and disarmament are linked, I said they were not organically linked but obviously progress in one would help in progress on the other. He commented that the reverse could also be true.

Again,

~~SECRET~~
SECRET

~~SECRET~~
SECRET

- 5 -

Again, on the effect of time I pointed out that President Kennedy had moved early in his Administration to try to create an atmosphere of calm in the relationships between our two Governments and, particularly, to restore effective contact between us. Even though we might not be able to agree on important issues, we had felt that responsible contact at all times was important. Dobrynin agreed and said that this had been much appreciated in Moscow and we mentioned the release of flyers, the cultural agreement and the variety of exchanges we have had as evidence of more effective communications. I told him that we thought that his own assignment in Washington as Ambassador was a step in improving communications, which he accepted with obvious pleasure.

I told Mr. Dobrynin that we were not unaware of the fact that shortly after Geneva the situation in West Berlin itself had significantly improved. I had said to Mr. Gromyko that we should be listening with both ears - with one to what is said, and with the other to what is done in Berlin; I was glad to see that matters had moved to a much more normal position there since Geneva and that we felt this was a wholesome contribution. He nodded acquiescence.

I told him that we were prepared to go ahead with conversations as anticipated by Mr. Gromyko and me at Geneva and that we were not on our side wishing to procrastinate - and reminded him of my exchange with Gromyko on that subject in Geneva.

My net impressions of this one hour's talk with Dobrynin were (a) he was not under instructions to pursue these questions on their substance; (b) he did not attempt to leave any impression that the Soviets were in any hurry; (c) he clearly did not attempt to leave any impression that they wished to move the matter to a crisis or showdown; (d) he was amused but entirely relaxed about the press flap out of Bonn; (e) he would report our conversation and be in touch with me again about any suggestions Moscow had about how the conversations might continue, and (f) he thought my outline of the three levels of discussion was a useful clarification and had thought so when I first presented it to Gromyko in Geneva.

He seemed equally relaxed about Laos, which he mentioned on his initiative just before leaving. I told him that it must be obvious to them that we were making serious efforts to support the idea of a negotiated coalition government, that we were having some difficulties with the RLG leadership and that we thought that it might take a little more time to bring the matter to a satisfactory conclusion.

I told

~~SECRET~~
SECRET

~~SECRET~~
SECRET

I told him that I had told the press for background that they should not expect too much from this meeting this afternoon, that this was our first contact since Geneva, that one of the matters we would be discussing in what way we might continue the discussions between our two Governments on these problems.

Dean Rusk

S DR:ma:cbs

~~SECRET~~

Record Number 58752

Berlin Crisis
Yes
Memorandum of Conversation
04/16/1962

DOCUMENT TYPE

DATE

IRCD

TIME

CABNO

DOCNO

ORIGIN

SIGNATOR

DESTO

DESTP

DRAFT

CLASSIFICATION

TITLE

CTIT

NAMES

NAMES

NAMES

NAMES

NAMES

TERMS

ORGAN

PGS

United States. Department of State
Rusk, Dean

Secret
Memorandum of Conversation with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin

Dobrynin, Anatoly F.
Gromyko, Andrei A.
Kennedy, John F.
Khrushchev, Nikita S.
Adzhubei, Aleksei

6

SUK

6535
4/17/62
Burdy

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: April 17, 1962
PLACE : Mr. Kohler's Office
TIME : 11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT: Secretary's Meeting with Soviet Ambassador

PARTICIPANTS: UNITED KINGDOM

UNITED STATES

Lord Hood
Mr. Thomson

Mr. Kohler
Mr. Cash

FDK

COPIES TO: S/S
S/B
White House ✓
EUR - 2
GER - 2
BTF - 2

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, SEC. 3(E), 5(D), 5(E) AND 11
State (WJK-R-853)
BY myt NARS, DATE 12/26/78

Mr. Kohler reviewed the memorandum of the conversation between the Secretary and the Soviet Ambassador on April 16.

After this was concluded, Lord Hood commented that the ball was now in the Soviet court.

Mr. Kohler replied that it may be that the Soviets are not anxious to push ahead with the talks on Berlin, but in any event we had gotten in before our nuclear tests.

Lord Hood inquired as to Mr. Kohler's thoughts on how a Western position would be agreed.

Mr. Kohler said he did not quite know the answer. We may now have a little time. If the Soviets do not come back too soon we might carry this over to the Athens NATO meeting.

Lord Hood commented that if the Russians come back next week, the talk could be purely procedural.

Mr. Kohler said this could be, or they could come back with a paper of their own which would put us at a disadvantage.

Mr. Kohler

SECRET

- 2 -

Mr. Kohler continued by saying there was no logical explanation of the German reversal on the technical commissions. However, we can accommodate them with respect to a couple of their minor objections. We just disagree with them on nuclear nondiffusion. We could eliminate the reference to Germany. On nonaggression we could force their hand. We could probably produce a somewhat revised paper. We haven't discussed too thoroughly internally what we do next. It may be that we should let matters rest for a day or two.

Lord Hood agreed that there was no rush.

SECRET

Record Number 53183

<u>DOCUMENT TYPE</u>	Memorandum of Conversation
<u>DATE</u>	04/17/1962
<u>CIRCD</u>	
<u>TIME</u>	
<u>CABNO</u>	
<u>ORIGIN</u>	United States. Department of State. Bureau of European Affairs. Office of German Affairs
<u>SIGNATOR</u>	Cash, Frank E., Jr.
<u>DESTO</u>	
<u>DESTP</u>	
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	Secret
<u>TITLE</u>	Secretary's Meeting with Soviet Ambassador
<u>CTIT</u>	
<u>NAMES</u>	Kohler, Foy D.
<u>NAMES</u>	Hood, Samuel
<u>TERMS</u>	
<u>ORGAN</u>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<u>PGS</u>	2

The position on the paper 'NATO Nuclear Policy' is as follows:

1. U.S. policy on MREB's will be governed by the provisions of this paper except that paragraph 2(d) should not be volunteered by the U.S.

2. In handling this issue in the NAC, the U.S. should outline its views in accord with the contents of this paper, not as a U.S. proposal, but as a U.S. contribution to the resolution of the issues involved in this question.


3. The Secretary of State will have the responsibility for handling tactics on this topic, consulting with the Secretary of Defense as appropriate.

April 17, 1962

SECRET

Unsigned summary of position paper on NATO nuclear policy

AGA (216) MLE, Gen. 11/61-6/62



Col. Smith E

~~SECRET~~

1020 of 4/18/62
I
MOR

18 April 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL TAYLOR

SUBJECT: Rusk and McNamara Speeches at Athens

1. In this Administration, speeches by ranking officials are very often vehicles for the enunciation of major policy decisions or determinants, despite the rather casual "clearances" which tend to substitute for hard coordination. Anyone interested in U.S. policy toward NATO must, of course, start with the 24 April 1961 policy paper, but, thereafter, high on the list of his best sources would be the President's Ottawa speech (May '61), the President's Berlin speech (July '61), the Gilpatric Warm Springs speech (November '61), the Rusk and McNamara Paris speeches to the NAC (December '61), the Ball speech in Bonn (April '62), and I suppose now the Nitze Hamburg speech (April '62). And Finletter's March 21 textual address to the Council may be about to be supplemented by the textual presentation of Henry Owen's MRBM paper, transparently and dishonestly modified in minor respects in order to mollify certain recognized pockets of opposition.

Copy enroute to you.

2. You have asked about the Rusk and McNamara speeches for delivery at the Athens NATO Ministerial Meeting. I find that no one has yet started on a first draft for Rusk. The McNamara speech is in approximately a third or fourth draft, and I detect an understandable disinclination to let me see it, at least until the Secretary himself has had a chance to react to it, probably later this week. I am told, meanwhile, that the early drafts drip with major policy. No wonder; Harry Rowen's Policy shop is writing it.

3. In line with paragraph 1, above, therefore, I would recommend an ounce of prevention for once. In view of the big splash both Secretaries made with their December speeches, recommend you suggest to Bundy the desirability of a coordinated White House review this time -- not a fast reaction from Carl Kaysen or something of the sort.

LJL

LJL

DECLASSIFIED BY: MOR 87-110

~~SECRET~~

70 126 / File 1: US Policy toward NATO NOW

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3
4/18/62
= 13:384A

SECRET

April 18, 1962

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 147

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: NATO Nuclear Program

The President has approved the recommendation of the Secretaries of State and Defense that U.S. policy on MRBMs be governed by the provisions of the paper entitled "Suggested NATO Nuclear Program", dated March 22, 1962; except that Paragraph 2(d) should not be volunteered by the U.S.

= 3/22/62
mgl

In handling the MRBM issue in the North Atlantic Council, the U.S. should outline its views in accord with the contents of this paper, not as a U.S. proposal, but as a U.S. contribution to the resolution of the issues involved in this question.

The Secretary of State will have the responsibility for handling tactics on this topic, consulting with the Secretary of Defense as appropriate.

4/18/62
McGeorge Bundy

Enclosure: 3/22/62 Paper

Information copy to:
General Taylor
Chris Henderson, AEC - Rcpt 536
(per C. Johnson)

cc: Mrs. Lincoln
Mr. Bundy File
C. Johnson
NSC Files

DECLASSIFIED
O. 12356, Sec. 3,4
NLS-88-23
SICF NARA Date 5/2/91

NSF/336/NSAM 147

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

April 18, 1962

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 148

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

SUBJECT: Guidance on U.S. Nuclear Assistance to France

The President has directed that the following line should be taken with the press on a background basis by all elements of the Executive Branch:

Recent news reports that the U.S. is moving toward the provision of assistance to the French national MRBM and nuclear effort are without foundation. There has been no change in the existing United States policy and none is expected.

The President has also directed that, under present policy, members of the Executive Branch are not to discuss with French officials any possible U.S. assistance to the French MRBM or nuclear program.

McGeorge Bundy
McGeorge Bundy

Information copy to:
General Taylor

cc: Mrs. Lincoln
Mr. Bundy File
C. Johnson
NSC Files

Mr. Bundy 6/10

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLK-592-3 (NSC Ctr. 8/4/92)
By SF NARA, Date 8/26/92

~~SECRET~~

NLF/336

4/19/62 65 00 03
BT-504 R

SECRET

NMA D-1/1

April 19, 1962

E185

NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING
Athens, May 4-6, 1962

Position Paper

Berlin and Germany

(To be raised at US initiative)

Anticipated Multilateral Foreign Positions

Our mission has reported that the Alliance will want to hear much about Berlin, and that the members will be looking forward to the Secretary's impressions as to the attitudes of the Soviets and their future moves. They reportedly want to know whether the Secretary thinks a period of relative calm over Berlin can be anticipated or whether he believes there will be more flare-ups such as the air corridor incidents.

Recommended US Position

You might wish to say that your meeting with the Soviet Ambassador on April 16 took place in an easy, relaxed atmosphere. Actually very little was done at this meeting. The situation was reviewed, but nothing of substance was discussed beyond Geneva. You talked about how best to proceed, but Dobrynin had no instructions on this point. You agreed that each side would report, and you would then be in touch again. It was clear from the conversation that Dobrynin had no instructions to continue further from where you and Gromyko left off in Geneva, or, if so, he had been instructed not to pursue the matter in that particular conversation. He did not attempt to leave any impression that the Soviets are in any hurry, and he clearly did not attempt to leave any impression that they wish to move matters to a crisis or a showdown.

You might wish to say that Dobrynin thought your outline of the three levels of discussion between the Soviets and ourselves was a useful clarification and had thought so when you first presented it to Gromyko in Geneva. You might wish to add that you, too, think it is a useful clarification of where we are in our talks, and because of this you wish to be certain that the Alliance understands what you mean by thinking of the exchanges with the Soviets as occurring on three levels.

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FPC/CDR BT

Date: 5/29/92

RELEASE DECLASSIFY
 EXCISE DECLASSIFY
 DENY IN PART
 DELETE Non-Responsive Info
FOIA Exemptions _____
PA Exemptions _____

MR Cases Only:
EO Citations _____

TS authority to:
 CLASSIFY as S or C OADR
 DOWNGRADE TS to S or C OADR

NSA

SECRET

- 3 -

prepared to negotiate seriously about Berlin, and it will last only as long as this conviction holds. Therefore, we must quickly reach agreement among ourselves regarding our proposals to the Soviets and put these proposals up to them.

Our mission has recommended that you note the unanimous agreement of the Alliance through the Council to stand solidly behind our firm position on Berlin, and, if you think it warranted, that you say this firmness has contributed importantly to the success of our Berlin policy which has been achieved to date, for, they add, it surely must be regarded as success that we have maintained our basic rights without fighting.

Drafted by: BTF:EUR:GER - Mr. Cash	Cleared by: EUR - Mr. Kohler
	G/PM - Mr. Weiss
S/S-S:LPezzullo:Rm 7241B, Ext. 4338	

SECRET

WTF:EUR:GER:JKHolloway:mgc
(Drafting Office and Officer)

SECRET

This document consists of 5 pages
Number 1 of 1 copies, Series A

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation 762 00/4-2162

DATE: April 21, 1962
Mr. Kohler's Office
9:15 a.m.

SUBJECT: Berlin and Germany

PARTICIPANTS: Foy D. Kohler - Assistant Secretary, EUR
Fritz Erler - SPD Bundestag Member
J.K. Holloway, Jr., - GER

This document consists of 5 pages
Number 1 of 1 copies, Series A

COPIES TO:

S/S - 1
S/B - 2
S/P - 3
EUR - 4
GER - 5

S/S WTF - 7 (13)
RA - 1
The White House - Mr. Bundy - 8
Ambassy BONN - 9
USMER BERLIN - 16

April 26, 1962

NO EXCISIONS
THIS PAGE

Spaw - 11-13

Mr. Erler called on Mr. Kohler in one of a series of conversations he has been having with American officials this week.

Mr. Erler opened the conversation by saying that he has been surprised by the stories in the American and German papers regarding the alleged American proposals to make concessions to the Soviets on Berlin and Germany. He had understood from the German Foreign Minister that the German Government was "very satisfied with the American position." Before he left Germany it had been agreed that there was no need to have a foreign policy debate in the German Bundestag as the proposed American course was in accordance with Germany's intentions and aims. In view of this Mr. Erler wanted to ask Mr. Kohler what he, Mr. Kohler, thought had happened which had lead to this new celebrated "leak" in Bonn about these alleged American plans.

Mr. Kohler said that our information seemed to indicate that there had been "revolt in the CDU" although we did not know precisely what had triggered this revolt. There was, as Mr. Erler knew, nothing new in our proposals. We had given the Germans a copy of the working paper which we had handed the Russians six weeks previously in Geneva. All we had been proposing to do was to revise this working paper in the light of the Geneva talks to take account of the language, but not the substance, of Russian proposals. Therefore, we were surprised and somewhat distressed to read that elements of the German Government were unhappy with this proposed US approach and were intimating that the US was prepared to make concessions on Berlin and Germany to the Soviets. This was particularly distressing because not only had no concessions been made on either side, but also because

the essential

FORM DS-1254
2-61

Classified by RJMR

SECRET

cc's rec'd in file

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY

Date

() RELEASE () DECLASSIFY
() EXISE () DECLASSIFY in PART
() DENY () DELETE

FOL EDITION

TS Authority to

GPO 908992

() CLASSIFY
CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY: G. GAIN

20 EXERCISES

SECRET

..... 2
.....
.....

the essential element in any US discussion on Berlin and Germany with the Soviets would be the positions of the German Government and German public opinion. The basic American policy toward Germany is the adherence of Germany to the Western Community and its integration into Western Europe. Berlin is only part of this larger policy.

Mr. Erler said that one source of the German misgivings might be the question of the International Access Authority. He himself had two questions; the first on the competence of the Authority, and the second on the composition of it. He recognized that German ground and water access to Berlin was almost exclusively under Communist control and that obviously there would have to be some concession as an inducement to the Communists to place this control under an international authority. It was in the air that he had misgivings about the competence. If it referred only to safety, this, of course, could be taken care of. If it referred to inspection and control of the people and goods moving by air, this would seem to be dangerous. He was not clear about the question of military transport, which, if controlled by an international access authority, would seem to be subject to a disunion of the Occupation status which had been in effect since 1945.

On the composition of the board, Mr. Erler thought it might be better if the Germans, both East and West (including East and West Berlin) be consultants or holders of minor rights rather than be raised to the same level as, for instance, the United States. The placing of the GDR on the same level as the US would be a great victory for the Ulbricht regime.

Mr. Kohler said before he went into detail, he wished to state the problem. The US is prepared to go to war over Berlin or over free access thereto. It is not prepared to go to war over East Berlin, East Germany or the Oder-Neisse line. We are not altogether sure when it comes to the moment that the US does go to war over West Berlin or access, that our allies will be with us. He would ask, in all seriousness, if the Germans would be with us? Mr. Erler replied, in a war over West Berlin there would be no doubt about this. Mr. Kohler went on to explain the extraordinary military measures the US had taken because of Berlin and the disruption which these had caused in the lives of many American citizens. He said that the President, having done these, now is under an obligation to try every means to find a peaceful solution. In the words of Churchill, "We arm to parley." In this regard, our policy was different from that of General deGaulle who would do nothing, but who is only allowed the luxury of that because of the US strength.

Mr. Kohler then said we had been talking now to the Soviets for some months. We had first tried a broad approach in the original Rusk-Gromyko talks. Then, in the Thompson-Gromyko talks, we had narrowed the conversations to access. Then, at Geneva, we had attempted to broaden them again. The results of these talks can best be seen on three planes. The first plane is that there can be no permanent settlement or solution of the German and Berlin problems without reunification. This unacceptable to the Soviets who want us out of Berlin and who wish to confirm

.....
..... the partition

SECRET

SECRET

3

the partition of Germany. If we are not going to war to effect the reunification of Germany, there is in the immediate future no possibility that progress can be made on this plane.

The second plane is that of the "facts." To the Russians there are two facts; one is the existence of the Soviet zone of occupation (called the GDR) with 20 divisions of Soviet troops and six divisions of GDR troops. The second fact is that East Berlin and its inclusion in the GDR are not considered by the Soviets as negotiable subjects. On our side, the facts are that we are in West Berlin and that we propose to stay there and that we will not have our access to it blocked.

The third plane therefore becomes the acceptance by both sides of these vital facts and an agreement to disagree. Mr. Kohler then explained in detail the American rationale of the working paper which we had given Gromyko which was in effect a plan by which we agreed to disagree. During the explanation of this, Mr. Erler noted his complete agreement with the idea of joint technical commissions of East and West Berlin. He also indicated understanding of the US position on non-transfer of nuclear weapons which he recognized as an American policy of long-standing. Further, he commented that the concept of a non-aggression pact and non-use of force to change the present demarcation lines of Germany were "old hat" and something that the Federal German Government had done essentially already. He also noted that the concept of a continuing forum for discussing German proposals was actually included in the 1958 resolution of the Bundestag.

Mr. Kohler then went on to comment on the International Access Authority. He said we view it as an operating authority which would be run by a general manager, possibly a Swede. We envisioned that this IAA would operate much as the Port of New York Authority does. Mr. Erler asked if the Authority which operates on the autobahn the same way as the Port of New York authority operates on the Holland Tunnel i.e., admitting any one who pays the tolls and meets the safety regulations. Mr. Kohler said that this obviously would be our first position but that we were not sanguine about obtaining it. At Geneva, the Russians had suggested that West Berlin authorities could determine who used the access routes of the Authority. This seemed worth discussing. He also commented that the concept of the IAA was obviously attractive at least in name as the Soviets had attempted to use it for their proposal which was, however, not a true international authority but only a court of appeals.

Mr. Erler then said he wanted to comment on Mr. Kohler's explanation of the proposed modus vivendi. He said he regretted the German leak because it gave the Soviets the idea they could manipulate the allies. He also wished to make clear that he believed that the US could be relied upon to defend Berlin. He would ask, however, if this proposal would not allow for "the creation of new facts" in that it seemed to accept the division of Berlin and the Wall. Mr. Kohler said that

contrary

SECRET

SECRET


contrary to general belief, we had spent hours talking to the Russians about All-Berlin proposals. But, the facts unfortunately were that beginning in 1946, the Soviets had gradually detached East Berlin from greater Berlin and that the wall, while a traumatic experience, had really only confirmed a fact of long-standing. Both Mr. Erier and Mr. Kohler agreed that there had been illusions about All-Berlin which perhaps had been held by both the Americans and Germans and that it was the collapse of these on August 13 which was the basis for the exaggerated reaction. Mr. Kohler and Mr. Erier also agreed that it had been the fine leadership of Mayor Brandt which had kept the West Berliners from losing either their heads or their spirit over the wall. Mr. Erier also said that it was this leadership of Mayor Brandt which prevented the SPD from losing votes in general elections of last year. Heretofore every Soviet aggressive move had tended to help the party in power in Germany. The actual gain in SPD votes

NR

J

SECRET

.....
.....
..... 5 -
.....



NR

.....
.....
.....

SECRET

Record Number 59751

DOCUMENT TYPE Memorandum of Conversation
DATE 04/21/1952
CIRCU
TIME
ORIGIN United States, Department of State
SIGNATOR
DESTO
DESTB
CLASSIFICATION Secret
TITLE Berlin and Germany
CTIT [Review of U.S. Position in Talks with Gromyko]
NAMES Kohler, Foy D.
NAMES Erlar, Fritz
NAMES Thompson, Llewellyn E.
NAMES Gromyko, Andrei A.
NAMES Ulbricht, Walter
NAMES Brandt, Willy
TERMS International Access Authority
ORGA. Christian Democratic Union (Federal Republic of Germany)
PBS 5

4/24/62
Est

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT *Eyes Only*
 CHARGE TO *DIS REVIEW*

SECRET

Classification

(21)
Caption removed;
transferred to O/FADRC
ACTION: Amembassy, BONN
with additional access
controlled by S/S
Caption and custody
retained by S/S *ER*

PRIORITY 2929

**MICROFILMED FOR
KENNEDY LIBRARY
APRIL 1964**

4/24/62

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR

Date 4-4-91 19__

We have tried our hand at a further redo of the revised working

paper on "Draft Principles, Procedures and Interim Steps," taking account of the principal specific suggestions made by FRG and other Allies. We have, however, not included a revision of the section on "Technical Commissions" between West and East Germany (Section 2b) since this was a matter put forward by the Germans at Lausanne and discussed between us. We have assumed that this still stands in spite of the apparent retraction/following the excitement in Bonn weekend before last. As the paper now stands it seems to us, while utilizing a certain amount of Soviet language from the Geneva talks, to contain no real substantive changes from the "Draft Principles" paper tabled at Geneva and provided to the Germans at the time. The only substantive additions are on questions which drew no objections from the FRG in the revised version given Grewe, specifically (1) the final paragraph of Section I, "Berlin," which

762.00 / 4-24-62
RR-762-10221

- DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MAR
- () RELEASE
- () EXISTE
- () DENY
- () DECLASSIFY
- () DECLASSIFY IN PART
- () DELETE
- () NON-RESPONSIVE INFO.

Drafted by: **EUR:FDKohler:mt**
4/24/62

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by *FDK* **Foy D. Kohler**

Clearances: **The Secretary (in substance)**

S/S-WSlater

SECRET

Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED".

~~SECRET~~
Classification

reflects suggestions previously made by Mayor Brandt and which have an all-Berlin connotation, and (2) the final sentence of Section 5 which implies that future progress toward agreement might lead to occasional "summit" meetings.

We have still not decided at what point we might put forward this revised working paper. However it might well prove advisable in view of my prospective absence of two weeks at various Alliance meetings to give it to Dobrynin toward the end of this week in order to provide something for the Soviets to be considering and thus keep the ball in motion.

I am sending you the text of the revised paper in a separate telegram. I should appreciate your giving a copy personally to Schroeder and getting his reactions as rapidly as possible. You should tell him that I have no intention of putting forward the other paper on the International Access Authority, at least until I have had a chance to talk with him about this and the whole situation in Athens.

END

RUSK

SECRET

EXCLUDED FROM THIS
"RESTRICTED"
"CLASSIFIED"

SECRET

Eyes only

4/24/62

E57

with additional access
 controlled by S/S
 Caption and custody
 retained by S/S
 Reviewed by: Elijah Kelly
 Date: 4-4-97

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

SECRET

Classification

034
 APR 27 1962
 4-24-62

(2)

Origin

ACTION: ~~Embassy~~ BONN

PRIORITY ⁸⁹³⁰ MICROFILMED FOR

Info:

Ref: 2929

KENNEDY LIBRARY

EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR revised

76200 APRIL 1964
4-24-62

Following is/text of "Draft Principles, Procedures, and Interim Steps"

referred to in immediately preceding telegram.

PREAMBLE

The parties have discussed certain issues related to the reduction of tensions and the strengthening of peace. They have sought to deal with these issues in a way which would accomplish two things: }

First, it would create a useful framework for continuing negotiations concerning aspects of these issues on which differences remain to be resolved. To this end, the parties have agreed in regard to each of the issues under discussion: (i) on general principles, which will serve as a basis for continuing negotiations, and (ii) on procedures to govern these continuing negotiations. In this connection, a Committee of Foreign Ministers' Deputies will be established which France and the UK will be invited to join.

Second, it would permit them to take interim action concerning urgent aspects of these issues on which the parties are already of the same view. To this end, the parties have agreed on certain interim steps to deal with aspects of these issues that pose immediate dangers. These interim steps do not purport to settle the questions for all time but they are needed to meet pressing

76200 / 4-24-62

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
 RELEASE
 EXISTE
 DIARY
 (A) DECLASSIFY
 (D) DECLASSIFY IN PART
 (D) DELETE
 Non-responsive info.

REMOVED BY: [Signature]
 Date: June 27, 1991
 (A) DECLASSIFY
 (D) DECLASSIFY IN PART
 (D) DELETE
 Non-responsive info.

Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and

BTF: EUR:GER: [Signature] 4/24/62

classification approved by:

GER - Martin J. Hehlenbrand

Clearances:

Mr. Kohler (in substance)
 The Secretary (in substance)

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED

Eyes only

E57

with additional access controlled by S...
Location and custody retained by S...
Reviewed by: Elijah
Date: 4-4-62

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

SECRET
Classification

1034
MAR 27 1962
4-24-62
Per DCT

Origin
Info:

ACTION: Ambassador BONN

PRIORITY 8930 MICROFILMED FOR

Ref: 2929

KENNEDY LIBRARY

EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR
revised

762.00 / APRIL 1964
4-24-62

Following is/text of "Draft Principles, Procedures, and Interim Steps"

referred to in immediately preceding telegram.

PREAMBLE

The parties have discussed certain issues related to the reduction of tensions and the strengthening of peace. They have sought to deal with these issues in a way which would accomplish two things: |

First, it would create a useful framework for continuing negotiations concerning aspects of these issues on which differences remain to be resolved. To this end, the parties have agreed in regard to each of the issues under discussion: (i) on general principles, which will serve as a basis for continuing negotiations, and (ii) on procedures to govern these continuing negotiations. In this connection, a Committee of Foreign Ministers' Deputies will be established which France and the UK will be invited to join.

Second, it would permit them to take interim action concerning urgent aspects of these issues on which the parties are already of the same view. To this end, the parties have agreed on certain interim steps to deal with aspects of these issues that pose immediate dangers. These interim steps do not purport to settle the questions for all time but they are needed to meet pressing

762.00 / 4-24-62

- DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/DODGER
- (4) RELEASE
- () EXISTE
- () DENY
- (4) DECLASSIFY
- () DECLASSIFY IN PART
- () DELETE
- () Non-responsive info.

RECEIVED BY: [Signature]
DATE: June 27 1961

Drafted by: [Signature] Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: GER - Martin J. Hillenbrand
BTF: EUR: GER: [Signature] Date: 4/24/62

Clearances:
Mr. Kohler (in substance)
The Secretary (in substance)

SECRET

Classification

pressing problems until more comprehensive agreements can be reached in the above-mentioned negotiations.

There follows, therefore, in regard to each of the issues under discussion, a statement of (i) general principles to serve as a basis for future negotiations; (ii) procedures for these future negotiations; (iii) interim steps to be taken in the meantime.

1. Berlin

(a) General Principles: They agree that the Committee of Foreign Ministers' Deputies should, in its continuing negotiations, take account of the general principles that, pending the reestablishment of German unity:

(i) West Berlin should be free to choose its own way of life;

(ii) the parties should undertake to respect the social order that has taken shape therein;

(iii) its viability -- including the stability and prosperity of its economy -- should be maintained.

(iv) Unrestricted communication will be assured between West Berlin and West Germany. Subject to the foregoing, an International Access Authority should be established to perform specified functions in order to ensure this unrestricted communication.

(b) Future Negotiations: They agree to study proposals relating to Berlin in an effort to reach agreements which would give effect to these principles in a way consistent with the vital interests of all parties in the aforementioned Committee of Foreign Ministers' Deputies.

(c) Interim Steps:

SECRET

Classification

SECRET
Classification

(c) Interim Steps: In the meantime, they declare that access procedures in effect on January 1, 1962, will remain in effect. Rules and regulations of the competent authorities which the Committee of Foreign Ministers' Deputies agrees are compatible with the principle of free access between West Berlin and West Germany, will be respected. Included among procedures in effect on January 1, 1962, is the fact that transit will proceed along the same communication routes presently used, and will be subject to compliance with the existing procedures, whereby:

(i) transit vehicles and their passengers are not allowed to deviate from the established transit routes;

(ii) passengers in transit are not allowed to go beyond the limits of the communications routes used for transit;

(iii) passengers in transit are prohibited from giving or receiving any articles; and

(iv) no one may board vehicles in transit to Berlin.

They also declare that they will seek the agreement of the authorities in West and East Berlin to establish an all-Berlin technical commission to be composed of officials appointed by the authorities in West and East Berlin to deal with such matters as the facilitation of the movement of persons, transport, and goods between West and East Berlin, and the regulation of public utilities and sewage.

2. Germany

(a) General Principles: They believe that the Germans have the right to determine their own future, and to reestablish the unity of Germany, if they so desire, and they wish to facilitate the exercise of this right in a way that will enhance the security of all European peoples.

END SEC ONE OF TWO
(b) Future

SECRET
Classification

SEC TWO

OF TWO

SECRET

Classification

(b) Future Negotiations: They agree that the authorities in West and East Germany should be invited to establish three mixed technical commissions, consisting of officials designated by these authorities, to increase cultural and technical contacts, to promote mutually beneficial economic exchanges, and to consider a draft electoral law or other steps toward German reunification, respectively.

(c) Interim Steps: In the meantime they declare they will insure that in any arrangements into which any of them may enter with any part of Germany account will be taken of the provisions in this paper agreed by the parties in advance, except to the extent that these provisions may be modified by agreement such as may result from the continuing negotiations within the Committee of Foreign Ministers' Deputies.

3. Nuclear Diffusion

(a) General Principles: They believe that further diffusion of nuclear weapons into the control of any national government not now owning them would make more difficult the problem of maintaining lasting peace.

(b) Future Negotiations: They agree to seek in the above-mentioned Committee (or other appropriate forum) to develop policies regarding non-diffusion of nuclear weapons to which all states owning nuclear weapons might agree and to which states not now owning nuclear weapons might also subscribe.

(c) Interim Steps: In the meantime, as states now owning nuclear weapons, they declare they will not themselves relinquish control over any nuclear weapons to any individual state or regime not now owning such weapons; they will not transmit to such state or regime information, equipment, or material necessary for their manufacture; and they will urge states or regimes not now owning nuclear weapons to undertake not to try to obtain control of such weapons belonging to other states

or to

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

~~Classification~~

or to seek or receive information equipment, or material necessary for their manufacture.

4. Non-Aggression

(a) General Principles: They believe that force should not be used to change existing frontiers and demarcation lines in Europe or for any other aggressive purpose.

(b) Future Negotiations: With a view toward strengthening peace and security, they agree to seek in the above-mentioned Committee (or a Sub-committee thereof):

(i) to develop a suitable declaration which the NATO and Warsaw Pact Organizations might make to register their renunciation of the use of force for the settlement of international questions, and, specifically, the renunciation of the use of force to change existing boundaries and demarcation lines in Europe, and,

(ii) to consider measures to reduce the risk of war by accident or miscalculation.

(c) Interim Steps: In the meantime they declare they will not themselves use or support the use of force to change the external and internal borders of Germany including the existing borders of West Berlin, and they note with approval declarations by German authorities in the same sense.

5. Procedures

(a) The parties note with approval declarations by the competent German authorities, assuring their allies that they will act in conformity with the above provisions regarding access and other matters relevant to their functions and prerogatives.

(b) Once the proposed Committee of Foreign Ministers' Deputies has been established;

SECRET

~~Classification~~

~~SECRET~~

~~Classification~~

established: (i) the Foreign Ministers of the countries represented on it would meet periodically as seems useful to review its work; (ii) if and as warranted, the Heads of Government could meet to consummate concrete agreements reached by the Foreign Ministers and their Deputies in the proposed Committee.

END

RUSK

CONFIDENTIAL, OADR

TOP SECRET
NMA D-1/1
Annex I
April 26, 1962

18A

4/26/62

R

NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING
Athens, May 4-5, 1962

Position Paper

Berlin Contingency Planning

(To be raised only at Foreign initiative)

Anticipated Foreign Position

A number of NATO members have exhibited some anxiety that the Three Powers, or NATO itself, not take action in the Berlin problem without consultation with all members. This sentiment has been expressed particularly in NATO Council discussions of Tripartite-NATO relationships with respect to military operations related to Berlin. They have wished particularly to be assured there would be no automaticity in NATO involvement as a result of earlier tripartite military actions. NATO members or the Secretary General may raise the matter in these terms.

Recommended US Position

1. It is the intention of the Three Powers to advise and consult with the NATO Council, time permitting, prior to putting tripartite military plans into effect. In addition, the Three Powers consider that NATO forces should be put in an appropriate alert condition prior to tripartite operations, and this will presumably involve some degree of consultation (further definition of the manner and degree will be determined as the NATO Council continues its consideration of contingency planning).

2. NATO countries will not automatically become committed to implement NATO contingency plans for Berlin by actions of the Three since they have the opportunity to take governmental action when NATO plans are approved on a contingency basis and when they are actually executed.

CONFIDENTIAL, OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FPC/CDR

Date: 5/28/92

RELEASE
 EXCISE
 DENY
 DELETE Non-Responsive Info
FOIA Exemptions _____
PA Exemptions _____

DECLASSIFY
 DECLASSIFY IN PART

MR Cases Only:
EO Citations: _____

[Signature]

TS authority to:

CLASSIFY as S or C OADR
 DOWNGRADE TS to S or C OADR

NSA

CONFIDENTIAL, OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 3 -

In general, NATO has in our view been kept well informed on tripartite planning and activity regarding Berlin. General Norstad has summarized tripartite land and air planning for the Council and the latter was briefed throughout the air corridor crisis of February - March. The only major exception is naval planning, in which so far the inability of the Four Powers to reach agreement among themselves has prevented discussion with NATO.

Drafted by: BTF:EUR:GER - Mr. Day Mr. Freshman	Cleared by: EUR - Mr. Kohler GER - Mr. Hillenbrand EUR/RPM - Mr. Albright G/PM - Mr. Weiss OSD/ISA - Col. Maccham
S/S-S:JDavis:Rm 7241H, Ext. 4338	

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL, OADR

WIRING TELEGRAM

Department of State

4/27/62 169

Bush WH

W
Action
SS
Info

~~SECRET~~

Control: 18849
Rec'd: April 27 1962
4:50 pm

FROM: BONN
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 2578, APRIL 27, 7 PM

EYES ONLY

PRIORITY

EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY

DEPTEL 2941 AND PREVIOUS.

WHEN I SAW SCHROEDER THIS AFTERNOON, HE OPENED CONVERSATION BY REITERATING REGRET FOR RECENT LEAK AND UNFORTUNATE SUBSEQUENT PUBLICITY. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE REFERRED TO VARIOUS PRESS IMPLICATIONS THAT HE HAD AGREED TO US POSITION, THAT HE HAD NOT REPEAT NOT AGREED, AND THAT HE HAD AGREED BUT RENEGED, SAYING ALL THIS HAD MADE HIS POSITION IN BONN DIFFICULT. HE REMARKED THAT HE HELD TO POSITION PAPER WHICH HE GAVE YOU IN LAUSANNE, AND TO SUBSEQUENT ORAL COMMITMENTS WITH YOU, BUT POINTED OUT HE HAD NOT SEEN PAPER HANDED OVER TO SOVIETS IN GENEVA UNTIL AFTER IT HAD BEEN GIVEN THEM. (CARSTENS, WHO WAS ALSO PRESENT, REMARKED THAT HE HAD POSED OBJECTIONS TO THIS PAPER AS SOON AS IT WAS BROUGHT TO HIS ATTENTION UPON HIS RETURN TO FOREIGN OFFICE FROM LEAVE.)

SCHROEDER CONTINUED THAT HE WAS NOT UNMINDFUL OF DIFFICULTIES WHICH HAD BEEN CAUSED OUR SIDE ALSO, AND INDICATED PROBLEM NOW WAS TO REPAIR DAMAGES. HE SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO START BY APPROVING REVISED "PRINCIPLES PAPER", BUT THAT HE COULD NOT REPEAT NOT DO SO UNTIL HE HAD HAD CHANCE TO CONSULT ADENAUER. HE WOULD HAVE OPPORTUNITY AT CADENABBIA ON MONDAY FOR PEACEFUL AND THOROUGH REVIEW WITH THE CHANCELLOR, AND HE WOULD REPORT TO YOU AT ATHENS MEETING, TO WHICH HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD.

IN MEANTIME, HE WOULD GIVE ME HIS PRELIMINARY REACTIONS TO REVISED PAPER, BUT MUST EMPHASIZE TENTATIVE NATURE OF THOSE

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4
NLK-92-131
BY SF NARA DATE 7/9/93

EYES ONLY

POF/117/Ges Sec

169

~~SECRET~~

-2- 2578, APRIL 27, 7 PM; FROM BONN

OBSERVATIONS UNTIL HE HAD TIME FOR MORE DETAILED STUDY AND ALSO DISCUSSION WITH THE CHANCELLOR.

SCHROEDER SAID FIRST QUESTION WAS WHETHER IT WAS WISE TO PUT IN PAPER OF THIS NATURE, WHICH COULD BE REGARDED AS SOME ACCOMMODATION TO SOVIET VIEWS, AS THIS STAGE, OR PERHAPS WAIT A WHILE LONGER. (WITHOUT ACTUALLY SAYING SO, HE SEEMED TO IMPLY THAT HE WOULD DEFER TO YOUR JUDGEMENT ON THIS; HE SAID HE WAS MERELY RAISING QUESTION WHICH HE THOUGHT MUST BE FULLY WEIGHED.)

RE PAPER ITSELF, HE COULD SAY HE WAS IN AGREEMENT WITH GENERAL NATURE THEREOF, BUT THERE REMAINED SEVERAL POINTS ABOUT WHICH HE WAS NOT REPEAT NOT HAPPY. THERE HAD BEEN QUESTION IN GERMAN MINDS RE ABSENCE OF REFERENCE TO WESTERN PRESENCE IN BERLIN AND FEDREP BERLIN TIES, BUT HE ACCEPTED MY COMMENTS (DERIVED FROM DEPTTEL 2936), AND AGREED THAT THESE QUESTIONS COULD BE HANDLED BY UNILATERAL DECLARATIONS AT APPROPRIATE TIME, OR IN SOME OTHER MANNER. THERE WAS ALSO PROBLEM, HE SAID, FOR ENSURING THAT SOVIETS UNDERSTOOD PAPER WAS A PACKAGE AND HENCE "SECURITY" SUBJECTS, I.E., NON-AGGRESSION ARRANGEMENTS AND NUCLEAR DIFFUSION BAN, COULD NOT BE SEPARATED THEREFROM FOR ACCEPTANCE, WITH OTHER ARRANGEMENTS BEING REJECTED. HE SEEMED TO AGREE WITH MY VIEW, HOWEVER, THAT THIS OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE ACHIEVED IN NEGOTIATIONS RATHER THAN BY ATTEMPT TO INCLUDE FURTHER LANGUAGE IN PAPER.

RE DETAILS, HE STILL FELT REFERENCE TO FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT BETWEEN FEDREP AND SOVIET ZONE WAS NEEDED IN 2(B), SINCE INTERNATIONAL ACCESS AUTHORITY WOULD OF COURSE CONCERN ITSELF ONLY WITH FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT TO BERLIN. HE SAID FONOFF WOULD TRY TO COME UP WITH APPROPRIATE LANGUAGE. HE ALSO THOUGHT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO DROP ANY REFERENCE TO THIRD COMMISSION "TO CONSIDER A DRAFT ELECTORAL LAW OR OTHER STEPS TOWARDS GERMAN REUNIFICATION", SINCE "OR OTHER STEPS" WOULD OPEN UP VIOLENT DISCUSSION IN GERMAN DOMESTIC POLITICS, WITH ENSUING ALLEGATIONS OF REVERSAL IN POLICY OF INSISTING ON FREE ELECTIONS, QUITE ASIDE FROM QUESTION WHETHER SUCH LANGUAGE REPRESENTED MOVE TOWARDS SOVIET ZONE REGIME'S PROPOSAL FOR "GERMANS AT ONE TABLE". HE ADDED HE THOUGHT OTHER REFERENCES TO REUNIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 2578, APRIL 27, 7 PM; FROM BONN

WHICH NOW APPEAR IN PAPER WOULD BE BETTER WAY TO HANDLE THIS QUESTION, EVEN THOUGH IT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE TO STRENGTHEN LANGUAGE SOMEWHAT. I ARGUED AGAINST ANY CHANGE HERE, BUT WITHOUT SUCCESS.

SCHROEDER THEN MENTIONED 5(A), SAYING HE WOULD PROPOSE DROPPING "PREROGATIVES", SINCE THIS MIGHT BE CAPABLE OF DANGEROUS INTERPRETATION BY SOVIET ZONE REGIME. HE THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE ADEQUATE TO REFER MERELY TO "FUNCTIONS".

RE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTERS, HE THOUGHT PAPER SHOULD INDICATE MORE CLEARLY THAT GERMAN QUESTION WOULD BE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION.

FINALLY, SCHROEDER SAID, QUESTION AROSE AS TO WHETHER ASSIGNMENT TO DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTERS OF RANGE OF QUESTIONS SET OUT IN PAPER WOULD NOT, IN EFFECT, CONSTITUTE SETTING UP ON WESTERN SIDE THAT TRIPARTITE DIRECTORATE TO WHICH US AS WELL AS FEDREP HAD ALWAYS BEEN OPPOSED. IN ENSUING DISCUSSION, AND IN SPITE OF MY ARGUMENTS, HE REMAINED UNCONVINCED, BUT OFFERED NO ALTERNATIVES, SAYING ONLY HE WANTED TO THINK FURTHER ABOUT IT. (IN SUBSEQUENT BRIEF CONVERSATION WITH CARSTENS ON MY WAY OUT, AND IN RESPONSE MY QUERY, HE SAID IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO RESTRICT GENERAL ISSUES TO US AND SOVIET DEPUTIES, AND CALL IN FRENCH AND BRITISH ONLY FOR CONSIDERATION BERLIN AND GERMAN QUESTIONS, BUT QUICKLY ADDED THIS WAS ONLY A PERSONAL THOUGHT AND IT SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT REPORT IT.)

I GAINED IMPRESSION SCHROEDER WAS MOST ANXIOUS TO FIND AGREEMENT WITH YOU, BUT OBVIOUSLY NEEDS TO WEAN CHANCELLOR AWAY FROM FIRST UNFORTUNATE IMPRESSION WHICH ORIGINAL DRAFT PAPER MADE ON HIM, OWING LARGLY, I SURMISE, TO STRENUOUS OBJECTIONS RAISED BY BRENTANO AND KRONE.

IN CONCLUSION, SCHROEDER ASKED THAT I CONVEY HIS GREETING AND TELL YOU HOW MUCH HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO TALKS WITH YOU IN ATHENS. FOLLOWING TELECON WITH HILLENBRAND THIS AFTERNOON, I TELEPHONED CARSTENS TO INFORM SCHROEDER THAT NO REPEAT NO PAPER WOULD BE GIVEN DOBRYNIN AT NEXT MEETING AND TO SAY YOU ALSO WERE LOOKING FORWARD TO ATHENS TALKS. HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR INFORMATION.

DOWLING

JTC

~~SECRET~~

EUR:FDKohler/mt
(Drafting Office and Officers)

~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

4/27/62
E3

7² R

Memorandum of Conversation

EYES ONLY

DATE: April 27, 1962

SUBJECT: Germany and Berlin

Downgraded To: ~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL
EO 11652: XGDS (1) 2 (3) 4
Approved by: H. D. ...
August 4, 1983

PARTICIPANTS: Anatoli Dobrynin, Ambassador of the USSR
Georgi M. Kornienko, Counselor of Soviet Embassy

The Secretary
Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

COPIES TO:

S
H
M
G
S/S
FHR
BTF
S/P
S/B
INR/D
W.H.

REVIEWED BY: TRB DATE: 3/24/91
(X) RECLASSIFIED (X) DECLASSIFIED
() UNCLASSIFIED
() CONFIDENTIAL
() SECRET
FOR THE SECRETARY'S USE
To authority to:
() CLASSIFY AS _____, OADR.
() DOWNGRADE TO () S or () C, OADR

After some preliminary remarks which included references to the thickness of the dossiers accumulating on this question, to the Khrushchev interview with Look editor Cowles, and to the public exchange between Foreign Minister Gromyko in his Supreme Soviet speech and the Secretary in his press conference, the Secretary said that he had wanted to have a further talk with Ambassador Dobrynin prior to his departure for various alliance meetings. He said that he would be talking in London and Athens with the allied Foreign Ministers and wanted to see before this whether Mr. Dobrynin had any further pertinent information from Moscow. Mr. Dobrynin replied that Messrs. Khrushchev and Gromyko had stated the position of the Soviet Government but that if there was any special clarification he could give the Secretary, he was prepared to do so. The Secretary referred in particular to Gromyko's reference to the American statement that it saw no obstacles "to combining free access to West Berlin with the demand to respect GDR sovereignty." He said that this had required some clarification which he had given in his press conference yesterday. After the Ambassador had explained the text and the word "demand" in the sense of a proposal the Secretary accepted that this was probably not a point for present dispute.

The Secretary then said he thought the question arose as to how these matters might best be discussed and he would make some preliminary comment on this subject. He reviewed the vital interests of the West in the Berlin situation: the presence of our forces and of access to West Berlin and the freedom of West Berlin to have whatever arrangements with others which were

important

CATEGORY "A"

Sensitive Designator

Removed AUG 17 1972

(S/S)

FILE RS/R

~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
EYES ONLY

62.00 / 4-1-1962

EYES ONLY

SECRET

- 2 -

important to its continued free life and viability. These were the more immediate questions and then there were broader ones. He referred to Gromyko's comment on the fact that there is some interdependence between progress on disarmament and progress on Berlin. In this connection he wanted Mr. Dobrynin to know that the United States was very serious in its approach to the disarmament question; this was equally true as regards nuclear testing and the United States would be happy to sign a satisfactory agreement on this subject, for example, this afternoon. Other broader questions about which he had talked with Mr. Gromyko in Geneva included the questions of diffusion of nuclear weapons, of boundaries and of nonaggression. The American side had repeatedly said that if the question of the vital interests could be disposed of, we considered that the others would easily fall into place. He observed, however, that Mr. Gromyko had repeated a demand for an end to the Occupation as an essential condition and if this were so, then Mr. Gromyko's reference to obstacles in the way of an agreement was an understatement. On the question of access, both sides had put up proposals for an International Access Authority. Perhaps some progress could be made if these were discussed on the basis of the essential needs on both sides. He pointed out that the United States had tried to take into account the fact that the USSR had put forward over several years public positions with respect to Germany and Berlin. He pointed out that the United States had also made proposals. It was clear that these proposals on both sides were unacceptable and he had discussed with Mr. Gromyko in Geneva the question of how we manage a state of disagreement. This was why the United States had put forward its working paper on "Draft Principles" which had deliberately omitted certain points of interest to both sides but provided a means for continuing to try to talk out these disagreed matters. The Secretary said frankly he did not see how we could be expected to go much further without knowing where we stand on the central issues. As he had told Mr. Gromyko, the matter of diffusion of nuclear weapons was a US national policy which we applied even to our own allies, with the single exception of the UK which had been an original partner with us in atomic development. In general, therefore, we found ourselves in a situation where the broader range of questions was subject to some movement and improvement. This brought us down to essential elements which were really, in the case of Berlin, the matter of our presence there and, in the case of disarmament, the question of verification. These were the keys which would unlock a whole series of possibilities. For the moment he would leave aside the disarmament aspect. He could, of course, repeat all that we had said in many conversations about our presence in West Berlin, but the Ambassador already knew our position. After the Ambassador confirmed that he did, the Secretary commented that since Mr. Dobrynin was a new participant in these talks perhaps he could bring some fresh air into them. Laughing, Mr. Dobrynin observed that he had his instructions. He then went on to say

that

CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET

that he understood the Secretary was not directly linking the problems of Berlin and of disarmament. The Secretary confirmed this was the case and Dobrynin said that similarly the USSR was not linking the two. He said he thought the relationship between them had been made very clear in Mr. Khrushchev's statement. The Secretary agreed that this was essentially our own interpretation.

Turning to the German question, the Ambassador said that he really had nothing new. He could of course go into detail on all the Soviet positions but these were already quite familiar to the Secretary. However, he would emphasize that his instructions made clear that there was no change in the Soviet position on the question of West Berlin, the status of the city and access to it. He then quoted the statement in Mr. Khrushchev's interview and Mr. Gromyko's speech that the Soviet Union could not accept an agreement continuing the Occupation status in West Berlin and the presence of Western troops there. This was indeed the main question. He did not know whether this was a light or a serious obstacle. However he stressed again that his instructions were very clear.

