



DÉLEGATION NÉERLANDAISE AUPRÈS DU CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

Paris, January 9, 1961.



Dear Dean,

Thank you very much indeed for your letter of December 27, which gave me the opportunity to have interesting discussions with Spaak and Norstad. I shall give you an account of these discussions and I hope that this account will prove to you, how keenly we on this side of the ocean are aware of the many problems as indicated by you, with which we all are faced.

I am sure that it will interest you to know that during my talk with Spaak it became quite clear that since the Ministerial meeting he has calmed down and is not inclined to take at the present moment rash decisions. He is also watching closely developments in Belgium.

I am writing now to the Hague in a general way about our correspondence, but for the rest I prefer to keep our correspondence private and personal, which gives me some more latitude to express my own opinions. It may well be that at a later date it may become clear that my Government has other views, but then at least we have had together the pleasure of this intellectual exercise.

- I. Let me first of all tell you how sorry we are that you prefer to help the new Administration as an adviser and consultant in Washington instead of coming back into the NATO-arena. For me the situation was different, because I felt that if I had stayed in Holland my successors would, after a certain time, not be interested in my own opinions and I felt that as the representative of a small country in NATO and OEEC, I would come, on the one hand, into contact with practically all political, military and economic issues and that, on the other hand, I could continue to be of some help to my Government in formulating policies on matters which come up in the Council. But I can well understand that this may be different for your country and for you yourself. Nevertheless we are all sorry.

Whenever I can be of any help to you, to give you an

The Honorable Dean Acheson,
2805 - P. Street N.W.,
Washington DC.

U.S.A.

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indication of what is going on, please do not hesitate to ask me for information.

- II. On page 3 of your letter, in the last paragraph, you make a distinction between new actions which will have to be taken (1) within NATO, and (2) outside of NATO.

Let me ask you first of all a few questions about (2), the broader political development involving Western-Europe and North America in the interest of greatly increased production for the three purposes you mentioned. I agree that your country is moving in a more protectionist direction. During the discussions which lasted for a year about the creation of the new O.E.C.D. it was clear to everybody that Dillon, who was practically in charge for the United States of these discussions, had to move with the greatest caution. Congress is jealous of its prerogatives and consequently there was little inclination to continue the old system of consultation and of possible conclusions on trade matters, which had been developed in the course of the years in the old O.E.E.C.

I would be very much interested to hear what you mean by "another political development". Have you in mind some form of organisation on the basis of a supra-national structure? I am sure that many people in Europe would like to see such a development, but do you believe that the Kennedy administration could persuade Congress to accept such a revolutionary and sweeping conception, which would link the United States and the European countries within an Atlantic Community?

Perhaps you may remember how I have personally always been in favour of such a development and how, at the end of the time when I was still Foreign Secretary, I wrote a letter to you, asking your advice on the request which had been made by the Clarence Streit group to wage a campaign in the United States for the Atlantic Community.

I agree with you that, as long as no new political approach has been found and as long as we have to consider the GATT-agreement as the Holy Gospel which cannot be altered or changed, there is little chance for stimulating new developments in the economic field.

Please let me know in which direction your ideas go.



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III. When I turn now to the problems within NATO, I am afraid that I have to go into a good many details.

You asked me two questions. First of all, whether it is my view that to devise "a multilateral European nuclear weapons system" goes beyond the political purpose for which it has been proposed and provides an adequate military strategy for the defense and strengthening of NATO. In the second place you say "Am I wrong in thinking that the Norstad proposal stems more from the effort -- a necessary one, I agree -- to prevent de Gaulle from doing something very foolish, rather than from a more long range military or political strategic plan?".

When I discussed these questions, separately, first with Spaak and later with Norstad I did so on the basis that it is also, in my opinion, necessary that we try to have a clearer definition of what under the present circumstances our political directive and strategic doctrine should be. On the other hand I do not think that the conceptions on which we are, at the present moment, working in practice are entirely without a foundation of long range military or political strategic plans. The difficulty is that these plans are not clear. The emphasis is sometimes more on the deterrent and at another moment completely on the shield, whilst not all countries put the emphasis on either of these two in the same way at the same moment.

In my discussion with Spaak I quoted several times from Kissinger's book on "Nuclear weapons and Foreign Policy". When I took these different quotations out of their context, I tried to clarify my ideas about the necessity of a better military doctrine by the following statements:

Kissinger says: "NATO is the key test for the possibility of an effective alliance in the nuclear age" and later puts the question: "if it is possible to devise a concept of defense equally meaningful to all its partners".

Earlier he says: "Our continental partners have been torn between a strategy of minimum risk and the desire for economy.

Instead of adopting the austere measures required for a major defense effort, they have tended to deny the reality of the danger or they have asserted that they were already protected by our retaliatory capacity.

So long as the U.S. strategic doctrine identifies the defense of Europe with all-out war, a substantial military



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contribution by our allies is unlikely." In my opinion this last statement is not, or no longer, correct.

Kissinger further states that the " U.S. has been responsible for many of NATO's inconsistencies" and criticises "our reliance on an all-out strategy". When, a little later, he describes the British opinions from the period Macmillan/Duncan Sandys, he ends with the remark: "By adopting our theory of deterrence as its own, Britain has thrown in sharp relief the urgent necessity, if NATO is to be maintained, of a new approach to the defense of Europe."

This is why Kissinger, in earlier chapters, has described in his book the possibility and "the problems of limited war and of limited nuclear war".

Whatever the importance and the value of Kissinger's book, which was written in 1957, may be, I continued in my discussion with Spaak to draw his attention to some further developments, which are important in this connection:

Adenauer, already on August 21, 1956, said "It is unrealistic always to imagine that a future war will be fought on the largest scale. I am of the opinion that it is essential to confine any potential conflict to one of local character - so as to prevent the outbreak of an intercontinental war with rockets."

I pointed out, furthermore, that Kennedy, in an article of September 3, 1960 (which, I believe, was drafted by Paul Nitze) has allowed to appear under his name expressions like "the notion that the Free World can be protected simply by the threat of "massive retaliation" is no longer tenable". Another remark in this article is "The bulk of the job of deterring Soviet nuclear capabilities must continue to be with the United States". If one sees this type of remarks in connection with f.i. statements like that of Mr. Herter on April 23, 1959 (of which I have only the French text): "Je ne peux pas concevoir qu'un Président des U.S.A. utilise les armements nucléaires, à moins que la vie même des U.S.A. ne soit directement menacée", there exists a strong tendency no longer to rely exclusively on an all-out nuclear retaliation.

In your letter you remark "Hence the reluctance on both sides to use strategic nuclear weapons will grow, and, without some other capability, the appeal of NATO will continue



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to decline".

In this connection it may be important for you to know that I have the impression that in Great Britain, after the period when Macmillan and Duncan Sandys relied strongly on nuclear retaliation, there now seems to be a change of attitude. During the Ministerial conference in December Lord Home used the following expression: "I would feel that there is one thing which perhaps we ought to watch, whether we are in danger perhaps of over-insuring on the nuclear deterrent and under-insuring against limited wars."

It is also important to know that Great Britain stopped the production of its missile the Blue Streak, after having spent an enormous amount of money on research and development. It is quite clear that in this period of "grandeur" in France the old position of Great Britain about the importance of nuclear retaliation has now been taken over by France. It seems to me to be out of the question that they can be more successful in these efforts than Britain.

Before turning now to the question where the basic conception for the NATO military doctrine can be found, I would like to draw your attention to the statement made by Mr Herter in the Council on the multilateral European nuclear weapons system. I am sure that it will be possible for you to get a copy of this statement in Washington and I should like to point to the paragraphs 20 and 43 of it. Here Herter has linked the problem of a new nuclear NATO force with the difficulties of the balance of payments in the United States. For the first time in an official document the possibility of a reduction of American presence in Europe has been indicated. To my mind these two paragraphs have to be taken very seriously. At the present moment the emphasis in Europe should be on an increased effectiveness of conventional forces, but if the United States wants to be paid for the sale of polaris missiles, or believes that it may come into a position where it should withdraw some of its conventional forces from Europe, then the opposite of what is at the present moment necessary will be the result. Apart from Germany, no European country would probably be in a position to pay for polaris missiles. Such payments would mean, therefore, a reduction in conventional forces in Europe and, if payments could not be made, the withdrawal of some American troops. I consider it to be out of the question that other European countries would be willing to accept that only Germany, even if under a NATO umbrella, would have polaris missiles and



under those conditions this new suggestion would have to be dropped completely. Under these circumstances Germany might wish to create its own nuclear force; this is a rather frightening thought.

I hope, therefore, that the new administration will come to the conclusion that the paragraphs 20 and 43 in Mr Herter's statement had better be forgotten.

In case, therefore, the new administration were to follow the suggestions of the Norstad proposals, I hope that more emphasis will be put on the need for an increase in conventional forces and I could well imagine that any new offer of ~~polaris~~ missiles might be used in order to put some pressure on European countries for more effective conventional forces.

I would like to repeat once again the three political reasons for which the Norstad proposals were of great importance:

1. there should be no doubt that the U.S. will continue to make its nuclear weapons available for use if necessary by NATO powers and there should be absolute confidence that American conventional forces will remain in Europe;
2. Everything should be done to prevent Germany from following France in its nationalistic desire to create its own nuclear weapons system;
3. it is highly desirable that European countries share in the responsibility for the decision of the use of nuclear weapons.

At the present moment the military doctrine on which the several commanders, and also SACEUR, have to base themselves must be found in the political directive C-M(56)138-Final and the overall strategic concept MC 14/2. These doctrines date from 1956 and 1957 and will have to be adapted to new developments, were it only for the reason that the much more dangerous influence of China has been added to the Russian communistic and imperialistic threat.

If you want to study the practical measures which Norstad at the moment takes in the execution of the two above-mentioned documents, I would like to refer you to the two statements Norstad made in November and December last, one for the NATO parliamentarians and the second for the WEU parliamentarians. I am sure that you can obtain copies of these statements in Washington.



Before the NATO parliamentarians Norstad said: "SACEUR believes that any penetration of the land frontiers ought to be stopped decisively, at once, if necessary, by the use of nuclear weapons". Granted that he uses words like "if necessary"; granted also that he does not indicate which nuclear weapons will be used, but the impression of such a sentence is undoubtedly that the emphasis is still on an all-out strategy.

But when Norstad uses this expression it does not mean that he does not believe in the possibility of a limited war or even of a limited nuclear war. When speaking to the WEU parliamentarians about the mission of NATO forces, he mentions in the first place: "the contribution to the deterrent. We must be able if possible to prevent an aggression. Should we be unsuccessful in this purpose then we must have the means to force a pause. The purpose of this pause is to compel a conscious decision on the part of the aggressor." He calls the importance of the shield forces in this period "not only necessary and valid, but of even greater importance". He states: "I wish to emphasize here and now the role of conventional forces"; somewhat later on "a substantial conventional capability is essential to the defense of Europe". That is why Norstad is of the opinion that what he calls "the basic combat elements should be so organised and so equipped that their normal defense would be with conventional weapons" and he finally arrives at the important statement (because at a certain moment of course nuclear weapons also may have to be used): "I believe that the threshold at which nuclear weapons would be introduced into the battle should be as high as possible, and the height of it will be determined by the adequacy of the forces". He continues: "I believe that atomic weapons should be introduced into the battle only as the result of a deliberate decision, which is the product of an established decision-making process, a process which in turn is directed by the political authority of the Alliance."

That these remarks of Norstad's have a serious meaning may be clear from the following sentences in a letter SACEUR wrote "in forwarding the NATO forces requirements for end 1966 on the 29th of December 1960": "After studying the full range of threats, from minor incursion to general war, requirements for Allied Command Europe have been shaped to provide, on a minimum basis, the balanced forces essential to the accomplishment of our assigned mission. In doing this, the modernization of forces of both the Alliance and the Soviet Bloc has been taken into account. Substantial dependence must be placed on nuclear weapons under almost any circumstance. Nevertheless, as conventional capabilities improve



even within this proposed program, it may be possible to raise the level of involvement at which such weapons would have to be introduced into the battle. If additional forces are made available above the proposed requirements, even greater latitude in the choice of response should be achieved."

I particularly draw your attention to the last sentence of this quotation.

Another proof of the way in which SACEUR tries to work out his strategic conception is given by the following part of his statement before the NATO parliamentarians: "Thus I believe that our forces must have a substantial conventional capability. They must be able to operate where the military situation permits, without using arms and weapons equipped with nuclear warheads. This will require shield forces of the general magnitude being provided under our present programme, a programme which I regret to say is not yet completed. I press for its completion.

This conventional strength requires an organisation or a system under which the basic combat elements would react normally with conventional weapons; but it also requires that associated with these basic combat elements there are atomic weapon units which can be used if necessary. However, the threshold at which nuclear weapons are introduced into the battle should be a high one. Further, the use of these weapons should be the result of a specific, deliberate decision, made at a level consistent with the policies and plans of NATO. In any case, this level must be higher than that of the commander of the basic combat elements, to which I have made reference."

It might also interest you to take note of a letter Norstad wrote to Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central Europe on September 13, 1960, which letter is classified Cosmic/Top Secret¹⁾:

- " 1. It has recently been brought to my attention that the basic strategy for Allied Command Europe is sometimes misunderstood because of the manner in which we plan our training exercises. Due to the fact that we frequently practice the most serious and difficult type of warfare, that involving the use of atomic weapons, some countries feel that this is not only the type most likely to occur

¹⁾ subsequently downgraded to: Confidential.



but is the only one for which we are preparing. Nothing could be further from the truth. Our Shield Forces are designed to bridge the gap between an all or nothing response, to give validity to the principle of the deterrent. We must, then, make it clear to all concerned that we will, of course, use whatever force is required to defend our NATO territory, but we do not propose to use more force than is necessary.

2. In order to clarify our intentions in this matter, I have listed below the six fundamental principles upon which our Allied Command Europe plans are based:

a. We would welcome additional forces but those presently programmed are generally adequate in quantity, on a minimum basis. However, their weapons and survival posture must be improved as a matter of urgency.

b. ACE forces must be organised, equipped, trained and deployed so as to be able to react promptly and effectively with:

- (1) Conventional weapons when they are adequate to the military situation;
- (2) Atomic weapons when use of such weapons is necessary;


c. Except in certain well defined cases of direct self-defense, atomic weapons will be introduced into the battle only after a particular decision to do so has resulted from the operation of an established decision-making process. This process will insure that such a decision would in all cases be taken by an authority at a level higher than that of the basic combat unit.

d. Atomic delivery forces of ACE must be able to survive hostile actions during operations in which they are not used.

e. The selective use of limited atomic fire-power will not necessarily result in total war, although it may heighten the degree of risk.

f. The ACE EDP and appropriate regional plans must include provisions for a mobile durable defense and ensure that critical targets, particularly concentrations of enemy troops, are adequately covered by atomic strikes.

3. In order to develop and train your forces in a realistic manner, you are enjoined to adhere to the principles set forth above. In exercise scenarios when atomic weapons are to be employed you should clearly establish that they are being used on the basis indicated in this letter.



I do not believe that I should, at this stage, go into the problem of how the Norstad proposals could be worked out, that is to say

- a. where the decision about targeting, and about the use of specific missiles of longer and shorter range should be taken, or
- b. which system has to be developed in the Council for arriving at political decisions on this matter.

It is a great pity that we cannot meet and have a discussion about these matters, because I would be delighted to hear more about your own opinions. I know that Norstad is going to Washington in the first few days of February. Perhaps a meeting between the two of you could be arranged; in a private discussion it is always so much easier to give an immediate reply to questions which certainly will arise in your mind when you read this letter.

The only thing which I tried to do is to explain that on the basis of existing documents and doctrine it is possible for SACEUR to work out his plans. On the other hand I agree with you that there is a good deal of misunderstanding on these matters in the different countries and that this lack of knowledge, especially about the possibility that the center of Europe can be defended without resorting immediately to nuclear retaliation, prevents many countries from making a real effort for their defense. There is, to my mind, a trend at the present moment to attach more importance to conventional forces and this should certainly be the trend to be followed by the Western European countries.

In the foregoing discussion I think that I have given you some indications which might induce you to reconsider your feeling that it is necessary "to fill the complete void which now exists". To my mind, the problem is more one of interpretation than of basic philosophy. The new administration and its allies should seek to achieve an agreed interpretation and then work together wholeheartedly to support it.

With warmest greetings
Sincerely
Dijk

11/10/61

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Berlin
(Hillenkamp)

THE BERLIN PROBLEM IN 1961

The Quest for a New Approach

1. After more than two years since the original Khrushchev threat of November 1958, unilaterally to terminate Western rights in Berlin, the Three Occupying Powers and the Federal Republic find themselves in a frustrating and worrisome situation. Despite the temporary lull in harassment of access and recent East German concessions permitting the restoration of interzonal trade arrangements, we know that, whenever it suits their purposes, the Soviets and the East Germans can again precipitate an active crisis and restore Berlin to the front pages of the world press. We can live with the status quo in Berlin but can take no real initiative to change it for the better. To a greater or lesser degree, the Soviets and East Germans can, whenever they are willing to assume the political consequences, change it for the worse.

2. Now this is a thoroughly unsatisfactory state of affairs for the West. It inevitably gives rise to the desire for some new approach, which will somehow or other extricate us, with honor and prestige preserved, from the awful burden of responsibility for an exclave which is militarily indefensible and which can only be maintained, under lessening conditions of credibility, by the ultimate threat of thermonuclear war. Critics of Western policy castigate it for immobility, lack of imagination, and failure to seize the initiative, and even those who are aware of the complexities and limitations inherent in our position cannot but hope that somewhere, somehow, a new and resolving formula can be found. In anticipation of further Soviet pressures within the coming months, it may be useful to review the status of the Berlin question and the approaches realistically open to us.

Soviet Objectives

3. Consideration of what can be done about Berlin must necessarily start with some estimate of Soviet objectives. Allowing for variations in emphasis, two broad explanatory theories have been advanced: (a) that the Soviets are using Berlin essentially as a lever to achieve their wider purpose of obtaining

recognition

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recognition of the GDR and consolidation of the satellite bloc, or (b) that West Berlin is a primary objective in itself because its continuance in its present form is so harmful to the East that it must be eliminated. The truth probably lies in a combination of the two. Berlin is a useful lever with which to attempt to gain broader objectives, whether it be the holding of a Summit meeting, a greater measure of recognition for the GDR, or stabilization of the status quo in Eastern Europe. At the same time, West Berlin's role as a channel for the flow of refugees, as a center of Western propaganda and intelligence activities, and as a show window which daily and dramatically highlights the relative lack of success in the East, is such that the Soviets may feel that they cannot tolerate it for the indefinite future.

4. Why, however, did the Soviets do specifically what they did in November 1958, and why have they been deterred from proceeding along their threatened unilateral path during the ensuing period?

The Development of the Crisis

5. The Berlin crisis has gone through four broad phases:

a. Following upon the Soviet note of November 27, 1958, there was an initial period of mutual restatement of position and exchanges of notes leading up to the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers which began on May 11, 1959. This was a period of intensive diplomatic activity among the Western powers during which they drew up the Western Peace Plan and made considerable progress in their contingency planning.

b. The period of the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers (May-August 1959) during the course of which the West agreed to discuss Berlin outside the context of German reunification and advanced proposals (rejected by the Soviets) for an "interim arrangement" on Berlin. The Soviets in turn made unacceptable proposals for an "interim arrangement".

c. The period between the Camp David talks and the collapse of the Paris Summit Meeting in May 1960. This likewise

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was a period of intensive Western diplomatic activity and many preparatory meetings.

d. The post-Summit period of relative diplomatic quiescence and of further Soviet postponement of threatened unilateral action pending the inauguration of a new American administration. GDR harassment of German civilian access provoked Western countermeasures which, in turn, led to GDR concessions, and by the end of 1960 the situation in and about Berlin had returned to as near normal as it ever gets.

6. It is reasonable to assume that, in November of 1958, the Soviets expected the combination of threat, pressure, and offer to negotiate to lead to a collapse of Western determination and acceptance of something along the lines of their free city proposal. Their subsequent postponement of what they claimed to be inevitable, their willingness to wait until some further negotiation or some other event had occurred, may be attributed to Soviet doubt that they could take the threatened unilateral action without precipitating a major crisis involving the risk of war. On the Western side, a major problem throughout this period has accordingly been to maintain the credibility, not only of the guarantee of Berlin against outright attack, but of the stated determination to defend Western rights in Berlin, ultimately at the grave risk of thermonuclear war. It is a moot point whether the credibility of the Western position has declined during the past two years in the light of comparative advances in weapons technology and related developments. There have been some disturbing signs of Soviet reluctance to believe that the West, given its divisions and its internal strains, would really prove firm in a showdown. However, this may be, an element of doubt has presumably persisted up to now sufficient to have deterred the Soviets from unilateral action.

7. Considered purely as a holding operation, Western efforts since November 1958 have been fairly successful. Nothing essential has changed in Berlin; the city continues to prosper economically; and the morale of the Berliners, despite some ups and downs, continues to be good. Moreover, since the initial Khrushchev threat, more than 350,000 refugees have come from East Germany to the West, the great majority through Berlin -- a

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recognition of the GDR and consolidation of the satellite bloc, or (b) that West Berlin is a primary objective in itself because its continuance in its present form is so harmful to the East that it must be eliminated. The truth probably lies in a combination of the two. Berlin is a useful lever with which to attempt to gain broader objectives, whether it be the holding of a Summit meeting, a greater measure of recognition for the GDR, or stabilization of the status quo in Eastern Europe. At the same time, West Berlin's role as a channel for the flow of refugees, as a center of Western propaganda and intelligence activities, and as a show window which daily and dramatically highlights the relative lack of success in the East, is such that the Soviets may feel that they cannot tolerate it for the indefinite future.

4. Why, however, did the Soviets do specifically what they did in November 1958, and why have they been deterred from proceeding along their threatened unilateral path during the ensuing period?

The Development of the Crisis

5. The Berlin crisis has gone through four broad phases:

a. Following upon the Soviet note of November 27, 1958, there was an initial period of mutual restatement of position and exchanges of notes leading up to the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers which began on May 11, 1959. This was a period of intensive diplomatic activity among the Western powers during which they drew up the Western Peace Plan and made considerable progress in their contingency planning.

b. The period of the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers (May-August 1959) during the course of which the West agreed to discuss Berlin outside the context of German reunification and advanced proposals (rejected by the Soviets) for an "interim arrangement" on Berlin. The Soviets in turn made unacceptable proposals for an "interim arrangement".

c. The period between the Camp David talks and the collapse of the Paris Summit Meeting in May 1960. This likewise

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was a period of intensive Western diplomatic activity and many preparatory meetings.

d. The post-Summit period of relative diplomatic quiescence and of further Soviet postponement of threatened unilateral action pending the inauguration of a new American administration. GDR harassment of German civilian access provoked Western countermeasures which, in turn, led to GDR concessions, and by the end of 1960 the situation in and about Berlin had returned to as near normal as it ever gets.

6. It is reasonable to assume that, in November of 1958, the Soviets expected the combination of threat, pressure, and offer to negotiate to lead to a collapse of Western determination and acceptance of something along the lines of their free city proposal. Their subsequent postponement of what they claimed to be inevitable, their willingness to wait until some further negotiation or some other event had occurred, may be attributed to Soviet doubt that they could take the threatened unilateral action without precipitating a major crisis involving the risk of war. On the Western side, a major problem throughout this period has accordingly been to maintain the credibility, not only of the guarantee of Berlin against outright attack, but of the stated determination to defend Western rights in Berlin, ultimately at the grave risk of thermonuclear war. It is a moot point whether the credibility of the Western position has declined during the past two years in the light of comparative advances in weapons technology and related developments. There have been some disturbing signs of Soviet reluctance to believe that the West, given its divisions and its internal strains, would really prove firm in a showdown. However, this may be, an element of doubt has presumably persisted up to now sufficient to have deterred the Soviets from unilateral action.

7. Considered purely as a holding operation, Western efforts since November 1958 have been fairly successful. Nothing essential has changed in Berlin; the city continues to prosper economically; and the morale of the Berliners, despite some ups and downs, continues to be good. Moreover, since the initial Khrushchev threat, more than 350,000 refugees have come from East Germany to the West, the great majority through Berlin -- a

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further demographic drain which an already underpopulated GDR could ill afford.

The Western Approach in 1958-1960

8. From the outset, the Four Western Powers principally concerned have differed to some extent in both their appraisal of the situation and their estimate of desirable policy. These differences have never developed to the point of open disagreement (except in press leaks), and a fine show of Western unity was maintained at the Geneva Conference and the abortive Summit. However, the variations in approach which have emerged during the preparatory work for conferences presumably remain a constant factor. The British have been most willing to compromise in order to achieve a solution; but after the unfavorable reception given to their "slippery slope" memorandum of late 1958 (which in effect advocated trading recognition of the GDR for a Berlin settlement), they have been reticent to expose their basic thinking. The French and Germans, on the other hand, have been consistently negative in opposing the introduction of any elements of flexibility into the Western position, either on Germany as a whole or on Berlin in particular. The United States has shown itself more willing at least to consider possible new approaches provided they seemed compatible with basic Western interests, and has had to provide much of the initiative needed to organize the work during the preparatory phases prior to the Geneva and Summit Conferences.

9. In developing the Western position on Germany and Berlin, the Four Powers have passed through phases somewhat analogous to the four noted above. During the initial phase prior to the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers, the West still operated essentially on the assumption that discussion of the Berlin problem should be kept within the context of the all-German question. Within the State Department various new ideas were considered for incorporation into a Western package proposal to replace the Eden Plan of the 1955 Geneva Conference. After months of discussions within a series of Four-Power Working Group sessions in Washington, Paris, and London, some of these ideas survived in the Western Peace Plan put forward at Geneva on May 14, 1959. It is highly questionable whether even a more forthcoming version of

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Peace Plan (still consistent with basic Western interests) would have proved at all negotiable with the Soviets, although the Western package would have been more appealing as propaganda. At any rate after a few weeks of inconclusive discussion of the German question at Geneva, with the Soviets emphasizing the necessity of a peace treaty and all-German talks and the West extolling the merits of the Peace Plan, the conference moved on to the subject of Berlin proper for a wearisome and protracted period. Despite the concern which they caused the Germans and the Berliners, the Western proposals for an interim arrangement on Berlin might have provided a satisfactory modus vivendi for a period of some years. However, it became clear at Geneva that the Soviet concept of an interim arrangement differed too basically from that of the West to make agreement possible.

10. At the subsequent Camp David talks, the only agreement reached on Berlin was that negotiations would be reopened with a view to achieving a solution in accordance with the interests of all concerned and in the interest of the maintenance of peace. Khrushchev gave assurances that, in the meantime, the Soviets would take no unilateral action and President Eisenhower agreed that these negotiations would not be indefinitely prolonged. After an involved preparatory process, the preferred Western objective on Berlin for the Summit emerged as an agreement for a standstill for a period of time during which an attempt might be made at a lower level to achieve progress towards a more formal agreement. The basic Western position paper did, however allow for the possibility that the Western Powers might have to discuss an arrangement along the lines of their Geneva proposals of July 28, preferably with certain improvements. It also left open the possibility, under certain circumstances, of reviving the old Solution C of the London Working Group of April 1959. Since the collapse of the Summit, the Western emphasis has been largely on refinement of contingency planning (particularly in the countermeasures field), and there has been little further discussion of the substance of the position which the Western Powers might take into future negotiations with the Soviets on Berlin. Prior to any such negotiations, the Western Powers will presumably have to go through the usual preparatory throes; in any event, the British and French will probably approach us shortly after January 20 in this connection.

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11. It may be noted that, prior to the collapse of the Summit in Paris, the Soviets gave President de Gaulle the text of certain new proposals on Berlin (Tab A). While couched in apparently reasonable language, these were, in some respects, even less satisfactory than their final proposals at Geneva in 1959, and were clearly designed to lead to the ultimate goal of a Free City of West Berlin via an interim arrangement during the course of which the Western Powers would be allowed to bow out of their present position in Berlin. Khrushchev has on several occasions since intimated that these would be the opening Soviet proposals at the next meeting on the subject.

Formulation of the Western Position for 1961

12. The quest for an abiding solution to the Berlin problem is essentially a quest for a satisfactory context. In isolation Berlin will always be a problem, though conceivably less acute if some sort of modus vivendi can be found. It is therefore worth asking once again whether we cannot discover such a broader context.

13. In this search, Chancellor Adenauer has for more than a year emphasized that a real solution to the German problem (and therefore automatically the Berlin problem) could only come within the framework of a general settlement on disarmament. There is certainly much validity in this prescription. If the United States and the Soviet Union should actually be able to agree on the broad lines of a disarmament arrangement, this would undoubtedly do much to relieve pressures on Berlin. We cannot, unfortunately, rely on this happening within the next six to eight months.

14. It may be that Soviet interest in eventual achievement of an agreement on disarmament, and in other areas where, for whatever reasons, we may assume that both East and West have somewhat similar objectives, would provide the basis for a meaningful approach to the Soviets in an attempt to create a proper psychological framework for discussion of the Berlin question. Such an approach, calculated to impress on them the serious results which any unilateral action with respect to Berlin would have, might help to add to the Western deterrent

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at a time when some believe that the ultimate threat of thermo-nuclear war is becoming less credible. It is fair to assume, for example, that the Soviets do not wish to see the United States mobilize its resources behind a greatly enhanced defense program of the type which accompanied the war in Korea, when we quadrupled our defense expenditures. A warning, therefore, that continuation of the Soviet threat to Berlin will inevitably bring the kind of massive mobilization of American resources for defense of which Khrushchev knows we are capable, but which neither we nor he basically desire, might provide a useful prelude to any negotiations with the Soviets on Berlin. The exact timing and level of such an approach to the Soviets should accordingly be considered along with the more specific aspects of a possible modus vivendi on Berlin.

15. It is possible to dream up many different proposals on Berlin, each with its own variants. A distinction, however, between the merely theoretically conceivable and the conceivably possible, narrows down the field for further consideration. All of the approaches indicated below have, of course, come under review to a greater or lesser extent, but it may be useful at this point to note their main characteristics in attempting to appraise the practical courses of action open to the West.

a. All-German Sweetening for Some Interim Arrangement on Berlin

If Berlin is at least partially a lever which the Soviets are using to obtain other objectives of more basic importance to them, it is possible to suppose that, if some proposal could be made by the West which promises movement toward the achievement of these other objectives, the Soviets might be willing to ease their pressure on Berlin.

1) One of the Soviet "other objectives" is usually put in terms of enhancing the status of the GDR so as to move towards de facto dealings by the West, although not necessarily recognition, as part of a process of freezing the status quo in Central Europe. The memorandum which the British gave us in the fall of 1959 proposed, for example, sweetening the July 28 Geneva proposals by permitting all-German talks under the cover of a Four-Power Group.

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ii) A second possible kind of sweetening would involve changes in the Western Peace Plan. Ambassador Thompson in Moscow has suggested an extension of the time period in that plan to from 7 to 10 years to prove to the Soviets that there would not be a showdown by free elections for an extended period, while the Mixed German Committee provided for in the Peace Plan presumably would be in operation.

iii) Other proposals have stressed that Western initiatives relating to European security arrangements might provide such "sweetening". Ambassador Thompson has suggested that United States troop reductions in Germany, and particularly limitations on West German armament, might constitute a sufficiently fresh approach to the German question to have enough attraction for Khrushchev to get him to postpone action on West Berlin at least while it was being explored.

iv) In preparing for the Geneva and Summit Conferences, the Western Powers have considered the possibility, as a tactical matter, of expressing willingness to discuss the principles of a peace treaty with Germany (presumably in a deputy or expert group) if it appeared at some point during the conference that a Western offer to discuss peace treaty principles might tip the balance in favor of preventing Soviet unilateral action against the Western position in Berlin. There are a number of objections to such action, and the French and Germans, in particular, have expressed grave reserves about the whole idea. In any event, the possibility is still open to consideration as a tactical expedient under certain circumstances.

From the Western point of view, it is doubtful whether any of the foregoing ideas would really contribute much in a practical sense to the process of achieving German reunification though ostensibly related thereto. It seems unlikely that anything could be added to the Western Peace Plan of Geneva which would make it a negotiable basis for a general settlement within which the Berlin question would assume its proper proportion. The suggestion has been made, however, that the nuclear armament of Germany might still provide a possible bargaining counter. Senator Mansfield has recently revived the suggestion for compensatory United States and Soviet troop withdrawals from

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Germany as a possible basis for a settlement. In the past such proposals have always floundered in the face of strong opposition both within the United States Government and among our NATO Allies. Whether, in this period of rapidly advancing technologies and definitive commitment to long-term weapons strategy within the Western Alliance, there is any real room for flexibility in this area is beyond the scope of the present memorandum.

b. Temporary Geneva-Type Arrangement

A proposal for an interim arrangement on Berlin to last for a specified number of years might conceivably proceed along the lines of the Western proposals at Geneva of July 28, perhaps with certain modifications or additions. The unacceptable Soviet proposals handed to the French on May 9, 1960 envisaged an interim arrangement of sorts, though the position of the Western Powers at the end of the time period of two years would be untenable. Is there any real basis for assuming that the positions of the Western Powers and that of the Soviets could be brought close enough together to allow for some sort of compromise agreement on an interim arrangement for Berlin?

On the difficult issue of "rights", the British (in a memorandum which they gave us in the fall of 1959, but which they did not circulate either to the French or Germans) seemed prepared to accept an oral assurance by Khrushchev at the Summit that the Soviets would not take unilateral action purporting to end Western rights, at least until after negotiations at the end of the period of the interim agreement for a more lasting settlement had broken down. There seems to be agreement, however, among the other three Western Powers, that they cannot safely go beyond the July 28 proposals in any important respect. It will be recalled that the Western Foreign Ministers in Geneva agreed on certain minor fall-back positions for use in the event that the Soviets appeared to be prepared seriously to negotiate on the July 28 proposals.

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In preparing for the Summit Conference, the Western Powers agreed on a set of "Essential Conditions for an Arrangement for West Berlin" as well as certain "Possible Improvements in the Western Proposals of July 28, 1959". The precise use to which these would be put in actual negotiations with the Soviets was not agreed, and while the various "improvements" were obviously desirable from the Western point of view, there was no reason to suppose that they would be acceptable to the Soviets. The idea that the West is in a position to improve its situation in Berlin to any marked degree hardly seems realistic, although this consideration has not deterred the Germans and the Berliners from making rather far-reaching proposals for Western demands to be made during negotiations, the achievement of which would constitute a major diplomatic defeat for the Soviets in a situation where they admittedly negotiate from a position of geographical and tactical strength.

Abstracting from what might be politically acceptable, the Berlin situation can, of course, be broken down into a number of elements which are particularly objectionable to the Soviet Union and the GDR on which the West might conceivably make further concessions. There is West Berlin's role in the continuing heavy refugee flow, as a center of Western intelligence activity, and as a show window for the East and center of psychological and political pressure on the entire satellite area, particularly the GDR. The Western proposals at Geneva envisaged certain self-imposed restrictions in the propaganda and "activities" field, though these were defined in very general terms. Apart from the impossibility of obtaining quadripartite agreement, it is difficult to see how the West could go much beyond Geneva without undermining the entire rationale of its position in Berlin.

There is little indication, therefore, that an interim arrangement of the Geneva-type, unaccompanied by impossible conditions, will be a feasible objective. It seems likely, however, that, in any negotiations with the Soviets, the subject of an interim arrangement will inevitably arise as a logical consequence of the Geneva discussions. The Soviets will presumably put forward something along the lines of their May 9,

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1960 proposals, and the West might wish to start off with an offer along the lines of the "improved" Western proposals for an interim arrangement agreed by the Four Western Foreign Ministers on May 14, 1960. These sets of proposals are obviously irreconcilable, but at least an abbreviated Geneva-type exercise would probably be necessary at this point until it became clearly evident that there was no basis for a meeting of minds on any sort of interim arrangements.

c. All-Berlin Proposal

The Western position paper for the Summit Conference noted that, at a suitable point, it might be tactically advantageous to put forward an All-Berlin proposal even if such a proposal is considered nonnegotiable with the Soviets. In this connection the Four-Power Working Group prepared the text of such a possible All-Berlin agreement for tabling at the Conference. This text is available should it prove expedient for the West to advance an All-Berlin proposal in the future. Despite continuing German (and West Berlin) misgivings about the dangers of the All-Berlin approach, the other Western Powers have never regarded acceptable proposals of this type as seriously negotiable with the Soviets though perhaps useful to put forward for tactical and propaganda reasons at a suitable stage in discussions with the Soviets. There is no reason to suppose that this will not continue to be the case.

d. Guaranteed City

The proposal for a "guaranteed city" has been discussed extensively within the Department and represents perhaps the most acceptable arrangement on Berlin which can be devised involving a change of juridical basis for the Western presence in the city. (Another type of proposal based on the same premise which has been given consideration is that of some UN trusteeship arrangement, but this has been held less desirable.) While President Eisenhower was generally familiar with the continuance of the "guaranteed city" proposal, it has never been discussed within the United States Government or put forward to our Western Allies. In essence, it involves agreement by the Four Powers to guarantee the security of Western military and civil access to West Berlin, with the Western Powers agreeing

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simultaneously to suspend the exercise of their occupation rights so long as the agreement was otherwise being observed. The West Berlin authorities would be empowered to request that foreign troops up to a stated ceiling be stationed in West Berlin and each Western Power would agree to supply and maintain any forces so requested. Full and unrestricted access for these troops would be guaranteed. The agreement would be registered with the UN and a representative of the UN Secretary General might observe its fulfillment.

While such a "guaranteed city" arrangement would obviously be preferable to anything along the lines of the Soviet Free City proposal, it involves many hazards. For example, its advocacy by the United States at the present time would probably cause a political crisis within the Western Alliance, since it would be interpreted as a sign of weakness and loss of determination to maintain our position in Berlin. Neither the French nor the West Germans would find it acceptable and it could probably only be advanced within a political and psychological climate of considerably greater detente between the East and West than now exists. However, given the division of Germany for an indefinite future, and with the passage of time rendering the Western occupation of Berlin increasingly anachronistic, a formula along these lines will presumably continue to have a certain appeal.

e. Solution C of the April 1959 London Working Group Report

The quadripartite tactics paper prepared for the Summit provided that, if an impasse had been reached at the conference and it seemed that the Soviets would proceed to take unilateral action purporting to end their responsibilities in the access field, the Western Powers might wish to consider making a proposal involving a series of interlocking but unilateral declarations on Berlin access aimed at achieving a freezing of existing procedures, with ultimate Soviet responsibility being maintained, although implementation might be by the East German authorities. This is essentially Solution C which was devised by the Four-Power London Working Group in April 1959. (See Tab B for fuller description as prepared by Four-Power Working

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Group for last year's Summit Meeting.) Since then it has had a somewhat checkered existence, but has survived as an ingenious way of dealing with a situation which may in fact arise whatever the Western Powers may want or do. It is possible to vary its complexity and specific content (for example, by adding similar unilateral declarations on propaganda activity and by introducing a UN role), but the access problem remains its focal point.

One aspect of Solution C, which was devised primarily for use in negotiations with the Soviets, is that its basic approach could conceivably be applied to a situation in which such formal negotiations do not take place or, if they do and have failed, to a subsequent stage of developments. In any event, from a purely tactical point of view, it would seem unwise to open any negotiation with the Soviets by putting forward Solution C. If used at all, it would seem most effective as a fallback position after a process of elimination of other possibilities has taken place.

f. Tacit Temporary Freeze

Although this seemed like a possible approach in 1960, it may no longer have much relevance in view of what seems to be Soviet determination to resolve the Berlin question in 1961. The precise modalities of such a freeze would depend on circumstances, but the essential thought was that, since neither standing on our Geneva position, nor discussing German unity and disarmament, nor proposing an immediate change of status in Berlin seemed very promising means of reducing an agreement and of forestalling unilateral action by the Soviets, a further holding action would be preferable. This would have had as objective freezing the situation in Berlin until after the German elections in September 1961.

Under one variant it was suggested that such a holding action might consist of a tacit agreement to put Berlin on ice for eighteen months or so by setting up a Four-Power Working Group to consider means of reducing frictions in Berlin and to report back at the expiration of the indicated time period. If the Soviets wished some more explicit agreement for the interim period, it was suggested that we could also propose concomitant

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unilateral declarations by both sides along the lines of Solution C, without mentioning troop reductions or attempting to conclude the kind of formal and comprehensive agreement which would have to deal with the "rights" issue.

In this case the assumption might be that, in the event the Working Group were unable to arrive at agreement, the period of eighteen months would be extended indefinitely, with the Solution C procedures continuing to prevail. A tacit understanding on both sides would, of course, be necessary that this was the best way to deal with an otherwise irresolvable situation. One disadvantage of the use of Solution C in such a context would be its identification with the temporary period to a point where its use as basis of a more lasting de facto arrangement might be nullified.

g. Delaying Action Without Specific Substantive Arrangement

As a palliative for anticipated failure to reach any agreement in the next round of negotiations, we might simply try to reach agreement on some machinery to continue a negotiating procedure, for example, at the level of the Foreign Ministers or Deputy Foreign Ministers, without pressing for a more formal kind of interim arrangement. This was essentially the preferred Western position at the abortive Summit. Whether it has any relevance to the situation in 1961 is doubtful; in any event, the Western Powers would obviously have to be prepared to deal with a Soviet refusal to delay indefinitely on Berlin in the absence of any progress towards agreement.

h. Mitigated Breakdown of Negotiations

Given a failure to find any basis for agreement on Berlin in the next round of talks, it might be possible to achieve some sort of tacit understanding with the Soviets so that the claimed effects of their signing a separate peace treaty with the GDR would be mitigated to the extent of preserving the essentials of the Western position in Berlin without an explicit new agreement, and thus avoid a major crisis or blow to Western prestige. This might likewise involve some of the elements of Solution C,

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probably, although not necessarily, without their being embodied in any formal declarations. Such an arrangement could subject the Western Powers to strong erosive pressures to deal with the GDR, but might under certain circumstances be preferable to an absolute breakdown of negotiations, unqualified signature of a peace treaty between the Soviets and the GDR, and the execution of our contingency plans.

1. Complete Breakdown of Negotiations with the Soviets

This would presumably precipitate the situation for which Western contingency plans have been prepared, i.e., to cope with the eventuality that the Soviets will sign a peace treaty with the GDR and turn over all checkpoint controls to the GDR authorities. It seems unlikely that the Western Powers would wish to enter the last round of negotiations deliberately intending to force their breakdown and hence the probable entry into effect of our contingency plans. They may, however, find the Soviet position so unreasonable that a breakdown of negotiations at some point becomes impossible to avoid. There are some who believe that the actual implementation of Allied contingency plans would be the most desirable course of action given continued impasse on Berlin and Soviet determination to proceed with unilateral action in turning over their responsibilities to the GDR. The hope would be that the situation would stabilize at some relatively early and still acceptable stage of the contingency plans. The Soviets might conceivably accept this as the lesser of evils under the circumstances, but it is hard to anticipate in advance how this might work out.

Conclusions

16. However impelling the urge to find some new approach to the Berlin problem, the ineluctable facts of the situation strictly limit the practical courses of action open to the West. The history of the Berlin crisis since November 1958 gives little reason for thinking that a lasting settlement can be devised which, under current circumstances, will prove acceptable to both East and West.

17. A vital component of the Western position is the maintenance of a credible deterrent against unilateral Soviet action.

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Without this the full geographic weaknesses of the Western position in Berlin will have decisive weight in any negotiation. Thought should be given to the possibility of other deterrents than the pure threat of ultimate thermonuclear war.

18. Further thought should also be given to the possibility of providing some all-German "sweetening" for the continuing discussion of the Berlin question with the Soviets. This should be done, however, in full awareness of the unlikelihood that any real step towards German reunification can be achieved within the calculable future under circumstances acceptable to the West.

19. In planning for further negotiations with the Soviets, the Western Powers must realistically expect that they will once again be forced to discuss the question of Berlin in isolation. While it is unlikely that a satisfactory interim arrangement on the Geneva-type can be achieved, it will probably be necessary and desirable to prove this by actual exchanges during the course of a conference. Under certain ensuing circumstances the Western Powers might find it desirable to aim at a stabilization of existing access procedures but allowing for an East German role along the lines of Solution C, or alternatively they might find it necessary to contemplate the execution of their contingency plans.

Attachments:

Tab A - Soviet Proposals on Berlin

Tab B - Solution C

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THE BERLIN PROBLEM IN 1961The Quest for a New Approach

1. After more than two years since the original Khrushchev threat of November 1958, unilaterally to terminate Western rights in Berlin, the Three Occupying Powers and the Federal Republic find themselves in a frustrating and worrisome situation. Despite the temporary lull in harassment of access and recent East German concessions permitting the restoration of interzonal trade arrangements, we know that, whenever it suits their purposes, the Soviets and the East Germans can again precipitate an active crisis and restore Berlin to the front pages of the world press.

