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U.S. MISSION TO NATO AND EUROPEAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

NO: POLPO 5

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DATE: JULY 1, 1961 3 PM

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FROM: USRO PARIS

ACTION:

TO: SecState WASHINGTON

RE: POUCH INFO:

/ RE: ALL NATO CAPITALS POLPO LHM

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LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

Restricted MAC Meeting with SACRUM on NATO Strategy -- June 30

Since MAC will publish summary record of meeting, following limited to

highlights.

I. Mobile Task Force

SACRUM briefed MAC on mobile task force, purpose being to react instantly

with appropriate strength to infiltration, incursions and local hostile

actions.

Though could be used in Center, primary military motive is to reinforce

flanks early where weakness likely to continue. Measure also of

considerable political significance since remote flank areas feel

lonely and may be desirable to give Allied complexion to resistance

both for effect on Allies and Soviets.

REF: Admiral Ross

COM: Mr. Thurston

DRAFTED BY

POL: J. Wolf/ha 6/30/61

AUTHORIZED BY

Amassador Vialatte

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-2-

In response to Belgian question SACEUR pointed out that if major threat in Center imminent, units could not be withdrawn but would have to stay in original deployment area. SACEUR would like this to be an additional force above present military requirements, but present requirements still need to be met. MTF requires integration and standardization of equipment and in good pilot test thereon. MTF could be used in Berlin crisis if political decision were to extend participation to include other Allies. When Germans argued for integrated airlift, Norstad pointed to need for standardization of airlift but stressed present ground rules made logistics a national function. In response to question from chair, SACEUR said that decision to use ^{MTF within ACE} ~~force~~ based on military requirement is responsibility of ACE command, but that use of force to give Allied complexion to situation is political decision. In response to Norwegian question, SACEUR made clear that decision whether to withdraw MTF from Center would have to depend upon all circumstances existing at the time. SACEUR refused to say whether units for MTF per se did or did not have priority over fulfilling military requirements.

He thought MTF would contribute to pause with regard to political rather than military threat, ~~the~~ Until divisions in Center built up, MTF would have to have dual role.

II. 66 Requirements and Strategic Concepts

Norstad explained he was briefing countries on 66 goals which had been established in response to MAC directive. After referring to early Lisbon and MC 48/2 goals, he quoted a from Political Directive as to responsibility of ACE, and his planning doctrines for 57 which made clear requirement to dispose of

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-3-

local aggression in manner not inevitably bringing on general war. He is convinced this doctrine still sound today, and MC 70 was developed on that basis. SACEUR said mission is to prevent war by dealing with any incident with appropriate means: (1) should incident occur, whether deliberate or accidental, must have means to enforce pause, i.e. break in continuity of action; (2) during pause ^{period} must be such as to make enemy decide to terminate action or enlarge it; (3) enemy must realize responsibility for general war will lie with him. Shield forces must be able to deal appropriately with situation with adequate strength.

Would be wrong to attempt to define pause in terms of time, space or forces.

It is mostly intended to compel enemy to take decision before incident occurs.

Pause does not imply change in responsibility to make him withdraw if he occupies territory.

SACEUR stressed must give credibility to the over-all deterrent. If not adequately equipped and deployed, no choice between all or nothing, since we could be destroyed and defeated piecemeal. Shield intended to bridge gap between all or nothing and provide means appropriate to measure of threat.

studies

Reported then referred to four ~~studies~~ studies conducted at SHAPE

..... involving various degrees of warning, various strengths of enemy attack, and various assumptions re use of nuclear weapons.

these studies

Principal conclusion from ~~these~~ was need for greater survivability in terms of mobility, dispersal and substitution of missiles for older weapons systems.

66 force goals are extensions of MC 70 in light survivability requirement, but with no significant changes from MC 70. Force requirements designed to permit use of conventional strength when adequate, atomic when necessary.

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Selected use of limited atomic weapons would not necessarily mean general war though they would heighten risk.

SACEUR then portrayed from charts changes in over-all and country breakdowns (a) present units; (b) MC 70 requirements; (c) 66 goals. MRBM requirement stemmed from need to modernize air breathing strike weapons and some aircraft. In his view, 66 goals are minimum requirements to serve purposes of political directive.

In response to Italian question, SACEUR said IIRBM's still needed, though hoped in due time to replace them. In response to complex Turkish intervention which evidenced concern at hesitancy to use nuclear weapons, SACEUR noted political directive required him to defend territory, using force needed including if necessary, atomic weapons. Aggression should be stepped at once at the border, using atomics. SACEUR noted term "border" needs some explanation, if necessary. / As to pause, it would be best if it came before the incident. A literal pause could only occur if there were minor aggression, but there could be no stages in a battle without defeat attaching to early stage.

Norway thought graduated reactions would avoid suicide. Norstad rejected as unsound idea of moving from one graduated phase to another, pointing out question is rather necessity of ability to respond appropriately to full range of threat. He ~~was~~ preferred to that of analogy of curve ~~with~~ series of steps.

UK sought support for idea of two pauses, one conventional and one limited use atomics, but SACEUR would not ~~agree~~ though both elements might be involved, there could be two pauses, Belgium inquired whether pause and threshold had effect on requirements. Norstad said pause and threshold were phrases interpretive of political directive. In response

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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Attached are two papers giving both sides
of the paper stamping issue:

1. One paper, by Mr. Acheson, is entitled,
"The Problem of the Breaking Point on Access".
It is an argument for maintaining existing
access procedures, regardless of who performs
these procedures.
2. The second paper, by Mr. Kohler, is
entitled "The Problem of Berlin Surface
Access". It is an argument for the "peel off"
procedure, under which we would identify our
military traffic to the East Germans, but
refuse to let them stamp our papers.

These are briefing papers for the 5 p.m. meeting.

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BERLIN

THE PROBLEM OF THE BREAKING POINT ON ACCESS

If the Berlin crisis goes as far as a USSR-GDR Peace Treaty and a turn-over by the USSR to the GDR of the checkpoints on rail, road and barge routes to Berlin, the question will arise as to the moment at which to raise the issue which may lead to blockade of Berlin and, perhaps, to war.

Present agreed tripartite planning is to announce in advance of a demand by the GDR that a new agreement governing the modalities of access be negotiated with them, that not only will this not be done but that existing procedures must be altered. Under the new procedures a copy of what amounts to a bill of lading will be handed to East German officials at the checkpoint, but that they will not be permitted to follow existing practice of stamping on the copy retained by the shipper the date and hour of entering and exiting from a checkpoint. A fortiori they would not be permitted to exercise any further authority.

If the East Germans refuse this procedure the break occurs, and the blockade with all its consequences begins.

I differ from this view and, submit that while we should not yield to the GDR demand, directly or indirectly, that we negotiate a new agreement with them, we should announce that existing procedures have worked satisfactorily for years and that we do not propose to permit them to be altered in any respect whatsoever.

My reasons for taking this position are, first, that this position (of leaving well enough alone and not being the ones to demand a change in our favor) will appear reasonable and non-provocative, and, second, that our allies will move to this position in any event. To attach our prestige to a position from which we shall have to retreat is most unwise.

The British have only agreed to present contingency planning under great duress; in an emergency, they would almost certainly propose that the East Germans be allowed to perform the functions which the Soviets now discharge. There would probably be considerable European press and popular support for the British position; there would be a disinclination for seeming to make paper-stamping a casus belli, no matter how much we explained the underlying issue.

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The alliance would thus be divided over an essentially procedural question, at the very time when maximum allied unity was needed as a basis for possible armed action in defense of Berlin. The situation would be the more difficult since there might be some questioning in the U.S. press, public and Congress as to whether we had really chosen the most suitable issue on which to fight. There would also be grave difficulty in making our position plausible to the uncommitted countries.

All this would be apparent to the Soviets, and they would be encouraged to press ahead to exploit the Western disarray. In the face of Bloc pressures and allied disunity, it seems likely that the allies would eventually accept the same paper-stamping from the East Germans that they now accept from the Soviets. To avoid such a last minute change in our position under fire, it would be better to straighten out this issue beforehand.

Therefore, the Western powers should announce, when a peace treaty is concluded, that whoever mans the checkpoints may perform present procedures and no more. This would mean holding the same line against a variety of ostensibly minor changes in these functions which we have held for many years. The difference would be that it would be the East Germans, rather than the Soviets, who would be trying to make the changes. Allied unity could probably be more readily secured on defending this existing line than on trying to improve it at the time of a GDR take-over. And parity of treatment for the GDR would be easier for the USSR to accept as an outcome of the crisis, if they wanted a face-saving "out".

Dean Acheson

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THE PROBLEM OF BERLIN SURFACE ACCESS

July 25, 1961

BASIC FACTORS

1) The Western Allies maintain that they have an unquestionable right to be in Berlin and to enjoy free access thereto, flowing from the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany.

2) While recognizing the original basis of these rights, the Soviets assert that they are already obsolescent and will terminate fully on conclusion of a peace treaty with the so-called "GDR" by the USSR. Transit to Berlin by land, water, or air thereafter requires newly negotiated arrangements with the "Sovereign GDR."

3) War-time and post-war agreements and arrangements between the four principal Allied powers did not confer rights of access but merely established procedures for their exercise. A continuing dispute between the 3 Western powers, who maintain these arrangements involve only identification of Allied military traffic, and the Soviets, who maintain they involve "control" of such traffic by the Soviet occupation forces, has never been resolved.

4) West German civilian traffic in persons (except refugees) and goods to and from Berlin is based upon arrangements between West and East German "technical" agencies and involve control by the East Germans. These arrangements were originally fostered by the four WWII Allies under their responsibility for Germany as a whole. At present a substantial traffic continues, sometimes uneasily, not only between West Germany and West Berlin but between West and East Germany, on the basis of a balance of interest between the FRG and the "GDR."

5) If German civilian traffic is blocked, all traffic theoretically becomes "military" traffic, since the Western Allies are responsible not only for the security but also for the general welfare of the population of occupied territories. This was dramatically demonstrated by the Allied airlift during the Berlin blockade in 1948. However, the principle was weakened by Allied inaction during GDR harrassment of West German traffic between 1950 and 1958.

6) Against the Soviet thesis of GDR sovereignty after the conclusion of a "peace treaty" the Western Allies maintain (as stated in the US note of July 17, 1961) that:

"If anyone

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"If anyone of the Four withdraws from these arrangements, then it is clearly the responsibility of the other Three to make such dispositions with respect to the exercise of their access rights as they deem appropriate."

7) It has been generally agreed, as phrased by Mr. Acheson, that "the issue over which the fight is made...Should be persistent physical interference with military or civilian traffic to and from Berlin, whether by East Germans or Soviets." The problem is how to arrive at that point, when it is clear that the other side will maneuver to prevent the development of any such clear-cut issue.

SOVIET/GDR OBJECTIVES:

1) Maximum initial assertion by the GDR and acceptance by the Western Allies of the concept of the "sovereignty" of the GDR and of its "control authority" over access routes to Berlin.

2) Gradual achievement of real control and erosion of Western "access rights" to facilitate eventual absorption of West Berlin by the GDR.

THE SETTING

Assuming that the threatened Soviet action is allowed to run its course, the one dramatic moment of crisis presently foreseeable will be the moment of East German officers replace Soviet officers at the check points and confront the first Allied vehicle. Hundreds of press representatives will be present and the eyes of the whole world will almost literally be on this encounter. Whichever side succeeds at that moment in effectively asserting its authority will have scored a potentially decisive round.

SOVIET/GDR TACTICS

1) It is of course possible that the East Germans would simply refuse passage to military traffic in the absence of a contractual arrangement negotiated by the Western Allies with the GDR. (This has already been said by Soviet and GDR spokesmen and might well be officially proclaimed in advance.)

2) It is also possible that the East Germans would accept the presently agreed "peel-off" identification procedure for Allied military traffic. (This procedure would have been proclaimed in advance under existing plans.)

3) It is more likely that the East Germans would seek to apply existing Soviet procedures, accompanied by a strenuous world-wide Communist-camp campaign to publicize (with pictures) the acquiescence of the Allies to East German "control authority" and the recognition thereby of GDR "sovereignty."

ALLIED ALTERNATIVES

1) Seek to forestall the arrival of the moment of crisis by tactics which would delay a showdown (e.g. negotiations with the Soviets and others)

or which would settle the access problem in advance of an unprepared confrontation. The former category of political action is dealt with elsewhere; with respect to the latter:

(a) The thesis that the Allies would accept the East Germans as "agents" of the USSR could not be successfully maintained either legally or psychologically in the face of Soviet and GDR denial of such relationship, which has already been indicated and would be reiterated.

(b) The three Allies could of course negotiate access arrangements with the GDR, as the Soviets demand, and at least for an initial period could probably get procedures less onerous and ambiguous than those presently in effect. The world would regard this as a major Soviet/East German victory and act accordingly. It would involve a considerable measure of recognition of the GDR and undermine the Western posture on self-determination. (While the British would accept this, the French would oppose, and it would be close to a breaking point with the FRG.)

(c) In order to avoid direct Allied negotiations with the GDR, it might be possible to extend the scope of the arrangements now governing civilian traffic by having the West and East Germans at the "technical" level agree on procedures governing all traffic to and from Berlin, including Allied military traffic. While such arrangements would seem to do violence to the theory of continued four-power responsibility, it could be rationalized on the assumption that both West and East Germans were acting as agents of the occupying powers. (The West Germans would probably turn down such a proposal, as they have other ideas involving increased dealings with the GDR; and since it would fall short of the measure of "authority" they seek, the East Germans might reject an approach along these lines, in any event. The British would probably favor. French reaction is hard to estimate.)

2) However, even if Allied plans contemplate forestalling the arrival of this "moment of crisis," contingency plans must be ready in case such efforts should fail.

(a) If the Allies stand by present planning, and the Soviets/East Germans rejected the procedure, the "moment of crisis" might be precipitated. If the Soviets/East Germans acquiesced, the West would have gained a psychological victory, would have won the unsettled "control" dispute, and would have made it difficult (though not impossible) for the GDR thereafter to erode or destroy Western access rights by means short of physical interference with traffic. (While the British have agreed to this procedure, they are clearly not happy with it and the U.S. has agreed to a review. It is not at all clear that the British would stand by the procedure--as stated in the attached, Mr. Acheson has grave doubts that they would--see attached. Absolute Allied agreement and unity would be essential for this course and this would have to be assured during the forthcoming tripartite consultations, if it is decided to confirm the present contingency planning. French and Germans will probably want to stand on the agreed procedure.)

(b) If the Allies decided to revise the contingency planning to allow the East Germans to execute the procedures presently followed by the

Soviets, the efforts of the other side to exploit "Allied acceptance of GDR control authority" would of course be mitigated to some extent by prior proclamation and publicizing of Allied intent. The GDR would inherit the Soviet side of the unsettled "control" dispute and could be expected gradually and cautiously to extend its control authority. (The British would like such arrangement, but the Germans and French might oppose.)

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on Newsweek story.

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On 12 August 1960, the JCS forwarded to the Secretary of Defense a check list of military and non-military counter measures in the Berlin Crisis.

This check list was the product of a working group from the Inter-agency Coordinating Group of the Berlin Contingency Plan, chaired by Mr. T. Livingston Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs at the time. The intent was to use the list to select measures to be recommended to the President by this group.

A sanitized version (BERCON-D-4) of this list was given to the tripartite ambassadorial group, consisting of U.K. and French Ambassadors, at a meeting in Washington on 24 October 1960.

On 28 April 1961, the JCS forwarded to McGeorge Bundy, through the Secretary of Defense, three hypothetical studies on Berlin, appendix C of which dealt with the check list. Mr. Nitze, ASD(ISA) forwarded a copy of this paper to State for information.

On 21 June, the JCS initiated and forwarded an updated revision of this check list to the Secretary of Defense, in which many of the measures of the previous list were included. A copy of this check list was sent to Dean Acheson, Special Advisor to the President. The purpose was to ^{action} recommend/ to deter the Soviets in connection with the Berlin Crisis and restore credibility of nuclear deterrence.

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON

July 3, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY:

In a conversation with Henry Rowen, Colonel Armstrong, also of ISA, and Henry Kissinger, on Friday, I discussed the initial response of the Joint Chiefs to the request for military plans in connection with Berlin (JCSM 430 and 431).

The planning for several alternative limited target lists which might be relevant to the Berlin crisis has not begun. Rowen is drafting a request for such planning, a copy of which I expect to receive, but I think this should be considered as an urgent matter at higher levels.

Carl Kaysen *CK*

Also, attached is a note on my talk with Gen T.

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By <i>[Signature]</i>	NARA, Date <i>7/20/61</i>

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Additional material has been released as a result of this review.

NRP (320) / Staff Memoranda: Kaysen

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July 6, 1961

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: MRBM's for Europe?

The MRBM issue is a basic point of difference between SACEUR and U.S. policy. Here is the background:

1. The Requirement. SACEUR developed, some time after Sputnik, a requirement for second generation MRBM's with a range of up to 1500 miles to replace his tactical strike aircraft. His tactical strike aircraft are now the chosen means for delivering nuclear weapons against battle-field targets in Europe, but they will become increasingly vulnerable to Soviet air defenses in the period ahead.
2. The Gates Proposal. In the spring of 1960, Secretary Gates offered to sell Polaris missiles to the European countries for land-based deployment, to meet SACEUR's requirement. As a second preference, he offered to help the Europeans produce MRBM's. The missiles were, in either case, to be nationally owned, nationally manned, and "committed" to SACEUR.
3. European Reactions. The European reaction was unenthusiastic. The U.K. -- and, in lesser degree, some other European countries -- did not want Polaris missiles in German hands; and it did not seem likely that this proposal could be executed without deployment to German forces. The French did not want any part of the proposal, as long as the missiles had to be committed to NATO.
4. U.S. Second Thoughts. A U.S. task force, which studied U.S. policy toward NATO in the summer of 1960, recommended dropping the Gates proposal, for three reasons:
 - (a) Deployment of MRBM's to national SACEUR-committed forces would lead to creation of de facto national nuclear capabilities: Since the warheads would be contained in the missiles, each country could fire off at will missiles which were capable of striking the USSR, nominal commitment of the missiles to SACEUR would not prevent this.
 - (b) Deploying more nuclear weapons with a "tactical" mission to Europe would be a waste of resources. There were enough such weapons there now to make clear to the Soviets that non-nuclear violence which surpassed our conventional capacity would lead to

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nuclear war. If any requirement for additional nuclear weapons existed, it was for weapons which would give the Europeans a feeling that they -- as well as the U.S. -- had a share in the strategic deterrent.

(c) 500 land-based MRBM's travelling about Europe (i) would involve an undue risk of physical accidents, possibly stimulated by Communist sabotage, which could generate European neutralist reactions; (ii) would be subject to seizure or use in an emergency by the national Governments in whose territory they were deployed, and would thus increase the risk of war by accident and miscalculation; (iii) would excite public concerns in the areas through which they travelled about the perils of atomic warfare (it was to minimize these concerns that the British proposed sea-based missiles -- 'out of sight, out of mind'); (iv) would have to be stationed in Germany, among other places, and this deployment would generate divisive fears and debates in NATO.

5. New U.S. Stance. In response to these objections, the U.S. floated a new concept at the Paris NATO meeting of December, 1960: a multi-nationally-owned and manned sea-borne MRBM force which would perform a strategic, rather than tactical, function. NATO would agree beforehand on guidelines under which the force would be used, and might delegate to a small group (or to the Secretary General or SACEUR) the task of applying those guidelines to specific cases. The warheads would remain in U.S. custody, and the President would be pledged to release the warheads whenever NATO decided to fire the missiles. The U.S. laid this concept before the Europeans; but did not urge it on them -- so that it would only be implemented if the Europeans really wanted this. In the meantime, the U.S. offered to commit some U.S. Polaris submarines to NATO, so that NATO would have its own strategic striking force, even if the European countries could not agree on how to set up the multilateral force. If the Europeans felt that this NATO-committed U.S. Polaris force gave them adequate participation in the strategic deterrent, and were content to stop at this point, that would be fine with us, since we were not anxious to have MRBM's in European hands.

as the US would not have a force

6. European Reactions. The Germans liked the multilateral proposal, since it would avoid creation of a national German missile force. The British still thought that MRBM's were too strategic a weapon to be given to NATO, but gradually came around to the view by placing some part of the strategic deterrent under multilateral control would not be a bad idea. Other countries showed no marked reaction, one way or the other. The prospect of the

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Europeans being able to agree on how to set up a multilaterally owned and manned missile force did not seem exhilarating. It seemed more likely that they would, after thrashing out the matter, conclude to continue present arrangements which leave the U.S. President free to make the decision without any NATO guidelines or advice, and thus rest on the commitment of U.S. Polaris submarines to NATO - rather than going in for an expensive new MRBM program. But the U.S. offer to help set up a multilateral force would have had the value of testing their desire for an independent strategic deterrent and showing them that it was the inherent difficulty of the project -- rather than U.S. objections -- which made it infeasible.

could he really have believed this?

7. Acheson Report. Mr. Acheson's report proposed that formation of the multilateral sea-borne missile force should be deferred until after NATO's non-nuclear goals had been met, so as to avoid diverting needed energies and resources from conventional improvements. He emphasized the need for centralized control over use of this force, and thus underlined the necessity for the U.S. retaining warheads to be used by that force; -- pledging itself to release the warheads when NATO decided that the missiles should be fired.

The President reiterated U.S. interest in this concept of a multilateral sea-borne missile force, which would be created after non-nuclear goals had been met, in his Ottawa speech. Chancellor Adenauer mentioned this speech to Henry Kissinger, and said that the concept of such a multilateral force would be most helpful to him in holding out an alternative to national nuclear programs to those Europeans (e.g., de Gaulle) who are concerned over their dependence on U.S. nuclear power.

8. Norstad Views. General Norstad still favors the original Gates proposal.

(a) He wants to get on with additional MRBM's now, to ensure his continued capability to perform the nuclear strike function now assumed by tactical aircraft; he does not want to leave the initiative to the European countries or wait until non-nuclear goals are achieved.

(b) He wants the missiles to go to national forces committed to SACEUR; he does not believe that multilateral ownership is necessary or that mixed manning is feasible.

(c) He wants the missiles to be deployed on the Continent, where they would be under his command and responsive to his immediate tactical needs, not on the high seas.

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(d) He would presumably favor current JCS proposals to extend the range of Pershings to be deployed to Europe to 700 - 1,000 miles and to increase greatly the number of Pershings to be deployed on the Continent, since this would be virtually a revival of the Gates proposal and would have the same effect as a new land-based MRBM program.

(e) General Norstad has persuaded Secretary General Stikker, who is an old and close friend, of the soundness of his views.

9. Basic Differences. Underlying these specific differences between the U.S. and SACEUR is a more general one: General Norstad believes that MRBM's are needed militarily to help NATO forces hit battlefield targets and defend Europe in case of general nuclear war. The U.S. considers that the issue of general nuclear war -- in Europe and everywhere else -- will be determined by the U.S. -Soviet nuclear exchange and that a requirement for MRBM's, if it exists at all, is primarily political -- to meet any European desire to lessen their dependence on U.S. strategic power. The commitment of U.S. Polaris submarines and the proposal for a multilateral force were designed to meet this political requirement, not to replace SACEUR's waning air strike capability.

phony The issue of MRBM's is thus more than a technical decision about a \$2 billion weapons system. It is a decision as to the basic direction which NATO is to take over the next 4-5 years, i.e., whether it is to develop a posture of lessened or increased dependence on nuclear weapons for the tactical defense of Europe. The posture outlined in the President's Ottawa speech and present U.S. policy points one way; General Norstad's and the Joint Chiefs' proposals point the other way. The question before the house is whether the U.S. proposals which are to be made to NATO in late July in amplification of our present general policy, should sustain the present U.S. position or General Norstad's view.

in fact real difference is political! Norstad wants semi-independence, US wants full control

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July 6, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Berlin Planning Organization

The Secretary of State, General Taylor, and I have discussed together a plan for Berlin operations which seems to all of us to make sense and which we think would be strengthened by your approval and perhaps by public announcement if you see fit.

Fundamental working group on Berlin would be an interdepartmental coordinating committee under the full-time direction of Foy Kohler. This committee will have sub-committees formed for specific assignments as they come from higher authority or as they are generated by Mr. Kohler and his immediate associates in the major participating departments. During Mr. Kohler's service on this committee, the other work of the European bureau will be handled by his deputy, William Tyler. It is our recommendation that the Defense Department also assign a full-time officer to this committee, and that other departments make appropriate personnel available as needed.

Mr. Kohler's committee will be responsible to a steering group chaired by the Secretary of State. Other members of this group will be the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director, CIA, the Director, USIA, General Taylor and myself. The steering group will be responsible for insuring full departmental support and policy coordination, under your final direction.

Appropriate records will be maintained by both the working committee and the steering group, and Mr. Kohler's office, in particular, will be a center of information, coordination, and follow-up on decided courses of action. Full reports will be available to General Taylor and to me, and a senior member of the NSC staff will be assigned to work with Mr. Kohler's group, probably full-time.

This brings me to my last request, which I regret to say does violence to an earlier understanding between George McGhee and myself. I believe that by his experience in the last six months and by his basic qualifications Mr. Henry Owen is unusually fitted to serve as the White House staff officer in this case, and I am sure that his service in this capacity far outweighs anything which he could accomplish in an equivalent time on the planning staff. If, however, he is to come with us during the next

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In accordance with
Executive Order 11652

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six months, Mr. McGhee cannot be expected to hold open the high position he has offered to Owen, and accordingly Owen should burn his bridges at the State Department and join us for good. Owen himself has made no move whatever in this direction, but I see no other good solution to a central problem of our own service to you.

General Taylor and I have recommended to the Secretary of State a somewhat parallel organization for Southeast Asia, but he is not yet ready to join in a recommendation on this point, and accordingly this matter is delayed for a couple of days. This raises the question whether we should make the Berlin organization known at once, at least within the government, or whether we should hold it up until we have a decision about Southeast Asia. My inclination is somewhat in favor of going ahead on Berlin, but I think General Taylor inclines the other way, because in his view these two crisis areas deserve to be kept in mind at once.

McG. B.

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National
Defense
University

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10 July 1961

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General Taylor -

Henry Kissinger has sent this over for your information. He will be in the Building on Wednesday, Thursday and Friday if you want to talk to him about it. Note Paragraph 5.

Meanwhile, you may or may not work this in somehow when you see Gen. Lemnitzer tomorrow.

LEGERE

There was no "final" version of this paper, I am told. It went forward to Mr. Bundy "as is".

Planning

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the Acheson report

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to ground access -

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DRAFT

HAK:slingerummm

7/7/61

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: General War Aspect of Berlin Contingency Planning

1. One of the key features of the Berlin contingency planning is the risk and the threat of general nuclear war. The Acheson report correctly points out that the President must make an early decision about his willingness to risk nuclear war over Berlin. All military plans contain the phrase that we must bring home to the Communists the "unmistakable risk of general war". None of our plans with respect to ground access - even Mr. Acheson's proposal - make sense unless we are prepared to face the risks of nuclear war.

2. This is good so far as it goes. I believe however that the President should not be asked to make a decision about going to nuclear war in the abstract. It seems to me that before he makes the decision he has to know what is meant by nuclear war. It would therefore seem to me essential that the nature of our nuclear options be defined now.

3. This seems to me essential not only to aid the President in making a decision but also if civilian control is to have any meaning particularly with relation to the actual conduct of operations. As things stand now, I fear that the military will try to force the President's hand during a crisis - particularly if ground fighting should take place - by claiming that they can no longer guarantee the security of their forces.

B-88

There should be agreement now about the measures they will be able to carry out.

4. As an initial step the Defense Department might be asked to prepare recommendations about graduated nuclear actions both in Europe and against the Soviet bloc. These should contain the pros and cons of the various courses of action. The Defense Department should be asked to submit a plan for graduated nuclear response even if the Joint Chiefs do not consider it the optimum strategy.

5. Once the President has made a decision I would recommend that General Taylor's office monitor its execution.

6. I have discussed the problem with both Carl Kayser and Henry Rowan, who concur. Henry Rowan would be happy to draft instructions for the President's signature if you agree.

Henry A. Kissinger

cc -Mr. Kayser
Mr. Rostow
Mr. Owen

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

UNCLASSIFIED 17, 1961

5/12/61
Box 34
Berlin
Legation
Gnaetwile

Memorandum of Meeting on Berlin, July 17, 1961

Present were: The President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Treasury, Attorney General, General Taylor, Mr. Sorensen, Mr. Bundy

The Secretary of State opened the meeting by stating the general view of his Department that we should begin on a low key, if possible. At the same time, necessary military strength should be built up and the Department would concur in a budgetary increase of \$4.3 billion and a call of National Guard and Reserve units if needed.

Secretary McNamara made it clear that a declaration of national emergency was not needed before September 1st or October 1st, although there would be a probable need for a call of air units before the end of the year. After prolonged discussion of the components of the \$4.3 billion requested, it appeared that immediately needed actions, for procurement, for Civil Defense, for the build-up of the three STRAF divisions, the possible provision of 64,000 additional men to fill out U. S. NATO forces, and other similar missions, would produce a budgetary request of \$3 billion, while the cost of large-scale troop calls under a declaration of national emergency would amount to about a billion and a half more (the difference between this total of \$4.5 billion and the total of \$4.3 billion with which the discussion began is explained by \$200 million for Civil Defense). There appeared to be general agreement that there need be no present request for a declaration of national emergency, and it appeared to be the dominant judgment that a budgetary request for \$3 billion would be preferable to a request for \$4.5 billion, since the additional money for Reserve units could undoubtedly be obtained after they were called up. Secretary McNamara's preference went the other way, and it was agreed that this question might usefully be discussed by the President with certain leaders of the Armed Forces committees of the Congress. It was also agreed that the President would review these questions of military policy with the Joint Chiefs of Staff before final decision was made.

The Secretary of State said that the second large item for discussion on Wednesday would be the planning of the negotiating position of the U.S.,

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The third point which the Secretary brought forward was the question of our eventual position toward the DDR. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

General Taylor asked about propaganda proposals, and it was agreed that concrete plans in this area should be developed by USIA and submitted through the Department of State. One fairly desirable event is a plebiscite in West Berlin, probably after the German election -- though the President was not convinced on this matter of timing.

UNCLASSIFIED

The President's speech had initially been planned for Monday, July 24, but Mr. Sorensen indicated that this seemed somewhat too early, and it was agreed that he would suggest a definite date at the NSC meeting on Wednesday, July 19.

It was agreed that many items of political, economic and military negotiation should be ready for serious discussion at the meeting of Foreign Ministers in early August. State Department will send an expert team sometime in the week of July 24, and on this team Defense and Treasury will be represented. Meanwhile, Secretary McNamara proposes to see General Norstad in Paris over the coming week end, in order to get his views and to work out a strong agreed position if possible.

The President ended the meeting with a discussion of organizational framework of work on Berlin. At the lower level is the interdepartmental coordinating group under Mr. Foy Kohler. This committee will be responsible for day-to-day operations and detailed planning. It will report to the President through a steering group under the Secretary of State as Chairman, with the following additional membership:

Secretary of Defense
Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
Director, CIA
Director, USIA
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Taylor
Mr. Bundy

"Steering
Group"

The President's desire is that this group should meet once a week on Monday afternoons. Among its duties will be the clarification of items to be discussed at the fortnightly Thursday meetings of the National Security Council.

The President asked the Secretary of State whether there could be a similar interdepartmental working coordinating group for Laos and Viet-Nam reporting through the same steering committee. The Secretary replied that there were real difficulties here in the internal organization of the Department of State, but it was agreed that

UNCLASSIFIED

he would present a recommendation on this organizational question at the NSC meeting on Wednesday, July 19. It was agreed that fundamental responsibility for supervision and follow-up would rest with the steering group, initially with respect to Berlin, and if assignment is later given, with respect to Southeast Asia as well.

McGeorge Bundy
McGeorge Bundy

Cop. for Mr. Bundy
✓ 7/17/61

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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July 17, 1961


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NSA/81/Gen. Sec. Gen. 7/15 - 7/17/61
NSA/84/Gen/Subj. Berlin steering group 7/17-9/11/61

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preparatory to discussion with our Allies. What negotiating position should we have, and how should its development be timed? On this point, discussion was inconclusive, and it was agreed that decision should await presentation of the "political scenario" on Wednesday. The Secretary indicated his view that the opening posture of the West should be an emphasis upon self-determination, and that probably we would wish to spin out the discussion in order to make it difficult for Mr. Khrushchev to proceed with concrete steps at an early stage.

The third point which the Secretary brought forward was the question of our eventual position toward the DDR. The President made plain his belief that since we shall have to talk with representatives of that regime at some stage, we should not now take so strong a line that these later talks will look like a defeat. Our rights in Berlin certainly cannot be discussed, but there can at an appropriate stage be a discussion of the way in which our rights are to be maintained without impairment. The Secretary mentioned the possibility of proceeding first through conversations in which the West and East Germans talk together (a notion which has echoes in Khrushchev's Vienna Aide Memoire), but no decisions, even of a preliminary sort, were reached, except that discussion of the "political scenario" might be lengthy and should be continued after the NSC meeting of the steering group if necessary.

Secretary McNamara made clear that the Defense Department would not be able to present a military operations plan on July 19. It would, on the other hand, have a shopping list of desired allied military actions. The State Department will present a similar paper on U. S. and allied steps in a campaign of economic warfare. The President made clear his concern for a strong U. S. team on this subject, mentioning among others the name of Milo Perkins, a name which Secretary Dillon agreed to check up on.

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The Attorney General
Director, CIA
Director, USIA
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Taylor
Mr. Bundy

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- 4 -

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McGeorge Bundy
McGeorge Bundy

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The attached White House originated documents are forwarded to you for your opinion on declassification. This consultation is being made with agencies of primary subject matter interest as indicated below:

<u>ITEM #</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>PAGES</u>	<u>CLASS.</u>	<u>ACTION TAKEN</u>
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1	7/17/61	McGeorge Bundy Memo of Meeting on Berlin, July 17, 1961	4	TS	
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DECLASSIFIED

NOTES FOR THE ARCHIVIST:

Item 1 is located in NSF:CO:Germany, Subjects, Berlin Steering Group, 7/7/61-9/11/61, Box 88.

-- Item 1 is also located in NSF:CO:Germany, Berlin, General, 7/15/61-7/17/61, Box 81.

-- Item 1 is also located in POF:CO:Germany, Security, 7/61.

-- Item 1 is also located in NSF:M&M:Meetings with the President, 7/61-8/61, Box 317.

RECLASSIFIED
In accordance with
Executive Order 11652

2/23/84

19 July 1961

A key point in determining the nature of the military course of action upon which we are about to embark is the extent to which the build-up will depend upon reservists and reserve units. The Interdepartmental Coordinating Group raises this issue in suggesting consideration of a third alternative course of action in the paper before the NSC today. This "Third Course" would call for a substantial increase to the Defense budget but would use this money for a permanent increase in the military establishment justified by the over-all world situation. In contrast, the Defense plan (Course A in the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group paper) would spend about 2 billion for permanent establishment and 2.3 billion for reserve forces as a transitory increase in strength related to Berlin.

a. Measures to correct deficiencies in our present forces
(Deferred maintenance")

c. Measures beyond a and b needed to cope with Berlin.

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Found the box like Col. Legent's Inquirer MBM

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This afternoon it may be useful to pose such questions as follows:

- a. What part of the Department of Defense program is regarded as permanent; how much is related only to Berlin?
- b What is the proposed manpower increase? How many are reservists?
- c. Why not put all our money now into strength which we need on an indefinite basis?

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

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7/19/61
July 19, 1961

C O P Y

MEMORANDUM TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: MRBM's

I understand that you will be grappling with the question of whether to propose land-based MRBM's (and/or the equivalent in the form of 7-900 mile Pershings)* to NATO forces, as a result of the NATO Working Group report.

I thought it might be helpful to set down the considerations which moved me to recommend against this course in my report to the President.

It seemed clear to me that weapons of this range would only be used in the event of general nuclear war. The issue of such a war would be decided by forces outside the theater. I concluded that first priority in NATO programs should go to preparing NATO forces for lesser contingencies, which could not be handled by outside forces.

Since a US MRBM proposal would run counter to this rule, it would seem to be the wrong kind of signal to give our allies just when we were trying hard -- and for the first time -- to persuade them that the path to salvation lies through non-nuclear, rather than nuclear, improvement. They would doubt this was our premise, since we were not acting on it. I would not under-estimate the symbolic significance which this matter of MRBM's has acquired over the years, as a portent of which policy is to prevail in NATO.

Even if this were not the case, the excitement and controversy generated by this proposal would be bound to divert our allies' attention from pressing Berlin non-nuclear programs. Theoretically, our allies can concentrate on

both tasks:

* The test of an MRBM, in my book, is whether it can reach Soviet territory.

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
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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6	
11/08/94-36	
By <i>[initials]</i>	NARA, Date 11/08/94

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
both tasks; in practice, nuclear programs are the more interesting and tend to overshadow others. This was clearly shown in 1960, when fruitless attempts to agree on a new NATO MRBM program diverted the attention and energy of the US and its allies from more pressing tasks.



The Berlin crisis seems to me the period, above all others, when we do not want to stir up British fears of Germany or divisive issues between the French and ourselves.

While I doubt that such a debate would result in agreement on a NATO MRBM program (the experience of 1960 rather suggests it would not), we ought to consider what the consequence would be if it did.


One consequence would be to divert significant resources from higher priority programs. And, if past experience is any guide, current estimates of the cost of new MRBM programs will prove to be substantially below the mark.



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These countries' possession of MRBMs would thus make it that much more difficult to prevent escalation of any conventional violence in Europe into nuclear war. It would also increase the risks of accidental or unintended use of nuclear weapons. And the difficulty of ensuring a controlled NATO nuclear response in the event of nuclear war would be correspondingly enhanced.

The prospect of having several hundred of these missiles touring around the Continent gives me pause for one other reason. Their presence would be painfully evident and might well stir up press, public and parliamentary concerns about the manner of their control, the likelihood that they would draw nuclear fire upon the Continent in wartime, etc. And if one of these land-based missiles should be involved in an accident (which might be stimulated by Communist sabotage), even one not involving nuclear contamination, European neutralist tendencies might well be powerfully intensified. It is for reasons such as these

that the

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- 4 -

that the British have favored a sea-borne missile force -- "out of sight, out of mind".

Is there a political need for land-based MRBMs so urgent that it must be met, despite these disadvantages?

I doubt it. The record to date is not one of great European demand. The British are opposed. The Germans, fearing either to offend their neighbors by deployment in Germany or to suffer discrimination by rejecting such deployment while the missiles are deployed elsewhere on the Continent, seem to see some advantages in sea-borne missiles. The French are a special problem, in view of the warhead custody question. General Norstad will continue to urge this proposal, but I doubt he will find an enthusiastic clientele -- especially if we keep the alliance busy with more important matters.

I would, therefore, hold to our present position: The US will meet its commitment to deploy a limited number of 2-300 mile Pershing missiles to Europe. It will commit Polaris submarines to NATO. We will consider European participation in this sea-borne missile force, if this is what our allies want -- after non-nuclear improvements have been achieved.

This sea-borne missile force would be in a safe place. It would -- at least for a long time to come -- be in American hands, so that it could not be seized and odd things done with it. It would be very powerful, and you could say to the Europeans: Here it is; it is there for your defense; we will not take it away. If you do not have any confidence in us, why we can't give it to you any other way, but this is a very great hostage which we make available to you.

Now I can see that General Norstad would prefer to have these missiles on the Continent, under his command. And I am sure that military arguments can be adduced as to why land-based missiles are preferable to the Polaris submarines. I wouldn't pretend to be able to judge these arguments, but I doubt the balance of advantage -- if it exists -- is sufficient to outweigh the very real disadvantages adduced above. Especially since the use of

these

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- 5 -

these missiles will be peripheral to the outcome of the posited contingency: general nuclear war.

If the Europeans feel otherwise, that is for them to say. If they say so with force and unanimity, this would be a matter to consider seriously. I doubt they will, but I would leave matters as they stand until this happens. I think you will find this is an issue which diverts less attention and resources from our main problem if we stand on our present course -- and leave the initiative in developing any new proposals to our allies -- than if we swing around to support General Norstad's position (and/or an equivalent proposal for 7-900 mile Pershings). This US support will not change General Norstad's views on matters of larger strategy; it will merely throw NATO into a first class debate which will divert and divide the alliance at a time when it has more serious business to do and could eventually lead to a military program which would be not only wasteful but downright dangerous.

Dean Acheson

~~SECRET~~

19/22/61
7/22/61
NSF/61/Gen Sec Com 7/19/61
July 19, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: This Afternoon's Meetings

You will have your Berlin steering group at 3 o'clock and the NSC at 4. The first meeting should allow us to get a clear sense of what we want to review and decide firmly in the second. I suggest the following agenda for the first meeting.

1. A brief review of the military alternatives. You are quite familiar with this, and Annex C of the blue report gives a good summary of the alternatives as they now stand. The only disappointing element of Annex C is the appendix, which shows the State Department's estimate that there will not be a strong allied response to requests for parallel action on their part. It thus becomes a major diplomatic question whether we want to ask strongly for something we may not get. You should also consider Max Taylor's memo on the third alternative, "in Annex A. (Written in ink on original)

2. Whichever military level you decide on, there is need for additional decisions about a national emergency and about standby controls and taxing authority. I believe there is general agreement in the steering group that the national emergency is not now necessary, but a hard wing of the Kohler group, led by Acheson and Nitze, disagrees. It will be important to decide how to handle this matter in the 4 o'clock meeting so as to have as much harmony and unanimity in the government as possible, once the decision is taken. On standby controls and taxes, Ted Sorenson has a memo; it's not an easy choice.

3. A third item which deserves discussion at the 3 o'clock meeting is economic sanctions policy. Annex B of the blue book gives a clear-cut recommendation for a general economic embargo against the Sino-Soviet bloc if access to Berlin is blocked. The case is worth reading, and it makes clear that we could do a lot of harm to the Sino-Soviet economy, at a considerable cost to ourselves. The intelligence estimate indicates that an

Berlin
(Copy in following folders:
NSC meeting, Steering Group
Memo to the President)

embargo in itself is not likely to have a decisive effect upon the Soviets. And again, as Annex B indicates, it will be hard to sell sanctions to our allies, and since the immediate cost will fall more on them than on us, we might have to provide several hundreds of millions a year in compensation.

4. But the most important subject for discussion in the first meeting, and the one which you may wish to put first, is the political scenario. The Secretary of State has sent over a talking paper which indicates his sense of the problem. The first two and one-half pages are a general summary. From IV onward, there is an indicated timetable of activity which carries through pretty clearly to the end of September, and becomes foggy beyond that point -- almost inevitably. The paper does not make clear the Secretary's view of two important questions which you may wish to raise with him.

The first is whether we should now make clear that neither the peace treaty nor the substitution of East Germans for Russians along the Autobahn is a fighting matter.

The second is whether we should extend serious feelers to the Soviets with respect to the elements of an eventual settlement of the crisis.

* * * * *

On the basis of the three o'clock meeting, I will try to draft an order of discussion for the four o'clock meeting, and I think you should begin that session by announcing the subjects on which you wish decisions. My guess is that it may make sense to take up the questions at the four o'clock meeting in the order of their urgency, something like this:

1. Level of military build-up
2. Other immediate measures -- national emergency?
taxes? stand-by controls?
3. (If you choose) Suggestions for the tone and content of your speech.

(From here on the urgency is somewhat less great, and the key problem is preparation for the Foreign Ministers Meeting.)

4. Economic sanctions policy

5. Immediate political steps

a. Early talks with the Soviets? (Acheson against and Rusk undecided)

b. An immediate decision on attitude toward the peace treaty and East German troops on the Autobahn. (The British are pressing hard for this.)

Some other matters which we are concerned with can be discussed at a slower tempo and should probably be explicitly deferred. Among these are the military operations plan in the event that access is blocked, the Defense Department's recommendations for a long-run defense build-up, details of the civil defense program.

This is probably the most important NSC meeting that we have had, and there is no reason why it cannot be continued tomorrow if you wish.

McG. B.

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Herby

July 19 3

DOMESTIC ECONOMY AND RESOURCES

1. Declaration of National Emergency, now or in fall?
Call-up of Reserves and Guard, now or in fall?
2. Amount of Defense Budget Request (McNamara and Bell)
 - if answer to (1) is positive, but to be announced later in fall, ask for \$3.3 or \$4.3 now?
 - if answer to (1) is negative, ask for \$ 2.8 bil now.
3. Domestic Economic measures -- taxes and controls (Dillon)
 - if answer to (1) is positive, seek authority to adjust taxes or impose controls
 - on a stand-by authority or immediate basis
 - if answer to (1) is negative, should taxes be requested to cover the \$ 2.8 billion.
 - and if so, on a stand-by or immediate basis.
4. Mobilization of resources (Ellis)
 - if answer to (1) is positive and control legislation is requested, also seek legislation for emergency mobilization of resources to supplement powers already existing under Korean emergency.
 - if there is no control legislation, there is no need for resource legislation.

7/19/61
NSA 1713
NSA 468 / 1307 7 13
NSA 468 / 1307 7 13
July 19, 1961

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BY *[signature]* NARA DATE 12/85

NSC 5449

(Cys in following folders:
Berlin, Steering Group
Memo to the President)

And again, as Annex B indicates, it will be hard to sell sanctions to our allies, and since the immediate cost will fall more on them than on us, we might have to provide several hundreds of millions a year in compensation.

4. But the most important subject for discussion in the first meeting, and the one which you may wish to put first, is the political scenario. The Secretary of State has sent over a talking paper which indicates his sense of the problem. The first two and one-half pages are a general summary. From IV onward, there is an indicated timetable of activity which carries through pretty clearly to the end of September, and becomes foggy beyond that point -- almost inevitably. The paper does not make clear the Secretary's view of two important questions which you may wish to raise with him.

The second is whether we should extend serious feelers to the Soviets with respect to the elements of an eventual settlement of the crisis.

* * * * *

On the basis of the three o'clock meeting, I will try to draft an order of discussion for the four o'clock meeting, and I think you should begin that session by announcing the subjects on which you wish decisions. My guess is that it may make sense to take up the questions at the four o'clock meeting in the order of their urgency, something like this:

1. Level of military build-up
2. Other immediate measures -- national emergency? taxes? stand-by controls?
3. (If you choose) Suggestions for the tone and content of your speech.

(From here on the urgency is somewhat less great, and the key problem is preparation for the Foreign Ministers Meeting.)

4. Economic sanctions policy

5. Immediate political steps

a. Early talks with the Soviets? (Acheson against and Rusk undecided)

b. An immediate decision on attitude toward the peace treaty and



Some other matters which we are concerned with can be discussed at a slower tempo and should probably be explicitly deferred. Among these are the military operations plan in the event that access is blocked, the Defense Department's recommendations for a long-run defense build-up, details of the civil defense program.

This is probably the most important NSC meeting that we have had, and there is no reason why it cannot be continued tomorrow if you wish.

McG. B.

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By SPR NARA Date 2-14-95

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7/19/61

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July 19, 1961

MEMORANDUM TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: MRBM's

I understand that you will be grappling with the question of whether to propose land-based MRBM's (and/or the equivalent in the form of 7-900 mile Pershings)* to NATO forces, as a result of the NATO Working Group report.

I thought it might be helpful to set down the considerations which moved me to recommend against this course in my report to the President.

It seemed clear to me that weapons of this range would only be used in the event of general nuclear war. The issue of such a war would be decided by forces outside the theater. I concluded that first priority in NATO programs should go to preparing NATO forces for lesser contingencies, which could not be handled by outside forces.

Since a US MRBM proposal would run counter to this rule, it would seem to be the wrong kind of signal to give our allies just when we were trying hard -- and for the first time -- to persuade them that the path to salvation lies through non-nuclear, rather than nuclear, improvement. They would doubt this was our premise, since we were not acting on it. I would not under-estimate the symbolic significance which this matter of MRBM's has acquired over the years, as a portent of which policy is to prevail in NATO.

Even if this were not the case, the excitement and controversy generated by this proposal would be bound to divert allied attention from less dramatic non-nuclear programs. Theoretically, our allies can concentrate on

both tasks;

* The test of an MRBM, in my book, is whether it can reach Soviet territory.

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- 2 -

both tasks; in practice, nuclear programs are the more interesting and tend to overshadow others. This was clearly shown in 1960, when fruitless attempts to agree on a new NATO MRBM program diverted the attention and energy of the US and its allies from more pressing tasks.

A US MRBM proposal would, moreover, generate divisive debate within the Alliance at a time when we could least afford it. The British would view with alarm any proposal to place missiles capable of striking the USSR in the hands of West German forces. The French would not want US custody over warheads for these missiles on French territory -- at least not unless we helped them with their own nuclear program, in return. Thus, any MRBM proposal would tend to raise debate within the Alliance on some of the most ticklish aspects of the Nth country problem.

The Berlin crisis seems to me the period, above all others, when we do not want to stir up British fears of Germany or divisive issues between the French and ourselves.

While I doubt that such a debate would result in agreement on a NATO MRBM program (the experience of 1960 rather suggests it would not), we ought to consider what the consequence would be if it did.

One consequence would be to divert significant resources from higher priority programs. And, if past experience is any guide, current estimates of the cost of new MRBM programs will prove to be substantially below the mark.

All questions of expense aside, I wonder whether these would really be good things to have around. I doubt it would be politically feasible to keep them out of European hands, if they were deployed to continental Europe at all. Would it be sound international policy to have them in France, if the French should want them? Would you want to have a large number of powerful nuclear missiles -- with the warheads aboard -- in the hands of any army as volatile as this one? I can see an argument that it would not be too wise. It is an argument I would not want to make in public, but one could state it.

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The proposed paper "commitment" to SACEUR is not a very impressive safeguard, considering the recent French withdrawal of their Mediterranean fleet from NATO. I understand there are physical gadgets to help maintain centralized SACEUR control. But would they really be proof against a sustained attempt by a technologically advanced country to devise counter-measures? I suspect the first thing the French (and probably the Germans) would do would be to devise such counter-measures. They might well consider that this was an essential precaution, in their own national interest, to ensure that they were able to use this very expensive weapon in case of need. Indeed, they might consider that the principal value of these weapons was in enabling them to strike a blow of undetermined origin against Soviet territory and thus to commit the US to nuclear violence in Europe -- against its will, if need be -- should their vital interests so require. And they might have a different view of these vital interests, in the event of a local clash, than the US.

These countries' possession of MRBMs would thus make it that much more difficult to prevent escalation of any conventional violence in Europe into nuclear war. It would also increase the risks of accidental or unintended use of nuclear weapons. And the difficulty of ensuring a controlled NATO nuclear response in the event of nuclear war would be correspondingly enhanced.

The prospect of having several hundred of these missiles touring around the Continent gives me pause for one other reason. Their presence would be painfully evident and might well stir up press, public and parliamentary concerns about the manner of their control, the likelihood that they would draw nuclear fire upon the Continent in wartime, etc. And if one of these land-based missiles should be involved in an accident (which might be stimulated by Communist sabotage), even one not involving nuclear contamination, European neutralist tendencies might well be powerfully intensified. It is for reasons such as these

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that the British have favored a sea-borne missile force -- "out of sight, out of mind".

Is there a political need for land-based MRBMs so urgent that it must be met, despite these disadvantages?

I doubt it. The record to date is not one of great European demand. The British are opposed. The Germans, fearing either to offend their neighbors by deployment in Germany or to suffer discrimination by rejecting such deployment while the missiles are deployed elsewhere on the Continent, seem to see some advantages in sea-borne missiles. The French are a special problem, in view of the warhead custody question. General Norstad will continue to urge this proposal, but I doubt he will find an enthusiastic clientele -- especially if we keep the alliance busy with more important matters.

I would, therefore, hold to our present position: The US will meet its commitment to deploy a limited number of 2-300 mile Pershing missiles to Europe. It will commit Polaris submarines to NATO. We will consider European participation in this sea-borne missile force, if this is what our allies want -- after non-nuclear improvements have been achieved.

This sea-borne missile force would be in a safe place. It would -- at least for a long time to come -- be in American hands, so that it could not be seized and odd things done with it. It would be very powerful, and you could say to the Europeans: Here it is; it is there for your defense; we will not take it away. If you do not have any confidence in us, why we can't give it to you any other way, but this is a very great hostage which we make available to you.

Now I can see that General Norstad would prefer to have these missiles on the Continent, under his command. And I am sure that military arguments can be adduced as to why land-based missiles are preferable to the Polaris submarines. I wouldn't pretend to be able to judge these arguments, but I doubt the balance of advantage -- if it exists -- is sufficient to outweigh the very real disadvantages adduced above. Especially since the use of

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these missiles will be peripheral to the outcome of the posited contingency: general nuclear war.

If the Europeans feel otherwise, that is for them to say. If they say so with force and unanimity, this would be a matter to consider seriously. I doubt they will, but I would leave matters as they stand until this happens. I think you will find this is an issue which diverts less attention and resources from our main problem if we stand on our present course -- and leave the initiative in developing any new proposals to our allies -- than if we swing around to support General Norstad's position (and/or an equivalent proposal for 7-900 mile Pershings). This US support will not change General Norstad's views on matters of larger strategy; it will merely throw NATO into a first class debate which will divert and divide the alliance at a time when it has more serious business to do and could eventually lead to a military program which would be not only wasteful but downright dangerous.

Dean Acheson

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Notes on National Security Council Meeting
July 20, 1961

General Hickey, Chairman of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee, presented the annual report of his group. General Lemnitzer stated that the assumption of this year's study was a surprise attack in late 1963, preceded by a period of heightened tensions.

After the presentation by General Hickey and by the various members of the Subcommittee, the President asked if there had ever been made an assessment of damage results to the U.S.S.R. which would be incurred by a preemptive attack. General Lemnitzer stated that such studies had been made and that he would bring them over and discuss them personally with the President. In recalling General Hickey's opening statement that these studies have been made since 1957, the President asked for an appraisal of the trend in the effectiveness of the attack. General Lemnitzer replied that he would also discuss this with the President.

Since the basic assumption of this year's presentation was an attack in late 1963, the President asked about probable effects in the winter of 1962. Mr. Dulles observed that the attack would be much less effective since there would be considerably fewer missiles involved. General Lemnitzer added a word of caution about accepting the precise findings of the Committee since these findings were based upon certain assumptions which themselves might not be valid.

The President posed the question as to the period of time necessary for citizens to remain in shelters following an attack. A member of the Subcommittee replied that no specific period of time could be cited due to the variables involved, but generally speaking, a period of two weeks should be expected.

The President directed that no member in attendance at the meeting disclose even the subject of the meeting.

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July 20, 1961

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Nuclear Weapons and Berlin

As I read the press, I become increasingly concerned lest too exclusive an emphasis on "conventional" build-up may tend to erode the credibility of our posture on Berlin. Despite the obvious good sense of the Acheson doctrine that in a nuclear stalemate we cannot respond initially with massive retaliation, to convey too strong a public impression that we will only react conventionally before we have really acquired a capability to do so will not carry much conviction in Moscow. Indeed it may have the opposite result.

I fully agree that our actual Berlin responses should be conventional. What I query is whether in our statements and actions leading up to this point we should over-stress this fact. Largely because of his substantial conventional superiority, Khrushchev will not be very impressed by modest increases in our non-nuclear strength. His contemptuous remarks to the British Ambassador about one French division coming back from Algeria, and his boast that he could mobilize 300, probably reflect his real feelings.

What we hope will scare him, of course, is fear that if a major fracas erupts in Germany, he will be started down a slippery slope which might lead to nuclear war. But conventional preparations, without keeping the nuclear threat alive in the background, may actually confirm to Khrushchev that we dare not use the very weapons which would scare him most. He may well interpret our remarks and preparations as meaning that we are in fact afraid to use nuclears in the clutch.

Premature emphasis on conventional to the exclusion of nuclear forces may also weaken our credibility to our allies. We have been telling them for years that our NATO nuclear capability was the great equalizer, and our success in selling this doctrine is amply evident in their less than enthusiastic responses to the Acheson doctrine. If we make it too patently apparent that our responses will be only conventional, we may fail to convince our allies that we will go to the wall if necessary over Berlin. As you know, they already fear that our

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new non-nuclear emphasis means we are no longer willing to use our nuclear "sword".

What can we do about this? *On this, and other points, see p. 12.*

Low Key Reminders of Our Nuclear Strength. Let me record again my conviction that our present tactical nuclear stockpiles in Europe (particularly in shorter range weapons) are substantially in excess of those of the Soviets. Khrushchev may say he doesn't think much of tactical weapons, but this is largely because he doesn't have too many yet. Soviet stockpiles are not yet sufficient to permit a major tactical weapons build-up on top of equipping their strategic forces (which naturally had first priority). Hence Khrushchev is probably still frightened of tactical nuclear war, despite his claims that any nuclear war would quickly become all-out (a smart thing for him to say during a period of his tactical inferiority). He is no more anxious than we to see a tactical nuclear war escalate into Armageddon.

Ergo, in demonstrating our determination in the test of wills over Berlin, we should not talk exclusively of conventional build-ups, even though conventional responses are all we actually contemplate. Mr. Gilpatric at his press conference seemed rather feeble on this score. Low key reminders of our current strategic nuclear superiority, and above all of our great tactical superiority, would dilute the non-nuclear focus, worry Khrushchev, and reassure our allies. Indeed, we might even deploy a few more nucs to Europe just to give balance to our public stance.

Threatening to Give Nucs to Bonn. These are dangerous days, and if we accept Mr. Acheson's precept that the stakes are absolutely crucial, can we shy away even from contingency plans for rattling nucs? On this score, Khrushchev might turn green if we threatened to give nuclear weapons to the Germans. I'd be no happier about this than anyone else. But at a late stage in a Berlin crisis, why not tell Khrushchev discreetly that if faced with such a crucial threat to our whole position in Western Europe we would feel compelled to provide our allies with whatever means were necessary to defend their vital interests?

Resumption of Nuclear Testing. Another way of reminding Khrushchev of the nuclear threat lurking in the background would be the resumption, at some stage in the crisis, of US nuclear tests. It is a fair bet that

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Khrushchev hopes he's put us in a box where we are unwilling to incur the onus of abrogating even an unpoliced moratorium. For us to test, and to incur this onus, would further validate our determination to go to war if necessary. It would also refocus attention on the nuclear stakes involved. Such a step would add to an already tense situation, but at least it would not be open to miscalculation.

Nuclear Demonstrations. If worst comes to worst, and we find ourselves at the brink on Berlin, certain high-risk options which now seem almost incredible might begin to look worthwhile. Let's say we are already in a substantial conventional fracas on the approaches to Berlin. At the eleventh hour we face defeat, negotiated compromise, or general war. But there is a further alternative which might be sandwiched into an ascending level of violence. I would call this a "controlled nuclear demonstration" of a very limited sort.

If things got to the point where the Soviets were licking us on the ground in Germany, they clearly would be gambling that we would not actually use nuclear weapons. The problem at this point would be to convince them, but by means short of all-out or even tactical nuclear war. This might involve the highly selective use of nuclear weapons as a demonstration of will.

I'm under no illusion as to the critical risks involved. Their escalation potential is great. They might petrify some allies. And two can play at this game. But remember that these steps would take place only when we were at the very brink of all-out war. They are suggested as last ditch alternatives which postpone an all-out response in the hope that they would forestall the necessity for it.

True, they might provoke a Soviet first strike but we are already in so tense a situation that the risk of preemption has become almost

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a constant; in any case we would be at full readiness. If firing a few nuclear weapons seems horrendous to contemplate, it seems less so to me than firing thousands. Hence, I urge some contingency planning to see what we might drum up.

RPK
RWK

cc: HO

FILE UNDER

MRBM

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 21, 1961

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Eyes Only

Dear General Norstad:

I enjoyed reading your recent telegram regarding Berlin (ALO 565) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I agree thoroughly with you on the need for a position of great flexibility in preparing for a Berlin crisis. Your comment on the desirability of arranging our preparations so as to avoid stimulating counterproductive Soviet reactions seems to me very well taken. You can be sure that your suggestions will be taken fully into account in our preparations for a Berlin crisis.

I wanted, in this connection, to write you my views concerning the relation to that crisis of the military planning which NATO will be discussing and undertaking in the months ahead.

I am anxious that this discussion and planning be geared, insofar as feasible, to needs which will be particularly important in the light of the Berlin crisis -- recognizing that this crisis may last for a very considerable period, on an on-again off-again basis.

This would mean, I should think, focusing particularly on efforts (i) to fulfill approved (MC-70) NATO force goals, particularly on the Central Front; and (ii) to agree on the need to improve the mobility, equipment, training, and manning levels of these forces, as you have recommended in your 1966 goals -- beginning with units which are in existence or can be created fairly quickly.

I hope that the Alliance can concentrate on this in the months ahead and that allied agreement and action on these programs will not be delayed in an attempt to secure agreement on more long-term proposals, notably those for nuclear programs additional to MC-70.

I understand the military considerations that have prompted you to seek MRBM's as part of your 1966 force requirements, in order to fulfill the nuclear strike functions now performed by your strike aircraft. I also understand the long lead time necessarily involved in any such program.

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This proposal raises, however, troubling and sensitive political issues. It also raises questions of priority relative to other military tasks. There is, as a result, a substantial difference of opinion within the Alliance as to whether, and if so how, MRBM's should be deployed to NATO forces. Considerable time will be required to resolve that difference one way or another.

I hope that the Alliance can continue to discuss and consider this matter, including the proposal in my Ottawa speech for a truly multilateral sea-borne missile force. A Berlin crisis does not seem the best time, however, for the divisive debate that might be triggered by a crash attempt to resolve this issue quickly -- in time to link it with agreement and action on other NATO force goals. I hope that we can reach agreement on these other goals and press toward their fulfillment with all possible despatch. The MRBM issue should, in the view of this Government, be left for later resolution.


The possibility of a Berlin crisis should bring home to all of us the foresight and wisdom that you have shown in guiding the Alliance toward early force improvements. The Secretary of Defense will be discussing with you the actions that we propose to take, and ask our allies to take, to this end.

I want you to know that you have the full confidence of this Government in these continuing efforts to strengthen and unify the Alliance. I want particularly to commend the views which you expressed on July 7 to the French Chief of Staff, General Olie; they coincide fully with my own. You were wholly right in indicating that the U.S. desire to accord priority to conventional forces should not cause any one to doubt the U.S. will to use nuclear weapons if need be.

I am writing you these views without in any way wanting to interject myself into the chain of command between you and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense, nor to set up a channel of communication outside that chain of command. I felt, however, that the Berlin crisis was of such over-riding importance that it would be useful to pass on my thoughts to you at this time.

Sincerely,

General Lauris Norstad,
Supreme Allied Commander Europe,
Paris, France.



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I-15,442/61

21 July 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY RUSK
SECRETARY McNAMARA
MR. GILPATRIC
GENERAL LEMNITZER

SUBJECT: Meeting with German Minister of Defense

Reproduced copies of my summary of the discussions between Secretary McNamara and German Defense Minister Strauss on 14 July have already been distributed to interested offices within the Departments of Defense and State, and to appropriate U.S. agencies in Europe. As a matter of propriety, the reproduced copies omitted certain critical and personal comments by Mr. Strauss. For your personal information, and in order to complete the official record, these omitted portions are set forth in the attachment hereto. One copy only will be retained in my office and it is recommended that your copies also be handled with due regard to their sensitive nature.

/s/ Paul H. Nitze

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Additions to Report of Strauss-McNamara
Conversations of 14 July 1961 (I-15,423/61)

Page 2, fifth paragraph. Delete period at end of first sentence and add the following:

"... by people who profess to be, or were actually promulgated as being, advisors to the Kennedy Administration. Kissinger, in a slip of the tongue, told Strauss that 'he was obsessed by nuclear weapons'."

Page 4, after first paragraph, insert the following:

"Minister Strauss said he understood we were concerned by reports of his conversation with Kissinger in which he indicated that even if Germans on the other side of the line were being brutally suppressed, he would order German troops to take absolutely no action. What he had had in mind was that our moral and material position in the West was not yet ready for a showdown. What is needed is that we take now the necessary preparatory actions."

Page 7, after fourth paragraph, insert the following:

"Strauss then discussed German relations with France. He said there was no adverse propaganda when the first German brigade went into France for training. They have the best relations in centuries with France. They couldn't, however, take the position of being teachers of France, of giving France advice. France wanted 14 divisions for the European Defense Community. Now they have 1½ divisions, one of which is an Infantry division, their ½ is ½ of an Armored division, the other ½ being outside of Paris. Their equipment is obsolete; only international politeness kept other NATO countries from saying the equipment was museum equipment. The structure of their divisions is a World War I structure. In the Infantry division, two regiments are colored Algerian troops, the other is a white regiment. They are fully occupied in watching each other. The French can do nothing with this division. They can't either take it back to France, send it to Algeria or dissolve it. The Algerians are disloyal and would add to the opposition in France or in Algeria. So the French keep the division in what amounts to a concentration camp in Germany. The Germans have asked the French to concentrate their NATO forces and put them in a position to take part in a forward strategy. They wanted them on the right flank to move into Austria in a crisis. No other nationality can do that job. The Austrians would fight the Italians, it would be unwise to

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7/21/61
FOR HAND TO JFQ

July 21, 1961

Berlin

I. Urgent Matters

1. Access. A decision is needed as to whether we will allow East German paper stamping, so that we can communicate this decision to our allies in the consultation which Foy Kohler leaves on Thursday to undertake. The President might ask the Secretary of State for a recommendation on this point by close of business on Monday. (The Secretary has already made up his mind that he is ready to accept paper stamping, according to Mr. Acheson.)

2. Quiet Approach to the Soviets. The US memorandum to the other three allied powers speaks of the possibility of an early quiet approach to the Soviet leadership. The object of this approach, while the Kremlin is still feeling the effects of our \$3 billion announcement and fearing more of the same, would be to try to work out an understanding with the Soviets before we are both locked into intransigence by a deepening crisis, that the East Germans will maintain present access procedures after a treaty. This proposal has met with approval in the State Department but is all too likely to die of bureaucratic anemia if it is not encouraged. The President might early in the week indicate his interest in this possibility to the Secretary of State, and ask the Secretary to report to him directly from Paris about allied reactions to it.

II. Other Matters

3. [.....] a comprehensive proposed program of preparations for creating turmoil in East Germany. The State Department (notably Chip Bohlen) has serious misgivings as to whether this program does not go too far (i. e., whether the recommended actions might not get out of our control prematurely). Henry Kissinger is following this one. His object will be to get State [.....] to come up with a recommendation to the President as to what should and should not be done in the way of preparations.

4. Long-Term Military Buildup. McNamara and the Chiefs are still wrestling over the amount and composition of such a build-up. The President might indicate his continuing interest in having DOD come up with some proposal for a long-term buildup which focuses on the main need -- expanding the non-nuclear combat forces -- instead of the kind of "balanced"

military

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By MMB NARA, Date 6/20/94

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military buildup the Chiefs are proposing, which would assign only about 10 percent of a \$11 billion program to the ground forces. Such an expression of Presidential interest might be helpful to McNamara in his dealings with the Chiefs.

5. How We Would Fight. The whole question of military courses of action in the event access is blocked needs to be studied more effectively than it has been to date. There are all sorts of problems involved in getting such effective study. For example, the Joint Chiefs now say that they can't study a substantial non-nuclear ground action in Europe until Basic National Security Policy has been revised, since present (Eisenhower) NSC policy prohibits such action. It may be useful to discuss ways and means of getting on with these studies with Secretary McNamara. One possibility would be to charge a select State-DOD group with this task under the leadership of General Taylor. There are some useful precedents for this. The Group might function nominally as a sub-committee of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group. It might remand the more detailed studies to SACEUR. McNamara may have different ideas. An early discussion of the subject with him seems indicated.

6. Basic Political Proposals. State should be asked to come up with concrete proposals as to our basic negotiating positions on Germany and Berlin within at least a month. Since the Secretary of State and EUR will be tied up with consultations for the next two or three weeks, it might be useful to suggest to State that the Policy Planning Council get into the act.

7. Nuclear War

[REDACTED]

7. Nuclear War: How To Make It More Flexible. Paul Nitze suggests that an early discussion between the President and the Chiefs on this issue is necessary. Questionnaires and directives will, he feels, accomplish nothing.

8. Reserves. It might be useful to tell Secretary McNamara that the President will want considerable advance notice before DOD makes any proposal to call up large scale reserves. The Interdepartmental Coordinating Group could then study the political and military pros and cons. Depending on the outcome of that study, the President could indicate to McNamara whether he would be receptive toward the proposal. It would not be good to have the proposal formally made and on the record until the President has decided whether he would be receptive.

McNamara → 9. Arms Control. A task force should be set up to study safeguards against war by miscalculation which could be prepared or adopted during the next six months. Such measures will never be more needed than during a Berlin crisis. This might be put to McCloy as a matter of urgency upon his return to Moscow. Henry Kissinger is interested in the problem and would be a good man to follow up on it from the White House. (There are other Berlin-connected disarmament problems, which will be treated in a separate memorandum.)

What did Bob find? → 10. Custody and Control of Nuclear Weapons in Europe. Against the background of a Berlin crisis, it is essential to strengthen U.S. custody of nukes in Europe, so that they won't go off by themselves under the stress of tension and heavy fighting. This was in one of the recent White House directives to DOD. Secretary McNamara is going to look into this on his current trip to Europe. State is also planning to propose to DOD a joint State-DOD group to come up with needed improvements. It may be useful to keep on reminding McNamara of White House interest in this question and to support the State proposal for a joint State-DOD working group. DOD and JCS have been studying this question since the Acheson report and have so far only succeeded in neutralizing each other.

→ 11. Increased Atlantic Cohesion. A Berlin crisis - with the attendant felt need for greater interdependence - should provide an opportunity for bold moves in this direction. A group has been set up with the State Department to study these possibilities. It might be useful to remind the Secretary of State from time to time of White House interest in the matter.

12. Congressional Consultation. It should be made clear to the Secretary of State that basic responsibility for continuing Congressional consultation on Berlin lies with him. He should undertake such consultation, ask other cabinet officers to do so as appropriate, and propose Presidential action when it is needed.

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Berlin a

July 22, 1961

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Sorensen

I enclose a number of items which may be useful background material for your speech. Perhaps the most significant is Thompson's cable (Tab A). In general, I myself agree strongly with his balance of judgment, and I also choose paragraph 2 of his alternatives. This seems to me to imply that while the President cannot propose a specific negotiating position or forum or date on Tuesday, he can and should indicate not only our willingness to negotiate, but our intent to take the lead in making negotiation possible and fruitful -- a forward-leaning position, in other words.

Henry Kissinger's memo to me of July 21 (Tab B) develops this point helpfully, and touches on another aspect of it that I think is important -- namely, that the question of ways and means of negotiating is worth discussing in at least a general way with the American people. Too few of us understand the difference between merely stating a position and framing a workable process of communication and understanding. We must not let the word "negotiation" become a shibboleth. Our policy is to seek serious understanding without giving away the rights of free men. This we must do in concert with our Allies, and I would agree with the tone of the enclosed story by Murray Marder in today's Post. Marder says that we mean to lean forward on negotiation, and I think the President can usefully indicate that developing a major part of the Secretary's August mission with the major Allied Foreign Ministers.

A further memorandum from Kissinger telephoned this morning (Tab C) offers some language on a point that he thinks is urgent in the light of the documents that we have already sent to our Allies. Here the point is simply to avoid any confusion in our own ranks on the ancient issue of conventional vs. nuclear weapons. Because our build-up is mainly conventional, it seems to him important to make clear that our resolution on Berlin is not limited to such forces. The operative sentence marked "X" in the margin and any alternative language that does the same job will be helpful.

I further enclose a useful outline from Henry Owen (Tab D), much of which will be clear and familiar to you. It nevertheless may be helpful because of his unusually full grasp of what we really have and have not done so far. I like his notion of constructive actions, although I think it may be somewhat more fully developed in Walt Rostow's memorandum of July 20, which I believe you have.

I enclose an interesting possibility which comes out of Hillsman's part of the State Department, from a bright Soviet expert named John Keppel (Tab E). If you can fit it in, it might be useful.

One other point comes to me from a number of sources. If Khrushchev persists, he can certainly have himself a peace treaty with satellites and some party-lining countries joining with him. We therefore do not wish to engage the prestige of the U. S. and of the President in any violent opposition which will make that peace treaty look like a defeat for us. The right course is rather to laugh it off, and to point out as we have before how little it contributes to peace.

I took it from our telephone conversation that we see alike in thinking that this speech should be full of information, and should leave the American people with the feeling that they know where they are and why. To me this indicates a cool tone, a willingness to explain lots of things that are not very dramatic or awe-inspiring in themselves -- it means, in other words, an action version of the report on Vienna. My own sense is that the actions announced will carry much of their own meaning and that, therefore, the President will do well in a quite literal sense to speak softly while he describes his new big stick.

All of this, as usual, is sent on for you to take or leave. I asked the State Department whether there was any additional material that might be helpful to you, and Foy Kohler sent the attached (Tab F) which I have not yet had the chance to read. I understand that the paper clips indicate the points that he thought you might want to have in mind, and so far as I know, you may have all this material already.

I also send an interesting memo from Harlan Cleveland (Tab G). The back half of it is a detailed discussion of Berlin in the United Nations that is not relevant, but the first four pages contain some very thoughtful stuff that might well be useful to you.

McG. B.

7/24/61

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July 24, 1961

Memorandum of discussion in the National Security Council on July 13, 1961

Subject: Berlin

The Secretary of State opened the discussion by pointing out that the Khrushchev timetable is not under our control. We might well find that any estimated date of the crisis was too early or too late.

Secretary Rusk pointed out that the essential point in the Acheson paper was that the U. S. was not currently in a good position to negotiate. If Khrushchev were now willing to protect our basic rights, he would not have moved as he has, and willingness to negotiate, on his part, will depend on appropriate steps from our side. The Secretary recommended a decision to proceed immediately in discussion of economic counter-measures in a three- or four-power group. After discussion on this particular point, the President indicated his desire to have a precise program framed for us to put forward. There was discussion of the balance of payments problem, the commodity problem, and the very large role which European countries must play in any economic sanctions. The problem was referred for definite recommendations to the Department of State, the President indicating also his desire that the Treasury play a major part in this problem.

The Secretary of Defense presented the Defense Department's recommended program (annex B of the study of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group of July 12, 1961). There followed discussion of the desirability of a declaration of national emergency. The Secretary of State indicated his view that such a declaration at this time would have a dangerous sound of mobilization, and quoted from the Acheson paper on the need for keeping early steps in a low key. The Secretary of State proposed as an alternative a Congressional resolution or other action authorizing appropriate military call-ups. The Vice President believed that the response to any such proposal in the Congress would be that the President should take the lead.

Mr. Acheson argued that we must do what is sound and necessary in itself, and not act for the sake of appearances. He believed that if we left the call-up of Reserves to the end, we would not affect Khrushchev's judgment of the shape of the crisis any more than we could do so by dropping bombs after he had forced the issue to the limit. He believed that not much later than August we should wish to begin training soldiers, though

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of course they would not all be called up at once. The Secretary of State agreed that the training process should not be left until too late.

There was discussion of the relation of any military preparation to our Allies, and the President requested preparation of a report showing what contribution we would expect from them, to match our own new efforts.

The Vice President asked whether there was provision for procurement of additional aircraft in the submission of the Department of Defense. The Secretary of Defense answered in the negative and explained that the new airplanes could not be obtained in a short time, and that this program was designed to provide immediately needed new strength.

It was agreed that the impact of the proposed defense program would require a review of other Administration programs and a study of such matters as stand-by controls and new taxes. These questions were to be reviewed by the Treasury Department, the Council of Economic Advisers, and the Special Counsel to the President.

There was further discussion in which Mr. Acheson made clear his belief that the President should decide to support a full program of decisive action. The Vice President agreed. Others felt that we should not take action now which might jeopardize the authorization and appropriation for the foreign aid program. The Secretary of State remarked that it will be a great victory for Khrushchev if by a memorandum and a few speeches he could weaken the foreign aid program.

There was no clear decision on these matters, and it was agreed that alternative programs, at different levels of present expenditure, should be refined for further discussion at the next meeting.

In a smaller meeting with the Steering Group after the NSC meeting, there was discussion of a series of four alternatives: The Vice President favored alternative 1. The Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State preferred alternative 2, and General Taylor preferred alternative 3. The President did not make a choice, nor did the meeting lead to any clear consensus on the "political scenario." The President did answer plainly the statement of the Secretary of State that there are two things which matter: our presence in Berlin, and our access to Berlin.

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REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVE

7/27/61

July 27, 1961

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
July 27, 1961 -- 4:00 PM

Others present: General Lemnitzer
General Decker
Vice Admiral Russell
General LeMay
General Shoup
General Clifton

General Lemnitzer opened the discussion with a briefing on what happened on the Hill. He said that the greatest concern with the Senate Committee was the amount of money it was going to cost and how we are going to call up the reserves. Senator Russell hoped that our first emphasis could be on new people via the draft rather than reserves, and indicated that a great concern was to prevent a repetition of what happened during ^{the} ~~the~~ ^{War} ~~where~~ they called up men first who had served in World War II. The Chiefs explained that they had agreed with Secretary McNamara to do their best to first call back those who had served only six months and then those who had served only two years before calling up reservists who had served in World War II or Korea. They pointed out it would be the toughest problem for the Army. They also indicated that this would not in all cases prevail, because certain key

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- 2 -

specialists had to be called up to make a balanced force who may have already served some time beyond the two-year limit.

The Committee also asked whether the Air National Guard and Army National Guard units had been selected for callup. The answer from Secretary McNamara and General Lemnitzer ^{to the Committee} was negative.

The Committee made an additional point that they ought to try ^{not} to call up reservists for a longer period than it takes to train a man.

The Committee also was curious about the amount of modern aircraft in the Air National Guard.

General LeMay gave a considerable dissertation on the procurement of modern aircraft and pointed out the advantages and disadvantages of pitting our F-86s ^(and F-105s) (which the National Guard has) against the MIG-17 and MIG-19. The altitude problem is the toughest one. General LeMay also discussed the problem of delivery of modern aircraft, stating that the regular schedule is about fifteen per month. He pointed out to the President that we had only allocated the money to items that could be delivered during this fiscal year. However, the production lines are running and we could expedite the fifteen per month figure and procure the same quantity in fewer months. In other words, all the aircraft we anticipate getting in the next eighteen months might be delivered in twelve to fourteen months, but then there would be a blank space and it would be the

TOP SECRET

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- 3 -

nineteenth month before a stepped-up flow would operate.

General Lemnitzer then continued the discussion of the Committee reaction and stated that they had been very greatly concerned about the question of when the President might use nuclear weapons if we actually got into war. They also wanted to know how long we could fight a conventional war prior to ^{employing} ~~going into~~ nuclear weapons with the buildup now being anticipated and asked for. It was the sense of the Committee that we must prove our willingness and agree to use nuclear weapons if this crisis continues. They had the feeling that our de-emphasis on nuclear weapons might encourage Premier Khrushchey to think that we would not be willing and able to use nuclear weapons, and, consequently, they urged the Administration to hold this line firmly so that Mr. Khrushchey might not misinterpret our conventional buildup.

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The President then talked about the difficulty in Central Europe with a conventional war and stated that he felt that the critical point is to be able to use nuclear weapons at a crucial moment before they use them. He inquired as to our capabilities of making such a decision without letting the enemy know that we are about to do it.

General LeMay first responded to this inquiry with a description of when and how SAC could be used and the amount of warning time under various conditions that the Soviet Union could derive from our

TOP SECRET

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- 4 -

attack approach. The President then asked several questions about the Soviet capability to detect and to react.

There was a further discussion of the command and control centers which now exist especially in regard to the NATO use of nuclear weapons. General LeMay pointed out during this discussion that there is a SAC Airborne Command post which could be used in case of disaster and Admiral Russell pointed out that the Navy has a Command Post afloat *in the North*.

During this latter discussion the President directed that we get out all the letters of agreement with our allies, especially the British, the French, and the Canadians, to our consulting them before a nuclear attack is launched.

During this discussion, General LeMay told the President that we could take off from the bases in Spain without any previous notification, but all the rest had strings on them, one kind and another.

The President continued the discussion with the question: If we build up our forces and then we decide to work over Cuba, what would be the speed of our attack, and how much could it be concealed?

General LeMay said that a cover plan is essential and would be our best bet. There ensued a discussion of various cover plans, that would be useful, including regular maneuvers.

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- 5 -

Admiral Russell said that one problem is that the embarkation of Marines is pretty much of a giveaway and General Lemay added that in this necessity for surprise the airborne attack is best.

There was a lengthy discussion of our potential for ^{Operation Against} Cuba and the strong point made by the President that we must consider Cuba and Berlin together, not separately.

The discussion then reverted to the briefing of the Committee, but General Lemaitzer stated that the sense of the Committee was not to call reserves like we did in ^{the} Korea ^{War}. General Lemay added that the Committee members did not want us to call men who have already been in one war.

General Lemay, General Decker and General Shoup then had a discussion concerning the Air Force National Guard, the Army National Guard, and reserves and the ready reserves of the Marine Corps, stating that these units were filled with men who really want to fight if there is trouble and who have kept in touch with the military all these years with the firm conviction and full knowledge that if we got into any trouble they would be the first to come. They made this point that it contradicted the feeling of the Committee to a certain degree, but that it probably could be worked out if we are careful.

The President then raised the point about the tactical use of our allied forces and our buildup and the kind of tactical air support that we might expect in Europe from our allies.

TOP SECRET

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NARS, Date 5-2-94

TOP SECRET

- 6 -

Admiral Russell, in response to a question, indicated that there were forty destroyer units that ^would be called up shortly and eighteen ASW squadrons out of one hundred squadrons available in the reserve which would have to be called shortly, and that a lot of men in these units had fought before.

General Lemnitzer then discussed the Committee reaction, stating that they felt the reaction of our allies would be a very big point of concern and consideration. He added that Defense Minister Strauss of Germany was fully aware that twelve months ^{of active} duty was not enough and would probably raise that shortly.

(General Lemnitzer stated that)
The Committee on the Hill ^{are} was also very greatly concerned about the return of our dependents from overseas in the near future, and the Chiefs discussed both the pros and cons of the advantages and disadvantages and stated that the feeling on this point was about evenly divided.

They then brought out the point that General Norstad ^{stated} strongly that it would be a mistake to move the dependents now, and when the President raised the question about the dependents leaving Berlin, the response was made that there was a great fear on Norstad's part that if the dependents left Berlin we would possibly precipitate an exodus of ^{West Berliners} German people, which would be most damaging both politically and morale-wise at this early point in the

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- 7 -

proceedings. The Chiefs also pointed out that if we moved the dependents from Berlin we would have to move a lot of dependents from the other Easternmost portions of Germany which are in as much danger. They reassured the President, however, that they would keep this particular problem under constant study and reassured him that there are very complete and adequate plans for *evacuating* the families in the forward areas.

General Lemnitzer then pointed out that the program on Capitol Hill was pretty well set, but that civil defense didn't get much play in the hearing. The President asked some specific questions and General *Lemnitzer* ~~Lemay~~ said the NIKE-ZEUS was not mentioned, but that Senator Symington had made quite a point about manned bombers. There had been some discussion of the B-70, but the greatest concern in the Committee was the adequacy and modernization of our fighter bomber force.

One additional point from the Committee was that they feel we should take stronger measures to "fire up our production lines" for the long pull even though we may not be taking much end product from these production lines at the moment. The President then asked more about Cuba, and General Lemnitzer said, in substance, that there had been *increases in Cuban* ~~no~~ military forces ~~in Cuba~~ recently that we knew about and that in the July 26 celebration the military was

TOP SECRET

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- 8 -

not given the emphasis that one might expect. There was a fly-by of six MIG-15s and there is an estimate that the Cubans have about ten MIGs operational and quite a few more in boxes. In the last thirty days, General Lemnitzer said, there have been seven to nine Soviet tankers and eight to twelve Soviet dry cargo ships unloaded in Cuba. We believe that most of the load of the cargo ships was military equipment, to include a lot of wheeled vehicles (trucks) and a good deal of electronic and communications equipment.

The President raised the question of our continuing reconnaissance and General Lemnitzer said that so far we have no basis to believe that they have established any missile bases ^(in Cuba). However, General Lemnitzer said they have been standardizing ^(military) ~~installations~~ with supporting artillery and they now have about 200,000 men in these units. He reported that in the Escambray Mountains the ~~forces are now reduced considerably~~ ^{as the result of a decrease in guerrilla activity, so that a} and that the bulk of the activity in Cuba is small unit training. He told the President that we are quite surprised at the progress that the Cuban army training is making -- they are doing quite well.

General Lemnitzer then lead a discussion of Cuban military plans of our own, stating that six months ago we had a relatively ~~small force in mind, but that now~~ ^{as a result of the build-up of Cuban forces recently} ~~small force in mind, but that now~~ ^{CINCLANT} has a rather extensive plan and it is being currently reviewed in the JCS. (For purposes of security, I am not listing the information that the JCS gave the President.)

TOP SECRET

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The JCS indicated⁹ that if they had
~~They put forth the idea to the President that if he gave the~~
 the authority to have frequent alerts exercises
~~go ahead to have some practice that the Air Force and the Army~~
 and maneuvers just prior to implementing
~~and the Marine Corps could plan and execute a weekly drill~~
 any decision on Cuba
~~to move airborne divisions and a weekly drill to move two-thirds of~~
~~a Marine Division~~ that if they did this long enough and habitually
 enough, it would be the best cover plan. *we could devise it*
~~at that time~~

The President directed that the Joint Chiefs continue to review
 the plans now, and a lengthy discussion of Cuba and its problems in
 relation to Berlin ensued.

General Lemnitzer then reported that the Joint Chiefs had been
 reviewing our overall National Security Council policies in an effort
 to derive a new *statement of* ~~set of paragraphs or a new section, on our related~~
 military policy. He pointed out that the Joint Chiefs had not confined
 themselves to the military policy section, but had studied and commented
 upon the overall NSC policies, but had paid the most attention to the
 military section. He said that this recently completed review had
 been forwarded to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary Defense
 had Mr. Gilpatric and Mr. Nitze both going over it and coming up
 with a *paper* of their own, *which included portions of the JCS*
~~including comments on the JCS action~~
paper described above.

The President directed that they discuss this more completely
 at their next meeting, and, in the meantime, he would probably get a

TOP SECRET

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- 10 -

look at the McNamara paper too. *(Note. This matter has been deferred as the result of the developments on the Berlin situation)*
The President then discussed briefly the Foreign Ministers

meeting taking place August 4-8 in Paris and the possibility of having the Foreign Ministers call the Defense Ministers for supporting action on the Berlin contingency planning. General Lemnitzer pointed out that quite often the Foreign Ministers would call the Defense Ministers into conference and usually each Defense Minister was accompanied by one of his Chiefs of Staff. General Lemnitzer reported to the President that the British have already sent one of their foremost planners over to SHAPE to work on ~~this particular problem~~ *"Live Oak" planning* in SHAPE Headquarters.

He
~~They~~ reported to the President that there is no meeting of Defense Ministers set at this time and the President then directed that he be reminded to discuss this point with Secretary McNamara and Secretary Rusk. He also stated later in the conference that he wanted to discuss with Mr. McNamara and Mr. Rusk, not only the possible meeting of Defense Ministers, but also the potential NATO assistance that we could expect for a Berlin airlift, especially in tactical air support.

The President then inquired if the Standing Committee of NATO has indicated any reaction about the U.S. approach to the present problem. General Lemnitzer stated that it was a little early to get their reaction, *but we would obtain further information as the planning proceeds,* ~~but that he would talk up with the Standing Group and the Military Committee which sits in Washington, some of the points~~

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- 11 -

~~of our present planning and especially ask them about tactical
support for the Berlin activity.~~

In concluding the meeting, the President asked to be reminded about several questions which are listed in the attached memorandum of notes.

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July 27, 1961

Notes for the President from the Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting,
July 27, 1961

To discuss with Secretary McNamara and Secretary Rusk:

a. The possibility of a meeting of NATO Defense Ministers at or about the time of the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting to go over the military aspects of the crisis planning.

b. Look into the assistance we might expect from NATO in a Berlin airlift situation, i.e. how much airlift they will offer and what kind of technical airlift protection?

✓ Whose responsibility is it to keep up the stocks in Berlin? (General Lemnitzer says that "he is pulling it all together.") A status report is needed from Secretary McNamara.

✓ Check up on report of the technical means the Soviets can use to block our airlift. Get an estimate of our chances of a successful airlift from a technical viewpoint.

✓ What progress are we making in bringing Cubans into the Army (and Marine Corps)? How many are we getting? What are the plans for bringing them together in case the situation arose where they would be more effective than being scattered throughout the Army?

✓ Is the Army and the Marine Corps making any particular effort to keep our Cuban recruits in units in the Eastern U.S.?

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WASHINGTON

July 31, 1961

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Minutes of Meeting of Inter-Departmental Coordinating Group on
Berlin, July 26, 1961, 5:15 p.m.

Present: The President, the Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Acheson, Mr. Kohler, Mr. Nitze, Under Secretary Fowler, Mr. Hillenbrandt, Mr. Owen, Mr. Bundy.

The President opened the meeting by asking about progress on our negotiating position. The Secretary responded saying that timing was a major problem. Should we propose a meeting before the 22nd Congress? The Germans might not approve, and he thought the topic should be one for discussion in the Paris working sessions.

The Secretary asked if Mr. Acheson had supplementary comments. Mr. Acheson said the problem was tough. He would advise against calling a peace conference, since that would bring too many countries into the act. He also believed that it would be wrong at this stage to go to the United Nations.

Mr. Acheson believed that the outlines of any proposal would amount to a dressed-up form of the status quo, that such a dressed-up status quo might eventually include a four-nation agreement that they are not going to fight over Berlin, perhaps endorsed by NATO and by the members of the Warsaw Pact. (This endorsement would give a certain indirect role to the DDR.) At a later stage in the negotiations, Mr. Acheson said later, we might go a little further. (1) there could be a discouragement of movements of population distinct from acts of genuine political refugee; (2) there might be new trade arrangements; (3) we might give assurances on the Oder-Neisse boundary.

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In further discussion of timing, the Secretary and Mr. Acheson agreed that sometime after the German election but before the 22nd Congress, the United States should propose a conference to convene after the 22nd Congress.

The Department is also completing its White Paper on Berlin. The President asked again about a plebiscite in West Berlin, and the Secretary of State said the matter was under discussion in the Department of State.

Discussion then turned to the "paper stamping" issue. Mr. Kohl presented the elements of the argument developed in this memorandum on the subject. The President indicated his own preference for the opposite position, stated in Mr. Acheson's memorandum (attached). Mr. Nitze indicated that the Defense Department preferred Mr. Acheson's position, on the practical ground that it allowed for

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later decision on military action. It emerged from discussion that Mr. Acheson's recommendation is very close to to the actual position of the U.S. in 1959 (a point which will be checked further). In Mr. Acheson's view, we should simply insist that there be no change in present procedures. We could hold to this line sharply, but under the procedures currently approved and supported by Mr. Kohler, we should be making a change, in refusing to accept an act of stamping which we had accepted before. Yet we should be doing this for a reason that we already admitted as invalid back in 1959. Mr. Kohler later remarked that after all the fundamental change here is the Soviet withdrawal from participation in the four-power occupation, but Mr. Acheson's argument won the President's approval. Upon inquiry, the President was informed that the act of paper stamping is not in fact an act of approval, but rather one of bureaucratic registration of times of entry and departure, and on this understanding he thought that it would not make sense for us to sustain a position of refusing to permit such stamping.

Mr. Acheson believed that if this new U.S. position were made clear in advance, there would be no question of a concession and the earlier position would simply disappear. Both he and Mr. Nitze were sure that the United Kingdom would not hold to the current position, and the President agreed that we could not press the British on this point.

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The decision, then, was to change the current United States position in the course of appropriately managed diplomatic discussions, terminating in the meeting of the Foreign Secretaries; the new decision would be allowed to become public, or at least known to the Soviets,

McGeorge Bundy

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August 1, 1961

NOTES ON CONVERSATION WITH
DEFENSE MINISTER FRANZ JOSEF STRAUSS
At Mr. Paul Nitze's place in Southern Maryland
Saturday and Sunday, July 29 and 30, 1961

The conversations reported here took place on Saturday afternoon and evening and Sunday morning. During some of the time I was alone with Herr Strauss; at other times my wife and I were alone with him; at other times Mr. Nitze and I talked with him; and at still other times Mr. Nitze, Mrs. Acheson, and Mrs. Paepke (Mr. Nitze's sister) were present. What follows does not purport to be the whole conversation. Some of it I have forgotten. Some of it between Mr. Nitze and Herr Strauss was on technical matters of weaponry, to which I frankly did not listen. The following probably represents the highlights.

Portugal. Herr Strauss and I were talking alone on Saturday afternoon. He mentioned that he recently had been in Lisbon, where he had had several talks with Salazar. He said that the Defense Ministry was doing considerable business with Portugal. Two factories in Portugal were occupied exclusively with orders for the German

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By CS

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- 2 -



army -- ammunition and perhaps small arms. The Germans were delivering some trucks, machine guns, etc., for a division which the Portuguese were to have ready under NATO arrangements some time after M Day.

Before going to Portugal, Strauss had discussed the Portuguese Angola situation with the Chancellor and von Brentano.

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Alleged German lack of knowledge regarding nuclear warheads available to their troops. Chatting before dinner, Strauss remarked that, as Defense Minister, he was in the embarrassing position of not knowing the number of nuclear weapons or their technical aspects which might be available to German troops in case of war. When I said that I thought this was a highly misleading statement, he said he was aware I had said as much to the Chancellor. When I brought out that he had been given the approximate figure for planning his operations and a description of the capabilities of the weapons and had the delivery systems, he agreed to this. He said also that he agreed that the approximate figures


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- 4 -

were very close to the actual ones. Mr. Nitze then drew from him the admission that what he meant by the statement he had made a few minutes before and the one which he had made earlier in the year to the Chancellor was that he had not counted, inspected, and did not have the scientific data about the warheads. While continuing to insist that he should have this information, he did not deny that his statement was misleading.

This exchange gave Mr. Nitze the opportunity to tell Strauss that it was essential for him to have greater trust in his Allies,



Strauss's conception of Europe's future. In order to get some idea of his thinking beyond the strictly military field, I asked him later in the evening to assume that in a few years fate made him Chancellor and to

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- 5 -

tell us what sort of a Europe he would try to create. To my surprise, he seized eagerly on this question and with enthusiasm and every appearance of conviction he drew a picture of a united Europe, very much along the lines of the Chancellor's policy, with great emphasis on a continued and close relationship with North America. I had expected a much greater emphasis on German nationalism and the recovery of the lost provinces. But all of this appeared quite subordinated to the main purpose just mentioned.

Military preparations for a Berlin crisis.

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During the evening we picked up the conversation which had been begun at Blair House some weeks ago on German contribution to preparations for a Berlin crisis. The point which had caused trouble in the earlier conversations seemed to have disappeared. This was that the initiative in regard to access to Berlin lay with the three occupying powers. This now seemed to be assumed by him to be a formal matter. He quite readily conceded that it was quite essential to the allied position that both Germany and France should be wholeheartedly in favor of a vigorous attitude. He also did not bridle at the idea

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- 6 -

that, in view of the problems of the French and the British, the major burden would fall upon Germany and the United States. We asked him to discuss in a purely objective way the nature of a command structure, both military and political. He apparently had given very little thought to this. But, after some questioning and analysis, he found himself moving to the position that

but later, while never accepting the idea, he seemed unable to think of any alternative and said that he would like to ponder this whole matter.

A ground operation in East Germany. The talk then moved to what should be done to meet an East German stopping of access to Berlin. All the usual non-military sanctions were mentioned and Strauss himself spoke of the possibility of naval action to close the Baltic and the Black Sea. He seemed also to accept the view that, if these efforts should be unsuccessful, he was not proposing

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- 7 -

2 59
the use of nuclear weapons. However, when it was suggested that the alternative might be a fairly substantial ground operation for the purpose of indicating that, if continued, this might result in nuclear war, he became very agitated and spoke most emphatically and at some length against it. He ended up by saying that, rather than adopt this course, he would be in favor of evacuation of the whole population of Berlin. Upon this note, and it then being after midnight, Mr. Nitze thought it was time to end the evening, whereupon all retired.

The next morning Strauss was very late for breakfast. Everybody else being busy, I sat with him and was told that he had lain awake for a long time thinking about our conversation. When he finished breakfast, he and I went off and talked for a long time together, being later joined by Mr. Nitze.

2 59
He referred to his closing remark the previous evening, saying that he had been worried about having given a very false impression. [He did not mean that Berlin was not worth fighting for; nor did he mean that the city should be evacuated rather than be the cause of war, but rather that he did not think the West was ready. When asked when it would be ready, he thought that it

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


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would take three years of vigorous effort. I then asked what his proposal would be if the crisis came in the meantime. Would he propose to take Khrushchev's terms? He said no; but that he thought lesser measures might be effective, mentioning sanctions and perhaps naval measures. I said that everyone hoped that, but my question went further and asked for his proposal upon the assumption that the milder measures were not productive or that such measures as the naval blockade might precipitate military action by the Soviets. Surely, we must anticipate all contingencies and either act or not act depending upon our state of preparation for the next step.



He agreed with this, and then tried to slide off the point by saying that, surely, we should not engage in war with the Soviet Union merely to maintain the status quo; we should have an objective beyond this. When I pointed out that war was a slippery term and that a ground action might be contemplated for the purpose of causing the Soviets to break off and resume the status quo, he said that at this time the West could not win a conventional war in East Germany. When I agreed with this and pointed out that it was not the proposal, but

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- 9 -

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that the proposal was rather to face the Soviets with a return to the status quo or with the grave danger of escalation to nuclear war, he said that he must think about the matter more deeply.

We ended by my suggesting to him again that, in thinking about the matter, he must face realistically the possibility of accepting Khrushchev's terms or of running the danger of nuclear war and that, if he was prepared to do the latter, he should be prepared to do something less than the latter in the hope of avoiding the latter, unless he believed that such a step would be a disadvantage to us should we be forced to nuclear war. I had the impression that this syllogism was new to him and puzzled him deeply.



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A POLITICAL PROGRAM

PREFACE

Acheson
My earlier report on Berlin, dated June 28, 1961 gave Khrushchev's purposes in pressing to a 1961 year-end crisis his Berlin demands of November, 1958, as:

- oblivious to political nuclear course*
1. To stabilize the regime in East Germany and prepare the way for the eventual recognition of the East German regime;
 2. To legalize the Eastern frontiers of Germany;
 3. To neutralize Berlin as a first step and prepare for its eventual take-over by the GDR;
 4. To weaken if not break up the NATO alliance; and,
 5. To discredit the United States or at least seriously damage our prestige.

important, my word for the 1948-49!
The paper further stated that Khrushchev was now going further than the USSR had ventured since 1948, because he believed that the U.S.A. would not use nuclear weapons to stop him, and could not do so otherwise. The paper suggested a method of altering this belief and inducing in the Kremlin a frame of mind conducive to a settlement conformable to the interests of the U.S.A. and its allies. Steps are under way to attain the capabilities necessary to do this.

The political means and end of this endeavor are outlined here.

First, a word as to the end. The immediate end is simple. Since the world position of the U.S.A., the integrity

of NATO

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BY *MSZ* NARS, DATE *6-10-77*

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- 2 -

of NATO, and the future of Germany and, perhaps, of Europe are drawn in issue by Khrushchev's demands, the immediate purpose of the U.S.A. is to frustrate them. Another end of very great importance is to do this without precipitating nuclear war.

The more distant end is the one which this Government has sought in Europe since the late 1940s. It is to begin the stabilization of the free world by the stabilization of Europe. This stabilization should ultimately involve (i) the de-Sovietization of East Germany; (ii) the countries of Eastern Europe regaining a substantial national identity; (iii) limiting armaments so that the possibility of successful offensive action, either way, in Europe will be greatly reduced.

This is a long-term aim; there is no sensible short-cut. But progress toward this long-term aim may be facilitated if we can (i) use the Berlin crisis to develop and put forward sensible proposals regarding Germany and European security (ii) obtain, at the conclusion of that crisis, an acceptance and stabilization of the status quo in Berlin, without sacrifice of Allied rights, with perhaps some machinery for continuing negotiations about Germany and European security. Unless Khrushchev is foolish enough to commit his prestige to forcing the allies to accept his terms, he ought not to find this impossible. We probably cannot attain more, i.e., force him to accept something which is worse for him than the status quo, without war. We should not give him more, i.e., something which would be worse for us than the status quo, "to save his face." As will be seen the status quo can be garnished without sacrifice, if that seems necessary, at the proper time.

Second, a general word about political means in reaching the end just outlined.

Means should be adjusted to the various periods into which the Berlin operation seems likely to fall. While each will merge into the one following it, three phases with distinctive characteristics seem probable:

Phase I:

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Phase I: The phase of preliminary jockeying until after the German elections. During this time a forthcoming posture toward negotiations is required, without translating this posture into such specific and novel proposals as would cause alarm and division in Germany. During this period a vigorous effort should be made to lay our case regarding Berlin before the world and to concert with our allies about the specific political steps that will be required after the German elections. A Western call for a Foreign Ministers' Conference will be necessary during this Phase.

Phase II: The phase of open and formal negotiation, between the German elections and the conclusion of any peace treaty between the Soviet Union and East Germany. For the start of this phase what is needed is a counter proposal to Khrushchev's proposed conference for treaties with either one or both of the two Germanys. The essentials of the counter proposal are that:

- (a) as put forward, it should make no major concessions;
- (b) it should have something of novelty and more of appeal to allied and neutral opinion; and
- (c) it should be capable of being added to later on if the USSR appears willing to negotiate in earnest.

Specific suggestions are made in Section II of this paper as to what the content of this counter-proposal should be and as to how it might be expanded, as the negotiations progress, so as to provide a basis for agreement.

Phase III: The period following the signing of a peace treaty between the USSR and the GDR, if this occurs. In the event an agreement safeguarding the Western position

in Berlin

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- 4 -

in Berlin has already been achieved, this Phase can be viewed with some equanimity. If not, this Phase will be a dangerous one and the political keynote should be calm constancy - neither retreating under pressure from the bedrock positions which we will have previously developed nor increasing our demands on account of heightened tensions. Such a firm and consistent political posture will hold the best chance of achieving a peaceful settlement in this Phase.

These general principles are given body in succeeding sections of this paper.

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PHASE I: UNTIL THE GERMAN ELECTIONS

1. Propaganda. This is the time to launch our propaganda campaign regarding Berlin with vigor and effect. If we can move free world opinion to our side, the Soviets will be less likely to expect us to be inhibited by that opinion in resisting their pressures, and they will reckon the political costs of those pressures in determining their future actions. The themes of our propaganda campaign should be simple:

First, Freedom: In the name of creating a Free City, the Soviets are trying to deprive two million West Berliners of the freedom they already possess.

Second, Peace: In the name of creating a peace treaty with Germany, they are threatening the peace that already abounds in Germany.

Third, the Defaulting Trustee: World War II left the Four Powers as trustees of Germany and Berlin. The three Western powers have fulfilled the terms of the trust; the Soviet Union has not only defaulted on those terms but has absconded with the assets.

Fourth, Self-Determination: The principle of self-determination is basically what stands between the Soviets and ourselves. We want the people of Berlin and Germany to have the right of self-determination. They don't.

We have not even begun to exploit those themes.

Imagine what the Communists would do to damage our position in every part of the world, if we mounted as bald and cynical an aggression as they are now undertaking against Berlin. We could expect "save-Berlin" committees to spring up in many countries. Resolutions demanding justice for Berlin would converge on us. Demonstrations

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against U. S. Embassies in many countries could be expected. Delegations from all sorts of legal and humanitarian organizations would be sent to Berlin, and their reports on the threat to freedom would be widely publicized. It is probable that such a campaign would weaken our alliances and have a real impact on uncommitted opinion throughout the world.

We can hardly be said to have risen to the opportunity which the Communists have thus presented us.

This may be due, in part, to the fact that we have tried to exploit it with the normal resources of the government. They are not adequate to the task. Unusual measures are required in this, as in most other fields of Berlin planning.

There is at present, for example, no person of eminence in the Government whose only task is to arouse the world to Soviet iniquity regarding Berlin and who seeks to spur new and unorthodox activities of the Government to this end. We recommend that such a person be appointed as a special assistant to the Secretary of State. He should have a flair for propaganda and considerable background in the tangled problem of Berlin. Such a person is the late Assistant Secretary for Policy Planning, Gerard C. Smith.

2. Concerting with our Allies. Phase I is also the time for agreement with our allies on the moves following the German elections. Such moves are suggested later in this paper. No time should be lost in agreeing on them with our allies.

The first proposal is the calling of a Four Power Foreign Ministers' Conference to convene in October or November. The call should be made in time to avoid discussing Berlin in the UN General Assembly which opens September 19. UN consideration of the issue would not be in our interest at this stage. The mere fact of that consideration would slow Western

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- 3 -

military preparations and inhibit serious political moves. To keep the Berlin issue out of the UN, a Four Power negotiation should be pending before the GA convenes. A Western proposal for such negotiation before the German elections would be more likely to strengthen than weaken the Chancellor's position, provided we do not go into premature public detail about the proposals to be advanced at the Conference.

In proposing a Four Power Conference, the Four Powers should suggest that it be so constituted, in view of the gravity of the occasion, as to be an effective forum for negotiation, rather than propaganda. They should, therefore, propose that its sessions be attended only by each Foreign Minister and one adviser. As a fall-back, they might be prepared to accept the 1959 Geneva position - a great, claqué of attendants, including West and East German "advisers" - on the understanding that the serious business of the Conference would be handled in more restricted sessions.

3. The International Court of Justice. We should make no further proposals to submit our right to be in Berlin - and to stay there - to the World Court. This proposal does not make the same impression abroad as it does in the United States. Many Americans are in the grip of the illusion inherent in the American Bar Association slogan "World peace through world law". No one else is; and we really do not believe it, either. Vital issues are political issues and are not judiciable. As we shall see, there is no "law" on these subjects; and no nation will accept third party adjudication - in effect arbitration - on matters affecting their world position and/or their vital interests. Nehru would not arbitrate Kashmir; or Sukarno, West New Guinea; or Nasser or Eden, Suez; or de Gaulle or the FLN, Algerian independence or their claims to the Sahara; or Khrushchev, Berlin. For us to do so means to the world that if the Court should take jurisdiction and decide that we had no rights in Berlin, we would be willing to accept the decision.

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This, in turn, means to others that we cannot care very much one way or the other.

To have made the challenge once gets out of the proposal any good there is in it. To push it further will expose its phoney aspect. The Court would not accept jurisdiction on our request over Soviet objection. An advisory opinion could only be obtained, if at all, on the request of the Security Council, where the USSR would veto it; or, of the General Assembly, where the requisite majority would be improbable, if the Communist bloc objected and if all the Afro-Asians and Latinos saw, as they would, the implications for them in a court decision being obtainable on some of their shenanigans - Castro's, for instance.

Finally, when we talk about our "legal" rights in Berlin - and when the Russians talk about the "legal" effect of their proposed treaty on our "legal" claims, neither of us mean that there are any accepted rules or judicial decisions applicable to the issues raised. What we are doing is to gild our positions with an ethos derived from very general moral principles which have affected legal doctrines. On our side, the gilt is the morally binding effect of agreements. On the Russian side the gilt is that the moral effect of an agreement is affected by time and changed conditions--for instance, upon restrictive covenants not to sell land to persons of color. No "law" determines which of these moral values shall triumph in a specific case.

In the case of Berlin to stress our willingness to accept judge-made law would be either a sign of indifference or a fraud.

4. Quiet Approach to Soviets. Paragraph 10 of the "Memorandum on Measures for Dealing with the Berlin Situation" which was given to the British, French, and German Ambassadors on July 21 suggests the value of an early, informal, and quiet talk with some Soviet official to warn of the dangers of rigid positions, and suggests the advantage of keeping

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open opportunities to maintain the status quo.

This approach should be made toward the end of the first phase, or the beginning of the second phase, before the Soviets are locked into courses which will be difficult for them to reverse.

We should use a special channel for this purpose, to emphasize the gravity of the matter and to keep the approach out of the normal line of diplomatic fire. This tactic was successfully used in the talks with Malik (then Soviet representative to the UN) which led to ending of the Berlin blockade and to armistice negotiations in Korea.

For instance, Mr. Bohlen might speak to a representative of the Soviet Government along these lines: "We are strengthening our position against the contingency of trouble over Berlin, will continue to do so as the crisis deepens. Do not doubt that our most vital interests and prestige are engaged. But do not doubt also that this course of action is not of our making. It is not we who are attempting to change an existing peaceful situation. Whenever the Soviet Government wishes to end the crisis which it has created, we are prepared to make this possible."

We should go no further unless the Soviet Government responds constructively. If it should do so, we should accept reciprocal Western and Communist declarations that existing access procedures should be maintained after a peace treaty, regardless of who performs them. This is the essence of what has come to be known as "Solution C."

It is barely possible that the Soviets might wish to end the crisis in this way soon. It is more likely that they would not. Even so, the approach would have been useful, since the Soviets would know that serious talks were open to them as the crisis deepened. It is essential that this approach should have all the appearance of informality and privacy, and should thus be kept absolutely secret - even from our allies.

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- 6 -

PHASE II: PERIOD BETWEEN GERMAN
ELECTIONS AND A PEACE TREATY

1. Four Power Foreign Ministers' Conference. The agenda for a Foreign Ministers' Conference should be brief and non-controversial, e.g., "a peaceful settlement of the questions of Germany and Berlin." Our opening stance at this Conference should meet three requirements:

- (a) It should not give away anything of value.
- (b) It should have sufficient of the novel to draw favorable comment in the free world.
- (c) It should be susceptible of later expansion or contraction, so as to serve as a basis for serious negotiations - if these become possible.

2. Western Peace Plan. These requirements would be best met by changes in three major aspects of the Western Peace Plan:

(a) Berlin: The present proposal for an all-Berlin solution in Stage I should be replaced by a more realistic Berlin proposal: The Four Powers declare that they will maintain the status quo in Berlin pending reunification. In the meantime, Berlin would be the headquarters of the Mixed Committee and the all-German Assembly called for in the Peace Plan.

(b) Mixed German Committee: The functions of the Mixed German Committee, which is designed to promote all-German contacts and unity, should be expanded to include the promotion of mutually beneficial trade and credits between the two parts of Germany, with a clear implication that this would involve increased

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West German credits to the GDR. Given the present parlous state of East Germany, this would seem a generous and appealing gesture by the West, and might help to slow down the flow of refugees. In addition, the Peace Plan's existing provision that alternative electoral laws must be submitted by the Mixed Committee to the German people for vote after a period of one year, if the Committee cannot agree on a single law during this period, should be deleted; leaving only the provision that if the Mixed Committee cannot agree on a single law in thirty months the Four Powers should then determine its disposition. This would somewhat extend the period within which the Mixed Committee would be a forum for serious negotiation and discussion between West and East German officials, and pave the way for the further extension contemplated by Ambassador Thompson. (See paragraph 4, below).

(c) European Security: The disarmament and European security provisions of the Western Peace Plan are out of date. They should be replaced by a proposal to create a Standing Four Power Commission (with German advisers, if necessary), which would negotiate about arrangements to maintain security and to safeguard against surprise attack in Europe. These arrangements would come into force at appropriate stages of the Peace Plan, as might be agreed in the Four Power Commission. In making this proposal, we would suggest immediate conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the Four Powers. Considerable emphasis would be placed on this suggestion: Europe is faced with a clear threat of war over the threat of a unilateral change in the status of Berlin; the first item of business is to dispose of these two threats. The non-aggression pact would be co-terminous with and contingent on the Berlin arrangement proposed under (a), above. Upon German unity, it would be replaced by more permanent security

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arrangements agreed to in the Four Power Commission.

3. Negotiation. These changes would not make the Western Peace Plan acceptable to the Kremlin. They would, however, be sufficiently novel and reasonable as to make it difficult for the USSR to dismiss them out of hand. We should try to spin out the negotiations about these proposals, as long as we could.

(a) This would enable us to spell out our position on German unity in sufficient detail as possibly to convince some elements of the Soviet leadership that unification could be secured, if they wished, on a basis that would not injure their security. This might have some long-term influence on Soviet policy.

(b) Our position on the question of German unity is better than that of the Soviets in terms of popular appeal. The longer we can publicly debate this question, the better for us from a propaganda standpoint.

(c) Prolonged negotiations would give us time in which to carry forward our military preparations, which might affect Soviet intentions.

4. Next Steps. When we had strung out this negotiation for all it was worth, we would have to decide whether the Soviet attitude had been sufficiently affected by our political and military posture to make genuine negotiation feasible. If so, we should move toward our real negotiating positions, which would involve the following amplification on each of the three above changes in the Western Peace Plan:

(a) Berlin: The Berlin proposal in the Western Peace Plan should be expanded to provide for declarations that activities which threaten peace or the interests of other parties would - consistent with fundamental human rights and freedoms - be avoided in Berlin, plus perhaps a general undertaking to discourage excessive movements of

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population, so long as reasonable freedom of movement is permitted within the city, including freedom to live in one part and work in another without economic or other penalty. We should try to bargain for some form of international control over the access routes in return for these and the further concessions indicated below. + 5/29/61 NY 265

(b) Mixed German Committee: The life of the Mixed German Committee should be extended to seven years, as Ambassador Thompson has proposed. The future of the Mixed Committee thereafter, if it had reached no agreement on German unity in the meantime, would be decided by the Four Powers - as in the existing Peace Plan. This would permit West and German official representatives to talk to each other about the electoral law and about increased contacts, trade, etc., for a considerable period, without any irrevocable commitment to unity at the end of this period, and with a consequent enhancement of the stature of the GDR. (While we should not enhance that stature by having US, UK, and French officials talk with the GDR, West German contacts are a different matter - given their long history).

(c) European Security: The Western powers would indicate that they were prepared to discuss the following measures in connection with the work of the Four Power Commission envisaged in the revised Western Peace Plan: (i) a zone of inspection against surprise attack in Europe, with the possibility of eventual limitations on forces in this zone being left open; (ii) a declaration by the Western Powers recognizing the Oder-Neisse frontier; (iii) a declaration by the Federal Republic indicating its intention not to produce or acquire nuclear warheads; (iv) unilateral declarations by the Four Powers not to deploy MRBM's in Germany (we have no intention of doing this anyway). These or any other measures agreed to in the Four Power Commission would - like the continued evidence of the Mixed German Committee - be dependent on fulfillment of the Berlin arrangements referred to under (a), above.

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- 10 -

5. Further Negotiation. Several variants of further negotiations might be envisaged, depending on reactions to these proposals:

(a) Early Agreement. The Foreign Ministers might themselves seek early agreement on the revised Western Peace Plan. If they made good progress, they could persevere and leave to a Summit the task of consummating final agreement on that Plan. Such agreement is not wholly inconceivable; the idea of setting up a Mixed Committee to handle German matters and a Four Power Commission to consider European security might have considerable attraction for the Soviets, even in return for their leaving the Berlin status quo untouched. In this case, of course, no peace treaty between the USSR and East Germany would be concluded - at least for the seven years in which the Mixed Committee would function.

(b) Continuing Negotiation. The Foreign Ministers might conclude that the negotiation was too complex and time-consuming for them, and set up the Four Power Commission to negotiate further about all these aspects of the Western Peace Plan; not merely about European security and safeguards against surprise attack in Europe. This might result in a negotiation as prolonged as that which led to the Treaty of Westphalia; indeed, the Commission might become a standing feature of the international scene and the Berlin crisis might tend to be subsumed in its larger deliberations. Again, no treaty would be concluded between the USSR and East Germany, at least so long as these deliberations continued.

(c) Peace Treaty. The Soviet Union might be indisposed to postpone a peace treaty with the GDR, but indicate a desire to continue negotiating in the Four Power Commission about some of our proposals (e.g., regarding European security and a Mixed German Committee) as separate items, after a treaty is concluded. Our posture, in this case, should be that negotiations about these subjects

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must hinge on an agreement first being reached which will protect our position in Berlin against the effects of the intended Soviet peace treaty. For this purpose, we should propose the reciprocal declarations which have come to be known as Solution "C". These declarations would leave each side free to reserve its position regarding the juridical status of Berlin; have the East Germans declare that they would maintain existing access procedures; and have the Western powers declare that they would deal with East German personnel on this basis, avoid subversive activities, not increase their forces, etc. (A simplified version is set forth at Tab B.) Once such an agreement had been reached we would be prepared, despite a Soviet-GDR peace treaty, to go ahead with establishment of the Four Power Commission to discuss matters German and European.

6. The Political Side of Military Arrangement.

Phase II would also be the time for political discussions with our allies, to persuade them to take the following steps in connection with the Berlin crisis:

(a) To agree to place appropriate forces under NATO command and operational control at an appropriate time before military action, so that SACEUR could order these forces into position.

(b) To agree to the use of these forces by NATO in an agreed military operation which is part of an agreed program of action to preserve allied rights in Berlin and allied security in Europe.

(c) To agree to a political command structure to give the Supreme Commander orders through a military channel.

The negotiations of these steps should not be started in the Phase I for three reasons.

First, the Germans will find it difficult to negotiate before the election.

Second, in all probability, US proposals for the military operation -

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- 12 -

operation - allowing for the process of JCS preparation, Department of Defense review, and Presidential approval - will not be completed until about the middle of September. Our allies are not likely to be willing to turn substantial forces over to a Supreme Commander, to agree that they may be used in a military operation, and to agree to a political command structure unless they know what the operation is to be and are able to judge of its effect.

Third, our allies will also want to know the larger program for dealing with the whole Berlin crisis in all its phases, negotiation, economic pressure, pressures of other sorts, as well as military action. Development and discussion of this larger program with our allies will take time.

At some point in Phase II, however, these prerequisites will be behind us, and it should be possible usefully to discuss the politico-military proposals indicated under (a)-(c), above, with our allies.

The political command structure will require the most delicate negotiation of all. Only the President, with the efforts of the Secretary of State and Defense, can handle this. What is recommended here is that the NATO Council, with the authorization of their Governments, or at least with the authorization of the governments whose forces are represented in the Central Command, should delegate the direction of the operation to a war council consisting of the United States, France, Germany, and Great Britain, and that this war council delegate the executive command to the President of the United States, who would communicate to the Supreme Commander through his Chiefs of Staff.