The Secretary replied that he might clarify the position. He referred to his remark to Mr. Gromyko that the Germans had once made us Allies and that he hoped that they might not now make us enemies. After Mr. Dobrynin had interjected agreement, the Secretary asked rhetorically: what does this mean? He then answered that if the Russians said they cannot forget 50 years of history, this we could understand. We have shared in that 50 years of history. However, the Secretary thought that Moscow had not sufficiently weighed and appreciated what it means to have the Federal Republic integrated into Western Europe, a Western Europe very closely linked with the United States. In broad historical terms, after 500 years the time had come when the possibility of intra-European wars was gone. This was a matter of uncommon interest to the security of the USSR. No longer would there be in Western Europe the intrigue, the rivalries, and the conflicts which had set off the two world wars. Also, the Secretary continued, there was a great element of stability when 15 nations were associated as we are in the Atlantic Alliance. The possibility that 15 partners could generate aggressive appetites and that any one of them could dominate them is simply nonexistent. If he were a political scientist, he would point to the "political inertia" which such arrangements involve. The Secretary said he thought it was also important that the Soviets understand that we really believe that the presence of the US in West Berlin is in itself a stabilizing factor so long as the Germans remain divided. Until the German problem as a whole is resolved, the reuniting of the country remains unfinished business from the point of view of German nationalism. Unless this situation is handled very carefully it holds great dangers for both sides. He said when the Soviets

*outs, pretend
him*

*was good
on USSR*

*to be to
keep her
in line*

CONFIDENTIAL used

CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

used the term revanchists they apparently mean anyone who seeks German reunification. However, in the sense of the possibility of German nationalism moving off by itself, this is a matter about which we are also concerned. We are also sincerely convinced that the general attitude of Western Europe as a whole is that of a genuine desire to move toward more normal relations with Eastern Europe and particularly with the USSR. President Kennedy had spoken to Chairman Khrushchev on this in Vienna and he was sure that the Soviets themselves had direct evidence of this from such Western statesmen as Spaak and Fanfani who had visited them. The Secretary suggested that Moscow should think in terms of the state interest of the Russian people and not let such questions as Berlin get caught up in ideological warfare. Both the US and the USSR had a mutual interest in normalizing the situation and in getting on to the great tasks of which Chairman Khrushchev had spoken. We genuinely do not believe Gromyko's statement that the absence of a peace treaty creates "a serious danger of conflict" between us in Central Europe. Until there is a long-term settlement of the German problem--and he recognized that this might take a long time--he saw no reason why there should be such danger unless the Soviets were determined to get us out of West Berlin. If this were the case, then he would agree that the situation was indeed dangerous.

Ambassador Dobrynin replied that he appreciated the Secretary's comments on the last 50 years. He would be inclined to agree that it was difficult to see Western Europe initiating a war. However, he would point out that at the end of World War II there was really a different world-power situation. Formerly, there were various power centers in Western Europe but since World War II, there are only two great powers. It is not a matter of conflict between the French and the UK, for example. Consequently, he would agree with this formulation. What he could not agree with was the Secretary's suggestion that the situation within Europe was not the number one problem. On the question of Western troops in West Berlin, this was something which the Soviet Union could not accept and he spoke with deep conviction as a Russian. At present the relations between the US and the USSR are "very bad"--or he would correct himself to say at least not as normal as the Soviets would wish. In present circumstances the confrontation of our troops involves dangerous possibilities of clashes. If, for example, Western troops should leave West Berlin, then there would just be a USSR and an East Germany and a West Germany. As the situation stands at present, two little boys getting into a conflict involves two big boys. He did not understand why we considered our presence in West Berlin so important. It would be impossible to explain convincingly to an ordinary Russian why US troops must be in West Berlin. It was an open secret that the troops of the Allies had come to Germany as Allies and conquerors. However, US troops had remained there against Soviet interests and in opposition to the Soviet Union. He did not understand how continued presence of our troops in West Berlin could be a vital interest to us. As long as they remained, there would be incidents and statements

and ups

~~SECRET~~

*Unbelievable
Christman! DM
so we had
any long words!*

EYES ONLY

SECRET

- 5 -

and ups and downs in the situation. Except for this problem, there was nothing that divided us in our relations except the general problems of disarmament and, perhaps, outer space.

The Secretary replied that it was true that the US and USSR had almost no strictly bilateral problems, other than such things as a Lend-Lease settlement and some aspects of trade. The problems between us all arise out of what might happen to someone else. If all the members of the UN really felt secure, there would be no problems and there would be nothing for us to fight about. If we could move forward to such stabilization gradually, then the relationship between the US and the USSR would become increasingly normal. The Secretary stressed that he could not agree that direct contact of the troops of responsible governments contributed to the dangers of the situation. He was not sure that a "no-man's land" between us would as yet be safe for either side. It was better to have Soviet and American troops confronting each other, rather than East and West Berlin Police.

Ambassador Dobrynin cited the situation in Korea as an analogy and expressed the opinion that this was a small problem. The Secretary replied that we had broken contact in Korea, and this had led to war. Dobrynin indicated he did not agree with this remark. He said the Soviets sincerely believe that the situation in Germany, after so many years, cannot remain unchanged. West Berlin is a permanent irritation, a point where clashes may happen at any time. The United States seems to want to wait. If someone were ill, he did not think that a prolongation of the illness helped toward a cure. The Secretary asked whether the Ambassador was recommending suicide as a cure. The Ambassador replied that we should agree to surgical operation. The Secretary recommended that if it is a real German settlement which is in question, then we are prepared to talk about this. The lack of a real German settlement seemed as abnormal to us as the situation in West Berlin to the Soviets.

The Ambassador then said that if the United States had really wanted a united Germany, it could have had this earlier on a neutral basis. Many people in Washington had understood this but the U.S. Government had always sought a unified Germany united with the West against the USSR. No Soviet Government could remain in power if it accepted a reunified Germany which was thus united with the West against the Soviet Union. Now it would be more difficult to arrange a neutral Germany since it was doubtful whether the East and West Germans themselves would accept. However, this was in the past and the US had ended the possibilities then existing by the creation of "Bizonia". The Secretary recalled that events at that time in Germany were taking place in the light of what was happening in Eastern Europe in violation of agreements. When the Soviets say that the time has come, after seventeen years, to draw a line under World War II, this apparently means that they want to get us out of West Berlin while they do not get out of

East Berlin

CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
EYES ONLY

Analysis
but no
point to this
re condition of
things

1952-54
not read
UP admits
prop
on an
this
should say
to both
gov. how
As
example
I saw it
part
out
both
part
out
or
part
right
over
express
-
14

about
good
say
As
east
of
to us
not
not
not
not
not
not

EYES ONLY

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

*Just the boys for Mrs - a
same guarantee of it or legal
feeling - is some continuation
of the OC. regime.
is a rehearsal
from what he said
p5*

East Berlin and East Germany. Ambassador Dobrynin commented that it would be better for the US to be in West Germany and the Soviets in East Germany. The Soviets recognize both states but the US was unwilling to accept the GDR. The US would never convince the Russians that what the US was doing in West Germany was not the same thing the USSR was doing in East Germany. The GDR is a separate State and has the right to enjoy the prerogatives of sovereignty. The Secretary replied that the Soviet attempt to create what they called a sovereign State in East Germany was subject to our presence in West Berlin and our access thereto. The Soviets do not have the ability to create such a State because there is this defect in their title. Having said that, he repeated what he had said to Mr. Gromyko in Geneva: that we accept that the situation in East Germany is not going to change and that we are not going to interfere.

Ambassador Dobrynin said that the US, however, was coming to the Soviets and asking them to subscribe to the continued presence of its forces and the Occupation in West Berlin. The Secretary replied that we were not asking the Soviets for anything in this respect. We had the impression, however, that the Soviets were not reciprocating our attitude in not challenging the Soviet control in East Germany and in East Berlin. We had not pressed them for recognition of our rights in East Germany and East Berlin. The Ambassador repeated that the Soviets recognize both the Federal Republic and the GDR while the United States refused to accept the GDR. He did not understand why the United States could not accept the existence of the GDR and its sovereign right to have normal exercise of its prerogatives as respects such things as transit. The Secretary replied that this was easy for the Soviets because they wished to make permanent the division of Germany. He said he would now reciprocate Gromyko's advice to him that the Soviet proposals would be good for the US. We do not believe it is good for the Soviet Union or for anyone for the Germans to be divided. Even if the practical situation must continue for the time being, we believe it is important not to foreclose the question of reunification. Even Moscow has seemed to recognize this as a problem in its occasional statements about reunification being a matter for the Germans themselves. Mr. Dobrynin said he did not like to portray this as a black and white situation with the US for and the USSR against German reunification. However, the question now was when that could be. At present, the West Germans refuse even to talk with the East Germans. Moreover, he could assure the Secretary that the Western statesmen who had come to Moscow were not in favor of any early reunification. He could see no practical way to approach this question; besides, there was the question of what kind of united Germany. Even if by some miracle the two of us should decide that Germany should be reunified within six months, he was not so sure that a way could be found. The Germans are stubborn and there are two German States. The Secretary said that if we now say that we do not see how reunification can be accomplished, this is because the Soviets refuse to leave the matter to the German people. At the same time we

recognized

SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECRET

recognized that this was not a matter over which either side wanted to go to war. However, he would point out that the situation as respects Berlin was the same as that involved in all of Germany. Ambassador Dobrynin disagreed with this, saying that we could not decide about all Germany, but that we could decide about Berlin. The Secretary interjected that we could decide nothing without our Allies. After acknowledging this interjection, Dobrynin continued that the Federal Government has nothing to do with West Berlin. The Soviets accepted that West Berlin was under Allied sovereignty. The Secretary commented that Dobrynin seemed to be saying that since the Three Powers had the authority, they could agree to give Berlin up. The answer to this question was positively, "no."

Ambassador Dobrynin commented that the Soviets were not necessarily against reunification but that no one could put forward a realistic plan which would be acceptable to both sides. As to West Berlin, he reiterated that this was a separate city. The Secretary admitted that it was unlikely that Chancellor Adenauer and Herr Ulbricht would agree at this stage. Then observing the time, he said that he had to go to the airport to meet Prime Minister Macmillan. He said that unless the Soviet Government had other ideas we must consider how we were going to talk about this matter which had its complications and could not be considered all at once. We had gone quite far to indicate that we considered agreement possible on some points, but we felt that no headway could be made on these unless we could come to grips with the central issues of presence and access. He therefore proposed that we discuss these matters further after his return. We could also consider the "Principles" paper. In this connection, however, he pointed out that the Soviet paper was quite different in kind since the Soviet paper put forward Soviet proposals on controversial points. Ours on the other hand was designed to show how we could handle a situation of disagreement. It was important for its omissions, such as our omission of any confirmation of the occupation. After his return, he hoped we could discuss our paper further. The Ambassador indicated agreement but referred to "the papers exchanged at Geneva". However, he wanted to point out that he could foresee no change within the next ten days in the Soviet position as regards the presence of Western troops. The Secretary replied that he did not foresee any change in our basic positions either.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECRET

EYES ONLY

4/27/62
 State Hall - for tomorrow's
 MRAM. 2625
 K99

~~DEPARTMENT OF STATE~~

Retain class'n Change/classify to _____

With concurrence of _____

Declassify In part and excise as shown

EO 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a) (1)

FPC/HDR by act 4/18/95 April 27, 1962

~~STATE DEPARTMENT SYSTEMATIC REVIEW~~

Retain class'n Change/classify to _____

Declassify with concurrence of _____

EO 12958, 25X _____

FPC/HDR by _____ Date: _____

R

Mac - Withdrawal No. _____

1. Here is the memo, which I mentioned to you last night, on how Secretary McNamara's paper on missile X might be handled at Athens.

Stikker would buy this tactic, since he does not want a big MRBM discussion at Athens, but he would probably also buy doing what McNamara wants (distributing the missile X paper at Athens as an Appendix to McNamara's speech), since Stikker naturally does not share our concern over either (i) avoiding the appearance of a US Athens "initiative", or (ii) not now committing ourselves to missile X.

Incidentally, Harry Rowen tells me estimates of the development cost of missile X have risen 75%. Since the original development cost was \$500 million, this presumably means a new cost of \$875 million for development alone. Here's a chance to save the President some money; I gather Carl Kaysen is working on this.

2. I also enclose a copy of McNamara's Athens paper on missile X. You will note:

- (a) It speaks of ship and roadmobile and mentions the greater accuracy of land deployment. ~~The~~ Presidentially approved policy provides for only sea-based deployment. ^{1.3(a)} (1)
- (b) It suggests 200-400 missiles; ~~The~~ Presidentially approved policy calls for only 200. ^{1.3(a)} (1)

The pencil marks are changes I've suggested to Harry Rowen; he doesn't know if he can sell them.

Henry Rowen
 DEPT OF STATE APPEALS REVIEW PANEL (ARP)

EOIA/PA	Mandatory Review	JFK LIBRARY MANDATORY REVIEW CASE # NLK-94-37 DOCUMENT # 29
() Release	() Declassify	
() Excise	() Declassify in Part	
() Deny	() Class. Rpt/Renew	

Mr. Bundy Exemptions _____

ARP Action Cert. _____ Date 2/5/99

to Bundy NSR/...

2/6

no hostility to us position down the line

ACTION COPY

COMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

PERMANENT RECORD COPY

859 4/28/62

33-31
Action

21

UNCLASSIFIED

Control: 19369
Rec'd

April 28, 1962
1:40 pm

JUN - 7 1962

FEC

Down 2583

BTF
Info

FROM: BONN

TO: Secretary of State

SS
SR
G
SP
L
SB
EUR
NEA

NO: 2583, APRIL 28

FOLLOWING IS SUBSTANCE OF DPA ACCOUNT OF INTERVIEW WITH BRENTANO APRIL 27 SHORTLY BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR WASHINGTON FOR CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT KENNEDY APRIL 30.

BRENTANO HOPED TO HAVE FRANK TALK WITH PRESIDENT ON BERLIN AND GERMAN QUESTION. HE SAID COOPERATION WITH USA REMAINS ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF FRG POLICY. AT SAME TIME HE WANTED TO NOTE THAT COOPERATION PRE-SUPPOSED FRANK DISCUSSION. IT WAS FOOLISHNESS TO SAY HE DISTRUSTED US POLICY. HE ALWAYS HAS SAID FRG MUST STAND WITH US. THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE.

HE HAD NO GOVERNMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS OR SPECIAL MISSION IN WASHINGTON HOWEVER, IDEA THAT HE SHOULD TALK WITH PRESIDENT HAD FULL GOVERNMENTAL APPROVAL, PARTICULARLY OF CHANCELLOR WHO CONSIDERED IT URGENTLY NECESSARY.

HE THOUGHT IT DESIRABLE BUNDESTAG DEBATE BERLIN AND GERMAN POLICY PUBLIC HAS RIGHT TO KNOW WHERE PARTIES STAND ON MATTERS CONCERNING WHICH DIFFICULT DECISIONS HAVE SOON TO BE MADE. THIS DID NOT MEAN BUNDESTAG SHOULD MAKE FOREIGN POLICY. BUT BUNDESTAG WOULD NOT FULFILL ITS RESPONSIBILITY IF IT DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN DEALING WITH MATTERS AFFECTING FUTURE OF GERMANY AND WESTERN WORLD. ACCORDING TO BRENTANO'S INFORMATION AMERICANS HAD NOT FINAL POSITION FOR TALKS ON BERLIN. STILL OPPORTUNITY FOR DISCUSSION AMONG ALLIES AT ATHENS NATO MEETING.

BRENTANO SAID TIME HAD PASSED WHEN ONE COULD HOLD HIM RESPONSIBLE FOR ALLEGED LEAKS. HE THOUGHT IT UNFORTUNATE THAT EXTENSIVE AND PARTLY BADLY INFORMED DISCUSSION OVER CERTAIN US IDEAS HAS TAKEN PLACE. BUT ONCE PROBLEMS HAD BEEN OPENLY RAISED, THEY COULD NOT

611622A
4-28-62
33-31

- () RELEASE
- () EXISE
- () DENY
- () DECLASSIFY
- () DECLASSIFY in PART
- () DELETE
- () NON-RESPONSIVE INFO.

- () DEPARTMENT OF STATE / CDC/MR
- () NSC
- () INR
- () CIA
- () NSA
- () OSD
- () ARMY
- () NAVY
- () AIR
- () RMR

This copy must be returned to RM/RM/... REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS UNCLASSIFIED

ACTION ASSIGNED TO:	ACTION TAKEN:	DATE OF ACTION:	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R:
EUR	Noted	30 Apr	File
NAME OF OFFICER:	OFFICE SYMBOL:		
GER-75			

UNCLASSIFIED

-2- 2583, APRIL 28; FROM BONN

BE AVOIDED. BRENTANO OUTLINED OWN POSITION AS FOLLOWS:

CDU/CSU HAD ALWAYS FAVORED EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS. FRG AGREED THAT US IN CONJUNCTION WITH ALLIES SHOULD CONDUCT TALKS WITH SOVIETS. AT EVERY PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS FRG MUST POINT OUT THAT CERTAIN GOALS OF COMMON POLICY MUST NOT BE AFFECTED. THUS, A MODUS VIVENDI FOR BERLIN MUST NOT BE OPEN TO INTERPRETATIONS GERMAN QUESTION HAD BEEN FORGOTTEN.

BRENTANO GAVE FIVE POINTS:

1. THERE MUST BE NO POLITICAL DECISION ON BERLIN WHICH UPGRADES GDR AND MEETS SOVIET THESIS OF TWO GERMAN STATES.

2. BERLIN IS PART OF FREE GERMANY AND NOT A SEPARATE POLITICAL ENTITY. IT MUST BE VIABLE, HAVE MILITARY PROTECTION OF ALLIES AND BE ECONOMICALLY AND POLITICALLY CONNECTED WITH FRG.

3. PLAN TO HAVE COMMISSIONS FOR CONTACTS BETWEEN FRG AND GDR HAS LITTLE TO DO WITH BERLIN QUESTION. INCORRECT THAT GENEVA PEACE PLAN OF 1959 ALREADY APPROVED SUCH COMMISSIONS. AT GENEVA FORMATION SUCH COMMISSIONS LINKED WITH DEFINITE STEPS TOWARDS REUNIFICATION.

4. ATOMIC ARMAMENT OF NATO UNITS AND THE IDEA OF EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEMS HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH BERLIN SOLUTION. THEY COULD ONLY BE CONSIDERED IN CONNECTION WITH SOLUTION OF GERMAN QUESTION.

5. FRG HAD CLEARLY STATED IT WOULD NOT RESORT TO FORCE TO ACHIEVE REUNIFICATION. RECOGNITION OF SO-CALLED DEMARCATION LINES BEYOND PREVIOUS STATEMENTS WOULD BE SUPERFLUOUS.

DOWLING

JTC

UNCLASSIFIED

SANITIZED COPY



4/27/62
Start a folder for tomorrow's
MRBM. 262-
RP 29
✓ breakfast

April 27, 1962

Mac -

1. Here is the memo, which I mentioned to you last night, on how Secretary McNamara's paper on missile X might be handled at Athens.

Stikker would buy this tactic, since he does not want a big MRBM discussion at Athens, but he would probably also buy doing what McNamara wants (distributing the missile X paper at Athens as an Appendix to McNamara's speech), since Stikker naturally does not share our concern over either (i) avoiding the appearance of a US Athens "initiative", or (ii) not now committing ourselves to missile X.

Incidentally, Harry Rowen tells me estimates of the development cost of missile X have risen 75%. Since the original development cost was \$500 million, this presumably means a new cost of \$875 million for development alone. Here's a chance to save the President some money; I gather Carl Kaysen is working on this.

2. I also enclose a copy of McNamara's Athens paper on missile X. You will note:

(a) It speaks of ship and roadmobile and mentions the greater accuracy of land deployment.

(b) It suggests 200-400 missiles;

The pencil marks are changes I've suggested & Harry Rowen; he doesn't know if he can sell them.
Henry Owen

Mr. Bundy

SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLK-94-37
By (NMK) NARA, Date

nd but
5-20-62
RP
30

~~SECRET~~

EXCERPT FROM STATEMENT ON NATO NUCLEAR ISSUES
BY SECRETARY McNAMARA, WASHINGTON, MAY 1954

Multilateral NATO Force. The measures which I have discussed should go far toward meeting our Allies' concerns in the nuclear field. If our Allies desire, however, we are prepared to go further. As the President said at Ottawa, if our Allies wish to add NATO's to programmed Alliance forces and to participate in their deployment, we would be prepared to join in the creation of a sea-based NATO force which would be under fully multilateral ownership, control, financing and manning. As Secretary McNamara and I indicated at Paris, the U.S. would be prepared to facilitate procurement of NATO's for an Allied NATO force only if it was fully multilateral. We are not urging NATO's, in view of the great strength of programmed Alliance forces. I would also add that what we do in this field must go hand in hand with steps which must be taken to strengthen NATO's conventional forces, thus providing the Alliance with a better-balanced and hence more effective deterrent. If our Allies attach urgency to this matter we would be prepared to participate in serious and detailed consideration of this question in the Permanent Council as soon as possible after this meeting, and would outline our latest thinking about political, military, and technical aspects of the issue at that time.

Excerpt from Rusk's Acheson Statement

NBF/216 (MLP, Gen, 1161-610)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12358, Sec 3.4
NLK-94-37
MINK MAPA Dec 7/24/95

~~SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

Downgraded To: SECRET ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
EO 11652: XGDS (1) 2 (3) 4

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Authorized By: H. D. Browster
August 4, 1975 HDM

White House Briefing For Joint Committee On
Atomic Energy, May 1, 1962, Executive Office Building.

Present: Chairman Holifield and senior members of JCAE; Mr. McGeorge Bundy; AEC Commissioners Seaborg and Graham; Deputy Secretary Gilpatric; Deputy Under Secretary Johnson; staff members from State, Defense and AEC.

This briefing was held pursuant to a conversation the President had recently with Chairman Holifield to inform the Joint Committee about the recent Presidential decision to resume the dispersal of nuclear weapons to non-US NATO forces.

Mr. Gilpatric opened the briefing by reviewing the history of the nuclear build-up in NATO. He noted that three classes of nuclear delivery systems have been deployed in Europe: air strike; battle field; and air defense. Until last year about 500 nuclear warheads had been deployed to Europe divided roughly between the air strike and battle field categories. Since January 20, 1961, there has been no further substantial dispersal of nuclear warheads to Europe. During the time that the dispersal was held in abeyance, intensive studies on the custody, control and protection of nuclear weapons have been made. By early 1962 the Defense Department decided in the light of the studies that had been made and ^{of the fact that} the measures for improving the protection of nuclear weapons had been instituted, that it would be desirable to make good our commitments to NATO and resume dispersal of nuclear warheads for those systems which were in place. Early in April DOD, with the concurrence of State and the qualified agreement of AEC, proposed to the President that he authorize the dispersal of 1,000 additional warheads in all three categories of weapons. Under the proposed dispersal plan warheads in the following categories would be dispersed: 125 for air strike, 420 for battle field, and 480 for air defense. Thus by July 1 of this year roughly 1580 warheads will be positioned for non-US NATO forces.

740-5611 / 5-162

Mr. Gilpatric noted the limitations that the President had placed on dispersal.

- (1) In the case of 2-stage weapons only those with lower yields would be dispersed.
- (2) All dispersals would be subject to review in the light of future decisions on NATO strategy.

Both Mr. Bundy and Mr. Gilpatric indicated that they agreed with the long-standing contention of the Committee that by selling NATO countries particular delivery systems the US had established a strong commitment to furnish the necessary warheads for those systems. Mr. Gilpatric conceded that this was "putting the cart before the horse", but he said that we

XLR 740.5

~~SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

have made

~~SECRET~~
TOP SECRET

-2-

have made commitments which we must go through with. He indicated clearly that before we enter into future commitments on delivery systems we will go through the entire procedure of making the necessary determinations first. At this point Mr. Holifield asked whether the decision on dispersal was primarily military or diplomatic. Mr. Gilpatric explained that the reasons for resumption are both political and military. The military Commanders involved (General Norstad) contended that they needed to have the capability within their own NATO forces to cover Soviet targets with air strike weapons, although the US is now targetting with external forces about 90% of the Soviet targets. We do not see that it is possible to stop short of arming all NATO units which are now in place since the Soviet forces facing them possess nuclear weapons. Mr. Gilpatric continued by noting the third condition placed on dispersal, namely, that the President has directed that top priority be given to installing permissive links in the Jupiter and subsequently in other weapons systems. Mr. Holifield inquired about the technical difficulties involved in installing permissive links. Mr. Seaborg stated that it will be necessary to assign priorities to this work. It would be possible to start with the Jupiter later this summer and complete installation by the end of the year or by next fall. Thereafter installation could be made on air strike weapons, the Sergeants and the Pershings. In reply to a question by Mr. Holifield, Mr. Gilpatric stated that permissive links will not be installed before this dispersal goes forward. A further condition that had been imposed on dispersal was that there will be no dispersal at this time of nuclear weapons for Turkish strike aircraft.

Summing up, Mr. Gilpatric said that the net effect of the defense recommendations would be to avoid damage to the alliance and degradation of its military capabilities. He stressed that the proposed dispersals were not of a character which would create further commitments. As to the future (he mentioned specifically weapons for the F-104 G's) we intend to deal with these on a case by case basis.

Mr. Holifield asked whether the administration was retreating from its intention to stress the conventional build-up. Mr. Gilpatric answered by saying that we are pushing hard to bring convention up to MC-70 levels and ultimately to MC 26/4 levels. Mr. Holifield asked whether that was a quid pro quo for this dispersal, that is, whether we would demand from the Europeans a larger conventional build-up. Mr. Gilpatric stated that we can not expect a quid pro quo for this dispersal. He cited the fact that General Norstad has already noted a 25% improvement over last May in conventional forces. In this connection he noted improvements in both the French and German forces and reiterated that both State and Defense are making a strong pitch to our allies to do more. He underscored the fact that our allies are facing the same threat as are we. If they are assigned the same military missions in NATO as our forces we can not deny them comparable weapons. For example, we can not ask the Germans to build up to 12 divisions and take over a large segment of the line without furnishing them with the same weapons as our allies holding positions on the same front.

~~SECRET~~
TOP SECRET

Mr. Johnson

Mr. Johnson strongly supported Mr. Gilpatric stating that we must avoid charges of bad faith. Having given the Europeans these systems we must furnish them with appropriate warheads. Senator Hickenlooper inquired whether there was a greater military necessity for this dispersal. Mr. Gilpatric said yes.

Senator Pastore wondered whether this was not at bottom a German problem. Mr. Johnson indicated that it was really a NATO-wide problem. At this point Senator Jackson asked whether this dispersal would not really amount to a proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities. He thought that by making these dispersals we would be hurting our chances of agreement with the Soviet Union on proliferation of nuclear weapons to their satellite and ultimately to communist China. He questioned the military basis for dispersal and asked why is it necessary to provide a nuclear capability to allied strike aircraft. He thought it would be desirable to distinguish between battle field type weapons and those for strike weapons. Mr. Gilpatric explained that we are really stuck with our commitments, and noted that the US had encouraged the Europeans to undertake common production of the F-104 G. Senator Jackson continued that he thought that the Europeans would use the dispersal as an excuse for not building up their conventional forces. Mr. Bundy explained that not to resume dispersal would actually be a reversal of our position on conventional weapons; if we were to renege on these commitments the Europeans might well say that we did not defend Europe. Senator Jackson responded by saying that he thought this was not dispersal but rather proliferation. He conceded that we are stuck with supplying warheads for surface to surface delivery systems, but wondered why we could not ask the Europeans to accept a conventional capability by strike aircraft, keeping nuclear weapons for our own strike aircraft. Mr. Gilpatric said that we can not ask the Europeans to accept a conventional capability for the F 104s and Mr. Bundy stressed that to do so would hurt NATO. He asserted that no senior NATO military officer believed that the 104s should have a conventional capability. Mr. Hollifield remarked that most NATO nations have not met their conventional requirements and expressed concern that we are getting no quid pro quo for dispersal. Mr. Bundy made the point that we must try to hold NATO in a single nuclear position or risk seeing it disintegrate into a series of national nuclear capabilities.

Mr. Gilpatric noted the final condition attached to dispersal of nuclear weapons, namely, that no 2-stage weapons would be placed on US or allied aircraft on quick reaction alert. Mr. Hollifield said that he could not accept the idea of parity of nuclear weapons systems in NATO. The Europeans have not, he said, fulfilled their conventional requirements. This dispersal will, in his opinion, prejudice the chances of the Europeans build-up their forces. Mr. Bundy indicated that the US is trying to turn the attention of the alliance to the fact that US external forces are adequate to provide cover of strategic targets of interest to the alliance but he sought to make the point that within NATO it was desirable for forces having the same missions to have the same kinds of weapons. He conceded, however, that the principle of parity is not an absolute one.

There then

SECRET
TOP SECRET

-4-

There then followed discussion of the fact that the prohibition against putting 2-stage weapons on alert aircraft applied to US as well as non-US forces. The Committee indicated that it would not think it was a good idea to apply this restriction to US aircraft as well. In this connection, Mr. Gilpatric observed that studies are being made of the role of strike aircraft. Senator Jackson reiterated his concern about the effect of dispersal of weapons for strike aircraft on the US diplomatic posture. Mr. Bundy said that our intelligence has indicated that the Soviets know that we have dispersed nuclear weapons to non-US forces and that the Soviets accept US custody as a fact. Mr. Conway of the JCAE staff asked whether we proposed to make public our custody concept with respect to quick reaction alert aircraft. It was indicated that we have done so at least in general terms, but that more specific publicity would be quite undesirable at least until by means of the permissive link we have made US custody more effective.

The remainder of the briefing was concerned with reporting to the Committee our intention to announce at Athens that we would commit Polaris submarines. This elicited a favorable reaction from the committee. Mr. Gilpatric also noted our intention to give our allies more nuclear information in particular through Mr. McNamara's proposed statement at Athens and to give the Europeans a better idea of the planning factors in our program. Finally, Mr. Bundy outlined for Mr. Holifield the line we intend to take with the Europeans on a MRBM multilateral forces stressing that we would not make any commitment on such a force at the Athens meeting. Mr. Holifield asked whether subsequently the Committee would be faced with the same kind of situation they were in today with regard to dispersals, namely of being faced with commitments which they did not like but would feel impelled to honor. Mr. Bundy said that it was being made clear in discussions that the US could not take certain actions without legislation; the Committee might be faced with a problem a year from now, but not with a commitment. The NATO discussions might end up with satisfaction with the present nuclear program; it might lead to broad endorsement of a multilateral MRBM force under custody and control arrangements along present lines; or it might lead to a strong push by our allies for a completely integrated force without US custody or veto. In that last case, we would have to weigh with the Congress whether such a force was an acceptable alternative to the dangers of a number of national nuclear forces in Europe.

The Committee did not press the discussion of the MRBM force further, nor did it ask that the dispersal program be held up. There appeared to be a consensus that the briefing had been a useful one.

Ans
EUR:RPM:AGJames:jn
5/4/62

SECRET
TOP SECRET

06 D 124
Box 169
S/S

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Bureau of Intelligence and Research

5/3/62
BERLIN (187E)

(F17)

12

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

EXCISE

Research Memorandum
RSB-3.32, May 3, 1962

A
b1 a3
bias

ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT SOVIET INTENTIONS IN THE BERLIN CRISIS:
APRIL 19 - MAY 2, 1962

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

Negotiations. Secretary Rusk met with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin twice during the week prior to his (Rusk's) departure from Washington for the NATO Ministers' gathering in Athens, but on neither occasion (April 23 and 27) were any new substantive elements introduced into the Berlin discussions. It was, however, agreed that the current series of US-Soviet exchanges would continue in Washington rather than in Moscow.

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's report to the Supreme Soviet April 24 contained the first detailed public discussion of the Berlin talks by a Soviet source for some time, and his presentation suggested the possible emergence of several variants to the Soviet position. Although adhering in general to familiar Soviet proposals, Gromyko proved to be equivocal both on the matter of Allied troop presence in Berlin and on the "free city" concept.

Gromyko referred to replacement of occupation troops by neutral or UN forces as part of a "normalization of the situation in West Berlin" but presented this latter point as one of a "complex of questions" for which an "agreed solution must be found ... simultaneously with the conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR by the Soviet Union and other states willing to do so." Elsewhere he termed troop replacement merely "one of the variations of the solution of the problem of guarantees" and in still another formulation, linked it entirely to Ulbricht's proposal for an arbitration agency on access as the quid pro quo for such an arrangement. (In explaining the arbitration agency proposal to the Supreme Soviet, Gromyko treated it exclusively as a GDR proposal and refrained from any exposition of Soviet thinking on the subject.)

Gromyko's comments on a "free city" of West Berlin made no mention of a "demilitarized neutral free city," the standard Soviet formulation in the past. He mentioned instead a "free city of peace and quiet," and was specific only in insisting that West Berlin was not a part of the Federal Republic.

1. An authoritative Pravda "Observer" article published May 3 (technically outside the time span covered by this paper) reiterates the Soviet position on the Berlin talks and to some degree sharpens Soviet objections to the US proposals on access. The article terms the US International Access Authority unrealistic and insists only an arbitration-type agency (the Ulbricht proposal) is possible and that only if an agreement is reached on the withdrawal of Allied troops from West Berlin.

Free access to Berlin, according to "Observer," is possible but only by agreement with the GDR as "sovereign master of all lines of communications and air routes."

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDCZMR

REVIEWED by [Signature] DATE 1/17/90

RELEASE DECLASSIFY
 EXCISE DECLASSIFY in PART
 DENY Non-responsive info.
FOI, EO or PA exemptions (b) (1)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
APPEALS REVIEW PANEL, DATE 12/2/81
 RELEASE EXCISE DENY

Classification Review By JUL
 DECLASSIFY
 DECLASSIFY IN PART
 RETAIN CLASSIFICATION (a)
 CLASSIFY AS _____, OADR

CLASSIFY as _____ TS authority to: Non-responsive information
 DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () G OADR
FOIA Exemptions (s) _____

Berlin and Germany. Access procedures to and within Berlin remained unchanged during the period. Several individuals (including the wife of the Venezuelan Ambassador to Bonn) were refused permission to transit East Germany en route to Berlin on grounds of improper documentation, but none of the cases appeared to involve a concerted attempt to harass traffic. Rather, the GDR for the moment appeared intent on demonstrating the ease of transit across its territory. During the Easter holidays in particular, with over 100,000 visitors traveling to Berlin, East German authorities exerted considerable effort to insure rapid processing of travellers.

Implementation of the GDR customs law April 30 has to date entailed no changes in existing practices; only the designations on the goods control offices at the border crossing points have now been changed to read "GDR Customs Administration," and new customs declaration forms have been introduced.

GDR Interior Minister Karl Maren on April 21 charged that West Berlin plans for a May Day demonstration in the vicinity of the Brandenburg Gate were "provocative" in character and warned the Senat would have to bear "full responsibility for all complications and consequences which may arise." The demonstrations in both East and West Berlin passed without incident, however, despite the fact that some 750,000 West Berliners appeared at the Western rally at the sector border.

Statistics released by the West Berlin authorities indicate that in 1961 150-170 West Berliners and West Germans were arrested by the GDR police while traveling between Berlin and the FRG on the autobahn or by train.

The Soviet Union has filed an application with the West Berlin Senat for permission to incorporate in West Berlin a branch of "Sovexportfilm," a Soviet film distribution agency, ostensibly to facilitate the sale of East bloc films. No Senat decision on the Soviet request has as yet been announced.

A number of known SED functionaries have officially moved their residences from East Germany to West Berlin in recent weeks, evidently in implementation of the reported plan to separate the West Berlin SED apparatus from that of the East German SED. West Berlin communist youth functionaries are also now receiving their training and instructions exclusively in West Berlin, not in the GDR as was the case before.

ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET INTENTIONS

Recent public Soviet pronouncements on Berlin, as well as Soviet gestures on the Berlin scene (departure of Kozlov, promotion of Seleznev, overtures to rescind the commandants' ban, and the continued absence of harassment), while presumably intended to preserve the negotiating atmosphere, could also point to a more flexible Soviet bargaining position. Gromyko's speech to the Supreme Soviet conveyed a certain degree of optimism as to the course of the current talks, though he carefully refrained from clarifying the extremes which the Soviets are prepared to accept. J. Das

~~SECRET~~

- 5 -

tactics will probably not become evident until after the first Rank-Debrynin exchanges following the Secretary's return from Athens.

Dias

"Sovexportfilm", the agency which the Soviet authorities are attempting to introduce into West Berlin, has in the past been reported as a front organization of the KGB, the Soviet security service. Its activities have provided a cover for Soviet intelligence work in Southeast Asia in particular.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

[the Gromyko speech allows for a variety of possible interpretations on these points (cf the attached Assessment paper), and it would appear the Soviet side is interested in learning what conclusions the US chooses to draw from Gromyko's presentation before becoming more specific on its own part. It is also evident Moscow did not expect or at least did not reckon seriously with the possibility of any significant changes in the US position immediately prior to Athens. The USSR appears still to estimate that more flexibility will be forthcoming from the US side in the face of Soviet adherence to maximum, -- though not wholly clear -- positions.]

b1a5

~~SECRET~~

66 D 124
Box 169
5/5

SECRET

BERLIN (167)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bureau of Intelligence and Research

(F17)

12

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

EXCISE

Research Memorandum
RSB-3.32, May 3, 1962

ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT SOVIET INTENTIONS IN THE BERLIN CRISIS:
APRIL 19 - MAY 2, 1962

E
bias
bias

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

Negotiations. Secretary Rusk met with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin twice during the week prior to his (Rusk's) departure from Washington for the NATO Ministers' gathering in Athens, but on neither occasion (April 23 and 27) were any new substantive elements introduced into the Berlin discussions. It was, however, agreed that the current series of US-Soviet exchanges would continue in Washington rather than in Moscow.

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's report to the Supreme Soviet April 24 contained the first detailed public discussion of the Berlin talks by a Soviet source for some time, and his presentation suggested the possible emergence of several variants to the Soviet position. Although adhering in general to familiar Soviet proposals, Gromyko proved to be equivocal both on the matter of Allied troop presence in Berlin and on the "free city" concept.

Gromyko referred to replacement of occupation troops by neutral or UN forces as part of a "normalization of the situation in West Berlin" but presented this latter point as one of a "complex of questions" for which an "agreed solution must be found ... simultaneously with the conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR by the Soviet Union and other states willing to do so." Elsewhere he termed troop replacement merely "one of the variations of the solution of the problem of guarantees" and in still another formulation, linked it entirely to Ulbricht's proposal for an arbitration agency on access as the quid pro quo for such an arrangement. (In explaining the arbitration agency proposal to the Supreme Soviet, Gromyko treated it exclusively as a GDR proposal and refrained from any exposition of Soviet thinking on the subject.)

Gromyko's comments on a "free city" of West Berlin made no mention of a "demilitarized neutral free city," the standard Soviet formulation in the past. He mentioned instead a "free city of peace and quiet," and was specific only in insisting that West Berlin was not a part of the Federal Republic.

1. An authoritative Pravda "Observer" article published May 3 (technically outside the time span covered by this paper) reiterates the Soviet position on the Berlin talks and to some degree sharpens Soviet objections to the US proposals on access. The article terms the US International Access Authority unrealistic and insists only an arbitration-type agency (the Ulbricht proposal) is possible and that only if an agreement is reached on the withdrawal of Allied troops from West Berlin. Free access to Berlin, according to "Observer," is possible but only by agreement with the GDR as "sovereign master of all lines of communications and air routes."

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDCZME

REVIEWED by [Signature] DATE 4/17/90

- RELEASE DECLASSIFY
- EXCISE DECLASSIFY in PART
- DENY Non-responsive info

SECRET

FOI, EO or PA exemptions (b) (1)
TS authority to:

CLASSIFY as GADR

Khrushchev also touched on the Berlin talks in his interview with US publisher Gardner Cowles April 20, noting that "some glimmers of hope for agreement" had emerged. He insisted, however, "it cannot be held that agreement is possible" without resolving the question of the "presence of Western occupation forces in West Berlin to which we cannot agree." But, in another passage, he claimed these were "no longer occupation troops but forces of NATO nations having absolutely definite designs against the socialist countries. These designs, naturally, alarm us and we cannot put up with them." (A Moscow lecturer April 30 echoed this formulation, stating the major problem in the negotiations now was the "question of liquidation of NATO forces in West Berlin.")

On April 20 the Soviet Ambassadors in East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Rumania called officially on the heads of government at their respective posts to discuss the "US-Soviet exchanges of views on the peaceful settlement of the German question and problems connected with it." On April 24, TASS announced the second Rusk-Dobrynin meeting had taken place the previous day, noting that the two participants "continued the discussion of the questions pertaining to a German peace settlement."

Military Preparations and Demonstrations. No changes in military postures relating to Berlin and Germany were reported during the past two weeks.

One week after it became known General Clay was to leave Berlin the Soviet Union announced the recall of Marshal Konev from East Germany. According to the April 19 TASS announcement, Konev was returning to Moscow to take up duties in the Ministry for Defense. General Yakubovskii was simultaneously reappointed commander-in-chief of the Soviet forces in Germany, the position he had held prior to Konev's arrival in Germany August 10, 1961. On April 28, Yakubovskii's promotion to full general was announced; apparently at the same time. Col. Solovyev, the Soviet Berlin commandant, was promoted to the rank of general.

The American and Soviet political advisers to the Berlin commandants met at Spandau (in the British sector) April 19, 29, and 30 to discuss arrangements for a meeting between their respective superiors. (Both commandants are barred from entering each other's sector, the US ban on the Soviet commandant having been instituted at the end of December, the reciprocal Soviet ban on the American general in early March.) A further meeting of the advisers was scheduled for May 3 to decide upon the locale of the prospective commandants' session.

US military convoys on the Berlin-Helmstedt autobahn continued to experience sporadic delays at the Soviet checkpoint, generally in connection with Soviet demands on inspection procedure. No serious interruption of military traffic developed, however.

1. Khrushchev's and Gromyko's recent discussions of the Berlin-Germany issue are treated in detail in a separate Research Memorandum currently in preparation.

Berlin and Germany. Access procedures to and within Berlin remained unchanged during the period. Several individuals, including the wife of the Venezuelan Ambassador to Bonn, were refused permission to transit East Germany en route to Berlin on grounds of "imperfor. dokumentation," but most of the cases appeared to involve a concerted attempt to harass traffic. Rather, the GDR for the moment appeared intent on demonstrating the ease of transit across its territory. During the Easter holidays in particular, with over 100,000 visitors traveling to Berlin, East German authorities exerted considerable effort to insure rapid processing of travellers.

Implementation of the GDR customs law April 30 has to date entailed no changes in existing practices; only the designations on the goods control offices at the border crossing points have now been changed to read "GDR Customs Administration," and new customs declaration forms have been introduced.

GDR Interior Minister Karl Maren on April 21 charged that West Berlin plans for a May Day demonstration in the vicinity of the Brandenburg Gate were "provocative" in character and warned the Senat would have to bear "full responsibility for all complications and consequences which may arise." The demonstrations in both East and West Berlin passed without incident, however, despite the fact that some 750,000 West Berliners appeared at the Western rally at the sector border.


Statistics released by the West Berlin authorities indicate that in 1961 150-170 West Berliners and West Germans were arrested by the GDR police while traveling between Berlin and the FRG on the autobahn or by train.

The Soviet Union has filed an application with the West Berlin Senat for permission to incorporate in West Berlin a branch of "Sovexpartfilm," a Soviet film distribution agency, ostensibly to facilitate the sale of East bloc films. No Senat decision on the Soviet request has as yet been announced.

A number of known SED functionaries have officially moved their residences from East Germany to West Berlin in recent weeks, evidently in implementation of the reported plan to separate the West Berlin SED apparatus from that of the East German SED. West Berlin communist youth functionaries are also now receiving their training and instructions exclusively in West Berlin, not in the GDR as was the case before.

ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET INTENTIONS

Jbas



SECRET

- 5 -

cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc
cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc
cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc
cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc

b1 a5

SECRET

cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc
cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc
cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc

SECRET

S/S Mr. Battle
This document consists of 2 pages
number 11 of 17 copies, Series A.

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

SECRET

Special Supplement to RM 3.32

.....
RUSK DOBRYNIN TALKS (APRIL 23 AND APRIL 27)

The second and third meetings between Secretary Rusk and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin (April 23 and 27) added little of substance to the US-Soviet exchanges on Berlin. They did, however, confirm that Gromyko's speech to the Supreme Soviet April 24 and Khrushchev's interview with Gardner Cowles should be regarded as the currently valid Soviet statements of position on the subject. (These two presentations are being treated in detail in a Research Memorandum now in preparation.)

b1a3
b1a5

SECRET

.....
.....
.....
.....

81-524

E 23 5/5/62

SECRET

US/MC/ 23
May 5, 1962

EXCISE

UNITED STATES DELEGATION
TO THE
TWENTY-NINTH MINISTERIAL MEETING
OF THE
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Athens, Greece, May 4-6, 1962

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: May 5, 1962
Time: 1:15 P.M.
Place: Grande Bretagne Hotel

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

Participants:

United States

France

Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand

M. Henri Froment-Meurice,
French Foreign Office

Subject: Berlin and Related Subjects

Copies to:	S/S	Amembassy BONN
	EUR (1)	Amembassy MOSCOW
	GER (1)	Amembassy PARIS
	WE	Amembassy LONDON
EUR/RPM		USBER BERLIN
INR/D-2		USRO PARIS
S/B		S/P
G		

During a luncheon conversation which ranged over a number of subjects, the following items of interest arose on Berlin and related questions:

NS/PFC/CDR 61 Date: 3/27/72

MR Cases Only:
EO Citations

TS authority by:
() S or () C OADR
() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C OADR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

() RELEASE
() EXCISE
() DENY
() DELETE Non-Dispersive Info
FOIA Exemptions
PA Exemptions

() DECLASSIFY
() DECLASSIFY IN PART

SECRET

b1/a

N9A

SECRET

- 3 -

avoid attempting to list points of disagreement on which no meeting of the minds was possible, but instead to list certain principles on which at least verbal agreement might be possible and to provide a forum for continuing discussion. If the Soviets wanted a modus vivendi which was partly procedural and partly camouflage, this might provide a basis for it. We were far from optimistic that this approach would in the end be accepted by them, but it seemed to us certainly worth while trying. Many of the substantive items in the "principles paper" were merely declaratory of existing policy and, it seemed to us, provided adequately for the safeguarding of our vital interests in Berlin.

We could likewise not agree that the Soviets were bound, as the French apparently thought, to interpret our paper as a sign of weakness, and, therefore, an invitation to make increased demands. While it was true to say the Soviets had not noticeably softened their position, it was likewise true to say that they had not hardened it, and it was also true that harassments had ceased after the Geneva talks. The French imputation that this was because the Soviets now expect to get substantial advantages out of negotiations was one which could not be proved and did not seem consistent with the available evidence. While we could not be absolutely sure what had caused the Soviets to call off their harassments, it appeared more likely that the evidences given of our strength and firmness had led to this.

Finally, Mr. Hillenbrand continued, [

] It was not true to imply that the majority of German leaders or public were opposed to an approach along the lines which we had taken. What you apparently had was a vocal segment of the CDU in opposition, with the SPD, the FDP and a considerable segment of the CDU ready to support our approach, at least in its broad essentials if not in every detail. It was reasonably clear to us that, considerations of substance apart, much of the hullabaloo which had followed the "leak" in Bonn last month, had involved an internal fight for power between various Bonn political leaders. Foreign Minister Schroeder had indeed been put in a difficult position, and had to move carefully, but it should have been clear to the French that, in broad essentials, he was sympathetic to the American approach. We did not believe that a modus vivendi based upon our "principles paper" would have a traumatic effect upon the German people or set in motion a chain of causation which would take the Federal Republic out of the Western Alliance. The preservation of the close ties between the Federal Republic and the free world was an integral part of our policy, just as were the vital interests which we had in the Berlin situation. It was, therefore, a distortion of the US position to say, as some had done, that by focussing too narrowly on the three vital interests which we had defined in the Berlin situation, we ran the danger of losing sight of broader Western interests.

[

SECRET

b1a5

b1a3

]

5/7/62 (7)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

May 7, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Action on Nuclear Assistance to France

In March and April 1962, the question of nuclear assistance to de Gaulle became active. The principal sources of concern and advocacy were three.

First, there was Ambassador Gavin in Paris. He had become deeply bothered by the gradual deterioration of Franco-American relations, and he was persuaded that the principal cause of this difficulty lay in the failure of the United States to meet the hopes of the French in the nuclear field. He foresaw that with the ending of the struggle in Algeria de Gaulle would become not less but more difficult, and he believed, as Ambassadors in Paris have characteristically believed, that a major improvement could be accomplished if only the United States would respond to the interests and desires of General de Gaulle.

The second main source of interest was in the Pentagon; it derived initially from a concern for practical relations with the French in such fields as the build-up of NATO conventional forces, cooperation with NATO in a variety of other fields (e.g., tropospheric scatter), and the balance of military payments. Observing the persistent obstructionism of de Gaulle with respect to NATO, concerned by the persistent refusal to permit nuclear NATO forces to use French territory, uncertain over how much of a conventional build-up France could afford unless relieved of the nuclear burden, and tempted by the prospect of extensive French purchases in the nuclear field -- purchases which it was hoped might balance the military expenditures of the United States in France -- the senior civilians in the Pentagon (initially Paul Nitze and later Ros Gilpatric and Bob

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5(b)

White House Guidelines
By NARA, Date 6/30/97

POF/116a / France - Security 1962

McNamara in descending order of enthusiasm) joined in recommending that a serious approach be made to the French Government.

The third substantial voice raised on this side of the argument was that of General Taylor. In a visit to Europe in the latter part of March, he was deeply impressed by the unanimity of the Frenchmen with whom he talked, in passionate commitment to development of a nuclear capability, and in passionate resentment of the refusal of the Americans to provide assistance. Concluding that the French would soon have a nuclear capability of their own in any event, and fearing the consequences for the Western alliance of French bitterness extending well beyond de Gaulle, General Taylor joined in urging a re-examination of American policy.

Many others, at other times, have shared these same concerns about our relations with de Gaulle and had asked whether some new relation in the nuclear field might not be worth seeking. At the President's direction members of the staff had encouraged Paul Nitze's inquiries earlier in the winter, and the President himself had written a most tentative letter of explanation to General de Gaulle at the turn of the year. General de Gaulle's cool response had discouraged the White House, but there was general recognition that the matter should in fact be reviewed once more.

Among those who believed that the subject should be reopened, there was some difference on ways and means. There was little support for an immediate decision to provide technical nuclear information to the French on the basis of a finding of "substantial progress" under the terms of the Atomic Energy Act. It was believed, rather, that a beginning should be made in areas related to nuclear weapons delivery systems -- notably assistance for the French program to produce MRBM's, for use as a means of delivering French warheads against the USSR.