2. Now this is a thoroughly unsatisfactory state of affairs for the West. It inevitably gives rise to the desire for some new approach.

Critics of Western policy castigate it for immobility, lack of imagination, and failure to seize the initiative, and even those who are aware of the complexities and limitations inherent in our position cannot but hope that somewhere, somehow, a new and resolving formula can be found. In anticipation of further Soviet pressures within the coming months, it may be useful to review the status of the Berlin question and the approaches realistically open to us.

Soviet Objectives

3. Consideration of what can be done about Berlin must necessarily start with some estimate of Soviet objectives. Allowing for variations in emphasis, two broad explanatory theories have been advanced: (a) that the Soviets are using Berlin essentially as a lever to achieve their wider purpose of obtaining

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
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recognition of the GDR and consolidation of the satellite bloc, or (b) that West Berlin is a primary objective in itself



4. Why, however, did the Soviets do specifically what they did in November 1958, and why have they been deterred from proceeding along their threatened unilateral path during the ensuing period?

The Development of the Crisis

5. The Berlin crisis has gone through four broad phases:

a. Following upon the Soviet note of November 27, 1958, there was an initial period of mutual restatement of position and exchanges of notes leading up to the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers which began on May 11, 1959. This was a period of intensive diplomatic activity among the Western powers during which they drew up the Western Peace Plan and made considerable progress in their contingency planning.

b. The period of the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers (May-August 1959) during the course of which the West agreed to discuss Berlin outside the context of German reunification and advanced proposals (rejected by the Soviets) for an "interim arrangement" on Berlin. The Soviets in turn made unacceptable proposals for an "interim arrangement".

c. The period between the Camp David talks and the collapse of the Paris Summit Meeting in May 1960. This likewise

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
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was a period of intensive Western diplomatic activity and many preparatory meetings.

d. The post-Summit period of relative diplomatic quiescence and of further Soviet postponement of threatened unilateral action pending the inauguration of a new American administration. GDR harassment of German civilian access provoked Western countermeasures which, in turn, led to GDR concessions, and by the end of 1960 the situation in and about Berlin had returned to as near normal as it ever gets.

6. It is reasonable to assume that, in November of 1958, the Soviets expected the combination of threat, pressure, and offer to negotiate to lead to a collapse of Western determination and acceptance of something along the lines of their free city proposal. Their subsequent postponement of what they claimed to be inevitable, their willingness to wait until some further negotiation or some other event had occurred, may be attributed to Soviet doubt that they could take the threatened unilateral action without precipitating a major crisis involving the risk of war.



an element of doubt has presumably persisted up to now sufficient to have deterred the Soviets from unilateral action.

7. Considered purely as a holding operation, Western efforts since November 1958 have been fairly successful. Nothing essential has changed in Berlin; the city continues to prosper economically; and the morale of the Berliners, despite some ups and downs, continues to be good. Moreover, since the initial Khrushchev threat, more than 350,000 refugees have come from East Germany to the West, the great majority through Berlin -- a

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
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further demographic drain which an already underpopulated GDR could ill afford.

The Western Approach in 1958-1960

8. From the outset, the Four Western Powers principally concerned have differed to some extent in both their appraisal of the situation and their estimate of desirable policy. These differences have never developed to the point of open disagreement (except in press leaks), and a fine show of Western unity was maintained at the Geneva Conference and the abortive Summit. However, the variations in approach which have emerged during the preparatory work for conferences presumably remain a constant factor.



9. In developing the Western position on Germany and Berlin, the Four Powers have passed through phases somewhat analogous to the four noted above. During the initial phase prior to the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers, the West still operated essentially on the assumption that discussion of the Berlin problem should be kept within the context of the all-German question. Within the State Department various new ideas were considered for incorporation into a Western package proposal to replace the Eden Plan of the 1955 Geneva Conference. After months of discussions within a series of Four-Power Working Group sessions in Washington, Paris, and London, some of these ideas survived in the Western Peace Plan put forward at Geneva on May 14, 1959. It is highly questionable whether even a more forthcoming version of

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11. It may be noted that, prior to the collapse of the Summit in Paris, the Soviets gave President de Gaulle the text of certain new proposals on Berlin (Tab A). While couched in apparently reasonable language, these were, in some respects, even less satisfactory than their final proposals at Geneva in 1959, and were clearly designed to lead to the ultimate goal of a Free City of West Berlin via an interim arrangement during the course of which the Western Powers would be allowed to bow out of their present position in Berlin. Khrushchev has on several occasions since intimated that these would be the opening Soviet proposals at the next meeting on the subject.

Formulation of the Western Position for 1961

12. The quest for an abiding solution to the Berlin problem is essentially a quest for a satisfactory context. In isolation Berlin will always be a problem, though conceivably less acute if some sort of modus vivendi can be found. It is therefore worth asking once again whether we cannot discover such a broader context.

13. In this search, Chancellor Adenauer has for more than a year emphasized that a real solution to the German problem (and therefore automatically the Berlin problem) could only come within the framework of a general settlement on disarmament. There is certainly much validity in this prescription. If the United States and the Soviet Union should actually be able to agree on the broad lines of a disarmament arrangement, this would undoubtedly do much to relieve pressures on Berlin. We cannot, unfortunately, rely on this happening within the next six to eight months.

14. It may be that Soviet interest in eventual achievement of an agreement on disarmament, and in other areas where, for whatever reasons, we may assume that both East and West have somewhat similar objectives, would provide the basis for a meaningful approach to the Soviets in an attempt to create a proper psychological framework for discussion of the Berlin question. Such an approach, calculated to impress on them the serious results which any unilateral action with respect to Berlin would have, might help to add to the Western deterrent


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
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at a time when some believe that the ultimate threat of thermo-nuclear war is becoming less credible.



15. It is possible to dream up many different proposals on Berlin, each with its own variants. A distinction, however, between the merely theoretically conceivable and the conceivably possible, narrows down the field for further consideration. All of the approaches indicated below have, of course, come under review to a greater or lesser extent, but it may be useful at this point to note their main characteristics in attempting to appraise the practical courses of action open to the West.




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Conclusions

16. However impelling the urge to find some new approach to the Berlin problem, the ineluctable facts of the situation strictly limit the practical courses of action open to the West. The history of the Berlin crisis since November 1958 gives little reason for thinking that a lasting settlement can be devised which, under current circumstances, will prove acceptable to both East and West.

17. A vital component of the Western position is the maintenance of a credible deterrent against unilateral Soviet action.

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Without this the full geographic weaknesses of the Western position in Berlin will have decisive weight in any negotiation. Thought should be given to the possibility of other deterrents than the pure threat of ultimate thermonuclear war.

18. Further thought should also be given to the possibility of providing some all-German "sweetening" for the continuing discussion of the Berlin question with the Soviets. This should be done, however, in full awareness of the unlikelihood that any real step towards German reunification can be achieved within the calculable future under circumstances acceptable to the West.

19. In planning for further negotiations with the Soviets, the Western Powers must realistically expect that they will once again be forced to discuss the question of Berlin in isolation. While it is unlikely that a satisfactory interim arrangement on the Geneva-type can be achieved, it will probably be necessary and desirable to prove this by actual exchanges during the course of a conference. Under certain ensuing circumstances the Western Powers might find it desirable to aim at a stabilization of existing access procedures but allowing for an East German role along the lines of Solution C, or alternatively they might find it necessary to contemplate the execution of their contingency plans.

Attachments:

Tab A - Soviet Proposals on Berlin

Tab B - Solution C

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SECRETMEETINGS OF CHIEFS OF STATE AND HEADS OF GOVERNMENT
PARIS, MAY, 1960U.S. DELEGATION TRANSLATION OF FRENCH TRANSLATION
OF RUSSIAN TEXT HANDED TO FRENCH BY SOVIET AMBASSADOR
IN PARIS ON MAY 9, 1960PROPOSALS OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

The Soviet Government favors proceeding immediately to the signature of a peace treaty with the two German states. However, since such a solution of the problem raises objections on the part of the Western Powers, the Soviet Government, which as always strives to achieve concerted action on the German question among the four principal members of the anti-Hitler coalition, is prepared meanwhile to agree to an interim solution. This interim solution would consist of the signature of a temporary (provisoire) agreement on West Berlin, suited to prepare conditions for the ultimate transformation of West Berlin into a free city and the adoption of measures leading to the preparation of the future peace settlement. In this connection the Soviet Government proposes the following:

1. To conclude a temporary agreement for two years relating to West Berlin. The agreement would include approximately the same list of questions as those which had already been discussed in 1959 by the Foreign Ministers at Geneva and, without bringing any radical change to the actual status of West Berlin, would, however, open the way to the elaboration of a new and agreed status for the city corresponding to peacetime conditions.

The temporary agreement should envisage the reduction of the effective strength of the forces of the Three Powers in West Berlin, which reduction could take place progressively in several stages. It would likewise be suitable to put in writing the intention expressed by the Three Powers not to place in West Berlin any kind of nuclear weapons or missile installations.

The agreement should moreover include a commitment to take measures to prohibit the use of the territory of West Berlin

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BY H22 6/29/77

as a base of subversive activity and of hostile propaganda directed against other states. Measures concerning the prohibition of subversive activities and of hostile propaganda with respect to West Berlin might likewise be envisaged under an appropriate form.

In the accord account would also be taken of the declarations of the Soviet Union and of the GDR concerning the maintenance of the communications of West Berlin with the outside world in the form in which they exist at present for the duration of the temporary agreement.

The engagements concerning the GDR could in that event take a form which would not signify diplomatic recognition of the GDR by the Western Powers who would be parties to the agreement.

To supervise the fulfillment of the obligations flowing from the temporary agreement regarding agreed measures in West Berlin, and to take, in case of necessity, measures assuring the fulfillment of the agreement reached, a committee could be set up composed of representatives of the French Republic, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States of America.

2. At the same time that they conclude an agreement on West Berlin, the Four Powers will make a declaration inviting the two German states to take advantage of the interim period fixed by the agreement in order to attempt to arrive at a common point of view on the German question. Contact could be established between the two German states by means of the creation of an all-German committee or under some other form acceptable to them.

In formulating these proposals, the Soviet Union proceeds from the thought that, if the German states refuse to engage in conversation with one another, or if, at the expiration of the temporary agreement, it becomes clearly evident that they are not able to come to an understanding, the Four Powers will sign a peace treaty with the two German states or with one of them, as they would judge it desirable. Of course, if the GDR and the GFR succeed in reaching an agreement, there will be no obstacle to the conclusion of a single peace treaty for all of Germany. Moreover, measures will be taken in order to transform West Berlin into a

free city.

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free city. As far as the statute of the free city of West Berlin is concerned, the USSR would prefer to elaborate this in common with France, the United Kingdom and the United States.

In proposing the transformation of West Berlin into a free city the Soviet Union does not in any way wish to damage the interests of the Western Powers, to change the present mode of life in West Berlin or to attempt to integrate this city within the GDR. The Soviet proposal derives from the existing situation and tends to normalize the atmosphere in West Berlin while taking account of the interests of all parties. The creation of a free city would not damage the economic and financial relations of West Berlin with other states, including the GFR. The free city would be able to establish as it pleases its external, political, economic, commercial, scientific and cultural relations with all states and international organizations. Completely free relations with the external world would be assured to it.

The population of West Berlin would receive sure guarantees of the defense of its interests, with the Governments of the Soviet Union, of the United States, of France and of the United Kingdom assuming the required obligations in order to guarantee the precise execution of the conditions of agreement on the free city. The Soviet Union states that it also favors participation of the United Nations in the guarantees given to the free city. It goes without saying that, in the event of the reunification of Germany, the maintenance of the special situation of the free city of West Berlin would no longer have any basis.

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CONFIDENTIAL

January 28, 1961

Dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing a brief chronology of the principal events relating to Berlin which have occurred since the ending of the first Berlin blockade in 1949.

The period covered falls logically into two parts: that from the end of the blockade until November 1958, when the current "Berlin crisis" began; and the period of the crisis itself since that time.

The first period was characterized by the readjustment of relationships between the Western Allies and West Germany, between the Federal Republic and West Berlin, and between the USSR and East Germany. The last of these in particular set the stage for the Soviet efforts to dislodge the Allies from West Berlin which began in 1958.

Soviet tactics to force Western abandonment of Berlin which, with the measures taken by the West to counter them, dominate the second period, have gone through two general phases. The first was a direct threat to Allied access rights to West Berlin. This threat took the form of the stated intention of the USSR to sign a peace treaty with East Germany and turn over to the latter the control over Allied access to the city. In the second phase, which has developed since the abortive Summit meeting of May 1960, the Soviets have substituted a gradual de facto transfer to the East Germans of control over Berlin, and in this framework harassment has centered on West German-Berlin relations. A return to the earlier tactic may be expected and may in fact be heralded by Khrushchev's reiteration on January 6 in Moscow of his threat to sign a separate peace treaty.

Meanwhile, relative quiescence has prevailed since Western, particularly West German, countermeasures brought an easing of East German harassment of Berlin access late in 1960.

The President,
The White House.

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There are indications that Mr. Khrushchev will be returning to the Berlin question in due course, perhaps soon. The chronology will give you a brief outline of the past pending a full briefing.

Faithfully yours,

/S/ DEAN RUSK

Dean Rusk

Enclosure:
Chronology.

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BERLIN CHRONOLOGY

5a

SINCE THE END OF THE BERLIN BLOCKADE

1949

May 4

UN Security Council Representatives of the US, UK, France and USSR issued a communique indicating agreement by their governments to remove by May 12 restrictions on communication, transport and trade between Berlin and the two zones of Germany, and to hold a Council of Foreign Ministers meeting to discuss Berlin.

May 12

The Berlin blockade ended.

June 20

The Sixth Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, meeting in Paris to consider Germany and Berlin, issued a communique agreeing to "maintain" the "New York Agreement of May 4, 1949" and to hold consultations for the purpose, i.e., of mitigating the effects of the division of Germany and Berlin, notably respecting trade, economic and financial relations, travel ... etc.

September 21

The Federal Republic of Germany officially came into being with the entry into force of the Occupation Statute and the Charter of the Allied High Commission.

October 7

The German Democratic Republic, with Berlin as its capital, was officially proclaimed.

October 10

The Soviet Military Administration transferred administrative functions to the East German Government.

1950

January 27 -
February 1

The East German Government announced that Western traffic into or through the Soviet Zone or Soviet Sector would need permits from East Germany (January 27). Supervision of East-West boundaries in Germany was transferred by the Soviets to East Germany (February 1).

October 1

The Constitution of Land Berlin entered into effect in West Berlin.

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State (NLK-77-211)
BY MEE NARS, DATE 6/29/77

1951

October 8

The Allied Commandants in Berlin agreed to a procedure whereby "the Berlin House of Representatives may take over a Federal law by means of a Mantelgesetz (cover law) which states that the provisions of the Federal Law are valid in Berlin". This, together with the "Third Transfer Law" of January 9, 1952, which defined the position of Berlin in the system of Federal Finance Administration, have been key elements in the legal relationship of Berlin and the Federal Republic.

1952

May 27

Following the signature in Bonn of the Contractual Agreements between the Western Powers and the Federal Republic, and concurrently with the signature of the European Defense Community Treaty in Paris, the three Western Foreign Ministers issued a declaration including the following reference to Berlin:

"The security and welfare of Berlin and the maintenance of the position of the three powers there are regarded by the three powers as essential elements of the peace of the free world in the present international situation. Accordingly, they will maintain armed forces within the territory of Berlin as long as their responsibilities require it. They therefore affirm that they will treat any attack against Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon their forces and themselves."

1953

June 16 - 17

Rioting took place in East Berlin and in the Soviet Zone against the Communist regime.

1955

May 5

The October 1954 Paris Agreements entered into force; the German Federal Republic thus became a sovereign country and a member of NATO.

In Berlin, the Three Powers issued the "Declaration on Berlin", which is the present basis for the relationships between the Germans and the occupying authorities in the city.

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1958 cont'd.

November 27

In notes to the US, UK, France and the Federal Republic of Germany, the USSR stated it regarded as null and void the September 12, 1944 and related agreements on the occupation of Berlin (the agreements also concerned the rest of Germany but were still significant only with respect to Berlin.) From these agreements proceeded Allied access and other rights in Berlin. The notes suggested a "free city" status for West Berlin, and stated the USSR would maintain the current access procedures for six months to allow time for negotiating a new status. If the period was not used for that purpose, the USSR would negotiate with East Germany the transfer to the latter of the functions "temporarily" performed by the Soviets under the agreements referred to.

These notes touched off the "Berlin crisis", which in one degree or another has continued since then.

December 7

Elections for the Berlin legislature gave the Socialist Party (SPD) 52.5 percent and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) 37.6 percent. No other party received the five percent required to be represented in the legislature. (The Communist SED received 1.9 percent.) The resulting government was an SPD-CDU coalition.

December 14

The Foreign Ministers of the US, UK and France, after discussing the Berlin question in Paris, stated they found the Soviet November 27 repudiation of its obligations unacceptable.

December 16

The NATO Council, in a declaration on Berlin, associated itself with the December 14 Tripartite Statement. It also declared, i.e., that NATO member states could not approve a Berlin solution which jeopardized the right of the three western powers to remain in Berlin as long as their responsibilities required it, or which did not assure free access to the city.

December 31

The US, UK and France replied to the Soviet November 27 note, stating they would continue to hold the USSR responsible for carrying out its obligations in Berlin. They stated, however, a willingness to discuss Berlin in the context of the German problem as a whole, though not under coercion of threats or ultimatums.

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1959

January 10

In a note to the US, proposing a peace conference on Germany, the USSR rejected the Allied suggestion that Berlin be discussed in the context of the German problem.

February 16

The US proposed to the USSR a four-power Foreign Ministers Conference on all aspects of Germany.

April 4

The USSR protested the flight above 10,000 feet of an American military aircraft in the corridor to Berlin.

April 13

The US rejected the Soviet April 4 protest, stating it recognized no limitation on the altitude of such flights.

May 11-
June 20;

July 13-
August 5

Following further note exchanges, the Foreign Ministers conference proposed by the US on February 16 was held at Geneva. The Western Powers advanced the Western Peace Plan for the achievement in phases of German reunification and a European security arrangement. After two weeks of inconclusive discussion of the all-German question, the Allies agreed to discuss Berlin out of the context of the German problem. The Allies and the USSR each advanced proposals for an interim solution of the Berlin problem, each proposal being rejected by the other side.

September 26-27

In discussions at Camp David, Khrushchey and President Eisenhower agreed that negotiations would be reopened on Berlin, the former giving assurances that the Soviets would in the meanwhile take no unilateral action and the President agreeing the negotiations would not be indefinitely prolonged.

December 19-21

Western Heads of Government (US, UK, France and, in part, Germany) met in Paris to discuss matters relating to an East-West summit conference.

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1960

- May 4 The NATO Council issued a statement reaffirming its December 16, 1958 declaration on Berlin.
- May 16 The abortive Four Power Summit Meeting took place in Paris.
- May 20 Speaking in Berlin on the breakdown of the summit negotiations, Khrushchev stated that the summit conference would have to be postponed six to eight months, until after the US elections. With the postponement of the conference, he impliedly postponed any critical USSR action against the West in Berlin for that period.
- August 29 The East German Government announced the institution on August 31 of a special five-day restriction on the entry into East Berlin by residents of the Federal Republic and threatened to harass travel to West Berlin by West Germans attending meetings of an expellee group and a group representing relatives of war prisoners.
- September 8 The East German Government decreed that citizens of the Federal Republic required permits issued by East Germany to enter East Berlin.
- This was the most important of a number of actions since the Summit meeting designed to extend East German de facto control over West Berlin and concentrating in this respect on relations between the Federal Republic and West Berlin rather than on the Allied position in that city, which had in the past been the focus of harassment.
- September 11 The US, UK and France, as retaliation for the East German September 8 decree, suspended issuance of Temporary Travel Documents, required by East Germans traveling to Western countries which do not recognize the German Democratic Republic. After September 24, TTDs were issued only to certain limited categories of travelers.
- September 13 East Germany announced it would no longer accept West German passports "unlawfully issued" to West Berliners for travel to bloc countries; it would enter the visa on a special sheet to be attached to the identity card issued by West Berlin. (Polish and Czech representatives in West Berlin made similar announcements two days later, as did the USSR on September 28).

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By <u>SF</u> NARA, Date <u>10/26/92</u>

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Attachment

MEETINGS OF CHIEFS OF STATE AND HEADS OF GOVERNMENT
PARIS, MAY, 1960

U.S. DELEGATION TRANSLATION OF FRENCH TRANSLATION
OF RUSSIAN TEXT HANDED TO FRENCH BY SOVIET AMBASSADOR
IN PARIS ON MAY 9, 1960

PROPOSALS OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

The Soviet Government favors proceeding immediately to the signature of a peace treaty with the two German states. However, since such a solution of the problem raises objections on the part of the Western Powers, the Soviet Government, which as always strives to achieve concerted action on the German question among the four principal members of the anti-Hitler coalition, is prepared meanwhile to agree to an interim solution. This interim solution would consist of the signature of a temporary (provisoire) agreement on West Berlin, suited to prepare conditions for the ultimate transformation of West Berlin into a free city and the adoption of measures leading to the preparation of the future peace settlement. In this connection the Soviet Government proposes the following:

1. To conclude a temporary agreement for two years relating to West Berlin. The agreement would include approximately the same list of questions as those which had already been discussed in 1959 by the Foreign Ministers at Geneva and, without bringing any radical change to the actual status of West Berlin, would, however, open the way to the elaboration of a new and agreed status for the city corresponding to peacetime conditions.

The temporary agreement should envisage the reduction of the effective strength of the forces of the Three Powers in West Berlin, which reduction could take place progressively in several stages. It would likewise be suitable to put in writing the intention expressed by the Three Powers not to place in West Berlin any kind of nuclear weapons or missile installations.

The agreement should moreover include a commitment to take measures to prohibit the use of the territory of West Berlin as a base for subversive activity and of hostile propaganda directed against other states. Measures concerning the prohibition of subversive activities and of hostile propaganda with respect to West Berlin might likewise be envisaged under an appropriate form.

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In the accord account would also be taken of the declarations of the Soviet Union and of the GDR concerning the maintenance of the communications of West Berlin with the outside world in the form in which they exist at present for the duration of the temporary agreement.

The engagements concerning the GDR could in that event take a form which would not signify diplomatic recognition of the GDR by the Western Powers who would be parties to the agreement.

To supervise the fulfillment of the obligations flowing from the temporary agreement regarding agreed measures in West Berlin, and to take, in case of necessity, measures assuring the fulfillment of the agreement reached, a committee could be set up composed of representatives of the French Republic, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States of America.

2. At the same time that they conclude an agreement on West Berlin, the Four Powers will make a declaration inviting the two German states to take advantage of the interim period fixed by the agreement in order to attempt to arrive at a common point of view on the German question. Contact could be established between the two German states by means of the creation of an all-German committee or under some other form acceptable to them.

In formulating these proposals, the Soviet Union proceeds from the thought that, if the German states refuse to engage in conversation with one another, or if, at the expiration of the temporary agreement, it becomes clearly evident that they are not able to come to an understanding, the Four Powers will sign a peace treaty with the two German states or with one of them, as they would judge it desirable. Of course, if the GDR and the GFR succeed in reaching an agreement, there will be no obstacle to the conclusion of a single peace treaty for all of Germany. Moreover, measures will be taken in order to transform West Berlin into a free city. As far as the statute of the free city of West Berlin is concerned, the USSR would prefer to elaborate this in common with France, the United Kingdom and the United States.

In proposing the transformation of West Berlin into a free city the Soviet Union does not in any way wish to damage the interests of the Western Powers, to change the present mode of life in West Berlin or to attempt to integrate this city within the GDR. The Soviet proposal derives

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from the existing situation and tends to normalize the atmosphere in West Berlin while taking account of the interests of all parties. The creation of a free city would not damage the economic and financial relations of West Berlin with other states, including the GFR. The free city would be able to establish as it pleases its external, political, economic, commercial, scientific and cultural relations with all states and international organizations. Completely free relations with the external world would be assured to it.

The population of West Berlin would receive sure guarantees of the defense of its interests, with the Governments of the Soviet Union, of the United States, of France and of the United Kingdom assuming the required obligations in order to guarantee the precise execution of the conditions of agreement on the free city. The Soviet Union states that it also favors participation of the United Nations in the guarantees given to the free city. It goes without saying that, in the event of the reunification of Germany, the maintenance of the special situation of the free city of West Berlin would no longer have any basis.

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Annex II

POSSIBLE ALL-GERMAN CONTEXT FOR BERLIN SOLUTION

Enhancing Status of GDR

1. One of the Soviet objectives in applying pressure on Berlin seems to be to enhance the status of the GDR so as to move towards de facto dealings by the West, although not necessarily recognition, as part of a process of freezing the status quo in Central Europe. The memorandum which the British gave us in the fall of 1959 proposed, for example, sweetening the July 28 Geneva proposals by permitting all-German talks under the cover of a Four-Power Group.
2. A second possible kind of sweetening would involve changes in the Western Peace Plan. Ambassador Thompson in Moscow has suggested an extension of the time period in that plan to seven years to prove to the Soviets that there would not be a showdown by free elections for an extended period, while the Mixed German Committee provided for in the Peace Plan presumably would be in operation.
3. During his recent visit to Washington, Governing Mayor Brandt intimated that a possibility might be to agree with the Soviets that after a specified period of years, perhaps ten or twenty with preference for the former, the Germans would at the end of such a period themselves work out their own reunification. In the meantime nothing would be done to increase tension and the danger of conflict over Germany. This, in effect, would appear to be a tacit but not legal recognition of the division of Germany. There would be a target date, however, as to when reunification might be brought about. Brandt seemed aware that such an approach would involve a considerable degree of de facto recognition of the East German regime but also seemed to feel that the situation could be handled in such a way as not to legalize the division.
4. These various approaches are being further studied with a view to arriving at specific language and some judgment as to their possible usefulness in meeting the Berlin crisis as it may develop in 1961.

European Security Arrangements

5. Other proposals have stressed that Western initiatives relating to security arrangements in Europe might provide such "sweetening".

Ambassador Thompson

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By SF NARA, Date 12/29/92

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Ambassador Thompson has suggested that United States troop reductions in Germany, and particularly limitations on West German armament, might constitute a sufficiently fresh approach to the German question to attract Khrushchev enough to get him to postpone action on West Berlin at least while it was being explored. The idea of compensatory United States and Soviet troop withdrawals from Germany has been periodically revived as a possible basis for a settlement. In the past such proposals have always floundered in the face of strong opposition both within the United States Government and among our NATO Allies, particularly the Germans. It is worth further study whether, in this period of repeatedly advancing technologies and developing NATO weapons policy, there is any real scope for flexibility in this area; but even assuming an American decision to support one of these possibilities, the difficulties of achieving prior agreement among the Western Allies should not be underestimated, since it would inevitably, in the minds of the Europeans, be linked to a fundamental change in United States strategy for Europe.

Oder-Neisse Line

6. Another suggestion is that the West might offer acceptance of the Oder-Neisse Line in exchange for a Berlin corridor, or for some other acceptable arrangement on Berlin. Apart from the difficulty of getting the Federal Republic to agree to a proposal of this kind (which would be considerable), it seems doubtful that any such arrangement would be negotiable with the Soviets. Their objective is stabilization of the satellite bloc, not at the Oder-Neisse Line, but at the present boundary between the GDR and the Federal Republic. The GDR has already accepted the Oder-Neisse Line, and certainly in the short run there would appear to be little to gain from the Soviet point of view in a Western renunciation of any claims beyond the Oder-Neisse. The Soviets presumably fear long-term German irredentism, continuing German dynamism. They would hardly be likely to feel that danger from this source would be removed by a commitment in 1961 that the Oder-Neisse Line was final, any more than present German protestations that any eventual settlement of the border issue would be a peaceful one are likely to be convincing to the Soviets. Whether a renunciation of claims beyond the Oder-Neisse might be a useful element in a more comprehensive all-German package, if one could be devised, is another matter.

Acceptance of Peace Treaty Qualified by Bolz-Zorin Type of Arrangement

7. Assuming the Soviet commitment to the signing of a peace treaty with the GDR to be an important one for them, we might take the line with

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them privately that we cannot, of course, stop the Soviets physically from proceeding with the signing of a peace treaty with the GDR, although we could not approve or underwrite a treaty confirming the division of Germany, and would have to oppose it publicly. On the other hand, we could point out that a major practicable interest to us would be the effect which such a peace treaty would have on our position in Berlin. Provided that arrangements similar to those under the Bolz-Zorin exchange of letters were still continued in effect, the signing of the peace treaty need not necessarily precipitate a crisis involving our position in Berlin. We on our part could try to make the necessary adjustment. It is difficult to see how this essential retention of the status quo would have much appeal to the Soviets unless they consider themselves so far over-extended on Berlin that they would welcome a face-saving formula as not to cover for a significant retreat. The Report of the Four-Power Working Group on Germany including Berlin submitted on February 10, 1961, on "Planning to Deal With a Separate Peace Treaty Between the Soviet Union and German Democratic Republic" did not discuss this possibility, which would admittedly involve a considerable change of emphasis by the West. In any event, it seems unlikely that the Soviets would consider this any real solution from their point of view at an early stage of the confrontation on Berlin when they would still be uncertain how much might be extracted from the West in negotiations. However, it might have more appeal to them at the point of second thoughts, assuming they were convinced of Western firmness and the seriousness of the crisis into which the East and West were heading.

Discussion of Peace Treaty Principles

8. In preparing for the Geneva and Summit Conferences, the Western Powers have considered the possibility, as a tactical matter, of expressing willingness to discuss the principles of a peace treaty with Germany (presumably in a deputy or expert group) if it appeared at some point during the conference that Western offer to discuss peace treaty principles might tip the balance in favor of preventing Soviet unilateral action against the Western position in Berlin. There are a number of objections to such action, and the French and Germans, in particular, have expressed grave reserves about the whole idea. In any event, the possibility is still open to consideration as a tactical expedient under certain circumstances.

Possible Package Proposal

9. The question remains whether any of the foregoing, or conceivable variants thereof, though insufficient alone, could not be combined into a

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package proposal which might achieve a satisfactory Berlin arrangement. The Western Peace Plan put forward at the 1959 Geneva Conference was such a package proposal, worked out quadripartitely with great care. Ambassador Thompson has recently suggested combining his suggestion for a seven-year time period in the Peace Plan with a British and United States declaration reassuring the Soviets on the frontier question and an interim Berlin solution presumably along the lines of the Western interim proposals at Geneva.

10. While the existing Western Peace Plan might well be used as the model for such a package, experience has shown that the process of arriving at agreement with our Allies on new formulations in the all-German area is both lengthy and laborious. This is, of course, no reason for not trying if we believe the end result will contribute to Western success in negotiations with the Soviets. On the other hand, it might argue for putting any innovations forward in relatively simple form and other than as part of a comprehensive staged plan.

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DISCUSSION OF BERLIN IN ISOLATION

Interim Arrangement

1. There is little indication that an interim arrangement of the 1959 Geneva Conference-type will be a feasible objective for the West, although it seems likely that, in any negotiations with the Soviets, the subject of an interim arrangement will inevitably arise as a logical consequence of the Geneva discussions. The Soviets will presumably put forward something along the lines of their May 9, 1960 proposals, and the West will have to consider whether it would wish to start off with an offer somewhat along the lines of the "improved" Western proposals for an interim arrangement agreed by the Four Western Foreign Ministers on May 14, 1960. These sets of proposals are obviously irreconcilable, but an abbreviated Geneva-type exercise might be necessary until it became clearly evident that there were no basis for a meeting of minds on any sort of interim arrangement.

2. It should be noted, however, that Ambassador Thompson believes an interim arrangement for Berlin should be an element in Western proposals which would also include certain all-German features (See Annex II, para. 9). Whether such an approach holds any promise will be largely determined by our assessment of the desirability and practicability of advancing the all-German proposals which he has in mind.

All-Berlin Proposal

3. At some point in negotiations the West might wish to consider whether it would be expedient to put forward an all-Berlin proposal for tactical and propaganda reasons. Such a proposal was developed quadripartitely in preparing for the Summit Conference of last May, but there is little reason to propose that it, or anything similar, would actually prove negotiable with the Soviets. The latter have repeatedly stressed that East Berlin is the capital of the GDR. Their agreement to an all-Berlin proposal of a type which might be acceptable to the West would in effect constitute a retreat which would certainly, from the point of view of the GDR, be less favorable than the status quo.

Change of Status

Guaranteed City

4. The proposal for a "guaranteed city" represents perhaps the most acceptable arrangement on Berlin which can be devised involving a change of

juridical

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juridical basis for the Western presence in the city. In essence, it involves agreement by the Four Powers to guarantee the security of Western military and civil access to West Berlin, with the Western Powers agreeing simultaneously to suspend the exercise of their occupation rights so long as the agreement was otherwise being observed. The West Berlin authorities would be empowered to request that foreign troops up to a stated ceiling be stationed in West Berlin and each Western Power would agree to supply and maintain any forces so requested. Full and unrestricted access for these troops would be guaranteed. The agreement would be registered with the UN and a representative of the UN Secretary General might observe its fulfillment.

5. While such a "guaranteed city" arrangement would obviously be preferable to anything along the lines of the Soviet Free City proposal, it involves many hazards. For example, its advocacy by the United States at the present time would probably cause grave problems within the Western Alliance, since it would be interpreted as a sign of weakness and loss of determination to maintain our position in Berlin. This is, of course, conjectural for, while President Eisenhower was generally familiar with the proposal, it has never been discussed with our Allies. Much would depend on the circumstances, but it seems unlikely that the French or Germans would find it acceptable and it could probably only be advanced within a political and psychological climate of considerably greater detente between the East and West than now exists. However, given the division of Germany for an indefinite future, and with the passage of time rendering the Western occupation of Berlin increasingly anachronistic, a formula along these lines will presumably continue to have a certain appeal.

UN Trusteeship or Capital Seat

6. Another type of arrangement for Berlin which has been suggested involving a change of juridical status would be the creation of a UN Trusteeship, or alternatively, the transfer of UN Headquarters to Berlin. A variant of the latter would make Berlin the first World City, capital seat of the UN, owned and governed by that body after the analogy of the District of Columbia in the United States.

7. The observations made above with respect to the "guaranteed city" proposal would seem equally applicable to such UN "solutions", which carry the additional handicap of extinguishing completely any Four-Power responsibility for the City. Moreover, it seems unlikely that the Soviets would ever accept such a function for the UN.

8. Various

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8. Various possibilities for a lesser UN role in Berlin have been suggested in connection with other possible approaches which would maintain the basic Four-Power responsibility. These should be considered on their merits, although the French have in the past reacted almost pathologically to any suggestion that the UN might make some useful contribution to a Berlin solution.

9. While the possibilities discussed in paras. 4-8 involving a change of status for Berlin should be further studied, we must realistically assume that, for the reasons indicated, they are likely to have little relevance to the next round of discussions with the Soviets.

Accommodation to De Facto Situation

Solution C

10. During the course of negotiations the Western Allies may well be faced with the necessity of accepting some sort of accommodation to the de facto situation which execution of the Soviet threat would create. It might, however, be possible to work out some sort of arrangement which would tacitly concede that the Soviets can, whenever they wish, turn over their controls to the GDR, while conceding also that we intend to hang on to the essentials of our position in Berlin. A number of variants are possible, but the most refined approach of this kind is that known as Solution C of the April 1959 London Working Group Report (a summary of this proposal is attached). The quadripartite tactics paper prepared for the Summit provided that, if an impasse had been reached at the conference and it seemed that the Soviets would proceed to take unilateral action purporting to end their responsibilities in the access field, the Western Powers might wish to consider making a proposal involving a series of interlocking but unilateral declarations on Berlin access aimed at achieving a freezing of existing procedures, with ultimate Soviet responsibility being maintained, although implementation might be by the East German authorities. This Solution C has survived as an ingenious way of dealing with a situation which may in fact arise whatever the Western Powers may want or do. It is possible to vary its complexity and specific content (for example, by adding similar unilateral declarations on propaganda activity and by introducing a UN role), but the access problem remains its focal point.

11. One aspect

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11. One aspect of Solution C, which was devised primarily for use in negotiations with the Soviets, is that its basic approach could conceivably be applied to a situation in which such formal negotiations do not take place or, if they do and have failed, to a subsequent stage of developments. In any event, from a purely tactical point of view, it would seem unwise to open any negotiation with the Soviets by putting forward Solution C. If used at all, it would seem most effective as a fallback position after a process of elimination of other possibilities has taken place. Despite the relatively unsatisfactory situation which this would create measured by a standard of absolute perfection, something of this kind may be the best we can hope to end up with.

Tacit Temporary Freeze

12. Although this seemed like a possible approach in 1960, it may no longer have as much relevance if the Soviets are determined to resolve the Berlin question in 1961. The precise modalities of such a freeze would depend on circumstances, but the essential thought was that, since neither standing on our Geneva position, nor discussing German unity and disarmament, nor proposing an immediate change of status in Berlin seemed very promising means of producing an agreement and of forestalling unilateral action by the Soviets, a further holding action would be preferable. This would have had as objective freezing the situation in Berlin until after the German elections in September 1961.

13. Under one variant it was suggested that such a holding action might consist of a tacit agreement to put Berlin on ice for eighteen months or so by setting up a Four-Power Working Group to consider means of reducing frictions in Berlin and to report back at the expiration of the indication time period. If the Soviets wished some more explicit agreement for the interim period, it was suggested that we could also propose concomitant unilateral declarations by both sides along the lines of Solution C, without mentioning troop reductions or attempting to conclude the kind of formal and comprehensive agreement which would have to deal with the "rights" issue.

14. In this case the assumption might be that, in the event the Working Group were unable to arrive at agreement, the period of eighteen months would be extended indefinitely, with the Solution C procedures continuing to prevail. A tacit understanding on both sides would, of course, be necessary that this was the best way to deal with an

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otherwise irresolvable situation. One disadvantage of the use of Solution C in such a context would be its identification with the temporary period to a point where its use as basis of a more lasting de facto arrangement might be nullified.

Delaying Action Without Specific Substantive Arrangement

15. As a palliative for anticipated failure to reach any agreement in the next round of negotiations, we might simply try to reach agreement on some machinery to continue a negotiating procedure, for example, at the level of the Foreign Ministers or Deputy Foreign Ministers, without pressing for a more formal kind of interim arrangement. This was essentially the preferred Western position at the abortive Summit. Whether it has any relevance to the situation in 1961 is doubtful; in any event the Western Powers would obviously have to be prepared to deal with a Soviet refusal to delay indefinitely on Berlin in the absence of any progress towards agreement.

Mitigating Effects of Separate Peace Treaty

16. Given a failure to find any basis for agreement on Berlin in the next round of talks, it might be possible to achieve some sort of tacit understanding with the Soviets so that the claimed effects of their signing a separate peace treaty with the GDR would be mitigated to the extent of preserving the essentials of the Western position in Berlin without an explicit new agreement, and thus avoid a major crisis or blow to Western prestige. This might be a variant of the approach indicated in para. 5, Annex II above, or might involve some of the elements of Solution C, probably, although not necessarily, without their being embodied in any formal declarations. Under the latter, we would end up with the peace treaty signed, GDR officials at the access check-points, and access procedures fixed, but also with a Soviet acceptance of their ultimate responsibility. Such an arrangement could subject the Western Powers to strong erosive pressures to deal with the GDR, but might under certain circumstances be preferable to an absolute breakdown of negotiations, unqualified signature of a peace treaty between the Soviets and the GDR, and the execution of our contingency plans.

Attachment:

Solution "C".

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Attachment

SOLUTION "C": LONDON WORKING GROUP REPORT

1. Solution "C" was devised to cover a situation in which the Soviets were attempting to give up all their responsibilities regarding Western access to Berlin. Under their contingency plans, the Occupying Powers are prepared to consider the possibility of a solution in which the Soviets would expressly authorize GDR personnel to function as Soviet agents in performing Soviet functions with relation to the access of the Three Powers to Berlin. Solution "C" assumes that the Soviets are not prepared explicitly to nominate the East German authorities as their agents. In effect it is an attempt to consider what would be the absolute minimum Soviet commitment with regard to access which the West would, in the last resort, be prepared to accept. Solution "C" may be summarized as follows:

2. The Western Powers would inform the Soviets and subsequently make a formal declaration to the effect that:

- a. they consider that they have absolute and unqualified rights, until Berlin is once more the capital of a reunified Germany, and that these rights include the right to have their troops remain in West Berlin and to have freedom of communications maintained between West Berlin and the Federal Republic in the same general conditions as hitherto;
- b. they continue to hold the Soviet Government responsible for the fulfillment of its obligations to the Three Powers in relation to their presence in Berlin and freedom of access thereto.

3. The Western Powers would then state that they would be prepared to take cognizance of a declaration of the Soviet Government guaranteeing that free and unrestricted access to West Berlin by land, by water, and by air would be maintained for all persons, goods and communications, including those of Western forces stationed in Berlin, in accord with the procedures in effect in April, 1959 and would not object if the East German authorities made a parallel statement to the same effect. The Western Powers would make it clear that the access procedures could thereafter be carried out by German personnel. (As a less satisfactory alternative, the Western Powers would be prepared to accept a Soviet declaration associating the Soviet Government with an East German declaration in accordance with the terms set forth above, previously made either to the Soviet Government or "to whom it may concern".)

4. The

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4. The Western Powers would state that all disputes which might arise with respect to the above-mentioned declarations would be raised and settled between the four governments. [If the Soviet Government refused to accept this the Western Powers should say that, in order to have some check on the activities of the East German authorities, the Four Powers should request the Secretary General of the United Nations to provide a representative, supported by adequate staff, to be established in both West and East Berlin, and at the access check-points, for the purpose of reporting to the Four Powers concerning any activities which appeared to be in conflict with the above-mentioned declarations.]

5. The above are the only essential elements of Solution "C". Tentative language for the declarations involved has been considered by the Working Group and texts could be produced at short notice once the principles had been agreed.

6. [In connection with Solution "C", it would be possible to introduce certain elements along the lines of the Geneva proposal of July 28, e.g., undertakings regarding force limitations and abstention from "questionable activities" on a reciprocal basis. But these are not essential elements of Solution "C".]

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Annex IV

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

I

Following the Soviet threats of November 1958, a Tripartite Planning Group was established in Washington to coordinate planning by the three Embassies at Bonn, General Norstad's Tripartite Staff ("Live Oak"), and the headquarters at Berlin for the various contingencies involved in a withdrawal by the Soviet Union from its functions with respect to Allied access to Berlin. The Germans have been acquainted with most aspects of this planning.

II

Although Soviet intentions are not clear, it is considered unlikely that Khrushchev will, in the immediate future, take any action beyond perhaps preliminary steps looking toward the eventual conclusion of a "separate peace treaty". However, should the Soviets withdraw, or appear likely to withdraw, from their access functions, Allied planning contemplates the following measures.

1. Prior to Soviet Action

(a) Preparatory Military Measures

Certain quiet, precautionary, and preparatory military measures, of a kind which would not cause public alarm but would be detectable by Soviet intelligence, were taken following the Soviet threat of November 1958 to demonstrate our determination to maintain freedom of access. Plans exist for additional measures of this sort, such as increased alert, preparation for unit deployments or dispersal, and preparation for evacuation of selected noncombatants in Germany and Berlin. The Governments will in due course have to decide which of these or other measures of this type should be taken and at what points.

(b) United Nations Action

It has been agreed in principle that, if Soviet unilateral action to withdraw from access functions were clearly imminent, it would be desirable to attempt to forestall this through a United Nations Security

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Council resolution calling on the Four Powers not to violate existing agreements regarding Berlin, to negotiate their differences, and to report the results of these negotiations to the Security Council.

2. At Time of, or After, Soviet Action

(c) Notice to Soviet Government and Public Statement

Drafts have been prepared for notes to the Soviet Government and a public statement (which would not only explain to world opinion but also put the "GDR" on notice) re-emphasizing Soviet responsibility under agreements concerning Berlin, explaining our legal interpretation of the Soviet action, and serving notice as to the procedures which we would follow in maintaining our access after the Soviet withdrawal (as in [d] and [e] below).

(d) Surface Access Procedures

After a Soviet withdrawal, every effort would be made to continue normal traffic, but the Three Powers would put into effect new procedures for the purpose of identifying Allied movements as being entitled to unrestricted access to Berlin. The procedures involve handing over to the East German personnel at each check-point a copy of the Allied travel order, but not accepting the stamping of a travel order as a condition of passage. Practical preparations for instituting the new procedures have been completed.

(e) Air Access Procedures

Every effort would be made to maintain unrestricted air access after a Soviet withdrawal from the Berlin Air Safety Center, and the Center would continue to operate on a tripartite basis. For safety considerations, flight information would be broadcast by radio and communicated by telephone and teletype directly to the Russians and to the East German air traffic control authorities.