If this could be arranged, it would combine the Command procedures which were adopted in World War II and in the Korean War. It will be recalled that in World War II, the basic strategic decisions were made by President Roosevelt

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- 13 -

and Prime Minister Churchill, advised by the combined Chiefs of Staff, or, more realistically, each advised by his own Chiefs of Staff, and the resulting decisions then coordinated through the combined Chiefs of Staff. When coordination with the Russians became necessary, Stalin joined the conferences which laid down the basic strategy. But the Russian staff never entered into joint command relations with the combined staffs of the United States and the United Kingdom.

In the Korean War, where there were more participants, although the overwhelming proportion of the force was United States and Korean, the United Nations delegated to the United States the command function for the United Nations. Thereafter, General MacArthur--in theory at least--operated as and under the controls of an American Theatre Commander. The State Department was charged with continuing consultation with the other governments having forces in the United Nations Command through their Ambassadors in Washington.

If our NATO allies could be persuaded to adopt the recommendation made above, the net effect of it would be that President Kennedy would consult, so long as that was possible, with Adenauer, de Gaulle, and Macmillan, on such major strategic questions as when to begin military operations, when to break them off, and when to escalate them. The United States Chiefs of Staff, who would issue the military orders, would consult with the tripartite NATO military Standing Group (General Heusinger is an ex officio member) here in Washington.

*from NW file
24 Apr 1962*
If some such arrangements are not worked out, the Supreme Commander in Europe will be put in the position of conferring directly with the Heads of Governments and reaching his own interpretation of their direction. In other words, for practical purposes he would be under no civilian or governmental control. I have no doubt that he, as well as the governments concerned, would believe that this imposed greater responsibility upon him than any field commander should carry.

7. Allied

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7. Allied Attitudes. Negotiation of these politico-military arrangements with our allies will be difficult, but no more difficult than negotiation of some of the political proposals suggested earlier. The Germans and, to a lesser degree, the French will be highly resistant to some of these proposed changes in the Peace Plan. Given the degree in which the Chancellor and General de Gaulle dominate the actions of their governments in the foreign field, it is doubtful whether German and French agreement can be secured except through direct talks between the heads of government. At some point before the Foreign Ministers' Conference such talks will be necessary. Indeed, it may be that two rounds of talks will be required: One to agree on what needs to be done and give directives to the Foreign Ministers to spell out the details, and another to review and approve their work. The amount of time and persuasion which will be required to move the Chancellor and General de Gaulle should not be underestimated. The task may be slightly eased, however, by the fact that we will be concurrently discussing the proposed military operation and command arrangements with them. As the Chancellor, in particular, contemplates the specific alternative to successful negotiations his attitude may mellow.

PHASE III:

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- 15 -

PHASE III: AFTER A TREATY

1. Two alternative assumptions may be made:

(a) That negotiations concerning a Berlin agreement have prospered, but that negotiations concerning the Western Peace Plan have failed and the Soviets therefore proceed to sign a peace treaty. In this case, our attitude toward the treaty should be more one of sorrow than of anger. We should denounce its signature, but keep the denunciation in low key since our basic purpose-preserving the status quo in Berlin - will have been achieved through prior agreement.

(b) An alternative assumption is that the Soviets sign a treaty after failure of negotiations concerning Berlin, as well as concerning the Western Peace Plan. The rest of this section discusses U.S. policy under this assumption.

2. We should prepare well in advance for this contingency:

(a) by discounting the treaty and thus minimizing the damage that its signing will do to our prestige:

(b) by making clear that we will allow East German personnel to perform access functions identical to those which have been performed by the Soviets. This announcement should not be too long delayed, lest it appear a last minute retreat in the face of pressure.

3. If the East German regime insists, after a treaty has been signed, that new access procedures be agreed to in formal negotiations between the GDR and the Western powers, the latter should refuse. They should state that the access procedures are a matter of right which are not subject to negotiations. They have consistently refused to negotiate any change in these procedures with the Soviets, and they see no reason to treat the East Germans differently.

4. The Western

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- 16 -

4. The Western powers should also make clear that they remain ready to engage in the exchange of unilateral declarations called for by Solution "C" (which would include a declaration by the East Germans that they intend to continue existing procedures unchanged and reciprocal statements, which take note of that declaration, by the Western powers).

5. If the East Germans should ask to negotiate about the wording of these reciprocal declarations, the Western powers should request the West Germans to serve as intermediaries in bringing GDR views to the attention of the Western powers and in conveying the intentions of the Western powers to the GDR. If this is refused, the Western powers should be willing to receive proposals through the USSR and to reconvene a Four Power Conference to discuss the matter with the USSR.

6. At such a Conference, our position should be governed by the principles and proposal set forth under II, above. To go further would be to concede, under threat, something we would otherwise have refused. This would encourage the Soviets and the GDR to view crisis-promotion as a productive and rewarding occupation.

7. If the East Germans refuse to permit Western military traffic to continue without direct and formal negotiation with them, we should go to a garrison airlift - while continuing each day to present our vehicles for passage on the ground in order to maintain our claim to ground access.

8. The Communists could then either:

(a) let the garrison airlift go on, in which case their objective would not have been achieved;

(b) extend the blockage to civil access, in which case we would mount a civil airlift.

(c) use force against the airlift, in which case we would use counter-force, wherever this could most effectively be applied;

(d) negotiate

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(d) negotiate.

9. Whichever one of these options was chosen, our political posture should remain the same: We should be willing (i) to close out the crisis at any time that the East Germans would permit our traffic to move under pre-treaty procedures; (ii) to exchange reciprocal declarations with the GDR concerning those procedures; (iii) to negotiate with the USSR about the question of Germany and Berlin in a Four Power Foreign Ministers' Conference. We should not raise our asking price because the crisis had deepened; this would vastly increase the chances of war.

10. It is always possible, of course, that the crisis would develop, e.g., by triggering an East German uprising, in a way which would convince both sides that restoration of the status quo ante was infeasible. In this case, proposals involving more rapid and radical change than those described under II, above, might be required to create a viable situation. We should, in the innermost recesses of the U.S. Government, develop proposals looking to quick, drastic and constructive change in Central Europe, which could be brought forward in this event.

11. Looming over all these events will be the United Nations - interested, agitated, impotent. It is not in our interest to hasten UN consideration of the Berlin issue. If a Foreign Ministers' Conference fails and the Soviets seem disposed to unilateral action, however, UN interest will become uncontrollable.

It would be better for the West if the issue were first raised in the Security Council, rather than the General Assembly, since debate will be more manageable in the Council. If some other country were about to bring the matter before the General Assembly, U.S. action in the Council might be necessary. This might take the form of a proposal that the Council call on the parties concerned not to take unilateral action to alter the status of Berlin or the access routes

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and to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the issue. If the East Germans nonetheless proceeded to block our access, we might then seek a further resolution calling on the parties concerned to restore the situation which had existed prior to their action.

These resolutions would both command impressive majorities and be vetoed by the USSR. These facts would not be harmful as we prepared for forceful action to fulfill what was clearly the manifest will of a majority of the Council - a will which the Communists would be flagrantly disregarding.

There might at this point be general urging that the U.S. should go from the Council to the Assembly, before using force. If we disregarded that urging some other country might - after Security Council action had been concluded - bring the matter before the Assembly.

Our posture in any Assembly consideration of the issue should be the same as in the Council. Reactions to that posture would be more diverse in the Assembly than in the Council, but Council action would have set a helpful precedent; we should hold to that precedent and urge our friends to do the same. We should not be delayed or deflected by GA debate from courses determined upon to meet GDR blockage of access to Berlin.

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Tab A

Western Peace Plan
(For Initial Presentation at Foreign Ministers' Conference)
(New Language Underlined)

STAGE I

1. The Four Powers would establish a Four Power Commission for consultation among the parties to supervise the implementation of the agreement and to settle any disputes which might arise before the conclusion of a peace settlement with a reunified Germany and to discuss European security arrangements as provided below. (A fall-back position would be to attach German "advisers" to this Commission.)

2. With regard to Berlin, the Four Powers would agree that:

(a) The existing situation would be maintained in Berlin until the performance of the agreement of the Heads of Governments made in Geneva, July 23, 1955, "that the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany by means of free elections shall be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security."

(b) Free and unrestricted access to West Berlin by land, water, and air should continue for all persons, goods and communications, including those of the forces stationed there, in accordance with the procedures in effect on June 30, 1961.

(c) The Four Powers would not increase their forces in Berlin beyond the numbers currently within the city.

(d) The Four Powers would not bring into the city nuclear weapons of any kind.

3. The Four Powers would enter into a non-aggression pact which would last so long as the arrangement regarding Berlin under 2, above, is being observed. When German unification is achieved, it would be replaced by more permanent arrangements to be devised in the Four Power Commission, as set forth below.

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4. In order to facilitate further the solution of political problems and the improvement of international relations, the Four Powers would, in the Four Power Commission referred to in paragraph 1, initiate discussion of staged and controlled measures to assure European security and to safeguard against attack in Europe. These measures would come into effect in Stages II and III of this Plan, as might be agreed by the Four Powers.

STAGE II

5. Bearing in mind the complex issues involved in reunification, a transitional period would be agreed. The Four Powers would set up a Mixed German Committee.

6. The Mixed Committee would consist of 25 members from the Federal Republic of Germany and 10 members from the so-called "German Democratic Republic". These members would be appointed by the Federal Government and the authorities of the so-called German Democratic Republic respectively.

7. The Mixed Committee would take its decisions by a three quarter majority.

8. The Mixed Committee would be entrusted with the task of formulating proposals:

(a) To coordinate and expand technical contact between the two parts of Germany, and to increase mutually beneficial trade and credits between the two parts of Germany;

(b) To ensure the free movement of persons, ideas and publications between the two parts of Germany;

(c) To ensure and guarantee human rights in both parts of Germany;

(d) For a draft law providing for general, free and secret elections under independent supervision.

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9. The Mixed Committee would transmit any proposals made by it under subparagraphs (a) to (c) inclusive of paragraph 8 above to the appropriate authorities in both parts of Germany. Such proposals, if no objections are raised with respect of them, should be implemented as appropriate in both parts of Germany.

10. (a) Any agreed proposal for an electoral law in accordance with subparagraph (d) of paragraph 8 above would be submitted to a plebiscite in both parts of Germany.

(b) If any proposal for an electoral law obtained a majority of valid votes in each of the two parts of Germany, it would acquire the force of law and be directly applicable for the entire electoral area.

(c) The Four Powers would, at the time of signature of the agreement, expressly authorize the competent German authorities to promulgate any electoral law so approved.

(d) The Four Powers would adopt a statute providing for the supervision of the plebiscite.

11. If all-German elections had not been held on or before the termination of a thirty months' period beginning on the date of the signing of the agreement, the Four Powers would determine the disposition to be made of the Committee.

12. Not later than two and a half years after the signature of the agreement, elections for an all-German Assembly would be held in both parts of Germany under the terms of the electoral law drafted by the Mixed Committee, approved by the Four Powers and adopted by the German people in a plebiscite (in accordance with the provisions in Stage II above).

13. The elections would be supervised by a supervisory commission and supervisory teams throughout all of Germany. The commission and teams would be composed of either (a) United Nations personnel and representatives of both parts of Germany

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or (b) representatives of the Four Powers and representatives of both parts of Germany.

14. The all-German Assembly would have the task of drafting an all-German constitution. It would exercise such powers as are necessary to establish and secure a liberal, democratic and federative system.

15. As soon as an all-German Government has been formed on the basis of the above mentioned constitution it would replace the governments of the Federal Republic and the so-called German Democratic Republic and would have:

(a) full freedom of decision in regard to internal and external affairs, subject to the rights retained by the Four Powers as stipulated in paragraph 16 below;

(b) responsibility for negotiating, as soon as possible after its establishment, an all-German Peace Treaty.

16. Pending the signature of a Peace Treaty with an all-German Government formed on the basis of the all-German constitution, the Four Powers would retain only those of their rights and responsibilities which relate to Berlin and Germany as a whole, including reunification and a peace settlement and, as now exercised, to the stationing of armed forces in Germany and the Protection of their security.

STAGE IV

Since a final Peace settlement can only be concluded with a Government representing all Germany, it should be concluded at this stage. The Settlement should be open to signature by all states members of the U.N. which were at war with Germany. The Settlement should enter into force when ratified by the Four Powers and by Germany.

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TAB B

PROPOSED REVISION OF SOLUTION "C"

1. The Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, while fully reserving their positions as regards the juridical aspects of the problem:¹

(a) Take cognizance of the attached declarations of the Government of the USSR and the so-called German Democratic Republic relating to the maintenance of free and unrestricted access to West Berlin by land, by water, and by air for all persons, goods, and communications, including those of Western forces stationed in Berlin, in accordance with the procedures in effect in June, 1961.

(b) Declare that, on a reciprocal basis, measures will be taken, consistent with fundamental rights and liberties, to avoid activities in or with respect to Berlin which might either disturb public order or seriously affect the rights or interests, or amount to interference in the internal affairs of others.

(c) Declare that, so long as the Declarations concerning free access are being observed, they will not

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¹ In a concomitant declaration to make this reservation explicit, the Western Powers would state that: (a) they consider that they have absolute and unqualified rights, until Berlin is once more the capital of a reunified Germany, and that these rights include the right to have their troops remain in West Berlin and to have freedom of communications maintained between West Berlin and the Federal Republic in the same general conditions as hitherto; (b) they continue to hold the Soviet Government ultimately responsible for the fulfillment of its obligations to the Three Powers in relation to their presence in Berlin and freedom of access thereto.

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station more than 11,000 (present level) members of their armed forces in West Berlin and will not bring into the city ballistic missiles or nuclear weapons of any kind.

(d) Will request the Secretary General of the United Nations to provide a representative supported by adequate staff, to be established in Berlin and along the access routes for the purpose of reporting to the Secretary General concerning any activities which appear to be in conflict with the foregoing declarations.

2. The Government of the USSR declares that it associates itself with the declaration of the Government of the German Democratic Republic relating to the maintenance of free and unrestricted access to West Berlin by land, by water, and by air for all persons, goods, and communications, including those of the Western forces stationed in Berlin, in accordance with the procedures in effect in June, 1961.

3. The Government of the German Democratic Republic declares that free and unrestricted access will be maintained to West Berlin by land, by water, and by air for all persons, goods, and communications, including those of Western forces stationed in Berlin, in accordance with the procedures in effect in June, 1961.


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
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P. JFK files

Record of Meeting, 4:30 p.m., August 3, 1961

Present: The President, the Secretary of State, Mr. Owen



2. The Secretary spoke of the possibility of an early instruction to Thompson to make a quiet approach to Khrushchev. One object would be to get Khrushchev engaged in a discussion of the access question. This object might better be achieved in private rather than in a formal talk.



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
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9. The Secretary said that while in Paris he would visit the NATO Council with the Attorney General. After Paris he would go to Italy to see Segni. He would write to the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers from Paris. The President thought well of the British suggestion that the Secretary come home by way of London.


10. The Secretary intended that Ambassadors Bruce, Dowling, Thompson, and Kennan constitute a standing group to provide ideas on Berlin. Kennan would also be keeping in touch with neutrals. The Belgrade meeting of neutral nations was briefly covered.

11. Tripartite consultation would take place in Washington. The Secretary would consult with the two Ambassadors; French and British members of the Standing Group would be brought in, as appropriate. This may not satisfy the French; they will have to be convinced that we meant what we said when we suggested that discretion would be needed.

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
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13. The President mentioned Senator Case's letter dealing with the possibility of a canal from Czechoslovakia.

14. It was agreed that the decision to propose a Four Power Foreign Ministers' meeting in early October should not be firmly taken in Paris, but should be referred to the Heads of Governments. The danger of leaks would thus be minimized.



16. The President mentioned the likely difficulty of persuading de Gaulle and Adenauer to our proposed positions at a Western Heads of Government meeting. The Secretary suggested that, in the end, de Gaulle would probably go along with our proposals, if the President indicated that they were essential to preserve our position in Berlin.

17. There was some discussion of propaganda themes. The President did not think much of the "defaulting trustee" theme. The Secretary said that our propaganda would be geared to the main themes in the President's speech, which was being widely translated and circulated.

18. The Secretary said that we should try now to keep Berlin out of the UN, where we would lack support as a result of Bizerte. We would have to take Berlin to the UN, however, if there were a peace treaty and moves were made against our access.

19. The discussion turned away from Berlin:

(a) The Secretary thought that negotiations over Bizerte would succeed if they could get started but that

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August 3, 1961

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You will recall that in the first NSC Directive on Berlin we included among the tasks assigned to DOD that of reporting on the measures which need to be taken to strengthen custody, command and communication re nuclear warheads in Europe, so that they won't go off by themselves in the event of Berlin fighting.

McNamara said that he would look into this personally when he went to Paris.

He talked to Norstad, as you will remember from the memorandum of the conversation. The talk was inconclusive and left many questions up in the air.

I am told that no action has been taken or machinery set up in the Pentagon to follow up on these matters. I know the Secretary is right-minded on the question but doubt if he has the time to do much about it himself, hence the necessity of persuading him to delegate the task to someone else.

Over recent months the question has been studied in the Defense by (i) JCS who say that everything is wonderful; (ii) Marvin Stern, in Research and Development, who says that a combination lock he has invented will fix everything up as soon as he gets into production in a year or two from now. Neither of these answers is of much help in the immediate crisis, where what we need, as General Taylor suggested the other day, is strengthening of custodial forces and other short-term steps.

It would be most helpful if the President would raise this question with McNamara on the basis of the memos of conversation between McNamara and Norstad, which I presume have been made available to the President. The President might point out that these questions were left hanging and ask McNamara what measures he proposes to follow up on them.

If this proposal commends itself, I will be glad to prepare a short briefing memo from you to the President in this sense.

Henry Owen

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Ministerial Consultations on Berlin
Paris, August 4-9, 1961

Approved in S
8/7/61

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: August 5, 1961
Time: 10:30 a.m.
Place: The Quai d'Orsay

Participants:

United States

The Secretary of State
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Nitze
Mr. Hillenbrand

United Kingdom

Lord Home
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh
Sir Francis Festing
Mr. John Killick

France

M. Couve de Murville
M. Charles Lucet
M. Charles de Carbonnel
M. Jean Laloy

Subject: Tripartite Meeting on Berlin and Germany

Copies to: S/S - E EUR IO P US Delegation
G GER Amembassy Paris
S/P WE Amembassy London
INR/C SOV Amembassy Bonn
S/B RA US Mission Berlin
REINA Amembassy Moscow

Couve de Murville opened the first Tripartite Meeting by suggesting that, while the Germans should normally participate in discussion of the Berlin question, there were certain aspects of the matter about which the three could perhaps talk more frankly in their absence. After referring to the consultative work accomplished by the Four-Power Working Group, the Secretary stressed the importance of bringing the Germans into future work in the most intimate way. It was necessary to have them participate to the point where the German people could not make the charge that their Government was not fully informed or involved. If a crisis is to come, it would be important that the Germans be involved in the center of the matter rather than at the side. The U.S. hoped that they could be included as full partners in the Ambassadorial Steering Group in Washington. As a result of the present meetings and the subsequent NATO meeting, we hope to achieve a high degree of Allied unity demonstrating that the West is prepared to protect its vital interests. It is important that we confront Khrushchev with an impressive display of unity for this will heighten

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the chances of a peaceful settlement.

After noting that the Working Group had produced a practical report for the Ministers, Lord Home agreed to bring the Germans fully in with the possible exception of their participation in early Ambassadorial talks in Moscow. He would not want, he thought, to press the Germans too much before their elections, particularly if such subjects as the de facto recognition of the GDR or UN involvement in the Berlin crisis were to come into the picture. Otherwise we could not bring the Germans in too much. Regarding the military build-up, the British would be prepared to call up the territorial army and to mobilize their reserves if necessary. They hope to join with the U.S., France, and Germany in obtaining the cooperation of the NATO countries, although it would be unrealistic to expect that the latter could produce much more strength on the ground.

Couve said he agreed entirely that the Germans must be completely in the picture. There might be a few things which could best be discussed tripartitely but this would not prejudice full German participation. One thing was certain. The Berlin question was much more a question of the future of the Federal Republic than of Berlin itself. While it was essential to save the liberties of two million Berliners, it was even more important to keep the Federal Republic attached to the West. Our main objective must be to avoid anything which could alter this and lead to German neutralism or an approach to the Soviets. In response to Home's question as to whether there was really any danger of this, Couve emphasized Berlin was really crucial for our relations with Germany and the future of the Atlantic Alliance. If the West suffers a political defeat the work of fifteen years will be undone and the course of the future will be profoundly changed. This is the spirit in which the Allies must consider the problem. Whatever they did, the Federal Republic must be in full agreement.

Home broached the timing question, noting that it seemed certain that the West will have to negotiate with the Soviets and will be pushed into negotiations either by the UN or by other pressures. What would be the best point at which to take the initiative to propose negotiations? Couve responded that there were two aspects: the tactical problem of when to take the initiative and for what date to propose talks, and the substantive problem of the Western negotiating position. Before deciding to have negotiations, he felt the West must decide on its substantive policy. He did not have any question as to what it should be.

The Secretary said he thought there would be considerable value in a Western initiative on negotiations so as not to appear simply to be sitting back with reliance on the status quo until Khrushchev pulls the West into negotiations. The West should have proposals regarding convening negotiations before the meeting of neutrals by the end of this month and certainly before the UNGA session opened on September 19. Unless such negotiations are in prospect, others might take initiatives which would

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work to the West's disadvantage. UK discussion of Berlin at this time is not likely to be to Western advantage. Therefore we want to discuss an early initiative for a Foreign Ministers' meeting to take place in the autumn -- perhaps the first week in October, or if the Soviets prefer a later date -- the first week in November. Regarding a substantive position, we supposed the West might start with proposals on which we would not necessarily expect to end but which would improve the status quo. From these we might expect to move to some de facto regulation of the situation in conformity with our interests and consistent with the maintenance of something like the status quo.

Over the present weekend, the West could not expect to arrive at a detailed negotiating position and this is not desirable. Probably such a position could not be achieved before the German elections. He agreed that the West must eventually arrive at a unified substantive position but he questioned whether, if we were unable to give the Germans complete details of our proposals now, this should be a barrier to an initiative towards negotiations. In any event and apart from the question of German participation in preparations, there were grave disadvantages in going well into the autumn without such an initiative.

Lord Home queried whether the Secretary was saying that we must move towards negotiations with the Soviets but not yet decide on what we would negotiate except to the extent that the Ambassadorial probe in Moscow might proceed. The Secretary agreed but noted that some Ambassadorial contact in Moscow was in any event inevitable. What he had in mind was that beyond a possible Ambassadorial approach, we should propose a specific Foreign Ministers' meeting to the Soviets and that this would become known publicly -- hopefully with Soviet acceptance of such a meeting. If we did not do this, our friends and Allies including those in NATO would be unwilling to support what seemed like a military build-up and the need for related economic and propaganda measures unless these were accompanied by a move towards negotiation. Home mentioned that Nehru was getting restive. If the problem got into the UN now, the position of the West was likely to be weakened thereby. This was the reason for an initiative on a Foreign Ministers' meeting before September 15 without revealing the substance of our position. In preparing the Western substantive position, Couve said there was a case to be made for the absence of the Germans if we actually have negotiations with the Soviets. The West could always advance something along standard lines combating the Soviet peace treaty proposal with proposals for German reunification on the basis of self-determination or for the unification of Berlin. Everyone on both sides knows that these are not practical. The discussion will inevitably move on to status of Berlin and access thereto. He was not certain that agreement with the Soviets on these subjects was possible. If there is agreement on Berlin, this means that the status quo will not be maintained as such. What the Soviets want is to crystallize the existence of the GDR and to change the Berlin situation in such a way that it is no longer a factual part of the Federal Republic not merely in the economic and financial sense. It was the political absorption of West Berlin into the Federal Republic.

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which particularly worried the Soviets. The West Germans had
 ... insist on holding Bundesrat and other meetings, having
 visits of the Chancellor and other officials, and other activities there.
 There was the burning problem of the refugees. If the Soviets accept an
 agreement on Berlin, Couve continued, for the Allies this would somehow
 have to involve a guarantee of Western communications even if the continu-
 ation of the occupation status was not formally recognized. The Soviets
 would indubitably insist on the discontinuance of West German political
 activities in Berlin under cover of the occupation status. This is a
 fact which we and the Germans must face if there is to be any agreement
 with the Soviets. However, all purely German communications with Berlin
 are presently under GDR control. Any agreement would have to stop what the
 Western Powers are doing to help Federal Republic political activities in
 West Berlin. The Soviets will insist that GDR control of German traffic
 between the Federal Republic and Berlin include refugees. This is what a
 substantive agreement really comes to in the last analysis. As to tactics
 and the role of public opinion, he frankly did not see the problem in the
 same light as the Secretary. This was a vital issue. Our life and future
 depended on what came out of the crisis. It was essentially a test of
 strength between the Soviet Union and the U.S. He frankly did not see how,
 if this were the case, you could impress the Soviets by taking the same
 line on negotiations as the Soviets. Vital Western national interests
 were at stake. The role of the UN was not an essential fact in this
 situation. The only essential fact was our relationship to the Soviets
 and how we do or do not deal with them. If the present situation is a
 trial of strength, it is essential to show no weakness. Therefore, he
 could not help but agree with the Secretary in his emphasis on maintain-
 ing not only unity in fact, but the appearance of unity. But to take
 action in the way proposed would merely show what was really at the bottom
 of our hearts -- fear of war. We must not be weak in our position.
 Khrushchev says this is an issue on which the West will not fight and
 that we will finally accept his position. Perhaps in the last analysis
 he is right but it would certainly be wrong to give him the immediate
 impression that he is right. Here Couve came back to his first point,
 that the entire future of the Federal Republic and our relationship to it
 was at stake.

Home said that since the East Germans presently control all civilian
 traffic to West Berlin except air communications, if we were to get a
 reasonable de facto arrangement because Khrushchev wants no war, we would
 not be much worse off than at present except that Allied air access could
 not be used to move refugees. Couve agreed that 95% of Berlin traffic
 was now controlled by the GDR but he emphasized that the other 5% is the
 crucial traffic. It was not really pure military traffic which caused
 trouble, but a use of military rights as a camouflage for essentially
 German traffic. It was natural from their viewpoint that the GDR would
 want to control this. A neutralized West Berlin to the Soviets would
 mean that no German could enter or leave Berlin except with GDR permission.
 The result would be a progressive adjustment of the Germans in West Berlin

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to the factual situation. Home mentioned that the East Germans could achieve this effect now. Couve said the point was that the refugees are transported by air. This was the real issue. He wanted to say this now while von Brentano was not present when it was awkward.

The Secretary commented on the trial of strength to which Couve had referred. We agreed this was involved here but this strength had many components. We should like not to discount too much the value of world reactions and the importance which this has both to Khrushchev and to ourselves. The Sino-Soviet bloc has extensive objectives in other parts of the world and is making large efforts in non-Communist countries. If we can show up their Berlin position before the rest of the world this would be a political factor they must take into account. If we can not convince most UN countries that our position is reasonable and that we are not just being stubborn, the pressure will be towards some position which will be difficult for us. In democratic societies people do not think much of war as an instrument of policy unless they believe war is unavoidable. We believe nuclear war to be possible in the Berlin crisis although we do not say this is inevitable. If we ask our peoples to take a risk of this magnitude, we must make clear that every feasible effort is being made to achieve our objective by other means. Democracies must be led to conflict with clear consciences.

Couve said he did not want to give the impression that he underestimated what the Secretary had said. The support of public opinion and of the noncommitted countries was very important. But when our very lives are at stake, this is not essential. The substance of our vital interests is essential. He also agreed concerning the importance of public opinion within the Western Alliance and the necessity that people be willing to follow their governments. It is essential that we explain and be understood, but this cannot change our basic position because Berlin is linked to our vital interests. It was not impossible that the crisis would lead to nuclear war but we must accept this risk. If what we accept instead weakens our position and our unity, it will be possible to avoid nuclear war in 1961. But this would merely lead to nuclear war in 1962 or 1963. This is not a policy. We have learned that in the past and must evaluate the present situation in that light.

In response to the Secretary's query as to whether Couve detected significant substantive differences between us and the Germans on these matters, Couve said he did not know. They obviously could not accept certain things which the other three might wish to propose. When it came to the real trial, he did not really know what their stand would be and he suspected they likewise did not know.

Home said that he did not think we should press the Germans too hard at this time. However, the fact was that Khrushchev was saying things which seemed reasonable to the rest of the world. A peace treaty did not sound bad and Khrushchev would certainly offer guarantees before he made

a peace treaty. If he did this, the West could not avoid negotiations. Therefore, as the Secretary had said, we must consider how we turn negotiations to our best advantage. If they come after a peace treaty is signed, then we must take account of the new position of the GDR. If they come before a peace treaty, Khrushchev might say he will make a peace treaty anyway but it will be subject to prior arrangements with the Allies. Home said he could see that if we surrendered the basic rights of West Berlin this would shake NATO and turn the Germans toward the East. The West must insist on the freedom of West Berliners including their freedom of movement to West Germany, but this inevitably involved some measure of recognition of the GDR. The Secretary noted that the fact that 95 percent of the present traffic to Berlin is controlled by the East Germans in itself is a sort of de facto recognition of their existence and of the need to deal with them. Home said two points on which agreement is necessary with Khrushchev would involve status of the GDR and our position on Berlin. On the second point, if Khrushchev did not want war, he might be willing to accept some compromise for at least sometime ahead. He had no objection to asking for a conference soon on Germany and Berlin without revealing our real negotiating hand. The Secretary said we might do this through diplomatic channels.

When Home repeated that the apparent reasonableness of the Soviet position for the rest of the world would make it impossible for the West to go to war without negotiations, the Secretary said this also had some relation to the "test of firmness". In the past he had sometimes felt the West was too nervous about negotiations as if the Soviets were 12 feet tall. We should have more confidence in ourselves and in our ability to talk to them even if we might never agree. By the first week in October many things which we were undertaking in the military, economic and propaganda fields will have begun to make their impression on Khrushchev in terms of underlining Western seriousness of purpose. By that time, the West should not be in a disadvantageous position to talk. If we did not show willingness to negotiate, our position would be eroded by the feeling that we should ^{have} explored every possibility before Allied traffic is actually turned back at the barriers.

Curve In response to Curve's query as to whether to answer the last Soviet note, Home said that in the last Soviet note Khrushchev had given us an opening by showing sensitivity on self-determination. This suggested a Western offer of a plebiscite. Curve commented that, speaking of tactics, it seemed to him that for some months now Khrushchev had been very self-confident and believed that the Soviet Union would not have to face a real crisis. The U.S. military decisions were good and could not fail to make some impression with the Soviets as evidence of U.S. firmness. If we now went to Khrushchev and said we wanted to negotiate, he would immediately conclude that we were not serious. An Ambassadorial approach in Moscow along the lines envisaged would also lead him to conclude that he could proceed. The minimum the West could do is to let the situation develop a little to see if Khrushchev can come to be persuaded that this is a serious matter. Home disagreed and said that the UNCTA was convening on September 19. Someone would undoubtedly come forward and ask for negotiations. If we had to respond, the West would be in a weaker position than if we took an initiative ourselves. Curve commented that he did not think it would be India, Pakistan or Indonesia that would be the decisive factor in the Berlin situation.

The Secretary referred to the President's speech to the U.S. people. We recognized that there were several audiences as well as the U.S. people. Not only the U.S. people, but our Allies - more than 40 countries - and not just NATO - they all had a direct interest if we got into war with the Soviets. We felt it important to make two points that we were prepared to fight for our vital interests if necessary but if they could be protected by peaceful means so much the better. The President had strongly emphasized that a Western initiative be taken on negotiations and that we did not have to detract from our position of strength. Instead it was an essential part thereof. We attach more importance to U.N. countries and the effect their attitudes might have on Khrushchev. We also had interests in other parts of the world which we want to further and regarding which we need to think in the Berlin context. By early October the seriousness of the U.S. steps could have impressed Khrushchev that we are facing war possibility. Khrushchev had certainly read the President's speech in full. A lack of interest in negotiation could scarcely make him feel we were more serious than otherwise. In fact, it might have the opposite effect. In the past, he has recognized that to scare the West he need only suggest negotiations. We are arming, but part of our purpose for this is to support us in negotiation.

Couve said that what Khrushchev says is clear in the Soviet note. He is prepared to talk purely on his own grounds. Our position has always been that we are willing to negotiate but not be subject to preconditions or threats. This had been discussed at great length two and one-half years ago before the Geneva Conference.

Home said he had to agree with the Secretary that the general effect of military measures would be enhanced by an offer to negotiate. Otherwise people would say the West had gone over completely to a military solution. He suggested that in late August or early September we might reply to the latest Soviet notes; in early September we could conduct the Ambassadorial probe in Moscow; following the German elections we could make a proposal just before the UNGA opening and before Khrushchev had reached his own decision on a peace treaty. Couve said that it was clear that Khrushchev had already decided to convene a peace conference after the October 12 Party Congress - perhaps in early November. Home responded that the question was whether he told the GDR whether the peace treaty is to be unconditional or to take account of a prior understanding with the Allies.

The Secretary hoped that we could take political steps to upset Khrushchev's timetable for signature of the peace treaty. If a Foreign Ministers' meeting were scheduled for early in October or November, it would be hard for him to go ahead. It would certainly be more difficult for him to persuade non-Communist countries to attend a peace conference. At this point, there was some inconclusive discussion over which countries might conceivably be invited to a Soviet peace conference.

In response to the Secretary's query as to how, in the absence of negotiations, Couve saw developments for the rest of the year, Couve said he did not exclude negotiations, but he did not like the way they were presently being proposed. This seemed to him to be the way of weakness coming too soon after a show of strength. We should answer Khrushchev's note saying that we are always ready for negotiations but cannot negotiate on his terms but only

under reasonable, open conditions. This might go forward in 2 or 3 weeks and the American Ambassador might then emphasize the seriousness of the Berlin situation and whether he has drawn all the conclusions possible from developments he has set in motion.

The Secretary commented that if we try to avoid negotiating on terms Khrushchev has suggested it was all ^{the} more important that we initiate negotiations on terms we want. Another factor relating to timing was that precisely because we take the Berlin situation so seriously in terms of our vital interest, we want to ensure to the extent possible that events themselves did not take control. Beyond a certain point, prestige and other elements would assume new proportions. The need for talks with the Soviets grows not only out of the problem of Berlin but out of our approach to it. Talks were not a sign of weakness; but we will talk because we understood what was at the end of the trail.

Home said he always kept coming back to the Soviet position that after the peace treaty, we must arrange access with the GDR. Our position then might well force on us a degree of de facto recognition of the GDR beyond what we want to concede. He agreed with the Secretary, that in the future the longer negotiations are postponed, the more rigid positions will be. Our objective should be to get prior guarantees from Khrushchev, before he signs a peace treaty, regarding the effect of the peace treaty on our position. He agreed, of course, that we must not give away West Berlin and lose West Germany in the process. Couve said that he had not precisely meant that. We obviously had to try to make a deal and this involved giving something away.

Lord Home said such a deal would be much more difficult in the post-treaty situation. He agreed we wanted to wait until September 17 before indicating we wanted a Foreign Ministers Meeting. Couve reiterated his proposed timetable for answering the note, saying we should negotiate but only under reasonable conditions. Delivery of the note could be accompanied by a warning from the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow and in September the Western Foreign Ministers might meet again and assess the situation and the steps to be taken. This would still be a month before the Party Congress and we would be rid of the German elections. In any case, a conference with the Soviets could not take place before the end of October or early November. After expressing a lack of enthusiasm for another Western Foreign Ministers meeting, Home said such a meeting could not take place before the German elections. Although Couve had said it should take place before the UNGA session, he hoped agreement could be reached that September 19 would be a good date on which to make the Western offer on negotiations. Another Western Foreign Ministers meeting would make it appear that Western Powers were running after negotiations. He thought agreement on when to offer negotiations should be reached now. The Secretary asked why it was necessary to wait until September 19. He did not object to answering the Soviet note if we had something quite specific in it about negotiations and if it were to be made public before the UNGA session, but there seemed to be a disadvantage in continuing a note exchange if we just said we were willing to negotiate but showed no sign of doing something specific. Home commented that we did not really need to answer the note until mid-September. The Secretary said the longer we delay in offering negotiation the more we run risk that the Soviets will take an initiative before the Party

Congress along the lines intended for after the Party Congress, and then we would be reacting to their terms.

Couve said that this would mark a change in the Soviet position. The Secretary said that the Soviets were making real headway with their proposals on a peace treaty and guarantees. We do not have anything in front of them to counter their proposals and this puts us in a weak position. We would have great difficulty in the U.S. in going ahead with a military build-up including the calling up of reserves, tripling the draft call, and pushing the civil defense program unless people knew diplomacy was at work trying to find out if all this were necessary. It would tend to undermine the present economy at home and in the Alliance unless other members of the UN knew we were exploiting every resource of diplomacy to protect our vital interests. Home noted his agreement. Couve, however, said this argument worked both ways. If you announce the conference at an early date, the world would inevitably relax and say it is all over and the West is going to make a deal with the Soviet. U.S. newspapers were right now commenting on a conference leading to a solution. This was the idea of the NATO allies and had been expressed in the recent WEU meeting. What, however, if the negotiations do not succeed? Then the pressure on the West will be the same as now. What do we do then if the crisis continued? He would hate to propose negotiations without first knowing what the Western substantive positions would be and this is not discussed in the Working Group Report. Home observed that this could be worked out in a later Working Group session and then the Western Foreign Ministers would have to meet and settle policy. If we delay too long and are exposed to pressures, this presumably will weaken our position.

The Secretary said the pressure and eventual disunity arising from a failure to offer negotiations would actually weaken the West in Khrushchev's eyes. He has gambled on Western disunity before. If negotiations^{are} postponed until later, there may be false hopes about their outcome. If they failed there would be too little time left to educate the people regarding the seriousness of the issue which could not be resolved. We should begin to find out sooner rather than later whether negotiations likely to settle the issue and what the real Soviet position is.

Couve said once again this cuts two ways. There was an obvious way we could get NATO unity and that was to imply that negotiations would settle the problem. This would be applauded. The harder and more realistic way was the better one. Home commented that obviously everybody wished that negotiation would settle the problem. If not, "we shall not have a meeting again".

Regarding contingency planning, Couve said that if it came to a real crisis and our communications were blocked, it was essential that we arrange things so that we were not obliged to be the first to shoot. Here he entirely shared the Secretary's preoccupation. In practice, the only way to do this is to use the air corridors. We should attempt to continue

military transport by air, and not begin with land operations.

The Secretary said we agreed. Our general attitude has been that since Berlin crisis may be a real one and cannot be eliminated by incantations such as the phrase "nuclear deterrent", we should try to force the other side to take the initiative with military measures. If we get to the situation where we have to fight, gaining time by an airlift to let our troops get into position might be desirable even if we could not sustain the city of Berlin by air for an extended period of time. We would also wish to bring economic sanctions and other measures to bear.

Home said he agreed on airlift question. As to economic sanctions, he also agreed but felt that detailed plans for various situations involving escalation to a total blockade needed to be worked out. We should develop a variety of economic weapons and study their consequences. The Secretary noted that we had just received a cable from Moscow reporting that the Italians had told our Ambassador that the Fanfani-Khrushchev talks had largely covered the same ground as the Vienna aide-memoire and the McCloy talks. However, Khrushchev had made the point that, after the conclusion of a separate peace treaty, the Soviets were prepared to use force to prevent unauthorized air access to Berlin. Couve noted that Khrushchev had already said that. The Secretary observed that Ulbricht had said it. Couve said that in any event, an airlift as in 1948 was not possible because of nuclear balance. It would not last more than one day.

Home asked, looking at October 12 as a final date for Soviet decision, and even assuming Khrushchev makes up his mind October 1, ~~when would Couve set a date for the conference?~~ when would Couve set a date for the conference? Couve said he was not sure Khrushchev had not now made up his mind. He thought he had. Home commented that if he agreed to make an agreement with us on Berlin, he would have to incorporate its terms in the treaty. Couve said that Khrushchev had already made up his mind and knows we will ask for negotiations. All he has to do is read the newspapers.

Home said if he knows we are going to do it sooner or later, isn't there some reason for doing it sooner?

The Secretary said that he doubted whether we should consider talking about our ultimate substantive position in the near future. It seemed impossible to prevent leaks, and thus our first word would become our last word. There was some merit in postponing discussion of the Western substantive position and not disclosing it too early in advance.

Home said we could, of course, work out a position on the all-German question opposing our self-determination principle to their peace treaty. We would get stuck on this. We would then work out our position on Berlin based on the three essential conditions in the Working Group Report. This would not be too hard to do. Perhaps new ingredients like the frontier question could be added. The Secretary said if we do not establish a substantive framework for negotiations now with the Soviets, the alternatives available to us later might be even worse. He observed that

discussions were both frequent and inevitable in Moscow. It was better to have a unified discussion than to have individual discussions on/non-unified basis initiated through diplomatic channels. Khrushchev might take the initiative or other Governments might do it. He could not guarantee that we would not talk to Khrushchev during the rest of August.

Couve observed that if the Soviets can speak to the U.S. Ambassador that will be enough for them. If this is done, care should be taken that nothing comes out to the German public. Home observed that if we know the Foreign Ministers are going to meet, the Moscow probings need not be started so urgently.

The Secretary ended on the note that if nothing is happening there is always danger of tinkers and meddlers attempting to intervene.

Martin J. Hillenbrand
August 5, 1961

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Ministerial Consultations on Berlin
 Paris, August 4-9, 1961

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: August 5, 1961
 Time: 3:30 p.m.
 Place: The Quai d'Orsay

Participants:

United States

The Secretary of State
 Ambassador Bohlen
 Mr. Kohler
 Mr. Cash

United Kingdom

Lord Home
 Field Marshal Festing
 Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh
 Mr. Killick

Germany

Dr. von Brantano
 Professor Carstens
 General Schnez
 Dr. Ritter
 Mr. Weber

France

M. Couve de Murville
 M. Charles de Carbonnel
 M. Charles Lucet

Subject: First Quadripartite Ministerial Meeting on Berlin and Germany

Copies to:

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At the first quadripartite meeting of the Foreign Ministers, the following portions of the "Report of the Four Power Working Group on Germany and Berlin" were considered: 1) "Soviet Motives and Intentions"; 2) "Strengthening of the Forces of the Alliance"; 3) "Recommended Minute on Economic Countermeasures"; and 4) "Review of Berlin Contingency Plans" (Ground Access Procedures).

Couve opened the meeting by suggesting a discussion of the Working Group's Report.

In connection with the first section on "Soviet Motives and Intentions," the British asked the Germans to comment on developments in East Germany.

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When von Brentano said that he had received a telegram from Governor Mayor Brandt this morning reporting that it looks as if the "GDR" is beginning a program of harassment of intersector Berlin traffic with the first steps being taken against East Berliners working in West Berlin, he mentioned the fact that such workers were now being obliged to pay for many things (for example, their rent and utilities in East Berlin) in DM West. This is a move to eliminate their incentive to work in West Berlin. A check of identity papers is to be initiated. There are reports that S-Bahn traffic is to be halted and the passengers required to get out for inspection although there have been no concrete steps to implement this. All of these measures will affect the refugees who are still coming in record numbers. The Germans are afraid that any additional measures will simply increase these numbers by creating panic. They feel that there is now no danger of the disorders of June 17, 1953, and they are doing nothing to encourage such developments. However, the despair of the people in East Germany is increasing, and this could easily become dangerous if the Berlin door were closed.

The Secretary said it seemed to him that an attempt to seal off refugees would result in a build-up of pressure in East Germany which might lead to an explosion and precipitate the problems under consideration sooner than expected. He suggested that the Four Governments keep their members of the Washington Ambassadorial Steering Group fully informed regarding the situation in East Germany so that information could be exchanged because it is important for us to keep as alert as possible and not be caught by surprise. He thought it would be enough if the Ambassadorial Group would keep the "Soviet Motives and Intentions" section of the Working Group Report current. He felt this section was adequate as of today, but that in coming days certain priorities might emerge.

Lord Home agreed that the "Soviet Motives and Intentions" section was all right and that the Ambassadors in Washington should be the center of an exchange of information regarding East Germany.

Von Brentano said that he agreed because of the necessity of keeping this problem under current review as developments in the Zone might produce another Hungary. We must decide in advance how we would react. It was his personal opinion that it would be impossible simply to protest. He did not think West German public opinion would acquiesce if the border police and the West German army remained quietly in their barracks in such an event.

Gouve said that he agreed with von Brentano that developments in East Germany could lead to a very serious situation.

It was agreed that the Washington Ambassadorial Steering Group should keep East German developments under consideration.

The Secretary asked if it was not correct that the Federal German

Government not only did not encourage the refugees to come to West Germany but wished that they would remain in East Germany in order to keep elements there sympathetic to the West. He thought the Ambassadorial Steering Group should begin consultations as to what our attitude should be if trouble really developed. He called attention to Annex A of the "Tactics" section of the report concerning the situation in East Germany and said this subject should be given constant close attention.

Couve said that all we could do now was to refer the matter to the Ambassadorial Steering Group and ask that the Group keep its information on the situation current. Couve then suggested that the Ministers address themselves to the "Tactics" section of the Report.

The Secretary said that he thought this part of the paper came in the wrong place because it was necessary first to consider what the NATO Alliance must do in a serious effort to strengthen itself in order both to create the basis for any future negotiations and to begin to get ready for the contingency of military action. He said that the U.S., after long and careful study, had concluded that negotiations with the Soviets could not be successful under existing circumstances, i.e., until Khrushchev had been influenced by our efforts to strengthen ourselves. He stated that the first step was to consider what measures need to be taken to strengthen the West. Military steps were important not only as a demonstration of our determination but also to make our deterrent credible. Khrushchev had concluded that with the nuclear stand off he could discount the possibility of nuclear war. The U.S. felt that NATO military plans should be realized and other measures taken so that Khrushchev would conclude that the West was indeed serious about Berlin. We also should take economic measures leading to a complete blockade if necessary. Also in the propaganda field actions should be taken to create an atmosphere more likely to lead to more successful negotiations. He suggested, therefore, that the military should first consider steps to strengthen the West and save the more complex matters of "Tactics" and "Substantive Political Questions" for the next meeting.

This was agreed.

Lord Home said that the U.K. has forces all over the world, and that it did not wish to strip one area to reinforce its troops in Germany. He said, however, that the U.K. could get two light anti-aircraft regiments and one other anti-aircraft unit with guided missiles to Germany in late August or September. He said that, in addition to cancelling the withdrawal of three fighter squadrons from Germany, the U.K. will now send one additional fighter squadron and has earmarked another Canberra squadron for this purpose. He said that the British Government could concentrate a division of two brigade groups in the U.K. for reinforcing U.K. troops in Germany. One armored regiment could be brought from Hong Kong and a brigade headquarters from Cyprus. He said that these were all visible

moves that would be quickly known to the Soviets. He said that the U.K. was ready to recall reservists and to mobilize territorials which could be put in Germany in about 17 days.

Couve said that the French had problems similar to those of the British, but that their main problem was, of course, Algeria. However, they have already recalled one good division from there and would complete its reconversion for European warfare early in September. He said that they had not yet decided to recall the second division because the situation in Algeria had not developed as they had hoped. They might, however, decide to do so later. They were, however, withdrawing some Air Force personnel now to reinforce their tactical Air Force in Eastern France and in West Germany. He said that further steps would be taken if necessary. This meant the recall of reservists (which could be done in about one week) to complete divisions now in Germany. He added that they would reconsider the deployment in Algeria if this becomes necessary and would recall more reservists. All of this was under serious consideration. Nothing would be announced unless it was decided to withdraw the second division. He said that, by early autumn, the French would be ready to take the necessary steps. Lord Home said that the British steps were not very spectacular but, spread out over a period of time, they would have the desired effect.

Couve said that what the U.S. is doing is of course immense, and the other Allies should also act even if they could not do so on the same scale.

The Secretary said that the U.S. Memorandum on Berlin of July 21st shows on pages 5 thru 8 the steps we would take. We had considered when we might move into a state of national emergency and call up the Reserve and National Guard and had decided not to do so at this time particularly not to create the psychology of mobilization. We also wished to undertake measures which we could support for some time because we should think of a general strengthening for the long pull. The President can declare a national emergency and call reservists and National Guard units to duty promptly. We attach the greatest possible importance to what the NATO alliance does. Khrushchev will watch very closely, and if only one, two, or three countries act, he might conclude that there was little support for our program within the Alliance, and this could be a very serious problem. Also if Khrushchev sees troops called up without the necessary production backup, he might conclude that we are not in earnest. Our preparations to increase our strength must be such as to produce a force that could, in fact, fight. Otherwise we might produce neither the effect we wish to on Khrushchev nor the force that we might need to apply at a later date. He asked what we could do to bring about an improvement in the Alliance's readiness to fight. Should our Defense Ministers consult quite soon (that is, all the NATO Defense Ministers, not just the Four)? Other steps should be taken in a NATO-wide context. Not only the troops, but all the essential supporting elements should be ready.

Lord Home felt that a meeting of the NATO Defense Ministers might

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possibly produce some alarm. He questioned whether or not the NATO Permanent Representatives might not study the problems involved. He remarked that the British Defense Minister had talked with Secretary McNamara just the other day.

Couve suggested that when the Secretary reported to the North Atlantic Council he might raise the problem of what the others could do. He added, however, that he was not opposed to a meeting of the Defense Ministers or the Chiefs of Staff.

The Secretary said that the U.S. was not partial to any particular method but felt strongly that there should be an organized follow-up.

Von Brentano said that he was in full agreement with what the Secretary had said, and he felt that it was exceptionally important. He said that the Germans had been greatly impressed with the actions the U.S. Government was taking and with the necessity that this be a cooperative effort. He said that it was very important for the Soviets to see that the West was ready to create the necessary force and to use it if necessary. With regard to the U.S. Memorandum of July 21st, in which the US had expressed its wishes and expectations concerning contributions from its Allies, the Defense Ministers had already discussed these in Washington. Concerning the German build-up first to 9 and subsequently to 11 divisions by next year, it was necessary that specific measures be taken, but he believed it doubtful that they should take these measures prior to their elections on September 17. He felt this would lay the German Government open to accusations that could markedly affect the outcome of the elections. He felt it might be dangerous to our joint efforts if the Germans tried to move too rapidly before September 17 in that the special measures might be taken, but that in so doing the CDU/CSU might lose the election and a government come to power which would not implement these measures. He felt that the Germans must take the necessary steps, but that they must wait until after September 17. He felt that it was necessary for the Defense Ministers to agree, and perhaps this might be done within the NATO framework. He said that the Netherlands representative had explained just the other day in WEU the steps his Government was undertaking. He thought consultations should perhaps begin with the Three or Four Defense Ministers so that measures would be coordinated. He said that he was convinced that the President was right when he had said that military weakness leads to war. He said that the Germans were prepared to establish the 9 and 11 combat-ready divisions and to assign the necessary Air Force units. The Secretary said that the U.S. understood election problems, but that the next five weeks could be quite important for their effect on Khrushchev. He assumed something could be done short of full mobilization for action. He asked what the Germans could do before September 17.

that

Von Brentano replied/a few days ago the Chancellor had discussed this problem with representatives of the Defense and Foreign Ministers, and had concluded that certain build-up measures could take place and arming be

done. He pointed out that the Germans had had to build their military forces from nothing. He added that relevant statements would be made in election speeches to create the proper psychological basis for the necessary steps. He added that some measures could be taken before the elections such as holding troops scheduled for demobilization, and that other steps would be taken after the elections. He added that the necessary preparation would now be made. He concluded by saying that the Germans were ready to participate.

Lord Home asked whether there were any objections to the reinforcement of tripartite troops in Germany prior to September 17. Von Brentano assured him that there were none.

Couve said that the real problem for all of us is when to call up the reservists.

The Secretary asked whether the Germans could now make known their intentions about the first 9 divisions. Von Brentano said he could not reply because he lacked the technical knowledge, but that he thought the statement that Defense Minister Straus had made to the press yesterday in Bonn indicated that the Germans would do all that their NATO Allies expected of them.

The Secretary said that it was necessary that the Allies understand what was really in our minds. There are certain elements in the German and Berlin situation which are absolutely vital to our national interests, i.e., the presence of the Western forces in Berlin, the ability of West Berlin to live as a city, and the maintenance of its physical access to the Federal Republic and the rest of the world. He said that these were vital in the sense that we must fight in order to retain them. This was not just because of the West Berliners, Allied rights, or NATO's future (although all of these were involved), but because of the policy of the Sino-Soviet bloc throughout the world. He said that this would be a historical turning point in the great confrontation. Although Khrushchev has not spelled out exactly what he would do, we must face the prospect that he will move against West Berlin. Khrushchev thinks we would not move to nuclear war if necessary. We should, of course, protect our interests without nuclear war if at all possible, but it seems to us that Khrushchev may have made a judgment which we run the risk of not being able to reverse before nuclear bombs fall. He felt that the conventional build-up will help us to engage the Soviets fully and to convince them that if we were prepared to go so far, we would be prepared to go the rest of the way. Otherwise, Khrushchev might persist until too late. We must make Khrushchev fully understand that we will defend our vital interests regardless of the cost, and that thus Khrushchev might eventually have to face nuclear war. Couve said he entirely agreed. Lord Home said that the British felt that the build-up was necessary and probably the only way to defend our vital interests in Berlin. The Secretary wondered whether

the Ministers might not have informal consultations over night on how to proceed further, i.e., by a meeting of the Defense Ministers, or other meetings. This was agreed.

The Ministers then turned to Section V of the Report, "Recommended Minute on Economic Countermeasures". Lord Home referred to Paragraph 4 and said he proposed a build-up in the NATO program of a series of different measures progressively mounting toward an economic blockade. He said that he did not want to convey the idea of a blockade from the start and asked if this formula could be agreed. He said a number of economic measures could be taken now and the British would like to take preparatory actions concerning a number of others. He felt it was important to get the program build-up in the right way in the North Atlantic Council.

The Secretary said that he felt that there was no difference in approach. If we could agree on the most severe and the least severe actions a number of measures could be prepared between the first warning measures and a complete embargo.

Couve said that he thought that the word "blockade" was better than the term "embargo". The French had doubts concerning attempts to impress the Soviets by means of preparatory measures on economic countermeasures. Khrushchev had said many times that economic countermeasures were exactly what he anticipated, and that he would not be concerned. He might draw the conclusion that we would do nothing in addition to taking economic countermeasures. He felt that both embargo and blockade were important, but that preliminary measures might make the wrong impression.

Von Brentano, referring to Paragraph 3, said he thought that it was important to consider what type of economic measures should be taken and when. He felt it was important to act when a peace treaty was signed because the signature would be the start of a process. The conclusion of the treaty with the Soviet Zone is not an end in itself, but merely a means of carrying out further Soviet intentions. He could not envisage the continuation of inter^{zonal} trade after the conclusion of a separate peace treaty. He said that the Communists did fear economic countermeasures as had been indicated in their reaction to the West German abrogation of the interzonal trade agreement, and Khrushchev's stated willingness to accept economic countermeasures was merely an attempt to forestall them. He wondered if we should not take countermeasures of the character of a blockade when the separate peace treaty is signed.

Couve said he thought Paragraph 3 was in accordance with the German position. He felt that von Brentano had been very convincing. He was convinced that a blockade would be a strong weapon. However, considering that the signing of a separate treaty would be an aggressive act, it was necessary to consider what should be the casus belli -- the signing of the treaty or interference with our access. Von Brentano said that he was not criticizing the economic countermeasures paper which he understood,

but that it was necessary to discuss divergent views. The paper was not a decision, but rather a guide line.

Lord Home said that he had looked upon economic reaction, like military reaction, as concerning physical interference with access. He did not think signature of the treaty alone would be a cause for action. He said that he didn't much like Annex B of the "Recommended Minute on Economic Countermeasures." He pointed out that "Temporary Travel Documents" had proved we had another effective weapon. He said that, after signing the treaty, the Soviets may change nothing. He felt that the Allies must react only to actions, not the signing of a treaty. What we really need is a basket of many varied countermeasures from which to choose.

The Secretary said that we should give NATO our thinking on this subject. He suggested that the paper be given to NATO so that they could get busy and take similar action. He said that we were all agreed that economic countermeasures alone would not be decisive, but merely an auxiliary action. Other measures could be taken, for example, breaking off U.S. negotiations with the Soviets on civil air matters and cultural and scientific exchange. Economic countermeasures should be like the console of a pipe organ, on which one could pull out one, several, many, or all stops.

Von Brentano said he did not think it likely that Allied traffic would be blocked and civil traffic continued, but he could not imagine continuation of interzonal trade if Allied access was blocked. He added that the signature of a treaty alone would mean nothing if Berlin were not located where it was. But because it was where it was, the signature of the treaty would be very significant.

The Secretary said we would wish to think about this. We felt that such a treaty could not affect our rights. The real test would be what happened after the treaty was signed.

Von Brentano said this was quite right but that we all knew why Khrushchev wanted to sign this treaty. The Germans thought it would be too much to permit interzonal trade to continue after the signature of the separate treaty. The Secretary said that he doubted that the signature of the treaty alone without some further act would give us a basis on which to move.

Couve said he was not certain that the treaty was directly connected with this section of the report inasmuch as it was not mentioned therein. The convocation of the peace conference is mentioned, but the signing of the peace treaty is not. He added that there would be a psychological consequence of the signing of the separate treaty in Germany that would not occur in the U.S., the U.K., or France.

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Von Brentano said that it was right that, if the separate treaty were signed and the situation unchanged, action was not called for, but the case would be quite different if the treaty were signed and followed by cutting off Allied traffic to Berlin with a concurrent continuation of interzonal trade.

The Secretary asked whether we should not get the various economic countermeasures lined up in this paper and decide later when to apply them.

After various suggestions regarding a re-draft of the Minute, it was agreed that the U.S. would undertake this effort before the next meeting. It was also agreed that the next step was to supply the information to the North Atlantic Council. It was agreed that an embargo was essentially an economic measure, while a blockade was military, but that both should be considered by the Ambassadorial Steering Group in Washington.

The Secretary suggested that the next topic for discussion should be Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the paper "Ground Access Procedures", a portion of the Working Group Report entitled "Review of Berlin Contingency Plans". The rest of this paper could be discussed tomorrow. The Secretary said that we had considered the access procedures question in terms of the casus belli. All along we have held that the Soviets have not controlled our rights. Considering East Germans as agents of the Soviets was almost a waste of time when everyone knew that they were merely puppets for whom the Soviets should be responsible. It would be hard to convince anyone that we should go to war simply because of the substitution of East Germans for Russians at the control points. This was somewhat different from the U.S. view taken in the past, but it was felt that it was sound.

Couve said he did not see much difference between Allied acquiescence in East German execution of the procedures presently followed by the Soviets with respect to ground access to Berlin and the so-called "peel-off" procedure.

Von Brentano said he saw no basic change as long as the system would work.

Everyone agreed to A, B and C of Paragraph 2.

Couve said that he was a little at a loss to see what was meant by Paragraph D calling for a study as to whether it might be possible to extend the scope of the arrangements now governing civil traffic by having the East and West Germans at the technical level agree on procedures governing all travel to and from Berlin including Allied military traffic.

The Secretary pointed out that most Berlin traffic was handled in this way. He said that if it became necessary to talk to the East Germans concerning the Allied traffic to Berlin, we would not wish to do so, nor

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would we wish to go to war in order to avoid doing so. If the Allies talked to them, it would increase their international prestige, which we would not wish to do. On the other hand, no one would understand our going to war simply because no one would talk with the East Germans. In such a situation, it would seem preferable for the West Germans to talk to the East Germans about Allied traffic as they now do about the 95 per cent of the Allied traffic which is civilian.

Von Brentano said he understood the idea, but that it would be a mistake to think it would work. It is true that interzonal traffic and traffic from the Federal Republic to Berlin is continued on a basis of East-West German exchanges at the technical level. He added that he had never thought much of this particular arrangement, and he thought even raising the idea of the Germans handling Allied traffic on this basis would be dangerous. It would be dangerous to broach the subject to the East Germans. The East Germans would undoubtedly say that if the Allies want to talk, they (the Allies) should be the ones to do so. In this process, we would have implied that the East Germans have some right to be consulted about Allied traffic, and this could be dangerous. He said that these were merely his thoughts on the subject and not a definite German reply as no final decision had been made. Couve said that from a practical standpoint Allied traffic moves to Berlin by road, air, and rail, and under the 2 A procedure, there was no problem with road traffic. Allied rail traffic is already handled at the East-West German technical level. This left only the problem of Allied air traffic, which was handled on a purely quadripartite basis in Berlin. He asked if it might not be possible to reverse what we had done in 1948, when we ceased to travel on the ground in favor of the air, by this time ceasing to travel by the air in favor of the ground.

Mr. Kohler explained that the well-worked-out existing contingency plan provides for the operation of the ~~air~~ Berlin Air Safety Center on a "tripartite" basis without Soviet or East German participation. There are ample communication channels for making available to the East Germans the information necessary for a continuation of our flights through the corridors without necessarily jeopardizing flight safety. Therefore, no need exists for considering the control of Allied air traffic at the East-West German technical level.

It was agreed that the study proposed in Paragraph 2 D should be undertaken.

It was then agreed that this discussion covered the "Ground Access Procedures" paper, and the Ministers would discuss the "Military Aspects" section of the "Review of Berlin Contingency Plans" on August 6, 1961.

After a brief discussion of a line to be taken with the press, the meeting was adjourned.

Frank E. Cash, Jr.
August 6, 1961

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Ministerial Consultations on Berlin
Paris, August 4-9, 1961

Approved in S
8/8/61

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date : August 6, 1961
Time : 10:30 a.m.
Place: The Quai d'Orsay

Participants:

United States

The Secretary of State
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Nitze
Mr. Hillenbrand

United Kingdom

Lord Home
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh
Field Marshal Festing
Mr. Buxton

France

M. Couve de Murville
M. Charles de Carbonnel
M. Charles Lucet
M. Jean Laloy
M. Froment-Meurice

Federal Republic

Dr. von Brentano
Dr. Carstens
Dr. Ritter
Major General Schnez

Subject: Second Quadripartite Ministerial Meeting on Berlin and
Germany - Military Aspects of Contingency Planning

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The Secretary opened the discussion on the "military aspects" part of the section of the Working Group report on contingency planning by saying that the US believed the Ambassadorial Steering Group in Washington should be given broad responsibility for planning for action on a world-wide basis along the lines of para 6(a) and 6(b) of the contingency planning section of the Report. The Ambassadorial Group might need to be strengthened with more military advisers; it should study and determine what is required in this respect. The Secretary also stressed the need for better liaison between

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Live Oak and the Ambassadorial Group involving, for example, full exchange of documents. He also noted the problem raised in the US military papers circulated August 2 and August 3 about whether NATO machinery as now established is suitable for control of operations at a time when we may be moving into the actual military phase. The channel between SACEUR and Governments requires careful thinking out. The Secretary noted that, in World War II, the practice was to designate one government as the executive agent for each theater, for example the US in Europe and the UK in South East Asia. Moreover, in the Korean War, the US was so designated for UN forces. He was not now suggesting a specific solution, but the problem must be given attention. The US supported the recommendations in para 6 of the contingency plans section of the working Group report and we would welcome views of other Ministers on the two military papers.

Couve asked whether it could be taken for granted that the recommendations in para 6 ^{were} approved. There was no dissent.

Lord Home said he agreed with what the Secretary had said. The question does arise of Norstad and the NATO machinery taking control at some point and with respect to channels between SACEUR and Governments. From a preliminary look at the US papers, which are being studied in London on an urgent basis, he could only conclude that they raised certain large and controversial issues which required further thought. Field Marshal Festing suggested that studies might preliminarily be conducted in the Washington Ambassadorial Group appropriately strengthened.

The Secretary observed that we would not expect immediate agreement but would appreciate the preliminary views of others. Home referred to the expression "discreet use of nuclear weapons" as an example of a statement requiring further study. He noted that the problem of a probe in strength was something about which soldiers had strong views.

Couve said the problem always turned around how to distinguish between an operation on the ground and the beginning of war. The more this was discussed, the more difficult it became to distinguish between the two. Von Brentano welcomed the proposal for full German cooperation in the Ambassadorial Group. He noted the control problem raised by the command structure in Berlin context. Even in the case of only 3 or 4 powers there ^{is} a problem of who would decide at the crucial time, and this problem even more complicated in NATO. It was not enough to say that there would be a common decision. The North Atlantic Council was inadequate for the purpose. Its decision would come too late. Couve

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commented that it had always been envisaged that if there were to be military action on land or air, governmental decisions would be required. This was what the US papers said. The Secretary observed the paper said that under certain contingencies military action would be taken. If shooting starts, management cannot be conducted by 15-member body. Soldiers must get their orders quickly and without confusion. They could not be put in the position where every question involved elaborate political discussion. They must have clear directives and there must be effective management of the operation. Couve said that the problem arose because of changes in Western planning which started with a small problem and rose through battalion, regiment and division until now even a corps was considered by United States. More and more this was synonymous with the beginning of war. This was the reason for the difficulty of decision.

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Von Brentano said political principles must clearly have approval, but the conduct of military operations must be done in such a way as to insure clear-cut direction in a single body. No matter of who, once an operation began, soldiers must be able to act with all the ability required to carry out operation most effectively. The West had to find an answer to this problem. Home said the question required study by the Ambassadorial Group and by governments. An operation run by all Chiefs of Staff would not be much better than one run by all Governments. We were now dealing with nuclear weapons and ICBM and it was hard to see how Governments could be kept out of this. We have troops with tactical nuclear weapons, yet no one knew how to use them in the Berlin context. British military judgement re two division seemed to be that you cannot expose two valuable military units in a manner that runs the risk of losing them.

The Secretary said that, without commitment, he wanted to point out that certain political decisions are required.

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(a) As opposed to the situation of 7 years ago, we are agreed that, under present conditions, military action re Berlin is an action of last resort. We want Khrushchev to assist from interference with our access to Berlin. Measures such as an economic embargo, an air lift, and a "roaring debate" in the UN should all be resorted to prior to shooting. We distrust the idea of an insignificant military probe to test Khrushchev's intentions, either because we will know whether or the probe would be too small to test them. We therefore think non-military means must be used to the maximum before we resort to military means. If Khrushchev shoots down an airlift, the move into the second phase may come rapidly.

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- 4 -

(b) The US paper proposes to engage East German and Soviet forces with significant Allied conventional forces to confront Khrushchev with the decision before nuclear war. We do not envisage pushing two divisions down the Autobahn but would consider the entire position along the front in terms of actions to be taken.

(c) If Khrushchev^{is} not deterred, then resort to nuclear weapons would follow.

Each of these three decisions would have to be by Governments, but management of operation would be under some executive agency to be an instrument of policy agreed by Governments.

Home said that the Secretary had expressed^{the} sequence of events as he saw it. The question is how to engage Soviet forces. He frankly had not seen any possibilities which made much sense. The Secretary said broadened Live Oak planning should take up the question immediately.

Couve observed that military planning was also needed for an airlift. If it is shot at, then how would the West react? As to ground action, the question was what kind could be envisaged both to be effective and not to waste precious units. This is a very difficult problem. Home said a possibility was that the Soviets would shoot down airlift planes from ground. Then decision would be whether or not to knock out missile sites from the air. The Secretary said we would presumably want to knock them out. It would be hard to ask pilots to carry on under missile fire. This was the sort of problem the military planners would have to get into. Couve said the Ministers should accordingly ask the Live Oak group to study these two problems. At the same time, the Ambassadorial Steering Group should put into precise form the sequence of political decisions, including economic sanctions, airlift, etc. The Secretary noted that the US Secretary of State, under the American Constitution, could not instruct the military authorities. The US paper was still/draft. Governments should study it to see if they could agree or make suggestions for improvements. The Secretary observed that the Ministers were giving the Ambassadorial Steering Group a large basket of tasks and he hoped the Governments would equip it with an adequate staff.

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Ministerial Consultations on Berlin

Paris, August 4-9, 1961

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M. Charles de Gaulle
M. Charles Loez
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M. Frontol'Aurice

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Dr. von Brentano
Dr. Carstens
Dr. Ritter
Major General Schnez

Subject: Second Quadruplicate Ministerial Meeting on Berlin and
Germany - Military Aspects of Contingency Planning

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The Secretary opened the discussion on the 'Military Aspects' part of the section of the Working Group report on contingency planning, stating that the US believed the Ambassadorial Steering Group in London should be given broad responsibility for planning for action on a small scale along the lines of para 6.1 and 6.2 of the contingency planning report of the Experts. The Ambassadorial Group might need to be strengthened with more military advisers; it should study and report on the military aspects of the report. The Secretary also stressed the need for further work on

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The Secretary said that, without commitment, he wanted to point out that certain political decisions are required:

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MJHillenbrand:jg 8/7/61

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6 August 1961

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Authorized By: H. D. Brewster
August 4, 1975

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Francois de Rose, French Foreign Office Expert
Charged with NATO and Atomic
Energy Matters

Paul H. Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense ISA

PLACE:

Dinner - M. de Rose's apartment

DATE:

8:15 p.m. - August 5, 1961

De Rose asked me whether I was informed on the discussion he had with Ambassador Finletter concerning nuclear strategic matters. I said I had seen a brief report of a discussion in which he had presented to Finletter some ideas which I had understood were purely his, de Rose's, ideas and not necessarily those of his government. He said this was correct but that since that time he had explored the matter further and General de Gaulle had given his views. These did not wholly correspond with de Rose's original ideas. De Rose said he wished to explore these revised ideas with me.

He began by reviewing the history of his discussion with Finletter. He said that Finletter had indicated that the United States would under certain circumstances be prepared to forgo its unilateral veto on the use of nuclear weapons.* I replied that I presumed Finletter had suggested that we were prepared to explore guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons. De Rose indicated there were two problems involved: one was the question of guidelines; the other was the possibility of a multilateral force over which the U.S. would not have sole direction.

We then discussed the question of guidelines. I said it would seem to me not difficult to agree on two basic guidelines: one was that, in the event of unambiguous nuclear attack upon any of us, the full use of nuclears would be authorized; the second was that an all-out non-nuclear attack by the Soviets involving the deployment of additional forces from the Soviet Union would require the all-out use of nuclears. I said the more difficult questions would arise on what to do about lesser forms of Soviet attack. I pointed out

*I have subsequently checked this point with Finletter. It was de Rose who initiated the conversations and made the initial proposal. Finletter referred to the Ottawa speech but not to the U.S. veto.

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that, if we improved the non-nuclear capability of the Alliance, we should be in a position in such contingencies to have the time to take deliberate political decisions in the light of the circumstances.

De Rose questioned this point of view on two grounds. He said that on this scheme the Russians might take Hamburg and we would then have to decide what to do in the face of this fait accompli. If on the other hand we had authorized the immediate use of nuclears in such a contingency, the Russian advance to Hamburg could have been stopped before it got there. His second point was that the French lacked all information about our nuclear dispositions and their probable effects. A political judgement as to whether to initiate the type of nuclear campaign necessary to get the Russians out of Hamburg once they were there could not be sensibly made without such information.

I replied that we were firmly determined that the Russians should not be permitted to stay in any position such as Hamburg that they might have seized in a quick operation and that we would probably agree in the guidelines that if nuclears were necessary to drive them out, nuclears would be used. I said I doubted, however, whether one could provide, in advance, for the correct nuclear response to all conceivable actions. What, for instance, would be correct response to a surprise parachute drop on Hamburg? De Rose replied that he had been at Arnheim and a parachute drop wouldn't be much use to the Russians unless they could rapidly secure ground access.

On de Rose's second point, about lack of information, I said I agreed that this was a serious problem to the mitigation of which we should address ourselves. I pointed out that Norstad's plans and requirements were worked out by an international staff in which French officers participated. De Rose agreed but said the French Government, as such, had very little information and from his talks with General Beaufre, who had served on Norstad's staff, he gathered that even on the SHAPE staff one got very little information.

De Rose then turned to the major subject which he wished to discuss. He noted that Norstad's MC96 requirements included 450 MRBM's with a range capable of hitting targets well within the U.S.S.R. I pointed out that the U.S. had not approved this requirement.

He then asked me what we felt about the Germans having a strategic nuclear capability. I said we were firmly against such a development. De Rose said they completely agreed; such a development would not only greatly increase our risks from the Russians but would also be upsetting to many other countries.

De Rose said this led him to the suggestion that a distinction, organizationally, be made between tactical nuclear weapons and strategic ones (in the sense that the delivery systems could reach Russian targets). The idea

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that he wanted to explore was that tactical nuclear weapons be handled as we are now handling them, U.S. custody of warheads, stockpiling agreements, etc. The British V bombers and Thors, the five U.S. Polaris, the French "force de frappe" and that portion of the MRBM force capable of reaching Soviet targets would, however, be put into a multilateral U.S., U.K., French force. France would be prepared to buy from the U.S. the missiles which were to be stationed on French soil and attach to them French warheads. (He raised a question as to whether this would be technically feasible. I suggested he go on with the development of his idea on the assumption that it was technically feasible.)

De Rose said that, just as we were free to use SAC in our own national interest if we saw fit and the British their V bombers, so France must have the right to control the use of its strategic delivery systems and warheads stationed on its soil. De Rose said they wouldn't care how we controlled strategic delivery systems stationed on somebody else's soil. I asked de Rose how he proposed that this multilateral force be controlled, short of the withdrawal of nationally based delivery vehicles; was it contemplated that all three of us would have our fingers on the safety catches or on the triggers. He said he contemplated the former; fingers on the safety catches. He said de Gaulle has a conception that the three great Western powers can arrive at a collective consensus and that the problem of vetos or unilateral action is not as central as some others think. De Rose said he could imagine no circumstances under which France could think of fighting a strategic nuclear war alone. I said I thought their position and that of the U.K. were in this regard similar. He agreed but returned to the point that France must control its own strategic weapons on its own soil.

I then asked de Rose how he proposed to relate this U.S., U.K., French multilateral force to NATO. De Rose said this was the rub; de Gaulle would not countenance the subordination of such a force to NATO. De Gaulle held the view that none of NATO except the three of us, with the further exception of Germany, was of any substantial importance. I said I had difficulty grasping the point; under de Rose's scheme France would in any case reserve to itself ultimate control of strategic weapons upon its soil, why should one not integrate the force into NATO and coordinate its use with NATO planning. Furthermore it seemed to me that guidelines on nuclear weapons use which seemed sensible to us could probably be explained to the other NATO countries. De Rose replied that he could not argue this point with me because he agreed. Mr. de Gaulle's viewpoint was however different.

De Rose then raised the question of whether such an arrangement would, in my view, change the U.S. position with respect to exchange of atomic information. I said this was difficult; in fact, I did not believe it would. De Rose said they would not suggest we give them information on hydrogen weapons, but in the field of plutonium weapons they had already gone so far there was nothing anyone could do to prevent their having a capability and

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he could not see why we couldn't give them information they were going to get anyway and which the Russians already have.

I said this question had a long history. He said he would volunteer an answer; it was that there were 20 percent Communists in France. I said part of the history of the case was that Currie, a Communist, had at one time been head of their commission. He said that was long ago and that all Communists had been eliminated from the organization.

De Rose went on to say that the question of atomic information, even though no one talked about it, was the thing which tended to poison relations between the French Government and the United States.

In conclusion I emphasized that I was not in a position to express any governmental views on his suggestion. I was, however, returning to Washington in a week and would see that his idea was examined by the appropriate people.

De Rose suggested that Ambassador Alphand would be an appropriate channel for any further exchange of views.

Paul H. Nitze

Paul H. Nitze

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Ministerial Consultations on Berlin
Paris, August 4-9, 1961

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

2

Date: August 6, 1961
Time: 10:30 a.m.
Place: The Quai d'Orsay

Participants:

United States

The Secretary of State
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Nitze
Mr. Hillenbrand

United Kingdom

Lord Home
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh
Field Marshal Festing
Mr. Buxton

France

M. Couve de Murville
M. Charles de Carbonnel
M. Charles Lucet
M. Jean Laloy
M. Froment-Meurice

Federal Republic

Dr. von Brentano
Dr. Carstens
Dr. Ritter
Major General Schnez

Subject: Second Quadripartite Ministerial Meeting on Berlin and Germany

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Couve began the meeting by reading a cable from Moscow reporting the Fanfani-Khrushchev conversation. He particularly noted that, after the Fanfani statement that the Soviets were raising a threat of general war and were acting dangerously, Khrushchev had claimed that this would not happen but had then added that maybe the Soviets would have to shoot first if the Allies attempted an airlift. Khrushchev said that they had already shot down a U-2 once and would repeat it.

The Secretary reported the contents of Ulbricht's letter to President Kennedy delivered in Prague (reported TOSEC 12) and noted that, in accordance with agreed procedures, we would take no further action with respect to the letter.

Military matters related to contingency planning were then discussed and are separately reported.

The Secretary suggested that the Foreign Ministers might meet before leaving Paris after a text is available of Khrushchev's speech scheduled to be made tomorrow night, since they might wish to consider if it made any difference to what is being said in the present meetings. After some discussion, the question of a further meeting was left open for later decision. All agreed nothing should be said publicly about the possibility.

The Secretary said that the question raised by the Working Group paper on tactics was how the Western Powers should explore a settlement of the Berlin problem by political means. He assumed all could agree that the primary objective must be to settle it by political means rather than by war. There will, at some point, have to be negotiations with the Soviets. The Soviets have made proposals which are before the world. We cannot lead democratic countries and the NATO Alliance into war unless they are convinced that war has been imposed upon us and that every reasonable step has been taken to settle the problem by peaceful means. The Working Group had considered various ways of raising the problem, for example: by convening of a peace conference, by Ambassadorial explorations in Moscow, and by a Foreign Ministers meeting. We were dubious, the Secretary continued, about the value of a peace conference whatever its composition. We were also skeptical about an early raising of the Berlin question in the U.N. which is filled with people not deeply seized with the problem before us and inclined to avoid war at any price. This situation gave considerable advantage to the side willing to press its case most vigorously. Experience had shown that, since the Soviets generally are unwilling to grant concessions, the U.N. countries applied pressure to the Western Powers to make them. Moreover, countries which favored self-determination elsewhere seem disinclined to apply it to Europe. The Bizerte problem also had consolidated the Afro-Asian Bloc and has created a mood antithetical to the Western position on Berlin. We had considered the idea of trying to get a standstill resolution in the Security Council, and we believed that if the crisis reached a critical point it would inevitably get into the U.N. We did not, however, propose to take a U.N. initiative at this time unless this should be necessary to head off U.N. action by someone else, for example Nehru. Despite the discussion of this possibility in the Working Group paper, we did not see an opportunity for the exploration of the merits of the question through Ambassadorial consultations in Moscow. Since at some stage there must be consultation with the Soviets, we are inclined to feel that a meeting of the Foreign Ministers would be most suitable and most likely to head off U.N. action. The timing of such a meeting is of considerable importance and we assume that it should not occur before the German elections. The Secretary said he had to confess that there were some divergent views on the U.S. side regarding the timing of a conference, but on balance he thought that a meeting scheduled to take place after the Communist Party Congress but publicly known before the Party Congress would be the best solution. If a Foreign Ministers meeting could be held later rather than earlier it might somehow defer Khrushchev's timetable and it might also be followed by a possible Summit meeting or a peace conference.

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In the U.S. we had a problem about the timing of public knowledge that such negotiations would occur. The U.S. people as well as the Alliance were waiting for some initiative. There were disadvantages in waiting indefinitely, as if we feared negotiations, until the Soviets presented us with an initiative. This spoke for public knowledge of an offer to negotiate before the Soviet Party Congress, the convening of the UNGA and possibly before the Belgrade neutralist congress. Some had felt that an offer of negotiations could be interpreted as a sign of weakness. He was not sure, the Secretary observed, that the measures being taken in the military field necessarily would become more impressive with the passage of time than at the point of announcement revealing Allied unity in the decision to take them. He felt that some time in early September we should suggest that a meeting of Foreign Ministers take place late in October or early in November. This involved the possibility, of course, that the Soviets would make a counterproposal for a meeting in early October before the Party Congress. mark

As to substance, the Secretary said that he did not believe we could now write down a complete negotiating position. On the other hand, our Governments were not without many ideas on which they could promptly consult and agree. The Secretary reviewed two basic categories of proposals which the West should consider:

1. Those proposals directed to improving the situation from our viewpoint as opposed to Soviet proposals to their advantage. These might include emphasis on the principle of self-determination in Germany, a simplified Western Peace Plan, and an all-Berlin proposal perhaps with presence of U.N. observers at the critical points of access. Perhaps we could include certain security arrangements in Europe along the lines already discussed.

2. Those proposals for the inevitable point at a conference when it became clear that there was no basis for a meeting of the minds on the proposals noted. We must assume Khrushchev will probably sign a peace treaty with the GDR and will press for some sort of GDR recognition. He could have his peace treaty and his theory of the case, provided he did not put it into practice. This would not be the first time two incompatible theories have lived together if not pressed to their logical conclusions. The question of whether any aspect of general security arrangements would be pertinent at this point should be studied.

Home said he completely agreed with the Secretary's analysis. There will clearly be negotiations with the Soviets, and the question was what kind would be to our best advantage. Unless the West were very careful during the next weeks, the Soviet position would become more plausible to the outside world with its emphasis on a peace treaty and the likely offer of guarantees of access to West Berlin. Since the Western stress was now on the military buildup, the danger was that we shall appear to world opinion as the side moving towards a warlike solution of the Berlin problem. Concerning the substance, he said that he, too, was not sure how far in the next few weeks agreement had to be reached on a negotiating position on Berlin. Our aim was not to weaken Western rights but to improve our situation. He could therefore see an advantage in taking the

initiative fairly soon toward negotiations. This might help Khrushchev to postpone a peace treaty or at least to make it conditional on the GDR's acceptance of a Berlin solution agreed by him and Western Powers. Obviously, the meeting itself could not take place until after September 17. In reply to the latest Soviet note, the Western Powers could offer negotiations. The reply could go forward in a week or two, or in any event before the UNCTA met. He was not too concerned with the meeting of the neutralist countries. Moreover, while he could understand the point that, if a Western offer were made too soon after the President's speech people would relax, the Western presentation could be put in a way to avoid this effect.

Von Brentano acknowledged the danger that the Soviets may achieve some psychological success with their emphasis on a peace treaty and a free city of Berlin with guarantees. Many people believe more in words than in what is behind them. Moreover, the West must not give the impression that it is seeking a purely military solution. He also recognized that some countries might raise the Berlin question in the U.N. and this had to be watched carefully. If such an initiative threatened, the West would have to act promptly, but apart from this he agreed that a Western initiative to raise the Berlin question in the U.N. was not desirable. The U.N. Missions must be instructed to watch developments carefully. He said that he had certain reservations about the report received from the U.N. Missions and the German observer, particularly respecting the overly optimistic estimates. This report could, however, serve as a basis for further studies.

Von Brentano admitted that public opinion exercised pressures for direct negotiations, and that the idea could not be repudiated. However, as the President had said, we cannot negotiate on the basis of "What's mine is mine and what's yours is negotiable". There was no indication that the Soviets were thinking in any different terms. Negotiations under such conditions could only lead to a worsening of the status quo which is already bad enough. Events were moving swiftly. The receipt of the Soviet notes had already overtaken the Working Group report in one respect. He did not think that the German elections were an important factor in the timing of a bid for negotiations and the neutralist countries were too divided to make their conference of much relevance. However, he was concerned that an expression of willingness to negotiate under current conditions would be interpreted as a sign of weakness. Khrushchev's statements were getting stronger, not weaker, and he was stating his maximum program in ultimative terms. Accordingly, negotiations should not be proposed but also they should not be refused. W. A. P. 15

Von Brentano recapitulated the possible substance of Western proposals. A plebiscite on the all-German question emphasizing self-determination was a good idea and will be painful for the Soviets. While he had certain reservations regarding an all-Berlin proposal, he personally did not object in principle. If the Soviets refused it, it might be easier for the West to refuse the discussion of partial solutions. The Western Peace Plan might be revised to eliminate obsolete portions and to simplify it for better public understanding.

Couve repeated essentially the same arguments on negotiations as he had advanced the day before. He argued that while the problem is one of tactics and of substance, substance must command tactics. Khrushchev keeps

repeating the same line publicly and privately. Everyone seemed to be prepared to repeat the 1959 Geneva performance for the first half of the conference, but the West had to be realistic. If it raised the all-German question first, the discussion would not last more than twenty-four hours. The concept of a protracted meeting with the Soviets on a German settlement seemed utterly unrealistic. The only thing that can really be discussed with the Soviets is the problem of Berlin, and this did not mean the reunification of Berlin. He could not be as optimistic as Lord Home and talk in terms of "improving" our position. It was irresponsible to propose negotiations without knowing what the West is prepared to do. This was a difficult and disagreeable responsibility which had to be faced. The first step is to reply to the last Soviet note and to express the view that for the West, negotiation is the proper way to settle this important problem. However, he did not think we should say we are prepared to negotiate on a German settlement since the Soviets would merely say: "let us call a peace conference". Perhaps the West might indicate that it is prepared to discuss all the problems at issue between us without pre-conditions. The Western Foreign Ministers should meet again in mid-September before taking any final decision. Meanwhile, however, we must study what is negotiable with the Soviet Union. The Secretary's timetable for actual discussions might be correct, but he did not think that we should now proclaim that we are going to propose negotiations.

Home said that he agreed that we should insist on the absence of pre-conditions in offering negotiations, but we could not expect Khrushchev to retract publicly. He referred to a cable just received from Ambassador Roberts in Moscow stating that unless the West had definite proposals, any Ambassadorial approach would only bring from Khrushchev a repetition of the standard position in harder terms or persuade him that we were threatening him and he should act. As to substance, Home agreed that a debate on the all-German question would not last long, but it might be of considerable value to the West in exposing Soviet opposition to self-determination. As to Berlin improvements, he was not sure, if Soviet guarantees on presence and access were obtained, that the West would not be better off than it is now.

The Secretary said that, as the first order of business, we would want to work out the details of counterproposals on Germany and Berlin. We had agreement on general principles and these could be put together quickly. It will be more difficult to work out a fall-back position. He did suppose, however, that we could spin out the discussion on public proposals more than twenty-four hours. It would not be a negotiation in the classic sense, but a debate in which we could discuss both their proposals and ours showing the hollowness of Soviet claims compared to their performance since 1944. He hoped that we would not have to leave to a Western Foreign Ministers' meeting just before the UNGA the question of whether there would be negotiations, though the final preparation of proposals might be left for such a meeting. When the West looked down the path leading to a possible nuclear combat (at this point the Secretary suggested that the other Foreign Ministers might usefully be briefed on the implications of this), he doubted that the Soviets are not aware of the true situation, and he could not be worried that they would feel that we were weak. They knew better.

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In response to a query from Couve, the Secretary said that, if we responded to the Soviet notes by the end of August or early in September, we might in our reply propose the time and the form of negotiations. This could be followed by a meeting of the Western Foreign Ministers just before the UNGA meeting. This seemed a reasonable combination. He was not enthusiastic about engaging in merely another polemical exchange with the Soviets. This added nothing and was not dignified for the Four Great Powers. The responsible Governments had to move the situation somewhat if they were to preserve the support of Western opinion. Home asked whether it might not be a good idea to propose negotiations for sometime in November and say at the same time that the Western Foreign Ministers would meet after the German elections to consider their position. He suggested that the formula "negotiation on the outstanding problems between us" without pre-conditions could be suggested. The Secretary said he did not know if the West wanted to get into such matters as the stationing of forces abroad, foreign bases, or Laos or disarmament which is being discussed elsewhere.

Couve continued to oppose the idea of suggesting a date for negotiations. He suggested a short reply to the Soviets, perhaps of one or two pages, avoiding repetitive arguments and ending by saying that the West is always prepared to examine the possibility of coming to an agreement on questions in dispute, taking account of the positions of all concerned and under conditions of equality and mutual respect. If the West made specific all-German proposals in a note, they would certainly be rejected and the Soviets would answer with their peace treaty line. Home said that he did not much like a general reference to the willingness to negotiate. People would question Western sincerity since that has been said so often before.

Couve said he was not certain that the Soviets would accept a conference without conditions. The Secretary responded that Soviet rejection would be a demonstration that the Soviets, after talking about negotiations, were now refusing them. Couve argued that, rather than be rebuffed, it would be better for the West to state its position in a general way not involving questions of prestige or substance. The notes could be sent before the end of the month and the West could then see how the Soviets react.

Von Brentano observed that the West did not have to use the exact words in the Soviet notes but could merely state that the Soviet statements showed great differences to exist on the problems of Germany and Berlin and that, taking account of the general state of tension, the Western Powers thought this should be discussed in negotiations.

The Secretary noted one possibility, which he was not sure he thought well of. The Western replies might end with a statement along the lines suggested by Couve and von Brentano but add that the Western Foreign Ministers are planning to attend the UNGA and would take advantage of the presence of Foreign Minister Gromyko to discuss possible arrangements for negotiations. This might be enough to head off Nehru. Home said he was not sure this was not a good idea. The Foreign Ministers agreed to consider this idea further at the afternoon session.

Martin J. Hillenbrand
August 7, 1961

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MINISTERIAL CONSULTATIONS ON BERLIN
Paris, August 4-9, 1961

Approved in S
8/8/61

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: August 6, 1961
Time: 4:30 P.M.
Place: The Quai d'Orsay

Participants:

United States

The Secretary of State
Mr. Kohler
Ambassador Bohlen
Mr. Lampson

United Kingdom

Lord Home
Field-Marshal. Festing
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh
Mr. John Killick

Germany

Dr. von Brentano
Professor Carstens
General Schneetz
Dr. Ritter

France

M. Couve de Murville
M. Charles de Carbenel
M. Charles Lucet
M. Jean Laloy
M. Froment-Meurice

Subject: Third Quadripartite Meeting on Berlin and Germany

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The French Foreign Minister opened the third quadripartite meeting by referring to the discussion at previous meeting about timing of negotiations. Lord Home asked whether the others had thought over the Secretary's final suggestion at the morning meeting that our answer to the Soviet Note of August 3 might express readiness to meet with Gromyko while he was in New York attending the UN General Assembly to discuss the possibility for arrangements for negotiation. He pointed out that this might give the West a little leeway by postponing the next round until after the German elections.

Brentano said

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/EPC/CDR Date: 8/21/63

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Brentano said he thought it would be inappropriate to mention German elections in any reply to the Soviets because this would be of little interest to the USSR. He said they should not play a part in the considerations of the West in regard to the timing of the next move. However, he questioned the advisability of proposing to discuss the Berlin question with Gromyko while he was at UNGA. There was danger that such a step might create an unintentional impression that the West was thinking of bringing the Berlin question into the UN.

Couve agreed. He thought that it would be better to speak about negotiations in Western replies without making any specific suggestions as to timing. Substance and tactics were very much mixed up together. They must be careful not to have the Russians misjudge our intentions or give them an opening which might embarrass us. He would prefer not to commit us to talking with Gromyko on Berlin in New York. There would be an opportunity at that time to decide whether this would be a wise thing to do. To commit West in advance to such discussions seemed to be going too far. It would be unwise to make a precise offer to negotiate before we have even discussed substantive positions. It would be premature to send a note between August 20 and the end of the month taking such a step. This would be far ahead of the schedule which we are told Khrushchev is going to follow. In mid-September we still would have time to take any necessary steps. We are not in an easy situation at present time. The Soviet note was the most violent one we have received. We are awaiting Khrushchev speech tomorrow which is likely to be very violent, especially after the new Russian success in space. Couve questioned whether this was the proper time to make such a gesture. No doubt it would be much welcomed by many persons in the West but how would it be judged in the East? The latter question is the one which should mainly concern us.

The Secretary pointed out that more than sixty Foreign Ministers would be at the General Assembly in September. There was bound to be a great deal of talk about Berlin during the session. The Soviet representatives will certainly talk a great deal about it. If we are wise we will do so also. The major matter we will be asked about will be our willingness to negotiate. The Secretary said that he could not add to points he had made in the morning session as to an initiative with the Soviets for negotiation. He did not suppose the Foreign Ministers could reach agreement at this meeting on this point. The question would be taken up through diplomatic channels between Governments. He could not agree to postponing an initiative on proposing negotiations or arrangements for negotiations until September.

He then

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He then emphasized the importance of having the Ambassadorial Group move on swiftly in the task of defining negotiating positions. He also asked whether it was necessary to answer the Soviet note at present. It might be preferable not to answer it for the time being unless we could put forward a position.

Couve agreed it might not be necessary to answer the note now but thought it useful to send an answer as soon as we could agree on one.

Home pointed out the danger of too many public statements. Statements tended to harden our positions. Meanwhile our military buildup would be progressing. This might make trouble with uncommitted countries who would think we were being bellicose and unreasonable. For example, there might be trouble with Nehru. He said he had been emphasizing in speeches the advantages of pursuing explorations with Soviets through the quiet unobtrusive channels of diplomacy. It might be possible to hold the line in this way until September. He threw out this idea but rather thought that it would not be enough.

Brentano thought that there might be some possibility of arranging for preliminary talks. Our reply to the Soviet note might merely express readiness to discuss the questions of time and place. He thought the strongest argument against proposing talks with Gromyko in New York was the implication regarding action in the UN. However, although he had reservations he was prepared to withdraw his objections if the others agreed this was the right thing to do.

In reply to a direct question from Home whether the matter could be contained in diplomatic channels for the time being, the Secretary replied he was not sure these contacts would deal with enough substance to support this approach for long.

Home then outlined some possible advantages of such a method. By advocating diplomacy through quiet ambassadorial exchanges the Governments might lead people to expect little by way of publicity. He agreed, however, that the line could not be held for long in this way. We would be pressed to hard to explain how we are responding to Soviet offers to negotiate.

The Secretary summarized the discussion by pointing out that the Foreign Ministers had agreed to instruct the Ambassadorial Group to work on possible negotiating positions.

As to.../

As to timing they were really not too far apart. It seemed that negotiations would probably take place in mid-October or early November. They agreed that they should be on the Foreign Minister level. The principal unresolved question was under what conditions and at what time we should publicly seek such negotiations. In an attempt to meet the views of the others he had proposed the idea of telling the Soviets that they would talk about the matter with Gromyko in New York. There is no doubt that Berlin will be intensely discussed in New York. The Secretary said that he would raise the whole question with the President. Then he explained the U. S. Government's concern with the need for maintaining the confidence of the American people, the Alliance and people throughout the world. Possibly others evaluated this matter differently. We looked upon it as a highly important element in the functioning of a large and disparate democracy. The reactions of the American people to world opinion should also not be overlooked. The Secretary ended his recapitulation by repeating that he could not agree to postponing decisions on when to negotiate in the way that had been proposed in their discussions.

Home said he found the Secretary's position sensible. He had very much the same point of view.

The Secretary then said he hoped that the difference of view on this one question would not obscure the very large amount of agreement which had been reached between them. The disagreement was really over rather a narrow point.

Home emphasized that they must all be careful not to give the appearance of serious disagreement. He threw out the suggestion that perhaps people did not ask questions in France or if they did they did not receive answers. Couve replied the French were like everybody else.

The Ministers then discussed the question of whether there should be a communique. The Secretary pointed out the difficulty of issuing a communique which had any substance in it before he had reported to NATO. The North Atlantic Council was very sensitive to being made to look like a rubber stamp. The Ministers agreed that a formal communique should not be issued. They decided to call in the information officers at the end of the meeting to furnish them a common line for giving background information to the press.

Couve then discussed the work of the Ambassadorial Group in Washington. In his view the work in Washington should be carried on by the same persons who had been doing

it in Paris...

it in Paris - or as nearly so as possible. They had more expertise generally on this subject, than Embassy staffs. Brentano agreed this would provide much needed continuity but was not sure how much he could spare Carstens from the Foreign Office. Home was unwilling to promise that Shuckburgh could work without interruption in Washington, but thought the Washington group could be reinforced from time to time. The Secretary commented they did not want anyone who could be spared.

Couve thought that the planning and preparation of an information program could be done in Washington. The Secretary turned attention back to a substantive question - namely a plebiscite in West Berlin which had important information aspects as well. This was quite different from making plebiscite proposals to the Soviets. The aim was to give the Berlin population an opportunity to demonstrate again, as they had in the 1958 Berlin elections, their overwhelming support for Allied presence and Allied rights in Berlin. This would greatly strengthen the Western posture. He thought this would be very helpful. He asked for German views.

Brentano said that he had discussed this with Mayor Brandt. Both thought it an excellent idea. He said that they would be able to make a definite recommendation to the Ambassadorial Working Group in ten days. The Berlin election was now very remote in time and it would be excellent to give the Berliners a chance to vote again. No doubt they would vote overwhelmingly in favor of the present status of the city. The best way to impress world opinion would be to invite observers from all countries to come to watch the plebiscite. It would have a very strong effect.

Home said it would be wise to have the plebiscite supervised by some impartial plebiscite commission in order to convince non-committed people that the vote had been genuinely free. He doubted, however, that the UN would be willing to take on the job of supervision.

Couve raised the problem of the relationship of a plebiscite to Western rights. It was very important to see to it that a plebiscite did not create the impression that our presence in Berlin was based from something other than our rights derived from the defeat and surrender of Germany. The Soviets would try to exploit this possibility. He also questioned whether it would not have to be the Allies who initiated the proposal.

Brentano said it was very important from the public opinion point of view that the initiative seems to come spontaneously from the Berliners. He saw no legal difficulty

in this./

-6-

The Berlin Senate and House of Representatives could propose this to the Berlin Kommandatura which would not exercise its veto and then the plans could go forward. He pointed out the disadvantage of proposing a UN supervision of the plebiscite because this would certainly lead to a UN debate on Berlin. He believed invitations to observe would do the trick. This should create a great impression. Nothing like this had ever been done in the Communist Bloc. Brentano reassured Couve that there could be no question as to the result.

Couve returned to the difficulty of having a plebiscite under an occupation. Brentano said that the Berliners and the Federal Republic would work out a possible question and submit it to the Ambassadorial Group for approval. He then emphasized the importance of keeping secret the fact that the idea had been put forward by the Working Group. It was essential that it appear to be a spontaneous idea of the West Berliners. They must take the first public step. He urged the greatest caution and thought it might be better to wait until he had returned to Germany before the idea was launched in Berlin. Then there would be less danger of it appearing to have been arranged in Paris. Home again urged that some sort of supervision be arranged so that it would not look like a put-up job. The Secretary pointed out it was a question of observation not supervision. Brentano suggested as a possible question: "Do you wish the Western Powers to continue to exercise their rights in Berlin and continue to protect/freedom of the population of Berlin?" He said that he would recommend a question after consultations in Berlin. Couve again warned against casting any doubts on the validity of Western rights.

The Secretary asked whether the Report of the Working Group on Information could be put before NATO. The Ministers agreed that it could and approved the report. They also agreed to submit to NATO Section I and V of the Working Group Report (The Soviet Intentions and Economic Countermeasures papers respectively), but Section II Tactics and Section III Substantive Political Questions would not be given to NATO. Section V was approved after amendments to paragraphs 3 through 7 were accepted.

The Ministers agreed that the questions discussed in the section entitled Substantive Political Questions together with the agreed German addendum should be further studied by the Ambassadorial Group. The problems of military preparations should be discussed in NATO. This was NATO business. The Secretary said he hoped other Permanent Representatives of the other Three would tell NAC of their military plans after he had finished speaking on Tuesday. He would be speaking only for his own Government. He was going to give NATO more than was in the President's speech.

The Ministers.../

-7-

The Ministers then called in the information officers and discussed how to handle the press. Brentano argued against a communique on the ground that every word would be compared with previous communiques. Any variations noted would result in endless speculation in the press.

The Ministers agreed to have no formal communique. They worked out a common line for background press briefing with emphasis on complete unity of approach. Couva suggested that the answer to questions about what is a reasonable basis for negotiation should be: no preconditions and freedom for each party to discuss his position. The Secretary suggested as a definition of an unacceptable basis for negotiation the phrase in the President's speech "What is mine is mine and what is yours is negotiable."

The Ministers agreed to say that the possibility of a summit meeting with Khrushchev had not been discussed. If asked whether there would be another Western Foreign Ministers meeting they would reply they would undoubtedly be seeing one another in New York.

The Secretary made the point that this meeting should be treated a part of a process of continuing consultation which had gone on previously and would continue for weeks and months ahead. There was nothing sudden or climatic about it.

Home wondered how questions on preparatory measures should be handled. He did not want to describe them too far in advance of their implementation. The Ministers agreed to use the phrase that they had "agreed on the necessity of certain preparatory measures." The meeting closed with the Secretary stressing the desirability of emphasizing unity. The Ministers agreed to use the phrase "complete unity of approach."

SECRET

Edward T. Lampson
August 6, 1961

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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American news and comment. Most Tuesday papers feature Khrushchev Threatens Buildup, some adding Asks Negotiation; most frontpage West Winds Up Paris Talks, also Twenty Billions For Latin America. Inside stories say Washington cool to Khrushchev talk. Comment on Khrushchev speech, also East German situation.

Paris Stories. AP Reedy Phila Inquirer, inside, reports West starts task building strength while seeking avoid its use over Berlin. Rusk will recommend NATO addition 80,000 men. Experts working on ways impress Russians West won't back down, but willing negotiate if basis reasonable. Westerners elated by Bonn support. In Asia discussions Rusk said American help improving South Viet-Nam's battle against infiltrators. Chitrib UPI stresses agreement to increase Central Europe units if Russians refuse reasonable line on Berlin. High diplomatic source says Southeast Asia crisis slightly eased but remains more than theoretical chance war in Europe. Absence of statement indicated work far from complete, standing committee will ~~ex~~ continue. Formal offer negotiations put off till end September, permitting strengthening

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Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and

P/POS:MKennedy:md 8/8/61

Classification approved by:

P/POS:HSEaster

Clearances:

S/S-RO: Mr. Gannon

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Western military posture.

Washpost Root stresses Western harmony, citing absence Bizerte discussion, Couve having informed two colleagues privately. Asia Africa discussions broke up without press briefings. Rusk sees Vietnamese situation eased and good chance early settlement Laos. Ministers reportedly discussed blockade of Baltic and Black Seas though this could cause good deal anguished reflection by NATO countries bordering exits. Baltsun Shaw says speed on Asia Africa made clear Berlin most critical issue. Complete world-wide agreement not claimed, Rusk making clear US would welcome more active French participation stabilizing Congo. Stoneman in Phila Inquirer reports top military men deadly serious about present situation, some calling chances military conflict greatest of past five years. Nytimes Doty stresses Paris accomplished all expected. Timing of talks will emphasize Khrushchev upsetting status quo.

Department
Washington Stories. Note President State ~~Department~~ /silent on Khrushchev speech for present. Hertrib Donovan says some found Khrushchev on blockade and access encouraging, but State Department officials said nothing new and doubted significance these remarks.

Noon Papers. Washstar banners Capital Skeptical Of Soviet Offer, frontpages Latins Cheer Aid Plan, also Rusk Seeks Support On Berlin. AP reports ministers delegated Rusk to seek support of smaller NATO nations in case of Berlin showdown. Ministers may refrain commenting

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Khrushchev speech since decided push ahead with constructive strategy rather than react every Russ move. Washnews Paris UPI reports US Seeks Increase Allied Power. Rusk will ask beefing up military strength without delay. Expected to declare more than theoretical chance of war.

Comment. Baltson calls Khrushchev speech deft performance, mingling threat of force with conciliatory phrases. Well aware world political effects and military threat implied by space lead. Threat of force, indeed, underlies whole speech. N.Y. Journal says we must not be intimidated by military implications space feat. Already our firmness forced Khrushchev soften threats against Berlin. Must continue call his bluff.

Hertrib, Nytimes, Washnews all agree relatively peaceful side balanced by tough, warlike talk, suppressed facts, falsehoods. Call for conference would be welcomed if he had explicitly withdrawn single one of contentions which created crisis, says Hertrib. CBS Marvin Kalb and Hottelet, NBC Wills make same point. Re no blockade pledge, Hertrib notes he still proposes put Berlin access under East German puppet, compel West deal with it. If really wants agreement, one can be reached that would leave Soviet and its satellites in no worse strategic situation than before.

Scripps-Howard Shackford says careful reading latest Soviet note, speech confirms there is no chance honest negotiations for German solution; East-West meeting which seems inevitable will be primarily

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talk to lower temperature. Seldom has Khrushchev reached extremes of falsification as yesterday. His double standard on self-determination issue unlikely be missed by neutrals.

But Washnews says at least repeated wish to talk rather than fight. This attitude must be encouraged, both by repeated evidences our willingness negotiate actual grievances and by tightened defenses. Washpost says evident Kremlin embarked upon massive campaign switch responsibility for Berlin tension to Western refusal sign peace treaty with Pankow. If we let him get away with this, will be our fault. Really significant thing is backdown from earlier militance, invitation to talk. This may damp down threat war, provided West couples defense measures with equally careful diplomatic preparations.

Nytimes and Washstar agree if Khrushchev makes recognition Western rights obligation of both Soviets, East Germans, West can live with situation created by separate peace treaty. But Star unlike most commenting, says speech not threatful, omitted expected boasting rocket superiority.

Some in Congress, like Fulbright, feel Khrushchev more positive than before re no blockade, non-interference West rights. Fulbright added if can depend on words. Sen. Cooper said we should talk to Khrushchev now to see what guarangees willing to give re access routes. Aiken said time for both sides stop shaking missiles, start talking. But Kuchel did not like belligerent tone speech. Dodd labeled it usual quota lies, distortions, saber rattling.

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Could Lincoln find Stevenson assessment Khrushchev's conciliatory attitude at variance with President's. Evident liberal elements in Administration taking road which could lead to appeasement. Such differences among President's advisers could lead to even more disastrous experience over Berlin than Cuban fiasco.

Time, Newsweek note Titov's flight carefully timed add weight Khrushchev's words. Both see talks on Berlin inevitable. Thanks to US determination, rapid military buildup and united will, US negotiators can undertake talks with more face cards in their hands, says Time. One of these was realization unrest East Germany poses real trouble for Khrushchev. Phila Inquirer says flight East Germans likely to be more significant for future course mankind than Titov flight.

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AMEMBASSY BONN 311
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 380

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Dept has noted apparent divergence in West German official thinking

on FedRep reaction to Hungary type uprising in Saxony. Brechtano's

QTE personal opinion UNQTE in REFTEL seems envisage military support for

uprising, e.g., West German public opinion would not support policy of

border police and army QTE remaining quietly in barracks UNQTE in event

uprising. During July visit here Strauss gave both public and private

statements that independent FedRep action not RPT not being considered.

Also implied border units disciplined to refrain rash action and Bundeswehr

under full control. While Department believes that this sounder view of

Strauss does represent FedRep policy, Secretary may wish consider

comment
inviting Adenauer to ~~offer~~ ~~comment~~ this point at Thursday meeting.

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Drafted by:

EUR:GER: JKHolloway:fw 8/8/61

Telegraphic transmission and
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Clearances:

GER - Mr. Vigdeman (in draft)
S/P - Mr. Over (in draft)
S/S - Mr. Grant

MR - Richard H. Davis

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ESB

Ministerial Consultations on Berlin
Paris, August 4-9, 1961

Approved in S
8/9/61

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: August 8, 1961
Time: 6:00 p.m.
Place: Elysée Palace

Participants:

United States

The Secretary of State
Ambassador Gavin
Minister Lyon

France

President de Gaulle
M. Adronikoff, Interpreter

Subject: Berlin

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OSUN
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RM/R-

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The Secretary expressed appreciation for the President's remarks and said that he brought the best wishes of President Kennedy to President de Gaulle.

The Secretary continued by saying that President Kennedy had charged him to do all possible to further the matter of consultation which President Kennedy had discussed with President de Gaulle and said he hoped that President de Gaulle would be satisfied with what had been accomplished in this connection.

SECRET

- 2 -

Obviously the Three Powers will be in close consultation in the coming months. In Washington, he himself met regularly with the British and French Ambassadors, he had asked the Pentagon to furnish such military help as seemed desirable, and we would welcome any military officials that the French cared to send to participate in this work. The Secretary continued that at least three meetings between the three Foreign Ministers were in view, one before the General Assembly, one before any possible Four Power meeting with respect to Berlin, and one before the NATO meeting in December. There would also probably be a Chiefs of Governments meeting.

President de Gaulle replied that this type of consultation was all to the good but not exactly what he had had in mind. There was no objection whatsoever to the Ambassadors' meeting in Washington but this was not as he had seen it. He had envisaged a special body such as the Allies had maintained in permanent session following the Versailles Treaty for political cooperation between governments to deal with both political and military matters. The United States did not see it that way. That was all right, the President said, and then asked Secretary Rusk how he thought the Ministers' meeting, which had just taken place, which was necessary, and in which Mr. von Brentano participated, had gone.

The Secretary said he thought the meetings had gone well. He said that there had been a large degree of unity insofar as the conversations had proceeded. There were still many points to be formalized with respect to military matters, economic matters, psychological matters, but good progress had been made. Further progress was required on Contingency Planning and certain other matters which effect better solidarity. They had not really attempted to formulate a program. There was one matter, the Secretary continued, which concerned President Kennedy. He felt that by early September we would have to indicate publicly that we would be entering negotiations with the Russians, perhaps at the end of October or early November. He did not feel that we could postpone too long the knowledge that negotiations would take place. Mr. Khrushchev talks of negotiations. He talk of negotiations. We are asking a great deal on the part of our people. They will be anxious for us to carry out negotiations before they are faced with the possibility of war.

President de Gaulle replied that the Foreign Minister had told him of our views on this matter. There were, he said, various ways of handling the question of Berlin. Mr. Khrushchev had created the situation. He could say to him, "No, we will not change the status of Berlin. We will not have our rights interfered with. We are there legitimately. We have been there for sixteen years. If you change the status of Berlin by force, we will reply by force. There is another way, such as you Americans propose. You have your views, the British have a view, we have our view. They are not all the same. It is difficult for us to reach common agreement. I know you are thinking that you must negotiate with the Soviets to satisfy your public opinion. I understand your view. If you see there is something

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- 3 -

[Which develops from these negotiations which is worthwhile, we will join you. But you really are doing it on your own account. In fact, you have really begun already. Mr. McCloy has seen Mr. Khrushchev; Mr. Thompson has had conversations too. If you had taken the first course, we would have been with you but this way is not our way. We don't like the idea of commencing negotiations without knowing what we are negotiating about. But it is quite natural for you Americans, you are far away and you are in a hurry with respect to Berlin. You are not Europeans. You are naturally very concerned about Berlin, but not as immediately nor as directly as we are. We here in Europe are much more directly concerned. But we have no objections. Please go on with your probing, we have nothing against it. Tell us if you find some substance in these negotiations and we shall join you.]

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A second point, the Secretary said, and he wished to make this extremely clear, was that we had no intention of withdrawing from Berlin. We had no more intention of doing so than had France. We regarded Berlin with the greatest seriousness. The Secretary said he wished to remove any other impression which President de Gaulle might have in this connection.

[President de Gaulle said that he was very interested in the Secretary's remarks. However, if one were to engage with Mr. Khrushchev one would have, as the diplomats say, to reach a conclusion. To reach a conclusion with him, one would have to compromise. Either you reach no result or you give up something. If you give up anything, the situation gets more and more difficult, eventually intolerable. However, if you want to probe, we have no objection.]

The Secretary said that we don't envisage that negotiations need lead to a compromise. We have no intention of giving our rights away. In fact, the Secretary said, he recalled one negotiation which led to improvement in our situation; in 1949 the negotiations with respect to the blockade. If we get nowhere in negotiations, we intend to make it clear to Mr. Khrushchev that we stand by our rights. We can't prevent his signing a piece of paper, a peace treaty, but we shall make it clear to him that we won't sign it and we won't be influenced by that piece of paper.

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The Secretary said that what was proposed by Mr. Khrushchev need not be a basis for the proposals of the West.

[Still, de Gaulle replied, negotiations will be started because Mr. Khrushchev has whistled.]

The Secretary asked President de Gaulle how he saw the Berlin matter developing.

[At first President de Gaulle misunderstood the question and said that if nothing from outside occurred, there would be no problem in Berlin, which had lasted now for sixteen years. Mr. Khrushchev had created the problem, otherwise it would not exist. Berlin could have gone on living as it had. The situation in Berlin was not impossible. In fact, the West Berliners were quite well off, but Khrushchev was compelling us to negotiate.]

Then President de Gaulle explained that he hadn't quite understood the question and said that he himself had explained to Mr. Khrushchev that it would be impossible to have East-West negotiations under the circumstances of cold war which he was creating. If he was serious about trying to reach an accord with the West, he should not have picked on Berlin. However, if he undertook to threaten and issue "dictats", there could be no serious negotiations. President de Gaulle believed that we should explain this to the people of the world. With Khrushchev behaving the way he was, we should have to either compromise with him and avoid war or not compromise with him and face war. Thus, we should not negotiate because he summons us. But, de Gaulle said, he realized there were sound reasons for the Americans' feeling as they did, but the French did not want to negotiate for the sake of negotiating.

The Secretary remarked that if we should reach a crisis over Berlin through some rash act of Mr. Khrushchev's prior to negotiation, we would not be able to aid Europe since the Western Alliance would not allow us to do so. The members of the European Alliance would demand negotiations beforehand.

President de Gaulle replied he understood our position. We were not in Europe. We would have to come to Europe and fight and die in Europe. But the Europeans had a different point of view. They were not in a hurry. If the negotiations between West and East were lost, then Germany would be lost and this would be very difficult for France, but again President de Gaulle said there was no objection to our probing. He understood our desire to establish contact with the Soviets but so far he saw no reason for doing so.

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The Secretary thanked President de Gaulle for his views and said we would keep in touch with him. He said he must repeat that there was absolutely nothing tentative in our commitments with respect to Berlin. He said it would not be a question of Americans coming to Europe to die but tens of millions would die in the United States for Berlin "as you will die in Europe over Berlin." We are extremely serious in this.

President de Gaulle said he had only remarked what he had because the Secretary had indicated that if there were no negotiations beforehand the United States could not come to Europe.

The Secretary said he wanted to make this very clear because he thought there might be a misunderstanding. He had said that it could not be possible for us to come to Europe because the Western European Alliance would not permit us to defend the Alliance without having tried negotiations first.

President de Gaulle asked what was the Western Alliance? France would want us to come.

The Secretary remarked that this was quite a different question.

President de Gaulle thanked the Secretary for this clear explanation.

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Ministerial Consultations on Berlin
Paris, August 4-9, 1961

Approved in S
8/9/61

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: August 8, 1961
Time: 6:00 p.m.
Place: Elysee Palace

Participants:

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Ambassador Gavin
Minister Lyon

President de Gaulle
M. Adronikoff, Interpreter

Subject: Berlin

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8/16/61
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~~SECRET~~
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Approved in S,
10/1/61

Date: August 9, 1961

Place: Palazzo Chigi, Rome

Present: Secretary of State Rusk
Ambassador Reinhardt
Prime Minister Fanfani
Foreign Minister Segni
Colonel Vernon A. Walters

Distribution:
See last page.

After exchanging the usual amenities, the Secretary said that he wished to thank the Prime Minister for the actions of the Italian Permanent Representative to NATO who had been the first to reply to the Secretary's statement (on Berlin) to the Council in a most vigorous and forthright fashion and had, in a sense, set the tone of resolute firmness which had prevailed. The Prime Minister thanked the Secretary and added that very precise instructions to this effect had been sent to the Italian Ambassador at NATO.

The Secretary then asked the Prime Minister whether anything new had transpired in his talks with Khrushchev that we did not already know. Fanfani replied that he had sent the NATO allies a summary of their talks and the Secretary said that he was most grateful for this. He said President Kennedy had not been aware until the previous day that he would be coming to Rome, but that he knew the President would be delighted as he remembered how useful and helpful the talks had been that he had had with the Prime Minister in Washington. The Prime Minister expressed his appreciation and added that these talks had been very helpful to him also. He said that Khrushchev had repeated his position with no evident change and had repeated his usual threats but always interspersing them with the reiteration of the fact that he really wanted to negotiate on a logical, practical base. But to him, a logical base meant taking his proposals as a basis for discussions and seeing what else he could get.

Khrushchev's Personality

In reply to a question by the Secretary, Fanfani said that Khrushchev is a very interesting personality. He alternates cajolery and threats, but Fanfani humorously indicated that there had been little

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cajokery during their talk with Khrushchev. He said that Khrushchev's greatest fear was to be thought a coward or appear to be a coward in the eyes of the Russians, and his second greatest fear was Germany. The third factor which influenced his personality was the inferiority of the Russians vis-a-vis the West. They had made great strides in space but were extraordinarily backward in other fields, particularly agriculture. Both he and Foreign Minister Segni were former Ministers of Agriculture and were struck by some of the backwardness in this area. Secretary Rusk confirmed this experience, mentioning that once he had attempted to talk to the Russians about this and had said that they should not necessarily take the United States as an example but observe what the Swiss and the Swedes did; however, the Russians had been offended. Foreign Minister Segni said the Russians had shown them as a great achievement some fruit from Kazakhstan and he commented grimly, "they showed us - one of the greatest fruit producing nations in the world - some miserable fruit that an Italian peasant wouldn't even consider eating, as if it were a great achievement." Fanfani added that "they showed us a hydrofoil and claimed that it was a great Russian invention. Actually it was invented by a German - the Italians bought the patent many years ago and have had hydrofoils operating in Italy for many years now." Fanfani felt that these fears and this inferiority complex should not be underestimated and added that anything we could do to give Khrushchev the opinion that we did not look down on him or did not scorn him would be useful in soothing his irascible temperament.

The Italian Prime Minister also felt that Khrushchev was probably under greater pressures than we imagined from within the Soviet Union and China. He said that on his arrival he had made it plain that the Italians had come to the Soviet Union without being sent by anybody, without attempting to negotiate anything, without trying to be crafty, and fully committed to their Allies. Khrushchev replied that he understood this. Khrushchev had told Fanfani that President Kennedy was under continuous pressure from his military and scientists to expend more money for warlike purposes and that every time President Kennedy

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-3-

made a tough statement he, Khrushchev, was under exactly the same pressures from his military and scientists. Fanfani said he had replied that every time Khrushchev made a speech he raised these pressures in the U.S. and Khrushchev had said that it would be better if neither side made any bellicose statements. Fanfani said that Khrushchev had told him that the President's speech had been a sort of ultimatum and that he, too, was going to announce military preparations in the speech he was to make on the 8th of August. Fanfani had told him it would be better if he left these out of his speech, but Khrushchev had said that he would mention them; However, it was interesting to note that in the speech as made he had said that he might take these measures, rather than that he had taken them.