Most of those urging a new departure believed that we should initially seek an agreement in which MRBM technology would be traded for balance-of-payments help and cooperation in NATO. Assistance for the production of warheads would be dependent upon still further

*The former
policy in 1954
was wrong*

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 3 -

French concessions. But one of those in favor of a change in policy, Secretary Dillon, argued powerfully that it would not be possible to make a step-by-step set of bargains with General de Gaulle. He believed that the whole question should be opened with de Gaulle by the President himself on the broadest possible basis, with the US laying out both MRBM and warhead assistance as part of a comprehensive package.

Those who held to the earlier policy were located in the State Department, the AEC, and the White House (except General Taylor). Their central argument was that the provision of nuclear assistance to France would not substantially improve our relations with General de Gaulle, would disrupt our basic European policy, and would be certain to weaken our position with respect to nuclear weapons in general -- with consequent grave implications for our effort to stabilize relations with the USSR.

As to General de Gaulle, it was argued that he had never proved amenable to bargaining in the past, that he would in no way bend his major purpose in response to offers of assistance from us, that this purpose was precisely to establish France as one of the three great independent Western powers -- leading a continent from whose most intimate affairs the UK and the US were excluded; and that the consequence of nuclear assistance to de Gaulle could only be to confirm him in this purpose and assist him in working for it. As a consequence, he might become more intransigent than ever in demanding all-out nuclear aid and US recognition of French continental leadership, on the theory that the Americans had shown -- in granting aid -- both an acceptance of his position and a vulnerability to his pressure. If the US resisted such further demands, the net effect of the episode would have been to worsen, not improve, Franco-American relations. We would have lost the respect which the General -- characteristically -- may now have for the firmness and consistency with which we hold to a course that, we have concluded, best serves our long-term interests. (He is reported on one occasion to have said that he understood our reasons for not extending aid to France and would do the same if he were in our shoes.)

~~TOP SECRET~~

De Gaulle's vision of a three power-directory was strongly opposed by this group of advisers -- and indeed by those on the other side as well, on the grounds that it simply would not work. The other nations of the Western European continent were entirely unwilling to accept the notion of French primacy, and neither the size nor the power of France put General de Gaulle in a position to enforce his view -- particularly vis-a-vis Germany. Even if France should become a nuclear power, it was not likely that she would achieve any such leadership. The existence of a more substantial nuclear capability in Great Britain had not produced any parallel British supremacy with respect to the other European members of NATO. Thus the idea of the directory was unreal, and US attempts to move -- or to help France move -- in the direction of this unreality could only lead to misunderstanding and frustration within the alliance.

These dangers were illustrated plainly -- the argument ran -- by the consequences of nuclear assistance to France for our relations to other NATO powers. Belgium and the Netherlands, strong supporters of NATO and of a Western Europe integrated within NATO, would feel let down by the inconstant Americans. The Italians, seeing themselves as a growing force equal in principle to the French, would be embittered. Most of all, the West Germans, restrained by their pledges, made modest by their past crimes, held to their present course mainly by trust in America, but stirring with new strength and increasingly insistent on equal treatment, would feel overwhelming pressure toward one or another of two dangerous courses: to insist on nuclear help from the U. S., or to bargain for a partnership with France. We could not count on de Gaulle to refuse such a partnership, whether or not we gave him nuclear help, since his whole foreign policy rests on the premise of Franco-German collaboration in building an independent Europe.

Equally dangerous was the signal such assistance would give about American policy in the nuclear age: a signal of American acceptance of nuclear diffusion to many nations. (To General de Gaulle, France was obviously unique; to many others she would be merely another middle-class power which had proved that the Americans respond to pressure.) Such diffusion was strategic nonsense; the Western

nuclear deterrent was fundamentally indivisible -- as Secretary McNamara was to explain at Athens in a notable speech to NATO on May 4th. There could be only one serious nuclear war against the Soviet Union -- and the prevention of that war, by credible deterrence, could in no way be assisted by the addition of small, ill-controlled, vulnerable, and wholly independent national nuclear forces. Measured in terms of defense against Soviet Russia, the French force in prospect could only be a danger to all -- including the French themselves. French policy, vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, was pointless -- and General de Gaulle may have known it. There was gossip that he had frankly admitted, in talks with French colleagues, that his nuclear weapons would be more useful within the Atlantic Community than for defense against the Soviet Union. Could it be in the interest of the United States to give nuclear help to such a man, with such a purpose -- thus strengthening his hand, in his own country and in Europe? Could it be in the US interest to suggest to other countries that the road to US favor lay through such unilateral and dangerous ventures, rather than through the multilateral arrangements that our policy ostensibly espoused?

Finally, the opponents of help to France asked what would be thought in the Soviet Government if now there should be a new U. S. policy of nuclear help to those friends who happened to want it a lot. Would the chances of some understanding on arms control be increased? Would a general accommodation become easier or harder? Would a moderate Soviet policy in Central Europe and Berlin be easier, or harder, to come by? Would the West be less or more able to defend itself in a nonprovocative, controlled, and single-minded way?

These were the main arguments on both sides. Within both camps there were lesser assertions. Thus the opponents of help denied that any major French contribution to the balance-of-payments problem was likely, even in return for nuclear help; they held that the French wanted knowledge more than hardware and that at best they would give only one-shot, temporary orders for purchase. There were also differences on the likelihood -- and the timing -- of French nuclear progress in the absence of help. At one

extreme the advocates of assistance argued that the French were sure to have a nuclear force (meaning fission-bomb aircraft) of their own within three years and would be deterred by nothing, with or without de Gaulle. At the other extreme it was suggested that Europe-based aircraft had been publicly branded as vulnerable and obsolete by General Norstad, and that really adequate weapons (meaning thermonuclear missiles) were not likely before 1970, and that by then a post de-Gaulle government might possibly be moved to submerge this costly and unfruitful effort into a broader multi-lateral scheme -- if US help had not bailed out the French program in the meantime.

The President read and heard the arguments. He talked individually with Gavin and Taylor; he also heard Jean Monnet as that determined European argued emphatically -- and privately -- against nuclear help to France, his own country. Monnet's themes were four: the deterrent is indivisible; nuclear diffusion is immoral -- and cannot be halted on the continent, once it is begun; we must build a Europe of equals, if we are not to have a Europe of rivals; de Gaulle will eventually accept what he cannot change.

Mr. Kennedy made his decision firmly -- in a sense he simply never unmade it. His personal responsibility for the nuclear posture of the West was never far from his mind, and he had an almost instinctive doubt that he could ease this burden by sharing it. The path of nuclear diffusion seemed to lead away from that limitation of the atomic arms race on which he never gave up hope. He respected de Gaulle, but on many great issues de Gaulle and he were in clear disagreement, and de Gaulle would not change his policy in return for nuclear weapons. On April 16th, the day of his final decision, in a meeting with the Secretaries of State and Defense, the President said, "You could probably get money from him, but that's all you'd get." It was not enough.

There were other elements in the decision. The President did not want to have the Germans clamoring for help in their turn; he would have found it a nuisance to face Congressional criticism from the assertive Joint Committee on Atomic Energy; he would have been troubled by the reproaches of the leading men of NATO --

Norstad in particular; he would have had to overrule the Secretary of State -- which he did not often do. These considerations could well have been overbalanced if there had been a great end in view; each of them after all had a minor counterbalance of its own. Against Rusk was McNamara; against Norstad were Taylor, Gavin and the JCS; against the Joint Committee were the angry journalists like Sulzberger who had taken up the French line; and against the German claim in the future was the French claim in the present.

But no one could offer him a solid and substantive return for this major change in policy, with all its evident disadvantages. No one could tell him that de Gaulle would join the team and throw his support to our basic policy of cohesive European and Atlantic communities. No one could deny the dangers of diffusion, which this basic policy sought to limit.

* * *

Among those who greeted this decision with approval, and with a renewed awareness of the practical clarity of the President's mind, there was little delight. The French problem remained, and the French nuclear effort would almost surely continue in some form -- with or without de Gaulle. It was no answer to give nuclear help, but what could be done?

Clear answers to this question had not emerged in early May. But a few preliminary points were plain:

First, there must be no complaints about French nuclear efforts -- and no public sneering at their limitations. The effort may be wrong, but it is also natural, determined, and in its way gallant.

Second, as we would not expect French cooperation in other matters in return for our help to France on nuclear systems, so we should not cease to seek effective relations with the French in other matters merely because de Gaulle wants (and will never ask for) nuclear help.

Finally, we must increasingly press upon all our European friends a deeper understanding of nuclear weapons as they look in the 1960's: numerous, deadly, and indivisible in their impact; costly, complex, and rapidly obsolescent in their technology; dangerous in their diffusion, and increasingly useless except in the single great goal of deterrence. We must recognize that for those who do not have them, nuclear weapons are the most potent status symbol since African colonies went out of fashion. But we must not give up the effort to demonstrate that -- always excepting strategic deterrence -- these weapons are about as much use, in the long run, as Ruanda-Urundi -- and much more costly and dangerous.

Above and beyond these immediate actions, we must persevere on the broader course of assisting and encouraging the movement toward European integration and Atlantic partnership. If that movement goes forward, the disadvantages of an unaided French nuclear effort can be contained and limited; we can still make progress toward our basic goals, despite that effort. And in the degree that the forces making for European integration and Atlantic partnership prevail, France may -- either during de Gaulle's term or after -- come to recognize that she can play a larger role by assisting than by hindering the prosecution of this basic policy. At least this course seemed -- in May of 1962 -- to offer a better chance of promoting US objectives than any other at hand.

McGeorge Bundy

5/7/62

I thought you'd be interested in the enclosed document, just declassified two weeks ago. (The version of this document released, in ~~sanitized~~ form, in 1991 had almost nothing of interest.) This is a discussion of the debate on nuclear assistance for France that took place within the U.S. government in the spring of 1962. One point of interest is the passage toward the bottom of p. 2, where it was pointed out that the pro-sharing people wanted to start with delivery systems. This, I think, reveals something about the meaning of the sale at about this time of the tanker aircraft, which, as you pointed out (L'alliance incertaine, p. 226) were indispensable to a French nuclear strike. The Bundy argument (in Danger and Survival, p. 494) that this had to do simply with the fact that large military sales ~~have many friends~~ i.e., that it did not have much political meaning is, I think, hard to credit in the light of this document, written, in fact, by Bundy himself.

The document itself I interpret as evidence of President Kennedy's ambivalence on this issue, and as thus foreshadowing the shift in American policy that took place at the end of 1962 in this area. The reason I say this is that Kennedy himself obviously knew the basic story, and if he was having Bundy write it up, it was not because he was concerned to leave a record for future historians. I think what led to this document was some comment of his to the effect, ~~Look, I'm not really comfortable with the policy we've opted for. Tell me again why exactly we reached the decisions we did?~~

Another implication of all this was that the McNamara nuclear strategy, the strategy outlined in the Athens speech, was phony. That speech was a product of the way the whole debate within the administration had been resolved, as Neustadt wrote; it represented the point of view of McNamara's opponents, not McNamara's own thinking which was radically different. I have lots on this. It's amazing how profoundly we've all been misled.

TO SUMMARY

5/7/62
7

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

May 7, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Action on Nuclear Assistance to France

In March and April 1962, the question of nuclear assistance to de Gaulle became active. The principal sources of concern and advocacy were three.

First, there was Ambassador Gavin in Paris. He had become deeply bothered by the gradual deterioration of Franco-American relations, and he was persuaded that the principal cause of this difficulty lay in the failure of the United States to meet the hopes of the French in the nuclear field. He foresaw that with the ending of the struggle in Algeria de Gaulle would become not less but more difficult, and he believed, as Ambassadors in Paris have characteristically believed, that a major improvement could be accomplished if only the United States would respond to the interests and desires of General de Gaulle.

The second main source of interest was in the Pentagon; it derived initially from a concern for practical relations with the French in such fields as the build-up of NATO conventional forces, cooperation with NATO in a variety of other fields (e.g., tropospheric scatter), and the balance of military payments. Observing the persistent obstructionism of de Gaulle with respect to NATO, concerned by the persistent refusal to permit nuclear NATO forces to use French territory, uncertain over how much of a conventional build-up France could afford unless relieved of the nuclear burden, and tempted by the prospect of extensive French purchases in the nuclear field -- purchases which it was hoped might balance the military expenditures of the United States in France -- the senior civilians in the Pentagon (initially Paul Nitze and later Ros Gilpatric and Bob

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5(b)

White House Guidelines
By NARA, Date 4/30/97

POF/116a / France - Security 1962

McNamara in descending order of enthusiasm) joined in recommending that a serious approach be made to the French Government.

The third substantial voice raised on this side of the argument was that of General Taylor. In a visit to Europe in the latter part of March, he was deeply impressed by the unanimity of the Frenchmen with whom he talked, in passionate commitment to development of a nuclear capability, and in passionate resentment of the refusal of the Americans to provide assistance. Concluding that the French would soon have a nuclear capability of their own in any event, and fearing the consequences for the Western alliance of French bitterness extending well beyond de Gaulle, General Taylor joined in urging a re-examination of American policy.

Many others, at other times, have shared these same concerns about our relations with de Gaulle and had asked whether some new relation in the nuclear field might not be worth seeking. At the President's direction members of the staff had encouraged Paul Nitze's inquiries earlier in the winter, and the President himself had written a most tentative letter of explanation to General de Gaulle at the turn of the year. General de Gaulle's cool response had discouraged the White House, but there was general recognition that the matter should in fact be reviewed once more.

Among those who believed that the subject should be reopened, there was some difference on ways and means. There was little support for an immediate decision to provide technical nuclear information to the French on the basis of a finding of "substantial progress" under the terms of the Atomic Energy Act. It was believed, rather, that a beginning should be made in areas related to nuclear weapons delivery systems -- notably assistance for the French program to produce MRBM's, for use as a means of delivering French warheads against the USSR.

Most of those urging a new departure believed that we should initially seek an agreement in which MRBM technology would be traded for balance-of-payments help and cooperation in NATO. Assistance for the production of warheads would be dependent upon still further

French concessions. But one of those in favor of a change in policy, Secretary Dillon, argued powerfully that it would not be possible to make a step-by-step set of bargains with General de Gaulle. He believed that the whole question should be opened with de Gaulle by the President himself on the broadest possible basis, with the US laying out both MRBM and warhead assistance as part of a comprehensive package.

Those who held to the earlier policy were located in the State Department, the AEC, and the White House (except General Taylor). Their central argument was that the provision of nuclear assistance to France would not substantially improve our relations with General de Gaulle, would disrupt our basic European policy, and would be certain to weaken our position with respect to nuclear weapons in general -- with consequent grave implications for our effort to stabilize relations with the USSR.

As to General de Gaulle, it was argued that he had never proved amenable to bargaining in the past, that he would in no way bend his major purpose in response to offers of assistance from us, that this purpose was precisely to establish France as one of the three great independent Western powers -- leading a continent from whose most intimate affairs the UK and the US were excluded; and that the consequence of nuclear assistance to de Gaulle could only be to confirm him in this purpose and assist him in working for it. As a consequence, he might become more intransigent than ever in demanding all-out nuclear aid and US recognition of French continental leadership, on the theory that the Americans had shown -- in granting aid -- both an acceptance of his position and a vulnerability to his pressure. If the US resisted such further demands, the net effect of the episode would have been to worsen, not improve, Franco-American relations. We would have lost the respect which the General -- characteristically -- may now have for the firmness and consistency with which we hold to a course that, we have concluded, best serves our long-term interests. (He is reported on one occasion to have said that he understood our reasons for not extending aid to France and would do the same if he were in our shoes.)

De Gaulle's vision of a three power-directory was strongly opposed by this group of advisers -- and indeed by those on the other side as well, on the ground that it simply would not work. The other nations of the Western European continent were entirely unwilling to accept the notion of French primacy, and neither the size nor the power of France put General de Gaulle in a position to enforce his view -- particularly vis-a-vis Germany. Even if France should become a nuclear power, it was not likely that she would achieve any such leadership. The existence of a more substantial nuclear capability in Great Britain had not produced any parallel British supremacy with respect to the other European members of NATO. Thus the idea of the directory was unreal, and US attempts to move -- or to help France move -- in the direction of this unreality could only lead to misunderstanding and frustration within the alliance.

These dangers were illustrated plainly -- the argument ran -- by the consequences of nuclear assistance to France for our relations to other NATO powers. Belgium and the Netherlands, strong supporters of NATO and of a Western Europe integrated within NATO, would feel let down by the inconstant Americans. The Italians, seeing themselves as a growing force equal in principle to the French, would be embittered. Most of all, the West Germans, restrained by their pledges, made modest by their past crimes, held to their present course mainly by trust in America, but stirring with new strength and increasingly insistent on equal treatment, would feel overwhelming pressure toward one or another of two dangerous courses: to insist on nuclear help from the U. S., or to bargain for a partnership with France. We could not count on de Gaulle to refuse such a partnership, whether or not we gave him nuclear help, since his whole foreign policy rests on the premise of Franco-German collaboration in building an independent Europe.

Equally dangerous was the signal such assistance would give about American policy in the nuclear age: a signal of American acceptance of nuclear diffusion to many nations. (To General de Gaulle, France was obviously unique; to many others she would be merely another middle-class power which had proved that the Americans respond to pressure.) Such diffusion was strategic nonsense; the Western

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 5 -

nuclear deterrent was fundamentally indivisible -- as Secretary McNamara was to explain at Athens in a notable speech to NATO on May 4th. There could be only one serious nuclear war against the Soviet Union -- and the prevention of that war, by credible deterrence, could in no way be assisted by the addition of small, ill-controlled, vulnerable, and wholly independent national nuclear forces. Measured in terms of defense against Soviet Russia, the French force in prospect could only be a danger to all -- including the French themselves. French policy, vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, was pointless -- and General de Gaulle may have known it. There was gossip that he had frankly admitted, in talks with French colleagues, that his nuclear weapons would be more useful within the Altnatic Community than for defense against the Soviet Union. Could it be in the interest of the United States to give nuclear help to such a man, with such a purpose -- thus strengthening his hand, in his own country and in Europe? Could it be in the US interest to suggest to other countries that the road to US favor lay through such unilateral and dangerous ventures, rather than through the multilateral arrangements that our policy ostensibly espoused?

Finally, the opponents of help to France asked what would be thought in the Soviet Government if now there should be a new U. S. policy of nuclear help to those friends who happened to want it a lot. Would the chances of some understanding on arms control be increased? Would a general accommodation become easier or harder? Would a moderate Soviet policy in Central Europe and Berlin be easier, or harder, to come by? Would the West be less or more able to defend itself in a nonprovocative, controlled, and single-minded way?

These were the main arguments on both sides. Within both camps there were lesser assertions. Thus the opponents of help denied that any major French contribution to the balance-of-payments problem was likely, even in return for nuclear help; they held that the French wanted knowledge more than hardware and that at best they would give only one-shot, temporary orders for purchase. There were also differences on the likelihood -- and the timing -- of French nuclear progress in the absence of help. At one

~~TOP SECRET~~

extreme the advocates of assistance argued that the French were sure to have a nuclear force (meaning fission-bomb aircraft) of their own within three years and would be deterred by nothing, with or without de Gaulle. At the other extreme it was suggested that Europe-based aircraft had been publicly branded as vulnerable and obsolete by General Norstad, and that really adequate weapons (meaning thermonuclear missiles) were not likely before 1970, and that by then a post de-Gaulle government might possibly be moved to submerge this costly and unfruitful effort into a broader multi-lateral scheme -- if US help had not bailed out the French program in the meantime.

The President read and heard the arguments. He talked individually with Gavin and Taylor; he also heard Jean Monnet as that determined European argued emphatically -- and privately -- against nuclear help to France, his own country. Monnet's themes were four: the deterrent is indivisible; nuclear diffusion is immoral -- and cannot be halted on the continent, once it is begun; we must build a Europe of equals, if we are not to have a Europe of rivals; de Gaulle will eventually accept what he cannot change.

Mr. Kennedy made his decision firmly -- in a sense he simply never unmade it. His personal responsibility for the nuclear posture of the West was never far from his mind, and he had an almost instinctive doubt that he could ease this burden by sharing it. The path of nuclear diffusion seemed to lead away from that limitation of the atomic arms race on which he never gave up hope. He respected de Gaulle, but on many great issues de Gaulle and he were in clear disagreement, and de Gaulle would not change his policy in return for nuclear weapons. On April 16th, the day of his final decision, in a meeting with the Secretaries of State and Defense, the President said, "You could probably get money from him, but that's all you'd get." It was not enough.

There were other elements in the decision. The President did not want to have the Germans clamoring for help in their turn; he would have found it a nuisance to face Congressional criticism from the assertive Joint Committee on Atomic Energy; he would have been troubled by the reproaches of the leading men of NATO --

Norstad in particular; he would have had to overrule the Secretary of State -- which he did not often do. These considerations could well have been overbalanced if there had been a great end in view; each of them after all had a minor counterbalance of its own. Against Rusk was McNamara; against Norstad were Taylor, Gavin and the JCS; against the Joint Committee were the angry journalists like Sulzberger who had taken up the French line; and against the German claim in the future was the French claim in the present.

But no one could offer him a solid and substantive return for this major change in policy, with all its evident disadvantages. No one could tell him that de Gaulle would join the team and throw his support to our basic policy of cohesive European and Atlantic communities. No one could deny the dangers of diffusion, which this basic policy sought to limit.

* * *

Among those who greeted this decision with approval, and with a renewed awareness of the practical clarity of the President's mind, there was little delight. The French problem remained, and the French nuclear effort would almost surely continue in some form -- with or without de Gaulle. It was no answer to give nuclear help, but what could be done?

Clear answers to this question had not emerged in early May. But a few preliminary points were plain:

First, there must be no complaints about French nuclear efforts -- and no public sneering at their limitations. The effort may be wrong, but it is also natural, determined, and in its way gallant.

Second, as we would not expect French cooperation in other matters in return for our help to France on nuclear systems, so we should not cease to seek effective relations with the French in other matters merely because de Gaulle wants (and will never ask for) nuclear help.

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 8 -

Finally, we must increasingly press upon all our European friends a deeper understanding of nuclear weapons as they look in the 1960's: numerous, deadly, and indivisible in their impact; costly, complex, and rapidly obsolescent in their technology; dangerous in their diffusion, and increasingly useless except in the single great goal of deterrence. We must recognize that for those who do not have them, nuclear weapons are the most potent status symbol since African colonies went out of fashion. But we must not give up the effort to demonstrate that -- always excepting strategic deterrence -- these weapons are about as much use, in the long run, as Ruanda-Urundi -- and much more costly and dangerous.

Above and beyond these immediate actions, we must persevere on the broader course of assisting and encouraging the movement toward European integration and Atlantic partnership. If that movement goes forward, the disadvantages of an unaided French nuclear effort can be contained and limited; we can still make progress toward our basic goals, despite that effort. And in the degree that the forces making for European integration and Atlantic partnership prevail, France may -- either during de Gaulle's term or after -- come to recognize that she can play a larger role by assisting than by hindering the prosecution of this basic policy. At least this course seemed -- in May of 1962 -- to offer a better chance of promoting US objectives than any other at hand.

McGeorge Bundy

~~TOP SECRET~~

EXCISE

E (b)(7)(D) (1) (2)
3519102
EXDIS REVIEW *E 65*

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

SECRET

Classification

EYES ONLY

Cat. A - Caption removed; transferred to O/FADRC
Cat. B - Transferred to O/FADRC with additional access controlled by S/S
Cat. C - Caption and custody retained by S/S

MICROFILMED FOR

KENNEDY LIBRARY

Date: **APRIL 1964**

ACTION: Amembassy BONN

3071

EYES ONLY FOR DOWLING FROM McGEORGE BUNDY, WHITE HOUSE

When you see the Chancellor, which the President hopes will be soon, you should have at hand and show to the Chancellor a translation of the following text of a broadcast from Schorr which the President heard over CBS this morning. You should indicate that while the President has been very careful and restrained in public utterance, he finds it hard to understand how a broadcast of this sort could happen unless in fact the Chancellor has been making comments of this sort.

REVIEWED BY *WTH*
FOR FO or PA exceptions *522*
CLASSIFY as *OADR*
TS authority to *OADR*
DOWNGRADE/TS to (S or) C, OADR
DECLASSIFY IN PART
DELETE
Non-responsive info.
RELEASE
EXCISE
DENY
DECLASSIFY
DECLASSIFY IN PART
DELETE
Non-responsive info.

#676

762.00/5-96-91-525 XR 762.4221

Drafted by: **White House: McGBundy**

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

S/S - Mr. Collopy

Clearances:

SECRET
EYES ONLY
Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED".

MA

SECRET-EYES ONLY
Classification

to the good old days when ~~Mr~~ John Foster Dulles was Secretary of State. He has said ironically that he sometimes wonders if the United States considers West Germany or Russia its ally. He has called the snubbing of his Ambassador ~~Wilhelm~~ Grewe a brutal act. He has ~~said~~ said he does not think the Kennedy Administration sufficiently understands West Germany's delicate double position as a major ally and at the same time an object of the negotiations with Russia. He has expressed strong doubt that West German ~~interests~~ are safe in the hands of the Anglo-Saxons, the United States and Britian, and he has shown an increasing tendency to think in ~~de~~ Gaullist terms of a strong continental Europe based on the French-German alliance. If that does not add up to an American-German crisis, it is only because Adenauer remains convinced he depends on American military strength, that any open disunity would only aid the ~~Communists~~ Communists. This is CBS news in Berlin."

UNQUOTE BALL

END

SECRET-EYES ONLY
Classification

#696

5/10/62

2.

Official Use Only

Mr. Bundy,

The German views of the latest fracas.

A version that Foy Kohler is the "culprit" is being given wide currency by the German Embassy staff here.

DKL:ia

KLEIN 22

FBI 45 OFFICIAL USE ONLY

WEST GERMAN COMMENT

REVIEW OF THE WEST GERMAN PRESS AND RADIO 10 MAY 62 G

MOST PAPERS REPORT THAT IN VIEW OF THE VIOLENT WESTERN REACTION TO CHANCELLOR ADENAUER'S BERLIN STATEMENTS FEDERAL PRESS CHIEF VON ECKARDT ON 9 MAY TRIED TO TONE DOWN ADENAUER'S REMARKS.

KOELNISCHE RUNDSCHAU REPORTS THAT ALL BUNDESTAG GROUPS ARE GRAVELY CONCERNED OVER THE VIOLENT AMERICAN REACTION TO ADENAUER'S BERLIN STATEMENTS. ACCORDING TO THE PAPER ADENAUER IS BEING CRITICIZED EVEN WITHIN CDU CIRCLES.

FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE QUOTES AMERICAN OBSERVERS IN BONN AS ADMITTING THAT RUSK WAS RIGHT IN SAYING THAT NOTHING HAD BEEN ACHIEVED SO FAR. THIS DOES NOT MEAN, HOWEVER, THAT THE EAST-WEST TALKS SHOULD NOT BE CONTINUED.

ACCORDING TO RHEINISCHE POST, DUESSELDORF, IT IS BELIEVED IN BONN THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S CRITICAL REACTION TO ADENAUER'S STATEMENTS IN BERLIN WAS INSPIRED NOT BY RUSK BUT BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE KOHLER WHOSE CRITICAL ATTITUDE TOWARD THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC IS WELL KNOWN. WITH THE BONN LEAK REGARDING WASHINGTON'S BERLIN PLANS HAVING BEEN OVER-EMPHASIZED AND WITH THE FACT THAT WASHINGTON IS GIVING THE COLD SHOULDER TO GREWE, BONN NOW ASKS ITSELF WHETHER A CERTAIN GROUP IN WASHINGTON IS ATTEMPTING TO WEAKEN GERMAN INFLUENCE IN THE WEST.

NEUE RHEIN-ZEITUNG, COLOGNE, DUESSELDORF, DESCRIBES KENNEDY HIMSELF AS THE AUTHOR OF THE SHARP AND SARCASTIC DECLARATION OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

JAN REIFENBERG IN FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE PAINTS AN EXTREMELY DARK AND GLOOMY PICTURE OF GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS. ADENAUER'S PUBLIC ATTEMPT TO TORPEDO WASHINGTON'S EFFORTS HAVE CAUSED FEELINGS OF DISMAY MUCH STRONGER THAN THE RECENT EXCITEMENT OVER THE LEAKS IN BONN, WRITES REIFENBERG.

VON BORCH IN DIE WELT REPORTS SPECULATION IN WASHINGTON THAT THE REAL CAUSE OF THE CURRENT DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN BONN AND WASHINGTON IS THE RIFT INSIDE THE BONN CABINET. BORCH SAYS THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS NOT THE SLIGHTEST DOUBTS THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO RECONCILE ADENAUER'S STATEMENTS WITH THE ATTITUDE TAKEN BY SCHROEDER IN ATHENS AFTER SCHROEDER'S TALKS WITH RUSK. THE EARLIER DIFFERENCES SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN OVERCOME. NOW ADENAUER OPENED THE RIFT AGAIN IN PUBLIC. IT IS FELT IN WASHINGTON THAT ADENAUER WENT FURTHER THAN DE GAULLE IN OBSTRUCTING WESTERN READINESS FOR NEGOTIATIONS. ACCORDING TO BORCH, THIS RUNS STRAIGHT AGAINST KENNEDY'S BASIC CONVICTIONS. IN VIEW OF THE GRAVE COMMITMENTS TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES KENNEDY FEELS THAT HE OWES IT TO HIS PEOPLE AND TO PUBLIC OPINION IN THE WORLD TO SEEK CONTACTS. BORCH CONCLUDES BY STATING THAT GERMAN EXPERTS IN WASHINGTON FEEL THAT THE INTERNAL CONFLICT IN BONN REFLECTS THE ANTAGONISM BETWEEN THE CONSERVATIVE FORCES HEADED BY ADENAUER AND THE GROWING FORCES OF CHANGE AND TRANSFORMATION.

JOSEF MAURER NOTES OVER RADIO MUENICH THAT IN CONTRAST TO ADENAUER AND DE GAULLE, PRESIDENT KENNEDY NO LONGER THINKS MUCH OF A WAIT-AND-SEE ATTITUDE SINCE HE SEES SOME OF THE WESTERN POSITIONS DWINDLING WITHOUT BEING ABLE TO DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT. MAURER POINTS OUT THAT IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT KENNEDY SEES NO END TO OBJECTIONS FROM BONN. RECENT DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND BONN SHOULD NOT BE DRAMATIZED. MAURER STATES, ADDING THAT SCHROEDER, BRENTANO, STRAUSS, AND THE OTHER VISITORS OF THE FDP AND THE SPD TO THE UNITED STATES AGREE THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE A FIRM STAND IN THE DECISIVE POINTS OF THEIR BERLIN PROGRAM AND WILL REMAIN FIRM. MAURER POINTS OUT THAT A SOBER ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION OF THE GERMANS IS NOW NECESSARY.

REINHARD GERDES OVER RADIO MAINZ BELIEVES THAT MOSCOW HAS EVERY REASON TO COLAT OVER THE RENEWED WASHINGTON-BONN TENSIONS WHICH STEW FROM MISTAKES MADE BY BOTH SIDES AND ARE DUE TO THE FAILURE OF AMERICAN AND GERMAN INTERESTS TO AGREE IN THE PROBLEM OF BERLIN. GERDES REGRETS THAT THE WEST IS SO OBVIOUSLY DIVIDED INTO TWO CAMPS--WASHINGTON AND LONDON ON ONE SIDE AND BONN AND PARIS ON THE OTHER. HE WONDERS WHETHER THE AMERICAN PROMISE STILL HOLDS TRUE THAT WASHINGTON WILL NOT ACCEPT ANY SOLUTION WHICH MIGHT VIOLATE THE INTERESTS OF ITS ALLIES. IF SO, RENEWED CONSULTATIONS AIMED AT A BINDING ACCORD WILL HAVE TO BE MADE. BONN SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT THE WEST CANNOT AFFORD WEST GERMAN-AMERICAN DISCORD, GERDES CAUTIONS.

DER TAGESSPIEGEL, BERLIN, FEELS THAT WHILE IT IS EXAGGERATED TO SPEAK OF AN OPEN BREACH BETWEEN THE TWO CAPITALS, IT CANNOT BE DENIED THAT THERE HAS BEEN QUITE A QUARREL. IN A CERTAIN WAY, THE PAPER CONTINUES, KENNEDY'S ASSUMPTION WAS CORRECT, BECAUSE ADENAUER NOT ONLY MADE THE REMARKS THAT CAUSED THE QUARREL BUT IN VARIOUS RESPECTS MADE IMPORTANT CONCESSIONS TO THE U.S. POINT OF VIEW, ESPECIALLY WHEN HE DEFENDED THE AMERICANS AGAINST THE ACCUSATION OF SEEKING A BERLIN SOLUTION IN RETURN FOR CONCESSIONS ON THE SECURITY QUESTION. THE LAMENT OVER HIS OTHER IDEAS DROWNED OUT THESE REALISTIC SENTENCES AND IT MUST BE HOPED THAT THE LATTER WILL FIND THE ATTENTION THEY DESERVE IN WASHINGTON.

10 MAY 1147A JLS/RH

PCF

65

Germany - General 5/62 - 8/62

UNCLASSIFIED

P

51962

6495

BONN

ADVANCE COPY

2675, MAY 9

NIACT

PART ONE OF SEVERAL

FOR ROWAN

JOINT EMBASSY-USIS MESSAGE

FOLLOWS "UNCORRECTED TEXT" OF CHANCELLOR'S PRESS CONFERENCE, BERLIN, MAY 7, OBTAINED TODAY FROM FEDERAL PRESS OFFICE.

"ADENAUER: THE FATE OF BERLIN IS A VERY ESSENTIAL PART OF THE TOTAL LINE OF TENSION IN THE WORLD AND FOR US GERMANS NATURALLY A PART WHICH TOUCHES US VERY DEEPLY PSYCHOLOGICALLY. THIS IS ALSO TRUE OF THE ZONE AND THE UNHAPPY GERMANS DOOMED TO LIVE IN THE ZONE. I WANT TO SAY INITIALLY NON-POLITICALLY BUT PUBLICLY HERE BEFORE THE WHOLE PUBLIC, THAT THESE ALSO ARE REALITIES FOR EVERY GERMAN, THAT THE BERLIN QUESTION AND THE QUESTION OF THE ZONE ARE SHOWN ALSO IN THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEM AND THAT THERE IS FOR US A FIELD OF DEEP SORROW AND DEEP WORRY, OF SORROW AND WORRY WHICH NATURALLY MUST SOMEHOW INFLUENCE POLITICAL DECISIONS, TOO. FOR THIS EVERYBODY, EVERY NON-GERMAN TOO, MUST HAVE UNDERSTANDING. IF THE BERLINERS CAN LIVE IN FREEDOM, IF THE GERMANS IN THE ZONE CAN LIVE IN FREEDOM AS THEY WANT TO LIVE, THEN I BELIEVE MANY A POLITICAL PROBLEM COULD BE SOLVED MUCH BETTER THAN NOW.

"THE NATO CONFERENCE ENDED YESTERDAY, AS YOU KNOW. I AM INFORMED ABOUT THE MEETING IN DETAIL, PARTLY BY TELEPHONE, PARTLY BY CABLE. YESTERDAY I HAD A LONG TALK WITH MINISTER SCHROEDER, WHO

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-2- 2675, MAY 9 FROM BONN

CALLED ME FROM ROME. I WAS ALSO INFORMED YESTERDAY BY V. BRENTANO WHO SAW ME A FEW HOURS AFTER HIS ARRIVAL TO REPORT TO ME ON WHAT HE HAD EXPERIENCED IN THE U.S. I THINK I CAN SAY THEREFORE THAT I, IN FACT, AM RATHER WELL INFORMED TODAY ON THE FOREIGN POLICY SITUATION.

"FIRST OF ALL I THINK THAT WE CAN WELCOME THE NATO MEETING WITH GREAT PLEASURE. FLYING HERE, I READ IN THE GERMAN PRESS CERTAIN CRITICISM OF THE NATO MEETING. IN MY OPINION THIS CRITICISM IS NOT JUSTIFIED. THE NATO MEETING HAS CONCLUDED A NUMBER OF VERY DIFFICULT QUESTIONS AND THIS UNANIMOUSLY. QUESTIONS WHICH HAD BEEN PREPARED BY SEC. GEN. STIKKER BY LONG AND THROUGH WORK MAINLY IN WASHINGTON AND PARTLY IN THE NATO COUNCIL IN PARIS. I BELIEVE THAT WE GERMANS SHOULD BE GRATEFUL TO SEC. GEN. STIKKER FOR THIS WORK WHICH HE HAS BEEN PERFORMING NOW FOR OVER A YEAR. I HAVE KNOWN STIKKER FOR A GOOD MANY YEARS AND WE HAVE VERY GOOD PERSONAL RELATIONS. THE CONDUCT OF THE NATO MEETING HAS TO BE CREDITED MAINLY TO HIS INDEFATIGABLE WORK. WE SHOULD EXPRESS OUR SPECIAL THANKS TO HIM FOR HIS GREAT UNDERSTANDING FOR THE BERLIN QUESTION AND FOR THE GERMAN QUESTION. THE MOST IMPORTANT RESULT OF ATHENS CAN BE SUMMARIZED IN ONE SENTENCE: THE UNITY OF THE FREE WEST. IF YOU THINK BACK TO THE MINISTERS MEETING OF NATO IN 1961 -- UNLESS MY MEMORY FAILS ME IT WAS IN DECEMBER -- THERE THE UNITY OF THE FREE PEOPLE IN THE WEST DID NOT LOOK GOOD; AND THE UNITY OF THE FREE PEOPLE OF THE WEST, I AM CONVINCED, IS THE BEST ASSET OF FREEDOM. THE EAST OBSERVES VERY CLOSELY WHETHER CRACKS APPEAR IN WESTERN UNITY AND THEY DO THEIR BEST TO CREATE SUCH CRACKS EVENTUALLY. I BELIEVE THAT THE POLICY OF THE EAST TO A LARGE DEGREE LIVES ON THE BELIEF THAT THE WEST ONE DAY WOULD BECOME DISUNITED. THIS NATO MEETING HAS STRONGLY UNDERSCORED THIS UNITY, AND THE FATE OF BERLIN DEPENDS ON THE UNITY OF THE WEST. THE WHOLE POLITICAL FUTURE IN THE EAST OF GERMANY FINALLY DEPENDS ON THE UNITY OF THE WEST AND I THEREFORE BELIEVE THAT WE CAN BE VERY SATISFIED WITH THE WAY THIS NATO CONFERENCE WENT.

"YOU WILL NOT EXPECT ME TO GO INTO DETAILS. YOU KNOW THE COMMUNIQUE. COMMUNIQES ARE ALWAYS PARTLY TRUE, AND PARTLY NOT SO COMPLETE.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-3- 2675, MAY 9 FROM BONN

"I AM ALSO VERY PLEASED WITH THE REPORT THAT V. BRENTANO GAVE ME YESTERDAY. NATURALLY IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE BRENTANO TRIP TO THE U.S. THERE WAS SPECULATION IN THE PRESS -- I DON'T WANT TO NAME THE PRESS -- ABOUT JEALOUSIES. I REFER TO THE ARTICLE BY INGRIM (BONNER RUNDSCHAU, MAY 7). I READ IT ON THE TRIP HERE, ABOUT THE JEALOUSIES BETWEEN THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND V. BRENTANO. I WANT TO TELL YOU THE FOLLOWING:

THE TASKS WITH WHICH WE GERMANS ARE CONFRONTED IN THE FIELD OF FOREIGN POLICY ARE SO TREMENDOUS AND SO DIFFICULT THAT BY HEAVEN NOBODY SHOULD DARE TO SAY HE ALONE COULD DO IT. WHOEVER IS IN THE POSITION AND PREPARED TO HELP IS VERY WELCOME WITH HIS WORK AND HIS HELP, BE HE A GERMAN OR A NON-GERMAN. LET ME TELL YOU ONE MORE THING. THIS IS 1962, THE INVOLVED COMPLICATION (VERKNAEUELUNG) -- I DO NOT KNOW A BETTER EXPRESSION -- OF POLITICAL RELATIONS IN THE WORLD ORIGINATED 17 YEARS AGO AND HAS CONSTANTLY CONTINUED, AND NOBODY SHOULD IMAGINE THAT THE WORLD CAN BE FREED OF THIS COMPLICATION WITHIN A FEW YEARS. AS THIS COMPLICATION HAS GROWN WITH THE PASSAGE OF TIME, THERE WILL BE TIME NEEDED TO UNTIE THIS COMPLICATED KNOT. THEREFORE ONE SHOULD NOT EXPECT A SUDDEN SUNRISE IN THE FIELD OF FOREIGN POLICY FOLLOWED BY A BEAUTIFUL CLOUDLESS DAY. IT BELIEVE YOU LEAST OF ALL ARE PRONE TO DO THAT. BUT I WANT TO SAY THIS NOW AND ASK YOU TO TELL IT TO YOUR READERS, THAT ESPECIALLY IN THE FIELD OF FOREIGN POLICY PATIENCE, PATIENCE AND AGAIN PATIENCE IS OF THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE.

"THE REPORT BY V. BRENTANO, WHICH HE GAVE ME LAST NIGHT, WAS ALSO OF THE KIND TO GIVE NEW SUPPORT TO MY INFREQUENT OPTIMISM. HE HAD TALKS OVER THERE WITH THE PRESIDENT, HIS DEPUTY AND OTHER GENTLEMEN OF THE ADMINISTRATION, ALSO WITH SENATORS OF THE TWO PARTIES AND FOUND VERY GREAT UNDERSTANDING AND FRIENDSHIP FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND FOR GERMAN QUESTIONS. WHAT V. BRENTANO TOLD ME YESTERDAY CONFORMED FOR ME WHAT AN AMERICAN HAD TOLD ME ON FRIDAY, WHOM I CONSIDER AN EXCELLENT JUDGE OF PUBLIC OPINION IN THE US BECAUSE OF HIS NATURAL INTELLIGENCE AND BECAUSE OF HIS POSITION -- HE HAS NO OFFICIAL POSITION. DON'T BE CROSS IF I SAY NOW, THANK GOD HE IS NO JOURNALIST BECAUSE JOURNALISTS ARE SOMETIMES SOMEWHAT INHIBITED AND JUSTIFIABLY SO, THEY CANNOT ALWAYS WRITE AS THEY WOULD LIKE. MORE COMING D

31
INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

PERMANENT RECORD

E68 5/10/62

W

SECRET

Recommend Release

Action

Control: 7006

SS

Rec'd: May 10, 1962
8:10am

Info

FROM: The Hague

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 856, May 10, 9 am.

EYES ONLY

PRIORITY

EYES ONLY

FOR PRESIDENT, BUNNY, BALL FROM SALINGER

Dan Schorr of CBS revealed to me that Adenauer made comment about Bonn-Washington relations at lowest level in 13 years to Clay in Berlin Tuesday. Inference is that Clay leaked statement to Schorr although Schorr will not be that specific.

RICE

SGC

Note: Passed White House 5/10/CWQ-FMH

Eyes only

CLASSIFIED REVIEW

- Class. A - Caption removed; transferred to O/FADRC
- Class. B - Transferred to O/FADRC with additional access controlled by S/S
- Class. C - Caption and custody retained by S/S

Reviewed by: Elijah Kelly Jr.

Date: 4-9-91 19

EYES ONLY

SECRET

This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of release taken. REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS TAKEN CLASSIFIED

ACTION ASSIGNED TO	ACTION TAKEN	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R	
NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE OF ACTION		

N9A

REVIEWED by *WHL* Date *7-1-67*

TS authority to:

- () OADR
- () CLASSIFY as
- () DOWNGRADE
- () TS to () S or () C
- () OADR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/C/D/C/R

- RELEASE
- DECLASSIFY
- EXEMPT
- DECLASSIFY IN PART
- DELETE
- DENY

Non-responsive

676

The Hague 856
6/11. 62a/5-1062

66 D 124
Box 169
5/5

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bureau of Intelligence and Research

BERLIN (16R) 5/3/62

12

(F17)

Research Memorandum
RSB-3.32, May 3, 1962

BEST COPY AVAILABLE



ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT SOVIET INTENTIONS IN THE BERLIN CRISIS:
APRIL 19 - MAY 2, 1962

A
b1 a3
bias

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

Negotiations. Secretary Rusk met with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin twice during the week prior to his (Rusk's) departure from Washington for the NATO Ministers' gathering in Athens, but on neither occasion (April 23 and 27) were any new substantive elements introduced into the Berlin discussions. It was, however, agreed that the current series of US-Soviet exchanges would continue in Washington rather than in Moscow.

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's report to the Supreme Soviet April 24 contained the first detailed public discussion of the Berlin talks by a Soviet source for some time, and his presentation suggested the possible emergence of several variants to the Soviet position. Although adhering in general to familiar Soviet proposals, Gromyko proved to be equivocal both on the matter of Allied troop presence in Berlin and on the "free city" concept.

Gromyko referred to replacement of occupation troops by neutral or UN forces as part of a "normalization of the situation in West Berlin" but presented this latter point as one of a "complex of questions" for which an "agreed solution must be found ... simultaneously with the conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR by the Soviet Union and other states willing to do so." Elsewhere he termed troop replacement merely "one of the variations of the solution of the problem of guarantees" and in still another formulation, linked it entirely to Ulbricht's proposal for an arbitration agency on access as the quid pro quo for such an arrangement. (In explaining the arbitration agency proposal to the Supreme Soviet, Gromyko treated it exclusively as a GDR proposal and refrained from any exposition of Soviet thinking on the subject.)

Gromyko's comments on a "free city" of West Berlin made no mention of a "demilitarized neutral free city," the standard Soviet formulation in the past. He mentioned instead a "free city of peace and quiet," and was specific only in insisting that West Berlin was not a part of the Federal Republic.

1. An authoritative Pravda "Observer" article published May 3 (technically outside the time span covered by this paper) reiterates the Soviet position on the Berlin talks and to some degree sharpens Soviet objections to the US proposals on access. The article terms the US International Access Authority unrealistic and insists only an arbitration-type agency (the Ulbricht proposal) is possible and that only if an agreement is reached on the withdrawal of Allied troops from West Berlin. Free access to Berlin, according to "Observer," is possible but only by agreement with the GDR as "sovereign master of all lines of communications and air routes."

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDCZMR

VIEWED by [Signature] DATE 1/17/90

<input type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	DEPARTMENT OF STATE
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY in PART	APPEALS REVIEW PANEL DATE <u>12/2/81</u>
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	<input type="checkbox"/> Non-responsive info	<input type="checkbox"/> RELEASE <input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE <input type="checkbox"/> DENY
CI, EO or PA exemptions <u>(b) (1)</u>	TS authority to: <input type="checkbox"/> Non-responsive information	
<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as _____	OADR	
<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C, OADR	FOIA Exemptions (s) _____	
<u>N/A</u>	PA Exemption (e) _____	

Classification Review By [Signature]

<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY
<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY IN PART
<input type="checkbox"/> RETAIN CLASSIFICATION (a) _____
<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY AS _____, OADR

Khrushchev also touched on the Berlin talks in his interview with US publisher Gardner Cowles April 20, noting that "some glimmers of hope for agreement" had emerged. He insisted, however, "it cannot be held that agreement is possible" without resolving the question of the "presence of Western occupation forces in West Berlin to which we cannot agree." But, in another passage, he claimed these were "no longer occupation troops but forces of NATO nations having absolutely definite designs against the socialist countries. These designs, naturally, alarm us and we cannot put up with them." (A Moscow lecturer April 30 echoed this formulation, stating the major problem in the negotiations now was the "question of liquidation of NATO forces in West Berlin.")¹

On April 20 the Soviet Ambassadors in East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Rumania called officially on the heads of government at their respective posts to discuss the "US-Soviet exchanges of views on the peaceful settlement of the German question and problems connected with it." On April 24, TASS announced the second Rusk-Dobrynin meeting had taken place the previous day, noting that the two participants "continued the discussion of the questions pertaining to a German peace settlement."

Military Preparations and Demonstrations. No changes in military postures relating to Berlin and Germany were reported during the past two weeks.

One week after it became known General Clay was to leave Berlin the Soviet Union announced the recall of Marshal Konev from East Germany. According to the April 19 TASS announcement, Konev was returning to Moscow to take up duties in the Ministry for Defense. General Yakubovskii was simultaneously reappointed commander-in-chief of the Soviet forces in Germany, the position he had held prior to Konev's arrival in Germany August 10, 1961. On April 28, Yakubovskii's promotion to full general was announced; apparently at the same time. Col. Solovyov, the Soviet Berlin commandant, was promoted to the rank of general.

The American and Soviet political advisers to the Berlin commandants met at Spandau (in the British sector) April 19, 29, and 30 to discuss arrangements for a meeting between their respective superiors. (Both commandants are barred from entering each other's sector, the US ban on the Soviet commandant having been instituted at the end of December, the reciprocal Soviet ban on the American general in early March.) A further meeting of the advisers was scheduled for May 3 to decide upon the locale of the prospective commandants' session.

US military convoys on the Berlin-Helmstedt autobahn continued to experience sporadic delays at the Soviet checkpoint, generally in connection with Soviet demands on inspection procedure. No serious interruption of military traffic developed, however.

1. Khrushchev's and Gromyko's recent discussions of the Berlin-Germany issue are treated in detail in a separate Research Memorandum currently in preparation.

Berlin and Germany. Access procedures to and within Berlin remained unchanged during the period. Several individuals (including the wife of the Venezuelan Ambassador to Bonn) were refused permission to transit East Germany en route to Berlin on grounds of improper documentation, but none of the cases appeared to involve a concerted attempt to harass traffic. Rather, the GDR for the moment appeared intent on demonstrating the ease of transit across its territory. During the Easter holidays in particular, with over 100,000 visitors traveling to Berlin, East German authorities exerted considerable effort to insure rapid processing of travellers.

Implementation of the GDR customs law April 30 has to date entailed no changes in existing practices; only the designations on the goods control offices at the border crossing points have now been changed to read "GDR Customs Administration," and new customs declaration forms have been introduced.

GDR Interior Minister Karl Maren on April 21 charged that West Berlin plans for a May Day demonstration in the vicinity of the Brandenburg Gate were "provocative" in character and warned the Senat would have to bear "full responsibility for all complications and consequences which may arise." The demonstrations in both East and West Berlin passed without incident, however, despite the fact that some 750,000 West Berliners appeared at the Western rally at the sector border.

Statistics released by the West Berlin authorities indicate that in 1961 150-170 West Berliners and West Germans were arrested by the GDR police while traveling between Berlin and the FRG on the autobahn or by train.

The Soviet Union has filed an application with the West Berlin Senat for permission to incorporate in West Berlin a branch of "Sovexpartfilm," a Soviet film distribution agency, ostensibly to facilitate the sale of East bloc films. No Senat decision on the Soviet request has as yet been announced.