III

If the foregoing measures have been taken, and the East Germans refuse to accept the surface access procedures mentioned or attempt to block air access, Governmental decisions will be required on the implementation of the following aspects of planning which have been developed on a stand-by basis but without commitment as to the necessity or the timing of their implementation.

1. Measures

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1. Measures to Maintain Air Access

(a) Plans exist for maintaining civil air services under flight safety conditions not usually considered normal.

(b) Plans exist for a "garrison airlift" to transport by air the personnel and equipment of the Allied forces which cannot move by surface routes.

(c) Plans exist for the movement of civilian passengers by military aircraft when civil airlines are no longer prepared to operate.

(d) Plans have been developed to cope with physical interference with air access.

2. Probe of Soviet Intentions

There are three alternate plans for a probe along the Autobahn to determine whether the Soviets would use, or permit the use of, force to prevent passage. Decisions would have to be made regarding the timing of the probe and which of the three detailed plans would be accepted.

3. More Elaborate Military Measures

The military commanders have plans for more elaborate military measures including measures which, while they might not succeed in reopening access in the face of Soviet determination, could nonetheless "take the initiative regarding ground access from the Soviets, provide circumstances in which negotiations with the Soviets might prove fruitful, and compel the Soviets to face the unmistakable imminence of general war". Decisions regarding the implementation of such plans, choices of possible courses, and timing of actions would have to be taken by the Governments in the light of circumstances as they develop.

IV

There are under active consideration at this time plans for indirect countermeasures such as economic measures, measures against Soviet aviation, and a naval blockade in order to increase pressure on the Soviet Union and the "GDR" in the event Allied access is forcibly obstructed.

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The planning discussed above relates only to the possibility of interference with Allied access. Extensive stockpiles exist in Berlin, and there are plans for a Quadripartite Berlin Airlift in the event of a total Soviet-"GDR" blockade of land access routes. In order to be in a better position to cope with gradual harassment of civil (i.e., German) access, planning for other countermeasures--primarily economic--is underway with the Germans and other members of NATO.

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January 17, 1961

THROU: 3/9

FROM : B/P - Gerard C. Smith

SUBJECT: NATO MEM'S and Long-Range Military Planning

Before leaving, I wanted to set down some brief and personal views about forthcoming issues in NATO long-range military planning, in view of S/P's involvement in these issues.

1. Commitment of Polaris Submarines. It seems in the US interest to commit five Polaris submarines to NATO, without requiring a European undertaking to acquire additional MRBM's from the US.

(a) Commitment of US Polaris submarines to NATO would in itself be beneficial to the US and the alliance: it would be clear evidence of the US willingness to use its strategic striking power in Europe's defense. It should enhance NATO cohesion and reduce European desires to create independent national nuclear forces.

(b) It is still not clear how strongly European countries wish to acquire additional MRBM's, in order to have a nuclear deterrent force of their own. If these desires exist, the Europeans will wish to acquire additional MRBM's without US pressure. If these European desires do not exist, there is little reason for us to press the European countries to mount an MRBM program since, by the time that such a program could come into being, the period of any "missile gap" will be behind us.

I hope, therefore, that at an early occasion we can make clear to the NATO countries that we are prepared to proceed with commitment of the five submarines on only one condition: That these countries want to have these submarines available.

2. Multilateral Vs National NUBM Forces. If the European countries do wish to acquire additional NUBM's,

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we should facilitate their procurement for a Force subject to multilateral ownership, control, and manning - not for national MRBM forces.

Even if committed to SACEUR, national MRBM forces would, in the last analysis, be just that: national. The fact that they were committed to SACEUR would be a weak and ineffective safeguard against their diversion to national purposes. Nor would US "custody" of the warhead be an adequate precaution: in missile-bearing subs or vessels, the warheads would be mounted in the missiles and US custody would consist merely of US technicians whose "second key" was required to fire the missiles. A nation that had reached the stage of desperation in which it contemplated national use of nuclear weapons would hardly boggle at revoking a paper commitment to SACEUR or seizing a key from the US technician.

The fact that this program opened the door to national nuclear capabilities would be apparent. Their creation would thus exert a marked divisive effect within NATO. This would be the more true since the Germans would necessarily be among the countries securing missiles for use with national forces under this program - a development that would stir intense concern in other NATO countries. The UK showed great sensitivity on this point when it was thought last April that the US would propose creation of national MRBM forces committed to SACEUR.

Creation of these national nuclear capabilities would also increase the risk of accidental war and pose a further obstacle to arms control.

On the other hand, a missile force that was subject to multilateral control, ownership, and manning could not readily be diverted to national purposes. A country that wished to create a national missile force would have great difficulty in disentangling its personnel and little prospect of withdrawing any weapons from such a force.

It is for this range of reasons, I presume, that Spahn and Norstad have agreed (Paris 2780) on the

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 30, 1961

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Policies previously approved in NSC which need review

1. The most urgent need is for a review of basic military policy. What is our view of the kind of strategic force we need, the kinds of limited-war forces, the kind of defense for the continental U. S., and the strategy of NATO? What should be your thinking about the great decisions, at crisis moments, on levels of U. S. military action? The urgency of these matters arises from existing papers which in the view of nearly all your civilian advisers place a debatable emphasis (1) on strategic as against limited-war forces, (2) on "strike-first," or "counter-force" strategic planning, as against a "deterrent" or "second-strike" posture, and (3) on decisions-in-advance, as against decisions in the light of all the circumstances. These three forces in combination have created a situation today in which a subordinate commander faced with a substantial Russian military action could start the thermonuclear holocaust on his own initiative if he could not reach you (by failure of communication at either end of the line). There are good arguments for the decisions which led to this situation, but there are arguments on the other side, and it seems absolutely essential that you satisfy yourself, as President, on these basic matters. Moreover, a review of this sort should include at all stages the relevant political questions, and it should go along the whole spectrum from thermonuclear weapons systems to guerrilla action and political infiltration. Our current troubles in Laos and other places seem to arise at least in part from too narrow and conventional thinking about "military" as opposed to "political" problems.

2. Our first problem is to decide how to get these matters studied out so that you personally can make the necessary decisions in the light of your own assessment of the complex issues involved. In the

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Historical Section, OSECCOS, SHAPE

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Notes on General Norstad's Meeting with the Military Committee on 2 Feb 61

After a few preliminary remarks by the Chairman of the Military Committee, General Norstad made a rather general statement on the mobile force concept and invited questions from the Committee.

In response to a question on whether a limited nuclear war was possible, General Norstad replied that this was very unlikely since the area was too critical. In fact, in General Norstad's view, limited nuclear war is a contradiction in terms. There could, however, be a mistake or a miscalculation, and it would not be impossible to use a few nuclear weapons precisely and selectively without causing an expansion to general war. Such an employment of weapons might even prevent expansion by demonstrating allied determination. However, if there were a substantial exchange, then in General Norstad's view, general war would result.

In response to a question as to whether the mobile force units would continue to be stationed in their present areas until they are deployed, General Norstad answered affirmatively.

In response to a question on whether SACEUR could move these forces without approval of the government's concerned, SACEUR answered that, except for certain air defense forces, he had no authority to command until the General Alert. However, since he felt the response of the governments would be immediate, he was not concerned with this limitation.

In response to a question on how SACEUR would go to war, General Norstad said he would just call the maximum number of governments and then appear before the Council.

In response to a question on whether the mobile force could be used in a situation outside the NATO area, say in Lebanon, General Norstad said that they could not be so employed as NATO forces, but that elements might be used as national units.

General Norstad then raised the question of control of nuclear weapons and gave a fairly detailed report on his meeting with the Council on this subject.

In response to a question as to whether the Council needed some military advice to help them define the problem, General Norstad answered in the affirmative and Air Chief Marshal Mills said that the

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Military Committee was already committed to help in this regard. General Norstad interposed to emphasize that before military advice would be useful, the Council must first consider the problem and decide on their own responsibilities.

In response to a question on the level of operations which would require the use of nuclear weapons, General Norstad noted that the SHAPE war games did not set a precise point at which nuclear weapons must be used. He added that we must be able to deter incidents by having a graduated capability covering the full range of threats from minor incursion to a situation approaching general war. However, the first step is to get our present forces modernized and "up to snuff." After that, we can worry about more forces.

In response to another question, General Norstad emphasized that Allied Command Europe would use whatever force is necessary, but that we add to the credibility of the deterrent by having a substantial conventional capability. Token forces would simply invite piecemeal attacks and gradual erosion.

In response to another question on whether Europe could be defended without nuclear weapons as proposed by B. Liddell Hart, General Norstad said that he was the one who had the responsibility, and that in his view, nuclear weapons are necessary for such a defense.

In response to a question on whether he was satisfied with the present concept and strategy, General Norstad said that he readily admitted that MC 14/2 was perhaps out of date in parts, and that certain passages could probably be improved, however, these changes are not really necessary. Above all, we should not cast doubt on the validity of fundamental documents without having something better to replace them with, particularly since the basic guidance and general philosophy are still sound. We must know what we want and be assured that we can get approval of a new document. If the question is raised at this time, we might end up with nothing.

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March 6, 1961 *msc* 8

MEMORANDUM FOR McGB and WWR

SUBJECT: Notes for Tuesday Planning Luncheon

(1) China. While my preliminary researches reveal no easy solutions yet, (you don't expect any in four days, I hope), they confirm that we are not approaching the China problem with anything like the requisite sense of urgency!

While State has been working on membership, Off-shores, etc. for some time, there is no stab yet at an overall review. Therefore, perhaps using Chalmers Roberts' article as an opener, why not prod them?

Maybe we ought to use some gimmick to get the necessary zip behind this project. We have discussed seeing if Mr. Bowles would take on the account. This might avoid the otherwise thorny problem of whether to wait until Alexis Johnson's return. One advantage of a task force (as I mentioned at lunch) would be to get people arguing with each other. My candidates would be Bowles, Johnson, Nitze or Bundy, WWR and myself, and Amory and Cooper from CIA. Bohlen also useful. Staffers could come from State and maybe CIA. Alternatively, sell Mr. Bowles himself the job, with staff support from Ed Rice in S/P and perhaps loan of Chet Cooper.

But if we don't get started pronto, we'll just be dragged into a piecemeal revision of China policy under the pressure of events. We may end up the same place anyway but let's do it wittingly. In the past we've never looked at this problem primarily from the viewpoint of our broad strategic concept rather than the traditional starting point of how best to preserve Free China (important as this may be).

(2) Why not prod DOD on Korean status-of-forces agreement? This is one of those thorny little problems that poison relations if allowed to drag out too long but that, if taken care of expeditiously, can buy us much more difficult issues. Obviously, our military have greater freedom if not so tied down, but hard to beat Premier Chang's argument that since fighting has been over for nearly eight years, why continue to demand special treatment on the grounds that a "state of war" still exists. We're going to have plenty of trouble in Korea (one of the great open drains on US aid), so why not close out a minor annoyance promptly with good grace? The military invariably are much too sticky on these problems.

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By *WJH*

NARS, DATE 12/12/84

NAR (321) / Staff Memoranda: Korea: 11/1/61-7/14/61

March 6, 1961

(3) Mr. Acheson, and some of my friends in State, are concerned at how Messrs. Gavin and Finletter are hot for nuclear aid to De Gaulle. Mr. A. will almost certainly recommend against this; indeed, he seems cool on even a NATO multilateral deterrent. We must be careful that our senior people don't go off in all directions on this issue; ergo, once the President has decided, some form of central discipline will have to be enforced. In the meantime, it might be better to caution all concerned about any premature expression of views.

(4) Both Mr. Dulles, when I said goodbye to him, and Bob Amory have some feeling that we ought to retain at least a minimum "institutionalization" of NSC procedures. Both like the studied informality now current, but say it will be easier to keep track of matters and make sure they are followed through if we have a little more in the way of agendas, minutes, etc. Moreover, the NSC exists by statute, so from a purely public relations standpoint, it might be well to have more White House meetings labelled as NSC sessions, simply so that no Congressmen could claim the NSC not being used. You may want to gently probe the Planning Group to see whether similar sentiments exist.

R. W. Komer
R. W. KOMER

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March 6, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Mr. Acheson on March 7th

Mr. Acheson requested this interim session chiefly to explore whether the issues he thinks are important are in line with your thinking, or whether you have some other thoughts which he should take into account.

From my experience on his task force, his thinking seems quite similar to that of Mr. Bowie's earlier effort.

He is also far cooler than Messrs. Gavin and Finletter seem to be about helping out the French national program.

The Bowie Report (attached) calls for reinvigorating NATO, particularly in the military field. Bowie argues that both exclusive NATO reliance on the SAC "sword" for strategic deterrence and the MC-70 tactical nuclear "shield" concept are outdated by Soviet acquisition of similar capabilities. Hence, a viable strategy for the 1960s demands enough conventional strength to stay below the nuclear threshold.

Other highlights are Bowie's call for a 5-nation NATO political steering group to get common big power agreement as an alternative to Gaullist "tripartism", a renewed push toward integration (he argues that Britain must eventually "join" Europe or suffer a sharp decline in influence), and a bigger program of aid to the underdeveloped, to be handled through OECD. Recommend you scan at least the Summary.

This would be a good opportunity to get Mr. Acheson's ideas on the all-important task of adequate follow-up to make sure that our new NATO policy is properly carried out. He could play a key role here too:

- (a) It would be a real prod to State if he could come in for a day every month or so, to be briefed on what's being done and then write a brief note on any points needing further action.

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BY MYM NARS, DATE 12/12/84

WJF / Box 321 / Staff Memoranda: Kona: 1/1/61 - 3/14/61

MEMORANDUM
FOR THE PRESIDENT

2.

March 6, 1961

- (b) To keep up momentum within NATO, he is recommending (as Bowie did) an Atlantic advisory committee of elder statesmen; their first act could be to take our new NATO proposals and give them a push through NATO. I believe Mr. Acheson would agree to chair it (Sir Oliver Franks, Ambassador Brosio, Jean Monnet are other possibilities). Such a team of "wise men", meeting periodically, could be most helpful in putting prestige and steam behind the revitalization of NATO.
- (c) Along the same lines, Mr. Acheson may be willing to go see Adenauer (he's been invited by Dowling); also perhaps Macmillan to advise latter that Britain must face up to "joining" Europe. But he is very cautious about private citizens mixing in public business, so you might want to encourage him.
- (d) You may wish to probe him on whether a change in SACEUR might help to create a "new look". Someone like General Taylor would emphasize the new accent on non-nuclear forces.

R. W. KOMER

SECRET

March 9, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ACHESON

SUBJECT: White House Meeting

1. There are two issues regarding the 500 land-based MRBM's which may be worth mentioning in the discussion with the President:

(a) What do we want to do about them? I take it the answer here is clear: We don't want these missiles deployed in Europe because of (i) the expense, (ii) the political disadvantages of having 500 of these things careening around European roads, (iii) the undesirability of placing these strategic missiles (with mated warheads) in European hands.

(b) What do we want to say about them to NATO? Here there may be room for a certain amount of soft-talk, in order to explain our position to the Europeans in a way that will not appear a direct repudiation of SACEUR. But we will need to be clear as to the purpose of the soft-talk: It is to let the MRBM proposition down easily, not to leave the proposition alive and as a topic for further inter-agency haggling in the US Government.

It occurred to me that if you merely summarized what you would propose that we say to the Europeans about this issue, the President might misunderstand the purport of your remarks and think that you were leaving the issue open - rather than merely putting it to death as gently as possible.

2. It may also be useful, in discussion with the President, to distinguish the MRBM issue from the proposed build-up of shorter range tactical nuclear weapons (Honest Johns, Davy Crocketts, etc.) in Europe. Most of this build-up is projected for the 1961-63 period, and it is now absorbing most of our military aid for Europe. If we mean to allocate more resources to the non-nuclear side, we will have to limit this build-up in some fashion. This would mean leaving the tactical nuclear weapons now in Europe, and adding to them only when the cost of doing so was minimal.

This question of what to do about the planned build-up of shorter range tactical nuclear weapons sometimes gets overshadowed by the MRBM issue but, from the standpoint of resources and reducing the risk of nuclear weapons getting out of control, it is of critical importance.

3. The meeting with the JCS is now set for Wednesday at 10:30.

Henry Owen

SECRET

Lot 67D 548
Box 183

Owen Jan-June '61

7/15/61

NATO Advisory



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS



15 March 1961

TO: Mr. Acheson

FROM: Mr. Albert Wohlstetter *Good to go with*

SUBJECT: Wild Idea?

The idea I have in mind concerns matters like the focus of U.S. power in Europe, civil-military relations, command channels from the United States to its representatives in NATO and NATO organization. Personnel and personalities figure but are secondary.

1. The present control of U.S. power in Europe.

At present the most important American in Europe is a military man. In good part SACEUR's great power comes from the fact that he is also CINCEUR. He controls the release of nuclear weapons, is in possession of the information as to their use, and is the key figure in developing strategy for Allied Command Europe. Together with SACLANC and Channel Command, he is crucial in elaborating the "requirements" that go to the military Standing Group and are eventually issued as "goals" by the Military Committee. "Requirements" and "goals" ^{proposed} by SHAPE, as the Secretary-General's international staff is painfully aware, are likely to have a major effect not only on basic strategic objectives of NATO but are also likely to imply large structural changes in European production and to raise a great many ticklish political questions. Yet participation by high civilian authority (American or European) is, in general, late, slight and limited mostly to such questions as feasibility. Because SACEUR is the focus of American power in Europe, he overshadows the Secretary-General. Also, therefore, the American Ambassador to NATO. And SHAPE dwarfs the North Atlantic Council.

For wartime such an arrangement may be appropriate or inevitable. For a long period of peace in which issues recur in inseparable clusters of politics, economics and strategy, it is most dubious.

- 2 -

2. The idea.

The gist of the idea is to make the principal American representative in Europe a civilian and to give his staff, rather than a military organization, the primary responsibility for evolution of basic policy.

This could be done (1) by making an American political man of first magnitude the Secretary-General, (2) by giving him two hats just as we have given two hats to SACEUR-CINCEUR. Besides his role as Secretary-General, he could represent the President of the United States directly. Or, in military affairs, he could serve as a deputy to the Secretary of Defense. He would then be in the direct line of command for the release of nuclear weapons ^{to} for NATO ~~of war~~ ~~in Europe~~ during a central war or during more limited action. He would have access to the necessary information affecting the use of nuclear weapons. He would need a small policy planning staff on military matters. The sense of this organizational change is precisely to give the principal American civilian in Europe a positive concern with basic strategic policy. This sort of change is very much in line with the present trend of the Department of Defense under Mr. McNamara. Moreover it is, I think, sound. Finally, in his position as Secretary-General the principal American representative in Europe would find it natural to lead NATO in the solution of political and economic as well as military problems.

3. European reaction.

How would the Europeans regard such a change? My answer to this is, of course, speculative. However, in recent times I have had a good many conversations with Europeans which suggest to me that they might like it very much. In fact, it was in conversations with influential Europeans concerned with NATO that the need came up for making stronger the civilian side of NATO, especially the American civilian side. And the Europeans were the ones who brought it up. The solution I propose is designed to fit a need they expressed. Parts of the solution, too, were suggested by them. All of this naturally is suggestive rather than conclusive. The European reaction could be affected by some trimmings which I have so far not mentioned.

- 3 -

4. New openings for Europeans.

Given an American Secretary-General with the powers described, SACEUR's importance would be reduced somewhat in size. His functions would be changed to emphasize detailed implementation of broad policy rather than its basic initiation. It seems clear that SACEUR should remain American for some time -- perhaps a year and a half. After this, however, it should be possible to make a change. With SACEUR reduced a little in size we could afford to consider a European SACEUR. There are some intriguing possibilities here. One of the more extreme, but perhaps the most fruitful, would be to contemplate rotation of the job beginning with a French SACEUR. There are clearly some problems here. None seems to me insuperable or as large as our present problems with the French. The stature of SACEUR and his actual importance would remain considerable enough to increase French grandeur. Yet, this seems a much safer way to increase French grandeur than to give them Polaris missiles to play with.

5. Personnel

I have carefully avoided any discussion of personalities so far. There are at least two things to be said in favor of the proposal from this standpoint although I shall not elaborate on them. (Both would favorably influence the Europeans) (1) Such an arrangement might reduce some existing personnel frictions. (2) Recruitment among American political men of the first order should be somewhat eased by the fact that the Secretary-General post itself would now assume a very great importance. I have some suggestions but it seems a good place to break off this memorandum.

Let me conclude by saying that, after contemplating this idea for the last few weeks, I do not think it is wild. I believe Paul Nitze, to whom I have talked, agrees.

Copy to:

Mr. Nitze
Mr. Bundy
Mr. Rowen

~~SECRET~~

7/24/61

March 24, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Berlin

I attach a paper on the PROBLEM OF BERLIN, together with four annexes, prepared by the Department's Bureau of European Affairs. It discusses the various proposals for a Berlin solution which have been advanced, or might be advanced, in negotiations with the Soviets and also also certain aspects of Western contingency planning.

A number of possible approaches discussed in the paper are indicated as deserving further study. These studies are proceeding and will result in individual papers on such subjects as the extension of the time period in the Western Peace Plan and other all-German approaches, possible European security arrangements, and UN solutions for Berlin. I will advise you as these studies are completed.

George C. McGhee

Attachment:

Paper on "Problem of
Berlin" with four
annexes.

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Declassified upon
removal of
classified information
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NSA/81 / Gen Sec on "The Prob of Berlin" 7/24/61

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THE PROBLEM OF BERLIN

Summary Conclusions

1. However impelling the urge to find some new approach to the Berlin problem, the ineluctable facts of the situation strictly limit the practical courses of action open to the West. The history of the Berlin crisis since November 1958 gives little reason for thinking that a lasting settlement can be devised which, under current circumstances, will prove acceptable to both East and West.

2. A vital component of the Western position is the maintenance of a credible deterrent against unilateral Soviet action. Without this the full geographic weaknesses of the Western position in Berlin will have decisive weight in any negotiation. Thought should be given to the possibility of developing and strengthening deterrents other than the pure threat of ultimate thermonuclear war.

3. While we should give further thought to the possibility of providing some all-German "sweetening" for continuing discussion of the Berlin question with the Soviets, this should be done in awareness of the unlikelihood that any real step towards German reunification can be achieved within the calculable future under circumstances acceptable to the West. It also seems questionable that any all-German approach acceptable to the West will alone suffice to provide the basis for even a temporary solution to the Berlin problem.

4. In planning, therefore, for further negotiations with the Soviets, the Western Powers must prudently expect that they will once again be forced to discuss the question of Berlin in isolation. While it is unlikely that a satisfactory interim arrangement of the Geneva-type can be achieved, it may be necessary to prove this by actual exchanges during the course of a conference.

5. While a proposal for a "guaranteed city" of West Berlin is probably the most acceptable arrangement which can be devised involving a change of juridical basis for the Western presence in the city and is conceivably negotiable with the Soviets, its advocacy by the United States at the present time would probably cause grave problems within the Western Alliance and be interpreted as a sign of weakness and loss of determination on our part.

6. Under

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By SF NARA, Date 10/26/92

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6. Under certain circumstances, the Western Powers might find it desirable to aim at a stabilization of existing access procedures but allowing for an East German role along the lines of Solution C as described below, or alternatively they might find it necessary to contemplate the execution of their contingency plans.

7. While the Western contingency plans as now developed constitute a highly articulated system of related stages, we must realistically expect the intrusion of unpredictable factors as well as possible efforts by our Allies, particularly the British, to reopen under crisis conditions certain aspects of contingency planning such as the documentation procedures to be followed by the Western Powers.

Political and Military Aspects of the Berlin Crisis

Basic Issues

8. The problem of Berlin is one of the gravest and most difficult with which United States policy must cope. Both East and West are so deeply committed to irreconcilable positions, publicly and in terms of basic policy, that the area of possible compromise seems rigidly limited. Berlin's physical isolation and vulnerability are ineluctable facts, and the difficulties which arise from them will last, in one form or another, until the Soviets accept the reunification of Germany or the West abandons the city to Communist control.

9. Berlin's importance for the United States is largely intangible but nonetheless undeniable. Since 1948 we have, by our own choice, made Berlin the example and the symbol of our determination and our ability to defend the free parts of the world against Communist aggression. We have frequently reiterated our "guarantee" that we shall treat any attack against Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon our forces and upon ourselves. We have more recently given our commitment a more extended though rather nebulous significance, for example, using such language as not abandoning the free people of Berlin or of not tolerating the unilateral infringement of our rights. The United Kingdom and France have joined us in the basic "Berlin guarantee" and the other NATO powers have associated themselves with it, but it is universally regarded as being meaningful only to the extent that the United States is committed.

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10. It is a commonplace that our abandonment of Berlin would be taken as an indication of our unreadiness to meet our defense commitments and thus would have a shattering effect on NATO and our other alliances. This may be an oversimplification, for one can conceive of an American withdrawal under circumstances (for example, the unwillingness of the Germans or of our other Western Allies themselves to face a general war for the maintenance of the Allied position) in which we could save our honor and which might even have a galvanizing effect on NATO. The risks of a loss of Berlin, regardless of the circumstances, cannot, however, be exaggerated.

11. The existing situation, while it has many obvious disadvantages, represents a modus vivendi which the West can tolerate pending a solution of the German question in its larger context. The status quo is viable as long as the Western forces are present and retain freedom of access, the Federal Republic of Germany continues its economic and moral support, the Berliners' morale remains reasonably high, and Berlin commands the attention and the sympathies of world opinion. While the loss of any of these four supports could bring a collapse, Communist efforts to date have not seriously weakened any of them.

12. Whether the existing situation is also a tolerable modus vivendi for the Soviet Union is a moot question. There are two competing theories as to Soviet objectives: (a) that they are using Berlin essentially as a lever to achieve the wider purpose of obtaining recognition of the GDR and consolidation of the satellite bloc; and (b) that West Berlin is a primary objective in itself because its continuance in its present form is so harmful to the East that it must be eliminated. The truth probably lies in some combination of the two, and the West must prudently base its calculations on such an assessment. Berlin is indeed a useful lever with which to attempt to gain broader objectives, whether it be the holding of a Summit meeting, a greater measure of recognition for the GDR, or stabilization of the status quo in Eastern Europe. At the same time, West Berlin's role as a channel for the flow of refugees, as a center of Western propaganda and intelligence activities, and as a show window which daily and dramatically highlights the relative lack of success in the East, is such that the Soviets may feel that they cannot tolerate it for the indefinite future.

13. The essence of the Soviet position as it has developed since November 1958 is that the time is overdue for a peace treaty to be signed

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with the two German states, or if the Federal Republic refuses, with the GDR alone; that the going into effect of a peace treaty with the GDR will make that country fully sovereign and thus in complete control of the access routes over its territory to and from Berlin; that Berlin is on the territory of the GDR and that the peace treaty will accordingly terminate the Four-Power occupation status of the city; that as an act of grace the GDR and the Soviet Union will join in permitting the establishment of a "free city" of West Berlin; and that, if the West insists, an "interim arrangement" for West Berlin might be made for a specifically limited period of time provided it terminates in the ending of the Western occupation and the creation of a "free city" of West Berlin.

14. To this the Western Powers have responded by stressing the goal of German reunification on the basis of self-determination and holding that a real solution of the Berlin problem can be found only within this context; emphasizing that a meaningful peace treaty can only be signed with a reunited Germany; denying that a so-called peace treaty between the Soviet Union and the GDR can terminate Western rights in Berlin and on the access routes; contesting that Berlin is territory of the GDR; expressing a willingness to discuss the Berlin question with the Soviets but not under threat of ultimatum; emphasizing Soviet obligation to refrain from unilateral violation of the basic agreements on Berlin; and stressing their intention to protect the freedom of the population of West Berlin.

The Problem of Deterrents

15. No one will claim that West Berlin is defensible against direct and massive Soviet and/or East German attack. Such attack would, however, become a casus belli under the Western security guarantee. Despite occasional alarms and rumors of Eastern build-up, few expect that, under current circumstances, the Soviets will indulge in such clear aggression.

16. The more urgent question involves the credibility of the basic deterrent which we can bring to bear to prevent the kinds of action which the Soviets are more likely to take or to permit the GDR to take. This question is raised directly by the terminal stages of Allied contingency planning and cuts across the entire confrontation between East and West over Berlin. (See Annex IV for a summary description of our contingency planning.)

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17. Given the exposed geographic situation of the city and its tenuous lines of communication, the fact is that, in the last analysis, our position is maintained by the ultimate threat of thermonuclear war. The military measures to reopen access contemplated under Western contingency plans are intended "to take the initiative regarding ground access from the Soviets, provide circumstances in which negotiations with the Soviets might prove fruitful, and compel the Soviets to face the unmistakable imminence of general war". The problem is how can our deterrent, as a refinement of the doctrine of massive retaliation, not suffer from diminishing credibility, given the belief in a so-called thermonuclear balance of terror, continuing rapid change in weapons technology and Soviet anticipation that world pressures would operate against even the firmest resolve on our part to go all the way if necessary.

18. In the LIVE OAK exercise under General Norstad it has proved impossible to arrive at any agreement on reopening access beyond the planning phase. Both the British and to some extent the French have proceeded on the assumption that the use of force to reopen access will inevitably and quickly reach the point of no return, and that at an early stage the Western Powers must contemplate taking all necessary measures to engage in global war. We have not committed ourselves on this point, and we here run into the many ambiguities which admittedly exist within the NATO framework as to how war starts and who has the authority to start it, including the utilization of the United States strategic deterrent. The question arises whether, at some point in this highly volatile situation, both sides would not have to consider a preemptive first strike, involving all the usual considerations as to how this could be done without precipitating similar action by the prospective enemy. Any resolution of the situation short of all-out war which might arise under these extreme conditions of confrontation has somewhat inelegantly been described as a matter of "who would chicken-out first". Under these assumptions, we may be faced with the hard decision either to desist from efforts to reopen access or to employ nuclear means. There is some evidence that the Soviets question whether the United States would be willing to run the risk of nuclear war in reacting to the kind of fait accompli which their threats contemplate, i.e., signing a peace treaty with the GDR and turning over control of access to GDR officials. There is little inclination anywhere to question that the Soviets have the capacity, if they wish to use it, to prevent our reopening access to Berlin by our use of conventional force.

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19. It may be asked what, under these conditions, really is deterring the Soviets from carrying out their threats. Certainly there would be serious political consequences short of war which the Soviets wish to avoid. There is also a continuing element of uncertainty about how a crisis situation might develop in practice and whether in the last analysis what the Soviets might consider purely rational considerations will actually determine the American decision for war or peace. Although clarity regarding our intentions is generally a virtue, it may be that in the Berlin context such uncertainty adds to the initial deterrent to Soviet action which might set off a possibly disastrous chain of causation, though at a later stage it may add to the over-all danger of miscalculation.

20. A vital preliminary to any further negotiation with the Soviets on Berlin must be a reaffirmation by the United States, together with its Allies, in the most convincing way possible, of our determination not to collapse in the face of Soviet pressure, a reaffirmation of the very serious danger which Soviet unilateral action would create. To heighten the seriousness of our approach, we should consider whether Soviet interest in eventual achievement of an agreement on disarmament, and in other subjects where both the Soviets and we may have somewhat similar objectives, would help in creating a proper psychological framework for discussion of the Berlin question. It is fair to assume, for example, that the Soviets do not wish to see the United States mobilize its resources behind a greatly enhanced defense program of the type which accompanied the war in Korea, when we quadrupled our defense expenditures. A warning, therefore, that continuation of the Soviet threat to Berlin will inevitably bring the kind of massive mobilization of American resources for defense of which Khrushchev knows we are capable, but which neither we nor he basically desire, might add to our deterrent. The exact timing and level of such an approach to the Soviets should accordingly be considered along with the more specific aspects of a possible modus vivendi on Berlin.

21. In this connection, it might be worth considering whether quiet use of diplomatic channels prior to the building up of Soviet pressure for a formal conference on Berlin would not be desirable. With the consent of our Allies, we could in frank, confidential discussions with the Soviets stress the points indicated in the preceding paragraph. As a tactical variant, the American spokesman might also take the line that the so-called

Berlin

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Berlin crisis is essentially a synthetic one. The new U.S. Administration does not see that the existing situation in Berlin creates any real problems, nor have the Soviets made clear why the changes which they claim are necessary would make any contribution to the easing of tensions. If the Soviets have specific problems with respect to Berlin, they are free to discuss them with us, but we cannot accept the kind of ultimatum which threatens unilateral action purporting to end our rights based on solemn agreement. Under such threat, we would have no choice but to take appropriate action to protect our interests.

22. Even while the major deterrent remains effective, however, it is particularly difficult to beat back each minor encroachment on Western rights. Tripartite consideration has been given to a wider range of non-military countermeasures for use on a contingency basis, but these plans are still being considered by the respective governments. Control of trade between East and West Germany has proved an effective weapon for the West, but we must expect some diminution in this capacity since the East Germans are seeking alternative sources of supply. Moreover, it is only prudent to assume that none of these countermeasures will be sufficient to deter the Soviets once they have taken the basic political decision to precipitate a crisis over Berlin.

A Position for Possible Four-Power Negotiations

General Considerations

23. Any assessment of possibilities in Four-Power negotiations on Berlin must necessarily involve some appraisal of Soviet intentions. It must also be conditioned to some extent by the negotiating history of the question since the present crisis broke in November 1958 and by our knowledge of what our German, French and British Allies are willing to accept. On the Western side the preparation of our position for negotiations with the Soviets has been, and must necessarily continue to be, essentially a Four-Power responsibility.

24. There is no reason to believe that the Soviets are not in deadly earnest about Berlin, whatever the reasons which have impelled them to postpone their so frequently threatened unilateral action. We must prudently assume that, at some point in time and in the absence of agreement with the other three occupying powers, the Soviets will feel it necessary to move ahead with their announced intention of signing a peace treaty with the

GDR

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GDR and of abandoning their responsibilities with respect to the West. If this is so, there will be no easy way out of the Berlin crisis; gimmicks and purely optical illusions are unlikely to suffice. On the other hand, we may also assume that the Soviets do not wish to engage in all-out nuclear war, or, if they can avoid it, to have a major crisis with a world-wide war scare.

25. Since the present Berlin crisis broke in November 1958 the United States Government has considered a great number of theoretical solutions to the Berlin problem. Some of these have been discussed with our Allies. (The paper attached as Annex I attempts briefly to summarize the development of the crisis since November 1958.)

Berlin Solution Within All-German Context

26. If Berlin is at least partially a lever which the Soviets are using to obtain other objectives of more basic importance to them, one might suppose that, if the West could make some proposal which promised movement towards the achievement of at least some of these other objectives, the Soviets might be willing to ease their pressure on Berlin.

27. Our traditional position has, of course, been that the only real solution to the Berlin problem must come within the context of German reunification, yet it is doubtful whether anything can be done at the present time which will really contribute much in a practical sense to the process of achieving German reunification. A great deal of thought and quadripartite diplomatic effort went into the formulation of the Western Peace Plan as put forward at the 1959 Geneva Conference, and it seems unlikely that anything could be added to it which would make it a negotiable basis for a general settlement within which the Berlin question would assume its proper position. All the available evidence points to an overwhelming Soviet disinterestedness in German reunification except on terms unacceptable to the West. On this realistic assumption the problem then boils down to whether the West could accept some form of all-German camouflage which might sufficiently serve Soviet interests to obtain from them in exchange a satisfactory Berlin arrangement. Although the possibilities in this area are worth further exploration to see whether they are compatible with basic United States interests, there would be little point in going through the travail of trying to get Allied acceptance of any of them unless we are persuaded that they might be negotiable with the Soviets. (Annex II contains a discussion of various possible all-German proposals.)

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Discussion of Berlin in Isolation

28. We must prudently assume that, at a fairly early point in negotiations with the Soviets, the West may be confronted, as at the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers in 1959, by the necessity of abandoning discussion of the all-German question and moving on to the problem of Berlin in isolation. An important aspect of the Western position at this point will be the agreed tactical handling of the further discussion with the Soviets, just as in preparing for the 1960 Summit meeting the agreed Western tactics paper in many respects embodied the most important elements of the Western position. In evaluating the various theoretical solutions to the Berlin position which it is possible to devise, the basic alternatives to the West boil down to four essential types:

- a. Some sort of interim arrangement of the kind proposed by the Western Powers at the 1959 Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers;
- b. The all-Berlin approach;
- c. Some permanent change of status for West Berlin intended to survive until reunification;
- d. Some face-saving formula either freezing the situation or permitting the Soviets to proceed with their intention of turning over control of access to the GDR but preserving the essentials of the Western position with respect to freedom of access.

29. A discussion of these four possible approaches and variants thereof is contained in Annex III, leading to the conclusion that the most likely development would be that the Western Powers will find it desirable to aim at an arrangement falling within the fourth category in paragraph 27.

Contingency Plans

30. In arriving at decisions at a conference, the Western Powers must, of course, take into consideration the implications of their contingency plans in the event of a complete breakdown of negotiations and the execution of the announced Soviet intention to sign a peace treaty with the GDR and to hand over control of access to GDR officials. The

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major focus of these plans, given the physical situation of Berlin, has been increased Soviet or GDR interference with freedom of movement between Berlin and the West. (See Annex IV for Summary.)

31. Partly at least due to United States initiative, the three Occupying Powers have been able to carry through a thorough review, and a considerable extension, of planning to deal with harassment of access. Plans for the earlier stages of a crisis are now reasonably complete but a further development of planning to cover the later stages will be more difficult. The governments concerned, particularly the British, are reluctant to commit themselves to rigid courses of action on a purely hypothetical basis and thus to deprive themselves of freedom to exploit any opportunity for new diplomatic approaches which might present themselves as the situation develops. (In this connection, it may be noted that the most advanced plans proposed by the United States for the restoration of access contemplate, at the most, achieving this objective through compelling the Soviets to resume peaceful negotiation on Berlin.) With respect to planning regarding German access, there exists the additional complication that the GDR has long exercised effective control over such access.

32. The ultimate success of Berlin contingency planning is problematic, for none of the measures contemplated can change the basic situation. From one point of view, the assumption of Western contingency planning is that the situation may deteriorate through various stages, for which plans have been outlined, until the Soviets are faced with the imminence of general war. The hope is, of course, that the situation will actually stabilize at an early and still acceptable stage. There are a number of critical points where the Communists might postpone or refrain from further action against Berlin, thus retarding or arresting the development of the situation and giving the Western Powers at least a temporary respite. From the Western point of view obviously, the earlier the break-off point is reached, the better.

33. Apart from these possible sticking points, a realistic evaluation will allow for intrusion of the unforeseen and the unpredictable. In a highly volatile situation where each side hopes, and may be prepared to gamble, that the other does not believe Berlin to be worth a war, the dangers of miscalculation are obvious, as is the possibility of pressures beyond those generated by formal working out of the plan. Under conditions of imminent threat of war it seems unlikely that the rest of the world will stand idly by and permit the situation to further deteriorate.

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the crisis becomes graver, one might expect pressures from public opinion and from other governments to have the UN seize responsibility from the Four Powers and to obtain acceptance of a peaceful "settlement" of the Berlin question, whatever the political cost to the West.

34. Be that as it may, the Western Powers have no prudent alternative but to attempt, as far as this is possible, to perfect their contingency plans within the inner logic of the formal system basically agreed by governments. Within this formal system, however, there obviously are a number of areas of probable difficulty where present agreement on a formula cannot hide the fact that, under crisis conditions, the interpretation and the objectives of the Western Allies may differ somewhat. Thus, for example, the British have never been enthusiastic about the "peel-off" procedure presently contemplated as a means of identifying official Allied travelers on the Autobahn and railway line without accepting formal processing by GDR officials. The British hope that the Soviets can be persuaded explicitly to accept the agency concept, which we likewise would be willing to consider, and it is likely that they would also be prepared to let East German officials at the check-points carry out essentially the same procedures as those now executed by Soviet officials. We may reasonably expect that, should the stage of contingency planning be reached, the British will make every effort to ensure that our insistence on the "peel-off" procedure does not become the point at which Allied movement to and from Berlin comes to a halt. There are several other subsequent points at which differences among the Allies may be expected to manifest themselves.

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Annex I

The Berlin Crisis Since November 1958

The Development of the Crisis

1. The Berlin crisis has gone through four broad phases:

a. Following upon the Soviet note of November 27, 1958, there was an initial period of mutual restatement of position and exchanges of notes leading up to the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers which began on May 11, 1959. This was a period of intensive diplomatic activity among the Western Powers during which they drew up the Western Peace Plan and made considerable progress in their contingency planning.

b. The period of the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers (May-August 1959) during the course of which the West agreed to discuss Berlin outside the context of German reunification and advanced proposals (rejected by the Soviets) for an "interim arrangement" on Berlin. The Soviets in turn made unacceptable proposals for an "interim arrangement".

c. The period between the Camp David talks and the collapse of the Paris Summit Meeting in May 1960. This likewise was a period of intensive diplomatic activity and many preparatory meetings.

d. The post-Summit period of relative diplomatic quiescence and of further Soviet postponement of threatened unilateral action pending the inauguration of a new American administration. GDR harassment of German civilian access provoked Western countermeasures which, in turn, led to GDR concessions, and by the end of 1960 the situation in and about Berlin had returned to as near normal as it ever gets.

2. It is reasonable to assume that, in November of 1958, the Soviets expected a combination of threat, pressure, and offer to negotiate to lead to a collapse of Western determination and acceptance of something along the lines of their free city proposal. Their subsequent postponement of what they claimed to be inevitable, their willingness to wait until some further negotiation or some other event had occurred, may be attributed to Soviet doubt that they could take their threatened unilateral action without precipitating a major crisis involving the risk of war. On the Western side, a major problem throughout this period has accordingly been to maintain the credibility, not only of the guarantee against outright attack, but of the stated determination to defend Western rights in Berlin, ultimately at the grave risk of thermonuclear war. It is a moot point whether the

credibility

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By SF NARA, Date 10/20/92

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credibility of the Western position has declined during the past two years in the light of comparative advances in weapons technology and related developments. There have been some disturbing signs of Soviet reluctance to believe that the West, given its divisions and its internal strains, would really prove firm in a showdown. However this may be, an element of doubt has presumably persisted up to now sufficient to have deterred the Soviets from unilateral action.

3. Considered purely as a holding operation, Western efforts since November 1958 have been fairly successful. Nothing essential has changed in Berlin; the city continues to prosper economically; and the morale of the Berliners, despite some ups and downs, continues to be good. Moreover, since the initial Khrushchev threat, more than 350,000 refugees have come from East Germany to the West, the great majority through Berlin -- a further demographic drain which an already underpopulated GDR could ill afford.

The Western Approach in 1958-1960

4. From the outset, the Four Western Powers principally concerned have differed to some extent both in their appraisal of the situation and their estimate of desirable policy. These differences have never developed to the point of open disagreement (except in press leaks), and a fine show of Western unity was maintained at the Geneva Conference and the abortive Summit. However, the variations in approach which have emerged during the preparatory work for conferences presumably remain a constant factor. The British have been most willing to compromise in order to achieve a solution; but after the unfavorable reception given to their "slippery slope" memorandum of late 1958 (which in effect advocated trading recognition of the GDR for a Berlin settlement), they have been reticent to expose their basic thinking. The French and Germans, on the other hand, have been consistently negative in opposing the introduction of any elements of flexibility into the Western position, either on Germany as a whole or on Berlin in particular. The United States has shown itself more willing at least to consider possible new approaches provided they seemed compatible with basic Western interests, and has had to provide much of the initiative needed to organize the work during the preparatory phases prior to the Geneva and Summit Conferences.

5. In developing the Western position on Germany and Berlin, the Four Powers have passed through phases somewhat analogous to the four noted above. During the initial phase prior to the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers, the West still operated essentially on the assumption that discussion of the Berlin problem should be kept within the context of the all-German question. Within the State Department various new ideas were

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considered for incorporation into a Western package proposal to replace the Eden Plan of the 1955 Geneva Conference. After months of discussions within a series of Four-Power Working Group sessions in Washington, Paris, and London, some of these ideas survived in the Western Peace Plan put forward at Geneva on May 14, 1959. It is highly questionable whether even a more forthcoming version of the Peace Plan (still consistent with basic Western interests) would have proved at all negotiable with the Soviets, although the Western package would have been more appealing as propaganda. At any rate after a few weeks of inconclusive discussion of the German question at Geneva, with the Soviets emphasizing the necessity of a peace treaty and all-German talks and the West extolling the merits of the Peace Plan, the conference moved on to the subject of Berlin proper for a wearisome and protracted period. Despite the concern which they caused the Germans and the Berliners, the Western proposals for an interim arrangement on Berlin might have provided a satisfactory modus vivendi for a period of some years. However, it became clear at Geneva that the Soviet concept of an interim arrangement differed too basically from that of the West to make agreement possible.