Fanfani said that Khrushchev was a very well-read man. Secretary Rusk confirmed this, saying that Khrushchev had indicated that he had read Secretary Rusk's speeches and other items which showed that he was a great reader. Fanfani said this was true, but he (Khrushchev) often "knew" things that were not so. The Secretary said that he had around him some people who might be helpful in giving him a proper perspective, such as Dobrynin who had been at the United Nations for a number of years. Fanfani said that his impression was that Khrushchev did not think highly of Dobrynin.

The Italian Prime Minister said that Khrushchev was interested in religious problems and had told Fanfani that he had given this matter a great deal of thought. Fanfani had said to him, "how do you expect to talk about peace in the world without establishing religious peace?" Khrushchev had replied "that is true," and then added humorously, "but your Catholics want too much." Khrushchev had also told Fanfani that he was probably irritated because Khrushchev kept repeating that he was a Communist but in the car on the way to the airport when they were alone he had said, "please remember that before I am a Communist I am a human being." Fanfani said that Khrushchev had told him that at his time of life he would rather build than fight and added "look around you and see how much there is still to do in Moscow." But he added that if he had to fight he would, and that the generals would not fight the war their way because he, Khrushchev, would assume supreme command.

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-4-

Fanfani had replied that the Italians had some experience (and it was not good) with chiefs of government who assumed the supreme command, and that while one may start a war one does not know how it is going to finish.

Fanfani felt that all of Mr. Khrushchev's judgments were based on his underlying conviction of the historic inevitability of the triumph of Communism.

Fanfani said that he had faced up to the issue of Khrushchev's returning the visit to Rome. He had told Khrushchev that if he were a foreigner he would advise him not to go as there would be problems with the Italian Communists and the Pope would leave Rome as he had when Hitler came and that Khrushchev would find himself in a position similar to Hitler's. Khrushchev had said that Fanfani was not a foreigner. What did he advise? Fanfani had replied, "don't come." Khrushchev was silent and then said, "don't tell anyone we spoke of it."

In the car going to the airport Foreign Minister Segni told the Secretary that Khrushchev is a dangerous man because he is a fanatic. Beyond a certain point he did not reason and this was dangerous. Mr. Segni said that Khrushchev needed a success for external and internal reasons and wanted to humiliate us and for this reason, he was not optimistic about finding a peaceful solution for the Berlin problem.

Berlin and Germany

Fanfani said that he refused to discuss with Khrushchev the future of Germany, which was Italy's ally, without Germany being present. Fanfani said he refused to discuss the future of Germany not merely out of solidarity with Germany and other allies, but because Italy did not want discussions involving her to take place without her presence. Fanfani added that Khrushchev had offered to help him with the Alto Adige problem.

Fanfani said that in Khrushchev's mind there were three fundamental factors: (1) he wanted a divided Germany; (2) he was willing to let Berlin remain free; (3) he needed a guarantee of the Oder-Neisse border for the Czechs and Poles but he did not exclude a deal with the West Germans.

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Regarding the unification of Germany, Khrushchev had told him that de Gaulle did not want this, Macmillan didn't want it, the Americans didn't want it, and even Adenauer didn't want it, so why should there be so much talk about it. Khrushchev had added that if an agreement were reached on Berlin and at some future time the Germans wish to get together through agreement between the two German states, he would not object. Fanfani's impression was that Khrushchev did not want a unified Germany even if it were united in Communism for fear that such a Communist Germany might usurp the Soviet Union's position as the leader of world Communism. Fanfani said he had told Khrushchev that the greatest security against a German danger was the fact that Germany was now incorporated in NATO and the Common Market and thereby unable to act independently. Khrushchev replied that the Germans already had the key posts in NATO and he would illustrate the point with a story. A hunter had gone into the woods to hunt a bear. His friends outside suddenly heard him shouting, "I've caught the bear, I've caught the bear," and when they said, "well, bring it out," the hunter replied, "I can't, he's hugging me." Khrushchev had said, "that is the way you are in NATO - the Germans are hugging you."

The Secretary asked whether there was any indication that the difficult economic situation in East Germany might be causing trouble for Khrushchev. He wondered if we said to Khrushchev, for instance, "get rid of this bandit Ulbricht. Put in some respectable Communist and we will help you solve the economic problems of East Germany." What did the Prime Minister think that Khrushchev's reaction to such a proposal would be? The Prime Minister did not think Khrushchev would "buy this". He had made no reference to the internal situation in East Germany other than to say that just as the West had difficulty with their Germans so the East had difficulty with theirs.

Khrushchev had said that he had no objection to the Berliners remaining free and living under capitalism if that was what they wanted, though they would regret it in the future. They could be guaranteed

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-5-

by the presence of troops of the four occupying powers or of neutral troops or of United Nations forces, but in all cases arrangements for access would have to be made with the East German government. He realized that the prestige of the United States and the West was at stake in Berlin and he was willing to take this into account. Prime Minister Fanfani's impression was that Khrushchev would wait until after the German elections, but that if there were no indication that negotiations would be under way, he would announce the unilateral signature of the peace treaty to the Communist Party Congress which was not merely the Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, but of all the Communist parties.

Fanfani said that, in his opinion, someone in the West or even a neutral if one could be found who could be trusted to handle the matter secretly, should approach Khrushchev in a secret channel and indicate to him that the West was willing to talk. This would be useful because it would guarantee that he would wait until after the German election. It would also enable him to resist his own ultras, and it would also act to soothe his reactions to some of the fiery speeches that will undoubtedly be made during the course of the German election campaign. Prime Minister Fanfani felt that Khrushchev could not be induced to wait indefinitely before signing his treaty, but that if negotiations were under way, despite all his statements that he would sign the treaty before the end of 1961, he could probably be induced to put this off until early in 1962. All things considered, Fanfani felt that the United States was the most indicated, and he had gathered in Moscow that it would be the most acceptable spokesman for the West to establish contacts with Khrushchev. He emphasized several times that this should be done secretly and emphasized again that any negotiation with the Russians should be very carefully prepared. He felt also that as soon as it was certain that the Russians were willing to sit down and talk, that some announcement should be made of the date. The Secretary said that he felt the announcement of a date would be helpful if only in compelling the Western countries to reach a common position. It was a truism that an alliance would take all the time it had and that if a definite date were set for negotiations,

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-7-

this would lead the Western allies to a quick formulation of a common position. The Secretary said he would not be hindered by the thought that some people might regard our willingness to negotiate as an act of weakness. Khrushchev himself knew how strong we really were. There was some reluctance on the part of General de Gaulle to associate himself with such an approach at this time. Prime Minister Fanfani said that we should take the necessary military steps, that the more steps we take, the less we should say out loud about them.

The Secretary said to the Italians that the President had given great thought to the question of Berlin, more thought perhaps than to any other single item since he had become President. He felt that it was essential in such a case to separate in our own mind those things which constituted vital interests and those which, while of great interest and very important, were still not vital. The President felt that the maintenance of allied rights at Berlin was vital to the United States, not merely to insure the liberties of the two million Berliners but because this might well be the present heart of the confrontation between East and West.

Fanfan previously. powers atte "over his d He had also this as "spy weapons. The use nuclear Prime Minist the framework of a general war. Foreign Minister Segni said that Khrushchev had told the story about the British optimist who said it would take nine bombs to destroy the United Kingdom, and the pessimist who said it would take only six. Khrushchev had jokingly said to Fanfani that he would let him in on a military secret. It would take ten, and he had them earmarked. Khrushchev had indicated that some part of the Soviet

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-8-

Union would survive a general nuclear war as would some part of the United States, but that the European countries would be destroyed. The Secretary commented that this was the same type of threat he was making to all the European nations. The Prime Minister said that a different type of threat that Khrushchev had used was that he would make a deal with the Germans and associate them in trade with China, and that this would stimulate the interest of German technicians and businessmen. Fanfani commented that Khrushchev did seem to be concerned about China. Fanfani added his own belief that talk of a "limited war" over Berlin was nonsense.

Fanfani said that Khrushchev had reiterated throughout that he wanted negotiations. Even at the period when he was making threats he interspersed the threats with his desire to negotiate.

Fanfani said that Khrushchev still had a great deal of esteem and respect for President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk and that this should be used. Secretary Rusk replied that when Khrushchev had talked to the President in Vienna he had found himself talking to a young man, who, when his torpedo boat had been sunk, had saved a member of his crew by supporting him for 13 hours in the water, and half that time holding his clothing in his teeth. Fanfani repeated that Khrushchev still had a great deal of respect for the President.

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Consultation

The Secretary then thanked the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister for this opportunity of exchanging views and said that he knew the President would be very appreciative. We were at all times anxious and willing to receive any advice and counsel which the Italian leaders might have during the coming weeks and months. He added that the new Italian Ambassador in Washington had gotten off to a good start, that he was deeply devoted to the NATO Alliance and that he was making a real position for himself in Washington. The Prime Minister thanked the Secretary for this assurance.

GRReinhardt/VAWalters:bw

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GFReinhardt/VAWalters:bw

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AF	IO	

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Approved in S
8/18/61

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

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US/MC/25

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8/19/61
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Date: August 9, 1961
Time: 5:30 p.m.
Place: The Prime Minister's Office, Rome

Participants:

Italy	United States
Prime Minister Fanfani	The Secretary
Foreign Minister Segni	Ambassador Reinhardt
Secretary General Cattani	Ambassador Dowling
Pol. Affairs Director Fornari	Mr. Sanders
Chef de Cabinet Sensi	Mr. Brown
Diplomatic Counselor Vanni	Col. Walters

Subject: Fanfani Meeting with Khrushchev; Paris Ministerial Consultation.

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EUR	IT	U. S. Mission Berlin	

After meeting privately with the Secretary and Ambassador Reinhardt and Foreign Minister Segni, the Prime Minister opened the wider meeting by reviewing his conversations with Khrushchev. Khrushchev had said he was prepared to take action up to war or to negotiate. Any measures the West might take would be met by counter-measures. In the absence of negotiations he excludes letting the situation remain unchanged. If negotiations were indicated, they could not be allowed to drag on for years. He said he will sign the peace treaty before the end of the year but did not indicate what he would do if negotiations were under way by then.

The Secretary asked if there seemed to be any flexibility in the period between the end of the year and what will happen in a few years

The Prime Minister replied he believed that, if negotiations were under way, then the signing could be put off from the end of the year timetable. Khrushchev had also said there were different possibilities for the future relationship between the two Germanies. During the period between multilateral negotiations and the getting together of the Germanies, Berlin could be a free city guaranteed by the four powers or by the UN. Free access and guarantees for the West Berliners to live under the capitalist system would be assured. If there were no negotiations or if they fail, the alternative is

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FPC/CDR

Date: 8/12/61

the peace treaty

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the peace treaty and the recognition of the right of the GDR to control access even if Berlin itself is a free city. The right of access for the Western forces and for the West Germans would have to be agreeable to the GDR. If the West attempted to obtain access by force, it would be met by force. The Soviets would not fire first. If an air lift was used, the defensive forces would fire. They would use nuclear weapons aimed at the US as well as the European NATO countries.

The Secretary asked if Khrushchev had given the impression he would go to general nuclear war or confine it to areas in Germany.

The Prime Minister replied that it would be general war in response to aggression against the GDR. Khrushchev recognized that provocative statements can create a chain reaction and prevent negotiations. Khrushchev said he was under pressure from his military and scientists to install new missile systems, just as President Kennedy was under pressure from his military. Khrushchev said he could resist this but not indefinitely. The Italian Government believes there is some residual hope that we can get out without war. For prudence sake we should take military measures but quietly.

Foreign Minister Segni commented that the Soviets will know what we are doing.

The Prime Minister said the watchword should be prudent firmness. We should make known soon the possibility of negotiations and bring this position to the attention of the general public at the most opportune time so as to orient our public and not leave in Communist hands the credit for moves towards peace. Public announcement of willingness to negotiate should be followed by secret, well-prepared preparations for negotiations. The United States is most appropriate to carry out these preparations. The German election campaign will not be helpful. We should be ready to open negotiations as soon as the elections are over. The Soviets are probably ready for negotiations even before the elections but it is not excluded that they would be willing to wait until after the elections. The Italian Government has no illusions as to the line of departure for the Soviets. Their initial position is rigid but there are hints here and there they may become less so. Reduction of the military power of Germany and the Polish and Czech borders are their preoccupations. They have an interest in peace to the west so as to be able to concentrate on China. In a desperate case it cannot be excluded the Soviets will follow the example of Hitler and Stalin and come to an understanding with the Federal Republic.

The Secretary expressed his thanks and paid tribute to the useful talks which had been held in Washington. The explanation

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of the Moscow talks had been most informative. We must be calm and firm and be prepared to deal with the situation as a fundamental crisis between the two blocs. We must try to protect our interests by peaceful measures, if possible, and negotiate. It will not be easy. Since 1945 we have expended most of the margins of compromise. We cannot go to the negotiating table with a sense of weakness. We cannot allow Khrushchev to think he can demoralize us by brandishing nuclear weapons. We are not concerned by those who fear that a willingness to negotiate would be a sign of weakness. If he says negotiations must be based on his proposals, this would be most difficult as he proposes to change the status quo to his advantage. We can discuss other subjects with him and see where we can go. At the end of the line maybe an arrangement whereby different theories can live side by side can be reached. A practical understanding of what happens on the ground may surmount questions of face or prestige.

The Secretary said the West must change Khrushchev's mind about the underlying relationship of East and West. We can consider military measures, economic warfare, public opinion. Our aim should be to build up the chances to make negotiations more possible and more hopeful. We value the suggestions Prime Minister Fanfani has made both on negotiations and the importance of making public the possibility of negotiations. This view, with one or two significant exceptions, is shared by the alliance. We cannot ask our people to prepare for the worst without knowing we have done everything possible diplomatically to avoid the crisis. As to timing, we cannot let events take over control and go beyond the resources of diplomacy. Thus, the Secretary concluded, we find ourselves very much in accord with the views the Prime Minister had expressed.

UNITED STATES MISSION
TO THE
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
AND EUROPEAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

EUK

8/9/61

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OFFICE OF
CHIEF OF MISSION

OTAN-NATO
PLACE DU MARÉCHAL DE LATTRE DE TASSIGNY
PARIS XVII^e - FRANCE

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OFFICIAL - INFORMAL

August 9, 1961.

Dear Dean:

I have just had a conversation with Pierre DE LEUSSE, the French Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council, which I must report to you.

This meeting was at M. de Leusse's request. He said he had something to communicate to me as a result of a recent talk he had with General DE GAULLE. He said that the General would be willing to agree to the establishment of a NATO MRBM force composed of the U.S. Polaris, some or all of the British V Bombers, and some or all of the French force de frappe when it comes into being. I asked him what he meant by a NATO MRBM force, and he said that General de Gaulle would be willing to accept the same arrangements for the force de frappe as the United States has said, in its April 26 paper, it would be willing to accept with respect to the Polaris submarines.

M. de Leusse and I then got out the April 26 paper and studied the paragraph under Nuclear Weapons Requirements, which starts "Our plan should take account ...".

In this paragraph there are three provisions with respect to the Polaris. One is that they shall be "committed to NATO". The second is that the deployment

and ...

The Honorable
Dean Rusk,
Secretary of State,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

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and targeting of the submarines would be developed with Allied participation through the NATO commands concerned. The third would be that the United States would remain free to use the submarines in self-defense.

We then discussed the unwritten condition about the Polarises which is that the decision to fire them in fact must be made by the United States. It would not be possible to compel the United States to fire its nuclear missiles on the order of anyone against the wishes of the President of the United States; and such, of course, must apply to any country unless and until it makes a specific agreement to surrender its right to control its own forces. The word "commit" does not amount to such a surrender; at least this is the way he and I interpreted this unwritten condition.

M. de Leusse repeated, after examining the April 26 document, that the foregoing is exactly what General de Gaulle would be willing to accept for the French force de frappe.

I then asked him whether or not there were any conditions on this. Was it a condition that we should furnish missile information to the French or sell missiles to the French? M. de Leusse said no; France was not asking for anything. The statement about the General's attitude stood exactly as I have just stated it above.

I then said that I had understood from Mr. Paul NITZE that M. François DE ROSE of the Quai d'Orsay had talked to him about this subject, but had said that General de Gaulle would have absolutely nothing to do with NATO, and that therefore any "commitment" to NATO would be out of the question.

M. de Leusse said that he had talked to de Rose after he (de Leusse) had seen General de Gaulle, and that he knew this was M. de Rose's theory as to what General de Gaulle believed, but that he (de Leusse) was sure that M. de Rose was wrong.

I asked M. de Leusse if he was sufficiently sure of this to justify my taking the matter up in Washington, and he said yes.

I think ...

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
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- 3 -

I think this is a subject which is well worth exploring.
I would like to have your guidance on the subject.

With best regards, as always.

Sincerely yours,



Thomas K. Finletter

BY

MEMORANDUM FOR:

General Taylor
Mr. Rostow
Mr. Kissinger
Mr. Owen

Re: Berlin Plans

I hope that this afternoon we can have a careful talk on Berlin Political planning, from the point of view of the President's own needs in the next few weeks. I suggest the following order of discussion:

1. In what respects do any of us have major reservations about the argument of the Acheson memorandum? In particular, do any of us believe that the President should examine further

2. What are the most effective ways of arranging study and argument for President on any such major departures from the Acheson line? (1)

3. Within any agreed U. S. position, what is the proper plan of diplomatic efforts to ensure maximum Western unity. How do we keep in unison with the Germans, particularly, on changes from this preferred position?

4. What other comments or suggestions do any of us wish to put forward for discussion or action?

McGeorge Bundy

SANITIZED

U.S. ARCHIVIST (NLK-78-654)

BY: W. H. H. -NARS, DATE 11/3/60

MEMORANDUM OF CONSULTATION

US/MC/26

8/10/61
1Approved in S
8/18/61

DATE: August 10, 1961

TIME: 10:00 a.m.

PLACE: The Chancellor's Villa
Cadernabia, ItalyParticipants:United StatesThe Secretary of State
Ambassador Dowling
Mr. BrownGermanyChancellor Adenauer
Dr. Von Brentano
Mr. Weber (interpreter)File
BerlinSubject: Review of Paris Ministerial ConsultationsCopies to:

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S/P	GER	Ambassy, Paris	USUN
INR/C	WE	Ambassy, London	White House
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The Secretary opened the discussion by stating that the Foreign Ministers meeting had been a good one. He had followed it by talking to the North Atlantic Council and had been surprised there by the unity of the Council. He had thought we would see some differences of views. The nine national representatives who spoke had all affirmed unity and seriousness of purpose. It was heartening and encouraging and is hopeful for NATO itself. Whether this will continue as we move into intense crises cannot be said; as of today there is unity of purpose.

The Secretary noted that the Chancellor would be seeing Prime Minister Fanfani later in the day. He said he had discussed the Prime Minister's visit to Moscow in Rome. What Khrushchev said to Fanfani is what he said to the President and publicly since early June. For our part we have not seen any plausible opening for profitable negotiation in what he has said. He repeatedly states he wants negotiations but on his own proposals rather than Berlin and Germany as a whole.

The Secretary said he wanted to mention a point on the President's mind on which he would appreciate the Chancellor's advice. The President feels most gravely his responsibility for the use of nuclear weapons. He has committed himself and the United States to full solidarity with Western Europe in the Berlin crisis. He is now calling on many Americans to disturb their civilian life by taking up military service. Draft calls have tripled and reserves are being called up. We are also calling on our allies to take similar steps to increase forces and make the necessary sacrifices. The President is concerned

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lost the Western alliances think of the problem only in military terms. There is not only the question of public opinion but also of leadership in each country. If we must come to the decision to use military forces it must be clear to all that every reasonable effort was made to find peaceful solutions and that war was forced on us by the other side. It is also important that any negotiation which occurs be under conditions wherein we have some control over the subjects to be discussed and not occur at a late stage of the crisis where we would talk only about subjects Khrushchev wants. Therefore, the President is considering whether the West should take initiative to bring about negotiations this fall. Naturally the Western position must be fully prepared in advance. It is not only the problem of having negotiations in this period but also of the timing of the public announcement of the possibility of negotiations. If the problem were only to be considered from the point of view of the United States, we would think that the possibility of negotiations should become publicly known not later than the first week of September. We know that there will be growing restlessness in the United States and in the Alliance as to when diplomacy will play its role. Additionally, if it were known that negotiations on the Foreign Ministers level were to take place there would be less prospect of someone like Nehru bringing Berlin into the UN in mid-September.

The Secretary then said that there is one serious development which affects the handling of the Berlin question. This is the Bizerte issue. The Tunisian Government request for a special meeting of the General Assembly is catastrophic for the Western position on Berlin. We have done everything possible in Tunisia and in France to get the two parties to talk. We have failed thus far. In the UN, the Communist Bloc, the Afro-Asians and some of the Latin Americans will be solidly against France and the West as well. This provides the worst possible background for a UN discussion of Berlin. If, however, negotiations are in prospect the UN might prefer to give the parties involved an opportunity to negotiate before opening debate in the UN. These are some of the factors, he continued, concerning timing. Usually timing is determined by subjects and prospects, but it does have its own importance. The Secretary expressed his desire to have the Chancellor's views on timing.

The Secretary said he had discussed the question with General de Gaulle. He had found no sympathy on the question of making the timing of negotiations public. General de Gaulle believes we are in Berlin and that if the Soviets disturb us we will shoot. This is not an adequate position in the sixties when we are considering a nuclear war. We see this even though there are vital interests in Berlin for which the United States will fight.

The Chancellor said he wanted to talk to the Secretary as frankly and as freely as he had done with Secretary Dulles. The Secretary said he considered this a high compliment.

The Chancellor said there are two factors we must remember in dealing with Khrushchev. First, he is a Russian; and second, he is a dictator. With a dictator, accounts are not reality but what he believes. A dictator gets reports from his ambassadors which do not reflect the full truth. He cannot understand our mentality or the fact that unity can be established from varying views.

- 3 -

The Chancellor then gave the example of General Von Kluge as a sensible, intelligent person whose own thinking was changed by serving under a dictator. Von Kluge had thought that Germany would never fight the United States but would make an arrangement with her. The Chancellor then referred to the President's speech, which he called impressive. He praised US efforts which have followed and then said these were counteracted somewhat by what has been said by Senator Mansfield, Senator Fulbright, General MacArthur, by the UK press and by the exploits of the Soviet astronaut. He said we may have learned from Prime Minister Fanfani that Khrushchev uses the statements of Senators Fulbright, Mansfield and Humphrey as representative of American thinking.

The Chancellor referred to a recent conversation between Senator Fulbright and a Mr. Springer, head of one of West Germany's largest publishing firms. Senator Fulbright had told Mr. Springer as early as February he would favor withdrawal of US forces from Europe. The Chancellor said that Khrushchev must have known about this statement within a week.

The Secretary said that Senator Fulbright is, as the Chancellor knows, running for election in an area somewhat isolationist. He does not, however, represent foreign policy. The Chancellor knows this but Khrushchev may not and this is of course the point the Chancellor has been trying to make.

The Chancellor said that Khrushchev is a Russian nationalist first and a Communist second. In 1955 Khrushchev had told the Chancellor that capitalism was doomed. He had said that the Soviets could handle other countries as they liked with the exception of the US and China. He had given at that time to the Chancellor the impression that he would be happy to have no opponents in the West ten or twelve years later in order to be ready for the East. A few years later he heard from Mikoyan relations between China and the Soviets were fine and that the Soviets troubles were not in the West but in the East. When asked if this would be still true in ten or twelve years, Mikoyan had not replied.

Adenauer thought Khrushchev wants to be the economic hero of the Soviet Union as Lenin was its founder and Stalin its war leader. The Soviet's economy produces some excellent things but the system is bad. This is certainly evident when you contrast the two parts of Germany. He has organized a twenty year plan and in a sense can escape responsibility as he may not be around when the twenty years are over. His steppe program has failed. Given his economic interest we should stress the value of economic countermeasures. Military preparedness is important but Khrushchev is afraid of an economic blockade and would take the threat of it seriously. Advantages of economic measures are that the effects are felt at once and that you can stop the measures you have adopted any time you want to. The Soviet bloc trade with the Federal Republic is considerable. Nevertheless, the Chancellor said, he would have no trouble brushing away German industrialist opposition and the Federal Republic would join in economic measures one hundred percent. To sum up, Khrushchev believes he is strong in the military and nuclear field but weaker in the economic one. He wants to develop his economy and knows the West can take countermeasures which can affect his plans adversely. As far as negotiations are concerned they can have the stage set by mentioning the possibility of economic countermeasures. We should be ready to say we are negotiating. The party organizations in Germany have asked him to speak on TV concerning international relations and the increase in the refugee flow. He thought he would also mention the possibility of negotiations and timing.

He approved the Secretary's suggestion on the latter. He thought that the negotiations themselves should take place before the Party Congress. If

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- 4 -

he would discuss this on TV, he would only make general references and not give details. Mention of the possibility of economic measures would have a calming effect although some industrialists in Germany would object.

The Chancellor then turned to de Gaulle, stating his position is difficult. He had been brought back to power by the Army in 1958 to save Algeria for France. He knows he has to give up Algeria. He has no party backing and his standing with the Army has decreased. The Army is the only basis of power for de Gaulle and the question he must always ask himself is "what can I do to get on better terms with the Army?" De Gaulle's experiences with the US have been bad and he has a grudge against the US. When Algeria came up in 1959, friends of de Gaulle asked him to use his influence to prevent a censure of France. He had talked with President Eisenhower of the necessity of supporting France and he had agreed. Later the US abstained in the UN vote. Even back in 1940 Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt had treated de Gaulle badly and he has never forgotten.

The Secretary said we understand de Gaulle's problem. He emphasized the fact that our position in the UN on the Berlin problem is greatly weakened by the Bizerte crisis.

Chancellor Adenauer said that he agreed. He then noted that Figaro had predicted a revolution in France for the 15th of August. He thought that we should wait until after that date before any approaches were made to de Gaulle on Bizerte. The Secretary said our position is well known. We do not want to have a General Assembly session on Bizerte. In the General Assembly we will say that we would like direct negotiation to take place and not UN actions.

The Chancellor said it was a wise course of action. We don't want to cause lasting damage in our relations with France. He said he appreciated the fact the United States had taken into consideration the question of German elections in studying timing. He has however no objection to mentioning the possibility of negotiation or a date before the German elections took place. He then referred in a rather annoyed way to the advice that the three Commandants had given to Amrehn not to leave Berlin while Brandt was out campaigning.

Mr. Von Brentano said he was going to Berlin tomorrow to see Amrehn.

The Chancellor said he wanted to sum things up. He favors negotiation. The suggested timing is right. The prospect of negotiation should be brought to the attention of the public and should be mentioned in the reply to the notes. We should study and prepare economic countermeasures and inform public opinion. Khrushchev must be made aware that such preparations are underway.

The Secretary said that any negotiations will be very difficult. Since 1945 the margins of compromise have been exhausted. There is little meat on the bone. Khrushchev has his prestige involved and it would be difficult to save his face.

The Chancellor agreed the situation is critical. If we take military measures only, he won't take the West seriously. But he does know the West can take economic measures without harm to itself, which he cannot reciprocate. It might be best not to mention economic measures in the note but through the press.

The Chancellor said he thought in the negotiations there might be a little meat still left on the bone. He then suggested we make another point, perhaps not in the note but in public statements. This related to the military advance of the US Army into Saxony, Thuringia and Mecklenburg during the war. The Soviets could be reminded that these territories had been exchanged for rights in Berlin.

The Secretary said he wanted to refer to the Chancellor's statements on Khrushchev as a Russian nationalist and try an idea on him which we had been thinking about. We might say to Khrushchev that the mess he had made in Eastern Germany is bad. He has had a gangster in charge who has created this. He puts pressure on the Soviets and poses danger for us. Perhaps this can be reduced by having a decent regime in East Germany. Then we could forget about it and the Berlin problem and concentrate on building up Russia. The future could worry about the line between the two Germanies. This would not be giving away anything in Berlin but changing the emphasis. he

The Chancellor said that the ideas were worth studying. We of course couldn't say we would give them aid to build up their economy as they are too proud of what they are today. The Secretary replied that the help he meant was trade not aid.

The Chancellor said we would get the serious press to consider Western military advance in World War II and its relation to Berlin. This could have a serious effect in the Soviet zone. We could say that the Governments had not raised this because of the unrest it might cause, but, if pressures continue, the Governments might bring it up.

Mr. Von Brentano said that it also rejects the idea that we obtained our Berlin rights only as a conquest.

The Secretary said it might disturb West Berliners unless some idea of exchange of population was possible.

Mr. Von Brentano said that the West Berliners should understand that this was a tactical approach.

The Secretary said that he had in fact mentioned Saxony and Thuringia before he had left Washington. He has also emphasized to the press that the Federal Republic had not started to arm until the Eastern zone had.

The Chancellor said, if we had rearmed Germany right after World War I and let it fight, the Russian situation might be different today. He recalled the fact that the German Government had financed the Russian revolution to the extent of 30 million gold marks.

The Secretary said that his greatest ambition is to pass the Berlin question on to his successor. He then wondered what we would do about de Gaulle in his present situation.

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Adenauer said we should do nothing until after the 15th of August. We should furthermore not press him on the integration of his forces in NATO.

The Secretary said that the UK and France are now in full accord that the Federal Republic must be a full partner in the consideration of Berlin and German questions.

The Chancellor said he appreciated this and that he received such assurances from Vice President Johnson in Texas which he had kept confidential. The Secretary said that he wanted the Chancellor to know that the President regards highly/close association with the Federal Republic. We must both work closely together. He would value any ideas which the Chancellor may wish to send us. In turn we will keep the Federal Republic informed.

The Chancellor expressed his appreciation and said that the Federal Republic wants sincere and honest cooperation and can be relied on to help the US strengthen its leadership in the West. What the Federal Republic is today, it owes to the US.

The Secretary replied that if we had not undertaken the task of aiding Western Germany to re-establish itself, we would not have it acting in our national interest. It would be a chill world for US democracy without our friends in Western Europe. He thought that the US post-war commitment to the purposes of the UN Charter and not to total exploitation of its power had been historically important.

The Chancellor referred to his approaching meeting with Fanfani. He will tell him that the two had discussed the results of the Foreign Ministers' conference.

The Secretary said he had talked at great length with Prime Minister Fanfani who has informed us of his visit to Moscow about which he will also tell the Chancellor. From Fanfani's talk in Moscow we can expect Khrushchev to say to various nations that the Soviet Union and the United States will be hurt but will survive a nuclear war which will demolish Western Europe. He is trying to drive a wedge between us and the countries of Western Europe.

The Chancellor replied Khrushchev has made this point to the Germans on several occasions.

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Norstad would envisage such an offensive taking place after all other military, political and economic measures had been attempted without success and following military contact or engagement at some level. The "selective offensive" could be aimed at improving the defensive position of the NATO forces or could be undertaken for the purpose of determining enemy intentions. The plan for the offensive would contemplate several contingencies: i.e., a small conventional offensive using no nuclears; a small offensive with discriminating use of nuclears, etc. BT

Norstad said that he felt it was essential that planning in this regard be undertaken soonest and that he intended to do so forthwith. He said at the breakfast that he would advise Stikker of his plans on a personal basis but that it should not be discussed in the NAC at this time (he has since informed Stikker in this sense).

General Norstad now plans to consult with General Speidel and Air Marshal Bandon on August 18 at SHAPE, and he will ask them at that time to proceed to draw up plans for a selective offensive operation in the central area intended to improve the defensive posture of the NATO forces.

4. With regard to any military probes or engagements in connection with access to Berlin, Norstad said NAC should give its agreement prior to such engagements, even though the military forces themselves, at least initially, would be tripartite in nature. He said the latter consideration was necessary from the legal standpoint. The Secretary commented that we should not concede this too readily, i.e., it might still be legal to attempt to compell access to Berlin with Western forces formed on a basis going beyond that of the three powers.

5. There was discussion of the idea of appointing the United States as the "executive agent" for the European area in the event of a military crisis. Norstad expressed the view that, if handled properly in the NAC, other countries would accept this solution without difficulty. He thought this was the only logical solution and that the same would hold true for control of atomic weapons. BT

6. There was an inconclusive discussion of the need for SACEUR to have political advice in time of military crisis. Norstad said that if shooting starts, he will be faced with the necessity of making decisions very rapidly; it will probably not be feasible to handle matters in neat sections and await full political consultations before taking the next step.

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7. The possibilities for taking actions at sea against the Soviets which would not involve engagement of firepower were considered. It was suggested that the US Navy might be charged with the task of developing plans for such actions. Norstad agreed with this in principle, although he stressed that any directives issued to area commanders should be general in nature and not go into detail. (Note: General Norstad commented after the breakfast meeting that it would be more correct to say that plans should be developed by the Joint Chiefs, rather than through the Navy in the first instance.)

8. General Norstad was asked if De Gaulle should be requested to consent to the storage of atomic weapons in France for use with US squadrons. Norstad said he felt strongly that we should not take the initiative in this matter. If we did so, the answer would undoubtedly be negative. Moreover, he is sure that in time of actual crisis the French will agree to the return of the planes and the weapons; in the meantime, we should not press them. BT

9. Following the breakfast, General Norstad mentioned to the Secretary that he was considering suggesting to De Gaulle that he be brought up-to-date by Norstad on the current situation of the Allied forces with regard to nuclear firepower. Norstad recalled he had briefed De Gaulle previously on this subject, and he felt a follow-up briefing would be appreciated by De Gaulle and might be generally useful. Norstad mentioned that he has also suggested that Adenauer receive a similar briefing. The Secretary indicated no objection to such briefings, although he hoped it would be understood that information conveyed in the briefings was extremely restricted in classification.

I might add that General Norstad felt the breakfast meeting was very useful and that he greatly appreciated the opportunity to discuss these matters with the Secretary, you and the others who were present.

Sincerely,

Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.

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August 14, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subjects: 1) Berlin Negotiations and (2) Possible Reprisals

(1) Negotiations

I find unanimity in your immediate staff for the view that we should take a clear initiative for negotiation within the next week or ten days -- safely before the Neutral Nations Conference. Since our allies are hesitant, the lead will have to come from you, at the highest level.

This opinion is strengthened by the border-closing episode, which can be described as one reason more for calling talks -- because of the dangerous and explosive weakness it reveals in the DDR.

I hope you can discuss this general question with Secretary Rusk this afternoon. His professionals are more cautious, being committed to a 4-Power process of planning. They see some virtue in the French argument that we ought not to talk about negotiation before we have reached agreement on the substance of our position. But the truth is that we're making very slow headway toward a clear position, as it is; a date for negotiation would put all our noses to the grindstone.

(2) Reprisals for the Border Closing

The Department's proposal for a riposte is likely to be the ending of the travel permits which have been issued by the three powers in West Berlin to East Germans who want to visit allied or neutral countries. This was used a year ago in response to East German harassment of civilian traffic, and it worked well. No one thinks it will cause a reversal of policy this time, in the light of the much more serious causes of this much larger action. But it is argued

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that it will give some pain, since it will cut off East German access to allied countries and to those neutral nations which play along.

I find this argument unconvincing. I doubt if we should take little actions in reprisal against this big one, especially when the punishment is unrelated to the crime. The only good argument for this action is that it has been discussed among the 4 Powers before as a possible retort to border-closing, and there may be some Allied worry about our "reliability" if we don't support it now.

Incidentally, I find agreement in both Joe Alsop and George Kennan to these three conclusions: (1) this is something they have always had the power to do; (2) it is something they were bound to do sooner or later, unless they could control the exits from West Berlin to the West; (3) since it was bound to happen, it is as well to have it happen early, as their doing and their responsibility.

McG. B.

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Berlin

August 14, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1. With this week's occurrences in Berlin there will be more and more pressure for us to adopt a harder military posture.

2. I do not think we can leave unused any of the men or money that were offered by the Congress with the exception perhaps of the bomber money.

3. I would appreciate it if you would plan to discuss this matter with me this week after you have made a judgment on it.

4. I am concerned that we move ahead as quickly as possible on Civil Defense. Perhaps we could get a report on that before the week is out.

Civil Defense

NSF/82/ Gen. Berlin. Gen. 8/11/61 - 8/15/61

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

8/14/61

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Category "A"
September 30, 1966
By Warren A. Henderson

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August 14, 1975 August 14, 1961

Amembassy
Belgrade
Personal and eyes only for the Ambassador

Should you find a convenient and natural occasion for a wholly private and informal talk with your Soviet colleague, you might tell him that you know, from your recent discussions with senior American officials in Washington, that the United States Government is sincerely anxious to find a peaceful solution to the Berlin crisis and realizes that this must be one which takes account of the interests of all the various parties involved. Your Government hopes, you may add, that regular negotiations to this end may be undertaken in the fairly near future. It is possible, however, that preparations for such negotiations might be facilitated if facilities existed for occasional purely informal and exploratory exchanges of views between the two governments on some of the problems involved. You would, you may say, be available for such discussions to him or to anyone else whom the Soviet government might wish to designate for this purpose. You should make it clear that you would not be able, in such discussions, to commit the United States Government or any of its allies or associates in any way, nor would you expect any such commitment on the Soviet side; anything of this sort would have to await regular and formal negotiations. You might add, however, that you are taking this step with the knowledge of your government, and that if such exchanges should take place, you would be in touch with your government and would not be speaking irresponsibly.

You should stress that the value of such discussions would be dependant on the observation of strictest secrecy; should the Soviet side not agree that the talks should be handled on this principle, then, you may say, it would be better not to pursue them at all.

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We feel that you should go no further than this on the first occasion. Should your colleague say that he is already empowered to hear anything you have to say along this line, you should request that he nevertheless first apprise his government of what you have told him, and say that you would prefer to await his government's reaction before getting down to any matters of substance.

Should he inquire whether any of the allies of the United States have knowledge of the suggestion you are making, you may say that they do not, and that while the United States will of course be guided, in its dealings with its allies, by whatever enlightenment as to the Soviet viewpoint it may derive from these informal exchanges, it does not intend that any other government shall be apprised specifically of the fact that such talks are occurring. In particular, it is not intended that the Germans shall have any knowledge of them.

DO. LEO NONSTAD PFFERS

8/16/61

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RECOMMENDATIONS
WHICH
D COMMANDERS

CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR
AND OF THE REVISED INSTRUCTIONS FOR EXPANDED LIVE OAK
PLANNING WHICH THE AMBASSADORIAL GROUP WILL PREPARE AND ISSUE TO
YOU AS A RESULT OF THE PARIS MEETING.

2. NOTWITHSTANDING THE FOREGOING, HE HAS DIRECTED THE JCS
TO REQUEST YOU TO COMMENCE MORE DETAILED PLANNING ON A UNILATERAL
U.S. BASIS AS A MATTER OF URGENCY. THE PURPOSE IS TO PLAN TO
APPLY NON-NUCLEAR MILITARY POWER ON A LARGER SCALE THAN HERETOFORE
ENVISAGED IN ORDER TO INDUCE THE COMMUNISTS TO REOPEN ACCESS TO
BERLIN. HE DESIRES THAT PLANS BE PREPARED FOR NON-NUCLEAR
OPERATIONS TO INCLUDE:

- A. GROUND ACTION, SUPPORTED BY AIR, OF A CORPS OR LARGER UNIT;
 - B. NON-NUCLEAR TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS, AND
 - C. MARITIME MILITARY OPERATIONS.
3. HE ALSO DESIRES THAT PLANS FOR THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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August 16, 1961

Minutes of the Meeting of the Steering Group on Berlin
August 15, 1961 - 10:45 AM


Present: Secretaries of State, Defense, Commerce, Agriculture, Under Secretary Fowler of Treasury, The Attorney General, The Director of CIA, Deputy Director Wilson of USIA, The Chairman, JCS, Mr. Foy Kohler, General Taylor, Mr. Bundy

The meeting began with a discussion of the response by the Executive Branch to new language in the preamble to PL 480. The Secretary of Commerce presented the case for a statement indicating that the United States would not send subsidized food exports to Soviet bloc countries. After considerable discussion, it was the sense of the meeting that such an announcement would be unwise. The President has authorized continuing negotiations with Poland which would involve such exports, and it was felt that an announcement of the sort proposed would be both too sweeping and unnecessary. Instead it was agreed that the Secretary of Commerce would meet with the appropriate members of the Congress, after discussion with the Speaker and with selected individual members of the group. He would explain to them the reasons for avoiding a public statement at this time, and at the same time calm any fears of subsidized exports to the USSR, or indeed to other bloc countries except where there was a special political opportunity.

Turning to the immediate situation in Berlin, the Secretary of State asked Mr. Kohler to summarize recent developments. Mr. Kohler described the progress which had been made through the Secretary's statement, the delivery of the protest of the three Western Commandants in Berlin, and preparation of a protest for delivery in Moscow. The Secretary of State noted that while the border closing was a most serious matter, the probability was that in realistic terms it would make a Berlin settlement easier. Our immediate problem is the sense of outrage in Berlin and

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NF 88/6a Subs. Berlin steering group 7/7/61 - 9/11/61

Germany which carries with it a feeling that we should do more than merely protest. It was not easy to know just what else we should do.

In the following discussion it was generally agreed that economic countermeasures would be inappropriate; either they would be much too trivial to count, like withholding Western participation in the Leipzig Fair, or they might set in train a chain of challenges and responses which might affect our own deepest interest, that of economic and human access to West Berlin.

Similar objections applied not only to such a course as general interruption of travel by East Germans to the West, but suspension of Temporary Travel documents. Moreover, it looks as if the new fence between East and West Berlin is there to stay, and we do not want to reply with temporary and incommensurate reprisals.

The one step for which there was substantial support in the group was the possibility of reinforcements of the West Berlin Garrison. There was no general agreement; and the Secretary of Defense indicated a specific reservation on the ground that such steps, taken as a gesture, were not desirable. His own inclination was to consider some reduction in U.S. military dependents abroad.

The discussion then turned to psychological measures and propaganda. Since it was agreed that, in the words of the Secretary of State, "we must keep shooting issues and non-shooting issues separate", and since it was further agreed that the closing of the border was not a shooting issue, the problem was essentially one of propaganda. We should reap a large harvest on this front. The Attorney General particularly pressed for a new and stronger organization of our efforts in this area; and it was agreed that there would be a special meeting on this subject at 6 p.m., August 15. It was further agreed that Mr. Earl Newsom would be invited to come to Washington to discuss ways and means of improvement of our propaganda efforts on the Berlin crisis.

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IT PROVIDES THAT PROSPECT OF HOPE FOR EVENTUAL SOLUTION WHICH PERSISTS UNDER STATUS QUO. AS "ABNORMAL" AS THIS STATUS QUO MAY BE, FURTHER DRAMATIC CHANGES -- EVEN THOUGH THEY BE IN ESSENCE LITTLE MORE THAN MANIFESTATIONS OF "REALITIES" OF SITUATION -- CAN, IN MY VIEW, ONLY RESULT IN ULTIMATE RADICAL REORIENTATION OF GERMANY POLICY. WHILE THIS MAY TAKE TIME I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT IT IS LONG-RANGE GOAL OF SOVIET POLICY RE GERMANY, FOR THERE IS NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT SOVIETS WILL BE CONTENT FOR LONG WITH CONSOLIDATION OF COMMUNIST REGIME IN SOVIET ZONE, TO WHICH THEIR PRESENT MOVES ARE DIRECTED. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT I HAVE FELT OUR OBJECTIVE SHOULD NOT BE CONFINED SOLELY TO DEFENSE OF OUR POSITION IN WEST BERLIN, BUT RATHER TO PREVENTION OF SUCH CONSOLIDATION.

AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, I AM NOT OVERLY CONCERNED THAT WEST GERMAN OPINION HAS PRESENTLY BOILED UP IN SUCH IMPATIENT AND SHARP MANNER. THERE REMAINS, I AM CONVINCED, BASIC CONFIDENCE

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-2- 354, AUGUST 17, 5 PM, FROM: BONN

IN WESTERN (I.E. US) POLICY, AND FEELINGS SHOULD SOON CALM DOWN PROVIDED WESTERN ACTIONS NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION, SUCH AS TTD BAN, STRENGTHENING OF BERLIN GARRISON, ETC., ARE CARRIED OUT AND BECOME KNOWN. ADENAUER HAS NOW INITIATED EFFORTS TO INDUCE PATIENCE, AND EDITORIAL COMMENTS, SUCH AS TODAY'S DIE WELT, WILL SUPPORT THESE EFFORTS. MOREOVER, AS CRISIS DEVELOPS, GERMAN PEOPLE WILL COME TO SEE SOUNDNESS OF WESTERN POLICY AND BE REASSURED AS TO FIRMNESS OF OUR DEFENSE OF INTERESTS WHICH WE HAVE IN COMMON WITH THEM.

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
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Steering Group Meeting, August 17, 1961

Present: The President; the Secretary of State and Mr. Kohler; the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Gilpatric, and General Lemnitzer; the Attorney General; Mr. Dulles and Mr. Murphy; Mr. Wilson; General Taylor, Mr. Bundy, and Mr. Owen.

1. The Secretary of State proposed two actions:
 - a. Reinforcement of the West Berlin garrison.
 - b. A statement of protest by the three Western heads of government.
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3. The President asked about our going to the UN. The Secretary said that there would not be sufficient Afro-Asian support to make a good showing. This might encourage Khrushchev. The UN should be held in reserve for a more important and suitable occasion.
4. The President said that this Bloc move should have been foreseen and that Berlin planning should look ahead to such possible contingencies in the future.
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 - a. It was agreed that the reinforcement would take place Saturday morning unless a strongly adverse allied reaction developed in the meantime.
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NSP/88 (62) Sib. Berlin Steering Group 7/16/91-9/11/91

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b. The tripartite statement would also be made Saturday.

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13. The Attorney General asked if more could not be done to stimulate worldwide protest over the East German action. A group will examine this question and report next week. It will include Mr. Dulles, General Taylor, the Attorney General, Mr. Wilson, and Secretary Goldberg.

14. Mr. Dulles reported a call by General Eisenhower about Berlin. A State-DOD briefing team will be sent, with Mr. Dulles, to Gettysburg Sunday, and Mr. Dulles will notify the General.

15. The President stressed the need for balance, in any press backgrounders, regarding recent events in Berlin. We should make clear that we remained firm in defense of our rights in West Berlin, which had not been affected or threatened by those events.

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August 14, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subjects: 1) Berlin Negotiations and (2) Possible Reprisals

(1) Negotiations

I find unanimity in your immediate staff for the view that we should take a clear initiative for negotiation within the next week or ten days -- safely before the Neutral Nations Conference. Since our allies are hesitant, the lead will have to come from you, at the highest level.

This opinion is strengthened by the border-closing episode, which can be described as one reason more for calling talks -- because of the dangerous and explosive weakness it reveals in the DDR.

I hope you can discuss this general question with Secretary Rusk this afternoon. His professionals are more cautious, being committed to a 4-Power process of planning. They see some virtue in the French argument that we ought not to talk about negotiation before we have reached agreement on the substance of our position. But the truth is that we're making very slow headway toward a clear position, as it is; a date for negotiation would put all our noses to the grindstone.

(2) Reprisals for the Border Closing

The Department's proposal for a riposte is likely to be the ending of the travel permits which have been issued by the three powers in West Berlin to East Germans who want to visit allied or neutral countries. This was used a year ago in response to East German harassment of civilian traffic, and it worked well. No one thinks it will cause a reversal of policy this time, in the light of the much more serious causes of this much larger action. But it is argued

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By hjm NARA DATE 9/85

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that it will give some pain, since it will cut off East German access to allied countries and to those neutral nations which play along.

I find this argument unconvincing. I doubt if we should take little actions in reprisal against this big one, especially when the punishment is unrelated to the crime. The only good argument for this action is that it has been discussed among the 4 Powers before as a possible retort to border-closing, and there may be some Allied worry about our "reliability" if we don't support it now.

Incidentally, I find agreement in both Joe Alsop and George Kennan to these three conclusions: (1) this is something they have always had the power to do; (2) it is something they were bound to do sooner or later, unless they could control the exits from West Berlin to the West; (3) since it was bound to happen, it is as well to have it happen early, as their doing and their responsibility.

McG. B.

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Berlin

August 14, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1. With this week's occurrences in Berlin there will be more and more pressure for us to adopt a harder military posture.

2. I do not think we can leave unused any of the men or money that were offered by the Congress with the exception perhaps of the bomber money.

3. I would appreciate it if you would plan to discuss this matter with me this week after you have made a judgment on it.

4. I am concerned that we move ahead as quickly as possible on Civil Defense. Perhaps we could get a report on that before the week is out.

Civil Defense

NSF/82/ Gen Berlin. Gen 1/8/11/61 - 8/15/61

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WASHINGTON, D. C.



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

Reclassified as
Category "A"
September 30, 1965
By: Warren A. Henderson

Downgraded by ~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL
EO 11652: XCL 2 6 4
Authorized by: [Signature]

August 4, 1973 / August 14, 1961

31
Ambassador
Belgrade
Personal and eyes only for the Ambassador

Should you find a convenient and natural occasion for a wholly private and informal talk with your Soviet colleague, you might tell him that you know, from your recent discussions with senior American officials in Washington, that the United States Government is sincerely anxious to find a peaceful solution to the Berlin crisis and realizes that this must be one which takes account of the interests of all the various parties involved. Your Government hopes, you may add, that regular negotiations to this end may be undertaken in the fairly near future. It is possible, however, that preparations for such negotiations might be facilitated if facilities existed for occasional purely informal and exploratory exchanges of views between the two governments on some of the problems involved. You would, you may say, be available for such discussions to him or to anyone else whom the Soviet government might wish to designate for this purpose. You should make it clear that you would not be able, in such discussions, to commit the United States Government or any of its allies or associates in any way, nor would you expect any such commitment on the Soviet side; anything of this sort would have to await regular and formal negotiations. You might add, however, that you are taking this step with the knowledge of your government, and that if such exchanges should take place, you would be in touch with your government and would not be speaking irresponsibly.

You should stress that the value of such discussions would be dependent on the observation of strictest secrecy; should the Soviet side not agree that the talks should be handled on this principle, then, you may say, it would be better not to pursue them at all.

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We feel that you should go no further than this on the first occasion. Should your colleague say that he is already empowered to hear anything you have to say along this line, you should request that he nevertheless first apprise his government of what you have told him, and say that you would prefer to await his government's reaction before getting down to any matters of substance.

Should he inquire whether any of the allies of the United States have knowledge of the suggestion you are making, you may say that they do not, and that while the United States will of course be guided, in its dealings with its allies, by whatever enlightenment as to the Soviet viewpoint it may derive from these informal exchanges, it does not intend that any other government shall be apprised specifically of the fact that such talks are occurring. In particular, it is not intended that the Germans shall have any knowledge of them.

SUR. LEO NORSTAD PETERS

8/16/61

Letter - Live Oak 1961 thru 30 Aug (2)

TOP SECRET

118

FROM: GENERAL LEMNITZER, WASHINGTON
TO : GENERAL NORSTAD, PARIS

16 AUGUST 61

1. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS THE 2-PHASED RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION IN CONNECTION WITH THE BERLIN CRISIS, WHICH YOU GAVE HIM ON 24 JULY. ALSO HE IS AWARE OF OUR MEMO TO COMMANDERS DATED 12 APRIL, ENTITLED UNITED STATES CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR BERLIN, AND OF THE REVISED INSTRUCTIONS FOR EXPANDED LIVE OAK PLANNING WHICH THE AMBASSADORIAL GROUP WILL PREPARE AND ISSUE TO YOU AS A RESULT OF THE PARIS MEETING.

2. NOTWITHSTANDING THE FOREGOING, HE HAS DIRECTED THE JCS TO REQUEST YOU TO COMMENCE MORE DETAILED PLANNING ON A UNILATERAL U.S. BASIS AS A MATTER OF URGENCY. THE PURPOSE IS TO PLAN TO APPLY NON-NUCLEAR MILITARY POWER ON A LARGER SCALE THAN HERETOFORE ENVISAGED IN ORDER TO INDUCE THE COMMUNISTS TO REOPEN ACCESS TO BERLIN. HE DESIRES THAT PLANS BE PREPARED FOR NON-NUCLEAR OPERATIONS TO INCLUDE:

- A. GROUND ACTION, SUPPORTED BY AIR, OF A CORPS OR LARGER UNIT;
- B. NON-NUCLEAR TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS, AND
- C. MARITIME MILITARY OPERATIONS.

3. HE ALSO DESIRES THAT PLANS FOR THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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16 Aug 61

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8/16/61

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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August 16, 1961

Minutes of the Meeting of the Steering Group on Berlin
August 15, 1961 - 10:45 AM


Present: Secretaries of State, Defense, Commerce, Agriculture, Under Secretary Fowler of Treasury, The Attorney General, The Director of CIA, Deputy Director Wilson of USIA, The Chairman, JCS, Mr. Foy Kohler, General Taylor, Mr. Bundy

The meeting began with a discussion of the response by the Executive Branch to new language in the preamble to PL 480. The Secretary of Commerce presented the case for a statement indicating that the United States would not send subsidized food exports to Soviet bloc countries. After considerable discussion, it was the sense of the meeting that such an announcement would be unwise. The President has authorized continuing negotiations with Poland which would involve such exports, and it was felt that an announcement of the sort proposed would be both too sweeping and unnecessary. Instead it was agreed that the Secretary of Commerce would meet with the appropriate members of the Congress, after discussion with the Speaker and with selected individual members of the group. He would explain to them the reasons for avoiding a public statement at this time, and at the same time calm any fears of subsidized exports to the USSR, or indeed to other bloc countries except where there was a special political opportunity.

Turning to the immediate situation in Berlin, the Secretary of State asked Mr. Kohler to summarize recent developments. Mr. Kohler described the progress which had been made through the Secretary's statement, the delivery of the protest of the three Western Commandants in Berlin, and preparation of a protest for delivery in Moscow. The Secretary of State noted that while the border closing was a most serious matter, the probability was that in realistic terms it would make a Berlin settlement easier. Our immediate problem is the sense of outrage in Berlin and

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NA/88/Gen Subs. Berlin steering group 7/7/61 - 9/11/61

Germany which carries with it a feeling that we should do more than merely protest. It was not easy to know just what else we should do.

In the following discussion it was generally agreed that economic countermeasures would be inappropriate; either they would be much too trivial to count, like withholding Western participation in the Leipzig Fair, or they might set in train a chain of challenges and responses which might affect our own deepest interest, that of economic and human access to West Berlin.

Similar objections applied not only to such a course as general interruption of travel by East Germans to the West, but suspension of Temporary Travel documents. Moreover, it looks as if the new fence between East and West Berlin is there to stay, and we do not want to reply with temporary and incommensurate reprisals.

The one step for which there was substantial support in the group was the possibility of reinforcements of the West Berlin Garrison. There was no general agreement; and the Secretary of Defense indicated a specific reservation on the ground that such steps, taken as a gesture, were not desirable. His own inclination was to consider some reduction in U. S. military dependents abroad.

The discussion then turned to psychological measures and propaganda. Since it was agreed that, in the words of the Secretary of State, "we must keep shooting issues and non-shooting issues separate", and since it was further agreed that the closing of the border was not a shooting issue, the problem was essentially one of propaganda. We should reap a large harvest on this front. The Attorney General particularly pressed for a new and stronger organization of our efforts in this area; and it was agreed that there would be a special meeting on this subject at 6 p.m., August 15. It was further agreed that Mr. Earl Newsom would be invited to come to Washington to discuss ways and means of improvement of our propaganda efforts on the Berlin crisis.

m. d. Romp

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Control: 12594

Rec'd: AUGUST 17, 1962

Action

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Info

FROM: BONN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 354, AUGUST 17, 5 PM

PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT 354; INFORMATION BERLIN 111, LONDON 79, PARIS 95, MOSCOW 58

VIEWED OBJECTIVELY, WEST GERMAN AND WEST BERLIN REACTION TO SEALING OF BERLIN SECTOR BORDER IS HIGHLY EMOTIONAL AND DISPROPORTIONATE TO GRAVITY OF SITUATION. IT EXISTS, HOWEVER, AND MUST BE RECKONED WITH AS FURTHER AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT GERMAN PEOPLE ARE NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT MOVES WHICH DEEPEN DIVISION OF GERMANY AND PUSH REUNIFICATION FURTHER INTO FUTURE. TO PUT IT ANOTHER WAY, FEDREP'S CURRENT FOREIGN POLICY WILL BE SUPPORTED BY PUBLIC OPINION ONLY SO LONG AS IT PROVIDES THAT MODICUM OF HOPE FOR EVENTUAL SOLUTION WHICH PERSISTS UNDER STATUS QUO. AS "ABNORMAL" AS THIS STATUS QUO MAY BE, FURTHER DRAMATIC CHANGES -- EVEN THOUGH THEY BE IN ESSENCE LITTLE MORE THAN MANIFESTATIONS OF "REALITIES" OF SITUATION -- CAN, IN MY VIEW, ONLY RESULT IN ULTIMATE RADICAL REORIENTATION OF GERMANY POLICY. WHILE THIS MAY TAKE TIME I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT IT IS LONG-RANGE GOAL OF SOVIET POLICY RE GERMANY, FOR THERE IS NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT SOVIETS WILL BE CONTENT FOR LONG WITH CONSOLIDATION OF COMMUNIST REGIME IN SOVIET ZONE, TO WHICH THEIR PRESENT MOVES ARE DIRECTED. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT I HAVE FELT OUR OBJECTIVE SHOULD NOT BE CONFINED SOLELY TO DEFENSE OF OUR POSITION IN WEST BERLIN, BUT RATHER TO PREVENTION OF SUCH CONSOLIDATION.

AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, I AM NOT OVERLY CONCERNED THAT WEST GERMAN OPINION HAS PRESENTLY BOILED UP IN SUCH IMPATIENT AND SHARP MANNER. THERE REMAINS, I AM CONVINCED, BASIC CONFIDENCE

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
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NSA/SS (62) Sib. Berlin Steering Group 7/10/61-9/11/61

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August 18, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY

SUBJECT: German Policy

I. General Consideration-The Problem of German Unification

At the center of any position with respect to the Berlin crisis is the attitude to be taken on the question of German unification. It is argued that Germany will remain divided whatever our attitude. Thus realism should impel us to confirm what we are incapable of changing. No other nation besides the United States is said to be interested in German unification. For us to press for German unity will be to undermine Allied cohesion and to drive the East European satellites closer to the USSR. As for the USSR, it is argued that its chief concern in fomenting the Berlin crisis is to obtain U.S. recognition for the status quo in Central Europe. A modus vivendi is possible, so the argument goes, if we accept the division of Germany as final.

These arguments do not do full justice to the complexity of the problem. The issue is not simply whether Germany will remain divided or not. The problem we confront is to demonstrate why and in the name of what it remains divided. At stake is not only the outcome of the immediate crisis but the expectations of the people of Germany. This in turn will affect the future course of the Federal Republic and therewith of the Western Alliance.

The goal of stability in Central Europe is highly desirable. However, in order to attain it, it is important to understand that the dividing line which offers the best prospect for it is the Oder-Neisse, and not the Elbe. In the long-term, reasonable people in the USSR or the satellite orbit should be made to realize that by seeking to prop up the East German regime they are creating the dangers they are trying to avoid. A corollary is that if they do come to this conclusion, they will find us forthcoming and conciliatory with respect to their legitimate security concerns.

The instability of Central Europe is not due to the failure of the U.S. to recognize the East German regime. It is inherent in the situation. The position of East Germany is different from

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that of the rest of the satellite Empire. In Germany a Communist regime has been established in only a portion of the country, a portion that has no historical, ethnic or cultural tradition distinct from Germany as a whole.

Moreover, there exists a free and prosperous West Germany which is the symbol of an alternative -- a condition different from that in any other satellite country. The East German regime will be driven by the logic of its situation to seek to undermine or to demoralize the Federal Republic. By the same token, no West German government can accept as permanent the partition of German territory without undermining its domestic support.

An acceptance by the West of the East German regime is almost certain to force any government of the Federal Republic into some degree of opposition to its allies. All West German political parties, all West German political leaders, have stood on the proposition that they represented the only legitimate government of Germany. To reverse this course would be a deep psychological shock to the whole fabric of West German politics. If the Federal Republic is persuaded that the West prefers the division of Germany for its own ends, it may attempt separate dealings with the East. The argument may gain credence that close ties with the West having failed, Germany must pursue a policy of pressure and nationalistic advantage. The chief thrust of Khrushchev's policy seems to me to make the West share the responsibility for the division of Germany and thus lay the basis for a Rapallo policy.

It is sometimes argued that, whatever its frustrations, the Federal Republic would soon discover that its scope for separate dealings was severely limited. This line of reasoning -- which I question -- overlooks the problem of timing. By the time the Federal Republic would have realized how circumscribed its area of maneuverability really is, Western cohesion would have been wrecked. Retaining Germany as a willing member of the Western Community is important not only for the future of Germany, but it is even more vital for the peace of the world. The Soviet leaders are demanding recognition of their East German satellite

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so insistently because they know very well that acceptance by the West of the status quo is the best means for undermining the status quo. (For the first intimations of shaken German confidence in the U. S. see West German editorials, as reported in Embassy Bonn's telegram 343 of August 16, 1961.)

Soviet and East German declarations leave no doubt that acceptance by the West of the status quo in Central Europe is conceived not as the end but the beginning of a process. They are always presented as a means to undermine the "militarists" and "industrialists" of the Federal Republic, i. e., its pro-Western orientation. To be sure, the USSR almost certainly does not have a detailed master plan to communize all of Germany immediately. It would settle for loosening the Federal Republic's Western ties and to radicalize its public life. It would then have the opportunity to play off Germany against its neighbors. It could appeal to German nationalism with the lure of unification, and to the other European countries through their fear of Germany.

For all these reasons, a wise Western policy will see to it that the Soviet Union is forced to bear the onus for the division of Germany. If the West understands its interests correctly it must stand for the unity of Germany despite the experiences of two world wars and despite the understandable fear of a revival of German truculence. The West may have to acquiesce in the division of Germany but it cannot condone it. The division of Germany is almost certainly unavoidable, but the future cohesion of the North Atlantic Community depends on our ability to demonstrate what makes it so.

Western policy should have four goals:

- (1) to demonstrate to world opinion that the Soviet Union rejects even the most reasonable schemes for unification;
- (2) to appeal to reasonable people in the Soviet Union and the satellite bloc that there is an alternative route to security than the division of Germany;
- (3) to demonstrate to Western Germany that it cannot do better for itself through separate dealings

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with the East than through being a loyal ally of the West; and

(4) This last goal in turn has two prerequisites:

(a) that the Allies seem to take seriously one of West Germany's paramount concerns -- that of unification, and

(b) that they give the Federal Republic an increasing stake in a larger framework than that of Germany, specifically, the Atlantic Community.

The attitude towards Eastern Germany is of importance also in our dealings with the Soviet Bloc. If the USSR can force us to give up the principle of self-determination in an area where our moral and legal position is unassailable, we will have demonstrated that we may accede to any fait accompli. Given the Communist mentality, this is more likely than not to set up a pattern of blackmail in other areas.

A plan for Central Europe should, therefore, have the following features:

(1) It should seek to offer a means towards the unification of Germany on the basis of some scheme of self-determination;

(2) It should seek to take account of legitimate Soviet security concerns. Reasonable men in the Soviet hierarchy should be able to come to the conclusion that their security can be safeguarded without enslaving 17 million people;

(3) It should reassure the East European countries about their present territorial extent. Specifically, Poland and Czechoslovakia should be given to understand that support for the Soviet Berlin policy is not required to safeguard their frontiers; and

(4) If the West settles for the status quo it should make clear that it does so not by preference but because it prefers the status quo to nuclear war.

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II. Illustrative Scheme.

(NOTE - The proposals that follow obviously require a great deal of detailed study. They are not presented as being fully thought out, but as indicating a direction in which to move. If the President decides on this course of action, the State Department should be able to come up with a great variety of suggested schemes.)

Phase I.

The West accepts the Soviet notion that there should be a Confederation of the two states in Germany. However, the governments of these states would emerge from free elections conducted separately in each state. All parties existing in one part of Germany can operate in the other and the elections would be under international supervision. The steps leading to elections could include a Mixed East-West German Committee to draft an electoral law. If the Committee could not agree, there would be a plebiscite as to the electoral law after three years. Elections for governments in the Federal Republic and the GDR would take place no more than four years after ratification of the agreement. The Confederation would have a common foreign policy, a common Defense Ministry and a common Finance Ministry. Each state would be free to maintain any social structure it chose. There would be free movement as between each of the German states. The East German state would be completely demilitarized -- i. e., no military forces of any kind could be stationed on its territory or recruited among its population. The East German state would fulfill the present economic obligations of the GDR to the Soviet bloc for a period of ten years. Western troops would withdraw the same distance from the Elbe as the width of the GDR. The Rapacki Plan would be instituted. The East German state would reaffirm its previous acceptance of the Oder-Neisse line. Berlin would be the capital of the German Confederation. (The clauses could be phrased so that they apply equally to both sides and do not seem to assume the transformation of the present East German regime. They are stated in the present form only for simplicity.)

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This scheme, if rejected, would demonstrate:

(1) that the Soviets oppose German unity on any terms involving free popular expression, and

(2) that the Soviet opposition to unity is produced not from fear that the Federal Republic would swallow up the GDR but out of fear of Soviet determination to maintain a Communist regime against the will of the people.

At the same time, the scheme would have the following attractive features from the Communist point of view:

(1) There would be a reasonable period of time for a transitional stage;

(2) The economic assurances make possible a gradual adjustment without any basic strain on the economies of Eastern Europe;

(3) The political frontiers in Central Europe would be recognized; and

(4) The military guarantees and leaves no doubt that the Soviet leadership is risking war not for defensive but for aggressive purposes. Indeed, this could be the theme of our propaganda.

The propaganda theme to accompany this proposal could go somewhat as follows:

"The United States has full sympathy for the fears of Germany's victims of World War II. It can even understand the apparent conviction of some countries -- such as the USSR and the East European satellites -- that a divided Germany represents the best guarantee of their safety. However, it is the conviction of the United States that this policy cannot be in the long-run interest of any state. The history of our century demonstrates that the quest for national self-determination, once

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thwarted, takes on ever more explosive forms. We advocate self-determination for the German people, because we are profoundly convinced that this is in the long-term interest of all Europe and the world. We have made certain proposals which to us seem to guarantee the right of self-determination. We are ready to examine any Soviet proposals consistent with the basic right of peoples to choose their own fate.

"At the same time, we will do everything in our power to eliminate the charges of aggression in Central Europe. The security features of our plan are designed to achieve this end. We are prepared to consider other proposals. It is the United States' conviction that support for the Soviet policy on Berlin is not required to meet the security concerns of any people, including the Russian people. Indeed, it is a good way to undermine these security concerns."

This theme could be elaborated to develop to a maximum any potential conflict of interests between the USSR and the satellites:

Phase II.

Here we could offer two schemes:

(1) The four powers agree that Germany be unified on the basis of free elections. As a symbol of this commitment, Berlin is established as the capital of Germany. Free elections would be held in all of Berlin no less than two years after the ratification of the agreement. Upon the establishment of a united Berlin, governmental bureaus of both the Federal Republic and the GDR would be removed from it. At this point, also, a Mixed German Committee would be established and charged with preparing an electoral law for all of Germany. If this Mixed Committee cannot agree, a plebiscite would be held in both parts of Germany at the end of five years. Elections on the basis of the new electoral law would be held within two years of

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the plebiscite. The security guarantees would be the same as in the previous scheme. The chief difference between Phase I and Phase II is the intermediate step of a free all-Berlin and the problem of timing. The time-table for unification would be in effect ten years. The East German regime would have given a hostage the fulfillment of its obligations by agreeing to the unification of all of Berlin -- a step which would at the least reduce the Communist incentive to maintain the GDR; and

(2) The main features of Mr. Acheson's Stage I with a commitment to a plebiscite at the end of three years.

Phase III.

A solution for West Berlin incorporating the main features of "Solution C". We might concede here the mode of negotiations with the GDR outlined earlier, provided that we can define the subjects for technical discussion with great precision.


Henry Kissinger

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August 21, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Subject: Berlin Political Planning

I want to take a stronger lead on Berlin negotiations. Both the calendar of negotiation and the substance of the Western position remain unsettled, and I no longer believe that satisfactory progress can be made by Four-Power discussion alone. I think we should promptly work toward a strong U. S. position in both areas and should make it clear that we cannot accept a veto from any other power. We should of course be as persuasive and diplomatic as possible, but it is time to act. My initial views on both subjects are set out below.

1. The Calendar

I like your plan to issue, before September first, an invitation to negotiations. I think this means that we should this week make it plain to our three Allies that this is what we mean to do and that they must come along or stay behind. I shall be glad to write to General de Gaulle myself if desirable.

I also like your idea that the four Foreign Ministers, at New York for the United Nations, should be empowered to work out a place and time for negotiations. If there is a better way, I'd be glad to accept it. In general, I like the idea of an announcement before September first, discussion of ways and means before October first, and formal negotiation about November first.

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DECLASSIFIED	
NSC Mr. dated April 9, 1979	
By mjm	NARS, Date 5/1/79

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Within the category of "discussion of ways and means," I place the possibility of preliminary private talks between appropriate US-USSR diplomats. I like Chip Bohlen for this, on our side. Obviously such talks would have to be based on a clear and solid sense of our policy, and so I do not think they can begin for about a month -- say around September 25th.

I do not think well of the plans for a three-Ambassador call upon Khrushchev to try to smoke him out. Until we have something to suggest ourselves, we shall not get any more out of him than we have been getting since Vienna.

2. The Substance of Our Policy

The Acheson paper is a good start, but it is not a finishing point. What you and I need is a small group of hard workers who can produce alternatives for our comment and criticism on an urgent basis. This, in my judgment, should be a labor separated from the day-to-day operational work and planning under Kohler. I think of such people as Bohlen, Owen and Hillenbrand from State and Bundy and Sorensen over here. Maybe there should be fewer; probably there should not be more. This group should be as nearly invisible as possible, and it should report directly to you and me. Most of the elements of a firm policy are standing around now -- and I believe a group with orders from the two of us could prepare a clear paper for my decision in one long session on August 31st. We shall need a paper by that time if we are to talk with our allies and get something like an agreed position from them by the end of September. I would suggest that such a group bring in preliminary proposals on Friday of this week -- August twenty-fifth.

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In general, what I think we should say to such a small group as guidelines is this:

1. Make the framework of our proposals as fresh as possible -- they should not look like warmed-over stuff from 1959.
2. Protect our support for the idea of self-determination, the idea of all-Germany, and the fact of viable, protected freedom in West Berlin.
3. Do not insist on maintenance of occupation rights if other strong guarantees can be designed. Occupation rights are a less attractive base, before the world, than the freedom and the protection of West Berliners.
4. Consider well the option of proposing parallel peace treaties. If we table our own drafts, we might do a lot with this; and Khrushchev would have to look at what we say, because he has invited just this course.
5. Examine all of Khrushchev's statements for pegs on which to hang our position. He has thrown out quite a few assurances and hints here and there, and I believe they should be exploited.
6. Do not put too much distance between our initial proposals and our fall-back position. Indeed it may be well not to have any fall-back position. Our first presentation should be, in itself, as persuasive and reasonable as possible.

a little
discrepancy
from Khrush

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Can I have your prompt reaction to this?



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

8/22/61 111
1257 20782
August 22, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Allen W. Dulles
Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Meeting on August 20, 1961, with General Eisenhower

PRESENT: General Eisenhower
Lt. Col. John Eisenhower
Allen W. Dulles, Director, CIA
Major General David W. Gray, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Mr. Richard H. Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
European Affairs, Dept. of State

1. We had a relaxed conversation of over an hour and a half with General Eisenhower on Sunday morning. During the briefing we covered the points outlined below. General Eisenhower asked many questions and commented in some detail as the briefing proceeded. The General's comments are grouped together in the second part of this memorandum.

(a) I reported on the events of the last week, the sudden closing of the Berlin sector boundary on August 13, to halt the refugee

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CIA doc. (WLC-78-670)
BY 4m2h NARS, DATE 6/17/81



flow, the shock of the West Berliners which exceeded our expectation, in view of the fact that the possibility of a sector closing had been often discussed, and the sudden drop in morale of the West Berliners as they saw the tanks and barbed wire across the exit points and along the sector boundary. I reported that there was a sudden fear among the West Berliners that there would be a military coup against them, and they were frustrated at their inability to do anything and quick in their resentment against the Western occupying Allies, particularly the United States, when no immediate action was taken. I said that this situation of sinking morale motivated the Johnson-Clay visit and the deployment to Berlin of a battle group.

(b) Mr. Davis followed with an account of the Foreign Ministers Conference in Paris on Berlin, described the work of the working groups, both inter-Allied and inter-departmental, on the Berlin situation. He mentioned that these discussions had led to decisions not to exacerbate the explosive situation in East Germany. He mentioned that at the inter-Allied level no agreement was reached on the timing of any Western initiative for negotiations with the Soviet, de Gaulle being adamantly against a Western initiative and the British

generally favoring it.

The contingency planning also included inter-Allied agreement for significant economic countermeasures amounting to total economic embargo against the Soviet Bloc if access to West Berlin should be cut off.

(c) General Gray covered the military planning, both at the Washington level and at the Foreign Ministers Paris Conference. He described the action taken by the United States to build up its own forces since the date of General Eisenhower's last briefing by Secretary McNamara and General Lemnitzer on July 15, including the readying of six divisions which would be able to go overseas by about the year end if required. General Gray also discussed the action taken with regard to sending the battle group to Berlin which, at the time of our briefing, actually was under way.

General Eisenhower's comments and queries on the briefing follow:

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(a) General Eisenhower commented that he was more favorable to General de Gaulle's views on negotiations, remarking that it is hard to negotiate with a man who is coming across your lawn armed with a club and ready to take possession of your house. After all, Khrushchev was asking for a change in the present status, we were not. It would seem to be the stronger position for us not to take the initiative in making proposals. He asked whether Khrushchev had asked for a conference to which we replied that he had hinted at the need for discussion in his speeches but that there was no formal proposal from Khrushchev. The General observed that the problems seemed to be about the same as they were before and that it was necessary to coordinate our actions as closely as possible with our Allies.

is this all? evidently something missing (should be (14))

(c) He thought Khrushchev would merely chuckle over our reinforcement of the Berlin garrison but he later remarked that if, in our judgment, this was necessary for the morale of the people in Berlin and West Germany, he agreed entirely with the action taken. He too thought that Khrushchev was more than ever determined to get some sort of a settlement this year of the German and Berlin problem, and he raised the question of what do we do if Khrushchev cuts off our access and attacks our Berlin forces.

In reply to the view we expressed that a physical attack on our Berlin forces would probably mean war, but that Khrushchev was unlikely to force this, General Eisenhower commented that if access were cut off, we would have to go to the UN and undertake our probe, since it was vital to maintain the three points of primary interest to us, i.e., Allied rights in West Berlin, Allied access to West Berlin, and the viability of West Berlin.

(d) In connection with General Gray's briefing on the military aspects of the Foreign Ministers Conference, and the actions taken by the United States in the build-up of its forces for possible overseas use, General Eisenhower remarked that it looked to him as if people think we can fight a conventional war in Europe without using

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nuclear weapons. General Gray explained that one of our objectives was a limited action in the preliminary phases of an acute crisis which could enforce a position allowing maximum opportunity for diplomatic moves.

General Eisenhower doubted whether the measures we were taking would in any way affect Khrushchev's intentions but they would be of tremendous importance in impressing our Allies of our resolve. General Eisenhower believed that our build-up would cause Khrushchev to initiate a larger build-up of ground forces in order to stay ahead of us. He further explained that since 1951 he had preached and still believed that the European nations should contribute the major part of the ground forces and that the United States contribution should be in the form of the more sophisticated elements such as airborne troops, air forces and missiles. The Europeans have not been willing to do this and so now the United States is faced with shouldering a larger part of the ground forces burden than they should have to. General Eisenhower also recognized the difficulties from a cost standpoint of a large increase in our military structure which will cause a progressively larger increase in the annual defense budget.

He then reminisced in some detail about the background of our having sent troops to Europe. As he had conceived this, it had

been a temporary measure and it had never been intended that they should stay there on a permanent basis. However, there was no use crying over spilt milk. Because we have had our troops there, the Europeans have not done their share. They won't make the necessary sacrifices to provide the soldiers for their own defense. He said that every time he had tried to do something about bringing our troops back, Secretaries Dulles and Herter had pled with him with tears in their eyes, not to talk about any withdrawal of American forces from Europe. At this stage he really had no suggestions to make and understood the actions taken by our Government so far. He recalled that at one time he had had the idea of making Berlin a "fief" of the UN; possibly make it the seat of the UN, but the State Department wouldn't go along with this.

General Eisenhower added that he did not think we were going to get into a war but the question we must ask ourselves is how long we can continue to spend ever greater sums of money which mean more taxes and would prevent the civilian sector of the economy from expanding. The Federal Government lives on the profits of business and of the individual and any squeeze on the civilian economy with ever-growing Government control could finally lead to a managed economy with everything centralized and controlled by the Government.

[REDACTED]

(e) In reply to General Gray's reference to the various contingency plans which the Pentagon had prepared, General Eisenhower recalled that long ago he had learned that plans are worthless but planning is everything. You could not make plans covering every contingency and hope to pull them out of the pigeon-hole and make them fit the existing situation. But planning was necessary in order to train people to think about the problems so that they would be ready to act with good judgment in the face of the actual situation.

General Eisenhower agreed that in this situation our major problem was the development of an effective method for quick decision-making from the political to the military level in NATO.

THOUGHTS ON BERLIN7600
8/22/61

The crisis in Germany is rapidly developing to the point at which we must choose between talk now and fight now. It has been our tendency to put off the question, "When should we talk?"; now it is our temptation to put off the question, "What shall we say?" and concentrate instead on the more subtle but shallow issues of forum, timing, and initiative. In what follows, I attempt to look at the deeper problem, and, perhaps inevitably, in a rather crude way.

U.S. Aims in Germany

What do we want in Berlin? It is perhaps better to ask, "What have we wanted?" so that we can be prepared to ask, "What should we want?" I think that the terms in which we have tended to view our interest in Berlin can be examined under three main headings: as a strategic forward position in our struggle with the Soviet Union; as a very important item in our transactions with the Federal Republic of Germany; and as an area of Western freedom which we are specifically committed to defend. As an advanced position in the cold war struggle, Berlin has had a number of functions. Its less important ones have been to provide a physical base for overt and covert activities directed against East Germany in particular, and the Bloc in general. These have included everything from radio broadcasts to the movement of secret agents. Much more important has been the effect of our physical position in Berlin and our political position on Berlin in unsettling Eastern Germany. We have made it more difficult for the Communists to consolidate their hold on Eastern Germany. Our refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the regime, our support for the similar refusal of the Federal Republic, our underlying claim that only free elections in Eastern Germany can provide the basis for a legitimate regime have all tended to this end. So has our refusal to give our assent to the permanency of the present boundaries between East Germany and Berlin. This indeed has wider implications, and has in practice been the principal official expression of our refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the whole Communist settlement in Eastern Europe.

Our position on Berlin and East Germany has had a powerful effect in tying the Federal Republic of Germany to us. This tie goes not only to the government but, in the last few years, to the opposition as well, since both major parties now support the position that unification can only come about as a result of free elections, i.e., on West

German terms. Further, our position on Berlin and unification can be viewed as guarding the right flank of the present government by preventing the unification issue from being used as the basis for popular appeal by a neo-nationalist right wing (e.g., the Free Germany Party). Both the general support that we have offered to the German Government and the specifics of support on Berlin and unification stimulate German interest in and contribution to NATO. This in itself has been a very important reason for our steadfastness in holding to our present position.

Finally, we have a broader commitment to the freedom of West Berlin that transcends either its relation to our ties with Germany or its significance as a forward post in the cold war. We have repeatedly pledged our word to the two million West Berliners that we would continue to defend their freedom, and there is no doubt that honoring that pledge is a test of our resolution and a gauge of the value of our support, especially in Europe, but also generally all over the world. Further, the significance to us of Berlin as a showcase of the economic and political achievements of the Western mode of organizing society also transcends the considerations examined under the first two sections. Finally, the history of Berlin as an escape hatch should also be mentioned. This of course has a strong connection with the first set of interests examined. There is no doubt that the continued flight of people, many of them from the professional and managerial groups, is one factor in the instability of the East Berlin regime and its difficulties in achieving satisfactory economic performance. Further, the escape hatch has significance in itself in respect to the maintenance of freedom for those within reach of it.

Soviet Aims in Germany

When we ask what the Soviet Union wants in Germany, we are, of course, in the realm of speculation. My own inclination is to be on the conservative side among the speculators, i.e., to pay more attention to specific Soviet statements and less, if any, to inferences from a presumed Soviet Grand Design. I think what the Russians want above all is a stabilization of the situation in Eastern Europe. This means recognition of the Oder-Neisse boundary by all the western powers, including the Federal Republic of Germany, recognition of the legitimacy of the GDR, and stability in East Germany.

It is a fair question to what extent political stability in East Germany is compatible with the existence of a free West Berlin, or even with the division of Germany in the absence of a free West Berlin. The extreme harshness of the Ulbricht government and the lack of even that element

of popular appeal which some, if not all, of the governments of the People's Democratic Republics possess is a product of the inevitable comparison that the 17 million East Germans must make between their lot and that of the 52 million West Germans. There is no doubt in my mind that even a "legitimate" government of the GDR, from whose concern the two million West Berliners had been lifted by a stroke of magic, would find this comparison a hard one to bear. It is further clear that the existence of free West Berlin exacerbates the situation considerably from the East German point of view. The immediacy of the comparison at the heart of East Germany, the escape hatch, the American, British and French troops, all contribute to rubbing the noses of both the people and the Communist Party functionaries in the differences between East and West Germany.

Nonetheless, I think it is clear from the Soviet statements that the Soviets themselves do not now envisage the existence of a free West Berlin outside the control of the GDR as a fatal flaw in their plans for stabilizing the situation in Eastern Europe.

The most recent Soviet actions in cutting communication between East and West Berlin may show that the Soviet concept of a free West Berlin cannot include continued tolerance of the escape hatch. Nonetheless, if we take their statements at face value, the hope of the Soviets is to gain enough from the unilateral recognition of the GDR implied by the Bloc's signing a peace treaty to improve the situation in some measure. In fact, it can be doubted how much effect this measure will have in quieting the turmoil in East Germany.

The second goal of the Soviet Union in its German policy is to place some limitation on the military power of West Germany. Here again we can say that, ideally, the Russians would like to see West Germany neutral and disarmed, as indeed they would like in some ideal sense to see every country not under their control neutral and disarmed. But more realistically, the Russians would find some gain in restrictions on German military power falling short of this. In particular, the outcry that the Soviet Union has raised about nuclear weapons in West Germany in my own judgment reflects a genuine concern, one which is widely shared among the satellites, and which goes deeper than the level of Communist propaganda. These have been Soviet aims for some time. They are now being pressed vehemently because Khrushchev feels that the continuing shift in the world balance of military power in his favor must be registered on the European political scene, where "must" has the force of both moral and natural law.

Conflicts Between Soviet and U.S. Aims

To what extent are our desires and those of the Soviet Union jointly achievable, to what extent irreconcilably conflicting? On our side, continued pursuit of the first two of the three sets of aims examined above -- Berlin as a strategic position in the cold war and as an essential tie in U.S. - West German relations -- is inconsistent with recognition of the East German regime and acceptance of the Oder-Neisse boundary. Together, these actions would go a long way toward complete acceptance of the legitimacy of Bloc control over Eastern Europe. Further, they would require a significant change in German foreign policy, no doubt at some political cost to the present government. The effectiveness with which we can pursue the first and second kinds of aims is diminished by increasing the tacit recognition we give to the Government of East Germany, even without formal acceptance. Within West Germany, the increase in informal dealings with the East Germans and the growth of trade across the boundary between the two Germanies has undercut considerably the strength of the official Western position on unification. Any steps we might make to accord an equal degree of practical recognition to the GDR regime would further this process.

On the other side, if the Soviets are successful in closing off West Berlin from East Berlin and East Germany, and push ahead in their determination to sign a peace treaty before the end of the year, while we maintain our present refusal to recognize the GDR, and our insistence on the illegality of the sealed border within Berlin, the Soviet desire for "normality" in East Germany will hardly be achieved. The resulting state of tension, both in East Germany and between East and West, if it is tolerable at all, will be such as to convert East Germany into a more complete garrison cum prison-camp than it is today. And, of course, the second Russian aim will also fail of achievement, since the NATO response to continued tension will insure a much higher level of armament in West Germany, both German and Allied. In fact, it is hard to believe that such a situation can remain stable for long.

In the past, we have pressed all three of our aims by upholding the status quo in Berlin, while calling for supervised free elections in all Germany, without restraints on the behavior of the resulting unified German state. The previous status quo has already been unilaterally modified by the Soviets and, in the absence of negotiation, further unilateral modification will almost certainly follow, at least to the extent of the Soviet peace treaty with the GDR.

It is clear, then, that if the Soviets pursue their aims, we cannot succeed in pursuing all of ours; and vice versa. Only if the Soviets prove willing to revert to the status quo ante, or if we can abandon the first and second of our past policy aims and concentrate on the third--the maintenance of freedom in West Berlin--is the area of conflict sufficiently small that negotiations might be successful.

Can We Expect the Soviets to be Satisfied with the Status Quo Ante?

Khrushchev's repeated contention that in the last few years there has been a shift in the balance of military power against the West is essentially correct, although he naturally exaggerates both its extent and its necessary consequences. This shift is more fundamental than the potentially transient weakness of Western conventional ground forces, in combination with the growing--though still inferior--Soviet strategic nuclear striking power. The growth in strategic power makes it possible for Khrushchev to be more daring in exploiting his familiar advantages in other directions in confronting the imperfectly united NATO powers in Germany. These include the greater flexibility and control an authoritarian government at home and a subservient set of Allies in the Warsaw Pact permit him in rushing toward and retreating from the edge of war, and the wide capacity for harassment short of providing a clear-cut casus belli provided by the geography of Berlin.

To these we must add the effects--although they are less clear cut--of the suspected pressures on Khrushchev within the Soviet Union and from China toward a hard line in dealing with the West.

The result of this sum hardly points to a ready acceptance by the Soviets of the previous status quo in Germany. Rather it suggests that the Western demonstration of force required to achieve that acceptance will hardly be achievable short of war.

Should We Modify Our Aims?

If we persist in our aims, we can arrive, at best, in a position in which the Soviets can, at little cost to themselves, raise the whole set of problems again without any real change in our ability to respond. More likely, we will, sooner rather than later, find ourselves working toward a military resolution of the issues. Should we indeed be willing to fight for the whole of our past position? Or is there part of it that we can give up?

It is perhaps simplest to talk first about the possibility of giving up those of our past goals that involve the relation between our German policy and our political ties with the Federal Republic. There is no question that there will be some political cost to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany in a change in these ties, and, in particular, that increased criticism from nationalist groups would result from any "retreat" from present positions on unification and the eastern boundaries. On the other side, Germany and Europe have both evolved greatly since our present position on these issues was formed within Germany. The Social Democrats have changed their positions on several issues so that they are much less sharply divided from the government than they once were. They have abandoned their previous espousal of some kind of neutralism and their skepticism of German membership in NATO. Further, they have abandoned the specifically Socialist character of their programs and thus have decisively widened the intellectual gap which separates them from the East: whatever appeal the notion of the unity of the Socialist parties has had is dead.

In Europe the rapid development of the EEC has so strongly tied the West German economy to that of its partners, that NATO is no longer the major political tie of Germany in Europe. To be sure, EEC has not directly tied Germany to the U.S. as do the political commitments we share with the present government on reunification, boundaries and Berlin, but it is not clear that a specific direct tie to the U.S. is more desirable than general ties to the Atlantic Community at large. This is not to say that this evolution has yet proceeded to the stage where we can view with indifference a change in Germany's relations with NATO at this moment. However, given the existence of the other ties, it is no longer the case that we run a great risk of undercutting German participation in NATO by changing our views on the German question. Finally, German attitudes themselves have changed. There has been a great growth of trade across the intra-German boundary and a variety of other contacts on the technical level between the Federal Republic and the non-existent GDR. The Germans have gone along in tacit acceptance of the fact of two Germanies. Indeed, they have gone further than we, and such a discrepancy would seem both curious, and not worth our effort to maintain.

Important as this is, it is far less so than the question of the relation of our past position on Berlin and Germany to our general strategy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. What is involved here is nothing less than

the terms in which we view the struggle between the U.S. and the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the instruments we choose to carry it on. At the one extreme we can see ourselves as engaged in a war and indeed a religious war in which a military conception of the problem leads naturally to an emphasis on military modes of dealing with it. In these terms, we see everything as a gain or loss for our side and a corresponding and equal loss or gain for the other side in a world sharply divided into friends and enemies; and we view neutralists with uneasy suspicion and an underlying belief that they must 'really' be neutral for us or against us because they certainly can't be 'really' neutral. At the other extreme we can see the struggle as a competition in good works and other displays of virtue in which a crowd of neutral onlookers from Africa, Asia and Latin America ultimately awards the palm to the side which has done most by direct action and example to make the world a better place to live in. Both of these views are false.

On the one hand, we are involved in a continuing hostile confrontation with the Sino-Soviet Bloc that in some degree affects and is affected by all our actions all over the world. The way in which we meet this confrontation will shape our own future and that of the rest of the world. On the other hand, we must increasingly deal with people to whom this confrontation is of secondary interest, and problems to which it is only indirectly relevant. It is only by giving primacy to the positive goals of our policy over the next decade that we can use the confrontation to serve our other foreign policy interests as well. Broadly, these positive aims are two-fold: to increase the strength and unity of the industrial nations of the Atlantic Community and Japan; to use that strength and unity to help the other half of the non-communist world to emerge from backwardness, isolation and colonialism in ways that favor uncoercive societies, free to choose their own paths of development and capable of doing so.

The instruments of such a policy must be chiefly political and economic; the focus of attention, chiefly on the parts of the world directly concerned: the free industrial nations on the one side, the less-developed countries on the other. This does not mean that either military measures or our direct relations with the Sino-Soviet Bloc are unimportant; but that, once these instruments are chiefly negative, and our direct relations are usually hostile, and at best cool, expected positive achievements cannot be looked for in these directions. And it is only by our positive achievements that we can confront the Sino-Soviet Bloc with the failure of their own expansionist aims and thus force them

to accommodate to a genuinely peaceful coexistence. We could view our immediate relations with the Bloc as the key to all our problems of foreign policy and warlike measures--in the military, economic, and propaganda spheres--as the prime modality of our relations, and thus take the classic cold war pose. This was in essence the position of the last administration. To a great extent, this position was inherited by that administration from its predecessor, which had been pushed into it by the Korean war. The Korean war led, not only to a sharp and permanent increase in the level of the defense budget, but also to a direct shift in the focus of the political and economic sides of our foreign policy in the narrower sense. In the one, alliances; in the other, military assistance programs, took the central position. The Eisenhower Administration continued this policy, but in a curious combination with an essentially weak military policy in terms of the size and composition of the armed forces and the grand strategy that informed their use. It may be that we were fortunate that an over-reliance on military means and a militarized view of our foreign policy was in fact combined with a weak, rather than a strong, military policy.

In addition to its primary shortcoming--its failure to contribute to the main positive goals of our foreign policy in the next decade--a cold war stance has some other significant defects. First is its rigidity; the recent past has demonstrated how hard it is to change. Further, its internal political consequences are highly undesirable: McCarthyism was not unconnected with the fact that we were literally at war with the Soviet Union in Korea. Both our history, and the great success in political and economic terms of our society make it appropriate for us to be much more conservative in moving away from simple Lockean concepts of property and liberty than are other societies, even the relatively successful and stable ones of Western Europe. A highly military stance abroad makes us increasingly intolerant of this difference, and a corresponding increase in the political weight of those radical right wing elements which see in the difference a threat to the American way of life. Further, when we take a strongly military stance, we face a dearth of suitable objects of action. This aggravates the internal political consequences of such a stance, and we seek enemies within when we cannot come to grips with the enemies without.

Negotiating Possibilities

The foregoing analysis convinces me that the only one of our past aims which we must continue to pursue is the freedom of West Berlin.

The rest, to the extent that they are not simply irrelevant to our present situation, have ceased to be worth the risks that their pursuit entails.

Two related questions immediately arise from this conclusion: (1) what is the essential "freedom" which we must defend, and (2) how much can abandonment of our previous aims be expected to help in negotiating a settlement that promises to maintain it.

The freedom of West Berlin involves several elements. First is continued internal freedom: the maintenance of orderly, responsible, and popular government. Second is freedom of access to West Germany for both people and goods. Third is some kind of continued symbolic association with West Germany that helps to support the will of Berliners to remain free. Last is a degree of security in the enjoyment of the other freedoms that permits their benefits to be realized.

The guarantee of these freedoms involves at least unrestricted access by land and air from West Germany to West Berlin, and something that speaks to the security of access over and above the Soviet's promise. In the past this has been the presence of the three power garrison, plus the membership of West Germany in NATO, plus the historical fact of the airlift. The current Soviet campaign against Berlin, especially the closing of the border between East and West, has diminished the sustaining power of history, and, by threatening the ties with West Germany and the maintenance of the garrison--assuming the absence of these to be the content of "neutralization"--threatens the other two supports of the security of Berlin's freedom.

In exchange for new or renewed supports, we should be prepared to offer:

(1) acceptance of the Oder-Neisse line as the final boundary of Germany as the part of the Federal Republic as well as the Western Allies;

(2) some form of recognition of the GDR as the government now in control of East Germany;

(3) agreement on the proposition that unification can come about only by discussion between the two German governments, and, accordingly,

initiation of such discussions; and

(4) discussion of mutual security guarantees for both Germanies by the Warsaw and NATO nations, including the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Germany.

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In accepting the first three of these, we do no more than accord recognition to present facts. Such recognition is as much in our interests, including West German interests, as in that of the Soviets. The unworkability of the Ulbricht regime in East Germany is not the product of our refusal to treat with it as a legal government; but our refusal does give some plausibility to Khrushchev's and Ulbricht's efforts to place part of the blame on West Germany and NATO. It is clearly a gain for us to force them to accept the complete responsibility for their failure. Further, the repressive function of Soviet troops in East Germany will be underlined by this change. Continuance of discussion between East and West German governments, and their elevation to an official level will make even more difficult the East German effort to seal completely the internal frontier. The attractive power of West German success in contrast with East German failure will make itself felt in all these contacts, and, accordingly, we should welcome, rather than fear them. In general, it is we who should be ready, and the Soviets unready, to assume the risks of promoting contact between East and West Germany.

Our formal acceptance of the Oder-Neisse line loosens the ties between Poland and Czechoslovakia, and the GDR, and stimulates them to a broader view of how their security interests can be served, changes which, again, we should welcome.

What in exchange must we ask with respect to Berlin? Our minimum conditions must include three provisions for access and security. We require guaranteed access from West Germany via specified land and air corridors, recognized by both the Soviet Union and the GDR, with complete freedom of travel through these corridors. We might be willing to make this travel subject to some form of inspection in respect to agreed prohibited categories of traffic: nuclear weapons, for example. On the security side, we might consider two alternatives: maintenance of the present garrisons, or incorporation of West Berlin into West Germany to parallel the incorporation of East Berlin in East Germany.

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Both of these can be viewed in form as interim arrangements in the absence of unification. Soviet demands for the end of the occupation regime in Berlin suggest that incorporation of Berlin in the Federal Republic might prove the better path to choose.

These are minimum terms; our initial requests should be for much more. We should press for an all-Berlin solution, which unifies the city under conditions we can accept. These would be the same as those described for West Berlin: access and security guarantees.

A way to provide both, as well as to pose a challenge to Soviet propaganda, which the Soviets will find difficult to counter, is to propose that a unified, neutral, free and democratic Berlin become the headquarters of the United Nations. As such, it would need only an internal police force to ensure its security; since neither GDR or Soviets would be likely to take on themselves the odium of attacking the UN headquarters city or disturbing the political arrangements on which it rests. As the UN headquarters, the city would naturally have to be freely accessible to the whole world, and hindrances to access would involve the same high political costs as interference with its freedom. In the same way, it would be wise to make the city free to trade with the whole world.

We can sponsor such an arrangement only under suitable safeguards as to the right of Berliners to choose their own form of government; and with such safeguards, we could be confident of the result.

This proposal would most likely be unacceptable to the Soviets. In the first place, the loss of East Berlin would be a further serious blow to the GDR; it is doubtful whether it could survive such a blow. Secondly, the abandonment of a Communist-dominated area to even a neutral status, with the right of self-determination is probably intolerable to the Soviets. Yet the dramatic nature of the proposal, its consonance with the propaganda campaign the Soviets have been carrying on against New York as the UN headquarters site, its symbolic appropriateness in dealing with the German problem, in view of the origin of the UN as the aftermath of the Second World War, would all make it difficult for the Russians to reject. This would be even more the case if the proposal can be put forward in a large forum, such as a peace conference.

Even the minimum position put forward above has a far wider propaganda appeal than would an attempt to stand on the present status quo, leaving aside our ability to do so. To the extent that we recognize

that the situation in Germany has changed, and that we acknowledge the limits on our ability to undo these changes, we make more reasonable our request for guarantees on West Berlin. Further, if we propose that West Berlin have the same relation to West Germany as East Berlin does to East Germany, in the context of our formal acceptance of the situation in East Germany, we are responding in a way which is consistent with Khrushchev's public statements and his private conversations with Western official visitors.

Obstacles to These Proposals

These are the major obstacles to the whole approach to Berlin and Germany proposed above, both external and internal.

The chief external obstacle is the probable resistance of the German government to so drastic a change in our common attitude toward the GDR. We have argued above that, in some respects, the Germans are already more ready to make this change than we; but, nonetheless, some shock probably will be involved. It is thus important to begin discussions with them on this point as soon as possible. It may even be worth considering the value of an announcement by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, made before the German elections, that we recognize the permanence of the present eastern border of Germany. This, while undoubtedly leading to temporary anger and agitation in Germany, would have the value of starting at once the process of re-thinking old positions, which must go on there as well as here and in Paris and London.

But the more important political obstacle is undoubtedly domestic. As the crisis grows tenser, the ability of the administration to espouse any policy which involves "concessions" to the Soviets diminishes, for fear that the opposition will attack it for appeasement. The whole argument of this essay is the error of such a view, and there is no way of dealing with it other than by meeting it head-on. The first step in so doing is to call now for negotiations: subsequent steps depend on the time, place and forum which evolve from that call.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

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DATE: August 26, 1961

SUBJECT:

PARTICIPANTS:

The Secretary
Hervé Alphand, French Ambassador
Jean-Claude Winckler, Counselor of French Embassy
Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary

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 9/11/61

The Ambassador presented the Secretary a copy of a reply from President de Gaulle dated today to President Kennedy's letter of August 25. After the Secretary had read the letter the Ambassador said that while this message indicated that the French would not participate in procedural talks, they would of course agree to talk on substance if possibilities of such talks developed. If the United States would agree to explore these possibilities through diplomatic channels, the French would not object. If the results were negative, then the Allies would apply the contingency planning. If the results were positive, the French Government would join on substantive negotiations. Thus the French in fact agreed that there should be negotiations as soon as possible on a real basis and this could result from a United States diplomatic approach. However, they considered it would be imprudent in advance to commit ourselves to negotiations without knowing what the results might be.

If the United States should agree that this procedure would be a way out of the present impasse, then it would be possible for the three to concert a reply to the Soviet note of August 3 omitting the last

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Last paragraph of the American text and substituting a paragraph proposed by the French (text attached) reading roughly as follows:

"Taking account of recent events and of the Soviet notes which have followed that of August 3, the French Government can only again warn the Soviet Government against any escalation on its part in an extremely grave situation for which it alone is responsible. The French Government continues to consider that a general solution of the principal problems on which peace depends is a desirable objective. It is ready as always to discuss on a reasonable basis in the absence of any threat or ultimatum and in an atmosphere of decency unresolved problems relating to Germany as well as other essential questions."

The Ambassador continued that if the United States could not accept this procedure and language but insist on its own formula then it could not speak on behalf of four Governments since France was not willing to be associated. Consequently, it was up to the US to choose.

The Secretary said that the US was clear that it wanted to say something publicly with respect to negotiations, to which the Ambassador replied that it was not clear in his instructions as to whether the French would agree or disagree on a public announcement as to exploratory diplomatic talks.

The Secretary said that with respect to the French point as to what might be the result of negotiations, the United States recognizes there is a relationship between substance and scheduling of negotiations. However, the broad policy of the Allies was well set even though the details had not been well worked out. Ambassador Alphonse was dubious as to whether Allied policies were agreed, referring in this connection to his talk with President Kennedy. He cited the President as mentioning the other policies line and the final acceptance of the GMR. This, he said, he considered to be new in the US position. If we went ahead on such lines, it would have to be without the Germans. The Secretary reiterated that the basic policies of the Allies with respect to Germany had been fixed for 15 years. If arrangements for talks were made in September there would be plenty of time to work out detailed positions. He suggested that perhaps the United States alone could say to the Soviets that the Secretary of State would explore with the British, French and Soviet Foreign Ministers at the General Assembly the "possibilities of negotiations." The French could

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could take a reserved position in this. [The Ambassador thought it would be better if we sent a common agreed note and then the United States made exploratory approaches through the normal diplomatic channel. He did not consider Foreign Ministers talks to be the normal diplomatic channel.]

The Secretary pointed out to the Ambassador that the United States was hardly in a position to discuss substantive positions with the Soviet while General de Gaulle was sitting in the background with a veto. The Ambassador hesitated, saying France did not have a veto. The Secretary replied that France certainly had in effect a veto since it was with us in Berlin and in the Alliance. The Ambassador said there was a great difference between discussion of arrangements for negotiations on the one hand and exploring "the possibilities of serious negotiations" on the other. The Secretary reiterated that the United States did not want to be in the position of a middle man between the Soviets and the French as to what might be "serious possibilities of negotiated settlements." He then raised the question as to whether any reply to the Soviet note was necessary at all after nearly a full month. If we were not going to use the final paragraph of the US draft. [The Ambassador then suggested that if we agreed on a common note he would propose to Paris that they agree that the Secretary of State should say publicly that exploratory talks would take place. The Secretary suggested in turn that perhaps it would be possible to arrange for a Western Foreign Ministers meeting prior to the EMCA meeting and any discussion which might take place with Gromyko there. He pointed out that the US formulation left open the question as to whether talks with Gromyko would uncover any possibilities of serious negotiations. In Paris he said the United States had been concerned that there should be some leadership in NATO. Added to that, we now think that if there is no action on the Western side and no schedule proposed we face increasing difficulties as regards factual development of the situation. The Ambassador replied that on this latter question the French hold a contrary view and apparently our views were irreconcilable. He asked again whether the United States would not attempt the course of an ambassadorial probe of the Soviets. The Secretary replied that we would not do so in lieu of a public statement. The Ambassador asked whether it would not be enough simply to say that the Ambassador was probing. The Secretary replied in the negative saying that the Ambassador could only explore the plans and timing of negotiations. He then asked the Ambassador whether, if he should say publicly that he would discuss those questions with the Foreign Ministers, Gromyko would say that he refused to discuss the matter. The Ambassador replied that perhaps Gromyko would not do it. The text. In any event, he

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he continued, his instructions were clear: that the French would agree to a US diplomatic probe but they would not be associated with it. He was thus faced with only three possibilities: a warning to Moscow as proposed by the French; US exploratory talks in Moscow; or the US formula which was not acceptable to the French.

The Secretary then returned to his suggestion of a Western Foreign Ministers meeting in Washington about September 14 or 15 before the UNCA. The Ambassador replied that he had no reason to believe that Gouve would not come to such a meeting. The Secretary assumed that the United States could ascertain through diplomatic channels whether Gromyko was coming to New York. If he were, was was likely, the other Ministers would inevitably see him. He, for example, was giving a reception for all delegates the first week of the meeting. It would be insane to believe that Berlin would not be discussed when the Foreign Ministers met. If the Western Foreign Ministers should meet in advance of UNCA, we could expedite our work and try to agree on the details of negotiating positions. If we did not put something into the works we might well be faced with the signature by the Soviets of their "peace treaty" in September.

The Secretary then inquired whether de Gaulle's position was based on international considerations, or whether there were some special domestic problems of which we were not fully aware. The Ambassador replied that de Gaulle's position was based on international considerations. De Gaulle had told him that he wanted to finish with Algeria before the end of the year because he was preoccupied with Berlin.

The Secretary then reverted to the possibility of a Western Foreign Ministers meeting, saying that if this were agreed the French obviously would not be in a position to prejudge what the results would be. If it were at the same time confirmed that Gromyko were coming to New York, speculation would then be inevitable to the effect that there would be talks with him. Naturally if Gromyko were in New York, he, the Secretary, would talk to him about Berlin. He then asked the Ambassador whether he was saying that the French would not be present if the other Foreign Ministers felt that it was necessary to talk in New York. The Ambassador replied that if the discussion were about negotiations France would not be there. The Secretary reiterated that the United States could not be in a position of negotiating between Khrushchev on one side and de Gaulle on the other.

In conclusion

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In conclusion it was agreed that the Secretary would consider the French communication and the Ambassador's remarks and be in touch with him later, probably in the morning. The Ambassador said that meanwhile he would not report to Paris.

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DIPLOMATIE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

19/ 1945
Approved in S
9/9/61

DATE: August 26, 1961
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1. ~~Ken Taylor~~
2. Bundy (Hold)

SUBJECT: Four-Power Ambassadorial Group Meeting

	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Germany</u>
PARTICIPANTS:	The Secretary	Ambassador Alphand	Ambassador Grewe
	Secretary McNamara	M. Winckler, Counselor	Mr. Krapf, Minister
	Mr. Nitze - Defense	M. Pelen, Counselor	Mr. Schnippenkoetter,
	Mr. Bohlen - S/B	M. Froment-Meurice	Counselor
	Mr. Kohler - EUR	Gen. Ezanno	Dr. Sahm, German Foreign
	Mr. Bundy - White House		Ministry
COPIES TO:	Mr. Kearney - L	<u>U.K.</u>	General Steinhoff
	Mr. Hillenbrand - GER	Ambassador Caccia	
	Mr. Holloway - GER	Lord Hood, Counselor	
For xxxxxx distribution		Air Chief Marshal Mills	
see last page.		Mr. Thomson, First Secretary	

I. Report of Military Sub-Group of Quadripartite Ambassadorial Group
on

Mr. Nitze reported the three matters considered at the Military Sub-Group meeting on Friday, August 25.

A. Harassment/Blockage of Air Access to Berlin

Twelve different situations have been catalogued under this category. An attempt is being made to isolate those requiring political decisions. At least three items require further work in Jack Pine II, and a draft to the Live Oak Planners on these would be discussed at the afternoon meeting of the Sub-Group. Ambassador Alphand said that Soviet Ambassador Smirnov's threat yesterday to civilian airlines serving Berlin introduces urgency into air access planning. Ambassador Grewe commented that Smirnov's warning certainly added weight to previous Soviet threats about air access. The German Ambassador also noted that we may be soon faced with a GDR announcement that its border could not be crossed by air without prior permission. The Secretary asked in this connection if we would then shift to military flights. Mr. Nitze said there was a possibility that Air France would continue in the face of GDR threats, but that Pan American World Airways and British European Airways probably would not. We would, of course, continue civilian flights as long as possible, although, as the Secretary commented, it would be difficult to keep civilian airlines flying for political reasons. In any event, we would certainly proceed with military transportation into Berlin and would hope to expand Jack Pine to encompass the questions of hot pursuit, attacks on anti-aircraft replacements, hostile airports, etc., in case

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our planes are attacked. In reply to the Secretary's question on GDR/ Soviet ground-to-air defense capabilities, Mr. Kohler replied that the G-2 briefing to the Berlin Task Force showed this capability to be fairly formidable in the Berlin area. The capability of the GDR/Soviets for electronic interference with air access is high but Mr. Nitze said electronic counter-counter measures could probably insure enough successful flights to maintain passenger traffic and garrison supply, but not airlift ^{for freight in face of such harassment.} capability. The Secretary asked if there were any need to establish promptly our rights to fly above 10,000 feet, but Mr. Nitze noted that in the past such a right had not been considered vital to our air access.

R. German Paper on Naval Measures up to and including Full Blockade

The Military Sub-Group has been told by a special U.S. study group that while measures such as the German paper envisaged were within US capability, the economic effect of such measures would not be significant against the USSR and would not be significant for any considerable time against the GDR. Such naval measures would have considerable effect upon Bloc countries detached from the central nucleus of the Bloc and against such countries as Cuba, Guinea and Ghana. It would lead to problems of political repercussions which would probably be most strident from India and the UAR, as well as from many elements in the United Nations. There would be no doubt, however, that the USSR would understand the gravity of its actions in Berlin if Soviet and Bloc ships were being detained or sunk by Western naval blockaders.

The Secretary inquired as to the political and military authority for such sea actions. Mr. Nitze observed that minor naval measures could have legal sanction, but that blockade would be an act of war, although the German Ambassador noted that peaceful blockade is usually considered within the purview of legal measures in international law. The Secretary suggested that a system of inspection which would entail administrative delay of Bloc vessels in selected ports might be useful and that in any event temporary theories might be devised which would be consistent with various possible situations in Germany. Mr. Nitze said there was a spectrum of legal actions against Bloc shipping including repossession of our ex-Liberty ships through institution of a navicert system up to a full blockade. The Secretary noted that precautionary defense measures might also be invoked in a seizure of Soviet electronic-spy trawlers, missile tracking vessels, etc. It would thus be well to have a whole battery of legal theory to back up various actions.

C. Instructions to General Norstad

The Military Sub-Group had now received the UK paper and a French paper which had included elements of the other nations' contributions. The German paper had been received earlier. An attempt is now being made to isolate

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the essential elements in all suggested instructions. At this junction, the main point was the relationship of the Live Oak Group to the NATO planning apparatus. The UK had noted that the problem of access was only a Tripartite responsibility but that action arising out of an access crisis would necessarily include NATO action. For this point, Mr. Nitze said he would welcome NATO Secretary General Stikker to meet with the Quadripartite Ambassadorial Group to discuss the transition from Quadripartite and Tripartite planning to NATO planning and action. The Secretary questioned whether it was realistic to try to separate Tripartite military actions from NATO military actions, as the course of events would tend to merge these problems. Ambassador Alphand pointed to the difficulty of military planning involving 15 nations, and he thus thought that the planning of the three or four would be the basic approach. Ambassador Caccia noted that it was a genuine dilemma in that it would be necessary to bring the NATO nations into our planning at an early stage if we are to call upon them for action at a later stage. On this point, Secretary McNamara expressed his concern at the time lag which would be caused by embarking on coordination of Tripartite and NATO plans at this juncture of our problems. There are, at the present, gaps in planning which would remain unfilled while coordination progressed through the various political and military levels of NATO. He suggested that Live Oak make its preliminary planning to include NATO planning subject to subsequent review by the NATO planners. In the meantime, directives from the North Atlantic Council to the NATO planners could be prepared. Mr. Nitze felt and Ambassador Grewe seconded it that this was an additional reason for including Stikker at this moment.

11. Broad Strategic and Political Planning in Berlin Crisis

The Secretary then raised the question of how the Western countries see future developments and how they will propose to deal with them in the broadest strategic and political terms.

A. Assumptions on Nuclear War

He said we have certain vital interests for the defense of which we are prepared to go to war. We think that if these interests cannot be protected by negotiations, we must then go to other measures in ascending order of violence and not a single move from the repulse of a Jeep probe to nuclear war. He suggested we must also consider the timing, form and logic of nuclear war.

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There are three assumptions on nuclear war under which we seem to have operated in the past:

1. that by saying we would go to nuclear war, war will not occur;
2. that if we say we are going to nuclear war, we will if necessary;
3. that if we have said we are going to nuclear war and then fail to when faced with an unacceptable situation, we must accept the political consequences of such failure.

The Secretary saw a danger in complete reliance upon the first assumption. It may thus be prudent and desirable to consider engaging all governments in substantial conventional military action to give a last clear chance to avoid nuclear war. This might require a considerable amount of fighting with conventional weapons. We must be prepared that even this amount cannot guarantee either that the Soviets would not use so much conventional force as to compel us to resort to tactical nuclear weapons to prevent our troops from being overrun or that the Soviets may choose to go to ultimate nuclear war immediately. Thus, in case of physical interference, it might be desirable to leave ground forces in strategic defensive positions and to attempt to maintain our rights by fighting an air war. There are a whole range of possibilities but unless we have the forces and the plans in being, we restrict the range of responses open to us and come back to the three assumptions listed above. Mr. McNamara amplified this by saying we are in addition now facing the possibility of using even nuclear weapons without sufficient planning for various kinds of alternative nuclear responses. Not only does this lack of planning restrict our range of alternatives but it prevents us from knowing actual shortages which would be identified in the planning process and which might be remediable in a relatively short period of time. He emphasized again that he was concerned at the lack of instructions to the Live Oak planners and strongly urged that the Ambassadors send instructions to Live Oak for planning of a wide-range of nuclear and non-nuclear actions. The French Ambassador asked if we envisage tactical nuclear weapons in conventional responses and the Secretary replied that anything beyond a probing action may well require tactical nuclear weapons. This escalation could take place very promptly, perhaps in a day. He noted that very much in the back of our minds is the recognition of what nuclear war means and this gives rise to our hope to deal with our present problems without resort to nuclear war. The grave responsibility of deciding

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Secretary McNamara said that we were so disturbed at the gaps in our planning that the US was now doing NATO planning. While he would admit this was a dangerous matter, already it has had the effect of showing up specific shortages which are now being remedied; e.g., fragmentation bombs, conventional bomb racks for 270 B-47's. There are also shortages in our nuclear weapons and our lack of plans for the use of the whole range of nuclear arms. These plans must be supplied but unless instructions are available there will be no plans.

B. Khrushchev's Nibbling Process

Ambassador Grewe also noted that we were faced with a serious time problem and that Khrushchev is aware of this and thus has speeded up his actions. The Soviets may very well be prepared to go to the brink, but they are now speeding up the process of getting there. The Germans were concerned that when the Soviets reach the brink they would not withdraw, but would begin a nibbling political action against West Berlin. The Soviets have available to them a wide scale of Western vulnerabilities, some of which we have had hints of in recent days -- the threat against German political figures going to Berlin, the attacks on Berlin's connections to the Federal Republic, the imposition of irritants into West Berlin's daily life, etc. The Germans were worried that unless we stepped up non-military measures against this nibbling Khrushchev could make West Berlin a hollow shell not worth the extensive military build-up now going on. The Secretary agreed that while the military build-up doesn't cover all our vulnerabilities, it was possible that political measures could lead to military measures. The U.K. Ambassador noted that heretofore in our discussions of political countermeasures there has been a consensus that we are doing as much as we can at the time. He referred to the TTD ban and other measures. The Secretary acknowledged that the problem of the "hollow shell" is a real one but that the primary responsibility for maintenance of West Berlin morale rests upon West Berliners. We can give them massive support but we can't make the internal decisions for them as to what type of life they want to lead, what their freedom is worth, etc.

III.

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III. Instructions to Live Oak Planners

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IV. Next Meeting

Mr. Nitze hoped that the Military Sub-Group would be able to come up with a simplified instruction to General Norstad which would lead to plans giving a wide range of military alternatives within which governments could make political decisions. Mr. Kohler noted that it was essential that Stikker be fully informed and that Live Oak planning go on to a NATO basis while consultations are going on about broadening NATO participation in the planning.

It was agreed that the next meeting of the Ambassadorial Group would be Monday at 3:00 p.m. Mr. Kohler said it is hoped to be able to finalize action at that time on four contingency papers which require governmental approval.

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9/9/61

August 26, 1961

Four-Power Ambassadorial Group Meeting

U.S.

The Secretary
Secretary McNamara
Mr. Nitze - Defense
Mr. Bohlen - S/B
Mr. Kohler - EUR
Mr. Bundy - White House
Mr. Kearney - L
Mr. Hillenbrand - GER
Mr. Holloway - GER

France

Ambassador Alphand
M. Winckler, Counselor
M. Pelen, Counselor
M. Froment-Meurice
Gen. Ezanno

Germany

Ambassador Grewe
Mr. Krapf, Minister
Mr. Schnippenkoetter,
Counselor
Dr. Sahn, German Foreign
Ministry
General Steinhoff

U.K.

Ambassador Caccia
Lord Hood, Counselor
Air Chief Marshal Mills
Mr. Thomson, First Secretary

For ~~suggested~~ distribution
see last page.

I. Report of Military Sub-Group of Quadripartite Ambassadorial Group

on

Mr. Nitze reported the three matters considered at the Military Sub-Group meeting on Friday, August 25.

A. Harassment/Blockage of Air Access to Berlin

Twelve different situations have been catalogued under this category. An attempt is being made to isolate those requiring political decisions. At least three items require further work in Jack Pine II, and a draft to the Live Oak Planners on these would be discussed at the afternoon meeting of the Sub-Group. Ambassador Alphand said that Soviet Ambassador Smirnov's threat yesterday to civilian airlines serving Berlin introduces urgency into air access planning. Ambassador Grewe commented that Smirnov's warning certainly added weight to previous Soviet threats about air access. The German Ambassador also noted that we may be soon faced with a GDR announcement that its border could not be crossed by air without prior permission. The Secretary asked in this connection if we would then shift to military flights. Mr. Nitze said there was a possibility that Air France would continue in the face of GDR threats, but that Pan American World Airways and British European Airways probably would not. We would, of course, continue civilian flights as long as possible, although, as the Secretary commented, it would be difficult to keep civilian airlines flying for political reasons. In any event, we would certainly proceed with military transportation into Berlin and would hope to expand Jack Pine to encompass the questions of hot pursuit, attacks on anti-aircraft replacements, hostile airports, etc., in case

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our planes are attacked. In reply to the Secretary's question on GDR/ Soviet ground-to-air defense capabilities, Mr. Kohler replied that the G-2 briefing to the Berlin Task Force showed this capability to be fairly formidable in the Berlin area. The capability of the GDR/Soviets for electronic interference with air access is high but Mr. Nitze said electronic counter-counter measures could probably insure enough successful flights to maintain passenger traffic and garrison supply, but not airlift capability. ^{for freight in face of such harassment.} The Secretary asked if there were any need to establish promptly our rights to fly above 10,000 feet, but Mr. Nitze noted that in the past such a right had not been considered vital to our air access.