A number of known SED functionaries have officially moved their residences from East Germany to West Berlin in recent weeks, evidently in implementation of the reported plan to separate the West Berlin SED apparatus from that of the East German SED. West Berlin communist youth functionaries are also now receiving their training and instructions exclusively in West Berlin, not in the GDR as was the case before.

ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET INTENTIONS

[Recent public Soviet pronouncements on Berlin, as well as Soviet gestures on the Berlin scene (departure of Kozlov, promotion of Solov'yev, overtures to rescind the commandants' ban, and the continued absence of harassment), while presumably intended to preserve the negotiating atmosphere, could also point to a more flexible Soviet bargaining position. Gromyko's speech to the Supreme Soviet conveyed a certain degree of optimism as to the course of the current talks, though he carefully refrained from clarifying the extremes which the Soviets are prepared to accept.] *blas*

~~SECRET~~

The key issue raised by the Soviets at the moment is that of the presence of Allied forces. On the face of it, the Soviets — notably Khrushchev in his talks with Gardner Cowles — categorically demand the removal of Allied forces as the condition for any arrangement. However, the Soviets must be aware that the presence of Western forces is not negotiable. Hence, Khrushchev's formulation — i.e., that the USSR cannot "agree" to the presence of Western forces — leaves open the possibility of tacit acquiescence in such a presence especially if, in exchange for such acquiescence, the USSR can make gains on such matters as an increased GDR role in an access arrangement, non-diffusion of nuclear weapons to Germany and recognition of GDR frontiers. Moreover, both Khrushchev and Gromyko have steadily referred to the Western forces as "occupation" troops and/or as "NATO" troops.

The question raised by these formulations is whether the USSR would accept the continued presence of these forces under some formula that would remove their "occupation" or "NATO" character. One possible vehicle here could be the NATO-Warsaw Pact nonaggression agreement which Gromyko indicated was all but accepted in principle by both sides. Also suggestive is the frequent, though not consistent dropping by the Soviets of the words "demilitarised" and "neutral" from the "free city" phrase.

To carry this line of speculation further, it is noteworthy that in their various recent statements the Soviets have been most specific in their demand that the alleged "threat to peace" stemming from the Berlin situation and from the NATO presence there must be eliminated. The question here again is whether the Soviets might consider some formula such as a nonaggression agreement as sufficient to permit them to acquiesce in the continued presence of Western forces.

Finally, Gromyko's statement that signature of a peace treaty with the GDR should be "simultaneous" with agreement on a whole range of issues relating to Berlin as well as Germany (e.g., frontiers and nuclear weapons) seems to relegate consummation of the peace treaty to a rather distant date. If Gromyko's formulation does in fact reflect a Soviet decision to postpone a peace treaty, the question arises of what kind of arrangement the USSR envisages for Berlin in the interim. The possibilities here range from a formal interim arrangement to a de facto acceptance of the status quo — though not necessarily without unilateral Soviet and East German harassment of the West — while negotiations continue.

It must be observed that the line of speculation pursued here is based on the ambiguities and possible implications in what Moscow has or has not said. The most that can at present be said with any degree of assurance is that the USSR gives evidence of being interested in pursuing the possibility of an agreed solution but that thus far in the US-Soviet exchanges the chief elements in the Soviet position (e.g., Western troop withdrawal, change in West Berlin status, and respect for GDR sovereignty as minimum preconditions for free access) have remained unchanged.

How long the Soviets will be content to continue marking time in this way cannot be predicted on present evidence. At this point, they probably expect to be in a better position to assess the limits of the US position after the US has consulted with its NATO allies in Athens. Clearer signs of the direction of Soviet

~~SECRET~~

- 5 -

Activities will probably not become evident until after the first Bush-Debrynin exchanges following the Secretary's return from Athens.

Dias

"Sovexportfilm", the agency which the Soviet authorities are attempting to introduce into West Berlin, has in the past been reported as a front organization of the KGB, the Soviet security service. Its activities have provided a cover for Soviet intelligence work in Southeast Asia in particular.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

S/S Mr [unclear]
This document consists
number 11 of 17 copies.

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

Special Supplement to RM 3.32

RUSK DOBRYNIN TALKS (APRIL 23 AND APRIL 27)

The second and third meetings between Secretary Rusk and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin (April 23 and 27) added little of substance to the US-Soviet exchanges on Berlin. They did, however, confirm that Gromyko's speech to the Supreme Soviet April 24 and Khrushchev's interview with Gardner Cowles should be regarded as the currently valid Soviet statements of position on the subject. (These two presentations are being treated in detail in a Research Memorandum now in preparation.)

Dobrynin confined himself primarily to procedural matters in the April 23 meetings. He notified the Secretary officially that Moscow was prepared to continue the talks at whatever location the US President should decide. His only other item of business was to present Moscow's response to the Secretary's April 16 query on the relationship between the Soviet access proposal and the presence of Western forces in Berlin. The relationship, according to Dobrynin, had been defined by Gromyko at Geneva; furthermore, the USSR could not "accept an agreement providing for continuation of the occupation regime and the further stay of occupation forces in West Berlin." His instructions did not clarify whether the phrase "continuation of occupation regime" related to the status of West Berlin or to the troop presence; the Ambassador's personal impression was that it related to forces, not status.

On April 27, however, Dobrynin's instructions appeared to imply considerably more movement in the Soviet position than Dobrynin himself seemed aware. He reiterated his earlier contention that the Soviet position on Berlin had already been clarified, but in this instance cited the Gromyko Supreme Soviet speech and the Cowles interview as the specific clarifications. (Dobrynin also interjected, evidently on instruction, that the word "demand" in Gromyko's statement that the American side "does not see obstacles to combining free access to West Berlin with the demand to respect GDR sovereignty" should actually read "proposal".) He noted specifically that the Soviet position on an end to the occupation and to Western troop presence in Berlin was as stated by Gromyko to the Supreme Soviet.

Dobrynin's instructions on both occasions apparently did not envisage as yet a serious discussion of the details of a Berlin settlement, nor did they -- evidently deliberately -- attempt to clarify the access-troop relationship or the troop presence question. The specific reference to

~~SECRET~~

b1a3
b1a5

✓

~~SECRET~~

-2-

the Gromyko speech allows for a variety of possible interpretations on these points (cf the attached Assessment paper), and it would appear the Soviet side is interested in learning what conclusions the US chooses to draw from Gromyko's presentation before becoming more specific on its own part. It is also evident Moscow did not expect or at least did not reckon seriously with the possibility of any significant changes in the US position immediately prior to Athens. The USSR appears still to estimate that more flexibility will be forthcoming from the US side in the face of Soviet adherence to maximum, -- though not wholly clear -- positions.

b1a5

~~SECRET~~

87-504

E 23 5/5/62

SECRET

US/MC/ 23
May 5, 1962

EXCISE

UNITED STATES DELEGATION
TO THE
TWENTY-NINTH MINISTERIAL MEETING
OF THE
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Athens, Greece, May 4-6, 1962

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: May 5, 1962
Time: 1:15 P.M.
Place: Grande Bretagne Hotel

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

Participants:

United States

France

Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand

M. Henri Froment-Meurice,
French Foreign Office

Subject: Berlin and Related Subjects

Copies to:	S/S	Amembassy BONN
	EUR (1)	Amembassy MOSCOW
	GER (1)	Amembassy PARIS
	WE	Amembassy LONDON
	EUR/RPM	USBER BERLIN
	INR/D-2	USRO PARIS
	S/B	S/P
	G	

During a luncheon conversation which ranged over a number of subjects, the following items of interest arose on Berlin and related questions:

blc

J

SECRET

N4A

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MR Cases Only:
EO Citations

CLASSIFY as () S or () C OADR
EXEMPT FROM TS as () S or () C OADR

TS authority is:

RELEASE ()
EXCISE (X)
DENY ()
DELETE Non-Disseminable Info ()
FOIA Exemptions ()
PA Exemptions ()

DECLASSIFY ()
DECLASSIFY IN PART (X)
Non-Disseminable Info ()
Exemptions ()

61

18/PPC/COR 61 Date: 2/27/72

SECRET

- 2 -

3. Froment-Maurice evidenced considerable interest in Mr. Hillenbrand's views as to how French abstinence from Allied counsels during the past six months or so had affected their capacity to influence US thinking. He specifically asked whether the course of events would have been different had the French actively participated in Allied consultations, as in the past. Mr. Hillenbrand commented that this was, of course, a hypothetical question about a situation which had not, in fact, existed. The US Government had to act in the context of French nonparticipation and had not considered, in the abstract, how it would have dealt with French views had they been made available in a different context. The failure of the French to participate in Allied consultations obviously had made some difference. It was a fact with which the US had had to deal, and it was not unreasonable to suppose that the French attitude had, among other things, created a certain amount of irritation. The US position was based upon what we thought was the appropriate thing to do in discussing with the Soviets the problem of Berlin, and while we always took into consideration the views of our Allies, we obviously could not take those views into account when they were not transmitted to us.

┌

└

└

b1c

Mr. Hillenbrand observed that there seemed to be three broad differences of view between the French and American approach to the Berlin situation: (a) with respect to the subject matter to be discussed; (b) with respect to the effect which the US suggestions would have on the Soviets; and (c) with respect to the effect which they would have on the Federal Republic. As to the first, we simply could not agree that the points of substance which we had included in our "principles paper" amounted to undesirable concessions. The Secretary had gone to some pains to explain the rationale underlying our approach, which was to

avoid

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

avoid attempting to list points of disagreement on which no meeting of the minds was possible, but instead to list certain principles on which at least verbal agreement might be possible and to provide a forum for continuing discussion. If the Soviets wanted a modus vivendi which was partly procedural and partly camouflage, this might provide a basis for it. We were far from optimistic that this approach would in the end be accepted by them, but it seemed to us certainly worth while trying. Many of the substantive items in the "principles paper" were merely declaratory of existing policy and, it seemed to us, provided adequately for the safeguarding of our vital interests in Berlin.

We could likewise not agree that the Soviets were bound, as the French apparently thought, to interpret our paper as a sign of weakness, and, therefore, an invitation to make increased demands. While it was true to say the Soviets had not noticeably softened their position, it was likewise true to say that they had not hardened it, and it was also true that harassments had ceased after the Geneva talks. The French imputation that this was because the Soviets now expect to get substantial advantages out of negotiations was one which could not be proved and did not seem consistent with the available evidence. While we could not be absolutely sure what had caused the Soviets to call off their harassments, it appeared more likely that the evidences given of our strength and firmness had led to this.

Finally, Mr. Hillenbrand continued, [

] It was not true to imply that the majority of German leaders or public were opposed to an approach along the lines which we had taken. What you apparently had was a vocal segment of the CDU in opposition, with the SPD, the FDP and a considerable segment of the CDU ready to support our approach, at least in its broad essentials if not in every detail. It was reasonably clear to us that, considerations of substance apart, much of the hullabaloo which had followed the "leak" in Bonn last month, had involved an internal fight for power between various Bonn political leaders. Foreign Minister Schroeder had indeed been put in a difficult position, and had to move carefully, but it should have been clear to the French that, in broad essentials, he was sympathetic to the American approach. We did not believe that a modus vivendi based upon our "principles paper" would have a traumatic effect upon the German people or set in motion a chain of causation which would take the Federal Republic out of the Western Alliance. The preservation of the close ties between the Federal Republic and the free world was an integral part of our policy, just as were the vital interests which we had in the Berlin situation. It was, therefore, a distortion of the US position to say, as some had done, that by focussing too narrowly on the three vital interests which we had defined in the Berlin situation, we ran the danger of losing sight of broader Western interests.

[

SECRET

] b1a5
b1a3
]

SECRET

- 4 -

}
bias
|

MJHill^{Min}enbrand:all:cb
5/9/62

SECRET

EXCISE

(b)(1)(A)(D)

EXDIS REVIEW

F-65

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

SECRET

Classification

EYES ONLY

Cat. C

Microfilmed and retained by S/S

FOR

KENNEDY LIBRARY

Date: APRIL 9 1964

ACTION: Amembassy BONN 3071

EYES ONLY FOR DOWLING FROM McGEORGE BUNDY, WHITE HOUSE

When you see the Chancellor, which the President hopes will be soon, you should have at hand and show to the Chancellor a translation of the following text of a broadcast from Schorr which the President heard over CBS this morning. You should indicate that while the President has been very careful and restrained in public utterance, he finds it hard to understand how a broadcast of this sort could happen unless in fact the Chancellor has been making comments of this sort.

REVIEWED BY: [Handwritten Name]
 FOLIO or PA extensions: 522111
 CLASSIFY as: OADR
 DOWNGRADE to: (S) or (C) OADR
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE/A/CDC/MR
 RELEASE
 EXCISE
 DENY
 DECLASSIFY
 DECLASSIFY in PART
 DELETE
 () Non-responsive info.

#676

762.00/5-96-91-55 XR 762.0001

Drafted by: White House: McGBundy

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

S/S - Mr. Collopy

SECRET EYES ONLY
Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED".

NA

SECRET - EYES ONLY
Classification

7
BIAS

Text

~~Text~~ of x broadcast follows:

"Chancellor Adenauer's casually launched torpedo at the Russian-American talks has caused as much astonishment here as it has in Washington. Morning paper headlines reflect a crisis in German-American relations that Adenauer complacently insists does not exist. The ^{Chancellor} astonishment is the greater as word percolates that the old ~~chancellor~~ chose to sound off against the American plan for a Berlin Access Authority ^{Foreign} just after that plan had been modified at the request of his ~~Foreign~~ Minister to omit any idea of including Germans, thus ducking the controversial issue of indirect recognition of ^{Communist} ~~Communist~~ East Germany. To understand Adenauer's motivations one must report what he has been saying in private conversation the past few days since his return from his six weeks vacation, the longest of his thirteen years in office. Adenauer has told associates, not all of them German, that he considers his relations with the American Administration worse than they have been at any time in those thirteen years. He has made many nostalgic references ^{good} to the ~~good~~ ^{guid}

676

SECRET-EYES ONLY
Classification

SECRET-EYES ONLY
Classification

to the good old days when ~~Mr~~ John Foster Dulles was Secretary of State. He has said ironically that he sometimes wonders if the United States considers West Germany or Russia its ally. He has called the snubbing of his Ambassador ~~Wilhelm~~ Grewe a brutal act. He has ~~said~~ said he does not think the Kennedy Administration sufficiently understands West Germany's delicate double position as a major ally and at the same time an object of the negotiations with Russia. He has expressed strong doubt that West German ~~interests~~ ^{interests} are safe in the hands of the Anglo-Saxons, the United States and Britian, and he has shown an increasing tendency to think in ~~de~~ ^{de} Gaullist terms of a strong continental Europe based on the French-German alliance. If that does not add up to an American-German crisis, it is only because Adenauer remains convinced he depends on American military strength, that any open disunity would only aid the ~~Communists~~ ^{Communists}. This is CBS news in Berlin."

UNQUOTE BALL

END

676

D COPY

~~SECRET~~
NLK-31-336
EXEMPT NLK-77-704
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

5/11/62
Francis 8c

MEETING IN THE CABINET ROOM
FRIDAY, MAY 11, 1962 4:30 PM

Present: The President, Ambassador Alphand
M. Malraux, M. Lebel, Mr. Bundy

After pleasantries, about M. Malraux's visit to the National Gallery, the President asked M. Malraux if he would like to state the general views of his government on major problems.

[Redacted area with horizontal dashed lines]

The President interjected that as he understood it, the French thought that the British should choose between the Commonwealth or the Common Market. A sharp choice here would make things difficult for Prime Minister Macmillan, who had to contend with his Labor opposition. The United States itself had urged that those applying for membership in the Common Market should pay the full entrance fee, but the question in his own mind was whether in fact

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLK-89-49

SEE NARA, Date 9/90

1038/71a / R-000 5/10-5/11/62

Sherrill Xerox cy dest 7/16/62

8a

TOP SECRET

General de Gaulle did not fear and oppose British entry into the
Common Market.

[Redacted area]

The President said that one does deal in terms of desire
in these matters, and that this was exactly what troubled him.

The United States favored British entry into the Common Market
not as a matter of simple U. S. interest. Indeed British entry
would be against the economic interest of the United States and was
desirable only on the larger political ground of holding the Germans as
a part of Western Europe.

[Redacted area]

The President said

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

8u

It was difficult to force a man to choose between an old wife and a new mistress, to which Alphant remarked that except for a short period one might keep both, while Malraux contented that to arrange one's affairs with both might involve boring troubles. The President repeated his view that the Common Market would be helpful in tying the British in, but said that perhaps in the French view this additional attraction was no longer needed -- perhaps the French believed that the Germans were already safely attached. He repeated again that if the United States could support the entry of the United Kingdom at a time when it was losing gold on the balance of payments, it was a fair question why the French should be so reluctant.

The President continued that our feeling was that General de Gaulle apparently preferred a Europe without Great Britain and independent of the United States -- a powerful force which France would speak for. This view brings France and the United States into conflict. We have felt that the defense of Europe was essential to the United States. A

Europe beyond our influence -- yet counting on us -- in which we should have to bear the burden of defense without the power to affect events -- would not be desirable. General de Gaulle should make no mistake:


Americans would be glad to get out of Europe. Just before the President took office, President Eisenhower had recommended to him

~~TOP SECRET~~

8a

TOP SECRET

cut of 2/3rds in the number of U. S. divisions in Europe --
although of course the nuclear guarantee was to be maintained. The
President instead had built up American strength. He wondered
whether General de Gaulle's fundamental attitude was based on his
experience with Americans in World War II, and he repeated that
Americans would be happy to leave Europe if that was what the
Europeans wanted.



TOP SECRET

80

~~SECRET~~

[Large redacted area consisting of a grid of horizontal dashed lines]

The President interjected that ^{we did not fear that} such a third force would be neutralist.
We were concerned ^{instead,} about whether there was to be a wholly
separate, independent force unrelated to American responsibility
and interest.

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

8W

The President said that we have no sense of grandeur, and no tradition of leadership among the nations. Our tradition is fundamentally isolationist. Yet since world War II, we have carried heavy burdens. In our international balance of payments we have lost \$12 billion, and the drain on our gold continues. We have engaged in a heavy military buildup, and we have supported development of the Common Market. When there was trouble in Berlin last year, the burden came on us. We have called up 160,000 men while France brought in two new divisions, and now France was reducing the period of military service. We find it difficult to understand the apparent determination of General de Gaulle to cut across our policies in Europe. If it is desired that we should cease to carry the load in Europe, nothing could be better from our point of view -- it has now cost us about \$1,300,000,000 to maintain our forces in Europe and the savings on these forces would just about meet our balance of payments deficit.

The President said that he and all of the leading members of his Administration were great admirers of de Gaulle -- and also of

[REDACTED]


86



[Large redacted area consisting of many horizontal dashed lines.]

The President replied that the Americans also were committed to the defense of the West. The line of defense for all of us was in Germany. How could each country defend itself merely by its own means within its own borders? We must defend our interests together at the place where defense is necessary.¹

[Redacted area consisting of horizontal dashed lines.]



[REDACTED]

8a

President asked how American policy cut across this basic
each purpose.

[Lined area for notes]

The President said he had been speaking of the defense of Europe.

[Lined area for notes]

[REDACTED]

TOP SECRET

8c

The President said that our policy is very simple: it is to sustain and to assist countries which wish to be independent. This effort was going on all over the world and it placed a great strain on the resources of the United States. We would like to have the help and support of our friends in Europe in this work. But the President repeated that he did not see how this work could go forward if, in fact, General de Gaulle's dream was that of independence from the United States and Great Britain in a Europe ⁱⁿ which France was the leader. The President repeated that if this were to be the policy of the European continent, the United States would like nothing better than to leave Europe. M. Malraux said the President might be right about the dream of de Gaulle, but that a dream is not the same thing as what one does in reality. He asked, speaking not as a Cabinet Member but as a historian, whether the United States could in fact leave Europe. The President replied that we had done it twice and that to stay there even now was very expensive. We were there now because of our obvious responsibilities, but some Europeans seem to regard our presence in a more sinister light, as a kind of unwarranted interference in their internal affairs.


TOP SECRET



8a

The President replied that certainly the Russian threat is the reason that we stay. He then reviewed his own personal experience since becoming President. We had made a tremendous effort after Vienna and the President believed it was these military efforts which had led Khrushchev to veer away from the showdown which had loomed in Berlin at the end of the year. Yet General de Gaulle seemed to say it was his determination which had produced the results. The President did not enjoy making these great military efforts. The United States was carrying a very large load, and in particular he found it very hard to understand this latent, almost female, hostility which appeared in Germany and France, and an apparent sentiment that we might not be reliable in keeping to our engagements.

[A large section of the page contains horizontal dashed lines, suggesting a ruled area for additional text or a list.]



SECRET

The President asked why these French requirements made it necessary to oppose NATO and to oppose the diplomatic probes. What was the reason that we always wound up in such sharp disagreement?

The President believed that given the dangers and the heavy responsibilities which the United States faced in Berlin, we must make an effort to talk. Such talks might not work, but we ought to find out. The President did not find an overwhelming determination in other members of the alliance. He had asked the Chancellor how many divisions he would have in the first fighting in Germany, and the Chancellor preferred to talk about a naval blockade. Now we read in the papers of a Franco-German axis. If there was to be such an axis, the President would be glad to let it try to handle the Berlin affair.

The President repeated that we do not understand the posture of France.

The President

repeated that we have done the military work while France had opposed probes, and this opposition had spread to Bonn. So we wind up

SECRET



80

with the alliance in disarray. The feeling in Bonn and Paris appears to be that the United States is not standing firm, and the President is getting tired of it.

[Redacted area consisting of multiple horizontal dashed lines.]

The President thought it was much more than that. The French position had indeed been regarded as opposition. If the U. S. were not carrying the load, then the President could understand a policy of every man for himself. But he knew from General Clay's cables that whenever there was trouble the call went out for the U. S. Yet he could get no cooperation from General de Gaulle. Back in December he had telephoned asking for a change of a few words in a communique -- with no result. The only reason the President could find was that somewhere deep down inside, General de Gaulle does not want the Americans in Europe -- perhaps, the President again suggested, as a result of his experiences in World War II.

[Redacted area consisting of multiple horizontal dashed lines.]



[REDACTED]

cc

The President replied that all the difficulties in communication were due to him and not to Ambassador Alphand, who, he was sure, had communicated the President's feelings very accurately. The President reminded M. Malraux that his wife is deeply Francophile, and that he himself had a great respect for General de Gaulle. De Gaulle had done two great things: first, he had achieved the Franco-German rapprochement; second he had handled the French withdrawal from the colonies in such a fashion that it was a victory for France. He thought that General de Gaulle was right 80% of the time, but he did wish that de Gaulle might say that we were right 20% of the time. Alphand said with a smile that perhaps the proportions were reversed. To make his basic point more sharply, the President said that we feel like a man carrying a 200-pound sack of potatoes, and other people not carrying a similar load, at least in potatoes, keep telling us how to carry our burden. If others would carry their share, the President could understand it. But we had done most of the work and now we were carrying most of the burden of criticism. The President was not going to do both.

The President says
When we a

[REDACTED]

80



ers will do, we get a poor answer. They will make no effort, and we must make no diplomatic probe. ^{We are told that} We ought speak for others, but only for ourselves. Yet the others make a corresponding effort. In these circumstances, should we continue?

[A large rectangular area containing approximately 15 horizontal dashed lines, likely a placeholder for text or a redacted section.]

The President agreed, saying that his whole object was to find out what the central difficulty was in our relations with France.

McG. B.



5/12/62

37

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE BY CHECKING: CHARGE TO

SECRET Classification

EYES ONLY

Origin
Date

ACTION: Amembassy BONN

PRIORITY

MICROFILMED FOR KENNEDY LIBRARY

EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR

APRIL 1962

following Chronology on handling of "Principles Paper" and International Access Authority paper may be useful to you in connection with instructions for your meeting with Chancellor Adensuer which are being sent in separate telegram.

CHRONOLOGY ON "PRINCIPLES PAPER"

Fall 1961 "Substantive paper" developed in Ambassadorial Group. Final version in report of meeting of senior officers in Paris December 7-10, 1961

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

Mar. 11, 1962 Secretary met Schroeder in Lausanne and went over substance of "principles paper" orally. Letter was consistent with "substantive paper" and with "nine point declaration" Schroeder gave Secretary.

Mar. 19, 1962 Gromyko gave Secretary Soviet "principles paper".

Mar. 22, 1962 Secretary gave "principles paper" to Gromyko. Paper then given Germans, French, British, and NAC. No objections were raised against it by our allies.

Apr. 9, 1962 Ambassador Grew given "principles paper" revised non-substantively to reflect Geneva discussions with Soviets and asked for German reaction by April 11 or 12 so Secretary could give to Dobrynin. Paper also

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX given

762.0221/5-1262

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/C/CA/R
() RELEASE () DECLASSIFY
() CONFIDENTIAL () UNCLASSIFIED
() SECRET () TOP SECRET
() Non-Dissemination

Printed by: BTF:EUR:GER:FCash:LMJ:Allenbrand:5/1/62
Telegraphed transmission and
Approved by: EUR - Roy D. Kohler

S/S-Mr. Rogers

EYES ONLY

given French and British.

Apr. 13, 1962 British concurred. []
I

D-1

Contents of paper became known to press in Bonn.

Apr. 14, 1962 Chancellor wrote President saying paper presented serious problems for him and asking for "pause" in negotiations.

Apr. 15, 1962 Dowling informed Carstens that Secretary would see Dobrynin but would hand over no papers.

Apr. 24, 1962 "Principles paper" revised to take account of some of German and French objections and given former for comment. This paper was discussed at Athens, and the Germans are referring back to the Chancellor the changes discussed.

END CHRONOLOGY ON "PRINCIPLES PAPER"

CHRONOLOGY ON "INTERNATIONAL ACCESS AUTHORITY PAPER"

Oct. & Nov, 1961 EQD 37 "Draft Charter of International Access Authority for Berlin" discussed with Germans, British, and French in Ambassadorial Group. []

Feb. 1, 1962 Thompson gave Grosyko very brief outline of International Access Authority with no mention of composition of Board of Governors or refugees. He hinted orally that there might be some role for East Germans, but Soviets did not pick this up. Oct 1962 Chan. given MAC. This is only access paper yet given Soviets or MAC.

Mar. 12, 1962

SECRET
Classification

Mar. 22, 1962 Gromyko gave Secretary Soviet "access paper".

Apr. 9, 1962 Ambassador Greve given very slightly revised "access paper" and asked for German reactions by April 11 or 12 so Secretary could table if receptivity indicated.

Apr. 13, 1962 British concurred. [

Contents of paper became known to press in Bonn.

Apr. 14, 1962 Chancellor wrote President saying paper presented serious problems for him and asking for "pause" in negotiations.

Apr. 15, 1962 Dowling informed Carstens that Secretary would see Dobrynin but would hand over no paper.

Apr. 21, 1962 Mardar carried in Post complete rundown on "access paper", which he was given to try to clarify situation.

May 5, 1962 Germans at Athens promised that detailed comments on "access paper" would be given us soon.

END

SECRET

not choose: us or fr.
can't have it both ways -
Our troops to leave us out, screw them.

5/18/62

V Bundy
10493 10
no other distributed

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~TOP SECRET~~

Travis

H
Origin
SS
Info

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS 6203 PRIORITY

MAY 18 4 46 PM '62

EYES ONLY FROM PRESIDENT FOR GAVIN

~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

I have read your interesting report of your luncheon talk with General de Gaulle. When you see him again, I hope you will spell out our inability to accept the notion that we should stay out of all of Europe's affairs while remaining ready to defend her if war should come. We cannot give this kind of blank check. In Berlin and Germany, in particular, all major questions of policy relate directly to the confrontations of the Soviet Union and therefore to questions of war and peace. General European policy in turn relates directly and sharply to the problem of Germany. We cannot and will not stand apart from these questions as long as our strength and will are committed to the defense of Europe against any Soviet attack. If Europe were ever to be organized/as to leave us outside, from the point of view of these great issues of policy and defense, it would become most difficult for us to sustain

Drafted by: **McGBundy** Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: **The Secretary**
White House: ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ 5/18

S/S - Mr. Little
DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, SEC. 3(E), 3(D), 5(E) AND ~~TOP SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED".

FORM 5-61 DS-322

BY *MGM* NA S. DATE 11/17/77

State (nlk-77-710)

~~TOP SECRET~~

sustain our present guarantee against Soviet aggression. We shall not hesitate to make this point to the Germans if they show signs of accepting any idea of a Bonn-Paris axis. General de Gaulle really cannot have both our military presence and our diplomatic absence, and you should make this point with emphasis. I am sending you by pouch copies of my conversations with Malraux in which you will find this position developed at greater length. END

RUSK

~~TOP SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

5/23/62

*2. Return file
W H*

L
Action
SS
Info

~~SECRET~~

Control: 16775
Rec'd: MAY 23, 1962
10:57 AM

FROM: LONDON
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 4317, MAY 23, 1 PM

EYES ONLY

King Fran

EYES ONLY SECRETARY FROM BRUCE.
DEPTEL 6197.

I AM OF COURSE AWARE OF CONSIDERABLE CURRENT SPECULATION THAT DEGAULLE MAY DEMAND UK SHARING OF NUCLEAR INFORMATION OR MACMILLAN MAY HAVE SOME SUCH PROPOSAL IN MIND. I KNOW NO REASON TO BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT MACMILLAN OR HIS ADVISERS BELIEVE EITHER (A) THAT SIGNIFICANT BRITISH NUCLEAR WEAPONS DESIGN AND FABRICATION TECHNOLOGY COULD NOW RPT NOW BE SEPARATED OUT FROM THAT OBTAINED THROUGH US-UK COOPERATION OF (B), EVEN IF IT COULD, THAT IT WOULD BE IN BEST UK INTEREST TO SHARE THIS WITH FRANCE. UK WOULD WANT A LARGE RETURN INDEED FOR ANY INVESTMENT IN EUROPE WHICH WOULD RISK JEOPARDIZING ITS PRESENT SPECIAL NUCLEAR POSITION WITH US. MOREOVER, I BELIEVE UK AGREES WITH OUR POLICY OF NOT RPT NOT ASSISTING FRANCE.

DEPT WILL RECALL SCOTT'S STATEMENT (EMBTTEL 3837) THAT SHOULD SOME JOINT NATO NUCLEAR FORCE, INVOLVING FRENCH PARTICIPATION AND HENCE SOME KIND OF US AND UK SHARING, BE EVOLVED, UK SHARING WOULD BE INEXTRICABLE FROM ITS COOPERATION WITH AND DEPENDENCE UPON US RPT US.

HE WAS REFERRING SPECIFICALLY TO WEAPONS DESIGN AND FABRICATION INFORMATION, AS WELL AS TO OTHER ASPECTS SUCH AS EMPLOYMENT AND CONTROL. EMBTEL 4230 ALSO RELEVANT.

POSSIBLY BRITISH MIGHT TRY TO PROPOUND SOME OTHER MORE LIMITED FORM OF COOPERATION -- I.E., COORDINATION OF

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLC-94-52/11
MARA, Date 5/21/79

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLAS"

EYES ONLY

1 NATO. weapons, cables, trans

~~SECRET~~

-2- 4317, MAY 23, 1 PM FROM LONDON

OVER-ALL POLICIES, WITH EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON CAPABILITIES AND PLANNING FOR USE -- WHICH WOULD NOT RPT NOT INCLUDE WEAPONS DESIGN AND FABRICATION INFORMATION OR SUPPLY OF WEAPONS AND/OR MATERIALS. POSSIBLE VALUE OF SUCH PROPOSAL TO BRITISH IN DEALING WITH DE GAULLE IS, OBVIOUSLY, ALSO ANOTHER QUESTION.

WITH RESPECT TO ANY US RPT US ACTION IN THIS REGARD WHICH MIGHT BE TAKEN BEFORE MACMILLAN SEES DE GAULLE, I SHOULD THINK THERE SHOULD BE NO HARM IN OUR SEEKING TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION FRANKLY, THOUGH PRIVATELY, WITH HIM OR LORD HOME.

BRUCE

DT

~~SECRET~~

PERSONAL

True copy
5/24/62 (2)

May 24, 1962

Dear Raymond:

I am grateful for your letter of May sixteenth, with the text of your article in Figaro. No problem has been more on our minds than this one, and the analysis in your article has been very helpful to me in understanding where some of the difficulties of our present situation lie. First let me say that I know of no one here in Washington who thinks of General de Gaulle as "an aggressor" in the current situation. The particular minor matters to which Joe Alsop referred would be small if they were real, but most of them are not. It is much more accurate to say that within the broad framework of contrasting policies considerable good will and good sense have been shown on both sides. The difficulty is in a genuine and serious political difference, and not in any small-minded irritation.

You are quite right in saying that much of our feeling derives from our conviction that the nuclear defense of the West is fundamentally indivisible. On this point, indeed, our view of the British nuclear capability is not different from our view of the French. I was not in Washington in 1957 and 1958 when it was decided to reopen nuclear cooperation with the British, but my impression is that this decision grew out of the sense of political insecurity which followed Sputnik. We were then pressing upon NATO as a whole a kind of "forward strategy" in nuclear weapons, and the reinforcement of the British in the nuclear field must have seemed a logical part of this undertaking. If we had it to do over again today, we should not encourage the British in this nuclear effort, and it is our guess that over a period of time all merely national deterrents in the hands of powers of the second rank will become uneconomic and ineffective. Thus from the point of view of nuclear weapons policy, in and of itself, the difference between our position toward Great Britain and our position toward France is simply that a commitment was made

to Great Britain at a time when thinking on these matters was very different from what it is now. I appreciate the force of your argument that Frenchmen cannot be expected to be pleased with the difference in treatment which results from this evolution of our thinking. I also recognize the force of the argument not developed in your article, but made clear to many of us by many French friends, that a society of the first quality cannot be expected to cut itself off from the technological and scientific adventures which are inherent in the nuclear field. I have a sense that much of the talent which France is committing to this enterprise feels the excitement of it more for its own sake than for any military or political purpose which a force de frappe may have. That too is entirely understandable, and in a merely technological and scientific context the absence of American cooperation would indeed be an outrageous affront to friends.

But unfortunately the nuclear problem is not merely one of scientific and technological adventure -- it is a problem of genuine hazard to the whole human race. Believing as we do that centralized control and indivisible response are vastly the least dangerous means of building the nuclear defense of the West, we are of the view that we could only shift our current policy for reasons of most unusual gravity. We do not see this kind of compelling requirement in the case of an independent French nuclear effort. That France should undertake this effort is her obvious right, and I hope you will not believe that in the Kennedy Administration there is any disposition to regard this decision with hostility; we may regret it, but it is not for us to oppose it. We may continue to hope that over time the nuclear efforts of our European partners may somehow become at once more widely European and more effectively joined, for defensive purposes, with our own. And we may believe that in the light of General de Gaulle's own policies, the extension of American assistance to France could occur today only on terms and conditions that might not move in this broad direction, but these are matters in which there is no need for bitterness or self-righteousness, on either side.

There are two further points in your article on which I should like to offer comment. With respect to Germany, I think it is probably right that for the immediate future an American decision to cooperate

with France would not produce irresistible pressures from Germany. But over time, and after the Chancellor, I feel much less confidence. The German renunciation of the manufacture of atomic weapons does not prohibit the Germans from acquiring them from others, nor does it prohibit them from participating in the manufacture and design of weapons with others. Moreover, stronger pledges than this one have been broken before by nations which felt the political pressures for prestige and power. And while Germany may lack space for testing, I do not find it hard to imagine a German argument that the lending of tunnels and open spaces is just as reasonable an act of partnership as the provision of technical information or specialized equipment. Perhaps more often than you know, our friends in the Federal Republic go out of their way to tell us that over the long pull the only hope for German solidarity with the West is equal treatment in all fields. That today they stop short of pressing this claim in practical terms in the field of nuclear technology seems to me no guarantee that they will act in the same fashion forever. Here again, we believe that the frameworks of NATO and Europe are better instruments of progress than the practice of increasing separation in nuclear defense.

With respect to England, I have a somewhat different comment. Your article comments on the depth and firmness of the decision of Great Britain to base her policies on an intimate association with the United States. This you describe as the view of General de Gaulle, and I think we could agree that on this point his assessment is correct. Moreover, in the nuclear field the particular object of British policy has been not so much to establish autonomy as to maintain a right of cautionary counsel to the United States. Thus British policy has aimed at intimacy with the United States, with an advisory relation to the safety-catch. Is it wholly unfair to say that French policy aims, by contrast, at increasing independence from the United States and immediate control of a trigger? When Walter Lippmann stated this general conclusion the other day, one of the senior members of President de Gaulle's Defense team promptly said to one of our people that he thought Lippmann was entirely right. As I have said already, the fundamental basis for our opposition to nuclear fractionalization is wider and deeper than the problem of any one nation, but I do wonder whether, in the context of these national differences

between British and French policy, your argument that what is given to Britain must in decency be given to France is not open to some question.

Let me put this point another way. One of the difficulties in the consideration of this whole question has been the absence of any real dialogue with the French Government on the subject. As I am sure you know, General de Gaulle himself has never asked for nuclear assistance, and he has never authorized any of his representatives to open the question in more than a tangential way. We thus have only our own guesswork to rely on in thinking what terms and conditions France might regard as appropriate for nuclear cooperation. To say that the French want exactly the same treatment as the British hardly meets the question, in the light of divergence of national policies which I have just touched on. What limitations on freedom of action and what commitments to common defense would France regard as reasonable? We have no way of knowing. And in a sense it is not normal that we should be required to take the initiative in a matter which involves the transfer of information that might be so used as to destroy us all. What I am suggesting is that a large part of our difficulty may lie in the fact that General de Gaulle simply does not engage in discussions which relate to this kind of problem, nor has he authorized anyone else to do so. But I am also asking what you yourself might be willing to say about the possible terms of any understanding.

I write as one friend to another, with no other purpose than to see if there are possibilities for improvement in Franco-American understanding and cooperation which our thinking has somehow neglected. I will count on you to reply with equal frankness, and I offer my apologies in advance if any clumsiness in expression has made this letter give offense in any way. I have complete reliance on your deep sympathy and understanding of the United States, and I think you know, in return, that nothing would give us more satisfaction than to find ways to exercise in practice the enormous personal feeling of sympathy which exists in this Administration for France.

Sincerely,

McGeorge Bundy

Mr. Raymond Aron
20 Rue de la Baume
Paris 8, France

NLK - 11-117
EYES ONLY
May 24 7 54 PM '62
w 18
FILE

Origin
SS

ACTION: Amembassy, PARIS PRIORITY 6319

If opportunity presents itself in your meeting with de Gaulle you should attempt correct some misconceptions on his part on underlying rationale of US exploratory talks with Soviets on Berlin which became apparent during his May 15 press conference. Same line could also be used as appropriate in Embassy contacts with ForOff.

By negative implication de Gaulle apparently under impression is engaged in definitive attempt to settle problem of Germany. This may be among Soviet objectives as embodied in their concept of drawing line under World War II, but US is under no illusions on this point. Our position remains, as it has always been, that only lasting solution to German and Berlin problems would be reunification of country in freedom with reunited Berlin as capital of this unified Germany. We are also realistic enough to recognize that this goal is unlikely to be achieved in foreseeable future, given basically conflicting Communist and Free World interests in Central Europe.

RUK to GAWK 5/24/62

Drafted by: EUR:KJHillenbrand/bb 5/24/62

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: EUR - Poy D. Koller

EUR - Mr. Tyler

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

FORM DS-322

EYES ONLY

Dept. of State (RUK-77-714)
3/30/78

NST/71a/Pr con 5/19-5/26

In explaining US approach, we have found useful conceptual framework analyzing discussions with Soviets as taking place on three levels. In this connection, you should draw on exposition in DEPTTEL 5567 to Paris of April 17, reporting Secretary's discussion with Dobrynin on previous day. We believe use of this framework can be helpful in clearing up misconceptions as to purpose of "principles paper" handed to Gromyko by Secretary in Geneva on personal and informal basis.

We cannot agree that certain broader elements included in this paper, such as nuclear nondiffusion, NATO-Warsaw Pact nonaggression statements and possible West German/East German mixed commissions amount to attempt to settle German problem. These are either merely declaratory of existing US policy or attempt to provide mechanisms (as in case of mixed commissions which suggested by Germans themselves) to improve de facto situation for benefit of Berliners, West Germans and population of East Germany.

FYI We would not, of course, anticipate that you could persuade de Gaulle of soundness US approach, given his position that mere posturing behind US nuclear deterrent will somehow or other suffice to prevent Soviets from taking unilateral actions which we cannot prevent and which will necessarily result in de facto deterioration of Berlin situation. On other hand, we do not wish to seem to agree, even by implication, with his assessment that present US/Soviet exchanges amount to

tacit

5/24/62 12

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
POLICY PLANNING COUNCIL

May 24, 1962

Mac:

Here is a revised last page for the memo, to put on the carbon which you have in place of pages 8 and 9.

George McGhee signed the memo last night, since the Secretary didn't get to it before he left. Then George thought Ball should see it. So it is now waiting Ball's review and will probably come over to you signed by Ball instead of McGhee. This memo has probably been reviewed by now by more people (McGhee, Johnson, Kohler, Bowie, Schaetzel, Fessenden, Cleveland, Vine, etc.) than any other piece of paper in the Department's history.

HO
Henry Owen

Mr. Bundy

NSF p-26 / MAW: weym, cat, France

mt-1962
File under
6/1/62

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

= 5/24/62
(all
Unon
new)

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

[Ball]

SUBJECT: UK Nuclear Cooperation with France

This memorandum outlines my views regarding UK nuclear cooperation with France.

I. The Effects of Sharing

1. UK nuclear sharing would strengthen de Gaulle in his efforts to promote European policies which are not in the US interest.

If the UK were to aid France, it would be clear that the French nuclear program had been powerfully aided, and enjoyed much more favorable prospects - in terms of both results and cost - than hitherto. This would be true if the UK shared only information developed by the UK before 1958, since the UK had made substantial progress before 1958.

Even if the sharing were thus limited to UK information, there would be a presumption in Europe that the US had connived in it, at least tacitly. Public US statements to the contrary would be taken with a grain of salt, in view of the close Anglo-American relation. There would thus be a considerable belief that this UK action represented Anglo-American ratification of the French nuclear program and of the political approach to Europe's future underlying that program.

De Gaulle's prestige would be greatly enhanced. The Europeans (including the French) who oppose his policies, and who favor an integrated Europe tightly linked to the US instead, would be weakened and discouraged as a result. De Gaulle would consider that the US and UK had succumbed to pressure, and that he could extort further concessions by the same means.

Against

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
MK-94-52/13
MRA Date 5/21/87

~~SECRET~~

NSF / 226 / MRA: Wegmy, Callahan, Brown

~~SECRET~~

-2-

Against this background, de Gaulle would be able to press ahead toward creation of a loose European grouping under French leadership with greater confidence and effectiveness than at present.

2. UK sharing with France would create much the same problems vis-a-vis Germany as U.S. sharing.

Germans would begin to view the French nuclear program as a potential success story, and wonder if they shouldn't follow suit.

Like other Europeans they would be apt to believe that this sharing indicated that the US, as well as the UK, accepted the rationale of national nuclear programs. As Ambassador Dowling has suggested in commenting on the effects of US aid to France, they would not then want the French to be the only continental country privileged to have such a program.

Over time, these views would begin to be reflected in pressures for a German national nuclear program. German leaders would gradually begin to reflect these pressures, - some out of conviction, and others to keep a firm political footing at home.

US attempts, in response to German pressures, to explain our unwillingness to aid a German nuclear program would intensify German resentment of French preferential treatment and of Anglo-American "discrimination".

These German stirrings would also move leaders and groups in other NATO countries to voice fears about Germany which they now keep to themselves. Their views would be copiously reported in Germany and would add fuel to the flames there.

In their resulting mood, the Germans might well draw back from European integration, succumb to de Gaulle's attempts to persuade them that the US was an unreliable partner, and fall in with his design for an independent "Europe des patries".

They

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

They might eventually seek nuclear cooperation with France, as part of this design. If they pressed strongly, it is unlikely that the French would indefinitely resist, since the success of their whole European policy must rest on German support and good-will.

Whether or not Franco-German nuclear cooperation developed, the alliance would be weakened and divided by German bitterness and by the fears which evident German desires for a national nuclear program would create among other NATO allies.

3. The French would probably wind up more, rather than less, hostile to the US.

The French would be constantly pressing for further British elucidation, discussion, and cooperation. The British would have a hard time, in the face of this pressure, deciding where pre-1958 information ended and post-1958 information began. If they interpreted this line "constructively", there would be continuing US-UK friction. If the British interpreted the dividing line strictly, the French would claim that they were being fouled.

A situation would be quickly created in which the British - and implicitly the French - would be pressing us to allow the UK to share US information as well. They would both expect us to acquiesce, regardless of any previous US warnings that we did not intend to allow the UK to go beyond sharing purely UK information. They would both believe that we could have prevented the initial sharing of UK knowledge if we had really wanted to - e.g., by threatening to cut off the US-UK special nuclear tie in reprisal; and that our failure to do so was a sign that our basic policy regarding the French national program was changing.

If we nonetheless proved adamant in refusing to allow the U.K. to go beyond purely U.K. information, both the French and the British would be surprised and disappointed.

U.S.

~~SECRET~~

US-French tensions would be even greater than a present as a result. If, on the other hand, we permitted US information to be involved, all the disadvantages with which you are familiar would come into play, and it is not clear that there would be any offsetting advantages to thus sharing through the UK instead of directly.

4. The Soviets would probably react to all of this by a more aggressive policy in Central Europe. They would be genuinely alarmed at the German interest in matters nuclear, and judge that pressure was the best way to discourage this interest. They would expect the allied divisions projected above greatly to weaken any allied response.

5. At this point, there would be little left of our present European policy:

(a) De Gaulle would be plowing ahead toward nationalistic goals with growing confidence.

(b) The Germans would be turning away from integration - toward either support for de Gaulle or an independent attempt to fish in troubled waters.

(c) Other NATO countries would be deeply divided by German nuclear stirrings, and discouraged by de Gaulle's progress.

(d) The USSR would see in all this allied weakness and disunity good reason to exacerbate, rather than dampen, the Berlin crisis and East-West relations generally.

6. Congressional reaction to UK aid for France would be adverse. The Joint Committee remains strongly opposed to any help for the French program. The Congress generally would probably react critically to anything which appeared to be a UK-French "deal", whereby the British sought to obtain better terms for their admission to the Common Market, in exchange

for

for nuclear help to France. The Congress would probably expect this help ultimately to involve US information - in view of the difficulty of separating out US and UK information in the hands of the UK.

II. Need for Sharing

7. UK sharing is not likely to be necessary in securing British admittance to the Common Market on what the US would consider acceptable terms. The French conduct in EEC negotiations to date suggests that they are prepared to admit the UK under the kind of ground rules which you indicated to the Prime Minister that the US itself favored. De Gaulle might well prefer to pose unreasonable terms, designed to keep the British out, but he probably does not believe that he can do so without giving serious offense to his other continental partners (notably the Germans), who are anxious to see the UK in - both to extend their export markets and to widen the base of an integrated Europe. As long as the Germans remain of this mind, de Gaulle's freedom of action will be limited.

8. The UK may nonetheless wish to propose sharing. The British Government probably does not need better terms than indicated above in order to secure domestic UK acceptance of entry, but it will naturally want better terms, and it may believe that it could get better terms through sharing.

9. The UK may in fact, not be able to get much better terms by sharing. The chief issue on which the British want better terms than the French now offer is that of temperate agriculture, i.e., the long term arrangements to be made for foodstuffs, and particularly grains, originating from the Commonwealth - notably from Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Macmillan is seeking virtually entirely preferred status for Commonwealth agriculture. De Gaulle may not wish concede on this point, since this would run directly to his basic position: That the UK must re-orient its policy away from the Commonwealth and toward Europe in joining the Common Market.

10. The "better terms" which the UK would seek regarding preferred status for Commonwealth agriculture would, in any case, be contrary to basic US interests. Such a preferred status would damage both the European integration movement and US economic interests, a point which you made to Macmillan in April.

III. The Way in Which the Issue Might Arise

11. It is doubtful, the British will propose to the French sharing of missile or aircraft technology. The only missile technology they could share would be US information which they are not free to dispose of; their own missile experience hardly qualifies them to add any expertise of their own. The French do not need British technology in the Mystere program; the US imposes no restraints on the provision of aircraft information to France.

12. The British cannot share US nuclear information without US approval, and would hesitate to share UK information if they judged that this would prejudice the US-UK preferential relation. They derive considerable prestige and some value from this tie. They may well believe that the US might curtail this tie, if the US was strongly opposed to their action in sharing UK information with France. They may fear that the US would not only cut down on the flow of information to the UK in fields of advanced military (including nuclear) technology but also diminish the "special" political relation, if it concluded that this relation was not one of complete mutual trust and confidence.

13. The British may believe, however, that they can handle the issue in a way that will not cause the US to react in this This probably depends, in their view, on being able to convince the US that:

(a) De Gaulle will make nuclear cooperation the price of Britain's entry into the Common Market.

(b)

~~SECRET~~

- 7 -

(b) The UK may, therefore, have to undertake such nuclear cooperation, even if the US should disapprove.

In this circumstance they might expect the US to make the best of a bad business by acquiescing in the inevitable. They will, accordingly, bend their best efforts in the period ahead to so arranging their dealings with both us and de Gaulle as to cause us to accept the validity of both these propositions.

14. The kind of sharing the British have in mind would be some sort of bilateral Anglo-French nuclear entente.

The present British Government, like De Gaulle, opposes the concept of a tightly integrated Europe. In the present stage of its thinking, it does not want to see other continental countries share in either the prestige of nuclear ownership or the responsibilities of nuclear decisions.

For these reasons, the British have no interest in creating a genuinely multilateral nuclear capability in which the other continental countries would take part. Should European plans move in this direction, however, the British might well want to join such a program - as they are now seeking to join the EEC - if it showed signs of getting off the ground and going forward without them. But their preferred object is to maintain a situation in which the French and the British retain ownership and effective control of their respective nuclear capabilities.

They may try to sugar coat this pill for the US by proposing to the French some form of paper "commitment" of part or all of these nuclear forces to NATO. But no one will be more conscious than they that these nationally manned and owned forces remain under national control and, therefore, subject to withdrawal at any time.