6. At the subsequent Camp David talks, the only agreement reached on Berlin was that negotiations would be reopened with a view to achieving a solution in accordance with the interests of all concerned and in the interest of the maintenance of peace. Khrushchev gave assurances that, in the meantime, the Soviets would take no unilateral action and President Eisenhower agreed that these negotiations would not be indefinitely prolonged. After an involved preparatory process, the preferred Western objective on Berlin for the Summit emerged as an agreement for a standstill for a period of time during which an attempt might be made at a lower level to achieve progress towards a more formal agreement. The basic Western position paper did, however, allow for the possibility that the Western Powers might have to discuss an arrangement along the lines of their Geneva proposals of July 28, preferably with certain improvements. It also left open the possibility, under certain circumstances, of reviving the old Solution C of the London Working Group of April 1959. Since the collapse of the Summit, the Western emphasis has been largely on refinement of contingency planning (particularly in the countermeasures field), and there has been little further discussion of the substance of the position which the Western Powers might take into future negotiations with the Soviets on Berlin. Prior to any such negotiations, the Western Powers will presumably have to go through the usual quadripartite preparatory throes.

7. Prior to the collapse of the Summit in Paris, the Soviets gave President de Gaulle the text of certain new proposals on Berlin (attached). While couched in apparently reasonable language, these were, in some

respects,

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- 4 -

respects, even less satisfactory than their final proposals at Geneva in 1959, and were clearly designed to lead to the ultimate goal of a Free City of West Berlin via an interim arrangement during the course of which the Western Powers would be allowed to bow out of their present position in Berlin. Khrushchev has on several occasions since intimated that these would be the opening Soviet proposals at the next meeting on the subject.

Attachment:

Proposals of the Soviet Government.

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3/25/61

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

March 25, 1961



Dear Dean:

I have just finished reading the final version of your paper on North Atlantic Problems for the Future. It is truly a remarkable work and one that I believe should have great influence for the good in our future policy development.

The section on military problems is naturally of particular interest to me and I am in entire accord with your recommendations. Indeed, I shall do all that I can toward the end that our planning here in the Pentagon conforms to your views.

Al Wohlstetter has told me of your concern, which I share, regarding some aspects of the current role played by SACEUR. There should be ways, I think, of providing greater opportunity for U. S. civilian leadership in formulating and carrying out NATO planning.

Sincerely,

Russell Tripatis

Honorable Dean G. Acheson
Covington & Burling
15th & H Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

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Papers of:
Dean Acheson

NATO Advisory

March 27, 1961



Dear Ros:

Your generous note of approval of my paper has warmed my heart and bolstered my confidence that we are on the right track. Thank you very much for writing it. With your backing in the Pentagon, the suggestions in the paper could go far.

Al Wohlstetter is drafting a memorandum on U.S. civilian leadership in NATO which should be finished today and on which I should like very much to have your advice.

Sincerely,

Dean Acheson

The Honorable
Roswell Gilpatric,
The Deputy Secretary of Defense,
Washington, D. C.

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WEG-127
Burt
March 27, 1961

Re: The Sino-Soviet Dispute and the Berlin Situation.

There are important differences between interests of the Soviet and the East German regimes on the Berlin situation. Moscow, although wanting and probably intending to intensify the situation at some time in order to attempt to force gradual Western concessions, would probably give greater emphasis in this context (as otherwise) to avoiding serious risks of general or local war than would the East German regime. Ulbricht is Stalinist by tradition and nature, and the weakness of his regime naturally inclines him toward repressive measures at home and toward major efforts to improve his prestige and position through extremist policies on the Berlin and German questions. There is considerable evidence that in 1959 and early 1960 the Chinese encouraged the East Germans in their desire for a stronger line on the Berlin question than the Soviets were willing to take. The Sino-Soviet controversy not yet having burst into the open, Ulbricht probably thought he could afford at least to flirt with Peking. Aside from covert material, there were at that time sufficient common propaganda themes on that question in the East German and Chinese press (as compared to the Russian) to make it seem likely that this was the case.

When, however, the Sino-Soviet dispute burst into the open, in the spring of 1960, Moscow rapidly compelled the East Germans to give up any indication of support or sympathy for the Chinese; since June 1960 such references have disappeared from the East German press. From what evidence is available we can deduce that Ulbricht (like the Czechs) supported Khrushchev completely at the Moscow discussions. Ulbricht has been the one Communist leader publicly to accuse the Albanians of supporting sectarianism (i.e., the Chinese) at the Moscow meetings. This probably indicates not only that he is as always (when lining up for or against Moscow is necessary) the most anxious of all the satellite leaders to please the Russians, but also that he wished to make amends for his past flirtation with Peking. All this happened after, (to Ulbricht's great chagrin), Khrushchev, subsequent to the failure of the summit conference, indicated in East Berlin that he did not intend to accentuate the crisis for the present.

Should the Berlin crisis accentuate, (and, since the Soviets will probably undertake something, it probably will), opportunity will again be offered to Ulbricht (and to Mao) to maneuver in such a way as to encourage the Russians to be more rather than less obdurate vis-à-vis the West. It seems unlikely, however, that the Russians will take serious risks of general (or even of local--interstate--war) over Berlin; it seems certain that they will take less than Ulbricht (and Mao) think they should.

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The probably increasingly serious Albanian crisis further polarizes the East European satellites. The Belgrade report (New York Times, March 19, 1961) that the East Germans and the Czechs have requested the Russians to send a circular letter to the satellite parties requesting their views on what to do about Albania is another indication of how completely Ulbricht is now an instrument of Soviet policy.

Nevertheless, a Berlin crisis per se might well, by intensifying general international tension, at least initially draw the Soviets and the Chinese closer together, since the Chinese (like the East Germans and Albanians) would welcome any intensification. However, were the West to maintain a firm position, the crisis will probably eventually accentuate their differences, since the Soviets will diverge again in policy from Peking and Tirana.

Conclusion: In addition to all the basic reasons for the United States continuing its policy of no concessions to the Russians on Berlin, the Sino-Soviet dispute offers one other: a completely firm U.S. position would in the long run be more rather than less likely to increase Sino-Soviet differences on this issue. It would also increase Ulbricht's discontent at relative Soviet moderation, and might even, within the context of any general decrease in Sino-Soviet tension (such as a Berlin crisis might initially bring), tempt him once again to seek some support elsewhere than in Moscow.

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RPTD INFO: Amembassy PARIS TOPOL 1369

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADORS GAVIN AND FINLETTER

EYES ONLY FOR THURSTON

After German Ambassador (Grewe) delivered message from Chancellor to Acheson on March 27 regarding Chancellor's desire meet with Acheson (reported separately), Grewe stressed Chancellor's interest in NATO questions and particularly in knowing what U.S. has in mind re nuclear armament for NATO. Grewe expressed interest in any preliminary views which Acheson might be able give.

Acheson said that NATO does in fact have substantial nuclear capability today, which becoming steadily greater. NATO doctrine as laid down in Political Directive is that nuclear weapons should be used from outset. General Norstad has recently introduced some modification this doctrine, saying that threshold for use nuclear weapons should be raised and that NATO forces should be able enforce pause long enough to bring home to aggressor full import his attack. This new interpretation appears generally accepted by all countries, and question now RPT NO is how to put this into practice. Today nuclear side of NATO armament appears proportionately stronger than conventional; may well therefore be desirable put more emphasis on conventional.

Re Grewe question whether U.S. MRBM proposals last December were being discarded, Acheson replied this not RPT NOT case and that role of MRBMs is

EYES ONLY

Drafted by:

EUR:RA:RFessenden:mck:ta

Telegraphic transmission
classification approved

EUR - Mr. Kohler

Clearances:

3/29/61

Mr. Acheson (in substance)

GER - Mr. Hillenbrand

S/S - Mr. Gray

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one of major matters under consideration. Acheson said he believes U.S. prepared to consider assigning large part its POLARIS submarine fleet European defense. Further important question being considered is how NATO Govts decide on when nuclear weapons should be used. Solutions include: (1) QTE Fifteen fingers on trigger UNQTE with its obvious pitfalls; (2) possibility of smaller group; (3) rules or guidelines for given situations, i.e., nuclear weapons to be employed in case Soviet nuclear attack or massive Soviet conventional attack. This is kind of question being considered by U.S. Govt now, along with question of where nuclear weapons should be placed on priority scale. In view resource limitations, appears clear some sort of priorities must be decided upon.

Grewe stressed QTE inflexibility UNQTE German build-up and difficulty converting from dual purpose to conventional armament. Acheson said he believed not RPT NOT a question of discarding present armaments.

Grewe stressed that Chancellor much interested in POLARIS missile for NATO and felt that NATO POLARIS force could be nucleus for more integrated NATO structure generally.

Acheson replied that question multilateral NATO force leads inevitably to question of decision on use. Under present situation, President of U.S. has basic determination on use. In conclusion, Acheson added that he appreciated fact that Chancellor very much desires that Germany not RPT NOT be drawn into nuclear field on national basis. Problem complicated by strong French drives for national capability. However, Chancellor's desire that Germany not RPT NOT become independent national nuclear power accords closely with U.S. basic interest in

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not RPT NOT seeing proliferation nuclear capabilities. Grewe concluded interview by stressing that full and satisfactory contact between Chancellor and President on this key question exceedingly important.

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DRAFT

Dear Jim:

GAVIN?

4/16/61
go out for a while

Your letter of March 9th, with its attached memorandum, has been a real help to me, and in the last few weeks I have thought a lot about the problem of our relations with France. In this study your description of what the French want has been very helpful, and now I want to write you about the basic problem in our relations as I see them.

As you say in your letter, our basic difference with France is in the military field. We simply do not wish to assist in the development of further independent national nuclear capabilities. I have reviewed this policy again, and in my judgment it should not be changed.

Fundamentally, in the nuclear field, the interests of the West are indivisible. The chance that there would ever be a serious use of nuclear weapons for or against France without major involvement of the US is a very small indeed. The nuclear defense of the Atlantic Community is a single problem, in an accumulation of national problems. There are, of course, varying national interests, and in particular there is a problem of the relation between the overwhelming responsibilities of the US and the natural concern of other nations for their own safety and their ability in some way to control their own destiny. The French -- and especially General de Gaulle -- have chosen the course of seeking an independent national capability. We

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cannot stop them, but in our judgment it would be fundamentally wrong to assist them.

This is not a matter merely of the rules of the Atomic Energy Act. The fact is, as you point out, that the French are now very eager for cooperation in the missile field, where there is no legal obstacle. But such assistance is related to French nuclear ambition just as clearly and just as significantly as components for a diffusion plant or nuclear warheads themselves. We have nailed our flag to the purpose of a single indivisible nuclear defense of the West, and if we now help the French to move in the opposite direction our whole nuclear policy will be gravely undermined.

You may well remark, as the French must often do, that we do cooperate with the British. That is true, and the historic reasons for this cooperation are obvious. But the correct line of our own policy now is gradually to move away from an intermittent partnership with the British and to use our own influence in the direction of a gradual phasing down of the British nuclear commitment. We believe that the technology and economics will combine to make this course more and more attractive to the British in the future. Concurrently we mean to do everything we can to show our allies in Europe that we are prepared to cooperate with them, on a community

wide basis, in developing a nuclear posture which will give as much confidence as possible to all concerned.

Your letter has eloquently urged a different position, and I want you to know that it has been most helpful to have your arguments at hand. But I am now quite clear in my mind on the points which I have set forth above, and I know I can count on you to do your very best in explaining, defending, and advancing this position in whatever ways may be appropriate in Paris. I do not, of course, expect that you will convert President de Gaulle tomorrow -- or ever -- but I do hope that important progress can be made in explaining to many Frenchmen who may have important roles to play both now and in the future that our position is in no sense hostile to France. It is based rather on the realities of the nuclear situation as we understand them, and on our conviction that there is no safe path, over the long pull, except that of working together for a single Atlantic deterrent. We recognize the right of any government to disagree, but we cannot be expected to reverse our own policy on that account alone.

I know that it sets you a hard task, but I should be very grateful if you could reconsider the whole problem of our relations with France in the light of this statement of my position. It may be that ^{if} we remove

all matters that relate directly to nuclear weapons systems, there is not much left to talk about, but at least the problem is worth exploring and you are the man in the best position to explore it.

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,

[J^{et}]

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Category "A"

September 21, 1988

TS7 Warren A. Henderson

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED by TB DATE JUN 27 1991

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☐ CLASSIFY as _____, OADR☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C, OADR**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT****EXCISE**

11 3, 1961

Subject: Berlin

I have started on the problem which the President posed for me, and will report further after my return from Europe about May first. In the meantime, it is essential to establish premises upon which analysis can rest. Those stated below are for study, which has already been requested, in my absence in the Departments of State and Defense.

Isotative Premises for Analysis

1. There is no "solution" for the Berlin problem short of the unification of Germany. All courses of action are dangerous and unpromising. Inaction is even worse. We are faced with a "Mabson's choice." If a crisis is provoked a bold and dangerous course may be the safest.

2. No agreement with the Soviet Union on Berlin is possible which will not weaken the Western position and open the way to early Western elimination from Berlin—except, of course, a wholly unlikely USSR decision to drop the whole issue. A temporary agreement, such as was discussed at Geneva in 1959, by its very time limit would call our basic position in Berlin into question, and merely postpones the crisis to be met under more disadvantageous circumstances. Nor is it probable that the crisis would be long deferred by any concession in the all-German field which we could realistically offer.

3. It seems more likely than not that the USSR will move toward a crisis on Berlin this year.

4. Decisions and preparations to meet this crisis should be made at the earliest possible date.

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5. Berlin is of great importance. It is more than probable, and approaches certitude, that if the United States accepted a Communist take-over of Berlin—under whatever face-saving and delaying device—the power status in Europe would be starkly revealed and Germany, and probably France, Italy and Benelux, would make the indicated adjustments. The United Kingdom would hope that something would turn up. It wouldn't.

6. If USSR is not to dominate Europe, and, by doing so, dominate Asia and Africa also, a willingness to fight for Berlin is essential. Economic and political pressures will not be effective; they would degrade the credibility of the United States commitment to NATO. Nor would threatening to initiate general nuclear war be a solution. The threat would not carry conviction; it would invite a preemptive strike; and it would alienate allies and neutrals alike. The fight for Berlin must begin, at any rate, as a local conflict. The problem is how and where will it end. This uncertainty must be accepted.

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Vow

7. The issue over which the fight is made should be chosen early and carefully. The issue should not be the substitution of East German for Russian personnel, or the stamping, form or style of papers. It should be persistent physical interference with military or civilian traffic to and from Berlin, whether by East Germans or Soviets. Opinion at home and abroad should be fully and carefully informed as to why such interference would constitute aggression. We should not be under any illusion, however, that the neutrals will accept our view. Our interests and theirs are not the same; they will want peace at any price. The United Nations is thus unlikely to be of any more help in a future Berlin crisis than it was in 1948; a problem may arise in keeping it from being a hindrance.

8. We do not have the capability, against determined USSR resistance, to open a ground corridor to Berlin or to maintain an airlift.

a. The former is demonstrable by a comparison of available ground forces.

b. The latter view rests, not on the outcome of an air fight over the corridor, but on the vulnerability of an airlift to

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ground-to-air missiles. If extensive bombing of these ground missile batteries were begun and replied to, the result might be not to make the airlift possible, but to broaden and escalate the warfare.

The issue, therefore, is not our capability to reopen ground or air access to Berlin; it is a test of will. In the face of a determined attempt to reopen access will the USSR make determined resistance? If so, how determined? And how vigorously and long would the USSR resist the efforts of others to stop the fighting on a status quo ante basis, a basis wholly in accord with United States interests?

9. The United States will have the gravest difficulty, as it has had in the past, in getting its allies, including the Germans, to agree in advance to a fight for Berlin. Nevertheless, the United States should proceed with its preparations. These preparations will be apparent to the USSR and will contribute to the deterrent. But they should be consistently played down, e.g., covered as plans for maneuvers. Unless these steps are handled most discreetly, and full consultation on the objective continuously conducted, our allies might become frightened and tempted to make concessions on Berlin, without our agreement, which might amount to its surrender.

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10. The United States Government should have ready plans, which should be allowed to become known, for a large increase in the United States military budget, which would be undertaken as soon as the USSR begins an increase of tensions on Berlin. Such an increase would, in fact, become necessary if the attempt to seal off Berlin should be made. It would also confront the USSR with unpleasant problems of the allocation of resources. The prospect of such an increase would thus add to the deterrent.

11. While the United States should make plain by its preparations that it did not intend to initiate the use of nuclear weapons, it should make no such declaration and should constantly indicate its concern at the possibility that events themselves might take command of the situation. The degree to which SAC alert should be increased as the crisis develops is obviously a matter of the greatest importance and utmost sensitivity. It should not be at a lesser rate or to a lesser extent than in prior crises, in order to maintain the credibility of United States determination. It

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should not be enough greater to drive the USSR to a desperate preemptive strike.

Questions To Be Resolved

1. Along what lines can we most hopefully seek Allied agreement on the issue over which we could test Soviet will? The principles are stated in Paragraph 7 above. The methods of making these principles clear require study by the State Department.

2. What should be the immediate and precise purpose of a fight over Berlin? If the premises stated above are correct--i.e., that neither ground nor air access to Berlin can be maintained against determined Soviet opposition--what is the purpose of the proposed fight?

a. The first purpose is to face the USSR with the hard decision whether to incur what risks there are in a determined opposition; and, if the opposition is not made, to reopen access. To accomplish this result the United States effort must be a determined one.

b. A second purpose, if the Russians do make a determined fight, is to convince them that to prevent the loss of Berlin is more important to the United States than gaining it by force is to the USSR; and that the United States is prepared to run greater risks to achieve its purpose than the Soviets should be to attain theirs. If time is on their side, as they say, why risk everything by being in a hurry? A sustained fight would involve grave risks of escalation, a drain on economic development and on "peaceful coexistence", and chances of trouble in the satellites.

c. A third purpose is to rally our European allies to a unified and determined rearmament program. Since Berlin cannot

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be held against determined Soviet use of military power short of nuclear war, it is important—if the decision is against nuclear war—to be able to mitigate a defeat over Berlin. To have put up a really determined fight might permit the United States to turn, in part, a liability into an asset, by rallying the alliance into greater unity and military power. This was done after the Czechoslovakian coup and the Korean attack. The consequences to the USSR might be serious enough to produce something much better than the unresisted yielding of Berlin. (It should be emphasized that this memorandum does not advise for or against eventual use of nuclear weapons in defense of Berlin, or suggest to what extent the choice will remain ours to make freely. At a later stage in this study, views may be possible on this point.)

d. There is a fourth and more speculative purpose. Might a grave conflict in the heart of Europe lead to widening the frame of diplomatic negotiation, to include steps toward a German settlement and arms control which now seem infeasible?

3. Should the Test of Will Take Place on the Ground or in the Air or Both? These alternatives need more careful study than they seem to have received.

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a. Doubts about an air operation arise from lack of any clear idea of what it seeks to or, if successful, will achieve. It cannot achieve an airlift against determined resistance. If the USSR decides not to oppose determinedly it achieves only an airlift, which, except for garrison supply, may be of ephemeral use. Nor is it clear how a continued air fight over the corridors would create a severe test of Soviet will, unless the United States were willing to expand the area of combat by ground bombing. This memorandum does not purport to judge the issue; merely to sound a note of inquiry, as a basis for further study. If it should turn out to be the proper choice, preparations should be instituted promptly.

b. A ground operation presents advantages and opportunities. It also presents grave dangers of escalation and of the Western force being destroyed or cut off—especially if and when the Elbe has been crossed. If undertaken it should be by a considerable force. A battalion is too small. It can be stopped, defeated

or captured.

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or captured without disclosing any of the intentions or achieving any of the results desired. Its only merit seems to be in the fact that this is as far as the British have been willing to plan. This is not an adequate justification. An armored division, with another division in reserve, is a wholly different matter. This is a formidable force. It raises the most difficult questions for the other side. It cannot be stopped without military action. It can take care of itself against East German or token Soviet opposition. It can raise the issue of determined Russian resistance without the certainty of disaster, if it occurs. If it succeeds, a real accomplishment will have been registered. It should begin its operation without tactical nuclear weapons, and without any great air assistance until the latter may be needed.

The preparations for a ground operation would be lengthy, discernible and ominous. They would require the movement of troops on the front, and perhaps additions to them by calling up European reserves to take the place of divisions to be used and perhaps by the movement of a STRAC division to Europe and the federalizing of one or more National Guard Divisions. This would not be without effect.

Both air and land operations are in urgent need of more professional study, which I shall ask to have undertaken.

Dean Acheson

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Approved in U
4/19/61

Memorandum of Conversation

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

DATE: April 4, 1961

SUBJECT: Berlin

US The Secretary
The Under Secretary
PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Bruce
Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary, EUR
Ivan B. White, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR
John M. Steeves, Acting Assistant Secretary, FE
William C. Burdett, Director, BNA
James W. Swihart, Officer in Charge UK and Ireland Affairs

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UK Lord Home, Foreign Secretary
Ambassador Caccia
Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar, Permanent Under Secretary, Foreign Office
Lord Hood, Minister
The Hon. Peter Ramsbotham, Head, Planning and Coordination Section,
Foreign Office

R. T. D. Ledward, Counselor, British Embassy
C. D. Wiggin, First Secretary, British Embassy
A. C. I. Samuel, Private Secretary, to the Foreign Secretary

COPIES TO: See Page 4.

Lord Home opened the discussion by noting we were agreed that the present position on Berlin was the best we could hope for. However, Khrushchev was bound to make a move before the German elections. If he was clever, he might make a treaty with the GDR. If the GDR were clever it might leave the situation just as it is for a year or more before beginning to tighten the squeeze on Berlin. This tactic would leave us in a most difficult position. Public opinion would be lulled and it would be hard to mobilize public support once the squeeze started. We should look at the kind of solution which might be worked out if this problem arose, but should not talk to anyone else before our minds are clear. Gromyko has said that the occupation status must end. This is the principal point he has made publicly. Would we be in a weaker position if our rights in Berlin were put on a treaty basis? The right of conquest argument is growing somewhat thin. We might then set the East Germans and the West Germans to working out their own treaty while we held fast on Berlin. We could keep the frontier card up our sleeve. The Secretary asked who would sign the treaty. Lord Home replied the treaty would be between the Four Powers. The idea would be to get Khrushchev off the occupation status hook. He might not wish to hand over control to the East Germans.

The Secretary inquired why would Khrushchev be interested? Lord Home answered so as not to hand over to the East Germans. If he did so the issue of peace

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of peace or war would be in the hands of the East Germans. Mr. Kohler commented that Khrushchev was not afraid of the East Germans. The regime was his creature. Furthermore, Russian troops were present. Sir Frederick asked whether Khrushchev would be willing to sign a treaty leaving the allied troops in Germany for ten years. Mr. Kohler remarked that he wishes the troops out.

Lord Home described his suggestion as an alternative to fighting. A solution must be found unless we are prepared to fight and to have a nuclear war. It would be very difficult to act if nothing happened on the ground. The Secretary said that if a treaty were signed by the Soviets with the East Germans we would just not recognize it. If nothing happened on the ground there would be no danger. Mr. Ramsbotham pointed out that the East Germans would take over the control posts.

The Secretary observed that as a private citizen he had not quite seen the argument that a treaty between the Soviets and the GDR would be so dangerous.

Lord Home expressed the belief that the right of our troops in Berlin rests on an agreement with the Russians. Mr. Kohler corrected him to say that it rested on the right of conquest. The Secretary said that he would be inclined not to stress the right of conquest. We might simply say that the three great powers were going to stay in Berlin until the German question was solved and were not going to be pushed out. This would avoid an argument on technicalities.

Mr. Ramsbotham said that the East Germans, if a treaty were signed, would begin to exercise their rights. Mr. Kohler pointed out that we have envisaged this and decided just what we would do. Lord Home asked what would happen if the East Germans made no difficulties. Mr. Kohler replied that we would then keep on going just as we do now. Lord Home described the East Germans as a different set of people not nearly as responsible as the Russians. The Secretary inquired whether the UK had heard from the Russians what they proposed to say in a treaty with the East Germans regarding our rights. Sir Frederick replied that our rights would terminate and access to Berlin would be at the sufferance of the East Germans. Lord Home inquired about the legal position noting the Russians say such a treaty would bring our rights to an end. Mr. Kohler answered that the lawyers were perfectly satisfied that we were on solid legal grounds. The Secretary doubted that there would be much pressure from the UN to abandon Berlin.

Lord Home reiterated that it would be safer to deal with the Russians. Sir Frederick inquired whether the Russians would be prepared to sign a treaty on Berlin without bringing in the GDR. The Secretary said that they might agree to bring in the GDR after ten years. Mr. Kohler commented that this was the joker introduced at the Geneva Conference. The Russians maintained that at the end of an agreed period a Free City should be established.

Lord Home again remarked that it would be very difficult if a treaty was
signed

signed and nothing happened. There was the question of public opinion. Mr. Kohler said that in the end the only route there we would fight on would be interference with our right of access. All of the contingency planning is based on making the right of access the issue. The Secretary said he assumed that this meant access to support the city of Berlin and not just our own forces. Mr. Kohler replied affirmatively. He described the situation last fall when we had used restriction of travel documents and trade pressures by West Germany in response to East German restrictions. He had discovered that these weapons were surprisingly strong.

Lord Home observed that if we let the Russians eat and deal with the East Germans over a period of years we will move deeper and deeper towards recognition of East Germany. Mr. Kohler said we would not deal with East Germany.

The Secretary thought that a build up by West Germany of relations with East Germany might be all to the good. The Under Secretary commented it was a mistake to think that the East Germans would dominate Germany. Lord Home said that if the Russians were out of the picture we might be worse off.

The Secretary said that he would need a good deal more briefing before he could give a flat answer to that proposition. He supposed there was not too much distinction to be drawn between the Russians and East Germans. If the latter started to deport themselves somewhat more gaily it would be with Russian inspiration.

Ambassador Bruce pointed out that the Soviet presence provides a control over the East German apparatus. The weakness of the Western position arises not from interference with our military forces but from East German control over civilians. It was a fallacy to believe that West German-East German exchanges would bring about a consolidation of the East German position. Impediments to trade came from the East Germans. The East Germans were being "corrupted" by the West Germans. The West Germans unfortunately were unimaginative in doing something constructive. They could not be expected to be imaginative as long as they abrogated their own responsibilities and pinned them on the West. Signature of a treaty would be extraordinarily difficult. It would result in a convolution in West German politics particularly during the election campaign. If we were to abandon our insistence on the right of conquest and sign a treaty it would be much easier for one party to repudiate the treaty. Lord Home said he was sure nothing should be done before the elections.

The Under Secretary inquired what the probable reaction would be if the Russians pushed the East Germans and we were to turn some of our powers over to the West Germans.

Mr. Kohler commented this was the thing the West Germans were most afraid of, that is, any easing off of Western responsibility. The Germans would be scared we were pulling out. The presence of allied forces in Berlin is an essential guarantee of our continued interest. During the last six months the West Germans have come to realize that they must play a larger role.

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We have brought them into the contingency planning.

The Secretary said that as he understood the matter tripartite planning did not envisage that a Soviet-East German treaty would start action. We would keep our eyes on what actually happened on the ground. Mr. Kohler pointed out that we have a contingency plan covering what to do if a treaty is signed. This plan calls mainly for diplomatic action and certain preparations.

Lord Home thought the situation was not so simple. Almost immediately after a treaty was signed we would be in the position of dealing more and more with the East Germans. The West Germans would be even further in such a position. Sir Frederick stated that one objective of the Russians, of course, was to obtain recognition of the East German regime. The Secretary asked whether the Russians were content to see an increase in East German-West German contacts. Mr. Kohler observed that the Russians keep a terrific control over any contacts except for the one loophole of Berlin.

Lord Home again said he was certain nothing should be done before the German elections. He was not at all sure that it was in our interest to have the Russians out of the German situation or that it was in the Russian interest. The East Germans could spark a war. The Russians would want to retain control. He did not wish to wash out entirely the idea of changing over to a treaty status.

The Secretary said he had been out of the picture for some time and would need further briefing. He would have thought that there were opportunities in de facto dealings with the East German regime. He was not convinced that the East Germans would be more dangerous than the Russians.

Sir Frederick suggested that the working group in Washington have a look at the various priorities in the contingency planning. The UK had heard that SACEUR thought that certain military measures might be taken almost automatically. Mr. Kohler said that the group had tried to assign priorities. An exercise was now in progress about priorities in the non-military series. The way the situation actually developed would largely determine the order of priority. Sir Frederick said the UK feared the military might think that a whole series of measures should start almost automatically. Mr. Kohler said that he readily agreed that the problem should be examined in the working group. He referred to a practical matter which had come up. The working group had discovered that some countries did not have the legislative basis for taking certain economic measures. All the governments should equip themselves to do so. He said we are equipped to do so but he understood the UK was not. Sir Frederick said this matter was being looked into.

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4/4/61
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April 4, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

1. Here's a first-rate interim memorandum on Berlin from Dean Acheson. It sharpens the issues and offers a base from which you may wish to make one or two comments to Macmillan.
2. Acheson argues: Berlin is of first importance; a crisis is likely this year; we have no good answer to Soviet pressure upon the routes of communication; [REDACTED]
3. His major conclusion is that we must be ready to use force in substantial amounts. [REDACTED]
4. Acheson urges study of the following possible courses of action, all of which I think he is likely to support as his work goes on: [REDACTED]
5. With respect to Macmillan's visit: It seems to me that there is every reason to press strongly upon the British our determination to stand firm here. Attempts to negotiate this problem out of existence have failed in the past, and there is none which gives promise of success now. We should of course be willing to look at any new schemes

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BY msm

NARA DATE 3/80

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they may dream up, but in return we should press very hard for British firmness at the moment of truth.

Berlin is no place for compromise and our general friendliness and eagerness for improvement on many other points really requires strength here in order to be rightly understood.

McG. B.

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4/10/61

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draft


CHANCELLOR ADENAUER'S VISIT
Washington, April 12-13, 1961

NATO, Including Results Acheson Review

Anticipated German Position

Political: The Chancellor will undoubtedly stress the great importance of American leadership in the NATO Alliance. In a message to President Kennedy and on other recent occasions, he has laid great stress on full political consultation in NATO and on the need for U.S. leadership in bringing this about.

Military: The Chancellor's chief concern will be that the U.S. is moving to a new strategic concept for NATO which involves a reduced priority for NATO's nuclear armament. This lessened emphasis on NATO's nuclear armament arouses a series of fears in the Chancellor's mind:

- 
1. He may feel that it reflects a growing U.S. unwillingness to use its strategic deterrent to defend the European NATO area.
 2. He may see in it a first step toward the "denuclearization" of the central European area, a prospect which he strongly opposes along with anything else in the category of "disengagement" schemes.
 3. He may also regard it as a derogation from the principle of the forward strategy for the defense of Europe, on the assumption that failure to plan on the use of nuclear weapons as far forward as possible will weaken the deterrent and thus lead to aggression and by falling back across most of Germany by allied forces which would be unable to contain that aggression. This is a totally unacceptable strategy politically to the Germans, since it involves the abandonment of German territory.

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Acheson Pp 12 State Dept + WH Adviser
Apr-June 1961 / 85 box / HIST

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- 2 -

More specifically, the Chancellor will be concerned about the future of the U.S. proposals of last December for a multinational NATO MRBM Force. The German Government strongly supported these proposals when they were made and has since displayed an active interest in seeing them carried out. The Chancellor supports the multilateral NATO MRBM Force because he looks upon it as an alternative to national forces.

A further element in the Chancellor's thinking is his interest in seeing NATO have greater authority in the use of nuclear weapons. He has never been very specific about how this is to be accomplished, but the reasons for his interest in this seem clear. He is fundamentally opposed to the spread of independent national nuclear weapons capabilities, and he is especially concerned that pressures will sooner or later develop for a German national program. The best preventive for this, in his mind, is to give the Alliance as a whole a nuclear capability and a voice in its use. The Chancellor believes that this can head off inevitable pressures for independent national programs.

The above issues are somewhat sharpened in the Chancellor's mind by the fact that NATO's nuclear armament is becoming a major issue in the German election campaign. Adenauer's party, in pressing its case for a strong defense policy, is heavily committed to a full nuclear armament for NATO and to increased NATO authority in nuclear matters. Adenauer appears to have pursued this line deliberately to keep the SPD off balance. The SPD under Brandt has moved in the direction of the CDU's policy of supporting adequate NATO defenses; to keep the initiative, Adenauer has stressed the importance of nuclear arms for NATO knowing that this presents difficulties for the SPD.

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Adenauer's purpose is to show up the SPD as not being really committed to a strong defense policy. It should therefore be borne in mind that Adenauer may look upon decreased U.S. emphasis on the nuclear side of NATO's armament as an undermining of his position in the election.

Recommended U.S. Position

Political: The political tie between Europe and North America -- i.e., the Atlantic Community -- is and will continue to be the foundation of U.S. policy. NATO is the principal instrument for this, with OECD providing a major new instrument in the economic field. It is of fundamental importance to us to maintain and strengthen NATO, just as it is clearly the basic Soviet purpose to weaken and disrupt it.

In the political field, we are convinced that consultation is the key to maintaining and strengthening the Alliance. We for our part intend to consult actively and meaningfully with our Allies.

We are ready and willing to consult with our NATO Allies on any of our policies, concerning both direct East-West issues and issues affecting other areas of the world in which the Atlantic nations have an interest. Our objective should, at best, be agreement on common action; as a minimum, we should seek understanding of how best to deal with disagreements so as to cause minimum damage for the Alliance.

Military: We believe it is of the greatest importance to keep NATO defenses strong. One of the first acts of the new Administration was to make absolutely clear to the Alliance that we believe the maintenance of U.S. strength in Europe is essential to the security of the Atlantic Community and the Free World as a whole. There should be no doubt or uncertainty about our intention to maintain a full contribution to NATO defense.

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We are also firmly committed to an effective "forward strategy" for the defense of Europe. One of the requirements of an effective deterrence in Europe is the maintenance of nuclear weapons in NATO Shield forces. We intend to maintain these weapons in Europe, available for the Alliance in case of need.

We also believe that the Soviets must never be given any reason for doubting our intention to use these weapons in the Shield, together with those outside the European area if necessary, to meet a Soviet attack on Europe.

An effective deterrent requires also strong conventional forces. NATO should not, by failing to maintain strong conventional forces, encourage the Soviets to believe that their growing missile capability enables them to threaten or engage in limited conventional aggression.

The question to be considered by NATO is the degree of emphasis which should be given to strengthening conventional forces. Our resources are not unlimited. We believe NATO to date has been devoting increased resources to nuclear build-up at the expense of its conventional forces. We believe all NATO Governments should take vigorous measures to increase the strength of their conventional forces. This should be a top priority task. It does not require that we go beyond the general quantitative level now planned in MC-70, but we should make a greater effort to meet these goals. We should also devote increased expenditures to improving manning levels, training, modernization of equipment and supply for conventional forces. This increased emphasis on conventional forces will, in our view, not decrease the overall effectiveness of the NATO deterrent. On the contrary, it should enhance the effectiveness of the deterrent by providing greater flexibility of response.

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The implementation of this program should not require any revision of the governing NATO strategy concept. Possibly all that is required is a re-interpretation of the concept along lines similar to those General Norstad has been developing, i.e., being able to introduce nuclear weapons at a higher threshold if necessary.

It will be necessary to develop a system of priorities to set forth primary emphasis on conventional forces. Limited resources permit no other course but this does not mean any abandonment of a nuclear capability for NATO shield forces.

As for the MRBM requirement, we are planning to reaffirm our intention to commit five POLARIS submarines to NATO. More than this, we are planning to commit additional POLARIS submarines, as they become available, which are intended for deployment in the Atlantic and Mediterranean. We are urging the U.K. also to commit its strategic forces to NATO.

These powerful forces could then be considered as available for the forward defense of Europe. To ensure this further, some portion of these forces might be allocated, on a contingency basis, to cover SACEUR's MRBM-type targets. We might work out some means of Allied participation in the targeting of these forces as it applies to NATO.

This is a very major step which should go a long way to help meet NATO's military requirements in the future. It should also provide very clear evidence of our deep commitment to the defense of Europe.

If the European members of NATO wish to contribute to the NATO sea-borne missile force provided by the U.S. POLARIS submarines after completion of the 1962-66 non-nuclear build-up, the U.S. would be willing to discuss the

possibility

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possibility of some multilateral contribution by the European members. [In any such discussion the U.S. would want to ensure against any national ownership of control of MRBM forces, against any weakening of centralized command and control over these forces, and against any diversion of required resources from non-nuclear programs. We would not want to facilitate European production of MRBMs or procurement of MRBMs for European national forces, whether or not these forces are committed to SACEUR.]

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The question of how the decision on the use of nuclear weapons should be made is a difficult one to which we have given much thought. [A collective decision by the full NATO Council raises obvious questions as to the real effectiveness of the deterrent. Another solution would be the delegation of authority to a smaller group, which also raises very difficult questions.]

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We for our part are committed to the fullest NATO consultation with our Allies on use that time permits. If the NATO Council wishes, we would welcome its development of guidelines on the use decision or on improved consultation procedures. The President alone must retain the authority to use nuclear weapons, but he could undertake to observe these NATO guidelines or procedures in exercising his authority.]

In conclusion, we believe the general program outlined above will enhance the overall defensive strength of NATO. The U.S. for its part will maintain its full national contribution. We will maintain significant nuclear weapons in the NATO shield. We will maintain present ground strength in Europe for the foreseeable future. We will expect all members of NATO to make a real effort to improve the conventional capability of NATO forces, thus adding to the overall effectiveness of the deterrent. Finally, we will commit U.S.

POLARIS

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- 7 -

POLARIS submarines located in the Atlantic and Mediterranean area and employ them in such a way as to ensure an adequate defense of Europe.



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April 6, 1961

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 36

TO: The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Improving the Security of Nuclear Weapons
in NATO Europe Against Unauthorized Use

The President has approved the Record of Actions of the March 29, 1961 meeting of the National Security Council in which it is noted that the Secretary of Defense would undertake the study called for in paragraph 7-c relating to the above subject of the proposed policy directive in Mr. Dean Acheson's report on NATO.

Accordingly, it is requested that the Department of Defense undertake the study as soon as possible for transmittal to the President through this office.

McGeorge Bundy

Copy 4 of 4 copies

cc: Mr. Bromley Smith,
Mrs. Lincoln
McG B's file ✓

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By <u>RW/m</u> NARS, Date <u>3/85</u>

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This document consists of 3 pages
Number 1 of 1 copies, Series A

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: April 11, 1961

SUBJECT: NATO and Nuclear Relationships

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Kohler, EUR
Mr. White, EUR
Mr. Albright, RA
Mr. Beigel, WE

M. de Rose, French Foreign Office
M. Winckler, French Embassy

April 18, 1961

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(19)

17-19

M. de Rose said he had been invited to participate in a panel discussion at the MIT centenary and took the opportunity to visit for a day here. He was interested in exchanging views regarding the outlook for the Oslo meeting of the NATO Council. In this connection he was interested in the outcome of the Acheson studies. Mr. Kohler said that we had briefed the Embassy here as fully as we could on this, and that Ambassador Finletter had also briefed the Council in Paris. He said that in addition arrangements had just been made for Mr. Acheson to discuss the subject with General de Gaulle on April 20. He said that while we have reached our own conclusions on certain aspects of the problems facing the Alliance, our views are not controlling and we will wish to hear the views of others.

Mr. Kohler went on to say that the principal conclusions that we have reached as an outcome of the Acheson studies are that NATO has a greater atomic capability today than many people seem to realize, and the question remains of how much nuclear power beyond that is required; and that by reliance on the nuclear deterrent NATO has become unbalanced, and the need now is to build up NATO forces toward the conventional goals set forth in MC-70. He said the present reliance appears to us to limit our own flexibility and freedom of choice to enforce a pause on any actions begun by the other side. The question is how to apportion the available resources of the Alliance over the next few years. He said that the US intends to go ahead with the commitment of Polaris submarines to NATO which had been mentioned last December. The US is also receptive to any European ideas regarding the use and control of nuclear weaponry by the Alliance. So far we have had only British reaction on this question, mostly in the form of questions; the only reaction from France has been that it is proceeding with its own national program.

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M. de Rose

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Mr. de Rose said that France was awaiting an elaboration by the new Administration regarding the suggestions advanced by Mr. Herter last December. Mr. Kohler said that Mr. Herter had spoken at that time in order to stimulate thinking by others on the subject. He said that we have felt there are sufficient nuclear weapons on the Western side already, to meet our needs. He said that the US is ready at all times to fulfill its obligations to NATO, although there seem to be some doubts about this in Europe. On one hand the British are fearful that we may be trigger-happy regarding our nuclear weapons, while at the other extreme the French have expressed doubts, so we understand, that we may not use such weapons at all. Mr. de Rose said the main question is what the Soviet Union thinks about US intentions. He said that even if the Europeans had no doubts this factor is a secondary one. Mr. Kohler said the Soviets may tend to feel the same way as the UK and we do not intend to disabuse them. He said the question is how can the European members of NATO be any more assured of our intentions than they are today.

Mr. de Rose said that the UK questionnaire appears to contribute little more than questions. He said the idea of a NATO nuclear deterrent was not a French idea, and that it is unlikely the Europeans will have any ideas that have not occurred to the US which knows much more about the subject. He said that the Europeans are eager to see how the US believes its suggestions might be feasible.

Mr. Kohler said that from our viewpoint any independent nuclear capability in Europe is not only a waste of resources but would also be divisive within the Alliance. He said that this concept would apply to the UK as well as to France, and he asked where the Germans would fit into the picture if the French trod this path as well as the British. He felt that there would be an irresistible trend inside Germany to move in the same direction. Mr. de Rose said that when asked why the British had developed an independent capability, Mr. Macmillan had once responded that "we made this thing by instinct." Mr. Kohler said that we would like to provide an alternative to an independent nuclear effort by France, and Mr. de Rose said that nothing would deflect France from its present course.

Mr. Kohler said that the principal problem facing France in fact is the delivery system. Mr. de Rose said he realized that the UK had given up in its effort to achieve a satisfactory vehicle, and that France recognized that mobile missiles are very expensive. Mr. Kohler said that when the V-bombers become obsolete the UK will in effect no longer have an independent nuclear force, and that France is bound to face the same problem when aircraft are no longer effective. He thought that this time would arrive soon when viewed in the time-span of the life of nations. Mr. de Rose said that France plans to tackle seriously the problem of delivery.

Mr. de Rose said that if there is no test ban agreement at Geneva there will be no hope to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons. He said that France plans in any event to carry on its tests as long as there is no other way to secure the information to be derived from testing. He said that inevitably Communist China will desire its own nuclear weapons, this will lead India to do the same, and this will in turn lead Pakistan in this direction. Mr. Kohler again referred to Germany, and Mr. de Rose said that there is not a trace of uranium in Western Germany. Mr. Kohler did not believe it would be difficult for the Germans to acquire the necessary raw materials.

With regard to a NATO deterrent, Mr. de Rose said that the present arrangement would seem to be better than the requirement for fifteen concurrences before any nuclear weapons might be used. Mr. Kohler said that perhaps there is some other solution and asked what arrangement would meet the security needs of France. Mr. de Rose referred to the statements of de Gaulle that a great nation must be capable of looking after its own basic security requirements. Mr. Kohler reiterated our belief that in the light of the nuclear impasse it is important that the conventional forces in Europe be greatly improved. He said that we feel there must be a division of labor in NATO, and that while he recognized the prestige aspect it was hard to see the purpose of any national nuclear capability in Europe other than a political one. Mr. de Rose said that the political aspects of this question should not be underestimated. Mr. Kohler said that this is not merely a question regarding France but is a fundamental question of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Mr. de Rose said that the French did not agree with this analysis and felt that there should be three nuclear powers in the West, one of which would be France.

Mr. Kohler was called from the room and Mr. White asked about French intentions for continued testing in Africa, and whether tests after the next one would be conducted underground. Mr. de Rose was reluctant to respond to these inquiries; he said that France has a program for testing, and he said that he could confirm that the statement regarding testing underground in the future was correct. He said that France will not be deterred from its program by any deliberate agitation against the program on the part of any governments in Africa. In response to Mr. White's inquiry, he said he could make no estimate of the nature of any Nigerian reaction to future French testing.

Mr. de Rose said that one other aspect of NATO had concerned him, namely the targeting of nuclear weapons in the hands of NATO forces and the consequences of a Soviet nuclear attack on Europe. He said that while certain officers at SHAPE may have such information, the NATO governments which are supposed to pass on questions of war and peace would be forced to take any decisions more or less in the dark about the specific military consequences of those decisions, both for the other side and for themselves. He said that few European governments appear to have any knowledge either about the nature of the nuclear warheads that are located in Europe or the precise nature of the target system. He said that the briefing given the Council by SACEUR last spring regarding MREB needs was of a most general nature regarding targets; regarding warhead yields no information was provided. He thought this was a very unsatisfactory state of affairs from the viewpoint of European members of NATO.

Mr. de Rose said he would be a member of the French delegation to the Oslo meeting.