B. German Paper on Naval Measures up to and including Full Blockade

The Military Sub-Group has been told by a special U.S. study group that while measures such as the German paper envisaged were within US capability, the economic effect of such measures would not be significant against the USSR and would not be significant for any considerable time against the GDR. Such naval measures would have considerable effect upon Bloc countries detached from the central nucleus of the Bloc and against such countries as Cuba, Guinea and Ghana. It would lead to problems of political repercussions which would probably be most strident from India and the UAR, as well as from many elements in the United Nations. There would be no doubt, however, that the USSR would understand the gravity of its actions in Berlin if Soviet and Bloc ships were being detained or sunk by Western naval blockaders.

The Secretary inquired as to the political and military authority for such sea actions. Mr. Nitze observed that minor naval measures could have legal sanction, but that blockade would be an act of war, although the German Ambassador noted that peaceful blockade is usually considered within the purview of legal measures in international law. The Secretary suggested that a system of inspection which would entail administrative delay of Bloc vessels in selected ports might be useful and that in any event temporary theories might be devised which would be consistent with various possible situations in Germany. Mr. Nitze said there was a spectrum of legal actions against Bloc shipping including repossession of our ex-Liberty ships through institution of a navicert system up to a full blockade. The Secretary noted that precautionary defense measures might also be invoked in a seizure of Soviet electronic-spy trawlers, missile tracking vessels, etc. It would thus be well to have a whole battery of legal theory to back up various actions.

C. Instructions to General Norstad

The Military Sub-Group had now received the UK paper and a French paper which had included elements of the other nations' contributions. The German paper had been received earlier. An attempt is now being made to isolate

the

the essential elements in all suggested instructions. At this juncture, the main point was the relationship of the Live Oak Group to the NATO planning apparatus. The UK had noted that the problem of access was only a Tripartite responsibility but that action arising out of an access crisis would necessarily include NATO action. For this point, Mr. Nitze said he would welcome NATO Secretary General Stikker to meet with the Quadripartite Ambassadorial Group to discuss the transition from Quadripartite and Tripartite planning to NATO planning and action. The Secretary questioned whether it was realistic to try to separate Tripartite military actions from NATO military actions, as the course of events would tend to merge these problems. Ambassador Alphand pointed to the difficulty of military planning involving 15 nations, and he thus thought that the planning of the three or four would be the basic approach. Ambassador Caccia noted that it was a genuine dilemma in that it would be necessary to bring the NATO nations into our planning at an early stage if we are to call upon them for action at a later stage. On this point, Secretary McNamara expressed his concern at the time lag which would be caused by embarking on coordination of Tripartite and NATO plans at this juncture of our problems. There are, at the present, gaps in planning which would remain unfilled while coordination progressed through the various political and military levels of NATO. He suggested that Live Oak make its preliminary planning to include NATO planning subject to subsequent review by the NATO planners. In the meantime, directives from the North Atlantic Council to the NATO planners could be prepared. Mr. Nitze felt and Ambassador Grewe seconded it that this was an additional reason for including Stikker at this moment.

II. Broad Strategic and Political Planning in Berlin Crisis

The Secretary then raised the question of how the Western countries see future developments and how they will propose to deal with them in the broadest strategic and political terms.

A. Assumptions on Nuclear War

He said we have certain vital interests for the defense of which we are prepared to go to war. We think that if these interests cannot be protected by negotiations, we must then go to other measures in ascending order of violence and not a single move from the repulse of a Jeep probe to nuclear war. He suggested we must also consider the timing, form and logic of nuclear war.

There

There are three assumptions on nuclear war under which we seem to have operated in the past:

1. that by saying we would go to nuclear war, war will not occur;
2. that if we say we are going to nuclear war, we will if necessary;
3. that if we have said we are going to nuclear war and then fail to when faced with an unacceptable situation, we must accept the political consequences of such failure.

The Secretary saw a danger in complete reliance upon the first assumption. It may thus be prudent and desirable to consider engaging all governments in substantial conventional military action to give a last clear chance to avoid nuclear war. This might require a considerable amount of fighting with conventional weapons. We must be prepared that even this amount cannot guarantee either that the Soviets would not use so much conventional force as to compel us to resort to tactical nuclear weapons to prevent our troops from being overrun or that the Soviets may choose to go to ultimate nuclear war immediately. Thus, in case of physical interference, it might be desirable to leave ground forces in strategic defensive positions and to attempt to maintain our rights by fighting an air war. There are a whole range of possibilities but unless we have the forces and the plans in being, we restrict the range of responses open to us and come back to the three assumptions listed above. Mr. McNamara amplified this by saying we are in addition now facing the possibility of using even nuclear weapons without sufficient planning for various kinds of alternative nuclear responses. Not only does this lack of planning restrict our range of alternatives but it prevents us from knowing actual shortages which would be identified in the planning process and which might be remediable in a relatively short period of time. He emphasized again that he was concerned at the lack of instructions to the Live Oak planners and strongly urged that the Ambassadors send instructions to Live Oak for planning of a wide-range of nuclear and non-nuclear actions. [The French Ambassador asked if we envisage tactical nuclear weapons in conventional responses and the Secretary replied that anything beyond a probing action may well require tactical nuclear weapons. This escalation could take place very promptly, perhaps in a day. He noted that very much in the back of our minds is the recognition of what nuclear war means and this gives rise to our hope to deal with our present problems without resort to nuclear war. The grave responsibility of deciding

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August 28, 1961

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

ISSUES TO BE SETTLED WITH GENERAL CLAY

There are two sets of issues here.

1. The first set is procedural and quite easy. Who does Clay command and who does he report to? He should obviously be the Senior American in Berlin -- and his seniority may give him a certain leverage on the British and French Commandants, at a moment of crisis. I believe he should report directly to the Secretary of State and to you with information to Dowling and to the military. He should leave all routine military channels alone, but for command decisions he should have full control of the Berlin garrison. This is not perfect from Norstad's point of view, but it is good from yours.

2. The second set of issues is more subtle. Clay is a soldier, but opinion is sharply divided on his ability to carry out a policy set by others, unless he fully agrees with it. You want no risk of setting up another MacArthur-Truman affair. Even without any public explosion, (which I think unlikely) Clay will be a burden to you if he takes a line more belligerent than yours: an intelligent Drumright or a powerful Lightner would be made use of by firebugs like Maggie Higgins.

What makes this urgent is that the main line of thought among those who are now at work on the substance of our negotiating position is that we can and should shift substantially toward acceptance of the GDR, the Oder-Neisse line, a non-aggression pact, and even the idea of two peace treaties. All of these have been unpalatable to the West Germans, though opinion is shifting. Even "occupation rights" seem less important, we find, when you ask about their long-term value. We are inclined instead to focus attention on

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the three fundamentals of freedom for Berlin, free access, and a Western presence, in that order -- and resting the "Western presence" on the fact that West Berlin wants us. You may not adopt this line, but I think you want to be able to decide as freely as possible when the time for decision comes (fairly soon.) There will be some criticism of any such position, and for this reason Clay's view is very important. If he's with us, he can be a major political protection, and I think no real domestic complaint would arise. If he were strongly against us, from the vantage point of West Berlin, the situation might be less satisfactory. Right now you have great freedom of maneuver on Berlin, here at home; you don't want to give anyone a mortgage on that freedom.

So what you need to find out Tuesday afternoon is whether Clay is with you on the political issues. Maybe you are tougher than the line of thought I have sketched, and maybe Clay is not inflexible (McCloy is an old friend of Germany, and he seems ready for a new policy). But it's not something to take for granted.

McG. B.

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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
WEAPONS SYSTEMS EVALUATION GROUP
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

WSEG STAFF STUDY NO. 83

U.S. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND MILITARY
DEPLOYMENTS IN NATO, AS RELATED TO THE
PROBLEM OF ARMS CONTROL

30 August 1961

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DISARMAMENT
25 Aug 1961
Box 24
JCS 1961
RG218

57. Though the actual political and military confrontation 1
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union appears to be roughly 2
as depicted in paragraph 86 (or at least so it has appeared 3
up to the present), the U.S. has no way of knowing accurately 4
what the Soviet strategic intentions may be at any given time. 5
In fact, it has no method of assessing what the Soviet mili- 6
tary strategy would have been in all cases in the past if 7
that of the U.S. had been different. There is little 8
evidence, for example, that the Soviets have seriously 9
planned to mount a deliberate all-out attack on Western 10
Europe at any time since World War II. On the other hand, 11
the U.S. has never been able to rule out the possibility of 12
such an assault--particularly as the realization must have 13
developed among the Soviets that Western Europe was not going 14
to fall to Communist subversive tactics. It can be assumed 15
also that the incentive for Soviet military initiative has 16
increased proportionately with the progress of West Germany's 17
re-establishment as a military power. If the Soviets are 18
truly concerned about the possible dangers of a resurgent 19
Germany, then it is apparent, in spite of Communist state- 20
ments to the contrary, that time is indeed working against 21
them in this matter. Their demands that the German problem, 22
and especially its microcosmic expression in Berlin, be 23
"settled" soon, can easily be regarded as stemming from a 24
genuine sense of urgency. While the Soviets have thus far 25
tried to "pre-empt" the development of West German power 26
chiefly by political and psychological means, the U.S. has 27
still had to base its strategy on the assumption that the 28
Soviets might at some point decide to use military force to 29
achieve a solution of the German problem satisfactory to 30
themselves. 31

at the same time, in attempting to demonstrate both their 1
capability and willingness to fight a limited, conventional 2
war, they must immediately make it clear that the nuclear 3
guarantee is not being withdrawn. 4

c. A third and related problem is the brittleness of 5
the deterrent strategy. Should it ever be challenged and 6
found wanting, either because it actually was a bluff or 7
because of lack of unity among the NATO allies, the con- 8
sequences for the U.S. objectives in Europe would undoubtedly 9
be catastrophic. It is here that the Berlin crisis prob- 10
ably has its most disturbing implications. If, for example, 11
Khrushchev should carry on from now until the end of the 12
year a carefully planned "carrot and stick" campaign, 13
alternately concentrating first on the sweet reasonable- 14
ness and nonaggressiveness of his plans for Berlin, and 15
then on the terrible consequences for the European nations 16
if NATO first uses military force against East Germany, 17
the U.S. may see the firm resolve of some of its allies 18
slowly drain away. Once the U.S. guarantee to Europe is 19
put on the line on a major issue and then withdrawn, the 20
entire NATO structure probably would crumble. Yet if it 21
should appear to the Soviets that the unity and resolve 22
of NATO were likely to hold firm, they can as always in 23
the past exercise the option of easing the crisis, and, 24
while waiting for a more opportune time, claim credit for 25
safeguarding world peace. This latter Soviet option 26
should not, however, obscure the very real possibility 27
that this time the Soviets are in deadly earnest, that they 28
are not bluffing, and that they will meet force with force 29
instead of backing down before the eyes of the world. 30

1. The Western Alliance is thus faced with a dilemma
wherein its choices appear to be either to succumb to further
Soviet pressure or to run the risk of nuclear war. This
dilemma of the Western powers has been matched by a similar
one facing the Soviets, namely, that of either backing down
before what they apparently regard as a dangerous threat, or
else risking the destruction of their own homeland. Such a
set of opposing dilemmas, both stemming from the same politi-
cal and military situation, would seemingly suggest a common
interest on the part of both sides in relaxing the string-
ency of the alternatives. Thus far, it would seem that not
only is this not the case, but in fact the exact opposite
situation prevails. Instead of either side acting to lessen
the tensions flowing from the confrontation in Germany, each
has tended towards increasing the threatening nature of its
posture vis-a-vis the opposing side, and thus towards in-
creasing the likelihood of general war in the event of armed
conflict. The reason for this ostensible anomaly would
appear to lie largely in the nature of the "German problem,"
and in both sides' attitude toward its relation to the
status quo.

94. As has been suggested earlier, the crux of the ex-
plosive "German problem" is not the continued presence of
U.S. forces, per se, in West Germany, or even the presence
of Western forces in Berlin. It is the growing military
power of West Germany (whose development these forces are
making possible), and the potential implications of German
military power for the unsettled situation in Eastern Europe.
This is the issue on which U.S. and Soviet political objec-
tives, and the military strategies supporting them, reach
the point where they may "go critical." For the U.S. the

ade of successful political and military policy. For the
Soviets the same fact constitutes the culmination of a decade
of major political reversals^{1/} and of deepening concern over
the stability of its position in Eastern Europe.^{2/} As long as
the German Federal Republic continues to proclaim that Berlin
is the future capital of Germany, and tries to add substance
to these claims by such devices as holding formal Bundestag
meetings in West Berlin and maintaining there a permanent
home for the president of the Federal Republic, the specter
of the historic German capacity for international trouble-
making--a renewed Drang nach Osten--must haunt Eastern Europe.
If the West German claim to Berlin could be settled, there
would probably be settled with it, from the Soviet viewpoint,
most of the problems of eventual German reunification and of
the Polish-German frontiers. On the other hand, if these
problems cannot be settled soon, the Soviets may well feel
that a showdown had better be had now rather than several
years from now when West Germany may be stronger, under dif-
ferent and more ambitious leadership, and possibly the pos-
sessor of a nuclear weapons capability.^{3/}

1/ The success of the Marshall Plan in the face of all-out Com-
munist sabotage; the East German riots in 1953; the revolts in
Hungary and Poland in 1956; the defection of Yugoslavia; the
apparently widening split with Albania; the continued strength
of NATO; the weakened position of the Communist Parties in
Western Europe in spite of the fact that approximately one-
fourth of the voters in France and Italy have consistently
voted Communist; and the growing economic and political unity
of Western Europe.

2/ The scientific infallibility of the dialectic as a means of
predicting the future apparently leaves something to be de-
sired. As late as 1948 the Soviets could have had a demili-
tarized Western Germany (they already had it) and a large say
in the affairs of all Berlin (which again they already had).
But with the Berlin Blockade, the coup in Czechoslovakia, and
then the attack on South Korea they brought into being a mili-
tary situation of great danger to themselves. After the death
of Stalin major efforts were made to reverse the trend toward
German rearmament; the Austrian Peace Treaty in 1955 and the
"spirit of Geneva" gambit in the same year were dramatic evid-
ences of this attempt. But the trend was too strong to reverse.

3/ Walter Lippmann, in a television interview on 15 June, stated
that Khrushchev had given the following answer to a question
on why he was in such a hurry for an immediate settlement of
the German problem: "I have to be in a hurry. I must have
the German frontiers fixed before Hitler's generals get

95. If the Soviet objective regarding Berlin and the German 1
frontiers is as stated above, then it would seem apparent that 2
a "free city" status for Berlin would largely accomplish this 3
objective for them, even if the entire city were included in 4
the arrangement and both sectors were placed under U.N. super- 5
vision. In such an event, Khrushchev then could afford to 6
wait. He would no longer have to be in a hurry because time 7
would be on his side instead of against him. Each year that 8
passed would then constitute a prescriptive ratification of 9
the fact that Berlin was not the capital of Germany, that its 10
inhabitants were no longer politically or legally connected 11
with West Germany, and that the eastern frontiers of Germany 12
(the Oder-Neisse Line) were settled de facto, if not de jure. 13
As Khrushchev has hinted, if he could secure a peace treaty 14
granting Free City status to West Berlin, token forces of the 15
NATO powers could remain in West Berlin for a possibly indef- 16
inite period. For the significance of the NATO forces as a 17
symbol of Berlin's link to West Germany would have been 18
changed to that of U.N. forces symbolizing Berlin's separation 19
from West Germany. 20

96. It does not, of course, follow automatically that 21
because Khrushchev wants this development, the U.S. and the 22
Western European powers should not want it. But it is im- 23
portant that the implications of the Soviet demands be quite 24
clear. With their customary deftness in presenting ambiguous 25
challenges, the Soviets are not asking that West Berlin 26
should be turned over to the Communists. They are simply 27
asking that West Berlin, which NATO for more than a decade 28
has firmly insisted belonged to the West, should now be de- 29
clared to belong to nobody. The difference in the two posi- 30
tions is fundamental. The first effect of agreeing to the 31

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Soviet demands would be a public and undeniable reversal
of a major NATO commitment--however the shift were acclaimed
as a victory for both sides.

97. The West Germans, we may certainly assume, would see
any kind of "free city" status which divorced Berlin from the
Federal Republic as a major political, economic and cultural
loss for their nation.^{1/} The British and the French, on the
other hand, might possibly be prepared to settle for some
kind of "accommodation" on this aspect of the problem, par-
ticularly if it reduced the threat of nuclear war. If the
earlier reasoning of this study is correct, however, it is
West Germany and not Britain or France which constitutes the
key country in U.S. strategic objectives for the defense of
Western Europe. If a reneging by the West on the guarantee
to West Berlin should bring about (1) a substantial dis-
illusionment in West Germany with the value of NATO, (2)
a weakening of West German confidence in, and identity with,
the West, or (3) a conviction that the pressure of the
power relationships in Europe once again required an accom-
modation with the Russians, as at Tauroggen and Rapallo,^{2/}

1/ NIE 23-60, The Outlook in West Germany (SECRET) states:
"West German leaders, regardless of party, are convinced
that Allied rights in Berlin and Berlin's economic and po-
litical ties with the Federal Republic cannot be reduced
or changed in any essential particular without serious
damage to West German interests. They are particularly
insistent that nothing be done to prejudice the Allied
position that the Western presence in Berlin is based
on the right of conquest. Any serious impairment of
Western rights in Berlin would be regarded by many
West Germans as the beginning of a series of events
leading toward the eventual loss of the city to the
GDR and as making even more remote the possibility of
reunification on terms acceptable to West Germany."
Page 8. (Emphasis added.)

2/ These two treaties have become famous as evidences of
the historic tendency of the Germans, and especially
of the German Army, to pursue foreign policy objectives
determined almost wholly by their own view of the German
national interest, and sometimes in contravention of
existing political agreements presumably binding upon
Germany. The German Army has injected a peculiar note

(Continued on following page)

One price for the U.S. would almost certainly be too high.

98. The hard fact cannot be ignored that a solution of the Berlin problem, like the creation of the problem in the first place, lies readily within the choice of the Soviet Union. By the same token, German reunification is also a concession which the Soviet Union has in its power to grant at any time, if it should be willing to pay the price of giving up its East German satellite. The U.S. has no such ability to offer reunification to the Germans--whatever the price--because it could not deliver the West Germans to the Soviets. The U.S. must, therefore, depend upon different appeals in any contest for the loyalty of the West Germans. While there is certainly no requirement to cater to every whim of West Germany, a U.S. abandonment of the Federal Republic on any important aspect of the Berlin issue would undoubtedly cause the latter to entertain serious questions regarding the worth of the NATO guarantee. Also, in dissociating itself from West Germany, the U.S. would for the first time in a decade have abandoned the strategic principle upon which it has placed its primary reliance for containment of Soviet power in Europe, namely, the principle that West Germany represents the keystone of NATO's European defense structure.

Footnote 2/ continued from preceding page...

2/ into this problem by sometimes entering into foreign agreements whose nature was unknown even to its own government. At the Convention of Tauroggen in 1813, the Prussian Army initiated an alliance with Russia against Napoleon, unknown to the Prussian King Frederick William III, and in violation of prior agreements to aid France against England and restrict their own military development. In the Rapallo Treaty in 1922, Russia and Germany, which were both outcast nations, entered into an agreement of cooperation with each other; the German Army later, during its "secret" period of redevelopment, was aided by a very intimate association with Russia, unknown to a great part of the government of the Weimar Republic.

99. Similarly, if the U.S. attempted to negotiate a settlement which, say, offered to exchange a future West German nuclear capability for a renewal of Western occupation rights in Berlin, it would be admitting the ability of the USSR to determine the basis upon which the West would be suffered to remain. In effect, additional concessions would be offered for something which NATO has firmly insisted is already a Western possession--the right, based on conquest, to be in Berlin, subject to no one's approval. Moreover, the implication in such an arrangement that the West Germans might become a sort of second-class, conventionally armed, "cannon fodder" ally, to take the initial shock of a future war, might well have serious consequences for the West German attitude toward the NATO Alliance.^{1/}

100. All this is not to imply that the U.S. must either "stand firm" in Berlin at the risk of general war, or else see its strategic objectives in Western Europe go down the drain. The worldwide pressures for arms control, when considered along with the political difficulties and strategic objectives of the Soviet Union, suggest that a Berlin settlement may be possible which contains "something for everybody," and yet which may at the same time not require the U.S. to

^{1/} Defense Minister Strauss, for example, has been outspoken on this point. A Special Article in the Current Intelligence Weekly Summary, 6 July 1961 (SECRET), pp. 5-6, includes the following statements: "As defense minister, Strauss has consistently aimed at the creation of effective German military forces with the best possible equipment. He has taken it for granted that Bonn must have a nuclear weapons capability, and has attacked any 'discrimination' against the German forces. Shortly after becoming defense minister, he criticized what he called the 'two categories of NATO members, first class and tenth class.' In one of the impetuous statements he often finds it necessary to deny having made, he reportedly remarked that the German and other European armies would be equipped with atomic weapons, 'whether the Americans like it or not,' and that he had no intention of providing German 'foot-sloggers for the American atomic cavalry.'"

compromise its fundamental strategic objectives in Europe. 1
The U.S. approach to this problem, however, must include the 2
realization that the Soviet Union is almost certainly not 3
going to agree to a settlement which requires it to abandon 4
any of its fundamental objectives either. 5

101. Examination of the opposing objectives of the NATO and 6
Soviet blocs, in the context of the existing situation, does 7
not show that all of the objectives for each side are of 8
equal significance as potential causes of war. In fact, much 9
of the conflict between the opposing objectives would appear, 10
from the preceding analysis, to be a matter of attitude to- 11
ward the status quo--a status quo which each side finds 12
unpleasant, and even threatening, but at least temporarily 13
bearable in most respects. The areas where these opposing 14
political objectives clearly intersect and contradict each 15
other, to the extent that each side may be prepared to go to 16
war in defense of its position, seem rather strictly circum- 17
scribed. In other words, while both sides have definite 18
ideas regarding the kind of settlement they would like to 19
see in Europe, it is becoming fairly clear that there exist 20
relatively few of these ideas which they are willing to im- 21
plement at the risk of war. For example, the Soviet Union 22
would obviously like to see U.S. forces leave Europe, West 23
Germany completely neutralized and disarmed, and Yugoslavia 24
returned to the Communist fold. But they have thus far not 25
considered it prudent to go to war in order to attain these 26
objectives. The U.S. would like to see the Soviets with- 27
draw completely from the satellites, relax their military 28
and political pressures on the neutral and pro-Western 29
European nations, and dismantle the structure and activities 30
of the Communist Party in non-Communist nations. But it has 31
not been prepared to use military force to secure these 32

67

~~SECRET~~

(RP) 12a
8/21/61

No 101

C
O
P
Y

August 31, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

✓
The development of the international situation during recent weeks in Europe and elsewhere has considerably increased the tensions which led to the initial moves of our military build-up. In addition to the possible military requirements in support of our position on Berlin, we have engaged in planning for Southeast Asia which could result in the commitment of U.S. forces.

Our principal adversary, the USSR, is responding to the situation by halting the demobilization of several hundred thousand men, and by resuming nuclear testing. What should we do at this juncture?

As a first step, I should like to take another hard look at the progress of our military build-up, with particular reference to those measures which we originally decided to defer. For this purpose, I am asking the Secretary of State to call a meeting of the Steering Group next week. At this meeting, I would like to have you present your analysis of the military situation with recommendations as to any further expansion of our military forces in the light of the events of recent weeks.

increase in
personnel

15/
J.F.K.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3 4
NLK-92-16
By SF NARA, Date 6/30/93

NSP/88 / Gen Subs Berlin Steering Group 7/7/61 - 7/11/61

NSF/82- Gen Ber Com 8/29/61
8/21/61

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

10

The attached is a letter from
Averill Harriman on the subject
of Berlin. After drafting it he
decided that it might be out of
line for him to send it on to you;
but I think it is worth your
attention anyway.

Arthur Schlesinger

10a

D R A F T

September 1, 1961

Dear Mr. President:

I have never been a good back-seat driver, and that's the reason for this letter.

Twenty years ago this month President Roosevelt sent me to Moscow on the Anglo-American supply mission, with Lord Beaverbrook representing the British. That started me on a long series of discussions and negotiations with Stalin which lasted over nearly five years and gave me the opportunity to see him at close range, probably more than any other Western representative. I attended the several bilateral talks between Churchill and Stalin, as well as the tripartite discussions. Naturally, it gave me also the opportunity to see the Kremlin at close range. Through my later responsibilities, I was able to follow the development of post-war Germany, NATO, Korean War, etc., at close range. This experience made it possible for me to project with some accuracy Stalin's behavior, and provided the background from which to judge later Kremlin policies. I have found that I haven't always been wrong, and that gives me the temerity to write you on the present complicated situation.

Frankly, it is my firm belief that a satisfactory deal can be made with Khrushchev over West Berlin, improving our present position.

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, SEC. 3(E), 5(D), 5(E) AND 11

State (NOK-78-681)

BY BIA

NARS, DATE

1/30/79

10a

Let me hasten to say that no one is more convinced than I that we must maintain the freedom of the people of West Berlin, the Western position in Berlin, freedom of access, present relationship between West Germany and West Berlin, etc. -- but I do not believe that we are entirely happy in our present arrangements. At present, although of course we do not admit it, the right of civilian access to Berlin is not legally beyond question. I have failed to understand why in 1949, when the negotiations for the renewal of access were concluded after the airlift, we did not insist on improving our access rights. But that's another story.

I believe that we can now improve our general position and contribute to more peaceful relationships in Europe if we seize this opportunity to attain desirable objectives and if we handle ourselves with skill and flexibility. There are a few sine qua non's on both sides. I have stated ours above, and as to Khrushchev, he intends to sign a peace treaty with East Germany and he wants to create greater stability in East Germany. Except for that, there is considerable flexibility in his position. I believe, however, that we will have to accept an arrangement with the East Germans, guaranteed by Russia, for Berlin access (clearer than we now have). This means some sort of de facto recognition, or at least acceptance of the existence of the East German regime. Since Potsdam, I have been satisfied that Germany would be divided for a long time. I am sure Khrushchev means what he says when he told me as well as others that "We would never agree to a

10

united Germany under socialism (as he calls it) and I will never agree to a united Germany under your system." Today, West Germany has in fact given de facto recognition to East Germany, with its several hundred agreements. Adenauer expects us to keep him respectable by our adamant refusal to deal with East Germany. In spite of this, Dulles conceded two or three points in regard to the acceptance of the East German regime, without obtaining anything in exchange. I know Adenauer and other German politicians may make difficulties, but in the last analysis, will have to accept our de facto recognition or acceptance of the reality of the East German regime, providing, of course, we make it clear that we have in mind steps towards the ultimate objective of a unified Germany.

If we carry on our discussions with Khrushchev in a broader context, I am satisfied we will find he wants acceptance of the Oder-Niese line. For my part, I believe this is equally advantageous to us as to him to settle that border dispute and not leave it open for future dangerous political exploitation. Obviously, this will also increase our opportunity of improving our relationships as time goes on with Poland and other Eastern European countries who still fear German aggression.

In addition, I believe Khrushchev is sincerely concerned over the re-militarization of Germany, and particularly with the prospect of her eventually getting independent nuclear capability. I know Stalin was concerned about the future military strength of Germany. I know the

11

Russian people are. Two years ago, wherever I went in Russia (including some places no American had gone before), one of the two principal questions I was asked was, "Why do you arm Germany against us?"

On the one hand, Khrushchev talks about reducing Germany to cinders with four nuclear bombs; on the other, he talks about the dangers from a re-militarized Germany. He feels Adenauer is safe enough, but he said to me, "What will happen if Strauss or someone else gets control?"

For my part, I believe it is of very great importance to the security of the United States to prevent Germany from having independent nuclear capability. I am opposed to a de-militarized neutral Germany. I believe Germany may become dangerous unless she is scrambled into the Western European political, economic and military community. But I consider it would be a real protection to us if the present understanding that Germany will never produce her own nuclear weapons be made part of an international agreement including the Soviet Union.

I have watched Germany's increased military independence grow from the original plan to integrate certain units in a European army under the E.D.C., into a separate military force. She will have the strongest army in Europe, and who can stop her if some leader determines that she shall produce her own nuclear weapons?

I firmly believe that West Germany is an essential part of Western Europe, politically, economically, and militarily. Without her Western Europe is an eggshell. Western Germany gives it essential depth and

strength. The dreams we had of Western European economic union are coming closer and closer to achievement. This will mean the development of a very strong third power in the world, closely associated with the United States, which with us can offset the power of the Soviet Union and China for many years to come. But I believe that our long-term interest can be advanced if we use the present occasion to come to an agreement with the Soviet Union for a denuclearized control zone of West Germany and East Germany to as far East as can be negotiated or perhaps an agreement that no additional European country, either East or West, should obtain independent nuclear capability. This is one step towards arms limitation, but more than that, protects us against the possibility of Germany's getting independent nuclear capability with which she could blackmail both West and East. Such an agreement would be a great achievement for Khrushchev to bring back to his people. He is a politician and depends for his great authority upon public good will, at least to a limited extent.

There are a number of other subjects that have to be weighed, but to me these are three of the most important. For my part, I believe we can improve our position and yet reach an agreement with Khrushchev. His face must, of course, be saved. He obviously does not want a nuclear war, and has not given any indication so far that he thinks that he can destroy us without having Russia subjected to unacceptable devastation in retaliation.

13 September 1961

Page 2297.

9/3/61

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

SINGLE INTEGRATED OPERATIONAL PLAN 1962 (SIOP-62) (U)

The enclosed briefing for the President by the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, presented on 13 September 1961, is circulated for information.

F. J. BLOUIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

SANITIZED COPY
DECLASSIFIED BY OJCS
DATE 15 AUG 1983
15 AUG 1986

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O.O. 3-1-61
Og 125 3004

TOP SECRET

JCS 2056/281

RETURN TO OP-004

FORM 10-61
Rev. 1-61

Special handling of this paper is requested. Access should be limited to individuals requiring the information herein in order to carry out their official duties.

FILE

D.C. DW R-1

ENCLOSURE

BRIEFING FOR THE PRESIDENT
BY THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ON
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
SINGLE INTEGRATED OPERATIONAL PLAN 1962
(SIOP-62)

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING;
DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10 DOES NOT
APPLY

THE JCS SINGLE INTEGRATED OPERATIONAL PLAN - 1962 (SIOP-62)

Chart 1

The Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) is the JCS plan which provides for the optimum employment of the US atomic delivery forces in the initial attack of strategic targets in the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

I shall describe to you the salient characteristics of this plan in terms of forces involved, targets attacked, and mechanics of execution of the plan. First, however, I believe it will be useful to review briefly the circumstances and actions which led to the drawing up of this plan.

Chart
Off

As a result of the technological advances in atomic weaponry - for example, it became possible for fighter-bombers to carry megaton weapons - and, as a result of the growth in size of the atomic stockpile, in recent years the capability to deliver atomic weapons was extended to include, in large numbers, the forces assigned not only to the Strategic Air Command but also those forces assigned to Commanders in Europe, Atlantic and Pacific. For example, a March 1960 analysis of the general war atomic plans of these commanders indicated that, of all the targets firmly scheduled to be struck, about half were planned for strike by SAC forces and about half by the forces of the other commanders. Further, targets were often of interest to more than one commander. Consequently, it was clear that very close pre-planning coordination was required to maximize the effectiveness of each delivery vehicle and to eliminate unnecessary duplication.

In recognition of the nature and level of effort by all commanders with respect to atomic strikes, measures were taken by the JCS to coordinate those efforts to insure direction of appropriate level of effort against each target and to avoid interference among forces enroute to and over targets.

Measures taken essentially were these:

a. Coordinating instructions were issued by the JCS in their Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, the basic guidance to the commanders upon which they base their war plans.

b. World-Wide Coordination Conferences were held at which the commanders were to coordinate among themselves their atomic strike plans.

c. Joint Coordination Centers - one in England and one in Hawaii - were established to assist in the elimination of interference among striking forces.

Chart
Off

Underlying all coordination efforts was the growing atomic threat posed by the USSR. All concerned with atomic planning were determined that optimum utilization should be made of all elements of the US atomic forces.

However, it became generally recognized that the coordination machinery was not producing the pre-D Day coordination results that the increasing atomic capabilities of our commands required, and certain corrective measures were initiated by the JCS. As a further development, in mid-59, in the course of studying the matter of employment of POLARIS submarines, the Secretary of Defense (Mr. Gates) became aware of and took an active interest in the problems associated with the planning and execution of atomic strikes. Mr. Gates asked that the JCS study and report to him on those problems.

In August of 1959, General Twining, then Chairman of the JCS, placed before the JCS some eighteen questions, the answers to which he felt would make strong contribution to solution of targeting problems. Those questions essentially were as follows:

Art 3

With respect to our targeting policy:

1. What should it be?
2. What categories of targets should it cover?
3. What agency should develop it? Maintain it?
4. What agency should review and approve the policy?

Chart 4

On the subject of an integrated operational plan for strategic nuclear operations:

5. Do we need such a plan?
6. What agency should develop it? Review and approve it?
7. Should non-all weather systems attack strategic targets? If so, under what conditions?
8. Should carrier forces have H Hour strategic targets?
9. If carrier forces are relieved of strategic targets, how do we state their nuclear mission?

Chart 5

10. Is there an immediate need for a Unified Strategic Command?

11. Is a Unified Strategic Command desirable in the future?
12. If we do not form a unified command now, should POLARIS and SAC Plans be integrated?
13. If so, how?

Chart 6

On the subject of operational control of the atomic strike forces:

14. Should unified commanders have H Hour strategic targets?
15. Should Joint War Room Annexes and Joint Coordination Centers be continued?
16. What additional measures would improve coordination?

Questions 17 and 18 pertained to operational analysis and war gaming.

An associated matter strongly bearing on the solution of targeting problems was a study conducted by the staff of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee, under the direction of Lt General Hickey. That study, known as Study No. 2009, was to establish, for the 1963 time period, the relative merits, from the standpoint of deterrence, of retaliatory efforts directed against:

- a. Primarily a Military Target System.
- b. Primarily an Urban-Industrial Target System.

or

c. An Optimum-Mix of combined Military and Urban-Industrial Target Systems.

Chart 9

Also, Study No. 2009 was to determine:

- a. The minimum number of enemy targets, by category, which the United States retaliatory forces must clearly be capable of destroying or neutralizing in order to achieve the objective of prevailing in general war.
- b. The US retaliatory forces required to neutralize or destroy this minimum number of targets.
- c. The adequacy of the required retaliatory forces to contribute effectively to the national objective of deterrence.

Chart 10

In essence, the conclusions of Study No. 2009 were as follows:

- a. Of the target systems studied (Military, Urban-Industrial, and Optimum-Mix) the Military alone and the Urban-Industrial systems, alone had certain shortcomings. No major ^{does not say what} limitations were evident relative to the Optimum-Mix System. Successful attack of the Optimum-Mix System should result in the US prevailing in general war.

*does not give logic -
no matter what strategy it?*

b. Forces programmed for the 1963 time period would be adequate to deliver the necessary weapons on each target, at a level of assurance between 75 and 90 percent.

c. The range of retaliatory force structures providing between 75 and 90 percent assurance, under the assumption of surprise attack, should provide effective deterrence to general war in 1963.

Chart 11

On 12 February 1960, the President approved the concept of the Optimum-Mix Target System, for a minimum of 75 percent assurance of delivering a weapon at each bomb release line, as described in Study No. 2009. The President also referred Study No. 2009 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a basis for planning.

In August 1960, following consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense of the matters covered by the Eighteen Questions and of Study No. 2009, there was issued the JCS National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy.

Chart 12

The intent of that policy was to provide guidance for the optimum employment of appropriate US atomic delivery forces

Chart 13

in the initial attack against the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The basic objective of the policy was to establish an essential national task to be accomplished under the several conditions under which hostilities may be initiated. Specific Objectives are:

Chart 14

a. To destroy or neutralize Sino-Soviet Bloc strategic nuclear delivery capability and primary military and government controls of major importance, and

b. To attack the major urban-industrial centers of the Sino-Soviet Bloc to achieve the general level of destruction as indicated in Study No. 2009.

Chart Off

Under the National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy, a National Strategic Target List (NSTL) and a Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) were to be developed to provide for the integration of committed forces for the attack of a minimum list of targets, the destruction of which would accomplish the objectives just shown. *meaning?*

General Thomas Power, CINCSAC, as agent of the JCS, was designated Director, Strategic Target Planning (DSTP) and was directed to organize a joint staff to develop and maintain the NSTL and the SIOP. The NSTL and SIOP were to be submitted to the JCS for approval. The commanders of the unified and specified commands were directed to commit appropriate forces to attack of the targets on the NSTL, to insure execution of those attacks, to program no attacks against targets on the NSTL except as provided in the SIOP, and to provide permanent senior representation at the headquarters of the DSTP for participation in the preparation of the NSTL and the SIOP and for liaison purposes.

Damage and assurance criteria were specified in the policy. Also specified were constraints to be observed in the programming of weapons, in order to protect friendly forces and allies. Constraints also were prescribed to be observed in the Satellite areas, toward avoiding the alienation of potentially friendly populations who are assumed to be not responsible for the acts of their governments.

Pursuant to the National Strategic Targeting and Attack , the Single Integrated Operational Plan for 1962 was prepared. On 2 December 1960, the plan was approved by the JCS and the Secretary of Defense, and was made effective on 15 April 1961.

I shall now describe for you some of the methodology employed in developing the National Strategic Target List and the Single Integrated Operational Plan.

Chart 15

The NSTL was developed from a list of more than 80,000 potential targets in the Bombing Encyclopedia. This list was analyzed, screened and finally reduced to 3729 installations which were determined to be essential for attack. Many of these are co-located in target complexes. A DGZ, or desired ground zero, can be located so that several installations may be destroyed or neutralized by a single weapon. Thus the total of 1060 DGZs cover the 3729 installations in the NSTL.

Chart 16

A breakdown of DGZs by country is shown on this chart.




Chart 17

This map will give you a feel for the geographic distribution of DGZs within the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Each red circle represents one actual DGZ. No attempt has been made to differentiate as to size or importance.

Chart
Off

Now to the Plan itself. Forces of the unified and specified commands participating in attack of these targets are as shown on this chart.

Chart

Strategic Air Command
Pacific Command
Atlantic Command
European Command
Alaskan Command

SIOP forces are launched from a total of 112 bases.

Chart 19

There are 49 bases in the US
all Strategic Air Command forces.

Deleted

Chart 20

Shown here are bases in the Pacific area

Deleted

Chart 21

Launch bases in the Atlantic and European areas are
shown on this chart.

Deleted

Chart 22

Operational Concepts.

The Targeting and Attack Policy prescribed that the SIOP
provide for the initial attack only. Therefore, the foremost
objective in integrating these forces was to attain the highest
probability of success with this initial attack. This has been
accomplished by:

Cross Targeting of aircraft and missiles on a common
target system, considering the capabilities of each system.
Launch bases were considered from a standpoint of location,
vulnerability, and distance from the target area. A specific
base survivability factor is not in the plan. However, it is
recognized that many bases will come under enemy attack.
This consideration caused the selection of weapon delivery
vehicles from different types of bases, as well as different
geographical locations, in order to achieve the best
probability of delivering a weapon.

Route Coordination was accomplished, as well as controlled timing. This helps us to avoid defenses and to take advantage of results of weapons already dropped.

Time Over Target Coordination was effected. Target times are controlled to avoid target conflicts and to insure that we do not destroy our own delivery vehicles.

Economical Weight of Effort is applied through the integration of all forces directed against a single target list. The weight of effort against each target is consistent with the worth of that target and the assurance desired on each target. As a result, unplanned duplication has been eliminated.

Optimum Strike Effort Base on Preparation Time is accomplished by a series of options which provide the JCS with a means of applying the maximum number of weapon carriers which can be generated for any given time. Warning time, whether it be in minutes or days, is the key to success of the plan. Therefore, heavy emphasis has been placed on tactical warning and quick reaction of the committed forces. Full strategic warning is also provided for.

Targeting Sequence.

All forces have been targeted in the order of their arrival in the target area. The sequence of targeting was first, the ballistic missiles; second, forces launching from forward areas; and last, forces from the US

The first group of forces to be targeted was that identified and maintained as the Alert Force, which was applied under conditions of tactical warning against highest targets.

Next to be targeted were the Follow-on Forces. The Follow-on Force is that portion of the committed forces which are not maintained in a condition for immediate reaction.

(Cont'd)

Confirms we in base that the plan is effective in conceptually because of forces in our capability, not effect in them

What can we do with what we have? - not related to other goals & circumstances

Seems totally correct

Does this mean that sequence not a function of ~~the kind of weapons~~ target & Brown vs. Bette

humbly only in 1944 - from more than

REF [redacted]

Warning time is required to ready this force. The Follow-on Force is targeted to take advantage of the Alert Force strike; to improve the probabilities on targets scheduled for strike by the Alert Force; and, as a result of a larger force made available by preparation time, it is used to expand target coverage.

Chart 25

Warning of 10 min? Alert Force? Follow-on Force? Reaction Capability?

The penetration and delivery capabilities of all weapon systems in the plan were analyzed and applied to insure the highest probability of delivering at least one weapon on each target. The number of weapons scheduled against each ground zero was determined by the target characteristics and the desired assurance of delivery. Weapons were then scheduled until the desired assurance was obtained at each target bomb release line.

The final factor considered was that of maximum exploitation of the following factors within each force: reaction capability, launch locations, range capability, and weapon and system variety. I will cover some of these items in greater detail.

Chart 26

Reaction Capability.

Primary consideration was given to the quick reaction capability of the Alert Force, responding under conditions of tactical warning. The planning criteria for tactical warning has been established as shown here.

Deleted.

That portion of the SIOP force requiring time to prepare for launch, which I have previously identified as the Follow-on Force, has been assigned launch timing based upon the generation or preparation rate of the aircraft and missile systems concerned.

Chart 27

Here are the weapons planned for aircraft delivery.

Chart 28

And by missile.

Forces.

I have previously mentioned the consideration given to programmed force changes during the life of this plan.

Practically all commands have weapon systems phasing into or out of their inventory during the next 12 months. In SAC, additional ATLAS and TITAN units are becoming operational, and other systems are being phased down. In Europe there are changes in the MATADOR-MACE program. CINCLANT is scheduled for additional POLARIS capability.

Chart 29

*has no
recovery?*

In order to provide a degree of stability to the plan, yet effectively provide for the employment of all forces, systems scheduled for operational readiness at any time during the plan life have been assigned a target.

An additional consideration in regard to force commitments was the identification and coordination of forces assigned to SACEUR, both US and non-US. Those forces have been targeted in a joint effort, with consideration given to the SACEUR NATO commitments. Those forces will respond to common Alert and Execution Reference Hours and will accomplish prior coordination with the Omaha planning staff on all program changes. The weight of effort of these forces, both US and non-US, has been included in the plan.

Under normal conditions, the carrier forces of CINCLANT (the Second Fleet) would not be in launch position. That is, they would be operating off the East Coast of the US or in port. However, to provide for the eventuality that these forces may be ordered into their launch area, Delivered targets have been assigned in order to capitalize on their capability.

Under conditions of strategic warning these carrier forces will be in position, and under this condition delivery probability has been assigned and weight of effort of these forces computed.

Chart 30

Non-All Weather Forces.

Twenty-two percent of the force, carrying sixteen percent of the weapons in this plan, are of a non-all weather category. In order to apply realistically the weight of effort represented by these forces, a planning factor was developed for the probability of these forces making correct target identification during conditions of bad weather and darkness. This factor was applied in determining forces necessary to provide the desired assurance.

Chart
Off

Tactics programmed for the SIOP are in two principal categories - the penetration phase and the delivery phase. In the penetration phase, the plan considers degradation of those defenses that offer the greatest threat to our forces. Peripheral defenses are scheduled to receive the first weapons. Subsequent arriving aircraft then bomb deeper defenses and primary targets as the force penetrates. The attack becomes a progressive development, following the principle of "bomb as you go."

Chart 31

Roll-back of the target system in this manner, within a selected geographical area, is called a "corridor." These corridors vary in width from (deleted) with defenses degraded within and for a (deleted) distance on either side. This distance represents potential ground-controlled interceptor coverage within the corridor.

(Deleted)

In those areas where, due to extensive Soviet defenses, roll-back of the target system or establishment of corridors is impractical, penetration is scheduled to be accomplished by maximum possible use of low level flight.

In the delivery phase, increased assurance has been obtained through the assignment of different delivery systems to the same target, by diversified tactics, and by cross-targeting on a common target system with consideration given to the capabilities of all systems in terms of reaction, circular error probable, yield, and launch location.

Optimum Launch Timing.

Should warning time be available, procedure has been established to designate the size of the strike force for immediate launch and to establish the timing of the entire force.

Chart 34

We accomplish this timing through execution options. These provide the capability to immediately launch variable forces as a function of preparation time and also provide proper timing for each size force.

In this Plan, 14 options have been established. Option 1 is the Alert Option. Options 2 through 13 are based on preparation times of up to 14 hours. Option 14 is the Strategic Warning Option and pre-supposes a minimum of 14 hours' preparation with no maximum time established.

This chart illustrates the option assignment based upon preparation time and the increase in available delivery systems under each successive option. The left column lists the option numbers. The center column indicates hours after Alert Hour. The right column indicates the additional delivery systems brought to ready status during the respective period.

Thus, under Option 1, the Alert Option, there are 1004 delivery systems capable of immediate launch. They carry 1685 weapons. In the event of surprise attack and only 15 minutes warning, it would be essentially the Alert Force which would constitute our retaliatory force. If one hour of preparation time is available, an additional 95 systems will have been prepared. At the end of six hours of preparation time, 1658 delivery systems will be prepared for launch under Option 7. Option 14 completes the force with a total of 2244 delivery systems generated and ready for launch, carrying a total of 3267 weapons.

*into head up? reduction
number what kind of attack
we have suffered!*

NATO and SIOP forces use a common reference timing system.

Deleted.

The JCS will designate A Hour based upon:

- a. Available intelligence,
 - b. Recommendations of unified and specified commanders,
 - or c. Declaration by unified and specified commanders of an
- Air Defense Emergency
- or
- Defense Emergency.

The JCS will designate E Hour and the appropriate execution option:

a. After consultation with appropriate commanders and the Director, Strategic Target Planning, if feasible, and

b. After receipt of authority from the President, including withhold instructions.

Unified and specified commanders may launch aircraft under positive control, a "fail-safe" system, advising the JCS.

Unified and specified commanders may, after E Hour, launch forces in advance of scheduled launch time but will avoid other scheduled SIOP strikes and will inform the JCS.

FLEXIBILITY

Sketch on retinal target set the same. signed pmc wrong

A fundamental characteristic of the current SIOP is that it provides for attack of an Optimum-Mix Target System. This follows the conclusions and the Presidential decision relative to Study No. 2009 that an optimum-mix of both military and urban-industrial targets must be successfully attacked in order for the US ultimately to prevail. Consequently, the SIOP is designed for the accomplishment of this total essential task. This embraces such things as timing and routing of attacks so that the maximum mutual support of the attacking forces is achieved. For example, tactics of follow-on forces relate directly to results expected to be achieved by earlier-arriving forces.

Thus, basically, the SIOP is designed for execution as a whole.

Notwithstanding the above, the current SIOP does have certain flexibility - some of which is built into the plan by design, and some of which, although not included in the design of the plan, is inherent in the mechanism for control of forces committed to the plan.

*say
nothing
about
re-work*

Chart 38

The plan is so designed as to contain the following flexible features:

a. It may be executed as a total plan

(1) In retaliation to a Soviet nuclear strike of the US, or

(2) As a preemptive measure.

(The ballistic missiles covered by the plan are assigned alternate targets for the two conditions of retaliation and preemption.)

just not other forces?

See p 10, 15

b. Strikes can be withheld against targets in any or all of the Satellites except for defensive targets.

(Also it would be possible to direct withholding of strike of all targets in the Satellites, providing the CINCs are so notified sufficiently in advance of E Hour to permit alteration of existing plans.)

In addition to the above designed flexibility, because of the positive control we exercise over our nuclear forces, it would be possible to direct that attack be withheld against any specific category or categories of targets in any area. For example, it would be possible to order that no direct attacks be made on cities.

However, it must clearly be understood that any decision to execute only a portion of the entire plan would involve acceptance of certain grave risks.

Chart
Off

As earlier pointed out, the plan is designed for execution as a whole, and the exclusion of attack of any category or categories of targets would, in varying degree, decrease the effectiveness of the plan. There is no effective mechanism for rapid re-work of the plan, after order for its execution, for a different set of conditions than for which it was prepared. Further, the characteristics of the greater majority of the weapons systems now committed to the plan are such that if withheld from their scheduled attack of assigned targets their survival for subsequent use would not be assured.

Thus, withholding of a portion of the planned attack could degrade our plan and the forces committed to it to the point that the task essential to our national survival might not be fulfilled. *all measures for this category?*

There are additional factors which bear on partial execution of the SIOP.

because of large
The very great majority of targets now covered by the SIOP are military in nature. For example, of about 1000 DGZs covered by the plan, some 800 are military targets. Further, atomic weapons are relatively non-discriminating, particularly with respect to fallout. Consequently, because of the relatively high number of military targets, the proximity of many of those targets to urban-industrial centers, and the characteristics of atomic weapons, there is considerable question that the Soviets would be able to distinguish between a total attack and an attack of military targets only *no sense for priority among military targets* even if US authorities indicated that the US attack had been limited to attack of military targets.

17

implies whole plan can be executed with alert force [p/4]

same question simply means our air defense levels

Another point relates to the thought that by concentrating attack on military targets only, the damage inflicted by the Soviets on the United States might significantly be reduced. The current SIOP provides for a very high level of assurance of success against Soviet targets posing a direct nuclear threat to the United States. Under any circumstances - even a preemptive attack by the US - it would be expected that some portion of the Soviet long-range nuclear force would strike the United States.

not "most probable" circumstances

It is not clear that increased weight of US effort against military targets over that already provided by the SIOP would significantly alter the strength of Soviet strikes on the US. Clearly the most important factor affecting damage to the US is that of whether the US acts in retaliation or preemption.

hardly the AP

As an additional point, while personnel casualties would be somewhat reduced if urban-industrial installations were not directly attacked, nevertheless, because of fallout from attack of military targets and co-location of many military targets with urban-industrial targets, the casualties would be many millions in number. Thus, limiting attack to military targets has little practical meaning as a humanitarian measure.

Very important
alert for
strikes not
designed
to prevent
B-59
destroyed
rest of
generalized
force allocated
to other
missions

The Single Integrated Operational Plan was designed to meet requirements under conditions such that our national survival is at stake. If the enemy were to launch an all-out nuclear attack against the US and its allies during the current time period, the expected gross disruption of facilities, military capabilities, communications and control elements, and other national assets imposes an overriding requirement for simplicity of military response. This overriding requirement severely limits the operational responses which

for
force
weight
of
attack

for negotiation — *The Herodotus*
may practically be planned - this notwithstanding how *was for a US*
desirable some responses individually might be under certain *1st strike!*
circumstances. The ability to defeat the enemy must not be
lost by the introduction into the SIOP of an excessive number *after they had*
of options which would contribute to confusion and lower our *launched an*
assurance of success under the most adverse circumstances. *all-out attack*
first?

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we believe that the current SIOP effectively integrates in a well-planned and coordinated attack the forces committed. Further, the plan is well designed to meet the objectives prescribed in the policy governing its preparation. Attainment of those objectives should permit the US to prevail in event of general nuclear war.

*Doesn't it matter what the Soviets
do - what kind of strategy they have?
The UN. 1959 doc.*

*In fact, serious discussion. NESC.
But this simple-minded. Treaty-protection?
Exclude these dumb civilians by
treating them like children?*

Marc, Give me a call w/ comments 10/17/86
also give an. Finally appreciate
your help. Sorry about the screw
up last week. Love
Stern
495-3273
44-3834

SIOP-62: The Nuclear War Plan Briefing to President Kennedy

On September 13, 1961, President John F. Kennedy received a top secret military briefing from General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the United States plan for nuclear war. Also present at the meeting in the White House were Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Military Representative to the President General Maxwell Taylor, and Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Walt W. Rostow.¹ A new war plan, the Single Integrated Operational Plan for Fiscal Year 1962, or SIOP-62, had come into effect on April 15, 1961² and General Lemnitzer explained in considerable detail how the complex war plan was built, the kinds of targets in the "Sino-Soviet bloc" which would be attacked, and the mechanics of the execution of the SIOP. His conclusion was simple and chilling: execution of SIOP-62 "should permit the United States to prevail in the event of general nuclear war". Yet General Lemnitzer also sounded a strong cautionary note, informing the President that "under any circumstances--even a preemptive attack by the U.S.--it would be expected that some portion of the Soviet long-range nuclear force would strike the United States".³

The SIOP is one of the most highly classified and closely held documents in the United States government. Even U.S. nuclear war plans that are over twenty-five years old, such as SIOP-62, remain classified because they could provide the Soviet Union with insights into current nuclear targeting plans,

intelligence sources, and crisis military wartime operations. General Lemnitzer's September 1961 SIOP briefing, however, was declassified by the Declassification and Archival Branch of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 15, 1986, with minor deletions to protect sensitive information. It is the first presidential SIOP briefing to be made available to scholars and the general public.

*Does it
no one even
denied that
the military
follows a
way*

The SIOP-62 briefing raises doubts about two widely held views. On the one hand, it weakens the claims of minimum deterrence advocates, that the military balance makes no difference whatsoever once each side has even small survivable nuclear forces. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed the United States would "prevail" in a general nuclear war in 1961 is significant for, at a minimum, it suggests that the President would be likely to receive assertive military advice, reflecting such an assessment, in a crisis or conventional conflict.⁴ On the other hand, however, the Joint Chiefs' warning that the United States could not preempt with complete success in 1961, despite the lopsided nuclear balance favoring the U.S., should at least temper the nostalgia among more hawkish analysts for the "golden age" of U.S. nuclear superiority in the late 1950s and early 1960s.⁵

Three issues will be discussed in this introduction to the SIOP-62 briefing. First, the balance of strategic nuclear forces in 1961 will be examined in order to shed light on the Joint Chiefs' position that while the United States could "prevail" in a nuclear war, they could not guarantee that an American preemptive strike would destroy all Soviet nuclear forces.

in December 1960 and came into effect four months later. It was this coordinated war plan that was presented to the President on September 13, 1961.

What was the strategic nuclear balance in 1961? Both the United States and the Soviet Union possessed a primitive triad of nuclear forces: bombers capable of reaching targets in each others homeland, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarine launched nuclear missiles. By any quantitative or qualitative measure of nuclear power, however, the United States possessed massive superiority.

Although the actual briefing charts on U.S. forces (charts 18, 34, and 35) used in the President's SIOP briefing are not available, a complete breakdown of forces utilized in SIOP-62 has been declassified. The following tables present the SIOP-62 forces in the same detail as would have been presented to President Kennedy in the White House meeting. (The charts were prepared by Cyrus Vance for President Lyndon Johnson in October 1964, in response to Johnson's inquiry concerning increases in U.S. military strength achieved during the Fiscal Year 1962-1965 period.)⁹ Alert Forces refer to strategic weapons that could be launched upon tactical warning in the event of a surprise Soviet nuclear attack. An estimated minimum of 14 hours was necessary for the United States to generate the Non-Alert strategic forces for potential SIOP execution.¹⁰

Second, what military options did the President have in the event of a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union in 1961? General Lemnitzer's briefing demonstrates the degree to which SIOP-62 was an inflexible plan for massive retaliation, or massive preemption, against the Sino-Soviet bloc and helps explain why the Kennedy Administration sought to increase the options available to the President in a crisis or war, when he might face, in McGeorge Bundy's phrase, "the moment of thermonuclear truth."⁶ Finally, I will offer some conclusions, of a more speculative nature, on the political and strategic significance of U.S. war plans in the early 1960's.

The Strategic Imbalance

Since 1948, the United States military has been authorized to prepare plans for the potential use of nuclear weapons.⁷ Prior to 1960, however, each of the Commanders in Chief (CINCs) of the relevant U.S. military commands prepared his own plans for nuclear strikes and there was often inadequate political guidance given to war planners and insufficient coordination among the various CINCs.⁸ During the last years of the Eisenhower Administration, a major effort took place to re-examine and coordinate U.S. nuclear war plans. On August 16, 1960, Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates established a new military organization, the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) at Offutt Air Force Base, and authorized it to produce a coordinated nuclear war plan based on extensive guidance documents that had been previously approved by President Eisenhower. The product of the JSTPS's work, SIOP-62, was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Table 1
U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces/Alert
July 15, 1961

	TOTAL	SAC	PAC	EUR	LANT
<u>TOTAL WEAPONS</u>	1530	1236	84	178	32
ACFT WPNS	1413	1212	75	126	0
GRUISE MSLS	31	0	9	22	0
BAL MSLS	86	24	0	30	32

Table 2
U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces/Non-Alert
July 15, 1961

	TOTAL	SAC	PAC	EUR	LANT
<u>TOTAL WEAPONS</u>	1737	944	337	311	145
ACFT WPNS	1525	890	277	261	97
GRUISE MSLS	110	0	60	50	0
BAL MSLS	102	54	0	0	48

Table 3
 U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces/
 Fully Generated Alert Level
 July 15, 1961

	TOTAL	SAC	PAC	EUR	LANT
<u>TOTAL WEAPONS</u>	3267	2180	421	489	177
ACFT WPNS	2938	2102	352	387	97
CRUISE MSLS	141	0	69	72	0
BAL MSLS	188	78	0	30	80

The information currently available on Soviet strategic nuclear forces in September 1961 is less definitive. This reflects both the continued classification of some intelligence information, as well as the strong disagreements on Soviet force levels among U.S. intelligence agencies in 1961, which was evident in the range of intelligence estimates provided to the President. What is clear, however, is that while Soviet nuclear forces capable of attacking Europe were large, Soviet intercontinental forces were far inferior to those of the United States.

The Soviet ICBM forces have received considerable attention because of the missile gap controversy. American fears of an

impending missile gap favoring the Soviet Union, fears which John Kennedy exploited during the 1960 presidential campaign, were the product of U.S. intelligence shortfalls in this period, inevitable uncertainties about Soviet procurement plans, and Khrushchev's blustering attempts to gain political advantage through nuclear bluff and intimidation.¹¹ The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of December 1958 had estimated that the Soviets could have 500 ICBMs in 1961, but such estimates were repeatedly lowered in subsequent NIEs as improved intelligence became available.¹² By September 1961, however, it was clear to American policy makers that the missile gap actually favored the United States: On September 6, the CIA informed the President that earlier estimates that fifty to one hundred Soviet missiles were operational was "probably too high" and the NIE published on September 21 placed the number of Soviet ICBMs on launchers as only ten to twenty-five with no marked increase considered likely during the immediately succeeding months.¹³

It is critical to remember, however, that ICBMs were only a small part of the Soviet strategic force posture in 1961. The ICBM force was not as large as had been previously estimated, the CIA reported on September 6, but "nevertheless, the present capabilities, along with those of bombers and submarines, pose a great threat to U.S. urban areas, but a more limited threat during the months immediately ahead to our nuclear striking forces."¹⁴ What were U.S. estimates of the other two legs of the Soviet triad?

In 1961, the bulk of the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear weapons resided on its long range bomber force. Declassified material prepared for special high level war games held during the Berlin Crisis in early September 1961 estimated that "the Soviets could put about 200 bombers over North America" in an initial first strike, an estimate that is consistent with Secretary McNamara's testimony in executive sessions of the Committee on Foreign relations in February and September 1962.¹⁵ This estimate included BISON and BEAR heavy bombers as well as BADGER and BLINDER medium-range bombers, but excluded combat attrition from American air defenses, which would have existed since, as Secretary McNamara testified in February 1962, "such an attack could not be launched without our receiving warning more than adequate to alert our strategic force and air defenses."¹⁶

Turning to American estimates of Soviet submarine launched nuclear missiles, the September 1961 Berlin Crisis war game material stated that there were approximately twenty-eight Soviet long-range submarines (twenty-one diesel-electric powered, seven nuclear-powered) capable of launching "about seventy-eight" nuclear missiles against United States coastal targets.¹⁷ In February 1962, McNamara testified that thirty Soviet submarines could deliver approximately ninety nuclear missiles.¹⁸ This submarine force was an extremely primitive one, however, equipped with short-range SS-N-3 cruise missiles and SS-N-4 ballistic missiles, both of which required the submarine to approach within 150-350 nautical miles of the U.S. coast and surface prior to launching an attack.¹⁹ If one collects these estimates, the

resulting estimated total Soviet strategic nuclear force during the SIOP-62 period is given in table 4 below:

Table 4
Estimated Soviet Strategic Nuclear Forces, September 1961

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number</u>
ICBMs	10-25
Submarine launched missiles (ballistic and cruise missiles)	about 78
Bombers	200

When one examines the relative alert levels of American and Soviet strategic nuclear forces in 1961, the imbalance appears even more pronounced. In 1961, approximately half of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) bomber force was kept on fifteen minute ground-runway alert with a small number of B-52s on airborne alert at all times through the continuous airborne alert training program. Two of the Atlantic Commands' five Polaris submarines (each with sixteen missiles on board) and thirty percent of SAC's ICBM force (twenty-four out of seventy-eight missiles) were also routinely kept on alert. In September 1961, the Chairman reported that execution of the alert option in SIOP-62, would launch 1,004 delivery systems with 1,685 nuclear weapons against the Sino-Soviet bloc.²⁰

In stark contrast, none of the Soviet ICBMs were kept on routine high states of alert in 1961: nuclear warheads were controlled by the KGB and kept physically separated from the rocket forces; the missiles' non-storable liquid propellant was unstable; and the September 1961 war game material suggested that it might take one to three hours to warm up the electrical

equipment and fuel the early Soviet ICBMs.²¹ As a special inter-departmental intelligence report for President Kennedy stated in August 1962: "present Soviet procedures for firing initial and subsequent salvos are relatively slow and complicated, and design limitations of their current missile systems appear to preclude attainment of readiness conditions approaching those of U.S. systems".²² The Soviet bomber forces' alert status was similar: no bombers were ever on routine day-to-day runway alert and no Soviet airborne alert program existed.²³ Finally, no precise estimate on the day-to-day readiness of the Soviet nuclear armed submarine force appears to have been available in 1961, and the 1962 special intelligence report could only state that the Soviet submarine fleet was "for the most part" kept in port during peacetime and that "virtually none would be in position to launch immediately against the United States under day-to-day alert conditions".²⁴

Preemption and Warning

Given the size of the Soviet strategic nuclear force by 1961, it is understandable that American officials believed that the effects of a Soviet first strike would be horrendous. What bears special attention is General Lemnitzer's discussion of U.S. preemption. It should by no means be surprising that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs discussed nuclear preemption with President Kennedy in 1961: the existence of such capabilities and options was common knowledge in the late 1950s and early 1960s and senior American officials publicly discussed such a possibility.²⁵ Indeed, what might be surprising, given the imbalance of forces

outlined above and the extraordinarily low readiness states of Soviet forces, is General Lemnitzer's warning that "under any circumstances--even ^a preemptive attack by the U.S.--it would be expected that some portion of the Soviet long-range nuclear force would strike the United States."²⁶

Why was this the case? A number of possibilities must be examined. First, one must consider the scenario under discussion. At no point in the SIOP-62 briefing did General Lemnitzer discuss an American "bolt out of the blue" surprise attack against the Soviet Union.²⁷ Instead, what the preemptive option referred to was the possibility that the United States might preempt, launch an offensive strike, upon receiving warning that the Soviet Union was about to launch an attack.²⁸ Yet, military activities that would constitute strategic warning that a Soviet nuclear attack was imminent--such as alerting ICBMs, loading and dispersing bombers, or sending bombers to Arctic staging bases²⁹--were precisely the Soviet actions that would reduce the effectiveness of an American preemptive strike. If the United States alerted its missile forces or placed SAC or European Command bombers on higher states of alert in order to increase coverage and effectiveness of SIOP-62, such actions would constitute strategic warning for the Soviets and increase the likelihood of corresponding Soviet alert measures.³⁰ Indeed, Robert McNamara expressed precisely such concerns in late 1962 in a draft memorandum for the President:

I am convinced that we would not be able to achieve tactical surprise, especially in the kinds of crisis circumstances in which a first-strike capability might be relevant. Thus,

the Soviets would be able to launch some of their retaliatory forces before we had destroyed their bases.³¹

General Lemnitzer's statement may well reflect similar considerations, since it clearly suggests that the Joint Chiefs believed that even if warning of such Soviet activities was unequivocal and prompt, and even if the President authorized nuclear attack under such conditions (and there may have been considerable uncertainty on both counts)³², the United States could not be confident that a preemptive attack could destroy all Soviet bombers and missiles on the ground before they were launched.

A second factor contributing to cautionary military assessments concerning preemption can be seen in the measurements of military effectiveness used in SIOP-62. As the Chairman's briefing makes clear, President Eisenhower approved guidance prescribing a minimum seventy-five percent assurance (probability) of the U.S. delivering an atomic weapon at each "designated ground zero" (DGZ) against the "optimum-mix" of military and urban-industrial targets in the Sino-Soviet bloc.³³ American war planners faced grave operational uncertainties: for example, early American ICBMs did not have high reliability rates, and the bomber forces' ability to penetrate enemy airspace depended, in part, upon initial priority attacks against Warsaw Pact air defenses and complex low-altitude flight tactics.³⁴ Through the use of enormous redundancy and cross targeting (placing multiple weapons from different sources on a single target), however, SIOP-62 requirements for destruction could be placed at much higher levels: seven priority targets

may be being
by balanced
about Cuba
Oct 16
estimate the 6 days

don't (as all have to do w assumption of a big attack being the only one - Also, it about rolling attack)

in fact, counterargument.
Soviets would not do this (ump in a crisis)
US preemption!
The was right after Cuba! 11-63
not honest -

were to be destroyed with ninety-seven percent assurance; 213 targets with ninety-five percent assurance; and 592 with at least ninety percent assurance.³⁵

Although the assurance of figures against the priority nuclear delivery counterforce targets (approximately ten to twenty-five Soviet ICBMs, 150-200 bomber bases, and up to thirty submarine bases³⁶) are not available, even if these high SIOP-62 requirements were met, a small percentage of such forces would, probabilistically speaking, survive. Thus, American war planners would have to expect that even a successful preemptive strike, one that caught all Soviet forces before they could be launched, would still leave some nuclear delivery capabilities undamaged.³⁷

The third factor prohibiting confident assessments of preemption in 1961 was continued uncertainty concerning the readiness level of small portions of the Soviet nuclear force. For example, although Soviet bombers and ICBMs were not kept at on day-to-day alert, any force exercise or even nuclear testing activity would require a higher degree of readiness for the specific bombers or missiles involved used.³⁸ Such uncertainty was especially important with respect to the Soviet submarine force. It is very unlikely that U.S. military authorities were confident that all Soviet submarines could be located and destroyed before they reached within 150-350 miles of the American coast and launched their short-range ballistic and cruise missiles. The United States had plans in 1961, which were actually implemented during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, to set up an ASW (anti-submarine warfare) barrier of attack

submarines to intercept any Soviet missile-launching submarines approaching the American coast.³⁹ Yet the U.S. military's confidence in such ASW activities in the late 1950s and early 1960s was high, but not absolute: the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, for example, testified in 1959 that "it would be very difficult for the Russians to get submarines (close to the U.S. coast) in any kind of numbers that would warrant their attacking this country," but cautioned that "one or two isolated submarines" were likely to get through.⁴⁰ Moreover, the U.S. Navy could not rule out the possibility that a very small number of Soviet submarines might be close to the U.S. coastline prior to the setting up of ASW barriers in a crisis. There is some evidence that the U.S. Navy suspected that Soviet Zulu-class submarines practiced occasional, though not routine, covert patrols off the Atlantic coast,⁴¹ and cruise missile carrying submarines apparently routinely patrolled the Caribbean.⁴² In either case, a few Soviet submarines might have reached the American coastline undetected.

In summary, there were more than sufficient reasons--grave operational difficulties, uncertainty concerning warning, authorization and timing of attacks, and unpredictability in Soviet nuclear force operations--to make the Joint Chiefs extremely cautious in their assessment of the effects of a preemptive strike. Every Soviet ICBM that was not destroyed on the ground might place a three megaton warhead on the United States; every bomber that escaped destruction and penetrated NORAD defenses could drop two to four weapons; each submarine

that approached the American coast could launch two to six nuclear armed missiles.⁴³ Some might argue that Lemnitzer's warning merely reflects the worst-case analysis typical of military planners, and certainly the U.S. military was not adverse to exaggerating the Soviet threat in the early 1960s. Yet these uncertainties were real and profound, and General Lemnitzer was responsible for providing such a warning. Indeed, it is revealing that the SIOP briefing did not even attempt to make predictions of casualties in the United States: all that Lemnitzer told the President was that "clearly the most important factor affecting the damage to the U.S. is that of whether the U.S. acts in retaliation or preemption".⁴⁴ Estimates of casualties beyond that general statement were, in the strategist's jargon, "scenario specific".

In contrast, General Lemnitzer's assessment that the United States would "prevail in the event of general nuclear war" does not appear to depend upon whether the United States preempted or retaliated after a Soviet first strike.⁴⁵ Such a military assessment most likely was based on two sorts of calculations. First, the United States would prevail in the narrow military sense of achieving the specific war aims which had been prescribed by national policy guidance to the SIOP planners. Second, the United States could expect to suffer some unspecified amount of damage under any condition of war initiation, the Soviet Union would confront absolutely massive destruction regardless of whether it struck first or retaliated. The degree

during same
people also make the
opportunity and already making
bias toward offense

Left could be a problem
the other way through
First with an all-out
attack

to which political authorities agreed with such calculations is, of course, a separate question.⁴⁶

Flexibility and Change

In preparing the nuclear war plan, the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff was told to achieve two objectives "under the several conditions under which hostilities may be initiated": first "to destroy or neutralize the Sino-Soviet bloc strategic nuclear delivery capability and primary military and government controls" and second, "to attack the major urban-industrial centers of the Sino-Soviet bloc."⁴⁷ The SIOP-62 briefing reveals the degree to which JSTPS simplified their task by designing an inflexible, overwhelming nuclear offensive to destroy the full range of Soviet targets in one great spasm. The war plan contained fourteen so-called "options" based on the U.S. alert level, but each simply launched all available strategic forces against the "optimum mix" of military and urban industrial targets throughout the Sino-Soviet bloc. Nevertheless, General Lemnitzer told President Kennedy that the total plan could be executed either in retaliation to a Soviet nuclear strike or as a preemptive measure and that he had the option of ordering that attacks against individual satellite countries be withheld, except for air defense targets. Any further effort to limit the planned attack, however, (for example, completely withholding attacks against individual countries or cities) could only be undertaken if there was sufficient time to re-work the plan, which would be very unlikely in the pressured environment of a superpower crisis or conventional war.⁴⁸

General Lemnitzer's argument against adding more flexibility to the SIOP was four-fold. First, he noted that because of the huge number of military targets in the SIOP (approximately 800 of the 1,000 DGZs), the "relatively non-discriminating" nature of atomic weapons "particularly with respect to fallout", and the proximity of many military targets to urban-industrial centers, it was doubtful whether the Soviet Union would be able to distinguish between a total attack and a purely counter-military attack. Secondly, while he acknowledged that enemy casualties could be "somewhat reduced" if only military targets were attacked, he maintained that such limits had "little practical meaning as a humanitarian measure" since enemy casualties would still be "many millions in number". Third, he questioned whether the damage inflicted against the United States could be significantly reduced by further concentration on military targets. Finally, General Lemnitzer stressed that a Soviet first strike would cause a "gross disruption" of U.S. nuclear forces and command and control which "imposes an overriding requirement for simplicity of military response."⁴⁹

These arguments against adding "an excessive number of options" into the war plan were clearly an appeal to President Kennedy to temper the ongoing efforts of Secretary McNamara to add more flexibility to the SIOP.⁵⁰ Lemnitzer's appeal failed. Although the full details of resulting changes are not currently available, enough is known to outline McNamara's success.

Guidance drafted in 1961 was used by JSTPS to construct a new war plan, SIOP-63, that separated the "optimum-mix" into

Note: no consideration
 of the
 consequences of a
 nuclear war

(page 12 here should be: no plan for
 retaliation; Also for 1st strike

three parts or "tasks": nuclear targets, other military targets, and urban-industrial targets.⁵¹ The President was provided with significant new flexibility: five primary attack options, which could be executed under various conditions of retaliation or preemption, were provided, and the capability to withhold U.S. nuclear attacks against each of the targeting "tasks", any individual or set of communist countries, and individual "tasks" within a specific country was built into the new war plan.⁵² The twin objectives guiding the SIOP revisions can be seen in McNamara's September 1961 draft memorandum for the President on strategic forces:

First, to strike back against Soviet bomber bases, missile sites, and other installations associated with long-range nuclear forces, in order to reduce Soviet power and limit the damage that can be done to us by vulnerable Soviet follow-on forces, while, second, holding in protected reserve forces capable of destroying the Soviet urban society, if necessary, in a controlled and deliberate way.⁵³

Thus, just as SIOP-62 reflected many of the assumptions behind Eisenhower's "massive retaliation" policy, the new war plan reflected Kennedy's policy of "flexible response". SIOP-63 came into effect on August 1, 1962. It was briefed to the President on September 12, 1962, one month to a day before the start of the Cuban Missile Crisis.⁵⁴

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Conclusion

The nuclear superiority of the United States in 1961 was indisputable. SIOP-62 sought to maximize the effect of such superiority through a massive, simultaneous nuclear offensive -- in preemption if possible, but in retaliation if necessary -- against the full set of military and urban-industrial targets in the Sino-Soviet bloc. Although they were not confident that even a preemptive strike would destroy all Soviet strategic forces, Joint Chiefs did believe that they could achieve the war objectives that guided their plans and that the United States would prevail in a general nuclear war. It is clear the the Kennedy Administration enacted major changes in U.S. nuclear strategy, operational plans, and strategic force acquisition policy. Precisely why and how such changes were made is not, however, entirely clear. I suspect, moreover, that different Presidents and Secretaries of Defense have faced similar dilemmas in efforts to make war planning meet national security objectives. How well has military planning reflected political guidance? What political and organizational barriers have civilian authorities faced in this arena? Finally, how have nuclear war plans, military advice, and perceptions of war outcomes influenced policy-makers in crises?

Political scientists and historians have long had, of course, a great interest in such questions. A rich literature on deterrence theory exists, but the scholarly efforts to understand such "operational" dimensions of nuclear strategy has been greatly inhibited by the paucity of solid evidence about U.S. war

planning and military operations. Major strides have been made in recent years, but far more documentary evidence such as the briefing presented here should be made available to add historical flesh to the valuable bones of deterrence theory and enable scholars to contribute more effectively to the critical objective of maintaining nuclear forces and plans that maximize the prospects for peace.

[I would like to thank Richard K. Betts and Mark Kramer for their comments on an earlier draft of this introduction.

Scott D. Sagan]

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Footnotes

1. President's Appointment Book, July-December 1961, Wednesday, September 13, 1961, 4:30 p.m., John F. Kennedy Library (JFKL).
2. Briefing for the President, SIOP-62, p. 6. SIOP-62 thus came into effect just prior to the start of fiscal year 1962.
3. Ibid, pp.18-19.
4. For example, at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised the Secretary of Defense: "We have the strategic advantage in our general war capabilities; we have the tactical advantages of moral rightness, of boldness, of strength, of initiative, and of control of this situation. This is no time to run scared" JSCM 328-62, October 26, 1962, Cuba General 10/26/62, National Security Files, Box 36, JFKL. Also see Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969) p. 36 and p. 119.
5. For example Colin S. Gray has argued that "it probably is no exaggeration to assert that the U.S. Air Force's strategic Air Command (SAC) could have won a World War III at any time from the early 1950s until the mid-1960s, at very little cost in direct nuclear damage to U.S. society". Colin S. Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style, (Boston: Hamilton Press and Abt Associates, 1986). p. 103. For an excellent review of the uncertainties facing U.S. decision makers in the age of U.S. nuclear superiority see Richard K. Betts, "A Nuclear Golden Age? The Balance Before Parity", International Security, Winter 1986, Vol. II, No. 3, pp. 3-32.
6. On July 7, 1961, as the Berlin Crisis raised American fears of a conflict with the Soviet Union, Bundy warned President Kennedy that the SIOP was extremely inflexible: "The current war plan is dangerously rigid and, if continued without amendment, may leave you with very little choice as to how you face the moment of thermonuclear truth. We believe you may want to raise this question with Bob McNamara in order to have a prompt review and new orders if necessary. In essence, the current plan calls for shooting off everything we have in one shot, and is so constructed as to make any more flexible course very difficult." Covering Note on Henry Kissinger's memo on Berlin, National Security Files, Box 81, Germany - Berlin - General, 7/7/61, JFKL.
7. For detailed examinations of the evolution of U.S. nuclear strategy see David Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960," International Security, vol. 7, no. 4, Spring 1983, pp.1-71; Desmond J. Ball, "Targeting for Strategic Deterrence",

Adelphi Paper 185 (London: IISS, 1983); Aaron L. Friedberg, "A History of U.S. Strategic 'Doctrine'--1945 to 1980", The Journal of Strategic Studies vol. 3, no. 3, December 1980, pp. 37-71; Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War 1945-1950; and Scott D. Sagan, "Change and Continuity in U.S. Nuclear Strategy" in Michael Mandelbaum (ed.) American Military Policy (forthcoming 1987).

8. See Rosenberg, "Origins of Overkill" pp. 61-64, and History and Research Division, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, History of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff: Background and Preparation of SIOP-62, (partially declassified and released by OJCS, April 1980), pp. 1-11.
9. Cyrus Vance, Memorandum for the President, "Military Strength Increases Since Fiscal Year 1961", October 3, 1964, TAB G, National Security Files, Agency Files, Box 11-12, Department of Defense, 11-63, vol. 1, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library. The total megatonnage was 1,798 for the alert force and 7,420 for the fully generated force.
10. Briefing for the President, SIOP-62, pp.13-14.
11. The best sources on the missile gap are Lawrence C. McQuade Memorandum for Mr. Nitze, "But Where Did the Missile Gap Go?", 31 May, 1963, National Security Files, Box 298, Missile Gap, 2/63-5/63, JFKL; John Prados, The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Soviet Strategic Forces, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press edition, 1986) pp. 110-126; and Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966) pp.35-102.
12. NIE, 11-4-58, 23 December 1958, as cited in McQuade memo: "But Where Did the Missile Gap Go?", pp.7-8. NIE, 11-4-59, (9 February 1960), estimated 140-200 ICBMs on launchers by mid-1961 and NIE, 11-8-61, (7 June 1961), reported the intelligence community's consensus that the Soviets "might already have fifty to one hundred operational ICBM launchers" as cited in Ibid, pp. 9-10, and 14.
13. Central Intelligence Agency Memorandum: "Current Status of Soviet and Satellite Military Forces and Indications of Military Intentions", 6 September, 1961, President's Office Files, Countries, Box 117, German Security 8/61-12/61, p. 4, JFKL; NIE, 11-8/1-61, 21 September 1961, cited in McQuade memo, "But Where Did the Missile Gap Go?", p. 15.
14. CIA memo, "Current Status of Soviet and Satellite Military Forces", p. 5.
15. Materials Prepared for NATO Planning Conference, 9 September, 1961, Red Strategic Forces, OSD-FOI; Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Together with Joint

Sessions with the Senate Armed Services Committee, (Historical Series). Vol. 14, 87th Congress, 2nd session, 1962, (Washington, DC, USGPO, 1986), p. 145 and p. 694. McNamara testified on September 5, 1962 that the Soviets have about 165 long-range bombers and tankers, and about 950 medium-range bombers and tankers, and out of that total bomber tanker force of something on the order of 1,100 or 1,200 aircraft, they could put about 200 bombers, we believe, over North America today", Ibid p. 694.

16. NATO Planning Conference Materials, Red Strategic Forces; Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Vol. 14, p. 145. No official estimates of the expected effectiveness of the NORAD (North American Air Defense Command) air defense against such a Soviet attack are available, but NORAD exercises in the early 1960s revealed that U.S. air defenses were far from perfect in defending against a concerted Soviet attack. See HQ NORAD, Sky Shield III, "Conclusions and/or Recommendations", December 6, 1962. CCS 3150 Joint and Combined Exercises, 20 December, 1961, Sec. 2, Box 66, Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff 1961, RG 218, National Archives. (Hereafter JCS.)
17. NATO Planning Conference Material, Red Strategic Forces. This material appears to have been based upon official U.S. estimates of the rapidly growing Soviet submarine force. NIE 11-8-62 (July 6, 1962) stated that in mid-1962 the Soviets had ten H-class nuclear submarines (three ballistic missiles each), 4 E-class nuclear submarines (six cruise missiles each), seven Z-class (diesel-electric) submarines (two ballistic missiles each), 25 G-Class (diesel-electric) submarines (three ballistic missiles each) and 6 converted W-class (diesel-electric) submarines (three cruise missiles each). The total was therefore 155 nuclear missiles on fifty-two submarines. Figures in Raymond Garthoff, Intelligence Assessment and Policy Making: A Decision Point in the Kennedy Administration, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1984) p. 55.
18. Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Together with Joint Sessions with the Senate Armed Services Committee (Historical Series), Vol. 14, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, 1962 (Washington, DC, USGPO, 1986) p. 145.
19. For a discussion of Soviet submarine missile launching capabilities in the early 1960s, see K.J. Moore, Mark Flanigan and Robert D. Helsel, "Developments in Submarine Systems, 1956-1976" in Michael McGwire and John McDonnell (eds.) Soviet Naval Influence, (New York: Praeger, 1977, pp. 154-162), and Robert G. Weinland, "The Evolution of Soviet Requirements for Naval Forces: Solving the Problems of the Early 1960s", Survival, vol. XXVI, no. 1, Jan./Feb. 1984, pp.16-25. U.S. intelligence estimates after 1962 dropped

cruise missile submarines from the strategic-attack force estimates on the grounds that they were likely to be used for anti-carrier operations, not land attack missions. Garthoff, Intelligence Assessment and Policy Making, p. 22.

20. Briefing to the President, SIOP-62, p. 14.
21. Stephen M. Meyer, "Soviet Nuclear Operations and Command and Control" in Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles A. Zracket, Managing Nuclear Operations, (Brookings, forthcoming); Robert P. Berman and John C. Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces, (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1982) p. 49; NATO Planning Conference Materials, Red Strategic Forces. Fred Kaplan has reported that American intelligence estimated in 1961 that it would take at least six hours to load warheads on Soviet ICBMs. Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 295.
22. "Report of the Special Inter-Departmental Committee on Implications of NIE 11-8-62 and Related Intelligence", in Garthoff, Intelligence Assessment and Policy Making, p. 49.
23. Meyer, "Soviet Nuclear Operations and Command and Control". The NATO Planning Conference Material states, in contrast, that ten percent of the Soviet bomber force was on ground alert, but this appears to have been a conservative estimate "insurance" factor compensating for uncertainty. Interviews.
24. "Report of the Special Inter-Departmental Committee on Implications of NIE 11-8-62 and Related Intelligence Assessment and Policy Making", in Garthoff, Intelligence Assessment and Policy Making, p. 47.
25. For example, Air Force Chief of Staff General Thomas White, discussed the U.S. taking the "initiative"--in a nuclear war in event of "tactical or strategic warning" in open congressional testimony in 1959. President Kennedy also told Stewart Alsop in March 1961 that, "in some circumstances we might have to take the 'initiative' " in nuclear war, apparently referring to a Soviet conventional attack on NATO. Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960, Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 86th Congress, 1st Session, Part 1, pp. 928-929; Stewart Alsop, "Kennedy's Grand Strategy", Saturday Evening Post, March 31, 1962. Also see "First Strike?", Newsweek, April 9, 1962, p. 26.
26. Briefing to the President, SIOP-62 p. 18.
27. There appears to have been some discussion of a surprise counterforce attack among civilian planners during the Berlin crisis, but the incident is still shrouded in mystery and cannot be confirmed by documentary evidence. Kaplan states

that U.S. fatalities in a successful first strike were estimated at two to fifteen million, but also notes the great operational uncertainties involved and the expectation that European allies would suffer far greater damage due to the large number of Soviet Theatre nuclear forces. See Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, pp. 294-301 and Gregg Herken, Counsels of War, (New York, Knoph, 1985) pp. 159-162.

28. As early as April 1950, the U.S. government rejected the possibility of surprise attack and preventive war. As NSC-68 put it, "it goes without saying that the idea of 'preventive' war--in the sense of a military attack not provoked by a military attack upon us or our allies--is generally unacceptable to Americans". Moral and political considerations "rule out an attack unless it is demonstrably in the nature of a counter-attack to a blow which is on its way or about to be delivered". NSC-68 in Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis (eds.) Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978) pp. 431-432. In 1957, three members of the Gaither Committee advocated a reconsideration of the preventive war option, but Eisenhower apparently did not follow that advice. Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill", p. 47.
29. In congressional testimony in January 1959, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Nathan Twining noted that "large scale movement" of long and medium range Soviet bombers to Arctic staging bases "might provide us with very valuable strategic warning." Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series) Vol. XI, 86th Congress, 1st session, 1959 (Washington: USGPO, 1982) p. 23.
30. In addition, as Richard Betts has argued, if the Soviet Union launched a conventional attack against NATO, it would in all likelihood alert its strategic nuclear forces in order to protect against an American nuclear response. Betts, "A Nuclear Golden Age?", p. 22. Steven Meyer has argued that the Soviets probably had military base-watchers (KGB and GRU agents) scattered around Europe and the U.S. to provide strategic warning. Meyer, "Soviet Nuclear Operations".
31. Draft Memorandum for the President, November 21, 1962. Subject: Recommended FY 1964-1968 Strategic Retaliatory Forces, OSD-FOI (Hereafter DPM-62), p. 8.
32. In 1959, the Joint Chiefs could not agree among themselves whether the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan should provide guidance for the "possibility of obtaining strategic warning if sufficient precision to impel the President to direct the initiation of operations by United States forces", Briefing Sheet for the Chairman, JCS, 7 December 1959, Subject: Joint

Strategic Objectives Plan for 1 July 1963 with enclosure, CCS 3130, JSOP (25 November 1959), JCS 1959 as cited in Rosenberg "Origins of Overkill", p. 63.

33. Briefing to the President, SIOP-62, pp.4-5.
34. Atlas D and E missiles had a reliability rate of approximately .70-.80. DPM-61, p. 7 and p. 19-20; the bomber penetration tactics are described in Briefing to the President, SIOP-62 pp. 12-13.
35. Memorandum, CINCLANT Ft to CNO, April 27, 1961, Arleigh Burke papers, NSTL/SIOP messages, Exclusive and Personals, Center for Naval History, as cited in Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, p. 268. Kaplan states that the JSTPS calculated that the average target would receive 2.2 weapons, although the scenario used in this calculation is not clear.
36. The precise number of nuclear delivery counterforce targets in SIOP-62 is not available. For the source of the ICBM estimate, see footnote 14. (It should be noted, however, that first generation Soviet ICBMs were soft and placed with two missiles per site.) The bomber base estimates come from Draft, Appendix I to the Memorandum for the President, Recommended Long Range Nuclear Delivery Forces, 1963-1967, September 23, 1961, OSD-FOI, (Hereafter DPM-61), p. 6 (150) and the Hickey committee report (200) as cited in Rosenberg "Origins of Overkill", p. 62. The submarine base number is McNamara's November 1962 estimate for such targets in 1968 and may therefore be slightly larger than 1961 estimates. DPM-62.
37. For discussions of current methodology for measuring targeting effectiveness see George J. Seiler, Strategic Nuclear Forces Requirements and Issues, (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University Press, 1983) and Richard Lee Walker, Strategic Target Planning: Bridging The Gap Between Theory and Practice, (Washington DC, National Defense University Press, 1983) National Security Affairs Monograph Series 83-89; and William T. Lee and Richard F. Staar, Soviet Military Policy Since World War II, (Stanford: Hoover, 1986) pp. 135-170.
38. The Penkovskiy papers state that both bombers and missiles were delivery vehicles in the Soviet nuclear weapons testing program and that at least some long-range bombers training flights carried bombs. The Penkovskiy Papers, (New York: Doubleday, 1965), pp. 333-335 and p. 343.
39. Admiral George W. Anderson, Harvard Business School Speech, The Pentagon, Nov. 27, 1962 Public Speeches and Published Articles of George W. Anderson, Jr., Mimeograph, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. For a discussion of U.S. ASW activities in 1962, see Scott D. Sagan, "Nuclear Alerts and Crisis Management", International Security, vol. 9, no. 4,

Spring 1985. pp. 112-118.

40. Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series) Vol. XI, 86th Congress, 1st session, 1959 (Washington: USGPO, 1982) pp.51-52.
41. On October 22, 1962, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, a Zulu-class submarine was spotted refueling off the Azores. According to Admiral Robert Lee Dennison (CINCLANT), this submarine's "topside condition, and the submarine's requirement for fuel, of course, indicated that she'd been at sea for quite a long period. Considering this together with two possibly valid contact reports, she'd been on a covert patrol in the Western Atlantic near the East Coast of the United States." The Reminiscences of Admiral Robert Lee Dennison, (U.S. Naval Institute, August 1975) p.436, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington DC. Also note that CINCSAC requested in 1960 that all CINCPAC submarine contact reports be furnished to SAC immediately. AF IN message 3852, 4 February, 1960, SAC to JCS, CCS 2010, Collection of Intelligence, (3 February 1960) Box 7, JCS 1960.
42. Moore, Flanigan, and Helsel, "Developments in Submarine Systems" p. 161. It is worth noting that NORAD/SAC exercises in 1962 included simulated Soviet submarine launched cruise missile attacks against the United States from the Caribbean. HQ NORAD, December 6, 1962, Sky Shield III Conclusions and/or Recommendations, p. 25, CCS 3150 Joint and Combined Exercises, 20 December 1961, Sec. 2, Box 66, JCS 1961.
43. To be added.
44. Briefing for the President, SIOP-62, p. 18. In contrast, Daniel Ellsberg has claimed that the Air Force privately told President Kennedy during the Berlin Crisis that U.S. casualties would probably be under ten million if the U.S. struck first. See Herken, Counsels of War, p. 145.
45. Briefing for the President, SIOP-62, p. 19.
46. For an important discussion of the impact of the nuclear balance on American and Soviet decision makers during the Cuban Missile Crisis see Marc Trachtenberg, "The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis", International Security, Summer 1985, Vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 137-163. For evidence on other crises, see Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Coercion: The Brink and the Balance, (Washington: Brookings, forthcoming).
47. Briefing for the President, SIOP-62, p. 5.
48. Ibid, pp. 15-17.

49. Ibid, pp. 17-18.
50. On this effort see David Alan Rosenberg, "Reality and Responsibility: Power and Process in the Making of United States Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1968", The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1, March 1986, pp. 35-52, and Henry S. Rowen, "Formulating Strategic Doctrine", in Report of Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, (Washington: USGPO, June 1975), Vol. 4, Appendix K, p. 219-234.
51. Rowen, "Formulating Strategic Doctrine", p. 230.
52. Proposed Outline for Presentation of SIOP-63 to the President, undated, and JSTPS memorandum: General Format for SIOP-63. CCS 3105 Joint Planning, 8 March 1961, (3), Secs. 4 and 2, Box 30, JCS 1961; Draft Memorandum for the President, Recommended FY 1965-FY 1969 Strategic Retaliatory Forces, December 6, 1963, p. I-3.
53. DPM-61, p. 4.
54. JSCM 467-62, 20 June 1962, Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, CCS 3105, Joint Planning, 8 March 1961, (3) Sec. 4, Box 30, JCS 1961; Presidential Appointment Book, September 14, 1962, JFKL; Interviews.

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7 September 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL TAYLOR

SUBJECT: Strategic Air Planning and Berlin

2496

1. Mr. Kaysen's memorandum to you has four major parts: a basic memorandum outlining why he believes strategic air planning needs review in conjunction with Berlin planning; an alternative to SIOP-62, an annex which spells out a possible substitute for the initial attack of SIOP-62, this variation emphasizing surprise and a well coordinated, small-scale attack against Soviet intercontinental strategic capabilities; a brief analysis of SIOP-62, outlining its target philosophy, planning factors, and limitations; and an unaddressed draft request for a planning study on an alternative to SIOP-62. Each of these parts is summarized below.

2. Basic Memorandum. SIOP-62 is built around two concepts that may not be appropriate in a Berlin crisis: (a) it is essentially a strike second plan, and (b) it calls for attacks against a single set of "optimum-mix" targets. Two sets of possible circumstances suggest the need for supplementary and alternate plans, namely, we might be lured out of position by a false alarm or strategic feint by the Soviets, and we might desire to strike first.

a. A false alarm, if it resulted in the launching and recall of the Alert Force, would degrade our capabilities significantly for about 8 hours, at least. Further, the forces held back might not be prepared to attack appropriate targets, the highest priority ones having been assigned the Alert Force, now recalled.

b. The first-strike alternative might occur from escalation of military action around Berlin, which could force US to move from the local to the general war level.

----- This does not appear an appropriate response to repulse a 3 division attack, especially since SIOP-62 will almost inevitably alert the Soviets and, in response to our attacks on Soviet cities, they will respond in kind. Rather than this "massive retaliation" plan, small US forces should be used against military targets, and the bulk of our strategic forces should be held in reserve to deter Soviets from using their surviving forces against US cities.

c. Two recommendations follow:

(1) CINCSAC should look at the false alarm problem and make any necessary changes in his plans to minimize degradation of his force under such a development.

Additional material is being released as a result of this review.

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(2) The JCS, Director STP, and CINCHAC should consider an alternative to SIOP-62 for use in context of Berlin contingency planning, with emphasis on a first strike against the Soviets' long-range striking power.

3. An Alternative to SIOP-62. Its objectives would be "to destroy the long-range nuclear offensive capabilities of the Soviet Union; to limit or avoid damage to the United States and its Allies; to limit damage to the Soviet Union compatible with the achievement of the military objective; to have capabilities in reserve available to press home the attack, if necessary; to dissuade the Soviets from using any residual forces against the US and Allied cities."

a. Reliability of present missiles is low, their accuracy uncertain, and problems of achieving simultaneity on target formidable. Therefore, ICBMs, theoretically ideal for this kind of minimum-warning attack, are ruled out at present time.

b. Bombers normally have been rejected as minimum-warning vehicles, primarily because they have operated in mass. But, if 88 BQZ's -- air bases, staging bases, and ICBM sites -- are assumed to constitute the essential targets, the destruction of which would paralyze nuclear threat to US, bomber use becomes more attractive. Further, if 26 of essential targets are staging bases that do not need to be hit in first wave, if 42 targets, close together, can be hit by 21 bombers (each bomber striking two targets within 20 minutes of one another), then to carry out this plan the US must only get 41 bombers into Soviet airspace and over their initial targets within a 15 minute period. (88 BQZ's - 26 staging bases - 21 colocated targets = 41.) Allowing a 29% attrition rate would mean that 55 aircraft, instead of 41, would have to penetrate Soviet airspace. It is further assumed that these aircraft could fan out and penetrate undetected at low altitude, bomb, and withdraw at a low altitude. In sum, success of this first strike would depend upon small numbers, dispersal, and low altitude penetration. This kind of attack, employing air burst 1 MF weapons, might result in Soviet casualties of less than 1 million and probably not much more than 500,000.

c. Two questions arise: How valid are the assumptions, and do we possess the skill and capability for such a raid. There are reasons to believe assumptions are reasonable. (These are amplified in some detail, based on statements in HIE's, with emphasis on deficiencies in Soviet low-level detection capabilities.)

d. There are risks as well as opportunities in this approach. With the initiative, the US could reduce the consequences of partial success and exercise some control over Soviet behavior. Once bombs had fallen on USSR, US non-committed forces could be alerted, civil defense measures instituted, air defenses alerted. Compared with SIOP-62, the small-scale,

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minimum-warning attack -- coupled with follow-on raids -- has distinct advantages with respect to recall, achievement of surprise, reduction in Soviet long-range capabilities before launch, and control over the number and character of initial and subsequent attacks.

e. Appendix. Damage assessment to the US from such a minimum-warning attack must deal with uncertainties, but rough calculations can be made.

(1) Damage to US will be affected by the number of Soviet long range forces surviving the initial attack; the numbers and types of targets the US attacked, and the influence of this on USSR war plans; the numbers and yields of USSR weapons per-US target, especially in urban areas; the height of burst (which determines fall-out); civil defenses available to US, and uses made of them.

(2) US can attempt to influence Soviet behavior in peace by declaring use of nuclear weapons only against military targets unless enemy initiates a counter-city campaign. This may influence Soviet retaliatory choices by offering Soviets a powerful incentive to use whatever residual forces they command in a sensible manner.

*no cities
primary*

4. An Appreciation of SIOP-62. The SIOP-62 target list is constant, with 1077 BQZ's, of which the Alert Force hits 480.

a. President Eisenhower established requirement that US forces should have the capability to achieve -----

----- To achieve specified assurance major tactics include: (1) low level attacks (65% of SIOP weapons are so scheduled); (2) high level penetrations that depend on mass; (3) principle of opening corridors through enemy air defenses. Cross-targeting (using different types of vehicles launched from different areas) is employed. Degradation factors are also calculated and allowed for. Allowing for these, the average assurance that one weapon will detonate on target is ----.

b. Flexibility of SIOP-62 only comes from ability to withhold preplanned strikes. Once the Alert Force is launched, however, selective withholding of its forces is not presently possible.

c. -----

d. SIOP-62 is a rigid, all-purpose plan, designed for execution in existing form, regardless of circumstances. Rigidity stems from:

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(1) Military belief that USSR will strike cities, or urban-military targets; hence there is no need for selective US targeting.

(2) Military belief that, regardless of circumstances, USSR will be able to launch some weapons against US. Nowhere is real consideration given to possibility of interaction between ours and their targeting philosophy.

(3) Belief that winning general war means coming out relatively better than USSR, regardless of magnitude of losses.

(4) A fear that retaliation against cities after a surprise attack may be all we can do; with US command-control knocked out, alternative plans might leave residual US forces uncertain as to what to attack; US flexibility would become known, and decrease deterrence.

e. SIOP-62 is a blunt instrument, and its tactics almost make certain fulfillment of prophecy that enemy will be able to launch some weapons.

5. Draft Request for Planning Study. Alternative plans should be developed which concentrate on military targets required to eliminate Soviet intercontinental threat, and that minimize damage to Soviet population, industry and governmental authority. Unless justified, attack should be restricted to USSR. Emphasis should be given to minimum-warning attack with minimum sized force. Evaluation of plans should include Soviet force survival, damage to USSR, warning given USSR, damage to US, damage elsewhere; and US follow-on force capabilities. A progress report is requested by 25 September.

/s/

W.Y.S.

S/B:CEBohlen

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Approved in S
10/1/61September 15, 1961
3:30 p.m.

Washington Foreign Ministers' Conference (Restricted Session)

United StatesFranceUnited KingdomThe Secretary
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. KohlerCouve de Murville
Ambassador Alphand
Mr. LucetLord Home
Sir Harold Caccia
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh

XXXXXXXXXX

GermanyMr. Von Brentano
Ambassador Greve
Dr. Carstens
(Interpreter - Mr. Kasterer)

COPIES TO: See page 10.

THE SECRETARY, after referring to the fact that the luncheon conversation at the White House had been a good start for this meeting, asked the French Foreign Minister if he could give them the French view as to negotiations and the general courses they should follow, looking down the road. He had in mind that in his conversation with Gromyko, he could say that the Soviet Union and the Western Powers were on a collision course; the Western Powers had rights and obligations and were in Berlin and intended to abide by these rights in which they were supported by NATO; if Khrushchev signed his treaty and as a result considered that these rights were cancelled, then they were indeed on a collision course. He asked Couve de Murville to please let his colleagues know what he saw for the future.

COUVE DE MURVILLE said it was a difficult enterprise to foresee the future. He said the French did not disagree with the idea of any discussions or even negotiations with the Soviets, but rather questioned the type of negotiation. It was clear that the Soviets would certainly not object to a discussion on their proposals for peace treaties and a free city for Berlin, but it was also possible that they might be prepared to consider variations of this in which Western rights were not protected. If, for example, the Soviets released their threats that there would be a basis for discussion. (In reply to the question from the Secretary, Couve de Murville outlined what he meant by threats.) The Russians say they will sign a treaty and that as a result the GDR would control access and the Western Powers then must make separate deals with the GDR or possibly the three allies collectively, but if not, there will be no access and any attempt by the Western Powers to go through would be aggression and the

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Soviet

3/9/92

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- 2 -

Soviet Union, with all its power, would support the GDR against such aggression. This was what he meant as a threat. If there was an indication that the Soviets accept our access rights, this would remove the threat. He was speaking in general terms and there were, of course, many variations on this point, but this is essentially the basis. He continued that if there were to be talks, and repeated that the French did not object to talks, then roughly speaking, the aim should be in the direction of the removal of the Soviet threat. If we are to talk business, this can only be achieved if the real issues are clearly understood by both sides. He said the French fully understand the gravity of the situation and would fight if necessary, but that one aspect was not clear, and that was whether the Soviet Union wants a war or think that it can achieve its objectives without war because the West is divided or lacking in determination. Therefore, the aim in any talks with the Soviets should be to convince them of our purpose and determination. The Soviet threats against one country after another must be clarified. He concluded by saying that these talks begun with Gromyko would be protracted as the issues were not simple. He said Gromyko would not be given requisite authority and that they would certainly go on as long as Gromyko is in New York. He concluded that the general idea was to bring the Soviets back to reality unless they want a war, and that as he had said at lunch, he felt the dangers of war lay in misunderstanding.

LORD HOME said that he agreed with the objective of bringing the Russians back to reality, and inquired if Couve de Murville would contemplate negotiations if something concerning access came out of the discussions. This, in essence, was the case for probing, but he was not sure that the Secretary would get very far with Gromyko on substance since Gromyko would have no authority. The maximum that might be expected would be an agreement on an agenda for future negotiations.

COUVE DE MURVILLE replied that the Russians were quite clearly putting their case to the world, saying that they had put forth their views and inquiring what was the position of the Western Powers. In effect, they had put their case in such a way that we could take it or leave it and, in effect, were merely asking for our acceptance. However, they say that access will be guaranteed, but generally, do we know what conditions he had in mind. It was possible that the Secretary could ascertain this from Gromyko. He thought, however, it meant the continuance of the Western right for military access but the suppression of the unlimited right we now enjoy in the air corridors in respect to German travel.

THE SECRETARY agreed that this might be the main purpose, but that he was thinking of what he could say to his colleagues after his talk with Gromyko.

COUVE

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

[COUVE DE MURVILLE said it would be difficult to foretell until the conversations had taken place.

THE SECRETARY continued that what he wanted to know was what was the object of the enterprise and specifically what his colleagues would consider a success.

[COUVE DE MURVILLE said he imagined two stages, not necessarily separated by a long term. The first stage, as he had mentioned at the luncheon, would be one of warning the Soviets. No one could tell what Gromyko's reaction would be and, therefore, it was difficult to plan the second stage. But, the second stage would deal with the question of the Soviet attempts against the rights of access in Berlin. For example, an unlikely but good solution would be to transfer to the treaty the Eols-Zorin agreement. In the second stage he felt that it would be important to find out how rigid the Soviets were on their positions.

THE SECRETARY said he had the impression that what Couve de Murville had in mind would be a successful negotiation and inquired if there was anything that would be satisfactory short of a successful solution.

[COUVE DE MURVILLE said that these talks would take a long time. The Secretary agreed and added that he felt that Khrushchev would wish to participate personally at some stage.

LORD HOME remarked that they did not have unlimited time, and pointed out that Khrushchev intended to make his treaty in December and that it would be very awkward for the Western Powers if he got to this point before there were any real negotiations.

COUVE DE MURVILLE pointed out that the Secretary's talks with Gromyko would constitute real negotiations. He felt that the Secretary would have something to tell them in a week or so regarding Gromyko's reaction and they would then see. He felt that the British idea was that East should see Gromyko and propose a conference in November. In such an event, let us say the twenty-fifth of September to November, everything would be frozen and then in November at the conference it would break down.

LORD HOME said he did not see why Couve de Murville saw a breakdown and he thought that the Secretary might go quite a way with Gromyko.

COUVE DE MURVILLE said that this could be done without fixing a conference date. He said, for example, the military build-up would be affected by the fixing of the conference, there would be general relaxation and people would feel that there was nothing to worry about.

SECRET

THE

SECRET

- 4 -

THE SECRETARY inquired how important was it for us to have the situation in Berlin maintained until the conference. He felt that this should be a pre-condition for any conference.

COUVE DE MURVILLE said that if we fixed a conference, the Soviets would become more confident and would go ahead with whatever plans they had in mind, and that after the conference had failed, the West would be confronted with the choice of capitulation or war.

LORD HOME said that he believed that whether you got the conference or not that situation might come when the treaty was signed with the GDR.

COUVE DE MURVILLE said that if he understood Lord Home correctly there would be a conference in the beginning of November but there would be no conversations with the Soviets. He personally believed in discreet talks rather than a conference.

LORD HOME inquired why there should be stagnation between now and November.

COUVE DE MURVILLE said that once they had achieved a conference, the Soviets would not be disposed to discuss any subject. He felt the subject of fixing a date for a conference should await the outcome of the Rusk-Gromyko talks. Couve de Murville and the Secretary agreed that the Soviets might discuss substance bilaterally.

THE SECRETARY said that it was obvious that they could not negotiate on Soviet terms for Germany and Berlin, but that they had in mind a wider agenda under which each side would put forth its proposals. He inquired whether, if the agenda were open to both sides, this would be acceptable to his colleagues or did they feel that they could only accept an agenda which excluded the Soviet item of a peace treaty and a free city for Berlin. In other words, was this a matter of openness of agenda for us or a rejection of the Soviet item.

LORD HOME said that in any negotiations both sides have a right to put forward their proposition, a general agenda which seemed to him to be in accord with Khrushchev's. He then read what Khrushchev had said to Nehru.

COUVE DE MURVILLE said that what was of interest to the West was the question of access; that the occupation statute was an academic question provided it had no consequences.

SECRET

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SECRET

- 5 -

THE SECRETARY said he was anxious to explore his colleagues' thinking since he was not anxious to talk to Gromyko with his flanks or rear exposed.

COUVE DE MURVILLE said the Secretary would be doing it with the general support of them all.

LORD HOPE said there was no need to name dates now, but he personally was doubtful if the talks would get that far. He felt that public opinion would sooner or later get them all around the table and the question was how long they could avoid this development.

COUVE DE MURVILLE remarked that the Busk-Gromyko talks may show there is no prospect of a conference.

THE SECRETARY inquired whether we would be better off with no conference or a conference that met and failed--that is a Foreign Ministers' conference since a summit was a different matter.

COUVE DE MURVILLE said it was too soon to speak of a conference.

LORD HOPE said that we would not be allowed not to have a conference. People who are about to be blown to atomic dust would insist upon a conference. He personally would prefer to do this on our own initiative than be forced into it. He felt that the Secretary's conversation with Gromyko would give us some idea on the subject, adding that if the conference were fixed, it would be more difficult for Khrushchev to undertake unilateral action in regard to Berlin.

THE SECRETARY remarked that it appeared to be Khrushchev's plan to concentrate on our rights rather than on the status of the GDR; since 1955 the GDR had been treated by the Soviets as a sovereign state, and that he felt that a peace treaty would not change this relationship. The chief effect of a peace treaty would be on our rights, although it might have some effect on the Oder-Neisse line. Otherwise, he did not see why Khrushchev would run all the risks merely to achieve something that he already had. He asked Mr. Kohler if there was any consensus in the Working Party as to what kind of status the GDR was expected to get. He went on to say that the Russians did not seem to be thinking in terms of full international recognition but rather in terms of de facto dealings.

MR. KOHLER said that his colleagues in the Working Group felt that the Soviet purpose was to strengthen the GDR internationally, and to afford the GDR some control over the access question, in addition to breaking the tie between the Federal Republic and Berlin. He said he was leaving aside the more general possibilities such as humiliation of the Western Powers and an impressive demonstration of Soviet power.

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SECRET

- 6 -

He said they did not know whether the Russians would insist upon the Western Powers' dealing directly with the GDR and that the military build-up might have had some effect on this point.

MR. CARSTERS said he felt that there were two points the Soviets were seeking: (1) the recognition of the GDR as an independent state; and (2) GDR authority over Berlin access; and that the second was the more important.

THE SECRETARY said it seemed to him that there would be little reason in establishing the competence of the GDR unless Khrushchev intended to accomplish something specific by utilizing this competence.

MR. VON BRENTANO said that he thought that Khrushchev's intention was the transfer of the control rights over access to the GDR. This would result in a situation where today you might have something but the day after it would be changed; that Mr. X would be permitted to go to Berlin and Mr. Y not. The same procedures would apply to types of goods. The Soviets would then deny any responsibility. He felt that this path was dangerous, if not fatal.

LORD HOME pointed out that the Soviets could virtually do that now in regard to German travel by land, although not by air.

MR. KOHLER mentioned that one thing was certain, that no West German official would be permitted to go to West Berlin if the East Germans controlled the access; that one of their main purposes was to break the ties between West Berlin and West Germany.

MR. VON BRENTANO said that the removal of the ties with the Federal Republic would be the beginning of the end for West Berlin. He said we should not try to interpret what the Russians really mean, but should read what they say. He mentioned there were people in Germany who lived by interpreting Soviet actions but what they say was very clear. They intend to sign a peace treaty with the GDR and turn over the access to GDR control. The Soviet guarantee would not be a guarantee of the status quo, but merely a guarantee of whatever agreement the GDR might make. There would be no rights left and the West would be in a very difficult position and the Soviets would be completely disengaged.

THE SECRETARY said that while we are all vitally interested in Berlin, it was of greater interest to Germany. He would, therefore, like to inquire of the German Foreign Minister what he saw in the future as to relations between the Federal Republic and East Germany, and between West Berlin and East Germany.

VON BRENTANO

SECRET

SECRET

- 7 -

VON BRENTANO said that this was not an easy question to answer, but, in general, he thought that the division of Germany would become more stable. He said up to now, while traffic had been obstructed by the Soviet Zone, it still continued, but he felt that the travel would now become much more difficult. Trade, he felt, would continue since it was in GDR interest but in September it was made very plain that the negotiators could deal only with trade and with other matters of traffic; they specifically stated they did not have any authority, especially in the financial and currency field. He felt that human contacts would decline and saw little prospect of any improvement in this respect and none whatsoever for any move towards reunification. He mentioned the example of church matters, pointing out that the new bishop of Berlin who lived in the Eastern Sector had not been permitted to come to West Berlin, nor had the Catholic bishops in Eastern Germany been permitted to attend the conference of German bishops. The successor to Dibelius had not been permitted to return to his home in the Eastern zone after a trip to West Berlin. He said the toughness of the East German attitude in regard to the churches indicated what their attitude would be on other matters.

LORD HOME said that the revised Western peace plan contained provision for "mixed commissions" and he wondered whether or not one of these commissions might not be a vehicle to make access arrangements.

MR. VON BRENTANO said that he had agreed to the proposal of mixed commissions with the exception of the third commission on human rights, which he felt was a little perverse. He had agreed to these commissions because he thought possibly the one on freedom of movement might effect some slight improvement despite their basic objection to the commissions where you would have coming into one body two incommensurable elements. He was willing, however, to try in the faint hope that this might improve communications. He felt, however, that any cooperation was impossible in political fields, no matter whether the commission met once or a thousand times. The communists' ideas in the political field were so different from their own that there was no hope.

LORD HOME said that he would agree on the political elements and human rights but felt that technical arrangements might be helpful in regard to access, particularly if these were guaranteed by the Soviets.

MR. VON BRENTANO felt that this would be a very dangerous idea since if allied rights were considered by this commission, made up as it would be of completely disparate elements, the Communists would try and refer this matter to Bulz, the East German Foreign Minister, with implications of recognition. He felt the three Western allies should not favor this course.

LORD HOME

SECRET

SECRET

- 8 -

LORD HOPE explained that he had not had allied rights in mind, but Germany.

THE SECRETARY said that he felt that at some stage Khrushchev was going to sign a peace treaty, but supposed that in the peace treaty there was a reservation along the lines of the Holz-Zoria letter. There would be no question in regard to rights themselves but it might involve some dealings with East Germans. In other words, the reservation might contain a reaffirmation of the allied rights but the exercise of the rights would be with the East Germans. He inquired what alternatives there would be to the allies in this event: to endeavor to obtain some UN responsibility; or, have the three allies deal with the East Germans; or transfer such dealings to the West Germans.

VON BRENTANO said the situation would be different if allied rights were the subject of the reservation and with the East Germans to implement. It would be necessary to negotiate with the East Germans, and he felt that the difference between rights and their implementation was razor-thin. The reservations might be in very general terms, which would have to be spelled out in negotiations with the GDR. An opinion on this would only be possible when they saw the language.

THE SECRETARY agreed and added that we should seek to have as little to do with the East Germans as possible. He said he previously, in a somewhat light vein, had referred to the fact that allied rights were in relation to Germany as a whole and that, therefore, it might be possible to have these rights worked out by Germans, if the rights themselves were not involved.

VON BRENTANO said they would be prepared to accept this fiction but pointed out by reading from the Holz-Zoria letter the fact that this had been merely done with a part of Germany, the GDR. He also mentioned that these rights were temporarily handled by the Soviets, pending a subsequent agreement.

THE SECRETARY said the Ministers may have strayed somewhat from the purpose of this meeting, which was primarily the talks with Ortwin. He wished to return to Carve de Marville's remark at the luncheon when Carve had stressed the necessity of working the Russians. He would like to inquire what his colleagues thought were the main points. For example, we had been speaking of the three vital Western interests: (1) the Western presence in Berlin, (2) the freedom and viability of West Berlin,

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- 9 -

and (3) access. He wondered whether these were sufficiently precise, since Gromyko might say that if we accepted the Soviet propositions these would be taken care of.

MR. VON BRENTANO said that there was general disagreement between what the Soviets meant and what the Western Powers meant, both on freedom and on access. The Soviets give the term "free city" one meaning, but we have a completely different idea. What we mean is the democratic order with freedom of speech, freedom of political parties, etc. The Soviets have a completely different point of view on ties with the Federal Republic. He mentioned that West Germany paid out 1.2 billion marks a year to the "lost child" of Berlin. He said of course we could say to the Soviets that if they included a definition of our requirements for freedom this might be a possibility, but he felt the incompatibility of ideas was very profound. He continued that it was awkward for a German to talk of these matters but he felt that in this small privileged gathering he could be frank. He said there were many people who said that the situation in Berlin was basically the fault of the Germans but the President had stated at the luncheon that it was not Berlin but our common policy that was at issue. If we started to liquidate the status of Berlin there would be an exodus from Berlin and that this would mean the liquidation of an advanced free world post. He recalled a 1958 conversation at NATO in which it had been said that if Berlin goes, there is no certainty what will go next, and that he felt that in that event there would be more than one Foreign Minister on the way to Moscow to negotiate the circumstances of his country's suicide.

THE SECRETARY said that Mr. Von Brentano had graphically stated the problem. He himself felt that with Gromyko the three vital interests were not enough and it might be necessary to go into further detail. He said we were all agreed on the importance of these three vital issues: our presence in Berlin, our protection of Berlin's freedom, and the right of access, over which we could not accept control or censure, but that he would feel that we should go beyond this and it might be a good idea to draw up a check list.

MR. VON BRENTANO said he was very grateful for the Secretary's words which had said what he had in mind. He felt it would be dangerous to attempt to stick to the three points since Gromyko might consider that anything not mentioned would not be considered important.

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SECRET

- 10 -

COMTE DE MURVILLE said he wished to make two points. He said that for life in Berlin it was very important to have links with the outside world, and especially with Western Germany. The Russians have raised the matter of political activity, but there were, in addition, many other kinds of ties--economic, financial, currency. He recalled that in 1959 in Geneva on the subject of political relations the Western Delegations had said that Berlin was not a part of the Federal Republic. He was sure that Gromyko would mention this point to the Secretary. He pointed out that political activities in West Berlin, in effect, were part of the question of access of West Germans to West Berlin. He felt that the main idea was, therefore, the uncontrolled nature of the air corridor for German traffic. He summarized that the two questions which he felt that Gromyko would logically raise were, (1) political activities, and (2) air access.

THE SECRETARY said the Ministers should devote a good deal of their time to the consideration of the proposals which might be made to the Russians. He felt they might think about the possibility of telling the Russians that since East Berlin has been made the capital of East Germany, that they did not have any right to go into the question of the ties between West Berlin and the Federal Republic. He said he felt that when we had first said that West Berlin was not part of the Federal Republic, we had, in effect, been reserving our position on all Berlin. He was not suggesting incorporation of West Berlin in the Federal Republic.

He mentioned that tomorrow the Ministers would also discuss the question of a naval blockade.

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REF: STRATEGY
BERLIN (FORCES)
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OUTGOING MESSAGE
(By Special Means)

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INDEX: McNAMARA'S 10 QUEST. 16 September 1961
1045 hrs

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TO: SECDEF - PERSONAL FOR SECRETARY McNAMARA FROM
GENERAL NORSTAD

INFO: CJCS - PERSONAL FOR GEN LEMNITZER FROM GEN NORSTAD

Reference: JCS 1364-61

1. I have studied your proposed answers to the ten questions which will be considered in connection with your recommendations..... Our respective reactions to the principal questions posed are conditioned by the basic views we hold, both with respect to future NATO strategy, and to the measures required to meet the current threat..... I believe that your paper reflects to a large degree my thoughts on these broader questions. It is in degree rather than in principle that our views may vary. I hope that the answers eventually submitted will contribute to a better understanding of both principle and detail. To this end, I will first outline my views on what I consider to be the basic issues, since these are largely the source of the related specific comments.

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NLE Case MR RI-254-75
By bc NLE Date 11/1/72


2. I fully appreciate and support the need to create a position from which we would be able to respond, within reasonable limits, to any form of Soviet aggression in the NATO area, forcefully, but in such a way as to minimize the risk of general war. I believe, however, that realistic planning must seek to exploit our strengths without overlooking our weaknesses; above all, it must weigh immediate needs against interests of the long-term defense posture of the West. While preparing to exploit any favorable developments, we must avoid convincing ourselves that the possible is probable. We must not confuse the wish with the fact. We should therefore consider, very carefully, our ability to enforce a gradual, controlled development of the battle, and not overestimate the extent to which we can dictate the Soviet response, particularly in a situation where it is unlikely that we would have the initiative. To assume that we could exercise independent, unilateral control over the battle would be as wrong in 1961 as it was wrong in 1953 to speak of "a time and place of our own choosing."