IV. Conclusion

15. We should make crystal clear to the British that we would be strongly opposed to any sharing of US or UK

information

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 8 -

information with France. We should explain the reasoning on which this US position rests, as outlined in appropriate parts of I and II, above. In arguing this case, we should be careful not to commit ourselves to indefinite continuation of the special US-UK nuclear relation. At some point after the UK joins the Common Market, French and other continental attitudes may well make it necessary for the UK to curtail or phase out this tie, if the UK is to play its full part in the European Community.

16. We should continue to seek to facilitate UK joining of the Common Market in the most effective way open to us: keeping France's continental allies persuaded that UK membership on reasonable terms is in their interest. We have recently made this point to Adenauer and Schroeder, as well as to the Italians. Our basic effort must be to offer these other countries convincing evidence that the goal of an integrated Europe, including the UK and tightly linked to the US, is more rewarding than the vistas de Gaulle holds out to them. In the nuclear field this means pressing ahead even more vigorously on the course we are now pursuing: affording our Allies an increasing role in nuclear matters within a multi-lateral framework, rather than within the framework of national efforts.

17. In short, I believe that the way to make our European policy succeed - in the nuclear, as in other, fields - is to put more steam behind it, not to undertake tactical moves which would undermine and run counter to its central thrust.

This policy shows good signs of progress. The cause of European integration is prospering. Most European opinion wants this integration to take place within the framework of an Atlantic Community.

If we stay the course, there is good reason to believe that the purposes of this policy can be fulfilled. UK sharing with France, whether pre-1958 information or otherwise, would do as much to blunt and obscure those purposes as any action we could take in this field.

George Ball

~~SECRET~~

E 4/30/62

HJK
GER: M. Hillenbrand and
Office and Officer
CUC/MR

CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1 R

MB
X

DATE: 7/26/91

Memorandum of Conversation

9036

Approved by S
5/31/62

CATEGORY "A"

DATE: May 30, 1962

10:00 A.M.

Secretary's Office

TO: Authority to: OADB
SUBJECT:) S (m) O, OADB Berlin

Sensitive Designator
Removed AUG 25 1972

1st W.P.W. (S/SI)

FILE RS/R

Downgraded To: ~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL

EO 11652: XGDS ① 2 ③ 4

Authorized By: H. D. Brewster

August 4, 1975

PARTICIPANTS:

Anatoli Dobrynin, Ambassador of the USSR
Georgi M. Kornienko, Counsellor of Soviet Embassy

The Secretary
Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary
Martin J. Hillenbrand, Director, Office of German Affairs

COPIES TO:

S/S EUR CIA
G BTF Secretary of Defense
INR L - Mr. Chayes (show) ISA
S/B P - Mr. Manning (show)
S/P White House

After an initial exchange of pleasantries, the Secretary noted that the fact that he had asked Ambassador Dobrynin to come in on an American national holiday had no special significance. He also pointed out, with reference to press reports about problems with our Allies, that these do not concern basic matters and thus were not related to the present discussion. One point discussed with our Allies involved something which Mr. Khrushchev had already rejected in his discussion with Mr. Salinger, namely, the composition of the Access Authority. The real issue is the central problem of our vital interests in Berlin, and this is between us and Moscow and not between the Western Allies.

After noting that the views of Chairman Khrushchev as expressed to Mr. Salinger had been fully reported to the President, the Secretary observed that nearly a year had gone by since the Vienna meeting between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy. During this year a considerable number of talks had been held with the Soviet Union and various things had happened. Both sides seem to consider that these talks had been useful in clarifying respective points of view. However, we could not see that much real progress had been made. During this period two things have happened: (a) There had been a certain change in the de facto situation with the construction of the wall and the further incorporation of East Berlin into East Germany. We did not like these because they were contrary to four-power agreements, but taking account of the interests of both sides and the problem which East Germany constitutes for the Soviets, we did not do anything about them.

762.00/5-3062

(b) In

FORM DS-125
61 MICROFILMED
BY S/S: CMS

CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET

20

EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

(b) In the talks with Foreign Minister Gromyko last fall, and subsequently, there has been mention of so-called broader questions. We had noted that, in regard to these, there seemed to be no real difficulty in coming to some sort of agreement and that they would fall into place if the central question of Berlin could be resolved. We did not find, however, any corresponding effort on the part of Moscow to take account of our vital interests. We have noted, for example, recent statements made in East Germany that agreement had been reached on a number of points such as nuclear non-diffusion, boundaries, and a non-aggression agreement between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries as if these were assured points to be stored away in the refrigerator. At the same time the Soviet Union's insistence on its original position with respect to West Berlin seems to be maintained.

*Finally,
a little
threat...*

The Secretary said he wanted to emphasize here that President Kennedy at Vienna had made completely clear that our commitments to West Berlin must be maintained. We could not accept the effects which a failure to do so would have on ourselves and the rest of the free world. A diminution of our position was not tolerable while, at the same time, the Soviets were consolidating their position in Germany. At Vienna, President Kennedy spelled out in considerable detail the relationship between West Berlin and US vital interests. He said that he had gained the impression that the USSR was presenting him with the alternatives either of accepting the Soviet position on Berlin or having a face-to-face confrontation. This led him to remark at one point that it appeared we were going to have a very cold winter, because a diminution of our position in West Berlin was simply not acceptable.

The Secretary noted that the Soviet Union had advanced various formulae as a substitute for the Western troop presence:

- a. Having symbolic forces of the USSR, France, the UK and the US in West Berlin as guarantors of the so-called free city;
- b. Having neutral troop contingents in West Berlin under UN aegis for a period of three to five years; and
- c. Having symbolic forces in West Berlin of other smaller NATO and Warsaw Pact countries for a period of three to five years.

These were simply variations of proposals that would eliminate the US in West Berlin, or reduce our position, and thus have the effect which President Kennedy had mentioned at Vienna.

We believe

EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

We believe that both sides, the Secretary continued, have a serious rational interest in avoiding a head-on conflict over Berlin. It would be dangerous for the two sides to come to the table, with one thinking that under no circumstances would the other fight over Berlin. This might lead to the one side's passing beyond the limits of toleration. It was, of course, true that war was irrational, but other things were also irrational, such as failing to meet our elementary commitments. We were thus trying to talk out with the Soviet Government how this situation could be handled. On the basis of what had been said so far, it did not seem likely that any agreement could be reached on a permanent settlement of the German question. We believed that any settlement which did not rest on the basic attitudes and wishes of the German people was unlikely to be permanent. There were grave disadvantages in trying to make a lasting arrangement which would merely stimulate the worst aspects of German nationalism and unsettle central Europe. We have not pressed for such a permanent settlement because we saw no real prospect of agreement, given the Soviet position. If we were wrong in this judgment, we would be willing to look again.

It would also be possible, the Secretary went on, to proceed on the basis of the factual situation, provided that all facts of the situation are taken into account, not only those facts which satisfy the Soviets. Two facts are: that Germany is not united and that the West is in West Berlin. We see no reason why the situation could not be stabilized on the basis of these facts pending an eventual permanent settlement. There is nothing more abnormal in the Western presence in West Berlin than in any other aspect of the German situation. We would regret it if the geographic situation of West Berlin created any illusions. We are there and have a basic right to be there. We have not been able to put much content into the Soviet demand that our position in West Berlin be reduced or eliminated. It is not realistic to talk about West Berlin as a military base. The Soviet military would not pretend this to be true, surrounded as West Berlin is by many Soviet divisions. Our troops are there for the political purpose of underlining and demonstrating our commitment to the city. They are in no position to take aggressive action against anyone. We have heard the phrase frequently repeated by the Soviets that it is necessary to draw a line under World War II. If, in translation, this means the time had come to remove the West from West Berlin, this is something we could not accept. The time has not come for that. We do not know what else is involved in the expression. If we are unable to agree on a permanent settlement, and apparently so far on the factual situation, what is to be done? We have said that we are willing to proceed on the basis of existing facts, the Secretary pointed out, and also to take account of a number of other matters in which the Soviets and we have expressed some

interest

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

22

CONFIDENTIAL EYES ONLY
SECRET

- 4 -

interest but which are not directly connected with Berlin. However, in our dealings with our Allies and our own people, we are unable to point to practically anything indicating that Moscow has made any effort to take our vital interests into account. We require a greater degree of reciprocity in these conversations. We cannot accept as a concession a mere reformulation of demands which amounts to the same thing, that is the reduction or elimination of the U.S. position in West Berlin. President Kennedy has more than once said that it is not compatible with the relationship between great powers for one to say that "What is mine is mine, and what is yours is negotiable." We consider, therefore, that there must be a greater degree of recognition that U.S. vital interests are involved in Berlin.

The Ambassador would recall, the Secretary continued, that in an earlier meeting between them as well as at Geneva, we had suggested a framework within which we thought these discussions might profitably proceed. We had reduced this to a paper which might be called a modus vivendi, although the title was of secondary importance. We thought that this provided a way of handling how our disputes with the Soviets might be resolved. We had tried to avoid having either side subscribe to points which were publicly known to be contrary to the positions of either side. We have said that we cannot recognize the GDR. When Ambassador Thompson said this to Foreign Minister Gromyko, the latter responded that we already did recognize the GDR. It was true that we were prepared to act on the basis that the GDR is there. We do not pretend it does not exist, nor do our Allies. The GDR has trade offices in eleven Western countries and there are substantial trade relations between West and East Germany. We have tried to leave out of our paper points the acceptance of which would require either side to change its basic position. Chairman Khrushchev had said to Mr. Salinger that the Soviets would not recognize any right of the West to maintain troops in West Berlin. In our modus vivendi paper we did not ask that this be recognized, since this did not require recognition by the Soviets. We are there and not by any right granted by the Soviets, but for reasons which are well understood. Our modus vivendi paper was silent on this point. The paper left open the way, if the Soviets felt it to be necessary in the light of their public commitments to sign some agreement with the East Germans, for them to do so. It was not the signing of such an agreement which was of concern to us, but rather the practical consequences which it purported to have on our position in West Berlin. There was no way by which one-sided arrangements between Moscow and Pankow could affect our rights and positions in West Berlin, but the practical consequences of such an arrangement were important to us. We had supposed that, in a modus vivendi, certain points of agreement might be registered and others put into a process of discussion which would open the way to their solution by peaceful means. This might take some time, but time

was

CONFIDENTIAL EYES ONLY
SECRET

EYES ONLY

SECRET

was less dangerous and expensive than haste if the latter were to involve a direct confrontation of the kind threatened over Berlin. We did not attach great importance to the precise wording of such a modus vivendi. There seemed to have been some confusion at Geneva as to precisely what we had in mind with our paper. Gromyko had handed us a working paper embodying the standard Soviet positions. This was not a paper designed to deal with the question of how we handled disagreement, but was a record of the elements which were disagreed and embodied in the Soviet position. Our paper was intended for another purpose: how to manage disagreement. It did not mention such matters as the Western occupation status or an all-Berlin solution, which would have been included in any full exposition of the Western point of view.

We consider, therefore, the Secretary went on, that our two Governments should think carefully about how they should deal with these matters and in which direction the discussions could be moved forward. We did not ask for a piece of paper recognizing our position in West Berlin. We are there. It ought to be possible to discuss and clarify some arrangements on access. The Secretary noted that he had said before that there was no inherent contradiction between free access and the authority of the East Germans in carrying out their responsibilities. This did not appear to be an insuperable problem.

The Secretary said he thought there might be an advantage in trying to find even some small point on which an advance could be made. This might be to devise some means to reduce the sense of tension existing in Berlin, which registered itself on both sides of the wall. Families were divided and could not visit each other and the flow of normal trade was made more difficult. Operation of the normal facilities of the city could best be worked out by arrangements between those responsible for the two sides of Berlin. We were interested in the possibility of increasing the well-being of the people of Berlin by facilitating their ability to work, to visit with each other, and to enjoy the cultural opportunities on both sides of the city. We could understand that the free flow of refugees that had previously taken place created great problems for the Soviets and the East Germans. It had never been our policy or that of the Federal Republic to stimulate this. When the refugees arrived in West Berlin we did what we could for them, consistent with our traditions. We did not consider it in our interest to have the flow proceed on the scale on which it proceeded. Without getting into the question of this kind of movement, we would like to see an improvement in the interchange between West and East Berlin. The Secretary then suggested a formula for the execution of an all-Berlin technical commission contained in the attachment to this memorandum of conversation, a copy of which he gave to Dobrynin at a slightly later point in the conversation.

The Secretary

EYES ONLY

SECRET

EYES ONLY

SECRET

6

The Secretary said he would like to add some comments on one or two other problems affecting the general situation. We did not fully understand why there seems to have been a tightening up of the situation. From our point of view, this seems to have been coming from the East, not from the attitudes or hopes of the West in these matters. Organically, there was no connection between Berlin and disarmament negotiations, but in the broadest political sense it was inevitable that these matters should influence each other. A crisis over Berlin would obviously have the gravest implications for disarmament. If there were movement on the one, there could be movement on the other in the sense that there would be mutual reinforcement for the effort to bring about normalization and reduction of tensions.

(See Separate Memoranda of Conversation dealing with subjects of disarmament and Laos for coverage of discussion at this point.)

Resuming the general discussion, the Secretary stated that there was need to give serious thought to the broadest direction of our respective policies. In a period where Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy would have responsibilities for the policies of their two countries, they would have a chance to decide matters of the greatest importance. These would involve whether the two great social systems represented would be able to work out their long-range relationships leading to a normal relationship between states. On ideological grounds this did not appear easy, but on practical grounds and in terms of the interests of the two and of the countries associated with them the problem did not appear to be insuperable. However, the Eastern side must recognize and take account of what the other side considers its vital interests, and not merely of what it thought the vital interests of the other side ought to be. The possibilities ahead for a more normal relationship were very great, just as the tensions and dangers of an opposite course of action would be very great. If the latter development ensued, it would be cold comfort to know that so much history depended on these two countries.

On the subject of Berlin, the Secretary noted we had made an immediate suggestion regarding an establishment of an all-Berlin technical commission. We also hoped that the Soviet Government would try to review its position carefully in an effort to find a basis on which these questions could be taken up with better reciprocity. It was not a good situation to have the President report to the U.S. people and our allied leaders report to their people, that, despite the building of the wall, the absorption of East Berlin and the discussion of certain other broad points on which agreement might possibly be found, on matters of direct major concern to us, there was nothing to show that Moscow was interested in moving towards a settlement. We also hoped, the Secretary added, that the Soviets would give further attention to our modus vivendi paper looking at it as a possible means of handling the situation of disagreement.

CONFIDENTIAL
EYES ONLY
SECRET

Ambassador

25

EYES ONLY

SECRET

Ambassador Dobrynin asked whether the formula which the Secretary had handed him on the all-Berlin technical commission was intended as a response to the paper given the Secretary by Gromyko at Geneva. The Secretary said our modus vivendi paper, given to Gromyko at Geneva, was intended as our effort to deal with the general situation as we saw it, which we did not feel, for reasons already indicated, his principles paper adequately did. Dobrynin said that what the Secretary had mentioned today had already been discussed with Gromyko and contained nothing essentially new. His understanding had been that there would be a reply to the Gromyko paper on certain points. His impression had been that now was the time to obtain this reply. Or did the Secretary not feel free to discuss the Gromyko paper, but instead wished to make different points? The Secretary observed that he had not supposed from the Geneva discussions that Gromyko expected a written reply to his paper. Dobrynin said it was not a question of a written reply, but of a reply. The Secretary commented that, from his talks with him, Gromyko could identify those points which created the main difficulties between us. If he wanted comments in an informal working paper on his informal working paper, this could be considered. Dobrynin said that Gromyko had proposed a point-by-point discussion of his paper, but now the Secretary was suggesting a different approach. The Secretary pointed out that the purposes of the two papers had been different. Recalling the content of Mr. Gromyko's paper at Geneva, he did not believe we could carry any discussion very far without a greater element of reciprocity on the part of the Soviets. He did not see enough readiness to take account of our vital interests to promise that any discussion of the Gromyko paper would be profitable. Our paper was intended to advance the process of discussion.

The Secretary said he had been interested in one formulation of Chairman Khrushchev to Mr. Salinger. He had said that the Soviets could not recognize the right of the Western powers to maintain troops in West Berlin. If this were analogous to our statement that we could not recognize the GDR, that was one thing. In the context of the other remarks made by Chairman Khrushchev, we assumed that there was no significance to this formulation, but if there were, we would be glad to know about it. That would open up further possibilities.

With respect to the German question as a whole, Dobrynin stated, there were certain positive facts. The Soviets did attach some importance to the fact that exchanges on these matters were now going on. A peace settlement and a Berlin settlement were of great importance to the Soviet Union, which had fought together with the Western powers against Germany and had suffered much. The Soviet Union now wanted to draw a line under World War II. It

was not

EYES ONLY
SECRET

EYES ONLY

SECRET

8

was not trying to gain anything from the United States. What was desired was a recognition of the situation existing in Germany, that is the existence of two German states. During the War the U.S. and the Soviet Union had been allies, and had had the same aim of eliminating the Hitlerite aggressive forces. But now, the troops of the two countries have different aims. They were not allies any more. U.S. troops were in West Berlin not just as occupation troops, but as NATO troops. He was not speaking of the number of such troops, but of the fact that they were still there to fight the Soviets and against Soviet interests. It was, therefore, better to lessen tensions and to settle this matter so that relations between the Soviet Union and the U.S. could be improved. Clearly, the Soviet Union wanted to have good relations with the United States, but certain circles in West Germany wanted the two countries to clash. Otherwise, their "Great German" schemes could not be carried out. The Soviet Union was not interested in such a clash. In response to the Secretary's query as to who precisely in West Germany wanted such a clash, Dobrynin said that many people demanded the restoration of the German borders as before, and he was sure the Secretary knew who they were as well as he did. Such a restoration could not be obtained without U.S. assistance; hence they wanted a clash between the Soviet Union and the U.S. A settlement of the situation in West Berlin would be good for both countries. If this could not be obtained, then we might come to the point where we would be confronted by a great test. The Soviet Union was trying to avoid this and to seek a solution. If one were to take the substance of the Secretary's statement, Dobrynin continued, and what is being discussed in the West German press, what the Western powers were trying to do was to find a settlement of the German and West Berlin problem within the framework of the old occupation situation, and without taking account of the new situation in the world and in Europe. The Secretary asked what he meant by the "new situation." Dobrynin responded the war has been over for more than 17 years, and we could not live forever in a state of war. It was necessary to draw a line under World War II in a legal sense. The Soviet Union wanted to legalize the situation of peace. Whether one liked it or not, there were two Germanies. The Secretary commented that when we talk of the fact of the two Germanies, we also must say that our presence in West Berlin and free access thereto are facts.

Dobrynin said that the general line of the Western approach was very clear; it was an open secret which could be read in the papers. The substance of the West German proposals as they had appeared in the press had the intention of spreading the occupation rights existing in West Berlin to the communications between West Berlin and the outside world. They wanted to continue four-power responsibility, but what responsibility did the four-powers have? Ninety-five per cent of all traffic to West Berlin was the responsibility of the GDR. Five per cent was controlled by the Soviets

under

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL EYES ONLY CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL SECRET CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

under agreement with the East Germans. When the peace treaty was signed the Soviet Union would give that five per cent back to the East Germans. It could not be said that even now there was any four-power responsibility for access. The Secretary said he could not accept such a formulation. Dobrynin observed that the Secretary had spoken of facts. It was a fact that ninety-five per cent of all traffic to West Berlin was now the responsibility of the GDR. The Soviets had felt that it was a good idea, after the Geneva discussions, for him (Dobrynin) and the Secretary to proceed with the positive points which had been discussed with Gromyko, but now three or four meetings had taken place in Washington and "we had not made a single move." The Secretary commented that he was glad that Dobrynin had said "we."

Dobrynin stated that in the respective positions of the two countries there were certain things in common which could be settled without too much difficulty. However, as Chairman Khrushchev had said to Mr. Salinger, and Gromyko and he to the Secretary, all these questions could be easily solved, but only if there were a settlement of the main question--liquidation of the occupation regime in West Berlin. He referred to the fact that the Secretary had many times raised the question of guarantees of access. The Soviets had accepted the idea of an arbitration body or board. This had been a move on their part, after the President had first raised the subject of an access authority with Adzhubei. The Soviets were ready to discuss this but they could only accept the idea if there were agreement on the main point--ending the occupation regime in West Berlin. When speaking of an access authority, the Soviets had always made it clear this was not a control organ over access, for the access routes go through the sovereign territory of the GDR, which has the only real right to exercise the right of a sovereign state within its sovereign territory. It was difficult to expect that the GDR and the Soviets would agree to give rights which already belong to the GDR to an international body. When the peace treaty was signed, the GDR would have all its sovereign rights over access. The Soviet Government was not prepared to discuss suggestions aimed at strengthening the remnants of the occupation regime instead of its liquidation. Dobrynin noted that the so-called West German proposals had not been discussed, but as these had appeared in the press, they were completely unacceptable to the Soviet Union which was unwilling to consider anything aimed at strengthening the occupation regime. The Soviet Union still hoped that an agreement could be reached on West Berlin and a German peace settlement. It felt that there was a possibility of ending the occupation regime without inflicting moral damage on the U.S. or Soviet Governments. They could declare to their people that they had come to an agreement directed at achieving closer relations between both countries. He, therefore, had to say that while there was some glimmering of hope for an agreement, his Government could not accept the maintenance of occupation rights

*but not
different
to West
to do
rms*

in West Berlin,

CONFIDENTIAL EYES ONLY CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL SECRET CONFIDENTIAL

EYES ONLY
SECRET

- 11 -

Again referring to his notes, Dobrynin referred to the Secretary's remarks on co-existence and said that it was the Soviet Union's view that the two countries should really co-exist. In the ideological sphere this was more difficult, but in the factual sphere the Soviets felt that peaceful co-existence was both possible and required. There were no insuperable problems between the two.

The Secretary said he wanted to comment on a few points made by Dobrynin. The latter had referred to our troops in West Berlin as being there to fight the Soviets. They were not there to fight anyone if West Berlin were left alone. They were there to insure the safety of West Berlin. On the question of rights, he continued, neither in terms of international law nor the specific post-war arrangements was there any way by which the Soviet Union could create a situation in East Germany which modified our rights in West Berlin. If we differed on this, we wanted the Soviets to be clear on how we saw the situation. On the other hand, there was no need for practical interference with the authorities in East Germany in the maintenance of free access. This was something that could be resolved, but we did not want to leave the impression that we think East German sovereignty can in any way take over our rights in West Berlin.

On the central question, the Secretary continued, Dobrynin had said the key was in our hands. This was an expression of the lack of reciprocity which is at the heart of the problem. Far-reaching proposals for change have come from the Soviet side. It is not we who have developed the sense of crisis over West Berlin. We cannot accept the proposition that the Soviet Union should make such proposals and then claim that the key is in our hands in the sense that we must accept them. One cannot deal with the United States in that way. The key is in Soviet hands in that it has made the proposals. We are willing to try to find a common key. We require some reciprocal recognition that our vital interests are involved. In that sense the key is in the Soviet hands.

As to the technical commission in Berlin, the Secretary added, our thoughts were that anything that reduces tension between Germans in Berlin would be beneficial to us, since such a reduction of tension would be transmitted to us. Dobrynin said the two sides could not deal with this matter in the fashion suggested in the paper handed him. The Secretary said this was just a suggested formulation. Dobrynin said it was up to the Germans and not to us. The Secretary asked whether he did not think ^{it was} a matter where we could not exercise a certain influence. Dobrynin merely repeated that it was the Germans' job, not ours. Mr. Kohler noted that he had read that the wall had represented a decision of the Warsaw Pact powers.

Dobrynin

EYES ONLY
SECRET

30

EYES ONLY

SECRET

- 12 -

Dobrynin said that, if the Secretary preferred to use the term "common key", the Soviets were prepared to accept this. He did not understand the Secretary's remarks, however, about GDR sovereignty. The Secretary said he had been referring to an article in an East German paper that we had already recognized the sovereignty of East Germany. Dobrynin commented that the U.S. may be overly sensitive on this. The Soviets understood this, but what they wanted was that the sovereign right of the GDR in its own territory be recognized. The Secretary noted that he had said the Soviets could not give East Germany something which the Soviets did not have. Dobrynin injected that, with the peace treaty, the GDR would enjoy full sovereignty. The Secretary said "Not without our consent." Dobrynin responded "This is where we differ."

Dobrynin said he had noted that the Secretary was planning another trip to Europe. The Secretary said he might make such a trip, but only for a few days. At Athens he had not had time to discuss many problems of interest to the West other than Berlin and Germany, and he wanted to deal with these, such as the common market. Dobrynin said he thought this was mainly Undersecretary Ball's subject.

As the conversation terminated, it was agreed that Dobrynin would report back to Moscow and when he received new instructions would request a further meeting with the Secretary.

EYES ONLY
SECRET

31

SECRET

This document contains 2 pages; end May 1962
Number 1 of 10 copies. Price A

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
EUR

8838

E96

DATE:

TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S *[initials]*

FROM: EUR - Roy D. Kohler *[initials]*

SUBJECT: German Suggestions for Changes in the "Principles Paper"

9/23/62

There is attached a paper prepared in GER presenting in tabular form the language in our revised "Principles Paper" of April 24, 1962, in the changes which I discussed with Carstens at Athens and in the German Aide-Memoire of May 22, 1962. The relevant German arguments for the new language which they favor are as follows:

Preamble second paragraph - "It appears necessary to make this addition because the Four Powers in certain questions such as that of making non-aggression declarations between the two pact systems possess no exclusive competence".

1(c) "With this proposed expansion a tendency toward improvement of the access procedures currently in effect would be established".

1(c) "By this new formulation the impression would be avoided that the limitations and prohibitions under i to iv determine the important content of the existing procedures".

2(a) "The formula used up to now could be so understood as if doubt existed about the wish of the German people as a whole for reunification".

2(b) "The proposed change in the text brings about dropping the third commission which has the responsibility for discussing the draft of an electoral law or other steps in the direction of the reunification of Germany. Such a mandate would have a purely political and non-technical character. The Federal Government, by the acceptance of such a mandate, would set itself along the line of one demand of the Soviets' German policy: 'Germans at one table'. The change in the text leads further to a re-establishment of the earlier foreseen mandate of the second commission to remove limitations on freedom of movement in Germany with particular emphasis on cultural and technical contacts".

3(c) "In the view of the Federal Government the part of this paragraph the omission of which is proposed should not be part of a Berlin agreement. In this connection, a responsibility of the nuclear Powers to press non-nuclear Powers toward nuclear abstinence could be interpreted as meeting

762.00 / 5-2362

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY *[initials]* SECRET *[initials]* DATE *[initials]* [halfway]

- RELEASE
- EXISE
- DENY
- DECLASSIFY
- DECLASSIFY in PART
- DELETE
- Non-responsive info.

- CLASSIFY as _____
- DOWNGRADE TO () S or () C, _____

EUR: GER: M Hillenbrand "FECashin"

SECRET

-2-

halfway the Soviet demand for the establishment of a nuclear free zone in Germany. Moreover the Federal Government does not intend to make a broader declaration than that made in its declaration of 1954 in connection with the Brussels treaty about refraining from the manufacture of ABC weapons as the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs has emphasized several times.

"The Federal Government proceeds further from the point of view that the envisaged declaration concerning the nondiffusion of nuclear weapons should in no way change the currently employed system for the maintenance of the nuclear defensive capability of NATO or the possibility of establishing a multilateral nuclear force within NATO, and this will also be made fully clear to the Soviets".

4(c) "The proposed text signifies no essential change, but it protects the Western legal standpoint by which Germany as well as Greater Berlin continue to exist as unities".

"In our view this paper should only be given to the Soviets when there exists the prospect of agreement soon. The decision whether this is the case remains ceded to the Government of the United States".

You will recall that, at Athens, the Germans stressed the Chancellor's desire that we take advantage of our discussions with the Soviets to attempt to secure some alleviation of conditions in the GDR. There was the suggestion that we might even hint that an improvement of conditions in the GDR, including a change in the political leadership, could lead to a less negative Western position.

In view of the German desire to do something about conditions in the GDR, repeated again by Carstens to Dowling, it seems desirable to consider including some appropriate remarks to Dobrynin in your next meeting. We, accordingly, have some talking points on the subject along with the others.

In this connection, you will be interested to know that, as early as the Working Group meetings in Paris, which preceded the Four-Power Ministerial Meeting in August, we attempted to inject the idea of talking about the GDR to the Soviets in the sense indicated into the draft instructions of the Working Group for the early Ambassadorial approach in Moscow which was being considered as a logical next step in establishing contact with the Soviets. An American paper on the subject was prepared and tabled. However, the other Working Group delegations, including the Germans, were unenthusiastic, and the theme was squeezed down to a point in an appendix to the Tactical Section of the Working Group Report that, if an Ambassadorial approach were made in Moscow, at an appropriate point observations might be made on the situation in the GDR.

Attachment:

Comparison of Language Changes in "Principles Paper".

EUR:GER: MJH:llenbrand; FE:Cash; gw.

5/23/62.

SECRET

SECRET

DRAFT PRINCIPLES, PROCEDURES, AND INTERIM STEPS

April 24

May 5-6

May 22

Preamble 2nd para—In this connection, a Committee of Foreign Ministers' Deputies will be established which France and the UK will be invited to join.

Preamble 2nd para—In this connection, a Committee of Foreign Ministers' Deputies will be established which France and the UK will be invited to join if and when matters are to be discussed in which they have direct responsibility.

Preamble 2nd para—In this connection, a Committee of Foreign Ministers' Deputies will be established which France and the UK will be invited to join if and when matters are to be discussed in which they have direct responsibility.

1(c) Interim Steps: In the meantime, they declare that access procedures in effect on January 1, 1962 will remain in effect.

1(c) Interim Steps: In the meantime, they declare that access procedures in effect on January 1, 1962 will remain in effect until the Foreign Ministers' Deputies have agreed on improvements of access procedures.

1(c) Included among procedures in effect on January 1, 1962 is the fact that transit will proceed along the same communication routes presently used, and will be subject to compliance with the existing procedures whereby:

1(c) Included among procedures in effect on January 1, 1962 are the facts that:

(i) transit vehicles and their passengers are not allowed to deviate from the established transit routes;

(i) transit will proceed along the same communication routes presently used;

(ii) passengers in transit are not allowed to go beyond the limits of the communications routes used for transit;

(ii) transit vehicles and their passengers are not allowed to deviate from the established transit routes;

(iii) passengers in transit are prohibited from giving or receiving any articles; and

(iii) passengers in transit are not allowed to go beyond the limits of the communications routes used for transit;

(iv) no one may board vehicles in transit to Berlin.

(iv) passengers in transit are prohibited from giving or receiving any articles; and

(v) no one may board vehicles in transit to Berlin.

2(a) General Principles: They believe that the Germans have the right to determine their own future, and to re-establish the unity of Germany, if they

2(a) General Principles: They believe that the Germans have the right to determine their own future, and to re-establish the

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

April 24

May 5-6

May 22

ire, and they wish to
state the exercise of this
in a way that will en-
the security of all
European peoples.

unity of Germany, and they wish
to facilitate the exercise of
this right in a way that will
enhance the security of all
European peoples.

Future Negotiations:

They agree that the authorities
in West and East Germany should
be invited to establish three
technical commissions,
consisting of officials
designated by these authorities,
to increase cultural and tech-
nical contacts, to promote
mutually beneficial economic
exchanges, and to consider a
change in electoral law or other
matters toward German reunifica-
tion, respectively.

2(b) Future Negotiations:

They agree that the committee
of Foreign Ministers' Deputies
should consider all adequate
steps to make progress toward
realizing this right. It might
also consider the possibility
of establishing mixed technical
commissions, consisting of
officials designated by the
authorities in West and East
Germany, for such matters as:
to promote mutually beneficial
economic exchanges and to re-
move existing restrictions
concerning the free movement
of persons in Germany, in-
cluding those imposed on
cultural and technical
contacts.

2(b) Future Negotiations:

They agree that the authorities
in West and East Germany should
be invited to establish two
mixed technical commissions,
consisting of officials
designated by these authorities,
to promote mutually beneficial
economic exchanges and to re-
move existing restrictions
concerning the free movement
of persons in Germany, in-
cluding those imposed on
cultural and technical
contacts.

Interim Steps: In the

interim, as states now owning
nuclear weapons, they declare
they will not themselves re-
linquish control over any
nuclear weapons to any in-
dividual state or regime not
now owning such weapons; they
will not transmit to such state
or regime information, equip-
ment, or material necessary
for their manufacture; and
they will urge states or regimes
not now owning nuclear weapons
to undertake not to try to
obtain control of such weapons
by transmitting to other states or
regimes information, equip-
ment, or material necessary
for their manufacture.

3(c) Interim Steps: In the

interim, as states now
owning nuclear weapons, they
declare they will not them-
selves relinquish control over
any nuclear weapons to any
individual state or regime not
now owning such weapons, and
they will not transmit to such
state or regime information,
equipment, or material neces-
sary for their manufacture.

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

April 24

(c) Interim Steps: In the meantime they declare they will not themselves use or support the use of force to change the external and internal borders of Germany including the existing borders of West Berlin, and they note with approval declarations by German authorities in the same sense.

5(a) The parties note with approval declarations by the competent German authorities, assuring their allies that they will act in conformity with the above provisions regarding access and other matters relevant to their functions and prerogatives.

May 5-6 May 22

4(c) Interim Steps: In the meantime they declare they will not themselves use or support the use of force to change the external and internal borders or demarcation lines of Germany, including those of West Berlin, and they note with approval declarations by German authorities in the same sense.

5(a) The parties note with approval declarations by the competent German authorities, assuring their allies that they will act in conformity with the above provisions regarding access and other matters relevant to their functions. /US agreed to substitute "and responsibilities" for "and prerogatives."7

4(c) Interim Steps: In the meantime they declare they will not themselves use or support the use of force to change the borders and demarcation lines of Germany including those of West Berlin, and they note with approval declarations by German authorities in the same sense.

SECRET

.
.
.
.

v6.

DRAFT AIRGRAM

ACTION: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: AmEmbassy BONN _____ AmEmbassy LONDON _____

SUBJECT: French Views on NATO Nuclear Policies



Secretary McNAMAR's presentation made May 5 at the Athens NATO meeting and the U.S. paper on MREM's submitted to NAC June 15 were discussed with French officials at a series of meetings on June 25 by Mr. Robert BOWIE, Consultant to the Secretary of State, Mr. Henry ROWEN, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and an Embassy officer. The military and political bases of the U.S. position and the U.S. desire to work out with its European allies an acceptable solution to the nuclear problems of the alliance were stressed. Discussion developed the following French viewpoints.

Meeting with Ambassador Francois DE ROSE and Vice-Admiral Pierre O'NEILL, who are respectively Civilian and Military Deputies to the Chief of Staff of National Defense:

1. The French want to study carefully the U.S. proposals and will apparently have a number of questions to ask on the U.S. MREM paper. These questions will deal at least in part with targeting policy, the adequacy of present and prospective coverage of opposing forces, and the effectiveness of remotely based strategic forces.
2. Several military considerations are important. SACEUR has stated a need for MREM's to replace manned aircraft. Military commanders prefer to have control over the various means of their defense rather than surrendering control to command echelons further removed from the scene of conflict.

AUTHORITY 92-127
 EO 12356, Sec. 3.4
 UNCLASSIFIED
 MIL Date 6/21/93

Acheson Dip / SD + WREN 1962 / 852

UNCLASSIFIED

NATO military commanders described in MC-95 several military situations calling for the virtually immediate use of nuclear weapons; these views were rejected at the political level during subsequent NAC discussion. But there is a military problem and a multilateral force with dispersed control would be unable to act quickly enough.

3. The U.S. has asserted that it can carry out the alliance's strategic mission with programmed forces. (It was agreed that MREM's are strategic and would be used only in the event of a general nuclear war.) But European nations are especially concerned about forces threatening them and want some means in Europe of countering these opposing forces. When asked if missiles should be stationed in Europe as distinct from being controlled from Europe, de Rose said that he meant the latter. Seaborne forces might be preferred.

4. The U.S. has given the impression that it wants to create another sharp point of discontinuity in the spectrum of escalation in addition to the non-nuclear/^{present}~~nuclear~~ distinction by making possible a tactical nuclear war confined to Europe. The refusal of the U.S. to replace manned aircraft by strategic missiles in Europe is evidence of this intent. Moreover, the U.S. will withdraw its tactical nuclear weapons. Admittedly the U.S. is doing the opposite now, but in time the policy will be reviewed.

5. There are also important political elements. The European members of NATO are gaining in strength and need a stronger voice in NATO policy. The Europeans and especially the Germans want definite assurance that they will be defended by necessary means in event of attack, and they also believe that a strong nuclear deterrent must be assured in order that the Soviets will be dissuaded from initiating an attack.

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

6. A multilateral NATO force would be uncertain in the event of attack because the determination to resist varies among the NATO members. The likelihood of Soviet blackmail would be greater and the chances of its success larger if NATO were to establish a multilateral ownership and control of an MRBM force because the weak members could prevent its use. The problem of responding to a sudden nuclear attack is not difficult. The U.S. has said that it would respond immediately and this is ^{accepted,} ~~understood~~. But how about other situations, the nuclear threat or a limited attack? In these circumstances it is much more plausible that national forces will respond. It would be more effective if the U.S. were to make bilateral arrangements with its allies rather than to favor a multilateral solution.

7. France has no intention whatsoever of using its national nuclear force as a means of triggering a war which would require the U.S. to come to France's defense. This notion is crazy.

8. Relations between the U.S. and France are not happy. The U.S. paper of June 15 has created malaise in the minds of a number of other European NATO members, some of whom are now coming to the point of view that France is right in creating a national force. Officials from two smaller countries ^{came} ~~came~~ to de Rose after ~~the~~ June 15 and told him that they now understand the reason for the force de frappe and they think it a good thing.

Meeting with General Andre MARTIN, Chief of Staff to Minister MESSMER

1. NATO's military requirement for major tactical numbers system will be met by VSTOL aircraft and PERSHING missiles.

2. Militarily there is a question whether MRBM's with their long-range are necessary. They are essentially strategic rather than tactical weapons. Moreover, he agrees with the U.S. view that longer range higher yield

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

strategic weapons dominate tactical weapons.

3. Politically and psychologically European NATO members need greater assurance over the means of their defense. Therefore, some force such as an NREM force is necessary.

4. NATO should put greater stress on cooperative armament production. Here is where very basic decisions should be made. Cooperation between Europe and the U.S. can take various forms: Cooperation between private armaments producers, consortia such as the HAWK group, or full-scale governmental cooperation. More should be done along all these lines.

Meeting with Jean de la GRANDVILLE and Henri RUFFIN of Service des Pactes, FonOff.

1. Secretary RUSK and COUVE agreed that the NREM problem should be studied without any pressure for rapid decision. They also agreed that U.K. entry into the Common Market would have a basic effect on this problem.

2. In the meantime, NATO SYG STIKKER's first two proposals, study of NREM military requirement and costs, should be carried out by the NAC.

3. Europeans link the Ambassador FINLETTER statement of June 15 with Secretary McNamara's Athens statement and deduce a U.S. intention to withhold strategic nuclear weapons from Europe and to cut back on tactical nuclear weapons already in Europe.

4. Europe needs a bigger role in its defense. Even the British have made it clear by successive statements that they will assert the independent national character of their nuclear force even though it is coordinated with the U.S. Following McNAMARA's Michigan speech, Watkinson first emphasized the closeness of identity of the British force with the U.S. But public opinion forced him several days later to stress its political independence.

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

5. The German problem is admittedly difficult but there is no reason to conclude that development of the U.K. and French forces has set in motion a trend for a whole series of national forces within NATO. Legal restrictions inhibit Germany and capabilities differ among the NATO nations.

6. Military integration among the NATO nations will have to come after first economic, and then political progress toward unity. EDC proved that it was premature to try to put military before political unification.

7. Under the June 15 proposal, control over nuclear weapons would remain in the United States. The Europeans would thus not obtain control over use of the MRBM's. Control remains a key problem in the view of France.

Meeting with General Paul STEHLIN, Chief of Staff of French Air Force.

1. General Stehlin is in complete agreement with U.S. views on nuclear weapons so far as military considerations are involved. He shares the view that unity or at least closest coordination of command and control is essential.

2. The French do not have enough independent information or access to U.S. plans sufficient for them to be satisfied with our assertions on the military adequacy of our program and plans. Speaking for himself, he agrees with the U.S. analysis on the military side. But there is a psychological problem stemming from lack of access to the facts.

3. The French nuclear force will be an extremely weak one for years to come. It is inefficient for France to be providing fifty bombers and these fifty bombers ~~capable of delivering nuclear weapons~~ certainly do not constitute a strong nuclear force.

4. General de Gaulle cannot agree that the defense of France may be entrusted to a foreign country. The memory of 1940 is still strong in the mind of de Gaulle and other important Frenchmen.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

5. General Stehlin rationalizes the French nuclear force on the ground that it is the germ of a European nuclear deterrent force. He believes that this is also General de Gaulle's idea although de Gaulle has never said this. Stehlin has discussed the idea of a European force, apparently composed in the first instance of French and British forces, with other European military. The British have, so far, said they cannot discuss it because of their special relations with the U.S. Regarding the Germans, Stehlin feels that some arrangement could be worked out whereby the Germans would not control nuclear bombs on German soil but rather Germany would contribute industrially and financially to the development of a European nuclear deterrent.

6. A European nuclear force would work very intimately with the U.S. There would be the closest coordination. The idea of a European "third force" in between Russia and the U.S. is absurd. Two things are vital: that the countries of NATO remain united, and that the U.S. remain committed to defense of Europe indefinitely. *for the future*

7. U.S. military relations with Europe are in a critical stage. The problem of nuclear relations between Europe and the U.S. is at the heart of the issue. It must be solved in a way that gives Europe a proper role.

COMMENTS.

1. The official French view on the policy of the U.S., especially as put forward by de Rose and de la Grandville is as follows:

a. The U.S., now vulnerable to nuclear attack, is limiting its commitments to the defense of Europe. Our emphasis on non-nuclear forces, on the controlled use of nuclears, on the limited utility of tactical nuclears, on our refusal to base strategic weapons (MRBM's) in Europe, provides a consistent body of evidence to support this view. *Winters*

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The

by McNAMARA's Athens and Michigan speeches and the June 15 position on the MREEM ~~clearly support this view.~~

b. It may be surmised that the French will shortly seize on the U.S. decision to install the permissive link on weapons in Europe as further ~~proof~~ ^{proof} ~~of this~~ (There was no discussion of this subject in these meetings.) The argument will probably run: "Now we understand your tactical nuclear policy. It is not, as we had assumed, to remove these weapons, but to leave them in Europe -- neutralized by the lack."

c. The multilateral force proposal of the U.S. is intended to divert effort from the French and British forces towards a multilateral force over which the U.S. has a veto.

d. Alternatively, we don't want the multilateral force to come into being; it is a smokescreen to help avoid giving nuclear aid to France. If we did want it to come into being, why do we take the position that there is no urgent military need for an MREEM force?

e. The French see the need for close coordination with the U.S. on nuclear policies and military strategy in general, but there must be a greater voice for France and for Europe in strategic decisions.

2. There seems now to be a strong possibility that the French will propose the creation of a European nuclear force in the near future. This force would be composed of British and French operational units under national command but committed to a European command. Financial and materiel support from Germany ~~might~~ ^{would} be sought. This force should be closely coordinated with the U.S. through NATO. It seems likely that there have ~~obviously~~ been some cautious discussions between the French and British on this idea.

7
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

3. There is no disposition evident on the part of the French military (certainly Stehlin and Martin and probably O'Neill) to quarrel with U.S. strategic views or the adequacy of our programs. They have positive views on these matters, but qualify them in two important respects:

① They do possess all of the necessary information to make judgements, and ② their influence today is quite limited.

However, after de Gaulle, their influence is likely to be much greater. Since some of them at least seem sympathetic to our ideas and anxious to learn more, it would seem sensible for the U.S. to make a determined effort both to see ~~that~~ that certain potentially influential French military officers are brought to a fuller understanding of our ideas, and capabilities, and ~~that~~ that they be given a feeling of being more on the inside.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Miller
MRBM
6

1 June 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL TAYLOR

SUBJECT: Avoiding a Collision Course in US Policy Toward MRBMs in NATO

1. This memorandum will attempt to incorporate only one attribute: a dispassion appropriate to the level of the President when those who advise him on politico-military policy seem to be pursuing collision courses with respect to our Allies and even among themselves. There is plenty of back-up material if you want it; I am prepared to discuss in depth the points at issue; and, finally, there is certainly no lack of crusaders prepared to defend their ex parte positions before the President if that seems to be indicated.

2. All seemed well after Athens. On May 21, Secretary Rusk himself approved a "where-do-we-go-from-here" circular cable to all NATO capitals which was a masterpiece of moderation in its counsel on going slowly with the MRBM question while we awaited appropriate initiatives from our Allies (Circular 2005). Then things started to go wrong:

a. At its Paris meeting on May 21, the Military Committee of NATO considered MC 99. This was a paper prepared without national guidance, labeled "Discussion Draft", and entitled "Military Aspects of the Introduction of MRBMs into NATO". It was, however, an appropriate NATO military exercise for the period after the Paris December Ministerial Meeting, at which the Council had deferred action on Norstad's stated MRBM requirement pending further study and information. In effect, the MC 99 draft endorses a military requirement for MRBMs in NATO. A few days before the meeting Secretary McNamara had furnished to the U.S. representative detailed guidance for use in the further development of MC 99; if the U.S. representative had tabled all this guidance at the meeting, it could hardly have escaped striking our Allies as a massive U.S. power play to demolish the paper, far in advance of the parallel political consideration of MRBMs calmly contemplated by Secretary Rusk in Circular 2005. General Lemnitz, acting in rotation as Military Committee Chairman (and therefore wearing an international hat), had no alternative but to suggest that the Standing Group proceed to revise MC 99 in the light of comments at the meeting, with a view to processing a final version through the Military Committee to the North Atlantic Council "by the earliest practicable date".

b. On May 28th Ambassador Durbrow and Secretary-General Stikker engaged in a tour d'horizon, in the course of which Stikker, referring to MC 99, apparently bore down rather hard on MRBMs, implying a need

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLK-94-36
By: [Signature] NARA, Date: 10/10/94

NSA / 216 / MLP 1162-6162

SECRET

- 2 -

to move forward with Council consideration of them (POLTOs 1581 and 1582). In an Eyes Only message to Secretary Rusk on May 30th, Ambassador Finletter reinforced Durbrow's reports, adding that he needed instructions quickly -- preferably approved by the President because of "local and exceptional reasons", possible "friction", and "a fundamental difference of opinion" on MREMs, all of which obviously refer to General Norstad's known position and his strong potential influence on the Council (POLTO 1594). In response to these reports from Paris, State and Defense have been preparing a joint message of instruction for Finletter; it should reach the White House for approval today or tomorrow (June 1st or 2nd).

3. At this point of possible crisis, substance is secondary; what is primarily important is to avoid unnecessary conflict and collision. This requires two parallel courses of action:

a. Acquire some control over MC 99 and slow it down, simultaneously muffling General Norstad's applause from the sidelines;

b. Help Stikker to collect himself and to prevent the Council from jumping the track on which it was working at Athens and after Athens as late as May 21st, when Secretary Rusk sent his moderate message of guidance to all NATO capitals.

4. Two courses of action which might work are:

a. Let the Standing Group go ahead with its revision of MC 99, but as a part of this operation have the U.S. Representative sponsor a Standing Group request to SACEM for a fully detailed justification of the 655 MREMs he has stated to be necessary for the modernization of his strike capability.

b. Inform Stikker (and, if necessary, the Council members) that the NATO military authorities are proceeding with their deliberate and detailed examination of the military aspects of NATO MREMs, and suggest that, meanwhile, the harmonious moderation and agreement that characterized his (and their) handling of the MREM question before, during, and after Athens should not now yield to sudden and inexplicable panic.

5. The above courses of action prejudge nothing substantive, which may be either virtue or fault; they would, however, tend to stabilize matters right now, which is probably on balance an advantage. What would then happen might be something like this:

a. For the first time, Norstad would have to defend in detail his MREM requirement with something besides rhetoric. This would

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

6

- 3 -

take time, which the United States could well use on both the political and military sides of the house to sell its case gradually, an approach which everyone was applauding a scant few weeks ago. No matter what the final MC 99 says, it can always be treated as expressing "purely military" views (as was the case with MC 95 on command and control) and either placed in cold storage or, if necessary, overruled by compelling political and economic considerations.

b. Stikker, restored to normal from an emotional state for not the first time during his tenure of office, would resume his pre-Athens and Athens role of Great Moderator as the Council proceeds with its work in accordance with the Ministerial agreements at that meeting, including such deliberate discussion of MREMs as our Allies care to initiate. If MC 99 or Norstad himself (directly or indirectly) has been bothering Stikker, the Standing Group's MC 99 activity, including Norstad's participation, should help reassure the Secretary-General.

LEGRE

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NK-94-53

NARA Doc

12/1/94

6-2-62
14

DRAFT/6-2-62

A. Broad Alternatives within NATO

The nuclear structure of NATO is likely to evolve in one of three broad ways during the 1960's:

1. U. S. nuclear force plus weak British and French forces; possibly German and other national forces by 1970.
2. U. S. nuclear force plus small British and French forces and a modest NATO multilateral force with a U. S. veto.
3. U. S. nuclear force plus a modest European nuclear force (no U. S. veto), British and French national efforts probably limited in favor of the European force.

The preferred situation from the U. S. viewpoint is not included in this list. It would be for Britain and France to recognize the folly of carrying forward national programs, for them to cut their programs back, possibly even terminate them, and for no other national programs to be started. This situation seems highly improbable, especially for the French. What is the next best alternative? The choice would seem to lie between (1) continued U. S. discouragement of national forces (probably including a turn-around in our nuclear cooperation with Britain) but with the expectation that the British and French (and in time probably other) national programs will continue; and that there will be weak nuclear forces - but ones strong enough to be political factors in peacetime and potentially disastrous ones in war-time; (2) In addition, to support, as we now are, the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force with a U. S. veto in the hope that this will stave off German pressures for its own nuclear force and in time may come to be regarded by the British and French as better serving their interests than

NSF/226 / NATO: weapons, cables, France / JFAL
"blind paper on NATO + nuclear weapons"

14

their national forces. We have set as an objective that this force be international in its operation and manning; however, technology may make it possible through the use of the permissive link to have nationally operated units and international control over them; (3) the U. S. might support the creation of a European nuclear force free of a U. S. veto that could be stronger than foreseeable national programs in Europe but a good deal weaker than projected U. S. nuclear strength. A possible condition for the creation of such a force might be the limitation or abandonment of national nuclear programs.