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON
APR 12 1961

Copy 2 of 4 copies each
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Dear Mr. Bundy:

At its meeting on November 17, 1960, the National Security Council took the following action with respect to the subject of NATO in the 1960's:


"Noted the President's directive that the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, arrange for a re-examination of present NATO stockpile procedures in order to indicate what legislative changes might be required to give assurance of a prompt and proper response within the short reaction times of missile warfare."

In view of the re-examination concerning NATO which is presently in progress, I recommend that the above be dropped as a National Security Council action since it is only a small part of the overall re-examination being conducted.

Sincerely yours,

Signed
ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Honorable McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House



~~TOP SECRET~~

SecDef Cont. No. TS-340

see
FRUS 1958-60 201: 655, 659 (this is what was left in
NSF 1329/ NSAM 39: reexamination of NATO stockpile procedures

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

APR 12 1961

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of 1 pages series A (1)

Mr. Smith

Mac
Dear Mr. Bundy:

At its meeting on November 17, 1960, the National Security Council took the following action with respect to the subject of NATO in the 1960's:

agreed

"Noted the President's directive that the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, arrange for a re-examination of present NATO stockpile procedures in order to indicate what legislative changes might be required to give assurance of a prompt and proper response within the short reaction times of missile warfare."

In view of the re-examination concerning NATO which is presently in progress, I recommend that the above be dropped as a National Security Council action since it is only a small part of the overall re-examination being conducted.

Sincerely yours,

R. G. Epstein

DEPUTY

Honorable McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House

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E.O. 12856, Sec. 3.4
104-93-103
By <i>[Signature]</i> NARA Date <i>5/14/77</i>

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SecDef Cont. No. TS-340

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: April 14, 1961

SUBJECT: Courtesy Call on the President

PARTICIPANTS: The President

Mr. Paul Reynaud, Former Prime Minister of France
Ambassador Herve Alphand, French Embassy

COPIES TO: Mr. William L. Blue, WE
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Mr. Paul Reynaud made a courtesy call on the President accompanied by Ambassador Alphand. At the beginning of the conversation, the President recalled a visit he made to Mr. Reynaud as a student some 20 years ago to deliver a note from Mr. Bullitt. After expressing some concern over the differences in U.S. and French policies the President said that he realized that certain differences were likely to continue to exist, but he hoped that both countries could adjust to them. Mr. Reynaud said that there were at least two points on which there were no differences between the United States and France, i.e., 1) firmness on Berlin and 2) the Common Market. He added that he had known General de Gaulle for 27 years and that his attitude towards many problems was conditioned by his life as an officer in the armed forces, which had not given him an opportunity to travel very widely.

The President said that he could understand that the General might have some reservations about the U.N., but it was his belief that the U.N. could play a useful role and he cited the Congo situation as a case in point. He pointed out that at least the presence of the U.N. in the Congo had prevented a direct encounter between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

In answer

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E. O. 11652, SEC. 3(E), 5(D), 5(E) AND 11

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NSP/70/Pr. Gen. 5/1/61 - 5/10/61

In answer to a question from the President concerning the Algerian talks, Mr. Reynaud said that these talks would continue over a long period, as the Algerian leadership is divided and some of the leaders were not just insurgents but revolutionaries who were not prepared to sit down and talk to representatives of capitalistic France. When the President asked him if the talks would drag on through the spring and summer, he responded in the affirmative. Then there ensued a discussion on the question of partition which led the President to ask if partition was a realistic alternative. Mr. Reynaud agreed that partition would be very difficult to achieve and stated that de Gaulle was using it mainly as a bargaining point.

The President then said that one of the other questions which concerned him was that of a nuclear capability for France. Mr. Reynaud said that he quite frankly took a different position on this question than General de Gaulle. He added that in his view it would be difficult for a country like France to run a race with the United States and the USSR in this field. The President mentioned that the initial cost of developing the bombs was tremendous, but that in addition there was the great cost of developing the means for delivery. He then cited as further evidence of the expense of nuclear developments the fact that we were spending two billion dollars a year on the National Space Agency alone. He said it was not simply a question of France's having nuclear capability, but the next step would be for Germany to have this capability. He went on to say that this was dangerous in view of the fact that Adenauer might be leaving the scene some day. Mr. Reynaud responded that that was why he had always been a supporter of a European army and why he deplored the mistake which Mendes-France had made in not allowing this to come about. Mr. Reynaud also said that he agreed with the President's recent statement on conventional arms and had recently made a speech in the Assembly which was a plea for more conventional forces to avoid "war by accident".

The conversation then turned to a discussion of the recent Adenauer visit and the President said that it had been a great experience to talk to a great European like Adenauer.

Mr. Reynaud thanked the President for his telegram to Mr. Hallstein, the President of the Commission of the EEC. He said it was a very important message. (Mr. Reynaud apparently was referring to a telegram which the President sent to Mr. Hallstein earlier in the administration expressing his support of the European Community concept.) Mr. Reynaud added that he often thought the United States had a better understanding of the importance of a united Europe than Europe itself. The President responded that perhaps it was easier for us to look on these

things

MacArthur
n-5.

INCOMING TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 1992

TOFOL 1485

NO: April 19, 9 pm

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RECD: April 20, 1961 5:37am

FROM: WASHINGTON

TO: USRO PARIS FOR ACTION

PRIORITY

USRO PASS DEAN ACHESON AND THURSTON

VERBATIM TEXT

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

This message conveys draft paper on NATO strategy and defense planning that we intend for USRO distribution in Council when it has been fully cleared here and after initial congressional consultation has been completed. It may be useful to Acheson in connection his talk with Council on April 21.

BEGIN TEXT

This paper summarizes the initial views and suggestions of the US Government resulting from its review of NATO defense strategy and planning. It is our hope that these views, together with those of other governments, (particularly the British paper on NATO strategy) will be discussed fully and frankly in the Council, in coordination with the NATO military authorities through customary procedures.

NATO's General Defense Posture

Fundamental to our approach is the great importance of strengthening NATO's defense posture. The direct Soviet military threat to the NATO area is not diminishing despite changes in Soviet forces. We must not give the Soviet Bloc any reason to think that they could gain their objectives by threatening or using force against Berlin or any part of the NATO area. The US is firmly committed to a forward strategy in Europe. To this end, as the President has already indicated in his message to NATO, the US intends to maintain the strength of its NATO forces in Europe. Deterrence requires that NATO shield forces continue to have an effective nuclear capability, and the Soviets must never be allowed to doubt NATO's readiness to use this capability, if necessary, together with the nuclear forces outside the European theater, to counter Soviet attack on Europe. It is at least equally important for deterrence that NATO have strong conventional forces. Without such NATO forces, the Soviets might be encouraged to believe that they could engage in limited conventional aggression with relative impunity under the umbrella of their growing missile capability.

It seems.....

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By 240 NLE Date 4/16/92

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PAGE TWO

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It seems unlikely that there would be any debate on these general propositions. The difficult questions are confronted in determining the most appropriate balance between nuclear and conventional forces and in working out the best arrangements for provision and control of nuclear weapons.

Balanced Forces

For several years, a high priority has in effect been given in NATO military programming to the development of nuclear-capable forces. Although there has been no conscious decision to give conventional forces a lower priority, these forces have suffered considerably from inadequate allocation of resources. [We believe there is now an urgent need to redress the balance of conventional and nuclear forces so that the Alliance would in fact have a full range of forces to ensure flexibility of response.] It seems to us that NATO should have conventional forces strong enough to be able to force a [considerable] pause in the event of substantial Soviet conventional aggression, and to prevent any Soviet miscalculation of our intentions.

This approach should not require any revision of the political directive or the strategic concept. These documents, which have served their purpose well, should rather be subject to a constructive interpretation in support of this approach along the lines that SACUR has been developing. The magnitude and nature of the conventional forces required for this purpose would have to be worked out carefully in NATO. Although it may well be unnecessary to go beyond the general quantitative level of forces now planned in MC-70, it would clearly be necessary to [give the strengthening of conventional forces a first priority.] Increased resources should be devoted to the achievement of high qualitative standards for these forces in manning levels, training, modernization of equipment and supply. It is primarily because of the importance of this task that, as the President stated recently to the military committee, the US intends to maintain its own divisions and supporting units in Europe and to increase their conventional capabilities. In doing so, we would expect the other members of NATO, who are in a position to do so, to make a vigorous effort to provide the balance of required conventional forces at adequate strength. Where other members clearly need help in achieving their force goals, the US is prepared to continue its military assistance toward these goals. [We would hope that NATO countries whose economic position permits might participate in the provision of such assistance.]

While it might be desirable ideally to meet an entire range of requirements such as those indicated by the NATO commanders, the cost of doing so would probably be considerably in excess of what NATO can reasonably be expected to provide. Therefore, if we are to succeed in strengthening NATO's conventional forces, it will probably be necessary to develop a general system of priorities to ensure that the overall allocation of NATO resources will support the desired pattern of forces. The Council, working closely with the NATO military authorities, should be responsible for the development

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PAGE THREE

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of this system of priorities. It should take full account of the possibilities for coordinated NATO research, development and production of improved weapons and equipment for conventional forces, and for integration of logistics and training facilities. We also believe that the priorities should enable rapid progress in organizing and training the mobile task force that General Norstad has been planning.

Nuclear Weapons Requirements

NATO shield forces have achieved a very substantial nuclear capability. It is the firm policy of the US that this capability be maintained and that US nuclear weapons in the European area not be withdrawn without NATO consent or adequate replacement.

The question of how NATO requirements for additional nuclear weapons should be treated in a system of priorities is one for careful examination in NATO. Sufficient European resources are probably not available to meet all of the nuclear weapons requirements posed by the NATO commanders for deployment in Europe, and, at the same time, to enable the necessary strengthening of conventional forces. It will be necessary to review nuclear weapons requirements with this in mind, and efforts to meet these requirements would probably have to be adjusted at some point to be consistent with a first priority for conventional forces.

Our planning should take account of the fact that the nuclear defense of Europe will continue to be provided for with weapons and forces outside the European theater as well as those deployed in Europe. For this purpose, the US reaffirms its intention to commit five Polaris submarines to NATO and also undertakes to commit to NATO, as they become available, additional Polaris submarines planned for deployment in the NATO command areas. The exact number that this would involve, the areas of deployment and the NATO command arrangements to be adopted will require further study, although it would be understood that, in accordance with existing procedures, the US would remain free to use these submarines in self-defense. We also have in mind that the deployment and targetting of these submarines would be developed with allied participation through the NATO commands concerned.

The NATO commitment of these submarines will make available to NATO command a very substantial portion of US strategic forces for coverage of targets of direct importance in defending against an attack on Europe, as well as deeper targets in the Soviet Union for which the strategic forces have thus far been responsible. This will obviously have the effect of expanding the range of the committed forces. It is impossible at this stage to indicate the extent to which the roles and missions of the submarine force might be divided between these two general categories of targets. Since the distinction between tactical and strategic weapons and targets is becoming increasingly blurred, and since much planning must be done on a contingency basis, it may be that a definitive breakdown cannot be developed....

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U.S. MISSION TO NATO AND EUROPEAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

TELEGRAM CONTINUATION SHEET

CONTROL: 1992

PAGE FOUR

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be developed. However, [the defense of Europe and of North America is indivisible and] the availability to NATO of this Polaris submarine fleet should help significantly to deter any major Soviet [action] against Europe. *was be a major factor in deterring*

We would hope that the UK might also be willing to consider the NATO commitment of its strategic forces on the same general basis as the Polaris submarines will be committed. Such a commitment of UK forces, should further augment NATO's deterrent effectiveness by increasing the availability to NATO of nuclear weapons for defense against an attack on Europe. It would also have great political significance since, in combination with the Polaris submarines, it would bring within the NATO structure the greatest portion of the strategic forces in the North Atlantic and the European area.

The NATO commitment of these strategic forces should postpone the time when it may be necessary to deal with the MBR question which we are continuing to examine. Meanwhile, if other NATO members should be interested in contributing MBR's to a multilateral NATO force after the non-military goals have been met, we would welcome their views on how the MBR force concept that was suggested at the Ministerial Meeting last December, might be carried out.

Control and Use of Nuclear Weapons

We have not yet been able to develop answers to all of the specific questions on control and use of nuclear weapons in the British paper on NATO strategy. However, we agree that these questions are important and should be considered carefully by NATO.

Aside from questions relating to [tactical] use of nuclear weapons, the problem of control and use can be divided between military controls on the one hand, and problem of the basic decision on use on the other.

With respect to military control, we believe it is vital that the physical arrangements for custody, communications, deployment and military command be made as secure as possible to ensure that the military use of nuclear weapons will always be responsive to a deliberate and responsible political decision. Urgent consideration should be given to the possibilities for improvement in this field.

On the problem of how the basic decision on use should be made, it is important to the effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent that its use be subject to a clear line authority able to make a quick decision if circumstances require. It is also important that the basic decision on use be made by responsible political authority. The US would welcome any suggestions by other NATO members as to how a system of NATO control might be created over all NATO nuclear weapons, or some portion thereof, which would be responsive to these principles and which would ensure the most effective allied participation in that control.

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PAGE FIVE 117

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One form that this might take could be the development by the Council of general guidelines regarding the use of nuclear weapons committed to NATO and/or of a political method to facilitate consultation and decision on use. The US would undertake to observe any agreed guidelines or political method consistent with the principles indicated above.

The Council might endeavor to refine or extend these guide lines on use, with particular reference to the type of question posed in the British paper on NATO strategy.

Procedural Approach

In studying these general defense problems, it may be advisable for the Council to concentrate initially on the task of developing policy guidance to provide a basis for adjustment of on-going programs.

[We would suggest consideration of the following procedure in dealing with this question.] As soon as a consensus of the Council has been reached on policy guidance, the Council would develop a five-year projection of increased resources that might be made available for NATO defense programs on the assumption of a determined effort by all governments. The Council might then ask the NATO military authorities to design alternative military programs consistent with the Council's policy guidance and with two levels of resource availabilities: One corresponding to the Council's five-year projection and the other corresponding to present levels of military expenditures. With these alternative programs in hand, the Council could then reach a decision as to the magnitude and nature of defense programs that should be supported by governments in fulfillment of the Council's policy objectives. END TEXT.

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Mr. Culley it was the purpose to decide
that procedures should be followed in putting
the guidelines into effect. One procedural approach
might be as follows:

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4/21/61 (1) [REDACTED]
April 21, 1961

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: A New Approach to France

I. THE PROBLEM

1. Objective. Our purposes are twofold:
 - (a) To re-enlist French energies in the common cause - NATO.
 - (b) To close the door which France's nuclear program may be opening to nuclear proliferation, particularly across the Rhine.
2. De Gaulle's Position. The advantage of dealing with a great man is that he makes his views crystal clear and then sticks to them.
 - (a) Political. In September 1958 de Gaulle asked for a three power directorate to determine world-wide strategy. This is still his fundamental goal. A major purpose of his national nuclear program is to bring this goal within reach by giving France the power and prestige which will enable her to take part in such a directorate.
 - (b) Nuclear. Another basic concern is to have more knowledge and control over nuclear weapons committed to NATO. This theme was repeated in his press conference last week: "It is intolerable to a great nation that its destiny be left to the decisions and the actions of another nation, however friendly. The question of the use of nuclear weapons by the two Western powers who have them ... must be clarified. For the continental European powers must know exactly with what weapons and in what conditions their overseas allies will take part in the common battle."

Underlying both these concerns is the same uneasy view of the Anglo-American combination which de Gaulle has held since 1940. In the last volume of his memoirs he speaks bitterly of how this combination operated in 1944-45: "America, Russia, and England were determining the great issues... Everything occurred as if our allies were intent on excluding France from their plans. We could not actually put an end to this banishment, but we could make it unendurable to those inflicting it on us". This is still his grand design; his boycott of NATO, his national nuclear program, his obstructive posture in non-NATO areas -- all are designed to make unendurable the monopoly which he conceives the U.S. and U.K. to have established over the resolution of issues of decisive moment to France.

He feels that U.S. and U.K. function intimately together as world military and political powers -- a feeling heightened by the unequal British and French positions under the MacMahon Act. He is determined no longer to

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BY MFM NARS, DATE 8-31-77

USF/70/France General 3/16/61 - 4/21/61

tolerate the unequal position in which this leaves France in respect of decisions regarding such matters as the use of nuclear weapons or the development of Western policy in the Far East and Africa.

If the Alliance is to be brought toward unity, proposals must be made which would meet de Gaulle's concerns on these points. The proposals need not follow the lines which he has suggested; they must take into account British, German, and other interests which should legitimately affect the contours of the Alliance over the long pull. Nevertheless, the proposals should seek to go to the heart of de Gaulle's anxieties.

II. OUR APPROACH

3. Political. We should make clear that we agree with de Gaulle: Western policies must be coordinated in all parts of the world, and that coordination must be primarily the business of the powers with interests in all parts of the world.

We propose that committees be established to achieve this coordination in major areas -- notably in Africa and the Far East. Urgent business for them might be policy for the Laos conference; for Vietnam; for the Horn of Africa; and for Morocco. These committees could be among those which Mr. Acheson has proposed be established under the North Atlantic Council. The U.S. will assign to these committees men of stature and competence, capable of freeing themselves from past attitudes and acrimony. It hopes that France will do the same. The task of these committees will not be to study or amass facts; it will be to recommend specific policy actions, as to narrow areas of disagreement for higher authority to settle.

The U.S. recognizes that the gravest decisions must be reserved to the Heads of the Governments concerned. It proposes that their consultation concerning matters before these committees or the North Atlantic Council be facilitated (i) by more frequent use of the telephone facilities which now link the U.S. President with the heads of the British and French Governments; (ii) by periodic meetings between the heads of the three Governments with major overseas responsibilities -- preferably with Germany's inclusion; an ostensible desire periodically to review the German question could serve as a convenient pretext for this membership, without giving undue offense to Italy.

Such an arrangement would give de Gaulle much of the substance he is seeking through tripartitism, without giving him so much of the form as to disrupt the alliance. But the inclusion of some provision for personal involvement of heads of government will be essential if he is to see the matter in this light.

4. Nuclear. There are several separate concerns to be met here:

First, We must try to eliminate the privileged British status. In matters nuclear, the road to Paris may well be through London. Among the

most important preparations for the President's meeting with de Gaulle will be those made with the British. Our minimum objective should be to persuade the Prime Minister to commit his warheads to the NATO Atomic Stockpile and his delivery weapons to NATO commanders, on the same basis as the U.S. Beyond this, we should try to move him to cease the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes if France will do the same, in return for the U.S. undertakings suggested below. His agreement to such a cut-off, even conditioned on French parallel agreement, will be hard to come by. We should stress these advantages:

- (a) It would help to stop German production at a favorable moment.
- (b) It would take the French off the hook gracefully.
- (c) It might strengthen Moscow's hand in resisting Chinese demands for production assistance.

Of these advantages, the first is the most important: We can best settle the German issue in Adenauer's, not Strauss', time.

Second, We must meet the desire for more knowledge about how many and what kinds of warheads we have in Europe and what we propose to do with them. A special committee of the Council should be established to deal with matters nuclear. Its initial membership should be the three nuclear powers -- with German inclusion a must, sooner rather than later. This committee should, insofar as possible, be provided with information about the number, type, and location of warheads committed to NATO, and about contingency plans for their use.

Third, We must try to assure our European allies of effective participation in control both over U.S. tactical nuclear forces already committed to NATO and over the U.S. strategic forces (Polaris submarines and possibly B-47's in the U.K.) to be committed to NATO. We should invite the British and the French, preferably with German participation, to devise proposals to this end in the above-mentioned NAC committee. That committee might recommend to the Council:

- (a) Guidelines to determine use of nuclear weapons committed to NATO. Such guidelines might, for example, specify that nuclear weapons should be used in responding to unmistakable nuclear attack. This is probably the one case on which advance agreement could be reached.
- (b) A political method to facilitate decisions regarding use of nuclear weapons. This political method might involve a War Council, with the same membership as the nuclear committee, performing two functions:
 - (i) reaching judgments about application of the agreed guidelines to specific cases when they arise; (ii) making recommendations to the Council about other specific cases which arise and which are not covered by the guidelines.The U.S. President would undertake to observe any guidelines or specific recommendations developed by the Nuclear Committee and approved by the Council in ordering the use of U.S. nuclear weapons committed to NATO. The British would make a similar undertaking.

Fourth, We must afford the French an opportunity eventually to participate in the NATO nuclear deterrent, if they wish, on a larger scale than would be represented by any national contribution they could make in the foreseeable future. To this end, we should stress the proposal by Mr. Acheson for consideration of a multi-national sea-borne missile force, after NATO's non-nuclear goals have been met. We should suggest that French personnel - both military and scientific -- could play a large role in the development of such a force. (In fact, it is highly doubtful if such a force would ever come into being, given the problems of command and control that would be involved; the long-term prospect and possibility of such a development would, however, strengthen the hand of those Frenchmen who oppose a national "force de frappe", even if it had little appeal to the General himself.)

Fifth, It may be that the French will want similarly to share in the development of outer space programs. We should offer them and other European countries a chance to participate in the U.S. program extensively -- offering to convert it, in effect, into an Atlantic-wide program, if they wish.

Sixth, We must meet, in some measure, French and other European desires for influence over world-wide use of U.S. nuclear forces. The U.S. might be able to provide the NAC nuclear committee with some information about the size and character of these non-NATO forces. We might consider inviting this committee eventually to try to develop guidelines and a consultative method regarding use of these non-NATO nuclear forces, which the President would undertake to observe insofar as feasible. Another possibility would be to extend the NATO command structure to North America, by creating a new major command for the strategic forces and air defense forces in the U.S. and Canada. It would then be possible to coordinate all NATO military planning through the established NATO institutions -- with particular emphasis on the role of the tripartite Standing Group (on which the Germans are represented by the ex officio participation of General Heusinger). In this field of non-NATO nuclear forces, obviously we would have to proceed slowly and carefully, but even a U.S. willingness to consider the long-term possibility of some allied influence over these forces would open up light at the end of the tunnel which could be helpful in dealing with our allies -- regardless of whether the train ever actually got that far.

5. Quids and Quo's. What would we ask of France in return?

(a) To participate actively in NATO -- particularly in the program of intensified political consultation and the non-nuclear buildup which we will have proposed at Oslo. (A large French role here will be essential.)

(b) To commit any nuclear forces it may deploy in Europe to NATO, as the U.S. and U.K. will have done. (This is an act of very limited meaning, but it may have some symbolic value. De Gaulle's abrupt countermanding of General Eisenhower's orders to the SHAFF-committed First French Army in 1945, to the grave detriment of allied strategy, suggests that he would not hesitate to use a French nuclear force, if he thought this necessary, for national purposes -- to the detriment of any controlled and centralized allied response -- whether or not that force was committed to SACEUR.)

(c) To cease production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes on some future date certain, after creating a stockpile which France considers an effective contribution to NATO. (This would be of the greatest value, for reasons which have been outlined in discussing a British cut-off.)

There can be no assurance that the posited course of action would achieve these purposes. We must reckon with the possibility that de Gaulle will continue to mount his national nuclear program and even to create problems in NATO. If our actions respond to France's legitimate concerns, however, the energy that he devotes to these purposes may be less than otherwise and his successor may be even more constructively disposed. What is more, European sympathy and support for his posture will remain limited; most important of all, Germany will not be of a mind to join or imitate him.

If we go further than the program outlined above -- i.e., in providing aid for the French missile or nuclear program -- this last purpose will have been placed in jeopardy. Germany will have little desire to imitate French missile and nuclear programs which are as unlikely to produce militarily significant results as those now underway -- particularly if she is afforded a chance to share in control over the nuclear deterrent. But any U.S. disposition to aid French missile or nuclear programs would open a very different vista; Germany would then be disposed to seek similar aid, and the mere prospect of a German MRBM and/or nuclear program would shake NATO to its foundations.

III. TACTICS

6. The first step in developing an approach such as suggested above would be to try to persuade the U.K. to agree to those parts of it which would require British cooperation.

7. The next step would be the President's meeting with de Gaulle. That meeting could be judged a success if de Gaulle were moved by it to pledge his full cooperation to NATO, even if he insisted on continuing a nuclear program. For allied agreement on proposals which met many of the concerns underlying that program would make it less likely that the French would prosecute the program vigorously over the long-term or that the Germans would follow suit.

8. If the meeting scores a success, even in this sense, it would be important to translate that success into immediate action. The Prime Minister might be invited to join the President and General de Gaulle in Paris. The British and American undertakings could then be announced simultaneously with France's intention henceforth to devote her full energies to the political and military tasks facing NATO.

9. An early meeting of the NATO Heads of Government might then be scheduled to consider both U.S.-U.K. proposals regarding commitment and control of

nuclear forces and the proposals for a substantial non-nuclear buildup which will have been gathering specific substance in discussions of the NATO Council. The Atlantic Community's joint projects and purposes would thus be given an impetus the like of which has not been seen since its most creative days. The revitalization of NATO which the Chancellor urged on the President would be well on the way to accomplishment.

✓ 18-2000 4/21/61 (2)
✓ MRBM
✓ ADJMC - NACL
✓ V. M. P. (POLARIS)
✓ UK (FORCES)
21 April 1961
✓ FORCES

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PRESENT: SAC EVZ
The Secretary of Defense
General Lemnitzer
Assistant Secretary of Defense/ISA Nitze
General Miller
Colonel Eaton
Colonel Rowny
Colonel Downey

DATE: Tues, 11 April 61, Washington, D. C.

1. Following a private discussion between General Norstad and Assistant Secretary of Defense Gilpatric, Mr. Gilpatric departed and the participants indicated above, except The Secretary of Defense, continued the discussions in Mr. Gilpatric's office. They were then joined by Mr. McNamara.

2. General Norstad noted that weapons systems must be designed more and more to fulfill political as well as military requirements and both of these factors were considered in establishing the ACE MRBM requirement.

3. Mr. Nitze referred to Dr. Stern's study and wondered if it would be possible to provide custodial units for the PERSHING or any other land-based mobile missile. General Norstad said that he thought this could be arranged through the use of a two-key system of some sort; in any event, he felt sure the problem could be solved.

4. Secretary McNamara asked General Norstad whether responsible authorities in Europe questioned whether the U.S. would use strategic nuclear weapons if these were required. He said he thought there were several ways to reassure Europeans on this point, one of which might be to put some of the U.S. strategic units under NATO. General Norstad said he did not really think there was too much concern on this point, but it was important that we guarantee the availability of those nuclear weapons necessary for the direct defense of Europe and attempt to devise some means to give the other NATO nations a greater voice in the use of these

Norstad to Policy RHP / 91 / US Support of
NATO 1961 thru
30 June 61

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By	8/16/93

weapons. General Norstad did not think it would be necessary to commit strategic forces. In response to another question, General Norstad stated that the Germans definitely want the PERSHING

5. General Norstad then gave a brief rundown on the MACE problem with France,

✓ [6. Secretary McNamara then asked General Norstad for his view as to whether 5-10 POLARIS submarines should be assigned to NATO. General Norstad replied that the offer of these submarines is as sound today as when it was made last December, but these submarines would not take the place of mobile land-based MRBM's.] The Secretary of Defense wondered whether the commitment of these submarines and efforts to meet other programs for nuclear-delivery systems would not operate to prevent the UK, France and Germany from increasing their conventional forces. General Norstad noted that the United Kingdom would not increase its conventional forces under any circumstances.

7. Assistant Secretary Nitze wondered whether we would not be better off if the Germans were to pick up some of the British commitments in Europe so that the British could maintain their forces elsewhere throughout the world. General Norstad remarked that we probably cannot get more from anybody and that, in any event, this is not the problem. The problem is to raise manning levels and provide modernized equipment. We do not need more divisions. General Lemnitzer agreed and emphasized that we must improve the quality of the forces already programmed rather than attempt to increase these forces. General Norstad emphasized that he was tired of having "paper divisions." Rather, he needed full-strength modern units.

8. Secretary of Defense McNamara then commented that he thought we had had enough talk on concepts and principles, and must now get down to specifics, i. e., what forces, how many, what manning levels and equipment, costs, etc. General Norstad agreed that the problem needs to be further defined in terms of these specifics.

S. W. DOWNEY
Colonel, US Army
Executive to SACEUR

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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April 25 - 11 PM

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TO: USRO PARIS FOR ACTION

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At April 26 NAC meeting you should make following presentation on NATO strategy and defense planning:

BEGIN TEXT

This paper summarizes the initial views and suggestions of the US Government resulting from its review of NATO defense strategy and planning. It is our hope that these views, together with those of other governments, (Particularly the British paper on NATO strategy) will be discussed fully and frankly in the Council, in coordination with the NATO military authorities through customary procedures.

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NATO's general Defense Posture ✓

Fundamental to our approach is the great importance of strengthening NATO's defense posture. The Direct Soviet military threat to the NATO area is not diminishing despite changes in Soviet forces. We must not give the Soviet bloc any reason to think that they could gain their objectives by threatening or using force against Berlin or any part of the NATO area. The US is firmly committed to a forward strategy in Europe. To this end, as the President has already indicated in his message to NATO, the US intends to maintain the strength of its NATO forces in Europe. Deterrence requires that NATO shield forces continue to have an effective nuclear capability, and the Soviets must never be allowed to doubt NATO's readiness to use this capability, if necessary, together with the nuclear forces outside the European theater, to counter Soviet attack on Europe. It is at least equally important for deterrence that NATO have strong conventional forces. Without such NATO forces, the Soviets might be encouraged to believe that they could engage in limited conventional aggression with relative impunity under the umbrella of their growing missile capability.

It seems unlikely that there would be any debate on these

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general propositions. The difficult questions are confronted in determining the most appropriate balance between nuclear and conventional forces and in working out the best arrangements for provision and control of nuclear weapons.

Balanced Forces

For several years, a high priority has in effect been given in NATO military programming to the development of nuclear-capable forces. Although there has been no conscious decision to give conventional forces a lower priority, these forces have suffered considerably from inadequate allocation of resources. [We believe there is now an urgent need to insure that the alliance will in fact have a full range of forces to permit flexibility of response.] It seems to us that NATO should have conventional forces strong enough to be able to force a pause in the event of substantial Soviet conventional aggression, and to prevent any Soviet miscalculation of our intentions.

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This approach should not require any revision of the political directive or the strategic concept. These documents, which have served their purpose well, should rather be subject to a constructive interpretation in support of this approach along the lines that SACEUR has been developing. The magnitude and nature of the conventional forces required for this purpose would have to be worked out carefully in NATO. Although it may well be unnecessary to go beyond the general quantitative level of forces now planned in MC-70, it would clearly be necessary to strengthen conventional forces as a matter of the highest priority. Increased resources should be devoted to the achievement of high qualitative standards for these forces in manning levels, training, modernization of equipment and supply. It is primarily because of the importance of this task that, as the President stated recently to the military committee, the US intends to maintain its own divisions and supporting units in Europe and to increase their conventional capabilities. In doing so, we would expect the other members of NATO, who are in a position to do so, to make a vigorous effort to provide the balance of required conventional forces at adequate strength where other members clearly need help in achieving their force goals, the US is prepared to explore with these countries what might be provided most effectively in the form of military assistance.

The cost of meeting an entire range of requirements for all contingencies, such as those recommended by the NATO commanders would probably be considerably in excess of what NATO is prepared to provide. Therefore, if we are to succeed in strengthening NATO's conventional forces, it will probably be necessary to

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develop a general system of priorities to ensure that the overall allocation of NATO resources will support the desired pattern of forces. The council, working closely with the NATO military authorities, should be responsible for the development of this system of priorities. It should take full account of the possibilities for coordinated NATO research, development and production of improved weapons and equipment for conventional forces, and for integration of logistics and training facilities. We also believe that the priorities should enable rapid progress in organizing and training the mobile task force that General Norstad has been planning nuclear weapons requirements.

NATO shield forces have achieved a very substantial nuclear capability. It is the firm policy of the US that this capability be maintained and that US nuclear weapons in the European area not be withdrawn without adequate replacement.

The question of how NATO requirements for additional nuclear weapons should be treated in a system of priorities is one for careful examination in NATO. Sufficient European resources are probably not available to meet all of the nuclear weapons requirements posed by the NATO commanders for deployment in Europe, and, at the same time, to enable any necessary strengthening of conventional forces.

It will be necessary to review nuclear weapons requirements. They would probably have to be adjusted at some point to be consistent with the priority to be accorded conventional forces.

Our planning should take account of the fact that the nuclear defense of Europe will continue to be provided for with weapons and forces outside the European theater as well as those deployed in Europe. For this reason, the US reaffirmed its intention to commit five Polaris submarines to NATO and also undertake to commit to NATO, as they become available, additional Polaris submarines planned for deployment in the NATO command areas. The exact number that this would involve, the areas of deployment and the NATO command arrangements to be adopted will require further study, although it would be understood that, in accordance with existing procedures, the US would remain free to use these submarines in self-defense. We also have in mind that the deployment and targetting of these submarines would be developed with allied participation through the NATO commands concerned.

with this in mind, and efforts to meet these requirements

* Corrected by nsg

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The NATO commitment of these submarines will make available to NATO a substantial portion of US strategic forces for coverage of targets of importance in defending against an attack on Europe. This will of course have the effect of expanding the role of NATO-committed forces. It is impossible at this stage to indicate the extent to which the roles and missions of the submarine force might be divided between categories of targets. It may be that a definitive break-down cannot be developed. However, availability to NATO of this Polaris submarine fleet will be a major factor in deterring Soviet attack against the alliance.

This NATO commitment of US Polaris submarines will emphasize the indivisibility of the nuclear defense of Europe and North America. The US hopes it will lead toward further measures to strengthen North Atlantic area defense arrangements within the institutional framework of NATO.

The availability of such forces to NATO commands should postpone the time when it may be necessary to deal with the MRBM question which we are continuing to examine. Meanwhile, if other NATO members should be interested in contributing MRBM's to a multilateral NATO force after the non-nuclear goals have been met, we would welcome their views on how the NATO MRBM force concept that was suggested at the ministerial meeting last December, might be carried out.

Control and use of nuclear weapons

We have not yet been able to develop answers to all of the specific questions on control and use of nuclear weapons in the British paper on NATO strategy. However, we agree that these questions are important and should be considered carefully by NATO. ^{As for} From questions relating to operational use of nuclear weapons, the problem of control and use can be divided between military controls on the one hand, and the problem of the basic decision on use on the other.

With respect to military control of nuclear weapons in Europe, we believe it is vital to insure that the use of these weapons will always be responsive to a deliberate and responsible political decision, and to provide for maximum possible security against sabotage and unauthorized or accidental expenditure. To this end, urgent and

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continuing attention should be given to improving present arrangements for physical security of installations, security and reliability of communications, and of weapons deployments.

On the problem of how the basic decision on use should be made, it is important to the effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent that its use be subject to a clear line authority able to make a quick decision if circumstances require. It is also important that the basic decision on use be made by responsible political authority. The US would welcome any suggestions by other NATO members as to how a system of NATO control might be created over all NATO nuclear weapons, or some portion thereof, which would be responsible to these principles and which would ensure the most effective allied participation in that control.

One form that this might take could be the development by the council of general guidelines regarding the use of nuclear weapons committed to NATO and or of a political method to facilitate consultation and decision on use. The US would undertake to observe any agreed guidelines or political method consistent with the principles indicated above.

The council might endeavor to refine or extend these guidelines on use, with particular reference to the type of ~~next~~ question posed in the British paper on NATO strategy.

Procedural approach

In studying these general defense problems, it may be advisable for the council to concentrate initially on the task of developing policy guidance to provide a basis for adjustment of on-going military programs.

As soon as a consensus of the council has been reached on policy guidance, it will be necessary to decide what procedures should be followed in putting this guidance into effect. One procedural approach might be as follows: The council would develop a five-year projection of increased resources that might be made available for NATO defense programs on the assumption of a determined effort by all governments. The council might then ask the NATO military authorities to design alternative military programs consistent with the council's policy guidance and with

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two levels of resource availabilities: one corresponding to the council's five-year projection and the other corresponding to present levels of military expenditures. With these alternative programs in hand, the council could then reach a decision as to the magnitude and nature of defense programs that should be supported by governments in fulfillment of the council's policy objectives.

Erd Text

Although you will probably wish to make foregoing presentation orally, exact text as given above should also be circulated in writing.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

TOPOL 1526

NO: April 25 - 11 pm.

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CONTROL DATE

2703

RECD: April 26, 1961 7:16 am

FROM: WASHINGTON

TO: USRO PALETTE FOR ACTION

CORRECTION NOTICE:

Following is correction on page three, third paragraph (underlined portion previously omitted):

....It will be necessary to review nuclear weapons requirements with this in mind, and efforts to meet these requirements would probably have.....

Following is correction on page four, fourth paragraph (underlined portion previously omitted):

carefully by NATO. Aside from questions.....

In third paragraph, page five, word "next" should be omitted and underlined portion inserted as follows:

...with particular reference to the type of question posed....

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USCIBR-3161-0437

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April 24, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

The State Department has asked that you mention to the Congressional leadership tomorrow the NATO policy, based on Mr. Acheson's report, that we are proposing to our allies. The Department is consulting this week about that policy with the Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs, and Armed Services Committees, and with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

The Department is pressing this consultation, since it intends soon to submit a paper elaborating our NATO policy to the North Atlantic Council, which has already heard Mr. Acheson's presentations. If your speech Thursday is to be on NATO, the need for consultation is further enhanced.

I attach a copy of the briefing paper that the Department is using in its own consultations. I also attach a one-page summary of the main points in this paper, [together with one or two of our own, which could well be mentioned to the leadership.]

McG. B.

SECRET

Lot 67 D 548
Box 183 Owen Apr-Aug 61

W

Secret

*copy for
J. C. Wray
Bury*

NATO and the Atlantic Community
(Talking Points)

1. Non-Nuclear. NATO non-nuclear forces should be improved, to the point where they could force a considerable pause in the event of substantial Soviet non-nuclear aggression. This probably does not mean going beyond the planned (MC-70) level of forces, but it does mean putting increased resources into meeting these goals and improving the quality of these forces. The main effort here belongs to our Allies, and it will not be easy to get them to make it.
2. U.S. Polaris Submarines. NATO should continue to maintain an effective nuclear capability in Europe. To this end, we will commit to NATO: (i) five Polaris submarines initially; (ii) additional Polaris submarines, as they come along, that are planned for deployment in NATO command areas. This commitment would not prevent the U.S. from using these submarines in self-defense. We hope the U.K. can also be persuaded to commit its strategic forces to NATO, and that this in turn may lead to a gradual modification of the present stiff French position (though certainly not at once).
3. Control of Nuclear Weapons. We will indicate U.S. willingness to consider any ideas the Europeans may have for NATO control of nuclear weapons committed to NATO. The U.S. would participate, as a member of the NATO Council, in deciding on any of these European suggestions. The difficulties are such that it is unlikely the Council will be able to agree on any means of giving NATO full control. But NATO may, however, be able to work out some advisory guidelines concerning use of nuclear weapons and a political method to facilitate consultation on use. It is important that we appear to be responsive to European concerns in this field, in order to deflate any drive for independent European nuclear capabilities. Meantime, the U.S. would make clear its intention to use nuclear weapons in case of nuclear attack or overwhelming non-nuclear attack on NATO forces.
4. European MRBM's. The NATO commitment of Polaris submarines, and possibly of U.K. strategic forces as well, should postpone the time when it becomes necessary to deal with the question of MRBM's for deployment in European hands. We are not persuaded that MRBM's are needed -- NATO already has very great nuclear strength, and Polaris deployment will add great
5. Command, Control, and Candor. We are taking energetic steps to strengthen our own command and control over nuclear weapons, and we propose, with encouragement from members of the JCAE, to see to it that our Allies understand better how very strong NATO now is, on the nuclear side. The law allows this candor, and our own position will be strengthened by it. This is not a matter of know-how, but one of rough quantitative statistics.

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Ann 1944 to the Atlantic Community
Talking Point for Briefing Congressional
readers

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9. We believe it is vital that the arrangements for military control of nuclear weapons ensure that their use will always be responsive to a deliberate and responsible political decision. To this end, we mean to consider urgently in NATO measures for improving the physical security and effectiveness of command centers, communications, and weapons deployment. (We are also studying measures to strengthen the U.S. physical custody of nuclear weapons, and to clarify SACMUR's procedures for ordering the use of nuclear weapons. However, this is not likely to be discussed generally in NATO since it is primarily a U.S. responsibility.)

10. It is important that the basic decision on use of nuclear weapons be made by responsible political authority. The effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent requires that this be a line authority able to make a quick decision if circumstances require.

11. This authority is now exercised by the President and it is difficult to see how he could share the ultimate decision. However, European desires for participation in control of nuclear weapons make it politically important that we be willing to consider any ideas they may have for developing some form of NATO control in this field. The U.S. would participate, as a member of the NATO Council, in considering and deciding upon any European suggestions. The difficulties are such that it is unlikely they would be able to agree on a scheme of giving NATO full control.

12. Nevertheless, it may be possible for the Council to work out guide lines regarding the use of nuclear weapons committed to NATO, and to develop a political method to facilitate consultation and decision on use. We will invite NATO to do so and undertake to have the President observe whatever conclusions, consistent with the above principles (paragraph 10), the Council may reach.

13. Meanwhile, we would tell NATO that the President wishes to make clear his intention to direct the use of nuclear weapons if the NATO area is subjected to an unmistakable nuclear attack, or if NATO forces are subjected to an overwhelming non-nuclear attack.

14. The NATO commitment of Polaris submarines, and possible of U.S. strategic forces as well, should postpone the time when it may be necessary to deal with the question of MRB's for European deployment. Meanwhile, if other NATO members should be interested in contributing MRB's to a multinational NATO force after the conventional force requirements have been met, we would welcome their views on how the NATO MRB's force concept suggested last December by Secretary Rarner might be carried out.

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON

APR 28 1961

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Dear Mac:

I have received your memorandum of April 24, 1961, subject: Improving the Security of Nuclear Weapons in NATO Europe Against Unauthorized Use: National Security Memorandum No. 36.

I expect to have our study of the security of nuclear weapons in NATO Europe completed early in May and at that time I will forward you a copy of the study with recommendations. I will also send copies to the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of State requesting their comments. We will, of course, provide you with our consideration of any comments after they are received from these two agencies.

Sincerely,

Lo

DEPUTY,

Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLK-93-103
By <i>[Signature]</i> NARA Date <i>5/11/97</i>

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SecDef Cont. No. 5-424

NSR / 329 / NSAM 36: Improving the Security of Nuclear Weapons in NATO

Chon

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May 3, 1961

Mac -

The treatment of matters nuclear in these papers is dead wrong, and I would think it most useful for the President to set the Prime Minister aright.

The Prime Minister says in effect that if de Gaulle will commit his nuclear force to NATO, we should help him develop it.

De Gaulle's commitment of his nuclear force to NATO would do little good; the force would still be nationally owned and manned and could be nationally controlled in an emergency. De Gaulle's countermanding of General Eisenhower's order to the First French Army in January 1945 shows how lightly he would take this sort of commitment if he thought France's national interests were at stake.

U.S. aid for the French nuclear and/or missile program, on the other hand, would be a disaster, for the Germans would then seek similar aid in a nuclear and missile production program of their own; and at this point NATO would be shaken to its very foundations.

The line to be taken with de Gaulle in the nuclear field is:

(1) that which the Prime Minister suggests at other points in his paper, mainly that we try to work out ways of giving the French greater influence over the use of U.S. nuclear weapons committed to NATO. If we can do this and give the French what they are really after -- more of a voice in world-wide policy (including world-wide use of nuclear weapons) some of the steam will go out of the French nuclear program after de Gaulle, if not before, and that program will not, without our help, achieve such militarily significant results as to tempt the Germans to follow suit.

The are the views of those about town with whom I have discussed the problem: the State Department, Harry Rowen, etc. If you wish, I will prepare a draft reply to the Prime Minister on this one point, and then set out to clear it in State and Defense. This should not be any problem, since it is wholly consistent with the statement of U.S. policy, which the President approved for NATO.

It seems to me important to set MacMillan right on this point as soon as possible, lest he start talking with the French in a way which would seriously mislead them.

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It might be useful for the President to raise this issue in his meeting with Mr. Acheson this afternoon.

Henry Owen

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FROM: WASHINGTON

NO: 4770 May 5, 9 PM

EMBASSY PASS USRO AND STOESSEL

PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

I am grateful for thoughtful analysis reflected in your 4479, and believe it might be useful spell out my own thinking these issues.