3. Based upon the principle that it is sound practice to be confident in execution but questioning and concerned in planning, I am disturbed with respect to:

a. The alternatives that will, in fact, become available to us by measures that essentially meet force goals previously established by NATO as the minimum required for an effective defense of Europe.


with nuclear support when necessary.

b. What more we can achieve, because of the conventional force build-up envisioned,



d. The impact of the measures which we propose to take on both the short-term and long-term efforts of our Allies.

4. Our force posture should be such as to permit us to respond to the whole range of the Soviet threat.



5.

6. While not wishing to overestimate Soviet capabilities or to underestimate our own, we must recognize that the Soviets may well start with superior forces, will almost certainly have the initiative and would enjoy superiority in conventional air operations from the outset.

7. Lastly, we must keep in mind the fact that our NATO strategy must be generally acceptable to our Allies if they are to have either the will to face up to possible military operations or the

inclination to build up their forces. Unreasonable as such an inter-

pretation would be.

8. I fully endorse the strengthening of our capabilities and our efforts to get our Allies to do likewise. I have always advocated

9. I suggest that you consider the general observations above as comments applicable to all of the questions and answers posed. In addition, there follow a few observations relating directly to specific questions.

QUESTION ONE:

10. Substitute the following for para d: Strengthen the alternatives between inaction and all-out nuclear war.

11. Add the following sentence to the paragraph beginning: "Additionally, it would guard ... " Reinforcement of NATO's non-nuclear capability would serve to broaden the choice of response, depending on the nature of the attack and the circumstances prevailing at the time.

QUESTION TWO:

12. The following comment pertains to the third paragraph of the answer that begins: "Finally the non-nuclear ... " My reply to JCS 1103 contained:

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Approved in S: 9/27/61

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: Sept. 16, 1961
10:45 a.m.
Room 1107, State Dept.

SUBJECT: Quadripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting

PARTICIPANTS:

UNITED KINGDOM

Lord Home
Ambassador Caccia
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh
Mr. Brooke

FRANCE

Couve de Murville
Ambassador Alphand
Mr. Lucet
Mr. Curien

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GERMANY

Dr. von Brentano
Ambassador Grewe
Dr. Carstens

UNITED STATES

The Secretary
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Day

OCT 2 - 1961

COPIES TO: See page 7.

(21)

October 3, 1961

Germany and Berlin

The Secretary referred to the report of the Working Group and the Ambassadorial Group regarding the problem of dealing with Soviet proposals. He noted that there was a certain seductive quality in the Soviet use of the terms "peace treaty" and "free city". It had been agreed in Paris that the West should prepare for the presentation of some proposals which would be direct, simple and easily understood both by our own and world public opinion. At the same time they would make the essential points to the Soviets. The trouble with the Western peace plan from the point of view of some of us was that it was too complicated and unappealing.

He said he would like the comments of other Ministers as to how large a gap there should be between our initial proposals and the probable outcome of negotiations. Khrushchev had committed himself strongly to signing some piece of paper which he would call a peace treaty. It would not be easy to prevent him from doing so. Should we then make proposals in such a way that his signing the treaty would be looked upon as a defeat for the West or should we try to put the treaty into the context of some sort of provisional arrangement? We did not wish to give the treaty any status. However, if we made a declaration reaffirming the right of self-determination of the German people, creating some overriding concept reducing the options of both sides to the nature of an interim arrangement, this would tend to keep the situation open. The Secretary said he had no firm ideas, but we should consider the gap between our

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our proposals and the probable outcome of a Soviet peace treaty signing. If anything done in the Soviet Zone and Berlin could be cast in the light of interim arrangements this would open up further possibilities. He mentioned as examples of the way these possibilities might be exploited, the use of the mixed committees provided for in the Working Group report, European security arrangements, etc.

[Couve said he was not sure he understood precisely what the Secretary had in mind. He felt that the Four Powers all took the position that the peace treaty was something which did not affect them. They could not prevent it and did not recognize its validity. The one thing of importance was the consequences the Soviets and the GDR could draw from the treaty regarding our rights in Berlin. The treaty itself would not change the status of the GDR or the relations between the GDR and the USSR. Our purpose must be to defend our rights and interests.

The Secretary agreed that the heart of our position was insistence upon our rights. However, if the Soviets signed a peace of paper which they termed a peace treaty and insisted that this brought about the permanent sovereignty of the GDR, the Western position over a period of time might very well be eroded. Various countries would recognize the GDR, attempt to bring it into the UN, etc. Could we not put self-determination forward as an overriding principle which would make out of the new situation simply an interim status.

[Lord Home stated that the signing of the peace treaty was certain. We should not regard it as a defeat; we should say publicly that it did not affect us although actually it would of course have effects for us. Could we not adopt something like the draft opening proposal of the Working Group and state that certain practical arrangements could be made in the interim pending a final solution? We would be preparing people for the de facto recognition of the GDR by holding out a future status as a final solution. He remarked that it was not the peace treaty which would bring about the continued split of Germany but the continued occupation of East Germany by Soviet forces.

The Secretary said that what we needed was some theory that would in a theoretical way prevent the permanent division of Germany. He mentioned the Bolz-Zorin letter as such a concept. The Germans then could continue to look forward to reunification in the future. This would make it possible to regard any other arrangement as of an interim nature. Lord Home asked if we would expect the Soviets to join us in a declaration of this sort. The Secretary replied that would perhaps not be possible. He reiterated, however, that we must expect a steady erosion of our position regarding the GDR over a period of time as a result of a peace treaty. Could we not deal with this

by preparing

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by preparing some response or some position which could be put forward prior to the signing of the treaty? Von Brentano agreed with the Secretary's assessment of the effects of a peace treaty. We could, he said, make a general statement that the peace treaty did not affect us. We could not, however, say that the treaty was a matter of indifference to us because the Soviets have clearly set forth the effects which such a treaty would have on Allied rights. We could not say that the Soviets did not wish to do what in fact they did wish to do. They did not want a provisional but a final arrangement incorporating the GDR in the Soviet Bloc. Lord Home was right, he said, concerning the presence of Soviet troops being responsible for the division of Germany. If the East Germans had the opportunity to express their views they would of course express a desire for reunification. But the Soviets wanted to prevent reunification. The only answer we could give was the submission of something along the lines of the 1959 peace treaty, perhaps connected in some way with the statement of principles which had been agreed upon in 1959. We had one convincing weapon, he continued, in discussions with the Soviets and with other countries -- self-determination. The Soviets were most afraid of that concept and found it awkward to counter it. We could not present a Soviet-GDR peace treaty as inaugurating a new phase looking toward reunification. We could only say it did not affect us or our rights, or the rights of self-determination and reunification.

The Secretary said in his opinion we could not count too heavily on the power of the concept of self-determination to win the support of the neutrals. This principle was used on an eclectic basis by the neutrals themselves. Neutrals had commented to him since Belgrade, he said, that self-determination must be viewed against the background of existing realities. He had in mind, he continued, a statement such as that Khrushchev made in a recent speech to the effect that reunification was a matter for the Germans themselves. Whether with the idea of mixed commissions or in another way we should head off the concept of the permanent division of Germany. Lord Home said this was worth pursuing, although the Soviets did not of course intend to reunite Germany. He thought there were other Khrushchev statements of this sort on reunification which we might use. Von Brentano noted that a peace treaty could have either a provisional or a definitive character. He referred to the proposal in the Working Group report for an electoral commission, and wondered if this did not point the way to an interim solution. The Soviets would regulate their relations with the GDR, Berlin would remain unchanged, and the Four Powers with the help of the mixed commissions would consider future arrangements leading eventually to elections. In practice we might take part of the Western peace plan and present it independently. He remarked he was simply thinking out loud and had not examined the question carefully, but it seemed worth considering. The Secretary referred to the point made by

the President

the President yesterday that if a de facto situation came into being after the treaty and we had no suitable answer to the question of what alternative there was, we would be in a most uncomfortable position.

Lord Home turned to the problem of Berlin itself, asking what purpose the life of the city would have now that the Iron Curtain had dropped across it. He wondered if putting the UN into West Berlin or all of Berlin would provide such a purpose. Referring to the example of the Vatican City, he wondered if we might internationalize Berlin and if that would help keep the city alive. Von Brentano remarked that his confidence in the Vatican was considerably higher than his confidence in the UN Secretary General, as a result of recent political events. He felt the idea of moving the UN to Berlin was very questionable and might seem in fact to be a desperate escape by the Western Powers. He mentioned the following objections to such a course of action:

1. The UN in West Berlin would be confronted with all the problems that the Allies now have;
2. If the idea had merit, it would have to apply to all Berlin. He questioned whether the Soviets would accept that;
3. We must be very clear about what an internationalized free city would really mean. It would in fact, bring about a three-way division of Germany. Furthermore, other experiences with free cities in the past had not been too satisfactory.

He did not, however, wish to be simply negative; we must, of course, examine all possibilities. He wanted to make clear, however, that such an arrangement, constituting a division of Germany into three parts, could not be a final settlement. It could only mean that an attempt was being made to remove for a period of time the problem inherent in the present Berlin situation. The title of the German people to all of Germany would have to be reaffirmed. Such a step would be an effort to facilitate arriving at a final solution; it could not itself be such a solution. Lord Home noted that the Vatican did not encompass all of Rome and in his view a UN area need not encompass all of Berlin or, indeed, all of West Berlin. The mere presence of the UN in West Berlin gave that city a reason for existing. Von Brentano said he feared the proposal would actually be a means of perpetuating the division of the city. He then remarked that if the various crises with which the world was faced were to be solved in this way, the UN would come to resemble the German Diet of the middle ages which moved constantly about and held its sessions in various cities of the empire.

JAN 26 50 The Secretary
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The Secretary said the U.S. had no formal position on the idea of introducing the UN into Berlin, but he felt the idea was an interesting one. He agreed it was necessary to think hard about the future role of West Berlin. He thought there could be many important roles for it to play. It could be the seat of the mixed commissions and the Four Power Commission described in the Working Group report; it could play a role in trade, etc. In addition, there could be built into Berlin some of the functions and activities Lord Home mentioned. Agencies of the UN might have their headquarters there, and the city could be a site for international meetings. He was dubious, however, about moving the UN headquarters 110 miles behind the Iron Curtain. This would unquestionably have prestige benefits for the Soviet Bloc. He noted there were pressures to move the UN from its present location. We should not let the present situation in Berlin result in getting us out of Berlin and the UN out of the U.S. He could not see how a UN guarantee of the freedom of West Berlin would be as good as that of the Three Western Powers. On the other hand, the UN might very well feel it could not have its headquarters in a city protected by the Three Powers. He was not rejecting the idea, he said, but suggesting problems together with the possibilities which lay in measures less than the movement of the entire UN headquarters to the city. It was agreed that the Ambassadorial Group should look further into the question.

The Secretary then said he wished to mention one other question which had been the subject of discussions in the public and among Government representatives, namely whether there was an occasion to place the legal aspects of the Berlin problem before the International Court of Justice. Experts on the U.S. side felt that this was not a good idea, he said, and he asked for the views of the other Ministers. Von Brentano said he agreed to the U.S. objections and hesitations. It was clear, he said, that the Berlin problem was highly political. In addition, it would be several years before the Court could be expected to make a decision, and in any case the USSR traditionally rejected international jurisdiction of this sort.

Von Brentano then turned to the question of Paragraph 16 of the original Western Peace Plan concerning a European security system. He remarked that a system of this sort would be possible only with the disappearance of tensions. European security was not an entirely military matter but was highly political, as demonstrated by the Rapacki plan. He referred also to the efforts to achieve protection against surprise attack on a worldwide basis which he said he agreed with. However, he said, it would be dangerous to deal with European security without linking it with political solutions. To do so might well bring about the destruction of NATO, for example.

The Secretary

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The Secretary said that the terms of reference of the study group on security provided for in Paragraph 8 of the Working Group paper on Substantive Political Questions were very broad. However, he was not sure that political settlements and security arrangements were mutually exclusive in point of time. We faced the same question in disarmament. The political situation must certainly be taken into account, but we should still go forward with efforts to reduce the effects of the confrontation of the great power systems without necessarily awaiting final political solutions. To this Von Brentano agreed.

Lord Home turned to Annex One of Section Four (Western Statement of Principles on a Solution). He said this seemed satisfactory to him and asked if the idea was that it should be used as material for speeches, statements, etc. The Secretary replied that that was the case. We did not intend to issue it as a formal document. He pointed out, however, that the first page was most suitable for this purpose since the second was a bit premature for use at this point. Lord Home said he accepted the paper on that basis.

The Secretary said that the Four Powers should now turn promptly to the drawing up of an agreed text for an opening proposal in negotiations which would be made public in due course. He noted that we were not far from agreement at the present time.

The Secretary then turned to the question of the German F-84 airplanes which landed in West Berlin. He noted there had been some confusion as to the manner in which the pilots should be handled. Couve said the French commandant in Berlin had been instructed to keep the planes on the ground and the pilots in the city. The Soviets had issued a statement opposing the flying out of the planes. Couve thought the best course at present was to keep quiet on the matter. Von Brentano said he had had a report that the German State Secretary in Bonn had made an apology to the Soviet Charge and that the latter seemed in general not to give great importance to the issue. Von Brentano agreed that we should keep the planes and the pilots in Berlin for the present. Couve noted that in interviewing the pilots the French had received an impression of good faith on their part. Mr. Kohler (the Secretary had left the meeting temporarily) agreed to the French suggestion.

The Secretary having returned, Von Brentano reverted to the question of a European security system. He said he wished to be sure there was no misunderstanding among us as to what he meant. Nothing should be done to weaken the West unilaterally. The inclusion of Germany in a neutral zone would be such an action. He assumed that in considering disarmament we

followed the

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followed the same general principle. The Secretary replied that it was of course true that we did not wish to strengthen the East and weaken the West but, he added, we did not have to wait until all political problems were solved before taking any steps in the security field. Von Brentano said we should avoid setting up a system that stabilized and consolidated a situation of inherent tension. Couve said he had sympathy for the German position as he understood it. He noted there was a school of thought that believed there could be reunification if Germany were neutralized, but what should be even more excluded was the perpetuation of two German states, both neutralized. The Secretary agreed with Couve, saying to Von Brentano he did not see how we could resolve these matters in terms of general principles. He simply wanted to note that we should not on principle oppose security steps until political solutions were complete.

At this point Assistant Secretary Cleveland joined the meeting and at the request of the Secretary briefed the Ministers on the Congo situation. The meeting then recessed for lunch.

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Approved in S: 9/27/61

September 17, 1961

Berlin and Germany

Lord Home, British Foreign Secretary
Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador

The Secretary

**U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary for
 Political Affairs**

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With respect to the Secretary's meeting with Gromyko on Wednesday, Lord Home said that he would, of course, later be seeing Gromyko on some bilateral matters, but he would not talk Berlin or Germany unless the Secretary felt that, following the Secretary's talk with Gromyko, the Secretary felt that he could do something useful. He therefore left it up to the Secretary to tell him what he should do.

The Secretary said that in his talk with Gromyko he planned to do three things -- first, probe to see what Gromyko envisaged negotiations would be about, that is, would the Soviets be willing to talk not only about their peace treaty with the GDR and position on Berlin, but would they also be willing to talk about what we wanted to talk about; secondly, he intended strongly to make the point that negotiations must not be upset by unilateral attacks against the status quo; thirdly, he intended to probe Gromyko's thinking with regard to the timing and methods of negotiations. With respect to the second point, Lord Home expressed some concern that the Soviets might interpret this as also applying to re-enforcement of our garrisons in Europe. Elaborating on the third point, the Secretary thought that negotiations might eventually culminate in a summit meeting but he did not plan to talk with Gromyko about this now. Lord Home agreed. However, there was agreement that

there

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[there might well have to be a Foreign Ministers Meeting with the Soviets to prepare for a Summit. Lord Home said that he hoped the Secretary would "go as far as you like and can" in his talks with Gromyko, and expressed the view that we could not permit ourselves to be held up by the French in such negotiations. He characterized de Gaulle's position as saying to the Soviets go ahead and make a treaty if they wanted to with the GDR, but if you or the GDR "bother us we are going to shoot." Lord Home also indicated that he did not now favor a Western Summit Conference, as de Gaulle was likely to prove completely intransigent, and much more inflexible than Couve, who while acting under rigid instructions, still acquiesced to a certain extent. In general, Lord Home took a position favoring US-Soviet bilateral negotiations being carried as far as possible with a subsequent Foreign Ministers Meeting with the Soviets, and then a Summit Meeting with the Soviets, largely having for their purpose the ratification of the substance agreed upon between the US and the Soviets.

The Secretary said that he had interpreted von Brentano's statements at yesterday's meeting in the sense that the German Government would not agree to any general security arrangement in Central Europe unless and until Germany was unified; that Germany must not be in any position that appears to be inferior to that of any other ally; and specifically, that any NATO - Warsaw Pact arrangements would not be acceptable as long as Germany is divided. The Secretary said he thought it important that the Germans realize that it was not a question of discrimination against Germany because of their nationality, but rather a factual situation arising from their geographical position. The Secretary also expressed concern that Adenauer and de Gaulle would seek to throw on the US responsibility for any concessions which the Germans might find distasteful. He pointed out that if negotiations are going to be successful, the Germans will have to help. However, in view of the possibility of considerable reorganization of the German Government, following today's elections, the Secretary had not attempted to come to grips with von Brentano at this time.

[Lord Home expressed concern over the question of long-term morale of Berlin and thought that "international activity" should be built up there. The Secretary said that Hammarskjold was willing almost immediately to move the ECE there and that we were looking into other possibilities.

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3 3 Series C.

September 17, 1961

S/S

MEMORANDUM FOR: EUR - Mr. Kohler

Dear Foy:

Attached is a draft of conversations between the Secretary and Lord Home on Berlin. The substance of this was scattered through many other subjects which I have dealt with in separate memoranda. I would appreciate your looking it over carefully for any "bloopers" and then I think it probably should be approved by the Secretary before being distributed. I will leave to you what distribution you think it should have.

U. Alexis Johnson

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FPC/CDR

Date: 9/19/61

Attachment:

Draft MemCon.

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DRAFT - September 17, 1961

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Berlin and Germany

PARTICIPANTS: Lord Home, British Foreign Secretary
Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador

The Secretary
U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

With respect to the Secretary's meeting with Gromyko on Wednesday, Lord Home said that he would, of course, later be seeing Gromyko on some bilateral matters but he would not talk Berlin or Germany unless the Secretary felt that following the Secretary's talk with Gromyko the Secretary felt that he could do something useful. He therefore left it up to the Secretary to tell him what he should do.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

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REPLY TO
ATTN OF: AFCCS

SUBJECT: (C) Recommended Long Range Nuclear Delivery Forces
1963-1967

18 SEP 1961

TO: SAFS

1. (SECRET) I have reviewed the proposed memorandum to the President on "Long Range Nuclear Delivery Forces 1963-1967" which was forwarded to you on 29 August 1961, by the Secretary of Defense for comment. In my view, the reductions in certain strategic offensive systems substantially below Service recommended levels for Fiscal Year 1963 procurement are not justified.

2. (TOP SECRET) The general war deterrent strategy set forth as a basis for force level determinations is not clearly delineated. While rejecting the dangers of "minimum deterrence", the posture counseled largely contradicts that intent.

a. For example, the requirement is recognized for the capability to respond with nuclear attack against the Soviets in case of major assault upon our Allies. It is implied, however, that we should not attempt to develop the capability to pre-empt in the case of unequivocal strategic warning of impending attack upon the United States itself.

b. This embodies the suggestion that we would be in a less favorable position if we responded to a threat of attack only against the U.S., than if we retaliated to assault upon one or more of our Allies. We would, in fact, be in a far better position in the former case, and could expect Allied contribution to our response.

c. In my judgment, both capabilities are vitally necessary to a viable deterrent strategy and to our collective security commitments; a force capable of either will be capable of both; and such a force is infeasible only if we choose to regard it as such.

d. I am particularly concerned over the implication that we cannot provide required strategic forces except at the cost of resources needed to increase the conventional capability of our theater forces. I have supported conventional improvements with the clear understanding that the strategic posture would not be permitted to weaken, since a strong nuclear deterrent posture is the essential element of military strength which makes a conventional option feasible. This is a fundamental tenet of the new U.S. policy toward NATO which is predicated upon the assumption that in preparing to meet non-nuclear attack in NATO we would not divert resources from programs to assure an ample and protected U.S. strategic power.

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3. (TOP SECRET) In addition, the calculations which underlie the judgment reached on forces give rise to questions on points such as the following:

- a. While a range of assumptions are employed, only one basic case is assessed, and that includes a threat of unrealistic dimensions.
- b. The enemy attack against the proposed U.S. force appears to have been developed without full regard for optimum programming against all elements of the U.S. and Allied nuclear threat to the enemy.
- c. The estimates of the median numbers of enemy missiles appear to comprise an unweighted average between two extreme views in published estimates now in process of significant revision, rather than a median.
- d. The assumptions regarding the deployment, hardening, yield and accuracy of enemy ICBMs are not consonant with current estimates, and seriously exaggerate the kill potential of the Soviet hardened follow-on ICBM.
- e. The target system postulated omits important elements of enemy capability, obscures the distinction between targets and aiming points, contemplates indiscriminate attack upon enemy population and urban floorspace, and invites unacceptable risk by excluding Communist China and the satellites except for possible defense suppression objectives.
- f. The weapon loading of bomber alert forces is significantly overstated.
- g. It is stated that the Soviet ICBM/MIRV threat can be most economically attacked intercontinentally. In the face of rapid growth of this threat, NATO will not long exist without suitable countering weapons of its own. A NATO MIRV capability would be both cheaper and more effective.

4. (SECRET) A number of the judgments made on the ability to delay or modify current procurement decisions without impact upon future options are also questioned. The decision on increased MINUTEMAN force levels cannot be delayed beyond the Fiscal Year 1963 Budget cycle without the risk of serious penalties to an orderly, economical and operationally feasible program leading to timely final system installation and check out. Similarly, while there is apparent agreement on Fiscal Year 1963 procurement of additional KC-135 jet tankers, the proposed reductions in future force goals have immediate implications. Future KC-135 levels bear upon production rate, and support for an increase from 9 to 14 per month is required in the Fiscal Year 1963 Budget actions.

5. (CONFIDENTIAL) I am particularly concerned as to the security of sensitive war planning information contained in Sections II and III and the Appendices of the proposed memorandum to the President. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are in agreement that these sections should be removed, retained under close control in the Department of Defense, and not be forwarded to the President.

6. (SECRET) My views as to the levels of strategic offensive forces required are expressed in the Departmental Submission for the FY 1963 Budget. I have discussed the strategic concepts underlying the development of these force levels with the Secretary of Defense on at least two recent occasions. Additionally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reached full agreement as to the numbers of strategic weapons which should be specifically procured in the FY 1963 Budget. This agreement should be supplemented by funding of necessary long lead-time items to protect the option to attain the force goals reflected in Departmental submissions, for MINUTEMAN and POLARIS for example, upon possible later determination that such higher levels are required.

7. (CONFIDENTIAL) It is my strong conviction that our requirements for added military strengths in long-range nuclear delivery forces are a matter of the highest priority to the future security of the United States. If this dictates an expanded budget, then I am convinced that it can be expanded with public understanding and Congressional support.

8. (UNCLASSIFIED) This letter is classified TOP SECRET to safeguard details of planning for future force levels of strategic offensive weapon systems.

Curtis E. LeMay

CURTIS E. LEMAY
General, U.S. Air Force
Chief of Staff

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

9/18/61

9/18/61

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Military Build-up and Possible Action in Europe

This memorandum is in response to your memorandum dated 8 September 1961 in which you ask ten questions on the build-up and deployment of non-nuclear forces.

We believe that further mobilization and deployment actions should be taken at this time in order to convey to the USSR and to our Allies a firm determination and resolve to defend our interests in Berlin and to remedy the unfavorable balance of ground forces in and readily deployable to Central Europe. We propose the early deployment of at least one additional U. S. division to Europe; others may be sent later. In order that we can be assured of having an adequate strategic reserve in the coming months, we recommend that 4 National Guard Divisions be called to active duty at this time.

Taken in conjunction with other measures now underway, these additional actions should reduce the likelihood that our position in Berlin will be challenged; our negotiating position would be strengthened; and, if open conflict nonetheless occurs, our capability for waging it without resort to nuclear warfare would be substantially increased.

QUESTION 1:

What will the presence in Europe of 6 additional U. S. divisions accomplish

- a. In meeting the Berlin situation?
- b. In vitalizing NATO and strengthening the long-term defense of Western Europe?

ANSWER:

Six additional U. S. divisions, temporarily deployed in Europe, would achieve important political and military objectives. Specifically, the presence in Europe of 6 additional U. S. divisions would:

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
a. Clearly show that the U. S. regards its Berlin interests most seriously and is taking the lead in responding to the Soviet challenge.



c. Add substantially (about 35% in effective fighting strength), to NATO's ground strength in the Central Region. (See Question 3.)


d. Strengthen the alternatives between inaction and nuclear war.

e. Put us in a stronger position to engage in negotiations.



Additionally, it would guard against a possible Soviet seizure of some territory in the west, e.g., Hamburg, possibly in response to an Allied naval blockade, limited air attack, or ground probe.

Reinforcement of NATO's non-nuclear capability would serve to broaden the choice of response, depending on the nature of the attack and the circumstances prevailing at the time.



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The Allied response to our build-up and exhortations that they do likewise has been fair. Substantial progress is being made toward the goals we set forth in our August 8 proposal. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] More vigorous actions can be taken, especially by the Germans after September 17. Further build-up by the U. S. will make it less difficult for the Germans to call on their people for a greater effort.

The need for a long term build-up of the non-nuclear defense of Europe has been clearly recognized by the U. S. Government. It is not clear, however, at this time what the scale and composition of the U. S. contribution to the direct defense of Europe should be over the long term.

QUESTION 2:


Will an increase in our conventional forces in Europe convince Khrushchev of our readiness to fight to a finish for West Berlin, or will it have the opposite effect? What other steps of all kinds may help to carry conviction on this point?

ANSWER:

Inevitably it must be quite uncertain what would convince Khrushchev of our willingness to fight to a finish over Berlin. While a conventional build-up alone would be unlikely to convince him, the absence of a build-up would probably increase his doubt of our determination. To continue efforts focused mostly on nuclear forces and nuclear threats would carry less conviction than building up both non-nuclear and nuclear forces.


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Finally, the non-nuclear program proposed to NATO by the U. S. provides for a greatly strengthened defense of Western Europe.

It puts us in a much better position to engage in limited ground, air, and naval action over Berlin with attendant dangers of the escalation which Khrushchev almost certainly wants to avoid. It makes it apparent that the U. S. is in Europe to stay regardless of the scale or intensity of any Soviet pressure or action. In this regard, deployment of forces toward the north of Germany increases our capabilities in an area where NATO is extremely weak and where the main effort of any initial USSR ground offensive would likely occur. In our judgment, Khrushchev will assess this build-up policy as significantly strengthening his opposition over Berlin.



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nuclear operations, potentially hostile populations, vulnerability of the LOCs (particularly the rail net) to sabotage and air interdiction, and the restrictive geography of the European peninsula.

Consequently the ratio of superiority of (a) Soviet deployed divisions plus those readily deployable, over (b) NATO divisions on the line plus those which could be gotten on the line in time to be effective, would be substantially reduced by the contemplated NATO build-up. Any Soviet offensive action would thereby become proportionately more hazardous from the Soviet standpoint, (see Question 3) and NATO capabilities for any initiative would be increased.

QUESTION 10:

What is the estimated net gold cost per year of the movement of six divisions to Europe and what can be done to reduce it?

ANSWER:


The movement to Europe of six divisions (220,000 men) and the related readiness measures including the deployment to Europe of 28 tactical squadrons (26,000 men), if the movement took place between January 1 and March 1, 1962, would increase U. S. Defense expenditures overseas by \$350 million in FY'62 and \$760 million in FY'63. Of these sums \$250 and \$545 million respectively would be spent in Germany.

[REDACTED]

The suspension of movement of dependents to the European area, which will take effect in October 1961, will benefit the U. S. balance of payments by \$10 million in FY'62 and \$100 million in FY'63. If all dependents now in Europe were returned to the U. S. before March 31, 1962, U. S. overseas expenditures would be reduced by approximately \$90 million in FY'62 and about \$300 million annually thereafter.

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With reference to the total U. S. program, General Lemnitzer offered these general observations:

"Although there are deficiencies in the logistical field, we can, in my opinion, undertake effective military action. The magnitude of these logistic shortages is not sufficient to be considered a bar to taking the action required to meet the threat.

"An additional point which I wish to emphasize is that if NATO deploys 30 effective divisions on the central front and accelerates production of critical items and conventional ammunition, and if we also expand our organic depot repair and supply support activities as soon as possible, our resultant capabilities can far exceed that provided solely by the 30 divisions. Short of the Soviets initiating nuclear war, these forces would give us the capability to defend by sustained conventional operations for a sufficient period to allow for the build-up of the second echelon forces in Europe. This factor, taken in conjunction with the fact that there is a finite upper limit to the number of forces the USSR can effectively employ on the peninsula of Western Europe, convinces me that the West, with 30 divisions deployed in Central Europe, would be in a much better position to wage either nuclear or non-nuclear war than we are now. As a minimum, considerable additional time would be provided the President before he had to make the decision to initiate tactical nuclear war or general nuclear war.

"As an over-all observation, I believe that we must convey to our allies and the USSR an increased sense of urgency on our part. Substantive build-up and deployments along the lines outlined in the answers to the President's questions, if taken now or in the near future, should generate a commensurate build-up on the part of our Allies and should serve as a deterrent to the USSR making a grab in Berlin. This build-up would further our purposes both in Europe and world-wide. Taken in conjunction with other measures, the credibility of our over-all posture would be greatly enhanced, thereby lessening the chance that we

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would have to use these forces in combat. Moreover, if the deterrent fails, our capability for successfully conducting combat operations, conventional or nuclear, would be substantially increased."

* * * * *

General Norstad's general comments on my answers to the questions are stated in Appendix A.

Robert S. McVernon

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

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7/18/61

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Military Build-up and Possible Action in Europe

This memorandum is in response to your memorandum dated 8 September 1961 in which you ask ten questions on the build-up and deployment of non-nuclear forces.

We believe that further mobilization and deployment actions should be taken at this time in order to convey to the USSR and to our Allies a firm determination and resolve to defend our interests in Berlin and to remedy the unfavorable balance of ground forces in and readily deployable to Central Europe. We propose the early deployment of at least one additional U. S. division to Europe; others may be sent later. In order that we can be assured of having an adequate strategic reserve in the coming months, we recommend that 4 National Guard Divisions be called to active duty at this time.

Taken in conjunction with other measures now underway, these additional actions should reduce the likelihood that our position in Berlin will be challenged; our negotiating position would be strengthened; and, if open conflict nonetheless occurs, our capability for waging it without resort to nuclear warfare would be substantially increased.

QUESTION 1:

What will the presence in Europe of 6 additional U. S. divisions accomplish

- a. In meeting the Berlin situation?
- b. In vitalizing NATO and strengthening the long-term defense of Western Europe?

ANSWER:

Six additional U. S. divisions, temporarily deployed in Europe, would achieve important political and military objectives. Specifically, the presence in Europe of 6 additional U. S. divisions would:

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a. Clearly show that the U. S. regards its Berlin interests most seriously and is taking the lead in responding to the Soviet challenge.

2 1960 [By example and leadership, strengthen Allied will to face up to possible military operations growing out of the Berlin crisis and spur the Allies to build up their forces. If our Allies fail to support the U. S. by their own build-up, the onus of failure to take positive measures to strengthen NATO will not be placed on the U. S.]

c. Add substantially (about 35% in effective fighting strength), to NATO's ground strength in the Central Region. (See Question 3.)

d. Strengthen the alternatives between inaction and nuclear war.

e. Put us in a stronger position to engage in negotiations.

2 [The presence in Europe of 6 more divisions would not give us the capability to overcome all determined Soviet opposition on the way to Berlin, nor the capability to launch offensive operations on a broad front. But the six divisions, if accompanied by a commensurate build-up by our Allies, would give us the capability for conducting limited operations in East Germany toward Berlin, should it be decided to try to reopen ground access in reaction to a Soviet political decision to block access.]

2 [Additionally, it would guard against a possible Soviet seizure of some territory in the west, e.g., Hamburg, possibly in response to an Allied naval blockade, limited air attack, or ground probe. (At the present time, the Allies would have to resort to the use of nuclear weapons to stop such an attack.) Reinforcement of NATO's non-nuclear capability would serve to broaden the choice of response, depending on the nature of the attack and the circumstances prevailing at the time.]

[It is the stated view of many of our allies that nuclear weapons must be used at the outset of a conflict in Europe. This view in part reflects the belief that nuclear threats will deter the Soviets from serious action. It also reflects the real non-nuclear weakness of NATO on the continent. If the U. S. build-up in Europe is to have the desired vitalizing effect, it is important that we communicate to our Allies our belief that this move substantially increases the non-nuclear capabilities of NATO; that it is much to be preferred to the alternative of being in a weak non-nuclear position and thus depending crucially on the efficacy of the threat of immediate nuclear attack against the Soviet Union in response to Berlin or other provocations.]

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The Allied response to our build-up and exhortations that they do likewise has been fair. Substantial progress is being made toward the goals we set forth in our August 8 proposal, which calls for 32 active, fully manned, combat ready divisions backed up by 8 combat ready divisions in reserve. More vigorous actions can be taken, especially by the Germans after September 17. Further build-up by the U. S. will make it less difficult for the Germans to call on their people for a greater effort.

The need for a long term build-up of the non-nuclear defense of Europe has been clearly recognized by the U. S. Government. It is not clear, however, at this time what the scale and composition of the U. S. contribution to the direct defense of Europe should be over the long term. If the U. S. sends 6 divisions to Europe, it should not plan on keeping them there indefinitely. The European members of NATO have the resources to do more for their defense; it is essential that they do so. If a total of 11 U. S. divisions are placed in Europe, the U. S. should press for the replacement of at least the 6 additional, and possibly some of the 5 already there, by newly formed European units. How this shift from U. S. to European ground forces should be managed is uncertain; this issue should certainly not be raised with our Allies now.

QUESTION 2:

Will an increase in our conventional forces in Europe convince Khrushchev of our readiness to fight to a finish for West Berlin, or will it have the opposite effect? What other steps of all kinds may help to carry conviction on this point?

ANSWER:

Inevitably it must be quite uncertain what would convince Khrushchev of our willingness to fight to a finish over Berlin. While a conventional build-up alone would be unlikely to convince him, the absence of a build-up would probably increase his doubt of our determination. To continue efforts focused mostly on nuclear forces and nuclear threats would carry less conviction than building up both non-nuclear and nuclear forces.

Khrushchev's knowledge of the Soviets' own nuclear strength and of Allied apprehension has apparently made him confident that our nuclear threats would not in fact be carried out and that the Alliance would be split over the issue of using nuclear force. To the extent that a conventional build-up stiffens Allied determination, it should

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therefore make Khrushchev less certain of his estimate of eventual Allied disunity. At present, however, Khrushchev probably has no good reason to question his low estimate of Allied resolution, and perhaps only an explicit indication that the U. S. is prepared to act alone and leave the Allies no alternative but to follow, could effectively influence him. Moreover, the non-nuclear responses to Soviet political aggression, implied by the build-up, carry with them major risks of nuclear war evolving from a non-nuclear conflict. For this reason, this course should prove persuasive to Khrushchev. It is probably a more convincing course for the Allies actively to prepare to engage in substantial non-nuclear conflict in Central Europe -- a conflict which inevitably would carry a substantial risk of nuclear war -- than to threaten, unconvincingly, the certainty of a nuclear response to a political aggression.

Finally, the non-nuclear program proposed to NATO by the U. S. provides for a greatly strengthened defense of Western Europe. While it does not put the Allies in the position of being able to liberate Berlin, it puts us in a much better position to engage in limited ground, air, and naval action over Berlin with attendant dangers of the escalation which Khrushchev almost certainly wants to avoid. It makes it apparent that the U. S. is in Europe to stay regardless of the scale or intensity of any Soviet pressure or action. In this regard, deployment of forces toward the north of Germany increases our capabilities in an area where NATO is extremely weak and where the main effort of any initial USSR ground offensive would likely occur. In our judgment, Khrushchev will assess this build-up policy as significantly strengthening his opposition over Berlin.

Some other steps that might be taken in addition to a non-nuclear build-up in Europe that may help to carry conviction include:

- a. Holding maneuvers and exercises appropriate to a higher alert posture.
- b. Stepping up of strategic force operations (e.g., expanding the airborne alert).
- c. Covertly preparing for a possible East Germany and Eastern European uprising in the event of an East-West conflict.
- d. Long term increases in our defense establishment.
- e. Increased reconnaissance activities.

- 4 -

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- f. Giving authority to commanders to respond quickly to certain Soviet or GDR provocations.
- g. Demonstrations of Allied unity on the importance of defending Berlin rights and on the appropriate actions for doing so.
- h. Positioning units in Europe so that it is clear that they are in a good position for initiating actions.
- i. The call up of additional reserve units.
- j. Implementing SEATO Plan 5, or a suitable variation thereof, if the Communists resume offensive operations in Laos.

QUESTION 3:

Supposing that we and our Allies raise the (Central Front) ground strength of NATO to 30 effective divisions, what have we accomplished? Specifically:

- a. Can NATO then defend Western Europe against a massive conventional attack by the Soviet Bloc?
- b. Can we safely mount a corps-size probe to reopen access to Berlin and at the same time present an adequate ground shield?
- c. How long can 30 divisions be supported logistically in combat?

ANSWER:

If the 32 division Central Front build-up, contemplated in our plan, is accomplished, Western Europe can be defended against a massive conventional attack by the Soviet Bloc for a significant period of time without having to use nuclear weapons. Although the exact time cannot be determined with any precision because of the imponderables of combat action, it will be sufficient to demonstrate the resoluteness of NATO and to permit national-level decisions as to future courses of action in event the USSR persists in aggression. A recently completed study of the defense of Europe concludes that a forward line could be held for at least a month ^{a/} and possibly longer with a force of this order of magnitude.

Briefly, a NATO force in Central Europe of 32 fully effective divisions can accomplish this mission because:

- a/ General Norstad considers this unduly optimistic.

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a. There is a limit to the size of force that the Soviet Bloc can effectively deploy in an attack against Central Europe. This force is of the order of 55 divisions.^{a/}

b. The lines of communication supporting the Soviet forces have vulnerabilities that can be exploited by NATO forces. Soviet forces will be operating at a considerable distance from the USSR homeland and the lines of communication run through areas occupied by potentially hostile peoples. Special Forces activities and air interdiction could further reduce Soviet support capabilities.

c. The capability to defend by sustained conventional operations for a substantial period will allow for the build-up of the second echelon forces in Europe. NATO combat capabilities would therefore increase with the passage of time if the line could be held during the initial weeks.^{b/}

An 11 division U. S. force within a total NATO Central Front force of 32 effective divisions would permit the mounting of a corps-size probe to reopen access to Berlin without degrading the ground Shield. In fact, any additional forces assigned, for example, to the vicinity of Helmstedt for a probe would increase the defensive capabilities of the Shield forces. Forces deployed in the probe and in support of such an action will be positioned to cover the Eisenach-Erfurt gap and the North German plain, the two most likely avenues of Soviet attack. The over-all combat posture of NATO will thus be strengthened. Although a corps-size probe could not open access to Berlin against full Soviet resistance, it has a number of advantages. It could provide a tangible test of Soviet intentions by its capability to defeat GDR forces and, if resisted by Soviet forces, to hold a salient in East Germany for a period adequate to permit necessary political decisions.

Assuming a D-Day of 1 January 1962, stocks can be available in Europe for the support of 11 U. S. and 9 FRG divisions for between 30 and 60 days of intensive combat. Non-compatibility of equipment limits the U. S. support of the other 12 divisions in varying degrees but it is estimated that they can be sustained in combat operations for 30 to 40 days.

a/ General Norstad states: "Our intelligence credits the Soviets with a capability of committing, employing, and supporting upwards to 100 divisions in Central Europe."

b/ General Norstad states: "The second echelon, non-U.S. forces of Central European nations would, even on an optimistic basis, not exceed ten division equivalents on limited capability. There is little or no air force replacement or build-up capability beyond the M-Day forces."

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The ability to support the 32 divisions cannot be separated from the logistic and combat capabilities of the NATO air forces which would be required to support the ground action.

With regard to non-U. S. NATO air forces in Central Europe, it appears that supplies of most categories of conventional armaments would be adequate -- depending on the success of operations to defend ground areas both from air and ground attack. Critical shortages would be in certain specialized ordnance. However, with expected attrition, use of cannibalizing measures, and substitute armament loads, it appears the approximately 100 squadrons of non U. S., conventionally armed, NATO air forces (including 27 squadrons in Central Europe) could be logistically supported for at least 30 to 60 days.

The 31 U. S. fighter bomber squadrons that would be available to USAFE for use in non-nuclear operations in Europe could be supported for a period of at least 30 to 60 days at U. S. sortie rates. If initial operations were protracted, the period of available logistic support would be extended appreciably.

These estimates take account of recent decisions to expand ammunition production. A further major expansion could not materially improve this situation until approximately six months after the decision is made.

QUESTION 4:

It has been my understanding that we would need to call additional divisions only as we actually decided to send existing divisions to Europe. Since our current plan is to send only one such division, why is it necessary now to call 4 divisions from the Reserve?

ANSWER:

Developments over Berlin and elsewhere in the world make it prudent for us to seriously consider sending 6 divisions to Europe. We propose that one division be sent within the next 6 weeks. In the event the six are sent, we would be left with inadequate reserves in the U. S. In addition, a further deterioration of the Berlin situation would have world-wide implications, for example in Iran, for U. S. force requirements. It would be improvident of us to contemplate denuding the U. S. of combat ready forces especially in view of the fact that, at present, it takes about four months to get reserve divisions in good shape for combat. Consequently, in our judgment the 4 National Guard divisions should be called up at this time, rather than after the deployment of available units.

- 7 -
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QUESTION 5:

If we call up four additional National Guard divisions now and do not send them to Europe, how can they be usefully employed? How long would it take to convert them to Army of the U. S. divisions? How long would it take to create effective A.U.S. divisions by other means?

ANSWER:

If from 4 to 6 Army divisions are sent to Europe, the 4 additional National Guard divisions will constitute the bulk of our strategic reserve available for further reinforcing Europe or for other contingencies throughout the world.

If it is not deemed necessary to send extra divisions to Europe, these divisions would be occupied in a training program. After about 4 months we would then have 10 Army and 2 Marine Corps combat ready divisions in the U. S. available for deployment. This 12 division force would not only increase the level of our non-nuclear capability, it would enable us to move forces to, or near, potential trouble spots at an early stage with less danger of having our forces maldeployed.

After demobilization, the 4 Guard divisions and their supporting units, a total of approximately 150,000 men, would be maintained in reserve status at full strength and a high level of training, thereby increasing our combat readiness above present levels.

It would take from 6 to 12 months to convert these divisions to Army of the U. S. status. The exact time would depend on the availability of trained replacements and the degree of combat readiness maintained during conversion.

Formation of new combat ready divisions by using a partially regular and partially reserve cadre and untrained fillers would take about 9 months.

QUESTION 6:

How much of the 4 division build-up would be justified in view of the over-all world situation if Berlin were not an immediate issue?

ANSWER:

If Berlin were not an immediate issue there would be substantially less justification for calling up the 4 National Guard divisions. There would remain, nevertheless, a good

- 8 -

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case for strengthening the combat readiness of our ground forces. This conclusion is based on the view that;

a. The strength of our ability to deter Communist encroachment on areas contiguous to the Sino-Soviet BMDs through the threat of nuclear war has unmistakably weakened;

b. The Communist Bloc is challenging us world-wide -- most directly, apart from Europe, in Southeast Asia;

c. It is both important and feasible for the U. S. and its Allies to defend the majority of the threatened areas; the ability to do so will probably help to deter overt aggression against them.

The conversion of the 3 STRAP divisions to STRAC status gives us 8 combat ready divisions in the U. S. readily available for deployment. This is a sizeable force. However, we would still be short of being able adequately to meet two limited war situations at the same time (for example, 9 divisions were involved in the Korean War) unless fully manned, well trained reserve divisions were available for call.

QUESTION 7:

What tactical air support is needed for the planned forces in Europe and what is the plan for providing such support?

ANSWER:

On 1 September there were about 500 U. S. and 2000 non-U. S. fighter aircraft (excluding air defense fighters) committed to NATO. With planned reinforcements from the U. S. of 24 tactical squadrons, the Allied total could be increased to about 2900 aircraft. The majority of the U. S. aircraft previously assigned to NATO (approximately 425 out of 500) were reserved for nuclear strike missions. However, current plans provide for approximately 31 USAF tactical fighter squadrons, about 525 aircraft, to be assigned to non-nuclear support.

The majority of non-U. S. NATO committed fighter aircraft (approximately 1900 out of 2000) are configured primarily for the delivery of non-nuclear weapons.

The amount of tactical air support needed for the planned NATO forces is difficult to determine. However, it is believed that the approximately 2425 conventionally armed

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fighter aircraft that present plans would make available to NATO could provide non-nuclear air support for a significant period. It is estimated that the total fighter and tactical bomber force of the Soviet Union and its satellites (excluding air defense fighters and aircraft based in Asia) approximates 3250 aircraft.

In the event of either extended ground action or extended air action, it may be necessary to divert nuclear armed NATO fighters to non-nuclear missions (replacing their nuclear capabilities with B-47's) and to expand the total NATO fighter force by the addition of squadrons from the uncommitted reserves of both the U. S. and its Allies. a/

QUESTION 8:

The reduction in terms of days of combat of the supply backup of U. S. forces in Europe which will result from increasing our forces and from supplying the West Germans has been noted. Would this result in putting U. S. troops in a possible combat situation without adequate supplies?

ANSWER:

As indicated in the answer to Question 3, both FRG and U. S. forces can be adequately supplied for approximately 30 to 60 days of intensive combat.

QUESTION 9:

If we add six divisions to NATO, may not Khrushchev add six or more divisions to the conventional forces facing NATO? Or will logistical problems, fear of attack by atomic weapons and preoccupations in the Satellites set a limit on the Soviet conventional forces available for immediate use against NATO?

ANSWER:

Yes. He may add divisions at any time. He could increase his strength in Eastern Europe, within several weeks, from 26 divisions to a total of 61 divisions, of which the six presently in Poland and Hungary would probably remain in place.

This resultant net total of 55 Soviet divisions, however, probably could not be increased materially because of logistical problems, dispersal required by the threat of

a/ General Norstad states: "With marginal ground force resources, air assistance, effective and continuing, is absolutely essential. ACE air capabilities are limited and vulnerable, particularly when required to conduct sustained conventional operations."

- 10 -
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nuclear operations, potentially hostile populations, vulnerability of the LOCs (particularly the rail net) to sabotage and air interdiction, and the restrictive geography of the European peninsula.

Consequently the ratio of superiority of (a) Soviet deployed divisions plus those readily deployable, over (b) NATO divisions on the line plus those which could be gotten on the line in time to be effective, would be substantially reduced by the contemplated NATO build-up. Any Soviet offensive action would thereby become proportionately more hazardous from the Soviet standpoint, (see Question 3) and NATO capabilities for any initiative would be increased.

QUESTION 10:

What is the estimated net gold cost per year of the movement of six divisions to Europe and what can be done to reduce it?

ANSWER:

The movement to Europe of six divisions (220,000 men) and the related readiness measures including the deployment to Europe of 28 tactical squadrons (26,000 men), if the movement took place between January 1 and March 1, 1962, would increase U. S. Defense expenditures overseas by \$350 million in FY'62 and \$760 million in FY'63. Of these sums \$250 and \$545 million respectively would be spent in Germany. To help offset this increase in the present U. S. balance of payments deficit, Germany could be expected to make dollar payments to the U. S. for

- a. Increased military procurement in the U. S.
- b. Joint use of some U. S. facilities in Germany, and
- c. Purchases of U. S. reserve stocks in Germany.

The extent to which such German payments would diminish the balance of payments impact of increased U. S. overseas deployment will depend on the outcome of negotiations which are now in progress between U. S. and Germany and which will be stepped up after the German national elections.

The suspension of movement of dependents to the European area, which will take effect in October 1961, will benefit the U. S. balance of payments by \$10 million in FY'62 and \$100 million in FY'63. If all dependents now in Europe were returned to the U. S. before March 31, 1962, U. S. overseas expenditures would be reduced by approximately \$90 million in FY'62 and about \$300 million annually thereafter.

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It will be the U. S. objective in the forthcoming negotiations with the Germans to agree upon arrangements which would essentially eliminate the entire foreign exchange costs of U. S. troops in Germany. A Treasury-Defense paper spelling out in more detail the problems and possibilities of such negotiations is being submitted separately.

With reference to the total U. S. program, General Lemnitzer offered these general observations:

"Although there are deficiencies in the logistical field, we can, in my opinion, undertake effective military action. The magnitude of these logistic shortages is not sufficient to be considered a bar to taking the action required to meet the threat.

"An additional point which I wish to emphasize is that if NATO deploys 30 effective divisions on the central front and accelerates production of critical items and conventional ammunition, and if we also expand our organic depot repair and supply support activities as soon as possible, our resultant capabilities can far exceed that provided solely by the 30 divisions. Short of the Soviets initiating nuclear war, these forces would give us the capability to defend by sustained conventional operations for a sufficient period to allow for the build-up of the second echelon forces in Europe. This factor, taken in conjunction with the fact that there is a finite upper limit to the number of forces the USSR can effectively employ on the peninsula of Western Europe, convinces me that the West, with 30 divisions deployed in Central Europe, would be in a much better position to wage either nuclear or non-nuclear war than we are now. As a minimum, considerable additional time would be provided the President before he had to make the decision to initiate tactical nuclear war or general nuclear war.

"As an over-all observation, I believe that we must convey to our allies and the USSR an increased sense of urgency on our part. Substantive build-up and deployments along the lines outlined in the answers to the President's questions, if taken now or in the near future, should generate a commensurate build-up on the part of our Allies and should serve as a deterrent to the USSR making a grab in Berlin. This build-up would further our purposes both in Europe and world-wide. Taken in conjunction with other measures, the credibility of our over-all posture would be greatly enhanced, thereby lessening the chance that we

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
would have to use these forces in combat. Moreover, if the deterrent fails, our capability for successfully conducting combat operations, conventional or nuclear, would be substantially increased."

* * * * *

—General Norstad's general comments on my answers to the questions are stated in Appendix A.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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fileMemorandum of ConversationThis document consists of 2 pages.

DATE: September 18, 1961

Number 1 of 13 copies, Series 12

SUBJECT: Discussions With French on NATO Nuclear Strike Force.

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
PARTICIPANTS: Mr. John Thompson, First Secretary, British Embassy.
Mr. Robert N. Magill, Deputy Director, EUR/RA.

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Amembassy Paris for USRO and Stoessel, S/AE, DOD - Mr. Nitze

Mr. Thompson called ostensibly to obtain some superficial factual information regarding the recently announced 144b agreement with France. After this subject had been exhausted, he referred casually to his understanding that there had been some discussion of the concept of a NATO nuclear strike force between the President and deGaulle, and asked whether the U.S. had had any follow-up discussions with the French on this subject. He said the British had gotten the impression from some conversations with the French that the latter were discussing this subject with the Americans, but that it did not appear, from the information available to him, that the French had been at all precise regarding the nature of the discussions.

I told Mr. Thompson that the question of a NATO nuclear strike force had been discussed at French initiative in general terms with U.S. officials in Paris on two or three occasions subsequent to the President's talk with deGaulle. The French appeared to be trying out various formulations involving a NATO commitment of U.S., U.K. and French strike forces. There did not appear to be any clear-cut French position on the subject and it was difficult tell whether the French initiatives had been authorized or personal. It was also difficult to ascertain the extent to which the French concepts were conditioned on concessions by the U.S. with respect

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to sharing of technology. It did appear, however, that the French conceived of the NATO force as being strictly tripartite in composition and under some special tripartite command arrangement apart from the existing NATO command structure. I said that the French initiatives had not been followed up by Washington and that this was due partly to our great preoccupation with the Berlin situation and partly to general reservations regarding the French approach. However, we had not yet considered the matter fully and might at some point be able to do so.

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EX-111

19 September 1961

MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL LEHNITZER

The President has asked me to pass the attached list of questions to you for transmission to General Power.

He would like General Power to respond to these questions at their meeting tomorrow, September 20th.

Maxwell D. Taylor

Encl.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INSEC 167/Z

19 September 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. Attached herewith are a number of questions bearing on the Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP) which you may wish to ask General Power at your meeting with him tomorrow. The questions are designed to produce answers to some of the alleged weaknesses of the SIOP which include the following:

a. Without engendering dangerous confusion, it is difficult if not impossible to vary the schedule of planned strikes by excluding planned targets, bringing in new ones or stopping the schedule.

b. As a result of the inflexibility noted in a above, in an escalating situation over Berlin, we could not execute a surprise first strike exclusively against Soviet military targets if we so desired.

c. If four weapons are scheduled for delivery on a target and the target is destroyed or the enemy capitulates after two have been delivered, it is not possible to withhold the remaining two.

d. If the Alert Force is launched on a false alarm and later must turn back, our strike capability will be degraded for a significant period.

2. In obtaining answers to the foregoing, it is important to separate out what controls are available now and what are for the future. This time factor was not clear in the briefing last Thursday. Also, when the point is made that the injection of some forms of flexibility will reduce military effectiveness, we should get some feel whether the reduction is so serious as practically to eliminate the option.

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W. K. [unclear]
(Not [unclear])

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3. If the questions appear to cover the ground which you wish to cover with General Power, I will have them transmitted to him at once.

Maxwell D. Taylor

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STRATEGIC AIR PLANNING

Question #1. I understand the strategic attack plan now contains 16 "options." I gather the impression, however,

[REDACTED]

Is it not possible to exclude [REDACTED] from attack? If not, how soon could you develop a plan which contains such options? Can whole areas, [REDACTED] be eliminated from attack? If so, at what risk?

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Question #2. [REDACTED] would leave a sizeable number of MRMs facing Europe.

g. Would the inclusion of these MRMs in the initial attack so enlarge the target list as to preclude tactical surprise?

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k. If so, is it possible to plan an immediate follow-on attack which would strike these targets before the first attack was completed? In particular, would our European land and sea-based air forces be suitable for this task?

Question #4. I am concerned over my ability to control our military effort once a war begins. I assume I can stop the strategic attack at any time, should I receive word the enemy has capitulated. Is this correct?

Question #5. Although one nuclear weapon will achieve the desired results, I understand that, to be assured of success, more than one weapon is programmed for each target. If the first weapon succeeds, can you prevent additional weapons from inflicting redundant destruction? If not, how long would it take to modify your plan to cover this possibility?

Question #6. What happens to the planned execution of our strategic attack if the Alert Force is launched and several hours later it is discovered that it has been launched on a false alarm? How vulnerable would we be, and how soon would the U.S. be in a position to attack the USSR?

Question #7. After the Alert Force has been launched, how do I know that our remaining forces are being used to best advantage. Are these follow-on forces automatically committed to predetermined targets, or do we have means of getting damage assessments to direct their attacks?

Question #8. Given the European situation, some of SACEUR's tactical fighters now scheduled for atomic attacks may be employed for conventional support of ground forces instead. Can other forces take over the responsibility of hitting SACEUR's atomic targets without jeopardizing the success of the plan materially?

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLK-90-78

By SF NARA, Date 10/26/92

September 20, 1961

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT

Others present: General Lemnitzer
General LeMay
General Shoup
General Eddleman
Admiral Anderson
General Clifton

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The meeting started shortly after 4:00 o'clock and was over at 5:40 pm.

General Lemnitzer indicated that no memorandum of conversation be kept and the President agreed. However, certain requirements were established from the discussion, which are listed:

1. The President indicated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should firm up various Berlin contingency plans, especially concerning ground probes, the naval blockade and associated steps; after they are put in the same form as we now have the air corridor contingencies enumerated, they should be brought to the President for approval; and thereafter, through General Norstad and by other means open to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, all of this should be "put to our NATO allies" for their response. It was the sense of the meeting that our communication to NATO must be more effective on these various military plans.

2. Sometime in this process, General Norstad is to be invited to come home for discussion of these things.

3. Admiral Anderson was requested to come up with the report on the possibilities of naval blockade and/or shipping controls and/or associated actions. It is assumed that this specific study would be incorporated into the overall determination mentioned in paragraph 1.

4. The President directed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff become conversant with the cabled report of the Harriman conversations at Geneva with the Soviet representatives on the subjects of what the Soviet Union wants -- their end objectives.

5. In the discussion on the situation in Southeast Asia, the President set forth the requirement:

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a. That General Craig and his group who visited Southeast Asia should be brought in for a discussion with the President on their reaction to the feasibility of Plan Five and their estimate of the FAL potential;

b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are directed to come forth with a detailed study of the Communist supply situation in this area, with special attention being paid to the roads and trails out of North Viet-Nam and out of South Viet-Nam into the Laotian panhandle. The President specifically mentioned that aerial photography should be included, and that he wanted to know the methods of supply they are using, with as good an estimate as we can make on the tonnage per month;

c. The President made the point that SEATO Five "doesn't go far enough," and gave Admiral Anderson a requirement to come up with an estimate of what "the Navy and the Navy Air can do in support of this plan." Hanoi was specifically mentioned;

d. The President directed that "we address ourselves to a study of the relative strength of the USSR versus the U.S. at present, and at specific time periods in the future, on nuclear capability."

In the lengthy discussions, some significant points were made. The Joint Chiefs were very firm that a naval blockade was an act of war, would be so interpreted by the Soviet Union, and that the Soviet Union would know that we know that a naval blockade is a very serious step and could well counter with an all-out submarine war against allied shipping.

General LeMay stated, in answer to the President's question, that the United States Air Force and the NATO forces could not "take the USSR Air Force for very long." He did urge that if we got into difficulties we seriously consider escalating with Air and Navy rather than ground attack because an air battle, once started, can be broken off without seriously involving national prestige, etc. The inference was -- and this was not objected to by others -- that once the ground battle is joined, the nation is pretty much committed to all-out military action.

The President asked -- almost rhetorically -- at what period since 1945, in their opinion, was the U.S. in the best position. The consensus was

TOP SECRET

- 3 -

1953-54 when the Korean War had been terminated, our nuclear stockpile was substantial, our forces had been established at a new high level (which we have never really abandoned), and the Soviet nuclear capability was not yet very great. Admiral Anderson pointed out that in 1950-51, he made a study under the then Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Sherman, and predicted at that time that the period 1962-63 would be "the period of greatest danger."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that in the next two years we need not be in an inflexible military posture, that the President would have several choices he could make (courses of action from which he could choose) and that they would address themselves to putting these in a form which would be easily studied.

The meeting ended with the President indicating to them that he was going to "look over" the Armed Forces this fall and would probably start by going to Fort Bragg to see STRAC on October 12, and that he was interested in seeing the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force subsequent to this.



C. V. CLIFTON
Major General, USA
Defense Liaison Officer

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NRK-10-78

By ST NARA, Date 1/24/92

September 20, 1961

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
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C. V. CLIFTON
Major General, USA
Defense Liaison Officer

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9/20/61
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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 20, 1961

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: First Meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko

1. We should not expect a first meeting with Mr. Gromyko to make significant headway toward a solution for Germany and Berlin. It is probable that this encounter will largely go over the ground covered by you and Mr. Khrushchev in Vienna. However, events since June will permit discussion which might open up leads for further talks, either in New York or in Moscow through Ambassador Thompson.

2. In the first meeting, it seems to me that the following points might be made (not necessarily in the order shown).

a. The situation is a most serious and dangerous one which, if not carefully and wisely handled, could lead to war.

b. This crisis is not caused by Western threats against legitimate Soviet interests but by Soviet threats and pressures against vital interests of the West. (Here repeat your position with Khrushchev at Vienna on this point).

c. The steps being taken to strengthen the United States and the West were not stimulated by any desire to threaten the USSR but were in response to the direct threats by the USSR against vital Western interests.

d. The problem is not, as Mr. Khrushchev seems to think, to find a formula to save Western "face" but for the USSR to refrain from invasions of vital Western interests and commitments. We are sensitive to questions of prestige, including the prestige of the Soviet Union, but Mr. Khrushchev has come very close to a total commitment of his prestige to moves which would be wholly unacceptable to the West. This commitment of prestige adds to the danger.

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(2) and 5(b) or (c)

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By: [Signature] NARS, Date: 1-25-72

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e. The West has made no demands, backed by the threat of force, to change the position of the Warsaw Pact area; Mr. Khrushchev has done just that with regard to allied and NATO commitments.

f. We can understand that Mr. Khrushchev has been anxious about conditions in Communist areas of Eastern Europe, including East Germany. These conditions are not the responsibility of the West. If these conditions have created problems and pressures upon the Soviet Union, the West cannot accept that they be solved at the expense of the West.

g. The crisis does not turn upon whether the Soviet Union wishes to sign an agreement with the East Germans, whatever such an agreement be called. The two have signed agreements before. What is of concern to the West is the effect upon basic Western rights the Soviet Government claims such an agreement would have. An agreement which purported to end the rights of the three Western powers in Berlin and to subject established rights of access to West Berlin to the will of the East Germans would be wholly unacceptable to the West. The Soviet Union, in any arrangements it makes with the East Germans, can safeguard Western rights, as it has done before.

h. Soviet spokesmen have repeatedly referred to negotiations about a peace treaty with the two Germanys and a solution of the Berlin problem on that basis. The West cannot undertake negotiations on any such limited basis but only if the rights, interests and views of all parties are to be considered in relation to all aspects of the problem of Germany and Berlin.

i. President Kennedy has said that if the Soviet Union has genuine concern about the general security situation in Central Europe, these are questions which can be discussed and on which some headway might be made.

j. The President, as Mr. Khrushchev knows, is anxious

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-3-

to avoid a catastrophe which might occur through misunderstanding or miscalculation. He wishes to know whether the Soviet Union is prepared to find solutions to outstanding problems on the basis of the vital interests of all parties or whether it has decided to bring the world situation to a climactic confrontation between the Soviet bloc and the Western world. If it is the latter, the future of both our countries and of the rest of mankind is very black indeed.

k. On our side, we believe that both countries have a fundamental interest in avoiding a nuclear holocaust. It has been President Kennedy's hope that ways could be found to reduce tensions and thereby open the way for long-term solutions of the more difficult and complex problems. There is some encouragement, at least, in the agreement reached recently on certain principles applicable to disarmament. Our hope that a genuinely neutral and independent Laos can come into being has not yet been realized but we believe that our two Governments should continue to work at this matter and try to give effect to what we understand is an agreed objective.

l. I am not speaking on the basis of a mandate from other governments - but I know that the Western allies and NATO are united on the point that vital interests in West Berlin must be defended at whatever cost. The West prefers, of course, that its vital interests be sustained by peaceful means but surrender of these interests cannot be contemplated.

m. We hope that Mr. Gromyko will think about what has been said and that further talks between our Governments might explore constructive possibilities. Meanwhile we underline the importance of keeping the situation under control and that no steps be taken which will add to the dangers of the present scene.

3. I look forward to the opportunity to discuss this with you.

DR

Dean Rusk

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: 2:30 p.m.
September 21, 1961SUBJECT: Germany and Berlin, Disarmament,
Red ChinaPLACE: Secretary's suite
Waldorf Towers
New York City

US
PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary
EUR - Mr. Kohler
S/B - Mr. Bohlen
D/P - Mr. Aakalovsky
(Interpreting)

USSR
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Semenov
Mr. Kovalev
Mr. Sukhodrev
(Interpreter)

COPIES TO:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED by *MR*Date *June 26, 1991*

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☐ EXISE ☐ DECLASSIFY in PART
☐ DENY ☐ DELETE
☐ Non-responsive info.

FOLEDO/PAT/...
TS authority to:
☐ CLASSIFY as _____, OADR
☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C, OADR

Following the luncheon the Secretary opened the discussion, saying that he was glad that Mr. Gromyko had been able to lunch with him and to have a talk about "Germany and Berlin". He said he should make it clear that although he knew the points of the other Governments concerned on our side, he was not speaking with a mandate from them. These were bilateral conversations. He would start by referring back to the conversations between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev at Vienna. He would recall that President Kennedy was very disturbed by what Mr. Khrushchev had said with respect to the Soviet position on Germany and Berlin. Much had also been said on the subject since that time. Therefore the Secretary thought it would be well if he explained as simply as he could what we considered to be the heart of the matter. He would therefore speak about the present situation as it appeared to us and Mr. Gromyko could then tell us whether this was a correct presentation from their point of view.

The Soviet Government, the Secretary said, states that it is putting forward certain proposals with respect to Germany, but that if these are not accepted by the West then

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- 2 -

the Soviet Union will conclude a peace treaty with the East Germans. Up to this point we are presented with no overwhelming problem because, even though we may dislike it and not agree, we cannot prevent the signature of such a document. As we see it the crisis occurs because the Soviet Government states that this act will terminate allied rights and that access to West Berlin will then be subject to the agreement and consent of the East German regime. At this point the Soviets would be moving against what President Kennedy has described as three vital interests of the United States. Not only are these vital interests but they represent fundamental commitments of the United States and its NATO allies. Thus we are in a situation when the United States is not moving in any way against the USSR but the Soviet Government is taking the initiative against the vital interests of the United States and its allies. This is the situation that is dangerous. He was not threatening but he would say that we consider ourselves to be under a threat. We do not want an arms race but we will not draw away from it in these circumstances. We do not want a conflict but we will have to prepare and be ready to face one if it is forced upon us.

The Secretary continued that both sides must know clearly what are the vital interests of the other so that there can be no mistake. If the Soviet Government has concerns which have not been made known to us officially, he was prepared to hear them.

We believe, the Secretary said, and we believe you believe that our two countries share a common interest in preventing war. We also believe and believe you believe that each side has vital interests which are not the same but perhaps parallel, but that we still have a common interest in finding ways to live at peace in the world. The Soviet proposals did not seem to us to be put forward in a spirit of discussion and negotiation but rather as a sort of unilateral edict. The Secretary quoted the Soviet formula that the urgent and important question was "the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany and the solution on this basis of the problem of West Berlin." Such a formula left little or no room for discussion or negotiation as these terms are commonly understood.

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- 3 -

From time to time, the Secretary went on, there were some remarks from the Soviet side which if taken out of context seemed to us reasonable. Consequently we had felt that quiet talks might clarify to each other what we consider our vital interests. We would see whether the crisis has to proceed to a grim conclusion or whether there is some way to bring it to an end.

Mr. Gromyko replied by saying that the Soviet Government had expressed its readiness to have this exchange of views between the Secretary and himself in order to discuss the question of a peace treaty with Germany and of settling the problem of West Berlin on the basis of such a treaty. He continued that the success of this exchange of views should be measured by the extent to which the two governments will succeed in drawing a line under World War II by signing a peace treaty with Germany. The Soviet Government believed that there is no problem today that is more urgent and pressing than the question of a peace treaty with Germany and of settling the question of West Berlin on the basis of such a treaty. The fact that the situation has become even more heated recently -- and this was not caused by the Soviet Union but rather by the Western Powers -- confirms the necessity of reaching agreement on or at least having some kind of success in this matter as a result of this exchange of views. Referring to the Secretary's remark that he wanted to obtain a fuller clarification of the Soviet position and of the Soviet Union's objectives in this matter of a peace treaty, Mr. Gromyko stated that he would try to set forth the position of the Soviet Government although that position had been outlined in great detail by Mr. Khrushchev in Vienna. He said that he recognized the possibility of the US Government's not having a completely clear picture of the Soviet position and objectives. Therefore he wished to indicate why the Soviet Union had raised this question and why it believed a peace treaty was so urgent and brooked no delay. As the Secretary knew, sixteen years had passed since World War II. Likewise the Secretary knew that the period of occupation after a war was always terminated by

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- 4 -

a peace treaty if no peace treaty was signed immediately after the cessation of hostilities. In spite of the fact that sixteen years have passed there is still no peace treaty with Germany. The reason why the Soviet Union believed it to be necessary to have a peace treaty signed is that it is convinced that such a treaty would place obstacles in the way of the development of revanchism and militarism in West Germany. West German leaders have been raising the question of a revision of borders in Europe and the Soviet Union believes that a peace treaty would codify juridically the borders which have been shaped as a result of World War II. A peace treaty would also change radically the abnormal relations between West Germany and the GDR. As is well known, now the relations between West Germany and the GDR are far from normal and this is due to the aggressive policy of West Germany toward the GDR. West Germany does not conceal its intention to swallow the GDR; however, it should know that this is an adventurous policy. Likewise a peace treaty would eliminate the cause of aggravation in the relations between the US and the USSR and indeed among all big powers. Such a treaty would also eliminate the cause of the rise in temperature in Germany and Europe, which are in a feverish state like a sick man. The Soviet Government believes that the wisdom of policy should be measured not by the degree to which the militarists and revanchists of other countries succeed in setting our two countries of loggerheads but rather by the degree to which we succeed in staying away from the brink of war, a war which would be a thermo-nuclear one, and by the success in averting such war. Such should be the yardstick in appraising the policy of the great powers and particularly of the United States and the USSR in view of their significance in Europe and elsewhere. A peace treaty must be based on the actual situation now prevailing in Germany and Europe, i.e., on the fact that there are two German states in existence, the GDR and the FRG. Therefore the Soviet Union proposes that a peace treaty be signed with both states. There could be one treaty with two states or two separate treaties one with each of the two states. The fact that some officials

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- 5 -

in the West dislike the situation in the GDR or the leaders of that state should not be an obstacle. After all some states do not like the situation prevailing in West Germany. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it dislikes the present situation in West Germany because it resembles very much the situation prevailing in Hitler's Germany. There have been statements to the effect that a peace treaty with the two German states would make unification of the two Germanies or rapprochement between them more difficult. This argument holds no water because the Soviet Union believes that if unification is possible at all it can be achieved not by heating the situation existing between the two German states but rather by a peace treaty under which both German states would undertake to refrain from the use of arms and to settle their problems by peaceful means. A rapprochement between the two German states would be brought about by a detente in Germany and throughout Europe. Mr. Gromyko repeated that only a peace treaty would increase the chances of German unification, if there are such chances at all. Thus this argument proves just the opposite of what it is intended to prove. If one of the two German states, namely the FRG, sharpens its knife with the intention of plunging it into the GDR's back, the latter will not remain passive and will call its allies for help. This would of course not promote any rapprochement and would only deepen the rift. On the other hand a peace treaty signed by all states which participated in the war against Germany would further the cause of rapprochement between the two German states. These two states are not entirely different; the difference between them is as deep as possible because the two states have different social systems. Therefore they cannot be brought closer together on any basis except the basis of foreign policy. Of course there is another possibility -- that of a military solution -- but the United States and the Soviet Union are great powers and both of them know what that would mean. Mr. Gromyko reiterated that if there is a possibility of rapprochement between the two German states it exists only on the basis of foreign policy. Mr. Gromyko

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- 6 -

recalled that Mr. Khrushchev had explained this aspect of the problem in Vienna. Mr. Khrushchev had also mentioned the cheap demagoguery in West Germany with regard to self-determination. However West Germany leaves only a small detail out of sight namely that one of the two German states is a militarist state whereas the other is a socialist state and peace-loving by definition. Mr. Gromyko went on to say that the problem of West Berlin could also be solved by a peace treaty. There is an occupation regime in West Berlin today, which is the result of World War II and which is based on the various temporary agreements concluded among the allies after the war. However that occupation regime cannot exist indefinitely; it has outlived itself. Mr. Gromyko stated that he had been instructed by the Soviet Government that a peace treaty would terminate the occupation regime and would proclaim West Berlin a free city. As to the question of a free city of West Berlin, Mr. Gromyko said, there appeared to be certain problems and aspects which were of interest to the United States. He said he did not know what words to use so as to sound as convincing as possible. Mr. Khrushchev had stated quite convincingly that the idea of a free, demilitarized city of West Berlin did not signify the desire on the part of the Soviet Union or the GDR to gain hold over that city. The Soviet Union does not need West Berlin. It does not need its resources, its population, or its housing. The GDR -- and the Soviet Union knows its position -- is of the same opinion and is prepared to pledge to respect what the West calls the freedom of that city, i.e., the independence of West Berlin. Mr. Gromyko said that he wanted to stress this point as vigorously as he could and noted that if there was any doubt on the part of the United States it should be removed now. He emphasized that the Soviet Union was prepared to accept the strictest international guarantees and recalled the fact that the Soviet Union had made various suggestions on this point. The Soviet Union would be prepared to have forces of the Four Powers -- the U.S., the USSR, the UK and France -- in West Berlin so as to ensure what the Secretary had called US presence in that city. Another possibility would be to have neutral forces stationed in West Berlin

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or as a third possibility to have UN forces in that city. Mr. Gromyko said he wondered what other more effective guarantees were needed if the status of West Berlin as a free city were to be guaranteed with the participation of the US, the USSR and the other great powers, or if necessary by the UN. He said that no more effective guarantees existed either in theory or practice. All this should certainly dispel any doubts the US might have on this point. Turning to the question of access, Mr. Gromyko stated that access was linked to a number of temporary -- and he said he wanted to stress the word temporary -- agreements concluded as a result of the unconditional surrender of Germany. A peace treaty would change this situation in the sense that the solution of the problem of access would have to be on a different basis. The Soviet Government and Mr. Khrushchev himself have repeatedly stressed that the signing of a peace treaty would not signify severance of all communications between West Berlin and the outside world. Neither would it signify a blockade of West Berlin because a blockade would strangle the city and its economic life. The Soviet Union opposes anything like this. Soviet proposals provide for free access to West Berlin. The only rule that the United States and the other countries should observe is that in view of the fact that a peace treaty would have been signed and that all communication lines including air run through the territory of the GDR, access would have to be based on arrangements with the GDR. Mr. Gromyko then stated that he was aware of the fact that certain US officials, including the President and the Secretary himself, had raised the question of how one could be sure that there would be freedom of access if a peace treaty was signed with the GDR. The Soviet Union's reply to this is that not only can free access be ensured but it will be ensured on the basis of Soviet guarantees. The GDR has stated repeatedly that it would also respect such arrangements. But even assuming that the United States, or the President, or the Secretary personally

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- 8 -

does not trust the GDR, there is no reason for concern because both our countries would guarantee West Berlin's ties with the outside world. After all, don't our two countries rely on their own capabilities? If we cast doubt on our own capabilities or policies, then the state of affairs is gloomy indeed. Mr. Gromyko recalled that President Kennedy had used the simile of a pipe which could be cut off in the middle, presumably by the GDR. The Soviet Union can state that that would be impossible and that such a possibility is completely out of the question. The Soviet Union knows its capabilities. Furthermore there should be reliance on international agreements because if there is no such reliance the situation is also gloomy indeed. Should we really refuse to sign any international agreements? Mr. Gromyko went on to say that the Soviet Government had weighed and discussed this problem of access and tried to understand why the United States Government regards this solution to be unacceptable. The Soviet Government has been unable to find any basis for such doubts on the part of the United States. In the view of the Soviet Union the question of access, which is frequently overdramatized by the West, is much simpler than it is represented. This problem would be resolved on the basis of a peace treaty. No vital interests are involved here, nor is the prestige of the United States or any other country in question. Of course all depends on the interpretation of what prestige means. There could be an incorrect, one-sided interpretation, but in any event the Soviet Union has no intention of injuring the prestige of the United States. Mr. Gromyko said he did not know whether the Secretary would agree with this but he thought that all nations, including the peoples of the US, the Soviet Union and other countries, would experience relief if this cause of tension was removed. Referring to the Secretary's remark that the US considered itself to be under threat, Mr. Gromyko stated that the Soviet Union did not intend to threaten anyone. The

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- 9 -

proposal to sign a peace treaty is no threat, whereas war is a threat. All the Soviet Union wants is to purify the atmosphere in Europe and throughout the world. Referring to the Secretary's statement that Soviet proposals implied that if they were not accepted a peace treaty with the GDR would be signed unilaterally and that therefore negotiations were not possible, Mr. Gromyko said this was apparently a misunderstanding. This was not correct. The Soviet Union has repeatedly stated that it is prepared to consider other proposals, by the US or by other states, relating to the conclusion of a peace treaty. Turning to the present situation and to the question of how the Soviet Union envisaged the further development of events, Mr. Gromyko stated that as before the Soviet Government wished to reach agreement with the United States and its allies, the UK, France and others, on the signing of a peace treaty with Germany and on the solution of the West Berlin problem on the basis of such treaty. Mr. Gromyko said that he wanted to emphasize that this was the Soviet Union's choice number one. Only as a last resort would the Soviet Union sign a peace treaty unilaterally -- to use the Secretary's term -- in other words do the same the United States did in Japan. If the United States action in Japan was legitimate why then is there such nervousness about the Soviet Union's intention to sign a peace treaty with the GDR. There can be no two rules of legitimacy possible. However, Mr. Gromyko said he wanted to repeat that only in that case would the Soviet Union be compelled to sign a peace treaty with the GDR. After stating that this was his reply, Mr. Gromyko added that, as to the timing, Mr. Khrushchev had stated the Soviet position in his conversation with the President and that he personally had nothing new to say. The Soviet Union believed that a peace treaty should be concluded this year. It also believes that there is possibility for reaching agreement on this question. Mr. Gromyko concluded by expressing the hope that the present discussion would constitute a beginning in that direction.

SECRET

SECRET

-10-

After Mr. Gromyko's opening statement, the Secretary said that in the interest of moving things forward he would add to his own statement. He said he was certain that Mr. Gromyko would understand that we are not completely convinced as regards the reliability of new agreements put forward at the very time when it is clear that existing agreements are to be disregarded. It was true in one sense that the agreements made during and after the war were considered temporary, because it was then assumed that they would come to an end as soon as it became possible to conclude a peace treaty with a single German Government. It was not assumed, however, that one side would unilaterally bring them to an end before that time.

As to the principle of self-determination he said we believe that this opens the way to a solution which would have some chance of being workable and viable over a period of years. When "solutions" are founded on an artificial basis then a situation of instability results. He realized that the Soviet Government would not agree with him, but he felt that this principle must be taken into account because of its bearing on the longer term stability of any arrangement.

Mr. Gromyko had mentioned the so-called rearmament and militarization of Western Germany. We could understand why the peoples of Eastern Europe after their terrible experiences of the last war would be concerned about the rearmament of a Germany with aggressive designs. The Secretary recalled however, that the Western allies had not permitted Western Germany to rearm until after the East Germans had been rearmed by the Soviets in the face of Western protests. We were well aware that at the present time there were in East Germany not only the East German military forces but at least 20 divisions of Soviet forces mobile and well equipped. He recognized that these

SECRET

SECRET

-11-

latter might be in part for East Germany itself but these forces nevertheless were a part of the military problem confronting the West. The Federal Government's rearmament was not aggressive and the Federal military forces were integrated into NATO which also was not aggressive. There was great assurance of stability and security in the fact that the Federal Republic is thoroughly integrated into the broader Western European community. The Secretary said he would not try to review history on which he and Mr. Gromyko would not agree. However, if Mr. Gromyko would examine carefully he would realize that NATO was conceived, organized and exists as a purely defensive organization with no aggressive intentions. However, he said, we are willing to look at both sides and to see whether arrangements can be found which would relieve tensions and give to both the East and the West a greater feeling of security.

The Secretary said he also wished to comment as to why the Soviet proposals on West Berlin are not acceptable. The area of greater Berlin was agreed to as a separate enclave within - it is true - but separate from the Soviet zone of occupation. In all Soviet discussions of the Berlin problem and in the Soviet proposals East Berlin has simply disappeared from the scene. We have been told that the subject of East Berlin is not negotiable. Thus having disposed of East Berlin without regard to its four power responsibilities the Soviets were now turning to West Berlin which is our area of responsibility under these agreements. The Soviet proposals ignored the simplest approach. If the Soviet Government wished to have troops in Berlin it could have proposed their stationing in East Berlin. If the Soviet Government wished for example to suggest the locating of the UN in Berlin then it could have proposed that this location be the whole city of Berlin. Mr. Gromyko had asked what better guarantee West Berlin could have than the Soviet proposals. The Secretary said he knew at least one answer: the proposals of the United States, Britain and France as at present guaranteeing the integrity of West Berlin and the freedom of its population.

SECRET

SECRET

-12-

The situation is the same, the Secretary continued, as respects the access question. There is no mystery about this. For many years access rights have been exercised by road, by rail, by canal and by air. There was no need for the Soviets to reopen this question. If the Soviet Government wants to make an agreement with the East German regime, then that is one thing. However, he wanted to say clearly that our access rights are not available to the Soviet Government to be turned over to the East German Government. The Soviet Government cannot turn over to someone else what it does not have itself, that is, the right to dispose of our access rights. The Secretary felt that some illusion had been created by the physical location of Berlin. He would ask Mr. Gromyko rather to look at the political aspects of the question. For political purposes, he said, West Berlin is not 110 miles inside East Germany, but right on the demarcation line between West and East Germany.

The Secretary took note of Mr. Gromyko's remarks with respect to relations between the Federal Republic and the East German regime. He said that we, too, believe that relations between the two in such fields as trade are valuable and could be extended. This would be a good field to explore.

The Secretary said this had been a useful exchange giving both sides something to think about. He was concerned from what he knew and had learned of the Soviet position that the two countries would be on a collision course. Therefore, we must review and think on both sides about how to avoid this. He agreed that it was important not to let the situation get out of hand and develop into a direct clash. There was no reason why this should be as between the Soviet Union and the United States, both of us had big things to do at home; moreover, the arms race should be stopped and the arms burden reduced.

The Secretary said that when President Kennedy was in Vienna he had received a strong impression that the underlying intent of the Soviet proposals was to drive the West out of Berlin and pave the way for the absorption of the city. What

SECRET

SECRET

-13-

Mr. Gromyko had said today had not wholly removed the Secretary's anxiety on this score. We trusted that Mr. Gromyko would understand that these were most important concerns and that we would welcome further clarification on these matters from the Soviet side.

The Secretary concluded that it was important for the two governments to keep in touch on these questions. He wanted to make sure that Mr. Gromyko understood that the U.S. does not have in mind to seek prolonged talks and negotiations as a delaying tactic. Surely the Soviet Government understands that there were some limits to discussion during the German electoral campaign. At the same time, he himself had some understanding of Mr. Khrushchev's complaint to the effect that "somebody is always having elections." The Secretary considered it important that talks keep us in touch and that we not let events keep us in touch. It was for this reason that he had recently called in Soviet Charge Smirnovsky on the question of the Soviet references to our air access, since unilateral action in this respect could very seriously get in the way of peaceful discussion. On our part we were not surprised at the Soviet reaction when the West German fighter planes landed in Berlin. Speaking quietly here, he could assure Mr. Gromyko that the West German flyers were not spies but were really lost. However, we would on our part try to prevent further incidents.

Mr. Gromyko said that he wanted to make a few remarks about self-determination. He said that it was difficult for him to believe that the Secretary was serious in raising that question. While the Secretary had not spelled out his conception of self-determination, it appeared that his conception was Adenauer's conception. If this is so then it should be pointed out that the German people expressed their self-determination in 1949 when two states, different in nature and organized on the basis of different social systems, came into being. Adenauer's conception is divorced from life and, Mr. Gromyko said, it was difficult to believe that the Secretary should seriously contemplate such an idea. Referring to the Secretary's remarks on the question of militarism and

SECRET

SECRET

-14-

revanchism, Mr. Gromyko said that he was not surprised by what the Secretary had said. After all, the United States is an ally of West Germany. However, Mr. Gromyko said, he was not impressed. The Soviet Union knows very well that Hitler's Germany unleashed a war which caused millions upon millions of victims and what is now happening to West Germany reminds very much of Hitler's days. This is not theory, it is fact. The United States states that it has vital interests, but the Soviet Union says that the situation in West Germany is of vital interest to it and to its allies. This is why the Secretary's remarks on this point, including his appraisal of NATO and German membership in it, are not convincing. The Secretary had referred to the formation of armed forces in East Germany. However, at one time the Soviet Union had proposed that a limit be set for armed forces in both West and East Germany and that such an arrangement be subject to control. The United States rejected that proposal. If troops in East Germany were of no concern to the United States at that time, then why are they now. Apparently at that time the United States weighed the possibility of demilitarization of all of Germany against the prospect of a rearmed West Germany, taking into account that something would of course be done in East Germany as well. The latter concept apparently prevailed; therefore why should the Soviet Union be blamed now? Furthermore the fact is that East German forces are no threat to the Western powers or anyone else. As to the Berlin question, Mr. Gromyko said, the situation would be different if West Berlin were located in the heart of West Germany. However the United States cannot escape the fact that West Berlin is inside East Germany. The Secretary had said that the Soviet Union should not over-emphasize the temptation caused by the geographic location of Berlin. This term is not applicable and is totally out of place. The fact is that East Berlin is part of the GDR. Its social order is the same as that in the GDR. On the other hand the social system in West Berlin is different and in fact the United States itself says that it wants to preserve that different system, or what it calls

SECRET

SECRET

-15-

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system, or what it calls freedom. Mr. Gromyko then said that he wanted to make a few remarks on the question of negotiations and exchange of views. He said that he liked the Secretary's concluding remarks to the effect that both sides must search for a way out, for a way to avoid collision between the US and the USSR and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact as a whole. The Soviet Union is all for it and this is why it agreed to have this exchange of views, which was proposed by the United States. It has agreed in order to find a mutually acceptable solution. However, as the Soviet Government has repeatedly stated, solution cannot be postponed indefinitely. Sixteen years have passed; how many years should we wait -- fifty years? Referring to the Secretary's remark about the German elections, Mr. Gromyko said of course the United States knew best what the situation was and stated that he would inform his government accordingly, namely that there was no intentional or artificial delay. He then stated that the Soviet Union was of the opinion that a peace conference should be called in the nearest future and that it would be best if a date for such a conference could be agreed during the present exchange of views.

The Secretary said he wanted to go back to Mr. Gromyko's earlier description in his opening remarks of the subject of his talks, and the interpreter read his notes on this point, indicating that Mr. Gromyko had said he was authorized "to discuss the question of a peace treaty with Germany and of settling the problem of West Berlin on the basis of such a treaty." The Secretary said this was a very narrow basis for a discussion. He asked whether we were in a long "Palais Rose" argument about an agenda; or were we talking about Germany and Berlin?

Mr. Gromyko fuzzed his reply to this question. He said that the question of a peace treaty relates to a treaty with both Germanies. Thus, the whole German problem is involved.

SECRET

SECRET

-16-

As to West Berlin, it is only a part of this broader problem.

The Secretary commented that he supposed he could take it that Mr. Gromyko was not excluding the broader approach, other than the proposals advanced by the Soviet Union.

Without replying to the Secretary's last comment, Mr. Gromyko said that he now wanted to express his views on some other problems not related to the question of disarmament and China. He thought that the principles agreed yesterday between the USSR and the US had produced a favorable impression on the Soviet Government and the Soviet people, as well as throughout the world.

The Secretary agreed that was right.

Mr. Gromyko resumed, saying that if there were a real desire to promote disarmament then the Soviet Government was of the opinion that progress could be made in the disarmament field, in bringing about a disarmament agreement, and in implementing such measures as would rid mankind of the burden of arms and lead to a radical improvement also in Soviet-American relations. It would be of great significance in promoting general and complete disarmament if the US and the USSR would agree on bringing the Chinese People's Republic into the talks.

American statesmen, including the Secretary himself, had said that disarmament would be impossible without the participation of China. This was true, but it was not possible to elaborate a disarmament treaty and then simply submit it to the Chinese Government for signature when they had not been party to the negotiations. The United States had been negotiating with the Chinese People's Republic at the ambassadorial level in Geneva and then Warsaw for many

SECRET

SECRET

-17-

years, had participated in 1954 with the Chinese in the Indo-China conference, and was now negotiating at the same table on Laos. Consequently, what reason could there be for the United States not to negotiate with the Chinese People's Republic on the all-important question of disarmament? Turning to Red China's membership in the UN, Mr. Gromyko said that the Soviet Government considered the United States position on the admission of the Chinese People's Republic to the UN to be unjustified. That position would find no support. Solution of this question would be important to the UN, to Soviet-American relations, and of course also to relations between the United States and the Chinese People's Republic. In any event, this was not a third-rate problem.

Mr. Gromyko said he wanted to raise this question in these talks. Perhaps he and Mr. Rusk could reach some informal understanding which could later be formalized.

The Secretary replied that he would have to take this matter under advisement. There were some practical problems. Certainly the United States recognized that effective disarmament, at least in the long run, would require the participation of Peiping. In this connection, he cited the US position in the nuclear test proposals providing for release from obligations if other governments, such as the Chinese Communists, did not tie in. However, there were some differences between this problem and the question of UN membership. Moreover, our experience in trying to negotiate with the Chinese Communists had not been encouraging. He commented that the Russians might also have found life with Peiping to be difficult.

Mr. Gromyko denied that the Soviet Union had difficulties with the CPR.

SECRET

SECRET

-18-

The meeting concluded with a discussion of what should be said to the press. It was agreed that as little as possible should be said, simply the statement that there had been an exchange of views on a number of problems of mutual interest to the two governments, and that there would be a further meeting sometime next week, the exact date and place still to be set (Mr. Gromyko indicated that he would wish to invite the Secretary and others present to luncheon at the Soviet Delegation's headquarters, tentatively next Wednesday, September 27).

The meeting ended at 5:25 p.m.

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Record Number 60306

Berlin Crisis
Memorandum of Conversation
Yes
09/21/1961

Donation

United States, Department of State

Akalovsky, Alexander
Kohler, Foy D.
Secret

Germany and Berlin, Disarmament, Red China
[Rusk-Gromyko Discussion]

18

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: 2:30 p.m.
September 21, 1961SUBJECT: Germany and Berlin, Disarmament,
Red ChinaPLACE: Secretary's suite
Waldorf Towers
New York City

<u>US</u>	<u>USSR</u>
PARTICIPANT The Secretary	Mr. Gromyko
EUR - Mr. Kohler	Mr. Semenov
S/B - Mr. Bohlen	Mr. Kovalev
D/P - Mr. Akalovsky	Mr. Sukhodrev
(Interpreting)	(Interpreter)

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Date: 3/9/92

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Following the luncheon the Secretary opened the discussion, saying that he was glad that Mr. Gromyko had been able to lunch with him and to have a talk about "Germany and Berlin". He said he should make it clear that although he knew the points of the other Governments concerned on our side, he was not speaking with a mandate from them. These were bilateral conversations. He would start by referring back to the conversations between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev at Vienna. He would recall that President Kennedy was very disturbed by what Mr. Khrushchev had said with respect to the Soviet position on Germany and Berlin. Much had also been said on the subject since that time. Therefore the Secretary thought it would be well if he explained as simply as he could what we considered to be the heart of the matter. He would therefore speak about the present situation as it appeared to us and Mr. Gromyko could then tell us whether this was a correct presentation from their point of view.

The Soviet Government, the Secretary said, states that it is putting forward certain proposals with respect to Germany, but that if these are not accepted by the West then

SECRET

- 2 -

the Soviet Union will conclude a peace treaty with the East Germans. Up to this point we are presented with no overwhelming problem because, even though we may dislike it and not agree, we cannot prevent the signature of such a document. As we see it the crisis occurs because the Soviet Government states that this act will terminate allied rights and that access to West Berlin will then be subject to the agreement and consent of the East German regime. At this point the Soviets would be moving against what President Kennedy has described as three vital interests of the United States. Not only are these vital interests but they represent fundamental commitments of the United States and its NATO allies. Thus we are in a situation when the United States is not moving in any way against the USSR but the Soviet Government is taking the initiative against the vital interests of the United States and its allies. This is the situation that is dangerous. He was not threatening but he would say that we consider ourselves to be under a threat. We do not want an arms race but we will not draw away from it in these circumstances. We do not want a conflict but we will have to prepare and be ready to face one if it is forced upon us.

The Secretary continued that both sides must know clearly what are the vital interests of the other so that there can be no mistake. If the Soviet Government has concerns which have not been made known to us officially, he was prepared to hear them.

We believe, the Secretary said, and we believe you believe that our two countries share a common interest in preventing war. We also believe and believe you believe that each side has vital interests which are not the same but perhaps parallel, but that we still have a common interest in finding ways to live at peace in the world. The Soviet proposals did not seem to us to be put forward in a spirit of discussion and negotiation but rather as a sort of unilateral edict. The Secretary quoted the Soviet formula that the urgent and important question was "the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany and the solution on this basis of the problem of West Berlin." Such a formula left little or no room for discussion or negotiation as these terms are commonly understood.

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

From time to time, the Secretary went on, there were some remarks from the Soviet side which if taken out of context seemed to us reasonable. Consequently we had felt that quiet talks might clarify to each other what we consider our vital interests. We would see whether the crisis has to proceed to a grim conclusion or whether there is some way to bring it to an end.

Mr. Gromyko replied by saying that the Soviet Government had expressed its readiness to have this exchange of views between the Secretary and himself in order to discuss the question of a peace treaty with Germany and of settling the problem of West Berlin on the basis of such a treaty. He continued that the success of this exchange of views should be measured by the extent to which the two governments will succeed in drawing a line under World War II by signing a peace treaty with Germany. The Soviet Government believed that there is no problem today that is more urgent and pressing than the question of a peace treaty with Germany and of settling the question of West Berlin on the basis of such a treaty. The fact that the situation has become even more heated recently -- and this was not caused by the Soviet Union but rather by the Western Powers -- confirms the necessity of reaching agreement on or at least having some kind of success in this matter as a result of this exchange of views. Referring to the Secretary's remark that he wanted to obtain a fuller clarification of the Soviet position and of the Soviet Union's objectives in this matter of a peace treaty, Mr. Gromyko stated that he would try to set forth the position of the Soviet Government although that position had been outlined in great detail by Mr. Khrushchev in Vienna. He said that he recognized the possibility of the US Government's not having a completely clear picture of the Soviet position and objectives. Therefore he wished to indicate why the Soviet Union had raised this question and why it believed a peace treaty was so urgent and brooked no delay. As the Secretary knew, sixteen years had passed since World War II. Likewise the Secretary knew that the period of occupation after a war was always terminated by

SECRET

SECRET

- 4 -

A peace treaty if no peace treaty was signed immediately after the cessation of hostilities. In spite of the fact that sixteen years have passed there is still no peace treaty with Germany. The reason why the Soviet Union believed it to be necessary to have a peace treaty signed is that it is convinced that such a treaty would place obstacles in the way of the development of revanchism and militarism in West Germany. West German leaders have been raising the question of a revision of borders in Europe and the Soviet Union believes that a peace treaty would codify juridically the borders which have been shaped as a result of World War II. A peace treaty would also change radically the abnormal relations between West Germany and the GDR. As is well known, now the relations between West Germany and the GDR are far from normal and this is due to the aggressive policy of West Germany toward the GDR. West Germany does not conceal its intention to swallow the GDR; however, it should know that this is an adventurous policy. Likewise a peace treaty would eliminate the cause of aggravation in the relations between the US and the USSR and indeed among all big powers. Such a treaty would also eliminate the cause of the rise in temperature in Germany and Europe, which are in a feverish state like a sick man. The Soviet Government believes that the wisdom of policy should be measured not by the degree to which the militarists and revanchists of other countries succeed in setting our two countries of loggerheads but rather by the degree to which we succeed in staying away from the brink of war, a war which would be a thermo-nuclear one, and by the success in averting such war. Such should be the yardstick in appraising the policy of the great powers and particularly of the United States and the USSR in view of their significance in Europe and elsewhere. A peace treaty must be based on the actual situation now prevailing in Germany and Europe, i.e., on the fact that there are two German states in existence, the GDR and the FRG. Therefore the Soviet Union proposes that a peace treaty be signed with both states. There could be one treaty with two states or two separate treaties one with each of the two states. The fact that some officials

SECRET

SECRET

- 5 -

in the West dislike the situation in the GDR or the leaders of that state should not be an obstacle. After all some states do not like the situation prevailing in West Germany. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it dislikes the present situation in West Germany because it resembles very much the situation prevailing in Hitler's Germany. There have been statements to the effect that a peace treaty with the two German states would make unification of the two Germanies or rapprochement between them more difficult. This argument holds no water because the Soviet Union believes that if unification is possible at all it can be achieved not by heating the situation existing between the two German states but rather by a peace treaty under which both German states would undertake to refrain from the use of arms and to settle their problems by peaceful means. A rapprochement between the two German states would be brought about by a detente in Germany and throughout Europe. Mr. Gromyko repeated that only a peace treaty would increase the chances of German unification, if there are such chances at all. Thus this argument proves just the opposite of what it is intended to prove. If one of the two German states, namely the ^{FRG} ~~FRG~~, sharpens its knife with the intention of plunging it into ^{the} GDR's back, the latter will not remain passive and will call its allies for help. This would of course not promote any rapprochement and would only deepen the rift. On the other hand a peace treaty signed by all states which participated in the war against Germany would further the cause of rapprochement between the two German states. These two states are not entirely different; the difference between them is as deep as possible because the two states have different social systems. Therefore they cannot be brought closer together on any basis except the basis of foreign policy. Of course there is another possibility -- that of a military solution -- but the United States and the Soviet Union are great powers and both of them know what that would mean. Mr. Gromyko reiterated that if there is a possibility of rapprochement between the two German states it exists only on the basis of foreign policy. Mr. Gromyko

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• 6 •

recalled that Mr. Khrushchev had explained this aspect of the problem in Vienna. Mr. Khrushchev had also mentioned the cheap demagoguery in West Germany with regard to self-determination. However West Germany leaves only a small detail out of sight namely that one of the two German states is a militarist state whereas the other is a socialist state and peace-loving by definition. Mr. Gromyko went on to say that the problem of West Berlin could also be solved by a peace treaty. There is an occupation regime in West Berlin today, which is the result of World War II and which is based on the various temporary agreements concluded among the allies after the war. However that occupation regime cannot exist indefinitely; it has outlived itself. Mr. Gromyko stated that he had been instructed by the Soviet Government that a peace treaty would terminate the occupation regime and would proclaim West Berlin a free city. As to the question of a free city of West Berlin, Mr. Gromyko said, there appeared to be certain problems and aspects which were of interest to the United States. He said he did not know what words to use so as to sound as convincing as possible. Mr. Khrushchev had stated quite convincingly that the idea of a free, demilitarized city of West Berlin did not signify the desire on the part of the Soviet Union or the GDR to gain hold over that city. The Soviet Union does not need West Berlin. It does not need its resources, its population, or its housing. The GDR -- and the Soviet Union knows its position -- is of the same opinion and is prepared to pledge to respect what the West calls the freedom of that city, i.e., the independence of West Berlin. Mr. Gromyko said that he wanted to stress this point as vigorously as he could and noted that if there was any doubt on the part of the United States it should be removed now. He emphasized that the Soviet Union was prepared to accept the strictest international guarantees and recalled the fact that the Soviet Union had made various suggestions on this point. The Soviet Union would be prepared to have forces of the Four Powers -- the U.S., the USSR, the UK and France -- in West Berlin so as to ensure what the Secretary had called US presence in that city. Another possibility would be to have neutral forces stationed in West Berlin

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SECRET

- 7 -

or as a third possibility to have UN forces in that city. Mr. Gromyko said he wondered what other more effective guarantees were needed if the status of West Berlin as a free city were to be guaranteed with the participation of the US, the USSR and the other great powers, or if necessary by the UN. He said that no more effective guarantees existed either in theory or practice. All this should certainly dispel any doubts the US might have on this point. Turning to the question of access, Mr. Gromyko stated that access was linked to a number of temporary -- and he said he wanted to stress the word temporary -- agreements concluded as a result of the unconditional surrender of Germany. A peace treaty would change this situation in the sense that the solution of the problem of access would have to be on a different basis. The Soviet Government and Mr. Khrushchev himself have repeatedly stressed that the signing of a peace treaty would not signify severance of all communications between West Berlin and the outside world. Neither would it signify a blockade of West Berlin because a blockade would strangle the city and its economic life. The Soviet Union opposes anything like this. Soviet proposals provide for free access to West Berlin. The only rule that the United States and the other countries should observe is that in view of the fact that a peace treaty would have been signed and that all communication lines including air run through the territory of the GDR, access would have to be based on arrangements with the GDR. Mr. Gromyko then stated that he was aware of the fact that certain US officials, including the President and the Secretary himself, had raised the question of how one could be sure that there would be freedom of access if a peace treaty was signed with the GDR. The Soviet Union's reply to this is that not only can free access be ensured but it will be ensured on the basis of Soviet guarantees. The GDR has stated repeatedly that it would also respect such arrangements. But even assuming that the United States, or the President, or the Secretary personally

SECRET

SECRET

- 8 -

does not trust the GDR, there is no reason for concern because both our countries would guarantee West Berlin's ties with the outside world. After all, don't our two countries rely on their own capabilities? If we cast doubt on our own capabilities or policies, then the state of affairs is gloomy indeed.

Mr. Gromyko recalled that President Kennedy had used the simile of a pipe which could be cut off in the middle, presumably by the GDR. The Soviet Union can state that that would be impossible and that such a possibility is completely out of the question. The Soviet Union knows its capabilities. Furthermore there should be reliance on international agreements because if there is no such reliance the situation is also gloomy indeed. Should we really refuse to sign any international agreements? Mr. Gromyko went on to say that the Soviet Government had weighed and discussed this problem of access and tried to understand why the United States Government regards this solution to be unacceptable. The Soviet Government has been unable to find any basis for such doubts on the part of the United States. In the view of the Soviet Union the question of access, which is frequently overdramatized by the West, is much simpler than it is represented. This problem would be resolved on the basis of a peace treaty. No vital interests are involved here, nor is the prestige of the United States or any other country in question. Of course all depends on the interpretation of what prestige means. There could be an incorrect, one-sided interpretation, but in any event the Soviet Union has no intention of injuring the prestige of the United States. Mr. Gromyko said he did not know whether the Secretary would agree with this but he thought that all nations, including the peoples of the US, the Soviet Union and other countries, would experience relief if this cause of tension was removed. Referring to the Secretary's remark that the US considered itself to be under threat, Mr. Gromyko stated that the Soviet Union did not intend to threaten anyone. The

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- 9 -

proposal to sign a peace treaty is no threat, whereas war is a threat. All the Soviet Union wants is to purify the atmosphere in Europe and throughout the world. Referring to the Secretary's statement that Soviet proposals implied that if they were not accepted a peace treaty with the GDR would be signed unilaterally and that therefore negotiations were not possible, Mr. Gromyko said this was apparently a misunderstanding. This was not correct. The Soviet Union has repeatedly stated that it is prepared to consider other proposals, by the US or by other states, relating to the conclusion of a peace treaty. Turning to the present situation and to the question of how the Soviet Union envisaged the further development of events, Mr. Gromyko stated that as before the Soviet Government wished to reach agreement with the United States and its allies, the UK, France and others, on the signing of a peace treaty with Germany and on the solution of the West Berlin problem on the basis of such treaty. Mr. Gromyko said that he wanted to emphasize that this was the Soviet Union's choice number one. Only as a last resort would the Soviet Union sign a peace treaty unilaterally -- to use the Secretary's term -- in other words do the same the United States did in Japan. If the United States action in Japan was legitimate why then is there such nervousness about the Soviet Union's intention to sign a peace treaty with the GDR. There can be no two rules of legitimacy possible. However, Mr. Gromyko said he wanted to repeat that only in that case would the Soviet Union be compelled to sign a peace treaty with the GDR. After stating that this was his reply, Mr. Gromyko added that, as to the timing, Mr. Khrushchev had stated the Soviet position in his conversation with the President and that he personally had nothing new to say. The Soviet Union believed that a peace treaty should be concluded this year. It also believes that there is possibility for reaching agreement on this question. Mr. Gromyko concluded by expressing the hope that the present discussion would constitute a beginning in that direction.

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-10-

After Mr. Gromyko's opening statement, the Secretary said that in the interest of moving things forward he would add to his own statement. He said he was certain that Mr. Gromyko would understand that we are not completely convinced as regards the reliability of new agreements put forward at the very time when it is clear that existing agreements are to be disregarded. It was true in one sense that the agreements made during and after the war were considered temporary, because it was then assumed that they would come to an end as soon as it became possible to conclude a peace treaty with a single German Government. It was not assumed, however, that one side would unilaterally bring them to an end before that time.

As to the principle of self-determination he said we believe that this opens the way to a solution which would have some chance of being workable and viable over a period of years. When "solutions" are founded on an artificial basis then a situation of instability results. He realized that the Soviet Government would not agree with him, but he felt that this principle must be taken into account because of its bearing on the longer term stability of any arrangement.

Mr. Gromyko had mentioned the so-called rearmament and militarization of Western Germany. We could understand why the peoples of Eastern Europe after their terrible experiences of the last war would be concerned about the rearmament of a Germany with aggressive designs. The Secretary recalled however, that the Western allies had not permitted Western Germany to rearm until after the East Germans had been rearmed by the Soviets in the face of Western protests. We were well aware that at the present time there were in East Germany not only the East German military forces but at least 20 divisions of Soviet forces mobile and well equipped. He recognized that these

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-11-

latter might be in part for East Germany itself but these forces nevertheless were a part of the military problem confronting the West. The Federal Government's rearmament was not aggressive and the Federal military forces were integrated into NATO which also was not aggressive. There was great assurance of stability and security in the fact that the Federal Republic is thoroughly integrated into the broader Western European community. The Secretary said he would not try to review history on which he and Mr. Gromyko would not agree. However, if Mr. Gromyko would examine carefully he would realize that NATO was conceived, organized and exists as a purely defensive organization with no aggressive intentions. However, he said, we are willing to look at both sides and to see whether arrangements can be found which would relieve tensions and give to both the East and the West a greater feeling of security.

The Secretary said he also wished to comment as to why the Soviet proposals on West Berlin are not acceptable. The area of greater Berlin was agreed to as a separate enclave within - it is true - but separate from the Soviet zone of occupation. In all Soviet discussions of the Berlin problem and in the Soviet proposals East Berlin has simply disappeared from the scene. We have been told that the subject of East Berlin is not negotiable. Thus having disposed of East Berlin without regard to its four power responsibilities the Soviets were now turning to West Berlin which is our area of responsibility under these agreements. The Soviet proposals ignored the simplest approach. If the Soviet Government wished to have troops in Berlin it could have proposed their stationing in East Berlin. If the Soviet Government wished for example to suggest the locating of the UN in Berlin then it could have proposed that this location be the whole city of Berlin. Mr. Gromyko had asked what better guarantee West Berlin could have than the Soviet proposals. The Secretary said he knew at least one answer: the proposals of the United States, Britain and France as at present guaranteeing the integrity of West Berlin and the freedom of its population.

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-12-

The situation is the same, the Secretary continued, as respects the access question. There is no mystery about this. For many years access rights have been exercised by road, by rail, by canal and by air. There was no need for the Soviets to reopen this question. If the Soviet Government wants to make an agreement with the East German regime, then that is one thing. However, he wanted to say clearly that our access rights are not available to the Soviet Government to be turned over to the East German Government. The Soviet Government cannot turn over to someone else what it does not have itself, that is, the right to dispose of our access rights. The Secretary felt that some illusion had been created by the physical location of Berlin. He would ask Mr. Gromyko rather to look at the political aspects of the question. For political purposes, he said, West Berlin is not 110 miles inside East Germany, but right on the demarcation line between West and East Germany.

The Secretary took note of Mr. Gromyko's remarks with respect to relations between the Federal Republic and the East German regime. He said that we, too, believe that relations between the two in such fields as trade are valuable and could be extended. This would be a good field to explore.

The Secretary said this had been a useful exchange giving both sides something to think about. He was concerned from what he knew and had learned of the Soviet position that the two countries would be on a collision course. Therefore, we must review and think on both sides about how to avoid this. He agreed that it was important not to let the situation get out of hand and develop into a direct clash. There was no reason why this should be as between the Soviet Union and the United States, both of us had big things to do at home; moreover, the arms race should be stopped and the arms burden reduced.

The Secretary said that when President Kennedy was in Vienna he had received a strong impression that the underlying intent of the Soviet proposals was to drive the West out of Berlin and pave the way for the absorption of the city. What

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-13-

Mr. Gromyko had said today had not wholly removed the Secretary's anxiety on this score. We trusted that Mr. Gromyko would understand that these were most important concerns and that we would welcome further clarification on these matters from the Soviet side.

The Secretary concluded that it was important for the two governments to keep in touch on these questions. He wanted to make sure that Mr. Gromyko understood that the U.S. does not have in mind to seek prolonged talks and negotiations as a delaying tactic. Surely the Soviet Government understands that there were some limits to discussion during the German electoral campaign. At the same time, he himself had some understanding of Mr. Khrushchev's complaint to the effect that "somebody is always having elections." The Secretary considered it important that talks keep us in touch and that we not let events keep us in touch. It was for this reason that he had recently called in Soviet Charge Smirnovsky on the question of the Soviet references to our air access, since unilateral action in this respect could very seriously get in the way of peaceful discussion. On our part we were not surprised at the Soviet reaction when the West German fighter planes landed in Berlin. Speaking quietly here, he could assure Mr. Gromyko that the West German flyers were not spies but were really lost. However, we would on our part try to prevent further incidents.

Mr. Gromyko said that he wanted to make a few remarks about self-determination. He said that it was difficult for him to believe that the Secretary was serious in raising that question. While the Secretary had not spelled out his conception of self-determination, it appeared that his conception was Adenauer's conception. If this is so then it should be pointed out that the German people expressed their self-determination in 1949 when two states, different in nature and organized on the basis of different social systems, came into being. Adenauer's conception is divorced from life and, Mr. Gromyko said, it was difficult to believe that the Secretary should seriously contemplate such an idea. Referring to the Secretary's remarks on the question of militarism and

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-14-

Evanchism, Mr. Gromyko said that he was not surprised by what the Secretary had said. After all, the United States is an ally of West Germany. However, Mr. Gromyko said, he was not impressed. The Soviet Union knows very well that Hitler's Germany unleashed a war which caused millions upon millions of victims and what is now happening to West Germany reminds very much of Hitler's days. This is not theory, it is fact. The United States states that it has vital interests, but the Soviet Union says that the situation in West Germany is of vital interest to it and to its allies. This is why the Secretary's remarks on this point, including his appraisal of NATO and German membership in it, are not convincing. The Secretary had referred to the formation of armed forces in East Germany. However, at one time the Soviet Union had proposed that a limit be set for armed forces in both West and East Germany and that such an arrangement be subject to control. The United States rejected that proposal. If troops in East Germany were of no concern to the United States at that time, then why are they now. Apparently at that time the United States weighed the possibility of demilitarization of all of Germany against the prospect of a rearmed West Germany, taking into account that something would of course be done in East Germany as well. The latter concept apparently prevailed; therefore why should the Soviet Union be blamed now? Furthermore the fact is that East German forces are no threat to the Western powers or anyone else. As to the Berlin question, Mr. Gromyko said, the situation would be different if West Berlin were located in the heart of West Germany. However the United States cannot escape the fact that West Berlin is inside East Germany. The Secretary had said that the Soviet Union should not over-emphasize the temptation caused by the geographic location of Berlin. This term is not applicable and is totally out of place. The fact is that East Berlin is part of the GDR. Its social order is the same as that in the GDR. On the other hand the social system in West Berlin is different and in fact the United States itself says that it wants to preserve that different system, or what it calls

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[System, or what it calls freedom. Mr. Gromyko then said that he wanted to make a few remarks on the question of negotiations and exchange of views. He said that he liked the Secretary's concluding remarks to the effect that both sides must search for a way out, for a way to avoid collision between the US and the USSR and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact as a whole. The Soviet Union is all for it and this is why it agreed to have this exchange of views, which was proposed by the United States. It has agreed in order to find a mutually acceptable solution. However, as the Soviet Government has repeatedly stated, solution cannot be postponed indefinitely. Sixteen years have passed; how many years should we wait -- fifty years? Referring to the Secretary's remark about the German elections, Mr. Gromyko said of course the United States know best what the situation was and stated that he would inform his government accordingly, namely that there was no intentional or artificial delay. He then stated that the Soviet Union was of the opinion that a peace conference should be called in the nearest future and that it would be best if a date for such a conference could be agreed during the present exchange of views.

The Secretary said he wanted to go back to Mr. Gromyko's earlier description in his opening remarks of the subject of his talks, and the interpreter read his notes on this point, indicating that Mr. Gromyko had said he was authorized "to discuss the question of a peace treaty with Germany and of settling the problem of West Berlin on the basis of such a treaty." The Secretary said this was a very narrow basis for a discussion. He asked whether we were in a long "Palais Rose" argument about an agenda; or were we talking about Germany and Berlin?

[Mr. Gromyko fuzzed his reply to this question. He said that the question of a peace treaty relates to a treaty with both Germanies. Thus, the whole German problem is involved.

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-16-

As to West Berlin, it is only a part of this broader problem.

The Secretary commented that he supposed he could take it that Mr. Gromyko was not excluding the broader approach, other than the proposals advanced by the Soviet Union.

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The meeting concluded with a discussion of what should be said to the press. It was agreed that as little as possible should be said, simply the statement that there had been an exchange of views on a number of problems of mutual interest to the two governments, and that there would be a further meeting sometime next week, the exact date and place still to be set (Mr. Gromyko indicated that he would wish to invite the Secretary and others present to luncheon at the Soviet Delegation's headquarters, tentatively next Wednesday, September 27).

The meeting ended at 5:25 p.m.

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ENCLOSURE B to JCS 2242/384

Report on the J-1 on Emergency Response
Requirements Program
for Allied Command
Europe

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. SACEUR stated* that existing telephone, teletype, and operations room procedures were grossly inadequate to communicate alert, status, execute, and mission result instructions and reports to and from his Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) Nuclear Strike Plan (NSP) Forces in the short time permissible. He therefore stated** a requirement for improvement of the existing means.

2. Recognizing the urgency of the requirement and realizing that implementation was feasible without major research and development effort, the United States offered*** to furnish and install terminal equipment to achieve the objectives of this Basic Military Requirement (BMR). The US offer was conditional on NATO assuming operation and maintenance responsibilities.

3. The FAST CAT system is designed to provide the current status of the Quick Reaction Alert Forces, as well as to permit the instantaneous alert and release of selected nuclear delivery units assigned tasks under SACEUR's Nuclear Strike Plan. SACEUR has provided* detailed descriptive data concerning operational aspects of the system.

4. SACEUR has submitted* a requirement for 236 manpower spaces, of which 59 are US spaces. He has offered to provide eight spaces from the current resources of various headquarters.

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Matthias

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 4-3-61

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DELIVERY CAPA-
BILITIES OF FREE WORLD COUNTRIES
OTHER THAN THE US AND UK

Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, and AEC.

Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

on 21 September 1961. Concurring were The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; the Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of his jurisdiction.

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NSEC 168/4

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DELIVERY CAPABILITIES OF FREE WORLD COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THE US AND UK

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the capabilities and intentions of Free World countries other than the US and UK with respect to the development of an operational nuclear capability, i.e., both nuclear weapons and compatible delivery systems,¹ over the next decade.

(NOTE: In this paper we deal with the potential of certain individual Free World countries and certain groupings of them to develop an operational nuclear capability at present levels of external assistance, the likelihood of their initiating programs, and also the forms such programs might take. Any significant change in the level of external aid would clearly alter the basic estimates in regard to timing, likelihood, and form, contained herein.)

CONCLUSIONS

1. The prerequisites to developing a nuclear weapons program are becoming increasingly available to nonnuclear states. Uranium is easier to obtain; many countries are acquiring research and power reactors and are training technicians; information on weapons technology is more widespread. Nevertheless, the inhibitions on deciding to start a weapons program are formidable. At the present state of the art, the most limited weapons program would cost in the hundreds of million dollars and a moderate program of sophisticated weapons and delivery systems would run into the billions. We estimate that over the next several years

there will be no technological breakthrough which would significantly alter the complexity and costs of these tasks. Furthermore, decisions on undertaking a nuclear weapons program remain profoundly influenced by psychological, political, and military considerations. (Paras. 5-15)

2. France, and possibly Israel, have already made the decision to develop operational nuclear capabilities. Assuming no increase of outside aid, we estimate their program as follows:

a. France will almost certainly continue its program, and by 1962-1963, if it overcomes the difficulties shown in the 1961 tests, it will probably have an initial op-

¹ The words "operational nuclear capability" are used with this meaning throughout this paper.

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erational nuclear capability using light bombers and compatible fission bombs. Provided France maintains a large-scale effort, by the end of the decade it could have a varied strike capability using aircraft, missiles with ranges up to 1,500-2,000 n.m. with either high-yield fission or thermonuclear warheads, and possibly nuclear-powered missile submarines. Loss of the Sahara testing sites could create major problems for the French. (Paras. 20-22)

b. *Israel* has strong incentives to develop a nuclear capability against its Arab neighbors and has received significant assistance from France. With the addition of plutonium separation facilities, *Israel* could probably produce by 1965-1966 sufficient weapon grade plutonium for one or two weapons a year, deliverable by aircraft. By 1968 *Israel* could also have its own 200-300 n.m. missiles. *Israel's* lack of space for testing weapons or missiles imposes a considerable obstacle to its programs. Without a continuation of the scale of aid *Israel* has received from France, the program would be delayed at least a year or two. (Paras. 23-28)

3. We believe that no other Free World country has made the decision to start a nuclear weapons program. Among the countries which might do so in time to

produce an operational nuclear capability before 1971 are Sweden and India.

a. *Sweden* is not likely to make a decision before 1963. If it then decided to pursue a weapons program, it could probably explode a device by 1965-1966, have a weapon deliverable by aircraft a year or so later, and fission warheads for domestically developed 500 n.m. missiles by the end of the decade. (Paras. 29-31)

b. If *India* decided within the next year or two to start a weapons program, it could have a modest capability, using aircraft and fission weapons, by 1968-1969. A decision by *India* to initiate a weapons program would probably be made only if the Communist Chinese first exploded a device, and if Communist Chinese foreign policy became more truculent. (Paras. 32-35)

4. We believe it unlikely that any other Free World country or possible grouping of countries will initiate weapons programs during the next several years. Even if they were to decide to do so, we believe that none except Canada could detonate a test device for at least 4-5 years after decision and could probably not, on their own, develop the types of weapons and delivery systems suitable to their needs before the end of this decade. (Paras. 17-18, 36-44, Table II, page 4.)

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Gaulle. As time goes by, however, it will become increasingly unlikely that any successor government, except a radical left government, would wish to abandon the effort.