B. Prospects with Current U. S. Policies

1. The Future of the French Program

It now appears virtually certain the French nuclear program will be carried on post-de Gaulle. Much less certain is the vigor with which this program will be pursued once the initial goal of a minimal, largely symbolic, operational capability exists. Even the present French program, which does not attempt to give France a protected retaliatory power of any considerable magnitude by 1970, may call for resources beyond those now anticipated by the French despite their increasing awareness of the high costs of the nuclear game. The program seems to have wide enough support in industry, the military, and even in the National Assembly for its future to be assured. We should assume: (1) that France will continue with an independent program under de Gaulle; and (2) that after de Gaulle there may be a lessening in interest and less money for the program but it is almost certain to continue.

2. Franco-German Cooperation

The French may seek support from the Germans, especially as the costs mount. Moreover, if the government really believes what Couve de Murville has said, that a German program is inevitable, the French might seek to link

14

up the Germans with themselves in a joint program rather than see an independent German program develop. However, their allies would clearly be strongly opposed to such a move. And Germany, in particular, is in no position to adopt a policy that would meet with powerful resistance in the U. S., Britain, the Low Countries and Scandinavia. In short, the French may make the offer but the Germans, for some time to come, are almost certain to refuse. Only if Germany were to lose confidence in the U. S. ability or will to defend Germany's vital interests would such an offer stand much chance of being accepted over the next several years.*

3. Pressures within Germany

The continuation of a vigorous, if modest, French program will undoubtedly generate pressures within Germany over time for an independent German force. Moreover an additional motive for a German program may exist as compared with the British and the French; the desire to strengthen its bargaining position vis-a-vis the USSR over reunification and Berlin. The Germans might, for example, be prepared to forego nuclear independence as part of a larger deal on unification. But for this leverage they would have to have the option open to them. That the Germans are conscious of this possibility probably accounts for their reluctance to reaffirm their nuclear self denying position on nuclear weapons in the WEU.

* Conceivably if Adenauer's faculties deteriorate enough, he might adopt a policy that would run directly counter to the main theme of his entire foreign policy - to keep the U. S. intimately involved in Europe's and Germany's defense. His likeliest successors, however, Erhard or Schroeder, are not likely to abruptly reverse this policy.

14

The obstacle to German possession, allied opposition, is formidable, however. Moreover, the transfer of loyalties and nationalist feelings from individual nations, Germany in this instance, to Europe may proceed fast enough to offset parochial feelings of discriminations. The French, and British, nuclear forces may come to be regarded by the Germans and others as the European's nuclear forces. But we shouldn't count on this happening.

4. Other National Nuclear Forces

Within NATO, there is a fairly well established pecking order of national power and prestige. A partial ordering runs, after the U. S., the UK, France, Germany, Italy, the Low Countries. In general, we can expect those lower in the list not to aspire to, or even consider, having nuclear weapons until the next higher up the scale has them. The reason is not one of technical competence or even of resources. Rather, the motives for having them are largely, and vaguely, political. But with strong inhibitions against their possession unless the political pressure has built up. Thus, today there are some in Germany beginning to anticipate German possession, but there is virtually no one in Italy, the Low Countries et seq visibly contemplating national possession. When France is clearly in the club, having been spurred on by the existence of the British program and the U. S. assistance to this program, the process is likely to be rejected. Perhaps, since in this tacit ranking Germany is next and Germany's history and position is special, the process can be stopped. (In any case, it will take a long time to be felt.) And visible U. S. opposition to the French program is not likely to encourage the Germans to join the club.

14

The effects outside of NATO of the French program are likely to be small. The USSR certainly would not be motivated to help any of its allies. The Swiss and Swedes, both of whom have the technical competence to carry out programs and have shown some interest, might come to consider that the shape of the world called for their possession but there is little evidence that they are close to making the decision to go ahead. Of more concern is French assistance to Israel. It seems on the face of it incredible that the Israelis would go so far as to try to obtain nuclear weapons given their vulnerability. Or that the French would help them to. In the unlikely event the Israelis could probably be dissuaded from acquiring them.

5. The Problem of the British Force

Even without British entry into the Common Market, its nuclear force has posed a problem. Most immediately relevant has been its role as an irritant to de Gaulle and a spur to the creation of France's nuclear force. Our nuclear cooperation with the British stemming from 1958 now seems to have been a mistake. It has not led them in any noticeable way to divert resources to non-nuclear arms, nor to make them enthusiastic supporters of our foreign policy. Most of our base rights existed before 1958, although we might have had more difficulty in getting the use of Holy Loch without their cooperation.

de Gaulle might make Britain's entry into the Common Market conditional on (1) French nuclear cooperation with Britain; and/or (2) Britain's severing or curtailing its nuclear cooperation with the U. S. (The temptation to impose these conditions would be the greater if there were evidence indicating British or U. S. acquiescence visible to him.) The latter condition, if it is posed, should not present us with too difficult a problem unless it is associated with a severe cutback in our base rights in Britain. The former would present a more serious problem that is discussed below.

14

With respect to the former condition, there has been a basis for US-UK nuclear cooperation that may not exist with France. Except for several short-lived episodes, such as the abortive Suez affair British foreign policy for a century has rested on the proposition that it cannot afford a fundamental split with the U. S. This drawing together has become far more explicit in recent times in view of the ^{over} ~~Age~~-riding importance the British attach to the American Alliance. The British have accepted the status of junior partner in the firm in exchange for a special relationship which they believe affords them a unique opportunity to influence U. S. policy.

It is within the context of the vital relationship that the British have created their nuclear policy - first in the environment of five years of wartime collaboration, then during twelve years of independent efforts, and finally during four years of enjoying the fruits of cooperation with the U. S. under Sections 91 (c) and 144 (c) of the Atomic Energy Act as amended in 1958. Coterminous with this 21 year period was the rapid shrinkage of the colonial empire and a return to the Little England policy of Gladstone, the admission of growing dependence upon U. S. security forces, and a financial situation which did not permit lavish expenditures upon atomic programs.

The advantages of this cooperation to the British are manifest. For a relatively small expenditure they have acquired a nuclear capability which in the eyes of world opinion compares favorably with that of the U. S. on a qualitative (but not quantitative) basis. The possession of the Bomber Command has seemed to be an important factor in giving the British the second place in the councils of the Free World.

In this connection, however, it is to be noted that the British position is untrammelled except with respect to actions which they know will disturb Washington or the American public. They can buy from the U. S. or manufacture

themselves as much nuclear material as they can afford. There are not U. S. - imposed limitations, except transmission, upon the size of their technical-scientific establishment, upon the nature of their research program, upon the number and type of nuclear weapons systems or upon their test programs.

Within the frame of the 1958 bilateral, the British have enjoyed great advantages. Except for gaseous diffusion data they are privy to virtually every U. S. development in the nuclear weapons field. They had the run of almost every U. S. research institution; access to a large part of U. S. intelligence data; and they could, if they chose to do so, construct almost any one of the U. S. weapon designs. In addition, they are able to exchange their surplus of plutonium for American U-235. That they choose not to apply much of this sharing information to development of their own weapon systems is due to their own policy decisions and not to any control ~~or~~ exercise by the U. S.

In short, by their own volition judged in terms of their own national interest the British are able to profit from the fruits of their unique sharing relationship with the U. S. To give up this relationship would be extremely costly to British prestige, quite apart from the losses which would be incurred for their security forces, their research organizations and their engineering industries. On the other hand, with a possible exception of conditions which would govern their entrance into the EEC, there are no forces impelling them to disturb their harmonious nuclear relationships with the U. S.

This is not to say, however, that the British have not had to pay for this special relationship. The size and nature of US-based facilities in the UK have been a difficult problem for several British governments, the most recent incidents being the Holy Loch affair. Similarly, the British have accommodated the U. S. on a number of colonial issues in a way they would have felt no obligation to do if it had not been for the higher stakes of the American Alliance.

14

6. Prospects for the NATO Multilateral MRBM Force

If the French and British actively oppose the NATO nuclear force, it is unlikely to come into being. If they do not oppose but refuse to participate, the prospects would be better but still not high in the light of the high cost of such a force. A force of 200 - 250 missiles in strength would probably cost close to \$2 billion. If we want this force to come into being, we may not only have to put up most of the money, but also push the program vigorously within NATO. The present approach which is to play down the military need for MRBM's and not openly advocate the concept does not seem likely to lead to the creation of the force.

7. Summary on Present Policies

It cannot be claimed for our present policy that it will with high probability turn out well. de Gaulle may block UK entry into the EEC; the Germans, frustrated over Berlin and concerned about a US-USSR deal, may, unlikely and irrational as it appears, come to depend increasingly on the French connection; the French and Germans may come to collaborate on nuclear matters; the French may set such an independent nuclear course as to raise the gravest problems about the compatibility of this policy with the U. S. commitment to defend Europe; and the French may continue to be uncooperative in NATO, possibly to the extent of seriously affecting the strength of the Alliance, e.g., by not supporting the non-nuclear build-up, the Forward Strategy, and not helping offset U. S. gold flow problems caused by U. S. military associated expenditures in France.

The immediate short run issues are (1) whether de Gaulle is prepared to make European integration and French cooperation in NATO depend on a change in the present pattern of nuclear cooperation and control within NATO.

D. Building Options for Changing Control

There is a precedent for the idea that nuclear forces might be set up in a way that would make it possible to quickly change nuclear controls. The present arrangements in Europe for the delivery of U. S. weapons by non-US forces would lend itself to a rapid transfer of control. In fact there has been some concern that this transfer might take place by force without the approval of the U. S. The concept of the President "releasing" nuclear weapons (instead of "controlling" their use) suggests that the idea of a transfer of control has been implicit in the present system. From the point of view of the Germans, or others set up in this way, this arrangement would seem to move substantially in the direction of setting up national nuclear forces.

The development of a highly effective permissive link (combination lock) may make possible the extension of this concept. In principle, by making possible a separation between possession and control over nuclear weapons, control can be from a distance. Perhaps more importantly, control could be changed. For example, a NATO controlled multilateral force might be changed within minutes into two: a European one and a U. S. one; or it might be quickly broken down into national units. Whether or not it would make sense to buy such an option (which might imply the avoidance of mixed manning in nuclear units) deserves further study.

(2) If so, what changes in our present policies, if any, might be to our interest to adopt?

B. Nuclear Cooperation with France

1. Types of Cooperation

The possibilities run from marginal help on some aspects of, e.g., missile technology, to the degree of assistance we have given the British - open access to all of our nuclear technology and major help on delivery systems. The French in turn would undertake some or all of the following: agree to participate in the NATO multilateral force, build up non-nuclear forces, and support the Forward Strategy, agree to joint targeting and close coordination of nuclear forces, commit its nuclear forces to NATO, more favorable treatment of Britain, entry into the EEC, help on U. S. balance of payments problem, and no transfer of nuclear information to third countries.

2. The Effect on the Germans and Others.

If the United States were to give nuclear aid to France it is most improbable that there would be a demand within Germany for comparable treatment. Over the longer run (e.g., 3 - 5 years) the Germans are likely to feel discriminated against, that their treatment within the Alliance is not commensurate with their behavior as good "Europeans" and as members of NATO increasingly important for its non-nuclear defenses. This feeling of discrimination could become acute if, in addition, the U. S. and the USSR were to conclude a no-nuclear sharing agreement that inevitably would appear to be directed largely at Germany. Even in this situation, however, the obstacles, principally allied opposition, to German possession of nuclear arms would remain formidable.

14

A major concern of such cooperation should be the message it would convey of the overall strategy of the U. S. and the incentives it might encourage. For one thing, it would seem to run counter to the important theme of indivisibility in nuclear matters the U. S. has been stressing. Second, it would signal that the costs of entry into the nuclear club are lower than anticipated; it would suggest that after a modest initial investment the U. S. would step in and pick up much of the burden. Third, it would suggest that intransigence in dealing with the U. S. pays.

3. Controlling the French Program

It would be difficult to contend that the U. S. controls the British nuclear program in the sense that we make, or influence, the British to do things to which they object. Rather, the more reasonable interpretation is that the harmonization of their nuclear policy with that of the U. S. caused them no pain, and that the atomic assistance received from the U. S. has been sheer profit.

For reasons which are unnecessary to spell out, the French relationship to the U. S. is vastly different than the British. There is no background of a century of harmonization of policies. There is no counterpart of the US-French alliance. Unlike the British, the French under de Gaulle are determined to re-establish a political position they have not had for generations. Furthermore, the negative French attitude toward NATO and their unwillingness to receive U. S. nuclear forces on French territory are important obstacles to harmonization of U. S. relations with France. Perhaps a nuclear deal would remove these obstacles, but there is not a firm and well-established foundation of mutual confidence and trust which would seem to be an essential for an activity so delicate and important as nuclear sharing. It is perhaps, likely

that the French would give up their atomic cooperation with Israel in return for "substantial progress" sharing with the U. S. But in this matter, as in the cases of disarmament and the test ban, de Gaulle has shown himself to be exceptionally sensitive, if not to say intransigent, with regard to actions which limit his freedom of action. The British have been willing to live within the nuclear policy favored by the U. S., and they have done so without having to sign any written commitments to this effect beyond the arrangement not to retransmit data and atomic materials. On the other hand, there is every reason to believe that de Gaulle is unwilling to restrict his policy options similarly, whether this pledge would be written or unwritten. As for control over the flow of weapons designs, nuclear material, and missile technology if the French were to shift scientists and technicians to other activities and not expand nuclear production plants, the U. S. would have the power to disrupt the French program by cutting off aid. However, if, as is likely, the French were to continue to invest scientific talent and money heavily in nuclear and missile technology despite U. S. support, the extent of U. S. control would be minimal.

4. Would limited Assistance to France make sense?

Giving a little nuclear help to France may be like getting a little bit pregnant. What is at issue is not so much the immediate material consideration but the conception of NATO and the U. S. relation to it. If we were to decide to help France, it would seem better to make this help very substantial rather than partial. To do otherwise might leave us in the position of having compromised our principles but with the irritation of more extensive cooperation with Britain remaining. If, for example, we were to give aid to France on fission weapons, the British might be tempted

to give help to France on fusion weapons (perhaps claiming that their fusion aid did not go beyond 1958 independent British developments).

The U.S. has two alternatives in attempting to bring its nuclear policies toward Britain into harmony with those toward the other members of NATO; it can level up or level down. Leveling up would mean extending to France (and possibly in time other allies) nuclear assistance more or less along the lines of our aid to Britain. Leveling down would mean limiting or cutting off assistance to Britain. Or an intermediate formula for reduced cooperation with Britain and increased with France might be devised.

5. Summary

Present policy gives us no great expectations for an improvement in NATO's internal affairs and its strength vs the USSR. The question is whether a shift toward nuclear cooperation with France promises better. It might help. It might smooth Britain's way into the EEC, lead to French participation in the NATO multilateral force, remove a wide variety of irritations in NATO, lead to a greater French commitment to NATO, forestall Franco-German cooperation, lead to a greater non-nuclear build up, and not increase the likelihood of a further proliferation of nuclears in NATO. If any appreciable number of these benefits were to be had, such a shift in policy would seem clearly indicated. But is this a reasonable expectation? The problem is a tactical one of finding out without setting up possibly counter-productive expectations.

C. Multilateral Forces

The discussion of the past year or more on MRBM's a NATO nuclear force, and a European nuclear force, have confused several issues. One is the relation-

ship between the presence of strategic weapons in Europe and the targeting of Soviet forces threatening Europe. The U. S. has attempted, with what appears to be considerable success, to make clear to the Europeans that the major nuclear forces that deter the USSR from attacking Europe, and would act if Europe were attacked, are, and should be, located all over the world. A separate question has been the willingness of the U. S. to act. On this, we have reiterated our intent and backed this up by continuing to station several hundred thousand troops in Europe plus several thousand nuclear weapons. It would appear that on these crucial matters there is no serious widespread European concern about the nature and extent of the U. S. commitment - de Gaulle's statements to the contrary notwithstanding.

A NATO multilateral force with a U. S. veto would seem to add little to the existing commitments and guarantees if its control involves several European vetoes as well. If, on the other hand, the Europeans were to conclude that the real as distinct from the formal control of the system might make possible either European, or national control in some circumstances, the implications of setting up such a force would be very different. But mixed manning is intended to prevent at least the latter.

Many of the reasons for a lack of interest in a NATO multilateral force with a U. S. veto would seem to apply to a European force. There would remain the crucial matter of control. It would not seem to be much easier to work out a system of control which excluded the U. S. than one including it. Is the typical problem of a European country one of trusting the U. S. less than other allies in Europe? And since the U. S. would almost certainly be forced to reduce its commitments to Europe if such a force were created

(Just as it is forced to consider carefully the circumstances in which it would come to the aid of a nation with independent nuclear power) the net effect of the creation of a European force might be a sharp reduction in the felt security of at least the more exposed European members of NATO.

To be sure, the spirit of the EDC might be revived in the more favorable atmosphere in Europe of the 1960's. But apart from its feasibility, is it better for the U. S. to foster a single European nuclear power as compared with the present and prospective situation in which there will be two small national forces in Europe? A European force would seem on the face of it to present greater problems to us than the alternative - especially if the guiding spirit of a European force were to be de Gaulle.

However, rather than limit consideration to strict alternatives such as national forces vs European force vs a NATO force, etc., the concept of buying options which leave open the direction in which NATO might evolve should be explored.

TELEGRAM

Department of State

SECRET

Control: 3395
Rec'd: JUNE 5, 4:15 PM

1952 JUN 5 4 15 PM
DEPT. OF STATE
FILED
JUN 5 1952
2970
762A.5611
6-562

-M
Action
EUR

(81)

FROM: BONN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2970 JUNE 5, 5 P.M. (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

PRIORITY.

ACTION DEPT 2970 INFO PARIS PRITY 849 LONDON 743 BRUSSELS 94
THEHAGUE 57

PARIS ALSO FOR USRO STOESSEL AND MCGUIRE.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION.

DEPTEL 3273.

762A.5611/6-162
XR-611.62A
AS

IT IS OFTEN DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE PRECISELY WHICH MOTIVATION
MAY BE PARAMOUNT WITH STRAUSS AT ANY TIME IN DETERMINING GERMAN
POLICY CONCERNING USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS; QUESTION INVOLVES
BOTH BASIC MILITARY FACTORS OF STRATEGIC DOCTRINE AND CON-
SIDERATIONS OF NATIONAL PRESTIGE -- I.E. GROWING INSISTENCE THAT
FEDREP BE TREATED AS EQUAL MEMBER OF ALLIANCE. ANSWERS
TO DEPARTMENT'S QUESTIONS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN THIS FRAMEWORK.

(1) STRAUSS IS APPARENTLY SATISFIED AT PRESENT WITH GUIDE-
LINES AND OTHER ASSURANCES RESULTING FROM ATHENS MEETING.
ACCORDING TO FONOFF SOURCES STRAUSS BELIEVES RESULTS OF ATHENS
MEETS "MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS" OF FRG. HIS CONTINUING SATIS-
FACTION, HOWEVER, WILL BE DETERMINED BY MANNER IN WHICH FRG
ROLE IN CO-DETERMINATION MAY DEVELOP. IF WE ARE NOT FORTHCOMING
IN PRODUCING TANGIBLE AGREEMENTS TO WHICH HE CAN "POINT WITH PRIDE,"
STRAUSS WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO DEMAND EITHER A GREATER
DEGREE OF CO-DETERMINATION OR ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TO MEET
HIS FORMULATION OF FRG REQUIREMENTS.

(2) IN GENERAL, IF STRAUSS KNEW THAT HE WAS BEING GIVEN EQUAL
• This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action from this copy. IS

NEED TO.	FOR/RPM	ACTION	SECRET	PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
OF OFFICER	Alan James	DATE OF ACTION	—	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R
ICE SYMBOL				File

SECRET

-2- 2970 JUNE 5, 5 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM BONN

TREATMENT WITH OTHER ALLIED STATES IN THIS FIELD, IT WOULD SUSTAIN HIS SATISFACTION WITH ATHENS AGREEMENTS AND UNDERSTANDINGS, BUT IT WOULD NOT NECESSARILY SOLVE ALL THE PROBLEMS HE HAS RAISED. FRG CONCERN HAS NEVER BEEN THAT US WOULD FAIL TO USE FRG-BASED NUCLEAR WEAPONS BUT THAT THE PRESIDENT MIGHT DELAY USE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EARLY STAGES OF CONFLICT TO DETRIMENT OF GERMAN NATIONAL SECURITY. TO MEET THIS HYPOTHETICAL FEAR, FRG HAS CONSISTENTLY MAINTAINED THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS MUST BE IN RELATIVELY FORWARD POSITIONS AND CONTROLLED THROUGH NORMAL COMMAND CHANNELS ONCE THEIR USE IS AUTHORIZED AT HIGHEST LEVEL. IDEALLY, HE WOULD PREFER A PRIOR AGREEMENT WITH US ON CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH WEAPONS WOULD BE USED. REALIZING ITS DIFFICULTIES, HE HAS ADOPTED A "BACKDOOR" APPROACH TO CONTROL QUESTION. HE KNOWS THAT IF HE OBTAINS INFORMATION ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS STORED IN FRG AND HAS A VETO OVER THEIR REMOVAL, CHANCES ARE GREATLY INCREASED THAT HE CAN EXERT PRESSURE SO THAT THESE WEAPONS COULD BE USED AT OUTSET OF ANY MAJOR CONFLICT.

(3) IN OUR VIEW, FONOFF WOULD BE PROPER CHANNEL FOR DEALING WITH FRG ON THESE QUESTIONS. ATTEMPT TO DRAW STRAUSS OUT DURING WASHINGTON VISIT WOULD HOWEVER BE HELPFUL AS FURTHER CLARIFICATION OF HIS VIEWS SINCE FONOFF USUALLY RELIES ON MOD FOR GUIDANCE IN THIS FIELD.

(4) AS STATED ABOVE, US APPROACH TO CONTROL SHARING MUST HAVE SUBSTANCE IF IT IS TO MEET FRG DESIRES FOR GREATER NUCLEAR ROLE. GERMANS HAVE NO PRESENT INTENTION OF DEVELOPING INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR CAPABILITY SINCE THEY ARE FULLY AWARE THAT IT COULD IN NO WAY PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE NATIONAL DEFENSE. STRAUSS IS REPORTED TO HAVE STATED IN DEFENSE COUNCIL THAT HE WOULD BE COMPLETELY SATISFIED WITH US CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROVIDED FRG COULD HAVE VOICE IN DETERMINING THEIR USE. IF NOT, MOST OBVIOUS ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE TO MOVE TOWARD JOINT FRANCO-GERMAN EFFORT. GERMANS WOULD BE HESITANT TO ACCEPT THIS ALTERNATIVE UNLESS THERE IS MAJOR SHIFT IN US POLICY SINCE THEY WOULD BE SUSPICIOUS OF LIMITED CONTROL WHICH THEY MIGHT HAVE OVER RELATIVELY INEFFECTIVE NUCLEAR FORCE. GERMANS ARE

SECRET

SECRET

-3- 2970 JUNE 5, 5 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM BONN

AWARE OF THEIR EXPOSED POSITION AND POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES
OF US WITHDRAWAL WHICH THEY FEAR MIGHT ENSUE IF DEVELOPMENT OF
INDEPENDENT FRANCO-GERMAN NUCLEAR CAPABILITY IS PRESSED.

DOWLING.

FRM/21

SECRET

ACTION COPY

PERMANENT RECORD COPY

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

SECRET

59-M
Action
EUR

Control: 3350
Rec'd: JUNE 5, 1962
3:56 PM

REC'D
JUN 5 1962
7 38
DEPT OF STATE

FROM: BONN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2970, JUNE 5, 5 P.M. (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

PRIORITY.

ACTION DEPT 2970, INFO PARIS PRITY 849, LONDON 743, BRUSSELS 94,
THE HAGUE 57

PARIS ALSO FOR USRO STOESSEL AND MCGUIRE.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION.

(5) EMBASSY WOULD BE INTERESTED IN COMMENTS OF OTHER ADDRESSEES ON THIS POINT. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THERE IS GROWING ACCEPTANCE AMONG EUROPEAN NATO MEMBERS OF FACT THAT FEDREP IS DESTINED TO PLAY INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT ROLE IN MUTUAL DEFENSE.

(6) THERE IS NO APPARENT CONNECTION IN STRAUSS MIND BETWEEN US-FRG AGREEMENT GIVING FRG SUBSTANTIAL VOICE IN CONTROL OF FRG-BASED US NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND GERMAN SUPPORT OF MULTILATERAL MRBM FORCE. BOTH ARE CONSIDERED TO BE NECESSARY IN MILITARY SENSE AND ARE ADDRESSED TO TWO DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF PROBLEM OF DEFENSE. THE FIRST WOULD, IN STRAUSS VIEW, BE RELATED TO CONTROL OF TACTICAL WEAPONS WHICH ARE NECESSARY TO OFFSET SOVIET CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY WHILE MRBM FORCE WOULD BE INTERPRETED AS REPLACING NATO STRATEGIC STRENGTH NOW REPRESENTED BY AIR POWER. IF CO-DETERMINATION IS PUSHED TO POINT WHICH GIVES GERMANS A DECIDING VOICE IN USE OF WEAPONS, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT STRAUSS MIGHT LOSE SOME OF HIS CURRENT ENTHUSIASM FOR MULTILATERAL MRBM FORCE.

STRAUSS MAY ALSO DRAW CONNECTION IN WASHINGTON TALKS BETWEEN

... destroyed, RM/R

*** This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken. COPY IS**

ACTION ASSIGNED TO:	ACTION TAKEN	PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"	
NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE OF ACTION	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R	

SECRET

-2-2970, JUNE 5, 5 PM, (SECTION TWO OF TWO), FROM BONN

EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE GREATER CONSULTATION AND CO-DETERMINATION IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARRANGEMENTS AND DISCUSSION IN TALKS ON BERLIN WITH SOVIETS OF POSSIBLE BAN ON FURTHER DIFFUSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. PROPOSAL TO BAN FURTHER DIFFUSION HAS BEEN FULLY DISCUSSED IN GOVERNMENT AND PARTY CIRCLES AS WELL AS IN PRESS. DISCUSSION REVOLVES AROUND PROBLEM OF IMPACT OF PROPOSALS ON GERMAN MILITARY SECURITY AS WELL AS POLITICAL QUESTION WHETHER A COMMITMENT SHOULD BE MADE TO RUSSIANS ON MATTER WHICH MIGHT BE VITAL TO GERMAN NATIONAL DEFENSE, AND WHICH GERMANS FEAR WOULD PROVIDE SOVIETS PRETEXT FOR INTERFERENCE IN GERMAN POLITICAL AFFAIRS. SINCE IT IS VIEWED AS A CONCESSION TO SOVIETS, IT IS ONE OF CHIEF FACTORS IN CREATING DIVISIONS WITHIN CDU-CSU ON QUESTION OF SUPPORT OR NON-SUPPORT OF US POSITION. STRAUSS OBVIOUSLY PLAYS SAME ROLE IN THIS DEVELOPMENT ALTHOUGH HIS PRECISE POSITION IS NOT KNOWN. IT MIGHT BE WELL TO DRAW HIM OUT ON POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR POLICY, BOTH WITH RESPECT TO PROBLEMS OF MUTUAL DEFENSE AND OBJECTIVES IN CURRENT TALKS WITH SOVIETS ON BERLIN. IF QUESTION RAISED WITH HIM, ATTEMPT SHOULD BE MADE TO SEEK HIS VIEWS ON IMPACT WITHIN HIS OWN PARTY OF PROPOSALS FOR BANNING NUCLEAR DIFFUSION AND EFFECT WHICH IT MAY HAVE ON ULTIMATE ROLE WHICH FRG WOULD DEMAND IN WHOLE FIELD OF CO-DETERMINATION.

DOWLING

FRM/ COT

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

-2- 5876, JUNE 7, 7 PM FROM PARIS

NEUTRALIZATION OF EUROPE. I BELIEVE SINCE WRITING HIS LETTER HIS APPREHENSIONS AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS OF US POLICY HAVE BECOME MORE FIRMLY ROOTED THAT EVER.

COMMENT: I HAVE NOTED ALPHAND IN TALK WITH SECRETARY REPORTED DEPTTEL 6412 REFERRED TO FACT JANUARY 11 LETTER HAD NEVER BEEN ANSWERED. EVEN THOUGH THIS REMARK WAS IN CONTEXT TRIPARTISM, JANUARY 11 LETTER MIGHT SERVE AS GOOD PEG ON WHICH TO HANG EXPLANATION SOVIET TALKS.

GAVIN

GDW

Eyes only

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Cat. A	Caution removed; transferred to S. S. ADPC
<input type="checkbox"/> Cat. B	Transferred to S. S. ADPC with additional copies controlled by S. S.
<input type="checkbox"/> Cat. C	Caution and copy retained by S. S.
Reviewed by: <i>ELC</i> Elijah Kelly Jr.	
Date: <i>11/16/90</i>	

SECRET

6/8/62

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Distribution Office and Agency

SECRET

To: _____
No. 1 of _____
Oper. Series A

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Approved in White House
6/22/62

Memorandum of Conversation

033.62A1/6-862
DATE: June 8, 1962

XR-762.00

350

SUBJECT: Call of the West German Defense Minister, Franz Josef Strauss, on The President

PARTICIPANTS: (4) Franz Josef Strauss, West German Defense Minister
Ambassador Wilhelm G. Greve, German Embassy
Mr. Waldbert Schnippenkoetter, Counselor, German Embassy

The President
General Maxwell D. Taylor, Military Representative of The President
Assistant Secretary Foy D. Kohler, EUR
Mr. Robert M. Brandin, EUR/OER

DISTRIBUTION: (See last page)

June 28, 1962

(22)

After a brief opening discussion of Minister Strauss' schedule, the President raised the question of the ambivalent Soviet attitude toward Berlin. Although the Soviets had internal problems, there was evidence of an intensive Soviet missile build-up in recent months and a hardening of their line on Berlin, particularly as regards the presence of Western troops in Berlin. Unless there was a lessening of their position, we could have another crisis.

Minister Strauss said the question was whether the Soviets were prepared to reach an informal agreement respecting the status quo or whether they were too committed to Ulbricht to do so. He thought they might make some new proposals, taking what they liked out of the Western proposals and combining it with what they wanted, as a final offer.

The President observed that, although the presence of Allied troops in Berlin was the heart of our position, the Soviets had repeated to Mr. Salinger the demand that they be withdrawn.

Mr. Kohler noted that the public Soviet line on Berlin had also hardened.

The President said Allied troop withdrawal did not seem to be a fundamental point when he talked to Gromyko last September. There was no emphasis then that the Soviets considered such withdrawal was necessary.

The President then turned to the size of Allied conventional forces, noting that the problem of West Berlin required the forward strategy. If there were any

Berlin

SECRET

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

23
FNU's me
DUP

240
mi
60 D 149

FNU
to me
W. Rusk
in NATO

↓
for XR
Berlin

28F59/1

SECRET

28F59/2

-2-

Berlin problem, Western Europe would be the last place the Soviets would attack. Yet, as General Clay had said, we could not be firm on the autobahn if we only had nuclear weapons. Hence, conventional forces increased the credibility of our posture. But the forward strategy with conventional forces only made sense if we carried it out. The President expressed concern that at the rate we were going we would end up short in an untenable position, strategically and politically.

Minister Strauss agreed it would be easy if we did not have the Berlin problem. He could not imagine a local or limited Soviet attack in Central Europe because it would turn into a general attack and total war. In this context, there was no practical problem of a nuclear threshold. On the other hand, the Soviets could block access to Berlin and force us to be the aggressors.

The President remarked that we did have the Berlin problem, however, and asked Minister Strauss whether he supported the forward strategy.

Minister Strauss replied that since the Berlin problem could not be ignored, the conventional build-up had to be supported. He said there would be a hard debate in NATO over the MC 26/h force goals of thirty divisions.

The President said he was not sure of the genesis of the German concern about the possible loss of Hamburg and Munich.

Minister Strauss explained that this fear related to Soviet counteraction to Western moves in Berlin. If it were not for Berlin, there would be no problem because any Soviet attack would mean general war. For example, fear of general war deterred Soviet moves against Turkey or weakly-defended Northern Norway.

Minister Strauss added that the forward strategy would play a role in the Berlin problem only if there were a Soviet counterattack. He referred to the Emergency Defense Plan in this connection.

The President then asked why it was essential in the present situation to maintain troops all along the border.

Minister Strauss said it resulted from the nuclear stalemate.

Ambassador Greve remarked that it was also required by the lack of depth.

Minister Strauss went on to say that it had not been a problem until the nuclear stalemate developed. He recalled that Admiral Radford had once told him the US would hit the Soviets with everything it had the day after they attacked. This was no longer true and the President was the strongest proponent of the change in strategy.

The President gave the credit to General Taylor, but pointed out that nuclear retaliation had never been used in Southeast Asia.

SECRET

Minister

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

SECRET

28 F 51 / 3

-3-

Minister Strauss said he was grateful for that. No one wanted a nuclear holocaust.

The President asked Minister Strauss why he supported the forward strategy and conventional build-up.

Minister Strauss referred to Secretary McNamara's speech at Athens and said it was necessary to fill the expanding gap between zero and the point of use of nuclear weapons to make the deterrent credible. In Germany, for example, there was a danger of losing territory to a Soviet attack. Ground would be lost if nuclear weapons were not used, but they could not be used without provoking general war. The question might arise of negotiating with the Soviets over territory they had already grabbed.

The President asked how many divisions would be needed to carry out the forward strategy, given the Berlin problem, and how they would be raised.

Minister Strauss said a minimum of thirty divisions would be needed in Central Europe, but that this total could be reached only if the French contribution were raised from four to six divisions.

The President asked why this should be so difficult. In 1957 it was recognized that France had problems in Algeria and in the French Community. Now it was largely a matter of reequipping divisions for Europe and stationing them beyond the French border. This depended on de Gaulle's judgment and was complicated by history.

Minister Strauss observed that the actual French contribution to NATO was only one and one-half divisions.

The President remarked that since the US had contributed six divisions, it was difficult to understand why Europeans were impressed by the French talk about being firm. The President hoped the Chancellor could influence de Gaulle to increase his contribution; we could not.

Minister Strauss agreed to report the President's views to the Chancellor. He said the French contribution was supposed to be four divisions, but even this was too small. Belgium had two divisions in Germany, but these did not have new equipment. There were no combat units in Belgium, only cadres. In other words, Belgium was now contributing more than France. The Netherlands had two divisions stationed on the German border. Minister Strauss said it would take an armed force of 750,000 in Germany to meet the MD 26/h goals, but that Germany could only support a 500,000 - man force. Hence, it might be necessary to reduce the size of the divisions.

The President said the US maintained 400,000 troops in Europe which created a number of problems. He expressed appreciation for Minister Strauss' help in easing the balance-of-payments problem. Every country could meet its internal budget problem, but the balance of payments problem was difficult.

Minister Strauss said the plan to raise thirty-five brigades in Germany to

SECRET

meet

SECRET

28F59/4

meet peacetime goals would involve about 400,000 troops and might require a budget increase. He acknowledged the President's remark that it would be a burden on the population as well.

The President said we should meet the goals required by our strategy or reconsider the strategy. He thought there was something wrong if the US and Europe could not match the USSR in this field.

Minister Strauss said there should be a fair breakdown in reaching the goal of 11 - 32 divisions on the central front. There was, however, the question of French priorities. If France gave first priority to nuclear weapons and national requirements, it would give low priority to equipping forces assigned to NATO.

The President referred briefly to the offer made by Secretary Mombasa to re-equip two French divisions. Then he went on to remark that if our strategy is valid -- i.e. it supports West Berlin, deters war and is supported by Germany -- we ought to carry it out. There was no sense in believing in a strategy, but not implementing it. The President said the US views on nuclear support were well known. He had discussed them last November with Chancellor Adenauer. In 1950, in the atmosphere following Sputnik, we had made an agreement with the UK which embarrassed our argument today. The President was of the opinion, however, that the acquisition of a nuclear deterrent had not helped British prestige or security. At the same time, it was very expensive.

The President asked, if the US went ahead with France, what would stop Italy and Germany from making the same argument to the effect that they needed a nuclear capability because the US could not be relied on to defend European cities. The President thought national proliferation would be a dangerous, unnecessary and expensive development.

Minister Strauss added that it would mean the disintegration of NATO as well.

The President said the US policy on non-cooperation in the nuclear field could be wrong. For example, General Taylor thought the possibility of helping France should be explored. In any event, the policy made US-French relations difficult. The President thought de Gaulle would be reluctant to send troops outside France even if he had a nuclear force. Given de Gaulle's reasons for wanting his own nuclear deterrent and his views on NATO, the President believed any US assistance to France would stimulate requests from other countries for similar aid. Under its law, however, the US could not give any assistance until countries had reached a certain level of development. Who would help these countries reach this level? The President acknowledged that some good will would result from helping France, but was dubious about any other gain.

Minister Strauss said the Athens NATO Meeting could have been a beginning in dealing with the French problem. He pointed out that the French tendencies went back at least five years. French views had been ignored in all the NATO meetings. Now we had to face the problem. Perhaps it could be solved in the post-de Gaulle era.

SECRET

The

SECRET

20854/5

The President noted we had assigned Polaris submarines to NATO and had offered to consider a NATO multilateral sea-borne MRBM force although the latter proposal seemed to be dead now.

Minister Strauss said the development of a multilateral NATO force raised a number of legal, technical and political problems. He referred to the problem of fifteen fingers on the trigger and the question whether NATO was sovereign.

Minister Strauss then outlined the proposals put to him recently by the UK Defence Minister, Mr. Watkinson. After the UK joined the Common Market, it might be possible to develop a genuine political union. UK and French military nuclear production would be pooled under a European authority. National production would expire. The US could then have the same relationship with the European authority that it now has with the UK.

The President asked who would control this British-French authority. He assumed there would be a problem until someone like Macrotad were found.

Minister Strauss said the French would waste assets if they continued with their nuclear program. Yet the French Defence Minister, Mr. Messer, felt an independent nuclear capability was essential for sovereignty.

The President asked Minister Strauss how he felt about this.

Minister Strauss said he agreed that the possession of an independent nuclear capability was essential for unlimited sovereignty, but he did not agree unlimited sovereignty was necessary. He thought no European nation could be fully sovereign now because it could not defend itself. European nations needed US help, otherwise they would have to surrender. The time of national sovereignty in Europe was gone. The present was not like the 17th, 18th and 19th Centuries in this respect.

The President asked, this being the case, why anyone was interested in developing a national nuclear capability. He inquired whether Minister Strauss agreed with the French views.

Minister Strauss favored concentrating on Atlantic cooperation. He thought the French views reflected de Gaulle's philosophy. The French Defence Minister, Mr. Messer, had also argued that if what Secretary Nkolamara had said at Athens about the sufficiency of the present nuclear deterrent were true, there would be no reason for the UK to have a nuclear force. In view of the French attitude, Minister Strauss thought the French problem could only be solved in connection with the UK. There were three possibilities: they could give up their nuclear capability; they could pool their capabilities; or a European outfit could be formed. Minister Strauss was sure, however, that the French would not drop their nuclear force unless the UK did so.

The President repeated that the development of a national nuclear capability had not helped Britain's defensive posture. Moreover, with the development of missiles

SECRET

SECRET

2BF57/6

missiles, their nuclear air force would become obsolete.

Minister Strauss agreed, but said the French would not believe this.

The President said these matters go back to World War II and, like the US Commander of SHAPE, have a historical rather than logical basis. Nevertheless, if the US assisted France, the USSR would react and the consequences as far as China is concerned would not be clear. Moreover, if we went ahead with the French, what argument would there be against assisting others? He referred to pressures from Germany and elsewhere (e.g., Sweden and Switzerland).

Minister Strauss admitted there was no reasonable argument in this case, but thought it was impossible to stop the French. After de Gaulle, however, the French might be willing to pool their nuclear capability. The US had tried to find a formula at Athens to meet this problem. Agreement had been reached on guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons, but this would not end the problem. It was unlikely that any other NATO country would raise the nuclear problem in the 60s because there were no prerequisites in Italy or Scandinavia and Germany had renounced the production of nuclear weapons. But the matter was still pending. Consequently, an effort should be made to get the UK and France to give up their independent nuclear force and to turn it over to the US or NATO or a European establishment. This would at least gain time. If the UK entry into the Common Market resulted in the development of a European political authority, it might be possible to head off the problem this way. Minister Strauss said, in any event, he fully shared the President's concern about the proliferation of national capabilities.

The President asked whether the US should change its policy. What effect would a change have on others?

With respect to changing US policy, Minister Strauss expressed the opinion that the US need not worry about proliferation for the next five years because no other country would be in a position to develop nuclear weapons in that time. He could not say what effect a change might have. With respect to US opposition to the independent use of nuclear weapons, Minister Strauss said the British Defense Minister, Mr. Hefferman, had pointed out that the UK force was integrated into NATO targeting. In fact, however, the UK still had a potential independent capability even if it never used it. Minister Strauss added that the US seemed to fear that France wanted an independent force to use independently. He wondered whether France would agree to integrate its weapons into the NATO strike plan together with the US and UK and whether such a commitment or pledge could be relied on.

The President acknowledged that the UK in effect had a national capability as did the US. He thought it was a poor argument to use the British case as an example however. In his opinion the 1958 decision to help the UK was probably unwise. The President agreed it was not logical for the US to control Europe's destiny, but said the present situation was a result of history. He asked Minister Strauss whether pressures would rise in Germany for an independent nuclear force if the US helped France develop one. Would the strategic situation require Germany to keep up with developments outside its own frontiers?

Minister

SECRET

SECRET

LBEST/7

-7-

Minister Strauss did not think there would be any immediate demand for a German nuclear force if the US helped France. Public opinion would be against it as long as NATO was effective. It was a question of the reliability and cohesion of NATO including US nuclear support thereof.

The President said that to question US support of NATO would require the totally irrational assumption that the US was not interested from its own point of view in the defense of Western Europe.

Minister Strauss said that if the French sabotaged the integrated NATO defense effort or left NATO, the US position would become very difficult, particularly as regards logistics. If France left NATO, NATO would change, the US would change and Germany would change. There was no doubt about NATO solidarity now, but such changes would lead to a disastrous situation.

The President noted that the French had taken their fleet out of NATO and that most of their forces were not assigned to NATO. If they were to insist that the NATO Headquarters be moved elsewhere and that the US withdraw, the situation would indeed become very serious.

Minister Strauss agreed but said that if the US changed its attitude toward France on the nuclear question now, it would appear that French blackmail had succeeded. Others would be attracted to follow suit.

The President then referred to the French proposal to establish a tripartite, which he considered to be anti-European. The French were not satisfied with the quadripartite Ambassadorial Group. They wanted a formal directorate with worldwide responsibilities. If they had nuclear weapons, they would be in a stronger position to insist on the creation of such a political directorate.

The President thought the French would encounter great difficulties with their nuclear program. It would be extremely costly. The President said de Gaulle seemed to have some mystical argument against assigning troops outside France. The President was not optimistic that the French would come up with the troops to support the forward strategy. In that connection, he referred to the fact that conscription had not been introduced in the UK, although in his opinion it would have been politically feasible.

Minister Strauss returned to the question of what attitude to take toward the French nuclear program. There were various possibilities things could be allowed to go along as they were; the US could change its position; the UK and France might be induced to drop their military nuclear activity; or the UK and France might be persuaded to pool their capabilities into the NATO system.

The President observed that de Gaulle's views were anchored in the historical past and did not refer just to 1962.

Minister Strauss changed the subject to express his pleasure at the way US-German bilateral military arrangements were developing.

SECRET

The

2BFS418...

SECRET

-6-

The President responded by thanking Minister Strauss for his help in dealing with the US balance-of-payments problem.

Minister Strauss remarked that the increase in German conventional forces would raise the German budget.

The President said budget problems could be managed, but balance-of payments problems were more difficult.

Minister Strauss expressed the view that the US and Germany should cooperate in military research and development. He was not impressed with NATO research and development, noting that practically no decisions had been made on twenty-three proposed projects. Decisions had been made on aircraft, but the production runs were too small to be efficient.

The President concluded the conversation by observing that there were some people in the US who thought we should meet our balance-of-payments problems by keeping our troops at home and sending them overseas only when necessary.

SECRET

6/13/62
MRBMS

DECLASSIFIED BY: NSC MBR-87-150

13 June 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President on MRBM Instructions to Ambassador Finletter.

1. At approximately 1145 hours today, the President met in the Cabinet Room with a number of his principal departmental and other advisers on Southeast Asia. When this meeting finished, the President moved back to his own office with Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Mr. Bundy, and General Taylor, in order to discuss a proposed message which would transmit to Ambassador Finletter the text of a statement which he would make in the NATO Council concerning the present United States position on MRBMs (draft of the instruction as considered at this meeting attached at TAB A).

2. In the course of the general discussion which ensued, General Taylor passed to the President a memorandum on this subject (copy attached at TAB B), and was able during the discussion to reinforce orally the points which he had made in the memorandum. The President indicated that he was impressed with the abundance of nuclear weapons available for the defense of the Alliance and the importance, therefore, of having our NATO European Allies concentrate on an effective buildup of conventional forces. In response to General Taylor's point in the memorandum at TAB B concerning the reservations of General Norstad and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as the forthcoming Standing Group-Military Committee activity on the question of a military requirement for MRBMs, Secretary McNamara said:

a. That he felt the Joint Chiefs of Staff had agreed to the lack of an urgent military requirement in the text of their comments on his draft speech proposed for delivery at Athens.

b. That he felt General Ruffner, being a unilateral US representative, could introduce the US position into the Standing Group and thereby effectively influence the final paper.

3. It was agreed that, in addition to the cable of instruction to Ambassador Finletter, a letter should be sent to him, but it was not clear whether the President, Mr. Bundy, or the Secretary of State should sign this letter. In any event, the letter would state that the United States felt that MRBMs were probably not necessary for military reasons and that the NATO European nations should be compelled to face up early to the problem of financing any MRBM arrangement which they might wish to propose.

4. General Taylor has cleared the above text.

L. J. Legere
L. J. Legere
Colonel, USA

Attachments



#49A
35
Box NATO
1961-62

70 / 35 / GB NATO, G

COMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

6/14/62
Bundy 18
WH

51

~~SECRET~~

Action
SS

Control: 11021 011
Rec'd: JUNE 14, 1962
6:09 P M

EYES ONLY

Info

FROM: PARIS
TO: Secretary of State
NO: POLTO 1671, JUNE 14, 9 P M

NIACT

EYES ONLY SECRETARY

NO OUTSIDE DISTRIBUTION

SINCE YOU MAY NOT RPT NOT ALREADY HAVE THIS, I NOW REPORT WHAT UK RPT UK PERMREP MASON JUST TOLD ME ABOUT REPLY OF BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO SUBJECT MATTERS RAISED IN TOPOL 1892. MASON SAID FOLLOWING:

1. HMG WOULD NOT RPT NOT AGREE TO ADOPTING PASSIVE ROLE IN CASE OF A MULTILATERAL FORCE DISCUSSION IN NAC.
2. HERE FOLLOWED A LONG RECITAL OF REASONS HMG AGAINST THE MULTILATERAL FORCE ALL OF WHICH ARE FAMILIAR TO YOU AND REVEALED ONLY THAT BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS NOT RPT NOT THOUGHT SERIOUSLY ABOUT PROBLEM. THE REASONS GIVEN WERE; IT WOULD BE EXPENSIVE; IT WOULD BRING THE GERMANS INTO THE ATOMIC BUSINESS; IT WOULD INTERFERE WITH UK RPT UK ON DISARMAMENT; WE SHOULD GIVE IDEA OF THE NUCLEAR COMMITTEE A CHANCE BECAUSE THE UK WAS CONVINCED THE NUCLEAR COMMITTEE WAS A BETTER SUBSTITUTE FOR THE MULTILATERAL FORCE; THE ATHENS PACKAGE, NAMELY, GUIDELINES AND ASSURANCES OF THE US RPT US AND UK WERE ENOUGH TO TAKE CARE OF ANY PRESSURE THERE MIGHT BE FROM THE ALLIANCE FOR A SHARE IN THE NUCLEAR WEAPONRY; THE SOLUTION MIGHT BE TO GIVE NORSTAD SOME MRBMS THAT WOULD TAKE CARE OF ANY POSSIBLE TARGETS A MULTILATERAL FORCE MIGHT BE USED AGAINST; IN ANY CASE ALLIANCE DOESNT WANT ANY SHARE IN NUCLEAR POWERS; WE ARE EXAGGERATING PRESSURES FOR NUCLEAR

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
MPX-94-52/18
By *[Signature]* NARA, Doc # *5417*

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

EYES ONLY

in hand / NATO. Weapons, Coll, France

~~SECRET~~

-2-, POLTO 1671, JUNE 14. 9 P M, FROM PARIS

SHARING; EVEN IF THERE WERE ALLIANCE PRESSURE FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS THE WAY TO BEAT THAT IS TO HAVE A NUCLEAR COMMITTEE; THE MULTILATERAL FORCE WOULD NOT RPT NOT POSSIBLY HAVE ANY MILITARY VALUE, IT WAS ONLY A POLITICAL DEVICE, ETC.

3. IF ANYBODY MENTIONED TALK ABOUT THE MULTILATERAL FORCE IN NAC MASON SAID HE WOULD HAVE TO KNOCK IT DOWN.

I TOLD HIM THAT I FELT SURELY SOMEBODY WOULD MENTION THE MULTILATERAL FORCE NO RPT NO MATTER WHAT AGENDA THE SYG PROPOSED AND THAT I UNDERSTOOD MASON TO SAY IF THAT HAPPENED HE WOULD HAVE TO PRODUCE ALL THESE ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE MULTILATERAL FORCE. I SAID I THOUGHT THIS A MOST UNCOOPERATIVE, NEGATIVE RESPONSE TO THE REQUEST OUR GOVERNMENT HAD MADE. HE THEN HEDGED ON HIS STATEMENT AND SAID THAT THE ARGUMENTS IN (2) ABOVE COULD BE TREATED AS A PRIVATE US-UK DIALOGUE. I AM NOT RPT NOT AT ALL SURE THIS WILL STICK IN FACT. I HAD EXPRESSED MY VIEWS VERY FIRMLY TO HIM WHICH MAY HAVE CAUSED MASON PERSONALLY TO MAKE THIS COMMITMENT.