1. Our policy of trying to slow down acquisition nuclear weapons capabilities is based on view that such acquisition will increase risk of war by accident or miscalculation, diminish possibility controlled nuclear response in event of hostilities, raise new obstacles arms control, and pose very grave threat to allied political cohesion. The more rapid and extensive any additional acquisition of nuclear capabilities, the greater will be these dangers.
2. Policy of trying to slow down nuclear proliferation precludes U.S. assistance not only for development nuclear warheads but also for development ballistic missile systems, since such systems represent an essential and politically most sensitive aspect of effective nuclear strike capability.
3. We recognize that provision info on ballistic missiles might be of only limited importance in overcoming formidable difficulties France faces in trying create militarily meaningful missile capability. But experience to date suggests provision any kind of aid only leads to requests more extensive assistance. Refusal of these further requests (unavoidable under existing national policy) then leads to more friction than if no aid had been granted in first place.
4. Recognize that France will nonetheless continue its missile program. But cost and time required for France to prosecute that program will surely be greater if we do not provide help than otherwise. This cost and time may eventually tend discourage French from pursuing present path, in post-deGaulle period, if alternative means of responding to basic French concerns are developed by U.S. (see para 6 below).
5. We also recognize that French will probably develop nuclear strike capability with manned aircraft, even if they do not develop effective ballistic missile capability. Their national nuclear program will be less promising in this event, however, than if they have missile capability, since aircraft less effective delivery means. Thus French will be less apt, if dependent on aircraft delivery, to consider they have achieved such success in nuclear program as to justify continued national effort in this field in post-de Gaulle period. And Germans will also be less likely, in this event, to consider that such striking success has been achieved in French nuclear program as would justify their trying to follow in French footsteps.

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E. O. 11652, SEC. 3(E), 5(D), 5(E) AND 11

State NLK-77-567
BY hpm NARS, DATE 8-31-77

NSF/701 Fr. GA. 5/1-5/10/61

6. Key question throughout, in my view, is not so much whether France will achieve some sort nuclear weapons capability but effect on German aspirations and thus on NATO of US posture of encouraging French nuclear effort. The French will face a most serious resource problem in trying to prosecute a national missile and nuclear program alone. They may well seek German aid at some point. The Germans would not now wish to be drawn into such a venture and would be unwilling to grant aid under present circumstances. But if US signifies it approves French program and helps that program, German resistance to joining it may be greatly weakened. Even possible that, despite Chancellor's desires, Germany might eventually be moved to seek US aid for its own program in this event. Any such German effort creat or join in creating nuclear capability would shake NATO to its foundations. For this reason I am not aware and would not approve any assistance to Germans or any other country for development of national ballistic missile capability.

7. In light these factors, and after most careful review different considerations, I believe US should proceed along lines laid out in Acheson recommendations concerning US policy toward Atlantic nations, which President approved April 21:

(A) Not help France achieve nuclear weapons capability or produce or acquire MRBMS's.

(B) Seek to respond reasonable French interests and concerns through such steps as more intimate political consultation with France, guarantee to maintain US nuclear capability in Europe for life of treaty, commitment US Polaris submarines and UK strategic forces to NATO, greater allied and particularly French participation in planning and decision regarding use nuclear weapons committed to NATO, and other measures to same end now under consideration here.

RUSK

1981/3129

5/24/61

PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO DE GAULLEParis, May 31 - June 2, 1961

SANITIZED COPY

Background PaperFrench Attitude Toward NATO
Political-Military Questions

There follows a resume of the French attitude toward a number of key NATO political-military questions.

Integration of NATO Forces

General de Gaulle has expressed concern over too extensive integration of NATO forces, claiming that this would derogate from the degree of national authority he believes France should maintain over its NATO forces. His concern stems from a mixture of the following views: (1) that each nation ultimately must be capable of acting for its own national security with national forces if necessary, (2) that NATO integration of forces may place too much power in the hands of military commanders without adequate control by political authorities, (3) that integration of NATO forces will undesirably reduce the degree of national identity in a country's armed forces which is necessary to maintain morale and sense of mission in service of the nation.

These attitudes have conditioned French action with respect to further steps within NATO toward integration of efforts in the fields of air defense and logistics.

(a) Integrated Air Defense

In 1955 NATO approved the concept of a coordinated air defense system for NATO Europe. Since that time there has been growing recognition within NATO of the need to integrate European air defense systems in the face of the rapidly changing technology of modern air war. In September 1960, the North Atlantic Council adopted MC 54/1, which calls for the integration of the existing air defense systems of Europe into one system under the operational control of SACEUR in peace time. The essence of the new system is the assignment by nations to SACEUR in peace and war of the responsibility, necessary forces, and authority to defend the nations of NATO Europe against air attack.

Although there was general agreement to this paper, France entered extensive reservations. The French agreed to MC 54/1 only on condition

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that the

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that the greater part of metropolitan France remain the responsibility of the French Air Defense Command, it being agreed, however, that the French commander thereof would cooperate with SACEUR. MC 51/1 applies to only a small area of Eastern France. The French also insisted that authority to open fire over even this area be retained as a French responsibility. French reservations thus prevented the creation of an integrated air defense system to include France, as envisaged in MC 51/1, but, in General Norstad's view, it was desirable to accept the French reservation in order to get on with the establishment of an integrated air defense system for the rest of NATO Europe.

(b) Integrated Logistics in NATO

The NATO Heads of Government in December 1957 recognized the growing interdependence of the nations of the free world and urged that efforts be made toward the most effective utilization of national contributions in NATO. It was agreed that a high degree of integration in all fields, particularly air and naval defense and logistics, was desirable. Since that time there has been increasing interest in NATO in integrated logistics. Germany, in particular, has taken the initiative in urging a fully integrated logistic system for NATO. The US, in part out of the belief that integrated logistics is in itself desirable, and in part because further integration in NATO could tie Germany even closer to the West, has supported these German initiatives.

The NATO Military Committee has in the last year prepared an overall study of integrated logistics for NATO, MC 86/1, which concludes that the best method of improving the logistical system is to proceed within the existing framework to building up in peacetime a logistic system which will provide NATO commanders in wartime with the maximum practicable degree of flexibility and effectiveness; in this way it should be possible to assure workable systems in peacetime which will facilitate the transfer of logistic control to NATO commanders concurrently with the transfer of operational control. MC 86/1 called for a series of studies to be made. Two of these, Integrated Logistics for Advanced Weapons, and Training Area Problems, have been completed. The NATO Council last December established a Working Group to study the implementation of specific suggestions for further integration of NATO logistics, and the Training Area Problems and Advanced Weapons Logistics papers are now under study in the Working Group.

In its approach to the problems of integration of NATO logistics France has taken a markedly nationalistic attitude; it has maintained that logistics is a national responsibility and that any attempts to improve the existing system should be handled on a bilateral rather than multi-lateral basis. While some nations, particularly Germany, have tried to move away from the established doctrine that logistics is a national responsibility toward more integration of effort, France has persisted in its attempts to restrict the development of a logistic doctrine more attuned to the times. France opposed the establishment of the Working

Group

Group on Logistics, but acceded on the understanding that its recommendations to the Council would cover only the political, economic, financial and production aspects and not the military aspects of integration of logistics.

France has agreed to the creation of the NATO Maintenance Supply Service Agency, which is situated in France and which provides logistical support to NATO nations in peacetime for selected weapons systems in common use by NATO members. France is making considerable purchases of spare parts through this Agency. The French have also, on a bilateral basis, concluded arrangements with Germany for cooperation in the use of training areas in France. However, these represent but modest advances toward greater integration of logistic efforts in NATO. In their negotiations with the Germans to provide training areas in France, the French have demanded increased German procurement of French military items as a quid pro quo for agreement to use French training areas. The Germans have told us that they have repeatedly requested the French to deal with problems of procurement and use of facilities in a NATO framework, but the French insist on bilateral discussions.

NATO Commands

(a) Withdrawal of the French Mediterranean Fleet From NATO

The French withdrew their fleet in the Mediterranean from the status of "earmarked for assignment to NATO" in March 1959. The main reason given was the necessity of keeping these forces free to meet national requirements. Commitment to NATO was held to be inconsistent with this obligation since NATO did not and would not accept all French military responsibilities as NATO responsibilities. Hence, France maintained that it must make provisions to protect its vital interests in Algeria and in other areas. France has so far only been willing to discuss "cooperation" between its Mediterranean forces, naval forces and NATO. Since withdrawal of the Fleet, SACEUR and certain French authorities have discussed wartime cooperation between France and NATO in the Mediterranean. Last fall SACEUR told the French Prime Minister he was willing to accept as a fact the French decision to withdraw its Mediterranean fleet. Arrangements for wartime "cooperation" have not been worked out.

(b) Reorganization of NATO Naval Commands

In December 1960 the NATO Military Committee in Chiefs of Staff Session instructed SACEUR, SACLANT and CINCPAC to review the organization of NATO naval commands. In March 1961 general agreement was reached among SACEUR, SACLANT and CINCPAC on clarifying subordinate command boundaries in the Atlantic. SACEUR, however, indicated he was not prepared to discuss possible changes in his command area at that time. In addition, it was agreed that control of the Bay of Biscay (~~was~~ a separate subordinate command, BISCLANT) would be made a part of the larger command IBERLANT, which has not yet been

activated. These changes in the Atlantic will not be carried out until the overall review of naval commands has been completed.

In February 1961 France submitted proposals to the Standing Group on IBERLANT, recommending also that it be commanded by a Frenchman. Under the proposed reorganization discussed above, IBERLANT, when activated, would control the waters off Portugal and Morocco to a point west of the Madeira and Canary Islands. France has proposed expanding the IBERLANT area westward in the Atlantic, adding the western Mediterranean. The IBERLANT commander would thus be responsible to SACLANT in the Atlantic and SACEUR in the Mediterranean. No action has been taken by the Standing Group on the French proposals. The French have not raised the matter with the US at the diplomatic level.

In April the Military Committee in Chiefs of Staff Session urged SACEUR to expedite his review of the organization of naval commands in the Mediterranean, while generally endorsing the lines taken by SACLANT and CINCHAN in their recommendations for naval command reorganization. The French proposal on naval commands did not mention whether France would be prepared to return its Mediterranean Fleet to the status of earmarked for assignment to NATO if its views were adopted. There is no reason to believe that it would do so.

(c) Number of French Officers Holding Major NATO Commands

Other than the French desire to command IBERLANT, there have been no official approaches by the French to obtain increased representation in the increased representation in senior NATO command assignments. The French, however, are known to be dissatisfied with the present distribution of such positions; this dissatisfaction has been expressed largely through rumors and hints. A survey of the senior posts does indicate a US and UK predominance. It has been our position that any revision of the NATO command structure is of primary interest to the NATO military authorities and France should submit its proposals through these channels. The US is prepared to consider any reorganization of commands recommended by the NATO military authorities. To date no other countries have taken any steps to initiate a reorganization of the command structure.

Storage of US Nuclear Weapons in France

After the 1957 decision of the NATO Heads of Government to proceed with the establishment of a NATO atomic stockpile, our discussions with France to provide warhead support for both French and US forces stationed in France were placed by us in the NATO context.

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Atomic Cooperation Agreement

Negotiations with France for an agreement for atomic cooperation have virtually been concluded, and Ambassador Gavin is being authorized to initial the agreement. The proposed agreement would permit the transmission of atomic information to France to enable French forces assigned to NATO to attain full operational capability on nuclear capable delivery systems. As a practical matter, this applies only to French forces in Germany.

Drafted by: EUR:RA:AGJames	Cleared by: EUR - Mr. McBride
	WE - Mr. Brown
	WE - Mr. Beigel
	RA - Mr. Fessenden
S/S-AC - Mr. Col. Joy, Room 7512, Ext. 3257	

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MEMORANDUM

May 26, 1961

Subject: General Norstad's Proposal for NATO
Control of Nuclear Weapons

1. Norstad's public statements on this concept have always been in very general terms, e.g., that "control of weapons might be passed to the Alliance and that they might be committed to NATO as long as the Alliance endures."

This is close to the present US position, based on the policy paper approved by the President April 21: That the US should explore with its allies means of increasing allied participation in control of nuclear weapons committed to NATO.

2. Norstad's private expositions of his concept have been somewhat more specific. He appears to have in mind that the North Atlantic Council would authorize in advance SACEUR to release US nuclear weapons in an emergency to NATO national forces, with national governments then individually making their decisions as to whether or not these weapons should be used by them. It is doubtful that this particular application of Norstad's general proposal is understood by Chancellor Adenauer or would be acceptable to most NATO governments. For this proposal would make it possible for any one NATO country (Turkey) to initiate use of nuclear weapons by agreement only with a military commander (SACEUR) and without any political consensus within the Alliance.

The alternative possibilities referred to in the April 21 policy statement are that the North Atlantic Council might agree on general guidelines to govern the use of nuclear weapons, and that a small committee

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Council might be established to concert about application of these guidelines to specific cases or about the handling of cases not covered by these guidelines.

3. When Chancellor Adenauer spoke favorably of General Norstad's proposal to General de Gaulle, he was almost certainly speaking of the general concept outlined in paragraph 1. The only evidence we have as to the Chancellor's thinking on any specific application of this concept is the strong interest he showed, in talking with Henry Kissinger recently, in the President's Ottawa reference to possible creation of a NATO sea-borne missile force which would be "truly multilateral in ownership and control." This creation is envisaged in the April 21 policy statement as a possibility--after NATO's non-nuclear goals have been met and if it should be desired and found feasible by our allies.

5/29/61

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 29, 1961

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Specific answers to your questions of May 29th relating to the USSR

First, on Berlin: At Tab A you will find some papers you asked for plus a general paper giving the State Department German desk views. The author, Hillenbrand, will be in Vienna, and is an able man. I'm asking him for better dope on the West German legal position.

I checked Walter Lippman's view with him again and it can be summarized as follows:

1. Stand absolutely firm on our right of access to Berlin and point out the extreme danger of any interference with it.
2. Avoid any actual negotiation at Vienna and aim to defer such negotiations beyond the German elections in September.
3. Do not foreclose the possibility that in return for detailed written guarantees of access to Berlin, we for our part might offer a practical de facto acceptance of the East German Republic (perhaps by associating it in the guarantee of access.) Lippmann thinks that without recognizing the GDR in formal terms, we can yet find ways of meeting what he thinks may be the fundamental Soviet impulse -- a need for security in Eastern Europe and the fear of what the post-Adenauer Germany might be like.

You will see that the differences between the Achesonians and Lippman do not turn on the specific issue of standing fast to defend our access to Berlin. They turn rather on whether there is any legitimate Soviet interest to which we can give some reassurance. At one extreme are those who feel that the central Soviet purpose is to drive us out of Berlin and destroy the European Alliance as a

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TOP SECRET

BY W. S. Gochinist (WKK-76-307 appeal)
NARS, DATE 11/30/78

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

consequence. On the other extreme are those who feel that if we think in terms of accommodation, we should be able to avoid a real crisis.

Secretary Rusk inclines to the harder view, while Thompson, as you know, believes we must explore the possibility of accommodation. But in practical terms, for Paris and Vienna, there may be no real difference between them. Rusk, for example, suggests that in talking with Khrushchev you may wish to begin by a strong statement on access to Berlin and go on to ask, as Thompson so often has in his conversations with Khrushchev, just what the Soviets really find so unsatisfactory, as a practical matter, in the present situation. There is a chance that you might draw him into some clearer statement of their purposes here. It's not a very good chance, though, because he will probably be cautious in tipping his hand, just as you must be.

*but not a
Lippman!*

My own summary is first that firmness on allied access to Berlin is indeed fundamental, and second that a willingness to hear the Soviet argument on other points will not be harmful. The one thing which must be avoided in both capitals is any conclusion that the United States is feeble on Berlin itself. What we might later be willing to consider with respect to such items as the Oder-Neisse line and a de facto acceptance of a divided Germany is matter for further discussion, and we ourselves might indeed have new proposals at a later time. (One which we like and Soviets do not is a free city of all Berlin, and it's not unfair to mention that in Vienna if you want.)

Second, on the possibility of scientific proposals, I attach at Tab B a new and much improved memorandum from Wiesner's office. They put a priority on four possible areas of cooperation -- two in space and two in nuclear physics. Your own proposals to Khrushchev should probably not go further than to express your own interest and to suggest the matter be discussed at experts' meetings arranged through Ambassador Thompson. The practical process of scientific cooperation can be very difficult even with friends, and you will not want to get your own prestige hooked to specific negotiations that could be made sticky at any time by the Soviets.

TOP SECRET

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- 3 -

At Tab C are some recent disagreeable Chinese Communist statements about the United States.

We do not have any good facts on the relationship between Albania, Russia and China, but we will have some tomorrow.

We are proceeding to seek assurances that a mission in Outer Mongolia would be acceptable. Very few other nations have missions -- a list is being obtained. France does not.

m.f.B.

McG. B.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

5/29/61

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SSControl: 18469
Rec'd: May 29, 1961
4:33 p.m.

Info

FROM: Brussels

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1991, May 29, 7 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1991, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY PARIS 489

EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY

PARIS FOR INFORMATION AMBASSADORS GAVIN AND FINLETTER.

By prior arrangement I saw Spaak alone this morning following his return from Paris late yesterday, to get confidential report on his talk with De Gaulle. ^{May 25} Spaak said that while he had useful talks with French about European unification (reported separately), he wanted us to know in strictest confidence on eve of President's visit, about De Gaulle's present general attitude re defense of Europe and American's role therein because presumably this general subject would come up in President's Paris talks.

In discussing defense of Europe and NATO military strategy De Gaulle expressed strong and adamant view that United States would never risk using its strategic nuclear striking power solely for defense of Europe, since this would invite Soviet retaliation on American cities. Neither Europe nor France, De Gaulle reiterated, could count on US strategic nuclear capability to defend it.

Spaak said he argued strongly with De Gaulle that not only would United States use its strategic nuclear power to defend Europe, but also that the defense of Europe was impossible without United States power backed by its nuclear striking

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-2- 1991, May 29, 7 p.m., from Brussels

force. Spaak told De Gaulle that in his conversations with you at Oslo you had discussed desirability, under proper safeguards, of developing a NATO nuclear capability which would not be subject to the veto of the US or others. Spaak stressed to De Gaulle this indicated the sincerity and determination of the US to use any and all weapons, including our strategic nuclear power, to defend Europe.

De Gaulle, according to Spaak, pooh-poohed this and went on to say it was both clear and understandable that US would never share control of its nuclear striking power with any other nation, but would retain it intact for use, as it alone saw fit, in defense of its own interests and purposes. Despite Spaak's efforts, he said he could not shake De Gaulle in slightest from his conviction along these lines.

On the basis of foregoing assumption with respect to United States policy and attitude, De Gaulle went on to develop his thesis about imperative necessity of France developing its own strategic nuclear capability. De Gaulle said that since US would not use nuclear weapons to defend Europe, it was possible that Europe would receive an ultimatum from Soviets (presumably over Berlin or some other tense question) to capitulate and to emphasize seriousness of ultimatum, Soviets might at same time drop nuclear bomb on some secondary city such as Hamburg, Munich or Lyon. Should this occur, Europe must respond at once by dropping a bomb on some Soviet city, such as Kiev, to let Soviets know that Europe would not capitulate and that all-out nuclear war would ensue if Soviets persisted. Today Europe could not reply to such Soviet action and United States would not be willing to do so because of fear of immediate Soviet retaliation against American cities. However, when France developed its own nuclear capability it would be in a position to reply at once to such Soviet action. In this connection De Gaulle told Spaak he was not trying to build great nuclear strength, with many bombs, but he wished to have enough bombs to be able to deliver one if the Soviet Union should pursue above course and also something in reserve if Soviets did not desist.

/Spaak

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- MacArthur

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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CORRECTION ISSUED:

6/3/61, 3:15 AM SMD/UT

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By ing, NARA, Date 3-5-93

Control:

1496

Rec'd:

JUNE 2, 1961

1:46 PM

FROM: PARIS - CORRECTED COPY

Info

1994/2586

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 6, JUNE 2, 5 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

PRIORITY

EYES ONLY ACTING SECRETARY.

FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY BASED ON UNCLEARED MEMORANDUM PRESIDENT'S FOURTH CONVERSATION WITH DE GAULLE 3:30 - 5:00, JUNE 1.

MEETING WAS DEVOTED TO NATO PROBLEM. PRESIDENT SAID NATO AND MANNER IN WHICH ALLIANCE COULD BE MADE STRONGER WERE IMPORTANT SUBJECTS. DE GAULLE SAID HE WISHED DISCUSS THIS VERY IMPORTANT QUESTION WITH UTMOST FRANKNESS. NATO, HE DECLARED, IS FIRST AN ALLIANCE AND SECOND AN ORGANIZATION. NO ONE QUESTIONS NEED FOR ALLIANCE THOUGH PERHAPS IT SHOULD BE EXTENDED BEYOND EUROPE. HOWEVER WITH REGARD TO ORGANIZATION IT HAD BEEN FOUNDED ELEVEN YEARS AGO ON PRACTICAL US MONOPOLY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WEAKNESS THEN OF EUROPEAN POWERS. ESSENCE OF ORGANIZATION HAD BEEN DEFENSE OF EUROPE BY US NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITH SOME CONVENTIONAL FORCES TO PERMIT DEPLOYMENT OF US NUCLEAR FORCES. NATO HAD BEEN, HE CONTINUED, AN AMERICAN DEFENSE OF EUROPE. SITUATION HAD NOW GREATLY CHANGED. SOVIETS AND US ARE MORE OR LESS EQUAL IN NUCLEAR STRENGTH AND US IS NOW IN DANGER OF BEING DESTROYED. US WILL THUS FIND IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT MAKE DECISION USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IF SOVIETS DO NOT STRIKE FIRST WITH SUCH WEAPONS US MIGHT NOT STRIKE EITHER. IN PARTICULAR IT IS NOT CLEAR US WOULD BE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IF SOVIETS LAUNCH PURELY CONVENTIONAL ATTACK. FURTHERMORE US IS COMMITTED NOT ONLY IN EUROPE TODAY BUT THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

EUROPE HERSELF HAS ALSO CHANGED, DE GAULLE WENT ON. FRANCE IS SOMEWHAT STRONGER THOUGH GENERAL IS NOT UNDER ANY ILLUSIONS THAT SHE IS GENERALLY STRONG YET. IN ADDITION THERE IS DIFFERENCE IN FRENCH PSYCHOLOGY. ELEVEN YEARS AGO FRANCE HAD GIVEN UP WHILE TODAY AGAIN SHE HAS AMBITION AS A NATION. DE GAULLE ADDED TODAY THERE IS NO NATIONAL

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-2- SECTO 6, JUNE 2, 5 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM PARIS

DEFENSE IN EUROPE BUT ONLY INTEGRATED DEFENSE UNDER US COMMAND. THIS IS UNACCEPTABLE TO FRANCE.

DE GAULLE THEN REFERRED TO REVOLT OF FRENCH GENERALS IN ALGERIA. HE SAID HE DID NOT WISH TO IMPLY THAT THIS WAS ENCOURAGED BY NATO BUT SIMPLY THAT STATE OF MIND OF GENERALS TOWARDS THEIR GOVERNMENT WAS TO LARGE EXTENT DUE TO SUPRANATIONAL CHARACTER EUROPEAN DEFENSE. MENTALITY OF THESE GENERALS WHO DISOBEYED THEIR GOVERNMENT MAY BE DUE TO FACT DEFENSE HAD BECOME DENATIONALIZED. HE ADDED IS DIFFICULT FOR FRANCE TO HAVE STABLE STATE AND STABLE GOVERNMENT WITHOUT FEELING GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBLE FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. THIS IS WHY, HE CONCLUDED, FRANCE CANNOT CONTINUE UNDER SYSTEM INTEGRATED DEFENSE.

DE GAULLE CONTINUED ON THIS THEME SAYING ABSENCE NATIONAL DEFENSE NOT GOOD FOR ALLIANCE ITSELF. IF WAR COMES IT CANNOT BE WAGED WITHOUT FULL SUPPORT OF PEOPLE AND THIS WILL REQUIRE NATIONAL DEFENSE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. AT THE PRESENT TIME THERE IS ATMOSPHERE OF INTERNATIONAL CRISIS AND FRANCE DOES NOT HAVE ANY INTENTION OF DEMOLISHING NATO AT THIS MOMENT.

FOR FUTURE, DE GAULLE SAID, FIRST FACT IS THAT IT IS NOT CERTAIN THAT US WILL STRIKE FIRST WITH ATOMIC WEAPONS WHILE SECOND IS THAT BIGGER EUROPEAN POWERS SHOULD HAVE THEIR OWN NATIONAL DEFENSE. DE GAULLE ADDED HE DID NOT BELIEVE DISTINCTION BETWEEN TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC WEAPONS WAS VERY REAL. HOWEVER EVEN IF IT WAS, CONSEQUENCE WOULD BE THAT WESTERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE WOULD BE LAID WASTE BY SOVIET AND US TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AMERICAN NUCLEAR POWER REMAINS IMPORTANT BUT SHOULD BE USED ONLY IN LAST RESORT. DEFENSE OF EUROPE SHOULD BE ASSURED BY EUROPEAN COUNTRIES NOT WITHOUT US BUT NOT EXCLUSIVELY THROUGH US. MAJOR EUROPEAN POWERS SHOULD HAVE THEIR OWN NATIONAL DEFENSES. UK ALREADY HAS THIS TO SOME EXTENT AND THIS IS WHAT FRANCE WANTS AND WILL DEVELOP AS SOON AS ALGERIAN BUSINESS TERMINATED. DE GAULLE

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Control: 1496

Rec'd: JUNE 2, 1961

1:46 PM

FROM: PARIS

EYES ONLY

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 6, JUNE 2, 5 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

PRIORITY

EYES ONLY, ACTING SECRETARY

FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY BASED ON UNCLEARED MEMORANDUM PRESIDENT'S
FOURTH CONVERSATION WITH DE GAULLE 3:30 - 5:00, JUNE 1.

MEETING WAS DEVOTED TO NATO PROBLEM. PRESIDENT SAID NATO
AND MANNER IN WHICH ALLIANCE COULD BE MADE STRONGER WERE
IMPORTANT SUBJECTS. DE GAULLE SAID HE WISHED DISCUSS THIS
VERY IMPORTANT QUESTION WITH UTMOST FRANKNESS. NATO,
HE DECLARED, IS FIRST AN ALLIANCE AND SECOND AN ORGANIZATION.
NO ONE QUESTIONS NEED FOR ALLIANCE THOUGH PERHAPS IT SHOULD
BE EXTENDED BEYOND EUROPE. HOWEVER WITH REGARD TO ORGANIZATION
IT HAD BEEN FOUNDED ELEVEN YEARS AGO ON PRACTICAL US MONOPOLY
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WEAKNESS THEN OF EUROPEAN POWERS.
ESSENCE OF ORGANIZATION HAD BEEN DEFENSE OF EUROPE BY US
NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITH SOME CONVENTIONAL FORCES TO PERMIT
DEPLOYMENT OF US NUCLEAR FORCES. NATO HAD BEEN, HE CONTINUED,
AN AMERICAN DEFENSE OF EUROPE. SITUATION HAD NOW GREATLY
CHANGED. SOVIETS AND US ARE MORE OR LESS EQUAL IN NUCLEAR
STRENGTH AND US IS NOW IN DANGER OF BEING DESTROYED. US
WILL THUS FIND IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT MAKE DECISION USE NUCLEAR
WEAPONS. IF SOVIETS DO NOT STRIKE FIRST WITH SUCH WEAPONS
US MIGHT NOT STRIKE EITHER. IN PARTICULAR IT IS NOT CLEAR
US WOULD BE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR (#) EUROPE HERSELF HAS ALSO
CHANGED, DE GAULLE WENT ON. FRANCE IS SOMEWHAT STRONGER THOUGH
GENERAL IS NOT UNDER ANY ILLUSIONS THAT SHE IS GENERALLY STRONG
YET. IN ADDITION THERE IS DIFFERENCE IN FRENCH PSYCHOLOGY.
ELEVEN YEARS AGO FRANCE HAD GIVEN UP WHILE TODAY AGAIN SHE HAS
AMBITION AS A NATION. DE GAULLE ADDED TODAY THERE IS NO NATIONAL

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-2- SECTO 6, JUNE 2, 5 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM PARIS

DEFENSE IN EUROPE BUT ONLY INTEGRATED DEFENSE UNDER US COMMAND. THIS IS UNACCEPTABLE TO FRANCE.

DE GAULLE THEN REFERRED TO REVOLT OF FRENCH GENERALS IN ALGERIA. HE SAID HE DID NOT WISH TO IMPLY THAT THIS WAS ENCOURAGED BY NATO BUT SIMPLY THAT STATE OF MIND OF GENERALS TOWARDS THEIR GOVERNMENT WAS TO LARGE EXTENT DUE TO SUPRANATIONAL CHARACTER EUROPEAN DEFENSE. MENTALITY OF THESE GENERALS WHO DISOBEYED THEIR GOVERNMENT MAY BE DUE TO FACT DEFENSE HAD BECOME DENATIONALIZED. HE ADDED IS DIFFICULT FOR FRANCE TO HAVE STABLE STATE AND STABLE GOVERNMENT WITHOUT FEELING GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBLE FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. THIS IS WHY, HE CONCLUDED, FRANCE CANNOT CONTINUE UNDER SYSTEM INTEGRATED DEFENSE.

DE GAULLE CONTINUED ON THIS THEME SAYING ABSENCE NATIONAL DEFENSE NOT GOOD FOR ALLIANCE ITSELF. IF WAR COMES IT CANNOT BE WAGED WITHOUT FULL SUPPORT OF PEOPLE AND THIS WILL REQUIRE NATIONAL DEFENSE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. AT THE PRESENT TIME THERE IS ATMOSPHERE OF INTERNATIONAL CRISIS AND FRANCE DOES NOT HAVE ANY INTENTION OF DEMOLISHING NATO AT THIS MOMENT.

FOR FUTURE, DE GAULLE SAID, FIRST FACT IS THAT IT IS NOT CERTAIN THAT US WILL STRIKE FIRST WITH ATOMIC WEAPONS WHILE SECOND IS THAT BIGGER EUROPEAN POWERS SHOULD HAVE THEIR OWN NATIONAL DEFENSE. DE GAULLE ADDED HE DID NOT BELIEVE DISTINCTION BETWEEN TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC WEAPONS WAS VERY REAL. HOWEVER EVEN IF IT WAS, CONSEQUENCE WOULD BE THAT WESTERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE WOULD BE LAID WASTE BY SOVIET AND US TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AMERICAN NUCLEAR POWER REMAINS IMPORTANT BUT SHOULD BE USED ONLY IN LAST RESORT. DEFENSE OF EUROPE SHOULD BE ASSURED BY EUROPEAN COUNTRIES NOT WITHOUT US BUT NOT EXCLUSIVELY THROUGH US. MAJOR EUROPEAN POWERS SHOULD HAVE THEIR OWN NATIONAL DEFENSES. UK ALREADY HAS THIS TO SOME EXTENT AND THIS IS WHAT FRANCE WANTS AND WILL DEVELOP AS SOON AS ALGERIAN BUSINESS TERMINATED. DE GAULLE

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-3- SECTO 6, JUNE 2, 5 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM PARIS

ADDED ONE OF ERRORS OF NATO HAD BEEN TO GIVE SMALL NATIONS AS LARGE A VOICE AS LARGER ONES. HE CONCLUDED PRESENTATION SAYING US SHOULD BE RESERVE TO BE COMMITTED FULLY BUT NOT AT FIRST MOMENT. THERE CAN BE NO NUCLEAR WAR ONLY TOTAL NUCLEAR DESTRUCTION.

PRESIDENT SAID HE WISHED REPLY WITH EQUAL FRANKNESS. DEFENSE OF EUROPE AND DEFENSE OF US ARE SAME THING. LOSS OF EUROPE SPELLS CERTAIN DEFEAT FOR US. THEREFORE IF SOVIETS ATTACK AND THREATEN TO OVERRUN EUROPE EVEN WITHOUT USING ATOMIC WEAPONS, US MUST STRIKE FIRST WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. ONE OF REASONS FOR PLACING AMERICAN TROOPS IN EUROPE IS TO MAKE SOVIETS UNDERSTAND ANY ATTACK BY THEM IN EUROPE WOULD BE PHYSICALLY AND AUTOMATICALLY ATTACK ON US. IN NUCLEAR WARFARE ADVANTAGE OF STRIKING FIRST WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS SO GREAT THAT IF SOVIETS WERE TO ATTACK EVEN WITHOUT USING SUCH WEAPONS US COULD NOT AFFORD TO WAIT TO USE THEM. ?

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Department of State

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Control: 1523

Rec'd: JUNE 2, 1961

2:25 P.M.

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FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECID 6, JUNE 2, 5 P.M. (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

PRIORITY

EYES ONLY ACTING SECRETARY

PRESIDENT ADMITTED THERE MIGHT BE SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL ADVANTAGES IN STRICTLY NATIONAL DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENTS BUT ALL PROBLEMS COULD NOT BE SOLVED THEREBY. DE GAULLE INTERRUPTED TO SAY HE DID NOT HAVE IN MIND NATIONAL DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENTS WHICH WOULD INCLUDE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. GERMANY, HE NOTED, IS LEGALLY PREVENTED FROM HAVING SUCH WEAPONS AND DISADVANTAGES DERIVING FROM GERMAN POSSESSION OF THEM WOULD BE FAR GREATER THAN ADVANTAGES.

PRESIDENT SAID THERE IS CONSIDERATION ON US PART TRANSFER SOME ATOMIC WEAPONS TO NATO CONTROL TO STRENGTHEN UNITY AND MUTUAL TRUST OF MEMBERS. SUCH TRANSFER WOULD CREATE DIFFICULT COMMAND PROBLEMS. WHO WOULD GIVE ORDER SUCH WEAPONS BE USED? PRESIDENT SAID HE WOULD BE WILLING SEE GENERAL DE GAULLE THE SPOKESMAN OF EUROPE IN RESPECT TO THIS QUESTION. PRESIDENT SAID ONLY IF WILL TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS OBVIOUS WILL SOVIETS BELIEVE IN DETERRENT. PROBLEM IS TO BUILD TRUST WITHIN NATO AND BELIEF IN DETERRENT. PRESIDENT CONTINUED SAYING THERE ARE TWO DIFFERENT QUESTIONS. FIRST IS FRENCH DECISION TO OBTAIN NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. DEFINITE DECISION

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-2- SECTO 6. JUNE 2, 5 P.M. (SECTION TWO OF TWO) FROM PARIS

SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN TAKEN ON THIS POINT. SECOND QUESTION IS QUITE DIFFERENT. THIS IS DEFENSE OF EUROPE. THERE IS NO CONFLICT BETWEEN TWO QUESTIONS AND POINT IS HOW TO STRENGTHEN ALLIANCE. IF FRANCE HAS INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR CAPABILITY, SHE MAY ADD HER GUARANTEE TO THAT OF US.

DE GAULLE SAID HE AGREED IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE MAKE SOVIETS BELIEVE US ATOMIC WEAPONS WILL BE USED TO DEFEND EUROPE. GENERAL IS NOT SURE SOVIETS DO BELIEVE THIS NOR IS HE CERTAIN EVEN US BELIEVES IT. HE CONTINUED SAYING THAT NO ONE BELIEVES ANY COUNTRY WILL PLACE ITS ATOMIC WEAPONS IN HANDS OF OTHERS. THIS IS WHY HE DOES NOT ASK US FOR HELP IN FORM OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR IN NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE. FRANCE WOULD NOT GIVE HER NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO ANYONE ELSE ONCE SHE HAS THEM. PRESIDENT REAFFIRMED ANY SUBSTANTIAL ATTACK ON THE WEST WOULD BRING ABOUT US NUCLEAR RETALIATION. HE INQUIRED HOW FRANCE WOULD PARTICIPATE IN CREATING CONFIDENCE WHICH WE ARE TRYING TO BUILD UP ONCE SHE HAS NUCLEAR WEAPONS. DE GAULLE SAID IT WAS NOT HIS IMPRESSION US WOULD NEVER USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS BUT ONLY THAT US WOULD USE THEM SOLELY WHEN IT FELT ITS TERRITORY DIRECTLY THREATENED. DE GAULLE REFERRED TO FACT PRESIDENT HAD STATED THAT FOR US OUR TERRITORY AND EUROPE ARE THE SAME FROM DEFENSE VIEWPOINT, ADDING, "SINCE YOU SAY SO, MR. PRESIDENT, I BELIEVE YOU," BUT STILL CAN ONE BE CERTAIN.

DE GAULLE WENT ON INQUIRING AT WHAT MOMENT US CONSIDERED SITUATION CALLED FOR USE ATOMIC WEAPONS. GENERAL REFERRED TO US INTENTION TO RAISE THRESHOLD FOR USE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS. HE SAID THIS MUST MEAN US HAD DECIDED NOT USE THEM IN ALL CASES. WHEN ARE THEY GOING TO BE USED? THIS IS QUESTION WHICH PREOCCUPIES EUROPE. IT IS NOT KNOWN AT WHAT POINT THEY WILL BE USED AND GENERAL FEELS IF HE WERE IN PRESIDENT'S PLACE HE WOULD NOT KNOW EITHER.

/PRESIDENT

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*Primary the ally
not our master
is a pol. decision
not our master*

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-3- SECTO 6, JUNE 2, 5 P.M. (SECTION TWO OF TWO) FROM PARIS

PRESIDENT SAID RAISING THRESHOLD WAS ATTEMPT AT OBTAINING BETTER CONTROL AND PREVENTING USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LOCAL UNPLEASANTNESS. IT IS FOR THIS PURPOSE US ASKS INCREASE ITS CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES. HOWEVER IT IS CLEAR ANY SOVIET ATTACK WHICH THREATENED TO OVERRUN NATO SHIELD FORCES WOULD CONSTITUTE SUCH THRESHOLD.

PRESIDENT CONCLUDED SAYING THERE WAS GREAT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US PREVIOUSLY AND US TODAY. HE REFERRED TO FACT US HAD MOVED IN UNHESITATINGLY AT TIME OF KOREAN WAR AND THIS SHOULD BE CAUSE FOR CONFIDENCE AMONG AMERICA'S ALLIES.

DE GAULLE CONCLUDED THAT CONVERSATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT SHOULD CONTINUE AND REITERATED THAT IN PRESENT CRISIS FRANCE WOULD DO NOTHING TO WEAKEN NATO. MEETING CLOSED WITH PRESIDENT SAYING HE WOULD LIKE TO COME TO GRIPS WITH MANNER IN WHICH TRUST COULD BE FOSTERED.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

6/4/61

SAINTIZED COPY Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: June 4, 1961
10:15 A.M.
Soviet Embassy
Vienna

SUBJECT: Meeting Between The President and
Chairman Khrushchev in Vienna.

US

USSR

PARTICIPANTS:

The President
The Secretary
Ambassador Bohlen
Ambassador Thompson
EUR - Mr. Kohler
D - Mr. Akalovsky,
(interpreting)

Chairman Khrushchev
Foreign Minister Gromyko
Mr. Dobrynin, Chief,
American Countries Division,
USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ambassador Menshikov.
Mr. Sukhodrev, Interpreter,
USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs

COPIES TO:

The White House
The Secretary
Mr. Kohler

Permanent record copy for the Executive Secretariat's
conference file

During the exchange of amenities, the President asked Mr. Khrushchev what part of the USSR he was from. Mr. Khrushchev replied that he had been born in Russia, in a village in the vicinity of Kursk, 7 or 10 kilometers from the Ukrainian border, but that he had spent the early part of his life in the Ukraine. In this connection, he mentioned that recently very large deposits of iron ore had been found near Kursk. The deposits already prospected are estimated at 30 billion tons. The general estimate of these particular deposits is about 300 billion tons. Mr. Khrushchev said that according to US official statistics total deposits of iron ore in the US are estimated at 5 billion tons. Thus, he said, Soviet deposits will be sufficient to cover the needs of the entire world for a long time to come.

The President observed that he wondered why then the Soviet Union was interested in Laos.

Mr. Khrushchev said that the Soviet Union was not interested in Laos, but that it was the US which had created the Laotian situation.

The President said that he was not sure whether Mr. Khrushchev and himself could reach agreement on all the items under discussion,

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

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NLK-86-138 APPEAL

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NARA, Date 9/90

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Under such conditions, how could any of the two be certain that nothing suspicious is going on in his neighbor's room. The President then said that a treaty along such lines could not be confirmed by the Senate. In sending any treaty to the Senate the President would have to give assurance that the treaty provides if not for a fool-proof control system, at least for a reasonable deterrent against violations. However, if the Soviet proposal were accepted, no such assurance could be given. Likewise, how could Mr. Khrushchev give such assurance to those people in his country who may think that the United States is testing clandestinely. True, Mr. Khrushchev is in an advantageous position because of the open way in which the United States acts.

Mr. Khrushchev smiled and said: "But what about Allen Dulles? Isn't that secret?" The President replied he wished it were. Furthermore, the President continued, how can we inspect events in the Soviet Union if any such inspection would be subject to Soviet approval? Under such an arrangement any party that might have tested clandestinely would simply refuse to accept inspection in the area where the test had occurred.

Mr. Khrushchev referred to his statement about three inspections a year to verify suspicious events and also noted that the President had failed to address himself to his statement regarding the dropping of the troika proposal if nuclear tests were linked with disarmament. If this arrangement were adopted, then full control could be exercised any time and at any place. Mr. Khrushchev went on to say that a nuclear test ban alone would not be very important to the national security of the people. The danger of war would remain, because the production of nuclear energy, rockets, and bombs would continue full blast. What people want is peace. Therefore, agreement should be reached on general and complete disarmament. Then the troika would be dropped and the USSR would subscribe to any controls developed by the US, even without looking at the document.

The President said that he agreed that a nuclear test ban would not of itself lessen the number of nuclear weapons possessed by the USSR and the US. Nor would it reduce the production of such weapons. However, a test ban would make development of nuclear weapons by other countries less likely, although, of course, no one can guess what will happen in the future. At this time, the United States and the USSR possess great stocks of nuclear weapons; Great Britain possesses certain quantities of such weapons and France is also getting some capability. If we fail to reach agreement on a nuclear test ban then other countries will undoubtedly launch a nuclear weapons program. While a nuclear test ban would be no certain guarantee against the

proliferation

proliferation of nuclear weapons, it would certainly impede such proliferation. If no agreement is reached, then in a few years there might be ten or even fifteen nuclear powers. So in considering this question of what Mr. Khrushchev calls espionage one should balance its risks against the risks involved in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. If we are successful in reaching agreement on a nuclear test ban then it will certainly at least put a brake on the spread of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Khrushchev agreed that there was some logic in the President's position and said that this was why the Soviet Union had entered the negotiations. However, practice has demonstrated that this logic is not quite correct because while the three powers are negotiating in Geneva, France simply spits at them and goes on testing. Thus if there is no link between a nuclear test ban and disarmament other countries may say that they are in an unequal position and might act like France. Other countries may say that if the great powers possess stockpiles of nuclear weapons they should also acquire such stockpiles. On the other hand, if there were disarmament, then nuclear weapons would be eliminated and other countries would be in an equal position and would not have to spend money on the development of nuclear weapons. General and complete disarmament is the most radical means of preventing war. The Soviet Union has always regarded the question of a nuclear test ban merely as a small step toward general and complete disarmament. But let us now begin with the main issue and include the test ban in it.

The President said he agreed that a test ban would not be a basic part, but it would be a most important part. He said that the treaty as drafted now provides for abrogation of the treaty if any country associated with any party to the treaty should conduct tests. The United States does not support French testing. We hope that once a treaty has been concluded most other countries will join in it. The question of a nuclear test ban is a relatively easy problem to resolve because the controls required are based on scientific instrumentation, such as seismographs, etc. So why not start with this relatively easy question. The President then inquired whether the Soviet conception was that if we used the term general and complete disarmament -- or general and comprehensive disarmament as used by us last year -- the process would be carried out step by step with the necessary parallel inspection. Or is it the Soviet view that we would simply announce that goal as an objective of national policy and countries would carry out inspection on their own.

Mr. Khrushchev

discussions on disarmament on June 19, which will be in effect a continuation of the discussions Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Stevenson had had in New York.

Mr. Khrushchev inquired whether the President would agree to tie together the question of the test ban and disarmament.

The President replied that he would not unless there was assurance that agreement on disarmament could be reached speedily. He referred to the fact that negotiations on a nuclear test ban had been in process for three years. The President emphasized that the problem of espionage mentioned by Mr. Khrushchev paled if compared with the problems which would result from the development of nuclear capabilities by other countries. This is bound to affect the national security of our two countries, and increase the danger of major conflicts.

Mr. Khrushchev said that if we agreed on general and complete disarmament that problem would not only pale but would completely disappear.