22. French progress is heavily dependent on continued testing of both nuclear and missile components. Loss of testing sites in the Sahara would create major problems for the French program, the resolution of which would be costly and time consuming. Such a development could lead to basic modification in the French program—particularly after de Gaulle leaves—and could possibly result in greater reliance on multilateral arrangements within NATO.

Israel

23. There is considerable evidence to indicate that Israel is engaged in developing capabilities in the nuclear weapons and delivery fields. Israel, surrounded as it is by hostile Arab states, has strong incentives to have an operational nuclear capability. It has been receiving substantial help from the French in the nuclear field. Furthermore, Israeli technical abilities are of a high order. While the Israeli program may not now be directed specifically toward an operational nuclear capability, we believe that the Israelis intend at least to put themselves in the position of being able to produce nuclear weapons fairly soon after a decision to do so.

24. Israel is engaged in the construction of a 26 MW heavy water reactor and supporting facilities in the Negev near Dimona. The official Israeli position is that this installation is a necessary forerunner to the future construction of nuclear power stations. However, the Dimona site will also provide the necessary experience to develop a plutonium production capability beginning with the processing of ore, and proceeding through the separation of plutonium. There is also extensive evidence that France has supplied plans, materials, equipment, and technical assistance to the Israelis, and is also training personnel. Israel has also attempted to purchase ore from sources not requiring limitations on the use and disposition of the fissionable material produced.

25. Israel differs from other countries in that its targets are much closer at hand, i.e., the Arab countries, particularly the UAR, and the defensive capabilities of its potential enemies are not great. For this reason, its delivery system needs neither the range nor the sophistication required by other countries.

26. While Israel is not developing any aircraft, it is procuring planes from France. At present the Israelis have the French Vautour II-B, a subsonic jet light bomber, capable of carrying a nuclear weapon weighing up to 5,000 pounds, to a radius of 550 n.m. In view of past political and technical cooperation with France, it is probable that Israel plans to acquire more modern French aircraft suitable for delivery of any future Israeli weapons. The firing on 5 July 1961 of a meteorological rocket, SHAVIT II, reportedly of native construction and design, lends credibility to reports of Israeli efforts to develop an independent surface-to-surface missile capability. SHAVIT II is reported to be a multistage, solid propelled, unguided rocket which reached an altitude of approximately 50 n.m.

27. We estimate that the present Israeli reactor operating at maximum power could produce sufficient weapon grade plutonium for one or two weapons a year by 1965-1966, provided separation facilities with a capacity larger than that of the pilot plant now under construction are available. By 1968, the Israelis could also have a few 200-300 n.m. missiles, but these would require nuclear warheads of refined design. The costs of both a weapons and missile program would require annual outlays which would considerably increase military expenditures over the current level (\$232 million in 1960). A more serious impediment to the acquisition of an operational nuclear capability is the lack of space in Israel for conducting adequate tests for nuclear weapons or medium-range missiles. Further, the estimated rate of production of weapon grade material is so low that a test program might consume the material as fast as it was produced.

28. It is unlikely, therefore, that even a very limited operational nuclear capability, using aircraft, could be achieved until two or three

years after weapon grade plutonium first became available unless the French provide major assistance (e.g., testing facilities for weapons and missiles or weapons designs which would obviate the need for tests). In the absence of major French or other external support, we believe that the Israelis would probably still continue to work toward a limited operational nuclear capability, setting their sights initially on a very few nuclear weapons deliverable by aircraft. They could probably achieve this by 1967-1968, and would probably work diligently toward an operational missile capability at a later date, probably after 1970. Even if Israel should go directly to producing crude fission weapons of original design without any testing, we believe it could not have a weapon before 1966-1967.

Sweden

29. Sweden has so far avoided making any clear-cut decision in regard to a nuclear weapons program. Military leaders and some conservative political elements, as well as a few leaders of the governing Social Democratic Party (SDP) have agreed that an operational nuclear capability would discourage Soviet attack on Sweden, alone or in connection with hostilities between Soviet and NATO forces. Moreover, basic nuclear research of high quality is continuing, and there are some indications that a facility for plutonium separation is in the planning stage. However, the economic and financial costs, the strong opposition within the bulk of the SDP, and the fact that it will probably be at least several years before enough domestically produced plutonium becomes available even to conduct a test, have all combined to keep a clear-cut decision in abeyance.

30. The present government is likely to remain in power for several years more at least, and it has taken the position that no decision will be made before 1963 on the question of whether or not to direct its nuclear program toward the production of weapons. If at that time the international climate appeared to be calm, especially if positive steps toward disarmament had been agreed upon by the major powers—or there were reasonable hopes that

one would materialize—it is unlikely that the Swedes would decide to undertake a nuclear weapons program. In the absence of such reassuring factors and especially if other countries had already decided to produce nuclear weapons, the pressure to initiate a nuclear weapons program would probably grow sharply. In the event of a rapid degeneration of the international situation, the Swedes might prior to 1963 make a decision to have a weapons program. However, even on a crash basis we believe they could not have enough domestically produced weapon grade material to conduct a test before 1964-1965.

31. Sweden's basic aim in developing an operational nuclear capability would be to command respect for its traditional policy of neutrality. Sweden recognizes, however, that its only potential enemy is the USSR and hence their delivery systems would be primarily for defensive, relatively short-range weapons. Given this aim, the considerable costs involved, and its geographic proximity to Soviet targets, Sweden would probably plan a limited program involving development and production of high-performance jet aircraft and shorter range (200-500 n.m.) missiles with compatible fission warheads. Provided a decision were made to go ahead in 1963, and given Sweden's advanced nuclear research program, its nuclear power program and its industrial resources, we believe it could produce enough weapon grade plutonium to enable it to start testing about 1965-1966, to have a weapon deliverable by aircraft a year or so afterwards, and missile systems carrying compatible fission warheads by 1970.

India

32. The psychological and political factors opposing any nuclear weapons program continue to be strong in India. The cost and reluctance to divert resources from present economic programs also constitute significant barriers. On the other hand, there is clearly a mounting Indian concern with Communist China's foreign policy, and a growing awareness that probable Communist Chinese progress in the nuclear weapons field endangers

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if confidence in the US alliance decreased. In such cases, pressures for an independent capability would probably increase. Nevertheless, barring the unlikely return to power of a right-wing authoritarian government, we believe that Japan will not undertake a nuclear weapons program of its own in the next few years.

West Germany

39. We do not believe that the West Germans now have any definite plans for developing an independent nuclear capability. The foreign and military policy of West Germany continues to rest on the principle that the country's security against the Soviet Bloc depends on a strong and cohesive NATO in which US power and leadership play the central role. Moreover, the obstacles to initiating such a program are considerable. Treaty restrictions and lack of space for testing constitute hurdles to an independent effort. Furthermore, to undertake a nuclear weapons program in the near future would probably involve serious political dissension both within West Germany, and in the Western Alliance, and act as a provocation to the USSR at a time when the overall West German military strength is still limited.

40. On the other hand, West German interest in improving the strength of West Germany's military forces by acquiring modern weapons, and sensitivity to any indications that West Germany has a second-class military status in the Western Alliance, continue to increase. Moreover, as West Germany continues to grow in strength and importance, such feelings are likely to mount, especially if following Adenauer's departure present Defense Minister Strauss moves into greater political prominence.

41. Since 1957 West Germany has been carrying on a nuclear power and research program as well as research in missiles. Of particular interest is the work which the West Germans have done on isotope separation including the gas centrifuge process. If this latter process bears fruit, the separation of U-235 from uranium ore would be greatly facilitated. West German participation in a joint Euro-

pean space program will also give West Germany a boost in the missile field and help remove what gaps may still exist between itself and other major European countries on this score.

42. We believe that West Germany could detonate a nuclear device in four to five years if it made a decision to have a crude weapon suitable for delivery by large aircraft and could also develop in that period missiles with ranges up to 1,000 n.m. Weapons suitable for missile warheads, or for delivery by such advanced aircraft as the F-104, would probably take several additional years to develop and would require considerable testing.

43. Whether or not West Germany makes such a decision will depend less upon its technical capabilities than upon broader political developments, and the degree of prosperity and security which it derives from its Western Alliances. For the present we believe West Germany will continue to seek the benefits of nuclear capability through cooperation with its allies. Initially, and so long as NATO strategic doctrine remains responsive to what the West Germans believe to be their security needs, they will seek NATO solutions including a multilateral nuclear capability under arrangements which would give the West Germans as much voice as other NATO countries in the use, if not the direct control, of nuclear warheads. If frustrated on these matters, West Germans might look to some form of European cooperative effort to produce an operational nuclear capability. Failing all these, the West Germans might be then tempted to initiate an independent nuclear program, or even to consider some political accommodation with the Bloc. Such a situation, however, is unlikely to develop unless there are fundamental alterations in the concept and nature of the NATO Alliance which are seemingly in conflict with what the West Germans believe to be their basic security needs.

Western European Groupings

44. Extensive cooperation between France and West Germany, especially within the framework of a larger continental European

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Gen Norstad's
views

9/28/61

28 September 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL TAYLOR

SUBJECT: General Norstad's Views

1. General Norstad's Four Major Points.

a. Controlled development of any conflict. The Allies cannot unilaterally control any conflict with the USSR and thus may not be able to enforce a gradual, controlled development of the battle, particularly since it is unlikely the Allies will have the initiative in operations designed to restore access to Berlin. Consequently, the US must be prepared for explosive escalation to general war. (Para. "2" and 5)

b. Limits on Alternative Courses of Action. The Allies should not overestimate the additional alternatives for use of force provided by meeting force goals previously established by NATO as the minimum required for an effective defense of Europe, with nuclear support when necessary. (Para. "3")

2. Comments on the Four Points.

a. In essence, Norstad's comments are directed at two separate but related points, namely, (1) his ability to implement a "controlled escalation" strategy, and (2) the degradation of his own forces in combat

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b. General Khorstad cannot completely separate into entities any Berlin probes and his general war capabilities. Given the consequences involved, he therefore tends to concentrate on his general war posture and to analyze problems in terms of Soviet capabilities to deal with allied military actions over Berlin. Since General Khorstad believes we have less ability to influence Soviet responses than we think -- i.e., that it is more difficult to convey dissatisfaction latent in war than in peace, the "fog" or "noise level" being much higher -- he wants any error in planning to be on the side that puts him in the best position to meet the worst possible contingency. Thus, he is less concerned with what the Soviets might do than with what the Soviets can do.


3. General Comments on General Khorstad's Views.

a. General Khorstad first used these remarks (all except paras. 4 and 5) in commenting on the "Ten Questions" which were discussed at the session with the President on September 18, prior to the latest decisions on military buildup. Hence some of his reasoning -- e.g., that which speaks of defending against "massive conventional attack" by Soviet forces employing the initiative (paras. "3c", "3g", and "6") -- is not entirely applicable to the concept of a limited ground conventional effort to achieve the limited objective of inducing the Soviets to re-open access to Berlin.

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Memorandum

09/28/1961

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Taylor, Maxwell D.

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General Norstad's Views

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Norstad, Lauris

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Authority OSD/6 11/3/76

By LMY NARS, Date 3/31/77

M E M O R A N D U M

Memorandum of conversation between Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, Ambassador Gavin, Ambassador Finletter and General Norstadt at the United States Embassy, Paris, France, Sept. 30, 1961.

1. General Norstadt opened the discussion with a description of planned countermeasures in the event the Soviets or the East Germans seek to deny allied air access to Berlin. He said he had an agreement with the British to take such countermeasures on his own initiative. The French, he said, desired to have such steps taken only after the issue was referred back to the respective Allied governments. Nevertheless, General Norstadt said that he intended to act under his agreement with the British should the communists seek to force the issue in the air corridors.
2. General Norstadt then discussed the division of Berlin by the communists. He said he felt that if he were the military commander on the scene, he would have strung a hook across the barbed wire when it was erected, attached the hook by a rope to a jeep and torn down the wire. He also stated that he would have felt justified under the same circumstances in battering down the Berlin wall with a tank. However, he said he did not believe orders to take such action could be delivered by a government to a local commander.
3. General Norstadt expressed great concern over the situation in Steinstuecken, a small section in East Berlin under allied control. He said that Steinstuecken acts as a "magnet", attracting refugees from East Berlin. He said he had given approval to a helicopter flight of a group of refugees from Steinstuecken to West Berlin and anticipated another request for similar approval of another helicopter delivery of refugees within a few days. Meanwhile, he continued, the communists have intensified their guard around Steinstuecken and there was a distinct possibility that patrols would fire at the next helicopter that attempted a rescue. General Norstadt said he had rejected a request by General Clay last Sunday for a motor convoy from West Berlin to Steinstuecken as a means of asserting allied access rights. General Norstadt said that maintaining allied rights to Steinstuecken and probing communist intentions in regard to the territory presented very high risks of launching a war. He said that if the United States government decided, as a policy matter, to take such risks he would go along with

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the decision. But meanwhile, he said, there should be some thinking about the problem and a policy determination.

4. General Norstadt said he had been opposed to the sending of the Vice President to Berlin along with a battle group because he thought such steps should be saved to a later date as part of a calculated "build up" program in the "war of nerves". As the situation now stands, he said, another morale crisis in Berlin could be solved only by sending the President himself because "we have committed our reserves and I believe committed them too early." He said he believed that General Clay should have been sent first and the Vice President sent upon the next occasion of a slump in morale. He described the Vice President's mission as a "tremendous success" but thought it should have been saved for a time of greater urgency. He said he had communicated these views to Washington but had received no response.
5. General Norstadt expressed great admiration for General Clay and said he was "the right man" for Berlin. But he said that as he understood the matter, Clay had no authority and his presence in Berlin complicated an already complicated administrative problem. (At this point, General Norstadt had to leave in order to keep an appointment.)
6. ~~XXXXXX~~ Ambassador Gavin remarked that he did not see "how Clay can be effective without authority from the President to get things done." He said he thought General Clay should have "political authority" in Berlin but agreed that General Norstadt should have authority over NATO military action.
7. In response to a question, Ambassador Finletter said the administrative complications flowing from General Clay's presence in Berlin might be one of the reasons for a forthcoming trip to the United States by General Norstadt. He remarked, however, that General Norstadt has "diplomatic and political skill" and the ability to resolve complex administrative and personality questions.
8. Vice President Johnson then told Ambassadors Gavin and Finletter that there is a widespread feeling in the United States that America's allies are NOT putting as much into the defenses against communism as they should. He went over a document prepared by the Secretary of Defense which indicated that America's allies had not fulfilled any of their important commitments completely and asked how public criticisms on this point could be answered. These criticisms, he added, have reached a point where legislation to back up programs was in grave danger.

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9. Ambassador Finletter said that General Norstadt was expressing himself "quite optimistically" on the NATO buildup. He listed Greece and Turkey as being financially unable to do more than they are now doing; Portugal as unwilling to act because of the Angola dispute; Norway and Denmark as "the bad ones"; and Germany as doing everything it could "short of mobilizing." However, he conceded that most of the progress is in terms of "commitments" rather than performance. Greece and Turkey he described as "on the flank" of the allied defensive position and he said he was more interested in the "central front" where only Denmark and Norway represents a "weakness". He said that Danish and Norwegian memories of the German occupation was still so fresh that it was difficult "to get them worried about Berlin." Furthermore, he said, it is difficult to explain to Europeans the need for a conventional buildup in arms after the United States has stood on the concept of massive nuclear retaliation for so many years. Finally, he said that most Europeans do not believe that Berlin is the main crisis and expect the "big headlines" to come next year in the form of a crisis at some other location. But he expressed optimism on the European buildup and left with the Vice President a memorandum outlining the steps he thinks have been taken by the European allies to improve their contribution to NATO. He said the best way to handle criticism in the United States was to have General Norstadt make some statements on the subject.

10. General Gavin also expressed optimism. But he cautioned that "leadership is a lonely thing" and that it is not surprising that European nations are not putting as much into NATO as the United States. He described France as "probably the strongest ally we have in Europe" and said that General De Gaulle had anticipated the problem of the military buildup and it had started to take steps a year ago to meet it. He said that De Gaulle was "trying to get out of Algeria as fast as possible" so France will have more troops to commit to NATO. He stated also that he personally favored a "steady, slow buildup" over a fast buildup spurred by a military crisis which might collapse with the collapse of the crisis.

11. Ambassador Finletter said that in his judgment the NATO alliance itself is more important "than the buildup". He said that Khrushchev's major objective in Berlin had been to smash the alliance but this crisis had been met and averted. The European allies, he said, "now think the United States has leadership and they are willing to go along."

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Authority 01412 11/9/76

By hmg, NARS, Date 3/31/77

M E M O R A N D U M

1. The Vice President's conversations with NATO leaders in Paris brought forth three major problems which must be considered:

a) Despite the optimism of high officials, our European allies are still slow and reluctant in building up their strength.

b) General Clay's presence in Berlin has caused some administrative and possibly personality difficulties.

c) There is a need for clearcut policy guidance to the NATO military commander as to how he should handle the situation at Steinfurcken.

2. The fact that the European allies are reluctant to engage in the necessary military buildup is apparent from analyzing the discussions of Ambassadors Gavin and Silletter. Both claim the situation is improving and that they are optimistic. But both concede that the "improvement" is in terms of promises, rather than performance. Furthermore, after stating their optimism both discuss at length the reasons for European reluctance to rearm. These reasons may be completely valid. But they sound suspiciously like the classic alibi of the public relations official whose client is caught in an embarrassing situation: "The situation is entirely normal and we are doing everything we can to correct it."

3. The complications involving General Clay are due entirely to the peculiar administrative setup in Berlin. As it now stands, Ambassador Dowling has authority, the military commandant of Berlin has authority and General Norstad has authority. This leaves unclear the extent, if any, to which General Clay has authority. He has no control over the troops and no control over the civilian population. Apparently, he is primarily a symbol and General Clay is an active, "get-it-done" type of personality who does not react well to being a symbol.

Notes: Through State Dept. Liaison
Communication

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4. The Steinfuecken-East Berlin situation is a parallel-- in miniature--of the West Berlin-East Germany situation. It represents an opportunity for refugees to escape from East Berlin but then presents the problem of how to get them to West Berlin across 2,000 meters of communist-held territory. Furthermore, the refugees must be evacuated by helicopter--a far more tempting target to the communists than faster moving forms of air transport. Obviously, if we continue to evacuate refugees we must test communist intentions at the risk of war. We are already running that risk in Berlin itself but at this point we have thought it through and calculated the risks. We apparently have not done so in regard to Steinfuecken as the NATO commander does not regard himself as having clear policy directives and is "playing the situation by feel."

5. Recommendations:

- a) That some of the highest and most persuasive officials of the administration be sent to countries such as Norway and Denmark for personal "heart-to-heart" talks with the chiefs of government as to their contribution to NATO.
- b) That thought be given to clarifying General Clay's position.
- c) That a policy decision be made as to whether and under what circumstances the United States will continue or cease to evacuate refugees from Steinfuecken. Obviously, this situation could be "solved" only by "solving" the Berlin situation itself. But the NATO commander should have guidance at least as thorough as that he has on West Berlin and the access routes.

In principle, we must determine in advance what we wish to achieve and what will be the result of our various actions. Our present moves will then have the strength of liberation rather than the weakness of afterthought.

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MEMORANDUM

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WKC OCT 2 1961

TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S *WKC*

FROM: ~~WKC~~ - Roy D. Kohler *WKC*

Downgraded To: SECRET

EO 11652; XGDS 10 2 4

SUBJECT: Berlin Military Planning

Authorized by: H. D. Brewster

AUGUST 4, 1975 *WKC*

I attach a draft paper we have just received from Paul Hise which is an excellent analysis of the latest views of General Horsted and the JCS on strategy issues involved in Berlin Military Planning. You will probably wish to read this prior to the meeting we are trying to arrange for you with Secretary McNamara and General Horsted on Tuesday morning to prepare for the meeting with the President (which we now understand will be Tuesday afternoon).

Attachment:

Analysis of RACHUM and JCS Proposals

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Analysis of SACM and JCH Proposals

This paper presents a summary analysis of General Horstad's latest cable (ALO 855, 29 Sept) and the recent JCH Memo for Sec Def (World-wide Military Actions), together with some conclusions drawn therefrom.

General Horstad's Views

This cable can be interpreted as moving Gen Horstad's position somewhat closer to the strategy of graduated, non-nuclear military measures. However, it appears to adhere basically to his former views and requires considerable amplification.

The combination of actions he proposes, if the Soviets persist in denial of access, involves: 1) a "limited" probe, the "size and tactics" of which would clearly indicate that subsequent "use of significant force" by us is "logical and inevitable"; 2) "limited, selected offensive actions" to seize objectives which "enhance our defensive position" but which somehow also "emphasize special attention to Berlin and/or access thereto"; 3) these operations would be "initiated" on a conventional basis, but the US and NATO "must succeed" and thus must use nuclear weapons "intensively at the time and to the extent" necessary for success.

For valid analysis, this combination would require considerable spelling out, both in its detail and in its relation to the forces assumed to be available. Appropriate questions would include: 1) What would be the timing of the probe in relation to forcible denial of access, and of the "limited selected offensives" in relation to the probe?

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2) How would operations "emphasize special attention to Berlin"? 3) What is the definition of "success" -- holding objectives seized against any Soviet Bloc attack?, forcing open access to Berlin?, preserving integrity of forces? 4) How soon might it be expected that nuclear weapons would be required?

Subject to the detailed answers to such questions, the proposal seems to amount to the taking of military actions which would bring on the early use of nuclear weapons, perhaps in a limited way, with NATO forces in the best possible defensive posture. If this is a valid appraisal, it becomes important to analyze: 1) What non-nuclear capabilities General Forsted visualizes having available; and 2) What the probable developments in nuclear action might be.

General Forsted recommends the following preparatory measures:

1) immediate completion of the 40,000 personnel augmentation; 2) maintenance of the Sixth Fleet at full strength, especially in AEW capabilities; 3) logistic preparations for the support of additional forces to be deployed; and 4) readying of sea and air lift for rapid subsequent deployments. He does not recommend deployment of additional divisions at this time. General Forsted must therefore contemplate one of two situations: 1) access will remain denied (before or after a probe) for an appreciable time while a buildup is undertaken; or 2) he will initiate actions rapidly with the forces he has available. He appears to favor the second, since he states: "He must undertake the line of action outlined ... whether or not we are better prepared than at present."

If this is the case (and it might well be politically necessary at

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the time), then forces to sustain operations by conventional means would be relatively limited, and hence the use of nuclear weapons would come earlier.

The most probable results of such nuclear action under these circumstances would be escalation, gradual or rapid, in Europe or world-wide, depending on subsequent reactions on both sides. It is difficult to conceive of conditions under which the resulting exchange could end, short of all-out war, in which the US would occupy a relatively advantageous position. At any intermediate stopping point, assuming as we must that the Soviets had at least matched us in kind, the politico-military situation would be one in which we were still out-matched in usable conventional strength and under extreme pressure to avoid any further use of nuclears.

A possible (although less likely) alternative Soviet response to our initial use might be to fail to reply in kind, but to protest and warn the Europeans that they must get the "American madmen" out before all Europe was destroyed. Then we would have to: 1) press our temporary military advantage -- almost certainly to general war, or 2) desist under very adverse military and political circumstances.

General Norstad states that NATO would support his proposed actions, "if it is in the manifest intent of the US to proceed along these lines, particularly with respect to the determination to use atomic weapons". While General Norstad's opinion in this regard should certainly be given due weight, there is at least some evidence that NATO would not find this an easy course to adopt. The current attitudes of NATO nations appear

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divided and conflicting. On the one hand, they tend to reject any deviation from the purely defensive, nuclear-oriented NATO strategy of the past. On the other hand, many NATO governments (e.g. Canada) refuse to contemplate the use of nuclear weapons in any hostilities over Berlin. (The net result of accommodation to all these attitudes could be complete inaction.) Many Europeans seem to be particularly sensitive to "offensive actions" on our part -- especially if such operations are not clearly focused, politically and geographically, on a "legalistic" objective (e.g. the British worry about moving off the Autobahn proper).

In view of the foregoing, General Horstad's proposal (unless more adequately explained) does not seem a wholly consistent and practicable alternative.

Thus, other possibilities should be more carefully examined. These include: 1) an immediate increase in mobilization and deployment schedules to provide in Europe the resources required for more graduated, and more extensive non-nuclear operations; and 2) world-wide actions to bring military pressure to bear, as an alternative or complementary measure to action in Germany.

JCS Views

These other possibilities are covered in the recent JCS recommendations which include actions in Europe and world-wide under the two conditions of "administrative" or "forcible" denial of access by the Soviet Bloc.

The combination of actions in Germany visualized by the JCS should access be forcibly denied may be compared with General Horstad's proposal. The JCS combination includes: 1) a platoon probe with simultaneous fighter

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sweeps of the border; 2) a battalion probe, with air support and a Corps in reserve in the vicinity of Helmstedt; 3) commitment of the lead division of this Corps on a Helmstedt-Berlin axis, followed by remaining elements if necessary, all with direct air support; and 4) no use of nuclear weapons except if necessary to reply in kind, to meet a massive attack and retain integrity of forces, or in response to the overrunning of West Berlin.

This proposal is essentially different from General Horsted's in several respects: 1) it goes into some detail as to the nature of operations; 2) it represents a more graduated approach; 3) it focuses more closely on the political issue; 4) it appreciably delays resort to nuclear weapons. There are however some key considerations involved: 1) the actions are proposed "fully supported by NATO"; and 2) they assume a substantial non-nuclear capability which may not be available at the time required.

The question of NATO support has been examined in connection with General Horsted's views. Regardless of the course of action we finally adopt, these allies must somehow be persuaded that the US-proposed strategy is also in their best interests.

The JCS proposal is not clear on the timing of additional deployments to Europe to create the desirable non-nuclear capability. It would appear that the JCS may contemplate earlier action than does General Horsted, since they associate with "administrative" denial of access an action to "complete the deployment of augmentation forces to Europe."

The world-wide actions proposed by the JCS seem in cases quite severe under both of the "assumed conditions." In case of "administrative"

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denial

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denial, these include, for example: 1) declaration of national emergency and mobilization of the 1,000,000-man ready reserve; 2) naval harassment and denial actions; 3) deployment of the 25th Division from Hawaii to the Philippines; 4) initiation of a series of atmospheric nuclear tests; and 5) closure of the Kiel and Panama canals to KLOS shipping. Examples under the condition of denial "by force of arms" are: 1) implementation of SEATO/CINCPAC plans to regain Laos or support action against Vietnam, ("If the situation in Southeast Asia has not improved"); 2) closure of the Baltic exits and Turkish straits; and 3) seizure and sinking of Soviet ships, and shooting down of their aircraft.

There is no doubt that such actions world-wide would bring great pressure on the Soviets. However, they would also have certain potential disadvantages which should be carefully examined: 1) possible Soviet reactions are not easily predictable; 2) the over-all "geographic escalation" might lead quickly to general war; 3) there could be great pressure applied (e.g. by "neutrals") against such "geographic escalation"; 4) these actions could absorb resources which might be more urgently required for the immediate problem in Europe (e.g. Admiral Felt has recently strongly recommended that an additional division be deployed from general reserve to the Philippines; this could be done only at the expense of available reinforcements for Europe); and 5) at the termination of any local hostilities involved, we could be in a disadvantageous politico-military position in the respective areas similar to that earlier described in connection with the limited use of nuclear weapons in Europe.

A possible alternative which might avoid some of these potential

disadvantages

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disadvantages would be to concentrate on measures in sea areas of the world. There is, however, some doubt that any but the most violent measures in these areas would bring adequate pressure to bear. (CIECIANT, for example, in his reply to JCS questions has expressed the opinion that such measures would have to be associated with complementary actions in Europe.)

Conclusions

This summary analysis would lead to the following principal conclusions:

- a. Any kind of nuclear action should be deferred until all other possibilities have been exhausted.
- b. Some world-wide actions are certainly desirable, but these should be limited in magnitude so as to avoid depletion of resources.
- c. As a general principle, it is preferable to focus military effort as closely as possible on and in the area of the basic political issue.
- d. For these reasons, the JCS concept of operations in Europe should be preferred over General Horstad's proposals.
- e. In order to pursue this concept, further mobilization and deployment actions should be expedited to make resources available at the time they will be required.

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DRAFT/HFW/6 Oct 61

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: General Norstad's Discussions with the JCS on Monday, 2 Oct 61

The discussions did not appear to follow any set agenda, although the agenda attached at Tab ___ gives a general guide.

I. MORNING MEETING. During the morning meeting, General Norstad met with the Joint Chiefs and their Operations Deputies.

1. General Norstad was asked what could be done in Europe with regard to the Berlin problem. He replied that the United States could bring into position a statement of policy of which we could expect full NATO support. He stated that NATO would not agree to a 12 division assault up the autobahn in an attempt to reach Berlin. One of our needs is a clear statement of policy that will let our Allies know precisely where we stand. The wording of some of the questions and statements made by U.S. representatives leads other NATO countries to question our willingness to use atomic weapons to prevent the over-running of Europe. He stated further that some NATO countries do not agree with the "ordered escalation" which some of our people seem to think is possible. He compared escalation to a chemical reaction wherein a certain series of steps is followed. However, the reaction could be so rapid that it is uncontrollable.

2. When asked how do we restore our rights in Berlin, General Norstad replied that his thinking along this line is reflected in his reply to General Lemnitzer's question and he also believes that this reflects NATO thinking. (See JCS 1653 and ALO 855.) He quoted from his remarks on the draft Quadripartite Directive. He stated that NATO approves the LIVE OAK type planning and is giving authority to go beyond this.

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3. At this point, Colonel Ware gave a short briefing on General Norstad's directive to CINCENT on limited offensive actions and reviewed General Speidell's reply. General Norstad pointed out that it was not suggested that these actions should be taken but that we should certainly plan for them. *

4. The subject of reinforcement of Europe was brought up. General Norstad stated that he wanted the following:

- a. 40,000 Army personnel to round out the units presently in Europe;
- b. An armored cavalry regiment as soon as he could get it; and
- c. An infantry battle group to replace the one presently in Berlin. This unit should remain in Europe after deployment on Exercise LONG THRUST.

He stated that he did not, at the present time, want any divisions deployed to Europe. His feeling was that this would stimulate a like reaction on the part of the Soviets and such a process would serve no useful purpose. Further, deployment of divisions to Europe would commit all our reserves too early in the game. In any case, these divisions could not make the difference between success and failure in general war. Such action could permit the Soviets to call us war-mongers should they decide to sign a peace treaty with provisions which would not change current rights for access to West Berlin.

General Norstad stated that he did not wish to discuss the Air Force build-up in Europe at this time but wanted to give it further study.

* Briefing repeated at afternoon meeting.

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II. AFTERNOON MEETING. Secretary McNamara and Assistant Secretaries Gilpatric and Nitze joined those who attended the morning meeting. This meeting followed the same program as the morning meeting, and the following additional points were made:

1. Secretary McNamara stated his concern that Allied requirements for material and equipment for the short term build-up in NATO were not being sufficiently expedited. He said there was no single agency to handle this in that certain countries dealt through MAP and others had bilateral arrangements with the United States. General Norstad offered to contact all NATO countries and ask them to expedite their plans on these requirements. Secretary McNamara will direct DOD personnel to study the U.S. aspects of this problem.

2. Secretary McNamara asked how soon after his call for reinforcement would General Norstad want augmentation divisions to arrive in Europe. General Norstad replied as follows:

a. He would want the first 2 to 3 divisions within 10 to 14 days.

b. The remaining 3 or 4 Army and 2 Marine divisions should follow within 30 days after warning. However, this could change with the situation existing at the time.


c. Secretary McNamara agreed to inform General Norstad the ability of the U.S. to meet the above requirements.

3. When asked when he would evacuate dependents from Europe, General Norstad replied that he would evacuate them when their presence interfered with actions in Europe. He thought that he would recommend evacuation of dependents at the time he called for the 6 divisions. The transportation deploying the 6 divisions would be used to return dependents.

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In this respect, the present plan does not provide for sufficiently rapid evacuation of dependents. A new plan will be developed for more rapid evacuation.



5. In response to the question of what General Norstad thought might be negotiable regarding the Berlin situation, he replied as follows:

- a. The Oder-Nesse line.
- b. Berlin as a capital of West Germany.
- c. Access procedures.
- d. Control and inspection areas.

He summarized by stating that the political people must use their imagination and come up with ideas on this subject.

6. After again discussing possible plans for limited actions in Europe, Secretary McNamara agreed with General Norstad that what is required is:

- a. A catalog of plans which would provide us with options as opposed to serialized steps.

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b. A review of forces in relation to these plans and improvement of their readiness.

c. An appraisal and refinement of the plans.

7. During the discussion of possible actions which could be taken on a world-wide basis, General Norstad stated he would want ACE reinforcements immediately in the event of a naval blockade which involved shooting.

8. General Norstad was asked what sort of incident would warrant a decision to send the 8 U.S. divisions to Europe. He replied:

a. Interference with air access, which would be serious but not final.

b. Certain political developments which might arise.

9. General Norstad made clear in the discussions that NATO is involved from the first shot and that under certain conditions atomic weapons might be required from the outset. In any case, we should make clear to our NATO Allies and to the Soviets our determination to use as many nuclear weapons as soon as required to insure success of our actions.

10. With regard to the timing of our response to any Soviet action to blockade Berlin, General Norstad stated that our reaction must be immediate and must relate to the action taken by the Soviets. This would not, however, preclude our reacting in other areas not directly related to the Soviet action. Secretary McNamara agreed that any response on our part must be immediate.

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2. How far can you execute the limited offensives which you have been asked to plan with available forces without endangering your defensive front?

3. I understand that you do not want additional U. S. divisions deployed to Europe, but that you do want several available on a short term call. Under what conditions might you wish to call them? Is it not better to have them in place before a possible showdown? (In a separate memo, Taylor states his belief that Norstad is just pretending to want these on-call divisions.)

4. How can you convert this U. S. contingency planning into NATO planning? How can we get our Allies, particularly the Germans, to share our political and military responsibilities and risks? (This comes near to your deep present concern for avoiding a German attempt to put all the blame for any settlement on us. But both McNamara and I strongly agree that the wider political aspects of this not be discussed with Norstad. He should not be an agent for political arrangements, and he or someone else present might easily misinterpret your concern as reflecting some decision to give in to the Soviets.)

5. Are you satisfied with the efforts of our NATO Allies to increase their military readiness? What additional measures can we take to stimulate them?

6. Does he think there is a risk that a conventional build-up will undermine the credibility of the deterrent? (This has been Strauss' view, widely held in NATO, and some, like Nitze, believe Norstad has given it encouragement.)

I should emphasize that McNamara is as clear about his differences with Norstad as anyone. He simply does not see the good in pressing discussion of divisive issues when there is a growing area of agreement -- and no disagreement on current courses of action. He would put off the hard argument over contingency planning on ground access until we have specific plans to choose from. Norstad probably shares McNamara's preference -- though for reasons of his own.

My conclusion is that you can and should adopt both lines of discussion. It is important to work with Norstad; he is a very able and devoted officer; he is just about indispensable for NATO; and we all need to get on with an agreed effort. But it is also important to begin the hard dialogue between the President of the United States and his crucial Field Commander. If Norstad sets a very different weight on the uses

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of nuclear war from your own, you need to know it and you need to make him know who is boss. }

My suggestion (in which Max Taylor joins) is that if you find Nerstad's discussion in the larger group leaving doubt in your mind, you may want to have a much more private talk with him at the end of the meeting, perhaps with only Bob McNamara present. Then you could tell him -- or ask him -- about what nuclear war means -- to Europe particularly -- and tell him -- or ask him -- how many NATO leaders will really approve such a course at the moment of truth.

McG. B.

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FROM: E. J. Brandt: gw.

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Approved in S
10/6/61

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: October 3, 1961

SUBJECT: German Views on the Berlin Crisis

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary
German Ambassador Wilhelm G. Grewe
Assistant Secretary Foy D. Kohler
Mr. Robert M. Brandin, GEF.

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The Secretary said he had asked the Ambassador to come in because he wanted in the next few days to have a wide ranging discussion with him on how the German Government sees the problems now facing us. The Secretary was not sure he fully understood the German views. The United States and Germany were together on many important things, but the Germans seemed uneasy. The Secretary added there was uneasiness here too, but it was good to talk things out. He would leave it to the Ambassador to decide whether he felt fully briefed to have such discussions.

The Secretary said it would be extremely helpful, for example, to know how the Federal Republic sees reunification coming about. It is an objective and an idea, but a policy implies means of implementation.

The Secretary said it was also necessary to talk over the military problem. We are trying to make credible that which is not credible — i.e., the nuclear deterrent. A jump from three jeeps to nuclear war would not be believed by Khrushchev or anyone in the West. The question is whether the Western European countries are really ready to use nuclear weapons, or whether they are taking a one hundred per cent gamble that it will never be necessary. The Secretary said a substantial engagement on both sides of conventional military forces not using nuclear weapons would increase the credibility to Khrushchev and instill a sense of reality on our own side. It would be a clear indication we recognized there are things worth fighting for. 2/ The Secretary said he had some questions about the German attitude toward naval blockade and economic sanctions in relation to its reluctance to see ground action in Germany, particularly since the last might be the alternative to nuclear war.

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The Secretary said he would like to discuss our objectives, how to reach them, and how to relate them to the present situation. In short, the Secretary would like to discuss where we go from here.

[The Ambassador admitted there was uneasiness in Bonn as he had indicated in the Ambassadorial Meeting earlier in the day. He felt he was prepared to talk on the main points, but he would seek further instructions. He pointed out there were some difficulties during the present post election period in Bonn.]

The Secretary expressed the hope the Ambassador would seek instructions. He emphasized, however, that he considered his reports on his talks with Mr. Gromyko as privileged communications. He said they should not be discussed with political party leaders in Bonn.

Mr. Kohler pointed out that in a situation where political parties were jockeying for position, they would use such information against each other. The Secretary said he did not want to get into a public exchange to the detriment of United States-German relations and repeated his enjoiner that his talks with Gromyko not be made known to German political parties.

The conversation turned briefly to the formation of the new German cabinet. The Ambassador said the Bundestag would meet on October 17, 1951 to elect a new Chancellor. The worst case would be if no decision had been made prior to that date, because then the process could drag on several days.

The Secretary and the Ambassador then agreed to hold their first conversation at 5:00 p.m., Wednesday, October 1, 1951.

The Secretary thought some questions could be dealt with immediately. It was no secret, for example, that the United States is opposed to the expansion of national nuclear-weapon capabilities. The United States is prepared to give full nuclear support to NATO, and would welcome the ideas of the European NATO members on how this might be handled. Mr. Kohler pointed out that United States proposals regarding NATO nuclear capability never envisaged national control of nuclear weapons.

[The Ambassador said he thought there were questions about NATO nuclear power and national NATO forces using nuclear weapons in an emergency. He said the Federal Republic is keenly interested in retaining the delivery systems it has developed. Mr. Kohler said the talks with Mr. Gromyko did not affect this aspect of the situation.]

The Ambassador recalled the Federal Republic had unilaterally announced in Paris in 1954 it would not produce nuclear weapons. It would be reluctant to see this self imposed restraint incorporated in an international agreement in a discriminatory way.

The Secretary then said he did not have as clear a picture of the German attitude toward military planning and the necessity of fighting for Berlin as heretofore. There was a question in his mind, not directed at the Federal Republic alone, whether the western countries were prepared to go the way.

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If they were, why were they not ready to take intermediate steps? He referred to the general reluctance to get ready to impose economic sanctions. The Secretary said he wanted to probe deeply to find out what everyone is ready to do for Berlin. He knew and could say what the United States is willing to do.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

191
October 4, 1961

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Tuesday, October 3, 1961, 4:30 PM

Present: President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense
General Taylor, General Norstad, General Lemnitzer,
Admiral Anderson, General Smith - (Vice Chief of
Staff of Air Force), Lt. Gen. Munn - (Assistant
Commandant, Marine Corps), Mr. Allen Dulles,
Secretary Gilpatrick, Mr. Kohler, Mr. Nitze,
General Eddleman, Mr. Bundy

The President asked Secretary McNamara to summarize the results of his discussions with General Norstad. Secretary McNamara reported that agreement, and some disagreement, had been clarified in four categories.

1. It was agreed that our capability for different kinds of war would be increased, but there was disagreement as to how conventional warfare could or should be sustained. General Norstad thought this would be a matter of days, while the Department of Defense were thinking in terms of about a month.

2. The response to a block-off of ground access had been discussed. There was agreement about response to interruption of air access, but not on response to a blockade of ground access. The Department of Defense was inclined to non-nuclear and diversified responses, while General Norstad was undecided.

3. The broad needs of a military build-up were agreed, and there was also agreement that there need be no immediate deployment of additional U. S. divisions to Europe. General Norstad had asked that two to three divisions be on call in the U.S., for delivery within ten to fourteen days, and that six to eight divisions be on call for delivery in thirty days. There was doubt in the Department of Defense that the second request could be met. On the other hand there was agreement on the trading of air squadrons so that those which could be rapidly deployed would be in the U.S., while squadrons with a slower reaction time would be transferred to Europe now.

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4. There was clear agreement to prepare a catalogue of plans for a response in various contingencies.

At this point the President asked for General Norstad's views. General Norstad began by stating that he was often astonished to find how little resemblance there was between his real views and those which he read about in newspapers or in memoranda. In general, he had always advocated a balanced NATO force. All NATO programs call for strong conventional forces. There was no misunderstanding of the need for such forces, and they should -- if possible -- be used first. But once major forces were engaged, the United States must be in a position to use whatever forces were necessary.

General Norstad believed that words often become rigid and misleading, and he felt this way about the words "graduation" and "escalation". He thought he himself had the responsibility for injecting "pause" and "threshold" into strategic discussions, and he wished he had not done so. "Graduation" and "escalation" suggest a serial progression in which we move easily and by prepared steps from one stage to another of a development within our own control. This seemed to him unrealistic; he believed that in normal war escalation is apt to be explosive.

General Norstad had himself initiated LIVE OAK planning, two and a half years ago. These plans now include a series of probes graduated up to the battalion level. He had planned the probes for use, but you could not decide which one to use today. The probes, of course, include conventional weapons only.

General Norstad noted the interest in expanded planning expressed to the North Atlantic Council by the Ambassadorial group. Two months ago, with his NATO hat on, he had asked General Spetzel to plan for a raised level of action, to be used if other responses had failed and if the probes were unsuccessful or indecisive. These were selected offensive efforts, in three categories: 1) the purely conventional; 2) conventional with selected nuclear weapons; 3) a separate and selective use of nuclear weapons. General Spetzel had presented six plans. General Norstad did not like them all, but they did show what could be done.

General Norstad emphasized that we do not yet know whether there will be a form of action available between the battalion probe and general war. This is not a matter which we can control. The Soviets have at least an equal voice in the matter. General Norstad himself suggested that action at the division level would in all probability mean general war. He had reviewed a division, and it included a lot of people and tanks and trucks.

In concluding his opening statement, General Norstad emphasized that [the deterrent has no meaning except in the context of the readiness to use atomic weapons.] Repeatedly the question is raised in Europe whether the United States is in fact ready for such use. The Germans and the Chancellor ask the question again and again. These doubts, in General Norstad's view, could be straightened out by a sentence or two in public. The one central point of concern is this: do we intend to use our nuclear power if necessary?

The President said that in his judgment statements were not the answer to this problem. We had indicated our position often enough. He had done so himself at the UN; the Attorney General had done so recently; and earlier statements by himself and others had repeatedly emphasized the will of the United States on this point. In his judgment, what was creating uncertainty was not statements or silence in the United States, but the facts of the developing balance of capabilities. It is the growing relative atomic strength of the Soviet Union, and the increasingly terrible character of any general war, which is affecting the expectations of our allies. The President asked for comment on what we could usefully say or do in addition to what we have done. The Secretary of State asked what the Europeans themselves thought of the prospect of nuclear war. General Norstad said that [the United States could avoid the submission of documents which, by emphasizing strengthened conventional capabilities, appeared to cast doubt on the importance of nuclear warfare. Later in the meeting he indicated again that while conventional weapons should be strengthened, along with all NATO forces, the specific indication of absolute priority on this point was dangerous to the confidence of our allies.] Mr. Nitze, in this later discussion, pointed out that in fact it is conventional reinforcement which we do want from our allies at present, but the consensus appeared to be that we could work for specific improvements in the build-up without indicating a theoretical commitment to one kind of weapons, or one specific strategy as against another.

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The President asked why General Norstad himself could not indicate the determination of the U.S. to use nuclear weapons if necessary, and General Norstad said that he could find an opportunity to make such a statement, informally and on his own responsibility. He would, however, like to have such a statement cleared and approved by the Secretaries of State and Defense.

Discussion then turned to the circumstances in which nuclear weapons would or would not be used. The President pointed out that a general war was a form of "pulling the house down". We clearly would not do it unless we had no other choice. General Norstad said with emphasis that he would not use nuclear weapons if there were any other alternative. As to when such weapons could be used, he noted that when you have started a serious ground action, you cannot afford to get thrown back.

The President asked whether General Norstad felt that tactical nuclear weapons might be used in a limited area. General Norstad believed that this was possible, depending on the situation. He himself doubted whether the situation would develop in this way, but in some circumstances it might give one more chance of action before proceeding to general war. It was not impossible that the use of a limited number of small-yield weapons, precisely delivered on specific targets, would be a sensible course, and though it was unlikely, we should be prepared.

The President then asked whether we ought not to have a clear decision ahead of time on our proposed responses. General Norstad said that if he had to respond today he would choose Probe C, from his LIVE OAK plans. This is a probe of engineers and cars. A month from now he might want a battalion probe instead. The President asked what would happen if Probe C was stopped, and General Norstad replied that at that point he would force a fight with the battalion. If the battalion was beaten, there would have to be a prompt and larger reaction. Although he did not say so flatly, it was clear in the context of the discussion that General Norstad believed it would probably be necessary at this point to move rapidly toward nuclear warfare.

The President then asked Mr. Nitze what other governments' responses are, and Mr. Nitze reported that all LIVE OAK plans require government decision at the moment of action. There is no agreement in advance to approve any one of them. The President then asked how we could get our allies into agreement on political and military planning. General Norstad reported de Gaulle's belief that there must be consultation on every decision. Couve de Murville had recently called him in to say that the French were "tough as hell" on the Berlin question, even while reporting their unwillingness to give advanced approval for procedures for use in the event of interruption of air access. The British have done well on air access but have reserved the right to respond to anti-aircraft fire, probably on Macmillan's own decision. Other countries have insisted on a rightful opportunity to share in the responsibility of planning. The President asked if we can't somehow get some definite agreement on planning. General Norstad responded that planning is going forward. The President noted the French refusal to make an advance commitment and General Norstad thought that when we knew our view we should give them a further chance to make such commitments.

The Secretary of State believed that we could not get allied agreement in advance for decisions implying open war. What we could and should seek is agreement to 1) a catalogue of plans; and 2) taking of steps to put forces in proper position. General Norstad remarked that we have plans up to the level of division probe which are accepted as reasonable by other governments, subject to later decision on execution. The President asked whether General Norstad believed in the division probe. General Norstad answered that we should have plans for such a probe, and repeated his conviction that we must have a fight if ground access is interrupted.

The President remarked that as soon as somebody gets killed, the danger of major involvement is very great.

Returning to the question of allied agreement, the President asked how we can get them to say what they will do if there is a fight. The Secretary of Defense said that in his view we should get the NATO planning directive approved and passed to General Norstad so that the catalogue of plans could be developed in response to this directive. Then the President asked about our own views on these options, and especially our view of proper action once a

probe is beaten. The Secretary of Defense reported that the Department of Defense has views but has not discussed them with our allies and does not think they should be discussed in this way. The President asked whether we ourselves should not make such a plan and take some decision. General Norstad commented that if we know what we are going to do -- if we take the lead and show that we mean it -- we can carry these people. Even Adenauer is ready to lean on someone who knows his own mind.


General Norstad asked if we are firmly decided among ourselves on some form of probe in response to an interruption of ground access. The President said that we had considered reliance for a period on air supply but that we ought to decide. The Secretary of State said that there was a lot of paper on this point, that our current plan was that if there were interruptions there should be an airlift and not a ground probe and that there must be a delay before any such drastic action is taken. General Norstad disagreed, stating that if there is an interruption next week, it will be necessary to act, not wait -- to engage ourselves in a fight -- and not to let the interruption of our rights stand unchallenged. You have to react immediately, in order to see if the other man means war. Where will your allies be if you wait?

The Secretary of State said that the Western world is not ready for decisions which would mean a clear road to general war. There should be many other actions in between, like complete economic sanctions, a naval blockade and air action. General Norstad replied that he hoped before there was any such proposal, the European temperature would be taken. He does not believe that the Europeans are in favor of this course. He believes that they want a nuclear reaction. The Secretary of State said he doubted it. General Norstad said we should find out. Mr. Nitze remarked that it might be dangerous to find out. The President indicated his own doubt that Europeans would wish to go so far so fast. General Norstad offered in support of this conclusion the fact that countries are taking actions which are politically tough. The Chancellor held people in service before the election (but it was asked whether this action was not to his advantage politically). The Italians are taking steps,

although the British are not good. But it was noted again that there was no decisive agreement in advance on the battalion probe.

The President then turned the discussion to the build-up of conventional forces. General Norstad said that in strictly military terms he ought to ask for six to eight divisions now but that he did not wish to ask for them. There followed discussion of specific modest adjustments of other forces, and it became plain that in the view of the Department of Defense an on-call limit of thirty days for six divisions was not feasible. General Norstad then indicated that what he meant to do was ask for the best available time.

The President remarked upon the importance of the gold drain and the need for obtaining German help on this point. General Norstad said it was a great question whether enlarged U. S. forces would lead Europeans to do more or relax. He thought the Germans need another "good, hard crack" taken at them soon, and he thought that we might, by hitting hard and early, get something substantial. The President returned to the question of nuclear weapons and asked General Norstad if he would use them quickly. General Norstad said that you have to use them if necessary.



General Taylor then asked General Norstad under what conditions he would want these six to eight divisions in the light of his statement that by the military book he should want them now. General Norstad thought the book answer was wrong in this case. He thought it was useless to stack up more forces on both sides in a situation in which the end result would leave us still outnumbered. He thought it not unreasonable to look at this situation as one of two snowballs in which an addition to the mass and acceleration on one side led to similar action on the other. He doubted whether this movement would psychologically be a good thing for our allies. He believed that we were in a poker game and he pointed out that when this card has been played, we will

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October 4, 1961

Handwritten notes:
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Tuesday, October 3, 1961, 4:30 PM

Present: President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense
General Taylor, General Norstad, General Lemnitzer,
Admiral Anderson, General Smith - (Vice Chief of
Staff of Air Force), Lt. Gen. Munn - (Assistant
Commandant, Marine Corps), Mr. Allen Dulles,
Secretary Gilpatrick, Mr. Kohler, Mr. Nitze,
General Eddleman, Mr. Bundy

The President asked Secretary McNamara to summarize the
results of his discussions with General Norstad. Secretary
McNamara reported that agreement, and some disagreement,
had been clarified in four categories.

1.

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+ short war

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*Norstad: don't kid
yourself or cannot
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4. There was clear agreement to prepare a catalogue of plans for a response in various contingencies.

At this point the President asked for General Norstad's views. General Norstad began by stating that he was often astonished to find how little resemblance there was between his real views and those which he read about in newspapers or in memoranda. In general, he had always advocated a balanced NATO force. All NATO programs call for strong conventional forces. There was no misunderstanding of the need for such forces first. 215

General Norstad believed that words often become rigid and misleading, and he felt this way about the words "graduation" and "escalation". He thought he himself had the responsibility for injecting "pause" and "threshold" into strategic discussions, and he wished he had not done so. "Graduation" and "escalation" suggest a serial progression in which we move easily and by prepared steps from one stage to another of a development within our own control. This seemed to him unrealistic; he believed that in normal war escalation is apt to be explosive.

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The President said that in his judgment statements were not the answer to this problem. We had indicated our position often enough. He had done so himself at the UN; the Attorney General had done so recently; and earlier statements by himself and others had repeatedly emphasized the will of the United States on this point. In his judgment, what was creating uncertainty was not statements or silence in the United States, but the facts of the developing balance of capabilities. It is the growing relative atomic strength of the Soviet Union, and the increasingly terrible character of any general war, which is affecting the expectations of our allies. The President asked for comment on what we could usefully say or do in addition to what we have done. The Secretary of State asked what the Europeans themselves thought of the prospect of nuclear war. General Norstad said that

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Mr. Nitze, in this later discussion pointed out that in fact it is conventional reinforcement which we do want from our allies at present, but the consensus appeared to be that we could work for specific improvements in the build-up without indicating a theoretical commitment to one kind of weapons, or one specific strategy as against another.

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The President then asked how we could get our allies into agreement on political and military planning. General Norstad reported de Gaulle's belief that there must be consultation on every decision. Couve de Murville had recently called him in to say that the French were "tough as hell" on the Berlin question, even while reporting their unwillingness to give advanced approval for procedures for use in the event of interruption of air access. The British have done well on air access but have reserved the right to respond to anti-aircraft fire, probably on Macmillan's own decision. Other countries have insisted on a rightful opportunity to share in the responsibility of planning. The President asked if we can't somehow get some definite agreement on planning. General Norstad responded that planning is going forward. The President noted the French refusal to make an advance commitment and General Norstad thought that when we knew our view we should give them a further chance to make such commitments.

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The President remarked upon the importance of the gold drain and the need for obtaining German help on this point. General Norstad said it was a great question whether enlarged U. S. forces would lead Europeans to do more or relax. He thought the Germans need another "good, hard crack" taken at them soon, and he thought that we might, by hitting hard and early, get something substantial.

General Taylor then asked General Norstad under what conditions he would want these six to eight divisions in the light of his statement that by the military book he should want them now. General Norstad thought the book answer was wrong in this case. He thought it was useless to stack up more forces on both sides in a situation in which the end result would leave us still outnumbered. He thought it not unreasonable to look at this situation as one of two snowballs in which an addition to the mass and acceleration on one side led to similar action on the other. He doubted whether this movement would psychologically be a good thing for our allies. He believed that we were in a poker game and he pointed out that when this card has been played, we will

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not have it left to play later. When General Taylor asked under what circumstances he would play the card, General Norstad replied that he would do it only when the situation seemed bound to deteriorate. He remarked that there was no great desire in Europe for these forces, and although he did not say so directly, he may have believed that an early deployment would appear to indicate a shift away from reliance on nuclear weapons if needed. The President repeated the American position: we will not accept anything that we regard as a defeat, and we are just as determined as de Gaulle.

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Record Number 57076

<u>SET</u>	Berlin Crisis
<u>BC1</u>	Yes
<u>DOCUMENT TYPE</u>	Memorandum of Conversation
<u>DATE</u>	10/04/1961
<u>CIRCD</u>	
<u>TIME</u>	
<u>CABNO</u>	
<u>DOCNO</u>	
<u>ORIGIN</u>	United States. Office of the White House
<u>SIGNATOR</u>	Bundy, McGeorge
<u>DESTO</u>	
<u>DESTP</u>	
<u>DRAFT</u>	
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	Top Secret
<u>TITLE</u>	
<u>CTIT</u>	[Summary of Discussions with General Norstad]
<u>NAMES</u>	Norstad, Lauris
<u>NAMES</u>	McNamara, Robert S.
<u>NAMES</u>	Kennedy, John F.
<u>NAMES</u>	Nitze, Paul H.
<u>NAMES</u>	Couve de Murville, Maurice
<u>NAMES</u>	de Gaulle, Charles
<u>NAMES</u>	Taylor, Maxwell D.
<u>TERMS</u>	
<u>ORGAN</u>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<u>ORGAN</u>	United Nations
<u>PGS</u>	8

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

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Downgraded For: SECRET

EO 11652: XEROX

Approved For: R. D. Foy

August 2, 1975

TO: The Secretary

THROUGH:

S/S *MC*

FROM: EUR - Foy D. Kohler *FDK*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Ambassador Grewe today at 5:00 P.M.

There are attached for convenient reference the following:

1. Memorandum of my conversation with Ambassador Grewe on September 29 on LIVE OAK planning (Tab A) - 375/92961
2. Memorandum of my conversation with Ambassador Grewe on September 29 on other aspects of the German and Berlin problem (Tab B) 762.00
3. Memorandum covering your meeting of yesterday afternoon with the Ambassadorial Group (Tab C)

The specific questions asked by Ambassador Grewe yesterday are listed on page five of the third attachment.

In your conversation with Grewe yesterday afternoon you gave him a fairly good idea of the line of questioning which you will be pursuing. The fundamental problem, as I see it, is to make the Germans face up in a more realistic fashion to the nature of the choices before the Western Allies. Diplomatic immobility plus unwillingness to consider the kinds of military action in Central Europe which are the subject of the new directive to LIVE OAK does not add up to a policy.

Attachments

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Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: September 29, 1961

SUBJECT: German V

Planning

PARTICIPANTS: Foy
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*Gen. Groppe
ground ops*

Embassy
German Embassy

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States Mission-Berlin
n Embassy-Paris
USRO-Paris
Stoessel-Paris

In a conversation mainly devoted to other subjects (see separate Memorandum of Conversation) Amb. Grewe referred to the paper on tripartite NATO relations and the use of German forces in Berlin operations which Mr. Nitze had distributed in the quadripartite military sub-group. Mr. Kohler said he had not really studied this paper intensively although he had approved its distribution for working purposes in the military sub-group. He was under the impression that it more or less met German views. Amb. Grewe said that this was true with one significant exception. He recalled the German reservation in connection with the new planning directive for Gen. Norstad. Under instructions from Bonn, this reservation to the concept of extended air and ground operations, derived from a different strategic assessment. The German Government felt that the operation envisaged would be very dangerous, and would probably not succeed but instead result in the loss of important points in the Federal Republic such as Hamburg and Munich. Thus the Western Powers would end up weaker than before, apart from the grave risk of automatic escalation. The German Government felt that an alternative approach would be to pursue another set of measures in the maritime and economic fields, plus full NATO mobilization.

Mr. Kohler stated that the fact that we were developing one line of action on the ground related to our point with respect to the need for a wider range of choice of measures. These measures were essentially political in their objective. A purely military objective would be to destroy the war-making capacity of the Soviet Union. Western planning for extended ground action was intended to enhance the credibility of the ultimate use of nuclear weapons, if required. The Soviets were unlikely to be impressed by our intentions if they saw no Allied force build-up taking place. They could not consider it as credible that Western plans would go from a probe to the immediate use of nuclear weapons.

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Amb. Grewe said he understood this way of thinging but, to put it bluntly, Bonn felt that the other measures it was proposing such as naval blockade, economic embargo etc., were a clear cut alternative course of action, not something merely to go along with the extended air and ground military actions. This was the crucial point.

Mr. Kohler argued that the possibility of resort to the kinds of measures mentioned by Amb. Grewe would be more effective if preparations had also been made for ground action. Amb. Grewe commented that Germany was not prepared to participate in the large-scale ground action involving one division or more as set forth in the new directive to Gen. Norstad. Mr. Kohler commented that what you did in one field could strengthen you in another field by giving evidence of will and ability to act.

Amb. Grewe said that, in his opinion, it would be necessary to do two things in an attempt to persuade Bonn to change its views: a) to explain clearly how we saw the use of maritime measures, such as a naval blockade, as an additional Allied weapon rather than as a major part of a different and alternative course of action; b) to obtain Gen. Norstad's views on the proposed extended air and ground measures and how they related to the general defensive posture of NATO. Amb Grewe said his government was not convinced that General Norstad's views would be positive on this subject.

With these two elements clarified, Amb Grewe continued, it might be possible to clear up other outstanding points of difference. He also wished to note that the paper distributed by Mr. Nitze did not seem to take adequate account of the fact that all German forces are assigned to NATO. He did not see how these German forces could participate in any of the more extensive LIVE OAK actions unless they were a NATO action ab initio. Mr. Kohler commented that the basic assumption is that Germany can only be involved in military operations into East Germany when NATO is involved. Involvement in back-up operations would of course, be necessary from the outset. This was an area which obviously needed more working out.

Amb. Grewe said that, as long as the Western military build-up was not completed, extended air and ground actions were in any case not possible under the American concept. The maritime measures envisaged by Germany would in any event be required for an interim period. Mr. Kohler said this was not ruled out. The idea of an airlift and an economic embargo also related to this point of time. However, the Soviets must see that we are strengthening ourselves in other respects, including our capacity to carry out ground action. He referred in this connection to statements made by Khrushchev that all he really expected from the Western Powers in response to Soviet action on Berlin would be a break in diplomatic relations and an economic embargo, both of which he was prepared to accept.

Dr. Schnippenkoetter said a related problem was how planning could proceed for the terminal stages, beginning with the action to be taken by a division, without

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concomitant NATO planning. Mr. Kohler said this must largely be left to Gen. Norstad to work out. He would be communicating with Governments through appropriate channels. The answer to this question would become clearer as plans developed. The attempt to define this relationship too precisely now was what had given rise to the problem with the French. We might move to the conclusion that NATO must be involved from the outset. Amb. Grewe said the Federal Republic felt that a NATO alert must come at a fairly early stage in connection with the Trade Wind exercise.

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FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Bonn, October 4, 1961

THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR

10/4/61 (2)

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Dear Mr. President:

I thank you cordially for your letter of September 21. I was very pleased by your congratulations on the result of the Federal election and your words of praise for my 12 years' work as Federal Chancellor. I am glad that we agree on what is most important for the Western world, namely to preserve its unity and resolution.

I also want to take this opportunity to thank you sincerely for your speech at the United Nations, and especially for your firm stand in behalf of Berlin. Ambassador Grewe reported to me that you were disappointed by certain initial German press reactions. I deeply regretted this and am happy that these voices remained sporadic; by far the greater part of the German press and the German public have—as you will know—reacted positively to your speech.

Utterances in the press, on the radio, and on television, will probably cause us concern again from time to time in the difficult period ahead of us; and in this connection I would like, dear Mr. President, to touch briefly upon the question of European security, about which, unfortunately, the public is confused. One reason for

The President

The White House

Washington, D.C.

this is that the concept of European security is unclear and is used with different meanings. Moreover, even within the Western camp there are obvious substantive differences in the public discussion of this question.

The view which the Federal Government has advocated for years vis-à-vis its allies remains unchanged. To our mind zones of a special military status--no matter of what kind--would be disastrous, if not impossible, in Europe. The Soviet Union will in essence remain what it is, even if a certain degree of understanding is now reached. In the centuries of the Czars, at least since Peter the Great, Russia was already aggressive and intent on constantly increasing its territory, especially towards the West. Unfortunately, the history of Russia during the last centuries is largely unknown in the world. One has to know it in order to follow the right policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Communism has not weakened Russian nationalism; on the contrary, it has strengthened it. Mr. Khrushchev, too, in my opinion is primarily a Russian nationalist and only secondarily a Communist.

A special military status for a country of Western Europe, particularly the Federal Republic, will be a constant invitation to the Soviet Union to push farther into Western Europe. Such an advance would involve great dangers for the United States, too, particularly in the field of world economics. For this reason such a special status is unacceptable to us. Such a status would also lead to the dissolution of NATO and, in the course of a few years, would subject all of Western Europe to the influence of the Soviet Union. The Communist Parties in France and Italy are the ones most tightly and systematically organized and are directed by Moscow.

I am certain that we agree on these questions and I have communicated my thoughts to you only because I attribute especially great importance to this matter.

Yours sincerely,

(signed) Adenauer

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

Approved in S
10/12/61

October 4, 1961

DATE: 5:00 P.M.
Secretary's Office

Reunification and European Security.

SUBJECT:

Germany:

PARTICIPANTS:

Ambassador Grewe
Mr. Schnippenkoetter

United States:

The Secretary
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Cash

COPIES TO:	S/S	EE	Amembassy Moscow
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Ambassador Grewe said he would start with the questions the Secretary had posed in yesterday's meeting, i.e., what does reunification mean, and how do we get there?

He said that the common policy of reunification started in 1951 and 1952 with the negotiations concerning EDC, the liquidation of the occupation, and the Federal Republic's entry into NATO. At that time there was no practical prospect for reunification in the near future, and in this respect there is no basic difference today. There was, perhaps, a chance for reunification on the basis of the Soviet note of March 1952, but only on the basis of German neutrality. The Germans had rejected this because they felt that neutrality was not safe, as it would mean that Germany would eventually become a Communist satellite. They had entered into the EDC and NATO negotiations and had obtained solemn pledges on a common reunification policy. The Germans feel there is no basic difference today.

Reunification means preserving a Western offensive -- using reunification as the opening position in all East-West talks on Germany in all future negotiations. It is important that it be used as a maximum opening position, and that nothing be done to damage this. In addition, the Germans feel that it is of the utmost importance to keep the question at the present level without adding additional obstacles. The status quo cannot, of course, be changed, but it is important to keep the status quo as a nonrecognized status quo. If

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1. RELEASE 2. DECLASS. 3. EXT. 4. INT. 5. FILE 6. INDEX 7. SERIALIZED 8. FILED 9. EXT. 10. INT. 11. FILE 12. INDEX 13. SERIALIZED 14. FILED 15. EXT. 16. INT. 17. FILE 18. INDEX 19. SERIALIZED 20. FILED 21. EXT. 22. INT. 23. FILE 24. INDEX 25. SERIALIZED 26. FILED 27. EXT. 28. INT. 29. FILE 30. INDEX 31. SERIALIZED 32. FILED 33. EXT. 34. INT. 35. FILE 36. INDEX 37. SERIALIZED 38. FILED 39. EXT. 40. INT. 41. FILE 42. INDEX 43. SERIALIZED 44. FILED 45. EXT. 46. INT. 47. FILE 48. INDEX 49. SERIALIZED 50. FILED 51. EXT. 52. INT. 53. FILE 54. INDEX 55. SERIALIZED 56. FILED 57. EXT. 58. INT. 59. FILE 60. INDEX 61. SERIALIZED 62. FILED 63. EXT. 64. INT. 65. FILE 66. INDEX 67. SERIALIZED 68. FILED 69. EXT. 70. INT. 71. FILE 72. INDEX 73. SERIALIZED 74. FILED 75. EXT. 76. INT. 77. FILE 78. INDEX 79. SERIALIZED 80. FILED 81. EXT. 82. INT. 83. FILE 84. INDEX 85. SERIALIZED 86. FILED 87. EXT. 88. INT. 89. FILE 90. INDEX 91. SERIALIZED 92. FILED 93. EXT. 94. INT. 95. FILE 96. INDEX 97. SERIALIZED 98. FILED 99. EXT. 100. INT. 101. FILE 102. INDEX 103. SERIALIZED 104. FILED 105. EXT. 106. INT. 107. FILE 108. INDEX 109. SERIALIZED 110. FILED 111. EXT. 112. INT. 113. FILE 114. INDEX 115. SERIALIZED 116. FILED 117. EXT. 118. INT. 119. FILE 120. INDEX 121. SERIALIZED 122. FILED 123. EXT. 124. INT. 125. FILE 126. INDEX 127. SERIALIZED 128. FILED 129. EXT. 130. INT. 131. FILE 132. INDEX 133. SERIALIZED 134. FILED 135. EXT. 136. INT. 137. FILE 138. INDEX 139. SERIALIZED 140. FILED 141. EXT. 142. INT. 143. FILE 144. INDEX 145. SERIALIZED 146. FILED 147. EXT. 148. INT. 149. FILE 150. INDEX 151. SERIALIZED 152. FILED 153. EXT. 154. INT. 155. FILE 156. INDEX 157. SERIALIZED 158. FILED 159. EXT. 160. INT. 161. FILE 162. INDEX 163. SERIALIZED 164. FILED 165. EXT. 166. INT. 167. FILE 168. INDEX 169. SERIALIZED 170. FILED 171. EXT. 172. INT. 173. FILE 174. INDEX 175. SERIALIZED 176. FILED 177. EXT. 178. INT. 179. FILE 180. INDEX 181. SERIALIZED 182. FILED 183. EXT. 184. INT. 185. FILE 186. INDEX 187. SERIALIZED 188. FILED 189. EXT. 190. INT. 191. FILE 192. INDEX 193. SERIALIZED 194. FILED 195. EXT. 196. INT. 197. FILE 198. INDEX 199. SERIALIZED 200. FILED 201. EXT. 202. INT. 203. FILE 204. INDEX 205. SERIALIZED 206. FILED 207. EXT. 208. INT. 209. FILE 210. INDEX 211. SERIALIZED 212. FILED 213. EXT. 214. INT. 215. FILE 216. INDEX 217. SERIALIZED 218. FILED 219. EXT. 220. INT. 221. FILE 222. INDEX 223. SERIALIZED 224. FILED 225. EXT. 226. INT. 227. FILE 228. INDEX 229. SERIALIZED 230. FILED 231. EXT. 232. INT. 233. FILE 234. INDEX 235. SERIALIZED 236. FILED 237. EXT. 238. INT. 239. FILE 240. INDEX 241. SERIALIZED 242. FILED 243. EXT. 244. INT. 245. FILE 246. INDEX 247. SERIALIZED 248. FILED 249. EXT. 250. INT. 251. FILE 252. INDEX 253. SERIALIZED 254. FILED 255. EXT. 256. INT. 257. FILE 258. INDEX 259. SERIALIZED 260. FILED 261. EXT. 262. INT. 263. FILE 264. INDEX 265. SERIALIZED 266. FILED 267. EXT. 268. INT. 269. FILE 270. INDEX 271. SERIALIZED 272. FILED 273. EXT. 274. INT. 275. FILE 276. INDEX 277. SERIALIZED 278. FILED 279. EXT. 280. INT. 281. FILE 282. INDEX 283. SERIALIZED 284. FILED 285. EXT. 286. INT. 287. FILE 288. INDEX 289. SERIALIZED 290. FILED 291. EXT. 292. INT. 293. FILE 294. INDEX 295. SERIALIZED 296. FILED 297. EXT. 298. INT. 299. FILE 300. INDEX 301. SERIALIZED 302. FILED 303. EXT. 304. INT. 305. FILE 306. INDEX 307. SERIALIZED 308. FILED 309. EXT. 310. INT. 311. FILE 312. INDEX 313. SERIALIZED 314. FILED 315. EXT. 316. INT. 317. FILE 318. INDEX 319. SERIALIZED 320. FILED 321. EXT. 322. INT. 323. FILE 324. INDEX 325. SERIALIZED 326. FILED 327. EXT. 328. INT. 329. FILE 330. INDEX 331. SERIALIZED 332. FILED 333. EXT. 334. INT. 335. FILE 336. INDEX 337. SERIALIZED 338. FILED 339. EXT. 340. INT. 341. FILE 342. INDEX 343. SERIALIZED 344. FILED 345. EXT. 346. INT. 347. FILE 348. INDEX 349. SERIALIZED 350. FILED 351. EXT. 352. INT. 353. FILE 354. INDEX 355. SERIALIZED 356. FILED 357. EXT. 358. INT. 359. FILE 360. INDEX 361. SERIALIZED 362. FILED 363. EXT. 364. INT. 365. FILE 366. INDEX 367. SERIALIZED 368. FILED 369. EXT. 370. INT. 371. FILE 372. INDEX 373. SERIALIZED 374. FILED 375. EXT. 376. INT. 377. FILE 378. INDEX 379. SERIALIZED 380. FILED 381. EXT. 382. INT. 383. FILE 384. INDEX 385. SERIALIZED 386. FILED 387. EXT. 388. INT. 389. FILE 390. INDEX 391. SERIALIZED 392. FILED 393. EXT. 394. INT. 395. FILE 396. INDEX 397. SERIALIZED 398. FILED 399. EXT. 400. INT. 401. FILE 402. INDEX 403. SERIALIZED 404. FILED 405. EXT. 406. INT. 407. FILE 408. INDEX 409. SERIALIZED 410. FILED 411. EXT. 412. INT. 413. FILE 414. INDEX 415. SERIALIZED 416. FILED 417. EXT. 418. INT. 419. FILE 420. INDEX 421. SERIALIZED 422. FILED 423. EXT. 424. INT. 425. FILE 426. INDEX 427. SERIALIZED 428. FILED 429. EXT. 430. INT. 431. FILE 432. INDEX 433. SERIALIZED 434. FILED 435. EXT. 436. INT. 437. FILE 438. INDEX 439. SERIALIZED 440. FILED 441. EXT. 442. INT. 443. FILE 444. INDEX 445. SERIALIZED 446. FILED 447. EXT. 448. INT. 449. FILE 450. INDEX 451. SERIALIZED 452. FILED 453. EXT. 454. INT. 455. FILE 456. INDEX 457. SERIALIZED 458. FILED 459. EXT. 460. INT. 461. FILE 462. INDEX 463. SERIALIZED 464. FILED 465. EXT. 466. INT. 467. FILE 468. INDEX 469. SERIALIZED 470. FILED 471. EXT. 472. INT. 473. FILE 474. INDEX 475. SERIALIZED 476. FILED 477. EXT. 478. INT. 479. FILE 480. INDEX 481. SERIALIZED 482. FILED 483. EXT. 484. INT. 485. FILE 486. INDEX 487. SERIALIZED 488. FILED 489. EXT. 490. INT. 491. FILE 492. INDEX 493. SERIALIZED 494. FILED 495. EXT. 496. INT. 497. FILE 498. INDEX 499. SERIALIZED 500. FILED 501. EXT. 502. INT. 503. FILE 504. INDEX 505. SERIALIZED 506. FILED 507. EXT. 508. INT. 509. FILE 510. INDEX 511. SERIALIZED 512. FILED 513. EXT. 514. INT. 515. FILE 516. INDEX 517. SERIALIZED 518. FILED 519. EXT. 520. INT. 521. FILE 522. INDEX 523. SERIALIZED 524. FILED 525. EXT. 526. INT. 527. FILE 528. INDEX 529. SERIALIZED 530. FILED 531. EXT. 532. INT. 533. FILE 534. INDEX 535. SERIALIZED 536. FILED 537. EXT. 538. INT. 539. FILE 540. INDEX 541. SERIALIZED 542. FILED 543. EXT. 544. INT. 545. FILE 546. INDEX 547. SERIALIZED 548. FILED 549. EXT. 550. INT. 551. FILE 552. INDEX 553. SERIALIZED 554. FILED 555. EXT. 556. INT. 557. FILE 558. INDEX 559. SERIALIZED 560. FILED 561. EXT. 562. INT. 563. FILE 564. INDEX 565. SERIALIZED 566. FILED 567. EXT. 568. INT. 569. FILE 570. INDEX 571. SERIALIZED 572. FILED 573. EXT. 574. INT. 575. FILE 576. INDEX 577. SERIALIZED 578. FILED 579. EXT. 580. INT. 581. FILE 582. INDEX 583. SERIALIZED 584. FILED 585. EXT. 586. INT. 587. FILE 588. INDEX 589. SERIALIZED 590. FILED 591. EXT. 592. INT. 593. FILE 594. INDEX 595. SERIALIZED 596. FILED 597. EXT. 598. INT. 599. FILE 600. INDEX 601. SERIALIZED 602. FILED 603. EXT. 604. INT. 605. FILE 606. INDEX 607. SERIALIZED 608. FILED 609. EXT. 610. INT. 611. FILE 612. INDEX 613. SERIALIZED 614. FILED 615. EXT. 616. INT. 617. FILE 618. INDEX 619. SERIALIZED 620. FILED 621. EXT. 622. INT. 623. FILE 624. INDEX 625. SERIALIZED 626. FILED 627. EXT. 628. INT. 629. FILE 630. INDEX 631. SERIALIZED 632. FILED 633. EXT. 634. INT. 635. FILE 636. INDEX 637. SERIALIZED 638. FILED 639. EXT. 640. INT. 641. FILE 642. INDEX 643. SERIALIZED 644. FILED 645. EXT. 646. INT. 647. FILE 648. INDEX 649. SERIALIZED 650. FILED 651. EXT. 652. INT. 653. FILE 654. INDEX 655. SERIALIZED 656. FILED 657. EXT. 658. INT. 659. FILE 660. INDEX 661. SERIALIZED 662. FILED 663. EXT. 664. INT. 665. FILE 666. INDEX 667. SERIALIZED 668. FILED 669. EXT. 670. INT. 671. FILE 672. INDEX 673. SERIALIZED 674. FILED 675. EXT. 676. INT. 677. FILE 678. INDEX 679. SERIALIZED 680. FILED 681. EXT. 682. INT. 683. FILE 684. INDEX 685. SERIALIZED 686. FILED 687. EXT. 688. INT. 689. FILE 690. INDEX 691. SERIALIZED 692. FILED 693. EXT. 694. INT. 695. FILE 696. INDEX 697. SERIALIZED 698. FILED 699. EXT. 700. INT. 701. FILE 702. INDEX 703. SERIALIZED 704. FILED 705. EXT. 706. INT. 707. FILE 708. INDEX 709. SERIALIZED 710. FILED 711. EXT. 712. INT. 713. FILE 714. INDEX 715. SERIALIZED 716. FILED 717. EXT. 718. INT. 719. FILE 720. INDEX 721. SERIALIZED 722. FILED 723. EXT. 724. INT. 725. FILE 726. INDEX 727. SERIALIZED 728. FILED 729. EXT. 730. INT. 731. FILE 732. INDEX 733. SERIALIZED 734. FILED 735. EXT. 736. INT. 737. FILE 738. INDEX 739. SERIALIZED 740. FILED 741. EXT. 742. INT. 743. FILE 744. INDEX 745. SERIALIZED 746. FILED 747. EXT. 748. INT. 749. FILE 750. INDEX 751. SERIALIZED 752. FILED 753. EXT. 754. INT. 755. FILE 756. INDEX 757. SERIALIZED 758. FILED 759. EXT. 760. INT. 761. FILE 762. INDEX 763. SERIALIZED 764. FILED 765. EXT. 766. INT. 767. FILE 768. INDEX 769. SERIALIZED 770. FILED 771. EXT. 772. INT. 773. FILE 774. INDEX 775. SERIALIZED 776. FILED 777. EXT. 778. INT. 779. FILE 780. INDEX 781. SERIALIZED 782. FILED 783. EXT. 784. INT. 785. FILE 786. INDEX 787. SERIALIZED 788. FILED 789. EXT. 790. INT. 791. FILE 792. INDEX 793. SERIALIZED 794. FILED 795. EXT. 796. INT. 797. FILE 798. INDEX 799. SERIALIZED 800. FILED 801. EXT. 802. INT. 803. FILE 804. INDEX 805. SERIALIZED 806. FILED 807. EXT. 808. INT. 809. FILE 810. INDEX 811. SERIALIZED 812. FILED 813. EXT. 814. INT. 815. FILE 816. INDEX 817. SERIALIZED 818. FILED 819. EXT. 820. INT. 821. FILE 822. INDEX 823. SERIALIZED 824. FILED 825. EXT. 826. INT. 827. FILE 828. INDEX 829. SERIALIZED 830. FILED 831. EXT. 832. INT. 833. FILE 834. INDEX 835. SERIALIZED 836. FILED 837. EXT. 838. INT. 839. FILE 840. INDEX 841. SERIALIZED 842. FILED 843. EXT. 844. INT. 845. FILE 846. INDEX 847. SERIALIZED 848. FILED 849. EXT. 850. INT. 851. FILE 852. INDEX 853. SERIALIZED 854. FILED 855. EXT. 856. INT. 857. FILE 858. INDEX 859. SERIALIZED 860. FILED 861. EXT. 862. INT. 863. FILE 864. INDEX 865. SERIALIZED 866. FILED 867. EXT. 868. INT. 869. FILE 870. INDEX 871. SERIALIZED 872. FILED 873. EXT. 874. INT. 875. FILE 876. INDEX 877. SERIALIZED 878. FILED 879. EXT. 880. INT. 881. FILE 882. INDEX 883. SERIALIZED 884. FILED 885. EXT. 886. INT. 887. FILE 888. INDEX 889. SERIALIZED 890. FILED 891. EXT. 892. INT. 893. FILE 894. INDEX 895. SERIALIZED 896. FILED 897. EXT. 898. INT. 899. FILE 900. INDEX 901. SERIALIZED 902. FILED 903. EXT. 904. INT. 905. FILE 906. INDEX 907. SERIALIZED 908. FILED 909. EXT. 910. INT. 911. FILE 912. INDEX 913. SERIALIZED 914. FILED 915. EXT. 916. INT. 917. FILE 918. INDEX 919. SERIALIZED 920. FILED 921. EXT. 922. INT. 923. FILE 924. INDEX 925. SERIALIZED 926. FILED 927. EXT. 928. INT. 929. FILE 930. INDEX 931. SERIALIZED 932. FILED 933. EXT. 934. INT. 935. FILE 936. INDEX 937. SERIALIZED 938. FILED 939. EXT. 940. INT. 941. FILE 942. INDEX 943. SERIALIZED 944. FILED 945. EXT. 946. INT. 947. FILE 948. INDEX 949. SERIALIZED 950. FILED 951. EXT. 952. INT. 953. FILE 954. INDEX 955. SERIALIZED 956. FILED 957. EXT. 958. INT. 959. FILE 960. INDEX 961. SERIALIZED 962. FILED 963. EXT. 964. INT. 965. FILE 966. INDEX 967. SERIALIZED 968. FILED 969. EXT. 970. INT. 971. FILE 972. INDEX 973. SERIALIZED 974. FILED 975. EXT. 976. INT. 977. FILE 978. INDEX 979. SERIALIZED 980. FILED 981. EXT. 982. INT. 983. FILE 984. INDEX 985. SERIALIZED 986. FILED 987. EXT. 988. INT. 989. FILE 990. INDEX 991. SERIALIZED 992. FILED 993. EXT. 994. INT. 995. FILE 996. INDEX 997. SERIALIZED 998. FILED 999. EXT. 1000. INT. 1001. FILE 1002. INDEX 1003. SERIALIZED 1004. FILED 1005. EXT. 1006. INT. 1007. FILE 1008. INDEX 1009. SERIALIZED 1010. FILED 1011. EXT. 1012. INT. 1013. FILE 1014. INDEX 1015. SERIALIZED 1016. FILED 1017. EXT. 1018. INT. 1019. FILE 1020. INDEX 1021. SERIALIZED 1022. FILED 1023. EXT. 1024. INT. 1025. FILE 1026. INDEX 1027. SERIALIZED 1028. FILED 1029. EXT. 1030. INT. 1031. FILE 1032. INDEX 1033. SERIALIZED 1034. FILED 1035. EXT. 1036. INT. 1037. FILE 1038. INDEX 1039. SERIALIZED 1040. FILED 1041. EXT. 1042. INT. 1043. FILE 1044. INDEX 1045. SERIALIZED 1046. FILED 1047. EXT. 1048. INT. 1049. FILE 1050. INDEX 1051. SERIALIZED 1052. FILED 1053. EXT. 1054. INT. 1055. FILE 1056. INDEX 1057. SERIALIZED 1058. FILED 1059. EXT. 1060. INT. 1061. FILE 1062. INDEX 1063. SERIALIZED 1064. FILED 1065. EXT. 1066. INT. 1067. FILE 1068. INDEX 1069. SERIALIZED 1070. FILED 1071. EXT. 1072. INT. 1073. FILE 1074. INDEX 1075. SERIALIZED 1076. FILED 1077. EXT. 1078. INT. 1079. FILE 1080. INDEX 1081. SERIALIZED 1082. FILED 1083. EXT. 1084. INT. 1085. FILE 1086. INDEX 1087. SERIALIZED 1088. FILED 1089. EXT. 1090. INT. 1091. FILE 1092. INDEX 1093. SERIALIZED 1094. FILED 1095. EXT. 1096. INT. 1097. FILE 1098. INDEX 1099. SERIALIZED 1100. FILED 1101. EXT. 1102. INT. 1103. FILE 1104. INDEX 1105. SERIALIZED 1106. FILED 1107. EXT. 1108. INT. 1109. FILE 1110. INDEX 1111. SERIALIZED 1112. FILED 1113. EXT. 1114. INT. 1115. FILE 1116. INDEX 1117. SERIALIZED 1118. FILED 1119. EXT. 1120. INT. 1121. FILE 1122. INDEX 1123. SERIALIZED 1124. FILED 1125. EXT. 1126. INT. 1127. FILE 1128. INDEX 1129. SERIALIZED 1130. FILED 1131. EXT. 1132. INT. 1133. FILE 1134. INDEX 1135. SERIALIZED 1136. FILED 1137. EXT. 1138. INT. 1139. FILE 1140. INDEX 1141. SERIALIZED 1142. FILED 1143. EXT. 1144. INT. 1145. FILE 1146. INDEX 1147. SERIALIZED 1148. FILED 1149. EXT. 1150. INT. 1151. FILE 1152. INDEX 1153. SERIALIZED 1154. FILED 1155. EXT. 1156. INT. 1157. FILE 1158. INDEX 1159. SERIALIZED 1160. FILED 1161. EXT. 1162. INT. 1163. FILE 1164. INDEX 1165. SERIALIZED 1166. FILED 1167. EXT. 1168. INT. 1169. FILE 1170. INDEX 1171. SERIALIZED 1172. FILED 1173. EXT. 1174. INT. 1175. FILE 1176. INDEX 1177. SERIALIZED 1178. FILED 1179. EXT. 1180. INT. 1181. FILE 1182. INDEX 1183. SERIALIZED 1184. FILED 1185. EXT. 1186. INT. 1187. FILE 1188. INDEX 1189. SERIALIZED 1190. FILED 1191. EXT. 1192. INT. 1193. FILE 1194. INDEX 1195. SERIALIZED 1196. FILED 1197. EXT. 1198. INT. 1199. FILE 1200. INDEX 1201. SERIALIZED 1202. FILED 1203. EXT. 1204. INT. 1205. FILE 1206. INDEX 1207. SERIALIZED 1208. FILED 1209. EXT. 1210. INT. 1211. FILE 1212. INDEX 1213. SERIALIZED 1214. FILED 1215. EXT. 1216. INT. 1217. FILE 1218. INDEX 1219. SERIALIZED 1220. FILED 1221. EXT. 1222. INT. 1223. FILE 1224. INDEX 1225. SERIALIZED 1226. FILED 1227. EXT. 1228. INT. 1229. FILE 1230. INDEX 1231. SERIALIZED 1232. FILED 1233. EXT. 1234. INT. 1235. FILE 1236. INDEX 1237. SERIALIZED 1238. FILED 1239. EXT. 1240. INT. 1241. FILE 1242. INDEX 1243. SERIALIZED 1244. FILED 1245. EXT. 1246. INT. 1247. FILE 1248. INDEX 1249. SERIALIZED 1250. FILED 1251. EXT. 1252. INT. 1253. FILE 1254. INDEX 1255. SERIALIZED 1256. FILED 1257. EXT. 1258. INT. 1259. FILE 1260. INDEX 1261. SERIALIZED 1262. FILED 1263. EXT. 1264. INT. 1265. FILE 1266. INDEX 1267. SERIALIZED 1268. FILED 1269. EXT. 1270. INT. 1271. FILE 1272. INDEX 1273. SERIALIZED 1274. FILED 1275. EXT. 1276. INT. 1277. FILE 1278. INDEX 1279. SERIALIZED 1280. FILED 1281. EXT. 1282. INT. 1283. FILE 1284. INDEX 1285. SERIALIZED 1286. FILED 1287. EXT. 1288. INT. 1289. FILE 1290. INDEX 1291. SERIALIZED 1292. FILED 1293. EXT. 1294. INT. 1295. FILE 1296. INDEX 1297. SERIALIZED 1298. FILED 1299. EXT. 1300. INT. 1301. FILE 1302. INDEX 1303. SERIALIZED 1304. FILED 1305. EXT. 1306. INT. 1307. FILE 1308. INDEX 1309. SERIALIZED 1310. FILED 1311. EXT. 1312. INT. 1313. FILE 1314. INDEX 1315. SERIALIZED 1316. FILED 1317. EXT. 1318. INT. 1319. FILE 1320. INDEX 1321. SERIALIZED 1322. FILED 1323. EXT. 1324. INT. 1325. FILE 1326. INDEX 1327. SERIALIZED 1328. FILED 1329. EXT. 1330. INT. 1331. FILE 1332. INDEX 1333. SERIALIZED 1334. FILED 1335. EXT. 1336. INT. 1337. FILE 1338. INDEX 1339. SERIALIZED 1340. FILED 1341. EXT. 1342. INT. 1343. FILE 1344. INDEX 1345. SERIALIZED 1346. FILED 1347. EXT. 1348. INT. 1349. FILE 1350. INDEX 1351. SERIALIZED 1352. FILED 1353. EXT. 1354. INT. 1355. FILE 1356. INDEX 1357. SERIALIZED 1358. FILED 1359. EXT. 1360. INT. 1361. FILE 1362. INDEX 1363. SERIALIZED 1364. FILED 1365. EXT. 1366. INT. 1367. FILE 1368. INDEX 1369. SERIALIZED 1370. FILED 1371. EXT. 1372. INT. 1373. FILE 1374. INDEX 1375. SERIALIZED 1376. FILED 1377. EXT. 1378. INT. 1379. FILE 1380. INDEX 1381. 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- 2 -

[a certain amount of recognition were given the status quo, this would damage the spirit of resistance in Eastern Europe and elsewhere.

At this point Ambassador Grewe quoted -- from a paper published by Polish exiles in London -- an article supporting German reunification with the argument that a hardening of the division of Germany would mean a hardening of the division of Europe.

The Ambassador continued by saying that the German government felt that any serious damage to the idea of reunification would give the Soviets added security, increase their self-confidence, and widen their freedom of action.

Any damage to the idea of reunification would, he continued, damage existing confidence of West Germans in the West. It would create an internal psychological danger in West Germany. It would seriously hurt those who favored the closest ties to the West. Up to the present time, the Soviet note of March 1952. had been the most crucial point in the Federal Republic's history. When taxed with their failure to seize this opportunity for reunification despite the neutralization aspect, those who supported close ties to the West always cited Western pledges of support for reunification as what West Germany had obtained instead.

The Secretary said that the US had no problem with reunification as a policy objective. If the road to reunification were not held open, tension would be increased in both West and East Germany. The aspirations of a divided people could not be ignored in the long run. The US was puzzled, however, as to how to move toward this objective. In its view certain things would -- over time -- contribute toward reunification in a sophisticated way. First among these was the arrangement -- the relationship -- the West Germans could establish with the East Germans. The more the West Germans became involved with the East Germans, the more they moved toward reunification.

[Ambassador Grewe said this was exactly the point of difference. Over the years others had urged this line, including Secretary Dulles. The Germans had never accepted this idea because they didn't see how it could promote reunification. There were, first of all, technical contacts such as the railroad, the waterways, the interzonal trade, and travel. With regard to the latter, there is a big difference whether it is private German citizens who submit to East German control or the Occupation Powers. As far as trade is concerned, interzonal trade was established on the basis of the Potsdam Agreement provision that Germany should be administered as an economic unit. In addition, the 1949 agreement had urged the expansion of such contacts, and thus the Germans were acting with a mandate from the Occupation Powers. The German dealings did not involve the problem of

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international recognition especially as they were kept at a low, administrative level. These technical contacts they hoped to maintain. Secondly, there were private contacts, which the Federal Government strongly favors increasing. This, however, is difficult because of East German restrictions.

The Secretary asked whether the Germans saw the possibility of expanding technical contacts in order to increase the attractive power of West Germany for East Germans.

Ambassador Grewe said they saw no need to increase this attractive power, which is already overwhelming. In addition, it does not influence the situation. It does not add to the political chances of reunification.

The Secretary observed that it appeared to him that a multiplication of contacts would improve the attractive power as compared with a severance of the contacts.

Ambassador Grewe agreed in principle but observed that in practice this would not be so because the East would demand a very high political price for any increase in contacts. They would demand the establishment of political contacts pointing toward confederation. In any increased traffic the East would only let the politically reliable travel, and thus there was always an imbalance in such exchanges. Confederation would not restore freedom in East Germany.

The Secretary pointed out that one major obstacle in developing more contact between Eastern Europe and the West was the large Soviet force in East Germany. He asked whether the Federal Government would not see some advantage in the thinning out of this force.

Ambassador Grewe responded that it would all depend on what price was involved in thinning out Western forces in West Germany. He felt the price would be very high indeed. The Soviets would require the removal of 16 divisions on each side, and West Germany would thus be denuded of all protection.

The Secretary observed that the Soviets would not get very far with such a proposal. He felt that if there were fewer Soviet troops to the West of them, Eastern Europeans would think much more in national terms. He envisaged a proposal whereby the US would say to the Soviets that it would keep no more than 3 divisions in other NATO countries if the Soviets kept no more than 3 divisions in other Warsaw Pact countries.

Ambassador Grewe said the situation would not be changed such as long as the Soviets could return in 24 hours.

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- 4 -

The Secretary pointed out that he wasn't speaking of disengagement, which was not profitable because it would create a vacuum. The thinning out concept was bound to come up in disarmament discussions, and he thought it would be a political gain.

Ambassador Grewe said it was hard for him to believe that the Soviets would withdraw more forces than would the West.

The Secretary observed that the great difference was that Western divisions would not have to be in Western countries to sustain the loyalty of the peoples of those countries, whereas Soviet divisions must remain in Eastern countries to sustain the loyalty of those countries.

Ambassador Grewe said that the big factor since the Hungarian Revolution had been the rapidity with which the Soviet troops could return.

Mr. Kohler interjected that, at the same time the Hungarian Revolution was going on, the Poles had been able to make certain gains along national lines. Once Soviet troops were withdrawn, there would be national opposition to their return. In addition, a considerable political price would have to be paid if they were to return.

Ambassador Grewe reiterated that the Federal Government would be gravely concerned over any thinning out on the Western side.

The Secretary said he didn't believe the Soviets would buy a US-USSR disengagement now because Western Europe is stronger than the satellites.

Mr. Kohler observed that the Soviets would pay a high price to get the US out.

The Secretary replied that this was probably true, but that the US was not going to get out.

Ambassador Grewe said that everything short of disengagement would be of the gravest concern to the Germans.

The Secretary said that European security measures could affect Germans in two different ways: 1) as Germans; and 2) simply because of the geographical position they occupy. For example, an arrangement aimed at providing security against surprise attack could not help but affect the Germans, not because they were Germans, but simply because they were where they were.

Ambassador Grewe said the Federal Government had the strongest objections to narrow zones of inspection because this would be the first step

toward creation

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- 5 -

[toward creation of a special status for central Europe, and because it would hurt Western defense. It would involve a complete change in the present NATO strategic concept. Secondly, not much could be expected of the Bundeswehr if they knew they were equipped with second-class arms.

| The Secretary said that he had been thinking only in terms of inspections of troop concentrations, order of battle, etc.

| Ambassador Grewe said the Germans could accept large zones of inspection, zones from the Atlantic to the Urals, but they could never agree to small zones.

| The Secretary said he wished to emphasize that he had not mentioned narrow zones to Gromyko.

| Ambassador Grewe said to be perfectly frank he must say that Bonn had been concerned over the fact that European security had been breached at all. To Gromyko this meant Rapacki plan, withdrawal of troops, narrow zones of inspection, and a general trend toward the neutralization and demilitarization of central Europe. This was of the utmost concern to the Germans.

| The Secretary asked what attitude the Federal Government had toward the disarmament proposals the US had presented to the UN.

| Ambassador Grewe said these had evoked a very favorable response, and he was certain the Federal Government would like to participate if these proposals did not imply a special status for central Europe, which would be the first step toward neutralization.

| The Secretary asked if the keeping of the doctrine of reunification clear was the central preoccupation of the Germans, inasmuch as they did not seem to see any practical steps toward its achievement.

| Ambassador Grewe responded affirmatively saying that the Germans had tried to be flexible in the case of the East Germans at the check points, but, he added, this could be made very difficult for his Government if it were presented as the first step toward recognition of the so-called "GDR".

| The Secretary said the US was not thinking of recognition.

| But, Ambassador Grewe responded, the whole Western press was talking of recognition, and the Secretary himself had said that there was no real difference between de facto recognition and de jure recognition. The Ambassador continued that recognition would be considered a serious retreat

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- 6 -

On the part of the West and do great damage. In addition, it would have the greatest impact on the people of East Germany and would be a psychological catastrophe.

The Secretary said that the US was not talking about recognition. It was, instead, thinging of the fact that East Germany was, after all, there. The West -- above all West Germany -- had had a wide variety of contacts with East Germany. He saw no prospect of a change in the fact of the existence of East Germany any time soon. Our problem was how to accept this fact while ruling out recognition.

Ambassador Grewe said this fact had been lived with for 12 years, and he saw no reason why it couldn't be lived with for years to come. The crucial point was not the question of diplomatic relations, but was, as Mr. Gromyko indicated, "respect for the sovereignty of the GDR." He said he hoped the Secretary understood the sensitivity of the Germans when they heard recognition on all sides.

The Secretary observed that he didn't believe Gromyko expected recognition of the "GDR." Ambassador Grewe agreed that Gromyko certainly would not expect formal recognition, but he would attempt to come as close to it as possible. For example, a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries would imply recognition of the "GDR." Dealings between East and West German delegations might also.

The Secretary asked whether an agreement not to resort to the use of force to change the existing situation would be considered recognition.

Ambassador Grewe said at first glance no. He said this could be done in an arrangement with the Soviet Union, but not so as to establish a treaty relationship with the "GDR."

Mr. Kohler said this could be handled through reciprocal declarations similar to "Solution C."

Ambassador Grewe said this would be possible and would also be a way for handling the Oder-Neisse problem.

The Secretary said he would like to continue these talks with the Ambassador and would be in touch with him about time. He would like to get to the question of how we should now proceed, and what the timing should be.

Ambassador Grewe said he would have two leading refugee representatives in town soon, one the chairman of the refugee organization, and the other a leading socialist, Kruger and Jaksch. It might be useful, if the Secretary had the time, if he could talk with them.

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- 7 -

The Secretary said that in closing he would like to remind the Ambassador that sensitivity worked both ways, and that people here were sensitive to the expressions of distrust coming out of Germany. He wished to point out that this was a mutual problem. He hoped that the whole process could be speeded up so that normal conditions could be recreated soon.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

EXCISE 10258

APPROVED IN S/S
10/20/61

DATE: October 6, 1961

SUBJECT: Tripartite Meeting October 6, 1961: Decisions by governments to
Execute Allied Military Plans on Berlin

PARTICIPANTS:

US
The Secretary
Mr. Kohler, EUR
Mr. Tyler, EUR
Mr. Blue, WE

British
Lord Hood, Chargé
Mr. Thomson, First Secretary

French
Ambassador Alphand
Mr. Lebel, Minister
Mr. Winckler, Counselor
Mr. Palen, Counselor

COPIES TO:

S/S Paris for Stoessel
S/P USRO - Paris
C Ambassador Paris
EUR Ambassador London
WE S/E
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G/PM
INR/D

The Secretary opened by saying that he was happy to return to tripartite consultations again. He then read off the agenda:

1. Decisions by Governments to Execute Allied Military Plans on Berlin.
2. Tripartite Reaction to Soviet Interference with Air Access to Berlin.
3. Analysis of the Syrian Situation.
4. Angola.

In response to a question concerning additional suggestions, neither the French nor the British representative proposed additional items.

The Secretary said he thought he should mention that he did not expect that Gromyko's call on the President would advance the discussions which had been held in New York. Gromyko had said from the very first that he wanted to call on the President while in the United States to present Mr. Khrushchev's warm regards. The Secretary added he did not expect any new subjects to be introduced by Mr. Gromyko.

In introducing the first subject on the agenda, the Secretary asked Ambassador Alphand if he would like to comment. The French Ambassador said that, as the Secretary knew, two directives have been issued to General Norstad, but the question remained as to who would take the decision for the implementation of these plans. He said there were three main areas to be considered: the first being the

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decision in the tripartite phase, the second after NATO had come into the operation, and the third was the special problem of the use of atomic weapons. With reference to the first phase, he said there was no question but that the decision and operation was tripartite, but what would happen if the Council is asked for an alert and one of the members says no. He said that this must not be allowed to paralyze the Tripartite or Quadripartite operation.

In the second case he said there would be more time, perhaps a few hours or a few days, when a conventional attack would be faced and resisted with conventional arms. Here, he said, we have a chance of consultation on the use of nuclear weapons, but what will happen if there were unanimity? He asked what would the Three do? Now is the time to study this matter. He said he realized that perhaps these questions could not be answered today but they should be discussed confidentially in this small group.

The Secretary then asked Lord Hood for his comments. The British Charge said that he would take up the questions raised by the French Ambassador in turn. On the tripartite problem, he said it was the feeling of his Government that in order to avoid the difficulties mentioned by the French Ambassador we would obtain general approval in advance both for tripartite plans and necessary NATO alert measures. We had asked for plans for appropriate NATO alert measures and these would be submitted to NATO and the NATO countries would have approved them in principle in advance. In addition we must share equally with them our knowledge of our tripartite plans so that when the time comes to take a decision it rests with the three. As for the implementation of NATO plans it must rest with the North Atlantic Council, but we must address ourselves as to how this is to be most efficiently taken. Lord Hood said he understood that this matter had come up in the NATO Council this week and that the Secretary-General had put forth some ideas and would be circulating a paper. He indicated that the Secretary-General's ideas would be in the direction of weighted voting, which the British Government did not think was too satisfactory, but that it was necessary to await Mr. Stikker's paper before a decision is reached. It would be unfortunate, he added, if this discussion delayed the directive to General Norstad as planning was most important now and the other matters we could deal with at a later stage. He mentioned that there were also proposals for a smaller group within NATO. If this is agreed to by the Council the British believe this would be a useful thing.

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contingency planning in NATO as much as
obtain the views of other Governments.

The Secretary doubted that an objection from a single NATO Government would prevent the Three from doing things which had to be done, but it might, of course, put a strain on the alliance. He said that these issues are so grave that each Government must consider what is necessary to preserve the life of the nation; that each Government feels that it must be seized of these issues. He added that in terms of conducting the NATO battle, there were problems that could not be settled in advance. Indeed, until Governments are confronted with the issues at a late stage they are unlikely to yield participation in the decision to go to war. As we near a crisis he said it will be clear that decisions by fifteen governments cannot govern the conduct of the battle. On the question of an executive agent he said that even during World War II when there were only two Governments involved, there had to be agreement on an executive agent and it may be necessary to decide who in fact will give orders to the Commander.

With reference to nuclear weapons the Secretary said we have already committed ourselves in Mr. Dulles' commitment to NATO to take every possible step to consult on the use of these weapons and we would wish to consult to the maximum extent. We would hope that we could do this in advance but this might not always be possible. He cited as an example the launching of a corps probe which might lead to the use of nuclear weapons unless the other side decided to withdraw. The Secretary stated that the U.S. has also agreed we will fully support NATO with nuclear weapons. Any fighting could lead to the use of nuclear weapons, and as we cannot always count on unanimity in NATO we must decide what to do if one or the other government objected. Of course, if one of the countries on the periphery objected we could go ahead without crippling NATO. The Secretary said he was not certain that he had answered all of the Ambassador's questions, but that we should anticipate as much as possible by advance planning.

The French Ambassador said he would like to know, in the case of an initiative by the Russians leading to a full scale atomic attack, whether the delegation of authority would operate or whether the decision still rested in the hands of the President. The Secretary said the decision was basically in the hands of the President. He said that we are reviewing contingency planning in case there is no Washington or there is no President, but that the matter now rests with the President.

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The French Ambassador said that he agreed that we must try to anticipate as much as possible among ourselves and in NATO, but search for unanimity in advance, but that lack of agreement in NATO should not be allowed to stop action. The Secretary agreed that it would be a serious matter if the Four decided to go ahead and most of the rest of the alliance would refuse to do so, but he thought this unlikely. Lord Hood added that this is why we must take them into our confidence and prepare them for a decision. The Secretary said that we should come back to this subject on an early occasion. In response to a question from the French Ambassador on the participation of military advisers in these meetings, the Secretary said that as the decisions are highly political he would have to look into the matter, but would inform the Ambassador of his views before the next meeting.

Mr. Kohler, who took over the meeting on the departure of the Secretary, stated that the second item on the agenda (The Brigade's Reaction to Soviet Interference with Air Access to Berlin) was highly related to the first. When the French Ambassador replied that he had not had any response from Paris on this question, Mr. Kohler said it would be discussed further when the French got some word from Paris.

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18 January 1962

✓ File: Berlin (Chamber)

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✓ Atomic Pol
✓ US Support

FROM: GEN LEMNITZER, JCS, WASHINGTON

TO: GEN NORSTAD, SHAPE PARIS

JCS 0116-62

Ref your EYES ONLY PRS 010 and PRS 120.

1. I can well understand your feelings regarding the actions mentioned in reference messages which were as distasteful to me as I am sure they were to you. For many weeks I have been resisting strongly the constant hounding and harrassment to take these and other actions which I regard as serious violations of the U.S. traditional and tested system of military command relationships which, as you say "Erode command integrity". In some cases I succeeded in resisting but in these two cases the point was reached where further resistance was impossible without being in direct violation of the specific instructions of the Commander-in-Chief.

2. With respect to my 2053-61 and your PRS 10, I know of no specific instance of delays caused by individuals or agencies either here in the JCS or in Allied Command Europe which caused the subject complaints. It was for that reason, among others, that I resisted the dispatch of that message. You are so right that the responsibility for actions rests with you.

3. With respect to my 0109-62 the directive came in my opinion as the result of some sharp questions regarding the [REDACTED] which were directed at the President during his press conference last Monday. This has been a matter of extreme sensitivity here for many months. The directive reached

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Agency Case OSD 89-MDR-616
NLE Case 89-34 #4
By SLB NLE Date 8/10/89

PAGE 1 of 3 PAGES

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18 January 1962

my office shortly after the press conference concluded. It was transmitted personally by a member of the President's staff who visited my office for that specific purpose. That was the situation as I found it upon my return from Honolulu Tuesday morning, hence my JCS 0109-62.

4. New Subject: Last evening I and several members of the Joint Staff had a two-hour conference with the President and several specially selected members of the White House staff on the subject of alert procedures, SIOP, employment of nuclear weapons in Europe, etc. At the conclusion of the conference the President stated that he would like to discuss the general subject of nuclear weapon employment in Europe with you during your visit here next week. At the present, the best indication of the types of questions he will be asking you is about as follows:

because so much would depend on the situation. Forces involved, and countless other unknown variables. I believe he understnads this to a

PAGE 2 of 3 PAGES

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18 January 1962

reasonable degree. However, you can expect a thorough discussion of the subject, particularly numbers and [REDACTED]

6. From our examination of USCINCEUR family of plans submitted to JCS we are aware of criteria you propose as to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The President is particularly interested in details of command and control procedures under conditions of Phase IV. He is also interested in details of each of SACEUR's Berlin plans to include [REDACTED]

PAGE 3 of 3 PAGES

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CMD & CONTROL

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7 Oct 1961

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Dear Mr. President:

On 24 August 1961, I informed you of my intention to establish a National Command and Control Task Force headed by General Earle E. Partridge, USAF(Ret.). By memorandum dated 31 August, you approved the formation of the Task Force and asked that it give urgent attention to the matter of safeguards for our atomic weapons.

General Partridge, with selected specialists of his Task Force, consulted in Washington with Department of Defense personnel who have recently conducted extensive studies of this problem. After completing their own studies, the Task Force group visited various senior command headquarters having nuclear weapon responsibility and visited actual weapon locations of typical U.S. air squadrons and missile battalions. As a result, the Task Force has reached certain conclusions. In brief, these are:

- a. Existing safety rules and procedures governing the storage, handling and transport of nuclear weapons make extremely remote the chance of an accidental nuclear detonation.
- b. Provisions against the unauthorized seizure of our weapons by dissident or disloyal groups are generally sound. However, to minimize the possibility that weapons may fall into improper hands under such conditions, certain increased emphasis is warranted.
- c. Procedures to prevent employment of nuclear weapons without Presidential authority have recently been strengthened by General Norstad and are adequate to preclude unauthorized use.

NORSTAD, Lauris:
Papers, 1930-87
Box 85, ATRM - NUCL Policy '61(1)

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The Command and Control Task Force is continuing on an urgent basis its investigation of proposals for remedying this situation.

I am enclosing for your information a copy of General Partridge's detailed report to me.

Sincerely,

/S/ Robert S. McNamara
Secretary of Defense
Robert S. McNamara

Attachment.

The President

The White House

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CMD & CONTRL 10/5/61

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7 Oct 1961

Dear Mr. President:

On 24 August
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by General Earle E.
dated 31 August, you
and asked that it give
for our atomic weap

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Task Force headed
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matter of safeguards

General Partridge, with selected specialists of his
Task Force, consulted in Washington with Department of Defense
personnel who have recently conducted extensive studies of
this problem. After completing their own studies, the Task
Force group visited various senior command headquarters
having nuclear weapon responsibility and visited actual
weapon locations of typical U.S. air squadrons and
missile battalions. As a result, the Task Force has reached
certain conclusions. In brief, these are:

a. Existing safety rules and procedures governing the storage, handling and transport of nuclear weapons make extremely remote the chance of an accidental nuclear detonation.

b. Provisions against the unauthorized seizure of our weapons by dissident or disloyal groups are generally sound. However, to minimize the possibility that weapons may fall into improper hands under such conditions, certain increased emphasis is warranted.

c. Procedures to prevent employment of nuclear weapons without Presidential authority have recently been strengthened by General Norstad and are adequate to preclude unauthorized use.

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR
INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY
DECLASSIFIED. DOD DIR 5200.10

~~TOP SECRET~~
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DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETED
Agency Case *OSD 89-MDR-065*
NLE Case *89-97#9*
By *246* NLE Date *12/27/90*

Norstad Rpt /85 / Atomic Nuclear Policy 1961 (1)

~~TOP SECRET~~

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preservation purposes.

The Command and Control Task Force is continuing on an urgent basis its investigation of proposals for remedying this situation.

I am enclosing for your information a copy of General Partridge's detailed report to me.

Sincerely,

/S/ Robert S. McNamara
Secretary of Defense
Robert S. McNamara

Attachment

The President

The White House

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~DECLASSIFIED~~

*Continue to
HOLD USE*

(S) (L) (S)

The political problem is no simpler. Mr. Rusk's exploratory conversations with Gromyko have been just that and nothing more. As you know from immediate experience, the Germans tend to be nervous about nearly any American statement of these matters, but in fact we are still merely circling each other to find out what the areas of eventual

~~TOP SECRET~~
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED

negotiation might be. The real problem is the one which was highlighted by German misunderstanding of your own informal remarks: how do we get the Germans to recognize that it is not a betrayal of them for all of us to face the fact that we cannot enforce reunification now. We should certainly sustain strongly the broad principle of support for reunification, but we are not going to get Soviet agreement on this point right now, and we must find ways and means of sustaining the courage and energy of our German allies in the face of the continued division of their country.

*Continue to
HOLD
O(2)(5)
NSC*

What we will not budge on are the things which are essential to the people of West Berlin and it is on that point above all that your presence and your work can be so significant. Meanwhile, I shall count on your help in finding ways of sustaining a clear sense of common purpose with our friends in West Berlin and West Germany.

*(6) (1)
(2)
(5)*

Finally, it becomes more and more plain that whatever the form of an eventual settlement, it will be necessary for the West to take energetic measures in further support of the life and meaning of the city of West Berlin. I count on you in this field too, and I look forward to hearing your views on the ways and means of meeting this challenge, as they develop. In my judgment, the basic responsibility and need for initiative here fall to the people of West Berlin themselves and to the citizens of the Federal Republic, but where American stimulus or energy can be helpful, we will not hesitate. The vitality of West Berlin and the confidence of Germany are together the prizes we must win from this crisis.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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
THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~DECLASSIFIED~~

I am sure that your work in Berlin is hard and demanding, and I can well believe that it has some frustrations. This crisis is one which makes unusual demands on all of us. But I do want you to know that your presence there is a source of encouragement and strength to me as I am sure it is to Mayor Brandt and all the people of West Berlin.

Sincerely,



The Honorable Lucius Clay
Special Representative of the President
U.S. Mission
Berlin

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Record Number 58459

<u>SET</u>	Berlin Crisis
<u>BCI</u>	Yes
<u>DOCUMENT TYPE</u>	Letter
<u>DATE</u>	10/08/1961
<u>CIRCD</u>	
<u>TIME</u>	
<u>CABNO</u>	
<u>DOCNO</u>	
<u>ORIGIN</u>	United States. Office of the White House
<u>SIGNATOR</u>	Kennedy, John F.
<u>DESTO</u>	
<u>DESTP</u>	Clay, Lucius
<u>DRAFT</u>	
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	Top Secret
<u>TITLE</u>	
<u>CTIT</u>	[Updates on Recent Developments on Germany and Berlin]
<u>NAMES</u>	Rusk, Dean
<u>NAMES</u>	Gromyko, Andrei A.
<u>NAMES</u>	Brandt, Willy
<u>TERMS</u>	
<u>ORGAN</u>	
<u>PGS</u>	4

Box 37
Noted?

7/1/61

Z

10/10/61
Luz 002
cc Bine

DRAFT - 10 October 1961

I thank you for the letter which arrived yesterday and for the interest in the subject which it reflects.

Dear Sir, I am pleased to hear that you are planning to visit Washington.

I greatly appreciated having you visit me and hearing your views on the preparations and courses of action which we might adopt in defense of Western rights in Berlin. Since your departure I have discussed some of those matters again with Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and am now prepared to give you my views on the points at issue.

I recognize that you are both an international commander and a United States commander, with somewhat different responsibilities in these two capacities. However, as the United States is the leader in the NATO Alliance and the primary contributor to its strength, I would not expect the views and attitudes of the United States Government to run contrary to the interests of the Alliance as a whole. Since you are the senior American commander and symbolize the role of the United States in NATO, you have an unusual responsibility in expounding the United States position and convincing our Allies of its soundness.

87-5-056-87

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87-WDR-135

Copy R-44 ②

NSA

With regard to our strategy in Europe and such related matters as a further reinforcement of U.S. forces there, I would like you to make your recommendations to me primarily as the military commander.



Although I recognize how blended political and military considerations are in these NATO matters, I view you primarily as my military advisor on the European problem, and depend upon my own direct communications with heads of state, Secretary Rusk's contacts with other foreign ministers, and the processes of responsible diplomatic officers as the primary source of my political judgments. With this thought in mind, I would like you to give me your formal recommendations with regard to additional U.S. forces which you may want and the desired schedule for their movement.

With regard to further divisions to Europe, I would feel much more secure in reaching decisions bearing on the use of force if I were assured in advance that the necessary reinforcements were in place in Europe to assure the overall safety of the defensive front while any lesser military actions are in progress.

In closing, I would revert to my earlier thought that you are uniquely placed to guide and influence our Allies and to explain to them the U.S. thinking on important points of interest to the Alliance. I value your advice and counsel most highly, and invite you to communicate with me freely in order to assist me in forming positions and decisions. I would like your communications to come to me directly, with information to the Secretary of Defense on those matters which primarily affect United States forces.

Record Number 54423:

Berlin Crisis

Yes

Memorandum

10/10/1961

DOCUMENT TYPECOMEORNGORIGINSIGNATORDESTODESTPCLASSIFICATIONTITLECTITUnited States- Executive Office of the President
Kennedy, John F.

Norstad, Lauris

Secret

[As Leader of the NATO Alliance, United States Policy
Should Be Take Precedence and the Allies Should Be
Convinced of Its Soundness]NAMESTERMSORGANPGS

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

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10/11/61 (2)

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

October 11, 1961

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
with
His Excellency, the German Ambassador,
Wilhelm G. Grewe

This morning the German Ambassador called on me at his request and remained for an hour's talk. He was disturbed and depressed. I shall not attempt to give the whole conversation in detail, but merely its high lights.

290/1317

He began by asking me what was going on in the making of United States policy toward Germany and where was our Government headed. I told him that I could not answer this question, except in the most general way; that I had prepared a memorandum on the subject at the end of July, which I had understood was favorably received by the President and the Secretary; but I had not been in the State Department for over a month. I knew from the press that the Ambassador was disturbed and hoped that in the course of our talk he would tell me why.

I reminded him that in my book I had described a meeting with the Chancellor in 1951 in Paris, in which he had asked me whether he could rely upon the United States, or whether it was fattening West Germany to get a more advantageous price upon selling it to the Soviet Union. I had

CONFIDENTIAL

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- 2 -

replied that there was no possibility of this as far as I could then see ahead, which was certainly through the administration which would follow Mr. Truman's; and I now wished to assure the Ambassador that he need have no such suspicion of the present one.

I went over the general points of my recommendations on policy, in the course of which he interrupted to say that he would be wholly in favor of such a policy, but that in the past two weeks it was clear that the Administration had taken a new line in regard to several points. In the first place, the Germans had been told almost categorically that it was a waste of time even for negotiating purposes to talk about reunification of Germany. In the second place, they were being urged to form contacts with the East Germans quite apart from any program looking toward unification. Thirdly, the United States was moving toward something which was indistinguishable from de facto recognition of East Germany: and, fourthly we were talking about the desirability or possibility of recognizing, as of the present, the Oder-Neisse line as the boundary of Poland. He said that these points had been practically announced by the press as the official line and that never in his ten years of working with the U.S. Government had he felt so depressed about its policy or about his personal relations with his American colleagues.

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- 3 -

I told him that I had gotten from the press the same idea regarding these points, but that I had no such impression from any of my friends in the Department. I would, of course, disagree with such a policy; although it would seem to me that, if a Russian acceptance of the status quo in Berlin (ante the division of the city) could be obtained, the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line would be a price worth paying -- not that it was worth much, DeGaulle and others having already indicated their willingness to pay it. To this he replied that all that Germany could do, since every fifth person was a refugee from the east of that line, would be to say that force would never be used.

The rest of the conversation was taken up by my urging the Ambassador to urge the Government in Bonn (which he said was practically settled with the Chancellor continuing) to emerge from the trauma of the election and take a positive and vigorous position. My impression of the German official attitude, I said, was that it was negative, suspicious, and hysterical, seeing dangers in every suggestion, protesting, making no positive suggestions, and taking no action. I said that even a wrong attitude was better than none and that action of any sort would calm a nervous situation.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 4 -

I urged the Ambassador to get the Government to do two things: One was to work out a practical negotiating position, which he was to present and fight for; secondly, to take steps so that the German Government would be able economically, politically, and militarily to play a vigorous and active part in carrying out the agreed policy.

The Ambassador said that he had made the suggestion that if worse came to worst we should blockade the Baltic and the Black Sea. I said that this did not impress me, first of all, because it was a suggestion by them of what someone else should do; secondly, because I had studied the same suggestion and had made it myself, but only upon the realization that such action was quite likely to produce immediate hostilities, for which we had all better be prepared.