WE ENDED WITH AN AGREEMENT THAT I WOULD SUGGEST AT THE NAC MEETING (WHICH I HAVE ARRANGED WITH SYG FOR TOMORROW AND AT WHICH YOUR INSTRUCTIONS WILL BE PRESENTED) THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO RPT NO DISCUSSION OF SUBSTANCE AT THIS MEETING AND PREFERABLY THAT THE FIRST ORDER OF DISCUSSION WHEN IT TOOK PLACE SHOULD BE ON THE REQUIREMENT OR NON-REQUIREMENT FOR MRBMS. MASON SAID HE WOULD AGREE TO THIS AT THE MEETING AND THAT IF SOMEONE INSISTS ON TALKING ABOUT THE MULTILATERAL FORCE HE WOULD MERELY SAY THAT THIS WAS SOMETHING THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE EXAMINED VERY FULLY AT SOME STAGE IN THE PROCEEDINGS SINCE ITS FULL VALUE WAS NOT RPT NOT PROVEN AND WE SHOULD FIRST DISCUSS THE QUESTION WHETHER THERE WAS A REQUIREMENT FOR MRBMS IN EUROPE.

FINLETTER

MGG/22

~~SECRET~~

COMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

Σ 6/15/62 17

Bundy

36

~~SECRET~~

Action

Control: 11401

EUR

Rec'd: JUNE 15, 1962
7:51 AM

Info

FROM: PARIS

SS

TO: Secretary of State

SR

G

NO: 6029, JUNE 14, 7 PM

SP

L

H

DAC

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

SAE

FROM STOESSEL

SSA

P

IOP

INR

RMR

IT SEEMS CLEAR FROM REMARKS OF SEVERAL FRENCH OFFICIALS RECENTLY THAT QUESTION OF COORDINATION OF FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCE WITH U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES IS ASSUMING IMPORTANCE AND IT MAY BE SOMETHING THAT COUVE DE MURVILLE WILL WISH TO RAISE WITH SECRETARY, PERHAPS WITH VIEW TO SEEKING SPECIFIC US-FRENCH AGREEMENT ON THIS SUBJECT.

GENERAL NORSTAD COMMENTS THAT, WHILE HE KNOWS ALL FACETS OF THIS PROBLEM WILL BE CAREFULLY WEIGHED BY SECRETARY AND OTHERS, HE FEELS OBLIGATED TO ADVANCE CERTAIN CONSIDERATIONS WHICH HE BELIEVES ARE OF IMPORTANCE IN CONSIDERING U.S. POSITION:

(1) IT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD THAT ACHIEVEMENT BY FRENCH OF REALISTIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEM IS STILL SOME TIME IN FUTURE. GENERAL NORSTAD THEREFORE FEELS THAT THERE IS NO (RPT NO) GREAT URGENCY IN REGARD TO PROBLEM OF COORDINATING WITH SUCH FORCE.

(2) AGREEMENT BY U.S. TO SOME FORM OF COORDINATION OF FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCE WILL NOT (RPT NOT) LESSEN DEGREE OF INDEPENDENT FRENCH CONTROL OVER THEIR FORCE. SUPPORT FOR THIS VIEW IS FOUND IN SERIES OF STATEMENTS BY DE GAULLE IN PAST GIVING REASONS WHY FRANCE MUST HAVE ITS OWN FORCE DE FRAPPE.

(3) ANY AGREEMENT ON COORDINATION WITH FRANCE OF NUCLEAR FORCES SHOULD BE STUDIED IN LIGHT OF THE EFFECT THIS WOULD HAVE ON OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND ALSO ON THOSE PEOPLE IN FRANCE WHO HAVE SUPPORTED NATO AND INTEGRATION IN NATO AGAINST IDEA

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
N.K. 94-52/17
By: [Signature] NARA, Date: 5/11/97

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

NYP/226/NKCN. wegnny, Capra, [Signature]

~~SECRET~~

-2- 6029, JUNE 14, 7 PM, FROM PARIS

OF INDEPENDENT FORCE DE FRAPPE. GENERAL NORSTAD BELIEVES IT IS REASONABLE TO SUPPOSE THAT MANY OF THESE PEOPLE WOULD SEE AN AGREEMENT BY U.S. FOR COORDINATION OF NUCLEAR FORCES WITH THE FRENCH AS CONSTITUTING U.S. APPROVAL OF A FRENCH STAND WHICH GOES CONTRARY TO NATO INTERESTS.

IF F. RAISE Q.

IF FRENCH RAISE QUESTION OF COORDINATION WITH SECRETARY DURING HIS VISIT, GENERAL NORSTAD SUGGESTS SECRETARY SHOULD LISTEN BUT AVOID GIVING ANY COMMITMENT. FRENCH APPROACH OF COURSE SHOULD NOT (RPT NOT) BE REBUFFED OUTRIGHT, AND PERHAPS LINE COULD BE TAKEN THAT SUBJECT IS IMPORTANT ONE WHICH MUST BE STUDIED FROM MANY ANGLES, INCLUDING RELATIONSHIP WITH ALLIANCE AND BALANCE OF FORCES IN ALLIANCE.

GAVIN

HLN

E 1
SECRET

RESERVATION COPY

June 10

June 19, 1958

~~TOP SECRET THIS ONLY~~
TO AMBASSADOR WILKINSON FROM THE PRESIDENT

I have just approved the long cable of instructions to you on HANNAH but I would like to give you this short additional statement of my own views for your guidance.

First, you should make it very plain that the military need for this force is not proven. Even from the center rather than from a theater command post, the ~~theater~~ theater military need for this force is undemonstrated.

Second, the cost of this undertaking is great, and the main burden must necessarily fall on European members. The advantages of this force should neglect or underrate this problem of cost.

Third, the United States would strongly oppose the substitution of this force for needed efforts to strengthen conventional forces. Our support for a multinational main force will be contingent upon adequate efforts in the conventional field, and so our allies should understand that the cost of this force would be an addition and not merely a substitution.

Fourth, my estimate is that in the light of these factors, the probability of final affirmative action on this main force is low at present. Nevertheless, I strongly support discussion

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
DATE 9-14-36
MARA Date 1 110 170

~~TOP SECRET~~

100-6169

~~TOP SECRET~~
- 1 -

and examination in NATO for its educational effort and as a basis for any action our allies may in fact wish to take. As I see it, your job is to communicate our central position while keeping it clear that if Europeans do want this force, we will finally support it and pay our proportionate share.

John F. Kennedy

~~TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

6/17/62

GWB Chron file

To Copy

June 17, 1962

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Answer to Eight Questions

I am attaching our answers to the eight questions raised in your memorandum of May 25.

I call your attention particularly to our answer to question number eight in which we point out the dangers and disadvantages of threatening the reduction of our forces in the European Theatre. I hope that Secretary Rusk can discuss this with you on Monday since it is essential that he have clear instructions on this question before going to Bonn.

The element of timing seems to me of critical importance in relation to any approach we may make to the nuclear problem. While an improvement of communications with General de Gaulle is certainly called for -- and I hope a beginning can be made with the Secretary's trip -- I do not think that this is a good time to seek an accommodation with the General on basic policy. At the moment his strength is at the top of the curve for two reasons:

- (a) His domestic position gains strength from the fact that the Algerian situation is not yet definitively settled. If, for example, the French Assembly had not been facing the Algerian referendum a couple of weeks ago it would very likely have thrown out the Pompidou Government by a vote of no confidence. As soon as Algeria settles down the French will almost certainly

experience

CP 312 uWJ
ACM / (53)

SECRET

- 2 -

experience a reassertion of democratic principles and a widening rift between the Palais Bourbon and the Elysee.

- (b) His European position depends upon the desperate resolve of Adenauer to consolidate the Franco-German entente during what may be his few remaining months of office. The Chancellor's domestic position has suffered greatly from the strains and stresses of a coalition government. My last visit with him a month ago confirmed the widely held impression that he is beginning to face up to the hard reality that he will not be in power forever. If Erhard succeeds him -- which seems likely at least for a transitional period until the elections in 1964 -- the Paris-Bonn dialogue will be interrupted. Erhard is a classical economist with no feeling for politics and no comprehension of political concepts; De Gaulle is preoccupied with grand political designs but regards economics as the business of quartermasters. I see no possibility of their being able to achieve close rapport, and Erhard's instincts are all on the side of an ever closer involvement of Britain in Europe.

Under these conditions we would be at a disadvantage at trying to do serious business with De Gaulle. This is a period of great fluidity and within a relatively few months circumstances are likely to bring about a greater isolation of the General both in France and in Europe. Experience shows that De Gaulle is usually prepared to adjust his strategy under the pressure of hard reality, while at the same time not yielding his long-term goals. But when he is in a position of strength he cannot be appeased.

Within

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

Within a few months we shall presumably know whether Britain will succeed in her negotiations with the EEC. Pending the outcome Britain cannot play a constructive role either in European affairs or nuclear policy. In either event -- if the negotiation succeeds or fails -- a new situation will result. We would do well to await that new situation -- as well as the changes referred to under (a) and (b) above -- before undertaking any major reexamination of policy.

Meanwhile, we should proceed as rapidly as possible to educate and clarify European thinking about nuclear matters. At the moment a rather confused debate seems to be getting underway in Europe on the whole area of nuclear policy. It is greatly to our interest to ensure that this debate proceeds on an informed basis, which will show up the disadvantages of the solution most dangerous to our interests: proliferation of national capabilities.

The forthcoming discussion of a multilateral NREM force should help to serve this purpose, during this period of European political transition.

George W. Ball

Attachment:

As stated

U:GWBall:hc

SECRET

SECRET

QUESTION

1. The chief argument against the French having nuclear information has been the effect it would have on the Germans, encouraging them to desire the same. Are we certain that cooperation with the French will have that effect? Is it possible to make an arrangement with the French that would limit the Germans in their demands?

ANSWER

1. In our view the chief argument against nuclear sharing with France is not the effect on the Germans. The issue is much broader than that.

Nuclear sharing could frustrate our efforts to promote collective defense and to encourage the UK and eventually France to merge their nuclear forces with that collective defense.

It could impair the chances of organizing Europe and the Atlantic partnership effectively in the political and economic fields.

The effect in each of these respects is treated below:

- (a) Collective Defense: Nuclear sharing with France would adversely affect the basic issue as to whether our view or De Gaulle's view of the future military organization of the Atlantic Community will prevail.

Broadly supported by our Allies - except France - we have taken the stand that the defense of the West requires more, not less,

reliance

SECRET

- 2 -

reliance on collective security. De Gaulle's view is the antithesis; his whole effort is directed at more reliance on national security. He maintains that the US cannot be relied upon to defend Europe and that an independent national French nuclear force is therefore needed. Because the independent French nuclear force has become the symbol of De Gaulle's thesis in the security field, our aid to that force would be viewed by all our Allies, not merely the Germans, as indicating that we were wavering in our support for collective security. Their attitude toward the numerous other actions that we are urging them to take in order to sustain a cohesive Atlantic defense would be strongly and adversely affected.

In the long run, the principle of collective security can probably be maintained in the military field as a whole only if it is extended to the nuclear field. We believe that this may well be possible, if US actions looking to bilateral sharing do not interrupt certain long-term trends now beginning to be felt.

The British, for example, are today showing increasing signs of passing into a new phase of self-doubt about their own program. In time they may decide to drop out of the national deterrent business.

Such a British decision would reinforce groups in France who are likely to try to merge the French program into some broader program, once De Gaulle is no longer in power.

The fact

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

The fact that there is support in French industry, the military and the parliament for some kind of French nuclear activity does not mean that that activity need take place within a national -- rather than multilateral -- framework. Quite the contrary: support for some kind of multilateral alternative seems to be growing in France (see answer to question four) and might well reach decisive proportions if British action gave the lead.

For us to aid the French nuclear program would tend to halt this constructive evolution in French and British thinking. It would strengthen the hand of those in both countries who argue that national nuclear programs make sense. In time, it might increase the temptation for the Germans to enter the field.

In all these ways, bilateral sharing would reverse trends that may otherwise strengthen the principle of collective security on which an effective defense of the Atlantic Community must, in the long run, be based.

- (b) Political and Economic: Ever since the war we have sought to bring about a politically united and strong Europe, that could work with us in an increasingly cohesive Atlantic partnership. De Gaulle, on the other hand, envisages a Europe organized on national lines that would seek strength not to cooperate but to become independent of us.

To the General an independent nuclear force is the political symbol of first-class-power status. The achievement of such status is an essential step in his design for a Europe under French hegemony.

To help

SECRET

SECRET

- 4 -

To help provide him with this symbol would thus work against our basic objectives regarding the political and economic organization of Europe.

This, in our view, is the most serious danger that would be presented by a policy of nuclear sharing: it would critically impair the chances of organizing Europe along lines consistent with US interests.

- (c) Germany: Nuclear sharing with France would also have important consequences for German stability.

So long as we do not aid the French nuclear program, the pressure in Germany for a national nuclear program can probably be kept within tolerable bounds. Not only is Germany under WEU limitations but there would be few temptations for it to embark on a national nuclear effort so long as (i) it was apparent that France was having a difficult time in achieving minimal results with its own program and (ii) the United States was continuing to oppose national programs.

US aid to France would, however, undercut both of these restraints.

By improving the speed, ease, and quality of the French achievement such aid would tend to stimulate imitation by a Germany that believed its technical competence greater than that of France and foresaw the possibility that it might also ultimately secure US help.

Once it was clear that De Gaulle had been able to obtain US assistance through the application of pressure, domestic demands

on the

SECRET

SECRET

- 5 -

on the German Government to follow suit would grow progressively more intense.

Obviously no member of the present German Government could admit this. German political leaders must continue to express the conviction that Germany has renounced nuclear weapons and will continue this self-denial no matter what policy the United States may follow towards France. But it seems unrealistic to expect that over a period of time German politicians could resist the temptation to exploit the issue of US nuclear discrimination against Germany -- particularly when Germany is making a far larger contribution to total NATO defense than France. And such demands for an end to discrimination would be reinforced by the insistence that Germany have the "best" weapons for its defense - particularly in view of its exposed position.

If this analysis is correct our nuclear aid to France could in time prove a corrosive element in the alliance; the German pressures that it would generate would be precisely the ones that we and our allies would be bound adamantly to resist.

These domestic German pressures giving rise to this situation would, by their very nature, not be significantly affected by any favors that might be extended to Germany in substitution for nuclear aid, e.g., an acceleration of the French conventional build-up or an extension of NATO missile programs.

Nor would the situation be greatly improved, even if assurances could be obtained from France that it would withhold nuclear help from Germany. General de Gaulle's basic design for

organizing

SECRET

SECRET

- 6 -

organizing Europe rests on the continuance of German good will and support. For us to exact assurances from France that it would not share its technology with Germany would likely prove more an irritant to the French than an effective inhibition on Franco-German sharing. Such assurances might well go the way of De Gaulle's 1958 assurances of an "Algerie Francaise" -- and for the same reason: they no longer fitted the "objective realities" of the situation.

The only arrangement likely to prevent German pressures for a national program would be sharing, not with France on a bilateral basis, but with a genuinely multilateral program into which France and Britain might merge their national efforts and in which Germany could participate on a basis of complete equality. Such a multilateral venture should be one in which the contributions of all countries were so intermingled that none could be withdrawn as a national force.

But so long as he can hope to achieve his basic nationalistic objectives, it is unlikely that General de Gaulle would be prepared to participate in such a multilateral venture.

(d) The State Department continues, therefore, to urge a policy with both negative and positive aspects:

(1) A negative aspect, in that we should persist in refusing assistance to national programs.

(2) A positive

SECRET

SECRET

- 7 -

- (2) A positive aspect is that we should hold out to our allies in the nuclear field the same kind of invitation to formulate a truly multilateral approach and proposal that Secretary Marshall extended in the economic field in 1947.

SECRET

SECRET

QUESTION

2. Is it possible that refusing to give the information to the French will encourage them to go to the Germans -- thus making German possession more likely?

ANSWER

1. There is no evidence of Franco-German nuclear collaboration today.
2. There are strong factors inhibiting the French from seeking such cooperation.
 - (a) De Gaulle's motive in building a French nuclear force is to give France a means of pursuing nationalistic aims. He is not likely to dilute the prestige and power secured through a French nuclear force by helping another nation to acquire a similar force.
 - (b) Unless he is driven into it by German pressures, he will be reluctant to incur the political opprobrium, in France and Europe, of being responsible for triggering a German national nuclear program.
 - (c) The cost of the French nuclear program, while burdensome, is still manageable, so long as France has the will to make the effort. France is not, therefore, compelled to seek a German financial contribution and, in the field of "know-how", the French think themselves ahead of the Germans as of today.
3. The Germans are not likely to seek, or agree to, nuclear cooperation with France, so long as the US continues to oppose national nuclear programs.

So long

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

So long as our basic policies remain geared to objectives which Germany strongly supports -- collective security, and political unification of Europe -- the Germans are likely to conclude that their basic interests will be better served by cooperating with the US and other NATO countries than by cooperating with France. No German Government will be anxious to take on the international complications of a national nuclear program unless it is forced to do so by domestic pressures. So long as US actions toward France do not generate the issue of 'discrimination' in German politics, such pressures are, in the foreseeable future, unlikely to reach a critical stage.

4. We have concluded, therefore, that refusing nuclear help to the French would probably retard, rather than hasten, Franco-German nuclear cooperation -- because it would slow down the crucial determinant: German desire for such cooperation.

SECRET

SECRET

QUESTION

3. Is not the entry of the British into the Common Market ultimately going to bring the French into nuclear discussions, either directly or indirectly?

ANSWER

1. On the basis of the evidence so far, we doubt De Gaulle will try to make UK nuclear aid to France the price of UK admission to the Common Market.
2. Once the UK joins the European Community the nuclear issue is likely to be brought forward in two different ways:
 - (a) The Continental countries are likely to feel that it is incongruous for the UK to participate in their intimate political ventures and still retain a special nuclear connection with the US that is denied to them. In the long run, if Britain wants to play its full part in the European Community, it may have to give up that connection.
 - (b) Over a period of time there are likely to be increasing pressures for the UK to merge its national effort into some kind of multi-lateral European program. De Gaulle and the present British Government may envisage this multilateral effort as no more than the commitment of their respective national forces to a common European command, from which they could be withdrawn at any time. Other European countries and the supporters of European integration in France and Britain will press for a genuinely mixed force under full

multilateral

SECRET

multilateral control. The resolution of this issue, if it arises, will be of vital import to the US for three reasons:

- (i) It will go far to determine whether Europe goes the way of real integration or remains the loose grouping of divided nations that De Gaulle envisages; it is hard to contemplate a truly integrated Europe whose members each retain essentially national forces.
- (ii) The bearings of this issue on the kind of German nuclear program which eventually emerges is obvious.
- (iii) We will want to make sure that any such European nuclear program is carefully tied to NATO, in order to preserve the principle of the indivisibility of defense. It would be much easier to assure that a genuinely mixed force is fully integrated into NATO than to assure that a common command of essentially national forces (which can be withdrawn from that command at any time) is so integrated.

QUESTION

4. Isn't our presumption that we could attract French support ultimately, perhaps post De Gaulle, to a European deterrent becoming increasingly slim?

ANSWER

1. The British case may be a relevant precedent. The British independent deterrent program developed under much better auspices than the French. They had better technological support and the added great advantage of US assistance. In spite of this, there are increasing signs that the British are becoming dissatisfied with their program. Given constructive alternatives, they may in time be prepared to merge their program into a broader NATO or European effort.
2. In view of the strong French desire for European unity demonstrated in last week's revolt in the French Assembly against De Gaulle's nationalistic policies, a post De Gaulle France is likely to turn even more quickly than Britain toward a European nuclear solution.

After all it was the French who first proposed the European Army (EDC) and that proposal would presumably have been adopted had De Gaulle not opposed it.

When De Gaulle put his "force de frappe" proposal to the National Assembly, it was rejected until he made it a question of confidence. At that time, it was pretty clear that predominant French opinion in the Assembly opposed a national program. Admittedly, since then they have made a substantial investment of capital and effort in the nuclear program and their commitment is, therefore, greater. It does not follow, however, that a

national

national nuclear program now enjoys majority support.

3. Opportunities for us to sound out informed opinion on this issue in De Gaulle's France are limited, but such evidence as we have suggests that the concept of some kind of multilateral program commands substantial and increasing support. For example:

- (a) Political: A group of French Parliamentarians recently visiting the US agreed among themselves with virtual unanimity -- including the Gaullists -- that a multinational European program made more sense in military, economic and political terms than a national program. The rapporteur of the Military Commission of the French National Assembly (a Gaullist) recently told us that he thought a NATO multilateral force would also be an acceptable alternative, if the procedure for determining its use did not provide for an absolute US veto.
- (b) Military: The Chief of Staff of the French Air Force recently told Henry Kissinger that he favored a 'joint European force' rather than a French program, and that he had so informed De Gaulle. An American attending the French Ecole Supérieure de la Guerre found middle-grade officers strong believers in the European approach.
- (c) Intellectuals: Raymond Aron told a US official, in discussing the nuclear problem recently, that a fourth alternative must be found and he looks for it in a European force. A published compendium of long-range

policy

SECRET

- 3 -

policy prescriptions by prominent French intellectuals ('Debats pour la France de Demain') reflects somewhat the same consensus.

4. The evidence cited above is, of course, not decisive. It seems clear, however, that the national program does not yet enjoy conclusive and irrevocable support, and that a multilateral approach is more attractive to a number of groups that are likely to play a leading role in post De Gaulle France. We can expect this trend to continue, and to grow in strength, as further progress is achieved toward European integration.
5. The eventual outcome may well turn on whether:
 - (a) The US continues, by refusal of bilateral aid, to create a situation in which the national French program has only dim prospects of achieving militarily significant results.
 - (b) The US continues to encourage proponents of the multilateral approach, and also continues (as in the MRM debate in the NAC) to avoid explicitly foreclosing the possibility that such an approach might eventually lead to a force over whose use the US did not exercise a clear and unfettered veto.

SECRET

QUESTION

5. Isn't it obvious that the French are now going to have this nuclear deterrent, that they will have no obligation to us, and that we will lack the element of control that our cooperation with the British has given us?

ANSWER

1. We engaged in extensive weapons cooperation with the British, and yet they insist that the decision to use V-Bombers, which contain warheads we helped the UK to produce, should rest entirely in British hands. The British have carefully preserved completely independent control over their national nuclear force because this is the basic purpose for which they want that force.
2. There is no reason for supposing that De Gaulle would act differently. On the contrary, he would be even more prone to protect his independent control at all costs. The whole object of De Gaulle's effort is to develop a nuclear force that the US cannot control. He is not likely to make concessions that would vitiate this object in order to secure US aid.
3. He would presumably be willing to set up arrangements for US-French consultation about targetting and about use of the force in case of hostilities. But he would insist that ultimate decisions about use continue to rest in his hands. These consultation arrangements would be sufficiently in his interest, because they would increase both the prestige and the efficiency of his independent force, so that he would probably favor them, whether or not we aided the French program. De Gaulle is not the man to refuse us arrangements which would thus advance his national purposes because we want them, any more than he would accept "deals" which frustrated these purposes because we were willing to give nuclear aid in return.

4. At the

4. At the same time, De Gaulle would try to turn these arrangements to his advantage. He would seek to work his way into a participation in the control of our global deterrent. This is the goal he clearly set for himself in his September 1958 letter to President Eisenhower on tripartite coordination of global strategy. There has been no sign that he has abandoned that goal.

5. Not only would US help fail to get us any real control; it would increase the size and effectiveness, and thus prolong the life, of French national nuclear forces we could not control.
 - (a) Without our help, the French will have only a vulnerable and unreliable Europe-based aircraft delivery system in the 1960's; they will not have the beginnings of a militarily significant delivery system (MIRVs with mated warheads) until the later 1960's or 1970 -- if they persevere in this course. The uncertain and distant nature of this prospect will be one of the factors that may persuade De Gaulle or his successors to merge the French national program into a multilateral effort.

 - (b) With US help the French can have a larger and better national force earlier than indicated above. As a result they may be less disposed to abandon that force in favor of a multilateral program, if and when De Gaulle leaves the scene.

6. For the reasons indicated above, aid to the French force will weaken, rather than strengthen, the prospects for getting that force out from under French national control.

SECRET

QUESTION

6. Is it not a fact that the NATO nuclear concept is still-born -- not really developing in any way and no longer a likely prospect?

ANSWER

1. It would be premature to pass judgment at this time on Allied attitudes toward the NATO multilateral concept.

Until very recently, the US had not developed a firm position on this concept. The Europeans sensed that we did not have a firm proposal, concluded that we did not take the concept of a NATO multilateral force seriously, and felt no incentive to discuss the matter with us.

2. The US is now, for the first time, prepared to play a sufficient role in NATO discussion of the NATO multilateral concept to indicate that we are serious. As this discussion gets underway we should be able to form a more reliable judgment of European attitudes.

The Belgian, Italian, and Canadian representatives in NAC have indicated that they support it. The Dutch will probably do the same. The Greeks and Turks are likely to favor the proposal, although they will not participate financially. The Scandinavians are not likely to be enthusiastic although they could be expected to prefer a multilateral force to nationally manned NREMs.

The French will seek to avoid any participation in the program that would divert resources from their national program.

The evidence

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

The evidence regarding German attitudes is inconclusive. We have recent information that the German representative in the North Atlantic Council had been instructed by the Chancellor strongly to support the multilateral MRBM concept. When the President suggested to Strauss, on the other hand, that the NATO multilateral MRBM force was probably dead, he seemed to agree; this may be a reflection of his chronic tendency to agree with his seniors, when he is trying to please them.

Strauss also indicated, during his recent visit, that he had been interested in the concept of a multilateral force, despite the large problems of NATO sovereignty, etc., involved. On another occasion he indicated that his cautious approach reflected primarily his assessment of a lack of US interest. There is no assurance that any one of these statements is more accurate a reflection of his views than any other; he is clearly trying to take the measure of our intentions.

The truth is that the Germans will probably form their judgment only after they decide what other options are open to them. Strauss would prefer a nationally manned and owned German MRBM program, because Germany could exert greater control over it. If he is convinced that the US will not permit such a German program - because of its adverse effect on allied cohesion and East-West relations; if he is persuaded that the US is now serious about the multilateral concept; and if the Chancellor interests himself in this matter on broad political grounds (as he has occasionally done in the past), there is some chance that the Germans will press forward with a multilateral program. This chance will be increased in proportion as the Germans believe

that we

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

that we are prepared to consider any form of multilateral control over the force on which a majority of our allies agree - that a US "veto" is not pre-ordained, and that our allies can explore the control question with an open mind.

3. If the Germans do show a serious interest, the multilateral NREM program may well get off the ground. In this case the British - who will be initially hostile to any continental participation in NREM deployment - may well decide that it would be better to join the procession than to allow it to go on without them.

All this is conjecture - no more. It is at least as likely that the Germans will conclude that they can eventually bring us around to a nationally manned force and therefore turn a deaf ear to the multilateral concept at this time - on the ostensible grounds, as Schroeder recently put it, that it costs too much and that it isn't needed.

4. All that can be said with confidence, therefore, is that (i) the Germans' attitude will be crucial; (ii) their attitude will be significantly influenced by the German assessment of US intentions; (iii) the only way to judge European reactions with confidence will be to go forward with NAC discussions in a way that makes clear both our unwillingness to aid national NREM programs and our willingness to support a multilateral program.

SECRET

QUESTION

7. Is it a fact that if we help France at this point it will encourage other national deterrents? Does our refusal to help her really discourage the development of other national deterrents? Which countries are likely to follow the French example?

ANSWER

1. US aid to France is likely to encourage Germany, and refusal of US aid to France is probably one of the factors that discourages Germany. The reasons for this view were set forth in the answer to question 1.
2. As to what countries would follow Germany: One is reminded of Mossadegh's story about the defense of the Iranian Army Lieutenant who was court-martialed for not firing his battery during maneuvers: "I had fourteen reasons for not firing. First, I had no ammunition" There may be other countries that would follow France, but the first would be Germany, and that would be enough to throw into disarray our efforts to promote European integration, strengthen the Atlantic Community, and stabilize East-west relations.

SECRET

QUESTION

8. With the French reluctance to commit troops to Germany, and the German troops held at 12 divisions, is it going to be possible for us to implement the forward strategy? If not, should we consider whether it is possible for us to reduce our forces in the European theatre?

ANSWER

1. The possibility of executing the forward strategy should not be ruled out because of present French reluctance to commit troops to Germany.

What is here involved is, in considerable measure, a question of timing.

Until the Algerian question is finally settled, De Gaulle will not seriously put his mind to the future role of the French army on the continent.

When he does, he will wish to proceed with re-equipping and re-training of French forces for European warfare. This process will take quite a while and, while it is underway, it will not matter too much whether the French forces in question are in France and Germany, since their combat value will be limited.

When this process is completed, it will be of great importance that these French forces move into Germany. But by then German pressures on France may well have brought about a French decision that this move should be undertaken. The Germans have the greatest stake in this decisions, and they are in the best position to bring pressure on the French. Secretary Rusk will make this point to them in Bonn.

If the

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

If the Germans do press strongly, the French may be reluctant to resist over the long term, since this could jeopardize, in some degree, the Franco-German partnership on which they set such store.

2. In the meantime, we should be cautious in threatening to withdraw US forces on account of allied non-performance.

Any suggestion to Bonn that we might consider reducing US forces if our Allies do not perform adequately would be almost certain to reach Russian ears since everything leaks from Bonn.

Such a suggestion coming at this time might incite the Soviet leaders to toughen their line on Berlin. It could give aid and comfort to those elements in the Kremlin favoring a military solution since the inference could be drawn that the US had concluded that the defense of Europe was too costly.

Finally, we doubt that such a threat would have the desired effect on our Allies. It would almost certainly play into De Gaulle's hands.

He could repeat and distort our threats in such a way as to document his basic contention that US presence in Europe may well be temporary. This contention is a key argument in his efforts to persuade other European countries that they should look to themselves (under French leadership), rather than to the US, for the defense of Europe.

US emphasis on this threat would also stimulate Adenauer's almost neurotic fears regarding US disengagement from Europe. This fear recurs at the slightest provocation. If it should get out of control, the Chancellor would be an even more prickly

partner

partner than in the recent past and might be tempted to succumb to De Gaulle's enticements.

The total effect of this threat would more likely be division and disintegration within the Alliance than increased performance on the part of France. Quite obviously the 12-4 ratio is unfair and unsatisfactory. Quite obviously also it is extremely burdensome on the US to maintain our present level of forces in Europe and extremely irksome that our Allies do not pull their oar. But we should not make a bluff unless we are prepared to call it, and for us to reduce our forces in Europe could well mean the disintegration of the Alliance and an open invitation to the Soviet Union to embark on an adventure designed to push the Iron Curtain Westward, either through military means (e.g., increased pressure on Berlin) or through subversion and demoralization based on this military threat.

3. The alternative is, over the long-term, fairly promising.

Our present information is that, if the agreed 1966 force goals can be met, the forward strategy can be successfully implemented. We believe that the prospects for meeting these goals have improved over the last year. General Norstad reports a 25 percent increase over a year's time in combat effectiveness in the forces under his command. The German force build-up toward the goal of 12 divisions continues. The French are strengthening their existing forces in Germany. Although the two divisions returned from Algeria that are now being modernized have not been formally committed to NATO, General Norstad has been given to understand that they can be counted on as being available to him in an emergency. The attitude of the

British is more encouraging than it has been for some time. They have indicated that they will at least bring the Army of the Rhine up to 55,000 men, and there is some prospect that they may in time even strengthen the Rhine Army.

All these trends would be interrupted by reduction of US forces in Allied Command Europe. The greatest determinant of European actions comes from our own example; nothing would be better calculated to give the Europeans a sense that the forward strategy is impossible of realization than overt action by the US to lessen its own commitment to NATO forces.

We can give no categorical assurance that the forward strategy will eventually become feasible in the absence of such US action. The chances are good enough, however, to make continued efforts to this end more consistent with US interests than abandonment of the effort at this time.

DECLASSIFIED BY: MDR-87-150

18 June 1962

6/18/62
II

MDR

The 6

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL TAYLOR

E

SUBJECT: McNamara Speech, Rusk Trip, and a European Nuclear Capability

1. Secretary McNamara's Michigan speech and Secretary Rusk's European trip have already begun to inspire editorials, columns, and news stories with a common thread running through them -- perhaps not entirely fortuitously. They are all saying that the two Secretaries are responding constructively to European pressures for a European nuclear force. In my opinion, they are wrong, and, further in my opinion, we shall soon be finding it out.

2. What the newspapers are saying, though they may not fully realize it, is that our mild, reluctant-dragon position on a NATO multilateral MRBM force will prove the answer to Europa's military aspirations (and by "Europa" I mean the increasingly corporate West European entity the economic manifestation of which is the Common Market). It will not;

a. because our position is not at all oriented toward Europa;

b. because our position, stripped of camouflage and verbiage, is that Europa and its constituent nations should be rational enough to see that they have no alternative to dependence on the United States, within NATO, for the defense of their existence;

c. because the nations which are the subjects of international politics and law are no more wholly rational than are the individuals who are the subjects of municipal politics and law;

d. because in a few years' time Europa can probably achieve through pooled resources, talents, and programs, a military capability, including nuclear strike forces, which to us may not today appear attainable. (We have underestimated the enemy before; must we now underestimate our friends?)

3. As emphasized in my memorandum of 15 June and in my earlier memorandum today, our MRBM position is a narrowly conceived and backward-oriented proposal which fails entirely to take into account the most vital and challenging movement in Europe today. By our actions toward economic Europa and at least by our exhortations toward political Europa, we have given new direction to our policies, but toward military Europa we have come up with a mouse, and in the wrong forum at that -- NATO instead of Europa-in-Europe, or something of the sort.

L

LEGERE

[Redacted]

1/11/62 3. "The 11/12"

DECLASSIFIED BY: MDR-87-150

6/18/62
II
MDR
18 June 1962
The 6

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL TAYLOR E

SUBJECT: McNamara Speech, Rusk Trip, and a European Nuclear Capability

1. Secretary McNamara's Michigan speech and Secretary Rusk's European trip have already begun to inspire editorials, columns, and news stories with a common thread running through them -- perhaps not entirely fortuitously. They are all saying that the two Secretaries are responding constructively to European pressures for a European nuclear force. In my opinion, they are wrong, and, further in my opinion, we shall soon be finding it out.

2. What the newspapers are saying, though they may not fully realize it, is that our mild, reluctant-dragon position on a NATO multilateral MRBM force will prove the answer to Europa's military aspirations (and by "Europa" I mean the increasingly corporate West European entity the economic manifestation of which is the Common Market). It will not;

a. because our position is not at all oriented toward Europa;

b. because our position, stripped of camouflage and verbiage, is that Europa and its constituent nations should be rational enough to see that they have no alternative to dependence on the United States, within NATO, for the defense of their existence;

c. because the nations which are the subjects of international politics and law are no more wholly rational than are the individuals who are the subjects of municipal politics and law;

d. because in a few years' time Europa can probably achieve through pooled resources, talents, and programs, a military capability, including nuclear strike forces, which to us may not today appear attainable. (We have underestimated the enemy before; must we now underestimate our friends?)

3. As emphasized in my memorandum of 15 June and in my earlier memorandum today, our MRBM position is a narrowly conceived and backward-oriented proposal which fails entirely to take into account the most vital and challenging movement in Europe today. By our actions toward economic Europa and at least by our exhortations toward political Europa, we have given new direction to our policies, but toward military Europa we have come up with a mouse, and in the wrong forum at that -- NATO instead of Europa-in-Europe, or something of the sort.

L
LEGERE

1/1/62 3: "The fix"

S/AE 3675

June 18, 1962

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNNY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: JCAE Letter of May 14 on Nuclear Weapons
Arrangements for NATO Forces

We have reviewed the subject letter as well as Chairman Seaborg's comment thereon contained in his letter to you of May 25. State Department staff also had an opportunity to comment on the content of Mr. Gilpatrick's memorandum to you of June 8 during its preparation, and we believe it provides the basis for developing a reply to the Committee.

We believe the emphasis of the President's reply should be one which makes clear the very large degree in which we share the Joint Committee's concerns and are trying to do something to meet them. This should be balanced with a treatment of the very important political and military needs, but the over-all impression should not be left that we are wholly satisfied with the existing and projected situation; we are not, and we ought to capitalize on the increasing efforts we are making to alter this situation in a direction which will be more consistent with the new Administration's approach and philosophy.

Accordingly, it is suggested that the President's reply should:

1. State that we share the concern that nuclear deployment to Europe be confined to that minimum which is today essential to the national interest. To this end:

(a) In view of possible changes in our NATO strategy we have decided not to endorse requirements for nuclear delivery systems over and above those we are already committed to provide. Further, we will ensure that NATO countries are aware that we have not yet decided to provide those additional nuclear delivery requirements contained in MC 26/4 for end 1966;

TOP SECRET

S/AE 3675

June 18, 1962

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNBY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: JCAE Letter of May 14 on Nuclear Weapons
Arrangements for NATO Forces

We have reviewed the subject letter as well as Chairman Seaborg's comment thereon contained in his letter to you of May 25. State Department staff also had an opportunity to comment on the content of Mr. Gilpatrick's memorandum to you of June 8 during its preparation, and we believe it provides the basis for developing a reply to the Committee.

We believe the emphasis of the President's reply should be one which makes clear the very large degree in which we share the Joint Committee's concerns and are trying to do something to meet them. This should be balanced with a treatment of the very important political and military needs, but the over-all impression should not be left that we are wholly satisfied with the existing and projected situation; we are not, and we ought to capitalize on the increasing efforts we are making to alter this situation in a direction which will be more consistent with the new Administration's approach and philosophy.

Accordingly, it is suggested that the President's reply should:

1. State that we share the concern that nuclear deployment to Europe be confined to that minimum which is today essential to the national interest. To this end:

(a) In view of possible changes in our NATO strategy, we have decided not to endorse requirements for nuclear delivery systems over and above those we are already committed to provide. Further, we will ensure that NATO countries are aware that we have not yet decided to provide those additional nuclear delivery requirements contained in MC 26/4 for end 1966;

TOP SECRET

740.5611/6-1862
TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

(b) We have begun in the NAC an information program on the large nuclear capability presently in existence to support NATO in order to reduce our Allies' appetites for additions to this capability;

(c) We are taking the lead in the full discussion in the NAC of NATO strategy, with a view to bringing our Allies around to a realization of the need for placing greater relative emphasis on non-nuclear efforts than in the past;

(d) The Departments of State and Defense have been directed to undertake urgently a thorough study of the strike aircraft program in the light of such factors as existing commitments and NATO strategy, in order to meet just such concerns as those voiced by the Joint Committee;

(e) The U.S. Government is making clear to NATO that it does not believe there is an urgent military need for adding MRBM's to NATO forces. Nevertheless, our Allies continued to express their concern about this matter. In the continuing discussions in the NAC, we are making clear the limitations on actions by us to meet their concerns;

(f) We have indicated to the German Government that the U.S. reserves the right to review its commitments to provide Pershings to Germany in the light of the continuing review of NATO strategy.

2. We suggest that the reply emphasize the statement of our revised NATO posture set forth in the concluding summary paragraphs on pages nine and ten of Mr. Gilpatric's memorandum. To this summary might also be added the point that we need to maintain, on the part of our Allies, sufficient confidence in the Alliance's nuclear capability and

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

- 3 -

to provide a means for Alliance-wide participation in that capability in order to offer them a constructive alternative to pressures for national nuclear capabilities.

3. We share also the JCAE concern that we retain adequate command and control of the weapons deployed abroad. To this end, we are, as described in Mr. Gilpatrick's memorandum, taking a number of improvement actions.

In the course of our consideration of an appropriate reply to the JCAE, we have been interested in bringing ourselves up to date on the studies and actions in the areas addressed by the JCAE letter and which have also been of concern to us. We have had as a result some very useful reviews with Department of Defense staff. While the comments contained in Mr. Gilpatrick's memorandum with respect to the specific points raised by the Joint Committee are as full as we can provide at the present time, we believe we must be prepared to provide the JCAE, at the appropriate time, the results of certain studies and programs now in train. We have in mind, particularly, measures to assure unilateral U.S. capability to destroy weapons if required to prevent their falling into unauthorized hands. The problem of front line or forward deployment of nuclear weapons has also been a matter of concern to us, and we are reassured that studies already initiated in the Department of Defense should shortly offer us an opportunity to review those requirements in terms of our current policy.

We, and particularly Mr. Orwick of my staff, are available to assist in any further way you or Mr. Johnson of your staff desire.

/s/ U. Alexis Johnson

Deputy Under Secretary

Clearances:

S/P - Mr. Owen (in draft) L - Mr. Chayes (in substance)
EUR/RPM - Mr. Fessenden (in draft) G/PM - Mr. Kitchen (in draft)

G/PM: DOrwick:alb
6/17/62

TOP SECRET

Dictated by Georgi Bolshakov
June 18, 1962

611K162

An increase of tension took place recently. It had been caused by United States' atomic tests, American ^{MILITARY} interference in Southeast Asia, ^{AFAIRS} and ^{by} certain American steps in NATO leading ^{factually} virtually to atomic rearmament of Bunzswär. All these events are taking place ^{AGAINST} over a background of continued unsettlement of the West Berlin situation. West Berlin has been under occupation for many years and is the source of tension in Europe and the situation there threatens peace. It makes our relations more difficult and this situation ^{possibilities of} over there is full of dangerous collision between states.

Our plans and intentions on German peace settlement are quite clear. Mr. Khrushchev frankly spoke about them to Ambassador Thompson and to Pierre Salinger.

The Soviet Union sincerely wants to reach an agreement with the United States which would not hurt vital interests ~~and~~ or prestige for both sides.

If we do not succeed in reaching this agreement the Soviet Union will face the necessity of signing a peace treaty with GDR and the question of liquidation of war remnants will be sold ^{ve} and on this basis the situation in West Berlin -- a free demilitarized city-would be normalized.

We want to reach a mutually agreed solution of a German peace settlement. But if the United States continues to put

PERSONAL PAPERS OF ROBERT F. KENNEDY: ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PERSONAL CORRESPONDENCE: 1962, Boland - Byrd, Box 4.

Microfilm by the Kennedy Library
the value of the original

forward as a condition its demand to keep an occupational regime in West Berlin and keep occupation troops there, the conclusion of peace treaty with GDR with all consequences might be the only way out at the present situation. Then the United States and other Western powers should discuss with GDR all the questions in which they are interested.

One tried ^{to} picture ~~or interpret~~ ^{PROPOSAL} our suggestion on the end of the occupation of West Berlin and ^{to} withdrawal ^{the} of occupation troops from there ^{as} that the Soviet Union's intention ~~is~~ to get the settlement for the sake of Western powers' interest. That is a completely wrong understanding of the Soviet position.

It is known that the Soviet government has suggested several ^{VERSIONS} compromises of solutions of occupation troops problem, each of which gives an opportunity to find a way out without damaging the prestige and interests both of the United States and the Soviet Union. We decisively cannot agree with the continuation of the present state of affairs in West Berlin -- continuation of the occupation of West Berlin and the continued stay of occupation troops there.

In Moscow the leaders draw special attention to Mr. R. Kennedy's statement that the President and his government are realists and trying to reach an agreement and would like not to have a military conflict with the USSR. This is a wise and

reasonable position and the Soviet government shares completely this approach because it completely corresponds to the approach of the Soviet government.

From: MJ Hillenbrand: gw.

Approved in S 6/19/62

SECRET - EYES ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

E5 6/18/62 10874

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDS/MR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

U1 (R)

TAB X

3/24/91

Memorandum of Conversation

CATEGORY "A"

DATE: June 18, 1962
11:30 a.m.,
Secretary's Office

Sensitive Designator

Removed AUG 25 1972
v/ QW (S/SJ)

Authority to:

SUBJECT: Germany and Berlin
C, OADR

FILE RS/R

Downgraded To: SECRET CONFIDENTIAL

LEO 11652: XGDS 1 2 3 4

Authorized By: H. D. ...
August 4, 1975

PARTICIPANTS: Anatoli Dobrynin, Ambassador of the USSR
Georgi M. Kornienko, Counselor of Soviet Embassy

The Secretary
Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary, EUR
Martin J. Hillenbrand, Director, Office of German Affairs, EUR

COPIES TO:

- S/S
- S/O-BTF
- W.H. - Bundy
- G - Mr. Johnson
- INR - Mr. Hilsman
- S/B - Mr. Bohlen
- S/P - Mr. Rostow
- EUR - Mr. Kohler
- CIA - Mr. McCone
- DEF. - Mr. McNamara
- DEF/ISA - Mr. Nitze
- L - Mr. Chayes
- Moscow - Amb. Thompson

Ambassador Dobrynin said that he had brought the Secretary's remarks at their last meeting to the attention of his Government and had now received appropriate instructions. He then read from an English text along the following lines:

(Mr. Hillenbrand was able after the meeting to check a number of points with Counselor Kornienko, who had the Russian text of Dobrynin's instructions, but no aide-memoire or other written document was handed over.)

The Soviet Union has agreed to an exchange of views with the United States Government on a peace settlement with the aim in mind of reaching a wide agreement which would contribute towards mutual understanding consistent with the interests of both sides. The Secretary's statement had been a repetition of what had already been said many times: That the United States would not participate in a German peace treaty, whether in a single treaty with the two German states or in separate treaties with the two German states. At the same time the United States is evading an agreement which could be concluded on such a basis that thereafter the Soviet Union could complete its peace treaty with the GDR and thus affect a mutually beneficial solution of the West Berlin and other related problems.

We now face the task of concluding a peace treaty and eliminating the vestiges of World War II. The most urgent situation requiring normalizing is that of West Berlin. This cannot be on the basis of the preservation of occupation rights, that is on the basis of the continuing presence of the occupation forces of the United States, Great Britain, and France. It is impossible to continue a useful

SECRET - EYES ONLY

discussion

a note of invitation & instructions
w/ Hillenbrand & earlier memos

162.00/6-18-62

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

-2-

discussion of the German problem by attempting to lay aside the basic question of West Berlin and the liquidation of the occupation regime therein. To do this would be to preserve a dangerous hot-bed which could blow up the entire world.

If nothing was said about ending the occupation regime and withdrawing the occupation forces in the draft principles paper which the Secretary gave Foreign Minister Gromyko at Geneva, this was a weakness not a strength of this paper. It seeks to fix the present abnormal situation of West Berlin for an indefinite period and to engage both sides in indefinite talks. It would thus not lead to an arrangement which would draw a line under World War II.

The Soviet Union cannot accept any agreement perpetuating the occupation regime which is now constituted by NATO troops. The forces in West Berlin are not the same kind of forces as were there in 1945. Then they were directed at the elimination of German militarism and Nazism and at averting a further threat of World War. The occupation of West Berlin today constitutes a specific kind of NATO military base in which NATO forces are stationed.

The Soviet Government has made a number of concessions in its various proposals to have token forces of the four occupying powers in West Berlin, or to have neutral or UN troops in West Berlin. To these has been added the suggestion that symbolic forces of certain smaller NATO and Warsaw Pact countries might be stationed there. In the latter case these forces should naturally operate under the UN flag and not as representatives of the two blocs. They would be in West Berlin on the basis of a new treaty. Thus a clash between the US and the USSR would be avoided and account would be taken of prestige considerations on both sides. These troops would be a kind of symbol of the will of the participants not to allow outside interference in the affairs of West Berlin.

The Soviet Union had a right to expect that the United States would approach the Soviet proposals objectively, but the US has shown no willingness to compromise or to take account of the interests of both sides. The Secretary of State has said that the United States does not require recognition of the presence of its occupation forces since this is a fact. This presence allegedly gives the United States the right to stay indefinitely in Berlin. The Secretary has indicated that this is not a subject for discussion at all. But if the United States does not want to discuss this subject, then what is there to discuss? The continuing presence of occupation troops contradicts the aim of seeking a mutually acceptable solution and bringing an end to World War II. The US has also referred to its rights under the quadripartite agreements and the unconditional surrender of Germany. But these did not establish a basis for the indefinite occupation of any part of Germany. They envisaged a peace treaty and drawing a line under World War II. The US assumes unilaterally that it has an obligation to defend West Berlin and the rights of its population. This cannot, however, create additional rights with respect to presence or access. As is known, the Soviet Union and the GDR acknowledge the right of West Berlin to determine its own life. They are also willing to give international guarantees either by having

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

UN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET - EYES ONLY

UN troops there or under the most recent formula of troops from the two blocs under the UN flag. Any unbiased person would have to admit that these would be an improvement over occupation troops which are a constant cause of friction.

When the United States insists on the maintenance of the occupation, it is difficult not to get the impression that it cares less for the rights of the population of West Berlin than it does for NATO military interests. The US has said that it does not recognize any GDR right to control traffic to West Berlin. The GDR does not need such a right. Even now it controls 95% of all such traffic. When speaking of access therefore, one is talking only of 5% of the total traffic. The only basis for an agreement on such access would be one combining the principles of freedom with respect for the rights of the GDR. The Soviet Union is surprised, therefore, that the US has thought of the idea of some sort of international body, with a membership of thirteen states, which would exercise rights in and crossing the territory of the GDR. Such a proposal is unacceptable in view of its inconsistency with respect for the rights and sovereignty of the GDR. How could one expect the GDR to give up what it has to a body devised to deprive the GDR of its sovereignty over a part of its territory? This would not better but worsen relations between countries.

The Soviet Union has put forward its proposal for an international organ to act as an arbiter. This was a step towards the US position. It would not control access, however, but be an arbitral body to pronounce judgments. It would not play master over the territory of the GDR or interfere with its sovereignty.

It will be impossible to come to an agreement if the Western Powers try to force through Adenauer's claim to Berlin as a Land of the Federal Republic of Germany or his ideas on an access treaty. The Federal Republic of Germany is aggressive and threatening. Every delay in achieving a peace settlement encourages the Federal Republic to new provocations organized in West Berlin, for example, such hostile actions against the Socialist countries as those planned in West Berlin for the middle of July. (When queried by the Secretary as to his reference to the middle of July, Dobrynin checked with Kormilenko's Russian text and corrected his statement to "the middle of June".)

As for the US suggestion regarding an all-Berlin technical commission, it had to be pointed out that, after having taken certain defensive measures, the GDR made certain proposals to the West Berlin Senat for agreement on measures to facilitate movement between West Berlin and the capital of the GDR. No favorable response was received. This could not be a subject for talks between the US and the USSR since it concerned a matter within the exclusive competence of the GDR. Its solution was an internal matter for the Germans themselves.