Turning to the question of Germany, Mr. Khrushchev said that he wanted to set forth his position. He said that he understands that this will affect the relations between our two countries to a great extent and even more so if the US were to misunderstand the Soviet position. Conversely, if US understood the Soviet position correctly our two countries would be brought closer together rather than be divided. Sixteen years have passed since World War II. The USSR lost 20 million people in that War and many of its areas were devastated. Now Germany, the country which unleashed World War II, has again acquired military power and has assumed a predominant position in NATO. Its generals hold high offices in that organization. This constitutes a threat of World War III which would be even more devastating than World War II. The USSR believes that a line should be drawn under World War II. There is no explanation why there is no peace treaty 16 years after the war. This is why the USSR has suggested that a peace conference be convened. In this connection, the USSR proceeds from the actual state of affairs, namely, that two German States exist. Our own wishes or efforts notwithstanding, a united Germany is not practical because the Germans themselves do not want it. No delay in the matter of signing a peace treaty is justifiable and only West German militarists gain from such a delay. A peace treaty would not prejudice the interests of the US, the UK, or France; on the contrary, these interests would be best served by a peace treaty. The present situation looks as if the US opposes a peace treaty while the USSR wants it. Mr. Khrushchev said that he wanted the

President

President to understand him correctly. He would like to reach agreement with the President -- and he said he wanted to emphasize the words "with you" -- on this question. If the US should fail to understand this desire the USSR will sign a peace treaty alone. The USSR will sign a peace treaty with the GDR and with the FRG if the latter so desires. If not, a peace treaty will be signed with the GDR alone. Then the state of war will cease and all commitments stemming from Germany's surrender will become invalid. This would include all institutions, occupation rights, and access to Berlin, including the corridors. A free city of West Berlin will be established and there will be no blockade or interference in the internal affairs of the city. West Berlin should have a clearly defined status. If the US desires, guarantees could be given to ensure non-interference and the city's ties with the outside world. If the US wants to leave its troops in West Berlin, that would be acceptable under certain conditions; however, the Soviet Union believes that in that case Soviet troops should be there too. Likewise, the USSR would be agreeable to having neutral troops stationed in Berlin. UN guarantees would be acceptable as well. The USSR would be prepared to join the US in ensuring all the conditions necessary for preserving what the West calls West Berlin's freedom. However, if the US rejects this proposal -- and the USSR will regard such an action as having been made under the pressure of Adenauer -- the USSR will sign a peace treaty unilaterally and all rights of access to Berlin will expire because the state of war will cease to exist.

The President said that first of all he wanted to express his appreciation of the fact that Mr. Khrushchev had set forth his views in such a frank manner. At the same time the discussion here is not only about the legal situation but also about the practical facts which affect very much our national security. Here, we are not talking about Laos. This matter is of greatest concern to the US. We are in Berlin not because of someone's sufferance. We fought our way there, although our casualties may have been not as high as USSR's. We are in Berlin not by agreement of East Germans but by contractual rights. This is an area where every President of the US since World War II has been committed by treaty and other contractual rights and where every President has reaffirmed his faithfulness to his obligations. If we were expelled from that area and if we accepted the loss of our rights no one would have any confidence in US commitments and pledges. US national security is involved in this matter because if we were to accept the Soviet proposal US commitments would be regarded as a mere scrap of paper. West Europe is vital to our national security and we have supported it in two wars. If we were to leave West Berlin Europe would be


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abandoned as well. So when we are talking about West Berlin we are also talking about West Europe. The President said he would like to see the relations between our two countries develop in a favorable direction so that some arrangement could be found. Mr. Khrushchev seems to agree that the ratios of power today are equal. Therefore, it is difficult to understand why a country with high achievements in such areas as outer space and economic progress should now suggest that we leave an area where we have vital interests.



Mr. Khrushchev interjected that he understood this to mean that the President did not want a peace treaty. He said that the President's statement about US national security could mean that the US might wish to go to Moscow because that too would, of course, improve its position.

The President replied that the US was not asking to go anywhere; we were not talking about the US going to Moscow or of the USSR going to New York. What we are talking about is that we are in Berlin and have been there for 15 years. We suggest that we stay there.

The President continued by saying that the US was interested in maintaining its position in Berlin and its rights of access to that city. He said he recognized that the situation there is not a satisfactory one; he also recognized that in the conversations Mr. Khrushchev had had with former President Eisenhower the term "abnormal" had been used to describe that situation. However, because conditions in many areas of the world are not satisfactory today it is not the right time now to change the situation in Berlin and the balance in general. The United States does not wish to effect such a change. The US is not asking the USSR to change its position but it is simply saying that it should not seek to change our position and thus disturb the balance of power. If this balance should change the situation in West Europe as a whole would change and this would be a most serious blow to the US. Mr. Khrushchev would not accept similar loss and we cannot accept it either. The question is not that of a peace treaty with East Germany but rather of other aspects of this proposal which would affect our access to Berlin and our rights there.

Mr. Khrushchev

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Mr. Khrushchev said that he was sorry that he had met with no understanding of the Soviet position. The US is unwilling to normalize the situation in the most dangerous spot in the world. The USSR wants to perform an operation on this sore spot -- to eliminate this thorn, this ulcer -- without prejudicing the interests of any side, but rather to the satisfaction of all peoples of the world. It wants to do that not by intrigue or threat but by solemnly signing a peace treaty. Now the President says that this action is directed against the interests of the US. Such statement is difficult to understand indeed. No change in existing boundaries is proposed; a peace treaty would only formalize them. The USSR wants a peace treaty because such a treaty would impede those people who want a new war. Revanchists in West Germany will find in a peace treaty a barrier impeding their activities. Today they say that boundaries should be changed. But if a peace treaty is signed there will be no ground for revision of the boundaries. Hitler spoke of Germany's need for Lebensraum to the Urals. Now Hitler's generals, who had helped him design to execute his plans, are high commanders in NATO. This logic cannot be understood and USSR cannot accept it. Mr. Khrushchev said he was very sorry but he had to assure the President that no force in the world would prevent the USSR from signing a peace treaty. 16 years have passed since World War II and how long should the signing of a peace treaty be delayed? Another 16 years, another 30 years? No further delay is possible or necessary. As far as US losses in the last war are concerned, losses are difficult to measure. Loss of a drop of blood equals the loss of a pint of blood in the minds of those who shed that blood. The US lost thousands and the USSR lost millions, but American mothers mourn their sons just as deeply as Soviet mothers shed tears over the loss of their beloved ones. Mr. Khrushchev said that he himself had lost a son in the last war; Mr. Gromyko lost two brothers, and Mikoyan a son. There is not a single family in the USSR or the leadership of the USSR that did not lose at least one of its members in the war. Mr. Khrushchev continued by saying that he wanted the US to understand correctly the Soviet position. This position is advanced not for the purpose of kindling passions or increasing tensions. The objective is just the opposite -- to remove the obstacles that stand in the way of development of our relations and to normalize relations throughout the world. The USSR will sign a peace treaty and the sovereignty of the GDR will be observed. Any violation of that sovereignty will be regarded by the USSR as an act of open aggression against a peace-loving country, with all the consequences ensuing therefrom.

The President inquired whether such a peace treaty would block access to Berlin. Mr. Khrushchev said that it would.

The President

The President then said that the US is opposed to a buildup in West Germany that would constitute a threat to the Soviet Union. The decision to sign a peace treaty is a serious one and the USSR should consider it in the light of its national interests. Referring to the question of boundaries, the President said that General de Gaulle had made a statement on this question. This problem has been discussed in the Western world and there is some division of opinion on this matter. However, the US is committed to the defense of Western Europe and has assisted Western Europe in the past. The President said that one of his brothers had been killed in the last war, when the US came to Western Europe's assistance. If the US were driven out of West Berlin by unilateral action, and if we were deprived of our contractual rights by East Germany, then no one would believe the US now or in the future. US commitments would be regarded as a mere scrap of paper. The world situation today is that of change and no one can predict what the evolution will be in such areas as Asia or Africa. Yet what Mr. Khrushchev suggests is to bring about a basic change in the situation overnight and deny us our rights which we share with the other two Western countries. This presents us with a most serious challenge and no one can foresee how serious the consequences might be. The President said it had not been his wish to come here to Vienna to find out not only that a peace treaty would be signed but also that we would be denied our position in West Berlin and our access to that city. In fact, the President said, he had come here in the hope that relations between our two countries could be improved. The President stressed he hoped that Mr. Khrushchev would consider his responsibility toward his country and also consider the responsibility the President of the United States has toward his people. What is discussed here is not only West Berlin; we are talking here about Western Europe and the United States as well.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that he could not understand the President's reference to Western Europe. The USSR does not wish any change; it merely wants to formalize the situation which has resulted from World War II. The fact is that West Germany is in the Western group of nations and the USSR recognizes this. East Germany is an ally of the socialist countries and this should be recognized as a fait accompli. East Germany has now demarcation lines and these lines should become borders. The Polish and Czech borders should be formalized. The position of the GDR should be normalized and her sovereignty ensured. To do all this it is necessary to eliminate the occupation rights in West Berlin. No such rights should exist there. It would be impossible to imagine a situation where the USSR would have signed a peace treaty with the US retaining occupation rights, which are based on the state of war. The US may say that its blood was shed, but the USSR shed blood too and not water.

The President

The President interjected that our rights were based on a four-power agreement. Mr. Khrushchev replied that this was so in the absence of a peace treaty, but said that a peace treaty would end the state of war and those rights would therefore expire.

*make
changes*

The President said this meant unilateral abrogation of the four-power agreement by the USSR and emphasized that the US could not accept such an act. Mr. Khrushchev replied that this was not so because the USSR would invite the US to sign a peace treaty and would sign it alone only if the US should refuse to do so. In that event the US could not maintain its rights on the territory of the GDR. The President again referred to the four-power agreement, but Mr. Khrushchev replied that the USSR considered all of Berlin to be GDR territory. The President stated this may be Soviet view but not ours. If the USSR transfers its rights, that is a matter for its own decision; however, it is an altogether different matter for the USSR to give our rights which we have on contractual basis. He said that the USSR could not break the agreement and give US rights to the GDR. Mr. Khrushchev rejoined by saying that this was a familiar point of view but had no juridical foundation, since the war had ended 16 years ago. In fact, President Roosevelt indicated that troops could be withdrawn after two or two and a half years.

Mr. Khrushchev continued by saying that all the USSR wants is a peace treaty. He could not understand why the US wants Berlin. Does the US want to unleash a war from there? The President as a naval officer and he himself, a civilian although he participated in two wars, know very well that Berlin has no military significance. The President speaks of rights, but what are those rights? They stem from war. If the state of war ends, the rights end too. If a peace treaty is signed US prestige will not be involved, and everybody will understand this. But if the US should maintain its rights after the signing of a peace treaty, that would be a violation of East Germany's sovereignty and of the sovereignty of the socialist camp as a whole. Mr. Khrushchev recalled that President Eisenhower had agreed that the situation in Germany was abnormal. Eisenhower had said that US prestige was involved. Then the possibility of an interim agreement was discussed, an arrangement that would not involve the prestige of our two countries. Perhaps this could serve as a basis for agreement. The USSR is prepared to accept such an arrangement even now. Adenauer says that he wants unification but this is not so. As far as unification is concerned, we should say that the two German governments should meet and decide the question of reunification. A time limit of say 6 months should be set and if there is no agreement we can disavow our responsibilities and then anyone would be free to

conclude

conclude a peace treaty. This would be a way out and it would resolve this question of prestige, which, Mr. Khrushchev said, he did not really understand. Mr. Khrushchev said that he had hoped that Eisenhower would agree subsequently at the Summit, but the forces which are against improvement of relations between the US and USSR sent the U-2 plane and the USSR decided that in view of the tensions prevailing as a result of that flight this question should not be raised. However, the USSR believes that time for such action is ripe now. Mr. Khrushchev expressed regret on his own behalf and on behalf of his colleagues and allies at not having found understanding on the President's part of the Soviet Union's good intentions and motivations. If only the German question were resolved the road would be clear for the development of our mutual relations. The USSR does not want to infringe upon anybody's interests, but neither would it concede its own interests. Mr. Khrushchev said he believed that the US does not want territorial gains although there is ideological disagreement between the US and the USSR. However, ideological disagreements should not be transferred onto the plane of a devastating war. He said that he was confident that people would be reasonable enough not to act like crusaders in the Middle Ages and would not start cutting each other's throats for ideological reasons. If the United States disagrees with the Soviet proposal it should at least understand the Soviet position. The USSR can no longer delay. It will probably sign a peace treaty at the end of the year, with all the ensuing consequences, i.e., all obligations will come to an end. The status of West Berlin as a free city will be guaranteed and complete non-interference will be ensured. West Berlin will be accessible to all countries with which it will want to maintain ties. However, access will be subject to GDR's control, since communication lines go through its territory. If the US is concerned about what it calls freedom of West Berlin, let us develop guarantees jointly or invite the UN. No nation will understand the US position of perpetuating the state of war with Germany. The USSR will explain its position to the world. It wants to prevent the possibility of war. If the US refuses to sign a peace treaty, the USSR will have no way out other than to sign such a treaty alone. The USSR lost 20 million people in the last war while the US lost 350 thousand.

The President interjected that this was why the US wanted to prevent another war.

Mr. Khrushchev continued by saying that if the US should start a war over Berlin there was nothing the USSR could do about it. However, it would have to be the US to start the war, while the USSR will be defending peace. History will be the judge of our actions. The West has been saying that Khrushchev might

miscalculate.

miscalculate. But ours is a joint account and each of us must see that there is no miscalculation. If the US wants to start a war over Germany let it be so; perhaps the USSR should sign a peace treaty right away and get over with it. This is what the Pentagon has been wanting. However, Adenauer and Macmillan know very well what war means. If there is any madman who wants war, he should be put in a straight jacket. Nations close to USSR territory know what war will mean for them. The USSR thinks of peace, of friendship, and it is happy with its trade relations with West Germany, France, Great Britain and Italy. It is not by accident that trade between the US and the USSR is still frozen but that is a problem for the US. So this is the Soviet position. The USSR will sign a peace treaty at the end of this year. Mr. Khrushchev concluded by saying that he was confident that common sense would win and peace will prevail.

The President said he recognized that the situation in Germany was abnormal. Germany is divided today. When President Roosevelt talked about the withdrawal of troops he was not able to foresee this situation or the fact that our two countries would be on different sides. The US does not want to precipitate a crisis; it is Mr. Khrushchev who wants to do so by seeking a change in the existing situation. The President then said the US was committed to this area long before he had assumed a position of high government responsibility. Now Mr. Khrushchev suggests a peace treaty at the end of the year, which would deny our rights in that city and our rights of access. Mr. Khrushchev knows very well that Berlin is much more than a city and yet he makes such a suggestion. Is that a way to secure peace?

Mr. Khrushchev replied he did not understand how the signing of a peace treaty could worsen the world situation. Peace is always regarded as something beneficial while the state of war is regarded as something evil.

The President said that the signing of a peace treaty is not a belligerent act. He had not indicated this at all. However, a peace treaty denying us our contractual rights is a belligerent act. The matter of a peace treaty with East Germany is a matter for Mr. Khrushchev's judgment and is not a belligerent act. What is a belligerent act is transfer of our rights to East Germany. West Berlin is not important as a springboard. However, the US is committed to that area and it is so regarded by all the world. If we accepted Mr. Khrushchev's suggestion the world would lose confidence in the US and would not regard it as a serious country. It is an important strategic matter that the world believe the US is a serious country.

Mr. Khrushchev

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Mr. Khrushchev wondered what he should do in these circumstances. He said he believed that US intentions led to nothing good. The USSR would never, under any conditions, accept US rights in West Berlin after a peace treaty had been signed. He said he was absolutely convinced that the peoples of the world would understand such a position. Moreover, the US had deprived the USSR unilaterally of its rights and interests in West Germany, it had deprived the USSR of reparations in West Germany, and it had signed a unilateral peace treaty with Japan. As a result of this latter action the Soviet Union still has no peace treaty with Japan.

The President interjected that Mr. Khrushchev had said to President Eisenhower that he would have signed the treaty. Mr. Khrushchev confirmed this, while Mr. Gromyko said that the fact remained that the US had signed the Japanese peace treaty without the Soviet Union.

Mr. Khrushchev went on to say that the US regarded all this as appropriate, but now it says what the USSR wants to do is immoral. The USSR would like to do it together with the US, but if the US refuses to sign a peace treaty the USSR will do it alone. East Germany will obtain complete sovereignty and all obligations resulting from German surrender will be annulled. The factor of the USSR's prestige should be taken into account. What the US wants is to retain the rights gained after World War II even after a peace treaty had been signed. This is a policy of "I do what I want". The USSR regards East Germany as a completely sovereign state and it will sign a peace treaty with it. Responsibility for violation of that sovereignty will be heavy.

The President said that there is every evidence that our position in Berlin is strongly supported by the people there, and we are committed to that area. Mr. Khrushchev says that we are for a state of war. This is incorrect. It would be well if relations between East Germany and West Germany improved and if the development of US-USSR relations were such as to permit solution of the whole German problem. During his stay in office, Mr. Khrushchev has seen many changes, and changes will go on. But now he wants a peace treaty in six months, an action which would drive us out of Berlin.

Mr. Khrushchev had said that the President was a young man, but, the President continued, he had not assumed office to accept arrangements totally inimical to US interests. The President said he

was

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was prepared to discuss any problem but Mr. Khrushchev should take into account our interests just as he says we should take into account his views.

Mr. Khrushchev said that then an interim agreement should be concluded. However, no matter how long a time limit such an agreement were to provide for, the Germans would not agree because no one wishes reunification. An interim agreement would be a formal factor, it would give the semblance of the responsibility for the problem having been turned over to the Germans themselves. If the US does not wish such an arrangement there is no other way but to sign a peace treaty unilaterally. No one can force the US to sign a peace treaty but neither can the US make the Soviet Union accept its claims. Mr. Khrushchev then said that an aide-memoire on the Berlin question had been prepared so that the US could study the Soviet position and perhaps return to this question at a later date, if it wished to do so.

The group then moved to the dining room for lunch.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

6/4/61

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Memorandum of Conversation

SUBJECT: Meeting Between The President and
Chairman Khrushchev in Vienna.

DATE: June 4, 1961
10:15 A.M.
Soviet Embassy
Vienna

	<u>US</u>	<u>USSR</u>
PARTICIPANTS:	The President The Secretary Ambassador Bohlen Ambassador Thompson EUR - Mr. Kohler D - Mr. Akalovsky, (interpreting)	Chairman Khrushchev Foreign Minister Gromyko Mr. Dobrynin, Chief, American Countries Division, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ambassador Menshikov. Mr. Sukhodrev, Interpreter, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs
COPIES TO:	The White House The Secretary Mr. Kohler Permanent record copy for the Executive Secretariat's conference file	

During the exchange of amenities, the President asked Mr. Khrushchev what part of the USSR he was from. Mr. Khrushchev replied that he had been born in Russia, in a village in the vicinity of Kursk, 7 or 10 kilometers from the Ukrainian border, but that he had spent the early part of his life in the Ukraine. In this connection, he mentioned that recently very large deposits of iron ore had been found near Kursk. The deposits already prospected are estimated at 30 billion tons. The general estimate of these particular deposits is about 300 billion tons. Mr. Khrushchev said that according to US official statistics total deposits of iron ore in the US are estimated at 5 billion tons. Thus, he said, Soviet deposits will be sufficient to cover the needs of the entire world for a long time to come.

The President observed that he wondered why then the Soviet Union was interested in Laos.

Mr. Khrushchev said that the Soviet Union was not interested in Laos, but that it was the US which had created the Laotian situation.

The President said that he was not sure whether Mr. Khrushchev and himself could reach agreement on all the items under discussion,

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"We don't wish to act in a way that would deprive the EU of its role in Europe."

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

1294
3346DATE: June 4, 1961
10:15 A.M.
Soviet Embassy
ViennaSUBJECT: Meeting Between The President and
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PARTICIPANTS:	The President The Secretary Ambassador Bohlen Ambassador Thompson EUR - Mr. Kohler D - Mr. Akalovsky, (interpreting)	Chairman Khrushchev Foreign Minister Gromyko Mr. Dobrynin, Chief, American Countries Division, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ambassador Menshikov Mr. Sukhodrev, Interpreter, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs
COPIES TO:		

The White House

The Secretary

Mr. Kohler

Permanent record copy for the Executive Secretariat's
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During the exchange of amenities, the President asked Mr. Khrushchev what part of the USSR he was from. Mr. Khrushchev replied that he had been born in Russia, in a village in the vicinity of Kursk, 7 or 10 kilometers from the Ukrainian border, but that he had spent the early part of his life in the Ukraine. In this connection, he mentioned that recently very large deposits of iron ore had been found near Kursk. The deposits already prospected are estimated at 30 billion tons. The general estimate of these particular deposits is about 300 billion tons. Mr. Khrushchev said that according to US official statistics total deposits of iron ore in the US are estimated at 5 billion tons. Thus, he said, Soviet deposits will be sufficient to cover the needs of the entire world for a long time to come.

The President observed that he wondered why then the Soviet Union was interested in Laos.

Mr. Khrushchev said that the Soviet Union was not interested in Laos, but that it was the US which had created the Laotian situation.

The President said that he was not sure whether Mr. Khrushchev and himself could reach agreement on all the items under

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cease-fire. The point is that the situation at front lines is always unstable and even a shot fired accidentally by a soldier could be regarded by the other side as a violation of the cease-fire. Therefore, other questions should not be made contingent upon a cease-fire. However, the President should not misunderstand this position. The USSR believes that the question of a cease-fire should be handled on a priority basis, but the basic question is to bring about agreement among the three forces in Laos, so that the formation of a truly neutral government could be secured. Mr. Khrushchev agreed that no normal conditions for settlement would exist in the absence of a cease-fire. However, he was not aware of any fighting going on; if the United States had contrary information, it should be verified.

Mr. Gromyko remarked that the ICC was already in Laos and that it could act by agreement of both sides. In response to an inquiry by the Secretary, Mr. Gromyko clarified that what he meant by both sides were the two sides fighting in Laos. The ICC should not be granted the rights of a supragovernment.

The President reiterated his hope that the Secretary and Mr. Gromyko could discuss this problem briefly during lunch.

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Mr. Khrushchev then addressed himself to the question of nuclear weapon tests. He said he would not go into any details because the positions of the two sides were well known. Furthermore, he was not familiar with all the details of this intricate problem. However, there were two basic questions: (1) the number of suspicious events to be inspected and (2) organization of control. The Soviet Union cannot accept such controls as have been suggested so far. The events in the Congo taught the Soviet Union a lesson. Before those events the Soviet Union might have signed a treaty like the one suggested. However, the events in the Congo indicated that the UN appears to be able to act against the interests of individual states. The Congo had invited UN troops and those troops acted against the interests of the Congolese Government. So if there is a single chairman of the control commission (Mr. Khrushchev was obviously referring to the administrator) he will be able to set the policy. The US would not agree to having a Communist chairman and that is understandable. If it did then the Soviet Union could accept a single chairman (administrator). But the Soviet Union cannot accept a neutral chairman; after all, Hammarskjold is also neutral and an intelligent one at that. He is not the worst neutral possible. One should try to imagine a situation, Mr. Khrushchev said, where he, as Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, would have to subject his actions to such a commission (administrator). The people of the Soviet Union would never accept such a situation and if the United States wants him to be fired then it

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should pursue this line. The Soviet Union does not seek control over the control organization but it does not wish the United States to have such control either. This is why the USSR has proposed a three-man body. Such an arrangement would not be prejudicial to any of the sides. Mr. Khrushchev said that he believed that the work of other international organizations should be organized along the same lines. He said that the United States was now in the majority in the UN, but times may change -- one cannot say when -- and the US may find itself in a minority. The UN is not a parliament, it is an international organization and the majority rule has no place there. Each group of countries should be equally represented, so that a balance of forces be established and that no one be able to pursue a policy prejudicial to any other side. Referring to the number of inspections, Mr. Khrushchev said that three inspections a year would be sufficient. A larger number would be tantamount to intelligence, something the Soviet Union cannot accept. Mr. Khrushchev then said that he wanted to link the question of nuclear tests with disarmament. If agreement could be reached on disarmament, then the USSR could agree to any controls and it would then drop the troika arrangement and the requirement for unanimity. The Soviet position on disarmament is well known; it was stated at the UN and the USSR still proceeds on that basis. Under the conditions of general and complete disarmament control must be most extensive so that no country could arm itself clandestinely. If there were general and complete disarmament there would be no question of espionage because there would be no armaments. Then there would be no secrets and all doors must be open so that complete verification could be ensured. This would include nuclear plants. In view of the fact that apparently no agreement can be reached on the question of nuclear tests, this question should be linked to disarmament. The disarmament group should combine the two questions and work out a general plan. Given good will, two years should be sufficient to develop an agreement on general and complete disarmament. Mr. Khrushchev said that he could give the President an aide memoire setting forth the Soviet position on this question. (The aide memoire was received from the Soviets after the meeting.)

The President said that he wanted to ask Mr. Khrushchev whether he believed it to be impossible to find any person that would be neutral both to the US and the USSR.

Mr. Khrushchev replied in the affirmative.

The President then said that the result of the Soviet proposal could be compared to a situation where if he were living in this room and Mr. Khrushchev in the adjacent room, they could not go to each other's rooms without the consent of the occupant.

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Under such conditions, how could any of the two be certain that nothing suspicious is going on in his neighbor's room. The President then said that a treaty along such lines could not be confirmed by the Senate. In sending any treaty to the Senate the President would have to give assurance that the treaty provides if not for a fool-proof control system, at least for a reasonable deterrent against violations. However, if the Soviet proposal were accepted, no such assurance could be given. Likewise, how could Mr. Khrushchev give such assurance to those people in his country who may think that the United States is testing clandestinely. True, Mr. Khrushchev is in an advantageous position because of the open way in which the United States acts.

Mr. Khrushchev smiled and said: "But what about Allen Dulles? Isn't that secret?" The President replied he wished it were. Furthermore, the President continued, how can we inspect events in the Soviet Union if any such inspection would be subject to Soviet approval? Under such an arrangement any party that might have tested clandestinely would simply refuse to accept inspection in the area where the test had occurred.

Mr. Khrushchev referred to his statement about three inspections a year to verify suspicious events and also noted that the President had failed to address himself to his statement regarding the dropping of the troika proposal if nuclear tests were linked with disarmament. If this arrangement were adopted, then full control could be exercised any time and at any place. Mr. Khrushchev went on to say that a nuclear test ban alone would not be very important to the national security of the people. The danger of war would remain, because the production of nuclear energy, rockets, and bombs would continue full blast. What people want is peace. Therefore, agreement should be reached on general and complete disarmament. Then the troika would be dropped and the USSR would subscribe to any controls developed by the US, even without looking at the document.

The President said that he agreed that a nuclear test ban would not of itself lessen the number of nuclear weapons possessed by the USSR and the US. Nor would it reduce the production of such weapons. However, a test ban would make development of nuclear weapons by other countries less likely, although, of course, no one can guess what will happen in the future. At this time, the United States and the USSR possess great stocks of nuclear weapons; Great Britain possesses certain quantities of such weapons and France is also getting some capability. If we fail to reach agreement on a nuclear test ban then other countries will undoubtedly launch a nuclear weapons program. While a nuclear test ban would be no certain guarantee against the

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proliferation of nuclear weapons, it would certainly impede such proliferation. If no agreement is reached, then in a few years there might be ten or even fifteen nuclear powers. So in considering this question of what Mr. Khrushchev calls espionage one should balance its risks against the risks involved in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. If we are successful in reaching agreement on a nuclear test ban then it will certainly at least put a brake on the spread of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Khrushchev agreed that there was some logic in the President's position and said that this was why the Soviet Union had entered the negotiations. However, practice has demonstrated that this logic is not quite correct because while the three powers are negotiating in Geneva, France simply spits at them and goes on testing. Thus if there is no link between a nuclear test ban and disarmament other countries may say that they are in an unequal position and might act like France. Other countries may say that if the great powers possess stockpiles of nuclear weapons they should also acquire such stockpiles. On the other hand, if there were disarmament, then nuclear weapons would be eliminated and other countries would be in an equal position and would not have to spend money on the development of nuclear weapons. General and complete disarmament is the most radical means of preventing war. The Soviet Union has always regarded the question of a nuclear test ban merely as a small step toward general and complete disarmament. But let us now begin with the main issue and include the test ban in it.

The President said he agreed that a test ban would not be a basic part, but it would be a most important part. He said that the treaty as drafted now provides for abrogation of the treaty if any country associated with any party to the treaty should conduct tests. The United States does not support French testing. We hope that once a treaty has been concluded most other countries will join in it. The question of a nuclear test ban is a relatively easy problem to resolve because the controls required are based on scientific instrumentation, such as seismographs, etc. So why not start with this relatively easy question. The President then inquired whether the Soviet conception was that if we used the term general and complete disarmament -- or general and comprehensive disarmament as used by us last year -- the process would be carried out step by step with the necessary parallel inspection. Or is it the Soviet view that we would simply announce that goal as an objective of national policy and countries would carry out inspection on their own.

Mr. Khrushchev

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Mr. Khrushchev replied he wanted to make a complaint: The President apparently had not read the Soviet proposals with sufficient attention. Otherwise, he would know that the Soviet proposals provide for disarmament in stages and for control in stages.

The President then inquired whether this was to be understood that, if both sides accepted general and complete disarmament and agreed to reduce their armed forces, the number of their aircraft or submarines, or to disarm outer space, the Soviet Union would accept inspection any place in the USSR.

Mr. Khrushchev replied in the affirmative, using the word "absolutely".

In other words, the President inquired further, if general and complete disarmament were accepted as a commitment of national policy and a nuclear test ban were included in the first stage, would that mean that the test ban would be subject to inspection without a veto?

Mr. Khrushchev replied that in that event he would try to persuade the President not to start with this measure because it is not the most important one.

In response to the President's question what should come first, Mr. Khrushchev replied that any other measure would be acceptable, such as, for instance, prohibition of nuclear weapons, prohibition of the manufacture of such weapons, or elimination of military and missile bases. (At this point Mr. Gromyko corrected the interpreter saying that Mr. Khrushchev had not mentioned prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear weapons. However, Mr. Khrushchev confirmed that he had mentioned this item.) The Soviet proposals on disarmament contain all the details and there is logic in those proposals. The proposals also provide for complete control. In any event, both sides should try to reach agreement on the priority of individual measures so that neither side would have its interests prejudiced by the other.

The President said that Mr. Khrushchev appeared to feel that a link should be established between a nuclear test ban and disarmament and that these two questions are inter-related and should be discussed together. We, on the other hand, believe that a nuclear test ban would be if not the most important step, at least a very significant step and would facilitate a disarmament agreement. There is a Chinese proverb saying that a thousand-mile journey begins with one step. So let us make that step.

Mr. Khrushchev

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Mr. Khrushchev rejoined by saying that the President apparently knew the Chinese very well but that he too knew them quite well. To this the President replied that Mr. Khrushchev might get to know them even better. Mr. Khrushchev retorted that he already knew them very well.

Referring to the President's statement about the significance of a nuclear test ban, Mr. Khrushchev said that the USSR could agree to a nuclear test ban provided it was subject to the troika arrangement.

The President then said that it appeared to him that the conversation was back where it had started. Therefore, he wanted to conclude this discussion by saying that the United States is greatly concerned by the uninspected moratorium that has been going on for three years in connection with the negotiations. This indicates how long it takes to reach agreements. The prospect of an indefinite continuance of a moratorium without controls is a matter of great concern to the United States. Therefore, it is difficult to envisage how the question of nuclear tests could be included in disarmament negotiations, which we hope will be successful but which will probably require a long time. Perhaps it would be best to go back to Geneva to make another effort and to see what each of us should do in this matter. Perhaps then the conference might be recessed or some other action taken. Whether or not there is agreement on nuclear tests we would start our discussions on disarmament on June 19.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that he was agreeable to conducting negotiations in Geneva and said that there was a Soviet representative there. However, the Soviet Union could not accept such controls as would be tantamount to espionage if weapons themselves were not eliminated. This, in effect, is what the Pentagon has wanted all along. Eisenhower's open skies proposal in 1955 was a part of that scheme. Now ground posts are envisaged and this is also reconnaissance. The Soviet Union has agreed to negotiate on a nuclear test ban in the hope of reaching agreement and proceeding to general and complete disarmament. If the US refuses to accept general and complete disarmament then the Soviet Union cannot agree to accept such an arrangement. The Soviet Union cannot accept a situation where controls would prejudice its national security and where the Soviet Government would be subject to the will of a third party and would not be free to act on its own.

The President said that it was obvious that if controls should turn out to be prejudicial to the national interest of any of the parties to an unreasonable degree, the treaty could be abrogated. The President reiterated that we would begin our

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discussions on disarmament on June 19, which will be in effect a continuation of the discussions Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Stevenson had had in New York.

Mr. Khrushchev inquired whether the President would agree to tie together the question of the test ban and disarmament.

The President replied that he would not unless there was assurance that agreement on disarmament could be reached speedily. He referred to the fact that negotiations on a nuclear test ban had been in process for three years. The President emphasized that the problem of espionage mentioned by Mr. Khrushchev paled if compared with the problems which would result from the development of nuclear capabilities by other countries. This is bound to affect the national security of our two countries, and increase the danger of major conflicts.

Mr. Khrushchev said that if we agreed on general and complete disarmament that problem would not only pale but would completely disappear.

Turning to the question of Germany, Mr. Khrushchev said that he wanted to set forth his position. He said that he understands that this will affect the relations between our two countries to a great extent and even more so if the US were to misunderstand the Soviet position. Conversely, if US understood the Soviet position correctly our two countries would be brought closer together rather than be divided. Sixteen years have passed since World War II. The USSR lost 20 million people in that War and many of its areas were devastated. Now Germany, the country which unleashed World War II, has again acquired military power and has assumed a predominant position in NATO. Its generals hold high offices in that organization. This constitutes a threat of World War III which would be even more devastating than World War II. The USSR believes that a line should be drawn under World War II. There is no explanation why there is no peace treaty 16 years after the war. This is why the USSR has suggested that a peace conference be convened. In this connection, the USSR proceeds from the actual state of affairs, namely, that two German States exist. Our own wishes or efforts notwithstanding, a united Germany is not practical because the Germans themselves do not want it. No delay in the matter of signing a peace treaty is justifiable and only West German militarists gain from such a delay. A peace treaty would not prejudice the interests of the US, the UK, or France; on the contrary, these interests would be best served by a peace treaty. The present situation looks as if the US opposes a peace treaty while the USSR wants it. Mr. Khrushchev said that he wanted the

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President to understand him correctly. He would like to reach agreement with the President -- and he said he wanted to emphasize the words "with you" -- on this question. If the US should fail to understand this desire the USSR will sign a peace treaty alone. The USSR will sign a peace treaty with the GDR and with the FRG if the latter so desires. If not, a peace treaty will be signed with the GDR alone. Then the state of war will cease and all commitments stemming from Germany's surrender will become invalid. This would include all institutions, occupation rights, and access to Berlin, including the corridors. A free city of West Berlin will be established and there will be no blockade or interference in the internal affairs of the city. West Berlin should have a clearly defined status. If the US desires, guarantees could be given to ensure non-interference and the city's ties with the outside world. If the US wants to leave its troops in West Berlin, that would be acceptable under certain conditions; however, the Soviet Union believes that in that case Soviet troops should be there too. Likewise, the USSR would be agreeable to having neutral troops stationed in Berlin. UN guarantees would be acceptable as well. The USSR would be prepared to join the US in ensuring all the conditions necessary for preserving what the West calls West Berlin's freedom. However, if the US rejects this proposal -- and the USSR will regard such an action as having been made under the pressure of Adenauer -- the USSR will sign a peace treaty unilaterally and all rights of access to Berlin will expire because the state of war will cease to exist.

The President said that first of all he wanted to express his appreciation of the fact that Mr. Khrushchev had set forth his views in such a frank manner. At the same time the discussion here is not only about the legal situation but also about the practical facts which affect very much our national security. Here, we are not talking about Laos. This matter is of greatest concern to the US. We are in Berlin not because of someone's sufferance. We fought our way there, although our casualties may have been not as high as USSR's. We are in Berlin not by agreement of East Germans but by contractual rights. This is an area where every President of the US since World War II has been committed by treaty and other contractual rights and where every President has reaffirmed his faithfulness to his obligations. If we were expelled from that area and if we accepted the loss of our rights no one would have any confidence in US commitments and pledges. US national security is involved in this matter because if we were to accept the Soviet proposal US commitments would be regarded as a mere scrap of paper. West Europe is vital to our national security and we have supported it in two wars. If we were to leave West Berlin Europe would be

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abandoned as well. So when we are talking about West Berlin we are also talking about West Europe. The President said he would like to see the relations between our two countries develop in a favorable direction so that some arrangement could be found. Mr. Khrushchev seems to agree that the ratios of power today are equal. Therefore, it is difficult to understand why a country with high achievements in such areas as outer space and economic progress should not suggest that we leave an area where we have vital interests. How can the US agree to East Germany's preventing it from exercising our rights we had won by war? The United States cannot accept an ultimatum. Our leaving West Berlin would result in the US becoming isolated. The President emphasized that he is not President of the US to preside over isolation of his country just as Mr. Khrushchev, as leader of the USSR, would not want to see his own country isolated.

Mr. Khrushchev interjected that he understood this to mean that the President did not want a peace treaty. He said that the President's statement about US national security could mean that the US might wish to go to Moscow because that too would, of course, improve its position.

The President replied that the US was not asking to go anywhere; we were not talking about the US going to Moscow or of the USSR going to New York. What we are talking about is that we are in Berlin and have been there for 15 years. We suggest that we stay there.

The President continued by saying that the US was interested in maintaining its position in Berlin and its rights of access to that city. He said he recognized that the situation there is not a satisfactory one; he also recognized that in the conversations Mr. Khrushchev had had with former President Eisenhower the term "abnormal" had been used to describe that situation. However, because conditions in many areas of the world are not satisfactory today it is not the right time now to change the situation in Berlin and the balance in general. The United States does not wish to effect such a change. The US is not asking the USSR to change its position but it is simply saying that it should not seek to change our position and thus disturb the balance of power. If this balance should change the situation in West Europe as a whole would change and this would be a most serious blow to the US. Mr. Khrushchev would not accept similar loss and we cannot accept it either. The question is not that of a peace treaty with East Germany but rather of other aspects of this proposal which would affect our access to Berlin and our rights there.

Mr. Khrushchev

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Mr. Khrushchev said that he was sorry that he had met with no understanding of the Soviet position. The US is unwilling to normalize the situation in the most dangerous spot in the world. The USSR wants to perform an operation on this sore spot -- to eliminate this thorn, this ulcer -- without prejudicing the interests of any side, but rather to the satisfaction of all peoples of the world. It wants to do that not by intrigue or threat but by solemnly signing a peace treaty. Now the President says that this action is directed against the interests of the US. Such statement is difficult to understand indeed. No change in existing boundaries is proposed; a peace treaty would only formalize them. The USSR wants a peace treaty because such a treaty would impede those people who want a new war. Revanchists in West Germany will find in a peace treaty a barrier impeding their activities. Today they say that boundaries should be changed. But if a peace treaty is signed there will be no ground for revision of the boundaries. Hitler spoke of Germany's need for Lebensraum to the Urals. Now Hitler's generals, who had helped him design to execute his plans, are high commanders in NATO. This logic cannot be understood and USSR cannot accept it. Mr. Khrushchev said he was very sorry but he had to assure the President that no force in the world would prevent the USSR from signing a peace treaty. 16 years have passed since World War II and how long should the signing of a peace treaty be delayed? Another 16 years, another 30 years? No further delay is possible or necessary. As far as US losses in the last war are concerned, losses are difficult to measure. Loss of a drop of blood equals the loss of a pint of blood in the minds of those who shed that blood. The US lost thousands and the USSR lost millions, but American mothers mourn their sons just as deeply as Soviet mothers shed tears over the loss of their beloved ones. Mr. Khrushchev said that he himself had lost a son in the last war; Mr. Gromyko lost two brothers, and Mikoyan a son. There is not a single family in the USSR or the leadership of the USSR that did not lose at least one of its members in the war. Mr. Khrushchev continued by saying that he wanted the US to understand correctly the Soviet position. This position is advanced not for the purpose of kindling passions or increasing tensions. The objective is just the opposite -- to remove the obstacles that stand in the way of development of our relations and to normalize relations throughout the world. The USSR will sign a peace treaty and the sovereignty of the GDR will be observed. Any violation of that sovereignty will be regarded by the USSR as an act of open aggression against a peace-loving country, with all the consequences ensuing therefrom.

The President inquired whether such a peace treaty would block access to Berlin. Mr. Khrushchev said that it would.

The President

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The President then said that the US is opposed to a buildup in West Germany that would constitute a threat to the Soviet Union. The decision to sign a peace treaty is a serious one and the USSR should consider it in the light of its national interests. Referring to the question of boundaries, the President said that General de Gaulle had made a statement on this question. This problem has been discussed in the Western world and there is some division of opinion on this matter. However, the US is committed to the defense of Western Europe and has assisted Western Europe in the past. The President said that one of his brothers had been killed in the last war, when the US came to Western Europe's assistance. If the US were driven out of West Berlin by unilateral action, and if we were deprived of our contractual rights by East Germany, then no one would believe the US now or in the future. US commitments would be regarded as a mere scrap of paper. The world situation today is that of change and no one can predict what the evolution will be in such areas as Asia or Africa. Yet what Mr. Khrushchev suggests is to bring about a basic change in the situation overnight and deny us our rights which we share with the other two Western countries. This presents us with a most serious challenge and no one can foresee how serious the consequences might be. The President said it had not been his wish to come here to Vienna to find out not only that a peace treaty would be signed but also that we would be denied our position in West Berlin and our access to that city. In fact, the President said, he had come here in the hope that relations between our two countries could be improved. The President stressed he hoped that Mr. Khrushchev would consider his responsibility toward his country and also consider the responsibility the President of the United States has toward his people. What is discussed here is not only West Berlin; we are talking here about Western Europe and the United States as well.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that he could not understand the President's reference to Western Europe. The USSR does not wish any change; it merely wants to formalize the situation which has resulted from World War II. The fact is that West Germany is in the Western group of nations and the USSR recognizes this. East Germany is an ally of the socialist countries and this should be recognized as a fait accompli. East Germany has now demarcation lines and these lines should become borders. The Polish and Czech borders should be formalized. The position of the GDR should be normalized and her sovereignty ensured. To do all this it is necessary to eliminate the occupation rights in West Berlin. No such rights should exist there. It would be impossible to imagine a situation where the USSR would have signed a peace treaty with the US retaining occupation rights, which are based on the state of war. The US may say that its blood was shed, but the USSR shed blood too and not water.

The President

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The President interjected that our rights were based on a four-power agreement. Mr. Khrushchev replied that this was so in the absence of a peace treaty, but said that a peace treaty would end the state of war and those rights would therefore expire.

The President said this meant unilateral abrogation of the four-power agreement by the USSR and emphasized that the US could not accept such an act. Mr. Khrushchev replied that this was not so because the USSR would invite the US to sign a peace treaty and would sign it alone only if the US should refuse to do so. In that event the US could not maintain its rights on the territory of the GDR. The President again referred to the four-power agreement, but Mr. Khrushchev replied that the USSR considered all of Berlin to be GDR territory. The President stated this may be Soviet view but not ours. If the USSR transfers its rights, that is a matter for its own decision; however, it is an altogether different matter for the USSR to give our rights which we have on contractual basis. He said that the USSR could not break the agreement and give US rights to the GDR. Mr. Khrushchev rejoined by saying that this was a familiar point of view but had no juridical foundation, since the war had ended 16 years ago. In fact, President Roosevelt indicated that troops could be withdrawn after two or two and a half years.

Mr. Khrushchev continued by saying that all the USSR wants is a peace treaty. He could not understand why the US wants Berlin. Does the US want to unleash a war from there? The President as a naval officer and he himself, a civilian although he participated in two wars, know very well that Berlin has no military significance. The President speaks of rights, but what are those rights? They stem from war. If the state of war ends, the rights end too. If a peace treaty is signed US prestige will not be involved, and everybody will understand this. But if the US should maintain its rights after the signing of a peace treaty, that would be a violation of East Germany's sovereignty and of the sovereignty of the socialist camp as a whole. Mr. Khrushchev recalled that President Eisenhower had agreed that the situation in Germany was abnormal. Eisenhower had said that US prestige was involved. Then the possibility of an interim agreement was discussed, an arrangement that would not involve the prestige of our two countries. Perhaps this could serve as a basis for agreement. The USSR is prepared to accept such an arrangement even now. Adenauer says that he wants unification but this is not so. As far as unification is concerned, we should say that the two German governments should meet and decide the question of reunification. A time limit of say 6 months should be set and if there is no agreement we can disavow our responsibilities and then anyone would be free to

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conclude a peace treaty. This would be a way out and it would resolve this question of prestige, which, Mr. Khrushchev said, he did not really understand. Mr. Khrushchev said that he had hoped that Eisenhower would agree subsequently at the Summit, but the forces which are against improvement of relations between the US and USSR sent the U-2 plane and the USSR decided that in view of the tensions prevailing as a result of that flight this question should not be raised. However, the USSR believes that time for such action is ripe now. Mr. Khrushchev expressed regret on his own behalf and on behalf of his colleagues and allies at not having found understanding on the President's part of the Soviet Union's good intentions and motivations. If only the German question were resolved the road would be clear for the development of our mutual relations. The USSR does not want to infringe upon anybody's interests, but neither would it concede its own interests. Mr. Khrushchev said he believed that the US does not want territorial gains although there is ideological disagreement between the US and the USSR. However, ideological disagreements should not be transferred onto the plane of a devastating war. He said that he was confident that people would be reasonable enough not to act like crusaders in the Middle Ages and would not start cutting each other's throats for ideological reasons. If the United States disagrees with the Soviet proposal it should at least understand the Soviet position. The USSR can no longer delay. It will probably sign a peace treaty at the end of the year, with all the ensuing consequences, i.e., all obligations will come to an end. The status of West Berlin as a free city will be guaranteed and complete non-interference will be ensured. West Berlin will be accessible to all countries with which it will want to maintain ties. However, access will be subject to GDR's control, since communication lines go through its territory. If the US is concerned about what it calls freedom of West Berlin, let us develop guarantees jointly or invite the UN. No nation will understand the US position of perpetuating the state of war with Germany. The USSR will explain its position to the world. It wants to prevent the possibility of war. If the US refuses to sign a peace treaty, the USSR will have no way out other than to sign such a treaty alone. The USSR lost 20 million people in the last war while the US lost 350 thousand.