The Ambassador asked what I would think of the proposal that Berlin should be made the eleventh Laender. I said that, as a proposal coming from the Germans, it made no sense to me. In the first place, it would be the height of provocative action by a government which was prepared to take no risk at all. Here again it was the suggestion that somebody else do something. From the point of view of the allies,

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 5 -

it seemed to me to be based upon an acceptance of the division of Germany and the attempt to retain an enclave far within East Germany rather than our present position, which was that we held West Berlin as the symbol of reunification of Germany to which we were all pledged. The proposal would play into the hands of those people in England and elsewhere who talked about the folly of "fighting for Berlin."

I said that what I would like to see from the Germans was a responsible and vigorous attitude by a government which regarded itself as speaking for an important power.

I reminded the Ambassador that, while he was now criticizing what he said was U.S. policy as being too weak, Strauss had criticized my suggestions as being too strong, even to the point of recklessness. The Germans could not have it both ways, and it was time that they worked out a policy which they were prepared to propose and back up with power.

Dean Acheson

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(C end insert)

He added that he would have

343

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ed to have had Eugene Black as his Secretary of the Treasury, but discovered he was unavailable. Douglas Dillon, whom he hadn't known very well at the time, had been first suggested to him by Philip Graham, publisher of the Washington Post and Joseph Alsop, the columnist. The President said he was very happy with Dillon, that they had had no disagreements on fiscal policy and he didn't expect them to have any.

(C end insert) The President asked whether I thought he should ignore the attacks on his record by Republican National Chairman Miller or leave them to be handled by Democratic National Chairman Bailey. I said I thought he should let these fight the "battle of the mimeograph", a phrase which he must have liked because he repeated it at his news conference a couple of hours afterwards. (C end insert)

Extrout from item 343. track interview w JAR, 10/11/61
track pp 11 / 1023 / Mudd

oppos had better keep a "million miles away" from
...ed by Speaker Rayburn's illness. ~~But~~
~~has not so much~~

343
I remarked to [redacted] that his three important victories in Congress
had been made possible by Republican defections from their party leadership.

[redacted] agreed with an air of great amusement and said he had anticipated that
situation because of the nature and purpose of the bills involved and the
struggle in the fight to transfer the powers of the House Rules Committee.

The President remarked on the opposition of Democratic "liberals"

and a number of scientists to his choice of John A. McCone as director

of the Central Intelligence Agency, but he said he wasn't paying much

attention to "those groups." I confirmed his impression that I thought

McCone was a first-rate appointment that would prove itself in action.

The President said he had first offered the job to Arthur H. Dean, but

he was well satisfied with McCone.

Can't

ag

The President's close reading of the newspapers was again

indicated when he seized on a sentence in Reston's piece of that day

to the effect that men of Rayburn's generation didn't have their speeches ghost-written for them. The President said that the charge made

~~by me~~ that he hadn't written "Profiles in Courage"

was hard to shake off, but didn't I remember seeing him writing the

book at Palm Beach? I replied that I certainly had, that I recalled

seeing him lying flat on his back on a board with a yellow pad on which

he was writing the book, and that I read enough of those pages at the

time to know that the product was his own.

Another subject was the difficulties he sees in the news-conference system--the long questions, the questions with a "policy purpose", etc.

"I have the habit," he said, "of turning to the right, and then every

time I am confronted by those women, ~~Mae Craig and Sarah McEwen~~ ^(naming two)."

(But I noticed at his news conference later that he almost succeeded in entirely overlooking these female characters who were on their feet often.)

operate as makers of United States policy and not as allies.

Wick The President expressed a good opinion of the reporting of Max Frankel and Tom Wicker of our staff. I told him I thought he was very wise in having responded to Frankel's request for some details on his conversations with Gromyko and urged him to get the habit. He said he rather thought he would.

Wick The President discussed the various modi vivendi of working out an easement of the Berlin situation that have been publicly discussed, particularly complimenting Senator Pell of Rhode Island on his speech in that quarter. He also urged me to continue to publicize that and similar speeches, and recalled I had performed that service originally for Senator Pell. The President said he made a mistake in sending David Bruce to London where our easy relations with the British required no use of Bruce's great talents. "I should have sent him back to Bonn," said the President. "The career man there is all right, but it is a job for a diplomat like Bruce who is experienced in politics and executive government as well."

let) ~~VICTORY~~ The President had just come from a meeting on the problem in that country. He said the Pentagon generally approved a recommendation by the Chiefs of Staff to send 40,000 troops there. The President said he was not favorable to the suggestion at this time and therefore was sending General Maxwell Taylor to investigate and report what should be done. It was a hell of a note, he said, that he had to try to handle the Berlin situation with the Communists encouraging foreign aggressors all over the place. The

President said he was thinking of writing Khrushchev, urging him to call off these aggressors in Viet-Nam, Laos, etc., and asking Khrushchev how he thought he could negotiate with Kennedy if their positions were reversed. The President still believes, he said, in what he told the Senate several years ago--that United States troops should not be involved on the Asian mainland, especially in a country with the difficult terrain of Laos and inhabited by people who don't care how the East-West dispute as to freedom and self-determination was resolved. Moreover, said the President, the United States can't interfere in civil disturbances created by guerrillas, and it was hard to prove that this wasn't largely the situation in Viet-Nam.

(end) I asked him what he thought of the "falling domino" theory-- that is, if Laos and Viet-Nam go Communist, the rest of South East Asia will fall to them in orderly succession. The President expressed doubts that this theory has much point any more because, he remarked, the Chinese Communists are bound to get nuclear weapons in time, and from that moment on they will dominate South East Asia. (end indent)

20/12/61

Topics

In The Nation

When Policy Critics Propose No Substitute

By ARTHUR KROCK

WASHINGTON, Oct. 11.—Thus far the critics of President Kennedy's efforts to find a basis of negotiation with the Soviet Union on West Berlin have displayed the fatal weakness of having no constructive alternative to propose. Their common demand that he "stand pat" and that anything less is "appeasement," would be a constructive alternative if the Berlin situation were desirable to the West, or even to the United States, to maintain.

But it is as undesirable to the West to prolong as to the Soviet Union; in some important respects more so. The *status quo* of Berlin makes it an embedded and permanent crisis. And just below the surface are sparks, now more dangerous than ever before in history. Because at any time they could accidentally explode vast arsenals of thermonuclear weapons.

The President did not create this terrifying condition; he inherited it. And since the longer it lasts the greater its danger to every people and area, his obligation is to explore every means to reduce its total war potential. In a state of affairs so stark and so plain, the President needs and deserves the silence of critics crying "appeasement" and unable to propose an alternative which would relieve the immediate objects of their protective activities, the West Berliners, from a tense day-to-day existence in the midst of alarms.

This plight, a consequence of the *status quo*, was mentioned several times by the President in his news conference today. The important difference is that critics who have produced no constructive alternative seldom if ever make this mention. Moreover, they never indicate willingness to concede another important fact that explains why West Berlin is a source of irritation to the Kremlin in particular and the Communist world in general.

This fact is that all the free media of information, plus those officially or covertly subsidized by some West-

Comments on Shelters

Civil Defense Defended

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES:

You published on Oct. 3 a letter from Arthur Springer which sharply criticized civil defense programs. They were characterized as promoting a religion of personal survival from which one loses his motivation to see that a nuclear war never occurs. Because this attitude is widespread, an opposing view of civil defense might be useful.

It seems to me that a civil defense program has three valid purposes and that these are the same today as in any past time of international crisis. First, the program aims to save human life in the event of war. Statistics published by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Defense Department convincingly show that the lives of a large percentage of the national population can be saved by fall-out shelters.

If this estimate is accurate, we then have an entirely natural and ordinary responsibility to ourselves and our families that prescribed precautions be taken. "It is as natural a precaution as for a young married man to take out a life insurance policy."

A second purpose of civil defense lies in the integral part such a program plays in our total national policy of deterrence. The knowledge of the enemy that a strong civil defense program would blunt the

with the reality that is necessary? Nuclear war will be final to the greater part of the population. No fall-out shelter or extensive program can reduce this.

The hope for survival does not rest within the shelter, but within the people and their realization of the problems ahead.

RICHARD LANDESMAN.

Brooklyn, Oct. 8, 1961.

Getting Rid of Bombs

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES:

May I add a warning to the excellent letter from Arthur Springer (Oct. 3) on the effect of civil defense? This speeded-up program which, as he says, is "developing all the illusions of any heresy born of fear," deliberately and officially sets the stage for serious neuroses in our children. This could condition their whole lives—a psychology of apprehension, just what our best therapy is aiming to cure.

The focusing of large numbers on anticipation of disaster produces the very conditions which can draw it toward us. One of the "illusions" is that you can plan ahead to meet unpredictable circumstances. Let us all rethink this through and use the equivalent attention and money toward ridding our earth of the diabolical bombs.

HARRIET M. RICHARDS.

New York, Oct. 3, 1961.

Government Program

IF THE NEW YORK TIMES leaders tell us, we face of being pulverized by lack of, if we survive, ty of poisoning and the subsequent radio-1 it not be logical that zed, government-spon- is be instituted at once truction of adequate ll, instead of leaving pitiful efforts of in- owners?

ng accept the notion efense, and individual t foreign attack? Yet ly what we are doing, the defense of our list, nuclear attack, silence on this issue

feeling—the recognition of the reality of the impossibility of true defense of the population?

And would the raising of this question on a realistic level help drive home, deep into the popular consciousness, the overwhelming and overriding issue: the need to direct our foreign policy toward making nuclear war impossible, toward recognizing the terrible meaning of

KROCK

There is today un- as limited wealth of au- dible and visible in- formation at hand about what goes on here and everywhere. One ave to go to some trouble to long ignorant of the latest in Europe, Asia, Chicago, ton or the more remote of Long Island, to mention w localities that can and do ws. No metropolitan res- iver, indifferent he may e doings of the great, the the notorious, can easily eing the face and hearing e of every political aspirant, onal visitor, high public noteworthy figure in busi- engineering, drama, art, litera- tion and a hundred other s. Radio, television and the ed press combine to engulf utious with a flood of opies to become intimately with what everyone in the oks like and sounds like. re never heard from more ice, but that once brings rcibly into our ken whether particularly anxious to make quittance or not. Today we e the achievement of a man d four centuries before any apparatus for publicity ex- it most of us think we know t his general appearance far han those of a good many who have been in headlines this year.

Christopher Colum- bus is the most ele- mentary fact there is to know about the history of the modern If you haven't got a pretty ion of what he did, you can't and the progress of civiliza- ce 1500, and you are in no n to grasp the potential sig- e of exploring outer space. an history begins with Co- because he founded it, un- ly perhaps, but the error is ble, when one considers the and importance of what he t he had accomplished. No- ince has done anything that ade quite the same impact history; yet no one really what Columbus looked like, his voice sounded.

This is not because raits" men and women have ently not tried to depict ere him. They began to o this not many after his death and in the of that his features have

shelters, fall-out shelters or what- ever you choose to name the current homestead necessity. The fantasy is twofold.

Their occupancy is based upon a human psychological impossibility. They aim to instill a false assump- tion about nuclear war and its consequences. It is inconceivable to per- petuate human life for two or three weeks, consuming the requisite

Communist world in general.

This fact is that all the free media of information, plus those officially or covertly subsidized by some Western nations, including the United States, for years have chosen West Berlin as a showcase to demonstrate the material as well as the spiritual advantages of the products of capitalism over those of communism.

This contract is among the many which are not "negotiable," as the President has said and repeated today. But it does impose an obligation on the Western nations which did their best to make it a divisive factor between the Soviet Union and its satellite peoples. The obligation is to cooperate in any search for negotiable grounds on which West Berlin can remain viable and free. And the obligation rests not only on the United States, whose second World War Government shares the responsibility for making Berlin the Allied headquarters of post-war Germany and then allowing it to be located one hundred and ten miles within the Soviet zone. It falls as heavily on the French and West German Governments, which regularly cite one reason or another for discouraging every idea advanced to ease the Berlin crisis, including those which involve no retreat from the basic Allied commitments.

Mr. Kennedy's Direct Reference

Whenever, for example, reports of the discussions between Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko, or between the President and Gromyko, have included mention of such ideas as Western acceptance of the Oder-Neisse boundary or the removal of United Nations units to West Berlin, some spokesman for France or West Germany has publicly or privately objected that this would be taken in Moscow as evidence of a weakening resolve by the United States to stand by its fundamental commitments. When the President remarked today that, now the West German elections are over, its Government would "be able to participate with perhaps more vigor in making allied policy with the other NATO countries," and "assume its responsibilities," he was saying that Bonn has not been making this essential positive contribution to the common problem.

He made no reference to France. But it doubtless has not escaped his notice that political considerations might suggest to General de Gaulle that the impact in France of fundamental compromise in Algeria would be softened by the hardest of hard

They aim to instill a false assumption about nuclear war and its consequences. It is inconceivable to perpetuate human life for two or three weeks, consuming the requisite canned goods, awaiting we know not what. Only the hope that you will survive one hardship (confinement in a collapsed mine shaft, for example) enables you to endure that hardship.

The aftermath of a nuclear explosion (dirty or clean) is beyond human conception, and consequently obviates hope for continuing life. Secondly, by postulating survival, the cardinal threat of nuclear war is circumvented. The myth of survival replaces the reality of life or death.

LEIGH BRISTOL

Northampton, Mass., Oct. 7, 1961.

For Preserving Records Only

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES:

How childish can we be? We all know that bomb shelters are only suitable for records. Certainly humans cannot survive and have life after an attack.

It is unfair to children to think that grown-ups will deceive themselves and not face reality. The only adult approach is to put all our efforts on prevention.

If we think there is a possibility of an attack, let's get our records for posterity into the shelters and go about our business in adult fashion.

FLORENCE E. WINCHELL

Bennington, Vt., Oct. 6, 1961.

Facing Reality of Nuclear War

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES:

There seems to be what one may call a crash program on the part of the Civil Defense Office and private industry to educate the people on the effects of nuclear war, fall-out and shelters.

The Civil Defense Office seems to leave out a very important aspect in their program. What happens after the bomb drops? It is all very well and good to have fall-out shelters where one can be relatively safe for several days or even weeks. But what happens after this?

People cannot remain in their shelters forever. What will be left on earth to sustain life? All exposed foodstuffs and animal life will be either radioactive or dead. Water would be at a premium and the earth free of contamination would be nonexistent. Transportation facilities and roads for travel would be restricted, if organized at all. There is not too much for people topside after a nuclear blast.

Is it better to have the people subjected to this unnecessary problem of shelters just to live a short

consciousness, the overwhelming overriding issue: the need to direct our foreign policy toward making nuclear war impossible, low recognizing the terrible meaning President Kennedy's recent U. speech—that mankind must make an end to war, before war makes an end to mankind?

MEYER RANGELI

Floral Park, N. Y., Oct. 7, 1961

Erection of Shelters Urged

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES:

We must face our enemies calmly and with concern for "the future of our race"—so you at our position in your recent editor. It is well stated.

There can be little future for American people unless they guaranteed a minimum of safety. Today this is not so. Without adequate shelter program the United States nuclear deterrent is a shield against disaster.

We have lived in a prolonged crisis since 1950. This crisis is now approaching its climax. If the United States Government is to continue oppose the ambitions of the Soviet Government to spread communism over the world, then the American people cannot be left undefended.

Billions are being spent on roads that, in the event of war, would only lead to graveyards. Let us all demand of the men in our local, state and Federal government that they provide shelters before roads—deep shelters.

There is no reason why, with adequate planning, the construction of roads and shelters could not be carried in one operation, by routing roads underground for use as shelters, by similar devices. OLIVER BELMONT

Weston, Conn., Oct. 1, 1961.

Post-War Man

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES:

I am glad you publish letters which dispel illusions about fallout-shelters. I mention another reason for putting our energies into something better than ways to wage a "defensive" war.

Once the bombs drop, what happens to the freedoms we prize above mere safety? Remember how food was rationed in World War II? In the next war, how will the drops of water be rationed? How long will it take to get a free enterprise?

Much is being said today about the ethics of guarding one's shelter for one's own family. You recently reported a sermon in praise of such action. Some of us cannot help wondering just what type of human being will survive to start rebuilding.

HENRY NEUMANI

FULL FOUND IN THE WOODS

...that once held eyes
...blooming, rise
...below

TELEGRAM Department of State

12 OCT 13 PM 1 28

~~SECRET~~

06230

ACTION: Ambassador BONN

PRIORITY 1025

EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY FOR CHARGE

Please deliver following letter from President to Chancellor Adenauer at earliest opportunity:

BEGIN TEXT

Dear Mr. Chancellor:

Thank you for your letter of October 4.

I was especially gratified by your reaction to my speech at the United Nations, as I was also by Foreign Minister von Brentano's public expressions of appreciation.

It is a source of satisfaction to me that you have frankly expressed your views concerning European security. It is only through such candid exchanges that we can preserve the unity and resolution of the West, which, we both agree, is absolutely essential.

Before turning to the main subject of your letter, I should like to take this occasion to put before you certain general considerations relating to the present stage of the Berlin crisis. With the conclusion of the round of talks which Secretary of State Rusk and I have had with Foreign Minister

Gromyko,

UR:GER:FECash

UR:GER:MHJHillenbrand:all 10/11/61

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

EUR - Roy D. Kohler

S/S - Mr. Brubeck White House - Mr. Bundy
Defense-ISA - Mr. Nitze Amb. Bohlen
Amb. Thompson

B - Mr. Ball (in draft)
Amb. Dowling

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EYES ONLY

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POF/11/Gen. Security 8610-1261

U.S. RECORDS (DOW-81-10)
BY NARS, DATE 11/11/83

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Gromyko, the time has come to take counsel with one another. In cooperation with our British and French Allies, we need to assess the significance of certain statements made by Mr. Gromyko, to determine the best course of action for us to pursue, and then to move ahead decisively along lines calculated to achieve our common objectives with respect to Germany and Berlin.

You have been kept fully informed of our discussions with Gromyko through your Ambassador in Washington. As you know, these talks were purely exploratory on both sides. In a real sense they did not move beyond the stage of verbal sparring. As Secretary Rusk indicated to the Ambassadors, the following generalizations seem justified in the light of the Gromyko talks.

1. The Soviets have been warned and they appear to have taken cognizance of the warning that our present course is dangerous to them.
2. They are clear on the point that negotiations on Germany and Berlin must be between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers, not between the GDR and the Western Powers.
3. The time element has acquired a certain fluidity in terms of when the Soviets will proceed with unilateral action, but the West does not have unlimited time. The Soviets could, of course, proceed on a basis not disclosed by Mr. Gromyko.
4. Further contact of an exploratory nature with the Soviet Union is desirable not only to probe but to prevent unilateral acts by the Soviets which would change the facts of the situation.

I think it fair to say that, if the substance of a possible modus vivendi on Berlin has not emerged, at least the possible outlines of a procedural formula,

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of a framework, were suggested within which the West could reasonably explore further the possibilities of such a modus vivendi. I am referring here to the idea that a separate agreement between the United Kingdom, France, the United States and the Soviet Union might be achieved ^{which} then the Soviets would undertake to superimpose upon their separate peace treaty in such form as to assure our vital interests, which include the freedom and viability of West Berlin.

We have made it quite clear to the Soviets that we will not be parties to such a treaty, but this act has acquired such symbolic importance for them, that at some point they will proceed to consummate it. The question for us is whether we should passively and fatalistically accept this inevitability or whether we should make a final effort to achieve by negotiation a better result than the de facto situation which we will in any event face after the conclusion of the separate QUOTE peace treaty UNQUOTE. It must be made clear that we have no intention of withdrawing from Berlin nor do we intend to give our rights away in any negotiations. On the other hand, the logic of history and the needs of the Alliance demand that every effort, consistent with our vital interest, be made to solve this problem by peaceful and diplomatic methods before the ultimate confrontation.

I should not want to give you the impression that I am optimistic about the possible outcome of negotiations with the Soviets. Mr. Khrushchev is not interested in strengthening our position in Berlin, and he obviously has in mind using the leverage

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leverage which the apparent advantages of geography give him to extract maximum concessions from the West. We cannot permit him to deprive us of any of our vital interests in Berlin, and it may well be that our application of this criterion will make any agreement impossible to attain. But we shall not find out beyond doubt until we have come to grips with the Soviets in a more substantively significant way than up to the present.

In the meantime, we must continue our military build-up and perfect our contingency planning in all its ramifications. This is a matter on which we expect to be in further communication with you.

My own view is that for the immediate future, through the period of the Soviet Congress, bilateral discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union should continue, conducted by the United States Ambassador in Moscow with Mr. Gromyko, or if necessary, Mr. Khrushchev. If these bilateral talks go sufficiently well, a Foreign Ministers' conference might be held at a later time, perhaps in mid-November. We would, of course, keep you fully informed on these discussions.

At some point we will have to decide whether to propose negotiations with the Soviets of a formal character. If we cannot make progress through the normal processes of diplomacy, then we shall be faced with even graver military decisions than those we have taken so far. Should the confrontation over Berlin move to the stage of great and dramatic crisis, we shall require not only all the resolution and clarity of purpose which we can muster but also assurances that the Alliance as a whole, and its principal members, are fully aware of and prepared for all the

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the consequences in a military sense.

Coming now to the subject of European security, I agree with you that there is a great lack of clarity surrounding this concept as well as much public confusion.

Perhaps some of this will be eliminated by my stating unequivocally to you that ⁱⁿ we are in agreement on your main point that the imposition of a special military status for any country of Western Europe especially the Federal Republic, would be an invitation for further Soviet incursions in Europe. This would, as you say, include great dangers for the United States, particularly for its security.

I should also clarify that so-called QUOTE disengagement UNQUOTE is not something we contemplate at all. This would create a vacuum of responsibility, and I do not believe we can escape our responsibilities.

As indicated in the disarmament proposals ~~presented~~ presented to the United Nations, the United States Government takes the problem of disarmament very seriously and is prepared to exhaust every effort to see what progress can be made in this field. We think it would be worthwhile to see how the confrontation in Central Europe might be reduced. It would certainly be to the great advantage of the West if the concentration of Soviet forces in the satellites could be lowered. Steps ^{be} should also be studied that would assure both sides that no surprise attack is being prepared, or is about to be launched. All of this proceeds from our deep convictions that it is in the common interest of both sides that the peace be kept.

However, all these matters will require the most careful study and much time for their development. The United States regards this process as a search for areas of agreement.

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TELEGRAM Department of State

12 OCT 13 PM 1 28

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ACTION: Amembassy BONN

PRIORITY 1025

EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY FOR CHARGE

Please deliver following letter from President to Chancellor Adenauer at earliest opportunity:

BEGIN TEXT

Dear Mr. Chancellor:

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I was especially gratified by your reaction to my speech at the United Nations, as I was also by Foreign Minister von Brentano's public expressions of appreciation.

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However, all these matters will require the most careful study and much time for their development. The United States regards this process as a search for areas of agreement.

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of agreement. It is by no means something that could be agreed very quickly.

As far as the nuclear weapons component of European security is concerned, I need not remind you that it has been the long-established policy of the US Government not to relinquish control of nuclear warheads to any nation not owning them and not to transmit to any such nation information or material necessary for their manufacture. This policy is reaffirmed in the US Program for General and Complete Disarmament submitted recently in the United Nations. It is my understanding that this concept is in fact entirely acceptable to you, and indeed in conformity with our own announced policies.

Let me assure you that none of this is considered under any illusion as to the nature and purposes of the Soviet regime, with your assessment of which I can wholly agree.

Let me also assure you that I have the security of the United States and the Federal Republic very much in mind and would do nothing that might endanger either, the that might lead to/undermining of NATO, on which the security of both our nations depends.

I trust, dear Mr. Chancellor, that we are in agreement on these matters, and I would appreciate your sending me your thoughts to which we both attribute such great importance.

Sincerely,

(signed) John F. Kennedy

END TEXT

BALL

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: October 14, 1961.
Rm. 6228
12 Noon

SUBJECT: Berlin and Negotiations with the USSR

PARTICIPANTS: FRANCE

Ambassador Alphant
Mr. Lebel

UNITED STATES

Mr. Kohler
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Holloway

Mr. Kohler began by giving Ambassador Alphant the memorandum of the United States views of the Western position in the light of the four talks which Foreign Minister Gromyko had had in the United States recently. Mr. Kohler explained that the memorandum was essentially a compendium of views already given to the Ambassador, plus some extra points taken from President Kennedy's letter to General de Gaulle which presumably would have been delivered this morning. Mr. Kohler noted that this letter had been written before the French communication of yesterday although it dealt, of course, with many of the matters which had been discussed as a result of the French communication. Mr. Kohler then read the letter aloud.

Ambassador Alphant thanked Mr. Kohler for the explanation of the United States views and said he would report them to Paris forthwith.

Mr. Bohlen referred to a statement of Ambassador Alphant, which had been repeated twice in yesterday's meeting, to the effect that the present Western course of exploratory talks was not the right way to deal with the Soviets. He noted that Ambassador Alphant had not suggested what would be to the French mind the right way to deal with the Soviets. Mr. Bohlen said that he would offer the observation that, assuming that our eventual aim is negotiations with the Russians, we are now only at the "very beginning of a long process". It would be a mistake, he thought, to predicate Western moves on the thesis that what the Soviets had thus far advanced were indeed firm positions. Mr. Bohlen said he drew the following conclusions from the talks thus far held:

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/EPC/CDR 12, Date: 3/3 / 93

(☒) RELEASE (☒) DECLASSIFY
() EXCISE () DECLASSIFY
() DENY IN PART
() DELETE Non-Responsive Info
FOIA Exemptions _____
PA Exemptions _____

MR Cases Only:
EO Citations _____

TS authority to
() CLASSIFY as () S or () C OADR
() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C OADR

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- 2 -

- A. The Soviets seem not only willing but anxious to talk to the West about Berlin. There had been nothing of the classic USSR tactics in conversations where they had no intention of reaching a conclusion.
- B. There was nothing in the talks thus far which would indicate that they were being used to inhibit our military buildup. This would also be a typical Soviet maneuver in talks where they were not serious.
- C. The timing of these talks just prior to the CPSU Congress suggests that the talks will set the tone, if not the positions themselves, in what Mr. Khrushchev will report on Berlin. The nature of the Soviet system is such that we must accept that what is said there will later admit of little possibility of fundamental change. If we should leave the impression with the Soviets now that we are breaking off these conversations, it will have the effect of hardening the Soviet line in a manner which will leave us and them little room for maneuver later. It might conceivably close the door on any possibility of negotiations.

Mr. Bohlen said that Ambassador Thompson agreed with him in the above evaluation. He would add that on the positive side there seemed to be in the Gromyko talks indications of certain possibilities. For example, the phrasing and general nature of the ideas with which Mr. Gromyko advanced the Soviet proposal for the stationing of USSR troops in West Berlin seemed to indicate that this was not any firm USSR position.

Mr. Bohlen concluded his analysis by observing that the French Government seems to have taken all the Soviet proposals in the four Gromyko talks as ultimate Soviet positions. He would agree that there was as yet no basis for negotiations, but that no positions had been taken in a manner which would preclude negotiations.

Ambassador Albrand said he agreed with President Kennedy's observation in his letter that there was no disagreement in our aims. Where we disagree, he said, was in the method to be used in pursuing those aims and in the assessment of the general framework of our present position. General de Gaulle's view was that after what the Soviets have done and are doing in Berlin they must consider that their threats, their madness and their blackmail are paying off. They have reason to believe that they have forced us into taking the initiative but that they themselves have not had to give a single inch on their positions.

Mr. Bohlen

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- 3 -

Mr. Bohlen said that he thought that for the Soviets they had made a certain amount of progress on procedural matters. For instance, they seem to have separated out the question of a peace treaty with the GDR from negotiations with the West and they seem to have agreed to make some sort of arrangement with the West before such a treaty. Ambassador Alphand asked if it were really clear that they would be prepared to make such an arrangement. Mr. Bohlen replied that in the President's talks with Gromyko the latter had said an agreement by the Four Powers could be made separately from the treaty and later either annexed to, or reflected in, the treaty. There were also hints in this talk that the Soviet position on respect for the sovereignty of the GDR did not involve any formal recognition of the GDR.

Ambassador Alphand said that the French method would be to say to the Soviets that it is clear from the Gromyko talks that the Soviets are insisting on a position in Berlin that is completely unacceptable to the West. Mr. Bohlen asked would the French give a mandate for Ambassador Thompson to say this because, he noted, this is also a technique of exploration and it is in fact how we would envision Ambassador Thompson proceeding.

Ambassador Alphand said the French did not believe that the Soviets wanted war which would only destroy their economy or even their country. In view of this belief he would review what General de Gaulle had said to the Secretary:

We are not in favor of opening ourselves to negotiations.
We will not be a party to negotiations. We cannot, of course, object to your soundings. After you have made those soundings we will see if there is a serious basis for negotiations, in which case we would be prepared to reconsider.

Ambassador Alphand said that the French find no possibility to reconsider their positions now. He would note that although he had sent the best possible analysis to Paris, it should be noted that in addition to the normal difficulty one has in understanding what the Soviets say, there has been the added handicap that the French have received these talks through still another medium. Possibly, Paris would be prepared to reconsider after they receive the memorandum he had been given today. However, in any event there was no question of the French acceding to the London meeting giving instructions to carry on the talks in Moscow because these talks would not be the same as those already held. They would, he added, be going into substance.

Mr. Bohlen asked the Ambassador if General de Gaulle indeed wanted a direct confrontation with the Soviets over Berlin. That was, in fact, what he would have at the end of November if we followed the line that the French

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seem to wish to follow. The Soviets might, of course, back down when faced with the ultimate of war but we don't know this. Ambassador Alphand observed that perhaps the answer to that question is in the first paragraph of the memorandum he received today, which said that the Soviets have indeed recognized that their present course is dangerous to them. Ambassador Alphand said that he saw two alternatives to war: one would be an arrangement which would give too much away and the second would be standing on the status quo. Mr. Bohlen asked if this second were good and Ambassador Alphand replied that it was our best position. Mr. Bohlen asked if this meant that the French would deny the possibility of an arrangement of access to Berlin or on a new status for Berlin which would be an improvement. Mr. Label explained that improved arrangements with regard to Berlin proper were indeed conceivable, but that these could only be obtained at a price in concessions elsewhere which would be unacceptable. Far better would be the status quo and no price.

Ambassador Thompson said he felt Khrushchev was committed inextricably to a peace treaty with the GDR. If we allowed him to do this without any prior arrangement, the maximum hope that we could have would be that Khrushchev would judge rightly in the scope which he gave to the GDR in what would then be the GDR's relations with the West. Ambassador Thompson felt that here was the greatest danger of war, because in this type of situation the GDR would not be prone to be cautious and Khrushchev would be bound to back up the GDR. This would be, Ambassador Thompson said, a "very dangerous situation" because the possibility of miscalculation might then lie within the capability of a single man on the border. Ambassador Alphand then said that this would be precisely the situation we would be faced with if we tried and then failed to make an arrangement with the Soviets. In that case, Mr. Kohler replied, we would have to face war but we would be sure of having our people behind us.

Mr. Bohlen said he would ask Ambassador Alphand if General de Gaulle's attitude toward negotiations with the Soviets stemmed from his 1944 experience, when a flat no produced a Soviet collapse over the question of the Polish government. If so, Mr. Bohlen would note that the circumstances of that particular negotiation were very much different from the circumstances today. Ambassador Alphand replied that he felt General de Gaulle's attitude came from a philosophy of dealing with dictators rather from any single experience.

Mr. Kohler noted that the United States is already paying a very high price to impress the Soviets militarily. We should hope that our Allies will be prepared to pay the same price. We have increased our military

budget

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- 3 -

budget 14%, matter of six to seven billion dollars; we have disrupted the lives of a quarter million of Americans; we were preparing to make serious changes in our national life and economy. We would certainly wish that our NATO Allies see their ways clear to paying a higher national price themselves to help impress the Soviets. Ambassador Alphant said that the French appreciate what we are doing and they agree they must do the same thing, and that we must all go in the same direction. Mr. Bohlen said that indeed the logical corollary of the French position on negotiation is increased military effort which means a substantial increase in military budgets. He asked if the French were prepared to do this. Ambassador Alphant said that they had already brought two divisions from Algeria and were bringing back a third, which was however, not equipped for European warfare. While the French had requested assistance in so equipping it, they were prepared to pay for this equipment.

Mr. Kohler then brought up the question of the future procedures for consultation among the Allies. He said that in view of the French communication of yesterday we considered the London meeting to be out of the question. Instead we would now propose to intensify our work within the framework of the Ambassadorial Group here in Washington. We would hope that Shuckburgh and Carstens would join us next week. And, we would certainly be prepared to welcome Jean Laloy if the French can see their way clear toward participating. He did note that there would be the problem of the press in view of the UK announcement that the London meeting had been arranged. The United States, of course, had said "tentatively arranged" so that we could now say that various possibilities had been considered, including London, but that we had decided to continue our consultations within the framework of the Washington machinery, and that we would be joined in this by representatives of the Foreign Offices. Ambassador Alphant said he would consult with the Quai and he will see what will be the effect and feeling of Paris after the receipt both of the President's letter and the paper which he had been given this morning. He said he proposed to say that these intensive sessions in Washington would be for the purpose of defining a common Western position on substance of negotiations. Mr. Kohler suggested that the talks would have a purpose somewhere in between, as we were not yet considering positions in regard to formal bargaining or scaling down of Soviet demands. Rather, he said, these talks would be for the purpose of giving guidelines to Ambassador Thompson which would tell him how far he could go in indicating to the Soviets the points beyond which we will not be pushed. Ambassador Alphant asked if this would be in the form of a mandate. Mr. Bohlen said that it was a mandate only in the sense that Ambassador Thompson would not be speaking for the United States alone but would be operating within a framework of Western policy. He said it was clear we could not do much more with the Soviets without indicating what we would consider and what we would not consider. He added that if he were

Ambassador Thompson

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- 6 -

Ambassador Thompson, he would not enter into these talks without such guidelines. Mr. Kohler told Ambassador Alphand that he was afraid the Ambassador might be "scaring" his government by the use of the word mandate. He wished to make clear that the US did not propose to explore with the Russians and then come back and negotiate with the French to see if these explorations were acceptable. He would again ask what the French wanted to know before they were prepared to go to negotiations. Mr. Kohler recalled that in 1959 the French had participated in an abortive conference when there had been practically no explorations. In fact, they had agreed in 1959 to a worse forum, in that it included East German participation. Mr. Kohler said that in his opinion we are already further or at least as far as we were when we agreed to negotiate in 1959. He would ask Ambassador Alphand to make clear to his government that Ambassador Thompson would have no mandate to commit the French government to final positions, but that we have to know how far we can go and still be sure that the French Government will follow. Mr. Label interjected that he felt the word "quadripartite" was the operative word in these explorations.

Mr. Bohlen then asked if the French could say what they did want and Ambassador Alphand replied that in the French view the West does not have to approach the Soviet Union and that after the first round of talks there is no reason for an initiative by the West toward the Soviet Union. Mr. Bohlen observed that perhaps too much emphasis was being placed on the word initiative. He did not feel that the Soviets felt we had taken an initiative. They themselves had been putting out feelers in many directions for these talks and the fact that the talks have taken place has not hardened their position. If they had thought that our approach was a sign of weakness, both their propaganda line and their line in the talks would have been much tougher. Thus, Mr. Bohlen concluded, he did not feel that the word initiative was any more applicable to us than to the Russians.

It was agreed that Ambassador Alphand would report the foregoing proposal regarding the talks in Washington to his government. Mr. Kohler emphasized that we would require an answer fairly shortly as we would be faced by press questions on this the early part of next week. He suggested that Monday would be the best date for a reply.

SECRET

October 17, 1961

On Tuesday, October 17, I spent an hour with Ambassador David Bruce. Although he made no restrictions on what he told me, I think it would be better to use this for background rather than for direct attribution.

East-West negotiations: Bruce does not think the dispute with France serious. Actually, de Gaulle probably is right in believing that if the West stuck together and declined to negotiate until Khrushchev were reasonable, the whole thing would go better. But democratic countries have difficulty doing this. Bruce's own feeling is that there must be negotiations, if for no other reason than to keep public opinion in support of Western governments. But he would go into the meetings with no fixed positions, in the sense that he believes ~~the~~ it time for the Russians to be putting forth some proposals. In addition, there's always the problem of leakage of Western positions -- fall-back positions as well as the original bargaining points. In this Bruce's feelings are very close to those of the British. The problem was particularly bad, he says, at the 1959 Geneva conference. Incidentally, he believes the West went altogether too far in suggesting that it would control "propaganda activities" in Berlin. This would be altogether one-sided with no control over Soviet subversion in East Berlin, which he says is very substantial.

Inspection zone-denuclearized zone: Bruce throws down hard the Ormsby-Gore idea of a ground inspection zone. Off the record, he says he has talked with Lord Home about it and that ~~the~~ Home will have no part of it. Home thinks it very dangerous except as part of a larger disarmament plan. The basic difficulty is still that it would appear to discriminate against Germany, and would play into German feelings of self-pity. Bruce thinks that Ormsby-Gore simply has not been briefed on the subject and has been too close to the disarmament negotiations (I am not sure that this is true, because the plan comes from elsewhere in the Foreign Office also).

Essentially what Ormsby-Gore is proposing is similar to the Norstad plan suggested several years ago, and all of these plans ^{are} variants of the Rapacki plan. There might be some point to them later, but as a beginning offer they would be perilous because the Russians would seize upon them to obfuscate other issues. The Russian objective still remains to detach Germany. Bruce thinks that there is substantial danger that the Germans would feel badly let down if any inspection or security arrangements seemed to make them second-class citizens.

At the same time, Bruce thinks that Adenauer, while he is a great European and has been right about Germany's links with the West, has been "pig-headed" about Berlin.

Status of Berlin: Bruce sees substantial danger that even under the best of circumstances West Berlin will become a hollow shell, with people and capital fleeing from the city. Already there has been some indication

of this in the concern of foreign industries for their plants in Berlin. West Germany is subsidizing Berlin to the tune of half a billion dollars a year, and this is exclusive of what industries themselves are doing to locate plants in Berlin. If this bill became as high as one and a half billion dollars a year, Bruce feels that there would be a substantial movement in Germany simply to ~~scuttle~~ scuttle Berlin as not worth the cost.

Accordingly, Bruce is very much in favor of some sort of United Nations solution as mentioned by Walter ~~Lippman~~ ^{Lippmann}. He believes that the best way would be to locate the U.N. headquarters in Berlin and make Berlin a world capital. By doing this it would be possible to demand that all of Berlin, rather than merely ~~the~~ East Berlin, be included in the area. Bruce also would demand land corridors under international control to West Germany. He thinks that the focus of international attention on Berlin would be a sufficient guarantee and probably would succeed in holding the population in Berlin. He agrees that the cost would be quite great, but he believes that the headquarters in New York could be sold for a good price. The U.S. probably would have to pick up much of the bill, but it would not be much more expensive than a year of Congo operations.

Bruce thinks that the West suffered a grievous loss in the closing of the East Berlin border, and that the failure to do more than wring our hands contributed to the loss of morale in West Berlin. Bruce himself would have taken action, presumably in knocking down the barriers.

British nuclear deterrent: Despite the U.S. effort to build up conventional forces in Europe (which Bruce does not think a real addition to the deterrent because it is nuclear war that frightens the Russians), Britain has done almost nothing along this line. In point of fact, the recent exercises of the British Army on the Rhine (widely discussed in the Times and Guardian the last few days) indicate that the British are in fact preparing to fight a nuclear war in Europe. The army forces are ~~as~~ sadly under strength, and they simply do not have the capability to mount anything but a nuclear response.

All of this stems from the "new look" period some years ago when the British took up the American line that it was somehow possible to get a bigger bang ~~bang~~ for a pound and defense could be had cheaply. Bruce thinks that Sandys was a major culprit. The blunt fact is that conscription is going to have to be reintroduced here shortly, and Britain is going to have to pay a substantially larger defense bill (Iain Macleod mentioned to me the other day the possibility that Britain would reintroduce conscription). Actually, none of the NATO partners has done very much toward building up conventional forces, although there have been a few pro-forma moves. Although Bruce disagrees with the idea of more

conventional forces, he says that if the theory that such forces would be more credible to the Russians (on the basis that we might use them to respond, whereas there might be some doubt whether we would actually use nuclear weapons in a small fracas) is to be effective, certainly there will have to be more evidence of cooperation.

Laos: Harriman has done extremely well in the negotiations at Geneva. His greatest problem has been not the Russians, but the Indians. Krishna Menon's proteges have obstructed an agreement at every point, and according to Bruce have been much worse than the Russians to deal with. Bruce thinks Menon totally impossible at every point. He blames Menon in particular for talking Nehru out of a strong stand both on nuclear tests and on Hungary five years ago.

In a related area Bruce told of a luncheon today with the Vietnamese Ambassador. It was a monologue of a professorial sort, with the Vietnamese opining that what Vietnam really needed was to mount a religious crusade and to enlist the services of Moral Rearmament. Bruce winced, but the Ambassador really meant Moral Rearmament.

Congo: Bruce confirmed that Britain had not permitted two Ethiopian jet fighters requested for the U.N. Congo operation to refuel, although he does not have this officially. There had been no explanation here of this mystery. British opinion changed very quickly in the Congo affair. It had been quite broadly pro-U.N. all during the year. There was no sympathy with the Belgian mercenaries or with those few British citizens serving Tshombe. In fact, the passports of the latter were quickly taken up. But when the U.N. forces abetted the holding of Tshombe as a prisoner, public opinion quickly switched. This seemed quite unfair. In addition, there is an admiration here for stability wherever it is found, and Tshombe seems to represent most of the stability in the Congo. Bruce added that he thought a great deal of the difficulty in the Congo over the last year had been caused by the Indians. He had no good word for Dayal, although he believes his trouble primarily one of intellectual snobbery and race prejudice.

Bruce has rather admired Salazar in the past, but concedes that it is difficult for any dictatorship to remain benevolent. Salazar was ~~was~~ one of the few philosophers who really did not want power. But now the problem has gone much beyond Portugal. In this vein, he spoke with some admiration of what had been done in the Dominican republic to promote economic development even though the wealth went to Trujillo. He believes it important for the United States now to recognise the ~~dominant~~ ^{Belaguer} government in Ciudad Trujillo so as to get the Trujillo heirs out of the running.

British neutralism: Bruce does not think the various ban-the-bomb and neutralist campaigns here much of a threat. British opinion is solidly against nuclear war as such, but opinion anywhere probably would be the same if the question were asked baldly. The anti-war movements are much

Record Number 33624

Berlin Crisis

Memorandum

10/17/1961

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Background Talk with David Bruce

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3

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET

October 20, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Berlin meeting, 10 o'clock, Friday, October 20

Two papers will be presented for approval today: (1) a revised State-Defense draft of the preferred sequence of military actions to be taken in response to a blockage of access in Berlin; (2) a letter to Norstad which would accomplish ~~this~~ the preferred sequence as a statement of your policy. These documents have the agreement of State, Defense, and the JCS, but this agreement covers a deep-seated difference between the civilians in both departments and the military both here and in Paris. ~~Indeed~~ This is the difference between those who would expect a period of non-military action: sanctions, naval harassment and UN action -- and those who believe we should act promptly and continuously by military means to restore access once it is blocked.

Both the "preferred sequence" and the Norstad letter fudge this issue. This is deliberate, I am sure; Bob McNamara thinks the consequences of a sharp division now would be serious. Before reaching your own judgment on this point, you will want to read the two documents.

Detailed comments on the preferred sequence follow:

(I) relates to probes, not offensive military actions, and is quite well agreed. The only rock in the channel here is that a fighter escort operation might well escalate very rapidly.

(II) is about non-combatant activity. The economic embargo is the most important item here, and a report from Joe Fowler makes clear that there is much still to be done. This is TAB 1 of the supporting papers for today. In substance, it reports that only France, Germany and The Netherlands are in full agreement on this one. A number of efforts are going forward to strengthen the souls of the unrighteous. You may want to ask whether more pressure should be put on the British at a high level.

But the most important part of II is in the parenthesis, which states, without resolving, the issue between "delay" and "prompt action." This is the issue which divides the soldiers and the civilians.

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1:27 p.m.

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-2-

(III) describes naval, air and ground action of a non-nuclear sort. The points to be noted are these:

(A) None of the military believe in a blockade without accompanying ground action in Europe. You may want to ask General Lemnitzer why this is.

(B) Non-nuclear air war is regarded as attractive by a number of the experts, but apparently not by the Air Force itself. Thus planning for this one may be approved in principle and neglected in fact. The Air Force both here and in Europe prefers its nuclear capability and has been leaking its point of view to the papers. You may wish to press on this point too.

(C) General Taylor believes that the description of the non-nuclear ground advance should make clear its specific function of exposing Soviet intention as distinct from the DDR. Otherwise, there is no major disagreement here.

If you approve of (III) as it stands, you can perhaps insure your own control over the course of planning and thinking by requesting regular reports of readiness and of the progress of planning. This is particularly important in the field of non-nuclear air action.

(IV) is about nuclear action, and it leaves unresolved the great issue which was touched on between McNamara and Nitze in our last meeting. This issue, briefly, is whether we can and should have nuclear strikes short of the massive strategic attack which is the current basic plan for general war. I do not think much additional work has been done on this, and again you may wish to press for continued analysis and multiple planning. McNamara has just called it a very big and not prepared in this for today. But all of the issues in (III) and (IV) are essentially subordinate clauses in the main question, which is still the question between our view and Nordstad's: Are there a variety of steps between blocked access and general nuclear war, or not?

McG. B.

TOP SECRET

great issue
unresolved

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 20, 1961

UNCLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET

Dear General Norstad:

Since your visit here I have given further thought to the two principal subjects of our discussion in relation to the Berlin situation, namely, contingency planning and the preparatory build-up in NATO military strength.

As you have been informed, all the measures you recommended for immediate action have been authorized and put in motion, except for the replacement of the 3rd battle group now in Berlin which will take place when additional such units move to Europe as part of the Long Thrust exercise.

My present thinking on the preferred sequence of types of actions that we should take in the event of any abrogation of Western rights in Berlin is reflected in the sequence of four courses of action designated by Roman numerals in the enclosed outline. The import of this sequence should be clear to you, and I desire that it serve as the guidance for your discussions with our Allies and for your planning of detailed military operations.

In the course of that planning I ask that you spell out for me with particularity your operational concepts for the command and control procedures

Two aspects of my present thinking about Berlin planning and preparation deserve especial emphasis.

First:

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E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4(b)
Agency Case <u>NSC F90-217A</u>
NLE Case <u>89-3841</u>
BY <u>HL</u> NLE DATE <u>5/12/90</u>

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
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Norstad / 86 / Berlin. Live Date 1961 (Sep - 31 Dec 62)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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-3-



When contingency plans have been completed and received through established channels, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will review them with me and my other advisors.

Sincerely,

General Lauris Norstad
Supreme Commander
Allied Powers Europe
Paris, France

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 20, 1961

~~TOP SECRET~~

Dear General Norstad:

2. Since your visit here I have given further thought to the two principal subjects of our discussion in relation to the Berlin situation, namely, contingency planning and the preparatory build-up in NATO military strength.

As you have been informed, all the measures you recommended for immediate action have been authorized and put in motion, except for the replacement of the 3rd battle group now in Berlin which will take place when additional such units move to Europe as part of the Long Thrust exercise.

My present thinking on the preferred sequence of types of actions that we should take in the event of any abrogation of Western rights in Berlin is reflected in the sequence of four courses of action designated by Roman numerals in the enclosed outline. The import of this sequence should be clear to you, and I desire that it serve as the guidance for your discussions with our Allies and for your planning of detailed military operations.

21990
In the course of that planning I ask that you spell out for me with particularity your operational concepts for the command and control procedures within your command to be used in the "selective nuclear attacks" and "limited tactical employment of nuclear weapons" referred to in Contingencies IV A and B of the enclosure.]

Two aspects of my present thinking about Berlin planning and preparation deserve especial emphasis.

21990
First: [What I want is a sequence of graduated responses to Soviet/GDR actions in denial of our rights of access.]

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921990
[The purpose is to maintain our rights and preserve our alliance. The responses after Phase I should begin with the non-military and move to the military. We cannot plan in advance the exact time each response should be initiated; for one reason, because we cannot now predict the date of Soviet/GDR action, for another because we cannot foresee the duration or the consequences of each response. But there are some principles applicable to this matter of timing. The earlier responses should be thoroughly prepared in advance and the purpose should be to initiate them and keep them going long enough so that the next response may, if necessary, come in when needed. This requires vigor in preparation, readiness for action, and caution against going off half-cocked. The military sequence indicated begins with the air action outlined in III A 1. Since it seems likely that any form of Soviet blockade will include interference with air access, every effort in preparation should be made to increase the chance of success in air operations. The rewards of success would be great indeed. The other indicated steps are those outlined in III A 2 and III B. These courses will require the timely addition of considerable forces to your command, and appropriate dispositions on your central front. Should it appear that Soviet forces sufficient to defeat these actions are being brought into play, the response, on which you would receive specific directives, will be one or more of those contained in paragraph IV.

Second: At this juncture I place as much importance on developing our capacity and readiness to fight with significant non-nuclear forces as on measures designed primarily to make our nuclear deterrent more credible. In saying this I am not in any sense depreciating the need for realization by the U.S.S.R. of the tremendous power of

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WASHINGTON,


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9/19/44
[Our nuclear forces and our will to use them, if necessary, in support of our objectives. Indeed, I think the two aspects are interrelated. It seems evident to me that our nuclear deterrent will not be credible to the Soviets unless they are convinced of NATO's readiness to become engaged on a lesser level of violence and are thereby made to realize the great risks of escalation to nuclear war. I will be interested to hear of any suggestion from you as to how we might intensify that realization.]

When contingency plans have been completed and received through established channels, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will review them with me and my other advisors.

Sincerely,



General Lauris Norstad
Supreme Commander
Allied Powers Europe
Paris, France

~~TOP SECRET~~

Excluded from automatic downgrading and
declassification

Meeting - Cabinet Room
10:00 a.m.

Oct. 20, 1961

Last Version
Berlin 8

1/7

"First: What I want is a sequence of graduated responses to Soviet/GDR actions in denial of our rights access. The purpose is to maintain our rights and preserve our alliance. The responses should begin with the non-military and move to the military in the sequence outlined below. We cannot plan in advance the exact time each response should be initiated; for one reason, because we cannot now predict the date of Soviet/GDR response, for another because we cannot foresee the duration or the consequences of each response. But there are some principles applicable to this matter of timing. The earlier responses should be thoroughly prepared in advance and the purpose should be to initiate them and keep them going long enough so that the next response may, if necessary, come in when needed. This requires vigor in preparation, readiness for action, and caution against going off half-cocked.

The military sequence should begin with the air action outlined in HIB and every effort in preparation and execution should be made to achieve success. The rewards of success would be great indeed. The next steps, if needed, should those outlined in IIA and C, executed for the reasons given nearly simultaneously. This will require the timely movement of considerable forces to your command, and appropriate dispositions on your central front.

Should it appear that Soviet forces sufficient to crush the ground action are being brought into play the response must be that contained in Paragraph II and must be decisive.


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20 October 1961


U. S. Policy on Military Actions in a Berlin Conflict

In the event military force is applied in the Berlin situation, it is United States policy that the nature and sequence of such use should preferably be:

I



II



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20 October 1961

U. S. Policy on Military Actions in a Berlin Conflict

= NSAM 109

In the event military force is applied in the Berlin situation, it is United States policy that the nature and sequence of such use should preferably be:

- I If Soviet/GDR administrative or other action interferes with Berlin access by ground or air but is short of definitive blockage, then the tripartite powers should execute Berlin contingency plans, to include tripartitely agreed probes of Soviet intentions by a platoon or smaller force on the ground and by fighter escort in the air; they should continue to use fully any unblocked mode of access.

(COMMENT: Through this point, risks of major war, unless Soviets wish to start one, are not materially raised by any tripartite action, and therefore, decision on execution is tripartite rather than NATO responsibility.)

- II If, despite the above tripartite actions, Soviet/GDR action indicates a determination to maintain significant blockage of our access to Berlin, then the NATO Allies should undertake such non-combatant activity as economic embargo, maritime harassment, and UN action. Simultaneously, they should mobilize and reinforce rapidly to improve capability for taking actions listed below. Meanwhile, they should use fully any unblocked access to Berlin. (If, however, the situation has so developed that NATO forces have been substantially reinforced, after appropriate non-combatant measures undertake without delay one or more of the courses of military action shown below.)

(COMMENT: Since the Alliance proposes to exploit other means before initiating major military operations, non-combatant efforts to restore ground access will precede the military efforts shown below in any case. A separate issue is the choice between delay while reinforcing in Europe, and prompt action. Without a build-up by the Allies, the range of options for early military action by us is limited. Undue delay could weaken nuclear credibility, threaten the viability of West Berlin, and erode Alliance resolve, but these potential disadvantages may be outweighed by the higher risk of nuclear escalation if early non-nuclear action were taken with no more than the currently available forces. To the extent that Alliance forces in Europe are raised above present levels, the delays in initiating military action can be reduced or the military action can be tailored to the existing force levels.)

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III. If despite the above Allied actions, our Berlin access is not restored, the Allies should take appropriate further action to clarify whether the Soviets/GDR intend to maintain blockage of air or ground access, or both, while making clear our intention to obtain re-opened access. Then embark on one or more of the following expanded military courses of action:

A. European Theatre

1. Expanding non-nuclear air action, against a background of expanded ground defensive strength, to gain local air superiority. Extend size and scope as necessary.

(Comment: Opposing strengths probably will be roughly comparable. Military success locally is not impossible. As a political operation, this shows the Soviets visibly higher risks of nuclear war. The pace and volatility of extended air operations raise risks of rapid escalation.)

2. Expanding non-nuclear ground operations into GDR territory in division and greater strength, with strong air support.

(Comment: This is a politically oriented military operation aiming to display to the Soviets the approaching danger of possibly irreversible escalation. Military overpowering of determined Soviet resistance is not feasible. The risks rise, as do the military pressures on the Soviets.)

B. World Wide

Maritime control, naval blockade, or other world-wide measures, both for reprisal and to add to general pressure on the Soviets.

(Comment: This action, by itself, is not apt to be effective and might lead to Soviet initiation of action on the European central front in any case. It lacks direct relation to Berlin and may entail political liabilities. It exploits pronounced Allied naval superiority. It would have a delayed impact on nuclear risks. It is the view of the JCS and the principal unified commanders that a naval blockade should be accompanied by other military action in Central Europe.)

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IV. If despite Allied use of substantial non-nuclear forces, the Soviets continue to encroach upon our vital interests, then the Allies should use nuclear weapons, starting with one of the following courses of action but continuing through C below if necessary:

A. Selective nuclear attacks for the primary purpose of demonstrating the will to use nuclear weapons.

B. Limited tactical employment of nuclear weapons to achieve in addition significant tactical advantage such as preservation of the integrity of Allied forces committed, or to extend pressure toward the objective.

C. General Nuclear war.

(Comment: The Allies only partially control the timing and scale of nuclear weapons use. Such use might be initiated by the Soviets, at any time after the opening of small-scale hostilities. Allied initiation of limited nuclear action may elicit a reply in kind; it may also prompt unrestrained pre-emptive attack.)

UNCLASSIFIED

October 23, 1961

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 109

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: U. S. Policy on Military Actions in a Berlin Conflict

The President has approved the following statement of U. S. policy on military actions in a Berlin conflict:

In the event military force is applied in the Berlin situation, it is United States policy that the nature and sequence of such use should preferably be:

- I. If Soviet/GDR administrative or other action interferes with Berlin access by ground or air but is short of definitive blockage, then the tripartite powers should execute Berlin contingency plans, to include tripartitely agreed probes of Soviet intentions by a platoon or smaller force on the ground and by fighter escort in the air; they should continue to use fully any unblocked mode of access.

(COMMENT: Through this point, risks of major war, unless Soviets wish to start one, are not materially raised by any tripartite action, and therefore, decision on execution is tripartite rather than NATO responsibility.)

- II. If, despite the above tripartite actions, Soviet/GDR action indicates a determination to maintain significant blockage of our access to Berlin, then the NATO Allies should undertake such non-combatant activity as economic embargo, maritime harassment, and UN action. Simultaneously, they should mobilize and reinforce rapidly to improve capability for taking actions listed below. Meanwhile, they should use fully any unblocked access to Berlin. (If, however, the situation has so developed that NATO forces have been substantially reinforced, after appropriate non-combatant measures undertaken without delay one or more of the courses of military action shown below.)

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by S. Tilley, National Security Council

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(COMMENT: Since the Alliance proposes to exploit other means before initiating major military operations, non-combatant efforts to restore ground access will precede the military efforts shown below in any case. A separate issue is the choice between delay while re-inforcing in Europe, and prompt action. Without a build-up by the Allies, the range of options for early military action by us is limited. Undue delay could weaken nuclear credibility, threaten the viability of West Berlin, and erode Alliance resolve, but these potential disadvantages may be outweighed by the higher risk of nuclear escalation if early non-nuclear action were taken with no more than the currently available forces. To the extent that Alliance forces in Europe are raised above present levels, the delays in initiating military action can be reduced or the military action can be tailored to the existing force levels.)

- III. If, despite the above Allied actions, our Berlin access is not restored, the Allies should take appropriate further action to clarify whether the Soviets/GDR intend to maintain blockage of air or ground access, or both, while making clear our intention to obtain re-opened access. Then embark on one or more of the following expanded military courses of action:

A. European Theatre

1. Expanding non-nuclear air action, against a background of expanded ground defensive strength, to gain local air superiority. Extend size and scope as necessary.

(Comment: Opposing strengths probably be roughly comparable. Military success locally is not impossible. As a political operation, this shows the Soviets visibly higher risks of nuclear war. The pace and volatility of extended air operations raise risks of rapid escalation.)

2. Expanding non-nuclear ground operations into GDR territory in division and greater strength, with strong air support.

(Comment: This is a politically oriented military operation aiming to display to the Soviets the approaching danger of possibly irreversible escalation. Military overpowering of determined Soviet resistance is not feasible. The risks rise, as do the military pressures on the Soviets.)

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B. World Wide

Maritime control, naval blockage, or other world-wide measures, both for reprisal and to add to general pressure on the Soviets.

(Comment: This action, by itself, is not apt to be effective and might lead to Soviet initiation of action on the European central front in any case. It lacks direct relation to Berlin and many entail political liabilities. It exploits pronounced Allied naval superiority. It would have a delayed impact on nuclear risks. It is the view of the JCS and the principal unified commanders that a naval blockade should be accompanied by other military action in Central Europe.

- IV. If, despite Allied use of substantial non-nuclear forces, the Soviets continue to encroach upon our vital interests, then the Allies should use nuclear weapons, starting with one of the following courses of action but continuing through C below if necessary:

A. Selective nuclear attacks for the primary purpose of demonstrating the will to use nuclear weapons.

B. Limited tactical employment of nuclear weapons to achieve in addition significant tactical advantage such as preservation of the integrity of Allied forces committed, or to extend pressure toward the objective.

C. General Nuclear War.

(Comment: The Allies only partially control the timing and scale of nuclear weapons use. Such use might be initiated by the Soviets, at any time after the opening of small-scale hostilities.

- A. Allied initiation of limited nuclear action may elicit a reply in kind; it may also prompt unrestrained pre-emptive attack.)

In view of the President's approval of the above statement, Supplement 1, "U. S. Policy on Berlin", to NSC 5803, "U. S. Policy Toward Germany", is declared to be no longer applicable.

McGeorge Bundy

Information copies to:

Gen. Maxwell Taylor
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Mr. Amory, CIA

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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October 24, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

On Adenauer's Visit

It now seems plain that a visit from Adenauer is the best way of moving forward on Berlin negotiations. He wants it; we believe de Gaulle expects it; the British seem willing, and no other method seems promising.

The preparation for such a meeting is a matter of first importance. I believe you should take charge of it yourself, and not delegate it to the Secretary of State or to the Berlin planning group. I suggest further that you should bring in as personal advisers two men with enormous influence and standing in Germany: Dean Acheson and Robert Bowie. Secretary Rusk's reputation with the Germans is for the moment gravely shadowed by his brief flirtation with "a reduction of confrontation."

If you took this course, Acheson could prepare the brief on our political negotiating position while Bowie concentrated on the larger question of the future of West Berlin and West Germany in a constantly growing Western community. This positive and long-range element in the matter may be crucial in winning the Chancellor's genuine and enthusiastic support. We can probably browbeat him into acceptance of a reasonable negotiating position, but what we want is his leadership, not his surrender.

It is now reasonably clear that Acheson likes the negotiating position that is emerging at the staff level. He is also interested, at least, in the parallel treaties. He would at your invitation take the brief to develop and defend these two alternative bargaining positions.

Flanked by Acheson and Bowie, and of course with Mr. Rusk at your right hand during the meetings, you would be in position to make Adenauer's visit a decisive, positive turning point in the crisis.

McG. B.

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NARS, Date 3/86
B217

10/24/61
Box 351
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NATO
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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24 October 1961

Re: []

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNNY

SUBJECT: Differences among NATO Allies on Broad Strategy

1. Levels of Differences

At the risk of over-simplification, I would say that this Government is experiencing difficulties with its NATO Allies on three levels:

- a. The relatively pure-political question of when and how to negotiate what with the Soviet Union;
- b. The relatively pure-military question of achieving a meaningful and selective NATO-wide military build-up;
- c. The halfway-house question of broad NATO strategy (or "philosophy", as members of the North Atlantic Council often call it), which derives in part from the broader political question and which, in turn, provides the basis for derivation of the more specific military question.

2. Focus of This Memorandum

This memorandum will try to concentrate on the halfway-house level of differences because it is in this area that political and military considerations are so intermingled that neither the statesman nor the soldier is sure that they are his business.

3. 1961: Berlin and NATO Strategy

a. In connection with the Berlin crisis which the Soviets have created this year, the military policy of this Government has been: (1) generally, to give top priority to measures aimed at dealing with that crisis; (2) specifically, to improve the ability of the NATO Alliance to respond to less-than-total aggressions with less-than-total force, thus raising the threshold that would lead to general nuclear war.

b. Although this Government, from the President on down and in many different forms, has repeatedly pointed out that its current stress on conventional strength for NATO does not imply abandonment,

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but rather reinforcement, of the deterrent, some of its Allies remain unconvinced. [REDACTED] 11.3(2)(5)

4. [REDACTED]

It has become increasingly clear during the past few weeks that the following elements represent a hard position on which [REDACTED] have decided to stick:

5. Pacification [REDACTED] *de Gaulle*

a. The position of this Government is logical and clear. Several excellent messages from Washington to the field have furnished policy guidance to its ambassadors and senior military officers, but the resistance, almost amounting to mistrust, continues among certain of our Allies. [REDACTED]

b. [REDACTED] *Adenauer* additionally, have been gravely suspicious of the current intentions of this Government in the field of potential negotiations with the Soviet Union, and this undoubtedly colors their approach to NATO strategic considerations.

c. The President has reassured [REDACTED] *Adenauer* on negotiations; if this doesn't "take", nothing will. For reassurance on strategic considerations, however, there is one man whose judgment would mean even more [REDACTED] to any tangential NATO malcontents) than that of the President: General Norstad.

sanitized
[REDACTED]

d. The NATO nations have grown to trust Norstad because they feel he is one of them, not an advocate of some American policy. Just a few days ago [REDACTED] told Norstad that [REDACTED] . . . would consider modifying their position only if Norstad personally and formally stated that he would go along with Stikker's proposed formulation /which is acceptable to U.S./ and indicated that he believed either that MRBM's not necessary or that subject of no great urgency."

e. Norstad naturally did not respond to this feeler [REDACTED] but indicated later to his political advisor that, "If asked, he must reaffirm his view that MRBM's are necessary At same time, he would qualify this statement by saying he understands NAC will shortly be considering this matter and that meanwhile it should not be permitted to hold up action on other important problems."

6. Recommendation

That the President designate one man to go to Paris and persuade General Norstad that the interests of NATO as well as of this Government will be best served if he exercises his great influence to secure agreement within NATO on the NATO military policy of this Government.

a. Maybe the book says Finletter, but the facts indicate Norstad.

b. Maybe an order would do the job, but persuasion would be far more productive of convincing response.

c. The man selected should (ideally):

(1) Enjoy the full confidence of the President.

(2) Enjoy the full confidence of Norstad, as nearly as can be determined.

(3) Believe fully in the NATO military policy of this Government, as nearly as can be determined.

Lawrence J. Legere, Jr.
Colonel, U.S. Army

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10/27/61 2 (420)

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October 27, 1961

~~SECRET~~

TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM: EUR - Mr. Kohler
S/P - Mr. McGhee

SUBJECT: MRBM's

1. Attached is a proposed letter to the Secretary of Defense, expressing the Department's belief that the choice between sea-based and land-based deployment of MRBM's in NATO should not be foreclosed by any early change in the US posture on this issue in NATO and our hope that US development work on possible new MRBM's will explore possibilities of sea-based as well as land-based deployment. No decision on this last point has apparently yet been reached in DOD. It is vital, from a foreign policy standpoint, that the sea-based route not be ruled out, if we are to preserve the option of holding to the NSC policy toward NATO which the President approved April 21.

2. The NSC policy:

a. precludes deployment of MRBM's to the forces of individual European countries, whether or not these forces are committed to NATO;

b. authorizes commitment of US Polaris submarines to NATO and holds out the eventual possibility of a multi-laterally owned and controlled NATO sea-borne NATO missile force.


3. This policy was hammered out after intensive and successive consideration of the problem by:

a. A NATO Study Group headed by Bob Bowie which labored on the question for several months in the summer of

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1960, and whose conclusions were accepted by the Government after several meetings on this subject between President Eisenhower and his principal advisers (including General Norstad and Bowie who each had an opportunity to present their opposing viewpoints).

b. The 1961 NATO Task Force headed by Dean Acheson, whose conclusions are reflected in April 21 NSC policy. The President reinforced this policy in his Ottawa speech when he said:

"To make clear our own intentions and commitments to Defense of Western Europe, the United States will commit to the NATO command five - and subsequently still more - Polaris atomic-missile submarines, which are defensive weapons, subject to any agreed NATO guidelines on their control and use, and responsive to the needs of all members but still credible in an emergency. Beyond this, we look to the possibility of eventually establishing a NATO sea-borne force, which would be truly multi-lateral in ownership and control, if this should be desired and found feasible by our Allies, once NATO's non-nuclear goals have been achieved."

4. The course indicated in the April 21 NSC policy seems the only means of MRBM deployment consistent with our broader policy objective of maintaining and promoting cohesive ties, both among the European countries and between these countries and the US.

a. A proposal to deploy MRBM's only to US forces, with no possibility or prospect of European participation, would heighten the European concerns which arise out of the US atomic monopoly. It will be difficult to maintain a meaningful partnership between the US and Europe if these concerns grow.

b. A policy of deploying MRBM's to the forces of individual European countries would be a major step toward

creation

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- 3 -

creation of de facto national strategic nuclear capabilities. These missiles would be capable of reaching the USSR, and the warheads would be contained in them rather than in US storage sites. Neither these missiles' commitment to NATO nor planned physical safeguards would probably be adequate protection against a determined attempt by a technologically sophisticated country to divert the missiles to national purposes.

It would be more difficult to maintain the cohesion of an integrated Europe and the Atlantic Community in the face of widespread awareness that several NATO countries now had the means of independently initiating effective strategic attack on the USSR. This would be the more true since the Soviets would be working to stir up allied fears - particularly in the UK - over the assignment of these missiles to the Federal Republic, and would argue that this annulled, for all practical purposes, any agreement we might have entered into not to diffuse control of nuclear weapons. The German role would be the more important since it might well not be possible to deploy these missiles in France; the French would probably, as in 1960, insist on some kind of aid for their national program as a pre-condition.

c. A decision to deploy the missiles initially to US forces, while indicating a willingness also to deploy them to a multilaterally owned and controlled NATO missile force would avoid the divisive effects of either of the above courses of action. US support for this proposal would also help to meet concerns which have lately been aroused, particularly in Germany, as to US policy in the nuclear field. Chancellor Adenauer commended the multilateral proposal in speaking to Ambassador Finletter and Henry Kissinger on two separate occasions following the President's Ottawa speech; he asked Kissinger if the President meant the proposal seriously and urged Finletter to press the proposal vigorously as an alternative to national programs. The feasibility of the multilateral force would, of course, hinge on the NATO countries being able to work out an acceptable procedure for deciding on its use. The initiative on this question would rest with

the European

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- 4 -

The European countries, as you implied in speaking of the possibility of an independent NATO force during your interview with Ambassador Grewe on October 22.

4. Sea-based deployment would be more consistent with the policy outlined above than land-based deployment:

a. The initial deployment of sea-based MRBM's to US forces alone would be more feasible than that of land-based missiles. Continental European countries would probably not permit US land-based MRBM's to be stationed on their territory, unless they could acquire some of these missiles for their own forces. The deployment of US sea-based missiles could be accomplished with less difficulty.

b. The proposal for subsequent MRBM deployment to a multilateral force is more plausible in a sea-borne than in a land-based context, since land-based missiles are clearly vulnerable to seizure by the countries in whose territory they are deployed.

5. There are, of course, economic and military implications of land-based deployment, to be weighed along with these political factors. Any economic saving would seem a lesser consideration, in view of the grave implications of this choice for our national security. In trying to determine the relative weight to be given the military factors, the existence of large US strategic forces outside the theater seems of some importance, since it is these forces - rather than nuclear forces in Europe - which will largely determine the issue of any general war. By contrast, the political effect - for good or evil - of the way in which nuclear forces in Europe are deployed will be of crucial importance.

6. It is for these reasons that we believe it desirable not now to foreclose the issue of land vs. sea-based deployment either by a one-sided development program or by now approving a NATO requirement for land-based MRBM's.

Recommendation.

That you sign the attached letter to Secretary McNamara and speak to him of the importance which we attach to this issue when the occasion arises.

Attachment:

Letter to Secretary of Defense.

FORM 100-1000

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given w 10/27/61 (420)

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Dear Bob:

In order to keep open the option of holding to the April 21 NSC policy, I believe that our posture in NATO should continue for the present to be one of reaffirming both our intention to commit Polaris submarines to NATO and our willingness to consider a multilateral NATO sea-borne missile force, if this is desired by the other NATO countries, but that we should not approve in NATO any requirement for land-based MRBM's until the political and military aspects of the question have been thoroughly studied in the US Government. For the same reason, I would hope that planned US MRBM development work could relate to weapons suited for sea-based, as well as land-based, deployment and that we could avoid describing this work in NATO in terms so specific as to narrow our later freedom of action.

You will recall that the April 21 NSC policy precludes deployment of MRBM's to the forces of individual European countries - whether or not these forces are committed to SACEUR, calls for commitment of US sea-based missiles to NATO, and holds out the long-term possibility of a multilaterally owned and controlled sea-borne NATO missile force, such as the President discussed in his Ottawa speech.

Sea-based deployment could be reconciled with the concept underlying this policy more readily than land-based deployment, for two reasons:

1. We could deploy sea-based missiles to US forces in NATO waters without too much difficulty. An attempt

to deploy

The Honorable

Robert S. McNamara

Secretary of Defense

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E.O. 12356, Sec 3.4
NLR-94-37
CA MMRK NARA Date 7/24/95

(draft) Revo → McNamara
NSR 1216 / MFA, Geneva, 1/61-6/62

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- 2 -

to deploy land-based US missiles, on the other hand, would almost certainly move the European countries on whose soil they were to be stationed to seek comparable missiles for their own forces.

If we refused their requests, we would probably fail to secure deployment rights for US missiles. If we acceded to their requests, this action would be viewed as a major step toward creation of de facto national strategic nuclear capabilities, since neither these missiles' commitment to NATO nor planned physical safeguards would likely be considered adequate protection against a determined attempt by a technologically advanced country to divert the missiles to national purposes.

Resulting widespread awareness that several NATO countries thus had acquired the means of independently initiating effective strategic attack on the USSR would make it more difficult to maintain the cohesion of Europe and the Atlantic Community. It would create peacetime divisions within the alliance - particularly in any grave international crisis, as well as greatly lessen our ability to follow a non-nuclear strategy or a centrally controlled nuclear strategy in event of hostilities.

These divisions would be the greater since (i) we might well be unable to deploy these missiles in France without aid for the French national program, which I would consider contrary to our interests; (ii) the German role in any MRBM deployment would have to be substantial and would generate great concern, particularly in the UK. It is presumably an awareness of this concern which moved the German representative in the North Atlantic Council to indicate that his country would not accept deployment of mobile MRBM's on its territory, in the NAC discussion of October 24.

2. The alternative proposal of a multilaterally owned and controlled NATO MRBM force is more plausible

in a

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-3-

in a sea-based than in a land-based context, since land-based missiles would be clearly vulnerable to seizure by the nations in whose territory they were based. The fact that the Soviets are deploying a growing number of MRBM's on land does not seem a good reason for our deploying them there too if US and multilateral deployment would be more feasible at sea, and still be effective. I am anxious to hold the proposal for a multilateral force open to the Europeans since it may well reduce pressures, particularly in Germany, for attempts to compensate for the present US atomic monopoly by developing national strategic nuclear capabilities.

I realize that there are economic and military, as well as political, considerations which bear on the choice between sea and land-based deployment. Any economic savings would strike me as a lesser factor, in view of the grave implications of this choice for our national security. The military factors are, of course, a matter for judgment by your Department. It does seem to me that any military advantages would have to be considerable to outweigh the damage that land-based deployment would do to the alliance in other respects.

It is for these reasons that I am anxious to avoid any actions which would now prejudice the option of holding to sea-based, rather than land-based, MRBM deployment in NATO Europe.

Sincerely,

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UNCLASSIFIED

3 November 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion on Defense budget.

1. On 1 November, I attended a four-hour discussion on the Defense budget in Mr. McNamara's office. It was presumably to permit the White House staff and Defense staff to exchange views on certain parts of the budget. State Department was notable by its absence. Those present were:

Mr. McNamara
Mr. Hitch, DOD Comptroller
Dr. Brown, Director of Defense R & E, DOD
Mr. Bundy
Mr. Sorensen
Mr. Kaysen
myself
Mr. Bell, Bureau of the Budget
Mr. Hansen, BOB
Mr. Veatch, BOB
Mr. Shapley, BOB
Dr. Wiesner and Mr. Keeney of Science Advisory Office

2. This meeting had been preceded by a meeting on strategic or nuclear offensive forces (Package I), which took place October 27th with a more limited group, and reportedly was rather inconclusive.

3. The first topic was the MRBM, which is actually an R & D project. Mr. McNamara explained his views on this. It is actually a funding for development in FY-63 and some reprogramming in FY-62, with no pre-commitment to procure the weapons in the future. The requirement is for fast reacting, highly mobile 1,000 or 1,500 to (I missed this figure) to 2,000 nautical miles range, a [redacted] warhead, a very small CEP of [redacted] at 1,000 miles, 10,000-pounds weight. It could be land or sea based, and although it is primarily designed for Europe, it could possibly be used elsewhere. Development is estimated at \$500 million, the missiles \$1 million a piece, total program for 500 or less missiles, \$1 billion. This project was vigorously attacked by Bundy on political grounds. After a lengthy discussion on this, McNamara said he was willing to emphasize the sea based label in order to minimize political difficulties. McNamara finally stated that he would keep the missile in the program but flag it for quarterly political review.

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sea-based missiles would minimize political difficulties

Why?
Bundy

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FLDR

Taylor

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4. ZEUS was the next subject.

McNamara inferred that his tactic on this area was to list all of the disadvantages in his paper in order to pull the teeth of the opposition.

Wiesner suggested a couple of hand built batteries in order to get an operational unit more quickly.

Bell asked if the system would handle sea launched ballistic missiles, and whether it was susceptible to tighter command and control.

McNamara answered "Yes" to the first question, and as to the second said there is no real problem due to the fact that you are firing it over your own country. He pointed out that it is essentially an automatic system, but he felt the local commander should have authority to fire.

Wiesner again mentioned the time lag in the change of strategic balance in the DOD program.

Bell asked what happens when it goes off in the air from a fallout point of view.

Brown said that the ^{sublimation} ~~sublimation~~ melts fissile material in the ICBM, breaks up the warhead, or wrecks the electronics. There is not much, if any, fallout.

McNamara said that here he felt the program was very unstable quantitatively, that you might go to much larger or none, depending on developments. However, his rule is when in doubt, spend. In fact, he is proposing the minimum program that gives you R & D plus the price of admission to any defense.

Kaysen returned to the attack with a proposal for a quicker program for an earlier start and earlier finish.

McNamara went into a long discussion about more advanced systems, ZEUS 2 and 3, and how he might reorient the program as they get better hold of it. ~~There is a possibility of a reorientation of the program to a long lead time procurement proposal.~~

NSC 64
Bell suggested reorienting the program to a long lead time procurement proposal. McNamara seemed to bend a little in this direction.

[REDACTED]

Bundy pointed out that this six-city program is hardly worth while.

Bell pointed out that the argument on page 2 is very flimsy -- what is the military advantage?

Sorensen said if we postponed the procurement program all we have done is lost a year. Then he went into a long dissertation as to how we could explain to the public that we aren't going to buy ZEUS until we can get a worthwhile system.

In summary, Bell, Sorensen, Bundy are against, Wiesner in the middle.

I expressed your view for the record and, in rebuttal of Sorensen's argument, stated that I felt the public was getting tired of these complex arguments as to why we aren't doing something. We should state that we are going to get a missile defense system, and work aggressively in this direction.

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November 6, 1961

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Recent Developments Regarding MRBM's

If General Norstad raises the MRBM issue, as he did in his meeting with DOD, it will probably not be necessary to say more than that our position is being studied. You may wish, however, to be aware of the following recent developments:


1. The North Atlantic Council recently approved General Norstad's proposed 1966 military requirements, minus both the sea-based and the land-based MRBM's that the NATO commanders have proposed.

(a) The Germans are pressing hard for early consideration of the MRBM requirement in the Council, although they have stated that they do not want MRBM's in their territory. The French also want the requirement acted on, but they have indicated that they would not accept missiles unless at least some of them came under their full national control.

(b) The UK and many of the smaller countries are unenthusiastic. The UK has suggested that NATO deployment in Europe of MRBM's (capable of reaching the USSR) would mark a basic change in NATO strategy. It is concerned about the possibility of these weapons winding up in German hands.

2. General Norstad strongly favors approval of the MRBM requirements. He considers that these weapons are needed to provide tactical support of his forces, which can no longer be assured by his increasingly vulnerable tactical aircraft. He wants land, as well as sea, based missiles on the grounds that land-based missiles:

(a) will



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(a) will be more accurate and subject to continuous communication;

(b) would fall in his command area; sea-based missiles might not.

3. The Secretary of Defense has included in his proposed FY 1963 DOD budget an initial \$40 million for a \$500 million R & D program on MRBM's, which will not mature till the later 1960's. General Norstad is aware of this.

4. The Secretary of State has written the Secretary of Defense, asking (i) that this effort include possibilities for sea-based deployment, and (ii) that the US push the proposals in our Ottawa speech regarding commitment of US Polaris submarines to NATO and a possible NATO multilateral sea-borne missile force, but not approve General Norstad's proposed requirement for land-based MRBM's. The Secretary suggested that land-based deployment could not be reconciled with either of the provisions of existing NSC policy:

(a) The initial exclusively US deployment would not be politically feasible on land; the European countries on whose territory the missiles were to be stationed would not accept it.

(b) The eventual NATO multilateral deployment would be difficult on land, since the missiles would tend to fall under the control of the countries in whose territory they were stationed; land-based deployment would thus lead to creation of de facto national nuclear capabilities, which would seriously divide NATO.

The Department is anxious to begin emphasizing the multilateral sea-borne scheme, which it believes will enhance NATO cohesion and help meet German concerns about US unwillingness to use nuclear weapons. The Chancellor is reported to have responded enthusiastically to the references

to this

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to this scheme in your Ottawa speech. State argues that land-based possibilities can be left for later consideration, after experience with sea-based deployment (Polaris) indicates whether there is still a need and demand for additional missiles.

5. The Secretary of Defense has seemed receptive to the proposition that the proposed R & D program should explore sea-based possibilities and should be periodically reviewed from a broad policy, as well as technical, standpoint.

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7 November 1961
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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with General Norstad - November 7, 1961
62

Present: The President
Secretary McNamara
General Norstad
General Taylor

The discussion, which lasted approximately 45 minutes, covered the following points:

- a. Relations with General Clay. General Norstad reported on his relations with General Clay in Berlin.
- b. National Security Action Memorandum No. 102. In response to a question from the President as to how General Norstad anticipated dealing with an interruption of traffic on the autobahn, General Norstad commented on several features of National Security Action

He indicated that he was not particularly impressed by the need of further mobilization in this period, but stressed the importance of taking some dramatic political action. As an example, he suggested that President Kennedy might summon Khrushchev to an emergency meeting in Berlin to talk over the crisis. The President expressed interest in this thought and directed the preparation of a memorandum to Secretary Rusk on the subject.

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Asked how he expected to get our Allies to adjust to the policy contained in Memorandum 109, he expressed confidence in his ability to accomplish this. He intends to prepare for presentation to Washington a paper based upon Memorandum 109, which he believes can receive Allied acceptance and at the same time be consistent with the thoughts expressed by the President and the Secretary of Defense in Memorandum 109. He observed that, in its present form, this memorandum would create concern in NATO, particularly among the Germans. He mentioned several times there was ambiguous language in the paper as he read it, but that he would produce a document for his planners which stated clearly his understanding of the President's desires.

c. The Adenauer visit. General Norstad strongly recommended that Minister Strauss accompany Adenauer to the United States. Strauss himself has shown interest in coming, asking Norstad who in the past had kept him, Strauss, from seeing President Kennedy. The President asked that Strauss be informed that he would be very happy to see him, at an appropriate time, and indicated that he wanted State to prepare a program for negotiations with Adenauer. With regard to the new paper based on Memorandum 109 mentioned in the preceding paragraph, General Norstad undertook to have it in the hands of the President before Adenauer's arrival on November 20th.

d. Friedrichstrasse. Asked to comment on the situation in Berlin and possible future harrassments of communications with the East Sector, General Norstad suggested that the next move might be to change

With regard to the showing of passes, Norstad feels that we should get together on a sensible position. He noted that we were showing passes at the subway station near Friedrichstrasse, whereas we declined to show passes above ground. The President directed a memorandum to the Department of State calling for a recommended position on the question of a change in the location of access and of the showing of identification documents.

M.D.T.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 9, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Conversation with Macmillan

Foy Kohler asked me to do this memorandum to save time. I have talked to him and Alexis Johnson, but Dean Rusk has not been available.

1. There is no difficulty at all on the Berlin side. We should tell him simply that Adenauer's visit seems to us very important, as you and he agreed in your last talk, and that we will welcome any comments and suggestions he may have before the meeting. Kohler tells me that our view on the substance of a negotiating position is pretty clear to the British and pretty well agreed with them: the main point is to get a satisfactory settlement for Berlin, protecting the three basic rights, and not to give away things in the larger context "of European security" that will break the morale of Germans. The notion of internationalized access is getting a favorable reception, and we have ideas about a guaranteed status for Berlin that might be more durable and more negotiable than current occupation rights. (There is no need to go into detail on this with the Prime Minister, but you may find the background useful). I did not talk with Kohler or anyone else about the possibility of your dropping in on the Prime Minister's weekend with de Gaulle, and this of course is the main point of the phone call.))
2. I talked with Alexis Johnson and Walt Rostow, and they feel strongly that we should not foreshadow a decision either way on troops. What we can do is thank the Prime Minister for Lord Home's thoughtful message to Dean Rusk, and tell him that we have very much in mind the interlocking problems of Laos, South Vietnam, and Southeast Asia as a whole. (It looks as if the State-Defense recommendation might imply a time interval before we send troops, specifically for the purpose of trying to get Laos arranged, but this point should not be surfaced with the PM before you have had a chance to review it, since Rostow and probably Taylor will disagree.)
3. On atomic tests, you may want to tell him that you are answering his letter about underground testing and that perhaps he will already have heard of our reciprocal interest in Christmas Island. We think the underground tests can be arranged, and there are important international reasons why Christmas Island would be better for atmospheric testing than Eniwetok -- and technical reasons why it is better than any third place that might be available to us.
4. Other possible topics of conversation are Nehru, Friedrichstrasse, and Krishna Menon, but you hardly need any briefing on any of them.

McG B.

McG. B.

Record Number 53851

DOCUMENT TYPE Memorandum
DATE 11/09/1961
CIRCD
TIME
CABNO
ORIGIN United States. Office of the White House
SIGNATOR Bundy, McGeorge
DESTD
DESTP Kennedy, John F.
CLASSIFICATION Non-Classified
TITLE Your Conversation with Macmillan
CTIT
NAMES Macmillan, Harold D.
NAMES Johnson, U. Alexis
NAMES Kohler, Foy D.
NAMES Rusk, Dean
NAMES Adenauer, Konrad
NAMES de Gaulle, Charles
NAMES Rostow, Walt W.
NAMES Home [Lord]
NAMES Taylor, Maxwell D.
NAMES Nehru, Jawaharal
TERMS
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Notes on National Security Council Meeting
15 November 1961

Mr. Dulles opened the meeting with the reading and discussion of a prepared report on the Soviet-Chinese rift. Following the presentation the President asked for the basis of the current impasse between Russia and Albania. Mr. Dulles replied that it was obviously ideological since Albania was one of the smallest countries in Europe with the lowest per capita income and possibilities and potential in general. Mr. Amory then discussed the current food and agricultural shortages in Communist China and brought out the fact that Chinese advances have been generally retarded across the board because of crop shortages. The deficient diet has tended to diminish efficiency in other fields of endeavor. Production generally is on the decline. A brief outline of the size and disposition of Chinese armed forces was given. The President then asked what routes of movement are available for these troops from China to North Viet Nam. Mr. Amory pointed out and described the condition of railway and roads of access and cited the generally inadequate aspects of these avenues. Mr. Dulles cautioned that it should not be assumed that the Chinese setbacks as well as the ideological rift were such that the Soviets and Chinese would not be able nor willing to engage jointly any nation which threatened Communist interests.

Mr. Rusk explained the Draft of Memorandum on South Viet Nam. He added the hope that, in spite of the magnitude of the proposal, any U.S. actions would not be hampered by lack of funds nor failure to pursue the program vigorously. The President expressed the fear of becoming involved simultaneously on two fronts on opposite sides of the world. He questioned the wisdom of involvement in Viet Nam since the basis thereof is not completely clear. By comparison he noted that Korea was a case of clear aggression which was opposed by the United States and other members of the U.N. The conflict in Viet Nam is more obscure and less flagrant. The President then expressed his strong feeling that in such a situation the United States needs even more the support of allies in such an endeavor as Viet Nam in order to avoid sharp domestic partisan criticism as well as strong objections from other nations of the world. The President said that he could even make a rather strong case against intervening in an area 10,000 miles away against 16,000 guerrillas with a native army of 200,000, where millions have been spent for years with no success. The President repeated his apprehension concerning support, adding that none could be expected from the French, and Mr. Rusk interrupted to say that the British were tending more and more to take the French point of view. The President compared the obscurity of the issues

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in Viet Nam to the clarity of the positions in Berlin, the contrast of which could even make leading Democrats wary of proposed activities in the Far East.

Mr. Rusk suggested that firmness in Viet Nam in the manner and form of that in Berlin might achieve desired results in Viet Nam without resort to combat. The President disagreed with the suggestion on the basis that the issue was clearly defined in Berlin and opposing forces identified whereas in Viet Nam the issue is vague and action is by guerrillas, sometimes in a phantom-like fashion. Mr. McNamara expressed an opinion that action would become clear if U.S. forces were involved since this power would be applied against sources of Viet Cong power including those in North Viet Nam. The President observed that it was not clear to him just where these U.S. forces would base their operations other than from aircraft carriers which seemed to him to be quite vulnerable. General Lemnitzer confirmed that carriers would be involved to a considerable degree and stated that Taiwan and the Philippines would also become principal bases of action.

With regard to sources of power in North Viet Nam, Mr. Rusk cited Hanoi as the most important center in North Viet Nam and it would be hit. However, he considered it more a political target than a military one and under these circumstances such an attack would "raise serious questions." He expressed the hope that any plan of action in North Viet Nam would strike first of all any Viet Cong airlift into South Viet Nam in order to avoid the establishment of a procedure of supply similar to that which the Soviets have conducted for so long with impunity in Laos.

Mr. Bundy raised the question as to whether or not U.S. action in Viet Nam would not render the Laotian settlement more difficult. Mr. Rusk said that it would to a certain degree but qualified his statement with the caveat that the difficulties could be controlled somewhat by the manner in which actions in Viet Nam are initiated.

The President returned the discussion to the point of what will be done next in Viet Nam rather than whether or not the U.S. would become involved.

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The President asked what nations would possibly support the U.S. intervention in Viet Nam, listing Pakistan, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand (?). Mr. Rusk replied that they all would but the President implied doubts because of the pitfalls of the particular type of war in Viet Nam. He described it as being more a political issue, of different magnitude and (again) less defined than the Korean War.

Mr. Fowler said that the studies suggested to him that the job to be done has been magnified, thereby leading to pessimistic conclusions as to outcome. Taylor responded that although the discussion and even some of the draft memoranda were somewhat pessimistic, he returned from Viet Nam with optimism over what could be done if certain clear-cut actions were taken. He envisioned two phases: (1) the revival of Viet Nam morale, and (2) the initiation of the guerrilla suppression program. Mr. McNamara cautioned that the program was in fact complex and that in all probability U.S. troops, planes and resources would have to be supplied in additional quantities at a later date.

The President asked the Secretary of Defense if he would take action if SEATO did not exist and McNamara replied in the affirmative. The President asked for justification and Lemnitzer replied that the world would be divided in the area of Southeast Asia on the sea, in the air and in communications. He said that Communist conquest would deal a severe blow to freedom and extend Communism to a great portion of the world. The President asked how he could justify the proposed courses of action in Viet Nam while at the same time ignoring Cuba. General Lemnitzer hastened to add that the JCS feel that even at this point the United States should go into Cuba.

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The President stated the time had come for neutral nations as well as others to be in support of U.S. policy publicly. He felt that we should aggressively determine which nations are in support of U.S. policy and that these nations should identify themselves. The President again expressed apprehension on support of the proposed action by the Congress as well as by the American people. He felt that the next two or three weeks should be utilized in making the determination as to whether or not the proposed program for Viet Nam could be supported. His impression was that even the Democratic side of Congress was not fully convinced. The President stated that he would like to have the Vice President's views in this regard and at that point asked if there was information on the Vice President's arrival. The President then stated that no action would be taken during the meeting on the proposed memorandum and that he would discuss these subjects with the Vice President. He asked State to report to him when the directed studies had been completed.

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11/16/61

November 16, 1961

Dear Mr. President:

You will recall that at our last meeting, at which we discussed the actions which might be taken in connection with the access to Berlin, I informed you that I was working on instructions to my planners which would carry out the intent of your letter of October 20, 1961, and of the NATO directive to me on the same general subject (PO/61/808, approved by the NAC 25 Oct 61). I am forwarding to you herewith a draft of this paper, which up to this time has not been considered outside of my own office and which will not be circulated until I am advised of your reaction.

I have tried to develop a rather specific line of action which would meet your requirements and at the same time have a chance of being accepted by our Allies. Although the ground would have to be prepared before presenting this proposal, and the tactics carefully worked out to meet or bypass the sensitivities of some of our Allies, I am convinced that the position I suggest in the attached paper would receive serious and sympathetic consideration. It should, for instance, meet most of the current fears of the Germans.

As you know, I believe that we will weather this particular round of crises without becoming involved in a shooting war. However, a well established and, if possible, agreed position on the part of the Alliance will enhance this possibility by permitting us to show, to the Soviets and to the world, firmness, good order and strength.


Faithfully yours,

Incl:

SACEUR's Instructions
to SHAPE Planners

LAURIS NORSTAD
General USAF

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.



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Norstad / 104 / Kennedy, JR (4)

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NATO UNCLASSIFIED

053/SHGS/91, 7 NOV 91

Date 24.3.95

Section, OSECCOS, SHAPE

SACEUR'S INSTRUCTIONS TO SHAPE PLANNERS

GENERAL

1. Planning for military action in connection with air or ground access to Berlin will be guided by the following general principles:

a. We must prepare a broad catalog of plans to meet the situation at ascending levels of political and military involvement, but we must do so with full awareness that the choice of timing and action rests at least as much with the Soviets as with us. We must plan for many contingencies on various levels, but cannot with complete assurance plan on any particular pattern or sequence.

b. Whatever action is taken, political or military, should if possible improve our over-all military position, but under no circumstances can it be permitted to detract therefrom.

c. No military operation, even the smallest probe, should be conducted except on the basis of a strong defensive posture and general readiness to defend along the entire NATO front. We cannot afford to exchange ground meter by meter with the Soviets. There is no way in which Satellite territory can be equated with that of NATO countries we are charged with defending.

ASSUMPTIONS

2. If Western access to Berlin is effectively blocked, there will be a prompt reaction by the Tripartite Powers, with the general support of NATO, in a manner and place directly related to Berlin or the access thereto.

3. The initial Western reaction will be selected at the time from the catalog of plans prepared by LIVE OAK, but in any event it will involve the use of some degree of armed force.

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4. The use of armed force, even in limited quantity, risks the danger of explosive expansion to higher levels of conflict, including the highest level. This risk is accepted, and therefore we stand ready to use all forces and weapons available, including nuclear weapons, if necessary, to protect the territory and people of the NATO nations and to defend our other vital interests.

5. The timing of military actions initiated by us in response to a Berlin crisis will be regulated primarily by the critical points on the curve of the developing political situation.

OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

Ground Access

6. In the event that access to Berlin via the autobahn is blocked:

a. NATO will adopt a reinforced alert, the forces moving to their established defensive positions, and the Strategic Air Command, United Kingdom Bomber Command, and other national strategic forces will be placed on an appropriate alert status.

b. Other means of access to Berlin will continue to be used, if available.

c. The Soviet Government will be notified that the Tripartite nations, with the support of NATO, will move a military convoy, including armed guards and combat vehicles, along the autobahn to Berlin, and that any restrictions or obstacles to the movement of this convoy must be immediately removed.

d. The Tripartite Powers will promptly launch a probe on the autobahn. The most likely choice would be the battalion-level TRADE WIND or the smaller FREE STYLE C, both of which are joint British, French and American efforts. FREE STYLE C consists of a total of 120 men and 27 vehicles, including one bulldozer, two APC's, and two armored cars. The purpose of this initial probe is to confront the Soviet/East German forces with a convoy to which wide

publicity would have been given, thereby forcing them to allow the convoy free passage or to use force, preferably military, to prevent the passage of an Allied movement. The convoy commander will be instructed to take all necessary action within the capabilities of his force, short of offensive firing of his weapons, to overcome, breach or bypass within the confines of the autobahn and its verges, any obstruction or interference with free passage of the convoy under his command. If his force is fired upon he will be instructed to take whatever defensive action, including returning fire, as may be necessary to extricate and withdraw his force. The probe commander will be directed to establish beyond doubt that the Tripartite Powers are being denied access to Berlin and, if possible, to establish that the denial of access is being accomplished by use of Communist military force. The probe commander will be instructed to so conduct his action as to create the best foundation on which the Western Powers may take political initiatives or, if that proves impossible, further military action.

e. It is recognized that the Tripartite probe can be met and overwhelmed by a superior enemy force. Depending on its purpose and momentum, the enemy action could result in:

- (1) The annihilation of the probe.
- (2) The dispatch of larger forces to rescue the probe, thus enlarging the battle.
- (3) Immediate action on the part of the Soviets to carry the battle into NATO territory.
- (4) An attack against West Berlin.

In any one of these cases, the development of the conflict could be explosive.

f. If, as may be probable, the Tripartite probe is halted without resort to the extreme measures cited in par e above, the West would take immediate political initiatives. These actions could include:

(1) Referral of the problem to the United Nations or to another world body. It would not be expected that the U.N. would resolve the Berlin problem or even make any substantial contribution to a solution, but, rather, that referral to that body would provide a dignified intermediate step as a result of which time would be available to prepare for subsequent actions, political or military, and to mobilize further public opinion in support of the position of the West.

(2) Announcement by the President of the United States that he would arrive in West Berlin within, say, 12 hours for the purpose of talking face to face with Mr. Khrushchev. He might be joined for this purpose by the President of France and the Prime Minister of Great Britain. This action might be taken in addition to the U.N. referral, or independently thereof.

(3) Application of political pressure, worldwide, wherever possible, for the purpose of confusing and distracting the Soviet leadership.

(4) In addition to those actions which may already have been taken in these fields, initiation of a naval blockade and economic measures designed to emphasize the seriousness of the Western attitude.

g. Should all the measures taken up to this point fail to improve the situation, there is then no acceptable alternative to direct military action. This action might be general war, initiated by the West. If, however, there is reason to believe that the Soviets doubt the seriousness of the West, or if the Western public is not yet prepared for such large-scale military action, NATO forces will launch one or more limited offensive operations, as indicated below:

(1) An operation to establish a salient along the Helmstedt-Berlin axis, but not to attempt a penetration beyond the Elbe.

(2) An operation to seize and occupy the high ground in the Thuringer Wald area.

(3) An operation to reduce the Kassel salient.

(4) Air operations, using conventional weapons, which may be in support of the ground operations indicated above, but which alternatively could operate beyond the support role, primarily for the purpose of gaining and maintaining air superiority.

(5) Action involving the limited and selective use of nuclear weapons, independently or in connection with the foregoing military actions, in order to demonstrate the will and the ability of the Alliance to use these weapons.

h. The selected, limited-objective offensive operations discussed above are short-term actions which will have served their purpose soon after initiation, probably within hours. By initiating any operation in this category, the commitment of the West will become complete. Whether this step will lead to general war will be determined by the Soviet reaction, which may be prompt and total.

USG object
to this
- one 12/15/61
NK answer:
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Air Access

7. In case of interference with air access to Berlin, the Tripartite Powers will act in accordance with the plans prepared and approved under LIVE OAK procedures, the broad nature of which is known to the North Atlantic Council. In this connection, two points should be noted:

a. The principles governing Western reaction to the problem of ground access are generally applicable to the problem of air access.

b. The question of reaction to Communist military force interfering with air access may involve wide-scale air-superiority operations, outside as well as inside the air corridors. Even if initially such action were limited to the use of conventional weapons, our involvement would be raised quickly to a very high level. The situation would be further aggravated by Soviet attacks against Western air installations, a development which NATO can tolerate only briefly if we are to maintain our over-all defense posture, particularly the full power of our nuclear capability.

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8. Should both ground and air access be blocked, appropriate action will be taken in both areas. However, where a choice must be made, requirements of the ground access problem should determine the timing and the nature of our efforts.

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11/20/61

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Approved in WH 11/27

Memorandum of Conversation

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SUBJECT: Meeting in the Cabinet Room with Foreign Ministers and Advisors Present.

PARTICIPANTS: GERMANY

Chancellor Adenauer
Foreign Minister Schröder
Defense Minister Strauss
Under Secretary Carstens
Mr. Franz Krapf
Mr. von Eckhardt
Mr. Schnippenkoetter
Ambassador Greve
Heinz Weber (Interpreter)

UNITED STATES

President Kennedy
Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
Under Secretary Ball
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Bohlen
Ambassador Dowling
Ambassador Clay
Mr. Bundy
Mr. Hillenbrand
Mrs. Lajins (Interpreter)

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In broad outline, the President reiterated the topics of his earlier private discussion with the Chancellor, and the Chancellor agreed with his presentation. The President indicated that every effort should be made to reach a more concerted Western position prior to the time of the Foreign Minister's meetings in December.

The Chancellor stated that he was planning to see General de Gaulle on November 30. He felt that it might be well to have certain suggestions which might be given to de Gaulle at that time. However, one should avoid giving de Gaulle the impression that something definite had been worked out which he was expected to join. The General was very sensitive in such matters. But the Chancellor agreed that something fairly definite should be worked out during these discussions and he would then try to persuade de Gaulle to subscribe to these suggestions. The Chancellor felt that any proposals must by all means be kept out of the press, since if de Gaulle reads about them in the press before the Chancellor has a chance to discuss them with him, de Gaulle will hesitate to agree to them.

The President said that having seen what the press can do, for instance with German/Polish relations, within a period of two months, we should certainly try to keep these matters out of the press. It was essential that these agreements be kept confidential until the Chancellor had had a chance to discuss them with the General.

The Chancellor

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The Chancellor said that it would suffice to tell the press that progress in formulating a Western stand has been made and that it is hoped to speed up matters even more. It would be all right for de Gaulle to read this. Today is November 22. Only 10 days are left before Adenauer sees de Gaulle. Perhaps there will be no rush until that time.

The President replied, saying that Washington is more difficult in this respect than Bonn. The Chancellor stated that an idea had just struck him. He thought it might be wise for him to write to de Gaulle from Washington, giving him some information about the present talks, and indicating his desire to discuss these matters with him. The President said that this was a good idea.

Secretary Rusk expressed the opinion that the Chancellor's writing in this way was particularly advisable since the Ambassadorial talks would continue and there might well be a leak in that connection before Mr. Adenauer had a chance to talk to the General.

Then followed a brief discussion of the evening's activities, the further meetings on Tuesday morning, and a brief discussion of a short statement to the press.

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G

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S/P - Mr. Owen

S/P - Mr. Gerard Smith

KUR - Mr. Kohler

KUR - Mr. Tyler

KUR/CKA - Mr. Hillenbrand

KUR/KA - Mr. Vessenden

KUR - Secretary McNamara

OSD/ISA - Mr. Witsa

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(11/21)

Memorandum of Conversation

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DATE:

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SUBJECT:

November 21, 1961, 11:00 a
Cabinet Room

Negotiations on Berlin

PARTICIPANTS:

GermanyUnited States

COPIES TO:

Chancellor Adenauer
Foreign Minister Schroeder
Defense Minister Strauss
Under Secretary Carstens
Mr. Franz Krapf
Mr. von Eckhardt
Mr. Schnippenkoetter
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Heinz Weber (interpreter)President Kennedy
Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamee
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(see page 12)

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Secretary Rusk said that he had met earlier this morning for over an hour with Foreign Minister Schroeder and other members of the German delegation to discuss some of the questions on the present agenda. As usual, when Ministers do the talking, the experts must tidy up matters afterwards. One of the matters discussed was the legal position of West Berlin, on which there is a difference of opinion between the U.S. and Germany. While Germany considers West Berlin to be a German "Land," with a certain suspension of its status on the basis of the 1949 action of the Military Governors, the U.S. does not consider West Berlin a "Land." Whether this difference in view would have any serious effect on the projected negotiations with the Soviets is not quite clear at this point. Both Germany and the U.S. agree that the ultimate aim of both the U.S. and the Federal Republic is to retain the freedom of West Berlin to establish its own relations and other ties with the Federal Republic, which ties are vital to the maintenance of Berlin's existence and prosperity. The U.S. recognizes the importance of the psychological aspects of the situation, since Berlin feels its existence closely tied to Allied rights; at the same time West Berlin has intimate ties with the Federal Republic. The US may have to take the view that the German Basic Law is inoperative for Berlin and that Berlin can make its own contractual arrangements for its ties with the Federal Republic. If the negotiations which the U.S. envisages with the Soviet Union will assure improved access conditions, then the Federal Republic might be willing to put into

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the background the constitutional aspects of this matter. It is hoped that something more definite can be written up on this subject before the end of these present meetings. The Secretary wondered whether the German Foreign Minister might like to make some comment on his summary of the discussion of this point. The German Foreign Minister had nothing to add.

The Secretary continued that not all aspects of access to Berlin had of course been covered, but only certain ones on which there might be a difference between the U.S. and Germany. Germany was extremely anxious to see that everything was done to guarantee German access to West Berlin. The U.S. took the stand that free access to Berlin was an essential requirement, and that our right to access included both military and civilian access on the basis of our Occupation rights. The West Berliners are entitled to exercise such access, as well as those with whom West Berlin wants to communicate, including the West Germans. Thus, there should be no real difficulties between us and Germany if any arrangement which we might enter into with the Soviets makes it clear that we are talking about full access, which includes both military and civilian access; and, of course, we encompass German access in our understanding of civilian access.

The President understood on the basis of this presentation that there existed no real substantive difference between the U.S. and Germany on the matter of access to Berlin, but that the problem was essentially one of formulation.

The Secretary indicated that the Germans feared that when we talk to the Soviets of Allied access we might refer only to Allied access or infer that this did not include German access. West Berlin cannot live without full access. As a footnote, the Secretary wished to add that there might perhaps be an advantage in having some kind of a new agreement or arrangement with the Soviets on the matter of access. Such an agreement would not destroy our Occupation rights but rather would be super-imposed on them. The Occupation rights would remain in the background and could be called upon if needed. Thus the new contractual agreement could spell out in detail what the rights of access were, but they would be based on our Occupation rights. In this manner the Soviets could then possibly concentrate on the new agreement as such, while we could move confidently because all this was based on our Occupation rights, pending a peace treaty with Germany as a whole.

The question of possible dealings with the GDR on matters of access needed to be worked on further, the Secretary indicated. We supposed that first of all it would be necessary to clarify the right of access with the Soviets. We would have to make sure that these rights would in no way be

diminished. We

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diminished. We would point out that we expected the Soviets to guarantee these rights, and that the Soviets would have to ensure that East Germany would comply with whatever was agreed upon. We, the U.S., would not enter into any negotiations on access rights with the GDR itself.

The problem before us was what might happen after the Soviet Union enters into a separate peace treaty with the GDR. What will happen if the Soviets should subsequently disappear from the checkpoints and withdraw from administrative arrangements with reference to access? Who in that case should take over dealing with the GDR on the implementation of access rights? In order to minimize the international aspects of the GDR, we have suggested to the West Germans that they undertake to maintain the necessary contacts in technical matters. Apparently there has been some misunderstanding on what we mean when we speak about "talking" to the GDR. We do not mean negotiations, but only practical day-by-day dealings, such as might be involved in clearing up traffic jams, doing certain repair work, or getting a barge through a canal. The question of the access rights themselves, or any indicated deliberate political obstruction of access, is something entirely different. Then, we would look to the Soviet Union for satisfaction and neither we nor the Federal Republic will negotiate on such matters with the GDR. At this point the Federal Republic is considering whether it would prefer the Western powers to take over practical dealings with the GDR or whether they themselves should assume this responsibility itself.

The German Foreign Minister stated that this is a problem which does not involve the matter of recognition of the GDR, but that Germany is concerned about the safeguarding of civilian access. The Federal Republic fears chicanery on the part of East Germany, which may demand unreasonable controls, inspections and institute other forms of harassment. This type of thing will be much more difficult for Germany to deal with than for the Allied powers. It is a purely practical matter for Germany.

The Secretary of State voiced the opinion that on the basis of what has transpired in the conversations of this morning, it would appear that it might be necessary to prepare a detailed description of what the present exercise of the right of access consists of, so that we can insist vis-a-vis the Soviet Union that East Germany must permit the exercise of access at least on the level described in this document. This would require a great deal of detail in order to avoid new access formulae by East Germany. This description of the exact character of the access to be exercised should be included in whatever agreement we reach with the Soviets.

The President indicated that in his discussions with the German Ambassador, he had learned that talks of the nature now discussed had already

been taking

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been taking place between East and West Germans on a number of technical matters.

The Secretary of State then pointed out that the real problem left now was how to handle the 5% of traffic which was the military part of the total. He did not anticipate too much of a problem with the civilian traffic.

The President pointed out that it was very important that every detail of this be worked out.

The Secretary of State then recalled that at one point in the morning's discussions, the possibility of a certain amount of UN participation in this matter had been brought up. He felt that there might be a certain advantage to having international civil servants enter the access-control picture. They would be individuals on the spot, without political implications, to whom either side could talk. Such UN participation might prove to be a barrier to bad faith.

The German Foreign Minister then indicated that, if the UN were brought into the picture in this manner, the occasion would certainly arise where the Secretary General of the UN would have the authority and the need to talk to the GDR. The Foreign Minister felt that this constituted an element of recognition of the GDR which, to him, represented a much greater danger and was less desirable than direct talks between the Allied Powers and the GDR.

The Secretary added that there would be no such complication, of course, if there were an International Autobahn Authority. The Secretary of State then pointed out that the morning's discussion had not gotten around to the stationing of UN troops in West Berlin. To be sure, the Soviets had offered Soviet forces to be placed in West Berlin as guarantors of the freedom of the city. We opposed the stationing of Soviet troops in West Berlin. We were strong enough to safeguard and defend West Berlin ourselves. Moreover, we did not feel that the Soviets had any experience in safeguarding democratic freedom in any area. He felt sure, however, that the question of stationing a UN contingent in Berlin might well arise. He did not feel that the UN was inclined to assume additional expenses and responsibilities such as would be involved in stationing a contingent of troops in Berlin. He also knew that West Germans were skeptical about such a contingent.

The German Foreign Minister confirmed the Secretary of State's statement, indicating that the Federal Republic much preferred to see their share of UN troops in the form of British, French or American troops. Germany was truly skeptical, however, about UN forces as such.

The Secretary

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The Secretary of State stated that we did not assume, by any means, that such UN forces would replace the forces of the Three Western Allies. Nor--as the President interjected--assume our responsibility.

The Secretary of State continued that the stationing of a UN contingent would make it much more difficult for the Soviets to resume their pressure on Berlin. Moreover, if UN organizations and activity were brought into West Berlin, the significance of the city would be greatly increased and this measure might put a stop to further harassment by the Soviets. It was no guarantee, however.

The German Foreign Minister pointed out that if it were possible to bring UN authorities and activity into West Berlin this would be highly desirable, but he would first see whether this is really possible before he would consider placing a UN contingent there. The stationing of a UN contingent in Berlin would really be contrary to the usual UN practice. Usually, the host country is expected to guarantee the safety of the UN activity in a given locality. In this case, it would appear as though the UN itself were having to protect its own organization. Thus, he would prefer that the matter of stationing UN activities in Berlin be taken up first, and the UN contingent left for later eventualities.

The Chancellor interjected at this point that he considered the establishment of UN activities in West Berlin extremely important, especially as a psychological measure, since it would convince the Berlin population that there was no intention of ever sacrificing them to the Soviet Union. UN soldiers, on the other hand, did not constitute such a guarantee.

The Secretary of State indicated that this was not a matter which the U.S. felt we should press. It remained to be seen whether some UN contingent might be advantageous, but it was a question to be left open.

The President then asked whether the Chancellor would like to comment on the points thus far covered.

The Chancellor indicated that the first point, i.e., the constitutional status of Berlin, is what he considers most important of all. While Western Germany is ready to do everything in its power for the benefit of the Berlin population, he feels that what is right is right and must be upheld. He himself was the chairman of the Constitutional Committee that drafted the Basic Law. He was, therefore, well acquainted with what had happened in connection with the suspension provisions concerning Berlin's status. He realized that certain things had happened subsequently, which were not quite in accord with these provisions, but the Allies had not objected, since they had not considered

these matters

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[these matters particularly serious. Only in one instance had they vetoed a measure thus undertaken. But, from the standpoint of international law, the Chancellor felt, the status of Berlin was very clear and had to be upheld--including the suspension provisions.]

The Secretary of State pointed out that there had been general agreement in the earlier morning meeting to do everything possible to uphold West Berlin's freedom of action and its right to maintain its ties with Western Germany, since these were fundamental to Berlin's wellbeing.

The German Foreign Minister recalled a discussion carried on during the earlier morning meeting about the existence of about 80 Federal German Agencies in West Berlin. While the Federal Republic did not consider many of these particularly important, it felt nevertheless that as long as they were there, their removal would be a psychological blow to the Berlin population; who were very sensitive on such matters. Thus, if the Federal German coat of arms were to be taken down in even one of these offices, it would be interpreted by the Berlin population as a sign of retreat and withdrawal. Thus, the Foreign Minister reiterated this matter was a psychological rather than a constitutional one.

The Chancellor on his part reiterated that he considered this a purely psychological problem, and he wanted to hear no further talk about the removal of coats of arms. He felt certain that in their talks with the Soviet Union the US would be called upon to make certain concessions. If this were so, the US could insist on the introduction of UN activities in Berlin as a sort of replacement, and this would help the situation.

The President confirmed that we should start negotiating on the basis of a position, such as outlined by the Secretary of State, which would insist on the complete freedom of Berlin to maintain its relations with West Germany and with whomever it pleases. He had understood that Ambassador Kroll told Khrushchev that the ties between West Germany and West Berlin were not negotiable. Nevertheless, before we were through negotiating, there might of necessity develop some limitations on the freedom of Berlin.

The German Foreign Minister reiterated what he had said in the earlier morning meeting; namely, that if the negotiations with the Soviets would result in greatly improved and more secure access, this might ease many of the other Berlin problems, which would then be viewed in a somewhat different light.

The President then stated he understood that Point five had not been covered in the earlier meeting and he proposed that he and the Chancellor withdraw to his office for a private conversation; while the remaining members of the two delegations went over the unresolved points of the agenda.

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At this point (11:45 a.m.) the President and the Chancellor withdrew to the President's office.

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The Secretary commented that, as far as we are concerned, we have emphasized to the Soviets the problem of buying the same horse over again. The President had put it in terms of their attempting to sell an apple for an orchard. We do not believe we should once again be called upon to purchase our basic rights in Berlin. The Soviets will, however, surely raise the boundary question, and he did not believe that the American people were interested in any change in the Oder-Neisse line.

Foreign Minister Schroeder said he could accept what the Secretary said. If the Soviets were really prepared to make a satisfactory Berlin arrangement, then the question would arise whether the matter of peace treaty negotiations were not become pertinent, but outside of the forum of Berlin discussions. If, however, the West gave up in advance, all questions related to the peace treaty, then the Federal Republic would have nothing to gain from a peace treaty. This would destroy the theory we have, which is that a Germany unified on a basis of self-determination is in the best position to negotiate a peace treaty. Although it is true that many people in the world consider

the Oder-Neisse

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- 9 -

the Oder-Neisse line settled, certain facts also remain on the other side of the argument. He could also agree that the longer the West waited on this the weaker its position became, but he had grave reservations relative to settling the Oder-Neisse question within the Berlin context.

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November 21, 1961

This morning I talked for three-quarters of an hour with the Chancellor.

Either it was a bad morning for him or he has failed somewhat since last spring. He was either evasive or not making very much sense.

He started out by a very gloomy description of the world. The Russians, he said, were discouragingly powerful. They had 20 divisions in East Germany, 9 East German divisions, and 70 more Russian divisions near by. When I asked about the figures, he said they were authentic. Thus nothing could be done against them with conventional power. Nuclear power must not be used. Therefore, we must negotiate.

I questioned the "therefore".

The great trouble with the West, he indicated, was disunity. He was going to see Macmillan and de Gaulle in an effort to restore unity. With unity and strong American leadership a successful negotiation was possible. The Chancellor knew from his talks with Khrushchev in 1955 that Khrushchev's great fear was of the Chinese. There was room for negotiation, even though the Russians had taken East Berlin.

I kept asking the Chancellor why Khrushchev should make any concessions whatever if he were in the position pictured by the Chancellor. His only answer was that Khrushchev's fear of the Chinese would lead him to settle with the West while he could. I said that if I were advising Khrushchev I would tell him to stand pat on concluding a treaty with the GDR, to insist that the West - to use Kroll's term - "respect the sovereignty of the GDR," and to promise that access to West Berlin

would be

Acheson Rp / 65 / 'State Dept & WMI Advisor, 1961 - Oct - Dec'

would be completely free so long as all access, both by air and by land, was checked through East German personnel. To this the Chancellor replied that this would be good advice indeed. I asked: good advice for whom? He answered: for everybody.

I asked whether the Chancellor thought Mr. Khrushchev believed that we would use nuclear weapons over the Berlin issue. The Chancellor answered that while we must not use these weapons, we must not tell Khrushchev we would not do so. I explained that Strauss had told me last night that he had given the US Government a paper on the military steps that West Germany was willing to take and hoped that this was a step forward. The Chancellor did not respond. I explained the Acheson theory of the non-nuclear buildup in Europe. He thought that this was hopeless since no one, except the Germans, would do anything. At this depressing point he was taken away to see the President.

Dean Acheson

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November 21, 1961

TIME: 9:00 P.M.
PLACE: Cabinet Room -
White House

Approved for
12/1/61

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UNITED STATES

The President
Secretary Bush
Secretary McNamara
Mr. Dulles
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Wilts
General Lemaitre
Ambassador Dowling
Mr. Bundy
Mr. Hillenbrand

GERMANY

Chancellor Adenauer
Foreign Minister Schröder
Defense Minister Strauss
Dr. Carstens
Ambassador Grews
General Schnees

(See last page for distribution)

The present conversation flowed over from the exchange which took place at the end of the restricted military briefing given at 4:00 to Chancellor Adenauer and the German Foreign Minister and Defense Minister.

Defense Minister Strauss commented that the figures for Soviet ground strength given during the briefing obviously did not jibe with those which have been disseminated at NATO. British and American officers in Paris have spoken of 130 to 140 Soviet divisions, and the figure of 160 divisions had become so fixed in NATO thinking that anyone who claimed it to be too high was automatically labeled an optimist. Now the US had given a figure which was one half as large as that considered obligatory in NATO. He recognized that sometimes inflated figures are given in order to encourage the NATO countries to more effort, but he felt that it was urgently necessary to discuss the new US figures and to arrive at a commonly-agreed estimate. This should be a priority matter for the Chiefs of Staff of the NATO Military Committee which would be meeting in Paris in December. One of the implications of the larger figure commonly used was that it meant the nuclear threshold had to be very low. Other data which required correction were those commonly accepted for comparative tank strength. The President observed that the relative equipment of the Soviet and Western divisions and their size also needed to be compared. Strauss said that the Soviet divisions in the GDR are essentially assault divisions and that they lack infantry. Although they have more artillery and tanks than NATO divisions, the strength of the Soviet divisions is roughly 9,000 to 10,000 as compared to the 15,000 in the standard NATO divisions. This meant that the Soviet divisions would be weak on the defensive. If the new US figures for Soviet divisional strength were correct, then instructions should be issued to NATO committees so that the

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defense line would no longer be along the West-Goth line but on the basis of a more forward strategy. He recognized that the US troops operated on the basis of a forward strategy now, but this was not true of the British Army of the Rhine or of the French forces. Secretary McNamara said he agreed the figures needed refinement. The total of 170-180 Soviet divisions is obviously excessive. He also agreed that modification of NATO plans should be based upon a more realistic estimate of Soviet strength plus the fact of the recent NATO build-up.