On a number of items some basis for understanding did seem to be emerging. The Soviet Government did not underestimate these. If the US were reasonable, agreement could be reached on them, but the principal task in connection with drawing a line under World War II is to settle the West Berlin question. As the Warsaw Pact powers

SECRET - EYES ONLY

had

SECRET - EYES ONLY

had recently stated, they were willing to reach agreement on a mutually acceptable basis. If the Western Powers did not show a similar desire, then the Warsaw Pact countries would conclude a peace treaty with the GDR with all the ensuing consequences. This would mean that the GDR would acquire all the rights of a sovereign state and the vestiges of war would be completely liquidated. West Berlin would become a free demilitarized city and the rights of the occupation troops to remain there would not be recognized. All countries wishing to have contact with West Berlin would have to conduct normal negotiations with the GDR.

As Chairman Khrushchev had said recently to Mr. Salinger, it was unwise for the two sides to try to frighten each other. They both have ample power. To threaten to resort to the argument of force does not help understanding. If anyone tries to threaten, he should realize that he is doomed to failure. It was believed that the US Government was aware of this.

Returning to the analogy of the Japanese Peace Treaty, it had to be pointed out that the US and the USSR had fought together against Japan and that the Japanese had also surrendered to the USSR. Nevertheless, a separate peace treaty had been signed with Japan depriving the Soviet Union of its rights as an occupying power. Now the US wants to keep its occupation troops in West Berlin despite such a peace treaty, even though this would merely lead to tensions and prevent the elimination of the vestiges of the war. If it is true that at the time of the San Francisco conference the US had certain ground to believe that it enjoyed a military advantage over other powers, this time has now passed. As the President recently said, there is now an equality of power. Regard must, therefore, be taken for the position of other sides. This must be understood. If in fact the Western Powers force the Soviet Union to conclude a peace treaty with the GDR, they will find themselves in the same position as the USSR after the Japanese treaty.

The Soviet Union does not want to see the glimpse of hope and understanding between it and the US fade. It, therefore, hopes that the US Government will not yield to those who are trying to force a collision.

(This concluded the formal statement of Dobrynin's instructions.)

The Secretary said he was going to address a rather curious question to Dobrynin as Ambassador. He wondered what his answer would be if he were to ask the Ambassador whether he saw anything new in what he had just said. Dobrynin responded that his remarks were intended as a summary of the Soviet position. The Soviets had received no reply to the proposal which Chairman Khrushchev had made as to the possibility of having troops in Berlin from the two pacts. The Secretary stated he believed from what had been said earlier that Dobrynin knew we could not accept this proposal. Dobrynin asked whether our definite reply was that this was not acceptable. The Secretary said "yes".

The Secretary then gave his first observations on Dobrynin's statements. He said that he did not think we could accept full responsibility for the phenomenon of repetition. In its essential aspects the Soviet position which had just been

SECRET - EYES ONLY

outlined

SECRET - EYES ONLY

outlined had been regularly repeated since 1948. We do not believe that constant repetition will of itself produce a series of proposals from the West which could involve continuous attempts at compromise leading to erosion of the central necessity of our position in West Berlin. It is true that we have repeated this central point over and over, but there has been repetition on both sides. With reference to Dobrynin's statement about our remarks as to attempting to perpetuate the presence of our troops in West Berlin, we have not used this term. We hope that in time it will be possible to reach a permanent settlement of all outstanding German questions. We do not believe that we can reach such an agreement under present circumstances. We cannot seem to reach agreement either on a permanent settlement or on a definition of the de facto situation. Perpetuity is a very long time and we have not ourselves thought of the question in terms of perpetuity. With respect to a question like that of Berlin which is extremely difficult and central, time can have a useful effect. As the President had indicated to Chairman Khrushchev in his communication, he was encouraged to think that a way was opening to a settlement of the issues of Southeast Asia with particular reference to Laos. We hoped the Geneva conference would resume and achieve this result. This would be an important step. We also hoped that there were other points, such as outer space and disarmament, where improvements in our relations could occur. The more the general atmosphere improves, the more possible it will be to sort out the relationships between the two countries and the more manageable the central issue of West Berlin might become. An improvement of conditions in East Berlin and East Germany might make this more manageable.

The Secretary said he found it difficult to attach importance to the charge that the occupation troops in West Berlin were NATO troops. Western Europe and the United States united in the NATO agreement under circumstances with which Dobrynin was familiar. In an analogous sense the Warsaw Pact organization had been formed. The facts that our troops are in West Berlin and that we are members of NATO does not change the reality that our troops are there under earlier arrangements and that these arrangements cannot be changed and still have us meet our commitment to West Berlin. When in our modus vivendi paper we said we were not asking the Soviets to recognize the occupation status, we were trying to take the prestige question into account. Dobrynin had mentioned it was true that our prestige was heavily involved. If Soviet prestige is involved in the removal of Western forces from West Berlin, this was a problem created by the USSR for itself. Under these circumstances, it was not easy for us to solve the problem of Soviet prestige on the basis which the USSR proposed. Our modus vivendi did try to take account of Soviet prestige.

The Secretary went on to say that he was disappointed not to recognize in what Dobrynin had said any element of reciprocity in taking account of the other's vital interests which, in their last talk, he had requested the Soviets attempt to do. Dobrynin kept using the words "concession" and "compromise". The lack of reciprocity was disturbing in the Soviet reference to certain things which were stated not to be open for discussion. Such subjects as German reunification or solution of the Berlin problem on an all-Berlin basis seemed to be beyond discussion. We cannot accept that only the diminution of our rights and commitments are open to discussion. We

SECRET - EYES ONLY

do

SECRET - EYES ONLY

do not see that necessary reciprocity here which would open the way to handling this admittedly complicated and but at the same time simple and potentially dangerous problem. If Moscow were attempting to consider how things look from our side, its reference to relations between West Berlin and the Federal Republic could not be made as it is made. After all, the Soviets maintain that East Berlin is part of the GDR. In the face of this, it would be perfectly normal for us to say that West Berlin is part of the Federal Republic. Years ago, we entered a reservation which prevented an application of the Federal Republic's constitution to Berlin in order to be in a position to deal with these matters on a four-power basis. Now the Soviets say that East Berlin is part of the GDR and that is the end of it.

With reference to Dobrynin's mention of the discussion of force, the Secretary continued, he thought it right that neither the US nor the USSR should attempt to settle questions with each other by threats or reference to a war which the few survivors would never be able to understand. But the pressure of force comes from what the Soviets have said and from what Dobrynin had repeated today with respect to the consequences of the proposed agreement with the GDR. It was this pressure, intimidation and attempt to frighten which had given an atmosphere of crisis to the Berlin situation. This was dangerous and unnecessary, the Secretary added, but he wanted to identify that this pressure had been exerted by the Soviets on one of the key problems from the very beginning.

The Secretary said he would not go into any detail on the Soviet attempt to draw an analogy with the Japanese Peace Treaty. We could provide extensive notes as to why we did not consider this really relevant. Soviet forces had not been in occupation in Japan. Soviet cooperation with us in the Japanese war had been of three days' duration, although we had made strenuous efforts to enlist Soviet cooperation in that war at a time when we were also fighting Nazi Germany. There had been no quadripartite occupation of Japan, no zones of occupation and no Soviet presence. There had been general agreement among the community of states as to the terms of the Japanese treaty, although the Indians thought they were too severe and the Burmese thought them not to be severe enough. The Secretary added that he believed Chairman Khrushchev had told the President at Vienna that the Soviets should have signed the Japanese treaty. Thus, there were many differences which do not make the Japanese analogy relevant to the present situation.

As to access, the Secretary continued, the Soviets are aware from the newspapers that we ^{have} had some thoughts which had been under discussion among us on an International Access Authority. At an earlier point, Ambassador Thompson had indicated some general ideas on the subject to Foreign Minister Gromyko. We were, of course, familiar with what Gromyko had said at Geneva on a four-power arbitral group. The Secretary said he thought there were matters involving access which could perhaps be worked out, but what makes them secondary is to link the access question with the withdrawal of Western forces from West Berlin. It did not seem profitable to try to find out whether such a four-power body would act unilaterally or what precise authority it would have as long as the link with troop withdrawal were maintained. At Geneva there seemed to be a time when this did not appear to be a fundamental point in Soviet thinking, but this now

SECRET - EYES ONLY

does

SECRET - EYES ONLY

does seem to have been clarified as a fundamental point. Therefore, there did not seem to be much prospect in going down this trail.

These were his first observations, the Secretary concluded. He would report to the President and would be seeing his colleagues among the Western Foreign Ministers on his forthcoming visit to Europe. We would review the whole situation and presumed the Soviet side would do likewise, but he thought the central point continued to be the one which Dobrynin had indicated. It was the key that would unlock these other doors. The Secretary could also repeat arguments one through twenty, but did not feel any need to do so.

*it, these
are
incomparable*

Dobrynin said he would like to reverse the Secretary's question and ask what is new in the US position. The Secretary commented that this was an important point. If one looked back on the past year of discussions between the two governments, one noted that we had made a considerable effort to draw attention to certain points we thought of interest and of importance to the Soviets and on which we considered some form of agreement might be possible. We have thus over the past year been injecting new elements. The Soviets, on the other hand, seemed to be putting them in a bag, tying the noose and then asking, "what's new?". Then when we get to the point of West Berlin, they continue to ask "what's new?".

Dobrynin here reviewed what he called the four Soviet variations for replacement of Western occupation troops in West Berlin: symbolic units of the four former occupying powers, of neutral countries, of UN forces and of certain countries of the NATO and Warsaw Pact groupings.

(Subsequently, Mr. Hillenbrand queried Kormienkov as to whether the second and third above were really variants. It was confirmed that they were, although the neutral units would be there under UN aegis.) Dobrynin said that the Soviet Union wanted to lessen tensions in the Middle of Europe. Yesterday Adenauer had been in Berlin. This would probably lead to a further exchange of notes. Did we think that this would help relations? The Soviets were trying to find a way, but the Secretary said only "No, No". The US had also given an ultimatum in saying it had no answer but to maintain the presence of Western troops. While the situation in Laos contained many elements that were not parallel, one advantage was that the US and the USSR were not confronting each other there. The Secretary commented that he was not sure that this applied in Germany. Dobrynin observed that it would be better if troops could be withdrawn to some extent. He did not want to emphasize the point which was linked to the concept of zones, but ending the confrontation would be a good thing in Berlin. The Secretary asked why, if this were so, the Soviets were not prepared to have the four powers accept the responsibility for all of Berlin. Dobrynin said that East Berlin is the capital of the GDR. This was not just an announcement, but there was a completely different social life there. The Secretary commented that there was no reason why East Berlin could not continue to be the locale for the small Soviet contingent just as West Berlin was the locale for the small Western contingents. The fact is, he continued, now that all these other things are in the Soviet basket,

SECRET - EYES ONLY

they

they are reaching out to deprive us. Dobrynin asked whether the Secretary believed that a UN presence would put West Berlin in a Soviet bag. The Secretary answered in the affirmative, noting that the reactions of the West Berliners and of our Allies would be just what President Kennedy had explained at Vienna. Dobrynin said the proposal for symbolic troops from the two Blocs was fair. The Secretary asked what the two Blocs had to do with West Berlin. Dobrynin responded by saying that it was not the capital of the Federal Republic. The Secretary observed that we were holding it in trust until the day when Berlin became the capital of a reunited Germany. He did not see why the Soviets could not keep their troops in East Berlin simply because of their effort to make East Berlin capital of the GDR. After all there were some twenty odd Soviet divisions in the GDR.

Dobrynin said the Soviet Union had nothing against German reunification, but the situation had changed much since the end of the war. If after World War II the West had wanted unification, it could have had it on one condition - the neutralization of Germany. The US could scarcely expect the Soviets to permit the reunification of Germany under such conditions as would have it end up in the Western camp. At that time the Soviet Union was quite prepared to have a united but neutral Germany. Then came Bizonia and subsequent developments. Now there were two German states. Surely the US did not believe that unification was possible now. It was true that such a powerful people would eventually have to be united. But the Soviet Union could not wait until then. As to the Japanese analogy, Dobrynin continued, the question was not one of how long the Soviets had fought in the war against Japan. After all, their contribution in the war against Germany and their losses had been much greater. As a matter of fact, the question was not one of counting the days of fighting but simply that the US did not wish to take consideration of Soviet interests in the Far East. The Secretary observed that a lot of history was involved, but it could not be forgotten that the Japanese treaty came at a time when practically every agreement we had made with the Soviets during and after the war had turned sour, for example that on China. Dobrynin commented that there was no China in 1949. The Secretary said that one of the reasons for this was that the Soviets had not kept their agreement on the disposal of Japanese arms. Dobrynin said he could not accept this, but in any event this was not the question.

Coming back to West Berlin, Dobrynin claimed that he could not understand why the US insisted on one-hundred per cent of its position, that is only the presence of troops of the three powers. Any of the various Soviet proposals would permit the West Berliners to have their way of life. Why did the Secretary insist on keeping US troops there permanently? The Secretary said he should qualify "permanently". After all Dobrynin continued, the US is fond of UN troops elsewhere and the Soviets are not. Therefore, they thought UN troops in West Berlin should be acceptable. If UN troops were accepted there, an agreement could be reached on their composition. The main question from the beginning has been that of the Western troops. Other questions were interesting, but were not primary. The Soviets had never tried to give the impression that this was not the principal question in order to get a little more out of the US. Yet the US always said "no" to Soviet attempts to provide a formula. The

Handwritten notes:
 The US...
 ...did not...
 ...1949...
 ...Soviet...
 ...agreement...

Secretary observed that we have tried to find some answer to the question of prestige. It had been unnecessary for the Soviets to make a point which they knew was impossible for us a matter of their prestige. This had been imprudent from a diplomatic point of view. We have tried to suggest how this problem of prestige might be dealt with. The Soviet line in rejecting our suggestion leads to the conclusion that their purpose is to get us out of Berlin and thus bring about a fundamental change in the situation in West Berlin. Dobrynin said the Soviets wanted West Berlin to live as it did now. They believed that it was not necessary to have US troops there to guarantee this. But the US insisted there was only one way. This is the agreed way, the Secretary commented. We agreed that the Soviets would be in East Berlin and the Western powers in West Berlin. Dobrynin said that seventeen years after the end of the war had brought a new situation. The Secretary asked what the new elements were. Dobrynin responded that there were now two German states which were members respectively of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Any collisions between those two states would inevitably reflect on their respective Allies.

all the more reason for stability in terms of status quo, Adenauer presence

The Secretary commented that the problem of West Berlin had no bearing on this relationship of the two parties if the Soviets left West Berlin alone. Dobrynin observed that West Berlin was a source of danger. Today Adenauer was there, tomorrow there would be more clashes at the borders. The Secretary said that perhaps if someone other than Ulbricht were there, these frictions would decline. Dobrynin said that he would not make the same remark about Adenauer or Brandt. It was not a question of only one man. It would be far better if there were no opportunities for these daily clashes. The Secretary observed that they were not necessary. Dobrynin said that people thought they could do anything they liked in West Berlin because they could hide behind the "big boy". The US said its prestige was involved. But if the US were not there, then the Germans could not run and hide behind "big boy". It was hard for the US to say "keep quiet" to the Germans. Neutral representatives or UN representatives would not permit these things. They would say "keep quiet". Why was the US so stubborn in keeping its troops there? The Secretary observed that Dobrynin and the Soviets continued to be just as insistent that we abandon our responsibilities in West Berlin. What after all do the Czechs and the Poles know about the so-called way of life in West Berlin? They have had no experience in guaranteeing this way of life to West Berlin. Dobrynin said they would know what to do and not allow activities in West Berlin which would jeopardize relations between the US and the USSR.

Adenauer's presence is a source of danger...

The Secretary asked why there should be a problem from the Soviet view in having an agreement filed with the UN, with our staying in West Berlin. Why could we not agree that pending final settlement of the German question, the Western powers would continue to accept responsibility for the security of West Berlin. The access question could be worked out. This agreement could be filed at the UN and the UN could approve it and establish some sort of presence in West Berlin. Dobrynin commented that unless this mean UN troops, there would be no change from the present situation. The Secretary said that it would give the Soviets a change to refer to something which they could say was better than occupation status. If there were other issues of the sort about which Dobrynin had expressed concern, these could be taken up in the UN. Dobrynin stated that with UN troops in Berlin, the situation would be different. The UN can follow

SECRET - EYES ONLY

-10-

a line more gracefully than could the US. The Gaza Strip experience had worked out pretty well. The Secretary observed that different parties were involved. Dobrynin said the Secretary was too suspicious. The Soviets had made a serious offer. It was not just a trick to get something from the US. The Secretary commented that there had been a lot of history since 1949. A lot of experience in mutual confidence was required. Dobrynin said that Laos was a good experience. The Secretary added that we have told Moscow that July 2 is agreeable to us for the opening of the Geneva meeting. Dobrynin asked whether the Secretary would be going to Geneva. The Secretary observed that what might be done was that Harriman and Pushkin could get the matter settled. Dobrynin commented that then the Foreign Ministers could come along and sign.

SECRET - EYES ONLY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE *IS/FPC/CDR* Date: *3/9/85* D 330, 7146
Secy's M of 6/20/62
 RELEASE DECLASSIFY MR Cases Only:
 EXCISE DECLASSIFY EO Citations
 DENY IN PART
 DELETE Non-Responsive Info
 FOIA exemptions
 APAC Exemptions *S*
6/25/32
 TS authority to:
 CLASSIFY as S or C OADR
 DOWNGRADE TS S or C OADR
SECRET
 SET/MC/10
ER25
R
 2

SECRETARY'S EUROPEAN TRIP

(June 18-23, 1962)

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: June 20, 1962
 Time: 3:00 p.m.
 Place: Quai d'Orsay

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

Participants:

United States

The Secretary of State
 Ambassador Gavin
 Mr. Boulton
 Mr. Kohler
 Mr. Manning
 Mr. Hillenbrand
 Mr. Cleveland

France

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville
 Mr. Lucet
 Ambassador Alphand
 Mr. Laloy
 Mr. Baraduc
 Mr. de Margerie

Subject: Berlin

PH-2-4
 Copies to:

- S/S-1 Embassy PARIS (4) - *9-12*
- G-5 Embassy PARIS - USRO (2) - *13-14*
- S/P-6 Embassy BONN - *15*
- EUR-7 US Mission BERLIN - *16*
- GER-8 Secretary's Delegation (10)

WHITE HOUSE - 17

RM/R-3

The Secretary said that, since the French would be able to have a look at the transcript of his most recent conversation with Dobrynin on June 18, he would not attempt to go over it in detail. Dobrynin had begun with a relative precise and systematic presentation of the standard Soviet position. To illustrate the difference between the new Soviet Ambassador and his predecessor, the Secretary mentioned that, after the meeting, Dobrynin had permitted the Counsel of the Soviet Embassy to consult with a Departmental officer who had been present in order to make sure that the Soviet statement had been recorded accurately.

The Secretary said he would summarize his impressions as follows:

1. The Soviets are now concentrating on the point of direct interest and confrontation -- the presence of Western troops in West Berlin.

2. The

SECRET

2. The Soviets had shown an interest in other matters such as NATO-Warsaw Pact nonaggression agreement, nuclear nondiffusion and mixed commission but the key point remains that of troop presence on which they have not moved. We had not put in any papers on these other subjects nor have we tried to develop them in any way.

3. In his talk with Dobrynin of May 30 the Secretary had urged the need for the Soviets to bring more reciprocity into the talks in recognition of the vital interests of the West. The Soviet reply in the latest conversation was in the direction of urging us to bring forward new ideas. Dobrynin accused the US of repetition and said the Soviets had brought forward new ideas. The Secretary commented that these were formulae to get us out of Berlin. We have not felt the need to put forward new formulae. If they indulge in repetition, we will also be repetitions. This had gotten to the point of repetition by general reference without need for going over each argument in detail.

4. Thus there has been no advance in the Soviet position, but we do not have the impression that they are moving towards an early military crisis. This might change tomorrow, the Secretary added.

5. As the Secretary had indicated at Athens, the Soviets do not seem to want to register a complete diplomatic impasse.

6. Our exchanges with the Soviets were therefore becoming increasingly sterile, but we believe they have been worthwhile and have served a purpose. Khrushchev has used them to justify the elimination of timetables or harassments. If we do come to the point of crisis, no one can say we have been diplomatically negligent. Maintenance of contact has been worthwhile. There has been no war in the past year over Berlin, and no concessions have been made or any price paid by us. On the other hand, we see no solution in prospect on an issue which for us is casus belli.

The question of Soviet intentions is, therefore, highly important at this time, the Secretary continued. We do not feel that we know what the Soviets are up to. We are not sure that Khrushchev knows himself. His recent statement in Bucharest was relatively mild. On the other hand the Soviets seem to have caught themselves on the prestige problem of a separate peace treaty. We should not create obstacles to their getting out of this, should they want to do so. But they are also going ahead with a rather active military build-up in the missile and nuclear field, and may just be waiting until they are in a strong military position. We should, therefore, not appear too relaxed but continue our own military build-up, although avoiding provocative measures in raising prestige issues. The Secretary said his Berlin visit during the present trip had been necessary, but he hoped to avoid any speech which would inflame the situation. The Germans might be disappointed that he was not giving any rousing speech. A serious thing is that pressures still exist in East Germany and East Berlin with dangerous possibilities.

Summarized

6/20/62

SECRET

-5-

Summarizing, the Secretary said, we are largely in agreement with the French on substance. The French views as to the difficulty of making headway on substance have so far been correct. We have felt it necessary to go ahead with talks. We would welcome greater French participation. Our differences may, of course, be resolved by events themselves.

Couve said he could agree that much of the drama had disappeared since the December NATO meeting. The big problem is what the Soviets have in mind. He thought it clear that, since 1958, the situation in East Germany and the actions of the East German Government have played a big role in the situation. It was, therefore, important to know what was causing the East Germans to push the Soviets. Ten months had gone by since the erection of the wall which took care of one of the reasons why the question had seemed so acute in June 1961. The wall at first seemed to be a success, but now it seems that the situation is not really settled and that much trouble and unhappiness remains in East Germany. He wondered whether this was related to recent harassments on the Autobahn, but concluded that it probably was not. Three-power reactions during past months had generally been good. There had been no real differences or hesitations in the face of incidents.

As to US contacts with the Soviets, the French took it for granted that those would go ahead. The US was aware that the French did not approve of those who participate in them. They would wait and see what developed.

Couve asked whether the Secretary still had the idea of giving a new paper to the Soviets. He wondered whether during his visit to Bonn the Secretary would try to obtain final agreement on a paper which could be used when the time was ripe. He understood that two main problems with the Germans had arisen over the International Access Authority and nuclear non-diffusion. As to the International Access Authority, Couve said that his personal reaction was not to like the idea of any other authority than that of the Four Powers. He could see some advantage in the Soviet proposal for some sort of arbitral body. He did not like to depart from the basic point of keeping the Four Power system in Berlin. As to nuclear non-diffusion, Couve continued, this was a delicate subject with the Germans because of their special commitments and because of the Soviet attitude. He thought it would not be good to give the Germans the impression of favoring anything that implied the neutralization of their territory. Referring to Khrushchev's speech at Bucharest, Couve said the French likewise have the impression that the Soviets do not seem to be pressing as hard now as they did a year ago. Perhaps GDR pressure on them is less. A striking contradiction is that the fact of the arms race has never been so rapid as now without the political situation becoming more dangerous. He had no explanation for this.

The Secretary stated that it was possible that, in the nuclear and missile field, the Soviets had taken advantage of their ability to demonstrate they had the first long-range missile to act as if they had a complete weapons system. For two or three years they maintained a bluff. In the past year we have received extremely accurate missile information. The Soviets know we know more. They may have decided last summer that they needed to increase their

militar

SECRET

-4-

military preparations. Nuclear tests which they conducted last fall, the Secretary believed, were for military purposes to strengthen their military establishment. This was perhaps the explanation of the fact that in the nuclear weapons test talks, even the latest US/UK offer did not really interest them. Their opposition, even from an espionage point of view, was ridiculous. When at Geneva we said we were prepared to eliminate the threshold without increasing inspections the ratio of suspicious events to inspections went up from 1 to 5 to 1 to 40. The Secretary also noted that we had been prepared to concentrate the stations in earthquake areas, which meant that in 7/8ths of the Soviet Union there would only be three stations. This meant that the annual inspections would look at less than one part of the USSR in 2000 per year. This was a "farthing's worth." We had to conclude that they were more interested in going ahead with their missile program.

The Secretary noted that we had not put in a paper since Geneva. We did not want to exclude this possibility, but at the moment we saw no profit in it, since the Soviets had narrowed the issue to one of troop presence. We did believe there would be some advantage in getting the details of the access question into some sort of framework, so that great prestige issues would not be raised for both sides. We thought access arrangements could be made consistent with the sovereignty of the GDR in the GDR. Reacting to press reports, the Soviets have already said that the International Access Authority is totally unacceptable because of the proposed West German membership. We do not intend to quarrel with the Germans on an academic question. If the Soviets should let us know that they will make no point of our presence, a variety of access arrangements could be considered. A Four Power body such as the Soviets had proposed might be discussed, but we would not want to limit it to arbitration or have it operate only under a rule of unanimity. Couve observed that, if it came to some sort of discussion, it will have to be on the basis of continued Western presence in Berlin. Then the problem of the difference between military traffic and civilian traffic will arise. The idea of an arbitral body seems less abnormal for civil traffic, whereas the idea of an Access Authority seems more normal for military access. He noted that, in recent statements, Khrushchev had called special attention to military traffic as distinct from civil traffic. He asked whether we did not think that, one day, the Soviets would change their position on military presence. The Secretary commented that there was a time in Geneva when we thought this possibility might be opening up. Semerg had indicated to Mr. Kohler that this was a matter for the Ministers, and had made some hints that it was a flexible point. We have not yet been able to confirm this. If the Soviets were convinced that some sort of Western presence were essential, and indicated this, they might be interested in some sort of a deal. This was not now the case. They have had many opportunities to hint to us. They know this is a breaking point for us. There must come a time, unless the Soviets are prepared to face war, when they must back down or change their views on this point. There has been some hint from them that we ought to come up with fresh proposals on the status of West Berlin. The Secretary referred to the suggestion made by Lord Home a year ago that a new agreement might be made, although occupation rights would be kept in the background to be fallen back on as required. This was not followed up at the time.

The Secretary

SECRET

-5-

The Secretary said he had some concern about the build-up of pressures in East Germany. This might have its effect on Khrushchev. The Ulbricht regime was not in good condition. He wondered whether a change of regime would make any difference. There was, of course, no hint of such a change. If the GDR regime were improved, perhaps the pressures on us would be less. He asked Couve for his views on the German attitude towards the GDR. To him the West Germans seemed to have insufficient confidence in this respect. They were strong and prosperous and seemed to stand only to gain from informal relations with East Germany. This had some bearing on the recent East German requests for credits. We understand why the Ulbricht regime is anathema to the Federal Republic. We have the impression that, if there were more West German contacts with the East Germans, prospects of reunification would be improved. However, we recognize West German sensitivities.

Couve said it was difficult to judge the West Germans on these matters. They always contradicted themselves. He was not sure they had so many apprehensions as to the developments of their own contacts with the East Germans. They were apprehensive about other contacts with the East Germans. There were considerable contacts between the West and East Germans. Proof of this was the fact that one party could ask the other for credits. It was hard to imagine this taking place unless the parties were in close contact. The Secretary said he had been a little surprised at the West German reaction to our International Access Authority proposal when they said it implied recognition of East Germany. What they were doing was far in excess of what we were doing or had proposed. As to the credits which the East Germans had requested, we were inclined to think that a positive response might be a good idea. Couve said he had no real views on this point, and did not know if the East Germans would still insist in view of the publicity. In any case this was not a basic question.

The Secretary said that Governing Mayor Brandt would apparently like to have some arrangements made with the East German authorities to open up holes in the wall so that families and friends could again see each other. He had mentioned this to Dobrynin, who said it was of no concern to the Soviet Union but a matter for the Germans. We understand the problem is that when the West Berliners try to establish contact with the East Berliners they face the GDR. There were a number of matters we need to think more about here in order to determine what our positions should be.

MJHillenbrand:all:mt

SECRET

led in S
28/62

65 D 330, 7146

Secylo Mofe 6/22/62

JUL 12 1962

SECRET
SIF/MC/27

SECRETARY'S EUROPEAN TRIP
(June 16-28, 1962)

E131

R

1

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

Date: June 22, 1962
Time: 3:00 P.M.
Place: Schaumburg Palace
Chancellor's Conference Room

Participants:

United States

Germany

The Secretary of State
Ambassador Dowling
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Manning
Mr. Morris
Mr. Hillenbrand
Mr. Cleveland

Foreign Minister Schroeder
Dr. von Eckhardt
Dr. Carstens
Dr. Krapf
Dr. von Hase
Dr. Osterheld
Dr. von Braun
Dr. Reinkensyer

Subject: Berlin Discussions

Copies to: *Slater-4*

S/S-3 RPM-8 Amembassy BONN - 11
G-5 GER-9 Amembassy LONDON - 12
S/P-6 RPE-10 Amembassy MOSCOW - 13
EUR-7 *RMIR-2*

Foreign Minister Schroeder began by saying that he would like to review with the Secretary the few outstanding points which had emerged from the discussions on the US "principles paper" and on the International Access Authority proposal. The first item was the "if clause" in the Preamble to the "principles paper". Although leaving this out created certain problems for the Germans, in view of the negative French and UK positions on this clause, the Germans were inclined to go back to the original UK language.

The Secretary commented that we would, of course, have no particular problem in going back to our original language.

Schroeder then agreed that the original US formula should be used.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE *J. Cross* SIFPC/CDR Date: *7/12/62* On the

RELEASE UNCLASSIFY MR Cases Only: _____
 EXEMPT DECLASSIFY EO Citations _____
 DENY IN PART _____
 DELETE Non-Responsive Info _____

FOIA Exemptions _____
 PA Exemptions _____

SECRET

CLASSIFY as _____ TS authority to _____
 DOWNGRADE TS to _____ S or _____ C OADR _____
 S or _____ OADR _____

6/22/62

On the question of nuclear nondiffusion, Schroeder observed that the first time this item had been mentioned was in his Lausanne talks with the Secretary. Here it was explained as a possible way of broadening the terms of discussion with the Soviets. The Germans had always understood that a point corresponding to fixed US policy might be useful to put in a Berlin package from which something might be obtained which could not be obtained in the Geneva disarmament framework. The Federal Republic does not participate in the Geneva discussions. The primary German interest in this matter of long standing US policy was that it would not apply only to Germany. Despite all intentions to the contrary, the danger of using it in the Berlin context was that the other side might say that, if agreement cannot be reached on a general basis, let us limit it to Germany. The Federal Republic would like to avoid any discrimination because of its renunciation of the production of ABC weapons. Moreover, other countries might not want to accept the commitment asked for in the American language. Therefore, it was preferable to handle this matter in Geneva and see what happened there rather than to have it discussed in the Berlin context. The Soviets have shown no recent special interest in having this subject brought within the Berlin framework. We could wait and see what happened in the future, but in any event, must avoid discrimination against the Federal Republic and any further limitations on the Federal Republic. The Federal Republic does not want a US-USSR agreement to urge further German renunciation in a Berlin context, although this would be acceptable in a world-wide context at Geneva.

The Secretary said that our attitude on diffusion of nuclear weapons remains what it was when the Baruch proposals were put forward shortly after World War II. Now that diffusion is even more likely, by applying the rebus sic stantibus doctrine, our policy is even more applicable now. This question has come up in the Berlin discussions largely by passing reference. It has not been covered in detail. The Secretary had confirmed to Gromyko our standard policy on this subject. Gromyko said he would want a treaty with a specific reference to Germany, which we indicated was impossible. He then said that, if we have a general agreement, we would not want a violation by Cambodia to lead to a German plea that the restrictions were no longer applicable. The Secretary said that he would respond by saying that violations would release all signers from their obligations. The Secretary observed that there seemed more chance of handling this as a general matter in Geneva rather than in the Berlin context, but we did not want necessarily to leave it out of the Berlin context entirely. We have authorized our delegation in Geneva to agree to opening up a discussion of nondiffusion there. The Soviets also keep referring to groups of states in this connection. We want to avoid any formula which would affect a possible multilateral force. We are not certain that many UN members, who supported the Swedish resolution, would not support restrictions on the possibility of a multilateral force as well. We believe we should try

to obtain

revised
during 2/66
15/140

SECRET

To obtain a general agreement rather than a specific one, and such an agreement cannot interfere with the NATO multilateral force.

The difficulty in the position we are taking, Schroeder said, is not in that position, but in the tendency of the Soviets to discuss other problems in the Berlin context. The Soviets say the peace treaty is the greatest problem. The Federal Republic wants to avoid giving them a point of adhesion on which they can bind general subjects to their peace treaty concept; hence the preference for Geneva. The Germans have been clear from the outset that the Americans want to exclude any specific prohibition on Germany or NATO, but the Soviets will try to force the discussion in this direction. The same danger does not exist with reference to the nonaggression pact.

The Secretary commented that the two should say they agree on the underlying policy, and not take the position that this subject cannot be discussed. We have maintained that the presence of Western forces in Berlin is nonnegotiable. If any paper is called for in the discussions with the Soviets, we will consult you. This is now not the case. We believe that, once the subject is discussed in Geneva and positions are clarified, it is unlikely to be discussed in the Berlin context as the full range of disagreement becomes apparent.

Schroeder said he understood how it might be useful to put forward some language on this subject in a paper on which progress seemed likely. We do not have to proceed from the assumption that the paper contains final formulations. We should avoid those which do damage to negotiations. Therefore, in the present stage, we should not try to put atomic policy into the Berlin paper. The US position in principle is clear. It was put forward in the Geneva Disarmament paper and the US is ready to talk about it. Only when the points are discussed there, can the risks be calculated. This is a complex subject and the Western Powers do not want to make a main theme of a subsidiary theme in the Berlin discussions.

The Secretary said he would discuss this matter further with his British and French colleagues. They might have an opportunity to consider it briefly if there were to be a Foreign Ministers' meeting in connection with Laos. He said he did not really know if this was an issue between us and the Germans and he preferred not to deal with it on a hypothetical basis. We understand the policy of the Federal Republic. We oppose the element of discrimination or anything which would prevent a NATO nuclear force. Why do we not just see what the requirements are? Maybe it might be treated in the "principles paper" by reference to the Geneva disarmament discussions.

Schroeder argued that now that all the world knows that we have talked for a long time over the US paper, there is a certain risk if full agreement on that paper were to be interpreted as a definitive German preparedness to assent to the proposed renunciation by nonpossessing countries. Thus German accord

would

SECRET

SECRET

- 4 -

would indirectly already have been obtained in advance of the agreement of any other countries. A commitment would be anticipated which is to be made only in a world-wide context. The Secretary asked whether Schroeder's problem was what was to be said after the meeting today. In general, the Secretary stated, he did not want to put himself in a position where he had promised not to speak on something or to have said that something would not go in the paper, even though it might not be of active relevance now. We have no plan to put in a paper in the foreseeable future.

Schroeder observed that if we are speaking of a Berlin paper which is to be put in now, he would rather not see anything in it about nondiffusion. This was not intended as a critique of the position of the US on this subject in the Geneva disarmament context if it led to a world-wide agreement. So long as a world-wide agreement was not obtained there could be no prior declaration from the Federal Republic.

The Secretary said he thought we would be in touch with the Germans further about this. It was a highly contingent problem. We start discussion in Geneva on nondiffusion in mid-July. The Soviets have shown no interest in pursuing these peripheral problems in the Berlin context. He was reluctant, however, to say that, in any future paper to the Soviets, this subject could not be mentioned in some way. Schroeder commented that, if tomorrow a paper were to be put in, then it would be better to leave out the atomic question. Perhaps it would look different in a few weeks to the Federal Republic. It might be assumed that the Soviets would discuss what had been placed on the table at Geneva in the disarmament context. He wanted to avoid a treaty mixing nuclear weapons with the German problem. The Secretary could, of course, talk with Gromyko any time about the disarmament proposals. If the other side raised the question, the Federal Republic would want the US to make the point that this is a world-wide question and not just a German problem.

The Secretary said we had not planned to agree on a final paper here. Schroeder said he agreed the point need not be settled here since no paper was being handed over now.

As to the US proposal for an International Access Authority, Schroeder said he could now accept the ^{US} formula for the make-up of the Board of Governors. He had a little hesitation in doing this, however. The Federal Republic would never forget the 1959 Geneva exercise when the representative of the Federal Republic was placed in an invidious position with respect to the GDR Adviser. The more one downgraded the GDR with a formula, the more the Federal Republic would suffer. Hence some actually favored going back to the old US formula of 13 full members rather than 9 full members and 4 advisers. While he was therefore prepared to accept the 9-4 formula, this matter should still be considered open for discussion and not a definitive formula, leaving open the possibility of changes in continuing discussions with the Soviets.

The Secretary

SECRET

SECRET

- 5 -

The Secretary said he had the impression that whatever we say now as to the details of such an arrangement would be far from a final solution. We have not pursued this subject much with the Soviets, although Ambassador Thompson had given Gromyko an outline of our International Access Authority proposal in Moscow. It might be worth considering further alternatives. Actually the Soviets, in their paper given us in Geneva, had been closest to the German Four-Power formula. Perhaps we should see what changes we could make in the Soviet proposal to make it acceptable to the West, giving the Authority a number of operating functions and avoiding any rule of unanimity. In the event the Soviets tell us that the Western presence is no longer a breaking point, then the access problem obviously becomes a larger question. We should continue to think of alternatives in this regard. We might take the Soviet proposal and see what essential elements must be added from the Western paper to make it acceptable. [Schroeder said we should not build up the concept of the Authority as a great international body like the UN; it should rather be considered like an International Port Authority.] The Secretary said one possibility was that a Secretary General could handle the business and, if there were German advisers, they could have their offices in the same building.

SECRET

USDEL:MJH:llo:bx:cll
6/26/62

Secy's Memo

in S
6/28/62

JUL 12 1962

SECRET
SET/NC/24

SECRETARY'S EUROPEAN TRIP
(June 16-28, 1962)

E/28
R 1

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

Date: June 22, 1962
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Place: Palais Schaumburg
Chancellor's Conference Rm.

Participants:

United States

- The Secretary of State
- Ambassador Dowling
- Mr. Bohlen
- Mr. Kohler
- Mr. Manning
- Mr. Morris
- Mr. Hillenbrand

Germany

- Chancellor Adenauer
- Foreign Minister Schroeder
- Dr. von Eckhardt
- Dr. Carstens
- Dr. Krapf
- Dr. von Hase
- Dr. von Brandt
- Dr. Osterheld
- Dr. Reinkensperger

Subject: Berlin

Copies to: *Slater-4*

- S/S-3 GER-8 Amembassy BONN -11
- G-5 RPM-9 Amembassy LONDON -12
- S/P-6 RPE-10 Amembassy MOSCOW-13
- EUR-7

RM/R-2

After the private meeting had terminated between the Chancellor and the Secretary, with only an interpreter present, the discussion resumed in a larger group including Foreign Minister Schroeder and other senior officials. The Chancellor announced he had had a good and frank talk with the Secretary. Mutual trust had been increased "if this were possible". The Chancellor repeated, "if this were possible" (*wenn dies moeglich waere*). The Secretary expressed his appreciation for the Chancellor's words and indicated the primary purpose of his visit to Europe was to consult with the Federal Republic and to make sure that no accidental misunderstandings persisted which could be eliminated by discussions. He noted that this was his first visit to Bonn.

Schroeder said he also wanted to express his gratitude that the promise which the Secretary had made at Athens about the visit had been carried out.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE *D. P. [Signature]* IS/ENC/CDR Date: *12/19/62*

RELEASE DECLASSIFY MR Cases Only: _____
 EXEMPT DECLASSIFY EO Citations: _____
 DENY IN PART _____
 EXEMPT Non-Responsive Info _____

TS authority to _____
 CLASS **SECRET** S or CADR _____
 DOWNGRADE TS to S or CADR _____

While

SECRET

2

While this had started out as "a little promise", the way the trip had developed it had turned into a considerable commitment of time and energy by the Secretary. He was therefore all the more grateful that the Bonn visit had remained possible.

The Secretary then reviewed his recent talks with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin. He said it was not always pleasant to talk with the Soviets, but this was always easier when the Western Powers are united and going together on the policies involved. He was grateful for the basic unity which existed. He had initiated these additional talks with Dobrynin because his Geneva talks with Foreign Minister Gromyko had arrived at a point of no agreement on the most elementary Western vital interest: our troop presence in West Berlin. Other subjects had been discussed with the Soviets but there had been no real exploration of these. We kept coming back to the fact that the Soviets were trying to eliminate or cripple the Western forces in Berlin. At one stage in Geneva the Soviets did not seem to be completely adamant on this point. They hinted that they might abandon their position. The Secretary had now seen Dobrynin four times; the talk on June 18 had been at the Soviet Ambassador's initiative. Dobrynin, in effect, admitted that he had nothing new to say, and the Secretary said he nothing new to add. Dobrynin complained that there were no new ideas from us, but that the Soviets keep coming up with new ideas, for example, the various formulae for replacing the Western troop presence in Berlin. The Secretary noted that he had pointed out to Dobrynin that it was not very helpful to produce a number of variations to accomplish what was not acceptable to us. This did not amount to putting forward new ideas. However, the Secretary added, we did not have the impression that the Soviets now wanted a military crisis or a diplomatic impasse, although we could not be sure of this. We seemed to be getting to the point where there was not much more to say unless we get into details which are attractive to both sides and which might help to ease tensions while the basic disagreements continue, for example, easing of border incidents in Berlin by a meeting of the commandants, procedures so that families and friends could meet with one another, et cetera. There is no reason to think that any agreement on the broad issues of Berlin and Germany is likely in the near future.

The Secretary noted that, in his talks in Paris, he had found the French much more relaxed on Berlin than previously. The differences with the French were proving much narrower than had been feared. He indicated that he had had to admit to President de Gaulle that the French view on the impossibility of finding a satisfactory basis for negotiations had so far proved correct. In return, de Gaulle admitted that the Secretary's talks had not caused the disturbance and crisis within the Alliance which he had feared.

There seemed to be general agreement on policy with the French although not on tactics. The French had not said they would join the activities of the Washington Ambassadorial Group for consultation on our talks with the Soviets, but they are, of course, fully participating in Berlin contingency planning.

Reporting on

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

Reporting on his trip to Berlin, the Secretary said he had been gratified by the good morale and the steadfastness of the Berliners. He noted that the German NATO representative, von Walther, during the recent NAC meeting, and Mayor Brandt during their discussions in Berlin, had expressed concern about the possibility of a build-up in pressures in East Germany which might lead to renewed pressures on Berlin itself. If the pressures in the GDR could be relieved somehow, this might reduce the crisis in the Berlin area.

Schroeder said that his impression of the Debrynin talks was that they had gone on in a good atmosphere without bringing any real change. The Soviet concentration in recent talks on the point of the Western troop presence and their general stress on Berlin proper rather than on broader subjects might be a Soviet tactic so they could say this was the really important issue which had to be solved first when the East Germans applied pressure on them to move ahead with signature of the peace treaty. He referred to a recent talk which he had had with Ambassador Svirnov in which the latter had placed stress on Berlin, and also to a more recent talk with FDP leader Mende and Svirnov which, if correctly reported, indicated continued Soviet interest in some form of access authority. This to him seemed to confirm the limited nature of the present Soviet interest in concluding a peace treaty. It seemed clear that the Soviets would have little purpose in signing such a treaty without prior agreement on a modus vivendi with the Western Powers. If they did go ahead and sign such a treaty, then they would presumably have to consider inserting some separate Berlin clause in the peace treaty. He thought therefore there was a possibility the Soviets might eventually accept the unavailability of continued Allied presence in West Berlin; hence their interest in possible access arrangements. This spoke for the probability of drawn-out discussions.

As to the situation in the GDR, Schroeder expressed the view that despite the increasing unrest which reflected stronger refugee pressure, he believed it unlikely that the regime would lose control in view of the overwhelming Soviet military presence in the GDR. He outlined West German thinking on the East German request for credits. The basic considerations were to do as much as possible to preserve the economic ties of the GDR with the Federal Republic and favorably to affect Berlin access. The population of the GDR, to the extent this could be determined, would argue against extension of credits as further strengthening the regime preferring to suffer rather than to see this happen. However, this would not be an obstacle to a positive decision if other factors were in favor of it. Extension of long-term credits also had the disadvantage of seeming to accept the long-term existence of the GDR and would also create an incentive, after the period of initial deliveries was over and the period of repayment of credits starting, for the GDR to upset any arrangements. The Federal Republic had the problem under active consideration. It was clear that the GDR was very greatly interested in these credits. The economic interest of the Federal Republic was minimal, and the political interest was not yet precisely defined.

The Secretary said we appreciated Bonn's assurance that we would be consulted before a final answer was given to the East Germans. While such credits

would be

SECRET

SECRET

- 4 -

would be important politically, it was not easy to know in what direction they would go. Khrushchev had used the existence of talks between Moscow and Washington as a pretext and possible reason for the postponement of the deadline on the peace treaty and the ending of further harassments. Whether an additional trade relationship between the Federal Republic and the East Germans would serve as a further pretext to defer signing of the peace treaty was a relevant question. Moreover, if these credits were as important to the GDR as they seemed to be against the background of economic difficulties in the Bloc, then an extension of credits might create a value which the East Germans would feel it important to protect and thus give them a stake in calm relations. He was inclined to discount somewhat the argument that credits would support a regime from those who prefer hardship to loss of freedom, since no amount of hardship was likely to overthrow the regime unless the West were prepared to fight a war. In summarizing, he said we would be generally sympathetic to the idea of credits if the Federal Republic thought they were a good idea, if they did not involve highly disadvantageous trade features, and if they did maintain pressure on the other side to keep the situation peaceful because of its interest in continuing deliveries. Schroeder said the Federal Republic still wanted to consider the various arguments pro and con, and felt no need to begin formal negotiations today or tomorrow. It would discuss the matter with its Allies when the Germans knew their own minds better.

Schroeder raised the possibility of dramatizing the incidents at the Berlin wall and demarcation line by bringing the situation before the UN Human Rights Commission. While the Federal Republic did not categorically reject this, up to now it had generally not favored it on the ground that the other side would try to bring the whole Berlin question as well as the question of the peace treaty and the German problem before the UN, once an opening were provided. The UN as now constituted could not be relied upon to consider the issue favorably. The Secretary said there were two separate questions involved: What can be done to help the people of East Germany and how can we make the Communists pay for what they are doing? He did not believe that conditions could be improved by a propaganda approach. Hence the question might first be explored through International Red Cross contacts. If we had determined that improvement was not possible, then we could decide how to achieve a maximum propaganda effect. He agreed that, once the question got into the UN it would be unpredictable what many UN countries would do, particularly in the light of the Soviet position that UN forces might be substituted for Western occupation troops.

USDEL: M Hillenbrand: intral
6/25/62

SECRET

II 6/22/62

~~TOP SECRET~~

22 June 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL TAYLOR

mo2

SUBJECT: US Policy Toward NATO

1. I have just spent an hour reviewing the development of NATO thinking within this Government since the first of the year, with natural emphasis on the work of your office in support of you. It has been a mournful exercise indeed. In any context it is far worse psychologically to have been right and alone than to have been wrong along with everyone else. In fact, the operators who have landed the United States in its present pickle will probably manage to imply that your position, insofar as it may have leaked out, only gave aid and comfort to the Europeans and thus helped shipwreck Henry Owen's "Suggested Nuclear Program". Even the President, in a startling over-simplification, refers to you as "the man who wants to help the French".

2. There are, I submit, some "lessons learned" to be derived from a study of the events of these past six months. In no particular order, here are a few:

a. You should react to major policy courses earlier and without self-imposed "military" limitations. The April 12 and June 13 decisions by the President had been so carefully engineered by the operators that on both occasions you found yourself submitting one-page crash memos which were largely addressed to timing and tactics rather than substance, and which got no place anyway. As for the "purely military" viewpoint, it invites rejection if not contempt; witness the President's offhand June 13 dismissal of JCS views with the remark: "Oh, the military always want more of everything." The subject of "NATO Nuclear Policy" is after all basically military, but this doesn't faze the operators one bit; they (and here I include Secretary McNamara) accept, reject, or ride roughshod, as they see fit.

b. It has been clear all along that the really prime objection to Owen's arrogant policy would be its political unacceptability to the Europeans. Although your interviews in Europe were mostly with Defense people, military and civilian, this message came through loud and clear, even if it happened to focus primarily on the French, who had at that time thought through the problem more than had the Germans, the Italians, and the special-interest British. Political as the subject was and is, the State Department fell flat on its face; no one over there, to my knowledge, was on the right wave length, and Henry Owen's energy and zeal were sweeping like an ocean tide between Foggy

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED BY: MDR 87-110


CLASSIFIED BY:

0 13 / RIA 1: US Policy Toward NATO

Bottom and the West Wing of the White House. Nobody responsible in the premises warned the President of this diplomatic "Cuba" that lay ahead, and you felt constrained by your military role and by the engineered agreement of the two Secretaries, neither of whom knew half as much about the subject as you did. Summing up, you should give the President fully-rounded, basic advice as you see it, including political. Only thus will you protect your policy role against the assignment of sticky operational projects which no one else is able to handle.

c. You should be willing to initiate as well as to react. Because of your small staff, and for other good reasons, you cannot and should not get into the business of initiating actions broadcast, not as long as the State and Defense Departments are doing business with their large, complex, and experienced organizations. However, not even the Secretaries of State and Defense are more closely identified with the policies of this Administration than you are -- and will be in the history books. Among military professionals, your relationship to the President is so special as to be incommensurate with anyone else's. If you are thus going to be considered one of the President's top team in the history books, you have the same right as the others to suggest, to propose -- in short, to initiate. The one man who stands closer than you do is Mr. Bundy; you should therefore try to line him up on your side when you decide that policy circumstances warrant an initiative.

3. A fresh US initiative on NATO is needed right now, and it will be catastrophic if the individual architects of the house that dramatically collapsed are placed in full charge of planning a new one. What really should happen is that Rowen, Owen, Fessenden, Kaysen, Admiral Lee, and a few others ought to be ordered to colored troops at Fort Huachuca, but this is unfortunately impracticable. I have some ideas for you, but will reserve them until I have smelled around State, Defense, JCS, and Standing Group for any signs of life.


LEGERE