The President interjected that this was why the US wanted to prevent another war.

Mr. Khrushchev continued by saying that if the US should start a war over Berlin there was nothing the USSR could do about it. However, it would have to be the US to start the war, while the USSR will be defending peace. History will be the judge of our actions. The West has been saying that Khrushchev might

miscalculate.

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miscalculate. But ours is a joint account and each of us must see that there is no miscalculation. If the US wants to start a war over Germany let it be so; perhaps the USSR should sign a peace treaty right away and get over with it. This is what the Pentagon has been wanting. However, Adenauer and Macmillan know very well what war means. If there is any madman who wants war, he should be put in a straight jacket. Nations close to USSR territory know what war will mean for them. The USSR thinks of peace, of friendship, and it is happy with its trade relations with West Germany, France, Great Britain and Italy. It is not by accident that trade between the US and the USSR is still frozen but that is a problem for the US. So this is the Soviet position. The USSR will sign a peace treaty at the end of this year. Mr. Khrushchev concluded by saying that he was confident that common sense would win and peace will prevail.

The President said he recognized that the situation in Germany was abnormal. Germany is divided today. When President Roosevelt talked about the withdrawal of troops he was not able to foresee this situation or the fact that our two countries would be on different sides. The US does not want to precipitate a crisis; it is Mr. Khrushchev who wants to do so by seeking a change in the existing situation. The President then said the US was committed to this area long before he had assumed a position of high government responsibility. Now Mr. Khrushchev suggests a peace treaty at the end of the year, which would deny our rights in that city and our rights of access. Mr. Khrushchev knows very well that Berlin is much more than a city and yet he makes such a suggestion. Is that a way to secure peace?

Mr. Khrushchev replied he did not understand how the signing of a peace treaty could worsen the world situation. Peace is always regarded as something beneficial while the state of war is regarded as something evil.

The President said that the signing of a peace treaty is not a belligerent act. He had not indicated this at all. However, a peace treaty denying us our contractual rights is a belligerent act. The matter of a peace treaty with East Germany is a matter for Mr. Khrushchev's judgment, and is not a belligerent act. What is a belligerent act is transfer of our rights to East Germany. West Berlin is not important as a springboard. However, the US is committed to that area and it is so regarded by all the world. If we accepted Mr. Khrushchev's suggestion the world would lose confidence in the US and would not regard it as a serious country. It is an important strategic matter that the world believe the US is a serious country.

Mr. Khrushchev

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Mr. Khrushchev wondered what he should do in these circumstances. He said he believed that US intentions led to nothing good. The USSR would never, under any conditions, accept US rights in West Berlin after a peace treaty had been signed. He said he was absolutely convinced that the peoples of the world would understand such a position. Moreover, the US had deprived the USSR unilaterally of its rights and interests in West Germany, it had deprived the USSR of reparations in West Germany, and it had signed a unilateral peace treaty with Japan. As a result of this latter action the Soviet Union still has no peace treaty with Japan.

The President interjected that Mr. Khrushchev had said to President Eisenhower that he would have signed the treaty. Mr. Khrushchev confirmed this, while Mr. Gromyko said that the fact remained that the US had signed the Japanese peace treaty without the Soviet Union.

Mr. Khrushchev went on to say that the US regarded all this as appropriate, but now it says what the USSR wants to do is immoral. The USSR would like to do it together with the US, but if the US refuses to sign a peace treaty the USSR will do it alone. East Germany will obtain complete sovereignty and all obligations resulting from German surrender will be annulled. The factor of the USSR's prestige should be taken into account. What the US wants is to retain the rights gained after World War II even after a peace treaty had been signed. This is a policy of "I do what I want". The USSR regards East Germany as a completely sovereign state and it will sign a peace treaty with it. Responsibility for violation of that sovereignty will be heavy.

The President said that there is every evidence that our position in Berlin is strongly supported by the people there, and we are committed to that area. Mr. Khrushchev says that we are for a state of war. This is incorrect. It would be well if relations between East Germany and West Germany improved and if the development of US-USSR relations were such as to permit solution of the whole German problem. During his stay in office, Mr. Khrushchev has seen many changes, and changes will go on. But now he wants a peace treaty in six months, an action which would drive us out of Berlin. If we accepted such a proposition we would lose our ties in West Europe and would lose all our friends there. We do not wish to act in a way that would deprive the Soviet Union of its ties in Eastern Europe. Mr. Khrushchev had said that the President was a young man, but, the President continued, he had not assumed office to accept arrangements totally inimical to US interests. The President said he

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was prepared to discuss any problem but Mr. Khrushchev should take into account our interests just as he says we should take into account his views.

Mr. Khrushchev said that then an interim agreement should be concluded. However, no matter how long a time limit such an agreement were to provide for, the Germans would not agree because no one wishes reunification. An interim agreement would be a formal factor, it would give the semblance of the responsibility for the problem having been turned over to the Germans themselves. If the US does not wish such an arrangement there is no other way but to sign a peace treaty unilaterally. No one can force the US to sign a peace treaty but neither can the US make the Soviet Union accept its claims. Mr. Khrushchev then said that an aide-memoire on the Berlin question had been prepared so that the US could study the Soviet position and perhaps return to this question at a later date, if it wished to do so.

The group then moved to the dining room for lunch.

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V. G. G. G. G.

RP 6/10/43

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
(The President and Mr. K. alone)

1944/ 3356
The President opened the conversation by saying that he recognized the importance of Berlin and that he hoped that in the interest of the relations between our two countries, which he wanted to improve, Mr. K. will not present him with a situation ^{so deeply} involving our national interest. Of course he recognized that the decision on Berlin, as far as the USSR was concerned, was with the Chairman. The President continued by saying that evolution is taking place in many areas of the world and no one can predict which course it would take. Therefore it is most important that decisions be carefully considered. Obviously the Chairman will make his judgment in the light of what he understands to be the best interest of his country. However, the President said, he did want to stress the difference between a peace treaty and the rights of access to Berlin. He reiterated his hope that the relations between the two countries would develop in such a way that no direct contact or confrontation would occur between them.

Mr. K. said that he appreciated the frankness of the President's remarks but said that if the President insisted on U.S. rights after the signing of a peace treaty and that if the borders of the GDR-- land, air, or sea borders -- were violated, they would be defended.

Mr. K. said that the U.S. position is not based on juridical grounds. The U.S. wants to humiliate the USSR and this cannot be accepted. He said that he would not shirk his responsibility and would take any action that he is duty bound to take as Prime Minister. He said he would be glad if the U.S. were to agree to an interim agreement on German and Berlin with a time limit so that prestige and the interests of the two countries would not be involved or prejudiced.

However, he said he must warn the President that if he envisages



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- 2 -

any action that might bring about unhappy consequences, force would be met by force. The U.S. should prepare itself for that and the Soviet Union would do the same. The President enquired whether under an interim arrangement forces in Berlin would remain and access would be free. Mr. K. replied that that would be so for six months. In reply to the President's query whether the forces would then have to be withdrawn, the Chairman replied in the affirmative.

The President said that either Mr. K. did not believe that the U.S. was serious or the situation in that area was so unsatisfactory to the Soviet Union that it has to take this drastic action. The President said there were difficulties in this problem because he ~~had~~ was going to Macmillan and the latter would ask what had happened. The President said that he would have to say that he had gained the impression that the USSR was going to take this drastic action. The President said that he had come here to prevent a confrontation face to face between our two countries and that he regretted to leave Vienna with this impression.

Mr. K. said that in order to save prestige we could agree that token contingent of troops could be maintained in West Berlin, including Soviet troops. However, this would be not on the basis of some occupation rights, but on the basis of an agreement registered with the UN. Of course access would be subject to the GDR's jurisdiction because this is its prerogative. Mr. K. continued by saying that he wanted peace and that if the US wanted war, that was its problem. It is not the USSR that threatens with war, it is the US. The USSR will have no choice other than to accept the challenge; it must respond and it will respond. The calamities of a war will be shared equally.

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- 3 -

War will take place only if the US imposes it on the USSR. It is up to the US to decide whether there will be war or peace. This, he said, can be told Macmillan, De Gaulle and Adenauer. The decision to sign a peace treaty is firm and irrevocable and the Soviet Union will sign it in December if the US refuses an interim agreement.

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

EYES ONLY

Seen by Mr. P. S. Low

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Action
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Control: 1860
Rec'd: JUNE 2, 1961
10:09 PM

FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 9, JUNE 3, 1 AM (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

PRIORITY

EYES ONLY ACTING SECRETARY.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 92-394

By 1-8, NARA, Date 3-5-93

1004
1004
2587
FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY BASED ON UNCLEARED MEMORANDUM OF SECOND PART PRESIDENT'S FIFTH CONVERSATION WITH DE GAULLE, JUNE 2, 11:30 - 12:45, WITH ADVISERS PRESENT ON U.S. SIDE - SECRETARY, AMB GAVIN, BUNDY, BOHLEN, KOHLER, MCBRIDE; ON FRENCH SIDE - DEBRE, COUVE, ALPHAND, COURCEL, AND LUCET.

CONVERSATION WAS PRIMARILY SUMMATION BY DE GAULLE OF PREVIOUS PRIVATE TALKS WITH SOME ADDED INTERCHANGE ON NATO AND TRIPARTITE CONSULTATIONS.

BERLIN. DE GAULLE OPENED BY REVIEWING US-FRENCH AGREEMENT ON BERLIN. HE SAID PRES COULD TELL KHRUSHCHEV FRANCE IN FULL IN AGREEMENT THERE SHOULD BE NO MODIFICATION BERLIN STATUTE OR GERMAN QUESTION NOW. HE SAID TRIPARTITE MILITARY EXPERTS SHOULD COORDINATE ACTIVELY ON CONTINGENCY PLANNING.

LAOS. DE GAULLE THEN REVIEWED TALKS ON LAOS. HE REITERATED HE UNDERSTOOD US COMMITMENTS IN AREA AND SAID HE AGREED WITH PRESIDENT SITUATION ON GROUND BAD. IF US HONOR FORCES US TO INTERVENE IN LAOS FRENCH WILL NOT OPPOSE. NEITHER WILL FRENCH INTERVENE. PRESIDENT NOTED HE HAD STRESSED THAT WHILE HE UNDERSTOOD FRENCH POSITION HE HOPED IT COULD BE KEPT ENTIRELY PRIVATE. DE GAULLE CONCURRED. DE GAULLE

SAID

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~~SECRET~~

-2- SECTO 9, JUNE 3, 1 AM (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM PARIS

SAID WITH REGARD TO GENEVA CONF ON LAOS HE THOUGHT LEAST BAD POSSIBILITY WAS RETURN TO '54 AGREEMENTS. IN SO FAR AS THE LAO GOVT CONCERNED SOUVANNA PHOUMA SEEMED MOST QUALIFIED PERSON. PRESIDENT THOUGHT MILITARY SITUATION SO BAD THAT PERHAPS NOT EVEN SOUVANNA WAS POSSIBILITY. HE THOUGHT FRANCE COULD USE ITS INFLUENCE IN DESIRABLE SENSE WITH SOUVANNA. IN RESPONSE TO DE GAULLE'S QUESTION PRESIDENT SAID THERE WAS NO PRESENT PLAN FOR SOUVANNA TO GO TO WASHINGTON.

LATIN AMERICA. DE GAULLE REITERATED FRANCE CONSIDERED US HAS PREDOMINANT ROLE IN HEMISPHERE. HE REVIEWED UNFAVORABLE FACTORS IN LATIN AMERICA WHICH HE THOUGHT MADE IT INCUMBENT ON EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO ASSIST U.S. HE NOTED PRESIDENT HAD STRESSED EUROPEAN ROLE IN LATIN AMERICA AND ACCORDINGLY FRANCE WOULD DO WHAT SHE COULD IN CULTURAL, ECONOMIC AND EVEN POLITICAL SPHERE. HE REFERRED TO JULY OAS MEETING IN MONTEVIDEO AND SAID FRANCE WOULD ATTEND IF INVITED AND WOULD URGE U.K. AND OTHER MEMBERS OF SIX TO ATTEND ALSO. HE SAID MATTER WOULD BE PUT ON AGENDA SIX HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING.

CONGO AND ANGOLA. DE GAULLE NOTED THAT U.S. POLICY WAS STILL TO ACT VIA U.N. WHEREAS FRANCE CONSIDERED U.N. NEITHER EFFECTIVE NOR IMPARTIAL. HE NOTED SOME FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN CONGO AND SAID FRANCE WOULD ENCOURAGE KASAVUBU THROUGH HER AFRICAN FRIENDS. HE SAID HE WAS NOT OPPOSED TO U.S. POLICY IN THE CONGO.

DE GAULLE REVIEWED SERIOUSNESS; WITH WHICH BOTH HE AND PRESIDENT SAW ANGOLA SITUATION. GENERAL AGREED PORTUGUESE POLICY BEHIND THE TIMES AND THOUGHT THEY SHOULD TAKE MORE PROGRESSIVE LINE. HOWEVER PILLORYING THEM WOULD NOT HELP AND MIGHT CAUSE REVOLUTION IN PORTUGAL. IT WOULD BE

UNDESIRABLE

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-3- SECTO 9, JUNE 3, 1 AM (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM PARIS

UNDESIRABLE HAVE COMMUNIST STATE IN IZÉRIAN PENINSULA. HE SAID IN RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT'S REQUEST FRANCE WOULD ENCOURAGE PORTUGUESE TO TAKE CONSTRUCTIVE LINE. PRESIDENT CONCLUDED ON SUBJECT SAYING MILITARY MEANS ALONE INSUFFICIENT SETTLE ANGOLA QUESTION. HE THOUGHT BECAUSE OF FRENCH POSITION AFRICA, FRANCE COULD BE USEFUL WITH PORTUGUESE.

NATO AND TRIPARTITE CONSULTATIONS. DE GAULLE SAID HE HOPED HE HAD CLARIFIED FRENCH POSITION AND PRESIDENT HAD CERTAINLY CLARIFIED U.S. POSITION TO HIM. HE REITERATED HIS VIEWS RE CHANGES IN WORLD SITUATION SINCE NATO FOUNDED -- LOST U.S. NUCLEAR MONOPOLY AND RENASCENCE OF EUROPEAN STATES, ESPECIALLY FRANCE.

DE GAULLE SAID IT MATTERED NOT WHO HAD GROUND POWER SINCE SOVIETS AND U.S. COULD DESTROY EACH OTHER AND EITHER COULD DESTROY EUROPE. HE ADDED FRANCE WOULD HAVE A MODEST FORCE WHILE GERMANY AND ITALY COULD MAKE SUITABLE CONTRIBUTION ALSO THOUGH PRESUMABLY NOT IN NUCLEAR FIELD. FRANCE WANTS A PERSONALITY IN HER DEFENSE AND CAN NO LONGER BE SATISFIED WITH INTEGRATION. FRANCE WANTED NATIONAL DEFENSE POSTURE WITHIN ALLIANCE. HE WOULD NOT DEMOLISH NATO IN PRESENT CRISIS SITUATION BUT NATO CANNOT GO ON INDEFINITELY AS IT IS. THEREFORE HE WISHES REAFFIRM SITUATION.

GENERAL THEN REFERRED HIS DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT RE USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THERE WAS NECESSITY EUROPE SHOULD KNOW WHEN U.S. WOULD USE THESE WEAPONS. HE RECOGNIZED U.S. POSITION THAT WE WOULD USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FIRST IF SOVIETS WERE TO OVERRUN NATO FORCES IN EUROPE. HE SAID OF COURSE WE COULDN'T TELL AT PRECISELY WHICH POINT WE WOULD USE THESE WEAPONS AND REPEATED HE WOULD FEEL THIS WAY HIMSELF IF HE HAD SUCH WEAPONS.

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-4- SECTO 9, JUNE 3, 1 AM (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM PARIS

THE PRESIDENT REITERATED WEAPONS WOULD BE USED IF U.S. OR EUROPE IN SERIOUS DANGER OR IF OUR FORCES IN DANGER. HE NOTED CONTINGENCY PLANNING DID NOT NOW ENVISAGE USING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IF BERLIN BLOCKADED. HOWEVER IF BERLIN WERE SEIZED U.S. WOULD RESPOND WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS SINCE THIS WOULD CONSTITUTE ATTACK ON OUR FORCES IN EUROPE. PRESIDENT THOUGHT THIS QUITE PRECISE. DE GAULLE REFERRED TO POSSIBILITY OF EMPLOYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE ALONE AND DANGER THIS ENTAILED. HE SAID POSITION PRESIDENT HAD TAKEN WAS MOST IMPORTANT. THE GENERAL THEN INQUIRED AS TO WHAT TARGETS U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD HAVE. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT INCLUDED SOVIET UNION. DE GAULLE THEN REFERRED TO FACT U.S., U.K. AND FRANCE WERE ONLY POTENTIAL NATO NUCLEAR POWERS AND THAT THREE SHOULD PLAN USES OF THESE WEAPONS AMONG THEMSELVES. THIS SHOULD BE DONE ON WORLD-WIDE BASIS INCLUDING NOT ONLY EUROPE. IT WAS NOT NATO AFFAIR AND SOME DAY TRIPARTITE PLAN IN THIS FIELD SHOULD EXIST. HE REFERRED AGAIN TO HIS PLAN FOR A SMALL STANDING GROUP TO APPLY TRIPARTITE PLANNING. PRESIDENT SAID HE HAD ALREADY TOLD DE GAULLE IT WAS IMPORTANT CONSULT ON ALL MATTERS IN WHICH ALL THREE INVOLVED ALL OVER THE WORLD. IT WAS ALSO IMPORTANT NON-NUCLEAR NATO MEMBERS SHOULD HAVE SOME VOICE IN THEIR OWN SECURITY. HE THOUGHT CONSULTATION SHOULD COVER NOT ONLY NUCLEAR WARFARE BUT ALL SORTS OF PROBLEMS.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Control: 1817
Rec'd: JUNE 2, 1961
9:23 PM

Info

FROM: PARIS

004

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 9, JUNE 3, 1 AM (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

PRIORITY

EYES ONLY ACTING SECRETARY.

PRESIDENT STATED THAT HE WAS HEREBY EXTENDING TO DE GAULLE GUARANTEES WHICH HIS PREDECESSOR HAD GIVEN TO U.K. THAT FRANCE WOULD BE CONSULTED REGARDING USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD UNLESS THREAT ATTACK SO IMMINENT AS TO THREATEN OUR SURVIVAL. THE PRESIDENT ADDED PRESENT CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS NOT ENTIRELY SATISFACTORY. HE WILL NOMINATE OFFICIAL WHO CAN CONSULT WITH BRITISH AND FRENCH IN ORDER NATIONALIZE AGREEMENTS AND AT LEAST DEFINE PROMPTLY DISAGREEMENTS WHICH MAY EXIST. THIS WOULD INCLUDE CONSULTATION ON USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. MUCH WEIGHT WOULD BE GIVEN TO FRENCH AND BRITISH OPINION. FURTHERMORE, IF, FOLLOWING GERMAN ELECTIONS KHRUSHCHEV SHOULD PRESENT US WITH BERLIN CRISIS, WE SHOULD CONSIDER TRIPARTITE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING.

DE GAULLE SAID HE WAS VERY FAVORABLE PRESIDENT'S VIEW ON CONSULTATION AND PERMANENT CONTACT WITH THREE. OTHER NATIONS COULD BE CONSULTED ON MATTERS OF DIRECT INTEREST TO THEM. HOWEVER THE THREE HAVE WORLD-WIDE RESPONSIBILITY EVEN THOUGH THOSE OF U.S. MUCH GREATEST. HE THOUGHT CONSULTATION RE USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT. AND REITERATED HIS PROPOSAL FOR TRIPARTITE MILITARY GROUP FOR THIS PURPOSE ALONG LINES SIMILAR THOSE SUGGESTED BY PRESIDENT FOR POLITICAL QUESTIONS.

REFERRING

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-2- SECTO 9, JUNE 3, 1 AM (SECTION TWO OF TWO) FROM PARIS

REFERRING TO PLANS TO FURNISH POLARIS TO NATO, DE GAULLE SAID HE HAD NO OBJECTION BUT THIS OFFER DOESN'T CHANGE SITUATION FOR EUROPE SINCE NATURALLY ENOUGH THESE U.S. WEAPONS WOULD BE USED AS RESULT U.S. DECISION. IT WAS AGREED HAVE FURTHER MEETING FRIDAY AFTERNOON TO DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT AGAIN.

DE GAULLE CLOSED THIS MEETING WITH UNUSUALLY WARM TRIBUTE TO PRESIDENT AND TO UTILITY THEIR TALKS. HE CONCLUDED ON NOTE THAT NEVER HAD U.S. AND FRANCE HAD CLOSER COMMON DESTINY. PRESIDENT LIKewise PAID FROM TRIBUTE TO ENERGY AND VITALITY OF FRENCH AND TO HIS CONFIDENCE IN DE GAULLE.

RUSK

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

Approved by the White House,
6/23/61

DATE: June 4, 1961
Lunch
Soviet Embassy
Vienna

SUBJECT: Vienna Meeting Between The President
and Chairman Khrushchev.

PARTICIPANTS: Listed on Page 5.

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The Secretary
EUR - Mr. Kohler
Executive Secretariat-
Permanent Conference File

During lunch the following points of interest emerged:

1. Mr. Khrushchev said he had not had the good fortune of meeting Lenin.
2. Mr. Khrushchev referred to the obsolescence of naval surface ships such as cruisers and carriers. He said that the Soviet Union had switched to the production of submarines, particularly of submarines designed to combat other vessels. On the other hand, US submarines are designed to attack land masses. Of course, the USSR has such submarines too. Mr. Khrushchev then expressed the view that missiles are the God of War today and said that they had three types of missiles in production: short-range, medium-range, and inter-continental.
3. Mr. Khrushchev said he had heard that pressure was being brought to bear on the President to resume nuclear weapon tests. He said that he was under a similar pressure; however, the USSR will wait for the US to resume testing and if the US does resume the USSR will follow suit.
4. Mr. Khrushchev said he was placing certain restraints on projects for a flight to the moon. Such an operation is very

expensive

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

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By SKF NARA, Date 9/90

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NSA/187/USSR. KRUSHCHEV (sic) TALK (Minsk)

expensive and this may weaken Soviet defenses. Of course, Soviet scientists want to go to the moon, but the US should go first because it is rich and then the Soviet Union will follow.

5. In response to the President's inquiry whether perhaps a cooperative effort could be made in that direction, Mr. Khrushchev said that cooperation in outer space would be impossible as long as there was no disarmament. The reason for this is that rockets are used for both military and scientific purposes. The President said that perhaps coordination in timing of such efforts could be achieved in order to save money. This would not involve Soviet rockets. Mr. Khrushchev replied that this might be possible but noted that so far there had been few practical uses of outer space launchings. The race was costly and was primarily for prestige purposes.

6. Mr. Khrushchev said that he had read the President's defense message and that in reading it he had thought that perhaps the USSR should also increase its land forces and artillery. The President observed that the US was not planning to increase its armed forces except for 10,000 Marines to bring three Marine Corps divisions up to full strength.

7. During a brief discussion of the Laotian situation, Mr. Gromyko said that the difference between the Secretary and himself was that Mr. Rusk wanted the ICC to be free to go to any point in the country. On the other hand, the Soviet view is that the purpose of the ICC is to verify the cease-fire and that, therefore, the ICC should be allowed to go only to points along the front line where clashes occur.

8/ In his toast to the President, Mr. Khrushchev said that he was very happy to meet the President and to be able to exchange views with him. He said he preferred as much as possible to have personal contacts. This is always better than to act through even the best possible Ambassadors. He quoted a joke that natural love is better than love through interpreters. He said that he always preferred contacts and did not like to evade crucial issues. If leaders of states cannot resolve the most complex problems between themselves, how can officials at a lower level accomplish that task. This is why he prefers personal meetings, where he can listen to the position of the other side and set forth his own. He said he had heard the President's position and had set forth his own. At this time, apparently no understanding has been reached between the two sides. However, if people could resolve all difficult questions in their first meeting, no difficult questions would exist. Noting that he was speaking on behalf of the Soviet Government and on behalf of the USSR's friends in the Warsaw Pact who are interested in a

peace

treaty with Germany, Mr. Khrushchev said that he wanted to stress that they are for peace. The President might agree or disagree with this, but, Mr. Khrushchev said, he wanted to assure the President that the USSR's motives are sincere. He wanted the President to understand that when the USSR undertook this action, it would not be directed against the US or its allies. The Soviet Union wants to remove the roadblocks that stand in the way. This is a painful process and it is similar to a surgical operation. However, the USSR wants to cross that bridge and it will cross it. Evidently US-USSR relations will sustain great tensions as a result of that but, Mr. Khrushchev said, he is sure that the clouds will dissipate, the sun will come out again and will shine brightly. The US does not want Berlin, neither does the Soviet Union. It is true that US prestige is involved in this matter, but the only party really interested in Berlin as such is Adenauer. He is an intelligent man but old. The Soviet Union cannot agree to having the old and moribund hold back the young and vigorous. Strauss is the most aggressive-minded man in West Germany, but even a man like himself, whose mind is in the eclipse, can apparently see the light. On one occasion Strauss wisely admitted that he fully understood how greatly Germany would suffer in a new war and how complete its destruction would be. This was a very wise remark. So let us try to remove the seeds that engender conflicts. Mr. Khrushchev said that he understood the President's position was a difficult one; his allies may raise the question of why the US should be speaking on their behalf. However, the allies of the USSR feel the same and are jealous about their rights. Mr. Khrushchev said that he was sure that if a US ally like Luxembourg were to raise its voice, there would be no problem for the President. He said he did not wish to name some of his own allies who, if they were to raise a belligerent voice, would not frighten anyone. However, the situation would be quite different if our two countries were to clash. Mr. Khrushchev then raised his glass to the solution of these problems. The President is a religious man and would say that God should help us in this endeavor. For his part, Mr. Khrushchev said, he wanted common sense to help us find solutions to our problems.

9. In his reply, the President expressed his appreciation of this opportunity to meet the Chairman and said that the reason why he had been anxious to meet with him was that he felt that our two countries were strong and that our peoples wanted peace and continued progress toward a better life. He also felt that a meeting between the Chairman and himself would be in the interest of world relations generally. The President then said that while the talks had been wide-ranging, he appreciated the atmosphere in which they had taken place. As he had told Mr. Gromyko, his ambition was to prevent a direct confrontation between the US and the USSR in this era of evolution, the outcome of which we cannot foresee. Such a confrontation might endanger peace.

The President

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

The President said he had never underestimated the power of the USSR and he knew Mr. Khrushchev also realized that the US was a strong country. Both have vast supplies of destructive weapons. In the past, it was possible to fight wars without necessarily causing a lasting effect, but the effects of a modern war would go from generation to generation. Therefore, the President continued, both he and the Chairman have the special obligation of carrying out their responsibilities toward their peoples and their national interests in a way not endangering all. In other words, there should be a basic understanding of basic and secondary questions. For instance, Germany and its future is extremely important because of its geographic location. Each side should recognize the interests and responsibilities of the other side.

The President expressed the hope that he would not leave this meeting in Vienna, a city that is symbolic of the possibility of finding equitable solutions, with a problem involving national security and reputation. Although in other days people with similar responsibilities failed, the President said, he hoped that he and the Chairman would be able to succeed. This goal can be achieved only if each is wise and stays in his own area. The President concluded by recalling that last night he had asked Mr. Khrushchev what position he had occupied at the age of 44. The Chairman had replied that he was head of the Moscow Planning Commission and was looking forward to becoming Chairman. As far as he was concerned, the President said, he hoped to become at the age of 67 head of the Boston Planning Commission and perhaps National Chairman of the Democratic Party. Mr. Khrushchev interjected that perhaps the President would like to become head of the Planning Commission of the whole world. The President said no, only of the city of Boston.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

Approved by White House,
6/23/61DATE: June 4, 1961
3:15 P.M.
Soviet Embassy
ViennaSUBJECT: Vienna Meeting Between The President
And Chairman Khrushchev.PARTICIPANTS: The President
D - Mr. Akalovsky
(interpreting)Chairman Khrushchev
Mr. Sukhodrov, Interpreter,
USSR Ministry of Foreign
Affairs

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The Secretary
EUR - Mr. Kohler
Executive Secretariat, Permanent Conference File

After lunch, the President said he wanted to have a few words with the Chairman in private.

The President opened the conversation by saying that he recognized the importance of Berlin and that he hoped that in the interests of the relations between our two countries, which he wanted to improve, Mr. Khrushchev would not present him with a situation so deeply involving our national interest. Of course, he recognized that the decision on Berlin, as far as the USSR was concerned, was with the Chairman. The President continued by saying that evolution is taking place in many areas of the world and no one can predict which course it would take. Therefore, it is most important that decisions be carefully considered. Obviously the Chairman will make his judgment in the light of what he understands to be the best interests of his country. However, the President said, he did want to stress the difference between a peace treaty and the rights of access to Berlin. He reiterated his hope that the relations between the two countries would develop in a way that would avoid direct contact or confrontation between them.

Mr. Khrushchev said he appreciated the frankness of the President's remarks but said that if the President insisted on US borders for the signing of a peace treaty and that if the

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLK - 86-138 APPEAL

By SKF NARA, Date 9/90

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

borders

INFORMATION COPY

NSF/187/USSR. KRUSHCHEV (sic) talks (President)

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

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borders of the GDR -- land, air, or sea borders -- were violated, they would be defended. The US position is not based on juridical grounds. The US wants to humiliate the USSR and this cannot be accepted. He said that he would not shirk his responsibility and would take any action that he is duty bound to take as Prime Minister. He would be glad if the US were to agree to an interim agreement on Germany and Berlin with a time limit so that the prestige and the interests of the two countries would not be involved or prejudiced. However, he said, he must warn the President that if he envisages any action that might bring about unhappy consequences, force would be met by force. The US should prepare itself for that and the Soviet Union will do the same.

The President inquired whether under an interim arrangement forces in Berlin would remain and access would be free. Mr. Khrushchev replied that would be so for six months. In reply to the President's query whether the forces would then have to be withdrawn, the Chairman replied in the affirmative.

The President then said that either Mr. Khrushchev did not believe that the US was serious or the situation in that area was so unsatisfactory to the Soviet Union that it had to take this drastic action. The President referred to his forthcoming meeting with Macmillan and said the latter would ask what had happened. The President said that he would have to say that he had gained the impression that the USSR was presenting him with the alternative of accepting the Soviet act on Berlin or having a face to face confrontation. He had come here to prevent a confrontation between our two countries and he regretted to leave Vienna with this impression.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that in order to save prestige we could agree that token contingents of troops, including Soviet troops, could be maintained in West Berlin. However, this would be not on the basis of some occupation rights, but on the basis of an agreement registered with the UN. Of course, access would be subject to GDR's control because this is its prerogative. Mr. Khrushchev continued by saying that he wanted peace and that if the US wanted war, that was its problem. It is not the USSR that threatens with war, it is the US.

The President stressed that it was the Chairman, not he, who wanted to force a change.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that a peace treaty would not involve any change in boundaries. In any event, the USSR will have no choice other than to accept the challenge; it must respond and it will respond. The calamities of a war will be shared equally. War will take place only if the US imposes it on the

USSR.

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

INFORMATION COPY

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

-3-

USSR. It is up to the US to decide whether there will be war or peace. This, he said, can be told Macmillan, De Gaulle and Adenauer. The decision to sign a peace treaty is firm and irrevocable and the Soviet Union will sign it in December if the US refuses an interim agreement.

The President concluded the conversation by observing that it would be a cold winter.

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

INFORMATION COPY

6/9/61

~~SECRET~~

June 9, 1961

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: President's June 13 Meeting with Ambassador Finletter

1. Introduction. This meeting could usefully focus on two questions:

(a) U.S. policy toward NATO's military posture, -- to ensure that Washington and Paris are on the same wave length.

(b) Next steps in implementing that policy, concerning which decisions will soon be needed.

Each of these questions is discussed below.

2. U.S. Policy. The President might ask Mr. Acheson to run down the main military elements of approved NATO policy, to ensure that there is a clear and common understanding of these elements:


(a) Non-Nuclear. To prevent automatic escalation of any clash in Europe into nuclear war, we envisage qualitative improvements in presently programmed NATO non-nuclear forces. This will require increased emphasis on these forces, even though they are not to be expanded beyond presently contemplated goals.

(b) Nuclear. We will keep the nuclear capability now in Europe, and make such of the already approved additions to it as are politically required. We will also commit U.S. Polaris submarines to NATO and urge the British to commit their strategic forces. We will not otherwise enlarge the nuclear capability in Europe substantially.

(c) Control of Nuclear Weapons. On a technical level, the U.S. wants steps taken to ensure that nuclear weapons in Europe are not subject to unauthorized use. On a political level, the U.S. would welcome its allies' views as to how they might play a larger role in control of these weapons. It envisages the possibility of agreed principles to govern use of these weapons and of a small grouping of the North Atlantic Council to concert about the application of these principles to specific cases.

3. Next Steps. The North Atlantic Council is now discussing the new U.S. NATO policy, as presented by Ambassador Finletter. Meantime,

~~SECRET~~



6/9/61: RS: NAB: 6/11/61 - 6/30/61 - ORO: 6/20

a U.S. working group is being set up in Washington to spell out what the U.S. believes that policy means -- in terms of specific force goals.

There is no formal agreement as to where we go from there in the Council. State and Defense have been considering this question, and the President may wish to secure their views, as well as those of Ambassador Finletter, in the meeting.

Ambassador Finletter suggests in his May 29 letter to the President that a combined civil-military effort to shape NATO military programs is needed. There is a general consensus in Washington that the first major step in such an effort should be Council agreement on a fairly concrete directive to the NATO military commanders to prepare military programs consistent with the new NATO policy.

There is real uncertainty, however, as to whether the Council will be able to work out such a directive in any useful time period. There are two reasons for this:

1. Relations between General Norstad, Ambassador Finletter, and Mr. Stikker are increasingly strained. The General opposes the lower priority for NATO's nuclear build-up which Ambassador Finletter champions on behalf of the U.S.; and he is naturally resisting the efforts of Messrs Finletter and Stikker to achieve greater civilian control over NATO military planning. Messrs Finletter and Stikker differ among themselves as to where this civilian control should be located -- in the North Atlantic Council or the Secretary General's International Staff. No one of these three able and dedicated men has sufficient pre-eminence or prestige to exert leadership in the Alliance which the other two will follow. The resulting conflicts at NATO's summit makes it difficult to get on with constructive work.

2. Neither the Council nor the International Staff now have the analytical competence required to develop a meaningful directive to the NATO military commanders. The structural changes required to create that competence on a permanent basis could almost certainly not be agreed to in time to have the desired effect this year.

In the absence of a fairly specific Council directive to the NATO military commanders, the situation will be confused: The U.S. will have proposed a new policy, and the NATO commanders will be pressing programs which are unaffected by that policy. Council agreement on a bland set of general principles will, as Ambassador Finletter points out in his letter to the President, have little impact on what the military commanders actually do.

State and Defense have very recently discussed the following means of coping with this problem: Temporary (e.g., 2-3 months) appointment of a high level Special Assistant to the Secretary General, who would command the respect of Messrs Finletter, Norstad, and Stikker, (not only because of his eminence, but also because they would know he was not staying on). This Special Assistant would be charged with preparing, in the light of the policy discussions now going on in the Council, a fairly specific directive to the NATO military commanders which the Council could approve. That directive would define the general character, level, and purpose of needed forces; NATO commanders would then prepare specific programs to create such forces.

In executing the studies required to prepare such a directive, the Special Assistant could bring together a small staff on a temporary basis -- by borrowing people from existing military and civil staffs. The U.S. would supply this Special Assistant (as well as Ambassador Finletter) with the U.S. working group's conclusions concerning NATO force requirements -- for his private guidance.

This procedure would fulfill the purpose laid out by Ambassador Finletter in his letter to the President: a combined staff effort designed to produce a composite result which is militarily, fiscally, and politically sound.

It would not, of course, create the permanent institutional arrangement that Mr. Finletter is looking for. After the Special Assistant withdrew, however, consideration could be given to setting up a more lasting means of carrying out the functions that he had performed. Experience would have been gained which would be useful in determining what those means should be.

State and/or Defense may surface these thoughts if the President encourages discussion of next steps in NATO at his meeting with Ambassador Finletter. The Ambassador's enthusiasm for such arrangements may naturally be restrained, since the Special Assistant would not be working directly for him; but he would be more likely to accede with good grace in a meeting with the President than otherwise.

DCA

June 28, 1961.

My dear Chancellor:

Your kind letter to me, written not long after your return from your American visit, has gone too long unanswered. I am taking advantage of Ambassador Grewe's return to send this note to you by him.

May I say first of all that I hope that it finds you in the robust health and fine spirits in which you were on that memorable Sunday when I had such a delightful day with you. I think of it often and always with the greatest pleasure. Everything combined to make it a perfect day -- the beauty of the countryside, the opportunity to be with you for so long a time and in so relaxed an atmosphere, and, finally, your dazzling prowess at boccie.

I hope, too, that, as appears from this distance, the political trend in the Federal Republic is building up more and more in your favor. I have never held the view that it is wrong for a foreigner to have strong preferences among the parties and personalities of another country, although I have been keenly aware of how unwise it is to have this appear publicly. So I say in privacy to you that I am hoping fervently for your success.

His Excellency
Konrad Adenauer,
Chancellor of the
Federal Republic of Germany,
Bonn, Germany.

Re: (Yale) Box 1, Folder 6

The international scene is a disturbing one. This Administration inherited unhappy situations in Laos and in Cuba and has not improved them. The virus seems to be spreading in Latin America and quite probably in South East Asia also.

And then there is Berlin, a situation which seems to me fraught with the gravest dangers. I should think it right that war over Berlin is the last thing that Khrushchev wants. But I think also that his appraisal of American resolution -- and I hope of allied resolution -- is quite wrong and that, if things are allowed to drift, it is more likely than not that he may produce a clash which could escalate into the war which he does not want.

The problem is how to change this situation. I do not think that it can be done by talk, and I see little possibility that in his present state of mind negotiations with Khrushchev can be productive. The task, therefore, is to change his state of mind. It seems to me that one important way of doing this is to translate allied firmness from declarations and communiques into a military posture which reflects its determination.

If this is to be done, I should strongly urge that it be done in an undramatic and quiet way, accompanied by constant education about the nature of the issue and a willingness to discuss with the Soviet Union anything except the basic and non-negotiable rights and interests of the allies. I think that this could and should be done in such a way as not to impair your situation in any way.

It would seem to me certainly true that the more drastic steps which might be taken would be much more useful if taken later on as the crisis deepens, rather than too early. There is, however, the greatest need for allied unity in the face of Khrushchev's threats. Why he has gone as far as he has is hard to see. He appears to believe so strongly in the weakness of the West that he goes very far in limiting his own freedom of maneuver. This creates a most dangerous situation, but one from which we should not recoil.

Since for so long our thoughts have run in parallel, I have the strong hope and belief that what I have said is in accord with your own judgment. I hope also that President Kennedy will think along these lines. Doubtless our government and yours will maintain close contact on this important matter and will exchange views and, I hope, reach agreements through the appropriate channels. In the meantime, I share my thoughts with you, as I have for so long.

I also send my warmest greetings and very best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Dean Acheson

NLH-77-548

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

NSC letter, 12/20/77

By JK NARS, Date 1/5/78

7/10 sent copy to Mrs. Lincoln for JFK file

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SANITIZED COPY

Discussion at NSC meeting June 29, 1961

1. The meeting began with a discussion of security control of documents of high sensitivity. The President expressed his great concern about leaks of information which had already occurred with respect to Berlin planning, and expressed his displeasure at the number of copies of the Acheson report in circulation. After some discussion he directed that the matter of circulation of such documents be reviewed by the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of CIA, and Mr. Bundy.

The President made it clear that he was speaking not of ordinary documents relating to ordinary problems, but to such unusually sensitive papers as, for example, the Acheson report and the record of his conversation with Khrushchev.

2. Kuwait - The Secretary of State opened a discussion of Kuwait by saying that the situation was critical and that decisions might be called for soon.

There was a brief but careful discussion in which the great interests of the West in Kuwait were noted, and there was concurrence in the view that the Secretary of State could give reassurance to Lord Home on both points.

3. Berlin - The Secretary of State gave a summary account of the current state of the Department's work on the aide memoire, on briefing books and on international and other immediate aspects of Berlin planning. He then asked Mr. Acheson to discuss his report. Mr. Acheson did just that. In addition, the following significant comments were made by Mr. Acheson: he gave special emphasis to the idea of the trust of Berlin and the peace which exists there, and argued that the real themes should be that Khrushchev is a false trustee and a war monger, and these themes should be hammered home.

The President asked whether really it was to our advantage to press the argument for unification, feeling that our position lacks appeal. Mr. Acheson argued that this position should not be abandoned but he did not wholly convert the President until the Secretary of State reminded him that self-determination is a better ground than unification, a position Mr. Acheson cheerfully accepted.

The President asked about the value of a plebiscite in Berlin and after general agreement that such a plebiscite would be useful, the Department of State was asked to concert a plan for discussion of such an enterprise with the Germans in appropriate ways, since the initiative ought to come from them.

The President questioned Mr. Acheson about the reciprocal effect of military build-ups on each side. Mr. Acheson agreed that this is a most important point and that planning should be so arranged as to avoid such back and forth challenges as far as possible.

Mr. Acheson made clear his own doubt that interference with civilian traffic will be an early step by the Soviets. Mr. Dillon later noted that in earlier Berlin planning this interference had been rated as a very grave danger and asked what Mr. Acheson's specific recommendation was in such a case. Mr. Acheson, reiterating his feeling that the Russian's own propaganda made such a move difficult now, said that in the event that such an interference did occur, he would propose an attempt at air lift and a prompt resort to other measures described in his report.

Admiral Burke made plain his opposition to the scale of the "probe" recommended by Mr. Acheson and his opposition also to an airlift unconnected with a probe. In reply to the first point, Mr. Acheson emphasized his belief that

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hidden
can't convince the enemy that they are not strong enough to
use weapons will be used

The President noted the difficulty of sustaining a strong political posture and posed the question, as an example, of finding the right answer if Khrushchev proposes a Summit this summer. Mr. Acheson, remarking that it is hard to answer any specific proposal ahead of time, nevertheless believed that it would not be hard to find answers as we go along. In reply to a summit proposal, for example, the President could readily suggest that

conversations be undertaken first at a lower level. Mr. Acheson believed that there were plenty of "elderly unemployed" people like himself who could be sent to interminable meetings. He thought it important to understand that we could converse indefinitely without negotiating at all, and he asserted that he could readily do this himself for three months on end.

Mr. Dillon raised the question of possible domestic economic effects of a mounting crisis and of a possible need for legislation to give the President necessary powers. In reply the President asked him to assume the leadership of a study of this problem.

It was decided not to make substantive decisions on the basis of this first discussion, and the President directed Mr. Bundy, in consultation with Mr. Kohler and others, to prepare a list of departmental assignments which might be carried forward in preparation for further discussion and appropriate decision in two weeks.

4. Laos - The Secretary of State presented an outline of the current situation in Laos, closely following a memorandum sent over from the Department of State. It was agreed that appropriate encouragement should be given to Phoumi and that he should be given to understand that there are points at which the United States will intervene to prevent a Communist Laos this summer. On the other hand, these points must be measured and decided by the United States and not by Phoumi, and accordingly, careful instructions will need to be sent to Ambassador Brown, and Phoumi must be encouraged to stay in close touch with the Ambassador. There was also agreement that efforts should be made to improve our communication and understanding with Souvanna, and in particular General Gavin is to be instructed to press him again in this direction.