The President said that when we stressed the desirability of a build-up of conventional forces, we had aroused doubts as to our intentions regarding the use of our nuclear forces. He wondered what Strauss' thoughts were on this subject. Strauss said that no one in Europe had so great an interest as the Germans in avoiding a thermonuclear war. His Government favored balanced collective forces including a strong conventional component. It had always rejected the Radford theory and General Beaulieu had been sent to Washington on a special mission in 1956, when the so-called Radford Plan was being discussed, to emphasize the need for a strong conventional component in NATO forces. The Federal Republic is not "nuclear-obsessed" - a term which the Defense Minister had heard for the first time from an American. The Federal Government did, however, support the concept of a credible deterrent as the chief objective of NATO. It opposed the idea that the opponents could safely operate within the nuclear threshold, knowing how far they could go without nuclear retaliation. The other side should never know where the nuclear threshold is. We live in Europe because of the impossibility of war not because of the possibility of conventional war. Even large-scale conventional war would be disastrous for Europe under current conditions.

The President asked whether, based on his information, he believed NATO should build up enough conventional forces to defend Germany without nuclear weapons. Strauss said that Morstad was supposed to have at least 30 divisions on the central front. Assuming these 30 divisions to be really there and using only conventional means, NATO would be able to resist the Soviet divisions now in the GDR. It could not cope with Soviet reserves or interdict the movement of these reserves forward. He pointed out that, even with the 12 full German divisions in the line, the state of the French divisions was such that NATO would not really have the 30 full divisions of which he had spoken.

General Lemaitre said he agreed that there was a great disparity in estimates regarding the number of Soviet divisions, particularly for those in central Europe. Our estimate was that there were 55 in all the latter area whereas the German estimate was 70 and 9 Satellite divisions. This discrepancy had to be worked out in the Military Committee and as Chairman he would see that it was. He did not believe however that all these Soviet divisions could be used against the NATO shield. Large forces were tied down in rear area defense. Moreover, our nuclear capability in Europe was very great. We would like to see 30 divisions on the central front. This would provide a difficult military problem for the Soviets in central Europe. If the Soviets moved westward their lines of communication would be very vulnerable. The question of when we would employ nuclear weapons could only be determined under the circumstances at the time.

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Defense Minister Strauss said he welcomed the fact that one of the effects of the Berlin crisis had been to achieve the NATO force goals which had been established for non-Berlin crisis conditions. It was hazardous to think that with the divisional strength indicated NATO could fight a conventional war. The Soviets were traditionally willing to expend men and material, and would not be inhibited from doing so if this would achieve their objectives. Hence the German position that, if the West had to commit more than one division, there should be a selective use of nuclear weapons and then full-scale nuclear war. Khrushchev regards himself as the consummation of the Communist revolution. He had attacked the Stalinists for their adventurous policy. He knew that a nuclear war would mean the end of the central leadership system in the Soviet Union, and he feared this. In the last few years the credibility of the Western nuclear deterrent has suffered. Perhaps the talks of the Secretary and of the President with Gromyko had increased this once again.

Chancellor Adenauer said he saw the problem in somewhat simpler terms. If no agreement were reached on Berlin in negotiations, the Soviets would take West Berlin within 48 hours, and one hour thereafter they could be moreover in Hamburg; Munich was only 80 kilometers from the East German border. The Soviets would have deployed troops to achieve these objectives, while NATO forces stayed at their own level. The Soviets would build up all the forces they required. Therefore, he said the situation was very serious. The President said he did not doubt that, if the events described took place, we would be in a nuclear war. The seizure of Berlin would be enough to trigger off such a war. He could not see the Soviets giving up the advantage of a first strike by providing this kind of warning, the nuclear situation being what it is now. He thought they would either cut off access to the autobahn or in the air.

The Chancellor asked if he believed that, if the Soviets occupied West Berlin and Hamburg and Munich, that the Italians or other NATO countries would want to fight. The President said the important point was whether the Germans, the Americans, the British and the French would be willing to resist. He asked what, in his judgment, would be the German view if it were realized that use of nuclear weapons by the US would lead to the destruction of Germany. Chancellor Adenauer said he had seen from the military briefing that Western Europe was the target of the main Soviet nuclear strength. Western Europe would indeed be destroyed. Would the Europeans be of a mind to do much fighting under these conditions?

Strauss said he wished to summarize. It was agreed that the Norstad build-up proposals, as agreed by the Foreign Ministers in Paris, must be carried out. If the access routes to Berlin are blockaded because negotiations failed or because they have not taken place, the Western Powers would try to win time by creating an air bridge, though admittedly this would not solve the problem. The Western Powers would make the three kinds of probes contemplated to sound out Soviet intentions. However, the considerations mentioned by Chancellor Adenauer regarding the destruction of Europe had led the Germans to put forward proposals on the use of sea and naval action. Once land and air forces are locked in combat it would be difficult to control the development of the situation. The Allies would then develop action involving up to one

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divisions in the West. Thereafter the West should make a positive statement. It would give the West the far negotiations and other countries a decision whether or not to give up Berlin. The West would be in a position to make a political and moral defeat. Such a flexible approach would be available before the ultimate confrontation is essential. It is not possible that the West avoid, through airing of differences, encouraging Khrushchev to think that the Alliance is falling apart. If Khrushchev will not be persuaded by such a process, then he is obviously prepared to have a showdown.

Chancellor Adenauer said he agreed with Strauss. A naval blockade would be a serious warning to the Soviets. He did not know why the British were so opposed to it. The West was far superior at sea. The President commented that the British were on such a narrow ledge as far as the financial situation was concerned that they were fearful of the effects of a blockade. Secretary McNamara said there was also a question of the efficacy of a blockade. It was a useful tool and should be used at a certain point. He believed the Germans would be interested to know that we had reactivated 40 destroyers and taken other measures specifically to add to our naval blockade capabilities. He considered this such a potentially useful measure that we were prepared to undertake it if the necessity arose. The Chancellor observed that the US and Germany supported the idea but the British objected.

The President asked whether the Germans had any reaction to our NATO offer as contained in his Ottawa speech. Strauss said that there was not a unified European attitude. He did not think that NATO as a whole could meet the President's request for suggestions on the central problem. The Italians, the Benelux, the Federal Republic, Greece and Turkey would support such a move, and the Federal Republic would soon make proposals as to how it might be translated into reality. Neither the French nor the British were interested, for different reasons. The Germans would make their proposals in the NATO meeting in December. He hoped to discuss certain details with Secretary McNamara during his present visit to Washington.

RECEIVED: Secretary Rusk Secretary McNamara
Mr. Kohler Mr. Riecke
Mr. Bohlen Mr. Bundy
Ambassador Dowling Mr. Dulles
Mr. Ball

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

Approved in S 11/26/61

DATE: November 21, 1961
9:00 a.m.
Secretary's Conference Room

SUBJECT: Negotiations on Berlin

PARTICIPANTS:

American - Secretary

Mr. Ball, Mr. Kohler, Mr. McNamara, Ambassador Dowling,
Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Mitze, Mr. Hillenbrand

German - Foreign Minister Schroeder, Defense Minister Strauss,
Under Secretary Carstens, Ambassador Grewe, Mr. Krapf,
Mr. Schnippenkoetter, General Schnez, Mr. Simon,
Mr. Hille

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Starting with the status of Berlin, the Secretary said he did not know whether the variance in legal interpretation between us and the Germans would make much difference in respect to what we said to the Soviets. He supposed we might try at the outset to get some sort of all-Berlin arrangement and try to bring down the wall. There was no reason to think this would succeed. We might then insist on the status quo, maintaining our rights or moving towards some sort of independent city of West Berlin free to make its own arrangements with the rest of the world. We would not contemplate anything which would weaken its ties with the Federal Republic.

Foreign Minister Schroeder said the Germans thought it would be best to maintain the occupation rights as the source of rights. There was no reason to change the position of the three occupying powers, as the Soviets demanded, since there was no legal basis for the Communist claim that this would take place. On the basis of the maintenance of occupation rights the relationship between Berlin and the Federal Republic could be built.

The Secretary asked whether the Foreign Minister could comment on how he saw this working out in actual discussions with the Soviets. If the Soviets said that there was nothing to be discussed in regard to East Berlin, then the harder we would presumably stress the point that they would have correspondingly less right to have a voice in the affairs of West Berlin.

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- 2 -

[Schroeder observed that the Soviets accept the fact of the Western presence in Berlin on the basis of the right of conquest. There was no reason to eliminate this. The relations of the Federal Republic to Berlin had to be associated with this right of conquest. If the existing status were changed, then the West would be starting from a zero point and all relationships with Berlin would have to be established from the beginning. The West should, therefore, start with what it had now in any negotiations.

The Secretary indicated we could agree that in negotiations we should start with occupation rights. Any fresh arrangement would be superimposed on occupation rights which would remain in the background to be called upon if required. Schroeder agreed this was the German view. In dealing with the Soviets, the Secretary continued, we may find that agreed practical arrangements may turn out to rest upon different theories. For example, in agreeing on an independent city, the Soviets could claim their view while we would maintain occupation rights in the background. [Schroeder pointed out that, from the aspect of international law, the West must emphasize legal occupation rights because this was the most convincing public argument open to it. The Secretary said he did not see how we could agree to a de facto incorporation of West Berlin into the Federal Republic and at the same time find a solid basis for access to West Berlin. [Schroeder commented that there were mixed views in Germany on complete incorporation of West Berlin in the Federal Republic. His government took the view that, at least for the time being, there could be no full incorporation for the reason indicated. The western source of access rights was linked directly to occupation rights and the Germans had no share of those rights.

The Secretary observed that we did not want to make too much a point of this, but he might mention that there was no question but that West Berlin was now our specific responsibility. The American people understood this. If West Berlin were incorporated into the Federal Republic, then we would in a sense become gendarmes for the Federal Republic. This would not be easy for the American public to understand. [Schroeder said he fully agreed. Allied rights must overshadow the rights of the Federal Republic which must remain in the background. The Secretary wondered if we could not agree that what we are saying with respect to the status of West Berlin is essentially for ourselves. What we may say to the Soviets may go beyond this. For example, we might propose an all-Berlin solution, or we might say that, if you claim East Berlin is gone, then West Berlin is gone for you. We will strive very hard to protect the full freedom of action of West Berlin to maintain ties with the Federal Republic.

[Schroeder indicated that the question of a plebiscite might arise in negotiations with the Soviets. If it did, it should first be proposed for all of Berlin, and only later for West Berlin.

The Secretary

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- 3 -

The Secretary said he wondered if it made any difference to the Federal Republic if these relationships which were under discussion took the form of contractual arrangements or agreements. [Schroeder commented that this, in fact, did create a problem because of the West German constitution. If relationships were put on a contractual basis then an amendment of the constitution might be necessary and this would be difficult in an internal constitutional sense. The Berliners and the West Germans would consider it the "status quo minus." The problem was essentially a psychological one. The answer also depended partly on whether any great improvement of access could be achieved. If so, this would perhaps make handling of the constitutional problem somewhat easier. The Secretary asked if there could not be an understanding between West Berlin and the Federal Republic introduced by the statement that pending reunification or full implementation of the constitution, the Federal Republic and West Berlin would establish the following relationships. [Schroeder said he believed the decision of the Supreme Constitutional Court was that Berlin was a LAND of the Federal Republic, apart from certain Allied reservations. The Secretary's question could not be answered without further study. If, in a complete arrangement on Berlin, access thereto were improved, the status question would lose importance. This might be a means of bringing pressure on the Soviets. These legal questions were not so important from the viewpoint of the Federal Republic, but the Berliners' feeling of security depended on (a) the Allied guarantee, and (b) maintenance of vital ties with the Federal Republic. The Berliners were especially sensitive regarding the latter, and the psychological factor was, therefore, more important than the purely legal. There were many federal offices in Berlin--some eighty in all. From the viewpoint of the Federal Republic these were perhaps not so important, but from the viewpoint of West Berlin the departure of any of them would be interpreted as the beginning of a general exodus. Removal of the Federal coat of arms from a building would be taken as a signal of withdrawal by the Berlin population. Mr. Kohler commented that we agreed the ties would stay as they are. The question was how to do this. The Ministers might even find independent status for the city consistent with our legal position, but this was obviously related to the improvements we could get. The question should be further studied.

[Dr. Carstens asked whether the Soviets would not, in talks, say that the Berliners should decide their economic and cultural relations, but would strongly object to the maintenance of political ties. He, therefore, questioned whether this whole approach was useful. If we discussed relationships, the Soviets would try to impose all sorts of conditions on their agreement. The Secretary commented that if the Soviets insisted that East Berlin could not be discussed, then we would say that West Berlin could not be discussed. We cannot accept the claim that what's mine is mine and what's

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- 4 -

yours is negotiable as a basis for discussion. But we may need some formula so that the Soviets could say that this is what they were talking about.

With respect to access, the Secretary stated that, in his talks with Gromyko, he had emphasized that there could be no diminution in our access to West Berlin. We have the impression that the Soviets will try to apply pressure to uncontrolled forms of access, especially air. We have taken the view that both military and civilian access is a part of our occupation rights. We have taken the position that civilian access is important. We would not accept East German censorship on air access; they would use this to suffocate the city. We have also taken the position that our access rights are not subject to negotiation between the Soviets and the GDR. The Soviets cannot give away something they do not have. If we could improve or reinforce our rights, so much the better, but it seems that the West Germans want to add to our rights by specific coverage of civilian access. [Schroeder said the Federal Republic would like to see the agreement specifically cover civilian rights of access. He could see that there is a difference in view. The Federal Republic says that civilian rights depended on Allied rights. This was recognized in the Jessup-Malik agreement of 1949. The LZT agreement of 1960, which was the first to link the trade agreement to Berlin access, used very vague language to the effect that any concern that traffic might be disturbed or impaired by either of the participating parties was completely unfounded. A permanent solution to the civilian access problem could only be reached if this were blanketed into occupation access rights.]

The Secretary observed that our position was that the right of the occupying powers is that Berlin have free access. Any mention in the LZT of civilian access was in addition thereto. The Secretary asked whether the Germans could see any practical effect in covering German access in an agreement. Dr. Carstens said an agreement should include civilian access. After some discussion it was agreed that the term "civilian access" rather than "German access" should be used for purposes of clarity.

Mr. Kohler observed that the problem seemed to be more a semantic one than a substantive one. What we want is at least one uncontrolled means of access. If this can be obtained on the Autobahn so much the better, but at least it should be uncontrolled in the air. But we can never establish this as a formal right in an agreement at the present time. As in the period of the air lift, under crisis conditions we would assimilate civilian access into military access. [Ambassador Grewe commented that the crucial problem is in the wording of the access guarantee. We cannot refer only to Allied personnel. German civilian traffic must be covered as well. The Federal Republic was not seeking express guarantees or a formula seeking new rights. Mr. Kohler made the point that the longer civilian traffic could be covered

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- 5 -

by the IZT the better. We do not want the present practical arrangements for civilian access to be disturbed. If after the peace treaty the East Germans want to deal with the Federal Republic on a government-to-government level regarding trade, they would have to consider the question before throwing the responsibility for access to the Allies. [Schroeder said that the Federal Republic had no agreement on access with the East Germans outside of the IZT. It could not be assumed that this would suffice in the long run. Civilian access had to be covered by the Allied mantle to avoid pressure in the years to come.

The Secretary said that if you and we are clear that we will not accept any disjunction in our access rights and these include both military and civilian access, and at least one important means of access must be beyond East German control, then it did not seem necessary to go beyond this. He asked Dr. Carstens and Mr. Kohler to try to arrive at an agreed formulation of the discussion.

[With respect to "dealings" with the GDR, Foreign Minister Schroeder said here was a subject on which the Federal Republic had considerable skepticism. One overestimated the capacity of the Federal Republic if one imagined that anything reasonable could come out of negotiations between the West Germans, acting on behalf of the Western powers, and the East Germans. The Federal Republic has no real means of exercising pressure on the GDR. The Allies must therefore keep matters in their own hands without regard to how unpleasant this might be in terms of dealing with the GDR. He cited his own experience as Minister of the Interior to show how the GDR could bring pressure on the Federal Republic with respect to Berlin access. The Federal Republic was not able to tighten border controls directed against the GDR because it feared reprisals against Berlin access. This weakness arose from the pure facts of geography. If the GDR deliberately disturbed Allied access, the Federal Republic could not do very much. It was ready to help on technical difficulties. The Secretary commented that we have said to the Soviets that we will not negotiate with the GDR on access. We have said such negotiations must be between the three Allied powers and the Soviets. Under the circumstances such an understanding might be superimposed on the Soviet-GDR peace treaty. This could clarify the access problem, but the sanction behind access would still be our presence in West Berlin as well as the Federal Republic's trade with the GDR. What we are concerned about is the situation which would result if there is a peace treaty and the Soviets simply leave the access checkpoints. No one will then be there except East German officials. We had assumed that the Federal Republic would prefer to handle technical arrangements with the East Germans through West Germans.

[Schroeder commented that the GDR would respect the Allies more than the Federal Republic. It would be a difficult situation if the Federal

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[R]epublic were to discuss procedures and formalities with the GDR and then arrived at agreements which affected the Allies. He could understand the Allied principle that the Western powers did not speak with the GDR. The solution, therefore, was to set forth the arrangements so clearly in an agreement with the Soviets that everything thereafter would be automatic and no further discussions would be necessary. The Secretary observed that perhaps some measure of misunderstanding arose out of a different view as to the kind of dealings we had in mind. These would not involve the question of our rights but such matters as traffic control. If our rights were established, we had thought the Federal Republic would prefer to do that sort of thing rather than have us do it directly. [S]chroeder said he could understand how the US could say that it is in the interests of the Federal Republic to deal with the GDR rather than the Allies. But the other side was full of tricks. If you have an agreement on access the GDR will want to codify this. It will make additional demands which are not acceptable to the West. The Federal Republic could not reduce these demands and the Western powers would have to intervene. This would put the Federal Republic in an impotent and laughable position. He referred particularly here to such matters as inspection, documentation, etc. Ambassador Grue said the Federal Republic would always be willing to talk to the East Germans as far as controls applying to civilian traffic were concerned. Allied traffic was now being discussed. If the Soviets disappeared, a problem would be to whom the Allies might talk. The difficulty was that Federal Republic discussions with the GDR on control procedures at the checkpoints, documentation, stamps, inspections left the Federal Republic in a weak position because these matters were too intimately connected with Allied access rights.

The Secretary said that we needed to make our understanding with the Soviets sufficiently clear. We would hold them responsible under the agreement. If differences arose and no satisfaction was obtainable, then we would complain to the Soviets. Indeed if the West Germans made an unacceptable agreement for us, we would say we did not like it. The point really was whether, with respect to the some 5% of total traffic involved, the Germans would prefer that we make the arrangements at the checkpoints or the Federal Republic would prefer to do this as a part of the total picture. [S]chroeder commented that he thought it would be better for the Allies to do it despite the unpleasant implications for recognition. This was more consistent with the German position on civil traffic which they wished to have protected under the Allied umbrella. In this instance the legal point of non-recognition was less important than effective maintenance of access. Dr. Carstens observed that if there were physical interference, for example, damage to a bridge, this could be taken care of by the Federal Republic. If, however,

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It were a question of checkpoint procedures, control of luggage, identification of personnel, etc., there was no purpose in having West Germans talk to East Germans about this. This was the very issue to be discussed with the Soviets. The principle was that the Federal Republic would talk to the East Germans so far as it could. For the rest, the Western powers should talk to the Soviets. The Secretary noted that talking in Moscow would not help much when a practical problem arose at the checkpoints. Dr. Carstens observed that if the East Germans made trouble it would only be with Soviet approval. The Secretary said we may be using "talk" in a different sense. We would not negotiate with the GDR regarding our rights of access, but if a car breaks down and needs help or there are traffic questions that would be something different. Dr. Carstens said he thought this point required more study. It was necessary to distinguish between the different types of cases which might arise.

The Secretary suggested that perhaps UN assistance on the access routes might help solve some of these problems. International civil servants might serve a useful function in this connection. [Dr. Carstens commented that they would also add to the difficulties of the situation, if an International Access Authority were obtained that would solve the problem. Even without such an Authority, the Secretary observed, international officials at the key points might provide the answer. Schroeder said he saw no trouble in this. Dr. Carstens, however, indicated he did not have much confidence in such a solution. The Foreign Minister maintained his view that, if this point arose in discussions, the Federal Republic could not object. The Secretary said the Soviets might claim that this would interfere with GDR sovereignty. He said an agreement might attempt to specify a little more in detail the kinds of arrangements now in effect with the Soviets at the checkpoints. In any case there could be no negotiations with respect to Allied rights of access.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

Approved in S 12/1/61

November 22, 1961
9:00 a.m.

SUBJECT:

Meeting Between the Secretary and the German Foreign Minister

PARTICIPANTS:

GERMANY

Foreign Minister Schroeder
Defense Minister Strauss
Under Secretary Carstens
Ambassador Grune
Mr. Kraft
Mr. von Eckhardt
Mr. Schnlpenkoetter
General Schner
Mr. Reinemeyer
Mr. Weber (Interpreter)

UNITED STATES

Secretary Rusk
Mr. Dehlen
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Minister Strauss said he would like to leave aside the NATO problem and discuss the question in relation to negotiations. His understanding was that what was under consideration was a possible US-UK-USUK agreement -- he was unsure of the French role -- whereby atomic weapons would not be transferred to nations not now possessing them.

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The Secretary said this referred to national control, not the present NATO arrangements or proposals for a NATO voice in the control of nuclear weapons.

a little more here, perhaps

Minister Strauss said he wished to emphasize that as far as German policy is concerned they were in principle not pushing the idea of national control of atomic weapons aside from the present NATO formula. Our two Governments are in full agreement on this as are all parties in the Bundestag. The Federal Government's declaration was made in connection with WEU, and it continues to be fully valid. No change is contemplated. This renunciation is quite obviously connected with NATO's continuing to be in position to carry out its protective function. It had been suggested that in connection with East-West negotiations on nontransfer of atomic weapons, the Federal Government should repeat its declaration renouncing their manufacture in the Federal Republic. The linking of the renunciation in this connection with East-West negotiations would create a special legal status for the Federal Republic, discriminating against it and putting it in a status different from the other nonatomic NATO countries. Because the latter were not in a technical or financial position to create atomic weapons, this would create a very special status for the Federal Republic. This also poses the question of whether the other nonnuclear NATO countries would be ready to repeat the same renunciation. So far this matter was between the Federal Republic and the NATO powers, and we must avoid giving the Soviets the right of intervention and control. In a short time this could prove especially unpleasant and embarrassing for all NATO. The Soviets could produce a new crisis and say the German renunciation was not being fulfilled. This would be especially easy if the new declaration were part of a Berlin arrangement. In the current Finnish development one can see what ridiculous pretexts the Soviets can put forward. Therefore the Germans do not think repeating their declaration in connection with a Berlin arrangement would be wise. It should be done only in connection with world-wide disarmament with controls and inspection.

The Secretary said there is no discrimination with regard to US policy on the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We take this view with any government anywhere. Any discrimination against the Federal Republic occurred in 1954 at the time of the WEU declaration. We don't wish to give the Soviets any treaty right of intervention. The question is, are we prepared to declare our existing attitudes. If the Federal Government does not wish to reaffirm its renunciation, we, nevertheless, presume it continues to apply. Could we take declaratory note of our existing policy and the Federal Government's renunciation?

Minister

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Minister Schroeder said the Germans would prefer to have this matter excluded entirely from negotiations because it would put the Federal Government in a very difficult position. This whole matter should not be connected with Berlin, but should be part of a peace treaty or disarmament. However, there would not be so many objections to the Secretary's last suggestion concerning taking declaratory note. On the other hand, the Germans would prefer to have the whole matter avoided.

The Secretary asked whether there would be advantage in making a continuation of such commitments on nuclear weapons contingent upon Soviet compliance with any new arrangement on Berlin.

Minister Schroeder said the Germans object to any linking to Berlin. They are under the impression that the Soviets are using Berlin as a means of achieving other ends.

The Secretary said the 1954 arrangement now seems conditioned by other developments. Suppose India or Sweden produced nuclear weapons, would this affect the German renunciation?

Minister Schroeder said he was not inclined to give a definitive reply. The Secretary's predecessor had made a statement in this connection to the Chancellor. Things would have to be reconsidered if there were a basic change in the situation.

The meeting concluded after a discussion of the Communiqué, which Mr. Bohlen and Mr. von Eckhardt will refine, and the paper "Agreed Formulation of Issues," on which Mr. Carstens gave his comments.

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Memorandum of Conversation

Approved in S 12/1/61

November 22, 1961
9:00 a.m.

DATE:

Meeting Between the Secretary and the German Foreign Minister

SUBJECT:

GERMANY

UNITED STATES

PARTICIPANTS:

Foreign Minister Schroeder
Defense Minister Strauss
Under Secretary Carstens
Ambassador Grewe
Mr. Krapf
Mr. von Eckhardt
Mr. Schnippenhoeffer
General Schmes
Mr. Reinkenmeyer
Mr. Weber (Interpreter)

Secretary Rusk
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Kohler
Ambassador Dowling
Mr. Hillenbrand
Mr. Cash

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11/23/61

✓ State Dept. Advisory - Berlin
Shulman, Marshall D.

November 23, 1961.

Dear Marshall:

Your piece was in last Sunday's Post.
We both thought that it was excellent and
enlightening.

Adenauer is here (leaves today). He
asked me to call on him yesterday. I found
him much changed since April last -- aged,
shrunken, slower, and, so I thought, confused.
A cold may have contributed, but I gather from
Strauss that my impression has foundation. His
attitude on Berlin: USSR is too strong to oppose
with conventional weapons; nuclear ones must not
be used (but don't tell Mr. K. that); hence we
must negotiate. The Germans will leave it to us
and not criticise if it turns out badly. When I
said that on his diagnosis Mr. K. need only go
ahead with his treaty, require German civilians
to travel to and from Berlin via East German entry
ports, and sit tight, he became so entranced with
the idea that he repeated it to the President as
his own. But he counts on Mr. K.'s fear of China
to make him willing to settle with us.

This is "not for attribution."

Yours,

Mr. Marshall D. Shulman,
Russian Research Center,
Harvard University,
16 Dunster Street,
Cambridge 38, Mass.

Adenauer 11/65 / State Dept & WH Advisor, 1961. Oct - Dec '61

11/24/61

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

Approved in S
12/1/61November 24, 1961
DATE: Secretary's Office
4:30 P.M.

SUBJECT: Visit of the Chancellor

PARTICIPANTS:

MR: Sir David Crossby Gero
MR: The Secretary
MR. Kohler
MR. Cash

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12/4/61

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Sir David opened by saying that the Prime Minister had asked if--before the end of the de Gaulle visit--there were anything else he should know about the Chancellor's visit with the President.

The Secretary said there had been some distortion in the press, but this was mainly a matter of detail and emphasis. He continued that he thought for the first time the Chancellor was showing his ego. It is true he was tired from the trip and suffering from a cold, but he did not seem quite as vigorous as usual. He did not take as active a part in the conversations when others were present. Schroeder and Strauss did much of the talking. The Chancellor did not give any systematic exposition. However, he and the President did have some very lively exchanges. The Chancellor arrived more discouraged than we had expected. He did not seem as firm and hard as we had anticipated. Apparently he had had a military briefing from his own people which had shaken his confidence. Some of the figures he had been given did not appear too reliable, and we think they should be reviewed, e.g., the relative number of Soviet and Eastern tanks and divisions in Central Europe. The Chancellor displayed some plans which we tried to dispute with some apparent degree of success. The Chancellor is quite clear that we must negotiate with the Soviets, and he agreed to do his best to persuade General de Gaulle.

Sir David said the British had gathered that the Chancellor's letter to de Gaulle was very brief and had not done much to convince the General. The Chancellor had said he was in favor of negotiations but had not appealed to General de Gaulle to fall into line. The French feeling seemed to be that the letter, itself, would not be enough.

Mr. Kohler

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Mr. Kohler interjected that he had just come from a meeting in which he had given a briefing to the British and French concerning the points discussed during the Chancellor's visit.

Sir David asked whether anything had been said concerning the level of negotiations with the Soviets.

The Secretary said he felt the export level wouldn't get anywhere. We would probably have to start with the foreign ministers and perhaps go to the summit level before anything was accomplished.

The Secretary continued that the principal surprise of the talks had been the German preference to have the Allies establish technical contacts with the East Germans regarding access rather than do it themselves.

Sir David observed that most of the contacts would concern civilian access.

The Secretary said the West Germans were prepared to continue these contacts regarding civilian access, but they were unwilling to expand them to include the military.

Mr. Kohler said that underlying all this was the concept that in the last analysis civilian access is our responsibility as Occupiers as was demonstrated during the Airlift.

The Secretary said the Germans were keen that we cover both military and civilian access. He reiterated that they were not as disturbed at the thought that we contact the East Germans as they were over the thought that they do so.

The Secretary added that the Germans do not want other questions brought in such as boundaries and nuclear weapons.

Sir David found it inconsistent that the Germans want better guarantees of access but are not willing to give anything in exchange and asked what there was in it for the Russians.

The Secretary said that after all we shouldn't have to buy the same horse several times.

He said the Germans did show some yielding on the status of West Berlin. They had indicated that introduction of US activities into West Berlin would allow a cut in West German representation there and might permit the constitutional question to recede into the background. They do not want to amend the constitution. They want a long way to meet us on legal theory.

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The Secretary added that if the Soviets say that East Berlin is not to be discussed, we must reply that then West Berlin cannot be discussed.

Sir David said this seemed fair enough, but would we accomplish anything thereby. This would mean that there would be no agreement with the Soviets, and that they would sign their separate peace treaty with East Germany. They would then begin their series of movements, the West Berliners would lose confidence, and the city would be deserted. The British feeling is that successful negotiations are important for our position in West Berlin, and they doubt that we will get an agreement without a new status.

The Secretary said the Germans did not resist making West Berlin an independent city as long as the occupation rights were kept in reserve.

Sir David asked whether we shouldn't, instead, have our presence in West Berlin on a request by the West Berliners for the stationing of our troops.

The Secretary replied that we couldn't give up our occupation rights for an agreement which the Soviets could then denounce and thus create a vacuum. He said the Germans would not agree to a new agreement at the expense of our occupation rights. He said we wished to hold on to our occupation rights in Germany as a whole until the entire matter could be settled.

Sir David asked to what extent the Germans appeared flexible on the question of status.

The Secretary said we did talk about a new agreement with the occupation rights in the background.

Sir David asked whether the Germans had referred to their plan for an autobahn walled off from East Germany or had discussed the International Access Authority instead.

The Secretary said that the walled-off autobahn did not come up. He added the Germans appeared allergic to permitting the UN to cluster around with Berlin.

Sir David said the UN presence was important only insofar as it would give confidence to the West Berliners.

The Secretary said the Germans resisted the idea of UN troops in Berlin or UN assistance in general.

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The Secretary said the Easton article in this morning's Times had not been too accurate.

Sir David inquired about Ambassador Kroell's four points.

The Secretary said the Chancellor had brushed off the Kroell episode, the representations of the Foreign Ministry had been intelligent about it, and the Foreign Minister was somewhere in between. He added that there had been very little discussion of the Kroell matter.

Sir David asked if the Chancellor had not favored it.

The Secretary said the Foreign Minister had said Kroell did not represent the view of the Federal Government. The Secretary had asked what had been meant by Kroell's reference to disarmament discussions and had been told that Kroell was aware of several ideas which he pulled out and tossed on the table.

Sir David asked whether the Germans were thinking only in terms of a narrow negotiation.

The Secretary confirmed this saying that he had expressed the opinion that the Russians would raise other questions.

The Secretary said that with reference to nuclear matters, it was obvious that the Germans were very reluctant to confirm to the Soviet Union their earlier declaration concerning ABC weapons. They do not wish to give the Russians the right to intervene. They did reaffirm their commitment to the declaration. They are obviously interested in the NATO nuclear deterrent.

Mr. Kohler said they apparently plan to make a proposal in this regard in December.

Sir David asked whether the Chancellor had indicated that he had any hopes of convincing General de Gaulle.

The Secretary said the Chancellor had spoken several times of the efforts he would make in this direction, but he had not predicted the outcome.

Sir David closed by thanking the Secretary for this information.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
POLICY PLANNING COUNCIL

11/27/61
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General
Start a file
NATO
DETERRENT

CONFIDENTIAL

November 27, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Multilateral MRBM
Force

In connection with the proposal for a multilateral NATO nuclear deterrent, rather than deployment of MRBMs to the forces of individual European countries, I thought that you would be interested in the attached 1960 advocacy of an independent NATO deterrent by the President, in a review which he wrote of a book by Liddell Hart for the "Saturday Review of Literature".

VO
Henry Owen


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As Stated.

CC: EUR - Mr. Kohler

for NATO
deterrent
file

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NSA/216 / MLE, General, 1/61-6/62

Department of State

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N: Amembarr., PARIS 3090

PARIS PASS STOESEL AND USRO FOR AMBASSADOR FINLETTER

PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR GAVIN FROM THE SECRETARY

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I appreciate your thoughtful consideration of problem discussed in your 2542. Upon reflection here I believe that to furnish enriched uranium to France for military applications would lead to other French requests relating to production of nuclear weapons and would be in contradiction to US policies which we have already clearly decided and in part announced. We have made clear to all governments that we will engage in no activity and undertake no action which would be likely to assist any now nation to acquire or develop an independent nuclear weapon capability. Significance of present legislation in this respect is that it is designed to limit such cooperation to the one other country allied with us that had already achieved such capability.

I also believe it is already clear to French that we will undertake no action likely to result in any direct or significant aid to France in developing or securing independent nuclear warhead or effective nuclear weapon delivery capability. As you have just reiterated to French Defense Minister, we otherwise stand ready to continue our mutual cooperation with France in scientific matters and in peaceful applications of atomic energy as well as in such mutual defense matters.

EUR:WE:EJBeigel

1/41:EDWilliams/db 11/22/61

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

The Secretary

- Mr. Tyler S/AE - Mr. Farley S/P - Mr. Owen (draft) S/S - Mr. Manfull

White House - The President (per B. Smith)
Defense - Mr. Rowan (substance)

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E.O. 11652, SEC. 3(E), 5(B), 5(E) AND 11

Dep. of State (NEX-77-689)
BY *MM* NADG DATE 11/18/77

NSP/71/ F. G. 215 - 3/16/61

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matters as recently signed 144(b) Atomic Cooperation Agreement with France. I believe French recognizes that cooperation in mutual defense matters can proceed only in conjunction with full cooperation by France as NATO partner, and I recognize you will continue pursue this line with Messmer. We shall also press this point with him during his forthcoming visit here.

I believe you are already familiar from our earlier exchange of telegrams in this general field that we are profoundly convinced that not only would assistance along lines your 2542 confirm and encourage presently independent course followed by France but would lead to increased pressures in Germany and elsewhere for national nuclear programs. It would be divisive force within NATO. We consider best way to handle problem within NATO is through our multilateral HIGH offer, which I plan to renew at NATO Ministerial Meeting in December, and through possible other means to give Alliance a larger NATO nuclear role, if our allies so desire.

We all realize that our position on this subject may hamper development of closer relations with France and we are striving in other ways to overcome this handicap. You of course realize difficulties caused for all of us by French position on variety of important military questions affecting NATO security, and we fully endorse and support your efforts to bring greater measure of French cooperation in these questions.

In view of President's great interest this general subject he has also reviewed this message and has approved it.

RUSK

Position Paper

MREB'S


(To be raised at German Initiative)

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Anticipated Position Other Governments:

Other NATO nations' positions vary with respect to the deployment and method of control of a second generation, mobile, either land or sea-based, medium range ballistics missile, capable of strategic use. (SACEUR has indicated a substantial 1966 requirement for such a weapon to replace the tactical aircraft on the continent, which are becoming increasingly vulnerable.) The United Kingdom is strongly opposed to their deployment to the Continent, fearing German possession and believing that this is a strategic weapon that is not appropriate to the role of NATO forces in Europe. After initial scepticism, the UK has indicated a view that a multilateral MREB force might be useful in meeting European - and particularly German - concerns, although they do not think that it would be militarily useful or necessary. The British coined the derogatory phrase "15 fingers on the trigger", and doubt a multilateral force would credibly enhance the deterrent to Soviet aggression already posed by existing strategic forces. They would, in any event, very much like a POLARIS system of their own. Norway and Denmark are opposed to the deployment of any nuclear weapons on their territory; additionally they would presumably have grave fears concerning German possession of this type of missile. They are not expected, however, to oppose in principle the concept of a NATO force or the validity of SACEUR's requirement, if means can be worked out of meeting that requirement which do not involve deploying MREB's to German forces. France is not inclined to participate in a multilateral MREB force, believing it impracticable, nor to participate in a program involving commitment of MREB's to SACEUR, but does desire national possession, i.e., sea-based missiles under full French controls. We continue to refuse to provide her technical assistance for the development of a nuclear-powered submarine. The Benelux countries are opposed to national possession, with The Netherlands in particular being an advocate of multilateral control. The Federal Republic is the principal advocate of an early resolution of the MREB question, and can be expected to press strongly for a US decision as to whether and how it will support SACEUR's requirements. Believing that a substantial European based MREB force is an absolute military necessity after 1965, the Germans may propose an integrated NATO force (comparable to the mobile Task Force) of nationally owned and manned MREB's under SACEUR command with a mix of two-thirds sea-based and one-third land-based. It is conceivable, although not likely, that they would come up with an alternative proposal for a WEU or EEC force, but still under SACEUR control. Underlying the German pressure is probably concern shared with the French lest the US eventually disengage from the nuclear defense of Europe. The Italians appear to be for MREB's and may well tend to follow the Federal Republic lead; they have indicated that they believe the German proposal has inadequate support in NATO to prevail. The

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Italian preference would probably be for sea-based missiles. Greece and Turkey can be expected to follow the US lead, although Turkey has voiced considerable interest in a NATO force.

Recommended US Position:

The US is prepared to consider the MREM question early in 1962. Our general views are as follows:

1. Available and planned strategic forces cover all major elements of Soviet military strength whose destruction is necessary to the defense of NATO Europe. The US recognizes, however, there remain allied concerns on the question of coverage and it is therefore prepared to join with its allies in developing guidelines and procedures for deciding the use of these forces to provide even greater assurance that their use would be responsive to European concerns. As an example, the five Polaris MREM submarines deployed in the Atlantic have been committed to NATO.
2. As previously stated, the US is willing, if Europe's concerns are not met by the above arrangements, to consider the establishment of a multilaterally owned and controlled NATO MREM force. A multilateral force would be the means of MREM deployment most consistent with NATO cohesion, and the US is not prepared to facilitate the procurement of MREM's for national forces not under multilateral ownership and control. Consideration of such a force would run to the complex problems involved in developing a force under multilateral ownership and control, and with mixed manning in the degree considered operationally feasible, and to the equally complex questions involved in devising a means for its control. In such consideration, the US preference would be for sea-based options, to avoid the practical and political problems involved in deployment of MREM's on the territory of national governments.
3. The US has initiated the design phase for the development of a second-generation, solid-fueled, mobile MREM which could be used either with land or sea-based delivery systems. This project is being carried out in response to US worldwide requirements and without prejudice to their possible use in NATO Europe.

Drafted by:	Cleared by:	
EUR/RA-Mr. Kranich	S/P-Mr. Owen	WE-Mr. Biegel
	G/PM-Mr. Weiss	GFI-Mr. Marcy
	EUR-Mr. Fessenden	BNA-Mr. Sweeney
	GER-Mr. Brandin	WE-Mr. Vallettri
S/S-RO:N.A.Vellotes, Room 7241F, Ext. 3737		

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THAD H 12/4/61

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Sanitized

Box 37
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4 December 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Response to November 16 Letter from General Norstad.

The Secretaries of State and Defense find General Norstad's proposed instructions to NATO planners, enclosed in his November 16 letter to you, only in part consistent with U.S. policy on military actions in a Berlin conflict. I agree, and have prepared in support of this view the short attached paper, which lists and explains four major points of inconsistency.

Your alternatives would seem to be three, depending upon the reason you are inclined to accept for these inconsistencies:

Reason

Action

1. General Norstad does not yet completely understand the full thrust of agreed U.S. policy; if he did, he would modify the draft instructions and conduct himself differently in the future.

2. Send General Norstad a rather detailed letter of follow-up to your October 20 letter and its enclosure, to be signed either by you or by the Secretary of Defense (the Secretaries of State and Defense have prepared such a letter; it is available, along with a few changes which I would propose).

(D)
12/11/61

~~TOP SECRET~~

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(18)

Copy to - Mr. 12/24

Spec. 75-000-87

Reason

3. General Norstad holds strong views which have caused him consciously or unconsciously to resist accepting U.S. policy, and probably will continue to do so unless rather drastic action is undertaken.

Action

3. Send a personal emissary to General Norstad to talk through in detail the full range of U.S. policy in a Berlin conflict, using as a primary vehicle the joint draft letter prepared by the Secretaries.


MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

Enclosure



Record Number 57073

<u>SET</u>	Berlin Crisis
<u>BC1</u>	Yes
<u>DOCUMENT TYPE</u>	Memorandum
<u>DATE</u>	12/04/1961
<u>CIRCD</u>	
<u>TIME</u>	
<u>CABNO</u>	
<u>DOCNO</u>	
<u>ORIGIN</u>	United States. Office of the White House
<u>SIGNATOR</u>	Taylor, Maxwell D.
<u>DESTO</u>	
<u>DESTP</u>	Kennedy, John F.
<u>DRAFT</u>	
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	Top Secret
<u>TITLE</u>	Response to November 16 Letter from General Norstad
<u>CTII</u>	
<u>NAMES</u>	Norstad, Lauris
<u>TERMS</u>	
<u>ORGAN</u>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<u>PGS</u>	2

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

DDRS-1997
1255
12/5/61

5 December 1961

P. A. Josef:

reflecting on our discussion at dinner on 26 November, it occurred that there may remain some room for misunderstanding between our views of the MRBM problem. With this in mind, I thought that it be useful if I summarize our views on this question for your information.

I recall, you made the following points:

- a. A solution to the MRBM problem is required urgently.
- b. Your government proposes the creation of a NATO nuclear force composed of national contingents, to be controlled by SACEUR. If this proposal is unable to move forward reasonably soon in NATO you subsequently recommend the creation of such a force within the framework of Western European Union.
- c. You consider that this force should have some 600 missiles with a range of 2,000 miles, in order to permit coverage of

As I recognize your concern over this problem, and I understand the position behind your proposal, I would like to give you our line of thinking on several points which bear on this problem.

I will recall that the United States suggested the creation of a national MRBM force, not solely to meet a military requirement, but also for intention of meeting European political concerns. The response to our suggestion has not been generally enthusiastic, but we continue to study other means of meeting this concern. Our position remains open, however, and we are prepared to discuss the merits it offers.

Understand that the time element involved in the MRBM problem is a factor and we do not at this time share your sense of urgency in this. This is so because a significant portion of the United States effort is now devoted to targets which threaten Europe and which threaten the United States, including the Soviet MRBM threat. The United States must, and will, continue to provide this coverage outside of Europe for at least several years. We appreciate the concern which attaches to this area, and you will recall, from

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 2.3(b)
Agency Case 93-M-0272
NLE Case 93-270-#2
By 36m NLE Date 2/12/94

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1961 DEC 5 22 56

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THE WHITE HOUSE

OUTGOING MESSAGE

#116
Box 37 - Poodle
Blanket



WHASA

5 DEC 1961

PRIORITY

PRECEDENCE

CLASSIFICATION

DATE

FROM: BUNDY

Cleared by

EYES ONLY
McGeorge Bundy per BKS

TO: GENERAL LAURIS NORSTAD, SAC EUROPE

PARIS FRANCE

INFO: SECSTATE EYES ONLY FOR RUSK

SECDEF EYES ONLY FOR McNAMARA

CITE: CAP 5409-61

UNCLASSIFIED

EYES ONLY FOR GENERAL NORSTAD

Quoted below text of letter signed today by President which, along with its enclosure, is being dispatched to you through the SHAPE Liaison Office.

BEGIN TEXT

Dear General Norstad:

Since receiving your letter of November 16 and its enclosure, "SACEER's Instructions to SHAPE Planners," I have had these instructions studied by State and Defense in relation to our basic position paper, "U.S. Policy on Military Actions in a Berlin Conflict." This study has resulted in comments which I have approved and now enclose for your guidance in planning and in future relations with your NATO colleagues.

Secretaries Rusk and McNamara will be in Paris next week and will want to talk over this matter with you. Please take full advantage of the presence of the Secretaries to give them the benefit of your views and to set forth any difficulties which you may anticipate in bringing our Allies to a full and sympathetic participation in our contingency preparations.

Sincerely,

/s/ John F Kennedy

PAGE 1 OF 8

UNCLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE
OUTGOING MESSAGE

21
WHASA
5 DEC 1961
DATE

PRIORITY

PRECEDENCE

CLASSIFICATION

FROM: BUNNY

TO: GENERAL LAURIS NORSTAD, SAC EUROPE PARIS FRANCE

INFO: SECSTATE
SECDEF

CITE: CAP 5409-61

Enclosure:

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Although General Norstad's letter of 16 November in general takes into account your letter of 20 October with its enclosure, there are certain significant respects in which it diverges. The following paragraphs therefore expand somewhat on previous guidance concerning the nature and purpose of the several phases of the US preferred sequence of actions. These more detailed expressions of US policy should equip General Norstad to proceed with planning and with winning Allied support.

PAGE 2 OF 8

THE WHITE HOUSE

OUTGOING MESSAGE



WHASA

PRIORITY

PRECEDENCE

CLASSIFICATION

3 DEC 1961

DATE

FROM: BUNNY

TO: GENERAL LAURIE NORSTAD, SAC EUROPE PARIS FRANCE

INFO: SECSTATE
SECDEF

CITE: CAP 5409-61

In any case, the planning guidance General Norstad issues should serve both to stimulate the build-up of required forces and lead to the development of agreed Allied plans for the use of these forces in accordance with the sequence of military action set out in your letter of October 20.

/s/ Dean Rusk
Secretary of State

/s/ Robert S. McNamara
Secretary of Defense

END TEXT

END MESSAGE

Copy to:
General Taylor
Mr. Bundy

PAGE 8 OF 8

Record Number 57470

<u>SET</u>	Berlin Crisis
<u>BCI</u>	Yes
<u>DOCUMENT TYPE</u>	Cable
<u>DATE</u>	12/05/1961
<u>CIRCD</u>	
<u>TIME</u>	
<u>CABNO</u>	
<u>DOCNO</u>	
<u>ORIGIN</u>	United States. Office of the White House
<u>SIGNATOR</u>	Bundy, McGeorge
<u>DESTO</u>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization. European Command. Supreme Allied Commander
<u>DESTP</u>	
<u>DRAFT</u>	
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	Top Secret
<u>TITLE</u>	
<u>CTII</u>	[Text of Letter Signed by the President on Military Actions in a Berlin Conflict]
<u>NAMES</u>	Rusk, Dean
<u>NAMES</u>	McNamara, Robert S.
<u>NAMES</u>	Norstad, Lauris
<u>TERMS</u>	
<u>ORGN</u>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<u>ORGN</u>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
<u>PGS</u>	3

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION

PERMANENT

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Action

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Info

FROM: BONN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1385, DECEMBER 8, 6 PM

Control: 5219

Rec'd: DEC 8, 1961

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EYES ONLY

ACTION DEPARTMENT 1385, INFORMATION PARIS TOPOI 68.

EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY

EYES ONLY FINLETTER

POLTO 142.

Downgraded To: SECRET CONFIDENTIAL

EO 11652: XGDS (1) 2 (3) 4

Authorized By: H. D. Breaster

August 4, 1975

I HAD LONG TALK WITH STRAUSS LAST NIGHT IN WHICH HE BROUGHT UP NATO MRBM FORCE. HE CONFIRMED FEDREP NSC DECISION AGAINST BRINGING FORWARD GERMAN PLAN AT NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING NEXT WEEK. INSTEAD, HE WILL RAISE SUBJECT IN GENERAL TERMS AND PROPOSE THAT NAC INITIATE STUDY DURING COMING MONTHS OF ANY PROPOSALS WHICH MIGHT BE BROUGHT FORWARD. HE HOPES U.S. WILL APPROVE OF THIS APPROACH AND SUPPORT IT.

ALTHOUGH WE DID NOT GO INTO DETAIL, I GATHER THAT STRAUSS IS NOW THINKING OF NATIONAL CONTINGENTS TO BE PLACED DIRECTLY UNDER SACEUR (AND COMPLETELY REMOVED FROM NATIONAL COMMAND) WHICH WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY U.S. CUSTODIAL TEAMS FOR WARHEADS. THUS DECISION FOR USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD REST SOLELY WITH SACEUR -- AS NATO COMMANDER, NOT AS U.S. IN ANY EVENT, HE ASSURE ME HIS IDEA WAS TO DISCUSS GERMAN PROPOSALS BILATERALLY WITH U.S., ON MOST SECRET BASIS, AND IF U.S. APPROVAL OBTAINED, TO PRESENT TWO OR THREE ALTERNATIVES TO NAC EARLY NEXT YEAR IN ORDER TO GET DISCUSSIONS GOING. HE SAID HE WOULD HOPE TO HAVE PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION WITH SECRETARY MCNAMARA AT PARIS.

DOWLING

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 USIA/7-13
 217

QUADRIPARTITE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING
Paris, December 10-12, 1951

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

LEAD DISTRIBUTION

Date: December 11, 1951
 Time: 3:30 p.m.
 Place: Quai d'Orsay

DEPARTMENT OF STATE	IS/FFC/ODR	Date: 12/19/52
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() CIA Exemptions		CLASSIFY as () S or () C OADR
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Participants:

United States

Secretary Rusk
 Mr. Bohlen
 Mr. Kohler
 Mr. Hillenbrand

United Kingdom

Lord Home
 Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh
 Sir Anthony Rumbold
 Mr. Ledwidge

France

M. Couve de Murville
 Ambassador Alphand
 M. Lucet
 M. Laloy

Germany

Dr. Schroeder
 Mr. Carstens
 Ambassador Grewe
 Mr. Krapf

Subject: Berlin

Copies to:

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#1 - RM/R
 12/61

Lord Home began the discussion by stressing the problem which would be created in the NATO Council unless the Four could clear up their differences prior to Wednesday. He requested information on the de Gaulle-Adenauer talks. Couve asked Schroeder to assess the results. The latter said this was not easy since most of the time on Saturday was spent in private conversations and the Foreign Ministers had participated only in the formal discussion towards the end of the afternoon. He could say that agreement had been reached on basic objectives but not to the same degree on procedure. Chancellor and he had taken the position on negotiations of which the others were aware from the recent Adenauer visit to Washington. The French had presented a number of impressive arguments which he would prefer to leave to Couve.

Couve

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Couve said he wanted to begin from the beginning. The Berlin problem had been under discussion with the Soviets, directly or indirectly, for the past three years. This was not a question of the status of Berlin and the fate of its inhabitants, to the defense of which the three Western Powers were committed, but rather one vital to the future of Germany and therefore of Europe, including France, and important also to the UK and the US. It seemed to the French that the Soviets were moving not just to take Berlin but to change the entire situation in Central Europe and thus one step nearer their constant goal since the end of war of creating a satellite belt and neutralizing the rest of Europe.

This was why the French took the Berlin problem so seriously. Since the cutting of Berlin in two in August, the Soviet stress had been on these broader objectives. The pressure on East Germany caused by the refugee flow has greatly diminished. Hence, the Soviets could abandon the time limit for their peace treaty set for the end of the year. The Soviet offensive continued with growing emphasis on alleged German revanchism and with the Finnish action really aimed at Scandinavia. Moreover, in his talks with the Secretary in New York, Gromyko had linked Berlin to the all-German problems of security and boundaries.

The French recognized, Couve continued, that the essential problem of Europe would eventually have to be discussed with the Soviets in one way or another. They had had the illusion in May 1960 that this kind of discussion, including such related problems as disarmament, might take place. For various reasons the Summit had proved abortive. Nobody could exclude the possibility that such broad talks might be revived and the French were prepared for them, though they would not be easy. It was quite obvious that Berlin was not a question in itself for the Soviets but a means to an end, now that pressure to resolve the refugee problem has been eliminated. There was a tendency, he noted, to admit this might be true but then to argue that our business now was the threat to Berlin and that we must therefore offer the Soviets negotiations. The French position was that negotiations would neither be realistic nor useful. They would be unrealistic because they would not deal with the essence of the problem. He saw little prospect of a limited solution on Berlin. If the Soviet position on Berlin alone were taken -- that the Occupation is outmoded and should be replaced by the status of a free and neutralized city, that there would be no relations with the Federal Republic except those agreed between us, thus excluding political relationships, and that the Berlin garrisons must go or be reduced to symbolic status for a certain period with Soviet units added -- he could not see the West could gain any advantage. On access, the Soviets spoke both of freedom and also of respect for GDR sovereignty, and nobody knew precisely what the Soviets had in mind. Soviet demands were thus far from the position the West was prepared to discuss. In

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Formal negotiations with Soviets the two sides would thus start far apart. Either the West would not budge and negotiations would rapidly collapse, or the West would find a way to compromise the present situation and accept at least part of the Soviet program. Nobody could say where this would lead. Once negotiations had begun it would be difficult to take the responsibility for a breakdown, and he did not believe the Western Powers would do this. It was very well to say that the West must negotiate from a position near the status quo, but it was clear it would have to deviate from this if talks were to succeed. The French also feared that the Soviets would ask for all-German concessions, especially on the military side, and that the Western Powers would end up discussing proposals leading to that neutralization which the Soviets had in mind.

Couve said he knew the question which the others would put to the French was what alternative they had in mind. He noted that in the August and September Ministerial meetings he had defended the position that the Western Powers had to remain strong and unified. They should say that they would not discuss Berlin under Soviet blackmail and threat. The Soviets were not going to risk war over Berlin any more than we were, and the situation could therefore continue for a long time. Two things had happened in the seven months since Vienna: the splitting of Berlin and the lifting of the time limit for a peace treaty. He could not see from the experience of recent months how anything had been lost by not proposing negotiations. The situation was in fact a little less bad. The Soviets and the GDR were compelled to take the risks involved in splitting Berlin, risks not from the West but from the East Germans. The action taken would have had to come at some point. It had been prepared for a long time in advance like the Soviet nuclear tests.

To sum up, Couve stated the real problem was not Berlin but Germany as a whole, which meant Europe. A severe weakening of the Western position in the world would come from offering negotiations which were tantamount to offering a compromise on Berlin. What Khrushchev had said in his speech on Saturday confirmed the French position. He had derided the idea of a discussion limited to Berlin. The West should not fool itself. It could not improve the situation in Berlin but only make concessions. The only thing that mattered was the German question and this was the "real and only casus belli." In response to a request by the Secretary that he elaborate, Couve said that, when it finally came to a showdown, this would be the point on which the West must fight because its life would be at stake. In response to a further question by the Secretary, Couve said he was referring not to signature of the peace treaty but to a situation where the Soviets would demand German withdrawal from

NATO

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-4-

NATO and removal of nuclear weapons from Germany. This did not mean the Berlin situation was not dangerous. He was aware of Western contingency plans but he did not think it would ever come to that.

Lord Home said it was obviously correct to say that Communist strategy was to weaken the position of the Western world and democracy everywhere, but he did not think we could therefore argue that the West should never try to find areas of agreement with the Soviets or to negotiate on anything. Negotiations were already under way on Laos, nuclear tests, and would begin again on disarmament. The probability of success was another question. Couve was correct in putting Berlin in the context of Germany, Europe, and the entire world. This did not mean it could not be the subject of negotiations. There were compelling reasons for at least beginning them. It might well destroy German morale if negotiations on Berlin led to concessions which would damage Germany in the future, but the deterioration of Berlin as now proceeding could also affect Germany. In August he had argued that the chances of deterioration in Berlin were very real, and the experience since August indicates that the city might simply wither away. He did not see how West Berlin could have an effective life until the current situation of uncertainty was settled. Couve had said Khrushchev might do nothing, but the chances were he would make his peace treaty with the GDR, thus putting additional power in the hands of Ulbricht who had his own interests in nibbling away at West Berlin. This process would begin almost at once and lead inevitably to a loss of confidence in Berlin.

The reason for arriving at an agreement on negotiations in the next two days was that the NATO members regarded the military build-up and negotiations as complementary. They would be unwilling to continue their build-up of strength unless there were a prospect of negotiations. The situation might lead to a serious rift in the Alliance.

Couve had said that the Soviet and Western positions were far apart, Home continued, but this was likewise true of other matters about which the West was willing to negotiate with the Soviets, such as disarmament. How could the West tell whether the Soviets were willing to accept reasonable arrangements on access and the status of West Berlin without negotiations? The subject of Western rights could be left aside. The Soviets could say they were ended and the West could say they were continued. In addition, the Western Powers could say they were there because the West Berliners wanted them. As to contacts between the Federal Republic and Berlin, the Soviets had said they could accept economic and cultural ties. The question of political ties might involve giving up such items as Bundestag meetings and certain other

contacts

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-5-

contacts which the Federal Republic might find it possible to relinquish. As to contacts with the East Germans, many of these already existed between East and West Germans. It might be possible to find a formula to express these contacts. Thus the West would eventually be trading facts of life which already exist for some compensation from the Soviets.

As to the nature of negotiations, Home added, the Foreign Ministers might have a wide-ranging global agenda including Germany and Berlin, or they could begin on the narrowest possible basis. If Khrushchev said the latter meant GDR must be recognized, the matter could be referred to deputies. Another possibility was that the Western Ambassadors in Moscow could make further probes with Gromyko. He did not favor this since the Soviets would merely say the Ambassadors did not have enough authority to discuss solutions, and might themselves ask for a Foreign Ministers' meeting. Therefore, he now believed, the West should ask for a Foreign Ministers' meeting either to discuss world affairs, including Germany and Berlin, or to begin on a narrow basis with a broadening out only if compensation were obtained from the Soviets each time a larger question were discussed.

In response to the Secretary's query as to the circumstances under which French might consider a general discussion with the Soviets could profitably be held, Couve pointed to the period at the end of 1959 and beginning of 1960 when an atmosphere of detente was "generated." On this basis a Summit meeting had been agreed. He was not now pleading for a Summit meeting but for the idea that discussion with the Soviets should only be held in that kind of atmosphere if it should be possible one day to create this. This was different from discussions under the present circumstances of threat, blackmail and 100 megaton bombs. He did not see how the West could make any kind of dignified response to the last speech of Khrushchev which brought the situation back to July. Home said this depended on the kind of negotiations which the West obtained. It was better to have the situation stabilized than to have tension continue and Berlin run down.

Schroeder said he understood the French fears that once negotiations began the danger of broadening them to include Europe existed. The best way to diminish this danger was to enter negotiations with a firm Western agreement to keep to the narrowest possible basis. Many had said to the Federal Government that if negotiations had then been under way the events of August 13 would not have happened. This was perhaps incorrect but could not be refuted. The problem existed that, if in the foreseeable time no negotiations were launched offering reasonable prospects, the psychological deterioration in Berlin would increase and the city would disintegrate under the eyes of the West. This was the strongest reason in the German view for

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-6-

seeking negotiation. He also accepted the argument that continuation of the NATO build-up required negotiations. His government, therefore, supported negotiations on a narrow basis with as much agreement in advance as possible to avoid slippage during them.

Couve conceded that a great state of uncertainty existed in Berlin, with many planning to leave. This was almost inevitable in the circumstances, but he did not see how negotiations ending in failure with a big crisis, or in agreement on a change of status of the city would hearten the Berliners and keep them there. Speaking of the Western substantive position, he continued, the Working Group paper contained an ambiguity on the status of Berlin in saying that the source of rights would be maintained. What would be the legal authority of the so-called Occupation powers, who at present are sovereign and on this basis in 1949 opposed certain articles of the Basic Law? In the final analysis Berlin morale depended on the Western guarantee. Any acceptance of the new status which Soviets want would make Berlin morale disappear. This, in his view, was more important than the garrisons themselves. He did not say the occupation could be maintained forever, but it was the essence of the problem.

Home said that, from the viewpoint of West Berliners, if agreement on access underwritten by the West and the Soviets could be obtained, and attached to their peace treaty, this would be an improvement if the occupation status were not dropped on our side. The Soviets could say it was dead, but we could claim it remained. He wondered whether Couve would agree to a Foreign Ministers' meeting with a world-wide agenda which admittedly would quickly get to Berlin but might put the Soviets in a defensive position. Perhaps some compromise between the German and French positions on broad and narrow negotiations might thus be found, or there might be a series of meetings of Foreign Ministers. Couve said his concern was not the question of a broad or narrow agenda but that any negotiation, unless broken off (which the West would not accept the responsibility for), would lead to concessions the Soviet counterparts for which he did not see.

Home said that Gromyko in the New York talks had stressed recognition of the GDR. We could not accept this, but perhaps could use some formula which the GDR might find satisfactory. Gromyko was interested in frontiers. He did not want to say much about this now but he wondered why, in the same way as de Gaulle had previously put it, the Western Powers could not link a commitment on frontiers to eventual reunification, whether or not the Germans felt they could say something on the subject themselves. Such items dealt with the facts of life and did not concede anything if the West obtained an

access

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access arrangement which would help Berlin and West German morale. Couve observed that he saw nothing which the other side was willing to give which would be in the Western favor or provide assurance for the future. Facts of life on the Western side were that the Federal Republic is part of the West and a member of NATO and that West Berlin is also a part of the West, but the Soviets did not accept these facts. There must be a balance in acceptance of the facts of life, and the right of the Federal Republic and West Berlin to remain in the West must be the basis of any modus vivendi. He commented that these were facts of life to which the West would stick through thick and thin. Other facts were also access and freedom of the city. He did not see how the facts of life as the basis of a deal made by the West need put us at a disadvantage.

The Secretary said he thought the Western world was confronted with a crisis in its contest against the Sino-Soviet Bloc of historical proportions. The Communists have made clear that they are serious about world revolution and will press for it where they can. In this sense we will be under pressure for a decade or longer and they from us. We will be exchanging threats and taking action against each other, and there will be periods of greater and lesser tension. Tensions will be reduced prior to negotiations and increased if negotiations fail. A serious problem which the Ministers had to think about was whether a lack of mutual confidence did not exist among themselves. To what extent were their problems not in regard to the Soviet Union but due to a lack of mutual confidence as to intentions and willingness and ability to work together? There was a crisis of the Alliance. He had thought the Western Powers were agreed that their basic position in West Berlin was a vital one, which, if challenged, would be a casus belli. If this were not agreed, we must find it out. The US position started with this premise. We did not look upon negotiations as involving a compromise giving away what otherwise would be a casus belli. We estimate, but do not know for sure, that the Soviets will not wage nuclear war over Berlin, but we could not assume that the Soviets would not risk war over Berlin. The Soviets may very well risk war over Berlin and he had assumed we would likewise. One of the quickest ways to have a nuclear war is to have the two sides persuaded that neither will fight. Precisely because a casus belli is involved in this situation it would be irresponsible for governments that have nuclear weapons under their control not to be in contact with each other even up to the last few seconds before the holocaust. If the West did not come away from these meetings with genuine unity the Soviets will indeed erode our position and the unity of the Alliance is unlikely to be repaired subsequently. He did not equate negotiations with surrender or concessions, the Secretary continued. In a certain sense the status quo is not negotiable and in an equal sense the Soviet proposals not negotiable. To negotiate with the Soviets and to fail to reach agreement would still leave

the status

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-8-

the status quo which could not be disturbed without war. The fact of negotiations does not commit the West to yield vital aspects of its position. The Western Powers had talked about Solution C. Perhaps there might be some way, in the face of important disagreements, to find a modus vivendi to avoid war. On the question of broad or narrow approach to opening negotiations, we have no strong or complete commitment but would be glad to work with our Allies to obtain a common view. We would be willing to start with narrow position, recognizing that the Soviets will almost inevitably raise broader questions. He wondered, the Secretary repeated, whether the difficulty was with the Soviets or lack of confidence in each other. When security questions arose in his talks with Gromyko, rumors regarding US disengagement intentions began to spread, although he had specifically told Gromyko this was not involved. We were willing to consider the wide-ranging negotiations Home had suggested, including, for example, Communist penetration of Southeast Asia, nuclear weapons, disarmament, and Germany and Berlin. Perhaps such a broad review by Foreign Ministers would be worthwhile. We had thought we could come to quicker agreement by starting on a narrow basis. We also agreed the Soviets could not try to sell us the same horse over and over again. The Jessup-Malik agreement in 1949 had recognized Western rights in Berlin without Western concessions. The situation had changed since then, but with great seriousness he wanted to point out that, apart from the need to keep in responsible contact with the Soviets on more dangerous subjects, we faced the problem of leading the West to maintain its strength and to unify its policies so as to deal effectively both with the Berlin situation and the broader long-run conflict with the Sino-Soviet bloc. He was quite sure that we could not call upon our own people to make a substantially increased effort and to face a great crisis if the impression were given that we were diplomatically sitting on our hands and not trying to find out what the alternatives were. This was also true of the Alliance as a whole which was being asked for extra effort.

He did not want to claim that much was achieved by the Rusk-Gromyko talks but several points emerged: a) Gromyko understood clearly there would be no GDR recognition and appeared to accept this. Their discussion of alternative proposals was based on such an understanding. This discussion was not satisfactory but Gromyko understood there would be no de facto or de jure recognition. b) Gromyko recognized that we are not going to talk with the East Germans but that any arrangement must be between Moscow and the West and the Soviets would impose it upon the GDR. c) The situation was helped by removal of the deadline. Whether or not the talks accomplished this, they did give the Soviets a pretext to explain their postponement of the year-end date. These items were procedural in character, and he must say that on the substance of their free city proposals the Soviet position had not changed. The Soviets know we will not accept their troops in West Berlin

or interruption

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-9-

or interruption of access. Our problem here is to get Western agreement on a position, then to establish responsible contact with the Soviets to avoid getting beyond the point where governments could lose control of the situation.

[Horne said he agreed with the points made by the Secretary regarding Russian understanding of the non-negotiable aspects of the Western position. He did not think negotiations necessarily had to collapse or involve major concessions. The West might get something satisfactory out of them. Referring to Couve's citation of Khrushchev, the Secretary said he frankly wondered whether an impartial umpire, examining both recent Soviet and US statements on nuclear strength, particularly our capacity to destroy the Soviets even after a first strike against us, could decide who was being the most threatening.

[Couve said he wanted to explain that as to the casus belli the French were in basic agreement with the US. The reason for any confusion was that the French did not think it very likely that the Soviets would go to war on Berlin. If it came to that, it would come to that. It was true to say that France did not want to go to war, and when he said the real casus belli is the future of Germany, that is where our real vital interests lie. He could agree that Berlin was where the Soviets had to be stopped, for this was a question of West Germany. The danger of negotiations is to be drawn into concessions, or if negotiations collapse, the situation would become worse than ever since there would be no further recourse. The Secretary argued that, if we did not talk, our position would be weakened, since we would be seeming to let the crisis develop without clarifying before the world our respective positions. Pressures would build up which, bit by bit, would tend to break up the Alliance. Trying to get Allied agreement on contingency plans has proved difficult enough. Soviet salami tactics would further strain allied unity. If we engage the other side in discussions and explain our position, then we can better maintain unity among us.

[In response to a query from the Secretary, which he at first did not completely understand, Schroeder strongly maintained that neutralization is the last thing in the world the Germans want. The Federal Republic started from the viewpoint that it was permanently an integral part of the Western Alliance. This was the consistent policy of present and previous governments. The German attitude on negotiations had nothing to do with any fear that they would lead Germany away from the West which was the known Soviet goal. He indicated that, in revising the official government policy statement, he had in several places stricken the word "neutralization" and substituted "isolation." It was true, of course, that certain proposals in the military field were believed to have a tendency to lead towards neutralization.

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As to Home's remarks on the Oder-Weisse line, he added, these did not belong in this context. The occupying powers were bound by their 1954 agreements with the Federal Republic to discuss this question only with an all-German Government. The Secretary commented that the Soviets had as objective just as much splitting off the US from the rest of Europe as the neutralization of Europe. The decision on these matters is clearly in our hands.

Home said he was glad that Schroeder had made such a strong point on neutralization and he hoped that this would remove one of Couve's fears. He wanted to reiterate again that the four must have agreed proposals to put to the NATO Ministerial Council on Wednesday along with a clear idea of what they hoped to get out of NATO. Otherwise, the Alliance would appear in a state of disarray.

MJHillebrand:allint

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Approved in S - 12/13/61

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US/MC/10

QUADRIPARTITE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING
Paris, December 10-12, 1961

21

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: December 12, 1961
Time: 4:15 p.m.
Place: Quai d'Orsay

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

Participants:

Germans:

Foreign Minister Schroeder
State Secretary Carstens
Ambassador Grewe
Minister Krapf
Mr. Kusterer (Interpreter)

British:

Lord Home
Sir Pierson Dixon
Sir E. Shuckburgh
Mr. W. B. J. Ledwidge

French:

Couve de Murville
Ambassador Alphand
M. Lucet
M. Laloy
M. Mayer (Interpreter)

US

The Secretary of State
Assistant Secretary Kohler
Ambassador Bohlen
Mr. Bercival

Subject: Berlin and Germany

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	S/O	L	USUN	" Paris for Stoessel	

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville opened the third quadripartite Foreign Ministers' meeting on Berlin and Germany with his apologies for being late to the afternoon meeting. He stated that the French Government did not believe it would be good to accept a statement of some kind or another of willingness to negotiate with the Soviets. Especially in view of recent Soviet statements, i.e. Khrushchev statements before the WFTU and Ambassador Menshikov's speech in Washington on December 11, 1961, the French Government

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felt that a readiness to negotiate would be interpreted by the Soviets as a sign of Western weakness. He repeated that the French Government was not opposed to Ambassadorial soundings being made in Moscow by one or several Ambassadors. The French, however, did not believe it would be good to state this willingness publicly or have it endorsed by the NATO Council. Such a statement of one kind or another would merely indicate a weakness in the Western position, he repeated.

Lord Home said he would like to pose a question. He believed that Couve had said he did not object to soundings by one or several Ambassadors in Moscow. He wondered whether this statement meant that the French Ambassador in Moscow would be ready to take part in such soundings.

Couve replied that he had not said that the French Ambassador would take part in such soundings. The French Ambassador in Moscow was always in touch with the Soviet Government but he would not now participate in the soundings which were under discussion. By the phrase "one or several Ambassadors", he had meant that soundings could be undertaken by the American Ambassador or by the American Ambassador and the British Ambassador. It was his impression that the British would like to be associated with the American Ambassador's efforts as had been the case in New York with the Rusk-Gromyko talks.

Lord Home commented that Couve's position posed great difficulties for the four powers. He observed that the French indicated a willingness to see exploratory talks take place but it was difficult to understand why the French Ambassador should not take his share in these talks since the three powers were partners in the same alliance system and had similar responsibilities concerning Berlin.

Couve replied there was a very simple reason. The Soviet position was very clear to the French and had been made more so by the recent Soviet statements to which he had earlier referred. Therefore, the French saw no reason for the exploratory talks to take place.

At this point the Secretary asked for a fifteen-minute recess.

After the recess, Lord Home stated that he was very worried indeed. The French were taking the position that exploratory talks might weaken the Western position vis-a-vis the Soviets but it was a fact that within 24 hours the four Foreign Ministers would have to appear before the NATO Council without any position whatsoever with respect to negotiations. The NATO countries, however, insist upon negotiations and the differences which exist would become publicly known. If there were to be Western contacts with the Soviets, they should be based on an agreed Western position. Otherwise the West would be in a terribly weak position. The Soviets

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- 3 -

would take advantage of this situation to sow confusion in the NATO alliance which was undoubtedly one of their principal objectives. He asked whether the introduction of the adjective "exploratory" before the phrase "diplomatic talks" in the formula under discussion would help the French.

The Secretary observed that the four Western powers seemed to be in a very grave position. The US had tried to explain why it believed it was necessary to make an approach to the Soviets to ascertain whether there was a possibility of negotiations due to the potentially grave threat to the peace which the Berlin situation posed. The US had no illusions or false hopes concerning the course of such negotiations which would not be easy. The US was not prepared to make concessions to the Soviets which might be regarded as unacceptable by the US and its allies. At the same time, the US saw the possibility that the crisis might become so acute as to lead a nuclear war. In such a situation, it was imperative to have the complete support of and unity of views within the NATO alliance. He was obliged to wonder whether there is in fact an alliance. When there are overwhelming necessities in dealing with a given and specific situation and this feeling is completely shared by the alliance, the US feels that each member country should overcome its marginal doubts about a particular move so that the alliance can take unified action. He said he was appalled at the possibility of what might happen if the Foreign Ministers left this and the NATO ministerial meetings in obvious disarray. The Secretary asked how the French Government foresaw the most probable course of events if the four Foreign Ministers adopted the view that: there should be no negotiations with the Soviet Union, no exploratory talks with the Soviet Union, and no contacts with the Soviet Union on an agreed Western basis.

Couve responded that the Secretary had mentioned two matters: the Alliance and its attitudes and what should be the appropriate course of action now taken by the four Western powers. As to the first, he did not doubt that most of his NATO colleagues yearn for negotiations. It was quite evident that a majority of the NATO countries desired negotiations with the Soviets over Berlin. I think, he said, that France and the United States are very much in agreement on the substance of their position. He did not think that the US had decided to or envisaged making any concessions, even on the status of Berlin, which would endanger Berlin. The French -- US difference was on tactics. I would not, however, he said, say the same thing for all the NATO countries, for many of them at the bottom of their hearts do not share our view of what must be maintained in Berlin. One of the differences is in assessing the importance of NATO country attitudes. Concerning the second matter, he said the problem was that should be the Western course of action. The answer to this mainly depended on the Western estimate of Soviet intentions. He doubted that the Soviets would

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[take a major risk over Berlin. He said the Soviets wished to obtain their objectives by frightening the West. They have already removed their time limit on signing a separate peace treaty. While he did not know the future, he doubted that there was a great risk to be run and that the Soviets would lead the West to war. He asserted that if the West takes no action, the Soviets will be embarrassed and not know what step to take next.

When the Secretary commented that if this was the case, both sides would be in an equal position, Couve replied that this might be the case. Nevertheless, it was the Soviets, not the West, who wished to make changes with respect to Berlin.

Lord Home observed that he did not believe that the NATO nations want negotiations for negotiations' sake. NATO did not favor the "sacrifice" of Berlin. If the NATO nations, however, are to make the sacrifices and great efforts needed to face the Soviet challenge over Berlin and possibly be asked for more sacrifices, then they must be satisfied that every avenue be explored with the Soviets. He wondered if the Foreign Ministers could not agree at least to exploratory talks being undertaken with the Soviet Union so that there would be some position to present to the NATO Council.

Couve replied that all thinking about the situation returned to the same basic thought. What was important to the Foreign Ministers, in his view, was not what the NATO Council might think but what the Soviet Union thinks and intends. He opined that if the West showed a willingness for or a desire for negotiations at a time when the Soviets are acting as they recently have, the Soviets will believe the West is both frightened and weak and is, therefore, requesting negotiations. Even an outsider, he said, would then judge that NATO had demonstrated its weakness in the face of Soviet threats.

Lord Home countered that it was clear what the Soviets would think about NATO if the four Western powers could not even talk about exploratory talks with the Soviets. In such a situation the NATO countries would publicly demand negotiations. He could not understand why, if the French did not object to exploratory talks, they did object to exploratory talks on the basis of agreed positions. He noted that the formula considered in the morning merely called for contacts with the Soviets. He wondered if the Foreign Ministers could not take the position that recent Soviet statements indicating that Khrushchev showed no current interest in serious negotiations but that if Gromyko wished serious negotiations, the Western Ambassadors in Moscow would always be available to receive any initiative Gromyko might wish to make. Thereby, the onus for further initiatives could be put on the Soviets.

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- 5 -

The Secretary stated he could not accept this concept, for important and vital interests were involved. He was not certain that all the governments participating in the consultation with respect to Berlin and Germany were aware that war might result from the current situation. There was a basic casus belli involved in the situation. The American people, he said, would only go to war with good consciences. They would wish to believe that they were fighting for a just and honorable purpose. He would prefer not to take up Lord Home's concept since the West could not leave to the Soviets alone the decision as to whether or not anything more should be said concerning the problem of Berlin and Germany.

Lord Home replied that he was not particularly taken with his own idea which he had merely advanced in the hope that it might be something with which the French could agree.

Foreign Minister Schroeder stated that he had two particular comments to make. He wanted to emphasize that the German delegation had just learned about the Menshikov speech in Washington during the course of the morning. He had not had an opportunity to read a complete text of what Menshikov had said. From the press accounts, however, he could only conclude that Menshikov had repeated most of the ideas contained in the Soviet November 1958 note with certain minor differences with respect to military matters. Menshikov had also rejected the idea of an international access guarantee. Most of the statements which the Soviets make, in his opinion, seem to repeat the demands of 1958. At the same time, the Soviets are faced with a similarly clear purpose and firm Western position which has rejected most of the Soviet argumentation. There is a great gulf between the positions of the two sides. But nothing obliges the West to believe that it does not have some chance to bring about a shift in the Soviet position which was the purpose of the formula suggested during the morning session. What the West wishes to explore is the possibility of reducing Soviet demands. In his opinion, the West should proceed with further exploratory talks without illusions towards goals on which the West is united. The West was agreed on objectives. The current principal difference was on tactics. If the West is to engage in exploratory conversations with the Soviets, it should be done on the basis of a unified agreed NATO supported position, for only in this manner would the Western effort be impressive to the Soviets. If the Western position was not solid and unified, the Soviets would exploit Western differences. In his opinion, unity of purpose and unity of objectives would be supported and clearly demonstrated if there were procedural unity. The procedure suggested in the formula involved no commitments. Equally decisive was the fact that diplomatic efforts had to be accompanied by the NATO military build-up. He agreed with Secretary Rusk that public acceptance and support were required.

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- 6 -

Not only for the military build-up but also for the Western position in general, and that Western public opinion would not be satisfied unless it was certain that the Western governments had fully explored the Soviet position. He did not believe that the procedure suggested was harmful even though the French argued that it was due to the two recent Soviet statements. What was more harmful was that if the West seemed in a state of confusion the Soviets would try to cause more trouble. He opined that the Soviets interpreted unified Western action as a sign of Western strength and thought that it represented an effort on the West's part to nail them down in an effort to come to a solution of the Berlin problem. Therefore he believed that the Foreign Ministers should agree to further exploratory talks with the Soviets to see if a real basis for negotiations might exist.

Couve responded by asking whether anyone thought that, exposed to the current trial of strength, the best reply to the Soviets was an expression of willingness to negotiate. He thought that Western display of anxiety to negotiate would be interpreted by the Soviets as a sign of weakness and as a sign of Western sensitivity to Soviet intimidation. The best response, in his opinion, to Soviet tactics was to say that if the Soviets behaved badly, there would be no negotiations.

Foreign Minister Schroeder reiterated that in his opinion the recent Soviet statements were largely repetitive of previous positions. One of the difficulties is that the Soviets keep publicly answering public statements by Western leaders and thus restrict the area of negotiating flexibility. In his view, it was necessary to let the Soviets know that we could not accept their contentions but that we were willing on the diplomatic level, not in the public arena, to see if there was not some real basis for a negotiated settlement. In some circumstances he might agreed with Couve's views but there were two important factors to be borne in mind. In the first place, the Soviet Union was in a position to create changes with respect to Berlin to the West's disadvantage. Either we responded to Soviet salami tactics with protests only or the West had to react more strongly to Soviet moves which might require serious military actions. Serious military steps, however, could not be taken until public opinion was convinced that there was a necessity for such action and was convinced that it was necessary for the West to stand and fight if need be. One cannot, he said, always wait for what appears to be a more propitious time for conversation. The enemy was materially and psychologically in a position to exert strong pressure on the West. He felt it was essential to explore the Soviet position further before the Western area of maneuverability and flexibility was again narrowed.

The Secretary observed that if the Soviets in two different recent speeches on two different days had prevented the West from moving forward together in unity, then these speeches would be

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two of the most fantastically productive speeches ever made. In a certain sense what the four countries thought was of a major importance was of major significance because of their responsibilities. But it was also important that the NATO alliance display unity. Other countries of the alliance also had their vital interests. An appearance of complete NATO disagreement would make Khrushchev more bold. If he were convinced there was no NATO unity and agreement on how to deal with the Berlin crisis, he might gain the impression that the Western Alliance was gravely weakened. This might seriously increase the dangers of miscalculation on his part. In all frankness and good will, he felt obliged to say that he had thought the four Western powers were agreed on the substance of their position. He had to confess, however, that if the most minimum move to develop the substance of the Soviet position was rejected, the U.S. would have to review the whole situation to see if it and its allies were in fact agreed on substance. It would appear that review would be necessary to ascertain whether all four powers had the same objectives. Maybe, he said, Khrushchev is trying to prevent negotiations and will go ahead and sign his separate peace treaty and thus initiate a grave crisis. On the other hand, he may let his threatening campaign peter out. In any case, large risks are involved which must be clarified. The Secretary stated that it would be helpful to him for the four Foreign Ministers to speak alone in private for he was obliged to report to the President and he wanted to clearly understand the French position. After this conversation, he thought it would be possible for the Ministers to determine what might be said in the NATO Council and what should be said to the Press.

Lord Home supported the Secretary's request. He stated that the possibilities of an understanding should be thoroughly exhausted for otherwise "disaster stares us in the face".

A private meeting followed in which the Foreign Ministers agreed to meet again at 9:45 pm, December 12, 1961.

CLASSIFICATION

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Approved in S-
12-13-61

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QUADRIPARTITE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING
Paris, December 10-12, 1961

22

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

Date: December 12, 1961
Time: 2:15 P.M.
Place: American Chancery

PARTICIPANTS: Governing Mayor Brandt of Berlin

Dr. Klein

Dr. Lemmer

Dr. Bahr

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FPC/CDR

Date: 3/7/92

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IN PART

The Secretary ☐ DELETE Non-Responsive Info

Mr. Kohler

FOIA Exemptions

Mr. Hillenbrand

Exemptions

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Subject: Berlin

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#1 - RM/R
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The Secretary began by extending his condolences on the death yesterday of Senator Lipschitz. He then said he knew that sometimes the line to Berlin seemed a long one from Washington, and that he would be glad to try to answer any questions the Governing Mayor might have.

Brandt said that the most important political and psychological question for the Berliners was the relationship of the City to the Federal Republic. He did not know what the Western position was since he had not yet seen Foreign Minister Schröder. However, there were reports of proposals for changes in the status of West Berlin which had caused fears. Any transformation of the City into an isolated area with only weak links to the Federal Republic would destroy confidence in the future. The Secretary said that, as a matter of international law, West Berlin was under tripartite occupation. This had led to the suspension of inconsistent articles of the Basic Law in 1949. Thus Berlin was not a part of the Federal Republic under international law. It was essential to maintain occupation rights as a basis for access rights. The Federal Republic and Berlin could not provide such a basis between them for access rights. Thus the status of the City was intimately linked to access. We recognized that the ties between West Berlin and the Federal Republic

were of

were of utmost importance and we did not wish to disavow them. The word "contract" had crept into discussions. We did not have in mind that the Federal Republic and Berlin should sit down to negotiate a contract. We would maintain as against the Soviets that West Berlin must have the right to work out its own arrangements with the rest of the world, including the Federal Republic. Many of these arrangements already existed. From an international law point of view these ties rest on consent. We are not suggesting that the constitution of the Federal Republic be changed as long as our position is not affected, but vis-a-vis the Soviets we feel that the Occupation status of the City must continue as basis of access rights. Moreover, the Secretary continued, from the point of view of the US people, there was another factor. We had an absolute commitment to the security of West Berlin which was a casus belli all the way to the use of nuclear weapons if necessary. This was a complete commitment. It was easier to justify this as something we had undertaken on our own responsibility rather than as part of a NATO force. We would, therefore, sustain and protect the relationships between Berlin and the Federal Republic, but not on the basis of the Federal Republic's constitutional position.

Brandt pointed out that, even if one could not accept the legal concept of the Federal Republic, many legal and formal links between the two had been established with the consent of the three Occupation Powers, sometimes even at their request. West Berlin should not be regarded as an area with no obligations towards the West German State. The Secretary noted that there might be a difference in what we would say to the Soviets and to the Germans. If the Soviets take the position that East Berlin is not to be discussed, we could respond by saying they have no interest in West Berlin. We want to protect our position with respect to the Soviets. We recognize that intimate links have grown up between Berlin and the Federal Republic and that they are vital to the City. However, we could not expect to translate these into de jure links in any formal agreement with the Soviets.

Brandt said it might strengthen Western tactics if, on certain points, the Western Powers told the Soviets that they also had to take account of the commitments and agreements which they had with their Allies in West Germany and Berlin. The Secretary said he thought it would, in fact, work out this way. Brandt commented that the idea of a new contractual agreement could cause difficulties if the Soviets regarded themselves as silent partners. The Secretary said that, while the relations between the two were not constitutional relations, the Federal Republic and Berlin had links based on the mutual consent of the two. We had to be careful in dealing with the Soviets not to give them a chance to attack our access rights because of such an alleged constitutional relationship. In confidence, the Secretary continued, he wanted to tell Brandt that we wished to reserve the right to put to the Soviets, under certain circumstances, the possibility of making West Berlin the Eleventh Land of the Federal Republic by removing our suspension of the pertinent articles of the Basic Law.

Brandt

Brandt asked whether the US would demand certain changes in the present situation in Berlin, e.g., removal of the wall. The Secretary said we would put forward an All-Berlin proposal which would cover restoration of free movement in Berlin, but we could not have very much hope that it would be accepted. Brandt agreed with this estimate but thought that it might be possible to get some additional movement between the parts of the City.

In response to the Secretary's inquiry as to whether the Mayor had any doubt as to the US commitment on Berlin, Brandt said he had none but that there were many people in the Federal Republic who had such doubts. He had made this point in a recent memorandum to the Chancellor and to party leaders in Bonn. The Chancellor himself had not been convinced before his visit to Washington. He had returned convinced and perhaps even a little frightened at the extent of the American commitment. Brandt said he also had the impression that the US was now somewhat more convinced that responsible German leaders were prepared to play their part in this serious commitment. The Secretary agreed that some of our doubts had been removed. He also thought that the point had been clarified in Khrushchev's mind, despite his speech on Saturday which did not change much. Khrushchev was perhaps not in the position of strength he had thought he was some eight or nine months ago. Brandt wondered whether he might not come to the same conclusion about his small chances of success in negotiations, as he apparently had prior to his breaking up the Summit meeting in 1960. The Secretary noted that, if the present situation merely dragged on and the Soviets turned over more and more of their responsibilities to the East Germans, this would be followed by a series of erosions. If so, he thought, we should try to pin the Soviets down specifically soon rather than just sit.

In response to Brandt's query as to the talks with Gromyko in New York, the Secretary said that the results had been essentially procedural: (a) the Soviets were aware that we would not recognize the GDR; (b) they were aware we would not negotiate with the GDR on access to West Berlin and that the Soviets would have to take care of any arrangements with us with the GDR; (c) removal of the deadline.

Brandt commented that, in an interview less than two weeks ago, CBS Correspondent Daniel Schorr had asked Ulbricht regarding the peace treaty. The latter had said he was convinced the GDR would get it in 1962 but did not specify when, and in general did not give a very clear impression. On the substantive side, the Secretary continued, Gromyko made no concessions but a certain clarification had been achieved such as his knowing we would not accept the Soviets in West Berlin.

In response to the Secretary's question, Brandt indicated that there had not been much recent discussion in Berlin about a UN role in the City. The Mayor said he had never believed in moving the UN headquarters there, and considered this unrealistic. However, UN agencies would be welcome

In Berlin,

in Berlin, although he was not "too enthusiastic" about the idea of replacing German agencies with UN agencies. The Secretary commented that he likewise did not believe in moving the UN headquarters to Berlin. This was both a matter of national interest and principle. However, movement of certain UN agencies there was another matter. Before his death, Dag Hammarskjöld had expressed the view that the ECCE might be moved there from Geneva.

Revising the current economic situation in Berlin, Brandt said it was better than people thought it would be under the circumstances. Production was increasing despite the heavy manpower losses incurred through the cutting in two of the City. There had been some out-flow of capital to West Germany, but the trend had begun to stabilize early in October and things were now as good as they could be. There was still some movement of people out but people were also starting to come in again. He did not want Berlin to turn into a ghetto and favored free movement of people in and out. Progress was being made on the project to establish West Berlin as a world educational and cultural center, and the efforts of the Federal Republic in this area were being concentrated in West Berlin. The City Government had set up a planning group, with representatives from business, government, trade unions and the universities to assist in this work. He had been fortunate in obtaining the services of Professor Schilling to replace the recently deceased Senator Hertz as Senator for Economics.

The Secretary asked what the other vulnerabilities of West Berlin would be if there were no military action against the City and present access could be maintained. Brandt said these were really negligible. The only weak spot was sewage disposal which is still handled by a common all-Berlin system. If this were disrupted, conditions in West Berlin would be very bad. The City would be forced to dump its sewage into the lake and canal system. This would, however, also badly affect the surrounding GDR areas. Hence there was a strong common interest in maintenance of the present sewage disposal system. As far as water, gas, electricity, and city transport were concerned, West Berlin was self-sufficient. As a matter of fact, Brandt continued, he was convinced that the Berliners could carry on during a certain period of blockade if there were trouble with access.

Brandt explained the various efforts being made to achieve at least a certain measure of movement over the sector boundaries in humane cases. The SED had so far refused permission for family visits over Christmas, but there were indications that General Watson's approach to the Soviet Commandant on this subject had been reported back to Moscow. Brandt favored discussion of this general subject in its broader terms at the Four-Power level to be followed by recommendations to the Germans to take care of the details.

In conclusion, the Secretary returned to the point that Khrushchev also has his worries - not only about the conditions in the Bloc but also in connection with the basic power situation between the Soviet Union and the US. He had been surprised and angered but impressed by the President's speech of July. He did not expect a victorious US reaction to his threats.

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Revised on 5 - 12/15/61

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QUADIPARTITE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING

Paris, December 10-12, 1961

E105

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

Date: December 12, 1961
Time: 9:45 p.m.
Place: Quai d'Orsay

Participants:

United States:

The Secretary
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Hillenbrand
Mr. Cash

British:

Lord Home
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh
Sir Pierson Dixon
Mr. Ledwidge
Mr. Killick

French:

M. Couve de Murville
M. Lucet
M. Laloy
M. Froment-Meurice
M. de Beaumarchais

Germans:

Dr. Gerhard Schroeder
Dr. Carstens
Mr. Krapf
Ambassador Grewe

Subject: Berlin

#1 - RMIR 1/2

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G	RA-2	Ambassador PARIS	US Mission BERLIN
		for USRO	USIN

The following text which had emerged from a telephone conversation earlier in the evening between the President and President de Gaulle was circulated:

"The NATO Council approves the proposal according to which diplomatic contacts with the Soviet Union would be undertaken to pursue the aims which the West is following to preserve the peace of the world. The Council hopes that these contacts may serve to determine whether a basis might be found for negotiations."

In response

SECRET

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Date: 3/6/02

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In response to a query from the Secretary as to whether the French now accepted the idea that the Ambassadorial Group would agree on the line to be advanced through these diplomatic contacts, Couve said this was not part of the agreement as he understood it. He further explained that the contacts would not be established in common. This had not been approved. The French stood where they were in September when the first diplomatic contacts were made by the Secretary.

Lord Home queried whether, if the text were adopted by NATO as part of its communique, the Four would all subscribe to it. He assumed the French diplomatic move would not be ruled out if this were thought to be a good thing. Couve agreed but indicated the French could say in advance they were not going to make any diplomatic move. In response to the Secretary's question as to how a query in the NAC as to who would undertake diplomatic contacts could be answered, Couve responded that it would be better if the Americans said we would than if the French said we would not. That would satisfy everybody. The Secretary indicated it would not satisfy us unless there were quadripartite participation in the contacts, that is, to provide a basis for an agreed position of the Four Western Powers.

Lord Home said he assumed the Four would all continue to prepare the materials together for the individual who would undertake diplomatic contacts. Couve commented that the Ministers always come back to the distinction between diplomatic contacts by all or by one or the other. Lord Home observed that if the contacts were to be by one or the other it was all the more important that preparation therefor be agreed between the Four. Couve said that this would amount to diplomatic contacts in common.

In response to the Secretary's query as to whether France would vote for or against the text in the NAC tomorrow, Couve said they would vote for. This meant only that there were going to be diplomatic contacts, the aim of which would be to ascertain whether there was any basis for negotiations. The Secretary said the question arose whether the person undertaking diplomatic contacts would be acting on the basis of an agreed Four-Power position or mediating between Moscow and Paris. Couve commented that this was not the way to put the question. The difficulties will be in Moscow. Lord Home said his difficulty was that if the Four wanted support in NATO, there had to be some commitment, but there was no French commitment to participate or even to prepare a position. The person undertaking the explorations in Moscow must have an agreed position on certain things such as the question of contacts with the GDR. The Secretary asked whether if we say we will undertake diplomatic contacts, but only on the basis of the positions prepared in the Ambassadorial Group, the French would continue to participate in the Ambassadorial Group. Couve said they would continue to participate, but it would be a different matter if it were said that the contacts were undertaken on behalf of all the Governments. This was the basic question which the Foreign Ministers had been turning around and around since yesterday.

At this point the Minister went into private conversation.

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QUADRIPARTITE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING
Paris, December 10-12, 1961

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Approved in S -
12/13/61

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

UNCLASSIFIED

Date: December 12, 1961
Time: 6:30 pm
Place: American Chancery

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

Participants:

United States

The Secretary
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Brown
Mr. Stabler
(interpreter)

Italy

Foreign Minister Segni
Ambassador Cattani
Ambassador Brosio
Minister Sensi
Mr. D'Andrea
(interpreter)

Subject: Berlin

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The Secretary said that for the past two days the four Foreign Ministers have been discussing only one subject: whether there can be further exploratory talks to find out if there is a basis for negotiations with the Soviet Union. They will meet again this evening on the same subject. The problem is de Gaulle's opposition to exploration.

We Americans, he continued, believe we are utterly committed to the defense of West Berlin including the possibility of nuclear war. We must maintain responsible contact with the Soviet Union even until the last moment. It is the responsibility of the responsible powers to be joined into such contact. We can not tolerate being placed in a position where we maintain contact while our flanks are exposed to the attack of friends. This issue is fundamental in the alliance. The force and power of the United States is not for use as gendarmes at the whim of any member of the alliance. Perhaps

the situation

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Perhaps the situation will change overnight but we are not optimistic. The success or failure of the alliance may be determined within the next 12 hours. If Italy has any influence to bear it is our hope it will use it.

The Foreign Minister said Italy believes in taking soundings leading to negotiations. He has so told the Parliament and will so say here in NATO. The general public must be shown that all has been done to avoid catastrophe.

The Secretary said that this is important. We are not optimistic about the outcome of negotiations but the exploration must take place.

The Foreign Minister agreed. The Secretary said that since the talks with Gromyko we have withheld contacts with the Soviets to take into account the views of de Gaulle. We can not do this indefinitely. The responsibilities which rest on the President of the United States are too heavy. He is the only leader on the western side who can decide if we are to end up in nuclear war. Without appearing presumptuous we think that if he feels he needs some particular diplomatic move in connection with his responsibilities then the allies should agree.

The Secretary said that the possibilities for the future are grave indeed if this problem is not solved now. He was being completely frank with the Italian Foreign Minister whom we regard as the Dean of the NATO Foreign Ministers. He asked that this information be protected most confidentially as there might be a chance that we can change the position during the night. The Foreign Minister said that he would of course keep this quite confidential. He felt that de Gaulle had recently seemed to have eased up on his opposition to negotiations and now seemed to have hardened again.

The Secretary said that he might be influenced by the recent Khrushchev and Menshikov speeches. If the result is to break up the alliance, these might be the most profitable speeches in history.

The Foreign Minister said that he can not understand why de Gaulle opposes soundings.

The Secretary replied that he thought we had worked out a formula this morning. This would involve further diplomatic explorations to be taken on the basis of agreed Western positions to see if there were bases for formal negotiations. This seemed to be a minimum and to protect all concerned. It was not accepted. If this problem remains unresolved, the NATO meeting could be catastrophic.

The Foreign

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The Foreign Minister agreed. He asked if the Germans were still favorable to exploration.

The Secretary replied the Germans are very much in agreement with us and with the British. He thought only the French would oppose in NATO.

The Foreign Minister said he was sure that the French and de Gaulle would not want to isolate themselves completely as such could have negative reactions on European matters.

The Secretary said Khrushchey would profit from disunity. He might make fatal moves on Berlin. This could lead to war. We have been trying to work out something so that de Gaulle's prestige would not be engaged. If, however, the matter remains unresolved tonight, we will have to expose the situation completely in NATO so that there will be full understanding. There seems to be a certain amount of contempt on the part of de Gaulle for the views of other governments, including those of the United States. This is not a position we expect to be in when we bear such a heavy share of the responsibility. If the French should accompany their position by general mobilization in France, we might find it more understandable.

The Secretary said if it is not possible to resolve tonight we count on Italy for maximum support in the Council. It would break the alliance if we fail to secure general support on this issue. General de Gaulle seems to have a basic misunderstanding what negotiations mean. He thinks it would lead to disastrous results. We already consider Berlin a casus belli. We will not give up in negotiation what we are prepared to fight for. Negotiation does not need to be a defeat for the West but we can not leave all the initiative to the Soviets. We are strong and we are not afraid to talk. In France we sense a basic weakness; perhaps they fear talks.

The Foreign Minister commented that not to negotiate would not prevent the worst.

The Secretary said in democratic societies people cannot be asked to go to war without being assured in advance that all possible has been done to prevent war.

The Foreign Minister said the Italian Government agrees completely. It is a moral as well as a political duty.

The Secretary said that if he had to speak in the Council, he would hope for an early intervention by the Italian Foreign Minister who plays such an important role in the alliance. Our

basic

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Our basic position has two elements. First, we must be firm on making good on our Berlin commitments. Second, we must be in contact with the other side to assure that all has been done to avoid a possible conflict. The Khrushchev and Menshikov speeches do not exhibit a position of strength. Khrushchev understands the limitations of his power but he is gambling on disunity as he intimidates. If we are unified, he will not dare push all the way to the end. Thus, this is a test of the alliance. The Germans are in complete agreement. If de Gaulle is thinking of Germany, he is being more German than the Germans themselves.

The Foreign Minister said he thought German opinion should be decisive in this situation.

Ambassador Cattani said that if the situation is fourteen to one in NATO, then we should not be too perturbed. One member-not one of the strongest-should not prevent the alliance from going on.

The Secretary said that this would be grave as France is one of the three powers in Berlin. We would be prepared to proceed on the basis of the agreement of fourteen but want fifteen. There is no magic formula to cover up the difference in basic ideas. De Gaulle wants no responsibility for contacts, for negotiations or talks with the Soviets. He believes a willingness to explore with the Soviets is a symptom of Western weakness. He states we are there and, if we are annoyed, we shoot. We know we Americans will shoot and believe we must be in contact with the other side before we have to do so. We wonder what he will do. De Gaulle may be right but this is a total gamble of the life of the West. The problem is exceedingly complex, but we believe we must pursue the course we are on with the agreement of fourteen.

The Foreign Minister said he hoped that France, faced with the opposition of the fourteen, would change its attitude or at least not obstruct the others.

The Secretary said it would be difficult even to talk to Khrushchev. It would be worse if we did not know what the results would be among our friends. The Secretary then asked Mr. Kohler to get in touch with Ambassador Prossio later in the evening. If the French position remained unchanged, the Italians might be able to do something bilaterally.

The Foreign Minister agreed to do so.

It was then agreed that this conversation would remain most confidential and that nothing would be said to the press on substance.

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Case Control No. 9100679

Mr. Marc Trachtenberg
University of Pennsylvania
Department of History
207 College Hall
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6379

MAY 20 1994

Dear Mr. Trachtenberg:

A Department of State Appeals Review Panel has carefully considered your appeal of February 29, 1993 for the release of one document withheld in full by the Department in the course of responding to your request under the Freedom of Information Act.

It has decided to release this document in its entirety. A List of Released Documents is enclosed, along with the released material.

Sincerely,

MICHAEL D. MCCURRY
CHAIRMAN, APPEALS REVIEW PANEL
SENIOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Enclosures:

Document list
One document

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48-12/19/61

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Minutes of National Security Council Meeting
19 December 1961

With the President and Secretary Rusk in private conference, the Vice President asked Mr. Gilpatrick to give his report on the Paris meeting. Lemnitzer spoke first of the general acceptance achieved for MC-96, the force goals for the next five years, superseding MC-70. He read a detailed involved report of the military discussions at Paris. He listed as two achievements of the conference, (1) the Norstad explanation of the atomic weapons picture for NATO planning and (2) the apparent decision of the Germans to participate more fully in NATO activities.

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E.O. 1206
1-301(12)

Nitze commented on McNamara's report to the Council of Soviet ICBM capability and assessed U.S. superiority. The NATO members were impressed by this statement and particularly by McNamara's and Rusk's assurances in this context of the depth of U.S. commitment to NATO. Nitze went on to report some of the difficulties of the meeting,

E.O. 1206
1-301(12)

Nitze informed the U.K. representative that the United States would not be able to take over British commitments in such places as Aden, Singapore, and so forth, if the U.K. moved out.

E.O. 1206
1-301(12)

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Authority NSC 1-20-82 w/ NLI-80-83
By CCO, Date 4-16-82

C O P Y

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directed Mr. Rusk to work out a plan of action if the Congo talks fail. The plan should also include proposed press statements. While speaking of the press the President questioned the handling of the press in Paris and added that he felt it was not very well done. Mr. Rusk concurred and admitted that there had perhaps been a breach of security and certainly one of confidence by

E.O. 12065
- 1-301(d)

The President departed and Mr. Rusk began a discussion of the unwillingness of the French to negotiate with the Soviet Union at the present time. The French thus far have failed to accept the logic of the U.S. position. Rusk perceives in De Gaulle a feeling of weakness rather than the generally conceded position of strength, particularly because of the precarious political position of De Gaulle. In this sense Rusk feels that the United States has previously underestimated the depth of De Gaulle's truculence. The one action that Rusk reported from the Paris meeting was the decision to proceed with the Thompson-Gromyko talks.

Rusk discussed with NATO Council members individually the Cuban matter and asked each representative to review the situation in the near future. Rusk concluded with a pessimistic remark on the achievements of the meeting and observed that perhaps the Congo situation tended to reduce its chances for success.

Lemnitzer reported certain details of the meeting which he and Secretary McNamara had at Honolulu with Nolting, McGarr and Felt. He termed the meeting very successful. (He did not mention Secretary McNamara's principal statement at the meeting to the effect that the United States had made the decision to pursue the Viet Nam affair with vigor and that all reasonable amounts of resources could be placed at the disposal of the commanders in the area.)

Rusk reviewed briefly his meeting with Franco. He was particularly concerned by certain press reports which were somewhat critical of the U.S. association with the Spanish monarch. Rusk feels that the United States should make no apology and that continued association with Franco should be wholeheartedly pursued. He noted that a great amount of work has been and is being done on the transfer of power at the conclusion of Franco's tenure.

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C O P Y

Mr. Rusk referred again in Paris to the President's offer in Ottawa to provide Polaris submarines to NATO. He asked for consultation with the representatives of any countries interested in this proposal.

E.O. 12066
1-301(2)

The President entered the Council meeting and was informed of the reports just presented. He then turned to the subject of utilization of Reserve Forces in the current crisis. He noted the hearings which will begin early next year and suggested that the interval be utilized for developing positions and arguments in support of our actions. He felt that the use of the Reserves should be defended vigorously, that the number of complaints and perhaps hardships were minor in regard to the whole operation and that under these circumstances he anticipated no difficulty in the presentation of a case. General Taylor added that the use of the Reserves in the current crisis follows a principal justification for the existence of Reserve Forces. Taylor went on to say that the increase of the Regular Establishment to 16 divisions would permit the achievement of a truly effective force for the long term run and the interim utilization of the Reserves in this particular scheme will have given the United States more strength than originally contemplated.

1-301(2)

Mr. Dillon reported that approximately half of the NATO finance ministers were present at the meeting and that the principal agreement related to the International Monetary Fund.

✓ E.O. 12066
1-301(2)

Mr. Dillon received a report that General De Gaulle was well pleased about this achievement. The President suggested that Mr. Rusk prepare a letter to De Gaulle expressing particular satisfaction also with the agreement. Mr. Murrow requested permission to release the President's letter but the President suggested deferment since it would appear that he would be taking unnecessary advantage of De Gaulle.

The President spoke of the status of negotiations with the Soviet and expressed somewhat pessimistically his feeling that our efforts to negotiate with the Soviets will be unsuccessful. He felt a treaty would then be signed and the troubles would begin with East Germany not only on the principal issue of recognition but also on the incidental harrassments. The President asked for a release of a statement on Latin America and also on the Dominican Republic. He felt it quite timely to release the latter one in order that it might have some effect on moving the Dominican situation toward a climax. The President

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<u>SET</u>	Berlin Crisis
<u>DATE</u>	12/19/1961
<u>CIRCD</u>	
<u>LOCOR</u>	Lyndon Baines Johnson Library. Vice President Security File. National Security Council (11)
<u>CLLNO</u>	
<u>VARTY</u>	Excised Copy
<u>DOCUMENT TYPE</u>	Minutes
<u>CABNO</u>	
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<u>SIGNATOR</u>	
<u>DRAFT</u>	
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	Top Secret
<u>TITLE</u>	Minutes of National Security Council Meeting, 19 December 1961
<u>CTIT</u>	
<u>NAMES</u>	Rusk, Dean
<u>NAMES</u>	Gilpatric, Roswell L.
<u>NAMES</u>	Lemnitzer, Lyman L.
<u>NAMES</u>	Norstad, Lauris
<u>NAMES</u>	McNamara, Robert S.
<u>NAMES</u>	Nitze, Paul H.
<u>NAMES</u>	de Gaulle, Charles
<u>NAMES</u>	Thompson, Llewellyn E.
<u>NAMES</u>	Gromyko, Andrei A.
<u>NAMES</u>	Taylor, Maxwell D.
<u>NAMES</u>	Dillon, C. Douglas
<u>NAMES</u>	Murrow, Edward R.
<u>ORGAN</u>	International Monetary Fund
<u>ORGAN</u>	United States. National Security Council
<u>ORGAN</u>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<u>LINEY</u>	25
<u>EXENDP</u>	
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TO: Secretary of State

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I HAD LUNCH WITH DE ROSE DECEMBER 22 TO CONTINUE OUR DISCUSSIONS OF LAST WEEK. HE BEGAN BY TALKING ABOUT NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING, SAYING HE HAD STUDIED CAREFULLY TALKS BY MCNAMARA, RUSK AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE STRAUSS. IT CAME THROUGH QUITE CLEARLY TO HIM THAT GERMANS ARE GOING TO WANT NUCLEAR WEAPONS SOONER OR LATER, PROBABLY SOONER THAN WE THINK. AS FRENCH SEE IT, MCNAMARA MADE CLEAR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCE THAT WOULD BE ABLE TO STRIKE DEEP INTO RUSSIA WOULD REMAIN UNDER US CONTROL AND NOT IN WESTERN EUROPE. STRAUSS HAS MADE CLEAR ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS DEEP CONCERN OF GERMANS FOR WHAT MAY HAPPEN IF SOVIETS STRIKE WITH CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND SUCCEED IN OCCUPYING MAJOR PORTIONS OF WESTERN GERMANY WITHOUT INSIDE RUSSIA BEING STRUCK. FURTHERMORE, FRENCH BELIEVE THAT USSR MAY NOT BE STRUCK IF US RETAINS CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DECIDES THAT THRESHOLD WHERE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL BE USED HAS NOT BEEN REACHED. IN DE ROSE'S OPINION IT IS THIS CONDITION THAT CONCERNS GENERAL DE GAULLE VERY MUCH FOR HE IS DETERMINED TO "WELD" WESTERN GERMANY TO FRANCE. FRANCE ITSELF WILL CONTINUE ON ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM. HE SAID DE GAULLE IS NOT QUITE READY TO GIVE NUCLEAR INFORMATION TO GERMANS NOW BUT HE WILL BE LATER. HE BELIEVES THAT IF GERMANY OFFERED TO PICK UP HALF THE COST OF GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT FOR AN EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION DE GAULLE PROBABLY WOULD NOT ACCEPT OFFER NOW BUT IF THE TWO COUNTRIES CONTINUE TO WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER IT IS INEVITABLE BUT THAT THEY WILL SHARE NUCLEAR INFORMATION. FURTHERMORE, AS POINTED OUT ABOVE, TO FRENCH MILITARY REASONING, IT IS NECESSARY FOR FRANCE AND GERMANY TO HAVE UNDER THEIR CONTROL IN EUROPE NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO STRIKE AGAINST RUSSIA IN EVENT OF HOSTILITIES.

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12/28/61

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den 28. Dezember 1961
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10 Ausfertigungen
4. Ausfertigung

OFFENGELEGT DURCH

REFERAT 117
SIEHE KOPIE NR. 2

Aufzeichnung

Kopie Nr. 1

Betr.: Deutsch-amerikanische Rüstungswirtschaftliche Beziehungen;
hier: Vortrag des Brigade-Generals Becker (BMVtg) im Auswärtigen Amt am 22. Dezember 1961
1. Anlage

4. JAN. 1962

Brigade-General Becker, BMVtg, Abt. W., hielt auf Veranlassung von Ref. 406 am 22.12.1961 im Auswärtigen Amt vor dem in anliegender Teilnehmerliste aufgeführten, auf Geheimnissen verpflichteten Personenkreis einen Vortrag über den gegenwärtigen Stand der deutsch-amerikanischen Rüstungswirtschaftlichen Beziehungen.

Im Anschluß an den Vortrag wurden auf Wunsch von D4 und anderer Herren noch mehrere Einzelfragen betr. Großbritannien, Indonesien und die VAR erörtert, zu denen das Erforderliche geschildert veranlaßt wurde. Im Rahmen seines Vortrages führte Herr Becker aus:

Bei den Verhandlungen des Herrn BM Strauss mit Verteidigungsminister Mo. Namara in Washington Anfang Dezember habe Herr Strauss die Amerikaner über den derzeitigen Stand und die weiteren Aussichten der laufenden gemeinschaftlichen Produktionsvorhaben unterrichtet und eine Übersicht über die Rüstungskäufe der BRD in den USA für 1961/62 gegeben. Außerdem seien eine Vereinbarung betr. Materialversorgung im Kriegsfall, das Problem der Verfügungsberechtigung über Atomwaffen sowie Fragen der NATO-Ersatzteil-Agentur (NMSSE) erörtert worden. Im einzelnen führte Herr Becker hierzu aus:

1. BM Strauss habe auf die außerordentlichen Vorteile hingewiesen, die sich für die USA aus der Gemeinschaftsproduktion des Mehrzweckflugzeuges "Starfighter F 104 G" (beteiligte Staaten: Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Belgien, Niederlande, Italien) ergäben. Während die Niederlande, Belgien und Italien bis zur Hälfte der placierten Aufträge als Geschenk erhielten, beliefen sich die Aufwendungen der Bundesrepublik für das Projekt auf 1,7 Milliarden \$, von denen 870 Mio \$, von denen 870 Mio \$, also etwa die Hälfte, in die USA zurückfließen. Auch Japan, Kanada und Indien zeigten sich gegenüber den USA an der Lieferung von Starfightern interessiert, was für uns insoweit wichtig sei, als der Bundesrepublik aus diesen Lieferungen ein bestimmter Prozentsatz, über den er sich nicht näher anließ, zufließen würde.

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Geheim

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— amtlich geheimgehalten —

schlecht gearbeitet habe, da a) es an geeignetem Personal mangle, b) Schiebung festgestellt worden seien, c) der leitende amerikanische General, um dessen Abberufung gebeten worden sei, versagt habe. Deutscherseits seien Vorschläge zur Behebung dieses nicht mehr vertretbaren Zustandes gemacht worden.

3. Die Frage des Verfügungsrechtes über Atomwaffen, insbesondere atomare Sprengköpfe, sei einer der Hauptpunkte in den Gesprächen gewesen. Wir seien nicht länger bereit, Trägerwaffen zu erwerben, wenn wir nicht wüßten, wie es mit der Überlassung der Atomköpfe stehe. Zwar vertraten die Amerikaner unter Berufung auf ihre gesetzlichen Bestimmungen auch weiterhin den Standpunkt, daß die Verfügungsgewalt in amerikanischer Zuständigkeit verbleiben müsse. Jedoch sei es im Laufe der Verhandlungen gelungen, sie mit der deutschen Auffassung vertraut zu machen und beide Standpunkte anzunähern. Die Verhandlungen hierüber liefen im NATO-Rat weiter. Die USA beabsichtigten, über kurz oder lang die NATO zur vierten Atommacht zu machen. Über das "Wie" sei man sich allerdings noch sehr im unklaren gewesen.

4. Becker kam dann ausführlich auf den Besuch des Unterstaatssekretärs im amerikanischen Verteidigungsministerium, Gilpatric, in Bonn im Oktober 1961 zu sprechen. Strauss und Gilpatric hatten am 24. Oktober 1961 ein "memorandum of understanding" vereinbart, in dem ein kooperatives Logistiksystem als wünschenswert bezeichnet wird, über das formelle Übereinkommen getroffen werden sollen. In dem Memorandum wird die Erwartung ausgesprochen, daß "die hiernach von der BRD an die USA zu leistenden Zahlungen ausreichen, um sicherzustellen, daß die zum unmittelbaren Vorteil der amerikanischen Zahlungsbilanz dienenden militärischen Transaktionen von genügendem Umfang sind, um die Transaktionen der US-Streitkräfte in der BRD zugunsten der westdeutschen Zahlungsbilanz auszugleichen, und zwar auf der Grundlage der gegenwärtigen in der BRD stationierten oder bisher für die Verlegung in die BRD angekündigten Streitkräfte." Im Falle weiterer Dislokierungen amerikanischer Streitkräfte in die BRD soll eine neue Prüfung stattfinden. In einem ergänzenden Brief des RM Strauss an Gilpatric vom 30. Oktober 1961 vertrat Herr Strauss die Auffassung, daß der erwartete Devisenausgleich für die Jahre 1961/62 erreicht werden wird. Feste Zusagen über diesen Zeitraum hinaus seien jedoch a.Zt. nicht möglich. Im Falle der Verlegung von weiteren US-Kontingen

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- 3 - ~~amtlich geheimgehalten~~ -

bilanz zwischen beiden Ländern berücksichtigt werden, und es sei eine multilaterale Regelung anzustreben. Schließlich wird um Verständnis gebeten, daß wir unsere verteidigungswirtschaftlichen Beziehungen auch zu anderen NATO-Staaten aufrecht erhalten müssen und im Falle von politischen Schwierigkeiten in dieser Hinsicht die politische Unterstützung der USA erbitten.

Herr Becker führte aus, Gilpatrick habe den Strauss Brief am 27. November 1961 beantwortet und sich mit dem Inhalt im wesentlichen einverstanden erklärt. Das Auswärtige Amt werde noch eine Durchschrift dieses Schreibens erhalten. Die USA beständen in dem Schreiben auf bilateralen Verhandlungen und forderten, obwohl sie unsere Pflicht, Großbritannien finanzielle Hilfe zu gewähren, anerkennen, auch weiterhin ein Primat bei allen amerikanischen Forderungen. Eine Unterstützung Groß-Britanniens auf Kosten der USA werde ausdrücklich ausgeschlossen.

Im übrigen beziehe sich der Inhalt des Briefes im wesentlichen auf die Jahre 1961/62. Erörtert würden ferner in dem Schreiben eine Reihe von Einzelpunkten, von denen uns, abgesehen von der unbedeutenden Depot-Frage, vor allen folgende interessierten:

- a) die gemeinsame Versorgung aus dem europäischen Logistiksystem der USA und die Instandsetzung
- b) die Zusammenarbeit in der Sanitätsversorgung
- c) die Nutzung der großen Truppenübungsplätze.

Das BMVtg beabsichtige, zu den Einzelpunkten etwa am 15. Januar 1962 schriftlich Stellung zu nehmen. In diesen sei allerdings finanziell nicht viel enthalten. Es handele sich aber immerhin um etwa 100 Mio \$ pro Jahr.

Besonders wichtig sei Abschnitt E der Anlage zum Gilpatrick-Brief, in dem ein neues Finanzierungssystem für die gesamte Beschaffung im Vorschlag gebracht werde. Vorgeschlagen werde die sofortige Einrichtung eines neuen Kontos bei der Treasury, über das sämtliche Zahlungen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland für Verteidigungszwecke laufen sollen. Zweck des neuen Kontos, das einsilos geführt werden soll, sei es, feste Kontrollmöglichkeiten dafür zu gewinnen, wieviel Devisen aus Verteidigungsmitteln nach den USA fließen. Das alte Konto bleibe vorläufig blockiert. Auf das neue Konto seien jeweils grundsätzlich 100% voraussusahlen.

Geheim

9 (61)

LUCIUS D. CLAY

General, Retired
U. S. Army

U. S. Mission Berlin
APO 742, New York
December 29, 1961

Dear Dean:

I have just read with much interest your "Fifty Years After" and, particularly, your concluding paragraph.

I wish that my stay in Washington had been long enough to have had a talk with you as you have expressed much more eloquently than I could what the real problem is for our country.

It seems to me that few realize that we are facing the ultimate challenge now and that, at least militarily, time is against us. If we do not have the courage or if we are deterred by Allied weakness in the short remaining period in which military odds are in our favor, what will we do when this is no longer true.

I cannot see any evidence that the free world is not prepared to concede more and to resist less as Soviet pressure increases. I hope that our leadership can stop this swing. We cannot succeed unless we take the lead. I believe we can succeed and that, in our own interest, we should seek the confrontation sooner rather than later. If the free world is unwilling to face the risk of nuclear war to save freedom wherever it is threatened, whereas the Communist world is willing to take this risk to expand, there can be only one outcome.

I look back to the fall of 1948 and the spring of 1949 when our foreign policy was bold, imaginative and successful. We moved then with you as Secretary of State to consolidate the forces of freedom and did not hesitate to take the lead in bringing it about.

Research Rg/65 / State Dept & WH Advisor 1962 - Jan - key,

Page 2

I am not being critical of anyone and I have confidence that the President understands the challenge. I hope our people do.



I could not resist writing this letter to you as I read your article. With high regard, and all good wishes for the New Year.

Sincerely,

Lucian

The Honorable
Dean Acheson